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THEORIA

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PIETERMARITZBURG

EDITORIAL COMMENT

'Sheltering under a leaf', as Virginia Woolf put it, in the foul weather that has overtaken our country, we continue the academic life as best we can. The moral and intellectual climate has changed: infringements of liberty and acts of inhumanity no longer arouse the furious indignation that would have flared up even four years ago; discussion among staff or students is no longer as frequent, as free, as easy and as vigorous as it was; many of our best academics have left the country. All this affects the quality of thought in every field, even the wholly unpolitical like that of *Theoria*. All the more reason, therefore, why people who feel that they have anything to say—about the humanities at least—should have an organ like *Theoria* to say it in; and we trust that they will throw off the apathy that sits on us all like the weight of the atmosphere on a hot, clammy day; and say it with all the energy, clarity and eloquence they can command.

Once again we are delighted to publish a piece of original creative work, again by the recent winner of the AKADEMIE VIR KUNS EN WETENSKAP's Olive Schreiner Prize for Drama. Readers of Mr Manson's *Prologue* in this number will look forward to the appearance of the new play of which it is the interesting herald.

THE EDITORS.

P.S.—Since going to press we have learned of the death of Dr Peter Hey, of whose article appearing in this number we had read the proofs while he was mortally ill in hospital. Though his health had been very seriously injured, partly as the result of a war wound, and his life threatened for many years, Dr Hey's energy, enthusiasm, experimental enterprise, philanthropic activities and practical resistance to Apartheid never flagged until he was finally struck down. He will be sadly missed and mourned in many circles, among old and young, and on both sides of the colour line.

CICERO'S FRIEND ATTICUS

by B. H. P. FARRER

ATTICUS, Titus Pomponius Atticus, the friend of Cicero, has always interested me, not least because rather contrary opinions have been expressed about him, and because he is so commonly referred to as 'Cicero's friend' that one perhaps tends to forget that he was another man, with an individuality and personality of his own. Let us take a description of him from a school book[1] to show you what I mean. We read:

> In a dangerous age, Atticus contrived to outlive friend and foe alike. He was a neutral in politics and always had friends in every camp. He was a Roman knight, and an astute business man of enormous wealth, much of which he lent out at interest. He was a good and patient friend to Cicero . . .

Is this praise or blame? Note that word 'contrived'. Was Atticus what the younger generation would call a 'shrewdie', and is the younger generation praising when it uses this word in an unqualified way? (Used of a cricket captain, for instance, it is praise.) This is perhaps the chief question I shall try to answer in this paper, with the aid of what Terence calls *bonitas vostra atque aequanimitas.*

And in trying to answer it I shall concentrate on the Life by Nepos. I should have liked to have gone farther afield, but limited time has counselled me to follow the example of Atticus himself, who, we are told in chapter 15, was very careful both in undertaking commissions and in carrying them out: *Levis arbitrabatur polliceri quod praestare non posset; idem in nitendo, quod semel annuisset . . . suam rem videbatur agere* (adapted). 'He thought it the characteristic of an unprincipled man to promise what he could not perform, but in striving to carry out what he had once undertaken to do he seemed to be prosecuting not another's but his own business'. So my main sources will be the text itself (O.C.T.) and an annotated edition revised by the so-called 'gloomy Dean', whom I once had the privilege of hearing preach, and whom I would describe as *devastator adversariorum.*

The family of Atticus, who lived 109-32 B.C., was equestrian, and traced its descent from one Pompo, a son of Numa, which makes it, I suppose, about as respectable as a Roman family could hope to be. The boy was carefully educated, and gave early evidence both of teachability and what is termed *suavitas oris atque vocis*—

[1] N. Fullwood: Cicero on Himself (Alpha Classics), p. 14.

'attractiveness of expression and pronunciation' (cf. *suavitas sermonis Latini* c. 4, where there is further reference to this *nativus lepor*). One thinks of Mr J. H. Hofmeyr or a good radio announcer, but the voice of Atticus was destined to be heard by relatively few, and not in public life.

He was connected by marriage with the Marian party, and because, in the troubled state of affairs at Rome, he found he could not live *pro dignitate* 'in accordance with his rank' without offending one or other of the parties, he withdrew to Athens to follow the bent of his interests there. This was in 86 B.C., and he stayed in Athens some 21 years, earning thereby the agnomen Atticus by which we know him.

At Athens he showed great public spirit, we are told. He had transferred there a large portion of his capital, and when the authorities were short of money, he lent them this free of interest, merely insisting that it had to be repaid by due date, a method both kind and firm, which might be employed, for instance, by governments towards municipalities.

He had not been there very long when the mighty Sulla passed through on his leisurely way back from the East, and Atticus, despite his Marian connections, pleased him greatly. It is somewhat odd to read of the rather inhuman dictator (as he was to be) being attracted by the *humanitas* of Atticus, and by his reading of Greek and Latin poems. He wished to take Atticus back to Rome with him, but the latter prudently declined the offer.

When he did eventually return to Rome, many years later (65 B.C.) it was to the universal regret of the Athenians, who seem to have shed as many tears as he had lent them sesterces.

Some light on his character is given us by his relations with some of his kinsfolk. We hear of a crusty uncle, Quintus Caecilius, *difficillima natura*. Yet, though no one else could stand him, Atticus retained his goodwill until his death, when he became heir to three-quarters of his estate—*pietatis fructus* says Nepos. Was this *fructus* a tribute to the good nature or to the shrewdness of Atticus? So good a business man as he must have had some shrewdness, but there is evidence to show that he had a definite code of behaviour as well.

Let us look at his relations with his sister Pomponia, the wife of Quintus Cicero, admittedly something of a shrew (cf. *Ad Atticum* 5.1. where she flares up over an imagined slight, says 'I, the mistress, am no more than a stranger here' and refuses to come to the table for luncheon.) We are told (c.17) that he never had a quarrel with her, and that this may have been due to his conviction that it was wrong to be angry with those whom it was his duty to love. And Nepos goes on to add that this conduct of his sprang not only from *natura*, as in other men, but also from *doctrina*, his philosophical principles. (He was an Epicurean.)

We are not surprised to hear that he was far more friendly with

Marcus Cicero than with his blustering brother-in-law Quintus, which leads Nepos to remark that similarity of character may be held to count for more in friendship than relationship by marriage does. But the truth seems to be that the basis of the two (friendship and relationship) is different, and it is difficult to compare them. Your friend may become a relative, and your relative a friend, but in the latter case the relationship seems to do no more than introduce you to each other. It is not an ingredient in friendship like similarity of character. It is a bowl, so to speak, containing ingredients, and the bowl is of the same set as yourself.

The mixture for the cake of Atticus, then, had more common ingredients with the mixture for the cake of Marcus than it did with the mixture for the cake of Quintus; but, for the purposes of this comparison, both the mixtures for Atticus and for Quintus were in green bowls marked A (*affinis*—'in-law'), while the mixture for Marcus was in a true blue optimate bowl marked C (*cognatus*, blood relation of one of the others).

Which leads us on to the observation that Atticus also belonged to the Conservative Party but took no direct part in politics, because he thought that those who entrusted themselves to the waves of public life had no more control over themselves than those who were tossed about by the waves of the sea—a disturbing thought, and one wonders whether it is generally known down in Cape Town.

He also never went to law about his own affairs (wise man?) and regularly declined posts in the provinces offered him by friends. We are told in this connection *rei familiaris despexit fructum* (6.1) 'he scorned the profit that might have accrued to his estate'. Did he just know he could do better at Rome? It might have been rather like leaving Johannesburg to speculate in Barberton or Ladysmith or even Pietermaritzburg.

When the new series of Civil Wars broke out in 49 B.C. the behaviour of Atticus conformed to his behaviour during the earlier ones. We are told *vetere instituto vitae effugit nova pericula* (7.3) 'by his old rule of life he avoided new dangers'. He helped his Pompeian friends from his private resources, but did not offend Caesar, who, when victor, went out of his way to be kind to him, releasing his nephew and his brother-in-law from Pompey's camp.

During the ascendancy of Brutus and Cassius his conduct was similar. He would help Brutus unofficially; but would have nothing to do with a proposal for a kind of private treasury for the 'liberators'. His good services had to be given *sine factione*, we are told, i.e. 'no politics'.

There followed the campaign around Mutina of 44-43 B.C. Antony was declared a public enemy and eventually left Italy. His enemies turned on his wife and children and friends. But not so Atticus, who, despite his friendship with Cicero, protected and aided them as best he could, and lent Fulvia (Antony's wife) money free of interest when she could not pay up for a farm on the appointed

day. In relating this Nepos gives us a phrase which might be taken as the motto of Atticus, at least the Atticus of Nepos. We are told he was glad to show that it was his custom to befriend *people*, and not their fortunes, *non fortunae sed hominibus amicus.* Nepos adds that no one could have thought that he was acting as a time-server, for no one thought that Antony would return to power.

But, as we know, he did return, and the proscriptions followed, from which Atticus was expressly excluded because Antony was 'mindful of his services' (10.4) to Fulvia and others. And here we come to that for which Atticus has been more scathingly criticised, nay condemned, than, I think, for anything else in his life.

He, the friend of Cicero, proceeded to live at peace and on good terms with one whom history regards as little short of Cicero's murderer. What are we to say? Was Atticus just a heartless, callous financier after all, without any human feeling? I shall return to this point later, but for the moment I would remind you that Julius Caesar's so-called *insidiosa clementia* (Cicero's own phrase) was considered something odd in the ancient world. In the power politics of the day Cicero's end was something more usual than not, and was Antony even capable of comprehending Cicero as a literary figure? Men like him have always, I think, tended to dislike and distrust clever orators. It is a sort of inferiority complex of the man who cannot argue or, at least, not argue well.

But we are told that Atticus did not use Antony's influence to increase his own wealth, although Antony did arrange the marriage of his (Atticus's) daughter to Agrippa. But, for the rest, he used his influence with Antony to protect and rescue friends in danger of proscription. And his estate in Epirus seems to have been a standing asylum for these people. It seems strange that the triumvirs should have countenanced this. Perhaps they didn't know, or perhaps they just didn't care once the *calamitosi* were outside Italy.

But though Atticus used his wealth to relieve others, he was not ostentatious in his use of it for himself. *Nemo minus fuit emax, minus aedificator* (13.1) which means that he was free from two of the prevalent weaknesses of the time, collecting and building for their own sakes. *Neque tamen non in primis bene habitavit.* He had an old house on the Quirinal, with an attractive park (*silva*) attached, which he made as comfortable as possible without altering anything unless, through its age, he had to.

His household staff was useful rather than ornamental. He did not have even a page who was not also a good reader and copyist, and his handymen (*artifices*) were all *apprime boni*, 'first-rate'. And all these were home-born and home-trained. Nepos commends him for this, for it is obvious he could easily have bought on the open market. His furniture was unpretentious (*modica non multa*) and his household expenditure regularly 3,000 HS a month (=£50, R100?).

For entertainment at dinner he had only a reader, and no other form of it, Henry Howell not Cecil Wightman, and his guests never went without their ration of this, 'that their minds, no less than their stomachs, might be delighted' (14.1).

His attitude to lies was strictly Kantian. He never told one (well, not as a rule; the word is *dicebat*) and he couldn't abide them in others. If he thought that the main purpose of words was to convey our meaning to, not to deceive, others, he must be commended for his old-fashioned and unassailable view. To his scrupulousness in undertaking and carrying out commissions I have already referred. He did the business of several eminent men.

Cicero's letters *to* Atticus hardly come within the scope of this paper, but it is interesting to note that Nepos already regards them as a virtual history of their times, and rather surprising to find him praising Cicero as a true prophet of political events (cf. 'As a politician Cicero failed to realise[2] . . .' which type of statement is commoner in our text-books).

But Atticus was also himself something of a *littérateur*. He wrote an annalistic history of Rome, and also monographs on separate families, e.g. on the '*Iunia gens*'. He also dabbled in verse, and wrote four to five line verse summaries of the achievements of notable Romans, to be placed under busts of them. Nepos commends his aptitude for this, and I wish I could give you an example. He wrote one book in Greek. The subject? The consulship of his friend Cicero.

We have seen how Atticus acquired *affinitas* with Agrippa. In the next generation, so to speak, he acquired it in a higher quarter. His daughter bore Agrippa a daughter Vipsania who was so well thought of that Augustus (then still 'Octavian') betrothed her to his stepson Tiberius when she was hardly a year old. 'But, of course, my dear, they never married'. Well, in this case they did, and the marriage was, as we know, highly successful until broken by Augustus for his cold-blooded dynastic plans.

This betrothal cemented a friendship which was already in being. For we are told that Augustus, when he was away from Rome, never sent a letter to any of his family without sending one for Atticus, or at least apparently enclosing a message, while when he was in the city he apparently wrote to him daily, unless he had good reason not to do so. This looks like the forerunner of the telephonic daily chat enjoyed by some people. Nepos says Augustus did it because he was too busy to see Atticus as often as he wished, but I confess the effect of the information on me is to arouse the thought 'What wonderful leisure, when a man has time to sit down and write to another man in the same town every day'. But of course everything was in Latin already. Augustus didn't have to correct proses.

[2] Ibid., p. 49.

In his last illness Atticus voluntarily abstained from food because he felt he was merely feeding his ailment. This was perhaps correct treatment, for after two days of it the fever abated. But he continued in his resolve, and died three days later, in his seventy-eighth year. He was buried *sine ulla pompa*, as he himself desired.

Such then was Titus Pomponius Atticus, known to a hundred books as 'the friend of Cicero', reviled by others for his disloyalty to that friend's memory. What manner of man was he really? —simple, peace-loving soul or expert trimmer?

The other day I had the good fortune to listen to a B.B.C. reporter's interview with Robert Graves, and the latter, always interesting if provocative, claimed that he had the power of transmitting himself back into the past to a certain point of time, so that he then knew how things really were in, say, the Rome of 54 A.D. This gift he said he used to understand the Emperor Claudius. It seems to me rather like the *Allwissenheit* a modern writer has found surprising in Tacitus, and I don't know how it rates as a historical method, but I am going to suggest that we can perhaps form some opinion of the character of Atticus without recourse to it, and just on the evidence before us. I am going to suggest that from this we can trace a consistency in his behaviour and a consistency that was perhaps based on his philosophical beliefs. We are told (c.17 end) *principum philosophorum ita percepta habuit praecepta, ut iis ad vitam agendam, non ad ostentationem uteretur*, 'he had acquired such knowledge of the teachings of the most notable philosophers that he used these teachings to help him lead his life, and not to air his knowledge'.

I have said he was an Epicurean, but this quotation would seem to make him a bit of an eclectic. What are the facts of his life? As a young man he leaves Rome to avoid civic strife, amid which he realised he could not please both parties. He returns to Rome and finds himself involved in civic strife again. He is quite often to be found helping the losers, but in a private capacity, *non fortunae sed hominibus amicus*. He is censured by some optimates 'for seeming to hate bad citizens too little' (c.9). You will remember that in the political language of the day 'bad citizens' meant those of the opposite party. But he is not impressed. He follows his own judgment, and takes as his criterion 'what it was right for him to do' (c.9 end).

Perhaps, like Livy, he couldn't understand why men can't be sweet and reasonable. Perhaps, like Vergil, he shows those prestirrings of Christianity which made it easier for the new religion to take root. He made peace with Cicero's murderers, but these people became related to him by marriage and so under a rule of his life which I have quoted earlier (p. 2). 'Not only *natura* but *doctrina* also' came into play (c.17). And even had Atticus had no such rule, it is very hard to ignore 'in-laws'. However deplorable their views may be, they are, as it were, in the clan.

I shall end with a thought derived from a friend, who tells me it is not original, though he retailed it very well. He thinks it may come from Tolstoy. The thought is this. Amid the steam-roller movements of world politics, when 'the kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together', there is not much, it seems, that an individual man can do to alter anything. The most he can hope is that if he is kind and helpful to those around him, he may, in some way, be helping the wagon on towards a new dawn.

Perhaps Atticus, at his best, was such a man.

This paper was originally read to the Classical Association of South Africa, at its biennial conference in Pietermaritzburg in February, 1963. One or two slight alterations have been made.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN THE TRANSKEI

by W. BRANFORD

1. *Introduction.*

Much in Africa turns upon language problems. Hence the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Teaching of the Official Languages and the use of the Mother Tongue as Medium in Transkeian Primary Schools*, despite its forbidding title, is worth study. It has further interest as an assessment, sponsored by the Department of Bantu Education, of some of the achievements of the first seven years of Bantu Education in the Transkei.

Though the report is fairly short, a full analysis of it would amount almost to a review of African Education in the Republic. This paper offers only a brief consideration of its views on language, comparing them principally with those of the Eiselen Report (*Report of the Commission on Native Education*, 1949-1951, the blueprint for the present system of Bantu Education) and with those of the Commonwealth Conference on the Teaching of English as a Second Language held at Makerere, Uganda, in 1961. Since the full titles of these three documents are inconveniently long, they will be cited here simply as the Eiselen, Makerere, and Transkei Reports.

2. *The Mother-tongue Principle.*

The Transkei Commission holds that 'the case . . . for education through the medium of the mother tongue is so strong that it cannot be challenged' (page 18). This is an article of faith to which most educational writers find it necessary to subscribe, but in particular cases it is often equally necessary to surround it with saving clauses. Thus for the Xhosa people, as for many others, it may be necessary in the first place to learn a second and sometimes even a third language in addition to the mother tongue, and in the second place perhaps to abandon, at a certain stage of their education, the mother-tongue medium for another.

There is an important distinction between teaching a language as a subject and using it as a medium of instruction. The distinction is not absolute, because teachers, say, of English as a second language, will use English as far as possible as the medium for language lessons. But a pupil who uses English in English classes only has (as the Transkei Commission recognises) much less chance of mastering it than has a pupil who uses it in other classes too.

Language then, for people like those of the Transkei, presents three separate but interlocking questions:

(i) The suitability of the mother tongue as a medium;

(ii) The learning of other languages;

(iii) The transfer, if any, from the mother tongue to another language as medium of instruction.

Each of these questions is apt to be surrounded by unpalatable facts. The simplest case is that of a nation with one mother tongue that is entirely adequate to all its needs. But some vernaculars, though it may be rash to say so, are inadequate to some of the needs of their speakers, and some states have more than one vernacular. Further possible difficulties are those of educational tradition—the wishes and habits of parents, children and teachers, in addition to the policies of Departments of State. The Transkei Commission's confidence in the mother tongue is echoed in the official statements of UNESCO, the Government of India and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., (Counts, 1959), but to act, in 'underdeveloped' countries, uncompromisingly upon the mother-tongue principle may be more difficult than it seems.

In such countries three forces seem to operate against mother tongues: the conservatism of parents and teachers, the urge to master English or another European language at almost any cost, and the uncertain status of some of the 'mother tongues' by law established in recent years. Thus Siqueira (1952), writing of the introduction of the mother-tongue medium in Indian schools over the period 1935-1950, notes that 'Many schools, frightened by the change, applied for permission to continue to teach in English'. After the independence of Pakistan, English was excluded from the curriculum of primary schools in East Bengal, yet Huq (1954) writes that 'Though this step was in the right direction, conforming to the practice in many of the educationally advanced countries, yet many schools, particularly in the urban areas, unofficially teach English at the primary stage'. Multilingualism further complicates the issue: Natarajan (1962) reports from India 'vigorous criticism of the manner in which the Union Government is spending large sums of money on the advancement of Hindi, and "bolstering it up" to the obvious disadvantage of other Indian languages'. Language, in short, is one of the activities in which the community and the planners are particularly liable to thwart one another.

This is true, of course, not only of efforts to promote the 'mother tongue' but even more of efforts to suppress it. The architects of mother-tongue education for Africans sometimes appeal in defence of their policy to the example of the early struggles of Afrikaans against the oppressor. 'Watter reg het ons,' asks Meiring (1950) 'om teen die naturel dieselfde soort onreg te pleeg?' A slightly different case is that of independent Ghana, where an attempt to establish English as the general language of the schools by government decree has failed because neither the schools nor the community were ready for it (O'Hagan, 1962). Here the change to English has perhaps been only postponed.

In Indian education in Natal, the 'mother-tongue' or 'vernacular' principle was rejected many years ago. Cooppan (1948) cites the

report of the first Inspector of Indian schools (1881) who recommended the use of English as a medium in Indian schools owing to the diversity of Indian vernaculars and the wishes of a number of Indian parents. Forty years later, faced with requests for instruction in Tamil and other vernaculars, the Natal Education Inquiry Committee of 1921-1922 decided 'That it was not the duty of the State to include instruction through the medium of a language foreign to the country, the teaching of that language as a subject, or the promotion and preservation of the national aspirations and ideals of other States or peoples, even though they be sister Dominions or peoples.' Thus English is the medium of instruction in Indian schools in Natal.

A good command of English opens opportunities closed to those limited to the vernacular. The Swaziland Sample Survey (1962, Chapter VI.E) shows that even in rural Swaziland it was among those who had had experience of English-medium teaching at school (i.e. the Higher Primary group) that the economic advantages of education began to show, though English in Swazi schools is introduced as a subject in the first year of the Lower Primary course.

Considerable difficulties attend the transfer from one medium to another. Nel (1942) cites evidence from Wales and the Dutch East Indies of the 'geesteskonflik' involved; Smit (1962) claims that 'Experience and research have proved conclusively that the majority of pupils suffer irreparable damage in the process.' 'Irreparable damage' is a pleasant hypothesis for all pupils educated through the medium of Latin in the schools and universities of the Middle Ages and later, and much of history might thereby be explained. But 'proved conclusively' cannot be allowed to pass without question. The point is not that a change of medium will not be difficult or even damaging, but that the alternative—in this case limiting the pupils' experience of English—may for many pupils be difficult and damaging to an even greater extent.

For the question of change of medium, however, the main issues are probably not those of individual psychology. As the Makerere Report suggests (Page 21, paragraph 61): 'By far the most important consideration lies outside the realm of education. Linguistic policy in the school is only part of a broad governmental decision. Where a community has decided to participate as speedily as possible in the technological and other advances of a wider society, a decision to use English as a medium is likely to be inevitable, and the pressure for introducing it fairly early may well be heavy. A society which lays more stress on the preservation of a traditional way of life will not introduce English as a medium until later in the school life of the child.'

To this one might object that experience in India and elsewhere shows that 'broad governmental decisions' may shipwreck on the actual wishes and capacities of the governed, and that decisions

which fail to allow for the diversity of aspirations and abilities in a large population are likely to be thwarted by the facts.

The general approach of the Makerere Conference, however, is far from dogmatic. On the question of transfer to the medium of English (if there is to be such a transfer at all) the Conference suggested that 'The guiding principle regarding the age at which the language can be introduced should, subject to various limitations, be "The earlier the better".'

One important 'limitation' may be the child's previous attainment in English; another is that of the teacher. Further, as the Makerere Report points out, to use English as a medium 'is uneconomical of time and effort if it is regarded as a substitute for well planned instruction in English as a subject.'

Some recent work on the transfer to English in Commonwealth territories shows an extension of the principle 'as early as possible' to its logical conclusion. One of the principal objections to transfer is the danger that it 'may make the pupils' educational programme excessively linguistic' (Makerere Report, page 23, paragraph 65; Transkei Report, page 16). Very early transfer exploits the young child's flexibility, and, under the right conditions, familiarises him in the context of his daily activities with the structures and vocabulary of spoken, informal English, which are less likely to be assimilated later when the main emphasis, almost inevitably, is on the written word. Thus O'Hagan (1962) reports extensive experiments in Kenya from 1957 onwards, with the introduction of English as a medium in Standard I of primary schools, at first for Asian children and later for Africans. These were only possible after much preparatory work on two fronts: the special training of teachers, and considerable research in 'the breaking down and reassembling of English structures within the limits of carefully selected word lists' for a special series of textbooks. 'Young children,' writes O'Hagan, 'can develop in English a flexible command of controlled structures and vocabulary quite sufficient for their current needs both in and out of school', and the Kenya pupils, he adds, 'have not suffered from any psycho-somatic disturbances as the result of learning through the medium of a foreign tongue.'

Experiments in the very early introduction of the English medium are also reported from Basutoland and Malaya, and are under consideration in Swaziland as well. (O'Hagan, 1962; Director of Education, Swaziland, 1962).

3. (*a*) *Bantu Education Policy: The Mother Tongue.*

At the date of the first Bantu Education Act (no. 47 of 1953) the official medium of instruction in Transkeian schools was the vernacular for the first four years of the primary course (i.e. in the sub-standards and up to Standard II) after which there was a gradual change to English. A very few classes appear to have used English from the beginning. The statistics of the Eiselen Report (Table 83) show that in Standards III and IV the usual practice in the Cape was to use English and the vernacular in

roughly equal proportions, but that most classes from Standard V upwards were conducted 'mainly or only' in English. This was despite official encouragement for the experimental use of the vernacular in the higher classes. The figures suggest considerable variation from school to school, no doubt in accordance with local circumstances and traditions, and the capacities of pupils and staff.

The Eiselen Report (paragraph 1001) states as a fundamental principle that 'Effective education is only possible through the medium of the mother tongue, and that the mother tongue, as bearer of the traditional heritage of the various ethnic groups, is one of the most important subjects.' It is essential, the Report continues, 'to organise the school as a social institution, and such organisation would naturally be impossible unless the language of the community were also the language of the school'. The main specific recommendations on language policy of the Eiselen Report (paragraph 921) were:

(i) 'That *all* education, except in the case of a foreign language, should be through the medium of the mother tongue for the first four years.

(ii) 'That this principle should also gradually be applied in the subsequent four courses of study in the higher primary school by progressively extending the use of the mother tongue to the higher standards year by year.

(iii) 'That in order to expedite the change-over to the proposed procedure, committees should be appointed to compile the terminology which will be necessary in the teaching of all primary school subjects through the Bantu language.

(iv) 'That this committee or other committees be also entrusted with the compilation of suitable terminology for all secondary school subjects.

(v) 'That according as this terminology, together with the necessary manuals, becomes available, the principle of mother-tongue medium of instruction be also introduced gradually in the secondary schools.'

Of special interest here, as in the Transkei Report later, is the insistence that the official languages of the Republic are 'foreign' languages to its African citizens (Transkei Report, pages 4 and 10). This is a matter on which we lack reliable information. To many Africans, probably, the official languages are neither entirely foreign nor entirely familiar. Horrell (1962) cites an official estimate of the number of Africans who have passed Standard VI as 295,600; this constitutes a minimum estimate of the very substantial block of Africans who are familiar, in most cases well above the level of 'functional literacy', with at least one of the official languages. The African readership of English newspapers, the large circulations of *Drum* and *Golden City Post* and the fact that even such a newspaper as *Ilanga lase Natal* carries some English editorial matter, suggest that English, for considerable numbers of Africans, is something more than a foreign language.

At the time of the Eiselen Report, incidentally, seven different Bantu languages were in use in the schools, though the Commission expressed the hope that these would in time be reduced to five.

It will be seen that the Eiselen policy relied largely upon the manufacture of special terms by language committees. This has taken time; further, as the Transkei Report shows, it is one thing to issue lists of words, and quite another to get the words into circulation. Seven committees (not five) set to work, and provisional word-lists were issued from time to time, but it was not until February 1963 that the *Bantu Education Journal* was able to announce, as a matter 'for celebration', the publication of booklets containing 'a key list of approximately 8,000 words for use in the various primary school subjects', noting, however, 'that there are spiritual strangers among us to whom the appearance of the glossaries has no significance'. As the Transkei Commission remarked, 'Many vocabulary lists are still lying unopened in many cupboards.'

The publication, and still more the reception, of the Departmental glossaries, demonstrate that mother-tongue instruction does not in all cases suffice to protect the pupil from the effects of the language crisis of the modern world. Against English-medium instruction it has been urged that it confronts the Bantu child with 'strange facts in a strange language' (Transkei Report, p. 18); true as this may be, the adaptation from above of the Bantu languages to the world of today may well result in 'strange facts in a strange language' over again.

From 1955 onwards, in accordance with the new policy, English 'progressively disappeared as a medium' from the primary schools, though it remained the medium for Secondary work and was taught as a subject from the sub-standards upwards. (Transkei Report, page 2.) The Junior Certificate syllabus of the Bantu Education Department (1957) announces that 'The principle of mother-tongue instruction will, as in the case of the lower and higher primary school, be applied at the Junior Certificate level of the Secondary School, but the Bantu languages as media of instruction will be introduced progressively as the technical difficulties which render their effective use impractical are overcome.'

For Matriculation, up to 1961, all candidates were required to offer English or Afrikaans (Higher Grade). From 1959 onwards, however, African failures in Matriculation English began to make headlines, and early in 1961 the Joint Matriculation Board agreed to a further extension of the mother-tongue principle; as from the examination of November-December 1963, a candidate whose home language is a Bantu language may offer this language on the higher grade as his 'Group I' subject. Such a candidate need not offer an official language on the Higher Grade, but must pass both English and Afrikaans at least on the lower grade. Thus if he offers six subjects, as most candidates do, three of his six will be South African languages.

The Transkei Con stitution Act, No. 48 of 1963, takes the reco

nition of African vernaculars a step further by providing that subject to the provisions of the Republic of South Africa Act (No. 32 of 1961) for the status of Afrikaans and English, 'Xhosa shall be recognised as an additional official language of the Transkei.' 'Sesotho', the Transkei Constitution adds, 'may also be used for governmental, legislative, official and judicial purposes.' Future Constitutions will no doubt make similar provision for Zulu, Tswana, Venda and Tsonga, and perhaps in due course for Urdu, Tamil, Telegu, Gujerati and Memon.

3. (*b*) *Bantu Education Policy: Afrikaans.*

Early Christian-National theory (Nel, 1942) proposed, quite reasonably from its own standpoint, that the Bantu primary schools should teach only one of the official languages, and that this language should be Afrikaans. Two official languages, in addition to the vernacular, would, as Nel points out, considerably overburden the child: 'Daar dit uit 'n opvoedkundige oogpunt nie gesond is om meer as twee tale aan kinders in die laer skool te leer nie, moet slegs óf Engels óf Afrikaans toegelaat word.' The choice, one might argue, could well be left as far as possible to School Boards in consultation with parents. If all Europeans were, as they ought to be, fully bilingual, a Bantu citizen would be safe with either language and would not need both. Nel, however, ignoring the entrenchment of English in the staff and institutions of African education, urges the choice of Afrikaans, 'omdat die gees van die naturel ontvankliker vir die Afrikaanse taal is as vir Engels.'

The Eiselen programme for Afrikaans is in some ways more realistic. The Commission found, as did the Transkei Commission later, that Bantu witnesses generally wished for Afrikaans to be taught in their schools, but that 'Afrikaans, nevertheless, has still to make up considerable leeway, especially in the Cape Province.' Of 1,560 African candidates for the Cape Junior Certificate in 1948, only 47 offered Afrikaans B; none offered Afrikaans A. In the Transvaal, on the other hand, nearly all African candidates offered Afrikaans.

The Transkei Commission states that 'Several years before 1954, Afrikaans was introduced in the training schools of the Transkei', and as qualified teachers became available, the Primary Schools began to teach Afrikaans. But even as late as September 1962, as the Commission's figures show, of 384 teachers of Afrikaans in 200 primary schools selected at random, 181, or 47%, were still unqualified, while a further 128 (33%) held qualifications described as 'Standard VI or Preparatory'. (Transkei Report, p. 8.) This was nine years after the first of the Bantu Education Acts.

'In and after 1955', however, as the Transkei Commission reports, 'all Bantu Primary Schools introduced Afrikaans in their curricula as a compulsory subject for instruction.' Thus, by the middle of his first year at school, the child was already learning three languages: the vernacular, English and Afrikaans.

To meet the needs of unqualified teachers of Afrikaans, the

Department ran a number of special Afrikaans courses lasting from ten days to three weeks, and it appears that by 1956 all Standard VI candidates in Transkeian schools were writing Afrikaans C. It may seem remarkable that responsible Afrikaners could tolerate such a programme for the teaching of their language to many thousands of children. Examination figures, however, were encouraging: of 6,736 Transkeian candidates writing Afrikaans C in 1956, 6,548 passed (97%); this suggests either an educational miracle or a remarkably low standard of examination. By 1961, however, the rate of failure had risen to 42%. (Transkei Report, p. 9).

In 1959, pending the general adoption of the vernacular in Secondary Schools, the Minister of Bantu Education announced that 'If teachers were able to do so, both English and Afrikaans, in equal proportions, must be used as the media of instruction for subjects that were not taught through an African language'. (Hansard, 15th May 1959, Columns 2349-50; cited by Horrell and Skinner, 1960.) This flies in the faces both of Christian-National principle and mother-tongue rationale. So few secondary teachers, however, were able to teach in Afrikaans that this policy could be only sporadically applied. (Transkei Report, p. 10).

4. *Appointment of the Commission.*

The catalogue of dismissals, riots and examination failures that fills so much of the history of African education in this country over the past seven or eight years need not be repeated here. Such incidents can, of course, be paralleled from the recent experience of many other African states, though not always for the same reasons as in the Republic.

In 1962 the policy and conduct of the Department of Bantu Education, and in particular the mother-tongue rule and other language measures, were sharply criticised in the debates of the Transkeian Territorial Authority. This appears to have led to the appointment of the Transkei Commission, with the following terms of reference:

'(*a*) To inquire into the educational standard of teaching in the two official languages in the Transkeian Territories and submit to the Minister recommendations as to how the teaching of the two official languages in the Transkei in particular, and in the system of Bantu Education in general can be improved and the standard of achievement in these languages raised, and

'(*b*) to inquire into the related matter of the application of home language medium in primary schools and consider complaints which are brought forward.'

The Chairman of the Commission was Mr R. Cingo, Sub-Inspector of Schools, who sat with Mr N. P. Hela, Mr B. B. Mdledle and Mr D. M. Ntusi as Members of the Commission, and Mr P. R. T. Nel (Inspector of Schools, Natal Education Department) and Mr J. L. Boshoff (Inspector of Bantu Education) as Assessor

Members. The absence from this list of an English name adds considerable interest to the findings. Mr Nel, I should add, is not the author of the treatise cited above.

Since education is ultimately to pass under the control of Bantu Regional authorities, the timing of the appointment of the Commission might be criticised. The Transkeian Constitution Act appears unequivocally to entrust Bantu Education in the Transkei to the Transkeian Legislative Assembly (Act No. 48 of 1963, Clause 37 and First Schedule, Part B.) Clearly, a report addressed to the Minister of Bantu Education may not be oriented quite as would one on the same subject to the Minister of Education in the Transkeian Cabinet. On the other hand, the Report reveals a state of emergency that calls for immediate action, and it is fitting that the Department of Bantu Education should testify to its own stewardship. The factual and impartial spirit of the Commission's inquiry should reassure any who feel that one of the motives for its appointment may have been to anticipate, and perhaps prevent, action by the Transkeian Government.

The Commission first met in Pretoria on 31st July and 1st August, 1962. The Commissioners appealed for evidence from 'all interested persons and organisations' and invited the Universities and certain other bodies to submit their views. A special questionnaire was circulated to the Principals of all Transkeian schools and other leaders and to churches and other organisations. The Commission visited a number of schools and training colleges, and set two special language tests, one English and one Afrikaans, to groups of Standard VI pupils from about thirty primary schools. It is a pity that the Commission did not also repeat some of the tests used by the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education in 1936 and by the Eiselen Commission in 1948. These would have provided an empirical check on changes in levels of attainment. The Commission's own tests and observations, however, are sufficiently revealing of present standards.

The final Report, dated on the cover 'October, 1962', was not tabled in Parliament until 9th May, 1963. Alarming as it is, all students of language and education in this country should welcome this Report.

5. *Languages in Transkeian Schools.*

The Transkei Commission reports 'an almost frighteningly low standard of education in all subjects', including, of course, English and Afrikaans (p. 18). Its strictures and recommendations range over the whole field of education, from the wishes and shortcomings of parents to the powers and duties of school boards, as well as matters of general policy and principle. Many topics have been very summarily treated, and it is no criticism of the Commission to suggest that its Report shows principally that, if the Transkei record is a fair sample, Bantu Education needs a thorough and immediate overhaul.

For facts and findings, the Report itself must be studied in

detail. Here I propose only to examine some of the evidence which it presents on the three questions with which this paper began: the suitability of the mother tongue, the learning of other languages and the transfer, if any, from the mother tongue to another medium.

The Commission affirms, in the first place, that the Xhosa language has a future and is worthy of development. Its witnesses, apparently, were not so enthusiastic. Of 462 responses to item 10 of the Commission's questionnaire: 'Do you consider Xhosa as a suitable medium of instruction in Primary Schools?' 158, i.e. over a third, were 'No'. Most of the rest supported the use of Xhosa for the early years of instruction only—for the sub-standards (21 respondents), up to Standard II (102 respondents), or up to Standard IV (89 respondents). To the next question, 'Is Xhosa capable of being developed as a suitable medium of instruction in Primary Schools?', 140 replied 'Yes', 139 were 'undecided' and 278 replied 'No' (p. 30).

The Commission itself 'unhesitatingly rejects' the use of Xhosa 'for several years to come' as a medium in Secondary Schools, and accepts that in its use for certain subjects even as low as Standards V and VI, 'terminology would cause some difficulty'. It considers, however, that Xhosa would have been more successful in the schools but for two factors: 'the haste with which new words have had to be fabricated' by the Department, and 'the habit of many teachers of ignoring publications such as the *Bantu Educational Journal* containing valuable information and useful guidance' (p. 17).

On the second question, that of the teaching of the official languages, the Commission has some highly depressing findings and recommendations. The standard of English is described as 'very very low indeed'; many pupils both in Standard VI and Form I (i.e. at the very end of the primary course) are 'unable to express themselves coherently in the simplest English' (p. 3). Much the same is to be said of Afrikaans (pp. 8-9).

This state of affairs has been masked, to some extent, by official examination results. These are summarised below:

LANGUAGE EXAMINATIONS IN THE TRANSKEI

Year	Number of Candidates		Percentage failing			
			English Higher		Afrikaans C	
	Std. VI	J.C.	Std. VI	J.C.	Std. VI	J.C.
1959.. ..	8,165	1,268	59	5	18	31
1960.. ..	8,230	1,586	20	2	22	6
1961.. ..	9,210	1,596*	11	2	42	10

* 1,515 for Afrikaans C; 80 (of whom 70 passed) offered Afrikaans B. This leaves one pupil's Afrikaans examination unaccounted for.

Some of these figures, such as those for Junior Certificate English (Higher Grade), simply suggest low standards; others can hardly be interpreted at all. A failure rate of 11% for Standard VI English Higher in 1961 cannot be reconciled with the findings of the Commission. There are remarkable fluctuations: for eight thousand Standard VI candidates in 1959, there were three times as many failures in English Higher as in Afrikaans C, while for nine thousand candidates in 1961, there were nearly four times as many failures in Afrikaans C as in English Higher. Such figures might only confirm that the art and science of examining is sadly neglected; unfortunately they are cited in Parliament by the Minister of Bantu Education as 'hopeful signs that the temporary decline in examination achievement has been halted' (*Bantu Education Journal*, September, 1962).

The Commission agreed that English in schools had deteriorated (p. 3) and that this was partly due to the use of Xhosa as a medium in class and to the gradual disappearance of English from hostels and playgrounds. 'In the past', it suggests, 'the really effective teaching of English in Transkeian Schools was largely done by the teachers who used English as medium of instruction. Now that English is no longer used as a medium as from Standard III the poor teaching of English as a subject in many schools has been exposed' (p. 16).

The remedy proposed by the Commission is not a return to the introduction of English as a medium in Standard III (though three-quarters of the responses to its questionnaire request, in effect, that this should be done) but an improvement of teaching methods, an increased allocation of time for the teaching of the official languages, and the postponement of the introduction of the second official language to the beginning of the child's third year at school.

On the third question, that of transfer, the Commission, as already indicated, accepts that there must be a change:

'The Bantu child therefore *must* . . . change his medium of instruction . . . A foreign language *must* . . . at some stage in his scholastic career become a substitute for his mother tongue' (p. 19, Commission's italics).

This marks a retreat from the uncompromising theory of the Eiselen Report. Further, the Transkei Commission 'wishes to stress that only one of the official languages can become the mother-tongue substitute. Any attempt to make both official languages the mother-tongue substitute must be firmly rejected' (p. 19). Unlike the Makerere Conference, however, the Transkei Commission considers that 'As a general principle, it can be said that the later this change in medium is introduced, the better. Obviously a child who has had tuition in a foreign languageas a subject for six years should know the language better than a child who has had tuition in that language for only three years' (p. 19). Against this it may be suggested that children are likely to be less adaptable, linguistically, as they grow older, and that the real issue is that of

the value of instruction in the language against instruction plus, in the later years of the course, experience of the language as medium.

While stressing the psychological primacy of the mother tongue, the Commission possibly underestimates the social and economic roles of the official languages. It recommends the retention of the mother-tongue medium up to and including Standard IV, and a gradual transfer during Standards V and VI. As the majority of pupils are concentrated in the lowest standards, and leave school before reaching Standard VI, this means that the English-medium work would be confined to a relatively small group at the top of the educational pyramid. The figures given in the Union Yearbook for 1960 show for the total African school population approximately 8% in Standards V and VI and 3% in Standards VII to X. Even for pupils in the higher primary standards, the use of the English medium might be limited to a selected group if the Department were to take up the Commission's suggestion of 'the application of a differentiated education after Std. IV with a view to selecting the really suitable candidates for Secondary and Higher education' (p. 20).

In defence of postponing the change of medium, the Commission states that:

'Millions of children in many countries of the world learn foreign languages successfully, in spite of the fact that these languages are not used as media of instruction. Provided a foreign language is well taught as a subject the normal child should be able to acquire a sound enough knowledge of that language to derive the maximum benefit a knowledge of that language may bring' (p. 16).

It is true that millions of children go through the motions of learning foreign languages, but their success is highly debatable. Bloomfield, who was well qualified to judge, wrote in 1933: 'The large part of the work in high schools and colleges that has been devoted to foreign language study includes an appalling waste of effort; not one pupil in a hundred learns to speak and understand, or even to read a foreign language'. Carroll (1953), citing this, does not indicate that much had happened since 1933 to modify Bloomfield's conclusion. The Commission's second statement, that learning a language as a subject can give a normal pupil 'the maximum benefit that a knowledge of that language may bring', is questionable on any serious view of language.

Even if good language teaching could achieve what the Commission claims, the teaching of English and Afrikaans in the Transkei, on the Commission's own showing, is far from good and is not likely to improve quickly. Many teachers of English are poorly qualified and most teachers of Afrikaans are nearly or completely unqualified. Many teachers are incapable either of teaching an oral lesson or of correcting their pupils' written work (pp. 5-6). One of the Commission's constant complaints is that of the teachers' 'neglect of duty' and ignorance of method (p. 18; see also pp. 4-5,

17 and 21-22). Further, 'The Commission's attention was drawn to the fact that Bantu Education was not attracting the best available recruits into the teaching profession' (p. 22). This makes the prospects for the Commission's own teacher-training schemes rather bleak.

The Report notes the possibility of employing more European teachers as a stop-gap, but where, one may ask, are these European teachers to be found? While the Report refers freely to educational thinking overseas, its suggestions for action bring home the isolation of the Republic, and of Bantu Education in particular, from the practical help that is so readily available to our neighbours. While Nigeria, for instance, is able to employ large numbers of British and American teachers on short-term contracts, such a prospect is hardly open to the Department of Bantu Education at present.

It is, however, upon theoretical issues that I wish to focus in conclusion. The Transkei Report, admirable for its resolute presentation of the facts, uncertain in its excursions into theory, is an excellent reminder of the status of our thinking about language training. What the Report offers is a reasoned plan for making the best of existing institutions and available people. While outlining its plan, however, the Report refers with an air of confidence to theoretical foundations which, on any broad and critical view of the matter, are far from solid. The Commission states its belief in the mother-tongue principle as 'educationally unassailable'. Here, perhaps, it is the word 'educationally' that opens the door to the saving clause; the Commission's own treatment of the principle shows how 'assailable' it can be in the actual practice of education.

Even on the question of the curriculum for the child's first year at school, the Commission states its position only to surrender it: 'The Commission strongly supports the principle of devoting the first year of the child's school career solely to mother-tongue instruction, and that at this stage the child should not be burdened with other languages. It realises, however, that there are practical reasons which make it necessary to introduce an official language during the last six months of the first year' (p. 6). What is the use, one begins to ask, of 'strongly supporting' a principle that 'practical reasons' can so easily overrule?

The main issue, however, is not that of compromise between 'principle' and 'practical reasons'. It is the issue of the limitations of our knowledge. Despite the enormous literature on the teaching of second languages, Carroll had to conclude in 1953 that 'we are little better off in our knowledge of the problem than we were, say, thirty years ago, that is, before the flush of wide-scale investigations which started about that time. Perhaps we are better off in a negative sense—we know better the extent of our ignorance'. There have, no doubt, been advances since 1953, but not such as to justify anybody's confidence that he has the answer to problems of language teaching in the Transkei.

Fundamental to all learning, however, is the issue of motivation,

which the makers of policy ignore at their peril. It was the desire, in a sense the love, of the Afrikaner people that created and preserved Afrikaans, and there is little hope for a language policy that does not build on foundations of this kind. What the Transkei Report exposes is the lack of such foundations for the current policies of the Department of Bantu Education. Most harmful, perhaps, is the rigid standardisation of practice for all localities and schools; any policy that fails to allow for the diversity of people and institutions will live only as another monument to the vanity of dogmatising.

Cautious as is the general tone of the Report, its data and even its conclusions direct us to a re-thinking of basic assumptions. One can only endorse its concluding hope: 'May the outcome be the opening of new horizons for education in the Transkei in particular, and Bantu Education in general.'

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THE STATUS OF THE TEACHER IN A CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY

by P. D. HEY

WE NATALIANS who are associated with the teaching profession find ourselves 'cribbed, cabin'd and confined' by our roles: we must guard our tongues for fear we shall transgress. We live in a frontier society and there are few of us: we are privileged people. We have evolved a discreet mode of association and address to make it easier to get along with one another. There is an agreed discretion which cloaks what we think on public occasions. There is a public dialogue we in Natal have learned. It is a blunted speech. To put it another way, in our public roles in education we learn the lubricatory phrase. We must not upset the boat.

I have, in spite of the caution inherent in my opening remarks, regarded this opportunity to speak to the Natal Teachers' Society as an essay in articulation. I have attempted to define my views on the status of the teaching profession and hope it will not be necessary for me to declare my personal belief in the importance of the role of the teacher or of the magnitude of that role. I have attempted a formulation on the status of the teacher after ten years of University teacher training. These views suffer from the limitation of oversimplification and are meant to give an outline to a theme.

Although one has to speak in absolutes, the categories are oversimplified in order that the wood may be seen. As I see it, there are three sorts of teacher to be found in the world (to give, I repeat arbitrary categories):

(1) the teacher in the *revolutionary society* (as in Russia of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the China of today and the underdeveloped societies of Africa);
(2) the teacher in the *conservative society* (as in pre-1944-Act Britain);
(3) the teacher in the *reactionary society* (certain parts of South Africa).

The status of the teacher is related to the nature of the society in which he finds himself. It is related to the sort of role that he is called on by the society to play. My point is that status is created by the society in which one finds oneself. It is not a matter of 'doing anything about it' oneself. Status is what one falls heir to in a particular society.

We are not arguing here, necessarily, that there is a cyclical movement in education (that is, from the revolutionary to the conservative to the reactionary). An educational system can move

from the one state to another, depending on political climate and other influences. In some countries (as in South Africa), all three states (that is, the revolutionary, the conservative and the reactionary) are to be found in the minds of men. Briefly allow me to outline my conception of the three states of society:

(1) A *revolutionary society* may be defined as a deliberate, organised, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture. It may be either religious or political, but it is usually a combination of both. The code of the movement defines the previous state of society as inadequate, as perverse, even evil, and depicts a utopian image of a better society as a goal towards which the present regime is carrying the society. A characteristic of the revolutionary society is the degree of autonomy given the central authority and the Messianic zeal with which the programme is often carried out. There is a sense of mission and of purpose in the revolutionary society which gives to the educational institution a stature which is rarely found in other societies. The status of the teacher is high because he is the agent of social change. He is an important tool of the movement. An index of his role is often the salary he is paid relative to other occupations in the society. He possesses the new knowledge and he is, as a consequence, the catalyst. The structure of the administration reinforces his ascendancy, investing power in him as an intellectual and the formulator of the new code. This charismatic knowledge is sought by the people. It is the new way of life and holds the promise of plenty. All this contributes to the enhancing of the status of the teacher. A high value is placed on his ability to formulate the new code. The point must be made that in the revolutionary society the role of the schools and of the teacher is a moral one: that is, the moral transformation of the population to the revolutionary code.

The best example of the revolutionary society that I can think of is the Russian society of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Although Marx himself said relatively little about education in his writings, his disciples, and particularly Lenin, made a great deal of the role of the teacher in creating a Communist society. The Soviet Union has always placed great emphasis on the school and, as a consequence, enhanced the status of the teacher in transforming Russian society. Other sociological factors which enhanced the status of the Russian teacher were:

(*a*) the highly centralised system which made the teacher an *instrument* of the State and a prime initiator of State policy;

(*b*) the relative lack of local power, which did not threaten his status, indeed enhanced it;

(*c*) the role of the teacher as political agent which enhanced his status. The infiltration of Communist doctrine into every aspect of the curriculum (illustrated from text books) enhanced the status of the person responsible for initiating it;

(*d*) the importance of education and success in the school determined the child's future role in society, and enhanced the status of the school and of the teacher;

(*e*) as an index of social position, the relative salary of a teacher (more than that of a doctor or an engineer) suggested the importance of the role in Russian society during this period;

(*f*) the use of the teacher in the technological revolution. The teacher was the 'New Man'. He was the instrument of social change and drew to himself appropriate status. Increased status was associated with technological change.

(2) Our second category is the *conservative society*. Here the function of the culture's institutions is to *maintain* the life style of the society, not change it. The problem is to keep the machine going, with occasional technical improvements. However, technology in the conservative society is not valued in institutions of learning. The educational institutions of the conservative society do not take cognisance of technology to the same degree as in many revolutionary societies. Technology tends to be marginal in the life of the educational institution. If anything, the technologist is denigrated and the educational tradition ignores the technological revolution that is taking place in the economic institutions. The conservative society does not have the need to infuse moral values since these are already given by the society. Intellect becomes a specialist tradition, *without access to power*. Intellect is tolerated, but the formulation of the life style has been done and there is now no need radically to change the life style of the people. There is little religious teaching in the schools and what there is is taught, as it were, without conviction or denominational bias. Religious teaching goes by default. In the conservative society, 'pure intellect' develops, producing vastly significant contributions to knowledge but divorced from power. The teacher's role in this society is lubricatory. It is conservative. His role is supportive. It is not used as an agent of change. His teeth have been drawn. He has little or no political membership or influence. (Illustration: the American teacher and his membership of the Communist party; by a decision of the Supreme Court in the 1950s, American teachers cannot be members of the Communist party since, it was argued, Communism is committed to transforming society,

and no democratic teacher could, therefore, be impartial; also note the role of the Natal teacher, for whom active political membership is prohibited.) Political influence is limited. This reduces the status of the teacher in the conservative society. One observes the proliferation of subject matter in schools which matches the burgeoning of the economy. However, the status of the new subjects is often low if the subject relates to the new technology. (This contrasts with the high status given to the technological subject in the revolutionary society.) There are vast increases in technical resources and industrial development in the conservative society. But the humanities are the subjects which draw most status. The role of the teacher in this society, we repeat, is supportive. As you and I are largely concerned in the life of a conservative society, I shall return to this theme in a moment.

(3) The third category is the *reactionary society* and is to be found in such areas as South Africa, Portugal, Spain, and those colonial places that still survive in a world where colonialism is now no longer respectable. The reactionary society is a post-conservative society. There are two paramount concerns of the reactionary society and these are evidenced in its institutions (the Church, political institutions, schools and the like), and as a consequence, greatly influence the status of the teacher:

(*a*) to combat alien heresies which threaten the life style of the reactionary society;

(*b*) to recapture the moral enthusiasm of an earlier phase in the life history of the *volk*, the people.

The teacher here has high status: he is concerned with morality and the maintenance of the traditional life-style. His first concern is with the moral redemption of the people, he re-emphasises religious feeling and stands in the school in the role of parent and minister. His teaching is closely associated with religious belief and his status is high because of his moral (religious) commitment. The importance of the moral purity of the teacher is insisted upon, and knowledge is not stressed, but morality. Intellect is feared as a potential enemy but power is often given to the intellectual. As in the revolutionary society (unlike the conservative society), the intellectual is given posts of political responsibility and influence. His intellect is yoked to the militant defence of the life style of the *volk*. The role of the teacher is dogmatic and there is a Messianic zeal in his teaching. The method of instruction is highly selective and is designed to emphasise by its selectivity the pre-eminence of the *volk*. This selectivity gives a sense of purpose and identity to the people. The reactionary society is energised by its need for survival

and is given direction and purpose by the threat of engulfment. (A classic account of the reactionary society is to be found in the Christian National Education programme.) Repressive laws and a restricted freedom characterise the life-style of the reactionary society.

It seems to me that one could find these three sorts of society in South Africa: the revolutionary, the conservative and the reactionary. The revolutionary is to be found in the non-White systems of education; the conservative amongst the European English-speaking community, and the reactionary amongst the Afrikaans-speaking European. The status of the teacher is enhanced or reduced, depending on the sort of society that he serves.

Allow me to generalise, however, about another society, in order that a clearer picture may be gained. We have mentioned the revolutionary society of Russia in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, with its attendant raising of the status of the teacher. Let us look at another society in an effort to clarify our categories: let us consider, by way of illustration, British education in the twentieth century. It seems to me that until the 1944 Act, British education was conservative. It was concerned with the maintenance of the 'status quo'. The school reinforced the social class divisions that were to be found in Britain. The accident of a man's birth determined his education, not his inherent ability. The function of the school was supportive of the social order. The 'two nations' received an education which did not alter radically the social class order. Achievement was related to birth. A boy born in the middle and upper classes could look forward with confidence to an education in the public school and at Oxbridge. A remarkably small percentage of working-class children found their way into the hallowed institutions of English education. Merit did not matter—one's family did. The role of the school was to *support* the social order, not change it. Difference between social groups was emphasised by the educational system; education was not a means to attain social mobility (as it is now in the new society). The élite tradition prevailed, viz: the training of leaders in the public schools, with heavy emphasis on the humanities in their education. Technical training was looked down upon: the conservative tradition emphasised the importance of the classics. What one saw in Britain in the early twentieth century was a vast growth of economic power, but a steady decline in the status of the teacher, since the school was not an important determinant of one's success in life. A characteristic of British education since the 1944 Act (and, for that matter, the other European systems of education), has been the increased importance of the school as a selection agency. The school, more than at any time in the history of British education, is now the determinant of success in life. One's position in the social class order is now being determined by one's success or failure in the eleven-plus examination. The school is now the agent of social change, and as a consequence, the focus of parental expectation and

anxiety as never before. Because of this enhanced role, the status of the teacher in Britain has become considerably enhanced. A silent social revolution has taken place. Britain has become a 'revolutionary society' by means of its school system. In a complex industrial society, the teacher is a social selector; selecting in terms of intellect and knowledge, rather than in terms of character and life style. Increasingly, achievement and social class placing is being measured in terms of school and university success. Although we are isolating Britain in this general account of a society which has moved from the conservative to a revolutionary society, we could, with equal justification, make the same claims for other European systems. This, by way of illustration, before we attempt our final analysis of the Natal European teacher and his status in this conservative society.

What are some of the characteristics of the Natal society which make it 'conservative'? There is an élite tradition which works towards the maintenance of the 'status quo'. This is seen in the school system which selects in terms of birth and life style rather than in terms of inherent ability. The function of the school is supportive of the traditional social order. The teacher in the conservative society is a guardian rather than an initiator. There is an absence of educational experiment and change. The conservative society cultivates the acceding voice. It is not given to self-examination. The religious and the educational functions of the conservative society are the same. They do not act as a bridge between groups, but as barriers. There is, in the conservative society, covert avoidance on public occasions of the true situation. What criticisms of the conservative society are to be found (and we think here of the pulpit and the lecture platform) are found in phrases which are general and lacking in point. The attacks are on sins which no one really fears.

The institutions in the conservative society maintain a 'precarious equilibrium', hence the system of restraint placed on the intellectual and on the teacher. Power is taken from him and, as a consequence, his status is reduced. It is true that most professional roles in South Africa are supportive of the 'status quo'. The professions are fundamentally conservative in their selectivity: we think of the ministry, law, medicine, teaching and the like. Caste is perpetuated in the professions by virtue of the fact that most professional roles (by one device or another) are 'closed' to non-Whites. What professional opportunity exists is severely restricted. However, within the conservative European society the different roles performed by different professions want examination and we propose to examine some of the reasons why the status of the teacher is not as high as in other professional roles:

(1) Unlike the role of the doctor or the lawyer (which we shall call 'crisis roles') the teacher in a conservative society does not see his influence achieved within a short space of time. His role, by its very nature, requires a long period;

it is diffuse. It does not magically restore or provide immediate salvation or cure, as does the successful doctor or lawyer. The teacher, alas, has no marvellous antidote. He is not a charismatic figure. Even the *dress* of the two professions (the white, antiseptic coat of the doctor, the gown of the advocate) sets these professions apart. The dress of the teacher (sports coat and grey flannels) is the dress of everyday. The teacher in a conservative society, we are saying, sees his labour extending over long periods in an era when the specialist, the consultant, is given high status.

(2) The teacher in a conservative society stands for restraint, conservatism, modest achievement, in an economic world that has, for a long time, valued the quick return, the sudden rise in salary, the spectacular success. In South Africa we breathe the air of the frontier society: swift riches, golden opportunity. We are children of a predatory society. By its very nature the role of teacher in the conservative society rarely achieves these things. The child and the parent view the modest gains in salary and other achievements against the spectacular gains of the economic world. The teacher's remuneration is not compatible with the ethos of the conservative economic order. (Seen also on the films, on television and on the radio.)

(3) The conservative society is characterised by immense variety of job opportunity. (Witness the number of occupational opportunities that are to be found in the Natal European society.) In the revolutionary society, job opportunity is limited and the role of the teacher is a valued one. In the conservative society the immense number of professional job opportunities available reduces the quality of entry into the teaching profession and, as a result, influences the status of the teacher.

(4) A characteristic of roles such as those of medicine and the law is their specificity. The doctor has a case to cure and the lawyer a brief to win. These are clearly defined tasks. By contrast, who is to say when the teacher's role is accomplished, when his case is won? The teacher's work (and I apologise for the truism) is never done. The teacher in the conservative society is bedevilled by an immense number of roles that he is expected to play. This makes it difficult for him to succeed in them although the expectation of the community remains as high as ever. He is expected to be a parental substitute, a moral adviser and to concern himself with extra-school activities that do not relate to the intellectual advance of his charges. The diffuseness of these roles makes it impossible for him to satisfy all demands. (Our point here is that the conservative society, by weighting the teacher with numbers of

roles he cannot hope to accomplish satisfactorily, restricts his status.) By contrast, the revolutionary society with its more limited goal (minimum literacy and political commitment, for example), is much more easily attained.

(5) Another reason, we submit, why the status of the teacher is not as high as in other professions is that the teacher in the conservative society (under the influence of educational theory since the seventeenth century) is bound to remove himself as the fount of all knowledge. His teaching method is undogmatic. He sees that he no longer is possessed of the Truth. He has been urged, since the seventeenth century, to withdraw himself, to place the onus of learning on the child, to confess his inadequacy as a teacher. He is reduced as an authority figure. He does not allow that he has a Messianic vision. Doubt and withdrawal are his methods of instruction. In recent years in the conservative European society, the school has grown in size. As a consequence the social distance between staff and students has increased and the role of the headmaster has changed. From being (as he was in the earlier, revolutionary, society in the days of Langley), a dynamic headmaster in a relatively small school, he is now in control of large numbers of children with whom he has little hope of becoming acquainted. I am saying that the role of the headmaster has changed. Now he has become skilled in organisation, in manipulation of large numbers of children and staff. His are the management skills of the organisation man. The personality that is required is that of the capable administrator rather than the dynamic presence which was characteristic of the headmaster in Natal in the earlier years of this century. Because the interaction between staff and students has diminished, the authority role of the staff has also been reduced. (Another circumstance which would want another paper to examine is the difficulty experienced by the teacher where his classes have become larger, in establishing rapport between himself and his charges. The committed teacher is not necessarily the man who advances in the pyramid of power in a school system. It is a man, very often, remote from personal association, who attains status within the administrative hierarchy. It is the man who withdraws himself from personal contact, and is able to devote himself to the impersonal skills of the administration who advances within the hierarchy of the profession.) These methods contrast markedly with those of the teacher in the revolutionary and reactionary societies. Here the method of instruction is often dogmatic and assertive. The teacher has seen the Light and his duty is to show his charges. It is a charismatic vision that the teacher in these two societies

has. The emphasis is on knowledge which alone is possessed by the teacher in the revolutionary and reactionary societies. By contrast, the teacher in the conservative society removes himself from authoritative insights as far as possible. However, the teacher in the conservative society is working in a 'closed' society. It is a world unto itself, cocooned from the influence of outside. The voice of criticism is muted. Only within the sacrosanct walls of the administration is criticism of the system permitted. The conservative system removes itself from the world and does not permit criticism. The school is remote from daily life and it is not for nothing that the Natal European school is often set in green fields, distant from the bustle of the city, with high walls of red brick.

(6) One of the reasons why the status of the other professions (law, accountancy, medicine) is higher than that of teaching is the vocabulary of the professions. The uninitiate cannot easily participate in the discourse in these fields, while anyone who has been to school knows about education. The language of education is that of common discourse. By contrast, a field such as the law has an esoteric vocabulary which demands assiduous training. Moreover knowledge of the law is acquired only by arduous training and prodigious attention to the serious details of the subject.

(7) My next point is associated with the one that has preceded it. The length of time spent and the expense of acquiring the vocabulary of the high-status professions (law, medicine) influences the status of the subject.

(8) By contrast with the revolutionary society, where the teacher has a peculiar, desired knowledge, or the reactionary society where the teacher is the protector of the *volk*, the knowledge possessed by the teacher in the conservative society is not so exclusive. He might have access to a particular technique, but his knowledge is not so unusual. It can be acquired, the layman feels, in the conservative society, by anyone. Everyone has been to school, and all know how the role of the teacher should be played. The role of the doctor or the lawyer wants esoteric knowledge and insights.

(9) While other professions work with an adult population (the lawyer with the old lag, the doctor, often, with the dyspeptic adult patient), the population the *teacher* is concerned with is a youthful one. No other job works so exclusively with children, away from the tempering influence of the adult. This influences the status of the profession. Also the predominance of women in the profession influences the status of teaching. It is not for nothing that medicine and the law and accountancy, to

give three examples of fashionable occupations in the conservative society, are dominated by men.

(10) In the conservative European society in Natal, the lawyer and the doctor are what one might call 'free professionals'. (We do not say that they are not conservative, or that they do not, as a body in South Africa, represent a cautious and —we repeat the word—conservative body, timid of change, supportive of the 'status quo'. Though they have access to the institutions of professional training, their sense of responsibility does not extend far beyond their own caste.) They are, however, free to make (and break) appointments; they are, in other words, able to decide on their degree of professional commitment. The teacher in the conservative society, by contrast, is restrained by his world in a hundred different ways: time-tables, inspectors, headmasters, old boys' associations, hedge him in and compel a certain sort of behaviour. Decision is taken from him: he learns that he is expected to behave in a certain way because of the painful demands of the role. He must achieve a certain personality: patient, scrupulous and with a keen sense of the hierarchy in the pyramid of power in the school administration.

(11) In the conservative society in Natal (as in the English public school in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), the élite tradition emphasises the importance of games and this preoccupation takes from the seriousness of the life of the school. The attention of staff and pupils is given greatly to sporting skills and these draw from the seriousness of purpose of the school and of the school tradition generally. Our argument here is that though the youth culture demands attention to games, there are too many giving too much time to this activity and they are taking away from the academic pursuits of the schools. The role of teacher is becoming, in the conservative society, tainted by the concern for games played by the European élite. It is an aristocratic tradition with ideals of team spirit and inner discipline but nowadays this élite tradition in the conservative Natal society is used to isolate the European child from other associations with other children of different racial type. The games that are played emphasise difference and the élite associations of the children. There is no exchange. The conservative society secures its allegiance by interacting with its own kind.

(12) The teacher is exposed to inspection and is open to the public gaze. There is a continual dispute about his authority (for example, should corporal punishment be given or not: what methods should be allowed in the teaching of mathematics, and so on.) He is continually under fire and this constant supervision reduces his status. He is also under

pressure to 'get on' and as we have said, he cannot succeed in the way that the business man does. The problem of maintaining equilibrium in this uncertain sea is enormous.

It was Henry Adams who said that a man who followed the career of teaching for ten years was unfit for anything else, and there is no question that the role of teacher and the habit of teaching compels a certain set of mannerisms and a style of behaviour which marks (I did not say mars) the life of the teacher in the conservative society. While any professional occupation will indelibly imprint itself on an individual, teaching is the occupation that most marks a man.

It is customary to end an address of this sort on a hortatory note: we have been implying that the role of teacher is a most difficult and taxing one in the conservative Natal society. The teacher is too often wooed from the task of education by the society that presses upon him. He is, in Natal, beset by the problems of inertia. He serves a minority whose interests are as jealously guarded as were those of the upper classes in the years before the British 1944 Act, yet he serves a profession which, since Condorcet in the eighteenth century, has, in the West, demanded equal educational opportunity for all. He teaches the children of a privileged community who eye any attempt to achieve equality of educational opportunity for anyone but their own kind with jaundiced eye. With these manifold challenges, is it to be wondered that he does not always meet the demands of the role?





Yale School of Architecture, New Haven, Conn. By Paul Rudolph, 1963.





Larkin Administration Building, Buffalo, N.Y. By Frank Lloyd Wright, 1904.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE IN THE TRADITION OF LOUIS SULLIVAN AND FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT

by D. THERON

THE ARCHITECTURAL revolution of the eighties in America, led by Sullivan and Wright, had its roots far back in American history. It went back as far as the first realization of the tremendous possibilities of the new and independent character of the American nation by such writers and philosophers as Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau, Whitman and Melville and the breaking away from the imitative arts and traditions of the Old World.

It was in this great tradition of inquiry and independent thinking that Sullivan first put forward his ideas on form and function. Trained in the office of the Philadelphia architect, Frank Furness—an outspoken rebel who scorned the genteel academism that had enveloped the architectural taste of the Eastern States—Sullivan has the distinction of having been the first architect to face the expressional problem of the steel-framed skyscraper and to solve it in a logical and honest way. In the skyscraper he saw a means of developing a truly American architecture.

Sullivan believed that no architectural dictum, tradition or habit should stand in the way of the development of an honest architecture, based on the real needs and requirements of the time, the function determining the form and the form expressing the function: 'All life is organic. It manifests itself through organs, through structures, through functions. That which is alive acts, organizes, grows, develops, unfolds, expands, differentiates, organ after organ, structure after structure, form after form, function after function. That which does not do these things is in decay. And decay proceeds inevitably as growth, function declines, structures disintegrate, differentiations blur, the fabric dissolves, life disappears, death appears.'

Frank Lloyd Wright, an admiring pupil of his 'Lieber Meister', also believed in the beauty and perfection of nature. Nature should be the great source of inspiration for architects. The organic forms of nature, each part as well as the whole, conform to its function. Architecture too, should be organic—it should be a noble organic expression of nature, 'the idea of Life itself, bodily and spiritually, intrinsic organism. Form and function as one.'

Sullivan saw in the skyscraper a means of achieving a true expression of American architecture; Wright turned to the Prairie

House. His rejection of European tradition and influence was definite and complete.

In literature this revolt against European influence had occurred much earlier. Writers and poets like Thoreau, Hawthorne and Whitman had produced uniquely American works in which form was as original as content. 'In every part of Great Britain,' Thoreau wrote in his diary, 'are discovered traces of the Romans, their funereal urns, their camps, their roads, their dwellings. But New England, at least, is not based on any Roman ruins. We have not to lay the foundation of our houses on the ashes of a former civilization.' The conquest of the west, contact with the Mexicans, other Latin American nations and the Far East had also helped to open the American mind to foreign influences. Emerson found some aspects of the Hindu and Persian cultures as close as that of the Greeks, similarly Frank Lloyd Wright found a new world in the art of the Far East.

Buildings like his Robie House (1908), the first of his Prairie Houses, the Larkin Building in Buffalo (1903) and the Unity Temple in Chicago (1905) reflected for the first time a realization of the possibilities which technology and science offered for the development of a new architecture.

In Frank Lloyd Wright the two main streams of American architectural thought as embodied by Richardson and Sullivan were again reunited: Sullivan, the functionalist, as insistent as a Whitman in his quest for the original and truly American, the expositor of Greenough's ideas on form and function and Richardson, the Romanticist, the architect who, for the first time, successfully combined architectural elements like the low horizontal line, the sweeping roof and the continuous band of windows in a strong and masculine architecture.

In the Robie House Frank Lloyd Wright made extensive use of windows to bring the exterior and interior spaces into a seeming whole. The massive chimney stack around which both the exterior and interior are centred, served as a unifying element. The interior is handled as one unit of space and the space flows from one room into another without any impression of separateness or enclosure. Here the open plan is pushed to its logical conclusion by a thorough reorganization of space. The interior appears as a great open space in perfect harmony with the outside surroundings, serving as a background for the interior arrangement through the huge and unobstructive windows. Decoration is virtually eliminated, the desired effect having been achieved through the use of the various building materials. In the Unity Temple too, the building is a single monolith, the concrete poured into moulds, while the four hollow piers which support the flat roof serve as heat ducts. The flat roofs, the outside walls, severe and completely unadorned, and the massive features of the walls, create a spirit of solemnity. Again the various elements, setting and materials had been blended into a coherent unity.

In his work one finds the close relationship between the client and the architect, and the closeness of man to his surroundings is a dominant theme, much as in the words of Thoreau: 'What of architectural beauty I now see I know has gradually grown from within outward, out of the necessities and character of the indweller, who is the only builder, out of some unconscious truthfulness and nobleness without ever a thought for the appearance; and whatever additional beauty of this kind is destined to be produced will be preceded by a like unconscious beauty of life.'

The Unity Temple and the Larkin Building were the first great protestants against the elaboration and the fashion of the time. A building should reflect and contribute to the moral, ethical ideals of men. A building should be true, not dishonest. Forms must be what they seem to be. Here Frank Lloyd Wright joined with writers like Mark Twain, William Howell, Jack London, Henry James and others in the reaction against conventionalism and narrow moral values and false respectability which traditional America held sacred.

The works of many of the younger American architects like Paul Rudolph, Bruce Goff (often called the most 'American' architect), Eero Saarinen, Victor Lundy, Louis Kahn and others could be regarded as a continuation in the tradition of Sullivan and Wright. For them the ultimate reality lies in the spaces containing the activities of the building. The form of the building as the revelation of its life determines the design. A building is 'what it wants to be'. The design process is from the 'inside outwards'.

In the Richards Medical Research Building by Louis Kahn in Philadelphia (1961) the Wrightian tradition is obvious in the jointed growth of the building and crystalline form. The laboratory exhaust towers are grouped around the 'served' spaces in a manner similar to the grouping of spaces around the chimney stack in the Robie House. The towers, arranged in a formal way around the central spaces, are reminiscent of both the form and function of similar elements in the Larkin Building. Similarly the studio spaces in Paul Rudolph's new School of Architecture in New Haven can be compared to the office spaces of the Larkin Building, grouped around a large open hall. Each one of these two buildings, through the process of its own integral realization, demonstrates the profoundness of its grip with modernity—the very same quality that marked the great buildings of Sullivan and Wright.

On the modern American scene progress is equated with the increased use of machinery, which is said to give man greater control over nature and thus to ensure an ever more glorious future. Several poets in modern American literature, like Gerald Lee and Carl Sandberg, see in the machine not only an aid to economy but also an object of intrinsic beauty—in accordance with Santayana's view that every vital impulse or organized form of life will develop its own ethics and aesthetics. Still, the fear that humanity will perish spiritually from the consequences of the machine is very real. The

danger is that man will acquire their rhythm and become mechanized. This process manifests itself in the inability to rest and contemplate and it is this excessive standardization of life that a Sinclair Lewis satirizes and against which a Lewis Mumford warns.

Throughout the fifties American architects proceeded with the creation of a stereotyped, standardized and highly mechanized environment, the best-known buildings of this period being the new General Motors Research Centre by Saarinen in Detroit (1954) and the Lever Building by Skidmore, Owens and Merrill in New York (1952). Reaction against this new mediocrity in architecture followed soon. Under leadership of architects like Louis Kahn, Paul Rudolph and Eero Saarinen a new movement towards a more individualistic and humanistic architecture was born. These men realized that some of the basic values which man had lost, or was in danger of losing, should be restored to the man-made environment. Spaces, internal as well as external, should be expressive of the uses to which they will be put and should evoke an emotional response in those who use them, as for example in the new Yale College hostel in New Haven by Saarinen (1962). New mechanical equipment like air conditioning, ducting, mechanical ventilation etc. and new structural methods pose new problems of expression like in the Medical Research Building in Philadelphia or the Salk Laboratory Buildings in San Diego, California, both by Kahn. New functional requirements and advances in technology and science demand and make new architectural forms in buildings such as Saarinen's TWA Air Terminal at Idlewild or his Ingalls Hockey Rink in New Haven possible.

A new, bold architecture, in which each new form or detail has meaning, is being produced; an architecture which offers refuge from the standardization and regimentation of our industrial age. For American architecture the present decade holds great promise because new and powerful forces for a renaissance in architecture have been released by these architects.

CORRESPONDENCE

1. MEDIEVAL IDEAS OF LOVE

The Editors, *Theoria*,
University of Natal,
PIETERMARITZBURG.

Dear Sirs,

I thank Mr Royle for his clarifications.

Of his original statement: 'the passions were held to be evil' he says: 'This statement was accurate as far as it went'. But, as his quotation from Aquinas shows, Aquinas held that they were good when controlled by reason. (I must apologize for the lack of the signs of abbreviation . . . at the end of my brief quotation from Aquinas; they were left out by inadvertence, mine or the proof-reader's.) I am sorry if my statement that Aquinas held that they were good, misled any reader; compression, not suppression, was my intention. It did not occur to me that I, or Aquinas, might be supposed to mean uncontrolled passion: after all, anger and hatred are passions too. Anger at injustice, hatred of evil, love of the good are all good when proportioned to their objects; that is what Aquinas means by the control of reason: that we should see to it, e.g., that our anger is not blind destructive rage, but measured rather by the quality of the injustice and the task of removing it. If this is not what Mr Royle means by passion it is what Aquinas meant by *passio*, and what English speakers commonly mean by 'passion'.

Mr Royle had stated that the medieval theologians held love to be sinful. In this statement 'love', it is now made clear, does not mean what the theologians meant by love, nor those lovers who equated it with adultery, nor what the Concise Oxford Dictionary means by love (1. Warm affection, attachment, liking . . . 2. Sexual affection or passion or desire . . . etc.) but what Mr Royle chooses that it shall mean. Before going on to discuss what he means a further short consideration of what Peter Lombard meant may be appropriate.

My account of Peter Lombard was drawn from the article *Mariage* by G. Le Bras in the *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*. (May one point out that love is normally supposed to have something to do with marriage, now as in the Middle Ages?) I much regret that there is no text of the Sentences of Lombard available to me; Migne's *Patrologia Latina* is unfortunately out of print, and the second part of Aquinas's *Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum*, which prints Lombard's text, is under re-edition. However,

I do have both Bonaventure's and Aquinas's (printed as the *Supplementum* to the *Summa Theologiae*) interpretations of Lombard, and these are certainly to be preferred to that of C. S. Lewis, as presented by Mr Royle. C. S. Lewis is *not* an acknowledged authority on medieval theologians, though he is, of course, too careful a scholar wittingly to lead us astray. But it cannot be too firmly stated that when Mr Royle assures us that C. S. Lewis has given us an admirable summary of Lombard's teaching, and in that summary we find no mention of the sacramental aspect of marriage, we must simply reject the assurance. The sacramental view of the world may not be to Mr Royle's taste; it has everything to do with Christian medieval conceptions of love, marriage, man, world, God.

Turning to the quotation 'from a supposedly Pythagorean source': *omnis ardentior amator propriae uxoris adulter est* may one plead for an attention to *Empfindungsweise* here too? Bonaventure interprets Lombard to be speaking of the man who is not interested in his wife but *only* in physical delight (*delectatio*), or who is impelled by such vehemence towards delight that he knows his wife as if she were a prostitute, that is, when he would know her even if she were not his wife (*qui cognoscit uxorem propter delectationem finalem, aut movetur in delectationem tanto impetu ut cognoscat uxorem sicut meretricem; et hoc tunc est, quando eam cognosceret, si non esset uxor* . . . Sent. IV, dist. XXXI, q. III). Aquinas similarly: if delight is sought beyond the honest good of marriage, so that a man does not think of his wife as his wife, but simply as a woman, ready to have to do with her even if she were not his wife, there is grave sin. And such a man is said to be *too ardent a lover of his wife*, because such ardour goes beyond the good of marriage. (*Si delectatio quaeratur ultra honestatem matrimonii, ut scilicet aliquis in coniuge non attendat quod coniux est, sed solum quod mulier, paratus idem facere cum ea si non esset coniux, est peccatum mortale. Et talis dicitur* ardentior amator uxoris: *quia ardor ille extra bona matrimonii effertur.* Suppl. 49, 6, c.) Perhaps one might go so far with Bonaventure and Aquinas, and presumably with Lombard too, as to recognize that the fact that a woman is one's wife is part of her personal identity, a recognition of whom the other person is?

Turning to Mr Royle's description of 'love': 'Love is a passion.' 'Love, by definition, meant a capitulation to the dark, enslaving forces of unreason. One can neither make oneself love nor prevent oneself from loving. Love is magic. transcending the sphere of responsibility and divine law.' Mr Royle states that the passions, in this sense, were held to be evil, though not morally evil. He is wrong. If love, 'seriously', is capitulation to the dark, enslaving forces of unreason, is taken to transcend the sphere of responsibility and divine law, Aquinas would certainly have held it to be morally evil. I invite readers of *Theoria* to hold this theory of love morally irresponsible. I do not see how love can be a passion on which marriage is to be based, if this is what we are to mean by love. Can marriage truly be founded on a capitulation to unreason? Is

marriage not a life in which our fullest human responsibility must be engaged? Can marriage be beyond the divine law and therefore beyond the moral law that depends upon divine law?

This is not to say that love between man and wife should not include, and in one sense find its greatest fulfilment in, ecstasy, physical ecstasy. This is where I disagree with Aquinas, and at this point I will reply to Mr Royle's question: 'what does Fr Smith mean?' In love, paradoxically, it is reasonable to lose one's reason for love's sake. This implies no capitulation to the enslaving forces of unreason, however, no abdication of responsibility: this union of bodies and souls, self lost in the other self, is something to be entered upon with the fullest possible responsibility and responsiveness. There is nothing shameful here, no evil (no *malum poenae:* a diminution of good suffered as a punishment for the primal sin), nothing that calls for compensation; this is part of man as he came fresh from the hands of God. There is a mystery: a natural mystery of beauty, generosity and tenderness, even before one considers, with the whole of Christian tradition, the mystery (that it is a sacred sign) of the love of Christ for the Church. If a prosaic parallel may be permitted, it is a responsible matter ('in accordance with right reason' as Aquinas would say) to go to sleep at night, unless one happens to be on guard duty. Teresa of Avila clearly regarded her religious ecstasies as coming within the sphere of her moral responsibility, for she was extremely careful, as she tells us in chapter 27 of her autobiography, to discover whether her visions were of God or of the devil.

Aquinas did not forbid enjoyment in sexual intercourse; Mr Royle has mis-read S.Th.III, Suppl. 41, 3.1. I admit that the English translation uses the word 'enjoyment'; but Aquinas's word is *fruitio*, a technical word inherited from Augustine which does not mean merely enjoyment. If Mr Royle will consult the I-IIae, Question II, he will discover that for Aquinas we can be said to 'enjoy' (*frui*), in the full sense of the word, only the goal of our whole existence: God. In the passage Mr Royle quotes Aquinas means that one should not make a god of the physical delight of intercourse. That there is such a physical delight in intercourse, natural and so far good, he makes clear in his discussion of temperance (II-IIae, 141, 4, c.). To refrain from sex simply because of an abhorrence of physical delight would be vicious, in Aquinas's opinion (II-IIae, 142, I, c.).

Mr Royle charges me with inanity because I attempt to establish the meaning he is giving to the word 'love'. Since he uses the word in a sense of his own which is neither that of *amor* nor that of current English usage, such an attempt is necessary. Mr Royle's distinction between love and *caritas* rests, of course, upon a total misconception of what the medievals meant by *caritas*. The II-IIae, Question 26: *De ordine caritatis* shows that for Aquinas passionate love of one's wife is indeed *amor*, is *dilectio*, is, ideally

at least, *caritas*. Why should Mr Royle expect any of this to surprise *me?*

Finally, may I make the strongest possible protest against Mr Royle's accusation of disingenuousness, supported as it is by continual innuendo. This is not an accusation to be made lightly by anyone who values civilized usages. A question has arisen as to the accuracy of some of Mr Royle's statements concerning medieval theologians. Neither Mr Royle nor myself should be under attack. This discussion, in the interest of truth, is not concerned with victory or defeat. Neither of us has a monopoly of truth, neither of us has a monopoly of common honesty. I call upon Mr Royle to withdraw his accusation.

Yours sincerely,

JEROME SMITH.

P.S.—With regard to the (irrelevant) statement that ' . . . the Catholic Church *did* (and does) believe in predestination to damnation . . .', may I refer Mr Royle to the apposite canon of the Council of Trent: 'If anyone shall say that the grace of justification touches only those predestinate to life, and that all the rest, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, since they are by God's power predestinate to evil: let him be anathema.' (Sess. Vi, Can. 17.) Predestination to damnation is commonly supposed by Catholic theologians to be a Calvinist heresy.

2. TWELFTH NIGHT.

Gentlemen,

I appreciate Mrs King's comments on my little article on *Twelfth Night* (which was published in *Theoria* 19); but I should like to offer some defence of the points which she singles out for criticism.

If Mrs King is right to suggest that the phrase 'great creating Nature' brings inevitably with it the full context of the last plays, then certainly I was wrong to use it in describing *Twelfth Night*. But may not the phrase—like so many of Shakespeare's phrases—be allowed a certain life of its own? Moreover, though I would agree that the mode of *Twelfth Night* is indeed different from the mode of *The Winter's Tale*, I think the plays have a certain similarity of direction. I am not quite certain what Mrs King means when she says that '*Twelfth Night* is a comedy whose background is entirely social'; but I suspect that I disagree with her. Is it valuable to say that 'the background' of, say,

> And so they are: alas that they are so;
> To die, even when they to perfection grow

is 'entirely social'? And surely that couplet has something in common with

> . . . pale primroses,
> That die unmarried ere they can behold
> Bright Phoebus in his strength—a malady
> Most incident to maids.

I disagree with Mrs King about Orsino. I *like* Orsino, but especially in the first half of the play, though I am able to admire him in a certain sense, I laugh at him. He is amusing, pleasantly and lovably amusing, as any fundamentally noble but earnestly deluded person must be. An Orsino in whose bestowal of advice on Viola's greater wisdom and deeper feeling we are to see simply (and solemnly) 'a real concern' seems to me rather less 'attractive' than the duke that I attempted to describe. And surely his undoubted half-perception of Viola's femininity in Act I scene iv makes his request that she should plead for him to Olivia—a ridiculous enough thing in itself—all the more gaily laughable: his partly perceiving serves mainly to emphasize the inadequacy of his perception. Certainly the play traces the growth of Orsino's affection for Viola, his coming 'inescapably face to face with reality'; but the growth, the movement, is profoundly comic.

C. O. GARDNER.

3. THE MURDER OF AGRIPPINA AGAIN

Gentlemen,

There appeared in the last issue of *Theoria* an excellent article by Mr S. Bastomsky on the murder of Agrippina by her son Nero, emperor of Rome A.D. 54-68. The writer dealt mainly with the account and text of Tacitus. His tentative conclusions were that Nero plotted the murder by himself, that Seneca and Burrus, his chief advisers, were not in the plot, that the successful completion of the assassination without the help of these two confidants gave Nero the courage to break free from their tutelage, finally that the murder marked the end of the so-called 'Quinquennium Neronis', a five-year period distinguished by good administration.

The conclusions briefly summarized are mutually consistent and have been acceptable to many historians. They do, however, depend exclusively on the Tacitean tradition, and even on a particular interpretation of Tacitus, and I do not think that Mr Bastomsky's view is necessarily the only possible, or even most probable one. Its coherence and simplicity may have been achieved at the expense of a truly synoptic view of all the evidence.

The view proposed by Mr Bastomsky has the merit of providing confirmation of one theory about the 'Quinquennium Neronis'. This hypothesis may be summarized as follows. There really was a five-year period of excellent administration, both at home and throughout the empire, and this lasted from the accession of Nero in 54 A.D. until the liquidation of Agrippina in 59 A.D. Seneca and Burrus were responsible for the government during the quinquennium; after the murder of Agrippina, in which they had had no part, not even being consulted until after the ship fiasco, Nero, full of self-confidence, dispensed with their services. An obvious immediate objection is that neither Seneca nor Burrus was removed or dismissed until some years later, but it might be conceded that their power steadily diminished after 59. Before making assumptions like this, however, it is as well to look at the whole motivation of these ideas. They are accepted because they support a particular interpretation of the quinquennium, but unfortunately the evidence for this interpretation of the quinquennium as a period of benevolent and prosperous government is not at all firm.

From 1911 to 1957 most scholars accepted the conclusions of Anderson[1] that the 'Quinquennium Neronis' mentioned by Victor and an anonymous epitomator referred to a period of urban development and magnificent building works. In 1957, Lepper[2] showed that Anderson's central arguments from the text of Victor were vulnerable, but he admitted the difficulty of proving that Nero's first five years were ones of good government and conduct by the 'princeps'. He concluded like Mr Bastomsky that the quinquennium was a five-year period of good rule until 59 A.D., when, after the assassination, Seneca and Burrus lost their authority over Nero.

Before the events of 59, Nero had committed only a few minor peccadillos. The murder of Britannicus is regarded as non-proven. Lepper observes: 'Britannicus' death was never a clear case of murder'. None of the accounts give this impression, and the hasty funeral together with the convincing circumstantial detail of heavy rain convey quite the opposite. The murder of Britannicus took place in 55 A.D. If this was one of the years of the quinquennium, that supposedly placid period is marred by an appalling crime. Even the 'minor peccadillos' are disputable. In addition, there is one other vital piece of evidence which if accepted is somewhat incompatible with the view of the quinquennium that we are considering.

Dio Cassius writes[3] 'After the death of Britannicus, Seneca and Burrus no longer gave careful attention to public business, but were satisfied if they might manage it with moderation, and still preserve their lives.' If their influence and power were waning by 55 A.D. a quinquennium inspired by them becomes less credible.

So far I have tried to show that the idea that there was a five-year period of de facto rule by Seneca terminated by the events of 59 A.D. is not so sound as some believe. Let us now review some more purely negative objections to Mr Bastomsky's construct.

The point on which he places the most emphasis is that of the non-complicity of Seneca and Burrus. From a passage in Tacitus,[4] itself a textual crux, he argues that the statesmen could not have known of the plot. He backs up his reading by observing that Seneca would have had an alternative scheme in case the Heath-Robinsonish ship plot was bungled. Supposing we accept the 'expergens' reading, the one most favourable to Mr Bastomsky's view, this would be the sole piece of positive evidence for the non-complicity of Seneca. The point is that the advisers would hardly have gone to sleep at such a critical period. If, however, it is obvious from 'expergens' that Seneca and Burrus could not have known, why does Tacitus bother to write 'incertum an et ante gnaros'. This phrase either throws the 'expergens' into doubt or proves that Tacitus thought the advisers' sleep compatible with complicity. In any case what is clear is that Tacitus was aware of testimony to Seneca's guilt. Tacitus throughout the Annals shows partiality, or at least lack of hostility to Seneca, and he may well be playing down hostile tradition. Usually Tacitus' ambiguities are damning; in this case he may be using ambiguity for the opposite purpose, to whitewash Seneca. Later in his narrative Tacitus[5] writes of Nero's apologium penned by Seneca. 'Ergo non iam Nero, cuius immanitas omnium questos anteibat, sed Seneca adverso rumore erat, quod oratione tali confessionem scripsisset'. Usually it is assumed that the 'confessio' is Nero's, but it gives better sense to regard it as Seneca's. By writing the apologium Seneca had, in the view of contemporaries, penned a confession of his own culpability. Why else should he be so eager to write a defence if his own guilt was not suspected? If Nero had been regarded as the sole culprit

Seneca should have held his peace. Any movement against Nero, inspired by popular revulsion, could have been to Seneca's benefit if not implicated. Whatever we make of Tacitus, the witness of Dio Cassius is quite clear. Dio[6] states categorically that Seneca incited Nero to the murder. Dio unlike Tacitus is bitterly hostile to Seneca, but there is no reason to reject out of hand what he tells us, especially when Tacitus makes it quite clear in one place that Seneca's complicity was 'incertum', and elsewhere implies that he was guilty. It is noteworthy that Dio specifically states that many trustworthy sources testify to Seneca's part in the crime. Tacitus probably based his ambiguities on the sources which Dio accepts at face value. Even if some of Dio's sources derive their anti-Senecan material from the diatribe of Suillius,[7] this still does not prove that it is untrue. Since it seems reasonable to reject Lepper's view of the quinquennium one other source of temptation to reject Dio can be rejected. Tentatively then, I shall accept the view of Dio as compatible with our other material, and conclude this section with one more observation. If Seneca and Burrus were not in the plot to murder the dowager empress, why were they present at Baiae? Nero had gone at the time of a festival, but there seems no particular reason why both heads of government leave Rome.

Mr Bastomsky and others have refused to believe that statesmen like Seneca and Burrus could have subscribed to such an amateurish scheme as that of a collapsible boat. This is not so certain. If Agrippina were to be wrecked in the middle of a bay with agents of the plotters ready to despatch her with boat-hooks, it might reasonably be calculated that her survival would be impossible. It was a million to one chance that overhanging beams would prevent the immediate death of the empress, and another that Acerronia should divert the attention of the assassins when the victims were in the water. That Agrippina was not such a competent swimmer as to be able to reach Baiae from the wreck is shown by a passage from the 'Octavia' describing the wreck. She was almost drowned but, 'multi dominae ferre auxilium fractis viribus audent, bracchia quamuis lenta trahentem voce hortantur manibusque levant.' If the 'Octavia' is to be believed the empress also got at least one blow from an oarsman, despite Acerronia. 'Non funesta, violata manu remigis ante, mox et ferro lacerata diu, saevi iacuit victima nati'. The whole scheme was so fantastic that who would have guessed the truth? There remains the difficulty of the calm night of the murder. Would the plotters be so foolish as to arrange the 'accident' for a calm night in the tiny bay of Baiae? It is a fact that only moderately bad weather may eventually lead to a full-scale storm off the Italian coast at Baiae. Strangely enough it is Seneca himself who supplies this information. He himself was once caught in such a storm in the very bay in which Agrippina's ship was to disintegrate.[10] Even if the night were apparently calm it might have been possible to persuade the local inhabitants that an accident had occurred during a freak squall while they were

asleep. In any case, who would suspect the incredible truth? Although sailing boats[11] were out on the bay on the night of the attempt, doubtless fishing, the people who, having learnt of the wreck, ran to the beach and climbed on to fishing boats nearby, believed that an accident had occurred.[12] This was when it was still night, for Tacitus tells us that the crowd brought lights. For whatever reason, an accident was credible, and Nero's counsellors must have known what favourite interpretations might be locally placed on the events of the night. Granted all this, it still may be asked whether Seneca and Burrus could have devised a less involved accident'. The reason they could not is that if there had been the least proof of foul play, the Praetorians, even the Provincial armies, might have mutinied, for they could not be relied on to accept the murder of a daughter of Germanicus. Burrus[13] was clear on this point at the nocturnal interview consequent on Agrippina's escape from the collapsible boat. If the body was lost at sea, what proof would there be?[14] The simplest method of procuring the empress's death would have been poison, but if Suetonius is to be believed, Agrippina had taken a course of prophylactics.[15]

Yours truly,

P. J. BICKNELL.

PROLOGUE FOR A PLAY IN PROGRESS

PATRICK MULHOLLAND'S DAY

by H. W. D. MANSON

Now that you are settled and still,
The house lights doused and dim,
Make your minds like this dim darkness
And bring up into it the smallest speck,
The tiniest mote or atom it can think of—tip and touch,
And yet hold some memory of so doing;
And imagine it . . .
Spinning and spinning in empty space.
Then say this spinning speck
Is our whole world—in one perspective.

Ridiculous that it should spin
Being flung off so long ago
From another star or other speck
That still is spinning, I suppose, somewhere—
Or exploded—long ago—gone—
In a silent white blast we never heard
Or ever shall see
Although that blast may be
What will blow our world away one day.

Yet this day our little world still spins . . .
Magnify this mote or speck and what do we see?
It is dark on the one side away from the sun,
Silver-bright, it seems, on the other
And spinning and spinning continuously . . .

And on that mote or speck are men—millions of them—
Infinitesimal animals—
Who crawl upon its surface and cling
To life and this atom as it spins
Through day and night
Dark and light
And life and death
In a day, so to say—ridiculous !
Ridiculous to live at all
On such a tiny spinning ball !

But these are words, mere words . . .
Let's zoom our minds down, say, in human focus and feel;

Know and feel and see
Our huge, majestic world reel slowly through centuries,
And the great and glorious sun come up slowly,
And the distant, vast hills begin to loom,
Soar and assume dark shapes and sharp edges
Against the pale pink of the sky,
And the high peaks run down in ridges
To the wet, dark, silent valleys below
Where nothing yet can be known but noises,
Running water and the croak of frogs.

But the world turns
And pink pales slowly to pearly gold.
And rivers run not nowhere now
And no longer only murmur in darkness
As if they'd lost their way;
We see.

We see reed beds dimly swaying and dark rocks,
And how the river mist lifts and curls.

As rose to pale gold lost,
So pale gold now to other lightness lifts
And clouds all mackerel green and grey
Stay steady like a painted scene
While the clear bright light of morning blue is set
That declares the scene is day.

What sort of day has dawned for this man
Whom we shall see presently behind this curtain?
Nothing is certain but that dawn begins
And night ends day.
And who among us shall see the next dawn certainly
No man can say.

DUST AND ASHES: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DISENCHANTED

by G. HARESNAPE

English Department, Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg

AT THE UNIVERSITY where I am teaching, a group of students are producing a magazine whose editors ask for articles reflecting various aspects of disenchantment. They claim that there are those who rise above the mediocre. They desire satire and effective criticism of dull conventions. This magazine seems to be a voice for an important attitude which I have noticed amongst small groups not only here but also at other South African universities. These people could, I think, be called the Disenchanted. The proposed publication of the magazine has made me consider what my own ideas are on their important state of mind and emotion.

Personally, I hope the only thing which will ultimately disenchant me is disenchantment itself. By disenchantment I do not mean the spirit of independent thinking and scepticism which was in a man like Socrates. Although he refused to put up with the pomposities of the Good Citizens of his time and laughed at the flatulent philosophers who thought they could sell truth like potatoes, he none the less believed in something.

He always had a lively interest in what was around him; his friends, horses, wine, the latest pronouncement of the Delphic Oracle and so on. Finally, think of him taking the hemlock with such purpose and disdain of fear in the hope that he would be better off where he was going. I imagine him with his grinning, satyr's face, and see him stalking like a pelican (one of his admirers, I believe, described him in this way) into battle against the Persians. Vigorously independent, yes, but not disenchanted.

Nor do I think a man like St Simon Stylites was disenchanted. We are told he renounced the world and climbed up on to a column where he stood with his eyes fastened on heaven. From this pedestal he never shifted, eating, sleeping, and performing all the other necessities of nature there. People came to gaze at him and tease him, much as they do to chained baboons on perches nowadays.

Stylites is supposed either to have ignored them entirely, or, on other occasions, to have reviled them, reminding them of their sins in no uncertain terms. They thought him mad and disillusioned. Like Socrates, he wanted his own view on life and was prepared to be sceptical of the conventional modes. But the indifference with which he suffered the seethe of lice feeding at the varicose ulcers

on his leg and the way in which he stood proudly erect in his stench and tatters, show that he had a higher aim.

The saint had the eye of his imagination fastened upon the New Jerusalem whose walls were rubies and carbuncles, where the patriarchs swung censers and the angels blew their trumpets.

'Hierusalem, my happy home,
Would God I were in thee!
Would God my woes were at an end
Thy joys that I might see!'[1]

His vision of heaven was so sweet, he could afford to think the world so much dust and ashes.

As I understand it, our modern disenchantment is not of this kind. It is mainly a refusal to be taken in when somebody else shoots a line.

'I'm no fool,' the disenchanted one says with a humourless laugh. 'Did he expect me to swallow that? Ha!'

In this mood he convinces himself that most of the institutions and customs of his society are for the birds. He experiences a sense of relief. Thank goodness he has been saved from the traps which close upon the ignorant. Now he goes on to apply his critical intelligence to ideas or people held nearer to his heart. Perhaps one night his girl friend says to him.

'Darling, wouldn't it be lovely if we could go on like this for ages? I think you're really cute.'

He feels full of joy, but suddenly pulls himself up short. It is her sex-drive twisted into sublimation which makes her say this. Given the right stimulus she would say it to anybody, he thinks. By the same reasoning, his own generous actions and thoughts are so much tinsel disguising the sinister and destructive impulses in other, deeper parts of his mind.

Already his glance is baleful as he looks around him. He knows that things which had once seemed bright and lively are cheats of one kind or another, and he cannot afford to be duped by them any longer. His interest in the world, which brimmed up spontaneously like water in a fountain, dwindles. It is replaced by a harsh determination to live on, to be himself, in spite of all.

'The world stinks, but I'm damned if its going to get me down,' he says. He is now a fully-fledged member of the Disenchanted.

At this stage there comes into my fancy the picture of Milton's Satan, lofty and rhetorical as he addresses his fellow spirits prostrate in the fires of Hell. Darkness visible surrounds them. All is emptiness. This great Demon is filled with an impressive pride; at the same time his environment is vastly, terrifyingly boring. We notice that he has the good sense to leave this tedious place at the first opportunity on an exploratory trip of the universe.

On a smaller scale the Disenchanted are like this Satan. Their

[1] From 'The New Jerusalem'. *The Oxford Book of English Verse:* Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1953, p. 97.

world becomes more and more boring; and their pride in being members of a select band holds them to the dreariness.

Tentatively, I suggest that the cult of Disenchantment is a logical progression from the aestheticism of the nineteenth century. In that generation delicate gentlemen threaded poppies and lilies through their slender fingers and surveyed the petals drooping, ah, too soon.

'Alas! What an evanescent thing is beauty,' they sighed.

Now the Disenchanted stuff copies of Jack Kerouac into their duffle coats and gaze wearily from hooded eyes.

'Oh God, don't give me that,' they say with groans.

The aesthetics lost faith in everything except that ephemeral moth, beauty. With the Disenchanted even beauty had died.

Passion and vital interest are, I admit, inconstant, flickering things, like flames in a fire. Moreover, they can be destructive, searing through a man's constitution and disturbing his blood, digestion and nerves. Finally they may burn him out. But memories of his former heat remain. Ezra Pound's poem, 'Piere Vidal Old', describes such a man. The Provencal troubadour is getting on in years and is mocked by a younger, more cynical generation. He recounts his former loves and zest for life. His memories fill him with joy, despite his shambling limbs and broken constitution.

> 'O age gone lax!' (he says to his chaffers) 'O stunted followers
> That mask at passions and desire desires,
> Behold me shrivelled and your mock of mocks;
> And yet I mock you by the mighty fires
> That burnt me to this ash.' [2]

In Vidal, as in St Simon Stylites and Socrates, are energies and interests which can be called heroic. They allowed the living flame of their interest in the world to consume them. Yet—and this is the important thing—like the Phoenix, they could continually remake themselves and rise up in joy from their own ashes.

How much better this than disenchantment which lies so near to *ennui*, or boredom, the terrible acid which scores and dehydrates the spirit of an individual. That is why I fear it. In his 'Flowers of Evil' Baudelaire shows a bitter knowledge of what it is like to be bored. For him it is to be near hell. 'Foretaste of the Void', a sombre poem without resonance of hope or joy, reveals the poet well advanced on the road of disenchantment.

> 'Dull spirit, once in struggle resolute,
> The spur of hope that sets your heart aflame
> No longer goads you! Rest and feel no shame,
> Old steed who stumbles now along the route.' [3]

Spring, love, arguments interest him no longer. He is as one

[2] *Ezra Pound: Selected Poems.* Faber and Faber, London, 1959, P. 57.
[3] *Flowers of Evil (Les Fleurs Du Mal): Poems of Baudelaire.* Translated by Florence Louie Friedman. Elek Books, London, 1962, p. 123.

frozen. Finally, in a terrifying vision, he imagines himself sinking away into nothingness. Receding from him is the world with all its former pleasures and interests; but now he feels too empty to belong there.

Unlike Piere Vidal, the Disenchanted do not permit themselves to be burned to embers. On the contrary, they pick up the fire-buckets of disillusion and disbelief and hurl the sand and ash upon the first signs of a flame. Possibly they are not taken in or made to look foolish; they never waste their energies in false directions. But their final environment is frighteningly uniform: acrid fumes, emptinesses and quintessence of dust.

MANIFESTO FOR A GROUP OF ENGLISH LITERATURE TEACHERS[1]

(Addressed to their pupils)

by C. VAN HEYNINGEN

WE BELIEVE that the sole function of literary training is to help readers to understand—not in the first, or even the tenth place to criticise, classify, grade, or place in time, but to understand—works of literature.

It goes without saying that the most important part of understanding books is to comprehend and feel what they say and to feel their value and effect, in fact to experience them as thoroughly as possible. It was for this purpose, after all—that they should be experienced—that they were written.

We believe, from the evidence around us everywhere, that most readers[2] don't fully understand what they read; but we also believe that almost anybody young enough to learn can be taught how to read with understanding—or rather, can learn to improve greatly his ability in that direction.

All that he needs to be taught is to read with real attention—to read

'. . . even with the very comment of (his) soul.'

Of his soul, mark you—not merely his mind. He must read with intellect, emotions, senses, all moving and working at the same time. Learning to do this may be slow and difficult at first, but if the student gives his close attention to passage after passage, book after book, for years, this way of reading will become a habit, and no longer laborious.

A B.A. course can do no more, at most, than help us to open our minds and hearts and inform and fortify them so that we may respond adequately to the education that the rest of life (including years and years of reading) will provide.

Most University English departments make a great fuss about the alleged need to know, before you can understand his work, a great deal about an author's life, his theories, and his period; and they give much time to biographies, histories of literature, and

[1] From a book now in the press, *On the Printed Page.*

[2] The forces in the modern world that are laying waste our civilisation—which we inherit chiefly by understanding or experiencing as we read what the greatest men of the past have to tell us—are discussed in the critical works of F. R. Leavis, Q. D. Leavis's *Fiction and the Reading Public*, Stephen Potter's *The Muse in Chains*, R. G. Biaggini's *The Reading and Writing of English*, F. R. Leavis and Denys Thompson's *Culture and Environment*, Jacques Barzun's *We Who Teach*, and many other books.

summings-up of the author's philosophy. We, on the contrary, believe that our business is with the actual works of literature themselves, and the impact they make on a mind open and eager to receive them, and that we need all our time and attention for this. Information about an author and his times is often interesting and occasionally relevant—we believe that it is best got from such an unpolluted source as letters and journals written by the author and his contemporaries, or some great work of history—straight history, not literary history. Too much information of this kind, however, may be a distraction; Matthew Arnold felt this:

> '(Mr Newman says) that my ignorance is great,' says he. 'Alas! that is very true—And yet, perverse as it seems to say so, I sometimes find myself wishing, when dealing with these matters of poetical criticism, that my ignorance were greater than it is.'

Meanwhile, let us quote also Coleridge, who says that the reason why a work of art is as it is, should be found only in the work of art itself.

Finally, let us quote D. H. Lawrence:

> 'Literary criticism can be no more than a reasoned account of the feeling produced upon the critic by the book he is criticising. Criticism can never be a science: it is, in the first place, much too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that science ignores. The touch-stone is emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon.
>
> 'A critic must be able to *feel* the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and its force. To do so, he must be a man of force and complexity himself, which few critics are. A man with a paltry, impudent nature will never write anything but paltry, impudent criticism. And a man who is *emotionally* educated is rare as a phoenix. The more scholastically educated a man is generally, the more he is an emotional boor.
>
> 'More than this, even an artistically and emotionally educated man must be a man of good faith. He must have the courage to admit what he feels, as well as the flexibility to *know* what he feels. So Sainte-Beuve remains, to me, a great critic. And a man like Macaulay, brilliant as he is, is unsatisfactory, because he is not honest. He is emotionally very alive, but he juggles his feelings. He prefers a fine effect to the sincere statement of his aesthetic and emotional reaction. He is quite intellectually capable of giving us a true account of what he feels. But not morally. A critic must be emotionally alive in

every fibre, intellectually capable and skilful in essential logic, and then morally very honest."

The qualities mentioned in the last sentence need training. The best way to train them, we believe, is by practice, by exercising them as one reads. Hence the exercises that follow. But as in many years of teaching in different universities we have found the same fundamental difficulties constantly recurring, we have prefaced our exercises with a few brief analyses and comments that may help to untie the knots.

A highly educated man was exclaiming once at the incomprehensibility of *A Long Gay Book* by Gertrude Stein (*we* find it incomprehensible too) when a six-year-old child offered kindly, 'Can't you read it? I'll read it for you. I can read everything!'

So she could in one sense; and so in that sense can anybody who reads this line.

But there is a sense in which many people can't read. Consider, for example, the following passage from a novel:

> 'In the morning sunlight Harriet and Somers were out first, after Somers had made the fire, having a frightened dip in the sandy foam. They kept far back from the great rollers, which, as the two sat in the dribbling back-wash, reared up so huge and white and fanged in a front attack, that Harriet always rose and ran, and it was long before she got really wet. And then when they did venture to sit in a foot of water, up came a sudden flush and flung them helpless rolling a dozen yards in, and banged them against the pebbles. It was distinctly surprising. Somers had never known that he weighed so little, that he was such a scrap of unimportance. And he still dared not quite imagine the whole of the blind, invisible force of that water. It was so different being in it, even on the edge of it, from looking at it from the outside.
>
> (After they had come) trembling and panting up the bank to the grass-plot, dripping and smelling so strong and sticky of the Pacific . . . they ran to the little tub-house and washed the sand and salt and sea-stickiness off with fresh water.'

What has the author got to say? That two people had an early morning dip in the Pacific, were rather frightened by the force of the waves, and afterwards washed off the salt with fresh water?

Does that—as we've put it now—make anybody feel anything? Does it have an effect on his 'sincere and vital emotion'? Does it make him aware of a 'complexity and force' in life?

Not in the least. But if he went back to the original passage, and read it intently, he would find that *that* decidedly does make him feel something, it does 'affect his sincere and vital emotion' and have 'force and complexity'.

This being so, he should be able to point out exactly which words and phrases, with their separate and combined association in the context, their sound, energy and rhythm, produce this effect on him. It is never enough to say of a passage, 'It is impressive', 'it is effective', 'it moves me', 'it is beautiful'. If he wants to make anyone believe him, to make anyone see what he sees in it, he must show exactly *what* impresses him, *what* the effect is, *how* he is moved and by *what*, and if possible *what* the beauty is. (And, of course, if he doesn't like the passage he ought to be able to demonstrate why not.) All this is difficult, but it is valuable, for it makes him understand much more clearly the full impact and import of what the passage is saying than he did before.

At this point may we say that the sole value of a passage to each reader consists in its effect upon him personally. As far as he is concerned, it does not matter in the least what other people think and feel about it. Their opinions, even the most eminent, cannot educate him: he can only be educated by some genuine change or development in his own. Someone else's opinion may act like a shot in the arm giving him fresh energy to consider whether his own opinion hasn't been influenced by prejudice, ignorance, cowardice, a 'bad ear', or some other limitation. Someone else's analysis may make him see something he hadn't seen before. However, it is not until, perhaps immediately, perhaps days, months or years later, he genuinely changes his mind in the light of an analysis that it is any good to him.

But let us turn to the passage.

The first sentence, with the mention of morning sunlight and the fire having been made, gives in two touches a remarkably vivid idea of the human and domestic life going on at the edge of the ocean. These two people are there ready to enjoy themselves in a light-hearted way—it is early, fresh, yet with a gentle warmth. Then comes 'taking a frightened dip in the sandy foam'. Almost shockingly we feel how small and frail the human creatures are, how immense the sea: 'sandy foam' makes it clear that the two don't venture beyond the very edge, and that the power of the rollers, even there where they are spent, is so great that they churn up the sand, beating it up into each new rush of foam.

An immensely strong idea is rapidly built up in the rhythm and in these details and those that follow of what is expressed in the last two sentences of the first paragraph: 'And he still dared not quite imagine the whole of the blind, invisible force of that water. It was so different being in it, from looking at it from the outside'. 'Great rollers' suggests the long mounting motion of the mighty oncoming flood, the beginning of the swell visible far off; 'dribbling backwash' the exact movement and look of the last part of the receding wave—the dribble, or weak dispersed running of little thin strands of water left as the whirlpool movement of the backwash sucks back; it also suggests the momentary relief from the terror of the tide each time a wave is spent: they sit in it, which

suggests its extreme shallowness and the momentary harmlessness of it. Then comes 'reared up so huge and white and fanged': the wave rears like a lion about to spring, like him arches, and gapes suddenly like huge opening jaws, the foam just below the curving crest is white like the fierce gleam of a wild beast's teeth as it falls on its prey—immensity and terrible power are suggested, but far greater than that of any beast. In 'So . . . that Harriet always rose and ran, and it was long before she got really wet' the whole immense scene is felt humanly, with humour. The irregular and sudden shocks with which new waves overtake the bathers, as well as their force, are suggested in 'sudden flush' ('flush' suggesting the mounting volume of water and its sweeping movement) 'flung' (hard and heartless), 'helpless rolling', 'banged them against the pebbles', 'scrap of unimportance'. Then 'he dared not quite imagine' suggests how superhumanly brave it would be to imagine it, 'the whole of that blind, invisible force' suggests with great powers the terror of the immeasurable immensity of the non-human forces in the midst of which we live. And 'it was so different, being in it, even on the edge of it, from looking at it from the outside' greatly increases the extraordinarily vivid sense we get of the reality of what is described.

This sentence confirms the impression that the rest of the passage has made: Somers and Harriet, and through them the reader, have felt—felt intensely and with energy, not just thought about—the beautiful, terrifying mystery in which human beings, so full of varied consciousness, but so weak and ignorant, have to live, amid forces greater and wilder than they 'even dare to imagine', yet which they have somehow to confront.

The second paragraph, with 'trembling and panting', 'dripping and smelling so strong and sticky of the Pacific', not only makes one feel in one's own body the sensations mentioned (the sea-smell, the fresh stickiness and saltness, the exhilaration of bathing) but also gives one the sense the couple have almost of having narrowly escaped from a great peril. Yet particularly in the words 'strong' and 'the Pacific' (the hugest of oceans), in that context, we are aware of a grandeur in the experience. And the whole passage, by the details we have mentioned, and others, and by the dramatic placing of words and phrases, suggests, not without amusement, the need for courage, and its existence, in the fragile human beings who find themselves amid unknown and, as it were, divine powers. In creating this suggestion, the homeliness of detail at the beginning and end of the passage contributes largely.

A notable quality of the passage is its directness and simplicity. None of all these very full and revealing words or phrases appear to have been sought after or to stand out: they seem to flow off the pen as easily as the ink does. The effect of this is that one seems to be *there*, as if one *were* Harriet and Somers on the shore of the Pacific: there is no bar between us and what is described—communi-

cation here has been as simple and complete as the intermingling of the angels in Milton's Heaven.[3]

And when you read the whole book (*Kangaroo*, by D. H. Lawrence), you find that this passage throws light on the book as a whole, and it in turn throws light on the passage.

Students occasionally say, 'You are reading more into the passage than the writer can possibly have meant'. But thought is far swifter than an arrow, or a bullet, and perhaps the greater part of our feeling is subconscious; swift thought and subconscious feeling often pack enough meaning into a phrase to fill page upon page when it is unpacked. Our analysis of the Lawrence passage is not complete.

We learn to read, in fact, merely by allowing ourselves to feel the full impact of each word and phrase, as that impact is directed and controlled by all the other words and phrases in the context.

[3] . . . if spirits embrace
Total they mix, Union of, Pure with Pure
Desiring; nor restrained conveyance need
As Flesh to mix with Flesh, or Soul with Soul.

LINCOLN AND LIBERTY

by C. W. COOK

FIVE BUILDINGS mark out a cross in the heart of Washington, D.C. Where the arms intersect, the Washington Memorial stands. North, at the head of the cross, there is the Capitol building; East, the tidal basin with its cherry-blossom wreath and the Jefferson Memorial; West, the White House; and South, the Lincoln Memorial. Each building also has its distinctive hinterland. Between the White House and the Capitol are huge federal government buildings, and appropriately enough for this administration, the National Gallery. Behind the Capitol there is the Supreme Court. Eastwards, the way to Jefferson's memorial passes the Smithsonian Museum, which with its gothic exterior, superb collection of human oddities and scientific achievement, well prepares one for the mixture of rationalism and absurdity that was Jefferson's thought. But it is the south that holds the eye: behind the Lincoln memorial there stretches the river, and beyond the river, the Arlington cemetery. The dead face and silently watch the ceaseless activity of the living. From the simple memorial, of Greek design, Lincoln looks out brooding over the city he saved and in which he was murdered. In a way he is the representative of all the dead who rest behind him. But superb as the marble is, and almost alive though it seems, it is the living words carved on his left and right that finally claim the attention: the Gettysburg Address and the second Inaugural. The Greek building lies in the ancestry of democracy; but something more than Greece was needed if democracy was to be saved and reborn.

* * * *

This year is the centenary of Gettysburg. The battle was fought from the 1st to 4th July; the address was given on the 19th November when the cemetery was dedicated by Lincoln. And now, with the United States aflame with the question of civil rights, and our own continent ablaze with kindred questions, it surely is fitting to look again at the great theme of freedom which emerged as the most significant of all the questions agitated in and by the American Civil War. Those questions have now become of international significance. And whether we like it or not, we are involved in them, not only by the international giants, but because in our own internal development we have come to much the same kind of point. No more than could the states of the South ignore the tides of history can we. There is the same temptation for us to attempt what the South did: to defend the indefensible in the hope that we would be able to keep something we believe to have value for ourselves at the expense of the welfare of the rest of those

with whom our lives are bound up. The South made the mistake of imagining that its profit depended upon a particular system, and defended the system at the expense of every other consideration —including in the end, its own life. The significance of Lincoln is that in a remarkable way he was able to point out the foundations upon which alone a diversified, disparate and divided country could build freedom. Not only did he spell out the conditions of freedom, he also paid personally its immense cost.

* * * *

Many different factors contributed to the Civil War. We may note one of immense significance: the emergence of the West as a region of growing importance. The West was different from both the North and South. It did not have the economic resources of either. The westerner was a man on the move: the ordered life of the plantation and its hierarchy was a different way of life from his own. And he was often a debtor; many of the conditions of his life were settled for him by the money power of the East. However, this new political group raised acutely the problem of how the South was going to prevent itself from being outflanked and then outvoted. There are comparable developments in South African history that suggest themselves: the way in which the discovery of gold and diamonds upset the equilibria of the South African republics; or the way in which the Transvaal in the '90s found itself being outflanked by the Colossus of Rhodes. This coincided with the social and economic shift occasioned by the establishment of the cotton industry. King Cotton made princes, princesses and queens. Slavery might easily have died a natural death had it not been for the fact that it now opened vistas for gracious living for the few that are still the inspirations of the incurably romantic. There was all the difference between migrant labour on the colossal but casual scale, and the turning of this into a basic principle so that labour is moved round at the will of others.

Thus the question of the Civil War at the beginning was whether there was to be a United States; it became inevitably, the question: What kind of united states? The South seceded because it saw no hope for its own way of life in a united states: the forces of union would squeeze out its way of life. The North came to see that only if slavery were eventually done away with, could it be contained at all. Therefore however much each side began by wanting to avoid the problem, and to keep the matter at the level of constitutional politics, inevitably the political question developed and deepened, as it always must in any society touched by the gospel, into the question of what was happening to the people concerned. Lincoln approached the problem of slavery along the line that its existence was a threat not so much to the slave—who after all knew nothing better—but to the free men. He was forced into, rather than deliberately chose, the role of emancipator. He saw more clearly than most that the emancipation of the slave and the destruction of the economy of the South might lead not to

freedom, but to economic domination by the north-east. He was as a westerner able to sympathize with those in the South who feared the money power of the north-east; and from this perspective, the problem of freedom was by no means as clear cut as it appeared in Boston to abolitionists like Phillips and Garrison.

Thus his approach to emancipation was cautious in the extreme. He waited for a northern victory in arms to make clear that he was not calling for a slave revolt; the proclamation was made in October to take effect on the 1st January, 1863. In December, 1862, in his State of the Union address, he stated that:

> As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we can save our country.
>
> Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this congress and administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trail through which we pass will light us down, in honour or dishonour, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honourable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just.

Uppermost in the mind of Lincoln then was the question not merely of the preservation of Union, but of what kind of union was to be preserved. The decision laid him open to the attacks of Northern democrats who declared that he was fighting for abolition under the pretext of being concerned with Union; and of abolitionists, for not being more vindictive towards the South. Lincoln had grasped earlier that liberty was indivisible: either it would have to come to all, or it would exist for none. At the same time, he was realist enough to recognize that the mere granting of emancipation would not in itself bring freedom to the slave. Liberty was more than emancipation: this distinction, basic to any people knowing the Old Testament, still has to be learned on this continent.

At the same time, Lincoln also considered the possibility of colonization. After some abortive attempts, he realized that however much colonization might work for a few individuals, it could never be settled in this way; therefore the real issue was learning to live together. Thus for example, the perennial red-herring about Indian repatriation begs the question here in Natal; and what happens in the border industries can only be of limited significance compared with what happens in the main industrial centres. Ham-

marsdale may be all right for tourists; industrialists will want to know about Mobeni.

* * * *

In the middle of 1863 the Battle of Gettysburg; a few days later Vicksburg on the Mississippi fell to Union arms. In Lincoln's phrase 'The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea.' Taken together these events mark the turning point of the war. From this point on, despite the occasional great wave of confederate attack, the tide ebbed unmistakably towards Appomattox. Thus in September, Lincoln wrote to some of his friends preparing for an off-year election in Illinois, one of those letters designed to be published in which he set out the position as he saw it.

> Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that, among free men, there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet . . . And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones, unable to forget that with malignant heart, and deceitful speech, they strove to hinder it.

This then is the background to the Gettysburg address.

> Fourscore and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
>
> Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of it, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
>
> But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or to detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they have, thus far, so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they here

> gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.

In almost identical terms, but at much greater length, Pericles had once sought to solace the bereaved in Athens. What was new in Lincoln's speech was its opening and its ending. Athens had not been conceived in liberty; it had grown to the point where certain of the citizens had very great liberties. America had consciously dedicated itself to this ideal and had grown away from it. Athens was certainly not dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal; since Athens was more interested in excellence than in equality. But many had questioned whether the United States had been dedicated to this proposition; and they did so in order to defend slavery. What Lincoln had seen was that there could be no United States unless all men came to be treated as equal. Not simple egalitarianism, but justice was the end he sought.

Hence the closing: Lincoln saw that what was needed was not political manipulation, but rebirth. The war was being fought for such an opportunity. This was what Athens had failed to achieve. Pericles had not seen that of greater danger to the beloved city than Sparta was the fact that certain were second-class citizens and others were slaves. Thus having set out in memorable terms what constituted a democracy, Lincoln recognized that the fundamental problem of inequalities within a democracy still had to be faced. This was where rebirth was necessary: otherwise the majority might become a vindictive, revengeful and totalitarian force. Until this had been checked, majority rule would mean not freedom but tyranny.

Lincoln was not pre-eminently a political theorist. He left this question to outworking in practical politics. Within his own administration he encompassed a varied group of politicians; he shepherded a still wider group as leader of the North. But he never lost sight of the fact that if the war was won, the South would also have to take its rightful place again within the nation. Thus government had to be able to accommodate a wide variety of groups within its orbit; the powers of government had to be restrained so that certain features of life were deliberately omitted from its jurisdiction. Not only had there to be the recognition of differences, but these had to be acknowledged in the structure of politics in such a way that no mere majority could extinguish the legitimate differences and development of others in the country. The South was to have a real place: the only thing for which there could be no room in a free nation was slavery. Slavery was not simply the denial of freedom; it was the denial of the slave's humanity, and this was the intolerable offence. Lincoln recognized

that whether in the North or South, the forces of imperialism derived their power from their dehumanizing individuals. Here was the real enemy, however it might be disguised.

* * * *

The Gettysburg address therefore points to the second Inaugural. By March 4th, 1865, the progress of Union arms had put victory within short and certain grasp. In assessing the address, we need to remember that it was spoken in the context of imminent victory. The war had aroused deep and bitter passions that still disturb American life today. In the fact of these appalling passions, generated by appalling loss of life, Lincoln's address is all the more memorable. The North was shortly to be in the position of enforcing almost any kind of peace it wished on the Confederacy. Lincoln might have used the opportunity to have blamed the South for the war. Instead, he recognized the war as the judgment of God upon both:

> Neither part expected from the war, the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other . . . The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully . . . If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a Living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope —fervently do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether'.
>
> With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.

The themes of this prophecy are of tremendous importance. For precisely because the United States chose during the period of reconstruction to ignore this course, that reconstruction was accompanied by the most terrible dishonesties and hypocrisy. Nothing did more to make the South a synonym for pathological emotions. More than that, it meant that the North had nothing but a guilty conscience with which to meet the problems of a society moving from a rural economy into an industrial revolution. The plight of the South was bad enough; the plight of the immigrant millions that had begun to flood into the Northern cities was to become even worse. It is surely not without significance that the prophetic voice of the American industrial revolution and of the period of emergence into international affairs should have been the young Virginian, eight years old at the time of Appomattox: Thomas Woodrow Wilson.

* * * *

Let us then summarize these themes:

1. There is the theme of universal judgment. Without the recognition of this Lincoln would have been simply a politician. Having seen this and recognized it, he became a prophet. Lincoln saw that to see the Civil War in black and white terms would lead only to terrible self-righteousness on the one hand, and unabsolved guilt on the other. A civil war provided an almost irresistible temptation to transfer one's guilt to another. On the other hand, atonement and reconciliation began with the recognition and acceptance of one's own responsibility. The terrible trials of the four years were here recognized as the responsibility of all. Thus the whole question had moved to a much deeper level than that of political recrimination. At stake was righteousness itself. This was not here, and never is, the property of one side alone. Truth had been one of the casualties of war; and the time had now come when people needed to re-examine their consciences in the light not simply of what they or their side had suffered, but in terms of the judgment of God.

   This raises the question: Can there be any real freedom without such a painful re-examination of one's own conscience? As one reflects on the history of Afro-Asian development towards Independence that began with the Treaty of Vereeniging, this surely is one of the main questions that emerges throughout. Whatever wrong may have been perpetrated by the colonizing or imperial powers does not absolve, much less deny, the existence of wrong on the part of the subject peoples. It has become fashionable to picture Africa before the coming of the white man as a paradise: here is neo-Rousseauism at its worst. Africa has been a continent of slavery, disease, of the witch-doctor, of fear and of poverty. What purpose is there in denying these facts save to blame another for one's own guilt? Unless one comes to recognize the existence of a wider

judgment than that which justifies your family, your tribe, your nation, there can in fact be no real freedom. All freedom begins with the recognition of the truth, and particularly the truth of one's own guilt. Yet this is to move beneath the artificial constructs of political thought to where the whole person is engaged. It is to raise the question of what makes a man a man. Beneath the shallow political division, Lincoln recognized a judgment operating on both North and South that made nonsense of political propaganda. And as leader of the North, he was prepared to recognize, accept and bear his responsibility for the wrongs of the North.

2. Slavery was an offence against God. Because of what it did to a man, however much it might be justified by political or economic arguments, it could not be tolerated. 'I am for the dollar and the man, but in the case of conflict, for the man above the dollar.' Not only did it treat the slave as less than a man; it also made the slave-owner less than a man. To be sure, there were all kinds of kindly and well-intentioned plantation owners. But the real issue was that in the development of the country, not even benevolent paternalism would suffice any longer. If the country was to develop further, and to develop as a whole, all groups had to move into a new relationship with one another. This was not so much the rule of law—since there were slave laws—as rule based on the assumption that since government dealt with men, the only way of keeping men men and not numbers was to allot them certain rights. The bill of rights had to be for all, or it would be for none.

   This theme of Lincoln's was prophetic. It did not yet have a certain place in the new country. What to do with the Indians was at least as much a problem as what to do with the slaves; what to do with immigrants was potentially even more difficult. Yet the second inaugural established the point that slavery was an offence, and that whatever system might depend on it would have to go in the interests of a free society for all. There are certain things that you cannot do to a man or woman without making him something less than human and becoming something less than human yourself.

   American fascism has never been able to come out into the open against this. The reason is obvious: the arguments for fascism were gone through in the debate over slavery. Each represents a view of man that in making some men more than men makes others less. This surely is a theme of great significance for contemporary Africa. States with leaders who are supermen generate citizens who are super-mice.

3. Retribution. More terrible than political revenge is the wrath of God. When men deliberately flout the laws of God, they bring wholesale disaster. Lincoln recognized that we live in a moral universe. The time comes when our wickedness is

overwhelmed by it. You can carry just so far your arguments for liberty and self-determination: but if you use them in the Transvaal in the 1900s you will find them being used against you in the Transkei in the '60s. Or again, what made the conquest of the South African interior so easy was the internal strife of African tribes. And if migratory labour is the way in which later generations have since paid for their fathers being on the warpath, we may well ponder: What may be in store for us?

Already we see that nations who themselves are heathen or pagan are demanding that we behave in a way they would never expect to do themselves. They are judging us because we have not practised, not what they practise, but what we preached. In this connection, it is interesting to listen to the uninhibited paganism of the SABC bulletins, with their endlessly implied *ad hominem* arguments against the outsider. Lincoln, out of agony, and out of a Christian background, saw otherwise. The question is not whether the other nations are doing the same kind of things that we are doing, but why are we not doing differently?

4. Atonement has come by blood; it depends on the removal of the accursed thing. Surely all that has to be done here is to state the theme: its implications are immense and obvious. Lincoln recognised that all stood in the shadow of the greatest atonement of all time: the sacrifice made from before the foundation of the world. But this point of universal reconciliation would remain inoperative as long as men clung to that which was an offence against God because an offence to fellow men. Whatever offends against human dignity offends against God; and to cling to any such practices makes the new beginning impossible.
5. With charity to all. Since this has been the awful price; since God's judgment has been recognized and admitted, reconstruction must take care of all casualties, all needs, impartially and indiscriminately. Widow and orphan are wider than north and south. Charity for all remains the gateway to human freedom, and the only way in which it can be long preserved. Without such charity, the whole of society must collapse under the pressure of malignant and vindictive passions; the hot war pass into a no less deadly cold stage.

But the nation did not listen. There was not charity for all in the reconstruction after Lincoln's assassination. Malice governed the treatment of the South by the North. The result was a century of upset and missed opportunity. The civil-rights struggle of the present time derives its bitterness from the fact that there was the attempt to enforce freedom without charity. In doing so, freedom was lost to carpet-baggers, scalawags and all the rich variety of American political reptiles. The disease that began in the plantations spread to the cities.

Lucky Luciano and Al Capone were the final products of a reconstruction that forgot that unless charity were for all, it would become the racket of some.

There are in fact no exceptions to this. Whether the experiment be on the scale of the foreign-aid programmes of the United States, or of the self-government programme of our own government, the issue will be the same. Either there must be malice toward none and charity for all; a genuine concern for the widow and orphan, the powerless and the rightless; or the new opportunities for the construction of freedom will become simply another racket for some, based on malice towards all.

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