

3.6 GLENMORE

3.6.1 Introduction

Glenmore is a farm located on the eastern side of the Great Fish River, about 40 km by road from Grahamstown. It is directly opposite Committee's Drift - the place originally chosen in the early seventies to hold over 100 000 displaced people.

Work on Glenmore began in September 1978 after the decision was taken to relocate the residents of Grahamstown's Fingo Village. Fingo Village was, however, 'saved' in August 1979, when it was announced that any further relocation to Glenmore had been frozen. By the beginning of 1979, though, 500 'temporary' wooden dwellings with asbestos roofs and mud floors had been built. These 'temporary' houses were to accommodate the work-force for the 5 000-house 'model town' which was to be well supplied with a social and economic infrastructure. 'My heart beats warmly for that area, there are things that must be done for that area', said Dr Piet Koornhof. Two years later these words were to ring very hollow indeed.

The nucleus of the removals occurred in the middle of 1979. The vast majority were resettled from the Kenton-on-Sea/Klipfontein area, Coega and Colchester settlements near Port Elizabeth. The Fish River scrub and shale provided a sharp contrast to the green coastal hills of Kenton, 100 km away, and to the rich, lush farming lands of Coega and Colchester.

The removals, especially those from Klipfontein, were preceded by a very unusual legal battle. In the end, most of the people were left with little option but to move rather than face continued harassment and intimidation from the authorities.

They all arrived to find a place that was worse in every respect than their original localities. The quality of the land was poor, there were pitifully few employment opportunities and privation was their only companion as they suffered the consequences of enforced relocation, many lies and empty promises. Most lived dangerously close to starvation.

3.6.2 Historical background

FINGO VILLAGE & COMMITTEE'S DRIFT

The government's initial decision to build a new 'town' in the Eastern Cape was made in the early

seventies. Committee's Drift, a patch of veld on the Ciskei's side of the Fish River and directly opposite Glenmore, was the site chosen to hold displaced 'Ciskeian nationals'. It would be the finest black town in South Africa, said Dr Piet Koornhof in 1972. It was only in April 1975 that the decision was clarified by government minister Punt Janson. Fingo Village, one of Grahamstown's three black townships, was singled out for future relocation. 'Conditions in Fingo Village are very bad', said Janson. 'These people must be housed properly. That's the first step, then it depends on future developments and the need for housing others who can commute from Committee's Drift to their places of employment.'

However, in October 1975 future plans for the resettlement camp at Committee's Drift were shelved. The Bantu Affairs Administration Board was allegedly dissatisfied with the site, but ironically 'a lack of finance' was the official reason forwarded. The reprieve was, however, shortlived. Later that month Mr Janson said that, although resettlement could not occur on the scale originally intended, Fingo Villagers and 'others who needed to be settled' because of 'overcrowding' would still receive priority attention.

In 1976 Glenmore was chosen as a replacement.

Grahamstown's black townships had not yet been forgotten. In November 1977 the Department of Bantu Administration and Development informed the town clerk of Grahamstown that 'in view of the fact that Grahamstown is less than 50 kms away from the Ciskei, policy dictates that Bantu families residing there should eventually move to the homeland concerned.'

Although the fate of all three of Grahamstown's black townships was uncertain at the time, the threat to Fingo Village was especially outrageous for historical reasons. This township has had freehold tenure since 1855 when the Mfengu were granted the land 'in the name of Her Majesty Victoria with full power to possess the same in perpetuity', for services rendered to the British by the Mfengu against the Xhosa. (Berger, 48) (The Village today is one of the two last areas in 'white South Africa' where africans have freehold rights in an urban area, the other being Alexandra near Johannesburg.) The position remained unaltered for just on a century until a Coloured Group Areas Board in 1957 proposed a reallocation of the township to coloureds, indians and chinese. Widespread opposition saw the shelving of the plan.

The uncertainty was further aggravated in 1970 when Fingo Village was proclaimed a Coloured Group Area and a government proscription on any additional building followed. The Village was at this time characterised by extreme overcrowding and slum conditions which, given the government's oppressive housing policy, can be attributed to the high incidence of subtenancy exercised by those with freehold rights.

The deterioration in physical and environmental conditions in the township together with the declaration of Fingo Village as a Coloured Group Area were the official reasons for the Village being singled out for removal. They were, it seems in hindsight, mere fronts for the chief aim of clearing out the Village freeholders and dispossessing them of their legal and historical rights. (Health hazards are invoked to justify removal, but are ignored year after year otherwise, as anyone can tell from the reeking, suppurating rubbish left to rot in the bad roads of all three townships in Grahamstown. The dangerous and inadequate bucket toilet system is a hazard in itself. As for the group area plans, they were shelved when seriously opposed.)

To facilitate the removal to Committee's Drift, the government had to expropriate land from the Village titleholders, and the next few years saw much official activity in this regard. An unprecedented visit was made by Koornhof to Grahamstown's black townships for a first-hand view of the housing situation. A clash of views between the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the Eastern Cape and the Bantu Affairs Administration Board ensued over the Committee's Drift scheme, and Sebe met Vorster in Cape Town to urge the Republican government to cancel the scheme. (Davenport, 1980, 33-37)

Matters started coming to a head on 29 April 1975 when an angry meeting of Village freeholders and residents expressed themselves 'totally opposed to the loss of our lands and title deeds'

and to 'removal to the barren and jobless environs of Committee's Drift'. (Ibid, 37) Shortly afterwards the suspension of the Committee's Drift project was announced and a referendum was held in Fingo Village on an imminent removal to Glenmore (a farm next to the old Committee's Drift site). In a 20%'opinion poll' the proposals were defeated and the bid to split the tenants from their landlords consequently failed. (Ibid, 40)

Deadline for the Fingo Village removal to Glenmore still stood, however, at some time in 1981. At this stage in 1976 a town of corrugated iron shacks - euphemistically named 'Silvertown' - was developed as a transit camp for Villagers due to be resettled at Glenmore. 'Voluntary' removals to Silvertown were suspended during the nationwide struggles of that year, and Silvertown instead became inhabited by rent defaulters and squatters from the Dead Horse Kloof area rather than by Fingo Villagers.

In May 1978 the government stance took yet another peculiar turn when it was stated that Glenmore was not designed for Grahamstown's black population. Dr Connie Mulder endorsed this view when he stated that Glenmore was not intended as a dormitory suburb for Grahamstown, but 'would be a normal town incorporated into the Ciskei'.

In August 1979, when the initial 500 houses at Glenmore had been occupied, further relocation to the area was frozen. Fingo Village and its estimated population of 10 000 had been granted a stay of execution. It still remains the position at the time of writing.

Back to Glenmore: when this farm was expropriated from its white owners in 1976 it was proudly announced that a R26 million township would be built there over 5 years. Suddenly the lack of funds that had reportedly torpedoed the Committee's Drift scheme had been forgotten, or so it seemed. The scheme was, to say the least, grandiose: 5 000 houses, 5 schools, 3 clinics, 2 halls, workshops, a police station and sports facilities were to be built. Provision was also to be made for roads, electrification, sewerage and water reticulation. The money, however, was to be used solely for the development of the town. Besides hollow mutterings about irrigation schemes and agriculture-oriented industries, no provision had been made for any long-term infrastructural development.

The construction of 500 temporary houses began at Glenmore in September 1978. These wooden dwellings with asbestos roofs and mud floors were to house a vanguard of 500 families who would provide the labour force required for the construction of the township. It was at this time that Koornhof was quoted as saying in Parliament that only R875 127 had been spent at Glenmore - less than a sixth of the R6.1 million set aside for the year ending August 1979. No reason for the shortfall was proffered. (EPH, 13.06.79)

KENTON-ON-SEA: A SHIFT IN FOCUS

Despite the attention that had been focussed on the precarious future of Grahamstown's townships, and Fingo Village in particular, it was elsewhere in the Eastern Cape that the first targets for relocation to Glenmore appeared.

On 22 March 1979, 35 families from the Kenton-on-Sea Bantu Emergency Camp received handwritten notices informing them of their imminent relocation and the cancellation of their site permits. 'Take notice that you and your family are being moved to Glenmore, district Peddie. The move takes place from April 2, 1979', read the notice.

The Kenton location was established in 1956. Since 1963 the location had been declared an emergency camp 'for the purpose of accommodating homeless Bantu'. (Grocott's Mail, 3.04.79) The location remained a 'temporary emergency' camp for the next 16 years, since it was considered a hindrance to the development of the white vacation resort. This was not the causative factor behind the threatened removals however, since only a section of the population were under threat of removal. The rationale was explained by an Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB) official in 1978 who said that the move was intended to reduce the black Kenton population 'to


the barest minimum necessary for the labour needs of Kenton and Bushman's River'. (Berger, 49)

To implement this plan, however, required the destruction of another black settlement in the area, a squatter camp of 1 200 people at the Klipfontein farm across the river from Kenton. As the Black Sash pointed out, the 35 Kenton families to be removed had been 'selected from the Kenton emergency camp residents to make way for an equal number of fortunately employed residents presently living at Klipfontein.' (EPH, 31.03.79)

The plan was as rational as it was simple. Clear Klipfontein completely, transfer 35 municipal workers and their families to Kenton and shunt the 'surplus people' in both areas to Glenmore. An ECAB spokesman put it in a nutshell:

It was planned to remove only the unproductive and unemployed squatters to Glenmore. We have a responsibility to the permanent African population which is indispensable to our economy. (EPH, 3.04.79)

Map 1 ORIGINS OF THE GLENMORE FAMILIES



KLIPFONTEIN

At the time of the impending removals some of the Klipfontein residents had been there for about 30 years. Most, however, indicated that they had only been there for a few years. This recent inflow was mainly due to evictions off white farms in the area. Evictions occurred for a variety of reasons, such as arguments between farmer and labourer, old age and so on. For instance, it has been customary among Eastern Cape farmers to evict from their farms any retired workers whose children have not remained to work on the place. Whatever the particular incident that precipitates an eviction, the underlying structural cause is the general reduction in agricultural employment. The increase in the population at Klipfontein was ultimately a manifestation of this process.

The questionnaires reveal that the Klipfontein community was fairly cohesive, renting the land together from the coloured owners. There had been no significant friction, and the coloured owners were by all accounts not unhappy with the situation at the time. Almost all the squatters were involved in horticulture producing a variety of vegetables on a reasonable scale. Some even boasted fields sufficiently large for rearing cattle, goats, pigs and poultry. Many of the inhabitants were seasonally employed on the nearby pineapple and chicory fields while the women operated as domestic labourers. A school had been established to educate the children and as far as can be ascertained the community was subsistent, productive and above all, settled.

Apparently there were a number of reasons why the Klipfontein squatters were declared an undesirable presence in the area. Firstly, most of the squatters found seasonal employment on the surrounding farms during the pineapple and chicory seasons. Inbetween they sustained themselves with domestic employment and small-scale agriculture. Thus, these squatters appear to have had an ambivalent position in white farming interests. On the one hand they served as a local pool for seasonal labour on the chicory and pineapple fields without the farmers having to take on the permanent reproduction of their labour - a decided advantage for the farmers. On the other hand their presence irked these farmers who complained that 'valuable grazing land was being destroyed by stock kept by more than 1 000 squatters'. (EPH, 2.04.79) Secondly, the ambivalence was further manifested by the high incidence of petty theft and trespassing for firewood and water. The theft occurred on a relatively large scale, and farmers alleged that it was costing them a great deal of income. It would seem that in this instance the repulsion effect was stronger, hence the farmers' support for the move.

These causative factors aside, there also emerged contributory factors which led to Klipfontein being first in line for removal to Glenmore. The desire of the Alexandria town council to use Klipfontein as a 'coloured' township was also advanced, as was a ludicrous reason by the Nationalist MPC for Albany who claimed that the coloured people were being terrorised by african squatters and wanted help. And, of course, the perennial reason that Klipfontein constituted a health hazard was also proffered.

3.6.3 Relocation

PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE

After the issue of the eviction notice (see above) to the 35 families at Kenton-on-Sea and significant press coverage by Eastern Province newspapers, opposition to the imminent relocation was steadily growing. Both the Black Sash and the PFP took up the issue. The Black Sash argued that the statutory 30 days' written notice had not been given and that many of the

people under threat had Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) rights - legal grounds to remain in the area .

The Sash also noted that most of those under threat were 'the old, disabled, unfit, unemployed and their dependants and families'. This was interesting in the light of former ECAB statements that those moved to Glenmore would form the work force there to build the rest of the township. The Sash made the obvious response:

Contrary to official assurances it appeared that a large number of these retired people to be resettled at Glenmore would be unable to serve as the professed labour contingent in the construction of further houses on the site. (EPH, 31.03.79)

The reactions of the Kenton residents threatened with relocation were as bitter as they were poignant. One man who had received a notice was a blind pensioner. He had lived at Kenton since 1956 working for one employer for 15 years. Most registered their opposition to the move. Some threatened to refuse to board the trucks. One old age pensioner was dumbstruck:

I have not committed a crime. I have trusted the Christians all these years, but now I have lost my trust. (EPH, 3.04.79)

A 66-year-old woman who had lived there for 25 years was more damnatory:

They make us work like donkeys and then they throw us out. (DD, 3.04.79)

Following an outcry by various sectors the Kenton removals were temporarily halted after PFP representations to Koornhof. ECAB also felt obliged to check whether any unregistered but employed residents had been issued with notices. The Klipfontein removals were, however, to go ahead. Klipfontein squatters had a history of fighting removals through the courts. After being told to move in 1976 they were allowed to remain after a successful court case. In March 1978 charges of illegal squatting were deferred on the grounds that there was no alternative housing available. (Berger, 51)

The Klipfontein squatters received no written notice at all. They were simply informed by a police sergeant that they were to be moved within a week. Despite reports that Koornhof had instructed that only those willing to leave Klipfontein should be moved to Glenmore, ECAB, it would appear, had other ideas. The school at Klipfontein was closed down and teachers and pension payments moved to Glenmore. A pensioner at Klipfontein was adamant:

If they want to take the roof off they will do it themselves. If they force us to leave we will telephone our lawyers. (DD, 2.04.79)

A few days later six Klipfontein residents made a round trip of more than 200 km to collect their pensions which were being paid out at Glenmore. One 80-year-old pensioner said they had to hire a van to Glenmore which cost R11 each. His pension paid out every 2 months was R45. He said he was told by a policeman at Alexandria that the money would be paid at Glenmore:

I was angry at this. They shouldn't put my money where I am not. It's hard to come out on my pension money. (DD, 6.04.79)

The Klipfontein squatters were adamant. They were not moving to Glenmore. The ECAB response was to threaten people with prosecution if they continued to resist:

As far as we are concerned there has been the necessary consultation over the move. We met them and so did the Ciskei Minister of the Interior, Chief Lent Maqoma. The Klipfontein people indicated they were in favour of the move. (EPH, 3.04.79)

This statement was soon to be exposed for its blatant fraudulence when Chief Maqoma denied that the Klipfontein squatters wanted to move. His opinion was later endorsed by the ensuing legal battles. What did emerge, however, was that some of the residents were indeed consulted about the impending removal and taken to visit - not Glenmore - but the nearby Tyefu agricultural project - a political showpiece on irrigated land. (Berger, 51)

Louis Koch of ECAB reiterated that no-one would be forced to board the trucks or treated in an

undignified manner. 'There are other ways of dealing with these things', he was reported as saying. (EPH, 3.04.79) He was probably referring to the charges deferred from the year before. At this stage both Glenmore and Klipfontein were sealed from the press. The Chief Plural Affairs Commissioner for the Eastern Cape, when asked about the press bans, retorted, 'There is nothing to hide', but he did not want photographs taken 'because there was too much interference at this stage'. (DD, 4.04.79)

Despite the claims of Koch and Koornhof that squatters would not be forced to move, newspaper reports and statements by squatters gave a radically different picture.* One man, a father of three, said the removal squads had arrived at his two-roomed house and ordered him to break it down.

I told them I would not do it. The man in charge then told the others to take my furniture out and they broke the house down. (WP, 7.04.79)

A 30-year-old mother 'returned to her home at Klipfontein for a visit earlier this week and found it levelled and her family gone.' (WP, 7.04.79) Her employer reported that she had then left to try finding her aged mother and two children. They were at Glenmore, more than 100 km away.

Affidavits made at the time confirm that the community felt itself under pressure:

That on or about 21 March 1979 a Sergeant R*** called a meeting and informed the residents that they will have to move on the 2nd April 1979 as the lorries were coming on that day. This European Sergeant told me that he was acting on the instructions of a Judge from Grahamstown. I questioned this instruction in view of the fact that a Court case was pending during May 1979. On the 2nd April I saw these Government lorries arriving driven by black drivers. These drivers then fetched the furniture from the house and the children assisted them. I did not assist with the loading. This happened on the 9th April 1979. I was presented with a form to sign which I refused to sign. I was very worried and disturbed and I cannot say how my children or grandchildren got on the lorry. On the 11th April Sergeant R*** came back and told me that they were going to break the house down. I was further told by the European Sergeant that I was still going to be moved whether I like it or not.

That on the 3rd April 1979 A European Sergeant asked me when I would be leaving for Glenmore. I replied saying that I would not be going anywhere. The Sergeant then told me it would be wise to move to Glenmore as I would not be able to collect my pension in Klipfontein any longer but that I could only collect it in Glenmore. That on 10 April 1979 Sergeant K*** came to me and asked me when I intended to leave for Glenmore. I told him that I would not leave until I had spoken to my lawyers. Sergeant K*** then told me that we are wasting our time as our lawyer had lost the case and that we would have to leave.

That on the 5th April 1979 the officials of the Eastern Cape Administration Board came to my house and told me to move. I persist in my attitude not to move. That on the 9th April I was told by the ECAB official that "Kaffir you must break down your house, failing which we will do it or arrest you." On the 10th April 1979 a number of white officials came to my house, and instructed me to break my house down. There were about five officials including those from the ECAB. I demolished my house and shall not move.

That on 11.4.79 I noticed that our house was demolished. I saw my sister who told me that my mother and the children were on their way to Kenton-on-Sea. I never saw my mother or the children. At the time when my house was being demolished I was waiting along the Bushmans River - Alexandria road for my Attorney to consult counsel. I have no idea where I am going to stay.

* Accounts of coercion come from the press and affidavits made on 11.04.79 by 26 Klipfontein residents. It has not been possible to verify the facts of the removal in any greater detail. Officials insist that, as Dr Koornhof said, people left only of their own free will and signed accordingly. In view of these conflicting statements of events, the following account should be read as an attempt to reflect the subjective interpretation of the community, rather than as fact.

That the authorities came to our home on the 3rd April and that my mother informed them that we could not move because my father was in hospital. The authorities again came on Wednesday the 4th April. The officials from the Eastern Cape Administration Board then informed my mother that they were going to break the house down. When I returned to my house I found my mother on the truck and that all our personal possessions were on another lorry. My wife and children have been transferred involuntarily to Glenmore.

That I heard from friends about our pending removal on the 2.4.79. The ECAB officials came on the 3.4.79. They came again on 6.4.79. I saw Sergeant K*** in the township and I said that I shall not be leaving and he replied that we cannot remain in Klipfontein. K*** took a piece of paper and asked me to place my thumb print thereon. I refused and further said all the people must leave. Sergeant K*** took my hand and placed my thumb on his book. This was a blank piece of paper. My name was written on this paper in my presence. Sergeant K*** took my thumb on the ink stamp pad and thereafter he placed my thumb print on this blank piece of paper on which he had written my name.

Allegations of forced removals accompanied by the levelling of homes were denied by Koch as 'not the truth'.

All we used was persuasion. How 6 whites can force 1 400 people to board trucks is beyond me. If we had tried there would have been incidents and there were no incidents yesterday. (EPH, 5.04.79)

ECAB also denied the use of bulldozers. They apparently forgot to mention that once the school, teachers and pension payments have been moved, even with legal action pending, there exists very little need for bulldozers and the accompanying publicity.

LEGAL STRUGGLES

Following years of threats and verbal intimidation the relocation to Glenmore began to materialise on April 3, 1979 when government trucks arrived at Klipfontein. The press was subsequently barred from the area. The following day it was learnt that the first 38 families had arrived at Glenmore. On the same day 200 of the threatened squatters met an attorney to discuss the possibility of obtaining a Supreme Court interdict to halt the removals. The removals continued the following day under a blanket of secrecy. The next day the removals were temporarily halted following the hearing of the urgent application to the Supreme Court. The basis for the eviction was an order from an Alexandria magistrate against 150 people, on the grounds that the settlement was a health hazard. It was declared that the eviction orders were irregular since legally 3 days' notice was required and only 2 had been given. The eviction orders were thus declared invalid.

The chairperson of a committee representing all the families on the farm denied in an affidavit that the removals were voluntary. He also claimed that the families had the consent of the owner to live there. This was later endorsed by one of the four usufructuaries of the farm who stated in an affidavit that the 180 families living on the farm did so with his consent. At the same court case ECAB announced that 95 families had already arrived at Glenmore.

The Deputy Minister of Plural Relations, Dr W L Vosloo, then announced the completion of 'fruitful talks' with the Ciskeian cabinet à propos the removals. At the same time Vosloo said that people would not be settled where work could not be provided. Later the Chief Minister of the Ciskei was reported as saying,

We have had enough of this phraseology about voluntary removals. Now we insist that officials have a letter of consent before squatters' possessions are removed. (WP, 7.04.79)

This is interesting in the light of earlier statements by the Ciskei government threatening to 'move heaven and earth' to stop 'another dumping ground like Dimbaza'. Legitimacy had now been given to the removal by both governments.

On the 12 April it was reported that Glenmore housed 185 families, the vast majority of whom came from Klipfontein. Most of these families evidently capitulated in the face of official pressure after losing hope of any success in the legal battle. There were still 28 families at Klipfontein - 17 were waiting to move to Kenton, the other 11 were resisting.

The resumption of the court case on the same day saw the temporary halting of removals when the irregular eviction order was set aside. The Supreme Court also ruled that squatters who had been moved to Glenmore were now free to return to Klipfontein. The State had lost Round 1 of the legal struggle but were soon to retaliate. Less than a week later it was reported that the resisting families would be prosecuted under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 'if they had not changed their minds by the end of the month'. At the same time definite signs of solidarity appeared amongst the remaining families at Klipfontein when the 17 families due to be relocated at Kenton joined the 11 resisting families by refusing to move.

The first court case took place 3 weeks later when a 78-year-old Klipfontein resident who had lived there for 29 years and was gainfully employed by one of the 4 usufructuaries was tried. Interestingly he was found to be living on the farm illegally because he was not a bona fide registered full-time worker. He was convicted - not under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, but under the more watertight Bantu Land and Trust Act. He was sentenced to a fine of R90 or 100 days (suspended for 3 years) and ordered to leave Klipfontein within a month.

More than two weeks passed before the State took action against the remaining families at Klipfontein. On 19 May papers were served on the resisting families notifying them that an application was to be made to an Alexandria magistrate for their eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act which provides that squatters may be moved from an area if the health or safety of the squatters is endangered. On the same day 10 people were arrested including the vice-chairperson of the committee elected to represent the squatters, and they paid admission of guilt fines for trespassing on the farm. The Kenton police alleged that they had received a complaint from one of the usufructuaries.

When the application order for the eviction was heard, the magistrate dismissed it on the grounds that the evidence did not conclusively prove that conditions at Klipfontein posed a health hazard. Counsel for the squatters accused the Alexandria police commander of misleading the magistrate by claiming that Klipfontein had no water supplied by taps, no sanitary facilities and that crime was prevalent there.

ECAB responded by reverting to the Bantu Land and Trust Act again. On 6 June, 22 heads of Klipfontein families appeared at a Bushman's River Mouth court on charges under the Act. One married father of two children was convicted since it was alleged that he was not registered as an employee of the owners of the farm. He was fined R100 (or 90 days) and ordered to leave within a month despite the evidence of a Kenton-on-Sea building contractor who claimed that the accused was a registered employee of his.

Two days later it was reported that a former squatter who had been evicted to Glenmore had moved his furniture back to Klipfontein, saying

Glenmore is not a happy place. They can shoot me if they want, but I won't go back. I'd rather die. (EPH, 8.06.79)

THE REMOVALS SPREAD

While the legal struggles over the fate of the Kenton and Klipfontein removals occupied the main focus of attention, ECAB and its officials were being far from sluggish. In the intervening period people in at least three other areas had been threatened with removal. As one observer put it,

It emerged that ECAB had a fairly well worked out and comprehensive plan to rid the Eastern Cape of as many 'economically inactive' people as possible, as well as many economically active people. (Berger, 56)

On April 14 Koch confirmed that ECAB had switched its attention to squatter settlements at Coega housing about 50 families. This was to disrupt some 180 families eventually. At the same time it was announced that notices of removal had been served on 27 families at the Hillside location at Fort Beaufort, and on families at Middledrift.

Coega is a small settlement almost 20 km to the north of Port Elizabeth. Most of those threatened with removal were squatting on white-owned farms in the area. Approximately 20% were employed on the farms while the others found employment as shop assistants on farm stalls and in hotels. A significant number were employed in the brick-manufacturing concerns in the area. According to the questionnaires the vast majority of those moved had spent at least 3 - 4 years in the area, with significant numbers having spent up to 20 years there. Most of the people however were squatting on land wanted by the white farmers who subsequently demanded that ECAB do something to remedy the situation.

Most of those questioned were involved in horticulture on a subsistence scale and of those who had fields and grazing rights, cattle, pigs and poultry were their most popular choice. It was this latter group who were the most bitter after removal:

We sold our stock there (Coega). So we do not have any here. We have only a dog here.

We sold our stock and lost our land.

It was reported on 23.04.79 that ECAB would begin moving 180 families from Coega and resettle them at Glenmore. The Board admitted that despite the finality of the decision, not all the squatters had been contacted at the time of the announcement. Of those contacted only 15% refused to be relocated at Glenmore. The vast majority of those interviewed, however, did not want to leave. Commenting after their removal, they insisted they had left Coega against their will. A 35-year-old mother of four children said:

I was told that it was illegal for me to live there and that the farmer wants his land for other use.

The same was said by a man who had been living on the farm for 18 years:

They said the farmer needed the land desperately for farming purposes.

For the 15% who had initially refused to move, resistance had not been ruled out. Some entertained the idea:

We tried to stay but the government officials told us we would be taken to court.

Others opted for some organisation. There was an official crackdown:

We convened a meeting discussing resistance, then some of us were arrested.

One man hit on a less conventional plan of action:

The first day of the removals I hid away. We were told we would be arrested if we resisted. I gave up.

Their accounts suggest that ECAB behaved conventionally in their eyes:

We resisted but they cut the water supply. People were arrested for walking around at night.

We tried to stay but our houses were demolished.

In the end they all moved save for a small group of 15 families who had been living on Roman Catholic church property at Coega. They were granted a last-minute reprieve by the Deputy Director of ECAB who was reported as saying that these families would definitely not be moved

until permanent accommodation was available at Glenmore .

While ECAB were still investigating the Coega families it was suddenly announced in the press that 32 squatter families living in the Colchester area north of Port Elizabeth were due to be shifted to Glenmore . All the threatened families were living on privately owned land and 'in conditions considered by the board to be unsatisfactory' . According to Louis Koch , for ECAB , all the families had given their consent to the removal . Yet again this proved to be somewhat untrue . One woman , a regularly employed mother of four children , refused to sign the letter of consent . Another , a 67-year-old pensioner , claimed ownership of the land he lived on , saying he had the papers to prove that his family had bought the ground about 45 years before . He also claimed that not all his neighbours who had been moved the previous day were happy to leave:

They feared they would go to jail for 6 years if they did not leave .

He did not mention how that particular fear occurred to them .

As with the Kenton - Klipfontein removals it was interesting to note the class interests operating at Colchester . Two cases exemplify the point . One woman was reported as saying that her husband wanted to build a motel on the land occupied by the squatters . On the other hand , a resident of Colchester village , while pleased that the 'sometimes rowdy' squatters were being moved , complained that the removal would cost him and many other employers their servants .

Barely a week before the Colchester squatters were moved , notices of removal were served on 41 families at the Hillside location near Fort Beaufort and on families at Middledrift . The families at Hillside were determined to face prosecution for illegal squatting rather than be moved to Glenmore . The Fort Beaufort municipality claimed they were squatting on municipal commonage and wanted them moved to the Ciskei - only 300 metres away . The families on the other hand claimed that the settlement was historically black land . This was supported by a Rhodes University historian:

Whatever the subsequent legal niceties , the basic claim is there .

Ultimately , these families were not moved to Glenmore . Apart from a few who went over to join Chief Lent Maqoma at Healdtown , they are all still in Hillside at the time of writing (May 1982) .

Earlier it was announced by ECAB that three Grahamstown families had voluntarily moved to Glenmore as well as ten families from Thornhill in the Alexandria district .

On 25 May it was reported that the Deputy Director of ECAB had confirmed that almost all the 500 temporary houses built at Glenmore were full . 'Large-scale removals' would only begin when the first permanent houses came on line . (EPH , 25.04.79) A little over ten weeks later , Koornhof announced that the resettlement scheme at Glenmore had been halted and would only continue when employment could be provided . At the same time it was announced that the possibility of a settlement at Peddie was being investigated .

Before continuing with the conditions experienced during the initial weeks at Glenmore , it would be both interesting and useful to note the responses to the 'Glenmore scheme' of two groups in the white community . The first , the Glenmore Action Group , constituted largely of liberal academics at Rhodes University , did valuable work in ensuring maximum publicity for the removal and were instrumental in organising funds from the World Vision organisation , an ecumenical body for giving aid in crises such as famine relief at Glenmore whether or not it had political origins . Despite this the group 'remained entirely within a liberal idealist paradigm seeing the removals as the working out of bigoted social ideology' . (Berger , 50)

The second group consisted of about '40 Rhodes University students who staged a symbolic protest by erecting a mock squatter camp in the university quadrangle' . (Berger , 54) They provided a colourful sight surrounded by corrugated iron structures , tents and sleeping bags . The aim of the squat was to focus attention on relocation and highlight the inadequacy of the South African education system in dealing with such problems . There was the usual student take-off too:

A counter demonstration at the time was put on by 5 law students who, in boaters and striped blazers, played bowls on the lawn and reclined in deckchairs sipping tea brought by an obsequious African in white clothing. One student later said he was trying to show how good colonialism was. (Berger, 54)

The one-night squat ended in an open air meeting attended by 400 students. They were not removed, but left of their own accord. Genuine though the solidarity was, the squat was still a world away from the real thing.

INITIAL CONDITIONS AT GLENMORE

Conditions suffered in the initial weeks at Glenmore were nothing short of critical. Complaints of unemployment, hunger and cold were rife. The rations provided by the government were pitifully inadequate and many who had been gainfully employed in their places of origin were now 'asking and borrowing' to stay alive.

A survey written up in June 1979 by a Rhodes University academic found that

in 25 households there were 30 workseekers, but only one case of a family member employed at Glenmore. It also found that the average income of 25 households had fallen from R60 a month to R27 a month, and that several households had no cash income at all. (Berger, 56)

The fall in income was attributed to the high number of men that had lost their jobs, forcing them to migrate to Port Elizabeth in search of employment. It was also claimed that many women who had previously worked part-time had lost their sources of income. It was also reported that of the 507 men who had sought employment at Glenmore only 10% had been successful.

There were complaints by the residents that the brackish water from the Fish River was making people ill. The water was tested and found to be passable by South African standards although some elements were very high - the saline trace was above the limit allowed by some other countries, for instance. Then there were numerous complaints of diarrhoea, vomiting and bloody stools and children covered with pustules. As the first rations began to run out there were increasing reports of children with swollen feet and stomachs. When approached, a spokesman for the clinic said there had been no complaints of hunger and only one case of kwashiorkor. The spokesman was quick to add that the case 'couldn't have started at Glenmore'.

Agriculture in the initial weeks was understandably nonexistent. Many who had supplemented their incomes at Coega and Klipfontein with livestock and crops were now denied this source with little or no compensation. No-one had, at that stage, been able to cultivate maize and other vegetables. Some of the Klipfontein people had brought their cattle but these quickly succumbed to the ticks and the tulp, a poisonous iris in the area. Newspaper reports indicated that stock deaths were averaging two a day, and by 18 June it was reported that a quarter of the cattle had already died. Officialdom ruled out compensation.

Begging, borrowing and sharing were the only avenues open to many to eke out a precarious existence. Rations dried up after the first few days and many pension payments had not been transferred to Glenmore at that stage, necessitating costly trips to collect the money. The Glenmore Action Group organised the World Vision to sponsor 2 000 kg of food each week for eight weeks, to be distributed to 200 families. This helped ameliorate the crisis in the short term.

The total of all these conditions materialised on 7 June when newspapers reported there had been 11 deaths at Glenmore - 9 were children. Gastro-enteritis, kidney inflammation, kwashiorkor and bronchial pneumonia were among the causes.

This critical state of affairs provides a sharp contrast to the words of ECAB Director, Louis Koch, in his press statement:

We believe that in moving the squatters here we have succeeded in bringing dignity to the lives of people who have been living in very unfavourable conditions.

(EPH, 13.04.79)


3.6.4 Glenmore profile

DEMOGRAPHY

The demographic aspects of Glenmore are in no sense unusual and, in fact, are strikingly similar to those of other closer settlements in the Eastern Cape.

The de jure population of Glenmore is slightly in excess of 4 000 with the age and sex composition bearing a close resemblance to that of the South African black population as a whole.

Fig 1 DE JURE POPULATION, 1981 (%)



The household size, although relatively standard, does deviate slightly from the national averages. The average household at Glenmore has 7,3 members, and is the highest of the six SPP case studies in the Eastern Cape. Although this would seem to imply an acute housing shortage, the problem appears to be helped by migrancy to the metropolitan areas. Nevertheless Glenmore is characterised by a significant number of large families: 27% of all households interviewed have 5-7 members and a massive 54% have between 8 and 12 members.

A more than marginal discrepancy between male and female members is evidence of temporary migration from Glenmore to other centres. This is supported by a number of complaints in the questionnaires concerning migration.


My husband's work is too far from this place.

There are no job opportunities here. My grandchildren only see their mother once a month.

The town is too far from this place. Travelling costs money.

The presence of migrancy is further illustrated by a comparison of the de jure and de facto population data.

Fig 2 DE JURE AND DE FACTO POPULATIONS COMPARED, 1981 (%)



The severe imbalances associated with temporary migration are however not as blatant at Glenmore as at Kammaskraal and Elukhanyweni. The latter closer settlements boast migrancy rates of 18,5% and 20,2% respectively while Glenmore has a migrancy rate of 10,5% - well below the average of 14,6% in the areas studied by SPP. It is worth noting that this latter average includes Dimbaza and Mdantsane which have low migrancy rates of 7,6% and 8,8% respectively, attributable to their close proximity to industrial complexes.

Despite these somewhat low migration rates which serve as a preliminary indicator of income and poverty levels, temporary migration is virtually the only option for employment. Just under half of all males between the ages of 25 and 44 migrate at least on a monthly basis to their places of employment. The migrancy rate for males between the ages of 15 and 64 is 39,3%. The total female migration for the same age span is 27,7% which is significantly lower than that of other closer settlements in the Eastern Cape. This is probably best explained by Glenmore's geographic isolation and the limited and expensive transport services to surrounding towns which inhibit employment for females in the services sector.

The migrancy rate also has the deleterious effect of exacerbating the age imbalance in these closer settlement communities. The low numbers in the 25 - 45 age range endorse this with severe over-representation of young and old people.

The magnitude of the problem is further illustrated by the significant number of household heads involved in temporary migration. The problem is particularly acute at Glenmore where 27% of all household heads migrate. The figures for Sada, Elukhanyweni and Kammaskraal are 22%,

23% and 21% respectively. The 27% of household head migrancy at Glenmore is made up entirely of males. This figure is put into perspective when it is realised that 70% of all household heads are male.

The adverse impact of migrancy on family life is well documented.

I am a widow. I haven't seen my sons for a long time. They seldom send me money.

My husband works in Port Elizabeth. He only sees us once every two months because it costs so much to travel. The money he sends us is not enough.

For a community living in such adversity the irreplaceable loss is of the young people in the prime of life. One of the community leaders puts it in perspective:

We cannot afford to lose these young people. Their families need them. The community needs them to help us make something of this terrible place. We need their muscles and their leadership.

AGRICULTURE

The state of agriculture at Glenmore is nothing short of critical. It represents one of the greatest sources of frustration and bitterness for those who were promised prosperity only to experience subsequently both the poverty of the promises and the land.

The data speak volumes:

Table 1 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: HOUSEHOLDS INVOLVED (%)

Maize	Potatoes	Beans	Other
70	63	54	30

Table 2 ANIMAL HUSBANDRY: HOUSEHOLDS INVOLVED (%)

Cattle	Goats	Sheep	Pigs	Poultry
22	22	0	20	85

The large percentage that kept poultry accounts for the high (85%) production of meat and eggs. All those that reared cattle and goats were rewarded with regular milk and hides and skins. Half of those interviewed claimed they had 'much more' land at their previous locality than Glenmore; 40% claimed they had 'more' land before; the other 10% said they had equivalent portions of land at both places.

At Klipfontein, Colchester and Coega some kept stock and many grew vegetables - often on a scale large enough to supplement their incomes via limited commercial activity. 43% of those interviewed produced enough in the way of vegetables, milk, eggs and hides to sell to friends and neighbours. This is particularly interesting in view of the clamp-down on selling rights at Glenmore. The low agricultural yield probably inhibits this anyhow.

People arrived at Glenmore to find a 'hot, barren, inhospitable wilderness founded on shales which yield scanty water from underground'. (DD, 30.03.79)

We need fields. We want to have stock, but this place is too dry.

This place cannot be compared to Klipfontein in any way.

At Klipfontein we used to plough. This land cannot be ploughed. It is too stony.

For those Klipfontein residents taken to visit the Tyefu irrigation project prior to the removal, the reality must be all the more harsh, the lies all the more fraudulent.

In comparison with other closer settlements Glenmore does have some land available for grazing purposes. 27% of those interviewed have access to grazing rights. Most of the land is, however, of extremely poor quality with little grass and infested with the deadly tulp plant. 43% claimed at least one garden plot available for agricultural production while 37% claimed access to at least two or more plots. The average size of these plots, however, lends itself to only the meanest subsistence production. This is borne out by the production figures for those interviewed, as shown in Table 1.

Although 70% of all those interviewed claimed to be involved in agricultural production to some degree, the small quantities and poor quality of the crops make this figure somewhat less impressive. Minute plots, infertile soil and little water give scant cause for optimism and there appears little hope for an increase in the supply of agricultural implements and fertilizers.

The majority of those interviewed, despite bemoaning their lack of selling rights, realise that even given this 'privilege' the aforementioned characteristics would prevent any significant improvement in production.

We sold our stock and lost our land. There is not enough land here. Even the available land is infertile.

How can we sell when nothing will grow.

I would like to have land for planting.

Our pension money is not enough. We need land to grow our food. Otherwise we might starve.

The critical state of agriculture at Glenmore is well illustrated by the data on animal husbandry as in Table 2 above. These figures represent a significant decline in the number of animals owned before the move and the natural habitat of the area offers no prospect of forthcoming relief.

We sold our stock at Coega. So we do not have any here. We have only a dog here.

We sold our cattle before we were moved. It was the right thing to do. They would have died here.

All our cattle died in the first two months. Now we only have a few chickens.

Thus any livelihood from agriculture at Glenmore is not likely to be more than marginal until a fully implemented irrigation scheme with reasonably sized holdings has been realised. At one stage there was hope of water from the Orange-Fish scheme being directed there. Most of the people have realised that this will never materialise. Even if crop and vegetable production does achieve reasonable proportions, there is no local market for the produce and the locality is served by substandard roads to Grahamstown, Alice and Peddie. The matter is probably academic anyway, as the Glenmore people are on the verge of being moved again to Peddie at the time of writing (May 1982) and there seems to be a firm intention among officials to carry out the removal, with no great factors that might deter them.

LABOUR

It must be stated at the outset that the SPP data for Glenmore on labour-related phenomena must be treated with a small degree of caution. This is due mainly to reliable evidence that the employment rate has increased somewhat since the data were compiled and collated.

The figures for the adults at Glenmore who are either economically active or seeking employment are remarkably low. These activity rates are consistently lower than those for the other SPP case study areas in the Eastern Cape and well below the national averages.

Table 3 GLENMORE'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITY COMPARED WITH OTHERS (%)

Sex	Mdantsane	Dimbaza	Sada	Elukhanyweni	Kammaskraal	Glenmore	Av	National
Male	39	41	47	38	34	29	38	49
Female	38	33	31	27	25	22	29	26
Total	38	37	39	32	29	25	33	37

(Note: These figures represent a percentage of the whole population, not just those of working age.)

Table 4 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATES AT GLENMORE BY AGE AND SEX (%)

Age spans	Male	Female		
15 - 24	61	55		
25 - 34	96	57		
35 - 44	90	77		
45 - 64	58	33		
64 +	16	0		
Total	29	22	25	Average

The table above differs very little in its relative age and sex ratios from the other closer settlements in the Eastern Cape. The male activity rates in all age groups are higher than the female rates and the rates for the young and very old are significantly lower than those for the 25 - 44 age group.

A number of reasons exist for the low activity rates for Glenmore. The oft-mentioned geographical isolation of Glenmore and an aversion to migrancy can probably be cited as contributory factors alongside low levels of skill and education. The questionnaires imply that the enforced proletarianisation of a predominantly rural people and the dearth of employment opportunities are the main causative factors for the low activity rates. Another less verifiable factor which should not be discounted is the demoralisation suffered by the people as a result of the removal and the aforementioned factors.

As might be gleaned from the activity rates, the employment (and unemployment) figures for Glenmore indicate a critical situation.

Table 5 EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND INACTIVITY RATES AT GLENMORE (%)

Age span	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
15 - 24	27	31	42
25 - 34	57	24	19
35 - 44	65	20	15
45 - 64	21	18	61
Total	42.5	23.25	34.25

The main reasons for the high unemployment and inactivity rates are difficult to pin down but one reason does suggest itself: the newness of the camp implies that people were still adjusting to their new environment at the time of the survey and so had not fully acquainted themselves with the existing labour channels and prospective employment opportunities.

Of the male population 52% are employed and 19% unemployed. The female figures differ significantly with 27% unemployed and 20% employed.

Of the employed male population about 12% work locally while the other 88% migrate on either a monthly or a yearly basis to their place of employment. The migrancy rate for employed females is slightly lower, with 82% migrating and 18% being employed locally. Most of those who work locally are either at the Tyefu irrigation scheme or in the services and agricultural sectors at Peddie. It should be noted that the incidence of local employment has, by all accounts, increased somewhat since the survey was taken.

Migrant labour and employment opportunities for the Glenmore population are mutually interdependent phenomena and will remain so unless the Ciskeian and South African authorities embark on massive labour-intensive agricultural schemes. The likelihood of this is, needless to say, negligible. Thus, as odious as the present employment situation in the Glenmore area is, there is little hope of change. The bitterness of the people on the issue is clear, as some comments show:

We were close to a town where we were staying at Coega. Therefore we could find jobs easily. Here travelling expenses eat so much money.

The government should help us because they took us away from our well-built houses and our work. Here we are starving without work.

We were promised jobs here. I haven't been able to find work for two years. They lied to us.

Others interviewed are far more acquiescent about their fate and seem demoralised to a point beyond bitterness.

I am a farmer. There is no good land here. How can I work in factories in the cities? I have no training.

We are helpless. My husband has been searching for work for two months. We are starving.

There are no jobs at Glenmore. There are few jobs in the cities. What must we do to survive?


As we can see from the figure on the next page, the main place of employment for those involved in temporary migration is Port Elizabeth: 37% of all those interviewed are employed in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage industrial area. This is not surprising since it is the largest industrial conurbation in the Eastern Cape and is very close to the places of origin of most of the Glenmore people.

Ironically 12% of those employed are working at Coega. Before the removal this 12% had had employment on their doorstep; now they must travel 200 km to keep the same job.

The temporary migrants can be divided into those who migrate on a yearly basis and those who migrate on a monthly basis: 44% of migrants return to Glenmore only once a year while the remaining 56% migrate monthly. The 44% comprises those employed on the mines and a significant percentage of those employed in Port Elizabeth who cannot afford the exorbitant travelling costs each month.

Of the temporary migrants, 76% submit regular remittances to their dependants at Glenmore. The remaining 24% either remit on an irregular basis or not at all. The irregularity of remittances to some households is an obvious cause of hardship and distress:

Fig 3 MAIN PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT BY PERCENTAGE OF WORK FORCE



I haven't seen my son for 18 months. He never sends us money. I don't know if he is dead.

My husband earns so little that he cannot send us money every month.

We turn now to the sectors of employment. Those employed in the transport, services and construction sectors are mainly located in Port Elizabeth. Needless to say, all those involved in mining migrate to the Reef. Employment in the agricultural sector is well spread over the Ciskeian and Eastern Cape towns, as is the services sector. A significant percentage of those employed in agriculture are employed locally at Tyefu and Peddie.

Table 6 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT

Sector	%
Agriculture	22
Transport, storage, communications	18
Mining	15
Construction	14
Services	14
Electricity, gas, water	7
Manufacturing	5
Commerce	5

The above table shows that employment is spread relatively evenly among the different sectors, given the rural background and low levels of training and education prevalent among the adult population. Indicative of these low levels is the disproportionately small share of employment for the manufacturing and commercial sectors. No-one interviewed was employed in the financial sector.

The share of employment in agriculture is relatively high. This can be attributed to Glenmore's favourable geographical position vis-a-vis agriculture in the Eastern Cape. This is due to Glenmore's proximity to the Ciskei and to many Eastern Cape farmers who are able to recruit labour there without much difficulty.

The services sector which is dominated by female employment is also under-represented. Amongst rural and semi-rural blacks in the Eastern Cape the two chief sectors providing employment for females are agriculture and services. The enforced proletarianisation of the people has severely curbed opportunities in the former, while Glenmore's geographical isolation and the general excess labour supply amongst domestic workers is the main cause for the services sector's low share.

An interesting figure which is indicative of Glenmore's many adverse characteristics is that none of the people interviewed are self-employed. 33% are employed in the government sector and the remaining 67% in the private sector.

The following table reflects the occupation structure of the labour force:

Table 7 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF GLENMORE'S WORK FORCE COMPARED (%)

Occupation	Glenmore	Mdantsane	Dimbaza	Sada	Elukhanyweni	Kammaskraal
White collar	3	16	13	9	13	11
Services	10	22	20	26	29	20
Skilled	4	22	21	27	12	29
Unskilled	83	40	46	38	46	40

It is this table which represents perhaps the most scathing evidence (other than the employment figures) of the plight of a people proletarianised under duress. In none of the other areas considered in the Eastern Cape case studies is the unskilled component of the work force so disproportionately large and the white collar, services and skilled components so disproportionately small.

Only 56% of those employed at Glenmore are on a signed contract. This is further evidence of the low levels at which Glenmore people are incorporated into the labour market and the inaccessibility of the labour channels to most of Glenmore's population. There is no labour bureau in the immediate vicinity.

Amongst those employed 62% found employment on their own steam. Just 16% were recruited via the labour bureaux, 11% used the family-friend network to find employment, and another 11% were recruited either directly by the employer or by a recruiting agent.

On this evidence Glenmore appears a classic example of a people the vast majority of which are doomed to unemployment as a result of their relocation. Even if they were not employed, in the institutional sense of the term, previous to their relocation they were at least involved in small-scale agriculture. Now even that has been largely denied them.

INCOME

There is unfortunately very little reliable data available on the average family income at Glenmore, and estimates based on presumed earnings had to be used.

Before continuing with these estimates it is useful to note the extremely high dependency rates at Glenmore which serve as a very basic indicator of income and poverty levels. On average there are 1,06 migrants per family, 0,3 local earners and 0,5 pensioners.

Average family income was estimated in the following way. We assumed that on average a male migrant earns R150 a month remitting R100, and a female migrant R80 a month remitting R50. It was also assumed that male locals earn R80 a month on average, female locals R40 a month, and that pensioners receive R60 every two months (1981 incomes).

On this basis the average family at Glenmore receives a monthly cash income of R145 exclusive of migrant earnings. This figure would rise to a little under R200 if migrants were included. Despite the fact that a variance of about 10% can be imputed to these figures, they must nevertheless be treated with caution since the employment rate for Glenmore has apparently risen since the survey. The dependency rate will then have decreased, thereby increasing average family incomes.

It is, however, worth noting that the 1980 Household Subsistence Level for a family of 6 living in the Peddie district was calculated to be R170,66. This is significantly higher than the average monthly cash income for a Glenmore family of 5,7 estimated to be in the region of R145.

POVERTY

Average family income is, however, a relatively unreliable indicator of poverty in Glenmore. This is due to the fact that household income and household size, the two most immediate determinants of poverty, are unequally distributed across the community. Consequently, the incidence of poverty was measured by subdividing the households into 6 different poverty levels as indicated here:

Table 8 INCIDENCE OF POVERTY (%)

Families	Average income per member per month
6	R40 - 45
6	30 - 39
16	20 - 29
47	10 - 19
12	less than R10
13	rations and gifts

This table is based exclusively on the permanent resident component of each household, and gives poignant evidence of the high incidence of poverty and subsequent privation experienced by well over 70% of Glenmore's de facto population.

The relatively affluent families who earn between R30 and R45 per member a month constitute a small proportion of the population. Typical examples of this group are a family of 9 with 4 migrant earners, and a family of 15 with 6 male migrants and one pensioner.

By far the largest group of families (47%) are decidedly poor with the average income of each member being a miserly R10 - 19 per month . This barely gives enough to feed someone for a month , let alone provide for clothing , education and health needs .

The final 25% are the most destitute of all . 12% of this group's members receive a monthly income of less than R10 - enough to supply bread for the month . The last 13% survive on government rations , which last on average for 2½ weeks of the month , and gifts from friends and neighbours . Very little stands between them and starvation .

I cannot afford to buy food because I depend on a monthly remittance from my son which doesn't always come .

I cannot afford to buy basic things and pay my child's education .

NUTRITION

Table 9 EATING FREQUENCY IN GLENMORE HOUSEHOLDS (%)

Commodities	Daily	Weekly	Less than weekly
Carbohydrates: Maize	89	11	-
Bread	51	33	16
Sugar	81	5	14
Proteins: Meat	-	30	70
Eggs	3	16	81
Fish	-	8	92
Vitamins: Milk	30	24	46
Vegetables	8	62	30
Other: Tea/Coffee	81	5	14
Margarine	32	36	32

60% of those interviewed ate 3 times a day; 34% twice a day; and 6% ate only one meal a day .

The table indicates that carbohydrates dominate the diets of most of Glenmore's people . The survey shows a critically low protein intake although the vitamin intake is substantially better with 62% eating vegetables at least once a week .

Many people recorded their distress along these lines:

There are no jobs and no food at Glenmore . We are starving .

We have no money . Friends give us food . Otherwise we would die .

My baby is ill because there is so little food for him . We have no money .

I would like to join the burial society but cannot afford to .

SERVICES

In comparison with other resettlement camps in the Eastern Cape, Glenmore's services are of a relatively high standard. In comparison with the services they were offered prior to the removal, however, the situation is woefully inadequate. The people were promised 5 000 permanent houses, five schools, three clinics, two halls, workshops, a police station, sports facilities, local employment, and water from the Orange - Fish River scheme. Pitifully few of these have materialised. Most never will, especially as Glenmore now has the status of a transit camp.

HOUSING, SANITATION, WATER, ROADS

The accommodation situation has shown no improvement since the people arrived in 1979. All are still accommodated in the 500 temporary houses provided before the removal. Each house comprises a three-roomed wooden shed lined with chicken wire and roofed with asbestos. These houses are bitterly cold in winter, scorching in summer, and most leak during the rains.

The houses we live in were said to be temporary. But it is after such a long period that we are convinced they were always meant to be permanent.

I would like the houses to be plastered with cement to protect them against the rain. We cannot afford to buy cement.

Accommodation is a big problem. The house leaks when it rains. That causes damage to the walls inside.

We expect to get a well-built house.

We need a permanent well-built house to keep the children from getting sick in winter.

Each 10 x 20 m plot has a bucket toilet, with one tap serving 20 houses. The taps are located at 80 m intervals down the dirt roads. Some people complained about the dirt roads which created so much dust. Others were more hopeful and demanded that the government tar the roads. Many of those interviewed complained about the brackish water, saying it caused the children to get sick. It would appear, however, that the sanitation system and the purification of water is better than at the other closer settlements in the Ciskei such as Elukhanyweni and Kammaskraal.

EDUCATION

The following table presents the educational level attained by Glenmore's population:

Table 10 EDUCATIONAL LEVELS AT GLENMORE (%)

Level	% of population
No education	33,5
Lower primary	40
Higher primary	20
Lower secondary	6
Standard 9 +	0,5

These figures are very bad and perhaps help to explain the critical unemployment situation at Glenmore. Less than 30% of the population have completed a Std 5 course. Most have no

education at all or only lower primary education . The presence of only one primary school at Glenmore is doing little to ameliorate the situation . All pupils who wish to attain higher standards must commute to schools elsewhere in the district . Those attending the primary school must continually suffer from the overcrowded classrooms with few books and a high teacher-pupil ratio .

The figures indicate that the poor educational services at Glenmore are only helping to perpetuate the plight of the inhabitants and at the same time ensure that the children suffer the same oppressive , jobless fate that their parents are enduring .

I can't afford to pay my child's education .

We need a high school to educate the children .

We can do nothing without an education . Now our children must also go without an education . They will also be poor .

HEALTH

Of the three clinics promised to the people , only one was completed at the time of the removal . The others have never been built . The clinic boasts a few trained nurses and a doctor who pays a weekly visit from Peddie to attend to the more serious cases .

We need a hospital here . Many people are sick .

We want to have doctors all the time otherwise people will die . The doctors only come once a week . It is not enough .

PENSIONS

In December 1981 a great number of cases , 51 in all , came to light of pensioners at Glenmore who were not receiving their pension payments . The issue was taken up by the Grahamstown Advice Office who immediately wrote to the Chief Commissioner of the Department of Co-operation and Development in Port Elizabeth , the local MP and Dr Koornhof on behalf of the pensioners .

Some of the pensioners had not received any payments since mid-1979 , apparently because a transfer had not been effected after the removal from Klipfontein . Others experienced lapses in payment . Many of the pensioners suspected the clerks of embezzlement .

The Advice Office was also concerned as to who was responsible for future payment , as Glenmore was still trust land at the time and its consolidation into the Ciskei had not been gazetted . The outgoing Commissioner in Grahamstown apparently left a directive that pension payments were to become 'a matter for the Ciskei' from December 1981 .

The Chief Commissioner replied to the Advice Office query in January 1982 saying that the Alice magistrate was attending to the matter . He claimed that some of the pensioners had , in fact , been receiving pensions , and cited photocopied vouchers as proof . These vouchers , however , were no proof that the money had in fact been reaching the pensioners . He then went on to explain that some cases were receiving the 'personal attention' of the Alice magistrate and that applications had been submitted in respect of others .

After another round of correspondence between the Commissioner and the Advice Office , the latter decided to ask legal advice on the pensioners' behalf . At the time of writing (May 1982) a court action is in the offing . Meanwhile , three pensions have finally been transferred from Port Alfred to Glenmore , 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ years after the removal .

TRANSPORT AND SHOPPING

Another source of discontent among the people is the expensive and infrequent bus service. A railway bus runs to Grahamstown six days a week in the afternoon, once a week in the morning. Return trips are made on the following mornings except for a special return bus early on Saturday afternoon. The buses travel through to Glenmore and on to Debe Nek most days, giving people transport eastwards too. The single fare between Glenmore and Grahamstown is R1,40 (1982). The only day when people can come in to Grahamstown and return the same day is Saturday, which is obviously a very awkward limitation, not least on getting jobs.

Buses should cost less so that people can go to town easily and every day to work.

There should be a bus every day.

Paying R2,80 return puts shopping in Grahamstown beyond most people's reach, so that they have no choice but to buy from the one shop in Glenmore. This is a main point of discontent because by all accounts the prices are exorbitant.

The shop is exploiting us. More shops should be built.

There should be more shops and a public telephone.

The shopkeeper should be put in jail. Few people can afford to pay his high prices.

Despite the imminent move to Peddie, the hopelessly inadequate provision of services at Glenmore seems to be improving, if only marginally. Six new classrooms were completed towards the end of 1981, and sports and social clubs are on the increase. 'Disco' evenings sometimes take place, and there is a regular soccer and rugby league. There is also a boxing ring in the middle of the warehouse, provided by the new camp superintendent, and the boxing club intends concreting the floor and providing seats with the money it collects from spectators and the sale of cool drinks. This is strong evidence of the community's initiative and capacity for organisation.

SOCIAL RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES

It is difficult for outsiders to gauge the social relations at Glenmore. After three years of hardship and adversity, attitudes vary from house to house. Some are activated by religious conviction, others by a deep but ambivalent repugnancy for the authorities, many by a stoic, impassive acceptance of the situation. However, despite an awareness of the common malaise, there is some uncertainty as to the exact nature of social relations. The questionnaires, on the one hand, imply a surprising degree of solidarity and common empathy; on the other, observers noticed a definite rift between some of the people.

Most of the antagonism appears to be between the Klipfontein people and those from the Coega/Colchester area.

It is not easy to get on with them. Conflicts arose resulting in faction fights among the men.

There were some conflicts. One resulted in the death of a young man who was originally from Coega. He was stabbed by one who came originally from Klipfontein.

We do not get on very well. There is some rivalry between some of the Coega people and some of the Klipfontein people.

Many of the interviewees, however, did not mention any divisions or polarisation in the community.

We get on very well with them because we knew some of them before we moved to this place .

We get on very well with the other people . The fact that we come from a different place has no role to play in our relationships .

We were the first group at Glenmore but we live in peace with those who arrived later .

We relate very well to the other people . We attend the same church as some of them . We are trying to make ends meet for a common cause .

Even though there appears to be a significant incidence of antipathy towards those from other localities , some remained preoccupied with improving the common lot by sharing their problems .

We get on very well with our neighbours because we try and share with people what little we have .

We have common problems . We understand one another .

We would not have survived if our friends and neighbours had not shared with us and helped us .

The chief cause of internal strife appears to be the somewhat dubious actions of the so-called Peacemakers - a group more proficient at antagonism than pacification .

The Peacemakers should respect us . They treat us very badly .

We get on very well with the people excluding the Peacemakers who are very rude . Once they kicked my door when I did not open it in the middle of the night . I was afraid because my husband was not there . They slapped me and drank one of my bottles in front of me .

The people predictably saved most of their rancour for the government which still holds its oppressive vigil over them . No less than 75% of those interviewed identified the government as the main cause of their predicament . All thought it the responsibility of the government to redress the problem .

We expect no-one else to help except the government of the Republic of South Africa .

The government has so much money . They should build houses and find jobs .

The government should build houses and factories . We didn't choose to come here . They sent us in their trucks .

The government should help us but it seems as though they have forgotten us .

Despite the dissatisfaction with Glenmore and the antipathy towards the South African government most of the people are adamant that they wish to remain under the South African government rather than be moved to the Ciskei .

I am used to being under the white government . They have not treated us well but I grew up under them and I know what to expect from the whites .

Their experience of the past few years has made the people acutely aware that nothing they say or do will ultimately have any effect . The Klipfontein experience is still very fresh in their memories and few wish to repeat the pain and expense of lengthy proceedings , intimidation and fines . Through their democratically elected leaders they continue to protest to ECAB , to little avail .

The administration is very rude . They do not want to listen to our problems .

The authorities take no notice of us when we ask them to do something about our situation .

The one issue the community may have affected was in the matter of rents . The Klipfontein group had been told they would have to pay R6 per month rental after their first month at Glenmore .

The two elders went to the ECAB office soon after they arrived, and explained that the Klipfontein people had never wanted to move to Glenmore, and had not wanted the houses there, and would therefore not be paying any rent. They conveyed the message as a flat statement of intent, not as a request. We cannot say that this decided the matter, but the fact remains that no rental whatever has been demanded or paid at Glenmore in the three years since it began. As we have said, though, this was an exceptional case. Otherwise it seems people found that their protests were in vain.

A few laid the blame for their plight squarely on the shoulders of the local authorities - not realising the connection with a higher authority. One pensioner, ironically, considered it the responsibility not of the government or the local authorities, but of Prof Whisson of the Glenmore Action Group to help them.

Now, as the Glenmore population await their second forced relocation, this time to Peddie in the Ciskei, the attitudes of the people have not changed. Many bitterly oppose the new move. Some say they would rather be on the borders of the Ciskei at Glenmore than further in at Peddie. Others dislike the prospect of moving to a congested area where they will have to share the site with other communities and compete with more people at the labour bureau than they did at Alice. They also point out that they have established gardens at Glenmore already. Above all, they want to return to their original homes. Their second choice generally is to stay at Glenmore. It is not that they are happy with the situation there, with the lack of agricultural land, the poor housing, the high prices, the dearth of job opportunities, but weighed against Peddie it is considered by most people to be the lesser of two evils. A few even feel Glenmore is viable, like these two pensioners:

How can we start from scratch all over again? We have just started settling down here. We have gardens now and new classrooms, some are even getting jobs. (EPH, 28.11.81)

We are settling down now. At least I have some land of my own, although we were promised much more. I've worked hard to get this garden going and I am having good results now. It will be hard to start afresh at Peddie, where I hear there is no land.

In their dissatisfaction at the new move they echo the sentiments of hundreds of their fellow residents.

3.6.5 Conclusion

Following weeks of intimidation and legal battles, eventual removal and three subsequent years of poverty and privation, Glenmore's 4 200 residents face yet another move in the near future. It was reported in the Eastern Province Herald (19.11.81) that they 'are to be resettled once more at a camp currently being laid out near Peddie in the Ciskei'.

According to the Ciskei government, Glenmore's 500 temporary houses are situated on valuable arable land wanted by the Ciskei for extensions to its Tyefu irrigation project. The impending arrival of the Tyefu scheme at Glenmore is patently visible. Irrigation pipes are being laid and tractors can be seen driving in and out of Glenmore where their equipment has already been stacked - alongside the heaps of equipment originally intended for the permanent Glenmore township.

However the Tyefu scheme will not approach Glenmore's houses until the people have been moved, according to the deputy project manager, Mr A Stone. Then the houses will be pulled down and the land on which they stand used for crop cultivation, he added. (EPH, 28.11.81)

Thus the Glenmore people are now being administered by the Ciskei government in spite of refusals in the past by the same authorities to accept responsibility for the people. The Ciskeian Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Rev W M Xaba, denied however that there was anything

inconsistent about the present policy:

We objected in principle to the move to Glenmore and refused to take responsibility for the place. But we want the land and do not mind the people moving to Peddie as long as the South African government provides houses and job opportunities. (EPH, 19.11.81)

But of course Mr Xaba realises that once in Peddie, Glenmore's 4 200 people will no longer be the responsibility of the South African but his own government. Who will then provide them with houses and employment? An Anglican church minister in Peddie said:

Job opportunities are exactly nil. We have absolutely no industry or jobs here. (Ibid)

At the time of the report an interchurch group, alarmed at the prospect of over 5 000 people from Glenmore and the nearby Kammaskraal resettlement camp being relocated at Peddie, were busy preparing a garden project on church land which, it was hoped, would enable them to grow their own vegetables.

A spokesman from the Department of Co-operation and Development stated that the people will have toilets and a temporary water supply and will be employed in the installation of the infrastructure before the other groups are moved. Temporary prefabricated houses and other basic facilities would also be provided, he said.

So they have to begin all over again against a background of the same utterings and promises that were made just three years ago. As one young mother of three said,

We will never get used to one place. We lead the life of a bird.

She speaks for 4 200 surplus people wanted neither by South Africa nor by the Ciskei, and doomed, it seems, to a future as grim as their immediate past.