

CLARION CALL

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THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSION

**The requirements for
stability and development in
KwaZulu and Natal**

CLARION CALL

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Clarion Call wishes to thank Professor Lawrence Schlemmer for preparing this brief analysis of the Buthelezi Commission. Additional information added to his paper was taken, in part, from the two volume report of the Commission.

It must be stressed that, owing to space, only certain excerpts from the Commission's detailed and comprehensive political and constitutional report have been highlighted, omitting many of the findings relating to economic development, education, social and health services, agriculture and so on.

The Buthelezi Commission, Volume 1 and Volume 2, can be obtained from H & H Publications (Pty) Ltd., PO Box 50024, Musgrave Road, 4062, Durban. Price R30 plus postage or from Mrs S. Griffin, Box 783966, Sandton 2146. Tel: (011) 7833280.

THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSION

It's place in the process of constitutional development in South Africa.

By Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, Director, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal. Secretary to the Buthelezi Commission 1980 - 1982.



Black political rights is without doubt the key political issue in South Africa today.

Black politics, irrespective of the group or movement in question, is centred on the issue of citizenship and the franchise.

Without a resolution to this issue no single major political, social or economic problem facing South Africa can be meaningfully addressed — whether it be unrest in the townships, confidence in the economy, the disinvestment campaign or industrial unrest.

The Buthelezi Commission, under the chairmanship of Professor G D L Schreiner, which reported in 1982, stands even today as the major constitutional alternative to government suggestions and proposals which demonstrably carries the support of leading South Africans across lines of party affiliation, colour and creed.

Interest in it has been increasing in recent times and it is appropriate to analyse its findings and implications once again.

The Buthelezi Commission was a Black initiative. One has often heard Black intellectuals and political

observers say that Black people need not struggle to find compromises and alternatives to the polarisation of views in South Africa.

As they often put it, the Whites through their refusal to acknowledge Black people as full citizens, are creating the essential problems, and that it is up to Whites, therefore, to formulate alternatives and policies which Blacks may or may not find acceptable.

While this viewpoint is perhaps understandable in view of the frustrations of decades of one-sided White control and administration, they are singularly unhelpful in assisting South Africa to struggle with its enormously complex constitutional problems.

Chief M G Buthelezi and his government obviously do not hold to this view.

The Buthelezi Commission was established as a very substantial and indeed historic gesture of willingness to struggle with Whites, Coloured people and Indians to find a path between all the pitfalls of hostility and antagonism which make the solution to our problems so difficult.

The KwaZulu government took this step after a period in which the critical problems facing the future of Natal and

KwaZulu had become painfully apparent.

In his speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly announcing details of the Commission, Chief Buthelezi said: "South Africa stands on the threshold of a new era as the sole remaining White-ruled territory in Africa, with signs of impending internal change ... yet with all the formal initiatives for change occurring within the National Party-dominated political framework.

"Since the time of Union Blacks have had no formal share in the shaping of the constitutional, administrative and economic structures of South African society.

"The absence of formal initiatives by Blacks has left the central political process in South Africa dangerously impotent and helpless to solve its own problems...

"Given this truncation of political vision it is hardly surprising that today South Africa finds itself in a situation of stalled political evolution...

"Inkatha recognises that the present political impasse cannot be circumvented by protest ... the time has come for a formal Black initiative in planning the collective political future..."

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KwaZulu at present consists of over forty pieces of territory stretching from the Transkei in the south with blocks of land interspersed with the territory of Natal right up to the borders of Swaziland and Mozambique in the north.

Investigations by the Eastern Regional Consolidation Committee of the central Government had shown how enormously difficult and costly it would be to consolidate the dispersed blocks of KwaZulu into the ten major pieces as defined in official government proposals in 1975.

Ten major pieces is understandably hardly a geographic basis for a separate state, and therefore the committee had to consider even more radical consolidation if any geo-political realism was to be introduced as a basis for a coherent KwaZulu of the future.

It was realised that even the 1975 proposals would involve the unproductive expenditure of millions of rands and the resettlement and political alienation of hundreds of thousands of Black people.

The enquiries into a possible consolidation alarmed very prominent business leaders, as a consequence of which the South African sugar industry requested Professor Jan Lombard and a team from the University of Pretoria to consider alternatives to consolidation.

Professor Lombard and his colleagues could not complete their final detailed examination, but what they found was sufficient to move them to say in a preliminary report that a separate and independent dispensation for the territory of KwaZulu was simply not practical. (J.A. du Pisanie, J.A. Lombard, G.C. Olivier and W.B. Vosloo, *Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu: Progress Report*, Pretoria: Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria, 1980.)

Chief Buthelezi and his cabinet were aware of the investigation by the team from the University of Pretoria and the draft of the interim report was submitted to Chief Buthelezi for comment.

In discussions which followed between Chief Buthelezi and representatives of the sugar industry it became clear that Black viewpoints and the input of the KwaZulu government and of Inkatha were vital in taking the debate further.

At another level, informal procedures for consultation and a certain degree of joint planning had already been instituted between the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial

NATAL ZULU AREAS AND
MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS
1 Feb 1972



KwaZulu (dark shading) and its border areas (lighter shading).

Administration.

These included the presence, informally, of members of the KwaZulu cabinet as observers at Natal Executive committee meetings.

The issue of the political and constitutional relationship between the African people of the KwaZulu/Natal region and the Whites and others in Natal had emerged very clearly in debate in the region.

Were the African people to be "consolidated" into a completely separate dispensation, or would the growing interdependence of KwaZulu and Natal be reflected in a different constitutional evolution?

The KwaZulu cabinet decided to take a lead in the debate and in May 1980 the KwaZulu government established the Buthelezi Commission, with Professor Schreiner as its chairman.

The terms and reference of the Commission will be dealt with, in brief, further on. It is important to note now, however, that the Commission was directed to investigate the political, constitutional, economic, educational and administrative future of *both* KwaZulu and Natal *within* the constitutional structure of the Republic of South Africa as a whole.

This brief ensured that the Commission would consider the future of the region within a comprehensive framework, attuned to the more general debate about the constitutional future of South Africa as a whole.

The significance of the Commission, which included over 40 prominent

African, White, Coloured and Indian South Africans was underscored by the central government's decision to exclude African's from its own constitutional planning body, the President's Council.

The Commission held its first plenary session in October 1980. It allocated its very wide terms of reference to a number of specialist working groups:

- Constitutional and Political.
- Economic Development.
- Planning and Administration.
- Education, and
- Social Services and Health.

A Central Working Group, including the Chairman of each Specialist Working Group, was also set up to co-ordinate activities, to hear oral evidence and receive written evidence.

The final report consisted of two volumes to each of which were attached essential appendices.

The two volumes consist of:

Volume 1:

The Commission's Main Report
The Planning and Administration Sub-Committee

The Report on the Attitude Surveys

Volume 2:

The Report of the Political and Constitutional Sub-Committee
The Report of the Economic Development Sub-Committee
The Report of the Education Sub-Committee
The Report of the Social and Health Services Sub-Committee.



Chief M G Buthelezi with Prof. G D L Schreiner, chairman of the Buthelezi Commission.

The major findings

Large area of compromise exists between Blacks and Whites.

The Commission had to take the policy of the National Party/South African Government very seriously indeed and consider fully all arguments in favour of a permanent political partition of Natal and KwaZulu.

This was particularly necessary after the governing party itself declined to serve on the Commission.

After exposing itself as fully and as fairly as possible to all factors indicating the desirability of the separation, the Commission nevertheless had to conclude otherwise — and in so doing reached the same broad conclusion as reached by Professor Lombard and his associates.

The Commission's reasons, very broadly, were that:

- There appeared to be negligible support among representative high-

level community and business leaders in Natal for separation;

- The growing inequality in material circumstances between KwaZulu and Natal could not be combated with a divided administrative and political dispensation;

- This conclusion held even after the fullest considerations of the benefits which might accrue to KwaZulu from the new Regional Development policy and whatever benefits could emerge from a "Confederal" link between KwaZulu and South Africa, as a current government policy proposes;

- Separation could only increase the political alienation of Black and White. This the Commission saw as a particular danger given the overwhelming evidence the Commission obtained of growing anger, militance and radicalism among Blacks.

Extensive surveys were undertaken as part of the Commission's work among Blacks, Coloureds, Indians and Whites in the region.

Black opinion was also surveyed on the Witwatersrand.

Among the many issues covered, people interviewed were probed as to the acceptability or otherwise of various political and constitutional options for the region.

The results of the surveys showed that a large area of compromise exists in the views of the different groups regarding a political future for the region.

As would only be expected, Whites are the most resistant to options which include a sharing of power between races in the region.

Even in this group, however, slight
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majorities or near-majorities are prepared accept options which majorities of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians seem to accept.

On the basis of the kind of results presented (all the tables are shown in the Commission's report) the Commission accepted that, even among Whites, an integrated region of Natal/ KwaZulu was an achievable political goal for any political party — excluding only the right-wing opposition to the present government.

A schedule of "Consensus-Dissent" illustrated this. Among some party supporters, mainly National Party supporting Afrikaners, considerable leadership will be required to sell the policy but the majority agreement among Whites generally could encourage movement among government supporters.

It was not assumed that majority agreement on a political devolution for KwaZulu/Natal would be immediately forthcoming from National Party supporters but the Commission anticipated the possibility of considerable movement with adequate leadership over the few years following its proposals.

Also, attitude profiles within the National Party have now changed since the re-alignment which created the Conservative Party.

The results of the attitude surveys also indicated that, despite much popular wisdom in South Africa suggesting that Black and White political cultures were incompatible, the Black respondents, no matter how they were questioned, revealed basic political values which appeared to be remarkably close to those of Whites.

Considering the distorting effect of great inequality in circumstances, it was surprising that so slight a basic ideological cleavage exists between Blacks and Whites.

The studies revealed, for example, that majorities in all races supported the free market economy, the principles of opposition in politics, the protection of civil liberties within the constraints of maintaining law and order and most importantly the need to protect the legitimate interests of minority ethnic groups.

The results suggested quite strongly that what divides people in South Africa are social structures more than the sentiments and attitudes of ordinary people.

In general, virtually all the survey results supported the Commission's final proposals for a move toward the

unification of KwaZulu and Natal, autonomous within but not independent of South Africa, with an internal dispensation based on universal franchise, proportional representation in an all-race legislative assembly, constitutional protection for minorities and a racially-balanced executive or cabinet along consociational lines.

The Commission's report noted that a regional solution in KwaZulu/Natal, involving non-racial political co-operation, joint decision-making or a merging of government is acceptable to as many as six to seven out of ten people in the region and is even acceptable to a slight majority of Zulu-speaking people in the Transvaal.

If such a dispensation were coupled with some degree of representation for Black South Africans at the centre, the acceptance in the Transvaal could rise meaningfully.

The report added that a regional accommodation is by no means the ideal solution as Black South Africans see it, even among people in the region itself.

It must be seen as a severe compromise for Black people whose whole political history, virtually, is one of attempts to gain representation in the South African parliament.

Nevertheless, in line with the great openness of Black people to alternative options which will bring progress, a regional dispensation carries effective majority acceptance.

Not all the results of the many surveys have been touched on in this article and readers are referred to the more detailed presentations in the body of the report for a full insight into the attitudes and perceptions of the various population groups.

The high levels of economic and political discontent and significant extent of expressed militancy among Black South Africans in particular indicated the urgency of the situation in South Africa and in the region of KwaZulu/Natal.

The Commission made it clear that popular sentiments appear to be made as to create a climate which will encourage, justify and protect groups aiming at creating instability in the country.

When the report was published it commented: "While a revolutionary situation has not yet emerged in general terms within the populations inside South Africa, developments appear to point in that direction.

"The importance of legitimate internal Black political organisations like

Inkatha and others in directing Black South African political sentiments along peaceful and constructive lines cannot be over-emphasised.

"The expectations which the surveys reveal indicate that such organisations have to be seen to be achieving progress in political, constitutional, economic and social affairs if they hope to continue exercising a peaceful and constructive influence...

"This will not be possible unless a political accommodation can be achieved. The minimum expectations of White South Africans, other minorities and Black South Africans in the region, as well as the basic political and economic values in all groups indicate clearly that a mutually acceptable accommodation is possible...

"Political party leaders may not agree with these findings ... this would be understandable, because party leaders receive feedback from the more active and older members of their constituencies. In conservative parties these and older members are almost always more conservative than the cross-section of passive supporters of the party.

"We are concerned, however, that these surveys reveal a possibility of political progress which majorities of rank-and-file, White, Coloured and Indian South Africans can accept as a creative compromise, in order to secure the stability which the future development of this region requires..."

It must also be stressed that the surveys showed quite clearly that there is very little acceptance of the principle of the territorial separation of Black South Africans or of the principle of Black ethnic national areas.

The Black South Africans surveyed in non-homeland areas had no significant emotional or civic identification with KwaZulu, in many cases despite quite extensive social contacts with the territory. Hence Inkatha is not seen as a homeland organisation by its adherents. This is true, even of the fairly substantial proportion of Blacks in the region who are self-consciously Zulu in their ethnic identification.

Despite the rejection of the homeland dispensation, the Buthelezi Commission's findings showed that the leadership in KwaZulu (which has always refused to take so-called 'independence') enjoys high legitimacy.

Hence the prospect of representation by the KwaZulu leadership in some more general South African political forum is much more acceptable than 'independence' for the area.

The Recommendations

An open 'Consociation' giving Natal and KwaZulu the same degree of autonomy but with both remaining part of S.A.

The Buthelezi Commission report covered not only constitutional matters but also addressed economic, administrative, educational, health and welfare problems.

Only the political recommendations, however, are summarised in this brief paper.

The results of the attitude surveys indicated the urgency of the need for a more adequate political and constitutional dispensation, not only in the region of KwaZulu/Natal but in the country as a whole.

The Commission did not rely only on the attitude survey results. It also exposed itself to a mass of verbal and documentary evidence.

On the basis of this evidence the Commission became aware that no amount of political separation could reduce the need for the fullest co-operation between Natal and KwaZulu at every level of administration.

The clearest example of this has been described by the Chairman, Professor Schreiner, as the problem that cholera, anthrax, rabies, stock-theft, water-courses, fires and a host of other phenomena do not observe political boundaries. By the same token, KwaZulu's problem cannot be sealed off.

Quite apart from considerations of social and political justice and equity, therefore, the Commission found itself moved by the irrefutable fact to consider the most sensible ways of getting to grips with the interdependence of Natal and KwaZulu and of all the groups in the whole region.

In doing so the Commission had to consider fully the guiding principle of the government's constitutional policy and planning in South Africa — that of what is referred to as "segmental autonomy" — involving various groups in joint decision-making but as segregated political groups, with separate voting structures, separate residential areas, separate institutions and the like.

The Commission took full account of the traditional policies in this regard, but considered that this approach, rather than protecting group interests, is actually extremely dangerous.

The main reason is that where groups enter into political decision-making as explicit racial groups, any political conflict between groups becomes a racial conflict.

The Commission believed it to be essential to start *blurring* the lines of racial tension rather than emphasising them.

The Commission, after very careful thought and after taking detailed evidence from one of its members, Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the world's leading authorities on constitutional processes in divided societies, decided to recommend that can be called an open "Consociation".

This, in the area of Natal/KwaZulu would involve Natal acquiring the same degree of autonomy as KwaZulu but with both remaining part of the Republic.

The Central Government would retain authority over defence, foreign affairs, transport, and major powers of that nature.

The Commission supported decentralisation of authority down to the lowest level of government, but not independence or secession for the region.

The autonomy would enable the Natal Executive Committee and the KwaZulu Cabinet to combine, with the addition of Coloured and Indian members, into a provisional joint cabinet for the region.

This would be an equilibrium body with little danger of domination of any group by another. It would in effect be a racially balanced "consociational" body, but groups participating would be specified by race as such at the very initial stage.

Thereafter the groups would be allowed to combine and rearrange themselves along the lines of political interests rather than on the basis of race as an official categorisation.

The responses of Black South Africans, despite their high levels of discontent and the growing militancy which this study reveals, indicate a pervasive moderacy of views. On virtually all policy topics the majority tends to take a point of view which would protect the basic institutions in our society. They are sceptical of idealistic alternatives; they recognise the need for efficiency in the economy and for protecting the skills and initiative which other groups bring into the system.

— The Buthelezi Commission.

A cynical White reader of this report may well ask, if these conclusions are to be believed, why there is so much political instability and a pervasive breakdown of democracy in Black-ruled states in Africa. The following points must then be made. Firstly, Black South Africans are not identical in outlook to Africans to the North. Black South Africans for centuries have been exposed to the workings of a much more complex economy and society than anywhere else on this continent.

— The Buthelezi Commission.

Constitutional democracy has failed in Africa not primarily because of the political cultures of people, but largely because of the social and economic under-development of these territories. Societies in Africa to the North are too homogeneously poor to produce a variety of different and competing social groups which give society a balance and a strength. The poor in the rest of Africa are generally too poorly organised to constrain and sanction the activities of their elites. Business interests are too poorly developed and often (as expatriate companies) too alienated from the societies to exercise constructive pressures on government.

— The Buthelezi Commission.

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This executive would continue on consociational principles, with major political parties or groupings being represented in balanced proportions, whether on a racial basis or not.

This executive would continue to initiate legislation and policy on the basis of consensus and negotiation with the executive.

This balanced executive would also demarcate boundaries of regions or constituencies within which representatives to a legislative assembly would be created.

These regions would not necessarily be of the same population size. They should, as far as the Commission is concerned, be demarcated on the basis of common sociological characteristics rather than on the basis of race or strict demographic size.

Therefore the racial representation on the legislative assembly would essentially result from a process of decision-making and negotiation on the balanced executive.

The Commission made no provision for and certainly did not see it as automatic that there would be a ratio of representatives following the proportions of the population, although there is little doubt that Blacks would be a majority in the legislative assembly.

In each of the constituencies for the legislative assembly there would be provision for "proportional representation", to avoid the "winner-take-all" principle in our current system.

In addition, on the legislative assembly, there would be a provision for a minority veto, a Bill of Rights and a continuous testing of the constitution by an independent judiciary.

An essential feature of the basis of representation would be that the Group Areas Act would have to be phased out, so as to allow people of similar status and lifestyle to congregate together. In this way the element of racial conflict in the region could gradually be defused.

As already indicated, the Buthelezi Commission was directed to consider not only the political/constitutional future of the region, but also to deliberate on the policies necessary to bring about optimum developments in the spheres of economic welfare, administration, education and social services.

By and large the findings of the sub-committees established to consider these other areas of problems reinforced the findings in the political and constitutional sphere. Only certain highlights can be presented here.

With every new reform which brings social and economic development to the Black people, the political contrasts between South Africa and the rest of Africa grow ... Generally what emerges from the probes on alternative political dispensations is a considerable degree of flexibility and openness to options. There is very little rigid thinking and even less ideologically motivated commitment to particular outcomes. If a proposal appears to expand the degree of participation for Black South Africans, or to enhance their rights and privileges, it is enthusiastically welcomed.
— The Buthelezi Commission.

In broad terms the basic political sentiments and beliefs of Black South Africans as regards institutions of government are such as to suggest that they would value and support democratic institutions and balance moderation in public policy. The basic attitude toward economic processes indicate strong and consistent support for the market economy system as opposed to pure socialist or communal alternatives. There is, however, also considerable emphasis on the extension of welfare in society and hence one may describe the dominant preference of Black South Africans as being a mixed economy.
— The Buthelezi Commission.

The results from carefully designed disguised questions testing dispositions towards other races in public life suggest very little inclination to support policies which would discriminate against White, Indian or Coloured South African minorities. While Blacks would not like to see Whites and other minorities retain privileges on an overtly racial basis, there is little sign of an embedded antagonism towards minorities. These conclusions broadly indicate that the public values of rank-and-file Black South Africans are such to make their incorporation into a more open political system for South Africa or the region possible, provided social or economic circumstances do not magnify racial feeling.
— The Buthelezi Commission.

The Commission concluded that neither land redistribution or a consolidation of the territory of KwaZulu would produce optimum development for Black people in the region, even if the extent of the redistribution was very substantial.

This flowed from the fact of the very high density of population in the rural areas of KwaZulu and the very substantial lack of the infra-structure for the stimulation of market-oriented production to replace the subsistence economy which is characteristic of most of the region.

Movement towards existing towns and cities would occur in time naturally resulting in significant depopulation of the rural areas.

The Commission noted that throughout the surveys among Black South Africans it became very clear that the central concern, above all others in political matters, is the right of freedom of access to the labour market and the residential market in the major urban complexes of Natal and the Witwatersrand. Any policy of dispensation which either erodes these rights or does not meaningfully expand them, is rejected by at the very least seven out of ten Black people.

It also emphasised that acculturation to the accepted norms of modern democracies seems to be sufficiently well advanced and consistent to augur well for racially inclusive political institutions in the region. In fact, comparable enquiries in the surveys among White, Indian and Coloured people revealed very considerable overlap in political values between the races.

Where sharp differences did occur they could more often than not be traced to the exclusion of non-Whites from full participation in the common area of South African society.

Most of the reports submitted to the Buthelezi Commission state explicitly or implicitly that for reasons of efficiency the entire care of KwaZulu/Natal should be governed or administered as a single unit.

In the beginning (of a consociational-type administration) KwaZulu may require special protective measures. However, the Commission noted that this temporary need could not justify that KwaZulu be maintained as a separate governmental entity.

In the surveys consociational proposals were warmly accepted and generally what emerged from the probes on alternative political dispensations was a considerable degree of flexibility and openness to options.

The Buthelezi Commission and the future

At the time of the publication of the Buthelezi Commission report in 1982, the central government, while accepting the value of the research and fact-finding of the Commission, roundly rejected its political recommendations.

This position has changed somewhat in recent times, however.

Today the central government appears to be encouraging joint planning initiatives in the region of KwaZulu and Natal and it fully accepts that economic development must be promoted in the region as a whole.

In fact, the new "growth pole" policy of the government has proposed regions for decentralised economic development which straddle political boundaries and nowhere is this more evident than in the region of KwaZulu/Natal.

In early May, 1984, the Minister of co-operation and Development went further to say that he was prepared to negotiate aspects of the Buthelezi Commission report with Chief Buthelezi.

Again this year, the now Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, said that he too was prepared to examine aspects of the report.

In an interview with Mr Hugh Murray in *Leadership* magazine, Dr Viljoen said that there were many areas in the Buthelezi Commission which the central government could explore in consultation with the KwaZulu Government.

This was welcomed by the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, Chief M G Buthelezi.

Chief Buthelezi said he found the Minister's comments "quite encouraging and statesmanlike..."

Dr Viljoen said in the *Leadership* article that there were several areas in the Buthelezi Commission which merited further study, especially in the



Inkatha youth with their message.

economic and social fields.

He said the studies would also be of value in view of the urgent need for further industrial developments in KwaZulu.

What political concessions the Government would be prepared to make, however, remains to be seen.

In one major respect the Buthelezi Commission has received a possible setback.

The Government has announced its intention to dismantle the Provincial Councils as a tier of *representative* government. This will remove the Natal Provincial Administration as an elected 'partner' body to the KwaZulu Government in the region as a whole.

The new provincial dispensation will involve an Administrator in Executive appointed by the central Government reporting to a standing committee of Parliament. This will have to be the body to which the KwaZulu Government would have to relate if the proposals of the Buthelezi Commission are to be pursued.

There are both advantages and disadvantages for KwaZulu in the new arrangement. On one hand it takes responsibility for decision-making in Natal out of the hands of a local group and vests it with the central Parliament and Cabinet.

This may create some powerful impediments to the Buthelezi Commission proposals and slow down the process of their acceptance — since they will be more clearly seen as constituting precedents for other parts of the country.

On the other hand, the advantage is that any negotiation with regard to the Commission's proposals can now occur very directly with the central Government, giving the process of negotiation much greater authority and weight.

The central Government has accepted in principle that Blacks in the common area of the country are entitled to a form of representation at central level.

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It has not, however, given any clear indication of what it envisages as possibilities for Blacks in self-governing areas like KwaZulu which refuses to take independence.

Thus, while some acceptance of the Buthelezi Commission has occurred in respect of planning and economic development, and a more broadly sympathetic attitude to its political recommendations is emerging in a very general sense at central Government level, there are considerable impediments in the way of a gradual and constructive implementation of the political findings of the Commission.

In recent statements to the Press, Chief Buthelezi has been quoted as saying that the decision to replace the provincial council systems with a new second-tier government (regional service councils) to be staffed by officials appointed by President P W Botha was "... another blow to the process of bringing about change through negotiation and non-violent means..."

"What hope is there for the future if the South African Government hurtles into the politics of obscurity, leaping from one expedient to another in desperate attempts to make the new constitution work?" he said.

In another statement he added it was "imperative" that the authorities in Natal and KwaZulu should be closely involved in formulating policy such as the Draft Bill on regional service councils announced by the central Government.

Commenting about the nature of representation on the proposed regional service councils, Chief Buthelezi said:

"If this is in any way weighted to favour one group over the other, it will unavoidably lead to a speedy collapse of the effectiveness of the structure and will, in fact, militate against the willingness of KwaZulu to participate in it..."

Clearly the task assigned to the Buthelezi Commission — that of promoting a peaceful sharing of power in the region within the context of a wider South Africa — is far from over.

The Buthelezi Commission, however, has provided the evidence which shows that this task is vital.

It has also provided a model of workable power-sharing which most responsible people in the region can accept. In these respects it has built the foundations for the task which lies ahead.

The process of establishing a government in KwaZulu Natal

The Buthelezi Commission envisaged that a government for KwaZulu/Natal could be established in four steps.

Each successive step represented an increase in the degree of co-operation between areas and peoples. Each step would be used to prepare the next step.

It was vital, the Commission reported, that the entire process should not be prolonged indefinitely — hence it felt it advisable to specify that each step be completed within one year.

In brief the report stated:

1. The first step consists of the closest possible consultation between the existing executive and legislative bodies of Natal and KwaZulu.
2. The second step entails the establishment of a single executive consisting of representatives of the KwaZulu Cabinet and the Natal Provincial Council or, alternatively, an amalgamation of the two executives into a single executive responsible to both of the legislatures. At this step, it is also of vital importance to include one or more elected Asian representatives in the joint executive, and also, but perhaps less urgently, a representative of the smaller minorities.
3. The next step would be the transition to a common multi-cultural executive and legislature for part of the area of KwaZulu/Natal. The most appropriate area for this is the Durban metropolitan area. The DMA government should be set up accordingly to consociational principles. In particular, it should include a power-sharing executive composed of sizeable political or cultural groups.
4. The final step would be to bring the entire area of KwaZulu/Natal under single government. The consociational proposal as set out represents one possibility. An alternative is the Lombard Plan. Probably its main weakness is that it maintains KwaZulu as a separate unit in an arrangement of three units that would also have a joint executive and legislature. Hence it fails to respond to the need for a full integration of KwaZulu/Natal.

In effecting a choice between options, there are definite considerations that need to be stressed, namely:

- A KwaZulu/Natal region should not entail independence from the Republic as such.
- An autonomous KwaZulu/Natal should constitutionally always form part of the broader South African context and therefore, appropriate forms of representation and participation in the central government are to be maintained as vital linkages.
- An autonomous KwaZulu/Natal would require a new dispensation as far as the fiscal inter-relationship between that unit and the central government is concerned.

The Commission stressed in its report that its recommendations represented only a consociational proposal and that many other consociational arrangements were possible. It emphasised:

The drafting of a consociational constitution should not be the function of an outside "expert" but should properly be performed in a negotiating process by the representatives of the people involved.

The only firm general recommendations of the Commission were that these negotiations be guided by the principles of power-sharing, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto.

	Hanf 1977 Tvl/Natal %	Quail Commission Tvl. 1979 %	Buthelezi Commission 1981 Tvl/Natal % %	
"Life in general"				
"Very happy"/Just happy"	22	10	6	8
"Unhappy"/"Angry and impatient	57	72	79	78

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, and applied to the Buthelezi Commission study.

Black South Africans — what they feel

The Buthelezi Commission revealed significant evidence of an increase in expressed political discontent and anger — which is now present among between seven and eight out of ten Black South Africans.

Actual militancy and an attitude of confrontation appears in between three and four out of ten Black South Africans.

In a section entitled "Political consciousness among Black South Africans," the Commission reported on detailed attitude surveys which were carried out.

The report indicated that most Black South Africans in all the regions surveyed expected moves towards equality with Whites as opposed simply to improvement in their circumstances.

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf, et.al. of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, applied in the Buthelezi Commission study, provided the noteworthy comparisons in the table above.

A view expressed among 45 to 55 percent of people across groups is that African National Congress (ANC) insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from *most or very many* Black South Africans; a view which extends to rural areas of KwaZulu.

In addition the overwhelming majority of Black respondents spontaneously predicted violence or adult social unrest on a large scale if meaningful policy reform did not occur in the near future.

Seven out of ten respondent, for example, predicted mass strikes if people were called upon to act by a credible leader.

Chief M.G. Buthelezi and Inkatha received clear majority support in all regions of Natal and KwaZulu and also have a substantial degree of support on the Witwatersrand.

The report went on:

There are four interconnected but nevertheless distinctive types of *dissident* consciousness among Black South Africans surveyed. Firstly, as indicated, there are groups which are ideologically conservative, relatively apolitical, but which have high levels of discontent with material circumstances, amenities and opportunities.

Secondly, there is a large formation of political consciousness which involves more than a sense of discontent or deprivation but which is characterised by a sense of relative deprivation.

A much sharper political consciousness is present among these people.

They want at least equality of opportunity and participation in decisions affecting their lives. They are not necessarily radical or militant in out-

look, however. A typical non-youthful Inkatha supporter would approximate to this type of consciousness. This consciousness is also coloured by African Nationalism and a concern with Black solidarity.

A third type of consciousness is tending towards an urban lower-middle and middle-class radicalism. This type of consciousness is not as wide-spread as the second type identified but nevertheless predominant among better-educated younger adults on the Witwatersrand and substantial among the groups in Natal and KwaZulu.

It involves a strong verbal allegiance to both the ideal of Black consciousness and the aims of the ANC in exile.

There is among this group a questioning of South Africa's institutions with quite a considerable flavour of socialism or African communalism. This group tends to have fairly high lifestyle aspirations and could not be called genuinely proletarian in outlook.

A fourth broad type is what one might describe as militant. It is probably among this group that one would find the most serious commitment to the current strategies of the ANC in exile.

This type is not necessarily associated with high education: in fact considerable hard core militancy is found

continued overleaf

from previous page

among some semi-skilled and skilled manual workers, and among some rural subsistence people.

This consciousness is also not necessarily radical in ideological content: indeed even some people with a strong Zulu ethnic consciousness are militant. Militancy is also present among some younger or highly discontented Inkatha supporters.

The relative size of these types of consciousness is very difficult to estimate. Judging broadly from the Commission's results one might say that the second type is the largest in terms of its spread, followed by the first and then by the fourth and third.

Together all four types of consciousness, with variations and overlap, would encompass some 90 percent or more of the Black South Africans in the regions surveyed.

As we have already estimated, the militant category, including the more militant radicals of the third category, probably account for between three and four out of ten Black South Africans in Natal, KwaZulu and the Witwatersrand.

Results indicate that the second and largest category, although politically conscious and with strong feelings of relative deprivation, is moderate in terms of acceptance of policy alternatives. The militant and some of the radical types is less flexible in outlook.

Embedded hostility to Whites is present only among some of the militants and radicals, but is not a feature of the first two groups identified.

From this viewpoint it follows that not all the people who say that they support the ANC are likely to be militants. Some will support the ANC on the basis of the older sentiments of African Nationalism, some because it has become fashionable to support "liberation movements" after Mr Mugabe's ascendancy in Zimbabwe, some because the ANC currently symbolises a radical rejection of the "system" and some because there is, for them, a vacuum of leadership inside the country.

One cannot assume, therefore, that majorities of Blacks have a revolutionary consciousness. A militant and committed revolutionary consciousness with *intentions to act*, as it were, is probably still a minority phenomenon, found among the militant group we have described and among a small number of the better-educated urban radicals.

Even if the group with "intentions to act" is no more than five to ten percent of the young adults, however, it constitutes a disturbingly large number of people.

There is a widespread expectation of violence and a sense of its inevitability as well as considerable sympathy or verbal support for insurgency for a variety

of reasons.

These sentiments can have two important effects. Firstly, they create a climate in which insurgency can occur with approval which reinforces the motivation of the insurgent and in this shelter the insurgent may also expect protection and shelter.

Secondly, this consciousness undermines the credibility of internal leadership, which, if internal leadership becomes discouraged, leads to a vicious cycle of an ever-widening political vacuum within the country.

This coupled with the effects of separate development in "removing" internal Black leadership from the common arena of South African politics, could come to be seen as the only political instruments of the Black South African.

There is a clear need for political initiatives which will counteract this trend by building legitimacy for open, internal Black politics in South Africa and in the region.

The comments of the types of consciousness above also imply that there is to some extent a split between economic consciousness (type 1) and political consciousness (types 2,3,4). It stands to reason that politicisation is likely to spread, not decrease, and if the low-level economically deprived Black people become politicised a very significant deepening of the potential instability could take place.

Others fear for the future of S.A.

Whites, Coloureds and Indians acknowledge the need for reform

Less than one-third of Indian South Africans and less than one-quarter of White and Coloured South Africans claim to be confident about the future of South Africa.

The result's of the Commission's surveys among White, Indian and Coloured South Africans showed that the greatest degree of pessimism or anxiety is found among Whites who support parliamentary opposition parties — both to the right and the left of the ruling National Party.

In brief the Commission reported:

Supporters of the National Party appear to have an unusual degree of complacency about the future, which is perhaps partly because of faith in the policies of the governing party, but partly because of other reasons.

The view expressed by Heribert

Adam in the political report of the Commission — that White South Africans are too convinced of their superiority over Blacks to be fearful of Black reactions in the future — may be particularly relevant to the supporters of the governing party.

Substantial proportions of each group, however, see the future involving instability and disturbances in race relations. This, where present, is expected as a consequence of the present dispensation for different races or the state of race relations in South Africa today.

In response to these perceptions, very large majorities of Whites and virtually all Indian and Coloured South Africans see the need for reform in the socio-economic conditions for Black South Africans.

Substantially fewer than half of the Whites and less among Indian and Coloured South Africans believed that the present situation of the social and political separation of KwaZulu and Natal could last indefinitely. Among all minorities there is a very high recognition of the fundamental interdependence of all groups in the region.

Of particular importance was the finding that majorities among White businessmen, Progressive Federal Party and New Republic Party supporters, politically conscious and upper-middle status English-speakers endorse the item (in the surveys) that Chief Buthelezi should share in the government of the Province of Natal.

Generally Chief Buthelezi's significance as a political figure and his support among Black people in the region was well recognised.

Whites evasive and defensive

There is great inconsistency and internal contradiction in the pattern of attitudes of White South Africans as regards the policy of separate development.

In surveys studying attitudes to the separation of races in the region and to separate development, the Buthelezi Commission reported a pattern which appeared to be that political separation of the races appealed very strongly to many Whites at an emotional level.

The report said it was essentially an "evasive, defensive reaction" which took little account of the practical implications.


Thus when these Whites were faced with questions about the implications of separate development, there was very little consistent adherence to the policy as formulated and rationalised by political leaders.

While substantial proportions of Whites valued the racial segregation which separate development entailed, the same groupings of people were more often than not least likely to indicate a willingness to grant concessions to a homeland which would allow it to attain minimum viability as a state on its own.

The consolidation of KwaZulu as a geographical entity, involving territorial concessions, was rejected, very substantially, by White South Africans in the region.

Clear majorities in all the minority groups (Whites, Indians and Coloureds) considered it likely that independent homelands would become hostile areas within South Africa and that forces in an independent KwaZulu would destabilise the region.

The Commission reported that given the majority view that the races in the region are greatly interdependent and the fact that KwaZulu and Natal are in close juxtaposition, it was understandable that people could not see problems being sealed off in an independent KwaZulu



KwaZulu/Natal distribution of Black population — 1980 census.

Population distribution in the region

Census figures underestimate Black numbers

The population in the region KwaZulu/Natal, according to data obtained by the Buthelezi Commission, is approximately 20 percent of the total population of the Republic of South Africa.

The official figures from the 1980 census give a total population as 5 722 221, of which 3 187 987 are resident in KwaZulu. This latter population, with the exception of a few thousand Black South Africans, is predominantly Zulu.

In the area of Natal the 1980 census figures record 1 240 699 Black South Africans, 646 907 Indian South Africans, 557 044 White South Africans and 87 753 Coloured South Africans together with a further 1 841 persons classified as "other".

The Commission noted that it is highly probable that the 1980 census figures represent a considerable underestimate of the number of Black South Africans in the area.

It added that in 1978, population estimates for the region totalled six million and the Black South African population in Natal was estimated at two million.

For example, although the 1980 census figure for Umlazi was 150 670, the Port Natal Administration Board officials make an estimate of between 220 and 250 thousand and the KwaZulu Development Corporation works on an estimate of 300 000 for the same area.

The Commission anticipated that the underestimate was perhaps greatest for those population groups where involvement in the census was avoided through misunderstanding and where there were problems of legality of residence which involved concealment.

Despite the difficulties associated with such an estimate, it is thought that there are probably not less than an extra 400 000 people in the region.

The Natal population, according to the census, is 49,1 percent Black South Africans, 25,5 percent Indian South Africans, 22,0 percent White South Africans and 3,4 percent Coloured South Africans. It is probable that even in Natal the Black South African population is an absolute majority.

The growth rates of the population groups in the area differ significantly. In the ten years between the censuses of 1970 and 1980 the Black South African population increased by 1,182 million (35 percent), the Indian group by 128 000 (24 percent), the White group by 106 000 (24 percent) and the Coloured group by 15 000 (20 percent).

Prayers for peace and unity

Call for Christians to act now

Too few people appreciated just how difficult it was to retain a sense of Christian balance in Black politics in South Africa. Chief M G Buthelezi told guests at the recent 12th prayer breakfast of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly held in Durban.

"There is around me vast suffering and it is among a people who are given so little hope that their future — and worst still the future of their children — will be improved...

"There are Black South Africans who do not experience the country's churches bringing them the protective arm of the Lord, but only experience the brutality of the police enforcing influx control laws and pass laws..."

Chief Buthelezi said he believed that the present constitution of South Africa was no more than cries of fear by those who had too little faith to turn the other cheek and go just that extra mile which would make so much difference.

Distinguished guests from throughout the country attended the breakfast. The message was read by Archbishop Stephen Naidoo, Catholic Archbishop and Metropolitan of Cape Town. Ministers representing many religions were present.

Chief Buthelezi said that every time he arrived at the Prayer Breakfast he was yet again reminded of the inadequacies of South Africa's Christian life, of his own inadequacies in terms of the Christian faith and the extent to which the Church was only now beginning to grapple with the definition of responsibility in apartheid society.

"At present our country looks like a country of lost opportunities merely because up to now we have lacked the courage to demonstrate God's Kingdom here on South African soil," he added.

"I offer as my central thought in this

address that were it not for Christianity we in this country would have long since torn the very fabric of our society apart and set upon each other in violent confrontations of the kind which are catastrophic...

"I believe that in terms of the rawness of human nature; in terms of man's mental make-up, Black South Africa would long since have exploded were it not for the guiding hand of God..."

"I offer as my second thought that God's love is both reconciliatory and also at times judgemental. Prominent theologians have seen God's judgement in action in times of war and revolution — the wrath of God, I believe, would be terrible to behold in South Africa if we continue to presume on His patience..."

Chief Buthelezi said that as a Christian he was not a racist and he was not a racist when he said that White South Africa had a particular responsibility to play.

"White South Africans scoff at the anti-South African resolutions passed at the Organisation of African Unity or at the United Nations and they scoff at the resolutions of the Security Council — little knowing how Black South Africans are turning more and more to scoff at the pious utterances of White Christians who have so much, share so little and dare even less to risk what they have got in the fight to implement the spirit of our Lord and to execute His will here on earth."

Chief Buthelezi said that for most Black Christians, when they prayed "Give us this day our daily bread", they meant it literally.

Christian definitions of the evils of South Africa should also contain in them urgently needed remedies.

Explaining this Chief Buthelezi said: "If a man has fallen by the wayside and



a traveller passes and defines the man's position as a man who has fallen by the wayside, he is not a good Samaritan.

"If on the other hand a man passing someone who has fallen by the wayside defines his problem as someone needing a helping hand there and then, his is the definition of a good Samaritan.

"We can define the evils of apartheid in such a way that we blame racism..."

"But until such time as we define the evils of apartheid that we blame ordinary people living under it and supporting it and benefitting from it, our



Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi greeting the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev. Stephen Naidoo, and the Most Rev. Dennis Hurley, Archbishop of Durban, to the Durban prayer breakfast.

definition is not the definition which the parable of the good Samaritan teaches us to have..."

He went on to say that he and his colleagues in Inkatha and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly carried a heavy load in trying to strive to achieve those things that Christendom decreed were worth achieving.

"As I struggle to avoid the escalation of violence; as I struggle to bring about change through peaceful means; as I strive to further the politics of negotiation, I am intensely aware that there will be victory in none of these strivings unless God's hand is here in South Africa to guide the Government,

our captains of industry and the ordinary public to lend a hand, to love their neighbours and to love them as a good Samaritan should love them."

He said he believed that one could possibly say with truth that there were in churches in South Africa, preachers and few few prophets.

There were teachers but there were none to lead the people out of the wilderness of race hatred. He feared that there were no prophets because the people did not deserve them.

"I fear sometimes that there are too few who attempt to gather together the Christian offerings that have been made.

"There are too few who see the need to gather together decency wherever it exists and there are too few who demand that that which has already been done by Christians, and that which is already established as decent, be enshrined in our institutions, in our law and in our constitution.

"I believe that the present constitution is a barrier against Christian wisdom ... that reforms so often talked about these days are no more than cries of fear..."

Christ, he concluded, was a great reconciler and in South Africa there was a unique opportunity for His reconciliation to bridge divisions.



Mr Ntwe Mafole, National Organiser of Inkatha's Youth Brigade.

Tough talk at historic meeting

South Africa's two largest youth movements, the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB), and Inkatha's Youth Brigade searched for common ground for ongoing dialogue at a recent meeting at the Rand Afrikaanse University in Johannesburg.

The historic talks, which were said to have been watched closely by the National Party, were opened by KwaZulu's Minister of Interior, Dr Dennis Madide, who is also chairman of Inkatha's political, constitutional and legal affairs committee. They were closed by Dr Gerrit Viljoen, SA Government Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education.

The session broke into bitter acrimony from time to time but at the close the leaders of the two groups, Mr Keith Musa Zondi of Inkatha and Mr Marthinus van Schalkwyk of the ASB, issued a joint statement on issues on which the two parties had reached consensus. KwaZulu's delegates also included Inkatha's national youth organiser, Mr Ntwe Mafole.

Points agreed upon included: That South Africans, Black and White were one people with one destiny; that there

should be one citizenship for all people; that people should be free to reside where they wished, own ground and become qualified in any trade or profession; that South Africa belonged to all and must be one State with one common destiny, economy, defence force, destiny and so on.

Areas of often heated disagreement were the total rejection by the ASB delegates of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state, Black majority rule and the need for a national convention.

Inkatha delegates told Dr Viljoen that they felt they were essentially leaving the conference "empty handed" and repeated the call of the President of Inkatha for a declaration of intent from the South African Government recognising that the ultimate destiny of the country would be one in which there would be power sharing between Blacks and Whites.

In his opening address Dr Madide stressed the point that Inkatha (with its stated aims of non-violence and negotiation) recognised that most Whites feared the numbers of Blacks and therefore refused to listen to any talk of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state.

Inkatha was therefore prepared to accommodate this fear and willing to look at alternative forms of democracy. There were enduring Federal systems throughout the world, for example, which had proven their utility for generations.

Inkatha, he added, would not lay down impossible preconditions for the politics of negotiation.

Dr Madide added that while the South African Government was committed to the new constitution which aimed at a racist dominated confederal system, Black goodwill in the politics of national reconciliation was sacrificed.

Society today had to deal with Black anger as well as White intransigence and one could not deal with one without the other.

"What we will eventually achieve depends almost entirely on doing something which will most minimise Black anger and break White intransigence," he said.

Dr Madide read in detail evidence that Inkatha gave before the Schlebusch Commission in 1979.



Mr Marthinus van Schalkwyk, ASB chairman.



Mr Musa Mkhize, an Inkatha Youth Brigade leader.

The Commission was charged with investigating a new constitution for South Africa. It was a result of this Commission that the present tricameral Parliament came about.

It is history that the tricameral constitution totally excluded Blacks and that Inkatha has totally rejected it.

Dr Madide said he was aware that Blacks and Whites shared a co-responsibility in setting the stage for vast new developments and vast new achievements in the affairs of the country.

"But I want to put it rather bluntly that a change of White heart, a break away by Whites from traditional fears and prejudices, is a prerequisite for this partnership," he said.

"I believe that Blacks hearts have sustained goodwill as their contribution to the partnership we needed, I do not believe that White hearts have thus far in fact justified the faith and hope of black goodwill..."

All the Inkatha speakers told the conference — in one way or another — that they believed that today, in 1985, South Africa's social, economic and political systems defied international norms of morality.

They defied Christian perceptions of man and society and that South Africa was still locked into archaic forms of social, economic and political behaviour.

Dr Madide, in summing up, said:

"Despite all the positive things we can say about the conditions which are

ready for bringing about positive change in South Africa, we live under the very real threat of vast underachievement and the degeneration of our circumstances into circumstances in which anger will replace reason and



Dr Dennis Madide

in which violence will replace democratic decency..."

Black goodwill and a commitment to democratic decency was in the hearts and minds of millions of Blacks and this, surely, was sufficient for Whites to break away from intransigence, fear and prejudice.

In a society claiming to be based on Christian principles, all evidence pointed to object failure on the part of

the ruling class to live up to its principles.

There was White prejudice which viewed the current wave of unrest sweeping the country as barbarism justifying apartheid. There were still Whites who supported a society where the great divide between haves and have-nots was a racial divide. There were Whites who supported pass laws and influx control laws because they did not believe in democracy and could not introduce a system of government by consensus.

Worst of all, there were Whites who simply did not believe in love and the will of God and who refused to live with their fellow Black South Africans in equality and love.

The new tricameral constitution was reducing a great many areas to a state of ungovernability. It was now patently clear to all clear thinkers that Whites could not govern Black townships either directly or indirectly.

It was time that the National Party took the extra step of recognising that the new constitution's exclusion of Blacks in national decision-making could not remain a permanent feature of South African politics.

If the State President was to issue a statement of intent together with Black leaders recognising that the ultimate destiny of the country was one in which there would be power-sharing between Blacks and Whites, the politics of negotiation and the politics of hope would take a great surge forward.

The open wound of Black disunity

On KwaZulu's Day of Prayer for Black South Africa, held in mid-May, hopes were expressed for the "African dream" that the country would become a race free, open democracy in which there would be equality for all.

At a moving function in Ulundi,

of racism in our midst ... the open wound of Black disunity must be closed forever."

The violence that was daily erupting on the streets of Black townships throughout the country and the bitter hatred which was evident, had fostered a driving force of criminal vandal-

Battle of Isandlwana..."

Time after time since then Blacks in KwaZulu had fought back and been defeated, their Kings had been banished, and their land carved up by the Whites.

But it was in KwaZulu still that Blacks began to spearhead their role in



Chief M G Buthelezi



Mrs Winnie Mandela

Chief M G Buthelezi, pursuing a central theme of Black unity, said in his address that never before in the history of South Africa had there been such an urgent need for Africans to take stock and put an end to Black/Black confrontations.

"Never before have so many Blacks been involved in the internicine Black/Black strife in which people degenerate into the kind of animal thing that stone people to death, that hack people to death, that burn people alive, that plunder, rob and loot," he said.

"Never before has there been such an urgent need for Africans to put their political house in order and to realise once and for all that Black unity is an absolute prerequisite for the abolition

ism, he said.

It was time this ceased.

It was time Blacks used the wisdom of their heritage.

"We here at Ulundi are aware of the evils of racism," said Chief Buthelezi.

"It is here on the very soil that we are building the town of Ulundi where the colonial might of Great Britain finally employed its vast technological superiority in the machinery of war to defeat the Zulu people..."

"It was here at Ulundi that Africans experienced the only fully fledged war that was waged against Black South Africa and it was here that the full might of the British army marched into to defeat us in order to revenge the terrible defeat inflicted on them at the

a new South Africa.

It was six years after the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 that Dr Pixley ka Isaka Seme, a son-in-law of King Dinuzulu (Chief Buthelezi's maternal grandfather), had founded the now banned African National Congress with others.

Inkatha (founded by Chief Buthelezi 10 years ago) was structured in the very ideals in which Dr Seme, Dr Dube, Rev Makgato, Rev Calata, Mr Seloape-Teme and others founded the ANC.

Chief Buthelezi said the ANC was founded in 1912 to create Black unity and today that need for Black unity was in the hearts and minds of people. Unity did not have to be created — the

causes of disunity had to be eliminated.

"This is why I am so appalled at the Black/Black conflicts taking place today," he said.

"Wherever I go I find ordinary people longing to come together in unity. This longing for unity must be translated into united action, and that is why democracy is so important to me...

"It is why only when you give ordinary people the democratic machinery with which to express their aspirations — and to determine aims and objectives for their leaders — that we can begin talking with one voice, acting as one people.

"At mass meetings I have held, people have flocked to me to plead with me to try to banish Black/Black hostility from their midst.

"Ordinary people yearn to work with each other and the fact of the matter is that Inkatha is not a divisive force, as is claimed by some for their own ends. There are people who work day and night to spread this infamous lie across the world.

"The fact that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and AZAPO are now indulging in butchering each other is kept quiet by these same people. There is now a great mute silence from certain quarters about the horrors of Black/Black violence.

"It is now that the authors of disunity and Black/Black strife are becoming visible.

"We strive for unity. It is others who destroy unity."

Chief Buthelezi added that the UDF and AZAPO were committing "atrocities" against Inkatha as well as against each other.

"It is they who are denying ordinary people the right of free political expression," he added.

"It is they who march on Inkatha meetings to do what the machinery of oppression has done to Black South Africa for so many decades — destroy the right of the people to associate politically and to pursue aims and objective of their choice..."

These destructive forces would "burn out". Inkatha was the longest surviving Black political grouping in the country. Inkatha had internal unity and solidarity which other organisations lacked.

Chief Buthelezi said Inkatha had "little hope" that Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Bishop Desmond Tutu, would work effectively for reconciliation between Black and Black.

"We do not have to read about

"Those who oppose Inkatha have the right to do so democratically. Despite what is said, there is no political organisation in South Africa more tolerant of other opinions than Inkatha. But however tolerant we are of others, and however committed we are to democracy, we will defend our rights to the very last to pursue that which our own conscience dictates we should pursue. Inkatha's anger is a deep anger, and its commitment is a deep commitment and any who try to stampede us out of the role we are playing will find we have a resilience and a strength they never dreamed of..." — Chief M G Buthelezi, Ulundi, May 12, 1985.

"No armed struggle can be waged successfully unless Inkatha is drawn into it. No non-violent tactics will succeed unless we in Inkatha are part of those tactics. There will be no politics of negotiation without us being involved. We are an irradicable presence in the struggle for liberation, and it is from this position of strength that we extend the hand of friendship to all, and warn all to think very clearly before they employ brutality against us. We do not know what heights Black anger will rise to. But this we do know: Whatever course history takes, and whatever direction the struggle takes, we in Inkatha will be there in the thick of things..." Chief M G Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu (six-million Zulus), President of Inkatha (one-million paid-up members, 2050 branches throughout South Africa), chairman of the South African Black Alliance.

Bishop Tutu's actions or to be told about them," he added. "We experience them first hand. We experience denigration which he has hurled at us so often from public platforms both here and abroad.

"And yet it was Inkatha which responded to his call for Black unity and formed a delegation to meet him and other clerics recently in Soweto. This more than anything else is surely proof of our commitment to unity..."

Inkatha had never claimed to be the only and sole representative of the people of South Africa. Inkatha knew that the struggle for liberation had to be waged across a broad front and that no organisation, and no group, and no one set of leaders could orchestrate the totality of the struggle.

He then said that he felt he had to pause to make a point regarding Inkatha and the actions of Mrs Winnie Mandela, wife of the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela.

"We have all been witness to the insults hurled at Inkatha ... that it is a tribal organisation pursuing tribal politics in what in swear words is called a Bantustan. I as President of Inkatha am painted as a Zulu traitor pursuing tribal aims and objectives for self-glorification..."

"Take the words of Mrs Winnie Mandela. In a nationally broadcast telephone interview in Canada she said that I was: 'A man who benefits from apartheid, a man who works within the framework of the apartheid regime, a man who is part of Pretoria, cannot do otherwise than promote what is promoted by Pretoria...'"

Chief Buthelezi said he had often wondered since he had heard those words why the wife of "a great son of Africa" would speak in this way.

He believed that perhaps she had ceased being an African in the true sense of the word.

In another interview which Mrs Mandela had given, published in "Index on Censorship" last year, she had said about the Black people of Brandfort:

"They have been emptied of all their culture ... it is nothing to talk of incest here; about aggressive sons who rape their mothers... The culture that made us, and the culture that alone can save us is not ours anymore..."

Chief Buthelezi said he believed the key to Mrs Mandela's "political destitution and her impoverished view of South Africa" was her statement that "... the culture that made us and the culture that alone can save us is not

continued overleaf

ours anymore..."

He stressed: "It is culture that distinguishes man from beast, it is culture that turns us into people with human qualities created by God. It is cultural integrity and cultural values which make us walk tall as human beings and relate to others.

"Culture cements human beings into cohesive achievement-orientated communities seeking higher goals than those of the beasts. Culture is not an insular thing which divides one group from another.

"That is Nationalist Party propaganda; that is the evil belief on which apartheid rests..."

"In our own culture here in this part of South Africa, the spirit of Ubuntu-Botho is an all-pervading one which thrills a Zulu's heart with joy when he or she meets a cultured Xhosa, a cultured Venda or a cultured Tswana. African culture spreads across this country the fabric of unity we should be pursuing as Blacks.

"If Mrs Winnie Mandela was a true Black; if she was an African, she would not despise the people around her like she despises me.

"I have never met such an African defeatist attitude before as I have met in Mrs Mandela when she said in the same interview: 'We are left with nothing here because the culture that made us and the culture that alone can save us is not ours anymore...'

"It is those who have abandoned their Blackness and who have abandoned their African stature that crawl in the gutters of politics," he emphasised.

"Those who work to destroy unity are an alien evil force among us..."

He said that those who destroyed Black unity were known by their deeds. Those who despised Black unity encouraged children to go on rampages like wanton animals to loot and stone and burn people to death.

It was these same people who lead people into frenzies which resulted in people being barricaded in their burning homes and roasted alive.

People were encouraged to gather together to stone their fellow Blacks and to hack them to pieces with cane knives and choppers.

"And when they do so in the name of the struggle for liberation, and when they are lauded as being a new breed of South Africans with iron in their souls and when they are presented as an advance guard of the African National Congress' Mission in Exile, the pain in my being becomes unbearable," Chief Buthelezi concluded.

Schools survey shows influence of Inkatha

The influence of Inkatha in Natal/KwaZulu schools was largely responsible for the region being unaffected by the school boycotts which swept other parts of the country in 1984.

This was disclosed in an interview with a group of "typical" senior Black pupils in Natal high schools.

The interview was conducted by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, head of the Centre for Applied Society Sciences at the University of Natal and researcher Monica Bott. It was reported in a Indicator SA Quarterly Report.

the United Democratic Front and Inkatha, the group of pupils interviewed opted to remain neutral in spite of approaches from both sides.

The Indicator report, published in The Natal Mercury and other newspapers, makes it clear that the group interviewed were part of a wide spectrum of opinion and did not represent all pupils' viewpoints.

The group had a low opinion of activists who wanted to mobilise and "use students", objected to teachers trying to influence pupils politically, and emphasised keeping politics strict-



Youth at an Inkatha rally in Soweto. Supporters of other organisations try to claim Inkatha has little support on the Reef. At this rally 30 000 turned out to hear Chief Buthelezi and packed the Jabulani stadium. This figure of 30 000 was taken from a South African Press Association (SAPA) report. A short while later, less than 10 000 United Democratic Front (UDF) supporters arrived at the same stadium to attend a UDF "Celebration" rally and hear Bishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Allan Boesak, Ms Zinzi Mandela and others. These facts of the differences in open, public support between the two organisations did not, suprisingly, receive widespread publicity.

The report revealed that dissatisfaction with African education and social conditions, which were a major factor in the educational unrest, were as present in Natal as in other parts of the country.

But the important ingredient of mobilisation and organisation, seen in official circles as "agitation", was in Natal counteracted "by the pervasive presence of another well-mobilised force, Inkatha, an organisation which has always opposed community boycotts as futile and injurious to the African community."

"In Natal/KwaZulu a different balance of political groups, especially

ly from other fields such as religion and history.

Boycotts and violence were rejected and the pupils felt there was little to gain by taking part in them.

The authors said this was a category of moderate, pragmatic students which could "probably survive in the more evenly balanced political arena of Natal/KwaZulu but which is argued or coerced into submission in other parts of the country."

The pupils were, nevertheless, acutely aware of the "structured disabilities of African pupils" and sympathised with pupils in other parts of the country.

Show of strength as workers converge on diplomat's home

About 2 000 workers and Inkatha supporters converged on the stately home of the US Consul-General in Durban recently to give him part of a 10 000-signature protest against US disinvestment in South Africa.

They arrived in 34 buses and cars — singing and carrying placards — from throughout Natal and KwaZulu.

They were led by Mr Winnington Sabelo, a member of the central committee of Inkatha.

The Consul-General, Mr Harry Geisel, said the protest was "very impressive" and showed the seriousness of the situation.

"If people are to lose their jobs we have an obligation to think very carefully before we do anything," he said. "We are talking about the lives of very poor people."

The demonstration was widely reported in the Press and on television.

The demonstrators arrived in Durban North's "millionaire row", Monteith Place, carrying placards that read: "We want jobs for subsistence," "When did the masses call for disinvestment?," "Jobs are our weapons," "We can speak for ourselves," "Uproot the international sell-outs," "The clergy are not the workers nor political leaders," (a reference to Bishop Desmond Tutu and his pronouncements on disinvestment) and "No! to disinvestment."

Others stated: "Away with colonial arrogance" and "The struggle is ours. We have a right to wage it ourselves."

The protesters marched in front of the Consul-General's house and were then ushered into the grounds where they sang freedom songs and raised clenched fists while advocating their stand against disinvestment.

The protesters presented some of the signatures, as the complete list was too cumbersome.

While handing over the petition, Mr Sabelo asked Mr Geisel to send it to the US President Ronald Reagan with a plea to encourage Americans to keep investing in South Africa and in so doing create job opportunities.

"We want jobs, help us to get them.



The scene at the residence of the US Consul-General. Senator Edward Kennedy, after his much publicised trip to South Africa, has been reported as saying in the US: "Only Whites in South Africa oppose disinvestment..."



Mr Harry Geisel, United States Consul-General in Durban, stands in the garden of his Durban North home where 34 busloads of Inkatha supporters gathered to protest against US disinvestment in South Africa.

Disinvestment will kill us — to hell with disinvestment," said Mr Sabelo.

Mr Geisel replied that he was, in fact, leaving that day for Cape Town where he would discuss the matter with US Ambassador Mr Herman Nickel.

You can be sure that we will do all we can to help. I will never forget this

day. All the American people want is what is best for all South African people..."

Mr Sabelo, in reply to a question from the Press people present, said Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was known to have urged disinvestment abroad, did not speak on behalf of millions of Black workers.

Anti-disinvestment petition to the US Government

"No mass meeting of Black South Africans has ever approved of disinvestment as a strategy against apartheid..."

"No democratically elected Black leader in a membership based organisation has ever been given the mandate to accept disinvestment as a viable option..."

"We petition President Reagan, the Senators of the United States of America and its Congressmen to reject all pressures exerted on them to express abhorrence of apartheid through disinvestment in South Africa..."

The following is the text of the petition delivered by workers and Inkatha supporters to the US Government:

We as leaders elected to positions of authority in Inkatha, have a mandate to speak on behalf of Black South Africa.

This is evident because:

1. Inkatha is the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa and has a paid up membership of nearly one million.
2. Inkatha's leaders are elected to office by its Annual General Conference which is attended by members chosen at local Branch and Regional levels.
3. Inkatha leaders are not only elected by the Annual General Conference, but they are held accountable to it for the way they pursue the aims and objectives set by the conference.
4. The vast majority of Inkatha's members are workers and peasants and it is representative of Blacks in urban areas as it is representative of Blacks in rural areas.
5. Inkatha's aims and objectives and the tactics and strategies it pursues are determined by democratic procedure which enable ordinary members to direct the affairs of Inkatha.

We are mandated to tell Western industrial nations that Black South Africans do not support disinvestment as a strategy which will help them in the struggle for liberation which they wage as Blacks here in this country.

This mandate has been repeatedly given to us at:

1. Every Annual General Conference where resolutions rejecting disinvestment as a strategy are passed unanimously after the question is re-opened for debate every year.
 2. Central Committee debates and branch and regional debates which take place in the process of giving practical political effect to the expressed wishes of the Conference.
 3. Mass open public meetings which draw crowds of tens of thousands who acclaim the President of Inkatha and other leaders of Inkatha as they inform the Black public of Inkatha's intention to ask for increased investment in this country.
- Our stand opposing disinvestment has mass support and we challenge any Black leader who disputes this fact to share a platform with us in Soweto, the country's industrial heartland, to test public opinion.


We inform the United States Government that:

1. No mass meeting of Black South Africans has ever approved of disinvestment as a strategy against apartheid.
2. No democratically elected leader in a membership based organisation of any importance has ever been given a mandate to accept disinvestment as a viable Black political option.

On behalf of Black South Africa, we petition President Reagan, the Senators of the United States and its Congressmen to reject all pressures exerted on them to express abhorrence of apartheid through disinvestment in South Africa.

We thus petition because:

1. Disinvestment will minimise positive Western influences which we need in South Africa to speed up the process of change.
2. Disinvestment will further the politics of violence and damage the politics of reason.
3. Disinvestment is advocated by those who can not see that economic progress gives rise to inter-group dependencies which favour the politics of non-violent negotiation.
4. Disinvestment is most vehemently called for by those who favour the employment of violence to bring about change.
5. Whatever happens in this country, massive backlogs in Black housing, education, health and welfare services and all things Americans recognise to be essential to a decent quality of human life, will only be wiped out at some future time if we do not damage the economic foundations of South Africa in liberating it from the tyranny of racial oppression.
6. Existing Black poverty will be greatly increased if effective disinvestment campaigns deepen already very problematic unemployment levels.
7. The United States, as the world's leading industrial democracy, should do everything in its power to foster the economic development of the whole of Southern Africa. This obligation to Africa and to the Third World will not be served by damaging not only the South African Economy, but also impoverished neighbouring economies.



Government urged to reconsider

Statement of intent vital, says Chief Buthelezi

The South African Government has evaded the call by Chief M G Buthelezi for it to issue a "statement of intent" regarding power sharing between Blacks and Whites.

The next issue of *Clarion Call* will be devoted exclusively to this issue and will describe, in detail, the stand of the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha.

Recent attempts by the State President, Mr P W Botha, and the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr Chris Heunis, appear to have "poured cold water" — according to Chief Buthelezi — on the politics of meaningful change in the country.

As a result, violent reaction to apartheid could become endemic and a permanent aspect of political life, Chief Buthelezi added.

President P W Botha told millions of British television viewers in a recent interview with Brian Walden that he was "not prepared to do anything to destroy the present character of South Africa" and that the Government would never agree to one-man-one-

"I am prepared to talk about power-sharing without insisting on one-man, one-vote in a unitary state..."

"I ask simply that the South African Government declare its intention of talking about an alternative to a one-man, one-vote in a unitary state with Black South Africa..."

"A declaration or statement of intent should call on all leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups..."

"We must seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the people of South Africa..."

"Power-sharing within the framework of the present constitution is not possible ... power-sharing will only have meaning for Blacks when they share power at central government level..."

— Chief M G Buthelezi, Legislative Assembly, Ulundi.

vote in a unitary state.

He said the Government was working towards creating a system "for the broadening of democracy in South Africa" to see to it that everybody had a vote as far as possible over his own interests.

Asked whether he envisaged a Federal solution to the South African situation, Mr Botha said he did not want to prejudice the issue.

"What I have in mind is that we will start with an open agenda, providing we accept that we are a multicultural country and that every one of these cultural societies has certain rights. We are looking for a solution where every one of these cultural societies will retain their way of life, their language rights, their traditions and also, to a certain extent, their own ambitions..."

In the television interview, President Botha made several statements relating to Chief Buthelezi. The Chief has subsequently made it clear that he totally disagrees with President Botha's interpretation of certain events and issues.

Chief Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: "The State President told all of South Africa and the whole world (in the television interview) that he had met me frequently and that while he and I both accepted differences of opinion on some matters, we co-operated on a wide range of issues..."

"The fact of the matter is that we have only held one formal discussion in four years and one private one (arranged by a prominent South African businessman) to break the ice for the sole discussion," he added.

"But Mr Botha wants to pretend to the world that I am working closely with him and that we have our differences of opinion."

"... he (Botha) rejected what we regard as the essence of the Buthelezi Commission report. He ruled out giving political expression to the total interdependence of KwaZulu and Natal and he poured cold water on the prospects that the area of KwaZulu/Natal could be an experimental seedbed for the future. He ruled out the possibility of the government making a declaration of intent about power-sharing."

"The State President misleads South Africa ... if my going to Cape Town to see the State President is construed as active co-operation in legitimising White supremacist politics, I will, in future, rather stay here in

Ulundi and fold my arms while the Government squanders the hope which flows from the willingness of the majority of Blacks in this country to seek non-violent solutions..."

Chief Buthelezi said he was not afraid of "wilderness politics" and he would have to withdraw from situations in which he was represented as betraying the trust of millions of Black South Africans.

He went on to stress that within the framework of what President Botha had said on television there was nothing that he could talk to him about.

"The world must be told that he refuses to discuss even the possibility of power-sharing in a unitary state, that Mr Botha regards my goodwill and that of Inkatha as an expendable item which he does not really need."

Power-sharing, he said, would only have meaning for blacks when they shared power at central government level.

One man, one vote in a unitary state was his a Black South Africans' cherished ideal.

"No matter how deeply I cherish this ideal," said Chief Buthelezi, "I know that at this point in the history of our country, Whites will be driven to grave acts of desperation if we try to ram this solution down their throats."

"We would have to do so with butts of guns and we would have to attempt to do so in situations in which Whites would adopt a scorched-earth policy in their resistance to it."

"On the other hand, Whites will have to ram down Black throats, also with the butt of a gun, the notion that they as a minority are entitled to appropriate 87 percent of the country and all its wealth as their own and, therefore, all final decision-making both in the realms of internal and external policy."

"In recognition of these harsh realities, and out of a deep sense of South African patriotism, I express the love of my land by taking the first steps in the politics of negotiation."

"At great cost I take the step towards the politics of negotiation by saying to White South Africa that I am prepared to talk about power-sharing, without insisting that we talk about one-man-one-vote, in a unitary state..."

Chief Buthelezi said the South African Government had grasped the need to bring about reform with "... a very shaky White hand..."

Its lack of courage in doing what simply had to be done boldly, expe-

"I am against a unitary state in the form either of a federation or of a union..."

"We believe in the principle of one person, one vote as long as it is not in a unitary state..."

"What we are working towards is to create a system for the broadening of democracy in South Africa to see to it that everybody has a vote as far as possible over his own interests..."

"I am not prepared to do anything to destroy the present character of South Africa..."

— President P W Botha in a British television interview with Brian Walden.

"The State President misleads South Africa and the world when he says he has had frequent discussions with me. We have only had one formal and one informal discussion in four years..."

"Mr Botha wants to pretend to the world that I am working closely with him and that we have cosy discussions, despite the fact that we have differences of opinion..."

"Within the framework of what Mr Botha said in his television interview, there is nothing I can talk to him about..."

"The world must be told that he refuses to discuss even the possibility of power-sharing in a unitary state and that he regards my goodwill and that of Inkatha as an expendable item which he does not really need..."

"I will only speak to President Botha about power-sharing ... to keep alive the prospects of negotiation..."

— Chief M G Buthelezi, Legislative Assembly, Ulundi.

diently and with determination could well put President Botha "on the skids..."

In brief Chief Buthelezi asked for the following:

● The amendment of the South African Constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.

● The abandonment of apartheid.

● The provision of a political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all.

● The use of first, second and third tier levels of government to "fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process..."

Chief Buthelezi said the only point in his declaration that was "totally non-negotiable" was that South Africa was one country, and there should be one citizenship for one nation.

He criticised Mr Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, for his statement recently that he was not prepared to talk about a federal solution.

"Whether or not we end up with a federation of one kind or another, or whether or not we end up with an alternative constitutional model, negotiations cannot even begin if the Government rules out discussions about the merits of a federal formula," Chief Buthelezi emphasised.

He went on to threaten to close down the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly if the Assembly is "pushed too far" on the question of constitutional development.

Chief Buthelezi said he would "resist the dramatic" in politics as long as he was able to. However, he might have no choice but to go back to the people for a mandate for a much clearer focus on strategies and tactics which would have to be adopted to nurture democratic decency in South Africa.

President Botha had ruled out the possibility of the Government making a declaration of intent about power-sharing.

"If the President's statements reflect all that there is in him, I would rather go to the people for a massive endorsement of my opposition to him," he said.

"If we in this House are pushed too far, we will have no choice but to prorogue the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly..."

"I ask simply that the Government declare its intention of talking about an alternative to a one-man, one-vote unitary state with Black South Africa."

Declaration of Intent

Chief M G Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that "lest there be any possibility that I have been misconstrued or not understood" he would table the first draft of the "kind" of Declaration of Intent about which he was talking. He emphasised he was only giving an example of the kind of declaration he was talking about. There were Whites who were misled about what Black South Africa demanded. They did not demand to dominate as Blacks over Whites. They sought only to share in a way in which Whites could join in. "If we cannot do this, then what is there to do?" he asked.

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations which have managed to avoid the use of violence in the achievement of national objectives are the nations which have grown in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power. We need to share power in such a way that no one can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination, and we also need to share power in a formula within which the hallowed values of good government are not compromised.
 - The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.
- We will therefore together seek:
- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it more acceptable to all groups.
 - To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
 - To give expression to the common citizenship of all South Africa's peoples

without qualifying the meaning of citizenship for any group.

- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in exploration of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation.

I make only one thing totally non-negotiable. South Africa is one country, and there must be one citizenship for one nation.

27th May 1985.

**KWAZULU/INKATHA
LEADERSHIP:**

*Chief Minister, Minister of Economic
Affairs and Police and President of
Inkatha:*

CHIEF M G BUTHELEZI.

*Minister of Education and Culture and
Secretary-General of Inkatha:*

DR O D DHLOMO.

*Minister of Works and Deputy
Secretary-General of Inkatha:*

CHIEF S H GUMEDE.

*Minister of Health and Welfare
and Chairman of the Social and
Cultural Committee of Inkatha.*

DR F T MDLALOSE.

*Minister of Justice and Chairman of
the Security Committee of Inkatha:*

THE REV. C J MTETWA.

*Chief Whip, Legislative Assembly
and Chairman of the Economic and
Finance Committee of Inkatha:*

MR S Z CONCO.

*Minister of the Interior and
Chairman of the Political, Constitutional
and Legal Committee of Inkatha:*

DR D R B MADIDE.

Chairman, Inkatha Women's Brigade:

MRS A MCHUNU.

Chairman, Inkatha Youth Brigade:

MR K ZONDI.

*National Organiser,
Inkatha Youth Brigade:*

MR NTWE MAFOLE.

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