

5436
**BLACK
REVIEW
1975-1976**

2

BLACK REVIEW

1975-6

EDITOR



ASHA RAMBALLY

PUBLISHED BY
BLACK COMMUNITY PROGRAMMES
1977

ISBN 0 620 01958 1

Printed by
LOVEDALE PRESS, LOVEDALE 5702

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	v
Introduction	vii
List of Abbreviations	ix
1 Government Created Political Bodies	
Bantustans	1
Transkei	10
Ciskei	32
Kwa-Zulu	44
Lebowa	51
Bophuthatswana	54
2 Government Created Political Bodies	
South African Indian Council	60
3 Government Created Political Bodies	
Coloured Persons Representative Council	68
4 Security Laws and their Application	76
5 Urban African Affairs	96
6 Black Consciousness	107
7 Black Organisations	
Political Pressure Groups	
Black People's Convention	119
Natal Indian Congress	125
South African Students' Organisation	126
Self-help and Religious Groups	
Black Community Programmes	128
Zimele Trust Fund	131
Association for Self-Help	133
Black Women's Federation of South Africa	133
Institute for Black Research	135
Institute of Black Studies	135
Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre	136
Interdenominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa	137
8 Education—Primary and Secondary	138
9 Education—Teacher, Technical and Vocational	147
10 Education—Higher	152
11 Black Labour	160
12 Sport	176
13 Arts and Entertainment	193
14 Namibia	198
Index	218

Acknowledgements

Black Community Programmes wishes to convey most sincere thanks to all the people who have helped to make publication of this year's *Review* possible, particularly our friends who gave us assistance at this most crucial period. We are also grateful to our staff who, despite their daily chores, gave themselves time to see to the completion of this work.

We apologise to our readers for the delay in the publication of this *Review*. Our publication date was set for August 1976, but due to several setbacks which we encountered we have only been able to complete the publication early in 1977.

Introduction

The period under review was marked by interesting developments and events within the black community. In virtually all aspects of life there were notable developments. In Bantustan politics, the peak of what propagators of apartheid see as the success of the separate development policy, was seen live in the Transkei when the territory was involved in intensive preparations for the emergence of a new state under the independence tag. The continued opposition to segregated schools and separate education for the various races in South Africa resulted in the country-wide disturbances. The solution to the long standing issue of liberation of Namibia and the acceleration of international pressure brought to bear on the South African government still continued to hit the news during the period under review. In the field of sport there were echoes calling for non-racialism in sport and the South African government was insisting on the need for adherence to multi-nationalism in sport. Without delving into developments in each field, I want to mention that this book will present a valuable and interesting piece of literature from which the black community can assess its failures and successes in order to improve on the past.

It was encouraging to observe that the distribution of the last issue of *Black Review* was fairly successful which indicated a growing sense of appreciation and interest on the part of the public.

Black Review is used by researchers, libraries, educational institutions and those people who are interested in history because it strives towards projecting the objective facts about events and trends within the black community, presented by Blacks themselves.

The Communications Department of Black Community Programmes wishes to apologise to its readers for the delay in publication. Due to certain circumstances we were unable to complete this book by August, as was scheduled. Nevertheless, the completion of *Black Review* 1975/76 still manifests endless efforts by our staff and the community support to make this venture a success as always.

We wish our readers a pleasant time when assimilating the contents and also hope that the book will not only be displayed but read in order to know and to understand the black community better.

A list of other publications available at all Black Community Programmes offices in the country appears at the end of the book, including books published during the year under review and available at Ravan Press.

ASHA RAMBALLY, *Editor*

List of Abbreviations

AFC	African Football Confederation
ANC	African National Congress
APDUSA	African People's Democratic Union of South Africa
ASH	Association for Self-Help
BAAD	Bantu Affairs Administration Board
BAD	Bantu Administration and Development
BAWU	Black Allied Workers' Union
BCP	Black Community Programmes Ltd.
BIC	Bantu Investment Corporation
BJCC	Black Joint Consultative Union
BMC	Bantu Mining Corporation
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
BPA	Black Parents' Association of Soweto
BPC	Black People's Convention
BWF	Black Women's Federation
CDC	Coloured Development Corporation
CLA	Ciskei Legislative Assembly
CNDC	Ciskei National Development Corporation
CNIP	Ciskei National Independence Party
CNP	Ciskei National Party
CNUP	Ciskei National Unionist Party
CPRC	Coloured Persons' Representative Council
CRC	Coloured Representative Council
CULCOM	Cultural Committee (SASO)
DP	Democratic Party
EEC	European Economic Community
ELC	Evangelical Lutheran Church
EXCO	Executive Committee (SAIC)
FASA	Football Association of South Africa
FIFA	International Football Association
FINA	Federation International de Nation Amateur
GSC	General Students' Council

IBR	Institute for Black Research
IBS	Institute of Black Studies
ICC	Inter Cabinet Council
IDAMASA	Interdenominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa
ILTF	International Lawn Tennis Federation
LAC	Local Affairs Committee
LDC	Lebowa Development Corporation
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers' Union
MDALI	Music, Drama, Arts and Literature Institute
MDARU	Mdantsane Rugby Union
MPC	Member of the Provincial Council
MPLA	Marxist Popular Movement
NAYO	National African Youth Organisation
NIC	Natal Indian Congress
NNC	Namibia National Convention
NPSL	National Professional Soccer League
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan African Congress
SAABU	South African Amateur Boxing Union
SAACB	South African African Cricket Board
SAARB	South African African Rugby Board
SAASF	South African Swimming Federation
SAASU	South African Swimming Union
SABBC	South African Boxing Board of Control
SACA	South African Cricket Association
SACBOC	South African Cricket Board of Control
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SAIC	South African Indian Council
SAITA	South African Indian Teachers' Association
SALTU	South African Lawn Tennis Union
SANFA	South African National Football Association
SANROC	South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
SARF	South African Rugby Federation
SARU	South African Rugby Union
SASM	South African Students' Movement

SASO South African Students' Organisation
SRC Students' Representative Council
SWA (RM) South West Africa (Rhenish Mission)
SWANU South West African National Union
SWAPO South West African People's Organisation

TDC Transkei Development Corporation
TLA Transkei Legislative Assembly
TNIP Transkei National Independence Party
TYRU Tigerburg Rugby Union

UCM University Christian Movement
UN United Nations
UNISA University of South Africa
USA United States of America

WRAB West Rand Administration Board

XDC Xhosa Development Corporation

YWCA Young Women's Christian Association

GOVERNMENT CREATED POLITICAL BODIES

Bantustans

The period under review, 1975-76, saw the maturity of the South African policy of Bantustans with the Transkei making definite preparations to get over the last hurdle of Bantustan development—attainment of independence. With maturity there emerged some characteristics of the policy, some of which, although they had always been suspected by people opposed to the system, had, however, strictly remained in the back pocket of the men in the real driving seat—the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, and his key men in the Bantu Affairs Department. Some of these characteristics have brought the whole system of ‘bantustanisation’ of the country into greater controversy than ever before.

Of these characteristics that came up foremost was the capability of the policy to declare all Africans on the Southern part of the African continent, commonly known as South Africa, foreigners who had no rights, even to a limited extent, to citizenship of the country. They could be declared citizens of some nebulous states created by the South African Parliament. The Government was putting into practical effect the story, which had always been regarded only with theoretical significance, that the 18-20 million (it is not possible to give an accurate figure) African population in South Africa was, according to South African legislation, entitled to thirteen percent of the total surface area of the country. The provisions of the new South African Status of

Transkei Act were seen by political observers as a precedent of similar provisions binding all future independent Bantustans.

In a move that was apparently intended to cajole urban Africans to take Bantustan citizenship, the South African Government announced towards the end of 1975, that Africans in the urban areas could have leasehold agreements lasting thirty years over their homes, on condition that they first accepted citizenship of a Bantustan. This was only one of a battery of regulations that would compel Africans to find it more convenient to take Bantustan citizenship. Other measures in operation were that: when the birth of an African child was registered in the common area of South Africa, it had to be identified with a Bantustan. African professional men and traders seeking facilities for their businesses in the common area had to first declare identification with a Bantustan.¹

Addressing the Swazi Territorial Authority in April 1976, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, said that Swazis who took Bantustan citizenship would enjoy privileges over non-Bantustanians in the common area in regard to housing, jobs and influx control. He was also reported to have said in Parliament that "Bantu persons who identify themselves with their own 'black nations' are much more welcome here in the white area than those who deny or hide their relationship with a 'black nation' of their own We must grant (them) more and more privileges". He said that preference should be given to them in available jobs, housing, having dependents with them, freedom of movement, hospitalisation, transport, schools, sport, etc.

In the past, Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 was used to regulate the right of Africans to remain in urban areas. Qualification in terms of this Act would render such Africans entitled to all urban privileges. In this case the Minister actually said that Bantustan citizenship would be more important than Section 10.

As could have been expected, the Government plan to bantustanise all Africans in the country met with strong opposition from political movements like the BPC. It was however, more significant when it proved unpopular even with Bantustan leaders themselves, who were otherwise known to agree with government decrees without question. The Qwaqwa Chief Minister, Kenneth Mopeli, saw the move as intending to deprive urban Africans of their birth rights in urban areas. The Gazankulu Chief Minister, Hudson Ntswanisi, said: "South Africa belongs to Blacks and Whites—and therefore Blacks should not be considered as sojourners in towns and cities. They must be accepted as permanent and cannot be expelled from these areas." The chairman of the government created Soweto Urban Bantu Council, Mr T. Makhaya, said, "The people feel if they take out homeland citizenship

they will be sent back to the homelands. These are the suspicions of the people. If it comes to citizenship, we want to be South African citizens.”

This issue became a point of open conflict between the South African and Transkeian Governments, where the Transkei was refusing to accept Xhosa speaking Africans in South African metropolitan areas as Transkeian citizens. This came to a point where it appeared that after 26 October, Transkei Independence day, there would be thousands of stateless Africans in South Africa. Mr M. C. Botha, the Bantu Administration Minister, warned that if a Bantustan refused to grant citizenship to “its own people living in the Republic” after independence “the government of the Republic will be forced to consider very seriously whether people from such a homeland are welcome in our country.”²

Commenting on the minister’s statement and the whole citizenship imbroglio, a columnist in the Johannesburg weekly magazine, *The Financial Mail*, said: “Ominous words. The mind boggles at a policy which grants privileges to people born and bred in a country only if they are willing to make themselves foreigners.” The Secretary General of the Black People’s Convention, Mr Thandisizwe Mazibuko, in a statement urging rejection of Transkei independence, said that the South African Government wanted to sweep South Africa clean of all Africans who would, in terms of their language affiliations, be locked up in small dots called independent homelands. “Having declared all 18 million Africans non-citizens of South Africa in terms of the independent homelands policy, the four million Whites, who are more than the so-called Coloureds plus Indians, will claim to have majority rule in the country,” he said.

There were indications that the independence idea was progressively influencing more Bantustan leaders, as the Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, announced plans to prepare for independence for his territory towards the end of 1975. In a surprise statement in his policy speech at the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in April 1976, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Cedric Phathudi, asked the Assembly to review their long standing objection to sovereign independence for the territory. He referred to the question of independence as “vital”³ in contrast to what he had always said in rejection of independence. A further discussion of attitudes of Bantustan leadership towards independence will follow, under the discussions of the various Bantustans.

The Bantustans themselves, however, remained under heavy fire from various angles of the Black community. In the forefront of opposition was the Black People’s Convention which, in its congress held in December 1975 issued a document describing Bantustans as bodies which “were created to divert the energy of Blacks from the

true struggle for national liberation to racialist, tribalist and divisive political undertakings which at best keep the total liberation out of the immediate attention of Blacks, and at worst serve to bolster the white racist regime of those who created them".⁴

The document pointed out that Bantustans were designed to "cheat the black man into participation in his oppression and to hoodwink the international community into accepting the racist policy of the white regime as a sincere programme designed in the interests of Blacks."⁵ Black People's Convention further dismissed the Bantustans, along with the other government institutions like the Coloured Person's Representative and the South African Indian Councils, as "built-in safety valves in the balloon of black frustration, through which the steam is let out so that the balloon should not explode in the face of the oppressor."⁶

Nevertheless, the Government went on with its programme of purchasing land through the South African Bantu Trust, to consolidate the Bantustans into closer knit units, although the Transkei was the only one which could successfully be brought down to a single unit. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr M. C. Botha, revealed in Parliament on 20 February, 1976, that the amount of money spent by the South African Bantu Trust in acquiring land since 1 January 1949 to date totalled R201 156 174.⁷ During the 1975/76 financial year, a total of R57,6 million was spent on purchasing land.⁸

However, the future of the consolidation process was uncertain because of reported lack of funds for the continued pursuance of the scheme. In January 1976, there were reports that official sources had privately admitted that although land deals already negotiated for consolidation were trickling through to government offices, the programme would be stymied. But a report said, "Government sources are defensive about the future prospects for the consolidation programme and speculate about a possible rise in the gold price, which would make funds available again, or exports of other minerals to replace gold as an exchange earner."⁹ It appeared at the time, that the greatest threat to Bantustan consolidation programme was the possibility of the South African military involvement in Angola escalating into full-scale conflict.¹⁰ The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development further disclosed that, of the total quota of land to be purchased for African occupation in terms of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936, there still remained 414 900 hectares in the Transvaal, 29 200 hectares in Natal, 7 100 hectares in the Orange Free State and 471 400 hectares in the Cape Province, to be purchased.¹¹ The total quota to be released would make up +13 percent (158 674.2 sq. km) of the total surface area of South Africa (1 220 571 sq. km).

A number of people who were sceptical of Bantustan development to independence stage believed that the Bantustans would never achieve

economic viability. There was however, a good number of those who felt that if the Government could be made aware of what could be done, it would improve the economic situation of the Bantustans. The latter lot held the view that Government would use all available means to assist the African to full economic and political independence. The chief economist of the Federated Chamber of Industries, Mr A. Hammond Tooke, speaking in Port Elizabeth in April 1976, said that a total of R26 million would have to be spent to make all the South African Bantustans economically viable by the year 2 000. He said that the figure had been based on 1974 costing.

To date, the gross national incomes of all the South African Bantustans have relied heavily on the sale of labour to metropolitan South Africa, with the wages so acquired making up to over 90 percent of the national income of almost all of them. Other economic activities with considerable contribution to the total incomes of the territories are Agriculture, Forestry and Mining. Industry, which is piloted mainly by Government backed corporations like Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) and Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC), is painfully cropping up in the prescribed 'growth points' of all the Bantustans. In reply to a question in Parliament on the 16 February, 1976 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development disclosed the following figures reflecting the extent of afforestation and commercial agriculture in the Bantustans: A total of 225 609 hectares of the whole land making up Bantustans was covered with indigenous forest, 94 503 hectares was covered with commercial plantations and 25 853 hectares with non-commercial woodlots, 18 392 hectares had been planted with resilient fibres, and 14 349 hectares with sugar cane. Coffee took up 379 hectares, tea 1858, macadamia nuts 12, pecan nuts 5, coconut 940, cashew nuts 24 and citrus 3 148 hectares.¹² These figures were given as at 31 December 1975.

The Minister further revealed on 19 February, that a total of three mineral prospecting leases were held by white persons operating in Bantustans, 123 by white-controlled companies and 97 by African persons or companies. Seventy white-controlled companies actually had mining leases and two African persons or companies also, but there were no white individuals who had any.¹³ It should be noted, however, that any considerably serious mining was all in the hands of Whites. These African persons or companies with prospecting or mining leases were only involved in simple matters like sand digging. The Minister told Parliament that during 1975 an amount of R246 578 had been paid to the Government-backed Bantu Mining Corporation, which received it on behalf of the South African Bantu Trust, from royalties, prospecting or other fees connected with mining and quarrying in Bantustans. R40 963 was paid to Government established corporations like BIC.

No particulars were available of revenue which could have accrued to Bantustan Governments or authorities, African tribes or individual Africans.¹⁴ The following mining or quarrying operations had been established by the Bantu Mining Corporation in the Bantustans. Crushergiyani (Gazankulu), mining of betonite, andalusite, travertine, limestone, sodalite, stone, etc., in Lebowa, Bophuthatswana, Kwa-Zulu and Kaokoland; extraction of sand in Bophuthatswana, Kwa-Zulu, Gazankulu and Lebowa. The BMC was further providing financial and technical assistance to two entrepreneurs (believed White) in Kaokoland, as well as to certain African entrepreneurs extracting sand from the Ilovo river in Kwa-Zulu.¹⁵

The following figures were given with respect to the extent of mining in the Bantustans:¹⁶

	NO. OF MINING CONCERNS	NO. OF EMPLOYEES	
		WHITES	BLACKS
Bophuthatswana	30	4 023	58 845
Gazankulu	4	7	103
Kwa-Zulu	12	10	60
Lebowa	17	460	10 293
Venda	3	39	425

Below we give the value of mineral production in Bantustans in 1974 and 1975.¹⁷

	1974	1975
Bophuthatswana	R12 931 242	R18 949 145
Gazankulu	534 007	580 410
Kwa-Zulu	687 080	1 487 513
Lebowa	19 258 032	47 215 467
Venda	16 629	14 776

The Bantu Development Minister revealed the figures in regard to amounts of money spent on the development of growth points.¹⁸ These figures are shown in the table on page 7.

The following amounts were spent at the following growth points on the erection of factories for leasing to entrepreneurs:¹⁹

Babelegi	R16 691 514	Letaba	R 1 370 299
Witsieshoek	138 281	Butterworth	10 711 841
Isithebe	5 013 145	Umtata	1 336 936
Seshego	2 411 468		

A total of 883 Whites, 146 Coloureds and 24 025 Africans were employed in manufacturing undertakings in the Bantustans.²⁰

Most development of commerce and industry in the Bantustans has always been the major responsibility of corporations like the BIC and the XDC. The first one of these was the BIC, which was established in 1959 "to promote and encourage industrial and other concerns among Bantu persons in the Bantu territories and to act as a development, financial and investment institution and to provide for other incidental matters."²¹ The XDC was established in terms of Act No. 86 of 1965, to promote the economic development of the Transkei and Ciskei specifically, as opposed to the general nature of BIC operations. In the past years there has been a further breakdown of the administrations

	<i>Central Government</i>	<i>Transkei Government</i>	<i>Bophuthatswana</i>	<i>Qwaqwa</i>	<i>Babelegi</i>	<i>Witsieshoek</i>	<i>Isithebe</i>
	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
(a) Industrial townships	—	—	1 923 525	221 730	670 096	—	3 474 929
(b) Water schemes	—	Butterworth 4 828 000	196 032	55 170	377 298	—	128 190
(c) Electricity supplies	—	Umtata 113 000	44 826	29 256	17 811	3 800	838 713
(d) Housing for key white personnel	—	—	—	—	—	42 400	—
(e) Subsidisation of (d)	1 396	—	—	—	—	—	—

	<i>BIC Letabo</i>	<i>XDC Butterworth</i>	<i>Umtata</i>	<i>Other agencies</i>	<i>Seshego</i>
	R	R	R	R	R
(a) Industrial townships	54 583	2 235 217	339 250	—	160 539
(b) Water schemes	—	243 110	58 492	—	60 289
(c) Electricity supplies	—	544 723	34 967	—	—
(d) Housing for key white personnel	—	8 135 295	5 581 387	Babe'eg 1 659 295 Isithebe 1 183 817 Seshego 481 609 Letaba 87 545	—
(e) Subsidisation of (d)	—	—	—	—	—

and work of these corporations with the effect that each one of the following Bantustans had their own corporations with some Africans included on their Boards of Directors : Bophuthatswana, Venda, Gazankulu and Qwaqwa.²² The XDC was also broken down with the subsequent formation of the Transkei Development Corporation and the Ciskei National Development Corporation.

These corporations have largely been responsible, in collaboration with the Bantustan Governments, for the invitation of industrialists and businessmen to invest in the Bantustans. While these government bodies were engaged in encouraging local South African industries to decentralise into the homelands, several sorties were made to European and American countries to attract foreign investment. The major deterrent to Bantustan investment on the part of companies considering setting up business in these areas, politics aside, has been the prospect of being forced to sell to local interests within a fixed period of 25-30 years. This limit had been introduced in consideration of the length of time that the BIC could reasonably accept responsibility for any investment through the agency system through which it would base the land from Bantustan authority and erect the buildings required by the investor. Indications were that this limit policy could generally be relaxed as the Bantustans began to experience difficulties arising from industry's cold feet about investment. The Government has in fact been encouraging them to set up their own terms for investment in their territories. The Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, had announced as early as 1974, that Bantustan authorities had to decide for themselves the conditions they were prepared to offer investors. The Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, became the first Bantustan leader to relax the fixed period policy.

The Minister of Bantu Development gave the following figures of financial commitments of white entrepreneurs with whom contractual agreements had been concluded in regard to the establishment of industries on an agency basis at the growth points of the Bantustans:

Umtata	R 872 000	Isithebe	R 9 500 000
Butterworth	11 904 000	Seshego	3 800 000
Babelegi	35 400 000	Letaba	300 000

These figures were revealed on 16 February, 1976.

According to a news release issued in April 1976 by the Department of Statistics in Pretoria, the net national income of all nine Bantustans in South Africa had amounted to R1 552 800 000 in 1973-74 an increase of 64 percent over the previous three years. The report stated that for several reasons, meaningful comparisons between the per capita incomes for the Bantustans and those of other developing countries were not possible. "The most important reason is that there are appreciable institutional differences between the homelands and

other developing countries. It is generally accepted that income figures for countries with dissimilar economic systems are less comparable than for countries with similar economic systems".²³

Among the differences were the relationship of the Bantustans to the rest of the Republic of South Africa, "especially in the considerable assistance" granted by the central government to the Bantustan governments. This expenditure had an important influence on the economics of the Bantustans. The report said that a total amount of R239 700 000 had been transferred to all nine Bantustans in 1973-74, compared with R174 900 000 in 1970-71. The expenditure had made it possible to provide services such as education, housing and health in the Bantustans. These amounts did not include funds which the South African government gave to development corporations for investment.²⁴

In a statement issued in March, 1976, the BIC expressed hopes to increase its industrialisation programme for Bantustans from R24 million in the 1976-77 financial year to about R40 million. The programme, the statement added, had already created 14 000 jobs for Bantustan residents, and that the 1976-77 investment was expected to create 8 500 to 10 000 jobs. Speaking at an investment seminar in London, the managing director of the BIC, Dr Johannes Adendorff, urged industrialists to invest in the Bantustans because without foreign investment, South Africa would not be able to create sufficient jobs for its rising African population.

He described "profitable investment opportunities second to none", and he listed some of the incentives offered to companies investing in Bantustans. These included:

- Financial aid to 100 percent of the value of the land and buildings on the site selected in the Bantustan;
- Income tax concessions for 10 years;
- Adequate labour—the level of education among the Bantu people of South Africa is the highest on the continent, and approximately 80 percent of the population can read and write.²⁵

These advantages apart, Dr Adendorff said, there were two others in South Africa's politically stable and strong government, and guarantees by the South African government against any losses which industrialists might suffer "as a result of any other government action".

The Natal regional director of the BIC, Mr M. J. Olivier, addressing a youth congress of the South Africa Bureau for Racial Affairs in July 1975, said that the development of social snobbery among Africans was an essential prerequisite for the successful development of the Bantustans.²⁶ He said that the BIC was being criticised for establishing luxury facilities like three star hotels and beauty salons in the Bantustans, but in his view, these could be more effective stimulants to development than the building of factories. They could create a social snobbery

and stimulate an urgent desire among underdeveloped people to improve themselves without which development would simply be for the Black, and not by him.²⁷

Evidence of the snobbery which Mr Olivier had referred to was abundant among many Bantustan middle class citizens. This snobbery was reported to swallow up most of the professional people, as well as civil servants, who increasingly saw themselves as superior to the ordinary peasants because of their matriculation education. There developed in the minds of most educated people what a Transkei social worker called "bigmanship" which would "result in dangerous polarisation between the literates and the illiterates."

Transkei

Land Claims and Consolidation

Transkei, the largest of South Africa's homelands, has always persisted in its claims for more land to be ceded to it despite the assertions by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), Mr M. C. Botha, that nothing more than quotas outlined in the 1926 Land Act would be given to any homeland. In this long standing battle for land, the Transkei could be said to have gained a few victories. Two districts, Glen Grey and Herschel were incorporated into the territory early in the second half of 1975. The Transkei won a further victory when in November 1975, the proclamation was published in the Government Gazette that Port St. Johns, the disputed little town in the Transkei "wild coast", had been added to the zoned areas of the Transkei. However, the Chief Minister of the Transkei, declared that the Government's consolidation plan could not be considered as final "for in terms of the historical boundaries of the Transkei, Mt. Currie, Matatiele, Cedarville, Maclear and Elliot are part of the Transkei",²⁸ he said. "We hope that White South Africa has taken note of these insistent claims and should in future make a final demarcation of the Transkei boundary." The call by the Transkei leader was later backed by the Transkei Legislative Assembly when, in April 1976, it demanded that the Transkei border be extended to the Umzimkhulu river in Natal. Main towns that would be affected by the claim were Kokstad (Mount Currie), Matatiele, Harding, Port Edward, Margate and Port Shepstone.²⁹

Speaking at Lady Frere in June 1976 Chief Matanzima was quoted to have claimed Queenstown as part of the land belonging to the Transkei as well. "We shall get Queenstown and it will eventually become the

capital of the Transkei," he is reported to have said.³⁰ However, subsequent reports bore a denial of the accuracy of this claim by the Chief Minister. In his denial the Chief confirmed that he still believed that the Queenstown district should be part of the Transkei, but that he had no ambition of making Queenstown the capital. Umtata was the capital of the Transkei and would remain so. Of the areas that were declared in favour of the Transkei, Port St. Johns became an issue of great controversy as a result of a high feeling of insecurity amongst its white community. For many years, Port St. Johns' 400 Whites had struggled against the idea of the town being incorporated into the Transkei. In a statement issued in Pretoria, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, said that whites living in Port St. Johns would be subject to the same arrangements applicable to whites in the rest of the Transkei.³¹ These included Government guarantees to buy white-owned properties and to pay compensation to businessmen if they could prove that they had suffered loss as a result of the Transkei becoming independent.³²

As was mentioned earlier in this section, the Transkei did not consider the land consolidation issue as having been finalised. More claims could be expected even after independence. Room was left for such claims in the Transkei draft constitution which mentioned that the territory was to consist of the twenty-eight districts as well as such other land as might be added thereto. On the question of amalgamation with the Ciskei there was less activity on the part of the Transkei itself. The Ciskei side of the story is outlined in the section on Ciskei below. It would seem however that the Chief Minister of the Transkei had a better idea of how the matter would be resolved. This came out in his answer to a question on this issue in April 1976. "There may well be no Ciskei after independence. You wait and see," said the Chief.

Independence

The proposed independence for the Transkei, with effect from 26 October 1976, made the Bantustan the busiest in the country for the whole of the past year; especially in the latter part of the period under review; as the independence issue was becoming less and less remote. Preparations ranged from diplomatic offensive in the international scene to local village political campaigning; construction of roads, border posts, aircraft station, huge governmental buildings and mammoth hotels of sizes never known in the Transkei before. A small battalion which would make the nucleus of a future Transkei army was given training and its bases and barracks developed. A constitution which would form the foundation of the new state was also battered into shape. Below we make a survey of a number of the preparatory developments in the Transkei.

On 4 August 1975, the first batch of 87 recruits for the Transkei army left Umtata for training in the Republic of South Africa. The second military advisor to the Transkei Government, Brigadier Philip Pretorious, disclosed that the men would go for basic training at Ysterplaat in the Western Cape for about four months. He said the Transkei army would initially consist of an infantry battalion, composed of a ceremonial company, a rifle company, and a headquarters company. The ceremonial company would consist of a guard of honour of a hundred men, and a brass band of thirty-one. The rifle company would consist of a mounted platoon of thirty-two horsemen and an ordinary infantry platoon also of thirty-two.³³ The first campaign yielded a total of about 100 recruits altogether. However, this number dwindled to about 72. Another campaign would be embarked on by January 1976 and the last campaign was due in April.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei announced in the Transkei Legislative Assembly in April 1976, that his government would introduce conscription for a citizen force army. He said that a Defence Bill being drafted would make provision for both a permanent force and for civilian national service. All male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 would be liable to undergo military training. The number to be called up each year and the length of their training would be determined by the Minister of Defence, said the Chief Minister indicating with his finger that he would be looking after that portfolio himself when independence came.³⁴

The military base worth +R5 million was underway, about fifteen kilometres outside Umtata and it was described as one of the most modern and practical in South Africa.³⁵ Within five kilometres from the military base a R3 500 000 international airport was to be developed. A Natal construction company (Fowler Construction) had been awarded R1,33 million contract to build the first stage of the airport, which consisted of a two kilometre permanent surface runway, a grass runway and security fencing on a 500 hectares site plus 10 kilometres on the western side of the capital. Also included in the first stage would be the airport building and the control tower. At a later stage the Transkei Government would expand the airport to accommodate 737, 707 and possibly Jumbo jets.³⁶

Two border posts at Kei river in the south and Umzimkhulu river in the north were in construction, costing a total of +R866,000. More border posts on the Western side were being considered. A programme of renovating Transkei major roads was in operation, most of them to be finished with tarmac. An international sports stadium worth about R3 million with a sheltered capacity of 50 000 as well as a swimming pool and tennis courts was to be ready for independence. While the bulk of

the money for the stadium was offered by Anglo American Corporation and the Chamber of mines, R40 000 had already come from the XDC. It was reported that the XDC money had accrued from the profits of the unpopular Jabulani beer sales. Receiving the cheque for the money Chief Matanzima said that Transkeians would be thrilled to see what the profits of Jabulani beer had done for them, and would retract opposition to the sale of the beer in the Bantustan.³⁷

New official buildings were underway as well. A twin tower government office block was built in Umtata costing about R13 670 000. A fully equipped communication centre would be established on the ground floor of the building to be available to journalists visiting the Transkei for the independence celebrations. The centre would house a telex room, a picture transmission service and a workroom, with telephones for local, trunk and overseas calls. All the operators for the telex service would be drafted from the Republic of South Africa, and the expected team of twenty men would arrive in Umtata at the beginning of October to ensure that all was in order before the date of independence.³⁸ A new Umtata post office complex at a cost of R450 000 with automatic exchange was virtually ready for use by the end of 1975. A 120 room double storey hotel for the Holiday Inn's group costing about R1,4 million was being constructed at a fast pace to meet the deadline of October 1975, on which date it is due to be completed. All the rooms had already been booked by the Transkei to accommodate dignitaries expected to visit the Umtata independence celebrations. The hotel would also have a banqueting hall to set about 200 people, several dining rooms, a restaurant seating 150 people and a swimming pool. The banquet hall would be convertible to a conference hall seating 240 people.

Five new cabinet residences were under construction at a cost of R316 800 each, in addition to the existing seven residences. An official residence of the future president of the Transkei was also under construction just outside the built-up area of Umtata. The residence, which was estimated at a cost of R1 639 000, would include the president's dwelling quarters, aide-de-camps' quarters, housekeepers' quarters, guest accommodation, living rooms including a banqueting hall, kitchens, a wine cellar, laundry, conveniences, secretarial block including two floors of offices, with additions like a basement with garages, stores, transformer and generator rooms and telephone exchange, servants quarters and guards quarters.³⁹ It was believed that the super deluxe palace of the Transkei head of state, which would feature an enormous banqueting hall with a push button controlled sliding roof, would be the most expensive and opulent private residence yet built in South Africa.

The task of preparing the Transkei for independence had to involve the development of a basic team of trained diplomatic personnel who

would undertake the job of selling and defending the sovereignty. A number of selected men were given some short term training at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria from July 1975. The cadets were later sent for a year's training at the South African Embassies in Washington, New York, London, Bonn and Paris. Some were trained for diplomatic posts while others were trained as information officers. The trainees included Professor Mlahleni Njisane, South Africa born former University Professor in the USA who had taken American citizenship, Mr Qaba, former official of the Ciskei Education Department, Messrs Lila and Socikwa, former Methodist priests who had left the church to work full time for the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and Mr Tsepo Letlaka, former member of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa, who was a political exile in London until he became the first such exile to return to South Africa on the assurance of South African Premier John Vorster. Mr Vorster had guaranteed that applications from exiled Blacks to return to the country would be considered. Another cadet who joined the team a little later was Mr Ashton Dunjwa, former Urban Representative of the Ciskeian Government in Cape Town. Mr Dunjwa was also president of the South Africa African Cricket Board when he left for training. He was due to return to Transkei as the territory's senior Information Officer.

The biggest task facing Transkeian and South African Government officials during the time running up to independence, perhaps much more for Transkeian officials after independence, was that of convincing the world community to recognise the Transkei as an independent sovereign state alongside other countries in the world. In January 1976, the South African Department of Information announced a programme to launch a major publicity drive to project the Transkei to the world before and after its independence. The Secretary for Information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie, said that the Department would produce a series of publications dealing with aspects of the Transkei as well as a film of the territory during the year. The publications would be distributed in South and North America, Europe and Australia and the film would be seen in South Africa as well.⁴⁰ The Department would also invite a number of foreign journalists and television teams to South Africa during the year to report on what was going on in the Transkei before and after independence. Dr Rhoodie said that other new efforts would be made to advertise the Transkei and that it was probable that the Department would repeat its very successful series comparing the Transkei with other independent territories which had membership of the UN.

The series compared the Transkei with other countries in terms of

its history in obtaining independence, size, population, government budget and other aspects. "The idea as far as we are concerned is just to make the Transkei known to the world as it becomes independent and to show opinion formers, decision-makers, the media, businessmen and academics, what the Transkei is like," Dr Rhodie said.⁴¹ It was later revealed by the Minister of Information, Dr Connie Mulder, that an amount of R1 million would be used on the publicity programme.

In addition to the programme of inviting foreigners into the country, including some parliamentarians from Western Countries, Transkei leaders, especially the two Matanzima brothers, engaged in extensive tours abroad for the purpose of securing both diplomatic friends and foreign investments for the Transkei. Leaders of some independent African countries also had their own contributions to the Transkei diplomatic lobbying. One such leader was Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouët Boigny, who suggested that Chief Kaizer Matanzima should visit all African leaders personally or through a closer representative to give his side of the independence issue. It was expected that the Chief Minister would send his Foreign Minister designate, Chief George Matanzima, to tour Africa as he himself was too busy preparing for independence.

The results of a Matanzima Africa tour would probably have a very significant effect on the rest of the world community. Observers all over the world, including white South Africans, were generally agreed that member states of the Organization of African Unity and their attitude to an independent Transkei would have a decisive role as regards recognition or non-recognition by the international community. In October 1975, the United Nations' General Assembly Special Political Committee passed a resolution condemning the establishment of Bantustans and called on member states not to recognise them. The resolution described the homelands policy as a technique of consolidating apartheid and perpetuating minority rule. The decision which was almost certain to be approved by the plenary body would effectively bar the accepting of any Bantustan to United Nations membership after independence. However, eight western nations abstained from voting.⁴²

However, a survey of attitudes at the United Nations revealed that diplomats, including Western, would be heavily influenced by black Africa stance. Britain's Deputy Foreign Secretary, Mr David Annals, had made it clear that Britain would not recognise the Transkei. West German Government's attitude would depend largely on the stand taken by the OAU and Germany's European Economic Community (EEC) partners. France's position remained in the dark, especially after the controversial French nuclear deal with South African regime. A West German political scientist, Dr K. Van der Ropp, addressing a symposium organised by the Foreign Affairs Association (of South Africa) in April

1976, said that West Germany would hesitate for a long time before it decided to support the economic development of the Transkei through financial contributors and the sending of experts, as the Transkei was a product of apartheid, a political order sharply condemned by West Germany. "The quality of our relations with many countries, especially in Black Africa, is threatened by our relations with Pretoria, many people in West Germany fear a further deterioration if such diplomatic recognition is given to the homelands", Dr Van der Ropp said. To be recognised as an independent state, the Transkei would first have to coin diplomatic recognition in Africa.

The Foreign Minister's conference of the OAU, which met at Port Louis in Mauritius towards the end of June 1976, gave a clear indication of black African feelings on the Transkei independence issue. A resolution was passed recommending that all member states of the OAU be bound not to recognise the Transkei as a sovereign state after independence. Meanwhile back at home tensions were building up within the black community inside South Africa. Over and above general objection to Matanzima's independence Bill for the Transkei, the situation was compounded by implications of some constitutional provisions especially in regard to the citizenship clause, which shall be dealt with below.

Inside the Transkei itself a significant development occurred when the traditional leader of the Opposition Democratic Party, Mr Knowledge Guzana, was ousted by a much younger and relatively new H. B. Ncokazi with a clear majority of 44 votes to 14. Ncokazi's ticket was hinged on strong rejection of Transkei independence, whereas while Guzana was not in favour of independence, he, however, took a compromise line and participated in the constitutional advisory committee. The new leader appealed to the nations of the world not to recognise the independence of the Transkei, because recognition would give Mr Vorster and his Transkei "puppets" a certificate of respectability they did not deserve. He appealed "on behalf of millions of black people" who would be hard hit by independence, to all people of South Africa, Black and White, who were against the segmentation of the country to throw in their lot with them to fight independence.⁴³ Mr Ncokazi, who called for a boycott of all independence celebrations, demanded a referendum in the Transkei on the independence issue. He said that the pre-independence general election that Chief Matanzima spoke of could not reflect the true feelings of the people on independence because during elections people voted for candidates and not independence. He said the majority of people were illiterate and therefore did not distinguish between individuals and policy. They were being influenced by the chiefs to vote for the Governing party. His claim on the influence of chiefs was supported by a Guzana statement which

said that the chiefs, with their control over the allocation of land, pensions and disability grants, had a stranglehold on political thinking and emasculated any tribesman of independent mind. In a paper on Transkei independence written for a book in a series of Black Viewpoint publications by Black Community Programmes, Ncokazi stated the following points as reason for the Transkei people rejecting independence:

- (i) Their forefathers and brothers died during the two World Wars defending South Africa against foreign invaders, as a result of that, their relatives are orphans and some are widows because their fathers and husbands died in the wars. They want to be compensated by granting of full human rights to all their brothers in an undivided South Africa.
- (ii) The people of the Transkei, who are so shabbily and callously ill-treated by the South African socio-political system, are the self-same people who have built the South African economy which the government boasts of abroad. They have suffered most as a result of the mine disasters that have riddled this country in the past. They now want the fruits of their labours and compensation, by granting of human rights, for their sufferings.
- (iii) They want to fight hand in hand with their black brothers for their total liberation from the thraldom of white domination and top-doggism in South Africa.
- (iv) They feel that, with the retention of the Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act, Immorality Act and Proclamation R400, they will live in the shadows of death and detention without trial under the charge of Transkei rulers who are moral lepers, and they will be subjected to humiliation and ridicule among their fellow South Africans.
- (v) They feel that this independence is being imposed upon them by white racists in pursuit of a policy that has been reducing them to cringing beggars in their own country.
- (vi) They feel that only educated people will benefit from this independence. The ordinary masses who are in the lowest strata of society will continue living below the margin of subsistence.
- (vii) They feel that this will be pseudo-independence because the constitution has been drafted by the Republican Government through the instrumentality of the seconded officers.
- (viii) They also feel, and most of the civil servants agree with them, that in government service, promotion does not depend on merit. Instead only the blue-eyed boys of the seconded officers and loyal supporters and sympathisers of the ruling party are

given preference, and they feel things will be worse after independence.

- (ix) They feel that the election machinery has always been geared to favour the ruling party and the whole system undemocratic.
- (a) Polling officers are government servants.
 - (b) Senior polling officers are senior officers of the government.
 - (c) Chief polling officers are magistrates who are white seconded officials.
 - (d) The chief electoral officer is a seconded officer in the Department of Interior. His word is final: e.g. in the Engcobo by-election in 1975 the Urban areas' votes were not included. This was ascertained by the candidates themselves who were present when counting took place. They were aware of what they had got from local votes, but to their amazement, only local results were announced, and nothing was said of urban votes. On enquiring from the Chief Electoral Officer the candidates never got satisfaction. The procedure is that, after counting all the votes for the candidates the Magistrate sends the total figure to the Chief Electoral Officer who is in the Department of Interior in Umtata. The latter adds all the votes from the Urban Areas to these figures, thereby getting the total votes for each candidate.
- (x) They feel this independence is a "Matanzima Affair" because only the Matanzima brothers are often called to Pretoria behind every body else's backs to iron out certain constitutional differences with the Republican Government.

At the same time in the broader South African situation, the voice of the Black People's Convention (BPC) through its Secretary General, Mr Thandisizwe Mazibuko, called for complete rejection of Transkeian independence. The BPC dismissed Transkei independence as a plan by the white minority to carry the Bantustan policy to its logical conclusion, to make it acceptable to the world. Mr Mazibuko, who urged Blacks not to be blackmailed into acceptance of segmentation of their country, said, "The whole Bantustan system was conceived for perpetual domination of Blacks by White supremacy, as well as to make Africans foreigners in the country of their birth." He said that for many years, South Africa had found itself criticised and isolated for its apartheid policy. "By declaring these Bantustans independent, South Africa hopes not to be questioned on its policy, as the said Africans would now be coming from independent states, thereby having no right in the common area of South Africa."⁴⁴

The National President of the Black People's Convention, Mr Kenneth Hlaku Rachidi, talking to *Black Review* in a special interview, rejected the claim that Africans resident in the Transkei had a right to voice their opinion through a referendum on whether or not the Transkei could accept independence. He said, "The Transkei is an integral part of this country South Africa. We have repeatedly explained that South Africa is one unitary indivisible state, and that the people of South Africa as a whole should decide on the destiny of any bit of this country. The twisted logic that people living in the geographical area between the Kei and the Umzimkhulu rivers, commonly known as the Transkei, could secede at the instigation of the white minority regime, implies that any day one can wake up to hear that the city of Johannesburg or Cape Town has decided to be no longer a part of South Africa but that of Holland or France." Evidently shaken by the thought of Transkei independence the President intimated that the majority of the people of South Africa, would make means to express their opinion on the matter if only for the record.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei himself rejected the call for a referendum on the grounds that the Transkei government did not have money to waste. He claimed that a referendum had already been held in the Transkei. The referendum Chief Matanzima was referring to, took the form of tribal meetings of all the Transkei tribes constituting the 132 tribal authorities in the territory, as well as meetings of Transkei associations. The question of independence was fully aired at those meetings and discussed by "people who know" who were invited to submit resolutions on independence, the Chief said.⁴⁵ The former opposition leader, Mr Knowledge Guzana, commenting on Chief Matanzima's claim, said that he had seen the results of some of the returns from the mini referendum. He said that some tribal authorities had returned a majority of 10 000 for independence—a fanciful figure, said Mr Guzana, only possible if all men, women, children and all stock (cattle, sheep, goats and horses) in the area were counted.⁴⁶

Constitutional Developments

Implications of the independence of the Transkei, constitutionally speaking, in terms of the South African homelands development plan would suggest that the Transkei was to graduate to the last phase of the programme. Phase one was the first stage where executive authority in any Bantustan would be in the hands of a non-elected executive council under the leadership of a chief executive councillor and a handful of councillors in charge of various divisions of government. When the Bantustan developed to phase two, the title councillor would be replaced by cabinet minister, under the leadership of a Chief Minister

instead of a Chief Executive Councillor. From this stage the Bantustan could leap to the third phase and take independence. The Transkei had, therefore, arrived at the friction of the programme.

A draft constitution which had been prepared by a special committee of experts in Pretoria with the sanction of the Transkei government was tabled in the 1976 session of the Transkei Legislative Assembly which opened in March. The draft constitution provided amongst other things for the Transkei being an independent republic with a non-executive president as head of state when it became independent in October. The President would be vested with a variety of powers ranging from assenting to Bills, to declaring war if the need arose. He would act on the advice of an executive made up of 15 Ministers of State. The President would be elected at a meeting of a National Assembly, an executive body consisting of 75 Chiefs and 75 elected members, which would sit as an electoral college under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice or another judge. His term of office would be seven years and he would not be eligible for re-election unless the National Assembly decides otherwise. Judicial powers were to be vested in the Supreme Court, as well as existing lower courts, headed by a Chief Justice. Appeals against decisions by the Transkei Supreme Court would go before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. Xhosa would be the official language but Sesotho, English and Afrikaans could also be used.

The most contentious clause of the draft constitution was 57(a) which provided that all persons who were citizens of the present Transkei would automatically become citizens of an independent Transkei. The amendment to the draft constitution passed by the Transkei Legislative Assembly provided that borderline cases—people whose ethnic status was open to doubt such as an offspring of a Xhosa mother and a non-Xhosa father—would be subject to consideration by some kind of ethnic classification board.

Based on the provisions of the draft constitution, the Status of the Transkei Bill was introduced by the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, in the South African Parliament in May 1976. Clause 6 of the Constitution which dealt with citizenship became the hot issue of the day when the Minister made public his interpretation of the Clause to suggest that Transkei citizenship would automatically be conferred on all Africans of Transkei origin and those who had traceable with this origin territory, including those who permanently lived in the common area of the Republic of South Africa. The Matanzimas of the Transkei publicly opposed this interpretation and insisted that Xhosa speaking people who lived in South Africa would have an option of accepting or rejecting Transkei citizenship. The South Africa Minister, Mr John Vorster, had said on the occasion of his 60th birthday in December 1975 "As far as

we are concerned, all Black (African) people are citizens of one and other homeland. Citizens who happen to live in this country are still citizens of their countries.”⁴⁷ In terms of the provisions of the citizenship clause of the Status of Transkei Bill, the following points had emerged: All people who were already Transkei citizens would remain so. Under the 1963 Transkei Self-Government Act, Africans who were Xhosa speaking would be regarded as Transkei speaking, unless they were already citizens of other Bantustans. The definition included as Transkei citizens, any persons born outside the Transkei who were descendants of, or associated with, any of the tribes living in the Transkei. The same applied equally to children born out of marriages in South Africa between Transkei citizens as defined and Africans from any other tribes in South Africa, or from other countries. The only uncertain cases concerned third or fourth generation Africans in South Africa, whose Transkei origin or partial origin had become blurred. Outlining policy on such cases the B.A.D. Minister, Mr M. C. Botha, told Parliament that they would be resolved by a joint board, whose decisions would be final. What came out clearly then was that the whole matter had been drawn up in the premise of the official Government policy on Africans, as outlined by Mr Vorster on his birthday in 1975. The question that arose in the minds of many people concerned was whether or not the Transkei leaders were aware of the full implications of the citizenship clauses, both their own draft constitution, and that of the South African Status of Transkei Bill. Mr M. C. Botha said in Parliament: “I want to state immediately that an agreement was also reached at Cabinet level between the Transkei and the Republic in regard to the citizenship provisions.”⁴⁸ Asked about the strong denials by the Matanzima brothers of any knowledge of this deal, especially Chief George Matanzima, who was in London on his European tour, Mr Botha is reported to have said “George Matanzima is in London, and he is being given the treatment there by journalists,”⁴⁹ suggesting that the Chief was only playing politics.

The Minister insisted that there was no misunderstanding between himself and the Transkei Chief Minister on this issue. Clarifying the point, he said that he and other Government officials were having several consultative meetings with the Transkei leader. He said that Matanzima’s concern: “and he has told us about this, he told us about this recently here in Cape Town”, the people who are perhaps citizens of Lesotho, or of another homeland in the Republic and who, on the basis of their knowledge of the language or other relationship with the Transkei, could try to sneak into the Transkei in order to become citizens of the Transkei in that way.⁵⁰ What ever the true picture of the matter was, the Bill was piloted through all stages of Parliament by the Government and was to be effected from the date of the Transkei Independence

which was expected to fall on 26 October 1976. Provision was also made that the Transkei citizens who were employed in the Republic of South Africa would be welcome to continue working there and jobs would also be made available as had always been the case to those who wanted to come and work in the Republic. The Minister of Bantu Administration actually suggested, as has already been mentioned, that such citizens would get preferential treatment in regard to opportunities and privileges in the Republic.

The question of whether Whites resident in the Transkei would be eligible for Transkei citizenship or not cropped up, especially after the Port St. Johns land deals. Amongst people who were concerned about their position in the Transkei were those Whites who had preferred to remain in the territory even after independence, who otherwise wanted to be assured of their security, and those Whites who were employees of the Municipal and Bantu Township Board who sent a memorandum requesting that their positions be clarified before independence.

During the initial stages of independence negotiations with Pretoria, Chief Matanzima had publicly announced that those Whites who wished to remain in the Transkei post the independence period would be allowed to do so if they took Transkei citizenship. They would however forfeit their South African citizenship. This he justified as a measure to avoid dual allegiances. However, the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, contradicted this assurance, saying that no White man would be allowed to take homeland citizenship. Whites in the homelands would still remain citizens of South Africa. Even the definition of a Transkei citizen does not include Whites. It deals exclusively with Africans. This point was reinforced by two Bills which were published in Parliament in the middle of May 1976. Whites were therefore not encouraged to take Transkei citizenship.

In June, on the last month of the 1976 session of the South African Parliament, two Bills, the Electoral Laws Amendment Bill affecting White South African voters in the Transkei and the Coloured Persons Representative Council Amendment Bill affecting Transkei voters of the Coloured CRC, went through Parliament. The new⁵¹ provisions brought about by the amendments to the Electoral Laws Act provided that any person (White) who might qualify as a voter and who made his home in an independent state on or after the date of independence of that State, should be registered as a voter in the electoral division in which is situated the Magistrates office in the Republic of South Africa which is the nearest to his home as the crow flies. The second section regulated the position of those voters who were already registered in electoral divisions which on the date of independence of the new states were wholly or partly situated in that state. It provided that such voters should remain registered as voters in the divisions in which

they were registered as voters on the date of independence of the state in question and that they would remain so registered until further delimitation of electoral divisions, in which case the voters would be registered with magistrates offices in electoral divisions of the Republic nearest to them as the crow flies.

The amendments to the CRC Act,⁵² suggested in the Bill referred to above, provided for Coloured people living and resident in the Transkei to be able to "retain their right of participation in the highest Coloured representative body in the Republic," by having the right to be registered as voters and to vote for the CRC of the Republic of South Africa. As in the case of the new provision for Whites in the Electoral Laws Amendment Bill, later generations of Coloured voters could have themselves registered in a South African magistrates office nearest to them as the crow flies. According to the amendments the CRC would be able to use its funds and render services in independent Bantustans which would then be outside the Republic. Another Bill entitled Second Coloured Persons Education Amendment Bill was also introduced. It provided for the Coloured Persons Representative Council and the administration of Coloured Affairs in the Republic of continue taking care of the education of Coloureds in special Coloured Schools in the Transkei as has always been the case.

A number of South African Acts were, according to Chief Minister Matanzima, to be repealed with Transkei independence. These included, the Land Act 1913, Urban Areas 1923, Native Councils Act 1920, Colour Bar Act, Native Representation Trust and Land Act 1936, Urban Areas Consolidated Act 1945, Bantu Education Act 1953, Group Areas Act, Job Reservation Act and Industrial Conciliation Act.⁵³ Although the Chief Minister had said that these Acts would be scrapped because they were enacted to protect white interests to the detriment of the Black man,⁵⁴ there was no evidence that their scrapping would benefit the Transkei to any significant extent. Most of them had either become obsolete and irrelevant or unsuitable for the conditions prevailing in the Transkei. For instance, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which had formed the bases for Bantustanisation of South Africa, no longer served a purpose for the Transkei. The Bantu Education Act was only operative in the white areas of RSA and education in all Bantustans is controlled under the hand of the Education Departments of the various Bantustans. Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts do not apply in any Bantustan in South Africa. The Job Reservation Act is not operative in industries based both inside the Bantustans and the border Areas. The Industrial Conciliation Act, would perhaps be one Act that would have had a significantly advantageous effect for the people of the Transkei because it is the Act that regulates settlements of industrial disputes for White workers in the

Republic of South Africa. African workers in the Republic have always been excluded in the definition of employee for the purpose of this Act. As a result of this, they could not have legal trade unions which are provided for in the Act. Thus the scrapping of this Act in the Transkei implied that for as long as no similar alternative Act is put in operation, there would be no protection of the interest of Transkei workers inside the territory exactly as is the case in the Republic of South Africa.

It was reported that there would be a number of treaties between the two countries, South Africa and Transkei, covering the various aspects of defence and non-aggression, labour, movements of citizens between the two countries telecommunications and transport.⁵⁵ Details of the non-aggression pact, which would be the first between South Africa and a black African country, which is soon to be independent Transkei, were published in June 1976. The Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, had previously offered to sign similar pacts with all independent neighbouring states, but none was known to have taken up the offer.⁵⁶

In terms of article one of the pact, the two parties would undertake "never, for any reason whatsoever, to resort to the use of armed force against the territorial sovereignty and political independence of each other."⁵⁷ Both would undertake to strive for the solution of disputes through negotiation or other peaceful means. In terms of article two, the two parties would undertake not to allow their territory's, sea or air space to be used as a base or thoroughfare by any state, government, organisation or person for military, subversive or other hostile actions or activities. The parties would also agree to accord to each other the right of peaceful overflight of their airspace by military aircraft, as well as the right to innocent passage in their territorial sea and emergency shelter in harbours for naval vessels. The pact would be effective from the date of Transkei independence.

Economy

The economy of the Transkei is largely based on forestry and agriculture rather than commerce and mechanised industry, although a number of small industrial establishments have been cropping up in the growth points of Butterworth and Umtata. The forestry and agriculture sector, which contributes more than 35% of the gross national product, is the biggest employing sector of the Transkeian community, although most of the people are subsistence peasant farmers who are unable to make ends meet. As a result of this, a great number of them have to rely heavily on selling their labour to metropolitan South Africa to subsidise their income. Economic observers suggest that the sale of such labour in the Republic contributes nearly 70% of the Transkei gross national income.

The agricultural sector, which has been providing most employment opportunities, would inevitably offer less jobs with the improvement in agricultural methods and engagement of more scientific plans. This would leave the Transkei with little choice but to heighten the growth of industries. Reports have it that in the decade 1965-75, industrial development had generated 5630 jobs against an annual need of 26 000 jobs.⁵⁸

For the financial year 1976-77 the Transkei raised only 16% of its budget of R135,8 million from its own sources, the rest was subsidised by the South African Government. In May 1976, the Transkei Legislative Assembly approved an Exchequer and Audit Bill which provided for an appointment of an Auditor General. It also approved a General Loans Bill which would enable Transkei to raise loans locally and abroad to defray capital expenditure in respect of the physical development of the homeland. It enabled the Transkei to take up a foreign loan of R14 million to meet any shortfall in its budget. The provisions of this Loan Bill were put into operation on 30 June with the conclusion of a deal by the XDC, taking a loan of R12 million on behalf of the Transkei Government from international banks, Britain's Hill Samuel and the Dow Bank of the United States of America. The money would be made available to the Transkei Development Corporation for the funding of houses and to expand the infrastructure. The chairman of the XDC, Mr Paul Hoogendyk, described the acquisition of the loan as an historic occasion where international funds had, for the first time, been made available to an institution like the XDC to be used specifically for the development of the Transkei—the first homeland to become independent. "This is a meaningful and visual sign of confidence by foreign financial circles in the Transkei. Where some overseas political circles are in doubt over accepting the independence of the Transkei, this loan proves the opposite," said Mr Hoogendyk.⁵⁹

In terms of financial arrangements announced in the South African House of Assembly on 6 June 1976, all taxes and other monies paid to the South African Government by Transkei citizens in the Republic under the Bantu Taxation Act during the current financial year would be paid to the Transkei. Monies voted from the State Revenue fund during the current financial year for spending in and on behalf of the Transkei and not spent at the time of independence would be paid to the Transkei, plus any further amounts voted by Parliament for the Transkei.⁶⁰

With the coming independence the Transkei has been trying to interest industrialists in investing in the territory. The Government sponsored Xhosa Development Corporation has always been the midwife for economic growth and is largely in control of most industries.

It also has the greatest percentage control of private enterprise. Assets belonging to this body have, however, recently been handed over to a similar body with a new name, Transkei Development Corporation. This body, along with the Transkei leaders, has managed to secure the confidence of some industrialists. A senior executive of the newly found TDC gave assurance to industrialists, in a speech in Port Elizabeth, that those who had established factories in the Transkei would be fully compensated if their investments were nationalised after independence. Although, said the official Mr Maritz, the possibility of nationalisation was remote, "these things have happened in the past, and in such a case indemnity will be paid to the full value of industry at the time, not the value of the original investment." Mr Maritz who had been overseas with Chief George Matanzima, the Minister of Justice expected to be Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the post independence cabinet, said that European investors had shown tremendous interest in the Transkei.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei, Chief Kaizer Matanzima, who had gone to Europe in July 1975, came back with a claim that he had met industrialists in six European countries. He said that Italian and West German businessmen had promised to establish textile and motor assembly plants after independence. The Chief Minister said, "All the businessmen we met were very impressed by the Transkei's potential and by its political and social climate," because "such a situation is conducive to good industrialisation."⁶¹

In September 1975 it was announced that a European textile group was to set up a R2,5 million factory in Butterworth in the Transkei as the first phase of a R12,5 million project which would ultimately employ 1 400 people.⁶² In March 1976 the deal was concluded with the Italian industrialist, Mr G. Bertrand. The Bertrand group were reported to be the biggest acrylic spinners in Europe and the fourth biggest in acetate, and they would almost fulfill South Africa's need in acetate blend fancy yarns. This would save South Africa about R1,5 million a year in foreign exchange.⁶³ The first phase of production was expected to be in full swing by January 1977.

A white Transkei entrepreneur, Mr R. E. Blom, signed a R2 million agreement with an Argentinian Company for the manufacture of motor cycles in the Transkei. The project, which would be financed over five years by the Central Bank of Argentina, would employ about 400 people within a year. Discussing the deal Mr Blom said that his agreement with the Argentinian Zanella Industries, included technical knowhow, plant, staff and training facilities and that it provided for a school to be opened next to the factory, where factory

personnel would be trained.⁶⁴ Mr Blom later announced that he was negotiating a +R40 million industry with Renault Argentina for the manufacture of utility vehicles in Butterworth, Transkei, in addition to his motorcycle factory.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the Transkei Government was making plans to bolster the timber industry in the territory. In June 1976 the Government signed a 35 year contract with a private consortium to buy all timber in the plantations near Umtata. The consortium was established by the TDC with 40% share capital, the Sappi group and the Hans Merensky with 30% each.⁶⁶ It was estimated that the revenue from the forests concerned would be increased by the activity of the consortium from R250 000 to more than R1,2 million.

An agreement to establish a R1,5 million seaweed processing plant in Butterworth was reached between the Xhosa Development Corporation and the Taurus Chemical Manufacturing Company (Pty) Ltd. of Randburg. The plant would concentrate on the conversion of a seaweed into alginic acid and its derivatives, which are essential chemicals in food processing, petroleum, pharmaceutical and textile industries. The project would be embarked upon in phases. The first phase, which had started by October 1975, would be that of research; the second phase was that of factory construction for extraction of technical alginic acid from the kelp (giant seaweed). Other future phases, which would enable the plant to produce alginic salts and other derivatives later to reprocess residues for extraction of trace element, had already been planned. Commenting on the ability of the plant, Dr E. R. Becker the company's technical consultant, said the community would provide for its total internal requirement and would be able to export to satisfy R4 million worth of the demands. It was hoped that the plant would provide jobs for 300 Blacks.⁶⁷

The Transkei Minister of Agriculture, Mr Z. M. Mabandla, introduced proposals for the construction of a R19 million water supply and hydro-electric schemes in the Transkei. These would entail building a R11,1 million dam and two hydro-electric installations in the Umtata district and R8,1 million water supply scheme in the Libode district.⁶⁸

At the end of June 1976, the Transkei Chief Minister announced the establishment of the Transkei Bank under the leadership of the Volkskas Bank (an Afrikaans bank established by the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1934,⁶⁹ The bank would start off with a share capital of R2 million at the rate of 50c a share. The Volkskas would have 50,01% shares and 49,99% would be made available to approved people and other bodies.⁷⁰ The bank would operate from the Volkskas building in Umtata.

General Issues

Deep seated differences between the traditional opposition Democratic Party of the Transkei progressively depleted the power of the party in the past couple of years, and the rift came to a head with the eventual ousting from the leadership of Mr Knowledge Guzana—the man who had stood in the last two general elections of 1968 and 1973 against Matanzima—as leader of the opposition.

The internal politics of the Democratic Party shook the party seriously at the end of 1974 when the wing that was discontented with Guzana's leadership mobilized itself to some kind of reformist group and elected Mr Bongani Hector Ncokazi as its leader. Mr Ncokazi, who was seen as a leftist in terms of Transkei politics, soon incurred the disfavour of the Transkei Government, mainly because of his virulent attacks on the policies of the government, including the quest for independence which he saw as a move which would endanger the future of Transkeians. Mr Guzana continued to lead the main body of the Democratic Party until the 1975 party Congress in December, when he was unseated by his rival Ncokazi by 44 votes to 14. The majority of Guzana's key men subsequently refused to serve under Ncokazi and remained along with Guzana, apparently undecided about their political future. Ncokazi, however, declared that he had nothing against Guzana. He called on him to remain in the party and expressed hopes that the Legislative Assembly caucus of the party would elect him to represent the party in the Assembly; and that he and the party as a whole would give Mr Guzana every support. Mr Ncokazi was himself not a sitting member of the Assembly. He was known to be opposed to such membership on the grounds that it would be a frustrating waste of time" to sit in the "pseudo-parliament", as he called it.

When the fifth session of the third Legislative Assembly opened in the middle of March 1976, Transkei Chief Minister K. D. Matanzima announced that he would not recognise the new leader of the Democratic Party, Mr Ncokazi, as the Leader of the Opposition. He declared that he still recognized Mr Guzana as the official Leader of the Opposition, whereupon Guzana formed a party called the New Democratic Party of which he became Leader. He got the support of five other members of the Democratic Party, who were sitting members of the Assembly.

The ruling Transkei National Independence Party cashed in on the disputes within the Democratic Party ranks and got a number disenchanted Democrats crossing the floor, including Paramount Chief Tutor Ndamase, son of the late founder of the Party, Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland. Since then two opposition parties in the Transkei, one based inside the Assembly promoting multi-racialism and protection of minority groups, opposed to Transkei independence in principle, but participating in the necessary prepar-

ations for independence; the other based outside the Assembly, propagating multi-racialism and protection of minority groups in a united South Africa, opposed to Transkei independence in principle and doing everything in its power to stop the programme.

Speaking during the debate on the no-confidence motion piloted by Mr Guzana in the Assembly, the Transkei Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima, called on the Legislative Assembly to express grave concern at the communistic orientation of the Democratic Party which wanted to impose a "Marxist Transkei State on the unwilling inhabitants," and of seeking to sow "chaos and confusion in the Transkei before, during, and after the independence celebrations," said the Chief referring to the Party under Ncokazi's leadership.⁷¹ He went on to say, "As I have said, there are signs and suggestions pointing to the activities of the communists in the Transkei. Hence I seek a directive from this House for dealing with such elements." This talk made many people anticipate a tough future for the Ncokazi supporters in the territory. It actually shook his remaining two followers inside the Assembly to dissociating themselves with him for his alleged communistic orientation and they chose to sit as independents. These included one of the old Democratic Party stalwarts, Thembuland Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyabo who said: "When Mr Ncokazi was made leader of the Democratic Party we were not aware he was being called a communist and a saboteur. My Thembus do not want to be involved in revolutions or anything like that." He added "I shall stand back for the moment until the Government works this out. If they call Mr Ncokazi a communist they must arrest him and try him in court."⁷²

Ncokazi himself denied having any communist links. He said that Chief George "must not use parliamentary privilege. He must say these things outside the Assembly." He said that the Matanzima Government was making a scarecrow of him to frighten away his supporters. Paramount Chief Sabata, Dalindyabo however, later rejoined Ncokazi and went addressing several meetings inside and outside the Transkei opposing Independence. At a meeting in Guzana's parliamentary constituency he called on the people not to return Guzana to the Assembly in future elections because he had defected from the party.⁷³

At the Congress of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party which met a couple of days before the session of the Legislative Assembly in the middle of March, Party Leader, Chief Kaizer Matanzima, announced that he was to open negotiations with Pretoria for the release, before independence, of all Transkei citizens imprisoned on Robben Island. He also declared that all Transkeians in exile abroad were invited to return and could apply for passports. "The Transkeian citizens who went into exile because of fear of apprehension under the

Republican laws, may now apply for passports and visas from our Government," Chief Kaizer said.⁷⁴ He warned, however, that "loyalty to the Government of the Transkei would be expected from all;" and any "acts of disloyalty will be firmly controlled."⁷⁵ The possibility of the release of Robben Island prisoners of Transkeian origin, including men like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govin Mbeki, was seen by many to have the potential of boosting Matanzima's image and score some points for the emergent Transkei state in the world community. When a formal request was made to the South African Government by the Transkei cabinet, it was rejected by the Minister of Justice, Mr Kruger.

A trouble spot had been developing in the North Western part of the Transkei in the districts of Matatiele and Mount Fletcher where flares of tribalism invoked by the Government's ethnic differentiation policy threatened peace in the past year. The trouble arose out of the claim by Sotho speaking leaders of the area that if the Government's policy of separate development had to be carried to its logical conclusion, the Basotho of the area should join the Qwa-Qwa homeland which had been created for the Sotho tribe. As early as August 1975, tension between the Sotho and Xhosa speaking people in the area came into the open, with allegations that the Transkei Minister of Health, Chief Jeremiah Moshesh who is one of the Sotho leaders from the area, supported a plan to merge the area with Qwa-Qwa. Earlier in 1975, Chief Moshesh had taken a surprising step when he prosecuted a TLA member, Mr M. P. Ludidi, under Proclamation R400 for holding a meeting in his area without the necessary permission from him. Mr Ludidi (a Hlubi leader, Xhosa speaking) was the Secretary General of the ruling TNIP of which the Chief himself was a member.⁷⁶ A few months later, Mr Joe Zeka a Thembu (Xhosa speaking) and a known opponent of the Qwa-Qwa movement, was banished under Proclamation R400 from a predominantly Thembu area to a Sotho area. The Xhosa speaking leadership in the area formed what they called a Lundi Council to work for co-operation in resisting Sotho domination. One of the Council's first moves was to start a campaign for the name of the area to be changed from Maloti (the Sotho name which had always been used for the region) to Lundi. The Council encouraged Xhosa speaking people living under Sotho chiefs to break away and form their own tribal authorities.⁷⁷

Expressing the feelings of his people, one Chief from the Queen's Mercy area of Matatiele district, Chief N. Moshesh, said. "The Government has given all other tribes that live in South Africa self-rule except the Basotho living in East Griqualand. According to the policy of the Central Government, no race has to rule another race. In the case of the Basotho of East Griqualand, the policy is applied differently

Proclamation R400 is meant to silence the people of Matatiele.”⁷⁸ The Chief complained that there were five Basotho Chiefs who were being placed under Xhosa rule, and that Sesotho was not an official language in the Transkei, those who spoke it had difficulty in getting things done for them at some government offices in the Transkei.

There were reports that deputations had been sent several times to Pretoria to raise the matter with the Department of Bantu Administration, and Qwa-Qwa Government leaders had also come into the matter. In a meeting in December 1975 held at Witsieshoek the Qwa-Qwa capital, more than 60 top Basotho from all over South Africa decided to consider the feasibility of a court interdict against Transkei independence until the position of the Basotho in the territory had been resolved. The meeting, which was chaired by Qwa-Qwa's Chief Minister, Mr K. Mopeli, had representatives from the areas of Matatiele and Herschel, recently ceded from Ciskei to Transkei. The Transkei Minister of Health Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, however, denied any connection with the Qwa-Qwa move. The only time when he was reported to have shown disagreement with Chief Matanzima, was when the Chief Minister declared that “Morena Boloka”, the Sotho continuation of the black South African anthem “Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika” was irrelevant in the Transkei, and should not be sung as part of the official anthem of the independent Transkei.

In the Transkei Legislative Assembly the Secretary General of the ruling TNIP sponsored a motion that caused a stir inside and outside the Assembly. It called on the Transkei government to make personal grants of farms which had been transferred to the Transkei in the consolidation process, to Paramount Chiefs and to other people who had “rendered faithful service in the development of their country.” The farms, Mr Ludidi said, should be settled in such a way that their economic value would not deteriorate, “But the question whether the Paramount Chiefs would farm productively, is beside the point. I am concerned that the government should recognise the role the Paramount Chiefs have played in our long and non-violent progress to independence.” It turned out, however, that weeks before the motion was put before the Assembly some two huge farms near Queenstown, which were to have formed the basis of a big Transkei Development Corporation's cattle ranching project, had been taken over by Paramount Chief Kaizer Matanzima and his brother George. It was learned that the Transkei Development Corporation had already appointed a Manager to run the cattle ranch of almost 2 000 hectares on the farms. When he arrived at the homestead at Hafton farm, he found that Chief George Matanzima had already started moving in and that the Chief Minister had also been moving livestock and furniture into the nearby Webbworth farm.⁷⁹

Ciskei

Land Claims and Consolidation

As was reported in *Black Review* 1974-75, the Ciskei Legislative Assembly decided in a special session to cede the two districts of Glen Grey and Herschel to the Transkei in return for other land which would consolidate the Ciskei into a closer knit territory. A Government Proclamation excising the two areas from the control of the Ciskei was gazetted at the beginning of November 1975. For those inhabitants of Glen Grey and Herschel who wished to remain citizens of the Ciskei, land would be purchased for their settlement elsewhere. Glen Grey inhabitants had been allocated four pieces of land in the Queenstown district. These were the farms: Pavet, portion one of the farm Newhaustead, portion one of the farm Bushby Park and another piece which would form the remainder of Bushby Park. For the inhabitants of Herschel, land was made available on Bushmans Kranz farm.

There was evidence to suggest that the Ciskei Government was not particularly pleased to lose the populations of the two ceded districts. Every effort was being made to encourage the people to move to the new areas. Mr N. J. Mkrola, who was acting Chief Minister when the Ciskei Chief Minister, Mr Lennox Sebe, had been temporarily deposed, announced in September 1975 that his cabinet would facilitate the inspection of the alternative Ciskei land by Glen Grey and Herschel householders working as migrants in the urban areas. He said 95 men working in Cape Town would be taken on a conducted tour of some of the farms and that they would travel from Cape Town by bus. Similar tours would be organised for men working in Johannesburg, Germiston, Kliptown, Sharpeville, Welkom and Bloemfontein.⁷¹ The Ciskei even named the new areas to replace Herschel and Glen Grey Ntab'ethemba (Mountain of Hope) and Izwe Leding (Land of the Covenant), respectively. However, by 1 December, the purchasing of the promised land had not yet been effected when the Transkei took control of the released areas, and the Ciskei Government still had nowhere to settle the communities that were not keen to live under the Transkei government administration. As a result many of them, mainly from the Glen Grey area, apparently in a panic move "trekked" to Sada in the neighbouring Ciskei district of Whittlesea where they occupied school buildings as refugees.

Addressing a crowd at New Brighton township in Port Elizabeth at a special dedication of two truck-loads of food, collected for distribution to families accommodated in Sada classrooms, Ciskei Chief Minister, Mr Lennox Sebe, accused the South African Government and the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, of insulting the Ciskei

Government and its people, and of making them refugees in their land of birth.⁷² In a strong retaliatory statement, Mr Botha revealed that it had been established that in fact the so-called refugees, estimated at about 1 009 (87 families), had in fact moved at the instigation of the Ciskei Government and had been transported to Sada in Ciskei Government trucks. The Minister claimed that in terms of the agreement with the Ciskei Government, all people who wished to remain as Ciskeians had only to register their names as Ciskeian voters and that they would be moved to new areas when the necessary land had been acquired.⁷³

As a move to accommodate as many people who wanted to remain under the Ciskei government as possible, Mr L. L. Sebe said in a statement that steps were being taken by the CLA to amend the Ciskei Constitution Proclamation so as to include also some Whittlesea farms as compensation for Glen Grey and Herschel which were excised to the Transkei. Amongst those areas which declared their wish to leave Ciskei to join Transkei, was in the district of Hewu (Whittlesea) at the Zulu-Kama Tribal Authority where more than 1 500 people resolved that Hewu should secede from Ciskei to join Transkei before independence. Commenting on the secession, a spokesman for the Hewu people, Mr M. Nweba of Johannesburg, said that people had made their decision and were unlikely to reverse it.

Ciskei Legislative Assembly preferred the town of Alice, which had been zoned black in December 1975, as the capital of the Ciskei. For years Zwelitsha (a township near King William's Town) had been considered as the prospective capital of the Ciskei. The Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, said that all government departments would move to Alice. Alice was chosen for its convenience as it was totally black hence there would be no need for division into white and black areas. The town was also central and had a historical and academic background that was essential for Ciskeians. Whilst it would be impossible to develop Zwelitsha, the Chief Minister was optimistic that Alice, because of its distance from large white settlements, would be easy to develop effectively. He also revealed that the South African Government had vouched to finance the project.

The leader of the opposition, Chief J. Mabandla, who opposed the motion of Alice being the capital, said that he regarded King William's Town as the capital of the Ciskei. He suggested that the Ciskei Government should ask the South African Government to release King William's Town to Ciskei, especially because Ciskeians knew King William's Town as the administrative seat of Ciskei and that it had the greatest concentration of Blacks around it.⁷⁴

Other areas which were envisaged for Ciskei were the Cat River Valley (at present White area); Nojoli Mountain at Somerset East and the Gamtoos River as boundaries of the Ciskei.⁷⁵

Political Development

The sensational political squabbles continued to rage within the Ciskei political circles during the year under review. These occurred mainly between the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP), the opposition Ciskei National Party (CNP) and within the CNIP itself resulting in a party split. It was during this period that quite a number of chiefs were created by the Ciskei government which resulted in the Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, himself being made a Chief. According to the Ciskei constitution every chief in the Ciskei is an ex-officio member of the Legislative Assembly. Amongst notable political developments within the Ciskei was the establishment of a new Department of Health under a cabinet minister. In a cabinet reshuffle, the former Minister of Interior, Mr L. F. Siyo, was made Minister of Health.

After the election of candidates for the Zwelitsha division had been nullified at the Grahamstown election trial, October 1975 was set as the date for by-elections. It should be remembered that according to the verdict of the trial, all the candidates who had won the 1973 elections for Zwelitsha division had to step down but could, nevertheless, stand for election again if they so wished. Therefore Mr L. L. Sebe and his colleagues had to descend from their seats in the Legislative Assembly. Immediately after leaving his position as Chief Minister, news spread that Mr L. L. Sebe would remain in the Ciskei political background as the cabinet's economic advisor. Political observers saw this move as a means to retain Mr Sebe in the cabinet with the intention of keeping him "in the thick of things until he returns to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly if and when he is re-elected."⁷⁶ In yet another bid, seen by observers as intended to gain more votes for the ruling party, the CLA resolved to ask the South African Government to have the electoral divisions amended so that the Zibula Tribal Authority in the Stutterheim district and the Released Areas 32 and 52 in the Mdantsane magisterial district could be incorporated into the soon to be contested Zwelitsha constituency. It was believed that CNIP would embark on an intensive campaign in support of their side when and if these two districts were included in the Zwelitsha division.⁷⁷ Thereby it was hoped, especially from CNIP circles, that Mr L. L. Sebe would make a victorious come-back as Chief Minister. As has been mentioned above, the CNIP officials and supporters had indulged themselves in strong campaigns for votes in favour of their men namely: Messrs L. L. Sebe, V. V. Nqezo, E. D. Nkotso, T. Sam. Nominations for the opposition CNP pointed at Mr L. S. Mtoba, who had been the leading plaintiff at the Grahamstown Supreme Court, Mr P. F. Guzana, Mr M. M. Puti and Mr T. Simandla.⁷⁸

Mr Sebe and his colleagues all won the seats with good majorities and they were restored in the CLA. At election time there was considerable enmity between supporters of the CNIP and CNP. This was evidenced by the chaos and violence that accompanied the elections, where knives, axes, electric cords, sticks, etc., were flying in the air.⁷⁹ Immediately after the Sebe team had been sworn in as CLA members at a special session of the Assembly held in November, Mr L. L. Sebe was re-elected as the Chief Minister of the Ciskei. He beat his opponent, Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile, by 29 to 13 votes.

It must be noted that in nominating their candidate for chief minister-ship, the opposition party had not brought forward the name of their leader, Chief Justice Mabandla. Apparently this was done as a strategy to gain more support for the party from the Rarabe tribe of which Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile was head, and where he was expected to have decisive support. Three new cabinet ministers were appointed by Mr Sebe when he announced his new cabinet. The new ministers were: Chief Payment Siwani of the Mdushane tribe at Tamara, King William's Town, who was appointed to the Department of Agriculture, Chief W. Z. Njokweni of Peddie for the Department of Roads and Works, and Chief L. W. Maqoma as the Minister of Justice.⁸⁰

Towards the end of 1975, splinters of division within the CNIP were observable. On the one hand was the Chief Minister L. L. Sebe and his strong CNIP members and on the other Mr S. Burns Ncamashe, his Minister of Education. By this time Mr Ncamashe had been made a chief and, therefore, an ex-officio member of the Legislative Assembly, so he could sit in parliament even as an independent member. As a result of this rift, Chief Burns Ncamashe did not comply with CNIP expectations and collaborated with the opposition CNP, especially in the Victoria East constituency election campaigns. Rumours had spread that Chief Ncamashe would resign from the ruling party to join the CNP.

Following the verdict at the Supreme Court in Grahamstown, similar intensive campaigns were embarked upon by both parties at the Victoria East division. Voting would be for two seats.

The CNIP had four candidates who were, however, divided into two groups in terms of the rift referred to above. Mr L. L. Sebe was supporting one set of candidates—the CNIP “official” ones, whilst on the other hand Chief S. Burns Ncamashe was backing the “unofficial” group. This rift was widened by the tensions in the party caused by detente launched in Victoria East by Burns-Ncamashe with the opposition party. This peace move had been initiated by chiefs who wanted to prevent violent outbreaks between supporters of the two parties. Some sections of the CNIP had severely criticized Burns Ncamashe for collaborating with opposition chiefs and apparently

harming the image of the party. This step, taken by Chief Ncamashe, was said to have deterred effective campaigning by CNIP members. Candidates for CNIP were A. Z. Lamani, W. Ximiya, A. Ndindwa, and B. Ngaba; while candidates for CNP were N. Gamanda, A. Linda, and R. Swaartbooi. However, the CNIP candidates supported by Chief L. L. Sebe won the Legislative Assembly seats with majority. The opposition party aired its dissatisfaction with the way the Victoria East by-elections had been conducted. However, these complaints were dismissed by Mr Sebe as unfounded and only an indication of frustration resulting from defeat.

Most members of the ruling party had strongly voiced their discontent with the way Chief Ncamashe was representing the CNIP. They had observed that Chief Burns Ncamashe had diverted from the CNIP route and was, therefore, disloyal to the party. Because of all these hang-ups about Chief Ncamashe it did not come as a surprise to the public when reports came that he had been expelled from the ruling party in November 1975. However, Chief Ncamashe was retained in his position as the Minister of Education. Apparently, the reason for not removing Chief Ncamashe in the first reshuffle was that the Chief Minister did not have a suitable candidate with qualifications which fitted the position of Minister of Education.

An employee of the Department of Education, Mr D. M. Jongilanga, who was an education planner, was then made a chief. This would enable him to become a member of the Legislative Assembly. Soon after Mr Jongilanga had been installed as a chief, reports came that Chief S. Burns Ncamashe had been sacked from his position as the Minister of Education and Chief Jongilanga was sworn in to take his place. It became apparent that by not initially removing Chief Ncamashe from his post, the Chief Minister was still playing for time whilst organising for a new man whom he found in the person of Chief Jongilanga. In January 1976 after his dismissal, Chief Burns Ncamashe formed his new political party called the Ciskei National Unionist Party. There had been strong speculations that Chief Ncamashe would affiliate to the CNP because of Chief Ncamashe's alliance with CNP and because of his agreement with the party on three major issues. However, Chief Ncamashe broke away and attracted some supporters of both CNIP and CNP especially from in and around Alice. He formed his new party which aimed at strengthening "solidarity of our nation" and to bolster a strong feeling of national consciousness among their compatriots. Observations were being made of strong indications that the two opposition parties might coalesce in the fight for the 1978 general election against the CNIP.⁸¹ Leaders of both parties were not opposed to coalition but there had never been any positive move towards this direction. Like all parties participating in homeland

politics, the CNUP accepted apartheid "temporarily", the central policy being based on the land issue. Chief Ncamashe said the CNUP would strive for the union and not federation of the envisaged black states of South Africa.⁸²

Subsequent to Chief Ncamashe's dismissal, the CLA gave a go-ahead to the Chief Minister of the Ciskei to request the South African Government to remove the legislation which required the State President to approve, in the event of expulsions of cabinet ministers, before they could be implemented by the Chief Minister. Speaking on the motion, Chief L. L. Sebe said that he saw no point why the Chief Minister could not dismiss cabinet ministers while he had been empowered with the responsibility of appointing them.⁸³ Attacking the motion, Chief Burns Ncamashe, who had remained in Parliament as the sole representative of the CNUP, said that the motion had not been prompted by the principle of political development but "by Mr Sebe's personal consideration". He added: "No country two years old wants a dictator."⁸⁴ Observers saw this as a safety valve which the Chief Minister earmarked to use in times of crisis or when he wanted to remove anyone privately without valid reasons. He was following a practice which was already in existence in other Bantustans like Bophuthatswana and Transkei.

In a cabinet reshuffle effected in June, the Chief Minister excluded the Minister of Interior, Mr Myataza, and in turn appointed Chief L. Maqoma, former Minister of Justice, into the portfolio. It was reported that pressure had been applied on Mr Sebe to have Mr Myataza removed so as to improve the image of the CNIP which had been blurred by *inter-alia* some of Myataza's public utterances which were seen by members of the CNIP as being unministerial. Apparently rumours of his possible removal had leaked as early as October 1975 and therefore this exclusion did not come as a surprise to Mr Myataza. Mr Myataza had attacked Mdantsane and Zwelitsha Township councils for being inept. Such utterances were severely criticized by members of the CNIP especially because they had been backed by members of the opposition.⁸⁵ In Mr Myataza's case, it appeared that the Chief Minister was using his axing powers which he had asked for from the State President earlier in the year.

During the period 1975-76, there was a continuation of an exodus of people employed in the Ciskei civil service, who for various reasons, joined the Transkei civil service. An epidemic of fear had spread amongst most people employed by the Ciskei government who were waiting for the guillotine of expulsion to fall on them. As a result of this fear most people had remained either inactive politically or secretly opposed to the system they were working for. The Ciskei Public Service Act barred Ciskei civil employees from affiliating or actively partici-

pating in politics. According to the Act, they could only attend political gatherings and only ask questions which did not throw the Ciskei Government into bad public light. Therefore, from various interviews with employees of the Ciskei Government, *Black Review* gathered that anyone who publicly criticised the ruling party, belonged to the opposition party or to any other organisation which opposed the Ciskei Government or the Homelands policy, was always viewed with suspicion, dismissed from work or transferred to remote areas of the Ciskei.

Amongst those who had resigned out of disillusion were Mr A. M. D. Dlakavu and Mr E. N. Martius who said that they had been disgusted with "petty party politics" permeating the Ciskei government employ. They both confirmed that a lot of people were planning to leave the Ciskei while others had already left. Mr Dlakavu added that the mode of operation in the Ciskei was such that if one was a civil servant, one was expected to belong to the ruling party. The usual tactic was to demote a person so that in disgust he could leave and by so doing "the Ciskei is chasing all its intelligentsia. Qualifications are not the greatest asset in the Ciskei. You have to be a government supporter."⁸⁶ An example of Ciskei employees who were transferred to remote areas of the Ciskei was Mr Simon Mlonyeni who was transferred to Sterkspruit at just about the time when Herschel was to be ceded to the Transkei. Mr Simon Mlonyeni, who had already been promoted into first grade division, at the time of the transfer, was known to be opposed to executive Bantustan politics. Instead of complying with the terms of his transfer, Mr Mlonyeni resigned from his post.

The year 1976 opened with lots of controversies between the Ciskei parties. The key issue, which widened the political squabbles in the Ciskei, was the amalgamation of the Ciskei and the Transkei. Transkei had been insisting that Ciskei and Transkei should amalgamate into one Xhosa speaking state. However, the Ciskei ruling party was categorically opposed to this proposal, viewing it as a Transkei steamroller. The two Ciskei opposition parties were keen on the merger of the two homelands. They were, therefore, fighting hard to convince the Ciskeians that amalgamation would be a step in the right direction. In a motion on amalgamation tabled by the leader of the opposition of wanting to "perpetrate tribalism under the cloak of nationalism"; Chief Jongilanga also added that since they were opposed to independence which had been forced down the Transkeian's throat, then if they accepted amalgamation with the Transkei it implied that they automatically accepted independence "without being sure where this independence was leading."⁸⁷ The former Minister of Interior, Mr B. D. Myataza, and a CNIP active member supporting Mr Jongilanga said that the opposition party only wanted to amalgamate sections of the South

African soil, which was tantamount to the divide and rule policy which they heavily criticised. Apparently the CNIP feared domination by the Transkei leadership if amalgamation was effected. They felt that Transkei did not only want amalgamation but they wanted . . . assimilation of the Ciskei into the Transkei. In heated words, the opposition leader accused the ruling party of wanting to divide Xhosas so that they could fight each other. He expressed that amalgamation of Transkei and Ciskei would inevitably result in swallowing up of so called white spots between the two Bantustans. Chief Ncamashe of the CNUP, supporting Chief Mabandla, strongly accused the ruling party of perpetrating the British colonial policy which had divided the Xhosa land into the Transkei and Ciskei. He said the existence of two separate Xhosa nations in one province was foolish and should be done away with.⁸⁸ He had called on the Ciskei government to have a referendum to weigh the feelings of Ciskeians on the amalgamation issue.⁸⁹ The amalgamation proposal had also been promoted by Pretoria in a bid to solve the Transkei citizenship problem. The South African government had wanted to simplify the definition of a Transkei citizen. According to the Transkei constitution, any person who was presently a citizen of Transkei, or anyone whose origin could be traceable to the Transkei, would automatically be regarded as a citizen of the new Transkei state. To simplify the issue, the South African government wanted to confer citizenship on any Xhosa or Sotho people who were born in or out of the Transkei who were not citizens of any other Bantustan except the Ciskei. Mr Sebe was adamant on his rejection of this merger. Speculations had it that the opposition parties, viz. CNP and CNUP, were joining forces in attempts to amalgamate the two homelands. This has resulted in yet another widening of the gap between the ruling party and the CNUP.

Another dispute catalyst in Ciskei political circles arose with the death of Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile of the Rarabe tribes in May 1976. His son, Maxhobayakhawuleza, was still too young to replace him, and there was a need for a regent. The Paramount Chief had been a key member of the opposition CNP, and the question of who would succeed him became a very crucial one politically. The ruling CNIP wanted to have someone from their own camp to replace him, while the opposition wished to retain their favourable position with the royalty. According to an act passed by the CLA, wives of deceased chiefs could become regents for their sons who were not yet in a position to replace their fathers. Hence at the funeral of the paramount chief, it was announced that his wife, Mrs Nolizwe Sandile would take up the reigns. The opposition CNP supported this view happily because Mrs Sandile continued to support the party.

However, the ruling CNIP were pushing for the Ciskei Cabinet Minister, Chief L. Maqoma, to fill the position as he had also been a close relative of the Paramount Chief. Dismissing Mrs Sandile's claim, the Minister of Health, Mr L. F. Siyo, said that the act had referred only to ordinary chiefs; there was clarity in regard to the case of paramount chiefs.⁹⁰ As a result of the dispute the CNIP controlled CLA decided to submit the two names of Mrs Sandile and Chief Maqoma to the State President, who, according to South African legislation, reserves the right to appoint or dismiss tribal chiefs in his capacity as the "supreme chief" of the Africans. In the meantime, the magistrate of the Zwelitsha district, within which the great place was established, issued a notice in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act, banning all meetings at the royal kraal until the issue of succession had been resolved. At the time of going to print the State President had not yet announced his choice for the disputed throne.

The matter had already invoked strong feelings of enmity between the rival parties and was likely to aggravate the position when the State President made his decision.

Economy

The economy of the Ciskei was centred mainly around agriculture although Ciskei still depended on the Republic for most of the agricultural produce like milk, butter, etc. Large contribution to farming had been initiated by white farmers, who unlike most Africans in the Ciskei, had not been required to sell their stock. Other agricultural farms with any significant contribution were those which had been taken over from white farmers who had left the Ciskei as a result of the homeland's consolidation. The Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry has therefore been striving to develop or to improve on those farms, embarking on various agricultural development programmes. These included, the establishment of agricultural colleges, like the one being built between Alice and Hogsback, sponsored by the Anglo American Group's Chairman's Fund as part of social responsibility projects, involving R1,8 million.⁹¹ This department was also offering bursaries to students who wanted to proceed with agriculture as a career. A number of bursaries were awarded to students interested in further agricultural studies. The University of Fort Hare, which is situated in Ciskei area, has always offered courses in agricultural science. According to the Ciskei Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, twenty-six bursaries were to study for degrees in agriculture at Fort Hare. Agreements had also been made with the white University of Stellenbosch and the white Onderstepoort Research Institute attached to the University of Pretoria, for education in agriculture and veterinary science, of some two and

three Ciskeians respectively. Asked for the details of the value of the Ciskei's agricultural products, the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, said that by 1973-74 the value was R4,681,000. This amount was expected to increase yearly.

Industry is at a low ebb in the Ciskei and therefore most Ciskeian workers exhaust their services and potential in the white-declared towns like King Williams Town, East London, Queenstown; and a large section of the male population work in far off places like Johannesburg and Cape Town as imigrant workers. The Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, has been encouraging investors, be they foreign or local, to develop the Ciskei. These industries would be sold to Ciskeian's industries or XDC after and in an agreed period. Not much was achieved from this invitation. Dimbaza and Sada were earmarked for huge industrial development but so far very few entrepreneurs had opened industries in these places. The XDC, which was engaged in the industrial development of the Ciskei, established some factories at Dimbaza including the R1 million bicycle assembly plant established jointly between XDC, Port Elizabeth steel company and a West German company. There was also a factory for spectacle cases. It was also reported by the Chief Minister that a number of industrialists had agreed to set up factories in Dimbaza in terms of the White Agency Agreement whereby White investors would establish factories and manage them for an agreed period after which they would either sell them to black entrepreneurs or, if none were in a position to handle the project, XDC would run them in trust for any Ciskeians who might be interested to take over when ready to do so. Mr Helmut Schwarte, a Paarl businessman, was interested in putting up a radiator factory which would provide job opportunities for 60 Blacks; Premastic Ciskei (Pty) Ltd., manufacturers of prestressed concrete roof shells, would establish a factory worth R400,000 providing jobs for 35 people.⁹²

With the emergence of the Umanyano Bus Service, the Ciskei bus company, wherein black businessmen could buy shares, the total disappearance of Border Passenger Transport Service occurred. XDC, which had handled the venture since Mdantsane Bus strikes in June 1975, had 51% shares while 49% would be open to those citizens who could afford. This came into full operation from November 1975. It was expected that small bus operators would, in future, be amalgamated into the new bus company.⁹³

In a move to handle its own economic development projects, Ciskei established Ciskei National Development Corporation. The CNDC would take over most projects from XDC and was geared up to concentrating on agricultural development of the Ciskei and to providing financial and other help to Ciskei business. This body employed 1 000 Ciskeians and 100 Whites. The first board of directors for the CNDC

became: Miss E. N. Mzazi, Rev P. Ncaca, Rev N. Haya and Mr C. Ngxiki. The manager of the XDC, Mr Meisenhall, became the chairman of the CNDC Board. This move was a completion of the process of breaking down the XDC, where the Transkei Development Corporation and the CNDC were established separately to take over XDC activities in the respective areas of Transkei and Ciskei.

General Issues

Amongst the mentionable developments in the Ciskei was the emergence of the so-called Sebe's "soldiers" also known as "green berets" named after their uniform of khaki suits and green berets. These men came from all over the Ciskei to volunteer their services not only to the ruling Party but the aim of protecting the Chief Minister. Having settled in Zwelitsha with their families, they pitched tent at the Zwelitsha flats which were still under construction. On completion of the flats, they were then evicted from the flats and thereafter they were congregated at Zwelitsha hall for some time until they were transferred to some prefabricated wooden houses which had been used as a school, for temporary occupation. These soldiers, untrained, were loyal CNIP supporters and had a duty to protect CNIP hierarchy.

The beginning of 1976 saw the launching of the Ciskei Information Service almost similar to the South African information service of the Department of Information. This division would be under the Department of the Chief Minister and Finance. Various information officers would be planted in different regions of the Ciskei to collect any information which might be useful for the Ciskei Information Service. Heading this Division was Zwelitsha-based Mr V. V. V. Hoyana as principal information officer. The Ciskei Government intensified its campaign to have more Ciskeians as registered citizens of the homeland. People opposed to carrying the citizenship certificates had some privileges closed for them. For instance, the Ciskei Government service required that applicants for jobs be registered citizens, before they could be legible for employment or promotion. The Ciskei Public Service Commission had released a circular which demanded that citizenship cards be priorities before employment could be effected. It read: "As the machinery to obtain citizenship has been in existence for some time now and all the Government officers are fully aware of the fact that the Public Service Act requires that a person had to be a citizen to be appointed permanently, the Cabinet has ruled that unless a public servant has submitted proof that he is a Ciskeian citizen or that he has applied for such citizenship he will not be appointed in a permanent post capacity or be promoted."⁹⁴ This condition was applicable to all Ciskei employees (notable Africans) including those employed by the Education Department, like teachers. This move was seen by observers

as undiplomatic because most people were sceptical about the validity of the whole system of Bantustans and others who were totally opposed to the policy but were still working in the Ciskei, were likely to leave their jobs rather than bind themselves to Ciskei citizenship. This was yet another cause for a remarkable "great trek" of most qualified personnel from the Ciskei to seek new pastures elsewhere.⁹⁵ This question of citizenship also raised a furore in the Ciskei Legislative Assembly when some members from the ruling and opposition parties felt that registration as a voter was enough identification with the Ciskei. One CNIP member went further to say that these citizenship certificates were meant to deprive urban Blacks of their legitimate rights in urban areas. Opposition leader, Chief Mabandla, said in support of this rejection: "Any law that discriminates is dirty. Citizenship certificates will cause the people in the urban areas to lose their rights and be forced to stay in one particular area."⁹⁶ Observers saw such utterances as self-contradictory coming from people who were deeply involved in the apartheid structure yet attacking the policy from within. Unless a person was in possession of citizenship certificates, he would struggle to get a place to live in. By barring him from getting a house in any Ciskei township or getting a site, the Ciskei Government was tightening the rope of citizenship around anyone concerned. In desperation people were likely to take these certificates for the sake of getting houses to live in.

Since the establishment of Ciskei Department of Health, the Ciskei had made approaches to various hospitals within the Ciskei area to take over the administration thereof. Plans to take over the mission hospitals of St. Matthews (Kieskammahoek) and Lovedale (Alice) were still unconcluded. However, agreements had been made between Ciskei officials and the administration of Mount Coke Methodist hospital near King William's Town. The Ciskei Government was due to take over by August 1976. In a typical Ciskei pattern, a list of names of people regarded as undesirable to the Ciskei Government had already been submitted to Mount Coke Superintendent, Dr R. S. McDaide. It was believed that most of those people included in the list were either members or supporters of the opposition parties. Mr Mtoba's name, a leading CNP member and Sebe opponent who was employed as a senior clerk at Mount Coke, was reported to be in the list. The Ciskei government recommended that these be excluded from Mount Coke staff even before the take-over.⁹⁷ The Ciskei government also assumed complete control of the new Mdantsane hospital.

The Ciskei was planning to construct a R200 million port at Hamburg. Hamburg had not yet been incorporated into the Ciskei. If consolidation proposals succeeded, the Ciskei Government would then proceed with its plans. The port would serve the interests of the Ciskei especially

economically. It was expected that the harbour would attract industrialists, hoteliers and businessmen to open businesses there.⁹⁸

Late in 1975, the Ciskei Department of Roads and Works arranged for the training of 12 men, for a start, as traffic officers. These men would be posted to various parts of the Ciskei.⁹⁹ By the middle of 1976 these men had completed their course and had commenced duties as traffic officers.

Kwa-Zulu

Land Claims and Consolidation

Land consolidation in Kwa-Zulu has always been a rather controversial issue especially after the 1973 declaration by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development that consolidation of Kwa-Zulu would take at least twelve years.

At present Kwa-Zulu is composed of 48 separate pieces or units which shall, according to standing proposals, be consolidated into ten units including the Makatini plains, the Nongoma territory, the Tugela Northern Natal unit, the Southern Natal coastal strip, Mpendle-Pietermaritzburg and Reservation No. 10 in the vicinity of Richards Bay. Kwa-Zulu presently covers an area of three million hectares, and the homeland has always voiced dissatisfaction with the amount of land allotted to it. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi feels that the proposals by SA Government of land reserved for the territory "would not improve the economic base of Kwa-Zulu." He said, at a congress of the Chamber of Commerce at Sani Pass, that these proposals of land distribution and consolidation of the homeland had no bearing on what the Zulus wanted, but rather they were, "the enforcement of the White Government's plans for consolidation into pieces which do not make a single Zulu heart leap." No negotiations had been entered into between the White SA Government and the "powerless Blacks" on the consolidation issue.¹⁰⁰ However, Chief Buthelezi added that despite the fact that Kwa-Zulu regarded consolidation plans as inadequate, they should not spend all their time expressing this. He said, "We realise that if we allow ourselves to shed only tears of self-pity, we may drown in these tears without getting anywhere near our liberation."¹⁰¹

Consolidation proposals for Kwa-Zulu included parts of the South Coast area, leaving a narrow strip a few kilometres wide between Hibberdene and Port Edward, which would remain "white", most of the land North and South of the Tugela river excluding Richards Bay, which the Central Government refused to part with.¹⁰² Richards Bay was

earmarked by Government for development as a harbour likely to come in handy especially with the recent deterioration of relations with Mozambique. The town and harbour would be unfolded as an industrial area providing work opportunities for Kwa-Zulu citizens, a holiday resort, mining area tourist attraction and an agricultural highlight.

Apparently neither Whites nor Blacks were happy about this land distribution. On the issue of Richards Bay, the Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi stressed that historically the area belonged to the Zulu people and should thus be incorporated into Kwa-Zulu.¹⁰³

The SA Government on the other hand was adamant that Richards Bay would not be handed over to Kwa-Zulu mainly because it would be made available for development by SA itself. Commenting on possible future relations between Kwa-Zulu and SA Governments on Richards Bay, Leon Kok, reporter of the *South African Financial Gazette*, said "Richards Bay may yet constitute a confrontation between the South African and Kwa-Zulu Governments. Once Kwa-Zulu is independent, this could escalate." He added, "Whatever the merits Kwa-Zulu authorities will be a formidable force to contend with in the future of Richards Bay. The South African Government and White employers cannot do without Zulu labour while theoretically, it is supposed to be sourced from Kwa-Zulu townships."¹⁰⁴

Other instances where the Zulus aired their dissatisfaction with the land allotment were around Durban black townships like Kwa-Mashu which had not yet been incorporated into the homeland.

On the other hand, Whites living either in areas which had been included into Kwa-Zulu, or those who lived in the immediate vicinity of Kwa-Zulu areas felt concerned about their security for the present and after Kwa-Zulu gained independence. Farmers in the South Coast came out strongly attacking the government consolidation plans. They expressed fears that the South Coast, to be surrounded by black land—would become "a serious Port St. Johns." Mr George Alison, a South Coast farmer, expressing these fears said that the South African Government should be big enough to admit that it had made a mistake with the South Coast.¹⁰⁵

Another South Coast farmer, Mr L. du Plessis, said, "Nationalists were bluffing themselves if they believed that the Government's consolidation plan would work. It would result in White areas being cut off from the rest of South Africa and would lead to endless problems."¹⁰⁶ At an annual congress of the white Natal Agricultural Union held in Durban in September 1975, the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr Punt Janson, gave some assurance to the "concerned" Whites that consolidation would only be completed

in at least ten years time. He was saying this to farmers living on farms sharing a common boundary with Kwa-Zulu, Lesotho and Swaziland. These farmers were reporting a deteriorating situation of stock theft and cases of clashes with Blacks over cattle being grazed in their (White) farms. Mr Janson recommended that the system of fencing farms be implemented "to avoid serious clashes."¹⁰⁷

Constitutional and Political Developments

Kwa-Zulu had resolved not to go for elections using the South African passbooks but rather to use Kwa-Zulu citizenship certificates and that at least the minimum of two million citizens need to take out the certificates. By October 1975 just over 750 000 certificates had been issued. Disclosing the figure in a speech to the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly, the Commissioner General to the Zulu ethnic unit, Mr P. H. Torlage, said that to reach the two million mark, "pressure in some form," would have to be "brought to bear on citizens to apply for certificates."¹⁰⁸

Much as the registered citizens were not yet half the two million target, signs of preparation for the general elections could be observed during the October 1975 session of the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly. The significant feature was the introduction, by the Councillor for Community Affairs, Mr Walter Khanye, of a motion reorganising Kwa-Zulu's electoral divisions with talk of an election as soon as a date could be settled with the SA Government. However, the motion, which was seconded by Chief Buthelezi, the Kwa-Zulu Chief Executive Councillor, sought to entrench the use of citizenship certificates as a means of voter identification.¹⁰⁹

A cabinet decision in April 1976 mandated Chief Buthelezi to inform Commissioner General Torlage, of a decision to have elections before 31 December 1977. This would enable Kwa-Zulu to move into the second stage of development bringing it to par with the other self-governing Bantustans like Lebowa, Bophutha-Tswana, etc. The Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, had made the general election issue a condition for the development of Kwa-Zulu into the last phase before a decision on independence could be considered. Meanwhile, developments and events in the Bantustan over the past couple of years have served to indicate what constitutional direction Kwa-Zulu was likely to assume in the future. The only Bantustan to have a single paramount chief recognised as a monarch for the whole territory, Kwa-Zulu has gone through thick and thin to evolve a special overseer non-executive role for the king.

In March 1975, as had been predicted by several observers during 1974-75, Inkatha ka-Zulu, as revived and reorganised gradually since

1972, was launched as a "National Cultural Liberation Movement" with the following aims:

- (a) To foster the spirit of unity among the people of Kwa-Zulu throughout Southern Africa, and between them and all their African brothers in Southern Africa, and to keep alive and foster the traditions of the people;
- (b) To help promote and encourage the development of the people of KwaZulu, spiritually, economically, educationally and politically;
- (c) To establish contact and liaise with other cultural groups in Southern Africa with a view to the establishment of a common society;
- (d) To stamp out all forms of corruption, exploitation of man by man and intimidation;
- (e) To ensure acceptance of the principles of equal opportunity and treatment for all people in all walks of life;
- (f) To co-operate with any movement or organisation for the improvement of the conditions of the people and to ensure the most efficient production and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation in the best interests of the people;
- (g) To abolish all forms of discrimination and segregation based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed;
- (h) To promote and support worthy indigenous customs and cultures;
- (i) To protect, encourage and promote trade, commerce, industry, agriculture and conservation of natural resources by all means in the interests of the people and encourage all citizens to participate in all sectors of the economy;
- (j) To give effect to the principles approved from time to time by the appropriate organs of the Movement;
- (k) To ensure observance of the fundamental freedoms and human rights;
- (l) To inculcate and foster a vigorous consciousness of patriotism and a strong sense of national unity based on a common and individual loyalty and devotion to our land;
- (m) To co-operate locally and internationally with all progressive African and other national movements and political parties which work for the complete eradication of all forms of colonialism, racialism, neocolonialism, imperialism and discrimination and to strive for the attainment of African unity; and
- (n) To carry on any other activities which in the opinion of the Movement are conducive to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the National Movement and to do such things as are incidental to the attainment of the above objectives.

Observing the contents of sections (a) and (b) of the aims given above as extracted from the Constitution of the Movement, one could make out that Inkatha was launched to unite citizens of KwaZulu under a single leadership. However, as time went on there emerged more talk, particularly from Inkatha public officers, of the movement being a national organisation geared for the total emancipation of the South African black community as a whole. A number of people expressed views in disagreement with the idea in that because Inkatha had been established under the banner of an apartheid organ it could not qualify for a national unity movement which should ideally owe no allegiance to ethnicism. Articulating this view in a Heroes' Day speech, an exponent of the Black Consciousness Movement and member of the Black People's Convention, Mr Madikwe Manthata, warned that the new image of Inkatha, as recently portrayed, might herald an air of "Zulu imperialism" which would bring about tribal flare-ups. In a subsequent interview with *Black Review* Manthata pointed out that even the leadership structure of Inkatha, which was said to be geared to cater and represent the entire black population, was actually planned under "a Zulu tribal mental framework."

Supporting his statement Manthata quoted extracts from Chapter Three of the Inkatha constitution which read as follows:¹¹⁰

"Ungonyama, the king of the Zulu people and his successors, shall be the Patron-in-chief of the Movement, and likewise all Chiefs and Deputy-Chiefs shall be the Patrons of the Movement in their respective regions, areas or wards". Citing the section which gives qualifications for election into the office of the President of the Movement he quoted:

"A member of the Movement shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of the President unless he is a citizen of Kwa-Zulu constitution and qualified for election to the office of Chief Minister".

And further safety measurements which read:

"If a person elected as President of the Movement is not elected as Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu, he shall continue to be the President of the Movement until another person elected as President of the Movement at the General Conference and such other person shall then be the sole candidate for election to the office of Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu".

No person shall be eligible for election as a member of the Central Committee unless he:

- is a Kwa-Zulu citizen;
- is literate and conversant with languages of Kwa-Zulu;
- and is a registered voter for the purpose of the (Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly elections.

When *Black Review* put the question to the Witwatersrand Kwa-Zulu Urban Representative, Mr Gibson Thula, he clarified the position

and said that the Zulu people had always been interested in national unity and opposed to apartheid and that they accepted the Kwa-Zulu Bantustan platform because the SA Government left them with no choice; and that they were now using Kwa-Zulu as a springboard to foster unity of all black people in a way that avoided confrontation with the Government and further hardships for the community.

Mr Thula, describing the outlook of Inkatha, explained that Inkatha was not itself a political party but a political liberation movement to which political parties, cultural and other community organisations could be affiliated. This would offer a battleground for rival political parties to compete for domination of Inkatha. He saw this measure as a safety-valve to avoid unnecessary party quibbling in the Legislative Assembly which could retard progress. However, the national council of Inkatha, in a one day session at Nongoma in January 1976, passed a unanimous resolution rejecting the formation of political parties in Kwa-Zulu. The council noted that the Zulus were still bound in chains and that their primary goal was to free the "nation" of these chains. On this there could be no argument. "Therefore we can see no reason for the formation of political parties in Kwa-Zulu."

This resolution, viewed with the background of Mr Thula's explanation of Inkatha's attitude to political parties, could be interpreted to mean that, much as Kwa-Zulu political parties would ideally be welcome as affiliates in the movement, formation of such parties at this stage would not be tolerated.¹¹¹

Economy

The economy of Kwa-Zulu has seen no substantial improvements during the period under review. Outside income from community, social and personal service by public administration, education, health and other services, the main contribution to the gross domestic product has been that of agriculture and related industries. It has been reported that only 12,1% of Kwa-Zulu is being utilised for Kwa-Zulu while the territory has a total of 18,7% of arable land. Whereas plant production offers the largest contribution to agricultural produce beef farming takes the lead in the contribution made by stock farming. Most national agricultural income comes from the Government sponsored projects like those of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), mainly because most of the Kwa-Zulu population is only engaged in subsistence farming.

As at March 1975, there were nine working mines in Kwa-Zulu with a black labour force of 307. The key minerals mined were dolerite and kaolin. For the period from April 1975 to March 1976 the Bantu Mining Corporation (BMC) was spending more than 90% of its total Kwa-Zulu expenditure on prospecting for other mineral deposits

chiefly copper, nickel and coal. By August 1975 there were reports of a scramble by small S.A. mining companies for a deal for rights to mine coal deposits discovered in the territory. According to geological surveys by the South African Fuel Research Institute there could be deposits as high as 200 tons of anthracite coal in the area.¹¹²

By and large the Kwa-Zulu population had to either work outside the territory as migrant workers or as regular commuters. Earnings from such people constituted 97,8% and 98,3% of the gross national income in 1970 and 1973 respectively. These figures represented a growing dependency of the Kwa-Zulu community on the South African industries for employment. This state of affairs is a result of the traditional South African industrial planning where the 'native reserves' served as a labour reservoir. Supporting this view Kwa-Zulu Chief Minister Chief, Gatsha Buthelezi, said, "Black people who should have developed these areas have for more than a century been drawn to the metropolitan areas of South Africa to accelerate development there."¹¹³

Chief Buthelezi has made endless calls and appeals to industrialists at home and abroad to invest in Kwa-Zulu in the course of what he called trying to right the "intentional and calculated" by-passing of "native reserves" in the past.¹¹⁴ Besides the few other private business concerns in the territory the economy has always been dominated by the Bantu Investment Corporation.

Outlining his economic policy Chief Gatsha said that he advocated "the African brand of socialism which is not exclusive of a reasonable measure of free enterprise." He said just as socialist Tanzania still entered into partnerships with capitalist countries, he saw no reason why Kwa-Zulu should not have partnership with white concerns on a 50-50 basis.¹¹⁵ In pursuance of this policy, the Chief proposed tri-partite deals involving the public corporation operating in Kwa-Zulu, the white establishment concerned and private shareholders forming a third party. This arrangement was to be put into practice with regard to chain stores involving Checkers, which was to set up supermarkets in various African townships under Kwa-Zulu administration. African traders in these townships objected strongly to this proposal because they felt that it would strangle the small businessmen. However, the Kwa-Zulu administration would not allow traders to "dictate development policy."

Other package deals involving the Kwa-Zulu government included the following:

—The Trans-Tugela Transport Company which was forced to sell to Kwa-Zulu Holdings (a Kwa-Zulu Government backed company) when bus boycotts over fare increases bled the company to huge losses.¹¹⁶

—An agreement in principle with the Holiday Inn group to build a multi-racial hotel of international standard at Ulundi, the new Kwa-

Zulu capital, on a 50-50 basis. The Bantu Investment Corporation was to make the second partner with the Holiday Inns on behalf of the Kwa-Zulu Government.¹¹⁷

—A five year plan to develop a R7 million plant to make detergent raw materials to be put up in Kwa-Zulu was announced in January 1976 by the managing director of Chemical Holdings, Mr John Jotson. The plant would be built on an eight hectare site at Isithebe which, together with the building, was to be leased from the Kwa-Zulu Government for an initial 35 year period at a low rental.¹¹⁸ In addition a R6 000 loan had been obtained from the BIC, besides the usual decentralisation incentives for which the Company would qualify. The three raw materials to be produced were dodecyle-benzine-sulphuric-acid, sodium-layryl-ether-sulphate and sodium-layryle sulphate. A special company, Akulu Chemicals, had been formed to handle this venture, with joint ownership by Chemical Holdings and Akzo Chemic (Akzo is a Dutch company providing the technology).

Lebowa

Land Claims and Consolidation

Lebowa, a Transvaal Bantustan covering an area 2,2 million¹¹⁹ hectares in 14 separate pieces, is one of those Bantustans which have rejected the idea of independence before complete consolidation of the land apportioned to them. While the Government has prepared proposals finally reducing the number of Lebowa separate pieces to six,¹²⁰ the people of Lebowa are believed not to be satisfied with the proposals. Interviewed by *Black Review*, the former Minister of Interior in Lebowa and a Leader of the Lebowa People's Party, Mr Collins Ramusi, said "If the white man wants to have a consolidated Lebowa, he must be prepared to cede to Lebowa almost all Transvaal soil". Mr Ramusi said this expressing a belief that most of the Transvaal province of South Africa traditionally belonged to the Pedi tribe which makes up the Lebowa population. However, in the interest of healthy brotherly relations Lebowa was prepared to accommodate the presence of other groups living in the Transvaal namely, the Tsonga of Gazankulu, the Venda of Vendaland, the Whites of South Africa and the Tswana of Bophutha-Tswana. In recognition of this, steps towards a United Transvaal were taken by Lebowa in the quest for amalgamation with the other neighbouring Bantustans like Gazankulu and Vendaland. According to Mr Ramusi, these amalgamation moves collapsed because the leaders involved turned out to be working at cross purposes.

The dissatisfaction factor over Lebowa land consolidation proposals has been largely responsible for the Bantustan refusing to consider independence. Projecting this view to *Black Review*, Lebowa's Collins Ramusi went further and said "actually Lebowa never wanted to exclude itself from the rest of the country. Lebowa believes in freedom as South Africans not as Lebowa citizens." Talking on the same issue, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Cedric Phatudi, warned tribal chiefs not to be enticed into accepting the idea of independence.¹²¹ Addressing a crowd at Huma Township, Stilfontein, Dr Phatudi said he did not see how so many homelands could be independent when they occupied only 13% of the land and yet the population ratio was 5:1 to that of those who occupied 87% of the land. "We in Lebowa cannot be bluffed by the deceptive idea of independence of the homeland. We shall not agree to it." said the Chief Minister. He added, "The Government speaks in glorious terms of independence and separate development and yet the more we get involved in the system the more we get frustrated when we see it is unworkable."¹²²

Constitutional and Political Developments

During the period under review there has been no change in the constitutional status of Lebowa. According to usual development stages of South African Bantustans, Lebowa was ready to accept independence which would introduce new constitutional developments. A new Ministry of Health, which is usually the last before independence status can be assumed, came into effect in April 1976. The 1976 session of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, which opened at the end of March, started off in confusion with the only political party, the Lebowa People's Party, coming with two elected leaders each claiming to be head of the Party. The trouble started in December 1975 when the Party president, Dr Cedric Phatudi, was ousted¹²³ as leader by a Congress of the Party attended by about 300 delegates. The former Interior Minister and deputy leader of the party, Mr Collins Ramusi, was elected to replace Dr Phatudi who was not present at the Congress on the grounds that he had not authorised it.¹²⁴

Relations between Mr Ramusi and Dr Phatudi became sour towards the middle of 1975 apparently through differences over the Bantu Investment Corporation. There had been a misunderstanding between Lebowa Government and the BIC over some project undertaken by the latter without the approval of the former¹²⁵ and before this issue was resolved Dr Phatudi accompanied the BIC Manager, Dr J. Adendorff, to attend Investment Seminars in London and Amsterdam. Mr Ramusi publicly expressed disquietude over what he called "co-operating closely with Dr Adendorff in view of the unresolved quarrel with BIC".¹²⁶

On his return from Europe the Chief Minister asked Mr Ramusi to resign from the Cabinet. Mr Ramusi refused to comply, while in the interim, the Chief Minister sought and acquired powers to expel Ministers from his cabinet if he so wished. However, a delegation from the Lebowa People's Party warned Dr Phatudi not to use the powers against Mr Ramusi.¹²⁷ The axe came through after a three hour cabinet meeting on the 25 July when Dr Phatudi gave Mr Ramusi a letter of dismissal.¹²⁸

Subsequently reports filtered from Lebowa that at least three cabinet ministers were unhappy about Mr Ramusi's expulsion and were in favour of a special congress of the ruling party to resolve the dispute.¹²⁹ This call was supported by Party Secretary General, Mr C. L. Mothiba. Further reports alleged that the Chief Minister was under day and night police guard in fear of possible repercussions.¹³⁰

Over the next few months Dr Phatudi refused to call a Congress to discuss the issue, whereupon Mr Ramusi, in his capacity as chairman and deputy leader of the party, called a congress which ousted the Chief Minister from the ruling party leading position.¹³¹ When the Lebowa Legislative Assembly opened at the end of March 1976, most members showed no particular preference for any of the two leaders. *Black Review* established from interviews with several Lebowa members of Assembly that moves were being made to reunite the two gentlemen.

Economy

In Lebowa, as is the case in other Bantustans as well, the Bantu Investment Corporation has been responsible for most industrial developments as well as the running of key commercial enterprises. During 1975 the Lebowa Government sought to establish the Lebowa Development Corporation to take over BIC assets and liabilities in the territory.¹³²

Although, according to Mr Ramusi, Bantu Administration and Development Minister, Mr M. C. Botha, had agreed to the formation of the LDC headed by six white and eight black directors, Pretoria did not readily move on the idea.¹³³

No mention was made of a Development Corporation for Lebowa when Bantu Administration and Development Minister, M. C. Botha, in reply to a question in Parliament on 23 March 1976, enumerated the Development Corporations that had already been established by his Department for some Bantustans.¹³⁴

Bophuthatswana

Land Claims and Consolidation

The question of consolidation of land allotted to Bophuthatswana, which has always been regarded as of priority to the independence issue itself, remained unsolved by 1976. Chief Mangope's view had always been that Bantustans needed to be given more land than had been envisaged in the 1936 Land Act. As late as February 1976 he was quoted to say: "We have insufficient land in Bophuthatswana and even that is in pieces. We reject the 1936 Land Act as a basis for apportioning land because the present position was not taken into account and we were not even consulted."¹³⁵ He added however, that Mr Vorster had said that even after independence negotiations would remain open on the land issue.

Discussing the implications of independence for consolidation in an article, which appeared on a project publication, the director and the senior researcher of the African Institute of South Africa, Dr J. H. Moolman and Dr P. S. Hattingh, said that the completion of the 1936 (consolidation) phase could not be seen as the end of the process of forming (released) areas and that a new phase, probably on a new basis in which Whites and Tswana could hold joint consultation, was foreseeable. They said "Whites and Tswana leaders will have to reach an agreement on further territorial adjustments with a view to the efficient functioning of Bophuthatswana as an independent state. Even another state, Botswana, of which the population is also Tswana can become involved in this matter because Bophuthatswana is situated on its border."¹³⁶

Dr Moolman and Dr Hattingh pointed out that the Bantu Land Act of 1913 was the first attempt to arrange occupation of land by Blacks and resulted in a total of 53 fragmented units covering 1,2 million hectares being established for Tswanas. In 1936 an increase in land allocated to Blacks was recommended and the number of Tswana units was reduced to 36. The consolidation process further reduced this number to 18 units and eight in 1972. The final proposals for Bophuthatswana were made known in 1973 and reduced the number of land units to six. These proposals have, however, not yet been accepted by the South African Parliament.¹³⁷

Independence Plans

The campaign for Bophuthatswana citizens to seek independence for the Bantustan, as launched by Chief Minister, Lucas Mangope, came into the open in various stages as the unexpected move began to crystallize late in 1975. Chief Mangope first called a meeting of more

than 80 Tswana chiefs and at least 160 Tswana headmen who passed a resolution mandating him to press for independence.¹³⁸ The meeting came only a few days before the annual conference of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party which gave him a similar mandate.¹³⁹ This led to a special legislative assembly session which met late in November and passed a motion calling on the Cabinet to start negotiations for independence.¹⁴⁰ Chief Mangope, referring to possible non-recognition of his independent Bantustan by the international community, urged citizens of Bophuthatswana to adopt a soft, calm and non-militant attitude. He expressed his belief that a spirit of goodwill, mutual co-existence and trust between the Tswanas and the Whites of South Africa should continue after independence as it would be necessary for Whites to continue to help them.

At the special session in which the independence question was debated, Chief Mangope had next to him the first Bantustan leader to opt for independence, Chief Kaizer Matanzima of the Transkei, whose presence observers saw as a moral booster for Chief Mangope. The Transkei leader had already come out in open support of the Bophuthatswana move in a statement when he took issue with those who queried the decision of any Bantustan to move into the final stages of apartheid (separate development) and negotiate for independence.¹⁴¹

In February 1976, Chief Mangope met the South African Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, for independence talks. An official communique after the meeting revealed that joint committees had been appointed to determine an independence date as soon as possible. In the statement Mr Vorster reiterated that it was his policy to grant independence to any Bantustan that sought it. In terms of their agreement the Bophuthatswana Cabinet would be responsible for drafting an independence constitution to be approved by the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly; but a working committee as well as a cabinet committee consisting of representatives from both sides would work out the details.¹⁴²

The Chief Minister of Gazankulu, Professor Ntsanwisi, reacting to the Bophuthatswana independence steps and strongly criticising Chief Mangope: said "I am not going to give away my birth-right of being a South African by opting for independence, because it would cause me to lose what I am striving for."¹⁴³

Including Chief Matanzima in his attack Professor H. Ntsanwisi added, "We had agreed at a summit meeting at Umtata that any homeland wishing to become independent should consult the others, but so far those who have decided on independence have not taken us into their confidence."¹⁴⁴

In Bophuthatswana itself rejection of independence came mainly from opposition parties. A meeting of more than 500 delegates organised

by the opposition Seoposengwe and the Bophuthatswana National Parties, led by chiefs Tidimane Pilane and Hammond Maseloane respectively, unanimously opposed the move. Attacking Chief Mangope, Chief Maseloane said that he was a puppet used by Pretoria to sell the birthright of his own people. "What we need today is more black unity and solidarity and not fragmentation into backyards, said to be independent, yet nothing more than backyards of South Africa," he declared. He added, "Events today show that if war should be declared on South Africa, both Black and White will have to stand together to defend the country but we cannot defend a country we know we do not belong to."¹⁴⁵

Chiefs belonging to opposition parties were the only ones who did not vote in favour of independence at Mangope's 1975 meeting of chiefs and headmen which gave him the initial go ahead.

Economy

Because of the climatic factors prevailing in Bophuthatswana, the bulk of the land ($\pm 93,4\%$) is used largely for pastoral farming and for other non-agricultural activities with only about $6,6\%$ of arable land.

Beef farming makes by far the greatest contribution to stock farming. Revenue producing agriculture is largely dominated by the Bantu Investment Corporation which rents land either from a tribe in Bophuthatswana or from the South African Bantu Trust with permission from the Bophuthatswana Government. It is common practice for the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture to commission the BIC to run some Government agricultural projects. The declared intention on the part of the BIC is to sell its business undertakings, including agricultural projects, to local African entrepreneurs after a certain pre-determined period of time, or to make the shares of the companies available for black ownership.

In so far as mining is concerned Bophuthatswana has got a higher potential than the rest of the Bantustans. During the period between April 1975 and March 1976 the Bantu Mining Corporation spent large amounts of money on further prospecting and exploration with promising results. Presently there are 25 mines in operation in the territory, yielding deposits of platinum, granite, limestone, asbestos and manganese. These mines employ 61 023 people, the majority of whom are non-Tswanas.

Outside basic subsistence farming the people of Bophuthatswana do not have much opportunities to generate income. In 1970 income earned outside Bophuthatswana constituted $97,7\%$ of the gross national income. The Bophuthatswana Government, in conjunction with the South African Government, continued to invite both local and foreign industrialists to set up industries in the territory. These

efforts have included trade visits by Chief Minister Lucas Mangope and BIC officials to countries abroad. One such event was in October 1975 when Chief Mangope visited New Zealand to seek investments and trade links for his homeland. However, Chief Mangope was snubbed by the New Zealand Government.¹⁴⁶

In a further bid to attract foreigners to invest in Bophuthatswana, Chief Mangope announced in November 1975 that his Government was to waive restrictions with regard to investments by foreign based industrialists. The restrictions prevented localisation of foreign industries until 25 years after the original date of investment. He further declared that he wished to emphasise that his government "disassociates itself from claims for majority black shareholding or even minimum shareholding as a prerequisite for the establishment of industry on a permanent basis, as this will generate anxiety of interference and future takeovers." "In fact", he continued, "my government guarantees free enterprise after Bophuthatswana's independence on the basis of an intergrated economy."¹⁴⁷

According to information published in the *Economic Revue* by the semi-official Bureau for Economic Research re-Bantu Development known as Benbo, a survey in 1972 indicated that less than 14% of the income earned by the Bophuthatswana population was actually spent in Bophuthatswana. In an attempt to block this vast leakage of purchasing power, the Bophuthatswana Government has been investigating possibilities of establishing chain stores in the Bantustan.

General Issues

The two opposition parties in Bophuthatswana, the Seoposengwe and the Bophuthatswana National Parties which were both opposed to Chief Mangope's independence moves, joined forces in February 1976 and merged into a united Seoposengwe National Party. By March indications of disagreement over the question of leadership arose. Chief Maseloane, former leader of Bophuthatswana National Party, had been elected leader of the new party and Chief Tidimane Pilane, former leader of the Seoposengwe Party, deputy leader. Within the first month of the merger Chief Pilane resigned as deputy leader because of dissatisfaction with the election of Chief Maseloane as leader. "I chose Chief M. K. Molete as leader of the new party but things were done in such a hurry that I hardly had time to put forward this suggestion," the Chief complained and added that if the leadership changed he could reconsider his resignation.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile Chief Pilane indicated that he would consider any offer made to him by Mangope to join the ruling party, and in turn the Chief Minister said he would welcome Chief Pilane into his ruling

party. Even at this stage though, Chief Pilane still reiterated his total opposition to the moves towards independence taken by Chief Mangope. He said, "Homelands who seek independence, including Bophuthatswana are committing national suicide." Calling for a referendum to be held among the Tswana people to decide on the independence question, he warned that the South African Government was creating a dangerous situation by dividing Blacks into ethnic groups and forcing them into mini-states. "I do not think Chief Mangope has the support of the majority of the Tswanas for his independence moves", he concluded.

The Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly Recess Committee recommended Dinokana, a place 30 kilometres west of Zeerust along the Botswana border, as the site for the capital of Bophuthatswana. The Mafeking Town Council was disappointed with the recommendation because many Mafeking businessmen who were dependent on Tswana customers had nursed hopes that a site near Mafeking (the present provisional administrative headquarters) would be chosen.

REFERENCES

- ¹*Financial Mail* 21.5.76
- ²Ibid
- ³*Rand Daily Mail* 6.4.76
- ⁴*Daily Dispatch* 15.12.76
- ⁵Ibid
- ⁶Black People's Convention Congress Report, Dec. 1975
- ⁷1976 *Hansard* vol.4, col.302
- ⁸*Daily Dispatch* 26.6.76
- ⁹*Sunday Tribune* 25.1.76
- ¹⁰Ibid
- ¹¹1976 *Hansard* vol.9, col 622
- ¹²1976 *Hansard* vol.4, col.235
- ¹³1976 *Hansard* vol.4, col.281
- ¹⁴Ibid
- ¹⁵Ibid
- ¹⁶1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.906
- ¹⁷Ibid
- ¹⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.5, col.313
- ¹⁹Ibid
- ²⁰Ibid
- ²¹Homelands—The role of the Corporations: p.65
- ²²1976 *Hansard* vol.9, col.647
- ²³*Rand Daily Mail* 21.4.76
- ²⁴Ibid
- ²⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 4.7.75
- ²⁶*Daily Dispatch* 17.7.75
- ²⁷Ibid
- ²⁸*Herald* 24.10.75
- ²⁹*Daily Dispatch* 13.4.76
- ³⁰*Daily Dispatch* 7.6.76
- ³¹*Daily Dispatch* 15.11.75
- ³²Ibid
- ³³*Rand Daily Mail* 5.8.75
- ³⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 14.4.76
- ³⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 7.10.75
- ³⁶*Daily Dispatch* 19.2.76
- ³⁷*Daily Dispatch* 18.10.75
- ³⁸*Daily Dispatch* 9.4.76
- ³⁹1976 *Hansard* vol.3, col.124
- ⁴⁰*Daily Dispatch* 26.1.76
- ⁴¹Ibid
- ⁴²*Daily Dispatch* 1.11.75
- ⁴³*Daily Dispatch* 12.6.76
- ⁴⁴*Daily Dispatch* 15.6.76
- ⁴⁵*Daily Dispatch* 7.1.76
- ⁴⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 16.3.76
- ⁴⁷*Financial Mail* 19.12.75
- ⁴⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.8317
- ⁴⁹1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.8560
- ⁵⁰1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.8650
- ⁵¹1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.8919
- ⁵²1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.9014
- ⁵³*Rand Daily Mail* 17.3.76
- ⁵⁴Ibid
- ⁵⁵*Star* 5.6.76
- ⁵⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 9.6.76
- ⁵⁷Ibid
- ⁵⁸*Daily Dispatch* 22.4.76
- ⁵⁹*Imvo* 3.7.76
- ⁶⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 17.6.76
- ⁶¹*Daily Dispatch* 21.7.75
- ⁶²*Rand Daily Mail* 12.9.75
- ⁶³Ibid
- ⁶⁴*Daily Dispatch* 1.11.75
- ⁶⁵*Daily Dispatch* 28.11.75
- ⁶⁶*Evening Post* 29.6.76
- ⁶⁷*Daily Dispatch* 28.10.75
- ⁶⁸*Imvo* 3.7.76

⁶⁹*Daily Dispatch* 2.10.75
⁷⁰The Rise of Afrikanerdom, MOODIE, T. D. p.204
⁷¹*Rand Daily Mail* 25.3.76
⁷²*Daily Dispatch* 30.3.76
⁷³*Intsimbi* 15.4.76
⁷⁴*Weekend World* 18.3.76
⁷⁵Ibid
⁷⁶*Daily Dispatch* 5.8.75
⁷⁷Ibid
⁷⁸*Daily Dispatch* 23.1.76
⁷⁹*Daily Dispatch* 19.4.76
⁸⁰*Daily Dispatch* 18.9.75
⁸¹*Daily Dispatch* 24.12.75
⁸²*Daily Dispatch* 31.12.75
⁸³*Daily Dispatch* 22.5.76
⁸⁴Ibid
⁸⁵*Daily Dispatch* 20.6.75
⁸⁶*Daily Dispatch* 11.7.75
⁸⁷*Daily Dispatch* 7.7.75
⁸⁸*Intsimbi* 31.10.75
⁸⁹*Daily Dispatch* 4.11.75
⁹⁰*Daily Dispatch* 18.1.76
⁹¹*Daily Dispatch* 20.1.76 and 26.1.76
⁹²*Daily Dispatch* 30.1.76
⁹³Ibid
⁹⁴*Daily Dispatch* 28.5.76 and 18.5.76
⁹⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 29.4.75
⁹⁶*Daily Dispatch* 5.5.76
⁹⁷*Daily Dispatch* 26.5.76
⁹⁸*Daily Dispatch* 24.3.76
⁹⁹*Daily Dispatch* 24.4.76
¹⁰⁰*Daily Dispatch* 5.11.75
¹⁰¹*Daily Dispatch* 14.1.76
¹⁰²*Daily Dispatch* 15.11.75
¹⁰³*South African Financial Gazette* 19.3.76
¹⁰⁴Ibid
¹⁰⁵*Daily Dispatch* 12.5.76
¹⁰⁶*Daily Dispatch* 14.7.76
¹⁰⁷*Daily Dispatch* 7.6.76
¹⁰⁸*Daily Dispatch* 15.8.75
¹⁰⁹*Sunday Times* 10.8.75
¹¹⁰Ibid
¹¹¹*Daily News* 26.9.75
¹¹²*Rand Daily Mail* 3.4.76
¹¹³*South African Financial Gazette* 16.1.76

¹¹⁴*Daily News* 26.9.75
¹¹⁵Ibid
¹¹⁶*Natal Mercury* 12.9.75
¹¹⁷*Natal Mercury* 17.10.75
¹¹⁸Ibid
¹¹⁹*Ilanga* 21.4.76
¹²⁰*Daily News* 16.1.76
¹²¹*Sunday Tribune* 10.8.75
¹²²*Herald* 13.2.76
¹²³Ibid
¹²⁴*Daily Dispatch* 19.8.75
¹²⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 11.10.75
¹²⁶*Natal Mercury* 25.7.75
¹²⁷*South African Financial Gazette* 16.1.76
¹²⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.886
¹²⁹Ibid
¹³⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 23.9.75
¹³¹Ibid
¹³²*Rand Daily Mail* 29.12.75
¹³³Ibid
¹³⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 4.7.75
¹³⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 2.8.75
¹³⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 4.7.75
¹³⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 26.7.75
¹³⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 29.7.75
¹³⁹Ibid
¹⁴⁰Ibid
¹⁴¹*Black Review*—Interview with Ramusi
¹⁴²Ibid
¹⁴³1976 *Hansard* vol.9, col.647
¹⁴⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 2.2.76
¹⁴⁵Ibid
¹⁴⁶*Star* 24.3.76
¹⁴⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 6.11.75
¹⁴⁸Ibid
¹⁴⁹*Daily Dispatch* 20.11.75
¹⁵⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 7.11.75
¹⁵¹*Rand Daily Mail* 25.2.76
¹⁵²*Rand Daily Mail* 7.11.75
¹⁵³Ibid
¹⁵⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 2.2.76
¹⁵⁵*Daily Dispatch* 11.12.75
¹⁵⁶*Daily Dispatch* 7.11.75
¹⁵⁷*Star* 16.3.76
¹⁵⁸*Weekend World* 16.3.76

2

GOVERNMENT CREATED POLITICAL BODIES

South African Indian Council

Political Developments

Insistent calls had been echoed in 1974 to the Government by various people opposed to the idea of division of thirty seats into fifteen elected and fifteen nominated by the Minister of Indian Affairs, that all members of the South African Indian Council (SAIC) be elected by the Indian community and these had been of no avail. It was later learned that some senior members of the SAIC (elected in 1974) had secretly asked the Minister of Indian Affairs, Mr Marais Steyn, never to make the council a fully elected body.¹ It was reported that these council members had asked Mr Steyn to recommend to the Government that the next council be made up of thirty elected seats and fifteen nominated seats hence increasing the seats to forty-five. It was suspected that the senior council members had wanted this amendment to protect those nominated members who would be unlikely to win elections by popular vote. Commenting on these disclosures, Mr S. Abram Mayet, a SAIC elected member, said "the so-called leaders who are not wanted by the people should not try to get into the council through the back door."²

Later in 1975 an invitation by the Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, was tendered to the SAIC and the Coloured Person's Representative Council (CRC) to establish an Inter-Cabinet Council (ICC) with the South African Government. CRC and SAIC executive members would

meet, in consultation with the White cabinet minister, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to discuss common issues.³ The CRC rejected the offer whilst the SAIC had resolved to give the Cabinet Council a try for one year. This news was received with anger and disappointment from some Indian circles who disassociated themselves from the resolution. They felt that local communities, which have the pulse of the people and the Indians at large, had not been given a chance to air their views on the fundamental issue affecting them. They pointed out that a referendum should have been held on the Cabinet Council issue.⁴ In its editorial, the *Leader*⁵ praised the CRC for rejecting the invitation to "enter the White man's laager" especially after the Government's rejection of the Theron Commission recommendations. It was also noted that "The African was not invited at all because he is, no doubt, expected to resolve his destiny in his homelands". It further asserted that the "ICC was no legislative or executive power. At this stage it appears to be no more than another consultative and advisory body of no greater force and effect than the local affairs committees which have been proved to be so ineffectual and pointless."⁶ In yet another attack meted against the Council decision, Mr S. A. Mayet, amongst those SAIC members who wanted to delay its entrance into the Council until the SAIC was an elected body, said the Cabinet Council would not be able to do any more for the Indian community than the SAIC had done in the past twelve 'frustrating' years.⁷

The majority feeling within the council was that the climate of change in South Africa was moving favourably for the Government to prove its sincerity by making concessions through representations made in the committee and that the Indian Community could not lose anything by being included in the committee.⁸

The Indian Labour Party in Natal also raised voices of rejection to the Prime Minister's offer because they did not regard it as a stepping stone in the political development of the Black people towards direct representation in parliament. Mr Maurice Lewis, the party's executive member in Natal, reiterated that after a closer scrutiny of the details of the Cabinet Council, the party leadership arrived at the following conclusions:

—The Cabinet Council offered no real power, since the ultimate power of deciding was vested in the hands of the Prime Minister;

—It is simply white baasskop, sugar-coated;

—The Cabinet Council would not be the forum for the discussion of Indian and White affairs. Matters affecting the Indian community would be handled by the Indian Council and therefore, could not be presented to Cabinet Council for discussions.

—The ultimate goal of direct representation in the Parliament of South Africa was a matter not for consideration by the Cabinet Council. It was

therefore not the intention of the government to utilise the Cabinet Council as a stepping stone in the political development towards direct representation.⁹ It was on the basis of these reasons that Mr Lewis called the SAIC "tools of the government" insinuating at the irony which he saw in SAIC accepting the ICC proposals on the one hand and rejecting the CRC call for a black alliance on the other.

The subtle emergence of new Indian political parties, geared at contesting seats for SAIC, appeared to observers as a sign of inherent discontent with SAIC emanating from the way this body handled Indian matters. These parties appeared mainly from top businessmen's circles. A new political party, known as the South African Congress Party, was allegedly launched after some top-level caucuses among the executive of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC).¹⁰ It should be remembered that the NIC policy rejected any type of participation in these platforms. This issue of whether or not NIC should participate in SAIC to expose its fraudulence had accrued at the time of SAIC election and a resolution rejecting this move was adopted.

Having confirmed the intentions of some NIC top men to contest the SAIC elections, Mr M. J. Naidoo, the NIC chairman, interviewed by *Black Review*, said that this group rescinded its decision, after having analysed the possibilities of achieving its objectives. Mr Naidoo said that in the wake of new developments in the country, this group (with which he had sympathised) saw no value and no point in attempting to expose the system within the government created platforms. Therefore this party dissolved and a resolution to this effect was passed. Yet another party, the Republican Party, led by a Durban Cliffdale businessman, Mr R. G. Douglas, was formed, apparently on a strong footing. Consequently, the Minister of Indian Affairs requested it to submit five names of people who would stand for nomination to the vacant seat created by the death of a SAIC nominated member, Mr I. E. Vanda of Newcastle.¹¹ Interviewed by the *Leader*, the party's secretary, Mr R. Pillay, whose name was also submitted to the Minister, said that the Department of Indian Affairs had approached the party in February and the required names were subsequently submitted but no acknowledgement had been sent by the Minister. Briefly outlining the new party's mode of operation, Mr Pillay said that his party, being recognised by the Government, would, therefore, work in consultation with it. "We do not intend to make unreasonable demands on the government" he said.¹² Justifying the Party's participation in the SAIC, the chairman, Mr N. Sewchurran, said that the party decided to secure a position in the Council because it felt that two SAIC members were not able to highlight all the problems faced by the people of Chatsworth (referring to the SAIC members who were residents of Chatsworth); "In fact since both members are on the executive committee, it has

made their job even more difficult with due respect to the work they have done and are doing.”¹³ In short, according to observers, the Republican Party indulged itself, amongst other reasons, in order to remedy the situation.

Following a call made by the Labour Party leader, Mr Sonny Leon, for a black alliance between all black bodies working within or without the Government platforms, the SAIC had rejected the idea. However, after several attacks by some Labour Party periphery and further negotiations with Sonny Leon, the SAIC affirmed the arrangement of an informal meeting between top SAIC and CRC men. Talks would be based on the possible merger between the two councils. The Labour Chief Whip, Mr Lofty Adams, outlining some of the problems prevailing within the Indian and Coloured communities, mentioned the uproar which emanated from the Athlone committee (Coloured) inspecting licence applications for Indian traders in the area. He said that they found themselves in the same situations since both communities had ethnic councils. “We should get together to hammer out a pattern of uniformity. Once we have sorted ourselves out, the Africans, not amenable to the homeland concept, should in their own right be allowed to do the same: and then the two bodies should get together” he said. Supporting the move Mr, Leon stated his readiness to merge with anybody. He encouraged any moves towards the Councils’ merger.¹⁴ Welcoming the move, Mr Gopie Munsook, the Cape member of the Indian Council executive, said: “We have been living and trading together intermarrying and attending the same schools, so I don’t see why we can’t merge Councils till we get parliamentary representation.”¹⁵

There was a reported split within the SAIC resulting from observable personal differences. Consequently a section of SAIC decided to join forces in attempts to oppose the so-called conservative members of the Council. The Executive Council chairman had denied that the Council was split into two camps. But it emerged later that this group was preparing to form a new political party called the Reform Party which would follow a more liberal trend.

Mr Rajbansi, a member of the Executive Council of the SAIC, tendered his resignation from the Executive Council on the grounds that he opposed any participation in the Cabinet Council which he saw only as a consultative body. In his resignation he said that he upheld principle above finance and position. He felt sorry for Indian teachers who had high hopes that the SAIC, like the ICC, would have done something to put right the many ills in Indian Education. Quoted in *Post*,¹⁶ Mr Rajbansi said “In view of the general conditions prevailing in the country at this particular period, it would be unwise for us to serve on the Cabinet Council on which every race group in South Africa is not represented.”

He urged Indian teachers not to be disappointed but hope for the Reform group to solve their problems.

This new reformist group hoped to contest the 1977 elections with the five spearheads namely, Salam Mayet (Benoni), Mr Ibrahim (Pretoria), Mr Bassoo (Vereeniging), Mr A. Rajbansi (Chatsworth, Natal) and the leader of this group, Mr Y. S. Chinsammy, representing the Reformist party. This party hoped to enjoy full backing from the Indian community having adopted the Coloured Labour Party approach. The leader of the group hoped that the Reform party would be officially launched at an envisaged National Convention by the end of 1976.

Educational Powers entrusted to SAIC

It was reported in January 1976, that the SAIC had been entrusted with educational powers by the Minister of Indian Affairs. This followed a long period of waiting by the SAIC which had requested for such powers for some time. The SAIC executive had, prior to the new arrangement, requested complete control of Indian education, with the intention of opening all Indian schools to all races. It had also decided that it would employ suitably qualified teachers on merit, irrespective of their race. After long deliberations on the control of education the Council had resolved that it was particularly opposed to any educational institution being reserved for a particular race. The Executive Committee (EXCO) was directed by the Council to use every power at its disposal to work towards the ideal of having educational institutions opened to all children of the South African Community. The EXCO was also authorised by Council to make available wherever possible all educational institutions under its control to all other races.¹⁷

Certain powers initially delegated to the Minister of Indian Education were handed over to the SAIC. The Secretary for Indian Affairs, Mr H. A. Prinsloo, gave a clear indication of the position of SAIC in Indian education when he said, "Let me state very clearly that there has been no transfer of education to the SAIC at all.". The SAIC later resolved to redelegate the powers to the Director of Indian Education, Mr Gabriel Krog, to hold the fort for the SAIC until further notice. After the SAIC had been widely criticised for its redelegation of powers to the Director, it resolved in principle to withdraw all or any powers held by the Director. A report detailing the adjustment of powers was drawn up and Mr Rajbansi and two other executives, namely, Mr Ismail Kathrada and Mr I. S. H. Mayet, were mandated to report personally to Mr Krog. The EXCO had taken this decision in view of lack of communication and consultation between the Department and the EXCO.¹⁸ At the time of going to print, there had been no response from the Government officials. In terms of the Indian

Education Act, the control of education is vested on the Minister and the Secretary for Indian Affairs. However, the SAIC Act provides for the Minister of Indian Affairs to delegate certain or all of his powers conferred upon him by the Act to the executive committee".¹⁹ Mr Prinsloo emphasised "Please note that he can delegate his powers but not his responsibility".²⁰ Apparently the Minister delegated some of his powers but not all deducing from the subsequent controversial issue of staff promotions and appointments.

Less than a week after the Executive Committee of the SAIC had decided that the portfolio of Indian Education would be handled by Mr A. Rajbansi and Mr J. N. Reddy, the appointment by the Minister of Indian Affairs of ten inspectors of Indian education, three of them White, was announced by the Division of Indian Education. This came as a surprise to the Indian community which had hoped that SAIC could handle appointments as well. This also came as a surprise to the SAIC since they had not been consulted regarding the appointments. Commenting on the appointments, Mr A. Rajbansi said "The Minister of Indian Affairs made those appointments in terms of the Public Service Act while the powers which were delegated to the SAIC were those he enjoyed under the Indians' Education Act."²¹ He nevertheless, stressed that the SAIC should have been consulted in terms of the provision in the Indian Education Act which entrenched the spirit of consultation to prevail between the SAIC and the Division of Education in the Department of Indian Affairs.²² These appointments raised a big storm especially within the educational sectors in the Indian communities.

The South African Indian Teachers' Association (SAITA) registered its concern over the developments on educational matters. It had been sceptical about the redelegation of powers by SAIC to the Director and had voiced this out. When the new promotions of inspectors became known the SAITA officials adopted an we-told-you-so attitude towards SAIC. There was great dissatisfaction within the ranks of teachers over the promotions of teachers as well. Mr Dama Nair, secretary of SAITA, said that SAITA was examining the whole question of promotions of teachers. A memorandum was to be prepared for submission to the Director of Indian Education, Mr Krog, to whom powers of transfer and secondment of teachers were redelegated by the Minister of Education.²³ SAITA had a resolution which barred any recognition of the SAIC by SAITA until it was vested with powers over education.²⁴

General Issues

Housing or accomodation has always remained a key problem within the growing Indian community. The Department of Community

Development which is responsible for resettlement of the people from one area to the other, was severely accused by the Indian Community for various moves it made in terms of the Group Areas Act. Those who recognised SAIC as the authentic voice of the Indian Community, expected it to intervene effectively should any Indian people be evicted from their places of abode. Those who saw fraudulence in the Council expected its interventions to be ineffective.

Quite a number of places occupied by black families or businessmen in towns, were affected by these expropriations and evictions. In Durban, Indian families staying at Cathedral Road Pine Street, who were served with expropriation orders, immediately organised themselves in protest against these evictions. They were given alternative accommodation in Chatsworth until better accommodation was available in Phoenix. An action committee representing affected families was elected and subsequently the committee organised a mass meeting where the eviction would be discussed at length. SAIC had been invited to attend was unable to do so for various reasons. Opening the meeting, Mr I. Butler, one of the convenors, accused the SAIC members of saying "These so-called leaders of ours should have a rethink whether they want to serve their people."²⁵ At the meeting the following resolutions were adopted unanimously:

- Withdrawal of expropriation notices and eviction summonses;
- Stop all further action against families until adequate and suitable accommodation was available in the Phoenix housing scheme;
- Recognise that accommodation being offered to the tenants in Chatsworth's units six and eleven was unsuitable;
- Recognise that the eviction of families when the Muslim fasting month had just commenced and when their children were also busy studying for examinations was untimely.²⁶

Cato Manor, which is a suburb in Durban, had also been declared a white area and therefore Indians were required to leave the place. Indians believed that the whole of Cato Manor was historically theirs hence Mr Reddy's objection for representation by Coloureds to Government authorities pressing for a slice in Cato Manor. Following this the SAIC negotiated for the return of at least, the section of Cato Manor to the Indian Community. In a Cato Manor tour by the Minister of Indian Affairs together with SAIC team led by J. N. Reddy who fed out facts and figures to substantiate its plea for rezoning, only managed to say that the fact that the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Community Development and Planning were prepared to have a second look at Cato Manor was a hopeful sign. After the said tour one SAIC Executive member said that he was confident that at least "a slice of Cato Manor would be given back to Indians after our representation this week."²⁷

Approaches were made by the Member of Parliament for Albany M. W. H. D. Deacon to the Ministers of Community Development and Indian Affairs to allow Indian businessmen in Grahamstown to remain where they were. These businessmen were being moved from the central part of town to 1,6 kilometres from the main business centre adjacent to the Coloured and African areas in Grahamstown. Mr Deacon called for Mr Steyn to heed his plea and thereby gaining respect and appreciation from the people.²⁸

REFERENCES

- | | |
|---|---|
| ¹ <i>Daily News</i> 15.8.75 | ¹⁵ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ² <i>Ibid</i> | ¹⁶ <i>Post</i> 16.8.76 |
| ³ <i>Star</i> 29.6.76 | ¹⁷ <i>Leader</i> 1.8.75 |
| ⁴ <i>Ibid</i> | ¹⁸ <i>Graphic</i> 30.4.76, <i>Leader</i> 30.4.76 |
| ⁵ <i>Leader</i> 25.6.76 | ¹⁹ <i>Graphic</i> 30.4.76 |
| ⁶ <i>Ibid</i> | ²⁰ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁷ <i>Sunday Tribune</i> 20.6.76 | ²¹ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁸ <i>Ibid</i> | ²² <i>Leader</i> 23.1.76 |
| ⁹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 30.12.75 | ²³ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ¹⁰ <i>Post</i> 28.3.76 | ²⁴ <i>Graphic</i> 30.4.76, <i>Leader</i> 14.5.76 |
| ¹¹ <i>Leader</i> 30.4.76 | ²⁵ <i>Graphic</i> 14.5.76 |
| ¹² <i>Ibid</i> | ²⁶ <i>Leader</i> 2.8.75 |
| ¹³ <i>Ibid</i> | ²⁷ <i>Graphic</i> 18.7.75 |
| ¹⁴ <i>Star</i> 31.5.76 | ²⁸ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 5.2.76 |

3

GOVERNMENT CREATED POLITICAL BODIES

Coloured Persons Representative Council

The year 1975 became the most eventful one in the short history of the Coloured Persons Representative Council (CPRC). It was the year during which the second general elections of the Council were held and won decisively by the controversial Labour Party of South Africa under the leadership of Mr Sonny Leon. As was related in *Black Review* 1974/75, the Labour Party altered its earlier strategy of gaining control of the CPRC to destroy it through the boycott tactic. On the contrary, the Party opted to return to its original policy of remaining within the CPRC to expose the Government's policy of separate development. In accordance with the party decision, therefore, leader Sonny Leon accepted nomination as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the CPRC. The following Labour Party members were elected into his Executive Committee: Rev. Alan Hendrickse, Deputy Leader (Education); Mr Norman Middleton, Vice-chairman (Social Welfare and Pensions); Mr David Curry (Housing); Mr Fortuin (Rural Areas and Settlements).

After the Labour Party had taken control of the CPRC, definite moves were made by the Government to introduce proposals enhancing the status of the CPRC and giving it wider and greater powers over Coloured affairs. Meetings were held between the Labour CPRC

leadership and Government Cabinet Ministers, as well as the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster. Government proposals, which included the raising of the status of the CPRC Executive to that of a fully fledged cabinet and that of its members to ministerial status, provided for:

- The necessary arrangements whereby each minister would carry responsibility for his own department, and relations between ministers to be conducted in accordance with conventional cabinet procedures;
- Delegation of the necessary powers to ministers not only to initiate legislation without prior approval as at present, but also to carry out decisions of the council;
- The creation of a consultative cabinet council which would consist of an equal number of ministers from the CPRC cabinet and the white cabinet to consider matters of Common interest.¹

Subsequent to a meeting between the CPRC Executive and two South African cabinet ministers, namely Dr Schalk Van der Merwe, Minister of Coloured Affairs, and Mr. A H. Du Plessis, Minister of Community Development, in August 1975, the CPRC chairman, Mr Sonny Leon, announced that the whole Council would have to vote on whether or not his executive should accept the Government proposals. Talking about their meeting with the Government Ministers Mr Leon said; "We made it plain to the Minister that we are sick and tired of serving on toothless advisory bodies". He said his own view was that unless the Coloured members of the Inter-Cabinet committee were given real powers to introduce improvements in the political and the economic lot of the Coloureds, the whole exercise would be a waste of time.²

The new session of the CPRC was opened on the 5th September, by the State President, Dr Nico Diedericks, who urged Coloured leaders to respond positively to the Government proposals. By this time, however, the Labour Party leadership, which controlled the CPRC, was calling on the Government to give the Coloured people "political and economic parity with the Whites at every opportunity." Within a few days following the opening of the session, it was reported that the Labour Party caucus had unanimously approved a proposal to adjourn the CPRC until 19th March to give the Government time to consider Coloured demands for full South African citizenship. This was seen as a move that could force the Government to make use of the provisions of the new amendment to the CPRC Act. The provisions allowed for ministerial take-over of CPRC business, should the Council stop functioning.

On 12th September the CPRC decided by 33-22 votes to adjourn for a period of between 130 days and six months (until March) as had been proposed by the Labour Party caucus. The opposition Federal Party

Leader, Mr Willie Bergins, desperately tried to sway the Council against the move. He tried unsuccessfully to make a case that the Council should be used because it was the start of constitutional developments for Coloureds. He eventually threatened: "I will make it my work to go to the Government and ask them to make the necessary legislative amendments to make the Council work."³ In a speech introducing the motion Mr Leon mentioned several Coloured grievances. One of his major complaints about the Council was that, rather than narrowing, the disparity in expenditure between Whites and Coloureds had increased. He complained also that the Council had to accept the budget approved for it by the White Government, and nothing could be changed.

Later, referring to the six months ultimatum for the Prime Minister, Mr Leon said, "We've given him extra time, I think the Government will have to provide us with a new political dispensation for all the people. *They have no alternative.*"⁴ However, Mr Leon added that he would continue to carry out his duties as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the CPRC unless the Government decided to oust him. "Should I be dismissed then I am sure South Africa would be a laughing stock."⁵

All this was happening at a time when the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, was due to meet the Executive Committee of the CPRC on 20 October. When the meeting actually took place, Mr Vorster made it clear that the Government's policy remained firmly one of separate development.⁶ This was followed by a statement by the Minister of Coloured Re'ations, Mr Van der Merwe, on 23 October in which he called on Mr Leon to pass the budget for the continued services of the CPRC. In the statement⁷ the Minister said that in view of the fact that the Council had adjourned on 12 September 1975 until March 1976, before it had considered its estimates of expenditure for the financial year 1975-76, thus failing to make the necessary funds available for the continued services of the Council, he had prorogued the Council with effect from 8 October. He said he had consequently appointed CPRC Chairman, Mr Leon, to consider and appropriate funds deemed necessary for the continued services of the Council by way of expenditure for the current financial year, as well as the necessary part appropriation estimates for the first half of the following financial year.

Thousands Coloured officials, teachers and pensioners depended on funds voted in the budget for their salaries and pensions.⁸ Commenting on the Minister's demand, Mr Leon said, "This latest action of the government makes nonsense of the concept of democracy and forces me into an invidious position. It also makes an absolute farce of the CPRC as an institution by which Coloured people can attain control over their own affairs. He added that if there were still Coloured people

in South Africa who believed that the CPRC was anything other than a facade and that it could play any constructive role in their development, *they needed their heads examined*".⁹ It was subsequently announced that after consultation with his Executive, Mr Leon had refused to pass the budget.¹⁰ This budget, which Mr Leon regarded as discriminatory and unacceptable, amounted to R158 million. On the contrary the Labour Party submitted an increased budget amounting to R264 million which would enable the CPRC Executive to achieve parity with white expenditure on education.

A wrangle ensued between the Government and Mr Leon which ended with the Government dismissing the Labour Party Leader from his position as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the CPRC. Making the announcement, the Minister of Coloured Affairs also disclosed that the State President had appointed Mrs Alatheia Jansen to succeed Mr Leon. Mrs Jansen, a government nominated member of the CPRC, was employed by the Department of Information as an Information Officer.

Announcing Mr Leon's dismissal, the Minister said: "The position has now been reached where Mr Leon has not only failed until today to execute the duties conferred on him, but he refuses to do so on account of decisions taken by his Executive Committee and his party, the Labour Party. This has created a situation where the duties conferred on him as Chairman apparently clashed with his position as leader of a political party. His final refusal created a situation which, for the sake of orderly administration, could not be allowed to continue." The Minister added "Anybody who accepted such a responsible administrative and executive position knew it was inherent in such an acceptance that the duties attached should be executed irrespective of personal or sectional interest."¹¹

This incident was followed by the mass resignation of the rest of the members of the Executive Committee who had been elected by the CPRC. After the dismissal of the Labour Party from the CPRC driving seat, there emerged reports that in fact the opposition Federal Party Leader, Mr William Bergins, had recommended the Leon expulsion in a meeting with Premier J. Vorster on 29 October, 1975. In a memorandum, Mr Bergins was reported to have requested for the Leader of the minority party or an independent member to be appointed to the post.¹² The Transvaal leader of the Federal Party, Mr Jac Rabie, clashed with Mr Bergins over the Leon chairmanship issue. Mr Rabie apparently objected to the recommendation to have Mr Leon dismissed as CPRC Executive Chairman. He was subsequently dismissed from his position as Transvaal leader of the Federal Party and eventually expelled from the party.¹³

Following the sacking of Mr Leon as leader of the Labour Party which had won 31 of the 40 elected seats in the CPRC, Mr Leon immediately requested a general election. It is believed that Mr Leon was hoping that he would return to his position with a majority. However, this request was refused by the South African Government.

General Issues

June 1976, a month of storms and upheavals that were sweeping the country, was also the month during which the long-awaited Theron Commission report was published. This Commission, named after its chairman, Professor Erika Theron, who was regarded as an expert on Coloured matters, had been appointed in 1973 to research and analyse Coloured living conditions so as to recommend ways in which the interests of the Coloured community could be served economically, politically and socially. Other Commissioners, most of them Whites, included senior academics, senior members of the Coloured community, and people known to have expert knowledge of Coloured Affairs.¹⁴

This Commission presented recommendations which sparked off controversial reaction, not only from amongst white political parties, but also from the general public. Having conducted extensive investigations, the Theron Commission made wide-ranging recommendations in the fields of sport, welfare, economy, education, politics, etc. Almost all recommendations—centred around the Nats' policy of apartheid—led to a conclusion that the Government should reverse its policy in all respects. This was a bone of contention over which the Nats were not prepared to bow down. Prior to the release of this document, the Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, had made it clear to the public that the Government would not alter its policy irrespective of the findings of the Commission. The National Party Congress would indicate the line of direction to be followed by the Nationalist Government. Recommended reforms included the following:

- that there should be drastic constitutional changes which would allow for direct representation in Parliament, at different Government levels and in various decision-making bodies. Detailed proposals would be made by a committee of experts to look into the matter. The Coloured Persons Representative Council and its executive committee was rejected as being a total failure;
- the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act as well as Section 16 of the Immorality Act (which prohibits sexual relations between Blacks and Whites);
- that the Group Areas Act should be modified so that certain business and industrial areas could be available for use by Coloureds as well. District Six, Woodstock and Salt River in the Western Cape should

- be reclassified as Coloured areas. Coloureds should also be allowed to buy agricultural land wherever they wished;
- all sporting, theatrical and recreational amenities should be open to Coloureds on application to local authorities as against the traditional system of seeking ministerial permission. The Commissioner noted the widespread and intense opposition among the vast majority of Coloureds to the administration of Group Areas Act. However, it felt that the 'essential structure' of separate residential areas accommodated for in the Group Areas Act should not be disturbed;
 - that trade unions, agricultural co-operatives, private schools, business organisations like Assocom and other White organisations should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to admit Coloureds or not;
 - that in business, various measures were to be recommended to encourage the development of Coloured entrepreneurs. The Coloured Development Corporation (CDC), whose progress was still at a low ebb, should be expanded in scope;
 - that job reservation should be lifted for Coloureds because "job reservation between Coloureds and Whites no longer fulfils any appreciable function".¹⁵ In order for Coloureds to qualify in these jobs, a labour advancement programme was needed including the establishment of training centres. Wage gaps between Coloureds and Whites doing the same work should be eliminated;
 - reforms needed in farm labour included improved living conditions for labourers, abolition of the prison labour system and the giving of liquor to labourers—the so called 'tot-system';
 - that social welfare, transport, general housing services for Coloureds were inadequate and therefore needed urgent attention;
 - that culturally, the Coloureds should be regarded as part of the white group;
 - that there should be increased contact and dialogue between Coloureds and Whites in sport and move away from all unnecessary controlling regulations for competitions at national, regional and club level. Merit teams were preferred to "Invitation Sides" at national level.

In a subsequent White Paper, the Government reacted to the Theron recommendations which were somewhat unpalatable to it, reiterated that it would not divert from its standpoint. By so doing, the Government was avoiding a return to "a situation of political exploitation and conflicting of group interests."¹⁶ The White Paper further pointed out that parallel development had been beneficial to the Coloured people and the Republic since its inception. Most of the recommendations were rejected by the Government. These included: the repeal of Immorality Act's Section 16 and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act.

Also, another recommendation that Coloureds be allocated their own homeland was totally rejected by the Government.

Despite this adamant standpoint by the South African Government, the basic premise from which the Theron recommendations were based, that "there should be the greatest measure of consultation and the greatest possible say in the spheres of common interest"¹⁷ was affirmed in the White Paper. However, a more detailed official standpoint on the recommendations was still due for publication after the Government Departments affected by proposals had been given time to study them.

Widespread expressions of disappointment and anger swept the country following the Government's reaction to the proposals. The white opposition political parties saw this rejection as an omen for confrontation between all South African races.¹⁸ Mr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert warned that the Government rejected the recommendations "at its own peril as well as at the peril of South Africa".¹⁹ He further said that the last thing South Africa could afford at such a time was a government that floundered indeterminately in a political impasse of its own. The opposition saw this hesitancy to implement some of the recommendations as arising out of differences and tensions within the Nationalist Party.²⁰ The Coloured Community which had been waiting for the Theron Commission report for the past three years, expressed its feelings on the whole controversy. Amongst Coloured leaders who indicated concern was the Labour Party leader, Mr Sonny Leon, who said that relations between Whites and Coloureds would be strained as a result of the hopes that Coloureds had cherished over the recommendations and the subsequent refusal thereof. He asserted also that it would further encourage an African-Coloured alliance. Asked for his comment by *Rand Daily Mail*, Mr Willie Bergens, leader of the pro-Government Federal Party, declined to comment. Dr R. E. Van der Ross, Rector of the University of Western Cape who had served on this commission, based his argument on his experience with the Theron Commission warning people not to rush to conclusions and get rid of hot air, dispense a mass of flowery oratory which would vanish in the end. Coloured people were to accept that the Government would obviously not bend. Apparently Dr Van der Ross was worried about Coloured identity and the need for the Government to accept the Coloureds as nation and equal with Whites. He predicted disillusionment within the Coloured Community specifically from the merging middle-class who wanted a new dispensation. He said that the position could result in Coloured emigration from the country.²¹

Statements uttered by SAIC leaders give the impression that the Indian Council had been awaiting the report as well as Government reaction to it with keen interest. According to the former Chairman of the South

African Indian Council, Mr H. Joosab, the Indians were as disappointed as the Coloureds were at the Government's "ill considered action." As long as the Nationalist Party remained in power, the Indians would be condemned to second class citizenship. Indians, like Coloureds, were frustrated at their lack of representation in the real political power centres.

REFERENCES

- | | |
|--|---|
| ¹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 5.9.75, 19.8.75 | ¹² <i>Sunday Times</i> 23.11.75 |
| ² <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 23.8.75 | ¹³ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 21.11.75, <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 18.12.75 |
| ³ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 13.9.75 | ¹⁴ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 19.6.76 |
| ⁴ <i>Ibid</i> | ¹⁵ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁵ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 15.9.75 | ¹⁶ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁶ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 21.10.75 | ¹⁷ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁷ <i>Herald</i> 24.10.75 | ¹⁸ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁸ <i>Ibid</i> | ¹⁹ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ⁹ <i>Ibid</i> | ²⁰ <i>Ibid</i> |
| ¹⁰ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 31.10.75 | ²¹ <i>Herald</i> 10.7.76 |
| ¹¹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 12.11.75 | |

4

SECURITY LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION

Summary of the Main Acts

Below is a brief definition of the Acts under which most of the Black people are detained.

TERRORISM ACT, SECTION 6

This section provides for the arrest of any person whom a Commissioned Officer or above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, has reason to believe that he or she is a terrorist, or is withholding from the South African Police any information relating to terrorists or to offences under this Act. Such a person can be arrested without warrant and detained for interrogation at such places in the Republic and subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may, subject to the directions of the Minister, from time to time determine, until the Commissioner orders his release when he has satisfactorily replied to all questions at the said interrogation, or that no useful purpose will be served by his further detention, or until his release is ordered by the Minister.

This Act empowers the Commissioner to, as soon as possible after arrest of any detainee, advise the Minister of his name, and the place where he is being detained, and to furnish the Minister once a month with reasons why any detainee shall not be released.

The Minister may at any time order the release of any detainee.

Section 6 of this Act further prohibits any person other than the Minister or an officer in the service of the State, acting in the performance of his official duties, to have access to any detainee, or to be entitled to any official information relating to or obtained from the detainee.

If circumstances so permit, a detainee shall be visited in private by a magistrate at least once a month.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

Internal Security Act was introduced "to amend the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, so as to make provision for declaring organisations promoting activities endangering the security of the state or the maintenance of public order to be unlawful and for prohibiting certain publications accordingly and applying certain restrictions imposed by that Act, to persons engaging in such activities; to regulate the release on bail or otherwise of persons arrested for certain offences and to provide for the detention of certain witnesses; to amend the Public Safety Act of 1953, so as to extend the power to make regulations; to amend the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, in regard to the release of arrested persons on bail or otherwise, and the detention of witnesses; to apply the Riotous Assembly Act, 1956, to the territory of South West Africa; and to amend the Terrorism Act, 1967, so as to delete the provisions as to the release on bail or otherwise of any person detained in custody on a charge of having committed an offence under that Act; and to provide for matters connected therewith."

The Internal Security Act allows for "preventive detention" or "internment" for twelve month periods. Any member of the South African Police "who has received information that a notice (signed by the Minister) has been issued in respect of any person, may, before the notice has been delivered or tendered to such person, without the required warrant, arrest him and keep him in custody" but for not more than seven days. It further allows for a review committee who would meet "in camera" to investigate any internment order. The right to inspect committee records is reserved only for state officials; no court has jurisdiction to pronounce upon the functions or recommendations of the committee.

The detainee has no knowledge of the accusations against him nor who has given evidence to the committee and is without any right of legal representation.

The Act further provides for an Attorney-General to prohibit the release on bail "or otherwise" of any person charged with certain listed offences, until sentence has been passed or the person is discharged.

People detained under this legislation are generally granted status similar to that of awaiting trial prisoners. However, this remains at the discretion of the Commissioner of each prison and subsequently treatment differs considerably.

The use of powers under this Act cannot be tested in an open court of law. The courts will therefore never be called upon to define the

crucial and omnipresent phrase "endanger the security of the State and the maintenance of public order."

PROCLAMATION R400 OF 1960

Emergency regulations for the Transkei were promulgated in November 1960 by Proclamation R400. In their original form these regulations made no provision for detention without trial but by amendment introduced in the following month such detention was authorized (by Proclamation R413 of 1960). They were presumably enacted under the powers conferred upon the Governor-General (as he was then) by the Bantu Administration Act, and so by mere executive proclamation indefinite detention came into being in the Transkei.

The provisions governing detention authorise an African Commissioner, commissioned or non-commissioned officer of the South African Police to arrest and detain any person for interrogation for an unlimited period if the officer concerned suspects that such person has taken part, or intended to take part, in the commission of any offence, or that the person concerned has information about the offence or intended offence. The detainee may then be interrogated at the place of detention and held until "the said person has answered truthfully and fully all questions put to him which have any bearing upon the said offence or intended offence".

A person so arrested or detained may not consult with a legal adviser in connection with any matter relating to the arrest or detention unless the Minister, or a person acting under his authority consents to such consultation. A detainee may at any time be released by order of the Minister upon such conditions as he may determine.

The regulation does not specifically deny persons access to the detainee. It is silent as to conditions of detention, but if the detainee is lodged in a goal he will presumably fall under the appropriate prison regulations.

Bannings

1. PUMZILE MAJEKE was served with a banning order under Suppression of Communism Act on the 17th October 1975 which restricted him to the district of Qumbu. At the time of banning he was working for Zimele Trust Fund as a field worker. He was previously in detention for 164 days.

2. FATIMA MEER of the University of Natal was served with a banning order under the Internal Security Act on the 23rd July 1976. The five year banning order restricts her to Durban and prohibits her from entering any Black area, except the Indian residential area of Sydenham in Durban, where she lives.

Fatima Meer, a sociologist, was recently awarded the Morris Ginsberg Research Fellowship, but was unable to travel to London to receive it because her application for a passport was turned down.

The banning order is believed to have been the first served under the Internal Security Act.

3. MBUYISELO HOUGHTON SOCI of Middledrift; HETESE NTIBIXELWA of Mdantsane and HOLIDAY VINTA of Lady Frere received banning orders prohibiting them from attending gatherings in terms of Internal Security Act for two years, starting on the 23rd July 1976.

Detentions

During the period under review some fourteen people are believed to be still in detention at John Vorster Square alone, some since October 1975. It is thought that most of these people are being detained in connection with the NAYO trial which is being held in Supreme Court in Pretoria. However, a different spate of detentions seems to indicate that at best some are being held in connection with a different matter. A further three are men who were redetained immediately after having charges against them withdrawn.

Immediately following the student demonstrations, the security police stepped up their activities and many people were detained, largely under General Law Amendment Act of 1966. Some twenty five students of Ngoye University of Zululand, were detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, following the destruction of the administration block and library of the University. Thereafter swoop after swoop was made, and among many others Mr Kenneth Hlaku Rachidi, National President of the Black People's Convention (BPC), was detained.

The first detentions of journalists occurred at the end of July 1976 when four people in Cape Town were detained, three of whom have since appeared in court charged under the new Internal Security Act. The following day a further two journalists from Johannesburg were detained, and later several more journalists were also detained.

On the 10th of August 1976 Mr Kruger, Minister of Justice, announced that he had extended the preventive detention sections of the Internal Security Act, (which since the 16th June had been confined to the trouble-torn Transvaal), to the whole of South Africa.

Within days of this announcement some 50 or more recognised leaders of the Black Community were detained throughout South Africa, some in terms of the Internal Security Act, others under General Law Amendment Act of 1966, with the Terrorism Act almost always being imposed on these individuals after the completion of the 14 days incommunicado detention provided for under the General Law Amendment Act.

Of the people who were initially held under the General Law Amendment Act was Steve Biko, who was banned and restricted to King William's Town in 1973; also a former Black Community Programmes executive of the Eastern Cape Branch. Mr Biko's detention under General Law Amendment Act was later changed to Section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

Prominent national black leaders detained under Internal Security Act, Section 10 (1) included Mrs Winnie Mandela, who is an executive member of the Black Parents' Association (BPA); Mr Nyameko Barney Pityana of Port Elizabeth, an articled clerk who was formerly in the forefront of the Black Consciousness Philosophy; his wife, brother and nephew; Father S'mangaliso Mkhathshwa, a Roman Catholic Priest in Pretoria; Mr L. Mathabatha, a leading educationist and principal of Soweto High School; Mrs Fatima Meer, recently banned Durban sociologist and Indian Community leader; Mrs Jane Oshadi Phakathi, Transvaal Regional Director of the Christian Institute and National President of the YWCA (world affiliated); Dr Mamphela Ramphele, Superintendent of the Zanempilo Health Centre of Black Community Programmes and one of the doctors who represented the Mohapi family at the postmortem of Mr Mapetla Mohapi who died whilst in detention in August 1976. Dr Aaron Mathlare, an executive member of BPA; Mr Mxolisi Mvovo, vice-president of BPC; and Dr Nthato Motlana, also of BPA, were also detained.

Dr Manas Buthelezi, the Chairman of BPA, was detained for a short while and then released. It had all been a 'mistake' he was told.

Miss Thenjiwe Mtintso of the *Daily Dispatch* was held, first under General Law Amendment Act and later under the Terrorism Act; subsequently Peter Magubane, a renowned photographer with the *Rand Daily Mail* who was held incommunicado for a total of 586 days between 1969 and 1971; and Mr Joe Thloloe, President of the Union of Black Journalists. The last two were held under Internal Security Act.

A further police swoop took place in Natal and at least twelve more people were detained, and during the last week of August the net widened to include more black churchmen, a prominent Moravian Minister, Rev. Chris Wessels, and two Nederduitse Gereformede Kerk in Afrika Ministers, Res. Moatshe and Loputu.

The net moved further into the Coloured Community on 26 August, Mr Allan Hendrickse, the National Chairman of the Coloured Labour Party and a former President of the United Congregational church was held. Mr Hendrickse's son, Peter, was also subsequently detained.

Below are organisations and groupings which have had their leadership snapped into prison.

Black People's Convention (BPC)

South African Students' Organisation (SASO)

South African Students' Movement (SASM)

Black Community Programmes (BCP)

Black Women's Federation (BWF)

Black Parents' Association of Soweto (BPA)

Black Church organisations, individual Black Students and intellectual groups.

On the 23rd of August 1976 Mr Kruger threatened once again to use the arbitrary powers which the state has invested in him when he announced that he would introduce legislation to prevent publication of the names of people detained without trial under the security laws. He gave as his reasons for not wanting these names released or published:

—People held under Section 10 of the Internal Security Act were not necessarily guilty “and to go and give his name is to stick a stigma on him, which may be unfair to him.”

—Publication of names of detainees might actually stimulate unrest, whereas the detentions were designed to remove “potential trouble-makers” from the scene.¹

He said “If you give names you may actually stimulate the very trouble that you are trying to stop by indiscriminately giving names you make the members annoyed. You may actually even stimulate trouble whereas I am trying to stop trouble.”²

Transkei Detentions

From the 11th of June 1976 to the 30th of September of the same year 33 people were believed to be detained in the Transkei, most of them under Proclamation R400.

The most defined grouping hit by the detentions had been Transkei's opposition, the Democratic Party. The eight DP members below were in detention as at 8 September 1976:

Mr P. S. Fadane—National Organiser

Mrs Florence Mangcotywa—DP member

Mr L. L. Mgudlwa

Mr O. O. Mpondo—Deputy Leader

Mr Hector Ncokazi—Leader of the Democratic Party

Mr Jackson Nkosiyanane—National Chairman

Mr W. D. Pupuma—General Secretary

Mr S. A. Xobololo—DP member

The *Star* claims that it is now generally accepted in Umtata that the arrests were ordered by the Transkeian Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima, in consultation with his brother, the Chief Minister.

Eastern Cape Students' Detentions

It was reported in September that at least eight students, mostly from

Healdtown Institution, were held under the Terrorism Act in East London. All eight students were members of the South African Students' Movement.

Later most of these boys were charged under the same Act and others turned to be state witnesses. This case is discussed later in full detail.

POLITICAL TRIALS

SASO-BPC Trial

As the mammoth political trial of nine leaders of the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) reached its first anniversary on the 4th of August 1976, the end of the long and trying trial was in sight. The trial had become to be known as the "Trial of Black Consciousness" rather than of the nine accused, and had a particularly novel aspect. There are no physical acts of terrorism or recruitment alleged in the 82-page indictment, apart from charges of writings, allegedly composed or distributed by the nine accused. Instead the charges relate to the September 1974 "Viva Frelimo" rallies, SASO and BPC speeches, and the very concept and theory of Black Consciousness philosophy.⁴

In June this year the trial surpassed the 117 Pietermaritzburg African People's Democratic Union of South Africa (APDUSA) trial as the longest Terrorism Act case.

The court records stand at over 8 000 pages of evidence. Documentary evidence and exhibits run to more than 1 000 pages and by June the estimated costs of the trial for both prosecution and defence were well in excess of R120 000,00.

Mr Justice Boshoff pointed out that in seeking a conviction, Sub-section 2 of the Terrorism Act helps the prosecution to prove the men had intention to endanger the law and order of South Africa.

The sub-section lists a series of "likely results" of the men's actions which, if not disproved by defence, presume the men to be guilty of terrorism.

The accused must prove, among other things that their writings, speeches and philosophy were not likely to

- embarrass the administration of the affairs of the state,
- promote general dislocation, disturbance and disorder,
- cause substantial financial loss to any person or the state,
- hamper or deter any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order.⁵

For over four months the defence team argued for clarification and

further particulars regarding the indictment and experienced continued appearances and postponements. On the 23rd June, 1975, the State withdrew all charges against Sivalingham Moodley and Solly Ismail. The indictment against the other 11 accused was also withdrawn and a new one issued against nine men with individual indictments being served against Rubin Hare and Sadecque Variava. Finally six months after their first appearance and 11 months after the rally, the accused were asked to plead.

On the 7th October, ten people, some detained since the rally itself, were finally released. It is notable that no charges were brought against them and neither were they called as State witnesses. The State finally closed its case on the 12th December 1975 after calling 61 witnesses to court.

Mr. Justice Boshoff refused the defence application for the discharge of five accused but granted discharge of seven of thirteen counts facing the accused, ruled that the prosecution's allegation of a conspiracy among eight of the men to endanger law and order would not get the benefit of the above list of "likely results". He called the state's indictment alleging unspecified acts in the conspiracy count "clumsy".

The Defence opened their case on 29 May 1976 and Dr Rick Turner, a banned former Natal University Political Science lecturer was called as their first witness. Following him the international theologian, Dr. Manas Buthelezi, Secretary General of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South Africa and was called and then the first accused, Saths Cooper, explained Black Consciousness and its principles and objectives. He spent six full days giving evidence and was questioned on BPC's views on everything from sport, police and foreign investment to the white political parties in South Africa.

Steve Biko, banned under the Suppression of Communism Act, appeared as a witness for the defence. He is generally acknowledged as the founder of SASO and responsible for its Constitution and the philosophy of Black Consciousness. During the four days of evidence he gave an outstanding reflection of Black Consciousness, its principles and aims.

Another accused, Nchaube Aubrey Mokoape, was called to give evidence. He also alleged that he had been assaulted by a security police captain, Captain du Toit, at the time of his arrest a few weeks after the Viva Frelimo Rally.

Mr M. S. P. Lekota began evidence in his defence. He explained that SASO struggled for psychological and physical liberation and denied charges that the "Viva Frelimo" rally was planned to encourage or further racial hostility; cause change through social and economic means; embarrass the administration of the State; or deter the maintenance of law and order in the country.

Mr Pandelani Nefolovodhwe in his evidence said that "for 300 years Whites could not solve the problems of South Africa. Blacks must now take it upon themselves to facilitate change in the country." He explained that the Bantustans concept was regarded as a 'fraud' by the Black community and that Homeland leaders were regarded as 'atrocious opportunists' who posed as leaders of Black people but only confused and divided them. They had the "audacity and arrogance" to claim that they were true Black leaders. Of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi he said that "Gatsha was being used to further the policy of his bosses" and that he (the accused) did "not regard him respectable in so far as representing Black people". Black Consciousness was an end in itself, the self-realisation of the Black man, the way he helps himself and that Whites were forcing the Blacks to try to obtain the vote by violent means.

Mr Gilbert Kaboraane Sedibe giving his evidence said that SASO was a come-together for students to express their aspirations.

Mr Muntu Myeza, a former SASO president and one of the accused, gave evidence for five days and in answer to the state question as to what his attitude was to the build up of South African military capability, he said "any country needs to build up its defence, but the way the South African Government is going on, they are doing nothing to right the wrongs inside the country they are just building up their defence. Let us in South Africa circumvent conflict by righting these wrongs. We insist there must be change." He said that the passing of repressive legislation and the stepped-up defence budget showed the Government was "frantic, desperate and confused." These actions were designed to give the white electorate a false sense of security.

He told the court that Professor Barend Van Niekerk, of Natal University Law Faculty, had been consulted by the organisers of the "Viva Frelimo" rally on the legality of the meeting. He assured him that if there wouldn't be any SASO or BPC speakers, the meeting would escape the terms of the banning order.

Mr. Gessler Nkondo, a senior lecturer in English at the University of the North at Turfloop, was called to interpret Black poetry, sentiment and aspirations of documents before the court. He felt the poems dealt with the anguish of the Black man in South Africa and were meaningful and made sense to the reader. He felt that indiscriminate arrests and the use of police dogs at the University of the North had agitated students and created a potentially threatening atmosphere. He explained that the main aim of SASO, as he understood it, was to unite Black students and to emancipate the students in particular through the philosophy of Black Consciousness. SASO aimed at an egalitarian society and that most Blacks preferred to call South Africa "Azania".

Mr Ralph Mgijima gave evidence for the defence and was warned by

the Judge that he might face prosecution if he continued with evidence of how he "helped to organise the 1974 'Viva Frelimo Rally' in Durban".

Another accused, Strini Moodley, a banned former publications director of SASO, was also called to give evidence.

Absolom Z. Cindi, in giving evidence, denied the State's allegation that BPC co-operated and maintained communication with foreign based organisations and persons hostile to South Africa. He felt that Blacks could not be held responsible for South Africa's policy of apartheid. It was hoped that such isolation would lead to "soul searching and introspection on the part of the Whites to consider playing with Blacks in sport." Of the South African police he said they were "impudent and inconsiderate" and were agents of an oppressive system. The BPC was aimed at creating an equitable system based on Black Communalism which was an indigenous socio-economic system.

An internationally known expert on terrorism, Professor Ted Gurr, professor of political science at America's North Western University and a consultant to the US State Department, told the court that both SASO and BPC were protest rather than revolutionary movements. A revolutionary group wanted change in some aspects of existing political, social and economic conditions. A revolutionary group would use sabotage, terrorism and violence to achieve its aims and a protest group would use rallies. Part of the programmes of SASO and BPC were similar to the "conscious raising" methods used by women's liberation groups.

He also said that it was not correct to say that all successful guerilla wars were nationalistic wars. He said the meaning of "freedom fighter" was "anyone engaged in any kind of struggle for the purpose of achieving freedom."

A fierce clash erupted in the trial when the defence made application to interpose a former reporter to give evidence on the Viva Frelimo Rally. Finally Mr Vasantrai Soni was permitted to give evidence.

Mr Lybon Mabasa, a high school teacher, was called to give evidence on the rally at the University of the North which the State alleges in the indictment "endangered the maintenance of law and order" and thus constitutes terrorism.

Mr Lybon Mabasa was detained during the recent security swoop.

Mr Mduduzi Guma, an articled clerk and a former University of Zululand student, who was facing charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act, was interposed as a defence witness.

Mr Nkwenkwe Nkomo, one of the accused, told the court that "Blacks must be in a position to decide for themselves what education they want for themselves and their children." BPC's wish was that all children regardless of race, should receive the same education. He

explained that whites who were "helpful and sympathetic" towards Blacks created disunity amongst Blacks and that "it is impossible for us Blacks to sit around and plan our strategy of liberation with whites. When we have closed our ranks, then we can talk to whites, because whites created divisions among us."

Nkwenkwe went on to say that the Republic of South Africa had deprived the Black man of his rightful vote, but the Black men were now coming together to present a united front to demand the vote for all people except the insane and people under a certain prescribed age.

He explained that BPC rejected every form of Black representation established by South Africa "regime" and saw homeland leaders as "traitors" to the Black cause as they were part of a "puppet structure" which was manipulated by the white minority government of South Africa. BPC had the backing of by far the majority of South Africa. He said every Black person was opposed to racism, as was the case with many of the whites.

Rev. Tshenuwani Farisani, past President of the BPC, said BPC's objectives were the articulation of Black needs in order to counter the "psychological oppression" that said Blacks were inferior.

He further said that "whites must be educated to see that sharing is their best form of security" and when asked by the Judge whether a genius gains nothing by his talent, he replied that talent was not for personal gain, but should be used for the good of all—according to the Bible.

The Defence Counsel closed its case at the end of August, 1976, and the trial was remanded to 2 October.

Sadecque Variava, who was originally one of the 11 accused in the SASO-BPC trial was issued with a separate indictment at the end of June 1975. He was finally granted bail of R1 000 after nine months in detention.

Nomsisi Khuzwayo who was detained on the 25th November, 1975, is to appear with Sadecque after being granted a bail of R2 000 and their case will be resumed in November, 1976.

The SASM Trial

In February, 1976, it was reported that a number of Healdtown and Tembalabantu students, all members of SASM, were detained by Security Police in Alice and King William's Town under the Terrorism Act.

Police had visited the detainees' parents and warned them not to talk to the press about the detentions.

Sotomela Ndukwana (19), Vuyo Jack (20), both detained in October, 1975, Goodwin Mda (19) detained on the 20th February, 1976, Phumelele Sizani (22) and Ngcola Hempe (19) were charged under the

Terrorism Act, for allegedly taking part in "terrorist activities" and planning to or trying to leave South Africa to undergo military training. They all pleaded not guilty.

Mr S. A. Engelbrecht, SC, Deputy Attorney-General of the Eastern Cape, appeared for the State with Mr J. Muller, and Mr Kies, assisted by advocate T. L. Skweyiya of Durban, instructed by Tembani and associates of Grahamstown appeared for the defence. Mr Tembani was then detained under the Internal Security Act in mid August. The court then appointed another firm of attorneys in Grahamstown to continue to be the instructing attorneys in the trial.

Vuyo Baleni could not give evidence as a result of a "disturbed state of mind" which led him to be admitted at Fort England Mental Hospital. Andile Ngaki (detained) was called as a witness and was then remanded in custody under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

Tembani Pantsi refused to give evidence for the state on the plea that the accused "thirst for righteousness". God said "Blessed are those who thirst after righteousness." He was consequently sentenced to one month's imprisonment and ten days for contempt of court.

Don Qupe, who had originally refused to give evidence because he could not understand why he was "not charged and they were charged", was also jailed for a month. However, Don soon changed his mind after being "shut in a cold cell" and decided to give evidence.

Thamsanqa Nyati (20) who was called as sixth witness gave evidence for the State in connection with the alleged route to be used by the students to Tanzania and Mozambique.

Mr Wilberforce Sinxo (20) told the court that SASM stood for equality and majority rule, and that only white people like Bram Fisher and those banned or imprisoned because of their struggle for Black liberation were respected.

Mr Z. A. Marawu, a former five-year political prisoner of East London, was called as the thirteenth witness. Prior to giving evidence he was warned by the judge that he was being regarded by the State as an accomplice to one of the charges, and that if he gave evidence to the satisfaction of the judge he would be discharged from liability to incriminating statements he had made. He then alleged that a man from the World Council of Churches was suggested as a possible contact for getting out of South Africa without legal documents.

Mrs Myra Jack, Vuyo Jack's mother and Mr Collins Ndukwana, father of Sotomela, were called to give evidence against their sons. The defence counsel, after seeing their statements (Mrs. Jacks' and Mr. Collins Ndukwana's) indicated that they would admit the evidence and the parents would not be required to live through the horrible experience of giving evidence against their own sons.

By the end of June 1976 Vuyo Baleni was alleged to be at Tower Mental Hospital in Fort Beaufort for psychiatric treatment. The court was adjourned to 29 August and further to 7 of September, 1976.

Ben Louw Trial

Ben Louw (24), an active member of SASO who has been in and out of detention, appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate's court on the 20th August, 1976 on a charge under the Terrorism Act. It is alleged that he incited people to undergo military training. The trial has been remanded to the second week of September, 1976.

Ben Louw was later detained in the wake of country-wide unrest and therefore his case had to await his release.

Eric Molobi Trial

Eric Molobi, having been held incommunicado for 190 days before being charged under the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Acts, and found guilty on two counts appealed against the judgement. The outcome of the appeal is not known yet.

Frank Molobi, cousin to Eric, also lodged an appeal after being sentenced to imprisonment for four months following his refusal to testify for the State against Eric. He was released on bail of R500.

He was further charged with attempting to defeat the ends of justice, as it was alleged that he attempted to influence other State witnesses not to give evidence. However, he did not appear in court; it is believed that he has fled South Africa.

Vincent Selanto, who had been charged with statutory perjury, was acquitted because two security police gave conflicting evidence on their interrogation of him.

The NAYO Trial

On the 11th November, 1975, Joseph Molokeng, Bheki Langa, Amos Masondo, Benjamin Mfenyana, Andrew Moletsane, Patrick Maisela and Pumza Dyantyi appeared in Johannesburg on charges under the Terrorism Act. Charges alleged that the accused conspired with 46 named accomplices to form underground cells to gather and study information on certain strategic building and installations, and also to study the South African economy and the role that the Black labour force could play to cripple the economy.

After nearly a month, during which five witnesses had refused to give evidence before the court, the State closed its case. Mr J. van Jaarsveldt assisted by Mr S. Swanepoel appeared for the State whilst Mr. R. Allaway assisted by Mr L. Bowman appeared for the accused, instructed by Mr S. Chetty.

The defence applied for the discharge of the accused, claiming that there was no evidence to prove a conspiracy.

On the 3rd May 1976 the State conceded that it had no case against Bheki Langa, and that he must "go altogether free". The charges also against Amos Masondo and David Nhlapo who had been issued with a separate indictment under the Suppression of Communism, were withdrawn; Benjamin Mfenyana's charge under Terrorism was withdrawn as well.

Phumza Dyantyi, who had just been acquitted, was re-detained and whisked away "for questioning in connection with another matter."

During evidence Joseph Molokeng explained his convictions that social change must ultimately come to South Africa, and that Black Consciousness was striving for a better deal for the Blacks "through evolution and not revolution."

Amos Masondo claimed that he had made a number of statements on the afternoon of his arrest and the following morning. These were, however, torn up by the police claiming that they were not satisfactory. He also claimed that he was threatened with being beaten up if he did not "tell the truth".

Amongst the things in his statement allegedly written on Sergeant Smith's instructions were: "Formation of groups to study military objectives, hydro-electric schemes and similar projects to prepare for armed struggle" and "assignments to study targets such as the Hertzog Tower, the Vaal Dam and the Orlando Power Station."

Andrew Moletsane, in his evidence, stated that his ideal government in South Africa was communalism which "has its roots in the African tribal way of life and means a sharing with the community in general."

The Defence Counsel claimed that "there has been an enthusiasm which has been pumped into the State's case which has just about wrecked it." Mr Allaway felt that much of the State's evidence was "vague, variegated, unprecise and unable to stand against the denials of the accused."

Of great significance in the trial was the investigation system allegedly adopted by the Security Police, with a number of witnesses claiming that they never said certain things attributed to them in their official "statements". There was also evidence of interrogations of some witnesses being conducted with the witnesses in groups. "This is an undesirable practice to put it at its lowest" said Mr Allaway.

David Nhlapo and Amos Masondo were convicted and sentenced to the minimum compulsory sentence of five years. Leave to appeal was refused. Andrew Moletsane and Joseph Molokeng were found not guilty and discharged.

After giving 'hostile' evidence Mr Kgokong was immediately

arrested on the 24th March, 1976, charged with perjury under the Official Secrets Act, alternatively theft. Bail was initially refused but after lodging an appeal against the judgement a bail of R500 was granted.

Mr Kgokong has since been detained following the student demonstrations in Soweto which subsequently spread to general unrest throughout the country. Whilst in detention Mr Kgokong appeared in court and the case was struck off the Roll.

The Maisela Trial

Patrick Maisela, a laboratory technician at Baragwanath Hospital was originally detained on the 9th October and held in solitary confinement until 10 November, 1975, when he appeared with the six of the NAYO trial on charges under the Terrorism Act. Charges against him were withdrawn and a separate charge under the Suppression of Communism Act was served on him. The case was remanded and he was held in custody. When he appeared on the 3rd April, 1976 he was granted a bail of R1 000 on condition he reported to John Vorster Square weekly on Wednesdays and he had to hand over his passport to the police.

The court, after remanding the case several times, withdrew all charges against Mr Maisela.

THE RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES TRIALS

Viva Frelimo Rally, Durban Workers' Trial

Following a strike at the Heinemann Electric Company, five people were arrested under the Riotous Assemblies and Police Acts. Mr Mkhabele, Mrs Mashinini, Mrs Mogokare and Mr Maseko were charged in the Edenvale Magistrates Court before Mr J. Venter, under the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Bantu Regulations Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act. They were all refused bail and the case was remanded to second April when no evidence was led and bail was again refused on the plea that the accused could cause further trouble at the Heinemann factory and attempt to intimidate and communicate with potential state witnesses.

After several remands the State was asked for further particulars relating to:

- charges, whether certain charges were alternative or accumulative;
- names of people who the accused hindered;
- crimes, the exact location of the crimes, and the exact manner in which they were committed.

The case was then remanded several times and is still to continue.

Trade Union Officials' Trials

Mr Gavin Anderson, acting Secretary for the Metal and Allied Workers Union, appeared in court on the 30th March, 1976 charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act and was granted bail of R200.

On the 5th May, 1976, Siphon Kubheka, Secretary of MAWU, was arrested and appeared with Gavin Anderson in the Germiston Regional Court charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Bantu Labour Regulations Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act and the Police Act.

A labour officer, called to give evidence on the 16th June, 1976, told the court that he had called the police on Friday as he feared violence to property. He stated firmly that the Labour Department was against Trade Unions for "Bantu" and that the "correct" channels for workers' grievances was through the Workers and Liaison Committees.

Finally the two men were acquitted on charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act but were found guilty under the Bantu Labour Regulations Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act.

Gavin Anderson was fined R90 or 45 days; Siphon Kubheka R45 or 30 days. They are reported to have lodged a notice of appeal.

Western Cape Students' Trial

Eleven students of the Western Cape University were arrested on the 5th September, 1975, at the opening of the Coloured Representative Council when they staged a demonstration, and were held under the Riotous Assemblies Act. They were alleged to have displayed posters denouncing the CRC. Mr S. J. C. van Vuuren decided that insufficient evidence was lead and all 11 were acquitted.

The ANC—Pietermaritzburg Trial

Of the 50 people who were allegedly detained in Natal by the end of March, 1976, ten appeared in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, charged in an eighteen-page indictment, under the Terrorism Act and Section 11(c) of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950. The accused who appeared on 14 May, 1976, were Themba Gwala (55), William Khanyile (40), Anton Xaba (42), John Nene (32), Vusimusi Magubane (32), Matthews Meyiwa (51), Azaria Ndebele (40), Zakhele Mdlalose (51), Joseph Nduli (35) and Cleopas Ndlovu (42). All are alleged to be members or active supporters of the ANC and are alleged to have committed, conspired or attempted to commit the following:

- sent and received messages from members of the ANC in Swaziland;
- received "subversive" literature from Swaziland for distribution, discussion, study or taken notes of the material;
- received money from certain people, used and distributed the money;
- obtained information in connection with and planned routes by

which people recruited for training of a political or military nature could be transported up to the border or sent across the South African border into Swaziland, and issuing instructions on routes to be used;—incited, instigated, commanded, aided, advised, encouraged and procured others to undergo training of a military or political nature outside the Republic in order thereafter to return and assist in the overthrow of the Government of the Republic by violent and forcible means;—Mr Nduli is alleged to have undergone training in Dar-es-Salaam, Kongwa, Tanzania and in Odessa, Russia.

They were not asked to plead.

Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu made submissions to the Supreme Court that they had been kidnapped from Swaziland and tortured by the South African Security Police. They further sought a rule whereby the Ministers of Police, Justice, Prisons, Interior and Foreign Affairs would be ordered to return or allow them to return to Swaziland and withdraw the criminal case against them. Two affidavits from Colonel Johannes Gerhardus Dreyer and Major Jacobus Johannes de Swardt denied the alleged kidnap and the allegations of torture.

A surprise order, made by Deputy Attorney-General, Mr D. J. Rossouw, and handed to the Judge, stated that it was considered necessary in the "interest of the safety of the state and the maintenance of public order" that the two men could not be released on bail before sentence was passed, or before they were discharged.

It continued that, discharge under the Terrorism Act or alternately the Internal Security Amendment Act was not dependent on the judgement arising from any charge, and their being set free depended on the decision of the current court hearing.

The defence provided affidavits from a Pietermaritzburg specialist surgeon in which he said that after an examination of the applicants he found a number of scars on various parts of their bodies, some of which "could have been a result of chafing". Furthermore, Mr Nduli had scars on his forehead, back of his head, left side of his neck, ring finger, six scars on left forearm, two indistinct scars on right forearm, eleven on his right leg and nine on his left leg.

Counsel for the State submitted that Swaziland could demand the return of the two allegedly kidnapped men, only if it intended to place them on trial.

Swaziland's Head of Information sent a letter to *Rand Daily Mail* for publication, in which it stated Swaziland's position to be as follows:—
—that Swaziland had no knowledge or evidence of any alleged use of Swaziland territory by ANC for their activities;
—that Swaziland accepts genuine political refugees on condition that they do not engage in any political activities;

- in the case of the kidnap, the men who were allegedly kidnapped by the ANC from Durban to Swaziland were voluntarily repatriated to South Africa in response to their appeal for protection and repatriation, they never claimed that they were connected with the South African Security Police;
- concerning Mr Ndlovu and Mr Nduli who were reported to be missing from Swaziland, an intensive investigation into the matter was carried out; there was no evidence that their disappearance was connected with ANC activities, and, if reports were true that they were abducted on Swazi soil, then Swaziland demands immediate return of the two men.

The application for the release of the two men was refused by the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, Justice van Heerden stating that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to try the applicants "even if they had been arrested on Swaziland soil", and that the accused had failed to discharge their onus of proof that they had been kidnapped.

On the 3rd August, 1976, Major H. D. Stadler of the Security Police was called to lead evidence on "subversive" literature allegedly published and distributed by the banned ANC. Major C. J. Dirker, a retired South African Police officer, lead evidence dating back to the early 1960's Rivonia Trial and under cross examination admitted that the 1955 Freedom Charter of the ANC itself was never banned, only the organisation was banned.

Stephen Mtshali, James Ngwenya and a former ANC member, Carl Kleinboy, gave evidence for the State.

A nurse at Edendale Hospital, Catherine Mkize, told the court she had delivered letters for the accused to people in Swaziland.

Mr Hlapane, giving evidence for the State, attacked "white communists" whom he claimed betrayed Nelson Mandela and had used money received from overseas for the care of detainees' families and legal costs, for their own selfish ends.

Mrs Sylvia Gumede claimed that she had taken letters and suitcases to Mr Gwala from a man in Swaziland. The case is still continuing.

Donald Woods' Trial

Donald Woods, editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, East London, had an appeal case pending against a six month sentence for refusing to disclose the name of an informant who allegedly saw a Security Policemen damaging the Black Community Programmes' offices in King Williams Town. The appeal is to be heard in the Supreme Court in Grahamstown on 29, October 1976.

DEATH IN DETENTION

Below is a list of names of people who have died in detention in South African jails since 1963:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Alleged Date of Death</i>	<i>Place of Death</i>	<i>Alleged cause of Death</i>
Lukesmart			
Solwandle Ngudle	5.9.63	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
Bellington Merope	September 1963	Worcester	Undisclosed
James Tyitya	21.1.64	Port Elizabeth	Suicide by hanging
Suliman Saloojee	9.8.64	Johannesburg	Fell 7 floors during interrogation
Nejeni Gaga	7.5.65	Transkei	Natural causes
Pongolosa Hoye	8.5.65	Transkei	Natural causes
Hangula Shonyeka	9.10.66	Pretoria	Suicide
Leong Pin	19.11.66	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
A. Yan	5.1.67	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
Alpheus Madiba	9.9.67	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
J. B. Tubakwe	11.9.68	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
?	?	?	? (disclosed in Parliament 28.1.69)
Nicodimus Kgoathe	4.2.69	Pretoria	Slipped in shower
Solomon Modipane	28.2.69	?	Natural causes
James Lenkoe	10.3.69	Pretoria	Suicide by hanging
Caleb Mayekiso	June 1969	Port Elizabeth	Natural causes
Michael Shivute	16.6.69	?	Suicide
Jacob Monakgotla	10.9.69	Pretoria	Thrombosis
Iman Abdullah Haron	27.9.69	Cape Town	Fell down stairs
Mthayeni Cuthsela	21.1.71	Pondoland	Natural causes
Ahmed Timol	27.10.71	Johannesburg	Suicide by leaping from 10th floor window.
Joseph Mdluli	19.3.76	Durban	?
Mapetla Mohapi	5.8.76	Kei Road	Suicide by hanging
Luke Mazwembe	3.9.76	Cape Town	Suicide by hanging

Joseph Mdluli's Death

Joseph Mdluli (50), former banned ANC member, died on 19 March, 1976, about 24 hours after being detained under the Terrorism Act in Durban. Photographs of Joseph Mdluli purporting to show signs of torture were released at a Press conference in London by the ANC allegedly taken after the post mortem at the request of Mrs Mdluli.

After repeated demands for an inquest over the death of Mr Mdluli the Minister of Justice, Mr Kruger, disclosed on 11 June, 1976, in Parliament that no inquest would be held as the Attorney-General of Natal had decided that four police officials were to appear shortly on charges of culpable homicide arising from Mr Mdluli's death.

On the 17 June, Captain David Frederick van Zyl, Lt. Andrew Russel Cavill Taylor, Sgt. Mandlakayise Patrick Makhanya and Const. Zebulon Ngobese were charged with culpable homicide but were released on their own recognisances. The case was remanded to the 2nd August, 1976, and had to be remanded further following a car accident involving one of the accused.

Mapetla Mohapi's Death

Mapetla Mohapi (29) died on 5 August 1976 after 22 days incommunicado under the Terrorism Act in Kei Road near King William's Town by allegedly hanging himself with a pair of jeans. Mapetla, a former SASO official and an Administrator for Zimele Trust Fund at the time of detention, was banned for three years under the Suppression of Communism Act.

A post mortem was held on the 6th August, 1977, conducted by Dr R. B. R. Hawkes in the presence of Dr A. M. Ramphela and Dr Msauli (who were detained on 13 and 29 August, 1976, respectively, under the Internal Security Act) and Mr G. Mxenge, a Durban attorney.

Body tissues were also sent to the State laboratories for microscopic examination and an inspection of the "Death Cell" was done.

At the time of going to print the results of the investigation had not been released.

Luke Mazwembe's Death

Luke Mazwembe (32), a SASO member, died in Cape Town on 3 September, 1976, two hours after being detained under the General Law Amendment Act. Police officials allege that he had torn a blanket and hung himself.

REFERENCES

¹Statute Book of South Africa

²*Rand Daily Mail* 24.8.76

³*Star* 3.8.76

⁴*Star* 24.6.76

⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 15.7.76

5

URBAN AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAAB)

“Bantu Affairs Administration Boards are a fact of life in Black urban townships from which African people have literally on escape.”¹

They were introduced three years ago (1973) by Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr R. N. H. ‘Punt’ Janson. “Since then the harvest of complaints, discontent and finally exasperation and fury has been a big one.”

The urban African is told what to do in every serious matter concerning his daily life and where he may live by the Boards. The Bantu Administration and Development Department is a government within a government and its officials are accountable to a government department rather than to a country.

Mr Janson is reported to have once said that the Boards would become the organisations on which African workers would be dependent for their physical and spiritual welfare. The Boards’ officials would be the first line of contact between the White authority in South Africa and the citizens of the homeland governments.

The administration of Black townships was taken over by 22 State-controlled Bantu Affairs Administration Boards on 1 August 1973. Only Nationalists or sympathisers are “appointed chairmen of the Boards”.

There have been complaints about the Boards and urban Africans have been calling for a Commission of Inquiry into the Boards. A Nationalist MPC for Vryheid said in September 1975, that “the only

achievement of the Boards had been to become the biggest beer brewers in the world—and to double the price of the beer. The Boards had failed to make Black labour more easily obtainable in White areas. Mr Liebenberg (MPC Vryheid) said the Boards' actions in entering and searching homes and farms for illegal workers were harming race relations and he knew farms where workers fled when one of the Boards' vehicles arrived. They had become bureaucracies, had set themselves high salaries."

The Language Issue

In 1974 a circular from the Department of Bantu Education was sent to school principals. It stated a new policy: from 1975 English and Afrikaans were to be used on a 50-50 basis as mediums of instruction in schools situated in White areas. English was to be used as a medium of instruction in general science and practical subjects like homecraft, needlework, wood and metal work, art and agricultural science. Afrikaans was to be used in mathematics, arithmetic, geography and history. Mother-tongue instruction was to be used for religious instruction, music and physical culture.

This move by the Department of Bantu Education was condemned by a very large majority of Africans, both educationists and laymen.

The General Secretary of African Teachers Association, Mr H. H. Dlamlenze, expressed the feelings of African educationists when he said, "To say that the Blacks are opposed to the study of Afrikaans is a gross understatement In strict terms what we oppose now is the manner in which this is being done without regard to the interests of the children concerned. And if this trend continues without being checked then the education of the Black child will be seriously threatened" He went on to say that most teachers were not fully trained to teach in the medium of Afrikaans.

In spite of the fact that teachers were not equipped to teach in Afrikaans Mr Dlamlenze continued, "Some white inspectors are pressing the point regardless of whether this is in keeping with recognised educational practices or not. It is to be appreciated that these very inspectors have promised to assist but one cannot see how they can do this without lowering the standard and having to push children forward when in fact they know little of the subject, much to their own disadvantage"

He (Mr Dlamlenze) was happy, however, that the head office of the Department of Bantu Education had allowed deviations where there were problems but the inspectorate, in some cases the very men who hold the key, seemed to build up a wall of resistance to this deviation.²

There was a strong resentment by civic leaders against the behaviour of school inspectors in Soweto. Mr Peter Lengene, former mayor of Soweto, said, "Education is a professional matter. But in Soweto,

inspectors of schools are turning the issue into a political matter. It is unfortunate that we have to deal with school inspectors who are politicians and not educationalists. It's high time the Secretary for Bantu Education, or the Minister himself, got into this matter. It is already getting out of hand." Mr Maponya, an Urban Bantu Council member, felt that the activities of school boards were being frustrated by 'over-zealous' inspectors.³

Members of school boards voiced their misgivings to school inspectors about the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. It is reported that the inspectors told them that compulsory Afrikaans had been laid down by the Department of Bantu Education and therefore they could not help. The Inspectors further pointed out that teachers had stated that they were bilingual when they completed their application forms for posts. Board members were further told that that was a "professional matter and out of their scope".⁴

"Mr A. P. Treunicht, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, is reported to have said that Afrikaans was used as medium of instruction in the 'interests' of Africans The Government's policy was that both official languages must be given equal treatment."⁵

When the language question was discussed in Parliament in 1975, Mr Janson said he "thought it a good thing that everyone should learn as many languages as possible. An African might find that 'the big boss' only spoke Afrikaans or only spoke English. It would be to his advantage to know both languages." Asked if he had consulted the Black people, Mr Janson said that he had "only consulted the constitution of South Africa".⁶

In May and June 1976 pupils from seven Soweto schools boycotted classes following an order that they be taught half of their subjects in Afrikaans. More than 500 pupils at the Phefeni Junior Secondary School refused to attend classes on 17 May in protest against the order. It is reported that they stoned the principal's office and beat on his car.⁷

Meanwhile, a school circuit inspector, Mr M. C. de Beer, gave them three days to return to classes or face expulsion. On 19 May a school at Orlando West joined the boycott. By the beginning of June about six schools had joined the boycott and one school board had resigned over the language issue. On 4 June pupils who continued to attend were stoned. Students at Naledi High School set fire to a police car after security police tried to arrest a student. The police were told that there would be trouble if they arrested him. Their car tyres were deflated and they had to get help.

When the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr Willem Cruywagen, was asked about the boycott of classes, he replied that five of the schools involved had applied for permission to deviate from the Afrikaans medium of instruction *but* the applications had been refused.

On 14 June Mr Mosala, the deputy leader of Soweto Progressive Party, warned of the possibility of another Sharpeville. He said that Soweto was heading for "very ugly scenes that will come through our children who are tired of being made to accept what they don't like".⁸

THE RIOTS

Soweto and the Transvaal

On 16 June "Police threw teargas canisters and fired shots into a crowd of about 10 000 pupils demonstrating (outside the Orlando West Junior Secondary School) . . . against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction."⁹ At least one pupil was killed and a White official was clubbed to death in revenge. Police arrived in vans while pupils were assembled and singing the National Anthem. A *Rand Daily Mail* reporter wrote, "I did not hear the police give any order to disperse before they threw teargas canisters into the crowd of singing school children. The children scattered in all directions . . . The pupils then regrouped and when the police charged again, they threw stones at the police. The police then fired a few shots, some in the air and others into the crowd. I saw four school children fall to the ground. . . . A white man was dragged from a West Rand Board vehicle, beaten with stones, clubbed with sticks and left dead. He was later picked up by students and thrown into a rubbish bin. Some remarked: "This is where he belongs".¹⁰

By 18 June the number of those shot dead was estimated at 50 and those injured were said to be 250.

Meanwhile Government spokesmen accused what they called 'known agitators' as elements behind the riots. Government spokesmen and the Prime Minister said that the riots were being used to stop the Vorster/Kissinger talks. Blacks and many English newspapers blamed the whole apartheid structure for the riots. The *Rand Daily Mail* had this to say, "The compulsory use of Afrikaans by teachers and pupils who are not at home in the language did play a role. So did agitation. But that does not diagnose the disease. These are merely symptoms. Only people with legitimate grievances are susceptible to agitation on a large scale. Can we honestly say that the hundreds of thousands living in Soweto alongside the splendour of a rich city have no reason to be dissatisfied with many aspects of their existence?

"Basic living facilities are lacking, sufficient protection, adequate street lighting, shopping facilities, electricity . . . Now we hear that

police had to shoot; water canons could not be used against rioters because there is not enough water."¹¹

Mr Hlaku Rachidi, president of Black People's Convention, said that it would be difficult to restore the 'old order' in townships. "The authorities, the parents and the teachers are going to be faced with a new child. The kids have learned a whole political lesson during the last week They are rejecting the imposition of the whole White establishment and system plus the norms and values of Whites The BPC interprets this as Black Consciousness in the kids. It is gut reaction, not lofty philosophy, and it reflects and articulates the feelings of the people."¹²

On 17 June the riots spread to schools in the Orange Free State.

On 18 June the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) reported 21 offices burnt out and ten plundered, three schools burnt or plundered, bottle stores plundered or robbed, a bank, a library and filling stations destroyed and beer halls damaged. Mr Mulder (Chairman of the WRAB) said that the WRAB offices had clearly been prime target—"it represented the White man's property".¹³

The Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, appointed Mr Justice J. P. Cillie, Judge President of the Transvaal, to conduct a one man inquiry into the riots. Black leaders asked that there be a Black man on the Commission. This request was not accepted.

On the same day Mr Vorster, the Prime Minister, made the following statement in the House of Assembly, "I have to inform the House that the police have orders to use all the means at their disposal, without fear or favour, to protect life and property. I can, unfortunately, come to no other conclusion than that we do not have to deal with a spontaneous outburst but with a deliberate attempt to encourage polarisation between Black and White Orders have been given to maintain order at all costs."

All meetings (except sports meetings, and meetings held indoors or meetings specially authorised by the Minister [Justice] or Magistrate of the area) were banned under Riotous Assemblies Act as the riots spread to the rest of the provinces.

The riots had (by 22 June) spread to the East Rand, Pretoria Black Townships, Witsieshoek, Duduza (Nigel) and Lebowa.

By 26 June, 176 people had died. The Minister of Justice postponed the opening of African schools. On 16 July the preventive detention sections of the Internal Security Act were put into operation for the first time in the Transvaal.

On 17 July the Cillie Commission of Inquiry started. Evidence was to be led by Dr Percy Yutar S.C. assisted by Mr P. B. Jacobs and Mr A. M. Hlungwani. Meanwhile violence again erupted in Soweto.

On 23 August Soweto workers were told not to go to work for

three days. On 24 August vigilante groups in Soweto, made up mostly of Zulus, escorted workers from work. On the 25th and 26th a Zulu impi attacked Soweto residents. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi went to Johannesburg where he alleged that hostel dwellers were urged by police to attack the residents. A number of reporters reported seeing police urging the hostel dwellers to attack the residents.

Meanwhile the riots were still going on at the time of going to print and the police were still looking for the leader of Soweto Students Representative Council—Tsietshi Mashinini.

Natal

Between 15 and 17 June 1976 Natal papers reported that all was quiet in Natal. On 18 June the University of Zululand was set on fire and White staff members were attacked.

The Administration building and its extension were almost burnt out. Most of the University records were destroyed. The NG Kerk on the campus and the library were badly damaged with windows smashed, furniture destroyed and part of the library catalogue destroyed. Several vehicles including a bus and a mini-bus were burnt out, stoned or had their windows smashed. Two staff members were badly injured.

The rector of the University, Professor Marie, said that he believed that the Soweto riots and the attack on the University were part of a national plan to wreck the meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster and Dr Kissinger.

The students' view was that the burning of a university was a way of protest against the shooting of school children in Soweto and to express solidarity with them over the Afrikaans issue.

The University was closed and it will be re-opened at the beginning of 1977. Many students have since been arrested and are being held under Terrorism Act (Section 6), apparently for interrogation.

The library at the University of Natal Medical School was burnt down and the University was closed before the end of the first semester, following the arrest of about 99 medical students after they attempted to march into the city from the Medical School. These students were later charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. They all paid admission of guilt of R50 each.

On 24 July a high school at Tugela Ferry—Umsinga was burnt down.

On 25 July a library was damaged at Vryheid High School.

On 19 September a classroom at Umlazi Technical College was burnt down and type-writers were destroyed.

At the beginning of August students at the University of Durban-Westville boycotted lectures in protest against the police shootings in Soweto and other places. Three of their leaders were arrested and they are still in detention.

Cape Province

On 18 July Fort Hare students shattered windows and tried to set buildings alight. The University was closed. It was later re-opened in August. Again an attempt was made to set a building on fire. It was closed again and it will now re-open on 4 October according to a statement by the University authorities following representations by some parents.

At Lovedale College the administration building was destroyed together with the offices of the circuit Inspector of the Department of Education in the Ciskei. A store-room at Lovedale Press was also damaged by fire.

On 5 August about 800 students from the University of Western Cape boycotted lectures in protest against the boycotts.

Riots broke out in African townships of Langa and Gugulethu in Cape Town on 15 August. On the 24th there was rioting in the Coloured townships of Bonteheuwel, and all over the Cape Flats. Fourteen people were shot dead, 28 injured and 31 arrested in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage.

Riots and shootings continued in Black areas of Cape Town and the Minister of Justice banned meetings until 31 October. By the 2nd of September riots had spread to Adderley Street in Cape Town. By the 8th of September the following places had been affected by the riots: Ravensmead, Tiervlei, Gugulethu, Nyanga, University of Western Cape, Athlone, Uitsig, Elsiesriver and the Grand Parade in the centre of Cape Town.

Riots spread to Kimberley where a beer hall and Bantu Administration buildings were smashed at Galeshewe township. Students at the University of Stellenbosch stood guard with sticks on 9 September 'as a safety measure'.

On 9 September 14 people died in Cape Town alone and 19 were seriously injured, 30 were arrested.

At the time of publication there was an uneasy calm in Black areas. The very conservative count was 371 dead, unknown number injured and about 5 000 arrested.

Reactions to Riots

Mr Kruger (Minister of Justice) blamed what he called 'Black Consciousness Movements', University Christian Movement, the PAC and the ANC for playing a role in organising the riots. He is reported to have said, "Those who want confrontation must be given it because we are sick and tired of the troubles they have caused and the country could not live with it permanently We must show the Black man with words and deeds what Black Power ideology is and that it is not worth keeping because he cannot win a

confrontation. . . . We must bring home to the Blacks the only way to avoid confrontation is through separate development”.

When Mr Vorster (Prime Minister) was asked to take a closer look at his policy and change it, he told the leader of the opposition (Sir de Villiers Graaff) that he was not prepared to do so—riots or no riots. Otherwise the Prime Minister has been noticeably quiet over the riots.

In a press statement the National Vice-President of Black People's Convention, Mxolisi Mvovo, said:

**Mr Mvovo has subsequently been banned
so it is not possible to quote him**

All statements hitherto emanating from the Nationalist Cabinet, especially in the person of Mr Kruger, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, have shown a complete inaptitude on the part of this Government to grapple realistically with the root causes of the disturbances. Equally so, the Government is refusing to move away from its racially bigotted attachment to separation of races at the expense of the black man through his subservience to the white power structure.

This insensitivity of the Government to the real problems of our society is very clearly shown in the recent statement by Mr Kruger where he says: “We are committed to getting rid of discrimination and making South Africa a happy and easy place for everybody to live in”, and in the same breath goes on to say “apartheid is the only method in which we can live in peace in this country.”

BPC wishes to warn not only Blacks, but indeed all men and women of goodwill in South Africa, that this kind of utterance can only serve

to provide more fuel to the protests and disturbances now going on in the country because of its utter short-sightedness, arrogance and insensitivity.

BPC also feels concerned at the self-deceit on the part of the present government which it shows through its tendency to listen and talk to dummy institutions like the Urban Bantu Councils and Bantustan governments set up by them through the apartheid formula. There is no gainsaying the fact that these institutions have long been rejected by Blacks and are seen as mere extensions of the enemy into our ranks. When the Government therefore claims to be talking to the leaders of Blacks when consulting with these institutions they are, in fact, begging the question and insulting to Blacks. It is high time that the Government accepted once and for all that what they regard as being good for Blacks is often rightly seen as poison by Blacks.

Homeland leaders had this to say about the riots.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi: The blame for riots lay squarely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister and the White electorate who had vested its mandate in him.

Dr Cedric Phatudi: “. . . . the seeds of discontent are within the country, not outside.”¹⁴

Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi: “The Government itself has contributed to the accusation that we are irrelevant (since they could not diffuse the riots) by ignoring the genuine representations that we have made for our people.”¹⁵

The *London Daily Express* blamed the Afrikaner race policy for unrest saying that in practice apartheid “is a system of exploitation”. The *London Daily Telegraph* asked whether the Nationalist Government had “a policy other than that of sheer, physical repression”.¹⁶

The *Times* of India reported that “it (the riot) has brought home to the White minority regime in Pretoria that it can no longer terrorise the Black people into silence and surrender The youths are no longer afraid of reprisals by the Whites and their parents know they cannot win the respect of their children unless they stand up and fight for their rights. This psychological revolution cannot be undone, whatever else happens in South Africa in the short run.”¹⁷

President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast said, “They (the riots) have been caused by a decolonisation process which has been blocked by the obstinancy of the White minority. The Whites in South Africa do not seem to realise that their days of supremacy are over. They should realise that one day it all has to end.”¹⁸

Mrs Sheena Duncan, President of the Black Sash, said, “The children of Soweto have shown us all the inevitable consequences if this Government continues to display the insane arrogance and power-satiated race pride which is rapidly bringing us all to disaster.”¹⁹

The Black Allied Workers Union protested strongly against the police shooting and the use of dogs. It called the children's protest "a legitimate cry that deserved serious attention. The minority group cannot force their language down our throats and those of our children."

The Methodist Church of South Africa released this statement: "We believe it is an instance of incitement at its worst to suggest that the horror of these days is solely or even primarily the product of agitators." The suggestion "is not only a vain attempt to declare one's guiltlessness, but fails to solicit in trust and dialogue the understanding of the Black community concerning the reasons for unrest."²⁰

The South African Council of Churches released the following statement: "The fact that the confrontation involved school children has the frightening implication that black grievances are not only a matter of politics, but have become a matter of intense and widespread agony, felt even by children The people of South Africa and the authorities in particular must heed the deep hurt, anger, and frustration which the apartheid system has bred in the heart of all Black South Africans."²¹

The African Independent Churches called "upon the Government to remove all the root causes of misunderstanding and friction between White and Black"

The Inter-Denominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa (IDAMASA) expressed "Their abhorrence of the acts of violence perpetrated by the police on Blacks now, and in the past, which has now spread from adults to children whilst decisions are made for Black people and not with them and by them there shall continue to be dissatisfaction and race relations in this country will continue to be unhealthy."²²

Diakonia, an association of churches in the Greater Durban Area, urges all its members "to listen to the anguished plea of Black people which has so often gone unanswered and has now resulted in violence. Though we deplore violence as a means of affecting change, we have little difficulty in understanding why such an explosion of rage has taken place.

"We realise that many of our White Christians will not understand, and that they see in the riots an unjustified outburst we earnestly urge our members to take note of the deep groundswell of bitterness and resentment that exists among Black people throughout our country, and that can so easily be fanned into violence. If attention is not paid to the well-known causes of that discontent, no amount of security legislation, repression, deportations, detentions or bannings will give this country genuine and lasting peace."²³

REFERENCES

- ¹*Daily News* 9.7.76
- ²*Weekend World* 25.5.75
- ³*Star* 11.3.76
- ⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 28.5.76
- ⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 21.4.76
- ⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 7.5.75
- ⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 17.6.76
- ⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 17.6.76
- ⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 17.6.76
- ¹⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 22.6.76
- ¹¹*Sunday Tribune* 20.6.76
- ¹²*Natal Mercury* 18.6.76
- ¹³*Natal Mercury* 18.6.76
- ¹⁴*Natal Mercury* 14.8.76
- ¹⁵*Natal Mercury* 25.8.76
- ¹⁶*Natal Mercury* 25.8.76
- ¹⁷*Daily News* 24.8.76
- ¹⁸*Natal Mercury* 23.8.76
- ¹⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 17.6.76
- ²⁰*Ecunews Bulletin* 30.6.76
- ²¹*Ecunews Bulletin* 23.6.76
- ²²*Ecunews Bulletin* 23.6.76
- ²³DIAKONIA—*Special Report*

BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

By the end of 1975 Black Consciousness had become an undeniable force in the Black man's quest for an identity and in his need for a national consciousness. Black Consciousness was at this stage found to be existing in historical perspective and could only be evaluated from within that perspective. The tags had dropped, as far as Blacks were concerned. As a result many social and cultural groups had come to accept Black Consciousness as a way of life.

SASO and BPC continued to act as major voices of the Black Consciousness Movement. Despite bannings and detentions, SASO and BPC managed to spread Black awareness amongst Blacks.

The Political Significations of Black Consciousness

The case against the thirteen SASO and BPC members charged under the Terrorism Act moved into the second year since the group, and others later released, were arrested.

The State maintained its basic stand that the Black Consciousness philosophy was an imported idea taken from the United States Black Power. This stance has failed to convince even the conservative Blacks, as has been seen by the growing number of organisations that have come to adopt the concept of Black Consciousness and identification with the term "Black".

Even within Black Consciousness itself there was an effort to counter 'Black nationalism' and 'racism' attacks against the philosophy. This defence measure had unwittingly shifted emphasis from mere identity to Black solidarity-in-action. In addition it was this solid solidarity-in-action amongst the various groups in the Black community that had wrecked international effect for the Black Consciousness movement particularly in view of differing attitudes on the philosophy. The variant attitudes differed thus:

— There were those who were taking Black consciousness as being chiefly of cultural interest;

— There were those who wanted to transform mere identity into positive support for initiative towards defined socio-political change;

— There had been a danger of the intellectual groups succeeding in creating a reality that would only be available to themselves, a reality that, according to the more militant youth, would in effect be fictitious, since, as one South African Students' Movement (SASM) member put it, "a reality of pretending to be at least free in the ghetto."¹

— As the Black Consciousness organisations were almost succeeding to prise loose the grips of white liberal agencies in social welfare for Blacks, it was seen that the inner and outer contradictions of Black Consciousness were becoming more and more acute. The contradictions of Black Consciousness had thrown focus on the nature of Black Consciousness as understood by those political groups operating on Separate Development platforms such as the CRC Labour Party, the Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement led by Kwa-Zulu's Chief Gatsha and the Transkeian opposition party, the Democratic Party, led by Mr H. B. Ncokazi.

Black Viewpoint 3, published by Black Community Programmes, continued to probe into matters affecting the Black Community and especially the whole problem of apartheid society. The collection of papers read at a seminar which BCP had sponsored in January 1976 was entitled "Apartheid, Hope or Despair for Blacks?" From the strain of argument in the papers and particularly in comparison with papers read in 1974 at the Black Renaissance Convention, it came out clearly in *Black Viewpoint 3* that debate on the merits and demerits of separatism had exhausted itself.

Even then it was continuously being pointed out by some of the exponents of Black Consciousness that Black Consciousness was not an ideology but an awareness—ideal subject to national consciousness and tribalist degeneracies. As such, Black Consciousness could not be considered as being one with nationalism or any ideology. All that Black Consciousness had done was to emphasize the fact that Blacks had to think of themselves in terms of absolute equality with whites in all human attributes.

BPC threw attention to the overall importance that land played in Black Communalism. This focus, coming from a people who were part of only thirteen per cent of the land, had stimulating outcome on the organisation's approach to the land question regarding the redistribution of this country's wealth. Thus Black Communalism was given a more constructive character, with due stress on the factor that Black could best be defined by the Black themselves and on Black terms of reference.

It came as no surprise therefore in Black circles that at its seminar

held at Mafeking in May 1976 BPC had reached common agreement that the philosophy of sharing (communalism) within the context of industrialized society presupposed technical sharing, ie. it could only be scientific in content. This was contrary to those who held that Black communalism was a primitive concept.

On the other hand controversy arose on the claims made by some leaders of the Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement that it was a national organisation working for all the black groups. The BPC objection against such claim was based on:

— Whether Inkatha was not a political projection towards single party rule in Kwa-Zulu;

— Whether it was not an elitist tribal chauvinism that made some Kwa-Zulu adherents to claim representation of other Blacks who were also in the same Bantustan trap as Zulus; and

— Whether Inkatha was not steering a tribal direction by its existence being based on a separatist platform.

Until now the question of Inkatha's national claims has not been answered.

Further significations of Black Consciousness were shown by the formation of three Black bodies whose influence went deep into the roots of the Black community. A self-help organisation, Zimele, was founded at King Williams Town and has established branches at various parts of the country (see Self-help). Zimele aims to help dependents of those who have been subjected to arrest, imprisonment or bannings in the Black community.

Another organisation, the Black Women's Federation, was formed in December 1975 by Black women from all over South Africa. About 210 women attended, representing 41 organisations from all parts of the country. Black members from mixed organisations were allowed to join.

The need for the formation of the Black Women's Federation (BWF) sprang out of the realisation:—

*That Black women are basically responsible for the survival and maintenance of their families and largely the socialization of the youth for the transmission of the Black Cultural Heritage;

*Of the need to present a united front and to redirect the status of motherhood towards the fulfillment of the Black people's social, cultural, economic and political aspirations.

*Of the urgent need to co-ordinate and consolidate the efforts and activities of Black women and Black women's organisations in our country.

Already some members of the BWF have been detained under the General Laws Amendment Act and the Internal Security Act. Those known to have been detained are Mrs Nomzamo Winnie Mandela,

Mrs Fatima Meer, Mrs Jennie Noel and Mrs Jane Phakathi.

The Black Parents' Association was formed in Soweto and immediately received nation-wide acceptance as a body that represents the students who fell victims to disturbances during the recent student-strikes in negotiations with the authorities.

Under the chairmanship of Dr Manas Buthelezi the BPA has tied itself to the problems of black youth. Together with the BPC it has seen the disturbances as a "rejection by Blacks of the whole system of oppression, subjugation and explanation contained in the so-called policy of separate development or apartheid."

Meanwhile the Black People's Convention has asked the Government to meet a full bench of acceptable leaders to grapple with the reasons for the rejection by Black people of the present order.²

The Coloured reaction to the Theron Commission was varied. But a black awareness reaction was registered in almost all Coloured areas. Dr Jakes Gerwel, a "Coloured" authority on Black Consciousness and a lecturer at the University of the Western Cape, expressed total rejection of the Commission and said, "It was poetic that Soweto should so dramatically have preceded the publication of the Theron report;" and went further to say that, "there is to this, suggestion of ethno-racial elitism which is insulting to other Blacks."³

Following growing unrest and possible anti-white resentment after the shootings of school children in Soweto, Coloured students and youth enhanced the philosophy of Black Consciousness and expressed solidarity with other black groups in the country. This was seen as a direct rejection by the Coloured people of the Theron Commission's recommendations which suggested co-option of the Coloured into the white supra-structure.

In Durban, students of the Durban-Westville University for Indians also boycotted classes in solidarity with the African and Coloured students. The student boycott leaders dismissed implied statements that students were either intimidated or threatened from attending lectures. They were reacting to a statement by the head of the Indian Council Mr J. N. Reddy.⁴

Mass arrests and detentions have followed in the train of recent unrests throughout the country. The outstanding character of the arrests is the growing number of women detained. Among those women detained are members of BWF, members of SACC, members of BPA and supporters of BPC. Many SASO female members have also had brushes with the country's internal security laws; some are in detention. Three female members of staff of the Black Community Programmes Limited are in detention at the time of going to press.

There was a sharp rise in the number of plays written by Blacks that got banned. These bannings were most rife on the Reef where the

East and West Rand Bantu Administration Boards have control over the hiring of public halls and social venues. Unperturbed Blacks saw this as a sign of growth in the Black Consciousness philosophy and also as a sign of fear from some quarters that the concept of black awareness had gained full acceptance in the black community.

Economic Significations of Black Consciousness

The denial of the growth of a free labour movement in South Africa and the lack of free political expression in the industrial areas were seen to have brought about certain attitudes which grew and solidified into a black awareness that had fostered some kind of solidarity when certain pressing issues affecting the Blacks flared up. This was demonstrated again when ninety-six Indian and Coloured bus-drivers threw in their solidarity with five hundred of their African colleagues who had gone on strike at the Durban Municipality's central depot.

In reaction the drivers were given five minutes to decide whether to go back to work or face arrest. "Their choice was spelt out simply: back to work or five years in jail (maximum penalty under the Riotous Assemblies Act)."⁵

Meanwhile in Cape Town and the University of Western Cape, Coloureds had demonstrated against the Gugulethu and Nyanga shootings on Blacks. (See Chapter on Riots). All over the country Blacks expressed sympathy with Soweto and the country-wide police swoops. Thus Black Consciousness and solidarity emerged and grew with zealous impact on young Blacks.

Low wages and State non-recognition of Black trade unions made bargaining power hard to come by for Blacks, whereas monopoly capital was moving into the country-side for extraction of profits for its own benefits. As people were being uprooted from their traditional way of life and culture to be made a permanent labour force for border industries, decentralization of industries was actually being seen as an extension of South Africa's cheap labour policy. Moreover the creation of 'townships' such as Madadeni near Newcastle, Nseleni near Richards Bay, Mpumalanga near Hammarsdale, Mdantsane near East London, was being seen as part of a plan to create an urban-type consumer society away from the cities. People who had held free-hold title deeds in some of these 'townships' had lost their properties to governmental expropriation and had been mass-removed and absorbed into 'townships.'

The rural situation was obviously being altered. By 1972 labour and transport strikes had come to these 'border areas'; proving that urban-consumer awareness had been gained.

The operation of the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU) was being slightly disturbed by the bannings and detentions of its field

workers. This did not stop BAWU from growing into a strong trade union with growing affiliation.

Cultural Significations of Black Consciousness

As Black Consciousness grew and became part of the black community there was subtle but effective development of an active commitment in almost all the arts. It was a seeking of a vortex point or junction with life in the black community. The blinkered attitudes were falling off on all sides, as one black academic put it.

Arts

Many artists, even those that did not particularly advocate Black Consciousness, found themselves being obliged to give experimental preference to black creativity, and if black creativity presupposed giving social patterns for Blacks to the artists, it also presupposed giving a message to the black situation.

Artists like Percy Sedumedi, Fikile, Nat Mokgosi and others were forced by reality to theme their works 'Black' in the new sense of hope in the black man's future. Artist Jacob Nhlabathi's drawing captioned "Tribute to Courage" was acclaimed as a masterpiece. Art critic Vincent Kunene described the drawing as "a loud long shout that depicts a spit at the million black faces for turning their backs on their own plight and towing the line. Time is ripe for the African to stand tall on his feet. To stand up and do it himself, for no man can better represent what one is than oneself."⁶

Other artists like George Mbhele, Thamie Mnyele, Thsetlo Moleya, by virtue of being more established, were feeding black art with new input of an international dimension. Their works seemed to be taking the direction of original black drawing and sculpture mixed with the styles of prominent world artists living within the country and abroad.

Consequently most of the impressive works by black artists, perhaps dating back to Dumile Feni Khumalo, had inevitably come to be explained within the ambit of Black Consciousness.

Literature Writing

In literature black writers had moved a step further in the natural identification process of Black Consciousness. Black writing was:

- Bringing into focus the complex nature of ghetto life;
- Stimulating an awareness of positive values in indigenous culture which was by no means inferior to the European culture as Zimbabwe, Benin, the Magaliesberg excavation, etc., had shown; and
- Drawing lines between primitive cults of blacks and the decadent white cults such as the Satanic cults, the hippie cult, the emergence of Hell's Angels, etc.

Poets like Mongane Serote, Lefifi Tladi, Mafika Gwala, Mandlenkosi Langa and Zinjiva Nkondo were particularly at home with the first two categories.

There was an up and coming lot of writing from younger writers who, maybe because of contact or generational touch with the hip or modern trends and Afro-American Soul, were proving articulate in writing along tendencies of the third category, but not necessarily admiring the white cults. This factor could be attributed to Black Consciousness. One relatively 'unknown' but potentially brilliant writer is Kanakana Matsena. He has been described as having been "born with a silver microphone in his mouth." This member of the Dashiki group is able to hoist or delete the ideas of Salvador Dali, Leroi Jones, Dylan Thomas, then Zen Buddhists, Ferlenghetti or Allen Ginsberg at the twist of the pen. Black Consciousness was also having its flambuoyant aspects.

Black Consciousness had also brought into the fore-ground writers such as Nkathazo kaMnyayiza, Shabbir Banoobai, Leonard Koza, Hazel Johennesse, Christopher van Wyk, Abe Motana. These were poets who had not had to battle against 'whitism' in their writing; and as a result their poems had not had the old protest elements and bitterness that once characterized poetry by Blacks.

In a review of a collection of poems "Hurry Up To It!" by Siphon Sepamla, the Afrikaans newspaper *Rapport* singled out the growing need for Whites to understand the context of black writing. The review further cited the different styles of poets like Mandlenkosi Langa, Mongane Serote, Mazisi Kunene, Oswald Mtshali, Mafika Gwala and others.⁷

A Cape poet, Ilva McKay, though not widely published within the country, has proved to be one of the most promising poets writing today. Many of her poems, published through 'Blac Publishing House' have been banned. Blac is a publishing house that caters for blacks and is run by well-known black writer James Matthews. A collection of poems 'Black Voices Shout' produced and edited by James Matthews was banned soon after publication. Nevertheless Blacks continued to write as only they as Blacks can. A poem which is not bitter but which could be likened to Nhlabathi's "Tribute to Courage" appeared in the *Ophir* magazine under the title of "The Children of Nonti" and was written by Mafika Gwala.

A new literary magazine the '*New Classic*,' which is a revival of the old '*Classic*' founded by Nat Nakasa, Can Temba and other writers in the hey days of African writing, has done much to high-light up and coming black writers who would otherwise be unknown owing to lack of proper channels in black publications. *New Classic* has introduced prose writers of promise such as Mthobi Motloase, Bob Leshoai, Roger Knowles, Mbulelo Mzamane and Moteane Melamu. Prose,

especially short story writing and novel writing, has lacked in talent and drive in present day writers.

Ironically one well-known Cape black writer came out blastingly against Black Consciousness. He is Dr Richard Rive who once published novels and short stories of high worth. Mr Rive equated Negritude with Black Consciousness and said that "the Black who abstracts himself and seeks protection within race, no matter how valid his reason, is a racist."⁸

In the March 1975 issues of *Pro Veritate* Dr Rive had said, "Black Consciousness poetry in South Africa is still very new, and is mediocre and insignificant."

Notwithstanding such notions on black awareness another Cape writer, Professor Adam Small, published his anthology of English poems under the title "Black Bronze Beautiful." Adam Small is an accomplished writer in the Afrikaans language. Somewhere he writes:

"Fifty quatrains
for the African road
to a rhythm, new for
Africa's people, as we are growing together,
All of us."

In "Black Bronze Beautiful" Blacks are "urged to expand and relax." A remarkable feature of the poems is their providing a bodily image for the political attitude known as black consciousness⁹

Theatre and Music

In the Winter 1975 issue of *Sketsh*, the black theatre magazine published in Johannesburg, there was an overbearing relevance to the South African situation of the black community.

It was a critique written by Afro-American Xavier Nicholas on an American play by fellow Afro-American Ron Miller. The important points raised by Xavier Nicholas on the play "What the Wine-Sellers Buy", concerning black theatre were:

— That the Black movement now and then had to find itself in an ideological confusion wherein some works of art could be trapped within the "limitations of a narrow black cultural nationalism that does not carry the great leap forward"; and

— That there were elements that distorted black identity to mean black capitalism in the cultural and artistic activities of Blacks.

By the end of 1975 it had become self evident that Blacks were seeking a way out of this moral quagmire. Plays such as Gibson Kente's "Too Late" and "Beyond the Song" carried undeniably overtones of a correct awareness towards problems of the black community. Even Kente had graduated from obvious commercial art.

Another play, "The Train" by Zakes Mafokeng, depicted the crooked leverage in the relationship between African and Coloured—both

Black. There was also another play that was well received by audiences, "Ndancama" written in Xhosa by Sandile Nonxuba. It was a play with a well-intentioned message, unlike a production like "Umabatha" which was said to leave people in a "stamp your feet and romp" state of mind.

"Give Us this Day", a volatile political story based on the killing of student leader Tiro, relayed a message that was well received by the students and youth who witnessed it. This play by Mzwandile Maqina found much support in the townships and amongst protagonists of Black Awareness.

Winston Ntshona and John Kani also brought in a new play "The Island" which they first acted out whilst overseas. It was a worthy follow-up to their "Sizwe Banzi is Dead" whose popularity has led it to its banning in the Cape.

Mbaqanga music received wider support amongst the youth in the black community as jazz and soul delved deeper into the African forms of expression. Groups such as the Batsumi and the Jazz Ministers brought out new recordings. The Jazz Ministers were invited to the Newport Jazz Festival 1976 in New York. It is hoped some of their overseas jazz experiences will spill over for the other artists to pick up.

Phillip Tabane, now generally regarded as a jazz wizard for the many instruments he is able to master besides being guitarist of world acclaim, was also back from an American tour. Accompanied by drummer Gabriel Thobejane the two artists brought back new vitality to their versatile Malombo beat. Already a new record of theirs is due for release.

The most committed group for the Black Consciousness cause, the Dashiki, engaged further in their non-commercial contributions to jazz.

A new record by Jo'burger Mike Makhamele proved beyond doubt that jazz had taken its firm roots on the African continent. Makhamele has added another output, "The Peacemaker" to his earlier effort. There were also African jazz recordings by Johnny Windemere, Kippie Moketsi, Dollar Brand. Dollar Brand was later accompanied by famous jazz artist, Blue Mitchell, towards an LP recorded in Swaziland. South Africa was experiencing a Jazz Revival.

Brilliant productions kept pouring in from Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, Letta Mbuli, Jimmy Cliff, etc. In the Cape several coloured singers had captured the white record market and their recordings, light as they are, prove further how far blacks can go—given the chance.

Soul groups, for example "The Movers" and "The All Rounders", were observed to be graduating into African jazz, a more matured music form.

SASO's Cultural Committee (CULCOM) continued unabated to play an influential part in organizing shows for entertainment of Blacks

by Blacks through their own artistic forms of expression.

S'cathamiya, which has its origin in the Dixey Beat of the thirties, did not stop drawing support and articulation. Olive Masinga of the Inkspots days added to the liveliness of S'cathamiya to join its greats Selby Mkhize and the Black Mambazo.

Thus the blending of the old marabi and mbaqanga expressions in jazz could only be appreciated in the light of encouragement, as a booster to greater progress. A broader outlook had taken root amongst blacks.

White Reaction to Black Consciousness

Reactions to Black Consciousness from various white groups and individuals bore the common split pattern as blacks took initiative in resolving their problems.

In the religious sphere the Churches made bold attempts to reconcile existing differences between Blacks and Whites, despite incessant talks of a possible white backlash.

Diakonia, a joint project of Christian Churches, was formed in Durban following such moves in Johannesburg and Cape Town. It was established to help the churches in the greater Durban area towards the implementing of effective dealings in social situations amongst the different race groups. The project came into existence in March 1976. The project was based on an understanding:

— That different groups in our society have very different views of what future South Africa will look like;

— That there was pressing need for Christians to try to reconcile these different views of the future;

— That there was also need for Christians to face the future with Christian hope; and

— That there was need to undertake those actions which would genuinely help to secure the future.

At the Catholic Synod 1976 there was "need for new endeavours in the fields of development, formation and mission." The Archbishop, Dennis Hurley, called for the execution of the South African Council of Churches' resolution whereby the churches were urged to move towards a potentially vital role in the peace/war alternatives facing South Africa.

The Churches were called on:

(a) to make earnest attempt at reconciling the Black Church and the White Church;

(b) to reconsider wages and conditions of service of domestic workers and employees;

(c) to attempt to break down the racial barriers and petty prejudices that have been created during 300 years of separation; and

(d) to realize that as Christians all people are equal and should be treated as such.

Christian Churches re-iterated recommendations made in 1974 on the wages paid to domestic workers.”¹⁰

The year also saw the increase in the number of leadership positions being given to the Black clergy. The first black bishop of Zululand was consecrated for the Catholic diocese. He is Rt. Rev. Biyase who took over from a white bishop of the Benedictine Order. Another Catholic bishop, Peter Buthelezi O.M.I., was put in charge of the diocese of Umtata in the Transkei. The Rt. Rev. L. Zulu was consecrated Anglican Bishop of Zululand.

Further new appointments of auxiliary bishops were made for the Catholic Church in South Africa. It was expected that by virtue of congregational majority and existent problems crucially facing the black community, most of these elects would be black.

Some members of the South African Government however expressed different views. The Minister of Police and Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, said that Blacks and Whites in South Africa had known each other for 300 years. The Black man “knows his place and if not I’ll tell him...”¹¹

Following the wave of serious unrest in the country Mr Kruger suggested that blacks “be given enough to make them believe in separate development and want to protect what they have against agitators.” He went on to say that he was in favour of Black Nationalism but against what he called the Black Power Movement, which he believed was leading to black/white confrontation.¹²

He has also pleaded for tribal law to be brought back in areas like Soweto because of the laws and traditions in which the Blacks believe.¹³

In the first August issue of *South African Digest* in 1975 the then State President was reported to have said that the Indians had played an important part in South African affairs, and he and the government valued their efforts and contribution to the country’s prosperity.¹⁴ Yet almost a year after that, one of the important spokes-women for the suffering Indian groups, Mrs Fatima Meer, had been detained by the government.

The Editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, Mr Donald Woods, believed that colour consciousness had been started by the very official system of separatism that opposed Black Consciousness. Posing questions on official statements he pointed out that, “if you encourage Black Separation how do you stop it from developing into Black Consciousness which in turn develops into Black Power?”¹⁵

South Africa could crush unrest with an “iron fist or jak boot” but could not continue to live with unease between the White and Black communities. This was the opinion sounded by a white delegate at a conference in Durban.¹⁶

The Transvaal Chamber of Commerce had observed:

- that 70% of economically active people in the South African economy were Blacks;
- that about 17 areas of legislation which discriminated against Blacks had contributed to their discontent;
- that movement upwards in the occupational ladder was pathetically slow, in fact not more than one percent improvement a year ; and
- that there was resentment by Blacks of the unrestricted freedom of movement and job opportunities in industries which Blacks had served for years at subservient level.

The following recommendations were then made to the Government:

- Urban Blacks should be recognized as permanent urban dwellers since industry needs the Blacks on a permanent basis;
- More should be spent on land for private housing schemes and improved houses should be erected;
- Expenditure on Black education should be increased at the rate of 15,42 per cent a year for a budget of R328 100 000 by 1980;
- There should be greater job mobility for Africans and for this there was need to create “a central co-ordinated manpower planning policy” which would cater for manpower utilisation of all groups and widen skills training;
- There should be immediate phasing in of free education for Africans and an improvement in standards and salaries for African teachers;
- A new appraisal of the conduct of Government officials and “bureaucracy, red tape and unsymptomatic administrations” was long overdue.¹⁷

The variance of the definition of and attitude toward poverty was markedly illustrated by the Prime Minister's remarks in reference to Black accessibility to material resources consistent with their productive capacity in national input and basic social necessities. As if in answer to a statement made by Lebowa's Chief Minister, Dr Phatudi—who had said that regardless of colour or race, South Africans had a common future and isolation of Whites and Blacks was a grave mistake—the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, re-instated the opinion that South Africa could not afford to slip on to the path towards a welfare state “because the end of that path is communism”.¹⁸

REFERENCES

¹*Weekend World* 15.8.76

²*Ibid*

³*Drum* September 1976

⁴*Daily News* 18.8.76

⁵*Daily News* 3.9.76

⁶*Sketsh Summer* 1975

⁷*Rapport* 14.9.75

⁸*New Classic* No. 2, 1975

⁹*Reality* May 1976

¹⁰*Bonisanani* No. 2 August 1976

¹¹*Rand Daily Mail* 20.8.76

¹²*Rand Daily Mail* 14.8.76

¹³*Cape Herald* 23.6.76

¹⁴*South African Digest* 1.8.76

¹⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 25.6.76

¹⁶*Mercury* 13.8.76

¹⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 20.8.76

¹⁸*South African Digest* 3.10.75

BLACK ORGANIZATIONS

Political Pressure Groups

BLACK PEOPLE'S CONVENTION

During the period under review there was a remarkable growth in membership and the extension propagation of the Black People's Convention (BPC) policy was undertaken. By and large the smooth operation of the organisation was disturbed by the endless blows suffered (by the BPC leadership) at the hands of the South African Government during the latter part of the period under review.

Re-organization after mass arrests

In an attempt to bring BPC back to a firm footing, the BPC working committee—a provisional structure holding the fort for the national executive members who were detained—called a National Council in Hammanskraal in July 1975. All branches were required to send representatives to this meeting where future plans for the organisation were to be approved. Members of the Working Committee were then mandated to proceed with BPC work as the Interim Executive, until the annual general conference was held.

It was also resolved that the structure of regionalization of branches be effected on a trial basis. Attempts were made to resuscitate all BPC branches which were either functioning on a low profile or reasonably active. The success of these attempts was manifested by the good attendance at the National Congress.¹ This annual National Congress, which was held in King Williams Town in December 1975, showed that BPC enjoyed a huge following within the black community.

The theme of the Conference, chosen for a specific purpose, was *Persistence and Fortitude*. According to the then BPC Secretary-General, Mr Hlaku Rachidi, black people need to live through the obstructions put up by the authorities, to a point where they have to look back and re-construct themselves in correcting what adversely hindered their progress "we need to clarify ourselves most explicitly for what we stand in a philosophical approach". He further said "Surely it required courage, boldness and persistence to follow this path; BPC has done that."² This Conference, therefore, took the form of a formative one where the policy was analysed and reconstructed.

The basic policy of the organisation was broken down into sections which were discussed by four commissions, namely, Black Consciousness, Black Communalism, Relations and Government Created Political Platforms. At this Congress BPC also projected what type of state the Black people wanted to live in.

The layout of the physical structure of BPC was drawn up. Motions on BPC attitude towards current issues were tabled and adopted at Congress.

With regard to Black Consciousness, BPC policy defined the term "Black" to include "all those who are discriminated against by law and tradition, that is, politically, economically and socially". BPC recognises the essence of Black Consciousness as:

- The realisation by Blacks of their liberation and to operate as a group to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude;
- The determination to expose the myth that *Black* is an alienation from the normal which is white;
- The reconstruction by Blacks of their own Black value system and the attempts by Blacks to see themselves as defined by themselves and not as defined by others;
- The rejection of value systems that seek to make the Black man a foreigner in the country of his birth and dehumanise him;
- The attempts by Blacks to rid themselves of negative notions resulting in an inferiority complex and to infuse within the Black community pride in themselves, their efforts, their value system, their culture, their religion and their outlook towards life.³

The Black People's Convention, as a black consciousness movement, strives to achieve the following goals:

- To inculcate amongst Blacks a pride in themselves and a desire and eagerness to analyse their problems and offer solutions;
- To break down the stranglehold that white society has on privileges, wealth opportunities, and to create a truly plural society in which all persons shall be equal before the law;
- To eradicate racial prejudice in all its forms and to promote proper understanding amongst the various peoples in the open society;

On the question of Black Communalism, Congress decided to mandate the Executive to make a further study into Black Communalism to arrive at a constructive economic policy for the future state. A Seminar was organised by the Executive at Mafeking in April 1976 where speakers from various regions presented detailed papers on aspects of economy like land, commerce, industry, etc.

It was at this Seminar that a 30-point programme was adopted in principle as the official economic policy of the organisation, still to be approved at the next Congress.

A motion on Transkei Independence re-iterated BPC policy on government-created political bodies. The independence of these homelands was seen by BPC as "a cunning manoeuvre to 'legalize' the alienation of the people of the Transkei from the rest of Azania which is their motherland so as to give the denial of their rights in Azania, a legal and constitutional backing".⁴

Other motions on Sonny Leon's participation on the CRC and subsequent sacking by the South African Government, the occupation of Namibia by South Africa and moves towards liberation of Namibia, and also a motion of internal participation in the Angolan war were discussed and a policy to be adopted by BPC on these topics was arrived at.

The general policy on current issues was tabled in the form of motions discussed and adopted unanimously by Congress. Noting the motives behind the detente policy by the South African Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, BPC resolved to reject it as ". . . . a move calculated to entrench the position of the oppressors in South Africa at the expense of the oppressed majority".⁵

On the question of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and the deadlock reached by participants in the constitutional talks, BPC noted that the breakdown was a result of ". . . . the reluctance depicted by Smith to allow the talks to reach a logical conclusion of majority rule". The Congress, therefore, resolved to ". . . . encourage Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC to maintain the principled stand which represented the true wishes and aspirations of the majority of people in Zimbabwe; and to urge the ANC to continually make overtures to the White Rhodesia minority government for resumption of legitimate constitutional talks until it became absolutely clear that the latter was not interested in talks."⁶

BPC rejected government-created platforms, "recognizing them as safety valves created for the express purpose of diverting the energy of the black people from the true struggle for national liberation to racialist, tribalist and generally divisive political undertakings which at best keep the real and true goal of total liberation out of immediate sight and attention by black people and at worst to bolster the white racist regime of those who created them". The creation of these platforms is

seen by BPC "as designed to cheat the black man into participation in his own oppression because of built-in safeguards that make it impossible for any black man using them to liberate himself".

Meanwhile there were reports that Inkatha had made attempts to have talks with the leadership of BPC. BPC was surprised at this, but, however laid down conditions Inkatha had to meet if it was interested in 'talking liberation' with BPC. Some of the conditions were:

- to publicly withdraw from participating in tribal politics;
- to denounce its (Inkatha's) present constitution that binds its president to candidacy for the position of KwaZulu Chief Minister;
- to dissociate itself from leadership by government-paid political servants who live off the monies extracted from the masses through several taxes.

Failure to comply with these conditions would mean that Inkatha is part of "a grand design devised by their oppressor-master and also propelled by an ambitious leadership in their ranks to circumvent the inevitable option of dealing directly with authentic bantustans, and also those languishing in jail or restricted through the arsenal of South African Security Laws to various parts of the country."⁷

Detention of BPC Leaders

Most of the Executive members were detained during the latter part of 1976.

The National Chairman, Hlaku Rachidi, was detained in July 1976; shortly after that Thandisizwe Mazibuko, Secretary-General, was detained.

Mxolisi Mvovo, National Vice-Chairman was detained in August, just before Mapetla's funeral. Tamsanqa Qambata, Mzwandile Mbilini, Ray Magida, Dr A. C. S. Solombela—all executive members of BPC, King William's Town branch—were all detained.

BPC's Economic Policy

- BPC adopts black communalism as its economic policy, noting:
- that black communalism is a modified version of the traditional African economic life style which is geared to meet the demands of a highly industrialized and modern economy;
 - that the sharing envisaged will not be necessarily monitored by the state for the benefit of the state itself, but many will be either between groups of individuals or specific communities within the state or all the communities comprising the state;
 - that sharing shall imply sharing of property, wealth, services and labour.

Black Communalism implies that:

1. Land is a God-given gift to the people, therefore it shall be owned by all the people with the State being entrusted with its control.
2. All industry which involves direct exploitation of the land shall be owned by the state.
3. Family units shall be allocated land for dwelling.
4. Plots allocated to family units may neither be bequeathed, transferred or otherwise disposed of without prior consultation with the state, provided that the state will however consistently protect the interest of the family units concerned and their future generations.
5. Land allocated for private agriculture, commerce and industry shall be rented by the people concerned from the state.
6. Organised societal and religious groups, eg. churches, sports groups, shall be allocated land according to their reasonable needs and shall rent such land from the state.
7. Agricultural activity shall centre around the formation of co-operatives which shall be entrusted with the responsibility of spear-heading agriculture in consultation with the department.
8. Rural life shall be recognised such that more economically manageable villages shall be established whereby basic essential services can be made available to the village and in turn the people's agricultural activity can be jointly organised.
9. It shall be the duty of the state to assist such villages and co-operatives in marketing their agricultural products for both internal and external consumption.
10. The state may play a leading role in the planning and development of industry and commerce.
11. Industries whose products are of strategic importance to the nation shall be owned by the state, e.g. manufacture of arms and armaments.
12. Also industries of vital importance to the economy of the nation, e.g. major corporations shall be owned by the state.
13. Community initiation and ownership of industry shall be encouraged where this can be easily productively organised.
14. Private owned industry and commercial undertakings shall be allowed to operate without state assistance and within the framework drawn up by the state department responsible for commerce, industry and trade.
15. The level of foreign participation in industry and commerce shall be kept to a minimum as defined by the department responsible for commerce, industry and trade.
16. Salaries paid by employers to their employees in private industries and commerce as well as in co-operative, community and

state-owned enterprises shall be carefully supervised by the state to lay specific minimum for specific categories of undertakings.

17. In all cases the state shall specifically protect the interest of worker against exploitation and unsatisfactory working conditions.

18. Trade unions comprising the workers within certain crafts shall be encouraged and recognised and shall enjoy a particularly privileged relationship with the department controlling labour.

19. Wages and salaries assessments shall be periodically reviewed by a special tribunal consisting of representatives of trade unions and the department controlling labour.

20. Village stores shall be owned by the communities they are intended to serve.

21. Organisation of small time commerce, eg. grocery stores, shall vest in the hands of district commercial councils operating on behalf of specific geographic communities in consultation with the department controlling commerce.

22. Such commercial councils shall seek to generate profits for the development of the communities they serve.

23. The state will on its own participate in finance institutions in competition with private enterprise through the formation of a National financial corporation which shall run a National Bank with branches and an insurance house with branches.

24. The state financial institutions shall operate a developmental loan policy for the assistance of co-operative, community and individual enterprise provided that there shall be a differential interest charge for private and community enterprise.

25. The state through its department controlling commerce and industry shall at all times restrict importation of goods only to those categories and levels that are essential for complete existence and shall encourage local production of goods which can be sustained from natural resources and industry within the country.

26. The state shall operate its own importation programme through a National corporation in competition with privately owned import houses so that imported goods can reach the people at minimal and acceptable prices.

27. The state shall control the marketing of local products and goods intended for both internal and external marketing so that such products and goods can be available for internal consumption at minimal prices, and external consumption at advantageous prices.

28. All public transport shall be controlled by the department responsible for transport such that the state through its various organs participates maximally in intra-inter-town, inter-provincial as well as national and international transport.

29. There shall be no provision for private ownership of public transportation except by special licence, provided that all railways, harbours, and airways transportation shall be owned completely by the state.

30. The state shall allow a fair competition between privately owned and state owned mass media enterprises except that all radio and television stations will be owned either wholly or jointly by either the state or the communities and provided that all postal and telegraphic services shall be in the hands of the state.

NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS

According to the *Sunday Times* Extra of 28 March 1976, "The Natal Indian Congress . . . shied away from participating in the SA Indian Council elections." Members who had put forward the motion calling for participation backed down when they sensed the mood of delegates.

It however emerged that certain key Congress Members had had discussions on forming another organisation to contest SAIC elections. The members backing participation felt that a great deal more could be achieved by working within a government-created body.

Mr Naidoo himself touched on the question of participation in government-created institutions in his presidential address . . . Mr Naidoo subtly made all the arguments in favour of joining the SAIC, without actually stating his own position. He said people should not waste their energies trying to expose and condemn Blacks working within the system "whether or not they do so for their own private gain or in a forlorn endeavour to obtain some crumbs for the people they purport to represent."

Mr Naidoo also pushed the argument that government-created organisations got more space in newspapers than so-called 'Left-Wing' bodies. He said that "all this indicated the extent to which Left-Wing elements were being cowed down to 'toe-the-line'."

He then called for an urgent convention of all Black leaders who would unite Blacks under one banner and prepare a constitution for all South Africans.

In March Mr Naidoo denied that he was planning to leave the Congress after the Annual Conference. He said he was going to stay and try to change it to his way of thinking, which is joining the government-created bodies like SAIC and LAC and demand rights as enjoyed by whites.⁸

In a statement released by Mr A. H. Randeree (executive member

of NIC) on 29 August 1976, the Natal Indian Congress "totally rejected separate development as well as the South African Indian Council and its elections." The Congress has decided that plans be formulated to inform people of the futility of separate development. Mr Randeree further said that "while separate development may be palatable in certain quarters it is far from a solution as it is a policy based on racism. It is a tragedy that the hand of friendship extended by the Blacks has been rejected by white South Africa."⁹

Meanwhile a new Indian Political Party, the Peoples' Party of South Africa was born in the last week of August. Mr M. G. H. Mayat, the convener, said that the party would work for a non-racial South Africa and co-operate with any group which has similar aim. So far we have have not been able to establish whether any Congress members took part in the formation of this party.¹⁰

SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS' ORGANISATION

The 8th General Students' Council Meeting¹¹

The theme of the GSC was "The role of Black students in the changing Southern African situation". The meeting condemned the phasing out of black students from the University of Natal (black section) as an attempt to fulfill the apartheid policy of 'divide and rule'. a policy which "can only be only be seen in the light of the forces of oppression working hand in hand with the imperialist forces." The meeting expressed its belief that the universities were never meant to satisfy black needs and aspirations. The move to phase out black students was strongly condemned as "naked discrimination".

The meeting condemned the All-Blacks tour as "the highest degree of racist collaboration aimed at entrenching the status quo for capitalistic purposes". SASO further resolved to align itself with the OAU resolution urging all OAU states to boycott the Montreal olympic games meeting if New Zealand participated.

The meeting condemned the proposed introduction of a Bantu TV in 1980 as it is geared at eroding the black man's cultural values.

The meeting resolved to mandate the executive and regional directors to conduct leadership training services to counter the bannings and detentions of SASO leadership.

The meeting condemned the manner in which the police and government handled the Soweto demonstration.

SASO resolved to send its condolences to the Ugandan victims of

the Israeli raid and denounced the Kenyan government for its involvement therein.

Attack on SASO

Following Mr J. H. Snyman's assertion that "extreme and alarming hostility to Whites by a large section of students at the University of the North was being developed and fostered by SASO's subversive activities on the campus," and that SASO's main aim was promotion of hatred of the Whites, destruction of universities for Blacks and incitement to armed revolution, and furthermore that SASO was engaged in subversive activities throughout the country. Mr M. C. Botha threatening a clamp-down on SASO said "We simply cannot afford to spend money and keep hostile black campuses going" and that there were serious doubts whether SASO could any longer claim to be a students' organisation.¹²

Daily News of 18 May 1976 reported that KwaZulu's Councillor for Agriculture and Forestry, Chief Sotile, demanded that SASO and BPC must come out in their true colours and state clearly what they stand for. He said the objects of SASO and BPC, as he understood them, were the achievement of liberation for black people; that KwaZulu's leader, Gatsha, was working towards the same goal but SASO and BPC's opposition to him (Gatsha) was alarming, so they "must come out in their true colours. Why should we be placed in a position of not being clear as to what their stand is."¹³

Banning of SASO Newsletter

The banning of the March-April issue of SASO newsletter "and all subsequent issues of this journal" was announced in Pretoria on the 23 July 1976 in a special one-page *Government Gazette*.¹⁴

Detentions of SASO Members

The latter half of 1976 saw a series of arrests of SASO members.

Approximately 20 members of SASO are in detention under either Section 10 (Internal Security Act) or Section 6 of Terrorism Act.

The executive members in Durban have all been taken in including the Secretary in the SASO office, Sibongile Kubeka.

The SASO car which was used by the Permanent Organiser is believed to be in the hands of the Police in King William's Town. Silumko Sokupa, the Permanent Organiser, was arrested on 13 August 1976 and about two days later the car was found at the Police offices. It is claimed that police found the car deserted on the road between Alice and King William's Town.

Death of SASO Members

Mapetla Mohapi, a former SASO Permanent Organiser, died in detention on 5 August 1976 at Kei Road near East London. It was alleged that he had committed suicide by hanging.

He was previously detained under the Terrorism Act on 11 October 1974 and released 173 days later without any charges laid against him. He was then banned for three years under Suppression of Communism Act (now Internal Security Act) on 23 September 1975 and then redetained on 15 July 1976.

Luke Mazwembe

Luke Mazwembe, a SASO member, died in detention on 3 September 1976 in Cape Town. He was detained under General Law Amendment Act and died about two hours after he had been detained, allegedly by hanging himself with a blanket he had torn into strips.

Self-help and Religious Organisations

BLACK COMMUNITY PROGRAMMES (BCP)

Remarkable growth has been reported in the work of BCP during the period under review, despite the detention of several of its staff in the Eastern Cape branch and one in the Transvaal branch.

Health Programmes

This programme continued to receive tremendous support from the black community. Success of this health centre at Zinyoka was evident in the improvement of health conditions and disease rate at the surrounding villages. Milk schemes introduced in 1975 have seen a number of babies gaining the necessary weight and health level.

Due to increase in clinic demands an additional doctor and nurses were added at Tyusha, Ntsikizini, Ginsberg and Tsholomqa.

Plans are underway to establish a similar project in Natal, Adams Mission.

Women's Division

These include training in leadership skills for interested people in community development. An active sewing and knitting project was started in Umtata in 1975.

Leadership Training

Since the beginning of 1975 a strong core leadership was instituted. Each month women from various areas got together to learn skills in nutrition and health education so that they could go back to teach others in the home situation.

Another Centre will be set up as a base for all Women's Division training programmes. The key pilot programmes in nutrition, home economics and agricultural demonstrations will be tried out.

Home Industries

(a) Njwaxa Leather Home Industry—Eastern Cape

This is a leather industry which has made a steady growth during the year under review. The home industry produces leather goods and provides training to local tribesmen in leatherwork.

The marketing of products which includes belts, purses, hand-bags, seating cushions and mocassins is done by a specially created Sales Promotion department of BCP.

(b) Artefacts Home Industry, Transvaal

This industry concentrates on:

SEWING: Women who would ordinarily be unemployed are brought together and taught sewing skills and encouraged to produce articles for which they are paid according to their production. Those women who can sew act as teachers to others. BCP subsidizes the purchase of material and machines for use by the group.

SCULPTURE AND WEAVING: Members of the community who possess skills or potential in this field are encouraged to design and produce items which are then collected for sale and preservation. Skilled people are also organised to teach those who show potential.

(c) Creative Designs: Anniversary Card Project

BCP embarked on a programme of producing Anniversary Cards with a more relevant appearance and content for black people. Black artists were organised to contribute designs that are in expensive and relevant. The result was beautiful Christmas Cards which were enthusiastically received by the community.

Communications, Research and Publications

This research and publishing department continues to provide a useful service in the black community and the country as a whole through programmes intended at encouraging dialogue amongst members of the black community, exploring areas of community and national concern.¹⁵

- Black Review* is an annual publication which reports events, issues and concerns in the black community in the country of that particular year under review.
- Black Viewpoint* is published every three months and it is hoped that it will help encourage debate on some of the crucial subjects facing the country as a whole and the black community in particular. Topic covered in 1975/76 was Transkei Independence.
- Black Perspectives* is a publication in which writers are invited to contribute in-depth discussion on any one of the major areas of national life, like education, theology, etc. An examination of their contribution is made by an invited audience which gives further insights and criticisms.

Symposia

One of the important functions of this department is to organise symposia at which important issues in South Africa are debated fully and seriously. Out of this a publication is made which spreads the debate further as people read the publication. One such symposium in January 1976, made possible the publication of 'Apartheid'.

Resource Centres

The Research and Publications Department also has the responsibility for developing resource centres around the country. One such resource centre is to be opened in Umlazi at the end of 1976. After that another one at King William's Town will be opened.

General Programmes

- (a) **Welfare Activities.** In a very limited number of cases welfare activities are encouraged to tide people over difficult periods. In the health programme BCP has sometimes to provide free soups and other relief work.
- (b) **Ginsberg Creche.** This is another effort where BCP has helped in reviving a community creche that had ceased operation because of poor leadership. BCP contributed towards staff salaries, gave advice to the controlling committee and made the Medical Officer available free of charge to examine the children. The Home Industries also donated overalls for children.
- (c) **Bulk Buying Scheme**
This was launched to counter the effects of inflation. It started operating successfully until the wholesale dealer concerned refused to co-operate.

(d) **Self-tax Trust Fund**

The self-tax fund is money received from concerned individuals in South Africa who would like to contribute towards the development of the less privileged people in the country. These impose a taxation upon themselves and contribute towards this cause without putting conditions on how money should be used. This money is held in trust for the benefit of the black community.

ZIMELE TRUST FUND

Zimele was established in 1975 to satisfy the need for an organisation that caters for the interests of all former political prisoners and their families. This is mainly in the form of economic, social and educational restabilisation.

Zimele is solely run by black people who have "first hand information regarding the ills that afflict black society".

Zimele has decided to concern itself with former political prisoners because "firstly other types of prisoners have welfare bodies that take care of them during and after their imprisonment whereas political prisoners are often shunned by society as a result of extensive intimidation of their families and them personally.

"Secondly, political prisoners find it hard to readjust to present social trends after long periods of imprisonment. Work opportunities are scarce for them and even for those who do manage to secure jobs, their chances of survival are often slim because employers are often pressurised to dismiss them from work. This means they have to find some form of subsistence outside the sphere of formal employment resulting in dependence on meagre handouts that are hardly enough to cater for the basic day to day needs of the concerned individuals let alone their families. This state of affairs almost reduces them to beggars and destitution: this is an affront to the dignity and integrity of these men."

Aims, Goals and Principles of Zimele

1. Economic Restabilisation

This is in the form of projects that are initiated with a view to provide the essential economic needs of all ex-political prisoners and their family. These projects are in the form of small home industries and small

factories which are to be run by Zimele until qualified personnel are found.

2. Educational Fund

Bursaries and scholarships are provided for children of former political prisoners.

3. Relief Fund

This fund provides assistance to people on their release from prison. Funeral expenses, furniture, clothing, etc., are paid for by Zimele where necessary, whilst the person is looking for a place of employment.

How Zimele is Run

Zimele is run by Board of Trustees consisting of seven members, an administrator and a field worker. Ways and means of nationalising the organisation so that it has 12 trustees are being explored. The following people are members of the Board of Trustees:—

Mr S. M. Tembeni, Mr B. S. Biko, Mr S. Baqwa, Rev T. Moletsane, Dr M. A. Ramphela, Mr F. Bam and Dr L. Msauli. The Administrator was Mr Mapetla Mohapi who died in detention in August and the field worker is Mr Pumzile Mahlakatha.

The Board of Trustees has the following duties:

- To look into all legal matters relating to the organisation;
- To administer all financial matters;
- To administer the property of the organisation;
- To enter into such transactions as necessary for the promotion of the affairs of Zimele.

Members of Zimele intend making this a viable project that will ease the grim economic realities of the black people. It is hoped that this scheme will be nationalised in due course.

Recent Developments

Zimele suffered the pinch of bannings and detentions with the banning of its first field worker, Pumzile Majeke. The administrator of Zimele, Mapetla Mohapi, was detained and he later died in detention. The police said that he hanged himself with jeans. (See Chapter on Detentions).

All the other members of the Board of Trustees except Rev. Moletsane and S. Baqwa were subsequently detained in a national swoop on leaders of black organisations in August 1976.

ASSOCIATION FOR SELF-HELP (ASH)

This Association continued its work and established contact with groups and organisations within as well as outside the community in which it works. Notable is the fact that ASH succeeded in sharing its experience over the Communal Buying Schemes with other communities interested in the scheme.

By 1975 the Association had proved its strength and ability to survive. The fact that the Association had established contact with the people of the community placed its field workers in a position to communicate effectively with the groups in the surrounding communities.

Projects

The normal projects of ASH are:

- Communal Buying
- Children's Playgroup
- Literacy Classes
- Educational Training Programmes.

Progress during the year under review

The Annual Report of the Association 1975 states:

“To evaluate the success of the ASH Programme one has to look beyond structures created to the level of consciousness attained by the groups involved. The projects initiated have led to a creative environment for objective reflection and form a basis for communal action. ASH has successfully set itself up as a relevant resource agency for the community. Thus the movement towards development in the community has just begun.

A major task of ASH in this movement towards development will be to increase its efforts in motivating the community groups and to find all available resources that will assist the efforts of the community.”¹⁶

BLACK WOMEN'S FEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

In 1975 over 200 women from 58 black townships throughout the country met in Durban and committed themselves to work together as women to attain self-reliance and independence as black people.

At the first National Conference in Durban forty-one organisations were presented. Seventy-four women were members of women's groups, thirty were members of mixed organisations and one hundred and six indicated no organisational affiliations.

The Black Womens' Federation of SA was founded at the same

Conference in December 1975 and had the following as office bearers:

Mrs Fatima Meer	—	<i>President</i>
Mrs D. Mabiletsa	—	<i>Vice-President</i>
Mrs V. Gcabashe	—	<i>Secretary</i>
Mrs J. Noel	—	<i>Assistant Secretary</i>
Mrs V. Moloto	—	<i>Treasurer</i>

The preamble to the Constitution of the BWF states that “. . . . realising that:

1. Black women are basically responsible for the survival and maintenance of their families and largely the socialization of the youth for the transmission of the Black cultural heritage;
2. The need to present a united front and to re-direct the status of motherhood towards the fulfilment of the Black people's social, cultural, economic and political aspirations;
3. The urgent need to coordinate and consolidate the efforts and activities of Black womens' organisations in our country, do hereby resolve to adopt this document as our constitution.”¹⁷

The aims and objects of the Federation of Black Women

1. To establish contact and unity and practical co-operation amongst Black Women and Black Women's organisations;
2. To define common problems and to lay out priorities necessary for effective community action;
3. To determine strategies and draw up programmes with a view to heightening the social, cultural, economic and political awareness of Black Communities and thereby establish self-reliant communities;
4. To co-ordinate and consolidate Black Women and Black Women Women's organisations throughout South Africa with aims and objects similar to that of BWF;
5. To co-operate with other black organisations with similar aims and objects;
6. To conscientise the people towards a sense of self-realisation;
7. To raise funds to pursue the aims and objects of the BWF.”¹⁸

Membership

Membership is open to all Black Women and Black Women's Organisations in South Africa. Organised groups can apply for affiliation. Branches of ten or more Black women can apply for affiliation. Black Women may apply for affiliation in their individual capacity.

Structure

The highest of the BWF is the general council which is made up of affiliated Black Women, delegates from affiliated bodies and branches, and members of the executive committee.

During its first meeting the Black Womens' Federation resolved to motivate Black Women's Organisations to undertake projects of self-help to meet the needs of deprived communities. It was further resolved to "establish a committee on education to disseminate factual material and work out programmes for an alternative and positive system of education relevant to the needs of the people. A call for more technical schools and open universities was made".

The meeting called for the restoration of family life of people imprisoned in terms of 'racial laws' and all laws that curb freedom of expression of South Africans in order to entrench racial domination as conceived by the Nationalist Government.¹⁹

INSTITUTE FOR BLACK RESEARCH

The objects of the Institute are:

- to train researchers, to stimulate writers particularly in the black community;
- to encourage and undertake fact-finding surveys, to examine and report upon matters that concern the black people of South Africa;
- to compile, publish and distribute books, monographs, journals, calculated to promote the objects of the Institute.

The Officials of the Institute

Mr D. Zondi	<i>President</i>	Mr G. Reddy	<i>Secretary</i>
Mrs F. Meer	<i>Vice-President</i>	Mr Randree	<i>Treasurer</i>

Two members of the Executive Committee and an employee have been detained under the preventive detention clause of the Internal Security Act.

INSTITUTE OF BLACK STUDIES

The Institute of Black Studies was formed in November 1975 to provide a forum where the Black man can express himself. It was intended as a platform where issues facing the country can be analysed and interpreted.²⁰

Objectives

- "The objectives of the Association are:
- To provide a forum for the articulation of black viewpoints and exchange of ideas and opinions;

- To examine, assess and evaluate the standards, values and prejudices by which we live and to rewrite them in terms which accord with black dignity;
- To undertake studies in relevant areas and to disseminate such information;
- To encourage the development of specialist associations within or outside the main body and collaborate with organisations of similar objectives.”²¹

First Conference

The first conference of the Institute was to be held in July at Dube (Soweto). Prior to the day of the conference the organiser, Mr Mkele was interrogated by the Security Police who asked for copies of all the speeches that were to be presented. Mr Mkele was unable to do this as he did not have the copies then.

The Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg later banned the meeting in Johannesburg in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Alternative venue was found at Wilgerspruit.

A number of people who delivered papers at the conference were later detained under the Internal Security Act.

EDENDALE LAY ECUMENICAL CENTRE

The Federal Theological Seminary

On the 16th of September 1975, an undertaking was entered into with the Federal Theological Seminary to occupy the Centre for two years while negotiations for the acquisition of a suitable place were under way.

Mobile Programmes

In view of the presence of the Federal Theological Seminary and the fact that they were using most of the buildings at the Centre, the ELC decided to embark upon mobile programmes. These were to be conducted outside the Centre itself.

Promoters of these programmes were to go out into the community and work from there. These programmes started at Edendale and spread from there to other communities. An arrangement had been reached with the Federal Theological Seminary to enable the Centre to conduct internal programmes during winter and summer holidays.

The mobile programmes were launched on the 8th of March 1976.

The priorities chosen for the mobile programmes were Idamasa and Women's Organisation, with Idamasa as priority number one, and Women's Organisation as the second priority. These groups were considered as a basis of all community enterprise and were also influential. It was felt that many groups could be reached through these two groups.

INTER-DENOMINATIONAL AFRICAN MINISTERS' ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (IDAMASA)

At the 30th Annual Conference held at Gugulethu in Cape Town it was noted that:²²

- the time had changed, people must be prepared to go along with the change;
- worshipping God must involve the whole man;
- the Black man is in dialogue with God;
- Education is expensive, parents must sacrifice for their children. Education must be education that can liberate the people, and not make them better slaves. Education must help the people to harness the powers of nature. Bursaries must be provided;
- The poor must be helped by the better privileged.

Youth Programme

Parents and youth were invited to attend an awareness course organised by the Youth Committee. Parent-Youth relationship was cited as the major cause to dissipate what was summed up as the fear of the parents, first for themselves and then for the youth. This was done through agencies directly involved in these areas.

The youth project helped the young people in the following respects²²:

- advised them of bodies offering bursaries;
- helped them seek employment;
- advised them of what their rights and duties as young people and as students and workers are.

REFERENCES

- ¹BPC Conference Report
- ²Ibid
- ³Ibid
- ⁴Ibid
- ⁵Ibid
- ⁶Ibid
- ⁷BPC Press Statement
- ⁸*Leader* 26.3.76
- ⁹*Natal Mercury* 30.8.76
- ¹⁰*Mercury Extra* 28.8.76
- ¹¹SASO Report
- ¹²*Natal Mercury* 10.2.76

- ¹³*Daily News* 18.5.76
- ¹⁴*Government Gazette*
- ¹⁵BCP 1975 Annual Report
- ¹⁶ASH Report
- ¹⁷Black Women's Federation Constitution
- ¹⁸Ibid
- ¹⁹BWF Report
- ²⁰IBS Brochure
- ²¹IBS Conference Report
- ²²IDAMASA Annual Report.



EDUCATION

Primary and Secondary

Education, which forms the basic foundation for economic, political and general intellectual development in any community, has, for Blacks in South Africa, over many years and for several reasons, remained a burning issue for political debate in the country. This has been observable with regard to all levels of education whether primary, secondary, university or general technical. We shall, however, for the purposes of this Chapter, discuss issues relating to primary and secondary education.

Much as the ups and downs pertaining to education for Blacks in South Africa, affect the whole of the black community, it is evident from available information that the emphasis of most controversies affects the African section of the community most. Year after year a great struggle ensues between the growing number of African children of school-going age and the inadequate state finances to meet the demand for education.

The main problems are the endless shortages of sufficient monies to send willing children to school, insufficient classrooms and schools to accommodate those who can afford schooling and insufficient teachers to give attention to the soaring numbers. Remedies to these have been recognised by both the Government and the public to lie in free and compulsory education for all, a high rate of school building and measures to increase qualified teacher output every year. Whenever votes in favour of education for Blacks in the Appropriation Bill are discussed in the South African Parliament, the ruling National Party speakers and Government Ministers bring out loads of statistical information in support of arguments to demonstrate the efforts to improve the situation.

During a similar debate on the vote for Bantu Education in April 1976, National Party speakers defending disparity and the per capita expenditure between White and African pupils used the high number of African pupils and the fact that not much money came directly from the African community into the gross national income as the main reason for the unequal money allocations. Mr P. Cronje¹ disclosed that the Government annual per capita expenditure on Bantu Education in 1974 and 1975, was R39,53 and R44 respectively, estimating that the Government expenditure would be close to R50 in 1976 as against the white per capita expenditure of R500. He said the Government would be unable to raise enough money to bring the two per capita expenditures on par with each other. "If we want parity, an expenditure of R500 (white figure) times four million pupils (estimated number of African pupils) will be necessary. This gives a total of R2 000 million. This amount is absolutely prohibitive," said Mr Cronje. He averred that the Government had been able to spend so much money on each white pupil per year because, "the Whites' economic position has improved over the years". He made a strong case for the policy of the Government in favour of decentralising education for Africans to the control of Bantustan Governments and, "to improve the economic position of the Bantu".

Speaking on the double shift system with regard to African schools Mr Cronje said², "If we want to abolish the double shift system, approximately 11 000 teachers will be involved in this. This would mean that 11 000 additional classrooms would have to be provided at R3 400 per classroom. Ten thousand classrooms would cost R34 million and 11 000 a little more. If say R1 500 per year is paid to 11 000 additional teachers, this gives us a total amount of R16 million."

The total cost of the whole programme would then be too high to be considered at this stage. In the event of there being no miraculous rise in State revenue from African sources, these problems would remain unsolved indefinitely.

ENROLMENT

Coloured

The various figures reflecting numbers of coloured pupils enrolled in the various standards from Sub A to Standard 10 were not available at the time of going to print. However, the Minister of Coloured Relations had disclosed in Parliament that the total enrolment figure by the end of 1975 stood at 625 585.³ This figure showed an increase of 28 348 pupils over the 1974 figure of 597 237 (4,7%). Viewed against the

estimated 1975 increase of enrolment for Coloured pupils, this 1974 figure showed a shortfall. The estimated increase for 1975 was 33 712 pupils and further estimated for 1976-79 were 33 356, 33 663, 33 469 and 33 351 respectively.⁴

Indian

In reply to a question in the House of Assembly, the Minister of Indian Affairs disclosed the following enrolment figures for Indian pupils given as at March 1975.⁵

Class One	20 740	11,3%
Class Two	21 766	11,9%
Standard One	20 312	11,1%
Standard Two	19 169	10,5%
Standard Three	19 310	10,5%
Standard Four	17 693	9,7%
Standard Five	15 042	8,2%
Standard Six	12 416	6,8%
Standard Seven	11 743	6,4%
Standard Eight	13 401	7,3%
Standard Nine	6 116	3,3%
Standard Ten	4 478	2,4%
Adjustment classes	1 162	0,6%
	183 348	100,0%

These figures indicate that approximately 26% of the South African Indian population of +700 000 were enrolled at schools in 1975.

*The editor wishes to correct the misinformation on figures reflecting enrolment of Indian pupil as given in *Black Review* 1974/75. The 1976 figures, not being available at printing time, the editor takes opportunity to reproduce 1975 figures corrected.

African

The enrolment figures for African pupils as at March 1975 were given in the House of Assembly by the Minister of Bantu Education as follows:⁶

Sub A	808 251	21,86%
Sub B	598 335	16,18%
Standard One	540 026	14,60%
Standard Two	419 212	11,34%
Standard Three	365 934	9,90%
Standard Four	280 434	7,58%
Standard Five	221 019	5,98%
Standard Six	145 662	3,94%
Total (<i>carried forward</i>)	3 378 873	91,38%

Total (<i>brought forward</i>)	3 378 873	91,38%
Form One	149 251	4,04%
Form Two	91 265	2,47%
Form Three	50 772	1,37%
Form Four	18 271	,50%
Form Five	9 009	,24%
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	3 697 441	100,00%
	<hr/>	<hr/>

These figures include those African pupils whose education was under the control of the various Bantustan Governments.

The total number of pupils enrolled in 1975 showed an increase of 211 180 pupils (6,1%) over the 1974 total figure which was 3 486 261. The total figure for 1976 was revealed in debates in the House of Assembly as standing at four million (including technical and trade and vocational pupils)⁷ which indicated a further increase of 302 559 pupils (8,2%) over the 1975 figure.

Approximating from the figures given above, the total number of black pupils registered with schools over 1975 was 4 506 374.

Double Session System in Black Schools

The increased number of black school children aggravated the accommodation problem. According to available information,⁸ the accommodation problem has led to the continued practice of teachers running double teaching sessions everyday with one class coming in the morning and the other in the afternoon. In some cases, the platoon system is also used. This system entails sharing of classrooms by different classes at the same time. Sections of the black community most hit by this system were Indian and Coloured groups, especially the Indians who experienced the system up to Standards 5 and 6, followed closely by the Coloureds who were affected up to Standards 3 and 4, lastly by the Africans where reported cases had revealed the system to have been practised up to Standard 1 and 2. Current figures reflecting numbers of schools, classes, pupils and teachers affected by the double shift system amongst Africans (who as reflected above, are not affected as widely as other sections of the black community) were not available. However, the Minister of Bantu Education revealed in the Assembly on 30 March 1976 that no progress had been made in the elimination of the double school sessions in schools under his control since June 1975. Government thinking on this issue as had been given by a Nationalist Party speaker, Mr P. Cronje, in Parliament was that the elimination process would be too costly to be undertaken. Calculations had it that such a project would cost no less than R16

million. This figure would cover employment of the essential extra teachers besides the estimated R34 million which would go to the building of new classrooms.

Replying to a question in Parliament the Minister of Indian Affairs disclosed that during 1975, 86 new classrooms with capacity to accommodate 7 020 pupils were provided.⁹

The Minister further remarked that double sessions were still in operation from Class 1 to Standard 5 in Indian schools. The following numbers of pupils were affected in each class:¹⁰

Class One	2 361	Standard Three	822
Class Two	4 176	Standard Four	519
Standard One	4 017	Standard Five	17
Standard Two	2 899		

During the same year, 1975, 399 Indian teachers were involved in the system of double sessions. The Minister of Coloured Relations, replying to a similar question in Parliament on 25 February 1976, disclosed the following information regarding the operation of double sessions in schools directly under his department and those under the Administration of Coloured Affairs (under the hand of the Coloured Representative Council).¹¹

	<i>Department</i>	<i>Administration of Coloured Affairs for third term 1975</i>
Number of schools affected	25	606
Number of classes affected	63	2 003
Number of pupils involved	2 021	69 291
Number of teachers involved	63	2 003

He further disclosed that during 1975 a total number of 20 new primary schools were built to accommodate 15 925 Coloured pupils.¹² The pupil teacher ratio in Coloured education in 1975 was given as 31:1.¹³

COMPULSORY AND FREE EDUCATION

Blacks

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Education in an Assembly revealed that systematic preparations were being made for the ultimate introduction of compulsory school education for black children. The cost of compulsory education was estimated to be R245 million for black children between the ages of 7 and 15, and to bring such facilities to a teacher-pupil ratio of 1 to 30 would cost R400 million.

Mr G. J. M. Coetzee, Director of the Department of Bantu Education, further explained at the convention of the Institute of Personnel

Management that the rapid growth in population is one of the main reasons why the education system had not progressed further towards the aim of universal education. The department is also facing the task of training enough secondary teachers, whilst completing the second year of a four-year programme to provide all pupils from Standard 1 to Senior Certificate with basic text-books in all subjects.

Indians

Mr Marais Steyn, addressing speakers on the Indian Affairs Vote in June 1976, reported that there was strong possibility that compulsory education for all Indian children would be made law in 1977, so that it could be put into effect in 1978. "Every Indian child placed under compulsory education remains at school for as long as a white child—up to Standard 8 or until he has reached the age of 15 years."¹⁴

Coloureds

The introduction of compulsory school attendance for Coloured children up to the age of nine years was announced in the Government Gazette of 9 January 1976.

This is seen as a step in the systematic introduction of compulsory Coloured education by raising the age limit from year to year. Until then the compulsory school attendance for Coloured children was limited to those of seven and eight years.¹⁵

Control of Education

Control of Indian education was handed over on 2 January 1976 to the South African Indian Council when all powers previously held by the Minister of Indian Affairs were delegated to Indians. The SAIC's executive members signed the declaration of acceptance.

Although these powers have been re-delegated to Mr Krog, the Director of Indian Education, the SAIC will still have the final say in the promotion of higher grade (HI) principals.¹⁶

Replying to a question in the House of Assembly, as to how many Blacks were employed in senior educational posts, the various ministers gave the following figures:

AFRICANS

In March 1975 there were:¹⁷

109 inspectors of schools

338 assistant inspectors.

INDIANS

In 1975 there were:¹⁸

15 inspectors

- 7 assistant inspectors
- 6 educational planners
- 1 school guidance officer.

COLOURED

In 1975 there were:¹⁹

- 25 inspectors
- 12 assistant inspectors
- 4 organisers of adult education.

EXAMINATIONS

Africans

According to a *Daily News Report*, the Department of Bantu Education is to change its examination regulations to ensure that where irregularities occur in future, the reliability and integrity of examination standards can be protected.

This follows a settlement out of court between the counsel for the Minister of Bantu Education and parents of Matric pupils in the Durban area, whose results were withheld because of the theft of examination question papers.²⁰

Standard 8 and Senior Certificate examination question papers had been stolen from the office of the circuit inspector at Ndwedwe in 1975. Five school boys were detained in connection with the theft. Another theft of large consignment of examination question papers was reported at Ngwemabala Secondary School. Hundreds of Matric and Standard 8 examination question papers were stolen.

The Director of Bantu Education, Mr K. B. Hartshorne, however, said that exams would not stop. They did not want to upset the thousands of students who were then writing the examinations.²¹

The results of the schools which were allegedly involved in the theft were withheld and released at a later date.

Of the 8 445 students who had entered for Matriculation examination at the end of 1975, 5 400 passed, 3 520 of these qualified for university entrance.

48 124 entered for Junior Certificate, 35 214 passed.

134 231 entered for Standard 6, 104 063 passed.

170 755 entered for Standard 5, 111 288 passed.²²

The end of 1975 saw a change-over from the old Standard 6 examination to a new Higher Primary Certificate examination.

Indians

At the end of 1975, 4 327 candidates sat for the Senior Certificate examinations, 1 010 passed with exemption; 2 669 passed without exemption, and 648 failed.

In Standard 8 exams 6 716 passed at the academic level, 4 195 passed at practical level, and 2 055 failed. Of the 12 237 who had entered the Standard 6 examinations, 6 822 passed the normal high school course and 4 784 passed the practical course.²³

Coloureds

At the end of 1975, 3 746 candidates had enrolled for Matriculation examinations, 2 374 passed and 1 372 failed.

For Junior Certificate, 15 450 had enrolled 11 462 passed and 4 028 failed.²⁴

TEACHERS

A new concept of teaching by tape cassette was reported by *Star* to have been launched by the Educational Television—a joint project between the *Argus* Company and *The Star* schools. It is open to all teachers irrespective of where they stay.²⁵

However, more teacher training schools are being erected and existing ones have been extended. In 1974 a project for the training of unqualified primary school teachers was started by introducing a special condensed course. In this case recognition is given to the practical teaching experience a person has gained as an unqualified teacher.

Daily News reported that Mr P. A. Pyper (UP Durban Central) called for speedy action towards the placing of Coloured and Indian teachers on the same scale as Whites.

The closing of the gap between salaries of Black and White teachers is receiving attention. At present an African secondary school principal in a school with more than 600 pupils has a basic wage of R5580, rising annually to R6660. His white counterpart has a basic salary of R10 800, rising annually to R11 700.

African

Teachers employed as at March 1975:²⁶

Professionally qualified with		
University degree	—	1 143
Matric or equivalent	—	6 488
JC or equivalent	—	33 578
Other qualifications such		
as technical or vocational	—	1 542
Non-professional with		
University degree	—	60
Matric or equivalent	—	591
Technical or vocational	—	95
No matric/technical/vocational	—	10 169

Indian

This was the position as at 30.6.75:²⁷

Professional qualified with		
University degree	—	1 186
Matric or equivalent	—	4 449
J.C. or equivalent	—	945
Other qualifications eg technical or vocational	—	4
Non-professional with		
University degree	—	26
Matric or equivalent	—	89
Technical or other vocational	—	5
No matric/technical/other vocational certificates	—	133

Coloureds

The position in Coloured schools as at April 1976 was this:²⁸

Professional qualified teacher with		
University degree	—	678
Matric or equivalent	—	5 610
Junior or equivalent Certificate		16 633
Teachers without professional qualification but with		
University degree	—	54
Matric or equivalent	—	476
Technical or other vocational qualifications	—	72
Teachers without professional qualifications without matric/technical/other vocational qualifications	—	1 282

REFERENCES

¹1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.5680

²1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.5679

³1976 *Hansard* vol.12, col.870

⁴*Black Review* 1974/75 p.149

⁵1976 *Hansard* vol.4, col.264

⁶1976 *Hansard* vol.2, col.72

⁷1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.5680

⁸*Black Review* 1974/75, p.150

⁹1976 *Hansard* vol.11, col.778

¹⁰*Ibid*

¹¹1976 *Hansard* vol.5, col.363

¹²1976 *Hansard* vol.5, col.366

¹³*Ibid*

¹⁴*Daily News* 27.6.76

¹⁵*Daily News* 9.1.76

¹⁶*Natal Mercury* 3.1.76

¹⁷1976 *Hansard* vol.21, col.1298

¹⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.15, col.1019

¹⁹1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.1167

²⁰*Daily News* 5.3.76

²¹*Daily News* 7.11.75

²²1976 *Hansard* vol.15, col.999

²³1976 *Hansard* vol.16, col.1022

²⁴1976 *Hansard* vol.12, col.872

²⁵*Star* 22.1.76

²⁶1976 *Hansard* vol.14, col.964

²⁷1976 *Hansard* vol.16, col.1018

²⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.12, col.871

EDUCATION

Teacher, Technical and Vocational

TEACHER TRAINING

More teacher training schools are being erected and existing training schools extended in order to meet the shortage of teachers in the Republic. This was disclosed in Parliament by the Minister of Bantu Education.

Africans

The following are the enrolment figures for student teachers in the Republic in 1975:¹

	<i>Enrolled</i>	<i>Qualified</i>
Primary Teachers' Course	14 215	6075
Junior Secondary Teachers' Course	1 228	489
Secondary Teachers' Course	229	96
University Education (non-graduate)	28	4
Post-degree UED	109	90
B.Ed. and B. Ped.	195	39
Special courses in art/homecraft	103	85
Trade Instructors' Course	17	8
Diploma Courses in Special Education for the deaf and blind	39	36
Courses for training staff for pre-school institutions	59	49
Higher Secondary Teachers' Diploma	26	2

Indians

The following figures show the number of students who qualified as teachers at the end of 1975:²

Primary and Lower Secondary School teachers by in-service courses	226
Primary and Lower Secondary School teachers by means of full-time courses	176
Academic high school teachers	29
Specialist teachers of commercial subjects	31
Teachers of technical subjects	—
Remedial or special education Teachers of Arts	9
Physical education instructors	—
Home economics teachers	25
Diploma in School Counselling	6
Diploma for Teachers of children handicapped in Speech and Hearing	8
	2

Coloureds

These are the figures of students who qualified as teachers in 1975:³

Lower Primary Teachers' Course	988
Specialist Teachers' Certificate for Lower Primary Teachers' Course	131
Primary Teachers' Certificate	463
Primary Teachers' Diploma	288
Lower Secondary Teachers' Diploma	13
Secondary Teachers' Diploma (non-graduate)	3
Secondary Teachers' Diploma (graduate)	34
Adaptation Classes Teachers' Diploma	15
Post-graduate Degree Courses in education	7
Commercial Teachers' Diploma	31
Technical Teachers' Diploma	4

TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Africans

The Minister of Labour gave the following as figures of students who had qualified in the building trade at the end of 1975:⁴

Bricklaying	4 251
Blocklaying	109
Bricklaying and Plastering	347
Carpentry	1 531
Carpentry and Joinery	54
Electrical Wiring	53
Joinery	1
Total (<i>carried forward</i>)	6 346

	Total (<i>brought forward</i>)	6 346
Painting		1 043
Plastering		856
Plumbing		791
		—
	TOTAL	9 036
		—

The following are figures for students who qualified in the following fields at the end of 1975:⁵

(a) Technicians: Civil Engineering	—	7
Agricultural Engineering	—	1
Survey	—	4
Geology	—	4
Electro-technical	—	none
Telecommunication	—	none
(b) Water and Sewerage Purification Operators	—	9
(c) Maintenance Works	—	20
(d) Land Surveyors	—	none
(e) Engineers: Mechanical	—	none
Electrical	—	none
Chemical	—	none
Civil	—	none
(f) Architecture	—	none

There are also trade schools offering courses in general mechanics, concreting, electricians' block training, watchmaking, leatherwork, drainlaying, plumbing and sheetmetal work, motor body repair-men's, motor mechanics, upholstery and motor trimming, tailoring.⁶

Technical progress in Kwa-Zulu will take a vital step forward when the first training school for black vocational and technical teachers at Umlazi is officially handed over to the Kwa-Zulu Government. The Centre was built for R32 000 by the Natal Educational Trust, a fund established in 1974 by prominent members of the Indian community. When the school opens there will be facilities for 100 teachers. Two-year and three-year courses in plastering, bricklaying, tailoring and mechanics mechanics will be included.

Indians

The Minister of Indian Affairs revealed that in 1975 there were 140 pupils doing a technically orientated JC and 28 pupils doing a technically orientated Senior Certificate.

These were the other pupils who had enrolled for technical or vocational examinations in 1975:⁷

National Diplomas in Commerce	—	22
Art and (Dress) Design	—	3
Art and (Textile) Design	—	1
Public Administration	—	3
Community Health Nursing	—	7
Health Inspectors	—	4
Tropical Hygiene	—	7
Sugar Technology	—	3
Medical Technology	—	6
Chemical Technology	—	4
Civil Engineering	—	2
Civil Engineering (intermediate)	—	3
National Certificates: ⁸		
National Secretarial (Private Secretaries)	—	19
National Secretarial (Consulting Room Practice)	—	3
Hairdressing	—	13
Civil Engineering	—	1
Other Certificates:		
Architectural Draughtmanship	—	4
Institute of Certified Book-keepers	—	4
Nursery School Aids	—	2

Coloureds

In 1975 there were 679 students attending courses at technical colleges for:⁹

Teachers' Diploma (Technical)	
Teachers' Diploma (Commerce)	
National Technical Certificate: Part I, Part II, Part III	
National Certificate for Technicians	
Higher National Certificate for Technicians	
National Certificate in Hairdressing	
National Certificate for Builders' Foreman	
National Secretarial Certificate	
National Diploma in State and Accounts and Finance	
National Diploma in Public Administration	
National Diploma for Health Inspectors	
National Diploma for Community Nursing	
Certificate for Introduction to Cost Accounting and Accountancy Methods and Procedures	
Certificate for Chartered Institute of Secretaries (CIS)	
Certificate of the Institute for Administration and Commerce (CIAC)	

REFERENCES

¹1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.1137-1138

²1976 *Hansard* vol.16, col.1017

³1976 *Hansard* vol.12, col.866

⁴1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.910-911

⁵1976 *Hansard* vol.17, col.1087

⁶1976 *Hansard* vol.18, col.1114

⁷1976 *Hansard* vol.17, col.1087-1088

⁸1976 *Hansard* vol.16, col.1030

⁹1976 *Hansard* vol.19, col.1171-1172

10

EDUCATION

Higher

DEGREES AWARDED AT UNIVERSITIES FOR BLACKS IN 1975

University of Western Cape¹

	<i>Degrees</i>	<i>Diplomas</i>
Science	30	—
Arts and Philosophy	89	3
Commerce and Law	6	7
Education	1	74
Theology	1	11
TOTAL	127	95

University of Durban-Westville²

	<i>Degrees</i>	<i>Diplomas</i>
Arts	90	3
Commerce	65	15
Science	69	—
Law	2	—
Education	15	35
TOTAL	241	53

University of the North³

	<i>Degrees</i>	<i>Diplomas</i>
Arts	126	1
Science	34	30
Law	15	2
Theology	1	—
Economic Science	9	—
Education	4	112
Agriculture	—	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	189	145
	<hr/>	<hr/>

University of Zululand⁴

	<i>Degrees</i>	<i>Diplomas</i>
Arts	95	8
Science	11	—
Law	14	28
Theology	—	—
Economic Science	14	2
Education	14	80
Agriculture	—	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	148	118
	<hr/>	<hr/>

University of Fort Hare⁵

	<i>Degrees</i>	<i>Diplomas</i>
Arts	78	2
Science	44	—
Law	10	4
Theology	5	—
Economic Science	9	1
Education	11	15
Agriculture	2	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	159	22
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Natal Medical Faculty

The following graduated in 1976:⁶

Africans	7
Coloureds	5
Indians	37
	<hr/>
TOTAL	49
	<hr/>

The Snyman Commission Report

Mr J. H. Snyman found that the immediate causes of disturbances on the University of the North campus in September 1974 lay in the extreme and alarming hostility against the Whites.

The report given by *Natal Mercury* further said, it would be wrong to "attribute anti-White feelings to Leftist agitators" only. Evidence had been heard by the Commission on a wide variety of conditions at the University of the North, which points to dissatisfaction among Blacks. Among these was the control over the University.

The evidence suggests that in certain circumstances the Black Academic Staff Association might have acted differently, and more responsibly.

"The University has become ensnared in a much wider and deeper problem than a mere University situation."

The underlying causes of anti-white feeling at the University, the report said "must be examined in the light of the ideology of Black Consciousness".

"The position feature of this ideology," it continued, "is that the black man must free himself of the psychological oppression of his inferiority complex and build his own future by his own efforts. It is in this light that it may be said that Blacks, and especially students at the University, with their poor cultural and educational background, have become conscious that they have lagged behind the white man in the development of human civilization this gives rise to resentment."

According to the Report, Black Consciousness had introduced an aggressive claim that the black man was the white man's equal. The only field where he felt a trial of strength was a political one. He sought to escape from this situation of inequality by obtaining political power on the strength of numerical superiority. "Whatever the white man offers him in any sphere of life is acceptable to him only if he, the black man, is in control. As soon as he is in control his ego is gratified. It is in this realisation of inferiority that the main reason for the black man's revolt against the white man must be sought.

"It is true that this feeling towards the white man is aggravated by his personal experience with some thoughtless Whites and also by the restrictions imposed on Blacks which are often violation of human dignity

"There is evidence that at many schools this hostility is formented in pupils. It is the students of this type who are above average age and no longer children who are brought together on the campus. They carry with them the experiences they have had in their lives. This concentration of students offers agitators and subverters a golden opportunity to do their work," the report said.

In the Report the Commission produced a damning indictment against the militant Black South African Students' Organisation (SASO), finding that "its main aim is the promotion of hatred for Whites and incitement of armed revolution".

The Commission found that SASO had not played a decisive role in the unrest but that it was engaged in subversive activities throughout the country. It goes on to say that the mid-wife at SASO birth in 1968 was the now defunct UCM, inspired by the UCM (USA), the American Committee on Africa and the World Students' Christian Federation—a Marxist organisation—which captured the imagination of black students with its extremely radical attitude. The secret objective of UCM was to train the black people of South Africa for armed revolution against Whites. It also introduced the ideology of Black Power and the principal polarisation of Blacks and Whites.⁷

Justice Snyman reports that it is also clear from SASO's history, its aims and policy manifests that "it is not a true students' organisation, and membership is not limited to students. Its policy cannot be distinguished from that of a political party. The organisation has a comprehensive political policy embracing virtually every facet of South Africa and South Africa's international politics So, the aim of Black Consciousness, and therefore of SASO is the overthrow of the present system in South Africa."⁸

Recommendations of the Snyman Commission

- The Snyman Commission made the following recommendations:⁹
- that salary discrepancies between white and black be eliminated as a matter of priority. Mr Justice Snyman said salary parity was bound to relieve the tension;
 - that Blacks form a majority of the University Council;
 - the University be autonomous;
 - Whites should work under supervision of Blacks where appropriate;
 - Postgraduates be allowed to study at any university.

Reactions to the Snyman Commission's Report

Reacting to the Snyman Commission's report, Mr M. C. Botha said there were serious doubts whether SASO could any longer claim to be a students' organisation and that they could not afford to spend money to keep hostile black campuses going.

Regarding the violent resentment among black academic staff and students against the white-controlled university administration he said the Government "was alarmed at this state of affairs and will do everything possible and within the powers of existing legislation to improve or correct the position."

The Government acknowledged acceptance of some of the several far-reaching recommendations by the commission to Africanise and give greater autonomy to all three African universities.

The then SASO president, Diliza Mji, rejected the findings of the Snyman Commission.

In his denial of the statement made by Justice Snyman that SASO's membership was not limited to students he explained to *Black Review* that the members were registered either with black universities or with UNISA because they had been excluded from the black university campuses. "One could challenge the commission to produce one SASO leader who is not a student."

SASO had always been emphatic that they had a right to express black opinion and to present this not only nationally but internationally, he explained. This did not mean that SASO advocated a violent change as alleged, and the Commission had failed to show that.

Africanisation of universities was also rejected because, SASO said, acceptance of such would be supporting the separate development policy on which the Nationalist party hinged.

The ills in the universities recognised by Mr Justice Snyman were the very ones SASO pointed at as deserving removal from the educational scene. "Because these ills are enched in the whole apartheid structure it is not possible to separate the educational system from apartheid, not possible to hit at the educational system without hitting at apartheid."

University of the North to have Black Rector

The University of the North at Turfloop is to come under control of a black rector as from 1 January 1977. This was announced by the Minister of Education, Mr M. C. Botha, in Pretoria.

The black rector will be Professor W. M. Kgware, at present professor in Comparative Education at the University of the North. He will replace Professor Boshoff who is retiring.

Professor Kgware holds the degrees M.A. (cum laude), D.Ed. He has had a long and distinguished career in Bantu Education after graduating at the University of Fort Hare in 1939.

He published many articles on education in South African and overseas journals. He is also a member-trustee of various public bodies including the South Africa Foundation, the Bantu Welfare Trust and the Internal Institute of Education.

University of Zululand, Students' Affairs

Following the "anti-Buthelezi" demonstrations, senior university authorities were believed to be seeking a ban on the SRC. This was reported by *Daily News* on 20 May 1976.

The SRC had refused to apologise to the Kwa-Zulu Government and to comply with the university investigations into the demonstrations staged at the graduation ceremony where Chief Gatsha was awarded an honorary doctorate. Prior to this Chief Gatsha Buthelezi had allegedly complained of 'free love' and 'dagga-smoking' by the students of this University.

Evidence of student aggression at the demonstrations, including photographs and statements of correspondence between KwaZulu Government and the University officials was said to have been presented at a meeting. Information leaked out that legal advice was sought to approach the Attorney-General to have the SRC banned.

Daily News also reported that student teachers from the University had been banned from practical training lessons at KwaZulu schools until and unless the SRC apologises to Kwa-Zulu Government.¹⁰

University of Durban-Westville, Black Dean for Faculty of Law

Professor Badra Ranchod, head of the Department of Private Law at the University of Durban-Westville, has been appointed Dean of the Faculty.

The appointment, which was made early in September, has still to be considered by the Senate.

Professor Ranchod will become the first Indian to be appointed Dean of a university faculty.

Establishment of Medical Faculty at Durban-Westville

Replying to a question in the Legislative Assembly as to what progress had been made in regard to the establishment of a medical school at the University of Durban-Westville, the Minister of Indian Affairs said that ways and means as to how and when effect can be given to the Government's decision to transfer the training of Indians from the medical school attached to the University of Natal to a medical faculty at the University of Durban-Westville on a phasing-out basis were being investigated in conjunction with the interested parties.¹¹

University of Fort Hare, New Degree

As from 1976 Fort Hare has offered a three year course in Personnel Management. Major subjects are industrial psychology and sociology. Other subjects include anthropology, development policy and administration (two courses of each), English and social and economic legislation (one course of each).

The degree is offered to meet the shortage of Blacks in the field of personnel management.¹²

Black Lecturer in Political Science

For the first time in the history of any South African university, a black man has been appointed as a lecturer in Political Science.

Mr T. N. Marala, a Political Science and honours graduate from the University of Fort Hare has lectured in Political Science as from the beginning of 1976.¹³

Fort Hare Branch in Umtata

The University of Fort Hare, in consultation with the Transkeian Government, established its branch in the vicinity of Umtata.

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Mr J. N. H. Janson, said the branch would initially make use of temporary accommodation, and the availability of the staff would be a determining factor in respect of the courses which might be offered, as well as the enrolment of students.

Two black professors were appointed to the new Umtata branch of the University of Fort Hare which opened early in 1976. They are Professor Manganyi and Professor Beresford Koyana. Professor Manganyi graduated at Turfloop University with B.A. and obtained an M.A. degree and a Doctorate at the University of South Africa. He is the author of a booklet "Being Black in the World". Professor Beresford Koyana, Professor of Private Law, is a Fort Hare graduate who had lectured there for some years. He had been practising as an advocate before joining the new Fort Hare staff. Professor Koyana was reported to have died in June following a motor car accident.¹⁴

SASO on the Campus

The new Umtata branch is reported to have taken a more accommodating attitude towards SASO. The Branch's rector, Professor B. van der Merwe, told *Daily News* that he has "no quarrel with SASO as long as it worked towards black nationalism and did not cause campus unrest".¹⁵

He had admitted students to the branch who had left Fort Hare during the 1972 campus disturbances. "Even if they had been expelled from Fort Hare we would have accommodated them".¹⁶

Foreign Black Students at South African Universities

The Minister of Bantu Education gave the following distribution and figures of students studying at South African universities:

<i>Country</i>	<i>University</i>	<i>No. of Students</i>	<i>Faculty</i>
Botswana	North	1	Arts
		1	Natural Sciences
Rhodesia	North	6	Arts
		2	Natural Sciences

Rhodesia	North	1	Commerce
		2	Theology
		3	Education
Swaziland	North	1	Natural Sciences
Lesotho	North	1	Law
Rhodesia	Fort Hare	3	Natural Sciences
		1	Theology
Lesotho	Fort Hare	1	Agriculture

Disturbances at Black University Campuses

(See report on Riots)

REFERENCES

¹1976*Hansard* vol.9, col.644

²Durban-Westville Pamphlet

³1976*Hansard* vol.19, col.1144

⁴Ibid

⁵Ibid

⁶Ibid

⁷*Natal Mercury* 10.2.76

⁸*Natal Mercury* 10.2.76

⁹*Natal Mercury* 10.2.76

¹⁰*Natal Mercury* 2.7.76

¹¹*Daily News* 20.5.76

¹²1976*Hansard* vol.2, col.50

¹³*Natal Witness* 23.9.75

¹⁴*Daily News* 3.3.76

¹⁵Ibid

¹⁶1976*Hansard* vol.12, col.840

11

BLACK LABOUR

The recession of the South African economy in the past year has thrown some confusion on the Government's labour policies. On the one hand there have been observable indications from Government circles that its tough labour policies need to be reviewed to accommodate national economic demands, though coupled with some hesitancy to give a lead to industry, while on the other hand industrialists have been wanting to improve the status of black workers (most of them to reduce their overhead expenses), but at the same time not quite knowing how far they could go without offending the Government. During 1975/76 there has been greater evidence of white labour shortage than ever before. This shortage, which hit a number of industries in the sphere of skilled work, brought about several calls for the promotion of blacks into the skilled labour ranks.

The advance of African workers into skilled jobs called for an intensification of African training in the various artisan skills. A Government White Paper published five years ago on the report by the Inter-Department Committee on the Decentralisation of Industries said, *inter alia*, that Africans should be trained only in the Bantustans for artisan work. Since those days the attitude of the Government has changed significantly. In a speech opening the 1975 National Convention of the Institute for Personnel Management (Southern African) the outgoing Minister of Labour, Mr Marais Viljoen, said, "The Government is aware that it would be to little avail if new and more advanced work opportunities were to be created for non-white workers, and they were not equipped to take advantage of the opportunities because of lack of suitable training. It is for this reason that quite apart from the extensive industrial training facilities it already provides for black workers (African) in the homelands and Border areas, and for the

other population groups in the rest of the country the Government recently appointed an inter-departmental committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Bantu Education (now late Mr Van Zyl), whose recommendations have led to the creation of special training facilities for black (African) workers in certain work categories in white metropolitan areas.”¹

For the implementation of approved recommendations of the Van Zyl committee referred to by the Minister, a committee known as the Permanent Committee for In-service Industrial Training for Bantu Employees in white areas was established. Apart from the State Department concerned, the new Committee consisted of representatives of eight large employers’ organisations and two large employees’ organisations. Outlining this in a speech in Parliament, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, Dr A. P. Treurnicht, explained that the employers’ organisation must assist in advising and establishing in-service training needs, the employees’ organisations must guard against the introduction of training projects which might cause labour unrest.²

Asked to comment on the new developments, a spokesman for the Black Allied Workers Union said that the provisions of all legislation on labour in this country were primarily meant to preserve white interests. The black workers were almost only tolerated, the spokesman said, citing that no provision for black worker representation had been made in the establishment of an organ to take care of in-service training for black workers, but rather white workers’ interests were protected by their representatives whose role was to ensure that no training concessions that could jeopardise their privileged position were allowed to Blacks.

The Government, however, went on to establish centres for in-service training of African workers in major townships around white metropolitan areas. But because of the feeling that business needed to play a major role in the training of its workers, there was a directive to the effect that the running costs of the training centres would be financed through levies on industrial and commercial employers of the workers attending the centres. The Government was believed to be drawing up the necessary legislation.³ By May 1976, four training centres were reported to be in operation, in the townships of Bloemfontein, Krugersdorp, Vereeniging and Pinetown. The Port Elizabeth centre was due to open soon, and the ones planned for Benoni, Pretoria and Potchefstroom were awaiting building tenders.⁴ It was learnt that the Bloemfontein centre had already applied for the government levy on local employers who benefitted from the worker training, and the governing councils of three other centres were considering applying for the same.

Labour observers in South Africa believed that the advance of black workers into skilled jobs was pressurised by the shortage of white workers to fill the jobs. In the past, shortage of white skilled man power was kept sufficiently in control by the admission of skilled white immigrants. In recent years labour demands have been such that in spite of job reservation, black workers have climbed higher and higher on the ladder. A 1975 Department of Labour publication, *Manpower Survey No. 11*, gave some indication of the movement of Coloured and Indian workers into skilled jobs. According to the *Survey*, in 1971 there were 33 500 Coloured artisans and apprentices and by 1975 the figure had risen to 42 800. During the same period the number of Indian artisans and apprentices rose from 6 200 to 7 300. Although there were no previous figures to compare, the 1975 survey listed 6 500 Africans as artisans and apprentices.⁵ The figures indicated that very little consideration had been given to the training of the vast African labour force for skilled work.

It appeared that the greatest threat to the Government allowing or encouraging radical changes in its job reservation policies was the possible white worker action at election time. The new Minister of Labour, Mr Fanie Botha, opening the Congress of the Confederation of Labour in Johannesburg in June 1976, said that the Government did not want confrontation with white labour. "We won't introduce legislation without prior consultation. Any developments in the future will be something we plan together", said the Minister. He added that the white workers had no reason to fear that their work security would be endangered by the movement of black workers into better jobs. He gave an assurance that job reservation would not be abolished. It's role was to prevent competition between workers of different races and to assure workers of their careers and entrepreneurs of their labour force. In his presidential address, Mr Attie Nieuwoudt, the President of the Confederation, warned the Government that white unions influenced some 500 000 voters. "If the white worker begins to lose his trust in the Government, we can't say where we will be driven."

Amongst the voices that called for the advance of black workers in the past year, was that of the Bantu Investment Corporation chairman, Dr S. P. du Toit Viljoen, who advocated the scrapping of the whole system of job reservation. Dr Viljoen said that job reservation limited the use and training of black workers and served only a political and not an economic function.⁶ He said that South Africa would need at least 3,5 million black employees by the year 2000 and that such a massive development called for fundamental changes in South Africa's educational, managerial and policy making systems to bring them in line with the realities of the society due to emerge in the next thirty years.⁷

According to projections of the Economic Development Programme, more than 200 000 Blacks would be moving into the labour market during the six years between 1975 and 1979 reflecting substantial changes in the role of black labour. This was stated by the Deputy Economic Advisor to Premier John Vorster's office, Dr Simon Brand, who said that a comparison between black/white labour ratios in the 1963-69 Economic Development Programme with those projected for 1974-79 showed a 0,74% growth per annum in the number of Blacks.⁸ The black/white labour ratios in the major sectors showed that in 1973 for every one white worker employed there were 26,54 Blacks in agriculture 10,41 in mining, 3,77 in manufacturing industry and 2,14 in services. Figures released by the Department of Statistics in Pretoria indicated that by April 1975 the total number of employees in the manufacturing, construction and electricity industries, in mining, in the Post Office and South African Railways was 2 740 442 of whom 1 751 778 were Blacks and 589 070 were Whites. Ten years previously, in April 1965, the total employed was 1 987 513. The number of Blacks was 1 504 536 and Whites 482 977. This brought the increase of black workers in ten years to 646 836 against the white worker increase of 106 093 — roughly 6:1.⁹ In reply to a question in Parliament the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development disclosed the following numbers of South African and foreign African workers registered in each category of labour:

	<i>South African</i>	<i>Foreign</i>
Agriculture	531 334	15 230
Mining and Quarrying (including labourers employed by mines affiliated to Chamber of Mines)	298 603	348 086
Manufacturing	731 695	12 409
Construction	411 240	8 727
Wholesale and Retail trade	341 679	3 668
Government Service (including SAR, Government department, semi government organisations, local authorities and provincial administration)	448 989	10 220
Domestic Servants	603 386	10 417
Miscellaneous (including private transport, storage, accommodation and catering services, financial institutions, insurance and private businesses)	317 563	5 829

These figures were given as at 30 June, 1975. In terms of these figures there was a total of 3 684 489 local African workers registered in the Republic as well as 414 586 foreign African workers. However, on 5 May 1976 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development

gave the following figures of foreign African workers in terms of their countries of origin:

Angola	623	Mozambique	150 738
Botswana	37 016	Rhodesia	8 895
Lesotho	152 188	Swaziland	16 390
Malawi	39 308	Zambia	914

These figures reveal a total of 406 072 foreign Africans employed in the Republic of South Africa. They could be employed on contracts not exceeding periods of two years.¹⁰ It could be assumed that there was a great number of other local and foreign African workers 'illegally' employed without registration because of the stringest regulations involved in the registration process. All these workers were up to now not regarded as employees in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act's definition of employee, which accommodates only white, Indian and Coloured workers. The main point against the inclusion in the definition of African has always been the Government's refusal to allow recognised trade unions for African workers. According to a news release issued on 9 February 1976 by the Department of Statistics in Pretoria, there was a total of 307 771 Coloured and 92 448 Asian workers registered in six major sectors as at November 1975. The totals were derived from the following sectors:

	<i>Coloured</i>	<i>Asian</i>
Mining and Quarrying	6 815	619
Manufacturing	223 500	83 500
Construction	51 900	3 800
Electricity	1 100	—
Transport and Communication	18 836	1 659
SAR & H and Post Office	5 620	870

The data in respect of manufacturing, construction and electricity were based on a sample survey covering private establishments in manufacturing, construction and electricity (including ESCOM). With regard to Asian employees in the electricity sector, the news release specified that the figure was too small to publish.

Building Industry

Developments in the building industry in so far as the labour situation is concerned followed the general pattern of apparent easing of job reservation, especially during the earlier part of the period under review. However, as was the case in similar instances in other industries, the relaxation of job reservation in this industry came rather cautiously and with clever safeguards against jeopardising white interests.

Probably in response to requests by leading employer groups in the building industry, in the Transvaal especially, it was announced in

October 1975 that with effect from 1 November, the building industry in that province was to give official recognition for the first time to skilled jobs being done by Africans, which were previously done by white and Coloured artisans. Discussing the move, the Secretary of the Industrial Council for the industry, Mr D. P. Ehlers, said that he had received about 300 applications from companies to have African builders classified in the operative grade. For the first time Africans would be allowed to lay bricks and blocks as long as they would be covered by plaster. Other skilled and semi-skilled jobs opened included *carpentry and joinery*: to cut and assemble rough timbers to a templet and to fix rough timbers, corrugated iron, roofing tiles to a gauge; *drain laying*: the laying of pipes to falls; *plastering*: all plastering including the preliminary finishing prior to the final trowelling; *tiling*: the cutting and fixing of tiles excluding the setting out and marking out operation.¹¹

It was revealed that the number of artisans employed in the industry in the Transvaal had steadily been dropping from 12 000 to about 9 000 in 1975 of whom less than a thousand were Coloured and the rest all Whites. The new agreement was seen as a move towards curtailing inflation by making use of cheaper African labour in skilled operation. Mr Ehlers disclosed that the minimum pay rate, stipulated in the industry, of 50c an hour—R22,00 for a 44 hour week, for African labour, was generally applied. The new operatives, as reclassified through the new agreement would be paid ±R1,00 an hour. The minimum rates for building artisans (Coloureds and Whites) was R1,92 an hour, R76-R80 for a 40 hour week; and maximum rates of R2,42 an hour—R96,80 a week.¹² Coloured artisans in the Transvaal made up only 10% of the available force, while in the Western Cape they took up 85-90% of the jobs, with Asians having 60% of the jobs in the Durban area.¹³

The newly created African operatives were supposed to act as skilled hands to the artisans in the industry. Strict control regulating the ratio of the operatives to the number of artisans would be applied, with surveys being conducted every three months to ensure that there was no unemployment of white artisans. Further guarantee for white security was the R1 million unemployment fund for Whites which would ensure full pay for 20 years.¹⁴

However, with the decline in the prospects of the building industry believed to be brought about by the political situation in Southern Africa, unemployment in the industry increased seriously at the beginning of 1976. Labour retrenchments were reported on all fronts and many small contractors were having difficulty obtaining work. A number of white artisans had to lose their jobs with the result that a corresponding number of African labourers were hit by the retrenchment. Mr Frank Mohlala, organiser for the Building and Allied

Workers' Union (formed in 1975), reported that about 100 labourers and 15 drivers had been laid off by Roberts Construction alone.¹⁵

The Public Relations Office of the Roberts Construction group disclosed that the labour force had been reduced by almost 7%. A survey conducted by the *Financial Mail* showed that the small contractors were having it real rough, while large companies could afford to take on work at a loss. Some 20% of small contractors surveyed had apparently ceased to operate, and those interviewed reported retrenchments ranging from 30-60% of their labour force. According to figures released by the Minister of Labour in Parliament on 28 April, 1976, a total of 9 036 African workers had obtained registration as building workers in terms of the Bantu Building Workers Act by the end of 1975. Of the total, 1 254 had obtained registration in the course of 1975. These figures included workers who were not trained under the Act but who had passed trade tests prescribed in terms of the Act. A further 456 were being trained during 1975. The following numbers of African workers were qualified in the following building trades on 31 December, 1975:¹⁶

Blocklaying	109	Electrical wiring	53
Bricklaying	4 251	Joinery	1
Bricklaying and Plastering	347	Painting	1 043
Carpentry	1 531	Plastering	856
Carpentry and Joinery	54	Plumbing	791

Mining Industry

The South African mining industry is the cornerstone of the South African economy with gold mining being the most important and producing more than 40% of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Its labour force is divided almost exclusively between Africans and Whites, where there are about 352 000 African and 35 000 white miners. nine thousand of the white workers are members of the ultra-right Mine Workers Union and a further 9 000 are members of other unions such as Electrical Workers, Boiler Makers, Woodworkers and Amalgamate Engineers Unions and the remaining 17,000 Whites are officials.¹⁷

Of 397 000 African workers in the mines under the Chamber of Miners there are about 177 000 South Africans and the rest foreigners from black Africa. This figure shows an increase of about 43,9% over the figure for 1975 which was 123 000; and an increase of over 100% on the 1974 figure which was 82 000. In 1930 South Africans made up 60% of the African labour force.¹⁸ By the end of 1974 this figure had dropped to about 25%; now it is up again to 44,5%. The steady increase today can be attributed to an intensified campaign to recruit

local African labour on the part of the Mine Labour Organisation as a result of the apparent insecurity in over-dependence on foreign labour. The general manager of the Mine Labour Organisation which claims to be the largest employment agency in Africa, Mr Antony Flaisher, writing in the biennial mining survey published by the Chamber of Mines, revealed plans of a high powered publicity programme. Touching on internal recruiting, Mr Flaisher said the image of mining as a peasant occupation in a strongly derogative sense had to be changed to attract local Africans to the industry.

Discussing the mine labour situation, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr M. C. Botha, said, in Pretoria, that the shortage was caused by certain countries who were holding back their labour while uncertainty existed regarding others. He added that one of the neighbouring states which had been a major source of black labour for the mines had also ended its agreement with South Africa. From those sources, the Minister said, the mines had recruited 76 000 labourers annually. Now that they were no longer available, the recruitment organisations were compelled to look for labour locally. He stated as well that the shortage made it necessary to employ black women on surface work, formally done by black men. The idea was to relieve the men from surface jobs so that they could work underground.¹⁹

The key problems facing the mining industry resulted mainly from the migratory labour system, the black/white wage gap, the employment colour bar restricting black advancement in skilled work opportunities and the denial to Africans of trade union rights for purposes of bargaining.

Migrant Labour

The migratory labour system which occurs on a large scale in the South African mining industry is a system whereby Africans are recruited to take up contracts with industrialists in far away metropolitan areas, where they work for what-ever contracted number of months (often 9-12) at the end of which they go back to the 'reserves'. Such workers may not live freely in the urban townships around the cities because of the restrictions brought about by the laws governing African influx to the cities. They are often kept in single men's quarters in compounds. Such compounds are usually built around the mines by the mining companies as well as in African townships by Bantu Affairs authorities and/or municipalities for workers employed in other sectors.

Many people inside and outside South Africa have attacked this system as responsible for family break-ups in the rural areas and many other evils that are reported to occur in urban areas. Most of these antagonists claim that any migrant worker who is a father can only be

with his wife and children for spells of time limited to a matter of weeks in any given year. This situation prevails for almost all his economically active years of life.

The South African Government has for many years encouraged the migrant labour system and sometimes justified it quite eloquently. The year book of the Department of Information issued in 1975 suggested that many of the male migrant labourers preferred that type of employment because they wished to shelter their families from the less desirable aspects of urban industrial life, while at the same time they wanted to retain close links with their own homeland.²⁰ It came as a surprise therefore, when the outgoing Deputy Minister for Bantu Administration, Mr Punt Janson, addressing the Natal Congress of the ruling Nationalist Party, told delegates that the migrant labour system was "bad at heart" and bringing with it "violent evils".²¹ Mr Jansen also revealed that his Department was conducting an inquiry into the defects of the system with the view to improving it as the Government could not possibly scrap it.²¹ The Bantu Affairs Minister, Mr M. C. Botha, disclosed in reply to a question in the House of Assembly on²² 27 January 1976, that the inquiry had been completed although the document of the findings would not be made public as it was "considered to be a confidential, departmental working document for official consumption only."²³

Early in 1976 it was reported that a group of companies in the Transvaal which employ more than 3 000 Africans had decided to phase out migratory contract labour on humanitarian grounds. The Group, Primrose Industrial Holdings, miners of clay and makers of bricks and pipes employing 2,300 Africans in the Transvaal and 850 in the Cape, announced intentions to phase out 80% of its contract workers in six years. It had alternative plans of establishing their quarters on its premises for an elite group of 10-15% of its black workers. By 1982 it planned to have only about 20% of its labour on contract: young unmarried men would remain by choice. Announcing the decision the managing director of the group Mr David Lurie said, "We do not like a system which causes separation of people from their families."²⁴

In Kimberley, De Beers Diamond Mining Company told *Black Review* that it had started effecting a similar scheme of doing away with the migrant labour system. The Company has since stopped employing new migrant labourers. However, with regard to those contract workers who were already with the Company, the Company had decided to revise its retirement system to speed up the phasing out process. Initially, the retirement age had been placed at 60 years, but with the new policy in effect, the migrant workers were allowed to work until they reached the age of 50, whereupon their positions would be filled by local men. In a bid to offer accommodation to its employees,

the same company had embarked on a house building programme at a local township—Galeshewe. The scheme, which is divided into phases, had already sparked off with 250 houses under construction. Outlining the scheme to *Black Review*, a De Beers official expressed hopes that the budgetted R2 million would cover 750 houses.

Black/White Wage Gap in the Mining Industry

Almost as a tradition now, African wages in the mines have been pretty low and by no means competitive with most other heavy industries in the country. These wages have never come anywhere near what the white miners were getting. There are several factors which have kept the gap quite wide. Amongst these could be counted, firstly, the common tendency on the part of most industries to keep the production costs as low as possible. The mining industry being both capital and labour intensive, substantial wage increases for the huge African labour force implies substantial increases in production costs. Secondly, this is also due to the presence of very conservative white trade unions for white miners who do all in their power to ensure that the gap does not narrow. This they do in various ways including preventing the relaxation of job reservation which is partly responsible for the gap.

In a revealing interview with the *Financial Mail*, the General Secretary of the White Mine Workers Union, Mr Arrie Paulus, said that black miners should always be sub-servient to white miners, the black miner only had a future as a labourer; the migratory labour system should be maintained; black miners should not be given trade unions and black miners did not need any more wage increases.²⁵ Meanwhile he suggested that the industry could afford to pay white miners up to R1,000 a month. By June 1975, the basic wage of an African underground miner was R2,20 per shift (26 shifts a month). The mining industry claimed however, that the average earnings of a black miner were R90 per month. The basic pay of a white underground miner was just over R400 a month, but the average white miner's pay was, according to the industry, R700 a month.²⁶

In interviews with De Beers Officials in Kimberley, *Black Review* learnt that the Company had set up a non-racial wage system where a person was paid according to the work he was doing. Workers generally received an average pay of R145 a month, with white-collared black officials getting the maximum ranging from R500 to R600 a month. By and large, however, the situation in the mines was not very rosy.

The current position of African mineworkers is such that there seems to be no question of a possibility of establishment of trade unions in the mines, even without government recognition, for quite some time. This has been the case throughout the period under review, despite

promising statements by such leaders of the mining industry as Anglo American's Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, and the recently retired Deputy Chairman, Mr William D. Wilson. In a major policy statement in the December 1975 issue of Anglo's *Optima* magazine, Mr Wilson discussed the question of upward and downward communication in the mines extensively: "The gold mining industry faces specially grave problems in the field of upward communication. Over the last two years serious riots have occurred during which lives have been lost, property destroyed and production affected. . . ."

"In all cases communications have at best been partially effective or at worst wholly ineffective. Established systems have simply failed to respond", said Mr Wilson. He added that there needed to be introduced a system of worker leadership training in industrial relations, and that some interim measure of worker representation should be implemented.

Apparently, the Anglo American Corporation saw the inevitability of African trade unions in the industry. Recently they introduced a briefing system for downward communication, which had been devised by the Industrial Society of the United Kingdom. This system, which was being introduced in all the Anglo mines and industrial companies, had previously been experimented on two gold mines, two coal mines, one diamond mine, two industrial operations, at the head office department of Anglo American and at the research laboratory. Talking to *Black Review*, officials of the Anglo American Corporation Public Relations Department explained that the system involved full briefing of staff at all levels by respective immediate superiors on all issues affecting the work as well as any policy matters. For over three years, the Anglo head office had been having a Black Joint Consultative Council (BJCC), composed of twelve Blacks, each elected by the work group that he represents, and four representatives of management. The chairman and secretary were black and the black representatives would caucus before Council meetings. This system was seen as a cross between a liaison and a works committee.

In the South African labour scene generally, most problems of the African workers have always arisen from the fact that they cannot have recognised trade unions. The communication of any grievances to employers, however sympathetic the employers themselves might purport to be, has always been prejudiced by the background that these workers remain legally powerless. The Government has always refused to legalise African trade unions, apparently because of fears that they would be used to advance the political aspirations of Blacks who are generally excluded from the South African political process. However, this conservative resistance to African trade unions has been given momentum by the conservative white worker trade unions which benefit

a lot from the restrictions on Africans, as well as the exploitative individual employers and employers' organisations who are about to impose any unacceptable working conditions on their African labour force with impunity.

Events indicating growing impatience on the part of the workers with their helpless position, as well as general national economic demands in recent years have, however, forced the Government to re-examine its labour policies in pursuit of any alternative short of allowing free workers organisation and representation. The Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act of 1973 offered certain avenues for the representation of African workers. The first one, which had existed in terms of the previous law, was the works committee. The works committee was a body of elected workers' representatives which could be formed in any establishment employing more than twenty African workers. A meeting convened for the purpose of electing a works committee had to be presided over by the employer or his representative.

The second one was the liaison committee which consisted of some members appointed by the employer, and others at least half of the committee, elected by the workers. Both the works and the liaison committee were only functional within the plant concerned and had no influence on the whole trade. A works committee could not be established where a liaison committee existed. The main practical difference between the two was that the liaison committee was a consultative body where employer and employee met to consider issues, while the works committee served the purpose of communicating the wishes and aspirations of the employees.

At the end of 1974 the number of liaison committees in operation was 750 (50,6%) in the Transvaal, 376 (25,4%) in Natal, 298 (20,1%) in the Cape, and 58 (3,9%) in the Orange Free State, while there were 98 (47%) works committees in the Transvaal, 45 (22%) in Natal, 61 (30%) in the Cape and 3 (1%) in the Orange Free State.²⁷ In 1973, for the first time the Government, in principle, conceded to the need for African workers to go on strike, although the 1973 legislation practically made it almost impossible for a legally justified strike or lock-out to take place, because of the protracted negotiation system demanded in times of discontentment. In fact, strikes and lock-outs for African workers were prohibited in the following instances:

- Where a wage regulating measure or order was binding and where it had been in operation for less than one year;
- During the period of currency of any agreement, award or determination made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956;
- During the period of currency of any agreement, award or determination made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956;

—Where the African workers were employed by a local authority (municipality or any other authority);

—Where the African workers were employed in essential services providing light, power, water, sanitation, passenger transportation or a fire extinguishing service, within the area of a local authority;

—Where they were employed in the supply, distribution and canning of perishable foodstuffs, or the supply and distribution of petrol and other fuels to local authorities or others engaged in providing essential services, if the Minister had extended the prohibition on strikes to such industries;

—Where the Central “Bantu” Labour Board had referred a proposed industrial council agreement which it found unsatisfactory to the Minister for a Wage Board recommendation;

—Where the Central “Bantu” Labour Board had reported an unresolved dispute to the Minister for a Wage Board recommendation.²⁸

Otherwise, in any other cases where strikes and lock-outs were not prohibited, disputes had to be referred to liaison or works committees which existed in the plant concerned. If the committee could not settle a dispute, it had to be referred to the “Bantu” Labour Officer for the area concerned. The workers had then to wait for thirty days after a report had been made to the Labour Officer, before a strike or lock-out could legally take place. However, most critics pointed out that the thirty days would be long enough for the employers to weed out ‘trouble makers’ and agitators from their firms, those who remained would be sufficiently intimidated not to follow the matter any further, but rather ‘lie low’ and swallow the grievances.

Nevertheless, these measures did very little to reduce the rate of ‘illegal’ strikes. In 1974, after a year of the enactment of this law, instances of strikes involving African workers were reported. In 1975 there were 119. It would appear that the authorities saw the need to reorganise their thinking on the question of African labour representation, because towards the end of 1975 the Department of Labour published a draft Bill which had proposals amending the 1973 legislation. The draft was generally circulated among employers organisations and white trade unions for comment.

The proposals included permitting Africans to serve in all positions of the Central “Bantu” Labour Boards, and also to serve as “Bantu” Labour Officers. This meant that they could be appointed as chairmen of Regional “Bantu” Labour Committees as well. They further allowed for works committees to be established regardless of whether or not liaison committees already existed. Works committees would be elected even if the workers employed were less than twenty, which would make it possible for smaller firms to also practise some form worker representation. A further proposal provided for the establishment of industry

committees. A group of liaison and works committees in a trade or area could apply to the Minister of Labour for the establishment of an industry committee. The Minister could, at his discretion, sanction the applications if he felt that they were sufficiently representative of the African workers in the trade or area concerned. The industry committee then would consist or elected representations from the works and liaison committees in question.

A Labour Department spokesman however revealed in June 1976, that the draft Bill had met with "a mountain of criticism and comment" from leading employers and labour bodies amongst whom it had been circulated. Employers' associations such as the Afrikaanse Henderl-sinstituit and the Federated Chamber of Industries were reported to have opposed the given form of the Bill because they believed it would further the growth of the African trade union movement.

The Confederation of Labour also saw the proposals as nothing less than a preparatory step towards trade unions. The Confederation, which stood for 195,000 workers, was opposed to African trade unions. Its secretary, Mr Wally Grobler, said that the proposals would create problems when Africans would be allowed to participate in industrial council meetings, because industrial councils were traditionally white, and there would be opposition to any measure making them otherwise.²⁹ Meanwhile, bodies in favour of African trade unions were of the view that the proposals would in fact have the effect of curbing the growth of the union movement.

Nevertheless the proposed legislation had to be redrafted to accommodate the views expressed in the various comments made, for consideration by the new Labour Minister, Fanie Botha. It was expected that the Bill would be taken to Parliament in 1977 with a number of changes.

Despite Government resistance, African workers continued to form trade unions and to demand their recognition by managements. A similar demand at Elandsfontein near Germiston in February 1976 led to a dispute with the management lasting weeks, culminating in an ugly police baton charge of the workers. Four hundred and eighty workers, making up eighty percent of the African workers at Heinemann Electric (SA) at Elandsfontein, signed a petition rejecting the company's liaison and works committees and demanding recognition of their trade union. The petition which was delivered to the managing director, Mr W. E. Wilckens, by three organisers on 20 February, had been preceded and followed by attempts by management to get the workers to accept the committee system.

The union reported that the liaison committee had become defunct early in February. The management tried to hold an election for a panel of new worker representatives. The move apparently failed

because only twenty seven workers out of six hundred and six, voted. On 19 February, foremen in the factory tried to persuade workers to vote in a new election for a liaison committee, and this time there was a hundred percent boycott. On 16 March, management tried another ballot for either a Heinemann Workers and Management Committee (some liaison committee) or a works committee.

In their petition, the workers stated:

“We, the workers of Heinemann Electric, wish to state that we are members of the Metal and Allied Worker’s Union (Transvaal) and that we reject liaison and works committees. We want the union to represent us and not a liaison or works committee.”

It was after a quiet week when on 25 March, some twenty workers were “retrenched because of the economic situation and particularly the downward trend in the building industry”, according to the managing director, Mr W. E. Wilckens. The following day the rest of the workers refused to start work, demanding that the dismissed men be reinstated. They believed that the ‘retrenched’ twenty were in fact dismissed because of their active role at meetings of the Metal Allied Workers’ Union. Mr Wilckens discharged the entire lot of them with a word that anyone of them wishing to be re-employed by Heinemann, could reapply the following Monday—“on condition they accept the company’s liaison and works committees.”

On the said Monday, workers still stuck to their demands, amid taunts from police troops who were on stand-by at the factory. The workers apparently did not believe that there had been a genuine need for retrenchment, as one worker said: “But it’s funny because new people were hired this morning.”³⁰

At about 10 a.m. a Col F. S. Botha who was in charge of the police, gave the workers thirty minutes to disperse. Before the time expired, the secretary of the Allied Metal Union addressed the crowd and asked them to go home. It is reported that workers were in the process of moving away, singing the national anthem ‘Nkosi Sikelel’i-Afrika’, when a policeman said “Hierdie kaffers is hard in die bek laat ons hulle gaan kry. (These kaffirs are cheeky—let’s get them).” Whereupon the stick wielding police troops set on the workers, and their dogs also had their fair share. People fled in all directions. “Police hit everybody and everything before them”.³¹ A woman about seven months’ pregnant was struck by a policeman wielding a stick resembling a pick handle. She lay on her stomach unconscious.

Subsequently, four of the workers were charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Their trial has been dealt with in Chapter 4.

REFERENCES

- ¹*Daily Dispatch* 5.8.75
- ²1975 *Hansard* vol.14, col.6150
- ³*Rand Daily Mail* 12.4.76
- ⁴*Financial Mail* 14.5.76
- ⁵*Financial Mail* 9.1.76
- ⁶*Star* 20.8.75
- ⁷*Ibid*
- ⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 25.10.75
- ⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 16.9.75
- ¹⁰1976 *Hansard* vol. 14, col. 961
- ¹¹*Rand Daily Mail* 3.10.75
- ¹²*Ibid*
- ¹³*Ibid*
- ¹⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 3.10.75
- ¹⁵*Financial Mail* 27.2.76
- ¹⁶1976 *Hansard* vol.13, col.910.
- ¹⁷*Sunday Times* 24.8.76
- ¹⁸*Ibid*
- ¹⁹*Daily Dispatch* 17.10.76
- ²⁰*Weekend Post* 20.9.75
- ²¹*Daily News* 26.9.75
- ²²*Ibid*
- ²³1976 *Hansard* vol.1, col.4
- ²⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 12.2.76
- ²⁵*Sunday Times* 24.8.75
- ²⁶*Ibid*
- ²⁷Saldru Working Paper No. 3—
African Labour Representation:
Dudley Horner
- ²⁸*Ibid*
- ²⁹*Ibid*
- ³⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 27.3.76
- ³¹*Rand Daily Mail* 30.3.76

12

SPORT

The year 1975-76 was marked with remarkable manoeuvres by South African sports officials to negotiate with each other with the aim of forming single bodies in control of different sports. These negotiations either ended in deadlock or with promises that could never be effected without Government approval as was the case in cricket. All these attempts were made in the wake of boycott threats by international bodies unless South Africa diverted from its policy of apartheid in sport. The stumbling block was not only those Whites who were not keen on mixing with Blacks but also the declared South African sports policy which barred integrated sport at club level and promoted a policy of multinational sport, which saw the South African racial units as 'nations'.

Most non-racial bodies were striving hard to discredit segregated bodies at international level so that South Africa could be expelled from world bodies. The effect of moves by these bodies, together with the London based South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), were seen when South Africa was excluded from a number of international bodies in 1976. In determined efforts to bar any opposition from within the country, the South African Government had refused passports to many outspoken sports officials representing the non-racial ideology. Amongst victims who suffered this measure was Raxuba, chairman of the South African Non-racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) in London, whose South African passport was withdrawn by the South African Government because of his continued fight for South Africa's sport isolation¹ in preference for inclusion of non-racial bodies. All these controversies will be illustrated when different sports are discussed below.

Soccer

During the period under review, several voices from various quarters were heard calling for integrated soccer play from club level. Although no one could predict at this stage when, if ever, a positive response to the call would come from the South African Government, it could be said that some of those calls were significant. They registered attitudes which contributed to decisions made when other governments or sports bodies declared policies on sports relations with South Africa on the one hand, and they would hopefully also contribute to decisions made when on the other hand, the South African Government reviewed its race policy in sport.

The Government, with the co-operation of the white Football Association of South Africa under Mr Dave Marais, made various offers to black leagues to either play top level internal inter-racial games under the banner of multinational sport or for black leagues to select sides to play visiting international teams as well as organising top level mixed invitation sides to play international sides. Most of these were often accepted with such smooth success that it had become common belief that the black leagues concerned were not bothered about segregated soccer. All these were seen by some critics as attempts to improve the South African image in the international soccer fraternity embodied in the International Football Association (FIFA), the 143 nation brotherhood of world football. For over ten years the white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) has been a member of FIFA but in latter years the retention of its membership has remained in precarious balance as a result of apartheid in South African soccer.

The only national soccer body which has always stood uncompromisingly against what they regarded as window dressing of apartheid, is the non-racial South African Soccer Federation under the leadership of president Norman Middleton. Recent events, however, within the South African National Football Association (SANFA), the powerful All-African soccer front, under Mr George Thabe, indicated growing impatience amongst African soccer administrators regarding the Government's race policy.

A quarrel of African clubs affiliated to the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL) and the South African National Football Association (SANFA) which is supposed to administer African amateur soccer, brought out strong feelings of opposition to the Government's multinational sports policy. The trouble started when several NPSL affiliated clubs expressed dissatisfaction with SANFA control of the NPSL. A number of grievances arose against the SANFA hand in NPSL

administration, amongst which were: the expulsion of Mr Rogers Sishi, the General Manager of NPSL, by SANFA without the consent of the NPSL clubs; sponsorship policy laid down by SANFA which made it difficult for clubs to raise financial support privately for themselves; and unreasonable disciplinary measures by SANFA against member clubs.

Explaining the sponsorship discontentment in an interview with *Black Review*, a director of the Kaizer Chiefs (one of the most powerful clubs), Mr Kaizer Motaung, said the problem arose from the fact that professional soccer was not a life-time occupation and therefore professional soccer players needed to be allowed to raise as much money as they could during their active years. "But according to the present policy, all sponsorship can only be channelled through the national body. We cannot, as individual clubs, make deals in the interest of our players," added Mr Motaung.

As has been indicated, this crisis, in which thirteen of the sixteen affiliated clubs of the NPSL stood up in revolt, came out with expressions of opposition to multi-national sports games. Spokesmen for the boycotting teams declared that their players were not to participate in the match organised between the Argentinian visiting side All Stars and a South African mixed Invitation XI not only because of their quarrel with SANFA but also because the match had been organised as a show staged to impress FIFA.

Although all the clubs later reconciled with SANFA and agreed to play the Argentinians, the desire for non-racial sport was not quenched. Talking to *Black Review* Kaizer Motaung said that he and a lot of other soccer players were opposed to the multi-national sports policy and would only be satisfied when non-racialism was introduced at club level. He said that he regarded multinationalism in sport as a modification of the apartheid policy in South Africa.

The mixed match referred to above was witnessed by a committee of three men sent by the International Football Federation to come and observe whether apartheid policies in sport were being relaxed or not. The Argentinians' game against the South Africans coincided with the fact finding FIFA delegation's presence in the country. The delegation met several soccer officials from all persuasions to discuss the effect and general developments in the South African sports policy. Amongst the key people the committee met, were senior officials of the non-racial South African Soccer Federation, under Norman Middleton, who submitted a memorandum to the committee. In the memorandum, the Federation urged the world body to expel the white FASA from international soccer because it had done nothing positive to bring about non-racial soccer in South Africa.² In a later statement a FIFA vice-president, Mr J. Goni of Chile, who was also a member of the FIFA

committee, said that they would recommend that the suspension of South Africa from the world body be maintained because they were not convinced that there was genuine progress towards non-racialism. Referring to the Argentine match with a mixed South African team, Mr Goni said, "we could not ignore the fact that the game was staged especially for our benefit and we made this known to the South African soccer authorities and the Minister (of sport in South Africa)."³ Another member of the Committee, whose name was not disclosed, said that unless some dramatic gesture was made before FIFA's congress in July, South Africa would be expelled from the world body.

The man, who was described as one of FIFA's moderates, added, "This is not my opinion, this is a fact. You people in South Africa do not realise how out of step you are with the rest of the world."⁴

Although the delegation saw the game with the Argentinians as a step in the right direction, they saw the isolated match as an insignificant instrument to help South African status in the world football. While the South African soccer scene was settling to wait for the FIFA's verdict at the July conference in Montreal, the president of the non-racial South African Soccer Federation, Mr Norman Middleton, applied for a passport to attend the July FIFA conference. Mr Middleton also stated that he wanted to visit the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand as well.⁵ The Government said that he would be given a passport if he made a written undertaking to the effect that he would not, at any stage during his absence from South Africa *with a South African passport*, commit any act designed to prevent any South African sportman or sportswoman from participating in international sport, or to cause any other harm to the Republic.

A similar governmental condition had been given to Mr Middleton when he applied for a passport for similar purposes in 1974. As he had done at the time, the SASF president once again refused to give the required undertaking. The Federation had however, already sent a memorandum presenting its case to the International Soccer Federation, through the FIFA delegation that visited South Africa in March 1976. Talking about the written undertaking that his Government demanded from Mr Middleton, the Minister of the Interior, Dr Connie Mulder, said that it was "regarded as a reasonable request with which any loyal South African citizen should be able to comply without hesitation."

Meanwhile, other attempts were made by FASA to win credibility in the international soccer arena, and subsequently retention of recognition by the International Football Association (FIFA). Mr Dave Marais, FASA President, and his secretary, Dudley Zagnoev, undertook a European tour to canvass support for FIFA congress which was to be held in Montreal, Canada. He was optimistic that South Africa would

not be expelled from this body. The least he expected was continued suspension which the three-men delegation that had visited South Africa in March 1976, had recommended.⁶

As the days for the Montreal Congress drew near, FASA began to debate the question of who would represent South Africa to plead her case. It was then decided that the all-white four man delegation consisting of FASA President, Mr D. Marais, Vice-President, Mr Syd Chaitowitz, Secretary of FASA, Mr Dudley Zagnoeov and Viv Granger would be ideal.⁷ After examining the chances of the South Africa story, of gradually moving away from discrimination, being believed, FASA decided to invite Mr George Thabe, SANFA president, to accompany its delegation to Montreal. This request was flatly refused by Mr Thabe who stated that he was not prepared to help FASA from expulsion. He said that the appointment of the all-White delegation had clearly shown that FASA wanted to go it alone without even discussing the matter at the multi-racial Top Level Committee. He feared that he would not be representing black football if he attended with FASA.⁸

George Thabe further accused some white officials of trying to wreck black football by making their own leagues multiracial. He pointed out that several black players and clubs had been approached and encouraged to break away and affiliate to white associations. The absence of any black football representative in the delegation was seen by observers as a blow in the face of South Africa soccer and as significant in that it would decrease the power of influence of South African delegates.⁹

Prior to the Montreal Congress, it was reported that African nations, through the African Football Confederation (AFC), would again seek South Africa's expulsion. The AFC president recalled that a clause had been inserted into the FIFA rules in 1974, barring countries practising racial discrimination from affiliation. Therefore in terms of this clause, South Africa did not qualify.¹⁰ Indeed South Africa was expelled from FIFA. South Africa was expelled after the Cavan report by the three delegates who had been sent to South Africa had been read. Commenting on this expulsion Mr Dave Marais said: "It is now perfectly clear this is definitely a political decision. Only a change of government or a change of policy in South Africa might enable FASA to get back into FIFA and even then I wonder if we would be accepted."¹¹ Most people blamed the Government for this move which could have been avoided. Norman Elliot, chairman of Durban city football club, confused as to what to do next, said that FIFA had not been fooled by this window dressing earlier in the year (referring to the multi-racial South African side).¹²

Rugby

The division between community segments supporting the rival policies followed by the various major bodies controlling rugby in South Africa grew wider during the period under review, with each side using what influence it had to tip the scales in its favour.

The struggle is the age old one between the pro-government rugby bodies established and maintained along racial lines, e.g. the all-African South African African Rugby Board (SAARB) and the all-Coloured South African Rugby Federation (SARF) on the one hand and the consistently non-racial South African Rugby Union (SARU) on the other. Paradoxically the officials of both the SAARB and the SARF have always claimed commitment to a sports policy that observes no race in selection of teams. These feelings were expressed by the SARF President, Mr Cuthbert Loriston, when interviewed by *Black Review* in 1975. They were echoed in a special newspaper article by Mr C. G. Mdyesha, who was vice-president of the African Rugby Board in 1975. In this article Mr Mdyesha said, "South African African Rugby Board has repeatedly said that it stands for multi-racialism in sport. It has made it clear in a memorandum that in agreeing to the match at Newlands it was in no way prejudicing its rights to merit selection, but it is prepared to try any method and approach that will ultimately lead to its goal. It is definitely not prepared to adopt the extravagant all-or-nothing approach," said Mr Mdyesha, apparently alluding to the approach adopted by SARU, the non-racial body which maintains a hard-line attitude to the question of race in rugby.¹³

A match in August between SARF and SAARB sides at a Johannesburg stadium, drew divisions between the supporters of the opposing bodies of racial as against non-racial rugby. The national leadership of the Coloured Labour Party came out in firm support of the SARU non-racial policy.¹⁴ Incidents of violence and bottle throwing threatened the security of the Federation players and officials at their hotel on the eve and morning of the big day.¹⁵ The rival SARU had organised a counter attraction event at Johannesburg's Western Oval stadium, just a stone's throw from the Protea/Leopards venue, where they fielded the Union's biggest crowd-drawers, Kwaru (from Port Elizabeth) versus Tygerberg (from Cape Town). SARU attracted 3 000 spectators as against 600 that watched the Protea/Leopards match. Commenting on the turn-out of people, the Labour Party Leader, Mr Sonny Leon, said:¹⁶ "The message is loud and clear, that people want non-racial sport." Referring to the earlier violent hotel incidents which he denounced,

Mr Leon, however, described them as "the expression of a powerless frustrated people."¹⁷

Attacking the attitude of the Labour Party in the matter, the Transvaal Rugby Football Association, the organisers of the Protea/Leopards match said: "It is surprising that the Labour Party, instead of seeing to the needs of the public as a whole, should interfere directly in sport."¹⁸ The Transvaal leader of the Labour Party, Mr Miley Richards, admitted that there were political overtones. He explained: "Because of government interference in sport, the Leopards and the Proteas are treated as separate racial teams. Our party is trying to get politics out of sport and that is why we support the non-racial unions."¹⁹

The question of how much politics influences the direction taken by sport or how much sport directs the political thinking in any given country, has always been a debatable one depending on the extent of influence on the issue by either the sporting public or the political power in control. However, as the South African Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, said, "Sport can influence people, nations, or even governments all over the world".²⁰ Likewise in those countries where certain sports activities are held in high esteem, this question arises every so often with regard to relations with South Africa. At the end of 1975 this point became an election issue in New Zealand's general election with the governing Labour Party, under Mr Wallace Rowling, opposing sporting ties with this country and the opposition National Party under Robert Muldoon pledging not to prevent development of the sporting ties New Zealand has with the Republic.

The New Zealand Rugby side—the All Blacks—has been in controversy in and outside South Africa as one of the four international rugby bodies regarded by anti-apartheid campaigners as guilty of promoting racism in Rugby by continuing to ignore the strong presence of Blacks in the sport in their dealings with South African rugby. The other three are the British Lions, the French Tricolors and the Australian Wallabies. Holders of the 'anti-apartheid' view maintain that outside the few consolation events available to sectional black sides like Leopards and Proteas on the occasions when a foreign team visits the country, there are in fact no worthwhile activities to occupy the rest of their time. This can be attributed to the growth in strength of the support the public gives to matches organised by the non-racial SARU. Supporting this view an official of the Border Rugby Union, Mr Silumko Sokupa, said in an interview with *Black Review* that

**Mr Sokupa has subsequently been banned
so it is not possible to quote him.**

Notwithstanding this, the White South African Rugby Board made plans in 1976 for the touring All Blacks to play a multi-racial South African Invitation XV during their tour. The SAARB Leopards would then meet the SARF Proteas as curtain-raisers on this occasion which was scheduled for 10 July in Cape Town. The Leopards and the Proteas were also due for individual opportunities to play against the visitors.

There was every reason to believe that the planned matches involving the black sides would go on as envisaged because the black administrators are known to see advantages in accepting matches at international level as former African Board vice-president, Mr C. Mdyesha, pointed out that such matches help to force South African authorities to construct stadiums for Blacks quickly to international specifications. Since the 1975 historic Invitation XI which met the French at Newlands in Cape Town there has since developed a tradition to have such matches with touring sides as is evidenced in the plans for the All Blacks touring side and reports of a possible 1977 French tour of South Africa. It has been reported that the French rugby Federation wants a multi-racial team to tour France at some future date.²¹ However, the non-racial SARU still insists on mixed rugby to start from club level.

Meanwhile the storm over whether or not to support the Government's race policy on sport should determine what teams may use official recreation stadiums in black townships, had not subsided since the 1975 rugby season when an official decision forced Kwaru and Sedru both Eastern Cape Province SARU units to play the rest of their South African cup matches on open fields. The highlight of this issue came in October 1975, when, while five sports stadiums in Port Elizabeth's African townships were virtually empty, more than 20,000 sports fans, both black and white, watched a SARU cup final between the Union's giants Kwaru and Tygerberg (TYRU) at a makeshift sports stadium on barren land.²² This controversy has since escalated to the Border area (East London, King William's Town complex) where there has been reports of growing defections by clubs from the Border African Rugby Board (SAARB affiliate) to SARU sub-unions. In East London's giant African township Mdantsane, which is under the administration of Ciskei Bantustan Government, a number of teams affiliated to Mdantsane Rugby Union (MDARU non-racial) have been experiencing problems with regard to sporting facilities. A senior official of the All African Border Rugby Board, Mr Joe Mtyeku, was quoted to have said that MDARU with their non-racial stand in rugby which he regarded as "political" would only play in Mdantsane over the dead body of Mr L. F. Siyo, a Senior Ciskei Cabinet Minister,

known to be strongly pre-SAARB.²³ While MDARU players feel entitled to all amenities in the township by virtue of their being residents and rent payers of the township, most of them hoped for very little, especially when Mr D. Jongilanga joined the Ciskei cabinet (Mr Jongilanga only resigned his office in Border African rugby in November 1975 when he became Ciskei Minister of Education). While the other Border African rugby officials condemned Mr Mtyeku's statement as destructive, Mr N. B. Gwili, Mdantsane sports officer in charge of all sports facilities, re-interated that MDARU's position could only be considered if they would guarantee to exclude 'Coloureds' in their matches, in line with Government policy.²⁴

Cricket

In the previous years attempts had been made by the major bodies controlling cricket in South Africa to form a multiracial organ which would have overall control of cricket in the country with the following aims:

- Gaining acceptance into the international cricket arena;
- Merit selections of players to compete against visiting teams;
- Playing cricket non-racially at club level which would allow freedom of affiliation to any club regardless of race.

The latest and the most significant attempt by the South African cricket bodies in persuance of the above goals came in January 1976, when the third summit meeting in four years, which was the most crucial for South Africa's domestic and international cricket future in that it sought to satisfy the requirements of the International Cricket Conference which is committed to recognising only one body truly representative of all South African cricketers.

This summit meeting which involved the white South African Cricket Association (SACA), the South African African Cricket Board (SAACB) and the non-racial South African Cricket Board of Control (SACBOC) resolved in principle to form a single body governing cricket, the constitution, name and composition of which would be agreed later on.

Commenting on the resolution the President of the white SACA, Mr Billy Woodin, said "mixed cricket is the ultimate we all wanted".

However, he added, "it will take time to get the end result we want, we cannot jump from where we are to Utopia overnight." The All African SAACB Mr Moses Nyangiwe saw the implications of the resolutions as the start of cricket play from grassroots level.

A nine-man committee mandated to ensure that the resolutions adopted at this meeting were implemented, was elected under the chairmanship of the SACBOC president, Mr Rachid Varachia. Other committee members Messrs Pat Naidoo, Mat Seegers (SACBOC), Moses Nyangiwe, Lennox Mlonzi, Nelson Mabunu (SAACB), Billy Woodin, Wally Hammond and Joe Pamensky (SACA).

Cricket enthusiasts, officials and anti-apartheid organisers, the world over, welcomed South Africa's move towards mixed cricket. The International Cricket Conference indicated its readiness to reconsider its ban on South Africa, should this principle be put into effect. Amongst the key people who registered their support for the move was Peter Hain of the Anti-Apartheid movement in London, who immediately declared an end to all hostilities against South African cricket but added: "I hope they do not let themselves get bowled up by the government. If their fight survives I will be in the crowd to cheer the first team from a genuinely multi-racial cricket background in South Africa." Mr Donald Carr, secretary of the Cricket Council, said "after the long years in the cold a platform at last has been built to bring the Springbok cricketers back into the international fold." But he also added, "We must wait and see how it progresses."

At home, the move was commended by a number of provincial and district cricket administrations although there was an intense feeling of concern in the majority of people who could not see cricket's way through the South African Government's policy. The Chairman of the special committee appointed to study the introduction of multi-racial cricket, Mr Rachid Varachia, expressed hopes to start negotiations on multi-racial cricket at all levels within three weeks.

Meanwhile on the eve of the historic summit meeting SACA President Bill Woodin announced that players of all races could be included in the South African Invitation teams to play the Derrick Robins XI²⁵ (an international invitation side sponsored by cricket philanthropist Derrick Robins). The matches against the tourists were both to be one day games in Cape Town (28 January) and Johannesburg (11 February) organised by the Western Province and Transvaal Unions respectively, all affiliates of SACA. In the past the non-racial SACBOC had always rejected unanimously all calls for them to participate in South African Invitation teams against touring sides including the Robins XI as token once a year indabas. However, as a result of the pledges made by officials of all races at the summit meeting to implement normal cricket

play at all levels, a new invitation was extended to SACBOC with regard to the current Robins event. SACBOC executive under the guidance of President Varachia thought acceptance would act as a sign of goodwill as well as showing the South African Government that all races wanted to play together and they duly accepted the invitation.

This act of goodwill led to heated debates when individual provincial units held their own meetings and insisted that SACBOC should not deviate from its previous stand—non-racial cricket at club level before anything else. The feeling of most players talked to was that their Board could be hijacked into accepting such invitations to confuse the international cricket community into believing that non-racialism was already fully on the cards in South African cricket. The players challenged the Whites to show their sincerity by calling off all tours to and from South Africa and instead concentrate their efforts in starting club leagues.²⁶

The disappointed SACBOC president Rachid Varachia believed that non-cricketers had influenced his players. This belief was also expressed from the white side by a springbok player who felt that SACBOC players were after one-man-one-vote and that their stand was politically motivated. The allegation that political activists outside cricket were behind the cricket players' stand had once been made in September 1975, when an agreed programme of mixed friendly matches between white and black cricketers from the Transvaal units of SACA and SACBOC collapsed. The matches which were organised as per agreement between Mr Joe Pamensky's white Transvaal Administration and Mr Varachia's non-racial Transvaal administration were seen by the SACBOC players as deliberately planned to coincide with a possible tour of this country by Australian cricketers. At the time, Mr Pamensky suggested that black politicians had pressurised the black cricketers not to go through with the agreed plans for mixed play, which allegation the players did not take kindly to.

Hopes remained high within the cricket community that the Government would not thwart their plans of playing 'normal cricket'—from club level in the near future. Expressing this point in an interview the chairman of the nine-man committee appointed to work out the scheme to implement non-racial cricket, SACBOC President Rachid Varachia, told *Black Review* that provincial units of all three national bodies—SACBOC, SAACB and SACA—were busy working out provincial and district plans for the operation, with intentions to have normal play in the 1976-77 season starting on 1 October 1976. Mr Varachia added however, that they had not yet met the Minister of Sport to discuss the plans, contrary to reports that the nine-man committee had met Dr Piet Koornhof, the Minister. He claimed that

they were just going ahead. "We shall use available grounds and facilities in all provinces, any difficulties we shall deal with when we encounter them," said Mr Varachia.

Tennis

The battle between the non-racial South African Lawn Tennis Union under Mr N. Pather supported by Black African, Asian, Latin American, and Eastern European countries on the one hand, and the white South African Lawn Tennis Union of Mr Ben Franklin backed by the whole Western block, raged through 1975 and 1976. This battle centred mainly around whether or not the white South African Lawn Tennis Union should or should not continue to represent the whole South African tennis community at the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) and the Davis Cup Nations. Such representation, which the white South African body had always enjoyed, enabled it to participate in the all important international Davis Cup Competition.

South Africa had won the Davis Cup by default in 1974 when the last nation it had to face, India, refused to play in protest against apartheid in South African tennis. The Davis Cup Management Committee then gave the cup to the South Africans. In July 1975, when the ILTF met in Barcelona, the Conference decided not to discuss the expulsion of South Africa. This followed a previous decision taken by the Davis Cup Nations Committee which voted against expelling South Africa from the 1975 competition. Apparently the committee was convinced by the case made by the South African delegation which included white SALTU president, Mr Ben Franklin, and all African South African National Lawn Tennis Union president, Reggie Ngcobo, in favour of South Africa. Addressing the Committee meeting, Mr Ngcobo said that moves to expel South Africa from the competition were politically motivated and unsporting; and that if South Africa were expelled, part of the Davis Cup objectives to promote and foster the game of tennis would be defeated in South Africa.²⁷ He said black tennis players also benefited from the hope that one day they could participate in the competition. With South Africa out of the competition he said, the number of black players in the country would shrink and tennis courts built for them would become white elephants.

Mr Ngcobo was subsequently deposed as president of the African Union because of the trip he undertook with the white tennis officials without the mandate from his executive to "pilot South Africa's case" at the Davis Cup Nations meeting in London. He was accused of telling

the London meeting that there was no apartheid in South Africa. Mr Ngcobo, who declared the meeting that ousted him unconstitutional and invalid, refused to step down nor to co-operate with the new administration.²⁸

The non-racial SALTU sent former South African black tennis champion, Mr Jasmat Dhiraj, now living in London, to address the 1975 ILTF meeting in Barcelona to make it clear that the white tennis union was not complying with the world body requirements.

Disclosing this the president of the non-racial body, Mr Pather, explained that the white Union had promised the world body that tennis in South Africa would be played on non-racial basis from club level onwards. This had not been fulfilled. All that the white body had done was to accept affiliation of Mr Ngcobo's African Union on a federal basis. Such affiliated players had been allowed to participate only in multinational tournaments. However, as had been said above, South Africa question was not debated at all at the ILTF conference.

In 1976 events took an interesting turn when the move to expel South Africa failed once more when the Davis Cup Nations Committee and the ILTF management committee held their meetings in April in Spain. The United States threatened to withdraw from the Davis Cup if Mexico was accepted in the competition for 1977. Mexico had refused to play South Africa earlier this year. The US delegation leader added, "we are also making it absolutely clear that if South Africa's entry for 1977 is refused, we will also leave the Davis Cup nations." The American threat was countered by Yugoslavian warning that Yugoslavia would also withdraw if Mexico was in any way punished for refusing to meet South Africa.

The Federation Management Committee also voted not to expel South Africa from its ranks. The matter would further arise for debate when the annual conference of the ILTF met on 1 July, 1976. Meanwhile the Management Committee condemned a motion lodged by the United Nations Committee on Racialism in Sport, and by the Soviet Union to have South Africa and Rhodesia boycotted by the tennis world. ILTF president Derek Hardwick of Britain said, "we reiterate more strongly than ever that the ILTF will not tolerate the interference of politics in sport. We regard the motions against both South Africa and Rhodesia as political."²⁹

The growing of clear divisions on East-West lines within the Davis Cup Nations might destroy the Davis Cup Competition as it has traditionally been known. The American withdrawal threat is expected to be supported by nations like Britain, France, West Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands while the Yugoslavia call might be supported by several Eastern and Third world countries. At best it could create two entirely separate competitions with effect from 1977.

Other Sports

The pattern followed by other sports organisations showed a similar trend as that depicted above. Apparently because of continued boycotts and/or isolation of South African teams abroad, there was a noticeable defection from segregated bodies in preference to non-racial bodies.

In athletics, participation by Blacks in 'white' tournaments was observed. The Comrades Marathon which had been regarded as exclusively for Whites, changed its pattern in 1976 when more Blacks officially participated in the race. A black runner, Gabashaene Raka-baele, was amongst the top ten winners. Despite all these attempts to satisfy the world demands, in a move seen by observers as a calculated effort by South African authorities to improve their image in the international scene, South Africa invited Zambia to compete in the athletics championship to be held in Johannesburg in February 1976. However, the secretary treasurer of Zambian Amateur Athletics Association, predicted that in view of Zambian policy against apartheid, the invitation would be turned down.³⁰ In a meeting between world athletics bodies held in Montreal, South Africa was expelled from the International Amateur Athletic Federation. For years, South African Athletics had been stopped from competing in international matches (as representatives of South Africa) but could only compete as individuals. This expulsion brought the above concession to an end. This expulsion came as a shock to the South African delegation to Montreal which, as Western Province Athletics Union chairman, Mr Jannie Mombery, said, "is a tragedy because we have done everything to conform to world demands".³¹ The fear expressed by athletics administrators was that athletics' participation in internal matches would weaken following this expulsion because athletes would lack motivation which had been, in the past, overseas participation and the aim to break world records.³² It was believed, from some circles, that SANROC (South African Non-racial Olympic Committee) had helped in lobbying countries towards isolating South Africa. SANROC, a London based organisation involved with campaigns for South Africa's international isolation in all fields of sport as long as South Africa still practised social segregation, had also called on all overseas countries to boycott a cycling tournament to be held in Cape Town in 1975. All those who participated would face strict disciplinary measures from the International Olympic Games. However, this issue did not crop up at the Olympic Games in 1976. SANROC was also believed to have played a key role towards the expulsion of South Africa from international football.

In the fields of karate and judo, attempts were being made to stage multi-racial tournaments. For instance, a karate championship tournament was arranged by Amateur National Karate Association for October 1975 at Curries' Fountain. Doors were opened for both white and black participants. This tournament was accorded international recognition by the world.³³ As preparations for the October tournament in Curries' Fountain, a non-racial karate, judo and jiu-jitsu body was formed in Mdantsane to meet for the demands of the world body. This organisation, called non-racial Border Martial Arts Association, would be fragmented into many clubs in the Border.

In swimming, the South African Amateur Swimming Federation (non-racial) had always been fighting for recognition by the world swimming body—FINA, instead of the White South African Amateur Swimming Union. In a bid to discredit the White SAASU in the international body and instead to present its case in the world body, the SAASF hoped to send its president, Mr Morgan Naidoo (who was living under restriction regulations of the Suppression of Communism Act since 1973) to Montreal. On applying for a passport, Mr Naidoo's application was turned down. This refusal added more water to SAASU's fight to escape expulsion. It had been speculated that SAASU would be expelled from FINA at its congress held in Montreal at the time of the Olympic Games. Both SAASU and SANROC had been barred from addressing the FINA conference, for various reasons. It had already been recommended by the FINA 14-men Bureau that South Africa be expelled. The Congress was contemplating ratification of this recommendation.³⁴

With the boycott of the Olympics by African delegates, chances of the white SAASU winning its case were better, since the presence of African countries could have lessened chances of success. Without the full support of the African delegates and with Britain and the United States usually wielding the big stick in swimming and generally known to show sympathy for white South Africa, SAASU was likely to win the battle. If the white SAASU were to be expelled from FINA, the non-racial SASF would stand a good chance of being admitted to the ranks of world swimming. A decision taken by FINA adverse to white SAASU would probably affect the position of the two South African swimming competitors who were at the Olympics at the time.³⁵

There were no remarkable events within the sphere of boxing. All that remained to be mentioned was continued victories by black South African boxers over overseas opponents. Amongst the best black boxers of the country were Mzukisi "Wonder boy" Skweyiya and Nkosana Mgxaji "Happy boy" both of Mdantsane, East London. For years boxing (whether Black or White) had been controlled by the South African Boxing Board of Control to which all South African boxing

bodies were affiliated. This body was responsible for arranging outside matches as well as the multi-national boxing tournaments between different races. There was also an all-black South African Amateur Boxing Union to which black bodies were affiliated. However, in September 1975 the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, Mr J. P. Van Onsellen, wrote a letter to the black South Africa Amateur Boxing Union, to which Indian, African and Coloured clubs were affiliated, informing them to operate separately. In that letter, Mr Van Onsellen drew the attention of the union to the Government's policy that different racial groups should have their own separate sports organisations and therefore, participate separately. He said, "As you readily agree it will only be possible to have one national controlling body for a particular sport per racial group which means that the Bantu, Coloured and Indian boxing clubs should be separate, with separate provincial associations and national unions."³⁶ This news was received with great shock by bodies affiliated to the Black SAASU who saw this decision as set-back in black boxing. Mr E. M. Lockhat, president of the Black Natal Amateur Boxing said that from a practical point of view the ruling could not apply because there were not more than ten Coloured and two Indian amateur boxers in Natal, therefore, they would not form themselves into effective separate bodies. There would be no competition which was an incentive to any sportsman irrespective of colour or creed.³⁷

In October 1975, black and white hockey officials from all over the country met in Cape Town to discuss non-racialism in hockey. However this meeting ended in deadlock resulting from the South African Hockey Union (white) failing to accept the (non-racial) South African Hockey Board's call for the total abolition of any racial hockey bodies. The union also said that it could not agree to players having the right to join any club without any form of racial discrimination. Officials of the white hockey body expressed their belief in gradual change towards the solution.³⁸ It was believed that further meetings of hockey officials would be arranged.

REFERENCES

¹*Daily News* 24.2.76

²*Intsimbi* 5.6.76

³*Daily Dispatch* 27.3.76

⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 23.3.76

⁵*Daily Dispatch* 11.5.76

⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 22.6.76

⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 8.6.76

⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 26.6.76

⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 24.6.76

¹⁰*Star* 29.6.76

¹¹*Daily Dispatch* 17.7.76

¹²*Sunday Tribune* 18.7.76

¹³*Imvo* 26.7.75

¹⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 4.8.75

¹⁵*Imvo* 9.8.75

¹⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 4.8.75

¹⁷*Ibid*

¹⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 1.8.75

¹⁹*Ibid*

²⁰*Daily Dispatch* 19.2.76

- ²¹*Rand Daily Mail* 25.2.76
²²*Intsimbi* 5.10.75
²³*Weekend World* 8.1.76
²⁴*Ibid*
²⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 11.2.76
²⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 21.2.76
²⁷*Herald* 3.7.75
²⁸*Weekend World* 8.1.76, *Daily Dispatch*
23.12.76
²⁹*Daily Dispatch and Star* 12.4.76

- ³⁰*Daily Dispatch* 1.1.76
³¹*Rand Daily Mail* 23.7.76
³²*Ibid*
³³*Natal Mercury* 9.10.75
³⁴*Graphic* 30.7.76
³⁵*Star* 5.6.76
³⁶*Daily News* 25.9.75
³⁷*Ibid*
³⁸*Sunday Times* 12.10.75

ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT

Drama and Theatre

From as early as 1974 there developed a wide escalation of real black theatre in South Africa. This theatre was introduced by black playwrights who sought to have a meaningful message to present to the black community. A number of such plays circulated all over the country during the period under review. However, theatre critics complained that there was no direction offered by theatre as to what Blacks could do to alleviate their situation, and that most plays sufficed to highlight the deplorable plight of Blacks in South Africa.

Most playwrights would argue that any plays more relevant were bound to invite adverse attention from the South African Government Censor Board, long before they had generated enough revenue to be worth the while. In other words this argument suggested that theatre would have to be heavily subsidised through some special sponsorship for it to be direct and to the point without fear of financial inevitability.

Much as sponsorship would help allay the financial fear of theatre producers, most independent thinking producers and directors fear the strings which are likely to come with financial grants. A theatre-seasoned Johannesburg man, Cornie Mabaso, put it this way, "some where along the line, the productions must take the form that will please your master".¹ Cornie Mabaso, a man with long associations with MDALI, believed that for the better development of black theatre, sponsorship would have to come on the strength of your production, rather than theatre production developing under the direction of sponsors. In a brief statement he said, "Black theatre should develop on its own not from sponsors."

As many playwrights found themselves faced with the difficult question of whether the money they wanted to raise was more important

than the preservation of genuine black theatre or not. A few opted for the pursuit of money even at the expense of genuineness of the black traditions which they purported to present in their plays. A greater number remained in the middle, offering no real solutions to black frustrations outside making attempts at dramatising day-to-day sources of such frustrations. A very limited few have produced theatre for the sake of theatre. Plays written by such people remain largely unknown outside the rehearsal halls.

Over and above the renowned playwrights in the black community, emerged a Port Elizabeth priest of the African Independent Churches, Rev. Mzwandile Maqina, with a play entitled *Give Us This Day*. The theme of Maqina's play was centred around the story of a university student who, because of his political assertions, was excluded from school and suffered many injustices because of his beliefs. This youth subsequently left his mother country for a new state where he died of a parcel bomb sent to him from an unknown person. Some observers, having seen the play, concluded that the play was dramatising the story of Onkgopotse Ramothibi Tiro. In his review of the play, Aggrey Klaaste of *Sketsh* felt that because it was a "highly volatile political story told in an almost pastoral vein, one is liable to miss the dam for the water." Despite criticism suffered by this play from black theatre critics, *Give Us This Day* toured the country and even neighbouring states like Lesotho and Botswana.

It also became the first South African play to tour as far to the north as Uganda, where it had several popular performances. The Uganda deal was clinched by the director of the play through the Uganda High Commissioner in Lesotho. *Give Us This Day* was subsequently declared objectionable by the Publications Control Board and could therefore not be staged with effect from 14 May, 1976.

The other play that crossed swords with the Publications Control Board was *Confused Mhlaba* written by a Port Elizabeth author and playwright, Khayaletu Mqhayisa. The play, banned in September 1975, was brought before the Publications Appeal Board by Mr Mqhayisa's publishers, Ravan Press, in March 1976. *Confused Mhlaba* portrayed the ups and downs which were faced by a former Robben Island prisoner in the course of his rehabilitation to society with immense theatrical potential. Khaya Mqhayisa acted in this play accompanied by talented actors like Mabel Mafuya, Sam Ntsinyi and Anne Gxasheka.

Giving evidence to the Publications Appeal Board in favour of the play the Executive Director of Ravan Press, the publishers, described *Confused Mhlaba* as "a piece of literature with dramatic merit."² However, the appeal was not successful. After his very successful plays like *Unfaithful Woman* and *Blame Yourself* Soweto playwright Sam

Mhangwani came out towards the middle of 1976 with a new play *Thembi*. Sam Mhangwani, born in Alexandra, grew up with theatrical interest in him, which contributed towards his study of theatre, production and administration in Cardiff and a three months study tour in America. Sam Mhangwani runs a drama workshop at DOCC in Orlando every Sunday morning.

During the summer of 1975-76 black theatre was hit by James Mthoba's inspirational *UHlanga*. This one man show came from the same stable as *Crossroad*, *ZZZip!* and UNosilimela Johannesburg based workshop '71 theatre company. The play, devised by actor Mthoba and director Mshengu (a pseudonym for Robert Mcharen a Wits University lecturer), was specially prepared to represent South Africa at the Festival of African Art in Lagos, Nigeria.³ *UHlanga* (Zulu word meaning the Reed) was a combination of a personal history of Mthoba's own life and Review of African history and experience, expressed in a series of varied roles and idioms which carry the audience across Africa with glimpses of Arab explorers; early African empires and modern South African Soweto. The play well merges the Africa past, present and the future and Vincent Kunene of *Sketsh* has this to say "Black theatres" as indicated by *UHlanga* is making great strides towards the development of black culture. *UHlanga* directly states to all of us that no man is without his perculiar indistructable form of culture even if there may be external forces seeking to eradicate it."⁴

The general development of genuine theatre in the black community has been hampered amongst other things by the lack of drama schools to promote and cultivate latent talent. Even at ordinary secondary day schools theatre is hardly considered as an extra mural course. One theatre organisation MDALI (Music, Drama, Arts and Literature Institute) whose aim has always been to promote self determination, self realisation and self support in black theatre and arts, expressed concern over the apparent ill discipline and non-direction in theatre. Talking to *Black Review* as spokesman for MDALI, Mr Molefe Phethoe, said that a programme of clinics and workshops at schools and community centres had to be organised to raise the necessary interest for the survival and growth of theatre in Black South Africa.

In the whole of the Republic of South Africa no theatres are built for the use of blacks, therefore ordinary halls act as theatres in most areas and this handicap reduces the element of good quality in black theatre in general.

Films

Although cinema going on the part of black South Africans has become a regular habit in many urban areas of the country, Blacks themselves

have not really entered the film industry. There are no black South African film directors or producers nor is there any form of available training in this direction. Be that as it may, over the last couple of years a number of foreign film makers, especially British, have come into the country to screen locally placed films. In the course of this there have developed practice of talent hunting in amongst Blacks mainly, for the purpose of making the films typically South African. The latest development has been that of screening South African black scripted plays like David Phethoe's *MaXhosa*, Simon Sabela's *Inkedama* or Welcome Msomi's *UMabatha*, etc. Although only a few with real good potential have emerged, there are more than 300 black entertainers in the film business.

A large number of these entertainers signed a petition protesting against the British Film Technician's Union ban on their members accepting employment on films made in South Africa, a move apparently designed to mark objection to South African Apartheid policies in entertainment.

By May 1976 the British Actors Union, Equity, was in the process of voting on a similar proposal to bar its members totally from working in South Africa. Organised by a British Film Director, Peter Colinson, the South African black film entertainers expressed that they would lose in all sorts of ways if the ban was enforced.⁵

Another threat to South African film making which put the position of black film stars in jeopardy was the apparent reluctance on the part of film companies to invest any large sums of money on new films until they had fully assessed the effects of television which has been in operation in South Africa since the beginning of 1976. Discussing the issue, one black actor, Ray ka Msengana, said that black actors had either to catch up with international movies which was difficult, or wait for local black movies which were inclined to run on ethnic lines thus offering little for the actor who intended hitting the top. "We have actually been attacked by many people who say we are propagating separate development by producing films in the Blacks' languages and we cannot have any strong argument against this," said Mr Msengana.⁶ He added, "The answer is in producing films with black background in English so that all Blacks including Coloureds and Indians can participate together and improve the potential of the industry." The other problem faced by black actors was that television had offered no opportunity for Blacks because it was not an open channel to suit the interest of the majority of South African citizens.

Music

In the music scene, while all types of music, jazz, blues, Afro-rock (Mbaqanga), pop, classic, traditional, non-instrumental vocals, etc.,

remained in vogue over the past year, jazz appears to have kept the tradition of being fairly well organised all over the countryside. This, as has always been the case in the past, contributed to the populous turnout when big festivals were called.

The jazz festival which topped the list was organized in Botswana by the South African Students Movement (SASM) during the cultural week. The objective behind the organization of this jazz festival was to promote black culture whilst instilling a sense of pride in Blacks with regard to their culture. Black artists from all over the world like, Letta Mbuli who roused ecstasy in the audience because of her authentic African music, Caiphus Semeya altoist singer and composer from America, Kent Brindley guitarist of the Crusaders, Jonas Gwangwa composer, arranger, pianist, trombonist now based in Boston, and many other artistes from overseas, featured in the programme. Amongst local groups who participated were the Beaters known for their good music, Dudu Phukwana a Port Elizabeth alto saxophonist, Dollar Brand the famous South African pianist, the Jazz Ministers from Johannesburg, a jazz group from Mdantsane led by Ndiphiwe Sihawu and various other groups from South Africa.

An art exhibition was also held during the same week, to encourage Black artists to display their paintings and sculpture. Seminars were organised before the actual musical shows were staged. At these seminars poetry was discussed revolving around the black man's way of life. Assessment was made on the role of a black artist in the black man's existential situation.

Thousands of people from all over Africa flocked to Botswana to witness black talents live. Everybody left having been saturated with authenticity depicted by Blacks on the stage. Miss Letta Mbuli gave the crowd a message that Blacks must carry on doing the right thing.

REFERENCES

¹*Sketsh Summer 1975*

²*Rand Daily Mail 11.3.76*

³*Daily Dispatch 3.1.76*

⁴*Sketsh Summer 1975*

⁵*Star 31.5.76*

⁶*Daily Dispatch 8.5.76*

NAMIBIA

Developments in Namibia over the period under review indicated clear acceptance by all concerned, the South African government included, of the inevitability of Namibian independence. The problem in Namibia arises from the confrontation politically and militarily, between the South African Government, the occupying power in the country, and the Namibian people as represented by their liberation movement, SWAPO. South Africa had been mandated by the League of Nations to administer the former German colony of Namibia. The mandate was however withdrawn by the world community over ten years ago, and the authority was given to the United Nations Council for Namibia to lead the country to ultimate independence under home majority rule.

The South African Government has continuously refused to accept the authority of the United Nations over Namibia, and has insisted that it was her responsibility to lead the Namibians to independence according to her own schedule and policies. South Africa has further refused to recognise the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) as representative of the Namibian people in spite of such recognition having been accorded by all the major international bodies including the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity. Instead, the South African Government has set up machinery to encourage the development and emergence of other political leadership along ethnic affiliation. This attitude was seen as motivated mainly by self-interest on the part of South Africa in that it was important for her to retain her political and military influence over the territory for as long as possible, so that the actual border with the hostile north is not brought dramatically to the Orange river.

A number of resolutions have been passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as the Security Council, on the Namibian

issue, intended to persuade South Africa to relinquish control of that country. Such resolutions, together with other diplomatic pressure applied by individual influential countries have only been able to secure a declaration on the part of South Africa that independence shall be granted to the people of Namibia in the next few years. Political observers sympathetic to the Namibian cause believe that this undertaking has itself come about as a result of the logistical disadvantage that followed the establishment of MPLA rule in Angola, and subsequent pressures for a settlement in Zimbabwe.

South Africa is also believed to have been under heavy pressure from major western powers to find a peaceful solution for the Namibian problem, in order to avoid the escalation of the military conflict. The main hitch remained the refusal of the South African Government to see a role for SWAPO in the quest for a peaceful solution. Despite this problem, the western powers have continued to block mandatory United Nations action intended to pressurise South Africa to respond positively to world demands on Namibia. This protection has offered South Africa valuable time to work out her own strategy to solve the issue. The South African solution was set rolling on 1 September 1975 when representatives of all the eleven ethnic groups in Namibia including the Whites came together at the beginning of a constitutional conference convened by the Whites at the Turnhalle in Windhoek.

The Turnhalle conference started off with a number of minor issues like the 'petty apartheid' at public places like hotels and cinemas. Very little business on the constitutional future of the territory was touched, except for the establishment of a commission of 35 delegates under the chairmanship of white leader, Dirk Mudge, (tipped to lead a South African inspired transitional government). The Government declared that the conference would not accommodate political party representations, but that only representatives of various ethnic and racial groups would be accepted. SWAPO, the only political movement believed to have huge support across tribal barriers, would only be welcome if they saw themselves as part of the Owambo delegation. This suggestion arose from the customary South African claim that SWAPO is an Owambo organisation with no political support amongst the rest of the Namibian people. The composition of the conference came under fire from the world community, mainly because of its exclusion of SWAPO, as well as its generally tribal nature. However, spokesmen for both the internal and external wings of SWAPO rejected any participation in the Turnhalle talks or any other talks, without certain conditions being met, as an indication of South African good intentions. SWAPO publicity Secretary in Windhoek, Mr Kaova Dan Tjongarero, dismissed the Turnhalle conference as "a circus" which had no meaning for the people of Namibia.

The constitution committee which had the task of working out recommendations to the full conference for an acceptable constitution for the administration of the territory was faced with a few proposals mainly from the white South West African administration, the Herero delegation and the Damara delegation. The Whites wanted a loose race confederation of ethnic territories that would be in control of internal practical matters. The central government would take charge of foreign affairs and defence. The Herero delegation, under Chief Clemens Kapuno, with the American constitutional expert, Mr Stuart Schwartz as his adviser, proposed a Westminster-type constitution. The proposal was based on one man one vote providing for a two-chamber legislature. The Herero proposals met with favourable response amongst a good number of the delegations. The Damara delegation proposed that Namibia be divided into two territories, North and South, each with an autonomous legislature. This proposal was rejected on the grounds that it would divide the people of Namibia. The Damaras further proposed that the United Nations be requested to attend the talks as observers.

Meanwhile the international community and other concerned people continued to press South Africa for a solution involving SWAPO. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in January 1976 calling on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and submit to United Nations supervised and controlled elections in the territory. The resolution condemned South Africa's military build up in Namibia and "any utilisation of the territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries". It demanded that South Africa stop applying apartheid and the bantustan policy in Namibia; and that South Africa should make a solemn declaration of intent to withdraw and recognise Namibian territorial integrity.

The Security Council gave South Africa up to 31 August 1976 to comply with its demands, whereupon it would review the matter and consider what other appropriate measures to be taken under the United Nations Charter in the event of South African failure to comply.

This resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations came after the International Conference on Human Rights and Namibia, which was sponsored by the International Institute of Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, in Dakar, Senegal, from 5 January. The aims of the conference were to throw light on the human rights situation in Namibia and on the struggle for human rights in the country, to lay the foundations for the liberation of Namibia in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The underlying objective was to formulate means whereby the United Nations could re-assert its authority in Namibia and end South Africa's occupation.

The constitution committee which had the task of working out recommendations to the full conference for an acceptable constitution for the administration of the territory was faced with a few proposals mainly from the white South West African administration, the Herero delegation and the Damara delegation. The Whites wanted a loose race confederation of ethnic territories that would be in control of internal practical matters. The central government would take charge of foreign affairs and defence. The Herero delegation, under Chief Clemens Kapuno, with the American constitutional expert, Mr Stuart Schwartz as his adviser, proposed a Westminster-type constitution. The proposal was based on one man one vote providing for a two-chamber legislature. The Herero proposals met with favourable response amongst a good number of the delegations. The Damara delegation proposed that Namibia be divided into two territories, North and South, each with an autonomous legislature. This proposal was rejected on the grounds that it would divide the people of Namibia. The Damaras further proposed that the United Nations be requested to attend the talks as observers.

Meanwhile the international community and other concerned people continued to press South Africa for a solution involving SWAPO. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in January 1976 calling on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and submit to United Nations supervised and controlled elections in the territory. The resolution condemned South Africa's military build up in Namibia and "any utilisation of the territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries". It demanded that South Africa stop applying apartheid and the bantustan policy in Namibia; and that South Africa should make a solemn declaration of intent to withdraw and recognise Namibian territorial integrity.

The Security Council gave South Africa up to 31 August 1976 to comply with its demands, whereupon it would review the matter and consider what other appropriate measures to be taken under the United Nations Charter in the event of South African failure to comply.

This resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations came after the International Conference on Human Rights and Namibia, which was sponsored by the International Institute of Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, in Dakar, Senegal, from 5 January. The aims of the conference were to throw light on the human rights situation in Namibia and on the struggle for human rights in the country, to lay the foundations for the liberation of Namibia in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The underlying objective was to formulate means whereby the United Nations could re-assert its authority in Namibia and end South Africa's occupation.

The conference recognised SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of the people of Namibia and warned that if the international community did not use the means available to it to terminate South Africa's presence in Namibia, all means, including armed struggle, would be justified. It recommended that the Security Council should accept that the continued occupation of Namibia and its use as a military base constituted a threat to international peace. It recommended, therefore, that the Security Council should implement a complete embargo on the sale of arms, including the provision of radar and telecommunications systems for South African military purposes. The conference also called on all member states of the United Nations to enforce Decree No. 1 of the Council for Namibia concerning the protection of the natural resources of Namibia, and provide the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Sean Macbride, with facilities to implement the decree. The decree declares illegal all natural resources mined, processed and exported from Namibia without the prior authorisation of the United Nations Council for Namibia. It also provides for the seizure of any ship, or any other type of vehicle found to be carrying cargoes of Namibian goods.

The conference was addressed by Senegal President, Leopold Senghor, and Zambian Foreign Minister, Rupiah Banda, who represented President Kaunda, as co-patron with President Senghor. SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, who was heading the SWAPO delegation gave a major address which was used extensively as a basis for discussion. President Nujoma pointed out that the question of human rights in Namibia could not be discussed in a vacuum, but that it was part and parcel of the struggle for the liberation of the Namibians because the lack of such rights was a direct consequence of South Africa's administration and policies in the territory. He said that SWAPO would be prepared to enter into meaningful negotiations with Pretoria, but demanded that the South African Government should accept the following "fundamental principles" before any talks:

—the right of the Namibian people to national sovereignty and independence;

—the inviolability of Namibia's territorial integrity;

—and that SWAPO is the only authentic representative of the Namibian people.

These fundamental principles were accompanied by the following set of pre-conditions:

—the release of all political prisoners held both in Namibia and South Africa;

—the return of all those Namibians in exile without fear of any arrest or any form of victimisation;

—prior commitment by the South African government that it will

In the meantime, a Stellenbosch University lecturer, Dr Gerhard Totemeyer, who had been urging that SWAPO be included in the South West African talks got expelled from the National Party.³ Dr Totemeyer, who is regarded as an acknowledged expert on Namibia, claimed that SWAPO's influence in the country was far greater than people had been led to believe. He said, "After widespread investigations, as well as discussions over the years with responsible white and black inhabitants of South West Africa, I do not have the slightest doubt that SWAPO has the largest support of all the black political parties, more than any of the other 20 Black political parties in the area.

"SWAPO has supporters over the whole of South West Africa and in practically every black ethnic group," said Dr Totemeyer, who had recently completed a doctorate on Namibia.⁴

A senior member of the United Party in Namibia, Mr John Kirkpatrick, joined the chorus that called for SWAPO consultation. Speaking at Luderitz Mr Kirkpatrick said that it was essential that political bodies such as SWAPO which were recognised by the United Nations and by many individual world powers, be invited to participate in the constitutional future of Namibia and that every effort should be made to secure the co-operation of SWAPO and other organisations.⁵ He said that ethnic representations in a Namibian interim government would not be contrary only to world opinion, but also to realities.

The head of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa, the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Reverend Bill Burnett, and the full synod of the bishops of the Church of the Province of South Africa also called on the Government to open negotiations with SWAPO and other South West African organisations in an attempt to avoid violence in the country. A resolution passed by the synod meeting in Lesotho and issued by the Archbishop read: "The bishops deplore the injustices perpetrated by the present authorities in Namibia, and express their deep sympathy with the victims. They urge the South African Government to open dialogue with the leaders of SWAPO and other Namibian bodies representative of viewpoints opposed to those of the present regime, before all the peoples of that territory are overwhelmed by the misery and suffering of war."⁶

The bishops' resolution also dealt with the continued recognition of Bishop Colin Winter and the suffragan Bishop Richard Wood as the church's leaders in Namibia. The two bishops had been expelled from the country by the South African authorities administering Namibia.

Interviewed on their way to the bishops' synod meeting in Lesotho, the former South African Defence Force chaplain, Suffragan Bishop Richard Wood said: "Inevitably when there is a change of power, SWAPO will be the dominant political party because it carries inter-

In the meantime, a Stellenbosch University lecturer, Dr Gerhard Totemeyer, who had been urging that SWAPO be included in the South West African talks got expelled from the National Party.³ Dr Totemeyer, who is regarded as an acknowledged expert on Namibia, claimed that SWAPO's influence in the country was far greater than people had been led to believe. He said, "After widespread investigations, as well as discussions over the years with responsible white and black inhabitants of South West Africa, I do not have the slightest doubt that SWAPO has the largest support of all the black political parties, more than any of the other 20 Black political parties in the area.

"SWAPO has supporters over the whole of South West Africa and in practically every black ethnic group," said Dr Totemeyer, who had recently completed a doctorate on Namibia.⁴

A senior member of the United Party in Namibia, Mr John Kirkpatrick, joined the chorus that called for SWAPO consultation. Speaking at Luderitz Mr Kirkpatrick said that it was essential that political bodies such as SWAPO which were recognised by the United Nations and by many individual world powers, be invited to participate in the constitutional future of Namibia and that every effort should be made to secure the co-operation of SWAPO and other organisations.⁵ He said that ethnic representations in a Namibian interim government would not be contrary only to world opinion, but also to realities.

The head of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa, the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Reverend Bill Burnett, and the full synod of the bishops of the Church of the Province of South Africa also called on the Government to open negotiations with SWAPO and other South West African organisations in an attempt to avoid violence in the country. A resolution passed by the synod meeting in Lesotho and issued by the Archbishop read: "The bishops deplore the injustices perpetrated by the present authorities in Namibia, and express their deep sympathy with the victims. They urge the South African Government to open dialogue with the leaders of SWAPO and other Namibian bodies representative of viewpoints opposed to those of the present regime, before all the peoples of that territory are overwhelmed by the misery and suffering of war."⁶

The bishops' resolution also dealt with the continued recognition of Bishop Colin Winter and the suffragan Bishop Richard Wood as the church's leaders in Namibia. The two bishops had been expelled from the country by the South African authorities administering Namibia.

Interviewed on their way to the bishops' synod meeting in Lesotho, the former South African Defence Force chaplain, Suffragan Bishop Richard Wood said: "Inevitably when there is a change of power, SWAPO will be the dominant political party because it carries inter-

would be best equipped to effect decisions taken at the conference from time to time. The six-point plan of the black caucus was submitted to the chairman's committee so that it could be put before the plenary session of the conference. There were expectations that the plan would raise clashes at the conference as it would drastically reduce the influence of the traditional South West Africa administration in implementing independence and hit against the interests of the right wing delegates like National Party's, Messrs Du Plessis and Eben van Zyl.

The general assembly of the conference was however adjourned until June, without the matter being discussed much. *Black Review* sources in Windhoek had difficulty in extracting the feeling of the conference on the black proposals. This was mainly due to measures taken to stop delegates from revealing anything about the deliberations at the conference. It was reported that all constitution committee members had been made to sign a document under oath, pledging secrecy. South African Police officials were charged with the responsibility of ensuring that delegates did not talk. Some revealed to *Black Review* sources that tough talking policemen had spoken to them about leaks.

The Coloured Council, whose delegation at the Turnhalle is led by its chairman Mr A. J. Kloppers, voted unanimously to include SWAPO in the talks. Mr Kloppers indicated that his Council would find it "unnecessary to continue with the talks if SWAPO continued to be excluded."

In a special statement in Parliament in Cape Town, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, indicated that he would not stand in the way if the conference at the Turnhalle decided to invite SWAPO to participate.¹⁰ Subsequently, the Chairman of the constitutional committee of the conference, Mr Dirk Mudge, said in Windhoek, that the possibility could not be excluded that the constitutional conference would in the future have talks with SWAPO. He added that in such negotiations, SWAPO would be treated as a political opposition and as an organisation with a different ideology from that of the constitutional conference.¹¹

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma announced the willingness of his movement to talk to Pretoria as the *defacto* colonial power in Namibia. During his discussions with United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, Mr Nujoma said that he would be prepared to have talks "perhaps in Geneva," with his delegation comprising all key people in Namibia, including church leaders, and that South Africa could include in its delegation, the Turnhalle conference representatives. Meanwhile other pressures were being exerted by major Western countries, like United States of America, for South Africa to make sure that at least an independence date for Namibia was set by 31 August, which could then be pointed out by the veto-carrying Western powers as an in-

dication that the independence ball was already in motion.

An announcement was ultimately made that the constitution committee of the Turnhalle conference had recommended 31 December 1978 as a date for the independence of Namibia, and that an interim government be established as soon as a constitutional basis for it had been worked out.¹² These proposals were expected to be endorsed by the plenary session of the conference when it met. This decision was taken after hard bargaining by all sides, with some black delegations threatening to defect to SWAPO if no progress was shown towards establishment of an interim government.

It was reported as most likely that the future form of government accepted by the conference would consist of a multi-tier administration, providing for self-governing population units or geographical areas with an umbrella government with clearly defined powers.¹³ Executive powers would be vested in a Council of Ministers.

The South West African National Union (SWANU) rejected the idea of an interim government. The chairman of its central committee, Mr Gerson Veii, said, "We are totally opposed to the Turnhalle and don't see how an interim government can work. It would have to be enforced by the South African army, and that would be a case of foreign troops on Namibian soil."¹⁴

However, in March 1976, the Turnhalle conference had passed a resolution requesting the South African government to maintain law and order in Namibia. The unanimously adopted resolution read: "The constitutional conference resolves that the protection given by the South African Government, especially on our northern border, be noted with appreciation. That the South African Government be requested to proceed in the meantime with the protection of the northern border and to maintain law and order thus to afford the leaders the opportunity to decide over the future of South West Africa in a peaceful atmosphere."¹⁵

An earlier amendment from the white delegation that Pretoria be requested to maintain a sound administration and economic development was defeated. SWAPO warned that it would continue its armed offensive against an independent Namibia if the South African Government handed power to a Turnhalle inspired government. Mr Lucas Pohamba, Dar-es-salaam SWAPO representative, said: "If South Africa goes ahead with its plan to give so called independence to its puppets, then all of us will go into the bush and fight both the Boers and their puppets, like our comrades in Vietman did."¹⁶

Objections to Development of Bantustans

While the Turnhalle conference was busy with constitutional proposals for a future Namibia, the South African administration in Namibia was continuing with its programme of giving semi-autonomous

status to the various ethnic groups in Namibia. Three delegates representing the "Coloured" group at the talks made a statement attacking this continued practice as blatant interference by the South African Government in the affairs of the South West Africa constitutional conference.

The three delegates, Mr C. A. Hartung, Mr A. Krohne and Mr R. Hercules, said that the installation of the Nama Council and granting of more powers to the Caprivians, the Basters and the Bushmen was contrary to the promise by Premier John Vorster of not interfering with the constitutional proceedings.¹⁷ The feeling was that Pretoria assumed that the conference would endorse an ethnically federal or confederal administration, rather than formulate a unitary central government.

Efforts to Promote the Turnhalle Conference Internationally

In October 1975 the South African Government organised for a 34 member multiracial group of Turnhalle delegates to visit the United Nations and major Western capitals in a bid to win recognition for the constitutional conference.

The United Nations Secretary General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, would not see them because he did not recognise the Turnhalle constitutional conference members as representatives of the Namibian people.¹⁸ A similar response was indicated by the office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Mr Sean Macbride. Although the schedule of the delegates was kept a guarded secret, it emerged that they did not meet with much success in arranging formal meetings with foreign diplomats. Only the British were openly prepared to meet them. A Mr Rahii Kahimise, a Windhoek Namibian, wrote a letter to the United Nations appealing to Dr Kurt Waldheim not to recognise the Turnhalle delegates who were visiting New York as representatives of the people of Namibia. The letter was subsequently confiscated by the police after receiving a report from a woman postal clerk.¹⁹ Mr Kahimise was himself detained and questioned for about twenty minutes by police at Windhoek's J. G. Strydom Airport.

In an address to the United Nations Council for Namibia, the exiled chairman of the internal wing of SWAPO, Mr David Merero, charged that the Turnhalle delegates visiting New York were "political opportunists" and enemies of the Namibian people. He said that SWAPO, because of its history, performance and origin, was the "only authentic representative of the Namibian people at home and abroad."²⁰ The Turnhalle conference, he added, "could not survive a day in Namibia without massive South African Police and military support."

In the middle of 1976, a multiracial organisation with the aim of supporting the Turnhalle talks was formed in Windhoek. It was called

Pro South West Africa. An interim steering committee of eleven people was elected, including five Blacks, to draw up a constitution.

The Death of Chief Philemon Elifas and the Aftermath

On the night of Saturday, 16 August 1975, the Chief Minister of Owambo, Chief Philemon Elifas was shot dead at short range while keeping a drink date with a friend, Mr Thomas Philippus. After the Chief had had a drink in the company of his brother, a cousin and Mr Philippus, at the latter's liquor store, he walked from the store to a lounge also belonging to Mr Philippus. Shots were fired and two bullets hit him. Several more shots were fired through the window of the liquor store, and one bullet hit the chief's cousin. The police, who were urgently summoned by Mr Philippus, rushed Chief Elifas to the hospital at Oshakati about 35 km away, but he died before he reached hospital. The following Saturday, 23 August 1975, the Chief was buried in his tribal cemetery at Olukonda, amid strict security precautions. Following the death of Chief Elifas, the Minister of Police, Mr J. T. Kruger, announced that police reinforcements were sent to Namibia to help control any possible disturbances after the death. Almost instinctively the chief opponents of the bantustan system in Namibia, SWAPO and the Namibia National Convention (NNC) came under official suspicion for the death of the chief. The SWAPO administrative secretary in London, Mr Moses Garoeb, expressed fears that the South African Police would use the Elifas death as an excuse to launch massive reprisals against the movement. "There will be heavier repression than ever," he said. Referring to the killing, Mr Garoeb said that he saw it as a just end of a traitor "who had collaborated with the South African regime."²¹ He added that the killing should be a warning to any other black who felt inclined to collaborate with the South African Government. The bishop-in-exile of Damara-land (Namibia), Bishop Colin Winter, said that South Africa was responsible for creating the situation in Namibia which could produce a man like Chief Elifas who was a symbol of oppression and who sanctioned public floggings of people. The Bishop added that "Chief Elifas was the same as the quisling of Europe—one of the pathetic band of people prepared to barter the freedom of their people for power and money."²²

There were wide-spread rumours in Namibia that Chief Elifas was the first of a number of tribal leaders who would be killed. The rumours had it that targets would be the leaders who had agreed to participate in the constitutional conference at the Turnhalle. As a result of these rumours, all tribal leaders who were to take part at the conference were supplied with body-guards to watch them day and night. Herero supporters of Chief Clemens Kapuuo, who was to lead his tribal

delegation at the talks, formed vigilante squads which rounded up top officials of SWAPO and broke into their homes at odd hours. The stick-wielding vigilantes generally abducted SWAPO leaders and handed them over to the police.²³ The Divisional Commissioner of Police in Windhoek, General Louw, confirmed that there had been "some arrests" by Herero squads.²⁴

These squads raided the home of Mr David Meroro, SWAPO's national chairman, at 3 a.m. They broke a window and opened the door. Mr Meroro fled into an adjoining room which had a steel door and barred windows and locked himself in. He subsequently disappeared and was later reported to be abroad. The vigilantes further called on Mr Othniel Kaakunga, organising secretary of SWAPO, Mr Axel Johannes, SWAPO secretary in Windhoek, Mr Aaron Muchimba, SWAPO Youth League organiser, Mr Munjaro, SWAPO foreign affairs secretary, Mr Zondagh Kanguuechi, SWANU vice-president. All these men are believed to have been handed to the police by the vigilantes.²⁵

The SWANU leader, Mr Kanguuechi, was apparently missed by the squads because he was not at home. He later reported that the tribal "terrorists" had set fire to his house.²⁶ "I arrived there to find it gutted and during the night I had to be protected by SWANU supporters armed with spears and bows and arrows," he said.²⁷

However, Chief Clemens Kapuuo denied that the Herero vigilantes had abducted the SWAPO leaders from their homes, but claimed that they were arrested near his home under suspicious circumstances.²⁸ Guard squads were watching Chief Kapuuo's business and home in the township. Other SWAPO leaders held were Mr Sam Shivute, regional secretary in the northern territories, Mr Reuben Hauwanga, secretary for publicity and information in the north,²⁹ Mr Alpheu Naruseb, Mr Lazarus Guiteb, secretary of the Otjiwarongo branch, Rev. Festus Naholo, Walvis Bay branch secretary, Mr Albert Kangehii, chairman of the NNC and Pastor L. Kameeta, principal of the Paulinema Theological College at Otjimbingwe.³⁰

In another incident, a group of Namibians marched through the streets of Katutura township in Windhoek, carrying sticks, hammers, knives and iron bars and singing freedom songs. Subsequent to this, one Mr Silvanus Haimbili was brought to court and charged with possession of a dangerous weapon and intent to intimidate, assaulting, injuring or doing any other harm to Chief Kapuuo. Mr Haimbili was sentenced to five months imprisonment. In Windhoek, northern migrant workers celebrated Chief Elifas' death and consequently two men appeared in court on charges of disturbing the peace.

Following all these arrests the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, Mr J. T. Kruger, speaking at the National Party Congress in Wind-

hoek suggested that SWAPO had a part in the death conspiracy against Chief Elifas. He said, "There are clear signs that it was members of SWAPO who were part of the conspiracy to kill Chief Elifas."³¹

From Lusaka, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma suggested that Chief Elifas could have been killed by one of his own people "because of his tyranny." The Namibian leader said that many people disliked the chief for his behaviour and flogging of women in public, even his wife could have killed him.³²

Early in December 1975 Mr Janie De Wet, commissioner-general for South West Africa, announced at Oshakati that an attempt had been made to kill Owambo Minister of Justice, Mr T. Imbili. The Minister apparently escaped death because he was warned by two women and because the manager of his shop did not identify him to two gunmen while he was still within shooting range.³³ The gunmen were alleged to have been carrying automatic weapons which police claim were Russian AK 47's.³⁴

The Trial

On 1 December 1975 six Namibians—three men and three women (one 18 years old)—appeared in the Windhoek Supreme Court for summary trial for terrorism and conspiracy. The charges were related to the killing of Owambo Chief Philemon Elifas. The accused, all said to be members or supporters of SWAPO, were: Mr Aaron Mushimba, Mr Andreas Nangolo, Mr Hendrik Shikongo, Miss Rauna Nambinga, Miss Nami Mombowa and Miss Anna Gihondjwa.³⁵ The six were accused of providing material assistance to people intent on overthrowing the administration of South West Africa between 1 April and 6 May, 1975. Mr Shikongo was alleged to have provided a Land-Rover van to men knowing that they intended to abduct or kill Chief Elifas.

On this day of appearance, the court surroundings were thronged with crowds bearing placards reading "*SWAPO will win*", "*We are suffering for a free united Namibia*", "*Illegal regime has no right to try the just cause*"; and singing songs which paid tribute to SWAPO leaders in exile or in prison.³⁶ The date for the trial was set for 16 February 1976, at Swakopmund. Mr Justice J. Strydom was presiding and the Attorney-General for South West Africa, Mr J. E. Noethling, S.C., led the State case. Defence counsel was Dr W.E. Cooper, S.C.

In a Christmas message, SWAPO secretary, Mr Othniel Kaakunga, who had been released with several other SWAPO leaders from the post-Elifas-killing detention, called on the people of Namibia not to celebrate Christmas, but to "express their sorrow that day", and to mourn "their children who had laid down their lives for Namibia, their imprisoned brothers and sisters, the sons and daughters of

Namibia who are imprisoned in South West Africa and South Africa, and members of SWAPO who are awaiting trial.”³⁷

When the trial resumed at Swakopmund some of the evidence given by State witnesses alleged that on the day of Chief Elifas’ death Mr Shikongo (one of the accused) had told a friend that he had himself taken a Mr Nicodemus Mahe and two other SWAPO members from the shop of a woman called Queen to the bottle store where Chief Elifas was. It was further alleged by another State witness that the three accused women had taken part in fund-raising campaigns at Engela Hospital in northern Namibia, to liberate Namibia; and that the three women, as well as the State witness, had separately visited guerilla bases in Angola. Evidence against Mr Mushimba was that he had allegedly bought a Land-Rover for guerillas and had handed over a radio, blankets and R380 to people bent on violent overthrow of the South West Africa administration. On 28 April 1976, the court found Mr Andreas Nangolo not guilty and discharged him. Similarly Miss Ansia Gihondjwa was also discharged. The defence counsel, Dr Cooper, had earlier pointed to certain evidence that the political problems and upheavals in Namibia were not the work of SWAPO, but of the conditions of living prevailing in the country. Counsel made a State witness, who was regarded as an expert on SWAPO, to read a memorandum which had been published by a number of churches in Namibia. The expert witness, former security policeman Mr Petrus Albertus Ferreira, read the memorandum which gave the following reasons why people were fleeing the country from northern Namibia:³⁸

“The enforced carrying of identity cards bearing their finger prints, which made people feel like criminals; a constitution forced on the people under which they could be flogged and tortured with electric current; claims that racial or ethnic segregation had only been strictly applied against Blacks; and the oppressive powers of the police which had caused fear and hatred towards the police in South Africa instead of respect for them as a helper of the people.”

A stir was caused in the defence ranks by the dissolution of the partnership of the instructing attorneys where one partner, Mr J. A. Smit, was asked to resign, following leaks of confidential information about SWAPO to the security police. Defending his conduct, Mr Smit said, “information I may have given to the police did not concern any particular court case. It was information any good citizen of South West Africa would have conveyed to the authorities.”³⁹

On 12 May 1976 at the end of the trial, Mr Hendrick Shikongo and Mr Aaron Mushimba were convicted and sentenced to death and the two ladies, Mrs Rauna Nambinga and Miss Anna Ngaihondjwa, were sentenced to seven and five years imprisonment, respectively. The

judgement, especially the issue of the death sentence, caused a major international stir. At an emergency meeting of the UN Council for Namibia in May, the Secretary-General was urged to intercede directly with the South African Government on behalf of the two men sentenced to death.⁴⁰ Both the Security Council and the General Assembly were requested to take up the matter and member governments of the UN were called on to put pressure on the South African Government.⁴¹

The main point raised by the international community was that, whether the accused were found guilty or not was immaterial, and that the court that tried their case was not competent to do so. This feeling arose out of the long declared stand that South Africa and its administrative and judicial structure in Namibia was illegal. The two men were the first in the history of Namibia to be sentenced to death for politically motivated offences. Leave of appeal was refused by the Windhoek Supreme Court and the Bloemfontein Appellate Division subsequently granted the convicted leave to appeal against the judgement.

SWAPO

The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) went through a difficult year inside Namibia as tensions grew as a result of the escalation of the border war involving the guerillas and the South African Defence Force. There were many more reported incidents of guerilla activity inside the country. This development brought the position of the internal wing of SWAPO into focus, with certain people feeling that the organisation should be declared unlawful.

The National Party MP for Middelland, Dr Paul van de Merwe, called on the Government to seriously consider banning the internal wing of SWAPO if it wished to stop the rot setting in Namibia. He said it was becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between members of the internal wing and other elements crossing the Kunene river into the country⁴². "If this is not done", he said, "we will have to do with attacks not knowing from where they come".

Dr van der Merwe added that various other political organisations like SWANU and NNC had not been banned because they did not see a communist under every bush. However, he said, SWAPO had been conceived in sin by Whites in Cape Town in 1957. They made Sam Nujoma president of the organisation to try to hide that Whites were involved. He charged that it was no secret that Mr Nujoma himself was a self-confessed communist.⁴³

A similar appeal had been made by the Owambo government which sought powers to ban SWAPO in the north of Namibia. The Minister of Justice, Mr J. T. Kruger, who was empowered to declare organisations unlawful said that no steps would be taken against SWAPO as a political organisation, nor were any steps contemplated. Mr Kruger

added that SWAPO had the same freedom of propaganda publication and action as other political movements in South West Africa.⁴⁴

The Government however, had already acted against certain stickers, and badges put out by SWAPO for political propaganda. It was reported that the Government had given notice in an official gazette that it intended to eradicate that kind of political warfare in Namibia.⁴⁵ The Minister of Economic Affairs who issued a warning explained that he intended to use the provision of the Merchandise Marks Act to prohibit the use of certain marks, words and letters in connection with any trade, business, profession or occupation. He said he would ban a marker, sometimes described as a sticker which was a black circle on a white background with a burning torch in the hand of a black person and the words, "FREE NAMIBIA", in prominent black letters in the circle.⁴⁶

He would also ban a sticker or marker which was a black circle on a white background with a map of Namibia in the centre. Above the map were the words "WORK IN SOLIDARITY FOR SWAPO", and below the map the words "JUSTICE AND FREEDOM". Also on the banned list was a black circle on a white background with a map of Namibia in the centre with the words "FREE NAMIBIA" inside the map, and the words "UNITED WE STAND—DIVIDED WE FALL" above the map, and the words "BLACK IS POWER" below the map. These stickers were occurring frequently in public places and political rallies in Namibia.

SWAPO Congress at Walvis Bay

At the end of May 1976, SWAPO held a national congress at Walvis Bay, a venue which was seen by observers as significant in the light of South African claims on the economically important enclave. The conference was described by one of the organisers, vice-secretary, Mr Othniel Kaakunga, as "being called in the darkest and most arduous hour of the people's struggle".

Although the Congress was held behind closed doors, occasional press briefings were made. From these the following reports emerged:

- the Congress pledged to concentrate on action against and not merely talk about oppression;
- the action was to be of a peaceful nature;
- the Congress further challenged the South African Government to hold national elections in Namibia "to test our support".⁴⁷ The elections would have to be held under international supervision. In a statement on behalf of the National Executive, Mr Jason Angula said, "We say to the white man, 'stop here, go no further.' We will fight his evils from all sides." With regard to Whites applying for

membership, SWAPO will allow them to join the organisation, although their applications will have to be sifted very carefully to avoid admitting members of the security police or South African Bureau for State Security.⁴⁸ However, it was re-emphasised that Whites were entitled "to stay in Namibia as Namibians".

Congress further attacked the German community in Namibia and the West German government for supporting segregated schooling in the country. Rev. F. Naholo, of the Lutheran Church in Walvis Bay, revealed that a resolution was passed which saw the German Consulate in Windhoek as a symbolic indication of the "historic tendencies of the Whites in Namibia". "The German Consulate is a source of apartheid because the intensified German culture comes from there. Germans here organised festivals in honour of Hitler's birthday. They want to remain Germans. They are a reactionary group in Namibia.

"The Bonn government helps apartheid in schools by subsidising teachers' salaries. We feel we have to take action against this", said Rev. Naholo. He added, "They are milking our country economically and sending the money to Germany, but they are helping South Africa to remain an occupier of South West Africa to exploit it."⁴⁹ Foreign countries operating in Namibia were advised not to pay taxes to the South African government, but to pay to the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was authorised by United Nations to run the affairs of Namibia in the meantime. Only on that basis were foreign companies welcome in the country. However, Congress spokesmen said the economic system to be followed in Namibia would not be declared yet, and that it would have to be decided by the people.

Congress made a unanimous call for the leaders who had been banned, detained or deported, to be allowed to return to Namibia. Mr David Meroro, the national chairman (in exile) of SWAPO, was re-elected National Chairman and Mr A. Katamila was elected Vice-Chairman. Mr Sam Nujoma, President of the external wing, was elected President of "SWAPO of Namibia".⁵⁰

Other Developments in SWAPO

SWAPO continued to give general political direction in Namibia, in the position of an alternative government for the people of Namibia, in spite of heavy reprisals against its leadership and the establishment of the government-sponsored tribal constitutional talks in Windhoek. In a Christmas message in December 1975 the organisation called on the people to regard Christmas day as a day of mourning. A statement issued under the hand of the deputy general Secretary, Mr Othniel Kaakunga, said:

"I am calling on the people of Namibia not to celebrate this Christmas with joy, but to express their sorrow on that day".⁵¹ It said that the

people should mourn "their children who had laid down their lives for Namibia, their imprisoned brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Namibia who are imprisoned in Namibia and South Africa, and members of SWAPO who are awaiting trial." The statement added that "The struggling people of Namibia once again are sure that the idiotic continuation of South Africa in their country of birth is the only thing which will continue forcing the oppressed people to fight South Africa out. Our struggle is not against certain structures within the status quo, but a bitter struggle against the South African presence in Namibia; and that SWAPO would fight until the South African flag is lowered whether South Africa wants to do it or not. SWAPO wishes the South African flag to be replaced by the national flag of the people of Namibia."

Meanwhile SWAPO externally continued to build up international diplomatic, material and practical support for its activities. Besides the favourable standing it enjoyed at the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, a good number of individual member governments pledged significant support for the movement and its military programme on the Namibian borders.

SWAPO President, Mr Sam Nujoma, visited Cuba and the Soviet Union where promises of military hardware were made for the movement. Mr Nujoma declared that his organisation had the necessary manpower for the military offensive on the South African administration in Namibia, and the hardware was his problem. He complained that such assistance was not forthcoming from western countries.⁵²

There was heavy speculation that despite the progress of the Turnhalle conference, despite his continual public display of contempt for the SWAPO leader, South African Premier, John Vorster, would eventually talk to the SWAPO leadership in connection with the problem in Namibia. Observers of Southern African politics believed that Mr Vorster was waiting for the solution of the Zimbabwe issue before such a move could be taken.⁵³

A petition on behalf of the detainees was made by the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia to the Administrator of South West Africa.⁵⁴ The petition read as follows:

Your Honour,

The Evangelical Lutheran Church (Rhenish Mission) makes the following application. As you already have notice, the following persons are being held by the Security police under the Terrorism Act: Z. Kameeta, A. Kanguuchi, F. Naholo, Guiteb. These are office bearers and members of the Church. This step cannot be understood by us. Therefore we want to request you urgently to use your influence in order to:

1. Make the release of these innocent people possible.
2. If you are not convinced of their innocence, to order that they be tried normally, so that their guilt or innocence can be proved.
3. We make this application for the following reasons:
 - (a) The arrest of the innocent members of the ELC in SWA (RM) has caused a spirit of unrest in our congregations;
 - (b) We cannot guarantee that we, as a church, will be able to admonish our congregations' members to rest in peace;
 - (c) Hate and frustration has been blown up by this unjust step, and the congregational members could go over to irresponsible actions, which we can in no way control;
 - (d) If you attach any value to a peaceful atmosphere, we ask you urgently to prevent the police and the army from intimidating and injuring innocent people. Their mere presence creates an atmosphere of frustration;
 - (e) We further ask you urgently that the terror caused by the Kapuuo group should be stopped forthwith, before a bloody confrontation between them and the other population groups can take place.

The following persons—Othniel Kaakunga, Axel Johannes, Aaron Muchimba, Elifas Munjaro, A. Naruseb, also members of the ELC, have been taken by the Kapuuo group and handed over to the police. They are still being kept. For them we are also asking an immediate hearing.

We ask you to see this petition of the church in a serious light and we will appreciate it if you can react upon it immediately and to inform us on the steps you have taken. We want to assure you that the ELC in SWA (RM) is prepared for peaceful co-operation, but that our work is being made difficult through such unjust actions against our church and our office bearers, and at the moment we cannot perceive that the chaotic conditions will make any contributions to the peaceful solution of the problems of this country.

REFERENCES

- | | |
|---|--|
| ¹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 14.10.75 | ¹³ <i>Cape Times</i> 17.8.76 |
| ² <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 3.6.76 | ¹⁴ <i>Cape Times</i> 17.8.76 |
| ³ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 4.6.76 | ¹⁵ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 18.3.76 |
| ⁴ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 12.4.76 | ¹⁶ <i>Cape Times</i> 27.8.76 |
| ⁵ <i>Cape Times</i> 27.8.76 | ¹⁷ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 28.7.76 |
| ⁶ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 3.5.76 | ¹⁸ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 15.10.75 |
| ⁷ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 28.4.76 | ¹⁹ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 4.10.75 |
| ⁸ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 24.10.75 | ²⁰ <i>Natal Mercury</i> 17.10.75 |
| ⁹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 26.4.76 | ²¹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 19.8.75 |
| ¹⁰ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 18.5.76 | ²² <i>Ibid</i> |
| ¹¹ <i>Daily Dispatch</i> 11.8.76 | ²³ <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 20.8.75 |
| ¹² <i>Cape Times</i> 19.8.76 | ²⁴ <i>Ibid</i> |

²⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 20.8.75
²⁶*Daily Dispatch* 26.8.75
²⁷*Ibid*
²⁸*Natal Mercury* 21.8.75
²⁹*Daily Dispatch* 20.8.75
³⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 26.8.75
³¹Copy of Petition from Evangelical
Lutheran Church
³²*Daily News* 25.9.75
³³*Rand Daily Mail* 29.8.75, *Daily*
Dispatch 29.8.75
³⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 9.12.75
³⁵*Ibid*
³⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 2.12.75
³⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 2.12.75
³⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 19.12.75

³⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 6.4.76
⁴⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 29.5.76
⁴¹*Star* 14.5.76
⁴²*Ibid*
⁴³*Daily Dispatch* 17.2.76
⁴⁴*Ibid*
⁴⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 11.2.76
⁴⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 11.7.75
⁴⁷*Ibid*
⁴⁸*Star* 31.5.76
⁴⁹*Ibid*
⁵⁰*Daily Dispatch* 1.6.76
⁵¹*Rand Daily Mail* 1.6.76
⁵²*Daily Dispatch* 19.12.75
⁵³*Daily Dispatch* 23.5.76
⁵⁴Copy of Petition from ELC

Index

ANC—Pietermaritzburg Trial	91
Anniversary Card Project	129
Artefacts Home Industry, Transvaal	129
Arts	112
Association for Self-help	133
Bannings	78
Bantu Affairs Administration Boards	96
Bantustans, General	1
— Mining in	6
Ben Louw Trial	88
Black Communalism	123
Black Community Programmes	123
— Women's Division	128
Black Consciousness	107
— Cultural Significations	112
— Economic Significations	111
— White Reaction to	116
Black Dean	157
Black Lecturer	158
Black Parents' Association	110
Black People's Convention	119
— Detention of Leaders	122
— Economic Policy	122
Black Rector	156
Black Viewpoint 3 and 4	108
Black/White Wage Gap	169
Black Women's Federation	109, 134
Bophuthatswana, Economy	56
— Independence	54
— Land Claims	54
— Opposition	57
Building Industry	164
Cape Province Riots	102
Ciskei, Economy	40
— General Development	42
— Land Claims	32
— National Development Corporation	41
— Political Development	34
Coloured Development Corporation	73
Coloured Persons' Representative Council	68
— Government Proposals	68
— Theron Commission	72
Communications, Research and Publications	129
Compulsory and Free Education for Blacks	142
— Coloureds	143
— Indians	143
Control of Education	143
Cricket	184

Death in Detention	94
Death of Chief Philemon Elifas	208
Degrees awarded at Universities	152
Detainees, Prevention of publication of names	81
Detention of BPC leaders	122
Detentions	79
Developments at the Turnhalle	204
Disturbances at Black University Campuses	159
Donald Woods Trial	93
Drama and Theatre	193
Durban Workers' Trial	90
Eastern Cape Students' Detentions	81
Economic Policy, BPC	122
Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre	136
Education, Double Session System in Black Schools	141
— Higher, Degrees Awarded	152
— Primary and Secondary Enrolment, African	140
— — — Coloured	139
— — — Indian	140
— Teacher Training	147
— Technical and Vocational Training	148
Efforts to promote Turnhalle Conference	207
Employees Registered	163
Eric Molobi Trial	88
Examinations	144
Federal Theological Seminary	136
Films	195
Foreign Africans Employed	163, 164
— Black Students	158
Fort Hare Branch	158
General Programmes	130
Health Programmes	128
Home Industries	129
Institute for Black Research	135
— of Black Studies	135
Inter-Cabinet Council	60
Inter-Denominational African Ministers' Association	137
Internal Security Act	77
Kwa-Zulu, Economy	49
— Land Claims	44
— Political Development	46
Joseph Mdluli's Death	94
Language Issue	97
Leadership Training	129
Lebowa, Economy	53
— Land Claims	51
— Political Development	52
Literature Writing	112
Luke Mazwembe's Death	95, 128
Maisela Trial	90
Mapetla Mohapi's Death	95, 128
Medical Faculty	157
Migrant Labour	167
Mining in Bantustans	6
— Industry	166
Mobile Programmes	136
Music	196
— Theatre and	114

Natal Indian Congress	125
— Riots	101
National Party Congress, recommended reforms	72
NAYO Trial	88
New Degree	157
Objections to Development of Bantustans	206
Other Sports	189
Political Trials	82
Proclamation R400 of 1960	78
Publications, Communications, Research and	129
Research and Publications, Communications	129
Resource Centres	130
Riotous Assemblies Trials	90
Riots	99
— Reactions to	102
Rugby	181
SASM Trial	87
SASO, Attack on	127
— Banning of Newsletter	127
— Cultural Committee	115
— Death of Members	128
— Detention of Members	127
— General Council Meeting	126
— On the Campus	158
SASO-BPC Trial	82
Self-help and Religious Organisations	128
Snyman Commission Report	154
Soccer	177
South African Indian Council, Educational Powers	64
— Housing	65
— Political Development	60
Soweto and Transvaal Riots	99
SWAPO	198, 212
— Congress	213
— Other Developments	214
Symposia	130
Teachers	145
Tennis	187
Terrorism Act, Section 6	76
Theatre and Music	114
Theron Commission	72
Trade Union Official's Trials	91
Transkei, Citizenship	20
— Constitutional Development	19
— Detentions	81
— Economy	24
— Independence	11
— Land Claims	10
— Opposition	28
— Political Parties	28
Transvaal Chamber of Commerce	117
— Riots	99
Viva Frelimo Rally, Durban Workers' Trial	90
Western Cape Students' Trial	91
White Reaction to Black Consciousness	116
Women's Division BCP	128
Xhosa Development Corporation	6
Zimele Trust Fund	131

BOOKS PUBLISHED DURING 1975-76

Publications available at

RAVAN PRESS

508 Diakonia House, 80 Jorissen Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg
P.O. Box 31134/2017, Braamfontein 2017

Literary Works

COETZEE, J. M. Dusklands—novel	R3,00
GORDIMER, N. The Black Interpreters—essays	R1,50
GRAY, STEPHEN Local Colour—novel	R4,95
HORN, P. Walking through our Sleep—poems	R1,95
JENSMA, W. Sing for our Execution—poems	R2,95
LEVINSON, B. From Breakfast to Madness—poems	R1,50
MACNAMARA, M. The Falls Run Back—poems	R2,65
Ophir 21—poetry journal	75
Ophir 22—poetry journal	75
Ophir 23—poetry journal	75

*NOTE: All previous issues of Ophir are out-of-print.
Ophir will terminate with No. 23 (July 1976)*

PATEL, Ed. (ed.) The World of Nat Nakasa	R5,25
PATOU, J. S. (ed.) The Grey Ones—essays on censorship	60
SAUNDERS & HORN (eds.) It's Getting Late—poems from Ophir	R1,10
TLALI, M. Muriel at Metropolitan—novel	R2,95
WILHELM, P. LM and Other Stories	R4,95
Xhosa Poems: The Making of a Servant	75

Bateleur Press

SIMON, B. Joburg Sis!	R5,85
STRAUSS, P. Photographs of Bushmen	R1,45
FARRELL, D. Charlie Manson Blues	R1,45
Bateleur Poets: Greig, Saunders, Kirkwood, Abrahams	R3,75

Other Titles distributed by Ravan Press

MOSS, R. Family Reunion (Scribners)	R6,30
MATTHEWS, J. The Park & Other Stories	R1,80
SEROTE, W. Yakhal' Inkomo—poems	R1,80
ROYSTON, E. 103 Poems	R1,75

Social and Political Issues

BOROWITZ & SEMPLE Encounter with Age	R2,40
BRINDLEY M. Western Coloured Township	R4,20
BUIS, R. Religious Beliefs & White Prejudice	R2,40
ICJ (Ed.) The Trial of Beyers Naude	R3,00
MANGANYI, N. C. Being-black-in-the-World	R1,50
NASH, M. A. Ecumenical Movement in 1960's	R6,90
OOSTHUIZEN, D. C. S. Ethics of Illegal Action	R2,00

SUNDERMEIER, T. (ed.) Church and Nationalism in South Africa	R2,70
THOMAS, W (ed.) Management Responsibility and African Employment	R1,00
WALSHE, P. Black Nationalism	R1,00
WELLS, L. G. Health, Healing and Society	R1,95
WILSON, F. Migrant Labour in South Africa	R2,50
LAURENCE P. The Transkei	R4,50

Reprinting

The Durban Strikes

Sprocas Publications

Some Implications of Inequality	R1,00
South Africa's Political Alternatives	R3,00
Towards Social Change	R2,00
Power, Privilege and Poverty	R2,00
Towards an Open Plural Society	R1,00
White Liberation	R1,00

Journals

Social Dynamics Index on Censorship	per issue	R3,00
South Africa Labour Bulletin	per issue	R1,00

Other Publications available

HERD, N. The Bent Pine: the trial of Chief Langalibalele	R6,90
NKONDO, G. M. (ed.) Turfloop Testimony	R2,50
COETZEE, A. Poesie en Politiek	R4,20
SAUNDERS, W. (ed.) The Reminiscences of Courtney Acutt	1977
PEREIRA, E. (ed.) Contemporary South African Plays	1977

Publications available at

BLACK COMMUNITY PROGRAMMES

86 Beatrice Street Durban. Telephone: 67558/327507

and

15 Leopold Street King Williams Town. Telephone: 4092/4030

BLACK REVIEW 1974/75—Editor: Thoko Mbanjwa	R4,00
BLACK VIEWPOINT 4—Transkei Independence	R1,50

Forthcoming

BLACK VIEWPOINT 5—South African Sports Policy. Editor: Thoko Mbanjwa.