



**The African
Communist**

NUMBER 45 2ND QUARTER 1971

**When Talk Is
TREACHERY**

PRICE PER COPY

AFRICA : 5p (1 shilling)

ELSEWHERE: U.K. 15p (3/-) U.S. 50 cents

SUBSCRIPTION

AFRICA : 20 p (4 shillings) AIR MAIL £1. 10. 0.

U.K. & EUROPE

1 year (four issues) 60p (12/-)

2 years £ 1.

U.S. & CANADA

1 year \$ 2.00 (Airmail \$ 4.00)

2 years \$ 3.50 (Airmail \$ 6.00)

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EDITORIAL

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All correspondence to the distributor:

**Inkululeko Publications
39 Goodge Street
London W 1 England**

THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

*Published quarterly in the interests of
African solidarity, and as a forum for
Marxist-Leninist thought throughout
our Continent, by the
South African Communist Party*

No. 45 Second Quarter 1971

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Editorial Notes

10 YEARS OF REPUBLIC-NOTHING TO CELEBRATE

On May 31 this year the South African Government will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The White man's Republic. In the 1960 republican referendum, only Whites were allowed to vote. Those voting for a Republic totalled 850,458; those against 775,878 – a pro-Republican majority of only 52.3 per cent. And in the 10 years of the Republic, White rule has been even more firmly established. The Coloured vote was finally abolished by the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1968, and the House of Assembly which was elected last year was the first in which no section of the Black majority, comprising 82 per cent of the total population, enjoy any form of representation whatsoever. It is a White man's Parliament for Whites

only, and to make the issue quite clear Vorster has ordered a new Republican flag to be designed which will be a symbol for White South Africans only. The Transkei already has its own flag and anthem, and each of the other population groups are expected to satisfy themselves with their own separate status symbols. There is to be no common citizenship.

Not surprisingly under the circumstances, most sections of the Non-White people will have nothing to do with the Republican celebrations. Meeting in Durban in January, 1971, the national executive of the Coloured Labour Party said participation in the Republican festival implied acceptance of apartheid. Even the leader of the pro-apartheid National Coloured People's Party, Dr Clifford Smith, said in Johannesburg last October that his party had nothing to celebrate.

The President of the National Union of South Africa Students, Mr Neville Curtis, has also gone on record in support of a boycott of the Republican celebrations. "What have 10 years of Republic brought us, and what have 23 years of Nationalist rule achieved?", he asked. He cited several examples of disparity between the treatment of Whites and Non-Whites in the country. Only 0.1 per cent of the African population, he said, had matric or school-leaving certificates, and expenditure on African education was less than one eighth of that on White education. "It is not unfair to conclude that after 23 years of Nationalist rule and after 10 years of Republic, South Africa is a sicker society than it was", he said.

The Vorster Government is bringing tremendous pressure on Black communities to take part in the celebrations, especially through the schools, where both children and parents are vulnerable. Some few Black pawns like Matanzima and Swartz may bow the knee. But we repeat: most South Africans have absolutely nothing to celebrate. The Republic may have an emotive significance for White chauvinists whose minds are still chained to the 18th century. For the majority of South Africans, however, the Republic is a

Republic is a prison-house of peoples and ideas which must be destroyed before the country can progress to a future in which all will be able to share both citizenship and wealth on a basis of full equality.

FREE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

One of the gimmicks which the Nationalist Government is using to drum up support for the Republican celebrations is an amnesty for prisoners. A handful of selected burglars, robbers, rapists, thieves, attempted and reprieved murderers and other criminals will be set free in the hope that they too, if only out of gratitude instead of political conviction, will wave a flag during the festivities.

For political prisoners, however, there will be no amnesty, just as there is no parole or remission of sentence – concessions freely granted to other good conduct prisoners as a matter of routine. The Government is determined to persist in its inhuman treatment of all opponents of the apartheid regime.

Yet it is at this very moment that the world has once again paid tribute to the outstanding qualities of the men and women who suffer in South African prisons because of their belief that all South Africans can live together as brothers.

Bram Fischer, Communist leader serving a life sentence for “sabotage”, was elected a Vice-President of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers at its 9th Congress held in Helsinki last July. In a letter to him the Secretary General of the Association, Mr. J. Nordmann, wrote: “I have the honour to transmit to you the fraternal greetings of the 350 Congress members and to reaffirm their complete solidarity with your courageous fight for the safeguarding of the human rights and dignity of your people”.

Another South African Communist serving a life sentence for “sabotage”, Govan Mbeki, was awarded one of the International Journalists’ Prizes for 1970 by the 7th Congress of the International Organisation of Journalists meeting at Havana in January 1971.

These testimonials of the high esteem in which our imprisoned leaders are held by the whole civilised world will, we hope, spark off a new campaign to secure the release of some of the finest men and women ever produced by our country, condemned to live out the rest of their natural lives in prison because they fought for a better life for all in South Africa.

No South African progressive can rest while Fischer, Sisulu, Mbeki, Mandela, Goldberg, Kathrada, Motsoaledi and their many comrades continue to rot in jail, deprived of any of the amenities of normal life, even of the right to read a newspaper, subjected daily to the humiliations and frustrations heaped on them by their sadistic captors.

Let us mobilise world support for the demand: Release all political prisoners in South Africa! Let us bring such pressure to bear that the Vorster gang will be forced to open the prison doors and set them free. 1971 has been declared United Nations year for action to combat racism and racial discrimination. There could be no more fitting way to celebrate this year than by taking effective action to secure the release of South African political prisoners.

S. A. "ECONOMIC MIRACLE" OVER?

There are increasing signs that the rulers of South Africa are worried about their economic prospects. During the second half of 1970, there were repeated warnings sounded by Dr. Diederichs, Minister of Finance, by Mr. Muller, Minister of Economic Affairs, by Dr. Kuschke, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation, and others. On December 8, Dr. Diederichs felt it advisable to issue a slight corrective. He was surprised, he said, to find that many newspaper reports were painting "an extremely sombre picture" and even using the word "crisis". He was convinced that "these prophecies of doom were totally exaggerated". But, having said that, he immediately went on to confess that there were "problems".

What are these "problems"? Basically, they relate to the balance of payments. Throughout the recent years of expan-

sion, South Africa has imported more than could be paid for by her industrial, agricultural and base mineral exports. The gap has varied from R300 million to R600 million a year, but in 1970 rose to a record R1,008 million, according to preliminary statistics issued by the Department of Customs and Excise in January 1971. Imports during 1970 amounted to R2,542.5 million, while exports totalled only R1,534.5 million.

These figures indicate that South Africa has reached a crisis. We normally bridge our trade gap with gold exports. Our gold production is at present worth about R800 million a year, and that figure is likely to go down in future, not up. Therefore, if South Africa's economic expansion is not to be brought to a sudden halt, there will have to be a major increase in exports.

The prospects of such an increase are not bright. On the contrary, South African exports may fall over the next few years. The reason which South African economists give for fearing such a fall is not the success of boycott campaigns; these are ignored by most economic commentators in the Republic. But a blow to South Africa's agricultural exports is expected if Britain joins the Common Market. As far as industrial exports are concerned, the fear is that South Africa's artificially restricted domestic market will never provide a base for really competitive large-scale production.

There is no doubt that if a few severe blows were to be struck on the boycott front at this moment South Africa could be in very serious trouble. As South Africa's largest single customer, responsible for roughly 30 per cent of our exports and imports. Britain is obviously important. But it is also worth noting that there is only one geographical area with which South Africa actually has a favourable balance of trade. *That area is Africa.* South African imports from Africa increased from R111 million in 1969 to R131.2 million in 1970, while South African exports to Africa increased from R254.6 million in 1969 to R263.5 million in 1970. South Africa's trade with Africa is roughly 10 per cent of her total trade. More important, it is increasing rapidly — by roughly

150 per cent between 1964 and 1970.

Of course, a good deal of South Africa's trade with Africa is with her fascist satellites, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. Exactly how much is a carefully guarded secret. The South African Government does not wish it to be known just how much or how little progress has been made in its efforts to increase trade with independent Africa. But we do know that the African boycott of South Africa is not 100 per cent, and we have also read newspaper reports which indicate that it is precisely those countries with whom South African trade is increasing that are the loudest protagonists of a "dialogue" with the Vorster régime.

It must be one of the main tasks of the progressive movement to work for a 100 per cent African boycott of South Africa, as demanded in resolutions by the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. The achievement of this target would be a severe blow to apartheid. The liberation of Rhodesia or any part of the Portuguese empire would be another blow — economic as well as political and military.

Economic expansion is, of course, important to any capitalist class, but to the South African capitalists it is vital. A more securely-based society could survive periods of stagnation and even recession. But the crazy structure of apartheid can well be compared to a bicycle, which can stay upright as long as it is moving but must fall down as soon as it stands still. There will be no more White immigrants if there is no more economic growth. The present level of military expenditure will no longer be possible. The class contradictions within the White population will once again come to the surface. The collaborationist factions among the non-White petty bourgeoisie will once again be disappointed in their hopes of profiting from their treachery. Above all, the smouldering anger of all sections of the Black urban proletariat will be fanned into flame by wage-cuts and unemployment.

Dr Diederichs has every reason to be worried. The liberation movement must now ensure that his worst fears are realised.

BLACK SESSION

The current Parliamentary session in South Africa opened to the accompaniment of a bread boycott called by the Coloured Labour Party and supported by the Black Sash and the National Union of South African Students in protest against the recent increase in the price of bread sanctioned by the Nationalist Government. The boycott, which lasted for five days, was reported to have cut bread consumption in all the main centres by about 10 per cent.

The bread price increase, of course, hit hardest the section of the population least able to afford it – the Africans, for most of whom bread is the staple item of diet. The Parliamentary session is bound to place further burdens on Black backs. One of the main items of legislation down for debate is a Bill to give the Minister of Bantu Affairs dictatorial powers over Africans in the urban areas by removing control over housing, influx control and labour bureaux from local authorities and transferring it to “administration boards” which would fall directly under the central Government. In this way, the Government hopes to eliminate the “obstruction” of local authorities which have been reluctant to carry out the inhuman measures demanded by the Government.

The Bill, which is called the Bantu Affairs Administration Bill, was published in draft form last December and is designed to implement the Government’s policy that the Africans have no intrinsic rights in the “White” urban areas. Earlier last year the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. M.C. Botha, told Parliament: “I am going to remove each and every one” of the rights Africans still possess in the urban areas, because the exercise of these rights led to “integration and equality” He made it clear that one of the rights he intended to eliminate was that at present conferred under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act in terms of which Africans born and permanently resident in an urban area, or who have worked for 10 years for one employer or for 15 years for

more than one employer without ever contravening any law, have a legal right to reside there.

The draft Bill contained a mysterious clause providing that administrative areas could be combined, and could include rural areas adjacent to any urban area; also that it would not be an offence, as it is now, for an African to work in an administrative area different from that in which he resides.

The Government has tried to create the impression that this clause will extend the labour opportunities for the average urban African, but opponents of the Government have been more suspicious of its intentions. The Rev. Beyers Naude, director of the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, commented that the Bill opened the way for the large-scale conscription of migrant labourers to work on farms where there is a shortage of labour because of the abysmally low wages paid to farm labourers.

The Institute of Race Relations also commented that the Bill presages a drastic lowering of the living standards of Africans in the urban areas. There is already a startling difference in living standards and amenities as between Africans living in Council-controlled townships and Africans living in townships controlled directly by Government boards. Africans living in Council townships have better housing, medical services, sporting amenities and other facilities, whereas Africans in Government townships are forced to live in "forbidding and inhumane austerity". Under the new Bill, the likelihood is that all African living standards will be equalised at the lower level, suggests the Institute.

The Bill gives the Minister the power to promulgate whatever regulations he considers necessary. These powers will include the ability to prescribe offences and penalties for contravention of the regulations ranging up to fines of R200 or 6 months in jail.

Needless to say, Africans will not be represented on these Government administration Boards. Not surprisingly, the Johannesburg "Star" headlined a report on the Bill: "Hard Time Ahead for Africans".

SEX AND DRUGS – “COMMUNIST WEAPONS”

Other legislation which the Nationalist Government wants to push through this session are Bills to tighten up censorship and to combat the drug menace which is steadily creeping into the country.

Under the censorship Bill, it would become an offence to publish details of extracts cut from films, or of any film banned altogether by the Censorship Board. This means that South African audiences would not only not be allowed to see offending scenes or hear offending words, but would also not be allowed to be told what they are missing.

As for drugs, one leading South African psychologist and educationist, Dr. Brian Rose, has estimated that between 10 and 15 per cent of South Africa's youth between the ages of 12 and 25 are already habitual drug takers. Dr. Rose said the percentage was increasing, and the proportion among university students could be 20 per cent or more. Another sociologist estimated that between 5 and 10 per cent of the total population used drugs.

It is clear that these figures relate only to Whites – but it is precisely for this reason that the Dutch Reformed Church and the Government are taking alarm. Last year, when the police complained that they did not have adequate powers, Premier Vorster promised stringent legislation including provision for confiscation of the property of drug pushers. Some Nationalists have said that sex and drugs are secret weapons of the Communists to undermine Western society. One Nationalist M.P. last year demanded that drug pushers should be liable to the death penalty, while another capped this with the suggestion that offenders should be executed in public.

Nationalist Afrikanerdom is clearly marshalling all its forces to combat the permissive society which is being imported into South Africa from abroad

TWISTING THE LAW

The shameful way in which the South African Government twists the law and the administration of the law to suit

its own purposes was exposed in two instances last January: the arrest of the Dean of Johannesburg under the Terrorism Act, and the withdrawal of the Immorality Act charges in the Excelsior case.

First, the case of the Dean. Arrested and held incommunicado under the Terrorism Act, he was eventually charged with possession of ANC and Communist Party leaflets in contravention of the Suppression of Communism Act. Why was he not arrested and charged in the normal way like any other accused? Why was he subjected to the ordeal of solitary confinement under the Terrorism Act? The only possible answer is that the authorities wanted to make it clear both to the Dean and to the Church as a whole that they are prepared to use all the resources of the State to suppress the growing opposition to apartheid, that they will not tolerate dissent in any shape or form amongst any section of the community.

Ten years ago, when these measures were used first against Communists and Congressmen, we warned that the attack would not stop there, that anti-Communism was merely the excuse for the introduction of fascist methods of coercion to preserve the privileges of a tiny minority. Today it is churchmen and even right-wing Nationalist dissenters like Hertzog and Marais who find themselves the target of attack. In South Africa today, who is safe from the vicious persecution of BOSS and the Security Police?

The withdrawal of the Immorality Act charges against the Excelsior 19 (5 White men and 14 African women) was said to be due to the fact the Attorney-General felt it was "clear that State witnesses were no longer willing to give evidence".

The South African authorities have shown no reluctance to use all the weapons at their disposal in political cases in recent years. We remember how Shanti Naidoo and Nondwe Mankahla were first detained for long periods in the Winnie Mandela trial, and then sentenced to two months imprisonment when they refused to give evidence. We remember also the savage sentence of one year meted out to Lesley Schermbrucker for refusing to give evidence in the trial of Bram Fischer.

Why were these fearsome weapons not used to procure convictions against the Excelsior accused? Perhaps a factor was that most of the Whites involved were good Nationalists – one was even secretary of the local branch – and the case would have done the Government no good. We would also refer to the report in the London “Observer” of January 31 by journalist Colin Smith, who was told by one of the defence lawyers “that some of the African girls whom the State were going to produce as witnesses were beaten up by white and black policemen while in jail to extract confessions that they had intercourse with the farmers”. The lawyer had affidavits and was ready to produce them in court.

Perhaps it is because of the threat of prosecution under the Prisons Act that this explanation was never voiced in the South African press, which continued to pretend to be mystified by the withdrawal of the charges.

But on the whole we don't think many people in South Africa have any illusions about what really goes on in South Africa's jails. The Johannesburg “Sunday Times” of January 31 reported:

“The film ‘Z’, based on the political murder in 1963 of Gregory Lambrakis, a Leftist member of the Greek Parliament, has been running for eight weeks at the Constantia, Johannesburg – and at every performance the audience has applauded parts of the film. The probable reason is that in some respects the film reminds the audience of the situation in South Africa – insofar as the rule of law is being threatened or undermined

“There is an odd coincidence in the film. A few years ago a detainee being questioned by the police in Johannesburg fell to his death from the seventh floor while allegedly trying to escape. In ‘Z’ the audience is told that a detainee fell to his death from a seventh floor while trying to escape”.

The man who died while under interrogation at Security Police headquarters in Johannesburg was Babla Solojee. His interrogator, Major Swanepoel (now promoted to Colonel), was photographed standing over his dead body.

In all, 15 political detainees have died while held in solitary confinement since detention without trial was introduced 8 years ago.

UGLY AMERICANS TO THE RESCUE

It is of course no secret that American investment is of critical importance to South Africa, both in terms of the aid and comfort to the apartheid regime which it provides, and in the giant profits it reaps for imperialist firms from the slave labour of our people. But we have lacked a systematic study of this investment up till now; the need has now been filled by the U.S. journal *Africa Today*, which has published a comprehensive analysis of American imperialism's economic role in South Africa.

Apartheid and Imperialism shows conclusively that, while the U.S. stake in South Africa accounts for only 12% of the total foreign investment, it is concentrated in sectors of the economy which are critically important for the development of a modern industrialised economy. U.S. corporations are concentrated in key areas of the economy such as the car industry (Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, etc.); mining (Union Carbide, U.S. Steel, Charles Engelhard); rubber (Firestone, Goodyear); oil (Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Mobil, Esso); and, most importantly of all, in finance (Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank, Chemical Bank).

These investments are not only assisting the apartheid regime in fashioning a powerful industrial base and in making South Africa much less vulnerable to sanctions, boycotts and the like; they are, in fact, laying the foundations of South African imperialist power. It is unlikely that South Africa will be able to supply industrial goods to the developed countries at competitive prices; it will, however, have a crucial advantage on the African continent. Thus, as the South African economy develops with the aid of powerful imperialist corporations, the economic necessity of South African imperialist expansion northwards is added to the already pressing political need. In short, the South Africans

are, with the help of the western powers, trying to develop a Southern African system which will eventually transform the whole of southern and central Africa into client states of the apartheid monster. This is no idle speculation: it is made explicit, for example, in an outstanding article in the January 1971 issue of the British establishment journal, *International Affairs*.

In the Kennedy and Johnson eras in the U.S., the President's advisers were of a "cold-war liberal" cast: that is, predominantly academics who were uncomfortable about U.S. support for racism in Southern Africa, and who encouraged closer American relations with independent Black Africa rather than with Vorster. They hoped that the U.S. could manage to maintain its interests in South Africa without earning the enmity of the rest of the continent. The Nixon administration has now largely abandoned even this minimal sensitivity to independent Africa's feelings and interests. The Americans have decided that they are going to assist South Africa in its efforts to become an imperialist power in its own right, to act as the "policeman" of the entire southern and central part of the continent.

In keeping with this more nakedly racist and imperialist orientation in U.S. policy, the "Kennedy liberals" have been unceremoniously booted off the President's African Advisory panel. Among those to go are Professors Gwendolen Carter and Vernon McKay, both of them assiduous proponents of American interests in Africa, but at the same time highly critical of South Africa (Prof. Carter has in fact been refused entry to South Africa); Mennen Williams, the millionaire former Asst. Secretary of State for African Affairs; George Houser, chief of the American Committee on Africa, which supports the Southern African liberation movements; and Dr. Cornelius de Kiewiet, the liberal South African expatriate historian.

In their place Nixon has placed a small group of businessmen with strong South African connections, and academics who are so right-wing that even their more conservative colleagues in U.S. universities are embarrassed by them. Promin-

ent among the businessmen is Thomas Smith, president of Farrell Shipping Lines, one of the two lines which operate directly between South Africa and the U.S. (can you just see *him* supporting a trade boycott?). Another is Edgar Kaiser, who has extensive and growing aluminium interests in South Africa (he was also the man who took Nkrumah for a ride over the Volta River project). Still another is Guido Garbarino, who works for Westinghouse, the giant electrical and electronics corporation whose South African investments are currently producing an annual profit rate of 24%. Prime front man on the academic side is Edwin Munger of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has had 20 years' experience of lying abroad for his State Department and South African allies (he did his "field work" in South Africa 1951-61, as the American Universities' Field Staff representative — i.e. as chief talent scout for the CIA).

Nixon is going to need the help of this repulsive bunch of ugly Americans: blacks, students and other radicals are making things hotter and hotter for U.S. businesses which shore up apartheid.

DAUGHTER OF THE REVOLUTION

The fight for civil liberties in the United States is today centred on the case of Angela Davis, the negro woman philosophy professor awaiting trial in a California prison on charges of conspiracy, kidnapping and murder.

Angela Davis has taken the place of the Rosenbergs, Sacco and Vanzetti, Tom Mooney and the many other martyrs of earlier American history framed to satisfy the bloodlust of a reactionary ruling class fighting to defend its privilege against the challenge of the working class.

Because the United States today is a battlefield, with passions roused on both sides, the case of Angela Davis is of more than usual significance. The fears of the rulers, the hopes of the oppressed, not only in the United States but throughout the world, are centred on her person.

Judging by past performance in the United States, the case of Angela Davis will drag on possibly for years, and the controversy even longer. For this reason it is worth setting down the sequence of events which led to her arrest and detention.

In the spring of 1969, Angela Davis, a graduate student of the University of California, San Diego, was awarded a two-year contract as Assistant Professor of Philosophy. The FBI leaked to the university authorities the fact that she was a Communist, and, challenged by the university chancellor, Angela Davis stated publicly that she was a member of the Che-Lumumba Club of the Communist Party of Southern California.

On September 19, 1969, the regents of the University of California voted to dismiss Miss Davis under a 29-year-old university rule barring the employment of Communists. The academic community of the university saw this move as part of a continuing attack by the regents against civil liberties at the university, as well as an attack on the movements representing the negroes, women, youth, workers and progressives.

On October 3 the faculty voted, by 539 votes to 12, to condemn the regents' ruling, and by 551 votes to 4 to rescind its own 1950 resolution against employing Communists.

The widespread support for Angela Davis was displayed on October 6 when 2,000 students turned out for the first lecture in her course "Recurring Philosophical Themes in Black Literature".

Miss Davis's dismissal was challenged in the courts, and on October 20 a Superior Court judge ruled that it was unconstitutional and ordered that she be reinstated. But by now Angela Davis was a target for right-wing attack, and she was subjected to harassment and threats by racists and hooligans.

Angela Davis was no ivory tower academic. She was active in the struggles of the negro community, particularly in defence of the Black Panther Party and the Soledad Brothers, three Black inmates at Soledad State prison, California, themselves being framed for the murder of a White guard.

The Soledad tragedy is closely linked with the case of Angela Davis. It started with the shooting by a prison guard



**FREE
ANGELA
DAVIS**

of three Black prisoners. The guard was found dead later that day. Three innocent Black prisoners, chosen because they were militants, were charged with the murder, and have become known as the Soledad Three.

The friends of Angela Davis supplied her with a bodyguard when she became a target of attack. One of the members of her bodyguard was Jonathan Jackson, a brother of one of the Soledad Three.

On August 7, 1970, while a Black San Quentin prisoner was on trial in San Rafael on charges of assaulting a guard, Jonathan Jackson entered the courtroom and handed weapons to the defendant and two other prisoners who were present as witnesses. Five hostages were seized, including the judge. According to the "Los Angeles Times", someone shouted: "We want the Soledad Brothers freed by 12.30 today!".

As the group attempted to escape, guards and police opened fire. Jonathan Jackson was killed, as well as the defendant, the judge and one of the other prisoners. Police allege the judge was killed by a blast from the shotgun Jackson brought into the courtroom.

Angela Davis was nowhere near the scene of these events. In fact, she was in another state at the time. Nevertheless, the police within a few days issued a warrant for her arrest on the grounds that she had provided the guns Jackson had brought with him into the court. They allege she bought them in 1968, 1969 and 1970.

Angela Davis was not around to receive the warrant for her arrest, and the FBI placed her on their list of the 10 most-wanted criminals. She was described by the FBI as "possibly armed and dangerous".

On October 13, 1970, following a nation-wide hunt, she was arrested in a Manhattan motel with a companion, David Poindexter, who was charged with "harbouring a fugitive". Poindexter was released on 100,000 dollars bail, but Angela Davis was held without bail.

On October 21 Governor Rockefeller signed an order to extradite Miss Davis to California and in due course, after a

number of court hearings, she was handed into the charge of Governor Ronald Reagan.

Angela Davis is at the time of writing in a California state prison, threatened with death in the gas chamber if she is convicted.

Joseph North, well-known U.S. Communist writer, has said of this case: "Angela Davis is under triple jeopardy. One, in being a woman under capitalism, hence suffering discrimination because of her sex. Two in being a Black woman, thus suffering the repression of racism. Three, with being a revolutionist, a Communist, one of the countless Americans who battle today to end the criminal war in Vietnam, to end racism, to end hunger. She represents the rebellious youth, Black and White, of campus and workshop. But above all she represents the unity of Black and White, the indomitable combination that can sweep imperialism aside and build a new world, Black and White unity, the unity of all races, for peace and plenty".

When she appeared in court to face her accusers, Angela Davis gave the clenched fist salute. Even in a moment of great peril for herself, she is thinking politically of what must be done to save America.

In a Ramparts magazine interview, she has appealed for a broad movement of revolutionary change in the United States. The campaign in her support should be broader than just to free Angela Davis, she said.

"I cannot be truly free as long as there exists another political prisoner and, in turn, political prisoners will not know freedom until the last starving Black child in Mississippi is assured nourishment, clothing and shelter.

"A movement must be built which, even if I am released tomorrow, can continue until the very fabric of America has been thoroughly and radically altered.

"It has almost become a crime to advocate the fight for the freedom of Black people, Chicános (Mexicans) and Puerto Ricans, for the true liberation of women and against the exploitation of working people, Black and White", she said.

This true daughter of the revolution must be saved. The release of Angela Davis will be a blow not only to the racists of the United States, but to racists everywhere, not least in our own South Africa.

Help free Angela Davis! Call meetings, sign petitions, march and demonstrate! Send protest telegrams and letters to Governor Ronald Reagan, Sacramento, California, U.S.A.

Act now!

WHEN TALK IS TREACHERY

AFRICA'S PARTING OF THE WAYS

by Toussaint

"A new and controversial course for Black Africa has been charted by Ivory Coast's President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who no longer sees South Africa as a country to be shunned, but as a powerful neighbour who can help the continent towards economic maturity and greater political maturity."

The Johannesburg Star. 4.11.70

There has been little or no attempt to explain how or why this new vision of South Africa suddenly arises. Is it heavenly inspiration? The sudden falling off of scales from the formerly blind eyes of all Africa? All that we are told is that the ageing gentleman suddenly — near the end of a long political career — discovers that “ .. the time has come for African nations to take reality into account”; that arms embargoes against South Africa and the severing of diplomatic links are “tragic and ridiculous”; and that by dialogue with white supremacist South Africa, there could be achieved that which sixty years of dialogue and political campaigning by South Africa's black majority had failed signally to achieve, “ ... a prelude to the Blacks and Whites in South Africa living together like brothers.”

We could leave the gentleman in this fool's paradise of his own making if he spoke for himself alone. But within days, his new vision of apartheid being exorcised miraculously by some quiet confidential chats with South Africa's racialist cabinet was echoed in one vein or another by several other African political leaders. Prime Minister Busia of Ghana thought “ ... we can get somewhere with a dialogue”. Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, offering Bathurst as a port for South African planes and flagships, declared that “ ... we do not practise apartheid in reverse”.

Other leaders of states in the French-speaking bloc followed up — Gabon, Dahomey — with inspired statements from the usual “well-informed sources” in Togo, Upper Volta and Niger adding their own governments to the clacque. Followed finally, naturally, by Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho.

Boigny’s proposals for a dialogue with white South Africa cannot be dismissed as a personal aberration. The speed with which his suggestions were seized upon and applauded elsewhere in Africa makes it clear that they have been discussed before, and even suggest that the whole thing was a well-prepared diplomatic manoeuvre.

The Master Voice

The main current of support for the idea of a dialogue with Vorster came from countries still very susceptible to pressure, both economic and financial, from France whose former colonial bonds have never been completely eliminated. Was Boigny in fact speaking for the Ivory Coast? Or for France?

“Ivory Coast’s desire for a new form of relationship with South Africa is understood to have the full support of France’s President, Mr. Pompidou”, writes the Rand Daily Mail’s own correspondent in Paris. “Some circles in Paris even claim that President Houphouet-Boigny’s policy has been master-minded by Mr. Pompidou personally. ...France is known to be anxious to maintain her valuable arms contracts with South Africa ...”

No doubt. The trade in armaments is shown by recent French figures to be the fastest growing sector of the French economy, and now a fundamental part of her foreign trade. Not all of this, of course, is with South Africa, though precisely how much has not been revealed. What is known is that, since Britain’s Labour government placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to South Africa, France has moved in to become the chief supplier of the Republic, whose arms expenditure continues to grow from year to year. French arms, it is known, are of all types, both those which could be said to be most suitable for major military operations against foreign armies, and those whose main suitability is for action internally against guerillas or insurgents. It is, it would appear, precisely because France is anxious to maintain this trade, that those African statesmen who still take their cue from the

Quai D'Orsay are – for the first time – publicly breaking with the policy of isolating South Africa, and calling for a “dialogue” whose only outcome can be to end South Africa’s isolation, and start the apartheid regime back on the road to international rehabilitation.

The timing of this volte face has been dictated perhaps more by Britain than by France. For during the years in which France has risen to first place in the ranks of arms traffickers with South Africa, she has managed to keep a foot in both camps – pursuing a policy presented simultaneously as friendship and trade with white South Africa, and as fraternity and aid to anti-apartheid black Africa. If South Africa has resented the so-called “community” of France with African states which followed the O.A.U. policy of isolating South Africa, there was little she could do about it.

Arms for Apartheid

The Heath government in Britain has changed the picture. Britain is clearly set on the Tory course of resuming arms traffic with South Africa, and notice has thus been served on France that Britain is about to try and recapture the French share of the lucrative South African trade. Both these imperial countries are now dedicated to preserving their own economic position by furthering the traffic in armaments. Both of them will stop at nothing to win the lucrative South African monopoly.

At the Commonwealth conference, Heath has shown how far the British capitalist class is prepared to go in this struggle. They are ready to shake up, if needs be to shatter the Commonwealth and to drive its African member states out of its ranks. They are ready to defy the UN resolution calling for an arms embargo, and to override what is clearly a majority opinion against the trade in their own country.

These political posturings in Conference are not the main issue; they are just the preliminaries, opening the way for a real sales-drive to elbow France out of its present position.

In that drive, Britain starts with several advantages. Not just the tradition of Anglo-South African arms co-operation; not just continuing naval agreements and treaties on the Simonstown base; not just that Britain is South Africa’s main customer for her large agricultural exports. But more importantly, Heath is counting on his Commonwealth conference performance. He will have shown that Britain, when it wishes to, can brow-beat black Africa into submission or into silence; that in the moments of import in history, Britain calls the tune to

which even the formally independent members of the former British Empire can be made to dance.

In a sense, Mr. Heath's intransigent and truculent rejection of all Zambia's, Tanzania's and Nigeria's objections to the British resumption of arms sales has been a demonstration to Vorster that South Africa needs Britain for more than just armaments. She needs Britain to help police anti-apartheid Africa.

Against this demonstration, France has been driven to a counter-bid. To rely on the allegedly superior military capacities of the Mirage fighter is not enough — not in the military-political realms where such decisions are taken after generals have made their purely military assessments. Heath has put in Britain's bid. The French ruling class must now counter-bid, or lose their stake. Britain has shown that she can brow-beat, perhaps dragoon the African members of the Commonwealth. France will have to do better. She will have to show that she can command the members of the so-called French Community in Africa, even to the extent of making them bow the knee to the Vorster regime, and start appealing for "a dialogue". It is a scene reminiscent of the old slave days — the captives dragged manacled and bound behind the chariots to be surrendered to the imperial victors. But there are differences. Once the captives were dragged unwillingly, protesting, screaming. Boigny and his cohort come willingly, without any attempt at resistance. Appropriately for such craven creatures, they are not delivered up before the populace at a great imperial triumph, but are merely traded across the boardroom tables in the great market halls of Pretoria—appropriate centre for a 20th century trade in slaves. There are differences, true. But the essential content remain the same. Imperialism is once again selling the people of Africa to the slavers in order to fill its own coffers.

Choosing the Future

It is easier to understand the motives of Britain and France than those of the African politicians and statesmen who campaign for a new "dialogue" preparatory to a negotiated surrender to white South Africa. When the first such surrender of modern times was made by Kaiser Matanzima in South Africa's own Transkei region, it was possible for one to understand even if not to forgive. There were then only two possible courses for the Transkei in its agony of deepening poverty, of growing landlessness, of galloping erosion and exhaustion of the soil which is its chief natural asset; only two possible courses which might

end the peoples' total subjection to Pretoria's "Native Affairs Department" and total exclusion from every citizen or civil right. One course was to enter into a long and demanding battle to smash the apartheid state from within, and thus open up the opportunity for the Transkeian people to share fully, as equal citizens, in a new non-racial South Africa, founded on principles of equality of rights, democratic control, and equitable sharing of its wealth and opportunities. The other course was to accept subservience to the white state, to take office in its apartheid institutions, and to attempt to use that office to lever concessions and piecemeal reforms from the apartheid overlord.

One can understand how a Matanzima came to accept the second course. His territory, such as it was, and his people were prisoners within the South African state. They were unarmed, poorly educated, rigidly excluded from every corridor of power by a sign reading "whites only". To be able to believe in the possibility of confrontation between these people, and the rich, mightily armed, well-organized, technologically advanced prison regime which encircled them on all sides — to see it not just as a dream, but as a belief held as strongly as life itself — this required a total dedication to the concept of freedom, a real faith in the ability of men to move mountains when once their minds have been aroused to do it, and the deep courage to face the certain trials and persecutions which will surely be encountered. If the men and women of the African National Congress had such qualities, Matanzima did not.

Doubtless he managed to persuade himself that concessions *could* be wrung from Pretoria by those prepared to accommodate themselves to the regime and make themselves indispensable to it; to persuade himself that however small the reforms, they would be better than the other alternative of painful struggle, achieving nothing. He could even persuade himself, as many earnest and learned economists have tried to persuade us all, that the only prospects of economic advance for black South Africans lies in a steadily advancing, prosperous South African economy, whose rising needs for skills and manpower will break through the restrictive web of colour bars. Such arguments one can understand, even though one can neither accept nor forgive them.

But for the later leaders of the ranks of black Africa's "hands-uppers", as South Africans call them, there is no such basis for understanding. They can find out from Matanzima's experience whether the course he has chosen leads anywhere. Hastings Banda of Malawi can look to the Transkei, and see what progress has been made by the Transkei through conciliation with Vorster's South Africa. Lesotho's

Leabua Jonathan can look to Malawi, and learn more. Madagascar can look to Lesotho, and Boigny to Madagascar.

The Road to Nowhere

No one who looks can now, on the evidence, believe that any substantial change has been wrought in the lives of black South Africans by Matanzima's course of co-operation with apartheid. Over the years, the reality has become very clear. In most respects, the Transkei drags on unchanged. The poverty is as bad as – perhaps worse than – ever at the very time when South Africa has experienced its dizziest boom, and the whites their highest ever levels of prosperity and wealth. Employment within the Transkei is as scarce as ever, the high-sounding schemes for “development” having produced only a laughable number of “enterprises” – cane-chair making and similar near-cottage industries employing a handful of people. For the rest, the men still leave the area to work on contract in South Africa's white areas, leaving the old, the infirm and the women at home to scratch the soil when they are fortunate enough to have a piece of soil to scratch. The white South African Administrator, Commissioner General Hans Abraham, still lays down white South Africa's dictates to the Transkeian “Cabinet” and its Premier Matanzima. White South African officials, “seconded” to the territory still effectively head every important department; and white police rule holds sway, administering white laws and white “security” including the still continuing State of Emergency and suspension of civil rights proclaimed by the White South African Government in 1960. There are still neither the beginnings nor even the promise of a modern state; the one main road is proclaimed “white”; the only port is “white”; the railroad is “white”; power, transport and communications remain as inadequate and backward as they were when Matanzima took office.

These are the facts which must be known to all the latter-day “hands-uppers” like Boigny. And because these facts must be known, it is impossible to accept the sincerity of their claims that an end to the policy of isolation would “. . . lay the basis for a better future” (Boigny) or “. . . create in Southern Africa a multi-racial society with equal rights and opportunities.” (Busia). All the proponents of dialogue must know that no dialogue with Vorster will change anything in the South African society. If they ever doubted it, Mr Vorster himself was quick to announce that: “The one thing we will not be discussing is apartheid.” What they will be discussing – if they ever get round a table – will not be apartheid but trade, finance, and matters more relevant to the future

of the black states themselves than the future of blacks in South Africa. Vorster spelled it out loud and clear in an interview with the London Daily Telegraph (16. 11. 70).

“Any relationship South Africa enters into with Black African states will be made on the basis that there is no interference with the Republic’s domestic policy of apartheid.”

The Proof of the Pudding

What is happening in those countries which have already made their peace with Pretoria and entered into trade relations with South Africa? Malawi for example (see African Communist No. 40) has a rising trade with South Africa. But while the figures show a steep rise in South African exports to Malawi, Malawi’s main export to South Africa remains her people – men to work on South Africa’s mines and Rhodesia’s farms – roughly 280,000 men in all according to Dr. Banda, or about one third of the adult male population. In exchange, Malawi receives investment capital from South Africa. But the investment is characteristically imperialist, designed not to raise living standards or even to assist towards economic self-sufficiency, but rather to consolidate the imperialist stake. Malawi’s impoverishment and backwardness will not be eased by the South African advance of R8 million for the first stage of Banda’s new prestige capital at Lilongwe (said to be likely to cost R40 million in all); nor by a further R11 million for a rail link to Mozambique, strategically important to the Southern African white bloc, but unimportant to Malawi for any economic purpose one can see. The white population flourishes monopolising the key positions in trade, commerce and the administration while the black population continues at or below subsistence level.

Nevertheless the candidates for South African patronage continue to emerge in other places. White South Africa and the Vorster government have recently been crowing over their ‘break-through’ in Madagascar. It is instructive to look at the South-African-Madagascar deal in some detail, since it is likely to be the sort of deal that is the best that most of the new “hands-uppers” can expect from South Africa. For they are not in the specially favourable position of Malawi or Lesotho to be able to export men to South Africa’s cheap labour markets, or to be able to provide bases and staging posts to assist the all-white military strategy for Southern Africa.

The much vaunted deal with Madagascar is, by international financial standards, small stuff – a combined government and private investment

in Madagascar of R4 million (£2.7 million). Its purpose is to develop "tourism"; or to be less euphemistic, a single tourist hotel on Nossi-Be island. A private South African company will build and run the hotel as a tourist attraction, mainly for South African holiday makers; the South African government portion of the loan will finance the "infrastructure" – to use the grandiose term bandied about in South Africa – a road, electrical generator and airport to serve the hotel. No one has dared ask the question which arises sharp and clear: Will the South African hoteliers apply South Africa's colour bars to their hotel? Is this perhaps the reason for isolating it on an island, secured from the people of all colours who live and mingle on the mainland? Whatever the answer to that question, it is clear that the "deal" is pretty small stuff, and can bring no improvement worth recording to life on the island. And yet enough to move Foreign Minister Jacques Rabemananjara to proclaim that "money has no odour" – not even South African.

This small venture is the start perhaps of something more, at least for South Africa.

"Industrialists as they explore the island (of Madagascar) are certain to realise the potential that lies in the low cost of labour", writes Carel Birkby in the Johannesburg Sunday Times. "For some it may be cheaper to manufacture in Madagascar than in South Africa's cities and border areas."

Or to put it less delicately, wage rates and poverty are worse in Madagascar than even in South Africa's non-white rural slums known as "border areas"; It is this that makes a deal with Madagascar attractive to the white supremacists. What makes it attractive to Madagascar's ruling party? Perhaps much the same considerations as made Premiership of a Bantustan attractive to Matanzima – the difficulty of finding any other way out of their troubles without the hard, demanding grind of social revolution. Madagascar's difficulties are real enough, and growing worse. Her balance of payments have a large and rising deficit – R26.4 million in 1967, R34.8m. in '68, R44.2m. in '69. Part of the rapid rise is explained by rising prices of imports, caused by the longer distances and increased time taken to import goods by sea around the Cape since the closing of the Suez Canal. But whatever the cause, the country is desperately poor, and on the verge of bankruptcy. 85% of the people depend on agriculture for their livelihood; nine-tenths of the country's exports are agricultural products, green coffee, vanilla, sisal, raw tobacco. There is little prospect of any substantial trade in these commodities with South Africa herself a major exporter of agricultural produce. In fact the figures indicate that

South Africa exports mainly things like tooth-paste and cigarettes to Madagascar – less than R1 million a year – and imports almost that same small amount in the form of spices, tea and rice. All that Madagascar can expect from South Africa is investment capital. But not the sort of capital that will aid basic development.

“This island would make a good base for South African manufacturers” Mr Frans Cronje, chairman of South African Breweries, said after his company had put up a part of the stake for the Nossi-Be hotel. “Artisans earn an average of R22 per month.” (Approx. £15!)

Bases for Baasskap

East Madagascar, like Malawi has also a strategic purpose for white South Africa. And it is perhaps the suborning of the country to South Africa’s military strategy that makes the South African government crow so loudly over this petty hotel deal. Madagascar has plans to develop a large repair and servicing base for naval vessels, especially oil tankers, at Marrinda Bay on the West Coast. The cost of the project is said variously to be between £30 and £40 million. The money for this vast enterprise is being sought from a joint investment by France and South Africa. The scheme which is said to be bigger than the Cabora Bassa project will be the subject of negotiations scheduled to start in February 1971. Portugal and Germany are also expected to participate. If this scheme is to go ahead, both South Africa and Mozambique will have to give up their own schemes to develop bases of their own, for the Indian Ocean, experts believe, cannot support more than one such major installation.

Why then such willingness in South Africa to discuss such a project? Or even, as some observers claim, to sweeten the way with the Nossi-Be hotel deal? It is not philanthropy. It is strategy; part of the real essence of Vorster’s so-called “outward-going policy” – on the one hand to bind Madagascar firmly in subservient, colonial-type relations to creditors in South Africa, France and Portugal; on the other to provide South Africa and her western imperialist allies with a major port close to the heart of independent Africa – a hostile base off the shores of Tanzania to complement the station of Diego Suarez, where French naval vessels already have facilities. In the Franco-South African alignment now building up, it is believed in Madagascar that before long South African naval vessels will share those facilities, and eventually

maintain and service her own submarines from the new navy base planned for Marrinda Bay.

The Great Divide

Thus the issue of relations with South Africa becomes the great dividing line for Africa, just as the issue of relations with the apartheid regime became — more than ten years ago — the dividing line for black South Africa. Matanzima and his colleagues who opted for co-operation and “deals” with the South African state turned their backs forever on the very idea of liberation. Whatever their motives, however they sought to justify themselves, history proves that they accepted puppet status and subservience. Those of the liberation movement and the African National Congress who refused the personal status and the profits of office which were held out in the Bantustans, also committed themselves irrevocably — to social change and revolutionary transformation of the South African state. The polarisation which commenced in 1960 with the first “outward going” policy of a Bantustan for the Transkei has continued unbroken ever since.

It cannot be put aside without either the collapse of the liberation movement, or the overthrow of the South African state. As each succeeding year brings a new accretion of puppet power, of status and recognition by white South Africa, the “hands-uppers” become ever more firmly enmeshed in the whole state structure of South Africa, ever more completely a part of the whole apparatus of apartheid. Ultimately they must defend apartheid against its attackers in order to defend their own power and privilege.

On the other side, the liberation movements, having taken to the path of overthrowing the South African state, are also driven by the logic of events. As all alternative prospects of peaceful change vanish, they turn to ever more radical, militant and revolutionary struggle to overturn the state. Thus, within South Africa, the great division in the ranks of the black majority is at the same time the herald of the rising confrontation between the revolutionary elements and the defenders of the white state.

So too in Africa. Though relations with South Africa appears as the dividing issue, the reality is more profound. The dividing line here — as in South Africa itself — is a schism on the whole question of how to shape the future of Africa. On a continental scale, as in South Africa, two groups are polarising out of what was once — or seemed to be — a homogeneous mass, moved by a single national feeling. On the one hand, there are those who have decided to settle for what they have already

got — power, albeit in under-developed, economically impoverished states; office, and the status, privilege and commercial opportunities it brings. On the other, there are those who have committed themselves to struggle against the whole colonial legacy, social, political and economic, and to carry through to an end the revolutionary transformation of their countries without which they will never be either fully free, or fully equal and independent.

The lines of this great divide are not clear cut. Within each country too the process of polarisation into camps proceeds. Many factors go to its making. Lines are drawn on the basis of past associations, on the basis of commercial interest and financial attachments; on the basis of ideology, of class, of courage and of devotion to an ideal. But however they are arrived at — and this could itself be the subject of study — the two main camps of Africa's future are assembling. On the one hand conservatism, reaction — call it what you will — reaching out for accommodation with the most backward and reactionary power on the continent — South Africa. On the other, radicalism, revolution, moving forward to ever sharper confrontation with it.

Each group moves inexorably, propelled by forces of history which it cannot command or control, the one towards final submission before white South Africa's incomparably greater financial, military and technological strength; the other towards ever sharper confrontation. The one towards puppet status, the other towards direct involvement with the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the apartheid state. It is not just a matter of "foreign policy". For in a deeply dialectic way, the foreign policy and internal social policy of each state is closely meshed. The countries moving to an accommodation with South Africa inevitably find themselves driven to maintain the status quo in their own countries; to maintain starvation level wages of workers, and subsistence conditions for the peasants in order to make their states "attractive" to foreign capital; they find themselves disposing of their countries' national assets before the inroads of the foreign investors, and thus foisting on themselves a new colonialism which differs only in form from the old. Ultimately, logically, they will find themselves providing the military bases, perhaps even the cannon fodder for the new imperialist adventurers to contain the forces of revolution.

If this seems far-fetched when applied to Boigny, consider how far-fetched it would have sounded of Dr Banda when he headed a popular movement for independence from Britain in the 1950s? Yet last January Banda's voice was raised alone amongst the Commonwealth states\

in Africa to support Britain's rearming South Africa. Who can assert that where Banda treads today, Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Bongo of Gabon, Leabus of Lesotho or Rabemenanjara of Madagascar will not tread tomorrow?

The right moves right, and the left, left. Those who have rejected cooperation with South Africa will have perforce to try and raise their own countries up by their own bootstraps. They too, driven by the logic of history, can only move in one direction, towards more radical internal policies which arise from and grow with their external policies. Large monopolies must be nationalised; financial aid for fundamental development projects, not for immediate cash gains, must be sought for and found outside the imperial camp, from China and the USSR, from East Germany and Yugoslavia. Internally, socialist ideas and embryo-socialist policies develop, and the desperate need for cohesive socialist direction gives rise to attempts to develop cohesive socialist parties. Thus, while compromising, conservative Africa moves to the right, radical Africa — Africa seeking confrontation with the white South — moves to the left. This is the great divide, and the herald of great new struggles which will grow and continue down the years in Africa till one tendency triumphs over the other. The final settlement of which way Africa goes is in the end bound up with the final settlement of South Africa's internal struggle.

These are not, on the surface, encouraging times in Africa. The "hands-uppers" are growing bold. The power-seekers threaten every radical state with military coups, backed by, encouraged, perhaps financed, perhaps even planned in the espionage centres of imperialism in Washington, London or Pretoria. They attempt to arrest the movement to the left, the growth of radical, anti-South African Africa, and to stifle its voice, as the white mentors have stifled the voice of the radical left within South Africa itself.

But those who look further must look to reality beyond the ranks of the great names — of the Nkrumahs and Obotes and Lumumbas who can be felled — to see the social movements of our time. They will understand that the polarisation of Africa has started a deep process going beyond the rulers and the leaders. It has begun to filter down to the masses, to the men and women everywhere who, in the long run, must decide the destiny of the whole continent. Dividing lines have begun to develop within the ranks of the people, grouping them for and against South African relations, for and against socialist style policies. This process, the real process of history, cannot be easily stopped neither by the surrender to apartheid of a premier, nor by the over-

throw of a premier and the substitution of a general. A process of polarisation has started, and however long it takes, that process heralds the end of the old order. It proclaims of Africa – as Galileo proclaimed against all the dogmas of his time – “And yet, it moves!”

UGANDA

by Henry Maya


The overthrow of President Obote's regime in Uganda faces free Africa with a challenge which is far too dangerous to be ignored — a challenge presented both by reactionary forces inside Uganda itself and the imperialists whose interests, wittingly or unwittingly, they are serving.

What were the causes of the coup? The statement which was made on behalf of Gen. Amin over Uganda radio alleged tribalism, corruption in high places, lack of democracy, unemployment, a rise in the cost of living at the same time as a fall in the prices of Uganda's two main cash crops, cotton and coffee. It was also alleged that President Obote had formed his own private army to protect his Cabinet and planned to downgrade the regular army. After the coup a further reason was given — that Gen. Amin feared he was to be sacked or even killed and decided to move first.

We remember that similar allegations were made about the Nkrumah regime in Ghana to justify the military take-over in that country. And the unhappy experience of the Ghanaian people since then should serve to clarify our assessment of the events in Uganda.

No doubt Uganda had problems under the Obote regime, even if they were not all of the order or magnitude indicated by the coup leaders. Poor countries cannot be made wealthy overnight, particularly countries burdened with the cruel legacy of colonialism.

The logic of events since independence had driven President Obote towards (a) a stronger stand against imperialism and (b) a partial realisation of the need for socialism as the only road towards economic development and greater independence — hence the adoption of the Common Man's Charter and the nationalisation of foreign firms in 1970. Inevitably, these developments alerted the enemies of socialism both in Uganda and abroad, especially in Britain, whose nationals owned 80 per cent of the firms affected by the nationalisation decrees. Many of Uganda's problems were not of his making but were obstacles placed in his way by those, both inside the country and abroad, who



opposed further progress on the road to economic independence and socialism.

When the conflict came to a head, President Obote found himself without adequate weapons to defend his programme. A "private army" — as Nkrumah, too, found — is not enough to prevent a coup. The harsh lessons of history are teaching that it is impossible to build socialism without at the same time building a reliable socialist party capable of mobilising the masses of the people in organised political action. Accepting that there were problems to be sorted out in Uganda, the real questions to ask now are: will the position be improved in any way by the coup? Whose interests do the 'coup leaders really represent? Who will benefit from the coup?

It is already very clear that the beneficiaries of the coup will not be the common people, either of Uganda or in Africa as a whole. Let us consider first a question very close to us – the issue of arms for the Vorster regime in South Africa.

At the Singapore Commonwealth conference, President Obote was united with Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda in leading the opposition to the Tory Government's proposed sale of arms to South Africa.

On January 31, a few days after the coup, Ian Colvin reported in the Johannesburg "Sunday Times": "The ring of hardline African states that was pressing on Britain over the South African arms issue has snapped. The leader who was most malignant on confrontation is a refugee in Dar es Salaam As a result of the coup on Monday, Britain can pursue the course of her own strategic interests lightened of one millstone".

On January 29, Henry Reuter of the Johannesburg "Star's" Africa News Service, reported from Kampala: "The ousting of President Milton Obote's Uganda Government is likely to lead to improved relations between Uganda and Britain and former ties between Uganda and the Commonwealth, whatever Britain's attitude towards arms sales to South Africa, according to political observers in Kampala".

Reuter reported that, questioned on the arms sales issue, Gen. Amin refused to comment. He merely said he would be guided on the South African issue by his new interim Government. Barely a fortnight later his new Foreign Minister, Mr. Wanume Kibedi, was equally equivocal, saying that the new government would not take any stand on the arms issue until there was concrete evidence that the British Government was actually selling arms.

From this it is clear that the front of African unity on the South African arms issue has been dangerously weakened by the coup. The withdrawal of Uganda from the ranks of the militants will (a) encourage negative elements in Kenya, already lukewarm on the arms issue; (b) lessen the pressure on those African states calling for a "dialogue" with South Africa; and (c) increase the isolation of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, now left with an unguarded rear in their confrontation with racist and colonialist southern Africa.

No More Socialism

Henry Reuter also reported: "It has already become clear, however, that Amin intends to put a halt to Uganda's 'move to the Left' engineered by Dr. Obote and that he intends to seek closer ties with the West,

following similar lines to those adopted by Kenya”.

General Amin himself said: “We will maintain good relations with the British because they were the people who ruled Uganda and did it well”.

Reuter reported on February 2: “Amin has indicated his intention to reverse Obote’s policy – to remodel the country on Kenya lines with the State owning major utilities while participating with private enterprise and protecting it in the interests of inducing a fast industrial take-off Many Kenya leaders are happy at the outcome of events.”

In his earlier dispatch, Colvin had also commented on the Kenya connection: “It would be hard to over-estimate the value of Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya as the stabilising factor in East Africa. Kenya’s President has a long and strong grip on the hard facts of life. His government realises what the flow of European money means to East Africa”.

On February 10 Brian Silk reported in the “Daily Telegraph” that “Uganda’s military government has decided to review former President Obote’s policy for nationalising British and other foreign interests I understand that Gen. Amin and his Council of Ministers are in favour in principle of some curb on the nationalisation programme”.

So the new Government proposes to “stabilise” the Uganda economy by promoting private enterprise and the flow of European money. It is no wonder the Tory Government rushed with indecent haste to recognise the new regime – the second country after Congo-Kinshasa to do so. And this recognition was thrust on Amin despite the fact that none of the normal criteria had been complied with. Bridget Bloom reported in the “Financial Times” on February 10 that the coup, far from uniting the Uganda people, had split both the civilian population and the army. At the time of writing reports of fighting continue to come out of Uganda, and the hands of the new regime are already stained with the blood of hundreds of its opponents.

That the British – the chief looters of Uganda’s wealth in the past – should benefit from the coup is no surprise; nor that they should take what steps they can to consolidate the power of the Amin regime, just as they have helped to consolidate the pro-Western regimes in Ghana, Lesotho and other African countries where independent regimes have been displaced, or prevented from coming to power.

Role of Israel

But Britain is not the only foreign beneficiary. One aspect of Amin’s coup in Uganda which has not received its full share of publicity is the

role of Israel. President Obote himself accused Israel of complicity in the coup. In his January 31 dispatch from Nairobi, Ian Colvin commented: "There may be some truth in the accusation Obote has made in Dar es Salaam that Israelis helped Amin to manage his coup It would be correct to say that Israeli military advisers outnumber and far outweigh those of other nations, and to these General Amin has turned for advice and sometimes protection during the past five uncertain years". It is not generally known that Gen. Amin got his paratroop wings during military training in Israel, and during the 1967 war expressed admiration for the Israeli prowess.

Without seeing any elaborate Israeli plot (there were, after all, plenty of Ugandan plotters available) there remain the interesting facts of Israel's extensive involvement in East and North-East Africa, and her vital interest in Uganda in particular.

Obviously, the Israelis have everything to gain from influence in that part of Africa – militarily by securing the Aqaba outlet which Israel currently controls, politically by ensuring continued division and discord between Arab and black African countries in the area. Thus the Israelis have virtually taken over the running of the Ethiopian secret police and counter-insurgency services, in a desperate attempt to fend off the Arab-oriented Eritrean guerrillas who are fighting for independence, and to prevent the whole rotten edifice of the Lion of Judah's feudalist regime from flying apart, if not tomorrow then at least when Haile Selassie finally dies – an event which cannot be much longer postponed. At the same time they work energetically to undermine Somalia, which is hostile to Zionism and friendly to the Eritreans, and give aid, of sorts, to Kenya (Kenya is in fact a growth area for Israeli diplomatic and commercial efforts).

But the real key to the Israeli strategy is the Sudan – and it is here that the Israeli role in Uganda is of critical importance. For Sudan, uniquely, is a link between Arab and black Africa in its ethnic composition; it is also of immense strategic and political importance vis-a-vis Egypt and the north-east African coastline. It is all the more important, now that it has bonds of political unity, however tenuous, with Egypt, Libya and Syria. And Sudan has also had, for some years, a rebellion on its hands in the negro southern part of the country – the area which had been ignored and neglected by successive Sudanese governments, and which had fed a lingering military campaign by the rebels which the Sudanese army could not crush.

Part of the reason for the persistence of this rebellion lay in the incompetence and corruption of the regime which preceded the revolt of

the young officers in 1969; even more important, however, was the support extended to the rebels by imperialist interests – and *especially by Israel*. In short, the Israelis had been using their “training” duties in Uganda – which included responsibility for the air force and for aspects of Uganda’s internal security – to extend support to southern Sudanese rebels operating from northern Uganda over the border into the Sudan. This state of affairs was well known to Obote and to the Sudanese revolutionary government. The Sudanese have been trying with some success to take the fire out of the rebellion by rectifying the justified grievances of the southern people (a considerable measure of southern autonomy has been granted). Obote was hampered from doing much by his dependence on various kinds of Israeli aid (not only military) and even more by his dependence on the army. He was trying to build up his presidential guard as a force which could be used if necessary to protect him from a coup and to enforce his political independence from the military command.

There are some signs that Obote was planning decisive action at the time of the coup: it is likely that the army brass got wind of it, and struck. How fortunate for the Israelis that they now have a ruler in Uganda who is not only sympathetic to western interests in general, but depends on the Israelis specifically for crucial military services, and who, to cap it all, comes from Acholi District, in the north of Uganda, from whence the rebels and their Israeli advisers operate.

Gain for Vorster

Nor is it surprising that the Uganda coup has been welcomed in South Africa, where Premier Vorster chose the opportunity of the no-confidence debate at the beginning of the present session of Parliament to launch his most bitter attack yet on Zambia’s President Kaunda, warning him that unless he watched his step he would “find himself in the same aeroplane as Obote”.

The whole purpose of Vorster’s so-called “outward policy” in Africa is to foster disunity amongst the African states as a necessary concomitant of South Africa’s imperialist penetration of the continent. It was for this reason that South Africa helped stir up trouble in the Congo after independence, and assisted Ojukwu in his bid to detach Biafra from Nigeria. It is for this reason that the Bureau of State Security was set up to function as South Africa’s CIA in Africa. Special funds voted by the South African Parliament to the Foreign Ministry are used to finance the activities of South African agents in every African country

These funds helped bring to power the regimes in Lesotho and Swaziland; they are used to promote tribalism in Botswana and Zambia as a lever against Presidents Seretse Khama and Kaunda respectively. Is it surprising to learn that Zambia's opposition leader, Harry Nkumbula, has all of a sudden become a supporter of the notion of a "dialogue" with South Africa as the only way to win independence "for our brothers in the South"? Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere are the main stumbling-blocks to the implementation of South Africa's policies in Africa, and the Vorster Government is bending every effort to get them removed.

Thus the Western imperialists, Israel and South Africa have common aims in Africa — and all benefited by Amin's coup in Africa. Is there anyone naive enough to believe that this is sheer coincidence?

Many African leaders are aware of the growing danger to their independence. At the OCAM summit meeting in Chad last January, the heads of state and representatives of the 15 French-African states involved protested strongly at what they called the concerted denigration of member states by leading European personalities and political parties. In the final communique issued after the conclusion of their annual meeting they deplored the "increasingly frequent and scandalous interference" by European leaders and political parties in the internal affairs of OCAM states.

Zambian Cabinet Minister Simon Kapwepwe also warned in a statement issued in Lusaka last January that the imperialist onslaught against African freedom and independence was gaining momentum.

"The only way Africa can survive all these imperialist plots against her independence and freedom is through unity", he said. "This is the great challenge facing us as leaders. The savage invasion of Guinea by Portuguese Fascists, supported by their Western allies, the army take-over in Uganda, are glaring examples of imperialist intrigues against Africa. The racists in South Africa have stepped up their psychological and propaganda war against Africa, and particularly against Zambia."

Kapwepwe was warning against tribalism in Zambia and urging the leaders of Zambia not to speak for group interests "because we are all one family and injustice against any Zambian or group of Zambians must be considered as an injustice against all of us".

The same holds good for Africa. Today, African unity is in danger. The overthrow of Obote is not only a crisis for Uganda but for all Africa. The Organisation of African Unity must rally its ranks to defend African independence from the assault of foreign imperialism — and the African people must stamp out the activities of those self-seeking forces

in their own countries which are prepared to act as the fifth column of the West.

Marxist-Leninist Parties

Above all, the lesson has now been rammed home again and again in Africa (as in other parts of the world) that socialism cannot be built without a party of socialism. It is not enough for a leader or a few leaders to proclaim socialist policies and adopt socialist programmes. Socialism cannot be built from the top: The construction of socialism requires both an ideology and an organisation which is capable of mobilising the forces of the people behind it particularly the working class, the most revolutionary class. It requires, not one man who understands the science of Marxism-Leninism, but a whole host of cadres at all levels who are politically and class conscious, tested by experience, capable of leading the people in revolutionary action. Such parties cannot be built in a day. Nor can they be built in the absence of the material conditions which create the need for them. Nevertheless, Africa has had enough experience of the wrong methods of work, has seen the fruits of independence dashed from its hands too often, to be satisfied to continue in the old way. African militants must now recognise that there is only one road to socialism – the Marxist-Leninist road. It is time to start laying the foundations now.

GUINEA

by B. Fau

The invasion of the Republic of Guinea by Portuguese military forces, assisted by a group of Guinean traitors, marked an escalation of the policy of aggression and subversion that the Portuguese colonialists have conducted against a number of independent African countries over many years. The invasion took place on the 22nd and 23rd of November, 1970.

The Portuguese disembarked 350 commando soldiers early in the morning of the 22nd, at various points on the Conakry coast. Among other targets, they made for the Presidential residence. Not finding President Sekou Toure there, they burnt the house down.


They also occupied the Sanory and Boiro military barracks and seized the power station.

Towards the end of the 23rd, the invaders had been repelled, leaving many killed, injured and captured.

In a midday broadcast on the 22nd, President Sekou Toure had stated that: "we are sure that the united front of the defence of Guinea will defeat the international reactionary forces which are using the flag of Portuguese colonialism to launch an attack against the independent Republic of Guinea."

On the same day, the government of Guinea sent messages to African heads of state "asking your mediation in this extremely dangerous situation" and another to the United Nations, asking for airborne troops "to help our national army liberate remaining positions being held by the Portuguese mercenary forces and drive away their warships from our territorial waters."

These messages were in themselves proof of the seriousness with which the government of Guinea viewed the invasion. It is now a matter of history that the UN Security Council, as far as is known, not only did not make preparations to send the airborne forces, as requested, but agreed only to send a special mission to investigate, the mission made up of delegates from Zambia, Finland, Colombia, Nepal and Poland. For its part, the OAU Ministerial Council only managed to hold its meeting in Lagos on the 9th – 11th December. As Major-General Gowon stated in his opening address: "A situation cannot



seriously be regarded as an emergency if it has to wait for two weeks for a solution.”

People's Resistance

It was thanks to the response of the ordinary working people of Guinea and her national army, to the appeal made by Sekou Toure for the defeat of the invaders, that the enemy was repelled. This becomes even more significant if we take into account that the regular army had to be fetched from the interior, where, according to Minister of Finance, Ismael Toure, “it was working in the farms”. The brunt of the attack was therefore borne by the militia and the civilian population.

It is interesting to note that from March 1969, following the discovery of a plot led by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Kaman Daby, acting in collaboration with cabinet Minister Fodebo Keita, measures had been introduced to integrate the army with the people, these including the carrying out of production tasks by the armed forces. Steps were also taken to increase the size of the militia, and to improve its training, both military and political.

As was to be expected, the Portuguese colonialists denied responsibility for the invasion. General Antonio de Spínola, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Guinea Bissau, stated that "in Bissau, official circles observe that for a long time, signs of a growing dissatisfaction with the regime of President Sekou Toure could be detected in the Republic of Guinea".

The facts however conclusively prove that the Portuguese colonialists prepared, mounted and led the invasion of Guinea. It was on the basis of these facts that both the OAU and the UN Security Council squarely laid the blame on Portugal. Some of the evidence we detail below.

Private F.D. Nanque, a Portuguese soldier, serial number 844/821/1970, fell into Liberian government hands after being rescued at sea by the Dutch ship "Straat Bli", two miles off the Conakry coast. He informed the Liberian government that he had been recruited into the Portuguese army 9 months previously. He was specially trained in commando operations and was a member of the First African Commando Company, "Adido". He was transported to Guinea by ship and with his fellow commandos disembarked using small landing craft. His unit carried not only small arms, but also heavy and light artillery. Another captured soldier, Garcia Lopez, gave similar evidence to the UN special mission.

The special mission also saw other Portuguese prisoners. It heard confirmatory evidence from the diplomatic missions of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Belgium and Switzerland. The mission also heard recordings of ship-to-shore messages transmitted during the invasion. It was shown hand grenades, sub-machine guns, grenade launchers, ammunition, radio equipment and daggers, all Portuguese made and captured during the course of the invasion.

The Portuguese government itself admitted its involvement in the operation when its radio broadcast on November 30th that Portuguese prisoners of war held in a Conakry prison by the PAIGC had escaped to Guinea Bissau, "taking advantage of the confusion resulting from recent political events" in Guinea, and were already on their way to Lisbon.

Portuguese Aims

The freeing of prisoners was not the only, and possibly not the main, aim of the Portuguese when they launched the operation. As the UN

special mission correctly pointed out, the two other aims were:

- to overthrow the government and instal a puppet regime; and
- to destroy PAIGC personnel, offices and equipment located in and around Conakry.

The Portuguese adventurers suffered a resounding defeat, not only in the operation itself, but also in their standing on the African continent and at the United Nations.

The Ministerial Council of the OAU not only passed resolutions condemning the Portuguese colonialists, but also adopted practical measures to assist the Republic of Guinea, as well as the PAIGC, to banish mercenaries from the African continent and to work out measures for an African High Command to ensure the speedy response of the whole continent if any country should be faced with the threat of foreign aggression. It also declared November 22 as a day of struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

The UN Security Council demanded that Portugal should pay full compensation for the losses suffered by Guinea. It called on UN members to halt deliveries of arms which could be used against the African peoples, both in the colonies and the independent countries. It also warned that the Security Council would take effective steps to halt any repetition of the action.

Imperialist Allies

But, as General Gowon said in his opening statement to the Ministerial Council, "Portugal is secure and truculent in her policies against Africa only because of her allies". And who her allies are was again demonstrated when, instead of siding with the peoples of the two Guineas and Africa, by voting for the UN Security Council resolution, the United States, Britain, France and Spain declared their support for Portuguese colonialism by abstaining.

Trying to camouflage its support for the Portuguese, the US had the temerity on December 13th, to offer "exceptional aid" to Guinea of 4.7 million dollars in the form of food and agricultural produce, "as proof of America's sympathy for Guinea following the attempted invasion, and as a contribution to the effort of reconstruction".

We must agree with the statement made by General Gowon that: "If the colonising adventurers had succeeded in Guinea, there is no doubt that they would have organised similar attacks against other independent African countries with a view to recolonising Africa".

Already the Portuguese colonialists have accumulated a lot of experience in this policy of aggression and subversion against independent African countries.

Faced with successive defeats at the hands of the armies of liberation in the colonies, the Portuguese colonialists have extended their operations to independent African countries neighbouring the colonies. The countries most seriously affected by these operations have been Guinea, Zambia and Senegal.

The operations pursue diverse aims. One of these is to terrorise the civilian population, particularly in the areas bordering the colonies. Countless incidents involving air-bombing, artillery shelling, the planting of anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines and shooting with small arms, all, acts committed by the Portuguese, have been recorded in all these countries. British Prime Minister Wilson stated in February 1969 that: "That there have been Portuguese attacks on Zambian villages is not in dispute". The UN has passed many resolutions condemning the Portuguese acts of aggression, but evidently without effect on the aggressor. Already, both Senegal and Zambia have had to place troops along some affected parts of their borders in order to defend their civilian populations from the invaders.

Disruption

Another of Portugal's aims is to disrupt the normal life of the peoples of these countries, with the aim of introducing political instability. This was the purpose of blowing up the bridge over the Luangwa river in 1968; over this bridge was carried 92 per cent of Zambia's oil fuel supplies. The Portuguese have also tried to take advantage of disaffection among sections of the population, notably among the population of what used to be Barotseland in south-western Zambia. In this case they encourage the population to come out against the government, going even to the extent of training military units, as the government of Zambia reported towards the end of 1968. Among the invaders of Guinea were included dissident Guinean nationals.

The Portuguese also launch operations to strike at what they consider to be sensitive parts of the liberation movements. It was partly for this purpose that they sent the expeditionary forces into Guinea. Hence also the death of Eduardo Mondlane at the hands of Portuguese saboteurs who managed to penetrate into Tanzania.

The Portuguese also conduct a psychological war against the peoples of independent Africa who support their brothers in the colonies. As

long ago as 1969 it was reported that during the previous 2 years, strong new transmitters had been installed in Angola and Mozambique. These not only give full domestic coverage, but can also be heard all over Southern and Central Africa. The purpose of the propaganda emitting from these transmitters is to justify the barbarous policies of the colonialists.

What do the colonialists seek to achieve? Of course, the destruction of the liberation movements in the colonies remains their main purpose. To this end they seek to isolate the liberation movements from contact with friendly countries. Aware that they cannot seal the borders, they therefore instigate a policy of terror against the friendly governments, "to teach them that support for the terrorists does not pay", and, where this policy fails, to overthrow these governments and put puppet governments in their place.

The Lessons

Independent Africa has drawn the necessary lessons from the invasion of Guinea. Central among these is that until the continent has rid itself of the scourges of colonialism, fascism and apartheid, Africa will remain easy prey to the adventures of world imperialism.

The Portuguese maritime invasion of Guinea has given the complete lie to the assertions of the British government that the supply of naval equipment to South Africa has nothing to do with apartheid.

The African peoples will surely be victorious. But they need vigilance and an unwavering resolve not to compromise in any way with the forces that have so patently proved themselves enemies, not only of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies, but also of the whole African continent.

Botswana- Balanced on a Tightrope

by J. Villiers

"The economic prospects of our region would be boundless were it not for the threats posed by racialism and minority rule, and the consequent dangers of instability and cold-war involvement."

**Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana,
speaking in Copenhagen in November 1970.**

When Botswana became independent in September 1966, she entered a new phase of her history bearing a three-fold burden. In the first place her economy was not merely undeveloped but apparently meagrely endowed with water, mineral resources, good soils or any compensating factors such as good communications with world markets. This was the legacy of geography, climate and objective conditions derived from the past.

Secondly, independence thrust Botswana on to the world stage in a state of almost total geographical encirclement by the white supremacist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, and highlighted the vast difference in material wealth and power between the Republic and its new neighbour. This was the legacy of imperialism and colonialism in Southern Africa, where only the rivalry of competing imperial powers saved the people of Botswana from direct rule by white settlerdom, but left them surrounded by white supremacy.

Thirdly, independence found in Botswana a Cinderella of British colonialism in Africa – a backwater neglected by Britain, deprived of adequate social services and most of the elements of a minimal econo—

mic infra-structure, and dependent for the balancing of her budget on hand-outs from Whitehall. This was the legacy of 81 years under British "protection".

Today, four and a half years later, it is too early to start examining the record for dramatic signs of economic progress. Even in the most favourable of circumstances a country facing Botswana's economic and social problems could not be expected to have changed much in so short a period. But it is possible to detect some changes, and to extract from the bleak statistics of Botswana's poverty the latent possibilities of future development. It is also possible to see how narrow is the range of options open to the leaders of this vast but empty country, and how crucial it will be that they keep their balance on the tight-rope of Southern African politics.

Five Year Plan

The Botswana Government's own view of the future is contained in the National Development Plan for 1970-75 published last September. Socialists who expect to find in it Soviet-style projections of future developments, detailed production quotas and targets of achievement in each sector of the economy, will be disappointed by the pragmatic, often vague formulations of Botswana's Plan. It is intended, however, to give broad guidelines for the future actions of Government and private activity in the economy. It is, in the introductory words of Vice-President Quett Masire, "a rolling plan. We do not have a First Five Year Plan, Second Five Year Plan and so on. The National Development Plan is being constantly reviewed and revised as newer and better information comes to hand".

In these remarks lies part of the explanation for the character of the Plan. Too little is known about several key aspects of Botswana's economy for accurate statistics and realistic quotas to be feasible. This is part of the colonial legacy that the Botswana Government is now grappling with. The growth of wage-paying jobs cannot be predicted with any certainty because employment records have not been comprehensive in the past and trends are therefore difficult to establish. Much of the population is only marginally — if at all — involved in the money economy, which makes measurement of production and consumption a hazardous operation for the large and vital, traditional sector. Export statistics are incomplete, being part of the intricate structure of the Southern Africa Customs Union which South Africa effectively dominates. Migratory labour working in South Africa is an

important source of income. Yet comprehensive figures of those not working on the mines (estimated to be as numerous as those working on the mines) are not available. Cartographical, climatic, demographic and ecological data are all similarly incomplete, though all are important for careful planning for the future. The Plan reveals that the Botswana Government is aware of these deficiencies, and is taking steps to meet them. The first agricultural survey was made in 1968 and it provided much of the basis for the estimates in the National Plan.

Lack of statistics may be a planner's nightmare, but the realities of life for the people are more fundamental. Some of these realities have been summarised recently in these pages and need not be repeated here. (see African Communist, No. 42, Third Quarter, 1970, pp.87-94). The population last year was estimated at 648,000 with a growth rate of some 3% per annum. The overall density is 3 persons to the square mile, but this figure does not bring out the disparity between the virtually uninhabited tracts of the game lands in the north-east, and parts of the Kalahari and the south-west on the one hand, and on the other hand the clusters of rural townships in the east-central parts where population density rises to between ten and twenty persons per square mile, reflecting the higher rainfall, better soils and proximity to the railway line of these parts.

Thus in a country half as large again as Rhodesia, and over four times as large as England, there are fewer people than live in Johannesburg. In relation to resources, however, Botswana is not under-populated. Rainfall is light, erratic and uneven. Water storage is difficult and drought a recurrent menace. The 1968/69 Agricultural Survey revealed that only 5.6% of arable land had been planted that year, and a series of droughts has caused a reduction in the acreage cultivated. Self sufficiency in the production of food crops is one of the general aims of the Plan, but it could take several years to achieve, since present production of cereals amounts to barely $\frac{3}{4}$ of total consumption, and of pulses, less than half. Irrigation of land presently cultivated, increased yields per unit area, and the bringing of extensive new areas under cultivation by means of resettlement and irrigation will all be necessary, if Botswana is to produce enough food to feed its rapidly growing population.

The government hopes also to keep the growth rate of the population down to 2½% per year, through general education and provision of birth control assistance at clinics. But this aim, even more than self-sufficiency in food, will be little more than a pious hope unless other aspects of the National Plan materialise, each inter-locking with the

others in a controlled programme of development.

The Target

The general aim of the Plan is to increase Gross Domestic Product by more than the present rate of 8% per annum at current prices, or 5% per annum in terms of real growth. The target figure is an overall real growth rate of 15% for the 5-year plan period, rising from an estimated R50 million in 1969/70 to R110 million in 1975. A major part of this increase, amounting to R30 million, will be generated by the exploitation (by De Beers) of the newly discovered diamond-bearing kimberlite field at Orapa, 110 miles west of Francistown, and the exploitation (by a subsidiary of Botswana R.S.T.) of the copper-nickel deposits at Selebi-Pikwe. Other minerals, including coal at Morupule, (near Palapye), manganese ore, gypsum and brine deposits (yielding salt and soda ash) are known to exist in economically significant quantities, and these will add to the already substantial contribution of mineral extraction to the increase in GDP. Mineral exports, currently yielding less than half a million rand a year, are expected to exceed R50 million by 1975. Of the ten thousand new jobs created in the money economy by 1975 it is expected that 3,000 will be provided by the two major mining projects mentioned above.

A rough projection of Government revenues derived directly or indirectly from mining activity suggests that the surplus of income over expenditure from this source will rise from a mere R22,000 in the current year to almost R11½ million in 1975, enabling the Government to dispense with U.K. grants-in-aid well before the termination of the Plan period, and to take on a far wider variety of development projects than it could otherwise envisage.

Thus the short-term future of Botswana has been staked very heavily on the exploitation of the nation's mineral wealth by outside private capital. The terms upon which foreign capital is to operate are not spelled out in the Plan, which gives the impression that the Government is delighted to have capital pouring into the country whatever the terms and the long-run effects. The Government does not appear to be demanding control or even participation, and it does not attempt to predict the mining companies' profits. It does at least admit that although GDP can be expected to double, "Gross National Income will be lower (i.e. than GDP) since the mining companies will transfer substantial profits abroad in particular to meet capital repayment charges."

Need for Ideology

But this admission does not go far enough. It does not go to the heart of the difference between exploitation and development, between economic growth (unbalanced, rewarding only to a tiny minority forming the national elite and to foreign investors), and socio-economic development, lifting the whole level of the people painstakingly and reducing dependence on alien capitalist influences. This apparent unconcern of the Botswana National Plan with broad social goals contrasts with the egalitarian and socialist objectives towards which President Nyerere is leading the people of Tanzania.

Sir Seretse Khama has on occasion spoken of the need for self-reliance, but he has not articulated an overall approach, a philosophy of development, still less an ideological framework for his people's future. Yet he is aware, as the quotation at the start of this article shows, of the dangers of white supremacy in Southern Africa, and of the inter-connectedness of political and economic processes. His sincere opposition to apartheid, stemming both from his personal experience and that of thousands of his countrymen, and his desire to align Botswana with the independent states to the north, needs to be harmonised with the economic perspectives of the country, lest the Trojan horse of foreign capital undermine it while more obvious diplomatic and political enemies are being kept at bay.

There is a real danger that Botswana's land-locked economy, subject to fiscal and monetary manipulations beyond its control, to *de facto* external control over almost all its trade, to neo-colonial dependence on both South Africa and Britain, could degenerate rapidly into an unofficial Bantustan supplying cheap labour and mineral profits for the benefit of South African whites.

The alternative course is for the Botswana to develop a strong sense of national independence, to create an island of social progress in a sea of racist reaction, to strive for economic self-sufficiency and the abolition of classes, to draw upon the strength of the socialist world, and become deeply committed to the liberation of the rest of the sub-continent.

Presented thus, the choice might seem an unreal one, remote from the day-to-day decisions of administrators. But elements of the choice are concretely present in the situation, and domestic policies cannot be divorced from foreign policy. The sympathetic observer is puzzled to see Botswana recognising the Soviet Union on the one hand, and receiving a diplomatic mission from Nationalist China (Taiwan) on the other.

There is a discrepancy between saying, as President Khama did in March 1970, "We must free ourselves from dependence on external aid" and relying almost exclusively for aid on a narrow range of donors: South African mining capital, international capital via the agency of the IBRD and IDA, and UK Government subsidies, British charities and educational and technical personnel recruited largely in Britain. External sources of capital and skills are indispensable for Botswana, but there is no objective reason why they should not be sought in socialist as well as capitalist countries, and in more developed non-aligned countries, thereby spreading dependence over a wider range of donors and reducing the influence of any one or two of them.

Inequality of Income

Ultimately, of course, the fate of Botswana cannot be decided separately from the confrontation between revolution and imperialism which is spreading steadily over the whole of Southern Africa. But where Botswana stands in that confrontation will in part be determined by the class forces that develop within the country, and the extent to which the present leadership succeeds in rallying the nation round clear political and social goals. Unity of the Botswana in the face of apartheid's reckless expansion will be an important check on Vorster's imperialist designs. It is therefore important that social developments should build such unity, and aim at a high degree of popular mobilisation. In these respects the National Plan does not inspire confidence. Substantial inequalities already exist among the Batswana, and the measures outlined in the Plan will increase these inequalities, as is grudgingly admitted in the following passage:

"It is planned to ensure that rural incomes do rise even if this means that an enterprising few will make most use of the assistance available from Government and in the short term become more prosperous than the mass of the rural population." (p.27)

The crucial inequalities affecting the nation are not so much those common to all African states at their present stage of development (the gulf between wage earnings and subsistence levels, between Government employees and others, the urban-rural gap etc.) – though these are all visible in Botswana – as the differences *within* the rural population. Some ten per cent of the total population, or 62,000 persons, have no identifiable source of livelihood (a calculation based upon the assumption that everybody (self)-employed is supporting three others). Agri-

cultural activities, principally cattle-keeping and crop growing, are the main source of income for 87% of the population. Yet one-third of the rural population has little or no land, and/or few or no cattle. The following table indicates the distribution of cattle wealth as revealed by a survey in 1968/69:

<i>Size of cattle holding</i>	<i>No. of Agricultural Holders</i>	<i>No. of cattle owned</i>	<i>Percentage of national herd</i>	<i>Av. size of holding</i>
None	13,988	—	—	—
1-10	9,822	59,712	4.2%	6
11-25	11,318	196,293	13.7%	17
26-50	6,818	245,947	17.2%	36
51 plus	5,808	734,922	51.3%	126
TOTAL	47,754	1,236,874	86.4%	—

The true class character of the cattle-owning elite is impossible to establish in the absence of fuller information about their relations with dependants (both relatives and clients). It seems likely though that the highly market-oriented character of cattle-ranching and animal husbandry generally — which provides three-quarters of the country's exports, and supports in the Botswana Meat Corporation Africa's largest beef processing enterprise — is transforming traditional feudal and tribal relationships of dependence into capitalist forms, enabling the fortunate minority to accumulate wealth and to exploit an increasingly large number of impoverished neighbours through various forms of unequal economic relations.

How extensive this process is, and what changes in land tenure systems are facilitating it or resulting from it, are matters the Government has still to investigate systematically. Meanwhile its policies are aggravating the process. Agricultural extension services are, by the government's own admission, geared largely to the wealthier, technically more adaptable farmers, while the majority of poorer peasants who need the help of demonstrators tend not to get it. Similarly the proposed new settlement schemes intended to open up for development hitherto stagnant areas in the western and northern State lands are attracting the interest not of the impoverished who lack land and/or cattle but of the top group of cattle-owners averaging 219 head each in Nojane, 263 in Lone Tree Pan, and 170 in Ghanzi block, and employing respectively on average 3, 4 and 2 hired workers each. (*Source*: "An Application by the Government of Botswana for a Loan to Finance A

Livestock Industry Development Project” Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone, July 1970. Appendix XIII). The same document cites the preliminary findings of an anthropologist engaged by the Government to investigate some of the social implications. His remarks throw an interesting light on emerging class differentials:

“People with less than 30 cattle are generally dependent on those with more, and those with over 100 cattle are obliged to support poor relatives by lending cattle to them and often feeding them as well. If the wealthier farmers move to new farms, there will be a conflict between their need to repay loans and to support poor relatives. They will need to recall the cattle they have loaned and the poor people will suffer if such ties are cut.” (Appendix XIV).

The lesson of capitalist development elsewhere is that the power of the market inexorably triumphs over traditional social obligations.

Need for Co-operatives

The need is great for co-operative and collective forms of organisation in the countryside. Only if such forms are vigorously encouraged by the Government will the rural populace avoid a future of heightened poverty for the great majority. Even with the substantial development of mining during the Plan period, wage employment will at most absorb 20% of the 10,000 annual increase in the adult labour force. Rural unemployment and underemployment are already extensive, and seem likely to get worse. Only an agricultural revolution will raise overall living standards faster than the population expands, and this in turn will require a social revolution.

At present, not only are the Government’s social goals obscure – at best – but forms of cooperative and collective organisation are minimally developed. The cooperative movement is barely 6 years old and comprises only 62 societies of which 25 are marketing concerns and 11 of the remainder consumer cooperatives. Apparently absent is the recognition which is present in Tanzania that “although ‘the cooperative is basically a socialist institution’..... it will become increasingly capitalist if it remains primarily a marketing organisation.” (*African Communist* No. 39 4th Quarter 1969 p.33) Unlike Tanzania many of the Batswana already live together in well established villages; Ujamaa villages would not have to be created, but the Ujamaa needs to be put into existing villages.

It is the will to do this that often seems to be lacking. A hopeful counter-indication is the spread of Youth Brigades which are starting to mobilise the nation's 245,000 young people between the ages of 5 and 19. Less tied to traditional forms of social relations and methods of agriculture, the Youth Brigades are acquiring technical skills and disseminating them in the community, at the same time making a valuable contribution to production and to the development of the roads and services needed for the economic infra-structure.



A further aspect of social progress that will not materialise unless the Government takes much more active steps to promote it is the adaptation of education to meet the actual needs of the people. The content of education is tending strongly to reflect the white-collar, elitist aspirations of the minority, and not to equip sufficient young people to tackle the farming, mechanical and technical problems which development demands should be solved. The following table, showing the number of pupils offering each subject in the Cambridge School Certificate examination in 1969, illustrates this:

English Language	213
English Literature	205
Geography	167
Maths	153
Tswana	144
History	134
General Science	126
Biology Practical	117

Further down the list a subject called 'Life of Christ' had more entrants (46) than Commerce (22) and Agricultural Science (14) combined!


SOUTHERN AFRICAN UNITY

Developing countries commonly experience a deluge of advice – often contradictory – from 'experts'. We do not claim any expertise, nor any monopoly of the scientific wisdom of Marxism-Leninism which is freely available for nations, leaders and individuals to draw upon in order to overcome problems of social and economic development. We do, however, claim a common interest with the Batswana people in the liberation of Southern Africa, and we recognise the interdependence of their future and ours. No strangers to the humiliation and hardships of apartheid, the Batswana people will assuredly stand solidly behind the oppressed masses of South Africa in their revolutionary armed struggle.

If we have been free with advice in these pages, it is because of the deep concern we have that Botswana should stand united and independent on the path to freedom, impervious to racist bullying and imperialist pressures, until the day when all the peoples of Southern Africa are free and equal and masters of their fate. In that spirit we look forward to the rapid social and economic development of Botswana which is a concomitant of our own freedom.

AFRICA: Notes and Comments

by A. Langa



SUDAN : A BACKWARD STEP

In our last issue, after discussing the economic development plan published by the Sudanese Government in June 1970, we commented on a number of difficulties which would arise in the implementation of the plan, and concluded: "Above all, there is a need for political unity. At the time of going to press it was reported that the Government of the Sudan had arrested the general secretary of the Communist Party,

Abdel-Khalek Mahgoub, and dismissed a number of members of the Revolutionary Council suspected of 'communist sympathies'. If these reports are correct, it is not a very good augury."

The arrest of Mahgoub took place in November, 1970. Shortly thereafter, the Sudanese Communist Party issued a statement accusing the Revolutionary Command Council of "weakening an important part of the forces of the revolution. It is impossible for the State power to protect itself against the attacks of reaction and imperialism and to safeguard the forward march of the revolution without the support of the formidable revolutionary battalions.

"The description of the Communist Party as 'destructive' can be met by the Party only by a flat rejection. Our people know very well the efforts exerted by the Communist Party to protect and strengthen the new regime by advocating and organising the masses for the development of the revolution".

The Communist Party pointed out that it had urged the strengthening and development of the nationalised industries and the institution of the five-year plan. It had campaigned for the establishment of a democratic movement in the South and a policy of regional autonomy "despite the difficulties created by the Rightist and bureaucratic elements within the State machine in the South". A Communist, Joseph Garang, was head of the Ministry of Southern Affairs.

For some time there had been pressure on the Party to dissolve itself and merge into a single party led by the officers of the Revolutionary Council, on the Egyptian model. The Party responded to this pressure by stating its right to an independent political existence and reasserting its demand for the formation of a national democratic front, based on the maximum unity of all democratic and anti-imperialist forces. Within such a front, the Party claimed the right to maintain its independent role as the leader of the organised working class.

"What is happening today", the Party said, "is a continuation of the Rightist political line by the Conservative elements which will continue to exert pressure sooner or later to bring about an absolute Right Wing coup which will deprive our people not only of the victories achieved since May 1969 but also all other victories achieved since independence".

The Party was also critical of the Sudanese Government's decision to join the federation with Libya, Egypt and Syria, and distributed thousands of leaflets denouncing the idea of federation as a capitulation to pan-Arabism. The Party feared that the creation of such a federation would strengthen the bourgeoisie in all four countries at the expense of

the working class and the peasantry, and would gravely undermine the revolution in the Sudan itself.

Nimeiry's Broadcast

On February 12 the Party's forebodings came true. In a broadcast speech the Sudanese Prime Minister, Major-General Jafaar al- Nimeiry announced that his regime had decided to "rush and destroy" the Communist Party and purge all Communists from public life. Accusing the Party of attempting to sabotage the Sudan's economy, national unity and foreign relations, Gen. Nimeiry said: "There is no more justification for the existence of the Sudanese Communist Party. They have already been isolated and will soon be purged from all Government departments, the civil service and trade unions".

He told listeners: "You must destroy anyone who claims there is a Sudanese Communist Party. Destroy this alleged Party"

Gen. Nimeiry's broadcast indicates that the Revolutionary Council has capitulated to right-wing pressure, and decided to replace the support of the organised working class with that of the bourgeoisie. Announcing a reshuffle in the Revolutionary Council, he said the revolution now stood on new land — "the land of a new coalition that opens the way for all organisations and establishments". The Council now had three new members, he said — "a farmer, a labourer and a member of national capitalism" — the last named Mohamed Idris Mahmoud, a former member of the right wing Umma Party.

The representation of national capitalism in the Council had significance, he said. "National capital is part of the revolution, and has its role in building up this country. The revolution opens for it a place side by side with the public sector. The responsibility of building up the country is greater than can be achieved by one sector without the other".


A few days later it was announced that at least 84 leading Sudanese Communists had been arrested in the Sudan, including members of the Party's central Committee, leading intellectuals and civil servants. Among those reported arrested were the general secretary of the Sudan Trade Union Federation El Shafie Ahmed el Sheikh, the president of the Sudan Women's Association Mrs Fahtma Ahmed Ibrahim, and Mrs Souad Ibrahim Ahmed, a member of the central committee and university lecturer.

Gen. Nimeiry's assault on the Communist Party, far from strengthening the unity of the revolutionary forces in the Sudan, can only imperil

the whole revolution, and retard progress on the road to socialism. To build socialism without the support of the organised working class is impossible. Socialism is not strengthened by expelling socialists from the Revolutionary Council and replacing them with capitalists. The logic of politics is that Nimeiry will have to look more and more to the right for support in his crusade against the Communists. His folly is calculated to destroy the only organised force capable of mobilising the masses of the people in support of the Sudanese revolution.

The Southern policy of the Sudanese Government is also in danger. Apart from the army, the Revolutionary Council had only the Communists to win the people to support the policy of regional autonomy. By attacking the Communists, Nimeiry is playing into the hands of the Anyanya guerrillas who demand total secession from the Arab north. This means that Khartoum will once more have to rely on military rather than political means to solve the Southern problem – and this means an indefinite prolongation of armed conflict to the point where the very unity of the Sudanese state may be called in question.

(For a full background to the Sudanese problem, we refer readers to “Sudan: the revolutionary task” by J. Girodot in the “African Communist” issue No. 43, 4th Quarter, 1970.)



LESOTHO: NO JOY WITH JONATHAN

The unfortunate Basotho people, having had their birthright of independence and democratic rights sold for them by the dictator Leabua Jonathan, are ending up without even the proverbial mess of pottage. The Lesotho Five-Year-Plan recently announced in Maseru reveals just how pathetic the state of the economy is, and how abysmally Jonathan and his side-kicks have failed to do anything about it.

The Plan will, if successful, create ten to fifteen thousand new jobs in five years – not even enough to absorb the new people coming on to the labour market every year, much less allow the homecoming of any of the more than 50% of able-bodied men who must spend their lives working in the apartheid slave state. Income per head in Lesotho is a miserable R63 per year: with the rate of growth in the new plan, it will be almost stagnant after population growth and inflation have taken their toll. The much-talked of Malibamatso Dam, part of the Oxbow hydro-electric scheme which was once the dream of Basotho prosperity, will swallow up no less than half of the R54 million allocated to development investment over the next five years – but the dam will produce no electricity! Indeed, it is doubtful whether any benefit whatsoever will accrue to the people from the dam – all that it will be useful for, apparently, is to sell a bit of water to the South Africans (who will, as sole customers, be able to name their price, of course).

But life in Lesotho is good for some – notably for the white South African degenerates who flock over to the Maseru casino and the expensive hotel and bars, for the civil servants and party hacks living off the people's backs, and of course for Jonathan, who has recently declared that there will be a "five-year holiday" from politics, and that his political opponents, including Ntsu Mokhehle, will remain in detention "indefinitely".

And life is happiest of all for Lesotho's encircling neighbour, South Africa, which has staved off the threat of an independent, democratic island in a sea of hate and fascism – and all for the cost of R400,000 grant-in-aid for "security purposes" (i.e. for suppression of the population), 20 or so seconded South African officials (for "security purposes" again), and no doubt a little gentle graft and bribery for Lesotho's co-operative officials. Lesotho is run more and more like its South African master, with Britain's able assistance in the person of Roach, who is now Commissioner of Police; while hotels and other "beneficial" investments come under the genial patronage and supervision of the Managing Director of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, Mr. Wynand Van Graan – who is not, as you might just have guessed, of Basotho origin, but a South African official seconded from the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation.



TANZANIA: FOUR GET LIFE FOR TREASON

A plot for overthrowing Tanzania's government and for assassinating President Nyerere, foiled by the arrest of the plotters in 1969, had its last act in the High Court in Dar es Salaam in February when four of

the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for treason against their country.

Among the traitors were Bibi Titi Mohamed, veteran Tanzanian politician and a former leader of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union, the governing party) and junior Minister in the Government. Another was Gray Mattaka, former news editor of the *Nationalist*, the party newspaper.

Both Mattaka and the two other "lifers", the brothers John and Eliyah Chipaka (the latter an army officer) are related to Oscar Kambona, the former Minister who resigned after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 rather than forgo his capitalist privileges (he was a considerable landlord in Dar). Shortly afterwards Kambona fled to Europe — just before Nyerere announced that some unpleasant facts about Kambona's finances had been uncovered when Tanzanian officials went through the books of the then newly nationalised banks. Bibi Titi Mohamed, too, was embittered by the Arusha Declaration: she too was a *rentier*, and had lost her political positions largely because of her flagrant commercial activities in Dar es Salaam.

The key issue of the case was the credibility of the chief prosecution witness, Potlako Leballo, the Pan Africanist Congress mouthpiece. Leballo claimed that he had acted as go-between for the plotters, but had volunteered information to the Tanzanian Intelligence Service in order to thwart the coup. He gave details of meetings, letters being passed, and feverish (although rather amateurish) planning to take over the government.

The plotters had attempted to win over Michael Kamaliza, former Minister of Labour, and Col. William Chacha, an army officer who was an old friend of the President's. Both these men were sentenced to 10 years in prison for misprision of treason — that is for knowing of the plot but not informing the authorities. An army lieutenant was acquitted on all counts and released.

The defence had launched an all-out attack on Leballo's credibility, pointing to the low esteem he was held in by other liberation organizations (and even sections of his own), to what they felt were the suspicious circumstances of his flight from South Africa to Lesotho, and to inconsistencies and alleged lies in his evidence before the court. They also pointed out that the Tanzanian Director of Intelligence regarded Leballo as a police agent, though Leballo denied this entirely.

In his summing-up to the four citizen assessors who heard the marathon (127-day) case with him, the Chief Justice drew attention to all these arguments about the character and credibility of Leballo, and pointed out that the main conflict was between the view that Leballo

was basically a truthful and adequate witness, and the view that he was a liar, either attempting to curry favour once it was clear that the plot could not succeed, or else possibly an agent of the South African Government whose aim was to sow confusion in Tanzania.

In his judgement after the defendants had been found guilty on various counts, Chief Justice Telfer Georges said that Leballo was a witness who exaggerated out of an exalted view of his own importance; his testimony could not be safely accepted. He found, however, that there was enough corroborative evidence in the important issues to sustain a verdict of guilty – notably in the documents which the accused wrote or had in their possession.

The six accused gave immediate notice of appeal – their appeals will probably be heard by the East African Court of Appeals when it sits in Dar es Salaam in May.

The long-term effects of the trial are difficult to assess: one of the heartening aspects of the case was that the plotters apparently made little headway in their efforts to subvert the Tanzanian People's Defence Force, which has been much reorganised and democratised since the army mutiny of January 1964, and since Arusha. It seems possible, however, that the Tanzanians will feel it desirable to look yet again at the structure and functions of the armed forces – particularly in view of the Ugandan coup. The closer the integration between army and people, and the firmer the control of party over army, the less chance there is of the Tanzanians being subjected to military dictatorship.

“SPANISH” SAHARA: FREEDOM FOR FRANCO

Within the next six months, Spain will hold a “referendum” in “Spanish” Sahara, the 103,000 square miles of territory between Morocco and Mauretania which Spain currently controls. Both Mauretania and Morocco have claimed sovereignty over this desert territory, very sparsely inhabited by nomadic clans who migrate seasonally mainly from Mauretania. But Morocco has now abandoned its claim, and stated that it will accept Saharan “independence”. Why?

In the first place, because it has probably come under quite strong pressure from Franco's ally, the U.S., which is anxious to maintain the stability of both regimes. The U.S. has vital military bases in Spain, which is the cornerstone of the entire American military system of southern Europe and the Mediterranean; it has vital military bases in Morocco, at Kenitra, Sidi Yahia and Sidi Bouknadel. (King Hassan's regime categorically denies that any U.S. bases exist on Moroccan soil –

a denial which provokes mirth from the inhabitants of Rabat, who are all quite well aware of the American presence 25 miles from the capital). It would obviously be very bad news for the Americans if its two most important allies on either side of the Mediterranean were to be at each other's throats. The Moroccans have therefore been strong-armed into renouncing their claim to the Sahara territory – and the Algerians, who formerly supported that claim, have been induced to go along by a trade pact with Madrid.

The Sahara territory's independence, of course, will be entirely bogus – it will constitute freedom for Franco, in fact. The territory will be nominally independent, and therefore uncomfortable attacks on Spanish colonialism in the U.N. will cease. At the same time, Madrid maintains that there are only about 58,000 "true" Saharwis, and that the rest are "immigrants". This ludicrous lie will ensure that the government of the territory passes into the hands of the head of the R'Gheba clan, who is a merchant in the pocket of the Spanish government. He will quite possibly become Emir or Sultan of the territory in due course, and will undoubtedly enter into defence and trade pacts with Spain to "protect" himself and his newly-established monarchy from Mauretanian claims. What Spain is really protecting, of course, is the freedom to pillage.

Spanish Sahara is now known to be rich in oil, gas, iron, copper and – most importantly of all – phosphate. Phosphate deposits (so far entirely unexploited) are estimated at about 30 billion tons: a two-mile jetty is now being built out into the Atlantic to harbour giant ore-carrying ships, and Krupps, the West German monopoly concern, are building a £25 million conveyor belt to carry the phosphate ore to the sea. The stage is set for a major rip-off of African wealth.

SOCIALIST LAND REFORM IN TANZANIA

by a Special Correspondent

"We have got rid of the foreign government, but we have not yet rid ourselves of the individualistic social attitudes which they represented and taught."

President J.K. Nyerere.

The policy of basing Tanzania's socialist development on the principle of Ujamaa has been justified by the President in terms of its relevance to Tanzanian conditions and history. There has been a similar concern in other African countries to relate the building of socialism to the nature of the traditional society,¹ and this is not therefore a particularly novel approach. But Nyerere carries the argument farther than any

¹Thus the term 'African socialism' has tended to become a catch-all. Cf. The Common Man's Charter (Uganda's 'opening to the left') and earlier the Kenyan Sessional Paper No. 10 on 'African Socialism and its Relation to Planning in Kenya'. Both these documents have varyingly tenuous links with socialism, the latter regarding Marxism as having no relevance to African conditions because it was a product of 19th century industrial Europe.

other African leader with socialist aspirations. In his policy pamphlet on Socialism and Rural Development, the President treats of traditional African Society as one living according to the principles of Ujamaa – and constructs a picture corresponding in many ways to the primitive mode of production of Marx. For Nyerere, the three basic assumptions of this society were mutual respect between the members, common ownership of property and the obligation to work. But he recognises at the same time two main inadequacies of the traditional system. First, that the women were placed in an inferior position, their exploitation manifested in the fact that they did more than their fair share of work; and secondly, that the people lived in poverty, resulting from ignorance and the small scale of their operations. The strategy of development in Tanzania is, then, to build on these three principles of traditional society and to add to them the development of a higher level of technology.

The President recognises, too, that what has been happening in the rural areas as a result of colonialism and the introduction of cash crops, is the development of individualism among the peasant farmers. This has meant the development of land accumulation by individual farmers and the widespread employment of casual labour. The result has indeed been an increase in production, but at the expense of ujamaa living, and therefore a deepening of rural socio-economic stratification.

Formation of Classes

Rural studies in Tanzania support the President's claim that there is increasing class formation and exploitation of labour in the countryside. For example, one study on the cotton farmers of Sukumaland found that 77% of the farmers hired labour. Tobacco, maize, smallholder sisal, coffee and wheat are other examples of crops grown by peasant farmers, many of whom depend on hired labour. In the more densely populated mountain areas, land markets have developed and with them the increasing concentration of land in fewer hands. It would not be true to say, however, that the problem is at all serious when looked at in terms of a developing landless proletariat – at least not at the present time.

The President further develops the argument by pointing out that:

The land is the only basis for Tanzania's development; we have no other. Therefore if our rural life is not based on the principles of socialism, our country will not be socialist.



President Nyerere addressing a mass meeting on the Arusha Declaration.

This is the crux of the problem. As Ngotyana (African Communist No.39) noted, it is not a new debate as to whether it is possible to move to rural socialism on the basis of social organisation said to have existed in traditional societies. And in many ways it is a debate with little meaning in the Tanzanian context, except as a form of speculation. The

achievement of rural socialism first may be the only path which Tanzania, or other similar countries with a socialist perspective, can follow. Tanzania then, has no choice but to adopt, in principle, the approach to socialist rural transformation, outlined in the policy document. Forced collectivisation does not offer itself as an alternative, not merely for historical reasons, but also because Tanzania does not have the human resources, particularly the rural Party cadres, to implement it. As an overall alternative rapid industrialisation lies in the future as far as a primary emphasis is concerned. Thus the objective is to create a socialist agricultural base in order to mobilise a surplus for industrial development over which Tanzanians will have control.

Ujamaa Villages

The basic form of organisation through which this transformation is to take place, is the Ujamaa village, and it is our purpose here to make a close examination of the nature of the Ujamaa village in practice. First then we shall look at the organisation and performance of selected Ujamaa villages, with particular reference to their claims to be socialist. Secondly, we shall look at the place of Ujamaa villages within the overall agricultural context, and finally look at the problems of implementation in agriculture on a widespread scale – the problems of what the Tanzania 2nd Five year plan calls the ‘frontal approach’.

There are now thought to be around 1400 Ujamaa villages in Tanzania. These may be said to fall into three categories in relation to their overall claims to accord with the principles of Ujamaa. First, there are the villages which are run completely on communal lines. Secondly, there are villages which are run partly on communal lines, but where the members have significant private holdings. Some of these are really village settlements¹ of old, transformed into Ujamaa villages but retaining much of their old form. Finally there are villages which have been formed largely, it seems, as a way for the already prosperous farmers to get funds and social services. The farmers still maintain their existing

¹ The Village Settlement Scheme was seen as the means of transforming rural life, and was generally composed of individual plots surrounding a social service centre which supplied water, health services and education. This was the kind of scheme recommended by the World Bank mission of 1961 and was an example of the so-called ‘transformation approach’. The Tanzanian Government later abandoned these schemes as very costly failures.

and often substantial private farms and work on an Ujamaa plot maybe two or sometimes three days in the week. It is not really possible to give an idea of the relative importance of these different forms, but two factors must be borne in mind. The population in the Ujamaa villages is only about 4% of the total rural population. Secondly, the communal villages probably constitute only 10% of the whole. Thus at present, the numbers of people living in the rural areas according to the principles of Ujamaa is very small. This is not to belittle the achievement to date, but to leave the reader under no illusion as to the task facing Party, Government, and, most important, the people they represent.

Ideal Model

The Ujamaa village of Mbambara in Tanga region offers an ideal model of envisaged Ujamaa development. This village, started in 1964 by a group of TYL (Tanu Youth League) members, mainly sisal workers from nearby sisal estates, cleared new land, founded a settlement and planted sisal at a time when the price was very high. They had seen the vast profits which were being made out of their labour by the private sisal owners, and so opted for a settlement where they would get some of the benefits of the higher prices themselves. By the time the sisal was ready to be harvested, three years later, the prices had fallen to less than half the level of 1964. The villagers stuck to their task and managed eventually to get some return for their effort. They were fortunate in having much personal support from the President.¹ They grew food crops for their own consumption and widened the scope of their agricultural activities by keeping chickens and fish and by moving into the sphere of vegetable and fruit production. Recently the village bought some cattle and nearly 200 chickens.

All the work in the village is now done communally. Each member is given a specific task to do each day and incurs a penalty if the job is not done properly. This generally means that he has to repeat the task, or to finish the work out of normal hours. The move towards communal acti-

¹ Two examples of Presidential support can be cited here. When the village found that they could not get transport for their sisal leaf to be processed on the neighbouring sisal estate, they were given a lorry by the President. When they had trouble getting the same sisal estate, even after nationalisation, to process their leaf, the President issued an order to the estate that they were obliged to help Ujamaa villages and therefore process the sisal.

vity in the village was itself revealing. Originally only sisal was cultivated and harvested communally. The work allocation on the village *shamba* usually meant that each member was required to do 4 hours work there, and the rest of the day was available for members to work on their private plots. Eventually the difficulties in selling sisal were such that it became necessary to think in terms of communalising food crop production since this had become the peasants' major economic activity. Through effective leadership and with the hindsight of experience, members began to learn the value of cooperative activity based on a work discipline inherited from their time on the sisal estates, more particularly the ability to raise the levels and the quality of production.

It is still possible for farmers in the village to cultivate privately. But it is not made easy for them to do so because they have a full and equal day's work to do on the communal shambas.

Nevertheless the principle of equal work can still allow the operation of private plots, for example in the case where some people are able to work faster than others. All men and women are not equal in strength and therefore the work allocation has to be such that those best equipped to do the heavy work are given the heavy work to do and vice versa. This principle of work allocation is clearly the fairest one and is incorporated into the Mbambara work schedule.

Even so the socialist principle of 'from each according to his ability to each according to his needs' is not yet fully operational and will not be until it is recognised that the strong man, by virtue of his strength should contribute more to the village in terms of physical labour than the weaker man. The operational principle at present adhered to is largely 'from each according to his ability to each according to his work'. Private exchange still occurs. Individuals own chickens and they sell their eggs to other villagers. Individuals own banana trees from the days when these trees were individually planted, and they sell their bananas locally. As far as the egg market is concerned, the new supply of eggs from the communally owned chickens will be sufficient for the whole village and will satiate the market thus denying a market to the individual egg producers. New houses are being built communally which means that houses in the village will no longer be able to be sold, as in the past, when individuals leave the village.

Membership of the village has now settled around 100 people, compared with the 240 pioneers who came in 1963 to clear the bush and the 60 who stayed through to 1964 to found the village. The actual population of the village is nearer two hundred when the families of the members are included. The villagers started a school themselves and this

is now a Government school. They also have built a dispensary, a concrete-based grain store, a well, a dam and a cooperative shop. The villagers now run their own adult education classes, during the evenings after the day's work.

Cash income, largely from the sale of sisal, is earned by the village, and is not automatically distributed to the members. It may be that the members decide to invest most of the surplus they produce in development projects, such as a grain store, or a cattle herd or a poultry house, these being some of the projects they have carried through from generating a surplus. Not all the earlier developments were internally financed, however, and the village has received many gifts. In the early years when the villagers concentrated on sisal they received gifts of food; the dam was built with gifts of cement from the District Council. The lorry was, as we have seen, a gift from the President. But at the present time the village is self-financing.

Village Democracy

The democratic organisation of this village also acts as a model. The early history of Mbambara was one of bad management and a misuse of funds. The satisfactory resolution of this state of affairs was achieved through a political struggle in which the members threw out the old leadership and substituted new leaders with whom they had forged close links during the struggle against the old leadership. Thus the principle was established that the general meeting of the village was the democratic control agency. The annual general meeting elects the chairman (who automatically becomes the manager), a secretary, a treasurer and an executive committee, which itself divides into work, education, health and shop committees. If found unsatisfactory in their work, any of these elected members can be unseated at a general meeting. These meetings can take place as often as twice a week.

Finally, Mbambara is a part of the Tanu structure. The chairman and secretary of the village are the chairman and secretary of the Party branch. There is clearly felt to be no conflict between the aims of the Party and the aims of the village.

The Ruvuma Experience

In the case of the Ruvuma Development Association (the RDA), the alliance between Party and villages was not so close. The RDA was an association of Ujamaa villages, or rather a movement, which was estab-

lished in Ruvuma Region on Tanzania's southern borders. In September 1969, it was banned by the Tanu Central Committee and its functions taken over by the Party. The RDA was, it seems, in frequent dispute with the local Party organisation, largely because of the Party's suspicion that the Association was becoming a law unto itself, and usurping the functions of the Party. Other explanations are difficult to accept. It is in fact most likely that the Party wanted some of the credit for Ujamaa development in these areas, especially as these particular villages were held up as a model to the rest of the country.

The Association of 15 villages was spearheaded by a village settlement at Litowa in Songea district, which was started in 1960 by a group of TYL members. After an initial setback, a second, this time successful attempt was made to start the village. After 8 years it had become a settlement with houses, a school, a dispensary, a nursery school and piped water. Although only 3 of the original 15 members were still with the settlement, the population had grown to over 100 people. The movement itself spread until there were 15 villages linked together through the RDA, which in effect acted as a servicing body for all the villages. It provided for example, a grain mill, a timber mill, a school and a workshop. Apart from the usual agricultural activities, certain 'cottage industry' type enterprises were developed such as wool spinning and weaving, and brickmaking. As with Mbambara, the group had the overall aim of building a self reliant community.

One of the more important developments was in the field of education. Here the principle of Education for Self Reliance as set out in the Presidential document carrying that title, was established in reality. The education given at the Litowa school was designed to enable the pupils to continue to work in the rural areas, but having, as a result of their education, a higher level of consciousness than the previous generation had. Adult education classes were also established so that the present generation should also be able to enjoy some of the benefits of education, and be able to employ what they had learnt in improving their agricultural practices.

The development of a cadre of better educated activists into the Social and Economic Revolutionary Army (SERA) which together with representatives of the villages, comprised the RDA, was a further step in experimenting with ways of spreading the ideology and practice of Ujamaa. The members of SERA were more technically qualified and constituted a leadership which was limited in its potential elitism by the fact that its representation on the RDA could not outnumber representatives from the villages. The villages themselves had representatives who

were democratically elected and subject to democratic dismissal. At all times the emphasis was on 'spontaneous' development from 'below' with the minimum of interference, while at the same time welcoming assistance from the Government machine and the Party. A further emphasis was on efficient management and dedicated leadership, both of which the Association had.

The 'Ujamaa' village settlements

These kinds of communally organised villages differ sharply from the settlements which still remain from the now defunct village settlement programme of the early sixties. The settlements incorporated sizeable private plots into their organisation. Thus in the only sisal settlement scheme established at Kabuku, in Tanga region, in cooperation with a large group of (still) privately owned sisal estates, each settler had a one acre plot for his own use, besides a block of several acres of sisal which was his own share of what was a block farm. At Kabuku the proceeds from each plot went to the holder of that plot, although the sisal was worked communally. This was a situation which immediately gave rise to income differences of a significant amount. The yields varied between the individual plots, partly because of the differing standards of upkeep and partly because of the differences in soils. Thus in one month the income of the most successful farmer could be 5 times that of the least successful. Now that this settlement calls itself an Ujamaa village there have been moves towards communalising agricultural production, but so far these have come up against the opposition of the better-off farmers. At present, also in contradiction with stated Ujamaa principle, the farmers employ labour on their sisal fields and on their own plots. The employment of labour even had the blessing of the Ministry of Information reporter who visited the village and wrote of the settlers' new log-business:

The Kabuku log business is conducted with expertise and shrewdness. Villagers cut the trees themselves, but when necessary they employ casual workers on wage terms. (1)

Upper Kitete in Arusha Region is similarly a village settlement scheme turned into an Ujamaa village. In this case the settlers each have a private plot of 3 acres but farm wheat communally on hundreds of acres, using modern agricultural equipment. The private plots were supposed to be exclusively for food crops, but in fact many farmers

(1) Reported in the *Standard* 'Kabuku shows the Way to Ujamaa Living' 28 August 1970.

have grown wheat on these plots in order to maximise their cash return. This has had an effect on the success of the communal plots. The farmers work on the communal area in the mornings only and the rest of the day is available for them to work on their own plots. This village despite being still some way from the Ujamaa living of Mbambara has managed to win the prize for the 'best Ujamaa village' in the Region.

These villages should not be dismissed lightly because they are not fully communal. This would mean dismissing the vast majority of villages. The important thing is that the principle of Ujamaa is understood. At Kabuku, for example, it is the farmers themselves who are discussing the ways in which the village might move to more genuine Ujamaa forms, and they do have an understanding that they are not at present a truly Ujamaa village. Here the strategy of moving gradually through varying degrees of communalism can be seen to be paying off.

A socialist society?

How far can the Ujamaa villages contribute to the socialist transformation of the rural sector? Ideally a set of socialist production relations in the rural areas should constitute the dominant mode of production. In Tanzania the dominant mode is not socialist. Not only is Ujamaa but a small proportion of the agricultural whole, but the major cash crops of the country are still at the mercy of the large international firms constituting the consumers, in what is an anarchic world market. The danger for the Ujamaa villages is that they become isolated from their main task, which must be to lead in the reorientation of Tanzanian agricultural production away from the world market dominated by capitalism, and towards, first, the internal market which is still undeveloped, and then towards the socialist countries, with which Tanzania can enter into long term barter agreements with guaranteed 'prices'. If the Ujamaa villages remain as they are they will have as their counterpart, not the collective or the commune, but the Israeli kibbutz, a cooperative certainly, but one linked through the society in which it exists to the international capitalist system.

Further, it can also be argued that the emphasis on self-reliance has led many to understand that each village, or set of villages, has to have as little contact with the world outside, in terms of exchange relations, as possible. While this is clearly advisable as regards relations with imperialism, the object of Ujamaa production has to be to prove that it is the best way of organising the peasantry to produce the surplus not only to feed the urban population, but principally to bring the benefits

of development to the rural areas, in terms of water and electric power. Thus Ujamaa villages must produce beyond their own needs, using higher levels of technology and the advantages of operating on a larger scale. This is not always made clear. Indeed at present most Ujamaa villages are distinguished by their poverty and lack of concrete assistance from the Government and Party.

Socialist property forms have as a major advantage, the consequent facility to be able to plan, and plan with some degree of accuracy. Socialist forms of ownership in the rural areas should in the longer run enable the planners to specify, for each village, production possibilities, needs and targets. At present with the low level of Ujamaa development the production of agricultural commodities is not only subject to the vagaries of the climate, but also to the uncertain rationalities of peasant decision-making. Hence control over volumes produced is exercised uneasily through the price mechanism. Actual socialist control of the means of production should enable there to be greater control over these volumes. Planning then would have to be a mixture of regional and central planning, with the implication that the central Government would play a more active role in Ujamaa production than they are at present encouraged to do by the advocates of the 'spontaneous' approach. The will to develop Ujamaa forms must come from the peasant farmers themselves; but there is also a stage where the centre must step in more massively and urgently than hitherto. The Tanzanian Government has to some extent recognised the urgency of the situation and thus switched from what one might call the 'spontaneous' development approach to what they have called the 'frontal' approach.

The Frontal Approach

The first region in the country selected for this 'frontal' strategy was Dodoma region, an arid, sparsely populated region of $\frac{3}{4}$ million people, some nomadic pastoralists, some arable farmers, but all living in often semi-desert conditions with a history of frequent famines, due to droughts. Inherent in the frontal strategy is the notion of planning the transformation of whole areas from the present, largely individualistic forms of landholding and production to Ujamaa forms. The problem of how this is done with nomadic people has been resolved in similar areas, like Masailand, by range management schemes, a sort of livestock version of the village settlement. But it is in the nature of the pastoralists' existence that they have to wander in search of fertile grazing land and in search of water. In the case of the arable farmers, the land has

varying fertility and varying rainfall over short distances, so that farms are scattered and only small plots of land are farmed; the transformation to Ujamaa indicates that the opposite situation has to be achieved.

The solution to these problems must logically lie in a combination of careful pre-planning to evaluate the different possibilities for both cattle and livestock, and this in turn implies the need to find supplies of water and provide forms of irrigation; of political education so that the peasants at all times realise what they are committing themselves to and why; and finally, of Government assistance which, in the early stages, might merely be the provision of technical personnel and maybe even of work brigades to help the peasants build their villages and water supplies.

The Role of the Party

The need for political education and the assistance of brigades and party cadres implies a different kind of political party from the party inherited from the colonial era. Tanu is still basically the same party which fought for Independence, a party of the broad front. Not all of its membership is socialist, by any means, including as it did sections of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, for whom the policy of Ujamaa is one which now has to be accepted, but its impact minimised. (1) What is required from the party is that it can provide from within its ranks advanced sections of the peasantry, coming out of the areas where Ujamaa is being built, teaching and working with the peasants in the process. What is not required is the wholesale importation of officials from outside the area, even if from the regional headquarters, instructing the peasants as to their task, but taking no physically active part in it themselves.

Therefore the Party this situation requires is a revolutionary socialist party, which understands the policy of Ujamaa and has a consciousness

(1) Indeed there have been several demands for a purge of Tanu. The Party newspaper the *Nationalist* headlined on 22nd October 1970: 'TYL wants TANU purged' – "Members or leaders of Tanu who have capitalist connections or ideas should be expelled from the Party in order to make Tanu a vanguard party of the workers and peasants only, it was resolved this week by a seminar of the Tanu Youth League in Dar es Salaam." Who is to carry out the purging is another question.

of the problems of implementation. This is not generally the case with Tanu. Those who are in charge of the implementation process are often those with the least consciousness and the least understanding of what Ujamaa is all about. Their objective is possibly to be seen as successful implementors and this has resulted in the use of force in some cases, to 'persuade' peasants to move to Ujamaa villages, thus giving the peasants themselves every reason to oppose Ujamaa as being another example of authoritarian intervention by the Government.

The Dodoma experience and the criticisms evinced of both Government and Party by revolutionary student volunteers who lived and worked in some Dodoma villages during their vacations (criticisms which were reported and voiced in the Government owned *Standard* and the Party's *Nationalist* newspapers) started a furious debate. The students' view of dictatorial Party and administrative bureaucracies was sharply challenged by people from within the Government and Party machines. Those who argued that the Party was not taking an active role in some areas and was interfering too dictatorially in others, were attacked for interfering in the work of those whose job it was to implement socialism. However, the fact that this debate took place openly in the columns of Government and Party newspapers alike, is an indication of the extent to which free and open debate can help define the lines of struggle and identify the opposing interests.

The Socialist Road

The path to socialism in the rural areas has been complex for all countries which have adopted a socialist strategy, and Tanzania is no exception. The task is perhaps more difficult in Tanzania because of the low level of human and material resources, that is, of the political cadres and the investable surplus. It is important to banish illusions about the scale of the problem, to point out that there is a struggle, and that therefore to criticise the implementation of Ujamaa in the rural areas is not to oppose. Criticism must always point a way forward, a road which travels through a heightening of political consciousness, through political education (both theoretical and practical) in the struggle.

As we have seen, the development of Ujamaa villages appears as a Government programme, rather than a total transformation of the rural life of the people from 'below'. The major problem which will have to be faced (whether the 'frontal' approach in areas like Dodoma succeeds or fails) is how to get the farmers of the cash crop zones, farmers with

a high level of prosperity and a high degree of individualism, to take up Ujamaa forms of production. Some elements of mutual aid are still to be found even in these areas, but so are the beginnings of a landless proletariat, and a poor peasantry, living off loans at high rates of interest obtained from the richer farmers.

The hope for Ujamaa may lie in cementing alliances between the poor farmers and the dispossessed peasantry, against the 'kulaks'. To wait for the formation of a large agricultural proletariat, however, would be to surrender power, totally, to the rural capitalists, who are already well entrenched. The development of socialism in the rural areas becomes then the only way in which capitalism can be arrested and the rural capitalists in Tanzania eventually expropriated.

WHY I JOINED THE COMMUNIST PARTY

by A. Ramsamy

My initial introduction to communism came in a strange way. I was sixteen, in my second year at High School where my English Master often used our English period to discuss a wide variety of subjects. He insisted that points of interest during such discussions should be noted in a little pocket book we were compelled to carry on our persons whenever we attended his class — or face a period of detention after school.

On one such diversion from our normal English lessons, he told us about the Soviet Union. What impressed me most, and still stands out clearly in my mind, although this lecture was delivered some 35 years ago, were two points my English Master made. The first was the fact that the USSR was the only country where race and national problems had been solved. The lecturer quoted figures on the number of nationalities that inhabited the Soviet Union and their position before and after the October revolution. He also told us how these various nationalities lived side by side in peace, advancing their own languages, customs and cultures.

The second point he made which impressed me was the fact that in the Soviet Union the means of production were owned by the people and not by a few as in the case in South Africa. Needless to say I made copious notes of the lecture in my little notebook which I carried with me long after I had left school.

Like all Blacks, I hated the system whereby I was treated as a second

class citizen. I abhorred racism of any kind, whether it was between White and Black or between the different non-White race groups.

At that time, long before progressive leaders had emerged among the Indian people, many Indians were as racist in their outlook, mainly towards the Africans, as the Whites in our country. This was a reflection of their class position. Not all Indians, as many South Africans imagine, are wealthy. By far the majority are workers. Nevertheless a significant minority, mainly small shopkeepers and farmers, were by virtue of their economic position leaders of the community for many years before the advent of a strong, militant and progressive leadership early in the forties.

In this situation it was easy for the Government to exploit the so-called problems of race, insofar as the Indians and the Africans were concerned. The racists, with the active connivance of the Indian leadership of the time, Indian priests and other Church leaders, and with the help of the mass media tried to create the illusion that Indians were in some way superior to their African brothers.

My English Master was not a person to brook any nonsense from anyone who showed the slightest inclination to behave or say anything in a racial manner, and this no doubt influenced me in my own non-racial outlook.

Went to Work

Forced to leave school that year owing to my family's precarious financial position (it was the period of the great depression and my father had been unemployed for almost three years) I had to find work and concentrate on being the family breadwinner. I therefore did not think any more about my English Master's lecture until about two years later.

About this time I attended several public meetings which were being held under the auspices of an organisation known as the non-European United Front. This organisation did not have a mass membership, but it did have a fairly large following in Durban. And while its leadership — a group of non-White intellectuals — did not include a single White person, they were not anti-White in their approach to the problems confronting our people. Their speeches were, in the main, against the colour bar and against British Imperialism. Once again my interest in the establishment of a non-racial society, first kindled by my English master, was aroused.

At about this time, I got a job as a van driver in a factory where

white drivers were being replaced by Indian drivers because employers were able to pay less for a more stable labour force. Within a short while some of us in the Industry organised a trade union, and I was elected its first treasurer.

As a trade unionist, I came into contact with other trade unionists, among them some members of the Communist Party who invited me to lectures at what was known as the Left Club. With the victory of the Nazis under Hitler in Germany and the threat of war increasing, the Communist Party, which had not hitherto been very active publicly, held more public meetings at the public square where I was a frequent visitor on Sundays to hear speakers of the Non-European United Front.

What the Communists said impressed me even more than what I had heard from the speakers of the Non-European United Front. They spoke of the need to organise into trade unions and explained how workers all over the world had done so and unitedly won higher wages and better working conditions. More important, from my personal point of view as a trade unionist, they offered to help workers organise trade unions and where trade unions already existed to help them by organising classes on trade unionism, and to assist in organisational work. They spoke of the unjustness of the impending war and warned that the working people could not benefit from it as it was only another war between Imperialist Countries in their everlasting desire to capture new markets. They spoke about the exploitation of man by man and the need to end this evil system and to replace it with socialism.

I was deeply impressed and took advantage of the offer of Communist Party assistance to organise my own Union. At one such meeting, late in 1938 or early in 1939, I filled in an application form to join the Communist Party of South Africa. I was interviewed about a week later and my membership was accepted for a probationary period of six months, and I was placed in a group. Having joined the Party, I soon realised that my understanding of Communism was most elementary.

Probationary Tasks

During my period of probation, I carried out all the tasks allocated to me by my group. In all honesty, I must add, this was not because I understood the reasons for having to carry out some of the decisions, but because it had been impressed upon me, when I was first interviewed, that my final acceptance as a full member depended on my showing as a disciplined member during the period of my probation. Among the tasks allocated to me, apart from selling the Party paper on

Sunday mornings, was attending regular political classes. It was during this early education that I got the first glimpses of the deeper meaning of Communism.

The lectures dealt with political economy from the Communist viewpoint, the difference between just and unjust wars, democratic centralism, the meaning of self discipline and what the class struggle was all about. In the period immediately after World War 2 began, the Party grew in strength and its influence particularly amongst the non-White peoples, and more especially among the Indian working class and intellectuals, was correspondingly greater.

The party's policy of opposing the war as merely a confrontation between two rival imperialisms was the main factor which contributed to this increase in support. Many nationally-minded non-Whites thought that the pressures of war would loosen the grip of the racists, that the apartheid state would disintegrate, that the day of liberation was at hand. Rallies of the Party drew as many as 10,000 people in Durban at this time.

If the Party received more support from the Indians than from the Africans at this time, it was because the Indians were a stable industrial labour force, whereas the Africans at that time were not. They worked in the cities for about six months in the year and then went back to their respective "Reserves" to tend their lands. Then those who had held the fort in the meanwhile went to the cities to take over the jobs left vacant by the first batch. There was never, at any one stage, work available for all the African workers in the "Reserves". They were forced to adopt this broken form of communal farming so that all members of the tribe could get a share in earning cash for their labours in the cities.

Crucial Test

The change of policy by the Party after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union was the first crucial test I had to face. The Party leadership correctly realised that the whole character of the war had changed, that the participation of the Soviet Union opened up for the first time the prospect of a progressive solution to the war, that it was the duty of party members everywhere to defend the first workers' state as the main bastion of the peace and freedom for which all progressives in all countries were fighting.

For the first time I took an active part in the general discussions that followed. I was still opposed to the war, only half-convinced by the patient and painstaking analyses and statements by the Party leadership

explaining how the character of the war had changed. To me support for the war meant support for Smuts and British imperialism.

In this I shared many illusions and misconceptions which were widespread amongst the Non-White people at this time — perhaps understandably in view of the discrimination to which we were subjected. When the Party took the decision to support the war, it immediately lost some support among the Non-Whites. We called on members of the Central Committee of the Party for assistance in convincing the people that the new policy was correct. At first even this did not help. I remember, for example, a crowd of several thousand people at Pietermaritzburg refusing to listen to us. They shouted down not only top members of the Party, but even their hero of only a few months earlier, Dr. Y.M. Dadoo, who had become the major spokesman of the Indian people and who had been interned for his opposition to the “phoney” war.

However, the Party stuck to its guns and more and more people began to understand. There was a reason for this too. Together with the change of policy on the war came the decision to build the party on a mass basis. We weathered the storm and grew from strength to strength.

For me this was a turning point in my political life. Through conflict, argument and struggle my understanding of Marxism was deepened. I saw how theory was related to practice. Today I am more convinced than ever that lasting solutions to the problems confronting the peoples of South Africa, particularly the African majority, can only be achieved by a strong Communist Party, working closely with the African National Congress.

THE STORMY TWENTIES

by A. Lerumo

The early nineteen-twenties were stormy and eventful years for South Africa. The economic crisis that swept through the world after the first world war had not left the country unaffected; nor had the revolutionary upsurge that followed the Russian Revolution of 1917. The African National Congress raised a strong demand for democracy and freedom for the oppressed people, and sent a delegation to place the African case before the Versailles Peace Conference. Non-white dockers at Cape Town, African municipal workers and 80,000 mine workers on the Rand and the workers of Port Elizabeth came out on strike for better pay and conditions. The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, supported by the A.N.C. and the Communists, had launched out on a spectacular drive to organise African workers of town and countryside.

The Smuts government, agent of British imperialism and the dominant mining capitalists of South Africa, struck back at the working people in a series of bloody massacres.

In *Port Elizabeth*, in October 1920, a mass of demonstrators gathered outside the police station to demand the release of the I.C.U. organiser, Samuel Masabalala, who had been arrested after demanding a minimum wage of ten shillings a day. Police opened fire, killing 23 and wounding 123 workers.

At *Bulhoek* location, near Queenstown, 800 troops marched in to 'deal with' an African religious sect (the 'Israelites') who had refused to move their camp and demanded to see Smuts. On 24 May 1921 the government troops opened fire, 163 Africans were killed and 129 wounded.

The *Bondelswarts*, a small tribe of Coloured people of South West Africa, were proving troublesome to the government of South Africa. They had fought a bitter struggle against German occupation, and after

the war they demanded freedom and independence from Pretoria in terms of the League of Nations Mandate. Smuts declared a virtual state of war. He sent bombing planes and troops armed with artillery and machine guns to South West Africa. Men, women and children were killed in air raids on their village of Guruchas on 29 and 30 May 1922. The Bondelswarts fled into the bush but were hunted down and overpowered by the superior weapons of the Union forces. Apart from those killed in the air raids, the South African authorities announced the casualties of this 'campaign' to be 150 Bondelswart men killed in action; government losses, two.

The Rand "Revolt"

The Witwatersrand was the scene of the most protracted and bloody strike in the history of the white workers' movement of South Africa, from January to March 1922. The employers, united in the Chamber of Mines, attempted to cut their gold-mining costs by cutting down the number of highly-paid workers and replacing some of them with Africans. The white workers resisted this attempt. This was the basic issue of the strike which began in January 22 and was only terminated in March after bloody clashes between the workers and Smuts's army:

The miners – mindful no doubt of the way in which Smuts had broken Witwatersrand strikes in 1907, 1913 and 1914 – had set up "workers commandos" some of which were lightly armed and engaged in picketing during most of the strike period. But Smuts provoked a showdown and pronounced the strike a "rebellion". On 9 March he declared martial law, called up the Active Citizen Force, and launched an all-out military attack. Military planes were used to bomb working class areas; artillery, tanks, and armoured cars were brought into action in addition to ground forces employing machine guns and rifles. A government enquiry reported the casualties at 153 killed (including 72 soldiers and policemen) and 687 injured. Thousands of strikers and their leaders were arrested and four – Long, Hull, Lewis and Stassen – were executed.

Smuts, on behalf of the Chamber of Mines, had broken the strike. But the brutal methods he had employed aroused a wave of indignation and outrage amongst a majority of the white voters. By 1922 a majority of the miners were Afrikaners, driven from the countryside during the post-war depression. The SAP (Smuts's South African Party) lost one election after another. In the general election of 1924 it went down in defeat to an alliance of the Nationalist Party, headed by General J.B.M.

Hertzog, and the Labour Party, led by F. Creswell.

From the outset the *Star*, the *Rand Daily Mail* and other newspapers controlled by big gold-mining interests had referred to the 1922 strike as "The Red Revolt". Using the same "anti-Bolshevik" scare propaganda, Smuts told Parliament a year later (19 March 1923) that "the aim of the Rand Revolutionaries was to establish a sort of Soviet Republic".

This was an absurd and deliberate exaggeration of the influence of the young Communist Party on the Rand events. The Party executive had, at the outset, issued a manifesto supporting the strike Committee, "convinced that essentially this is a fight against the capitalist class". The party members proved among the most loyal and devoted workers during the strike. Two of them, W.H. Andrews and E. Shaw, served on the Council of Action which played a vital part in the leadership at a time when the official union leaders were ready to surrender without a fight.

But the predominant leaders of the workers were by no means Communists. The union leadership was mainly in the hands of Creswellite "white labour" racialists, who made "White South Africa" one of the main slogans of the strike. Most of the Commando leaders were Afrikaner republicans. Indeed — though once it had pledged support it was given wholeheartedly — the Party had grave misgivings about the issue involved — the maintenance of a privileged position for the white workers. The manifesto specifically declared that Party support was given "without necessarily identifying itself with every slogan heard in the strike" and Andrews himself in a personal letter expressed his "private opinion" that the strike would "inevitably be lost". It was "impossible" he declared "for white workers in South Africa permanently to keep the Natives out of any form of industry ..."

Much of the energy of the Party during the strike was expended on appeals to the strikers to remember that their enemy was the capitalist mine owners and the government, not their black fellow-workers. Without such tireless propaganda there can be no doubt that many clashes, encouraged by government provocateurs and extreme white racialists, would have taken place between black and white workers. As it was some such clashes did take place, though by no means on a scale commensurate with the scare reports of the mine-owners' newspapers. The Martial Law Commission listed 25 non-whites killed, but does not state how many of these fell in air raids, shelling and shooting by the government forces.

KEEPING
THE
RED FLAG FLYING:

*An Address to the S.A.
Labour Party.*

БИБЛИОТЕКА
Академии общественных Наук
при ЦК ВКП(б)
Международный фонд
Л. _____

ISSUED BY THE
War on War League (S.A.)

P.O. Box 1891,
Johannesburg,
March, 1915.

Election Policies

It must be remembered, too, that the Communist Party at that time still bore the impress of its origin as a section of the white Labour Party and trade union movement. At the end of 1923 the annual Party Conference resolved to follow the example of the Communist Party of Great Britain which had decided (in entirely different circumstances) to apply for affiliation to the British Labour Party. (As in Britain, the application was rejected: the South African Labour Party, in the throes of negotiating an election agreement with the Nationalist Party, was particularly anxious to avoid any association with Communism.)

The Communist Party Annual Conference of 1924 saw a similar resolution to affiliate with the South African Labour Party decisively rejected.

By then the workers of South Africa had experienced the first year of the Nationalist-Labour coalition. The C.P.S.A. had welcomed the anti-Smuts alliance of the two Parties. Although expressing little confidence in an "alliance between bourgeois nationalism and labour imperialism", and "notwithstanding the obvious insincerity of the whole arrangement" the Party organ *The International*, declared (27 April, 1923) "we recognise that a general assault on the Smuts-Chamber of Mines combination must be made".

The Communist Party was not alone in this opinion. Similar conclusions were reached by both the I.C.U. and the African National Congress, for the imperialist Smuts government had earned the bitter hatred of all sections of the working people.

The same editorial in *The International* warned that a new government would not be "materially different" to that of Smuts — but believed it would serve to educate the workers. "The rank and file of both the Labour and Nationalist Parties must sooner or later refuse to follow their bourgeois leaders and will form a real workers' party ... to work for the overthrow of the capitalist system".

The underlying assumption was that the white workers of South Africa would or could form a vanguard in the fight for socialism.

This incorrect analysis was severely shaken by the events that followed.

Before the election, the two Parties had sworn to 'destroy capitalist domination' of South Africa. But having won, the coalition government headed by Hertzog, and containing two Labour Party men, launched its main drive against the African, Indian and Coloured people, fortifying existing segregation and colour bar laws, and leaving the dominant

finance-capitalist masters of the economy unscathed.

The Communists had opposed the entry of the Labour Party, as a junior partner, into Hertzog's cabinet, warning that this would make the Party a prisoner of the capitalists and inevitably drag it to the Right. The Labour Party did enter the cabinet, and it did move to the Right, burying its one-time professions of socialism. The Hertzog government did nothing to attack capitalism. It attacked the voteless non-white people. It tackled the "poor white" problem with its "civilised labour policy" of replacing African with white workers, especially in the government service. It cultivated colour prejudice. Smuts's and Botha's segregation laws and practices were considerably extended and consolidated.

So far from being disillusioned by these measures, the white workers, by and large, welcomed them. So far from moving to the left to form a "real workers' party" they began even to desert the Labour Party for the bourgeois parties.

At the same time a *real* awakening was manifesting itself among the black workers, who were flocking in their tens of thousands into the I.C.U. * which had inscribed in its constitution the socialist principles:

that the workers must "take from the capitalist class the means of production to be owned and controlled by the workers for the benefit of all, instead of for the profit of a few"

that a new society should be built on the basis that "he who does not work, neither shall he eat", and "from every man according to his abilities; to every man according to his needs".

Re-Evaluations

These facts had stimulated a profound process of re-evaluation within the ranks of the Communist Party, both of its tactics and of many of the assumptions on which these were based.

When the Communist Party was founded on July 30 1921, most of its leading members had behind them many years of experience in the trade union movement, in the Labour Party and, after 1915, the International Socialist League. They had courageously opposed the imperial-

* A detailed study of the I.C.U. appeared in a recent issue of this Journal ('I.C.U.' by Teresa Zania, African Communist No. 38, 1969)

ist war of 1914-1918; fought against the anti-African chauvinism of the white workers; ardently associated themselves with the great October revolution and the Communist International.

It was not yet, however, a consistently Marxist-Leninist Party.

Nearly all its members were white workers and intellectuals. Perhaps this was inevitable considering that when the Labour Party and subsequently the International Socialist League were founded, nearly all the permanently established working class, especially on the Witwatersrand, the main centre of industrial development, was white. The League's efforts to organise Africans had not borne fruit in the recruitment and promotion of African cadres. The only African whose name has come down to us from the League days was that of T.W. Thibedi, who continued to play a prominent part in the movement for many years. But he was not a delegate at the founding conference, which consisted of whites, as did the Party's first Central Committee.

Furthermore the League was not a homogeneous organisation ideologically. Its leaders, for the most part, considered themselves to be Marxists, though currents such as anarchism and syndicalism were represented. Even the Marxism of the League had come to them in a mutilated form through the writings of the American revolutionary Daniel De Leon.

These ideas, while attracting revolutionaries by their powerful and merited attacks on the right-wing trade union and labour leaders at the time, afforded but a partial and distorted account of Marxist theory. Rejecting all 'parliamentary politics' and despising traditional trade unionism, the doctrine was extremely dogmatic and sectarian in its tendency. All methods of workers' struggle and organisation were considered worthless 'reformism', except the direct fight against capitalism which was to be carried out by 'Industrial Unionism' ('One Big Union') and the General Strike. It was essentially this theory rather than an understanding of the need for the emancipation of the Africans as an oppressed nation that led the I.S.L. first to embark on the organisation of Africans.

From such ideas arose some of the underlying theoretical assumptions which governed much of the policy and practice of the I.S.L. and were carried into the Communist Party.

South Africa was looked upon as a typical capitalist state, in which the main contradiction, as in Europe, was that between capital and labour. The organised labour movement – at that time principally the white workers – was envisaged as the vanguard of an imminent socialist revolution. Hence the "native question" was considered as something of

Workers' Hall,

14 Market St.

—A MASS MEETING.—

WILL BE HELD AT THE ABOVE HALL THIS

Sunday, August 25th, 1929.

At 3 p.m.

TO CONSIDER THE FORMATION OF A

“LEAGUE OF NATIVE RIGHTS.”

TO DEMAND (BY NATION WIDE DEMONSTRATIONS, A “MILLION SIGNATURE” PETITION & OTHERWISE) THE FOLLOWING :

1. **No tampering with the Cape Vote.**
 2. **Extension of native franchise to other
Provinces.**
 3. **Universal free education for non-Europeans**
 4. **Abolition of Pass Laws.**
-

ROLL UP! ROLL UP!

THE CASE IS URGENT!

secondary importance.

The twenties, for the Communist Party, were above all a period of re-assessment, of applying to a country whose crucial feature was the dispossession and oppression of the African majority, the revolutionary principles of Leninism, especially in regard to imperialism and the national and colonial question. It was inevitably a lengthy and difficult process, involving a far-reaching transformation of the character, outlook and membership of the organisation.

Parting of the Ways

An essential first step was taken at the Third National Conference at the end of 1924. The central issue before the Conference was that of whether or not to re-apply for affiliation to the S.A. Labour Party. But behind this debate lay a key question which had even earlier been the source of division in the ranks of both the Party and its youth organisation, the Young Communist League. That issue was, essentially, in which direction should the Party concentrate its efforts: in the established, mainly white, trade union movement, or among the African masses? S.P. Bunting, who for many years had urged the movement to turn towards the Africans, was the principal opponent of the idea of affiliation to the S.A.L.P.; he was supported by the Cape Town delegation and by E.R. Roux who had successfully defeated a proposal in the Y.C.L. to introduce a "parallel" African youth body. The move for affiliation was backed by those whose main work was in the traditional trade unions.

Rejecting the motion the Party turned its back on the concept that its proper role was that of a left-wing within the white labour movement. It was a decisive turn towards the African and other oppressed peoples which was profoundly to affect the nature and aims of the Communist Party in the years to come. Bunting was elected Party Chairman at this Conference and Roux Vice-Chairman.

The leading trade unionists found the new orientation difficult to accept. W.H. Andrews resigned from the position of Secretary. He denied that there was a 'split over principles' and unequivocally supported the 'necessity of organising all workers regardless of colour'. But he disagreed with the 'speed and emphasis' with which the new leadership proposed to tackle the job of organising Africans, and devoted himself to trade union work. His place as Secretary was taken by Jimmy Shields, a Scottish immigrant, who retained that position as well as that of editor of the Party journal (renamed *The South African Worker*) until

his return to Britain in 1927.

The Party's new emphasis and direction resulted in hard and effective work among the oppressed people. African trade unions were established, especially on the Witwatersrand, which learning from the errors of the I.C.U. were able to organise thousands of workers and withstand increasingly vicious attacks for many years. Party schools were set up at which not only Marxist political education was imparted, but also elementary education to combat illiteracy and other effects of the government's anti-African policy of denying schooling to Africans. Regular public meetings were held in halls and the open air to bring the Party's message to the masses in the places where they lived.

New Cadres

Perhaps the most significant long-term effect of this revolutionary activity was the entry into the Party of substantial numbers of African workers and intellectuals. Many of them made invaluable contributions to the Party, the trade union and national liberation movements.

Albert Nzula was the first African to become General Secretary of the Communist Party. Born in the Orange Free State in 1906, he moved to the Transvaal after qualifying as a teacher and joined the Party, where his grasp of Marxism, and his outstanding talents as a speaker and writer won him rapid promotion. He worked as a trade unionist and Party official until leaving for Moscow for advanced Marxist studies. Here he worked with the Comintern, became a valued contributor to the *Negro Worker* (published by the Red International of Labour Unions) and wrote a book on South Africa which was published in Russian. He was still in Moscow when pneumonia cut short his life at the age of 27.

Moses Monane Kotane was born of Tswana origin in the Western Transvaal, near Botswana, on 9 August 1907. He joined the African National Congress in 1926 in Johannesburg, and the following year he came in touch with the Communist Party through his trade union, the African Baking Workers' Union. He played an important part in countering the sectarian faction in the Party in the thirties, and when it temporarily gained the upper hand he was removed from the Editorship of the Party organ *Umsebenzi*. Kotane was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1938, a position to which he was regularly re-elected. He also served on the National Executive of the African National Congress for many years and was once again elected to that position at the last ANC Conference at Morogoro in 1969. Comrade

Kotane's outstanding gifts of political leadership have been a tower of strength to the South African revolutionary movement over the past forty years.

Another veteran of the struggle, revered by Communists and non-Communists alike is "Uncle" *J. B. Marks*. Born in the O.F.S. on 21st March 1903, he was to become one of the most dynamic and popular leaders of the workers and oppressed people. In 1932 the Communist Party nominated him as a demonstrative "candidate" for Parliament in Germiston, Transvaal, though of course as an African he was debarred from standing. As president of the African Mineworkers' Union he led the great strike of 1946. He was president of the Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions and provincial President of the A.N.C. until 'banned' from both positions in 1952, and is at present a member of the National Executive and Chairman of the South African Communist Party, whose delegation he headed at the Moscow Meeting of Marxist-Leninist Parties in June 1969.

Johannes Nkosi (1905-1930) was another of the remarkable young African leaders who entered the Party during this period. A former farm labourer, he had come to Johannesburg as a domestic worker and helped to build up the ICU before joining the Party. Of Zulu origin, he was sent by the Party to Natal to organise the Durban branch with remarkable success. His brutal murder by the South African police is described at the end of this article.

Also among the many Africans who joined the Party following the turn in 1925 were *E. T. Mofutsanyana*, who was also to serve as the Party's general secretary, and later as Editor of its organ *Inkululeko* (Freedom); *Josie Mpama*, one of the first African Communist women leaders; and *Gana Makabeni*, who was to become a prominent trade union leader.

Relations with A. N. C.

Kadali's turn to the Right and his witch-hunt against Communists had been a set-back to the Party's campaign for unity. But this was balanced by a greatly improved relationship which developed between the C.P. and the African National Congress. Much of the credit for this must be given to the Congress leader Josiah Gumede. In 1919, when president of the Natal A.N.C. and editor of *Ilanga Lase Natal*, he had stood well to the right of the liberation movement. He was called to express his dislike of Bolshevism during the trial of the I.S.L. leaders Jones and Greene for publishing a leaflet ("The Bolsheviks are Coming").

But Gumede was an honest African patriot, able to learn the lessons of experience and with the courage to act on his convictions. As President of the A.N.C. he accompanied, together with the Cape Town Communist Party leader James la Guma, the South African delegation to the international conference of the League against Imperialism, held in Brussels in February 1927. Amongst the delegates were Madame Sun Yat-Sen, widow of the founder of modern China, and Jawaharlal Nehru from India. The intervening eight years had greatly modified Gumede's opinions of Communism. He told the Congress in Brussels:

I am happy to say that there are Communists in South Africa. I myself am not one, but it is my experience that the Communist Party is the only party that stands behind us and from which we can expect something. (1)

In November the same year he attended the Moscow celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. He travelled extensively in the Soviet Union and was deeply impressed by the experience. 'I have seen the new world to come, where it has already begun. I have been to the new Jerusalem,' he said at a Johannesburg rally to welcome him home early in 1928.

At the ANC national conference in June 1927 Gumede reported on his mission and said, as he had said in Brussels: "Of all political parties the Communist Party is the only one that honestly and sincerely fights for the oppressed." The conference re-elected him as president for the next three years. For the first time a Communist, E. J. Khaile, a member of the Central Committee and formerly financial secretary of the ICU, was appointed general secretary of the ANC.

The turn towards the African people decided at the 1924 conference of the Party had been warmly received by the masses and their most advanced representatives. Between 1927 and 1928 the African membership of the Party increased from 200 to 1600.

Yet the Party had still a long way to go before the correct emphasis in its work was matched by a Marxist-Leninist assessment of its role; of the character of South African society and the tasks of the Communist Party within it. It continued to adhere to its central thesis that unity between white and black workers was the precondition for what was conceived to be the imminent socialist revolution against capitalism.

(1) Translated by H. J. and R. E. Simons from the minutes of the conference, and quoted in their *Colour and Class in South Africa 1850-1950*, p.353.

This concept, evolved at a time when the Party still envisaged its role essentially as a left-wing within the white labour movement, was completely inadequate as a theoretical basis for the development of the South African democratic revolution for the national liberation of the African people.

The 1927 Party conference, on the proposal of the secretary, J. Shields, had elected three Africans to the Central Committee, G. Makabeni, E. J. Khaile and T. W. Thibedi, but at the same time many of the traditional slogans and attitudes, generated by working within a trade union movement saturated with assumptions of 'white superiority' were reflected in the Party's approach.

The 1928 Comintern Conference

Some detailed consideration of the problems of South Africa was given by the sixth world congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in 1928. These discussions were to be of great value in clarifying the theoretical and practical approach to the central issue which history has placed before the working people of Southern Africa.

The Congress's main conclusions are summed up in a brief section of the lengthy and important thesis adopted on *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies*, under section 39, headed 'The Negro Question', and covering problems of black minorities in America, of nominally independent states such as Liberia and Haiti, and of imperialist colonies in Africa, as well as those of South Africa itself. This section reads as follows:-

In the Union of South Africa, the Negro masses, who constitute the majority of the population, are being expropriated from the land by the white colonists and by the State, are deprived of political rights and of the right of freedom of movement, are subjected to most brutal forms of racial and class oppression, and suffer simultaneously from pre-capitalist and capitalist methods of exploitation and oppression. The Communist Party, which has already achieved definite successes among the negro proletariat has the duty of continuing still more energetically the struggle for complete equality of rights for the negroes, for the abolition of all special regulations and laws directed against negroes, and for confiscation of the land of the landlords. In drawing into its organisation non-negro workers, organising them in trade unions, and in carrying on a struggle for the acceptance of negroes by the trade unions of white workers, the Communist Party has the

obligation to struggle by all methods against every racial prejudice in the ranks of the white workers and to eradicate entirely such prejudices from its own ranks. The Party must determinedly and consistently put forward the slogan for the creation of an independent native republic, with simultaneous guarantees for the rights of the white minority, and struggle in deeds for its realisation.

The paragraph concluded with a sentence on the need to educate the exploited strata of Africans in class consciousness, as the development of capitalist relationships disintegrated the tribal structure, and to free them from the influence of exploiters among the Africans who were becoming agents of imperialism.

The South African delegation, consisting of Sidney and Rebecca Bunting and E. R. Roux, strenuously opposed these formulations and approach, particularly the slogan of an 'independent native republic'. Their argument, reflecting the theoretical approach of the Communist Party of South Africa at that time, was that the class struggle, not the national movement, was the key factor in South Africa. As head of the delegation, S. P. Bunting contended that national questions were not uppermost for the Africans. 'Nationalist revolt' in South Africa had 'not been on the part of the black workers but of the Dutch nationalists.' He agreed with the practical demands put forward, for equal rights, abolition of racial laws and land, but contended that 'class struggle is more capable of accomplishing the same tasks'. 'The A.N.C. is a moribund body', he declared. 'The Communist Party itself is the actual or potential leader of the native national movement'.

These arguments, reflecting as they did the beliefs of the C.P.S.A. at the time, were not acceptable to the Congress, which stood firm by its belief that 'the national question in South Africa, which is based on the agrarian question, lies at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa.' The resolution was accordingly adopted and in December 1928 the Executive Committee of the Communist International followed it up with a lengthy and detailed resolution which elaborated and explained the basis of the policy that had been adopted. No doubt the passage of time has revealed some errors of emphasis or fact in this resolution. But it stands as a remarkable document,* far in advance of any previous Marxist analysis of the complex problems of South Africa.

* Reprinted on p. 106 of this issue.

The resolution was duly adopted by the Communist Party of South Africa, as a disciplined section of the International. But many years were to pass before its basic lessons were fully absorbed and became an integral part of the Party's ideological heritage, outlook and programme.

Wave of Repression

Urgent immediate tasks faced the workers of South Africa, temporarily overshadowing theoretical questions. Hertzog's Nationalist government launched out on a fresh round of attacks on the African, Indian and Coloured people. Headed by the Communist Party, in alliance with the African National Congress and other liberation movements, the Africans fought back in a vigorous anti-pass campaign designed to end the hated system of passes.

The government and its police responded with a wave of terror, spearheaded by the savage police minister, Oswald Pirow. In 1929 at a Communist Party meeting in Potchefstroom, with the connivance of the police, a white hooligan opened fire on the platform with a pistol, narrowly missing E.T. Mofutsanyana and J.B.Marks on the platform.

On December 16th (Dingaan's Day), 1930 at a mass, anti-pass rally in Durban, police opened fire on the platform, wounding the leader of the Durban working class and organiser of the Communist Party, Johannes Nkosi, and two other speakers.

Comrade Nkosi was removed in a police van and beaten to death. A moving tribute to his memory was paid by A. Nzula:

An uncompromising fighter, he died as he lived, fearless and conscious of the great fight in which he was engaged, as his final message, short but characteristic shows. The message addressed in Zulu: "To the Workers of South Africa: Never, under the sun has a nation been so shackled with the chains of slavery. We are not even allowed to voice our opinion on the state of affairs in our Motherland. Why not awake and stand on our feet? Men, women and young women, we must support organisations that fight for our freedom."

A thousand Africans must take the place of Nkosi. Let his cowardly murderers know that the African Giant is awakening and nothing will stop his progress.

Long live the name of Nkosi!

Long live a Free Africa!

So, for the oppressed people of South Africa, the nineteen-twenties ended as they had begun: in bloodshed. The stormy and eventful

decade had seen the people increasingly recognising the need to stand up, organise and fight for their rights. Always with them, sharing their hardships, deepening its own understanding, growing and maturing in the process, and developing deep roots within the African working class, was their Communist Party.



THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

The following is the text of a resolution on "The South African Question" passed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International and printed in "The Communist International", Vol. VI, No. 2, 15th December 1928.

Economic and Social Struggle

South Africa is a British Dominion of the colonial type. The development of relations of capitalist production has led to British imperialism carrying out the economic exploitation of the country with the participation of the white bourgeoisie of South Africa (British and Boer). Of course, this does not alter the general colonial character of the economy of South Africa, since British capital continues to occupy the principal economic positions in the country (banks, mining and industry), and since the South African bourgeoisie is equally interested in the merciless exploitation of the negro population.

In the recent period in South Africa we have witnessed the

growth of the manufacturing iron and steel industries, the development of commercial crops (cotton, sugar, cane), and the growth of capitalist relations in agriculture, chiefly in cattle-raising. On the basis of this growth of capitalism there is a growing tendency to expropriate the land from the negroes and from a certain section of the white farming population. The South African bourgeoisie is endeavouring also by legislative means to create a cheap market of labour power and a reserve army.

The overwhelming majority of the population is made up of negroes and coloured people (about 5,500,000 negroes and coloured people and about 1,500,000 white people according to the 1921 census). A characteristic

feature of the colonial type of the country is the almost complete landlessness of the negro population: the negroes hold only one-eighth of the land whilst seven-eighths have been expropriated by the white population. There is no negro bourgeoisie as a class, apart from individual negroes engaged in trading and a thin strata of negro intellectuals who do not play any essential role in the economic and political life of the country. The negroes constitute also the majority of the working class: among the workers employed in industry and transport, 420,000 are black and coloured people and 145,000 white; among agricultural labourers 435,000 are black and 50,000 are white. The characteristic feature of the proletarianisation of the native population is the fact that the number of black workers grows faster than the number of white workers. Another characteristic fact is the great difference in the wages and material conditions of the white and black proletariat in general. Notwithstanding a certain reduction in the living standard of the white workers which has lately taken place, the great disproportion between the wages of the white and black proletariat continues to exist as the characteristic feature of the colonial type of the country.

The Political Situation

The political situation reflects the economic structure — the semi-colonial character of the country and the profound social contra-

dictions between the black and white population. The native population (except in the Cape province) of the country have no electoral rights, the power of the State has been monopolised by the white bourgeoisie, which has at its disposal the armed white forces. The white bourgeoisie, chiefly the Boers defeated by the arms of British imperialism at the close of the last century, had for a long time carried on a dispute with British capital. But as the process of capitalist development goes on in the country, the interests of the South African bourgeoisie are becoming more and more blended with the interests of British financial and industrial capital, and the white South African bourgeoisie is becoming more and more inclined to compromise with British imperialism, forming with the latter a united white front for the exploitation of the native population.

The Nationalist Party, which represents the interests of the big farmers and landowners and a section of white (mainly Boer) bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, is winding up its struggle for separation from the Empire and is surrendering before British capitalism (the formula proposed by the leader of this Party, General Herzog, and carried at the British Imperial Conference). Furthermore, this party is already coming out as the open advocate of the colonial expansion of British capital, carrying on an agitation for the extension of the territory of the Union of South

Africa to the north (the annexation of Rhodesia), hoping in this manner to secure a vast fund of cheap native labour power.

Simultaneously with the importation of British capital and British goods, there are imported to South Africa the methods of corrupting the working class. The Labour Party of South Africa, representing the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and of the skilled labour aristocracy, openly carries on an imperialist policy, demoralising the white workers by imbuing them with a white racial ideology. Nevertheless, the influence of this party is being undermined by the steady worsening of the material conditions of the mass of the white workers. At the same time the South African bourgeoisie is endeavouring to attract to its side certain elements of the non-European population, for instance, the "coloured" population, promising them electoral rights, and also the native leaders, turning them into their agents for the exploitation of the negro population. This policy of corruption has already brought about the fact that the leaders of the negro trade union organisations — the Industrial and Commercial Union — having expelled the Communists from the union, are now endeavouring to guide the negro trade union movement into the channel of reformism. The inception of negro reformism, as a result of the corruptionist policy of the white bourgeoisie, a reformism which acts in close alliance with the Amsterdam International, con-

stitutes a characteristic fact of the present political situation.

The united front of the British and South African white bourgeoisie against the toiling negro population, backed by the white and negro reformists, creates for the Communist Party in South Africa an exceptionally complicated but favourable position of being the only political Party in the country which unites the white and black proletariat and the landless black peasantry for the struggle against British imperialism, against the white bourgeoisie and the white and black reformist leaders.

The Communist Party and its Tasks

The Executive Committee of the Communist International recognises the successes which the Communist Party of South Africa has recently achieved. This is seen in the growth of the Communist Party, which is now predominantly native in composition. The Communist Party has a membership of about 1,750 of whom 1,600 are natives or coloured. The Communist Party also spread into the country districts of the Transvaal. The Party has waged a fight against the reactionary Native Administration Act. The ECCI also notes the growth of native trade unions under the leadership of the CP, the successful carrying through of a number of strikes and efforts to carry through the amalgamation of the black and white unions.

The present intensified campaigns of the Government against the natives offer the CP an immense field to develop its influence among the workers and peasants, and it is among this section of the South African population that the chief field of activity of the Communist Party must continue to lie in the near future.

(a) The first task of the Party is to reorganise itself on the shop and street nuclei basis and to put forward a programme of action as a necessary condition for the building up of a mass Communist Party in South Africa.

(b) The Party must orientate itself chiefly upon the native toiling masses while continuing to work actively among the white workers. The Party leadership must be developed in the same sense. This can only be achieved by bringing the native membership without delay into much more active leadership of the Party both locally and centrally.

(c) While developing and strengthening the fight against all the customs, laws and regulations which discriminate against the native and coloured population in favour of the white population, the Communist Party of South Africa must combine the fight against all anti-native laws with the general political slogan in the fight against British domination, the slogan of an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic, with full equal rights for all races, black, coloured and white.

(d) South Africa is a black country, the majority of its population is black and so is the majority of the workers and peasants. The bulk of the South African population is the black peasantry, whose land has been expropriated by the white minority. Seven eighths of the land is owned by the whites. Hence the national question in South Africa, which is based upon the agrarian question, lies at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa. The black peasantry constitutes the basic moving force of the revolution in alliance with and under the leadership of the working class.

(e) South Africa is dominated politically by the white exploiting class. Despite the conflict of interests between the Dutch bourgeoisie and the English imperialists, the basic characteristic of the political situation in South Africa is the developing united front between the Dutch bourgeoisie and the British imperialists against the native population. No political party in South Africa with the exception of the Communist Party advocates measures that would be of real benefit to the oppressed native population, the ruling political parties never go beyond empty and meaningless Liberal phrases. The Communist Party of South Africa is the only Party of native and white workers that fights for the complete abolition of race and national exploitation, that can head the revolutionary movement of the black masses for liberation. Consequent-

ly, if the Communist Party correctly understands its political tasks it will and must become the leader of the national agrarian revolutionary movement of the native masses.

Unfortunately the Communist Party of South Africa did not give evidence of sufficient understanding of the revolutionary importance of the mass movements of the native workers and peasants. The Communist Party of South Africa carried on a correct struggle for unity of the native and white workers in the trade union movement. But at the same time the Communist Party of South Africa found itself in stubborn opposition to the correct slogan proposed by the Comintern calling for an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic with full, equal rights for all races.

This opposition shows a lack of understanding of the task of our Party in South Africa relative to the revolutionary struggles of the native masses, which explains partly the still insufficient growth of the political influence of our Party upon the negro masses despite the extremely favourable conditions.

South Africa is a British dominion of a colonial type. The country was seized by violence by foreign exploiters, the land expropriated from the natives, who were met by a policy of extermination in the first stages of colonisation, and conditions of semi-slavery established for the overwhelming majority of the native masses. It

is necessary to tell the native masses that in the face of the existing political and economic discrimination against the natives and ruthless oppression of them by the white oppressors, the Comintern slogan of a native republic means restitution of the land to the landless and land-poor population.

This slogan does not mean that we ignore or forget about the non-exploiting elements of the white population. On the contrary, the slogan calls for "full and equal rights for all races". The white toiling masses must realise that in South Africa they constitute national minorities, and it is their task to support and fight jointly with the native masses against the white bourgeoisie and the British imperialists. The argument against the slogan for a native republic on the ground that it does not protect the whites is objectively nothing else than a cover for the unwillingness to accept the correct principle that South Africa belongs to the native population. Under these conditions it is the task of the Communist Party to influence the embryonic and crystalising national movements among the natives in order to develop these movements into national agrarian revolutionary movements against the white bourgeoisie and British imperialists.

The failure to fulfil this task means separation of the Communist Party of South Africa from the native population. The Communist Party cannot confine itself

to the general slogan of "Let there be no whites and no blacks". The Communist Party must understand the revolutionary importance of the national and agrarian questions. Only by a correct understanding of the importance of the national question in South Africa will the Communist Party be able to combat effectively the efforts of the bourgeoisie to divide the white and black workers by playing on race chauvinism, and to transform the embryonic nationalist movement into a revolutionary struggle against the white bourgeois and foreign imperialists. In its propaganda among the native masses the Communist Party of South Africa must emphasise the class differences between the white capitalists and the white workers, the latter also being exploited by the bourgeoisie as wage slaves, although better paid as compared with the natives. The Communist Party must continue to struggle for unity between black and white workers and not confine itself merely to the advocacy of "co-operation" between the blacks and whites in general. The Communist Party must introduce a correct class content into the idea of co-operation between the blacks and whites. It must explain to the native masses that the black and white workers are not only allies, but are the leaders of the revolutionary struggle of the native masses against the white bourgeoisie and British imperialism. A correct formulation of this task and intensive propagation of the chief slogan of a native republic

will result not in the alienation of the white workers from the Communist Party, not in segregation of the natives, but, on the contrary, in the building up of a solid united front of all toilers against capitalism and imperialism.

In the struggle against the domination of British imperialism in South Africa and against the white bourgeoisie under the slogans of the agrarian revolution and native republic the Communist Party of South Africa will undoubtedly meet with the most brutal attack of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. This can be no argument for not adopting the slogan of a native republic. On the contrary, the Party must wage a struggle for this slogan preparing by all possible means, first and foremost by mobilising the black and white workers, to meet the attacks of the ruling class.

The ECCI, while fully approving the Party's agitation against the native Bills put forward by the Pact Government, considers that this agitation should be further strengthened and intensified and should be coupled with agitation against all anti-native legislation.

The Party should pay particular attention to the embryonic national organisations among the natives, such as the African National Congress. The Party, while retaining its full independence, should participate in these organisations, should seek to broaden and extend their activity. Our aim should be to transform the African National Congress into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation

against the white bourgeoisie and the British imperialists, based upon the trade unions, peasant organisations, etc., developing systematically the leadership of the workers and the Communist Party in this organisation. The Party should seek to weaken the influence of the native chiefs corrupted by the white bourgeoisie over the existing native tribal organisations by developing peasants' organisations and spreading among them the influence of the Communist Party. The development of a national-revolutionary movement of the toilers of South Africa against the white bourgeoisie and British imperialism, constitutes one of the major tasks of the Communist Party of South Africa.

The Party should immediately work out an agrarian programme applicable to the native agrarian situation. The ECCI considers that the Party was correct in launching at its last Congress the slogan of "Expropriate the big estates and give them to the landless whites and natives". But this can only be treated as a general slogan. It is necessary to work out concrete partial demands which indicate that the basic question in the agrarian situation in South Africa is the land hunger of the blacks and that their interest is of prior importance in the solution of the agrarian question. Efforts should be made immediately to develop plans to organise the native peasants into peasant unions and the native agricultural workers into trade unions, while attention to the poor agrarian whites must in

no way be minimised.

In the field of trade union work the Party must consider that its main task consists in the organisation of the native workers into trade unions as well as propaganda and work for the setting up of a South African trade union centre embracing black and white workers. The principle that the Party's main orientation must be on the native population applies equally to the sphere of trade union work. The Party should energetically combat the splitting policy of the Industrial and Commercial Union leaders under the slogan of unity of the whole trade union movement of South Africa. Further, the Party should work out a detailed programme of immediate demands for the native workers. The Communists must participate actively in the trade union organisation of the native workers, pursuing the policy of building up a strong left-wing within these organisations under Communist leadership.

The Party should continue its exposure of the South African Labour Party as primarily an agent of imperialism in the Labour movement.

While concentrating its chief attention on organising the native workers in the trade unions the Communist Party should not neglect the work in the white trade unions. Its tasks are the organisation of the unorganised, work in the existing trade unions, to intensify the propaganda for reorganisation of the trade union movement on an industrial basis,

increased agitation for affiliation of all trade unions to the Trade Union Congress. In all trade union organisations the Party must strive to build up a strong left-wing under Communist leadership.

The Party must energetically combat the influence of the Amsterdam International in the black and white trade union movement, intensifying the propaganda for world trade union unity along the lines of the Profintern (RILU) policy.

In connection with the danger of world war, the present imper-

ialist intervention in China and the threatening war against the USSR the Party must fight by all means against the help given to the military policy of Great Britain which found its expression in the tacit support of the break of the British imperialists with the USSR. The Party should not neglect anti-militarist work.

The ECCI repeats its previous proposal to launch a special paper in the chief native languages as soon as technical difficulties have been overcome. Such a step is of great political importance.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDUCATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Brian Rose (General Editor) (Collier-Macmillan, Johannesburg & London) 1970.

*Price: 55s bound edition
25s. paperback*

Mr Rose and a team of educationalists, most of them with first-hand experience in Southern Africa, have set out to give a comprehensive picture of education in the Republic, the 3 ex-Protectorates, Malawi, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. South West Africa is left out, apparently because it (its status, presumably) is "still slightly ambiguous". This attempt to sit on the fence, to avoid facing up to reality (in this case the illegality of South Africa's administration of Namibia), comes on the opening page, and should alert the reader to what follows.

Education throughout white-dominated Southern Africa is racially discriminatory and controlled so as to maintain African inferiority and white superiority. Education in independent African states is non-racial and designed to further the well-being of the people – even in those unfortunate countries surrounded or adjoined by white racist states. These are straightforward statements, easily verifiable, almost too obvious to be made. Yet nothing as fundamental emerges from the welter of statistics, and interminable pages of mealy-mouthed prose provided by this pretentious book. When writing about Southern

Africa, political judgements cannot be avoided without compromising the integrity of the writer. The authors' attempts to divorce politics from education lead them straight into an obvious trap – the adoption of an apartheid framework which rules out comparisons between the races.

Thus R. G. Macmillan writes 26 pages on the education of whites in South Africa, Robert Jones 52 pages on African education (he follows government terminology, viz. using the term "Bantu"), Raymond Tunmer, 52 pages on Coloured and Indian education. Separate chapters are devoted to other territories. Readers wanting to compare the different forms of education in the Republic, or make inter-territorial comparisons, have to do all the work for themselves. Sometimes the strain of avoiding politics produces ludicrous results. Speaking about the imposition of apartheid on the universities, Jones says (p. 80) in connection with Fort Hare: "The Vice-Principal, a Bantu, resigned because his reappointment was made contingent on his resignation from an African political organization". Why not name Professor Z. K. Matthews and the African National Congress?

Even the reactionary framework, however, cannot completely suppress the tragic story which lies behind the bland statistics and careful, non-evaluative prose. It is a story of deliberate, systematic deprivation of over 30 million blacks on account of their race. Generation after generation is being given no education at all, or little and poor education designed to increase their utility as labour units in the white man's economy. The waste of talent, the frustration and hardship, the needless impoverishment of young lives – these are the price paid by the oppressed masses in Southern Africa for the wealth and privileges of the colonialists. Lack of space prevents us from amplifying these truths for all the territories, so we shall take one as an exemplar, and one that will be relatively unfamiliar to English-speaking readers: Mocambique.

The chapter on Mocambique and Angola suffers from the same faults as the rest of the book. The author, a Portuguese engineer, manages not to mention the wars of liberation that have been going on for ten years, the fact that the liberation movements each control at least 20% of their respective countries, and their educational achievements in those zones and in neighbouring friendly countries. He does venture a cautious criticism of the alarmingly vague educational statistics emerging from Angola, but fails to bring out the stark picture buried in his own statistics. There are, for example 7¼ million people in Mocambique, 97% of them being Africans. The *adaptacao* system of

primary education, handled almost entirely by Catholic missions, has been designed for the African majority. The government school system is for the white, Coloured and Indian, and African *assimilado* elite. (The number of Africans with *assimilado* status is negligible). This Portuguese equivalent of apartheid in education, besides imposing segregation and differential courses and standards on African pupils, has kept the total number of Africans in secondary school down to a mere 636 (in 1964/65), or 8.1% of the total secondary school population. In addition, almost three-quarters of the Africans attending primary school (333,699) are in the pre-school classes, only 28% attending the other four classes which could lead them on to secondary level. In 1967/68, only 8 Africans in Mocambique attended university-level institutions, and they formed a mere 1.1% of the population of higher education students. Some technical education has begun to be provided since the early sixties, and a marked expansion in primary school admissions, but as the late Eduardo Mondlane pointed out in his book "The Struggle for Mocambique" (its few pages on education are far more enlightening than the work under review), these changes only reflect a belated effort by the Portuguese to win African support.

In cutting down the quality and intensity of primary schooling for Africans for the sake of inflated numbers, the Portuguese have been following the same pattern as their counterparts in South Africa and Rhodesia, especially the latter. In both countries, post-war trends have been for school-hours to be shorter, classes bigger, qualifications of teachers poorer, and the cost of this semi-education greater to the African community, both through increased taxation and through increased school fees. Because of an unexplained gap of 2-3 years between the writing of the book and its publication many of the figures given relate to nothing more recent than the mid- and early sixties; thus Franklin Parker, writing about Rhodesia, stops short with the Smith regime's propaganda exercise of 1966 in announcing plans for universal primary enrolment within six years. If the expansion rate of the previous decade had been maintained, this might have been feasible, though pointless without a corresponding expansion of secondary and higher education and post-school employment. But in fact since 1966, through economic stringency, political pressure from the white settlers, and reduced need for even barely literate workers in the stagnant economy, the number of Africans enrolled in primary schools has actually dropped by 2,000 although in the same period the African population has increased by almost half a million. The other part of Smith's 1966 education blue-print — knocking a year off primary

school, introducing double-sessions, squeezing the missions out of secondary schooling – has of course been proceeded with. It is Bantu-education all over again, 1970's style, for Rhodesia.

Different problems arise with the independent African states. One is not told why British colonialism left Malawi with so little skilled manpower, and such poor secondary schooling as compared with neighbouring Zambia. The populations of the two countries are of almost equal size, but Malawi's would have been easier to educate because it is more densely settled (77 per sq. mile, as against 8.5 per sq. mile in Zambia). Yet in 1964 Malawi had 5, 441 children at secondary school, Zambia had 8, 177. Of all teachers in Malawi, 45% were untrained (in 1961), whereas 96.8 of teachers in Zambia had some degree of training (1963).

The explanation for these differences lies in the fact that Zambia had rich mineral resources, and a clamorous white settler population, to ensure a modest degree of economic and cultural development, whereas Malawi was the Cinderella of the British territories in Central Africa – an undernourished protectorate used as a source of cheap labour for the Southern African mining industry and urban employment in Rhodesia. If Dr Banda's Cinderella is now in the clutches of Vorster's Prince Charming, the British must bear some of the blame, and the outcome will be more of a tragedy than a romantic fantasy.

The book contains numerous tables and charts, several of which convey little information and should have been left out. Surprisingly, there is no index.

J. V.

ZULU POEMS

by Mazisi Kunene, published by Andre Deutsch, London, 1970.

Price: 30s. board

18s. paper

POEMS FROM ALGIERS

by Dennis Brutus, Occasional Publication 2 of the African and Afro-American Research Institute, the University of Texas at Austin – obtainable free of charge from them.

These two collections are together an essential part of the South African culture of tomorrow that is being elaborated and articulated to serve not only our present epoch but also to be the foundation for an edifice of predictably brilliant tomorrows in a free and single South Africa.

They reveal to the world at large what is the counter-culture that South African tradition and South Africa's democrats have produced in a situation rife with racialism and oppression, and in the face of norms dominated by metropolitanism. They appear on the eve of what must be the final phase before a South African revolutionary era is initiated. Both define aspects of and attitudes towards the South Africanism that is aware of individual strands in the past that once made for specific traditions – traditions which must in our new historical era be absorbed in the wider new reality and fruition of the future South Africa – a synthesis already being produced over wide areas of the African continent and also in South Africa itself.

Definition and Re-evaluation

We have an explanation in these collections of the essence of what Africa is today – angry struggle for the continuation of humanity and the reassertion of dignity – hence a definition or re-definition of oneself in the context of not only the twentieth century but also of the African reality and the African dream. Both volumes are simultaneously discriminate and wholesomely synoptic. For instance.

*A wrong-headed bunch we may be
but the bodies of poets will always be
the anvils on which will be beaten out
anew, or afresh, a people's destiny.*

*We must die;
We must buy
a new honest destiny:*

*not only tearing our flesh
to tear the shackles of alien oppression
but groping with lacerated fingers
to light, to our sense of right.*

(Brutus)

Or else:

*How many deceive themselves
That when we are dead
They will tell the truth?
They accuse us of entangling them
By our presence over the fire,
Telling others: the logs that burn
Are our tears.*

*Even when we are departed
They shall for ever be restless in our empty houses
Accusing the chairs of harbouring our secrets
As if they loved us when we lived.*

(Kunene – If we Die)

In both poems the public concern is clear and strong; the self-analysis is acute; the assertion of self firm and resolute; the tone is one of determination humanised by tenderness and the theme the achievement of life's fulfilment in socially responsible terms – or, put differently, the completing of society in life-enhancing terms.

It is one choral song of individual responsibility and social commitment, despite our having two very distinct, very distinctive poetic voices speaking, singing. Mazisi Kunene's "Zulu Poems" are all rich, rhetorical, full of emotional and intellectual over- and undertones that reverberate through all the musical variety of the chanting, singing, philosophising voice which he derives from an ancient and rich tradition.

Dennis Brutus' "Poems from Algiers", on the other hand, have often the tone of a speaking voice that draws much of its timbre from the modulations, pitch and tonality of twentieth century speech. But what the poets share is a common thematic occupation, a committed poet's task: they are never "pre-occupied" with socio-politics, but it is life, society, people, the history and politics that have made them, and the history that they are making, that occupies the central place in these volumes.

Thus the poem of the first quotation is subscribed in dedication to the Nigerian poets Okigbo and Soyinka, and in it Brutus, the South African poet, as it were stands on its head one aspect of Platonic criticism in order the better to reflect a present-day African reality where the poet-politico is a very real presence. In the poem of our second quotation, Kunene makes the heroic and ancestral (poet-) dead of South Africa (and Africa) become the vivid conscience and clear consciousness that shape today's determination. And in both poems poet and people become one.

People, Peoples

It is people – always. People are making history in the South Africa that is fighting for freedom and equality; hence such of Kunene's poems as "Elegy for my friend E. Galo", "The Political Prisoner" and "On the Death of Young Guerillas".

*You killed my children with a blunt spear,
You held me back so that I may not bury them.
The soil disgorges them:
Wherever I go I find their bodies scattered.
Could it be that you are tired of the old ones
Who reappear in the valley of dreams?*

But, just as the young guerrillas or the oppressors need not necessarily be South African only, so the volume itself encompasses the global struggle against tyranny and for health and human dignity, be it on the military or on the cultural field. Hence poems such as "Tribute to Joan Baez on Vietnam" and "Tribute to Rodin". Tributes to people, to the peoples of the world who make the diverse and richly interesting life of our possible world. Hence the glow of "The Spectacle of Youth":

*I praised the skilfulness of their power,
Knowing how soon they will be killing buffaloes.*

— the children of the lion about whom earlier in the same poem the glad optimist had said gloriously

*I knew the greatness of their future
When they leapt on the tender necks of antelopes . . .*

Exile and Reaffirmation

A particular history and a healthy cultural heritage as well as some clearly defined social tasks have been left us South Africans of today, and it is very much a celebration of one of the historico-cultural strands of modern South Africa that we find presented, recreated in "Zulu Poems".

Away from home, out of his land — unfortunately, even unhappily, but of necessity — it is the pity of this that is crystallised in the simple, succinct expression of "Exile":

*Our lives were ruined
Among the leaves
We decayed like pumpkins
In a mud field.*

There are fullness and expressivity in this poem which speak not only in the rich metaphors of home but also of the loss entailed by conditions at home, expressing at the same time a condemnation of those conditions, and a resolution, bitter, present and active, to change, to improve, to revolutionise that situation in the place from which

exile has driven one and in the places to which exile has forced one, may still send one. This awareness of the brutality and/or decadence of the world that chose “the bridegroom of steel” (“Europe”) this awareness of a trauma and an agony which needs revolutionary ardour, a revolutionary awareness of decadence and, more than anything, a revolutionary perception of goals to be attained is another of the strands that this memorable volume weaves into the South African cultural pattern.

Nation, Continent

From the national-particular which develops into the global-human that signifies momentum in the Kunene poems we turn to the personal that seeks to define identity – and also community and national identity – in the continental, and this is what Brutus’ “Poems from Algiers” sets out to do, especially in the first, longish of the volume’s nine poems “And I am driftwood”.

*And I am driftwood
On an Algerian beach
along a Mediterranean shore*

– and after much questing, questioning, midway or so through the poem:

*For I am driftwood
in a life and place and time
thrown by some chance, perchance
to an occasional use
a rare half-pleasure on a seldom chance.*

Here we can only casually refer to the verve with which “Algerian” and “Mediterranean” are reasonably juxtaposed, or later “some chance”, “perchance” and “a seldom chance”, the real point we want to make is, how homeward driven the poet becomes in exile, how he needs to look at, look through and look into and past “home”. Thus:

*A South African in Algiers: Homesickness
Cosmos, daisy and agapanthus
Kanna, scented geranium and Katjievering!*

A School at Ben Aknoun

Determination and Continuum

There are countless "literary-poetic" virtues to be detailed in this rich, allusive diptych: we must neglect them here, but a full analysis of the poem must bring us finally to realise that Brutus sings here the universal beauty and joy of life that are free, and is finding for these their local habitation and their South African names. Of course, again, as in the Kunene poems, we are dealing here with exile, and it is from his experience of exile that the South African poet today has set himself the perspective and task of defining his personality, his home and immediate background, his South Africanness, his Africanness, his humanity: the relatedness of time and place and people and person, moment and event . . .

*Only in the Casbah
in its steep, stepped and narrow ways
warrening in shops, homes and passages
(6 lines)
is the tenacious, labyrinthine and unshakeable heart
of resistance
truly known.
(Brutus)*

Background, Oeuvre

*When thirst burns the mind
May we return again to the villages
Where we shall partake in a feast
With those that are no more.
(“Continuity” – Kunene)*

It is against the background that speaks out from his own poetry: the oral tradition, the myths, legends, epics, history, izibongo as well as modern poetry of the Zulu (e.g. Vilakazi's "Zulu Horizons") that Kunene's poems want to be read for the South African creations they are; and not least important in his volume is 20 or so pages of sober and informative introduction and notes on the poems. Unfortunately his essays on South African literature are too scattered for easy reference.

Brutus has seven pages of comments on his poems, and three/four other groups or volumes of poems: *Sirens, Knuckles, Boots* (1963), *Letters to Martha* (1968), *“Denver” Poems* (1970) and a “set” of 15 poems in *Seven South African Poets* (1971).

These two volumes richly, worthily and inspiringly achieve the most fundamental and central of poetic functions: they enlarge – experience and life; and they also suggest a very important and vibrant new dimension to the phrase “committed art”: alert and passionate honesty, the tenderness and truth that can be a measured guarantee against the bravado that becomes empty posturing and possible sell-out, constant self-questioning, continuous courage:

*My lusts will not let me rest:
they are the wolves ravaging on the edges of my mind
(4 lines)*

*My lusts will not let me rest:
Strong appetites churn in the entrails of my self.
(Brutus)*

*There is no day passing
Without the barking of wild dogs.
They scream on the cliffs
While we slowly close our gates.
We ask ourselves: how long
Shall we escape their perpetual hunger?
(“The Middle of the Cycle” – Kunene)*

It is because of the friction of such facts against the backbone of their courage that each of our poets achieves, and each in his own way – the one alongside and almost despite religious overtone, and the other as a resultant of the impulse of the mytho-poetic vision – a glory and an elegance:

*What does one know?
What does one know to believe?
Yet my life is so suffused
With such a graciousness of sense;
how shall I not believe?
And how shall I not hope? (Brutus)*

While the last five lines in Kunene’s “Anthem of Decades (Extract from an Epic)” here ring out:

*Sodume threw a ball of fire
Displaying flashes of lightning in the distant horizon
Its flashes making paths in the sky
Those who like to play sped down on them
Swinging from ray to ray as they descended to the earth.*

Langa Mokwena

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Ghana-Soviet Relations – a close look

Ghana and the Soviet Union signed a cultural agreement on the 10th of July, 1970. To the ordinary observer there is nothing astonishing in this event.

What he would like to know, however, is why the two countries should have to sign a cultural agreement for the second time. This is an unusual occurrence and one wonders why it is the Soviet Union which has been the only country subjected to this kind of treatment.

It will be recalled that, soon after independence Ghana and the Soviet Union signed an agreement not different from the July 10 agreement. The only differences might be the vein in which the signatories appended their signatures on the various occasions and the august nature and grandeur of the ceremonies.

If at all the 1960 agreement did not play any significant role, it introduced the two countries to each other, and made them feel the need to be closer and to collaborate where necessary.

The need for reconstituting relations should not have arisen but for some slanderous fabrications and misconceptions which entirely distorted the good intentions the Soviets had towards a developing Ghana.

Under the impetus of the earlier agreement the Soviet Union offered 180 scholarships to Ghanaians to undergo courses in fisheries operations and a geological survey costing 4 million new cedis was carried out by Soviet experts. In addition the Soviet Union held a trade exhibition in Accra, to introduce the variety of goods that might be of use to us.

All this happened in one year! A little thought will enable us to arrive at the conclusion that by now a great deal could have been achieved for Ghana.

People have been duped with the erroneous impression that because the President of the First Republic aimed at a socialist form of government, the nation was plunged into a state of poverty which prevails up to this day.

It is true that Kwame Nkrumah tried to go socialist. But did he actually go the universally acclaimed socialist way? Did he not dilute to suit his own whims and caprices the inner meaning of socialism as professed by Lenin?

Why the fuss about the dangers of socialism? Africans, it seems, should want anything capable of giving them a life worth living.

Developing nations have been suffering a great deal of confusion as to which of the developed nations they should follow.

There is also keen competition among some of the developed nations to acquire the less developed nations mainly for their own interests.

The colonial powers are now eager to cover up the atrocities new nations suffered under their dominion. But they need a different form of approach, far from the pre-independence era and even their attitudes today, to be able to convince developing nations to follow them.

Once anxious to attain independence and self-sufficiency, new nations will not fail to observe critically the old-time tactics colonialists and capitalists adopted in annexing African colonies and subjecting them to semi- or total servitude.

We in developing countries are still suffering from social inequality. Just as in the capitalist states, there predominates a system of "to them that have should be added more".

Now we want something to enable us to embark on a gradual growth. We do not need temporary relief, only later to see the futility of our own efforts; nor do we need perpetual crumbs of food as the capitalist states want us to believe.

Ghana, like any other African country, has her own resources which need to be exploited to help us put our economy on the right footing. What we indeed want is to be a developed nation some day.

But it is glaring that what capitalist countries insist on pursuing is to suppress our self-determined efforts. They want to spoon-feed us with their surplus food and speak to us plausibly while meanwhile they insist on tapping our resources — alumina and gold. Instead of genuine help they want to 'chop us small'.

It is time African countries found a nation that could give us genuine help, not only doing things for us but teaching us what to do to stand on our own feet eventually.

R. Kiya-Hinidza

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LABOUR MONTHLY

Founded 1921

Editor : R. Palme Dutt

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