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**NOW IS
THE
TIME!**

**Towards a
massive
ANC
election
victory**

A detailed, textured illustration of Chris Hani's face and upper torso. He is shown from the chest up, wearing a blue and yellow striped shirt. The background behind him consists of abstract, colorful shapes in shades of blue, yellow, and pink. The illustration uses fine lines and cross-hatching for shading and texture.

**A NATION
REMEMBERS
CHRIS HANI**

The African Communist

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PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

Towards a massive ANC election victory

The election on April 27/28 is of decisive importance, not least for the working people of our country. A lot depends upon how well the ANC alliance does. If the ANC emerges as the largest party, but with a narrow majority, our capacity to begin a process of thorough-going democratisation and development will be more restricted. By contrast, a massive ANC election victory will provide our movement with real momentum to move rapidly towards substantial transformation.

We cannot take an election victory for granted. We cannot take the size of the victory for granted. Each vote for the ANC will count. In the

coming weeks and days, every communist must be out among the voters.

Why the SACP supports the ANC

The reasons for the SACP's support for the ANC's election campaign are both principled and practical.

Our alliance with the ANC stretches back nearly seventy years. Communists have helped build the ANC into the massive formation it is today. Communists have gone to jail for ANC involvement, communists have been killed in battle on ANC missions, communists have been hanged for their ANC work. Others might be flirting with the ANC, or joining the ANC because it is about to become the governing party. The SACP welcomes the conversion of the broadest range of forces and personalities to the side of the ANC. As for the SACP, we are no Johnny-come-lately, our record speaks for itself.

Our unique alliance is based on our longstanding strategic understanding that, in South Africa, the national democratic struggle for self-empowerment by the oppressed majority is both:

- morally and politically an absolute priority; and
- the most direct and democratic route to socialism.

The strategic connection between national democratic transformation and socialism has guided our party since the late 1920s. This guiding perspective remains as valid as ever.

A mass based election campaign

In this election period, the SACP has championed two important principles:

- a transparent, bottom-up nominations process for the ANC election lists.
- an election campaign and an election manifesto that are not just the normal and vague "pre-election promises", but which are based on a clear programme for national democratic transformation.

We have fought for these principles, because we believe that what we, as a broad movement, do before the elections will greatly impact on how we conduct ourselves after the elections.

In regard to the nominations, even our opponents have had to admit that the ANC-led alliance's nominations process was unprecedented in its levels of participation and democracy. Every other political formation in our country has compiled its lists in the secrecy of dark little offices, and on the basis of individual wheeling and dealing.

In the nominations process, the SACP deliberately did not campaign for its own quota or list of candidates on the ANC ballot. We trusted the democratic process, and the excellent showing of SACP members is a heartening indication of the party's popularity within the broader alliance.

In developing the Reconstruction and Development Programme parallel with the election campaign, the

alliance has succeeded in fighting a campaign that is about real popular concerns — peace, jobs, houses and education. In the people's and worker forums, the alliance has developed a fairly unique form of participatory election campaigning. This style of campaigning, listening to the people and not just talking at them, has served to reinforce, precisely, the relevance of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. All over the country, in mass forums, people are asking questions about peace, jobs, houses and education, over and over.

Chris Hani

Little more than two weeks before the election date, on April 10, our country will be commemorating the anniversary of Chris Hani's assassination. It is a tragic fact that it was his death last year, and the massive outpouring of national grief that established April 1994 as the date for our elections. Up until April last year, the apartheid government was still stalling. After his death, the world and all but a few extremists in our country woke up. A firm election date was no longer a matter for political manoeuvring. It had become a national necessity.

It is a tragedy that it had to be Chris Hani's death that served as this watershed — a tragedy, but an historical fact that no South Africa must ever forget.

But Chris Hani has left behind



much, much more than what will be the most important election date in our country's history. Indeed, all of the positive features in the ANC election campaign we have noted are part of Chris Hani's legacy.

Chris Hani was convening peo-

ple's forums long before the present election campaign. Even in the army, Chris Hani had a habit of turning his visits to MK military camps into soldiers' forums. Individually, he did more than anyone to hold MK together through the extraordinarily difficult 1980s. He did this not through enforcing an iron military discipline, but by talking with soldiers, by listening, by answering questions, and answering them honestly. He did not abdicate his leadership role, he exercised it in the most exemplary democratic and revolutionary manner.

After he became general secretary of the SACP in December 1991,

Chris Hani turned our country into a people's forum. Week after week, he moved from mine compounds to rural villages, from township stadiums to strike picket lines. He went into jails and listened and spoke to prisoners, and their white warders.

For Chris Hani, who led the people because he knew how to listen to them, democracy and socialism were not abstract ideas. They were about basic things — jobs and houses, education and water, the right to a life of dignity for everyone.

Let us draw inspiration from our fallen comrade. Every communist to the voters! Sekunjalo, Ke Nako, Now is the Time — Vote ANC! ★

Whose economic model is outmoded?

One of the key planks of De Klerk's election campaign is that the ANC is supposedly stuck with an "outmoded" economic philosophy "which has failed everywhere else in the world". These phrases get repeated over and over by NP campaigners. For its part, the NP manifesto proposes the "free enterprise", "market-oriented" philosophy of neo-liberalism.

The reality is that it is the NP's approach that deserves to be thoroughly discredited. Consider the facts. In today's world dominated by the neo-liberal model:

- 80% of all resources on our planet are controlled and consumed by 20% of the population.
- 25 million human beings die each year of malnutrition and starvation. In other words, each single day hunger claims the equivalent in deaths of one Hiroshima atom bomb.
- Between 1980 and 1990 the standard of living in Latin America dropped 15%, and in Africa 20%. FW De Klerk's neo-liberal model refers to countries in the South as "developing". This is a lie. Thanks to neo-liberalism we are not developing at all, we are being underdeveloped.

This is global apartheid. This is what the "new" NP is proposing for South Africa. Out with the old apartheid, but in with the new. From now on you will not starve because you are black, but because you are "developing", because you are in the third world, because of "market forces". From now on there will not be group areas and forced removals, but instead "structural adjustment". Profits before people, the market instead of morality, this is what the "renovated" National Party is proposing.

When the NP boasts that it has taken South Africa "back into the world", this is the world of which it is speaking.

The ANC-led alliance's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is based neither on discredited state commandist models, nor on De Klerk's naive neo-liberalism. It proposes a path of development based on major infrastructural construction to meet the most basic needs of the majority. This will require effective democratic governance at all levels — national, provincial and local. But the RDP is not a state-centred programme, apart from an effective state it also requires an active and mobilised mass democratic movement.

As far as the international context in which we are operating, the RDP accepts the need to interact with international markets, but it sets out a strategy to do so on terms that will ensure national sovereignty and real development.

Virtually every country in the

world deals with the World Bank and the IMF. A future South Africa will be no different. But there is no reason why we should conduct our dealings with these international finance institutions on our knees. There is no reason why we should become caught within an ever deepening debt trap, that results in our country becoming hostage (like so many third world countries) to the whims of the international financial institutions.

In the first place, South Africa's foreign debt situation is not in a critical state — partly as a result of years of international financial sanctions against South Africa. We do not have to borrow excessively and unendingly in order to service a debt that never stops growing. There are also many financial resources within our country which are either lying idle or being squandered on investments in little needed shopping malls and high rise office blocks. The financial resources of our country can and must be mobilised much more effectively to meet the overall requirements of our country.

But in order to deal effectively with external financial institutions, and in order to effectively mobilise our own national financial resources, we need to approach the social and economic challenges in our country with a coherent and overarching strategy. This is, precisely, what the RDP sets out to be. The RDP must become a rallying programme for all left, democratic and progressive forces in our country. ★



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini at a Shaka Day celebration

The Zulu Kingdom: Buthelezi's short-cut to power

This intervention arises out of a grave concern that the national liberation movement's approach to the question of the future place and role of the Zulu King is not being adequately dealt with. Failure to deal with this issue strategically can severely compromise the national liberation struggle. It is for this reason that this question should be thrown wide open for debate within our ranks, especially in Natal.

There are a number of very important reasons why this issue requires urgent but careful consideration within our own ranks. Firstly, our responses to the demands for the recognition of the Zulu Kingdom

BLADE NZIMANDE argues that Buthelezi is promoting new demands around the Zulu monarchy to retain personal power for himself without having to face the verdict of the electorate. Our own response, Nzimande argues further, has not been adequate. We need to understand the IFP in class terms, and we need to avoid being dragged in Natal into a competition over who is the most Zulu.

are mainly in the form of press statements, which most of the time are not mandated. As a result we are making serious policy decisions through ad hoc responses to press enquiries. Secondly, our movement has correctly committed itself to the recognition of the institution of the Zulu King, but without carefully deliberating on the exact content of such commitments.

Thirdly, and perhaps most serious, there is the tendency within the ranks of the national liberation movement, to respond to the issue of Zulu nationalism within the terms and framework set by the IFP. In the process there is minimal questioning of the version of Zulu nationalism as presented by the IFP. The result of this is to respond to Inkatha's Zulu nationalism in a manner that turns us into unwitting Zulu tribalists. Even more disturbing is the tendency within sections of our movement in Natal to discourage challenging Buthelezi's interpretation of Zulu history, and his claims about the centrality of his position in that history. The argument normally put forward here is that we should be tacti-

cal in criticising Buthelezi in order to avoid running a negative election campaign. But when one examines the real content of "being tactical", through the political practices associated with this argument, it normally boils down to never challenging Buthelezi and thereby not contesting Inkatha's Zulu nationalism. As a result of the lack of a strategic approach and debate on these matters, I would argue that even the enormous gains made in contesting Inkatha's version of Zulu nationalism through the KwaXimba and Sonke Festivals last year, have been diluted.

In order to discuss this issue seriously it is important to take off from where cde Cassius Lubisi left off in his contribution in *The African Communist*.^[1] An attempt will be made in this article to demonstrate that Buthelezi's struggle for the recognition of the Zulu Kingdom is in fact an attempt by him to retain political power in a democratic South Africa without going through a democratic election. This is the real agenda behind the protection of the Zulu Kingdom from the IFP's point of view.

What is the IFP?

To some this might sound like a question with an obvious answer. Nonetheless the post-February 1990 situation has tended to confuse even some of our leading cadres. It is important to deconstruct the IFP within the context of the present conjuncture. The IFP is best understood from a class perspective.

An analysis of Inkatha should be located against the background of the social composition and political alignments of the African petty bourgeoisie in South Africa's bantustans. This social composition can best be understood within the context of the evolution of this class under apartheid.

The objectives of apartheid were not to be achieved through repression alone, but also by securing the support of a segment of the African population which was to carry out the details of separate development. Since the material and ideological foundations of apartheid are based on an attempt to exploit and heighten ethnic differences among Africans and across national groups, the source for the creation of a collaborating section from within the African population in the bantustans became the rural and traditional structures of African society.

This strategy was not the sole invention of the apartheid regime in the history of South Africa, but constitutes the whole site of colonial struggles between the white colonisers and the colonised African majority. Shula Marks makes this point

very convincingly:

The structures and social relationships of african pre-capitalist society profoundly shaped the struggles that actually crystallised in policies of segregation. The contests over the form and pace of proletarianisation took place at a bewildering number of levels: between capital and labour, between and within branches of the state, between capitalist interests, and between all of these and the pre-colonial ruling class of chiefs and headmen in the countryside, as well as between the latter and their subjects.[2]

The political restructuring through the bantustan system centred mainly around the full incorporation of chiefs and headmen as a basis for creating and strengthening the bantustan system. The struggles between the colonisers and the African people centred mainly around terms of subjugation, and consequently the chiefs became central in the whole process of restructuring. The co-option of chiefs onto structures of colonial domination had always characterised colonial rule in Africa. South Africa was no exception.

Although the institution of chieftaincy was fully integrated into the colonial economy and colonial relations of domination, there was always resistance on the part of many chiefs, who resented being subjected to the political and economic structures of colonialism. In Natal for instance, the climax of this resistance was the Bhambatha rebellion in 1906.

The mass of the people on the other hand were caught in a contradiction between, on the one hand, traditional loyalties and sentiments to the chiefs, and, on the other hand, resistance to colonial exploitation and oppression as exercised through the institution of chieftaincy. This contradiction mainly manifested itself through the uneasy co-existence of both deference and resistance to chiefs.

It was these particular contradictions that the Nationalists inherited when they came into power in 1948. The Bantu Authorities Act was the first concrete conceptualization of territorial segregation under apartheid, using the institution of chieftaincy as its main instrument. The first task that the apartheid state set itself, in order to transform the bantustans into effective reservoirs of cheap labour, was to win over the chiefs. The Nationalist government adopted a much more aggressive approach, using a combination of positive rewards and repression to get the chiefs onto the side of the government. Although the chiefs were effectively relegated to the lower levels of the apartheid bureaucracy, the trappings of controlling sections of the apartheid state provided a positive inducement for some of the chiefs.

It was this process of incorporating chiefs within the bantustan system that saw the emergence of what I would call the core of the *bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie* in the bantustans, with the chiefs at the political helm. The bureaucratic petty

bourgeoisie in the bantustans consisted mainly of an alliance between chiefs and sections of the trading African petty bourgeoisie. It was this class, through its control of the subordinate state apparatuses in the bantustans, that benefitted most directly from the bantustan system. The relationship of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie to the bantustan state structures was typical of *parasitic capitalism* found in many African countries. Parasitic capitalism refers to a process of using the state apparatuses for purposes of accumulation.

The organised power of the chiefs was also institutionalised through the composition of the bantustan legislative assemblies. In most, if not all, the bantustans there are more appointed than elected members in the legislative assemblies, most of whom are chiefs. It was in this way that tribalism and chieftaincy within the bantustans became the dominant ideology of not only the apartheid state but also that of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie itself. Chieftaincy became the single most important institution for rationalising apartheid and subjugating the African people to its rule in the bantustans. This is succinctly captured by Kaiser Matanzima's statement in 1975, shortly before

Chieftaincy became the single most important institution for rationalising apartheid

Transkeian so-called 'independence':

"In the Transkei we will forever retain chieftainship...the black man has his own system of democracy, centred on the royal chiefs. These chiefs legislated for the people – commoners did not make laws for the chiefs. It must be the chiefs who are sent to the United Nations and who take part in detente moves." [3]

However, what is most striking is the extent of dependence of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie on the structures of capital accumulation and apartheid. The consolidation of the relationship between the apartheid state and the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie strengthened the hold of monopoly capital, and mediated the subjection of the African working class to the rigours of capital accumulation. For instance, since the 1920s, and particularly in the 1940s and 50s a strong relationship developed between the Zulu monarchy, chieftaincy and capital. The factory regimes that developed in the Durban industrial complex in the 1950's, for example, were strongly characterised by an attempt to reproduce Zulu tribal relations and discipline within the factories themselves. It is no surprise that, even up to this day, many factories in Natal still consists of labour forces drawn from tribal localities using the system of izinduna to recruit labour from the rural areas. The proletarianisation of the Zulus in Natal during the first half of this century proceeded on the basis of linking Zulu customs and traditions and factory discipline.

It was within this context that the

IFP emerged in the 1970s and consolidated its position within the KwaZulu bantustan. The IFP therefore is the political organ of a section of the Zulu petty bourgeoisie, whose reproduction has not only been dependent on, but closely intertwined, with apartheid's KwaZulu bantustan. The power of this bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie grew and consolidated as the KwaZulu bantustan spread its control over the lives of the African people in Natal. The power of the KwaZulu bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, like its counterparts in the other bantustans, lay in the control of substantial sections of the subordinate state apparatuses in Natal, thus giving it enormous power over health, education, issuing of business licences, allocation of land, control of chiefs through the purse strings, and control of vast townships and delivery of services to the people in these areas. In other words, that section of the Zulu petty bourgeoisie in control of the bantustan state apparatuses became highly dependent on the continuation of apartheid for its own reproduction.

The institution of chieftaincy also became one of the key centres of power, as this institution was gradually integrated into the structures of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the KwaZulu government. The Department of the Chief Minister became the centre for co-ordinating the activities of the chiefs, thus giving Buthelezi direct control over the chiefs. The subjugation of chiefs was achieved through a combination of appeal to Zulu tradition, patronage,



violent suppression and expulsion of recalcitrant chiefs. The institution of chieftaincy itself in KwaZulu became a major instrument in the hands of the IFP to secure its social and political base. Chiefs were also the main social stratum for the creation of warlordism.

The IFP and the fractioning of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie

The intensification of the mass-based semi-insurrectionary struggles of the mid to late 1980s led to serious internal divisions and fractioning of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie both within and across the bantustans.

The series of coups and counter-coups in the bantustans in the 1980s was one expression of these divisions. There were also significant realignments of class forces within the bantustans themselves.

The divisions, tensions and fractioning of the petty bourgeoisie in the bantustans happened at a number of levels. The one significant level was that of the antagonistic relationship between the upper echelons of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie (those who were absolutely reliant on bantustan structures) and a more professional or "civil" petty bourgeoisie (state-employed civil servants in various professional occupations, notably teachers, nurses, doctors and army officers).

The turning points in many struggles within the bantustans have been brought about through resistance from the professionals in civil service aligning themselves with progressive forces. The strike by senior civil servants in KwaNdebele in the 1980s was decisive in overthrowing the rule of the Sikhosana authoritarian clique in that bantustan, laying the basis for progressive sections of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie to ascend to power.

Buthelezi's personality has played a critical role in the nature and politics of the IFP

These divisions in fact are an expression of the fact that the relationship between the upper echelons of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie and the professional civil servants in the bantustans is often one of patronage and authoritarian control.

There are also, of course, serious contradictions between the upper echelons of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie and the mass of workers in the bantustan civil services — health workers, construction labourers, rank-and-file soldiers.

The IFP has not escaped the escalating struggles of the people both within and outside the KwaZulu bantustan.

The manner in which the IFP has been affected by, and responded to, these struggles has been a function of its difference from the ruling

parties in the other bantustans.

Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi

Whilst the IFP shares many of the characteristics and conditions of its counterparts in the other bantustans, it is different from them in a number of respects. The main difference is the presence of a figure like Buthelezi in the IFP, which other bantustan parties do not have. The history of the IFP is simultaneously the history of Chief Buthelezi in South Africa's politics. Whilst the one cannot and should not be reduced to the other, Buthelezi's personality has played a critical role in the nature and politics of the IFP.

Buthelezi's claim to the leadership of the IFP and the "prime ministership" of the "Zulu nation" is based on a combination of factors. Buthelezi fuses in his persona claims to a number of legacies. He presents himself as a former leader of the ANCYL (though Mzala challenges Buthelezi's claims in this regard quite convincingly); a chief of the Buthelezi tribe at Ulundi; a supposed confidant to Chief Albert Luthuli; and someone with a blood relation to the Zulu royal family. All these claims, real or spurious, have enabled Buthelezi to mould Inkatha around himself, making him almost irreplaceable in the organisation. These claims have also enabled Inkatha to create a mass following on the ground, some of which it has carried up to the present. Perhaps the most powerful factor that accounts for

Inkatha's social base is that Buthelezi was the only bantustan leader who entered the bantustan system on a ticket of opposition to the system, and to specifically block KwaZulu's "independence".

Inkatha's mass following can also be accounted for by the fact that at its formation in 1975, it had a positive image and a wider appeal within the African community. Related to this was the role of the ANC in the formation of Inkatha itself.[4] Between 1975 and 1979 Buthelezi used to be invited to address progressive trade union functions as well as meetings of the fledgling democratic organisations.

The banning of the national liberation movement in the early 1960s and that of the black consciousness movement in 1977 — and the political void these created inside the country — provided Buthelezi and Inkatha a unique opportunity and space within which to assert political leadership over the national liberation struggle. At the time, Buthelezi and Inkatha had enormous confidence that they were the true leadership of the African people in South Africa. The high point of this was the release of the results of an opinion poll in 1978 conducted by the German Arnold Bergstraesse Institute showing that Buthelezi was supported by 43% of Africans in Soweto, Durban and Pretoria, whilst Mandela had only a 21% following.[5]

It was with this confidence that Buthelezi led an Inkatha delegation to meet the ANC in London in 1979. At this meeting Buthelezi broke all

relations with the ANC, boldly proclaiming that he was a leader in his own right. He had calculated that he had effectively replaced the ANC inside the country. However, as subsequent events were to show, Buthelezi had seriously miscalculated. Indeed, the 1979 meeting and break with the ANC marked the decisive turning point in Buthelezi's fortunes.

Buthelezi's dream of having replaced the national liberation movement were shattered by a number of important developments in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The most significant was the dramatic growth of the democratic labour movement after its legalisation in 1979 and the formation and growth of the United Democratic Front in 1983.

Significant shifts took place within Inkatha itself in the 1980s. There was a mass desertion of sections of the African petty bourgeoisie, particularly the intelligentsia and professionals. The precursor of this process was the departure of Inkatha's first secretary general, Dr Sibusiso Bhengu in 1978. The wave of defections were partly an expression of divisions within Inkatha itself, between those sections of the petty bourgeoisie who were not happy

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with Inkatha's desertion from the Congress camp, and those sections whose response to the growth of the democratic movement was militant opposition, and later violence. After the formation of the UDF, the warlords increasingly substituted the earlier non-violent leadership in Inkatha's Central Committee. Whilst Buthelezi relied on the intellectuals and professionals in launching the IFP, with the intensification of mass struggles he increasingly relied on warlords and hard-core traditionalists, a reliance that came in time to be reflected in their dominance in the Central Committee.

Buthelezi and the KwaZulu bantustan

Although Buthelezi's initial basis for participation in the KwaZulu bantustan was opposition to the bantustan system as a whole, this began to change quite radically in the 1980s. Inkatha, like the rest of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie in the other bantustans, was caught in a vicious circle by the deepening mass struggles in the 1980s. The greater the challenge to apartheid, the more the bantustan bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie relied on repression to secure its positions. The more force this class used, the more it was rejected by the people. The greater this rejection, the deeper they were thrown into the hands of apartheid. It was because of this that the dependence of Inkatha on the KwaZulu bantustan deepened.

Inkatha and apartheid state inter-

ests converged around the smashing of the democratic movement in the 1980s. It was within this context that Inkatha became available for use by the state security forces in the latter's counter-revolutionary strategy, as subsequently revealed in the Inkathagate scandal.

From the mid-1980s Inkatha's ideology rhetoric about the KwaZulu bantustan began to shift. As Cassius Lubisi correctly points out, KwaZulu ceased being a creation of apartheid, and became instead the government of the "Zulu Kingdom". This about-turn was a reflection of the narrowing political options for Inkatha and Buthelezi. The discourse of Zulu nationalism and the Zulu Kingdom played an increasing role.

Inkatha's Zulu nationalism

Certainly, from its inception Inkatha had presented itself as the custodian of the Zulu nation, the appeal to the Zulu nation has increased in proportion to the erosion of its power base and influence. Inkatha's Zulu nationalism has been an attempt to keep a disintegrating regional power base together. In the process, Buthelezi has carefully crafted the KwaZulu bantustan onto the history of the Zulu Kingdom and firmly secured his position as the prime minister of the Zulu King.

For Buthelezi to effectively make use of Zulu nationalism as his mobilising force, it was important for him to ensure that the Zulu monarch was on his side. The years between 1975

INKATHA

and 1980 saw an intense battle for the political control of the King between senior members of the Zulu royal family on the one hand, and Buthelezi, Inkatha and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) on the other. During this time, the King resisted subjection to the structures of the KwaZulu bantustan. When the Zulu monarch was allegedly involved in an attempt to form a party in opposition to Inkatha in KwaZulu, Buthelezi called a special conference of Inkatha in January 1976 and summoned the King to answer for his involvement in politics. At that meeting, Buthelezi called upon the Zulu people to choose between himself and the King as the (Zulu) nation's political leader. There were members of the Zulu royal family who were, and continue, to be unhappy with the removal of the royal family from the seat of political power in KwaZulu.

In 1980 the tensions between the King and Buthelezi exploded again, when the King was summoned by the KLA to account for comments he had allegedly made about Buthelezi's collaboration with the apartheid regime. When the King refused to appear, his salary was approximately halved by the KLA. It was after this confrontation that Buthelezi was to finally subjugate the institution of the King to Inkatha and the KLA, and it was this subjugation that gave both Buthelezi and Inkatha the much needed material basis for using "Zulu nationalism".

Inkatha's Zulu nationalism is based on a distortion of Zulu history.



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

Mzala, for instance, has pointed to the inversion of the traditional roles of King and prime minister in the relationship between King Zwelithini and Buthelezi.[6] Furthermore the claim that Chief Buthelezi's family were the hereditary prime ministers to the Zulu King is Inkatha's invention. However, what is important here is not necessarily what is true or false about Zulu history, but the extent to which the KwaZulu bantustan, the Zulu King and the IFP's political demands, have all been deliberately conflated to maintain the social base of Inkatha.

Inkatha's Zulu nationalism is essentially *tribalist*. It is mainly direct-

ed at the ANC as a "Xhosa-dominated" organisation aimed at "destroying the Zulu kingdom and the Zulu people". Its sharpest expression comes out in the manner in which Inkatha explains the violence in the PWV region and Natal. With respect to PWV, the violence is projected by the IFP as violence directed against the Zulus. In Natal, members and supporters of the ANC are described

as "servants to (Xhosa) foreigners", who have betrayed the Zulu nation, and want to hand Zulu sovereignty over to the Xhosas. It was an attempt to transcend this backward and reactionary tribalism that led to the formation of the ANC in 1912. Inkatha's Zulu nationalism is in direct conflict

with the most fundamental principles of the national liberation movement. It is for this reason that those who argue that we must be "tactical" in challenging and criticising Buthelezi on these matters are playing into the hands of the worst forms of Zulu tribalism and in the process reinforcing it.

We must expose Buthelezi's agenda without apology. The national liberation movement's response to this tribalism must be to rise above it. Whilst it is important for leaders and members of the ANC in Natal to

project themselves as no less Zulu than the IFP, we should not let the struggle in Natal be reduced to a struggle for Zuluness. Rising above it means that, in dealing with the issue of Zulu nationalism, it should always be from the standpoint of national liberation, which at its core is anti-tribalist.

Even more important is the need to understand the implications of the fact that Inkatha's Zulu nationalism is an attempt by the Zulu bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie to prevent its social, economic and political base from disintegrating. This is sharply exposed through the manner in which KwaZulu — a site for the reproduction of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie — is now presented by the IFP as the government of the Zulu King and the Zulu people. This is aimed at disconnecting the KwaZulu bantustan from its apartheid origins and link it to the institution of the Zulu Kingdom. This is an attempt to re-legitimise the KwaZulu bantustan, so that most of its major institutions and the control the reactionary Zulu petty bourgeoisie has over it, are retained or inserted in a post-election Natal government.

Buthelezi's two paths to power

Buthelezi is fully aware that a democratic election is likely to reduce the IFP to a small and perhaps even insignificant political party nationally. Even more serious for him are the indications that even in Natal the IFP

We should not let the struggle in Natal be reduced to a struggle for Zuluness

is not as large a party as it has been claiming to be. It is the fear of a massive defeat that has necessitated the increasing appeal to Zulu self-determination and the preservation of the KwaZulu bantustan through the institution of the King. It is also this fear that has turned the IFP into an organisation whose sole mission is to retain power by attempting to prevent the ascendancy of the ANC into power. In order to achieve this the IFP is opposed to the holding of an election for a Constituent Assembly. This fear has thrown Buthelezi into alliance with the fascist white right-wing.

The less chances the IFP has to at least win Natal, the more it shifts to the right thereby becoming a handy instrument for fascist white right-wingers who want to prevent a democratic election. Whilst the IFP would still prefer to ascend to power via the political process, Buthelezi is now using the IFP as a mechanism to block the democratic process.

This then leaves Buthelezi with his only other available path to power, through the constitutional entrenchment of the sovereignty of the Zulu monarch, within the context of "Zulu self-determination". Whilst this strategy on the part of Buthelezi and the IFP is central in securing a political place for the IFP, I would argue that it should also be seen as an independent path to power in its own right.

There is a potential contradiction however between the IFP's demands for a federal Natal, and the constitutional entrenchment of the sover-

eignty of the Zulu monarchy in the province. The two cannot be easily reconciled, since it is not clear what the relationship would be between a sovereign monarchy and a democratically elected provincial government; as well as the respective powers and functions of each in relation to matters of government. The IFP has kept these two demands deliberately unclear. I would argue that this tension and potential contradiction could be a reflection of a shift on the part of Buthelezi to place more emphasis on the constitutional entrenchment of a sovereign Zulu monarchy as his second and more important route to power.

Buthelezi's strategy now is to retain his power base through his position as "prime minister" to the King. The way he hopes to achieve this is by securing a constitutionally entrenched sovereign monarchy where his position as, "prime minister" of this monarchy is automatically guaranteed. For Buthelezi to retain this position does not require a democratic election, nor is the position of the King to be subjected to an election. The net outcome of this will be to subject an elected provincial government to the "prime minister" of the Kingdom, or at the very least lead to the creation

**... to subject
an elected
provincial
government
to the king's
'prime
minister'**

of two competing constitutional centres of power.

In such a scenario, Buthelezi would play a role of being a link between the King and his subjects in the Natal provincial assembly. It is therefore not inconceivable in such a situation for Buthelezi to go and give the provincial assembly a dressing-down for implementing the reconstruction and development programme and for dismantling the structures of the KwaZulu bantustan without the approval of the King. And as it is well known the "King" in this instance would be Buthelezi. Whilst some comrades would argue that this sounds too far-fetched, all the evidence, as argued above, points towards such a plan by the IFP.

Although the use of the institution of the Zulu King by the IFP to undermine a democratically elected provincial government is a very real possibility in the post-election period, it is something else if we were to legitimise this dual power. This makes it all the more important that this issue be treated strategically and with utmost care and political clarity within our own ranks.

Towards a framework for handling the issue of the Zulu King

Some of the academic analyses on Inkatha's tribalism have tended to present Buthelezi's manipulation of Zulu traditions as a successful enterprise without its own contradictions. This is not the reality. There are a

number of contradictions in Inkatha's strategies at the present moment.

The first contradiction relates to the tension between the attempt by the IFP to reconcile its claims as custodian of Zulu traditions and at the same time presenting itself as a modern, cosmopolitan national political party. These two strategies sit uneasily with each other, as no party that claims to be national can at the same time only pre-occupy itself exclusively with regional and ethnic matters.

The second contradiction within the IFP arises out of its alliance with the fascist white right-wing. The demand for a volkstaat and the politics of the right-wing stand in direct contradiction to the interests of the constituency that the IFP is trying to win. There can be no reconciliation between the racism of the white right-wing and the freedom of the majority of the people of our country.

The third contradiction facing the IFP is around its boycott stance towards the election. This stance is alienating those in the IFP who want an election. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that by not participating in an election a sizeable number of political careers of large sections of Inkatha leadership is at stake. This includes those who defected to the IFP in order to secure their parliamentary seats, and current members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. If the IFP does not participate in the elections, it is likely to go through some serious internal ruptures. Similarly if the IFP does participate it faces the prospects of a massive election defeat. This is the cen-

tral dilemma of the Chief Buthelezi and the IFP.

The starting point for our strategy in Natal should therefore be to deepen these contradictions within the IFP. Related to this, our strategy and tactics must be sharp enough to cut through Inkatha's Zulu nationalism by grasping the fact that what is essentially at stake is the defence of the class interests of a bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie fearing the impending democratic transformation of our country. Whilst the issue of Zulu nationalism is a reality that must be strategically engaged, it simultaneously serves to obscure the real class interests driving this nationalism.

Since the IFP senses that it holds the strategic initiative over the issue of Zulu nationalism, it continually forces us onto this terrain. The effects of this is that we tend to react to the IFP's offensive by trying to prove our Zuluness, thus reducing the struggle in Natal to a competition over who are the true custodians of Zulu traditions. This tends to reinforce the notion that the struggle in Natal is political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. This obscures the most fundamental issue; that the struggle in Natal is but one manifestation of the wider struggle between the democratic forces, and those forces who have benefitted from apartheid.

A key component of our approach should be to consistently expose the dangers of dealing with Zulu tribalism through the prism of Zulu tribalism. It is not by narrowly

presenting ourselves as Zulus that we will challenge Inkatha's tribalism, but it is by demonstrating that being Zulu is not in conflict with national liberation. In fact Buthelezi's main weakness in his appeal to Zulu nationalism is to equate Zuluness with freedom, as if the struggle of the African people in Natal is the struggle to regain their Zuluness. Instead we must show that our struggle is that of national liberation, but that will it will simultaneously protect and promote the various cultures and customs in our country, as brilliantly captured in the Sonke Festival's slogan of "One people, many cultures". Failure to challenge Buthelezi on these matters plays into the hands of Inkatha and could subject our people to further Inkatha violence in the name of the "Zulu nation".

It is very important to realise that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between a constitutional, sovereign monarchy and the type of republican and mass-based democracy we are trying to build in South Africa, post-apartheid. It is for this reason that clarity is needed on the exact role of the King in a democracy.

The issue of the future of the Zulu King should not be dealt with abstractly, but should in the present period be related to our election campaign. It is of utmost importance that we place the issue of the role of the Zulu King in a future democratic provincial government at the centre of the election campaign itself, so as to get the people's mandate on this

issue. In other words, the outcome of the election should be treated as an unambiguous pronouncement on this issue. We are all agreed that the King must be given recognition in the post-election period, but the details of this need to be worked democratically, together with the issue of the name of this province. It is the newly elected provincial assembly that must make its final pronouncement on the matter, hopefully after direct consultations with the King.

Lastly, and perhaps most important, we must not allow the issue of the future of the Zulu monarchy to obscure our primary objective: to reach to the masses of our people throughout the province, to organise and mobilise them as an invincible force for democracy. ★

ENDNOTES

[1] See Lubisi, Cassius "Buthelezi and the 'Zulu Kingdom'" in *African Communist*, Third Quarter, No.134, 1993

[2] Marks, S (1986) *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* Johannesburg: Ravan Press, p.5

[3] Quoted in Southall, R (1977) "The beneficiaries of Transkeian 'independence'" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 15 No.1, p.14

[4] Cde OR Tambo explained the role of the ANC in the formation of Inkatha at the Kabwe Conference thus:

"We sought that this former member

of the ANC Youth League (Buthelezi), who had taken up his position in the KwaZulu Bantustan after consultations with our leadership, should use the legal opportunities provided by the Bantustan programme to participate in the mass mobilisation of our people on the correct basis of the orientation of the masses to focus on the struggle for a united and non-racial South Africa. In the course of our discussions with him, we agreed that this would also necessitate the formation of a mass democratic organisation in the Bantustan that he headed. Inkatha originated from this agreement." (Emphasis mine – *Oliver Tambo Speaks*, op cit., p.146).

[5] South African Institute of Race Relations (1978) *Survey of Race Relations* Johannesburg.

[6] Comrade Mzala (1988) *Gatsba Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda* London: Zed Press

More “Red Plots” — Disinformation Campaign

At the beginning of February the president of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, Dries Bruwer, announced that white farm owners in the Transvaal would prevent voter education taking place on their farms. This statement, later repeated by the Free State Agricultural Union, is in direct contravention of the new electoral act. Bruwer cited an SACP “document” in his possession as the reason for his defiance of the law. According to Bruwer the document was supplied to him by a “reliable source in Military Intelligence”.

The African Communist has since obtained a copy of this supposed SACP document, entitled “SACP Discussion Document on the Prevailing Situation”. It is, from beginning to end, completely fraudulent. A Central Committee press release (7 February) underlines some of the obvious blunders committed by the author or authors.

In the first place, it has clearly been written by someone whose first language is Afrikaans. This explains many spelling errors (“cabal”, for instance, is spelt “kabal”), and many literal and ungrammatical transla-

tions from Afrikaans (like “the regime was with its back against the wall”).

More importantly, there is a whole series of political blunders, including:

- Our 1989 party congress is referred to as our “7th *annual* congress” — the party was 67 going on 68 years at the time.
- The author obviously does not know that to be “workerist” is regarded as a problematic deviation by the SACP. The document keeps using the term favourably (“a vehicle with which to transform South Africa into a workerist state”).

Some of the passages in the fraudulent document border on the laughable: “We have already sent a delegation to Cuba to study the structure of Castro’s office so that it can be implemented in a similar manner in our own country.” (As the Central Committee press release noted: “Our admiration for the Cuban revolution does not extend, as far as we know, to comrade Fidel’s sense of interior decoration...”)

What is more, the document cannot quite help falling into certain racist assumptions. It explains the

DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

ANC-led alliance's offer of a sunset clause power-sharing arrangement thus: "we needed some experience and expertise to be transferred from them to our people to enable us to govern the country." Given the level of incompetence and corruption in the upper echelons of the apartheid regime, it could only be a white racist who could attribute this motivation for our deadlock-breaking offer.

This is just a sampling of the numerous spelling, language, conceptual and political errors in the 13 page document. It is easy enough to establish that it is a fraud, and even to find it amusing. But the document was not written for a communist readership, and its objectives are extremely sinister not comical.

Towards the end of the document a whole series of bogus "SACP" operations are listed with their supposed code-names. "Operation Hunter... to get rid of bad elements in the police"; "Operation Prickly Pear...aimed at enemy agents in our own ranks"; "Operation Breakthrough" to deal with the broad right-wing; "Operation Trench which is aimed specifically at the IFP in Natal"; and finally "Operation Sunrise" which is supposed to be the master plan for socialist insurrection.

The list of "operations" provides the clue to the main objective of the forgery. It is designed to incite and unite the security forces and a wide-range of right-wing formations in the face of a "common Communist threat". Apart from the Transvaal

Agricultural Union, we know that the AWB has also received the document.

What is more, this document must not be seen in isolation. It is part of a wider Komops or Stratkom (strategic communications) operation. This is not, for instance, the first mention of "Operation Sunrise/Sunshine". This bogus operation was first mentioned in a story in the Afrikaans-language weekly, *Rapport*, in a vicious profile of Joe Slovo ("Slovo: nice uncle or monster?", 5 September 1993). Written by De Wet Potgieter, the profile ends with the following paragraph:

"*Rapport* learnt this week from a very reliable source that Operation Vula, the underground movement of the SACP...is still continuing. It is no longer known as Operation Vula, but Operation Sunshine, and some of the key figures in the SACP who were earlier exposed as the brains behind the operation are still part of this Operation."

At the end of October last year, the Afrikaans Volksfront called on its members to prepare for war. General Tienie Groenewald, former head of the SADF's Military Intelligence, told *The Star* that the call was made because they had "received intelligence eleven days ago on a plan called Operation Sunrise", which he described as an "ANC strategy to step up military action against members of the Freedom Alliance." (1 November 1993).

Then, predictably, the next right-wing player stepped on to the stage. In an SABC *Radio Today* interview



Mourners at the funeral of assassinated SACP leader Chris Hani, who was the target of a major disinformation campaign before his death

on 25 November 1993, Jiyane, an IFP spokesperson, claimed that Inkatha had information that “radicals” within the ANC alliance were mounting a campaign of terror in Natal in order to ensure an ANC election victory. According to Jiyane, the campaign was codenamed Operation Sunrise.

Clearly, someone is systematically feeding right-wing forces with disinformation, with a view to inciting and uniting them. But who is doing this?

Soon after the assassination of

Chris Hani, *The African Communist* (1st Quarter 1993) ran an article on the major disinformation campaign targeting Hani in the months and weeks before his death. In that article we quoted Major Nico Basson, former head of the SADF’s MI Komops operation in the run-up to the Namibian independence elections in 1989. According to Basson, more than R1 million was spent on just one disinformation company (PRO Communication Projects) in that campaign. Basson revealed that

PHOTO: ANDREW MOHAMED

a sub-department of the army's propaganda department, Komops Vyand, had been working with great success over many years in "the planting and dissemination of false information". The Namibian anti-Swapo campaign was, according to Basson, a "dress rehearsal" for elections in South Africa, "all the networks are in place". (*The Star*, 11 June 1991)

So is the SADF's Military Intelligence responsible for the present fraud? Certainly in this document, and even more in a similar "SACP discussion document", first published in the *Aida Parker Newsletter* last year, the authors are at pains to portray the "SACP" as seeing MI as a major obstacle to its "plans". MI is deliberately contrasted with the National Intelligence Service, which is portrayed as being a "pushover". Moreover, as we have already noted, Dries Bruwer claims that his source was well placed within Military Intelligence.

On the other hand, the latest document is relatively less professional than some of the previous frauds. Although it is clearly written by someone, or a collective, with an intelligence background, it seems




PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

Nice uncle: Joe Slovo has also come under fire in the vicious disinformation campaign

less well researched and resourced than in the past. It may well be, then, the work of renegade MI elements, or ex-MI agents, working with their former boss, General Tienie Groenewald.

In any event, someone is deliberately throwing lighted matches about into what is already a charged political atmosphere. As the election campaign heats up, we can expect a lot more of this. ★

Trends in the new world order

Implications for South Africa

The dramatic positive breakthrough in February 1990 inside SA, coincided with negative changes in the international situation. In this paper (first delivered to the Conference on Global Change, Cape Town, February 1994) **RAYMOND SUTTNER** looks at these international changes, notes some new positive counter-tendencies, and considers the implications for SA.

A qualitative change in the international balance of forces developed in the late 1980s. Its general features were emerging before then, and have developed further in subsequent years. Despite the insularity of South Africans, which has perhaps worsened due to recent dramatic internal developments, we have been very aware of this change. It is, nevertheless, necessary for us to systematise what it has meant. In the context of evaluating the present state of this so-called "new world order", we have to ask what challenges and tasks it places before us in South Africa and in the South in general.

But before doing that, it is important to

stress what the "old world order" meant for us in the South African liberation movement. The collapse of eastern European and particularly Soviet socialism has been a noteworthy event for the South African liberation forces. It may be that some cynically think that it happened at just the right moment when, moving from the "politics of resistance" to the "politics of government", Soviet and east European assistance was no longer required. It is, nevertheless, crucial to acknowledge the substantial role that the former socialist states played in getting us to the point where the regime was prepared to negotiate, creating the conditions which place us on the threshold of



democratic power. That it is less fashionable to make this acknowledgement now, makes it no less true.


It may be that the armed struggle was not the decisive factor in changing the political conjuncture within our country. But certainly it was a fundamental element, and the fact that it was sustained with varying degrees of strength for thirty years was in no small measure due to the support of the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic.

The diplomatic support that these states gave our struggle and that of national liberation and third world struggles in general was consistent. There is little doubt that, whatever the negative side effects in terms of some of the influences, these states provided selfless assistance to us, which could have been used to avert or mitigate some of their own domestic problems.

What then are the general characteristics of the

collapse of the "old world order", which prevailed in varying degrees from the end of World War II until the late 1980s?

The most significant feature, just mentioned, was the collapse of socialism in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. What this meant was that the cold war had been won by the West. There was no longer any military nor any substantial diplomatic counterweight to im-



perialism.

At the ideological level this led to a major offensive, proclaiming "the end of history". According to this capitalist triumphalism, with the collapse of eastern European socialism, capitalism was now the only horse in the race — "the socialist episode had closed".

The collapse of the eastern European states has also coincided with profound crises of progressive third world states. All the governments hailed as revolutionary in the 1970s — Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Malagasy Republic, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Grenada and at times, Peru, and Bolivia are in crisis or no more.

This disintegration of the militant centre of the non-aligned movement, including the collapse of Yugoslavia and the (mainly externally-inspired) Cuban crisis, has meant that there are few effective counterweights to the imperialist states within the third world. Without an effective non-capitalist counterweight to imperialism, terms of trade and investment can be imposed upon the South more easily. There are very few remaining effective blocs of third world states and relationships between liberation forces in the South have been cut down to a minimum (apart from the important Sao Paulo Forum initiative in South and Central America).

This situation contains grave dangers for the maintenance of state sovereignty of weaker states, and exacerbates the possibility of intervention in the policies of liberation movements. There is also a massive

ideological crisis within the social formations of the South, with the crisis-ridden North, pretending to have solved their own crises for all time, proffering extensive advice about the 'only' path to follow.

New world order at its inception — and at its height?

● *Increasing militarism.* With the removal of the Soviet counterweight to American aggressive designs the onset of the so-called new world order immediately saw an increase in the deployment of military force.

Under the guise of the United Nations there have been imperialist military interventions in Iraq, Panama and Somalia.

The question is not whether any one of the states invaded had warranted one or other form of international attention or even intervention. What is significant is that armed force has become a preferred and early method of involvement in conflicts.

● *US capture of UN and other international institutions.* One of the features of the history of the UN since its inception has been the limitations on its authorisation of sanctions and force, in particular through



the balance of power in the Security Council between the US and the Soviet Union. It was only in the Korean war, when the Soviet Union temporarily boycotted the Security Council, that the US illegally used the Security Council to authorise military action. The use of UN sanctions was implemented on a compulsory

basis only for the first time in 1977 with the arms embargo against SA.

The weakening of the Soviet Union and its gradual collapse has seen the virtual capture of the UN by the United States, which is now more and more using the UN as a cover for its own military intentions. National sovereignty, a fundamental tenet of the UN Charter, is now flouted

by the US under the UN flag.

There has, at the same time, been a downgrading of UN bodies which have been dealing for years with disarmament and development. At an economic level, various specialised UN agencies have been turned into adjuncts of imperialist institutions, such as the IMF. Many of their headquarters have been shifted

from Europe to New York (for instance, the World Food Council has been moved from Rome to New York). The emphasis of UN economic activities has shifted to analysis, planning and programming for international development to be implemented by the Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank, IMF and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, where the developing poorer countries are at the mercy of the rich.

● *Imperialist dictation of economic policies to the South and former socialist Eastern Europe.*

With this new balance of forces, the IMF has been able to more or less impose a universal conception of economic development and growth. The power of the South to resist has decreased through the lack of any other alternative. No matter how limited socialist economic assistance might previously have been, it did at least offer some alternatives, even if only as bargaining chips against the imperialists.

Imperialist economic dominance over Latin America is not new, though its neo-liberal model is a new approach aimed at maintaining heightened relations of exploitation.

This new world order has seen the virtual recolonisation of eastern Europe. In many ways Russia has been de-industrialised and reduced to an exporter of primary products. Wholesale privatisation of state enterprises has seen large sections of the population lapsing into unprecedented poverty, while welfare benefits have been removed. In Russia,



★ National sovereignty is now flouted by the United States under the UN flag

particularly, this has been accompanied by a suppression of basic democratic liberties, with the support of major imperialist powers.

Inter-imperialist contradictions

The relative global dominance of the US needs to be qualified in at least two significant ways:

- despite its cold war victory, the US itself has serious internal structural problems of both a social and economic kind. It has not, therefore, been able to take full advantage of its new ascendancy.

- related to this, and partly because the US has taken on itself the role of pre-eminent imperialist military power (squandering billions on arms), other imperialist economic centres (western Europe and the Pacific Rim — notably Japan) have begun to challenge US economic supremacy. The present world situation, which is more unipolar than before, nonetheless also has multi-polar features.

Shifts in imperialist thinking

One important shift in imperialist thinking that started taking shape in the 1980s, has been a more sophisticated approach towards authoritarian regimes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the argument for holding onto discredited, corrupt dictatorships has been less persuasive than former imperialist cynicism allowed (see the old “he’s a son of a bitch but at least he’s our son of a bitch”). Pressure began to be exerted

on various dictatorships to liberalise, to allow free elections, multiparty systems, etc. In this context, elections have been held in places like the Philippines, Kenya, Chile, and now soon, of course, in SA.

Imperialism has responded to popular mobilisation (mobilisation that might well have led to revolutionary overthrows) in a variety of authoritarian third world countries, by pressurising these regimes towards the “IMF formula” for democracy. The formula entails a degree of political liberalisation, notably multiparty elections, but the denial of fundamental social transformation. The holding of free elections is intended to absorb all popular aspirations and to be seen as the end of the process of transformation.

Present phase of the new world order

When the ANC alliance entered into a new phase of political struggle in February 1990, this was overlaid by a relatively unfavourable international environment. One of the features of this environment was that the economic doctrines of the incumbent apartheid regime, with its new found neo-liberal rhetoric, had more resonance than the reconstruction policies of the ANC alliance (then less sophisticated in their formulation than they are now). Attempts by the ANC to redress social and economic inequalities looked likely to meet massive counter pressures from an international world dominated by the US multinationals.

Four years later, it is important that we note that, while the dominance of imperialism remains, there is not the same confidence and there have been a series of counter-tendencies, challenging and rejecting the neo-liberal economic and political project:

● In Latin America, in particular, there have been a number of demonstrations of rejection of the neo-liberal order — examples include the recent eviction of the Brazilian and Peruvian presidents, in the first place over corruption, but corruption that was linked to their privatisation policies. There is a strong possibility of the Brazilian PT (Workers' Party) winning elections later this year. In Uruguay last year, 72% of the population voted in a popular referendum against privatisation. In Venezuela a left-centre president recently won elections. In Mexico the recent rural uprising, which amongst other grievances, was a revolt against land privatisation, seems likely to provide an advantage to progressive forces in forthcoming elections. The left is likely to perform well in elections in El Salvador to be held in March.

What is significant, in the light of the breakdown of the nonaligned formations and various regional formations of the South, has been the establishment of the Sao Paulo Forum of left groupings of Latin American and the Caribbean. The Forum has helped develop a cohesive approach, among diverse formations, in the face of the imperialist neo-liberal onslaught. The breadth of

left unity in the Forum may well be unprecedented on that continent.

No such similar grouping is found on other continents to my knowledge.

● In the former socialist states we are now seeing a wholesale rejection of the shock therapy imposed on them by the likes of Yeltsin in Russia. There is growing mass rejection to the reimposition of capitalism in many parts of eastern Europe. At a political level, this has been manifested by a resurgence of support for reconstituted left/communist forces in countries like Lithuania, Poland, Russia and in the eastern parts of Germany.

● In Africa the New World Order appears to be having its own way to a greater extent. There is no unified regional approach to dealing with these questions. The OAU has gone into decline. There are numerous areas of instability, most notably in Somalia and in Angola, where the UN and the world generally has allowed a legitimate election to be openly subverted. There has, however, been the beginnings of an emergence of social movements in Ghana and Nigeria, protesting against the impact of neo-liberal economics, and in Malawi and Kenya there are important movements for multi-party democratisation.

● *But what has emerged most clearly in this period is that the imperialist victory in the cold war has not led to a renewed confidence in capitalism. What has been demonstrated clearly, throughout the world, is the incapacity of the capitalist mode of produc-*

tion to solve basic social and economic problems.

Awareness of this fact is not confined to the continents already mentioned. It is clear from within the major imperialist countries themselves, though this has generally not led to the birth of broad left movements. It is, however, significant that recent elections have seen very impressive performances by left-wing (formerly communist parties) in municipal elections in parts of Germany as well as in Italy. The possibility of Italy being ruled by a left government, comprising primarily renewed communist forces, after the March 26 election is a real possibility.

The New World Order and SA today

This peculiar world situation throws up various challenges for the new South African government, the ANC as such, and the tripartite alliance as a whole. I think that we must understand the future South African foreign policy as having more than one actor.

At one level, there will be a government of national unity within which the ANC is almost certain to be the dominant party. At another level, although there is not enough clarity on this matter, the ANC as a liberation movement will need to conduct its own relatively independent international relations. In part this is motivated by the fact that the ANC as a movement would be able to make essential interventions that may be too sensitive or unsuitable



for a government, especially a Government of National Unity, to make.

But even if the ANC were to be ruling alone, it is important to understand the need to separate government to government and party to party relations. The latter relations permit different levels of solidarity and interaction. It is also important to understand that the other formations of the tripartite alliance, the SACP and COSATU, have an important foreign policy potential, a potential that is crucial at this time of the decline of the left. For that reason, there ought to be some division of labour, and also overlap or dupli-

cation, between the various components of this alliance and the government of the day in pursuing foreign policy in the period ahead.

At a general level, the new situation throws up a need to neutralise forces in the new international order which might aim to subvert South African independence, reconstruction and internal liberty. Our chances of doing this are related to the way we relate to the world, and the way we relate to the world is a function of our internal situation.

A narrowly based UNIP government in Zambia, for instance, was not able, in negotiating with the IMF, to carry the weight of a broad constituency. To the extent that the ANC alliance carries the widest possible popular weight and a broad national consensus — including perhaps sections of capital — into its dealings with the international community, to that extent it is strengthened. Without this kind of weight behind it, an ANC dominated government will not be able to maintain its sovereignty and win support for its reconstruction goals.

In addition, the new government will have to contribute in the new world order, as a newly independent state, towards the strengthening of the United Nations as a force for democracy, national sovereignty and development. This will involve struggling to remove the present, often unilateral domination of the UN by the US.

At a regional level, we need to facilitate South-South relations. The conditions under which South Africa

now enters such relations in the region may provide a considerable boost to economic development in the entire subcontinent.

On a broader international level, the prestige that the ANC and particularly cde Mandela enjoy internationally can be used to facilitate the revival of the Non-Aligned Movement and other formations of states of the South. We need to join together in facing common problems and also in improving our bargaining power.

Conclusion

In 1990 we entered a new phase of political engagement, on a new terrain of internal struggle, simultaneously with a generally unfavourable change in the international balance of forces. Four years later, as South Africa prepares to re-enter the world as a sovereign and democratic state, the unfavourable patterns of international relations persist. But, within these four years, important counter tendencies have begun to manifest themselves.

It is crucial that the new South African state throws its weight behind those forces committed to struggling against the injustices of the so-called new world order. Indeed, the fate of South Africa's reconstruction programme has an international dimension. The extent to which we enjoy real independence is crucially linked to the international struggle against attempts to impose concepts of limited sovereignty and other barriers to full independence.★

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Ja

The CPUSA responds

Dear Comrade,

In the foreword to your interview with Charlene Mitchell (AC, 4th quarter 1993) you state: "a representative of the CPUSA leadership said it would be pointless" to be interviewed by *The African Communist*. Not quite so.

As the representative referred to, let me say it would not be pointless to be interviewed by the journal of the South African Communist Party. What was pointless was an interview with Charlene Mitchell, ex-communist, on the internal struggle in the CPUSA that had been settled by the 25th Convention of the CPUSA two years earlier.

Prior to that convention, the CPUSA had gone through more than

two years of wrenching debate with the factionalists. The overwhelming rejection of the oppositionist policies and activities of the Rubin-Mitchell-Cohen group by the convention marked an end to the prolonged disruption.

Since then the Party, united around its elected leadership, a leadership replenished by many young men and women, multi-racial in composition, who have been tested in mass work and struggle.

Our Party is growing in a solid way, as is the Young Communist League. The circulation of the *Peoples Weekly World*, *Political Affairs* and *Jewish Affairs* is growing. Our legal right to exist as a political party has been reaffirmed by a number of court decisions which have

defeated the attempts of the COC (Committees of Correspondence) to deprive the Party of its properties, funds and other assets. This COC attempt was marked by an appeal to anti-communism in the courts.

There is no crisis in the CPUSA. To speak of a crisis, as your heading does, two years after it was resolved shows that the COC cannot shake off the intoxicating affects of its "glory days" in the internal factional struggle. No thanks, we prefer the struggle against the class enemy to the debilitating inner struggle among comrades.

We have a healthy, stabilised, dynamic situation in the CPUSA. In that sense it was, and is, pointless to dig up what is dead and buried. We see no point in debating what was conclusively decided by the 25th Convention. If others want to make a career of this, that is their business. We are busily engaged in dealing with the current problems facing the working class and oppressed minorities of our country as a result of US imperialism's renewed surge towards world domination (NAFTA, Somalia, Haiti, defence of Cuba, etc., and the struggles against hunger, homelessness and massive unemployment, crime and drugs, etc.).

Should *The African Communist* want the views of the CPUSA on the urgent problems of the day, our views on the prospects of socialism, etc., we would be happy to oblige with an article by our Chairman, Gus Hall or another leading comrade.

Charlene Mitchell's interview is a slanderous attack against our Party

and against the memory of Comrade Henry Winston. It is expected that a fraternal party would want to invite our Party to speak for itself and not be satisfied with having an anti-communist speak for the CPUSA.

With best wishes for a productive new year on the road to democracy and socialism.

Comradely yours,

**James West,
International Affairs
Secretary,
National Board, CPUSA**

Suttner replies

Raymond Suttner, who conducted the interview with Charlene Mitchell published in our last issue, replies:

I approached cde West to be interviewed, explaining that I was arranging to interview cde Mitchell. Cde West responded by saying that he could see no point in *his* being interviewed. It is, therefore, totally inappropriate to say, as he does, that: "It is expected that a fraternal party would want to invite our Party to speak for itself and not be satisfied with having an anti-communist speak for the CPUSA."

The CPUSA was invited to speak for itself. Cde West declined.

Bolshevism and socialist transition

by Jeremy Cronin

“Historically intellectuals have always been more critical of the capitalist system than workers... Workers, directly, make the system work, they derive certain benefits from the system, they adapt and conform to the system...” — Neville Alexander, chairperson of WOSA (*Sowetan*, 26 July 1993)

At the time of making these remarks Neville Alexander was calling for a new workers' party that would break with the ANC. He was accusing the ANC of being dominated by middle strata elements. But this protagonist of an independent workers' party seems to have some reservations about workers, “they adapt and conform to the system”! Paradoxically, given his criticism of the ANC, he sees at least a section of the middle strata (intellectuals) as, inherently and spontaneously, more revolutionary than workers.

Why this paradox? The paradox has a long history and Alexander is certainly not the first to be embroiled in it.

Let me say at once that this is

not about to be a stalinist bashing of trotskyism. My own political roots belong to the lineage that I intend to critique. This history, this lineage *includes* Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Left and Right Oppositionists, indeed all the major exponents of Bolshevism. The paradox, which Alexander expresses in a particularly sharp and topical way, can be traced back, in part, to the incompleteness of the Bolshevik break with the evolutionism of the Second International.

Bolshevism and the Second International

Bolshevism was, to begin with, the theory and practice of a socialist revolution in a backward, semi-feudal society. Of course, it was always much more than that and I certainly do not want to give the impression that I am criticising bolshevism for its “backwardness”, quite the contrary. But to be, in the first place, the theory and practice of the 1917 revolution, it had to be a political critique of the evolutionism of the Second International.

For the dominant leadership within the Second International, at the turn of the century, the assumption was that history could only advance *politically* on its most advanced side. A socialist revolution in Europe's most backward social formation (Tsarist Russia) was unthinkable. The dominant current within the Second International saw history as evolving inexorably towards socialism. The growth of the capitalist forces of production, particularly in the monopoly phase, brought us to the very threshold of socialism. All that was required was a change in the management, a change that universal suffrage and parliament would assure.

Lenin's notion of "the weak link in the imperialist chain", Trotsky's theory of "combined and uneven development", and even Stalin's very different "socialism in one country" shared a common Bolshevik critique of Second International evolutionism. The critiques of the Second International by Lenin and Trotsky, in particular, challenged the assumptions of an easy evolution and introduced back into the picture a real dialectic, a process characterised by ruptures, unevenness, struggle, in short, real class contradiction.

This critique, incidentally, also accounts for Bolshevism's much greater historical sensitivity to (and attractiveness for) national liberation struggles in the colonised and neo-colonised world. The Second International was largely blind to colonial oppression. After all, if history always advances on its most "de-

veloped" side, then colonialism was even a blessing in disguise.

Bolshevism made thinkable a working class-led insurrection away from and ahead of the most industrially advanced societies in the west. It made thinkable the alliance between working class socialist struggles and third world national liberation movements. It broke, in other words, politically with the evolutionism of the Second International. But it failed to adequately extend its critique of evolutionism into the economic. The political project was Bolshevik, the separate economic project tends to remain technicist, developmental, evolutionist. The separation between Bolshevik politics and a technicist economic perspective is neatly and problematically captured in the famous slogan that socialism equals "soviets plus electrification".

You will find this kind of dualism in numerous statements by Lenin, Trotsky, the Left and Right Oppositions in the decade and half after 1917.

"By creating a new, Soviet type of State... we solved only a small part of this difficult problem [advancing to socialism]. The principal difficulty lies in the economic sphere, namely, the introduction of the strictest and universal accounting and control of the production and distribution of goods.." (Lenin 1918)

"It is *one and the same road* that leads from it [petty bourgeois capitalism] to both large-scale capitalism and to socialism, *through one and the same* intermediary station called 'national accounting and control of

“It is one and the same road that leads ... to both large-scale capitalism and to socialism...”



production and distribution’. (Lenin 1918)

“The possibility of building socialism depends exactly upon our success in combining the Soviet power and the Soviet organisation of administration with up-to-date achievements of capitalism. We must organise in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and adapt it to our ends.” (Lenin 1918)

The Bolshevik project becomes the attempt to deploy capitalist techniques while controlling/coercing them through a powerful Party/State apparatus. But as Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer (to whom I am indebted for much of the above) insist: “capitalist techniques cannot be copied neutrally. To follow them is to reproduce the appropriate ideological, cultural, political and production relations which sustain them.” (*Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory*, MRP, London and NY, p.56)

This was exactly the point Che Guevara was to make in the mid-1960s, by way of criticism of the path chosen in eastern Europe and

the Soviet Union:

“The pipe dream that socialism can be achieved with the help of the dull instruments left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell, profitability, individual material interest as a lever, etc.) can lead into a blind alley. And you wind up thereafter having travelled a long distance with many cross-roads, and it is hard to figure out just where you took the wrong turn.” (Che Guevara, 1965 – in Carlos Tablada, *Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism*, Pathfinder, Sydney, 1989.)

Of course, there are also counter-currents in Lenin’s interventions, in which he calls for self-empowerment by workers from the base, on the shop-floor and elsewhere. But it is the other tendency (political voluntarism/economic technicism) that comes increasingly to dominate the Bolshevik project.

The Bolshevik voluntaristic, political project became a means for backward societies to “catch up” with the most advanced capitalist countries. “Catching up”, indeed, be-

comes the fixation through the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. What tends to be side-lined is the transformative project, and, in the first place, the democratisation of the relations of production.

In the interstices

What accounts for the incomplete break with the evolutionism of the Second International effected by Bolshevism? Asking this question compels us also to interrogate the **politics** of Bolshevism. As I have already said, this politics was positive insofar as it broke with the evolutionism of the Second International. But Bolshevik politics, especially as it came to be canonised after 1917, was also flawed.

It has become a commonplace of marxism-leninism that the transition from capitalism to socialism is inherently different from other transitions (feudalism to capitalism, for instance). Both feudalism and capitalism are class oppressive systems, despite their differences and antagonisms they also, therefore, have a certain affinity. It is for this reason, the orthodox argument goes, that capitalism can and has grown within the "interstices" (nooks and crannies) of feudal societies.

The same cannot be the case with socialism, so the argument proceeds. As a non-exploitative system, socialism is in radical contradiction with capitalism. A decisive *external rupture* must first occur. This rupture is, of course, the political revolution, the installation of the "worker's

state", the "dictatorship of the proletariat".

In my view, this argument makes some incorrect assumptions. It is right to draw our attention to the fact that an emergent socialism is not going to be exactly like an emergent capitalism. The most crucial reason for this is, in the words of Stephens, the fact that

"... the emergent class, the proletariat, is also the subordinate class in the capitalist system; it owns no new force of production and thus does not exploit another class... Instead of developing a new system of domination based on a new force of production, the proletariat ushers in a classless society by transferring control over the existing productive forces from the capitalist class to the collectivity." (J. Stephens, *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, p.7)

Clearly, the development of socialism requires a far-reaching democratisation of every aspect of society. But does the process of transferring control over existing productive forces have to await an external (political) rupture? Yes, says the orthodoxy.

Interestingly, Marx is not nearly so clear-cut on this.

In his *Inaugural Address* to the First International, Marx deals at some length with the successful working class struggle in Britain for the Ten Hour Bill to be passed, and he also deals with the cooperative movement. On the Ten Hour Bill Marx says:

“The pipe dream that socialism can be achieved with the help of dull instruments left to us by capitalism...”



“besides its practical import, there was something else to exalt in the marvellous success of this working men’s measure... it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the *political economy of the working class*.” (Marx, 1864)

Similarly, Marx celebrates the cooperatives as a “still greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of property.” (ibid.)

Now Marx, as much as anyone, was aware that the Ten Hour Bill in itself represented an extremely limited reform. He was also acutely aware of the utopian and experimental character of the cooperatives of the time. But it is his notion of the political economy of the working class challenging and even partially displacing the political economy of capital *prior to* a working class political revolution that is critical here.

What is this, if not the embryonic emergence of socialism (the political economy of labour) in the interstices of capitalist production itself?

If you cannot think this possibili-

ty, then socialism is always going to be an *external* project, it will have to come from outside of the production process, from intellectuals, from a vanguard party, from cadres. I am not dismissing the need for and role of revolutionary intellectuals, or a vanguard party, or cadres, still less a political revolution — but everything depends upon the problematic within which you locate these. If capitalism is conceived as, partly, a neutral technological infrastructure; or as a more or less closed “system” (to use Alexander’s term) in which every partial reform is immediately recuperated to the greater glory of capital — then socialism can only come from outside.

This outside will tend to be “the political”, or a stratum (intellectuals) who are relatively independent of the production system. Once you get into this kind of conceptualising, where the outsideness of the socialist project is premissed, then a variety of *substitutions* for the working class (but always in its name, on its “behalf”) tend to follow naturally. With Stalinism there are, in fact, a

series of substitutions: the party/state substitutes for the working class; the party/state higher apparatus substitutes for the mass party and the once vibrantly independent soviets; and the general secretary, marshall Stālin himself, substitutes for the bureaucracy, — this is called the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Interestingly, Trotsky while he was still a Menshevik (in 1904) anticipated this chain of substitutions with great clarity:

“The party organisation [the caucus] at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the party as a whole; and finally a single ‘dictator’ substitutes himself for the Central Committee.” (Trotsky quoted in I Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, 1954, p.90)

Unfortunately, tragically, Trotsky was soon to forget his own predictions.

Similar, if less devastating, substitutions have also tended to occur in other traditions. In many ultra-left projects a small intellectual elite substitutes for the working class. In much of social democracy, the welfare state, its technocracy and the parliamentary party increasingly substitute for the class they claim to represent, people tend to be reduced to the consumers of welfare.

What is absent in these various versions of socialism as a political project intervening from outside of production is a thorough-going transformative programme of capitalist relations of production and broader capitalist social structures of

domination. Also absent is the conception of socialist transformation as a process of working-class and popular self-empowerment. Put another way, and this has been a feature of national liberation movements as well, the political problem is conceived rather more as a **transfer of power** (nationalisation, dictatorship of the proletariat, commanding heights, etc.) and rather less as a **transformation of power**, that is, a radical democratisation of power.

To summarise my argument thus far: Whereas the Bolsheviks were able to criticise politically the evolutionism of the Second International, they failed to carry this critique through to the totality of society. The capitalist economy tended to become a “system”, worthy of at least technical emulation, not the site of real, internal contradictions, whose essential contradiction is the clash between “the political economy of capital” and “the political economy of labour”. This shortcoming is itself linked to flaws in the way in which Bolshevism has tended to understand socialist political practice.

Relevance for the present

It might be useful to underline, first, what it is that I am not saying. I am not arguing that socialism can be built exclusively or even principally from the shop-floor up. I am not arguing against the need for state power, or working class hegemony outside of the production process as much as within it.

“In broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.”



I am also not arguing that socialism will be built more or less smoothly from a process of incremental reforms. I am arguing precisely against this notion, and I believe that bolshevism failed to adequately extend beyond the political, its critique of incrementalism. But, because of this, it also failed to adequately understand the significance of reforms, and working class struggles for reform, within capitalist formations. Reforms need not just be, at best, “rehearsals”, “learning experiences”, ways of mobilising workers for the “real” struggle (= seizure of power). Reforms, as Marx noted of the Ten Hour Bill, can have an inherent socialist value in their own right.

Recasting our understanding of the process of socialist transition along the lines sketched above, helps us to engage much more purposefully *as socialists* in the present. It helps us to avoid the twin dangers which loom so large:

- an unprincipled abandonment of any socialist perspective;
- a dogmatic and sterile clinging to

past certainties.

This theoretical re-orientation helps to explain more fully some of the important theses on socialism advanced in the SACP’s recent Strategy Conference (May 1993), among them:

- the affirmation, directed against a version of socialism as a project from the outside, that the socialism we should be building “will not be (one) party-centred, or state-centred — which is not to deny the importance of both a Marxist party (or parties) and a socialist state”;
- that “socialism will be essentially fought for, developed and defended, not bureaucratically, but by a *popular movement*”;
- that “socialism is not so much a separate entity from the national democratic revolution, as a crucial part of, or stage in deepening and defending it”, and
- “therefore, in the course of the national democratic revolution we should continuously seek to create momentum *towards* socialism, capacity *for* socialism, and even elements *of* socialism.”

In other words, we need to build socialism in the interstices of the present system.

This recasting of our theoretical approach also helps us to understand how we should engage, *as socialists*, in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. This is an area that Langa Zita, among others, has begun to explore in more detail.

It is precisely the notion of the possibility of imposing, in struggle, elements of a "working class political economy" on the political economy of capital that informs Zita's intervention. He highlights various struggles and objectives presently articulated within the trade union movement, the civics and the liberation movement, which, "whilst not pretending that capitalist parameters are non-existent, begin to advance positions that take society away from capitalist development." He mentions the civic movement's attempt to decommodify land, through its control by elected trusts, and the proposal of people's development banks. He also sees embryonic socialist possibilities in a democratic government ensuring that the millions of rands of public funds in large financial institutions like Old Mutual and Sanlam are used for progressive development. There is also the 25% of the present economy that is in public hands, and the millions of rands of workers' funds.

Zita calls for, and underlines the possibilities of, both "bending the logic of accumulation", while challenging the logic itself. "This means

transferring certain areas of the economic activity away from the mediation of the market to society..."

There are various choices we can make

- we can pine for some mythical socialist Paradise Lost;
- or we can score cheap points by throwing out authoritative quotes from the Marxist classics to prove that everyone else is "selling out", without, of course, offering a single concrete suggestion ourselves;
- we can succumb to the siren song of neo-liberalism;
- we can bury ourselves in ad hoc militancy, or
- we can try to chart a concrete socialist path forward for the concrete circumstances in which we find ourselves.

I have no doubt as to which is the correct choice. But it is not much more than a choice — everything remains to be done, to be elaborated, thought through, debated, tested in practice. There are no blueprints, no absolute authorities, no historical guarantees — just hard theoretical, practical and organisational work. ★

Shared values

Socialism

and religion

Let me begin by recalling the burial of Comrade Chris Hani who, by the way, was booked to deliver this lecture shortly before his tragic assassination.

The scene at the Boksburg cemetery seemed unusual to some. Religious leaders, in full regalia, officiated at the grave-side of the atheist Chris Hani. A few voices were subsequently raised within the religious community as to whether this was proper. But, leaving aside for the moment the philosophical tensions between socialist atheism and religion, the event did underline a significant commonality between religion and socialist values.

Albert Nolan (in his work *God in South Africa*) writes that, if faith is both a way of thinking and a way of living, there are both practical and theoretical atheists. The practical atheist espouses a belief in God, but denies this belief in practice by supporting social evil, for instance, in our case, racism and apartheid. "What," asks Nolan, "if the theoretical atheist in his/her practice is closer to the practice of Jesus?"

There can be little doubt that Hani, the theoretical atheist, was

The core values of religion — co-operation, human equality, sharing and liberatory hope — are, precisely, the core values of socialism. This is the argument of **JOE SLOVO** in a talk first delivered at the Summer School of the Department of Extra Mural Studies at the University of Cape Town (25 January, 1994).

closer to the practice of Jesus than many of his detractors. Hani, in the early part of this life, did aspire to priesthood, but what drove him then was precisely the same aspiration that drove him towards socialism.

And in case I am accused of evasion, I want to recall also that we not only buried a socialist but an activist who found, at a certain stage of his life, that he should shoulder a gun to meet the tyranny of apartheid. Very often the incompatibility between being a socialist and the Christian ethic is related to the question of pacifism and violence.

Here, too, the contrast is not as stark as some would have us be-

lieve. When faced with brute repression and a threat to the lives of his disciples, Jesus did not always turn the other cheek. He used force to expel the traders from the temple. At one stage he advised his disciples to sell their cloaks and buy swords for their own self defence. (*Jesus before Christianity* — Nolan) And history is replete with examples of the Christian Church wishing god-speed to men of arms, all too often in the kind of cause against which Hani was compelled to turn to the gun.

It is my contention that there is a major convergence between the ethical content of Marxism and all that is best in the world's religions. But it must also be conceded that in the name of both Marxism and religion great damage has been done to the human condition. Both ideologies have produced martyrs in the cause of liberation and tyrants in the cause of oppression.


In addressing the meeting point between socialism and religion, it is imperative to situate both of them within historical and social contexts. Firstly, religion encompasses many different faiths and within any one of these faiths, there are both forces for change and progress and forces

which have, and do, protect the status quo with all its exploitation and violence.

There are two Gods. There is the God of Trevor Huddleston, Mahatma Gandhi, Archbishop Tutu, Frank Chikane and others. But there is also the God of Verwoerd and his cohorts who claimed a biblical mandate for the ghastly system from which we are just beginning to emerge.

Let us be even-handed. The crimes committed over the centuries in the name of the great religions punctuate a large part of world history. There are not too many conquerors, colonisers or exploiters who have not used religious institutions to bolster and rationalise acts of human depravity. Yet true believers, conceding this reality, would never, on this ground, abandon faith in the moral objectives of their religion.

Surely, then, we ought not to allow distortions committed in the name of socialism to blind our understanding of the basic objectives of socialism and the calibre of its true adherents. Despite the glaring abuses



Has capitalism hijacked Christianity?

which history has witnessed in the practices of both religion and socialism, I remain convinced that among those whom we can trust as liberators from all that is evil in the human condition, are the true communist and the true believer.

I do not think that what drove Chris Hani is very different from what drove progressive religious activists. An element of difference is that Hani believed that our fate is in our own hands rather than in the hands of some force outside of history. But to the extent that believers perceive God as existing within history, that difference becomes less significant.

Existing socialism might have failed in many respects. But, if history is the yardstick, so has the Sermon on the Mount, whose values have been flouted ever since it was given. But this in no way diminishes the normative value of the Sermon on the Mount, anymore than the collapse in eastern Europe could be said to prove that the values of the Communist Manifesto are irrelevant.

The main religions of the world share fundamental ethical values, but in the South African context, the most widespread religion is that of Christianity, and it is this fact which explains why I proceed to illustrate my contentions through the commonalities of Marxism and Christian faith, or more particularly through some of the teachings and practices of Jesus Christ.

A Canadian poster which I have in my office shows a working class woman leaning on a fence in a pen-

sive posture. The words on the poster read:

"Class consciousness is knowing which side of the fence you're on. Class analysis is figuring out who is there with you."

Let me perhaps shock some of you by saying that this simple yet profound aphorism would place the founder of Christianity in the category of a class conscious socialist. Huddleston (*Spirit of Hope*) puts it most directly: "For me, Christianity and socialism ... (form) a unity... I am convinced that to be a Christian is to be a socialist and I like to tell my socialist friends it will do their souls good to read the New Testament story of Jesus."

Jesus and his disciples knew which side of the fence they were on. It was on the side of the wretched of the earth, the dispossessed and the oppressed. As Frei Betto says (in his *Fidel and Religion*):

"He chose to be born among the poor as the son of a carpenter... he spoke to everyone, both rich and poor, but from a specific social stand, from the social stand of the interests of the poor... he reflected the interests of the oppressed strata

†
Huddleston:
"To be a
Christian is
to be a
socialist."

of the times. If the rich man wanted to have a place next to Jesus he had to opt for the poor. There isn't a single example in all the gospels of Jesus's welcoming a rich man beside him without first making him commit himself to help the poor."

Those who would be at his side were abjured to sell their possessions and to share the proceeds with the poor (LK 12:33-34; 14-33) And if a rich man wanted to enter the king-

dom of heaven he had virtually to commit class suicide.

Even the most cursory reading of the teachings of Jesus would indicate that it is socialism and its values that should most naturally be associated with Christianity. Capitalism, by contrast, is thoroughly anti-Christian. It is at variance with the most basic values of the Bible and,

indeed, of all the world's great religions. Let me touch on four values which seem to me to be the cornerstone values of both socialism and Christianity.

In the first place, there is the consistent commitment in the Bible to those thoroughly non-capitalist values of community and co-operation. The ethos of the Bible is not the ethos of an unbridled free mar-

ket, the frenzy of the stock market or of privatisation and self enrichment from the labour of others.


In the second place, and closely related to the above, there is the deep-seated and, indeed, revolutionary Christian value — human equality. This expresses itself in the belief that we are all made in the image and likeness of God. We can debate whether or not there is a God, but the belief in the unity of God, and humanity's reflection in Him is a powerful symbol at the very least of human equality.

What could be more distant from capitalism, whose existence depends on a radical division between owner and non-owner of the means of production, between capitalists and workers? What could be more distant from the principle of our common, shared, single humanity, one people on earth, from a capitalism whose very origins and survival depend on the divisions of humanity into haves and have nots?

This brings me to the third basic value common to both the Bible and socialism. This is the value of sharing, of redistribution, on the basis of need not on the basis of individual wealth and power.

"The heart of the multitude of believers was one, and their soul was one there was no poor person among them, since whoever possessed fields or houses sold them, bore the proceeds of the sale and placed them at the feet of the apostles, and a distribution was made to each one in accordance with his needs." (Acts, Book 4, Chapter 32,

†
**Capitalism is
thoroughly
anti-
Christian**



The Church – A site of struggle between the old and the new

Verses 34, 35)

What does that sound like to you? Certainly not like those who exhort us to go forward and enrich ourselves — with the handy self justification that this is somehow in the general interest. It sounds rather more like Karl Marx's basic categorisation of the Communist ideal, as a society in which everyone works according to his or her ability and each is rewarded according to his or her need.

†
**The origin
of the
Communist
idea is
the New
Testament**

And then there is the fourth basic shared value, it is what we might call liberatory hope. The promise of some vastly improved future, whether it is portrayed in secular terms, or as a Kingdom of God, may, it is true, act as a demobiliser. It may encourage resigned passivity in regard to the present. But, for those who are op-

pressed, the dominant effect of some form of liberatory hope, of an alternative vision, is I believe a powerful mobiliser. It can, and does empower ordinary people into collective action, action which can begin to fulfil the vision itself.

It seems to me that the Bible is filled with precisely this message of liberatory hope, and in the words of Jesus, reading from the Book of

Isaiah, it is a message directed especially at the poor:

"The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has appointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." (Luke Chapter 4, Verses 18 and 19)

This is certainly not merely a promise of pie in the sky when you die.

My point is that the message of liberatory hope remains fundamentally foreign to the prophets and apostles of capitalism. You are black, you are a woman, you are in a developing Third World situation, you are a worker, you are an unemployed Bantustan dweller — bad luck. Hope a little, but do not hope too much. Isn't it telling that day after day the ANC is asked the question: "How are you going to deal with people's aspirations?" By "deal" the question usually means, of course, "manage" if not "suppress". The implication of all of this is that popular aspirations are somehow an embarrassment, something to head-off if possible.

These points of profound commonality between the core values of socialism and Christianity are not purely fortuitous. They are anchored in a shared history. According to Miranda (*Communism in the Bible*):

"The origin of the Communist idea in the history of the West is the New Testament ... the banner the Communist groups and movements

marched under from the first century through the Middle Ages all the way to Wilhelm Weiteling ... in whose pro-Communist organisation Marx and Engels were active in their youth — was the new Testament.”

If we go back to the historical roots of Marxism in the West, then we find that those roots are thoroughly Christian. Saint Simon, Cabet, Lamennais, Le Roux, Considerant in France, Ludlow in Britain — almost all the early modern socialist thinkers, were Christian. They turned to the Bible for support and inspiration. They saw themselves as continuing a long Communist Christian tradition, not breaking from it.

When, in the middle of the 19th Century, scientific socialism emerged with the theoretical work of Marx and Engels, it did so, it is true, largely in the form of a critique of the earlier Christian socialists. The new scientific socialism was critical of their woolliness, their impracticalities, and above all, of their attempts to launch small socialist experiments, islands in a capitalist ocean. The new socialism was also avowedly atheistic.

But its break with the earlier socialism is not total — it was dialectical. It drew heavily on the early Christian socialists anti-capitalism, and above all it grounded itself upon and even took for granted, the most basic ethical values which had been articulated earlier. Those values are precisely the ones I itemised earlier — a spirit of collectivism, of sharing, of equality, and of revolutionary op-

timism.

Despite this convergence, the divide between the Christian tradition and socialism widened in the last half of the 19th century and during the major part of the 20th century. The philosophical gap between materialism and idealism sharpened progressively, and threw a blanket over some of the key ethical commonalities of both ideologies.

On our side, the over-simplified phrase that religion was “the opiate of the people”, dominated the perceptions of most Communist revolutionary activists. Failing to draw a distinction between the practice of institutionalised religion and the moral potential of Christian teachings, we saw religion as nothing more than an instrument of capitalism. In doing this communists, as it were, donated all believers to the other side, and invited their hostility by the way in which believers and their institutions were treated in the socialist countries. The right not to believe was transformed into state policy leading to persecution and discrimination against believers. In a way it was a sort of counter-inquisition.

In any case, on reflection, the

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**Communists
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maxim that religion is the "opiate of the people" is fundamentally unMarxist. It contains what is certainly a part truth, but is completely one sided, which is to say undialectical. You cannot analyse religion except dialectically. The church (and religion more generally) have certainly been used for obscurantist purposes for deferring struggles to redress injustices and suffering on this earth, but religion has also been a weapon of the oppressed, a powerful voice of opposition in the face of tyrannies of all kinds.

South Africa is itself a telling example of this paradox. On the one hand, the racist state and its adherents and more particularly the establishment church, projected its mandate as coming directly from God. On the other hand, some of the most committed radicals on the side of liberation came from the ranks of the church.

In general, the liberation theology in Latin America and other places began to rescue the earlier tradition of Christian humanity from the grip of church institutions which were perceived as part of the mainstay of ruling class inequities.

In South Africa, the re-examination of the roots of Christianity was evidenced by the Kairos Document which provided a significant depar-

ture point. On our side, the liberation of Communist dogma from its separation between socialism and democracy and the emergence of a fresh spirit of tolerance towards the complexities of ideological disputes is more and more opening the way for a constructive dialogue between Communists and Christians. I have no doubt that we can begin to find each other through our shared values and principles.

Above all, in the spirit of that fine Biblical maxim, ("by their fruits you shall know them"), we shall find each other, as we have increasingly been doing, in practical, active struggle, shoulder to shoulder in a quest for a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, and united South Africa; a South Africa which will guarantee the right to believe, or not to believe — a South Africa in which the ultimate blasphemy of apartheid will be no more.

Let me end with a paraphrase of one of the kinder things which Lenin said about religion: Let us stop concentrating exclusively on the debate about whether there is or is not a paradise in heaven. Let us work together to build a paradise on earth.

As for myself, if I eventually find a paradise in heaven, I will regard it as a bonus. ★



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

ANC leaders Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa and Walter Sisulu at the Conference on Reconstruction and Strategy in January

Broad strategic tasks facing the ANC after April 28

This is a slightly edited version of the discussion paper presented to the ANC National Conference on Reconstruction and Strategy, Johannesburg, January 21-23, 1994.

Introduction

This paper does not purport to be a comprehensive strategy for the period that lies ahead. Its aim is primarily to provide a framework for discussion and pinpoint problem areas.

The ANC was formed in the wake of the 1910 Act of Union. Its

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first aim was to unite the African people, over time it became a broad movement of liberation dedicated to building a new nation on a democratic foundation. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is one of the products of this nation building project. It needs to be understood, not as a set of technical demands, but as one of a series of processes correcting the wrongs of 1910, ensuring that sovereignty becomes popular and substantial.

PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

This paper does not focus on this history, but looks primarily at the present. As a result of struggles on a variety of fronts



The elections will be a crucial moment in an ongoing process of democratisation and transformation

over many decades, culminating in the phase of ungovernability of the 1980s, a new phase and terrain were opened up on February 2 1990 with the unbanning of our organisations. The years that followed saw us engaging the regime in negotiations and various forms of mass struggle.

Out of these processes we achieved something fundamentally new, which constitutes the concrete conditions under which the ANC will assume office and will have to implement its programme of transformation.

Within these conditions there are opportunities to advance the strategic objectives of the ANC and its allies, and also concrete obstacles, ranging from counterrevolution to the specific conditions of government under which we will operate.

The resolution of these problems and utilisation of prospects opened up, raise questions regarding the role of the ANC in government and the relationship between parliamentary democracy and mass democracy.

How substantial the opportunities will be, and how formidable the obstacles we encounter, will in turn be related to the character of the election victory that we obtain.

Meaning of presumed election victory

On April 27 we will make a decisive break with the past, through democratically electing a parliament. It is a decisive but not complete break. It should be a moment of great victory, but it will not yet be a

completion of our tasks as a movement aiming to free our people from apartheid tyranny. It should open the possibilities for an ever widening and deepening of democracy and, through the RDP, bettering the lives of all.

April 27 is thus a crucial *moment* in an ongoing *process of democratisation and transformation*.

● We enter a fundamentally new period and conditions of struggle. We will operate in institutions that were previously not open to us, allowing the possibility of progress previously feasible.

● We need to establish how best we can function in this period to achieve our fundamental objectives. But we must immediately set about achieving substantial goals that contribute towards the realisation of our broad overall strategic objectives.

It has been remarked that after April 27 we assume office, but not power. We need to be very clear as to the character of the obstacles that we face, but more importantly what type of power is needed to take us forward in this new terrain.

A strategy must address how best we can use the opportunities, what forces we harness, how best we can marshal these forces, organised in what manner, to advance our goals. The same strategy has to address how best the obstacles and the constraints can be overcome or minimised.

Such an analysis requires both a command of the broad sweep of forces entailed, as well as a specific analysis of concrete conditions of

government — in particular in a system of Government of National Unity (GNU). Such a GNU may take on a number of permutations which we cannot entirely predict.

We are committed to the traditional goals of our movement — broad national democratic transformation, and this entails both democratic empowerment and self-empowerment and a programme of reconstruction and development. The question is how we, as a movement, understand and develop the link between the various centres of **democratic power** and harness these towards achieving broad democratic goals.

The GNU/Parliament

We will be entering governments of national unity *at various levels* — at the central level as well as provincial and local. Our powers are conditioned by having partners in these governments who do not share our objectives, our conception of nation building and RDP.

The power of our opponents may be greater where they are part of government, and all the greater where election victory has made their position more powerful. Of course, power-sharing when we are dominant may also create conditions for us to win our opponents over to our plans. There are, of course, many other scenarios.

We will occupy dominant power in parliament and the GNU, but there are other centres of power — in the civil service, army, parastatals, economy, etc., which will, at

PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS



The Mass Democratic Movement Reconstruction and Development Programme Conference – reconstruction is not just a government concern

first, be virtually unreconstructed.

We need to consider how best we can advance national and democratic power in the face of opposition in each of these sites of power and how best we can reconstruct such sites. Where required, it may be possible to shift power towards another site where the democratic force can be more powerfully manifested.

This means, amongst other things, that we need to carefully analyse the way in which government is structured and ensure that ministries are devised in a manner that manifests the least blockage of democratic and transformational advance.

If we rely on the GNU and the civil service alone for implementation the RDP is doomed.

We should recall that while the

GNU entails restraints imposed by partners who may fly in the face of huge majority aspirations, the parliament will more truly reflect popular power. How best do we balance the relationship between the two institutions in order to allow minority participation in parliament, without negating the importance of the numbers who, through the election, have indicated what they want government to do?

Central power and decentralisation

We have agreed to an interim constitution that entails power-sharing executives at all levels. Insofar as the RDP, and democratisation in general, have to be realised and implemented at all levels, this means that there may be a possible conflict between the national level and the provincial.

How do we deal with such conflicts? A difference between the national and a particular region may not necessarily be something negative and we must operate, as a new government, in a manner that recognises the possibility of individual regional creativity that may differ from that of the approach of other regions.

This is not to say that there may not be attempts by a region to actually frustrate national reconstruction goals.

We need to work out how to deal with this, while distinguishing such attempts to frustrate overall transformational goals from legitimate regional interests that need to be accommodated or dealt with sensitively.

Cumulative and qualitative gains

The character of the terrain on which we will be operating is, therefore, one where, because of the constraints that we face, there will be prolonged and ongoing contest and struggle over the direction and character of the transition. There are some who advise us that 'successful transitions' do not seek to go beyond political rights. The concept of democracy that we are urged to accept is one that does not consider the social conditions of our people.

Consequently our advance will entail struggle for a process of cumulative advance towards the consolidation of national democratic transformation. No single structural

reform will, in itself, complete this process. But considered together, over time, we must overcome obstacles and secure the series of advances that will entail a qualitative transformation in the lives of those who are now oppressed.

What power do we deploy?

To achieve such an advance requires a combination of forces inside and outside of parliament. This interrelated array of forces has to be deployed against a range of obstacles. These obstacles have to be clearly identified in order to develop the most appropriate ways of dealing with each.

We need to understand that the balance of forces may assume a variety of permutations, depending on our strength nationally as well as within the various provinces. We need to cater for a variety of scenarios. At this moment, there are numerous surveys forecasting a landslide election victory. We need to cater for that type of situation as well as the possibility (that has been the fate of many election contestants with such substantial forecasted leads) that we perform badly, even getting below 50% of the vote.

In our case, the translation of poll support into the logistics of transport to the poll and actually casting a valid vote is a lot more difficult than it will be for some of the minority parties. Whatever permutation the balance of forces takes in any one province or nationally, that

will merely be one terrain of opposition. We will still encounter many other centres of power where the democratic forces are not in command.

All of this makes it essential that we supplement the power of parliament and our power in the GNU with the popular power of the people outside.

The ANC must be reconstituted in a manner that best harnesses our membership in the new conditions where we are the dominant force in government. We need to ensure that there is a close and dynamic link between the ANC in parliament, in the cabinet and the ANC outside. These should all form contingents of support for the democratic and transformational goals that we advance.

How parliamentarians have conducted themselves in the past ought not to be our guide. Our representatives must be understood as political leaders, who form part of a coherent plan for building the organisation inside and outside parliament.

We need also to understand how the new conditions can be used by those located in the extra-parliamentary ANC to supplement the power of those in parliament, in implementing the popular mandate.

But it is not the ANC alone, in or out of parliament, that can ensure the implementation of this national and democratic programme for transformation. We need to draw on a variety of formations in civil society organised in various sectors, that stand to benefit if the programme is implemented. Together we can drive

this process against the resistance of various vested interests. The ANC must interact, consult and cooperate on a continuous basis with a variety of sectoral formations to advance their democratic goals, defend and deepen democracy and supplement government's efforts in implementing the RDP.

Concept of democracy


What the RDP aims at is informed by a specific concept of democracy, all of whose elements must be unpacked and elaborated:

- *representative democracy* at various levels — and for our representatives to link up with our mass support base, it means that we have to develop adequate processes and forums of accountability and mandates, etc. The representatives in parliament must develop distinct report back methods for the public in general, as well as for the ANC itself. There must also be transparency and well publicised code of conduct.

- *participatory democracy* — which needs to be strengthened and developed in, amongst other places, various forums, such as the National Economic Forum, the Housing Forum, etc. These have to be transformed from institutions created in conditions of state illegitimacy, into forums of consultation and cooperation to realise the aims of the RDP.

- *direct democracy* of a variety of types — self-empowerment and self-initiated action by organised forces on a variety of fronts.

We must also empower ordinary citizens to exercise their rights, as in-



F. THU. U. NIGEL UENING

The MDM RDP conference – A people-driven process is one driven by organisations, particularly the Alliance and organisations of the mass democratic movement

dividuals, who may or may not choose to belong to organisations or street committees or any other structures. The framework of democracy that we inaugurate must be one that allows ordinary people to do things that they have never considered within their rights and which gives them the capacity to understand and act on knowledge that was not previously their's. They must have access to what was previously barred including, of course, the system of justice, where economic factors must form no barrier.

Are we in a position to combine a process that must be government-driven in some respects, but also people- and popular- organisation driven?

Government-driven in some respects. We must expect a democratic

government to take definite responsibility for the implementation of the RDP and to ensure speedy advance with programmes of electrification, housing, education, job creation, etc. It must provide a coherent framework for all actors to contribute towards this democratic transformation, and should actively intervene through legislation and financial measures.

People-driven and popular organisation-driven. When we speak of a people-driven process we are not speaking of anarchistic popular actions, but of people organising themselves towards a particular goal. So a people-driven process means driven through organisations, in particular the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance and all the organisations of the mass democratic movement

(MDM).

In some cases these organisations bring together already existing organised workers or other sectors. In other cases, sectors may not be adequately organised. It is the responsibility of the alliance, in particular, and specific sectors where there is a particular element of a sector unorganised, to ensure that such organisation is stimulated. We think here, particularly of rural areas, where there is practically no organisation and where in many cases the ANC is weak. Existing civic organisation also needs to be strengthened.

But the implementation of the RDP goes wider than any previous processes and is in keeping with the broad conception of nation building which guides us. Insofar as a number of organisations, not part of the MDM or other alliances with which we have worked, have something to contribute towards health or education or other programmes, these organisations must be drawn in and their advice and support sought.

Reconstituting the ANC

We have looked at the GNU and the constraints under which it will operate in seeking to drive the process of RDP. What about the ANC? Are we preparing an ANC that can sustain popular power and mobilisation? Do we have an ANC that will have the capacity to act sufficiently broadly to harness the powers of the various organs of civil society to help break through the blockages? Do we provide the conditions for self-empowerment, conditions where, as in the

1980s, the creativity of the people is unleashed, this time, not against an illegitimate regime, but to advance democratisation and transformation?

Clearly these questions have not yet been adequately confronted, partly because, throughout the last four years, we have faced immediate challenges, negotiations, violence and now elections. The terrain of coexistence between an ANC as a governing party and as an organisation outside of government is one we have not yet explored. We can only try to visualise the problems that may arise.

We need to avoid two extremes in considering the future role of the extra-parliamentary ANC. One is to see it as a big or small echo of whatever is done by the government. It should not merely be an extension of the government, but a force with a degree of autonomy. Because it is located in the communities, it must relate to them not merely to defend whatever our representatives may have done, but also to respond to issues that may never have come to the attention of parliament.

This does not mean that the extra-parliamentary ANC becomes an oppositional force. It should be conceived as a force acting in combination with the ANC in parliament, working together towards the realisation of broad national goals. The ANC outside parliament can do things that cannot be done in parliament. It can link up with people and problems that need to be known by the organisation as a whole. We must be equipped to do this.

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Will the ANC become an organisation accountable to the masses only in periodic elections?

Arising from this, some of the questions we need to address can already be considered in this conference, in commissions.

● Within an overall organisational plan for the building of the ANC, we need to consider whether it is necessary to concentrate on recruitment rather than consolidation of our already massive membership.

What are the tasks of the various structures? How do we ensure that the various structures are able to perform them? Is the present structure of the organisation adequate to meet the needs of the new conditions?

● To what extent will we still need policy departments when the ANC is in government? If so, how should they relate to the corresponding departments of state? Do we not, for example, still need an ANC department of health to monitor things on

the ground, to feed into government what government may not know, and to link up through structures with other health organisations, as well as grassroots members of various organisations?

● What is the character of the relationship between a department like Department of International Affairs (DIA) and the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assuming it is under our influence? Does DIA dissolve into government, or do we still need an autonomous ANC department able to take actions, for instance, solidarity with various countries, that may be too sensitive for a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially in a GNU?

Parliament and outside parliament

Much of this requires from us a clearer definition of the link between the two terrains, and the develop-

ment of an organisation and political plan of advance that includes clear tasks for actors inside and outside of parliament. One thing must be clear, while parliamentarians may originally have been nominated or held office in SANCO, COSATU, or SADTU, for instance, they do not represent those organisations in parliament. In the case of COSATU they do not continue to hold COSATU positions. In the case of the SACP, representatives are not there as SACP, though many of those elected may continue to be office bearers of the SACP.

What is distinct about the ANC is that the parliamentary ANC is surrounded by a specific ANC constitutional structure, in the first place periodic national conferences and an elected National Executive Committee. How will the authority of the constitutional structures relate to cabinet, parliamentary caucuses, regional governments, and so on? The tendency in most parliamentary democracies is for the cabinet and parliamentary caucuses to become prime decision-makers. Can the ANC permit this while remaining an organisation rooted among the masses? Or will, or should the ANC become an organisation accountable to the masses mainly in periodic elections?

Conclusion

Our strategic tasks in the present go back to the earliest reasons for the formation of the ANC — the realisation of popular sovereignty, ensuring that South Africa in fact belongs to its people. For that to be meaningful means not merely the crucial acqui-

sition of political freedom, but the implementation of fundamental social and economic transformation.

Reference is sometimes made to the expectations of the masses as a danger. The RDP provides a realistic programme for speedily responding to these expectations. But the reference to the expectations of the masses is sometimes linked to the fear that we will lose a second election. Does this mean that we will lose it if we do meet the needs of the masses and create certain unhappiness amongst privileged sectors? Or are we supposed to postpone social remedies in the interests of supposed stability?

We cannot be deterred from implementing the RDP by the threats of our enemies. We cannot be deterred from ensuring that the masses benefit from the wealth that they have created by the fear of losing second elections. If it comes to that, far better that we honour our promises but lose elections, than that we betray our people.

We are not recklessly suggesting that we take a course that risks future election victories. But this conference must fearlessly choose a course that aligns us with the poorest of the poor and develops a strategy to better their lives in the shortest possible time. That may lead to resistance from some quarters, but in the long run it is the only basis for enduring stability and peace. ★

MZALA:

A revolutionary without kid gloves

Mzala was, perhaps, the outstanding revolutionary intellectual of the 1976 generation in our liberation movement. Many younger comrades continue to turn to his life and writings as a source of inspiration. In this rich account of his life, **EDDY MALOKA**, gives us a sense of just what it meant to be a South African revolutionary intellectual in the late 1970s and 80s.

It is three years since the SACP tragically lost Jabulani Nobleman Nxumalo, popularly known as "Mzala". He died on February 22, 1991. A number of obituaries in tribute to him were written at the time, but not enough serious attention has been paid to his life, and to his political and intellectual contributions. One sociology honours student at the University of the Western Cape has, however, written a dissertation on Mzala's contribution to the national question. A second student at the same university is in the process of completing a broader study of Mzala's intellectual contribution. These academic studies deserve to reach a wider audience.

It is important for the SACP to re-

member Mzala, not only because of his contributions to the development of our revolutionary theory, but also because our movement as a whole has always had an interest in the development of assertive African intellectuals. The numerical domination of many ANC policy departments by white comrades is a reminder of why such an interest remains important. Decades of apartheid education and imposed backwardness on black people (and African people in particular) are a central factor.

But there is also another reason why we need to revisit Mzala's contribution. The three intellectual issues that preoccupied Mzala — the national question, Gatsha Buthelezi and vigilante violence, and people's

war and armed insurrection — should be concerns for every South African interested in the freedom of our people.


Mzala was born in October 27, 1955, in Dundee, Northern Natal. He was brought up by his parents, school teachers with a strong love for books and a disciplined commitment to the acquisition of knowledge. He began his primary school studies at Louwsburg. He proceeded to Bethal College in Butterworth and matriculated at KwaDlangezwa College in Empangeni in Zululand. In 1972 at the young age of 15 he was detained without trial for his role in a student boycott. The following year he was arrested again and charged with public violence for his role in the student and worker strikes that shook Natal at the time. He proceeded to study law at the University of Natal (Ngoye) and became a member of the South African Student Organisation (SASO). He had to flee the country following the 1976 student uprising.

He was one of the hundreds of militant youth who flooded into the ranks of the ANC in 1976, and later became a soldier in MK's June 16 Detachment in Angola. He was a quick learner and a dedicated soldier. While still at a training camp north of Luanda called Funda, he was seriously injured in the face by a bullet mistakenly shot by a new recruit. He dropped down and comrades were at first convinced he was dead. He was rushed unconscious to hospital and later recovered.

His intellectual sharpness

brought him into the spotlight in the camps, and he was made the political commissar for Luanda later in 1976. He made a major impression as a commissar and later was made a newscaster for Radio Luanda. In 1978 he was one of the leaders of the ANC delegation to the International Youth Festival in Cuba. The speech he delivered there touched on bantustan politics and on sanctions. On his return, he toured all the camps to make a report-back. By 1979 he was secretary in the ANC office in Luanda, and co-ordinator of the commissariat structure. In 1980 he was one of the young commissars sent to the German Democratic Republic for advanced ideological and political training. Like the others, Mzala was the cream of the crop produced by Mark Shope and later Jack Simons.

What always struck people about Mzala was his love of books. Virtually all his time free from formal duties was occupied in reading. In 1977 he tried to write a simplified book on Marxism in Zulu. It involved six months of hard work, but I do not know what happened to that manuscript. He used to put his ideas in writing, placing them up on notice boards for other comrades to read and respond. He would, from time to time, publish in MK's *Dawn*. He often used his real name in his writings, hence he was called "Khumalo". But because he used to call everyone "Mzala, Mzala", the name later stuck to him. He never imagined himself publishing in the *African Communist* or *Sechaba*. He



thought that those journals were reserved for a certain calibre of comrade.

His first contribution to the *African Communist* was in 1980 as "Mzala". He made another contribution the following year, still using the same name. These early contri-

butions were on armed struggle and the question of arming the masses. As nobody responded to him, he responded to himself in 1982 in the *African Communist* as "Khumalo Migwe". He was to later try again to spark a debate around this issue in 1985 in *Sechaba*, writing as "Mzala".

"Alex Mashinini" also participated in this debate. He argued with himself as if there was an argument between two or more people. He possibly thought this was one way of not only expressing a different view, but of initiating a debate around an issue that he knew was preoccupying many comrades in the camps and forward areas. Not all our soldiers took Mzala seriously, some even thought that his mind must have been disturbed by that bullet!

In 1983 he was deployed in Swaziland, disguised as a journalist for the *Swaziland Observer*, using the name "Jabulani Dlamini". He rode a motorbike that needed only R5 to fill the tank. He always had a pipe between his lips — but it remained forever unlit. He stayed at the University of Swaziland and developed close links with the students there. The house in which he lived was frequented by ANC members, some of them working in the underground. Their long nights were spent in debate after debate. It was in the course of these debates that Mzala developed his "pot" theory. His argument was that one of the major problems for the ANC was that the pot was in Mozambique, the matches in Lusaka, and the stove in South Africa. What was needed was to synchronise the working of these elements in order to prepare a meal. He was later to make his polemical contribution in *Sechaba* on armed insurrection and people's war in the months before the Kabwe Conference in 1985, using titles that reflected the theory. He wrote

"Cooking the Rice Inside the Pot" as "Mzala", and "Alex Mashinini" responded with "Preparing the Fire Before Cooking the Rice Inside the Pot".

In the course of 1983 he was arrested by the Swazi police and deported to Mozambique. He returned to Swaziland around December 1983 to base in the Shiselweni district in the south as the commissar for the Natal Rural Machinery which aimed to establish a training camp in Ingwavuma, northern Natal. This was part of the ANC strategy to transfer command structures and political leadership into the country (Operation Vula was later to be the culmination of the process). In line with his "pot" theory, Mzala did not believe in what he termed "remote control". He intended to move into the country and base in Ingwavuma with his unit.

It was very dangerous to operate in Swaziland in those years as the Swazi government had signed a secret accord with the apartheid regime in 1982. The accord resulted in the setting up of a secret police unit and a witch-hunt for ANC members. The signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in March 1984 was another major step in this offensive from the apartheid state. Many comrades were being arrested in Swaziland. One day Mzala proposed to his unit that they should rescue some comrades held by the Swazi authorities. However, the mission had to be aborted after some tactical considerations. Their safe house in Mbabane was raided by the

police one night. None of the unit was in the house at the time but they were concerned about weaponry and, more importantly, documents in the house which, if discovered, would put the whole operation and machinery in serious danger. The unit moved on the house at one in the morning, but they found that the police had gone. Fortunately only the arms had been taken.

One day Mzala took an initiative. He moved to Ingwavuma on his own, established links with contacts and then, after some days, returned to his unit in Swaziland. He was greatly moved by this experience, and came back arguing that the claim that South Africa had no conditions for the conduct of classical guerrilla warfare was a myth. He had seen and been in the bush himself!

It was during these months that he wrote his *Latest Opportunism and the Theory of the South African Revolution* (1984). It was a polemical response to the formation of the National Forum and the adoption of its "Azanian Manifesto" in June 1983. He intended to finish the pamphlet within four weeks and have it distributed inside the country in time for the second conference of this National Forum. But he was, unfortunately, arrested again, and put in prison for five months. He managed to smuggle the manuscript into prison, where he completed it. He took it with him after deportation to Tanzania via Mozambique. In Tanzania he gave it to some Bulgarian comrades for publication in Sofia. The pamphlet was later

despatched into South Africa from Zimbabwe. It was only intended for internal use, hence there is no mention of the publisher nor the year of publication. Mzala had lost contact with his unit, and he never managed to see how the base in Ingwavuma grew.

It was in Tanzania, in Mazimbu, among the students of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAF-CO), that he met Mpho, whom he was later to marry. He worked for Radio Freedom while he was in Dar-es-Salaam, and in April 1985 he went to Zambia to join the Amandla Cultural Group. He was married to Mpho in December 1986 after the birth of their first child, but he did not stay long with his family. He was beginning to work on his book *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief*

with a Double Agenda (published in 1988). Some ANC comrades were reluctant to see it published by the organisation, but he managed to get a publisher in London (Zed Books), so he left for that city in April 1987. He stayed with Sonia and Brian Bunting



He argued with himself as if there was an argument between two or more people

while there, spending all his time on his typewriter and with his innumerable books.

In London he also worked on the international committee of the SACP and on the editorial board of the *African Communist*, for which he wrote "Africa Notes and Comment" as "Jabulani Mkhathshwa"). He later left for Prague in Czechoslovakia, taking over from Essop Pahad on the editorial board of the *World Marxist*

Review. He only stayed there for two months with his family, as he had to return to London due to illness. He then worked for the Research on Education in South Africa (RESA), and later registered for a doctorate with the Open University.

Mzala left us at a time when he was approaching the peak of his life. In 1990 he went with Joe Slovo to participate in

a seminar on socialism in New York. He addressed a series of meetings at US campuses during this trip. His doctoral thesis was on a topic that had been fascinating him for most of his adult life – the national question. He was concerned with South

Africa's ethnic and racial composition, and tried to apply creatively and with originality, Marxist-Leninist principles to this question. He made several contributions on this question as "Sisa Majola" in the *African Communist*.

It is not difficult in the present situation to understand how central Mzala's fascination with the national question, his own pride in being Zulu and his commitment to our struggle were. If he were alive today, he would have been in the forefront of political debate and discussion.

His writings show that he was never opposed to a peaceful resolution of the problems in our country, that is, a negotiated transfer of power to the people. But he believed in the centrality of struggle and the masses in the whole process. He was of the opinion that our hopes should not be placed in the goodwill of our adversaries. He was convinced that any gains made should be defended. Nothing was sacred for him, no-one was beyond criticism for him. He was a fierce critic of bureaucracy. He was definitely not one of those big mouths and noisy empty vessels who shiver when action calls them forth.

Our struggle is going through a most difficult phase. It needs people who are bold and intellectually courageous. Mzala's talents would have placed him the forefront of this challenge. ★



No-one was beyond criticism for him

Remembering Chris Hani

● *The Life and Times of Chris Hani*. Afravision/Safritel. Distributed by Film Resource Unit. R75. Tel 011-333-2401

● *Thami Mali Remembers Chris Hani: The sun that set before dawn*. Sached Books. R20. (Available at R15 to Alliance structures until end of May 1994)

Reviewed by Raymond Suttner

Almost one year after the assassination of comrade Thembisile Chris Hani, it is timely that a film and book on his life have appeared. Many of us knew cde Chris for a relatively short time. Consequently, it was not possible before his death to have the chance to learn some of the most significant qualities of this man.

I cannot speak for others, but in my

case, not knowing Chris before 1990, I had to disentangle various myths and rumours that coexisted in my mind together with the truth. I visualised cde Chris as heroic and got a sense of his dodging bullets and shooting back in the Maseru raid. I

also got a feeling through the extent of the enemy's hatred of him, of his general effectiveness.




PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

But many of us wondered: was there any truth in the allegation that he was something of a militarist? Also a demagogue? In asking and partially answering these initial questions in the negative, I think that we were not able to appreciate adequately how unique cde Chris's qualities of leadership were. What made Chris great went beyond such questions and related to a style of democratic leadership, communication, accessibility and many other qualities that were not found to the same extent in any other member of the leadership.

One of the problems of the immediate reactions and tributes following cde Chris's death is that many of these did not go beyond the generalities of his greatness and charisma. Something more has been needed to capture what it was that made people rise as they have never risen over any person's death. Something more has been needed about the specific qualities and deeds of this man to make us understand the impact that he made.

It is not to detract from the greatness of other leaders to say that Chris was unique. But in what did this uniqueness lie? As communists we have a special interest in this question because we need to know what we can learn from cde Chris's life in order to take forward the ideas for which he was killed.

Both Thami Mali's book and the video make important contributions towards answering these questions — extracting the qualities that made Chris so unique a person. Both need

to be studied by our cadres. Yet both have limitations.

The 56-minute film takes us through the various phases of Chris's life, including very moving interviews with one of his brothers, the real Chris Hani ("Chris" borrowed the name in his MK days), with his mother, and with his father, Gilbert 'Hendesi' Hani. In some ways, what they say of Chris as a child, foreshadows what he was to be. His brother remarks, in Xhosa: "He was a very kind person, he didn't like a bad thing... He didn't like us to quarrel with each other..."

His mother Nomayise Hani says: "There is something I think about him when I'm sitting alone...was what he was doing for me. He would clean for me, he would do everything for me. Even when I sent him to get things. I saw he would do it with a smile."

The young Chris was a devout Catholic and was persuaded to be a priest. But this was vetoed by his parents, especially his father, who says in the film: "that my child must go and be a priest, not to work for the public? I'm sorry to say — for some people are Christians [and they say:] We only do things so that some time after our death this is where we will get our reward. But a politician ...will bring us rewards now here on earth where we live."

Whether Chris Hani remained religious or not may be a subject of dispute (Limphe Hani, his wife, makes a point of his being a believer). Either way, there is no doubt that he found his calling on earth.



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

Chris Hani – He considered it essential to understand cadres as individual human beings

After starting school at 7 and finishing matric at 16, Chris went to Fort Hare, where he completed a BA at 19 years of age. Both the film and book describe his politicisation at Lovedale Mission school and Fort Hare (in a rather dull way in both cases).

After graduation, he goes to see his father, then a migrant worker in Cape Town. Gilbert Hani describes their communication with approving irony: "He was a child who would obey everything that I say to him. After his BA he went straight up to Cape Town to me and I told him that I wanted him to become a lawyer. He agreed to that [Hani se-

nior sighs] but agreed at the moment. But his doings, I noticed after some times that, no, this chap is no more interested in this. And I kept quiet."

Chris was of course throwing himself into underground ANC and SACP activities. After various brushes with the authorities, both the book and the film describe his being sentenced and skipping the country while out on appeal to avoid serving 18 months in jail.

The book is mainly chronological and has valuable material, throwing light on Chris's attitudes as a child and growing adult, the formation of his personality and values. There is

some unevenness. Some points are hardly developed, for instance, there is only one paragraph on his commitment to nonsexism.

What I think we needed from both these works was primarily a view from below, how Chris was seen by the various people with whom he interacted, in the camps, in the underground, workers, people in the rural areas, and so on.

The book does succeed in giving this general feel. Mali himself was an MK soldier in Angola, and the book particularly captures the texture of camp life and the enormous, morale-boosting role Chris played. The book, written to be accessible to high school students whose first language is not English, is fairly short and because it covers so much ground (basically Hani's whole life), it does not develop any particular theme.

The film on the other hand, hovers between a view of Chris from the top, an official view from ANC and SACP leaders mainly, and the view from those who loved him as their leader. The way in which the leaders phrase their admiration of Chris often sounds like utterances from textbooks and is very formalistic. Even where these are good summaries of Chris's personality, that is still a barrier in that it does not give us the immediacy of someone telling us how they felt about Chris, how he related to them, how and what he advised them, and so on.

The few statements from ordinary people are much more earthy, direct and bring us closer to what

this man was actually like, that he listened, unlike most other leaders, that he cared about people as persons as well as political actors.

There are some surprising absences from the film. Why were so few people from the very significant period in Lesotho interviewed? There is no glimpse of people like Thenjiwe Mthintso, Silumko (Soks) Sokupa and Linda Mti. While leaders often speak at great length, the statements of lower ranks are cut when they have hardly opened their mouths.

Where it shows Chris himself, the film is often at its most powerful. It captures some characteristic moments, with Chris speaking at rallies. The fact of Chris's infiltration into the country as early as 1974, about which some people have been sceptical and about which Chris seldom spoke, emerges graphically as he and Joe Slovo describe how the whole plan nearly came unstuck. It depended on Chris riding a bicycle, which, it was discovered at the last moment, was a skill that he did not possess. He had to learn quickly.

The film has some very good footage on the Wankie campaign, partly a dramatic recreation and partly from Zimbabwean archives. The Rhodesians open very heavy fire, and the film has Chris remarking, with characteristic honesty: "You must remember this was the first experience of battle. None of us had ever been fired at, and I can tell you it was frightening."

This type of insight into the human side of Chris, as opposed to the

view from a distance, is all too seldom seen.

There is a useful section on Chris's memorandum after Wankie, attacking the leadership's inaction in terms of infiltration into the country, an episode which is absent from the Mali book.

Again, strangely, in the middle of this controversy that leads to the Morogoro conference, Limpho Hani is parachuted into the film describing the initial moments of their romance. I do not think that the film has really worked out clearly how it wants to deal with Chris's relationship with his wife and family, and these sections come across clumsily.

One of the things that seems clear from what one hears about cde Chris was that he considered it essential to understand cadres as individual human beings. Their personal problems, he knew, could make it difficult for them to perform adequately in the military and political field. That is why people raised with him all manner of non-military, non-political questions. Chris never gave the solutions with a quick answer. As Dipuo Mvelase says in the film, he listened. He listened and helped people come to their own solutions. In short, he empowered people. But he first had to get to know them in order to do this.

Within this dimension of how Chris related to the personal, one could have located the relationship within the family. I have heard that Chris shared household duties, did things that many men in our movement scorn. I have heard that Chris



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

Tirelessly with the people

would sometimes excuse himself from other duties because of family commitments, though I imagine that this became increasingly difficult. I have heard something of Chris's relationship with his children that seems to indicate that he did not try to ram his views down their throats. Was any of this probed for the film?

One of the successes of the film is its repeated demonstration of Chris's commitment to non-racialism. A vivid example is a speech that he makes inside Modderbee prison, after a march for the release of prisoners. As always he addresses, not only his followers, but also the warders.

Although the book is only 100 pages, it does more than remember what Thami Mali has experienced of Chris Hani. Mali has done research into Chris's life and within the space limitations he presents this well.

An interesting clue to Chris's later development — his commitment to non-sexism and rejection of gender stereotypes, is related in the context of his general helpfulness as a young boy. "After school and when he was on vacation Tembisi never sat idle. He would help his mother with working in the fields, collecting wood and rain water. People in the Sabalele area had to go quite a distance to get water. Such tasks were regarded in the village as girls' work. But, having no sisters and an overworked mother, Tembisi didn't feel embarrassed at all to do the 'girls' work' himself. 'I feel shy to fetch water and firewood,' Nkosana [his brother] once complained... The other boys are going to laugh at us."

The young Chris Hani's reply is typical: "Let them laugh...These boys who pass silly comments are not going to feed you. If you want to eat, then you must get wood, you must draw water and you must cook."

Both of these works need to be studied by those interested in learning about the life of cde Chris. Whatever the disappointment one might feel about the film, both it and the book provide opportunities for us to understand better why cde Chris made so significant a contribution to the liberation of South Africa. More importantly, the human qualities that they highlight are ones that need to be embraced by all who seek a freedom that is more than a change of anthem and flag. If more of us can be like cde Chris, the future will belong to those who have until now been oppressed and downtrodden. ★

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


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
Big boots

SP Bunting: A Political Biography, by Edward Roux.

Mayibuye Books, Bellville, 1993. (A new edition edited and introduced by Brian Bunting)

In 1944 Eddie Roux published a short book, *SP Bunting: A Political Biography*. It was read keenly by a small circle of comrades at the time, but it soon became another victim of the wave of suppression that struck the communist movement in our country. One or two battered copies survived, as I remember, and were passed around furtively in the 1960s and 70s.

To anyone lucky enough to see a copy in those years, it was a real treasure. Here was an account, written by someone who had been on the inside, of the earliest years of the Communist Party in our country. As readers of his hitherto more available *Time Longer Than Rope* know, Eddie Roux writes in an accessible way. He combines pointed anecdotes and sympathy for his subject with an overall sense of history. All of these skills are in evidence in this



biography of SP Bunting.

But over and beyond these, this is a biography with a special poignancy. It is, for Roux, a coming to terms with his own conscience, an act, almost, of repentance.

There were a number of communist pioneers in South Africa, among them David Ivon Jones, Bill Andrews, TW Thibedi and, a few years later, Edwin Mofutsanyana, Josie Mpama, Albert Nzula, the young Eddie Roux himself, and many more. But if one were to single out an anchor-person through the critical years of 1915 to the late 1920s, then that person has to be SP

Bunting.

This large-framed, stubbornly honest, self-effacing man held the fledgling party together. It was he, more than anyone, who guided it from its original roots among the organised white working class and the left of the old SA Labour Party towards the beginnings of a real rootedness in the African proletariat and rural poor. He did this, not so much theoretically but, as Roux likes to insist, through dogged practical work. Bunting helped to sustain for many years a weekly communist publication — something the party has not been able to emulate for many years now. He regularly visited townships and rural areas. In 1929 he spent three months in the Transkei trekking about, campaigning electorally for the party in the most remote areas of Tembuland.

Years after “some communists”, as Roux recounts, “were selling literature in an out-of-the-way location. An old African was interested. ‘Who are you?’, he asked. ‘We are from the Communist Party,’ they answered. ‘Oh, I know the Communist Party,’ the old man said, ‘he wears big boots.’” (p.156)


The old man was referring, of course, to SP Bunting. Sadly, the man who personified the party for so many did not die a member of the organisation. SP was summarily expelled in September 1931 without a hearing or any discussion. The expulsion was simply announced in *Umsebenzi*.

The main time focus of the book, the 1920s through to the early 1930s,

covers a critical turning point in the party’s history. Through much of the 1920s we see an organisation struggling to find its feet, as an internationalist force but in the concrete conditions of South Africa. This is the party before Stalinism. It establishes night schools for workers and begins to build a new cadreship. It maintains a weekly publication. It is in the thick of working class struggles. It is a party increasingly anchored in, and facilitating an emergent mass movement.

But in the late-1920s and into the 1930s, the party is subjected to the imposition of a mechanical line formulated by the Comintern in Moscow. It is a line that corresponds to the geopolitical state interests of the Stalin regime. Much of the party’s time is consumed in debating, like religious fundamentalists, the nuances of Comintern resolutions. Factions, like so many sects, form around differing interpretations of The Word. Comintern representatives are sent to South Africa and, perhaps with the noblest of internationalist intentions, they play personalities off against each other. Under Douglas Wolton’s leadership the party is “bolshvised”. Internal democracy is suppressed. The national executive of the party is voted for en bloc according to a list presented by Wolton. Cliques develop, and individuals send correspondence to Moscow reporting on each other, behind each others’ backs. The party loses its organic roots and dwindles in size and influence.

SP Bunting had neither the apti-



SP Bunting at an ICU meeting in Johannesburg in the mid-1920s.

tude nor the appetite for any of this manoeuvring. He found himself marginalised and then expelled. But, unlike many others, SP Bunting never broke faith with the party, and he constantly attempted to be readmitted in the last years of his life. In 1936, health broken, possibly by his personal and political tragedy, Bunting died in Johannesburg of a stroke.

Eddie Roux, who had acquiesced in Bunting's expulsion, found himself expelled from the party a few

years later. This book is clearly written in part as tribute, in part to exorcise a sense of guilt. But neither of these motivations stops Roux from being an honest witness. The book serves to remind us that the first victims of Stalinism were communists and communism itself.

Eddie Roux's lost classic is now greatly enriched by a substantial introduction and useful footnotes by the editor of this new edition, SP's son, Brian. ★

— JC

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
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