Americans for South African Resistance, 25 June 1982

I was very pleased to receive the invitation to make statement to the

Special Committee against Apartheid on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the

beginning of the Defiance Campaign against Unjust Laws of South Africa, sponsored by the

African National Congress. This Campaign was a very important development in the struggle

against apartheid and white domination in South Africa. But it had a great significance to

me personally in spite of the fact that I was removed from the scene of the struggle by

thousands of miles. It was through this Campaign that I became involved in support of the

liberation struggle in Africa, a development quite unexpected, which was to be a

dominating factor in my life for years to come. So, what I would like to do in this

statement is to make a personalised narrative of the effect of the Defiance Campaign in

South Africa seen from many miles away, as well as to indicate its effect on the lives of

some of us in the United States.

I first heard about plans for the Defiance Campaign when a long-time

friend of mine, Bill Sutherland, returned from a trip to London in early 1952 with the

news that a non-violent civil disobedience campaign against racist laws was to take place

in South Africa soon. As believers in non-violence and as staunch and active opponents of

racism, we felt we should do something to support the campaign. We contacted the ANC in

Johannesburg and I opened up a correspondence in early 1952 which grew steadily over the

next several months. The Joint Secretaries of the Campaign were Walter M. Sisulu, the

Secretary General of the African National Congress, and Yusuf A. Cachalia,

Secretary-General of the South African Indian Congress. I wrote to them on CORE letterhead

and Sisulu replied on 26 March: "Your letter of the 17th of March has been a source

of great inspiration to me. I am very delighted to learn that your organisation (CORE) has

taken such a great interest in the struggle for fundamental human rights by my

organization."

Up to this time I had very rudimentary knowledge about South Africa. My

organisational experience was in the United States working with the peace and civil rights

movements. I knew something about the brand of racist laws called apartheid, and about

Gandhi`s non-violent campaigns at the turn of the century. I, of course, had read Alan

Paton`s Cry the Beloved Country. So, I had to learn a great deal about South Africa

quite rapidly.

Through correspondence with Sisulu and Cachalia and by reading the

memoranda which began coming to me from the movement in South Africa, I saw the plan for

the Campaign develop. The first joint meeting to lay the foundation for the effort took

place on July 29, 1951, at the invitation of the ANC. At that time the organisations

involved committed themselves to "declare war" on apartheid laws such as the

pass laws, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Suppression

of Communism Act, the Bantu Authorities Act. Cachalia wrote me that in January 1952 the

ANC had written to Prime Minister Malan demanding the repeal of certain apartheid laws,

failing which mass action against racist laws would begin. Malan responded with the threat

that "the government will make full use of the machinery at its disposal to quell any

disturbances". In the same communication the Prime Minister made the statement, often

quoted since, which reflects the essence of the white supremacist position: "It is

self-contradictory to claim as the inherent right of the Bantu, who differ in many ways

from Europeans, that they should be regarded as not different, especially when it is borne

in mind that these differences are permanent and not man-made."

The kickoff for the campaign was originally scheduled for April 6, 1952,

Van Riebeeck Day, the 300th anniversary of the coming of the white man to South Africa. It

also happened to be Palm Sunday. The European community planned large demonstrations and

celebrations for the occasion. It was a natural for black opposition demonstrations. But

the Joint Action Committee apparently did not feel quite ready for the inauguration of the

full effort. Sisulu wrote to me that "on the 6th of April we shall only have meetings

and demonstrations and a pledge shall be taken. Thereafter the Executive will fix the date

for the Defiance of Unjust Laws." Sisulu also said, "We need money for

propaganda, to assist some of the needy families, those people who are going to court and

imprisonment."

We in New York were deeply impressed by the plan to keep the campaign

nonviolent. Sisulu had written me in late March 1952 that he had just returned from a tour

of Natal, the Orange Free State, Zululand, and the Transvaal and was satisfied with the

response of the people. "We have made emphasis on a nonviolent approach; having

judged my people from the strike of 1950, they will certainly behave well."

In the meantime I had begun a correspondence with Professor Z.K. Matthews,

the President of the Cape Province branch of the ANC and the head of African Studies at

the only university-level school for Africans in South Africa, the University College of

Fort Hare. In the near future he was to come again to New York as a visiting professor at

Union Theological Seminary in New York where I became well acquainted with him. Referring

to the tactic of nonviolence in the campaign he said: "We take great comfort from the

fact that Gandhism was born on South African soil. Through these same means India was able

to achieve a tremendous upsurge of consciousness of destiny among the people of

India."

At about this time I began a correspondence also with Manilal Gandhi. He

was one of the sons of Mahatma Gandhi and he made his home at the Phoenix Settlement that

his father had started in Natal fifty years or so earlier. Manilal was still editing the

publication, Indian Opinion, also started by his father. I began the correspondence

with Gandhi in early 1952. He wrote me in March saying that he was a "bit doubtful to

what extent our struggle is going to remain nonviolent."

At the time he wrote this letter, Manilal Gandhi had already started a

21-day fast which he began on 7 March. But he advised us that we "should certainly

give our sympathy and moral support to the cause and watch how things go."

In New York we felt we had enough information about the campaign to make a

decision on what we ought to do. We decided to set up an ad hoc support group for

the campaign and adopted the name Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR).

Our task, as we conceived it, was to be a vehicle for information about

the Campaign and to raise funds. The National Action Committee in South Africa was calling

for one million shillings by the end of March. We decided we would do what we could, but

over a longer period of time, for we had no funds and were just getting organised. Our

first public activity was a mass meeting planned for 6 April in solidarity with the ANC

and the SAIC of South Africa. While the white South Africans, particularly the Afrikaners,

had their solemn celebrations commemorating the coming of the Dutch in 1652, and the

blacks had their mass protest gatherings in major centers of South Africa, we launched our

own effort in New York. Through mailings and the mass distribution of throw-away leaflets

we called on people to join us on 6 April "to support the drive against Jim Crow in

South Africa." "Use Palm Sunday to help Africans get freedom", another

leaflet was headlined. "Show the world we oppose Jim Crow abroad as well as at

home". Not surprisingly, our language was in the American idiom.

About 800 people attended our meeting held at Abyssinian Baptist Church in

Harlem where Adam Clayton Powell was minister. Speakers were Powell, Canada Lee who had

starred in the movie version of "Cry, the Beloved Country", Vithal Babu,

Secretary of the Indian Congress Parliamentary Party in New Delhi, who was briefly in New

York, and Donald Harrington, minister of the Community Church. The resolution of support

for the South African Campaign, passed by acclamation at the meeting, was sent to the

Joint Action Committee in South Africa, Prime Minister Nehru in India, Manilal Gandhi,

President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. With our note to Walter Sisulu we

sent our first check of $300 collected at the meeting to support the campaign.

The meeting was followed by a motorcade of cars with protest banners

floating alongside from Harlem down to the South African Consulate at 65th and Madison.

The motorcade was impressive and covered many blocks. I had written to the South African

Consul-General asking for a discussion with him on behalf of Americans for South African

Resistance even though it was a Sunday afternoon. He responded diplomatically that such a

meeting would serve no useful purpose. He put us off by saying that if we wanted more

information, not he, but the South African Information Office was the place for us to go.

My correspondence with key leaders in the Defiance Campaign, plus our

April 6th demonstration in New York, helped to establish us as serious supporters of the

effort.

On 18 June, only a few days before the campaign of civil disobedience was

to begin, Sisulu wrote me asking specific help. He said that they were having increasing

difficulty in using normal channels for dissemination of news of the movement. He then

said: "In addressing this letter to you, we are considering whether we could not

enlist your valuable support in assisting us in publicising our statements, bulletins,

photographs and other propaganda material....You will realise in this way you will at the

same time save us a large amount of financial expenditure which is naturally difficult for

us to outlay".

We were honoured to be accepted in this collaborative manner and eagerly

took on the responsibility. I was informed by Cachalia that Professor Z.K. Matthews was

coming to New York with a letter of introduction to me and that he would be our best

source of information about the unfolding campaign.

The civil disobedience began on 26 June. A group of 52 were arrested at

the Boksburg "Native" Location, 20 miles from Johannesburg. Led by Nana Sita,

the president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, they had broken the law by trying to enter

the Location without a pass giving them permission. A second group were arrested in

Johannesburg at 11.30 p.m. for defying the curfew regulations. This was led by Flag

Boshielo of the ANC who said to the police: "We are nonviolent fighters for freedom.

We are going to defy regulations that have kept our fathers in bondage." I received

Bulletin 2 of the National Action Committee for the Defiance Campaign soon afterward and

it reported that volunteers in the campaign broke apartheid laws in six different centres

in the Union. The organised acts of defiance were preceded by great mass meetings. There

were mass prayer meetings in Port Elizabeth, Durban, Johannesburg (in the Orlando

Township) and in Cape Town.

Both Sisulu and Cachalia were arrested on 26 June. Nelson Mandela, who was

the Volunteer-in-Chief for the campaign and the president of the ANC Youth League, was

arrested the evening of 26 June. Other leaders of the ANC and SAIC were arrested within a

few days, including Dr. Dadoo, president of the Indian Congress, Moses Kotane of the

National Executive of the ANC, and J.B. Marks, president of the African Mineworkers`

Union.

The trial of the group arrested at Boksburg did not come up for nearly

four weeks and they were held in jail. They all pled guilty for not producing passes and

were given seven days in jail or one pound fine. The magistrate said he was taking into

account the time they already spent behind bars in sentencing them. Only one paid the

fine. At the time of the trial the court and the yard outside were filled with African and

Indian spectators and demonstrators, most of them wearing the black, yellow and green

armbands of the ANC and giving the thumbs-up Congress salute. As the trial ended the crowd

left singing "Mayibuye Afrika" (God Bless Africa).

Dadoo, Kotane, and Marks were given four to six months in jail under the

Suppression of Communism Act. In their case the magistrate said: "It is common

knowledge that one of the aims of communism is to break down race barriers and strive for

equal rights for all sections of the people and to do so without any discrimination of

race, colour or creed... The Union of South Africa, with its peculiar problems created by

a population overwhelmingly non-European, is fertile ground for the dissemination of

communist propaganda. This would endanger the survival of Europeans. Therefore legislation

must be pursued with the object of suppressing communism." It was this kind of

mentality that made us discount the charge of communist influence in the movement.

Opposition to apartheid and the support of communism were made synonymous. By this

definition we were all communists.

Our sources of information about the Campaign were several - the bulletins

arriving from South Africa, continued correspondence, some press reports in American

papers such as the New York Times, but most important was Prof. Z. K. Matthews. He

arrived in New York in late June 1952 to take up his position as the Henry Luce Visiting

Professor of World Christianity at Union Theological Seminary, a post which was to

continue for one year. I made contact very soon with Matthews and we saw each other

frequently. He shared the stream of information coming to him from South Africa, most

important of which were communications from his son Joe. Joe was a young lawyer with an

office in Port Elizabeth, one of the most active centres of the Campaign. He was also one

of the leaders of both the Youth League and the ANC. So the information we received was

from the inside. With this kind of data we began to issue bulletins at least once a month

about the progress of the Campaign. The information coming from Matthews was treated

anonymously. We put out 18 or 20 AFSAR Bulletins in the 1952-53 year, and our mailing list

grew modestly but steadily.

One of the letters from Joe Matthews to his father in early September

reported that in Grahamstown in the Cape Province the people forced the City Council to

close down the beer hall in the African location. He wrote: "For days the people

stood in front of the beer hall praying and singing the African National Anthem until the

place was shut up. It was built at a cost of £8,000 and brought the Municipal Council a

revenue of £240 a week. That is one of the good by-products of the campaign: it has dealt

a death blow to hooliganism and drunkenness...."

This same communication reported that the biggest demonstration of the

Campaign took place on 26 August in Johannesburg against the arrest of ANC leaders. The

courts were jammed with 2,000 people inside the building and thousands more gathered in

the open square outside at a rally which lasted until dark." An unprecedented event

took place when the court adjourned for fifteen minutes to allow Dr. Moroka (President of

ANC and himself on trial), at the request of the prosecutor, to address the people. Amid

shouts of "Afrika", Dr Moroka stood on a chair and asked the people to

leave the building quietly so that the case could continue. They left immediately in

perfect silence.

Subsequently Dr. Moroka and 19 others were found guilty under the

Suppression of Communism Act and were sentenced to 9 months in prison at compulsory

labour, suspended for 2 years.

I received a letter from Sisulu written on 16 September urging us to do

what we could to send funds. "We need plenty of funds as you can see" he wrote.

"Our budget is becoming bigger every month". We were greatly limited in what we

could do. We were certainly not professional fund raisers. I suppose our mailing list was

something less than 1000. There was a growing edge to American interest in South Africa

and in the Campaign, but among a pretty select group. Nevertheless some established

groups, such as local and national church bodies, put the issue on their agendas. In

Boston a local group calling itself Bostonions Allied for South African Resistance

(BAFSAR) voluntarily affiliated with us. They sponsored public meetings, carried and

promoted literature, mostly supplied by our New York office, and raised some funds. At one

time in early 1953 we received about $700 for the campaign through the efforts of this

group.

We probably did not send as much as $5,000 to South Africa for the

duration of the Campaign. Much of it was sent through Z. K. Matthews. But there was a

sense of excitement about the support we received. Contributions came from all parts of

the US, including Hawaii, from Canada and India. A woman in Arizona sent us her diamond

ring saying she could not conscientiously wear it knowing that it represented slave

labour. We sold it and sent the proceeds to South Africa. A family in Ohio contributed

$100 at Christmastime and said it represented funds they had saved for family gifts. A

group at a theological seminary sent funds saved by eating sacrificial meals, and a person

who refused to pay federal tax for military purposes sent $100 saved in this way. Thus we

began to get some following around the country.

In 1952 the General Assembly of the United Nations began its session in

October. Spurred by the Defiance Campaign, India took the lead in calling for an agenda

item which for the first time would deal with the whole racial conflict in South Africa.

Up to that time the only items related to South Africa dealt with the treatment of people

of Indian and Pakistani origin and the question of Namibia, then called South West Africa.

A cross-section of Asian countries supported India`s lead. The item was assigned to the Ad

Hoc Political Committee whose chairman was Ambassador Alexis Kyrou of Greece. Asian

and African delegates were interested in having Z.K. Matthews give expert testimony to the

Committee relevant to its consideration of the issue. No one could have spoken with

greater authority. Today, hearing expert testimony before the appropriate committee of the

U.N. is accepted procedure, but in 1952, when the U.N. was looked upon as something of a

Western club, it was not. AFSAR helped organise a letter-writing campaign to the U.N. and

the U.S. Mission to the U.N. seeking approval for Matthews` appearance. Among the

distinguished Americans who wrote on behalf of Matthews was Harry Emerson Fosdick,

minister of the prestigious Riverside Church in New York, who wrote to Ambassador Kyrou

and Henry Cabot Lodge at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. A reply came from Charles E. Allen,

Director of the Office of Public Affairs at the U.S. Mission, explaining diplomatically

that to allow petitioners to appear before the U.N. "would involve radical changes in

the structures and procedures of the U.N." The function of the U.N., Fosdick was

told, was to reconcile judgements and policies of governments, not to function as

fact-finding agencies. The U.S. made clear it would vote against Matthews` appearance.

I recall a visit to Matthews` apartment in McGiffert Hall of Union

Seminary at about this time. As I entered the apartment, two gentlemen were just leaving.

After they departed, Z. K. Matthews said, "Do you know who those men are?" I

didn`t, so he explained, "They were from the U.S. State Department and came here to

urge me not to insist on speaking at the U.N. If I did the U.S. would have to vote against

me." The U.N., dominated at that time by the U.S., did not approve Matthews` request.

A crisis arose for the Defiance Campaign in October and November of 1952

when riots broke out, centred in the Eastern Cape Province, especially in Port Elizabeth

and East London. We had word from a number of sources, including Manilal Gandhi and

Quintin Whyte, the Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, that the

riots were quite separate from the Campaign although the government tried to associate

them.

The information which came through Z.K. Matthews was that in East London

Africans had been given permission to hold an open air religious service in the African

location. The preacher was reading about the oppression of the Israelites from the Bible

to about 200 people. Two vehicles loaded with armed police drove up. The policeman in

charge ordered the crowd to disperse within five minutes. The meeting immediately broke

up, but in less than two minutes the police ordered a baton charge. Before the crowd could

get out of the square, shots were fired and a man was killed. The police then drove in

their vehicles through the streets of the Location, firing at random. One man was killed

while sitting in his kitchen reading a newspaper. The rioting started after this, first

with stone throwing and later with setting fire to buildings. Altogether 13 people were

killed and at least 50 injured.

The net result from the riots was that the government cracked down on all

organised protests. Quintin Whyte wrote, "While we must distinguish between the

Campaign and the riots, nevertheless the state of tension is very high. There has been a

marked hardening against liberals in the country."

Whyte`s letter to me of November 14, 1952, was an important assessment of

the Campaign. He said the Campaign "is training heroes and martyrs as well as leaders

for future work." He spoke of the "remarkable self-control of the

resisters." In a summary sentence he said the effect of the campaign is "to

unite non-Europeans to give expression to African nationalism; to train for the future; to

demonstrate the power of Africans; to make Europeans question themselves; to make the

government more adamant; to make liberal Europeans more unpopular; and in the long run to

gain concessions."

The discipline of the volunteers in the Campaign began to win new

adherents and to gain the sympathy of some who had been sceptical about the degree to

which nonviolence would be followed.

On 8 December, international publicity was given to the arrest of Patrick

Duncan and Manilal Gandhi as part of a group that violated the law by going into the

Germiston Location near Johannesburg without passes. Duncan was the first white man to be

arrested. He attracted special attention because he was the son of a former Governor

General of South Africa. Further, he was on crutches at the time of his arrest as a result

of a motor accident.

Duncan was sentenced to 100 days in jail or $280 fine. Gandhi was given a

50 day sentence or $140 fine. Both chose to serve the sentences.

Up to December 16, 1952, the total number arrested in the Campaign was

8,057, of which 5,719 were in the Eastern Cape, 423 in Western Cape, 1,411 in Transvaal,

246 in Natal and 258 in the Orange Free State.

The government was bound to respond to the growing impact of the Campaign

with severe measures, and it did so toward the end of 1952. It passed the Public Safety

Act and the Criminal Laws amendment Act. Dr. R. T. Bokwe, the brother-in-law of Z.K.

Matthews, wrote to me on 30 December saying that no meetings of more than ten people were

allowed in African locations or reserves. Practically all African leaders, including

himself, had been served letters from the Minister of Justice forbidding them from

attending gatherings. He told me that he could not even attend a church service.

A so-called "Whipping Post Law" was passed under which anyone

who received funds for any organised resistance to laws of the Union was punishable by

five years imprisonment, £500 fine, and 15 lashes with the cane.

With these developments we in New York were hesitant to send more funds. I

wrote to Dr. Bokwe, who had been recipient of a good portion of the several thousand

dollars we sent to South Africa: "We have not wanted to send any further money until

we knew whether you or any others might be placed in jeopardy. Do you have any advice for

us in this regard?" Previous letters from Bokwe had informed us that our donations

had, in some cases, paid fines for resisters who had become ill in jail, and had helped

families whose breadwinners were out of circulation for a period of time. The fact is that

after the government passed this new legislation, the Defiance Campaign came to a halt and

the work of AFSAR had to change. We wrote to our supporters in our bulletin of April 14,

1953, that we had not sent any funds recently "because we are awaiting clarification

of the `Whipping Post Law.`" Bokwe wrote me on March 22, 1953, saying he had received

our contribution of 13 February and then added: "We have good reason to believe that

mail is subjected to scrutiny. One is thus unable to write you as freely as one should

have liked to".

By this time I had developed a keen interest in South Africa and felt

involved. I was more than casually interested in the election of Chief Albert J. Luthuli

to the presidency of the ANC at their December 1952 Congress, replacing Dr. Moroka. I

opened up a correspondence with Luthuli. I found out that until November 11, 1952, he had

been Chief of the Groutville Mission Reserve for seventeen years, having been elected to

the post by the people. He was told by the South African Government that he would have to

choose between his chieftancy and his work with the ANC. He unhesitatingly chose the ANC.

The government deposed him.

Activities of AFSAR apparently attracted some attention in South African

government circles. Arthur Blaxall sent me a clipping from a newspaper in South Africa in

which Eric Louw, then Minister of Economic Affairs, later Foreign Minister, called

attention to support which AFSAR was giving to the Campaign and to the relief of those

arrested.

On April 15, 1953, elections (for whites) were held in South Africa, the

first since the Nationalists came to power in 1948. They strengthened their hold on the

government by increasing their majority in parliament. Apartheid was extended also. The

Population Registration Act was passed, requiring all people in South Africa to register

with the government by race. Plans were laid for eliminating Sophiatown, an area of the

city where Africans could own land, and creating the area now called Soweto.

The Defiance Campaign came to an end. We in AFSAR had a series of meetings

to decide whether we should disband, set up a more permanent organisation dealing with

South Africa or establish something even broader. We decided on the third course. Thus

AFSAR was transformed into an organisation which would relate to the whole anti-colonial

struggle in Africa. The name chosen for this new entity was the American Committee on

Africa. [Transcribed from tape.