

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT OF RACE AND
POLITICS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN
SPORT (1970-1979)

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

ORIENTATION

Sport

Sport and Politics

Sport and Race

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Sport, Politics and Race : South Africa

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

DEFINITION OF TERMS

ORGANISATION OF REMAINING CHAPTERS

ORIENTATION

Sport

Loy and Kenyon (1969 : 36) have tendered the suggestion that sport during the present century has become a cultural phenomenon of great magnitude and complexity. Snyder and Spreitzer (1978 : 9) concur, but are less circumspect in their observation where they state the "Sport has emerged in the last half of the twentieth century to become one of the most pervasive institutions in contemporary society".

Clearly sport has developed its own identity and concomitant significance within contemporary societies. Not unnaturally this phenomenon and its development, of which Natan (1958 : 47) has said, "Never has a state risen so swiftly to world power as sport", has attracted considerable interest from all facets of society. In particular this has lent credibility to the academic study of sport.

The emergence of sport is attributed by Sage (1974 : 11) to an adoption of sport by the masses, increased leisure time, increased incomes and to the introduction of television accompanied by a greater orientation towards sport on the part of the media. Edwards (1973 : 4) substantiated the role of the media in the findings of Sage in a survey of twenty five American newspapers selected on random dates in 1969: three had no economic sections, five had economic sections of two pages or less, but all twenty five papers had sports sections. Empirically Sage's premise can be further strengthened if the steadily increasing number of periodicals, magazines, journals and newspapers which devote themselves entirely to sport, are noted.

Throughout its rise to world prominence sport for a considerable period of time received only cursory acknowledgement from academics. The difficulty encountered by sport in being taken seriously by academics can probably be attributed inter alia to its historical antecedents and to its generic connotation.

Weiss (1969 : 5) has suggested that Aristotle wrote brilliantly and extensively on logic, physics, biology, psychology, economics, politics, ethics, art, metaphysics and rhetoric, yet said hardly a word about either history or religion, and nothing at all about sport. Sport, therefore, emerged from Greek times with the Platonic aura of being of value but only in the sense that it ensured that the mind remained healthy in order to pursue disciplines considered more mentally orientated. One of the results of this association was that sport received a low status rating; a feature which until recently appeared to be quite widely accepted.

The non-acceptance of sport as a subject worthy of academic endeavour was compounded by man, the media, and his socio-economic system. Sport, as it began its upward journey, was viewed journalistically and commercially as a phenomenon with considerable financial potential : sport sold. The term "sport" became commercialised, and was used to describe anything from frog-jumping championships to snakes and ladders. The term lacked seriousness, as did the concept; it became

glamourised, and while it did sell newspapers and magazines, advertising space and suitably endorsed products, it was eschewed by those of academic aspiration.

Interest in sport, above and beyond the newspaper level, began to develop when claims were made that sport, amongst other things could develop character, discipline and loyalty. The validity of these claims has been questioned (Edwards, 1973 : 97-98), but the importance lay not so much in the validity or non-validity, but in the suggestion that sport had more than mere commercial potential.

Cozens and Stumpf (1953 : 2) realised this when they suggested that "Sports and games provide a touch-stone for understanding how people live, work and think, and may also serve as a barometer of a nation's progress in civilization". The implications were that sport could provide an insight into the behaviour of those persons who indulged in it, an opinion supported by Snyder and Spreitzer (1978 : 9). They suggest that this new line of research contained the potential not only for exposing the myths about the world of sport, but also for contributing new insight and understanding of human social behaviour.

The hypothesis that the serious study of sport may reveal more about men and women and their society is appropriate in the context of South African sport. The combination of favourable climate, a vast outdoors and a socio-economic system that provides leisure time in sufficient quantity to allow the utilization to maximum benefit of both these factors, has elevated White South African sport to a level where it has become, in the word of Edwards (1973 : 90) "a secular quasi-religious institution". Sport by itself in South Africa warrants serious study.

Sport and Politics

The sport/politics nexus can be evidenced in the Greek epoch. McIntosh (1963 : 16) relates how the Spartans utilised sport for the subjugation of the Helots and ipso facto for the

propagation of their militaristic ideology.

In establishing the superiority of a particular ideology or political system, war was, in Greek times, a frequent recourse. There were occasions, such as the athletic festival at Olympia, which witnessed all bellicose actions temporarily being held in abeyance.

The professionalisation and commercialisation of the Olympic Games by the Romans after 146 B.C. witnessed the decline of the sports spectacular and ipso facto the association (albeit indirect) of sport and politics. Mandell (1976 : 27) suggests that the sports of Christian Europe sprang anew from two separate sources. One was from the local peasant culture in the villages, and consisted of informal athletic contests usually performed as adjuncts to religious holidays and local fairs. The other source was to be found in aristocratic social life, and grew out of hunting and practice for combat.

In 1896 the Modern Olympic Games were revived by Baron Pierre de Coubertin who held the theory, which Mandell (1976 : 72) terms "the Olympic paradox", that patriotism and sports competition could be aligned to further international peace. De Coubertin evidently felt that pitting one nation against another in an Olympic arena would force prejudices into abeyance and that athletic competition would eventually erode them. McIntosh (1963 : 90) doubted the reality of this assertion when he observed: "Sport has certain characteristics which perhaps impel it more readily than other activities towards an association with politics". The re-emergence of the Olympic Games as a world forum where one system could claim superiority over another through athletic victory, presented sport with the inevitability of politicization.

Hitler was one of the first to recognise that the Olympic Games had potential for suggesting the superiority not only of one political system over another, but of one race over another. As Mandell (1971 : 280) in his work The Nazi Olympics points out:

The tables of points kept by sports reports in Germany and abroad demonstrated that (1) Nazi Germany did better than the United States; (2) Italy outperformed France; (3) Japan did far better than Great Britain. Consequently the inescapable implication was that fascism and totalitarianism were more effective mobilisers of human energies. These novel, anti-historical, anti-egalitarian ideologies were obviously the waves of the future. The inspired totalitarians would inevitably overwhelm the soft, super-intellectualized democracies.

The success of German sportsmen in the 1936 Olympics brought the sports/politics nexus to a new level. Mandell (1971 : 285) feels that the 1936 Games were a turning point. He argues:

In fact, one could cast the Berlin Olympics as the beginning in earnest of the evolution (still underway) of the role of the athlete as society's sap. In 1936 as never before, the better an athlete was as an athlete, the less he was allowed individualism and the more he was cast as an allegorical ideological battler.

In an attempt to limit the involvement of politics in sport, Avery Brundage, who then was president of the American Olympic Committee, declared in 1938 that sport transcended all political and racial situations (Mandell, 1971 : 289). This was an attempted rebuttal of the criticism that Japan was being allowed to hold the 1940 Olympic Games indulging in hegemonic and inhumane actions in Asia.

Brundage's belief was an ideal to be cherished, but, it was impractical as events at subsequent Olympics showed. In 1956 at the Olympics in Melbourne, Australia, Hungary was drawn to meet the Russians in water polo. At that time the invasion of Hungary by Russia was still not complete. Unable to defeat the Russians militarily, the Hungarians attempted to extract some kind of revenge in the swimming-pool. McIntosh (1963 : 199) reported that the game turned into a blood bath. It was becoming increasingly obvious that politically free sport was merely an ideal. The only real protest at this development in 1956, says Lund (1963 : 484), came from Dutch and Swiss teams who stayed at home and gave all the money which

had been collected for the teams to Hungarian refugees.

The Olympics in more recent times have been politicized even further with demonstrations by United States Black athletes in Mexico in 1968, by the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, and by the exodus of African nations from the 1976 Olympics in Montreal.

The indications are that most sport is involved to some degree with the government or state in most nations of the world. Natan (1958 : 54) suggests that in Eastern bloc nations participation in international events has become exclusively a matter for governments. "They are political operations with political motives and for that reason they cannot be left to the initiative of individual sportsmen or clubs". In reference to the Western bloc he felt that sport had never been immune to the infiltration of politics although "there can be no doubt that in most Western countries genuine efforts have been made to exclude politics from sport. But I am still convinced that such an unpolitical organisation of sport today is apparent rather than real" (Natan, 1958 : 57).

Given the apparent pervasiveness of politics in contemporary sport the suggestion appears that the survival of sport is dependent on its acceptance of this politicization. However, the world of sport has shown that it is selective in relation to those political systems which it is prepared to accept. Scotland was quite willing in 1977 to play soccer in a stadium that had been used to torture and murder Chilean men and women after a coup which cost the lives of 30 000 to 40 000 people in 1973. The World Cup soccer tournament was held in 1978 in Argentina, where about 6 000 had been killed and 15 000 were reported missing as the junta established itself. There is also the question of the 1980 Olympic Games being awarded to the Soviet Union. The awarding of the Games took place in the same year (1974) that the Soviet Union expelled Alexander Solzhenitsyn and imprisoned four other dissidents, Viktor Khaustov, Gabriel Superfin, Viktor Stern and Pacuir Airakyan (Sunday Times, London, August 17, 1978). The apparent arbitrariness of the exclusion of South Africa from international

sport is further underscored by Lund's (1963 : 485) statement that Communist countries should be boycotted until such time as they are prepared to show respect for human rights. However, Dennis Follows, chairman of the British Olympic Association, in a statement attributed to him, illustrated the difficulty in interpreting consistently the question of discrimination. "I'm prepared to play against anybody at any time, because if I were to be discriminatory there would be three-quarters of the world with whom I wouldn't play" (Sunday Times, London, August 27, 1978). The extrapolation from this statement is that if discrimination in various political régimes was objected to by means of sporting boycott, world sport in its present form would be extirpated. It must therefore be either that an exception is being made in the case of South Africa, or else that there is a specific factor or combination of factors which allow her to be singled out for sporting ostracism, while allowing other countries to compete with relative impunity.

Sport and Race

Women were one of the first groups discriminated against; they were barred by the Greeks from sporting events even in a spectatorial capacity. Mandell (1971 : 57) declares that there have been outrages against the Jews since Diaspora with the most overt display of anti-Jew feeling being at the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Lapchick (1973) has drawn parallels between the Nazi Germany of 1936 and South Africa prior to 1973, where, he says, the Black athlete faced similar suppression to the Jew in Nazi Germany. The common factor would appear to be discrimination because of race.

That discrimination takes many forms is obvious and has been remarked on by Loy and McElvogue (1972 : 310). They have further suggested that a major mode of discrimination is segregation, which they state, denotes the exclusion of certain categories of persons from specific social organisations or particular positions within organisations on arbitrary grounds, that is grounds which have no objective relation to individual skill and talent.

Olsen (1968) investigated discrimination against the Negro in American sport. He found that:

Until very recently the Negro athlete - amateur and professional - has been expected to stand fast and take it, keep his mouth shut and perform valiantly in front of cheering white audiences. If he wanted respect off the field, if he wanted to collect the hero worship and the social advantages that are the traditional reward of the good athlete, he had to go to Blacktown. There, long into the night, he might hold court while one by one people of his own colour dropped by ... (Olsen, 1968 : 17)

This utilization of the Black American athlete has also been described by Hoch (1972 : 387) as a modern version of the slave trade, in which coaches send their scouts out looking for quality Black horseflesh to reel in the trophies. Black reaction to this phenomenon was slow in developing. In 1968 at the Mexico Olympic Games Black American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos gave a Black power salute while standing on the victory rostrum. Two other athletes, Vince Matthews and Wayne Collett, stood casually on the winners rostrum while the United States national anthem was played. Their demeanor was meant to "reflect the casual attitude of White America toward Black Americans" (Edwards, 1973 : 110).

This protest helped bring to world attention the conundrum which was race and sport. As a practitioner of discrimination and segregation it was not unnatural that attention would also be directed at South African sport, and that she would be singled out for criticism.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Morton (1963 : 13) expressed the view that analysis of a nation at play reveals the stuff of its social fabric and value system. Edwards (1973 : 91) suggests that sport shares with the polity the function of disseminating and reinforcing values that are influential in defining societal means, and in determining acceptable solutions to problems. Sport, it would appear, has the potential to reveal and influence; therefore its study in the context which is South Africa,

suggests that much can be learned not only about South Africa's sportsmen but, about her society and, possibly, the direction in which it is inclined.

South African sport is, however, complicated in its potential for sports research by the additional elements of international sporting isolation, the internal involvement of politics and race, and international disapprobation, politically, racially and in sport. All of these elements contribute to present to the sports researcher a unique contemporary sporting phenomenon.

Adam (1971 : 16) has stated that for a sociological study it is necessary to analyse, rather than merely condemn, apartheid. Kenyon (1974 : 24) feels that a researcher who allows his personal values or social philosophy to influence his observation is by definition simply engaging in bad science. Further, he suggests that the researcher who commits himself to a value-neutral attitude while conducting research does not imply that he is free of opinions, values or aspirations. However, the extent to which he can hold in abeyance his personal values and perhaps even his prejudices will dictate the degree of usefulness of his findings.

There arises, therefore, a need to strive for an objective examination of a situation which is unique in the world of sport. There is further need, in relation to South African sport, of an objective documentation of the evolution of South African sport under the unique conditions that South African sport has had to endure.

It is an unfortunate indictment that when Adam's and Kenyon's guidelines are put into perspective in relation to the study of sport, politics or race in South Africa, it is noticeable that there have been considerable deviations. To try and circumvent this pitfall, the researcher, who derives from a multi-racial New Zealand environment, attempted, during a two-year period of residence in South Africa, to familiarise himself with the problems faced by Black and White sportsmen in South Africa. It is anticipated that this attempted value-free inquiry will contribute data which may be useful to those

interested in the research of sport per se, to those interested in an objective evaluation of South African sport, and its racial and political correlates, and that it may provide insight into the complexity which is South African society.

Such an examination may also give insight into the possible future developmental direction of South African sport and South African society. As Lüschen (1967 : 11) has stated: "Sport functions as a means of integration, not only for the actual participants, but also for the representatives of such a system". Further, Daniels (1969 : 19) has added that those who have chronicled life in America have made note of the important place which sport occupies in all classes of society. South Africa in this regard is similar, a value-free study of her sports systems and its political and racial elements can only contribute to the growing body of knowledge that is associated with the serious study of sport.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Sport, Politics and Race : South Africa

It would appear that the primary objection to South Africa's participation in international sport is the racial problem that is particular to South Africa. Discrimination in its various forms exists in other countries of the world and the political involvement in sport of most contemporary governments has been noted, yet they remain free to participate in international sport. Lapchick (1973 : 389-390) in his doctoral thesis, The Politics of Race and International Sport : The Case of South Africa, concluded that the major factor in the politics of international sport has become the racial and not the ideological factor. Nations, he suggests, are not added to or excluded because of their political systems, and that South Africa has been excluded because of the way race affects both its domestic and international competition.

Evidence of the pervasiveness of politics in world sport, covert racism, and discrimination would appear to support Lapchick's

conclusion. Other commentaries by de Broglio (1971), Grace (1974), Shaw (1976) and Brickhill (1976) offer further support of this conclusion. The question that arises is: what is it about the particular form of racial discrimination in South Africa that takes precedence in terms of world criticism over other violations of human rights in other parts of the world?

Brickhill (1976 : 4) has proferred that to enter the realm of South African sport is to enter a crazy world where race shapes and distorts everything. This complexity has been examined in a serious study, in relation specifically to sport, by Lapchick as previously cited. However, Lapchick chose to examine the problem from an international perspective. In addition, his study was completed in 1973. There was as a result a need for (1) further research which would be cognizant of developments occurring after 1973, and (2) an examination of South African sport, politics and race which would consider the problem in its context, from within South Africa.

It is proposed to review the evolution and examine the inter-relationship of sport, politics and race in South Africa. Within this frame of reference the sub-problems which will be considered are:

- (1) The origin of the sport, politics and race relationships in South Africa;
- (2) The effect of international criticism and sporting ostracism on the South African sports structure;
- (3) The developments in the interrelated structure of sport, politics and race;
- (4) The factors affecting the relationship of sport, politics and race.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The official languages of South Africa are Afrikaans and English. Approximately sixty percent of the White population speaks Afrikaans. As English is the language of the author, English sources were predominantly used. Afrikaans sources were

consulted where it was considered relevant.

Acknowledgement is further made of the natural bias that appears in newspapers, journals, periodicals and magazines of both language groups. An attempt was made to circumvent this limitation by restricting sources to verbatim accounts.

Interviews also had to be conducted in English. On several occasions those being interviewed suggested that their own language (Afrikaans) may have enabled them to present their thoughts, attitudes and ideals more lucidly.

The notation of sports events depends on their 'newsworthiness'. Some items that may have been significant to this dissertation, but were considered 'unnewsworthy', and have therefore not been reported by the media, may as a result have been omitted.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following terms are used in this dissertation. They are defined as they are normally interpreted in the South African context.

White: any person who in appearance, obviously is, or who is generally accepted as, a White person, other than a person who although in appearance obviously a White person, is generally accepted as a Coloured person, or who is a member of any other group.

Coloured: any person who is not a member of the White group or of the Native group. Seven groups of Coloureds have been prescribed. These are the Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, other Asiatic and other Coloured groups.

African: any person who is generally accepted as a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa, other than a person who is a member of a Coloured group.

Bantu: a person who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. This term shows a current tendency to be replaced by the term 'Black'.

Non-White: a person who is not White and is therefore not of European descent. This term also shows a current tendency to be replaced by the term 'Black'.

Non-racial sport: implies that there are no racial restrictions whatsoever and that teams are selected therefore purely on merit.

Multi-racial sport: persons from different race groups participate together. Sport under multi-racialism may be integrated but the term is used to connote integration with restrictions.

Multi-national sport: strictly interpreted this concept denotes sport between nations. Teams are drawn from one particular nation or race group and compete as a separate national entity against another nation or race group. Multi-national sport generally does not permit inter-mixing of different race groups except where specific dispensation is granted by the South African Government. This is usually in instances where mixed teams are a prerequisite for international competition.

ORGANISATION OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS

The remainder of the dissertation is organised into chapters as follows:

Chapter Two: outlines how the study was researched; from where material was derived and the period in which research was undertaken.

Chapter Three: presents a historical political overview of South Africa.

Chapter Four: examines the early developments of White and Non-White sport in South Africa until 1950.

Chapter Five: is a synopsis of the development of White and Non-White sport in South Africa, with consideration of the political influence to 1970.

Chapter Six: examines sport in South Africa and the concept of Multi-Nationalism.

Chapter Seven: examines sport in South Africa and the development of Multi-Racialism.

Chapter Eight: examines the demand for Non-racial or Normal sport in South Africa.

Chapter Nine: is concerned with the first of several areas which have been specifically involved in the development of sport in South Africa. This chapter is titled Legislation and South African Sport.

Chapter Ten: concerns the Anti-Apartheid Sports Movement and South African Sport.

Chapter Eleven: concerns the Non-Racial Sports Movement in South Africa.

Chapter Twelve: examines the role of the Broederbond in South Africa's sports development.

Chapter Thirteen: examines White Public Opinion in relation to sporting developments in South Africa.

Chapter Fourteen: contains the summary, conclusions and a final statement.

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CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

SOURCE MATERIAL

TIME OF RESEARCH

ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

Many of the issues presenting themselves in contemporary South African sport have their antecedents in colonial and post-union South Africa. An understanding of the geneses of these issues, it was considered, would contribute to a greater understanding of present developments in the area of sport, race and politics in South Africa.

The main consideration of this dissertation is sport and its development within the context of South African society. However, to adhere strictly to a sociological approach within defined sporting parameters would have deprived this research of valuable supporting and/or exegetic material. Background reading was therefore initiated in the areas of history, economics, political science, political philosophy, law, sociology and sport, to provide relevant material for this research.

The format of the study was determined by the recent occurrence of events in the main period under study and by the need to utilise a number of interrelated disciplines and sub-disciplines. It was notable that there was a variance in the interpretation of certain events and incidents, which created difficulties in documenting objective developments. Analysis depends, to a large degree, on the integrity, reliability and validity of documented data. Analysis of historically biased data, for instance, may have resulted in a fallacious or erroneous conclusion. Cognizance of this possible shortcoming contributed to the decision to present data chronologically with limited in-

text interpretation and analysis. Where a number of sources disagreed, and no congruity was obvious, a selection of sources was quoted. After presentation of the data a number of conclusions and general observations were formulated.

This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part, chapters one to five, considered: the period from the arrival of the first White settlers in South Africa, the development of racism, its manifestation in early sport in the colony, and finally the consolidation of the colour bar in South African sport and the initial opposition which developed against such a practice.

The second part, chapters six to eight, dealt with developments in South African sport specifically in the period 1970-1979.³ Research presented was gathered primarily from a chronological evaluation of newspapers published in this period. This information, which was derived from Afrikaans and English-language newspapers in South Africa, was supplemented by additional background reading, personal interviews, public and private documents, correspondence and public opinion surveys.

Again there were difficulties in many instances in deriving objective statements of incidents and events. This made interpretation difficult and to preserve the desired objectivity, several accounts from different sources have on occasion been quoted. An attempt, except where it was considered relevant to depict the majority of ruling opinion, was made to confine documentation to verbatim accounts.

In the third part of the dissertation, chapters nine to thirteen, there is consideration of particular influences which have operated on the development of South African sport. The origin of the influences is documented. Development or evolution is then recorded from this point until the end of the period under study in 1979.

SOURCE MATERIAL

The material for this study was derived from multifarious sources. A library search was initiated to collate relevant data. The scope of this search was international. At California State University, Long Beach, a computer search was undertaken to identify pertinent material. This was extended to an information retrieval system for the sociology and social psychology of leisure and sport, which is situated in the Faculty of Human Kinetics and Leisure Studies at the University of Waterloo, in Canada.

The scope of the literary research was further extended to the libraries of The Times, London, England, and the New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand. In South Africa the libraries of the Universities of Stellenbosch, Cape Town, Pretoria, Natal and of the University of South Africa were utilised. The National Archives Library in Cape Town was also used, as were the libraries of the Cape Times, Argus, Die Burger, Cape Herald, Rand Daily Mail and the South African Institute of Race Relations.

Personal libraries were made use of on numerous occasions and personal files were investigated.

In order to gather data for the contemporary period under investigation, an extensive survey of newspapers was undertaken in South Africa. Information, recorded in part two, was derived primarily from: Cape Times (Cape Town), Argus (Cape Town), Hoofstad (Pretoria), Die Burger (Cape Town), Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), and the Star (Johannesburg). Most other newspapers in South Africa were used to supply additional information, as were newspapers from the United States of America, Great Britain and New Zealand.

To add depth, perspective and objectivity, the South African official records of parliamentary debates, Hansard, were used extensively. The Department of Sport and Recreation's annual report was similarly used. Further information was obtained from other government publications, speeches, periodicals,

quarterlies, journals and magazines, and through correspondence and interviews with sports organisations, administrators, consumers and participants.

Interviews were conducted throughout South Africa. Opinion of White and Black sportspeople were recorded in an attempt to establish particular trends in thought and to assist in substantiating or negating that information which had been previously gleaned. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation, opinion was solicited under the following categories: Politicians, Academics, Sports Administrators, Sports Participants and Sports Consumers.

This information was accommodated under three separate chapter headings (chapter six, seven, eight of part two). These headings were decided on after assimilation of all the relevant data and consideration of the developments for the period 1970-1979. It was considered that presentation in three chapters, each with its own, although overlapping, identity, would lend clarity to the overall pattern of development and make any final analysis, interpretation or conclusion clearer and more definitive.

The headings for each chapter are arbitrary and must be considered within the realms of their definitions in chapter one. The first of these chapters examines the Multi-National Sports concept. Attention is paid to the idea that sport in South Africa must confine itself to nationalities. Chapter seven, Multi-Racialism and South African Sport, examines the period when strict multi-nationalism began to wane and greater contact among the Black and White races occurred. With contact between Black and White sportsmen becoming a possibility (within carefully prescribed parameters) down to school level in 1979, chapter eight, The Demand for Non-Racial and Normal Sport, examines what remained in the form of opposition, internal and external, to South African sport.

Legislation and its involvement in South Africa's development has been a contentious subject since the inception of discriminatory legislation in 1911. While there is no law which specifically forbids sport between the races in South Africa,

there is legislation which has the potential to inhibit sports participation amongst the various racial groups. In order to ascertain the degree of influence of legislation on South Africa's sports development, newspapers, law reports, government gazettes and the Statutes of the Republic of South Africa were reviewed to provide relevant information. Additional information was supplied from the law libraries of the Universities of Stellenbosch, Cape Town and the Witwatersrand. Legal personnel and legal firms were consulted and personal law libraries were made available. Interviews supplemented information for this chapter.

Pressure groups within South Africa were contacted personally and by mail. Of particular concern to this study was the non-racial 'South African Council on Sport' (SACOS). Interviews were conducted with its administrators, in particular with its current chairman, Hassa Howa, and correspondence was entered into with a number of its personnel.

Pressure groups outside South Africa were contacted by mail. Particular attention in this study was given to: the 'South African Non-Racial Open Committee'* (SAN-ROC) in London; 'Citizens Association for Racial Equality' (CARE) in Auckland, New Zealand; the 'New Zealand Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa' in Wellington, New Zealand; the 'International Campaign Against Racism in Sport' (ICARIS) in Evanston, United States of America; and the 'Supreme Council for Sport in Africa' (SCSA) in Yaounde, Cameroun. The 'United Nations Centre Against Apartheid' also provided information pertinent to pressure group activity and to the study per se.

Information received from these groups and from those associated with the groups was combined with historical data to produce chapters on the effect of internal and external pressure groups on South Africa's sports development.

The White Afrikaner Broederbond organisation sustained a number of revelations concerning its role in South Africa's social/

* Also referred to as the South African Non-Racial Open Committee

political/economic development during the period of research. As a result it was considered that this organisation in so far as could be ascertained and validated, had exercised a considerable influence on South African sport. It was considered, against a background of limited sources, that some acknowledgement should be made of this influence. Chapter twelve thus concerns the Afrikaner Broederbond's involvement in South African sport. Material was derived largely from two expository books on this organisation, which material was supplemented from articles, journals and newspaper reports. Interviews were also conducted with various personnel.

The development of sport in South Africa is the ultimate responsibility of the White ruling population. For chapter thirteen White public opinion from 1969 to 1979 was researched to ascertain what effect the decision-making section of the population had had on the development of South African sport. Assistance was received from two market research organisations: 'Market Research Africa' (Johannesburg) and 'Market and Opinion Surveys' (Cape Town); both organisations, on numerous occasions, solicited random national samples of public opinion. This information was made available for this research. Additional sources were private researchers and newspaper polls. White attitudes were then compared with South Africa's sporting development.

Chapter fourteen, summary and conclusions, was derived from the research contained in the foregoing chapters.

TIME OF RESEARCH

The majority of the research was collated in South Africa from January 1978 to August 1979. Preliminary work was undertaken in California (U.S.A.) from January to June 1977; New Zealand from July to September 1977; and in London (England) from September 1977 through to December 1977. Writing commenced in November 1978. Originally the end of 1978 was designated as the terminal point of the study. Subsequently there were certain important developments and the period was extended to the end of August 1979.

CHAPTER THREE

SOUTH AFRICA - A HISTORICAL POLITICAL OVERVIEW

One of the most frequent criticisms levelled by South Africans at foreign analyses of the South African 'situation', is that no real attempt is made by critics to familiarise themselves, or their readers, with those events in South Africa which preceded present day manifestations. A political historical overview is therefore included in a dissertation concerned with the study of sport in South Africa in order to circumvent this particular criticism.

It is also postulated by Parkin (1972 : 82) and Loy (1978 : 82) that sport tends to reflect the ideological elements of larger and more powerful institutions. An understanding of those ideological elements will assist in analysis of the role of sport in the South African environment.

The use of the term 'political sport' has become more frequent in writings on contemporary sport (McIntosh, 1963; Lapchick, 1973; Brickhill, 1976; Shaw, 1976). It is hoped that an overview of South Africa's political history will clarify some of the confusion that surrounds the term in its South African frame of reference.

South Africa is like no other state in the world. Because of her political structure, which can be described as an attempt to institutionalise various races, she is unique. Apartheid is often described as separate or parallel development and/or multinational development. The theme, however, remains constant, that is providing a territorial area where each group can set up its own schools, businesses, political systems, etc. (Greyling, 1972 : 94-98).

Within South Africa there are more than two thousand different religious sects, twelve major languages, racial groups representing all the main biogenetic divisions of mankind (negroid, caucasoid, mongoloid and mixed) and marked inequali-

ties in the distribution of wealth and resources (Official Yearbook of Republic of South Africa 1976 : 207). Separate development as a system aims to allow these disparities to be overcome and for the races to coexist harmoniously.

Those who object to separate development argue that in other multi-racial cultures of the world one man is not dictated to by another as to where he may or where he may not live. Cross reference to multi-racial cultures, such as those that exist in New Zealand, Australia or America, can be made only on a superficial level. Such comparisons, because of the complexity of South Africa's situation, are inadequate. Said and Simmons (1976 : 55) agree that in 53 states where the population is composed of five or more significant ethnic groups, nowhere is the problem more complex than in South Africa.

Southern Africa was inhabited by Bushmen (San) and Hottentots (KhoiKhoi) when Van Riebeeck arrived in 1652. He was sent to establish a refueling station by the Dutch East India Company which was to supply ships plying the East India trade route. There was no initial intention of establishing a colony.

Van Jaarsveld (1975 : 12) says that more European settlers arrived, comprising German, French and predominantly Dutch nationals, the result of which was an indigenous race of people, the Afrikaners, who accepted the country as their only home.

The early settlers encountered the Hottentots and the Bushmen. The Hottentots were a nomadic agrarian race while the Bushmen were a hunting group, who because they could not leave the cattle of other race groups alone, were often involved in hostilities (Van Jaarsveld, 1975 : 16).

Eventually the pressure exerted on the Bushmen by Bantu, Hottentots and Whites largely destroyed them as a race and those who remained in the colony were eventually assimilated by the Hottentots. Slaves from the West Coast of Africa, India, Malaysia and elsewhere were introduced to the colony at an early stage. The contact that resulted between Whites,

Slaves and Hottentots produced another race group who are known as Coloureds.

The Dutch East Indian Company, or 'the Company', as it was more commonly referred to, established a régime that was both oppressive and economically debilitating. It was largely as a reaction to this that the farmers began expanding the boundaries of the colony. Expansion, says Van Jaarsveld (1975 : 52), was unofficial, as 'the Company' sought to prevent it. Besides bringing these Vryburghers (free burghers) into conflict with 'the Company', expansion also brought them into contact with the Xhosa-Bantu in the seventies of the eighteenth century. The Xhosa-Bantu, a nomadic agrarian people, engaged the Whites in a series of hostilities which became known as the Frontier wars.

Britain took over the Cape in 1795, ostensibly to pre-empt a similar move by Napoleon who was at the time a growing threat in Europe. The colony was returned to the Netherlands shortly afterwards, but was finally awarded to the British as part of the peace settlement.

Marquard (1952 : 10) makes the following comment on initial British occupation:

The first thirty years of British rule at the Cape were years of considerable economic expansion and administrative reform. The British government had, however, done many things which the Dutch inhabitants had disliked. The English language had been declared the only official language and although this policy was reversed some thirty years later it left a deep mark in the minds of South Africans ... the 50th Ordinance was probably of equal significance. Passed in 1828 it repealed the previous pass laws. Repeal established the principle of equality in the eyes of the law for all free persons of colour.

Six years later, in 1834, the British also emancipated slaves throughout the colony.

Because of the 1834 announcement and other economic and political reasons the movement into the interior by Dutch settlers (the Great Trek) gathered momentum. Marquard (1952 : 11),

estimates that ten thousand Dutch men, women and children moved away from the Cape Colony between 1836 and 1846. De Kiewiet (1956 : 20), asserts that these Voortrekkers or pioneers envisaged an independent republican state free from British interference and colonial ideology, a republic in which there would be free and peaceful use of land with no equality between Black and White. A society, adds Marquard (1952 : 11), in which proper relations between master and servant could be maintained.

After asserting their mastery over the Zulu and Matabele, the Boers established their first republic in Natal in 1838. British imperialism, however, was close on their heels and the republic was annexed in 1843. There followed sufficient respite from British interference to allow the establishment of two more Dutch republics: first the South African Republic (Transvaal) in 1852, and then the Orange Free State in 1854.

In 1895/96 the British again tried to extend their sphere of influence. The Jameson raid was an abortive attempt that eventually led to the hostilities known as the Second South African or Anglo Boer war. The British envisaged a short sharp conflict that would break the back of Afrikaner nationalism (Muller, 1969 : 320). This did not materialise and the war dragged on for more than thirty-one months. In the process it heightened the British/Boer antipathy. Boer women and children were placed in concentration camps and houses were burnt to the ground, in what was generally regarded as a 'scorched earth' policy.

By the end of the war in 1902 the British were generally resented, both for their war victory and the methods used to secure it. The Afrikaner had been subjugated, but not destroyed.

In 1910 the four territories, Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal, merged to form a union. It was felt "in certain circles, although not in all, that a completely new beginning had been made and that the past had been buried. A spirit of optimism and faith that Boer and Briton would be

one nation prevailed" (Van Jaarsveld, 1975 : 228).

Louis Botha was appointed prime minister and drew his cabinet from the four provinces. Unity, however, did not last long. Botha's policy was based on co-operation with the British. Essentially it was a middle of the road approach attempting to favour neither Briton nor Afrikaner. It was not interpreted as equitable by one member of Botha's cabinet, J.B.M. Hertzog, who felt the British were being favoured. Hertzog then set about trying personally to uplift the Afrikaner.

The position in 1912 became intolerable. Botha resigned on December 12th and formed a new cabinet, excluding Hertzog. In 1914 Hertzog formed the National party which became recognised as the mouthpiece for White Afrikaner nationalism and initially demanded, inter alia instruction in both languages (English and Dutch) in the schools (Brotz, 1977 : 54).

The period between the foundation of Union and the formation of the National party produced several relevant pieces of legislation. The 'Mines and Works Act of 1911' introduced a colour bar in employment which effectively prevented Africans (Blacks) from holding the more skilled positions in the mines.

Further segregation was embodied in the 'Natives Land Act of 1913'. This Act divided the country into White and Native areas and prohibited the sale of land owned by Whites to Natives and vice versa. The importance of this Act was not so much its segregationist line of development, as this had been present previously, but in the fact that it was the first piece of post Union legislation to reflect this line of thought (Muller, 1969 : 343).

Botha died in 1919 and was succeeded by Jan Smuts. The new prime minister continued to pursue the 'British connection', which in turn served to fuel the Afrikaner Nationalist cause.

In 1924 Smuts was defeated in an early election by a Nationalist/Labour alliance. The development of segregation gathered momentum under this alliance. In 1930, for example, White women only were enfranchised. In 1934 there was a further

governmental change. Despite this change segregation continued to be implemented.

In 1936 there appeared the 'Representation of Natives Act' which (i) removed Africans (Blacks) from the common roll in the Cape and substituted a separate roll which was to return three White members and (ii) abolished the right of Cape Africans to purchase land anywhere (Worrall, 1971 : 42). This left the African politically moribund as he had not enjoyed these privileges in any other South African province. In 1937 there followed the 'Native Laws Amendment Act' which required Blacks to be removed from urban areas where, in the opinion of the Governor General, they were in excess of reasonable labour requirements (Worrall, 1971 : 42).

Apartheid was adopted as part of the election manifesto of the National Party in 1948. Malan, who was the party leader, campaigned on the twin menaces of communism and the rising tide of colour (Brotz, 1977 : 16). Although Malan has become inextricably associated with the apartheid concept, Rhodie and Venter (1959 : 148-149) point out that "the apartheid idea arose out of the ruins of segregation As Afrikaner nationalism grew in the 1940's, the tendency to compromise disappeared and the apartheid idea came to the fore as the nationalist Afrikaner's uncompromising answer to the challenge of the native question".

The apartheid idea implies the practical implementation of a policy which will gradually assure greater self government for the Bantu in their homelands. This was the essential difference between segregation and apartheid. Segregation did not make adequate provision for the national and political aspirations of the developing Black groups. In addition segregation had failed to counteract or even effectively control the economic integration of the Black.

One of the first major pieces of apartheid legislation was the 'Group Areas Act of 1950'. This Act demarcated separate residential areas for all the various racial groups (Muller, 1969 : 384). It is remarked that this Act did not radically affect the status quo, as residential apartheid

between Black and White was a long established South African custom. However, the Coloured and Indian races which were not clearly demarcated before this Act, were to become so following its introduction. To clarify the vague distinction between the races the Population Registration Act was introduced in 1950. In terms of this Act every South African subject over sixteen had to possess an identification card on which his race (White, Asiatic, Coloured or Bantu) was indicated (Muller, 1969 : 384). A host of discriminatory laws were to follow. The most contentious of these, says Muller (1969 : 385), was the government's decision to remove the enfranchised Coloured voters, approximately 38 000, from the ordinary (White) voters' roll and place them on a separate (Coloured) voters' roll where they would return their own separate representatives to parliament. The move was blocked in 1951 because it was considered unconstitutional. This problem was circumvented in 1956 and the Bill was passed. The Coloureds were legally removed from the common voters' roll.

The Coloureds, who are officially described as "Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, other Asiatic and other coloured groups" (Hosten et al., 1977 : 683) were compensated with limited legislative power in 1968 by the creation of a Coloured Persons Representative Council (C.R.C.). The council has forty elected members and twenty members nominated by the State President. All members are Coloured and the council elects its chairman from amongst its members (Hosten et al., 1977 : 683). In order to pass any legislation, the council must first ensure "that it is not repugnant to any act of parliament" (Hosten et al., 1977 : 683), after which it has to be sanctioned by the Minister of Coloured Affairs and the State President.

The Indians in South Africa are like the Coloureds, in that they are not destined to be returned to homelands or native reserves. Likewise they do not enjoy the same political rights as the European. They, like the Coloureds, are required to live in specific areas (Group Areas) and make political representation through a council (Indian).

The Africans (Blacks) enjoy no political representation except that they can elect representatives in their respective homelands. Part of the apartheid plan was the establishment of independent homelands (native reserves) which would provide a satisfactory solution to the country's political problems (Malan and Hattingh, 1976 : 6). This solution is currently being examined by the Nationalist party.

There is talk of reform in South Africa in 1979, and in the last decade there have been a series of concessions to the Non-Whites, especially in the realm of sport. Other 'grey' areas that have developed include, beaches, post offices and international hotels, to name but a few. There are, however, still some three hundred and fifty statutes governing race relations in South Africa (Horrell, 1978).

The National party has shown an inclination to move away from the apartheid concept as propounded by Malan and various predecessors. Their alternative is a modified form of consociationalism which would create three separate parliaments, one for the Whites, one for the Indians and one for the Coloureds. At this point the Blacks are to be excluded.

The new proposal aims at giving the State President control over each of the respective Prime Ministers. However, legislation under this proposal, could be initiated by each parliament to affect their own population group. Legislation that affected either of the other two groups would require the unanimous agreement of all three parliaments before it could be enacted. The proposal is progressive, in that it would give the Coloureds and Indians a greater say in their destiny compared with what they have at present, although the Whites would still retain control through the electoral college.

Lijphart (1977 : 236) agrees that some form of consociationalism is the ultimate answer to the South African situation, suggesting that "if South Africans are, to coexist harmoniously in any kind of democracy, then it will almost certainly have to be of the consociational type". Consociationalism implies some form of power sharing whose members exercise

the right of mutual veto, constructed along federational lines. But, as mentioned initially, South Africa is unique in the degree of complexity of her race relations, and any proposed solution will confront different and difficult problems.

Against this background sport has evolved, developing an identity that has reflected the ideological elements of the more dominant institutions. However, during the last decade sport in South Africa has grown in stature to the point where its relationship with the more dominant institutions is no longer unilateral. Sport in the late 1970's has assumed a position where it has no longer to be dictated to by the more dominant institutions but has a growing potential to assist in societal growth and development.

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CHAPTER FOUR

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF WHITE AND NON-WHITESPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA TO 1950

An examination of early manifestations of sport and race in South Africa makes it obvious that both have been subjected to various pressures, which have tended to be cyclical in nature.

In literature which describes life in the early Dutch colony scant mention is made of sport, suggesting that what sport there was, was of a generally informal nature (Marquard, 1952 : 63; Leonard and Affleck, 1947 : 423).

The arrival of the British in 1795 initiated a new era in sport in South Africa. The British brought with them a capitalist system and a military. Leck (1977 : 4) suggests that this marked the beginning of organised sport in South Africa.

However, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the first cricket match was recorded. A game between the Officers of the Artillery and the Officers of the Colony (Odendaal, 1977 : 306).

Other forms of sport continued to exist. Bird (1966 : 160) suggests that in the 1820s shooting was one of the favourite amusements at the Cape - an amusement indulged in by both Boer and British alike.

.... on the Cape side of the mountains and Berg river, the sportsman follows bucks (antelopes) shooting with most vigour and success. The English use double barrel guns; one barrel of which is loaded with buck shot, and the other with smaller shot, in order to be prepared for the variety of game which presents itself.

The Boers carry heavy long single-barrel guns, with which they almost unerringly bring down an antelope, if within 100 yards. They shoot with great precision, but only at the larger game, (Bird, 1966 : 161)

Such amusements continued into the 1850s. Lucas (1975 : 193) relates that:

Our principal amusements were quail shooting and deep sea fishing, which is very good; and off the rocks as the tide came in we caught fine rock cod and a very pretty species of sea perch, of a silvery white banded with black.

Lucas (1975 : 198) also relates the procedure in hunting the 'Pauo' or great bustard.

.... it is only to be got at in the veld by riding round it in circles, ever lessening until the happy moment when sufficiently near to get within shot. The huge bird in the meanwhile, stupidly regards the horseman with turning neck, apparently fascinated by the manoeuvres.

On August 23rd 1862 a more organised sport, rugby, had its first recorded match at Green Point common in Cape Town. The game was between the military and the civilians (Leck, 1977 : 6). Odendaal (1977 : 306) remarks that cricket had followed the British into the interior of South Africa and that by 1860 the game was organised in the Orange Free State.

The intervention of the South African war (2nd Anglo/Boer war) temporarily interrupted the development of sport. Following its conclusion in 1902 there remained a British/Boer antipathy which was transferred to sport. Craven (1978) maintains that early Boer/British segregation had developed in South African sport as a result of British class consciousness and exclusivity and that the war and its outcome contributed to this developing schism.

The beginnings of Non-White sport are obscure, most certainly they were informal. Odendaal (1977 : 305) quotes the following reference to 'Kaffirs' playing cricket in 1862.

After dinner the farmer paid us a visit, a good looking fellow, but decidedly like all I have seen, having a deuced seedy appearance, boots all worn out on the sole! Had been amusing himself playing cricket with the Kaffirs.

There was early inter-racial contact as Leck's (1977 : 8) report of a boxing match illustrates. The boxing match was between one Japie and a Mahoud circa 1862, and it was a bare knuckled contest which saw the two contestants arrested and fined

five shillings. Leck reports the incident as part of the historical tradition of boxing in South Africa. However, in looking at the genesis of Non-White sport the names are also of interest. Japie indicates that one of the fighters was of Dutch extraction, while Mahoud is not a Dutch derived name. It is possible to suggest therefore that Mahoud was either a Non-White who was fair enough to pass for a White, or that this was an instance of inter-racial sporting contact, albeit in a rather limited and obscure form.

Inter-racial boxing contests did take place further North, in and around the mines. These areas were flushed with new wealth, young men and entrepreneurs willing to provide entertainment at a price. As a result boxing bouts started with little concern for the colour of the contestants skin (Rand Daily Mail, September 20, 1976).

As far as can be established the first recorded inter-racial contest in South Africa, took place at King Williams Town in 1885 (Odendaal, 1979). The match was between an African side, the Champion Cricket Club and the White Albert Cricket Club. The Africans won this match and later in the year a similar match was played in Port Elizabeth. Odendaal adds that it is possible that games could have been played between the races before this date but the history of Black cricket is vague and not thoroughly documented.

In 1891 there was a 'Natives tournament' played in Port Elizabeth (Odendaal, 1977 : 306). There was a suggestion that Whites may have participated but the tournament basically catered for Non-Whites of varying cultural backgrounds. A similar tournament had taken place in Cape Town the previous year, but says Odendaal (1977 : 306), it catered only for "Malay teams from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Claremont."

In the summer of 1891/92 an English Cricket side toured South Africa under W.W. Read. Their itinerary included a match against a Malay XI at Newlands in Cape Town (Odendaal, 1977 : 325). The occasion was the first official cricket international in South Africa in which Non-Whites played Whites. It

took another eighty-two years for the occasion to be reproduced.

In 1904 the Olympic Games were held in St. Louis in the United States of America. Two South African Blacks competed in the marathon. Lucas (1905 : 48) says that "two entries from the Kaffir tribe, Zululand, South Africa, were Lentauw and Yamasani." He also suggests that they were unofficial entries and that they were employed by a concession at the nearby fairgrounds. There also appears to be a possibility that both Blacks were there to assist the official White South African entry B.W. Harris. However, Lentauw and Yamasani acquitted themselves well finishing ninth and twelfth respectively leading Lucas (1905 : 57) to comment that the stamina and running abilities of these two competitors received much merited attention. Non-Whites did not compete again either unofficially or officially for South Africa at the Olympic Games.

The Rand Daily Mail (September 20, 1976) insists that further international White/Non-White contact occurred in 1919 and 1928 in the sport of rugby. In 1919 a New Zealand Defence Force rugby team toured South Africa and this was followed in 1928 by a fully representative New Zealand All Black* side. Both sides are reported to have contained Non-Whites. However, Craven (1979) disputes this assertion suggesting that in the 1919 team there was an Indian and of the 1928 side there were only two players who were possible Maoris but they were fair enough to be Europeans and for the purpose of this tour had chosen to be Whites. Further to this point Craven maintains that there was an understanding between the South African and New Zealand Rugby Unions that tourists sent to South Africa with New Zealand rugby teams in the 1920s would be White. It appears that the development of the idea that Non-Whites had participated in New Zealand rugby teams, in this period, was supported by the Nationalist Party in 1970 as a further justification for the official acceptance of Maoris in the 1970 All Black side to tour South Africa.

* The name All Black is a misnomer and refers to the colour of the uniform not the players.

By the 1920s there was an unofficial colour bar developing in sport. Inter-racial sport was still played but with the concurrent development of White Afrikaner nationalism, inter-racial contact decreased. Exceptions have however been noted: Thompson (1964 : 26) states that the former national tennis champion G.H. Dodd in 1926 ignored convention and played a few sets against Africans at the Bantu men's social centre in Johannesburg. In 1932, to mark the opening of the Bantu sports club, White tennis players played exhibition matches with the Africans.

In Grahamstown inter-collegiate athletic contests were reported between the White Rhodes University and its affiliated Non-White college at Fort Hare (Thompson, 1964 : 26).

Several cities, says Thompson, had inter-race boards in soccer and cricket. Between 1936 and 1952 there existed inter-racial committees for cricket in the Transvaal, Eastern Province, Western Province and Northern Cape. The Transvaal body included a White team in its regular competition.

In 1944 a South African Indian team played against a White XI in aid of the Bengal Relief fund (Rand Daily Mail, September 20, 1976). Such occasions were not the norm. A more correct indication of the state of inter-race play was the official statement of the South African Amateur Athletic Association in 1931:

It (South African Amateur Athletic Association) would uphold the colour bar and in view of conditions existing in the Union would not permit athletes from countries such as India and the West Indies to take part even at the risk of appearing discourteous. (Grace, 1974 : 108)

The statement was made in reference to the possibility of South Africa staging the Empire Games* in 1934.

Reaction to the developing colour bar in sport was officially recorded in 1946. T. Ragasamy applied to the British Amateur

* Now known as the Commonwealth Games.

Weightlifters' Association for recognition of the Non-White weightlifters in South Africa. At the time the officially recognised organisation was the all-White South African Weightlifting Federation which the Non-Whites could not join. Replying to Ragasamy's application the British association stated that mixed contests were not permitted in South Africa, therefore no Coloured man could be chosen to represent South Africa in the international contests. However, affiliation would be granted as an Indian or Coloured Weightlifters Association, if a properly drawn up constitution and rules were submitted (Lapchick, 1973 : 61-62, 413).

Although at this stage racism in sport in South Africa had not been entrenched by various pieces of legislation, it was nonetheless firmly rooted. With the coming to power of the Nationalists in 1948 the lines became more finely drawn. On the one side the Nationalist Government with great determination set about structuring an apartheid society and ipso facto apartheid sport, while in opposition were the non-racialists who envisaged an egalitarian sport society.

* * * *

This reaction to apartheid sport became a major influence in South Africa's sporting development. It is an influence that has been previously researched and documented by: Lapchick (1973), Draper (1963), Thompson (1964), Brickhill (1976). In addition Horrell has contributed by recording a year by year development in the annual Survey of Race Relations.

Each has given his or her own interpretation and it is not proposed to replicate those philosophies in this dissertation. Such inclusion, although warranted, would be practically infeasible. An objective selection that will précis the developments in sport and politics to 1970 is therefore included. It is hoped that such a synopsis will provide an adequate basis for comparison with those events which occurred after 1970. It is considered imperative, in a study that is

mainly concerned with changes in South African sport after 1970, that there be some notation of those events which preceded this period.

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CHAPTER FIVE

A SYNOPSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WHITE AND
NON-WHITE SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
INFLUENCE OF POLITICS TO 1970

The period to 1970 is included in précis form for the reason that it has been extensively researched by other authors. It was felt that to have omitted the period entirely would have left a void in the area immediately preceding the main thrust of the study; 1970 to 1979. To try and maintain a perspective of the development of sport, racialism and politics in South Africa a synopsis was derived largely from the works of Horrell (1950-1970), Draper (1963), Thompson (1964), Lapchick (1973) and de Broglia (1971). Newspapers supplemented information from these sources.

1954

The South African Soccer Federation (SASF) made representations to the International Football Association (FIFA) for affiliation. The SASF maintained they were more representative than the White South African Football Association (SAFA), who SASF claimed had fewer players. FIFA offered to accept the SASF as an affiliated body without voting powers since the SAFA was already affiliated. The SASF refused to comply with this request (Horrell, 1956 : 226).

1955

South Africa was accused by Dr. Herman Santa Cruz of Chile, the head of the United Nations Inquiry Commission into South Africa's racial situation, of violating the Olympic Games Constitution by excluding all Non-Europeans (The Times, London, October 13, 1955).

The Free State Rugby Union announced that it supported the ban of Non-Europeans at the new Bloemfontein stadium even if separate facilities were provided (The Times, London, December 5, 1955).

1956

The World Soccer body (FIFA), put off the South African Soccer Federation's (Non-White) application for two years until the next congress in 1958 (Magubane, 1963 : 7).

The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) recognised the Non-White South African Table Tennis Board. The ITTF completely withdrew its recognition of the White body (Horrell, 1957 : 226-227).

The Non-White Cricket Board of Control (SACBC) was denied membership of the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC) (Horrell, 1957 : 226-227).

The Non-White South African Weightlifting and Body Building Federation requested participation in the 1960 Olympics (Horrell, 1957 : 226-227).

The White South African Amateur Cycling Federation indicated its willingness to assist Non-Whites by stating that it would bring Non-White riders to South Africa. It would not allow South African Non-Whites to join their association (Horrell, 1957 : 220).

Dr. Dönges, South Africa's Minister of the Interior, made a statement in regards to sport in South Africa:

1. Whites and Non-Whites must organise their sports separately.
2. No mixed sport would be allowed within the borders of South Africa.
3. Mixed teams going abroad should be avoided.
4. International teams coming to South Africa to play against White South African teams must be all-White according to South African custom. When South Africa travelled overseas, it would respect the customs of the country in which it was playing (it would play against multi-racial teams abroad).
5. Non-White sportsmen from overseas could compete against South African Non-Whites in South Africa.
6. Non-White organisations seeking international recognition must do this through the already recognised White organisations in

their particular sport.

7. The Government would not issue passports for Non-White activities designed to change South Africa's traditional racial divisions by any process of eliminating White South Africans from international competition (Draper, 1963 : 6).

1957

The British Empire and Commonwealth Games Federation announced that Non-Whites from South Africa would not have the right to compete until they were affiliated to the international federations controlling their particular sport (Horrell, 1958 : 217).

The Transvaal Cricket Union announced that it might consider raising admission prices for Non-Whites to keep out an undesirable element. This followed a spate of booing and shouting at the first test match between South Africa and Australia; for which the Non-Whites were largely blamed (The Times, London, December 28, 1957).

1958

The White Football Association of South Africa (FASA) was recognised by the World Soccer Organisation (FIFA) as being the only true governing organisation in South African soccer (Horrell, 1958 : 217).

The South African Sports Association was formed. This association was the forerunner of two important protest movements: the South African Non Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) (de Broglio, 1971 : 3-4).

1959

The Minister of the Interior, Naude, announced that a West Indian Cricket team would visit South Africa and that the team would play against Non-Whites. The tour had been arranged by the Non-White Cricket Board of Control (The Times, London, March 11, 1959).

The tour by the West Indian Cricket team was cancelled after

pressure was exerted by the newly formed South African Sports Association (Lapchick, 1973 : 79).

The Brazilian soccer tour to South Africa was cancelled (Lapchick, 1973 : 79).

The Indian boxer Pancho Bathacay was refused a visa to enter South Africa to fight the Non-White champion Sexton Mebena (The Times, London, February 24, 1959).

The passports of a Non-White non-racial table tennis team were withdrawn (Thompson, 1964 : 22).

Reg Honey, president of the South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association, said that Non-European sportsmen who warranted selection would be given every opportunity of competing. However, he added, that he did not know of any Non-European at the time who would qualify on merit (Star, February 24, 1959).

1960

In January 1960 new boxing regulations were gazetted. These prohibited inter alia boxing contracts or tournaments between Whites and Non-Whites (Horrell, 1960 : 265) (cf. Chapter Nine).

The South African Sports Association lodged the following charges with the International Olympic Committee:

There was no sport in which there was an open, non-racial trial; there was not a single body affiliated to the South African Olympic Committee that admitted all South Africans as members without racial discrimination, and all offers of affiliation made to Non-Whites were made on the condition that the Non-Whites accept apartheid in the administration of sport in South Africa (Horrell, 1960 : 263).

The new Minister of Interior for South Africa, Mr. Naude, clarified government attitude towards sport (Lapchick, 1973 : 87):

The Government does not favour inter-racial team competitions within the borders of the Union and will discourage such competitions taking place as being contrary to the traditional policy of the Union - as accepted by all races in the Union.

He also added that the policy of separate development was in accordance with the traditional South African custom that Whites and Non-Whites should organise their sporting activities separately. The inclusion of different races in the same team would therefore be contrary to established and accepted custom (Lapchick, 1973 : 87).

The New Zealand Rugby team, the All Blacks, arrived in South Africa without their indigenous players. The Maori's were excluded in order to comply with South African Government policy (Horrell, 1960 : 264).

The White South African cricket team visited England (Horrell, 1960 : 264).

The White South African Soccer Organisation (FASA) was directed by the World Soccer Organisation (FIFA) to integrate or face suspension (Horrell, 1960 : 264).

1961

Britain abandoned her traditional 'hands off' policy and gave support to a United Nations Council Assembly resolution calling for separate and collective action to bring about the end of racial segregation in South Africa (Cape Times, April 6, 1961).

The Pakistan Cricket Board announced that it would oppose South Africa's admission to the Imperial Cricket Conference unless South Africa dropped her exclusiveness and engaged in international contests with other conference countries irrespective of colour (Cape Times, July 18, 1961).

The Imperial Cricket Conference deferred consideration of South Africa's membership for a year (Star, July 20, 1961).

The White South African Soccer Organisation (FASA) was suspended from the World Organisation (Horrell, 1961 : 431).

The South African Non-European Boxing Association was affiliated with the White South African Amateur Boxing Association after pressure from the International body.

The following were listed as conditions of affiliation:

A liaison committee was established, with three White and three Non-White members with the Chairman of the White body as overall head. It was agreed that:

1. The policy to be followed should be one of parallel development of amateur boxing.
2. There would be no mixed boxing tournaments in South Africa because of Government policy.
3. Mixed teams might be selected to tour overseas.
4. Selection would be based on separate trials. If necessary final mixed private trials might be held.
5. Whites would help to organise Non-White tournaments and tours and to train officials (Horrell, 1961 : 278-279).

The International Rugby Board refused to interfere with the South African Rugby Board: "there would be no politics in Rugby" stated the I.R.B. (The Times, London, April 8, 1961).

The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Naude, stated that government policy had not changed since 1956 and that he would continue to withhold passports to ensure this policy remained intact (Horrell, 1961 : 273).

The New Zealand cricket team toured South Africa (Draper, 1963 : 22).

1962

The Japanese swimming team who were touring South Africa were denied the use of the Pretoria municipal pool because they had not been declared White by the South African Government (Horrell, 1962 : 223). The Pretoria City Council Management Committee later lifted the ban.

The Government charged two Whites, two Indians and five Coloureds with contravening the Group Areas Act by participating in a football match in October 1961. The nine were acquitted (Horrell, 1962 : 219). (cf. Chapter Nine).

The president of the Bantu Football Association, B.P. Morola, became the first Non-White South African to attend an international sports conference when he attended a meeting of the World Soccer Association (FIFA). He was to assist the South African Association (FASA) by having its suspension lifted, but the move failed (Horrell, 1962 : 218-219).

The Minister of Community Development, P. Botha, stated that applications from Indians and Coloureds would be considered if they wanted to use White golf courses (Star, April 17, 1962).

On April 16th, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. De Wet Nel said:

I am against mixed sport meetings in principle There is sufficient evidence to prove that such a policy would lead to the most distasteful racial tensions. It is senseless injudiciousness to encourage such a thing (Star, April 17, 1962).

The Minister of Community Development then reversed his stand on the use of White golf courses by Coloureds and Indians.

The Government announced that it could not approve of mixed sports teams going to world events; that mixed teams from other nations were not welcome in South Africa; and that separate White and Non-White teams from South Africa could compete abroad in international competitions. Reference was also made to multi-racial sports events which had circumvented both law and government policy in neighbouring Basutoland. Minister De Klerk said:

It must be understood that all attempts to evade or undermine the South African custom in neighbouring territories by inviting or inducing White and Non-White teams to play one another across the border (or by inviting mixed teams from South Africa in what are non international competitions, but only competitions organised specifically to do there, with South African sportsmen as participants, what is not permissible in South Africa itself, will be

viewed in an unfavourable light.

As regards the administration and control of sports activities it would be in accord with the Government's policy if Non-White associations were to exist and develop alongside the corresponding white associations. The latter associations could then act as co-ordinating bodies between the association at top level and serve as representatives in the corresponding white bodies. (Star, March 31, 1962; Draper, 1963 : 7)

General H.B. Klopper, president of the South African Olympic and National Games Association reacted with "Now we have no case to argue with the International Olympic Committee" (Star, March 31, 1962).

The South African Amateur Athletics Union announced that an all-White athletic team would be sent to Lourenco Marques even though two Non-White athletes beat times of the White reserves in a special trial at Welkom (Star, April 30, 1962).

The International Olympic Committee gave South Africa until October of 1963 to eliminate racism in sports (Lapchick, 1973 : 108).

The United States Amateur Athletic Union banned an American Universities' swimming team preventing it from visiting South Africa. The racial selection of the South African team and White spectators only were given as reasons for the banning (Horrell, 1962 : 222-223).

The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee was formed. In sport it was to become the foremost anti-apartheid movement. Its stated objective in 1962 was to apply for membership of the International Olympic Committee as the only truly representative Olympic Organisation in South Africa (de Broglie, 1971 : 4).

1963

Papwa Sewgolum won the Natal Open Golf Championship. As a Non-White he was prevented from receiving his award in the clubhouse by the Group Areas Act. The ceremony was conducted outside

where it rained (Horrell, 1963 : 298). The South African Broadcasting Corporation refused to broadcast results of the tournament (Draper, 1963 : 38).

The Minister of Community Development, P. Botha, said that Sewgolum had not had a permit to participate in the Open and the necessary action was being contemplated (Draper, 1963 : 38).

The leader of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, Dennis Brutus, was arrested. Brutus was shot while trying to escape (de Broglio, 1971 : 7-8).

The White South African Olympic Committee was given a directive by the International Olympic Committee: A firm declaration of the acceptance of the Olympic code had to be made particularly with regards to Principle 1 and Rule 24 read together. A change in policy had to be extracted from the South African Government by December 31st 1963 regarding racial discrimination in sports, competition within South Africa. Failing to comply with the directive, it was stated, South Africa would be debarred from entering the future Olympic Games (Lapchick, 1973 : 117).

This was followed by Minister De Klerk's statement:

South African custom is that within the boundaries of the Republic, Whites and Non-Whites exercise their sports separately and this custom must be adhered to, that is; that within our boundaries Whites and Non-Whites must not compete with each other, either in individual items or in teams or as members of teams.

Participation of mixed teams as representatives of South Africa as a whole in world sporting tournaments cannot be approved. Where, for example, Whites take part in such tournaments individually, they must do so as the representatives of the Whites of our country and in the same way, Non-Whites will represent Non-White South Africans South Africans could compete outside South Africa with men of other races who were not South Africans. (The Times, London, February 5, 1963)

Whites and Non-Whites were chosen for an amateur boxing tour of North America following separate trials. (Five Whites and three Non-Whites.) The party left on separate aircraft, and

They were not allowed to be photographed together. They competed in the United States amateur boxing championships as individuals, and none were awarded Springbok colours (Horrell, 1963 : 295-296).

Ten African (Black) athletes toured Britain for six weeks (Horrell, 1963 : 296).

It was announced that Springbok colours belonged exclusively to the White population. This developed into a controversy in 1976/77 when a decision was finally made to award Springbok colours on merit irrespective of race.

The White South African Cycling Federation announced that it would send qualified Non-Whites overseas and, possibly to the Olympic Games (Horrell, 1963 : 293).

Precious McKenzie, a Non-White world class weightlifter, refused to affiliate to the White organisation when offered a place in the South African team to compete in the World Championships in Stockholm (Horrell, 1963 : 299).

The Bloemfontein City Council banned Non-White spectators from a game against an Australian rugby team (Horrell, 1963 : 290).

A South African all-White cricket team toured Australia (Horrell 1963 : 288).

A South African team competed in the 1963 Commonwealth Golf championship in Australia. The team comprised of White members only (Horrell, 1963 : 296).

The International Football Association (FIFA) lifted its suspension of South Africa. This was the result of a visit by the executive of FIFA following which it was decided that the South African Soccer Association (FASA) did not practice discrimination (Star, January 24, 1963).

FASA announced that a mixed team would not be sent to the World Cup in 1966 in keeping with Government policy (Horrell, 1963 : 291-292).

1964

Zambia became the first nation to break sports relations with South Africa (Lapchick, 1973 : 131).

The International Olympic Committee withdrew South Africa's invitation to compete at the Tokyo Olympics (Lapchick, 1973 : 133).

John Harris, a leader in the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, was arrested and sentenced to death for bombing a Johannesburg railway station and killing three people (Lapchick, 1973 : 114).

The Davis Cup Nations, following anti-apartheid demonstrations at the South African-Norway match, passed two resolutions:

1. In no circumstances shall there be racial discrimination at international tournaments.
2. Teams or players whose entry has been accepted shall not withdraw except for reasons of health or bereavement, or unless with the permission of the organising committee.

Any transgressor was to be refused entry to future competitions unless a written guarantee was given that such acts would not occur again (Horrell, 1964 : 343).

South Africa was censured by the International Table Tennis Federation for continuing to practise discrimination in sport; especially the withholding of passports of Non-Whites.

The Bloemfontein City Council refused a request by the National Football League (White) to allow six Non-White players and officials to attend matches there to improve their playing standards (Horrell, 1964 : 341).

The International Soccer Organisation (FIFA) suspended the White South African Organisation (FASA) (Lapchick, 1973 : 143).

Demonstrations were encountered by the White South African cricket team touring Australia and New Zealand (Lapchick, 1973 : 144).

1965

The Government issued proclamation R26 of the Group Areas Act 1965. This necessitated the obtaining of permits if mixed spectators were to be present at any place of public entertainment (Horrell, 1965 : 303).

The Minister of Community Development announced that if a sports facility was in a predominantly White area it should in general be used by Whites only. However, if separate facilities (toilets, entrances and seating) did exist Non-Whites could attend provincial and international events if this did not disturb the Whites. Bantu could never attend events below provincial level, while Indians and Coloureds could, once again, as long as it did not disturb the Whites (Horrell, 1965 : 307).

Africans who went to the Rand Stadium to watch soccer were ejected by the police (Horrell, 1965 : 307).

The South African Rugby team toured New Zealand. There were no demonstrations (Lapchick, 1973 : 147).

South Africa's prime minister Verwoerd stated:

When we are the guests of another country we have to behave according to their tradition. We will play there in the exact way that it has been arranged by New Zealand. Like we subject ourselves to their customs, we expect that when other countries visit us, they will respect ours of no mixed teams.
(Horrell, 1965 : 311-312)

South Africa was excluded from the University World Games in Budapest because of her apartheid policy (Horrell, 1965 : 312).

1966

The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee was reborn in London (Lapchick, 1973 : 161-162).

Mr. le Roux, Minister of the Interior, stated that South Africa would never allow a mixed team to represent all of South Africa (Cape Times, April 28, 1966).

The South African Lawn Tennis Union (White) announced that Non-Whites would have to affiliate to their organisation to have any chance of international competition (Horrell, 1966 : 299).

Mr. F. Braun, head of the White South African Boxing Association, announced that there would be a Non-White tour of Italy, if the two Non-White groups reached agreement in regard to trials (Horrell, 1966 : 297).

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa was formed in December of 1966. Along with SAN-ROC it was to become the most vocal of South Africa's opponents. It stated:

It is the firm decision of the Supreme Council to use every means to obtain the expulsion of South African sports organisations from the Olympic movement and from International Federations should South Africa fail to comply with the IOC rules. (Lapchick, 1973 : 169)

1967

Dr. P.J. Meyer, chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, said that if integration was the price South Africa had to pay for participation in world sport, then the price was too high (Evening Post, April 10, 1967).

The Minister of Sport, Mr. F. Waring, announced that the government had made it clear on many occasions that it opposed mixed sport and that "if Non-Whites and Whites start competing against each other there will be such viciousness as has never been seen before" (Lapchick, 1973 : 175).

Minister Le Roux spoke on the possibility of a Marylebone cricket team (M.C.C) visiting South Africa.

Our policy is quite clear, he said, we will not allow mixed teams to play against our White teams. If this player (D'Oliveira, a self exiled South African Coloured) was chosen he would not be allowed to come here. That is our policy. It is well known here and overseas. (Sunday Express, January 22, 1967)

Mr. Vorster, South Africa's new prime minister, said that the national party had only one policy. Each group's sport had to

be practised and administered separately. He said South Africa should not open sports relations with the West Indies, Pakistan and India as South Africa did not have traditional sports relations with those countries (Horrell, 1967 : 321).

Mr. F. Braun, head of the South African Olympic Committee, then announced five new concessions at the International Olympic Committee meeting in Tehran.

1. The team would represent all South Africans.
2. The team would travel together.
3. The team would live together, wear the same uniform and march together as an integrated team under one flag.
4. Whites and Non-Whites could compete against each other at the games.
5. An equal number of Whites and Non-Whites, under Braun's chairmanship, would select the participants (Star, March 22, 1967).

Vorster then warned sportsmen not to make promises they could not fulfil. There was as a result general confusion as to whether the possible changes promised by Braun, could be implemented.

In April South Africa's prime minister Vorster made a detailed statement on sports policy:

I therefore want to make it quite clear that from South Africa's point of view no mixed sport between Whites and Non-Whites will be practised locally, irrespective of the standard of proficiency of the participants. we do not apply that as a criterion because our policy has nothing to do with proficiency or lack of proficiency. If any person, locally or abroad, adopts the attitude that he will enter into relations with us only if we are prepared to jettison the separate practising of sport prevailing among our own people in South Africa, then I want to make it quite clear that, no matter how important these sport relations are in my view, I am not prepared to pay that price. On that score, I want no misunderstanding whatsoever. in respect of this principle we are not prepared to compromise, we are not prepared to negotiate and we are not prepared to make any concessions.

In the second place, our attitude in respect of sport is that attendance of members of one group at such recreational events of the other group takes place by way of permit, if at all providing that separate facilities are available and as long as it does not result in situations which are conducive to friction and disturbance, and I want to add, provided that it will not hamper the development of their own facilities. (Hansard, April 11, 1967. Cols. 3960-3961)

Vorster's comment on various sporting events, including the Olympic Games, was:

I have no objection to the Canada Cup tournament being played here in South Africa. In fact, I have issued an invitation to that effect The same applies in respect of the Davis Cup competition if it were to happen that we had to play against a Coloured country in the finals, we would do so, whether in that country or in South Africa, because here one has to do with an inter-state relationship We must draw a very clear distinction between personal relations on the one hand and inter-state relations on the other.

To illustrate it even further it is not our policy that there should be social mingling of Whites and Non-Whites in South Africa, but because I was dealing with an inter-state relationship in that instance, I could receive the Prime Minister of Lesotho as I did, because it was not a personal relationship but an inter-state relationship. I received him as the Prime Minister of his country just as my forefathers received people of that rank many years ago I therefore say that this is my attitude in respect of the Olympic Games and in respect of the Canada Cup tournament and in respect of the Davis Cup competition. (Hansard, April 11, 1967. Cols. 3963-3964)

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa described South Africa's methods for selecting international sport teams as intolerable. They would tend to consolidate and consecrate apartheid (Evening Post, April 10, 1967).

The Financial Times, London, (April 12, 1967) commented that there was a danger, however, that Mr. Vorster might be thought to have made more concessions than actually was the case. A close study of the full report of the speech showed that, while the new policy was a major departure from the old one, it was a cautious evolution.

Mr. A. Brundage, president of the International Olympic Committee said his organisation was interested in compliance with the Olympic code which called for no discrimination at all (Evening Post, April 12, 1967).

Mr. A. Paton, renowned South African author, said it would be wrong of the M.C.C and the All Blacks, for instance, to consider that the immoral practice of apartheid had been relaxed merely because South Africa would allow Maori's and Basil D'Oliveira to play there Mr. Vorster had made it clear that South African Non-Whites would never be allowed to play against Whites on the sports fields of South Africa (Evening Post, April 15, 1967).

The Sunday Times, Auckland, (April 17, 1967), inquired whether the new policy extended to Maori's being allowed to visit South Africa as New Zealand rugby representatives.

The Minister of Sport, Mr. Waring, stated:

Our policy is separate sport and if the demand is made on us - a political demand - that we must change our pattern of sport and mix it, we are not prepared to pay the price.

We are quite prepared that our Non-Whites should take part in the Olympic Games. We will pick a white and a black team. (Argus, September 16, 1967)

An International Olympic Committee delegation consisting of: Lord Killanin, Reg Alexander and Sir Abraham Ademola visited South Africa to investigate sport (Lapchick, 1973 : 200-201).

Two groups of South African athletes toured Britain in July, one White, one Black. The teams had separate itineraries and the Black group was not allowed to wear the colours of South Africa. The athletes finally met at White City Stadium in London, against the special request of the South African Department of Sport not to do so (Horrell, 1967 : 323).

1968

The International Olympic Committee decided that South Africa could compete in the Mexico Olympics. Algeria and Ethiopia

withdrew in protest (Lapchick, 1973 : 224).

By March 1st, thirty seven nations had officially joined the boycott (Lapchick, 1973 : 229).

In May the International Olympic Committee at a special meeting decided to withdraw South Africa's invitation.

A decision was made to resurrect the South African Games, last held in 1964, as compensation for athletes not allowed to compete in the Olympic Games (Lapchick, 1973 : 240).

The Minister of Sport, Mr. Waring, announced that all sports bodies had to consult the Department of Sport and Recreation before inviting overseas' teams to South Africa (Horrell, 1968 : 295).

The Non-White Games which were to be held concurrently with the White South African Games were postponed until 1970 (Star, August 12, 1968).

South Africa was expelled from the International Amateur Boxing Association.

Basil D'Oliveira, a Coloured South African, was chosen at the last minute for an English (M.C.C) cricket team (Brickhill, 1976 : 13).

Prime Minister Vorster announced:

We are not prepared to accept a team thrust upon us by people whose interests are not the game, but to gain certain political objectives which they do not even attempt to hide.

The team as constituted now is not the team of the M.C.C but the team of the anti-Apartheid Movement, the team of SAN-ROC and the team of Bishop Reeves the matter has passed from the realm of sport to the realm of politics Leftist and liberal politicians have entered the field of sport and wanted to use it to suit their own purposes and pink ideals.
(Rand Daily Mail, September 17, 1968)

The M.C.C cricket tour was cancelled on September 25th (Horrell, 1968 : 300).

1969

West Germany agreed to send its strongest athletics team while the American Amateur Athletic Union refused to allow four athletes to participate in the White South African Games (Star, January 4, 1969).

France and Australia decided not to send their athletes (Star, January 9, 1969).

There was controversy over South Africa's use of the Olympic five rings symbol. The Minister of Sport, Mr. Waring, said:

South Africa is a member of the IOC and even though we did not participate in the Olympic Games at Mexico City, we have the right to use the five ring symbol in this connection.

As far as the SAN-ROC people are concerned, this is the type of propaganda they would like to use. They are not interested in sport only in destroying it. I am not really surprised at their action, as this is typical (Sunday Express, February 9, 1969)

The venue selected for the White Games was Bloemfontein. At first there were indications that no Non-Whites would be able to view the Games. Eventually the City Council agreed that Non-Whites would be admitted to those venues where temporary separate seating, separate toilets and separate refreshment facilities could be arranged (Horrell, 1969 : 248).

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa saw the following as the reasons for the existence of the White Games:

1. Compensation for being excluded from the Mexico Games.
2. To consolidate the spirit of White supremacy.
3. To display the solidarity between White Western sportsmen and South Africa's racialist sports policy (Lapchick, 1973 : 276).

The increasing pressure from the African Nations saw most nations withdraw, including West Germany. New Zealand and Britain still remained (Lapchick, 1973 : 276).

An inter-racial soccer match which was to be played in neigh-

touring Swaziland was cancelled because the Government announced that it would withdraw all passports of those involved (Horrell, 1969 : 250).

South Africa was suspended from the International Weightlifting Federation (Horrell, 1969 : 252).

Hungary refused to grant visas to South Africans for the World Modern Pentathlon Championships in Budapest (Horrell, 1969 : 252).

The Times, London, (March 31, 1969) carried the announcement that South Africa would waive its apartheid laws for two months to cater for the Iranian Davis Cup tennis team. The team would still be classified officially as Non-White but would be treated as any other overseas touring team.

Arthur Ashe, the American Black tennis player, announced that the South African Government had refused to give him a visa to compete in the 1969 South African championships (Horrell, 1969 : 250).

The Sunday Express (July 27, 1969) carried the announcement that there was a possibility of Non-Whites being on the South African Davis Cup team, if they were good enough.

The Government decided that if a White golf course was used for a Non-White championship, the Whites could not enter their own clubhouse for the duration of the tournament. Horrell (1969 : 254) commented that at the end of 1969 there was not a single Non-White course in South Africa which was of an adequate standard to cater for a Non-White championship.

Anti-apartheid demonstrators interrupted the Springbok rugby tour to Britain to the extent that Dr. Craven, president of the South African Rugby Board, suggested that the tour might be called off (Lapchick, 1973 : 306-317).

Discussion

Political involvement in sport in South Africa stems from the days of colonisation. The degree of political involvement has varied. Evidence seems to indicate that inter-racial sport did occur in South Africa in the early nineteenth hundreds; Non-Whites at first being utilized to 'make up numbers'. Identity and status amongst the various Non-White groups developed to the point where (in the 1920's and 1930's) several cities had inter-racial boards in soccer and cricket (Thompson, 1964 : 16).

The development of nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s brought with it discriminatory legislation. The election to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party saw racial discrimination given formality. Legislation was enacted to propagate an ideology of segregation of the races. Sport, as had been its destiny since earlier times, followed party policy. Sport would be separate; White and Non-White, no mixing would be allowed within the borders of South Africa and there would be no mixed teams sent abroad. Teams of international status coming to South Africa had to be White if they were to play against White teams; Non-White teams could come to play against Non-Whites but Non-White organisations must affiliate to the White associations for international recognition (Horrell, 1956 : 227).

As the concept of apartheid evolved it became evident that the Nationalist government considered sport to be an integral part of the apartheid development: the idea of separation of the various racial groups was to be strictly enforced in the sports world. The ideology purported that separate did not necessarily mean unequal. However, it was a premise that did not find total acceptance inside or outside of South Africa. Opposition and revocation of separatism in South African sport first emanated from largely Non-White non-racial sports organisations. In 1956 international recognition was accorded to the non-racial cause when the International Table Tennis Federation recognised the Non-White South African Table Tennis Board as being representative of South African table tennis. The Federation withdrew its support of the White organisation (Horrell, 1956 : 226-227). This precipitated the official

White sports policy previously outlined, and caused a definite bifurcation in South African sport. On the one side there was the Nationalist government which was immutably committed to separate sport, while on the other side there were the non-racial sports groups which amassed behind the idea of sporting integration and equality.

The non-racial sports cause was slow to develop in South Africa primarily because it was contrary to government policy and it was therefore restricted in its development by prosecutions, bannings and the withdrawal of passports from its leaders. The establishment of the anti-apartheid organisation, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), in London in 1965 revived the cause and gave it an international base from which information could be disseminated. Awareness of the plight of the non-racial sportsman in South Africa which SAN-ROC was able to create, initiated and nurtured anti-South African sports feeling which was to increasingly dominate the next decade. SAN-ROC having created this awareness worked in conjunction with sports participants and administrators and with governmental departments to effect an isolation of South African sport.

In the 1950s and 1960s the African and Third World countries had not yet become a world force in sport: there still remained a considerable degree of sympathy towards White South African sports from the international sports associations. However, the South African Government did little to assist the White sportsmen by presenting a intransigent facade when requested to ameliorate their sports policy. As a result international bodies began gradually, under increasing anti-South African pressure, to withdraw their sanction of White South African sport.

South Africa's sports isolation at the beginning of 1970 had not reached crisis proportions, although she was obviously aggrieved by her exclusion from the 1964 Olympic Games and the withdrawal of her invitation to compete in the 1968 Mexico Olympics. At the beginning of 1970 it did appear that the non-racialists and

The anti-apartheid groups had failed to bring about change in South African sport. But South Africa, by committing herself inexorably to a separatist sports policy, had also left herself with the prospect of a decreasing world of international sporting contact.

The period 1970 to 1979, which is the second section of this dissertation, is examined more specifically. The motivation remains unchanged although the perspective is more South African orientated in so far as research is concerned.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE MULTI-NATIONAL SPORTS CONCEPT

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NEW CONCEPT

MULTI-NATIONALISM

CONSOLIDATION OF MULTI-NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL REACTION
AND INTERNAL PRESSURE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GAMES, 1973

FURTHER MULTI-NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1973 and 1974

INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION GROWS

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NEW CONCEPT

With the election to power in 1948 of a Nationalist government, the majority of White South Africans sanctioned the formal introduction of apartheid as the basis of their political infrastructure. It was not unnatural that an ideological approach such as this would also be manifest in sport (Parkin, 1972 : 82; Loy, 1978 : 82). The intensity with which sport is pursued in South Africa approaches that in the United States of America, where Edwards (1973 : 90) had described its status as that of "a secular quasi-religious institution". As a major element in South African White society, it is unavoidable, from the point of view of ideological consolidation, that sport reflects the ideological elements of the larger and more powerful institution.

Amongst other things, a characteristic of sport after the 1948 election, was its reflection of the apartheid ideology of the South African Government. This state of affairs, where Black sportsmen were left to their own developmental devices, existed unchallenged until the middle of the 1950s, when Black sportsmen in South Africa organised themselves into non-racial organisations in an attempt to obtain right of entry into international competition (de Broglio, 1971 : 3). As noted in Chapter

Five, world recognition of the plight of South Africa's Black sportsmen was slow in developing. South Africa consequently found continued acceptance of her all-White sports teams internationally, and the apartheid approach to sport went virtually unchallenged. The beginning of the 1960's saw increasing world awareness of the divided nature of South African sport, when the United Nations passed a resolution calling for separate and collective action to bring about the end of racial segregation in South Africa (Cape Times, April 6, 1961). In 1962 the International Olympic Committee, after representation was made by the non-racial South African Sports Association, stated that South Africa had until October of the same year to eliminate racism in sport (Lapchick, 1973 : 108). In the face of developing antagonism to her apartheid approach to sport South Africa remained resolute: an adjustment in approach to racially segregated sport, it appeared, would weaken the ideological foundation which had been constructed around apartheid. As a result of this intransigence the International Olympic Committee withdrew South Africa's invitation to compete at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, and the International Soccer Organisation (FIFA) in the same year, 1964, suspended South Africa's White affiliated organisation (Lapchick, 1973 : 133, 143).

Under threat of decreasing international sports competition, there were signs that South Africa was trying to maintain this contact without compromising her approach. The suggestion by South Africa that she would in the case of the 1968 Olympic Games send a mixed (Black and White) team nearly secured this form of international competition for South Africa ; a form of which she had been deprived since 1964. However, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), which had operated out of London since its self-imposed exile in 1965, frustrated this South African attempt by direct intervention (Lapchick, 1973 : 193).

From this point international criticism and condemnation began to increase steadily, as did South Africa's sporting isolation at the official level in international sport. It was the threat to the traditional rivalry in White South Africa's number one sport, rugby, that first brought indications that some amelioration of

approach was likely. South Africa had until 1967 sent all-White rugby teams to New Zealand, and in turn had hosted all-White New Zealand rugby teams for tours of South Africa. Craven (1978) says this arrangement was official, and that the New Zealand Rugby Union was a party to it. The problem that resulted was how to maintain contact with New Zealand (who had in 1967 reneged on this agreement and demanded that a multi-racial New Zealand team visit South Africa) without compromising the principles of segregated sport ; or without appearing to do so.

The basis of the argument, which was to allow New Zealand to bring a multi-racial team to South Africa to play against South African White teams in 1970, centred around several items. Firstly, the New Zealand team was a representative team, and therefore could be considered under the inter-state taxonomy which allowed Non-Whites to receive temporary White status for the duration of their visit (Hansard, April 11, 1967. Cols. 3959-3964). This was equated with the example of the South African Prime Minister receiving a Black Prime Minister from another country: it was necessary in order that relations be maintained. Secondly, the theory was propagated that allowing Non-Whites (Maoris) to play against Whites in South Africa was not unprecedented. Craven (1978) claims that this theory was an attempt to assuage conservative opinion and convince those of the conviction that there should be an absolute approach to segregated sport, that the 1970 New Zealand rugby tour was not a deviation from Verwoerdian ideology. Craven maintains that the theory cannot be justified in terms of the agreement which the South African Rugby Board had with the New Zealand Rugby Union. Any Maoris, he says, that came to South Africa with New Zealand teams before 1970, were White enough to be regarded as Europeans and had nominated to be known as such. Therefore all New Zealand teams previous to 1970 had been in official construction, all-White.

From this obfuscation the important point arises that what was to be seen as not being a deviation in sports policy, was, in terms of that which had gone before, if not a deviation, then a minor adjustment. In light of the intransigence that had preceded it, it was significant in that it suggested a realisation that apartheid sport could isolate South African rugby internationally, and

that there was some possibility of a more flexible approach which hitherto had not been achieved.

The acceptance of the Maoris on the 1970 tour to South Africa did not introduce multi-national sport to South Africa. It was at best a temporary deviation or expediency. After acknowledgement that a multi-racial rugby side could visit South Africa from New Zealand, there was a period at the beginning of 1970 which further contributed to the idea that, although South Africa's strict segregationist approach could not remain intact in world sport, it would not be relinquished easily.

At the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970 the South African White Springbok rugby team toured Great Britain. The protests and demonstrations which accompanied the rugby team were of an unprecedented intensity (Lapchick, 1973 : 302-314). There was, however, no announcement from South Africa which suggested concern or expressed the idea that South Africa's sport policy would be reviewed.

Any thought of an amelioration was eliminated in April when Arthur Ashe, the Black American tennis player, applied to play in the South African Open tennis championships and had his visa refused (Cape Times, January 28, 1970). Because of Ashe's international standing the issue had far-reaching repercussions. The United States State Department commented that the decision would damage United States/South African relations (Star, January 29, 1970). Although South Africa maintained that Ashe had not been excluded because he was a Black tennis player, this conclusion, because of South Africa's racial sports policy, could not be escaped. South Africa maintained that Ashe was a political activist and that he had applied to play tennis in South Africa purely as an attempt "to put a crack in the racist wall in South Africa" (Hansard, September 1, 1970. Cols. 3075-3076). The South African Government judged, therefore, that Ashe wanted to play politics rather than tennis:

Mr. Ashe's present desire to compete in South Africa cannot be reconciled with his active support of the move to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Games in 1968. It therefore follows that Mr. Ashe's application for a visa to compete in the South African

tennis championships cannot be acceded to. (Hansard, August 31, 1970. Col. 3007)

To support this contention further, the Minister of Sport and Recreation recalled the testimony of a Mrs. Court, a wellknown woman tennis player from the United States. Mrs. Court is alleged to have:

.... noticed a profound personality change in Ashe in the last year. Where he had been frank, open, friendly and talkative, Mrs. Court said Ashe had now become reserved, withdrawn and uncommunicative. Having known him for a long time she taxed him with this saddening change.

This is what he said to her:

I was called on by some guys from Blackpower Power. They said they wanted me to lead an anti-South African crusade among tennis players. I answered that I had no opinion about South Africa. I knew and had played with South Africans and liked them. I did not want involvement in politics. These guys insisted that I had to be with them in their Blackpower movement. They had recruits from other sports. They must have one from tennis. When I said no again they stood over me. If I did not see things their way, I would have many regrets, they said. One of these days maybe I would find I could not play tennis because my right arm had been broken. There was no escape. I had to submit. Do you wonder why I have changed? (Hansard, August 31, 1970. Cols. 3006-3007)

Ashe suggested that his association with radical political elements was pure hyperbole, stating that his primary objective had been to play tennis at Ellis Park in Johannesburg. A secondary objective, he said, was to initiate positive movement in both the athletic and racial state of affairs, so that in two or three years other Non-White tennis players would have been able to follow his example. He added that he had even signed a notarised statement to the effect that he would not make any political statements to the press (Objective Justice Quarterly, 1970 : 5).

The incident served to focus world attention again on South Africa's sports policy contributing further to world awareness of the inequities that were extant in South African sport. It is possible that South Africa's primary objection to Ashe's visit was because of his political inclination, but such a conclusion loses

a certain degree of credibility when it is considered that Ashe would have been acceptable had he been part of the American Davis Cup team; which implied that such status politically deactivated Ashe. Also the Blackpower movement with which Ashe allegedly associated, was firmly against Ashe's visiting South Africa:

they had no faith in his building bridges or developing an inroads philosophy (Lapchick, 1973 : 350).

The controversy surrounding Ashe's visa rejection almost certainly influenced the March decision to exclude South Africa from the Davis Cup tennis tournament (Horrell, 1970 : 279). Opposition to South African sport generally also continued to escalate: the Jamaican Government refused visas to South African women who were to take part in a world netball tournament in Jamaica; five Western European states turned down a suggestion that South African athletes should tour their countries as they feared international repercussions; a South African schoolboys cricket tour to Australia was postponed because of concern over the boys' safety, and the International Amateur Cycling Federation announced that it was not satisfied with the constitution of the South African Cycling Federation as it did not represent fairly all population groups (Rand Daily Mail, February 28, 1970; Star, March 11, 1970; Horrell, 1970 : 280).

At this stage South Africa still enjoyed relative sports freedom in her two major sports. The Australian cricket team had arrived in South Africa in January 1970 to begin a tour which included four internationals (South African Digest, January 30, 1970), and the New Zealand rugby team was due to arrive in the middle of the year. The position of South Africa's international sport, however, was obviously deteriorating, although Mr. Marais Viljoen, Minister of Coloured Affairs, thought it would only be temporary. He cited three reasons. Firstly, South Africa's Non-White sports policy was based on moral grounds, as the Whites supplied the conveniences for the Non-Whites to practice their own sport. Mr. Viljoen tendered that there may come a time when world opinion would recognise this. Secondly, South Africa was one of the best sporting countries in the world. Sportsmen the world over wanted to compete against South Africa. Therefore South

Africa's isolation from international sport would only be temporary. Thirdly, Viljoen felt that South Africa would not sit back and do nothing about the matter. South Africa would encourage sports teams and individuals to come to South Africa (Die Burger, April 13, 1970). The prime minister, Mr. Vorster, viewed the attempted sports isolation as of less significance. The following day he was reported as stating:

The fact is that during the last couple of years we have had more international sporting teams touring South Africa and more South African teams left our shores than in the whole decade preceding these years. I say to you, nobody has done more than I have to keep the traditional sporting ties of South Africa. I went out of my way and I will go out of my way in the future. But, there is one thing you mustn't expect of me and that is to knuckle down to communist countries anywhere. (Cape Times, April 4, 1970)

A few weeks later Vorster did recognise that there was growing pressure from the outside world on South Africa to change her sports policy, but he gave no indication that South Africa was prepared to deviate from the status quo (Argus, May 2, 1970). South Africa's intractability over her sports policy brought her the distinction later in May of being the first country to be expelled by the International Olympic Committee. The vote was 35 to 28 against South Africa, with three abstaining (Cape Times, May 15, 17, 1970). This was followed shortly afterwards by an announcement from the British Home Secretary, Callaghan, that the Springbok cricket tour scheduled for June 1970 would not take place (Horrell, 1970 : 278).

The Nationalist-orientated newspaper Die Burger (May 25, 1970) reacted with an editorial titled 'Blackmail'. Die Burger observed that much could be said about the decision to cancel the visit of the South African cricket team to Britain and the circumstances in which the decision was taken.

It was further stated that even if the individual members of the British Government and the Government itself as a whole had been in favour of cancellation for entirely different reasons, the fact remained that conditions had been created as a result of which the decision had been taken under pressure from, on the one hand, people who blackmailed Britain with violence, and on the

other hand, countries which threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games in spite of the fact that the Games had nothing whatsoever to do with cricket.

Further, Die Burger speculated that even those in Britain who, for whatever reason, had welcomed the cancellation of the tour, had, if they still had any sense of responsibility, to be apprehensive about what this capitulation of the authorities of their country could entail. It implied an open invitation to anyone who felt encumbered by any aspect of British policy, to choose the shortcut of blackmail, street protests and riots. This could become a shortcut to anarchy (Die Burger, May 25, 1970).

In this editorial Die Burger reflected what appeared to be nationalist policy: that capitulation on the issue of sports segregation could lead to greater demands for integration. The Minister of Sport and Recreation confirmed this view shortly afterwards when he stated: "the Government will not be intimidated by demands for integrated sport, mixed trials will not be permitted, nor will South African White and non-White teams be allowed to compete against one another, whether inside the country or in neighbouring territories" (Rand Daily Mail, May 30, 1970).

Sportsmen tried to circumvent this new approach twice towards the end of 1970. Several top South African cricketers travelled to Rhodesia where they played against two West Indian cricketers. Waring, the Minister of Sport and Recreation in South Africa, subsequently stated that the government's sport policy would not allow itself to be circumvented by geographical snakes and ladders (Hansard, August 31, 1970. Col. 3015). In November, the Minister of the Interior advised the South African Table Tennis Board (the non-racial association and the first to be internationally recognised in place of the White association) that the granting of passports would be considered only if applications were made through the White body. But the Non-White applicants would then have to go to the world championships as representatives of Non-White players, and not as a national team, and their application would have to be approved by the White Union. These conditions were not accepted by the SATTB

or the International Table Tennis Federation (Horrell, 1970 : 281).

At the beginning of 1971 there were indications amongst White South African sportsmen that they were not all satisfied with South Africa's racial sports approach. Although these indications were not significant in the sense of being large scale protests against the government's treatment of the Non-White athlete, they were significant in that some form of protest had been initiated in White South African sport. Up to this point, protest and demand for change in South Africa's sports policy had emanated largely from agencies outside South Africa's borders. This made it very easy for the government to dismiss this pressure as being inspired by the ulterior motivations of some hegemonic force. The beginnings of protest amongst White sportsmen made it increasingly difficult to dismiss criticism out of hand.

The biggest protest in this period that preceded the multinational sports announcement occurred at Newlands cricket ground in Cape Town, where there was a mass walk-off of cricketers on 3 April 1971. As Odendaal (1977 : 26) observed, it was the first move of any real significance by White players in South Africa on the subject of mixed cricket. The walk-off was an expression of support for the White South African Cricket Association, which had requested that the South African Government allow Non-Whites on a South African cricket team to tour Australia later in the year. The occasion chosen was especially poignant, as the game, says Odendaal, was virtually a final Springbok trial, between the champion provincial side, Transvaal, and a Rest of South Africa side.

After the walk-off the cricketers handed a prepared statement to the press, which as reported by the Cape Times (April 5, 1971), read: "We cricketers feel that the time has come for an expression of our views. We fully support the South African Cricket Association's application to include Non-Whites on the tour to Australia, if good enough, and furthermore subscribe to merit being the only criterion on the cricket field". In an editorial in the same edition, the Cape Times remarked that sportsmen were ill at ease with the government's attitudes, and that the

government had made politics so central to the whole sports issue that sportsmen and administrators alike could hardly keep out of political policy. The Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger (April 6, 1971) said what was crystalising was that countries were really going to require national sports teams that were open to the entire population. Die Burger perorated that this did not imply full integration down to club level, but it certainly did imply mixed trials, which meant a drastic change in established customs, customs which were deeply rooted in South Africa long before the word apartheid originated.

The significance of Die Burger's attitude derives from its non-critical stance. It is regarded as a reflector of National Party ideology, and while it questioned the cricketer's move, it did not overtly condemn the protest as an affront to Nationalist ideology. The implication was that if a newspaper such as Die Burger was taking a softer line in regard to the question of integration in South African sport, then this implication could be the result of political insight, indicating that a softer line may be in the offing at state level.

Further indications of possible change, had been the granting of permission earlier in the year to the aboriginal tennis player, Evonne Goolagong to compete in the South African Open tennis championships (Horrell, 1971 : 325). This particular departure from the norm should also be considered in perspective. The Arthur Ashe affair the year previously had contributed unfavourably to South Africa's racial sporting image. This was an opportunity to display worldwide that the primary objection to Ashe had been because of his political motivation. Goolagong was acceptable because theoretically she was not politically motivated.

In March 1971 the all-White South African National Olympic Games Association met to discuss the possibility of a National Non-White organisation (Rand Daily Mail, March 1, 1971). Although this conformed to the apartheid principle of separate development, the significance of the occasion derives once again from the fact that White sportsmen were beginning to doubt the

continuing viability of strictly segregated sport.

MULTI-NATIONALISM

It was under these circumstances of increasing sports isolation, growing opposition at the international and domestic levels, that Prime Minister Vorster introduced the concept of multi-national sport to South Africans and to the world. Horrell (1971 : 314-316) supplies the following outline of Mr. Vorster's April 22nd sports announcement:

- (a) The policy is based on the conception of South Africa as a "multi-national" ("veelvolkige") rather than a multi-racial country. Hence South Africa's Whites and non-Whites will only be able to compete against one another within the country in certain "open international" events. Mixed or multi-racial sport on club, provincial or national level will not be allowed, nor will South Africa be represented internationally by mixed teams except in special cases.
- (b) A distinction is made between international and open international events, although exactly how many countries would have to participate to make an event an open international is not clear. Presumably, however, it would have to be a significant number. A cricket tour is an international event, while the Olympics, the Davis Cup competition, the world cycling championships, and so forth, are open internationals. Open internationals held in South Africa will be open to non-Whites as well as to Whites, but they will be competing as individuals and not as members of South African teams. Furthermore, with possible rare exceptions, only the premier open international event of the year in each individual sport will be open to South African non-Whites. Ordinary international events - as distinguished from open internationals - will continue to be un-racial. The implications of this aspect of the policy are that Papwa Sewgolum, for example, may compete in an open international golf meeting in South Africa, and Arthur Ashe will be allowed to play in an open international at Ellis Park as a member of the American Davis Cup team. Every seeded player, irrespective of race or colour, may participate in such a tournament, including South Africans. It appears that open internationals will be permitted in all Olympic sports - athletics, swimming, boxing, wrestling, karate, judo, etc.

(c) Multi-racial teams from countries with which South Africa has traditional sporting relations can tour South Africa, but only to play against separate White and non-White teams at segregated venues. No permits will be given to Whites to watch overseas teams play South African non-Whites. Under this aspect of the policy, the British rugby team touring South Africa in 1972 is to play against Coloured and Black teams. The same principle applies to cricket. A mixed athletics touring team may also compete separately against Africans, Indians, Whites and Coloured people; however, if the meeting is an open international all the races will be allowed to compete together. The same principle applies to Davis Cup tennis and to golf, but not otherwise. In terms of this policy, Basil D'Oliviera will be admitted to South Africa as a member of the British cricket team - provided he is not politically motivated.

(d) South Africa will not send multi-racial teams overseas, except in four specified instances; the Olympic Games, the Canada Cup golf competition, the Federation Cup and the Davis Cup tennis competitions. These exceptions are only made because the rules of admission to these contests require it. There will be no mixed trials to select overseas teams, but an open international tournament held in South Africa with participation of both White and non-White South Africans will serve the purpose. Teams for the four specified events will be regarded as South Africans, and not as Springboks, the Springbok blazer being reserved exclusively for Whites. Legislation to control the award of Springbok colours is being prepared.

(e) South Africa's non-White sports bodies will be encouraged to establish their own international sports relations.

(f) The establishment of a national sports council to co-ordinate the activities of all sports in the country is to be considered.

Multi-nationalism as a concept was based on Nationalist belief that each nation must be free to develop its own identity. Multi-national sport was the accommodation of this ideology within a sports framework. Essentially it connoted sport between nations, although as the nations were not defined by internationally recognisable boundaries, it was more correctly sport between distinct racial groups. Multi-nationalism did very little for the Black athlete in South Africa besides presenting him with a few occasions, ('open internationals'), per year, when he could pit his talents against those of the Whites and where

he could make use of their superior facilities. For this reason it cannot have been expected that this development would noticeably assist South Africa in her international sporting relationships. However, it was stated on numerous occasions previous to this announcement that while sport was important, primary consideration would be given to the national interest. Multi-nationalism therefore resulted from a desire to thwart the total demise of sport internationally, as South Africa had known it, without making any ideological concessions to the Non-Whites. Central and essential to the theme was that the identity of the White South African must not be alchemised. Around this tenet it was proposed to invoke certain dispensations. Multi-nationalism would allow touring rugby teams to play against the Coloured population group. Spectators at any such event would be limited to Coloureds, the only Whites allowed to attend were those who had a utilitarian role in the event. The extension of this idea was that any White supporters of a touring team could not watch 'their' team play against a Black team.

Considered in toto, there was little difference between multi-nationalism and "inter-stateism" which had been adopted in 1967. There had been no change in subjacent principles: the parameters of segregation had been expanded slightly. It was, within the frame of reference of sport being subservient to the national interest, a compromise. It did not antagonise the majority of conservative supporters (cf. Chapter Thirteen), nor did it have the effect of placating those opposed to South Africa's international sports participation on the grounds of her racial policy. As a result, the reaction of the critical English press was predictable: 'tortuous', 'as clear as mud', 'an unbelievable muddle' were the headlines that the Rand Daily Mail (April 23, 1971), the Natal Witness (April 24, 1971) and the Natal Mercury (April 24, 1971) respectively accorded the announcement. However, Die Burger (April 23, 1971), in its editorial, felt that Mr. Vorster had done everything possible within the South African way of life to assure South Africa's sports people international competition. Die Burger felt that it would not satisfy the activists, who were attempting to destroy not only South African sport but the entire social and political pattern, but that

overseas criticism would be undermined by the sports meetings which would be allowed under multi-nationalism.

To the outside world, the concept of multi-nationalism was confusing and difficult to interpret. The Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, through its president, Abraham Ordia, recognised it for the compromise that it was and dismissed it as "an utter sham". Mr. Bert Saelfors, vice-president of the International Swimming Federation, saw it as a half-measure which was hardly likely to do South Africa any good internationally (Cape Times, April 23, 1971).

As mentioned, the primary concern of multi-nationalism was not to appease world opinion. This was further underscored by Vorster when he commented on the introduction of the policy in parliament.

I am not insensitive to the attitude of the outside world. I am perfectly prepared to take it into consideration. However, I am not prepared to lay down a policy which would satisfy the Anti-Apartheid Movement. I cannot and do not want to lay down a policy which would satisfy the Sports Council of Africa. I am not prepared to lay down a policy which would satisfy the Communists.... In cases where we have been kicked out, it has not, except in isolated instances, been the Western countries which took the initiative or which were in favour of it, it has been blatant blackmail by the communists. I could mention so many examples of this. (Hansard, April 23, 1971. Cols. 5062-5063)

Vorster obviously wished to make it clear that these concessions had not been wrought because of certain pressure groups. However, the suggestion is inescapable that growing isolation and criticism forced the realisation onto the National government that pursuance of a strict apartheid approach to sport would mean the extirpation of international sport as South Africa had come to know it. Undoubtedly South Africa did not wish to give the impression that her policy had been a result, either indirect or direct, of pressure from antagonistic factions. This would have given overt recognition to the efficacy of the various pressure groups which in South African terms would have left her susceptible to further 'blackmail'.

The advent of multi-nationalism, when measured in terms of concessions demanded and/or expected for South Africa's Black sportsmen, resulted in an evaluation which categorised the event as being insignificant. Nevertheless, multi-nationalism derives significance from its historical alignment. When viewed in historical perspective, it can be ascertained that the advent of multi-nationalism in sport in South Africa in 1971 marked the beginning of an evolution away from the strict apartheid approach of the 1950's and 1960's. In May 1971 this was not a stated objective; subsequent statements confirmed the theory that multi-nationalism at least initially was intended to be an absolute concept. That in the long term it proved not to be so, is again significant.

CONSOLIDATION OF MULTI-NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND INTERNAL PRESSURE

The period following Vorster's introduction of multi-nationalism was one of consolidation of the concept and of continued world reaction to a system of sport which failed, even with its multi-national concessions, to find large-scale acceptance.

The proposed tours of Australia by South African rugby and cricket teams began to be subjected to increasing pressure from various sources in Australia. On May 4th 1971 the executive of the Australian Council of Trade Unions announced that this organisation had decided to ask the South African Government to select sports teams (on a non-racial basis) to visit Australia. If they did not comply, said the ACTU, individual Unions would exercise their consciences as to whether to boycott cricket and rugby teams (Cape Times, May 4, 1971). In May 1971 the French rugby team arrived with a Black winger Roger Bougarel. Brickhill (1976 : 23) asserts that White sports fans displayed their inherent racialism by screaming for joy whenever Bougarel was tackled. Greyvenstein (1977 : 334) disputes this theory and suggests that Bougarel's courage endeared him to large portions of the crowd in the same way that his personal aggressiveness antagonised many. Discrimination did present itself in overt form during

this tour, when Blacks were refused admittance to the game against Western Transvaal, the reason given being that they had applied too late for tickets (Rapport, May 30, 1971).

Although the concept of multi-nationalism was apparently acceptable to the French Rugby Union, as demonstrated by their willingness to tour South Africa, the prospect of South Africa finding greater acceptance for the concept was contra-indicated by developments in Australia, where South Africa's rugby and cricket teams were due to tour. Demonstrations against the Springbok rugby tour occurred in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, with violent clashes between demonstrators and police. Opposition to the tour spread beyond the active minority who attempted to disrupt matches and who captured the headlines. In addition to several major newspapers and many leading politicians, the Australian Council of Churches and the Council of Trade Unions opposed the tour, as did a group of fifty Melbourne lawyers who cabled the Australian Prime Minister urging the tour's cancellation. In spite of this opposition the tour went ahead, although many trade unionists refused to staff hotels where the Springboks were scheduled to stay, and unionists threats to blacklist airlines carrying the Springboks resulted in their having to be transported throughout Australia in six chartered light aircraft. The railways also refused to transport the team (Star, August 9, 1971; Horrell, 1971 : 320-321).

After this rugby tour it must have been increasingly clear to South Africa's cricketers that for their tour of Australia to go ahead, cricket would have to be multi-racial. The Balfour Park Cricket Club and the Pirates Cricket Club both passed resolutions in favour of multi-racial cricket. A few days later the University of Natal Cricket Club in Durban expressed support for the principle of integrated teams. They were joined by the Durban and District Cricket Union, the Natal Cricket Association and the Old Grey Club in Port Elizabeth (Rand Daily Mail, August 13, 17, 18, 1971).

On August 18th 1971 the Minister of Sport, replied by issuing a warning to cricket clubs that they would not be allowed to play multi-racial cricket at any level. Referring to reports of

resolutions by certain clubs expressing support for mixed matches, he said:

These hollow resolutions, which are apparently intended for popular local and overseas consumption may make interesting reading in newspapers, but they are in practice meaningless.... Should cricketing bodies in South Africa wish to contradict and confront government policy they must bear the full responsibility. (Rand Daily Mail, August 18, 1971)

In Australia, reaction from the rugby tour was being directed at the proposed cricket tour schedules for September. It was calculated that the tour would cost the Australian taxpayer R40 million. The State Governments of South Australia and Western Australia, had already announced their intention of extending the boycott of the rugby tour to the cricket tour (Sunday Times, August 15, 1971).

Meanwhile South African sport continued to be plagued at various levels. At the United States professional tennis championships in Massachusetts, three South African players were the targets of demonstrators. A French team from a visiting warship became embroiled in the apartheid controversy: a game of basketball had been arranged against a Natal Technical College Club team, who, on discovering that two Non-White Frenchmen were due to play against them, refused to play. The Transvaal Boxing Board of Control turned down an application for the Jamaican, Bunny Sterling (British and Commonwealth middleweight champion), to fight the Transvaal champion Jan Kies in October. The reason submitted was that the law prevented Black and White from meeting in the ring (Rand Daily Mail, August 4, 19, 23, 1971).

A bigger blow to South African sport presented itself in September 1971, when South Africa's cricket tour to Australia was cancelled. Odendaal (1977 : 12-13) says the announcement was made to a packed press conference in Sydney, and that the announcement read:

The Australian Board of Control for International Cricket today reviewed all aspects of the proposed South African tour of Australia in 1971/72.

Whilst there was substantial evidence that many Australians felt the tour should go on, the Board was equally made aware of the widespread disapproval of the South African Government's racial policy which restricted selection of South Africa's team.

The Board faced the unenviable situation that whatever decision it made would meet with the displeasure of a large percentage of the people but it could not let that factor influence it in coming to a decision.

It weighed carefully the views expressed by responsible Australian authorities, including political leaders, union officials, church dignitaries, police commissioners, ground authorities and others.

There could be no doubt the tour would engender internal bitterness between rival groups and demonstrations on a large scale would be inevitable.

Police would be called on to provide massive and prolonged protection at matches and elsewhere.

The Board has complete confidence in the ability, and the willingness, of the police forces to maintain law and order, but had to question whether it was reasonable, in the circumstances, to ask those men to undergo the severe ordeal which would be demanded of them to enable cricket to be played in peace, while at the same time other members of the public were deprived of their services.

The Board decided to advise the South African Cricket Association, with great regret, that in the present atmosphere the invitation to tour must be withdrawn.

It earnestly hopes that the South African Government will, in the near future, so relax its laws that the cricketers of South Africa may once again take their place as full participants in the international field, and the Board will give its utmost support to the South African Cricket Association to try and bring about this end. (Odendaal, 1977 : 12-13)

The Minister of Sport and Recreation reacted to the announcement by stating that the government was not prepared to change its policy for rugby and cricket. Multi-racial sport, the government believed, would lead to considerable racial conflict. There was no possibility, he added, that individual sports clubs would be allowed to hold mixed trials, although Non-Whites would be allowed to take part in open internationals if they complied

with required standards. He suggested that other countries should accept this policy in good faith, although he was not over-optimistic about the future prospects for South Africa in international sport. He felt that there was a determined international power doing its utmost to isolate South Africa from international sport: its aim was to break down South Africa's resistance for a political take-over (Die Burger, September 13, 1971).

The following day the Prime Minister criticised the reasons given by Sir Donald Bradman and the Australian Cricket Board for cancelling the tour. He said if it were ever necessary to protect any sports match in South Africa with the help of the police it would not cost the government a cent. It was the duty of the government, he said. Also, if the tour had been cancelled because of the pressure that would be brought to bear on the South African players, then this should be disregarded as a reason, because South African players had never said that the pressure would be too much for them. Vorster said that South Africans could look after themselves. Therefore he concluded that the cancellation of the tour was not the fault of the South African Cricket Association or of the South African Government: the tour had been cancelled by Sir Donald Bradman and his committee; and if it was suggested otherwise by Sir Donald Bradman, then he was talking through his hat. Supporting this contention, he cited the historic tradition established between England, Australia and New Zealand, where a link forged with White South African cricket teams only had been accepted by all concerned. He was not going to change this policy to satisfy communists and anarchists. He warned that democracies in the world should take note of the fact that minorities were dictating to majorities (Die Burger, September 15, 1971).

In October attention switched to women's tennis in South Africa. The Federation Cup competition to be held in 1972 was awarded to South Africa. The South African Lawn Tennis Union stated that the event would be held in Johannesburg and that the side would be picked on merit (Sunday Express, October 3, 1971). This was within the parameters of multi-nationalism, the Federation Cup being an 'exception'. However, the gesture of the SALTU was

somewhat hollow as there were no Non-Whites at that time who were sufficiently skilled to challenge for a place. It was obvious that a team chosen on merit would be White.

The English Rugby Union displayed an attitude to multi-nationalism similar to that of the French Rugby Union, by inviting a team from the South African Rugby Football Federation team, known as the Proteas, to tour England. The Proteas were representative of the Coloured race in South Africa, which the non-racial organisations had earlier pointed out made them 'racial', and conformists to White separation in sport. The non-racial rugby union would have no truck with this policy (Rand Daily Mail, October 27, 1971).

The implementing of multi-nationalism was witnessed by two events in November 1971, one a golf championship, the other an athletic meeting. These developments were not greeted with universal approval. Hoofstad (November 26, 1971) reported that two of the athletic organisers, Mr. Ivor Potgieter and Mr. Jan Momberg, were threatened on numerous occasions via the telephone. They were told, reported the Hoofstad, that multi-racial athletic meetings were the beginning of the dismantling of apartheid. The organisers were also told that they were responsible for leading youth in the wrong direction, a development which would make them susceptible to liberal thoughts.

The first 'Open International' sports meeting was a Professional Golfer's Association championship in Johannesburg. Sixteen South African Non-White golfers took part, along with thirty-six foreigners from seven countries. There was a field of over one hundred, with some 20 000 spectators of all races, with segregation being kept to a minimum. There were no incidents and in multi-national terms the event was a success (Sunday Times, November 28, 1971; Cape Times, November 24, 1971).

South Africa's first 'Open International' athletic meeting was the second multi-national event of November. The meeting took place at the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town. Over 200

athletes from nineteen countries participated, among them ten Black South Africans and athletes from the four Black African States of Lesotho, Malawi, Ivory Coast and Malagasy (Cape Times, November 26, 27, 1971). The Sunday Times (November 21, 28, 1971) noted that while athletes shared facilities, spectators remained segregated. Press reaction nonetheless was generally favourable to the idea of integration, even allowing for its strictly controlled state. Die Burger (November 27, 1971) felt that the athletics meeting deserved full marks as there were no problems or incidents. Die Burger (November 29, 1971) in an editorial also felt that the multi-national sports meetings would assist in blunting the weapon which the enemies of South Africa used against her. This referred to those who were making a political weapon of sport. In a further editorial on November 30, Die Burger suggested that what happened at the two multi-racial sports meetings was proof that the National policy of separation provided the essential foundation for the success of such sporting contact. The possibility that events of this type might lead to further integration was dismissed by Die Burger, which opined that South Africa had a government and a policy which would not permit such contact to lead to unrest. The Cape Times (November 27, 1971) attempted to summarise White feeling by stating that the two multi-national events were a good way to start conditioning the South African to a new environment through sports contact, confronting him with scenes of social integration.

The reaction of non-racial sports people was both warm and cold. Syd Lotter, president of the Western Province Amateur Athletic Union said:

I will agree that from an activity point of view, the multi-national athletics meeting was a success. From the point of view of principles, however, I am afraid that it was not such a success. One of our sprinters, Herman Gibbs, was invited to compete, but he required a temporary permit. I would like to know whether these visitors from overseas were also granted special permits. (Cape Times, November 30, 1971).

Mr. Hassan Howa of the non-racial cricket association saw even less merit in the multi-national concept:

Right from the beginning the whole idea of a multi-national athletics meeting left me cold. I honestly feel this was just a piece of window dressing. However, I also feel that this international meeting backfired on the organisers. This was intended to be MULTI-NATIONAL, in other words separate nations competing against each other, and as such within the framework of apartheid. But it did not quite work out that way.

The athletes themselves, their whole bearing, their joining hands at the end, all indicated that it was in reality a non-racial affair; and the crowd took it as such.

All this goes to prove that allowing people to mix will not cause racial friction. (Cape Times, November 30, 1971)

However, irrespective of principles still being infringed, Mr. Howa in his condemnation had also underscored the significance of the two meetings, which was the presentation to White South Africans of a semi-integrated sporting event. While not non-racial, it was movement towards that objective, rather than away from it as had been the case in the past. There were indications that in 1971 the government was not prepared to allow this development to gather momentum. The Minister of Sport warned those who thought multi-racial meetings were part of a natural progression, that the policy of separate sport was clearly described and would not be deviated from (Hoofstad, November 29, 1971).

Signs that International opposition was organising and hardening became apparent at the end of November, when the United Nations General Assembly passed its first major resolution 2775 D (XXVI) on 'Apartheid in Sport'. At its 1997th plenary meeting on 29 November, it declared the following (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 2775 D (XXVI) 1971):

The General Assembly,

Recalling that Member States have pledged themselves under article 1 of the United Nations, to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom, for all without distinction as to race, sex,

language or religion;

Recalling further its requests to all States and national and international sports organisations to suspend exchange of sporting events with South African teams selected under apartheid policies;

Bearing in mind that 1971 was designated as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, to be observed in the name of the ever-growing struggle against racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and in the name of international solidarity with those struggling against racism;

1. Declares its unqualified support of the Olympic principle that no discrimination be allowed on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation;
2. Affirms that merit should be the sole criterion for participation in sports activities;
3. Solemnly calls upon all national and international sports organisations to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination and to discourage and deny support to sporting events organised in violation of this principle;
4. Calls upon individual sportsmen to refuse to participate in any sports activity in a country in which there is an official policy of racial discrimination or apartheid in the field of sports;
5. Urges all States to promote adherence to the Olympic principles of non-discrimination and to encourage their sports organisations to withhold from sporting events organised in violation of this principle;
6. Requests national and international sports organisations and the public to deny any form of recognition to any sports activity from which persons are debarred or in which they are subjected to any discrimination on the basis of race religion or political affiliation;
7. Condemns the actions of the Government of South Africa in enforcing racial discrimination and segregation in sports;
8. Notes with regret that some national and international sports organisations have continued exchanges with teams from South Africa that have been selected for international competition on the basis of competition closed to otherwise qualified sportsmen solely on the basis of their race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin;

9. Commends those international and national sports organisations that have supported the international campaign against apartheid in sports;

10. Requests all States to urge their national sports organisations to act in accordance with the present solution;

11. Requests the Secretary General:

(a) To bring the present resolution to the attention of international sports organisations.

(b) To keep the Special Committee on Apartheid informed on the implementation of the present resolution.

(c) To submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session.

The resolution could have been termed 'South Africa: parameters for effective sports desegregation', in that it was directed primarily at South African sport. Essentially, the resolution lacked influence and any real power. It did serve to lay the issue before the world and indicate that international cognizance had now been accorded the undesirability of discrimination on any grounds in sport. As such it was a triumph for the anti-apartheid crusaders, in that their international cause had been acclaimed officially by such a prominent body as the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, it was necessary that the muscle behind this most impressive roar come from those who could create pressure beyond the sports arena.

The success of both multi-national sports meetings in 1971 was doubly instrumental in the continuing development of South Africa's sports policy. Firstly, the success ensured that further events would receive governmental approbation. Secondly, the policy of multi-nationalism allowed the inter-mingling of Black and White athletes, which to a degree counteracted the negative segregated image previously created overseas by the strict segregationist approach to sport in South Africa. While the plan was clearly defined in Nationalist minds, the minds of those outside Nationalist circles, especially outside South Africa, were confused as to its interpretation. Whether confusion in international sporting circles was an object of multi-nationalism is open to conjecture. The obfuscation was

particularly successful in tennis. In January 1972, South Africa was readmitted to the Davis Cup competition. In April this decision was rescinded and South Africa was expelled. In July, at a meeting in Helsinki of the International Lawn Tennis Union, South Africa was readmitted and new regulations were introduced to prevent teams withdrawing because of South Africa's presence. Because of the hostility encountered by South Africa from countries in the European zone of the Davis Cup, South Africa re-entered the competition in the South American zone (Star, July 12, 1972). This indecision underscored the difficulties international sporting organisations were having in deciding (a) whether multi-nationalism was in fact a change or alteration of the South African sporting status quo; (b) whether multi-nationalism connoted multi-racialism; (c) whether multi-nationalism was to be encouraged as the possible harbinger of brighter and better things in South African sport.

In South Africa the Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger (July 15, 1971) greeted the tennis decision as being enlightened, stating that the government, to wit the Prime Minister, must continue on the chosen road in the knowledge that sensible South Africans were fully conscious of the delicate boundary between success and failure. Die Burger added that setbacks should not be taken too tragically, because it was possible to reverse them with ingenious exertion and without allowing the price to become unbearably high. Multi-nationalism, it asserted, was capable of providing a solution to South Africa's sporting isolation.

Under the multi-national concept, where international competition was concerned, dispensations were to be made to allow Non-Whites to compete. The Federation Cup, in women's tennis, was one of these occasions. This dispensation allowed South Africa to secure the venue for the competition in 1972. However, the implementation of mixed competition, even on this restricted level, was not untroubled. Trials for the selection of South Africa's women's team were to be multi-racial, but because of the positioning of an Open International (the Federation Cup was to precede this event) a special mixed trial was necessary if South Africa was going to attach the label of merit-selected to her

Federation Cup team. This was strictly against the government's multi-national policy, according to which the only mixed events were to be Open Internationals. Mr. Waring explained his decision:

Firstly, the representatives of the Tennis Association had made a statement, with the approval of the Government, that an open international would be held to pick teams for the Davis Cup and Federation Cup on the basis of merit only; because these are world sporting events and we recognise world sporting events as all South African events. The two representatives of the tennis association came to me and said: 'We are in a big jam, we have made all the arrangements for the Federation Cup, but the Federation Cup tournament is taking place before the Open International (thus under the conditions outlined above effectively debarring the tennis officials of their opportunity to select a team based on 'multi-racial' performance). We have already said we are going to pick a team on merit; how are we going to do it?' They then asked whether they could hold open trials at Ellis Park. I said that was absolutely against Government policy. They know that an open international is the basis on which we allow teams to be picked on merit. Eventually after we had discussed the issue, the decision was reached that they could arrange what amounted to a sort of trial match. I have always understood that a trial match is a match played on a public court with the public as spectators. I then said 'In view of your predicament I have no objection to your arranging the matches on a private court, without the presence of representatives of the Press and S.A.B.C. The only people who may be present are those who are going to select the team'. (Hansard, May 2, 1972. Cols. 6288-6289)

Brickhill (1976 : 24) interpreted this clandestine arrangement as an attempt to obscure the merit selection process, as she says that after the private trials it was announced that no Blacks were selected. While this is a possibility, consideration needs also to be given to the thesis that the government was not inclined to distend the parameters of multi-nationalism down to national level; which is the implication open mixed trials would have conveyed. Waring in his ruling was attempting to interpret the policy of multi-nationalism consistently. At the Open International tennis championships in April, seven Black tennis players participated. There was criticism of this event, in that the selectors had not considered those players who were members of the non-racial South African Lawn Tennis Union (SALTU).

SALTU members refused to affiliate to the White South African Tennis Union and thereby accept subservient status; as a result the Black tennis champion did not participate in the championships (Daily Despatch, March 16, 1972).

Further acceptance by the English Rugby Football Union of the multi-national approach was demonstrated when their representative team arrived in South Africa in May 1972. This acceptance was not without criticism. The non-racial rugby union in South Africa (SARU) refused to participate against the English side, as they felt multi-nationalism was an insincere development which was designed to keep South Africa in international sport (Sunday Times, London, May 14, 1972). Two Non-White groups did co-operate with the White South African Rugby Board: the Coloured South African Rugby Football Federation (SARF) and the Black South African Rugby Board (SARB). Both groups supplied teams representative of their race groups to play against the English side, thereby establishing a rugby precedent in South Africa (Cape Herald, June 3, 1972). However, if the Non-White organisations assumed that their co-operation with the White Rugby Board would lead to mixed rugby in 1972, they were incorrect in their assumptions. Dr. Craven, president of the White Rugby Board, stated that there was no chance whatsoever of mixed trials for the selection of the 1973 Springboks. South Africa would not be prescribed to by anybody; world opinion would not influence South Africa at all, he said. Mixed trials were something he felt he could not recommend, and he stressed the fact that government sports policy was not inhibiting rugby, but merely expressing the general consensus of the Rugby Board (Star, May 12, 1972; Sunday Times, May 21, 1972).

As anti-apartheid factions in New Zealand, where the 1973 Springbok team was to tour, gathered momentum, it became increasingly obvious that such a segregated approach, as adopted by the South African Rugby Board could endanger the fulfillment of the tour. Die Transvaler (August 23, 1972) suggested that attention should be given to the claim of Coloured rugby players, adding that

there was strong pressure for such a step. Although Die Transvaler is regarded as a reflector of Nationalist opinion, the Hoofstad (August 24, 1972) reflected more accurately current Nationalist thought on further mixed sporting events. Hoofstad carried the comment that if Coloured rugby players were invited to multi-racial rugby trials, the National Party would be signing its own death warrant. Hoofstad carried the assurance to its readers that a Cabinet Minister had stated that such a development was completely irreconcilable with the policy of separate development. Shortly after this commentary Dr. Koornhof, the new Minister of Sport and Recreation, reaffirmed that there would be no deviation from multi-national principles. He could not, he said, understand the sudden insistence on mixed rugby trials. A few days later Dr. Koornhof made another statement again rejecting mixed trials: "At club level, provincial and national level there will be no mixed sport of any nature at all" (Cape Times, August 30, 1972; Star, September 7, 1972). He also added that he would not allow social mixing to take place after racially mixed international sports meetings. Social events would have to be confined to the various race groups areas. Strengthening the statement made by Dr. Koornhof was one by the Minister of Labour and Posts who stated that as long as the Nationalist Party ruled South Africa, there would never be mixed rugby trials, mixed rugby at club level or provincial level, or anything but White Springbok rugby and cricket teams (Cape Times, September 9, 1972; Die Burger, September 11, 1972).

Dr. Craven then revealed that the South African Rugby Board had done something of an volte-face and asked the government for permission to include Coloured players, on merit, in the 1972 Springbok touring side (Rand Daily Mail, September 5, 1972). This allowed the South African Rugby Board to suggest that although they (SARB) wished to have a mixed team, the government would not allow it. This apparently was an attempt to foil those, such as the anti-apartheid organisations in New Zealand, who were demanding an integrated team. The Star (September 14, 1972) reported that the leaders of HART (Halt All Racist Tours)

and CARE (Citizens Association for Racial Equality) had had a telephone conversation with Dr. Craven, in which they had suggested that if Dr. Craven could persuade the government to give Coloured players a fair chance to make the team, they would drop all plans to disrupt the tour. In view of the previous statement it was extremely unlikely that Dr. Craven could give such an assurance. Mr. Vorster confirmed this: "There would be all-White Boks or no tour", he said (Cape Times, September 14, 1972). Predictably, the opposition in New Zealand grew.

In New Zealand the Federation of Labour came out in opposition to the tour, while the brewery and the hotel workers' unions said they would blacklist hotels accommodating the Springboks. The New Zealand police meanwhile were preparing for the tour, taking massive precautions to ensure the safety of spectators and players (Star, September 4, 11, 1972).

While plans for the tour appeared to be in jeopardy, they were not, in September, moribund. The president of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union, Mr. Jack Sullivan, said that the invitation to the Springboks was still open (Cape Times, September 16, 1972).

Further government intractability was displayed in the sport of cricket. Permission for a mixed cricket match in Cape Town was refused. The objection to the match was that it was to be played on a ground open to the public. It appeared that mixed sport could be played only if the venue was private. The Minister of Sport and Recreation, who at this juncture was still F. Waring, explained the anomaly thus: "Sir, the hon. member must understand that on a private court a non-white can play against a white; no permit is needed". The hon. member T.C. Hughes replied: "I understand that on a private court non-whites can play against whites. Why cannot they play on a private cricket field as well?" The Minister then replied that it was left to the government's discretion. If the government felt that a match was arranged to challenge their sports policy, thereby allowing it to become a major policy issue, the government would not stand for it (Hansard, May 2, 1972).

This was the reasoning apparently applied to another cricket match organised to mark the departure of one of South Africa's most controversial cricketers, Basil D'Oliviera. The match was arranged by St. Augustine's (a Non-White club) who invited three Whites to play. Subsequently, after pressure had been exerted by White authorities, these three players withdrew their services. Hassan Howa stated that the players had no guts (Cape Herald, January 29, 1972). Into the breach then stepped former Springbok cricketer Owen Wynne, who offered to play. The Minister of Sport and Recreation in turn warned Wynne that if he played he would be arrested. Wynne replied that he did not think he was breaking the law, and "in any case if it was a crime to play in a cricket match against a fellow South African then it was time someone went to gaol for doing so" (Odendaal, 1977 : 27). The issue was bearing all the marks of becoming a policy issue confrontation. Mysteriously at 11 o'clock on the night before the game the invitation to Wynne was indirectly withdrawn. It was obvious that some form of pressure had been exerted. Theoretically the Non-Whites playing with Wynne would have been as guilty of any infraction as Wynne himself: perhaps they too had been threatened with arrest. If this was the case then SACBOC did not appear to be as determined as Wynne to pursue the cause of multi-racialism, and Wynne had justification for stating: "My only satisfaction from all this was on the Monday when I was able to tell Hassan Howa that as he had baulked at striking a blow for integrated cricket it would be a good idea if in future he kept his mouth shut" (Odendaal, 1977 : 27).

Following this confusion, which had threatened to lead domestic cricket outside the specific limitations of multi-nationalism, the Department of Community Development issued a statement that mixed cricket matches on private grounds planned for the following season would not be allowed; if people tried to arrange them, it was added, they would merely hasten legislation to ban them (Eastern Province Herald, July 5, 1972). Amongst this confusion the International Football Federation (FIFA) boosted multi-nationalism's credibility by giving a special dispensation to the White South African Football Association (FASA) which

allowed foreign teams to participate in South Africa, and in particular in the multi-national South African Games which were scheduled for early 1973 (Post, July 9, 1972). This was an unusual development from an international organisation, especially in view of the non-racial South African Soccer Federation's application for membership to the International Federation. In this application the non-racial organisation (SASF) stated that the Whites were attempting to undermine Black unity by the policy of "divide and rule" and by requesting the government and municipalities to bar the use of public fields by non-racial organisations (Post, July 7, 1972). The motivation from FIFA can only have been that FIFA regarded multi-nationalism as progress which, if it was encouraged, would possibly lead to greater integrational developments.

In August 1972 Dr. Koornhof was appointed to succeed F. Waring as Minister of Sport and Recreation. This was important, not in relation to the immediate future, but in relation to the five and a half years that he would hold the portfolio. Dr. Koornhof's opening remarks, however, did not hold promise of better things to come. As mentioned, he remained firmly committed to segregated rugby and to no mixed sport at any level other than were specified by multi-nationalism. In October Dr. Koornhof attempted to minimise the effect of sports isolation. Dr. Koornhof said that South Africa's isolation in sport was being exaggerated. Since the beginning of the year 65 overseas sportsmen or sports teams had taken part in 38 types of sport in the South African Republic. Further, South Africans had made 122 visits to other countries to take part in 32 types of sport. These figures referred only to amateur sport. The total number of visits overseas by South African sportsmen and visits by sportsmen to the Republic during the year was a record, he said (Rand Daily Mail, October 31, 1972). While Dr. Koornhof's statement was correct, his logistics had not taken into account the real effects of isolation: South Africans could compete overseas and therefore qualify for Dr. Koornhof's computations, but in many sports they were denied the honour of competing in an official or representative capacity. It also had the effect of depriving those who

competed of their Springbok colours. South Africa was still participating internationally, but it was becoming more difficult officially. The International Amateur Athletic Federation suspended South Africa for two years, which entitled South Africa's athletes to compete abroad as individuals only. Furthermore, several countries in Europe advised the South African Badminton Union that her team would not be welcome during their overseas tour in 1973, despite South Africa's good standing with the International Badminton Federation (Cape Times, August 31, November 7, 1971). Then in November the General Assembly of the United Nations requested "all States to take appropriate steps in accordance with the General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI) and to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination in sports, and to withhold any support from sporting events, organised in violation of this principle, particularly with the participation of racially selected teams from South Africa". In paragraph 16 the Assembly invited all organisations, institutions and information media to organise campaigns in 1973 on various issues, including the "boycott of South Africa in sports and in any cultural and other activities" (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 2923 E (XXVII) 1972).

At the end of November New Zealand elected a Labour Government and with it a new prime minister, Mr. Norman Kirk, who served notice on South Africa's sportsmen. Kirk said they would not receive as sympathetic an ear as they had under the previous National Government. The Labour Government, he said, would totally dissociate itself from the proposed 1973 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand (Star, November 27, 1972). Kirk's statement threatened future New Zealand South African rugby relations, although in a statement by New Zealand's Minister of Sport, J. Walding, it was clear that they were not moribund. Walding said although the New Zealand Government would not officially recognise the South African rugby tour, they would not intervene, and the Springboks would be entitled to full protection against demonstrators (Die Burger, December 20, 1972).. Australia had also returned a new prime minister, who was less circumspect than New Zealand's Kirk in regard to future sporting relations with South Africa. Whitlam stated:

"Australia will definitely sever sporting ties with South Africa unless teams chosen purely on merit are sent to this country. Sporting teams chosen on racial grounds will be refused permission to enter Australia for touring purposes" (Cape Times, December 7, 1972).

Internal opposition to multi-nationalism largely emanated from the non-racial sports organisations. These organisations wanted an egalitarian sports society. Some of the Non-White organisations which had joined the White organisations obviously cherished this objective as well. The difference was that the non-racialists did not believe that multi-nationalism would ever lead to anything else in sport other than the multi-national approach. They therefore refused to co-operate with the White organisations and continued to believe that only through boycotting sport, internally and externally, would meaningful change occur. Non-White groups who had co-operated with White organisations tended towards the belief that progress is by nature slow and that their co-operation would catalyse the evolution. In the interim their co-operation was also useful to the White organisations who sought to preserve international sporting contact. When, (1972), the President of the White South African Olympic Committee was sent to lobby the International Olympic Committee Executive in Japan over South Africa's possible readmittance, Brickhill (1976 : 29) reports that he was 'joined by two Black South Africans, the President of the Black Olympic Committee and the head of one of the racial sporting bodies. The impact of this confrontation is not directly ascertainable, but the contrast to previous years must have seemed spectacular to outside observers, especially since previous indications were of no Blacks in South African sport, let alone in administration. Therefore, it was not surprising that after meeting the four, the International Olympic Committee Executive passed a resolution which noted with pleasure the progress in mutual participation by Whites and Non-Whites in international sports events and in national sports administration in South Africa (Brickhill, 1976 : 29).

There was less co-operation from the non-racial cricket association (SACBOC). They met with the White South African Cricket Association and their Black affiliate, for discussion. SACBOC proposed a moratorium on all overseas cricket tours to and from South Africa for three years. The purpose of this, it was explained, was to allow time to be spent in reaching a goal of selection on merit at all levels (Post, May 7, 1972). This was obviously not within the government's multi-national guidelines and an alternate suggestion was adopted: touring teams would play against White, African, Indian and Coloured teams (Cape Times, May 2, 1972).

The non-racial South African Amateur Swimming Federation forwarded a suggestion to the White association that a single national controlling body be formed to give all swimmers an opportunity to represent South Africa on merit. This proposal was rejected and the non-racial organisation was offered the opportunity to affiliate to the White swimming association. The non-racial body refused stating that it had no wish to accept subservient status.

Although non-racial opposition at this point was only loosely organised under the Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Racial Sport Organisation (cf. Chapter Eleven) there was already a considerable schism developing between non-racial and multi-national organisations. Kane Berman (1972 : 8-9) in a paper titled "Sport : Multi-nationalism versus Non-racialism", suggested that the relations between the two factions were further bedevilled by mistrust which derived from the Whites desire to rescue South Africa from isolation rather than racism in sport. Kane Berman also suggests that in 1972 it appeared that the non-racial organisations were gaining in number, at the expense of those organisations who co-operated with White associations.

In spite of developing opposition internal and external, there was little doubt that at the end of 1972 multi-nationalism was to be South Africa's sporting idiom for the immediately foreseeable future. Further change was not indicated for 1973 and the year was one of further consolidation. The epitomisation of multi-nationalism was the 1973 South African Games. Herein,

a sports spectacular was created which (a) gave South African White sportsmen international competition on a level comparable to that of the Olympic Games, which they had been denied since 1960, (b) presented South Africans and (c) displayed to the outside world the integrational disposition of multi-nationalism.

Confusion as to the integrational disposition of multi-nationalism manifested itself when the international controlling body of soccer (FIFA) announced that foreign member countries would be allowed to compete in the South African Games. This condonement of multi-nationalism by the FIFA executive was then challenged by the African Football Federation who claimed that the executive did not have the right to lift the suspension which had been imposed on South African soccer since 1964 - that, they charged, was a matter for the congress of FIFA to decide (Cape Times, January 29, 1973).

At this point South Africans, primarily soccer administrators, were delighted. Dave Marais, who was chairman of the South African Football Association, reacted by inviting a delegation from FIFA to attend the Games at Pretoria. He stated that he hoped to satisfy the FIFA delegation that what was being done was the best for soccer in South Africa and for all race groups. He would also put a strong case for the final and permanent lifting of the suspension imposed by FIFA (Cape Times, February 3, 1973). The feeling was short-lived - a result, states Brickhill (1976 : 31), of the direct interference of the anti-apartheid sports faction SAN-ROC and the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa. Brickhill maintains that these two organisations petitioned FIFA and enlightened the soccer organisation as to the meaning of multi-nationalism. FIFA then made the announcement that the suspension was replaced, and that she had been misinformed and lead to believe that multi-national meant multi-racial (Brickhill, 1976 : 31).

This decision placed the soccer programme of the South African Games in jeopardy, as normally two overseas entries were required in order for an event to qualify as an open international. Dr. Koornhof consulted with Mr. Marais after which

it was decided that a departure from the multi-national format would, in the case of soccer, be sanctioned. Dr. Koornhof explained the departure by saying: "Seeing that the South African Games - of which soccer is an Olympic sport, is a subdivision - is an international multi-national event, the soccer arrangements will proceed" (Argus, February 17, 1973). Horrell (1973 : 368) reports that the Football Association (FIFA) and its two affiliates, the South African Bantu Soccer Association and the South African Coloured Football Association, went ahead and selected four teams to represent the four main racial groups. However, Horrell says the Indian team (and to a lesser extent the Coloured one) was weakened by the fact that many of its best players were members of the non-racial South African Soccer Federation, another group who refused to participate in the "racial games". This departure from formal multi-nationalism antagonised the more conservative White in South Africa, who obviously saw the development as a potentially damaging to the segregationist philosophy. This antagonism was obviously a consideration in the decision to move the soccer venue from Pretoria to Johannesburg. The Herstigte Nasionale Party, which is an ultra-right-wing faction with a history of devotion to the principle of White minority rule in South Africa, was one of the most vociferous critics of the soccer dispensation; consequently they claimed the shift of venue was the result of pressure mounted by opponents of the multi-national games. Dr. Koornhof denied this (Rand Daily Mail, March 15, 1973), stating that the decision was based on a greater spectator interest and better facilities in Johannesburg.

Contemporaneous with the soccer development was the formation of a new swimming association in the Transvaal consisting mainly of Black and Coloured swimmers. The new Non-White body was then affiliated to the White South African Amateur Swimming Union, with powers equal to those of a White provincial association. The President of the White organisation (SAASU) then announced that in future all swimming teams would be selected on merit. This did not, however, imply mixed teams or mixed carnivals. However, the government saw fit to offer direction,

lest the Swimming Union drift from the predetermined path of multi-nationalism. Beyers Hoek, secretary for Sport, advised the SAASU that it was wrong if it thought it would be able to select mixed national teams on merit. The policy had not changed, he said, and separate teams would have to be chosen to represent the various race groups; Black swimmers could compete in the games, but would have to do so as individuals (Cape Times, February 27, 1973).

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GAMES, 1973.

The South African Games encountered opposition internally and externally. Internal opposition as mentioned emanated from the more conservative or verkrampte White South Africans and from the non-racial sports organisations.

In the vanguard of conservative reaction was the Verwoerd Action Group which had been established to intensify public opinion against the multi-coloured ('bont') games. This group regarded the Games as the thin edge of the wedge which would eventually raise the Non-White and enable him to intermarry with the whites: 'a desired objective of the enemies of South Africa'. The Verwoerd Action Group circulated material to primary and high schools. Hoofstad (March 14, 1973) reported that a circular titled 'The Verwoerd Action against Undermining in Sport' suggested that Non-White athletes competing at the Games would receive the same treatment as White competitors. This was of utmost significance since sportsmen were the young people who became leaders of the country. In a similar vein, Dr. Albert Hertzog, leader of the breakaway conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party, blamed the liberals, suggesting that they were breaking down the feelings among young Whites not to compete against Blacks. He felt that the White man must remain master ('baas') in his own country; once the White man accepted the Black as his equal in sport he was only a small psychological step away from accepting him as his political equal (Hoofstad, April 9, 1973).

Further internal opposition emanated from the newly formed South

African Council on Sport (SACOS), which had become the mouthpiece of the majority of non-racial sports organisations (cf. Chapter Eleven). SACOS issued a statement which declared its opposition to the games on the grounds that they were a substitute for non-racial sport, a negation of the principles of non-discrimination in sport, and were designed to maintain racial discrimination in South African sport. SACOS felt that merit selection was the alternative, but that it was only possible if there were equal opportunities, equal facilities, equal training and equal experience at all levels (Argus, March 19, 1973). Outside South Africa the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA) announced that it had sent five protest telegrams to the national Olympic committees of West Germany, Japan, Britain, Belgium and Holland concerning their participation in the games (Natal Witness, March 15, 1973). The South African Non-Racial Open Committee (SAN-ROC) then denounced West German participation in the Games, through a cable to the West German chancellor, Willy Brandt. SAN-ROC said it was greatly distressed at the massive German participation in the apartheid Games. A second cable was sent to the President of the West German Olympic Committee. It said that West German support for South Africa was a direct insult to Africa after Munich, and a show of political support to compensate South Africa for exclusion from the Munich Games. SAN-ROC said it would call for a total boycott of West German sport by the whole of Africa (Natal Daily News, March 15, 1973).

The Rand Daily Mail (March 15, 1973) reported that anti-apartheid activists had mobilised in America. An anti-apartheid group, the American Committee on Africa, sent letters of protest to champion pole-vaulter Steve Smith and four others who planned to compete in the Games. The letters said that as pressure to end apartheid in sport mounted in South Africa, American athletes could make an 'important and positive' contribution by disavowing competition that clashed with the Olympic principle of non-discrimination.

Two weeks later, the American Amateur Athletic Union banned five track and field stars, including world pole-vault record-holder Steve Smith from competing in the South African Games.

The statement, greeted with elation by the anti-apartheid groups, read as follows:

By a unanimous decision the National Track and Field Board has voted to honour a long-standing policy of non-involvement in Track and Field (athletics) in South Africa

The move is an expression of solidarity with the majority of African nations represented by the Supreme Sports Council of Africa.

Whether or not the athletes from the United States travel as individuals or not, they are construed to represent the United States of America in international competition.

Consequently the National Track and Field Board deems it to be reasonable and responsible not to lend legitimacy to South Africa's official policy. (Rand Daily Mail, March 29, 1973)

Notwithstanding the withdrawals, the Games were officially opened on March 23rd. Representatives, official and unofficial, included the following countries:

West Germany	130 sportsmen plus 4 officials
America	47 sportsmen plus 6 officials
Britain	40 sportsmen plus 8 officials
Ireland	28 sportsmen
Switzerland	25 sportsmen
Japan	17 sportsmen
Italy	14 sportsmen
Canada	14 sportsmen
Israel	12 sportsmen
France	11 sportsmen
Holland	11 sportsmen
Belgium	10 sportsmen
Austria	10 sportsmen
African competitors	175
Black, Coloured, Indian, South Africans	120 sportsmen
White South Africans	741 sportsmen

(South African Digest, April 3, 1973)

The reaction of the media in South Africa confirmed that the Games were an organisational success (Star, April 7, 1973; Natal Witness, April 7, 1973; Sunday Times, April 8, 1973; Die Burger, April 7, 1973). There was a dichotomy over the greater implications of the Games. The English-orientated newspapers generally saw the Games as a progressive step away

from the apartheid approach to sport. The Afrikaans-orientated newspapers tended towards a more circumspect interpretation, as epitomised by Hoofstad's (April 9, 1973) political correspondent, who suggested that the Games were not a crack in the wall of apartheid, but rather a substantiation of the viability of the concept of multi-nationalism. Further, the Games illustrated clearly that the policy of apartheid meant equal opportunities for every nation in South Africa without the abandoning of their own identity. The Games, he suggested, were one of the most important victories that the National Party had gained to date. They provided further proof that all the problems of South Africa could be solved within the framework of the National Party policy. Although the success of the Games predisposed the climate of White public opinion to further change (cf. Chapter Thirteen), the government was apparently more cognizant of the threat of a conservative backlash. On April 15th it was stated that there would be no change in sports policy: multi-nationalism would be continued (Cape Times, April 15, 1973). Tournaments and competitions would thus continue through 1973 and into 1974. Even with this confirmation that the Games were not to be utilized immediately to advance the cause of sports integration, there can be little doubting the significance of the Games. It was not the end of apartheid, and the Games were at best a token gesture to Black sportsmen in South Africa; but they did indicate a flexibility previously unknown in the field of race relations and sport. Dr. Koornhof had observed that the Games were "the most significant steps this country has ever taken to improve relationships across the colour line" (South African Digest, March 30, 1973).

In essence Dr. Koornhof was correct, but his observation was general: more specifically it enabled White South Africans to observe Blacks association with Whites at a sports level. This event may not have metamorphosed White prejudice but the occasion must have demonstrated to the more conservative White South Africa, that racial conflict was not a compulsory by-product of integration, albeit in a limited, strictly controlled format. In South Africa's gradual move away from the strict apartheid approach to sport, the Games in 1973 were a valuable development.

FURTHER MULTI-NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1973 AND 1974

Multi-nationalism found manifold forms of expression following the 1973 Games: almost as a reaffirmation of the commitment to the subjacent ideological principles of separatism. Horrell (1973 : 366) reports that for some twenty years a popular multi-racial soccer league had existed at Tongaat in Natal. Black, Coloured or Indian teams, or teams consisting of all three groups, had come at weekends from surrounding small towns to play matches at the Watson Park stadium, which had been donated to all the people of Tongaat by the Saunders' family. Later, when the Group Areas Act was proclaimed in 1950, the stadium was included in the Indian area. During June 1973 the police warned players that they were liable to prosecution under the Group Areas Act if sportsmen, other than Indian sportsmen, played in that area. Sportsmen continued to do so and the police demanded lists of the players and addresses of the club officials.

About a fortnight later, the Town Clerk of the (multi-racial) Town Board wrote to the chairman of the soccer league, stating that although the Board had been pleased to encourage sport at the stadium between any members of the community, it had been advised by a higher authority that inter-racial sport was not permissible unless a permit had been granted under the Group Areas Act. The Board later confirmed that it was no longer able to make the Watson Park Stadium available to the community for the purpose of multi-racial sport, unless a permit authorizing the fixture was issued (Rand Daily Mail, June 19, 20, 25, 29, 1973).

In Durban a multi-racial cricket club was formed. The Aurora Club then applied for permission to play in the White second league matches of White clubs in that city. This was obviously throwing down the gauntlet at the government and multi-nationalism, and by way of reply Dr. Koornhof warned cricketers that the government would not allow mixed sport at club, provincial or national levels. He would not allow government policy to be flouted, he said: "Knowing what the policy of the Government is, it appears that these persons who agitate

for mixed cricket do not have the game, as such, at heart, but that their actions do in fact have political motive behind them" (Cape Times, June 29, 1973). However, the Aurora Cricket Club was not legally obliged to cease its sporting activities (cf. Chapter Nine). But its continued existence was an embarrassment to multi-nationalism; it flouted the precepts, as explained by Dr. Koornhof; it also suggested a viable alternative to multi-nationalism: multi-racialism, and it suggested that contact at a club level between Black and White sportsmen did not necessarily cause racial friction.

Although from Dr. Koornhof's statements there was still an unequivocal commitment to multi-nationalism in sport, there were those within the Nationalist Party who suspected possible deviation from the predetermined line of separate sport. Delegates at the National Party's Transvaal congress requested a clarification of the sports policy from Dr. Koornhof. They felt there was great confusion and that the policy was so complicated that the voters could not understand it. They said it was important that the policy should not give the impression that the government was on the road to integration.

Dr. Koornhof's reply was an assurance that integration in sport on a club, provincial or national level was out of the question in 1973 or in the future; it would not, he added, become the thin edge of the wedge by which integration would be forced on South Africa. The government would never give way to external pressure, he said, delegates did not need to be afraid that the government would make concessions, as National policy was so beautifully pure and correct that it could even evolve logically in the sphere of sport (Die Burger, September 14, 1973). He also mentioned that the government was drafting legislation to prevent the Aurora Cricket Club from playing against White clubs on private grounds. Dr. Koornhof said the law already prohibited integrated sport on public grounds but integrated sports meetings on private grounds had not been envisaged by law-makers (Cape Times, September 14, 27, 1973).

The threatened legislation preventing mixed sport on private grounds was presented as an Amendment to the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. Full details of Proclamation R228 will be dealt with in Chapter Nine. Let it suffice at this juncture, to say the clause of particular concern stated that any person who was at any time present in or upon any land or premises in a controlled area, or in a group area, as the case may be, for a substantial period, without necessary permission, was liable to prosecution (Die Burger, October 6, 1973). Infringements carried R400 fines or two years imprisonment, or both. The efficiency of the new legislation was doubted, however, from the moment of introduction. The problem arose from the definition of what actually constituted 'a substantial period of time'. The Aurora Cricket Club felt that there was sufficient laxity in interpretation and announced that they would continue to play mixed cricket. It is interesting that when questioned Dr. Koornhof (Koornhof, 1978) stated that no-one had been prosecuted under Proclamation R228, indicating that any court would indeed have difficulty interpreting 'a substantial period of time'.

This may have been deliberate so as not to destroy the progress which had been made in South African sport and to prevent further criticism internally and externally. In such a deliberate manoeuvre there was a considerable political risk if the conservatives, who had demanded a positive reply to the Aurora Cricket Club, felt that Proclamation R228 had been left deliberately open ended. Professor van Niekerk of the Natal Law Faculty, saw the nebulosity of Proclamation R228 in more simplistic terms: he opined that Dr. Koornhof and his advisers had become the victims of their own expediency (Cape Times, October 9, 1973). As a result it appeared that Proclamation R228 was of use only as a vague threat.

Confronted with the continuing intransigence of multi-nationalism, opposition towards this policy continued to grow; at the beginning of June 1973 Hassan Howa announced that his association was going to apply to the International Cricket Conference for recognition. Mr. Howa indicated that he had received

personal assurance from the West Indies that any movement in this direction would receive unofficial support (Odendaal, 1977 : 14). It was the first determined attempt to undermine the White-dominated South African Cricket Union; it was an attempt that met with resistance from the South African Government. Mr. Howa's passport was withdrawn and he was not able to travel to London to present SACBU's request to the International Cricket Conference (Star, June 6, 1973; Odendaal, 1977 : 14).

INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION GROWS

The New Zealand Government, following the earlier deprecatory remarks of its Prime Minister, finally intervened and cancelled the Springbok rugby tour to New Zealand which was scheduled for the middle of 1973. It was a success for the anti-apartheid sports pressure groups in New Zealand who had threatened public disorder and unrest if the tour went ahead.

Die Burger (April 11, 1973) in an editorial endorsed the South African Government's attitude of not capitulating to the demands for a multi-racial team. Die Burger opined that there was no comparison between an event such as the South African Games and rugby, especially Springbok rugby, where there were old sentiments and tradition at stake. However, six weeks later Dr. Craven made an appeal to the government for greater leniency in its sports policy. He wanted Coloureds to be considered for South African international rugby teams (Hoofstad, June 29, 1973).

In July New Zealand again declared its opposition to the multi-national sports concept taking South Africa to task over two more sporting events. The first concerned women's tennis. The Federation Cup tournament, which South Africa had hosted in 1972, was to be hosted by New Zealand in 1973. The Rand Daily Mail (July 27, 1973) reported that New Zealand's Prime Minister had informed the New Zealand tennis authorities that a South African team would only be acceptable if it were selected on merit. Mr. Blen Franklin, South Africa's Lawn Tennis Union

president, assured the International Lawn Tennis Federation that the team would be selected on merit. However, Mr. Franklin was obviously concerned at the possible interpretations of the word 'merit'. It seemed likely that New Zealand would not accept South Africa's interpretation, because as he pointed out to the Federation, they (the Federation) had ruled that the tournament would be held in New Zealand only if the authorities there accepted entries from all member countries wishing to participate. Alternatively, the venue would be switched to Italy. The answer and the veiled intimidation did not appeal to Mr. Kirk: further discussions were held.

New Zealand's second point of conflict with South Africa and her sports policy occurred in the area of women's bowls. Horrell (1973 : 375) reports that South Africa was one of the founder members of the International Women's Bowling Board which arranged for the world championships to be held in New Zealand that December. The South African team was selected and comprised five White players. The team was then informed, by the President of the New Zealand Union, that they would not be admitted. The New Zealand Association had consulted the Prime Minister after a protest had been received from Zambia, concerning South Africa's entry. In the interests of other participating countries (and undoubtedly bearing in mind that the Commonwealth Games in New Zealand were only nine months away), South Africa's entry was refused (Rand Daily Mail, July 24, 1973). New Zealand's Prime Minister delivered another tirade concerning sporting contact with South Africa in September. He said: "New Zealand sporting teams playing all-White sides before segregated audiences in South Africa would tarnish New Zealand's multi-racial reputation" (Cape Times, September 5, 1973).

In Britain the anti-apartheid movement displayed its determination to maintain pressure on South Africa. The major anti-apartheid organisation, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), along with Peter Hain, the leader of the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, The Young Liberals, the National Union of Students and the African National Congress-in-exile, joined forces and formed a new organisation Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour (SART). The prime objective of this

organisation was to obtain the cancellation of the proposed 1974 British Isles Rugby tour to South Africa (Sunday Express, August 5, 1973).

The General Assembly of the United Nations lent its voice to the South African issue in December 1973. The General Assembly issued the following statement:

Commands Governments which have boycotted, and organisations and individuals that have campaigned for the boycott of exchanges with racially selected sports teams from South Africa.

Calls upon all Governments which have not yet done so.

(a) To take all necessary action to ensure the cessation of exchanges with South African sports teams selected in violation of the Olympic principle.

(b) To draw the attention of national sports organisations to the provisions of United Nations resolutions on apartheid in sports.

(c) To deny any assistance or recognition to exchanges with racist sports teams from South Africa.

(d) To end all cultural, educational and civic contacts and exchanges with racist institutions in South Africa. (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII). 1973)

World opposition to South Africa's sports policy during 1973, extended also to boycotting events in which South Africa participated, and suspending South Africa from international competitions and sports organisations. However, Dr. Koornhof suggested that the effect of this action was being exaggerated: "Of 72 registered amateur sports, only 10 have not been represented at an international level in 1973. Of the 72, 43 participated overseas and 48 were hosts to tours from abroad". The Department of Sport and Recreation in its annual report (1973 : 23-29) also pointed out the following statistics:

<u>Visits to South Africa</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>percentage Increase/Decrease</u>
Number of sports	37	48	29.73%
Number of countries	36	44	22.22%
<u>Visits abroad</u>			
Number of sports	37	43	16.22%
Number of countries	21	25	19.05%
Number of sports where representatives competed at an international level	59	62	
Number of sports in which representatives did not compete at international level	13	10	

Although they degraded the effect of sporting isolation, the statistics did not consider in their computation whether South Africans were competing abroad as individuals or official representatives. In many cases it was in the capacity of individuals, and this created the effect remarked on during the year by Dr. Craven. He said the impact of the sports boycott was obvious when the form of South African cricketers was compared with that of a touring Derek Robins XI. South African batsmen were nervous and tentative, which Dr. Craven felt, illustrated the lack of international competition (Cape Times, November 13, 1973). Although Dr. Craven's conclusions were based solely on observation, they did underscore one of the major effects of sports isolation not determinable through statistical evaluation: a deterioration in international sporting technique and expertise.

This by-product of sports isolation was obviously considered a small price to pay for the maintenance of South Africa's sporting status quo. South Africa's sports policy therefore endured 1973 with its tenets intact and its multi-national parameters firmly aligned. However, pressure against multi-nationalism continued to grow in 1974. In Britain an attempt was made to propose legislation to curb British sports tours to countries, such as South Africa, that practised discrimination (Cape Times, April 11, 1974). This failed and the British Lions rugby team remained free to undertake its tour of South

Africa. However, the tour was to create further controversy. Kenya, singularly displeased, announced that she would boycott all United Kingdom sport if the Lions tour went ahead. A week after this threat, when no announcement of any cancellation was made, Kenya proved true to her word and broke of all sporting links with the United Kingdom, citing the forthcoming Lions rugby tour as the reason. Uganda and Nigeria then followed suit. Britain showed considerable concern at these developments. The Minister of Sport, Dennis Howell, suggested that all sports should not be punished because of the actions of others. He stated:

While the British government appreciates the views of the African countries, and has made authoritative public statements to this effect, I feel it is unwise of them to take retaliatory action against sports which have no responsibility for the event concerned and where international sporting bodies will not accept South African participation in their competition. (Cape Times, May 9, 1974)

Britain also directed her embassy staff in South Africa to have no official or unofficial contact with the British Rugby Lions. This was not sufficient to mollify the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa who announced that they too would boycott all British sport. Britain then dispatched her British Minister for African Relations to Nairobi. Joan Nestor, as Minister concerned, was to placate Kenyan authorities and explain that the British Rugby Lions, in spite of their name, were a private sporting team and that the British Government could not stop them visiting South Africa. Kenya and the Supreme Council of Sport later announced that they would reduce their boycott to British rugby (Rand Daily Mail, May 21, 27, 1974).

Japan, in June 1974, announced that she would be closing her doors to all South African sportsmen, even individuals. She also announced the end of cultural and educational exchanges (Cape Times, June 8, 1974). The World Chess Federation suspended South Africa in June the suspension meaning non-participation until there was no racial discrimination in chess in South Africa (Star, June 27, 1974). Although the British Lions rugby team had arrived in May and thereby re-established rugby contact

for South Africa at the international level, the tour was underscoring the effect of isolation. The British team was immensely successful, which raised the question of whether isolation was contributing to the inferior showing of the South African teams. Die Vaderland (June 25, 1974) felt that an urgent look at the obstructionists who were keeping South Africa out of international sport, was needed. Die Vaderland's comment suggested that it was gradually being realised that an inordinate amount of damage was being done to South Africa's major sport, as a result of her political ideology. With international sport being the vastly different game that it is, South Africa's isolation and deprivation of regular international rugby contact meant that she did not benefit from the free interchange of ideas that is the by-product of international sporting contact. The indications were that her major sport, rugby, was regressing in the desert of isolationism. The government nonetheless showed that it was not allowing itself to be cajoled into mixed rugby, when Dr. Koornhof rejected a request for two Blacks to be allowed to play in an invitation Barbarian/Quagga's team which was due to play against the Lions (Cape Times, June 20, 1974).

South African sport was embroiled in further controversy in July 1974, when she was literally thrown out of the World Gymnastics championships in Bulgaria. This was after much debate, as first the International Gymnastics Federation stripped Bulgaria, who had refused to issue visas to South African competitors, of the right to hold the contest. The Bulgarians then called a special meeting and defeated this proposal, after which South Africa was not allowed to compete (Cape Times, July 22, 1974).

Controversy was not confined solely to Gymnastics. A South African athletics team, which included a Black South African, Titus Mamabola, had been competing in Europe. In Naples, Ugandan, Tunisian and Kenyan athletes refused to compete against Mamabola, so the entire South African team walked out of the meeting in protest (Star, July 3, 1974). Earlier, in a meeting in Paris, the communist countries had participated only on con=

dition that the South African team was not officially presented and the South African flag was not flown (Star, June 6, 1974).

In August Italy announced that all sporting ties with South Africa were to be severed (Cape Times, August 23, 1974).

Whether the response was the result of Italy's statement, or whether it was a culminating effect, is difficult to ascertain; but a day later two Transvaal Nationalist oriented newspapers criticised the government for not implementing their liberal sports policy quickly enough. They said that sport was on the brink of total isolation, and that only multi-racial teams selected on merit could alleviate the situation. The Oggend=blad (August 24, 1974) said that the sport policy with all its consequences should either be implemented immediately, or it

should be accepted that it was a waste of time merely trying to postpone the sad day of sports isolation. There was no time left for a gradual evolution of policy. It added that by the time the policy reached its final stage of evolution all international sporting ties would be lost. At this crucial point the Oggendblad was showing more insight than had previously been displayed. At no stage had Nationalist sports policy suggested an evolution to multi-racial or merit-selected teams. Multi-nationalism alone was the purported goal. The Oggendblad was presuming that multi-nationalism would lead to multi-racialism, an idea which had been refuted, up to this point by Nationalists. Die Vaderland (August 24, 1974) also expressed concern about the probable future of South African sport, although their suggestion of a solution was more Nationalist-orientated. Die Vaderland suggested selecting teams that were representative of all of South Africa's population groups: this state of affairs, it suggested, would only exist until the Black homelands become independent.

Elsewhere, the question of full merit selection was being discussed as a possibility, and the question of Springbok colours was again raised. On this occasion, forty Springboks called for the Springbok emblem to be awarded to all races. Dr. Koornhof replied that even if a Black were selected for a South African team, he would not be awarded the Springbok emblem. The Springbok had been and would remain a White symbol (Sunday

Times, August 25, 1974). On September 9th Hoofstad presented an editorial which called for merit selection in rugby and cricket. Hoofstad pointed out that this did not mean that mixed sport should be played on a club, provincial or national level, other ways could be used to compile a representative team consisting of the best players from other racial groups. Merit teams in rugby and cricket, it perorated, were going to have to come, if not in 1974 then in the near future.

At this point the government displayed a steadfast commitment to multi-nationalism. Dr. Koornhof reiterated the government's viewpoint:

With regard to the present speculation about so called merit teams in rugby and cricket, the policy of the Government has been put repeatedly and the position is unchanged. The putting of view points on this in the public press serves no purpose and does not promote sport. (Cape Times, September 9, 1974)

This intractability did not help South Africa in her international sports relations, and Italy announced that she would refuse to play against South Africa in the interzone Davis Cup tennis final unless the matches took place at a neutral venue. A special meeting of the Davis Cup Nations Committee was organised, and it was declared that South Africa's Ellis Park stood as the venue and that Italy would have to play there or forfeit the tie (Rand Daily Mail, September 5, 1974).

In October it appeared as though the South African Government realised: (a) that the continued build-up of pressure against South Africa's sports policy was not going to abate of its own accord or because of limited concessions made to Black sportsmen by multi-nationalism; (b) that there was in South Africa an increasingly receptive climate (mainly the media) as epitomised in Hoofstad's (October 11, 1974) editorial, wherein the enemies of South Africa were castigated and the suggestion was made that the time was ripe for further change in South African sport which would assist in strengthening the arguments of South Africa's friends. Hoofstad felt that if Non-Whites were chosen in a South African rugby team, as requested by the French Rugby Union, it would be easier for the president of the FRU,

Mr. Ferasse, and his Minister of Sport, to stand up to the communists.

On October 14th 1974, Dr. Koornhof addressed parliament. He first assured the house that progress in sport had been possible because it had been built on a foundation of multi-nationalism (Hansard, October 14, 1974. Cols. 5225-5317). He then went on to explain how he envisaged the development of the sports policy. Firstly, sport would be practised and administered by the various population groups on all the various levels within a national context. Secondly, the national sporting bodies of the various population groups, each on the road to self determination, would be able to enter into their own relations with similar sporting bodies of other nations. Thirdly, individual sportsmen and women would be able to rise to the highest international level. Fourthly, within South Africa full opportunities would be afforded for inter-nation and international competition. Fifthly, organised participation in sport within this framework would be encouraged among all nations in South Africa. Sixthly, co-ordination on the highest administrative level among the sporting bodies of the various population groups in South Africa would be brought about. Seventhly, the development of organised sport would be related to the social and political development of the respective population groups (Hansard, October 14, 1974. Cols. 5303-5306).

The Minister then stated: "It is the standpoint of the Government that all the Olympic sports, as was decided by the Government of Dr. Verwoerd in 1962, may select an inter-nation team on merit, consisting therefore of the best individuals of all the nations in South Africa to represent South Africa under the South African flag until the Non-White nations become independent and conclude their own sport relations as Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana are already doing" (Hansard, October 14, 1974. Col. 5305).

The next point the Minister went on to make was that national sports in which participants competed in bona fide world championships, for example, the Federation Cup for women and the Davis Cup for men in the case of tennis, and the Eisenhower

Cup (amateur) and the P.G.A. World championship in the case of golf, it would be possible to choose an inter-national team on merit, with the same qualifications as above.

With regard to cricket and rugby (which did not fall into any of the above categories), Dr. Koornhof said that the historic developments of these varieties of sport would force relations with the associations of the various rugby- and cricket-playing countries to be maintained by the White Cricket Association and the White Rugby Board, as had always been the case. The various Non-White nations would then have to conclude their own cricket and rugby relations, as it was not possible to establish a co-ordinating body, either for cricket or for rugby (Hansard, October 14, 1974. Cols. 5306-5316).

Before Dr. Koornhof's policy is analysed further, it must be mentioned that there was another incident which was discussed in parliament, and which had further implications for South African sport. Problems had arisen in South African tennis when India refused to play South Africa in the final of the Davis Cup. Dr. Koornhof had heard that a Mr. A.S. Pilay was going to India, and so he had arranged a meeting between Mr. Pilay and himself (Race Relations News, November 2, 1974). Mr. Pilay then reported (Rand Daily Mail, October 14, 1974) that the Minister of Sport had given him two dramatic assurances about mixed sport: (a) That if India sent a cricket team to South Africa, a multi-racial team would be picked to oppose it; (b) That apartheid in South African sport would disappear completely.

The last assurance was dramatic indeed, and, if it was substantiated, indicated a departure or change in the very basis of South African Nationalist thinking. Dr. Koornhof then stated in parliament (Hansard, October 14, 1974. Cols. 5311-5312):

.... indicated that he (Mr. Pilay) should say in India that our policy in South Africa, as I indicated again this afternoon, is not based on discrimination on the grounds of race or colour. I have also told him that if Mr. Khanna (Secretary of the All-India Lawn Tennis Association) means by apartheid in sport discrimination on grounds of colour or race, I can give him the assurance that apartheid is disappearing from sport in South Africa.

The implication was immediately seized upon by journalists, and with much elation aligned with the sports policy. The elation would have been tempered somewhat if Dr. Koornhof's statement had been more closely scrutinised. Dr. Koornhof's last statement was an exercise in syntax and semantics. He had defined apartheid in his terms and then suggested that South Africa was moving away from it, because it implied discrimination on grounds of race or colour. Apartheid was the separate development of separate nations. It was an argument propounded by Hoofstad (October 15, 1974). In an editorial the comment was made that other countries should take note of the extent to which South Africa's sports policy had developed along the path to the total eradication of discrimination on the grounds of race or colour. It added that the government deserved praise and thanks for its attempts at keeping South Africa in international sport. However, delight was to be short-lived. On 29 October, 1974, India refused to meet South Africa in the Davis Cup final, and issued the following statement (Rand Daily Mail, October 30, 1974): "That in the absence of any assurance for the removal of racial discrimination and starting of integrated and mixed play in all sports in the country at national and international levels, India is not in a position to play South Africa".

The sports policy statement in October 1974 was a compromise. The variables which contrived to produce this compromise were world opinion, which demanded the abolition of racial discrimination in sport, and the media, which were demanding that further adjustments be made in South Africa's sport policy. Particularly important was the involvement of the Afrikaans press. At the other extreme, exerting considerable pressure, was a faction of conservative opinion which wished to see the Verwoerdian principles of separatism adhered to in sport. The Nationalist Party's problem was how to make the concessions, which enlightened and world opinion were demanding, without (a) appearing to cede to world opinion, (b) abandoning Nationalist principles of apartheid and separate development, or (c) losing support from the ultra-conservative faction within the National Party itself. As a result, multi-nationalism was still a dominant theme in

this policy statement, although there was a definite attempt to move away from 1971's format. The dissolution of Open Internationals allowed teams to mix at the national level, which had not been condoned in 1971. The selection of national teams irrespective of race was another concession in 1971 terms, merit selection not being a consideration in 1971. While the couching of the statement in Nationalist terminology may have confused the conservative faction, and therefore mollified their ideological opposition, it did not placate opposition from non-racialists opposed to multi-nationalism. Ebrahim Patel, secretary of the non-racial South African Rugby Union, said the concessions were not primarily in the interests of Black people in South Africa, or made out of goodwill towards Black people. Rather, they were piece-meal adaptations of a confused and incomprehensible sports policy made for overseas consumption. He further stated:

This is further illustrated by the fact that the concessions come at a time when South Africa is virtually begging to play India in the Davis Cup final. It lacks spontaneity and goodwill and there seems to be little for my union to rejoice about. (Cape Times, October 16, 1974)

Hassan Howa was even more condemning. He said:

The utterances of the National Party M.P.'s fill me with a feeling of deep contempt, mixed with pity. Contempt because they are still filled with the idea that South Africans are only white people. I feel pity for the National Party and its supporters. Here I include those stooges who wish to tell the world that South Africa is moving towards non-racial sport by these dishonest concessions Politicians should leave sports administrators to sort out where or with whom we should play. (Cape Times, October 16, 1974)

Anti-apartheid movements outside South Africa showed that they were unimpressed by South Africa's concessions. The Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace (MRAP) in France was joined in October by 21 other organisations, including the French Communist Party and the Roman Catholic International Commission for Justice and Peace, which threatened to disrupt the Springbok rugby tour of France in November. There were also threats of travel-hampering tactics when the Springboks'

plane stopped in Zaïre (Rand Daily Mail, October 26, 1974). The tour came about amid demonstrations, and the expressed disapproval of many French Members of Parliament and political figures, who had earlier registered their disapproval of the tour by signing a letter drafted by the Movement Against Racism asking the French President d'Estaing to cancel the tour. The Springboks were apparently untroubled by the demonstrations, although Greyvenstein (1974 : 235) says the play was generally uninspiring. In the middle of December 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations indicated that it was not satisfied by the concessions which the South African Government had introduced, and in accordance with this feeling passed a further resolution (3324 E (XXIX) of December 16, paragraph (c)) which requested all governments "to prohibit all cultural, educational, scientific, sporting and other contact with the racist régime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid" (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 3324 E (XXIX), 1974).

Further disapprobation greeted Dr. Koornhof when he undertook a trip to London to hold meetings with cricket and rugby delegates. Dr. Koornhof did not guarantee multi-racial sport in the immediate future; instead he informed them of the progress made. He said cricket and rugby had not come under the synonymous multi-national/multi-racial billing in his October announcement (Cape Times, December 10, 1974). When he met with French authorities, the response was in a similar vein; especially as he refused to give permission for a South African multi-racial rugby team to play against a French team, during the projected rugby tour of the Republic in 1975. This refusal threatened to harm the relationship between the French rugby organisation and the South African body, and the 1975 tour itself. This relationship had established itself as one of the most consistent that South Africa had had with any of the major rugby playing nations, with the French maintaining contact irrespective of the pressure against this association. The attitude of the French must therefore have been viewed with alarm by South African rugby administrators and governmental advisers. Antagonism of the French could lead to a total rugby isolation. The conservative faction in South Africa could

also see the pressure developing for a concession to be made. Two Ministers moved promptly to allay conservative fears that mixing might be imminent. Dr. Treurnicht, who had been in the vanguard of conservative thought, announced that those people who were talking about mixed rugby and cricket teams were not interpreting official National Party policy, but were merely thinking wishfully. In reply to a remark that 76 of South Africa's 78 sports were already mixed, Dr. Treurnicht said he was referring to cricket and rugby, which were not Olympic sports as all the others were. The rules of the Olympics required that teams should represent countries, not .. ions. South Africa, therefore, had no choice. He said this was merely a transitional arrangement. The ideal remained to make all the nations self-sufficient in all matters, including sport, so that each could be represented by its own people at international level (Cape Times, February 19, 1975). There seemed to be a power-struggle looming, as on February 25th Dr. Mulder, Minister of Interior and Information, confirmed Dr. Treurnicht's statement. He said that the government would not permit merit selection of teams for the proposed French rugby tour which was to take place later in the year (Cape Times, February 22, 1975).

While the public at large had endorsed the policies of the Nationalists in the April 1974 election, there was still strong opposition within the cabinet to mixed sport. Dr. Treurnicht had been appointed to a key cabinet position, becoming Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, and it was obvious that he could dig in and obstruct verligtes like Dr. Koornhof. Treurnicht and Mulder obviously gambled on the belief that Vorster would not swing all his power behind Koornhof and sport, thus risking National unity for the sake of rugby and cricket.

Thus it appeared that in February the possible distension of Nationalist ideology in the sports of rugby and cricket had been effectively shelved. This of course jeopardised the projected French rugby tour, since the French had requested a game against a multi-racial South African team. Dr. Craven was obviously annoyed by developments, and attempted to mini-

mise any effect that Mulder and Treurnicht could have by stating: "We deal with the Minister of Sport, Dr. Koornhof, not Dr. Mulder" (Argus, February 24, 1975). But the die seemed to have been cast: multi-nationalism would remain as it was, without greater movement or further straying from Verwoerd's principles. It was a belief that Vorster tried to encourage in a February speech:

And now, my friends, we have entered the third decade of our policy. We have imparted status to peoples, separate peoples; we have given them governments. We have given them people to be in charge of those governments, and I invite those people to my office and I discuss matters with them as equals, because they are leaders of their nations and I am the leader of my nation. I respect them as leaders of their peoples and I speak to them very frankly and I tell them: Look, I am not prepared - and we must understand one another very clearly - to give you a say over my people, not today, not tomorrow either. But I will not have a say over you for all time either. You must lead your own people, and we are now in the era, the third decade, in which we must face up to the multi-nationalism of our policy, for out of it certain consequences are going to arise. Certain consequences have already risen from it in the field of sport, and certain consequences will arise from it in every other sphere, and I shall face those consequences squarely, in the knowledge that my policy is aimed at that, and the corner stone of my policy is that I wish to preserve the identity of the Whites, that I also wish to preserve the sovereignty of the Whites over themselves at all times. If this is the case then I am prepared - and Dr. Verwoerd foreshadowed this in his time - to face the consequences of multi-nationalism squarely. (Hansard, February 7, 1975. Cols. 384-385)

Vorster's speech was an attempt at placating the more conservative White opinion; it reassured this faction that the development of multi-nationalism would not compromise the approach of Verwoerd, multi-nationalism would not threaten the identity of the Whites. However, in speaking about 'certain consequences' Vorster also intimated that the 1974 policy announcement on sport may not be absolute. The announcement when it did come in March 1975 marked the beginning of greater deviation within the parameters of multi-nationalism; a deviation which was to direct South African sport closer than just a semantical alignment to multi-racial sport.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

MULTI-RACIALISM AND SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

THE 1976 ALL BLACK RUGBY TOUR

THE 1976 OLYMPIC BOYCOTT

INTERNAL MULTI-RACIAL SPORT DEVELOPMENTS

THE 1976 SPORTS POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT AND REACTION

MULTI-RACIALISM AND SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT IN 1977

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

At the end of 1974, despite the October sports policy announcement, it was apparent that world opinion was hardening against South Africa's re-entry into international sport. The reception which Dr. Koornhof received when he had talks with British rugby and cricket delegates, and with French rugby delegates, at the end of 1974, left little doubt that greater change in South Africa's sports policy would need to be forthcoming if South Africa cherished any desire to maintain her international sports contacts, especially in rugby. Further distension of the multi-national parameters would not suffice; the French Rugby Union were demanding, as a pre-condition to the 1975 rugby tour, a degree of mixing hitherto unprecedented. The French wanted to play against a team which included Blacks and Whites : a multi-racial South African team. This was a clear deviation from the demarcations of multi-nationalism which had seen separate Black and Coloured teams, but never mixed teams. Separate teams theoretically representing separate nations were acceptable to the adherents of separate development; integrated teams would gainsay this basic philosophy.

At the beginning of March 1975 it appeared that the National party would remain bound by its more conservative element to

maintaining the status quo. Appearances conveyed the idea that National party unity was a far higher prerogative than the advance towards multi-racialism in South African sport. The announcement which came on March 4th was therefore something of a gamble. It was a gamble which challenged the ideological commitment of the more conservative faction within the National party, which had openly opposed any form of mixing in rugby and cricket, and which had repeatedly asked for assurances that multi-national sport would not lead to further mixing. The odds, however, were considerably shortened in Vorster's favour. At the 1974 election the most vociferous critic of the National party's sports policy, the Herstigte Nasionale Party, had failed to win a seat. While not automatically a mandate for further change it was a positive indication. Vorster was also reasonably assured of a favourable reception from the media which had been agitating for further implementation of the sports policy. The electorate, a great many of whom were rugby orientated, would hardly supply a negative reaction to an announcement which would virtually assure them international competition in White South Africa's number one sport. The speech on March 4th made by Dr. Koornhof almost certainly saved the 1975 French rugby tour, it also introduced a branch called multi-racialism, which would run off the multi-national continuum and initiate and consolidate its own parallel development. Dr. Koornhof's statement read:

At the request of the French Rugby Union, the Government had decided that the South African Rugby Board may arrange a special match in which an invitation team consisting of the various nationals of South Africa may participate.

In view of the fact that this tour is the South African Rugby Board's tour, the team will be selected by invitation by the Rugby Board. It will not include mixed trials, and it is not a merit or representative side of South Africa.

The playing of this match does not mean that there is change in the Government's position, that is, that sport on club, provincial and national levels is to be played separately by the various racial groups.

It confirms that merit teams, which naturally assumes integration in this respect, is against Government

policy. It also does not prejudice selection of a White Springbok team.

The tour program also includes two test matches against the Springboks, as well as a test against the Coloureds and a test against the Bantu peoples.

Completely in line with this attitude, the Government has by request also agreed to an invitation cricket team, selected on the same basis, to play against the Derek Robins XI. (Argus, March 5, 1975)

This occasions did not mark the demise, formal or informal, of multi-nationalism. The accordance of test matches against the Coloureds and Africans evidenced the desire to maintain the concept, a desire which is still manifest in 1979, as evidenced in the use, for example, of multi-national terminology in the annual report of the Department of Sport and Recreation (1978 : 2). The announcement by Dr. Koornhof was therefore more significant for what it initiated than for anything it aspired to end. It was not true multi-racialism in that the announcement only extended to a few invitation games at the national level: there were to be no mixed trials, and the team selected in rugby would be a South African XV, the Springbok team remaining the preserve of the White rugby playing population. The announcement was at best tokenistic multi-racialism, and as such the reaction varied. The president of the South African Rugby Board Dr. Craven was "very pleased". Boon Wallace, president of the South African Cricket Association, thought that it was the dawn of a new era in South African cricket, an era in which all of South Africa's cricketing hopes could be realised (Argus, March 5, 1975). Wallace was being decidedly optimistic on the strength of what amounted to a small concession, but obviously he hoped to convince those watching and listening overseas that the potential implicit in the announcement was more significant than that which it seemed to contain.

The reaction of the non-racial bodies added some perspective to the development. They said they would turn down any invitations to their players to take part in any of the invitation games. There had been no meaningful change for the majority of the country's cricketers or rugby followers, they said: "The government's policy on mixed cricket and rugby at club,

provincial and national level remained exactly the same" (Cape Times, March 6, 1975). The majority seemed to agree that at worst the government was pointed in the right direction. While Die Burger (March 6, 1975) in its editorial appealed for the new arrangement to be given a chance to see if and how it worked, the Hoofstad (March 6, 1975) was a little more circumscribed. In its editorial it stated that the decision had raised new questions. Dr. Craven was reported as saying that it was not the French rugby bosses who had demanded a mixed team, but the demands which had been made of them. The Hoofstad wanted to know who these people were that were making the demands, and what their aim was. If they were trying to force a policy of integration on South Africa through sport, then no notice should be taken of their demands, let alone accede to them. Hoofstad then suggested that Dr. Craven and the French rugby bosses should reveal who was making the demands and what their aims were. If there was the slightest doubt that sport was being used to further political aims, then the tour should be cancelled, it concluded. Two days later Dr. Mulder explained what had led to the government granting permission for this development. Dr. Mulder stated that the French had wanted to come and tour South Africa, but had indicated that problems might ensue if they did not play against a team in which Whites and Non-Whites were represented: other international teams like Australia, New Zealand and England might refuse to play against them. This was the choice with which the French Rugby Union was faced, said Dr. Mulder, so the government considered it on merit and decided that the South African Rugby Board could nominate a mixed invitation team, although no mixed trials would take place and it would not be a merit selected team (Hoofstad, March 8, 1975).

This presentation obviously reassured some of the conservatives that this concession to the French Rugby Union did not herald mixed rugby per se in South Africa, and Dr. Treurnicht did not resign as he had threatened to do on numerous occasions if mixed teams became a reality in South Africa. However, he did promise to resign if there were any more concessions and Dr. Mulder gave further reassurance to his constituents by stating that this recent government decision still fell in line with

government policy, invitation teams were merely an extension. The nationalists were not becoming a 'bunch of liberals', he added (Cape Times, March 10, 1975).

History was made when the French rugby team arrived in South Africa and met a mixed invitation South African XV for the first time. The game was played at Newlands in Cape Town and while the team was integrated Black and White spectators were kept apart. The South African XV beat the French 18-3, which was not held as being as significant as the fact that the crowd appeared to be, for the first time in South African rugby, unified in their support of a semi-national team (Cape Times, June 7, 1975). The general success of the venture argued for greater implementation and more occasions of multi-racial sport. The theme was taken up by the opposition in parliament when the debate on Sport and Recreation started on June 11th: "The fact that 15 Black, White and Brown South Africans played against and beat the touring French, is to be entirely welcomed as a limited improvement which we hope in future will become the rule rather than the exception" (Hansard, June 11, 1975. Col. 8066).

The government was again implacable. Dr. Koornhof claimed that integrated sport would lead to chaos, saying that he had on a previous occasion appealed to certain people not to use sport as a medium for trying to force the government to abandon its policy, because they would not succeed. Sport was, he said, important, but there were other things more important. The basic principles of the National Party's policy of separate recognition, existence and development of the race groups, were more important than sport (Hansard, June 11, 1975. Col. 8097). In reference to violence at soccer matches which had led to the suggestion that multi-nationalism was polarising feeling and making decisions against a team personal and therefore racial, the Minister replied that the rioting surrounding the soccer was a 'slight difficulty'. He further stated that "if any person in this country wants to suggest that the soccer matches which were played between the various peoples, created anything but sound relations in South Africa, that person does not know what he is talking about.... The facts of the matter

are that relations are not being marred. It is absolute nonsense to allege that" (Hansard, June 11, 1975. Col. 8098). The Minister's statement again indicated that multi-nationalism in sport was in no way moribund. His reaffirmation of the controlling influence of the subjacent separatist ideology committed the exercise in multi-racial teams firmly to the tokenistic taxonomy; equally important, it offered reassurance that the National Party still controlled sports development and that they would not be cajoled into change, nor were they becoming, in Dr. Mulder's words, 'a bunch of liberals'. Extending the defence of multi-nationalism still further, Dr. Koornhof commented on the recent Comrades marathon where Blacks who had participated were forced to wear tags reading 'Xhosa' or 'Zulu'. In replying to criticism that this practice was degrading and would cause racial resentment Dr. Koornhof stated: "It is a downright disgrace and an absolute reflection on the entire Opposition to level the accusation that if a Black man runs under the banner of his own people it means, 'putting a tag on a Black man'" (Hansard, June 12, 1975. Col. 8103).

Dr. Craven intervened in August with a rather puzzling statement to the effect that multi-national rugby in South Africa was the same as multi-national British Lions rugby. Perhaps Dr. Craven was taking his cue from Dr. Koornhof's parliamentary speech in June. At this stage it was pointed out by the Opposition that in this respect the difference between South Africa and Britain was that there was no law stopping a Scottish national from moving to London or Swansea or Dublin and playing for England, Wales or Ireland if he was good enough; whereas in South Africa two Non-White players like John Noble (Coloured) and Morgan Cushe would not be allowed to join a White club, let alone play for a White provincial team (Cape Times, August 26, 1975). That the policy of multi-nationalism was not proving acceptable to all those who played rugby in South Africa, was indicated by another rugby incident in August. The Coloured and African Rugby Organisations (the Proteas and Leopards), which were affiliated to the White Rugby Board, arranged to play against each other 'along the lines of British multi-nationalism', as Dr. Craven had suggested. The Coloured Labour Party, which

opposed apartheid, and the Johannesburg Coloured Management Committee, which was similarly disposed, called for a boycott of the game and urged potential spectators instead to attend a match organised by the non-racial union at a nearby stadium. The evening before the Proteas/Leopards match, a demonstration was held outside the Proteas' hotel. The next day, only 600 spectators turned up at the game while 3 000 attended the non-racial game. This prompted the leader of the Labour Party to observe: "The message is loud and clear that people want non-racial sport" (Brickhill, 1976 : 36).

The issue of the Springbok emblem was a further product of the multi-national/multi-racial development. With Blacks being selected for White teams it seemed logical that they would be entitled to wear the Springbok emblem which accompanied the honour of national selection. However, there was a considerable body of opinion who thought this would be eroding White identity as the Springbok had been the exclusive property of the White race. Dr. Koornhof tried to circumvent the problem by announcing that a new emblem was being designed. He added that the Springbok would always remain the emblem for White sport teams. It would be unfair to ask the Whites to give up their emblem, because it would imply that the Leopards and Proteas had to give up theirs. This attempt to maintain White exclusiveness was not enough to stem the conservative attack that was to follow at the National Party's Transvaal congress, where a number of delegates complained bitterly that the policy, as it was being applied, was rapidly setting the scene for integration between the country's races. At the same time a number of younger delegates surprisingly pleaded for more mixed sport, suggesting that Currie Cup and Sport Pienaar (rugby) competitions be made multi-national to increase the dignity of the Black teams (Cape Times, August 27; Natal Mercury, August 27, 1975). Dr. Koornhof rejected suggestions that sport would lead to integration (multi-national sport, according to Nationalist dogma, led to separate nations not to an integrated society). He insisted that application of the policy was the logical consequence of separate development. With regard to the private mixed teams playing in the Aurora (Durban) and Green Point

(Cape Town) cricket clubs, he said that the cabinet had refused to legislate on this matter because only one Coloured player was involved in each team (Die Burger, August 27, 1975).

The fears of those who criticised government policy for its possible leading to integration, were not assuaged by Dr. Koornhof's reassurances at the Nationalist Party congress. Early in September the separatist approach had again to be defined to allay fears over multi-racial invitation teams. Dr. Koornhof said that these teams were not opposed to the idea of separate development, nor were they the result of overseas pressure: they were merely an extension of government policy. That the conservative element may still have been confused is possible, taking into account the announcement which followed two days later. Under the heading "Policy of South Africa not racial", Dr. Koornhof explained that the South African Government was doing its best to get away from race/colour discrimination. He said that it was not easy to get away from colour discrimination quickly, but that if Non-Whites showed real ability, the government would 'go out of its way to assist them'. He continued by saying that the more Non-White sportsmen South Africa could produce, the better South Africa's image would be overseas (Cape Times, September 17, 19, 1975).

The conservatives were unimpressed and renewed their calls for legislation to prevent the multi-racial Aurora Cricket team in Durban from continuing its participation. Dr. Koornhof deviated slightly from his original defence that had declared this particular example of integration to be insignificant, by stating that an approach to sport which was too dogmatic should not be allowed to damage South Africa's detente programme. He said that sport should be seen against a background of a rapidly changing world (Die Burger, September 27, 1975). It appeared that Dr. Koornhof was becoming tired of pampering the conservative element, when he continued:

South Africa could not sit around the meat-pots and do nothing about attempts to isolate it. There were those who simply wanted to put up the white flag.

.... The National Party is a party which accepts the challenge, which is dynamic and which is not afraid

of change. When we deal with sport it should not be in isolation, but in its entirety as part of detente. (Natal Mercury, September 27, 1975).

It also seemed that Dr. Koornhof might be adopting a more realistic position with regard to multi-racial sport, but he soon made it clear, or at least gave the impression, that he had not strayed too far from multi-nationalism. "The party's biggest task is to secure White identity, but the sports policy does not threaten this", he said. "While it will never lead to integration people should not be petty and should try and understand the entire situation" (Natal Mercury, September 27, 1975).

The more conservative section of Nationalist support would have had to have been extremely short-sighted not to have understood that without further concessions South African sport and in particular rugby was going to be deprived of its traditional international competition. It appeared that the conservative element considered the need of South African sport to be subordinate to the need of preservation of White identity. They were not prepared to condone multi-racialism, as it ostensibly threatened to compromise the essence of separate development.

If the conservative element were not prepared to accept this form of multi-racialism, neither were the non-racial sports organisations. Norman Middleton, the president of the non-racial South African Council of Sport and the South African Soccer Federation, felt that South Africa was not moving away from discrimination and that there was no sincerity in the approach of White administrators. Ebrahim Patel, secretary of the non-racial rugby union, SARU, added that: "The argument for or against non-racial sport is an argument on principle, and in this regard one can surely not compromise You either adhere to it or you don't". Hassan Howa, of the non-racial cricket organisation, SACBOC, felt that the so-called breakthroughs were merely 'window dressing to appease world sporting opinion and help South Africa back into world sport' (Sunday Times, July 13, 1975). Considering Dr. Koornhof's statements following his March announcement, the non-racial organisations had a valid point.

Internationally there appeared to be a similar attitude, namely that there had been insufficient change in the sporting status quo to warrant an amelioration of attitude towards South Africa. In London the British Government threatened to withhold a grant from the World Youth Sailing championships on the Firth of Forth, if the participating South African team was selected on a racial basis (Argus, July 12, 1975). The Royal Yachting Association, which was hosting the event, announced that it would forego the British Government's grant of nearly £10,000, since under international yachting rules the host country is bound to accept the entry of any member nation wishing to compete (Cape Times, July 17, 1975).

The British Government interfered in sport again in August by banning South Africa from the world water-ski championships. The Cape Times reports that the decision was really made by the sponsors, 'Leisure Sports Ltd.', who sought and obtained permission to ban South Africa from the World Water-ski Union, after pressure from SAN-ROC who threatened adverse publicity. It was felt that it was better to hold the world championship without South Africa, than to cancel the event (Cape Times, August 22, 1975).

The Canadian Government adopted a similar attitude when it demanded its money back from the local organisers of the World Masters Amateur Track and Field tournament, because a South African team was allowed to compete. The government said that their policy had applied for some time, and that the organisers knew about it. Don Farguharson, president of the association, said that the government had not announced its stand until the South Africans were en route, and that if the organisers had to repay the government there would be insufficient funds to do so (Cape Times, August 14, 1975). There was some criticism of the Canadian Government's lack of consistency, as two South Africans participated in and won the 16-18 year age group synchronised trampoline event in Canada a week later. The lack of consistency appeared to stem from the fact that, although this was also in contravention of government policy, the Canadian Government, not having sponsored the competition, was not directly involved in contravening its own policy.

In New Zealand the question of sporting contact with South Africa was becoming a political issue. New Zealand elections were due in November and Mr. Muldoon, the National Party candidate and opposition leader, estimated that there were political advantages by promising New Zealanders contact with their traditional South African rivals. Muldoon stated that if the National Party was the government in New Zealand, threats of violence and civil strife would not cause the government to call off a tour by a South African rugby team. Muldoon said: "We wouldn't cancel a tour if the police said there would be riots. It was on the basis of such reports that Norman Kirk, the Labour prime minister, did so in 1973, after stating in his pre-election campaign in 1972 that they would not do so" (Auckland Star, October 16, 1975). South Africa recognised that if the National Party were elected to power in New Zealand the chance of re-establishing sporting and especially rugby contact was good. A New Zealand television team which sought to obtain permission to enter South Africa had their visas withheld. This prevented them from filming a documentary on sporting contacts between New Zealand and South Africa. The South African Government was apparently concerned that the report would not be favourable and that its release in New Zealand could interfere with the approaching November elections there. In this regard the following statement was released by the South African Consulate in Wellington (New Zealand): "We have a strong policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries It is felt the programmes could be seen as a kind of interference on the political scene here, particularly with the General Election coming" (Auckland Star, September 29, 1975). The statement was paradoxical, since by refusing visas to New Zealand T.V.-1 'Seven Days' team, the objectivity of public opinion was being influenced. The television team were told that they could re-apply in six months' time.

Although the anti-apartheid groups in New Zealand campaigned vigorously against the re-adoption of sports contact with South Africa, and attempted to create public awareness as to the inequities extant in South African sport, they were

unsuccessful and the National Party was swept to power with a landslide victory. This victory assured South Africa of future sporting contact, especially with regard to rugby. Muldoon, New Zealand's new prime minister, stated: "I want to see the All Black team go to South Africa next year and lick the pants off the Springboks. If I can personally be there to cheer them on, so much the better" (Christchurch Press, November 15, 1975). He added that he had "not the slightest doubt that continuing sporting contact with South Africa helped the process of integration" (Auckland Star, November 15, 1975).

Hassan Howa reacted to Mr. Muldoon's speech with the prediction that there would be an African backlash. He foresaw a backlash against New Zealand as a result of its dealing with apartheid, and claimed that Mr. Muldoon's government would change its tune when the reality of pressure from other countries, particularly in Africa, hits home (Auckland Star, December 4, 1975). Howa's words were to be prophetic.

The United Nations General Assembly was not as satisfied with South Africa's 'international' sport as New Zealand was. In November, the General Assembly adopted a separate resolution on apartheid in sports, stressing the importance of the sports boycott of South Africa. Resolution 3411 E (XXX) reads as follows (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 3411 E (XXX), 1975).

Noting that the campaign for the boycott of South African sports teams, selected on the basis of apartheid and in violation of the Olympic principle of non-discrimination, has been an important measure which has effectively demonstrated the abhorrence of apartheid on the part of Governments and peoples.

Rejecting the attempts of the racist régime to gain acceptance for participation in international sports by superficial and insignificant modification of apartheid.

Noting with regret that some national and international sports bodies have continued contacts with racist South African sports bodies in violation of the Olympic principle and the resolutions of the United Nations.

Condemning the racist régime of South Africa for its repressive measures against non-racial sports bodies in South Africa.

1. Reaffirms its unqualified support of the Olympic principle that no discrimination be allowed on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation;

2. Commends all Governments, sports bodies and other organisations which have taken action, in pursuance of the Olympic principle and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, for the boycott of racially selected South African sports bodies or teams;

3. Calls upon all Governments, sports bodies and other organisations:

(a) To refrain from all contacts with sports bodies established on the basis of apartheid or racially selected sports teams from South Africa;

(b) To exert all their influence to secure the full implementation of the Olympic principle, especially by the national and international sports bodies which have continued co-operation with South African sports bodies established on the basis of apartheid;

4. Commends all sports bodies and sportsmen in South Africa which have been struggling against racism in sports;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the production and widest distribution of information material on apartheid in sports in South Africa, and the international campaign against contacts in sports with South Africa. (United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 3411 E (XXX), November 21, 1975)

Irrespective of the general non-acceptance initially of multi-racialism, 1975 witnessed two significant developments in South African sport. The first was the match between a multi-racial South African team and a touring French side, and the second was a similar occasion in cricket. Both events demonstrated that it was possible for South Africans of all races to come together in a sporting environment, and in doing so to succeed in dispelling some of the extant myths and prejudices that had been developed over the centuries. While they were nonetheless brief tokens - players had to return to their own group areas, to carrying a pass, and to separate sport - both occasions underscored that in multi-racialism there was a viable alternative for South African sport; one that would not result in

racial aggravation. Although these developments were greeted by non-racial and world sporting organisations with insouciance, and by the conservative White element with open antagonism (the former because they were insignificant concessions, and the latter because they signified an erosion of rudimentary ideology), there were signs that even adopting a multi-racial approach to sport might not regain South Africa international sports contact; with the exception of New Zealand.

During 1975 the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid met on two occasions. The first occasion was in Paris where a seminar was convened which was attended by official and non-governmental representatives from many of the countries interested or involved in Southern African affairs. Recognition was officially accorded the principal anti-apartheid organisation, the South African Non-Racial Open Committee (SAN-ROC). The seminar also suggested that financial assistance be given to SAN-ROC to assist in developing and co-ordinating its future activities. In May the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid met again in Havana. At this meeting it was decided that sport was so inextricably involved with politics in South Africa, that it would remain a political issue until apartheid was eliminated (Brickhill, 1976 : 40-41). This intimated that as far as the Special Committee was concerned, it did not matter what progress was made in South African sport, or what the changes were called; sport was by its very nature the victim of political persuasion, and therefore could not be free from discrimination unless there was a total governmental policy change. This commitment to politically free sport was idealistic, especially if it was applied universally as a criteria for inter-nation competition. It was significant in that it showed an escalation in the campaign against South African sport and a recognition of the potential of sport to influence or to bring about change.

Opposition to South African sport continued to develop early in 1976. At this juncture the governments of Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan,

Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Senegal, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S.S.R., Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia had indicated a willingness to participate in the sports boycott of South Africa (United Nations, Notes and Documents, January, 1976. 76-11680, pp. 4-27). Tanzania attempted to apply further pressure against New Zealand to sever her sporting relations with South Africa by threatening to cancel a tour of New Zealand by her world-class runner Filbert Bayi, unless New Zealand renounced its ties with South Africa. When New Zealand failed to do so, Bayi's trip was cancelled (Cape Times, January 9, 1976). The Philippines, Mexico, Argentina and the Bahamas withdrew from a world softball tournament, which was being held in New Zealand, as a protest against the inclusion of a South African team (Newnham, 1978 : 18). The Guyanan Government announced that they would ban non-Guyanese sportsmen who had contact with South African sportsmen. This statement followed the banning by Guyana of Barbados' opening batsman G. Greenidge, who had played cricket in South Africa in 1975. Barbados responded by recalling their cricket team from Guyana. Unperturbed, the Guyanan Government reaffirmed its unequivocal support for the 5-year old United Nations' resolution on non-discrimination in sport, a resolution which called on all states to promote adherence to the Olympic principle of non-discrimination, and to encourage their sports organisations to withhold support from events organised in violation of this principle (Cape Times, February 27, 1976).

Contemporaneous with these developments, were indications that South African sport was itself escalating its development. On 18 January the representatives of South Africa's three cricket bodies met to discuss the possibility of uniting as one body. A decision was reached to form one united controlling organisation, subject to the agreement of the provincial affiliates of the respective organisations. The meeting then resolved to pursue 'Normal Cricket', a term taken to refer to competition between all cricketers regardless of race, creed or colour at club level, under one provincial governing body. Odendaal (1977 : 42) states that the reaction from most parties was one of surprise. The South African Council on Sport and the

Committee for Fairness in Sport hailed the new moves with enthusiasm. SAN-ROC in London said that the decision of the three bodies was admirable, but that as they were sceptical of White sports officials, they would only believe it when it was done. Peter Hain welcomed the move as a positive courageous step, and said that South African cricketers would no longer be hindered if they implemented their plans.

Successful implementation was dependent on government approval. The Minister of Sport and Recreation announced that the government approved the formation of one body, but refused to commit itself on the question of mixed cricket from club level upwards. This was interpreted in some quarters as a sign of disapproval (Cape Times, January 26, 1976).

THE 1976 ALL BLACK RUGBY TOUR

South African rugby, which had been slow in adjusting to the increasing demands for multi-racial sport, announced that from the beginning of 1976 there would be a new policy in South African rugby. Dr. Craven, who was in London (Guardian, February 1, 1976) announced that future South African teams would be picked on merit, after multi-racial trials. All South African national teams, he said, would be selected by a multi-racial selection committee, comprising delegates from the four rugby organisations. This would be known as the co-ordinating rugby committee. Dr. Craven's statement is significant in view of the repeated statements by himself, and at governmental level, that South African rugby would remain White. Although the statement did not imply full integration, that is, mixed clubs and mixed teams, it was an indication that rugby would distend the concept of multi-nationalism further and in so doing move closer to multi-racialism. Peter Hain, however, in this instance was unconvinced. He announced the plans would go ahead to disrupt the proposed Springbok rugby tour of Britain in 1978-79, and that only if there was a genuine commitment towards a irreversible policy on non-racial sport, especially at club level, would there be an amelioration of attitude (Guardian, February 1, 1976). With South African sport not yet having

achieved true multi-racialism, Hain's demand of a commitment to non-racialism, with its implications of discrimination-free sport, would likely be seen as too great a demand at that time.

With little appreciation outside South Africa of the significance of the developments in rugby, the proposed mid-year tour of South Africa to New Zealand continued to gather controversy. Abraham Ordia, president of the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, addressed a letter to the New Zealand Herald's sporting correspondent, Terry McLean, which was published on March 9th. In it, he declared that if New Zealand persisted in its support for racist South Africa, she would have to be prepared to face the consequences. She would be boycotted not only by Africa, but also by the friends of Africa. He added that these nations would not take part in the Olympic or Commonwealth games, if New Zealand also took part.

The New Zealand Prime Minister was not very concerned, saying that time would tell, and that he did not take much notice of inflammatory and extravagant statements by people like Ordia. Ordia replied that he thought New Zealand was being very childish. He could understand, he said, why some sporting associations occasionally took the law into their own hands against the wishes of the government, "but it is when the government itself gets involved, as with New Zealand, that it gets very bad" (Newnham, 1978 : 56). The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brian Talboys, replied that Mr. Ordia had misunderstood New Zealand's attitude to apartheid. New Zealand was not pro-apartheid (Cape Times, March 13, 1976).

The conclusion reached after this debate was that New Zealand had not stated that she was in favour of racism, but that by her deeds and Muldoon's statements she had not declared herself opposed to racism. This had left a definite suggestion of a South African/New Zealand alliance. Ordia, in fact, left the door open for Muldoon by suggesting that the New Zealand Government officially denounce sporting ties with South Africa. Muldoon chose instead not to follow the precedent set by the British Government two years earlier, when it had dissociated itself entirely from the Lions rugby tour. To all intents and

purposes, irrespective of Talboys' statement, the All Blacks rugby team would tour South Africa with the approval of Muldoon, and therefore of the New Zealand Government. Muldoon confirmed this shortly afterwards when he stated:

We are certainly not going to be blackmailed by Mr. Abraham Ordia, or have anyone else tell us what we can do in our own country. I don't know how strong his recommendation is, and frankly I'm not greatly interested If this goes on, about half the countries in the Olympics will be out South Africa has sporting relations with about half the nations which will take part. I believe we will have an Olympics and that all those nations who wish to take part will take part. This time next year we will wonder what it was all about. (Auckland Star, April 12, 1976)

Mr. Muldoon was only partially correct. Firstly, those nations who had sporting relations with South Africa did not hold them officially (with governmental approbation), as New Zealand did. Secondly, Mr. Muldoon underestimated (a) the abhorrence of African states to apartheid, and (b) the depth of the sentiment aroused by this issue, as the Montreal Olympics would later illustrate. Following a meeting of the Supreme Council of Sport in Nairobi on April 27th, Mr. Ordia directed Mr. Muldoon's attention to the following two points:

New Zealand can have South Africa or it can have the Black African countries - it cannot have both. Let them play against the South Africans, but they can forget the other African countries. All the other countries which have sporting ties with South Africa pale into insignificance alongside what New Zealand is doing. (Newnham, 1978 : 58)

He also mentioned the increased importance of the All Black tour, because of rugby's priority status in South Africa, and because of the traditional ties between the two countries (Newnham, 1978 : 58). The meeting of the Executive Committee a few days later endorsed Mr. Ordia's sentiments, and decided to go ahead and boycott the Olympics if the All Blacks toured South Africa. The Committee added that the New Zealand Government aided and abetted, pushed and encouraged the rugby union and made no pretences about it (Auckland Star, April 30, 1976).

The Australian Government, on the other hand, had realised the diplomatic implications of sanctioning sports contact, and stated that they were opposed to racial discrimination. They would not, however, stop Australian touring teams visiting South Africa, nor would they support any expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. Australia felt that total boycott was not conducive to constructive change (Cape Times, March 15, 1976).

At the end of June, the much-threatened and by now deeply controversial New Zealand All Black tour took place. The controversy did not abate. There were large crowds of Blacks amongst those welcoming the All Blacks, but they were not as large as expected. Undoubtedly the racial unrest in South Africa, which was gaining momentum (and with which the All Blacks would come face to face with later in the tour), contributed to the turnout's being smaller than expected. However, also contributing to this lack of support were the anti-All Black sentiments voiced by the non-racial sports bodies. Mr. S. Sokupa, president of the King Williamstown and District non-racial Rugby Union, stated before the first All Black match at East London:

We strongly condemn the All Blacks tour. We dismiss the so-called multi-racial match as an attempt by the Government to convince the world that positive attempts are being made to establish multi-racial sport in South Africa. In fact, concerted attempts are being made to crash the attempts of advocates of non-racial sport. (Newnham, 1978 : 100)

Newnham also reports that at the same time Mr. M. Mvovo, vice-president of the Black Peoples Convention, said that by coming to South Africa the All Blacks were helping to maintain the current racial policy, not only in sport, but also as a general principle (Newnham, 1978 : 101).

The realisation of the tour, sanctioned by the New Zealand Government, created the unprecedented possibility of an Olympic boycott. Mr. Talboys attacked the ethics of any such boycott saying: "Any boycott of the Olympics would only undermine the Olympic principle of free competition regardless of race, creed or colour, and by introducing colour in this way, they might well jeopardise the future of the Games themselves" (Cape Times, July 1, 1976). There was implicit irony in Talboys' statement.

The New Zealand tour of South Africa progressed amongst the growing racial violence and on one occasion in Cape Town several of the New Zealand team were caught in racial violence and the teargas attack which followed (Newnham, 1978 : 115).

THE 1976 OLYMPIC BOYCOTT

Controversy did not end with the final game of the All Black rugby tour. In July at the Montreal Olympics South Africa and New Zealand found themselves, their sports policies and their relationship, the cynosure of the world. In early Greek times, the Olympics had tended to be a non-political event, but in the 20th century, with such saturated media coverage, the Games had become arguably a more effective political platform than even the United Nations. Thus it was no surprise that it was in Montreal that the African Nations decided to lodge their greatest protest at the continuation of racist sport in South Africa. The protest was also aimed at those who continued to have sporting contact with the South Africans.

Initially the apartheid issue and New Zealand's sporting relationship with South Africa were eclipsed by the move to have Taiwan excluded from the Olympic Games. Finally with Taiwan ousted, the issue was presented to the International Olympic Committee, only days before the games were due to start. A statement was handed to Lord Killanin which read:

We are deeply grieved to bring to the notice of the IOC the indignation of the entire body of sportsmen and sportswomen of Africa, at the collaboration of the sporting authorities of New Zealand with racist South Africa despite world wide condemnation of such sporting relationships. It will be recalled that the IOC expelled the South African National Olympic Committee for its apartheid policy in sport. We have no other peaceful remedy against the barefaced support of New Zealand for acts of inhumanity against Africans in South Africa to call on the I.O.C. to bar New Zealand from participating in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada.

Should the IOC fail to heed this humanitarian call, the respective national Olympic committees of Africa reserve the right to reconsider their participation in the games of the XXIst Olympiad. (Newnham, 1978 : 147)

The sixteen signatory countries were: Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Mali, Cameroun, Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Zambia, Congo, Ethiopia and Uganda (Newnham, 1978 : 147). The issue was not put to the vote: Lord Killanin made an arbitrary decision, stating that from where he sat opinion appeared unanimous against the proposal. Newnham (1978 : 148) says that the Africans took it as a contemptuous rebuff.

The Nigerians immediately took it upon themselves to withdraw from the Games. The other African nations, because of a last-minute attempt at solving the dilemma created by New Zealand's refusal to withdraw, did not appear in the traditional opening ceremony of the games. At this stage Dennis Brutus, representing SAN-ROC, and Jean Claude Ganga, representing the African states, were trying to obtain a condemnation of racism and a public dissociation by the New Zealand Olympic Committee from the New Zealand rugby tour to South Africa. Since the demands were not met the African nations departed for home (Newnham, 1978 : 147).

The events of Montreal must have left an impression on other world bodies. The International Football Association (FIFA) expelled South Africa from their association, charging South Africa with failing to meet the statutes which specifically forbade any discrimination by FIFA members (South Africa had been suspended since 1964). South Africa was then expelled from the International Athletics Federation for practising racial discrimination in sport. The congress voted 227 to 145 in favour of the expulsion. This meant that South Africa would be unable to take part in any athletic events against other countries. Mr. Ganga, secretary for the Supreme Council of Sport, commented that only by closing the door would any change be achieved. The International Amateur Swimming Federation expelled Rhodesia and South Africa for practising racial discrimination. Small consolation to South Africa was the retention of her membership of the International Shooting Federation. The International body argued that it had nothing to do with politics; it therefore ignored the motion, put forward by Russia and East Germany, to expel South Africa (Cape Times, July 23, 27, 29, 1976).

South Africa paid an unexpectedly high price for the much sought-after New Zealand rugby tour in July. Expelled from three world bodies, the backlash even to isolation-hardened South Africans must have come as something of a shock. At the beginning of August, repercussions were still being experienced. South Africa was expelled, along with Rhodesia, from the optimist class of the World Yachting championships. In this particular case, Yugoslavia was the catalyst, staging a walkout protest which led to the expulsion (Cape Times, August 4, 1976).

INTERNAL MULTI-RACIAL SPORT DEVELOPMENTS

Although the Olympic protest served to focus attention on South Africa's sports policy and thereby effectively increasing the pressure for change, there had been indications of further flexibility in approach previous to this occasion, although there was also omnipresent conservative antagonism. Early in March an international cricket side arrived in South Africa. Called the 'Wanderers', it contained players from Australia, England, New Zealand and the West Indies. The team played eight matches with all but the first being against racially mixed sides. The three cricket organisations combined to produce mixed teams that played against the Wanderers. There were signs of dissent, and one cricketer from the Transvaal, who belonged to a non-racial cricket organisation, was suspended for playing against the international team. However, Odendaal (1977 : 45) reports that the idea became more acceptable to non-racialists as the tour progressed.

The momentum towards multi-racialism generated by the Wanderers tour was maintained through the formation in July of a nine-man motivating committee whose purpose was to amalgamate all the cricket organisations and form one national cricket body which would administer 'normal' cricket in South Africa. Such an announcement indicated that in cricket a further attempt was being made to widen the schism between multi-nationalism and multi-racialism. This was especially so since 'normal' cricket implied cricket as it was played elsewhere in the world, which meant free of racial restrictions. In order for such an

ideal to be accomplished, certain pieces of legislation had to be circumvented. Raschid Varachia, who had been appointed chairman of the nine-man motivating committee, did not envisage too many problems: "The Group Areas Act was a bridge that would be crossed when the time came; players good enough to play in any club side would not be rejected on purely racial grounds" he said, although he added that each club still had the right to choose its players (Cape Times, July 17, 1976).

Hassan Howa, president of the non-racial Western Province Cricket Board, indicated that his board would disband and operate under the Western Province Cricket Union. He too foresaw no difficulties with the laws: "The laws do not concern us", he said, "as there is no law forbidding people of different races playing together, although the government may have to amend, ignore or remove the Group Areas and the Liquor Act" (Cape Times, July 28, 1976). While cricket pursued multi-racialism with vigour there was no indication that the government would allow their idealism to be converted into pragmatic form. Opposition emanated from Dr. Treurnicht who had announced a 'New deal for Black sport'. According to this statement, Black sport appeared to be falling under the aegis of the Department of Black Administration, of which department Dr. Treurnicht was deputy minister. He was seeking, he said, to improve and create facilities for the better use of leisure time, with special regard to migratory labour and Black youth. He hoped:

- (a) To make available the necessary recreational facilities at hostels;
- (b) To encourage big industrialists and employers to erect hostels and compounds which although not luxurious, would nevertheless be attractive, and where provision would be made for sports fields and indoor recreational facilities;
- (c) To provide instructors and administrators on a voluntary or remunerative basis;
- (d) To develop and improve sport and recreational links between urban areas and homelands;
- (e) To develop strong and healthy national sport organisations within homelands (Cape Times, May 2, 1976).

While it was admirable that concern was being shown for Black sport, a closer examination of the modus operandi revealed that it was simultaneously entrenching the multi-national approach. The development would, if carried to its natural conclusion, thwart the moves toward mixed sport, since it linked Black township sport to the homelands, thus restricting Black/White contact to the multi-national level. Additional criticism was that the Black Administration Board suffered from a 'chronic lack of finances', and that as an administration unit it was primarily concerned with the strict enforcement of influx and labour control (Argus, May 6, 1976). The aims were therefore laudable, but a question mark hung over the underlying motivation, and the utilitarian potential of the new initiative. Displaying further concern about the movement away from the strict multi-national approach to sport, Dr. Treurnicht tried to exert further pressure by making a statement condemning mixed sport (Cape Times, July 19, 1976).

With indications from the government suggesting a willingness to allow greater flexibility of approach in sport, there was still no definite commitment by way of official proclamation. It appeared that the government was prepared to allow sport to progress towards multi-racialism without official condonement or condemnation. This approach also had the benefit of obfuscating official policy on sport and therefore decreasing the possibility of open antagonism between liberal and conservative elements within the National Party itself. Therefore when the nine-man motivating committee met Dr. Koornhof seeking governmental approbation for their plans to introduce normal cricket, there was neither a negative nor a positive reply. Dr. Koornhof merely described the meeting as encouraging, and requested 'additional information'. The provinces, however, took the initiative and pushed ahead with plans for normal cricket. These plans received a setback at the next meeting the committee had with Dr. Koornhof in August. The cabinet considered the plan and adopted a 'no decision' attitude (Odendaal, 1977 : 52). Although such non-commitment was a setback, the request to introduce normal cricket effectively increased the pressure on the government to make a further

policy statement. It was a situation further exacerbated by the racial riots, which produced considerable racial tension, which could possibly be eased if there was further integration in sport. Of importance also was the effect of the Olympic boycott. This had served to refocus attention on South Africa's sports policy : the reaction to this had seen international sporting relations further damaged. In short, a situation had been created which was the product of internal and external pressure.

THE 1976 SPORTS POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT AND REACTION

On September 23rd Dr. Koornhof initiated further development in South African sport and ipso facto committed South Africa to greater integration in sport; it was, as Horrell (1976 : 394) reported, a qualified commitment:

1. White, Coloured, Indian and Black sportsmen and women should all belong to their own clubs. Each should control, arrange, and manage its own sporting fixtures.
2. Wherever possible, practical and desirable, the committees or councils of the different race groups should consult together or have such contact as would advance the interests of the sport concerned.
3. Inter-group competition in respect of individual types of sport (will) be allowed at all levels, should the controlling bodies so decide.
4. In respect of team sports, the councils or committees of each racial group should arrange their own leagues or programmes within the racial group.
5. Where mutually agreed, councils or committees may, in consultation with the Minister, arrange leagues or matches enabling teams from different racial groups to compete.
6. Each racial group should arrange its own sporting relationships with other countries or sporting bodies in accordance with its own wishes, and each should award its own badges and colours.
7. If and when invited or agreed, teams comprising players from all racial groups can represent South Africa, and can be awarded colours which, if so desired, can incorporate the national flag or its colours.

8. Attendance at sporting fixtures (will) be arranged by controlling bodies.

Most of South Africa's top sports administrators considered the announcement a positive development in South African sport. Dr. Craven thought it was a far-reaching move that would help South Africa maintain its position in international sport. Edelston and Thabe, of the Black South African Soccer Association, thought it was great news for Black soccer, in that it would protect all race groups and stop one from dominating the others. Professor Hannes Botha, president of the South African Amateur Athletic organisation, saw the announcement as a great step forward for athletics. Frank Braun of the South African Boxing Association saw it as a step in the right direction but was disappointed that each race group was still expected to form its own sporting ties with other countries and sporting bodies. Such a situation contained an element of discrimination, he said, and was not practically possible because international sporting organisations did not negotiate with a particular race group, but with one affiliated controlling body in each country. Hassan Howa agreed. He felt that the announcement did not go far enough, that players should be allowed to choose for themselves which club they wanted to belong to: White or Coloured. It would not satisfy world opinion, as all that had happened was that multi-racialism had moved from national to club level (Die Burger, September 24, 1976).

Essentially the announcement of September 23rd was a compromise. It did not remove racial restrictions from sport, but it did move South African sport a little further away from the 1971 concept of multi-national sport, although with the government's refusal to condone mixed clubs, it did not do so completely. The policy held that all racial groups should belong to their own clubs, that team sports were to remain separate and that each racial group was to arrange its own international sporting contacts. National colours would be awarded to agreed upon national or mixed teams. It did appear, according to both the above criteria and the fact that there had been no concomitant law changes, that cricket would have difficulty implementing its plan for normal cricket, should approval be forthcoming.

Membership of clubs was still circumscribed and multi-racial leagues could only be arranged with ministerial approval.

Two days following the sports policy announcement Dr. Koornhof approved the non-racial cricket committee's request for multi-racial cricket. This was a significant development as it allowed, with government permission, multi-racial, as opposed to multi-national, sport. Mr. Howa reacted in a positive way and indicated that they would co-operate in the implementation of normal cricket (Odendaal, 1977 : 55). However, there were conditions: there should only be one national controlling body for all cricketers in South Africa, with the same applying at the provincial level; clubs should exercise their discretion as to whom they admitted; facilities at grounds should be open to all; and spectators should not be segregated (Odendaal, 1977 : 55).

The first official mixed club cricket match in South Africa was played at the Wanderers ground on October 2nd (Cape Times, October 4, 1976). The road towards greater integration in sport was not destined to be smooth, however. Misinterpretation, within the Department of Sport, of the sports policy, led to a mixed game being cancelled in Kimberley. Repercussions were felt throughout South Africa and Odendaal (1977 : 57) reports that the whole cricket set-up was threatened as the non-racial bodies were under the impression that they had been misled. Die Burger (October 5, 1976) pleaded for the new policy to be given a chance, stating that all patriotic people should try to promote its success, or at least should refrain from attitudes that might try to wreck it. Anomalous was the fact that strict adherence to the sports policy would have compromised the very aims claimed for it by Die Burger. The aims included the improvement of local sporting relations, and, simultaneously, of relations among the other national groups as well as the putting in order of South Africa's foreign sporting relations.

This is what developed in Natal on October 7th, when the Natal Cricket Association decided to opt for strict adherence to government policy, and not to allow mixing. The Coloured Representative Council was disenchanted with developments and

on October 8th voiced its opposition. The Council requested the government to leave participation in sport on club, provincial and national level to the sports administrators concerned; to repeal all legislation harmful to the normalisation of sport; to make merit teams the rule and not the exception; and to award Springbok colours to anybody who represented South Africa in the international sports field (Cape Times, October 8, 1976). On the same day, the Deputy Secretary for Sport, Mr. J.H. Verwey, announced that the various races should belong to their own clubs, and that the intention of playing a mixed rugby match in Port Elizabeth was contrary to government policy. It was, in fact, illegal, because the White players did not have permits to be in a Black area.

The game went ahead with eight White players mixing with Blacks before 10 000 spectators. Horrell (1976 : 395) reports that after the game the White players were carried shoulder high off the field by the Black players. Dr. Koornhof, when asked to comment, stated that the match was contrary to the sports policy which did not provide for mixed teams. It had also been illegal because the White players had lacked permits to play on public grounds in a Black area (Rand Daily Mail, October 12, 1976). The Sunday Times of October 17th reported that an attempt had been made to obtain permits, but that there had been no response.

Dr. Craven announced that disciplinary steps would be taken against those White players who had participated in the Port Elizabeth match. The players concerned, he said, would be suspended (Cape Times, October 12, 1976).

Mr. Abul Abass, president of the non-racial South African Rugby Union, SARU, reacted by describing the government's policy as totally unacceptable, adding that there was no chance of SARU co-operating with Dr. Craven's White organisation. He said, "I'm afraid we have been misled in the past, and because of this we have taken a firm decision not to co-operate again, until such time as integrated rugby down to club level, mixed trials, merit selection, and Springbok colours for all, regardless of race, can be guaranteed to players of our union" (Cape Times, October 20, 1976). He then stated that SARU was not anti-White,

but they were not prepared to compromise, nor were they seeking instant miracles, "in that we don't believe clubs should be forced to open their doors to all comers. But we do believe a club should have the right to admit whom they please".

Abass further contended that Dr. Craven had said that mixed clubs, mixed provincial teams, mixed stands and Springbok colours could be just around the corner. "Well if he is prepared to put a time limit on this - say two years - and to commit himself in black and white to a blueprint for its eventuality, we would certainly meet him for talks right now" (Cape Times, October 20, 1976). Dr. Craven and/or his executive obviously were not prepared to go to such lengths in 1976. Around the corner therefore appeared to imply longer than two years.

Meanwhile, the South African Rugby Federation (Coloured) and the South African Rugby Board (Black) who were affiliated to the South African Rugby Board (White), were quite happy with developments, seeing them as the ultimate step towards integrated rugby.

A further setback occurred in cricket when Mr. Billy Woodin, the president of the White Cricket Association, SACA, stated: "We never agreed to multi-racial clubs. We do need clarification on whether or not the odd cricketer can play for a club of a different race group" (Odendaal, 1977 : 60). This caused an immediate reaction amongst the non-racial bodies, and Odendaal (1977 : 60) feels that it was only after Dr. Koornhof had personally intervened and told Mr. Woodin to stop making statements in public, that any type of peace was restored amongst the various factions. Natal and the Transvaal then fell into line, and mixed cricket was established in these two provinces in 1976.

MULTI-RACIALISM AND SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT IN 1977

Following the lead of cricket Dr. Craven announced that there would be mixed rugby in 1977. Arthur Rice, chairman of the South African Cycling Federation, announced that South African cycling had opened its doors to all races. Any Black or Coloured club could now become affiliated directly to any

provincial body and cycling would in future be chosen on merit. This was a progressive gesture on the part of the Cycling Federation, but still the question of open clubs remained. More progressive was the decision of the South African National Olympic Games Association, that the Springbok emblem be awarded to representative South African teams or individuals irrespective of race (Cape Times, November 16, 17, 1976).

Within the context of South African sport these developments were undoubtedly progressive. Outside of South Africa there was limited recognition. Peter Hain stated that the merit selected cricket teams were being watched with interest and added that there appeared to have been genuine advancement towards non-racial sport (Cape Times, November 20, 1976).

New Zealand, also the subject of world scrutiny as a result of the Olympic games, was less circumspect. After consultations with Kenya New Zealand's deputy prime minister, Brian Talboys, announced that there had been a review of New Zealand's sporting relations with South Africa. He expressed the belief that there would be no further sports contact until there was a policy change (Auckland Star, October 2, 1976).

There was no apparent amelioration of attitude internationally towards South African sport as a result of the September announcement. In early 1977 there were indications that the demands originally made on South African sport, for mixed sport down to club level and merit selection, would be escalated. The non-racial sports organisation, the South African Council on Sport, through its chairman Norman Middleton, made a condemnatory speech on racial sport. Middleton called for the isolation of South African sport until non-racial sport had been introduced at all levels. He said that the longer international sportsmen continued to come to South Africa and to participate in racially segregated sport, the longer the racial system in South African sport would endure. South Africa would make meaningful changes in its sports policy only when it was totally excluded from all international participation (Cape Times, January 7, 1977).

From London it was announced by Peter Hain that the anti-apartheid movement had derived a blueprint for South Africa's readmittance to world sport. Firstly, the multi-national sports policy would have to be publicly buried. Secondly, a public declaration would have to be made by the South African Rugby Board (SARB). This declaration would have to state that the SARB would eradicate racialism from its organisation, and in future conduct rugby according to the principle of merit. This would have to be endorsed by the government and other sports bodies. Thirdly, there would have to be a commitment to integrate all clubs fully. Fourthly, there would have to be an undertaking that only players who were members of non-racial clubs would be considered for selection in provincial and national sides. Fifthly, assurance would have to be given that all legislation (for example the Group Areas Act) restricting the full integration of club facilities would be suspended and ultimately repealed, so that sport could be truly non-racial in all its dimensions. Sixthly, there would have to be desegregation of spectator facilities at all grounds, whether club or international, to cover such matters as entrances, seating or standing space, toilets, refreshments facilities etc. (Cape Times, February 18, 1977). The anti-apartheid movement in sport, in particular the London based SAN-ROC organisation, had been largely responsible for creating a worldwide awareness of the position of the Black sportsman in South Africa (cf. Chapter Ten).

The position adopted by the anti-apartheid movement was relevant to South Africa's re-acceptance into international sport. Their blueprint, and the less moderate stance adopted by SACOS, which had been accorded full member status of the influential Supreme Council of Sport in Africa in December, 1976, did not bode well for South Africa's future in international sport unless there was further substantial change. Change was occurring: on January 19th South Africa's four national rugby organisations agreed to come together at a later date to work out a means of organising mixed rugby at all levels. Following the meeting Dr. Craven announced that multi-racial rugby at club level in South Africa had been agreed upon (Cape Times, January 19, 1977).

There was some doubt surrounding the announcement as it appeared that those negotiating for the non-racial SARU were doing so without a mandate from their organisation. Nonetheless, dialogue between the four organisations continued, and in April it appeared that one multi-racial controlling body for South African rugby was imminent, although there was still some doubt as to the role to be played by the non-racial SARU. It was announced that a steering committee had been formed by the four organisations. This committee then drew up a proposal for the development of South African rugby, the aims of which were:

1. To have one national controlling body of rugby. (In the meantime the present national controlling bodies of rugby in South Africa will strive for full co-operation to promote the game of rugby and goodwill.)
2. To have one national team selected on merit.
3. To leave the membership of clubs entirely to their discretion.
4. To make equal seating and accommodation available to all spectators irrespective of colour, race, religion, language or creed on the rugby grounds and stands.
5. To allow players and rugby officials of all race groups to attend rugby functions after matches.

The committee also decided that the following would be immediate objectives:

1. All recognised unions will affiliate to the national body and will have one or two delegates (as decided) on it.
2. This body is to function on the same lines as the South African Rugby Board as far as sub-committees are concerned.
3. This body is to be known as the South African Rugby Football Board (Football Board in short).
4. To invite the best players to trials after which the team will be selected by the national selectors elected by the controlling body. (Craven, D.H. et al.)

Craven (1978) says that a meeting with Dr. Koornhof was then arranged which he and the three SARU delegates attended. It was supposedly to evince good faith, but Dr. Koornhof was non-committal and the SARU delegates felt dissatisfied. SARU maintained (a) that the plan was not ratified by the South African Rugby Board, which could not envisage one national organisation controlling South African rugby with equal representation, and (b) that the blueprint was rejected by Dr. Koornhof (Patel, 1978). It would appear that SARU were unable to secure a firm commitment from Dr. Koornhof for the implementation of non-racial rugby. As a result they were left with a compromise; a national organisation with limited representation and no positive commitment on amelioration of laws. The General Council of SARU subsequently rejected the dialogue and condemned the arrangement (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 83). South African rugby's movement towards multi-racialism was effectively moribund.

Cricket which had invoked its multi-racial format in 1976, continued its multi-racial expansion. The South African National Olympic Games Association announced that terms such as multi-racial/multi-national would be scrapped and that the association would be completely normalised (Cape Times, February 17, 1977). This did not imply a consensus in favour of greater integration. In the town of Krugersdorp the town council ignored the terms of the new sports policy, and banned Black athletes from the Krugersdorp Wanderers stadium. The council then lifted the ban after pressure from the media and the government, but refused to allow Black spectators. In Johannesburg the Digger's Rugby Club turned down applications for membership from two Black players (Rand Daily Mail, February 17; Natal Daily News, February 25, 1977).

Dr. Koornhof gave the movement further impetus in August. In an interview recorded in a government sponsored publication South African Panorama (August 1977 : 23), he stated that although the government did not condone mixed sports clubs, there was no law prohibiting mixed sports clubs in any sport in South Africa.

It is the inherent right of a club to control its membership, and the policy statement must be seen as a guideline in this respect. A club has the right at all times to decide who shall and who shall not be allowed to join that club sports bodies in South Africa are autonomous bodies arranging their own competitions at all levels. The Government does not control sports bodies, and neither I nor the Government will interfere in the leagues of competitions arranged by South African sports bodies. (South African Panorama, August 23 : 1977)

In what was an indirect approval of mixed clubs it was not unnatural that there would be a conservative reaction, in the vanguard of which was Dr. Treurnicht. He announced: "We must resist those who, in the name of moving away from discrimination, are leading us into integration" (Cape Times, August 12, 1977). These people he said want to break down those social structures which are necessary for a nation's identity, social structures such as group areas, schools, universities, trade unions, sport clubs and the like (Die Burger, August 12, 1977). Dr. Mulder then added his weight to the cause by stating that anyone who propagated mixed membership of sports clubs was not acting according to official party policy laid down at the Transvaal congress in 1976 (Die Burger, August 3, 1977). Dr. Koornhof was subsequently called on to defend his announcement. He reassured the National Party congress held in Cape Town that mixed sport at club level remained contrary to party policy, adding that sport in no way would threaten the identity or self determination of race groups. In mitigation he said that the period ending in June 1977 had seen only 56 cases of Whites playing for Black clubs or vice versa, and that 31 of these had been in cricket. This he said represented a minute 0.0045% of the actual sport-playing population, and indicated that there had been a success rate of 99.9955% in applying the government's new sports policy. This obfuscation was aided by his statement in Durban where he said that multi-national sport was free from discrimination on the basis of race and colour and then in Bloemfontein where he said that it was an infamous lie that government policy had changed (Die Burger, August 25, 31; September 8, 1977).

The implications were that the government was not going to make any concessions in general ideological terms, but that sport could develop a degree of independence, which, it had been determined, would not effect the greater commitment politically to separate nations. In early August, athletics took the initiative offered by Dr. Koornhof's statement on mixed clubs and formed a single controlling union called the South African Amateur Athletics Union. Under this organisation there were to be no race restrictions on clubs, and the athletes of all colours would be able to compete at all meetings (Sunday Times, August 14, 1977). This decision elicited the resignation of the president of the SAAU, Professor Hannes Botha, who felt that the decision to open clubs was, inter alia, in direct conflict with government policy, and that the constitutional plan for athletics made for a direct confrontation with the government. Now that the idea of throwing things open had become a reality, he felt that those who had tackled this undertaking had to face the political consequences. Professor Botha stated that he did not want to be part of "surrendering one's heritage" (Cape Times, August 31, 1977). Although the athletics development was obviously progressive, multi-nationalism continued its association with this particular sport. Black and Coloured athletics, which were to be incorporated into the new constitution, were given affiliated status at provincial level only. This meant that the status of the Black and Coloured athletic organisations was lowered from that of national organisations to affiliated associations (Botha, 1978). This also meant that Blacks and Coloureds were represented at national level, but that it was not equal representation.

The formation of the new union in athletics also demonstrated a movement away from government interference in sport. The athletic association, in adopting the new constitution, had not sought governmental approbation, choosing to present what was in essence a fait accompli. The non-racial athletic organisation was not impressed by the development. They could not reconcile their policy with a system that they felt required the obtaining of permits, whether specific or blanket, to hold sports meetings. They stated: "Since the policy of the South African Amateur Athletic Union is said by this Union not to run counter to any

of the laws of the country, we have to accept that it will operate under a permit system with all inherent indignities consequent upon such a system". The non-racial union also reiterated its standpoint of rejecting umbrella organisations which they felt had no other aim other than the retention of racial division (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 32).

Cricket advanced the cause of multi-racialism still further in September with the formation, after eighteen months of continuous struggle, of one national cricketing organisation, pledged to the implementation of normal cricket in South Africa. The new organisation was called the South African Cricket Union. The new president was Raschid Varachia, who in his inauguration speech outlined the principles of the new Union.

1. There would be open club membership, with no restriction according to colour, race or creed.
2. There would be merit selection.
3. There would be mixed cricket from club level upwards so as to facilitate true merit selection.
4. There would be a sharing of all common facilities. (Odendaal, 1977 : 88)

Odendaal (1977 : 91) says that the formation of one controlling body, SACU, in most quarters was hailed as a breakthrough and even Peter Hain saw it as an encouraging sign.

The formation of the South African Cricket Union was historic. Unfortunately it did not speak, as with athletics, for all sportsmen in this particular code. Dissent from the non-racial quarter was soon heard. Hassan Howa formed a non-racial cricket committee to represent the interests of cricketers truly committed to the non-racial cause. Horrell (1977 : 565) reports that of the original 5 000 cricketers who belonged to the non-racial cricket organisation approximately 1 000 left and joined the new SACU. The remaining 4 000 committed themselves to Howa's non-racial South African Cricket Board of Control. Horrell further states that three Black cricket clubs agreed to join seven

White clubs in the Griqualand West premier cricket league for the 1977-78 season, after having been assured that they would not need to obtain permits in terms of the Group Areas Act. Three other Black clubs refused to take part. In the Transvaal, three Whites joined a predominantly Black club, Kohinoor, while in Natal two Black clubs joined SACU leagues.

Following the developments in athletics and cricket, soccer displayed a willingness to progress. The White Football Association of South Africa (FASA) and its professional league disbanded and joined the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF). This did not produce one controlling organisation, as operating in competition with the SASF was the South African National Football Association, which also maintained a professional organisation: the National Professional Football League (NPSL). The SASF, although non-racial by inclination, was, because of the rival SANFA, largely made up of Coloured and Indian players. Norman Middleton felt that the decision of the White soccer association FASA to dissolve was a victory for soccer and non-racialism in sport. He felt it was something that non-racial soccer had striven for over the past 25 years (Daily Despatch, October 4, 1977).

By the end of 1977 it was clear that White sports administrators were positively inclined towards multi-racial rather than towards multi-national sport as it had been introduced in 1971. It appears that the government had capitulated on the enforcement of the strict multi-national approach, although there had been no indication of any concomitant change in the political or legal infrastructure, or in society per se. At the end of 1977 multi-racialism in sport in South Africa was regarded by anti-apartheid organisations, countries opposed to apartheid, and by the non-racial sports movement in South Africa, as being too little, too late. Mixed sport down to club level, as well as selection, which had been requests made of South African sport in the early seventies, had escalated. The demands were now for non-racial sport, normal sport and for a normalisation of society.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DEMAND FOR NON-RACIAL SPORT

GROWING DEMANDS FOR NON-RACIAL SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT AND INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION

DEVELOPMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE SPORTS NORMALISATION PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1978

INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1978

SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1979 AND CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

The unofficial acknowledgement in August 1977 that sports clubs could be integrated, although it would not be condoned at government level, completed the movement away from multi-nationalism, which had been initiated at the end of 1974 and during 1975. Multi-racialism, as it developed, did not replace the concept of multi-nationalism. There were constant reminders that multi-racialism was built on the foundation of multi-nationalism and that there had been no fundamental change of policy and no compromising of principles. Multi-racialism therefore did not remove discrimination from South African sport, as tacitly acknowledged by specific pieces of legislature (cf. Chapter Nine). Nevertheless it was clear by the end of 1977 that sports clubs were to a large degree using their own discretion as to whom they admitted, and while some obviously found it difficult to overcome years of separate sport, by the end of 1977 mixing was taking place at club level in South Africa.

GROWING DEMANDS FOR NON-RACIAL SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA

In 1977 there were indications that those who opposed South African sport were becoming more radical in their demands, and that the original requests for merit selection and mixed sport

down to club level would, if met by the White authorities and administrators, be insufficient to ensure the co-operation of the non-racial Black sportsmen. The co-operation of the non-racial organisation had become increasingly important as a means by which South Africa would ultimately return to international sport. This new-found significance accorded to the non-racial South African Council on Sport derived directly from an enhancement of status at the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977. SACOS was accepted as a full member of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa. The significance of such a development can be realised only when it is considered that SCSA was the foremost organisation, along with the London-based anti-apartheid organisation SAN-ROC, in the active and successful campaign against South African sports. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa monitors South Africa's sports developments for the United Nations Commission on Sport, which functions through the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid. In order to achieve permanent international recognition, South African sports organisations could be at a distinct disadvantage if the sanction of the United Nations Commission on Sport was not forthcoming. This commission relied on the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa for their information. Without the approval of the SCSA the commission would not recommend South Africa's sports organisations being reaccepted internationally (Supreme Council on Sport in Africa, September 20, 1978. United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, September 14, 1978). The granting of full member status of the Supreme Council to SACOS implied that South African sports organisations would now also require the sanction of SACOS before they (or the sports policy with which they were associated) were accepted internationally.

The attitude adopted by SACOS at the beginning of 1977, therefore, assumed a greater importance than had previously been the case. Norman Middleton, the chairman of SACOS, demonstrated its new-found position of strength and suggested possible philosophical deviation in a condemnatory speech on racial sport in January 1977. Middleton called for the isolation of South African sport until non-racial sport had been introduced at all levels. He said that the longer international sportsmen

continued to come to South Africa and to participate in racially segregated sport, the longer the racial system in South African sport would endure. South Africa would make meaningful changes in its sports policy only when it was totally excluded from all international participation. Visiting sportsmen, he said, often argued that they came to South Africa to build bridges and change the attitudes of the White South Africans; some even argued that by isolating South Africa in sport the Black sportsman would suffer the most. Middleton suggested that the Black sportsman had never enjoyed or experienced any privileges and that therefore such an argument was not logical. It was, he said, the White sportsmen who felt the results of isolation (Cape Times, January 7, 1977). Middleton's speech did not introduce the term non-racial, as it had already been used frequently, but it did serve to give the term greater pre-eminence. Non-racial sport, as opposed to multi-racial sport, implied that all racial restrictions, that is legislation restricting racial sport, would need to be removed before approval was forthcoming from SACOS. Further indications of a more radical stance manifested themselves in a memorandum which was presented to the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, who was visiting South Africa. SACOS took this opportunity to claim, inter alia, that there had been no advance toward non-racial sport, but merely the consolidation of apartheid; that White sportsmen of South Africa merely hid behind the government's policy; that there had been no mixed integrated play at club level; that dialogue with White sportsmen had proved a waste of time, and that it was the considered opinion of SACOS that White racist sportsmen would only yield if there was an international isolation of their sport (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 113-115). The suggestion implicit in this statement was that a change in the entire apartheid structure, not only in sport, was required.

Howa, who succeeded Middleton as chairman of SACOS, expanded on this theme in July. Under the title "No normal sport in an abnormal society", Howa explained that the non-racial organisations had decided that the normalisation of sport should be concomitant with political and economic equality for Blacks. Justifying the philosophical aberration, Howa stated that the

1976 race riots had hardened attitudes and initiated a process of soul searching. People, he said, questioned how one could be a White man's equal playing sport at the weekends, and for the rest of the week his inferior. They questioned how one could co-operate with a system that was depriving one of one's ordinary rights as a citizen. Mr. Howa then went on to explain how, when the South African Sports Association, forerunner of the London based SAN-ROC, had been formed about 20 years ago, officials had felt that the government's Achilles' heel was sport. He claimed that if apartheid in sport could be broken, then the main apartheid structure was well on the way to being broken. However, the non-racial association had now realised that winning concessions in sport and making progress towards integration, the main structure of apartheid had not been broken down, as anticipated. Therefore, to have settled for non-racial sport in an apartheid society would have meant reneging on the original objective of total equality (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 15, 1977).

An additional consideration not stated but acknowledged by Howa, was the increasing potency of sports as a lever which could be used successfully to secure further concessions. Sport had become the most efficacious implement available to Blacks; through sport, pressure could be brought to bear on White authorities (Howa, 1979). To have ceded to White sports authorities at this juncture would have removed this weapon from the Blacks' limited arsenal. Capitulation at this point would have committed the non-racial sports organisation to the vagaries of evolution and an uncertain future. To have joined forces with the White organisations would have deprived Blacks of a significant pressure group. However, in the move towards becoming unofficially more politically orientated (there was no little irony), as the non-racialists had since 1958 been demanding a depoliticization of South African sport. By their announcement in July 1977 SACOS had committed non-racial sport in South Africa to greater political involvement.

THE COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT AND INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION

With this readjustment of philosophy and the increasing politicization of sport by the non-racialists, there seemed little hope of a complete return to world sport by South African sporting associations, even with multi-racialism. This premise was supported by two previous developments, which had simultaneously escalated demands made on South African sport and committed politics to a part of the solution. On June 14th, 1977, the British Commonwealth leaders formulated a 'Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport'. Subsequently known as the 'Gleneagles Accord' or 'Gleneagles Agreement', the declaration committed Commonwealth member states to a policy of non-involvement in sport with South Africa. The statement read:

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognized racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London meeting, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the declaration of Commonwealth principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the principles embodied in their Singapore declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognizing that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage, contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organizations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organized on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognized that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realization of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organizations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally (Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport. Gleneagles, Scotland. June 14, 1977)

Die Burger reacted by asking what had become of the Commonwealth when the question of sporting relations with South Africa was allowed to take precedence over more urgent matters. It felt the whole matter would only be settled when the countries of the 'Old Commonwealth' gave way completely to the blackmail of the Black states or challenged them to go their own way. Die Burger felt that a compromise development, such as the Commonwealth Accord, was not going to get them out of trouble (Die Burger, June 15, 1977).

Dr. Koornhof's reaction was to invite the Commonwealth leaders to South Africa to see for themselves whether the decision to isolate South African sport was justified by local circumstances. Deprecation of the Gleneagles Agreement followed: "I learned with indignation of the decision of the Commonwealth conference concerning sporting relations in South Africa" (Cape Times, June 16, 1977). Dr. Koornhof said he could find no other explanation for this decision other than what had been motivated by political expediency, by ignorance about sports activities in South Africa, or by a wilful refusal to take note of the meaningful progress which had occurred in connection with the participation of all sportsmen in South Africa, irrespective of race, creed or colour, from club level to national and international participation (Die Burger, June 16, 1977).

Although the Gleneagle's Accord by its existence indicated that Commonwealth members were cognizant of the inequities extant in South African sport, Dr. Koornhof was correct when he suggested that the issue was becoming politicized.

Attention, as a result of the Gleneagles Agreement, was drawn to New Zealand, for so many years one of South Africa's traditional sporting rivals, and her interpretation of the Agreement was awaited. Abraham Ordia decided to pre-empt and pressurise New Zealand, by stating that African states were awaiting commentary from New Zealand before deciding whether or not to participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Daily Post, June 17, 1977).

Mr. Muldoon, New Zealand's prime minister, announced that New Zealand would discourage contact with South Africa in agreement with the Gleneagles Accord (Auckland Star, June 20, 1977).

With the obvious politicization of the sport issue by Commonwealth members and by the South African Council on Sport, the anti-apartheid sports movements outside South Africa were presented with a dilemma. Previously accused of being politically motivated, they had on numerous occasions stated their dedication to the sports issue only, as had the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa through its president Abraham Ordia (cf. Chapter Ten). The anti-apartheid organisations were now faced

with stating either that they adhered to their original philosophy, or that they were going to commit themselves to the new politically-orientated demands. Peter Hain subsequently stated that he sympathised with Mr. Howa, but that this did not mean that if the government and sport officials bypassed the discriminatory laws and provided equal opportunity for all sportsmen, he would not look sympathetically at South Africa's case. "We would not slam the door", he said (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 1977). The indecision as to what stance should be adopted was further reflected in Chris de Broglio's statement on behalf of SAN-ROC. The suggestion was that SAN-ROC was more favourably disposed to the new political orientation: "There can't be a fight only against sports racism. Blacks have to get equality in every field. If the non-racial groups in South Africa want equality in all walks of life as a pre-condition to mixed sport, we will put that view across to international bodies who will certainly listen" (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 1977). A further announcement in August suggested that discussions had occurred and the anti-apartheid sports movement would concern itself basically with the issue of discrimination in South African sport. The demands had, however, grown. They were presented as 'the lifeline for South African sport - a proposal for normalisation'. Essentially an expansion of the Hain blueprint proposed earlier in the year, this plan covered ten points and was sanctioned by the SAN-ROC organisation, viz.:

1. Passport restrictions on all non-racial sports officials - including M.N. Pather, Norman Middleton and Hassan Howa - must be lifted and all harassment of non-racial bodies stopped. The banning order on Morgan Naidoo must be rescinded.
2. The Government must declare an official moratorium on all major sports tours for two years while the sports system is reorganised.
3. The multi-national policy must be officially buried and a genuine non-racial policy adopted in its place.
4. Club sport must be fully integrated, with each club having in its constitution a mandatory clause making membership open to all races.
5. All legislation which prevents the full integration of club facilities must be suspended and ultimately repealed.

6. All spectator facilities such as entrances, seating and terraces, toilets and refreshments must be integrated.

7. School sport, leagues and competitions must be integrated.

8. Existing separate white and black national sports organisations must merge into truly non-racial national bodies for each sport. These should be democratically organised and fully representative with non-racial clubs to affiliate.

9. Teams representing South Africa should be chosen by the new national non-racial bodies, which would seek affiliation to international sporting organisations. Only players who belong to non-racial clubs would be considered for national or provincial sides.

10. Pass laws for sportsmen must be relaxed. (Sunday Times, August 14, 1977)

The movement against South African sport had clearly entered a new phase. No longer would the creation of a multi-racial sports society be sufficient for South Africa to win support for her sports policy. The escalation of demands required a normalisation of sport, or the establishment of non-racial sport in South Africa. Normal sport was adjudged by some to mean the removal of the various racial restrictions which surrounded Black sportsmen and administrators. Others felt that the term 'normal sport' could not be applied in South Africa unless there was a concomitant amelioration of political and economic racial inequities. South Africa's reply to the new demands, as previously stated, was the bestowing of unofficial sanction on mixed sport at the club level. While this may have been sufficient to have won South Africa some recognition in 1970-73, in 1977 it was, in relation to growing demands, too little too late. This point was underscored by a communiqué issued to British sports clubs by the British Minister of State Mr. Denis Howell. Howell advised the sports clubs, inter alia, that the United Kingdom Government, in common with every other Commonwealth Government, publicly recognised that it was their urgent duty to take all practical steps to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa. He said that it was accepted in the United Kingdom that sport was organised on a voluntary basis, and that the governing bodies of sport were free to make their

own decisions. However, abhorrence of apartheid policies was a humanitarian problem and could not be regarded as the concern of politicians alone: sportsmen and sportswomen were as involved as anyone else in following humanitarian principles. He then asked all those who were concerned with sport in the United Kingdom to take note of the unanimous declaration of the Commonwealth leaders and to act within its spirit. Not only should governing bodies seek to discourage participation in competitions in which teams or individuals representative of South Africa's apartheid policies are involved, but a similar attitude should then be adopted in dealing with international federations. Howell perorated that his government recognised and welcomed indications of progress in South Africa towards the breaking down of some of racial barriers in sport, but that such progress fell short of the standards set by the Gleneagles Agreement (Sports Council, Directive to Governing Bodies of Sport, October 18, 1977).

DEVELOPMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE SPORTS NORMALISATION PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1978

Against this background, and the demand for a normalisation of sport and society, South African sport was struggling to adjust to the possibility of mixed clubs. Although Dr. Koornhof had stated that there was no law against mixed (Black and White) sports clubs, certain conditions prevailed which militated against such integration. These conditions derived from legislation (cf. Chapter Nine) of which one of the most notable was the Liquor Act. At the beginning of 1978 this created further barriers to integration, as Digger's Rugby Club, one of the foremost rugby clubs in South Africa, expounded. They felt that there should be no colour barriers in sport, but there was the stumbling block of the social restrictions which would, under the Liquor Act, apply to Black members. A spokesman for Diggers stated: "We do not want to grant conditional membership to people, which is not fair. If, for instance, we have a dance, what happens about the Black members? And each time we played with the Black members we would have to go to the government in relation to the Group Areas Act" (Sunday Express,

January 22, 1978). This was a situation that was experienced by other clubs. If, like Diggers, they refused Black players, they were identified further as racialsists. If they opened their doors to all, clubs ran the risk of (a) embarrassing both Whites and Blacks and/or (b) having their liquor licences suspended, because they were contravening the law. Although there appeared to be an understanding that clubs might proceed with mixing at their own discretion, the co-operation of the Black Affairs Administration Board could not always be guaranteed, nor was it guaranteed that the clubs would not be prosecuted if they served liquor to Black sportsmen. This the Sunday Express discovered when it surveyed other top rugby clubs: all clubs agreed in principle to admitting Black members, but present laws did not encourage them to do so.

While it was possible to accuse these clubs of being negative about the situation and of not taking the initiative, or, alternatively, to suggest that conditioned racialism dies hard and clubs were merely using government policy to protect their exclusive identity, it also had to be considered that for many clubs their survival, financially, depended on the retention of their liquor licences. Without covert motives the risk for many was too great: the onus was on the government to create a situation which did not militate against integration at club level. However, to have repealed the Liquor Act or the Group Areas Act, by way of example, would have indicated a change in policy, a moderation of the subjacent ideology. Reaction came in the form of 'International status'. This was a dispensation granted under the Liquor Act which was usually bestowed on hotels that catered for international guests. International status was, in February 1978, made available to sports clubs (Argus, February 28, 1978). Sports clubs could apply to the Department of Justice for international status. If granted, this would allow sports clubs to entertain Black sportsmen and administrators at White clubs. Although this had been possible previously, the system involved in obtaining permission was cumbersome and time-consuming. Ad hoc application had to be made to the Department of Justice each time it was anticipated that a Black person may be a member of an opposing team.

International status circumvented this problem: it virtually gave certain sports clubs annual permission to entertain Black sportsmen, if certain conditions were met (cf. Chapter Nine). Although this did advance the cause of multi-racialism and did assist in the process of normalising South African sport, there remained certain anomalies which underlined the fact that this development was a distension of, rather than a change in, policy. The conditions that had to be read with international status were: (a) liquor, refreshments and meals could only be supplied to a non-White person who: (i) was a competitor taking part in any match or practice on the grounds owned or controlled by the club; (ii) was an official accompanying competitors taking part in any match; (iii) was a guest of a club member; (b) when these conditions were operating no dancing was to take place while non-Whites were present (Hansard, April 2, 1979. Questions and Replies, Cols. 590-594). In addition, the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 had to be read in conjunction with the conferral of international status, which meant that a permit, which was objectionable to non-racialists, still had to be applied for.

Further reaction occurred later in February when the International Tennis Federation sent a commission to South Africa to investigate the advances made in South African tennis. The commission consisted of Mr. Phillipe Chatrier (France), Mr. David Gray (Britain), Mr. Leslie Ashenheim (Jamaica) and Mr. Theodore Zeh (Austria). During their ten-day visit the commission managed to bring together the three dissenting factions in South African tennis. These were the predominantly White South African Tennis Union (SATU), the formerly affiliated and largely Black dominated South African National Lawn Tennis Union (SANLTU) and the non-racial South African Lawn Tennis Union (SALTU). The meeting ended in discord. SANLTU and SALTU submitted three points for acceptance, with which SATU felt it could not comply. These were: (i) that the SATU relinquish forthwith its membership with the International Tennis Federation; (ii) that the three organisations sink their identities to form one new non-racial tennis body; and (iii) that the International Tennis Federation imposes a moratorium on all players from overseas playing in South Africa until such time as the new non-racial tennis body be accepted by

the International Tennis Federation (South African Digest, March 3, 1978).

Following this meeting, Mr. Chatrier said that although no mutually acceptable solution emerged, all parties had agreed to meet again after the departure of the commission to try and find some common ground on which a new governing body could be speedily built. The prime necessity, according to Mr. Chatrier, was the dissolution of the three existing organisations and their replacement by one non-racial governing body (Press release. P. Chatrier: President International Tennis Federation, Cape Town, February 22, 1978). Chatrier also revealed that he had been given a letter of some significance by Dr. Koornhof. The letter, dated February 21, 1978, stated:

Dear Mr. Chatrier

In terms of our discussion this morning, I would like to state:

a. That no permit or other legal permission is needed by any player to play on any court in South Africa or to join any club. As for spectators, the National or Provincial Governing bodies can by arrangement with the Department of Sport, get a clearance annually in advance for their full programme of events.

b. That early steps are being taken to modify any restrictions as far as the Liquor Act is concerned by enabling sports clubs to get international status on application so that licencees can provide liquor to all participating sportsmen without application for a permit, bringing this matter on a par with similar sporting events in other parts of the world.

c. That early steps will be taken to ensure that allocations of money spent by the government on sport give all groups their fair and proportionate shares, based on population and participation. The Department of Sport will endeavour to use its influence with local authorities to provide sport facilities to all population groups according to their needs and the resources available.

I regard this statement as a clarification and a confirmation of the normalisation of sport on a non-racial basis in South Africa.

Warm regards

Yours sincerely

Dr. P.G.J. KOORNHOF

Dr. Koornhof's letter held much significance for South African sport in general. This was generated by what appeared to be a dissolution of the permit system. Although the permit system was not a tangible obstacle to normal sport, it was considered by non-racialists and others to be an important factor, on principle, in the inhibition of progress towards normalisation. They felt that sport should be a human right, not a privilege that had to be requested from a White authority. The implications were that this right had been restored, which, if correct, would have been a significant step in the normalisation of South African sport. However, there was some doubt surrounding the issue, especially as there had been no concomitant change in the Group Areas Act, the Black Urban Areas (Consolidation) Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act and the Liquor Act; pieces of legislation which required Blacks and Whites to obtain permission to indulge in mixed sport. David Dalling, opposition spokesman on sport, surmised that some form of change was implied, which in practice proved incorrect (Hansard, March 1, 1978. Questions and Replies, Col. 261). Reaction from the anti apartheid sports movement was, not unnaturally, circumspect, although statements illustrated that this group was also cognizant of the potential significance of the statement. Peter Hain said: "Superficially, it sounds like an important step forward, but I want to see the small print in this". Chris de Broglie, on behalf of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, commented: "I am cautious about this because in the past we seem to have made headway and then found we had not" (Argus, February 25, 1978).

Events later in the year demonstrated that the permit system had not been eliminated from South African sport. In August, Dan (Cheeky) Watson, the rugby player who had previously appeared in court for contravening the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act, was indicted again. The Sunday Times reports that he was charged with entering New Brighton (a Black township) without a permit, speeding (two charges), not stopping at a stop street, and reckless or negligent driving (Sunday Times, August 27, 1978).

The issue surrounding permits was raised again in September, when a soccer match planned for Cape Town had to be switched to Johannesburg. Tembalethu Hearts of Langa in Cape Town, a Black club, were to play a White club Highlands, at home. However, they could not get permission to do so. An attempt was then made to switch the match to Hartleyvale, a White area, but permission could not be obtained for the Black members of Tembalethu Hearts to play there. Finally, in order that the match be played, the game had to be transferred to a Johannesburg location, where a permit was obtained (Cape Herald, September 16, 1978).

The word 'clearance', in Dr. Koornhof's letter to Mr. Chatrier, obviously had not implied the removal of the permit system. Instead, it meant the granting of permission for specific sporting events. The principle of obtaining permission to play sport remained unchanged, while the process had been refined. Permission or clearance could now be obtained from the Department of Sport and Recreation for multi-racial sports events, if an annual league fixture list was submitted in advance. This clearance would be operative for a year. This circumvented the process of applying for permits for each multi-racial event (Rand Daily Mail, August 24, 1978). This development reduced the bureaucracy surrounding multi-racial sports events, but it did not reduce the objection to the principle that permission or clearance was still a factor in South African sport.

In April other obstacles in the way of normal sport were outlined in a presentation which was produced by the non-racial Councils of Sport in the Transvaal, Natal, Eastern and Western Provinces and the Committee Against Racial Discrimination in Sport (CARDS). The presentation was entitled 'A Charter for Normal Sport', and it functioned around the hypothesis that complete non-racial sport was essential for the rapidly-changing social situation in Southern Africa. The Charter demanded:

1. National Bodies: Every code of sport in South Africa must have only one, non-racial national body to control and administer that sport. In any particular sport code, every sportsman and woman irrespective of race, colour, creed or religion must fall under the jurisdiction of this national body.

This non-racial national body must represent SA at international and Olympic level. This basic principle nullified the concept of umbrella bodies catering for different "ethnic" or colour groups and is the very opposite of multi-nationalism or separate development in sport.

2. Provincial bodies: Every National sporting body must be composed of one, provincial, non-racial body controlling all unions (and clubs), in any code.

3. Clubs: Every provincial body must consist of unreservedly open clubs. Such clubs must not practice discrimination on the basis of colour, language, religion or social status.

All Sportsmen and Women must be eligible for membership.

All clubs must not only have a non-racial constitution but, in fact, play non-racial sport. No pretext to promote any form of racial discrimination must be tolerated. Racially exclusive clubs must be abolished or thrown unreservedly open.

4. Facilities: All club members must have equal opportunities to develop their skills and abilities. All training, coaching and playing facilities must be open.

5. Touring sides: All overseas touring sides must only compete against non-racial sides at national, provincial or club level. The practice of touring sides competing against racially selected sides must be abolished.

No visiting side in any code of sport must be entertained until complete non-racial sport has been introduced.

6. Spectators: Any form of player or spectator segregation at any sport meeting or function must be abolished.

7. School sport: Schools' sport and junior leagues must similarly be implemented on a completely non-racial basis.

Separate school leagues, for Black, Brown, and White must, just like the school systems, breed racialism, and can never provide equal opportunity for school sport.

8. Sportmanship: The implication of sport on a non-racial basis, as outlined above, will prevent the incitement of racial hatred and will instead mould a healthy sportmanship that will cut across colour, language or religious lines.

It will create the opportunity for any player to attain the highest colours or awards in his codes.

9. Concessions and Dignity: To play non-racial sport is not a privilege but a basic human right.

Consequently the policy of granting patronising concessions in sport is an insult to the dignity and self-respect of any player. Furthermore, a sporting policy that calls for:

- a) The existence of different clubs for White, Coloured, Indian and African sportsmen;
- b) Wherever possible, practical and desirable, the consultation of contact or committees or councils of the different race groups;
- c) Special permits from a political department to enable teams from different racial groups to compete;
- d) "Favours" to only certain codes of sport;
- e) Separate development in sport to appease the verkrampte right-wing elements; and
- f) Humiliating provisions of restrictive Acts of Parliament, such as the Group Areas Act and the Liquor Act, with separate and inferior facilities;

is basically a policy entrenching racialism in sport. (Voice, April 1, 1978)

The Charter revealed the gap which existed between the status quo in South African sport and the ideal of normal or non-racial sport. David Dalling, opposition spokesman on sport, urged the government to give cognizance to the Charter and to try and do more to fall in line with it (Cape Times, April 21, 1978). There was no official reaction, but in the same month further demands were made on the government by David Dalling to expedite the process of normalisation in sport during South Africa's parliamentary debate on sport in April. Mr. Dalling suggested that the government start by lifting restrictions on non-racial sports administrators, and allowing the Department of Sport to cater for all race groups. He further advised that the permit system should be removed, and that schools should be allowed to decide their own fixtures without governmental interference. This would prevent the deprivation of fields or facilities being used to co-erce sporting conformity. Finally,

it was suggested that moves away from segregated seating be initiated (Hansard, April 20, 1978. Cols. 5173-5183). Dr. Koornhof, in his reply as Minister of Sport and Recreation, argued that he had never been involved in the withdrawal of passports or the placing of restrictions on non-racial sportsmen. There was, he said, nothing to suggest that these restrictions had anything to do with their activities as sports administrators. He then continued to make the points that discrimination would completely disappear once the sports policy reached its full conclusion, and that the question of one Department of Sport and Recreation for all sporting communities was being investigated (Hansard, April 20, 1978. Cols. 5223-5243).

Although Mr. Dalling and the non-racial sports organisations in South Africa did not consider South African sport at this point 'normalised', the Sunday Express newspaper felt that there were positive signs and that anti-apartheid activist Peter Hain should be invited to South Africa to see these developments for himself. Dr. Koornhof supported the idea on condition that Hain was prepared to come with an open mind. Hain reacted by stating that he would go to South Africa only if certain conditions were met. These were: (i) The removal of a 1969 withdrawal of his visa exemption as a British citizen, plus guarantees of his safety; (ii) Complete freedom as regards whom he saw, when and where, including the country's Black townships; (iii) The lifting of passport restrictions on non-racial sports administrators such as Hassan Howa, M.N. Pather, Norman Middleton, and the unbanning of Morgan Naidoo (South African Digest, March 24, 1978). There was not a strong possibility of Hain's conditions being met, as two National party members of parliament, Mr. Karel Swanepoel and Dr. Connie Mulder, respectively stated: "It is outrageous, we cannot allow him here because one does not cherish a serpent in one's bosom", and "I want to say right now that Peter Hain is not welcome in South Africa. His audacity to put conditions to the South African Government is the limit of bad manners" (South African Digest, March 24, 1978). Hain did not visit South Africa, but the proposal did provide insight into White division on the subject of further normalisation of South African Sport. Hoofstad

(March 20, 1978) asserted that South Africans were not so naïve as to believe that Hain would abandon his long association with anti-apartheid movements, which had become his bread and butter, for the sake of objectivity as far as South Africa was concerned. Die Transvaler (March 21, 1978) added that liberals such as Hain stood out because of his intolerance and arrogance. It could be expected that he would find nothing good in South Africa or allow his mind to be broadened. The Citizen (March 21, 1978), under a leading article titled 'PAIN', expressed the hope that there would be a Stop the Peter Hain Tour of South Africa campaign. The Citizen added that it could not see Hain coming to his senses and telling the world what a "lekker" (nice, pleasant) place South Africa was, and that there was no longer a need to organise demonstrations against South African teams. This newspaper could not see SAN-ROC and the other anti-apartheid movements disappearing because Peter Hain had visited South Africa: "Come on", it said, "how can a man like Hain, with his track record, be convinced that anything South Africa or its Government does is right". More circumscribed was the opinion offered by the Rand Daily Mail (March 21, 1978) which suggested that if Hain arrived in South Africa he would step back into fundamentally the same apartheid society he had left as a boy of sixteen.

However, it is to the credit of our sportsmen - and indirectly of Hain himself - that this is not true of sport. At cricket, Black and Whites are playing together, and not only in the major leagues. Most weekends a visiting Peter Hain could watch Black athletes competing against Whites Sports administrators would tell him: We have achieved what you demanded. There is mixed sport at club level and merit selection. And there are Black Springboks to prove it. But Hain would also find White spectators being barred from soccer in Black townships (because there are not separate toilet facilities) and clubs needing international permits before they can admit Blacks. And he would not have to travel far to discover all the best facilities are in the White Areas. (Rand Daily Mail, March 21, 1978)

South African sport, during and following this period, reflected the division of White opinion on further integration. In April the formerly all-White South African Rugby Board disbanded and then initiated its own renaissance by reforming under the same

title but with a multi-racial constitution and executive. Making up the new South African Rugby Board were the South African Rugby Federation and the South African Rugby Association - the Coloured and Black organisations respectively - both of which had previously co-operated with the White organisation. Although both these organisations had representation on the executive of the new South African Rugby Board (which in effect meant that South African rugby was governed by a multi-racial organisation), they were still individually responsible for the administration of the rugby affairs of their respective race groups. This meant that White, Coloured and Black South African rugby continued to be administered by, respectively, the White, Coloured and Black members of the SARB. Such an infrastructure did little to move South African rugby closer to normal sport, and elicited from the non-racial unco-operative South African Rugby Union the criticism that such an arrangement was laughable, since the two New Black member organisations had merely virtually been given provincial status. The new body, they claimed, was multi-national not multi-racial (Cape Times, April 12, 1978).

Dr. Craven, who was elected to head the new organisation, justifies the structure of the organisation by stating that rugby is comparable to no other sport in South Africa. He maintains that it is not feasible to have one national body administering non-racial rugby in South Africa. Any attempt to do so, he feels, would result in chaos, because of the numbers involved, and because the geographical demarcations used by the various organisations are so different that insurmountable problems would ensue in trying to organise inter-provincial and inter-club rugby. He also sees the present structure being more practical in the long term when the homelands become independent. The Black body will then become an independent organisation with status similar to that of the South African Rugby Board (Craven, 1978).

South African cricket, which had undergone a similar metamorphosis in 1977, but had emerged with a genuine multi-racial administrative structure and competition, albeit without the sanction of the non-racial organisation, felt that enough had been done to normalise South African cricket. Three members of the multi-racial South African Cricket Union executive,

R. Varachia, J. Pamensky and B. Wallace, left South Africa in May in an attempt to engender support for South Africa's reacceptance into world cricket. They visited Britain, India, Pakistan and New Zealand (Australia refused to allow the three to enter). Talks were held with the respective cricketing organisations, but the Gleneagles Agreement emerged as a major obstacle. This stated that sporting contacts were to be held in abeyance until the policy of apartheid had been abolished. Any progress that may have been made towards normal cricket in South Africa was of negligible significance when faced with this clause. Varachia, who was heading the delegation, asked New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Mr. Brian Talboys, whether the New Zealand Government would visualise some sort of waiving of the Gleneagles Agreement as far as cricket was concerned. Talboys replied that there was no way that the New Zealand Government on its own initiative could exclude South African cricket from the Gleneagles Agreement (New Zealand Herald, June 3, 1978).

Athletics administrators obviously felt, as did the South African Cricket Union, that enough had been done in South African athletics to warrant favourable consideration at the international level. In October the South African Amateur Athletic Union submitted a memorandum to the biennial congress of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, stating that the demands which had been made on the SAAAU had been met. It further stated that in terms of the SAAAU's constitution and the constitution of its members, no discriminatory measures existed in South African athletics: integrated executive committees and national selection committees had become the norm since 1974, and all provincial and other associations as well as all clubs affiliated to the SAAAU were autonomous. Furthermore, any person, irrespective of race or colour, could join the club of his choice; there was one national emblem for all South African athletes; there was one national championship at senior, intermediate and junior levels; separate Black and White championships had been abandoned, and since 1977 integrated national teams had been selected on merit and competed at prestige meetings in South Africa (South African Amateur Athletic Union, 1978 : 5). The International Amateur Athletic Federation viewed these developments with favour, said Professor Nieuwoudt (1978), president

of the SAAAU. However, South Africa was advised to wait until the 1980 Olympics in Moscow before pressing any claims. Professor Nieuwoudt also said that it had been established that South Africa's expulsion from the IAAF, which had occurred in 1976, was illegal in terms of the constitution of the IAAF. The constitution only provided for suspension, not expulsion. Also he felt that there was a possibility of a fact-finding mission from the IAAF coming to South Africa in 1979 to ascertain what progress had been made in the normalisation of athletics (Nieuwoudt, 1978).

In November 1978 the South African Government announced that the banning order which had been placed in 1973 on Morgan Naidoo, head of the non-racial swimming association, would be lifted (Argus, November 2, 1978). It depended to a large degree on the attitude adopted by Naidoo and his organisation, whether discussions would take place concerning the development of one national controlling organisation for South African swimming. Naidoo subsequently outlined the conditions he felt would have to be met before he would consider dialogue with the predominantly White South African Swimming Union. These were: (i) all pools throughout South Africa should be thrown open to all races for competitive and recreational swimming; (ii) all clubs would show that they were genuinely open by way of word and deed; (iii) multi-nationalism must at no stage enter the swimming scene: there must be no separate Indian, African or any racial competition (Cape Herald, November 25, 1978). Any thought that these conditions could be met was quashed almost immediately. Twelve Black swimmers who presented themselves at Ellis Park for a training session were turned away. The Black swimmers were to attend a training session organised by the South African Swimming Union, when they were met by a city council official and told that they could not enter the pool area. Mr. Kramer, head of SASU, apologised for what he said was a misunderstanding, but he admitted he was disappointed. Mr. Manathebe Senekonyana, president of the affiliated Black organisation which had been co-operating with Mr. Kramer's association, reacted angrily over the incident, saying that his association would take no part in mixed galas until all discrimina-

tion was removed and equal training facilities for all races were available (Cape Times, November 21, 1978).

Soccer displayed similar discord during 1978. In July the two main protagonists, who were preventing the formation of one national controlling organisation, indicated that they might compromise and form one body. Middleton, who was representing the non-racial South African Soccer Federation, subsequently announced that the principle of one national controlling body was unacceptable to the SASF (Argus, July 29, 1978). It was not greeted with unanimous approval by some of the professional clubs within the SASF, who could obviously fore-see greater economic opportunity if the SASF and the rival South African National Football Association should merge. The SANFA drew its attendance largely from the large Black population, where soccer was the number one sport, and this virtually guaranteed economic viability. The SANFA stated in August that any clubs from the SASF professional organisation which wished to join their professional competition would find a willing ear (Cape Times, August 18, 1978). Hellenic, one of the SASF clubs, then took the initiative and crossed the floor. Cape Town City also defected, which prompted severe censure from SASF president Norman Middleton (Cape Times, August 23, 1978). In October it appeared that differences had been resolved. Dialogue between the two organisations took place and the Sunday Times (October 15, 1978) dramatically exclaimed that agreement had been reached between SANFA, SASF and Football Council officials, to form one controlling body for the sport. Further, it was stated that the new development had the sanction of the London-based anti-apartheid group, SAN-ROC. The Sunday Times was proved incorrect in both instances. Norman Middleton admitted that he had had dialogue with the SANFA, but that agreement had not been reached (Sunday Times, October 22, 1978). SAN-ROC described the allegation that it supported the formation of one national organisation as totally false. Further, it claimed that it would never approve of dialogue or mergers with racist sports bodies (Cape Herald, October 21, 1978).

Apparently the objection was to the fact that the SANFA functioned within the permit system. This was totally objectionable to the SASF, and although Middleton obviously realised he was putting his professional clubs in possible financial jeopardy, he felt he could not compromise 27 years of non-racial principles. South African soccer therefore remained divided, and as far away from a return to international football as it had been previously. Shortly afterwards, SACOS accused the SASF of having fallen prey to the multi-national sport concept, and of having betrayed the non-racial principles under which the SASF had been created. As a result the SASF was expelled from SACOS (Cape Herald, November 4, 1978).

By the end of 1978 two major approaches to the South African sports situation had been consolidated. There were those who argued that progress in South African sport was significant enough to allow South Africa back into international sport. Disagreeing with this opinion were the non-racialists, who were not satisfied with the status quo and demanded that South African sport be normalised, that is, all racial restrictions removed down to the primary school level, before they would co-operate with White sporting organisations.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S SPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1978

At the international level the inclination was towards the view of the non-racialists. At a meeting of nine European Common Market countries in Brussels, a joint formal announcement was made, stating that South Africans were not welcome to play sport in Europe unless the sport they represented was shown to be fully integrated at all levels. European governments, it was stated, would commit themselves to discouraging their citizens from any contact with racially selected players (Argus, March 16, 1978). This announcement, although further emphasising the increased line of resistance to South African sport, did not appear to be as far-reaching as the Gleneagles Accord signed by Commonwealth heads of state. The wording was such that arbitrary interpretation of 'integrated teams' still

provided a means for South Africa's entry into sporting Europe. The statement was therefore more of a moral code, significant only in its demonstrating that such a code was considered necessary. Shortly afterwards, Britain showed that she, for one, would abide by it. Derek Robins, an industrialist residing in Cape Town, approached the British Minister of Sport, Mr. Dennis Howell, to obtain permission to take a mixed cricket team to Britain. Mr. Howell replied that the British Government could not condone sporting contacts with South African teams while racial barriers continued to exist in sport (South African Digest, March 24, 1978).

Further condemnation emanated from the International Olympic Committee. At a press conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, Lord Killanin, president of the IOC, produced an 11-page manifesto on how the IOC saw its role and that of other organisations which interfered with its functioning. Lord Killanin condemned exaggerated nationalism, discrimination of all kinds, and the manipulation and exploitation of athletes. When asked if he considered the IOC's expulsion of South Africa and Rhodesia to be a case of politics interfering in sport, he replied that South Africa and Rhodesia had been expelled because their political situations prevented their National Olympic Committees from abiding by the rules of the IOC. Earlier he had suggested that there had been no material changes in South African sport and he had advised South Africa to forget about readmission (South African Digest, March 3, 1978). South African reaction was manifold. The Beeld (March 23, 1978) described Lord Killanin as the personification of spinelessness in the face of pressure by the Soviet group and the Afri-Asians, who were making a battlefield of the IOC. Die Burger (March 28, 1978) suggested that for top South African athletes, who yearned for competition against the world's best, it was extremely frustrating that even South Africa's best efforts were apparently in vain. The Pretoria News (March 22, 1978) was more circumspect in its comment. It felt that by international standards there was still quite a way to go in South Africa, and that there would be little change in overseas opinion until people of all races overcame the old social conventions and participated fully at club level with absolute

freedom.

South African tennis found that opposition was increasing against her participation in the Davis Cup competition, even though for the first time she had included a Black tennis player, Peter Lamb, in her team (Sunday Times, February 19, 1978). The Davis Cup tie was to be played against the United States in the United States. Anti-apartheid groups agitated for the cancellation of the matches with threats of bombing if the tie went ahead. Blen Franklin, the president of South Africa's Tennis Union, tried to appease the two groups organising the demonstrations; the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People and the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sports; by sending them telegrams giving background information on South African tennis and stating that there was no discrimination in the sport in South Africa. Little credence was given to Mr. Franklin's telegrams; both organisations went ahead with plans for demonstrations. One of the team-members was non-plussed, but one of the others found the pressure inhibiting. Ray Moore announced that he was withdrawing from the team. Moore said that he regretted the intrusion of politics into sport and then added that he thought South Africa would engender a lot of goodwill if she stood down for a year or two and "let them get on with the Davis Cup without having to worry about us" (Argus, March 4, 6, 1978).

Moore was replaced and the tie went ahead. On the Saturday of the match, 2 000 people, carrying banners and chanting slogans, marched 20 blocks from the state capital to the venue at Vanderbilt University. The effect of the demonstrations and bomb threats reduced the attendance to a mere 1 200 people. Victory was claimed by the demonstrators, one of whom, Bill Silver, a member of the Revolutionary Student Brigade, said: "What the world saw was not a tennis match - what the world saw was growing opposition to apartheid" (Cape Times, March 21, 1978).

Pressure was subsequently applied by Western Countries against the South African Tennis Union. It was suggested that it would become increasingly difficult to support South Africa's membership in the International Tennis Federation, if South Africa continued to participate in the Davis Cup, with all the adverse publicity this created. The South African Tennis Union announced that it would withdraw from the Davis Cup when the International Tennis Federation met in July in Stockholm. South Africa's withdrawal was to be for a year (South African Digest, March 3, 1978).

Initially it appeared that South African cricket might be treated more favourably at the international level. In June the secretary of the Australian Cricket Board announced that Australia would welcome South Africa back into world cricket (Friend, June 23, 1978). In South Africa the press replied that South African cricket deserved to hear the kind of remarks made about it (Rand Daily Mail, June 23, 1978). The Oggendblad (June 23, 1978) considered that the news was good, but recognised the realities of being able to secure a positive vote from the important members of the cricket establishment: India, the West Indies and Pakistan. The Oggendblad suggested that Australia should show its good faith by undertaking an unconditional tour of Australia. The Friend (June 23, 1978) however, felt that South Africa was not yet up to international reacceptance. It explained that there was still too great a gap in the theoretical situation, as explained by Dr. Koornhof, and the practical situation: the liquor laws, Group Areas Act and public attitudes ensured that for all the progress that had been made, South Africa was still a good way from having truly non-racial cricket.

Supporting the contention of the Friend was a contemporaneous report in the Sunday Tribune (June 4, 1978). Herein it was stated that (i) six Black athletes were refused entry to Randburg's Verwoerd Stadium, for a Republic day fun run; (ii) A Pretoria bowls club marred the Transvaal bowls championship by refusing to play against a coloured team; (iii) The Pretoria City Council declared Trim Park, a new jogging course, for 'Whites only', and unanimously approved the erection of

notice boards at the park's entrance proclaiming such.

Irrespective of the fact that discrimination obviously continued to exist in South African sport, Mr. Varachia felt that the conditions prevailing in South African cricket were far better than those required by the International Cricket Conference in 1970. Varachia asserted that in fact South African cricket had gone 200 percent further than the requests made by the ICC in 1970 (Sunday Times, June 18, 1978). Varachia's optimism failed to take into account the growing world awareness since 1970 concerning the plight of the Black, and Black sportsmen in South Africa. The progress made by the South African Cricket Union was considerable, and may have sufficed in 1970, but in 1978 the issue was no longer one of mixed sport at club level and merit selection, it was one of the removal of all discrimination. Varachia could not offer this; nevertheless, he intended putting South Africa's case before the ICC. Varachia explained that he was not seeking an immediate return to international cricket, but was hoping to succeed in convincing delegates that there had been changes in South African cricket, and then to secure from the ICC an undertaking to send a fact-finding mission to South Africa (Argus, June 22, 1978).

At the ICC meeting, because they had not been invited, Varachia and his delegation had to wait outside and lobby delegates as they came out of the meeting. Although unconventional, this tactic proved successful as the ICC subsequently decided to send a fact-finding delegation to South Africa in 1979, provided an invitation was forthcoming from South Africa. There were strenuous objections from the West Indies, Pakistan, India, East Africa and Bangladesh, all of whom dissociated themselves from the fact-finding delegation and the decision (Die Volksblad, July 28, 1978). Die Volksblad felt that this decision signified a noticeable change in the attitude of the ICC, and that South Africa could derive hope for the future. Hassan Howa was singularly unimpressed by the decision of the ICC. He said that he would refuse to see any delegation from the ICC because (a) it would be pointless, and (b) since the delegation would consist only of those nations already favourably disposed towards South Africa, any findings would be biased

(Howa, 1978).

Howa's point was significant. In addition, while it was progressive to have a fact-finding mission coming to South Africa, the results would sustain little credibility without support from the third world, the Carribean, or the Asian countries. There was also the possibility that such a fact-finding mission would adversely affect South Africa's chances of re-entry, not only by emphasising that discrimination still existed, but by creating a polarisation within the ICC itself.

Of the major sports, only rugby found any favour internationally in 1978. This, in a sense, was ironical, as rugby had been slow in implementing change. In November rugby in South Africa received the news that an invitation had been extended by the French Rugby Union for a multi-racial Springbok rugby team to tour France in September/October 1979 (Cape Times, November 13, 1978). One of the conditions of the tour was that the touring party had to contain at least three Black players not necessarily chosen on merit (Argus, November 18, 1978).

This condition, which the South African Rugby Board accepted, presented problems, not in finding three Black rugby players, but in finding three players of international calibre. Craven (1978) insisted that this would not be a major problem, that efforts during the six months available would be intensified, and that any Black players chosen would be worthy of the honour.

With the exception of rugby, international reaction to South Africa's progress in her major sports was unsympathetic. However, there were no indications that there was to be any volte face at the international level, or a reacceptance of South Africa. The evolution away from strict separatism in sport could not be denied, but in 1978 it was not far-reaching enough for the international sporting community. Dr. Koornhof had asserted in April that the more pressure exerted on South African sport, in an attempt to isolate it, the greater the failure of such pressure would be. South Africa, he said, would create such an internal sporting environment that the world would have no choice other than to take her back

(Hansard, April 20, 1978. Col. 5243). This suggested that once a situation of sufficient attraction had been created in South Africa, the international sporting community would be prepared to compromise its stand that sport be normalised and discrimination be completely removed. This was contra-indicated when, during 1978, South Africa was either barred from, or had invitations withdrawn which prevented her participating in thirty-two international sporting events (Hansard, March 8, 1979. Questions and Replies, Cols. 334-337). At the end of 1978 South Africa was expelled, barred or suspended from twenty five international sporting associations. They were: Ice-skating, Water-skiing, Rowing, Lifesaving, Chess, Canoeing, Hockey (women), Squash (women), Fresh Water Angling, Fencing, Athletics, Badminton, Weightlifting, Roller skating, Speed skating, Swimming, Cricket (women), Yachting, Netball, Cricket (men), Cycling, Boxing, Football, Wrestling and Bowls for the Blind (Hansard, March 8, 1979. Questions and Replies, Cols. 337-339).

This situation did not in itself deprive South Africa of international sporting contact. Sportsmen continued to visit South Africa in 1978 although in an increasingly unofficial capacity. On the 133 occasions that overseas countries were represented in South Africa, there were only 56 at a representative level, and on only 44 of the 103 occasions that South Africa was represented by her athletes abroad, was South Africa able to present representative teams* (Department of Sport and Recreation, Annual Report, 1978 : pp. 14-16).

Although at the end of 1978 South Africa was not totally isolated, she was being increasingly deprived of sporting contact at international representative level. The effect that this was having on South African sportsmen was difficult to evaluate, as in those sports where such contact was withheld there were no means, without international competition, of measuring degeneration of skill or interest. The effect was open to conjecture, but the zeal with which international competition at representative level was pursued by South African sporting organisations,

* Taiwan and Rhodesia were excluded from these figures as they are no longer members of the United Nations.

underscored the importance of international contact, since international contests are traditionally financial bonanzas for the major sports, this finance in turn being used to stimulate the sport at every level and maintain the overall health of the sport. Deprivation of this source of income was a particular loss.

SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1979 AND CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

Early in 1979 considerable opposition was generated in the United States over the presence of South Africa's heavyweight boxing champion Kallie Knoetze. Knoetze was due to fight an American Bill Sharkey in an elimination contest for the world heavyweight title. The American Co-ordinating Committee for Equality in Sports and Society, which was lead by civil rights activist, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, felt that Knoetze, because he had shot a Black boy in the leg while on duty as a policeman, epitomised the anti-Black sportsmen in South Africa (Los Angeles Times, January 14, 1979). Pressure was exerted on the United States State Department and a revocation of Knoetze's visa was obtained. Department officials said the decision had been made after a revaluation of Knoetze's criminal record. (Knoetze had pleaded guilty in South Africa to trying to defeat the ends of justice by attempting to convince two boys not to testify against a police colleague who was charged with assaulting them. Listed as a misdemeanour in South Africa, it was a felony in the United States, which theoretically prevented Knoetze obtaining a visa.) The decision to revoke Knoetze's visa was hailed by the Reverend Jesse Jackson as "a great victory for human rights" (New York Times, January 10, 1979). Die Burger (January 10, 1979) commented that it feared no American explanation would help to counteract an unfavourable reaction in South Africa. Knoetze appealed successfully, however, and a temporary restraining order staying the revocation was issued. Civil rights activists then tried to obtain a revocation of Knoetze's boxing license from the Boxing Commission. When this failed the fight went ahead with Knoetze winning in the fourth round (Independent Press-Telegram, January 14, 1979).

Knoetze won the encounter outside the ring, but indications were that greater difficulties over future participation for himself and other South Africans would ensue. Escalation of opposition to individual South African sportsmen was confirmed by the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC). Spokesman Sam Ramsamy observed:

Individual sportsmen from South Africa have done little or nothing to better the lot of Black sportsmen. In fact they have made hay of the situation while we have concentrated on attacking team sport, and individuals like Gary Player have been outspoken in defence of official government hypocrisy.

Well from now on it is going to get very tough for the individuals. All those rich tennis players, Cliff Drysdale, Bob Hewitt and Frew McMillan and the like, who make fortunes around the world parading as South Africans, while they use other passports, are in for a hard time. (Cape Times, January 11, 1979)

Significant progress was made in South African sport towards the end of February. The Department of Sport and Recreation, which had previously catered for South Africa's White sportsmen only, announced that racial barriers were to be dropped, and that the Department would become a truly integrated government department. The new Minister of Sport, Mr. de Klerk, said that the services rendered to all population groups would include financing of sport and recreation projects. There would also be technical advice and aid in training and the administration of sports, organisational help in sports promotion projects such as championships, leagues and other organised competitions, and aid in the presentation of fitness programmes (Cape Times, February 23, 1979). This development, for the first time at governmental level enabled Black and White to be considered as an integrated unit thereby giving overt recognition to greater integration which in theory also allows the needs of all races equal consideration and administration. However, this development did not remove official and unofficial discrimination which continued to militate against Black sports persons exploiting the full potential of one Department of Sport and Recreation for all. Overseas opposition, at governmental level, accorded this new development little recognition.

Further opposition against sporting contact with South Africa appeared as a result of a European sports ministers conference. Britain's Minister of Sport, Dennis Howell, stated:

This conference here has had evidence that there is increasing participation by South Africa involving itself with sporting teams from overseas countries. We strongly urge the governing bodies of sport not to give credence to South Africa since we think it undermines the traditional concept of sport.

Let me tell the sportsmen that if they want governments to keep out of sport, they must not involve themselves by accepting invitations to play against South African teams. They are being used to give respectability to South Africa's apartheid system. (Argus, March 14, 1979)

At the end of March Mr. Howell made another attack on South African sport. He said that the British Government was not prepared to condone sporting links with South Africa until certain conditions were met. These stated that the constitution of the governing body and its clubs had to be truly non-racial; the development policy of sport had to be non-racial; the quality of coaching had to be available at all levels without regard to race or colour; facilities and opportunities in clubs affiliated to the governing body had to be genuinely non-racial, as shown for example in bars, toilet facilities and in team selection at all levels; and there had to be a complete absence of racial discrimination in the arrangements for spectators at sporting events (Cape Times, March 30, 1979).

Howell's statement was difficult to reconcile with the Gleneagles agreement to which his country was a signatory. The Gleneagles agreement had stated categorically that apartheid per se would have to be eliminated before official sports contact with South Africa was re-established. Howell's conditions suggested that South Africa had only to remove discrimination from her sport.

Despite the probability that South Africa would not be re-admitted to the world sporting associations from which she had been expelled or suspended, two commissions arrived in South Africa in 1979 to investigate progress which had occurred and to report this position to their respective international associations. The International Cricket Conference delegation

arrived in February. After a ten-day visit, the delegation reported that it did not know whether sport could be separated from politics to allow South Africa back into world cricket. They refused to comment any further on their findings. These were, in the event, usurped by the British Minister of Sport who said he knew all about the mission and was not impressed. He asked how it could be regarded as a fact-finding mission when countries like Pakistan, India and West Indies were not represented. The British Government would not recognise any recommendations they brought back, he added (Argus, March 3, 13, 1979). The findings were not released at the International Cricket conference meeting in June; there was a suggestion that if the report was favourable and the South African Cricket Union were admitted, the West Indies, Pakistan, India and Canada would have withdrawn and formed their own association (Cape Herald, July 14, 1979).

On March 16th a four-man International Tennis Federation fact-finding mission arrived in South Africa. This mission's brief was to establish the progress that had been made in South African tennis since their mission a year before. During 1978 the two predominantly Black tennis organisations, the South African Lawn Tennis Union and the South African National Lawn Tennis Union, had amalgamated to form one non-racial organisation which was known as the Tennis Association of South Africa (TASA). At first this new organisation refused to have anything to do with the fact-finding mission, but later it capitulated (Cape Herald, March 17, 1979). In June it was announced by the committee of management of the International Tennis Federation that it was recognised that most of the restrictions which had prevented progress towards non-racial tennis in South Africa had been removed, but that the rate of this progress was still not acceptable.

They do not believe that the SATU should be expelled from the ITF, but they feel that, in the present situation, it would be wrong for South Africa to participate in the Davis Cup, the Federation Cup or any other team competition organised by the ITF or its member nations.

They will ask the annual meeting to recommend that no competition organised by a member nation should be sanctioned if a South African team participates. (Cape Times, June 14, 1979)

Further deprecation, at the international level in major sport, was witnessed in rugby. In April a South African provincial rugby team, Transvaal, tried to conduct a short tour of France. The Transvaal Union was apparently instructed by the French authorities to include Black players in their team. The Transvaal Union, states Loriston (1979), approached his Federation, which administers rugby for Coloureds and is affiliated to the South African Rugby Board. Because the two players required by Transvaal were domiciled in the Western Province and were therefore otherwise committed, Loriston suggested that they take two others, Abe Fillies and Japie Liederman. Transvaal refused the offer and left without any Black players. When the team reached France they were told that they were not acceptable. This refusal led to claims by Peter Hain that the hypocrisy of South African rugby had been exposed (Sunday Times, April 15, 1979).

* * * * *

There has been a gradual controlled evolution of the sport/race interrelationship in South Africa since 1971. However, during this evolution there has also been a crystallisation of world opinion. A greater awareness has been forthcoming as to the conditions faced by the Black man in sport and in South African society. Consequently this has resulted in an escalation of the demands made on South African sport: no longer is merit selection and the opportunity for Black sportsmen to compete at club level, sufficient to appease world opinion and allow South Africa back into international sport.

Exactly what criteria South Africa is required to satisfy in order to obtain recognition remains uncertain. Demands on South African sport have fluctuated between the need for normal or non-racial sport and the abolition of apartheid as such. One demand, in essence, concerns itself with sport, the other is political. These categories are, however, not nearly as idiomorphic as the syntax would suggest, and herein lies part of the problem in normalisation of sport in South Africa.

There are indications that sport is being used to gain political concessions for the Blacks in the same way that concessions have been sought in sport itself. Although concessions have been allowed to develop under the White South African Government, there have been statements on numerous occasions that sport would not effect integration on a greater level, and that there had been no deviation in policy, the policy being that of separate development. The realisation, therefore, that greater political and social change is being sought by various agencies under the amorphous sports mantle, has resulted in a conservative reaction against this development. Resistance to this development has allowed a widening of the gap between what is accomplished in South African sport, and what remains to be accomplished.

Since 1976 South Africa has moved increasingly further from the multi-national approach in sport. The point has now been reached where further attention is needed to rid the infrastructures of national and provincial sporting organisations of the vestiges of multi-nationalism. Attention should also be given to specific legislation which retains the potential to inhibit the development of non-racial sport (cf. Chapter Nine). The question of integrated sport at the school level remains an obstacle in the process of sports normalisation, although in August 1979 progress was made in this sphere. It was announced by the Minister of Sport and Recreation that inter-racial school sport would be permitted subject to the consent of school boards (Argus, August 17, 1979). While this reduced some of the bureaucracy which had previously inhibited inter-racial school sport, it did not remove restrictions, and, ipso facto objections by those demanding normal sport.

If attention is given to the above details there is still no guarantee that South Africa will be re-accepted by the international sporting community. The issue that is South African sport concerns commitment to a higher political/social/economics ideal. Sport, in the case of South Africa, has been seen to have the potential to influence and bring about change. Therefore, unless a substitute, such as equal political representation in South Africa is found for sport, or unless the world

sporting community decides that sport can be separated from politics, there appears every likelihood that sport in the South African context will continue to be used to achieve extrinsic ends.

In the final section of this dissertation, the various aspects related to South Africa's sports development are considered individually.

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CHAPTER NINE

LEGISLATION AND SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

THE LIQUOR ACT

THE BLACK (URBAN AREAS) CONSOLIDATION ACT

THE GROUP AREAS ACT

THE RESERVATION OF SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT

THE BOXING AND WRESTLING CONTROL ACT

It should be made clear at the outset that there is no law in South Africa which prevents members of different racial groups from associating in the pursuit of sport. However, there are certain pieces of legislation which can and have been utilised by South Africa authorities, to persuade sport in a predetermined separate direction. It is the intention in this chapter to examine the Liquor Act, the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the Group Areas Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act and the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act, to determine their relationship to sport in South Africa.

THE LIQUOR ACT

Progress has been made in South African sport to the point where sports clubs can be technically integrated. In order to be able to entertain Black sportsmen and officials, that is, to serve them refreshments and liquor, a White sports club first has to obtain permission, in the form of international status, which will allow them to do so without the fear of prosecution.

This has not always been the position. Under the original Liquor Act No. 30 of 1928 there were certain sections which were designed to prevent different race groups serving or imbibing liquor with other race groups (Statutes of the Republic of South Africa). Stuart (1978 : 8) stated that the only Non-

White who could be supplied with liquor by a licensee (in the ordinary course) was the Non-White who was employed by the licensee and then only when the liquor was given to the employee without charge. This did not create a problem as race groups remained divided/separate in sport. With the introduction of multi-nationalism in 1971, and with the gradual move away from strictly segregated sport, the problem arose that because of the Liquor Act, post-match socialisation could not be indulged in, unless permission authorising the supply of liquor to Non-Whites could be obtained from the chairman of the National Liquor Board.

To circumvent the possibility of prosecution for serving liquor to a Non-White, a White club applied to the chairman of the National Liquor Board, on an ad hoc basis, usually eight to ten days before an event, for permission to dispense liquor to their Non-White sports guests. If the chairman of the Liquor Board granted permission to the club applying, there were certain restrictions that usually accompanied it: a special private room had to be allocated for the entertainment of the Non-White team, and the entertainment had to be confined to that room. Only the team, team manager, coach and the reserves were allowed to attend (wives, families and team supporters were excluded). This procedure, besides being objectionable to most Non-Whites, was inconvenient, and further problems sometimes arose when an unexpected Non-White sportsman accompanied what was usually a White team. Permission could be obtained at short notice, but it was once again inconvenient and embarrassing (Stuart, 1978 : 11).

This was not conducive to multi-racial sport. In 1977 a new Liquor Act was passed: No. 87 of 1977. In February 1978 Dr. Koornhof announced that the process of applying for permits, to which White clubs were subjected to when they wished to entertain Non-White sportsmen, was to be refined. Dr. Koornhof explained that clubs would be allowed to apply to the National Liquor Board for 'international status', which, if granted would allow the sports club to open its facilities to all races, without the process of applying for ad hoc permission (Argus, February 28, 1978).

This was not an innovative development as previously international status had been granted to hotels under the Liquor Act of 1928. However, this development did allow a greater degree of integration in sport in South Africa.

Obtaining international status is a complex and time consuming procedure, and its acquisition is not a carte blanche to integration. If a White sports club wishes to obtain international status, notice of this intention must be lodged in a bilingual newspaper fourteen days before actual application, or in both an English and Afrikaans newspaper in the sports club's district. The application, with details of previous licences, is then sent to the local magistrate. Fourteen days later, the application must be sent by the magistrate to the National Liquor Board. There the application is processed and ratified, and either the applicant or his legal adviser must appear before the Board. All those requesting are then questioned, mainly on their reasons for wanting international status. If the National Liquor Board is satisfied, international status is granted to the club, with certain restrictions (Levin, 1978 : 189-191).

The restrictions which have been enumerated by the Minister of Justice, are: firstly, liquor, refreshments and meals can only be sold or supplied to a Non-White who is a competitor taking part in a match or practice on the grounds owned or controlled by the White club; this applies to officials accompanying competitors and to Non-Whites who are guests of White club members. Secondly, when these conditions are operating no dancing is to take place while Non-Whites are present (Hansard, April 2, 1979. Questions and Replies. Cols. 590-594).

Technically therefore, sports clubs in South Africa, if granted international status, can claim to be integrated. The restrictions which accompany its acquisition, however, sustain the criticism that in practice integration is difficult to achieve.

THE BLACK (URBAN AREAS) CONSOLIDATION ACT

Although there is no law which specifically prohibits members of one racial group from playing sport with another group, the

Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 is an example of legislation which has been an obstacle in the way of integrated sport.

The Black Urban Areas Act was originally intended, as stated in the preamble of the original act, to control the influx of Blacks into urban areas (Statutes of the Republic of South Africa). The act also gave urban local authorities, with the approval of the Minister, the power to define, set apart or lay out separate areas where Blacks could live. No person, other than a Black, was to be allowed to enter these areas without the permission of an officer who was appointed for the management of that area.

The influence of this act on sport can easily be identified: White, Coloured and Indian sportsmen have to obtain permission to enter a Black township to play sport. One of the most well-known cases, concerning the effect of this act on sport, is that of the rugby player Watson. Watson was one of a group of several players who pioneered multi-racial rugby in 1976, much against the stated wishes of the government and the South African Rugby Board, by playing in a match in a Black township in Port Elizabeth (Cape Times, October 8, 1976). No permission had been obtained from the authorities for the match. While those who participated were castigated by government spokesmen and by the South African Rugby Board, there were, however, no prosecutions. Watson then went on to become player coach of one of the Black sides, Kwaru. He applied for permission to do so, and in February 1977 was given an unrestricted permit to attend training sessions. However, in August the Cape Midlands Bantu Affairs Administration Board withdrew the permit. It was replaced with one that allowed Watson and two other White players to enter the township from 4pm. to 6pm. during the week, and on Saturdays between 1pm. and 7pm. Watson claimed that the conditions were impractical, because between 4pm. and 6pm. during the week his teammates were still working, and if he had to be out of the township by 7pm. on a Saturday he could not attend a social after-match gathering. In May 1978 Watson was arrested. He was convicted of being in a Black area without a permit. He was cautioned and discharged. Watson was

arrested again in 1978 and charged, inter alia, with entering the Black New Brighton township without a permit. He was acquitted of all charges (Sunday Times, August 27; October 17; Cape Herald, September 23, 1978).

Although the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act was designed primarily to control the influx of Blacks into urban areas, and is therefore not specifically concerned with sport, it is obvious that it can be utilised to inhibit the development of sport in South Africa, and therefore, in its present form remains an impediment to further normalisation.

THE GROUP AREAS ACT

The objective behind the original Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950, as stated in the preamble, was to establish "group areas for the control of the acquisition of immovable property and the occupation of land and premises and for matters incidental thereof" (Statutes of the Republic of South Africa). Although the Group Areas Act of 1950 has been repealed and replaced by the Group Areas Act No. 36 of 1966, the effect is still, as observed by Hosten et al. (1977 : 295), that of creating certain areas which are reserved for the ownership and occupation of persons of a certain race.

The implications of this act for sport were that it could prohibit one race group from entering a particular group area, which area they were not entitled to enter under the Group Areas Act, without special permission from the authorities concerned. If the authorities could determine who could enter a particular group area, control over inter-racial sport could be exercised. The prevailing ideology of the 1950's dictated separate development. As a result, permission for inter-racial sport was not generally forthcoming under the Group Areas Act. There were, however, loopholes in the legislation. Horrell (1978 : 124) reports that until 1956 the Group Areas Act did not contain a definition of "occupation", as it related to land or premises. In the case of Fen Sam Jackson v Conradie N.O. and Another 1955 (4) S.A. 266(E) a decision was handed down, which held that

patrons (Black) who occupied seats in a cinema, in a White Group Area, were not "occupying" the premises in terms of the Group Areas Act, and accordingly they did not need a permit to attend such performances.

The possible ramifications for sport were that "occupying" a sports ground for a similar period might also be considered in the same vein, and therefore regarded as permissible. However, an amendment to the Group Areas Act in 1957, Section 1(4) Act 77, declared that the presence of any person at any time on land or in premises in the area concerned: (a) for a substantial period of time; (b) for the purpose of attending any place of public entertainment or partaking of any refreshment at a place where refreshments were served; (c) as a member of, or a guest in, any club, would constitute "occupation" of such land or premises. It appeared that inter-race sport under provision (c) was being firmly directed by legislative means, in the direction of segregation. There were still those who were determined to challenge this development. In October 1962 a case was brought before the Natal Supreme Court. The case centred around a group of White and Coloured soccer players, who belonged to the Lincoln City club of Pietermaritzburg. The contention which arose was whether by playing a game of soccer in an area zoned for another race group, the players were contravening the Group Areas Act by 'habitually or physically' occupying the premises where the game had occurred. In this case, Proclamation 225 of 1960 was read in conjunction with section 29 of the Group Areas Act No. 77 of 1957. It was determined that since the players had not used the buildings, or 'club' buildings, as designated in the Act, they were not guilty of any offence under the Group Areas Act. An appeal was lodged in 1963 at which the original judgement was upheld. The judge stated that he had interpreted the Act, as it then was, to mean that what was forbidden "was the presence of the indicated persons on club premises for the purposes of partaking of refreshment in the manner indicated" (S.V. Brandsma and others, 1964(1) SA 261(n)).

This verdict, reports Kotzé (1978 : 43-50), was interpreted in Natal golfing circles as a possible gap in the legal situation regarding mixed sport participation. The Natal Golf Union in 1963 therefore decided to accept the entry of a Indian golfer, Sewsunker Sewgolum, in their Provincial Open Championship without obtaining official permission or applying for a special permit. Papwa Sewgolum, as he was more popularly known, won the event, which created further difficulties under the Group Areas Act. To have allowed Sewgolum into the clubhouse to receive his prize would have been in contravention of the Act, and the executive would have invited the intervention of the authorities and subsequent arrest. . Kotzé (1978 : 43-50) states that the solution was to hold the prizegiving outside. However, it then started to rain and a shelter had to be erected. Sewgolum received his prize under a tarpaulin and in so doing emphasised the potential that the Group Areas Act had, if not to prevent, then to restrict the development of inter-racial sport.

Changes to the Act followed in 1964 and 1965. In 1965 Proclamation R26 was gazetted. This stated that in group areas, controlled areas and specified areas, the provisions of the Act relating to the occupation of land or premises would apply also with reference to any disqualified person, who at any time was present in, or upon, any land or premises in such areas for the purpose of attending any place of public entertainment, or partaking of any refreshments ordinarily involving the use of seating accommodation as a customer in a licensed restaurant, refreshment or tearoom or eating-house, or as a member of a guest in any club (except as a representative or guest of the state, a provincial administration, a local authority, or a statutory body) (Government Gazette, February 12, 1965). This made the playing of sport of "disqualified" persons in certain areas illegal.

The Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 was repealed by the Group Areas Act of 1966. This latter Act specifically provided, however, that the proclamations made under former Acts were not repealed. Act 36 of 1966 provides, inter alia, that the State President might, after consultation with the Administration of the

Province concerned, declare, by proclamation in the Government Gazette, that as from a specified date all buildings, land or premises in a specific area, or in the portion of an area as defined in the proclamation, be occupied or used only for the particular purpose mentioned in the proclamation.

Section 20(1) of the same Act provides that no disqualified person shall occupy, and no person shall allow any disqualified person to occupy, any land or premises in a controlled area, except under authority of a permit.

The effect was that sports clubs were required to apply for permits which would exempt them from the provisions of the Act, if they wished to entertain guests from a 'disqualified' race group in their area. Horrell (1978 : 128) cites the instance of the Durban International Club, which was an inter-racial club that had existed to promote inter-race harmony and understanding. Its constitution provided that no liquor was to be served, that there was not to be any dancing on the premises, and that the club was not to be used as a political platform. As a result of the amendment, the club had to apply for a permit. Upon doing so, it was informed that no Blacks could visit its premises as members or guests. A similar restriction was placed on White and Coloured persons, which left Indians as the only possible patrons. The club closed shortly afterwards.

The aspect of the definition of "a place of public entertainment" was examined as an alternative loophole. K.W. Stuart, in preparing an Ex parte document for the Wanderers Club in Johannesburg, surmised the following:

In the ultimate analysis it would appear from reading the following cases:

Allen v Emerson and others, 1944 K.B. 362;

Terry v Brighton Aquarium Co. 1875(10) Q.B.D. 306;

Naylor and Preacher v Rex, 1910 A.D. 261;

Rex v Hattingh 1960(1) S.A. 656 (T);

Rex v Mphahele and others, 1942 T.P.D. 112

that a place of public entertainment is a place which is open to the public with some degree of regularity, that is, that the 'entertainment' is habitually held

for the public as a matter of course, and that every= one has general access to such place. (Stuart, 1972)

What this meant was that mixed sport could be played within the law, provided that it could be demonstrated that the game was not for public entertainment. The antonym of "public" was "private", so it was assumed that if a ground could be made "private", then mixed sport could proceed. This, in fact, meant that the public would have to be excluded and/or that a select audience would have to be invited. Since the law could be circumvented, it offered a possible solution for those who wanted to proceed with mixed sport, but it was also obvious that this was not satisfactory, and that it was not condoned by the government.

Mixed sport did go ahead, the most famous of the mixed events being the case of the Aurora Cricket Club in Maritzburg. They continued playing as a mixed team in a White league. As such they were a constant reminder that the law was being flaunted. The National Party was cognisant of this and there were requests to legislate against sporting developments such as the Aurora Cricket Club (cf. Chapter Six). Proclamation R228 under the Group Areas Act in October 1973 was an attempt, inter alia, to placate criticism.

Although the obvious intention of Proclamation R228 was to give the authorities greater control over, inter alia, the playing of sport by one race group in another group area, there was considerable doubt from the outset as to the efficacy of the new proclamation. The phrase of particular concern was 'for a substantial period of time', which referred to any person who was at any time present in or upon any land or premises in a controlled or group area. Doubt surrounded the definition of what actually constituted 'a substantial period of time'. The Aurora Cricket Club felt that there was a sufficient laxity in interpretation, and announced they would continue playing mixed cricket (Cape Times, October 9, 1973). No prosecution resulted, and Dr. Koornhof (1978) maintained that no other sportsman or sports club had, until the middle of 1978, been prosecuted. Proclamation R228 existed therefore as a vague threat, with

dubious enforcement potential. It was, however, a tangible reminder of the commitment to the subjacent philosophy.

Mixed sport was in 1973 not condoned at government level, and, on the occasions when it was deigned that it should take place, special permission had and has still to be obtained from various government departments: from the Department of Community Development in the case of White, Coloured and Asian applicants; from the Ministry of Planning in the controlled areas; and in the case of Blacks in all areas from the Minister of Black Administration and Development (Horrell, 1978 : 125).

Upon receipt of an application, the particular sports ground selected as venue is inspected by liaison staff of the Department of Sport. It is presupposed that a mixed sporting event will have mixed spectators, so these have to be adequately catered for. Separate spectator seating (where relevant) and toilet facilities must be available, and where refreshments are to be offered for sale to spectators, separate sales points must be offered to Blacks and Whites. No separate facilities are required for players, White and Non-White players may share the same toilet, bath, shower and changeroom facilities in all respects. If all these aspects are found to be in order, multinational games on that sports ground are then authorised (Stuart, 1978 : 6).

The principle of having to obtain permission to 'play a game' became one of the major criticisms voiced by the non-racial sports people. In 1979 it remains a problem in the implementation of normal sport in South Africa. There have been several refinements since 1973, and on several occasions Dr. Koornhof announced that he could see no reason for permits: "In my view we don't need a permit system in our sport", he said (Cape Times, August 24, 1978). On 2nd February 1978, he stated in a letter to the International Tennis Federation that no permit or legal permission was needed in order to play on any court in South Africa or to join any club. Technically, the statement could be interpreted as being correct, but its accuracy did depend on where the court was located, and who actually wanted

to play on it. This, at least was the explanation offered by some for the apparent incongruity.

Nonetheless, in 1978 the permit system was refined somewhat. Blanket permission, or 'clearance' as Dr. Koornhof preferred it to be called, was given to teams and players when their programmes or league fixtures were submitted at the beginning of the year. In August it was further refined to allow White spectators to attend Black matches under blanket permission (cf. Chapter Eight). While Black teams can now liaise with the Department of Sport and obtain blanket exemptions for their teams to play in White areas, White, Coloured and Indian sportsmen have to obtain permits under the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act to enable them to play in Black townships. However, before Dr. Koornhof was succeeded as Minister of Sport and Recreation in November 1978, he did announce that his department was giving serious consideration to amending this particular part of the Group Areas Act. For the time being certain sports meetings have taken place by way of permit, within a law structure that actually continues to forbid it (Stuart, 1978 : 7). This could be a serious obstacle in the way of those who endeavour to promote mixed sport.

THE RESERVATION OF SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT

The preamble to the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953 states that the purpose of this Act is:

.... to provide for the reservation of public premises and vehicles or portions thereof for the exclusive use of persons of a particular race or class

The effect of this Act on sport is that it requires, in the instance of a multi-national match where it is assumed that there will be a group of mixed spectators, separate facilities for Whites and Non-Whites. This applies to seating (where relevant), toilet facilities and refreshment outlets. However, no separate facilities are required for the players, so that Black and White athletes may share the same toilet, bath, shower and changing-room facilities. If there are no amenities of equal status for other population groups, or if none exist at

all, there are to be no exemptions.

Such an arrangement has been rejected by those advocating normal sport in South Africa. Their demand is for open facilities. Some sport clubs, have on occasion, obtained permission from the Department of Community Development, on an ad hoc basis, to allow facilities to be used by all races. However, in the terms of the permission, the signs, which normally designate which are the facilities for Blacks and which are the facilities for Whites, and which signs are removed to make the facilities open to all races, have to be replaced.

There appears to be a growing tendency, as illustrated by the new rugby stadium at Stellenbosch, to create facilities which are available to all races. Nonetheless the principle remains: there is legislation which can be invoked to require sports clubs holding mixed sports meetings to provide separate facilities. It is a law that is objectionable to many, and, irrespective of the growing tendency away from separate facilities, the objection to the principle will remain for as long as the law affects sport in South Africa.

THE BOXING AND WRESTLING CONTROL ACT NO. 39 OF 1954

The Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 39 of 1954 is derived from 'the Volksraad Resolution' of the Transvaal, Article 58, dated 10 May 1890. This resolution was promulgated to control boxing, and was amended in 1923 by the Boxing and Wrestling Act 5 of 1923. The objective in 1923 was to make the provision of the Act applicable to the regulation of the holding of wrestling contests. This was further amended by Act 10 of 1939 and then again by Act 39 of 1954.

The purpose of the Boxing and Wrestling Act 39 of 1954, as stated in the preamble, was to:

.... provide for the establishment of a South African National Boxing Board and a South African Wrestling Control Board to define their objects, to prescribe their powers, duties and functions, and to provide for other incidental matters.

The objectives of this Board were to regulate, control and exercise general supervision over boxing or wrestling at tournaments in South Africa, with a view to the diminution of undesirable practices, and the protection of the interests of boxers, wrestlers, promoters, officials and the public generally.

As has been mentioned at the introduction to this dissertation, early reports of boxing in South Africa indicate that prevailing circumstances dictated boxing regulations to a great degree. Multi-racial contests were therefore not unknown. Boxing, however, followed the prevailing ideology and developed along segregated lines, with the promulgation of the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act in 1954, provision was not only made for the control of professional boxing and wrestling, but regulation (j) determined that official contests would be segregated (Statutes of the Republic of South Africa).

The desire to see no contact between Black and White professional boxers was further evidenced in 1960. On January 8th Proclamation R33 was gazetted. It stated, inter alia, that:

No contract relating to boxing shall be entered into between a White person and a Coloured person, nor shall any contest, competition or exhibition between White and Coloured boxers be permitted to participate at the same tournament, nor shall any White person act in the capacity of promoter, manager, second or adviser at any Coloured tournament, nor shall they be directly or indirectly interested in any such tournament or in any Coloured boxer there participating.
(Government Gazette, January 8, 1960)

Professional wrestling was catered for under Proclamation R34 which stipulated that White and Coloured wrestlers were not to participate at the same tournament (Government Gazette, January 8, 1960). Mixed professional boxing and wrestling contests were therefore effectively prohibited by law, with further consolidation in this direction deriving from regulation 15 of Proclamation R423 in 1963 (Government Gazette, March 22, 1963).

With the advent of multi-nationalism in sport in 1971 (cf. Chapter Six) a small degree of flexibility was introduced into the regulations surrounding mixed professional boxing contests. In November 1973 the Minister of Sport and Recreation, after

consultation with the South African National Boxing Control Board, announced that the Boxing and Wrestling Control Act of 1954 was amended by Proclamation R2173 which stated that:

(1) No contract whatsoever relating to boxing shall be entered into between a White person and a non-White person; nor shall any contest, competition or exhibition of a White boxer versus a non-White boxer be permitted; and a White boxer and a non-White boxer shall not be permitted to participate in the same tournament.

(2) A White person shall not act as promoter, manager, matchmaker, second or adviser, or in any other capacity whatsoever at a tournament for non-Whites. A non-White shall not act as a promoter, manager, matchmaker, second or adviser, or in any other capacity whatsoever at a tournament for Whites. A White person shall have no direct or indirect financial interest at any tournament for non-Whites or in a non-White boxer participating therein, and a non-White person shall have no direct or indirect financial interest whatsoever in a tournament for Whites or in a White boxer participating therein. Provided that the Minister may in the case of a world title bout, or an internationally recognised final eliminating contest for a world title, or a tournament which complies with the requirements of a South African multi-national tournament and in which South African boxers participate who are registered with the recognised National Boxing Control Board, approve any departure from some or all of the provisions of this regulation.

(3) This regulation shall not apply to a firm belonging to Whites which prints programmes, advertisements or brochures for tournaments for non-Whites, where a firm belonging to non-Whites does not exist, or where such a firm does exist but is not willing to print such matters; nor shall it apply to a person or an association of persons supplying advertising materials or press advertisements. (Government Gazette, November 16, 1973)

This announcement was notable particularly for the section "Provided that the Minister may in the case of a world title bout, or an internationally recognised final eliminating contest for a world title, or a tournament which complies with the requirements of a South African multi-national tournament and in which South African boxers participate who are registered with the recognised National Boxing Control Board, approve any departure from some or all of the provisions of this regulation".

This allowed the Minister of Sport and Recreation to bring Black and White contact into professional boxing, albeit at a restricted level. Further developments followed in 1974 when it was announced that it would be possible, with the Minister's approval, for a White person, or a firm belonging to a White person, to sponsor a tournament for Non-Whites (Government Gazette, May 24, 1974). In 1976 the Minister decreed, Proclamation R1082, that a White boxer from abroad could be assisted by a Non-White second and that a Non-White boxer from abroad could be assisted by a White second as long as his permission was obtained (Government Gazette, June 25, 1976).

In 1979, Blacks can fight against Whites professionally, although the arrangements for the fight must still have the consent of the Minister of Sport and Recreation. With the Minister's approval boxing tournaments between Black and White fighters are now held at the provincial level. Dockell (1978) says fights are not generally sanctioned between the races at a level lower than provincial. However, boxers do train with each other irrespective of colour, with training facilities being used by boxers of all races.

Amateur boxing and wrestling in South Africa fall under the Olympic mantle and therefore enter the category of other Olympic sports, mixed tournaments being permitted with the approval of the Department of Sport and Recreation (The South African National Amateur Boxing Federation, 1978).

It was stated in the introduction of this chapter that mixed sport in South Africa is not specifically prohibited by law. However, there are specific pieces of legislation which inhibit or prevent mixed sport. In 1979 the situation therefore exists where mixed sport is played within a law structure, which, if strictly interpreted, could forbid such a development. This situation, while being a considerable development on the pre-1970 sports situation, still sustains the criticism that, for some, permission has to be obtained for activity that in other parts of the world is considered an inherent right, and, ipso facto, free. It would appear that a question mark will continue to be associated with South African sport for as long as legislation retains the potential to interfere, directly or indirectly, in South African sport.

After research was completed concerning Legislation and South African Sport there were further developments in South African sport which are relevant to this section and the study per se. The staging of a world heavyweight boxing title fight in South Africa, at a stadium which had previously catered for White spectators only, created problems when the American boxer John Tate, his camp and the promoter, demanded as a precondition to the fight taking place, integrated seating (Argus, June 27, 1979). South Africa's sports administrators decided that the Pretoria stadium Loftus Versfeld would be opened to all racial groups. In July the Newland's rugby ground in Cape Town, removed its apartheid signs and also allowed integrated seating (Sunday Times, July 15, 1979).

A more flexible approach to inter-racial school sport was evidenced in August. White schools were to be allowed to compete against Black schools subject to the consent of school boards (Argus, August 17, 1979). This development reduced the bureaucracy which had hindered inter-racial school sport but it did not amend or repeal any of the laws which have been outlined previously.

Permission or clearance from the appropriate authority is still required and this authority is in turn still governed by the various pieces of legislature. However, when considered in perspective these developments are progressive, to the point of making inter-racial sport easier, rather than maintaining a strict separatist attitude.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE ANTI-APARTHEID SPORTS MOVEMENT AND SOUTH
AFRICA'S SPORTS DEVELOPMENT

Of the many influences operating on the evolution of South African sport, the anti-apartheid sports movement is one of the most considerable. The movement consists of groups or factions worldwide who share a common desire inter alia to see racism eliminated in South African sport. In New Zealand the movement is supported by six separate groups, with the Halt All Racist Tours (HART) and the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) the most prominent. CARE is also established in Australia. In the United States the anti-apartheid in sports movement has been championed by human and civil rights groups, the most prominent of which have been the American Co-ordinating Committee for Equality in Sports (ACCESS), the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), and the International Campaign Against Racism in Sport (ICARIS). However, the organisation which has been the vanguard of the anti-apartheid sports movement, is the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), or as it has been more recently termed, the South African Non-Racial Open Committee (Newnham, 1976).

This organisation had its genesis in the sporadic attempts by Non-White sports organisations to challenge domestic and international sports apartheid (de Broglio, 1971 : 2). In 1955, organisations representing Black soccer, table tennis, cricket and weightlifting applied for recognition to the international organisations controlling these sports. The only success was in table tennis where the International Table Tennis Federation expelled the previously affiliated White South African Table Tennis Union and accepted the Black non-racial organisation (Horrell, 1978 : 377). South Africa's reply to this development was a statement confirming that mixed sport would not be allowed within South Africa, and that Non-White organisations seeking international recognition must do this

through the already recognised White organisations in their code of sport (Draper, 1963 : 6).

In 1958 the various non-racial sports organisations formally joined forces to become a united front under the South African Sports Association (SASA). The aim of SASA, as expressed by the notable meeting in Durban, was: "To co-ordinate non-White sport, to advance the cause of sport, and the standards of sport among non-White sportsmen, to see that they and their organisations secure proper recognition here and abroad, and to do this on a non-racial basis" (de Broglio, 1971 : 3).

One of SASA's first tasks was to submit a memorandum to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In this memorandum SASA alleged: (1) that the White South African Olympic Association (SAOA) was claiming that it had no colour bar, although its affiliated National units did. It was stated that this, however, was a result of conditions extant in South Africa for which the SAOA could not be blamed; (2) that SAOA claimed she would accept Non-White sportsmen as soon as they formed one united body in their sports; (3) that Non-Whites had never been excluded from national teams, there just had not been any acceptable quality; (4) that it was against the tradition and the laws of the country to allow mixed sport; (5) that mixed sport would lead to racial friction and even bloodshed (de Broglio, 1971 : 3).

Newnham (1976) intimates that the matter was referred to the South African Olympic Association, who passed down the ruling that membership of its affiliates was restricted to White sportsmen and women.

In view of the intransigence of the White South African Olympic Association, a decision was taken in 1962 to form a South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) which would make application to the International Olympic Committee as the only truly representative South African Olympic organisation. This organisation claimed that it was subjected to a great deal of harassment by the White authorities, and in 1965 went into self exile, making its new base in London (de Broglio, 1971 : 4-8).

Initial attempts by SAN-ROC to have White South African sports organisations expelled from their international associations were not immediately successful. While SAN-ROC was instrumental in creating a new awareness of the plight of the Black sportsmen in South Africa, the organisation really lacked any power. It could protest, but its ability to create decisive action was limited by its own inability to apply direct pressure. In this sense the formation of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) in 1966 assisted the cause. The SCSA was a formation which involved sports representatives from African states. Lapchick (1973 : 169) reports that the first meeting was chaotic but that such a state did not detract from the significance or the potential displayed. South Africa was of primary concern, and the council's stated objective was to obtain the expulsion of South African sports organisations from the Olympic Movement and from International Federations. It appeared that if an effective liaison could be developed between the SCSA and SAN-ROC, South African sport would face a formidable opponent; one that could demand change by applying direct pressure to foreign governments and sports organisations.

In the face of this development the South African Government remained intransigent. Apartheid sport was to remain. However, there were signs that combined external pressure was having an effect on the South African way of thinking and that certain concessions were being considered by the South African Government to preserve South Africa's international sport. These were made in regard to South Africa's Olympic participation at a Teheran meeting of the International Olympic Committee in 1967. These included: a mixed South African team marching under one flag and wearing the same colours. It was also to be permissible for Blacks and Whites to compete against each other. In addition a Non-White Olympic Committee would be formed which would nominate candidates from each racial group. A decision would then be taken by a liaison committee of Whites and Non-Whites (Star, March 22, 1967). While this did appear to be a major departure from the previously immovable front presented by the South African Government, it did conform to the principles of separatism on which the sports system was founded. SAN-ROC therefore

objected. The outcome as to whether South Africa would be able to participate in the 1968 Olympics was eagerly awaited. That she was denied entry underlined the increasing influence of SAN-ROC, as Lapchick (1973 : 193) reports that de Broglio and Brutus had seen Senor Vasquez, president of the organising committee of the 'Little Olympics' and had managed to persuade him not to invite South Africa.

In 1968 there was something of a breakthrough for the anti-apartheid movement. Kenya and Nigeria were persuaded to boycott the 1970 Commonwealth Games to avoid contact with those teams who were to participate in the 1969 South African all-White Games. The effect was dramatic. European nations began to withdraw teams from the Games in order to ensure that the Munich Olympics in 1972 would not be similarly jeopardised (Lapchick, 1973 : 273-274).

There were indications in 1969 that the movement initiated by SAN-ROC was gaining momentum. A Campaign Against Racism in Sport (CARIS) was started in Australia as a result of a speaking tour by Dennis Brutus. In New Zealand Halt All Racist Tours (HART), and the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) were in the formative stages. In Britain a Stop the Seventy Tour (STST), whose aim was to demonstrate against the 1969-70 Springbok rugby tour to Britain, was formed. This organisation was headed by Peter Hain (Lapchick, 1973 : 276-280).

The campaign itself was successful on two major counts: firstly, it created a protest movement of unprecedented proportions for a sports event, which in turn focused unprecedented attention on the apartheid sports issue, and secondly, it managed to disrupt the tour sufficiently to cast doubt on the viability of future sports tours by major South African sports teams.

SAN-ROC and STST had managed to interest churchmen, sportsmen, journalists and trade unionists in their cause. This informing of public opinion undoubtedly assisted in the cancellation of the 1970 tour of South Africa by the English Cricket Club, the M.C.C., and contributed to the formulation of the multi-national concept. Multi-national sport as a concept was

introduced in April 1971, however, Prime Minister Vorster denied that change had resulted from people such as SAN-ROC (Hansard, April 23, 1970. Cols. 5062-5063). Multi-national sport appeared to earn South Africa a period of grace on the international sports scene and during this period of 1971, a South African rugby team toured Australia. The team met with demonstrations but these did not appear to unsettle the team as greatly as those which had occurred in Britain in 1969-70, although the Rand Daily Mail (August 9, 1971) estimated that the cost of security for this tour was R1 600 000. The same source relates how opposition to the tour was not only confined to anti-apartheid factions but spread to leading politicians, the Australian Council of Churches and the Council of Trade Unions.

New Zealand expressed reluctance to involve itself in sport with South Africa in 1971, through the New Zealand Golf Association. The Star (September 27, 1971) reports that one of the main anti-apartheid groups in New Zealand, Halt All Racist Tours (HART), exerted sufficient pressure on the NZGA to force it to request South Africa to withdraw from its five nation amateur tournament.

An attempt was made by the Stop the Seventy Tour campaigner Peter Hain, to prevent the 1972 English rugby tour to South Africa. Despite various efforts and protestations to the British Government, the tour by the English Rugby Union went ahead (Sunday Express, September 12, 1971).

In 1973 SAN-ROC turned its attention to the White South African Games to be held in Pretoria. SAN-ROC denounced the Games, and then set about mobilising opinion against participation. A cable was sent to the West German chancellor Willy Brandt, expressing concern at the proposed massive German participation in the apartheid Games. A second cable was sent to the President of the West German Olympic Committee. This stated that West German support for South Africa was both a direct insult to Africa after Munich, and a show of political support to compensate South Africa for exclusion from the Munich Games. SAN-ROC added that it would call for a total boycott of West German

sport by the whole of Africa (Natal Daily News, March 15, 1973).

Pressure was also exerted on American athletes and the American Amateur Athletic Union to withdraw from the games. This pressure was effective and the American Amateur Athletic Union prohibited five track and field stars from competing in the South African Games (Rand Daily Mail, March 15, 29, 1973).

The result of this combined pressure, in particular from SAN-ROC and the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, was a spate of withdrawals and although there were approximately 30 countries with athletes represented in South Africa, the South African Financial Gazette (March 3, 1973) commented that most athletes were there without the official approval of their governments.

The 1973 South African Games did proceed and were an organisational success, but they were also something of a success for the anti-apartheid sports movement as withdrawal of official sanction of the Games by many countries testified to the growing influence of this movement.

Towards the middle of 1973 the Sunday Express (August 5, 1973) observed that the anti-apartheid movement in Britain had been joined by the Young Liberals and the African National Congress-in-exile. These organisations had formed, along with activist Peter Hain, an organisation called SART: Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour. SART's apparent vehicle was to be the familiar publicity one by which it hoped to generate sufficient anti-tour sentiment so that the 1974 British Lions tour to South Africa would be cancelled. In this instance SART was unsuccessful and the tour did go ahead. There was, however, a secondary development as Kenya denounced all sporting ties with Britain (Cape Times, May 9, 1974). This necessitated the dispatch of a minister to Kenya to explain that the British Government was not condoning the tour and that the tour was actually by a private sporting team. Kenya relented slightly and announced that her sporting ban would apply to British rugby only (Rand Daily Mail, May 21, 1974).

In October 1974 SAN-ROC enlisted the aid of African heads of state in applying pressure on the French Government. The occasion was the Springbok rugby tour of France scheduled for later that year. The tour went ahead amid demonstrations and protests. Although SAN-ROC was involved, their involvement was not as significant as during the 1969-70 Springbok tour to Britain, due perhaps to (a) tighter security arrangements, and (b) the distance to be travelled from London.

In April 1975 SAN-ROC received official international recognition. The United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid conducted a seminar in Paris which was attended by official and non-government representatives from many countries. The seminar suggested that financial assistance be given to SAN-ROC to assist in developing and co-ordinating its future activities (Brickhill, 1976 : 41).

New Zealand had returned a National Government at the end of 1975, a government which had included as part of its election manifesto the promise that the 1976 All Black rugby tour to South Africa would go ahead. Despite vigorous campaigning by the various anti-apartheid groups in New Zealand, the new government refused to renege its pre-election promise, or even to dissociate itself officially from the tour. New Zealand therefore became an international target for anti-apartheid criticism. SAN-ROC working in conjunction with the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, warned New Zealand that if she "persisted in its support for racist South Africa she must be forced to face the consequences. She would be boycotted not only by Africa but by Africa's friends" (New Zealand Herald, March 9, 1976). New Zealand appeared unimpressed by the threats and the tour went ahead.

The backlash was preceded by another event that illustrated how organised SAN-ROC had become. Previous to the Montreal Olympics, the International Amateur Athletic Federation met to consider, inter alia, South Africa's request for readmission. Behind the scenes negotiation saw a systematic presentation of

the case against South Africa by the African states. Le Roux* (1978) recalled that the presentation was unlike anything the South African delegation had encountered previously. There was no chaos and little repetition. In addition, he said that SAN-ROC members were to be found with the various delegations, advising and co-ordinating the plan of action against South Africa. The South African Amateur Athletic Association was not surprisingly refused readmission.

The Olympic boycott also saw SAN-ROC again active, although the African nations once again made the front running. The Quebec Peace Council, with the support of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, set up a Centre Quebecois contre l'Apartheid, which acted as a control centre for anti-apartheid movements from all round the world (Newnham, 1978 : 132).

New Zealand was then asked to withdraw from the Games because of her continued association with South Africa. When this was not complied with, twenty-one teams withdrew in protest. It was an unprecedented protest and helped refocus world attention on the issue of South Africa and her sports policy. Almost certainly this publicity contributed to four South African sports associations being suspended, expelled or barred from their international organisations shortly afterwards.

South Africa responded in 1976 with a further adjustment in her sports policy, which allowed inter-racial sport down to club level. Peter Hain was unimpressed and called it a "dishonest sham" (Cape Times, October 14, 1976). South Africa received no support from the anti-apartheid faction and pressure continued to be applied. Hain did suggest that cricket teams selected on merit were being watched with interest overseas, and that any sporting code which diminished all traces of apartheid would immediately qualify for readmission to the international arena (Cape Times, November 20, 1976).

Hain stated at the beginning of 1977 (Cape Times, February 18, 1977) that he did not believe change could be accomplished in

* Secretary of the South African Amateur Athletic Union and member of the South African delegation to the IAAF meeting.

South African sport overnight. Before the anti-apartheid movement would condone sporting contact with South Africa, he said that the multi-national sports policy would have to be publicly buried, and that the South African Rugby Board would have to adhere to merit selection as would the government and other sports codes. Also, there would have to be a commitment to integrate all clubs fully, with an undertaking that only persons who belonged to non-racial clubs would be eligible for selection in national or provincial teams. An assurance would be needed that all legislation that affected implementation of true non-racial sport would be repealed. Hain's announcement went unheeded.

In March, Chris de Broglie, on behalf of SAN-ROC, endorsed the remarks made by Hain, adding that he did not think Western Governments understood how bitterly the African states felt about sporting ties with South Africa (Cape Times, March 3, 1977).

With no further change in sight, Hain announced in May that the anti-apartheid movement would intensify its campaign and attempt to stop tours by South African club teams. He stated too, that there should be protests and demonstrations against individual South African sportsmen. However, even the anti-apartheid movement was surprised by developments which occurred in South Africa in July. The non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS), mouthpiece for the majority of non-racial sports organisations in South Africa, announced a major change in philosophy. Hassan Howa who was head of the organisation stated that SACOS would no longer be satisfied with the normalisation of sport, there would have to be a concomitant normalisation of society per se before SACOS would sanction contact with White sporting organisations (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 1977). The implication of Howa's statement was that sport had become a political vehicle, a stance to which the anti-apartheid movement had been opposed until this point. Objections from SAN-ROC and the other anti-apartheid groups had centred around the South African Government's interference in sport. This decision by SACOS to deliberately politicize sport placed the anti-apartheid movement in the position where it had to either break with SACOS, and

state that it remained faithful to its tenet of no politics in sport, or it could be hypocritical and realign itself with the new SACOS philosophy. Not surprisingly there was some confusion. Hain commented that he had sympathy for Mr. Howa, but that he would not slam the door on South Africa while de Broglio said that if non-racial groups in South Africa wanted equality in all walks of life as a precondition to mixed sport, that such a view would be put across to international organisations who would certainly listen (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 1977).

The United Nations showed its increasing concern over the issue of apartheid by declaring 1978 the Anti-Apartheid Year. Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General, announced that 25 governments had given R3 700 000 to fight racial discrimination in Southern Africa (Rand Daily Mail, March 22, 1978). In the same month South Africa's Sunday Express decided that Hain should be invited to South Africa. There was as a result considerable discussion inside and outside South Africa, and when Hain was approached as to his reaction to the invitation, he said he would accept if certain conditions were met. These were (1) the removal of a 1969 withdrawal of his visa exemption as a British citizen plus guarantees of his safety; (2) complete freedom of itinerary as to whom he saw, and when and where, including the country's Black townships; (3) lifting of passport restrictions on non-racial sports administrators such as Hassan Howa, M.N. Pather, and Norman Middleton, and the unbanning of M. Naidoo (South African Digest, March 24, 1978). Evidently the conditions were not met, as Hain did not visit South Africa.

Further testament to the growing power of pressure groups was evidenced in March 1978, when protests were organised in the United States against the South African/United States Davis Cup tie due to take place there. Protests and demonstrations in this instance contributed to the withdrawal of one of the South African players, although the tie was still played (Argus, March 4, 1978). Another significant occasion occurred at the beginning of 1979 when South African heavyweight boxing champion Kallie Knoetze entered the United States to fight an American Bill Sharkey in a world heavyweight title fight elimination contest. The contest was opposed by the American

Co-ordinating Committee for Equality in Sports which was lead by civil rights activist, the Reverend Jesse Jackson. This organisation requested the United States State Department to revoke Knoetze's visa on the grounds that Knoetze had admitted trying to persuade two boys not to testify against a fellow policeman (Los Angeles Times, January 14, 1979). The State Department reacted by revoking Knoetze's visa, a development which Jackson regarded as "a great victory for human rights" (New York Times, January 10, 1979). However, the decision was not upheld on appeal, and Knoetze was able to fight Sharkey.

SAN-ROC, meanwhile, had decided to escalate the protest against continuing South African international sports competition by stating that they would seek to have individual South African sportsmen barred from international competition (Cape Times, January 11, 1979). To date this part of their campaign against South African sport appears to be the least successful.

Pressure has not eased on South Africa's international participation in sport. The Argus (March 29, 1979) reports that during 1978 South Africa was barred, excluded or suspended from twenty international sports organisations or countries, and that she was excluded from thirty six international sporting events. The anti-apartheid movement cannot claim credit directly for all occasions, but recognition must be accorded to the movement, and in particular to the SAN-ROC organisation, for the world awareness they have created of the plight of the Black athlete in South Africa. From an obscure beginning SAN-ROC has risen to the position where it has been recognised and financially sanctioned by the United Nations. This recognition has increased its credibility which in turn has increased its influence.

South Africa's former Minister of Sport and Recreation, Dr. Koornhof, has disputed the effect of outside pressure groups on South Africa's sports policy (1978). His contention is that concessions have been made as part of the natural evolutionary process which is South African sport. However, in lieu of any stated scheme or objectives as to what this evolutionary process is and where it is going, the suggestion appears warranted that

the anti-apartheid sports movement, in conjunction with the Black African states, third world and communist bloc countries, has had a catalytic effect on the development of South African sport. This has been accomplished by protest and demonstration which has been used to draw attention to South Africa's sporting structure and to harrass South African sportsmen competing abroad. The other avenue which has been developed in anti-apartheid sports strategy is the sports boycott weapon. Countries, sports organisations and individuals have been encouraged to sever sporting associations with South Africa. This has gathered momentum and can be described as being successful.

South Africa still enjoys international contact but it is increasingly on an unofficial unrepresentative basis. It would appear that South Africa's re-entry into true international sports competition is now largely dependent inter alia on the sanction of SAN-ROC and her anti-apartheid movement associates. One of the most powerful of these is the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa which has stated that it will rely on information supplied to them by the non-racial South African Council on Sport (cf. Chapter Eleven). This Council has become politically orientated, with the result that South Africa's return to sport may depend increasingly on political change in South Africa and less on the approbation of such groups which are involved in the anti-apartheid sports movement.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE NON-RACIAL SPORTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL ON SPORT

It was noted at the beginning of this dissertation that sport in South Africa tended towards racial exclusiveness long before there was a recognised colour bar. There was not only a tendency for Black and White sport to be separate, but there was also a separation of the various Black population groups. Magubane (1963 : 28) has suggested these sports groups were founded according to various tribal demarcations which resulted in a certain amount of inter-tribal rivalry, which was not always peaceful. It was this mistrust of groups which contributed to the early lack of organisation as a united Black front against White domination in sport. Howa (1978) contends that it is a problem which still has not been overcome completely in the contemporary non-racial sports movement.

In 1946 the first protest was voiced at international level against White exclusiveness in South African sport, by T. Ramasamy. He applied to the British Amateur Weightlifters for affiliation on behalf of the Non-White weightlifters in South Africa. His request was turned down and he was referred to the White South African Association (Lapchick, 1973 : 61). The election of the National party to power in 1948 on the issue, inter alia, of racial segregation, must have confirmed for the Non-White sportsman the idea that he could from this point on expect little or no governmental support for his sport. One of the earliest reactions was in 1954, when the Non-White, non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF) started inquiries as to whether its players could indulge in international sports competition. The SASF approached the world soccer organisation (FIFA) for affiliation rights. Because FIFA allowed only representation from one country SASF was turned down as the White Football Association of South Africa was already affiliated. This association then notified the SASF that it could be affiliated to the White

association under certain conditions: SASF would have no voting or management rights, the colour bar would be observed and the Non-Whites were to promise not to ask for permission to play against the Whites. The offer was declined (Magubane, 1963 : 81).

There was limited organisation in 1955 when the Committee for International Recognition was formed. The aim of this committee was to try and obtain affiliation for South African non-racial sports organisations to the international organisations, thereby entitling the Non-White sportsmen to international competition. Its first success came a year after its inauguration. In 1956 the non-racial table-tennis association was given international recognition at the expense of the White association. As mentioned in Chapter Ten this created a backlash and Black sports organisations were instructed by the South African Government to seek affiliation through already recognised White organisations (Horrell, 1978 : 377; Draper, 1963 : 6).

The precursors of the non-racial South African Council on Sport were the South African Sports Association, which was formed in 1958, and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, which was established in 1962 but which went into self exile re-emerging in London in 1965 (cf. Chapter Ten). These organisations attempted to present a united non-racial sports front to combat racism in sport in South Africa, and to further the ambitions of the Non-White sportsmen internationally.

The restrictions of leading non-racial officials, which led SAN-ROC to commit itself to exile, hampered the development and effectiveness of the non-racial movement in South Africa. From a report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Racial Sports Organisation (March 17, 1973 : 28, 29) momentum was only regained when the South African Soccer Federation was deprived of facilities by the Johannesburg municipality. The municipality, states the report, alleged that mixed soccer was being played by SASF clubs, that is, Coloured playing against Indian. Spurned by this overt display of racism, the SASF resolved to call a conference of non-racial

organisations to consider the problem. On September 6th, 1970, representatives from: The South African Soccer Federation, The South African Rugby Union, The South African Amateur Swimming Federation, The Southern African Lawn Tennis Union, The South African Table Tennis Board, The South African Amateur Athletic and Cycling Board of Control, The South African Amateur Weightlifting and Bodybuilding Federation and the South African Hockey Board, gathered in Durban to discuss the growing problems facing Non-White sportsmen. The result of these discussions was the making of several resolutions:

- a) Recognition of the right of every South African to enjoy international sport on merit.
- b) To achieve international recognition by making sincere overtures to white-controlled national bodies to work with non-racial bodies to achieve international recognition.
- c) To attempt to solve the problems confronting non-racial sport through the lack of facilities and adequate sponsorship.
- d) That the private sector be urged to remedy the disparate system of sports sponsorship.
- e) The practice of applying for permits to play sport be stopped. (This action was considered degrading and humiliating.)
- f) That all national sporting codes of the country come together under the Federation of South African Sport organisations.
- g) That an attempt be made to obtain adequate press coverage for non-racial sport.
(Ad Hoc Committee of National Non-Racial Sports Organisation, 1973 : 28, 29)

The Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Racial Sports Organisations, which was the product of this meeting, then prepared a statement which was to be forwarded to the International Olympic Committee which was to meet in Munich during September 1972. The statement attacked the South African sporting status quo as being racist and discriminatory. Under the title 'Racial Discrimination (Apartheid) and Sport in South Africa', it was stated:

(1) All codes of sport in South Africa are played under the cloud of racial discrimination (Apartheid).

(2) The all-white sporting organisations do not allow blacks to participate with them, either by virtue of their statutes which confine membership to whites only, or by custom and practice.

In order to maintain and continue their membership in international bodies some all-white associations, such as the Football Association (FASA) have in recent years amended their statutes to give themselves a non-racial complex; but this move is merely superficial and is designed to hood-wink and bluff the international organisations.

It must be pointed out that despite the non-racial aspect of their statutes these organisations still remain 100% all-white. In practice and reality racial discrimination is still the dominating factor and non-whites are refused membership.

(Ad Hoc Committee of National Non-Racial Sports Organisation, 1973 : 35, 36)

During the period 1970 to 1973 the Ad Hoc Committee confined itself largely to a monitoring role in South African sport; its effectiveness once again hampered by its inability to apply direct or indirect pressure to the South African Government or the White South African sports associations to elicit any degree of change. In this period SAN-ROC, the anti-apartheid organisation, was the major force in generating outside awareness of the discriminatory nature of South African sport. Added to this was the problem which was carried over from the beginnings of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee: restriction of officials. Geo Singh, founder of the South African Soccer Federation, was banned in 1965 for five years. The year the Ad Hoc Committee was due to meet again in 1973, Morgan Naidoo, president of the non-racial swimming organisation, was banned for five years. Norman Middleton was convicted and fined for quoting George Singh and other non-racial sports leaders. Hassan Howa and M.R. Pather were told, as was Middleton, that their passports were withdrawn (Ad Hoc Committee of National Non-Racial Sports Organisation, 1973 : 39).

At the conference which was convened in Durban on March 17th, the Ad Hoc Committee reported on its monitoring of South African sport and its attempted dialogue with White sports organisations. It concluded that dialogue was a 'waste of time' because of the lack of sincerity on the part of White officials; that 'Open Internationals' introduced under the multi-racial concept were superficial; that public playing fields were refused to non-racial associations; and that commercial sponsorship of sport was unfair, as the majority was received by White associations. Backing up this claim was a study submitted to the committee which was titled: 'An Analysis of the Assistance Each Code of Sport Receives'. It was stated that sponsorship existed in the following proportions (major sports only have been quoted):

	<u>Non-racial</u>	<u>White</u>
Athletics	R 1 000	R 417 500
Cricket	R 5 000	R 163 700
Golf	R 6 650	R 310 000
Swimming	-	R 90 000
Tennis	R 18 500	R 394 250

(Ad Hoc Committee of National Non-Racial Sports Organisation, 1973 : 37-47)

Although sponsorship is the lifeblood of amateur and professional sport, and without which Black sport was destined to mediocrity, consideration also had to be given to the commercial viability of sponsoring Black sport. With limited exposure in the media, sponsors could see very little return, which is measured in terms of publicity received, for their money invested. The circle that had been created needed to be broken by greater exposure of Black sport, but with the media generally White-controlled and White-orientated, it appeared that there would have to be an amelioration of White attitude before the condition of sponsorship, and ipso facto Black sport, would improve.

Out of this conference in 1973 there developed the South African Council on Sport (SACOS). This Council then began a determined drive to publicise the plight of the non-racial

sportsman. Multi-nationalism was criticised as being discriminatory and the suggestion was made that merit selection should replace discriminatory multi-nationalism.

.... the system of multi-national sporting events are being offered as a substitute for non-racial sport, as a negation of the principles of non-discrimination in sport and designed to maintain racial discrimination in South African sport, and calls on all sportsmen to reject any overtures being made by racial sporting organisations to organise multi-national sports events.

.... merit selection is possible only if all participants in sporting events are able to compete with each other freely at all levels, and calls on all sporting organisations to reject any system or scheme which does not offer equal opportunities, equal facilities, equal training and equal experience at all levels. (Argus, March 19, 1973)

At this juncture SACOS was prepared to enter into dialogue with White organisations if facilities and organisations were integrated at club level (Howa, 1978). This was not forthcoming, and the non-racial organisations pursued their policy of non-participation with White organisations while attempting to gain international recognition of their plight. In June 1973 the non-racial cricket board (SACBOC) applied to the International Cricket Conference in an attempt to gain recognition, and ipso facto to undermine the affiliation of the White South African Cricket Association (Horrell, 1973 : 372). The application did not succeed and Mr. Howa was prevented from leaving the country to make personal representation, as his passport was withdrawn (Howa, 1978). Howa says no reason was given for this development, and Dr. Koornhof (1978), Minister of Sport and Recreation at the time, said it had nothing to do with his department. This was in essence true as withdrawal of passports is the concern of the Department of Interior. However, in view of the fact that Mr. Howa did not have a criminal record and was not classified officially as being politically subversive, it was apparent that the government felt the publicity that would be generated by Mr. Howa's visit to London would be embarrassing and possibly detrimental to the increasingly tenuous position interna-

tionally of White South African sport.

In 1974 there were further concessions under the multi-national sports policy (cf. Chapter Six). Non-racial reaction continued to be negative. In this instance Ebrahim Patel, secretary of the non-racial rugby union, SARU, stated that concessions were not being made primarily in the interests of the Black people in South Africa, or out of goodwill towards Black people, but were piecemeal adaptations for overseas consumption (Cape Times, October 16, 1974).

Until this point the concern of SACOS had been officially the plight of the Black sportsman in South Africa. Indications were that removal of racial restrictions in South African sport down to club level, would realise the co-operation of SACOS and non-racial sports organisations with their White counterparts. In 1975 there were signs that SACOS was seeking greater change than it was possible to achieve in sport. Norman Middleton, president of SACOS, displayed political undertones in a speech in July:

... I cannot foresee a non-racial sports policy within a segregated political system. To have a non-racial sports policy means a definite change in the political system of this country. You simply cannot have the system of apartheid on the statute book and expect sport to be non-racial. (Sunday Times, July 13, 1975)

At the first Biennial Conference of the South African Council on Sport in Durban in 1975, Mr. Middleton refrained from expanding on any possible shift in SACO's ideology, confining himself to the problem of discrimination.

I am also of the opinion that the longer International sportsmen and women come to the country and participate in a racially segregated sport, the longer the racial situation will exist and that the only time South Africa will make changes in its sports policy is when it is to be excluded from all international participation.

... The so-called Multi-National Games are being used to safeguard the White sportman's participation in international sport. As you are

probably aware, this new game known as MULTI-NATIONAL came into being in April 1971. It was designed to make the international sports federations believe that South African sport organisations were in fact integrated
(South African Council on Sport, 1975 : 10-11)

In 1976 further concessions were made in sport in South Africa, when the government allowed sport between Black and White sportsmen down to club level. Although it was not fully integrated sport based on merit selection, which SACOS had demanded as a precondition to co-operation, it was a major concession. There was wide-ranging reaction amongst non-racial organisations. Initially the non-racial cricket organisation SACBOC appeared favourably inclined towards negotiations with the predominantly White Cricket Association, although certain conditions were stipulated: facilities at grounds should be open, and spectators should not be segregated (Odendaal, 1977 : 55). The non-racial rugby union, on the other hand, were having no truck with the White South African Rugby Board until such time as there was integrated rugby down to club level, mixed trials, merit selection and Springbok colours for all regardless of race (Cape Times, October 20, 1976). By November 1976 it was becoming obvious that the non-racial organisations were not going to be content with the latest concessions. Howa, who was vice-president of SACOS stated: "If we are to play normal cricket in this country the laws of the land must change, because we are living abnormally. The Black sportsman can achieve his true potential only if he has equal opportunities and facilities" (Cape Times, November 6, 1976).

SACOS's demand for a removal of all race barriers had not in 1976 been officially aligned with a demand for political change in South Africa, although as evidenced there were indications that SACOS might be heading in this direction. SACOS also lacked the power and influence to bring about such sweeping change, and until the end of 1976 had had to content herself with being the mouthpiece of non-racial sport in South Africa and the self-appointed conscience of sport per se.

This was altered at the beginning of 1977 when the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa bestowed full member status on SACOS. The Supreme Council represented the increasingly influential bloc of Black African states, who spoke through the council as a united African voice on sporting affairs. The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, SAN-ROC, which was in the vanguard of the anti-apartheid sports movement, had formed a firm alliance with the Supreme Council on Sport in Africa. Together they had formed an effective combination in isolating White South African sportsmen. Their recognition of SACOS was therefore significant. By giving full membership status to SACOS they now had a direct input on South African sporting affairs which meant that before this influential organisation would sanction South Africa's return to international sport, they would require the approbation of SACOS.

In a directive to SACOS, the Council said:

African sportsmen and sports administrators have made great sacrifices for the cause of oppressed sportsmen of South Africa. In return they do not expect black South Africans to accept any form of "normalisation" of sport within the "multi-national" context. The only form of normalisation that is acceptable to Africa is non-racial sport at ALL LEVELS free of all the administrative trappings of apartheid.

All correspondence, applications, etc. to the SCSA must come through SACOS supported by a covering note by SAN-ROC. This clause was inserted not to provide an automatic veto, but specifically to prevent infiltration by stooges of Apartheid and opportunists, whom it will not hesitate to expose. (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 95)

Through this development SACOS had acquired a degree of influence and power hitherto denied. This realisation by SACOS, that international recognition had enhanced her status and potential to influence, was reflected in a shift in her philosophy.

Hassan Howa, who was acting president of the organisation following Middleton's resignation over a conflict of principles, stated in July 1977 that the non-racial sports organisations had decided that they would not condone sport with White organisations until there was what he termed 'normal sport'. Normal sport connoted a removal of political and economic racial restrictions (Rand Daily Mail, July 14, 1977). This firmly aligned SACOS with a political objective, which was ironic in that SACOS had been fighting to rid sport of the involvement of the South African Government.

In explaining this shift in ideology, Howa (1978) claimed that a change in societal apartheid generally had been an undisclosed objective of the non-racial sports organisations prior to this time, but the realisation that concessions were only being made in sport and not in society per se, and the fact that Blacks had been badly treated during the 1976 race riots, had necessitated a change in overt policy. In addition SACOS had clearly realised that while sport had not obtained change in the political and economic infrastructure, it had wrought certain concessions for the South African Black sportsmen. These concessions had been derived through a policy of non-participation with the Whites until demands had been met. The extrapolation applied by SACOS was that by depriving the White South Africans their international sports contact, they had a lever with which to apply pressure for change. To cede the rights to this lever over concessions in sport would have deprived Black aspiration of the only weapon it had in the greater fight against racism. While it may not have been honourable to continue the escalation of demands, it was not unnatural that, having obtained a small degree of limited sports freedom, the greater objective, total freedom should be sought.

Mindful of the difficulties that Black political organisations such as the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress had encountered (Johnson, 1977 : 20-22), Howa, at the October 2nd Biennial Conference of the South African Council on Sport in 1977, sedulously avoided any reference to political aspirations. Instead the Council remained within the

parameters defined by sport. The Council, which now comprised eleven national non-racial associations: the South African Amateur Athletic Board, South African Amateur Body Building Federation, South African Cycling Association, South African Cricket Board of Control, South African Darts Board of Control, South African Hockey Board, South African Soccer Federation, South African Amateur Swimming Federation, Southern African Lawn Tennis Union, South African Table Tennis Board, South African Amateur Weightlifting Federation, adopted the following resolutions:

1. We reaffirm the resolution passed at the inaugural Conference in 1973 that merit selection is possible only if all participants in sporting events are able to compete with each other freely at all levels, and the call made at that conference to sporting organisations to reject any system or scheme which does not offer equal opportunity, equal facilities, equal training and equal experience at all levels.

2. We confirm our assessment in 1973 that a system of multi-national sports events which has been offered as a substitute for non-racial sport was a negation of the principals of non-discrimination in sport and congratulates those organisations which refuse to participate in same thereby exposing to the world at large the farcial nature of these events. This meeting calls on those few sporting bodies which insist on participating in such events to accept that by continuing to do so, they are perpetuating racism in sport and delaying the entry of all sportsmen irrespective of colour, cast and creed into international competition and asks them forthwith desist from continuing to participate in same.

3. We condemn those business organisations that sponsor and actively assist the continuation of racially orientated sports bodies and deny assistance to those bodies which stand for and campaign for the participation in sports on a non-racial basis.

4. In accordance with its stand against racialism in sport, SACOS strongly condemns the South African Professional Players Golf Association (non-white) and the South African Golf Association (non-white amateur) in accepting subservient affiliation to their respective national white associations and participating in so-called multi-national tournaments to which SACOS is opposed.

SACOS takes cognizance of the fact that all Black Golfers in South Africa suffer inequities in all respects and stand uncompromisingly for equal opportunity for all golfers irrespective of race or colour. (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 10)

Emerging from the conference was what the non-racialists expected normal sport to be. The condition that they felt was mandatory before contact with White organisations could be entertained:

.... Normal sport calls for the abandoning of sectionalism and the removal of racism. Normal sport is a call to all sport minded people for the introduction of the ordinary norm as employed and enjoyed the world over and to give the aspiring candidate an opportunity to be selected on merit, genuine merit. Normal sport cannot be diluted or watered down to multi-nationalism or multi-racism. Normal sport is devoid of all racism, even multi-racial is a misnomer.

The systematic compartmentalisation must go; mixed play must commence at the lowest levels and here we could start with the schools and then all the clubs must become completely integrated; finally the national codes must change for true non-racialism. (South African Council on Sport, 1977 : 71, 72, 73)

The approach advocated by SACOS at this point, the integration of sport down to the grassroots level, viz., primary school, although agreed upon in principle by the majority, still had its critics. The most vociferous was the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF), which besides catering for amateur soccer also had a professional organisation to nurture. The problem that caused the conflict was the professional arm of the SASF. As a commercial organisation it had to compete against the predominantly Black professional soccer affiliate of the rival South African National Football Association (SANFA). SANFA had accepted multi-nationalism, whereas SASF had not. SASF maintained that it would not compromise its non-racial principles. The result was that the two organisations competed for sponsorship and for spectators, thereby

limiting the growth potential of the other organisation and committing each professional organisation to possible insolvency. For this reason it is understandable that SASF wanted dialogue with its rival as to the possibility of merging the two bodies and forming a super league of professional teams, which would have alleviated the fear for most soccer clubs of insolvency.

SACOS refused to entertain the thought of dialogue until there was normalisation of sport and then progressed in its demands to a new non-racial plane by invoking a 'double standards' clause which was to become part of the constitutions of all non-racial organisations (Cape Herald, November 11, 1978). The 'double standards' clause was to stop sportsmen playing one sport under a non-racial organisation and then playing another sport under a 'racial' organisation.

This development widened the schism that had occurred with the SASF. The feeling was that with only eleven sports affiliated to SACOS, a sportsman may have to sacrifice a sport he played because it did not have a non-racial administration. The SASF thought this unfair, and refused to adopt the double standards clause in its constitution. The SASF also then decided to have dialogue with the rival SANFA over the possibilities of a merger of their professional organisations (Citizen, October 30, 1978). This also was against the express wishes of SACOS. When SASF failed to respond to SACOS requests to discontinue talks SASF was expelled from the South African Sports Council (Cape Herald, November 4, 1978). Norman Middleton, president of the South African Soccer Federation, later reacted to this as follows:

SACOS say you can't play normal sport in an abnormal society. We must now tell all our sportsmen to stop playing sport because we live in an abnormal society? (Cape Herald, March 24, 1979)

The division that has entered SACOS is attributable to two elements: the moderate faction, who have sport as their primary concern, and a more radical element who envisage SACOS as a vehicle through which political and economic change can

be accomplished in South Africa. This faction has no intention of capitulating until there is a normal society, and they have been critical of Howa for not taking a hard-line approach on certain issues, in particular that of the South African Soccer Federation (Cape Herald, March 24, 1979). As president of this organisation Howa had tried to placate both groups, although in 1979 it does appear that those of a more radical inclination have the greater influence. Because of this constant escalation of demands and its recent political orientation it is difficult to ascertain what SACOS specifically requires of South African sport. Because it fears being cast as a political organisation (Howa, 1978), it avoids making any direct political demands. Therefore it is difficult to know what criteria it requires should be met before co-operation would be forthcoming. With regard to sport, non-racialism's most recent demands have been:

- (a) All clubs must have open membership. Where exclusion clauses are incorporated in club constitutions, these must be removed.
- (b) All clubs must participate in competitions organised by single non-racial controlling bodies at local, regional or provincial levels.
- (c) A single national non-racial body must control the sport nationally and represent the country internationally.
- (d) All sportsmen and sportswomen must have equal opportunities in private and public life.
- (e) Sponsorship must be utilised in such a way that all sportsmen benefit equally.
- (f) There must be no restrictions placed on clubs or other sports organisations in the acquisition of private sportsgrounds and club facilities, and all such facilities must be open.
- (g) Sports facilities must be provided to all sportsmen without discrimination and on an equal basis.
- (h) Selection must be based solely on merit in the composition of representative teams.
- (i) South Africa must be represented internationally by a single team selected on merit.

(j) All school children must be free to attend the schools of their choice and school sports must be free from any restrictions based on race or other abnormal consideration. (Memorandum to the International Cricket Conference 1979. Compiled by: South African Cricket Board, 1979 : 6-7)

Although these demands imply the requirement of greater societal change before co-operation from SACOS ensues, Howa (1978) has stated that if there were a pledge by the White government that sport in South Africa would become integrated over a two year period, from the primary school level up, then SACOS would disband; as Howa says, there would be no further need for it. Until this stage is reached, SACOS will have legitimate cause to continue campaigning for a normalisation of sport and the organisation will continue to be used by those cognisant of the concessions that might be obtained politically by such an organisation.

Until 1979 SACOS's influence was rejected by the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Dr. Koornhof (Argus, April 21, 1978). However, the Minister of Sport and Recreation who succeeded Dr. Koornhof in 1979, De Klerk, indicated that he would be prepared to have dialogue with SACOS. The offer to date has been refused by Howa who feels that until the laws which prohibit free integrated sport are removed there is little point in his organisation talking with the government (Argus, February 23, 1979). The position has been stalemated since June 1979. However, there are signs that the government is concerned about political inclination of SACOS, and that a stricter line may be taken in regard to its activities (Cape Times, May 22, 1979).

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CHAPTER TWELVE

THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

The Broederbond is an organisation which came into official existence in 1918 (Pelzer, 1979 : 6; Serfontein, 1979 : 11). Its purpose, as described by one of the eighteen founder members, was to "establish a kind of counterpart to societies and clubs which, in those days, were exclusively English-speaking" (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 46).

It is in essence a cultural organisation peculiar to White Afrikaans-speaking members of the population. O'Meara (1977 : 166) described the exclusiveness that developed within the Broederbond more succinctly when he says that those who were invited to join were chosen after careful and close scrutiny, and were generally "financially sound, White, Afrikaans-speaking, Protestant males over 25 of unimpeachable character, who actively accepted South Africa as their sole homeland containing a separate Afrikaner nation with its own language and culture".

The combination of exclusiveness, secrecy (which has been insisted on ostensibly to prevent personal persecution) and a pervasiveness which had netted 11 910 members in 1977 (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 366) contributed to the belief that the Broederbond had moved away from its original cultural definition. The publication of two books in 1978 and 1979, The Super Afrikaners and Brotherhood of Power, by Wilkins and Strydom and Serfontein respectively, did little to assuage the belief that this organisation had developed a considerable amount of power through being able to recruit members who were in dominant influential positions in society.

Official Broederbond reaction has been tabled through Pelzer's book Die Afrikaner Broederbond: Eerste 50 Jaar (1979).

Pelzer maintains that the Broederbond was more of a think tank

on South African affairs, and that although there were many influential people favourably disposed towards the Broederbond, that it has not misused this influence. Wilkins and Strydom, and Serfontein, in their more dramatic publications, maintain that the Broederbond, besides promoting think tanks, also attempted to influence the development of White Afrikanerdom and ipso facto South Africans per se.

It is against this confusing background of power and influence that the development of South African sport and the influence of the Broederbond has to be considered. It is unfortunate that Pelzer in his work pays little attention to the Afrikaner Broederbond and the sports policy. From this it may be inferred that sport was not particularly important to the Broederbond, and that as a consequence their influence was minimal. However, Wilkins and Strydom (1978 : 239-252) produced in their publication documents which they allege show that the Broederbond did have a considerable influence on the South African sports policy. Although Wilkins's and Strydom's book is written with a commercial motivation and a dramatic style, which removes it from the objective taxonomy, a certain credence has to be given to the documentation that they present as official Broederbond material. In view of the fact that Pelzer's book does not involve itself in discussion on the topic of the Broederbond and sports policy, it appeared that Wilkins's and Strydom's assertions should be considered in a dissertation of this type, albeit against the background outlined above.

It will be recalled that until 1971 (cf. Chapter Six) the South African Government had presented an intractable demeanour in the face of growing sports isolation and demands for the demolition of apartheid. Refusal was manifest in the South African Government's decision not to allow Maoris to tour with the 1967 New Zealand rugby team, and in the cancellation of a proposed English (MCC) cricket tour to South Africa, because the team was to include a Black. This intransigence on the part of the South African Government was attracting attention in an increasingly sport-orientated world.

In a circular dated June 2, 1970, the Broederbond displays an awareness of the international campaign against South African sport when it states: "The latest developments in international sport show clearly that there is a persistent campaign to isolate our country as much as possible" (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 242). The circular added that the Broederbond felt that the real issue was not mixed teams and participation, but the destruction of the existing order in South Africa.

Another memorandum was circulated in April offering advice and guidance on South Africa's sporting malady. Accompanying this circular was a document entitled "Sport and Politics" (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 243). This document was constructed by a sports committee within the Broederbond, or more literally a thinking committee concerned with the issue of South African sport. Wilkins and Strydom (1978 : 407) report that among other members of this thinking committee were Professor Pelzer (author of the abovementioned book), Johan Claassen (a former Springbok rugby captain), Kobus Louw (a former Springbok rugby player) and R.W. Opperman (who is now president of the South African National Olympic Games Association).

The document discussed, inter alia, the increasing politicization of world sport. This served as an introduction and justification for a new slogan for South African sport : multi-nationalism. Multi-nationalism was a term apparently derived to allay conservative fears within the Broederbond that may have felt that sport was being used to promote integration. The term was taken to connote sport between separate nations; there was to be no mixing with members of other nations, whether on local provincial or national levels. The implication was that segregation in sport would remain the status quo.

The point that is relevant in development of South African sport is that the discussion of multi-nationalism preceded any government announcement, and that multi-nationalism viewed alongside the hardline apartheid approach of the pre-1970 era was an alteration in the segregation status quo of sports.

The announcement by Prime Minister Vorster on April 22, 1971 (Horrell, 1971 : 314-316) appears to confirm the opinion held by Wilkins and Strydom, that the Broederbond had been influential in formulating South Africa's sports policy. That the Prime Minister's announcement followed very closely (almost word for word, suggest Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 245) the outline circularised to Broederbond members, is indicative of the influence the Broederbond had in securing its acceptance, and/or the fact that those on the Broederbond's sport committee were top sports people themselves, who saw the inevitable conclusion of South African sport in its present state, unless some compromise was struck. It is suggested that Vorster, realising this, decided to act on the compromise which had been proposed, in an attempt to improve South Africa's international sports position.

Although the compromise attempted to placate the absolute anti-segregationists within the Broederbond, by stating that multinationalism would not lead to integration, there were those who were not completely deceived and disapprobation was accordingly expressed. Wilkins and Strydom (1978 : 246) note that the following points expressing concern were made in a circular during October 1971.

4.1 Concern over the correct implementation of the 'nation basis' of the policy.

4.2 Anxiety that the policy of separate development might become diluted because of sports 'concessions'.

4.3 Vigilance must be strong against mixing after sports games, mixed audiences, integration, mixed participation on the local level, etc.

4.4 The fear that the sports policy opened the door slightly and might be the thin edge of the wedge.

4.5 The urgent necessity of strong control by a nominated sport council.

The executive tried to allay fears about the new policy by suggesting that members should actively attempt to gain control of sporting bodies, so that a greater degree of Afrikaner

orientation could be initiated. It was a request repeated in 1973 (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 247).

In the interim the Sunday Times (May 21, 1972) reported that Dr. Treurnicht, a noted right-wing Nationalist ideologue, had been appointed chairman of the Broederbond drafting committee on sport. It was suggested that this appointment was to allay the fears of those within the Broederbond who felt that the sports policy initiated by them might become a catalyst for integration. In an attempt to allay these fears even further, Dr. Treurnicht and Dr. Koornhof, a former secretary of the Broederbond organisation, toured the country addressing regional conferences on sports policy development (Sunday Times, October 20, 1974).

In August 1972 Dr. Koornhof succeeded to the post of Minister of Sport and Recreation. Dr. Koornhof did not make it clear immediately in what direction he would lead. In June, 1973 (Sunday Times, June 24, 1973), Strydom suggested that the Broederbond plan for South African sport was proceeding along the lines expounded in the April 1971 circular. He reported that two leading Broederbonders in sport, Rudolph Opperman, head of the South African Olympic and National Games Association, and Professor Hannes Botha, head of the South African Amateur Athletic Union, had proposed that a committee be established to investigate the establishment of a sports council.

Claims that this would further implement action of the Broederbond policy were denied by Professor Hannes Botha (Rand Daily Mail, June 26, 1973). He claimed that the idea was entirely his own and that the suggestion that it had been formulated by the Broederbond was 'ridiculous'. Further, said Professor Botha, he had been working on this project for five years as research for a doctorate, and it was therefore his initiative. However, since Professor Botha also served on Dr. Treurnicht's Broederbond Committee on sport, it seems probable that Professor Botha could have introduced his idea of a sport council to the committee, who obviously approved it. Professor Botha

was therefore technically correct in claiming that the initiative was his and not that of the Broederbond. However, the point that the plan had the approbation of the Bond, which in effect made Professor Botha's plan also the Bond's, cannot be overlooked.

Early in 1974 it became clear that a rift was developing. Strydom reports in the Sunday Times (October 20, 1974) that Dr. Treurnicht was concerned about the direction of the sports policy. He felt it could lead to integration. The momentum which had been generated by the 1971 sports policy announcement would undoubtedly continue unless Dr. Treurnicht could stem it. There were growing demands from South Africa's White sportsmen for further integration, and White public opinion had indicated that it was in favour of more limited multi-national events such as the 1973 South African Games (cf. Chapter Thirteen). Given the apparent influence which the Broederbond had gained in the area of sports policy, the position of Chairman of the Broederbond became an important issue. If Dr. Treurnicht succeeded to the chair, the influence of this position could be used to slow, if not stop, the gradual evolution which threatened to develop through multi-nationalism. To continue the evolution Dr. Koornhof needed the approbation of the Broederbond, or at least willingness to be persuaded towards greater multi-nationalism. Wilkins and Strydom (1978 : 249) attribute Dr. Treurnicht's failing to become chairman to some earnest lobbying by Dr. Koornhof.

The failure of Dr. Treurnicht to gain the chair (he was not available for election) did not signal a new era of enlightenment with Dr. Koornhof in the vanguard. It could rather be described as controlled progressivism, in which Dr. Koornhof then set about cajoling further concessions; always within the ideological parameters of Verwoerdism and separation of the races. An example of this was the circular dated March 3, 1975, which stated that "International sporting ties, especially in rugby and cricket, have serious implications at this critical stage for our country, regarding international trade, national trade, military relationships and armaments and strategic industrial development" (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 249-250).

The implication was that change would be necessary in South Africa's sports policy in order to prevent deterioration in spheres which were more important to her health as a state. Change was being justified in terms of other spheres of influence which created the position that those who objected did not have the larger interests of the state at heart. As a 'Super Afrikaner' one's objection could not be too vociferous. Nevertheless Broederbond members were assured that any changes such as mixed international teams were only a status in vogue until the Black homelands became independent.

While this piece of obfuscation allowed the acceptance of the demand by the French Rugby Union that their national team be allowed to play against a multi-racial team in South Africa in 1975, it did not succeed entirely in overcoming conservative criticism. In 1976 (Cape Times, July 19, 1976) Dr. Treurnicht made a strong statement condemning mixed sport, and promising to resign if further changes were made. In September 1976, Dr. Koornhof introduced his new sports policy which allowed mixed sport at all levels (cf. Chapter Seven). In order to widen the rift between the conservative faction and those regarded as enlightened, Dr. Koornhof obviously needed to be sure of the support of a group that had the potential to influence, as the Broederbond did. This was forthcoming; in a circular to Broederbond members dated October 5, 1976, it was stated: "The executive confirms the point of view it took in 1975 during meetings on the elimination of unnecessary separation measures, that contact and/or liaison between the different nations/national groups of the Republic must take place not only on national level but also on local levels provided it does not endanger the identity of the different nations" (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978 : 251). Justification was sought in the fact that concessions such as these would contribute to greater internal security and better race relations, both of which had been threatened by the racial disturbances and riots of 1976. Undoubtedly the Executive also saw the potential of publicity internationally, which would assist in suggesting that a greater flexibility was being adopted by the Afrikaner in the field of sport, and by implication in

race relations. To the outside world this, if accepted, would be regarded as a positive development. South Africa needed to reassure the world that from an investment point of view, South Africa was a sound proposition. Sport therefore assumed an ambassadorial role, in which capacity certain concessions were necessary for the overall good of the country.

Such a development and its concomitant justification did not placate all Broederbond members. Assurances were again requested in 1977 that there would be no mixed teams. Wilkins and Strydom (1978 : 251) report that strong reassurance was forthcoming, and that there were indications that lines were being drawn on the question of mixed clubs.

There has not been a major policy statement on sport since, although Dr. Koornhof has continued with concessions. In August 1977 Dr. Koornhof stated that there could be mixed clubs, although it was against government policy, and in 1978 he stated that sports clubs could obtain international status, thereby allowing limited social integration - yet another departure from Broederbond policy.

In conclusion, it would appear that, faced with the possibility of greater sports isolation in the early 1970s and the possible harmful effects that this may have on other spheres of South African life, the Broederbond conceived a plan which was approved by the government. It was termed multi-nationalism, and although it was stated that this connoted sport by separate nations, and that it was as a concept absolute, further change resulted, subtly encouraged by the Broederbond. It would also appear that the Broederbond has determined that sport should be increasingly left to the sportsmen, although their various policy statements, like the government's, have stated that they are not in favour of mixed sport. In any evaluation of South African sport, therefore, cognizance must be given to the role played by the Broederbond. They appear to have initiated the multi-national concept which, while containing sport within the separatist ideology, had the ultimate effect of overcoming the inertia which was preventing a more

flexible approach to the problem. The momentum which the Broederbond initiated was promoted by liberal factions within the Broederbond and the government, lead principally by Dr. Koornhof. There were determined reactions by the more conservative factions. This reaction had a negative influence on the sports development, an influence which appears to be losing ground with the movement towards leaving sport to the sportsman.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

WHITE PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

It is proposed in this chapter to examine various surveys of White public opinion and consider these within the developmental context of South African sport. It is not an attempt to quantify or field test any hypothesis, but to provide further insight into another of the variables which have effected the evolution of South Africa's sports policy.

Information has been derived from a number of sources: newspaper surveys, surveys and opinion polls by private researchers, and confidential client surveys conducted by independent market research groups. Information supplied by the market research groups was derived from a panel of consumers representative of the White South African population. This was not a covert or overt predilection on the part of the author, rather the product of the realities of the South African situation: the White section of the population is responsible for the constitutional alignment of the country and it is from this section that any change would have to be negotiated. Since this section decides what form the ruling polity will adopt, consideration of White attitudes and opinions was more relevant within the context of this dissertation. It is also assumed that Black members of the population would generally be in favour of change which would reduce racial restriction in sport, although as evidenced in preceding chapters, piece-meal adaptation is rejected by a great percentage of Black sportsmen. Within these limitations it was considered that the following information could make a valuable contribution to further understanding of the changes in the evolution of South Africa's sports policy.

South Africa's sports policy has, as noted, been subject to multifarious pressures during the last decade. Some have sought to affect change; others have sought to maintain the status quo. South Africa's apparent insouciance in the face of growing international opinion in the late 1960's was largely

a conditioning process which had established the idea of separate development for the various races in South Africa as the best solution for racial harmony. In 1969 Market Research Africa conducted an opinion poll, which established that White opinion considered, inter alia, that the greatest problem facing South Africa at that time was world attitude and/or interference towards South Africa. Because of her apartheid policy, only 6.6% of White opinion in 1969 wished to see this policy changed or abolished. On the same questionnaire, the sample was asked about its attitude towards seating of Non-Whites at sports events. In 1969 only 26% of Whites sampled advocated integrated seating arrangements at sports meetings (cf. Table 1, Question 2). Asked whether they were for or against the policy of allowing Non-Whites to represent South Africa at the Olympic Games, 60.3% were in favour of such a development.

Table 1. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1969 MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question 1. What is your attitude towards the seating of Non-Whites at sports events?

	<u>Only in one part %</u>	<u>Different parts %</u>	<u>Any place %</u>
<u>Total</u>	31	43	26
English/other	12	38	49
Afrikaans/both	41	46	13

Question 2. Do you Agree/Disagree with the policy of allowing Non-White sportsmen from overseas to play sport against Whites in South Africa?

	<u>Agree : with %</u>	<u>Disagree with %</u>	<u>Do not know %</u>
<u>Total</u>	37.1	58.6	4.3
English/other	59	35	7
Afrikaans/both	22	75	3

Continued/....

Table 1. (continued)

Question 3. Are you for or against the policy of allowing Non-Whites to represent South Africa at the Olympic Games?			
	<u>For the policy %</u>	<u>Against the policy %</u>	<u>Do not know %</u>
<u>Total</u>	60.3	35.5	4.2
English/other	79	17	5
Afrikaans/both	48	48	4

This survey illustrated a clear dichotomy between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. The significance of this is realised when it is considered that the Afrikaans-speaking person is in the greater majority in South Africa, and that therefore his opinion, or the majority opinion, is more influential. In 1969 there was clear opposition to integrated sport from this section, with opinion being divided over the issue of Olympic representation. The greater acceptability of Blacks in this sphere may be attributed, inter alia, to the fact that the prospect of Blacks in a South African Olympic team had been mooted in 1968. Rejection of this concession internationally may have suggested that for international acceptance Blacks were going to need to be a part of any future South African team. Clearly, the majority of White opinion was antagonistic to the idea of Non-Whites coming to South Africa to play against White sportsmen. The reason for this response may be found partly in the question, which tended to imply carte blanche participation by overseas Non-White sportsmen in South Africa.

A public opinion survey conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys, in February 1970, attempted to elicit a more specific response. Replies indicated that 59.6% of the White population were in favour of sportsmen from New Zealand with Maori blood visiting South Africa. But, this did not indicate a swing towards acceptance of White/Non-White competitive participation in South African sport. A sizeable majority, 64.7%, were against development in this direction. Furthermore, 58.5% were against

competition between Whites and Non-Whites at athletic meetings in South Africa. When the perspective was altered, and the question orientated towards the inclusion of Non-Whites in sports teams representing South Africa overseas, the response varied accordingly: There were 42.8% in favour and 43.0% against (cf. Table 2, Questions 1, 2, 3, 4).

Table 2. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1970 MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question 1. Are you for or against admission of players with Maori blood being included in a team which will be visiting South Africa in the near future?

	For %	Against %	Neither %	Uncertain/ Do not know %	Refusals to answer %
<u>Total</u>	59.6	19.8	14.1	5.2	1.3
English	77.9	4.7	13.9	2.5	1.0
Afrikaans	46.3	30.8	14.3	7.1	1.5

Question 2. Are you for or against White and Non-White competitive participation in all forms of sport in South Africa?

	For %	Against %	Neither %	Uncertain/ Do not know %	Refusals to answer %
<u>Total</u>	18.3	64.7	8.6	5.8	2.6
English	37.7	37.6	14.0	8.7	2.0
Afrikaans	4.3	84.3	4.7	3.7	3.0

Question 3. Are you for or against the inclusion of Non-Whites in sports teams representing South Africa overseas?

	For %	Against %	Neither for or against %	Undecided/ Do not know %
<u>Total</u>	42.8	43.0	9.3	3.3
English	70.5	13.2	11.4	3.3
Afrikaans	22.9	64.5	7.8	3.3

Continued/....

Table 2. (continued)

Question 4. Are you for or against competition between Whites and Non-Whites at athletic meetings in South Africa?				
	For %	Against %	Neither for or against %	Undecided/ Do not know %
<u>Total</u>	26.6	58.5	8.5	4.6
English	49.9	28.2	13.2	6.8
Afrikaans	9.8	80.5	5.0	3.1

This questionnaire confirmed the premise that there was extreme reluctance on the part of the White population, particularly the Afrikaans-speaking section, to be pressurised into mixed sport. However, it is discernable that in the case of the Olympic Games, as shown in the 1969 survey, and in the case of Maoris visiting with a New Zealand rugby team, they were prepared to make specific concessions. At this point these concessions had been carefully couched in Nationalist terminology which had suggested, in the case of the Maoris, a small temporary concession which was justifiable under the precepts of Verwoerdianism. This suggested that the White public was prepared to accept this rationalisation, and/or that it was sufficiently sports-orientated to accept the need for concessions which might prevent the complete extirpation of Olympic participation and competition with a traditional rugby rival, in the sport which is a major attraction for them. The idea that these two areas should be isolated concessions and not lead to greater mixing in sport was confirmed in a survey which appeared in Africa Today (November/December, 1970, Volume 17, No. 6). Herein the suggestion was reinforced that public opinion was strongly opposed to any inclination towards mixed sport. The inclusion of Non-Whites in sports teams, which were to compete overseas, was also disagreeable to the majority. The acceptance of Non-Whites in a New Zealand rugby team can possibly be attributed to the fact that it was a minor temporary concession (cf. Chapter Six). The possibility that this general antagonistic attitude towards sports integration might lead to greater

sporting isolation and therefore interfere with the sporting future of South Africa's youth, did not in 1970 appear to be a major consideration (cf. Table 3), and in this way it appeared that the status quo was being maintained.

Table 3. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1970 'AFRICA TODAY' SPORT SURVEY

Question 1. Are you in favour of any kind of mixed sport in South Africa?

	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
<u>Total</u>	90	9.7

Question 2. Would you be opposed to the inclusion of Non-Whites in teams to go overseas?

	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
Rugby	22.2	77.8
Cricket	25.2	78.4
Athletics	36.4	63.6
Boxing	38.1	61.9

Question 3. Are you in favour of mixed trials for selection of teams being held outside the borders of South Africa?

<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
66.8	33.2

Question 4. Are you in favour of the administrators of the various South African sports getting together to discuss the future of sport?

<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
18.3	81.7

Question 5. Have you any objections to the composition of the All Black (N.Z.) rugby team?

<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
85.3	14.7

Continued/....

Table 3. (continued)

Question 6.	Was the government right in forbidding the Negro tennis player Arthur Ashe and the British Coloured cricketer to visit South Africa?	
	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
	12.9	87.1
Question 7.	Are you troubled by the possibility that South Africa may be totally isolated in sport?	
	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
	58.6	41.4
Question 8.	Do you think young people will accept it if South Africa can no longer compete overseas?	
	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
	48.3	51.7
Question 9.	Do you think if sports isolation continues for a long time the pressure for non-racial sport will grow?	
	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>
	44.5	55.5

It can be concluded from the above that White public opinion indicated that South Africa was not ready to accept mixed sport. At this point the South African Government's concession to the Olympic movement and to the New Zealand Rugby Union appeared to be within the parameters of White acceptability. However, it is obviously difficult to determine whether this situation occurred as a result of governmental decision, or whether governmental decision had been the result of keen appraisal of public opinion. There is a suggestion that at this juncture the South African Government was attempting to lead public opinion. This theory is supported by the evidence that apparently justified the inclusion of Macris in a New

Zealand team, as not being a departure from the status quo (cf. Chapter Six). This attempted justification gives rise to the premise that such obfuscation was an attempt to ameliorate what could have been interpreted as a deviation, albeit temporary, from predetermined apartheid principles. The favourable reaction to this concession to the New Zealand rugby team, and Vorster's return to power in the early 1970 election, may have disposed the National party towards taking further initiative in making concessions in South Africa's sports policy. It most certainly established a precedent, as all subsequent announcements were couched in Nationalist terminology which obfuscated the concession being made.

While the majority of White public opinion was opposed to mixed sport, surveys conducted in 1971 indicated that it was eclectic. The Argus (January 10, 1971) conducted a rather limited poll which surveyed the attitude of sportsmen to integrated sport. It indicated that sportsmen, especially the cricketers, were generally more favourably disposed towards mixed sport in South Africa than was the White population. However, there was a reluctance amongst sportsmen to make this commitment as indicated particularly in the rugby players' survey (cf. Table 4).

Table 4. 'ARGUS' SPORTS POLL 1971

Question. Would you be prepared to play against or with Non-Whites in South Africa?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Cricket	39		1
Rugby	24	11	3
Soccer	18	4	
Tennis	9	2	

On April 8th, the Argus group of newspapers (Argus, April 8, 1971) further revealed that 260 of South Africa's top White cricketers answered YES to the question: "Are you prepared to play with or against Non-Whites at league level?" Ten said NO and six were uncommitted. A further poll, conducted by Professor Hendrik van der Merwe of the Abe Bailey Institute of

Inter-racial studies at the University of Cape Town, was reported in the Rand Daily Mail (April 12, 1971). It was reported that of 925 prominent South African sportsmen, 75% favoured integration in sport. Die Vaderland (April 21, 1971) conducted a similar poll amongst Afrikaans Springboks and ex-Springboks. It was reported that the majority of Afrikaans sportsmen were quite prepared to play against Black or mixed teams, both inside and outside South Africa on a national level, but that they were opposed to social mixing and integration at club level.

In April the Prime Minister issued his statement on multi-national sport (cf. Chapter Six). In this policy statement Vorster extended the parameters of segregated sport. However, it was strongly underscored that this policy would not lead to mixed sport and that essentially sport between the different nations in South Africa would be permissible only at the international level (Horrell, 1971 : 314). Exceptions were to be made in instances where international organisations demanded integrated teams. When Vorster's statement is aligned with the majority of White public opinion at the time, it can be ascertained that the policy was considered tolerable within the specifications propounded. Vorster had stepped forward but not so far as to antagonise the majority of Whites. It did not satisfy the outside world, but Vorster's primary consideration could have been the electorate, with the appeasement of growing world antagonism by the suggestion that some definite change had occurred as a secondary consideration only.

Following Vorster's April announcement, Market and Opinion Surveys conducted another opinion poll (November, 1971). From this data (cf. Table 5) it can be suggested that the South African Government, in so far as White, and especially Afrikaans, public opinion was concerned, was leading in the direction of further sports integration. The reaction illustrated in the survey, confirms a definite uncertainty amongst the White population over this particular line of development. There is furthermore a definite reluctance indicated on the part of the Afrikaans-speaking population to see any further involvement of Blacks in South African sport.

Table 5. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1971 MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question. If it would help South Africa to gain re-admission to the Olympic games, would you be in favour of mixed rugby trials to select a South African team?

	<u>No %</u>	<u>Yes %</u>	<u>Not sure %</u>
<u>Total</u>	38.3	47.7	13.2
English	11.6	80.4	8
Afrikaans	63.5	25.5	11

The year 1972 was a period of consolidation for South African sport and multi-nationalism, with open international sports events becoming more numerous. In 1973 South Africa held the South African Games, which epitomised the multi-national sports approach and presented the White South African public with an unprecedented occasion of mixing, albeit within carefully prescribed parameters. The Games provided a platform on which could be witnessed the act of limited integration. Market and Opinion Surveys (May, 1973) surveyed their panel to ascertain reaction to this event. Opinion was clearly in favour of such a development (cf. Table 6).

Table 6. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1973 MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question. Do you feel there should be more/fewer opportunities, such as the South African Games, in which White and Non-White sportsmen can participate?

	<u>More %</u>	<u>Fewer %</u>
<u>Total</u>	68.9	18.4
English	87.3	12.7
Afrikaans	56.6	43.4

The value of the Games as a platform for allaying extant racial prejudices is obvious. The fact that the Games were an organisational success undoubtedly contributed to this positive reception. The suggestion that Whites had to see integration before they would believe in its viability, appears to contain

a certain amount of validity in this instance, as there has been quite a substantial swing of opinion from that expressed in 1971. Public opinion appeared to be more receptive to further developments in mixed sport in 1973 than in 1970 or 1971. The 1970 figures previously mentioned showed that there had been a swing of approximately 30% towards a favourable acceptance of multi-national sport. Important in this swing was the fact that the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population was now more favourably disposed towards multi-national sport.

The influence on public opinion can be ascribed inter alia to open international sports meetings and the multi-national South African games. They had obviously assisted in overcoming White reluctance to accept sporting contact with the Black. Strengthening this premise were the results of a further survey carried out by Market and Opinion Surveys (December, 1973), which indicated that 69.3% of the population were agreeable to certain mixed sporting events taking place in South Africa (cf. Table 7).

Table 7. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1973(B) MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question. Arthur Ashe played tennis here and Bob Foster boxed here. In your opinion, should we have more or fewer such mixed sporting events?

	<u>More %</u>	<u>Fewer %</u>	<u>Not sure %</u>
<u>Total</u>	69.3	10.7	19.1
English	88	2.0	9.0
Afrikaans	56.9	16.4	25.8

It would appear, therefore, that public opinion was ready to accept greater change. The government held back until October, 1974, when Dr. Koornhof announced that international bodies would be permitted to hold multi-national rather than open international events. Overseas teams would no longer be needed, which meant that multi-nationalism had been sanctioned at the national level (Horrell, 1974 : 395).

Market Research Africa conducted a nationwide survey early in 1975 for the Argus group of newspapers. Indications, in relation to sport, were that while there was an increasing tolerance to the idea of mixed sport at club level, there was no clear demarcation either for or against such a development, and that there was considerable uncertainty and notable opposition from country areas. Results published in the Argus (March 5, 1975) indicated:

1. 44% of Whites would agree to integrating sport at club level.
2. 43% disagreed with racially mixed sport at club level.
3. 13% had no opinion or refused to answer.
4. 63% of English-speakers favoured racially mixed sport at club level.
5. 28% of Afrikaans-speakers favoured racially mixed sport at club level.
6. The cities produced an absolute majority (50%) in favour of the idea, while those in the towns and platteland were adamantly opposed (77%).

The question that arises, and is unanswerable, is whether White public opinion would have accepted greater and faster change in the sporting situation. The government indicated by the moderate course which it took in this regard, that it felt that the public would accept only gradual controlled change. If this was part of a carefully devised plan the end objective of which was full integration, much merit could be ascribed to such a scheme. Although Dr. Koornhof (1978) intimated that this development was part of a carefully devised step-by-step programme, he did not specify what the end objective was, or when he hoped the scheme would be fulfilled. In lieu of such a scheme the appearance was created in which the government was making concessions as and when it thought they would be acceptable (cf. Chapter Six). The government appeared to be wary of a backlash of a conservative opinion on concessions which were introduced without any justification. It was an opinion shared by the Argus (Editorial, March 6, 1975):

People outside this country might think that South Africans generally are making a mountain out of a molehill when it comes to mixed sport - after all, what can seem more innocuous than people getting together to play games? - but the Argus opinion poll published yesterday shows just how delicate this issue is, and how deeply the Whites are divided in their opinions.

.... In this sort of situation, exactly the wrong thing to do would be to rush in and try to force mixed sport down everybody's throat all at one go.

Scholtz (1975 : 4) carried out a survey at the Afrikaans-speaking University of Potchefstroom and found that 73% of students were in favour of giving sportsmen of all races an equal chance to be chosen for an international team to represent South Africa. However, if the nationwide opinion poll published in the Argus is taken as being more representative, and provided that there had not been a gross change in public opinion, the sports policy announcement of September 1976 faced considerable opposition, although it was assured of acceptance from a large number of sportsmen. From the surveys available, it would appear that the government had decided to take the initiative and pressurise White public opinion. The 1976 sports policy announcement allowed inter-group competition at all levels in individual types of sport. It preserved the essence of multi-nationalism, but conceded that teams of players representing all racial groups could participate in Olympic or specific international sports events (Cape Times, September 29, 1976). This development was contradicted by results obtained by Swart of the Institute of Urban Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University. Swart's results, obtained from a representative section of the population, established that a majority of Afrikaans-speaking voters were against multi-racial sport, and that while English or bilingual voters tended to support multi-racial sport, there was a conservative element who were opposed to it (Star, October 16, 1976). The government's method of influencing public opinion was undoubtedly the result of existing socio-political conditions. South Africa had just endured violent racial riots and therefore it may have been felt that further sporting concessions may ease racial tension. South African sport had also once again become the

cynosure following the protest of African states at the Montreal Olympics; which produced a backlash of opinion contributing further to South Africa's ostracism in the international sporting community. The 1976 sports announcement, which introduced limited integration in sport at club level, appeared to be more a product of circumstances than a desire for definitive action in the sphere of sport and race. But from this point momentum was allowed to develop in South African sport, and the initiative was increasingly taken by sports associations (cf. Chapter Eight).

Williams (1978), in a study initiated in 1976, made the following observations about specific aspects of the social milieu and life style of a group of top league rugby football players. He found that while 85.2% of all first league players could envisage a multi-racial South African rugby team touring abroad, only 59.1% would give such a venture their personal approval; 58.3% preferred games against separate White and Black teams; 60.8% were against sharing their hotel room with a Black player if the Black: (i) was participating in multi-racial matches in South Africa; (ii) was a team mate in a multi-racial South African side playing a touring team in South Africa; (iii) was a team mate in a multi-racial South African side touring abroad. When asked whether they would be prepared to share a hotel room with a Black team-mate in a multi-racial South African side to play a touring team in South Africa, 50% were prepared to do so. The percentage increased to 59.9% if the Black team-mate was part of a multi-racial side touring abroad. Williams notes that there was a decided dichotomy according to language spoken. The Afrikaans-speaking rugby player was generally opposed to such developments while the English-speakers (who constituted 23.3% of the sample) were at the opposite end of the spectrum, and favourably disposed to such developments.

Williams (1978 : 27) perorates that according to the findings, it would appear that in local trial games comparatively few players were prepared to share a room with Black players, but that their number increases in proportion to the status of the game. Similarly, he says, players are far less prepared

to share a room with Black on their home ground than they would be on foreign soil.

In November 1976, it was stated that merit selection would apply in South African rugby. Dr. Craven announced that teams selected on merit would be chosen by a mixed selection committee for the tour to New Zealand in 1978 and France in 1979 (Cape Times, November 8, 1976). Such an announcement would have enjoyed the backing of most top league rugby football players, as suggested by Williams's study.

In October 1976, cricket had taken the initiative in a far more dramatic manner and introduced multi-racial cricket down to club level. One year later, in October 1977, Market and Opinion Surveys conducted a survey for Professor L. Schlemmer of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal. The survey conducted for Schlemmer indicated that at the end of 1977 a sizeable majority was prepared to accept Whites and Non-Whites together in sporting teams (cf. Table 8). However, this is not significant by itself as it is necessary to ascertain to which particular level this referred : local (club, provincial) or national. The notable reluctance of Whites to share their facilities also needs further investigation, in order to ascertain what specific facilities Whites have reservations about sharing with Non-Whites : club, municipal, provincial or national.

Table 8. SELECTED ASPECTS OF 1977 MARKET RESEARCH SURVEY

Question. Suppose policy changes regarding race-matters are made in future, which of the following would be acceptable or unacceptable to you?

(a) Non-Whites and Whites together in sporting teams:

	<u>Acceptable</u> %	<u>Unacceptable</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %
<u>Total</u>	73.6	18.9	6.7
English	92.1	4.0	3.4
Afrikaans	60.7	29.2	9.1

(b) Admission of non-Whites to White sporting facilities:

	<u>Acceptable</u> %	<u>Unacceptable</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %
<u>Total</u>	55.7	29.7	12.8
English	80.7	7.6	11.2
Afrikaans	40.3	45.1	13.9

From the data presented, it may be postulated within the previously described parameters, that public opinion has changed markedly towards mixed sport (above club level) in South Africa in the period 1969-70 to 1977. In 1970 public opinion indicated that opinion regarding Non-Whites from overseas coming to play sport against Whites in South Africa was not favourable. Conversely, opinion did favour Non-Whites representing South Africa at the Olympic Games. The first multi-national sports policy in 1971 functioned very much within these defines. However, it did prepare the way, either wittingly or unwittingly, for greater integration. Open internationals and multi-national events provided a platform on which integration could be viewed. As a result sport became an agent for disseminating possible new values and attitudes. For example, at the end of 1973 there was agreement, among 68.9% of the population, that there should be more opportunities, such as the South African Games, in which White and Non-White could participate. Sport at this juncture was still separate, and although public opinion

sanctioned multi-national sport, greater integrated sport with mixed teams was obviously not considered desirable.

In 1974 the government introduced sport on a wider national basis. The government received criticism from its conservative element, but public opinion indicated a definite readiness to accept such proposals. It was not until 1976 that the government appeared to lead public opinion in the direction of mixed sport.

In 1977 the government stated that it did not condone mixed clubs, but it mentioned that there was no law against such a development. The government, in regard to public opinion, appeared to have taken the initiative and influenced the White section of the population into accepting greater change. There was no adverse reaction to this development, although opinion had suggested a reluctance to accept such changes. Sportsmen had displayed an attitude at variance with that of the White population, and would probably have accepted greater change, but cognizance of the attitudes of the White population per se would appear to have been the greater consideration. Further, the acceptance of changes made by the South African Government, suggests that sport has functioned in a socialising capacity particularly as regards the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population.

In a survey carried out by Pretorius and Potgieter in February, 1979 in the Cape Peninsula, 68% of the 284 respondents were of the opinion that sport could contribute to finding solutions as to how people should live together in South Africa. However, in spite of this positive outlook on the value of sport and the expressed opinion, by 76% of the sample, that South African sport would suffer as the result of lack of international competition, 48% of the group were of the opinion that South Africa should not change its political policy in order to regain entrance into the international sports arena. There were a considerable number of respondents (42%) who were of the opinion that the South African political policy had already changed sufficiently to warrant re-admission to international sport. As in the case of other surveys, Afrikaans-speaking people were

more conservative than the English-speaking section of the population. The English-speaking section indicated a general willingness to accept greater integration from the time of the first survey in 1969. It may be surmised that the attitude of the Afrikaans section inhibited a more expeditious evolution of South Africa's sports policy. The government appeared to realise that this section, which constituted approximately two-thirds of the voting population, was prepared to accept more than it was prepared to indicate. Subsequently the momentum of multi-racialism has been allowed to develop.

Acceptance of later more positive developments begets the question: would a more expeditious change in the sporting status quo have been acceptable to White public opinion? Extrapolating from the progressive acceptance of previous concessions, an answer in the affirmative would appear warranted. However, there are too many variables operating for the answer to this question to be supported by anything greater than conjectural evidence. It therefore remains a possibility only that change could have been promoted at a faster rate in sport in South Africa.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

FINAL STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examined the development of South African sport in conjunction with its political and racial correlates, particularly in the period 1970-1979. The examination was undertaken in three sections. The first section was an orientation to the main thrust of the study. Attention was given to historical antecedents which may have influenced the development of sport in South Africa. It was a section which supplied background material in an attempt to provide a continuity and present the topic in its general context. The second section consisted of a chronological evaluation of events occurring in South African sports. This section provided a more detailed examination of events, supplemented with empirically obtained data. The objective was to examine the phases in the evolution of South Africa's sporting development from the beginning of 1970 to the end of July 1979. The third section of the study considered various influences which had operated during this period. Attention was given to organisations, factions and groups which were considered to have had a significant effect on the development of South African sport. In this third section each influence is considered as a separate entity, although all have had a combined effect on the development of South African sport.

SUMMARY

There is confusion in literature concerning the early beginnings of sport in South Africa. Indications are that it was informal in nature and only took on organised form with the arrival of the British in 1795. Black sport similarly had obscure beginnings, the dearth of literature in this respect being even more pronounced. There were occasional instances of Whites and Blacks playing together, but this was not a typical characteristic of early South African sport.

South Africa's Black people developed their own sports teams and played mainly amongst their own race groups. This was a result of the prevailing class consciousness of the British, which excluded all except the most talented Boers from British clubs, and the incompatibility the Boer felt with the Black people. The result was development of 'racial' clubs that tended to cater exclusively for one particular group, with some sports clubs using religion as a means of demarcation.

While there tended to be a racial exclusiveness about the early clubs, informal inter-racial contact was present. This tended to disappear when the belief was encouraged through legislation that the Black people were to develop as a separate nation. The introduction of an official colour bar in the Mines and Amendment Act of 1911 began the crystallisation of this idea. White sports clubs in South Africa had in some cases become founder members of international sports associations, and because these associations recognised only one organisation per country, Black sportsmen were denied access to international competition.

By the 1930s racial demarcation had fully permeated South African sport, effectively denying the Black sportsmen equal opportunity and equal facilities. Reaction by Black sportsmen led to several non-racial sports organisations being founded in South Africa. Already in 1946 a request for affiliation was made to the British Amateur Weightlifters by the Non-White South African Association, but this was turned down.

This demarcation was carried further with the election to power in 1948 of a Nationalist government which brought with it an apartheid ideology that manifested itself indirectly in sport through legislation such as the Group Areas Act, the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act.

In the fifties the dissatisfaction of Non-White sports organisations with sports oppression increased in intensity, and in 1958 a non-racial South African Sports Association was formed to further the interests of the non-racial sportsmen. There was considerable opposition from White sports organisations and the government. In 1963 the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee was formed to further the Olympic aspirations of South African sportsmen. This organisation went into self exile in London in 1965. Operating from this base, it set about creating a worldwide awareness of the plight of the Non-White sportsman in South Africa, co-ordinating and organising protest movements against South African teams and persuading sports associations and governments not to have sporting contact with South Africa.

World opposition to the South African sports policy grew, and in 1964 South Africa was prevented from participating in the Olympic Games in Rome. This was to signal the end of her participation in the Olympics, and from this point opposition to her policy and her sports teams grew in intensity. South Africa announced in 1968 that she was prepared to allow a mixed national team to go to the 1968 Mexico Olympics, but it was to no avail as South Africa was again refused participation. At the beginning of 1970 there was a similar resistance to change in South African sport, although a small concession did give rise to transient hope when the South African Government deigned to allow Maoris to form part of a New Zealand rugby team in South Africa. It was an unprecedented move and as such was the first real concession to integrated sport, albeit temporary.

In April 1971 South Africa announced her multi-national sports policy, which essentially connoted sport by and between separate nations. It was in one sense a major policy change and in

another sense insignificant. It was a major change in that it presented White South Africans with a limited Black/White sports confrontation. Surveys suggest that the majority of White South Africans were opposed to this development, even in such a restricted form. This form was defined as contact between Black and White teams at Open Internationals. These were events where overseas competitors or teams participated. Exceptions were also made whereby certain sports whose international organisations demanded integrated teams, were allowed this right. These exceptions were the Olympic Games, the Canada Golf Cup competition, the Federation Cup and Davis Cup tennis competitions. This concession suggested that some attempt was being made to satisfy world opinion. However, the government vehemently denied that the changed sports policy was a result of international pressure. Those who were pressing for greater change were disappointed. They believed that the policy was an extension of the old apartheid concept under a new title. To them the changes were ineffective, because discrimination still existed after the policy announcement. In retrospect, however, it can be concluded that the policy was significant, although not in the changes that it instituted, since these were small concessions. The policy brought Black and White sport to the White South Africans. It attacked the centuries-old prejudices in a hitherto unprecedented fashion.

In 1971 the government stringently denied that this sports policy would lead to further integration. History has shown that, in regard to this hypothesis, the government, wittingly or unwittingly, was incorrect. The sports policy announcement of 1971 was the beginning of an evolution towards integrated sport.

The sports policy of 1971 created some confusion amongst the international sports community as governments and sports associations struggled to decipher the full implications of multi-nationalism. South Africa pressed ahead with multi-national sports meetings, exposing the White South African public to further multi-national events in 1972. By the end of 1972 the concept of multi-nationalism was firmly rooted in South Africa's sporting structure. Opposition from world governments and sporting organisations had not significantly decreased. The

development of multi-nationalism was continued in 1973 with the multi-national South African Games held in Pretoria. At these Games Black and White participated side by side for the first time: previous South African Games had been held for Blacks and Whites on separate occasions.

The Games created controversy outside South Africa. The anti-apartheid movement SAN-ROC, in conjunction with the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, campaigned vigorously amongst overseas sports associations, Olympic committees and governments to withdraw their teams. This pressure, which was combined with the threat of further sports boycott by sympathetic African states, realised a mass withdrawal of official international support for the South African Games. Of importance in this sphere was the withdrawal of approval for the 1973 South African Games which had been originally bestowed by the International Football Federation (FIFA). This deprived the Games of any official overseas competition for the soccer programme. Theoretically, under the terms of the 1971 sports policy, the soccer competition was required to have overseas teams to qualify for inter-racial competition. Rather than cancel the competition, a concession was made and the competition went ahead without overseas competition, although in deference to possible antagonism to such a departure the soccer venue was moved from Pretoria to Johannesburg.

The Games went ahead, with athletes from thirty-three countries participating. Each was reunited with his or her country's name once in South Africa, thereby allowing the essence of internationalism to be retained.

The Games did create antagonism from outside South Africa. An unstated objective appeared to be the placation of world opinion by the shoulder-to-shoulder competition of Black and White at the Games. That may have occurred if, as mentioned, the amorphous concept of multi-nationalism had been allowed to exist until the Games started. However, the work of anti-apartheid and anti-South African sport groups removed much of the shroud surrounding multi-nationalism and highlighted the sports discrimination which was extant. As a result, the

Games were not effective as an international publicity statement, since overseas reaction was largely negative. They were, however, an organisational success.

The real significance of the Games, beyond allowing South African sportsmen some form of international competition, was the creation of a platform on which White South Africans could witness limited integration. It was a large venture and the fact that it was acclaimed by South Africa's press and that it was free of incident, provided further avenues for possible development. An opinion poll taken after the Games testified to this premise: 68.9% of the White population were in favour of repeating this performance.

That the Games have not been repeated since 1973 tends to support the suggestion that the government is cognisant of the negativism and antagonism created overseas, and, with consideration of the costs of such a performance, has opted in the interim not to repeat it, although 1981 is currently being mentioned as a possibility.

At the end of 1973 the government chose not to exploit the goodwill developed within South Africa by the Games, when it announced that the Games would not lead to concessions towards multi-racial sport and that multi-national sport would remain the status quo. Pressure from the outside world had not decreased, although it was claimed that South Africa's sports contact with overseas countries and sports persons had increased. Figures generally pertained to individual unofficial South African international sports contact, which was increasingly becoming the lifeblood of South Africa's international sporting life. At the beginning of 1973 a non-racial sports organisation, called the South African Council on Sport, was organised within South Africa. (The precursor to SACOS had been the ad hoc committee of National Non-Racial Sports Organisations, which had consisted of eight non-racial sports organisations dedicated to the achievement of non-racialism in sport.) The formation of SACOS in 1973 lent formality to this association and gave non-racialism a mouthpiece. SACOS became the self-appointed conscience of South African sport.

SACOS declared immediate opposition to the South African Games, considering them racial and in keeping with the multi-national sports policy to which they also objected. In 1973 the South African Council on Sport required mixed sport down to club level before it would consider co-operating with White sports authorities. This co-operation was not forthcoming, and at the end of 1973 SACOS had firmly declared its philosophy on South African sport; antagonistic to multi-nationalism and racial sport.

Multi-nationalism began to develop greater flexibility in 1974. Couched in Nationalist terminology, the October 1974 announcement by Dr. Koornhof moved Black and White sport in South Africa onto the unprecedented level of domestic contact. This was in essence a compromise, since sport was to be allowed between Black and White at the national level, but the Springbok emblem was to remain the exclusive property of White teams while the sports of rugby and cricket were to remain segregated. There was to be merit selection of teams for all Olympic sports, the Federation and Davis Cup tennis teams, the Eisenhower Golf Cup team and the team for the Professional Golf Association's championship.

Once again, in the terms of reference used by various groups antagonistic to South Africa's sporting status, to judge the movement of South African sport away from segregation, this development was of little significance. The continued existence of discrimination in sport remained the contention.

However, the negative reaction of the conservative element to the 1974 proposals illustrated that, within White South African's frame of reference, multi-national sport at national level was indeed considered a considerable deviation from the status quo. Public opinion surveyed in 1973 had shown that the majority of Whites were in favour of greater mixing in sport, as exemplified by the South African Games. Although the sports policy announcement of 1974 in principle adhered to the precepts of multi-nationalism in 1971, there can be no doubt about its deviant potential. Obviously this was a matter of concern to verkrampes.

By the end of 1974 the momentum initiated in 1971 had been regained. Nonetheless South Africa's sporting isolation continued to increase. This isolation, it was suggested by sports administrators, was adversely affecting South Africa's sports participants and consumers. South Africa had hosted the 1974 British Lions rugby team, the effect of which had been, inter alia, to strengthen this premise by highlighting the various inadequacies of South African rugby at the international level.

The advancement of sport into 1975 registered further internal opposition to additional developments in South Africa's sports policy. It also highlighted the developing schism between liberal and conservative factions in the Nationalist party. The rift became more pronounced when the French Rugby Union informed South Africa that her national team would not tour unless a match against a multi-racial team was included in their itinerary. With the number of South African allies in the international rugby world uncertain, there was the possibility that if South Africa refused to accede to this request she might lose one of her staunchest allies. Alternatively it presented another problem. To accede to the request was to openly admit to bowing to pressure and to advance South African sport into the beginnings of multi-racialism. The Department of Sport and Recreation and the South African Rugby Board had previously stated that they would not capitulate to outside pressure, and frequent promises had been made that multi-nationalism would not lead to multi-racialism. The significance of 1975 was that it saw the capitulation of both the South African Government and the South African Rugby Board. It moved South African sport, irrespective of how slowly, in the direction of integration, and it widened the rift, initiated by the 1974 sports policy announcement between the conservatives and the liberals within the polity.

The anti-apartheid movements outside South Africa again regarded this development as minimal. Seen in terms of their overall objective; merit selection and equal opportunity in sport in South Africa; it was. The anti-apartheid movement in conjunction with the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa and a

growing number of Western, African, and Third World states, had continued to agitate for greater isolation of South African sport. SAN-ROC had been unsuccessful in requesting Britain to reject entry applications from individual South African sportsmen. However, she was given recognition by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, which suggested that financial assistance be given to SAN-ROC. At the end of 1975 South African sport had advanced towards greater integration, but the advance was dismissed by pressure groups inside and outside South Africa as being of insufficient magnitude. As a result there was no concomitant decrease in South Africa's sports isolation.

The isolation that South African rugby had endured since the 1974 British Lions rugby tour was ended in 1976. In spite of much criticism, the New Zealand All Blacks rugby team undertook a full scale tour of South Africa. The tour was interpreted by African states as a condonement of apartheid, a conclusion which precipitated the unprecedented Olympic boycott at the XX1st Olympics in Montreal, Canada, in July 1976. The boycott was a protest at the continuing apartheid sports régime in South Africa, and at the continuing support that South Africa was receiving from New Zealand in her major White sport, rugby. The Olympic Games was a forum unsurpassed in terms of focusing world attention on these twin issues. South African sports, excluded from the Olympic Games since 1964, appeared to have little to lose through the publicity. This was correct within carefully defined parameters. Nevertheless, attention was focused by the boycott on South Africa's sporting policies. New Zealand was as a result subjected to pressure to withdraw from the Games. Failure to do so caused an international analysis of New Zealand's sport politics. The significance of this publicity in regard to South Africa, is derived from the events which followed the Games. South Africa was subsequently dismissed from the Federation of International Football (FIFA), the International Amateur Athletic Federation, and the International Amateur Swimming Federation.

New Zealand in turn was pressurised by the anti-South African sport factions to adhere to United Nations Special Assembly resolutions and revoke all sporting relations with South Africa. Unless a commitment against sporting contact was forthcoming, the African states threatened to stage a similar boycott at the 1978 Commonwealth games. In addition, New Zealand was to be deprived of sports contact with African athletes until such time as she officially altered her attitude towards sporting contact with South Africa.

The reaction to the Olympic boycott by world sporting organisations and the vociferous criticism of South Africa's traditional rugby rival, which criticism threatened that relationship, undoubtedly contributed, along with the race riots, to a further policy announcement on South African sport in September 1976. It was announced that inter-racial sport would be permitted at club level, but that the race groups should remain as distinct entities: no mixing of teams would take place except in circumstances where there were specific invitations to mixed teams. The 1976 announcement, as anti-apartheid factions and non-racialists were quick to point out, did not approach the real problem of segregation in South African sport; sports participation was still defined according to race groups.

The 1976 announcement continued the movement away from the hard-line apartheid approach which had been characteristic of the period 1948-1970. But the significance of the 1976 announcement was, as with the previous announcements, largely confined to White South Africans. Herein it moved the White sport-playing population towards a degree of integration hitherto unknown. The 1976 announcement expanded multi-nationalism to its limits and left multi-racialism as the next step. Hence while the development was accorded little significance beyond South Africa's borders, within the context of South Africa's sports evolution it was again a significant development.

Momentum created by the September announcement was continued in limited style by the South African Rugby Board in December 1976, when they announced that all national rugby teams would be selected on merit, regardless of race, by mixed selection panels

after mixed trials. This was progressive for rugby, although it neither satisfied the non-racialists, nor adjusted rugby to the level of integration allowed in South Africa's other White sports.

At the end of 1976 a significant development in South African sport was the accordance of full member status, by the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, to the South African Council on Sport. This development accorded SACOS international recognition, the significance of which is derived from the fact that in 1977 African sport under the SCSA became an influential organisation in world sport.

With the prospect of financial gain through liaison with the emerging African states, world powers were anxious not to antagonise potential and newly-created African detentes. African attitude to sport was therefore treated with respect and concern, especially in relation to South Africa. The alliance of SACOS to this organisation, and the statement that any South African sporting development would have to have the sanction of SACOS, elevated this organisation to a new platform, a platform which assured her of a greater potential to influence developments in South African sport. Before South Africa was accepted back into the world sporting community the approbation of SACOS would be necessary. Escalating its demands of White South African sport in 1977, SACOS insinuated that this was going to be difficult to obtain. No longer would mixed sport at club level and merit selection be sufficient to assure the co-operation of the non-racial organisations with the White organisations. Before this would be considered, sport in South Africa would have to become non-racial or normal. This was interpreted as a demand for the removal of restrictive race laws, equal opportunity in financing, training, playing and coaching facilities, mixed sport at the school level and unreservedly non-racial administrative sports structure and clubs. In escalating their demands on South African sport, SACOS also committed the non-racial organisations to a greater political orientation. This desire to utilise sport to further political objectives was further emphasised in 1977, when heads of state of the British Commonwealth signed the Gleneagles Accord. This agreement committed each state to an official dissociation from South

Africa until there had been a revision of the apartheid structure. The implication was that change in the sporting environment in South Africa would not be acceptable to Commonwealth members: it would need to be concomitant with political and socio-economic revision.

South Africa gave no suggestion as to the dismantling of the apartheid edifice per se, although the progression towards integration in sport did continue. Cricket had initiated the development of a multi-racial league in 1976, and this continued into 1977. Athletics instituted a multi-racial constitution in 1977, although the vestiges of multi-nationalism remained: the two affiliated Black organisations were accorded what was the equivalent of provincial status, although they had full voting rights. After appointing a new president, the South African Amateur Athletic Union proceeded to stage multi-racial events down to club level, and awarded the Springbok emblem to Blacks who qualified.

The momentum which was generated by the predominantly White sports organisations was given impetus in August 1977, when Dr. Koornhof announced that clubs could integrate. Previous to this announcement mixed sport had been permitted at club level as long as the race groups retained their own identity in doing so. The August statement permitted clubs to go ahead and integrate if they so desired. Dr. Koornhof maintained that it was not the wish of the government that this should happen, but that the government would not interfere if clubs did. In terms of South Africa's sports evolution it was another significant development. There remained restrictions which prevented full sporting integration as it is known in other parts of the world, but the development was nonetheless progressive.

During 1977 South Africa's major sport, rugby, unsuccessfully attempted to form one national body. At the end of the year the South African Rugby Union attempted to bring itself into line with the developments of other sports, by announcing that rugby in 1978 would have a greater degree of integration. There would be mixed (multi-national) rugby from National to club level, and a 'merit' selected team would be chosen to represent South

Africa on a tour to France in 1979.

At the beginning of 1978 further progress in South Africa's sports evolution was noted. White sports clubs were told that application could be made for international status. This status, if granted, allowed White clubs to entertain Black officials and team members without applying for permission to do so each time a mixed event was to occur. Under international status, Blacks were to be guests, not members, of White sports clubs, and dancing was forbidden. This development removed much of the bureaucracy surrounding mixed sport, but it did not remove the vestiges of multi-nationalism.

Opposition, internationally and internally, to South Africa's sports policy remained. Nine European Common Market countries made a joint formal announcement which stated that South Africans were not welcome to play sport in Europe unless the sport could be shown to be fully integrated. The statement was not as absolute as the one the year previously when the Gleneagles Accord had been signed by Commonwealth heads of state. This announcement left the door open for South Africa in the European sphere of international sport.

The non-racial sports organisations continued objection to South Africa's sports policy became more specific in 1978. A Charter for Normal Sport stated that they considered the following necessary before South African sport could be regarded as non-racial normal or acceptable to them: non-racial national and provincial sports organisations, unreservedly open clubs, equal training coaching and playing facilities, no touring sides to South Africa until non-racial sport was fully implemented, no spectator segregation, non-racial school sport and the abolition of restrictive race laws.

Isolation of South African sport continued in 1978 forcing the Minister of Sport to suggest that the continuation of the sports boycott would cause an internalisation of South African sport. During 1978, the total number of sporting associations or events from which South Africa was barred, excluded or suspended internationally, rose to twenty-five. Twenty

countries or sports organisations refused entry to South African teams on thirty two occasions during 1978. In 1979 South Africa made another major advance in the normalisation of her sport, by opening the Department of Sport and Recreation to all races, making it the first fully integrated government department. This department had until 1979 catered exclusively for the White population. Under this new development finance, technical advice, aid in training, sports administration, sports organisation and sports promotion for all races would be catered for.

At present there is no noticeable lessening of opposition to South African sport. There are indications from the United States, following a civil rights action against South African heavyweight boxer Kallie Knoetze, that prominent South African sportsmen may be increasingly harassed in international competitions. To date, this has largely failed to materialise.

In 1979 South Africa finds herself largely bereft of official contact at the international level in the major sports of rugby, cricket, athletics, tennis and swimming. There has been a progressive movement away from strictly segregated sport and a movement towards non-racial sport, however, racial restrictions do remain along with vestiges of multi-nationalism. The removal of all race restrictions has been demanded as a precondition for the absolute normalisation of sport in South Africa and, ipso facto, for international re-acceptance. However, current indications are that only greater change on a political socio-economic scale will ensure international sporting re-acceptance for South Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

Predicated by this research the following conclusions appear to be warranted:

- (1) Sport developed an informal racial exclusiveness following colonization in South Africa.
- (2) Sport in South Africa was consolidated along racial lines

by British class consciousness, and by the religious and cultural disposition of the Boers.

- (3) Separate sport by different racial groups became an unofficially accepted phenomenon before the official manifestation of the apartheid doctrine following the 1948 election to power of the National Party.
- (4) The election of the National Party in 1948 gave overt recognition to the idea of separate sport by different racial groups, and in so doing committed the newly-elected polity to an unprecedented involvement in sport.
- (5) Legislation introduced by the Nationalist South African Government committed sport in South Africa to a White dominant/Black subservient relationship.
- (6) Until 1970 South African sport, in the face of increasing international and internal pressure, displayed an intransigence to the demand for a change in her sports system.
- (7) The establishment of internal and external pressure groups was a significant development in the total evolution of South African sport, as external and internal pressure groups played a substantial catalytic role in the evolution of South African sport.
- (8) The development of a liberal faction within South Africa's ruling elite expedited the South African sports evolution.
- (9) South African sport since 1970 has undergone gradual change, moving away from the hard-line apartheid concept with which it was associated in the 1950s and 1960s.
- (10) The momentum generated by the movement away from apartheid sport has been increasingly promoted since 1976 by liberal factions within White South African sport. There has been large-scale acceptance of multi-racialism, but vestiges of multi-nationalism do remain.
- (11) Contemporary South African sport from club level upwards can be described as multi-racial.
- (12) Sport in South Africa is not yet integrated at school level. It is not free from racially restrictive legislation and clubs are not unreservedly open to all irrespec-

tive of race or creed. Sport in South Africa is not non-racial or normal as recognised in other Western multi-racial societies.*

- (13) In the face of increasing sports isolation, South Africa has tended to emphasise its domestic sport.
- (14) Isolation from international sports contact does not appear to have adversely affected enthusiasm in South African sport.
- (15) International opposition to South African sport has steadily increased at the official representative level.
- (16) A greater international awareness of the South African sports situation has lead to an escalation in demands made on South African sport. In 1979 these demands reflect a greater commitment to a political ideal than to a sports one.
- (17) The rise of African, Third World and Asian States to international pre-eminence, concomitant with the promotion of Black nationalism, has increased international pressure on South Africa to change.
- (18) There has been an international politicization of the South African sports issue.
- (19) There has been a politicization of South African sport by internal non-racial sports organisations in South Africa.
- (20) There has been a depoliticization of South African sport by the South African Government.
- (21) Non-racial sports organisations in South Africa display quasi-political characteristics.
- (22) Black South African sport has displayed ethnocentric qualities which have inhibited a unitary development in Black sport.
- (23) Sport has had a socialising effect on White opinion in South Africa. White opinion in 1979 displays a greater readiness to accept Blacks in sport.

* Up until the day of examination.

- (24) Multi-nationalism has been a positive agent in the process of socialising attitudes towards greater acceptability of integrated sport in South Africa.
- (25) Multi-nationalism has created a polarisation of Black attitudes towards sport.
- (26) Sport in South Africa, wittingly or unwittingly, has functioned as a developmental platform in the field of race relations.
- (27) Sport has been carefully separated by the South African Government from South African society, so that it is not in conflict with or a direct challenge to the existing social order.
- (28) Sport in South Africa is not the microcosm of society that it may be in other societies.
- (29) South African sport has achieved a dominant institution-alised status of its own; displaying an increasing propensity to disseminate rather than to reflect attitudes, values and ideals.
- (30) The social control mechanisms operating in the schools and churches are not eroded by the processes pertaining to sports integration.
- (31) The sport/polity nexus in South Africa has tended to be unilateral.
- (32) It appears that sport has failed to elicit any major change in South Africa's political infrastructure or the subjacent political ideology.
- (33) Sport has offered a challenge to the existing social order in South Africa.
- (34) The successful development of sport has illustrated the potential viability of integration on a larger scale in South Africa.
- (35) Legislation inhibits the realisation of full integration in sport.
- (36) White attitudes suggest general opposition to unreserved non-racial sport.

- (37) The Broederbond organisation has had a notable effect on the process of sports integration.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- (1) It would appear, although it is statistically difficult to corroborate, that isolation has had a perceptible effect on South Africa's sports performance at the international level.
- (2) The news media, although they have assisted the process of integration by positive reinforcement, contribute negatively by continuing to demarcate according to colour.
- (3) It would appear that South Africa's sports policy has been a series of actions and reactions; but there is also a suggestion that it adhered to a covert controlled evolutionary scheme.
- (4) It would appear that non-racial sports organisations in South Africa are providing Blacks with a vehicle for the development of Black consciousness.

FINAL STATEMENT

To say that South African society is complex is to understate the situation. Constructed with multifarious racial groups, religious sects and traversed by numerous languages, it is not unnatural that problems have arisen when the question of harmonious integration of these diverse factions has been considered. The racial, religious and language disparities, among other things, has made harmonious integration difficult, although theoretically, not impossible. However, the situation is further complicated by the growing socio-economic disparities which has made the task of fitting the realities of the problem into a theoretical integrational model more difficult.

An alternative possibility, which is practised in South Africa, is the separation of various racial groups or nations. This practise has been subjected to an increasing amount of international criticism. Objections mainly base themselves on the

premise that all men must have the same basic human right, that is to determine their own future. Although this premise is not applied universally, South Africa has been selected for international cynosure. Considerable opposition to South Africa's policy of separation has resulted.

South African sport, as an institution of South African society, has reflected the dominant ideology and has received concomitant criticism. This criticism has led to international sporting ostracism, which although not totally debilitating, has exerted considerable pressure on South Africa to change her sports policy.

In South African sport there has been a gradual movement away from the more strictly segregated approach which originally characterised it and society in general. Racial barriers since the beginning of the 1970s have been gradually removed; sport in South Africa in 1979 bears little resemblance to sport in South Africa in 1970. All racial restrictions in South African sport however have not been removed and objections to South Africa's re-acceptance to international sport continue to be voiced.

It is clear that many of these objections are motivated by a desire other than the one for harmonious integration. Nevertheless there are those who genuinely seek a harmonious egalitarian South African society and see sport as having the potential to assist in the achievement of this objective. Therefore while sport in South Africa may have developed to the point where it is possible for the many race, religious and language groups to compete together, the issue has clearly become further complicated. Sport has been subjected to a number of political influences, making the issue of international sporting re-acceptance dependent on political rather than sporting change.

It would appear that many people outside South Africa are cognisant of both the changes in South African sport and the politicization of the sport issue, but because of increasing pressure for societal reform in South Africa, and possible political economic repercussions, which recognition of South African sport threatens to bring about, the issue of South African sport is not

considered in its less complicated form. Until this complication is removed and sport is evaluated on its own merits, or until there is greater societal change in South Africa, South African sport appears destined to remain largely isolated from world sport.

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* Numerous other interviews were conducted with less prominent persons; the number of which, for practical purposes, prevents tabulation.