



# Sash

Vol 26 No 4 February 1984 R1,20



**1984, Feudalism in the  
age of the computer**



## The story of the break-up of PEN in SA

The article by Lionel Abrahams, withdrawn from the February 1983 issue of Sash (Vol 25 No 4), has now been published, together with a complementary article by Mike Kirkwood, in SESAME No 3, 1983/4. It can be obtained from Renoster Books, 1a Fifth Street, Victoria, Johannesburg 2192 or, in Johannesburg, from the Market Bookshop, Exclusive Books, Children's Bookshop (Rosebank), Bookworm and some CNA branches.

- Officials of the SA government have said that people do not lose their rights when they move to a bantustan.

THIS IS NOT TRUE.

*The people of Umlazi and KwaMashu have lost all their rights.*

- Officials of the SA government have said that Lamontville and Hambanati people will not lose any rights they have at the moment

THIS IS NOT TRUE

*The law says it is not possible for these people to keep their Section 10 rights*

REMEMBER

THIS IS ALL PART OF THE PLAN OF THE SA GOVERNMENT TO EXCLUDE BLACK PEOPLE FROM ANY RIGHTS OUTSIDE THE BANTUSTANS


Published and printed by the BLACK SASH (Natal Coastal Region)  
2 Central Court 125 Gale Street Durban



## CONTENTS

- |    |  |            |   |
|----|--|------------|---|
| 1  | Editorial  | 25         | Black local government in SA<br>Sheena Duncan   |
| 2  | Mogopa rebuilds  | 32         | Nana Wynberg  |
| 7  | Feudalism in the age of computers<br>Marian Lacey                |            | Reviews:  |
| 14 | Sash visits Greenham Common<br>Jill Wentzel                      |            | (a) Black housing in the Cape — historical survey by Kim Elias<br>Reviewed by J de Tolly                              |
| 16 | Grasmere — an updated report                                     |            |   |
| 17 | On showing photographs of Crossroads<br>Cornelia Bullen Smith    | Back Cover | (b) The borders of apartheid — photographs and chronology of dispossession by Paul Alberts<br>Reviewed by Janet Sahli |
| 18 | Orwell's contemporaries and intellectual fascism<br>Jill Wentzel |            |   |
| 21 | UDF — affiliate or co-operate?<br>Helen Zille                    |            |   |

Cover picture: from a painting by Robert Hodgins — photo: Ingrid Hudson



Since Dr Neil Aggett died on February 5, 1982, four others have died in detention: Ernest Dipale, Simon Tembuse Mndawa, Paris Malatje and Samuel Tshikudo.

Public outrage is minimal when little-known people die in detention and when this happens it is our duty to protest that much more vigorously.

Already there are different lists, all over the place, of those who died in detention. This would not be so if proper attention, and, may we say, proper respect, had followed each eerie and horrible detention death. We have all been remiss in that there are no published photographs or biographies of many of the 56 men who have died since the 1962 amendment to the General Laws Amendment Act.

We are grateful to the Rand Daily Mail for sending a reporter to Venda to interview the family of Samuel Tshikudo who died there in January. We hope other newspapers will in future follow this example; for as long as detention exists there will be death in detention and those who are thus martyred should never be insulted with the kind of negligence which turns them into mere statistics.

While remembering those who died in detention, let us never forget those who are currently in detention, and therefore at risk.

Towards the end of last year an American professor wrote to Sash to say that he had been worried for some time about the direction the Black Sash was taking; that he thought Solveig Piper's article 'Recession: capitalism to blame' (vol 26 no 1, May 1983) should never have been published in our magazine; true, there had been a replying article but this had only been perfunctory: surely there was an editorial board which vetted Sash articles, and would we take his name off our subscription list.

We believe the Professor's criticism would have been more valid had he stood it on its head, for we should be publishing much more of this sort of controversy.

The capitalist/socialist debate has many permutations and perhaps the greatest and most significant point of stress is between social democrat and neo marxist. It has debilitated political parties and human rights organizations all over the world and we would be a poor and half-dead lot if it didn't affect us too. But it is unlikely to debilitate us. Fortunately we don't have the time to waste trying to resolve a possibly unresolvable argument (have a look at Koestler's theory of the 'withering away of the dilemma' on page 19) and in any case we have become quite amiably expert at consensus over the years — by *not* concealing disagreements within our ranks.

We haven't got an editorial board and only the editorial has to be approved by the national committee. Most articles flow directly from Black Sash activities but there are often others which we believe will interest our readers but which by no means reflect 'Black Sash thinking'.

Recently we have encouraged debate in our columns, believing this should re-enforce our habit of consensus: and although the more thoughtful articles are obviously the most valuable, the present editor has a weakness for the odd slanging match, which she doesn't think does any harm but rather livens up the magazine.

There is, however, one issue that we do have to resolve at this year's conference from March 15—18 in Johannesburg. We shall have to define our relationship with the United Democratic Front. Helen Zille has outlined the arguments for and against affiliation in a careful article on page 21. Please read it before the conference.

Inevitably, whatever conference decides, many members will disagree. We ask of them neither silence nor acquiescence, but just the usual hard work.

# Mogopa rebuilds

## a story of resistance

**H**arnessing help from the Black Sash, Applied Legal Studies at Wits, and other organizations, the Bakwena BaMogopa refused to move to Pachsdraai.

In the midst of a forced removal, with their schools, churches and water pumps already demolished, they are rebuilding all of these, re-erecting fences and ploughing the land.


Reacting to the world-wide publicity and diplomatic intervention, the government has seemingly backed off from overt confrontation but other communities, such as the nearby Motlatla, are threatened with removal.

Meanwhile outside help for Mogopa is pouring in. Students helped residents to transport building material. Three hundred families, congregants of Churches in Germany, have 'adopted' 300 Mogopa families. Volunteer teachers are available once the school has been rebuilt (all the government-paid teachers have been transferred to Pachsdraai).

**T**he Bakwena BaMogopa own two big farms near Ventersdorp in the Western Transvaal. They bought the first of these farms, Zwartrand, in 1911 before the Land Act was made law. It is rich in minerals including diamonds, which are currently mined in the area on concession from the tribe. For over 70 years the tribe has lived at Mogopa and developed it without any government subsidy or assistance. They collected money and built two schools, a primary and a high school. Both were beautiful cut-stone buildings. They sank boreholes and put in windmills. They bought tractors and ploughed their land, selling the surplus produced to the Farmers' Co-op in Ventersdorp. They erected fences and cattle camps and established roads. All of this was done so that the tribe would be able to maintain its identity and have a secure base in a world where its members were being scattered to work on white farms and in the towns.

Money is collected not only from the people living at Mogopa but also from migrants who work in town and who meet regularly as 'The Reef Committee'. All important decisions concerning the administration of the tribe are meant to be taken in general meetings held at Mogopa and attended by all adult members of the tribe who travel home from wherever they are working.

However the previously peaceful existence of the tribe was shattered when Jacob More, an ex-policeman from Carletonville, was made headman in 1978. Soon after he was installed the tribespeople began to complain



*Resisting removal. Mogopa Town Committee Chairman, Matthews Kgatitsoe addresses an open-air meeting  
photo: Paul Weinberg*

that he did not adhere to the democratic principles of the tribe. They say that he fined people large sums of money and even cattle for 'offences' which did not come before the Tribal Court. Apparently receipts were not issued for these fines and there was no record that they were deposited in the tribe's account. Other alleged offences include the extortion of money from old age pensioners and a R20 fee charged to workers when their annual labour contracts were renewed. One of the most serious complaints against him was that he refused to call general meetings to discuss these problems.

After trying to root out these practices and failing, the tribe decided to strip Jacob More of his office. On September 20 1981 a general meeting attended by 300-400 people resolved that Jacob More should be replaced by

Shadrack More as the new headman. New tribal councillors were elected at this meeting.

The new secretary of the Tribal Council then wrote a letter to the Magistrate at Ventersdorp, Mr de Villiers, informing him of the change of headman and councillors. They expected the matter to end there.

However, de Villiers called a general meeting for October 7 1981. At this meeting, attended by hundreds of people, he asked who no longer supported Jacob More. The crowd responded en masse 'We all no longer want him.' De Villiers was not satisfied and called for a vote by show of hands. Seven people voted to retain Jacob More. De Villiers then said 'I am the magistrate of this whole area, and as a white man I say Jacob More will rule until he dies.' He did however agree that his councillors should be changed. This was never done and the situation degenerated into one where Jacob More continued with his previous practices with no formal Council.

The tribe was horrified by the Magistrate's action. They no longer regarded Jacob More as their headman and they wrote to the magistrate asking for the return of the tribal stamp and pressing their allegations of corruption. Between January 19 and 27 1982 a Commission of Enquiry was held into the tribe's affairs. The Commission was chaired by an ex-magistrate from Klerksdorp. The tribe inform us that well over 100 people went to give evidence. The results, however, of the Commission were never made known to the people although they repeatedly requested to know the outcome. The tribe went to lawyers who wrote to the Chief Commissioner on their behalf asking

- (a) that the tribal books be audited, and that
- (b) the results of the Commission of Enquiry be made public.

The tribe took legal advice as to whether the decision of the magistrate that Jacob More retain his position, was valid. They were advised that in terms of the Black Administration Act of 1927 the State President is Paramount chief of all Blacks and so has the power to appoint chiefs; the Minister of Co-operation and Development has the power to appoint and depose headmen. Thus, however democratic and representative the tribe's decision to demote Jacob More was; there is no way it can be implemented.

During the Enquiry in January 1982 the tribe was summoned to a meeting on 'Resettlement'. They believe

*By courtesy of Rand Daily Mail*



that this meeting was the result of Jacob More's close relationship with officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development.

The meeting took place on February 15 1982 and was addressed by de Villiers and Mr L Pretorius from Pretoria. They said the tribe would have to move from Mogopa. People were horrified and the meeting became chaotic; everyone rejected the removal except Jacob More and his friends. The officials left, saying the people must resolve their differences between themselves.

From then until Friday (November 18 1983) no public meeting about the removal ever took place. Jacob More had various secret meetings with officials from both Pretoria and Bophuthatswana. The tribe was not informed of these meetings. When people saw that small groups were meeting they tried to attend to hear what was happening but were turned away. During this time Jacob More and his followers went to Pachsdraai to see the place. Others heard of this afterwards; they were not invited to go. Also numbers were painted on some people's houses, but again people did not know why. On February 1 1983 the tribe, through their lawyers, requested that a general meeting be held so that they could find out what was happening. This letter was sent to Jacob More with a copy to the Magistrate. There was no response.

On June 24 1983 the people at Mogopa were amazed to see bulldozers enter their village. Jacob More and his followers, allegedly ten families, were taken to Pachsdraai. As they moved, their houses were demolished. Then the schools were demolished, as well as the churches. Roughly 100 more families left in dribs and drabs, some of whom moved mainly because they were concerned for their children's schooling and compensation. Later the engines of the water pumps were taken away by the magistrate. It is said that before Jacob More left he threw diesel in their remaining water.

The old people at Mogopa say that during the demolitions de Villiers told them that the farms had been sold and they had two weeks to vacate Mogopa. Totally confused by what was happening they went to see their Paramount Chief Mamogale who holds the title deeds to the farms. He showed them the deeds still in his possession and said no sale had taken place. This was subsequently confirmed in a press interview on September 28 1983 with Mr L Pretorius, Assistant Director dealing with Removals of the Department of Co-operation and Development in Pretoria.

Pretorius said that the removal meetings had started in 1981, that several meetings attended by the entire tribe had been held and a planning committee elected, and furthermore that the exact terms of compensation had been made known to the people. The people who had left had been taken to Pachsdraai and Jacob More was living in one of the white farm houses there. He said Mogopa had not yet been bought by the government and that they would probably proceed to negotiate expropriation. The schools had been demolished because Bophuthatswana withdrew its teachers from the schools. He gave the journalists the names of the planning committee.

When we reported the above information to the tribe they were flabbergasted and fascinated to learn the names of the people on the 'elected' Planning Committee.



*Press Conference leads to world-wide outrage. (l to r) Aninka Claassens, Ethel Walt, John More, Matthews Kgatitsoe, Lucas Kgatitsoe, a member of the Mogopa Town Committee, Abner Kgatitsoe photo: Paul Weinberg*

The majority of people insisted they would not move. They suffered great hardship in remaining. There were no schools for the children, no water pumps, no churches, no bus service to Ventersdorp, 20 kms away. In addition some of the neighbouring white farmers had sent their cattle to graze on the Bakwena's land. When Tribal Representatives reported this to de Villiers he told them he was not prepared to deal with them, they should go to Pachsdraai and report their problems to the magistrate there.

People were in daily fear that their houses would be demolished. Some reported to us how their houses had been demolished in their absence and without their consent. From June until November a bulldozer was parked in the village next to the demolished high school. A small demolition team was camped next to it.

At the end of October the tribe's legal representatives wrote to the Minister of Co-operation and Development demanding that the bulldozer be removed and an undertaking given that no more houses would be demolished without the owners' consent. The undertaking was given and on Wednesday November 7 the demolition team packed up and the bulldozers pulled out of the village. The people were jubilant.

In the meantime they had collected money to pay the deposit on a new pump. They had approached the bus company to re-establish the bus service, and were trying to start an informal school for their children. People felt that life was slowly returning to normal.

The Mogopa people then received a letter saying that an Order from the State President would be read to them on Friday November 18 and they should gather to hear it. The Johannesburg workers heard of this meeting only a few days in advance, besides which it was on a working day, but many of them did manage to attend.

The Government was represented at the meeting by

Mr P de Villiers, the Ventersdorp magistrate, Mr Danie Smith and Mr Vermaak from Co-operation and Development in Pretoria and numerous policemen. To the horror and fury of the tribe the officials brought Jacob More with them. Members of the tribe spoke out immediately saying that Jacob More should be removed from Mogopa. De Villiers refused to discuss the matter. He said that the Order would be read and no further discussion would take place. He then read an Order in terms of Section 5(1)(b) of the Black Administration Act of 1927 — an Act not used for decades.

It stated that the State President ordered the members of the black tribe, the members of the black community and the black people living in the area and all their families to move to Pachsdraai within 10 days. It further ordered that they must never return to Mogopa.

After the notice was read de Villiers explained that trucks would arrive on Monday November 21 1983 (ie two days later) and every day thereafter until Tuesday November 29. People should load their possessions on to the trucks and they would be taken to Pachsdraai. He said that if people had not complied with this order by

*A lunch rest during the mammoth stone-cleaning operation: chipping concrete from the stones of the demolished building*



Tuesday November 29 they would be loaded up and taken away by force on that day.

The tribe was in uproar. Mr Lazarus Katitswe said that there had only been one previous meeting when removal was mentioned and the tribe had said they were not prepared to move and asked whether the government was going to force them to do so. The officials had said force would not be used. Yet today they were told they were to be loaded on to the trucks. He asked about the money the tribe had spent on the land and the improvements they had made. The officials said there had been many meetings held to discuss the removal and that the people present had refused to have their property evaluated. This was hotly disputed. People insisted they had not known about any meetings called. After the officials and Jacob More left, the tribe held a meeting at which they resolved that nobody would voluntarily get on to the trucks.

The next 10 days saw intense activity and negotiation.

A letter was written to the Minister of Co-operation and Development stating that the order to move was unlawful, on the grounds that Section 10(1)(b) of the Black Administration Act (1927) contains a provision that if the people refused to comply, a resolution of Parliament would then become necessary. When this failed, their legal representative applied to the Supreme Court for an urgent interdict to stay execution of the eviction order.

This also failed, on the grounds that the removal had already been approved 'in anticipation'.

A Press and Diplomatic Conference was called at which a Black Sash statement was issued and members of the Mogopa committee were present to answer questions. Helen Suzman, in New York at the time, was contacted and asked to make representations and to use her influence with the US State Department. This she did with great effect — to Chester Crocker personally.

The SA Ambassador in Washington was called in for discussion on the subject. We also ensured that all the relevant information was placed in the hands of top Government officials in London and throughout Europe, at the same time as the overseas newspapers and television services were beginning to carry the story.

Purely fortuitously, Pik Botha was at the same time on

his European diplomatic tour, and was acutely embarrassed by the publicity.

The campaign gathered momentum as November 29 approached. Under the guidance of Bishop Tutu, clergymen of all denominations gathered in Mogopa for an all-night prayer vigil. On the morning of the deadline of November 29, with the international press and TV present in force, the removals trucks, there for 10 days, made no move to carry out the order.

Seven families decided of their own accord to demolish their own homes and hired lorries at a cost of R300 each to move their possessions to Bethanie, in order to escape the dreaded move to Pachsdraai. The rest of the villagers are steadfast in their determination to remain at Mogopa.

The overwhelming condemnation of the international press and foreign governments finally brought a propaganda counter-offensive from the Government. Mogopa/Pachsdraai became a daily SABC news item, and a party of foreign journalists were flown up to both areas in a Government helicopter. They were accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Louis Nel, who attempted to explain the reasonableness of the Government policy and to point out the excellence of the facilities being prepared in Pachsdraai.

The responsible Minister, Dr Koornhof, has been noticeably silent on the issue. He and his officials did however receive a deputation of Mogopa tribal leaders on December 5 but excluded their lawyer. To their dismay they found Jacob More and his committee there too. The Mogopa committee had a short written memorandum prepared with questions for the Minister. He did not answer one of them. They were prepared to meet him more than half way, offering to move to a place approved by the tribe after proper negotiations concerning size of land and compensation. The Minister did not agree. He had a joint press statement ready which the people refused to sign. He said they must go to look at Pachsdraai, which the committee agreed to do after discussion with the rest of the tribe, but refused to do so in transport provided by the Government. Instead, they were taken there by Black Sash members, and later reported to Dr Koornhof that the area was unsuitable and

*Dawn breaks after the vigil. Brigid Ward second from left, Ethel Walt standing*



they refused to move there.

Dr Koornhof's office later issued a statement to the effect that the difficulty was simply one of a dispute between two opposing factions, and despite all his efforts he had been unable to resolve the tribal differences.

At the time of writing, no further efforts have been made by Government officials to move the people. Their lawyers have applied for leave to appeal against the Supreme Court judgement, and the Chairman of the Lawyers for Human Rights has called on the Government to stay the removal until the appeal has been heard.


Life goes on peacefully in Mogopa. The people have collected over R2 000 towards rebuilding their bulldozed school. They have eight experienced builders of their own as well as a great deal of enthusiastic amateur help. The older men are engaged in cleaning old re-usable bricks and stones from demolished buildings while the women and children are repairing roads for the trucks conveying building materials. With some additional assistance from sympathetic outside volunteers the walls are steadily rising from the ruins.

•At the moment of going to Press our members visited Mogopa — see back page



*Above, decorating a Mogopa Xmas tree to celebrate the 'reprieve'. Sue Sher in the background*

*Below l and r, spinaker off-cuts make ideal decorations — Jill de Vlieg's idea.*



*Rebuilding the school*



*Volunteers offload building material from a SAVS truck*



# Feudalism in the age of computers

— an analysis of recruitment strategies to reserve and allocate labour

Marian Lacey



*There are no jobs here. What must we do? Our children are starving... before we could look for work for ourselves and then come back and join. We can't do this anymore since this independence thing. Some of us have been waiting now for over a year... Things are getting worse and worse... the only hope is for work on the farms, not even the mines want us now.*

(Interview: workseeker, Herschel district, October 1981)

In October 1981, when this interview was conducted, South Africa was experiencing an unprecedented, but short-lived boom, a boom which barely affected recruitment in the bantustans. If anything the position had worsened. In the space of five years recruitment had dropped by well over 850 000 registrations.

By mid 1982 a recession had set in leading to the retrenchment of tens of thousands of workers. An inestimable number found that when their contracts ended these were not renewed. Retrenchments and dismissals became the order of the day across the country and in almost all sectors.

Particular sectors hit were those employing large numbers of contract workers. A brief survey of selected headlines in 1982 gives a stark picture: Slump hits metal workers; Sats (South African Travel Services) cuts no of workers by 7 000 — thousands will lose jobs as recession takes its toll; Sats cutback on 20 000 jobs; East Rand foundry to retrench 200; Benoni plant retrenches 600 workers; Lay offs sweep East Rand industry; 2 000 affected in Anglo American coal mines; Iscor's cream souring — 10 000 workers to be slashed; 5 000 reduction in Metal industry — unions fighting lay-offs; 1 000 workers at Highveld steel; Union lashes motor plant over retrenchments — 800 Sigma men sacked; 39 workers retrenched Good-Year, Ford 507 workers in June, 1982; Volkswagen retrench 315 workers — April 1982; 250 Leyland workers laid-off; Giant Chemical Group to retrench 500; 10 500 textile workers soon jobless; Garment workers unite; Employees sacrifice jobs to save colleagues.

Add to this, the massive crackdown on 'illegals', the continued and rising number of pass law arrests since the moratorium in 1979; and the ruthless brutality used against people said to be squatting illegally in urban areas and a picture very different from the much heralded 'liberal reform era' can be painted.

Essentially, what I hope to show in this paper, is that Riekert's proposed reforms with regard to urban blacks, which occur alongside the continued mass relocation scheme and the present tightening-up of labour recruitment and control of bantustan residents, are not contradictory, but part of a process of adapting the system of labour control to meet specific interests and changing economic, political and ideological circumstances.

Furthermore, I hope to show that the large reservoir or reserve army of labour, which has been built up in the bantustans, is and must be seen as an integral part of the workforce and not a marginal category of unemployable people beyond it. The streamlining and tightening-up of the labour allocation and recruitment system, as described in this paper, must therefore be seen as part of the State's present concern to incorporate *all* workers into a single integrated system of control.

The Riekert commission was appointed to carry out this task. As Riekert in his Report has shown in great detail and as subsequent steps taken have proved, what is required is a far more complex and coercive system of allocating and *reserving* a supply of labour to different categories of employer — defined variously by sector, industry and location.

## THE CONTRACTION AND RELOCATION OF TRADITIONAL LABOUR POOLS

In the past decade an urgent need to devise new labour strategies arose in response to increasing labour militancy and changed conditions for capital expansion in South Africa. This, along with both a massive cutback in recruitment from South Africa's neighbouring states and the uprooting and removal of some 3½ million Africans (SPP estimate) from so-called 'white' rural areas and towns, served to disorganise capital's traditional reserve army of labour. All sectors were equally affected by the contraction and relocation of their traditional labour pools as the following discussion makes clear.

### a) Revised recruitment strategies in the mining sector

The mines, in the wake of the withdrawal of 100 000 mineworkers by the Malawian government after the air-crash in 1974 and the establishment of an avowedly Marxist government in Mozambique the following year, saw

a massive reduction in their recruitment of foreign indentured workers. Recruitment of foreign workers for all sectors in 1974 dropped from a total of 763 674, of whom 231 666 and 227 619 were from Malawi and Mozambique respectively, to 301 758 in 1981, of whom only 30 602 were Malawians and 59 391 Mozambicans. The Chamber of Mines recruitment statistics for the period 1973-1979 illustrate the cutback in recruitment of foreign indentured mineworkers, and the urgent need, particularly between 1974 and 77, to replace those lost, with local workers. The number of foreign workers on the mines fell from just over 80% of the workforce in 1973 to barely 40% in 1979.

The urgency of the mines' position was realised in 1976, when, despite the substantial wage increases after 1973 and accelerated unemployment in the wake of the world-wide recession in 1974/75, the mines found they were unable to attract local workers. Only 4 000 novices presented themselves in 1974 to replace the 100 000 Malawians ordered to leave by Banda in that year, while overall recruitment suffered a shortfall of over 58 000 workers.

To break down traditional resistance of local workers to minework, state intervention was essential. This took various forms, the principal ones being: manipulation of nationality, citizenship and immigration laws so as to create an internal reserve of legally designated 'foreign' workers. As 'foreigners' they could be denied free access to certain categories of work and so be channelled into mining. In addition to this the state could also zone labour supply areas from mine recruitment only, and in

so doing, build-up a reservoir of labour for the mines to draw on. Once a district was unofficially zoned in this way, categorization of workers in zoned districts became possible and overtime, wastage, associated with the training of novices, would be greatly reduced.

A variation on this method in use was through the selective distribution of requisitions. Areas where the mines recruited heavily were by-passed in the distribution of requisitions on the grounds, as one labour officer in the Transkei put it, that, 'we have to give all districts a fair chance, so as requisitions are short we leave out mining areas'. (Interview: labour officer Butterworth October 1981).

Over and above these measures, the Chamber of Mines has also tightened-up on its own recruitment practices. In a bid to stabilize the local workforce, 'bonus cards', pioneered by the Anglo American Group in the 60s, have been extended throughout the industry; all mineworkers have been brought under a highly centralized system of computerized control enabling the mines to determine the level of skill, experience and work record of every worker in its employ.

With the steady implementation of these revised strategies, Theba officials report that today they have more than a 101% compliment and more in reserve. 'Fences are being flattened' and 'gates are kept locked' to keep out the hundreds of workers clamouring for minework. (Giliomee 1982). As one senior Theba official described the position:

*Gone are the days of hectic active recruitment still seen in '76. We are building up our local reservoir*

*Processing of migrant labourer at Mabopane*

*photo: Paul Alberts*



*of workers. They are accepting longer contracts, with shorter rest periods between... In fact to be a mine worker in the Transkei today, you are considered a privileged person.*

(Interview: Theba official Butterworth October 1981)

There is little doubt that the destitute conditions in the bantustans, accelerated unemployment and better wages on the mines, have helped to break down earlier resistance to minework. But above all, it is argued, it is the real absence of any choice, even in boom times, which acts to secure an inexhaustible supply of labour for the mines.

## **b) Revised recruitment strategies in the farming sector**

Not only the mines' foreign reserve army was disorganised by these events. In 1970, farmers were still recruiting 45 000 workers from outside South Africa. By 1977 this number had dropped to 16 000 and with stepped-up security in the wake of increased ANC activity, at the end of 1982 only 9 000 Mozambicans were given permission to return to work on the farms.

Within South Africa itself, the mass resettlement scheme executed over the past two decades, has resulted in the removal of an estimated 660 000 Africans from white farms, while steady expropriation of 'black-spot' and 'badly situated areas', has resulted in the relocation of a further 450 000 people from the 'white' areas. With this mass relocation of former labour and cash tenants and their families, farmers have had to shift from maintaining the largest possible labour supply on the farm to meet their variable labour requirements, to one of relying on a smaller core of permanently settled skilled workers, supplemented by extensive recruitment of casual/seasonal labour from the bantustans.

With the present oversupply of unskilled workers in the bantustans, the farmers too have an inexhaustible supply from which to draw on. If given the choice however, workseekers from the bantustans continue to resist farm work. Resistance to low wages still paid by many farmers and the fear of permanent classification in the farm worker category were suggested as reasons why some farmers still experience difficulty in securing a steady supply of seasonal workers.

But many thousands more are gradually being denied this choice. Evidence collected during extensive research in the eastern Cape and Transvaal bantustans revealed that a high correlation exists between the level of destitution in a particular area and the type, and often the absence of requisitions sent to those areas. In some instances areas remote from either the labour bureau or town were declared unofficially 'closed' to all recruitment bar farming. The farmers have a field day in such areas. They, or their private recruiting agents, are able to move into such areas to pick up men, women and children, and are assured of their supply. A worker whose reference book was still endorsed 'farm labour only', despite the fact that he had been relocated 10 years earlier to Sada, described his position thus:

*Before some of us here always worked on farms in this area (Queenstown-Whittlesea)... then we were moved here over ten years ago. We were forced to sell our cattle and land to plough... In the first few years*

*after the farmers were finished with us, many of us would get work for cash on the roads or the government... now not even those jobs are for us... we must just starve for the six months after they throw us back here.*

(Interview: Hewu labour office, February 1980)

Even workers relocated from the farms find themselves still tied to farm work, but immeasurably worse off. Dispossessed of land, stock and wage contributions from more than one member of the household under the former labour tenancy system, once relocated, they return to the farms as 'single' workers and become separated from their families, trapped as they are in the migrant labour system. Seasonal work lasts only from a three to six month period, so casual farm employees remain severely under-employed. Those who commute daily to farms, as an ever increasing number do, are no better off. Competition for jobs is intense in many areas so wages are low, some are even being forced to accept payment in kind for their services. As one woman who commutes daily to a tomato farm bordering the Lebowa bantustan explained:

*We women here and even our children are forced to go and pick tomatoes on the farms nearby. What can we do, there is no other work for our men and even the farmer doesn't want them. If we work on the farms we will maybe get some food and then we can sell the tomatoes that the farmer uses to pay us.*

*Without this little bit our children will starve.*

(Interview Moketsi district, Lomondokop resettlement area April 1982)

The Farm Labour Project in their submission to the Manpower Commission reported conditions similar to this in other commuter farm areas. As found elsewhere casual workers were being paid a derisory wage of anything from 50c to R1 a day. Men on the whole continue to resist being forced into farm work, but for women, trapped in the bantustans, who in the majority of instances have no other source of income, there is no other option but farm work.

Clearly farmers have benefitted from the creation of resettlement areas remote from towns or border industrial growth points. This, alongside the trend to zone labour supply areas for farm recruitment only, and the more recent practice of setting up assembly points run by administration board officials in mobile vans, rather than widely dispersed tribal labour bureaux, has meant that even fewer requisitions than in the past will ever reach remote bantustan districts. In time, the farmers too will be assured a steady stream of seasonal workers.

Attempts however, to secure a permanent core of fulltime wage labourers on the farms has proved far more difficult. Although desertion to the towns has all but stopped as a result of strict influx controls which prevent farm workers from moving from non-prescribed (ie rural) to prescribed urban areas, farmers complain that many thousands more eventually get to the towns by first relocating themselves to the bantustans. As early as 1964 attempts were made to solve this problem by creating a separate rural and industrial stream along a non-prescribed/prescribed divide. But as the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development made clear in 1968, it was not the solution that was at fault, but the farmers' failure to register all their employees. Opening the

Agricultural show at Middleburg he stated:

*It is not only government policy that Bantu labourers may not move from the farms to the urban areas to work there, it is also clearly laid down in the relevant regulations. The greatest difficulty, however, lies in the execution of these regulations and here I fear large sections of the farming community are making their own labour positions more difficult as well as complicating our task to prevent illegal infiltration into the cities.*

He then went on to detail how the system operates in practice:

*A record of every registered Bantu farm labourer in your service is kept in a central register in Pretoria, and the position is that the labourer cannot be employed in the urban areas, because as soon as his service contract must be registered, it will be established that he is a farm labourer, and then he cannot legally be taken into service. The whole control machinery with reference to Bantu farm labourers revolves therefore around the single cog of the registration of each labourer in your service at your local Bantu Affairs Commissioners' office.*

This exact system is still in operation today, but far more efficiently run. Not only have farmers been compelled to expel all surplus workers, labour tenant and squatters thus simplifying the registration procedure, but all workers have now been brought under computerized control. So even farm workers who try to get to the towns via the bantustan escape route could find in the future that their former 'farm labour only' classification is a bar to other work. Far more research in this area will have to be done to establish this trend with any certainty, but as far as fulltime farm workers are concerned, it is suggested that with their numbers rapidly shrinking attempts will be made to 'Riekertize' their position in a bid to stabilize a permanently settled core of more skilled farm workers needed on highly mechanized and agribusiness farms.

### **c) Revised recruitment strategies in the manufacturing sector**

Revisions in the labour system have also been demanded by the manufacturing sector — especially its most capital intensive multi-national component with its growing demand for a skilled and stabilized workforce.

This, combined with growing worker militancy and popular struggles against the degraded living and working conditions of urban workers, necessitated a revised strategy towards Africans who qualify for permanent residence rights.

The revised strategy, embodied in Riekert's proposals, aimed firstly to reduce rigidities in the labour supply by allowing section 10 rights to be exercised throughout urban areas *as long as* employment and housing are available and secondly to move away from a system based on race and control via the police, blackjacks and prosecution of pass offenders, to one based on citizenship and control by employers and registered house owners/tenants. An extension of these controls will be the continued deprivation of citizenship via 'independence' of the bantustans; and critical to these moves is the need to bring *all* workers under computerized control. Hence the crackdown on 'illegals' through the 1979 moratorium



*Newly recruited migrant labourer with his family, Ga-Rankuwa district 1979*  
photo: Paul Alberts

which put the onus on employers to 'register' workers as section 10d workers on contract under threat of a R500 fine.

Similarly the Crossroads 'concessions' brought people under control since they had to register to claim entitlement to jobs and housing. Nyanga shows the other side of the coin, as immigration laws were invoked to expel those who were said to be 'foreigners' from the 'independent' bantustan in the Transkei.

Further, the use of housing as an instrument of control has been refined by the decision to make house-ownership under 99-year leasehold a condition of urban security. Proof of approved accommodation is thus being *selectively* used in various ways: first to shunt the poor and the economically inactive (in state parlance the 'superfluous appendages') out of the urban areas; second as a means to further reduce social costs by shifting the cost of reproducing labour-power away from the wage packet to workers and their families living in the bantustans. Third, to further reduce the number qualifying for section 10 rights by transforming as many people as possible into 'frontier commuters'; and last, by encouraging house-ownership. Not only is the state trying to foster the growth of a stable 'middle class', but a docile working class as well. In the case of the latter, once in occupation of houses built, subsidized or financed by loans by their employers, their dismissal could mean eviction and then endorsement out of town. The government's current programme to sell off 500 000 housing units, will win



*photo: Paul Alberts*

much sought-after security for the more affluent urban resident, but for the homeless and poor the consequences will be disastrous.

These proposed reforms are to be extended to a mere 5 300 000 urban Africans who qualify for section 10 rights and who can afford to maintain them. Equally important, they must be seen as being inextricably linked to measures geared to ensure the efficient exploitation and control of bantustan dwellers who have been denied even these few concessions. Urban gains are thus at the expense of the majority of Africans condemned to live in destitute bantustans.

### **The manipulation of citizenship and immigration laws as an instrument for allocating and reserving labour**

By December 1981, with the granting of 'independence' to the Ciskei bantustan, all Xhosa-Tswana and Venda-speaking people had been deprived of their South African citizenship. In the space of five years, eight million South Africans were declared legal 'foreigners' — aliens in the country of their birth.

The numbers game has undoubted political and ideological advantages for the white minority in South Africa, whose fear of black majority rule is legion. This deprivation of millions of South Africans of their citizenship must also be seen as a 'non-negotiable' aspect of South Africa's present policy which aims to create an ethnically based political partition of South Africa along either federal or confederal lines. (H Zille, Sars, 1982). Connie Mulders' classic formulation in 1978 spells out the ultimate fate of all Africans in South Africa. In this he stated: 'If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned there will be not one black man with South African citizenship... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation in this Parliament to accommodate these people politically.' (quoted in Zille *ibid.*)

But what of the State's economic and social obliga-

tions? How does the loss of citizenship and the manipulation of immigration laws have any bearing on the revised system of labour reservation and allocation?

Winterveld may be characterised as a squatter/commuter camp housing more than half a million 'internal refugees' of the apartheid system. Sited within the 'independent' Bophuthatswana border these refugees have been deprived of their South African citizenship. But the majority living there are non-Tswanas who have rejected that bantustan's 'citizenship'. This renders them 'stateless' in the legal non-sense.

Their removal to their putative ethnically appropriate bantustan has been stalled, as most families living there have one person or more in their household working and commuting daily to the PWV and surrounding areas. Between the South African state and the Bophuthatswana bantustan administration a conflictual, but still happy marriage of convenience has been consummated. In this, neither partner will take responsibility for the health, welfare, education or housing of the Winterveld refugees spawned by the system. While both sides drag their feet millions of rand are being saved the taxpayer. But the real and immediate beneficiaries of this partnership are the profit-minded capitalists who at present reap enormous benefits from having a highly vulnerable and docile reservoir of commuter labour to draw from — without the social costs involved in reproducing labour power.

The mushrooming of similar squatter camps on the borders of all bantustans within commuting distance of towns and growth points is significant in another way: it proves the success of influx control via the bantustan 'independence' policy. In the long term, these vast squatter slums could become potential hotbeds for political violence. But segregated far out of sight and mind of whites in South Africa, they can be effectively and easily policed and controlled. Ironically, even apartheid's most virulent critics ignore the plight of these 'internal refugees' — because they happen to be living in an 'independent' bantustan which the international community refuses to recognise.

As declared 'foreigners' they are subject to new controls. Entry into 'white' South Africa of 'foreigners' will be more strictly policed. Freedom of 'foreign' workers to choose jobs or mines on which they wish to work can be severely restricted. As 'foreign' workers they can be forced to accept jobs shunned by local workers — these are usually the lowest paid menial tasks for which safety and health conditions are poor and often dangerous; where hours, especially in the case of shift work, are not congenial for men settled with their families in the towns. Similarly, industries such as agriculture, clothing, textiles, building etc, highly vulnerable to cyclical and seasonal demands, will benefit from this system. They will be able to recruit workers as 'foreigners', then hire and fire them at will.

A policy of assimilation or integration would destroy this mobility — ie the workers' re-exportability and dispensability. To sum up then, the ruthlessness with which workers from the Transkei were deported from the Nyanga bush site in Cape Town; the abrogation of financial responsibility towards squatters living within bantustan borders; the massive reductions of the migratory labour force during the present economic down-swing and the crackdown and expulsion of 'illegals', is proof

that the influx control system, refined via the logic of bantustan 'independence', functions as it is meant to.

As the remaining 'self-governing' bantustans are forced to take 'independence', so the state's capacity to control and police the entry and repatriation of migrants will become easier. In the meantime, the state has resorted to other mechanisms of controlling and allocating labour to which we now turn.

### Job categorization and the zoning of labour supply areas

In the pre-Riekert era, it was the workseeker from the bantustan who had a far wider choice of jobs than the urban dweller. The latter was tied to jobs within the administration board area in which he resided. Employers moreover were encouraged to recruit widely for their additional labour needs.

This position is now being reversed. Today, with the greater mobility of urban workers, combined with the enforced local labour preference policy and the zoning of labour supply areas, the numbers of workers recruited from the bantustans is being massively reduced. In addition the category of jobs open to bantustan workers is being steadily narrowed.

As a direct consequence of these strategies, the urban unemployed countrywide have become the principal source of industries reserve army. Hence the massive cutback in bantustan recruitment. Once the computers in the 14 Administration Board areas are aligned to one another, greater mobility of this urban reservoir will be effected. The local labour preference option will operate more efficiently, and the number of bantustan requisitions for urban employment can be expected to drop even more dramatically.

To enforce the local labour preference policy, the power of ABs to decide who, and for whom a workseeker may or may not work has been greatly enhanced. This, together with the high unemployment and deepening recession have made it easier for ABs to push through their plans to restructure the workforce along an urban/bantustan divide.

Their first step in this process, was to crackdown on 'illegals' through the moratorium in 1979. This brought all unregistered workers under computerized control.

Once this was achieved, the ABs moved to close certain jobs to contract workers. Local workers in turn were coerced into taking jobs normally shunned by them, by the soaring costs of basic necessities, transport and services — just as Riekert in his report predicted would happen.

On top of this, the housing shortage is being used as one of the chief instruments of control to enforce the local labour preference policy. ABs, on the grounds that no 'suitable' accommodation is available, have instructed employers to recruit locally. As a result, some workers recruited annually under the automatically renewable call-in-card system have reported that their contracts have been cancelled. This accounts for some of the cutbacks in bantustan recruitment.

The key to efficient computerized control of all workers is their registration. The R500 imposed on employers of 'illegals' has undoubtedly curbed the practice of engaging unregistered workers. As a consequence more and more workers are being forced back to the bantustans where they have to wait to be officially recruited, attested and computerized.

This crackdown on 'illegals' and the containment of workseekers within the bantustan boundaries has, moreover, opened the way for a far more efficient system of zoning labour supply areas. Workers in the remote bantustan areas are being shored-up to be channelled into the mining and farming sectors.

A more recent and sophisticated trend in zoning labour supply areas is emerging however. This appears to be based on the strategy that ethnicity will eventually become a fundamental organising principle in the canalisation of labour. Such a trend is well illustrated in the emerging pattern of recruitment by the Drakensburg and Port Natal ABs over a three-year period.

As the table below shows, there has been a steady cutback of workers from beyond Natal.

Seen in a political context, this rezoning of labour supply areas along ethnic lines fits in well with Prof Lombard's belief, that the successful launching of a federal scheme will depend on the state's ability to regulate the demographic distribution of its workers. He argues, that

Drakensburg				Port Natal		
	1979	1980	1981	1979	1980	1981
Lebowa .....				712	766	18
Gazankulu .....				642	625	41
Qwa Qwa .....	1 168	283	503	2 518	2 904	113
Ka Ngwane .....	703	366	302	1 020	1 144	96
Kwa Zulu .....	172 154	225 372	255 120	282 220	303 297	348 285
Kwa Ndebele .....	419	114	165	68	47	16
Venda .....	34	18	79	24	20	8
Bophuthatswana .....	24	388	501	84	59	12
Ciskei .....	379	1 752	1 526	573	460	16
Transkei .....	14 310	20 026	25 807	47 980	34 358	21 731
	189 191	248 319	284 003	335 841	348 680	368 336

labour must be allocated in a way that would 'keep the descendants of the different major African chiefdoms living in and around their original areas of settlement.' (Zille, Sars, 1982)

Moreover, as the regional decentralization programme, foreshadowed in both the Carlton and Cape of Good Hope Conferences, is elaborated to coincide with the political decentralization of metropolitan areas, so the trend to channel labour within zoned AB areas could be extended further.

The zoning of labour supply areas was however first used to stabilise the labour supply in border areas. The relocation of entire urban communities to dormitory towns within bantustan borders was one of the main mechanisms used to reduce the number of people qualifying for section 10 rights. The scale of such relocation can be seen from the rapid growth of bantustan towns and the concomitant increase in the number of 'frontier commuters'. According to Smit and Booysen, there were only three towns within the bantustan borders in 1960. These had a total population of 33 468. By 1970 this number had grown to 594 420. Eight years later in 1978, the population had more than doubled reaching an estimated 1,5 million people.

Alongside the growth of these towns the number of people commuting daily to work also grew phenomenally. Mastouroudes, in his report commissioned for Unit for Futures Research, estimated that in 1981 almost 740 000 people commuted daily to work. Assuming all these commuters were in registered employment it would mean that out of a total of 1 161 494 jobs registered in 1981, less than half, viz 420 794 were for non-commuter labour. In both the Ciskei and KaNgwane there were proportionately a far higher number of commuters than migrant workers — 37 100 commuters and only 9 288 registrations for Ciskeians countrywide. In KaNgwane more than half the number of registered workers were commuters, while KwaZulu was able to boast a commuter population of 400 600 out of a total of 492 131 recruited (from an analysis of figures supplied by Sheena Duncan: HAD May 1983).

When dormitory towns were first created to serve bor-

der industrial growth points, workers relocated were guaranteed a preferential access to jobs in the towns from which they were removed. This guarantee has back-fired. Today, with the more sophisticated and systematic zoning system, these same workers are immobilized as trapped pools of labour to serve the needs of employers zoned in their area. The example of Itsoseng illustrates the fate of these workers.

Itsoseng was established as a commuter area for towns in the western Transvaal. It lies 40km west of Lichtenburg on the main Mafikeng road. Population estimates vary between 30 and 50 thousand and unemployment stands at over 50 per cent. Competition for jobs is intense, and wages, traditionally low in platteland towns, are depressed even further. As Itsoseng is zoned to supply labour to towns and farms which fall within the western Transvaal ABs area only, workseekers are tied to jobs in these towns. There is no escape as requisitions for other areas are not distributed in Itsoseng. Employers in turn stand to reap enormous benefits, to say nothing of profits, from having an inexhaustible, but stabilized reservoir of labour to draw from. The creation of these zoned pools is being duplicated throughout the country.

**To sum up then.** In the post-Riekert era, a far more complex and coercive system of allocating and reserving a supply of labour has been devised. This has ensured a steady supply of low-cost labour to different categories of employer — defined variously by sector, industry and location. In devising various strategies, the state's priority has been to incorporate all workers into a single computerized system of labour allocation and control.

What the above analysis has shown is, that, despite the declarations made by apartheid apologists that South Africa has entered into a new era of 'liberal reforms', there is little doubt that workers from the bantustans and the associated reserve army, are being far more effectively manipulated and controlled. So much so, that it can be argued instead, that South African racial capitalism can still be characterized as a forced labour system — a new 'feudalism' in the age of the computer.

*Black Sash National Conference March 1983*



*A graveside service on the second anniversary of Neil Aggett's death, Feb 5 1984. Standing round the desecrated tombstone (spray-painted with hammer-and-sickle, 'commie', and 'hanged himself') former detainees, trade unionists, Black Sash members and members of the DPSC pay silent tribute to all who died in detention.*



# NOT Crossroads — it's Greenham Common

Jill Wentzel

*Sash visits Greenham*

**H**ow is it that an organization like the Black Sash, does not bring the nuclear issue into its protests, asked a group of women huddled round a log fire on Greenham common?

I went there a week before Christmas, having telephoned the CND to find out how to get there — catch the Newbury train and the bus to Basingstoke. I didn't know where to get off, but I needn't have worried because onto the bus climbed four tough young women in anoraks and heavy boots who quarrelled with the driver and raucously let the whole bus know what they thought of the police, and all about their court appearance that day (they had been charged arising out of the pulling down of the Greenham security fence). I timidly asked them to tell me when to get off. They were then very nice to me but I got dirty looks from the rest of the passengers.

Arriving at the camp at the main gate I was amazed to see a replica of Crossroads — exactly the same mounds of plastic criss-crossed with ropes. Two barbed wire fences surrounded the missile base, and policemen with dogs patrolled inside the area, greeting me in polite British fashion as I walked a short distance around the perimeter. Within a couple of hundred metres of the base, along the edge of the common, there are gracious homesteads and people on horseback, who may or may not find both missile station and women's camp an eyesore — one wouldn't know, as riders seem to learn disdain together with keeping their heels down and elbows in.

I wandered awkwardly around the camp, feeling very silly in my ordinary tourist clothes, among those hardy women in their camping outfits. I shouldn't have, for I was warmly received when I asked if I might listen in on a meeting that was in progress around a small and thoroughly inadequate fire — and everyone knew about the Black Sash.

It was a few days after the fence-breaking episode and the women were discussing its effects on their image in the minds of the general public. One woman, a doctor who seemed vaguely in control of the meeting, regretted having been impatient with women who had been critical of this violent episode. She said, 'I should have understood that they were where I was at, four months ago, and I should have taken the trouble to explain how we progressed to this point.' (Was she suggesting, I thought, that those who now opted for violence were somehow in advance of those who didn't? I was certainly too shy to ask.) Another warned against seeking martyrdom, having caught herself rather liking the idea of being the first women shot while storming the fence, which she realised was altogether irresponsible.

I felt quite at home when one woman spoke at length about her experiences in a peace camp in America, which didn't seem relevant to anything in particular. A few people had plenty to say about the British police, not that I could begin to comprehend what on earth they were complaining about. There were some wayout ideas for future demonstrations, and amid all the irrelevancies, as at any Sash meeting, the women were trying to think what sensible strategies they could adopt to reach out to ordinary women all over England: but it was getting very cold and they decided to adjourn to a meeting two days hence in a Newbury hall. I had no doubt that they, like us over all the years, would work out sensible ways of keeping their movement viable.

After the meeting I spoke to the half dozen women who remained by the fire. It was they who wanted to know about South African women and their attitude to the nuclear threat. I explained that the Black Sash were certainly concerned and that a paper on Koeberg had been presented to our last conference, together with a long dissertation from a member of the German peace move-



ment, but that the pass laws, relocation and detention engaged all our time and energy. This they readily understood. Didn't I think, though, that we might consider establishing some sort of contact with them and with the CND? I promised to suggest this when I got home.

I was amazed all six of them supported the ANC's military programme and they were equally amazed that I didn't. They didn't see how else apartheid could be got rid of. I said I didn't see how we could avoid the atom bomb if we didn't stop thinking in terms of violent solutions to problems. They said, yes, that may also be true.

I asked if the Greenham women, or CND, had contact with similar women in Russia. They said they had support from the official Russian peace movement but said 'the real peace workers' were savagely treated there and it was these people they tried to reach. One woman took out a Christmas card for a Turkish peace campaigner who was in prison, and we all signed it.

Even these few women represented a wide cross section. There was one ordinary housewife (so she described herself), dressed in red ski clothes, who had left her husband to look after the children while she spent a week at the camp. She said many women did this, some time or other during the year. Another young woman, wearing an awful black doek right down over her eyebrows, seemed to live permanently in peace camps all over Europe. There were a few students together with women in full-time jobs who came intermittently to the camp for a couple of days at a time.

What fascinated me was that they said the movement was largely unstructured. There are no committees or chairmen or leaders or spokesmen, and for two years the camp has kept going in this loose and ad hoc way. As they have a telephoning network, I assume there must be a consistent hard core of organizers somewhere along the line but there are certainly no structures at the camps. I saw a tent stocked with tinned foods and utensils and asked who organized that. Nobody, apparently. A group of people arrived one day, erected the tent as a donation and went away. This sort of thing happens all the time, they said. Donations of food pour into the camp, much more than the people there can consume, and they give away large quantities to welfare agencies. There are no shifts or duties. The women tidy the camp and wash up as the need arises or whenever they feel like it. There's not much else to do, they explained, apart from attending meetings. There is a tap at the main gate, but the women I spoke to said they thought the other camps had to transport their water, relying on ad hoc help with combis, cars or trucks. There are no lavatories, only spades for digging holes in the ground. It hadn't rained for some time but there was mud everywhere.

I imagine the numbers of women at Greenham were at their lowest during the Christmas period. Nevertheless there were 30 women at the main gate camp and I presumed a similar number at the five or six camps around the fence. The missile base is enormous and the camps are miles apart.

I nearly died of cold although the weather was 'mild', and was exceedingly sorry for myself during an hour-long wait for the Basingstoke bus back to Newbury. I should have hated to spend even one night there.

The next day I read the following in the Diary section of *The Times*, or *The Guardian*, I forget which:

*"Those of you in the habit of shopping in Tesco's just make sure you scrub behind the ears tonight and put on a fresh pair of knickers in the morning. The store management is getting a little choosy about its customers.*

*This is especially true of the Newbury Branch of Tesco's, which has decided it will not serve anyone who looks as though they might have emanated from the Greenham Common Womens' Camp. Unofficially, this is because Tesco's perceives them to be smelly. Officially, it is out of consideration for the sensibilities of the good folk of Berkshire.*

*'It's due to the customers' reactions to the women being in the store, I'm afraid' said a Tesco spokesperson."*

On the tube that same day I sat opposite two Sloane Rangers who told the whole carriage about their afternoon's shopping and that they were on their way to the ballet and that they might arrive at Covent Garden in time to get something to eat first. Their conversation was louder but considerably less interesting than that of the Greenham women on the Basingstoke bus. I was reminded of my favourite Orwell paragraph, written in his diary just before he died:

*'Curious effect, here in the sanatorium, on Easter Sunday, when the people in this (the most expensive) block of "chalets" mostly, have visitors, of hearing large numbers of upper-class English voices. I have been almost out of the sound of them for two years, hearing them at most one or two at a time, my ears growing more and more used to working-class or lower-middle-class Scottish voices. In the hospital at Hairmyres, for instance, I literally never heard a "cultivated" accent except when I had a visitor. It is as though I were hearing these voices for the first time. And what voices! A sort of over-fedness, a fatuous self-confidence, a constant bah-bahing of laughter about nothing, above all a sort of heaviness and richness combined with a fundamental ill-will — people who, one instinctively feels, without even being able to see them, are the enemies of anything intelligent or sensitive or beautiful. No wonder everyone hates us so.'*

Certainly I preferred the Greenham women. They may or may not smell, some of them; and others may be aggressive, but as far as showing off is concerned, the Sloane Rangers have them beat. Never mind their lunatic fringe, the Greenham women are mostly lively and friendly and have made a vital contribution to all our lives by compelling attention to the nuclear nightmare.

Like the Black Sash and the United Democratic Front, the peace movement has to hold together vastly disparate people. Among Christian pacifists there are those who are anti-West and those who are pro-West, some who 'would rather be red than dead,' and some who would 'rather be red than kill;' others who believe in Europe building up its defences but not with nuclear weapons, and some, among the uni-lateralists, who are multi-lateralist but believe there has been so much overkill in the West that we could easily make a gesture towards peace and disarmament without weakening ourselves.

A recent article in *Newsweek* (Peaceniks in Disarray, January 1984) pointed out, 'the broad base that was once a major strength is now a disabling liability.' This is a challenge we better succeed in meeting, all of us.

# Grasmere — an updated report

**People here are raided continuously even though they have agreed to move and are waiting to be transferred to Sebokeng, says Sue Sher. She, Merle Beetge and Josie Orkin are 'on call' to record facts and alert the ad hoc support committee when raids occur.**

**I**n mid-January this year some 200 people (mostly men) were arrested in Grasmere during an early Saturday morning raid. They were taken to a specially convened court that day. Most were sentenced to 100 days or fined R100 for squatting illegally in the area; this despite the fact that many of these people are awaiting housing allocated to them in Sebokeng. And that documentation is in their reference books.

About 600 black people 'squat' illegally in camps in the Grasmere region. (An area of plots and smallholdings about 20 kms to the south of Johannesburg, in close proximity to the 'coloured' area of Ennerdale.) Many of the squatters are legally in the area having been recruited as farm labourers. The squatters live in farm out-buildings and corrugated iron shacks, paying rent of R20-R100 a month to their landlords.

For many years it had been the practice for farmers from Grasmere to go out to the country areas to recruit workers who then lived and worked on the farms and whose children were born there. In 1974 the Department of Community Development expropriated the farms and within a couple of months the white farmers moved out, leaving their black labourers on the deserted farms.

Since 1977, with the development of Ennerdale and the expropriation of farmland by the Department of Community Development, the squatters have been subjected to increasingly frequent harassment by officials of the Oranje-Vaal Administration Board. On August 5, 1983 a deadline to leave the area was delivered to the squatters by officials of this Board. When this deadline was not met, Administration Board raids took place on an almost daily basis.

Then in October, 1983, Mr Ganz, of the Oranje-Vaal Board stated in the Press and later confirmed with the Black Sash at a meeting, that the squatter families would be housed in Sebokeng 'whether they qualify to be in the area or not'.

But during October officials from the Board updated the records of the squatters. Those who qualified to live in the area would be given houses in Sebokeng, those who were legally entitled to work in the area would be given hostel accommodation and the others must return to their 'homeland' areas. Two weeks notice was given to the latter group. The former two groups were told that they would be moved after the schools closed in December. (The children were writing exams at schools in Soweto.)

In mid-December an abortive move was made to Sebokeng from one of the Grasmere camps. Shacks were demolished and goods taken to Sebokeng. Three

young boys aged 13, 12 and 3 were sent along to guard the belongings. The trucks were supposed to return to collect the families concerned to transport them to their new homes. Three days later however nothing had happened and the people were then forced to hire a truck in order to retrieve the children and their belongings. They have again erected their shacks in Grasmere.

The most recent date for the removal to Sebokeng was given as early in January. But the squatters are still waiting. Meanwhile the children have lost their places at their Soweto schools and it is too far for them to commute to schools in Sebokeng.

All the while raids have continued on the squatter groups. And recently squatters who spoke to Black Sash and PFP members have been subjected to police enquiry..

There have been many alleged incidents of assault, arson, and intimidation by groups of 'unknown' men on the squatter community. The police say they are investigating these incidents. The people of Grasmere accept that they have to leave the area. But, despite official assurances, they are still waiting to be moved. And the raids continue.



*Sue Sher interviews worried squatters who qualify for housing in Soweto but are hopelessly far down on the waiting list — and have been warned to leave Grasmere within 14 days.*

By means of pickets and one-at-a-time stands the Black Sash has survived seven years of the Riotous Assemblies Act. CORNELIA BULLEN-SMITH devised a new method of reaching the public. Despite having their permit with them, she and Di Andrews were, of course, harassed by the police — which members are used to by now.

## About standing with a poster showing photographs of Crossroads

With Di Andrews to back me up, I stood at the entrance of the Grand Bazaars in Claremont.

Lots of people stopped and looked at the photographs, taken by Margaret Nash. Passersby were mainly blacks and coloureds. Most of them examined the photos very closely and the word 'Crossroads' filled the air around us. If white people did stop, it was only briefly and as soon as they recognized the theme of the pictures one could see their expressions change completely and they hurried on. After about half an hour a policeman came by, asked me which organization I belonged to and seemed satisfied with the answer, but later, returning to the Grant Bazaars after a brief stand in Rondebosch I was suddenly surrounded by six policemen who demanded to see my permit, asked me to move on, told me I couldn't stand there, said I was obstructing traffic, poked at the photos and said they were illegal.

I asked them to show me where to stand if I couldn't stand at the entrance and they moved me to the left of the main entrance onto the corner. Naturally this whole police action had attracted more attention than the poster itself and people were just crowding around me. While Di Andrews told people to have a quick look at the photos and then move on so as not to obstruct traffic, I tried to keep my hands from shaking too much. There were still all these policemen crowding around demanding 'What do you want to prove?' One said, 'Agh, she



just wants to show that we are Nazis. This is illegal'. The policeman who asked me my name, address and telephone number was so angry, so upset that he couldn't write.

Another policeman arrived with a walkie talkie and told his colleagues: 'She has a permit. As long as she is not obstructing the traffic, she can stay.' Everything seemed to calm down a bit, when a plain-clothes detective appeared and asked Di and me to follow him into the shop Crowns as he was not prepared to talk in front of the crowd. As we walked into this furniture store, the shopkeeper spat the words, 'a disgrace, a white person', at us. Detective Spanner took the poster and the permit and asked us, 'What do you want to prove? What do you want to show?' Di Andrews said: 'Don't you think these photographs speak for themselves?'

Mr Spanner didn't answer. He just asked us to come with him to the police station. We did that, had to wait there for about half an hour (watched by a still very furious policeman), finally got the poster and the permit back with Colonel Visser saying that he thought it was all right but that we were not to obstruct the traffic. We stood for another half hour in Claremont and then left.

Since then I have stood with the same poster in Claremont Link, Rondebosch Pick-n-Pay, Thibault Square without being harassed by the police. The reaction of the public has been very encouraging. The photos do have impact.

*Cornelia Bullen-Smith*



# Avoiding intellectual fascism — the dream of Orwell and his contemporaries

Jill Wentzel



Paul Alberts

As we prepare for our 1984 National Conference in Johannesburg on March 15 facing the same issues which worried George Orwell and his contemporaries, we might in many ways be guided by them. Some of us might be heartily sick of *Animal Farm* and 1984, for allegory can be tedious, once it has made its point. We should now look at the rest of Orwell's most delightful writing, and the works of men like Kafka, Thomas Mann, Huxley, Malraux, Koestler, Camus.

Their warnings, their misery and their tentative hope for humanity were spawned by circumstances similar to ours and we as a human rights organization can learn perhaps some wisdom from this intensely humanist generation of authors. Writing in the aftermath of the Russian revolution they saw human freedom diminished and threatened on two fronts: by the post revolutionary terror in Russia and by the menace of fascism in Spain, Italy and Germany. Similarly, while living with the Orwellian controls of the Nationalist Government, particularly in relation to labour manipulation (see Marian Lacey's article on page 7) we are already, on the other hand, bombarded by the liberatory language of *Animal Farm*.

Especially relevant to us, now, as we find ourselves in the midst of the capitalist/socialist debate in all its permutations, and as we face the problem of having to define our relationship with the United Democratic Front and the rest of the liberatory movement, is Camus' *The Rebel* and Koestler's essay, *The Right to say No*.

Camus in *The Rebel* expounds the contradiction at the core of our work, the point at which we feel restless about simple protest, somehow static and isolated and incomplete unless we move towards a closer association with the liberatory movement.

Camus explains that within our NO to injustice is a YES to a better order of things. The authoritarian danger lurks in the YES. Within the highly individualistic act of rebellion against an unjust order is contained a conforming affirmation of an alternative and perfect scheme of things, carrying with it the desire to subject, and compel others to subject, all individuality to the needs of the new order.\*

We cannot avoid this dilemma, for it is a schizophrenic contradiction at the core of our work and our thinking, but by recognizing it we can with rationality control the excesses to which it might otherwise lead us. The solu-

tion, Camus believes, is consciously to chose *rebellion*, which he connects with outrage, protest and a limitation of objective in order to keep in touch with reality, moderation and ordinary life, and shun *revolution*, which he connects with romanticism, utopianism and ultimately the feeling that one is justified in killing some and forcing the rest into an ideological framework for their own future good.

Camus' injunction, his theory of limitation, is to settle for imperfection and limited objectives and not to lose touch with ordinary people. The Black Sash is well placed to do this, for our work in the advice offices and among rural communities is grounded in individual suffering and anxiety. Also, because the Black Sash, as well as the UDF, manages to accommodate people with different political ideas, it may be said that a significant number of people seek to avoid the pitfalls of blind ideology.

There is another sense in which progressive organizations in South Africa practice the discipline of limitation — and that is by means of an almost fanatical insistence on internal democracy, especially within their educational programmes. (And one might argue that Samora Machel has done the same thing by seeking some kind of accommodation with South Africa for the sake of the economic well-being of his people).

**To the totalitarian threat and its fanatical creed we oppose an absolute and unconditional No. But our Yes to the civilisation which we are defending leaves full scope for nuances, divergent opinions, social theories and experiment.**

**Koestler, *The Right to Say No*.**

The great question is, can this sober discipline survive the pressures already generated by our society? The Black Sash will be increasingly subjected to these pressures. We are used to confronting white South Africa with the effects of apartheid. Can we confront liberatory South Africa, including the much fiercer overseas liberatory movement, with the possible effects of its ideology on ordinary people? Are we prepared to examine critically the effects of sanctions and boycott in all its forms? Are those leaders who over-use 'the oppressed masses' running the risk of turning people into proles? Do ordinary people really believe their best interests are served by boycotting elections? Do they properly discuss the al-

\*The Freedom Charter represents this yearning for affirmation, and criticism of 'bourgeois individuality' the yearning for conformity.

alternatives or are they increasingly afraid to do so? Does the Freedom Charter express the will of the people or seek to entrap the will of the people (so that one day they will be told, 'this is your will, now you've got it and it must be consolidated within a one-party state, so no more of the kind of elections that will allow you to change your mind')? If we don't know the answers, or if we think we do know some of the answers, will we insist on the discipline of continuously reassessing strategies? Or will we, through romanticism on the part of some members and fear of opprobrium on the part of others, fail to do so?

***Far from being a form of romanticism, rebellion on the contrary, takes the part of true realism. If it wants a revolution, it wants it on behalf of life and not in defiance of it. That is why it relies primarily on the most concrete realities — on occupation, on the country village, where the living heart of things and of men are to be found. Politics, to satisfy the demands of rebellion, must submit to the eternal verities. Finally, when it causes history to advance and alleviates the sufferings of mankind, it does so without terror, if not without violence, and in the most dissimilar political conditions.***

*Camus, The Rebel*

Are we prepared to acknowledge the integrity of men like Alan Paton, Dennis Beckett and John Kane-Berman together with many of our leader-writers and journalists who, like the Orwellian writers, are prepared to face the opprobrium of orthodox leftist opinion by acknowledging limitation and reality, and who are not afraid to explore the unspectacular, imperfect yet possibly significant advantages of piecemeal reform? Or would we prefer to keep such people at arms length?

Camus wrote, 'The logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the

***If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything; if every thought, every action which goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is in effect a measure by which to judge events and men.***

*Camus, The Rebel*

human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness.' Are we in the Black Sash, sitting on platforms at mass meetings, going to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood?

The Black Sash cannot ignore the economic debate in all its forms, from capitalist/socialist through to socialist/marxist. It might be, as Koestler claimed, anachronistic, but it is nevertheless still alive in the conflict between west and east and the third world, and within the western world of Thatcher, Reagan and Tony Benn. The significant point of stress seems to be between social democrat and neo-marxist, which is most vividly played out in the British labour party and which debilitates political parties, civil rights and protest organizations all over the

world. Within the Black Sash we might guard against getting bogged down by it, remembering Koestler's theory of the withering away of the dilemma:

*'It is a further fact that some of these great ideological conflicts are never decided; they end in a stalemate. In successive centuries it looked as if the whole world would either become Islamic or Christian, either Catholic or Protestant, either republican or monarchist, either capitalist or socialist. But instead of a decision there came a deadlock and a process which one might call the withering away of the dilemma. The withering or draining of meaning always seems to be the result of some mutation in human consciousness accompanied by a shift of emphasis to an entirely different set of values — from religious consciousness to national consciousness to economic consciousness and so on.'*

In the meantime, the great question is, can both sides reacting on each other mutate creatively? That this is possible, and that the results will be vastly important for mankind, was the great prophetic hope of the Orwellian writers. This is what Koestler was talking about when he wrote:

*'The real content of this conflict can be summed up in one phrase: total tyranny against relative freedom. Sometimes I have a feeling in my bones that the terrible pressure which this conflict exerts on all humanity might perhaps represent a challenge, a biological stimulus as it were, which will release the new mutation of human consciousness; and that its content might be a new spiritual awareness, born of anguish and suffering. If that is the case, then we are indeed living in an interesting time.'*

And Camus had the same dream:

*'Then, when revolution in the name of power and of history becomes that immoderate and mechanical murderer, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name of moderation and of life. We are at the extremity now. However, at the end of this tunnel of darkness, there is inevitably a light, which we already divine and for which we only have to fight to ensure its coming. All of us, among the ruins, are preparing a renaissance beyond the limits of nihilism. But few of us know it.'*

If the Black Sash can hold on to its consensus during the coming conference and the challenges of the next few years we might find by muddling through somehow we might have made some contribution, and maybe even a unique one, to that light at the end of the tunnel.

***Authentic acts of rebellion will only consent to take up arms for institutions which limit violence, not for those which codify it. A revolution is not worth dying for unless it assures the immediate suppression of the death penalty...***

*Camus, The Rebel*

● **This is an individual article. It does not represent Black Sash thinking.**

# 56th detainee to die

## SAMUEL TSHIKUDO

Preacher who died behind bars lived in the back of beyond

A small cluster of clay huts nestles on a lush mountainside 10km from the nearest tarred road, hidden by a thick cloud of mist and almost entirely cut off from "civilisation"...

That's where the Mail found the family of Samuel Tshikhudo, the Venda farmer and, according to his wife, lay preacher who became the second victim of the "homeland's" security laws when he died in detention two weeks ago.

Without the help of two eager guides, it would have been impossible to find the settlement.

The guides also acted as interpreters as Mr Tshikhudo's family speaks little English.

Through them, it was established that the dead man, aged 52, had three wives, one of whom — Sophia — deserted him a few years ago, and 11 children, seven with one wife and four with another.

He farmed vegetables for a living, earning about R200 a month, and was a preacher with the Zion Revelation Church of Southern Africa.

Mr Tshikhudo was a well-known and respected figure in the area. The locals came to him with all sorts of problems, often asking his assistance with farming and other matters.

---

**The head of Venda's security branch, Brigadier N T Ramabulana, said Mr Tshikhudo had been arrested under the Terrorism Act. The brigadier would not say what crime he was suspected of, adding that this would be "decided by the court".**

---

His first wife, Mrs Gladice Tshikhudo 44, wearing an old short-sleeved dress and a blanket wrapped around her waist, spoke of the day "they came to fetch my husband", and how she came to hear of the news of his death in a police cell two days later.

For Mrs Tshikhudo the news came as a terrible shock. She is a simple, rural woman who, until her husband's



*Samuel Tshikhudo, family man*

detention, had not even met a policeman. Not only has his death left her heartbroken — it has also left her confused.

She said six policemen came to her home to arrest Mr Tshikhudo. They returned the next day for her and his second wife, Gogogo, who lives about 12km away.

Mrs Tshikhudo said she was taken to the police station at Sibasa, where she was put in a cell and questioned about her husband.

She last saw him two weeks ago when the police brought him home to conduct a search. All Mr Tshikhudo said to his wife at their final meeting was to tell her how much money he owed at a store nearby.

A Captain Makwarela informed Mrs Tshikhudo of her husband's death. "He came here and wanted to know if I had any disease, like typhoid," Mrs Tshikhudo said.

The police did not tell her how her husband died, although they told the family's lawyers that the cause was typhoid and/or diabetes — a statement they later retracted.

The dead man had lived in Venda all his life.

He was very keen that all his children should receive a good education and went to great trouble to send them to schools in the area.

His name is known throughout the area where he lived. All the locals questioned said they knew him and were eager to show the way to his home, despite the terrible weather.

They spoke of him as a kind, simple man, devoted to his family.

He is buried in a cemetery in the Sibasa district — another victim of security legislation which affords no right of reply, and which dealt a simple family a tragic and confusing blow.

*From an article in the Rand Daily Mail, printed with permission*



*Dr Allan Boesak at UDF launching, Cape Town, August 1983*

# UDF — affiliate or cooperate?



*Helen Zille*

**S**hould the Black Sash affiliate to the UDF? This is one of the 'cutting-edge' issues in the Sash at present — and has been for the best part of eight months.

This is not particularly remarkable. Much the same debate has taken place within several other organisations opposed to the government's attempted restructuring of apartheid through the new constitution and 'Koornhof Bills'.

And they have reached widely divergent conclusions. Some believe it is time to pool their strength and resources with other groups under the umbrella of the broadest anti-apartheid front since the nationalists came to power. Others believe their effectiveness lies in their independence, without which they cannot fulfill their organisational objectives.

Within the Sash, the 'UDF debate' has been particularly long and intense. It has sparked off deep feeling on both sides in what has become one of the most contro-

versial issues in the Sash's history.

This article is an attempt to draw out the arguments on both sides, to air and circulate the issues before the national conference in March when a decision is likely to be made. (According to the Sash constitution a two-thirds majority is needed for the Sash to affiliate to the UDF.)

No doubt by that time fresh arguments and considerations will have arisen and new compromises forged. Indeed, it is the purpose of this article to stimulate further debate, as the lengthy, healthy and sometimes painful process of internal democracy runs its course.

## Arguments for affiliation

Many Sash members are strong proponents of affiliation. The Natal Coastal region has already made the move — with the majority support of its regional members.

Many supporters of affiliation make the following

points:

South Africa has reached a political watershed. Over the past decade, the National Party, sensing an impending political crisis on all fronts, devised a sophisticated plan to restructure apartheid, drawing in coloureds and Indians as its junior partners while entrenching the political exclusion of Africans.

At the same time, through the three Koornhof Bills, it is attempting to divide a relatively privileged group of African urban 'insiders' from the majority in the homelands who will face tightened influx control and increasing unemployment.

This political strategy demands an effective and organised counter strategy. Indeed, it has made such an organisation a pressing necessity — now, while the government is still trying to win legitimacy for its plans and implement them bit by bit. Individuals are isolated, vulnerable and incapable of effective opposition on their own, and so are organisations. Unless a unified front can mobilise its forces and pool its resources to oppose the implementation of restructured apartheid, the government will have a clear run, assisted by isolated and divided opposition groupings each doing its own thing.

The Sash has a unique opportunity to become part of a non-racial opposition movement that could influence the government's attempts at restructuring apartheid, simultaneously symbolising the alternative to apartheid: a process of non-racial, democratic co-operation and decision-making.

Indeed, this would be a logical step for the Sash to take, having played a pivotal role in analysing the shift from traditional to neo-apartheid, exposing the myths of reform, teasing out the real intentions of constitutional change and the Koornhof Bills.

Nor need the Sash sacrifice its autonomy and internal democracy. It is part of the very nature of the Front that affiliated organisations retain their own identity, policy and objectives — while co-operating on a limited number of issues of mutual concern. If this were not the case, the Front would collapse within a very short time because many organisations besides Sash would not tolerate interference in their internal affairs.

Mindful of the dynamics within its affiliate organisations, the UDF attempts to take decisions by consensus — and if consensus cannot be reached the issue is referred again to the individual organisations for discussion. This is what happened at the recent National General Council where the UDF failed to reach consensus on whether to participate in a possible referendum to test 'coloured' and 'Indian' opinion of the new constitution.

Of course, absolute unanimity may be unattainable, and there are times when decisions must be taken on common objectives. It is also conceivable that the Sash may not concur with the position adopted. But the very nature of democracy means abiding by a majority decision.

Nor is it valid to argue that the UDF has no specific constitutional and economic policy. As a Front, it shouldn't have. It consists in a number of different organisations with a range of policies, supporting a shared set of principles embodied in the UDF declaration. Yet it is inevitable that economic and constitutional issues will be discussed by the UDF in pursuing common objectives. If the Sash wishes to make an input into the development and growth of the non-racial opposition

movement, it can best do so from within. Moreover, affiliation would bring to a wider circle of Sash members a heightened awareness of (and participation in) the ongoing debate on economic and constitutional issues beyond the confined circle of white, middle-class women. This is an essential complement to the Sash's service role — particularly as the initiative of political opposition is increasingly centred in the organisations of the oppressed.

Finally, at a time when many young people have left the country, seeing armed struggle as the only remaining option for change in South Africa, it is remarkable that so broad an organisation could be launched committed to peaceful, non-racial methods of working for political transformation. As the Sash's primary objective is the non-violent struggle against apartheid, its logical place is in the UDF.

## Arguments against affiliation

Many Sash members have indicated their opposition to affiliation — for a wide variety of reasons. They do not all necessarily subscribe to every reason listed below. But they all believe that the disadvantages of affiliation will outweigh the advantages.

The arguments run as follows:

The Black Sash's effectiveness is rooted in its independence. It has jealously guarded this independence since its inception, refusing to become tied to any political organisation or movement. This has given the Sash the freedom to co-operate with any political grouping on specific projects; to criticise their decisions and actions when necessary; and to serve as an independent catalyst for people of differing political views. Most significantly it has given Sash a high level of credibility in performing its essential service functions through its advice offices and its analysis of legislation and political trends.

During the past years this independence has become all the more important due to the deepening differences between Black opposition movements. The Sash would jeopardise its role and its credibility if it sided with one of them — particularly as some (such as Inkatha) are excluded from affiliation even though they also oppose the constitution and Koornhof Bills. Such exclusivism prevents the UDF from being a genuine Front of organisations with differing policies and strategies. It indicates that the UDF is not primarily concerned with promoting unity around common principles, but of laying down the line on the goals and tactics of different organisations.

Nor has it been necessary to affiliate to the UDF to support particular campaigns and objectives. During the referendum the Sash played a leading role in the 'No' vote campaign — as did Nusas, a prominent affiliate of the UDF, to the mutual benefit of both organisations. However, had the UDF advocated abstention (as initially seemed likely) the Sash, following its own internal democratic decision, would have found itself advocating a different strategy. Had it been a UDF affiliate, severe problems would have arisen.

It is entirely probable that similar situations could arise in the future. The UDF has its own internal structures and office bearers through which decisions are taken, implemented and announced via the Press. This process may well take place democratically — but this cannot prevent a contradiction arising between the internal democracy of Sash and that of the UDF. If Sash were to affiliate, it could easily find itself unable to iden-



tify with a UDF decision or statement. This would give rise to an untenable position: either Sash would have to publicly dissociate itself, to the severe detriment of both organisations, or remain silent, risking the loss of a substantial number of members. While Sash, as a small organisation, could not hope to influence the decision-making process in the UDF it would run the risk of impairing its own internal democracy.

Another problem concerning the UDF is its lack of a clearly defined constitutional and economic policy (beyond its widely worded declaration.) Inevitably in the course of time, UDF congresses will adopt more detailed resolutions on these issues. As a UDF affiliate, the Sash would automatically be associated with these decisions and statements, whether or not it supported them or had any part in their formulation. To rush into a political organisation without a clearly defined constitutional and economic policy would be as naive as signing a contract without reading it.

It is no secret that many of the UDF's leading affiliates subscribe to the Freedom Charter, giving the organisation strong Charterist leanings. This has unavoidably resulted in symbolic associations with the African National Congress. It also gives the movement a socialist flavour, as the Charter advocates the nationalisation of certain industries and banks as well as the transfer of agricultural land to public ownership. This identification by association could cause internal problems for Sash — particularly amongst its liberal members who would resist such implications.

In short, by affiliating to the UDF, Sash would run the severe risk of undermining its own membership base, independence and credibility. As a crippled organisation, it could add little to the strength of the UDF.

## The compromise position

A compromise position is rapidly developing on both sides of the debate. There are proponents of affiliation who baulk at the possibility of splitting Sash or evoking mass resignations. They are working for a compromise that would involve endorsing the UDF's declaration of principles, and pledging co-operation in fighting the constitution and Koornhof Bills — but stopping short of affiliation.


On the other side there are opponents of affiliation who don't want to place themselves in opposition to the UDF. They believe a straight YES/NO answer on affiliation would have the same implications as the 'Do-you-still-beat-your-wife' question. They also favour a compromise that would involve endorsing the UDF declaration and pledging co-operation, while maintaining Sash's independence.

Then there are those who don't fall into either camp. They are genuinely convinced by certain arguments on both sides and believe that only time can provide the right answer. This group also favours a compromise for the present.

Sure, it's an attempt at having your cake and eating it. But then, as someone put it: 'Who would want to have a cake and not eat it?'

## What is the United Democratic Front?

It is a Front of some 400 widely divergent organisations (ranging from trade unions and community organisations to sports clubs) that have come together in a common commitment to resist the implementation of the new constitution and the 'Koornhof Bills.'



The most notorious of these Bills is the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Person's Bill, currently undergoing revision, that seeks to intensify influx control.

According to Mr Popo Molefe, national secretary of the UDF, there are two conditions for an organisation to affiliate to the Front.

It must:

- \* Support the UDF declaration
- \* Work outside government created structures

### **The UDF declaration:**

This is a widely-worded document consisting primarily of a rejection of apartheid in its traditional and restructured forms. It commits the UDF to work towards unity in opposing restructured apartheid, particularly as it is manifest in the constitution and Koornhof Bills. The declaration sets as its goal a 'united, democratic South Africa based on the will of the people' and an end to 'economic and other forms of exploitation.'

The UDF has not formulated a detailed constitutional and economic policy.

### **Working outside government-created structures:**

The phrase 'Government-created structures' refers to homeland governments, community councils, Parliament etc. UDF officials have described this condition as 'flexible.' It is not a hard and fast rule that would be used to exclude, for example, community leaders in rural areas who had traditionally used official structures, such as village councils, to resist forced removals.

'Our criteria are that an organisation must not, in its use of platforms and structures, become part of the oppressive system,' said Mr Molefe. Each case, he said, would have to be evaluated on its merits.

However it seems clear that the UDF will not accept participation in homeland governments or in central government structures created under the new constitution.

### **The structure of the UDF**

The UDF has a decentralised federal structure with five established Regions: Transvaal, Natal, Border, Western and Eastern Cape. Plans are also afoot to establish regional structures in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State.

Affiliation to the UDF is open to organisations only. Individuals who wish to join can only do so by becoming involved in 'area committees,' which, together with organisations, are represented on a Regional General Council.

All regions are linked by a National General Council consisting of representatives from different regional organisations. Area Committees are not represented on the NGC, giving organisations a significantly stronger role in the highest decision-making structures.

It is also the stated intention of the UDF to give greater weight to larger affiliated organisations, known as 'main-line' organisations. However a formula to give effect to this decision is still to be finalised.

A national conference will be held every two years at which executive members will be elected. The first national conference co-incided with the official launching of the UDF on August 20, 1983.

### **Would the Black Sash be welcome in the UDF?**


There has been some debate within the UDF, particularly in the Western Cape, over whether the Sash, 'a middle-class organisation of white women' should be accepted as an affiliate. However it appears likely that a majority of regions would support Sash's affiliation.

Said Mr Molefe: The history of the Black Sash shows that it is an organisation that has played a significant role in the struggle against injustice in South Africa. It has been shown to have a very profound insight into legislation affecting black people, and has demonstrated a strong commitment in defending the victims of these laws. The Black Sash has also played a significant role in squatter and relocation issues. We regard the Black Sash as one of the most informed organisations and it has won itself a place in the hearts and minds of the majority of South Africans opposed to injustice.'

Mr Molefe was well aware of the present debate within Sash on affiliation to the UDF.

He said the UDF had been formed as a wide Front to oppose the constitution and Koornhof Bills as effectively as possible. 'Of course we would like organisations to affiliate to strengthen this objective. But we understand that different organisations have different internal dynamics and that for this reason they may not see their way clear to affiliating at this stage.'

Affiliation, he said, was not a pre-requisite for participation in UDF campaigns. 'While affiliation would be an advantage, the UDF does not regard it as a priority. Our major priority is co-operation with various organisations in our campaigns.'



*Forward to a People's Government*

# Black local government in SA

*The burden of votelessness — blacks pay the same taxes as whites — but end up paying more for inferior services*

---

This article was written as a service to communities all over the country who speak a variety of languages. It has therefore been written in simple English.

---

Paul Alberts



Sheena Duncan

**T**he Black Local Authorities Act sets up a new local government structure to replace the Community Councils in black townships in the so-called 'white' areas - the area outside the homelands.

In most ways the Act is very like the laws which control white Municipalities. In South Africa much power has been removed from Municipal Councils and Municipalities and they are under the close control of the Provincial Councils. Government departments such as the Departments of Community Development and of Co-operation and Development can also prevent Municipalities from doing things they might want to do.

For example, if the City Council of Johannesburg wanted to say that any one at all of any race could live in the suburb of Mayfair they would not be allowed to do it. The Department of Community Development enforces the Group Areas Act and says that coloured and Indian people must live in coloured and Indian townships. Co-operation and Development, through the Administration Boards, raids properties in municipal areas regularly and arrests black people living there. The only black people allowed to live in white suburbs are registered domestic workers.

So no local authorities in South Africa have much power. It is not like the United States of America where town and city councils control many different things such as the local police force and education.

This is what DECENTRALISATION means when we talk about government. When city and town Councils have power the system is more democratic because the people have a chance to elect people they know to the Council and they can watch what the Councillors are doing and make sure that the Councillors do what the people want.

In South Africa local government is not like that for anybody.

**BUT** in black townships local government has even less power because of **LACK OF MONEY**.

When Soweto was part of the municipal area of Johannesburg, and other townships were part of the municipal areas of the white towns, black people had no representation on the Municipal Councils **but** money collected in rates on buildings and land in the white area as well as rents from the black townships all went to the Municipality and money from the Municipality was used for all the people, black and white.

Because black people had no representation on the Municipal Councils much more money was spent in the white townships than in the black townships but the situation was better than it is now.

In a city like Johannesburg the Municipality gets a lot of money from the rates (ie local taxes) paid by the wealthy shops and businesses and property owners in the centre of town and in the white suburbs. Some of this money used to be used to build houses in Soweto and to lay roads and provide water and sewage and so on.

**BUT** in 1971 the Government passed the law which set up the Administration

Boards. All black townships were taken away from the Municipalities and put under the control of the Administration Boards.

The Boards get no money from Municipalities at all.

The only money which the Board collects from white people is the registration fees and levies which employers pay to the Boards for their black workers.

**ALL** the rest of the money has to come from black people themselves. There are very few wealthy businesses in black townships because for many years black people were not allowed to establish and expand businesses in black townships so most of the money comes from **rents** and **site rents** and the sale of houses, liquor, beer etc.

### **It is Government policy that black people must pay for their own services**

That is the reason why site rents, lodger's permit fees, service charges go up and up all the time.

When the Community Councils were established some of the responsibilities of the Administration Boards such as allocation of houses and collection of rents were given to the Councils **BUT THERE WAS NO NEW SOURCE OF MONEY.**

So all the service charges, site rents etc, went on going up and up but now the increased charges are made in the name of the Community Councils instead of the Administration Boards.

On October 1, 1983 the Soweto Council increased the fees for a Lodger's Permit from R1 a month to R10 a month. This is only one example.

When electricity was put into Soweto the Community Council raised R186 million in loans to pay for the electrification.

**Every penny of that money** has to be paid back by the people of Soweto. That is why a levy was introduced by the Community Council in 1983. This levy was first R20 which had to be paid every month by **every** household — even the households which had no electricity. People complained so the levy was reduced to R12 a month but the Council said it would have to go up soon and might be R30 per month in 1984.

This is not justice because the people of Soweto have to buy their electrical appliances from white businesses. The companies which make things like stoves, fridges, irons, TV, lamps, heaters and so on are white companies. So are most of the shops which sell them.

The profits from the electrification go to white Johannesburg but white Johannesburg does not pay to the Soweto Council to help to raise the money for the repayment of the loans.

This is the reason why many people are saying that they will have nothing to do with elections for new Local Authority Councils in black townships. They say that without money they will be nothing more than scapegoats to bear the blame for increasing rents. They say that the new Councils will be able to do nothing to provide all the things that people in black townships need to make their lives better such as houses, tarred roads, parks, sportsgrounds, pavements, because there is **no money** to pay for these things unless rents go up and up and up.

It is also the case that neither Community Councils nor the new Councils can buy more land to add to black townships in order to make more space for housing because the Government will not allow land to be bought for more black housing in the cities.

Government policy is that new areas for housing must be far away and, if possible, in the homelands or next to them.

Thus Soshanguve was built for the non-Tswana black people of Pretoria. It is not in the prescribed area of Pretoria so people who go to Soshanguve because they need

a house lose their Section 10 rights.

Bloemfontein people who need housing will soon have to apply at Botsabelo which is more than 50 kms from Bloemfontein and which is on Trust land next to the resettlement area of Onverwacht. It may soon become a second part of the Qwa Qwa homeland. Ekangala is a big new expensive township 20 kms outside Bronkhorstspuit. Part of it will be included in the homeland — Kwa Ndebele.

### **Black Local Authorities can do nothing to change this policy**

If there was no Apartheid, and if South Africa was a democratic country, then all town people would be represented in the Municipal Councils and the total money collected in rates from all people, including the big buildings and big shops and businesses, would be shared out between **all** the people in the Municipal area so that the poor would not have to pay more and more all the time. This is what happens in democratic countries.

Because South Africa is not a democratic country many people feel that it is no good going into the new Local Authorities because these Authorities will have power **over** the people in the townships but no power to **change** things in the way the people want them to be changed.

Another reason why some people refuse to have anything to do with the Local Authorities is that the Government means them to be **instead of** rather than **as well as** full representation in South Africa's Parliament.

The Government would like the Local Authorities to be linked to the homeland governments. In some places one finds that Community Councillors are also representatives of a homeland government.



*photo: Paul Weinberg*

## THE BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES ACT NO 102 OF 1982

This Act is one of the three 'Kooornhof Bills'. The other two are the Black Communities Development Bill and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill which are not yet law but which will be coming before Parliament in 1984.

The Black Local Authorities Act was passed by Parliament in 1983 and the first elections are to be held in November and December 1983.

The Act says that the Minister of Co-operation and Development can establish a **Town Council** or a **Village Council** for a black urban township (or one Council for several townships together, or, if the township is very big, he can divide it into more than one part and establish a Council for each part.)

The Minister must consult with the Provincial Council and the Development (Administration) Board first.

A Village Council can become a Town Council and a Town Council can become a City Council if the Minister agrees.

Community Councils will be dissolved as soon as a new Town or Village Council is established.

The new Councils will fall under a Director of Local Government who will be an official of the Department of Co-operation and Development. He will fall under the direction and control of the Director-General of Co-operation and Development. If there is no Town or Village Council in any area the Minister can establish a **local committee**. These committees will be advisory bodies only and will be the same as the Black Advisory Boards.

A local committee will be dissolved if a Village Council is established for the township concerned.

**The number of members** any Council will have will be decided by the Minister of Co-operation and Development. He must publish his decision in the Government Gazette. After a new Council has been established the Minister must consult with it before he changes the number of members.



*By courtesy of Rand Daily Mail*

**Members of a Council** will be elected by voters in the township concerned.

**If no Council members are elected** for any reason, or if some of the seats on the Council are vacant because no one was elected, **the Minister can appoint** people to fill the empty seats.

## **Who can vote in a Local Authority election?**

In order to vote a persons must be:

- 1 **Black.** (The Minister can allow certain other people to vote. This might happen, for instance, in the case of so-called 'coloured' people living in a black township).
- 2 A South African citizen or a citizen of an 'independent' homeland.
- 3 Qualified in terms of Section 10(1)(a) or (b) or (c) **and** living in the area of the local Authority concerned.

If a person is not qualified under Section 10 he can still vote if he has been **lawfully** (ie with a permit) resident in the area for a full 12 months. (The Minister can change this 12 months period if he wants to and make it longer, but not longer than 3 years.

For example he might say that people who do not have Section 10 rights can only vote if they have been lawfully in the area for 24 months or 30 months or 36 months.)

- 4 Older than 18 years.
- 5 His name must be on a list of voters.

**A person cannot vote** if he has been convicted in South Africa or Namibia or an 'independent' homeland of treason, murder or any offence connected with communism or terrorism, if he has been sentenced to prison for that offence without the choice of paying a fine instead of going to prison.

**He cannot vote** if he has been convicted of a 'corrupt or illegal practice' and has been disqualified from voting.

**He cannot vote** if he has been detained for using drugs or alcohol, or if he has been declared by a Court to be mentally disordered, or if he is detained as a mentally ill person, or if he is detained in a reform school.

## **Who can stand as a candidate in an election of Councillors?**

A person who wants to be elected as a Councillor must be over the age of 21 years. He must also be qualified to be a voter as listed above.

**The mayor of a Local Authority** must be a member of the Council. He will be elected as mayor by the members of the Council. He will be elected to serve as mayor for one year at a time but at the end of the year he can be elected again for another year. He can be re-elected as often as the Councillors want him to be mayor.

**The deputy-mayor** is elected in the same way.

**Meetings of the Council** must take place at least once a month in 11 months of the year. The Council can meet more often if it needs to.

Government or Development Board officials can attend meetings of a Council if they are invited to do so by the Council but they cannot vote at Council meetings.

Meetings of the Council must be open to the public and the press but if the Council goes 'into committee' the meetings will be closed. In practice this means the public can be excluded from hearing discussion of important matters.

A Council can decide to go into committee and have the public removed and then open the meeting again to vote on decisions without discussion.

**The minutes** of a meeting of a local authority must be available for inspection by a member of the public on payment of a fee but **not** the minutes of the Council 'in committee'. This again limits the rights of the public to know about Council discussions.

**A Town Council will be responsible** for the 'moral and social welfare' of residents, sound community development, the beautifying and neatness of the area, parks and public resorts, sport and recreational facilities, libraries, museums, botanical and zoological gardens, bursaries, building plans and demolition of abandoned or illegal buildings.

It will also be responsible for the allocation and administration of the letting of houses, other accommodation, buildings etc, **AND** the prevention of the unlawful occupation of land or buildings — **that is squatting and trespassing.**

It will control the keeping of dogs and other animals, street trading and advertising, rubbish and night soil removal, some health matters, water supply and sewerage, electricity, parking garages and parking grounds, cemeteries, distribution of poor relief and the establishment and maintenance of charitable institutions, the building of roads and streets and their maintenance, the building of houses, flats and office blocks.

- **THE COUNCIL CAN DECIDE WHAT CHARGES WILL BE LEVIED FOR ANY OF THE ABOVE SERVICES**

A Town Council will take over all these functions from the Administration Board.

**A Village Council** will only take over these functions as and when the Minister decides to give the Council the responsibility.

**Town and Village Councils** can make recommendations to the Minister of Co-operation and Development about Regulations to be applied in the townships. They can also make recommendations about education, transport and postal services.

The State President or the Minister can give Councils additional responsibilities.

Local Authorities will be able to make by-laws relating to anything for which they have responsibility. By-laws must be published in the Government Gazette.

If a Council fails to do the things the Act gives it responsibility for, the Minister can arrange for them to be done and then charge the Council for the costs of the work done.

If a Council allows its financial affairs to become unsound the Minister can either remove members of the Council or dissolve the Council. If he removes members of a Council he can appoint people to do the work of the Council.

A Council can appoint a 'police force' if the Minister approves. The Minister must first consult the Minister of Law and Order. If a Council does have its own 'police force' the South African Police continue to operate in the area as usual. The SAP cannot be excluded from the area by the Council.

A Council must submit its budget to the Minister for approval.

- **WHERE WILL THE MONEY COME FROM?**

## **THE BLACK COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT BILL**

**This Bill is not yet law.** It is expected to come before Parliament in 1984.

The Bill allows for the establishment of Development Boards which will be very like the Administration Boards.

All Administration Boards will become Development Boards and Administration areas will become Development Board Areas.



Members of the Boards will be appointed by the Minister of Co-operation and Development.

'The object of boards shall be to promote the viability, development and autonomy of black communities...'

The Development Boards will administer the 99-year leasehold system and will be able to establish towns and hostels.

The Bill allows for the setting up of a 'Revolving Fund' to provide money for development programmes in Board Areas.

A revolving fund is an amount of money which can be used to do certain things and then used again after money has been paid back to the fund.

The Development Boards will be responsible for the same things as the Administration Boards except those things which have been given over to Town and Village Councils but there will be big changes in the administration of influx control when this Bill and the **Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill** become law.

**The Orderly Movement Bill** has been 'postponed' to 1984 and the Minister has said he is going to consult with the new Local Authorities after the elections at the end of 1983. Some changes may be made to the Bill after these consultations but it is clear that the Government intends to go ahead with:

- (a) Increasing the punishments imposed on people who come to town without a permit, and on those who give them employment and accommodation;
- (b) Reducing the number of black people who have legal rights to remain in town;
- (c) Stopping the urbanisation of black people who were born in rural and homeland areas;
- (d) Making a permit to be in town dependent on having 'approved accommodation', and limiting the amount of accommodation available in the towns by providing new housing in the homelands or just outside the homeland borders.
- (e) **Increasing the costs** of living in urban black townships so much that poor people are forced to move out to the homelands.

## **MONEY**

**Control over finance is the most important way in which people can exercise real power. Financial matters in South Africa are decided by the Central Parliament not by Development Boards or Local Authorities or Homeland Governments or by the governments of 'independent' homelands.**

All of them are dependent on the amount of money which the central government allows them to have. This money is always less than their fair share so all of them have to impose enormous levies, taxes or service charges on black people who live in their areas of jurisdiction.

Until black people have a vote and are represented in central government Local Authorities and all other black governmental institutions will be the scapegoats — the ones who take the blame — for the injustices in our South African society.

Black Local Authorities and the people they represent can have no real power until the **total revenue** from all the taxes collected from **all** the people are shared out between **all** the people.

**THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN UNTIL ALL THE PEOPLE ARE REPRESENTED IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.**

## Nana Wynberg

by Fatima Meer (from the funeral oration)

**Nana Wynberg died recently aged 53. A Sash advice office worker and much admired Rand Daily Mail book reviewer, she was a psychiatric social worker by profession. Many years ago she was Solly Sachs' secretary in the Garment Workers Union and in 1958, pushing her first child in his pram, she joined the first Aldermaston peace march.**

**S**he was the best person I knew, and I know that for just about every person here, she was the best person they knew.

Intensely humble — so humble as to teeter on self-effacement, she had the gift to restore people to themselves, to live with and through their problems, to make them her own.

When our self-esteem was shaken, our image spoilt, we went to her, and returned redeemed and made whole again.

She had a surfeit of material talents and she could have chosen to revolve her life around any one of these. She chose instead to revolve her life around ours, our concerns, small things, but large in personal scale. And if I dwell a moment on one of these, personal to me, it is because it is symbolic of the wonder she wrought for so many of us here today.

The year 1948, of that fateful election which reversed the destiny of our country. Three Indian girls at Wits, in a multitude of white, so overcome by its alienative strangeness as to threaten their resolve to stay. But the 17-year-old Nana changed this when she draws us into her circle of friends, and university



*Nana Wynberg — 'defied the exhortations of our material civilisation to compete and achieve'*

becomes fun.

The silence of intervening years — marriage — family, mine, hers. I am imprisoned. We are imprisoned, and Nana is there, with every manner of comfort, material and spiritual, as she always was with those the system ravaged.

She had an innate sense of justice that I do not believe anyone taught her.

She had an understanding of suffering that came with the knowledge and contact, though not actual experience, of the suffering of the 20th century, epitomised at Belsen.

She never made great declarations. She did not have to. She lived them.

She defied the exhortations of our material civilisation to compete and achieve.

And so she reassured and worked her wonder on all those she touched.

Nana — we salute that integrity that is Nana which you bequeathed, that you have added to our heritage.

Shalom dear friend.

## 'An Historical Review of the supply of housing for Urban Africans in the Cape Peninsula 1900—1980' C M Elias of the Research Unit for Sociology, University of Stellenbosch

Mrs Elias's study describes, in approximate chronological order, the history of the various African settlements in the Cape Peninsula during this century. The emphasis of the study is on the socio-political factors which influenced the decisions, and the resultant legislation, which governed the lives of urban Africans, and which dictated the development of housing for them.

The history and development of each settlement or housing scheme is described and details given of the amount and type of housing available, and of the health and education facilities and public services.

This report makes clear:


- that during this century, black Africans came to be regarded as temporary sojourners in Cape Town (some Africans had been freehold property owners in Athlone, Rylands and Retreat) and when no longer useful, endorsed out: ie 700 unemployed were repatriated from Ndabeni in 1925, 9 100 from Widermere in 1958—1959.

## Jenny de Tolly

- that since the beginning of this century, limiting (most) blacks to living in segregated residential areas (the first black Location came into being in 1901) and being in control of their housing has been a means of controlling the number of Africans permitted to live and work in the Peninsula.

- that 'resettlement' of blacks became institutionalised in 1901 when the Colonial Secretary was empowered to remove 'all or any aboriginal natives resident within the Cape district... to any place... duly proclaimed by the Colonial Secretary to be a native location' and that blacks have continued to be relocated in townships further and further from the 'white' areas of Cape Town.

This report is extremely useful for the detailed documentation of past and existing housing and facilities for Africans, and interesting for the historical perspective that it gives. It highlights the degree to which housing is used as a tool to control.



*The school, rebuilt in a month*

*photo: Paul Weinberg*

## They found the school already built!

### • Interview with women rebuilding the roads in Mogopa

*The women are taking bricks and rubble from the demolished buildings, crushing them and filling the holes in the road with the crushed material. There is a group of about 20 women working in the extreme heat. At midday they stopped to rest under a shady tree.*

#### **What are you doing?**

We are fixing the roads, because there is nowhere we are going. We are staying here so we are fixing up our place. We want to show this is a place inhabited by human beings.

We the women decided to fix the roads, because we're the people who always walk along them. We want to prance along, not trip and stumble and when we open the new school we want the cars to roll up smoothly.

On that day we are going to have a party and we will invite all the people who slept under the tree with us the night the government was coming to move us by force. We will never forget those people and how they suffered with us.

#### **What if the government comes to smash down this**

#### *A huddle of priests at the Mogopa vigil*



#### *school?*

The government can't come back now, we have suffered enough. We watched while they smashed our old schools. We still respected them enough. But if they try to touch this one. Hey! We will fight. Suffering has made us into equal human beings with them.

★ ★ ★

The building of the new school started on January 9 1984. Today, February 9, the school is virtually complete.

It has five classrooms, all beautifully built, and a shining zinc roof. The floors are being thrown at the moment, and all that is left to do is for the window panes and doors to be fitted.

There is a daily buzz of activity at the school. The builders range from tiny boys to very old men, each with his specific task. There are six experienced builders, all local Mogopa people, supervising operations.

No-one is being paid. The community has collected money, and out of this, food is bought and given to all the workers at midday. I spoke to the two men who prepare the food every day.

**Old men:** We are rushing to finish now. We have been working very fast. The children must get into school. They are hanging around at home now and they are under our feet. Also we cannot go on working for no wages. There is no money at home now not even to buy paraffin. In fact we are fewer now than when we started. Some men have had to go and work for the farmers to earn money for food. It is harvesting time now, though the mealies are dead.

Yes, we have built this school out of suffering. It was very painful to us when our other schools were broken by the government. And now we are suffering because we do not earn money while we build.

But we are also joyful. Because we are not going anywhere, we are happy because Mogopa is our place.

We thank God that we have been able to complete the school in peace.

*February 9 1984*

**Aninka Claassens**  
*Black Sash*

## The Borders of Apartheid

Paul Alberts, The Gallery Press, Cape Town, 1983, R30

**Black Sashers, politicians, diplomats and journalists cannot afford to be without this carefully researched chronology of land dispossession.**


*Because Paul Alberts hopes his book will be useful to many people, he doesn't want it to cost too much — so it can only be obtained by writing to the Gallery Press, Box 4547, Johannesburg.*

A coffee-table book with socio-political relevance sounds like a contradiction in terms. Yet this is exactly what Paul Alberts has achieved with **The Borders of Apartheid**.

The subtlety of the title, with its echoes of the Government euphemism for Bantustans — 'border areas' — pervades the book. The subtitle explains the book's theme: 'A chronicle of alienation in South Africa with a portfolio of photographs on Bophuthatswana today'.

Why Bophuthatswana? Mr Alberts explains that he chose it because 'it is generally accepted that the Bophuthatswana administration is one of integrity'. Moreover its geography, much of it arid and segmented, belies the picturesque clichés of official tourist brochures.

The 'chronicle' of the subtitle precedes the photographs. It is no dry history, nor is it simply a piece of subjective polemic. Mr Alberts quotes lone voices of dissent such as those of John X Merriman and the Black Sash's own Sheena Duncan. However, he succeeds in showing a thread of unity in white attitudes from Jan van Riebeeck onwards. Under the entry 1660 he quotes Van Riebeeck as saying that the 'Capemen' had entirely forfeited their right to their land 'through the war which they had waged against us, and (...) we were not inclined to restore it, as it now had become the property of the



Bee Berman

Paul Alberts

Company by the sword and the laws of war'. (p1) Is the spirit behind this remark so very different from Smuts' comment in 1908 that 'The political status of the Natives is no doubt a very important matter, but vastly more important to me is the Union of South Africa'?

The photographs have a core of quietness which evokes the still desperation of that 'alienation' of the sub-title. Every facet of life in Bophuthatswana is covered: mineworkers, young unemployed men, the meeting of the wives of President Mangope and Prime Minister Botha; kangaroo justice being meted out to a juvenile thief; the desolation of Winterveld squatter camp. Outstanding is no 90, which depicts a senile man strapped to a hospital bed beneath Family Planning posters.

**The Borders of Apartheid** is a book which one must ponder over and return to. It is a work of art which conveys intensely felt convictions without preaching. Buy it for yourself.

**Janet Sahli**

### BLACK SASH OFFICES

#### HEADQUARTERS

Khotso House  
42 De Villiers Street  
Johannesburg 2001  
Phone: 337-2435/6

#### CAPE WESTERN

5 Long Street, Mowbray 7700, Cape  
Phone: 65-3513

SA ISSN 0036-4843

This Magazine, as the official organ of the Black Sash, carries authoritative articles on the activities of the Black Sash. The leading articles adhere broadly to the policies of the organisation, which does not, however, necessarily endorse the opinions expressed by the contributors.

Published by the Black Sash, Khotso House, 42 De Villiers Street, Johannesburg 2001, and printed by Pacific Press, 302 Fox Street, Jeppestown 2094, Johannesburg.

**COPYRIGHT:** The copyright in all material which is identified by the symbol © is expressly reserved to the Black Sash. All other material may be freely reproduced provided that the source and the author are acknowledged.

All political comment in this issue, except where otherwise stated, by J. Wentzel, Khotso House, 42 De Villiers Street, Johannesburg 2001.

**LAYOUT:** By Joyce Brown