WORK IN PROGRESS 56/57

DOUBLE EDITION



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1988

Editorial

Rule by emergency decree has become the norm in South Africa, as the third year of a national state of emergency continues.

But even if emergency regulations are lifted - and there are indications of growing pressure from international finance for this to happen - little will change. Hundreds of permanent statutes will still provide for detention without trial, censorship and closure of publications, and banning of organisations and people.

More importantly, the secret 'state within a state', made up of the state security council, joint management centres, defence-manpower liaison committees and the like, is increasingly governing South Africa. As a number of articles in this double edition of *Work In Progress* indicate, the secretive joint management centres are at the heart of state policy and practice. And they appear to operate above any laws - emergency or otherwise.

The past year is a difficult one to analyse. It is probably best characterised as involving an uneasy equilibrium, with both government and opposition forces making gains and suffering losses. A special supplement in this edition examines developments in a number of key areas: the economy, repression, labour, foreign policy and the courts.

The state has both survived a period of 'insurrectionary' political resistance, and appears to be making headway in regaining control of the townships. But opposition has not been crushed. The organised working class, in particular, has both demonstrated strengths and made gains in a year in which union-bashing has become fashionable for both state and employers. Internal political and community organisation, however, has been severely weakened - some would say decimated - by the years of emergency rule.

In spite of concerted state attempts to obliterate the African National Congress from public consciousness, the ANC has established itself as one of the major actors on the political terrain - both nationally and internationally.

Despite indications of tensions within the ANC - especially over armed attacks on civilian targets - its diplomatic and propaganda successes have been substantial this year. Its draft constitutional guidelines have provoked serious and ongoing discussion over the nature of a future South Africa, and most South Africans believe the ANC is a crucial actor in resolving the political and economic crises which threaten to tear society apart. Recent visits by rugby and soccer administrators to Lusaka, headquarters of the banned organisation, are just one indication of this.

This double edition of *Work In Progress* is the final one for the year. *WIP* has survived, despite ongoing government threats to close it and others. A Publications Act banning of *WIP 53* was also successfully fought during the year.

But government is strongly committed to secrecy and censorship: indeed, with as much to hide as this government has, this is inevitable.

A vibrant press - critical, independent and progressive in nature - can play a vital role in building the future. But it has to be fought for, and protected - especially from a government fundamentally threatened by all that is worthwhile in journalism.

Cover graphic thanks to *International Viewpoint*

Living with the LRAA

The controversial Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA) is now a fact of life for South African workers, despite some of the strongest opposition in this country's labour history.

Although most unions have held internal seminars to discuss ways of living with the new act - which severely limits workers' rights to strike and organise - no direct strategy has yet evolved.

A move in this direction has been made by the country's two largest union federations, however: the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) are due to hold a joint meeting at which a common strategy will be worked out - probably by the end of the year.

According to Cosatu, the two federations are also prepared to revive discussions with the SA Co-ordinating Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola), even though previous talks seemed to create more animosity than results. Cosatu said a dispute currently exists with Saccola over discussions earlier this year, which were aimed at softening some of the more severe sections of the new law. Cosatu stressed, though, that the two federations were only prepared to resume discussions if Saccola unequivocally called on its affiliates not to take advantage of the sections of the law in dispute.

Cosatu and Nactu are also trying to step up pressure through the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Both federations have informed the ILO of their objections to the act and have invited the organisation to intervene.

In the meantime, workers in the clothing sector have won significant gains and unions in the metal industry are developing a code of conduct which will give workers a certain level of protection against the worst provisions of the act.

The Garment and Allied Workers Union (Gawu), launched last year, has come out with the most militant opposition so far. Three days before the new legislation became law, over 40 000 Gawu members in the Western Cape went on strike. They demanded an undertaking from employers not to implement certain provisions of the LRAA until Saccola and Cosatu had reached agreement on formulating counter-proposals to the act.

Bosses succumbed to the pressure, and agreed not to implement clauses which the union finds offensive. They have also given an undertaking to negotiate other aspects of the act. The agreement, made between Gawu, the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association and the Cape Knitting Industry Association, affects 56 000 Gawu members in the Western Cape. A similar agreement was reached with the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association, involving over 46 000 Gawu members in the province, after a series of work stoppages by thousands of workers.

In the metal industry, German union IG Metall and the South African Co-ordinating Council of the International Metalworkers Federation have drawn up a 14-point code of labour practice for German multinationals. Although not intended to directly counter the LRAA, the code does attempt to restore or expand certain rights restricted in the act. IMF's Brian Fredricks said of the code: 'It would be wrong to describe it as an attempt to sway opinion on disinvestment - but as long as multinationals are operating here, they should operate within these guidelines'.

Provisions in the code include:

* recognition of the right to strike (renouncement of the possibility of dismissal for participating in a strike);
* renouncement of the use of 'the undemocratic industrial council system' for rendering strikes illegal;
* right of peaceful picketing on company premises;
* agreement not to jeopardise the right of employees to live in hostels and other company accommodation, except in the case of fair dismissal.

The code also renounces the exploitation of advantages provided by apartheid laws, in particular the 'homeland' system and security laws. On this issue, the code calls for workers to be paid while detained or imprisoned under security legislation.

Chris Ledohowski - Afrapix

IMF unions will be negotiating the terms of the code with individual companies in the near future. The largest of these unions, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa), is working towards a uniform agreement with the 15 companies within the ambit of these guidelines. The IMF hopes to get the German Chamber of Commerce to accept these guidelines in principle.

A shop-stewards council is being set up for German multi-nationals and will monitor the implementation of the code in conjunction with the IG Metall shop stewards council in Germany.

As Fredricks points out, the labour code provides for a more amenable employer-employee relationship and could well set a precedent for other multi-nationals.

The possibility exists of similar union action in other sectors.

Although the issue of deregistration has been raised, it is an unlikely option in the near future as unions are increasingly moving towards industrial councils. If unions deregister they stand to lose the opportunity of using industrial councils as a bargaining forum, as well as losing stop order facilities. However, the gains and losses of this option are being debated in the labour movement.

One tactic which already has popular appeal in most unions is the idea of scrapping or amending old recognition agreements and re-negotiating new ones. Structures like the South African Breweries shop-stewards council, incorporating several unions organising at different companies in the SAB conglomerate, allow for unified demands being made in all SAB companies - *Shareen Singh.*

Parley with the Party

The first formal meeting between the African National Congress, Soviet academics and Afrikaner politicians, scheduled to be held in West Germany at the end of October, could provide some interesting ideological debates.

Two members of the Soviet delegation have adopted positions which differ sharply from those expressed by the South African Communist Party, 'historic ally' of the ANC.

Earlier this year, soon after the Soviet academics' views were published in South African publications, the SACP distributed a booklet outlining its own position on several key debates. The booklet contains rebuttals of positions put forward by the Soviet academics, Professors Gleb Starushenko and Viktor Goncharov, both of the Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The first issue which is contested is the Soviet academics' interpretation of the socialist nature of the South African struggle.

Goncharov's position was published in an interview in *WIP 48*. He argued that there was an attempt by some ANC members 'to put before the national liberation movement now the tasks of socialist revolution', and that this could lead to the liberation movement losing allies in the population.

He suggested that it could take 100 years to achieve socialism in South Africa - implying that this might be a desirable timescale.

The position put forward in the SACP booklet is that socialism has never been put forward as the immediate objective of the national democratic revolution. However, it concedes that far-reaching economic clauses of the Freedom Charter, which call for the nationalisation of the mines, monopoly industry and banks, and re-distribution of the land to those who work it, could be confused with socialist measures.

Soviet President Gorbachov

If one views the South African revolution as bourgeois-democratic, the Party argues, then one could confuse these economic measures with socialist transformation.

While conceding that these measures lay the basis for an advance to socialism, the SACP argues that they are intrinsic to the national democratic revolution.

According to this argument, the economic measures outlined in the Charter are essential because of the massive disparity between white and black living standards. So although the democratic revolution should try to attract the widest possible unity, the economic content cannot be jettisoned - even if this means losing some potential allies.

After a revolution in South Africa, the Party argues, the new democratic state will be required to implement economic measures which will go far beyond bourgeois democracy. These will create a favourable framework for socialist transformation, but will not in themselves create, or necessarily even lead to, socialism: the achievement of socialism depends primarily on the place the working class has won for itself as a leader of society.

The second issue on which there are differences is the question of group rights, which was recently addressed by Starushenko. He argued that a parliament which accommodated 'group rights' should be considered for the post-apartheid period, and that this parliament should consist of two chambers: one chosen on the basis of proportional representation, the other 'possessing the right of minority veto'.

Starushenko also urged the ANC to work out 'comprehensive guarantees for the white population', and undertake that there would be no broad nationalisation of capitalist property.

The SACP stresses Starushenko's pro-liberation intentions are not in dispute. However, it argues that while this approach was suitable in the Soviet Union, it is not valid for a new South Africa.

In the Soviet Union, a recognition of multi-nationalism was the foundation of national liberation and self-determination - as realised in the many republics which make up the Soviet Union. But because of South Africa's single economy, arguments for maintaining group rights are inevitably linked to maintaining white control over the means of production.

The Party also stresses its commitment to one united, democratic South Africa, while pointing out that this does not contradict the need to ensure that the cultural heritage of different groups flourishes in a unitary South Africa.

With the new degree of international flexibility presently

flowing out of the Soviet Union, it will be interesting to see how debate develops around these issues - not only at the West German meeting, but also in subsequent contacts between the Soviet Union and members of the Congress alliance. *WIP correspondent.*

Sewage in Soweto's streets

Health hazards are developing in Soweto, South Africa's largest black township, while a dispute rages between the Soweto Council and 4 000 municipal workers.

The strike has been on for more than three months, a period which has seen the development of numerous decomposing garbage dumps in the crowded township. In some areas, streams of sewage flow through the streets.

A wage dispute sparked off the strike, which resulted in dismissal of 4 000 council employees. Currently the main issue in the dispute involves reinstatement of the strikers - with the council prepared to re-employ only 70 percent of them, with slight salary adjustments.

The wage dispute dates back to November 1987, when the Soweto Council was upgraded in terms of the Act on the Remuneration of Town Clerks. In terms of this Act, Soweto was classified a Grade 12 municipality. This prescribed wage increases for council employees.

The council agreed to the increases in principle, but said they would only be implemented when there was money available. Almost a year later, council workers - organised by the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) - are still waiting for the salary adjustments.

The council claims it cannot afford the increases because of the two-and-a-half year rent boycott, which has left it with a R150- million debt. But strikers say this is 'just an attempt to use us to break the boycott'.

According to one worker, 'The council wants us to do its dirty work by demanding that we help municipal police evict rent defaulters and seal their windows and doors'.

Current minimum wages at the council range from about R370 a month for labourers to R609 for clerks.

The council embarked on a privatisation programme in January this year, and privatised certain departments during the strike. This is the reason it has given for offering to reinstate only 70 percent of the workforce - the other 30 percent, it says, have become obsolete in the privatisation process.

Despite the privatisation, garbage continues to pile up in the streets of Soweto.

Missing among the strikers this year are municipal police, who embarked on a huge strike over wages during 1986. Soon after this, the state gave municipal and railway police equal status to members of the SAP - and curtailed their membership of unions and involvement in industrial action.

Local municipal police still support the strikers, according to Samwu, and told a recent union meeting they would not evict rent defaulters in the township.

Strikers have been trying to hold a union meeting in the township since mid-September but police interference makes this almost impossible. One meeting was banned and at least three disrupted by police.

Police also disrupted a march by about 2 000 strikers, and sjambokked and teargassed workers after giving them 20 minutes to disperse. The union claims 12 members of its negotiating team have been detained under emergency regulations.

The union is finding it increasingly difficult to operate. So far the strikers have received some financial support from the National Association of Local Government Officers (Nalgo) in Britain, which also sent a telex to Soweto Town Clerk Nico Malan and Constitutional Planning Minister Chris Heunis urging them to resolve the dispute.

Cosatu's Wits region held a rally on September 18 in support of the strikers.

The question of staff association membership has also arisen during the strike. When the Soweto Council took over township affairs from the West Rand Administration Board in 1984, workers were compelled to join the staff association and pay R5 a month in membership fees. Since then, says Samwu, workers have seen no financial statements or any increase in benefits.

Samwu says that although workers clearly want the staff association dissolved, the council insists it is a democratic body and that a general meeting must be called to determine whether this is the case. Workers have agreed to this procedure. *Shareen Singh.*

Saved by the Soviets

After stringing out the Namibian peace process for more than a decade, Pretoria has adopted the same tactics to avoid suspension from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

At the same time some nifty footwork from Foreign Minister Pik Botha has won the South African government a year's reprieve from signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would force it to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

In September, Soviet delegates to the annual conference of the IAEA - a world body created to limit the spread of nuclear arms - combined with their US and British counterparts to head off a move to suspend South African membership.

This was the second year running that the Soviets refused to back the suspension of South Africa from one of the few international forums where it is still represented. The move reflects the importance placed by the Soviets on ending the arms race - overriding almost every other foreign policy objective - since Mikhael Gorbachev's appointment as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

In a flurry of negotiations before the September conference, Botha used this Soviet concern to talk his way out of both signing the NPT

immediately and facing suspension.

In a pattern established during several decades of Namibian independence moves, and refined more recently during the Nambia-Angola talks, South Africa won itself a breathing space by offering to sign the NPT. At the same time, it pointed out that isolation would do little more than allow it to do openly what it may or may not have been doing secretly for the past decade.

Shortly before the IAEA conference Botha travelled to Vienna to meet agency officials. At a press conference afterwards, he acknowledged that Pretoria has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons - while refusing to say whether it actually had them.

Botha's statement comes almost exactly nine years after US intelligence officials identified a massive double-flash over the south Atlantic as a nuclear test. They suggested it had been carried out jointly by South Africa and Israel.

Since then US state department officials have publicly estimated that South Africa has stockpiled between nine and 23 nuclear weapons.

These, according to University of Haifa academic Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, are mainly two-ton, low-yield, 'clean bombs' - tactical battlefield devices fired either from naval guns or 155 mm howitzers. Significantly, South Africa added the G5 155mm howitzer to its military arsenal at that time. The G5, with a range of 45 km, was extensively battle-tested by South African forces in recent fighting in southern Angola.

But almost two years before the south Atlantic blast, the Soviet Union warned US officials their satellites had identified a nuclear test site in the Kalahari desert, and that a test appeared imminent. Officials in Washington took the warning seriously enough to wake President Jimmy Carter in the early hours of the morning to alert him.

Carter announced later that he had extracted from Pretoria an undertaking that it would not carry out a nuclear test - an undertaking Pretoria later denied making. Owen Horwood, at the time South African finance minister, responded: 'We'll have the A-bomb if we want to'.

It was the first acknowledgment that South Africa, one of the world's major producers of uranium, might be developing a nuclear arsenal. In what would become a set pattern, Horwood then danced a step back, assuring the world Pretoria would only use nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

A nuclear blast

Since then, says John Venn of Koeberg Alert, the biggest of South Africa's tiny anti-nuclear organisations, officials have regularly claimed that South Africa has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

With pressure mounting for Pretoria's expulsion from the IAEA, South Africa last year agreed to negotiate signing the NPT. At their weekend meeting with US, Soviet and British IAEA officials, Botha and Technology Minister Danie Steyn held out for 'all the benefits of participation in the treaty'.

With an over-supply of uranium on the international market for most of the past decade, South Africa has slowly lost its leverage for nuclear technology over user-countries, several of which have ceased using South African-sourced uranium. The USA's 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, banning any nuclear co-operation, is the most obvious indication of this trend.

Botha and Steyn attempted to reverse the trend in Vienna, demanding full participation in the international exchange of nuclear technology, and an end to 'discrimination against South Africa in the buying and selling of uranium'.

In exchange they are offering not to develop nuclear armaments they might already have. The ambiguity has raised the stakes to Pretoria's advantage, says Beit-Hallahmi, author of 'The Israeli Connection', which investigates South African-Israeli military co-operation. The two countries have co-operated extensively on nuclear weapons development, he says, and both need a nuclear deterrent as a means of blackmailing the West when necessary.

But South Africa's nuclear industry predates any Israeli connection. Research began in 1946 after some prompting of the US and Britain, which were seeking reliable uranium sources. By 1960, with US and British investments, South Africa had 27 uranium mining ventures and 17 uranium oxide plants.

Helped by US President Dwight Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program and Britain's Atomic Energy Authority, South Africa acquired a research reactor and enriched uranium to fuel it. By 1970 South Africa had the know-how to 'hex' its own uranium oxide into uranium hexafluoride - the second link in the nuclear fuel chain, and the first step towards South African self-reliance. Industrial production began six years later, according to Koeberg Alert.

Using its massive sources of uranium as bait, South Africa established an international network of nuclear co-operation - including, at times, Argentina, Brazil, Iran (under the Shah), Israel, Taiwan and the US.

According to Koeberg Alert, West Germany has been particularly helpful in the vital field of uranium enrichment, the next link in the fuel chain and a vital one for both commercial and military use. Documents stolen by anti-apartheid activists from South Africa's consulate in Cologne in 1975 suggested the then Prime Minister John Vorster's announcement of a locally-developed enrichment technique was little more than a variation on West Germany's own technique.

Pouring oil on troubled water

The Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) is involved in two disputes which have crucial implications for organised labour in South Africa.

One concerns national bargaining, the other workers' rights within disinvesting companies.

Dispute number one involves the nine major employers in the petroleum industry, all of which have refused to bargain at national level. A conciliation board met in September but failed to make a finding and is due to meet again on November 2.

But it is the other dispute which has even wider implications. It involves 39 South African multi-nationals, and attempts by CWIU to negotiate the terms on which these multi-nationals disinvest.

The union applied for a conciliation board hearing on August 30, but this was turned down by the manpower department - opening the way for legal strike action.

CWIU is the first union to initiate such a campaign on a sector-wide basis, although Cosatu's second congress passed a resolution on conditions to be fought for around disinvesting companies. In addition, Numsa previously laid down conditions when General Motors and Mono Pumps disinvested.

CWIU policy supports comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. Selective sanctions, the union argues, can cause serious regional unemployment and tend to serve 'the interests of imperialist states rather than the working class'.

CWIU's campaign aims to minimise workers' disadvantages in the event of selective disinvestment. Most companies involved in the dispute have stressed that they do not intend to disinvest and have, as a result, refused to engage in the dispute.

The union began their campaign in July last year with a letter to 41 multi-nationals. It asked for a joint forum to negotiate a set of demands establishing common standards for the disinvestment process. CWIU argues the issues are broad and so fall outside the scope of in-house procedures which already exist.

The union cited a number of reasons why such negotiations were necessary:

* 'disinvested' companies remain under parent company control through franchise, licensing or technology agreements. These companies then get the best of both worlds: political credibility for having disinvested and profits from their ongoing relationship with apartheid;
* the terms are negotiated in secret between the multi-national and local management with no consultation with workers;
* packages negotiated disadvantage workers excluded from negotiations - they face pay cuts, longer working hours and retrenchment;
* local managements' job security and profit advantages increase.

In an attempt to obtain a better deal for workers, and ensure that workers did not become the scapegoat of the disinvestment process, the union demanded that multi-nationals:

* give workers a year's notice of intention to disinvest;
* conclude negotiations around terms in that time;
* pay workers one month's wages for each year of service;
* guarantee wages for one year from disinvestment date;
* give the union full information on the terms of disinvestment (royalty rights, licence fees, franchises);
* contribute to pension and provident funds up to retirement age in a single payment;
* pay the proceeds of disinvestment into a trust fund nominated by CWIU.

The companies flatly rejected a joint forum, and refused to negotiate the demands. Shareholders would not allow sensitive company information to be divulged in such a forum, they said. But the union noted an interesting similarity in the written replies. And it also received information that employers held a secret meeting in 1987 to discuss a common response to the demands.

In late 1987 Sterling Drug, an American-owned multinational, stated it was not considering disinvestment at all. But in early 1988 it disinvested without notice or consultation with the union. The bosses concerned refused to negotiate after the fact, saying they were no longer the employers.

CWIU declared a dispute and applied for a conciliation board. The board has met but to date no decision has been reached. Workers at Stirling went on a five-week strike in protest. The company argued it 'was not disinvesting', that its major shareholder was 'merely withdrawing from South Africa', and the union should seek relief from the American owners.

Two subsidiaries of Glass SA, Pilkington Shatterprufe Safety Glass and Pilkington Flat Glass, applied for an urgent interdict forcing CWIU to withdraw its application for a conciliation board. The industrial court dismissed this in favour of the union on September 27.

Pilkington argued that by refusing to go through in-house procedures, union action constituted an unfair labour practice; that the union was conniving to initate strike action; that as the company was not intending to disinvest the dispute was hypothetical; that disinvestment is like retrenchment and retrenchment procedures can handle the process; and that a joint forum is inappropriate. The company also applied for a conciliation board on these grounds. SA Cynamid has brought a similar action against the union, but has shelved the matter until the Pilkington cases are completed.

Recently an internal Mobil document revealed that despite appearing to be a strong contender for staying in South Africa, Mobil apparently discussed following IBM's example of selling its local assets to South African employees.

Of the 30 companies which responded to CWIU's conciliation board application, only nine sent copies of their responses to the union. All these companies agreed in principle to negotiate the issue at plant level. They argue that the issues involved are too complex for a joint forum, that the specifics of each company are different, and a joint forum would be too unwieldy to reach agreement. But the union is adamant in demanding protection for workers in the case of sell-outs.

WIP correspondent.

People's power and state reform in Alexandra

For a brief period, Johannesburg's Alexandra township was a 'liberated zone', run by structures set up by the local population. KAREN JOCHELSON looks at the time of people's power, its subsequent collapse, and the lessons to be learnt from that experience.

The collapse of people's power in Alexandra township was not caused solely by the state's clampdown on popular organisation. For people's power involved an insurrectionary strategy which gave rise to hasty organisation and was based on an inadequate understanding of state power.

The Alexandra experience of the 1980s involves a complex interaction between repression, reform and people's power. Some argue that government's reform policy is merely a failed attempt to restructure apartheid along liberal, capitalist lines. They maintain that reform has proved a sham, with the government offering minimal concessions to avoid genuine democratisation and consequently provoking popular protest.

Resistance, so this argument goes, has necessarily been met with state repression. This reflects the weakness of the state in two ways. Firstly, the extent of the challenge of popular organisation, especially people's power, is measured by the degree of government repression. Secondly, successive clampdowns demonstrate government's shaky hold on the future and lack of direction as it seeks to crush resistance and conserve and control the status quo.

This simplistic depiction of reform and repression as distinct policy alternatives dependent on the state of opposition politics, is unconvincing. It assumes a monolithic 'apartheid regime' and unchanging state structure, practice, policy and ideology. It fails to examine the changing terms of reform policy and the means of its implementation. Emphasis on the political illegitimacy of the South African state obscures its attempts to legitimate reformist and repressive activities in black communities. As the character of resistance has changed, so the state has developed new responses.

Alexandra is a black township in the heart of Johannesburg and Sandton's white suburbia. On May 7 1979, the government announced that Alexandra would be 'replanned for the accommodation of landowners and other qualified families'. This signified a reversal of a 1963 decision to demolish the freehold township and build a hostel city for urban workers. Alexandra's reprieve and subsequent development implied acceptance of the existence of permanent urban African residents.

The government rezoned the township for family housing and 99-year leasehold. The conversion from dormitory to residential town - from 'slaap' to 'woon dorp' in the language of reformists - became a practical reality when a masterplan to upgrade the township was unveiled in 1980. It recommended installation of basic infrastructure such as water, sewerage and electricity, and construction of storm-water drainage and graded, tarred roads. It suggested demolishing the township and constructing income-differentiated housing and an elite suburb.

Taxable property and the creation

of a central business district, planners hoped, would create a tax-base for financially self-sufficient local government. The government also recognised a liaison committee as the official representative of the community. State reformists' dream of a class-differentiated, politically-stable and economically-privileged, permanent urban African population lay behind the plan to upgrade Alexandra.

The dream soon faded under practical problems of implementation. The credibility of the liaison committee declined as redevelopment moved off the drawing boards and onto the streets. Construction of housing was painfully slow and residents were resettled in unsatisfactory temporary housing, including 'renovated' Putco buses.

When the liaison committee assumed black local authority status in 1983 the financial burden of development was shifted to residents. Rent for newly-constructed homes rocketed way beyond the pockets of most Alexandra inhabitants. And allegations of corruption in the council made the community even more suspicious of development.

The character of popular opposition gradually changed through the 1980s. Residents' opposition began with attempts to delay implementation of reformists' upgrading plan, and criticism of it. This led to a partial and then total rent boycott in 1985.

The leading political actor was the independent Alexandra Residents Association (ARA). But its activities were gradually superceded by the Alexandra Youth Congress (Ayco) and the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) which allied themselves with the United Democratic Front. The tone of local politics changed dramatically as activists from these groups established street committees and people's courts. People's power aimed to challenge state power rather than merely oppose state policy.

People's power was a short-lived experiment. The declaration of a second state of emergency in 1986 and widespread detentions crushed organisation. A joint management centre (JMC) was activated in 1986 making the SADF and state security system central to township administration.

This seemed to signal the failure of reform policy. But JMCs complement a new reform strategy implicit in orderly urbanisation policy and the recently-created regional services councils (RSCs). JMCs and RSCs represent a new institutional structure which complements the state's ideological offensive to create legitimacy for the reform process in the township.

State reformists dream of a class-differentiated, politically-stable, permanent urban African population.

The February 1986 'six-day war' between Alexandra youth and police was a turning point in local politics. Until then organisation in the township had been aimed at criticising and delaying implementation of the redevelopment scheme. By April 1986, activists announced people's power had been established in Alexandra. This dramatic shift in popular mobilisation was evidenced in new political actors, modes of organisation and political agendas.

During the early 1980s, ARA and its precursor, Ditshwantsho tsa Rona, had been the major organising force against removals and higher rents that accompanied township redevelopment. Ditshwantsho began as a cultural, political and historical discussion group in 1981. But its concern gradually shifted to organising opposition to township re-development and high rent tariffs.

Three local committees were established. They consisted of:

- residents in new houses facing dramatic rent increases;
- inhabitants who had been moved into unsatisfactory temporary housing and were awaiting promised new accommodation;
- and those whose houses were zoned for destruction to make way for infrastructure installation.

In late 1984 the three committees decided they needed a co-ordinating body, and ARA was launched.

ARA argued that the upgrading programme had betrayed Alexandra's workers. If redevelopment meant high rent or expensive home-ownership schemes, then it was aimed at 'forcing low paid workers out of Alex. To charge high rent is to select the wealthy for these houses... It is not the fault of the worker if he is retrenched, or if he gets a low wage. That is the fault of apartheid and the capitalist system'.

ARA also criticised the priorities of the development programme: people needed houses, not huge leisure and sporting facilities.

Ditshwantsho and ARA's emphasis on class analysis as the precondition of political action; on the role of the activist as facilitator rather than line-giver; and careful, slow, house-by-house organisation made them exceptions among most community organisations of the time. During this period Ayco and its ally, the Alexandra Civic Association (ACA) were inclined to rely on pamphlets and press statements rather than slow grassroots organisation. Ayco tended to emphasise nationally co-ordinated political campaigns and underplay local grievances.

Rent increases were suspended indefinitely at the beginning of February 1985. During 1985 the council tried to persuade residents that it was their duty to contribute to the running of the town by paying rent. Councillors argued that participation in the council was justified: the council was a means to a valid goal of township development.

The council lambasted ARA for misleading residents, delaying redevelopment and then blaming the council. However it consistently ignored ARA's overtures to discuss residents' grievances.

Opposition to high rent and redevelopment in Alexandra followed the pattern of similar protests elsewhere in the country. Rent and bus boycotts, squatter and housing protests highlighted the depth of the

Eric Miller - Afrapix

Alexandra was one of the townships marked for upgrading

urban management crisis. Public outcries against the tricameral parliament and black local authorities emphasised the undemocratic nature of the government's reform package.

By June 1985, 240 councillors, including 27 mayors, had resigned from councils across the country; 120 councillors had been attacked and five had died. Homes of 75 councillors had been burned down. Only two of 38 town councils continued to operate, one of which was in Alexandra. Local government's fiscal and political bankruptcy was patently obvious.

The declaration of the first state of emergency in July 1985 seemed an admission that the state had lost control and the plan to create stability through reform had backfired.

In November the council, emboldened by the appointment of its own municipal police force and perhaps sobered by the effects of the Vaal Triangle rent boycott, announced substantially reduced rent tariffs. Four-roomed sub-economic houses would cost R60 rather than R130 a month as originally proposed, and tariffs for a two-roomed flat dropped from R183 to R100 a month. But this admission that the economic rent policy was impractical had come too late. And despite restrictions on political activity, the emergency seemed to fuel rather than crush popular resistance.

Ayco had become a significant actor in township politics by 1985, when it made a concerted effort to organise and educate its youth constituency. It held weekly discussions on the education crisis, township social problems, apartheid and capitalism. It prioritised organising youth street-by-street and emphasised the responsibility of youth activists in conscientising parents.

The entire Ayco executive was arrested in the detention clampdown following the state of emergency in 1985. But the discussion groups and preliminary organisation paid off. In August that year, Ayco launched an anti-crime campaign. The high crime rate and lack of police concern was a long-standing source of rancour among residents. The state of emergency only heightened their resentment. The campaign's popularity was also helped by the strict discipline shown among comrades.

But further detentions removed remaining experienced activists from the township. By December 1985 an unruly element had begun to take over. These 'com-tsotsis' were new to political activity and relatively uninitiated in principles of political organisation and disciplined political behaviour. If their conduct was roughshod, it was often for the 'right' motives - hence the name 'comrade-tsotsi'.

But some comrades were still highly critical of heavy-handed behaviour in political campaigns. This, they felt, would not endear them to older, conservative township inhabitants and laid them open to criticism from hostile media. When some experienced activists were released from jail in December, they tried to reassert control and channel the groundswell of radical discontent in a positive direction.

They set about forming youth groups for each of the four sections into which they had divided Alexandra. These groups, they believed, would boost morale, and promote grassroots rather than centralised organisation. Decentralised organisation would better withstand repression and help bring militant youth under control.

At the same time an allied group of activists, disillusioned with the ACA's lack of political activity and recognising that non-politicised youth had to be controlled, decided to introduce street committees in Alexandra. Several of them were active in Cosatu affiliates. These committees were a way around the ban on indoor and outdoor meetings and a means, so activists believed, of consolidating politicisation that occurred at funerals and ensuring mass participation in the struggle.

Almost every night during February youths went from yard to yard summoning people to discuss creating street committees. Issues such as high rent, the housing shortage, overcrowding and lack of township development were discussed as local and national problems.

'We started with problems in the yard: only one line for washing, no drains, the bucket system, night soil spilling in the yard and kids getting sick. People tended to blame themselves or their neighbours instead of seeing it as the state's problem. People had to unite and direct their grievances at apartheid', explained an AAC supporter interviewed in 1987.

The basic unit of organisation was the yard committee which dealt with residents' daily problems in a politically educative manner. Two representatives from each yard committee constituted the block committee. Four representatives from each block committee sat on a street committee. Each street committee was to elect two representatives to the AAC which would be launched formally in August 1986.

The discussions and attempts at organisation allowed residents to air common frustrations, resentment and anger against the authorities. But the spark that set fire to the township was the funeral of an unemployed youth attended by over 11 000 people on February 15 1986. When police used teargas to disperse mourners, youths retaliated and took to the streets armed with petrol bombs and dustbin lids.

Over the following few days, a civil war raged within the township, popularly baptised the 'six-day war'. Youths pitted themselves against the SADF, SAP and township collaborators. Police reported they were fired at by armed residents. Frequent targets of popular anger were councillors, West Rand Development Board employees, municipal police and black policemen - who fled the township on February 17.

On February 18, residents stayed away from work and over 30 000 attended a meeting called by Ayco. The meeting demanded immediate withdrawal of security forces, release of all people detained and arrested in the past few days, and instant lifting of the state of emergency. Following negotiations, security forces agreed to maintain a lower profile. By February 22, the township appeared to have quietened down - the 'six-day war' was over.

At a funeral for 17 'war' victims on March 5, ANC and South African Communist Party regalia were in full display. The crowd's chants of 'Viva! Oliver Tambo/Nelson Mandela/Joe Slovo! Viva!' made its sympathies clear.

Speaker after speaker at the funeral repeated the message that, though comrades were freedom fighters, they had to be disciplined. Calls were made to form yard and street committees. The street committees would prepare residents 'to forget about our past differences and to prepare ourselves for the future'. Activists believed that street committees would allow residents to overcome ethnic rivalries and personal frictions which arose from living in such crowded conditions. Street committees were embryonic forms of future democratic mass government.

The overriding message from funeral speeches was an urgent desire for self-government and willingness to sacrifice even life to achieve it: 'Our people want FREEDOM now. They want to govern themselves and determine the destiny of their country TODAY not TOMORROW... They have therefore SHED ALL FEAR OF DEATH because the word TO LIVE has acquired the same meaning as the words TO BE FREE'.

Local grievances now meshed with national political demands. Consumer and rent boycotts were launched in mid-April. The boycotts were part of a national programme intended to isolate all collaborators socially and effect the collapse of local administration. Alexandra pamphlets listed demands ranging from affordable rent and electrification of the township, to dissolution of the council and police, withdrawal of troops and police from the township, and unbanning of the ANC. The 'entire apartheid regime' had to be dismantled and replaced by 'a democratic people's government', announced one pamphlet. Compared to the ARA's rent boycott demands, these embodied a political challenge to government.

In just one year, the face of popular politics had been transformed. The ARA had rejected councillors and the town council as legitimate community representatives. But it

had still been willing to negotiate with the Alexandra Town Council.

This new wave of radical protest, led by youth who aligned themselves with the UDF, superceded ARA in aims and organisation. The days of bargaining with councillors were over: 'The youth are no longer begging. They are tired of trying to negotiate and never being accepted by councillors', explained an adult activist. Local government had no credibility and councillors were urged to resign.

Ayco and AAC could draw huge crowds to meetings. Perhaps some people were coerced, or attended out of fear, as newspapers and the SABC insisted. But security force brutality generated an upsurge of anger among residents of all ages. In popular opinion, police action had crossed the moral boundaries of law and order.

ARA had explained its demands for lower rents and its criticism of the redevelopment of Alexandra in terms of working-class interests. It had also maintained that building democratic grassroots organisation was a slow and lengthy process. But its small-scale, single-issue committees, and its emphasis on education before action, meant it was unable to capitalise on new waves of anger.

The heat of February's battle and widespread support evident at public meetings led comrades to believe residents were 'ready' for new forms of organisation. Activists intended street committees to play an educative and political role. Discussion would root local grievances in a broad analysis of apartheid and capitalism, providing the foundation for informed political intervention. Street committees were also a training ground for democratic government.

In mid-April a flurry of resignations clinched the town council's demise. Some of the councillors publicly rejected the black local authority system, but the council chairman still maintained that participation in government structures was acceptable if it meant improved living conditions.

The UDF claimed the council's collapse as 'a victory that belongs to the people of Alexandra'. It promised that 'if councillors choose to join the ranks of the democratic movements, the doors are wide open for them'. A councillor and policeman who had resigned from the SAP offered to join ACA.

The council collapsed on April 22. That evening vigilantes burnt the houses and cars of several Ayco, ACA and AAC activists. Residents claimed that black policemen who had been driven out of their homes in earlier unrest were responsible.

Decentralised street committee structures with their speedy communications network now proved their value. The next day, April 23, residents stayed away from work and students boycotted schools. At a meeting in the stadium, speakers called on the 45 000 residents present to form 'self-defence units to protect ourselves from the agents of the system'. A week later AAC claimed people's power had been established and residents could now defend themselves against police. *Self-government was in the offing:* 'We believe we can solve our problems by ourselves', said an AAC spokesperson.

But the confidence was premature.

In mid-May security troops cordoned off the township, set up checkpoints at every exit and carried out an unhindered house-to-house search, described as a 'normal crime prevention' campaign. The police and army occupied the stadium to prevent further mass meetings. Permission for the funeral of eight victims of vigilante violence was twice refused - and then permitted on May 18.

Township organisation went underground. The AAC was unanimously elected sole representative of Alexandra during a mass meeting of township organisations. Most activists at the meeting agreed that the ACA should dissolve itself and serve in AAC structures. Ayco and Asco, it was decided, would continue to organise their constituencies under the guidance of AAC. ARA activists did not attend the meeting, but ARA was unilaterally disbanded.

Streets and schools were renamed in a symbolic display of popular control over the township. Youths daubed new names on boards and walls despite the intensive SADF patrols. ANC, Tambo, Solomon Mahlangu, MK, Steve Biko, Soviet, and Sobukwe were new street, area and school names.

When the state of emergency was re-imposed in June 1986, it marked the end of people's power in Alexandra. Despite the heavy security presence, AAC's confidence in its control over the township was evident even just prior to the second emergency. AAC officials met the newly-appointed administrator to assess his credentials and plans for the township. They wanted to hold a public meeting to canvass whether he was acceptable to residents. But the emergency pre-empted this.

People's power had challenged local government, which then collapsed. Its insurrectionary rhetoric was seen as a direct threat to state security. But to attribute its rapid collapse solely to state repression is shortsighted. Born in a violent and repressive political climate, it never had the opportunity to consolidate for the future by strengthening political education and building a democratic base.



Vuyi Mbab - Afrapix

The state had to deal with the continuing urban crisis... while counteracting the ideological challenge posed by people's power.

Some activists were aware of the potential weakness in the operation of people's government. ARA criticised the way street committees had been introduced: it maintained that politicisation was so low among youth that abuses were inevitable and no lasting structures would emerge. Dissatisfaction also emerged among older, apolitical residents who had initially supported the AAC. They began to complain about the power and arrogance of youths and resented being judged or punished by youngsters. They would willingly attend meetings, but disliked being ordered to do so: 'We have learnt from these children. It's because of them that we don't carry the dompas, but they cannot tell us what to do. They must fight the boere, not us'.

AAC and Ayco were aware of these problems. Domestic problems brought to people's courts were supposed to be dealt with by adult AAC members. They recognised it was 'disrespectful' for youths to pass judgement on their elders.

A significant factor in the quick demise of people's power lies in its own perceptions of dual power. A discussion paper circulated in the township at the time portrayed organs of people's power as tools to move from ungovernability to dual power. Though government power had been expelled from Alexandra, it argued, an organisation was necessary to imprint the people's will in organising daily life. It defined people's power as 'the ability to assert and defend our class interest, against those of other opposing classes. This involves control over every aspect of our lives - at work; at school; where we live; over the structures of local and national government; over the army, police, courts and prisons; the media; the church; financial institutions and the economy as a whole'.

Organs of people's power had to take control of importing and distributing foodstuffs and medicines, provision of health care, organising funerals and mass meetings, defence, administration and services, building organisations for particular constituencies, and running people's courts.

Local government did appear to have collapsed and had left a power vacuum. But this did not mean the township was ready for dual power. Local activists interpreted the demise of local government and the rapid mass mobilisation as a period of dual power. However, 1986 did not involve a situation in which the state was unable to rule and alternative organs of government were effectively challenging the status quo. The state, with its untouched centralised power structure, still had its military forces firmly behind it and was able to repress township resistance with brute force.

When the Alexandra town council collapsed in April 1986 a township administrator was appointed. He also heads the Alexandra mini-JMC. Nominally, the Alexandra council structure continues to exist, but its activities are now managed and planned by the mini-JMC. JMC upgrading programmes complement RSC strategy. They intend to counter the effects of two years sustained political protest by winning over disaffected communities and creating legitimacy for the reform package.

JMCs characterise a new bureaucracy where administrative and state security systems overlap. They are the lowest level of the national security management system (NSMS) and have an insignificant policy-making role. But they are the most visible manifestation of the NSMS structure at ground level.

The militarisation of local government is not a sudden phenomenon, but a long-term consequence of state restructuring which began when PW Botha assumed presidency.

Since September 1986, Alexandra has been administered through a mini-JMC. Membership of sub-JMCs and mini-JMCs is flexible and interested parties may be invited to attend committee meetings. Committees may meet twice a week and the level of security force participation is determined by the unrest situation. The mini-JMC consists of about 20 people drawn from local offices of departments of post and telecommunications, health and welfare, manpower, home affairs, education, SADF and SAP. Usually five representatives are drawn from the city council, including the town clerk, administrator or mayor and representative of engineering, technical, financial and law enforcement branches, or ambulance services. Private sector and local community representatives may be drawn in through liaison forums or steering committees.

State action from the latter half of 1986 attempted to resolve two problems. The state had to deal with the continuing urban crisis and the shortcomings of the Riekert reform strategy - while at the same time counteracting the ideological challenge posed by people's power and the easily politicised, deep-seated grievances over abysmal living conditions.

The second state of emergency was declared on June 12 1986 to pre-empt expected widespread insurrection on June 16. It gave the state more sweeping powers than before and seemed to be more carefully planned. Reinstating control over Alexandra had three dimensions: repression of political organisation; an ideological offensive to create legitimacy for the reform programme in the township; and institutional reform of urban management administration.

Resistance was crushed by the state of emergency, detentions and police and army presence in the township. Security forces swept through townships the night before the emergency was declared, detaining thousands of people. The police net stretched from high profile leaders to local grassroots activists and comrades. The entire AAC leadership was detained. The SADF cordoned off Alexandra and mounted 24-hour roadblocks at every entrance. High mast street lights were installed and World War Two searchlights lit up the township from nearby high ground to hinder political activity at night.

The state then launched an ideological offensive to counter the ideology of people's power. Arrests of residents were followed by a series of criminal and treason trials which aim to criminalise township leaders and their radical ideas.

Public violence, sedition, treason, subversion, arson and murder charges attempted to recast people's power and people's justice, and restore law and order. Simultaneously, JMC media sought to create a new moral community upholding free enterprise values and obligations of a dutiful citizen. It explained and tried to foster support for a new reform programme.

Finally, the terms of reform strategy itself were different. Urbanisation policy, RSC rationale and JMC strategy are complementary aspects of a new urban management policy.

Non-discriminatory, 'neutral' technocratic legislation and fiscal controls regulate labour settlement and employment patterns.

The responsibility for housing provision has shifted from the state to the individual and the private sector. Upgrading programmes and RSC fiscal policy have an ultimate aim of setting black local authorities back on their feet.

The highly-centralised structure of RSCs and JMCs also insulate the state from the effects of popular protest while simultaneously preventing cause for such mobilisation. The state of emergency did not manifest state loss of direction, but provided the space for implementing new policy and institutional mechanisms to resolve the structural basis of the urban crisis.

The *Alexandra Urban Renewal Proposal* was presented in 1986. It embraces security and orderly urbanisation strategy and is being implemented through the new RSC and JMC administrative structures.

In following orderly urbanisation policy the upgrading scheme envisages Alexandra as a metropolitan township catering for a class-differentiated population which is relatively well-paid. The plan limits state involvement to providing service and infrastructure and defines upgrading housing as the property owners' responsibility. It also sees the housing market as a new source of employment.

The security establishment metaphorically characterises the township's upgrading as an 'oil spot' programme. Initially specific townships are targetted for redevelopment. Successful reconstruction will permeate other Reef townships and gradually spread over the whole country. Alexandra's proximity to white areas, its symbolic value as an area of militant people's power, and current international attention focused on the treason trials, make the township a particular challenge.

The 1986 planners linked the lack of development to the emergence of political dissatisfaction among township residents. The earlier 1980 upgrading scheme had intended to demolish most houses, even though no suitable land existed for temporary accommodation. Consequently, argued the 1986 plan, the community viewed redevelopment as 'resettlement' which was 'socially and politically unacceptable'. People were bitter about the loss of freehold, which the 1986 plan termed their 'heritage and birthright'.

Residents' insecurity, the slow implementation of the plan and lack of upgrading of services in 'old' Alexandra, concluded the 1986 plan, had 'contributed towards the worrying security situation and the resignation of the former councillors'.

The new urban renewal proposal recognises and seeks to address these failings. It adopts many of the first plan's suggestions about expanding school and recreation facilities, installing municipal services, higher density and differentiated housing patterns and creating a small business district. Security strategy demands that work begins immediately and demonstrates tangible results.

One prong of the strategy is service provision. By March 1987, a post office and clinic had been built and public phones installed in the township. High mast lights had been erected, the main thoroughfare tarred and an outfall sewer had been completed. Escom drew up a plan for electrification of the area according to 'third world' standards. This meant substituting cheaper overhead lines for conventional underground cables, which would nevertheless still cost R120-million. The urban renewal proposal suggests individual stand metering for every dwelling by means of prepaid tokens - a nifty strategy to avoid service boycotts.

By the end of the year the council reported that ablution facilities - toilet, shower, wash trough - had been provided for every township dwelling.

A second prong of the plan is to make home-ownership more easily and rapidly available. All stands were surveyed and every structurally sound dwelling given a value during 1987. Residents can buy houses on freehold tenure, 99-year leasehold, or, where a property is occupied by more than one tenant, on sectional title. The responsibility for upgrading housing now lies with the individual owner. Provision has been made for loans to upgrade property, and technical advice and skills training are available. The planners argued that the privatisation programme, assisted by employers, building societies and financial institutions, 'would avoid continuous subsidisation by the state and would give the community a stake in the land'.

The cost of the urban renewal programme is prohibitive.

Housing standards have been differentiated according to income. Land on the east bank of the Jukskei was allocated to a private company for elite residential development.

In old Alexandra, the plan proposes maintaining, if not increasing, population density by retaining the current pattern of several dwellings in a yard, and developing dual function dwellings (residential-cum-business). This will minimise removals and reconstruction. Additional land for development will have to be claimed from surrounding areas currently zoned for industrial and white residential usage.

In October, shelters of several shack dwellers were demolished. The council maintained that their presence was illegal because the shacks did not comply with legal and health requirements, and stood in the way of the urban renewal scheme. It did however, promise that those squatters who had lived in Alexandra before July 1986 would be permitted to put up shacks on services land set aside for a temporary transit camp.

The 1986 proposal argued that the 1980 plan's reliance on government funding for housing and infrastructural development was impractical given the present state of the economy. But even with current lower infrastructural standards and shifting responsibility for housing to the individual, the cost of the urban renewal programme is prohibitive.

Financing this scale of development is beyond a local authority. The state granted R75-million for 1987 from the National Housing Commission and has promised a further R92-million over the next three years. Alexandra also requested R58-million from the Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council. Local government now has a potentially sounder financial foundation than envisaged in the early 1980s. But the enormity of development may still place unbearable strains on fiscal resources.

The overriding philosophy of mini-JMCs is to exercise 'good government' which 'must see and be seen', according to a senior intelligence official.

The key behind the psychological battle has been an information dissemination programme which explains developments in Alexandra and asserts a new value system. The Alexandra JMC has established a newspaper, *Newsletter to the People of Alexandra*, and a comic strip, *Alex and Friends*, to sell the new deal. These are published by the Bureau of Information and distributed freely. The Bureau also produces the *Metropolitan Digest* which offers a similar ideological focus though its 'news' is drawn from all townships on the Rand.

Newsletter portrays upgrading in physical and psychological terms: 'Through development we reach the sky!' The overriding philosophy behind it is 'Help Us to Help You Build a Better and Happier Future

for the Alexandra Residents'. It has given detailed accounts of the progress and problems of urban renewal, apologised for any inconvenience and frequently invited residents to participate.

For a start in October 1986, this meant residents had to begin paying rent, breaking the five-month-old, township-wide, rent boycott. In mid-September, the council issued rent arrear statements to all permit holders with letters urging residents to pay up or explain their problems to council officials.

The administrator stressed that the council did not fund the police or army in any way - and definitely not through rent payments. If service charges increased through inflation, the only way to beat it, he suggested, was higher productivity.

Articles on upgrading coincided with comic strips handed out by security forces. 'Alex', a young, healthy, happy resident did verbal battle with 'Comrade Rat', a weedy scruffy creature who always ran down new township development rather than accepting it enthusiastically. A liaison officer at the Bureau for Information described Alex as 'the good person, the good things of life. He represents the council's activities'.

Newsletter ran a series of articles introducing the administrator and council staff and officials and putting a human face to government. The council's sports liaison officer hoped to re-kindle community spirit, and improve the individual through expanding sports activities, with the help of government and business funding. A member of the council technical staff took redevelopment into his own hands and, of his own accord, built play-parks for children. He had an 'insatiable desire to work for the community'. The chief of community services had 'strength of character coupled with a pleasant personality including a keen sense of humour' and promised 'giant steps' with 'new' council powers.

Surrounding businesses have been incorporated into the JMC urban renewal and education programme. Besides financing housing construction, they sponsor skills training centres, small business development and youth programmes and provide equipment for clean-up campaigns.

The newsletter advertised skills training programmes (especially building skills) for unemployed, such as the Murray and Roberts 'Earn While You Learn Homebuilding Course'. Barlow Rand opened the Alexandra Enterprise Centre which was portrayed as a 'breeding ground for our future black manufacturers and industrialists'. It would help solve today's vexing problems of 'unemployment and dependency'. In November 1987 the administrator and businessmen launched 'Progress through Employment'. Its sub-committees deal with job placement, promotion of home industry, provision of venture capital to small businesses, training, and work creation. Representatives from technikons and the department of manpower also sit on the committees.

Urban development is complemented by the fostering of an individualist ethic where self-upliftment and hard work guarantee success. Warren Dale, president of the Sandton Chamber of Commerce, explained the motivation behind the Chamber's involvement in Progress Through Employment: 'The Sandton Chamber of Commerce is interested in creating a capitalist attitude in Alexandra and spreading the entrepreneurial spirit which does not exist there... They must realise that personal advancement will come from hard work not slogans... Our interest is in the development and maintenance of a capitalist framework'.

The paper tried to repair the image of the SADF. A report on a funeral for school children killed in a bus accident mentioned that 'the friendship offered by the SADF did not go unnoticed ... I overheard one boxom (sic) auntie say, as she wiped tears off her eyes: "They are not as bad as we are led to believe they are"'.

A front page article apologised for the inconvenience of security force roadblocks. It explained that roadblocks were 'to keep all troublemakers out'; 'to ensure the security and safety of all Alex residents'; and, significant in terms of urbanisation strategy, to 'prevent Alex residents from being overcrowded by squatters'.

Finally, *Newsletter* aimed at establishing a hold among disaffected youth. Several white trainers, possibly SADF personnel, and black coaches were hired by the council to run sports clinics for school children and organise competitions. Sport was seen as a healthy, non-political diversion for township youth. A R10-million project backed by businesses was launched to develop cricket skills in Alexandra. At the launch an Alexandra educationist said: 'We hope that with the advent of cricket we'll be able to make good bowlers out of so-called stone-throwers in townships'.

Metropolitan Digest offered more overtly political comment than *Newsletter*. It promised RSCs would help solve local government problems, advocated change throught negotiation rather than violence, and portrayed councillors as sympathetic, community-conscious people, with a ready ear for their constituents. It even went into ideological battle with the Freedom Charter. It argued that the Charter was 'outdated' since many of its demands had already been met by the current government: abolition of pass laws, freedom to form trade unions and participation in local and provincial administration with national involvement being envisaged through the national statutory council.

By July 1987 Alexandra's administrator boasted that no unrest existed in the township due to the upgrading programme, the state of emergency - which had 'definitely managed to create a climate of peace and security' - and improvement in employment opportunities.

The state of emergency appears to have created 'a climate of evolution' and restored the conditions for reform. Local political movements such as AAC, Ayco, and ARA are inactive or possibly have gone underground. ACA has reconstituted itself, but in a potentially compromising framework.

The Alexandra JMC is sufficiently confident of its strategy's success to broach the possibility of local government elections. In December 1987, *Newsletter* introduced the issue of 1988 municipal elections: 'To make a community a happy one, individuals ought to vote so that the best leader can be elected. Through this leader you will gain a voice in the community... The power of these councils are not of less importance or second best. No, these councils



'A long history of suspicion cannot be wiped out with a few months of overdue development.'

have equal rights and help develop your own community equally'.

This confidence was matched at a national level. Riekert had proposed participation in local government as a further hallmark of 'insider' privilege. In line with urbanisation policy, the government granted squatters local government franchise in April 1988.

The state of emergency represents not so much government's floundering last resort to maintain the status quo, as an attempt to establish reformist policy on sounder political, fiscal and administrative footing. Alexandra's Urban Renewal Proposal embraces new urbanisation policy and security strategy which counteract the urban crisis in complementary ways.

Urbanisation strategy uses subtle fiscal controls and non-discriminatory legislation to direct workseekers and industry to particular areas, thereby rationalising regional labour markets. The housing shortage is being dealt with by making home-ownership more accessible, lowering housing standards and shifting the burden for provision and upgrading from the state to the individual property owner and the private sector. RSCs and JMCs represent a new, highly-centralised administration which insulate the local state from the effects of popular protest.

RSCs promise infrastructure funded by business levies. Home-ownership and the expansion of small business in townships will also offer a future tax base. RSCs allow black and white local authorities to co-operate in multi-racial metropolitan government - a move matched at a national level by the national statutory council.

JMCs are an efficient bureaucracy, wholly within the reformist camp. They are extremely sensitive to the political mood of local communities, and able to respond immediately with upgrading and education programmes complementing urbanisation strategy.

It is difficult to gauge how residents perceive the new developments. A long history of suspicion and distrust cannot be wiped out with a few months of overdue development. Urban renewal can be interpreted as a government 'gift' to townships, as easily as a 'peoples victory' wrested from the state after the battles of 1986. By March 1988, about 15 000 Alexandra households were still in rent arrears, but whether from political conviction or economic necessity is unknown.

Suppression of open resistance and the difficulties of organising in such an atmosphere pose new problems for township, radical, political actors. Tangible benefits arising from the upgrading programme may win over more conservative residents and those who, while sympathetic to the demands of Ayco and AAC, were dismayed by the violence it provoked in the township and from the state. And if a repressive political climate continues, local activists may reconsider their principled boycott of local government structures. By January 1988, a leading ACA member felt participation in local authority elections was a viable political tactic: it could allow for bargaining from within the state, and create a legal space for political mobilisation. The argument that reform policy has been eclipsed by repression in response to the strength of political opposition is too simplistic. The current era of repression does not indicate that the state has lost direction and resorted to suppression of resistance to maintain the status quo.

The transformation of popular opposition and emergence of people's power did not reflect a period of dual power, as some activists believed. Though local government structures did collapse, the central state remained strong and has been able to re-initiate reform policy on new terms. Society is being re-ordered according to technocratic, functional, and regional prerequisites to redress the structural roots of the urban crisis. Urban renewal programmes financed and administered by RSCs and JMCs seek to redress socio-economic grievances that first sparked popular protest and thereby prevent political organisation around the more radical intentions of people's power.

While the state presently appears to have the upper hand, the success of its new strategy will depend on popular reception. Political organisations will have to consider an appropriate strategy for this new terrain.

This article is an edited extract of a paper, **People's power and state reform in Alexandra Township from 1979 to 1987,** *presented to the annual congress of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa in July 1988.*



Eric Miller - Afrapix

Upgrading of an oilspot

ANDREW BORAINE analyses the impact of township upgrading on popular resistance

'I want to see to what extent I can better the living conditions of the people, to what extent I can get the people to accept the government so that they don't break with the authorities and drift into the hands of the terrorists'.

With these words, Defence Minister Magnus Malan announced in March 1987 that he had taken 'personal responsibility' for the development of a number of turbulent townships - among them Mamelodi, home of one of the strongest networks of civic and youth structures.

Mamelodi, 17 km east of Pretoria, is one of 34 townships designated an 'oilspot' by officials of the joint management centres (JMCs). This term, borrowed from American military strategists in Vietnam, refers to the establishment of 'strategic bases' from which the security forces believe they can 'regain control' over the black population.

In November 1985, 13 Mamelodi residents were killed and hundreds injured by the police during a rent protest. At the funerals following the 'Mamelodi massacre', a call was made on residents to boycott rent and join the street committees. This received widespread support.

Within a few months, a remarkable network of 'organs of people's power' stretched through 35 zones, under the leadership of the Mamelodi Civic Association (MCA). With the Mamelodi Town Council (MTC) severely weakened through revenue shortages and political illegitimacy, the civic association began to assume increasing control over events in the township.

The immediate aim of the June 1986 state of emergency was to regain control of the townships by destroying the influence of 'alternative structures' such as these. In Mamelodi this took the form of mass detentions, house-to-house raids, roadblocks and foot patrols, and the establishment of a permanent SADF base in the township. All meetings, including public funerals, were banned.

However, in line with the thinking of the national security management system (NSMS), the repressive strategy in Mamelodi was soon broadened to include a programme of 'upgrading' housing and infrastructure, as well as measures to make the town council more viable politically and financially.

The key elements of the state's current security strategy were outlined by Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok in May 1987: 'You have to address the security situation; secondly, you have to address grievances and bring good government to the ordinary people; and thirdly, you have to address the political situation'.

In plainer terms, Vlok's strategy for control in Mamelodi can be outlined as follows:

* eliminate all opposition, particularly individual activists and community organisations;
* upgrade the socio-economic conditions that 'agitators' used to mobilise the people, and restore the authority of the town council;
* turn municipal representatives on the town council into 'political representatives' after the October municipal elections by including them in regional and national councils.

The two key structures in Mamelodi that have been attempting to implement these strategies are the mini-joint management centre (mini-JMC), and the joint operations centre (JOC).

The JOC, which falls under the command of the local police commander, Lt-Col Lekganyane, is the central security body in Mamelodi, co-ordinating the activities of SADF troops, local police, security police, riot police and municipal police. These activities, known in NSMS-terminology as 'hard-war' functions, include pre-emptive security action (detention, arrests, roadblocks, patrols), intelligence-gathering operations and monitoring of all oppositional activities.

The intelligence and monitoring work is performed by the joint intelligence committee (JIC), made up of members of the security police, military intelligence and the national intelligence service (NIS). One of its objectives is to collect information on all political, cultural, religious, sporting, welfare and business organisations in Mamelodi. The JIC also tries to monitor the whereabouts of all activists and community leaders in the area, as well as the identity of visitors to the township.

The information provided by the JIC forms the basis for direct security action against activists and community organisations.

Many activists from the civic association and the Mamelodi Youth Organisation (Mayo) have been detained, including MCA chairperson Peter Maluleka and general secretary Stanza Bopape, who were picked up in June 1988. Bopape's family were later told that he had 'escaped' from custody. He has not been seen since.

The information provided by the JIC is also used for the planning of upgrading activities in Mamelodi by the mini-JMC. Two SADF members of the JOC, Capt 'Bossie' Boshoff and Lt Peter Gagiano, form the 'security' committee of the Mamelodi mini-JMC, and provide the intersection between the 'hard war' of the JOC and the 'soft war' of the mini-JMC.

The mini-JMC is chaired by a Mr Wolmarans of the department of transport. It consists of committees that deal with 'communications' and 'welfare', as well as 'security'. These committees meet in secret twice a month, once jointly and once separately.

The mini-JMC has a total membership of about 30 people, including eight representatives from the Mamelodi Town Council. These are the town clerk, the four chief executive officers, the social welfare officer, the sports liaison officer and the council's public relations officer. These representatives are not councillors but paid officials of the council.

The other members of the mini-JMC are drawn from various government departments (in particular those dealing with black education, constitutional affairs, transport, telecommunications, health and social welfare), as well as the security forces.

The central task of the mini-JMC is to identify 'upgrading' projects in Mamelodi that could assist in re-establishing control over the township. So far plans have included:

- the development of infrastructure - the construction of a highway through Mamelodi, traffic lights, the tarring of 160 km of roads, storm-water drains, and a pedestrian bridge;
- the building of new facilities and amenities - two post offices, a mobile police station, the R3,5-million Moretele Park with swimming pools and other sporting facilities, eight schools and a new telephone system.

There are also numerous housing projects, including the recently completed elite suburb of Mamelodi Gardens.

A development project on 2 000 ha of land east of Mamelodi has been planned over the next 12 years. This will include between 10 000 and 20 000 houses, two business districts, a hospital, an old age home and another stadium, and will potentially double the size of Mamelodi. In addition, a major overhaul of Mamelodi's electricity, water and sewerage systems is planned. There are also various schemes to provide some residents with jobs, and to dismantle the migrant hostels and build family houses.

One of the functions of the mini-JMC is to make sure that various government departments are contributing to these projects, by providing research, expertise and in some cases, funding. Another function is to ensure that the town council is given the credit for the projects in an attempt to bolster its authority and influence, particularly in time for the October municipal elections.

This is the main function of the 'communications' committee, which develops methods through which the town council can 'interact' with people. So far, this has been attempted mainly through the provision of sporting facilities to schools and the distribution of food parcels to orphanages. However, direct propaganda means have also been used, including documentaries on Mamelodi, shown on SATV, and the distribution of pamphlets.

In the past, one of the major weaknesses of the town council has been its inability to generate sufficient funds without resorting to unpopular measures such as raising rents and service charges.

Part of the role of the mini-JMC is to identify and co-ordinate new sources of funding for the town council. Because of this, the mini-JMC has tried to find ways to break the rent boycott in Mamelodi, as the boycott has reduced the town council's income considerably over the past three years.

In line with current state strategy, which advocates a limited transfer of wealth from white to black residential areas, the mini-JMC has also tried to identify sources of finance outside the limited fiscal base of the town council. These have included various government departments, the Transvaal provincial administration (TPA) and the Pretoria regional services council (RSC). Finance from these bodies has been used mainly for infrastructural upgrading projects such as electricity and water.

Consistent with the state's aim of divesting itself of the responsibility of providing black housing, Mamelodi has been opened up to private development.

At least six private building and construction companies are involved in projects in Mamelodi, incuding the Urban Foundation's FHA Homes, Gough-Cooper Homes, Schachat Cullum Homes and Bonaero Park Ltd. Funding is also being provided by the Development Bank of South Africa, and the South African Housing Trust (SAHT). A private development company - Metroplan - is responsible for Mamelodi's eastward expansion.

Total upgrading costs in Mamelodi over the next 12 years are estimated at between R350-million and R400-million. Most of this is not being provided by the state but by private capital investment.

This investment has been made considerably easier in the last few years by deregulation in the building industry, which allows contractors to erect smaller houses using cheaper materials.

In Mamelodi there are (as yet) no clear indications whether the new state strategies of 'addressing grievances' and 'bringing good government to the people' have lessened the resolve of the majority of residents to resist the controls on their lives.

NSMS upgrading schemes are too closely associated with the mass repression of the security forces to receive uncritical support.

The Mamelodi Town Council is widely perceived to be under the control of 'white' officials, with little real power of its own. The NSMS may be able to erase the housing backlog in Mamelodi over the next 12 years, but this cannot provide a national political solution to the current crisis.

But there are many ways in which the face of urban politics is changing. One of the strengths of the JMC system is its ability to co-ordinate a number of diverse strategies at the same time, cutting through the bureaucratic tangle of the old administration boards. In Mamelodi, the mini-JMC, together with the JOC, has ensured the re-establishment of township administration in the form of the town council, the elimination of organised opposition to the council, and the beginning of a long-term process of improving the material conditions for some township residents.

The Mamelodi Town Council is in a stronger position than it was in November 1983, when councillors last faced elections. Councillors are protected physically by 243 municipal police and the other security forces. They are provided with a co-ordinated political and economic backup system in the form of the mini-JMC, very different from the days of clashes with the administration board over land and finance.

The MTC is led by Bennett Ndlazi, national organiser of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (Ucasa) and a 'rising star' in the ranks of Constitutional Planning Minister Chris Heunis' 'moderate' black leaders. Ndlazi recently became the first black person to be appointed to the liquor board, and was also included in a South African department of foreign affairs tour to Argentina.

The MTC still faces a partial rent boycott, and has been unable to make much progress in collecting arrears. It remains dependent on bridging loans provided by the TPA.

Mamelodi township

However, because of new external forms of revenues and investments, the council is no longer in such a financially vulnerable position.

The council is also legally in charge of the development and upgrading process in Mamelodi. It can disburse patronage in the form of houses, sites, jobs and business contracts. It can point to a number of completed housing schemes, and tell residents about the planned cableway from Moretele Park to the top of the Magaliesberg.

In some ways, Mamelodi is an exceptional township, in that it has a functioning town council that has been able to spearhead a large upgrading programme. In many other areas - Crossroads, Bontebeuwel, Mbekweni, Walmer, Cradock, Thokoza, Katlehong and Alexandra, upgrading programmes have been smaller, and were initiated more directly by security officials, or through a community liaison forum established by the mini-JMC.

A common critique of NSMS strategies is that the state does not have sufficient resources to upgrade every township. This is true, but misses the point. The current upgrading strategies in the townships are deliberately selective, designed to favour certain areas at the expense of others. This involves a differential policy that seeks to create fissures and widen existing cracks in communities. They are not designed to solve the urban crisis for all, only for some.

According to another critique of NSMS strategies, improvement of the standard of living does not necessarily 'buy' political support from townships residents. Again, this is true, but then WHAM strategy is not really about 'winning hearts and minds'. Security strategies are planned according to 'unrest areas', not the material needs of township residents. They are aimed at neutralising oppositional groups and activists, and the co-option of conservative elites, rather than a 'mass conversion' of the black population.

State policy has shifted away from influx control towards other forms of control in the urban areas. Current urbanisation trends indicate a growing gap between the traditional urban working class - located mainly within established urban townships - and the rapidly-increasing masses of unemployed and unhoused, who live in informal settlements on the fringes of the urban areas.

The results of the October municipal elections in black townships will no doubt indicate continued rejection of apartheid policies.

But democratic organisations will increasingly have to take account of the growing stratification of the urban areas, and the selective upgrading schemes designed to reinforce these divisions.

The 'success' of NSMS urban upgrading programmes lies not so much in established townships such as Mamelodi, but in the divide and control tactics used in squatter settlements like Crossroads and Khayelitsha. This is likely to become the dominant pattern of urban upgrading in the future.



The Star

State strategy and popular response

KATE PHILLIP examines the developing contradictions in state security strategies.

Total strategy began as a military initiative to counter the total onslaught. With PW Botha's rise to power, it became the framework for an overall political strategy.

Central to that strategy was the belief that South Africa's war is only 20% military, and 80% social, economic and political.

For the SADF, this did not mean it should confine itself to the military aspects of that war. Instead, it provided the basis for legitimising the increasing military involvement in all spheres of strategic decision making, co-ordinated through the state security council.

The state of emergency provided the gap for the military to consolidate its 'creeping coup', by extending the structures of the national security management system (NSMS) at regional and local levels. This decisively entrenched military involvement and dominance in internal security.

The NSMS is made up of 13 joint management centres, chaired primarily by SADF personnel. These overlap with military command structures and regional services council boundaries. Under these are sub- and mini-JMCs, which reach down to township level. All members are bound to secrecy by the Protection of Information Act.

There are four NSMS sub-committees: security; social, economic, political and constitutional (or 'welfare'); communications; and joint intelligence.

They are intended to provide a hotline of key intelligence from the townships up to the state security council, helping to formulate state strategy. To keep their fingers on the pulse of daily township activity, the mini-JMCs try to mirror strategies of democratic organisation. In Bonteheuwel, for example, attempts have been made to house police reservists on every street, and there have been door-to- door recruitment attempts. And some JMCs have set up community liaison forums, which draw in hand-picked and influential members of the community.

The most immediate task of the JMCs has been to smash the power of mass-based democratic organisations, and regain control of the townships.

But their role is not merely repressive; the 20%-80% logic is based on the belief that street patrols, blade wire and overt

repression can only achieve an unstable stalemate. Any long-term solution to the crisis of control necessitates winning greater legitimacy for the state among black South Africans.

The role of the JMCs is thus also to co-ordinate, monitor and develop strategies for this reformist dimension of state policy at local and regional level.

At a confidential briefing for businessmen, Major General Charles Lloyd, secretary of the state security council, clarified the different dimensions of the state's counter-revolutionary strategy.

Firstly, he said, the specific areas of dissatisfaction identified by the ANC need to be addressed - education, housing, health care and freedom of movement. Lloyd stressed that support from the private sector is vital in addressing these grievances.

Secondly, argued Lloyd, the security forces must protect government, must protect the masses against intimidation, and must 'eliminate' revolutionaries.

He stressed that the ranks of the enemy are very small, and consist of trained, committed and active revolutionaries. These people need to be identified specifically, and the security forces must be careful not to incur the wrath of the masses by 'eliminating' uncommitted, non-revolutionaries 'by accident'.

Thirdly, Lloyd stressed the need to win the support of the masses by communicating and demonstrating a 'realistic new future' to them.

The secrecy of JMC structures facilitates both disinformation campaigns and covert security force operations. The state denies masterminding vigilante murders. But there is a certain cynicism in the fact that a Reverend Maqina is both the chair of the community liaison forum in Port Elizabeth's mini-JMC, and the head of Ama Africa, a vicious vigilante squad that has been terrorising residents of Uitenhage townships.

Against a backdrop of ongoing repression, the JMCs have embarked on upgrading strategies. These reflect a shift in the state's analysis of the causes of the political crisis, which are no longer reduced to the work of agitators alone.

Instead, there is a recognition that real grievances exist.

Major General Bert Wandrag of SAP riot control argues, for example, that in Pietermaritzburg a small outlay of capital for text-books could have pre-empted the school boycotts, and saved the state millions of rands. In addition, he points to the misappropriation of school fees by school principals, and blames the DET for not exercising better control.

The Star

Major General Charles Lloyd

Wandrag uses this example to set out a broader strategic argument: 'The outcome of this struggle will not be determined by weapons alone. If this had been the case, I would not have any fears, because the communists are bent upon avoiding military confrontation. They prefer to foment domestic grievances - real as well as imagined - and to instigate the country's inhabitants to full-scale insurrection and revolution. The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip revolution in the bud, by ensuring that there is no fertile soil in which the seeds of revolution can germinate'.

The upgrading strategy is premised on this logic, and coupled to the notion that black political aspirations can be bought off by improved township conditions. As Magnus Malan says: 'The big question is how many black people are only really interested in meeting their material needs - things like housing, education, job opportunities, clothes, food and so on. I do not think democracy is a relevant factor for the masses in South Africa. For them, it is a question of satisfying their own needs'.

Government thus hopes that if local authorities get the credit for upgrading initiatives, they will win credibility in the eyes of township residents, despite their lack of any real power.

Much of JMC strategy has been geared towards boosting the credibility of the local authorities before the October elections, to ensure that these structures have at least sufficient legitimacy to collect the garbage without army protection.

Councillors have handed out food parcels, organised soccer tours, cut red ribbons at new township facilities, and had daily prime-time coverage on TV2 and TV3.

In areas where local authority structures have been completely destroyed, there have been attempts to engage democratic organisations in negotiations around upgrading. These initiatives have invariably been accompanied by attempts to co-opt organisations into participation in local authority structures.

Organisations damaged by years of emergency rule rarely enter these encounters from a basis of strength, and their structures of mandate and accountability have often been smashed. This explains the contrast between these initiatives, and the local-level negotiations the state was forced into when democratic organisations were on the offensive.

At St Wendolins in Natal, democratic organisations have participated on a committee that includes known JMC figures, and there have been continued attempts to tie upgrading to participation in local authorities.

And in the 'white corridor' between the Transkei and the Ciskei, similar attempts have been made. In this area, village committees had forced the state to deal directly with them in relation to pensions.

Last year, these village committees were asked to send representatives to a committee to liaise with the



Magnus Malan: The big question... how many black people are only really interested in meeting material needs.

authorities in defining upgrading priorities. They were offered offices and a 'secretariat'.

At the same time, the local authority boundaries in their area were being redefined to replace the tribal authority structures with town councils. The clear intention is to draw the village committees into these structures.

While the state was unsuccesful in both these cases, they highlight the need to formulate a national strategic response to NSMS upgrading strategies.

Township upgrading is a central part of the state's economic strategy. The threat of sanctions, coupled with the dismal performance of South Africa's manufacturing industries on international markets, has brought inward industrialisation to the fore as the impetus for capital accumulation. The provision of township housing is intended to kickstart this process.

The state hopes to depoliticise the sphere of housing by privatising township land. Capital has taken the bait, competing for the seemingly lucrative township contracts.

Nor does capital seem to have any moral dilemmas about working with the welfare committees of the JMCs. In Thokoza, for example, the JMC has tapped capital's social responsibility programmes to boost its shortfall of revenue needed for upgrading.

There is little apparent contradiction between JMC upgrading initiatives and liberal capital's own 'winning hearts and minds' strategy, which entails promoting home ownership and township upgrading in an attempt to win support for free enterprise.

Capital's social responsibility programmes usually attempt to distance themselves from apartheid. Nonetheless, there is increasing evidence of capital's direct participation in JMC structures, particularly at the level of community liaison forums.

And while the privatisation of township land and housing development is supposed to depoliticise this sphere, township residents' inability to meet their bond repayments puts the onus of eviction on building societies and housing contractors. This further politicises the role of capital, rather than de-politicising the sphere of housing.

But the state does not have the economic resources to deliver the goods on a national scale, and this places an obvious limitation on NSMS strategies.

Only a handful of 'oilspot' townships have tasted the welfare side of the NSMS strategy, while the rest have had to content themselves with repression alone.

Even where upgrading is taking place, there are attempts to recoup the costs by including them in the price of housing - a fatal mistake reminiscent of the logic behind the rent increases that sparked the 1984 and 1985 township uprisings.

But even if the state does manage to beg, borrow or steal the money it needs for national township upgrading, the NSMS strategy is far from a watertight solution to the current crisis. For the state has under-estimated the extent to which particular grievances that sparked the township uprisings were merely the signifiers of a broader resistance to national oppression and rank exploitation.

Whatever the nuances of Botha's reform rhetoric, this oppression and exploitation remains intrinsic to the experience of the mass of South Africa's people. Tarred roads and toilets may improve the quality of life, but they do not give people more control over their lives.

The state has misjudged the extent to which the form of struggles waged was as important as the particular local content. The experience of building mass-based democratic structures, of participating in street committees, SRCs and union local committees, breaking through the boundaries of silence and finding a voice, wielding power through collective action, and breaking down some of the structures of control - all these were of longer-term significance than the particular issues and demands of the moment.

These experiences of organisation and the political consciousness developed in the process are the basis of new forms of organisation and resistance to the new contradictions arising from the NSMS strategy.

The electoral strategy of the Irish Republican Movement

RUPERT TAYLOR examines Sinn Fein's electoral strategy and its value to the Republican Movement in the North of Ireland.

As debate intensifies over strategies of participation in national and local government structures, the tactics of Ireland's Sinn Fein are interesting to examine.

Sinn Fein first provided major political resistance after the 1916 Easter Rising against British rule in Ireland, when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged as the force for military resistance.

The armed struggle waged by the IRA between 1919 and 1921, and supported politically by Sinn Fein, brought the British government to the negotiating table. But rather than uniting Ireland, the Government of Ireland Act (1920) introduced the partition of the North from the South. This settlement was unacceptable to the Catholic community. But under the force of arms, a six-county subordinate parliament was set up in Belfast, Stormont, and accepted by the exclusively-Protestant Unionist Party.

Representation in Stormont was dominated by the Unionist Party, and exclusivism was preserved by the practices of state and local government control by Unionists in areas where the majority of the population was Catholic. These grievances were accentuated by the differing social class backgrounds of the Protestant and Catholic communities, with Catholics overrepresented in the lower classes. Catholics resented the law - the Special Powers Act 1922 concerning arrest and detention was directed against them - and were hostile towards the police.

In the late 1960s, with the lack of any meaningful changes, Catholic demands for civil rights led to peaceful street demonstrations. The civil rights movement revolved around demands for better houses, jobs, the repeal of the Special Powers Act and 'one-man, one-vote'. Marches were attacked by Protestant extremists, and reforms were slow to come. The Unionist monopoly of power at Stormont began to crumble and the force of events led to a spiral of conflict - the current 'troubles'.

After widespread rioting in August 1969 the British army was called in and some Protestants and Catholics

armed themselves. These events signalled the re-emergence of the IRA. A war of national liberation, launched by the IRA and supported by Sinn Fein, was mounted against the British army and the local forces of law and order.

In an attempt to quell the rise of the IRA, the Britain adopted counter-insurgency tactics, including (in August 1971) internment without trial. Following an IRA ceasefire, internment was ended in 1975. The IRA believed British withdrawal was just around the corner. This proved to be wrong, and the British army gained a huge security initiative, so much so that by the end of 1977 the IRA was almost completely demoralised.

But despite direct rule from London, the British government still found itself unable to maintain public order. And since the 1970s, with the foundering attempts at power-sharing, its policy has been essentially one of containment.

In the late 1970s the British government believed the IRA did not have much support, and the conflict in Northern Ireland came to be presented as essentially a criminal problem. So from 1976 onwards the British government tried to impose a normal prison regime on prisoners who thusfar had 'special category' (political) status (the right to wear one's own clothes, to abstain from penal labour, to free association and to educational and recreational activities). Continuing resistance by Republican prisoners to these moves led to the hunger strikes.

To Margaret Thatcher the hunger strikes represented the IRA's 'last card', and she believed that there was little support for the IRA among the Nationalist community. However, as hunger striker after hunger striker died, a huge reservoir of Nationalist support was tapped. Demonstrations and marches in support of Republican prisoners, many of which went unreported, were the largest seen in Ireland for over a decade.

Since 1981, with the election of hunger striker Bobby Sands as an MP, this support has become channelled into electoral politics. The Republican Movement was quick to see the political advantages that could be gained through widespread

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The British army 'keeping the peace' in the North of Ireland

electoral intervention, and the IRA leadership moved towards contesting elections through Sinn Fein.

The election policy was formalised at the 1981 annual Sinn Fein conference, the most significant one in a decade. A decision to contest particular elections on an abstentionist (non-attendance) basis was taken by Sinn Fein's national executive and the 'ballot box and Armalite' strategy was born. As Danny Morrison of Sinn Fein put it at the conference: 'Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand, and an Armalite (gun) in this hand, we take power in Ireland?'

Subsequently in both the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election and the 1983 Westminster general election Sinn Fein captured over ten per cent of the vote. In the Assembly election they won five seats (out of 78) and in the general election Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, was elected as MP for West Belfast. In the 1987 Westminster general election, Sinn Fein gained 11 per cent of the vote.

Recognising that the potential for expanding the base of the party is greater in the South of Ireland than in the North, Sinn Fein has, since the 1986 conference, moved towards letting its elected representatives sit in the Dail (Irish parliament). In the February 1987 Irish general election Sinn Fein captured 1,9% of the vote.

The electoral success of Sinn Fein has served an important role in showing support, and the claim that the IRA does not receive substantial support from the Catholic community can no longer be taken seriously. But it is electoral politics with a difference.

Most observers have argued that there is a contradiction between the ballot and Armalite strategy, in that the use of force by the IRA is damaging to the electoral prospects of Sinn Fein. However, it makes more sense to analyse Sinn Fein in accordance with the principles of revolutionary social movements.

The rise of Sinn Fein in the years following the 1981 hunger strike moved the struggle for the re-unification of Ireland into a new phase. The Republican Movement moved towards strategies that mirror Lenin's arguments on organisational development for revolutionary movements. Lenin placed great stress on the principles of organisation, arguing that the key to the successful development of such a social movement is its capacity to mobilise people for support and protests, to infiltrate all sectors of society and to engage in tactics of agitation, whilst also being able to maintain effective leadership and central direction.

The role of Sinn Fein has been central in developing these principles and broadening the scope of revolutionary activity within the Republican Movement. Sinn Fein has been utilised to build an enduring political machine that links the spontaneous basis of the movement



International Viewpoint

Gerry Adams on the election trail in 1982

to revolutionary activity. In this, the electoral process is used as a vehicle for building a lasting political organisation and not as a signal of recognition and approval of the existing electoral procedures.

As Sinn Fein argues, there is no democratic process in the North of Ireland; and from the start the leadership of the IRA made it clear that electoral intervention did not mean a run-down of the armed struggle.

The central organisational developments within Sinn Fein include the work of party activists in mobilising the community around key issues by agitation and infiltration; the extension of educative tasks and expansion of publications to legitimate the armed struggle; the growth of community advice centres which provide an alternative administrative structure in which local struggles can be fused with the national question; and the building of different levels of authority - in particular the rise of a new middle-level leadership of councillors.

Sinn Fein offers a chance of working for the Republican Movement for those who condone the armed struggle, but are not prepared to pull the trigger. For many, especially the young unemployed and alienated, involvement offers a hope and meaning to life. Pursuing forms of agitation around concrete instances of oppression has the function of increasing press coverage and sparking off demonstrations. And by adopting tactics of infiltration, party activists have moved into the unions, neighbourhood associations and the women's movement.

The educative task of Sinn Fein is to legitimate the armed struggle and to show there is no other way forward. A number of educational leaflets on Republicanism have been published and a glossy Sinn Fein policy brochure is available with handouts on issues like the economy, trade unions, social services and women.

There is a weekly paper, *Republican News*, a Republican magazine, *Iris*, and an Irish language magazine, *Saoirse*. Interest in publications has become much more focused on other national liberation struggles in the world, and solidarity is expressed with the Sandinistas, the PLO and the ANC - West Belfast has been declared an apartheid-free zone.

Sinn Fein also conducts classes on Irish history and culture, especially promoting the Irish language.

The grassroots activity of advice centres focuses on 'bread and butter' issues - providing social services for the underprivileged, helping with claims for state benefits, dealing with the Northern Ireland housing executive and electricity service. In the Catholic ghettos, people turn to advice centres above all else as they are the only effective direct link between the communities and the government.

There are now over 30 advice centres in Ireland. In league with the wider Republican Movement they deal with incidents of petty crime through neighbourhood policing. According to *Republican News*, 'any revolutionary organisation which is engaged in armed struggle has a duty and a responsibility to protect as best it can the people on whose behalf the struggle is being carried out'.

At local government level Sinn Fein's strategy is to challenge the established parties and advance Republican views in the North's councils. This is achieved through participating in these structures; Sinn Fein accepted at its 1981 conference that candidates in the North, if elected, would take council seats. In the May 1985 local elections Sinn Fein won 59 seats on 17 of Northern Ireland's 26 district councils with 40% of the Catholic vote.

Significantly, councillors have a close association with the armed struggle; one of the Sinn Fein councillors elected for Derry served a seven-year sentence for planting a bomb in Derry Guildhall - the council chambers! In the Irish Republic Sinn Fein holds 39 seats and since the early 1980s Sinn Fein councillors have served as chairmen on five local authorities.

With both the work of advice centres and the strategy of participation in local government, Sinn Fein is in a situation which it cannot lose: political benefits come either way. If material benefits are gained the Movement's support is enhanced; if they are not then the British government can be blamed for running an unjust system.

The Republican Movement faces two major problems. One is to convince members and supporters that money spent on electoral campaigns pays off in terms of organisational advantages. The other is to link the organisational advances to strategic interventions through developing tough policies that go beyond the rhetoric of 'Brits Out'.

Despite these difficulties, the experience of Sinn Fein suggests electoral intervention at both national and local levels and participation at local government level can bring major organisational advances, and does not necessarily imply recognition of the legitimacy of existing structures of government.

Democracy, Socialism, and the future



DARYL GLASER looks at some of the issues raised by the African National Congress's draft constitutional guidelines for a future South Africa

The ANC's recently-released draft constitutional guidelines involve the first significant elaboration of the Freedom Charter since its adoption in 1955.

But it is difficult to judge whether the guidelines are a coherent blueprint for a future society, or a tactical intervention to broaden the ANC's base, widen its appeal and accelerate progress towards a negotiated settlement.

In the broad opposition camp, there will be a variety of responses to the draft guidelines. Two are already predictable:

- liberals will welcome the guidelines as an affirmation of the centrality of liberal-democratic principles and as a programme involving pragmatic economic change; and
- the far left will dismiss them as 'bourgeois' and 'reformist', proof of the absence of genuine socialist commitment in the congress movement, and as an omen of a neo-colonial sellout to capital and its allies.

Neither response is adequate, especially for those concerned with a democratic socialist future for South Africa.

The ANC guidelines represent, in several respects, a welcome and important advance over the Freedom Charter. Some critics have dismissed the Charter as a 'bourgeois' set of demands. Yet some of the Charter's central deficiencies have been in the area of basic democratic rights which, far from being bourgeois, are crucial to the democratic self-expression of the proletariat. These include the right to form trade unions independent of the state and ruling party, and the right to strike in defence of union demands.

They also include the right of all people - including workers - to associate politically and form and vote for parties of their choice. And they include the right to free expression and criticism subject only to restrictions on racism and tribalism. These democratic rights, never explicitly affirmed in the Freedom Charter, are defended in the ANC document.

This is a positive development. For socialism can never be demo-



Sandy Smit - Afrapix

cratic without genuine political pluralism and a guarantee of civil liberties. In their absence it becomes impossible to counter this tendency towards bureaucratic centralism and political authoritarianism that has existed in countries following socialist paths of development.

There can also be no other way of establishing a genuinely representative political system, based on popular consent, and able to accommodate the divergent interests that are certain to continue, even amongst progressive social sectors, in societies building socialism.

Political pluralism and civil liberties are also crucial to 'direct' or 'participatory' democracy. Without free association and expression, even mass-based and grassroots political organs lose their democratic character. They become parochial, blandly consensual, and objects of manipulation by self-appointed and unchallenged elites.

These political rights are, moreover, a matter of life and death for the independent and far left which, without their protection, stand to be easily isolated and crushed under a post-revolutionary dispensation. Those on the far left who today dismiss the constitutional guidelines as populist may in future invoke its clauses in their own defence. These rights are therefore critical to the maintenance of a flourishing and diverse socialist political culture.

The ANC's constitutional guidelines are especially welcome when seen against the authoritarian record of orthodox communism and nationalism in the third world, as well as in the USSR and Eastern Europe. South African opposition politics has seen more than its fair share of political intolerance, internecine war between rival tendencies and attempts to achieve political monopolies, whether in local township precincts or national politics.

There has, until now, been little ground for optimism about the prospects for political democracy in a future South Africa. Provided that the ANC guidelines are more than a tactical ruse designed to achieve short-term objectives, they do encourage that hope.

One of the central tasks for independent and far-left groupings is to ensure that the ANC is held to the democratic clauses of its own constitutional guidelines, both now and in the future.

The economic programme offered is more difficult to assess. There are those on the far left who will cry foul at the slightest mention of 'mixed economy' or preserving a 'private sector', viewing any reference to them as proof of the ANC's abandonment of socialist goals and its descent into social democracy.

However, all but the most adventurist will admit that a substantial transitional period of 'mixed economy' is unavoidable in South Africa.

The economic and political consequences of a hastily-conceived programme of nationalisation are certain to be disastrous: breakdown of functioning economic structures; the premature, gratuitous alienation of strategically or numerically significant social sectors; and an inevitable slide into bureaucratic, centralised and statist patterns of economic management.

There is currently a world-wide debate over the 'economics of feasible socialism' amongst radical economists, taking place against a background of wide-ranging economic restructuring in virtually every country building socialism.

The overwhelming thrust is towards some variant of 'market socialism', usually based on different systems of ownership including - alongside the state sector - private sectors based on family and co-operative enterprises.

Without attempting any assessment of the necessity or desirability of market socialism, it seems intellectually and politically dogmatic to rule out in advance the possibility of mixed forms of ownership.

Finally, the term 'market socialism' is fraught with ambiguity. It

The SACP's Joe Slovo

Chris Hani of the ANC

The ANC's Joe Modise

ANC President Oliver Tambo

can include anything from a British-style capitalist welfare state to the systems operative in China or Poland. In itself the reference to mixed economy in the ANC guidelines means little, and is far less 'revealing' than the ANC's left critics claim.

Nonetheless, it is disappointing that the guidelines fail to hold out a more radical vision of South Africa's longer-term economic future.

While mixed forms of ownership may not be incompatible with socialism, the longer-term economic and political entrenchment of a monopoly capitalist sector might be. On this issue, the Freedom Charter is clearer than the draft guidelines. The partly decentralised economic management implicit in the ANC's new economic clauses, may, in important sectors, be preferable to central planning.

But the guidelines make no mention of the need for decentralisation to be accompanied by an extension of worker self-management and participation at the enterprise level. Here too the Charter, with its call for 'democratic organs of self-government' offers, if anything, a more convincing democratic vision.

While the trade union rights and workers' charter proposed in the constitutional guidelines are of critical importance, they may, in the absence of a significant degree of democratic economic management, result in the confinement of working-class organisations to a purely defensive role.

And while democratic socialism must be rooted in popular consent and seek the support of more than just the working class, it is a rather blandly populist conception of socialism which fails to define any kind of leading or hegemonic role for the working class.

The constitutional guidelines fail even to raise some of the other classic questions of socialist transition: the mental/manual division of labour, the divide between town and countryside, patriarchy and the 'agrarian question', to mention a few.

The adoption of highly desirable democratic features - a free press, independent unions, a plurality of political parties - is not therefore accompanied by serious consideration of socialism in any advanced sense.

The exclusion of these questions from the constitutional guidelines will be defended by some as tactically necessary to avoid alienating certain constituencies; alternatively as reflecting a desire not to spell out a too-detailed blueprint and thereby pre-empt future democratic discussion.

But there are other - and more worrying - possibilities. One is that socialism has been abandoned as a serious goal for the forseeable future, and displaced from the agenda of contemporary political discussion and mobilisation. That would run counter to the insistent demands for socialist politics coming from organised workers and black youth inside South Africa.

Another possibility is equally worrying: that the ANC document is merely a statement about the content of a 'national-democratic stage' of revolution, and that the democratic clauses contained in it have no particular relevance for the 'stage' of transition to socialism. That would allow for a transition to socialism under the leadership of a single entrenched ruling party fused with the state and ruling through totalitarian methods: a 'second stage' bereft of all the positive democratic features - political pluralism and civil liberties - that the ANC constitutional guidelines affirm.

This demonstrates the central danger of any constitutional document cast within the logic of two-stage theory. Not (as the far left fears) that it renders inevitable a reformist, 'neo-colonial' outcome. That is a possibility, but not inevitable.

The real danger of 'stagism' is that it might offer a choice of nightmares: *either* some more-or-less redistributive capitalist regime of 'national democracy', *or* a transition to 'socialism' based on bureaucratic dictatorship along the lines of Eastern Europe.

A long-term vision of democratic socialism must involve a commitment to empowering the working class and ending the rule of capital, while at the same time recognising that the freedoms of expression and association the ANC guidelines proclaim are central to socialism itself.

It remains to be seen whether the new constitutional guidelines mark a shift towards that kind of politics.



1988

This year is a difficult one to analyse. It is probably characterised as involving an uneasy equilibrium, with both government and opposition forces making gains and suffering losses. In this special supplement, we look at developments in the field of labour, repression, foreign policy, the courts and the economy.



Detentions

Close on 26 000 people were detained under emergency regulations between June 1986 and June 1987, compared to 6 000 in the 12 months thereafter. This review, prepared by the Human Rights Commission, shows how the state has stopped wide-scale detentions, and is now using the emergency regulations to keep key activists out of circulation. It also looks at conditions in detention, and several legal decisions which have even further restricted the lives of detainees.

The last 18 months have seen a change in the way detention is used by the state as a tool of repression. Although there have been mass detentions recently in an attempt to smash opposition to the municipal elections, the most controversial aspects of detention in the previous year - the large scale on which they took place, and the imprisonment of children - have come to an end.

Instead we have seen the prolonged incarceration of activists under state of emergency regulations and the restriction of organisations in the democratic movement. Opposition to the state has thus been silenced by more sophisticated and subtle means than in the past.

The main target of detention has been the United Democratic Front (UDF). Apart from the senior office-bearers of the UDF being engaged in the marathon 'Delmas' treason trial, many of the leadership are into their third year of detention without trial - with no end in sight.

A number of key UDF activists in the Western Cape were recently released but were so severely restricted that there was no way in which they could legally engage in any political activities. A number of them were in fact redetained recently when it became clear that they were active again.

This targetting of the UDF is borne out by a survey conducted by the Human Rights Trust on the reasons given by the minister of law and order for the detention of a sample of detainees in the Eastern Cape. According to this survey, 56% of the detainees were being held on the basis of alleged membership of an organisation. Most of the organisations were street and area committees - UDF affiliates.

A large proportion of detainees held during the June 1987-June 1988 state of emergency were held for longer than 30 days. This is in contrast to the more common practice in the past of 14-day detentions.



Eric Miller - Afrapix

A Detainees' Parents Support Committee meeting in Soweto in February this year: Weeks after this meeting was held, the DPSC was effectively banned

Detention under the state of emergency has continued to provide the state with a means of dealing with specific regional issues.

In KwaNdebele there have been extensive detentions of those opposed to 'independence'.

In Natal, where violent clashes between UDF/Cosatu supporters and Inkatha adherents have been raging, the police response has been to detain UDF supporters under emergency regulations. The state also scotched peace talks by detaining UDF participants just as the talks got underway.

Whilst detention causes both physical and psychological damage, the hardships faced by ex-detainees on their release are of great concern. Many children have found that on their release they are not admitted back into school and are labelled as 'troublemakers'. In February a case was reported of former detainees alleging that their matric results were being withheld.

It is common for detainees to come out of prison to find they have lost their jobs, and sometimes their homes. Another problem they may face is continued harassment from security or municipal police which forces them into hiding.

Disability grants and pensions are not being paid to detainees as the department of home affairs claims that the state gives detainees food and shelter while they are behind bars, and therefore do not need their grants. They may re-apply for their grants once they are released, but in the meantime their families receive no contribution to rent or food. Even after they are released, it takes a long time to get payment of the grant or pension re-established.

It has become a matter of course that emergency detainees are released with restrictions. In some instances, these restrictions are very severe, placing the former detainees under virtual house arrest or self-imposed detention. Recently many ex-detainees have been restricted from participating in discussions on the municipal elections.

Legal opportunities to challenge detention without trial have been severely eroded in the last 18 months.

Although several applications for release were made, only a few succeeded. Among the most important were those regarding detentions by the KwaNdebele police in South African territory.

A number of decisions handed down by the appeal court were of significance for detainees' rights. During 1986 several rights had been won for emergency detainees in successful applications. The state appealed and in its judgment in June 1987, the appeal court denied emergency detainees the following rights:

* the right to be given reasons for the detention;
* the right to make representations to the minister of law and order before being detained beyond the initial period of 14 or 30 days;
* the right to legal representation.

The appeal court found that the minister of law and order was not obliged to give reasons for the detention of an individual and that access to legal representation was a privilege, to be granted at the discretion of the commissioner of police.

It has been argued that the appeal court has tended to uphold the rights

of the state to act in the interests of state security as more important than the rights of the individual.

However, in March 1988, the appeal court upheld the right of emergency detainees to appear in court in applications regarding their detention.

Since June 1987 there have been at least 19 applications for interdicts to restrain the police from physical abuse of individual detainees held under the state of emergency and under section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

There are widespread allegations of mistreatment in detention. Particularly notorious is the handling of detainees in KwaNdebele, although applications for interdicts are made all over the country.

In September 1987, parliamentarian Helen Suzman raised the issue of abuse of detainees during a debate and concluded that there were enough allegations from different sources that a 'cast-iron case has been made out for a proper investigation, an independent inquiry with special reference to the indemnity clause which I have no doubt encourages excesses by the security police'.

Between June 1987 and October 1988 three people died in detention, two while being held under emergency regulations and the other while being held under Transkei security legislation. In the same period, at least four people are known to have died while being held in political circumstances.

According to Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee, teargas was used against detainees in prison on nine occasions between February 10 1987 and January 31 1988.

Conditions in detention vary widely from prison to prison and from police station to police station. Detainees are at the mercy of the authorities with respect to visitors, food parcels and study conditions. They have few, if any, rights and most concessions to their needs are regarded as privileges granted at the discretion of the police or heads of prisons.

'It has become a matter of course that emergency detainees are released with restrictions'

Over the past year there have been more reports of detainees experiencing psychiatric problems than ever before. Many detainees have been hospitalised and others referred to psychiatrists as outpatients.

In KwaNdebele, where there has been severe repression, many detainees have been held in police stations where conditions have been appalling. In an application for an order restraining the police, Frans Phatlane described conditions at the Verena police station in KwaNdebele. He alleged that he was forced to drink from a toilet bowl in his cell because it was the only water available. The toilet in the cell allegedly had no cistern. He also said he was forced to sleep on a mat five centimetres thick on a stone floor, had no pillow, and that his diet was 'grossly insufficient'.

In June 1987, the National Medical and Dental Association (Namda) prepared a dossier of information and called for an urgent investigation into detention conditions at Fort Glamorgan prison in East London. Issues raised related to overcrowding, food, medical care, and the physical and psychological effects of detention. The document said detainees were given two thin mats to sleep on and four blankets.

'Most detainees complain of general aches and pains and backache on release and attribute this to sleeping on cement'. Almost without exception, ex-detainees complained about the food. The dossier said medical treatment was one of the 'major areas ex-detainees bring up'.

According to the minister of justice there were 15 hunger strikes by emergency detainees in prisons between February and December 1987. Seven hunger strikes have been reported during 1988 with a particularly successful strike in the St Alban's Prison in Port Elizabeth where detainees won a number of concessions.

In January, section 29 detainee Thozamile Taai was hospitalised after being on hunger strike with fellow unionists for 24 days. He continued the hunger strike, reiterating his demand that they be released or charged, until he was charged in a court convened around his hospital bed.

The massive number of detentions in the year June 1986 to June 1987 was not repeated in the following 12 months.

The state has released an official figure of 2 896 people detained under the emergency regulations for more than 30 days between June 1987 and June 1988. The Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand has a list of 4 591 names of detainees for this period and estimates that at least 5 000 people were detained under the 1987 - 1988 state of emergency.

For the period June 1987 to June 1988, the centre estimates that there have been between 300 to 400 detentions under the Internal Security Act and bantustan security legislation. This excludes the 452 people detained in Bophuthatswana after the attempted coup in February 1988.

The total number of detentions under all legislation for the period June 1987 to June 1988 is therefore estimated as approximately 6 000 - in contrast to the 26 000 of the previous 12 months.

Since June 1988, approximately 1500 people have been detained, with an estimated 1 200 people in detention at the beginning of October.

The purpose of emergency detentions is not to charge people: as is indicated by the fact that only a small

Gisele Wulfsohn - Afrapix

The original 22 Delmas trialists : 'Apart from the UDF's senior office-bearers being engaged in this marathon trial, many of the organisation's leaders are into their third year of detention'

percentage of emergency detainees are ever charged.

Even when emergency detainees are charged, the 'preventive' aspect of their detentions is indicated. They are often charged after a year or longer - which means charging them was not a matter of urgency for the police - or they are charged with criminal offences like arson or malicious damage to property, for which they could have been held under the Criminal Procedure Act and charged within 48 hours.

Only two sections of the Internal Security Act providing for detention have been used since the renewal of the emergency in June 1987. Most of these detentions were under section 29, which allows for the questioning of someone the state believes has committed an offence endangering state security, or is a threat to state security, or has information relating to this.

In the last six months there was an upswing in the number of youths being detained under section 29. Many seem to have been picked up returning to the country, having allegedly received external training.

At the end of June, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies knew of 104 people being held under section 29.

Section 31 of the Act allows for the detention of a person who is required as a state witness in a political trial. The minister of justice told parliament that on February 29 1988, 49 people were being held under this section of the Act.

During 1988, section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Act was used in some cases to detain state witnesses in politically-related cases - for example, the murder trial of 18 members of the South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union (Sarhwu).

In a significant development in the Transkei, Major-General Bantu Holomisa spoke out against detention. Detentions in the Transkei have dropped dramatically since his military government took power.

However, the treatment of detainees and prisoners remains a sensitive issue for Holomisa's regime. This was indicated by the September 1988 banning of the recently-formed Prisoners Welfare Programmes (PRIWELPRO), an organisation established to monitor repression and campaign for the rights of ex-detainees and former prisoners.



Labour

This was the year the state officially declared war on the trade union movement: the year of the Labour Relations Amendment Act, large-scale detentions, and widespread attacks on union offices. But it was also the year of the largest, longest stayaway in South African history, a highly successful trade union congress and countless demonstrations of worker resilience. INGRID OBERY and SHAREEN SINGH report.

Was this the year the labour movement came of age, or the year it felt its age?

Strike action was down almost 80%, indicating a certain war- weariness after the turbulence of 1987, particularly following defeats in the metal and mine sectors. But there were also signs of a more cautious, strategic approach by unions - a move away from head-on confrontation to the pragmatic use of worker power.

There were no signs that the state was scaling down its onslaught on trade unions: repression and new legislation took their toll on the labour movement's struggle for worker rights.

As with political organisations, several unionists went 'missing' and have yet to be traced. Hundreds of workers were detained, some indefinitely but the bulk to be put on trial for strike action: 129 Ppwawu and Fawu members detained during a demonstration against the labour bill and released on R100 bail each; 100 Sacwu members arrested during a strike at Sasol and released on R1 000 bail each; 97 Bamcwu members arrested at a regular union meeting and released on R30 bail each - incidents like these put an immense strain on union resources.

At least ten union offices were bombed, and more than 20 raided by police or broken into by anti-union forces. Police presence and intervention at union meetings increased, particularly during strikes. Notable examples of this included the Ppwawu strike at Afcol, the metal strike, the Soweto municipal strike and, most recently, the hotel dispute, where a Harwu member was shot dead by a policeman during a lock-out at the Johannesburg Sun.

Direct confrontations between unions and the state became more regular as unions took on more 'political' roles after the February 24 restrictions on organisations like the UDF. By default



The new Labour Relations Amendment Act provided the major focus for worker protest this year.

rather than design, Cosatu - itself restricted in February - found itself having to fill the gap left by the UDF's restriction. The last eight months have thus been fraught with tension between pressures to take up campaigns around June 16, 'Save the Patriots' and the municipal elections, and restrictions on political activity.

State actions against the planned anti-apartheid conference organised by Cosatu included detentions, severe restrictions on individuals, harassment of delegates who arrived in Cape Town, and a final ban on the gathering.

The conference aimed to bring a wide range of organisations together, and would have looked at the nature of their alliance, and the way forward for anti-apartheid organisations. Key issues are still to be resolved within the unions on this proposed alliance: how far worker organisations can compromise to accommodate the politics of the middle ground; and the relative power and leadership of worker organisations within this popular front.

The union federations have increasingly found that they must deal with the political issues of the day. And on the ground, unions are faced with rank and file whose militancy and anger seem largely untouched by years of union-bashing and emergency rule.

Unions continue to grow, particularly after large, widely-publicised strikes. Although Nactu's membership has declined to 144 418 paid-up members, Cosatu has almost doubled in size since its formation, with a membership of almost 850 000. Numsa's paid-up membership increased from 167 000 to 183 000 within three months of the metalworkers strike this year; thousands joined Sarhwu after the SATS strike last year; the recent transport strike in Durban will probably net the union about 18 000 new members; Potwa's membership has increased to 16 000 since its strike in 1987; and Ppwawu and Fawu membership has risen significantly this year.

While the spirit is strong, and gains are often made - Sats' agreement to negotiate national recognition after the Durban strike is one example - these workers, often totally new to unionism, lack the experience of organisation evident in older, more established union members. Many strikes reflect the spontaneous reaction of thousands of dissatisfied workers, rather than carefully planned action aimed at a particular goal.

National conditions do not lend themselves to long-term organisational consolidation: a directionless government is anxious about the rise of the white right and the virtual collapse of the tricameral system. Employers fear sanctions and their effects on future economic growth and stability. And severe economic decline, potential disinvestment, and the psychological, physical and economic effects of both the internal and the border war add to a general climate of instability.

The June 6-8 stayaway involved the most significant working-class action of the year. Despite widespread initial scepticism about its potential for success, this was the longest and largest stayaway ever, with between 2,5-million and 3-million people staying away from work on each day. This action reflected massive protest against the Labour

Relations Amendment Act (LRAA), the state of emergency, and the February restrictions on 17 organisations.

The protest action was proposed at a Cosatu special congress held on May 14 this year. This congress was notable for its open debate and strategic assessment of conditions - unlike Cosatu's second congress in mid-1987, which was marked by divisions between different political tendencies in the federation.

The outcome of this year's congress reflected a healthier balance between the different tendencies and a more democratic approach to decision-making. Cosatu information officer Frank Meintjies put it this way: 'The congress opened up debate on strategy and tactics on the road to socialism - as did the three-day protest and preparations for the anti-apartheid conference'.

The anti-apartheid conference was organised in terms of a resolution adopted at the special congress, where unions committed themselves to the establishment of a broad front of anti-apartheid forces. This took the political fight to the state in an attempt to deny it the opportunity of dividing popular opposition further.



Anna Zieminski - Afrapix

The metal strike: Numsa's membership increased from 167 000 to 183 000 within three months

The nature of alliances remains high on the agenda of the labour movement. Several meetings showed union willingness to test the ground for some form of co-operation with capital against the state. A significant gathering of this nature - held over the weekend of August 6-7, involved the leadership of Cosatu, the UDF and various high-ranking business representatives.

The Consultative Business Movement (CBM), an alliance of businessmen willing to 'play a role in the struggle against apartheid' - arose from this meeting. The CBM aims for an ongoing consultative relationship with popular organisations on issues affecting the economy.

The success of the three-day stay-away was based, in part, on union willingness to ally with the democratic movement. After this display of worker and community action, Manpower Minister Pietie du Plessis suddenly declared that his 'door was always open', and met with union lawyers to discuss objections to the new labour legislation. The South African Co-ordinating Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola) initated a series of meetings with Cosatu and Nactu to discuss the legislation. But Saccola backtracked and the parties failed to agree on a common strategy towards the legislation.

Saccola may have been testing unions' ability or willingness to sustain pressure on business - because on September 1, the bill was promulgated and became law.

Options open to unions in opposing or dealing with the provisions of the LRAA are discussed in the Briefs section of this WIP. The long- term impact of the new legislation is not yet clear. As Meintjies puts it: 'The months ahead will tell whether trade unions will be permanently weakened by the Labour Relations Act or whether we will find strategies to advance nonetheless'.

The new labour legislation has led to increased joint action between Cosatu and Nactu.

'One-country, one-federation' is still seen as an ideal by some union-

ists. The May 2-3 Harare talks between the ANC and Nactu dealt with this issue, and the parties agreed it was imperative for the labour movement to strive towards the establishment of a single united labour federation.

A leadership with more clearly-defined Africanist leanings emerged at Nactu's August national congress. But general secretary Piroshaw Camay said the federation's general principles remain unchanged, and substantial policy shifts do not seem on the cards at present.

In a recent unity development, Cosatu and Nactu have agreed to convene a joint summit before the end of 1988. The summit will center around opposition to the provisions of the LRAA.

While Cosatu is growing and a number of union mergers have taken place in the three years of its existence, issues of unity have not all run smoothly, despite the federation's broad commitment to building one union per industry. Ccawusa and Cosatu have been unable to resolve internal political differences in the commercial catering union, while Gawu and Actwusa have failed to reach agreement over merging.

Many of the bigger, more-established unions came from a tradition of slow, solid shop-floor organisation. But rapid increases in membership and union engagement in broader political issues often prevented consolidation and education of new membership. Moving to consolidate the industrial unions, particularly in Cosatu, is now becoming a priority in current union organising strategies.

This turning inwards has meant unions often limit emphasis on the structures of their federations. Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo's comment in his speech to the federation's special congress probably still applies: 'The poor participation of Cosatu affiliates in the federation's structures has meant that forums where our militant shopfloor leaders could meet, plan

'While Cosatu is growing, issues of unity have not all run smoothly'

strategies to implement resolutions, and forge a clear way forward have not been used...'

Many recent union disputes have been handled at national sector level. The campaign over terms of disinvestment initiated by CWIU is an example of this (see Labour trends and Briefs). CWIU has also applied for a conciliation board over the issue of national sector bargaining with the petroleum industry.

The desirability of national bargaining forums is under investigation in a number of sectors. Numsa and three other IMF unions joined forces against Seifsa in the 1988 metal wage talks. No major wage gains were made, but important agreements were reached: a commitment from Seifsa to close the racially-determined wage gap; stop-order facilities to collect membership fees for IMF unions; a procedure to investigate unresolved allegations of racial discrimination; and May 1 and June 16 in exchange for two other public holidays.

While pushing for national bargaining to cover a majority of issues at industrial council level, Numsa also argues for plant-level bargaining over and above the yearly industrial council package.

Sector-based shop steward councils are also emerging, supported by a number of unions. Ppwawu and Numsa workers in the Afcol group of companies are represented on a joint shop steward council. CWIU has initiated a similar set-up in the petroleum industry.

This raises the possibility of multi-union blocks negotiating with large multi-nationals. Barlow Rand may be a case in point for the future. In the same vein, a joint shop steward council has been set up by the SA branch of the International Union of Food-workers for all organised factories owned by SA Breweries. Seven unions are represented.

And in the hotel industry Harwu, CLCTU, NLCTU and Ccawusa joined forces in negotiating wages and substantive issues with Southern Sun. The Southern Sun joint shop steward council represented the four unions - which together have over 8 000 members employed in the group.

Other issues of growing organisational importance include women's and gender issues, the unemployed, the development of co-operatives, and organisation of the farming sector. 'Cosatu's weak areas remain the public sector, where we have begun to make important inroads, and farmworkers where there has been little progress', admits Meintjies.

In August this year Numsa held a large women's conference. The union is in the process of surveying women workers in the metal industry to determine their specific demands and problems. Findings will inform a set of demands to be included in 1989 national wage negotiations.

Ccawusa organised a national women's day in August, the first commemoration of this sort to be organised by the union. Their women's group also includes men. TGWU, CWIU and Ppwawu have also resolved to address women's issues in the coming year, and Cosatu held a women's conference during August.

Nactu has an active federation-wide women's section which is one of eight units which have made up the federation structure since 1982. The unit has focused on issues ranging from shop-floor sexual harassment to legislation affecting married women and families. At the Nactu annual conference one of the issues discussed was the absence of women in the federation leadership. Patricia de Lille was subsequently elected Nactu vice-president.

Increasing retrenchments, and ever-growing numbers of unemployed workers, raise crucial issues for unions: how to deal with scab labour, and how to organise the substantial number of coloured, Indian and white workers who often make up the bulk of scab labour forces. The impetus to address these issues comes particularly from Natal, the Eastern and Western Cape. Cosatu has planned seminars to discuss programmes of action. In the Western Cape the Unemployed Workers Co- ordinating Committee is planning strategies on how to deal with scab labour.

Another growing focus is the organisation of the unemployed and the investigation of schemes or projects which can provide subsistence to at least a portion of these workers. NUM has employed a full time co-operatives co-ordinator to examine the viability of setting up productive co-operatives for unemployed mineworkers.

Dismissed Sarmcol workers in Howick, Natal started Sawco, a co-op which silkscreens T-shirts and runs a small farm. In Phalaborwa, 50 dismissed Foskor workers formed a co-op to silkscreen T-shirts. The project is five-months old and orders at this stage are exclusively from NUM. The Thusanang co-op in Brits was started by dismissed B&S metal workers. It has three production units: 14 women in a sewing co- op, five men running a fencing project, and five men in a brick-making project.

While co-operatives appear to provide useful avenues for unity and co-operative working, the growing feeling among those involved is that they are not subsistence sources of employment for the unemployed.

'This year, the campaign against the LRAA overshadowed the Living Wage Campaign'

Problem areas being discussed include: the fact that projects require huge capital injections; inadequate marketing strategies and techniques resulting in low sales of goods produced; lack of education, training and skills among members; problems of democracy and organisation of projects; and the fact that the projects often cannot pay members subsistence wages.

Wages remain the most volatile issue for workers, and the majority of strikes and disputes recorded concerned wage disputes. Last year, although the living wage campaign did not proceed as originally conceived in terms of building Cosatu structures, it did contribute to one of the biggest strike waves in South Africa's history.

This year the campaign against the LRAA overshadowed the living wage campaign. The campaign against the bill chould have formed part of the living wage campaign, but the issues were viewed separately. The living wage campaign is still on union agendas: but while most unions include the rhetoric in their yearly demands, negotiations continue much as before.

The effective banning of many political and community organisations forced Cosatu to adopt a more overtly political profile. And at no stage were the living wage and political struggles linked organisationally.

And in a serious failing, the concept of a living wage has not been quantified by the unions. With huge disparities in wages - the Labour Research Service in Cape Town calculates a range from R42 to R210 per week - it is unlikely that unions will be realistically able to demand an across-the-board minimum wage in the near future. The problem may initially be addressed through joint shop stewards' councils representing a number of companies spanning more than one sector, but owned by a single multi-national.

Cross-sector pressure again failed to materialise during the year. NUM and Numsa, for example, are logical allies around wage talk time. But once again this year, despite speculation about joint action, the unions in the most strategic sectors of the South African economy failed to co-ordinate their negotiations.

Last year, it was evident that workers in the metal and mining sector wanted a simultaneous strike. Leadership of the two unions have fairly diverse political profiles and this may be at the root of their failure to unify during crucial negotiations. Certainly neither union was in a position to undertake a protracted national strike this year, but evidence of unity in the two sectors would undoubtedly give employers something to think about.

With hardening management and government attitudes, unions' weakened financial resources after 1987 strikes, lowered standards of living for many workers, and an unwillingness to head each wage negotiation towards a strike, unions are often concentrating energies around provident funds, housing, health and safety, and parental rights in negotiations. Examples of this include the metal industry settlement, and the NUM/chamber of

Chris Ledohowski - Afrapix

The Labour Relations Act: It has already provoked countless protests, and will be one of the most testing challenges for the labour movement in 1989

mines settlement where offers around provident fund benefits rather than wage demands prompted the union to settle.

Arising out of its campaign against hostel conditions, NUM has looked at appropriate housing schemes for workers at De Beers, and discussions are taking place at Rand Mines and Samancor; Numsa, together with Metal Box management, is looking at a feasible housing scheme through the provident fund. The union is also exploring schemes at Iscor and Escom.

Most Cosatu unions are examining the benefits of provident funds. The precedent-setting agreement was between Fawu and Robertsons - a jointly-managed fund with the employer as sole contributor, backdated to 1952. And Numsa has proposed that the metal industry pension fund be converted to a provident fund.

The high accident and death rate on South African mines has meant that NUM has taken the lead in health and safety awareness. Its most recent breakthrough was an agreement with Phalaborwa mining which provides for 100 safety stewards elected by miners.

Other notable 1988 agreements in these areas include Ccawusa's parental rights agreement with Pick 'n Pay which addressed the issue of gender discrimination, improved benefits for expectant mothers and included rights for expectant fathers; the NUM/chamber agreement on improved death benefits for miners' families; and the Gawu agreement with the Eastern Province and Western Province Clothing Manufacturers Association providing for yearly instead of two-yearly wage negotiations.

Employee Share Ownership Schemes (Esops) have recently become very popular with managements, but unfavourably received by most union leaders. Many bosses see them as part of the way to building a happy, non-antagonistic workforce, and they continue to make offers.

Anglo American in particular was heavily criticised for unilaterally making share offers to workers without any consultation with the unions. Samcor's share offer to Numsa workers resulted in strike action, with workers finally agreeing to the initial proposal that the shares go into a trust with trustee representatives from both workers and management.

Fawu rejected an offer from ABI saying the sale of shares advanced profit-makers' interests while dividing united action by workers.

A Numsa official said that if management's motive was to get workers

to work harder and strike less, they were offering far too little, and that the repressive context discredited any ideological gains they may have hoped to win.

An issue already affecting workers is privatisation - the 'streamlining, reorganising and restructuring' which most often means retrenchment for large numbers. The municipal workers' strike in Soweto is a case in point (see Briefs).

With government cutbacks, privatisation seems inevitable, and will probably increase in importance for the labour movement.

Several new forms of legislation were introduced this year, most notably the LRAA. Similar legislation - the Sats Labour Bill - was introduced covering employees of the SA Transport Services. It provides for the establishment of a labour council to deal with labour relations in the industry. Legislation affecting post office workers in the same way may be in the pipeline.

The envisaged labour council deals only with officially-recognised unions, and all unions, irrespective of size, and management, have the same number of representatives on the council. Sarhwu has rejected these provisions as undemocratic and these issues will form a central part of their recognition negotiations with Sats.

The industrial court has been fairly busy this year. Unions were pessimistic after the court's judgement against Mawu in the Sarmcol case last year, where 900 striking workers were ruled to have been fairly dismissed. But in the Sacwu vs Sentrachem case this year, the court gave management six months to eliminate racially-based wage discrimination, and ordered it to re-hire 500 workers who had been refused re-employment after a legal strike. Two other cases also resulted in workers, dismissed after a legal strike, being reinstated.

A major case which did not end up in court involved NUM's wage claim against Anglo American for workers dismissed after last year's three- week wage strike. NUM lost the issue at arbitration. Another out-of- court settlement involved Numsa and Iscor, where a dispute arising from last year's wage strike was settled with improved fringe benefits.

There were several major trials involving union members: the treason and sedition trial involving Numsa general secretary Moss Mayekiso and four Alexandra Action Committee members continues and will certainly carry on into 1989; the Kinross Gold Mine hearing ended with Kinross mine and five employees being acquitted on all charges relating to the 1986 mine disaster which claimed the lives of 177 workers; Sarhwu workers were convicted of murder following last year's Sats strike, and Ppwawu members were detained after the killing of scabs during the Afcol strike this year.

Despite some setbacks, Cosatu's Meintjies believes that 1988 'has been a good year for the labour movement, despite the restrictions and increased repression.

'On the shop floor we have made great advances with hundreds of thousands of workers taking strike action. Employer resistance to the living wage and attempts to impose the wage freeze have generally not succeeded', he said.

'There have also been important gains and concessions on "benefits" demanded as part of the living wage campaign. Politically the labour movement continues to play a crucial role in putting forward demands for democracy and an end to apartheid'.

Nactu's Piroshaw Camay says that the union federation he leads goes into 1989 'more determined than ever to continue the protection of members in the workplace and the wider community'.

Although the deepening recession has not allowed unions to improve wages in the same way as in previous years, Nactu unions 'have negotiated increases above the Consumer Price Index', says Camay.

Despite increasing employer intransigence and state repression, Nactu argues that it has improved its links with political organisations, churches, students and the aged, and was also able to meet with the ANC, PAC, BCMA and New Unity Movement during 1988.

In Camay's assessment, Nactu has emerged from its recent conference 'strengthened in spirit and with improved structures to build a national workers movement'.

But whatever this year's gains and losses for the union movement have been, 1989 - characterised by a flagging economy, the new Labour Relations Amendment Act, and a repressive environment - promises to be a testing time for the labour movement as a whole.

'Nactu unions have negotiated wage increases above the Consumer Price Index'

— Piroshaw Camay

Foreign policy

Pretoria's need to crush domestic opposition to apartheid while smiling on the world has led to a foreign policy which often appears schizophrenic and contradictory. DAVID COETZEE reports from London on perceptions of this 'smiling death' policy, and the implications of events such as the Angolan peace talks, the US elections and persistent dirty tricks carried out by South African agents.

South Africa's twin policies of domestic repression and regional destabilisation have brought their inevitable negative international repercussions - but at the same time sharpened Pretoria's need to call on its traditional Western allies for help.

In Western Europe Pretoria's major efforts were devoted to attempts - often with the aid of organised right-wing and neo-fascist political pressure groups - to stem anti-apartheid mobilisation and limit the sanctions movement.

By the year end, however, Pretoria was facing a Europe in which Britain's Margaret Thatcher seemed more isolated than ever in her strident insistence on constructive engagement with South Africa's rulers.

Domestic South African events, such as the banning of anti-apartheid groups and the trial of the Sharpeville Six, pushed West German leader Helmut Kohl to reassess his sanctions stand in March - though no official measures followed. Already, however, South African exports had registered a sharp decline in West Germany, the country's third largest trading partner.

The bid to cut off European Community (EC) funding for anti-apartheid groups within South Africa also raised a storm of protest in EC institutions. This funding for 'acceptable' opposition bodies is one way of avoiding sharper decisions about sanctions. Pretoria eventually backed down on proposed legislation effectively blocking international funding for internal anti-apartheid activities.

Gangsterism used as an adjunct of policy, always so visible inside South Africa and the region, was extended to Europe with no apparent concern for diplomatic consequences - and again brought a clamour of protest against the South African connection.

In London the embarrassed British security services bundled off into oblivion the chief conspirators in the case of an attempted kidnapping of ANC leaders.



Cuban President Fidel Castro: SADF's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale was historic

Foreign Minister Pik Botha: Some diplomatic gains — behind closed doors

The twice-attempted murder of the ANC's Brussels representative, Godfrey Motsepe, and the successful murder of Paris representative Dulcie September in March, isolated Pretoria's best friends.

Even in Thatcher's London, the ANC representative was immediately given round-the-clock police protection (conveying ironically the kind of diplomatic standing the movement has only been able to achieve in the socialist and some African countries).

Nor was the gangsterism in the region ignored abroad. The capture of South African commandos and agents in Botswana and Zimbabwe was well reported, as was the attempted killing in April of ANC exile lawyer Albie Sachs in Maputo, who was seriously injured by a car bomb.

At the time there were even press reports in the US of FBI warnings against South African hit squads. In the popular consciousness South Africa was fast acquiring the reputation of a 'Papa Doc' state - and this could do no good at all for those of its diplomats seeking to assert respectability in those international forums still open to it.

It also made it more difficult for any Western politician wishing to be seen to do business with the regime - as Thatcher does.

The South African government's 'strike the enemy anywhere' strategy was presumably a considered response to what Defence Minister Magnus Malan saw as the ANC's bid to present itself abroad as a government in waiting. But Pretoria clearly had no idea of the extent of popular feeling in Europe and the US on the entire apartheid and racism issue - or of the pressure even right-wing governments are under.

So its diplomatic gains in Europe, such as they are, have been those registered in cloistered and secretive surroundings - at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation talks in Vienna in August, where they succeeded in not being expelled, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) talks in Berlin in September, where they could at least bring the depth of their economic crisis to the attention of their banking friends.

In Vienna Pik Botha admitted what everyone knew - that South Africa had nuclear potential. He wanted full participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty with guaran-

tees that would cancel sanctions - that South Africa could sell and buy uranium without discrimination, and engage in international exchanges in nuclear technology. The negotiations continue.

It seemed the West and the Soviet Union decided to treat Pretoria with the respect accorded an unexploded bomb: unpredictable, possibly deadly. They were agreed that it should remain where it could be watched.

The same powerful anti-apartheid forces revealing themselves in Western Europe have also been visible in the USA. There the long- hidden political forces of the black and Hispanic communities, mobilised in the Rainbow Coalition after the last presidential election, were focused in an unprecedented fashion on apartheid.

These grassroots forces showed in the spread of anti-apartheid sanctions legislation - in March this year there were no fewer than 48 bills before the senate carrying some reference to South Africa. The Sullivan Code was recognised as futile and disinvestment became a steady stream; US companies were announcing their withdrawal from South Africa each week. Sanctions campaigners began working on 'non-equity ties' - the links maintained by the US multinationals who got out.

Massive falls in trade, especially relating to coal, steel and uranium, were already being registered and still-stricter anti- apartheid legislation was on the cards.

The US general accounting office reported in September that even the ten 'strategic minerals' excluded after right-wing pressure from the 1986 anti-apartheid law were not so strategic after all.

In March, Anglo American supremo Harry Oppenheimer said there was 'no early prospect of a turn in the sanctions tide', and he described SA-US relations as being at an all time low.

Nor was this deterioration restricted to the US. Pretoria's second tier of

Gone: Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet

Gone: Bavarian prime minister Franz Josef Strauss

allies - Israel, Far Eastern and Latin American states - was also touched.

Israel, under US pressure, had already lowered its visible level of military collaboration with South Africa.

Japan was made aware - under US prodding - that it had overtaken the US as South Africa's main trading partner, and instructed its businessmen to draw back. But anti-apartheid pressures are not yet strong in Japan, and businessmen have not taken much heed of their government's instruction to back-off from South African links.

It was a blow to South Africa when its Chilean ally, dictator Augusto Pinochet, was rebuffed in a popular poll in October. Pik Botha had visited Chile in March with a stopover in Brazil and then Uruguay.

Elsewhere on the continent the military, as the determinants in their countries' politics, were slowly being forced back under democratic control.

The gangsterism which spilled over into Western Europe was more visible in the southern African region.

Botswana and Zimbabwe were both raided, and there were assassination attacks, but in the past year both countries have sharpened their security, and Pretoria's agents have been captured and put on trial - an important blow to the myth of military and racial invincibility.

The dual-track policy on Mozambique was continued - support for the Renamo bandit groups, together with official offers of economic assistance to Maputo. Mozambique's policy toward South Africa has been simply to demonstrate in the most visible possible way who the aggressor is, and finally to undercut Pretoria's support in the West.

In this President Joaquim Chissano had some success: when British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe visited Mozambique in September, he called on Pretoria to stop arming Renamo - the first time he has done so publicly.

These issues, however, became a sideshow alongside the war with Angola this past year. South Africa started off with - and may still have - the kind of hubris shown by Israel as it went into Lebanon. The generals and the politicians in an increasingly-military state could not but believe in their invincibility. They failed to take seriously enough the African army to their north, and they fell.

The victory of the combined Fapla-Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale was called historic by Cuban President



Paul Weinberg - Afrapix

PW Botha: Making friends with Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko — but hardly anybody else

Fidel Castro. South African forces had sprung to the rescue of Unita last year (as they had done two years previously) and had inflicted a defeat on Fapla, which retreated up to Cuito Cuanavale. But Pretoria did not understand their resolve to defend Angola. Perhaps they even believed their own propaganda about the relative influence of the Soviet Union and its alleged loss of interest in the war.

Whatever their motives, they were unable to take Cuito Cuanavale, tried to extend their and Unita's hold further north and failed, found they could not return, and found at the same time a reinforced Cuban- Fapla-Swapo army suddenly brought up to the very doorsteps of their northern Namibian bases. The days in which they had casually dominated the entire south of Angola were over.

The diplomatic consequences of thousands of their men being trapped in Angola are still being felt. It was the single largest factor in bringing them into serious negotiations. South Africa may find itself for a time on the side of its old allies and protectors, the US Republicans, represented by Chester Crocker, as they try to negotiate, each with a view to its own interests, the rescue of Unita. But in the long run no-one is still interested in backing South Africa's hold on Namibia, or its destabilisation of Angola.

In the teeth of defeat, PW Botha talked to his main African ally, Zaire's Mobuto Sese Seko, and announced large-scale diplomatic victories to come with unnamed African states. But in the one place a deal had been done - tiny Equatorial Guinea - Nigeria promptly instructed it to cut the links, which it did.

On the issues of Namibia, as on Angola, the US and South Africa were no longer on parallel tracks. The US has decided it can play its own game in Angola, using Unita but also using the IMF.

South Africa is once again on its own, in an isolation bound to increase if Michael Dukakis gets in as the next US president - but even if George Bush takes over. It had its best shots during Reagan's era.

Dukakis told a meeting in July: 'We're not going to sell arms to terrorists. We're going to crack down on terrorists, whether they live in Beirut, Tehran or Johannesburg'. He accused Pretoria of naked military aggression against its neighbours.

No doubt US political realities will modify his actions if he becomes president. But US opinion on the issue of apartheid is a good deal more to the left than ever before.

As the year end approached, Pretoria has seen its friends going out like candles - Franz-Josef Strauss, strongman of Bavaria; Augusto Pinochet, dictator of Chile; Reagan in the White House.

To crush domestic and regional opposition Pretoria will be forced to take further measures which will strictly limit chances of aid from the successors to Reagan, Strauss and their ilk.

Courts

In previous years, the courts have been a barometer of political resistance. Numerous treason and terrorism trials have illustrated the level of political and military activity in the country. But all that seems to be changing, argues GLENN MOSS. Fewer people are being brought before court - they are either killed, detained indefinitely, or, possibly, persuaded to spy on their own organisations.

More than 50 South Africans were accused of high treason during 1988. This is a serious political charge, carrying the death penalty in most countries - South Africa included.

Hundreds more have faced charges in dozens of other political trials, accused of murder, terrorism, membership of banned organisations, undergoing military training, and possession of arms and explosives. Sentences of those convicted have ranged between death, 25 years' imprisonment, flogging - or a fine.

By the middle of the year at least 56 people sentenced in trials with political overtones had spent time on Pretoria's death row waiting for appeal outcomes, reprieves, or the sheriff's invitation to die at the end of a rope.

In June, the University of Witwatersrand's Centre for Applied Legal Studies counted nearly 70 political trials in process, or due to begin within the next two months. They involved over 450 accused.

But despite these figures, some analysts believe political trials are less significant than they once were.

Eight years ago, *Work In Progress* argued that a study of political trials could 'provide insights into organisations involved in resistance activity'; give 'an indication of the level and intensity of popular resentment and organisation present within the dominated classes'; and indicate 'long-term trends both as far as resistance activity is concerned, as well as possible state response to such activity'.

For years, political trials provided one of the few legal sources of material on the nature and development of armed struggle, and developments and policies within resistance organisations.

More recently, *WIP* and other publications were able to lift a corner of the state of emergency's veil masking the township conflicts and struggles of

'For the state, bringing people to court to face politically motivated charges is not as important as it once was'

1985 and 1986, through careful and creative reporting of political trials.

Why, then, the argument that trial proceedings have become less significant? After all, the ongoing treason trial of Moses Mayekiso and four others has provided a wealth of information on Alexandra township during the 'insurrectionary' period of 1985 and 1986: people's courts and street committees, vigilantes allegedly linked to township police, organising strategies of youth, student and civic organisations - this is the very guts of a trial in which the state is seeking to prove that the constitution of alternative structures of power - 'people's power' - involves treason.

A recently-concluded trial of eight young Alexandra residents found guilty of sedition provided substantial detail on the operation of people's courts in that township during 1985 and 1986.

The 'Delmas' treason trial, now drawing to a close in a Pretoria court, has examined, analysed and dissected the UDF and its Vaal affiliates in tens of thousands of pages of evidence, exhibits and argument. This trial - in which 19 UDF and Azapo members are charged with a conspiracy to overthrow the state - details the development of the 1984 Vaal rent boycott, which some view as the beginning of the 'insurrectionary' politics of the mid-1980s. Prominent among the accused are 'Terror Lekota and Popo Molefe, both senior national UDF officials at the time of their detention.

The trial of alleged ANC 'big fish' Ismail Ebrahim and his two co-accused, Acton Maseko and Simon Dladla, has placed a wealth of usually unavailable information on ANC structures and activities before the public. This includes the evidence of four ANC defectors (referred to only as X1, X2, X3 and X4) and evidence taken on commission in London, where senior ANC personnel like military intelligence head Ronnie Kasrils and national executive committee member Jacob Zuma gave details about ANC policy, military and political structures, lines of command and hierarchy.

But these sorts of trials have become exceptions during 1988. There are others like them, of course: two important conspiracy trials in Cape Town involve 28 people allegedly associated with ANC military activity. It is probable that at least one of these trials will reveal details about Umkhonto we Sizwe's Western Cape operations over the past few years, including local cell structures and acts of sabotage.

And the trial of six alleged PAC members in Pretoria has provided some insights into that organisation's attempts to develop a military presence in South Africa, and forge links with Qibla, a Cape-based Islamic movement.

But trials involving active opposition to apartheid - be it in the form of armed struggle, mass politics, underground activity or popular opposition and resistance - have become less important. Not to those involved, of course. And not necessarily to the broad anti- apartheid opposition. But for the state, bringing people to court to face politically-motivated charges is not as important as it once was.

Organised township opposition and resistance to apartheid has lessened under the impact of successive states of emergency, massive waves of repression, and new state strategies

Messina trialists Mthethelei Mncube and Mzaondeleli Nondula, who received multiple death penalties this year — the acts were committed during 1985 and 1986. In terms of the Prisons Act, their photographs may not be published.

combining repression, control and material upgrading.

Localised township insurrections - witnessed nationally during 1985 and 1986 - are over for the present. And the sort of political trials this period gave rise to are also dwindling. The courts are still hearing some cases of public violence, arson, malicious damage to property and murder which emerge from this period. But trials of this nature are becoming less frequent, and few relate to contemporary resistance.

There is still a regular flow of trials in which accused face charges of undergoing military training, usually under the auspices of the ANC. These trials have shown that most initial training of Umkhonto recruits takes place at ANC camps in Angola, with more specialised courses held in East Germany or the Soviet Union. However, there are growing indications of basic training taking place within South Africa.

The majority of those facing terrorism charges are alleged to have undergone external training, and returned to South Africa with the intention of either smuggling in weapons, establishing arms caches, reconnoitring potential targets for attack, or undertaking acts of sabotage.

Noticeable about many of these trials is the speed with which this category of Umkhonto recruit seems to be apprehended by police. A number of current terrorism trials involve accused who were arrested very shortly after crossing back into South Africa - sometimes being apprehended within hours of entering South African territory.

This group also seems at some risk of being shot by police when apprehended. Police spokesmen claimed that 79 ANC guerillas were arrested in the first six months of 1988, while a further ten were 'killed in clashes'. According to police figures, a total of 106 guerillas were either arrested or killed during 1987.

Police releases in the second half of the year have been peppered with further reports of arrests and deaths of 'terrorists' - although it is almost impossible to confirm the accuracy of these reports.

On June 16, for example, Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok announced that police had killed nine ANC members the week before, when they had confronted 'two heavily-armed groups of terrorists' near Swaziland. In mid-July, the SADF announced that four ANC members had been killed in the Kruger National Park in a joint army and air force operation. On July 24, four suspected PAC insurgents were killed at a roadblock in the Western Transvaal.

On August 4, police announced that they had killed five suspected guerillas near Alldays in the Northern Transvaal. This brought the number of alleged insurgents killed in the area in the previous fortnight to nine. Police announced the death of another suspected guerilla in the area on August 9.

If police statistics are to be

believed, these figures alone (and they are far from comprehensive) show that South African security forces killed ten suspected guerillas during the first half of the year - and trebled this figure in the next two months.

Many alleged guerillas now on trial were apprehended by police in late 1986 or 1987. The delay between detention and trial is an integral part of South Africa's legal process with long periods of interrogative detention a normal prelude to trial, release or other action.

But despite this time lag in legal proceedings, it is clear that guerillas charged with acts of sabotage appear in court very infrequently. Police claim there were 230 acts of 'terror' in South Africa during 1986; 234 incidents in 1987; and nearly 90 had been recorded by June 1988. Yet during 1988, surprisingly few accused have faced charges related to these incidents of guerilla activity.

The Messina trial related to land mine explosions during 1985 and 1986; the Ebrahim treason case includes allegations of 'mine warfare' on Eastern Transvaal farms during 1986; two Cape Town trials include allegations of limpet attacks at DF Malan airport and elsewhere; and Gordon Webster - captured by police, released by colleagues in a daring raid on a hospital, and then recaptured on his return to South Africa - was found guilty of sabotaging an electrical substation and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. A Johannesburg trial which involves a bomb attack on a Hillbrow cafe starts shortly, but few 1988 trials have related directly to incidents of guerilla activity.

It is possible that the legal process is taking even longer than before to bring accused to court in political trials. There has also been speculation that periods of interrogative detention are often being used in attempts to 'turn' guerillas into spies for South Africa. Certainly the conditions of indefinite solitary confinement and total dependence on interrogators and other state officials create the preconditions for 'turning' soldiers. American experiences in Korea and Vietnam demonstrate this well.

Nonetheless, there are indications that fewer guerillas who have been involved in acts of sabotage are being apprehended by the police - or if they are being apprehended, they are not appearing in court. The increasing numbers of alleged guerillas killed by police and army may partially explain this.

The period of apartheid rule associated with Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Vorster was strange in its emphasis on legal procedures. The juridical process was increasingly perverted during this period, becoming an administrative caricature of justice. Yet the carefully- worded banning and house arrest orders of the time, the inquests into the growing number of deaths in detention after 1963, and the show trials were a strange legalistic feature of an exceptionally brutal system. The John Vorsters and Jimmy Krugers of the 1960s and early 1970s aimed to convince white South Africa and its international allies that their government faced a real threat from 'terrorism' and 'international communism', and was accordingly worth supporting. One convenient tactic in this strategy was the show trial - large numbers of ANC supporters or members, charged in gradiose conspiracies allegedly aimed at overthrowing the state by violence.

But the administration of Botha, Malan and their militarist clique has different priorities. Their government has faced a real threat from opposition forces and the international community. South Africa's rulers badly need to portray national stability to hold white support internally, and attract investment and support internationally. The show trial of notable opposition leaders, or indications of internal resistance and armed struggle, run counter to this portrayal of stability.

More importantly, the form of state developing in South Africa is dominated by secrecy: decisions and their implementation are increasingly controlled by a national web of joint management centres, local and regional mini-centres, regional services councils and the state security council.

State strategies have little to do with court proceedings or trials of leaders, activists or individual guerilla fighters. The public nature of these proceedings runs counter to the ethos of secrecy which is central to the current South African state.

The shadowy world of vigilante activity and abduction is more in tune with the national security management system than trials open to the public and press, where defence witnesses, lawyers and accused can challenge the state's version of reality. The long-term preventive detention of thousands of apartheid's political opponents also makes political trials less central than before. Incarceration, punishment and removal from the political arena are achieved at the stroke of a pen, avoiding court proceedings which can sometimes be embarrassing to the state.

And the effective banning of opposition organisations, linked to stringent censorship and control of the media, allows government to achieve its blanket of silence without recourse to public political trials. Government threats to limit court reporting further - and the possibility of holding some categories of political trials behind closed doors - could hide resistance to apartheid even more.

Political trials will not disappear. But the changing form of the state, and its changing priorities, suggest that the prosecution of political opponents will be less common than before.

Raids into neighbouring states; attacks on ANC centres and personnel; vigilante activity; long-term detention under emergency regulation; censorship and control of information; restrictions on organisation and individuals; 'dirty tricks' departments; disinformation campaigns: these, rather than political trials, are the repressive weapons which have dominated 1988.

The Economy

Meet South Africa's latest economic indicator: Nelson Mandela, jailed leader of the African National Congress. As DAVID NIDDRIE argues in this review of recent economic developments, Mandela's chances of being released improve as the economy deteriorates. And if current attitudes on Mandela's situation are anything to go by, the economy is in a pretty bad way.

You can tell the state of the South African economy by the eagerness with which President PW Botha addresses the question of freeing Nelson Mandela.

When the economy is looking good, Mandela's chances of release look bad, and vice versa.

And Botha, who as recently as June was suggesting that the editor of an Afrikaans-language paper be fired for calling for Mandela's release, can hardly make a public appearance these days without saying how much he would like to see Mandela free.

Which is another way of saying that the South African economy is in a bad way. And, given the economy's overriding dependence on foreign investment to keep it moving, that in turn translates as: South Africa desperately needs an injection of foreign investment.

The need for foreign investment is not new: South Africa has always relied on foreign capital to feed the economy - which, through the 1950s, 1960s and most of the 1970s, was able to turn that investment into healthy foreign earnings through export.

But by 1985 the picture looked very different:

* a falling gold price (down to US$302 from a 1980 high of $850) had cut foreign income;

* a falling rand value in relation to other currencies made repayment of foreign loans more expensive;

* local interest rates had been pushed up in a Reserve Bank attempt to control inflation;

* and mounting political turmoil at home was feeding pro-sanctions pressure overseas to make South Africa a less attractive investment prospect than it had been in the past.

It was the third of these factors which precipitated the crisis from which the economy has yet to extract itself.

The high local interest rates encouraged local banks (in particular Nedbank) to borrow at low rates overseas and lend out locally at higher

Finance Minister Barend du Plessis: South Africa will have to go it alone

rates - making themselves a quick killing.

That, at least, was the theory. But greater forces were at play. Foreign bankers were already cautious about lending long-term to South African institutions, so most of the loans were short-term, but lent out locally for longer periods. Meanwhile the dollar was getting stronger (making the rand proportionately weaker, thus increasing the rand value of the loans). The authorities did nothing to stop the process, either - they were swept up in a fever of 'free market' logic that required an almost mystical belief in the economy's ability to regulate itself.

Between 1980 and 1985 South Africa's foreign debt increased an acceptable 34% - but in rand terms it leapt a staggering 293%, according to Cape Town University economic historian Alan Hirsch. Six months before the crunch finally came in August 1985 a US bank reported: 'South Africa's external finances are in chaos'.

In August US banks, concerned about South Africa's ability to repay its debts, demanded the immediate repayment of all outstanding loans. Unable to repay immediately, Botha's government stopped all repayments, resuming them only in March the following year after extensive negotiations over a timetable.

It was while this process was underway that Botha, eager to demonstrate his ability to control the political turmoil that was helping turn South Africa into a bad investment risk, suddenly discovered the advantages of suggesting that Mandela be freed.

But after successfully rescheduling a debt repayment, he quickly forgot the advantages of freeing Mandela and imposed a savage nationwide state of emergency. The emergency and detention of 30 000 South Africans contained the rebellion of the previous two years - but did nothing to salvage the economy.

In purely financial terms South Africa, having committed itself to repayment of a vast package of loans, was not a particularly attractive investment prospect. It had fallen from 31st to 60th place on the Euromoney magazine credit ratings by late 1986. And politically, its domestic turbulence had re-ignited the international sanctions activity.

The country's economic planners had created a perfect vicious cycle: always reliant on foreign investment, the country needs a regular fix to keep the economy growing at a rate which would both make it an attractive investment prospect and lower the political temperature - a temperature steadily raised by growing unemployment, deteriorating conditions in the townships, and the like. Until the economy is growing steadily and the political temperature is lowered, however, South Africa cannot attract the investment.

Nevertheless, through 1987 Pretoria managed to maintain a careful economic balance, keeping economic activity at a level admittedly too low to do anything about unemployment, but high enough to keep repayments going on its R50-billion foreign debt.

A mini-boom early this year threatened that fragile balance - by 'sucking in imports to feed on', according to Labour and Economic Research Centre economist Stephen Gelb, thus adding to the foreign debt.

Adding to the difficulties, the price

of gold moved downwards amid a glut on the international gold market.

In May, faced with a balance of payments deficit (in which the value of imports exceeds the value of exports) for the first time in four years, Finance Minister Barend du Plessis attempted to enforce a cutback on imports by limiting available credit.

Despite this, the government was forced to draw on its foreign and gold reserves - its 'savings' - to cover the additional outflow of money. According to Hirsch, these reserves fell 28% between December 1987 - when they were already 'critically low' - and July.

In September Du Plessis had to act again, slapping a 60% surcharge on imported goods as part of a package of goods designed to cut R1,5- billion in imports. At the time, local economic analysts warned that 'the economy is running at a considerable pace again' amid a 'noteworthy increase' in the export of capital.

In search of relief, Botha used the opportunity of the October funeral of long-time friend and Pretoria-backer, Bavarian premier Franz Josef Strauss, to undertake a financial fishing trip among the banking gnomes of Switzerland.

But while one pro-government newspaper in Johannesburg described the trip as 'highly successful' and said 'bankers and industrialists are standing in queues to see the Bothas'. But as National Democratic Movement leader Wynand Malan said afterwards: 'Of course the bankers were interested in seeing President Bothha — they want to get their money back.'

The president acknowledged afterwards that the Swiss were not that eager to offer loans. 'I would not say we came to a definite agreement. What we did was inform them of the latest situation in southern Africa, and I think they were very much interested...'

Nor was it for lack of asking. Botha was frank about the reason for the trip: 'It's no secret South Africa needs capital. We're a developing

'Botha used the funeral of Franz Josef Strauss to undertake a financial fishing trip among the banking gnomes of Switzerland'

country and any developing country needs capital... That's the point I've been making to all the gentlemen I've spoken to'.

Assuming Botha was being entirely honest, he enjoyed as little success as Barend du Plessis two weeks earlier at the annual conference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Berlin. Du Plessis said afterwards it was clear South Africa would have to go it alone in attempting to restructure its economy - and at a linked World Bank meeting, he applied for a change in South Africa's status, from donor nation to recipient.

Adding to an already unhappy picture, Botha was greeted on his return from Europe by a US general accounting office report which calculated that US sanctions had lost South Africa R850-million in exports to that country alone. And there was the sale by US interests of R50-million in South African company stock and a fall-off in exports to South Africa's 22 other major trading partners, including R146-million from West Germany alone.

Botha also faced disturbing news on the local economic front, with Anglo American's US subsidiary Minorco bidding for control of the London-based Consolidated Gold Fields. Anglo and other South African corporate giants have had a foot in foreign markets for years. But the Minorco bid was the clearest indication yet of a trend best characterised by Anglo and others (notably Liberty Life and Rembrandt) shifting part of their operations out of South Africa.

While the companies are not about to pack up and leave the South African economy to its fate (in a very real sense they are the South African economy), their actions represent an attempt to lessen their dependence on South African operations.

At the same time, the National Party was facing a serious challenge in nationwide municipal elections on October 26 - being fought, in many white areas, over the economic and political consequences of his government's policies.

A hasty pre-election announcement of a 15% pay- rise for civil servants (plus an additional 7% for teachers) may have won back some wavering Nationalist supporters. But few missed the acknowledgment by Finance Minister Du Plessis that the government had not yet found the R4-billion needed to back the pay rise. Local economists quickly predicted an increase in general sales tax (currently running at 12%), possibly as early as December.

Botha's trip to Switzerland provides a pointer to what the government sees as a route out of the investment quagmire in which it finds itself.

At his closing press conference Botha said he had told bankers of the importance of South Africa's responsibility towards its neighbours - they 'cannot develop, cannot grow without



Eric Miller - Afrapix

The Johannesburg Stock Exchange: No big crash this year, but still subject to a lot of anguish while the Bothas were in Europe trying to raise foreign loans

(our) support'.

This, plus comments from Du Plessis soon afterwards may help to explain Pretoria's recently-revived passion for regional non-summits and forays into 'black Africa'.

Du Plessis said South Africa's main overseas creditor banks had made it clear at the IMF (and a later World Bank meeting) that there was no hope of major foreign loans: South Africa would have to accept that it would have to go it alone without access to foreign capital markets.

Significantly, he added that he had 'detected a softening of attitudes for the development role South Africa is playing and could play in southern Africa'.

His statement was followed by an announcement by Trade and Industries director-general Stef Naude of a major new export drive spearheaded by the car, automotive parts, textiles, electronics, steel and stainless steel industries. Naude referred to 'foreign markets becoming available to South African goods'.

This combination of industries seems to point in only one direction - north into Southern Africa. And Botha's heavy-handed attempts to charm African heads of state (unsuccessful so far, but showing signs of future potential) must have contained a hidden carrot to get as far as they have already.

With Western bankers apparently more eager to offer loans to South Africa for 'development' in the region rather than within South Africa itself, an economic safari into Africa appears to be a real possibility.

Such an initiative would take some time to bear fruit, however.

Pretoria faces a more immediate image problem which is interfering with its ability to negotiate further loans: reporting on the Swiss trip, *Beeld* - a favourite Pik Botha route for leaks - said many of those who had 'queued up to see the Bothas in Zurich' had spoken of the difficulties created by the continued incarceration of Mandela and the continuation of the state of emergency.

President Botha limited his public comment to the statement that it 'would not be necessary' for Mandela to return to the prison cell where he contracted tuberculosis. He added: 'I hope that he will continue to co-operate with the authorities and will not revert to policies that might lead to violence'.

But with no other prospect in sight for foreign investment, Botha may finally have to play the Mandela card.



Thirteen years after independence, Angola is finally able to start the economic reconstruction necessary after colonial rule. DAVID NIDDRIE examines this reconstruction, and looks at why it has been so long coming.

Every night you can hear the pop-pop-pop of AK-47 fire from Luanda's docks.

Usually, the shooting is directed not at people but into the air: the guards fire to discourage pilfering, say residents of the nearby Presidente-Meridiene Hotel. It begins after curfew at midnight and continues intermittently until the curfew ends at 5 am.

But the shooting does not stop the thefts. An estimated 40% of goods arriving in Luanda by sea - everything from tinned food to television sets - do not reach their planned destination. They disappear into the narrow streets of Angola's vast, crumbling capital, to reappear at Roque Santiero or one of the other massive unofficial markets. Here, the unit of currency is beer, costs are estimated in crates of 24 and 'change' is made up of individual cans.

In Luanda, home to one in five of Angola's nine million people, mile upon mile of empty shops stare vacantly through broken display windows at the quietly decomposing city. And the kandonga, the 'parallel economy', dwarfs officially-sanctioned commerce: if you don't have the US dollars to buy at the hard currency shops, you shop at Roque Santiero and, usually, you pay with beer.

Up to 400 000 of Luanda's two million people are officially recognised as 'destitute'. When the summer rains come, the waters flood the sewers sending sewage bubbling up into the streets. Last summer this fed a cholera epidemic in the city's sprawling musseques (townships) which killed 123 people.

Even in the relatively dry winter months, the smell hovers over Luanda, contrasting sharply with the majestic beauty of the city that was once the jewel in Portugal's imperial crown.

Wherever you look in Luanda you see soldiers. Some, armed with AK-47 rifles or stubby, evil-looking sub-machine guns, guard key intersections and buildings. But despite their weaponry, they are oddly unthreatening when compared to the guardians of the South African way of life back home.

Many, many more people move on crutches through the city - with part, or all, of a leg missing. Angola has a higher proportion of amputees than any other country in the world; relief workers put the number of non-military amputees, less than half the total, at 50 000.

Angola also has one of the world's highest infant mortality rates: three Angolan babies out of ten do not survive to their fifth birthdays. More than one in six Angolans would starve this year without foreign food-aid.

However much opponents of Apartheid would like it to be, Angola does not embody all that they are striving for. It is no paradise.

Although it is potentially one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, its 13 years of independence have offered little opportunity to realise that potential.

Even before the last colonial governor of Angola lowered the Portuguese flag on November 10 1975, and set sail for Lisbon, the country was at war.

In the north, British and American mercenaries and President Mobutu Sese Seko's Zairean army were fighting their way southwards under the flag of the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the least effective of the three Angolan nationalist movements, led by Mobutu's brother-in-law, Holden Roberto.

In the south a South African armored column was blasting its way northwards, brushing aside tiny units of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). South African planes were flying in weapons and equipment for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) led by Jonas Savimbi, a former member of both the MPLA and FNLA. Planeloads of US weapons and dollars also poured in for Unita - ferried in by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in defiance of official US policy.

The attack in the north collapsed within weeks in the face of determined resistance by MPLA soldiers defending Luanda, leaving the FNLA in ruins. Many of its fighters would later return to Angola to accept the MPLA's clemency offer and join the Angolan army.

In the south, the South African forces fought their way to within spitting distance of Luanda, stopping only after a series of bloody clashes with Cuban units called in to repulse the invasion.

Savimbi, having gambled on South African assistance winning him the dominant place in an independent government, took his Unita fighters back into the bush once it was clear the gamble was lost - but not before opening supply-lines to South African-ruled Namibia.

The South African decision to go into Angola (enthusiastically but secretly encouraged by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) swung world opinion behind the MPLA government. The invasion brought with it official recognition from virtually every member of the United Nations besides the United States (which continues to withhold diplomatic recognition) and South Africa.

But this rush of recognition helped the MPLA liberation movement - now transformed into Angola's socialist ruling party, the MPLA-Workers' Party (MPLA-PT) - little in solving its domestic problems.

This was primarily because 360 000 of Angola's 400 000 Portuguese settlers, who effectively monopolised all skilled jobs both in government administration and in the economy, had packed up and fled in the eight months before independence - the equivalent of about two million key South African administrators, technicians and officials vanishing overnight.

The exodus left devastation in its wake - 2 500 factories closed, most of them because their owners had abandoned them. Only 8 000 of Angola's 150 000 registered vehicles were still available for use.

Even in Luanda the most basic services collapsed. Says Swapo Information Secretary Hidipo Hamutenya, a long-time resident of the capital: 'When the Portuguese left, they even took the plans of the buildings with them. The Angolans couldn't even find things like pipes - they didn't have the plans to locate them - when they broke down'.

The building housing the Swapo office bears vivid testimony to this. From almost every floor black pipes make their way to an open sewer manhole in the street below - the only way the toilets can keep operating.

'The Portuguese not only ran the companies, shops, farms and banks, but they also drove the taxis, laundered clothes and shined shoes', delegates from the Canadian Council

for International Co-operation reported after visiting Luanda last year. 'In 1975...the young country inherited an economy in which almost nothing functioned'.

And although the MPLA was a Marxist-Leninist movement, committed to centralised economic planning with limited capitalist economic activity, the mass Portuguese exodus gave them few options. 'Strictly speaking the government nationalised nothing. It simply inherited abandoned productive capacity', the Canadians said.

From coffee production (at the time Angola had the world's fourth largest coffee industry, earning R1,2-billion annually) to hair-cuts, economic activity ceased.

Every barber-shop in the country closed as, literally, every single barber left. The coffee industry fell victim both to the exodus of settler-farmers - the elite of the settler community - and to the narrow base of the liberation struggle. The coffee plantations had been manned almost exclusively by migrant workers from the central Angolan provinces, many of them effectively forced labourers, and most of them Ovimbundu-speakers. This group makes up between 40% and 50% of the Angolan population, and is the base of Savimbi's support.

Administratively, too, the Portuguese legacy was one of empty government offices and gaping filing cabinets.

The government had to begin rebuilding the country from scratch. Any notion of long-term economic planning vanished in the face of the massive daily challenge of keeping the most basic facilities going.

For the first decade of its existence, the Angolan government could not so much direct the economy as annually attempt - generally unsuccessfully - to balance its own spending against its foreign income from oil. Only by the mid-1980s was it able to look beyond the next 12 months.

At the same time, the MPLA's guerilla army, the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Fapla), rapidly had to transform itself into a standing army, both to prepare for the possibility of renewed South African invasions and to defend against the steadily-increasing sabotage campaign of Savimbi's Unita.

Railways, bridges, roads, hydro-electric installations, state farms, health centres - the nuts and bolts of economic and political infrastructures - were destroyed.

This activity increased steadily every year - costing Angola R552-million in 1980 and R808-million a year later.

In the face of this mounting military pressure the MPLA-PT government managed to make some gains: its health and innoculation

MPLA information director Pinto Jaoa

programmes cut child mortality rates year by year from 1976 to 1980, while diamond production - potentially Angola's second biggest foreign currency earner - increased steadily, peaking in 1980 at 1,5-million carats.

But to defend itself, Angola had to spend the bulk of its foreign income - capital vitally needed for investment in the economy - to feed, clothe, train and equip its army. When the oil price plummeted at the beginning of this decade, slashing its foreign earnings, Angola was forced to spend 75% of foreign income on defence.

To win itself the time and space to begin economic reconstruction, the MPLA-PT argued, it must rid itself of the military threat to its survival. Year by year the only objective achieved in the national programme was that at the top of the agenda: 'Absolute priority to defence'.

In the late 1970s, other factors intervened to intensify that threat. After the failure of the United Nations to enforce implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435, granting independence to Namibia on Angola's southern border, Swapo steadily increased its guerilla campaign to end South African rule in Namibia. Granted bases in Angola after independence, Swapo was, by 1980-81, launching an average of three attacks a day and pushing its fighters south of the heavily-populated Ovamboland border regions into the white farmlands around Tsumeb.

The South African response was to launch a series of offensives into southern Angola, driving Swapo increasingly further into Angola and pushing the war out of northern Namibia into southern Angola.

With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House - and Chester Crocker as assistant US secretary of state for Africa - the prospect of Namibian independence receded further into the background. Unita's Savimbi - now transformed, for convenience, from an avowed Maoist into an anti-communist 'freedom fighter' - became the beneficiary of an annual US grant officially pegged at R36-million, now unofficially acknowledged at almost three times that.

With each new incursion, the size and duration of South African operations increased, turning southern Angola into a no-go area not only for in-transit Swapo guerrillas, but also for Fapla troops and government administrators. When Pretoria finally agreed to withdraw all its troops in 1984, says the London-based *Africa Confidential* newsletter, it 'cut a swathe through Cunene province (the southern-most of Angola's 18 provinces, bordering Namibia), committing atrocities and frightening away the local population'. Its intention was to create a deserted buffer-zone north of the Namibian border which would be patrolled by Unita and which would prevent Swapo infiltration of Namibia.

In a carbon-copy of MNR activity in Mozambique on the other side of the continent, Unita launched a major disruption campaign designed not so much to win popular support as to undermine the country's already-limited ability to keep itself alive. By

1985 one in four health facilities had been destroyed and extensive immunisation programmes wrecked, sending child mortality rates rocketing.

Writing in last year's *South African Review*, Joseph Hanlon estimates that between 1980 and 1985, '215 000 children in Mozambique and 320 000 in Angola died unnecessarily. Although not killed by bullets or machetes, they are all still war victims'. In the same period, a further 50 000 Angolans were killed either directly by the war or by famines induced by sustained and escalating guerrilla attacks on agriculture. Landmines planted in fields or paths left up to 50 000 rural Angolans - mainly women and children - maimed.

By 1985 Angola had suffered R42 000-million in war damage. At least 700 000 people had lost their homes - some observers put the figure as high as two-million, or one in four Angolans - while a further 400 000 peasants were unable to plant or harvest their crops. A country theoretically able to produce almost double the food it needs to feed itself will, in the next 18 months, need almost R200-million in food imports and food-aid to keep its people alive.

After visiting Angola early last year, UN emergency operations in Africa director Charles la Muniere told Canadian aid workers the country was 'like Europe in 1944 - starvation, disease and war-wounded everywhere'.

'What is surprising', says a senior Western diplomat in Luanda, 'is not that the Angolans were able to beat the South Africans, but that they were able to fight at all'.

While their country was ripped to pieces around them the Angolan government held to the policy of giving absolute priority to defence. By 1985 Fapla was no longer the guerilla army which had barely survived the double-invasion that marked Angolan independence. With more than 50 000 troops - most of them conscripts - backed by increasingly sophisticated weaponry, Fapla was able to challenge for control of southern Angola. It was also able to strike south-east towards Unita's headquarters at Jamba, 70 km from the Caprivi Strip border.

In spring offensives during 1985 and 1986, Fapla reached the outskirts of Mavinga, just north of Jamba, only to be forced back by South African bombers.

With increasingly-generalised fighting developing throughout southern Angola, a 10 000-strong Fapla force moved out of Cuito Cuanavale towards Mavinga in a third spring offensive last August.

Against the advice of senior Cuban military advisers, they attempted to take the town - this time to be beaten back by long-range artillery fire from

Angolan defence minister Pedro Maria Tonha

South African G5 and G6 155 mm howitzers.

For the first time South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan acknowledged SADF participation in the defence of Mavinga - telling parliament that without it, Jamba would have fallen.

South African, Unita and SWATF (the South African-led South West African Territory Force) and troops poured into the gap left by the retreating Angolans. The Angolans kept running until they reached the Lomba River, where they stopped and turned. They were forced back again, however, by a reinforced South African force numbering around 9 000. Then, at Cuito Cuanavale, 300 km north of the Namibian border, Fapla turned again.

Despite repeated frontal assaults continuing until May this year, an artillery bombardment averaging more than 400 shells a day and repeated bomber attacks, the South African advance stopped at Cuito Cuanavale.

Independent Western estimates put Angolan losses at Cuito Cuanavale at 1 500, those of Cuba's 'internationalista' (internationalist) troops - face-to-face with South Africans for the first time since 1975 - at 40, SADF casualties at about the same figure, SWATF losses at 250 and Unita (fighting as the front rank of the attack) at more than 2 000.

Lasting more than six months, the battle for Cuito Cuanavale was the biggest land battle in Africa since the Nazi defeat at El Alamein in World War Two - and probably almost as decisive. While the fighting still raged across the Cuito river east of the town, Cuban President Fidel Castro told diplomats in Havana: 'When the history of southern Africa is written, historians will divide it into two periods: before Cuito Cuanavale and after Cuito Cuanavale'.

For the first time in its history an SADF force in southern Africa - probably the biggest ever to take the field in the region - had been stopped.

'They can come with any weapon they like. Our people will defeat them', Manuel Francisco Tuta, military commander of the Cuando Cubango province, told the first Western journalists to visit Cuito in March.

And while insisting that the battle was not a major defeat for Pretoria, Angolan Defence Minister Pedro Maria Tonha said later in Luanda that Cuito Cuanavale had forced South Africa to re-assess its policy of regional destabilisation. 'South Africa realises it will have to find another way to solve its problems, a non-aggressive way'.

By early this year both sides recognised that the stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale would not be broken at Cuito Cuanavale. Both sides thus launched campaigns to change the balance of power beyond the immediate battle-zone - South Africa and Unita by-passed Cuito Cuanavale to the east and moved north towards the Benguela railway line, attacking Munhango (Savimbi's birthplace, which they held until September) and Cuemba (which they failed to take).

The Angolan thrust began 800 km to the west, at the southern ports of

Lobito and Namibe where 10 000 fresh Cuban troops, most of them members of the elite 50th division, disembarked to link up with Swapo and Fapla units to sweep south. They cleared Huila, Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces of South African and Unita bases and established a 450 km front just north of the Namibian border. At the same time, engineers rapidly constructed a complex network of radar and air-defence systems and two fighter airstrips just to the rear. These served as bases for the Soviet-built MiG-23s which had proved their superiority over the South African Mirage IIIs at Cuito Cuanavale.

Cuba and Angola now had a combined tank fleet - primarily the top-of-the-range Soviet T-62 - estimated at 105 in southern Angola. Castro boasted that this was bigger than Pretoria's entire tank fleet spread across South Africa, Namibia and the narrow strip of south-eastern Angola still open to them.

In June - in an apparent attempt to collapse peace talks in Cairo - gung-ho South African commanders at Calueque on the Namibian border ordered their G5 gunners to begin shelling the Cuban front rank.

Their outraged Cuban opposite numbers informed their government - which, in turn, informed the US and Soviet governments - and then launched a MiG-23 airstrike. South Africa later admitted having lost 12 men in the resultant carnage - the biggest single loss sustained by the SADF in Angola.

Reluctantly, the South Africans remained in the talks - agreeing to, and in September implementing, a South African withdrawal - with Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Foreign Minister Pik Botha developing a carefully-orchestrated public rivalry over the various advantages of negotiations and renewed war.

By August the reality was clearer: while South African negotiators continued to talk, up to 70 000 SADF troops had moved up into northern Namibia, with more on the way, despite a South African agreement to withdraw all but 1 500 of its troops from Namibia shortly after implementation of Resolution 435, due on November 1.

What happened at Cuito Cuanavale and in the rest of southern Angola was not a major South African defeat, but an enforced South African recognition that it could no longer range freely, uninvited and unchallenged across someone else's country. This created, in the words of Cuban Communist Party Politbureau Foreign Affairs Secretary Jorge Risquet, 'the objective conditions for a negotiated settlement'.

If the message of Cuito Cuanavale sent a cold ripple of concern through Pretoria, it surged through Luanda like a flood in a desert.

Its impact, however, needs to be seen against the background of Angola's past.

For 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule - a rule harsher than anything experienced in the African colonies of Britain and France - the dominant economic enterprise in Angola was the slave trade.

Vast areas were stripped of people until, in 1880, the Portuguese finally abandoned the practice - having sent eight million Angolans across the oceans.

Portuguese colonialism, only belatedly adopting the 'civilising mission' with which other colonial powers cloaked their conquests, did little to break down the tribalism and regional isolation the slave trade and the resultant de-population created and reinforced.

Holden Roberto's FNLA drew strongly and exclusively on tribal loyalties in the far north, along the Zaire border. Savimbi's Unita developed its tribal support primarily from Ovimbundu-speakers, the majority, in the centre. Only in the cities, where the explicitly anti-tribalist, socialist MPLA attracted its initial support, did these loyalties break down in the face of an emergent Angolan nationalism.

Thrust into power in 1975, the MPLA had little chance to build its anti-colonial struggle into national movement. War became its first and absolute priority. With much of the country either controlled or rendered ungovernable by Unita or South Africa, the MPLA-PT has battled to expand representation beyond the confines of the party's 40 000 members.

Regional, district and provincial people's assemblies through which Angolans theoretically participate in national decision-making were either destroyed by the war or never established.

Angola became, under the onslaught of war, a number of isolated islands of people in a sea of war. 'Many Angolans are aware only theoretically that they are Angolans', says a sympathetic Western diplomat in Luanda. 'MPLA presence in many areas has often been no more than one official. For many, the past 13 years have brought nothing but terror and strangers with guns'.

Unable to mobilise popular support and facing a massive campaign to destroy it, the MPLA in its first years of rule turned to those tactics which had served it best during its 14 years of clandestine struggle against the Portuguese, turning in on itself, talking only to those it trusted absolutely. To survive it had to throw its best brains, its most skilled cadres and its major resources into war.

In doing so it had to shelve those programmes of nation-building and national reconstruction which would normally form the first priority of any newly-independent country.

Cuito Cuanavale marked a turning-point for southern Africa, symbolising a turn-around in Angola's fortunes. Throughout 1988, says a Scandinavian diplomat, 'the signs of Angolan perestroika and glasnost have been growing - growing slowly, but growing.

'When I got here early this year, I couldn't get over the secrecy - the papers didn't even carry major policy speeches by (President Jose Eduardo) dos Santos. That's changing'.

Says another diplomat: 'As the threat of war diminishes - even if Namibia isn't immediately settled - so will the government's need for rigid control of all elements of Angolan life'.

Adds a young civil servant: 'For the first time the party is acknowledging that it is fallible, that the country's problems cannot all be blamed on the South Africans'.

The changes are most vividly demonstrated in the economy.

In February, with South African shells still raining down on Cuito Cuanavale, Angola's People's Assembly voted through five laws enabling the government to implement a major economic and financial reconstruction and reform programme, known by the Portuguese

acronym SEF. Although reportedly meeting some resistance from within the government bureaucracy, SEF has already achieved an end to price controls on 52 basic foods (among them tomatoes, potatoes, naartjies and apples) as part of an attempt to outflank the massive kandonga 'parallel economy'.

Although the kwanza remains almost valueless in Luanda - the official exchange rate is Kz29,92 to the US dollar, but in the kandonga a dollar changes hands at well over 200 times that rate - SEF is making some inroads. Last month more than 700 people attended a meeting called by government officials to enable Luanda traders to legalise their activities.

Luanda residents say the end of price controls, the legalising of private traders and privatisation of some commercial transport has brought more food into shops in the battered Angolan capital. The flow is likely to increase because of the expected decline in Unita activity in the months ahead - in early October, Dos Santos predicted that 'without massive (South African) intervention, Unita cannot last very long'.

The streets of Luanda themselves bear testimony to the change: rubbish removal was privatised and contracted out two months ago and the streets are clean for the first time in a decade, say residents.

The reforms go way beyond local trade, however.

While the MPLA-PT retains a strong commitment to central planning and keeps monopoly control of areas such as defence, central banking, education, postal and telecommunication services and power supply,the SEF laws have opened up vast areas of the economy to private traders.

In addition it is substantially loosening direct central control over state enterprises - and ending previously-automatic subsidisation of financial losses. Planning Minister Antonio Henriques da Silva told the people's assembly in June that 'the enormous problems and difficulties' of state enterprises, and 'indiscriminate' state subsidies of their losses had contributed to 'a huge budget deficit'. This included more than R8 000 000 in cross-debts (owed by state enterprises to other state enterprises) alone, equivalent to the annual general state budget.

SEF is also looking further afield - it allows for an ambitious wooing of foreign investment.

While attempting to avoid foreign monopoly control by encouraging a wide spread of investors (a practice it is developing even in its highly-centralised oil industry), the government is offering guaranteed rights of dividend repatriation in the event of sale.



Soviet military hardware arrives in Luanda

Most enterprises involving foreign investors have to be undertaken jointly with either state or private Angolan interests - such as the joint government-East German plant which produces the Simson 50cc bikes which zip through Luandan traffic, or the Yamaha plant in the south.

While the South African government and other critics continue to portray the Angolan economy as collapsing under the weight of socialism, foreign investors disagree: Portuguese and Belgian companies have recently begun joint diamond mining projects with Endiama, the Angolan mining company; French companies are about to begin joint granite and marble projects; and Brazil's Duarte company is involved in major upgrading of Angola's telecommunications network. This project also involves British Telecom and, with plans for a domestic satellite in the pipeline, probably a French company as well.

The reform programme is winning Angola other friends internationally. Brazil - recipient of most of the eight million slaves exported under Portuguese rule - has, appropriately, become Angola's major non-military trading partner. Cultural ties with Brazil are expanding - a fact demonstrated by the name of Luanda's biggest black market: Roque Santeiro, named after a Brazilian soap-opera.

And MPLA Information Director Pinto Joao says a mid-year World Bank investigation found that SEF went further than the reforms it would have demanded as a precondition for further aid. Bolstered by a steadily increasing oil output (up to 453 000 barrels a day, compared to the 1986 figure of 282 000) and foreign earnings from diamonds (at $100 000, triple the 1985 annual income), the SEF programme has helped Angola renegotiate several of its foreign debts. These now total $4-billion, with the USSR, Brazil and Italy its biggest creditors.

Despite ongoing US opposition, Angolan officials believe repeatedly-delayed negotiations over membership of the International Monetary Fund will be concluded successfully - particularly as US policy towards Angola is increasingly in conflict with its commercial relations: the US is the biggest single purchaser of Angolan oil.

Impressive enough on its own, this economic resurgence has combined with the massive boost in military confidence - and the prospect of peace - to persuade the government to ease its rigid political control.

With much of the country now under Angolan control for the first time since independence, the government is establishing or re-establishing district, regional and provincial people's assemblies.

As one young Angolan put it, peace for Angola will mean more than an end to war: 'It will mean we will learn what normal life is like'.

'If Unita does not succeed in forcing the MPLA to negotiate by 1990, it has no chance to succeed at all', Jonas Savimbi told a sympathetic journalist in 1980.

With just 15 months to go and conditions less favourable now than at almost any time since the 54-year-old Unita president made that statement, it will be a close-run thing. And if Angola's ruling MPLA-Workers' Party does eventually agree to settle with Unita, Savimbi himself is likely, like Moses, to be denied the privilege of leading his people into the promised land.

While President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and his Angolan government have let it be known over the past six months of negotiations that they might consider talking to Unita, they have flatly rejected the idea of talking to the man who has increasingly come to symbolise South Africa's 13-year-long military involvement in his country.

Yet the idea of Unita doing anything without Savimbi - indeed of even surviving without him - contradicts its entire history.

Born in Lubango in 1934, Savimbi rapidly developed a sense of his own worth. One of several hundred Africans from the colonies allowed by Portuguese administrators to study in Portugal, Savimbi moved to Switzerland in 1960 to begin a BA in political science. By the 1980s this never-completed course had somehow taken on the status of a doctorate, with his supporters routinely referring to him as 'Dr Savimbi'.

Even this early in his career Savimbi 'showed more hostility towards other rebel groups in Angola than he did towards the Portuguese', according to American historian Gerald Bender. Nevertheless, he managed to swallow his pride sufficiently to link up briefly with Holden Roberto's UPA (later renamed FNLA).

Savimbi formed Unita on March 13 1966 after quitting the UPA in frustration at its inactivity and failing to persuade the MPLA to grant him a position senior enough to satisfy his ambitions.

He and his first ten Chinese-trained fighters smuggled themselves from Zambia into Angola with the help of Namibia's Swapo nationalist movement.. Savimbi claimed afterwards that their first weapon was a Tokarev pistol given to him by Swapo president Sam Nujoma. Regardless of how true this is, Unita retained close ties with the Namibian movement for the next decade.

For the first five years of Unita's existence, Savimbi slowly but steadily developed Unita operational areas along the Benguela railway line - until Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, with no other outlet for his copper, won a Unita agreement to suspend these attacks - and below the railway line in south-eastern Angola. In 1974 Unita finally won recognition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its fighting force steadily increased to 4 000 by 1975.

In the same year, however, Savimbi's image as a freedom fighter was tainted for the first, but by no means the last, time: a French magazine published documents revealing details of an agreement between the Unita leader and the Portuguese forces he was allegedly fighting.

The agreement was signed in 1971, amid increasing competition between the three guerilla armies (Unita, MPLA and FNLA) for infiltration and communication routes into Angola. This was particularly the case in the east, along the Zambian border, where both Unita and the MPLA had established themselves. With merger talks underway between MPLA and FNLA, Savimbi initiated a 'merger' of his own, signing a secret cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese military, code-named 'Operation Timber'.

In exchange for uniforms (Savimbi specifically requested camouflage 'commando uniforms' for himself and Unita secretary-general Miguel N'zau), ammunition, medical and school equipment and food from the Portuguese, Savimbi undertook to wage war on MPLA and FNLA. Documents found by later researchers suggest 'Operation Timber' lasted until January 1974, and that a second agreement was being negotiated when left-wing army officers overthrew the Portuguese government. This ushered in Angolan independence a year later.

Flatly denied by Savimbi himself, this Portugal-Unita agreement has been confirmed by right-wing Portuguese prime minister Marcello Caetano (the target of the military coup, who referred to 'our understanding with Unita'); by General Francisco Costa Gomes, at the time chief of staff of the Portuguese army; and by several Portuguese officers who served in Angola.

Pro-Unita Austrian journalist Franz Sitte recently said the claims were 'doubted by no side', and even British journalist Fred Bridgland, highly-sympathetic author of 'Jonas Savimbi: A key to Africa', acknowledged that 'some degree of Portuguese-Unita collaboration against the MPLA cannot be ruled out'.

When talks between the liberation movements began on the nature of post-colonial Angola, Augustino Neto's MPLA and Savimbi's Unita thus confronted each other not as anti-colonial allies, but as bitter battle-field foes.

The three-party Alvor agreement on a post-independence government of national unity quickly collapsed under the weight of rapidly growing mutual mistrust, as the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began pouring funds and weaponry into Angola for Unita and the FNLA, whose president, Holden Roberto, was already on a personal annual CIA retainer of more than R25 000.

Savimbi himself was placed on the CIA payroll as an intelligence source.

Had the independence process proceeded as planned, Savimbi was in with a good chance - 'if we had elections in 1975, Savimbi would have won', says a long-time opponent in Luanda. 'He was charismatic and a powerful speaker, able to sway crowds. He had a major impact on the politically inexperienced rural masses - particularly when he was speaking his home language, Ovimbundu, among Ovimbundu speakers'. He was particularly adept at using the rhetoric and symbols of militant black nationalism which found a strong resonance among his audiences.

The US, disenchanted with Roberto's obvious inability to establish a serious 'moderate' alternative to the MPLA, was pleasantly surprised by its first dealings with Savimbi.

CIA agent Robert Stockwell, fresh from the collapse of America's operations in Vietnam, was assigned to Angola to prevent an MPLA victory.

Jonas Savimbi - Mercenary with a mission?



Cloete Breytenbach: *Savimbi's Angola*, 1980

'It was immediately clear that Unita was an organisation of a very different calibre from the FNLA', he wrote.

On learning that Unita had 4 000 troops, Stockwell wrote: 'Here was the most significant finding of my trip. We had understood Unita was the weakest of the three liberation movements; in fact Savimbi's army was several times larger than the FNLA's, better led and supported by a political organisation of some depth. This would be good news, an unexpected asset in our war against the MPLA'. He found Savimbi 'a good man'.

Only years later would Stockwell - sickened by the havoc he had wrought in Angola - reassess his view: 'Savimbi has no ideology ... He believes in nothing beyond his own selfish ambitions and fighting has become his way of life'.

Stockwell had barely digested the good news of Unita's fighting strength when the South Africans entered Savimbi's life for the first time.

Throughout the entire six months of what became known as Angola's second war of liberation, Savimbi claimed Unita alone was responsible for the conquest of southern and central Angola - telling Reuters news agency that 'there are no South African troops committed by the South African government here'.

News of a South African invasion, however, destroyed the support Savimbi had skilfully developed in Africa by portraying his movement as Africanist, nationalist and anti-Marxist.

When the second war of liberation ended with the withdrawal of South African forces in early 1976, Savimbi took his remaining forces and fled south-east into Cuando Cubango province, abandoning the cities captured for Unita by the South African advance.

He went back to the bush to resume what Unita had been doing since 1971: waging a guerilla campaign against the MPLA.

Initially he did so without the massive South African aid that later characterised his struggle. Pretoria's generals spent the early months of 1976 trying to construct a surrogate force around Daniel Chipenda, a guerilla commander who had split from both the MPLA and the FNLA and who had fled south on independence.

Pretoria eventually judged him too unreliable an ally and dissolved the force into the newly-created SADF 32 (Buffalo) Battalion.

By 1977 Savimbi was back in favour, with the SADF appointing its first full-time liaison officer with Unita.

Savimbi was allowed to travel through Namibia and South Africa on a mission to reconstruct a support-base among Africa's more right-wing heads of state. The first to give their blessings were Senegal's Leopold Senghor and Morocco's King Hassan.

Pretoria's enthusiasm for Unita waned slightly in 1978 during talks on Namibian independence, but resumed once South Africa had successfully dodged international pressure on the issue.

By 1979, Savimbi's biographer Bridgland acknowledges, South Africa's support for Unita was 'substantial ... notwithstanding Savimbi's denials'.

The US too - under 'liberal' president Jimmy Carter - was lending a hand. Banned by the US senate from aiding Unita directly, Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezinski asked the People's Republic of China to stand in for the US in Angola, according to documents leaked to Washington journalists in 1978. The Chinese obliged, delivering - via Namibia - 600 tonnes of weapons in early 1979.

Some of this was presumably used in a campaign of urban terrorism unleashed by Unita in the same year - in a matter of weeks Unita bombs killed 17 people on a commuter train, ten in a fairground and 150 in a marketplace. The campaign continued well into 1980 and beyond. Elsewhere, Savimbi directed his energy at destroying the country's economic infrastructure - bombing bridges, wrecking roads and ravaging towns.

His campaign forced the Luanda government - desperately needing peace to rebuild their shattered country - to concentrate their energies on defence: from 1978 to 1980 the government armed forces, Fapla, tripled in size to 80 000.

Savimbi also began challenging for control of towns in the south and south-east - taking Mavinga in late 1979, and establishing his headquarters at Jamba.

While Savimbi continued to claim exclusive Unita responsibility for these actions, his credibility was strained by the 1980 desertion of two members of 32 Battalion. British mercenary Trevor Edwards told newspapers how 300 32 Battalion soldiers had driven 75 km into Angola to seize the town of Savate - one of the first towns Savimbi claimed to have wrested from government control.

Former FNLA guerrilla Jose Belmondo, an Angolan who fled 32 Battalion soon afterwards, confirmed this: 'Whenever Unita had operational difficulties Savimbi would contact South African military security ... 32 Battalion would go in and operate on behalf of Unita'.

The capture of South African special forces saboteur Wynand du Toit during an attempt to blow up oil production facilities in Cabinda in the north only served to confirm these claims.

Savimbi, however, was riding on the crest of a publicity wave, claiming by 1980 to have 12 000 troops under his command. A year later, this figure had grown to 20 000.

At this time former CIA agent Stockwell estimated that Savimbi had only 300 guerillas operating in Angola.

While Stockwell may have been under-estimating Unita's strength, it should be recalled that Savimbi was, by 1980, claiming Cuba had 40 000 troops in Angola - while US intelligence officials put the figure at less than half that.

Whatever 'his' successes, Savimbi was increasingly dependent on South Africa - and thus increasingly vulnerable to Pretoria's pressure.

His views on apartheid softened markedly as his reliance increased. 'It is not for us to say what is right or what is wrong with our neighbouring countries', he responded to a journalist's query on South Africa's internal policies. And when PW Botha was inaugurated as South Africa's first executive president, Savimbi was there to speak glowingly of Botha as 'my friend'. He criticised opponents of apartheid for refusing to endorse Botha's 'reforms', saying 'they must have something to hide'.

Elsewhere too, Savimbi was finding new and unexpected friends. Having quit UPA in 1965 because 'Roberto has sold himself to the American imperialists', Savimbi welcomed the election of Ronald Reagan. Within months US military advisers had visited Jamba and the new administration began pouring almost R100-million a year into Unita.

By 1985 Savimbi's investment in Pretoria's friendship began to pay dues: a major MPLA offensive against Mavinga was beaten off only by massive South African intervention. In an unusually honest mood, Savimbi afterwards boasted to a *Washington Post* reporter how he had called in the South African military to head off the attack: 'We said: "give us mortars, ammo and cannons of every quality" - and they gave it'.

The South African connection did not leave Unita unchanged. South African destruction of the southern provinces before it withdrew from Angola caused major tensions among Ovambo-speaking Unita members, whose homes lay in ruins as a result.

Savimbi cracked down hard on the dissidents. Several senior Ovambo-speaking commanders disappeared, while Antonio Vakulakuta, a traditional leader among southern Angola's Ovambo-speakers who had helped cement Unita's initially close relationship with Swapo, fled to Namibia with 3 000 followers. He was arrested and handed back to Savimbi. He has not been heard of since.

Elsewhere in Unita dissent was also growing. As Fapla's strength grew throughout the 1980s and the prospect of a Unita military victory diminished, the organisation switched its tactics in an attempt to force the Luanda government to talk. 'More and more attacks are directed at women and children to terrorise the population and create instability', a United Nations agency recorded at the time. But these targets were the home bases of many of Unita's leaders who, not unexpectedly, opposed the switch in tactics.

The Cuito Cuanavale campaign also fed the growing dissidence, switching Unita's main form of warfare from guerilla campaigns to conventional fighting, in which Unita troops formed the front-line of the South African advance.

Savimbi admits that more than 1 000 Unita troops died in the unsuccessful attempt to take Cuito - although Western sources put the figure at twice that.

Understandably the decision to switch tactics was widely unpopular, although Savimbi, increasingly functioning as part of South Africa's military initiative in Angola, almost certainly had little choice.

By 1988, dissidence was moving increasingly into the open. Dissidents, particularly those far enough from Savimbi to avoid instant disappearance, forming a loose 'ditch Savimbi' alliance known as Unita-D (Unita-Democrats). Several of its members are known to have been in contact with officials of the MPLA-PT government. 'The young guard is tired of war. It is an open secret that Unita intellectuals abroad sometimes meet (MPLA officials). They compare views and wonder what point is served by the civil war which has now lasted 13 years', reports *Africa Confidential* newsletter.

And since Cuito, Unita has continually lost supporters - in one July incident 8 000 Unita supporters gave themselves up to the Angolan authorities.

The Dos Santos government's current policy towards Unita appears to be designed to hasten this disintegration. While welcoming former Unita supporters back into 'the Angolan family', the MPLA-PT is holding out the possibility of talks with Unita while encouraging a break-down of support for Savimbi himself.

Fapla's post-Cuito Cuanavale military campaign against Unita appears to be motivated by the same logic - steadily destroying Unita strongholds in south and central Angola while delaying an attack on Jamba itself. Fapla thinking appears to be that a direct attack now on Jamba could draw the South Africans back in, thus giving Unita a new lease on life, and persuading dissidents to shelve their opposition to Savimbi in the interests of the movement. Instead, Luanda appears to be attempting to bleed Unita to death.

The Unita president has responded in recent months by drawing his senior leadership from an increasingly small pool - many are now either related to him or drawn from the Andulo-Ovimbundu tribal group from which Savimbi himself comes. This is particularly true of the commanders of Unita security and intelligence units, according to Africa Confidential.

At the same time Savimbi has tried to re-define loyalty towards Unita as loyalty towards himself. Massive pictures of the rebel leader adorn Jamba, while the Unita manual, 'The practical guide for the cadre' demands personal loyalty to Savimbi.

This manual also throws interesting light on Savimbi's attempts to portray himself as a 'freedom fighter' struggling against the one-party democracy of the MPLA-PT. 'Unita has as its final objective to take power and institute a state', the guide says. 'Within the state there has to be permanent police supervision - not the police institution of law and order, but a political police'.

And while Savimbi has long maintained that he seeks a coalition government with the MPLA-PT, the manual says: 'Reconciliation is part of our tactics, but it is not part of our strategy because that is not possible ... Unita can never co-exist with the MPLA. It is not possible to co-exist in a state, not today or tomorrow'.

While Savimbi is not about to collapse tomorrow - increased US support via Zaire will compensate to a limited extent for the lack of South African backing - his military activities will be substantially curtailed in future.

At the same time, his political position within Angola is increasingly tenuous. While in the early years of independence he was able to trade on his reputation as an anti-colonial leader ('Operation Timber' notwithstanding), this is steadily finding less resonance in Angolan society. For more than half of Angola's nine million people are below the age of 15 with no personal recollection of life under the Portuguese. Their entire experience is of life in post-colonial Angola and they know Savimbi not as a contributor to Angolan independence but as 'the gate through which foreign invaders have entered and ruined our country'.

Anna Zieminski - Afrapix

The spirit of small enterprise

Deregulation involves the removal of rules and regulations governing various industries and areas of the economy. STEPHEN GELB and DARLENE MILLER explore the implications of this process in South Africa.

'Profits are what we are interested in - Profits! Profits! Profits!'

- a Barlow Rand official, on the corporation's motives for supporting Enterprise Centre.

'It would be a good thing if the white man did not exploit us in the future'

- John Sibeko, a small businessman at Enterprise Centre.

John Sibeko owns a glazing firm at Enterprise Centre (EC), a two-storied warehouse in Kew, next to Alexandra, which houses 29 such small firms.

Enterprise Centre is a 'cluster workshop': Sibeko, like the other entrepreneurs, has been allocated a small area (about six metres by five metres) for his 'factory'. He employs two other workers - his sons who help every day after school.

Sibeko was unemployed for ten years before coming to EC, during which he occasionally helped a cabinet-maker friend. He saved R400, and using this money for rent and raw materials, he started his firm.

Enterprise Centre - set up by a Barlow Rand subsidiary called Job Creation SA - is so far the only officially deregulated 'industrial park' in South Africa. Deregulation, as the name suggests, is the process of removing rules and regulations governing various industries and areas of the economy. The most popular example for supporters of deregulation is the removal of the permit system for taxis. This, they claim, has led to the rapid growth of the black taxi industry. Other measures include simplifying the process of obtaining business licences, and removing restrictions on opening hours for shops.

This article focuses on deregulation of manufacturing production, rather than commerce or transport. In relation to industrial parks, deregulation is implemented through the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act of 1986.

Under this law, a specific area, such as an industrial park, can be deregulated by proclamation in the government gazette. Firms in that area are then exempted from most of the rules and regulations about minimum wages, health and safety conditions, employment benefits, building standards and so on.

Deregulation has in recent years become one of the central themes in the debate about South Africa's economic future. But there is little agreement over the issue, which, as *Business Day* pointed out, has 'become something of an article of faith - or hate - depending on the viewer's perspective'.

On the one hand, many in business and government claim deregulation can make an important contribution to the growth of the South African economy, and create jobs for the ever-growing army of unemployed.

Following the fashion of conventional economic analysis in the United States and Britain, excessive state intervention in the economy is seen to be one of the primary causes of economic decline and stagnation over the past dozen and more years.

Deregulation supporters argue that state-imposed controls have distorted the operation of various markets, while government spending has been too high, leading to inflation.

Cosatu has condemned deregulation policy as directly attacking gains won by workers in past struggles.

The solution? 'Free the market' to do its work unhindered. Deregulation is one element in achieving this, together with policies like privatisation, and lowering of subsidies on transport and basic food items.

The labour movement has taken a very different attitude towards deregulation. Cosatu has condemned the policy as directly attacking gains won by workers in past struggles. Deregulation will 'generally cause downward pressure on wages and working conditions', says Numsa general secretary Bernie Fanaroff.

Government and business rhetoric about deregulation has aroused the spectre of a return to 'Dickensian' conditions for the labour movement, with workers once again slaving in 'sweat-shop' conditions. While these conditions are usually associated with early capitalism, they can still be found today - in the bantustans, and in the 'successful' economies of south-east Asia (Taiwan, South Korea, etc), presented so often by business as models for South Africa.

Big business and business-oriented 'service organisations' like the Free Market Foundation, the Urban Foundation and the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) have actively campaigned for deregulation. But despite this, and the recently-announced R5-million Bureau for Information advertising campaign promoting deregulation, only one industrial area - Enterprise Centre - has been deregulated in the two years of the Act's existence.

In one sense, it thus appears as if deregulation is more a question of propaganda and rhetoric than substance. But the whole question of deregulation, whether of 'cluster workshop' industrial parks or of black taxis, needs to be seen in the wider context of efforts to promote small business. Many 'industrial parks' similar to EC have been established: by Anglo American (at Katlehong and Kew), Barlow Rand and Anglovaal, and by the SBDC, a parastatal.

These projects have been allowed to operate with de facto deregulation: existing regulations have simply not been enforced. And the legal deregulation of 24 industrial parks, established by the SBDC, is now underway.

The cluster workshops are likened to industrial 'nurseries', providing hothouse-like protection for small businesses to develop from their informal sector status. Not having to meet minimum standards on wages, working conditions and hours of work could make up for their lack of capital, skills and technology, enabling them to compete with larger, more established firms in the same industry. Seifsa, which represents many medium-sized companies in the metal and engineering industries, opposed the deregulation of EC, and those of the SBDC 'parks', on the grounds that it would eventually lead to greater competition for its members.

According to deregulation supporters, the process has many benefits for the economy as a whole. One is the lowering of production costs: lower wages and long working hours mean small businesses can

produce more cheaply - especially for goods and services that use more labour than capital. This was poignantly expressed by John Sibeko, when asked whether he exploited his workers: 'I would be grateful if someone told me I am exploiting myself'.

Lower production costs are seen as beneficial in two ways. Cheaper consumer goods mean workers' living standards can be allowed to rise at no extra cost. And many large companies argue that South African exports can become more competitive internationally through extending the system of 'subcontracting', along lines which have been very successful in Japan and south-east Asia. In this system, some components of a larger product or particular services are no longer performed by the large firm itself, instead being sub-contracted out to small businesses.

These large companies, most notably Barlow Rand, also see considerable profit potential for themselves: the large firm has great power to dictate the price of the subcontracted item, so that there is pressure on the small firm to keep its costs down if it is to make a profit. But reliability of supply and product quality are questions that immediately arise with the small firms.

A second motive for promoting small business is that this sector is seen to have greater potential for creating jobs than the large corporations. This argument rests on the relatively labour-intensive character of small business compared with large corporations, which use a large amount of capital per worker. The cost of creating each job - in terms of capital required - is therefore lower in small businesses.

Supporters of small business accept that these jobs involve poorer wages and working conditions than employment in larger corporations. But, suggests Johan Naude of the SBDC, 'rotten meat from the pavement is better than no meat at all'. Of course, rotten meat might kill you faster than starvation. But the issue of massive, and growing, unemployment has led some proponents of small business to emphasise its perceived job-creating capacity even above the issue of lowering production costs.

The problem is whether small businesses, especially those in EC-type industrial parks, have enough capital to pay for a significant number of jobs to be created, even given the lower cost per job in this sector. Evidence from other countries on this is contradictory.



Paul Weinberg - Afrapix

Workers fear a return to 'Dickensian' conditions

The emphasis on strategies to reduce unemployment is not simply an economic issue. It is also part of a broad effort to achieve political stability in the longer term, this being a third factor behind small business deregulation. A large proportion of the unemployed are young people, who have also been politically militant. 'Securocrats' in the state see unemployment and other economic issues, such as the rising cost of living and poor housing and township amenities, as a major cause of resistance during the 1980s. Their response is the broad strategy of 'socio-economic upliftment', under the direction of the joint management centres (JMCs).

Priority in resource allocation has been given to a few key townships - the 'oil spots' - including Alexandra, next door to where EC is located. The small business sector, assisted by deregulation, is seen as a primary vehicle in this process, able to provide both jobs and some goods and services appropriate to the crucial activities of housing construction/improvement and increased provision of household items. Another aspect of political stabilisation relates to encouraging the emergence

of a 'black middle class'. There are many aspects to this process, which aims to encourage divisions within the black population. But the perception of supporters of small business (and indeed by most on the left) is that informal sector entrepreneurs who succeed in making the leap to formalisation are likely to play a conservative role in periods of mass opposition. As the general manager of the SBDC expressed it, 'most black business people are guys who want to get on with the job, and even if fires are burning around them, they want to do business. If they have something to lose, they will act responsibly'.

Job Creation SA was contracted by Barlow Rand in April 1986, to create 500 permanent jobs (lasting longer than two years) over a period of three years. Twelve months were spent converting an old warehouse in Kew into a cluster workshop, and in recruiting potential entrepreneurs.

Job Creation's black employees were sent scouting through Alexandra, talking to people on the streets and in shebeens, looking over backyard fences for signs of informal sector activities, and spreading their net of contacts by word of mouth.

In the study on which this article is based, 24 of the 29 businesspeople in EC were interviewed. Two points are notable about these people: their humble origins and very limited business skills, and the tiny amounts of capital with which they started. About 70% of the entrepreneurs were employed workers - some even union members - before moving into EC. Some ran informal sector backyard operations in their spare time. Most others were, like John Sibeko, unemployed. Almost all lived in Alexandra.

The entrepreneurs appear to have well-developed production skills, but few management or commercial skills. Some are barely literate - Sibeko, for example, had considered applying for an SBDC loan to supplement his meagre capital, but found the application form too difficult. Job Creation SA is attempting to remedy this deficiency by running classes at EC itself, but these are extremely basic: one class witnessed was devoted to the distinction between sales for cash and for credit, and the dangers of the latter.

One consequence of this is that it is impossible to assess the profitability of these firms with any confidence, because their bookkeeping practices are hopelessly inadequate. This will have real implications for their viability.

For most of these businesspeople, setting up in EC was preceded by long years of saving to build up their tiny stakes of capital. Fifty-seven percent of the interviewees started with under R1 000, and 80% with under R4 000.

Neither Job Creation nor the SBDC has made capital available via loans.

The emphasis on strategies to reduce unemployment is also part of an effort to achieve political stability.

There is very little machinery and equipment - one welding shop was started with only a blowtorch, the work being done on the floor. A year later, enough capital has been accumulated for this 'firm' to build itself a worktable from its own scrap metal.

These operations employ very few workers - nearly a quarter had no employees, and three quarters between one and three workers. This means that for EC as a whole, the number of jobs 'created' - moved from the informal to the formal sector - is around 70, if the entrepreneurs' jobs are included.

Alfred Letsoale, who makes burglar bars and security gates, explained that 'I am not getting a worker until I can afford one. I rather work hard myself'. And as John Sibeko noted, he 'exploits himself' - and his family. This is a common feature.

One reason for the use of family, rather than hired, labour is that cash flows tend to be highly erratic, sometimes being too low to cover wage costs. Only family members can be expected to tolerate going unpaid. Wage levels for employed workers tend to be relatively low by unionised standards: 18 of 28 workers surveyed (64%) earned less than R80 per week, or considerably less than R2 per hour.

The range of products and services on offer from EC firms varies widely, but most operations are directed either towards home construction and maintenance (carpentry, glazing, electrical contracting, etc), or to furniture (production and upholstery). About four-fifths of the firms are consumer-oriented. Not surprisingly, 80% of the firms sell their products in Alexandra, and all sell in townships.

Seventy-five percent of the entrepreneurs felt the selling prices of products produced by EC firms were at or below those of more established producers. But this may be a highly subjective view.

At this stage of EC's development, there is minimal sub-contracting. Only one-sixth of the firms do any at all, and none of them do it exclusively. There are five welding firms which produce security doors and burglar bars, and sell to both consumers and firms.

There has been a high rate of failure among the firms, even in the short period of EC's operation. Only six entrepreneurs (a quarter of those interviewed) have survived for more than a year, and interview responses suggested that only three of the original group of firms remained in EC.

The entrepreneurs at EC have emerged from the working class by dint of high levels of personal sacrifice and a determination to 'improve themselves'. For many of them their advance into self-employment is likely to be only temporary, as the high failure rate indicates. At this stage, there is little or nothing to distinguish them from ordinary workers.

The 1849 description of small employers in the north of England is apt: 'The "little masters" are just the same as if they were the fellow workmen of those they employ. They dress in much the same way; their habits and language are almost identical, and when they go "on the

spree" they go and sing and drink in low taverns with their own working men. They live in houses a little better and bigger than the common dwellings, but managed inside in much the same way'.

In quoting the above, social historian John Foster suggests further that 'all the little master had was his skill... He remained part of the work group, and his family worked beside him'. He was from the local area, and had no reason to escape from the immediate community of manual workers on his street.

Enterprise Centre is only one of a number of small enterprise deregulation initiatives. Although all are recent, some preliminary assessments can be made.

Thusfar these initiatives have a very mixed record of success in formalising informal sector production, and face substantial obstacles. Lack of capital and management skills are the most important of these. It is unlikely that these will be overcome in any adequate way as long as the broad approach to small industry remains dominated by a free-market orientation, as expressed in deregulation.

Removing some perceived handicaps, and then letting firms sink or swim in the open market, is not adequate. Greater intervention, by both the state and large institutions, is essential. This would have to be directed to provision of skills and easier access to capital. Without enhanced and active support of this kind, the new firms seem destined to remain fragile, barely clinging to survival.

The potential of these newly-formalised firms to create jobs is very limited. Notwithstanding the SBDC claim to have created 180 000 'new' jobs, significant progress on the unemployment front is unlikely to be achieved along this path - at least for many years to come. Similar considerations apply to sub-contracting as a way of lowering overall production costs and improving international competitiveness.

As a result, trade union concerns about this aspect of deregulation seem to be misplaced. It is unlikely that unionised companies will be able to cut their workforces and shift parts of their production into small firms in deregulated areas. It is even less possible that a more general downward pressure on wages will arise from undercutting through the spread of the latter type of operation. Small industry will not necessarily impact directly on unions' organisation and power on the shopfloor.

The threat posed by the emergence of small industry to trade unions, and to progressive political organisations, is more general. The major potential of this strategy lies in its contribution to political stabilisation via township upgrading and redistribution. These small firms seem capable of playing some role in meeting demand for housing and household items. And if the effective demand within these markets expands, the survival chances of these firms will grow.

To the extent that the strategy of redistribution is successful, it is likely to lead to wider class divisions within the black population as a whole. It may also increase divisions within the working class - around employment, living standards and residential areas.

The emergence of further political divisions between different strata is not inevitable, but deregulation and the redistribution strategy increase their possibility.

** This article is based on a research project carried out earlier this year in the Industrial Sociology Department at the University of Witwatersrand. The research group consisted of Darlene Miller, Desiree Daniels and Nadia Goga. The project was supervised by Stephen Gelb of the Labour and Economic Research Centre.*

Is it too late to participate?

In a previous edition of *Work In Progress,* Daryl Glaser debated whether progressive opposition organisations should participate in the Kwazulu/Natal Indaba. But, argues GERHARD MARÈ in a continuation of this debate, the Indaba has involved a long process, with different phases and stages. Each moment in this process demanded organisational responses based on a coherent opposition strategy for the Natal region.

Two contributions dealing with the politics of participation appeared in the last issue of *WIP*. One, by Guy Berger, challenged the 'new realism' of 'writers from the left' who have been arguing for participation in state structure - albeit under specific circumstances. The other, by Daryl Glaser, used the example of the Indaba proposals in Natal/Kwazulu to advise that doors be left open to the possibility of 'going in' on the regional option at some future date.

It is this second article with which I take issue, both because I have some familiarity with the terrain and because there has been a dearth of critical, especially organisational, response to the questions it raises.

The 'debate' about participation, at least in its public manifestation, has been limited to a very small number of participants. When Glaser justifies his sortie into this area he finds rather dubious immediate antecedents: 'some on the left' who have 'begun to reconsider opposition to negotiation'; the ANC 'tentatively reaching out' (Dakar); the UDF's 'cautious endorsement' of the National Democratic Movement and Five Freedoms Forum; reference to 'left intellectuals' and 'some on the left'; and finally the Soviet Union which 'seems eager for a political settlement in the region'.

Part of the problem lies in the generalisation that Glaser uses - 'the left'. The issue of participation needs to be located in the specifics of the occasion. 'The left' in Natal is not the same as 'the left' in the Western Cape, for example. It has different strengths and weaknesses, has been shaped by different historical processes, and is up against a particular alliance of classes, drawing on specific ideological symbols.

I agree with Glaser that 'regional autonomy' and federal structures are not in themselves to be rejected. However, with the history of fragmentation of South Africa, with the regional (ethnic) patronage patterns and political mobilisation that has occurred under apartheid, a prior demand is for national change and a national identity. A national solution might well include regional democratic structures, but this will not involve regional decisions shaping the national structure.

Glaser suggests that by neglecting the Indaba option 'political and economic elites' in the region might be lost to 'regional insurgency'. He does not specify who these 'elites' are. Is he talking about the sugar barons, the midland farmers, Inkatha leaders at the local and the central level, a black petty bourgeoisie, the tricameralists - any, all or none of these?

Whoever he is referring to, there seems to be little that 'the left' can offer to wean these 'elites' (capitalists large and small) away from an Inkatha leadership option - for that is what the Indaba is in essence. Inkatha has long been their chosen partner in the reshaping of the region, if not of South Africa.

Glaser contradicts himself when the says that the Indaba's bill of rights does not explicitly protect capitalism, and then says that the Indaba's purpose is to 'preserve the basis of the capitalist order'. He cannot have it both ways. There is, at any rate, no real ambiguity on capitalism within the Indaba: after a couple of meetings the Indaba accepted a set of principles, one of which was that the 'free enterprise' system would form the basis of negotiations.

Those 'elites' are committed to the Indaba and to Inkatha, and not to 'the left': because Buthelezi's movement has a track record of 13 years in power in the region; because apparatuses and agents of control are firmly ensconced in the Indaba constitution (such as the tribal system, a house of chiefs, tribal police, a Natal Regional Force, etc); and because it is through the 'moderation' of Buthelezi that they hope to circumvent sanctions and prevent or control civil unrest. The hundreds of deaths in and around Maritzburg dented that hope when it became clear that

Inkatha was as much a fuse for violence as an agent of control.

Glaser suggests that the 'democratic and legitimate demands' of the elites be separated from 'those of more nefarious purpose' and 'accorded due respect'. By that I take it to mean that they form part of the platform of participation for 'the left'. But these mutually acceptable demands cannot in themselves be a programme, devoid of the interests of the working class and the demands of millions of poverty-stricken and near-homeless people in the region whose demands are ultimately incompatible with the 'elites'.

Is Glaser suggesting that articulating these 'elite' demands along with 'popular' demands will provide protection during a campaign waged openly over an extended period? Or is he suggesting that a limited campaign be waged with generally acceptable proposals forming the content - a campaign acceptable to capital and privileged whites? If the latter is the case, it will need a campaign of enormous proportions to make the supporters of 'the left' understand and accept such a strategy.

I am not necessarily arguing against participating in a campaign, but then the campaign must be the goal and not participation. For the latter will not be allowed to succeed if it truly articulates working-class and/or popular demands: not by the central state, which will be calling the tune in any case during regional initiatives, nor by the bantustan branch of the state, in whose backyard the overwhelming majority of the regional population live.

The Indaba must be seen as a process, with the various stages demanding different responses. Such an approach indicates why the democratic movement needs a regional strategy, or a strategy in the region, before it needs a response to the Indaba proposals. Glaser is suggesting a response to the proposals, as though the debate around participation in the local government elections can be separated from the historical context of state attempts to establish legitimate local government.

The first stage was really the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970 and Kwazulu in 1972, and the formation of Inkatha in 1975, to 'work within the system' and to change it from within. Despite ANC approval for this strategy it could not find local cadres to direct that thrust, and Inkatha became firmly wedded to the person of Buthelezi and the direction of conservative reform under capitalism. Kwazulu has now existed for 18 years, during which time patterns of politics have been established that we ignore at our peril.

But patterns of politics do not exist in a classless vacuum called 'the people'. More importantly, it has been the politics of specific class interests and aspirations - the regional African petty and proper bourgeoisie, and national monopoly capital as it operates in the region (especially as sugar production).

While capital had a brief period of concern about the bantustan's involvement in Natal labour matters in the first half of the 1970s, regional capital soon came to realise that such links existed around the person of Barney Dladla, then councillor for community affairs, rather than through the strong central figure of Buthelezi.

Since 1976, with the upsurge of 'community' rather than factory-based struggles, Inkatha, as regional government, has increasingly come into conflict with those resisting the central state. In most ways it is part of that state, and even when it is not it acts like any conservative government would. As such it is an essential element in the social reproduction of capital in the region.

The second stage can be characterised as 'regional consolidation' at the political level. It dates back to 1979-80 and Inkatha's break with the ANC. A decision was taken at central committee level that Inkatha would consolidate its regional power-base, despite the risk of losing its national impetus. The results were the Buthelezi Commission and aggressively politicised ethnicity, with regular appeals to the 'Zulu nation' as its political constituency.

The third stage of consolidated regional administration, did away as far as possible with the absurdities of two major second-tier administrative structures for the region - the Natal Provincial Council and the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly. These moves resulted in the Joint Executive Authority, for which central state approval was needed and received. The JEA was formally launched by State President Botha in the Durban city hall.

The Indaba, the fourth stage, set out to establish a regional legislature, with powers that would be similar to those at present enjoyed by the bantustans, rather than those of the provincial councils.

The Indaba process must itself be subdivided into five phases.

- The decision to launch the Indaba and the sending of invitations to participate. It was called by agents of two structures created by the central state, the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly and Natal Provincial Council. Glaser agrees that this part of the process was undemocratic, and that the list of invitees posed 'serious problems of representivity'. No option of participation arose at this stage.
- The Indaba itself, with its closed-door discussions, loaded representation, operating under the state of emergency, was equally undemocratic. That it was intended to be such was clear from prior statements about the process. All left groups, such as the ANC, PAC, Azapo, UDF and Cosatu refused to participate under these conditions.

The state of emergency was extended to Natal during the process and elicited no public response, with Indaba participants unaffected by the restrictions.

But once these groups had rejected the Indaba they acted in most cases as though it then ceased to exist. Glaser is correct, in an obvious way, when he says that 'it (the Indaba) is a reality', but this seems to have escaped the opposition.

- The post-Indaba publicity campaign has similarly received relatively little attention from progressive organisations in the region or nationally. It is going to be difficult to make up for lost ground, other than through a simplistic political short-hand which equates the Indaba with apartheid, and anything that comes from it with the state.

It is understandable that under the state of emergency, with the progressive movement split along sensitive 'community' lines, and up

against a professional, financially well-endowed, and full-time Indaba campaign, this should have been the case. However, this lag in response will have to be taken into account in decisions about participating in any of the future stages.

The Indaba learned its lesson well, and shied away from too close an identification with any one political party soon after the constitution was released. It has been careful to create its own 'apolitical' corporate identity, away from the Progressive Federal Party's close embrace that turned out to be near-fatal in its planned negotiations with the central state on acceptance of a version of the constitution.

- The proposed referendum to test the Indaba constitution against the popular will has received very little publicity lately. Immediately after the release of the proposals there seemed to be some urgency, with several newspaper editorials calling for such a test. Since then one has seen only that South African surrogate for democracy, the opinion poll, of which there have been several, each one a central element in the Indaba publicity campaign.

The Indaba itself suggested at one point that a poll would be desirable as an alternative to a referendum. At present the Indaba office has tried to give added spice to the October elections, asking its supporters to vote for candidates who accept the Indaba constitution.

With the Indaba now engaged in equally undemocratic alteration of its initial proposals through 'implementation studies', and engaged in less high profile publicity than during 1987 and lobbying of other 'elites' (such as capital based in the Transvaal, the central state and Natal scholars) the referendum seems to have been shifted aside. Not that it matters much, for, at least publicly, the Indaba no longer exists for extra-parliamentary groups.

The question facing 'the left' at this point in the process would be two-fold - whether to vote in a referendum (if the participants' constitutional commitment comes to anything); and what to call for in a campaign. The logic of a 'yes' to the first part, would seem to indicate a 'yes' to the second part - if the Indaba will create 'space' then it has to



Cedric Nunn - Afrapix

Inkatha - ongoing conflict with those resisting the central state

be supported. A 'no' vote in, or an active boycott of, the referendum would create problems of explaining participation in the next stage, the regional elections.

It might be possible to test the water before the referendum by setting certain minimum demands for participation of any kind: freedom of association; freedom of access to and dissemination of information; freedom of movement; freedom to operate under the present regional authorities; and other 'reasonable' expectations for free and fair politics (as partly set out in the Indaba's own bill of rights). The response to such a demand might indicate whether there is any more 'space' for progressives here than in the tricameral parliament.

- The fifth stage, depending on the acceptance of the proposals by 'the people' of the region and by the central state, would be the elections for a regional government. The factors that would have to be taken into account at this stage are impossible to list in full. Not even the constitutional proposals are final - with both the Indaba and the central state possibly tinkering with them.

Decisions at this stage would also depend on previous decisions. And these, or the lack of clear decisions, may already have made worthwhile participation impossible, even if it was desirable or necessary.

Furthermore, to look at 'arguments in favour of participation (being) strengthened if extra-parliamentary spaces become even more limited' (Glaser) seems dangerous. To move into an arena that is so stacked against you, filled with ambiguities, demanding the full participation in and understanding of the decision by supporters, from a position of weakness - a last alternative - involves dubious reasoning.

Is not the lesson to be learned that unless there is accountability, which depends on strong structures and frequent contact with members, participating leaders tend to join the 'elites' against which they decided to participate - or become powerless in processes which they cannot change.

It is essential to examine the strengths, rather than the weaknesses, of organisations called upon to evaluate the politics of participation. Weakness might very well be the factor that rules out effective participation, rather than supports it. And that is even before gains from participating in an Indaba is concretely discussed.

Left: 'There is no extra-state terrain in society...the state's legal, administrative and coercive capacities affect most daily activities'. Right: Churches came out strongly against participation .

The Star

More great participation debates

The October municipal elections are over - but the debate over participation is not. Three contributors respond to Guy Berger's article, 'The Great Participation Debate', published in *WIP* 55.

Ivor Sarakinsky:

Guy Berger's constructive comments on my analysis of the state and possible strategic responses are most welcome. Such debate is far too important for polemics.

Berger is correct to argue that it would be difficult for the extra-parliamentary opposition to change its strategy after advocating non-participation over the last few years.

Although this does not mean that the possibility of participation need not be raised, it does suggest that the state has put severe constraints on the activities of the extra-parliamentary opposition.

Berger acknowledges this by stating that 'given the dislocation currently experienced by the mass democratic movement, with so many leaders in detention, and so many organisations struggling to re-build in difficult semi-underground conditions, could a major about-turn in policy realistically be debated and democratically adopted?' Given the state's resolve to continue with its assault on the extra-parliamentary opposition, Berger needs to demonstrate rather than merely assert that the 'political initiative remains with the broad liberation movement'.

In my *WIP 52* article, I argued that in the light of the state's sophisticated and multi-faceted counter-revolutionary programme, participation in the tricameral parliament and local authorities could provide a space for organisational consolidation and growth.

In stating that 'the state determines the arena in which the extra-parliamentary opposition operates', I was making a general point that there is no extra-state terrain in society, and that there is no distinction between state and civil society.

The fact that the state's legal, administrative and coercive capacities affect most daily activities illustrates this point.

My argument attempted to show how the state, as a political actor, can redefine the political terrain to its advantage.

This did not imply that the state acts in a linear way, with opposition having no effect on its initiatives. But I was suggesting that from the state's perspective the state of emergency had been effective and opposition organisations had become vulnerable. These points are made more concretely in my *WIP 55* article.

Berger misunderstands my argument when he suggests that I accept the state's good faith in negotiation. Indeed, my argument for some form of strategic intervention is premissed precisely on the state's bad faith in negotiations - illustrated by the events around the EPG mission of May 1986.

My point was that negotiations were occuring at local level between

certain state departments and representatives of opposition community organisations who were vulnerable to the actions of the security apparatuses. In this context, I suggested that an organisational space 'could' (not would) be secured 'by, for example', putting candidates forward for election onto state structures. I did not exclude any other means of organisational consolidation, nor did I intimate that participation would necessarily succeed as an oppositional strategy.

My argument is that it is possible for state structures to have unintended consequences, and this allows for the possible tactical use of institutions and procedures by the opposition for its own ends. Berger is incorrect that this assumes it is possible 'to transform apartheid through its own institutions'.

In my article I insisted that 'meaningful social change will only be achieved by a strong, organised and democratic mass-based movement'. At the same time, I suggested that some form of tactical intervention in state structures could consolidate the gains of the 1983-6 period.

Finally, Berger overlooks the long history of the liberation movements' participation in state-created structures. The ANC participated in the Native Representatives Council from its inception in 1936 until 1948.

At the same time the Communist Party and the ANC participated in Advisory Board elections from the late 1930s. The ANC continued to do so until the mid-1950s. The Communist Party put forward candidates for election onto provincial and city councils as well as the senate with some success. After it disbanded in 1950, former members successfully stood for election to parliament in the Cape Western constituency (under the amended Cape Native Franchise Act of 1936) while others either stood in Advisory Board elections or elections for the senate. These interventions in existing state structures were justified in terms of the opportunities for mobilisation and consolidation that they would provide for elected representatives.

Mark Swilling:

In his contribution to the participation debate, Guy Berger accuses me of holding positions I have never articulated and have publicly opposed.

In responding, I will refer to my writings in general. This is necessary because although Berger claims his critique is based on what I supposedly said in *WIP 50*, there is nothing in that article to support his accusations. His critique, therefore, is levelled at a general position he presumes I adhere to.

According to Berger, my so-called 'new realism' is supposed to imply that I believe 'the present period is one of retreat for the mass democratic movement'. Yet in *WIP 50*, under the sub-title 'The survival of the internal opposition', I argue that the democratic movement has 'strengthened and consolidated its political and organisational structures'. To back this up, I refer to the formation of Sayco, Cosatu's 'hands-off' campaign, several union congresses that passed political resolutions, the UDF's ability to hold a consultative conference in semi-clandestine conditions, the May 5-6 stayaway, the persistence of rent boycotts and various other initiatives.

I am accused of arguing that the democratic movement has elevated the boycott tactic to the status of a strategy that 'has obliterated any area for manoeuvre'. Yet a *Weekly Mail* article I wrote - which could not be published because of the February restrictions - noted: 'The history of the democratic movement shows unambiguously that strategies are selected for their tactical value, not simply because they flow from an abstract principle'. An article of mine in the *Monitor* maps out an anatomy of township protest and describes in some detail the creative and highly 'manoeuvrable' strategies that were implemented by community organisations during the 1980s. An article on the UDF, published in *Popular Struggles in South Africa*, edited by William Cobbett and Robin Cohen, makes the same point.

The most severe criticism is the allegation that I maintain that by participating, the splits in the state will be deepened. Nothing could be further from the truth. On page 22 of *WIP 50* I argue that 'the pressure of black resistance together with debilitating divisions in the white power bloc may steadily isolate the securocrats'. But nowhere do I come close to suggesting that this resistance should take a participatory form. I do not even mention the word 'participation' in that article.

I do suggest that local negotiations in the context of dual power can be effective, but have never argued that negotiations should be pursued to deepen division in the state.

After stigmatising me as a 'new realist' I am then charged with 'misreading the present'. Berger claims that despite fluctuations in the intensity of struggle, the 'basic features' of the current 'unstable equilibrium' involves 'the relative military and economic power of the government on the one hand, and its considerable political weakness on the other'. Yet I have frequently advanced this very view. To quote from my talk to a Five Freedoms Forum meeting in Cape Town earlier this year: 'The state is militarily strong, but politically weak'.

I am then accused of not explaining why the government is

The contradiction between white minority intentions and the majority's demands finally ruptured into full blown confrontation

politically weak. Berger says this weakness is due to 'the wholesale rejection and boycotting' of state structures.

But an article authored by a colleague and I - and presented at a recent sociology conference - makes a similar point: '...constitutional reform provided the focus for national organisation and resistance on a scale not seen since the 1950s'. All these manifestations of resistance and opposition short-circuited key state strategies - including, of course, the desire for what Berger calls an 'extensive bloc of black support'.

Berger raises the question of who has the political initiative. He says this still lies with the 'liberation movement'. According to my *Weekly Mail* article, 'The most that state strategy may achieve is compliance, not the spontaneous consent required to legitimise state structures'. Not even Berger is as confident as this. He contradicts his own questioning of the 'new realist' assumption by describing the current conjuncture as an 'unstable equilibrium'. Surely this means he thinks no-one has the initiative. Berger then completes his circle of contradictions by arguing that debating participation is not viable precisely because of the current weakness of the democratic movement. This is what I call 'new confusion'.

The absurdity of Berger's criticism is most obvious when he says I believe local state institutions can be used against the state. My writings on this subject over the years have constantly reiterated the essence of the argument contained in the following quote: 'In the final analysis, the contradiction between the intentions of the white minority regime and the demands of the majority of people that has always plagued local government, have finally ruptured into a full- blown confrontation between the "organs of people's power" and the reformed local government structures being introduced by the state' ('Taking power from below', in *Government by the People?*, edited by Heymans and Totemeyer, p 193).

Berger is totally incorrect when he accuses me of 'conflation between the strategies of negotiation and participation'. Negotiations in the context of dual power, not participation in the local organs of minority rule, is a position I have consistently argued in the past.

When Berger claims that I 'overestimate the organisational and tactical flexibility of the mass democratic movement', he ignores my *Weekly Mail* article which concludes that 'given the state's refusal to countenance any real dissent and given the general repressive conditions, participation would serve to legitimise rather than undermine state structures'.

Berger's article is a perfect example of how not to engage in open and democratic debate. Using classic academic tactics of distortion, manipulation and misrepresentation, he has issued a warning to all writers who want to explore new ways of analysing terrains of struggle: 'don't do it!' This method of debate is roundly rejected in the democratic movement. Hopefully this will mute Berger's anti-democratic warning and prepare the way for 'the careful examination of the broad conjuncture' he calls for.

Tom Lodge:

Guy Berger's closely-reasoned critique of the advocacy of electoral participation is most welcome. When I wrote the talk published as 'State power and the politics of resistance' it was partly with the intention of encouraging a debate of more thoughtful quality than appeared to be taking place at the time.

The most important point Berger makes is that at this stage the advocacy of electoral participation is simply impractical for most sections of the democratic movement. As he quite rightly says, conditions do not exist in which 'a major about-turn in policy could be debated and democratically adopted'.

As he contends, a crucial consideration in any move towards participation is the extent to which institutions retain some popular legitimacy. This is the strongest argument favouring the support of 'anti-apartheid' candidates in white municipal polls which was advanced by a section of the Five Freedoms Forum. This, presumably was the reason why the ANC continued to participate in Advisory Board elections through the 1950s. It is not the case, though, that the ANC after 1946 'explicitly refused to participate in the Native Representative Council or the other limited platforms that were available for participation'. Indeed, both the ANC and the Communist Party contested the NRC elections in 1948.

I am not sure that the present phase of repression is merely, as Berger believes, no more than a shift, fluctuation or momentary alternation in the balance of forces engaged in an 'unstable equilibrium'. I hope he is right but it would be dangerous to take this for granted.

In general, though, I am in agreement with the essentials of Berger's argument: for the time being, participation is not on the agenda. But as he concedes, it would not be 'unthinkable under every circumstance' - and to represent those arguments which favour it as 'treachery' is neither useful nor illuminating.

Labour trends July 22 to October 14

The period under review saw an escalation of industrial action; major disputes in the chemical, hotel, metal and municipal sectors; and a definite hardening of management attitudes to labour disputes.

According to the SARS monitor, over 78 654 workers were involved in industrial action in over 55 incidents of strikes, work stoppages, overtime bans and go-slows during the period under review. This reflects a 100% increase in the level of strikes over the period May 23 to July 22.

Management strategies

Judging by the number of lockouts in the past two-and-a-half months, management's use of this tactic is on the increase.

There were six reported incidents of lockouts, involving 9 100 workers. Major cases included Haggie Rand and Numsa, (2 700 workers), Southern Suns and Harwu (3 000 workers), and Checkers and Ccawusa (3 000 workers). Most lockouts were implemented either shortly after a strike began or after a management ultimatum was ignored. But in an interesting case Zincor management locked out 500 NUM members after a deadlock in wage negotiations at a conciliation board.

Many bosses see it as an easy option in disputes to lock out workers and then either terminate their employment contracts as in the Checkers case, or terminate the unions' recognition agreement with the company, as in the Southern Suns case.

The hiring of scabs during lockouts or dismissals - particularly coloured or Indian workers - has also become a feature of management strategy.

Although the most contentious clauses of the Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA) are not being fully implemented yet, a few unions have been threatened with their use.

Not knowing the consequences, bosses may be hesitant to use the contentious clauses of the act, and are waiting to see union reaction in other cases before going ahead.

These clauses outlaw solidarity or sympathy strikes; severely curtail the right to strike; outlaw the right to boycott company products; and give employers the right to sue unions for damages and production losses in the event of an illegal strike. The timing of their implementation will probably depend on the strength of union resistance.

Both unions and managements are making use of the courts in dealing with disputes.

Bosses are quick to turn to the courts for interdicts evicting workers during strikes; unions in turn often challenge the evictions. Recent interdicts included a court order granted to I&J to evict striking Fawu members from company premises; and an order granted to Cadbury restraining workers from continuing a strike.

In favour of unions was a court order against Southern Suns declaring their lockout unfair, and one granted against Natalspruit Hospital ordering them to reinstate 300 dismissed workers.

Police involvement in disputes

Adding fuel to the fire over the promulgation of the LRAA, bosses are allowing police to act as strike breakers. In the period under review, there were over ten cases of police action over labour disputes.

The Soweto Council strikers were harassed by police on at least three occasions and one incident led to a few workers being injured (see *Briefs*). In another incident at the plush Johannesburg Sun Hotel, a Harwu member was shot during a lockout of 3 000 workers. The worker, John Mkhise, died shortly afterwards.

Police involvement during industrial action has left an indelible mark on the labour movement, most notably over the killing of six Sarhwu members; six NUM members and the injuring of 500 workers during strike situations last year.

Union strategies

Under threat from the LRAA, Cosatu and Nactu have discovered much common ground in working together. This was evident in the three-day protest action and stayaway, joint negotiations with Saccola and, more recently, the proposed summit of the two federations. This should lay the basis for future joint actions.

Negotiations involving the SAB shopstewards' council, and the IMF-affiliated unions, have set an important precedent for joint union negotiations with employers. In addition, Ccawusa and the unaffiliated Fedcraw and Nudaw recently undertook joint negotiations with Clicks, making it the first time the three unions had co-operated in this way.

Although unions are striving for unity, strong divisions are still evident and in some cases are exploited by bosses. Ccawusa is a case in point: wage negotiations at both Ellerines and Woolworths ran into problems as one faction of the split union accepted management's final offer while the other rejected it.

At Woolworths, management unilaterally implemented a wage offer as an interim measure while negotiations continued. The Ccawusa faction that rejected the offer condemned management for exploiting the division in the union.

Actwusa and Gawu are also experiencing problems, with divisions being further entrenched. In Natal, Gawu declared a dispute with the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association over the issue of minority union recognition. According to Gawu, Actwusa is one of the minority unions. Both unions were involved in merger talks, but there has as yet been no sign of progress.

The disinvestment issue is still on the agenda for most unions. The first concrete challenge to multinationals over the terms of disinvestment has come from CWIU (see *Briefs*). IMF-affiliated unions

too, are demanding that German multinational companies abide by a special labour code if they intend staying in SA. (see *Briefs*).

In addition to regular strikes and disputes, union tactics have recently included overtime bans and placard demonstrations. In the transport sector, TGWU members embarked on overtime bans at Imperial Car Hire, Boland Passenger Transport and Pretoria Coal Distributors. Placard demonstrations were held at Barlow Rand over wages, and at three Haggie Rand subsidiaries in solidarity with 2 700 colleagues currently locked out.

Union breakthroughs

Ccawusa's recent parental rights agreement was followed by another breakthrough, setting a precedent for other unions. This time the union signed an agreement with Gallo providing for the recognition of traditional doctors in the treatment of illness. Ccawusa's Jeremy Daphne said many workers prefer to consult traditional doctors (inyangas, sangomas and herbalists) for some ailments, and union members feel they should have that right. In terms of the agreement Gallo will grant five days paid sick leave within the sick leave structure if workers produce a certificate from a traditional doctor.

Although most employers in the sector have in principle recognised the right of workers to see traditional doctors, there is disagreement over how proof of visits to traditional healers is presented. The union is suggesting that companies provide standard forms which can be signed or stamped by the traditional doctor consulted. Ccawusa has tabled a similar proposal as part of its wage negotiations with Metro, CNA and Frasers. The union is also considering a demand that company medical aid schemes pay for visits to traditional doctors.

Sarhwu has also made a breakthrough in its long battle for union recognition. Following a strike by over 8 000 Sarhwu members in Durban, SATS management agreed to negotiate recognition of the union nationally. The union also gained 18 000 members as a result of the strike.

Shareen Singh.

Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events and Outcome
Afcol	Ppwawu	1 500	September 1988	Afcol and Ppwawu reached a wage agreement which affects workers at six Afcol plants on the Reef. In terms of the agreement, wages will be increased by R25 a week backdated to July 13, bringing the minimum wage to R157 a week.
Afcol	Ppwawu	290	05.10.88	Arbitration proceedings upheld Afcol's Star Furnishers dismissal of 290 workers who went on strike over the dismissal of four colleagues early in 1988. The dismissal of the 290 resulted in a further six-week strike by about 1 200 Ppwawu members. The settlement dictated that workers should be paid for the period from their dismissal until the arbitration outcome. But the union and Afcol were in dispute over the meaning of 'pay'. Management agreed to pay wages only, while the union argued that 'pay' includes benefits.
Barlow Rand Kew	Numsa	200	15.09.88	About 200 Numsa members held a placard demonstration against Barlow's wage offer, which involved an increase of 53c an hour for the lowest and 94c an hour for the highest grade hourly-paid workers, conditional on agreement being reached about overtime, service awards and workers making up time taken off for stayaways. Settlement was reached on maternity, paternity and compassionate leave, and the conversion of a pension fund to a provident fund. Management also granted May 1, June 16 and March 21 as paid holidays.
Benny Goldberg's Wynberg	Ccawusa	100	11.10.88	Management instituted a lockout against 100 Ccawusa members on strike over wages. The union demanded a minimum wage of R720 a month against the company's offer of R630 a month.
Call Guard Transvaal	TGWU	300	07.07.88	Management dismissed 270 out of 300 striking workers on the first day of a strike over the dismissal of their chief shop steward. After negotiations, workers were reinstated and the dismissed worker was asked to appeal against his dismissal.
Checkers	Ccawusa	8 000	Aug 1988	Checkers and Ccawusa resolved their wage dispute after three months of negotiations. Workers will receive an across-the-board increase of R95 a month from July 1, 1988 and another R5 from January 1, 1989, bringing the minimum wage to R510 a month.
Checkers Transvaal	Ccawusa	3 000	23-29.09.88	Close to 3 000 workers at 40 Checkers stores were locked out and their contracts terminated following a solidarity strike over the dismissal of two colleagues at the Eastgate store. Management was prepared to reinstate the 3 000 on condition that they sign notices agreeing that the dismissal of the two workers was fair and lawful. The two workers were fired for assaulting a co-worker. Appeals against the decision had failed. After negotiations the parties agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. The workers signed the notice and the union agreed to refer the case of the two original dismissals to arbitration. Workers were reinstated but were not paid for the time on strike.
Clicks	Nudaw, Ccawusa, Fedcraw		14.09.88	Nudaw, Ccawusa and Fedcraw for the first time held joint annual wage negotiations with Clicks. The unions and Clicks agreed on a 33% increase which amounts to R115 a month, bringing the minimum wage to R500; increased annual leave; a 40-hour week; and recognition of 'traditional doctors' for purposes of sick leave and medical aid.

Diepmeadow Council	Samwu	700	06.10.88	Samwu and the Council signed a recognition agreement which grants the union stop-order facilities and recognises 36 shop stewards.
Ellerines	Ccawusa	6 500	03.08.88	The split within Ccawusa created confusion during wage negotiations with Ellerines. The 'Kganare group' wanted to accept management's wage proposal while the 'Mtwa group' rejected it. According to the Mtwa group, management proposals include increasing sales targets, an issue which was a strong factor in prompting the strike last year. The dispute entered its eleventh week with management and the union agreeing to a conciliation board hearing.
Eskom	Cumsa, Saisatu, & 13 other unions	5 300	September 1988	About 5 300 workers stand to lose their jobs when Eskom closes certain generators and mothballs some plants. This will be the second major retrenchment at Eskom in the past two-and-a-half years. In 1986 the company embarked on a rationalisation programme which made 6 000 workers redundant. According to Eskom, the closure of certain units and the mothballing of some plants is necessary because of the excess of power at present. But Numsa believes the closure and job losses are intended to make Eskom more attractive for privatisation. In 1986 the staff compliment was 67 000 and it currently stands at 57 000. Eskom and the unions involved were negotiating a retrenchment package.
Farm Fare Wynberg	Fawu	300	September 1988	Farm Fare management and Fawu reached agreement on the re-employment of 300 workers dismissed after a strike in July. Workers stopped work in protest against the transfer of the company's distribution section to an independant contractor. Fawu said management bused in scab labour from Bophuthatswana while negotiations were taking place.
Gallo	Ccawusa	5 000	05.09.88	After mediation Ccawusa and Gallo reached a wage settlement, ending a three-week strike by about 400 workers. During the strike about 100 workers staged a placard demonstration outside Gallo head office in Johannesburg. Music groups Stimela, Plush and Volcano also went on strike in support of Gallo workers. Workers will receive a R120 a month across-the-board increase, back-dated to April 1 1988, and a Christmas bonus equivalent to three weeks' pay. The company also agreed to recognise traditional doctors for a trial period of one year. Employees would be entitled to five days sick leave per year on the presentation of a traditional doctor's certificate.
Genrec Head Office Wadeville	Numsa	300	05-07.09.88	Workers downed tools after management instituted a disciplinary enquiry over incidents that took place during the metalworkers strike. They returned to work, but the enquiry continued.
Genrec G Bag & Wadeville Engineering	Numsa	200/100	05-07.09.88	Workers at Genrec G Bay and Wadeville Engineering went on strike in solidarity with colleagues at Genrec head office. All three companies are owned by Murray and Roberts.
Haggie Rand Jupiter and Germiston	Numsa	1 700	19.09.88	Numsa and Haggie Rand declared disputes against each other over wages, and management locked out 1 800 workers. Numsa's dispute was over the company's final wage offer of 45c an hour, when the union demanded 85c. Haggie declared a dispute when Numsa rejected their offer. Management locked out workers when they went on strike and threatened to evict them from company hostels. A number of informal meetings took place between Numsa and Haggie management in an attempt to resolve the dispute. Workers at Haggie Rand's sister companies, Consolidated Wire Industry in Pretoria and Germiston, Maksal Tubes in Springs, and Denver Metals in Benoni held solidarity placard demonstrations.
Irvin & Johnson Roodepoort	Fawu	500		More than 200 strikers occupied tents pitched at I&J's Roodepoort plant after management obtained a court order to evict striking workers from company buildings. Striking workers demanded a 50% wage increase. Management hired coloured scabs during the strike.
MMC Nelspruit	Numsa	500	15.09-09.10.88	Workers went on a wage strike demanding a minimum hourly rate of R3,75. Management offered a 49c increase amounting to a R3,30 minimum. Settlement was reached on 58c an hour bringing the minimum hourly rate to R3,39.
Multi-National Companies	CWIU	2 000	30.08.88	CWIU declared a dispute with 39 multi-national companies over their rejection of a joint forum to discuss the issue of disinvestment. The companies concerned - including Shell, BPSA, Mobil SA, Colgate Palmolive and Bayers Chrome Chemicals SA - said the issue of disinvestment did not concern them as they had no intention of disinvesting from SA. The union applied for a conciliation board, reiterating its requirements put forward to multinational companies last year. There was strong possibility that the union's 9 000 members would strike if the minister of manpower refused to appoint a conciliation board.(see Brief).
Nampak Chamdor	Ppwawu	80	01.08.88	Ppwawu members at Nampak stopped work after management introduced a new shift system without consulting worker representatives. Management dismissed three workers during the dispute. The dispute was resolved when management scrapped the new shift system and reinstated the dismissed workers.
Nampak Corrugated	Satu/Ppwawu	209	September 1988	Nampak Corrugated applied for exemption from their closed-shop agreement with Satu for 209 employees. These workers want to join Ppwawu, a Cosatu affiliate.
Natalspruit Hospital	Nehawu	300	02.09.88	A supreme court ruling ordered the reinstatement, with 13 months back-pay, of about 300 workers dismissed last August. They were protesting the dismissal of a shop steward. The court ruled the dismissal was unfair as the dismissed workers were not given a hearing.
Rennies	TGWU	950	18-20.08.88	Workers at five Rennies companies embarked on a national strike over the dismissal of Randall Howard, TGWU's vice president. He was dismissed by an SA Container depot in May for insubordination. The strike ended when management agreed to mediation.

Rand Scrap Iron and Steel Germiston	Numsa	200	29-31.08.88	Management unilaterally implemented a wage offer before reaching an agreement with Numsa, prompting a two-hour work stoppage by about 200 workers. Workers stopped work again on August 31 after management tried to dismiss three workers for intimidation during the first work stoppage. They returned to work after the union lodged an appeal.
SAB	Fawu	6 000	Aug 1988	Fawu rejected SAB beer division's final wage offer of a 17% increase. The offer, together with an increase in shift allowance, amounts to a minimum wage of R940 a month for the lowest paid shift worker, R1 278 a month for a grade 1 continuous-process shift worker working a 40-hour week and a minimum of R1 757 for a grade 5 worker. The union was conducting a strike ballot at most of the 25 SAB establishments where it is recognised.
Seifsa	IMF	330 000	03.08.88	The metalworkers wage strike this year ended in a landmark victory, according to the IMF unions involved in the dispute with Seifsa. While the agreement contains no improvement to Seifsa's final wage offer of 41c an hour, it makes provision for eliminating the racially-based wage curve for the different skill levels. The terms of the agreement include the following: compulsory stop-orders for unions party to the industrial council; wage anomalies in the industry's wage curve to be eliminated within five years; a procedure to investigate allegations of racial discrimination in individual firms as well as a procedure to investigate alleged intimidation and violence; June 16 as a paid holiday in exchange for Founders Day, and May 1 in exchange for Workers Day - subject to a 75% vote in favour by employees at individual plants; Seifsa is to persuade companies to reinstate workers dismissed during the strike and has agreed to support the Saccola initiatives on the new Labour Relations Amendment Act. The agreement, which covers over 330 000 employees at 9 000 firms, was the first in five years to be signed by Numsa.
Southern Suns/Karos	Harwu	3 000	12.09-09.10.88	The hotel industry was hit by a major strike involving over 3 000 workers at hotels owned by the Karos Group. The dispute, over the company's refusal to reinstate 125 workers dismissed at a few hotels for staying away on June 16, started off with placard demonstrations and two-hour stoppages on September 12. Workers at Sandton Sun, Milpark Holiday Inn, Rand International and Gold Reef City stopped work for three hours again on September 22. A national strike over the issue started on September 26. On October 3 Southern Suns locked out over 2 000 workers at 11 hotels around Johannesburg. On the second day a worker was shot in the lobby of the plush Johannesburg Sun Hotel. The worker, John Mkhize, died in hospital. At Arthur's Seat Hotel in Sea Point, police arrested 43 striking workers for trespassing. During the dispute Southern Sun terminated its recognition agreement with the union and the Johannesburger Hotel obtained a court interdict preventing workers from disrupting business at the hotel. Workers returned to work following an interim court order against the lockout. The court ruled the lockout was unfair and ordered that workers be permitted to return to work. On behalf of its members, the union undertook not to embark on industrial action, pending the outcome of a section 43 hearing.
Soweto Council	Samwu	4 500	20.07.88	Council workers were dismissed after failing to heed a management ultimatum to return to work on July 22. The workers were on a wage strike. The council said it would only consider increasing salaries if and when Soweto residents paid their rent arrears (see Briefs).
SA Transport Services	FSATU		09.08.88	A Federation of Sats Trade Unions delegation walked out of arbitration after realising that talks to settle a wage dispute were getting nowhere. The dispute started early this year when FSATU, ignoring the government's call for a wage freeze, demanded a 17% wage hike.
Tradegro	Ccawusa	30 000	July 1988	Ccawusa was involved in wage negotiations with companies owned by the giant Tradegro, which last year made a profit of almost R42-million after tax deductions. The union declared disputes with Checkers, Metro and Fraser while negotiations with Fairways, Jazz, Smart Centre, Wanda Furnishers and Dions were either in progress or were scheduled to start soon. Minimum wages in the companies vary from about R300 a month at Frasers to R410 a month at Metro and Checkers.
Ullmann Brothers Industria	TGWU	250	24.08.88	Management dismissed 250 workers shortly after they went on strike. The strike resulted from worker confusion about accusations of theft made by management, and police involvement. Workers said management was trying to divide them by offering rewards to anyone who would point out thieves at the plant. Workers stopped work and demanded a clear explanation of the situation. The strike affected deliveries of certain products to OK Bazaars, Pick & Pay and Checkers. TGWU planned to take legal action.
Woolworths	Ccawusa		14.07.88	The split in Ccawusa delayed the conclusion of a wage agreement between Woolworths and the union. As an interim measure Woolworths management made a unilateral wage offer to individual employees. According to management almost 90% accepted the offer. But Ccawusa general secretary Vivian Mtwa condemned management's unilateral offer, saying management was taking advantage of divisions between members.

Strikes and Disputes: Natal

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events and Outcome
Fedhasa	NLCTEU		August 1988	Close to 80% of Natal Liquor and Catering Trades Employees Union members voted in favour of strike action for the first time since the formation of the union. Following this, Fedhasa suggested that the matter go to arbitration. The union accepted the proposal.
James North - Pinetown	Actwusa		Aug 1988	Actwusa and James North signed an agreement on paid maternity and paternity leave. This is the first of its kind in the garment industry.

Mondi Paper Mill Merebank	Ppwawu	1 000	11.10.88	Over a 1 000 workers at Mondi downed tools over a wide range of problems which the workers claim have been aggravated by the appointment of a new manager two months ago.
Natal Crude Oil Storage Isipingo	CWIU	1	September 1988	The industrial court ordered the reinstatement of a shop steward declared unfit, by Defence Minister Magnus Malan, for employment at any national key point. The shop steward, Emmanuel Nkomo, was dismissed last year.
Oil Companies	CWIU	3 000	August 1988	CWIU was in dispute with nine employers in the petroleum industry over their refusal to agree to national bargaining. Issues the union wanted to discuss included: public holidays, maternity leave, education assistance, job security and social responsibility programmes. The companies involved are BP, Caltex Oil, Cera Oil, Mobil Oil, Mobil Refining, Sapref, Shell Oil, Shell Chemicals and Veetech Oil.
South African Railways	Sarhwu	8 000	19.09.88	SATS workers downed tools again this year in Durban and East London. The strikes were sparked off by the suspension of a worker and over pay increases. The East London strike pre-empted wage negotiations. Strikers demanded a 300% wage increase, which amounted to a minimum starting wage of R1 500 a month. In Durban the strike spread to most depots in railways and harbours. On the third day police used teargas to disperse strikers and 160 workers were held briefly for questioning. After nine days the strike had spread to Richards Bay. The demand to reinstate a suspended worker was met on the fourth day. Other demands included the recognition of Sarhwu and a minimum wage of R1 500. On September 29 workers in Durban and Richards Bay returned to work. They had agreed to a wage increase of 12% for graded workers and 20% for general workers and obtained an agreement from management that wages would be discussed at a national level in October.
Tongaat-Hulett Rossborough	Fawu	600	30.08.88	During a wage strike, about 600 workers were locked out by management at the Tongaat-Hulett Rossborough refinery. Workers downed tools after five months of unsuccessful wage negotiations. Two weeks before the strike, workers staged an overtime ban and management responded by introducing short-time.

Strikes and Disputes: Cape/OFS

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events and Outcome
Allied Publishing	Mwasa	300	02-04.08.88	Mwasa members went on a two-day wage strike, affecting deliveries of the Cape Times and Argus. Workers stopped work in support of demands for wage parity with employees at other newspaper houses owned by Allied. The matter was referred to conciliation.
Cadbury Limited Port Elizabeth	Fawu	137	01.08.88	Cadbury's was granted an urgent interdict against nine Fawu shop stewards and 128 employees restraining them from instigating strike action. Workers were on strike from July 14 to July 20 over the issue of overtime. The company said extra working time was urgently needed during its peak selling season. Cadbury's estimated R500 000 a week would be lost if workers did not work overtime.
Imperial Car Hire Cape Town	TGWU	20	20-22.08.88	Workers initially staged an overtime ban because management refused to negotiate a new shift system. Some workers were suspended and they went on strike. Workers returned to work after management agreed to negotiate with the union.
Mercedes Benz East London	Numsa	2 000/900	22.08-19.09.88	In the third strike at Mercedes Benz this year, workers downed tools demanding that management withdraw a suspension imposed on a worker in June. Mercedes management said the worker was suspended for misconduct and disruption of production and was subject to a disciplinary enquiry. Numsa demanded the company drop the disciplinary enquiry. The fourth strike, which cost the plant almost R100-million, ended after a series of talks between Mercedes management and the union. Numsa accepted a company proposal that the allegations of misconduct against the worker be addressed by internal disciplinary hearings following an arbitration over the suspension of two other workers.
Tek Corporation East London	Numsa	200	July 1988	Tek Corporation planned to advertise 200 jobs after dismissing the majority of its workforce in April this year. Management's decision was followed by a breakdown in protracted negotiations with the union.
University of Western Cape - Bellville	UWC Wkrs Union	300	07.09.88	Catering, gardening and maintenance staff went on strike demanding across-the-board wage increases of R300 a month. The university administration offered R150 a month in addition to annual graded increases.
USA Brush Cape Town	CWIU	500	18-24.08.88	Workers at USA Brush went on strike in support of demands for higher wages and improved working conditions. Agreement was reached on the following: a new minimum rate of R135 a week, Founders Day as a swop for June 16, gift parcels to be given to expectant parents, and improved service bonuses.
Volkswagen Port Elizabeth	Numsa	4 500	22-26.09.88	The Volkswagen plant came to a standstill when 100 drivers went on strike demanding that their jobs be upgraded. The drivers supply the production lines with parts and their strike affected other areas of production. As a result management had to send other workers home. The strike started over alleged discrimination in wage increases for black and white toolmakers and forklift drivers. The workers demanded to be upgraded to higher job grades, an offer allegedly made to white workers with only a few weeks' experience. Workers returned to work while the union and management discussed the issue.

Jacaranda Transport Bloemfontein	TGWU	250	24.08.88	More than 250 workers went on a go-slow after management dismissed some workers for participating in the three-day stayaway in July. Management applied for an interdict against the workers' action.
Bloemfontein Bakery Bloemfontein	Fawu			Workers went on strike over the use of racially-abusive language and assault by a member of management. The company refused to meet and discuss the workers grievances with the union.

Strikes and Disputes: Mines

De Beers	NUM	9 655	August 1988	De Beers will increase minimum wages to R553 a month at five diamond mines affecting 9 655 union members. NUM made a breakthrough in winning one year's income security for members in the event of incapacity and an 'inconvenience' allowance for members who spend nights doing fieldwork. Previously such allowances were granted to white workers only.
Rand Mines Milling and Mining - Crown Mines	NUM	600	23.09.88	NUM and Rand Mines Milling and Mining reached a wage agreement ending a month-long dispute. The parties settled for a 12,5% wage increase raising the minimum wage to R584 per month.
Talana Anthracite	NUM	500	Aug 1988	About 500 mineworkers lost their jobs following the closure of a Dundee coalmine, Talana Anthracite.
Zincor - Springs	NUM	600	26.09.88	Management at Zincor locked out 600 workers following a deadlock over wages at a conciliation board hearing. Under the new Labour Relations Act, bosses are legally entitled to take action after a deadlock at conciliation, provided the minister of manpower is informed of the deadlock. NUM planned to challenge the lockout on the grounds that the minister was not informed before the lockout took place, thus making the action illegal. NUM demanded a 13% wage increase on the current minimum wage of R361 a month, but was prepared to settle on the company's final offer of 12%, if the company agreed not to increase hostel fees from R70 to R78 a month. On October 3 management gave notice of its intention to dismiss the workers.

Repression and attacks

AUGUST

07.08.88 - Eight Numsa members employed by Donn Products in Germiston arrested at their homes for alleged intimidation. Released after two days on R500 bail each.
- Two Numsa members arrested at Tilly Macmill during metalworkers strike. Released on bail.
- 18 workers arrested at Langenau during metalworkers strike.
10.08.88 - Five workers at Exdin Engineering arrested for intimidation during metalworkers strike.
- Pamphlet by unknown source accusing Numsa of forcing workers to go on strike and urging the unemployed to take the jobs of striking workers.
- Bamcwu national executive committee members briefly detained at John Vorster Square.
- Mwasa's deputy president, Mthata Tsedu, detained by police in Venda.
- Numsa member, Wilson Mbovane, arrested by Ciskei police on charges of intimidation during a dispute at Tek Corporation.
- TGWU information officer Kally Forrest detained for two hours prior to a meeting to discuss the LRAA.
25.08.88 - A march by Soweto Council workers was disrupted by police, using teargas and sjamboks - ten workers injured and a few detained and released after three days.

SEPTEMBER

- Strikers meeting at Regina Mundi disrupted by police. Strikers meeting in Jabavu disrupted by police.
21.09.88 - Police detained 11 activists who were to take part in Cosatu's anti-apartheid conference.
21.09.88 - Police surrounded the building where Cosatu's Eastern Cape regional congress was being held.
21.09.88 - TGWU offices in Port Elizabeth raided twice. Cosatu and Numsa offices in East London searched by security police. The Ccawusa office in East London was burgled and cash stolen.
21.09.88 - 160 Sarhwu members arrested briefly during a strike.
21-23.09.88 At least 11 Cosatu officials were detained under emergency regulations.
22.09.88 - police used teargas to disperse strikes at Durban harbour.
22.09.88 - Restriction orders served on the following trade unionists: Sydney Mafumadi, Cosatu assistant general secretary; Chris Dlamini, Cosatu's vice-president; Donsie Khumalo, Cosatu regional secretary for Northern Transvaal; Vusi Khumalo, president of Potwa; Bob Mabaso, Potwa's vice-president; Moses Lamola, Cosatu's Northern Transvaal regional chairman, and a senior official from Sadwu.
23.09.88 - A bus transporting Sawco members from Howick to the anti-apartheid conference in Cape Town was petrol-bombed.
23.09.88 - The state bans Cosatu's anti-apartheid conference.
24.09.88 - Union offices in Eaton Road, Durban was petrol bombed. The building housed Cosatu local, CWIU head office, Cosatu printing unit, TGWU, Fawu and Numsa.

OCTOBER

04.10.88 - Harwu member, John Mkhise, shot dead during a lockout at the Johannesburg Sun Hotel.
- Four Harwu members arrested in Cape Town. Fifteen Harwu demonstrators arrested at Pretoria's Church square. Police tried to prevent picketing at the Johannesburg Sun despite agreements between the SAP, management and the union. Police blocked workers from entering the vicinity of the Rand International Hotel.

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***Work In Progress*, a publication of the Southern African Research Service, is published by an editorial collective, 37 Jorissen Street, Braamfontein. PO Box 32716 Braamfontein 2017. Tel: (011) 403-1912/1586**