


IKWEZI

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**CONCLUDING PORTIONS
OF THE "ROLE OF THE MIS-
SIONARIES IN THE CON-
QUEST OF SOUTH AFRICA"**

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In this issue of IKWEZI we carry the final parts of the significant pamphlet on the "Role of the Missionaries in the Conquest of South Africa." It has very special significance as the history of colonialism which it describes buttresses our consistent viewpoint that the national question in Azania is a colonial question. This is refuted in many quarters which have an interest and play a key role in the Azanian liberation struggle – in organisations like the OAU, UN, International Defence & Aid Fund, World Council of Churches, etc.

As we stated in our last issue there is a two-line struggle in the Azanian liberation movement represented by the ideologues of multi-racialism like the ANC of South Africa and its various international and white liberal supporters inside the country. The other line is the Black nationalist one represented by the PAC, the Black Consciousness Movement, AZAPO, etc. and which takes as its starting point the fact that the country and the land belongs to the African peoples. They state outright that the national struggle is fundamentally a struggle against white settler colonialism of which white racialism is an aspect. This is the principal aspect of the national struggle and it combines with the struggle for democratic rights.

The multi-racial approach denies the colonial nature of the national struggle and wishes to represent it as a struggle against racialism. The struggle against white racialism is a secondary aspect of the national struggle and is part of the struggle for democratic rights by the Black ma-

majority. But the multi-racialists who deny the colonial aspect of the national struggle fly in the face of history as this pamphlet conclusively proves. It is important that Azanian revolutionaries understand the historical background to the colonial nature of the struggle.

Concerning China

By the time of the next issue IKWEZI will be able to give its own answers to the vexed questions of events in China concerning the Cultural Revolution, Mao Ze Dong Thought and the problems which have arisen in the International Marxist-Leninist Movement. These are crucial questions which will decide the fate of the international M-L movement and will certainly have a bearing on the building of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Azania. The Azanian Marxist-Leninist Party has yet to be built and it is a task of historical importance.

We must point out that with the problems of the International Marxist-Leninist Movement the fortunes of IKWEZI have also been affected and we urge our supporters to be as charitable as possible in the financial support of the Journal.

In the next issue we will have further articles on the Democratic revolution in Azania, On the Question of a Revolutionary Style of Work, Namibia, Problems in the Building of a Marxist-Leninist Party, etc.

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Chapter VII

“The Missionary Charter”

Treaty or no treaty, the control was in the hands of the military and at this stage of conquest it could not be otherwise. Governors were first and foremost soldiers, whose hand held the sword more comfortably than the pen. For the Xhosa people, the period of “peace” differed little from that of open war. The viewpoint of the frontiersmen was remarkably sympathetic to that of the military and the explosion of war was only a matter of time. The clamour of the farmers against “depredations” and for a “revision” of the “Stockenstrom Treaties” were loud and long. In other words, they wanted a free hand in the matter of land plunder. The missionary communications with the Governor painted a picture of the “growing demoralisation” of the Xhosa, which fell in with the general attitude that it was time to scrap the treaties.

In official language, the treaties were “revised”. It is hardly necessary to ask in what direction. The new treaty tightened up the measures against “cattle-theft”, it made provision for the building of more military forts and it extended the colonial boundary. But one particular clause put the missionary stamp on it, so much so that it has been called “the missionary charter”. This clause gave special recognition to the “rights” of christian subjects within the tribes. Its effect was to split the tribal system more widely asunder by encouraging christianised Africans to violate their tribal customs. They were exempt from the morals and customs of their tribe, which, in the light of christian morality, were condemned as immoral. The chiefs themselves were quick to catch the implications of this move on the part of the missionaries and strenuously objected to this missionary clause. Indeed it was not difficult for the chiefs to draw their conclusions, since the Governor, Maitland, saw fit to impose the revised treaties with a great show of military might, while his negotiator and interpreter was young Theophilus Shepstone, son of the Rev. Shepstone and Resident-Agent with Chief Phatho. Captain Stretch, another Resident-Agent, reported that the chiefs were convinced that the missionaries “meant to steal their people and be magistrates and chiefs themselves”.

The missionaries seem to have shown their

hand too openly, particularly the Rev. Henry Calderwood (known as “Kondile”), who had been placed with Maqoma, and the chiefs totally rejected them as “peacemakers”. In 1845 Dr. Philip made the following significant observation in a letter to the London Missionary Society:

„The Gaika chiefs have no advisers, no intercourse with the missionaries and no confidence in them . . .“

The conciliators between oppressor and oppressed were for the time being prevented from carrying out their proper function – a state of affairs that always alarms a liberal, and to-day more than ever.

The Rev. Calderwood felt called upon to warn the Governor that:

“**The mind of the nation is in a perfect fever on the land question . . . The feeling is deep and bitter in the extreme . . . The agitation of the land question** is a powerful engine by which the war party can work upon the feelings of the more peaceably inclined . . . The feelings of the nation seem now to be against all *white* men, and in the event of war . . . even the lives of missionaries would be placed in extreme peril.” (His emphasis.)

The result of the Rev. Calderwood’s communication was to prompt the Governor to inform the Colonial Secretary (Lord Stanley) that the maXhosa were “ready to *unite*” to oppose our endeavours to put down depredations.” (His emphasis.)

Marching to Fort Peddie, the Governor had begun by imposing a new treaty on the Gqunukhwebe, chief, Phatho, then on the baThembu and the maNgqika and on the Gcaleka chief, Sarili, whose territory had not yet been confiscated. At the same time his agent brought a message of “friendship” to the Mpondo chief, Faku. This was done, states Walker in his “History of South Africa,” “in the hope that they would protect travellers along the mission road to Natal, prevent the landing of goods unlicensed by the Colony on their coasts and overawe the frontier (Xhosa) tribes from the rear.” The farmers rejoiced in the treaties. “The end of the wedge was now in, and Kaffirland must soon

fall," they said. The situation, charged with tension on both sides, was ready for the spark that would ignite the whole. A German missionary was murdered by a warrior of Phatho's — he who had once listened to the Rev. Shaw's promises of "protection" and redress. It was said that the missionary, a new arrival, was travelling in a coach lent by Theophilus Shepstone (who had negotiated the treaties) and was killed in mistake for him. Thus the missionary's son was spared to become the future "father" of the maZulu. Phatho refused to give up his man and the Ngqika and Ndlambe chiefs supported him in this.

The chiefs had been learning from bitter experience. While the British were pursuing the policy of "divide and Rule" in every conceivable way, and succeeding, there was at this time among the chiefs a strong drive towards unity. Captain Stretch reported that the Thembu and Ndlambe chiefs had declared that "We must stand by the House of Gaika (Ngqika) lest we be broken up as the Hottentots (Khoikhoi) were."

The usual small incident started the War of the Axe in 1846. Then the Governor issued a war manifesto declaring that "it was impossible to refrain any longer from punishing the systematic violation of justice and good faith on the part of the Kaffirs." But the first victories went to the united Xhosa tribes. Chief Phatho, disillusioned with missionary promises, threw in his lot with the maNdlambe and the maNgqika and only a section of the Fingos stood on the side of the British. This time the maXhosa did not spare the mission stations, but destroyed every one of them in their path: Wesleyan, London Missionary Society, Scottish and German. Two things seem to have prompted this act. The chiefs were resentful of the missionary interference with their christianised subjects, even though they were not in a position to understand fully all that the missionary was doing. The more immediate provocation, however, was the discovery that the mission stations were used as military camps. Light is thrown on this point by an incident recorded in the "History of Lovedale," by R.H.W. Shepherd. After the announcement of the Governor's war manifesto, British soldiers under Colonel Hare marched from Fort Beaufort to Burnshill Mission station, which had been set up near the Ngqika chief, Sandile, and up to this point "they did not meet the slightest resistance." From Burns-

hill they spread out on a man-and cattle-hunt, but as they were manipulating their booty through a narrow pass, the Xhosa counter-attacked and recovered their cattle, as well as some ammunition and stores. The fleeing British soldiery found refuge in Lovedale Missionary Institution, whose classrooms were turned into military barracks and its mission buildings into military stables, until Fort Hare, the largest fort in these parts, was built in 1847.

The war followed its usual course; for protracted fighting the assegai was no match for the gun and the "war" resolved itself into a cattle-driving, hut-burning expedition, with the fields laid waste. The British never failed to destroy the food of the people, knowing famine to be the strongest weapon of war.

And where were the Humanitarians? Where were the missionaries and "friends" of the African? They were unusually silent. Dr. Philip, we read, collected information for the Aborigines Society "which made no obvious use of it." And after all, the missionary-Superintendent had always advocated outright annexation of land. While protesting against the wastefulness of the military machine, he would have been illogical if he had quarrelled with its main result. We must not forget that he was a humble servant of British imperialism, and but one of its many servants, each of whom had to play his respective part. The liberal Fairbairn, his son-in-law and editor of the *Commercial Advertiser*, also supported the Governor and rejoiced that "the Fingos are as hostile to the Kaffirs as any could desire." The historian, Macmillan, comments that "there was an unusual consensus of opinion" amongst all sections of the population against the maXhosa, who had alarmed them by their strong resistance. But we are not surprised that the superficial differences between governor, missionary and frontier farmer should melt into thin air when it was a question of subjugating the African. The "restraint" of the Humanitarians at this time was the restraint that the liberals always exercise at the right moment and especially when they find the oppressed rejecting their overtures.

Now Stockenström came out of his retirement to "serve his Country" and led a burgher commando against the maXhosa (1846). As D'Urban had done in 1835, he entered the country of the Gcaleka beyond the Kei River and imposed on Sarili a treaty, making him responsible for the actions of the other Xhosa chiefs. He

next entered the territory of the baThembu, where his exploits are best described in his own cynical words:

"I attacked ... Mapasse ... driving off 7,000 cattle, killing many of the enemy and destroying numberless huts. ... The inglorious task, unredeemed by the least risk of danger, was performed with unmitigated severity."

This collaborator with the missionaries, he whom Philip had recommended as the only man fit to carry out his policy, concluded his Report to the Governor as follows:

"On one point all must be agreed. With their late acquired knowledge of their strength ... their power must be broken ... I contemplate the permanent incorporation of the Kaffir country to the Kei."

From now on till the climax of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing in 1856 the British pursued a policy of systematic devastation. The sheer ferocity of bullet, fire and famine was battering at the tribal system of the Bantu, and as the disintegration accelerated, so the plans for the control of the ever-increasing labour force were being put into action. The chiefs put up a strong and united resistance, but the forces of disunity were stronger. The chiefs could not rally their people as a whole, because hunger and destitution were driving great numbers of them to seek work with the very people who were destroying them. Economic necessity was dissolving tribal loyalty. The chiefs themselves were hunted men, their very office usurped by missionaries and the sons of missionaries. Sandile, the young chief of the maNgqika, was declared an outlaw and Charles Brownlee, son of the Rev. Brownlee, was made "chief" in his place.

It is not part of this history to detail the military campaign of these ten years, except in so far as it concerns our picture of the *working together* of the disruptive forces. It is sufficient to say that it was in the hands of a succession of military governors, each one more ruthless than his predecessor.

By 1847 the Governor, Maitland, had begun a system of registering those who gave up their arms and made submission as British subjects. He planned to place these under the direct control of magistrates and ignore the authority of the chiefs. This was an effective instrument of detribalisation. At the same time the British never failed to employ "divide and rule" to break the back of their military resistance. While

Phatho and other chiefs were still refusing to capitulate, the Governor was planning to fill up their lands with Fingos, Khoikhoi and "friendly Kafirs ... in some measure organised for defence, under British superintendence and supported by the military posts ... with the desirable addition of a missionary." While he planned to break the resisting tribes by "systematic devastation", he set aside new Reserves for the Fingos, who, armed with muskets, had destroyed the flower of Phatho's army, and he placed them under conditions that ensured further detribalisation, namely, under the control of a magistrate and a missionary.

The missionaries for their part identified themselves with the actions of the Government. In a memorial addressed to Maitland and signed by the Rev. William Shaw, the Wesleyans said:

"From an intimate knowledge of the people and their history on both sides of the boundary, we feel high satisfaction in supporting your Excellency's declaration, that this war has not been the result of any conduct of the border colonists towards the tribes of an oppressive or unjust character, nor is it chargeable upon any act of your Excellency's ..."

As before, the missionaries also constituted themselves the Governor's advisers, precisely because of this vaunted "intimate knowledge" of the people. But a new function now devolved upon them. This we shall best see if we follow the activities of the Rev. Henry Calderwood during this period.

New Functions

The Rev. Henry Calderwood was well-fitted to carry out the policy which the missionary-superintendent, Dr. Philip, had long since formulated, of integrating the conquered people into the economic system of the rulers. He looked beyond the military conquest to the second stage when an ordered society would be in a position to control the people it had subjugated. Hence his repeated emphasis on the necessity of the Government — a military Government — to *understand the Caffre Question*.

As missionary to the Ngqika people he very soon demonstrated his usefulness to the Government by his penetrating observations on the people among whom he had been placed. He was largely responsible for those clauses in the

Revised Treaties which attacked African custom and differentiated between the Christian African and the rest of the tribe. It was a perfectly logical step, therefore, to turn him into their Commissioner or chief magistrate, armed with legal authority to usurp the function of the chief. This was but to confirm what the chiefs themselves had already feared would happen. Throughout 1847 he noted that amongst the maNgqika, whom he described as the "strongest", there was a breakdown of tribalism. The upheavals caused by invasion were cutting across the tribal divisions and breaking up tribal unity, since the people sought refuge by dispersing themselves among the tribes beyond the Kei River, some going as far afield as Griquatown, where the chief, Waterboer, held uneasy rule between the missionaries and the Boers. But many more turned southwards to their old lands, hungry men looking for work, and this was a step fraught with much greater change in their mode of life.

Now the missionary-commissioner-magistrate assumed yet another function. The war-enriched farmers, who had paid high prices for land, were "in great distress" for labour, so the Government came to their assistance and encouraged recruiting through the Commissioners. It is recorded that "The Government approved of Calderwood engaging even the lately independent Xosa for service with masters who were prepared to take charge of and provide for them on their own premises." (Macmillan: "Bantu, Boer and Briton.") As recruiting agent, Calderwood despatched hundreds into the Colony to meet the farmers' needs. Applications, we are told, came from far afield and complaints were made that they "could use four times as many." It was a very significant fact that Calderwood recommended that the Africans should be sent in separate *families*, and "as far into the Colony as possible." The missionary thus aimed to expedite their detribalisation.

Thus we see the labour pattern developing. The engine of war was ceaselessly grinding the people and its wheels could not turn fast enough to feed the ever-growing demands of the colonists. For land-plunder meant economic expansion; it meant the springing up of towns and villages and sea-ports; it meant the increase of trade and agriculture and the beginnings of industry. The wheels of this great new machine were also turning, though slowly as yet, for gold and diamonds had still to be discovered. But this

economic machine already demanded black hands in thousands and tens of thousands. Government proclamations and enactments are often the barometer of economic needs; from the Glen Grey Act of 1894 down to the Bantu Authorities Act of to-day laws for the control of African labour follow each other in a steady progression. So it was at the beginning of 1848 when a Government Proclamation proposed to "apprentice" Africans to add to the "scanty supply of labour." It also proposed to "reclaim a number of the youth of British Kaffraria." We who are acquainted with the dire application of the "Rehabilitation Scheme" in the Reserves do not need to be told what devastation and exploitation lay behind that phrase.

The new Governor, Colonel (now Sir Harry) Smith had just dictated "peace" to the Xhosa chiefs. This he did in his capacity as High Commissioner for South Africa, a new title instituted by the Imperial Government to represent the Great White Queen in its negotiations with the Chiefs. **In language of which only the British are masters, the Colonial Secretary declared that:**

"The welfare of our uncivilized neighbours, and not least the welfare of the colonists, require that the Kafir tribes should no longer be left in possession of the independence they have so long enjoyed and abused."

Henceforward the maXhosa were to occupy a fraction of the land they had once possessed. The land of the Ngqika people was annexed as Victoria East; in the Tyhume valley above the Lovedale Missionary Institution, the soldiers who had carried out the "loot" policy of Governor Pottinger (Maitland's Successor) were settled in villages. "British Kaffraria" extended to the Kei and beyond it Sarili, Chief of the Gcaleka, was commanded to recognise the Queen's sovereignty over the main road to the mission stations of Butterworth and Clarkebury. The Government's appreciation of the missionaries is further reflected in this special clause.

All missionaries are invited to return to their missions; and, that no misunderstanding or misconception may arise, Her Majesty's Commissioner gives notice that the land of their mission stations shall be held from Her Majesty, and not from any Kafir chief whatever."

Lovedale and other missionary institutions, which had served as military barracks during

the war, were restored to their former function. And, as the Rev. Robert Shepherd comments in his "History of Lovedale," "missionary work was easier in many quarters because the chiefs had lost much of their power."

As soon as Sir Harry Smith assumed office he entrusted the Rev. Calderwood with the important task of working out "Native" policy in detail. The Governor's appreciation of his fitness for the task can be judged from the following reference in his Despatches:

"Considering the services of the Rev. Henry Calderwood, valuable as they are, would be of even greater utility within the new colonial border . . . he is appointed Civil Commissioner of Victoria and Resident Magistrate of Alice."

Thus the Rev. Calderwood took his place in the long line of missionaries and sons of missionaries who have distinguished themselves in this field of service on behalf of their Governments: such men as Dr. Philip, the Rev. Shaw, and the Rev. Boyce, of the older generation, and among the younger, Charles Brownlee, Theophilus Shepstone and the sons of the Rev. Ayliff, all of whom eventually became Ministers of "Native" Affairs or Government officials.

Calderwood worked out his "location Scheme" — as it has been called — on the Fingos, who came under his jurisdiction. In the Fort Peddie and Fort Beaufort districts, where the Fingos were placed, the land had been divided up amongst the English and Dutch colonists so that there was a more or less settled community in which to carry out experiments in the Government's labour policy. In the treatment of the Fingos we see the shape of things to come. It may be said that Calderwood acted throughout in close co-operation with his former colleagues, the missionaries.

Calderwood instituted a system of taxation which had the double purpose of forcing the Africans to work for the neighbouring farmers and also paying for the whole system of control over the Reserve. The Reserve was divided into individual small holdings for which an annual quit-rent of One Pound had to be paid; passes were issued to control "vagrants" coming into the Reserve. In the first place the idea of individual property, together with the payment of money, cut right across the tribal custom of common ownership. This did not liberate the individual, however, but on the contrary, was designed to turn him into the White man's la-

bourer. The holdings were too small to provide him with a livelihood for himself and his family, so that he had to seek work to pay his tax. The Reserve thus constituted a reservoir of labour for the local farmers. Of course the idea was not entirely new. The Khoikhoi of the Kat River settlement held their land on similar terms and Smith (assisted by the Wesleyan missionaries) had been working in the same scheme at the end of the war against Hintsa in 1835. The second principle involved in the scheme was the undermining of the authority of the chiefs. The magistrate himself usurped an important function of the chief by judging cases and imposing fines and Calderwood further instituted rule by headmen under Government control.

All these were methods deliberately designed to hasten the disintegration of tribalism in order to draw the people into the new economic system. What the Rev. Calderwood began, Sir George Grey was to continue on a much larger scale.

The Government also turned its attention to the all-important question of education, and for the same purpose. It is a task that it has always assigned to the missionaries. In 1848 the Secretary for the High Commissioner sent out a circular to the various missionaries asking for their views on the best methods of "inducing the Bantu to follow habits of industry, the first step to civilization." The circular also emphasised the following points:

"Too much pains cannot be taken to impress them with the necessity for wearing clothes and of the use of money, which, industriously gained, honestly obtains what their wants desire. His Excellency also requests your (the missionaries') opinion as to the best method of establishing schools on such a footing as would ensure hereafter teachers from among themselves, and of all things His Excellency requests that the English language be taught to the total exclusion of the Kafir dialect."

The far-reaching implications of these educational plans will be examined presently when we review the achievements of Sir George Grey, who became Governor and High Commissioner of the Cape Colony in 1854, the same year in which the liberals at last achieved their goal of Responsible Government. From that time onward the social and economic pattern of South African society could begin to unfold, even though the wars of conquest were not yet over.

In the Cape Colony the conditions for development were established in advance of any other part of Southern Africa.

For this the way was paved by the war of 1850–52 (known as the “War of Umlanjeni” – *Mlanjeni being a Xhosa prophet of the time*). In it, British Aggression reached a new peak of ruthlessness. Sir Harry Smith stated:

“The Kafirs must be totally deprived of arms; kept under subjection by military force for years to come; ruled at the outset through chiefs, whose power must gradually diminish; they must be held in subjection and taught their own insignificance . . . Peace is not the word. They must surrender and implore for mercy.”

And again:

“*The only means of ending this distressing war is to wrest his (Sarili’s) much-prized cattle from him in the heart of his fastnesses.*”

It is noteworthy that the Nongqause Cattle-Killing not long afterwards did this and much more.

Various reasons prompted the British to this rage of suppression. They were aware that never before had the Bantu tribes come together with such a determination to resist the invader. Sections of the baThembu and the maMpondo had joined the Xhosa; Sarili, chief of the Gcaleka, together with the old fighter, Maqoma, and the younger Sandile, chief of the maNgqika, and Phatho, planned three concerted points of attack on the Colony. And their forces were augmented by sections of the Khoikhoi of the Kat River Settlement, and from the mission stations of Theopolis and Shiloh. There is no doubt that the Government viewed this evidence of unity with alarm. It must be remembered that at this period the whole of Southern Africa was in a ferment. British and Boers were in “Natal”; the Boers were over the Orange River into the land of the Griqua and the baSotho; the story of plunder and fraud enacted on the Eastern Frontier was being repeated in other parts of the

country as far as the Vaal River and even beyond it. But in the north there was one chief whom the British feared more than any other, and that was Moshoeshoe, chief of the baSotho. They knew that he sought to strengthen his nation by alliances with other tribes, and that unity between him and the Xhosa chiefs would seriously threaten their position. Colonel Maclean, the Commissioner stationed among the maNgqika, expressed the opinion that “a shrewd people like the Kaffirs would not overlook so promising an ally as Moshoeshoe.” We do not for one moment, however, subscribe to the view (commonly put forward by herrenvolk historians) that Moshoeshoe instigated the unnatural act of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing in order to drive the maXhosa into an attack on the Colony. On the contrary, we would point out that for the British it was necessary at all costs to break any unity between the chiefs and they would therefore use any and every means to do so. Another factor that seriously alarmed them was the increasing use of guns on the part of the Bantu, for this reduced the military advantage they had previously had over a people armed only with assegai and shield.

There is one other aspect of this “War of Umlanjeni” which calls for comment, because it has a bearing on the final destruction of the maXhosa effected through the Nongqause Cattle-Killing. We refer to the fact that Government Despatches noted the great influence exercised by Mlanjeni, of the tribe of Ndlambe. This Mlanjeni, they were informed, was like the warrior-prophet, Makhanda, whom the people believed would one day return to save them. He claimed to hold converse with the dead; he prophesied the miracle of turning bullets into water and driving the English into the sea. He seems to have combined the mysteries of the witch-doctor with the appeal to the miraculous common to the Hebrews of the Old Testament. Tribal superstition infused with the fanaticism of Christian faith held dangerous possibilities.

Chapter VIII

“Christianity and Civilization”

In the eighteen-fifties and after, British politicians were wont to invoke Divine Providence, the Queen and the might of Empire in one breath. As they saw it, “God’s purpose was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant.” Inspi-

red by the profits of Empire, the language of politicians soared to heaven while rivers of blood of the oppressed people were flowing throughout the earth.

It was right and fitting that the missionaries, as agents of the Government, should take up this lofty tone of high moral responsibility, but what is surprising is to find it put into the mouth of a Black chief. In his book "Chief Moroka," S. M. Molema quotes the following letter as coming from the Rarolong chief to Sir George Grey:

"We desire to tender our warmest thanks to Her Majesty Queen Victoria for being an eye to the blind in sending a God-fearing man as Governor and High Commissioner to this benighted land, whose philanthropic heart has done so much already for that temporal and spiritual improvement of the aborigines both here and in other countries, and whose name guarantees further blessings for the future."

Sir George Grey was thus hailed as the great liberal administrator who brought the blessings of Christianity and Civilization to the African people.

Let us see what exactly Grey planned and carried out in relation to the peoples of this country. He was the first administrator who was not a military man and the choice is significant of the new stage reached in the subjugation of the Africans. The corner-stone of his policy was to break the power of the chiefs and destroy the tribal system, a task for which he had received ample training, for he had just come from the subjugation of the Maoris of New Zealand by methods that were to become familiar in his new sphere of colonial activity. He may well be called the direct inheritor of Dr. Philip's schemes for the expansion of the British Empire. His plans were as sweeping as the military plunder that had preceded him and paved the way for the application of those plans.

As we have said, the breaking down of one system, tribalism, was at the same time directed to the integration of the conquered peoples into the economic system of the invaders. If this was to bring "Christianity and Civilization—" to the African people, we must carefully analyse the process, or we are left with an empty phrase that does nothing to explain how the people, who were set on that road by Grey's far-reaching schemes, are to-day destitute of human rights in the land of their birth. **At this point we would do well to recall our first question: where did the missionaries come from? What was the nature of the civilization that sent them throughout the world to christianize the Non-White peoples? We indicated that to answer this question is to find the key to the activities of the most liberal of politicians as well as the most humanitarian of missionaries and the most ruthless of military commanders.**

Sir George Grey took a practical view of his task when he said:

"The Natives are to become useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue, in short, a source of strength and wealth to this Colony, such as Providence designed them to be."

We can at once recognise the similarity between this and Dr. Philip's statement when he demonstrated the benefits of "liberating" the Khoikhoi:

"By adopting a more liberal system of policy towards this interesting class of subjects, they will be more productive, there will be an increased consumption of British manufactures, taxes will be paid and farmers will have no cause to complain of a lack of labour."

Philip, Calderwood, Grey, they all handled the same problem, each one carrying the solution a step further. The end aim of Grey's policy was to create an army of workers who would actually build up the new civilization, known as "Western Civilization." By every possible means he sought to bind the Africans to a money economy. This applied to chiefs and headmen as well as to the mass of the people.

Money economy

Grey's first line of approach was extremely simple. He proposed to employ Africans on public works, the making of roads and such like, which would open up their country to further penetration. For their labour they would receive payment in money, the coin of the new economy. He had tried this out on the tribes of southern Australia and later in New Zealand, and boasted that he had never found it to fail. When half the day's toil was over, they would receive *sixpence; at the end of the day, another sixpence*. Sometimes they received payment in kind, such as sugar, salt or coffee, the White man's food. When they were fined, the payment of the fine had to be in money.

This process of binding the Africans to a money economy had a revolutionising effect on all relationships within the tribe. It tended to dissolve the old tribal allegiances, to break those ancient ties between the people and the chiefs, between the headman and the chiefs, and also that allegiance of the chiefs and headmen towards the people.

The attack on the position of the chiefs was an important part of Grey's scheme. The problem of depriving them of power had long exercised the mind of military governors, since the chiefs were the leaders of their people in war as well as in peace. And the military machine had done its work pretty thoroughly. Insecurity had

of itself disrupted the orderly life of the community and hunger was a mighty weapon of conquest. How could a chief, as head of his tribe, carry out his traditional functions, if the material conditions necessary to it were being razed to the ground? With his position thus weakened, it was an easy matter to undermine it further by forcing on him a representative of the Government. This policy had already been applied by Smith and it remained only for Grey to pursue it more vigorously.

There were three lines of attack: first, payment of the chief in money; secondly, placing a White magistrate over the chief; thirdly, driving a wedge between the headman and the chief. As to the first:

“Under such a plan” (of payment), wrote Grey, “every chief will be dependent on the Government and will, therefore, *have the strongest interest in its maintenance and success.*”

This was a cynically accurate observation. The chief, having thus relinquished his independence, would owe allegiance to the master who paid him. No longer could he afford to be the guardian of his people. The logical result of going to the little box to receive his pay, was that he could be utilized to betray his people.

The second part of the scheme was, of course, bound up with the first; the money payment was supposed to be a convenient substitute for the revenue derived from fines, which the chief would lose if cases were tried by a White magistrate. But by submitting to such an arrangement he lost very much more than his revenue. He lost his very birthright, his chieftainship. The Government adopted the usual tactic of professing to have the welfare of the people at heart – including that of the chief. Grey proposed that the chief should be “daily brought into contact with a talented and honourable European gentleman who will hourly interest himself in the advance and improvement of the entire tribe.” One such European gentleman privately reported that:

“I have carefully explained to the chief that I have to act as his friend and *not* as the chief of his tribe . . . I need scarcely say I laboured to correct the impression that white men were to be sent by the Government as chiefs.”

We need scarcely say the truth was far otherwise. The magistrate constituted a new authority directing the people to a new allegiance, away from the chief. The law was the law of the Great White Queen. The African believed he could appeal to the Great White Queen for justice. Thus the minds of the people were prepared for the acceptance of a system of laws that were to bind them fast to the wheels of the new economy.

Likewise in the payment of headmen the Government drove a wedge, not only between them and their chief, but between them and their people. They, too, in serving a new master could be used to betray their people. Grey’s immediate purpose, however, was to undermine the power of the chiefs. A certain Mr. Chalmers, a magistrate’s clerk, has left a record of the scheme.

“The instructions of Sir George Grey were that we were to treat the councillors or headmen in such a manner as to win them from their chiefs to the Government and by their instrumentality win the people to us and overthrow the chiefs, who had always been such a source of anxiety, danger and loss to the whole country and to the Imperial Government.”

“Our main hope and power in carrying out the policy,” he continued, “lay in the councillors. Through them a great revolution was quietly, unostentatiously, but surely effected in the (future) management of the natives.”

And he concluded with the following words:

“Suffice it is to say that the power of the chiefs has been completely and forever broken.”

An apt footnote to all these schemes is supplied by Senator Brookes in his book, “The History of Native Policy in South Africa.” He writes:

“Doubtless the fact that the Grey System was financially self-supporting weighed heavily in its favour at the Colonial Office. The payments to chiefs and headmen were met out in the annual Hut Tax.”

First Problem of Education

These levers or instruments for transforming the lives of the people and their modes of thought were not left to operate by themselves. They were reinforced by other powerful agencies. In fact, the problem presented itself as one of *educating* the people into the economic system of their conquerors. This was a many-sided task involving much more than formal teaching; *at this stage*, it meant opening up channels that led imperceptibly but *inescapably* to the new economy. Grey was aware of the many-sidedness of the task and enlisted the aid of those most fitted for it. He placed the missionaries at the centre of his schemes for education. He gave financial support for increased missionary activity and the establishment of mission schools. It is clear that he related education directly to his labour policy. Soon after his arrival he called a meeting of missionaries at Lovedale and laid his plans before them. “Native” education, he said, was too bookish. In handling

the Maoris of New Zealand (whom he had had under his jurisdiction for nine years) he had found it most useful to promote schemes for industrial education. He now proposed that the missionary institutions should undertake the same training for African students, and gave them increased grants for the purpose. Several centres for training in "the more useful mechanical arts" were established; the Rev. Ayliff, for example, became the head of an industrial college at Healdtown, while Lovedale fell into line with the new policy. Consultation between the Governor and the heads of Lovedale College (writes Dr. Shepherd in his "History of Lovedale") resulted in "a cordial understanding and agreement between them as to the institution, to be conducted by the mission, under the patronage and with the assistance of Government." **While the Institution was now to be combined with an industrial department, the missionaries were instructed to "give higher education to a portion of the native youths, to raise up among them what might be called an educated class, from which might be selected teachers of the young, catechists, evangelists and ultimately even fully-qualified preachers of the gospel." Moreover, African teacher-missionaries, thus trained, were to receive special Government grants towards their salaries.**

Two points are noteworthy here. First, Grey's educational policy recognised the necessity for creating a special, privileged "class" of educated Africans who would carry out the work of the missionaries among their own people — a class which, like the headmen and the chiefs, would tend to owe allegiance, not to their own people, but to the Government of the White man. As the astute Governor had said of his plan to subsidize the chiefs: "They will have the strongest interest in its maintenance and success."

Secondly, we would observe how consistent the rulers have been in relating the education of the Black man to their economic needs, to their requirements of labour. From the beginning up to the Eiselin Commission of 1952 the question has always been: How shall we prepare the Black man for his *particular place* in this society? Inspired by faith in the White man's Christianity and Civilization, the Black man assumed that he would share in its benefits. But the rulers were never in any doubt as to the particular education required for it. Like Rhodes, Grey emphasised the necessity to "eradicate native indolence." His schemes for training Africans in "the more useful mechanical arts," flowed from his original standpoint that "The Natives are to become useful servants . . . such as Providence designed them to be."

Grey's generous support of the missionaries

was a recognition of how far-reaching their influence could be. Taking their educational task in its wider aspect, they had to help to build up a whole system of new ideas, new needs and desires, new allegiances, new authorities, and a new morality, all leading to an *acceptance* of the new civilization by the Africans. From the beginning the mission station was a school where Christian dogma and moral instruction went hand in hand. The convert was taught the importance of faith and obedience to the word of God, and the indisputability of faith as being above reason. Thus his individual relationship to God set up a new authority in his mind. At the same time he learned new ideas of good and evil, reward and punishment and sin, ideas appropriate to the White man's civilization. The tribal morality, that had hitherto exercised authority over him, became immorality. For example, the custom of lobolo was denounced as "the sin of buying wives." The new morality had a great deal to do with the undermining of tribal culture. But the particular aspect we stress here is the link between the new morality and the new money-economy.

Commerce and Christianity

One might say that the Lancashire cotton trade owed a debt of gratitude to the moral teachings of the missionaries. New needs and desires, and the new sense of the sinful body, led straight to the local trading-store. But a man could buy nothing there without paying for it, in the coin of the White man, or in cattle or grain, or by getting into debt. So he had no choice but to go out and labour for the White man. Now as to their connection with trade the missionaries themselves were perfectly frank. We recall Dr Philip's emphasis on the creation of "artificial wants." The Rev. Kay, a Wesleyan missionary, put it neatly when he said: "Christianity laid the foundations of Commerce." And Charles Brownlee, son of the Rev. Brownlee, and magistrate with the maNgqika, could state from practical experience: To the missionaries mainly we owe the great revenue derived from native trade."

It is a long tradition that has linked Commerce with Christianity. In the Middle Ages the economic expansion of Europe was at the root of the Christian Crusades against the Mohammedans; the Spanish and Portuguese slave-traders and plunderers of the New World went forth with a holy cross at the mast-head of their ships; it was the combined inspiration of Christian piety and profit that sent the Elizabethan adventurers in the late sixteenth century to join in the commercial crusade begun by their rivals and that had stood the British in good stead from that time onwards. In Grey's time there

was a certain David Livingstone, who, though he wore the sober black cloth of a Scots minister of the gospel, carried on something of the tradition of the Elizabethan adventurers. He and Grey kept up a keen correspondence on the question of opening up Central Africa to commerce and christianity, establishing British settlements *on the Zambesi and founding a great cotton trade.*

“We (missionaries) are spoken of in contempt as traders,” wrote Livingstone, “but who has a better right to trade than we? Who in fairness ought to reap the profits of the markets, which we make and render secure, than ourselves?”

Such were the links, then, between Christianity, commerce and labour. While the African had no means of knowing the economic implications of his act of faith, Christianity did not exist in a vacuum. Its evangelists spoke freely of heaven and hell, but its roots were planted firmly in the capitalist civilization of their masters, an industrial civilization that was sending its many agents into Africa, Asia and India in the search for new markets and raw materials, for new lands to conquer and countless Black hands to labour for it. Christianity itself was an ideological weapon of what was called “Western Civilization.”

The Nongqause Cattle-Killing

We have seen the remarkable range of Grey’s plans in relation to the Africans. The still more remarkable thing is that Providence seemed to take a hand in his scheme. Every step in his policy had been designed to increase the labour force required on the farms and in the towns and villages springing up in the Colony. The Nongqause Cattle-Killing, an act of terrible faith on the part of the Xhosa and Thembu people, increased that labour force by hundreds of thousands. From the hearsay records that have come down to us, the story may be briefly told.

One day a young girl by the name of Nongqause, the daughter of Mhlakaza, came running to tell her father that some strange people had appeared in a boat on the river near her home. She had been afraid of them, because they were light-complexioned, and though they spoke in her own tongue, she had never seen such people before. But they had signed to her and addressed her in a friendly way. At her news, Mhlakaza hastened with Nongqause to see what manner of men they were. On arriving at the spot, he could not at first see anyone, but Nongqause pointed out their shadows among the tall reeds. The strangers did not reveal their identity and, while still concealing themselves, reassured Mhlakaza that they came as his friend and the

friend of his people. They had heard of the sufferings of the Xhosa people and pitied their distressed condition. Then with a great air of mystery they told Mhlakaza that they knew of a way to restore peace and bring happiness and plenty to his people. Mhlakaza greatly wondered at what the strangers had to say and again *they assured him that they had come from far across the water in their great desire to help the maXhosa.* When they had said all, they disappeared among the reeds as mysteriously as they had come.

Now Mhlakaza, who was a seer, was much moved at what the strangers had commanded him to do, and he and Nongqause went and told the people all that they had heard. They bade them prepare for the day of liberation, the “Great Day of the Lord.” They prophesied the resurrection of men and cattle, and the filling of the fields with ripe corn where no man had sowed; dead heroes – Makhanda, Ngqika, Hintsa – would rise again and lead their people into freedom. The heavens themselves would herald the dawn of that day of liberation, for the sun would descend, not to the west, but to the east; there would be darkness and thunder and lightning and a mighty whirlwind would sweep the White man down into the sea together with all those who did not believe the prophesy. But before these miracles could come to pass, the people were commanded to slaughter all their cattle, cast away all their grain, leave their corn-pits empty and their fields untilled.

Many among the Ngqika, Gcaleka and Thembu tribes believed this prophecy, but many refused to believe.

“The cattle are the race, they being dead, the race dies,” said a Thembu chief, and refused to slaughter his cattle. On the other hand it is said that Suthu, mother of Sandile, and the first woman among the Ngqika to become christianized, urged the fulfilling of this monstrous deed. No situation could have been better calculated to hasten the disintegration that had already begun and bring about greater disunity. So desperate a belief was in itself a mark of the demoralisation of the people. Several chiefs tried to stem the tide of fanaticism that swept the country; chief was divided against chief, brother against brother. Famine and fratricidal strife delivered the Africans into the hands of the White man. It was never possible to reckon how many people perished, though it has been estimated at many thousands. Those who survived streamed southwards in search of food.

Origin of The Cattle-Killing?

A mystery has been allowed to surround the origin of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing. The cu-

stomary Government Commission of Enquiry after the event concentrated on proving the guilt of the chiefs – not for the first time – and much herrenvolk ink has subsequently been spilt endorsing its conclusions. Those who describe Hintsa, Chief of the maGcaleka, as “that treacherous and ungrateful savage,” ask us to believe that Sarili, his son, and Moshoeshoe, Chief of the baSotho, together concocted this dire plan of self-destruction in order to let loose a desperate and maddened horde upon the Colony. As recent a writer as Dr. J. van der Poel has stated: “There is no doubt at all that Moshesh was the instigator of the unrest, his idea being to precipitate a crown of starving kaffirs on the Colony while he dealt with the Free State.”

We totally reject such an explanation of the event. In the midst of the plunder and intrigue of Boer and British going on around him, every effort of Moshoeshoe’s acute intelligence was directed to saving and unifying his people, not to their destruction. Charles Brownlee, the magistrate, remarked of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing that “This will do more to destroy the people than any war” – which was indeed true. All the more impossible, therefore, for Moshoeshoe to resort to so desperate a plan, whose prime effect was to fling the already disorganised Xhosa into greater confusion and disunity. This same Brownlee, in his “Reminiscences,” reveals how he utilized the perplexity into which Sandile was thrown by the prophet’s command to slaughter his cattle, to widen the breach between him and his brother, Magoma. It may be said here that the herrenvolk argument, even on their own evidence, was not proven. The Basutoland Records show the Chief Commissioner of “Kaffraria,” Colonel Maclean, the magistrate, Charles Brownlee, and the missionary, the Rev. John Ayliff, all trying to find proof of collusion between Moshoeshoe and Sarili, yet in 1856 they have to report – as Ayliff had done in the case of Hintsa – that “though they used their utmost endeavours, they have failed in learning anything of these or later messages.” If Moshoeshoe’s envoys brought to Sarili the message of unity, it was in keeping with his policy; but that he was the instigator of the wholesale slaughter of cattle, is wholly alien to that policy. As we have suggested, it was in British interests to isolate Moshoeshoe from any possible ally, so that the disorganisation of the maXhosa brought about by the Cattle-Killing, strengthened the position of the Government and weakened that of Moshoeshoe.

Herrenvolk historians themselves comment on the strange absence of any attempt to attack the Colony, which, they allege, was the reason for destroying the cattle. This was in marked

contrast to the behaviour of the Xhosa chiefs in 1850 when they carefully planned a concerted attack from three directions. But there was nothing strange about it. Since 1846, not to speak of what had gone before, they had been continually harried by open aggression, and just prior to the Cattle-Killing, Smith had, in his own words, “carried on systematically that devastation that will induce the people to submit to terms.” And when did a people ever prepare for war by famine?

Grey’s own behaviour contradicts the alleged fear of a violent attack on the Colony. In the period preceding the promised day of miraculous liberation, he had been buying up cheaply the grain so recklessly squandered and the cattle that could not be slaughtered fast enough by a people crazed by faith. Without undue haste or anxiety he bade his military commander have a force in readiness, while he himself, shortly before the Day, entered the territory to see for himself the extent of the self-destruction of the people, and, as it is recorded, brought back with him two or three captured chiefs. Then, as a disillusioned and starving people, leaving their dead behind them, made their way into the Colony, they were received by the magistrates, and sent as labourers wherever required. It is estimated that about 34,000 took service with White farmers.

While it is not important – or indeed necessary – to disprove the accusations of the Government against the chiefs, it clears the way to ask: what, then, lay behind the Nongqause Cattle Killing? The more one looks into this national tragedy, the more one realises that the falsification permeating the whole of the herrenvolk history of South Africa distorts this event also.

To this day many Africans are of the opinion that the strangers who spoke so mysteriously to the young Nongqause and then concealed themselves in the reeds, were actually sent by the White people. Be that as it may, one has to meet the fact that the destruction of cattle was directly – even violently – opposed to the whole social system of the maXhosa and therefore at variance with their whole way of thinking. How, then, could they have been moved to carry out an act of faith that led to their destruction? It could only happen to a people in a profound state of demoralisation, and in one sense it marked the final triumph of the British military machine that had been battering at tribalism for more than fifty years. But the particular form in which that demoralisation expressed itself was, in our opinion, due to the influence of the missionaries, in fact, directly due to their teachings.

It is well known that the more desperate a pe-

ople become, the more prone they are to call upon supernatural aid. They seek deliverance from an intolerable position. In this instance the soil had been well ploughed by the relentless devastations of war, so that the Christian message of peace would gain a willing hearing. How often must the missionaries have taught the blessings of faith and told the tale of how the ancient Israelites were by a series of miracles delivered from bondage and led into a promised land, flowing with milk and honey? It was not the first time, nor the last, that an oppressed people identified themselves with the Israelites, whose story of deliverance from the yoke of the oppressor is part of the heritage of Christians.

The impact of the White man's religion was capable of producing just such an act of blind faith as the Nongqause Cattle-Killing involved. Here was an appeal to the supernatural to which the people were all too ready to respond. Before the unknown forces of nature, the tribalist's only weapon is the magic rite; and confronted with the military force of an unknown civilization, he would seize upon those elements in the Christian gospel which seemed most likely to offer him protection: the belief in miracles, the resurrection of the dead, the promise of peace and plenty after tribulation and sorrow. It is in this sense that we say the Nongqause Cattle-Killing was missionary-inspired. It was the first fruits of the subjugation over the minds of the people. At the end of the wars of aggression the people were in a condition to be swept into a madness by wild rumour, superstition and faith.

In trying to assess how such a national tragedy occurred it is legitimate to be guided by a judgment of its results. At one stroke Sir George Grey's labour requirements were satisfied beyond expectation. The cattle had been slaughtered and the corn-pits were empty, but his labour bureaus were filled to the brim. The magistrates — Grey's "honourable European gentlemen" — worked overtime drafting thousands of starving men to the various applicants for cheap labour; like the missionaries before them they had to become recruiting agents. Thousands of men were indentured to farmers for a term of five years at the rate of 5/- a month. (See "Native Labour in South Africa," by Sheila van der Horst.) So great was the embarrassment of riches from the destitution of the Africans, that in 1857, the year of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing, six Acts of Parliament were passed to control the "influx of Natives." If herrenvolk historians can ascribe to Grey at this time the role of the "saviour of thousands," then equally may they describe the Rehabilitation Scheme (the se-

cond "Nongqause") as a scheme to "save" the Reserves.

With new territorial gains, also, the Governor could now pursue his plans for the importation of large numbers of European immigrants. For this, he had sent an armed force against Sarili and the remaining maGcaleka to drive them across the Bashee to a bare tract of territory near the sea. To the land that was already dead through an act of blind faith, had succeeded a state of war — *Ilizwe lilele*. In the confiscated territory Grey planted German legionaries and peasants, leaving some Reserves for "loyal Natives." In so doing he aimed to cut off Moshoeshoe from the coast tribes and link the Cape Colony in the north-east with Natal.

This faithful servant of British Imperialism had this in common with Dr. Philip, Rhodes and General Smuts, that his vision was never confined merely to the Cape. Beyond its borders the conflict between Black and White on the military level was still in progress, and it was by no means certain yet that the issue would be in favour of the Whites.

In the Cape Colony, however, the military power of the maXhosa and the baThembu had been broken; a vast labour force had been acquired and the Europeans could look forward to a period of unprecedented prosperity. From Dr. van der Horst's "Native Labour in South Africa" we get some idea of the extent of economic development during the late fifties of last century. Farming, trade and industry flourished; import and export figures showed a rapid rise. Grey's importation of thousands of Indian labourers, too, was an index of the ever-growing need for cheap labour. The pattern of modern South African society was in the making.

In summing up the results of the Nongqause Cattle-Killing, the picture would not be complete if we omitted the fact that the missionaries were now in a position to exercise their various functions on a much larger scale than before. In his "History of Lovedale," Dr. Shepherd writes:

"Doors were opened for missionary work in hitherto untouched districts and a period of steady and afterwards rapid expansion began."

During the wars of aggression against the maXhosa the missionaries had assisted the Government in a variety of ways, their most distinctive role being that of agents of "divide and

rule.—' In assessing the forces that brought about the downfall of the maXhosa, there is no doubt that a most important factor was the breach made in the Xhosa ranks by the missionaries. The first and catastrophic breach was that which separated Ngqika from Hintsa and Ndlambe, thus setting Xhosa against Xhosa. This was the crucial point of disruption. At the very time when these three should have been welded into one force — for together they were in a strong position and the British knew it — Ngqika was persuaded to accept the "friendship" of Britain, and with his own hand he gave the enemy access to Xhosa territory. The winning over of Phatho and his brothers by the Wesleyans further widened that breach between Xhosa and Xhosa. The division between Gealeka and Fingo was not comparable in its effects to that first betrayal by Ngqika. It came at a time when the Xhosa military strength was already seriously impaired. While the impression is frequently conveyed that Fingo regiments were used in the wars against the Xhosa, the truth of the matter is they were a comparatively small group and their military contribution necessarily insignificant. We cannot get away from the fact that the House of Phalo (Xhosa) was defeated largely by the actions of the Xhosa themselves.

Grey's administration had opened up a new stage of conquest and with it a new era of economic development. Within this framework an

extended field of activity lay before the missionaries. Their educational task had only begun. A large labour force had been precipitated into the economic system of the conquerors, but their hold over it was a precarious one and would have to be reinforced by every device of persuasion as well as compulsion. This is where the missionaries could play an indispensable part. They would have to be the educators preparing the Non-Europeans as a whole to take their particular place in the new civilization; they would have to be the conciliators reconciling them to that place in society. Their task would be to disarm the people morally and intellectually in order to ensure the continuance of White domination.

The achieving of British supremacy in Southern Africa, however, was still far from being completed on the military plane. In the following chapters we shall attempt to give it in broad outline, indicating how the activities of the missionaries fitted into the other fields of conquest. As the military aggression accelerates, they necessarily recede into the background. But we must not lose sight of the fact that precisely as the territorial conquest advances, so the secondary function of the missionary as educator comes increasingly into force. With the completion of the military phase of conquest the missionary emerges as an all-important agent in assisting the herrenvolk in their attempt to perpetuate the subjugation of the people.

Chapter IX

Triumph of Disunity (1)

The Griqua Nation

The conflict between Black and White in the north and north-east, beyond the Orange River, in Basutoland, and beyond the Vaal River, presents a complicated picture. Here the missionaries played an equally important role, together with that section of the Dutch who left the Cape Colony in small groups under different leaders — the Trek Boers. Inter-tribal strife, fomented by the Whites, was used to their advantage. The figure that presented to the invaders the greatest obstacle to their aims was Moshoeshoe, chief of the Sotho nation, and it is round him that much of the history of the north from the thirties on to the sixties revolves. Griqualand, too, on the banks of the Orange River, was a centre of conflict where a once independent people succumbed to the forces of disunity.

While it is convenient to divide this part of our history into two sections, one dealing with the part played by the missionaries in the breaking up of the Griqua nation and the second dealing with Moshoeshoe and more particularly the breaking up of the baSotho, the history of the north constitutes a unit where we must view in perspective the working out of British policy in relation to both the Africans and the Boers. Moreover, what was happening in the north must be seen as part of a whole, part of a continuous process of conquest going on simultaneously throughout Southern Africa, and directed to a single end, the subjugation of its inhabitants. Events overlap with those that were taking place on the eastern "frontier" of the Cape Colony, in the attack on the maXhosa and

also along the east coast in what was known as Natal. While it is necessary to pause here and there to emphasise certain details, we must not lose sight of the *continuity* of the process. The parts acquire significance only if we place them in a rounded whole. As in the earlier part of our history, also, the missionaries are best seen as one agency of conquest operating in conjunction with the other agencies to a single end.

It may be added that the so-called "Great Trek" will not occupy the position it does in the familiar herrenvolk presentation of history. It suffers from the same distortions and falsifications common to the rest. In so far as the "Great Trek" comes into the present section of history, what we have to say about it will best find its place when we come to deal with Moshoeshoe. First, let us look into the breaking up of the Griqua nation.

Andries Stockenstrom once said that if it hadn't been for the missionaries the Colony would have had the whole Griqua nation down on it. And that pretty well sums up the situation. The Griqua were great lovers of independence. They had guns, which the Dutch sold them in exchange for cattle — this being one of the "artificial wants" they had acquired from the White man. The Griqua nation was actually made up of remnants of various tribes; there were Namaqua, Koranas and a few baThwa amongst them; there were slaves who had escaped from the Cape Colony; there was a strong admixture of Coloured people from the Cape Colony, descended from the Khoikhoi and the Dutch settlers. In other words, this unification of peoples was itself an indication of the upheavals that had been going on in Southern Africa since the advent of the White man. Their steady encroachments had pushed the Griqua northwards to the Orange River, where they maintained their independence.

This fact alone was enough to make the English Governor look with uneasy eyes at the Griqua situated on the northern borders of the Colony. There was always the fear that they would join the Bantu tribes and also cause disaffection among the Khoikhoi within the Colony. But there was another reason why the British had to gain control over the Griqua. Two men with imperialistic outlook, the Rev. John Campbell, visiting director of the London Missionary Society, and Dr. Philip, early recognised that Griqua territory constituted the gateway to the north. They saw two main lines of advance into Africa,

through Philippolis, the route taken by the Trek Boers, and through Griquatown. Griquatown became the recognised starting point of the Missionary Road into the interior. The Rev. Robert Moffat went this way to set up an important mission station at Kuruman among the baThaping in Bechuanaland; from this point the Wesleyan missionaries also spread out among the Bantu tribes north of the Orange; the missionary-explorer, David Livingstone, was to follow the same route on his way to the Zambezi, and still later Rhodes and the plunderers of the maNdebele. The historian, Macmillan, writes:

"They (the Griqua) were in a position to bar the way to the North at a moment when the Bantu threatened to close the road to the east."

The British therefore considered it imperative to keep this road open, and this they could only do by controlling the Griqua.

The land question was the core of the problem, as it was for all the peoples of Southern Africa. The Griqua had gone northwards seeking independence, but they could not shake off the missionaries on the one hand, nor the Boers on the other, those Boers who were forever creeping up over the horizon in search of cattle and pasturelands. As Moshoeshoe, chief of the baSotho, once expressed it:

"They have an interest in getting cattle . . . They also have an interest in obtaining a war about cattle, to secure farms which they have obtained by fraud . . . The real cause of dispute is the land. They wish to drive my people out."

The missionaries made a great show of "protecting" the Griqua against the Boers, but actually it was the Boers who were being protected by the British in all their land seizures.

As early as 1800 the London Missionary Society had sent the Rev. Anderson and the Rev. Kramer to set up mission stations which became the nuclei of settled communities under missionary control. Dr. Phillip subsequently stated that the mission Griqua did not take possession of the land in their own name, but in the name of the London Missionary Society, which thus became the proprietors of a tract of African territory about the size of England. The chiefs at the three centres, Griquatown, Philippolis, Campbell, namely, Waterboer, Adam Kok II and Cornelis Kok respectively, seem to have been in the nature of vassal chiefs whose election by the people was valid only if confirmed

by the missionary-superintendent and the Government who thus together acted as overlord. Waterboer in particular fell under missionary influence and was educated to assist the missionaries as a teacher among his people. The creation of a nucleus of mission-Griqua was the first step in the dismemberment of the Griqua nation. Each chief regarded the others as his rivals. Each chief, too, ruled over a divided people with a divided allegiance. He could not serve the Government (through the missionary) and at the same time safeguard his people, whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of the Government.

It is not to be supposed that the Griqua relished missionary interference. The Rev. Anderson gloomily reported to Andries Stockenstrom, then Landdrost of Graaff Reinet, that the "rebel" elements were continually winning over his mission-Griqua. The attempt on the part of the missionaries to split the Griqua was not proving so easy. "They required only a bold leader such as Conrad Buis, to be a formidable danger," said Stockenstrom. To counter this danger (1820) he at first contemplated bringing in a burgher force under pretence of "protecting" the mission Griqua from their independent brothers, while actually keeping it in readiness to intimidate the people as a whole, break up the Griqua nation and transport the "rebels" far into the Colony as labourers. On second thoughts, however, he discussed the matter with the Rev. John Campbell, the Rev. Robert Moffat and the local missionaries and as a result decided to intensify missionary control. At the same time he appointed a Government agent to act as a further curb on the chiefs. There is no need at this stage to emphasise their joint function.

Soon after his arrival as missionary-superintendent, Dr. Philip had assured the Governor that "every portion of our (missionary) influence will be used to make the Griquas servicable to the Colony." The missionaries served British interests so well that they not only neutralised the military danger of a united and independent people by introducing multi-division amongst them through allegiance to different chiefs and different religious denominations. They did much more than that. The Griqua, armed with guns, had learned the White man's mode of fighting; they were potential allies of the other resisters to invasion. But that very strength was turned into an instrument to pro-

tect the British against the natural allies of the Griqua and at the same time to weaken their own position. They became a buffer state carrying the military burden against the Bantu on the north of the Colony in the same way as the Khoikhoi of the Kat River Settlement were employed against the Xhosa, but on a much more extensive scale.

When Philip wrote to the American Mission Society in Boston encouraging them to begin operations in Southern Africa, he described the Griqua as follows:

"Ever since the Griqua mission commenced, the Griquas have been a bulwark of the Colony on the north and north-east frontier for 300 miles. They have saved the Government expenses. . . . They have rendered the greatest services to the Colony; they are at this moment of the greatest importance to the Colony, as the peace and order of that part of the Colony is dependent upon them."

And again in one of his many reports:

"Such has been the beneficial influence of the missionary institutions among them that the Griquas might be more formidable than the Caffres, but it is not necessary to have *one* soldier on the more extended frontier of the Griquas to defend that part of the Colony."

As the agents of British interests, the missionaries served yet another purpose. The mission-Griqua, particularly those under Adam Kok and Waterboer, were persuaded to look to the British as their protectors against the ever-increasing encroachments of the Boers. The next step was an obvious one – to annex them outright. In 1833, after a tour of the northern missions, Philip wrote:

"On my late journey I was empowered by the Griquas to solicit that their country should be taken within the Colony. They are willing to pay taxes and be subject to the laws of the Colony."

Of course we are not deceived by the pretty affectation of soliciting, when we know that the chiefs held their position under favour of the missionary-superintendent. We might as well imagine the inhabitants of the present-day "Protectorates" – how this liberal terminology persists! – "soliciting" the Union Government to take them under its beneficent wing in order to enjoy its laws.

Seeking at once to neutralise the military power of the Griqua and utilize it to defend the

Colony, Philip advised the Governor to incorporate the Griqua into the Colony "on the same footing as the Kat River Settlement." Better one big bite by the British lion than the slow but sure nibbling of the Trek ox. Better also to have a military power working with you than against you.

In point of fact, the Government, far from protecting the Griqua, was contemplating using them temporarily as a pawn in the military game. Dr. Philip, in the role of political adviser, expressed the fear that, if the Boers were allowed to occupy Griqua territory too rapidly, they would not be able to protect either themselves or the Colony against the Ndebele Chief, Mzilikazi. It would require the Griqua to do that.

The British Government, however, was not yet prepared to undertake the expense of civil administration, which outright annexation would involve. Meantime a policy of *laissez-faire*, leaving the Boers to settle in among the Griqua unchecked, was all in favour of the White man and to the detriment of the Black. Failing annexation, Dr. Philip advised treaties for the purpose of ruling through the chiefs, "as we do in India." That is, through paid chiefs.

Waterboer was the first to have the so-called treaty imposed on him and the result was as disastrous for him as it was for the Xhosa chiefs. His first duty was to defend the northern frontier (as it was called) against the maNdebele, who, under Mzilikazi, were coming into conflict with the baTswana and checking the advance of the Boers. Waterboer had also to use his military forces against any "rebel" Griqua, that is, his still independent brothers. He was under constant supervision by a Government agent and a missionary. **The missionary, for his part, had to send in a monthly report to the field-commandant of Graaff-Reinet, giving all the information he could gather about surrounding tribes.** Besides this, to invest Waterboer with a little brief authority, while ignoring the other Griqua chiefs, was to sow further seeds of dissension amongst them. Adam Kok at Philippolis, Cornelis Kok at Campbell and Chief Barends at Daniel's Kuil, refused to accept Waterboer's authority. Adam Kok apparently tried to receive similar "recognition" from the Government, and sent a petition begging them to put a stop to the Boers settling on his land. But he was ignored at this stage because the missiona-

ries reported that he was too "weak." In other words he harboured too many independent Griqua who were too strong for missionary control and who objected to being pressed into military service for the British. To make confusion worse confounded, on the death of Adam Kok II the Wesleyans supported the claims of one son to the chieftainship, while the L.M.S. missionaries gave their blessing to another. Added to all this, Waterboer had an impossible task settling land disputes with Boers in Griqua territory. Here were all the elements for the ultimate dismemberment of the Griqua nation, Small wonder that "after 1834 (the year of the Treaty with Waterboer) the story is one of gradual but uninterrupted decline." (See "The Cape Coloured People," by Marais).

The people of Griqualand West, Waterboer's territory, gradually sank into poverty. The herrenvolk historian would have us believe that this was due to their weakness of character. Missionaries and others have described them as "lazy, indolent, hopelessly improvident and given to drink . . ." This is one of the many falsifications of the historical process. They were a small community in an increasingly arid region, with their advance in the east and north blocked by the Boers. And the truth of the matter is, their land became too poor to be coveted by the Boer or the British invader.

Then an all-important event took place. In Griqualand West, through which had passed the old missionary road to the north, diamonds were discovered in the late sixties. This, together with the discovery of gold, opened up a new chapter in South African history, for it made possible a great economic expansion. The claims of the Waterboers and the family of Cornelis Kok at Campbell were swept aside and the Colonial Government annexed Griqualand West (1871) thus completing the subjugation of a once independent people. The territory was opened up to the petty land-shark, who bought up the land of the impoverished Griqua. They were forced to join the ever-increasing ranks of landless labourers in Southern Africa, for the new economic machine was greedy for cheap labour. How the history of colonial conquest follows a relentlessly similar pattern throughout: subjugation, landlessness, economic slavery!

To-day the Griqua as a people have become almost extinct. And their epitaph is "To the last they were a very religious people."

Philippolis

It was in the early fourties that Dr. Philip, acting on behalf of the Government, turned his attention to the Griqua further east, at Philippolis, where Adam Kok III was chief. The Philippolis Griqua held land on individual tenure and had large herds of cattle. In warfare they used guns. They were a small but advanced community, and the strong element of independence in them always proved restive under missionary control. Above all things they feared the loss of their land.

By 1842 the tension between them and the Trek Boers had reached such a pitch that open battle between them was imminent. The Griqua were well armed and likely to win. At this point the missionaries took action.

The trouble with the Trek Boers was that, while they were British subjects, they were adopting a hostile attitude to the Government. But they were in no position to play tough with the British or anybody else. Comparatively few in numbers and hopelessly divided among themselves, they were extremely vulnerable to attack either by the Griqua or Moshoeshoe. Having crossed the Orange River, they were steadily eating up the land of the Griqua, especially round Philippolis. They were also on Sotho soil. Dr. Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society, was informed by the Rev. Casalis, a French missionary near Moshoeshoe, that "Boers still creep in silently and settle (in the west) where they are aware he (Moshoeshoe) has least control." With his imperialist outlook, Dr. Philip necessarily viewed their movements with some alarm, for he doubted their ability to hold the land they occupied by the simple expedient of asking for pasturage and then refusing to budge. An observer in these parts expressed the opinion that "The Griquas will not tamely submit to the Boers," and he feared that they might start a war of extermination. This was a contingency that might have unpleasant repercussions for all the Whites; therefore some means must be found to avert it. The British knew very well that they could not afford to risk an explosive situation in the north while they were still busy on the Xhosa front. If the Boers were so foolhardy as to provoke it, it was the British who would have to protect these refractory subjects of theirs, even against themselves. The French missionary, the Rev. Rolland, went so far as to say: "I fear the Boers must feel the

weight of the British arm before they will come to their senses."

Dr. Philip, however, had another line of approach, and there was no better interpreter of British strategy. After a tour of the mission stations in the north, in Griqualand, "Basutoland" and "Bechuanaland" he was able to report to the Governor that Adam Kok III and Chief Moshoeshoe were "favourably disposed" to a treaty making them "allies pledged to friendship" with the British Government.

The question of Moshoeshoe we shall look into later, confining ourselves for the moment to the Griqua. Here we must once more totally reject the falsification of history by the liberal historian who would have us believe that the "humanitarians" were fighting to defend the Griqua against the Boers. Macmillan writes ("Bantu, Boer and Briton"):

"The issue in the North was the maintenance of those same principles of justice which inspired Philip's vindication of equal human rights of the Coloured people of the old Cape Colony."

This is nonsense. Principles of justice had nothing to do with "liberating" the Khoikhoi into economic slavery. Still less did such considerations enter into the dealings of the Colonial Government with the Griqua. The Treaty engineered by the missionaries is enough to explode that fallacy.

There was a state of high tension between the Griqua and the Boers on the burning question of land. This was reported by the local missionary, the Rev. Wright, who indicated that the Griqua were holding themselves in readiness to attack. By means of the treaty with the British, however, Adam Kok was persuaded to withhold his hand. And what was the nature of that treaty? It defined the limits of the territory which the Griqua were expected to occupy, *after giving full recognition to the land that the Boers had grabbed from them*. In other words it legalised dispossession. Philip's delicate regard for Boer claims can hardly have struck the Griqua as being in accordance with the principles of justice.

"Let the Boers have guaranteed to them the land they possess," wrote Philip, "and forbid them to make any addition except by purchasing." In view of this remarkable delicacy shown by the "protectors" of the Griqua for the land-grabbing of the Boers, it is not surpri-

sing that Adam Kok made some protest. The Local missionary had to report that the Griqua were highly suspicious of the treaty and "not to be played with." In fact they were again ready for war, whereupon Philip found it necessary to counsel moderation, not on the rapacious Boers, but on the despoiled Griqua. His advice was typical of the latter-day liberals. He hoped that the Griqua were not listening to "rash counsels."

"The Griquas must not expect too much," he wrote to his local representative. "The Griquas will be sacrificed as a peace-offering to the Boers . . . On the subject of leases, therefore, the people must be fair and reasonable. *Anything unreasonable will transfer the sympathies of Colonel Hare to the Side of the Boers.*"

Then the missionary has the impudence to add:

"Supposing the farmers (Boers) are obliged to leave their farms at the expiration of their leases, what is to be done? The land cannot lie empty and the natives are not in a position to fill the farms with stock."

This treacherous treaty was but the beginning of the further spoliation of the Griqua. The onus had been placed on Adam Kok to settle land disputes between his people and the Boers, who, needless to say, became more arrogant than ever. We find Adam Kok writing in vain to the Governor, asking his "friend and ally" for assistance to maintain law and order. The People, disillusioned in their missionaries, no longer accepted them as advisers. One of these reported that "the Griqua resent any advice or interference in their temporal affairs by the missionaries." The missionaries for their part now adopted a passive attitude — where previously they had protested loudly on behalf of the people. They reported them as "weak and unstable" and concluded that "the great fault is with the Philippolis government and the people themselves." *Some fighting did eventually take place between the Boers and the Griqua, with the Boers getting the worst of it. Whenever that happened, the British had always to step in. On this occasion they "chastised" the Boers in a small skirmish, then, having demonstrated their military superiority, they proceeded with the important business, the "proper" settlement of the land question.*

This second treaty marked the second stage in the spoliation of the Griqua. Plans for the divi-

sion of the land were drawn up by the local missionary, assisted by Dr. Philip, and these the Governor made use of when presenting his terms to the Griqua. In brief, the larger part of the land was made forfeit to the Boers. The Griqua were relegated to a Reserve, on the understanding that whatever parts of it were still occupied by White farmers, would be vacated. In addition to this piece of land-robbery, Adam Kok had to receive a Government agent, who was to be paid out of the quit-rent paid by the Griqua for their farms. The Griqua were learning the sharp edge of this British "Protection" when it came to carving up their land.

The full implications of British strategy in relation to the Boers and the inhabitants of the northern territories, of which the Griqua formed a part, will be discussed in the following chapter where we review the situation in the north as a whole. For it was Moshoeshoe who was the main focus of attack and Adam Kok only subsidiary to their general plan. Here we shall content ourselves with saying that in 1848 Sir Harry Smith, as High Commissioner, proclaimed the sovereignty of the British Queen over the Griqua, the baSotho and the Boers, from the Orange River to the Vaal and east to the Drakensburg Mountains. Making short-shrift of Adam Kok's land claims, he deprived him even of part of the so-called "inalienable Reserve" by the simple trick of allowing the Boer farmers to demand compensation for any improvements they had made to the farms they were expected to vacate. Smith was having some trouble with the refractory Boers in the north, **but when it came to the question of land, the Whites always stood together against the Blacks.**

By 1849 we find Dr. Philip being advised to "encourage the Griquas to make what use they can of lands that are left to them, than to go on quarreling about what they have so unjustly lost." In other words, to make the best of it. Such advice was to become all too familiar whenever the rights of the non-Europeans were being attacked. The story of fraud and plunder, however, was not yet completed. By the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 the British recognised the independence of the Boers in the "Orange Free State." The land rights of the Griqua were swept aside, for by a secret agreement between the Boer leaders and the British Commissioners who had been delegated to settle the land question in relation to the Griqua, all lands

in the Reserve sold to Europeans were henceforth to form part of the "Free State."

The following message, communicated to Sir George Grey from the Griqua, is eloquent of their bitter disillusionment in British "Protection" and "friendship":

"The Griqua feel that they have been sacrificed to some policy they do not understand, and have been compelled to believe that no amount of fidelity, however great, can save the Natives from cruel injustice and insult by the British Government when it suits its purpose . . . An opinion is daily gaining ground that close friendship is to be avoided. For, however fair its professions may be, and however generous its actions may at first appear to the unsuspecting, its fixed purpose is to deceive and betray whenever a suitable opportunity occurs."

It is not our intention to pursue the history of Adam Kok and his people who defrauded of their land, trekked in search of a new home and eventually settled in what became known as Griqualand East, south-east of the Drakensburg mountains. Here, in what the invaders chose to call "No-man's-land," Sir George Grey allowed

the Griqua to remain, but under his control. They were still to be used as a pawn in the game of "divide and rule," as a buffer state protecting the Colony from the baSotho and the maZulu to the north-east. In one of his Despatches to the Imperial Government, Grey described Adam Kok and his force of armed and mounted Griqua as "a wall of iron" between the coast tribes and the baSotho. It is strange that when it is a question of finding reasons why the Griqua lost their land, they are frequently described, especially by the missionaries, as weak and improvident, but when the Government required military assistance the Griqua were men of strength.

In a war of attrition involving Moshoeshoe and all the tribes adjacent to the Natal border, and north to the so-called Free State, the Griqua, "allies" of the British, suffered the same fate as all the rest. The tribes rent one another in internecine strife, thus becoming weak and poverty-stricken. As in the case of their brothers in Griqualand West, once their territory was incorporated into the Cape Colony (1880), they, too, became landless and entered into a state of economic slavery.

Chapter X

Triumph of Disunity (2)

The BaSotho

The next part of our history revolves round Moshoeshoe, chief of the BaSotho, but he is not the central figure. To tell his story would be to tell the story of the Builder of a Nation and the heroic efforts he made by military strength and by diplomacy to save that nation from the inroads of the Whites. Before the Whites appeared on the scene he had built up his Sotho nation out of tribes and remnants of tribes into a strong unit. This unity of Africans continued to be the guiding principle of his life, all the more imperatively as he sought to counter the encroachments of the invaders. He welcomed those tribes who requested land from him, for he reckoned that they would identify themselves with the Sotho nation as allies. In the same spirit he sent his emissaries as far south as the MaXhosa. That is why the British feared him. His policy was known to them, largely through information gathered by the missionaries, and they recognised it as the source of his strength. Thus it was necessary for them to employ every device to counter his unity with disunity.

Wise as he was, however, the historical forces were against Moshoeshoe. While he was a match for the feudal Dutch, he had to fall before the more complex organisation of the British with its skilfully devised strategy and varied resources. The missionaries, as before, were to play an important part. Those tribes whom he thought to weld into a unit by natural allegiance to himself were to be won over to the side of the Whites and used as the instruments of his dismemberment. In the process they themselves were destroyed. The fact that Moshoeshoe saved a part of his nation from the predatory embrace of the Cape Government and came under the direct rule of the mother-country, Great Britain, was no mark of victory, as is sometimes claimed. Imperialism at the fountain-head has bequeathed stagnation and poverty to the African inhabitants of the so-called Protectorates, no less than Imperialism operating in The Union of South Africa has condemned the Non-Europeans to political and economic slavery.

Our particular task concerns the initial stages in the dismemberment of Moshoeshoe's territory. This part of the story involves the missionaries, with whom we have primarily to deal. But to understand more fully how and why the dismemberment was brought about, it is necessary to have a more extended picture of what was happening in the north, in the land of the baSotho, in the fertile valley of the Caledon River, lying to the east of the Griqua and beyond the Vaal in the grasslands of the High Veld.

It is not necessary here to go into the multiplicity of inter-tribal wars that had been going on in the north from the territory of the maZulu at the coast to that of the baTswana (Bechuanaland). There had been a movement of tribes east and south from the dry regions of Bechuanaland, bordered by the Kalahari desert, and a movement of tribes westwards, as well as south, occasioned by the Tshaka wars and the fact that the maNdabele, led by Mzilikazi, were on the march — and in greater numbers than the Trek Boers. It is sufficient to say that out of this chaos of tribal warfare Moshoeshoe had proved capable of welding together a strong unit, the main elements being of Sotho-Tswana origin. Our story begins when he was still in the process of building up that nation and was looking for every possible means of strengthening it. From the mountain strongholds of Basutoland he exercised a stabilizing influence. In the Caledon valley were several small tribes, such as the baTaung and a section of the baTlhaping, with their sub-chiefs. To the north of him the strongest chief was Sekonyela, chief of the "maNtatisi" (named after their warrior-queen, Mantatisi), a branch of the baTlokwa; Sekonyela had waged war with Moshoeshoe, but latterly lived on amicable terms with him. On the High Veld beyond the Vaal the maNdebele were in conflict with a number of smaller tribes, while down towards the coast the Zulu chief, Dingane, had made himself paramount, having usurped the chieftainship from his brother Tshaka.

We have to pick up the thread of our story, then, in the midst of this labyrinth of inter-tribal strife, with the Sotho nation constituting a core of tribal unity. Into this scene step first the missionaries, the agents of British interests. Later come the Trek Boers, those elements of discontented Dutch from the Cape Colony, who crossed the Orange River into Griqualand and Basutoland, with a few isolated parties crossing the Vaal and others trekking on into Zululand.

It will be of particular interest to us to see the relationship that developed between the missionaries and the Dutch in these northern parts. We have, further, to ask ourselves what was the attitude of the British towards these subjects of theirs, the Trek Boers. How did they fit into the over-all strategy of the British, which was directed to establishing their supremacy throughout Southern Africa!

The Missionaries — Advance Guard

Into the uncharted regions of the north the missionaries had been among the first to penetrate. The Rev. W. Edwards, one of the very first batch of missionaries sent to Southern Africa by the London Missionary Society, had, in 1801, penetrated as far north as the Kuruman River in Bechuanaland, where the chief of the baTlhaping had received him in a friendly manner. The Rev. Edwards had relapsed into trading, but the contact far north had been made. The work was subsequently taken up by the Rev. Read and later by that most able representative of the London Missionary Society, the Rev. Robert Moffat. Then, in 1819, when Dr. Philip arrived as Superintendent of the London Mission, the Rev. Moffat was sent to establish the mission station at Kuruman. Here he built up a centre of missionary influence among the various Tswana tribes. Significantly enough his prestige was enhanced by the fact that he was in a position to help the baTlhaping when they were attacked by a force of "maNtatisi" warriors, for he called upon the Griqua chief, Waterboer, who, it will be remembered, was a protégé of the missionaries, to come to their assistance, and, armed as they were with guns, the Griqua routed the "maNtatisi". There is no doubt that the Rev. Robert Moffat was an excellent ambassador for the British in the north. He was favourably received by the war-like Mzilikazi and his fame was carried to the ears of Moshoeshoe, who was told that these White men had skill in potent medicines, and that they had powerful weapons, guns that could defeat an enemy. To Moshoeshoe, these were facts of great interest and he was not likely to forget them.

At an early period, as we have seen, the missionaries of the London Missionary Society and the Wesleyans attached themselves to the Griqua chiefs. The Wesleyans, also, were not long in following after the London missionaries into

Bechuanaland, where they attached themselves to the baTaung. Soon afterwards four Wesleyan mission stations were established among different sections of the very "maNtatisi" whose war-like propensities had made it difficult for the missionaries to carry out their work. With the establishment of all these contacts among the tribes the missionaries constituted the advance guard of the British in the north.

The scene of missionary activity shifts next to Basutoland. It was in 1833 that a party of French missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Society, who had been in correspondence with Dr. Philip of the London Missionary Society, came northwards to Adam Kok II at Philippolis and from there were directed to Moshoeshoe's mountain stronghold, Thaba Bosiu. The Rev. E. Casalis, the leader of the party, interviewed Moshoeshoe for the purpose of obtaining land to set up a mission station. The chief received them with every kindness, and for this the way had no doubt been paved by the London Missionary Society. It was not only that the French missionaries acted on Dr. Philip's advice, since he was the local agent for both missionary societies; but Moshoeshoe's mind had been prepared beforehand by all that he had heard about the activities of the Rev. Robert Moffat, and those missionaries who were with the Griqua, which predisposed him to believe the missionaries were associated with a powerful people, the British.

The Rev. Casalis has left a record of his first interview with Moshoeshoe, from which we quote the following passage:

"Moshoeshoe and his people" (he said) "consented to place themselves with us under the care and direction of God, we had the most perfect assurance that he would undertake to make the incursions of their enemies cease and to create in the country a new order of belief and of manners which would secure tranquility, order and abundance. . . ."

To this Moshoeshoe replied:

" . . . It is enough for me to see your clothing, your arms and the rolling houses (wagons) in which you travel, to understand how much intelligence and strength you have. . . . I have been told that you can help us. . . . You promise to do it. . . . That is all I want to know. . . ."

Apart from the mere formalities of speech, Moshoeshoe says enough here to indicate the trend of his thinking. He must have been aware that the people who had sent these missionaries

were a power to be reckoned with; he knew what was happening among the Xhosa tribes; he had come out of a period of storm and stress with a nucleus of united tribes, but dangers lay ahead. Very possibly he argued that it would be wise to be in a position to treat with such a power, and for this purpose the missionaries would be useful.

Be that as it may, he granted the French missionaries leave to set up their first mission station at Morija, some twenty miles from his mountain stronghold at Thaba Bosiu. The French missionaries soon followed this up with several other stations in the Caledon valley, one with a section of the baThaping, another with the baTaung, and another at the foot of Thaba Bosiu itself. Within a few years they had eleven stations all told in the land of Moshoeshoe.

Next on the scene came the Wesleyan missionaries. This requires some explanation.

To the fertile Caledon valley a few months after the arrival of the French missionaries, came about 15000 people from the barren region of Platberg on the Vaal, which bounded Moshoeshoe's territory on the north. These comprised the Seleke baRolong, whose chief was Moroka, and several other sections of the baRolong who had sought refuge in Platberg from the maNdebele. Together with them came a section of the Griqua, who, under Barend Barends, had also settled on the Vaal, and a group of Koranas and Khoikhoin, all of them under their respective chiefs.

There was nothing extraordinary about a migration of this nature, especially under the disturbing conditions that prevailed at this time. According to tribal custom, any such tribe could ask and receive from Moshoeshoe abundant land in which to settle, accumulate cattle and grow their crops. While virtually independent, they would owe allegiance to Moshoeshoe as paramount chief; it was understood that the chiefs and headmen of any new tribe would join the counsels of the Sotho chief to assist him in matters pertaining to the territory as a whole. The land thus granted for occupation was not given absolutely, for it belonged to the people and was inalienable; but it was customary for the new tribe to give Moshoeshoe presents of cattle and sheep as a token of admission to the rights and privileges (i.e. citizenship) of the Sotho nation. It was in this way that the new arrivals, the baRolong, the Griqua and the Kora-

nas, were welcomed by Moshoeshe when they came asking for land. The baRolong, who were the largest in number, received an extensive tract of land west of the Caledon, at Thaba Ncho, and the others were accommodated according to their needs. It may be said that the question of boundaries, in the European sense of the word, did not enter into the matter. It was by such additions that Moshoeshe intended to strengthen the Sotho nation.

There was one factor, however, that made these new arrivals different from any that had gone before. These sections of the baRolong, the Griqua and the Koranas were each accompanied by Wesleyan missionaries. It is noteworthy that, as in the case of the Fingos, the missionaries were able to attach themselves to a tribe when it was already in a weakened state. They had come from Platberg with their protégés and on their arrival were met first by the French missionaries. Now Moshoeshe granted land to the new tribes in the usual manner, and received the few cattle presented to him by the chiefs as the customary token of becoming part of the larger Sotho nation. The missionaries, however, must needs draw up a document, on the strength of which they were to claim that several hundred miles of territory were *sold* outright for seven oxen, one heifer, two sheep and one goat. A strange "purchase price" indeed, and still more strange that a writer like S.M. Molema in his book, "Chief Moroka", should endorse this blatant distortion of fact. Stranger still, that he, writing to-day, should state: "He (Moshoeshe) gave the Methodist missionaries the right to settle the Barolong west of the Caledon." Since when had a Black man given the missionaries the right to interfere in the carrying out of a time-honoured custom whereby one chief gave land to another? It was by the same trickery that the Boers fastened on the fertile valley of the Caledon and refused to be shaken off. "They begged for pasturages everywhere in a very good, soft manner," said Moshoeshe once, "but we did not imagine that they would appropriate the land to themselves."

The full implications of the missionary transaction were only to become evident some ten years later. Meantime Moshoeshe maintained good relations with the lesser tribes around him. He intervened successfully in a dispute between the Griqua and the baTlokwa, whose chief, Sekonyela, seems at this time to have been on friendly terms with him. Moroka, chief of the

Seleke baRolong, had reasons to be grateful for his military assistance in driving off a group of hostile Koranas from the mountain fastnesses above the Caledon. Under the shadow of Thaba Ncho the once refugee baRolong lived at peace and increased their cattle. Whenever possible, Moshoeshe employed diplomacy in settling disputes and only when that failed did he make use of his military strength. It was a combination that made for stability.

With their habitual thoroughness the Wesleyan missionaries extended their activities to embrace not only those sections of tribes whom they had accompanied from the Vaal to their new home on the banks of the Caledon, but they attached themselves also to the Tlokwa chief, Sekonyela. Thus the Wesleyans, together with the French missionaries, who worked in close co-operation with the London Missionary Society, were well entrenched in Moshoeshe's country. Taking the north as a whole, the ground had been prepared for the next stages of the White invasion.

The Missionaries and the Trek Boers

By the middle thirties of last century the number of Dutch people moving northwards was considerably increased. Herrenvolk history books designate this stage in the migration of the Dutch as the "Great Trek". Of those who crossed the Orange River, many stayed on in Adam Kok's land round Philippolis; others, having humbly asked Moshoeshe for pasturage in the Caledon valley, had every intention of holding on to what had been granted to them by tribal custom: a few isolated parties under their separate leaders reached the Vaal, where they came up against the maNdebele; others trekked eastwards into the land of the maZulu. The Trek Boers were in danger of being submerged because of their complete lack of cohesion. For the procuring of guns they were dependant on the British, whose subjects they were.

But into these outlying regions in the north the missionaries had gone before them. And here an interesting relationship between the English missionaries and the Dutch developed. Down in the Cape Colony the Dutch had hated the missionaries for their interference in the matter of "liberating" the Khoikhoins; they were slow in recognising the usefulness of the missionaries in subjugating the inhabitants of

Southern Africa. Actually at this stage it was a question of the feudal Dutch lagging behind the new economy of the British. But on the High Veld the erstwhile antagonists recognised their identity of interests in relation to the Black man, and acted accordingly.

A year or two after the baRolong, accompanied by the Wesleyan missionaries, had come to settle at Thaba Ncho in Moshoeshoe's country, the first parties of Trek Boers passed that way. (Numbers of them had already been infiltrating into a considerable tract of his country where the Caledon River joined the Orange.) From the beginning, the Rolong chief, Moroka, sided with the Boers against other African tribes. This was undoubtedly due to the action of the missionaries. An incident at Veg Kop on the Vaal, where the Boers encountered the maNdebele, vividly illustrates what was happening here. Trekking with their oxdrawn wagons, their sheep and horses, the Boers were attacked by the maNdebele warriors, who left them high and dry on the bare veld, with nothing but their wagons. Placed in this helpless position, their leader, Hendrik Potgieter, sent his brother to Thaba Ncho for assistance and the Rev. Archbell took him to Chief Moroka, who brought the party to safety and supplied them with cattle and corn.

The first, second, third and fourth parties of Trek Boers found refuge in Thaba Ncho and some of them settled there. S. M. Molema in his book, "Chief Moroka," writes:

"Thaba Ncho had thus become the rendezvous of the Voortrekkers, their haven and half-way house to unknown and undetermined destinations. They were one and all guests of Moroka and Seleka Barolong... victims of a common enemy — the hated Matebele and Mzilika-zi."

The humanity of one people to another, irrespective of colour — this is understandable. But this was not all. Very soon afterwards the Trek Boers got the baRolong to do their fighting for them. And not only the baRolong, but the Griqua and the Koranas in Moshoeshoe's land, precisely those people, in fact, who were controlled by the Wesleyan missionaries. The Boers were glad to make use of one African tribe against another; for the Africans were best acquainted with the terrain, they knew the best roads to take, they knew the best time to fall upon a Ndebele village when the warriors were

away. In this the Boers were adopting a tactic well known to the British. In view of what ultimately happened to these allies of the Boers, S. M. Molema's comment on the events of that time strike one as particularly inappropriate:

"The four clans of the Barolong and their chiefs... as well as the Griquas under Peter Davids and the Koranas, all saw the hand of God in the arrival of the Dutch emigrants at Thaba Ncho... They rejoined at the prospect of having powerful allies."

It is a testimony to the influence so long exercised by the missionaries in inducing such an outlook, that a Black man can even today write in such terms, and with apparently so little awareness of the significance of such a situation where African was used against African, to the ultimate defeat of both.

As the Trek Boers continued to make use of inter-tribal conflicts, the maNdebele, being unable to turn back into Tshaka's country, where his brother, Dingane, ruled, moved further north across the Limpopo River, chiefly to escape Dingane. Now the Boers regarded themselves as the owners of that stretch of territory beyond the Vaal, where, with the departure of the maNdebele, the weaker tribes, such as the baHurutu, remained. At Mosega, where certain Anglican missionaries expressed a desire to continue their work, the Boers made it quite clear that they were allowed to remain only on sufferance. The missionaries "were not to forget that the country belonged to them," said the Boers.

Judging from the service, rendered by the Wesleyans, who had persuaded the tribes under their influence to regard the Boers as their allies and to fight on their behalf, it would appear that the missionaries were more aware of the common interests between the two White sections, i.e. in the subjugation of the Africans. This brings us to a consideration of the relationship between the Trek Boers and the Colonial Government.

Strategy of the British

By the forties of last century the movements of that section of the Dutch who had trekked away from the Cape Colony were complicating the advance of the British in Southern Africa. They were well entrenched on the banks of the Orange River, in spite of the protests, of the

Griqua; they were in the Caledon valley and Moshoeshe was likewise protesting to the British that the Boers refused to recognise his authority, while occupying his lands. With the departure of Mzilikazi still further north, they were assuming possession of lands on the Vaal, and, though the remaining tribes were divided and weak, they themselves were divided and lacked the military resources to back up their claims. They were highly vulnerable to attack from the Africans. As Dr. Philips once reported:

“The immigrant Boers are divided among themselves... the collisions which arise from differences of opinion make them fear each other. ... They are in fear from the Colony, and they are in fear from the natives...”

In the country of Tshaka, however, they had been able to set Zulu against Zulu and warriors of Mpande, Dingane's brother, had done the fighting for them, with the result that by 1840 Dingane was laid low.

Thus, in that part of the east coast known as “Natal” both the British and the Boers laid claim to the country. In the first instance Captain Gardiner, a naval officer who had turned missionary, had claimed in D'Urban's time that Dingane had “ceded” a part of his land to the British, and he had asked the Governor to take over the settlement at Port Natal (Durban). Then a party of Trek Boers led by A. W. J. Pretorius, set up a “Republic of Natal”, claiming that Dingane had “ceded” his land to another party of Boers led by Retief. Pretorius, moreover, proceeded to occupy Port Natal, which the missionary-captain had been at such pains to build up into a strong English community. The Boers were obviously getting rather out of hand. Port Natal was of strategic importance to the British for two reasons. The coast line was always the life-line for trade and communication with Europe. They had also to ensure their position to the rear of the maXhosa, whom they had not yet brought to subjection. The maMpondo and other tribes to the south of the maZulu and east of the maXhosa were kept in a state of disturbance by the Boer encroachments. The Wesleyan missionary with Faku, maPondo chief, urged him to seek the protection of the British, but on the whole the situation needed careful handling.

The difficulty was that the Trek Boers wanted to forget that they were British subjects. It was a

point, however, that the British never forgot. They assumed their own supremacy; they had the backing of the vast resources of the mother-country. And since they had taken over control of the Cape Colony the majority of the Dutch had lived amicably amongst them, collaborating with them in their wars of aggression and sharing in the spoils of conquest already completed. The discontented Dutch who had trekked northwards were comparatively few, but they were becoming difficult to handle because of their over-independent attitude. On the other hand, the British knew that the basic conflict in Southern Africa was between White and Black, and not only once, but every time the Dutch were in danger of being defeated by the Africans, the British came to their assistance. It had happened in the Cape Colony when a united force of Khoikhoin and amaXhosa – Ndlambe's warriors – had pursued the Dutch as far south as George; and again, when Dingane had put Retief and his party to death as his answer to their arrogant request for his country, the British at Port Natal had joined forces with the Dutch.

From the British viewpoint, then, the Trek Boers in the North could be allowed a free hand in their encroachments on African territory, provided they did not upset their own strategy and endanger the position of the White man in Southern Africa. British policy had still to be guided by the recognition of the fact that the Africans were capable of prolonged resistance, and especially did they fear Moshoeshe's policy of allying himself with other tribes, his continual efforts to strengthen the Sotho nation. If the British could find some means of rendering Moshoeshe harmless to themselves, the Trek Boers would be allowed to continue their land-grabbings. They were safeguarded by the fact that the British, with their superior organisation and resources, were coming up behind them. In due time British Imperialism would take over, and on its terms.

At first, however, the British had to maintain a certain equilibrium in the north. The relationship between themselves, the Boers and Moshoeshe, therefore, required skilful handling. This provides the key to the apparently ambivalent attitude of the British (the Colonial Government) to the Boers, at one time ready to come to their assistance and to recognise their land seizures, and at another time making a

“friendly alliance” with a chief like Moshoeshoe.

Actually these two things were part of a single strategy, for it was the British who were in control of the situation. Only the Boers did not seem to appreciate this comprehensive strategy. Any such “alliance” between an African chief and the British, by persuading him to accept their „friendship” – and consequently their interference in his affairs – neutralized his power and therefore saved the Boers from possible annihilation. Of course, it did more than that. In a difficult situation of this nature, the British always applied their master-tactic – Protection. A treaty pledging “friendship” and “protection” to a chief served the double purpose of enabling them to exercise control over him, and to step in as his “protector” against the Boers – or any other prospective land-grabber – when the time came to take over his territory themselves. This was an extension of the tactic they had employed in setting one Xhosa chief against another, only to seize what they professed to protect. And they were to employ it repeatedly in the next few decades.

This British “Protection”

The most clear-minded protagonist of British policy in relation to the north at this time was Dr. Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society. He was now politically mature, with a wealth of experience in handling affairs in the Cape Colony, and his valuable offices were fully recognised by the Government. He could now boast:

“I have the Home and the Colonial Government both at my feet . . . At this moment the Governor is consulting me and taking my advice on the most important affairs of South Africa . . .”

And again, writing to Buxton:

“At present the Colonial Government does nothing as to relations with the independent native tribes without consulting me.”

With his customary acumen he saw the situation in the north as a whole. In what might seem a labyrinth of inter-tribal wars and Boer encroachments, he had one guiding principle, the necessity for British supremacy and the establishment of the new economic system through-

out Southern Africa. This at all times dictated his attitude to the Dutch as well as the African chiefs. It was not that he was hostile to the Dutch. Witness his delicate regard for their land seizures at the expense of the Griqua. But he viewed with some disquietude an undisciplined advance of the Trek Boers under their separate leaders, coupled with their hostility to the British. And lack of unity on the European front weakened the hold of the White man in Southern Africa.

In 1840–41 he made a tour of the northern mission stations, which to all intents and purposes was a political tour. He visited Adam Kok at Philippolis; he held discussions with the French missionaries, who arranged a most important interview with Moshoeshoe; he made the strenuous journey by ox-wagon to Kuruman (the Rev. Robert Moffat being then absent in England) and learned a great deal about the inter-tribal conflicts of the Tswana tribes. And he did not let it rest at that. Through the French missionaries at Beersheba in the land of Moshoeshoe, he sent out invitations to the neighbouring Boer farmers, who had taken up their abode there, to come and have discussions with him. He had found them hostile (for what Dutchman did not hate the name of Philip, the so-called “liberator” of the Khoikhoi?) But, as he himself reported, he found them “much softened” after he had explained to them his “pacific intentions.” We do not know the details of his “friendly conversation,” but he adds that “they trembled for their security if I induced the chief (Moshoeshoe) to drive them out.” There spoke the arrogant representative of British Imperialism. To us it is significant that this missionary ambassador, who was about to visit Moshoeshoe for the precise purpose of preparing the ground for a “friendly alliance” between Moshoeshoe and Britain, which the chief undoubtedly supposed would strengthen him against the Boer encroachments, should go out of his way to reassure the Boers of his “pacific intentions.” These may be surmised from the fact that he advocated the recognition of the land seizures of the Boers during negotiations for the treaties with Adam Kok and Moshoeshoe.

Having collected his information about the position in the north Dr. Philip sent in his report to the Colonial Government, which promptly despatched it to the Imperial Government. Briefly, he reported a state of disorder

and division among the small African tribes on the Vaal and in Bechuanaland; and disorder and division among the Boers; but Moshoeshoe, chief of the Sotho nation, controlled a wide area. His conclusions can be summed up in the following statement that "the future peace of the country . . . was involved in the future relations between Moshesh and the Boers." His assessment of the situation, while it was accurate, laid rather more stress on the possibility that the Boers on the Vaal, realising the dangers of their dividedness, might join up with those in Natal. Naturally his bias was towards seeing established as soon as possible the new order of society under the supremacy of his masters. So his advice was forthright and sweeping: "Annex up to the Tropics." This would bring both the Africans and the recalcitrant Boers within the embrace of British Imperialism. The alternative advice was to make a treaty with Moshoeshoe, without delay.

As to annexation, the Government seems to have considered that the taking over of Natal for strategic purposes was enough at this stage (1842). The British, always masters in the tactics of "divide and rule," were not likely to be unduly perturbed at the spectacle of the refractory Boers and their strongest enemy, Moshoeshoe, engaged in a destructive war, so long as it did not get out of hand. Such a war might well give them the whip-hand of both.

Here we would remark that not every agent of British Imperialism saw as far as Dr. Philip in terms of the new society. Neither would we suggest that he could dictate the precise lines that events were to follow. This would be to falsify the historical process and fall into the error of ascribing too much to one man. Historical forces operate in a more complex fashion, making use now of one agent and now another. Nevertheless, as the political agent of the Government, Dr. Philip played his part in setting in motion the events that were to engulf the Sotho nation.

Acting through the French missionaries, Dr. Philip had first prepared the ground by a personal interview with Moshoeshoe. He then advised the Governor of his favourable reception by the chief and proposed that he should open correspondence with him on the question of a treaty, using the Rev. E. Casalis as their intermediary. In due course Moshoeshoe communicated with the British representative, expressing the desire to enter into friendly relations with the British Government. The manner in which he

expressed himself (through the missionary) makes interesting reading:

"He (Moshoeshoe) has observed with the greatest interest the development of the liberal system which the English nation has adopted in favour of the tribes which the extension of her territories places in contact with her. He is more and more convinced that the existence and independence of his people are possible only under the protective shield of the Sovereign whom you represent."

The request was accompanied by letters from the French missionaries and Dr. Philip.

Thus did Moshoeshoe put his neck into the British noose. For all his sagacity he was befooled by the myth of British "Protection." And not all his skill and cunning could extricate him from the consequences of that initial error. As in all such "treaties" the one signatory saw it in a totally different light from the other. For the British, the treaty meant the first step in gaining control over Moshoeshoe and his nation. Sir G. Lagden, in his History "The Basutos," describes it as "A historic document, being the herald of negotiations leading up to the Constitution of British rule in Basutoland." He is quite right, though it took a long time and involved a long and tortuous history of inter-tribal wars in which the British were the prime agent-provocateurs and the Boers the accessories.

There is no need to go into the detail of the "Napier Treaty" of 1843 (Napier was Governor of the Cape Colony at the time). It is sufficient to say that it was on the "Indian model" already worked out by Philip for the purpose of ruling through the chiefs. Moshoeshoe was to receive a "present" of 75 Pounds annually in money or arms. Guns were what he wanted and this pittance was a concession to the pretence of making him "the faithful friend and ally of the Colony," charged with the onerous duty of "punishing any attempt to violate the peace of the frontier of the Colony by any people living within his country." Two other important points call for comment. First, the chief undertook to receive a Government Agent with whom he had to consult "on all matters concerning his territory and the Colony." This meant the thin edge of the wedge of Government interference in all his affairs. It meant primarily interference on the question of *land* – the root question between Black and White. Secondly, the Government arrogated the right to *define the bounda-*

ries of Moshoeshoe's territory, and the boundary question was the land question. This proved to be the very crux of the situation. The chief could not have surmised that the imposition of boundaries was an important part of this "friendly alliance" with the Colonial Government; neither did he suspect the import of that little "deed of sale" that the missionaries had got him to sign under false pretences when he granted the baRolong land at Thaba Ncho. He signed the treaty, but pointed out that he was not satisfied with the proposed demarcations of his territory.

This brings us back to the Wesleyan missionaries and the part they played in the carving up of the land of the baSotho.

Dragon's Teeth

The Rev. William Shaw, superintendent of the Wesleyan missions, took it upon himself to write to the Governor protesting that certain lands, some hundreds of square miles round Thaba Ncho, belonged not to Moshoeshoe, but to his protégé, Moroka, chief of the baRolong. In the draft treaty sent to Moshoeshoe this land was not included as part of his territory. Moshoeshoe pointed out the "error" of demarcation and seems to have assumed that it would be rectified, for he dictated a letter to the British representative as follows:

"It being evident to me from the general tenor of the said treaty, that it is not the desire of the Governor to place any undue restraint upon me as to the extent of territory, I have given my signature in good faith . . ."

Alas for Moshoeshoe's good faith — or misplaced diplomacy — dragon's teeth had been sowed in his soil and the mutual destruction of the tribes would continue for years to come.

Within a month of the signing of the treaty, the Rev. Shaw put in separate claims on behalf of those small sections of Griqua, Koranas and Khoikhoin, whom Moshoeshoe had allowed to occupy his territory and welcomed as part of the Sotho nation, together with the baRolong. Protesting that these sections were completely independent of Moshoeshoe, he suggested settling the matter "without going into the question of native customs." S. M. Molema in "Chief Moroka" echoes this argument when he states:

"Moroka and his co-immigrants from Platberg on the Vaal . . . strenuously denied Mo-

shoe-shoe's right to overlordship . . . They averred that they had absolute right and full title to their territories by virtue of purchase proved by documentary evidence."

On the advice of the Rev. Shaw, those same baRolong, Griqua, Koranas and Khoikhoin asked for separate treaties with the Colonial Government, and he got Sekonyela, the Tlokwa chief, to do likewise.

"Those tribes combined," wrote the Rev. Shaw to the Governor, "are stronger than Moshesh . . . Their jealousy is aroused."

It was by such methods that the missionaries helped to bring discord into the land of Moshoeshoe, and no better means could have been found for splitting the tribes.

It was all too easy to make an issue out of this artificially engineered "boundary question," which was just land plunder under a new name. *The imposition of boundaries was previously unknown to Africans.* The very fact that a refugee tribe could ask and receive land for pasturage in the midst of the occupants already in the territory, flowed from this. But as soon as the new conception of the sale of land and separation into specified areas was introduced, clashes were inevitable. It was impossible to fix these boundary lines, except on paper; in fact they were deliberately left indeterminate, for no two charts agree. The Boers broke them at will, and in the case of the Africans, villages belonging to different groups lay on either side of these imaginary lines. What better pretext for creating a state of perpetual disturbance? These paper boundaries served one purpose only — to fan the flame of inter-tribal conflicts.

The Military Take Over

With the stage set for a protracted boundary dispute, the long tale of fraud, plunder and fratricidal strife begins to unfold. Where the missionaries left off, the other agents of Imperialism carried on, and it remains for us to summarize, with a view to bringing out the main points relevant to our theme, a period of anarchy as devastating as any in the history of Southern Africa. The details are voluminous and distracting and much must be omitted. We shall attempt to give the essentials, directing the reader to policies and tactics that mark, in the midst of apparent chaos, a steady progression towards the supremacy of British Imperialism in Southern Africa.

Throughout the period the missionaries still had their functions to perform, breaking down the old system with new ideas, as they were doing in their various fields of operation throughout the country. The different denominations, also, continued to be the partisans of their respective protégés, upholding the "property" rights of the different tribes, the French missionaries supporting the claims of Moshoeshoe and his allies, the Wesleyans supporting Sekonyela, Moroka and the others against him. The effect of this was only to whip up the boundary disputes. As the carnage increased the missionaries sent eloquent letters of protest to the Government, which were of no avail in mitigating the sufferings of the people.

Once Moshoeshoe had signed the Treaty it was not long before the British lion revealed the predatory nature of its "protection" and "friendship." Moshoeshoe and the various claimants to parts of his territory, as well as representatives of the Boers and the Griqua from Philippolis, were called to meet the new Governor, Maitland, ostensibly to settle the land disputes. The result was a second treaty which showed a remarkable partiality for the claims of the Boers. The English Governor professed himself unable to settle the thorny question of boundaries, but left a Dutchman to settle the whole matter, to wit, Commandant Gideon Joubert. (An excellent example of the jackal left in charge of the sheep.) The other clauses were equally significant: (1) "A portion of the *undisputed* country to be specified and set apart for the occupation of white British subjects"; (2) "Religious teachers and white persons desirous of carrying on trade and other business to be enabled to acquire land for building"; (3) A Resident Agent (i.e., Magistrate) was appointed to try Africans accused by British subjects; (4) Half of the quit-rents from the lease of land to the Whites went to pay the magistrate and a police-force. The far-reaching effects of these innovations are familiar to us from what had been happening among the Xhosa tribes. Furthermore, Moroka and the other disputants, who, through their missionaries, had begged for the favour of a treaty as well as Moshoeshoe, had also to allow British subjects to occupy their lands.

The Wesleyan missionaries waited upon the Commandant to ensure the land claims of their protégés, but he paid them scant courtesy,

though he expressed the conviction that the power of Moshoeshoe should be broken and the country divided into small "native" districts. The results of his interference were more land for the Boers and embittered relations between Moshoeshoe and the petty chiefs whose claim had been unsatisfied. Before long the first blood was spilt between the baTlokwa and Moshoeshoe's baSotho. Sekonyela was a great warrior, a chief in his own right, who held lands to the north of Moshoeshoe. He too, had been persuaded to enter the boundary dispute, and the old feud between them, which had died down, was rekindled. Raids and counter-raids brought death and destruction to both sides. This was but the beginning. Petty chiefs who were not involved in the actual boundary dispute, but were allies of Moshoeshoe, were also attacked by the baTlokwa; the baTaung, under Moletsane, suffered heavily at the hands of Sekonyela; the baRolong, the Koranas and the smaller Griqua groups under their various captains, became embroiled in the general upheaval. Added to this there were repercussions from the "War of the Axe," which sent fugitive baThembu into his country. The dogs of war had been unleashed.

Then Sir Harry Smith, the new High Commissioner, appeared, pursued his aggressions against the maXhosa, had a little fight with the Boers at Boomplaats and declared the sovereignty of the British Queen over the territories north of the Orange River to the Vaal, over Dutch, Griqua and Bantu — all as Dr. Philip had suggested in the first place. The Proclamation sent out by Sir Harry is an excellent demonstration of that contrast between truth and official language, with which we have become familiar. A brief extract from this lengthy document will suffice:

"I do hereby proclaim, declare and make known the Sovereignty of Her Majesty the Queen of England over the Territories north of the Great Orange River, including the countries of Moshesh, Moroko, Molitsane, Sikonyela, Adam Kok, Gert Taaibosch and other minor chiefs as far north as to the Vaal River . . . with no desire or inclination whatever on the part of Her Majesty to extend or increase Her Dominions or to deprive the Chiefs and their People of (the) hereditary rights . . . but on the contrary, with the sole view of establishing an amicable relationship with those chiefs . . . and protecting them from any future aggression or loca-

tion of Her Majesty's subjects . . ."

The gist of this document was the extension of British control north to the Vaal. Magistrates were installed among the baSotho and mission stations were declared to be "under the special protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England." With evangelical enthusiasm, typical of the arrogant Imperialist, Smith also decreed "the erection of Churches and Schools to prevent the spread of infidelity and immorality among the Emigrant Farmers, seeing that some were fallen nearly to a level with the natives." In view of the machinations of the missionaries, there was considerable irony in his answer to Moshoeshe on the question of the disputes that had arisen:

"In proclaiming the Sovereignty of the Queen, it is as much to protect Moshoeshe against his internal as his external enemies."

Then Smith took his departure, promising a Commission to settle the "boundary question."

These impudent speeches and promises were but the interludes to the interecine strife that soon burst forth again with renewed fury among the baSotho, the baTlokwa, the baRolong and other tribes. The farcical pretence of arbitration on the part of the Resident Agent, Major Warden, served only to enrage both sides, for Moshoeshe made it quite clear that he rejected this whole business of the "delimitation" of his territory. But he was not to escape the inexorable logic of having accepted British "protection." Major Warden seems to have played the role of *agent provocateur*. Be that as it may, as the feud between the baTlokwa and Moshoeshe's baSotho increased in ferocity, with the baRolong and others joining in, the Resident Agent decided it was time to make a display of British force. We find him writing to Sir Harry Smith that:

"the country cannot enjoy peace until the baSotho tribe, of late years become powerful, be put under restraint."

Smith replied with approval:

"Your suggestion that this Chief (Moshoeshe) must be humbled . . . must be carried out . . ."

"The accusations of the other chiefs must be carefully received . . ."

So war continued to ravage the baSotho.

The next step was a "Conference" with all the chiefs, excluding Moshoeshe, for the pur-

pose of forming a League against him and thus isolating him. Sekonyela and Moroka, as well as the Griqua chief, Gert Taaibosch, and the Korana chief, Carolus Baatje, were bribed with the promise of their lands being secured to them. What followed was the bareface robbery of the "Warden Line" decision, with the bulk of the land allocated to those British subjects now swarming on the banks of the Caledon – the Boers. Moshoeshe realised, like Ngqika before him, the greed of his "protectors."

For the baSotho, Warden's Boundary Commission resolved nothing and gave nothing but renewed carnage and devastation. Moshoeshe stiffened in his resistance both to the British and the Boers, and to all those of his people who had been persuaded to join forces with them. By 1849 Warden was writing to Smith:

"The Basuto require humbling . . . it can easily be done and at little cost to the Government. The Griquas, Baralongs, Mantatis (i.e., under Sekonyela) and Korannas with a small British support would, in a few days, overrun the whole of Basutoland."

Moshoeshe was to make him eat his words, but while the military victory of the campaigns that followed went to the chief, the loss to the Sotho nation was irreparable. The battles did not cease until Sekonyela and his people were destroyed and the baRolong reduced to a state of destitution, not to speak of all those smaller tribes reaching to the confines of Sotho territory on the lower Orange River who were involved in the disputes.

Having received such confident assurances from Major Warden, Smith authorized him to launch an attack on Moshoeshe and his ally, Moletsane, under the specious pretext of demanding restitution on behalf of the chief baRolong, Moroka, who had the paramountcy thrust upon him, an unhonoured honour that brought him as low as it had brought Ngqika and his people. The British armed their African "Allies" with guns, and the Boers for the most part looked on at the spectacle of the members of the Sotho nation severally and separately rending one another. Moshoeshe's defeat of the combined forces at Viervoet brought dire distress to the baRolong, to whom the British gave no compensation. The Boers made no secret of the fact that they were more interested in preserving their farms than helping the British and bargained with Moshoeshe to leave them

in possession of their (his) lands. Indeed it looked as if Moshoeshoe might yet outwit them all. Warden had to call for reinforcements from Natal, including Africans. But Moshoeshoe routed them also.

Faced with defeat in the very quarter from which they had most to fear, the British realised the necessity to revise their tactics. The trend of events was reflected in the action taken by the missionaries, who, in addressing a memorial to the Imperial Government, painted a picture of "irretrievable ruin" in Basutoland, where, they prophesied, no White man would be able to set foot, so bitter was the feeling of the people. This missionary action in itself served no purpose, except that it sounded the danger-signal, a function that the liberals to this day religiously carry out. The Imperial Government instituted a full-scale enquiry and a revision of colonial policy.

Here we must remind ourselves that it was the British who were in the long run masters of the situation, whatever the immediate set-backs. It lay with them to make the next move and evolve a master-plan, which, though protracted in its effects, ultimately delivered the baSotho into the hands of British Imperialism and thus furthered the military conquest of all the African tribes. They took immediate steps to resolve the crisis produced by Moshoeshoe's victory, by conciliating the recalcitrant Trek Boers and giving them a definite stake in the land they were occupying but doing so little to defend. But it was not a situation that allowed a simple solution and British strategy was to follow a tortuous path before it finally achieved its aim – the supremacy of British Imperialism. The overthrow of tribalism was to take another twenty years, and indeed, as the disintegration spread, the conflict sharpened, Moshoeshoe's first victories coincided with the unity of the maXhosa, ba Thembu and Khoikhoi in the 1850-52 War. The very extensiveness of the White invasion north and east and even in the more arid regions of the north-west, presented the British with the problem of control and more particularly the fear of any one region getting out of hand and provoking a general uprising. So uncertain was the situation and so precarious the balance of forces that they could not exclude the possibility of a general onslaught from every direction on a Colony that had not yet stabilized itself. As Sir George Grey was to express it:

"On some points of this extensive line, it is all

that the European race can do to maintain its position."

It was a state of affairs that the British had to reckon with for some years to come. The historian, Walker, writes:

"From the Zoutpansberg (Eastern Transvaal) to the Transkei and from Natal to Namaqua-Damaraland, the tide began to run strongly against the white man... Many of the Bantu had guns as good as those of their opponents." There was always the danger that if Moshoeshoe routed the Boers in the north the flood-gates of an African invasion would be released down into the colony.

Thus the continued lack of cohesion among the Trek Boers, coupled with their hostility, held dangerous possibilities for the British, precisely because they had not yet completed the subjugation of the African tribes. The Boers so far had shown themselves incapable of uniting their forces against the tribes surrounding them. Moshoeshoe himself was beginning to use the weapon of "divide and rule"; and with a fair measure of success, with the result that some of the Boers refused to join the British forces against him, preferring to pacify him if by so doing they could hang on to their farms.

It was in this situation that the British turned their attention to the Trek Boers. In a word they made a deal with them. The time was not yet ripe for incorporating them in a single unified state where the new economic system could fully develop. Meantime the Colonial Government gave them some form of independence and a free hand where the Africans were concerned. The first step in this political deal was the Sand River Convention of 1852 whereby Her Majesty's Government guaranteed "the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal freedom to manage their own affairs without let or hindrance". In the agreement the Boers promised to abstain from slavery, while Her Majesty's Government assured them of an open gunpowder market. It also disclaimed "all alliances whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations to the north of the Vaal River". Chaos reigned north of the Vaal among the various warring factions of Boers diehards, but by recognising them as constituting the "South African Republic", the British hoped to introduce an element of stability amongst them as well as giving them a stake in the land, which they must now defend as a unit against the tribes surrounding them.

Meantime the situation in the land of the ba-

Sotho deteriorated still further from the British point of view. A new Governor, Cathcart, having supplied Sekonyela, as his "ally" with guns and ammunition, vowed "to make an end of the baSotho nation as had been done of the Gaikas." But with his second resounding victory, this time at Berea, Moshoeshe deflated his thunder and the Governor departed, leaving behind him, in his own words, "a disadvantageous impression as to the real power of the British nation". Even now it can be said that the real losers were the baSotho, for the baTlokwa, the baRolong and the Moshoeshe's baSotho turned their fury against one another.

With the Berea victory behind him, Moshoeshe now proposed peace. But British strategy outplayed Moshoeshe's diplomacy. The Orange River Sovereignty, by which Smith had proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty over Griqua, Boers and baSotho, was declared to be no more. Now the second part of the deal with the Trek Boers was completed at the expense of Moshoeshe, and also Adam Kok, whose lands, by a secret agreement between the Boer representatives and the British Commissioners, were added to the bargain. The Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 bestowed independence on the Boers of "The Orange Free State", a piece of territory whose boundaries were deliberately left undefined, though Moshoeshe was led to believe that at least the large thefts of the "Warden Line" no longer held good. Thus did 15,000 Trek Boers receive a province — they who in number were rather less than those of Fingos who had been "liberated" and led by the Rev. Ayliff to their locations at Peddie, there to be used as "allies" of the British against the maXhosa. Like their brothers across the Vaal, the "Free State" Boers were to get their guns and ammunition from the Cape Colony, while a strict embargo was placed on the sale of guns to the baSotho. In the matter of treaties with chiefs, Her Majesty's Government did not relinquish its treaty with Adam Kok, but it assured the Boers that it had "no wish or intention to enter hereafter into any treaties which may be injurious or prejudicial of the interests of the Orange River Government".

On the chess-board of Southern Africa the British might thus be said to have made some skilful moves. Withdrawing overt control for the time being from the north, they had left the Trek Boers with two cattle-farmer republics as a counter to Moshoeshe and the tribes across the

Vaal. Presumably this would have a stabilising influence upon them since they had a common interest in defending themselves against the Bantu. The Treaty with the Waterboers in Griqualand West had been allowed to lapse. That one-time "bulwark of the Colony", was sunk in poverty. But (as we have seen) Adam Kok of Philippolis still had his uses. When his lands were thrown as a "peace-offering to the Boers", Sir George Grey transported him and the Griqua to a more strategic position in "No-man's-land". Stretching from the Drakensburg Mountains down towards the Atlantic south-east of the baSotho, it was a rich stretch of territory as any in Southern Africa. It had become a focal point of unrest. Theophilus Shepstone, now "Diplomatic Agent" in Natal, had a megalomaniac ambition to bring 60,000 amaZulu here, with himself as White Chief; but Grey intended it ultimately to carry a wealthy White population. Meantime he made Adam Kok's Griqua the "Fingos" of this region, as a barrier between the still independent maMpondo and maXesibe to the south-east of them and the baSotho on the other side of them. The Trek Boers with their republics were to act as the White "Fingos" against a possible attack from the baSotho of Moshoeshe and the various other clans of the Tswana descent further west and the maNdebele and others in the north-east. By such manipulations extending from the borders of the Cape Colony to beyond the Vaal, and by employing to the full the policy of "divide and rule", the British were in a position to bring about the gradual weakening of all the tribes. The Trek Boers had their republics; for their guns they had to rely on the Colony. It was under these conditions that they were given the right of way to begin fighting the baSotho.

The British had gone. After all the intrigues, from the coming of the missionaries onwards, they left a legacy of inter-tribal strife. When the Governor, Cathcart, had retreated, the erstwhile "allies" of the British, Moroka, Sekonyela and the rest, were left to their fate. The protracted wars had taken a heavy toll of life, laid waste their fields, brought hunger and want to their people. Their pleas for protection and compensation and their bitter recriminations fell on deaf ears. It is recorded that Moroka flung back his annuity of 50 pounds "with the taunt that the British Government had oppressed instead of protected him". It was knowledge that came too late. His people to-day occupy

the barren Reserve if Thaba Ncho in the midst of the "Orange Free State". The fate of Sekonyela, that brave fighter, was a tragic one. He continued the battle after the British and the Boers had gone, and Moshoeshe at first made a formal request to the Governor to intervene, but was told that "the policy of Her Majesty's Government was never again to interfere in native quarrels". Then the hand of Moshoeshe himself dealt retribution on Sekonyela and his ally, Gert Taaibosch, the Korana chief. With the flower of their warriors killed, a small band of homeless people sought refuge at Winburg and were sent to a location in the Cape Colony. Sir Godfrey Lagden, in his History of the baSotho, writes: "The Batlokwa ceased thenceforth to have any existence as a tribal entity". Sekonyela, too, it is stated, put the blame for his disaster on "his loyalty and alliance with the British". Moshoeshe offered him land for his people, but he refused. The chief's victory over Sekonyela was actually a defeat for the Sotho nation as a whole, and his offer of land could not mend what had been broken. These were some of the triumphs of disunity.

The wars — if such they may be called — between the Boers of the "Orange Free State" and the baSotho, are not our concern. By 1858 President Boshoff was suing for peace and sending a desperate call for help to the British Governor, Sir George Grey, putting the blame on the British Government for the "dire strait" in which the Boers had landed. The Government had sent arms, but the Dutch section of the Cape Colony had not gone to the help of their brothers. "The English ought never to have given it (the 'Free State') up", said Boshoff. True to pattern, the British stepped in and offered to mediate between Moshoeshe and the Boers. The Boers had been chastised enough; Moshoeshe was threatening to enter the "Free State", for he had not yet assumed the offensive. It was time to act. In his communications with the Imperial Government, Grey wrote:

"If the Basutos are conquerors in the war it will greatly encourage the coloured races against the Whites, and as they will be dissatisfied with our assumed neutrality, under the guise of which we have continued to supply the Orange Free State with arms and ammunition, whilst we have acted as police to prevent the Basutos from obtaining such supplies, I fear they will regard themselves as justified in... assailing us..."

Grey was already thinking in terms of exten-

ding the economy of the Cape Colony to include the Boers in the north. The whole drive of his activity, as we have seen, was the extension of British Imperialism, the smashing of tribalism and the establishment of the capitalist economy throughout Southern Africa. To him, therefore, the existence of the backward Boer States on their own was an absurdity. The "Free State" was threatening to collapse. As the historian, Walker, points out: "it was almost entirely a pastoral state, depending for corn on the Caledon valley tribes and on its European neighbours north and south". The Transvaal was rent with civil war, with political and religious feuds. The latter presents us with a point of peculiar interest. Walker writes: "Controversies raged round the question of the relations of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Transvaal with the parent church of the Colony. The issue was of great importance to the Transvaalers, who believed that Harry Smith had threatened to conquer them with the 'spiritual sword' of the colonial clergy."

Both States, also, were chronically bankrupt, trade being mostly by the primitive method of barter. It was all these factors that made Grey warn the Imperial Government that:

"The smallness and weakness of the states, the knowledge that they were isolated bodies... has encouraged the natives to resist and dare them..."

But, as he saw it, their weakness was not only a military danger to the Colony. Like Dr. Philip before him, he could not tolerate the continuance of the feudal economy of the Trek Boers, since it retarded the development of that system of capitalism which by its very nature could not be confined to the Cape Colony alone.

"Such petty (Boer) states", he continues, "... can have no efficient administration of justice. Trade and commerce must, therefore, necessarily languish. Their revenues will be so small that they cannot efficiently provide for their own protection. Hence a new incentive is given to the surrounding native races to attack them. Life and property thus become insecure... South Africa appears to be drifting by not very slow degrees, into disorder and barbarism..."

These were strong words, but the Imperial Government was to bide its time where the Boers were concerned. They seem to have thought that the two cattle-farming

“Republics” could be safely left on the High Veld. Neither of them had an outlet to the sea.

When President Boshoff of the “Free State” had sent his S.O.S. to Grey, the latter had proposed an armistice, to be accepted by the baSotho and the Boers. Moshoeshoe’s sons were against the proposal, but the French missionaries strenuously urged its acceptance. Moshoeshoe agreed. He requested simply the restoration of all the land of the baSotho before the White man came to carve it up. Grey acted as simply in the spirit of European unity and ratified the old Warden Line in favour of the Boers. British mediation had resolved a crisis for the Boers, but solved nothing.

The wars and intrigues of the following period lie outside the scope of this history. But the sum total of it was a state of perpetual upheaval in the land of the baSotho. Chiefs and minor chiefs, sons and brothers of Moshoeshoe, were all involved in a guerilla warfare on an ever-widening scale. To the end he kept his enemies at bay. Nevertheless, the final victory went to the Imperial Government.

At last Moshoeshoe, now an old man, requested the “Protection” of the British Queen. He was keenly aware of what had been happening in other parts of the country, in the Cape Colony, in Natal close to his borders, in “No-man’s-land” between the Colony and his territory, a vast process of tribal disruption going on everywhere; and his actions seem to have always been guided by the recognition that there was a people behind the Boers with far greater resources than his own. With them he sought to make an honourable agreement, expecting that the territories confiscated by the Boers would be restored to him, since in the guerilla campaigns he was unvanquished. But the Imperial Government was in a position to impose its own terms on him. This he knew. Between his first request for the “Protection” of the British Queen in 1841, when the missionary had painted such a glowing picture of its benefits, and his last request in 1868, lay a long and tragic history of conflict between him and those who were his natural allies. It is true, the core of the Sotho nation was still in existence, but later wars between his sons and the Colonial Government were to weaken the baSotho still further.

Moshoeshoe’s request for the Queen’s “Protection” resulted in a treaty which left the Boers in possession of large parts of Basuto-

land. THOSE in charge of Imperial policy had come to the following decisions: first, it had been a “mistake” to relinquish control north of the Orange and thus leave a “weak debatable land . . . between us and a foreign power”. The foreign power was Portuguese East Africa adjoining the Transvaal, which was itself seeking expansion in Central and Southern Africa. Secondly, they decided that:

“We should accept the Basutos’s offer (to come under the British Crown) and so tend towards one South African British Government including Natal”. (A British Crown Colony).

In these statements we see that British strategy is working itself out step by step to its logical conclusion – the supremacy of British Imperialism in Southern Africa. Behind these decisions were events of far-reaching importance making it imperative for Imperialism to complete the task that was actually begun – indeed was inherent in the situation – when the British took over the Colony at the beginning of the 19th century. These events we shall have to look into the following chapter, for they brought to a climax the whole process of the overthrow of one system, tribalism, by the forces of the new system, capitalism.

It was in 1869 that the land of the baSotho was annexed in the name of the Queen. A few months later Moshoeshoe died. When the Imperial Government granted self-government to the Cape Colony in 1872, it handed over the control of the baSotho at the same time. After a period of protracted wars between the sons of Moshoeshoe and the Colony, what is known to-day as Basutoland was taken over by the Imperial Government as a “Protectorate”. What this has meant for the Sotho people is evident in the lack of development, the stagnation and poverty of their country, the burden of taxation, the neglect of the soil, because the able-bodied men, as in all other “Native Reserves” in the Union itself, have to go out as labourers in the mines. Of the original land of the baSotho, large sections of it fell to the Boers of the “Free State”, while the southernmost parts were confiscated by the Cape Colony. Many of its people scattered in these territories comprise the landless peasantry living in South Africa to-day in a state of economic slavery.

Chapter XI

Completion of Military Conquest

In the late Sixties the old Missionary Road that had led Dr. Philip, the Rev. Shaw, the Rev. Robert Moffat and latterly David Livingstone and all the rest of the advance guard into the interior of Africa, acquired a new importance. In 1867 diamonds were discovered in the Campbell lands claimed both by the Waterboers and the Koks of Griqualand West. Then gold was discovered at Tati on the northern borders of Bechuanaland and the Missionary Road became the road leading to the Eldorado that was believed to lie north of the Limpopo, where Mzilikazi had set up his kingdom. These discoveries were to have far reaching effects on the whole of Southern Africa.

When the grasslands that were good enough for cattle to graze on were found to contain the precious diamonds and gold, British Imperialism had no doubt as to who should possess them. For were they not the instruments of a vast economic expansion? That old Imperialist vision of a new civilization extending to the tropics — a vision that had so well guided the superintendent of the London Missionary Society — could now unfold its fullest extent. In the Cape Colony the foundations of the new economy had been laid, but it was soon overtaken by an economic depression because the very nature of that economy demanded continual expansion. Now it could leap ahead. The time had come for British Imperialism to take over proper control in Southern Africa; it was imperative to complete the military subjugation of the Africans; it was essential to bring the Trek Boers back into the fold. Capitalist economy demanded a single, unified control. The flimsy barriers between state and state had to be swept away; boundaries had been all very well when it was a case of splintering the Sotho nation; cattle-“Republics” had been a pleasant fiction when it was expedient to pacify the unruly Trek Boers. And in any case, being completely bankrupt, they were “in pawn” to the Standard Bank of England, which, as the historian, Walker, expresses it, “carried the financial unification of South Africa far in advance of the political.” Trade and commerce knew no boundaries; telegraphs, railways, trade routes, roads leading to still further Imperialist conquest in

Central Africa — these knew no boundaries. The steel of the rail-roads must grapple the states together in an economic unity.

And there was need for haste in completing the task. Other European powers were joining the scramble for colonial possessions in Africa; French, Belgians, Portuguese and the hungry Germans, youngest of the capitalist countries to enter the race, were preparing to carve up the last remaining sections in Central Africa. And what complicated the situation for the British was that the Boers were spreading themselves into Bechuanaland, on their western border, across the vital trade route to the interior. They were also looking east, being desperate for an outlet to the sea. The granting of independence to the Trek Boers had its own logic and would have to work itself out during the next three decades.

Now the cry of “Annexation!” was taken up by one politician after another and action followed the word with amazing rapidity and rapacity. British “Protection” sought to embrace all with the grip of a giant boa-constrictor. With the discovery of diamonds in the Campbell lands of Cornelis Kok, the Cape Colony, which was about to receive self-government, annexed Griqualand West “for the peace of South Africa” (1871). This was done to out-manoeuvre both the “Free State” and the Transvaal, both of whom claimed it for obvious reasons. With a large gesture reminiscent of Sir Harry Smith, President Brand had proclaimed the “Free State Sovereignty” over the Campbell lands, while M.W. Pretorius, President of the Transvaal, gave his illegal blessing to the “Diamond Fields Republic” the grandiloquent name given to the hord of prospectors swarming in from every province to the Kimberley dry diggings. But with that time-honoured hypocrisy for which it is justly famous, British Imperialism considered it a “holy duty” to “annex the lawful possessions of such chiefs as desired to be taken over.” The Transvaal claims were brushed aside. Then, on the strength of a defunct treaty once engineered by Dr. Philip between the dead chief, Waterboer, and the Colonial Government, the Campbell lands, which were claimed by the Waterboers as well as the Koks, were an-

nexed to the Colony. It was a piece of shady practice in keeping with the urgency of the times. The next day the Union Jack was hoisted over the Diamond Fields.

The seventies were a period of wholesale annexations, completing the subjugation of a number of tribes on the north-eastern border of the Cape Colony. "No-man's-land" was still in a state of ferment and by 1873 the maXesibe and a section of the maMpondo were stated to be "asking for protection". When the maMpondomse resisted Government interference the Resident Agent enlisted Adam Kok to subdue them, but before the decade was out, he, too, was annexed. 1877 was a year of widespread resistance on the part of the maGcaleka, maNgqika and baThembu in one last heroic effort, and yet so strong was the influence of the missionaries among the people, that effective unity was no longer possible. "It was clear", wrote the Rev. Ayliff, "that the influence of Christianity had helped peace." With the final defeat of the maXhosa their lands were still more broken up. The missionary's further comment on the event is a significant one:

"The Gcalekas, broken and impoverished, woke at last to the value of the Christian religion."

In 1878 the flame of resistance leapt still higher, extending from Zululand to "No-man's-land" into Basutoland, into the Transvaal and as far as Kuruman, with the warriors of Cetywayo, the Zulu chief, the maMpondomise, The baThembu, Adam Kok's Griqua, the baRolong and the baTlhaping all taking part. The rout of the Imperial forces at Sandlwana ("Isandlwana") was a victory to remember when tales of heroic deeds are handed down from father to son, from generation to generation. So alarmed was the Government at what had taken place that it immediately passed the Disarmament Act, depriving all Africans of guns, "as a civilizing measure". The still independent maMpondo were wroth, and the Fingos cried out at the injustice. "If we have served the Government faithfully, we ought to be allowed to keep arms," said the Fingos. "What will be our fate if we are disarmed?" Their fate was the same as that of their brothers.

"I would annex the Planets"

"Annexation!" Again and again that word reveals the driving power of British Imperialism

to create the conditions of a unified control in Southern Africa essential to the development of the new economic system. To complete the conquest of the tribes on her eastern borders was but one of the tasks facing the Colonial Government after the discovery of diamonds and gold. As we have indicated, the center of land-plunder had shifted still further north. And the further north, the greater the danger from the weakness of the Boer States. The "Free-State" could for the time being be left to its own devices; it was on the whole amenable to the idea of Imperial protection, and it was well hemmed in — though we can hardly subscribe to Professor Walker's comment that the annexation of Basutoland "had solved its (the 'Free State's') Native problem"! The focal point of weakness was the Transvaal.

There were various reasons why the Transvaal had to be brought under control. There was the basic question of creating a unified state control throughout the country and this in turn involved other factors. The tribes, especially in the Eastern Transvaal, were in a state of upheaval. (We cannot speak of boundaries because there were none in actual fact.) In the east, this instability presented two dangers: the maZulu from the coast might unite with the maSwazi and other tribes further north (Cetywayo was said to be giving them encouragement) and overwhelm the Boers. This would have the obvious repercussions on the Colony. Secondly, with the possibility of new gold-fields being discovered the Portuguese on the north-east might themselves take advantage of the general disorder and come down on that region.

Hence the urgent suggestions to "annex the Republics in the commercial interests of South Africa," and simultaneously the suggestion to "annex all the tribes to the Portuguese border." By 1876 the Colonial Secretary was proposing to annex the Transvaal in order to "avert a general Native war" and at the same time to push on the plan of "confederation" of the various states, including Natal, of course under conditions dictated by the Cape Colony, the arm of British Imperialism in Southern Africa. The taking over of the Transvaal was promptly done — prematurely, as it turned out — by no less a person than Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who came up from the Queen's Crown Colony of Natal and stated his terms to the President (at this time the Rev. Burgers), while "Imperial troops, Cetywayo's warriors and a representative of the

Standard Bank were lined up on the frontier.” Then he ran up the Queen’s flag at Pretoria and for a year or two reigned as Administrator. But by 1881 the Transvaal claimed independence after one of those little skirmishes that took place from time to time between the British and the Boers.

But to go back a little in time. Under the powerful lure of the gold, the Boers themselves had their eyes turned northwards to that corridor to the interior, the Missionary Road through Bechuanaland. This meant interfering with the tribes along its route, the baThlaping, the baRolong, and other small Tswana tribes. Since “annexation” was the order of the day, President Pretorius did likewise and attempted to make the chiefs agree to be his “vassals”. But in Bechuanaland at this time there was the Rev. John Mackenzie of the London Missionary Society, a staunch Imperialist of the old school, and he advised the chiefs to seek British “protection”, which they did. The British said “Hands off!” Or, in ministerial language, the Colonial Secretary bade Pretorius “refrain from encroaching on tribes in alliance with Her Majesty”.

In those freebooting days, however, ministerial decrees had little effect in restraining any of the colonial aggressors. The Transvaal had no sooner received formal recognition of its independence from the Imperial Government, than it proceeded to declare two little “Republics” Stellaland and Goshen, right across the Missionary Road in Bechuanaland. This brings us to the wider issues involved for the British in this question of the weakness of the Boer States.

Here it is necessary to point out that for the politicians of the last three decades of the 19th century, “South Africa” had not its boundaries fixed at those lines laid down at the beginning of the 20th century. The stabilization of Union might be said to have been at the expense of amplitude – though by the 1914 War the arm of the Union was already stretching northwards again. The drive towards unified state control carried the predatory vision of Smut’s predecessors – Rhodes and the rest – at least as far north as the Zambesi River and encompassed the land of the maNdebele, where Lobengula had succeeded his father, Mzilikazi, as chief. For Imperialism had reached the peak of its rapacity and it was the era of naked aggression.

The man who most clearly expressed the aims of that era was Rhodes. Indeed he was the em-

bodiment in human form of the rapacity of British Imperialism. “I would annex the planets if I could. I often think of that”, said this monomaniac in all seriousness. The age demanded a different voice from that of the suave Dr. Philip whose business it had been to visit the chiefs of all tribes and offer them the “friendship” and “protection” of Britain. But for both men the end and aim were the same – the supremacy of British Imperialism. What the missionary-superintendent had envisaged and planned for at the beginning of the century, was at the end of it brought to fruition under Rhodes.

The starting point of all Rhodes’ planning lay in the following credo: “I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire”. Secondly, he always planned in terms of a South Africa extending to the Tropics.

“We must always remember”, he said, “that the gist of the South African question lies in the extension of the Cape Colony to the Zambesi.”

And again, impressing upon the Cape Parliament the supreme importance of annexing Bechuanaland, he stated:

“The question before us really is this, whether the Colony is to be defined to its present borders, or whether it is to become the dominant state in South Africa.”

Coming down to more detail one can perceive two inter-related aims in all his vast schemes of expansion: to strengthen the Cape Colony and create a South Africa stretching to the Zambesi was to strengthen British control in Africa, particularly against the power he feared most – Germany. Let us see how this was related to the question of the Trek Boers. Where possible we shall quote Rhodes himself, for he had a habit of stating a situation bluntly.

In the course of her subjugation of the peoples of Southern Africa, British Imperialism had concentrated on those to the Southeast where fertile lands promised the greatest profits.

So far she had been tardy in gaining control over the more arid regions to the north-west comprising Great Namaqualand, which lay west of Bechuanaland. She had her missionary outposts of the Wesleyan and London Missionary Societies, but it had been left to the Rhenish Mission to establish the strongest footing in that region. Then, in 1883, Germany declared Namaqualand and Damaraland in the north-west

as "Protectorates" under her jurisdiction. Britain became thoroughly alarmed. With her eyes already stretched to Central Africa she saw this as an unfavorable move. In fact Germany had cried "Checkmate!" to her northern expansion. Rhodes had urged on the Cape Parliament the necessity to annex the territory, but the farmers, lacking the predatory vision of the British Imperialists, weren't interested.

Rhodes' next step was to drive home the "supreme importance" of annexing Bechuanaland. Addressing the House on the introduction of a Bill for the purpose, he said:

"Bechuanaland is the neck of the whole territory up to the Zambesi, and we must secure it unless we are prepared to see the whole of the north pass out of our hands."

Now the granting of independence to the Transvaal Boers in 1881 had set him snarling, and when they proceeded to set up the two small "Republics" across the Trade Route through Bechuanaland, he did not mince words in the course of his assessment of the situation. He foresaw the possibility of an understanding between Germany and the Transvaal to close the way through Bechuanaland.

"Do you think," he asked, "that if the Transvaal had Bechuanaland, it would be allowed to keep it? Would not Bismarck (the German Chancellor) have some quarrel with the Transvaal, and without resources, without men, what could they do? Germany would come across from her Colony of Angra Pequena (on the west coast of Namaqualand). There would be some excuse to pick a quarrel — some question of brandy or guns or something — and then Germany would stretch from Angra Pequena to Delagoa Bay."

That is, from east to west. (Delagoa Bay was a strategic port on the east coast and at that time in Portuguese hands.) Rhodes could be magnanimous to the Boers. It was also his policy to conciliate the Cape Dutch and carry them with him in plans, but it was always on the assumption of British supremacy.

We see from the above quotation that once more it was a question of British Imperialism making a move on the great chess-board of Southern Africa, both to protect the Boers and ensure its own supremacy.

To turn to the other aspect of Rhodes's vast schemes, the strengthening of the position of the Cape Colony. He once said:

I made the seizure of the interior a paramount thing in my politics and made everything else subordinate."

And again in the parliamentary debate on Bechuanaland:

I look upon this Bechuanaland territory as the Suez Canal of the trade of this country, the key of its road to the interior. . . ."

And on another occasion, with reference to the two small "Republics" claimed there by the Transvaal Boers, he said:

"Are we prepared . . . to allow these republics to form a wall across our trade route? The railways have been constructed with the view of the trade of the interior. . . . We must look to the development of the north, not only in the interest of our merchants, but also in the interest of our farmers."

Here we have the beginning and the end of the whole Imperial purpose in Southern Africa, the establishment of British supremacy and with it the new economic system. And for this the land had to be confiscated and the people subjugated. The task was not yet finished. "Annex to the Tropics," the missionary-superintendent had said. "I made the seizure of the interior a paramount thing in my politics," said Rhodes. Between Bechuanaland and the Zambesi lay half a million square miles of unconfiscated territory and a still unconquered tribe, the naNdebele. The lands were fertile, there were many herds of cattle, and explorers said there was gold, fabulous gold. Rhodes set about completing the task.

Rhodes was better equipped for the job than any of his predecessors. The outstanding feature of this final stage of Imperial conquest in Southern Africa is that private enterprise with its colossal dividends (the Chartered Company) could, and did, do the job of British Imperialism. This was made possible by the discovery of diamonds and gold in the already confiscated territory where thousands of landless Africans were working in the mines. Thus from the bowels of African earth came the wealth that was to conquer and enslave still more Africans. With the discovery of the all important Rand gold-fields in 1886 the ruthless financial battles to procure the monopoly of control both of diamonds and gold, raged fast and furious. They were but part of the larger conflict for the confiscation of a country and the subjugation of a whole people. In this cut-throat contest between financiers Rhodes finally emerged triumphant

over all his rivals. By 1887 he had bought up all holdings in the big De Beers Company and in the same year founded the Gold-fields Company of South Africa. Less than a year later a still stronger monopoly was obtained by the founding of the De Beers Consolidated Mines.

From the outset Rhodes regarded this as an instrument for carrying out his plans for British supremacy.

"I want it put in the trust deed," he said, "that we have the power to go to the Zambesi, or further north, to spend the money of the Company, if thought advisable, to acquire a country and form an empire."

The new corporation "would be empowered to annex a portion of territory in Central Africa, raise and maintain a standing army and undertake warlike operations."

In the same year (1888) that the Consolidated Mines Company was formed, the Rev. J.S. Moffat persuaded Chief Lobengula to sign a treaty pledging that "peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects and the Amandebele people."

Once more the Missionaries

What part did the missionaries play in this last act of the long drama involving the conflict between two systems, tribalism and capitalism? It was the same that they had performed consistently throughout the period. Only the nature of their role was more patent, more difficult to conceal owing to the naked aggression of the time. They had to become more obviously the tool of British Imperialism.

The way north had been paved by the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, chief of whom was the Rev. Robert Moffat. We have several times referred to him and here it is necessary to pause and give a fuller picture of his activities, because they have a bearing on the event with which we have to deal in this chapter. On his arrival at the Cape of Good Hope in 1817, two years before Dr. Philip, he had been sent first on a mission to the Namaqua in the north-west and had won the approbation of the Governor, Lord Somerset, for the influence he had obtained over the chief, Afrikaner, who had hitherto stood out against the invaders. In 1819 he was sent to revive the mission among the baTlhaping in south Bechuanaland and spent the rest of his long career at Kuruman.

Robert Moffat was a man of upright character and strong personality, who from his mission centre at Kuruman, played what was perhaps a more important part than that of the missionary-superintendent, Dr. Philip, who was more pre-occupied with political machinations. Because of his personal qualities he carried the prestige of British power among the chiefs, with whom he kept in constant contact, and the name of "Moshete" was known far and wide.

One of the most remarkable things in the annals of the missionaries is the story of the relationship that sprang up between Robert Moffat and Mzilikazi, chief of the maNdebele. The full account is told by Moffat himself in his "Matabele Journals", which were discovered only a few years ago by his grandson. In them he kept a day to day record of each of his five visits to Mzilikazi, the first in the year 1829, when the maNdebele, having left Zululand, were in the region of the Vaal River; the second was at Mosega — Mzilikazi having moved further west towards the Bechuanaland border — when Moffat, through his influence, not only procured safe passage for the explorer, Dr. Andrew Smith, but was instrumental in getting the chief to accept a treaty of "friendship" with Britain (1836) this being part of Dr. Philip's general scheme of establishing a footing among the tribes. The treaty had meant little at the time, but fifty years later it was to reap a dreadful harvest. Moffat's remaining visits took him far north into the country of the maShona, whither Mzilikazi had led his people and now occupied territory stretching to the Zambesi River. Moffat had received instructions from the London Missionary Society, after consultation with the missionary-explorer, David Livingstone (who was his son-in-law) to inaugurate two new mission stations, one north and another south of the Zambesi. This was no easy matter, for while the chief had conceived a great affection for the missionary, the maNdebele were strongly opposed to the establishment of a mission station in their midst.

Moffat's description of his third meeting with Mzilikazi after a lapse of nearly twenty years is most moving, perhaps partly because of the fact that the missionary himself so casually received the devotion bestowed upon him.

"I confess I do not comprehend his attachment to me," writes Moffat, "and yet he will not hear the gospel."

On arriving within a few miles of Mzilikazi's

place, Moffat was welcomed by the people, who came running out of the villages to meet him.

"Everyone seemed to know Moshete (Moffat) . . . by name . . . I am sure if I heard the name Moshete once, I heard it a thousand times . . . while all appeared really delighted with the prospect that Moselekatse (Mzilikazi) would soon see his friend he had so long and so earnestly desired to see . . ." (Moffat's Journal, 1854.)

The next day the two men came face to face, both of them aged since last they had met.

"He (Mzilikazi) grasped my hand, gave one earnest look, drew his mantle over his face. It would have been an awful sight to see the hero of a hundred battles wipe from his eye the falling tear . . . He spoke not, except pronouncing my name, Moshete, again and again. Withdrawing his head, he looked at me again, his hand still in mine, and again covered his face . . . Now and then, when he thought I was not observing, he cast a look at me, as if I were his only son, lost but found, though he affects to call me Machobane, the name of his father." (Ibid.)

The journal gives many instances of the trust that the chief reposed in the missionary and the advantage that the latter took from his "entire confidence in his friendship" to impress upon the chief the necessity to "cease from all aggressive wars" and to open his kingdom to the missionaries. It was to require all Moffat's resources of persuasion before Mzilikazi finally consented on his fifth and last visit in 1860 to the setting up of a mission station at Nyati, but only on one condition, that, if Moffat himself did not remain, then his son, J.S. Moffat, should take charge of the mission. Young Moffat accepted the charge and received from Mzilikazi and from his son, Lobengula, who witnessed these things, the affection and trust due to the "son of Umshete" (Moshete).

It was solely Moffat's personal influence with the Chief that overcame the strong opposition of the maNdebele to allowing missionaries into their country. They would express themselves freely to Moffat on the sources of their suspicion of the White men, whether British or Boer, and shrewdly observed, for example, that wherever the missionaries penetrated, the Boers would follow after. Moffat records more than one conversation where the Chief and his indunas bluntly put it to him that, though the Boers had proved hostile to the British, the latter supplied them with guns and ammunition, which

they used against the Africans.

"Do not the English supply them with guns and ammunition, while they know the Boers use it to destroy the natives, that they may take their country?"

So Moffat reports a question put to him by the Chief, and in his journal adds:

"It was impossible for me to deny the fact that the English did enter into a treaty to supply those very Boers with arms and ammunition. . . . I was only glad that he (Mzilikazi) appeared not yet to have heard of the law promulgated by our Government . . . that the native tribes north of the Vaal River be not allowed to purchase a single ounce of ammunition. . . . Had Moselekatse pressed the question a little further, I should have been in a fix."

Moffat records another conversation which reveals how the Africans were clearly aware of the true nature of the relationship between the British and the Boers in their common attack against themselves. We make no apology for quoting at some length. The occasion was a visit to Sechele, Chief of the baKwena, whom Moffat visited on his way back from Mzilikazi in 1854. Sechele had a brother, Khosilintse, who was an eloquent speaker and had on a previous visit given Moffat a taste of his uncompromising logic when he had argued that "The Boers and the English were one, on one side, and the natives on the other." Khosilintse, then, took Moffat up on the question of the Boers, those Boers who were a menace to the peace of the Tswana tribes along the Missionary Road, but whom, apparently, Moffat made some attempt to defend. Moffat's notes for the day begin abruptly with a record of Khosilintse's answer:

"Khosilintse then proceeded, rather warmly . . . He said he wondered how I could talk so, as he and everyone else knew I was a friend of the Bechuana (baTswana) . . . for he considered that my reasoning went to allow the Boers to do as they liked with them (the baTswana) . . . Do you not see that we are reduced to poverty by the Boers, who are taking our meat, and drinking our milk?' And raising his voice to a higher key, he asked: 'Where are our children? When fathers and mothers lie down at night they ask: "Where are our children?" . . . Is it because we have not white skins that we are to be destroyed like libatana (beasts of prey)? . . . Why do the English assist the Boers? Why do they give them power over lands that are not theirs to give? Why do the English sup-

ply them with ammunition, when they know the Boers? Do the English want our country? You have spoken about what the word of God says. Have not the English the word of God? . . . Are we only to obey the word of God because we are black? . . . ”

Khosilintse relates an incident about the Boers, and then Moffat continues:

“He resumed in a more sarcastic tone: ‘we have been told that the English is a wise nation. What is wisdom? We have been told the English is a strong nation. They have driven their white Bushmen into our country to kill us. Is it strength? Have the English no cattles and slaves of their own that they send their Bushmen to take cattle and our children to sell? We are told that the English love all men. They give or sell ammunition horses and guns to the Boers, who have red teeth, to destroy us, and if we ask to buy powder, we can get none. No! No! No! Black man must have no ammunition; they must serve the white man. Is this their love? The English are no friends to the black man. If I am accusing the English, or the Boers, falsely, tell me! Are these things not so? You (Moffat) know all these things better than we do . . . I speak the truth. My words are not the words of a Boer. They are mine, I, Khosilintse! You know they are the words of truth. . . .’ ”

Then Moffat concludes:

“His eloquence was not that of a fine language or modulated voice, but it was the deep tones of a stricken soul. . . . (adding) I was right out thankful to depart, for though I had had many tough bones to pick in my missionary career, I never was in my life so completely floored.”

The mission at Nyati some miles north of Mzilikazi’s place did not prove a successful one, but the link between Mzilikazi’s son, Lobengula, and the Rev. J.S. Moffat, the “son of Ums-hete,” had been established, and was to be put to profitable use at the appropriate time.

The man most responsible for blazing the trail among the unknown peoples of the north was Rev. David Livingstone. Sent out as a missionary at Kuruman to assist the Rev. Robert Moffat, he would carry his Bible and his gun on exploring expeditions into North Bechuanaland, for the explorer was stronger in him than the evangelist. Thus he extended the Missionary Road into hitherto unknown regions. His habit was to conciliate the chiefs, rest awhile preaching the Word, and then pass on to new pastures, eventually crossing the Zambesi and pene-

trating as far north as Lake Nyasa. He was the avowed servant of “Commerce and Christianity,” whose frank opinions on these two subjects we have already quoted.

“The opening up of a path from either the East or the West to the centre of the Continents is a prominent part of our plans,” he said.

This was the man who more than any other made it possible for Rhodes to think in terms of a Cape Colony stretching from Table Mountain to the Zambesi and even beyond. Where Livingstone had trod, his brother missionaries followed one after the other, consolidating the missions, and in this outlying regions very often combining trade with religion. And not only came the missionaries; the Missionary Road was the recognised route for explorers, hunters, traders, adventurers, speculators and seekers after gold – men of many nationalities, but all seeking something, all of them the petty agents of a new system.

Wherever he went, Livingstone had upheld British interests. In the early days he had come up against the Boers, who were already trekking into south Bechuanaland.

“The Boers resolved to shut up the interior and I determined to open the country”, he said. “And we shall see who have been most successful in resolution, they or I.”

There was no doubt as to who was the most successful.

By the eighteen-eighties, Bechuanaland had been well-mapped out. The chief of most standing in the territory was Khama, chief of the bagyMangwato (Bmangwato) whose territory lay nearest to that of the maNdebele. He had been Christianized and encouraged to regard the British as his protectors. At the time of which we speak the most staunch upholder of British interests in Bechuanaland was the Rev. John Mackenzie, of the London Missionary Society, missionary to the bagaMangwato, but more or less unofficial administrator of the whole territory. This Rev. John Mackenzie was a forceful character and as ardent a politician as Dr. Philip had been; he was backed by the Aborigines Protection Society (which was still in existence); he was a maker of passionate appeals to British public opinion and a hater of the Boers. He, too, advocated the annexation of Bechuanaland as the key to the interior. But he was somewhat out of place in this period of rank aggression. It was Rhodes who was the more true embodiment

of the spirit of the age. Rhodes, too, made an appeal to the British public – and thereby launched his Chartered Company that most powerful instrument of British Imperialism.

The two men clashed over the question of control in Bechuanaland. And here we may observe a curious phenomenon at work. Both men were servants of British Imperialism. But the Rev. Mackenzie wanted control to be secured under the old and simple formula of Her Majesty's "Protection," while Rhodes aimed at control under the Cape Government. Rhodes' approach was in keeping with his aim to strengthen the Cape Colony as the dominant arm of British Imperialism in Southern Africa. At the same time it reflects another factor, on which we have already commented, that at this stage the gigantic resources of private enterprise could do the job of Imperialism. This dictated a different attitude to the Imperial connection. It could, when necessary, make use of those traditions that had been built up around the British Crown, and call upon the assistance of its old and trusted agents. In fact this is precisely what Rhodes was going to do when he came to deal with the maNdebele. On the other hand, private enterprise has its own ruthless laws and tends to resist anything that comes between it and the insatiable necessity to expand.

On the question of a Bechuanaland "protectorate," then, the Rev. John Mackenzie was all for the Imperial Flag, with the Boers thrown out neck and crop. But the predatory vision of the Imperial speculator was sharper than that of the missionary-politician. Rhodes managed things differently and he knew the Boers better. There were two methods of handling them – conciliation and a show of force. Boomplaats had been an example of the one, while the recognition of their land seizures at the expense of the Griqua and the baSotho was an example of the other. So Rhodes employed both methods, but in their proper time and place.

Paul Kruger, now President of the "South African Republic" (Transvaal) in place of Pretorius, was one of those whom Rhodes tried to conciliate. The extension of the railways northwards and the removal of all tariff-barriers between states were essential to economic expansion. Paul Kruger, however, had a monomania as strong as Rhodes' – to uphold Dutch Feudalism. Immovable in his prejudices, he was stubborn about railways – he preferred the ox – and stiff-necked on the question of tariffs,

which, it may be said, enraged the Dutch farmers at the Cape. Kruger for his part was very anxious to obtain control over Swaziland, which would bring the Boers a step nearer a much-needed sea-port, and for this he required recognition by the Imperial Government. This was even more important to the Boers than the pasturelands flanking the Missionary road in Bechuanaland, though, of course, they wanted the two little "Republics", Stellaland and Goshen, also recognised. The question of Swaziland was left in abeyance. Meantime Rhodes went in person to Stellaland and got the Boer farmers to agree that they would accept a Bechuanaland "Protectorate" under Cape control, if they in turn were left in possession of the land they had confiscated from the Africans. In the matter of Goshen, however, where Kruger suddenly proclaimed the land of a petty chief to be under his Government's "protection," Rhodes decided to urge that an expeditionary force should be sent from England to establish a "protectorate" over Bechuanaland, especially since the Cape Parliament couldn't come to a decision over the matter. There was need for haste since the German annexation of Namaqualand and Damaraland west of Bechuanaland had just been ratified. Thus, south Bechuanaland, including the territory of the chiefs as well as that claimed by the Boers, was declared a British Crown Colony, while the rest of Bechuanaland became a British "protectorate." The first Deputy Commissioner was the Rev. John Mackenzie.

In this manner the game was played, with a land and a people as pawns. As far as the Africans were concerned, the stormy contest between Rhodes and the Rev. Mackenzie (the detail of which do not concern us) had been nothing but shadow-boxing. Rhodes had it either way and the main purpose had been achieved. To control Bechuanaland was to control the way to the north. The Missionary Road would be converted into a railway route, the life-line of trade; the land and its people would be exploited when the Imperialists were ready to do so. But first – the way was open to the land of the maNdebele.

"Peace and Amity"

It was at the end of 1885 that Bechuanaland had been declared a British "Protectorate." In 1886–7–8 several events happened in quick succession. Gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand within the Transvaal; Germany and

England came together to discuss their respective spheres of exploitation in East and West Africa; Rhodes founded the Goldfields Company of South Africa and procured his monopoly of financial control in the diamond and gold industries. Feeling in a stronger position owing to the fact that the Rand gold was in Transvaal territory, Kruger despatched his agent, Grobler, to angle for a treaty of "protection" with Lobengula, chief of the maNdebele. When this became known, the Rev. J. S. Moffat, who had just been made Assistant Commissioner for the Bechuanaland "Protectorate," was ordered to proceed at once to Lobengula. For the next few years his duties in Bechuanaland were completely neglected, for he had more important work to do as "British Representative" with the Chief. His first instructions were to find out about this alleged Grobler agreement, get Lobengula to repudiate it and persuade him to sign a treaty giving Britain the exclusive right to interfere in his affairs.

The Rev. J. S. Moffat, son of the Rev. Robert Moffat, was eminently suited to the task that his Government imposed upon him. He had spent his boyhood at Kuruman Mission Station; he had learned the language of the people; he "knew" the African. His first mission had been to the maNdebele in Mzilikazi's time. It will be remembered that Mzilikazi had agreed to the establishment of a mission station in his territory on one condition: "Umshete (Robert Moffat) must either come himself or send his son." Later, the Rev. J. S. Moffat took his father's place at Kuruman and also held a position in the Moffat Institute which trained African teachers and preachers. Owing to internal disputes he had left Kuruman and became missionary to Sechele, chief of the baKwena, whom Livingstone had conciliated on his way north and with whom Robert Moffat had kept in contact. Then he entered Government service in an official capacity and became a "Native" Commissioner over a small Tswana tribe on the borders of the Transvaal when the latter territory was still under the jurisdiction of the Cape Government (1880). His appointment had been due to the fact that, while he had been missionary with the baKwena, the authorities (as R. U. Moffat, his son and biographer, informs us) "had been quick to see how valuable the services of a man like Moffat might be in dealing with the natives." Rhodes apparently was under the same impression and we have no reason to

doubt the further statement of J. S. Moffat's son that:

"Cecil Rhodes placed . . . a high estimate on Moffat's presence and influence in Matabeleland."

Moffat's arrival at the place of Lobengula opened up a chapter of treachery and plunder on a grand scale. The manoeuvres and manipulations that followed make sordid reading, but the stakes were high — no less than a territory three times the size of Britain, a people to the number of half a million, and limitless wealth beyond. One may well ask why the Imperial speculators in land and gold, who were not likely to be thwarted in their gigantic schemes for the lack of a mere scrap of paper called a "Treaty," should have taken so much trouble with these empty formalities of waiting for the Chief's permission. It might be answered that in making use of the time-honoured machinery and agents of British Imperialism, they were paying their respects to the old myth, for public consumption. It is in the nature of national myths to have an enthusiastic mass following. Be that as it may, in this instance Imperialism made full use of the myth of "Protection," that had been so assiduously propagated by the missionaries.

Lobengula received the "son of Umshete" as a man he could trust. "For his father's sake as well as his own Moffat received a warm personal welcome," states his biographer. By this time concession-hunters, big and small were swarming round the chief, to use his own phrase, "like wolves," and to pacify them he would throw out this promise and that, contemptuous of their importunity. There were two people, however, in whose advice he seemed to have implicit faith, the Rev. Helm, his interpreter, and, first and foremost, the "son of Umshete." The latter had to wait some time before the chief would give him an answer, but he "waited patiently" and at length was able to hand over to the High Commissioner a document duly signed by himself and Lobengula, a document that is rightly designated as "The Moffat Treaty." It invoked the early treaty that Dr. Andrew Smith, through the influence of Robert Moffat, had persuaded Mzilikazi to sign. Witness the dignified language of this document:

"The Chief Lo Bengula, Ruler of the tribe known as the Amandebele, together with the Mashona and Makakalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees . . . that peace and amity

shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects, and the Amandebele people; . . . and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligaas, with the then Governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the year of our Lord 1836."

The Chief also agreed to make no agreement with any foreign State to "sell, alienate or cede" any part of his territory, without the sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

Thereafter, the only document that Lobengula seems to have treated seriously was this treaty of "friendship" with Britain. "It was that same treaty, signed and sealed by himself (Moffat) that Lobengula respected and trusted in to the very end," writes R. U. Moffat, who also states: "It was an instrument that paved the way for all that was to follow."

For Rhodes the gist of the agreement was that it gave him the right of way in the land of the maShona as well as the maNdebele, as far north as the Zambesi. The next step was to obtain exclusive mineral rights. For this purpose Rhodes sent up three of his henchmen, including Rudd, his partner in De Beers. They did not wait immediately upon the Chief, but first presented Moffat with letters of introduction. Concerning this he himself has written:

"My instructions were to introduce them to the King with a favourable recommendation, and then to leave them to work out things for themselves."

They very much needed Moffat's influence with the Chief, who was becoming highly suspicious of every concession hunter who approached him. But at last after three months of weary waiting, Rudd rode off triumphantly with a document, witnessed this time by the Rev. Helm, which gave him "exclusive power over all metals and minerals situated and contained in his (Lobengula's) kingdoms, principalities and dominions." It may be mentioned that by one of those curious but unimportant chances, Rudd, on his way back, nearly perished of thirst in the Bechuanaland desert, but was rescued by some kindly Africans. In return for the Rudd Concession, Lobengula was to receive 100 Pounds a month, 1,000 rifles and a gun-boat on the Zambesi River.

Meantime Rhodes had not been idle. He went to England to float a British South Africa Com-

pany, with himself as managing director, and to procure Government support for his schemes. After some jockeying in the right quarters, some influential members of the House were won over to the point of view that it would be an excellent thing to have a private Chartered Company, over which the Government could retain control, though the financial responsibility would be that of the Company. They advised Rhodes, however, to include on his board of directors "men of social and political standing who would command more respect in England than those who . . . were merely associates with South Africa companies." Some members of the aristocracy and others were forthwith found to join the board, and then the Queen granted her Royal Charter. The *London Times*, a paper of ancient repute, trumpeted the fabulous riches of the land of the maNdebele, where the Chartered Company would "lay the basis of a great English-speaking colony in what appears to be the fairest region in Africa." Thereupon the British public in every walk of life took out shares to the tune of a million. The powers granted to the Chartered Company were "gigantic." It could make treaties, promulgate laws and maintain a police force: it could engage in mining and any other industry; it could build roads and railways and even charter ships if necessary. Its field of operation included Bechuanaland and had no limit northwards. Back in South Africa, Rhodes obtained the willing support of the Cape Parliament and the Afrikaner Bond (Dutch Party). The founder of the Bond, the Rev. du Toit, a one-time opponent of Rhodes, declared: "Let us not ignore the guidance of Providence. God has given us England as a guardian."

To return to the land around which so many schemes were revolving. Here the duties of the Rev. J. S. Moffat were not yet over. The Chartered Company was established in October 1889. In that month Moffat wrote:

"The principal thing occupying my thoughts has been a request from the Chartered Company to remain here as Government Representative."

And again:

"... (It) is a Government appointment, but it is really to be paid for by the Company."

His letters of this period express approbation both of the Chartered Company and of Rhodes, yet he seems to have been troubled in conscience at the role he would have to play. Hesitating to

accept the post, he wrote:

"...It means probable discredit and misunderstanding in the minds of the natives, for when the conflict and collision, humanly speaking inevitable, come, they will look upon me as their betrayer."

R. U. Moffat, his biographer, explains the situation as follows:

"The Chartered Company were not preparing to occupy Mashonaland ... but they feared that the passage of an imposing cavalcade along the eastern border might upset the equanimity of the Matebele. Violence at this stage was the one thing that the Directors wished to avoid, and so high an opinion did they set on Moffat's presence in Matabeleland that they agreed to provide the funds if the Government would appoint him British Resident for the next two years."

These words are sufficient to explain the role of the missionary in this whole Imperial transaction. It was natural that he should receive instructions not to identify himself in any way with the Chartered Company.

The next, and final, preliminary was a nasty bit of business. This was the obtaining of the Lippert Concession whereby Lobengula was inducted virtually to sign away his land. He was by this time regretting that he had ever signed the Rudd Concession; disgruntled concession-hunters were whispering in his ear that Rudd and his companions were actually agents of the Cape Government. He became alarmed; his signing of documents expected of him by the whites was perhaps not such an imbecility after all. Acting, therefore, in the spirit of the Moffat Treaty that had invoked the name of his fathers, he directed through his missionary an appeal to the Queen:

"The White people are troubling me much about gold. If the Queen hears that I have given the whole country, it is not so."

With the Chief's suspicions thus thoroughly aroused, it was thought necessary to get round him by means of a trick and with petty cunning the swindle was carried out.

Lobengula was deceived into believing that he was granting a land-concession to a German, Lippert, while it was actually being granted to the British Chartered Company, which had bought Lippert off beforehand. Lobengula naturally thought he was playing one concession-

hunter off against the other, for how could a chief give away the land of his people? The plotter knew he would calculate in this way, but they wanted his signature. In due course Moffat received a confidential letter from the British High commissioner outlining the scheme and assigning him his part in it. It is an interesting document. "If he (Lobengula) knew the concession had been bought by the Company," it ran, "he might possibly refuse to ratify it." Moffat was instructed to be present at the interview between the chief and Lippert and to make certain of the exact nature of the concession. Of course, in the eyes of Lobengula, Moffat's presence was in itself a guarantee of safety.

Moffat was obviously extremely uneasy at his part in the transaction, even though it seemed to be a passive one. In fact he protested against it to the High Commissioner.

"I am thankful Your Excellency assigns to me a quite limited course of action," he wrote. But His Excellency was quite unperturbed by the scruples of his agent. Moffat had no choice but to stand by while Lippert told as many lies as were necessary for the success of the scheme, and wait till Lobengula signed. Moffat wrote again to the High Commissioner:

"Mr. Lippert has not yet succeeded in bringing his negotiations to a successful end. I have been twice, at the chief's request, present while interviews have been going on. The chief has asked me to give him my advice. This is just what I am unable to do. ... I have had to do what is very hard - to sit by in silence and to hear things said which are not true ... I hoped to have been relieved from the necessity of being present at any of these meetings, but the chief would not go on without me."

Of all the actors in this tragic drama for the subjugation of a people, none played a part so ignoble. Commenting on the fact that the Chartered Company had now consolidated its position, his biographer writes:

"Moffat's presence in Matabeleland then became a hindrance rather than a help and the Government ... withdrew its representative from Matabeleland."

Events now moved swiftly. British Imperialism knew when to bide its time and when to hasten. It remained for the Chartered Company to occupy the land of the maNdebele. 1890 was a year of feverish activity. In the background was the strong arm of British Imperialism which was

simultaneously making treaties with Germany and Portugal, mapping out their respective spheres of exploitation north of the Zambesi. A British Protectorate had been declared in Nyasaland. It was decided that the maNdebele were too formidable for a frontal attack. To do this would require a strong military force, and the Chartered Company didn't want any unnecessary expense. So it was agreed that they should first occupy the land of the maShona, a less war-like tribe north of the maNdebele.

For this purpose the Chartered Company set about recruiting a company of gold diggers, a motley crowd from the Kimberley dry diggings, mostly English and Dutch from the Transvaal, the Cape Colony and Natal. They have been designated by the title of pioneers, but it would be more correct to call them the buccaneers of Imperialism. From the outset they looked to obtain land, cattle and gold shares, each one being promised a 3,000 acre farm and 15 gold claims. They were to be accompanied by a British South African police force. This was the "army" of the Chartered Company. In Southern Africa the wars of aggression had been carried out by the Imperial forces assisted by commandos of local Dutch and English farmers, but the Company employed adventurers and gold-diggers.

Elements of the gigantic and the petty entered into this final stage of the military conquest of the Africans; the ruthless battles and the vast speculations of the financiers, the manipulations of the politicians, the hypocrisies of the humanitarians, the greeds and the brutalities of the gold-seekers. It demonstrates more clearly perhaps than at any other period the coming together, the interaction, of all the agents of Imperialism, all of them harnessed to a single predatory purpose. Here we may observe the rapacity of the systems as a whole and in its many parts, for each one is moulded by the system and is an image of the whole.

The Company was still busy recruiting when a report came that the Boers, undeterred by the mere matter of a signed concession, were already trekking into Mashonaland. Rhodes took immediate action. To the Colonial Secretary he wrote with a crudeness of phrase that revealed his real attitude to the Trek Boers.

"The report as to Boers squatting . . . if true, you must instruct the police to expel them. If not the game is up. You cannot allow a single Boer to settle across the Limpopo until our position in the north is secure."

Soon afterwards he and the High Commissioner met President Kruger to come to some understanding. The British professed themselves prepared to bargain over the land of the maSwazi, while the Boers agreed not to interfere with the Chartered Company in the land of the maNdebele.

With all impediments thus removed, the expedition set out for Mashonaland, not without angry protests from Lobengula, whose suspicions had to be allayed by Rhodes' most valuable right-hand man, Dr. Jameson. In this he was reinforced by a deputation from the Queen, advising him "to put his trust in the new Company." On the way some Africans in Bechuanaland and Mashonaland had been recruited as labourers for the roads and the prospective mines. Jameson became Administrator of the new territory and Rhodes Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. And the land of the maNdebele was declared a "Protectorate."

After a time failure to find gold precipitated the next step towards seizing the territory. The Chartered Company shareholders were clamouring for those fabulous profits that had been promised them. Rhodes was already looking beyond the Zambesi and by 1893 had bought out the African Lake Company which, in co-operation with the missionaries, had established trading factories on Lake Nyasa. This territory had also been declared a British "Protectorate." All this was in keeping with the nature of the new economic system and its insatiable needs for profits. There was only one stumbling-block - Lobengula and his people. It was time to remove them. The speed and ferocity of the invasion that followed (known as the first "Matabele War") were commensurate with the necessity to open up Central Africa for further exploitation. Dr. Jameson enlisted the Chartered Company's volunteer force of 600 on the plain and simple basis of prospective marauders. In fact, they refused to join without a written promise of loot; for each man "a farm of 6,000 acres, twenty gold claims and an equal share of the famous Matabele herds."

The well-tried plan of provocation, in the name of "protection" was once more put into operation and the spectacle of the abominations that follows is something for the imagination to baulk at. It was the simplest thing in the world to precipitate a clash. Lobengula's warriors were straining for battle and skirmishes between them and the maShona were frequent. So it was

necessary for the British to "protect" the ma-Shona. One of the opening incidents in this campaign of land-plunder was the cold-blooded massacre of warriors "who had been forbidden by their Chief to lift their arms against the white man." Lobengula was thus acting in the spirit of the treaty pledging "peace and amity" with the British. But his envoys sent with messages to the High Commissioner were shot. In his extremity, the Chief (as J. S. Moffat himself records) addressed a message to the missionary:

"I want to know from you, Son of Umshete, why don't you speak? Why do you keep quiet? What great wrong have I done? I thought I wrote to tell you all. . . . I want to know about this matter. Tell me."

In another letter to his wife, Moffat writes:

"I am not a bit sorry for Loben and the Matabele. I am sorry for ourselves — that we can *demean ourselves to act so dishonestly.*"

Indeed the English were incorrigible! He even thought of resigning as a protest against what he called "the despicable business," but decided against it. "Would it be any use?" he wrote. "Should I not be simply squelched by the boundless resources of the Company and the High Commissioner together." He assessed the situation correctly; for they did, though he didn't resign. Having used him, they consigned him to complete obscurity in a small official post.

A good supply of maxim guns soon brought the Chartered Company's forces to Lobengula's village. There they found nothing but ruins, for the chief himself, before fleeing from the place, had used the dynamites he had received, to destroy it. By the end of 1893 the British could claim that they had added about half a million square miles to their Imperial dominions, while the maNdebele were relegated to two small "Reserves." It may be added that the shares of the Chartered Company doubled over-night. Lobengula and his people were fugitives; two month later, it is said, the chief died of small-pox at the Shangani River, whither he and his regiments had been driven. The surrender of the maNdebele was ensured by the usual method of famine; all their cattle were confiscated and the people were prevented from sowing their corn until they had surrendered their arms.

It is a fitting commentary to the predatory nature of the whole proceeding that at first Rhodes was at odds with the Imperial Governments

over the settlement of the new territory (called Rhodesia). The Imperial Government indicated that all negotiations had to be conducted through its representative, the High Commissioner, and not the Chartered Company. "I had the idea and found the money," said Rhodes. "I certainly intend to settle the question of South Africa lines." But the fact that the Imperial Government (leaving the Chartered Company nominally in charge) and not the Colonial Government took over control, served merely as a reminder that Rhodes and the Chartered Company, like all the rest, were the servants of British Imperialism.

With the subjugation of the maNdebele and the confiscation of their territory, British Imperialism achieved two objects; the military conquest of the Africans in Southern Africa was completed and British supremacy was secured. Agreements with Germany and Portugal as to their respective spheres of exploitation had been concluded, and the Cape Colony, with those dangers removed from her far northern borders, had British controlled territory to the north of her. She was also to receive an additional piece of territory, British Bechuanaland. On the military plane, all the important moves on the vast chessboard of Southern Africa had been made.

The primary task, the subjugation of the Africans and the confiscation of the land, had to all intents and purposes been fulfilled. At the beginning of 1894 the maMpondo, the last of the tribes on the eastern borders of the Colony to retain their independence, were also annexed. It was now time to pass on to the second phase in the subjugation of the people.

There was still the matter of the Trek Boers. As we have indicated, the new economic system of capitalism demanded a unified control — call it confederation or union or what you will; the main point was that it had to be under the British Empire. A self-governing South Africa always had to have the protection (to use the word in its plain meaning) of Imperial resources behind it. The Cape Dutch knew this and supported Rhodes in his Imperialist schemes. If the Trek Boers, therefore, were not prepared to return quietly to the fold, it would have to be done by force. The attempt to seize the Transvaal, where President Kruger had dared to deny political rights to the British "Uitlanders" on the Rand gold-fields, miscarried in the farcical Jameson Raid — incedentally pulling Rhodes

down with it. Many such Imperialist acts throughout the century had come off successfully, but this one was mismanaged. Hence the unfortunate episode of the Boer War, after which the British annexed the two Boer "Republics," but once the British had asserted their supremacy, they could afford to make the

Dutch their partners in what was now the main task, the political and economic enslavement of the non-European people. This was a recognition of the basic conflict in South Africa – as it had been from the beginning – the conflict between White and Black.

Chapter XII

End and Beginning

The military defeat of the Africans was followed by their political and economic enslavement, thus completing the purpose for which the people had been conquered and their land confiscated. We have said that the establishment of British supremacy meant the establishment of the new economic system, of capitalism. The discovery of diamonds and gold had opened up vast possibilities of development in commerce and industry. This demanded an ever-increasing supply of cheap Black labour for the mines, the farms, the towns. In other words, African labour was to be exploited in order to build up the South African State, but the Black man was not to be allowed to share in the fruits of the civilization he was building.

This opened up a chapter of history, brief in time, but as long and tortuous in its machinations as the century of military aggression that preceded it. It is a period that is well known to us. The conditions under which we live to-day, as outcasts in the land of our birth, are the direct result of the system of repressive legislation which, step by step and with enormous ingenuity, has been evolved with one purpose, to enslave the Non-European peoples of South Africa.

This period, too, has required its special agents, each with his specific function to perform. It has required a ruthless financier and politician like Rhodes; a Viscount Milner, who began his career as a member of the British Liberal Party and who, as High Commissioner, paved the way for the "Act of Union." It has required a General Smuts, who, like his early prototype, Lieutenant Governor Andries Stockenström, was a Dutchman who became the staunch servant of British Imperialism. It has also required its liberals. If the first generation of liberals, the missionaries and the "humanitarians," had served a useful purpose, the second generation, their inheritors, had an

equally important function to fulfill. In fact, so important was this function that there had to be a division of labour. They were required in the political field and they were required in the all-important field of education. The liberal politicians came particularly to the fore; as the missionaries during the period of military aggression had fostered the myth of British "Protection," so during the period of political struggles the liberal politicians, Merriman, Sauer and company, were to foster the myth of "Christian Trusteeship," which is Imperial "Protection" under a new name, but no less predatory in its purposes. And the function of the liberals was still the same – to split up the forces of the Non-Europeans and carry out once more the policy of "divide and rule."

Other hands will deal with this important chapter in history. For we are but at the beginning of the task of rewriting history that is free from the distortions and falsifications necessarily employed by the herrenvolk to bolster up the myth of White superiority.

Here, in the final chapter of this preliminary survey of the first period of British Imperialism in the 19th century, with its emphasis on the role of the missionary, we shall indicate the initial stages of the second period of aggression, i.e. in the political and economic field, always remembering that the process is continuous and unceasing. We shall indicate the lines of policy laid down by the rulers (where possible letting them speak for themselves), and conclude by forecasting the role of those agents, the missionaries, against the particular political and economic background.

It is in a double sense that we deal with an end and a beginning. The period of great economic expansion was the culmination of the period of military aggression, the completion of its purpose, which from the outset was inherent in the

situation. At the same time it marked the beginning of the period of political and economic enslavement, not only of the Africans, but of all the Non-Europeans of South Africa. But it marks something else – the beginning of a new period of struggle of the Non-Europeans, a struggle on the political plane.

The rulers, then, saw themselves as faced with two problems: they had to harness the Africans to the economic machine, and at the same time they had to ensure the continuance of White domination. From this time onwards we hear continually about the “Native Question” or the “Native Problem.” For the rulers it is indeed an insoluble problem. To put the matter another way: they had to draw the Africans into the new society and they had to shut them out. The needs of an expanding capitalism compelled them on the one hand to accelerate the breakdown of tribalism and force the Africans into the new economy, but on the other hand they wanted to arrest the inevitable consequences of bringing a whole people into contact with an industrial civilization. For a man’s mode of existence in society dictates his social relationships, his morality, his way of thinking. Tribalism is one mode of existence and has its corresponding relationships and ideas, while capitalism is a totally different mode of existence, with ideas and relationships appropriate to it. Actually the two aims of the rulers, to ensure White supremacy and to exploit African labour within the new economy, presented them with an insoluble contradiction. From the outset they attempted violently to arrest the natural process of development – by depriving the Africans of their political rights.

By the eighteen-eighties, with the military conquest nearing completion, the Cape Government began revising the Constitution as laid down in 1852, which had given legal equality to the Non-Europeans. The Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 marked the first step in the disfranchisement of the Africans. By excluding from the vote all those who held land in communal tenure (they called it the “Blanket Vote”) they disfranchised large numbers of Africans.

During the parliamentary debates “Native” policy was clearly defined. Rhodes had a happy propensity for bluntness and uncouth language, so we cannot do better than quote him when he stood up in the House to defend this Bill, which he and J. H. Hofmeyr, leader of the Dutch Par-

ty, were steering through Parliament:

“It is a perfect farce to call this Bill an interpretation of the Constitution Ordinance. I prefer to call a spade a spade . . . It is the basis upon which we shall have to govern the country . . . Let us boldly say: In the past we have made mistakes about native representation . . . We intend now to change all that . . . You say: ‘We are going to be lords of this people and keep them in a subject position . . . They should not have the franchise, because we don’t want them on an equality with us.’ . . . Now, my honourable friends are right in their views on the Native question . . . Well, I have made up my mind that there must be class legislation, that there must be Pass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts (depriving Africans of guns) and that we have got to treat natives, where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way to ourselves. We are to be lords over them . . . These are my politics on native affairs and these are the politics of South Africa . . . The native is to be treated as a child and denied the franchise . . . We must adopt a system of despotism, such as works so well in India, in our relations with the barbarians of South Africa.”

From that day to this, the rulers have been filling the Statute Book with legislation carrying out this policy. The elaborate business of “Settling the Native Question” has been an attempt to reverse the natural process of development under a capitalist economy. In order to maintain White domination the rulers had to invent another myth, the Interiority of the Black man. On this Lie they built up a whole structure of oppressive legislation based on *segregation*. They would have us believe that it was necessary to “protect” a “child race.” And they were to coin a name for the Lie – “Christian Trusteeship.”

The Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 carried a step further the disfranchisement of the Non-Europeans as a whole, though it professed to have no colour bar. It restricted the franchise by raising the property qualifications from 25 to 75 Pounds Sterling and including an education test. By this time the liberal politicians – chief among them Merriman, Sauer and Rose-Innes – were in full swing and they had to do some strenuous political acrobatics to square their acceptance of this Bill with their avowed defence of the rights and liberties of the Non-Europeans. Mr. Rose-Innes handed out the liberal argument in the all-too familiar “liberal

tradition" that he was prepared to pocket his principles in order to "save the poor natives" from the more drastic legislation which the Dutch Party would bring in if it were in power. In other words, he proposed to defend Non-European rights by supporting a Bill to take away those rights! Merriman, on the other hand, made no bones about this alarm at the increase in the Non-European vote: "Did members realise that if the Non-Europeans acted together, they could disfranchise the white man?" he asked. So blunt a question made it necessary for those Africans who expressed their faith in their liberal "friends" to defend the Bill – and their "friends" – against the interests of their own people, using the specious argument that "Compromise is the soul of statesmanship." Altogether it was a situation which fully revealed the treacherous role of the second generation of liberals, and would well repay a fuller study.

With the ground thus prepared, the rulers proceeded to pass the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which can be said to mark the end of one period, the military conquest of the Africans, and the beginning of the period of economic exploitation. The system of administration and control embodied in this Act had been worked out over a number of years by Charles Brownlee; now Secretary of "Native" Affairs, and by others who had acted as magistrates in the various districts. They supplied the details, while Rhodes defined the policy. His designation of it as "A Native Bill for Africa" (the land of the maNdebele having just been confiscated) is eloquent of the aims of Imperialism and the insatiable needs of its economic system, which he so accurately interpreted. A few quotations from his speech on moving the second reading of the Bill, will sum up the main points of policy.

"If the whites maintain their position as the supreme race, the day may come when we shall be thankful that we have the natives with us *in their proper position.*"

"We want to get hold of these young men and make them go out to work, and the only way to do this is to compel them to pay a certain labour tax."

"It must be brought home to them that in the future nine-tenths of them will have to spend their lives in daily labour, in physical work, in manual labour."

"My idea is that the natives should be kept in these native reserves and not be mixed with the

white men at all."

"Though we place them in individual positions with regard to certain pieces of agricultural land . . . the native has no right to claim a vote for it."

"Now I say, the natives are children . . . They have human minds and I would like them to devote themselves wholly to the local matters that surround them and appeal to them. I would let them tax themselves . . ."

The Glen Grey Act is already well known to us. It was designed as the answer to the herrenvolk's labour problem. It is based on the principle of segregation and laid the foundation of "Native" policy that was to be fully worked out after the "Act of Union" between British Imperialism and Dutch Feudalism in 1910. The main points of the Glen Grey Act were: the establishment of the Bunga system of local councils for the governing of Africans in Reserves; the creation of machinery to force the African to labour for the White man. Hence the labour tax. The system of land tenure on a quit-rent basis was devised for the same purpose. The first experiment along these lines had been the Rev. Calderwood's Location scheme for the Fingos. Africans were granted individual titles to their plots, but did not possess full ownership of the land thus held, nor did it entitle them to the vote.

The Glen Grey Act had this in common with the 50th Ordinance of 1828, which had purported to "liberate" the Khoikhoi while incorporating the old labour laws appropriate to serfdom – it faced in two directions, backwards to feudalism, and forwards to capitalism. Or, in other words, it combined capitalism with serfdom. This was dictated by the dual aims of the rulers, to pull the African into the new economic system, but to ensure White domination.

Second Problem of Education

Against this political and economic background what was the task of the missionaries? The legislative weapon for the oppression of the Africans was a strong one. But legislation by itself could not ensure the continuance of White domination; for this a more subtle means had to be employed. Education itself had to be used as an instrument of enslavement. Having drawn the African into the economic system, the rulers had assigned him a particular place in their society. It was necessary therefore to *educate* him to his "proper place." This was to be the task

of the missionaries more than any other educative force.

Now in acting as agents for the political and economic enslavement of the Africans, and of all Non-Europeans, the missionaries were acting consistently with their function throughout. It is only as the pattern of this industrial civilization brought by the invaders, developed, that the true meaning of missionary education, or the full import of the missionary as educator, becomes clear. Yet the logic of it was there from the beginning. It was not a question of humanitarianism, but of necessity. If we remember where the missionaries came from, we will have no difficulty in understanding their real function, both in the early stages when the rulers had to draw the African into the orbit of the new society and now at the later stage when they wanted to shut him out from the benefits of the civilization he was helping to build. As we have said, it was the very forces of an industrial civilization with its need for new markets, new sources of labour, new profits, that had sent its various agents of expansion throughout the world. When we fully understand this process, then the question: "Didn't the missionaries bring Christianity and Civilization to the Black man?" falls into its proper perspective.

It was exactly at the time of the passing of the Franchise and Ballot Act and the Glen Grey Act that the Government gave new and clear directives to the mission schools as to the *special* kind of education required for the Black child. Sir George Grey had subsidized missionary institutions so that they might provide industrial training as well as elementary education, for the purpose, of course, of fitting the Bantu youth into the new economy. But from about 1890 the emphasis on manual instruction acquires a new significance. In 1891 we find Sir Langham Dale, the Superintendent of Education, writing in his Report on Native Education:

"What the Department wants is to make all the principal day-schools places of manual industry as well as of book instruction."

In the following year his successor, Dr. Muir, is complaining that education for Africans is "too bookish and unpractical." From this time onwards there is increasing emphasis on manual training on the one hand and religious and moral instruction on the other.

The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on "Native Education," 1935-36, is a

highly instructive document, summing up as it does the educational policy of the Government. In this Report we read that: "By 1893 the mission schools eventually came to be the schools solely for Non-European pupils. Schools for White pupils, on the other hand, ceased to be under church control and came wholly under Government control. The Report continues:

"There are weighty considerations in favour of retaining the direct influence of the missions in a South African system of Native Education . . . The missions must remain active partners of the Government in the fulfilment of the task of giving a sound education to the Native."

Endorsing the recommendations of the 1919 Commission on "Native Education," it outlines a *differentiated* primary school course for African children, placing religious instruction first on the list as being of "paramount importance."

The key to all this is in the following often-quoted statement of policy in the same Report:

"*Practically* considered, the aim in the two cases (White and Black education) is not the same, because the two social orders for which education is preparing White and Black are not identical . . . It is not merely a question of method. The ends themselves are different in the two cases. The education of the White child prepares him for life in a dominant society and the education of the Black child for a subordinate society . . ."

Having invented the Lie of the inferiority of the Black man, the rulers have built up a whole system of legislation for his enslavement and a system of education to correspond with it, which is indeed an integral part of it. Segregation in education is the counterpart of political and social segregation, and segregated education for the Black child is education for a subordinate position in society.

Now the rulers have always known the paramount importance of training the young, of moulding the young mind to the pattern most suited to the interests of the State. This is where the special usefulness of missionary-controlled education comes in. The African child has to be trained to accept his subordinate position in society; the idea of inferiority has to appear natural to him. Of course segregated education in itself does this; the ill-paid and often ill-trained teacher; the crowded class-room; the travesty of education in the instruction dished up to the

child; the learning of words and facts parrot-fashion, all ensure the impoverishment of the mind in the purely educational sense. And it is all measured in terms of L.S.D. The amount spent on African education is less than a seventh of the amount spent on European education. Actually the disparity is even greater than the figures would indicate. For this amount is spent only on 30%, or less, of African children of school-going age, while the vast majority receive no education at all. On the other hand, education for European children is compulsory up to the age of sixteen.

But the process of preparing the Black child to accept inferiority involves something even more insidious than this. The stress on religious and moral instruction, to which far more time is devoted in a school for the non-White than for the White child — is not by accident. For this religious and moral instruction is made synonymous with training in obedience, humility, patience, fear, and passivity. It bids the individual accept his lot, not struggle against it; it bids him endure the sufferings and tribulations of this world as a preparation for happiness in some world to come. The potency of this device to induce the oppressed to endure the thousand shocks of their daily life under the present system of society, is incalculable.

The mission-school, then, feeds the Black child on inferiority and starves him educationally. But the training does not end there. The missionary institution intensifies the process on the growing youth. The mind of the young man or woman has to be moulded even more rigorously than that of the child. For the mind of youth wants to expand; it has hopes, ambitions, dreams, no matter what conditions of poverty it has lived in. And this is a quality that must be controlled. Yet the very impressionability of the mind of youth can be turned by the educator to his purpose, making it easier for him to divert that energy along circumscribed channels. It is possible to indoctrinate the youth with the desired ideas, to insinuate into his mind all the habits of thought that will make him accept inferiority. To enlist obedience to a supernatural censor of all one's actions and all one's secret thoughts, is to reinforce obedience to authority in whatever form or shape it may subsequently appear. Thus, locked in the narrow confines of the segregated missionary institution, the youth has been steadily conditioned into accepting, unquestioningly, the place assigned to him in

the social system. In most cases he has not even been aware of what was happening, but accepted his position as the natural order of things. Here it may be added that what the individual missionary is or is not, is irrelevant to the process that has been taking place; he is nevertheless carrying out his function as the servant of the Christian capitalist civilization.

Missionary-controlled education, therefore, has played an important part in subjugating the minds of the people and in this way ensuring the continuance of White domination.

To leave the majority of African children illiterate and subject the rest to missionary-controlled education has had the effect of frustrating the development of a whole people. But the full extent of this frustration only becomes evident when we pursue still further the ramifications of this whole process of controlling the people by controlling their outlook and ideas. In the political field the leadership was necessarily drawn from the small educated section, those who from childhood to manhood had received their training from the missionaries. And from whom did these leaders in the past receive their political education? At the end of the 19th century it was the liberal politicians who came forward as their "friends" and the "defenders" of their rights, those liberals who proceeded to throw out a smoke-screen to cover up the first steps in the disfranchisement of the Africans in the Parliamentary Registration Act (1887), the Franchise and Ballot Act (1892) and the "Act of Union" (1910) which was the third in the series.

Thus we see two layers of liberals operating in conjunction to maintain an intellectual stranglehold over the leadership of the Non-Europeans as a whole, and in this way disarming the people. It was this factor that so long delayed the political struggles of the Non-Europeans and prevented them from launching an independent struggle against oppression.

Historic Task

Economic forces, however, are stronger than man-made laws, stronger even than indoctrination with false ideas. "Christian Trusteeship," which cloaks exploitation under the pretence of a "sacred trust" towards the "child races," is up against an insoluble contradiction. It has drawn the Black man into the orbit of industrial civilization (they call it "Western Civilization") and it wants to escape from the inevitable re-

sults of that process. The rulers have laboriously evolved a system of oppressive legislation and employed artificial methods to deny the worker the rights of a worker, the member of a society the rights of that society, the builder of a civilization the fruits of that civilization. And the more the economic forces burst through the artificial impediments, the more desperately the herrenvolk attempts, by means of legislation, to arrest the process of development. Its latest attempt is the Bantu Authorities Act, which would erect the forms of a dead tribalism in the midst of an industrial civilization.

But the rulers in South Africa cannot defy the laws of the system which they themselves have set in motion. Industrial civilization, by its very nature, creates the conditions whereby the African becomes part of the forward progress of mankind. A whole people cannot be drawn within the orbit of this civilization without acquiring the modes of behaviour and the habits of *thought belonging to it*. In other words, they cannot be part of a society and yet be cut off from the ideas of that society. If the Black man feeds the industrial machine — even if it makes him starve — he is being educated and moulded by that process. The conditions of his daily existence, together with the ideas belonging to that society, supply him with the elements of enlightenment and suggest to him forms of struggle. In spite of themselves, the rulers provide the oppressed with the means of *education* in the broadest sense.

From the beginning the missionaries, who were the protagonists of capitalism, sought to implant the *ideas* of that system, which had recently vanquished feudalism in Europe under its famous slogans of liberty, equality, fraternity — the powerful slogans of democracy. In every collision between British capitalism and Dutch feudalism in Southern Africa, the Africans found themselves being drawn in on the side of the more progressive force, i.e. capitalism. When it was Dr. Philip attacking the feudal system of the slave-owning Dutch, he “liberated” the Khoikhoi under the slogans of liberty and equality, which had a tremendous appeal for the oppressed. When it was a question of the fight between the British and the Boers in the Boer War, the Africans were drawn in on the side of those whom the liberals had so eloquently presented as the bringers of Civilization and the defenders of their right to liberty. When, after the “Act of Union,” it was a question of ensu-

ring a majority for the English section in Parliament, the Africans were enlisted as supporters of those who stood for the “liberal tradition” inherited from the days of the British “Humanitarians.” But while, for the White politicians, their high-sounding slogans were no more than empty promises, to the Africans they were in real earnest. They crystallised the aspirations of an oppressed people, and the very contrast between those lofty ideals and the degradations of their daily existence, was a forceful education in itself. All these experiences were gradually supplying them with ideas in the political field — ideas which were of the very warp and woof of the system into which they had been drawn.

In the economic field, too, new ideas were being borne in on them because of their daily experience. When the White workers formed trade unions and pressed their right to collective bargaining for higher wages and better conditions of work, they found it convenient to appeal to the Non-European workers. Altogether, every time the various sections of the herrenvolk engaged in skirmishes amongst themselves, they found it necessary to draw in the Non-Europeans and in this way provided them with the means whereby they would one day fight for their own emancipation. The fact that the Non-Europeans were in every case denied the benefits of victory did not in any way lessen the value of the education they thus received. On the contrary, it heightened their consciousness of their true position, so that their very failures were from this point of view a gain. They could see how others benefited from the struggle while they, who were part of the same system, were excluded from its benefits.

It was inevitable that sooner or later the Non-Europeans would break away from the leadership of the various sections of the herrenvolk who made use of them in their sectional disputes. They had to strike out under their own banner and launch a determined struggle for democratic rights.

Nothing can alter the fact that the Non-European peoples of South Africa are part of the new economic system. The objective forces themselves have placed them within reach of the instruments of liberation. Capitalism has shattered tribalism and destroyed the social relationships that go with it; it has broken the old tribal bonds, but it has created new ties that bind men together in a much wider unity.