



RESTRUCTURING THE APARTHEID CITY


Cato Manor – ‘A Prime Urban Reconstruction Opportunity’?

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As the democratic initiatives of the early 1990s gained momentum, urban planners in South Africa attempted to reconstruct apartheid cities by pursuing initiatives to reverse the effects of racial planning. These initiatives included, *inter alia*, increasing residential densities in the core city, promoting infill on pockets of vacant land which served as buffer zones to segregate racial groups, and upgrading crowded townships and hostels. Great emphasis has been placed on restructuring the inner city in the post-apartheid era so that there would be desegregation and integration (Dewar and Uytendogaart 1991; Hindson, Mabin and Watson 1992).

In this regard the urban development strategy of the Government of National Unity aims to integrate segregated cities by concentrating on rebuilding the townships, creating employment opportunities, providing housing and urban amenities, reducing commuting distances, ‘facilitating better use of under utilised or vacant land’, and introducing urban management policies which are environmentally sensitive (*Government Gazette* 16679, 1995:10). The intention is to ensure that the resources of the built environment are used efficiently in targeting the needs of the urban poor so that they become economically productive and contribute to the growth of the city as a whole.

It is against this background that Cato Manor in the city of Durban was identified for urban reconstruction and development, with promising prospects for economic opportunities for the historically disadvantaged who had experienced the worst impact of apartheid policies. Cato Manor ‘is an evocative name in the province of Natal, and has powerful connotations with the history of the dispossessed in South Africa’ (Maharaj 1994:3). It has been described as ‘one of the uglier of the urban scabs caused by apartheid’ (*Daily News* 25 April 1997). The redevelopment of Cato Manor was looked upon with hope by most of the people living in the area and those who had been victims of the Group Areas Act, as it represented the ‘country’s prime urban reconstruction opportunity’ (CMDA 1995:2). The importance of Cato Manor



Source: Adapted from undated CMDA map

Greater Cato Manor Structure Plan

for urban development in Durban was aptly captured by Butler-Adam and Venter (1984:70-71):

Relative and absolute location, economics, the need for land and houses, and grave moral issues all place Cato Manor in the centre of Durban's urban fabric. As its future is woven, so the pattern and quality of the rest of the urban weave will be affected ... Just as Cato Manor's first residents shaped the city's past, and the problems of its former residents reflect the city's development, there can be little doubt that its present residents should play an important role in framing a substantial part of the city's future.

Cato Manor is strategically located within 7 kilometres of the central business district (CBD) and 10 kilometres of the metropolitan main employment centres. It is almost 2 000 hectares in extent, comprising mostly undeveloped land of which a substantial proportion is owned by the state. Cato Manor is bounded by the affluent white residential suburbs of Westville, Sherwood, Queensburgh, Hillary, Bellair and Berea. In addition, major transport routes such as the N2 and N3 freeways traverse the area (see map).

The aim of this paper is to examine the process of reconstruction, development and planning here, and more specifically, it attempts to

- i. Briefly trace the historical background.
- ii. Examine the origins of planning and development.
- iii. Critically assess the policy framework for the development of the area.
- iv. Examine the socio-political and economic dynamics involved in this planned development.
- v. Evaluate the extent to which planned development would restructure the apartheid city.

The primary data sources for this paper were current policy documents on planned intervention in Cato Manor, sketch plans and both internal and external evaluation documents of the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA). This was complemented by newspaper articles and field and observation visits which were undertaken to ascertain the status of the planned development of the area. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first section an historical overview of Cato Manor is presented. Increasing land and house invasions in the area are discussed in the second section. The origins of planning and development in Cato Manor are the theme of the third section. In the fourth section the policy framework for the development of Cato Manor is analysed. The development achievements and constraints in Cato Manor are discussed in the fourth and fifth sections respectively.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of Cato Manor is interwoven with the history of Durban and the apartheid policy of segregating the cities of South Africa (Maharaj 1994:3). In 1857 George Christopher Cato, the first mayor of Durban, acquired full legal ownership of the land, which then comprised 5 500 hectares (Edwards 1994:416). Although Cato sold much of his land, on his death the remainder of the estate was sold to both whites and 'passenger' Indians 'who acquired it for residence, capital investment and speculation' (ibid.:416). Much of the land owned by Indians and whites was leased to indentured Indians for farming and the construction of dwellings. The indentured Indians were mainly market gardeners who sold their produce in the CBD. As time passed, more Indians moved into Cato Manor and by the early 1930s most of the area was Indian owned (ibid.:416). The Indians established a thriving community and provided their own social infrastructure in the form of mosques, temples, schools and halls (Maharaj 1994:3). In 1932 the boundaries of the city were extended and Cato Manor was incorporated into the Borough of Durban.

The Second World War created a demand for African labour in Durban. A large population of Africans settled in Cato Manor on land sublet by Indian tenants. The influx of Africans led to overcrowding, increased competition for scarce resources and growing fears amongst neighbouring white residents about health conditions and security (Hindson and Makhathini 1993:3). Although the Africans were offered employment by Indians, many had become small entrepreneurs by setting up shack shops in Cato Manor. This led to competition between Africans and Indians and set the conditions for anti-Indian attitudes which contributed in part to the 1949 riots (Maharaj 1994:5).

The Group Areas Act was passed in 1950 and Cato Manor 'became ever more central within the state's plans to control the spatial and social features of Durban' (Edwards 1989:192). The Durban City Council played a key role in the development and implementation of the Group Areas Act (Maharaj 1997). In the 1950s the Council formulated new urban labour and housing policies and new residential plans for the whole of the Durban area. Central to these plans was the 'desire to increase the capitalisation of inner city land' by clearing it of Indians and Africans and promoting white ownership and occupation (Edwards 1994:418-419). In 1958 Cato Manor was zoned as a white group area.

The 1958 proclamation provoked widespread resistance. Various community and civic organisations made representations, held mass protests and forwarded memorandums to the local and central government to withdraw the 1958 proclamation (Maharaj 1994:8). There were sporadic outbreaks of violence and riots in predominantly African areas in 1959 and 1960. All these met with failure, and by the mid-1960s the state had cleared Cato Manor of both Indians and Africans, except for Chesterville which

remained a black spot because of the state's inability to provide for African formal housing in the inner city (Edwards 1994:422). The Indians were moved to Chatsworth and the Africans to KwaMashu and Umlazi.

Despite the area being zoned for whites, Cato Manor remained vacant and undeveloped for almost two decades. Land for whites was in abundant supply in other parts of the city. The cost of developing the land was high because of the presence of eccla shale. Since 1965 the state-appointed South African Indian Council (SAIC) had made many representations to the apartheid government for the deproclamation of Cato Manor for Indian occupation (Maharaj 1996:8). In 1979 the government agreed to deproclaim a portion of Cato Manor for Indians. While the rezoning of Cato Manor was welcomed, it had strong overtones of political manoeuvring by the apartheid government to increase the legitimacy of the SAIC in the Indian community.

The SAIC set out to develop Cato Manor for the middle- to upper-income groups. Given the political sensitivity surrounding the area, much concern was expressed on the development of Cato Manor for the wealthy. It was against this background that the Cato Manor Residents' Association (CMRA) was formed in November 1979, to represent the interests of past and present residents of the area (ibid.:8). The CMRA put pressure on the House of Delegates (HOD), which succeeded the SAIC, to ensure that there would be housing options for low-income groups in Cato Manor.

The HOD in the tricameral parliament initiated low- and middle-income housing estates for Indians in the Bonella and Wiggins areas of Cato Manor in the mid-1980s. The provision of racially exclusive housing for Indians sowed the seeds for greater racial conflict in the early 1990s, leading to housing invasions by Africans from neighbouring squatter settlements and Chesterville.

LAND AND HOUSING INVASIONS

In the mid-1980s squatters began to invade land in Cato Manor and this was attributed to a number of socio-political issues:

- i. Escalating violence on the periphery of the city
- ii. Increasing poverty in the townships
- iii. Accessibility to jobs and services available close to the CBD
- iv. Lack of planned development in Cato Manor
- v. Proximity to the workplace and reduced transport costs (Hindson, Gwagwa and Makhathini 1994:3)

The first wave of squatting took place clandestinely in Cato Crest and in the Wiggins area. By 1991 the number of shack dwellers had grown to visible proportions, causing anxiety and conflict with neighbouring white residents

(Hindson and Byerly 1993:6). As the squatters increased in number, they began organising themselves into legitimate groups to negotiate with the authorities. In mid-1991 the squatter movement and the authorities reached an agreement (social compact) that there would be no more future land invasions, with a guarantee that squatters would be housed in Cato Manor (*ibid.*:6). The invasions continued, however, and between 1987 and 1996 the number of squatters in Cato Manor had increased to 200 000 (Lundberg and Weise 1996:17).

A new dynamic unfolded towards the end of 1993, when formal housing constructed by the HOD for low-income Indians in Wiggins was invaded by Chesterville residents. Gigaba and Maharaj (1996:224) outlined two factors that influenced the invasion of houses in the Wiggins area:

- i. The shortage of housing in Chesterville
- ii. Protest against the racial allocation of houses to Indians by the HOD which had included Africans on the housing list and created the expectation of house allocations in Phase Two of the Wiggins development.

Although the invasion of Wiggins was condemned and alternative accommodation was provided for the displaced Indians in Bonella, the process highlighted the need for the desegregation and reallocation of resources in the post-apartheid city. Some lessons learnt from the Wiggins invasions included:

- i. Development and the distribution of resources which had been historically contested cannot be exclusively distributed to any single disadvantaged race group. In this respect, the development of Cato Manor could not only protect the claims and rights of Indians who had been victims of the Group Areas Act, nor only the Africans who had been prohibited from the ownership of land in the city by the provision of the Urban Areas Act (Edwards 1994:425; Hindson, Gwagwa and Makhathini 1994:4). A new system for the allocation of resources had to be developed in the changing South African context.
- ii. Attempts at desegregating the city through planned development should avoid any clientism associated with any political party or interest group (Gigaba and Maharaj 1996:228).
- iii. Allocation of resources in the city such as housing and land should not favour any race or income group (Edwards 1994:425).
- iv. The need for an 'urbanisation and development policy for Cato Manor' and the Durban region became urgent (Hindson, Gwagwa and Makhathini 1994:4).

A major task facing urban planners in Durban was the reconstruction of Cato Manor so that it could become a vibrant suburb, contributing to the

development of the city as a whole. It was against this background that initiatives for the planned development of Cato Manor emerged.

ORIGINS OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN CATO MANOR

The planning and development of Cato Manor received attention amidst the changing socio-political dynamics of South African society. During the transition period to democracy (1990-1994), Cato Manor experienced major turmoil due to political infighting from different factions, struggle for space from new invaders, different factions laying claims of entitlement to space, resistance from neighbouring white communities to squatters on their residential borders, and political uncertainty relating to development of the area (Gigaba and Maharaj 1996:232-33).

In 1991 the Durban Functional Region (DFR) Economic Development Initiative, code named 'Operation Jumpstart', highlighted the possible positive effects the development of Cato Manor would have on the City of Durban (Maharaj and Ramballi 1998). Operation Jumpstart was set in motion after an economic development conference hosted by the Durban City Council in November 1990.

During early 1992 Operation Jumpstart was able to bring 35 hostile factions coming from different political groups (ANC, Inkatha, National Party, Democratic Party), community groups (civics, such as the Cato Manor Resident's Association, Chesterville Resident's Association), business groups, local government, provincial and central government, to agree broadly that Cato Manor had to be developed on a non-racial basis (*Sunday Tribune* 1 March 1992). Arising out of these discussions the Greater Cato Manor Development Forum (GCMDF) was formed with the purpose of guiding and advising on the development of Cato Manor (Lundberg and Wiese 1996:17).

The GCMDF appointed a planning committee on 7 March 1992 to prepare a policy framework. On 9 June 1992 a final report was completed and all parties on the GCMDF agreed that the following principles would influence the planning and development of Cato Manor:

- i. There would be an holistic planning and development process incorporating all vacant land in Greater Cato Manor and taking into consideration the neighbouring built environment.
- ii. All interested parties would participate in the process, including past, present and potential future residents.
- iii. The development of Greater Cato Manor was to 'cater for the wider socio-economic needs of Durban's Metropolitan community', giving due consideration to those removed from Greater Cato Manor.
- iv. Planning and development was to commence without delay, taking into

consideration other projects in progress in the DFR and the need to make maximum use of available resources. (Robinson 1994:5)

Difficulties arose within the GCMDF when it was realised that advice and guidance based on the abovementioned principles was not adequate for the development of Cato Manor. The political dynamics in Cato Manor, the rejection of the all-white Durban City Council by the local inhabitants, the continued invasion of land and houses in the area, the demand for houses, and the absence and lack of clarity on the nature and status of the larger housing and development policy in Greater Cato Manor, presented problems that were beyond the capacity of the forum to resolve. After much deliberation on the type of organisation needed to be entrusted with the development of Cato Manor along non-racial principles, the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) was formed in March 1993 and registered as a Section 21 company not for gain, enjoying legal entity and the status of a non-governmental organisation (Robinson and Smit 1994:3). All stakeholders who were initially involved in setting up the GCMDF were included in the CMDA and the vision expounded by the Forum was adopted by the Association (*ibid.*:1).

In November 1994 Cato Manor was recognised as a Special Presidential Project in the Urban Renewal category of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It would therefore enjoy priority in qualifying for funds from the RDP budget. Also, Cato Manor would receive preference 'in the budgeting activities of line function departments at all relevant levels of government' (CMDA 1994:6).

POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATO MANOR

According to the CMDA the reconstruction and development of Cato Manor offers many opportunities to restructure the apartheid socio-spatial order of Durban by offering low-income housing close to the city centre, creating economic opportunities in the metropolitan region, cultivating a more sustainable environment, and promoting a desegregated housing development in the inner city which would contribute to urban reconstruction in the new South Africa (*ibid.*:3). The CMDA's policy framework for the development of Cato Manor envisaged the provision of between 30 000 and 40 000 houses for middle- to low-income earners over a ten-year period. The development of Cato Manor aimed to generate economic growth in the city through the payment of taxes and levies for services, employment and an increase in the rate of consumption of goods and services (Robinson 1992:8).

The policy framework for the development of Cato Manor focused on issues related to land, compaction and increasing densities, the creation of

activity corridors and nodes, environment and open-space management, transport and movement networks, housing and delivery systems and employment and economic development.

Land

The issue of land ownership and dispossession in the inner city had been the central feature of political struggles throughout the history of mass opposition to apartheid and the Group Areas Act. In the post-apartheid era, land restitution was a sensitive issue. Over 120 000 Indian, coloured and African victims of forced removals were dispossessed of their land in Cato Manor (Livion 1996:26).

A major constraint in the development of Cato Manor related to the uncertainty of land claims from those who had been dispossessed by the Group Areas Act. About 3 000 claims for restitution have been made in Cato Manor by former landowners (Ramballi 1998:96). However, in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, restitution could take a number of forms, including restoration of the land itself, alternative land allocation, or monetary compensation. In terms of Section 34 of the Restitution Act,

where plans for development are advanced, either the city or the provincial government would make an application to the land claims court to argue that restoration was not in the public interest. (Izwi March 1996:1)

In September 1996 the Durban Metropolitan Council, acting on the recommendations of the CMDA, made an application to the Land Claims Court that restitution in Cato Manor would not be in the public interest. The CMDA argued that the land in Cato Manor would be best used for the development of low-cost housing (*Daily News* 23 Oct. 1996). The major challenge facing the CMDA on the issue of land was to decide on whether to continue with development priorities for the poorest of the poor, or to stand steadfast on the principles of social justice and favour those who had been dispossessed of their right to own land in the inner city. Land restoration would impede development progress, therefore the CMDA was in favour of restitution (alternative sites) which would accommodate claimants in its land allocations policy. However, there was no mention of the historically dispossessed in the CMDA's land allocation policy (Maharaj and Ramballi 1997).

Fortunately, the issue of land claims in Cato Manor was settled after lengthy negotiations between the legal representatives of the claimants and the CMDA. In terms of the agreement the CMDA would incorporate land restoration and involve land claimants in its development plans where this

was feasible. If this failed, then other forms of land restitution would be considered (ibid. 1997).

Compaction and Increasing Densities

Several urban planners and researchers have asserted that compaction and increasing densities in the inner city was one way of restructuring the apartheid city (Dewar and Uitenbogaardt 1991; Dewar 1992; Hindson, Mabin and Watson 1992). The policy framework for the development of Cato Manor supported the model of compacted development and increasing densities in the area (Robinson 1992:10).

It should be noted that Cato Manor was being developed to accommodate approximately 30 000 to 40 000 houses on 2 000 hectares of land. Taking into consideration the various other social facilities that have to be provided for, such as schools, health centres, open spaces, recreational areas and places of worship, the amount of land available for housing would not be adequate. Senéque and Brown (1994:66-68) identified the following constraints which could impede compaction in the area:

- i. Topographical constraints characterised by steep slopes.
- ii. Unstable soil types which were not conducive to development of any kind.
- iii. The fifty-year flood plain in the Umkumbaan area. During July 1996 forty-four informal dwellings had been damaged or washed away. This was the second time that houses were affected by flooding (*Izwi* Aug. 1996:4).
- iv. Existing hard infrastructure such as servitudes, an oil pipeline, disused landfill sites and electricity substations already took up much of the land.

The CMDA hoped to overcome these constraints by increasing density through appropriate design of houses. In its policy framework the CMDA proposed a mix of densities and designs:

- i. Two- to four-storey walkups along activity corridors
- ii. Three-storey walkups on steep slopes
- iii. Six- to ten-storey flats around major nodes
- iv. Detached housing, simplexes and cluster housing (Robinson 1992:56)

Densification through high-rise building design may be appropriate for populations who have acquired an urban character. A study conducted by Hindson and Byerley (1993:16) amongst Africans and Indians in Cato Manor on attitudes to housing types revealed that 70 per cent of the African respondents were 'opposed to multiple family dwellings such as flats,

townhouses and semi-detached residences'. This was because such dwelling environments were perceived to be noisy and prone to crime and violence, and would be unsuitable for their children. Sixty per cent of the Indians surveyed did not mind living in multiple-storey buildings.

In the same study, Hindson and Byerley (*ibid.*:7) ascertained that the mean monthly income for African households was R666, compared to the Indians who earned R2 254 per month. It was possible that multi-storey buildings would be occupied by low-income Africans, as they would be cheaper to build. If this happened, the multi-storey buildings would become symbolic of apartheid-type housing, and the possibility of desegregating these dwellings would be unlikely as Indians, with their higher incomes, would opt for free-standing houses.

In spite of the worthy intentions to provide affordable housing to the poorest of the poor, high densities were known to contribute to rapid physical and social deterioration in living standards. Local examples from the apartheid era of dense tenement housing blocks are the rented flats in Wentworth and Phoenix in Durban, known for high levels of crime and antisocial behaviour. However, the difference in Cato Manor would be that multi-storeyed flats would provide security of tenure and alleviate the alienation from the ownership of property characteristic of the apartheid era. An alternative to densification would be to identify other vacant sites in the city and to spread development in order to utilise existing infrastructure effectively.

Activity Corridors and Nodes

Apartheid planning had deliberately distorted transport routes to protect the privacy of the white suburbs surrounding Cato Manor, and discouraged movement through them. In the planning and development of Cato Manor the CMDA had given major consideration to integrating the surrounding white areas into Cato Manor through activity corridors and nodes. The CMDA envisaged that these would provide significant opportunities to ensure that Cato Manor does not develop into a dormitory township characteristic of the apartheid era. It was also intended to integrate Cato Manor into the greater metropolis and provide efficient, convenient and cost effective transportation to and from the area (CMDA 1996).

In terms of the policy framework of the CMDA, activity corridors were identified for location in the following strategic areas of Cato Manor:

- i. **Central Corridor:** This would run through the middle of Cato Manor, east to west through François Road leading to Pinetown and to the Dalbridge rail station. This corridor was expected to be the mass transit route with several activity nodes on the way. The feasibility of establishing a light rail system on this corridor was being explored (see map).

- ii. Bellair Road Corridor: This would link with Brickfield Road to the north and spread southwards to Edwin Swales Drive. Both areas are known to be well distributed with light, medium and heavy industries providing employment opportunities.
- iii. Westville-Queensburgh Corridor: This area would be characterised by faster moving freeway-based traffic, and activities such as office parks and businesses which seek high profile exposure would locate alongside the route (Robinson 1994:17-25).

It should be noted that there is no guarantee that the concept of activity corridors and nodes would produce the desired outcome as anticipated by the policy framework. Seneque and Brown (1994:3) cautioned that 'the route of developing activity corridors is a high risk one. It has never been tried with serious intent in this country before, and there is little precedent to base it on'. Although it may be argued that the 'urban corridor' was a means of generating maximum accessibility, reducing transport investments and creating more efficient development, the major activity nodes lie outside Cato Manor, generally in the affluent white suburbs.

Indeed, established commercial and industrial interests in predominantly white areas were likely to benefit more from the activity corridors than the low-income residents of Cato Manor. For example, François Road cuts across the affluent white suburbs of Glenwood and Glenmore, Westville already has several shopping complexes, and Brickfield Road has an established business community. These established areas may exploit business opportunities on the activity nodes, leading to large sums of money being drained away from the heart of Cato Manor to the more affluent areas.

While not denying the possible advantages of activity corridors and nodes, there is a need to be cautious, given the apartheid experience where towns and suburbs were planned to benefit big business interests at the expense of small-scale business enterprises. Potential sources of benefit and opportunities should be offered to the poorest of the poor. The creation of 'islands of ghettos' amidst prospering neighbourhoods must be avoided.

Urban Environment

The CMDA emphasised that 'development and environmental concerns were not necessarily incompatible' (Robinson 1994:66). The approach was to use existing topography and landscape as far as possible, without damaging or destroying the natural terrain and causing damage to the environment. Instead of using the traditional methods of 'cut and fill' – not only costly, but also a source of major soil erosion, as well as a contributor to structural defects to buildings – the policy framework aims at using alternative technology. On very steep slopes, housing on stilts would be considered (ibid.:66).

While technology may contribute to the compatibility of development and the environment, the cost of laying building foundations was a major factor to be considered in using existing terrain for development. In addition, the question arises as to whether technologically sophisticated building designs and layouts will be within the skill and ability of the local labour force and small-scale developers, or whether these methods would rather benefit major developers who seek to make huge profits out of development in Cato Manor.

The CMDA policy document also considered the role of urban agriculture in Cato Manor. Although this was a radical departure from previous urban norms, the sustainability of these urban agricultural plots was questionable. As it is, people who moved into fast-track housing are already finding that they cannot afford to pay for water for domestic use (*Izwi* Nov. 1996:6). Without an abundant supply of cheap water, agricultural prospects in the area would be limited. In addition, people living in informal settlements close to or within the inner city generally adopt an urban life-style over a period of time and tend to depend on wage labour (Gilbert and Gugler 1992).

The policy framework focuses much attention on providing clean forms of energy. In the Wiggins fast-track housing project the people could not afford to install metered electricity and instead used the card system. The tendency would be to consume prepaid electricity to illuminate the house, and for other purposes, such as hot water, cooking, and keeping warm, there would be a likelihood to look for other forms of cheaper energy, such as gas, firewood and paraffin. Alternate forms of energy use and the added problem of poor health would make no difference to the quality of life as it had been previously experienced when living in informal housing. For example, even though Soweto was electrified, 22 per cent of the population was still dependent on coal stoves as a source of heating (Lawson 1991:56). This may be attributed to the fact that when moving into a new home individuals incur many costs, and hence are unable to purchase appliances requiring expensive energy forms.

The structure plan envisages a 'bus a minute' concept along activity corridors. According to the CMDA (1996:5) approximately 35 000 peak-hour trips would be generated when Cato Manor reached its optimum population. In a densely populated area with high rise, multi-storeyed buildings, this was likely to have major pollution and health implications.

Social Facilities

The Greater Cato Manor Structure Plan aims at providing appropriate and accessible social facilities while reducing the need for valuable flat land (*ibid.*:10). In addition, the structure plan promotes multiple use of facilities, for example schools would be located in proximity to a public library, community hall and sportsfield. Provision was also made for urban open spaces to provide relief from the densely built environment. The open-space planning was based

on the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (D'MOSS), taking into consideration ecological factors such as nature conservation.

The structure plan also made provision for social facilities which would be developed in the area over ten years (Table 1). In addition to the facilities in Table 1, the existing facilities such as the Cato Manor Technical College, Academic Hospital and resources of the surrounding built environment were expected to help supplement the social facilities in the greater Cato Manor area.

Table 1: Provision of social facilities in Cato Manor

Pre-schools	16
Primary schools	36
Secondary schools	20
Technical secondary schools	4
Worship sites	59
Libraries	4
Community halls	8
Civic Centre	1
Clinics	4
Community Health Centre	1
Sports field	20
Sport complexes	3
Urban parks	63

Source: CMDA 1996:13.

Although the aforementioned facilities may appear adequate, the question arises as to whether these facilities would be sustainable with densification and future population growth. The biggest concern was whether the number of schools planned for the area would be adequate in view of Cato Manor being characterised by a very young population. According to Makhathini and Xaba (1995:24-26) 44,8 per cent of the population in Cato Crest were below the age of 18 years, 19,7 per cent were between the ages of 18 and 26 years and 70,8 per cent were single. This confirms the likelihood of the present population reproducing itself over a short period of time. It was likely that the planned social facilities would not be sufficient.

Transport and Movement

A major assumption in the policy framework for the development of Cato Manor was that through compaction and increasing densities many daily activities would be achieved on foot or by bicycle, hence reducing household

costs and the dependence on public transport. The other assumption was that most of the unemployed would find employment close to Cato Manor in industrial areas such as Pinetown, Bluff, and Overport. Hindson and Byerley (1993:8-9) found that 41 per cent of the economically active population were unemployed, and the vast majority of those in formal employment worked as domestic servants in the neighbouring white suburbs. In addition, they noted that a small minority commuted to the southern industrial areas of Jacobs, Moberi and Isipingo. However, a significant proportion (36 per cent) of semi-skilled workers were employed in the CBD or in the Pinetown area.

It may therefore be argued that not all the unemployed would find employment in Cato Manor or within adjoining suburbs, hence necessitating travelling longer distances to work. In its Second Structure plan the CMDA (1996:5) gave attention to future population growth and employment in planning transport routes and acknowledged the need for road-based public transport as compared to the initial view that everything would be accessible on foot.

Housing Delivery Systems

The housing system for Cato Manor aimed at providing dwellings for people across a spectrum of income levels in order to achieve a strong income mix and to prevent the area from becoming an isolated ghetto. The biggest constraint in the housing development programme in Cato Manor was to ensure that the various income groups would qualify for finance, whether it was government subsidies for low-income people or mortgage bonds for higher-income groups.

Given the high level of unemployment in Cato Manor, almost half the African population would not qualify for housing subsidies because of irregular incomes or none at all. The CMDA policy framework identified three housing delivery systems: the state, the private sector, and a 'partnership between the state/private sector/community/NGOs/individuals' (Robinson 1992:50). The CMDA acknowledged that the state had limited resources, while the private sector was reluctant to take financial risks by investing in low-income houses. The CMDA was experimenting with four delivery systems in Cato Manor: bond and subsidy housing, fast-track housing, incremental housing, and *in situ* upgrading. In the latter part of 1996 the CMDA evaluated each of these delivery systems.

Bond and Subsidy Housing

A bond and subsidy formal housing scheme aimed at those who earned between R1 500 and R3 500 per month. This delivery system was being tested in Chesterville, and involved the public sector, the CMDA and three private sector developers taking different forms of risks. There was a tendency for developers to target housing for those who qualified for subsidies at the top

end of the scheme – those with an income of R2 500 to R3 500 per month. The bridging finance obtained by the CMDA from the City Council was based on zero interest with the aim of reducing financial risks for the developer in the servicing of sites. Although developers were requested to provide cluster and high-rise multi-storeyed houses in order to increase densities, consumers were overwhelmingly opting for stand-alone units (Smit 1996:5-7). This suggests that the multi-storeyed concept of increasing densities as envisaged in the CMDA policy framework was unlikely to be successful.

The CMDA was able to assemble land at a faster pace than the developer and was able to secure bridging finance. Whilst the CMDA was immediately successful in securing land, this was proved not to be sustainable, as approving authorities were tired of 'treating Cato Manor as a special case' in the light of developments in other parts of the city (ibid.:5). In addition, there was an 'unacceptably long time lag between the provision of serviced sites and the opening of a township register and the building of top structures'. Administrative and bureaucratic delays were responsible for the time lag – plan approvals, subsidy applications and registration of bonds (ibid.).

The CMDA, by securing bridging finance and engaging in land assembly, had taken on a developer role when its mandate was to be a facilitator. Based on this role change, the CMDA cannot assume that this method of housing delivery was a success as it had taken on major financial risks itself.

Fast-track Housing

This delivery model was developed in July 1994 after major land invasions in the Wiggins area threatened planned development in the whole of Cato Manor. This prompted the CMDA to attempt to speed up housing delivery in the area. The delivery model involved the following processes:

- i. The separation of the land development and housing delivery process.
- ii. The sharing of financial risks by the CMDA and the City Council, but in part the risk was distributed to small contractors or to the resources of the consumers.
- iii. The development of the land was handed to large contractors, and small contractors were expected to play a major role in housing delivery.
- iv. The target population comprised those who were earning R1 500 per month and were eligible for a maximum of R17 250 subsidy from the Provincial Housing Board (PHB). The beneficiaries could not access bonds from private financial institutions, however, but would have to use the residual amount from the subsidy to provide for the construction of houses. The fast-track housing development did not cater for those who earned less than R1 000 per month. The local community had requested rental options but the CMDA was unable to consider this in view of the costs.

- v. Local labour was used.
- vi. The allocation of housing opportunities was made through housing clubs (a group method aimed at site allocations and the construction of houses). This group comprised ten to twenty households, who were involved in site selection, participated in workshops on home designs, obtained information on the various available options on basic home construction, and linked with small contractors or the suppliers of housing prototypes. A housing opportunity centre was built on site to provide a range of support activities.
- vii. The Durban City Council had to manage the housing delivery process through the allocation and general sales administration of serviced sites.
- viii. The development of the fast-track housing scheme was aimed at the broader Durban Metro constituency. In addition, the availability of serviced sites on the fast-track housing development was open to allocatees on the Metro housing list. A fair balance of site distribution was maintained between allocatees on the Metro and the Cato Manor waiting list (Smit 1996:8-10).

The evaluation of the fast track delivery system by the CMDA (1996) revealed that there was a major gap between the very rapid delivery of serviced sites and the slow progress made in getting houses delivered. This led to a large stock of serviced sites and 'unproductive use of capital'. There was a tendency for consumers to engage small time contractors who were overextended. For example, some contractors had accepted fifty or more contracts, but their capacity would only allow them to deliver a few houses a year. In addition, small contractors did not have the physical infrastructure to handle large work programmes. The fast-track housing had created quality control and consumer protection problems. The CMDA was not able to take responsibility for defective buildings and poor standards of workmanship (ibid.:11-13).

Incremental Housing

Incremental housing refers to the provision of a serviced site on which the consumer erects a basic house with the residual amount left over from the housing subsidy after having paid for the serviced land. The house would then be built incrementally over a period of time depending on the needs of the consumer, improvements in personal circumstances, and the availability of resources.

An evaluation of this model by the CMDA revealed that progress was slow due to difficult land assembly issues, lower priorities accorded to the project, and conflict over densities. The CMDA finalised layout plans in consultation with the community without resolving the issue of densities. This led to severe difficulties being experienced by the developer in finalising the layout of the

project and contributed to an increase in cost. The CMDA was forced to provide working capital at low interest rates to the developer (ibid.:16-17).

Once again, the role of the CMDA as a facilitator had been extended to that of a developer: engaging in land assembly efforts and providing financial guarantees. Notably, the CMDA acknowledged that it had accorded lower priority in facilitating the building of incremental housing.

In Situ Upgrading

In situ upgrading involved the private sector, the community, the public sector and the CMDA in a complex risk sharing arrangement in Cato Crest, an informal settlement in Cato Manor (ibid.:1). The upgrading of Cato Crest had been influenced by concerns about massive land invasions and the disruption of planned development. As a strategic measure, it had decided to consolidate Cato Crest into greater Cato Manor. This had taken place at a time when the Homeless People's Federation had established itself in the area, strongly expounding a 'people-driven' and autonomous development route' (ibid.:18). The local community was suspicious of the CMDA and it withdrew from development initiatives which had been introduced by the Association. However, on 25 May 1994 the Cato Crest Civic Association (CCCA) and the CMDA agreed that the development of the area should be 'people driven' and would be characterised by the following:

- i. The formation of a 'policy steering committee' involving the CMDA, CCCA, and a co-ordinating developer.
- ii. The steering committee would approve development policy and plans.
- iii. Product costs were to be 'specified up front' and there would be compensation for any increases attributed to developer tardiness.
- iv. The CCCA was to be responsible for securing community co-operation and any increases due to stoppages caused by the community would be added to the product's price and borne by consumers.
- v. The CMDA would 'provide land for development and ... act as the guardian for the broader "public interest" by specifying certain parameters for development'.
- vi. An amount of R10 million as working capital would be provided for by the Durban City Council and entrusted to the CMDA. The developer would make the initial investment, thereby taking the 'first risk'. The working capital would protect the CMDA if the developer withdrew when difficulties arose, especially since Cato Crest was a volatile area (ibid.:8-20).

During May 1994 tenders were invited from developers, and an adjudication committee comprising CMDA, CCCA and Manor Gardens residents was established to interview applicants. At a preliminary meeting in July 1994 the

CCCA did not turn up as their legitimacy was being questioned by the local community. This problem was resolved, however, and in February 1995 a developer was chosen. In mid-1995 the developer backed out due to financial problems. The second developer also withdrew from the project as the legitimacy of the community structures was again being challenged. The situation was further exacerbated by a taxi war which made the area inaccessible (Smit 1996:20-21).

Two conclusions can be drawn from the *in situ* upgrade experience of Cato Crest. Firstly, Cato Crest was subject to land invasions and the area did not have strong leadership and community bonds. This dynamic was typical of newly formed squatter settlements where community organisation takes place over a period of time. The CMDA, in its effort to consolidate Cato Crest in the Greater Cato Manor development plan, had fallen short by marginalising the Homeless People's Federation. It should be noted that this federation had established strong community support and the CMDA could have used the Federation's status and influence in the area to facilitate development. Secondly, the CMDA should have been proactive in realising that big developers were risk-averse, especially when it came to *in situ* upgrades where profit margins were low.

An evaluation of the four delivery systems by the CMDA revealed that none of them had been successful in effectively providing housing at the required scale and rate. It was also apparent that the CMDA had not formulated an holistic plan for delivery, but rather adopted an approach which involved the managing of the planning and delivery processes simultaneously. In addition, it was clear that the CMDA had departed in many instances from its mandated role of facilitator to take on that of developer.

The willingness of the CMDA to assume risks without first attempting to facilitate a process of risk management with the delivery agents limits the reliability of assessing the delivery systems for two reasons. Firstly, it was a known fact that financial constraints would always adversely affect development. Secondly, developers have profit-making motives, and in taking risks as a facilitator the CMDA had not allowed development agents to be innovative, creative and responsive to the demands and challenges of low-cost housing.

The CMDA, instead of spending much time and energy on taking and managing risks, could have, as a facilitator, promoted the capacities of small-scale contractors and other NGOs in the delivery system. In addition, the CMDA need not have undertaken the task of capacity building on its own but could have encouraged other NGOs to undertake this responsibility on its behalf. Capacity building through the networking and pooling of resources in the development process would have presented opportunities for sustainable development.

The evaluation of the housing systems raises concerns about the capacity of the CMDA to act as a facilitator and developer simultaneously. This capacity was summed up by the European Union's Report on 12 July 1995 as follows:

.... the rate of service delivery (41 600 sites serviced in 5 years) is outside the management and scope of CMDA, and is not feasible financially, given limited funding resources by the major contributing government authorities ... (Rabenau 1995:12)

Economic Development

A basic premise of the policy framework of the CMDA was the provision of local economic opportunities through planned development. Economic opportunities would be realised through labour-intensive projects, promotion of local entrepreneurs, support for the informal sector and encouragement of decentralised business opportunities in corridors and nodes (Robinson 1994:44-47).

The extent to which local labour had been involved in the development of Cato Manor up to that time was difficult to ascertain at this stage. However, it was evident that contracts had been awarded to big construction companies who were under no obligation to use local labour, especially when that labour was unskilled. Considering the fact that big contractors had already been risk-averse, it was unlikely that they would have utilised unskilled labour.

Although some small-scale contractors had been used, these were predominantly concentrated in the fast-track housing delivery programmes. The number of small contractors had not been significant in impacting positively on housing demands and creating local employment opportunities. Some of the reasons for this may be the lack of resources such as technical infrastructure and finance for big business ventures, and strong local competition. The other problems with small contractors pertain to their inability to take risks and provide guarantees against defective buildings. The support offered to small contractors was insignificant. Large developers received significant support in the form of sureties and financial guarantees.

The CMDA also planned to promote the informal sector by setting up business hives with a view to creating employment opportunities. Big businesses would be established on the main activity corridors and nodes of Cato Manor. It was questionable whether small business would be able to survive because of strong competition from the formal sector. In addition, small business required investor confidence, entrepreneurial skills and the necessary economic support systems to become successful.

The CMDA policy framework places emphasis on labour-intensive development. The problem with this kind of development lies in its inability to meet deadlines. The CMDA business plan does not propose a strategy on

how the unemployed and the informal sector would be able to participate in the development process. Together with labour-intensive development, it was important that skills-training programmes were offered simultaneously to ensure that the skills of labour improved as development progressed. On completion of the development process, sufficient capacity would have been left behind in the locality for the ongoing social and economic development of Cato Manor. If this did not occur, then it was likely that the plight of the unskilled would remain unchanged, adding to urban poverty levels. While economic development and employment opportunities may appear promising for the locality, there were no guarantees that the present skills and capacities of the inhabitants would withstand competition for employment from the mass of unemployed and poor on the peripheries of the city. The economic development of Cato Manor and its ability to provide employment opportunities must be seen in the context of socio-economic development in the broader metropolitan area.

DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN CATO MANOR

The 'kick starting' of Cato Manor development through the efforts of Operation Jumpstart in 1992 would remain a milestone in the post-apartheid history of Durban. In the absence of local government legitimacy, the CMDA had served as an appropriate vehicle to undertake the development of Cato Manor outside institutional structures. The following is a brief overview of progress achieved:

Planning

The planning of development in Cato Manor was a significant departure from that characteristic of the apartheid era. The planning involved all role players and encouraged participation from the local community. A significant factor was the holistic approach adopted by the CMDA. The planning process had taken into consideration the various opportunities that would arise in the transition to a post-apartheid city.

Compaction and Densities

Although there were differences of opinion on the extent of compaction and density thresholds in Cato Manor, the policy framework attempted to overcome poor usage of urban space. The intention was to put the limited space available to a variety of mixed uses so that maximum output was achieved within prudent infrastructure costs.

Social Compacts

Cato Manor had a complex and diverse set of socio-political groupings. During the apartheid era no compromise would have been reached on an holistic

approach to development as communities maintained divergent interests, exacerbated by political fragmentation and internecine violence. A positive aspect in the development of Cato Manor was the agreement on social compacts, and although they had not been successful in all areas, the agreements did initiate some projects.

Social Infrastructure

Although the delivery of houses had not been according to the CMDA's expectations, the provision of social infrastructure had been well within the set time-frames. One secondary school, one sportsfield, two community health centres and an arterial road to promote commercial and small industrial activities, had been completed. The provision of these social infrastructures would play an important role in meeting the social needs of the different communities in Cato Manor and would contribute to community organisation and cohesiveness.

Development Facilitation

Although concern had been expressed about the explicit role of the CMDA, it had managed to establish legitimacy in the area. The central, provincial and local government recognised the status of the CMDA and were supportive of its development initiatives. The local people accepted the CMDA and community representatives served on it, sharing a common development goal.

Desegregated Development

Cato Manor represented the first major desegregated urban development project after the demise of apartheid. Although desegregated development does not necessarily mean cross-racial cohesion and integration, the important point to note was that planning in Cato Manor was no longer dictated by segregationist policies. The area was open to all races and previously disadvantaged groups were likely to benefit most.

DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS IN CATO MANOR

The constraints and challenges in the development of Cato Manor are many and complex. The constraints encountered in the planning and development of Cato Manor emerged during the period of transition to a new democracy. Some of the constraints affecting development are highlighted in this section.

Land Claims

Uncertainty about the future of claims for land by those dispossessed by the Group Areas Act in Cato Manor had led to the slowing down of the development process.

Violence

Cato Manor had been a centre of political violence and feuds related to competition for resources. In the Cato Crest area internecine taxi feuds stopped development for months and added to costs (*Izwi* March 1996). In addition to the violence, there was a high crime rate and gangsterism in Cato Manor. Vandalisation of incomplete buildings and theft of developers' property and equipment had been on the increase (*Izwi* Nov. 1996:7). Small-scale contractors had often been victims of intimidation and robbery which impacted on the rate and cost of development.

Breakdown in Social Compacts

Change in leadership and problems with non-legitimate leadership had delayed development projects. In Cato Crest development was delayed as the legitimacy of the civic association was questioned, while in the Ensimbini/Ematendeni area the development committee was ousted, leaving no structures in place to negotiate with the CMDA (*ibid.*:3). Community dynamics and the management of conflict was a major factor in whether development was stalled or accelerated.

Invasion

Development in Cato Manor was constantly under the threat of land invasions which caused disruptions to the planning and delivery processes. Handling of invasions ranged from the demolishing of newly built shacks by the community to engaging in a social compact with the local community to prevent further expansion of shacks in their area.

Masakhane

This was a RDP programme to promote a culture of payment for municipal services and levies. Non-payment during the apartheid era was used as a strategy to protest against illegitimate local authorities. Post-apartheid urban development required the payment of taxes and levies in order for the city to sustain itself financially so that it could provide bulk municipal services to all its citizens. In Cato Manor the culture of non-payment for services was constraining sustainable development. For example, in the fast-track development in the Wiggins East and West areas people had not paid deposits for the connection of basic services such as water, electricity and servitude (*Izwi* March 1996:3).

The consequence of these facilities not being operational upon occupation was serious. For example, in the absence of sewer connections, the disposal of waste from individual households could cause serious health problems. Similarly, the use of alternative forms of energy such as wood, coal, and paraffin could contribute to air pollution and deterioration of health, and this would be no different from conditions prevalent in shack settlements.

Corruption

When scarce resources become available after a long history of inequality and deprivation, it becomes the source of greed, squandering, criminal opportunism and corruption. During the invasion of homes in the Bonella and Wiggins area, incidences of illegal house sales were widely reported (*Izwi* Aug. 1996:1). In the Dunbar Road area residents were registering more than once for house allocations. Incidences of houses being sold by bogus agents had been reported. Corruption poses serious problems as it puts the credibility of the development process at risk. It also affects the administrative processes, brings about anarchy and defeats the purpose of social justice.

Institutional Factors

South Africa is an emerging democracy, and most institutional structures were either being transformed, replaced or reorganised to meet the challenges of the future. In some instances, policies were being formulated or reformulated and implementation procedures were either blurred, not determined or in a state of flux. Cato Manor was not impervious to these processes. For example, delays on the part of the PHB to allocate subsidies timeously had affected the rate of delivery. Delays in the deeds office in registering title deeds in the end-user's name had increased holding costs of completed dwellings for developers. Delays on the part of the City Council in approving plans and infrastructure details affected the pace of delivery. Unless streamlined policies and procedures are put into place at an institutional level, reconstruction, planning and development in Cato Manor will be adversely affected.

CONCLUSION

Development has to be initiated in other parts of the metropolis in order to give Cato Manor an opportunity to move towards a path of sustainable development. For example, there is an urgent need to reconstruct informal settlements on the periphery of the city and rehabilitate townships so that Cato Manor does not appear to be the only zone of opportunity. The expectancy that Cato Manor holds the key to the fortunes for the reconstruction of the apartheid city of Durban, needs to be viewed against the pace of other complimentary developments in the region.

Given the historical and current socio-political complexities surrounding the development of Cato Manor, there are great expectations for the reconstruction of the area. The development of Cato Manor was anticipated to cater for the needs of the poor, urbanised Africans in the city. If the economic growth envisaged by the planners does not materialise, then it is likely that the area will experience rapid social and physical deterioration. In the event of the area not showing substantial economic growth in the foreseeable future, the area has tremendous potential for both social and physical deterioration. If

this unfortunate situation arises, the economic sustainability of the city will be questionable.

Finally, it may be concluded that reconstruction, planning and development in Cato Manor was taking place within the broader context of national social, political and economic transformation so that South African cities may meet the challenges of the global economy. Failure to meet this challenge would be missing out on an early opportunity to put South African cities on the road to sustainable development. It was therefore imperative to identify and correct impediments which may have untold future social, political and economic consequences on any long-term development projects. Periodic checks, evaluations and monitoring of the development process will ensure that early mistakes are minimised. Development should strive for the betterment for all inhabitants of the city.

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