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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, the Ernest Oppenheimer Trust, Balliol College and Oxford University for their financial support over the last three years.

Thanks go to the librarians of the Cullen Library at the University of the Witwatersrand, the Institute of Contemporary History in Bloemfontein, the United Party Archive at the University of South Africa, the Central Archive Depot in Pretoria, the Cape Archive Depot in Cape Town, the British Library in London, Queen Elizabeth House in Oxford, and, most especially, Rhodes House Library in Oxford.

Drafts of most of the chapters in this thesis were presented at seminars at Queen Elizabeth House and Nuffield College in Oxford, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London. I am grateful to the participants for interesting comments and discussion.

My supervisor Stanley Trapido has generously shared his extensive knowledge of South African history. His comments on my work have invariably pointed me in the right direction, and he has always been ready to listen to my problems, academic or otherwise.

Saul Dubow found the time to read, and comment on, every chapter of this thesis. His constructive and accurate criticisms have helped me a great deal. I learned from numerous discussions with Debbie Posel; it was gratifying to find that, although our areas of research were different, our conclusions about the events of the 1950s often coincided.

Constant support from my parents, my sister Gillian and Deanna Petherbridge has been important to me.

Without Sue Rosenberg's love and patience, I would never have completed this thesis.

PREFACE

Between 1934 and 1951, D.F. Malan's Afrikaner nationalist political party changed its name three times. When J.B.M. Herzog's National Party and the South African Party came together in the United Party in 1934, Malan and his followers formed the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party; GNP). In 1939, Herzog and some of his supporters refused to sanction a South African declaration of war against Germany, and joined the GNP in the *Herenigde Nasionale Party* (Reunited National Party, HNP), although they soon left to form the Afrikaner Party. In 1951, the HNP and Afrikaner Party fused into the National Party (NP). To simplify matters, this thesis tends to refer to the successive post-1934 Afrikaner nationalist parties as the "NP". Note, too, that the term "National Party" has been used instead of "Nationalist Party".

The naming of government legislation after 1948 is equally confusing. During the 1950s, the term "Native" was progressively phased out and replaced by "Bantu"; thus, for example, the Native Building Workers' Act became the Bantu Building Workers' Act. When this thesis mentions a government measure, the official name of the piece of legislation at the time that it was passed has generally been employed.

In 1960-61, the Rand replaced Sterling as the official currency of South Africa. Where comparisons between post-1960 and pre-1960 statistics are necessary, particularly in Chapter Three, Sterling figures have been multiplied by two to produce Rand figures. Otherwise - as, for example, in Chapter Five, when the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission are dealt with - statistics of the time are used.

In this thesis, the terms "Afrikaner", "Afrikaans-speaker" and "English-speaker" are generally used to distinguish "white" South Africans. According to South African law, the population is divided into "whites", "Africans", "Coloureds" and "Asians". In a research project of this kind, reference to these government-specified "population groups" is unavoidable, and does not imply an acceptance of the validity of such divisions.

ABBREVIATIONS

AHI	<i>Afrikaanse Handelsintituut (Afrikaans Commercial Institute)</i>
ANC	<i>African National Congress</i>
AP	<i>Afrikaner Party</i>
Assocom	<i>Association of Chambers of Commerce</i>
Bonuscor	<i>Bonus Investments Corporation</i>
CNE	<i>Christian-National Education</i>
CP	<i>Conservative Party</i>
DRC	<i>Dutch Reformed Church</i>
FAK	<i>Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations)</i>
FCI	<i>Federated Chambers of Industry</i>
FVB	<i>Federale Volksbeleggings (Federal Volks Investments)</i>
GK	<i>Gereformeerde Kerk</i>
GNP	<i>Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (Purified National Party)</i>
HAD	<i>House of Assembly Debates</i>
HNP	<i>Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party)</i>
HNP	<i>Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party)</i>
ICNE	<i>Institute of Christian-National Education</i>
INCH	<i>Institute of Contemporary History</i>
JRA	<i>Journal of Racial Affairs</i>
JSAS	<i>Journal of Southern African Studies</i>
NGK	<i>Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk</i>
NHK	<i>Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk</i>
NP	<i>Nasionale Party (National Party)</i>
OB	<i>Ossewa Brandwag (Oxwagon Sentinels)</i>
OFS	<i>Orange Free State</i>

PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
RDB	Reddingsdaadbond (Rescue Action Society)
ROAPE	Review of African Political Economy
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
Sabra	Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs)
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAJE	South African Journal of Economics
Sanlam	Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewensassuransie Maatskappy (South African National Life Assurance Company)
Santam	Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust Maatskappy (South African National Trust Company)
SAP	South African Party
SAPA	South African Press Association
Seifsa	Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa
UCT	University of Cape Town
Unisa	University of South Africa
UOFS	University of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein
UP	United Party
UR	Uitvoerende Raad (Executive Council)
WCC	World Council of Churches
Wits	University of the Witwatersrand

GLOSSARY

<i>afsonderlike ontwikkeling</i>	- separate development
<i>baaskap</i>	- domination
<i>boer</i>	- farmer
<i>bywoner</i>	- squatter
<i>Eeufees</i>	- centenary of the Great Trek
<i>ekonomiese volkskongres</i>	- economic congress of the people
<i>geldmag</i>	- financial power
<i>Nuwe Orde Studie Kring</i>	- New Order Study Circle
<i>ontvolking</i>	- depopulation
<i>oorstroming</i>	- inundation
<i>platteland</i>	- rural areas
<i>politiek</i>	- politics
<i>predikant</i>	- minister / parson
<i>smelters</i>	- fusionists
<i>stryddag</i>	- "struggle day"
<i>swart gevaar</i>	- black peril
<i>Vierkleur</i>	- four-coloured flag of Paul Kruger's Transvaal republic
<i>volk</i>	- people / nation

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1948-1961

by
John Lazar

Balliol College
Oxford University
Michaelmas Term, 1987

One of the principal themes of this thesis is that it is incorrect to treat "Afrikanerdom" as a monolithic, unified ethnic entity. At the time of its election victory in 1948, the National Party (NP) represented an alliance of various factions and classes, all of whom perceived their interests in different ways. Given, too, that black resistance to exploitation and oppression increased throughout the 1950s, apartheid ideology cannot be viewed as an immutable, uncontested blueprint, which was stamped by the NP on to a static political situation.

The thesis is based on four main strands of research. It is grounded, firstly, in a detailed analysis of Afrikaner social stratification during the 1950s. The political implications of the rapid increase in the number of Afrikaners employed in "white-collar" occupations, and the swift economic expansion of the large Afrikaner corporations, are also examined.

The second strand of research examines the short-term political problems which faced the nationalist alliance in the years following its slim victory in the 1948 election. Much of the NP's energy during its first five years in office was spent on consolidating its precarious hold on power, rather than on the imposition of a "grand" ideological programme.

Simultaneously, however, intense discussions - and conflicts - concerning the long-term implications, goals and justifications of apartheid were taking place amongst Afrikaner intellectuals and clergymen. A third thrust of the thesis will be to examine the way in which these conflicts concretely shaped the ultimate direction of apartheid policy and ideology.

Nationalist politics was also affected by the legacy of the aggressive Christian-Nationalism of the 1930s. The final main task of the thesis is to trace how and why the key tenets of Christian-Nationalism - especially those pertaining to republicanism and education - developed after 1948.

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Balliol College

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Social Studies, Oxford
University, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Michaelmas Term, 1987

-1-

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I

Over the past fifteen years, scholars with a wide range of political and methodological priorities have analysed the phenomenon of post-1930 Afrikaner nationalism. Most of these studies have attempted to understand how it was possible that D.F. Malan came to head a National Party (NP) government in 1948 less than fifteen years after the formation of the United Party (UP) had forced him to lead a small band of dissidents into the political wilderness (1). A few have displayed a more contemporary bias, preferring to make predictions about the outcome of the South African struggle based on perceived current trends in Afrikaner nationalist politics (2). Developments in Afrikaner nationalism between 1948 and 1961 have been touched on in epilogues and prefaces by these scholars, but have seldom warranted an independent examination, except in the most extreme nationalist panegyrics. Yet it is incorrect to assume that categories which held true during the 1930s and 1940s, or 1960s and 1970s, can be automatically applied to the 1950s. The relationship between the crucial events of that decade and developments in Afrikaner nationalist politics deserves a

1) See, for example, D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984); T.D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975); N.M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa 1934-1948* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974).

2) See, for example, H. Adam and H. Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilised: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979); C. Charney, "Class Conflict and the National Party Split" in *Journal of Southern African Studies (JSAS)*, 10, 2, April 1984.

separate and serious appraisal.

In building a basic framework for the analysis of Afrikaner nationalism between 1948 and 1961, it is fitting to begin with Dan O'Meara's discussion of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism between 1934 and 1948 (3), since his is the most substantial and convincing of all recent accounts. An examination of his study will also provide a brief overview of the period preceding the 1948 general election. O'Meara's point of departure is a comprehensive critique of nationalist and liberal conceptions of Afrikaner nationalism. He attacks both camps for their treatment of "Afrikanerdom" as a discrete, unified nation. According to O'Meara, this leads, firstly, to a failure by most historians to recognise or acknowledge the shifting composition and conflicts of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Furthermore, by treating Afrikanerdom as a "self-generating a priori category", both liberal and nationalist theorists display an "extreme form" of historicism. One aspect of South African politics is separated from its "historically specific conditions of existence" and turned into a universal concept, which is then imposed

3) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*. See also D. O'Meara, "White Trade Unionism, Political Power, and Afrikaner Nationalism" in *South African Labour Bulletin*, 1, 10, 1975; D. O'Meara, "The 1946 African Mineworkers Strike in the Political Economy of South Africa" in P. Bonner (ed.), *Working Papers in Southern African Studies* (Johannesburg, African Studies Institute, 1977); D. O'Meara, "The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927-1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism" in *JSAS*, 3, 2, 1977; D. O'Meara, "Analysing Afrikaner Nationalism: the Christian-National Assault on White Trade Unionism in South Africa 1934-1948" in *African Affairs*, 77, 306, 1978; D. O'Meara, "Muldergate, the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism and the Crisis of the Capitalist State in South Africa" in *Work in Progress*, 22, April 1982.

backwards in time as an organising principle of South African history. The development of Afrikaner nationalism can then be regarded as nothing more than a "predetermined unfolding" of "what there was in embryo" (4).

An undifferentiated treatment of the category "Afrikanerdom" also leads, O'Meara argues, to a conflation of state, party and ethnic group in the context of South African politics. Thus, many historians studying the events of the last forty years suggest that Afrikaners have completely monopolised all political power, and constitute a ruling group or even a political class:

The South African state is reduced to an Afrikaner entity and seen as a simple instrument in the hands of the "ruling ethnic group".(5)

The capitalist nature of the South African state is completely obscured, and change explained wholly in terms of the actions and policies of "Afrikanerdom".

All of this, O'Meara suggests, reflects the idealism prevalent in liberal and nationalist historiography. For O'Meara, "historical processes, conjunctures and epochs" cannot be explained in terms of "the expressed ideas, ideologies and values of social actors" (6). Not only does this ignore the material struggles and conditions which created these values. Such an approach also ultimately reproduces Afrikaner nationalism's static, idealist conception

4) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.7.

5) *Ibid.*, p.7.

6) *Ibid.*, p.7.

of Afrikaner culture as the determining factor of social action. In O'Meara's words, "ideology then becomes a simple elaboration of what is already present in fixed form" (7).

O'Meara's study, in contrast, is based on the assumption expressed by Marx that "we cannot judge a period of transformation by its own consciousness: on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life" (8). O'Meara continues:

Thus the approach adopted here seeks to explain the development of Afrikaner nationalism from 1934 to 1948 through locating Afrikaans-speakers in the context of social relations, conditions, contradictions and struggles consequent upon capitalist accumulation in South Africa. It is particularly concerned with what are seen as the (differing) real conditions of existence of Afrikaans-speakers of differing social classes - that is, with the ensemble of varying and changing economic, social, political and ideological relations in which they are differentially incorporated. The study seeks then to explore the changing ideological matrices which arose out of such conditions to constitute social reality for these differentiated collectivities...(9)

O'Meara also argues, however, that it is not enough to merely describe the conflicts which accompanied capitalist accumulation, and conditioned the development of a "highly differentiated" Afrikaner nationalist ideology. His analysis is also concerned with the organisational and ideological forms through which Afrikaner nationalism's response to class struggle was fought out. In particular, O'Meara emphasises

7) *Ibid.*, p.8.

8) K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), p.182. Cited in O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.11.

9) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.12.

a "neglected" aspect of Afrikaner nationalism: the attempt by certain class forces, notably specific petty bourgeois groupings, to secure a base for capital accumulation in industry and commerce, through the so-called "economic movement"; a movement which utilised a wide range of organisational, ideological and political means to mobilise mass support from Afrikaners in support of petty bourgeois aims. For O'Meara, a study of the economic movement is vital because it "lays bare the character and structure of Afrikaner nationalism as a shifting class alliance", and provides the basis for an understanding of developments at a political level which were instrumental in the NP winning power in the 1948 election (10).

One important corollary is implied by this analytical framework. O'Meara's account places him firmly within the school of revisionist scholars who have criticised the liberal conception of apartheid as a dysfunctional intrusion on the rational and colour-blind capitalist economy, imposed by a rigid, reactionary and racist Afrikaner nationalism. For O'Meara, on the other hand, the apartheid policies of the NP "were a product of the particular character of capitalist development in South Africa, and acted as a spur to rapid capital accumulation in a given historical phase of South African capitalism" (11). Race, as an analytical category, is therefore assumed to be a less important variable than class.

The main body of O'Meara's study can be briefly

10) *Ibid.*, p.16.

11) *Ibid.*, p.247.

summarised as follows. O'Meara begins by examining the relationship between South Africa and the world capitalist system during the 1920s and 1930s. He explains the fusion between Herzog's NP and the South African Party (SAP) of Smuts in 1934 as a political and ideological reorganisation of the capitalist class, necessitated by the barriers to capital accumulation thrown up by the Great Depression. In particular, agricultural capital in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (OFS) found it necessary, because of a perilous economic situation, to collaborate with the "imperialist" mining industry. Displaced by monopoly mining capital as the primary class ally of northern agricultural capital, and "profoundly disorganised and confused" (12), the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie forged an alliance with Cape agricultural capitalists in Malan's *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party; GNP).

In the light of the weakness of the GNP in the Transvaal and OFS, the Afrikaner Broederbond is regarded by O'Meara as the most significant northern Afrikaner nationalist organisation, an organisation which "attempted to interpret the world and formulate policy for its petty bourgeois membership" (13). Above all, the Broederbond's intention was to transform the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie into a bourgeoisie "on the savings of Afrikaner workers and farmers" (14). Intense ideological debates within the Broederbond led to the formulation of "Christian-Nationalism", which

12) *Ibid.*, p.56.

13) *Ibid.*, pp.64-65.

14) *Ibid.*, p.66.

emphasised the divine inspiration of the Afrikaner nation, language and culture - and the importance of Afrikaner unity - as a means of mobilising Afrikaners of all classes behind the petty bourgeois militants. The need to win over Afrikaner workers, to submerge class consciousness in the organic whole of the volk (people/nation), was reflected in the Broederbond-directed assault on the white trade unions, and the organisation of Afrikaner workers into ethnic trade unions. A "wary alliance" between the Broederbond and the small "mafia" (15) of Cape financial capitalists helped to forge an economic movement given direction by the first *ekonomiese volkskongres* (economic congress of the nation) of 1939. A cultural and ideological offensive was launched to transform the "economic consciousness" of Afrikaners, so that they would be amenable to the growth of Afrikaner capital (16). Three major organisations were created to accomplish this task: the *Ekonomiese Instituut* (Economic Institute) of the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings* (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations; FAK), the *Reddingsdaadbond* (Rescue Action Society; RDB) and the *Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut* (Afrikaans Commercial Institute; AHI). O'Meara emphasises the influence of the *Suid-Afrikaanse Lewensassuransie Maatskappy* (South African National Life Insurance Company; Sanlam) on the operation, activities and policies of the economic organisations. In particular, Sanlam strategists constantly argued that the latent money-capital of Afrikaner agriculture capital, and the savings of Afrikaner

15) *Ibid.*, p.66.

16) *Ibid.*, p.134.

workers, should be mobilised and concentrated in central financial institutions, where the money could be transformed into productive capital. The petty bourgeois elements organised in the Broederbond, also perceiving that their interests were inextricably linked with the fortunes of Afrikaner agriculture, supported this campaign. Yet it was Southern finance capitalists who were the main beneficiaries of the economic movement. Facing them, and increasingly mistrustful of their ideological direction and power, was a "large, politically aggressive, trading petty bourgeoisie" (17).

The outbreak of the Second World War precipitated a shaky reunification of the followers of Hertzog and Malan in the *Herenigde Nasionale Party* (Reunited National Party; HNP). Although Hertzog's supporters soon left to form the *Afrikaner Party* (AP), and bitter clashes with the *Ossewa Brandwag* (Oxwagon Sentinels; OB) and *Nuwe Orde Studie Kring* (New Order Study Circle) also ensued, by the end of the War the HNP had re-established itself as the principal political voice of Afrikaner nationalism. By the 1943 election, too, a significant part of the rural support of the UP had shifted to the HNP (18). Farmers were further alienated from the UP government by the massive influx of labour from the African reserves to the cities, precipitated by the rapid expansion of secondary industry during the War, and the dissolution of pre-capitalist relations of production in the rural areas.

17) *Ibid.*, p.221.

18) *Ibid.*, p.121.

Farmers began to call for strong state intervention to control the flow of African labour into the urban areas, which was eroding capital accumulation in the rural areas. Mining capital's accumulation also depended on the existence of a cheap migrant labour system. However, although they were in agreement on labour issues, mining and agricultural capitalists clashed over the farmers' demand for the revision of the application of the 1937 Marketing Act, which was being used by the UP government to lower the prices of foodstuffs. Meanwhile, industrial capital pushed for the stabilisation of a large, permanent urban labour reserve, which would facilitate the higher rates of exploitation and mechanisation necessary for industrial accumulation.

Faced by the contradictory demands of the various fractions of capital, and the increasing militancy of both rural and urban Africans, the vacillating UP government was unable to govern effectively. Campaigning on an apartheid ticket, which emphasised the great bogey of the *oorstroming* (inundation/swamping) of the cities by the *swart gevaar* (black peril), the NP was able to organise a new alliance based on agricultural capital, the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, certain sectors of white labour, and the small group of Afrikaner finance and industrial capitalists. According to O'Meara, apartheid guaranteed that the conditions of accumulation of capital would be restructured so as to advance the interests of each group in the alliance (19). The growth of agricultural capital, on which both the petty bourgeoisie and the emerging

19) *Ibid.*, p.243.

financial capitalists depended, was to be assured by the imposition of influx control and pricing policies.

The victory of the NP thus marked a "decisive shift" in the balance of forces in the South African state (20). Nonetheless, O'Meara argues, although it was labelled "anti-capitalist", the NP ensured an increase in accumulation for all fractions of capital. Apartheid secured the interests of the entire capitalist class by allowing all capitalists to intensify exploitation of African workers (21).

II

It is useful to begin an assessment of O'Meara's study by testing his general criticisms of nationalist and liberal historiography. Certainly, all nationalist accounts of Afrikaner history seem to display the characteristics he so roundly criticises in the introduction to *Volkskapitalisme*. G.D. Scholtz's semi-official history of the Afrikaner nation is especially guilty of assuming that a conscious, homogenous Afrikaner ethnic entity is necessarily central to all aspects and periods of South African history (22). The work of the doyen of Afrikaner historians, F.A. van Jaarsveld, is far more subtle than that of Scholtz. Well aware of the danger of writing approved histories, he notes that "any historian who becomes the exponent of party tenets usually lapses into a

20) *Ibid.*, p.246.

21) *Ibid.*, p.247.

22) G. Scholtz, *Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner* (Johannesburg, Voortrekker Press, 1967).

tendentious or nationalist narration" (23). Although he argues that it is "virtually impossible" for a historian "to free himself from the influence of his time or his adherence to a particular philosophy of life", Van Jaarsveld still calls for a rejection of "unavoidable subjectivity" and "deliberate falsification" (24). Nevertheless, he remains torn between his duty to objective history, and the demands of his strongly nationalist environment. On the one hand, he argues quite forcefully that it was only during the years 1868-1881 that many Afrikaners developed a national consciousness and became a "people" or "nation" (25): "...there was no such thing as Afrikaner nationalism in the the Great Trek itself" (26). On the other hand - falling into the trap pinpointed by O'Meara - he also suggests that "we know that the Afrikaner people became a separate people" in the 18th century, "with their own identity and beliefs" (27).

In order to ascertain the accuracy of O'Meara's criticisms of liberal historiography, it is sufficient, for the purposes of this chapter, to scrutinise two major works by liberal scholars. The first, by Heribert Adam and Herman Gillomee, is one of those accounts mentioned at the beginning

23) F. A. van Jaarsveld, *The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History* (Cape Town, Simondium 1964), p.113.

24) *Ibid.*, p.168. See also F.A. van Jaarsveld, "Oor Vertolking en Hervertolking in die Geskiedskrywing" in *Communications of the University of South Africa* (Pretoria, 1963).

25) F. A. van Jaarsveld, *The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1961), p.3.

26) *Ibid.*, p.215.

27) Van Jaarsveld, *Interpretation*, p.5. See also F.A. van Jaarsveld, *Omstrede Suid-Afrikaanse Verlede: Geskiedenisideologie en die Historiese Skuldvraagstuk* (Johannesburg, Perskor, 1984).

of this chapter which confidently attempts to prognosticate about the future of Afrikaner nationalism. Adam and Giliomee begin their analysis with a review of the major approaches in the extensive social science literature on South Africa. According to Adam, none of these is in any way adequate. He attempts to "utilise insights from various perspectives without elevating a particular approach to the sole truth" (28). He soon produces a number of "keys" to understanding South African politics. Early in his introductory paragraphs, for instance, he argues that it is "ethnicity in conjunction with intraethnic class stratification that holds the key..." (29). He claims, furthermore, to be able to trace the interaction between Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation and "class forces" (30). Yet, this introduction of categories derived from historical materialism is quickly swamped: soon Adam is asserting that it is only "ethnic mobilisation" - or the "ethnic revolution" of the "ruling Afrikaner group" - which is "the key for an appropriate understanding of contemporary white politics" (31).

Adam and Giliomee's elision of their initial methodological premises leaves them with an explanatory framework which confirms O'Meara's reservations. Their overriding emphasis on a static and homogenous Afrikaner "ethnicity" results in all kinds of confusion. Sometimes, this entity is referred to as a "prosperous bourgeoisie" (32), or

28) Adam and Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilised*, p.16.

29) *Ibid.*, p.11.

30) *Ibid.*, p.12.

31) *Ibid.*, p.61.

32) *Ibid.*, p.145.

an "ethnic class" (33); at other points, it is "psychological security" which is Afrikaner nationalism's secret appeal (34). Conflicts within Afrikaner ranks are explained variously in terms of Afrikanerdom's "pluralistic nature", or vague, unsubstantiated notions of "cleavages" and "currents" (35). And the relationships between political struggle, party, ethnic group and state are conflated and over-simplified to such an extent that Adam finally concludes that it is "several dozen" Afrikaner "political entrepreneurs" who will ultimately "decide policy" (36), if not South Africa's future.

Giliomee, to his credit, avoids such sweeping assertions in his various contributions to the joint study. His account of the Afrikaner economic advance is particularly valuable; he shows in more recent work on 19th-century Afrikaner nationalism that he is well aware of the need to challenge traditional Afrikaner nationalist historiography (37). However, in the end, as O'Meara suggests, Adam and Giliomee's explanatory tool in *Ethnic Power Mobilised* simply begs too many questions. How, for example, does "ethnic mobilisation" adequately explain the following phenomenon, as recounted by Adam himself?

33) *Ibid.*, p.177.

34) *Ibid.*, p.52.

35) *Ibid.*, p.ix.

36) *Ibid.*, p.144.

37) See, for example, H. Giliomee, "Reinterpreting Afrikaner Nationalism c.1850-1900", in *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries* Volume 13 (London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1984); A. du Toit and H. Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought: Volume 1 1780-1850* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983), especially introduction.

A mature Afrikaner bourgeoisie in full control of state power has now identified itself once more with the laissez-faire labour policies of English capitalists with whom it shares similar interests of curbing the historical monopoly of expensive white labour.(38)

Nor would it be easy for Adam to gloss over the fact that the NP fractured itself again, just two years after he stated that - because of the power of "ethnic mobilisation" - "speculation about an imminent split in the Afrikaner oligarchy in terms of a fundamental realignment of political forces seems farfetched indeed" (39).

T.D. Moodie's 1975 account of the *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, in contrast, is based on a far more rigorous methodological foundation. From a background in theology, Moodie produces the notion of a "civil religion". This concept relies on the definition of "religion" as "a set of symbols whether words, objects, or ritual actions, which serve to assist the individual or group in meeting the ultimate problems of the human predicament" (40). A "civil religion", then, denotes the "religious dimension" of the state:

As such, it is invariably associated with the exercise of power and with the constant regeneration of a social order; it provides a transcendent referent for sovereignty within a given territory. The ultimate nature and destiny of political power is thus connoted in the symbols of the civil faith and re-enacted by civil ritual. The origins, the extent and limits, and the final purpose of political sovereignty are thereby set within the context of ultimate meaning; aspirations to sovereign power and the exercise of sovereignty are given transcendent justification.(41)

38) Adam and Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilised*, p.182.

39) *Ibid.*, p.193.

40) Moodie, *Civil Religion*, p.295.

41) *Ibid.*, p.296.

According to Moodie, the Afrikaner civil religion can be conceived of as "constellation of symbols" held fairly universally and consistently by Afrikaners "at least since the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902". Nonetheless, Moodie argues, this should not imply that Afrikaner beliefs were neither unchanging nor universally accepted. Rather, beliefs and rituals were constantly modified in response to conditions. However:

...since "conditions" are themselves perceived and responded to within a context of meanings, the crucial importance of ideas and beliefs, despite their relative fluidity is self-evident.(42)

Moodie's study traces the development of Afrikaner civil religion from 1902, through the Afrikaans language movement and the Pact government, to the events of the 1930s. He stresses the impact of Kuyperian and Neo-Fichtean ideas, which were brought back by young Afrikaner intellectuals from Europe, and quickly permeated the tenets of Christian-Nationalism. For Moodie, the centenary celebration of the Great Trek - the *Euufees* of 1938 - was instrumental in cementing the widespread acceptance of the civil religion. The re-enactment of perceived Afrikaner history in the symbolic and emotional ritual of the *Euufees* succeeded, according to Moodie, in uniting most Afrikaners behind the new vision of culture and ethnicity embodied in Christian-Nationalism (43).

In general, Moodie provides a detailed and convincing

42) *Ibid.*, p.295.

43) *Ibid.*, chapter 9. See also T.D. Moodie, "The Rise of Afrikanerdom as an Immanent Critique of Marxist Theory of Social Class" in Bonner (ed.), *Working Papers* 1977, pp.332-333.

analysis, especially of the abstruse ideological debates of the 1930s. Nevertheless, impressive as his work is, it is still open to several of O'Meara's criticisms. The principal weakness of Moodie's book is that he fails to come to grips with the interaction between "conditions" and the Afrikaner "constellation of symbols", despite his recognition of the importance of this relationship. He becomes trapped by the expressed beliefs of the Afrikaner civil religion. All political (and economic) conflicts between Afrikaners are therefore explained internally, as simple ideological disagreements over one or another aspect of the civil religion, be it republicanism or the Kuyperian definition of culture. Conflicts are never adequately contextualised or rooted. As O'Meara notes, Moodie's analysis "fails to pose the questions, who were the differential constituents of Afrikanerdom and what were the conditions and struggles which led to 'the rise of Afrikanerdom'? " (44).

III

On the whole, therefore, O'Meara's general critique of nationalist and liberal approaches to the development of Afrikaner nationalism is sound. Yet, while he grapples successfully with some of the vexing issues, O'Meara's own account is certainly not flawless. The major problems in his work arise out of his treatment of the nature and function of ideology. His approach to this complex question - based on work by Marx, Althusser, Sayer, Laclau and Gramsci - is laid

out in the introduction to *Volkskapitalisme*. He is careful, in his construction of a theoretical framework, to avoid what he calls the "crude economic reductionism" of certain Marxists, and not to suggest that, if an ideology is in some way deceptive, such mystification is simply a question of faulty perception on the part of those who hold to that ideology (45). But, he emphasises, in historical materialist fashion, that an analysis of ideology "must begin with the historical development of capitalist relations", and cannot remain at the level of the "what is given" of everyday experience (46).

Unfortunately, many of O'Meara's observations fail to display the subtlety promised by his theoretical introduction. It is a matter of theoretical debate - a debate which is beyond the intended scope of this thesis - whether this is due to misconceptions inherent in O'Meara's introductory theory itself, or whether it results from his inability to judiciously apply his own theoretical injunctions. In any case, O'Meara seems to fall into two related traps in his treatment of questions of ideology.

The first problem surfaces in his discussion of the role of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and the Broederbond in the formulation of Christian-Nationalist ideology. Throughout his study, O'Meara creates the impression that the petty bourgeois elements organised in the Broederbond possessed a very clear understanding of their material needs, and, more importantly, a conscious, often manipulative, programme intended to

45) *Ibid.*, p.12.

46) *Ibid.*, p.13.

mobilise the bulk of Afrikaners behind petty bourgeois goals and leadership. Passages such as the following serve only to reinforce this impression:

Specific petty bourgeois groups sought to transform themselves into an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie utilising a broad set of organisational, ideological and political means to mobilise mass support from Afrikaans-speakers of other classes for this attempt.(47)

And again:

...the overriding aim of the Broederbond intellectuals would be the transformation of the economic position of the Afrikaans petty bourgeoisie - to transform this petty bourgeoisie into a bourgeoisie on the savings of Afrikaans workers and farmers.(48)

At one point, to cover himself, O'Meara issues a warning:

A word of caution is necessary to pre-empt conspiratorial interpretations of the emerging ideology...The point is not that the leaders of the economic movement cynically hid their intention to become capitalists from the mass of Afrikaners and manipulated ideology and organisation for their own ends.(49)

This rather lame attempt - and it is the only attempt - to place the motivations of petty bourgeois ideologists in perspective does not adequately dispel the feeling of a conspiracy at work. At no point, does O'Meara adequately answer questions concerning the extent to which Christian-Nationalism was, on the one hand, a conscious, sometimes cynical manipulation of symbols and organisation; and, on the other hand, an ideology which petty bourgeois elements believed because it arose out of, and reflected, the

47) Ibid., p.16.

48) Ibid., p.66.

49) Ibid., pp.149-150.

contradictions and conflicts they experienced in their everyday life.

In a way, O'Meara's uneasy treatment of the role of petty bourgeois ideologists in the Broederbond is symptomatic of a second, more general, problem with his conception of ideology. Although an understanding of fundamental material processes should be the point of departure for an examination of the nature and function of ideologies, O'Meara assumes an extraordinarily direct and immediate relationship between ideological and political change, and material circumstances. For example, in his detailed discussion of the fusion between the NP and and SAP in 1934, O'Meara suggests that the vast majority of Transvaal and OFS farmers followed Herzog into the UP simply because they saw cooperation with Smuts and "imperialist" capitalist interests as the only way to solve their economic problems. Most importantly, the Depression had "compounded the constraints on the accumulation of capital" caused by the volatility of the internal market, for which Transvaal and OFS farmers primarily produced. With the NP government unable to stabilise the internal market for agricultural commodities, northern farmers found it necessary to turn to the new United Party. On the other hand, according to O'Meara, Cape farmers joined Malan's GNP because of their reliance on external markets, and their concern about export prices. Cooperation with "Hoggenheimer" (50) seemed to promise

50) *Ibid.*, p.258: "Hoggenheimer was the Semitic-featured caricature of *Die Burger's* cartoons, the racist symbol for monopoly capital in all its forms. The term was also used interchangeably with 'imperialism', but, because of its extreme anti-Semitic connotations, had a deeper impact. It is

only an intensification of "imperialist" domination and worsening terms of trade for Cape agricultural capital (51). Yet, can the dramatic political and ideological realignments of Fusion be explained, purely and simply, in terms of the problems experienced by farmers in securing markets for their commodities? In the end, O'Meara's explanation is far too simplistic to do justice to the profound political and ideological upheavals of the time. Similarly, in his discussion of the events surrounding the outbreak of the Second World War, O'Meara provides just one reason why "the overwhelming majority" of South Africa's farmers were "firmly united in opposition" to South African involvement in the war: the declaration of war deprived them of a lucrative economic market (52). However, the full complexity of republican and anti-imperialist feeling amongst farmers cannot be distilled into a single formula.

O'Meara's failure to credit ideological beliefs and systems with any real independence, resonance or effect spawns other conclusions which need to be questioned. One of the reasons, for instance, why O'Meara treats the Christian-Nationalism of the 1930s as a complete "break from the past", as "profoundly new" (53), is because the material conditions of Afrikaners, especially the petty bourgeoisie, had changed so dramatically: the ideology, in O'Meara's view,

a corruption of the name of the 'Hochenheimer' estate of arch-imperialist mining magnate Percy Fitzpatrick. The character first appeared as 'Hoggenheimer of Park Lane' in a 1902 musical comedy 'The Girl from Kays'."

51) Ibid., chapters 1 to 3.

52) Ibid., p.121.

53) Ibid., pp.165-166.

automatically followed suit. Yet, O'Meara's account would have been improved if he had recognised the resonance of the earlier, admittedly less conscious, forms of Afrikaner ideology; and then traced their intricate interaction with the "profoundly new" economic and political conditions of the 1930s. The legacy of the Afrikaans language movement (54), the Stellenbosch District Bank's economic strategy during the late 19th century (55), and the activities of Cape nationalists such as D.F. Malan during the period between 1910 and 1920 (56), affected much more than the "symbolic language" of Christian-Nationalism.

O'Meara's conclusions about apartheid ideology after 1945 can be similarly criticised. Although O'Meara is careful, throughout his study, not to treat the South African capitalist class as an organic, homogenous whole, he is still adamant, as shown above, that apartheid "secured the interests of the entire capitalist class" (57). Furthermore:

Variations in racial policy must be seen as flowing from changes in the structure of production and the alignment of class forces in the social formation.(58)

Here O'Meara lays himself open to a criticism levelled by

54) See I. Hofmeyr, "Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language, literature and ethnic identity, 1902-1924" in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, Longman, 1987).

55) H. Giliomee, cited in Marks and Trapido, *Race, Class and Nationalism*, p.14.

56) The Cape nationalist newspaper, *Die Burger*, first appeared in 1915, with D.F. Malan as editor. In 1918, Santam and Sanlam were founded in Cape Town.

57) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.247.

58) O'Meara, "The 1946 Mineworkers Strike", p.182.

Posel at certain "revisionist" scholars. Posel argues that it is limiting and reductionist to suggest that segregation and apartheid have always been completely functional to capitalism. There is no doubt that rapid capital accumulation occurred during the 1950s and 1960s: this belies the claim by liberal modernisation theorists that apartheid was an irrational, dysfunctional and extraneous intrusion on colour-blind economic forces. Posel argues, however, that it is inaccurate to suggest that racial ideology and policy have always been consistent with capitalist economic development. Rather, racial policy has often exhibited a contradictory combination of elements, which has "simultaneously both promoted and undermined the cornerstones of the social formation" (59).

Nonetheless, for O'Meara, the apartheid ideology of the late 1940s was a direct and immediate reflection of the material needs of capital. Furthermore, though it satisfied the principal demands of the other class groupings which comprised the 1948 nationalist alliance, apartheid was still primarily "an expression of the ideological hegemony of Afrikaner capital within the Economic Movement and the Nationalist alliance as a whole" (60). It is not surprising then, in the light of his general conception of ideologies, that O'Meara completely dismisses the effect of the intense

59) D. Posel, "Rethinking the 'Race-Class Debate' in South African Historiography" in *Social Dynamics*, 9, 1, 1983, p.62.

60) D. Posel, "The Meaning of Apartheid Before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Blueprints Within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance" (mimeo), Institute of Commonwealth Studies seminar paper, London University, 1986, p.2. Reprinted in *JSAS*, 14, 1, 1987.

ideological debates which accompanied the development of apartheid policy. These were just the musings of "a few intellectual visionaries locked in the Afrikaner ivory towers" (61).

IV

There are a number of lessons that can be learnt from the previous analysis. One of the strengths of O'Meara's account - and where it is so different from liberal and nationalist studies - is that he recognises the importance of locating Afrikaner nationalism within the broad context of general economic and political struggle. To come to grips with the internal workings of Afrikaner nationalist politics and ideology one needs to specify and interpret these conflicts.

An underlying assumption of this thesis, therefore, is that O'Meara, and other revisionist scholars, are correct in emphasising the significance of struggles attendant to the development of capitalism in South Africa. Material gathered during the research for this study has been constantly interpreted in the light of the economic exploitation and political oppression of black South Africans, and their active resistance to that exploitation and oppression. A full chronicle of the resurgence in black resistance after 1945 is clearly beyond the scope of this study (62). Yet, milestones

61) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.175.

62) See, for example, T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London, Longman, 1983); Simons, H.J. and Simons, R.E., *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969); B. Hirson, "Rural Revolt in South Africa, 1937-1951" in *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries Volume 8* (London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1977).

such as the 1946 mineworkers strike, the injection of a new militancy by the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League during the late 1940s, the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the formulation of the Freedom Charter, the anti-pass protest by women in 1956, and the Sharpeville massacre - not to mention all the other instances of individual and mass resistance - define the landscape which surrounded and shaped the events and processes described here.

The debunking of the myth of the Afrikaner monolith is another of O'Meara's valuable contributions. This thesis will follow his lead in assuming that it was not some homogenous Afrikaner ethnic entity, but rather a nationalist alliance - comprising different class groupings - which triumphed in the 1948 election. Like O'Meara, this study will also link certain conflicts within Afrikaner ranks to differing material needs and goals. Chapter Three, especially, will examine Afrikaner social and economic stratification after 1948. Three trends will be emphasised: the massive increase in the number of Afrikaners employed in "white collar" occupations; the rapid expansion of the few major Afrikaner corporations; and the polarisation of Afrikaner agriculture. Chapter Four, in turn, will focus on the political and ideological implications of these trends. The rise of a politically assertive Afrikaner intelligentsia and professional stratum, spearheaded by a resurgent Broederbond, at a time when southern finance capital was becoming less reliant on Afrikaner capital accumulation, will be pinpointed as being crucial to changes in the political balance of the nationalist alliance.

In contrast to O'Meara - and in line with some of Moodie's work - far more importance will be ascribed to the fierce ideological debates which divided Afrikaners. These cannot be reduced to pale reflections of fundamental class struggle. The extraordinarily active and powerful role played by Afrikaner intellectuals and ideologists, and the heated ideological conflicts in which they engaged, concretely affected the direction of economic and political struggle. Chapter Five of this thesis will examine the role of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Sabra) in the formulation of apartheid ideology. Particular attention will be paid to the deep divisions that emerged over the scale of African integration into the South African economy, and the speed of homeland consolidation and development. Chapter Six will scrutinise the effects of ideological cleavages in the powerful Afrikaner churches, especially concerning biblical justifications for apartheid. Chapter Seven will trace the development of Christian-Nationalist ideology after 1945. The tension between a republicanism which increasingly included English-speaking South Africans, and a Christian-Nationalist language and education programme which promoted Afrikaner exclusivity, will be analysed.

The emphasis on the impact of general political and economic struggle, the rejection of the notion of a monolithic Afrikaner ethnic group, and the recognition of the power and resonance of Afrikaner ideological debates, together imply that the apartheid policy of the late 1940s cannot be seen as an immutable blueprint which was then stamped by the NP onto a static political situation. It is a constant theme of this

thesis that vital aspects of apartheid policy had not yet been clearly defined when the nationalist alliance won power, and only crystallised, during the course of the 1950s, as the result of economic, ideological and political conflicts.

Finally, in examining Afrikaner nationalist politics, it is tempting to allow the NP - the principal vehicle of nationalist aspirations - to occupy one's attention to the exclusion of everything else. This thesis is based on a broader notion of what constituted "Afrikaner politics" during the 1950s, and consequently inspects a range of Afrikaner organisations and activities. It goes without saying, however, that a deeper understanding of the NP itself - of its priorities, its conflicts and its organisational structures and methods - will help to sketch the background for the rest of the thesis. The following chapter, therefore, will trace the political history of the NP between 1948 and 1961.

-28-

CHAPTER TWO

The National Party, 1948-1961

I

Looking back after nearly 40 years, it is easy to assume that the NP was as powerful and secure at the time of the 1948 general election as it proved to be during the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, this presupposition sits uneasily with the facts, and encourages a misunderstanding of the politics of the period, especially of apartheid ideology. It is important to remember that the NP's slim victory in 1948 (1) probably surprised many nationalist Afrikaners, as much as it shocked and dismayed UP supporters and South Africa's black population (2). Only ardent NP optimists could have expected the Party to recover so quickly from the conclusive defeat in the 1943 election (3), and the crippling internecine conflicts of the War years. While NP supporters rejoiced at the appointment of the first all-Afrikaner cabinet in the history of South African politics, it is nevertheless true that the Party was quite taken aback - although never dismayed - by the prospect of government.

One of the problems facing the NP, once it suddenly

1) The NP (see comment about name usage in Preface) won 70 seats, while its electoral partner, Havenga's Afrikaner Party, won nine seats. The UP won 65 seats, and could rely on the support of the Labour Party, which won six seats. It should also be remembered that the three white members who represented African men in the Cape, including people such as Margaret Ballinger, also consistently supported the UP until Verwoerd abolished their positions in 1959.

2) This is certainly the impression given by personal correspondence to NP leaders, such as Strydom, Verwoerd, Swart and Donges, immediately after the 1948 election.

3) In the 1943 general election, the NP (see comment about name usage in Preface) won 43 seats in the House of Assembly, against the 110 of the UP (including a few independents who supported Smuts, and the three Native Representatives).

found itself catapulted into power, was that "apartheid" still remained more a successful electoral slogan than a practical, consistent blueprint of policy. While nationalist ideologists had, in the years leading up to the 1948 election, formulated the general fundamentals of apartheid - namely, that "the most important ethnic groups and sub-groups" would be segregated "in their own areas where every group will be enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit" (4), and that Africans in the urban areas would be regarded as "migratory citizens not entitled to political and social rights equal to those of Whites" (5) - there was still much confusion and debate in Afrikaner circles as to apartheid's long-term implications and practical implementation. Certainly, the swart gevaar electioneering of the NP reflected broad consensus on the necessity of "preserving and safeguarding the White race" (6). Furthermore, the nationalist alliance was fully agreed on the need for specific immediate practical measures, such as the prohibition of mixed marriages and the overhaul of the pass law system. Yet, the broad platform laid down by the NP during the election campaign also highlighted the fact that, in crucial respects, much of the content that would concretise apartheid's general evocations and fears in practical terms still needed to be elucidated. For instance, on the question of the political and economic future of the African reserves, the nationalist alliance's plans were exceedingly vague (7).

4) *Race Relations Policy of the National Party* (HNP, 1947), reproduced in D.W. Kruger, *South African Parties and Policies* (London, Bowes and Bowes, 1960), p.404.

5) *Ibid.*, p.405.

6) *Ibid.*, p.402.

7) See J.G. Strydom Collection, A.2, Central Archives Depot, Pretoria, Vol.148, p.164, Sauer Commission Report, 1947.

In addition, with regard to other central issues, apartheid clearly meant different things to the different groups constituting "Afrikanerdom". For example - as Chapter Five argues, conflicts within the nationalist alliance as to the nature, implications and scale of the integration of Africans into the "white" economy had already emerged by 1948 and continued to rage into the 1950s (8).

It is incorrect to assume, therefore, that the NP came to power in 1948 with a single, immutable and comprehensive ideological blueprint. Moreover, even if a consistent, detailed and uncontested long-term programme had been available, it is debatable whether the NP leadership would have been able to systematically implement its provisions. For one thing, the resurgence of black trade unionism during the War and the emergence of a more militant leadership in the ANC indicated that the government was confronted with more than just a passive black population, which would allow itself to be pliantly manipulated. But it also soon became clear that the NP was faced with a situation in which its grasp on government was extremely precarious. The NP had only gained power because of a shaky alliance with Havenga's party of ex-Hertzogite smelters (fusionists) and OB members trying to regain a foothold in Afrikaner politics; and because it had, for the first time, won eight constituencies in the mining and industrial areas of the Witwatersrand. If another general election was soon to become necessary, a swing of

8) See also D. Posel, "The Meaning of Apartheid Before 1948: Conflicting Interests And Blueprints Within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance" in JSAS, 14, 1, 1987.

approximately 100 votes in constituencies such as Mayfair, Vereeniging and Kimberley District would put the government out of office (9). Moreover, while the NP's organisational structures had generally performed well during a bitterly-fought campaign, the Party was still weak in many areas and remained desperately poor. In short, the NP was in no position to entertain grandiose plans. Its first priority was survival and consolidation.

II

The NP's drive to strengthen its fragile position was fought on a number of different fronts. The first aspect of the campaign concentrated on the arena of white parliamentary politics, with the ambiguous status of Havenga and the AP assuming prime importance for the NP leadership. In the year preceding the 1948 general election, a number of prominent NP politicians had expressed grave misgivings about Malan's wisdom in entering into an electoral pact with Havenga. J.G. Strydom, C.R. Swart and Eric Louw were all open in stating their fear that the agreement presented the OB with a golden opportunity to infiltrate back into the heart of Afrikaner political life (10). On occasion, misgiving boiled over into open frustration. In October 1947, for instance, in a letter to Louw, Strydom wrote:

9) *The Star*, 11/11/49.

10) See, for example, the series of letters in the Strydom Collection, Vol.59. (Incidentally, Eric Louw's letters, particularly those written on 2/9/47 (p.83) and 24/11/47 (pp.147-148), reveal strong anti-semitic tendencies.)

I am sick and tired and have had a bellyfull, and unless chance events rescue us, we are headed, with Dr Malan at the forefront, towards certain defeat.(11)

And a letter written immediately prior to the 1948 election, on 19 April 1948, demonstrates that Strydom's anger had increased rather than diminished during the election campaign:

This is now the state of decline and demoralisation in which Dr Malan cum suis have landed the Party with their Malan-Havenga agreement and concessions to the OB...I am exhausted, without appetite or enthusiasm, and I don't know how I am going to hold meetings in other constituencies.(12)

Soon after the election, Strydom's suspicions seemed to have been confirmed when rumours began circulating that Havenga was reconsidering his agreement with Malan. In a letter to Smuts, for example, E.G. Malherbe, the head of the Military Intelligence investigation of the Broederbond during the War, claimed that Havenga was very disgruntled with the NP and "hated" its Broederbond members. Malherbe suggested that Smuts approach Havenga to form a new centrist coalition which would exclude the liberal J.H. Hofmeyr, object of concerted NP attacks during the 1948 election campaign (13). Uncertainty about Havenga's intentions was fuelled by the AP's decision to withdraw from the provincial elections in March 1949 (14), and by reports that a "considerable number" of UP members wanted

11) Strydom Collection, Vol.59, p.117, Strydom to Louw, 6/10/47.

12) C.R. Swart Collection, PV.18, Institute of Contemporary History (INCH), University of the Orange Free State (UOFS), Bloemfontein, Vol.3/1, Strydom to Swart, 19/4/48.

13) H. Brotz, *The Politics of South Africa* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.17-19.

14) *The Friend*, 8/3/49.

Havenga to start a new party (15). As late as November 1949, contemporary political commentators were still discussing the possibility that approximately 20 NP MPs would join UP and AP members in a "moderate" coalition (16).

The relationship between the NP and Havenga deteriorated even further when Malan stated his party's desire to remove Coloured voters in the Cape from the common voters' roll (17). The vote of the approximately 50,000 eligible Coloured men was considered to have been decisive in seven constituencies lost by the NP during the 1948 election (18); in five other constituencies where significant numbers of Coloured voters resided, the NP's winning majorities were meagre (19). With the NP claiming that the UP was now "moving heaven and earth" to register thousands more sympathetic Coloured voters for forthcoming elections (20), Malan declared that the continuation of the Coloured franchise in the Cape was "a danger to the whole of European South Africa" (21). This sentiment immediately antagonised Havenga, whose political mentor J.B.M. Hertzog had always stressed the necessity of an

15) *Rand Daily Mail*, 29/4/49.

16) *Rand Daily Mail*, 1/11/49.

17) The limited multi-racial franchise in the Cape was safeguarded by an entrenched clause in the Act of Union in 1909. In 1936, J.B.M. Hertzog removed registered African voters from the ordinary voters roll and transferred them to a special "Cape Native Voters Roll" to elect three whites to the House of Assembly. The position of the Coloured vote was left unchanged.

18) I. Goldin, "Coloured Preference Policies and the Making of Coloured Political Identity in the Western Cape Region of South Africa with particular reference to period 1948 to 1984" (D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1984), p.172.

19) *The Friend*, 22/11/49.

20) *Die Transvaler*, 29/8/49.

21) South African Press Association (SAPA) Report, 6/9/49.

entrenched clause in the Constitution guaranteeing the inviolability of the Coloured vote. Throughout 1949, Havenga's misgivings frustrated any move by the NP to table the proposed legislation. Although Strydom forcefully declared that the NP would, if necessary, proceed with its plans for the Coloureds without Havenga's support (22), Malan clearly felt he was in no position to do anything that would jeopardise the uncertain NP-AP alliance. His cause was aided by the failure of the UP leadership to capitalise on Havenga's uncertainties; Smuts, in particular, would have nothing further to do with Havenga (23).

By the end of 1949, Havenga was still not prepared to concede ground on the question of the Coloured franchise. At the AP national congress, he stated:

These safeguards were always respected by General Hertzog and our Parliament of 1936, and I am convinced that we will not serve the national interest, and, in particular, the interests of the Whites, when, in our zeal and impatience to find an early solution for certain aspects of our colour problem, we depart from that old national Hertzog road and follow a road without due regard to the explicit will of the people.(24)

After a stormy cabinet meeting a few days later, during which Havenga repeated his objections (25), Malan was forced to compromise: a joint public statement by both parties pledged that the proposed legislation would not be introduced during the 1950 parliamentary session (26). Strydom's Christmas

22) *The Star*, 21/1/49.

23) Brotz, *Politics of SA*, p.20.

24) T.E. Donges Collection, A.1646, Cape Archives Depot, Cape Town, Vol.90.

25) *Natal Mercury*, 19/11/49.

26) SAPA report, 12/12/49.

message to his supporters indicated that even he was now reconciled to the prospect of a long delay (27).

During the next year, however, the balance of power within the NP-AP alliance shifted. In August 1950, in terms of the government's South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, a mini-election was held in the administered territory to choose six representatives to the House of Assembly. By winning all six seats, the NP increased its number of MP's to 77, thus reducing its dependence on the nine AP members (28). Despite the fact that a defection by Havenga and the AP would still have spelt doom for the government, Malan felt ready, by the beginning of 1951, to proceed with the Separate Representation of Voters Bill. In the event, however, Havenga swallowed his misgivings, placated perhaps by promises of bigger things from Malan, and supported the government. Towards the end of 1951, the AP dissolved itself and fused with the NP, removing the last vestiges of doubt about Havenga's intentions.

Throughout the intense battle to shore up the NP-AP alliance, the NP continued, in other ways, to try to extend its power in parliament. Soon after coming to power, for example, the government repealed the Asiatic Land and Tenure

27) *The Star*, 5/1/50.

28) After the SWA election and a NP by-election victory during 1949, the state of the House of Assembly was as follows:

NP	77 seats
AP	9 seats
(government total	86 seats)
UP and Labour Party	70 seats
(opposition total, including Native Representatives,	73 seats)

Act of 1946, which had made provision for two white senators to represent Indians, and had empowered Indian men in Natal and the Transvaal who possessed certain financial and educational qualifications to choose three white representatives to the House of Assembly (29). The NP also moved decisively to limit the political damage that could be inflicted by unsympathetic immigrants. In 1949, the government introduced the South Africa Citizenship Act, which required five years domicile for immigrants from Commonwealth countries, and six years domicile for people from other countries, before full citizenship and voting rights would be granted. The Party's programme of principles also made it clear that the state should take the necessary steps to ensure that "no undesirable person" entered the country, and that immigration be limited to those "elements...which cannot be considered a burden or danger to the community" (30). The government implemented this principle in practice by imposing tight controls on the number of immigrants allowed into the country. In 1949, the number of immigrants dropped to 14,780, compared with a figure of 35,631 in 1948 (31); while in 1951, although the number of immigrants rose slightly to 15,243, the country experienced a net loss of 139 inhabitants (32). The FAK also emphasised the importance of quickly visiting new

29) Most details of legislation in this chapter were gathered from M. Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa 1948-1976* (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), 1978).

30) *Programme of Principles of the National Party* (Cape Town, 1949). According to certain NP supporters, the dangers posed by immigration would also be avoided if Afrikaner women produced more offspring. See, for example, *Inspan*, 8, 3, December 1948, p.9, and *Inspan*, 10, 7, April 1951, pp.20-25.

31) *Cape Argus*, 15/9/50.

32) Brotz, *Politics of SA*, p.78.

immigrants, inviting them to Afrikaner functions, and involving them in Afrikaner activities (33).

III

The NP's efforts to ensure its safety in parliament were complemented by a systematic attempt to bolster its support amongst the constituent groupings of the nationalist alliance. The following chapter will recount many of the details of NP economic patronage during this period; suffice it to state here that Afrikaner farmers, financial capitalists, small traders, and workers all received massive direct and indirect hand-outs from the government in the decade after 1948. On a more microcosmic level, too, evidence suggests that nationalist politicians were always prepared to cock a sympathetic ear to individual requests by NP supporters for preferential treatment, in a variety of situations (34). The post-1948 purge of non-nationalist elements in the civil service, army, police force, railways and judiciary (35) not only extended NP control over the state apparatus, but also provided a ready source of jobs for NP sympathisers.

A number of the noteworthy pieces of legislation introduced by the NP during its first few years in office were also intended, first and foremost, to quickly satisfy some of

33) FAK Collection, PV.202, INCH, UOFS, Bloemfontein, minutes of FAK executive meeting, 6/5/53.

34) See, for example, the correspondence in the H.F. Verwoerd Collection, PV93, INCH, UOFS, Bloemfontein, Vols.572-573.

35) See B. Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986, originally published 1964 and 1969), pp.152-157.

the vehement demands of nationalist supporters. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950, for example, reflected the obsession of many Afrikaner voters, especially members of the Afrikaner working class and petty bourgeoisie, with the protection of the "purity" of the white race. Nationalist ideologue A.F. Weich expressed the point succinctly when he wrote in 1949:

Everyone who has even the smallest hint of pride in the purity of his blood will seize any permissible means to ensure that purity, especially given the circumstances which white South Africa finds itself in today...We are thankful to the Creator that at the head of the State are men who stand watch, on a healthy Christian basis, over the purity of our blood...(36)

Similarly, while the Separate Representation of Voters Bill was primarily intended to reduce the number of anti-NP voters, it also happily catered for those government supporters who harboured strong prejudices about the Coloured population; nationalist adherents in the Cape Peninsula were further rewarded by the segregation of Cape Town public transport, made possible by the Railway and Harbours Act Amendment Act.

In addition, although it is true that the frequently-amended 1950 Group Areas Act became central to long-term apartheid policy, at the time of its introduction it was equally evident that the overriding motive of the legislation was the protection of the economic interests of Afrikaner commerce against Indian traders. Even before the 1948 election, nationalist groupings had initiated a vitriolic campaign against the "foreign coolies". In April 1947, for instance, an "enthusiastic" anti-Indian congress in

Vereeniging called for an economic boycott of all Indian undertakings (37). The nationalist journal *Inspan* welcomed the move, claiming that Indian traders had become wealthy "at the expense" of whites (38). With the election of a nationalist government, the pressure intensified. Edition after edition of *Inspan*, and other nationalist organs, lambasted the "unlawful trading methods" of Indian traders. A number of politicians bemoaned the fact that Indian "capitalists" had managed to displace white traders on the *platteland* (countryside) (39). And the NP MP for Brits, J.E. Potgieter, somewhat incongruously remarked that Indians must be boycotted until they were "bled white" (40). The introduction of punitive legislation was clearly foreshadowed by events at the Party congresses of 1948 and 1949. First, the 1948 OFS NP congress called for a ban on the issue of new trading licenses to Indians in "white" areas (41). Then, in 1949, Cape nationalists requested that the government prevent Indians from acquiring further land (42). Finally, the Natal NP congress of 1949 demanded that the "borders of Indian areas be moved to ensure that the best business areas are transformed into a White domain" (43).

It is not the intention, however, to suggest here

37) *Inspan*, 6, 7, April 1947, p.9.

38) *Ibid.*, p.1.

39) *Rand Daily Mail*, 3/5/48.

40) *Rand Daily Mail*, 19/7/48.

41) Donges Collection, Vol.98, M.P.A. Malan to Donges, 20/11/48, outlining resolutions of 1948 OFS NP congress.

42) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Paarl, 1949. NP congress agendas and programmes of principles referred to in this thesis were found in the Donges Collection, the Strydom Collection, and the United Party Archive at the University of South Africa, Pretoria.

43) Donges Collection, Vol.98, D.J. Potgieter to Donges, 18/5/49, outlining resolutions of 1949 Natal NP Congress.

that the NP's early legislation consisted only of manoeuvres aimed at extending its parliamentary power, or kneejerk piecemeal reactions to demands by the nationalist alliance. Firstly, at no stage did the NP government implement all the economic measures advocated by certain sectors of its support. In particular, the government quickly abandoned any notions it may have entertained about acting against "foreign" capitalist undertakings. Although leading Afrikaner businessmen complained that there were more monopolies in South Africa than anywhere else in the world (44), as Davies et al note:

The Nationalist regime never implemented any significant anti-monopoly measures, even of the normally ineffective type found in other capitalist countries. The sole piece of legislation - the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act - was only introduced in 1955. However, this weak act was not intended to curtail monopoly.(45)

In addition, pre-1948 threats by NP leaders such as Albert Hertzog to nationalise important foreign-controlled industries, especially the gold-mining industry, proved to be no more than election rhetoric. While the NP government actively fostered local Afrikaner capitalist interests, it was not unaware of its responsibilities with respect to general capitalist economic development. Indeed, its fiscal, taxation and tariff protection policies were often questioned by NP supporters (46). Secondly, although intense discussions in the

44) See, for example, Anton Rupert in *Inspan*, 10, 3, December 1950, p.10.

45) R. Davies, D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa* (London, Zed Books, 1984), p.23.

46) See, for example, editorials in *Volkshandel* (15,2, April 1954; 15, 3, May 1954; 16, 1, March 1955; 16, 5, July 1955; 16, 12, February 1956) criticising government concessions to high-income groups and calling for more protection for local capital.

Broederbond and other intellectual forums had not yet resolved questions about apartheid's direction and implementation in the long run - not to mention an array of short-term problems - the NP was certainly not rudderless, lacking conscious and active strategies. On the contrary, the NP leadership was quite well aware that its immediate interests, and the economic and political interests of its electoral base, were best served by a concerted assault on the rights, and therefore living standards, of South Africa's black population, especially the African working class.

The first in a spate of damaging, repressive measures was the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which outlawed the Communist Party and authorised the Minister of Justice to place restrictions on any person he considered to be engaged in broadly defined "communist activities". The law was repeatedly used to curtail the activities of a wide range of opposition groupings, but was especially aimed at important black union leaders (as well as socialist union organisers, such as Solly Sachs, who had extensive contact with members of the Afrikaans-speaking working class). By the beginning of 1954, the anti-communist legislation had resulted in the compulsory resignation of 27 prominent trade union leaders and the "naming" of 42 others (47). The use of the Suppression of Communism Act to restrict union leaders was accompanied by a general policy of "bleeding the trade unions to death" (48).

47) S. Patterson, *The Last Trek* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p.160.

48) Davies et al, *The Struggle*, p.21, quoting the Minister of Labour.

This culminated in the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act in of 1953. Not only were strikes by black workers forbidden; a completely separate industrial conciliation machinery for black workers was created, in terms of which negotiation could only be conducted through employer-controlled Works and Liaison Committees.

A gamut of further legislation addressed other issues seen to be pressing by the NP. Comprehensive racial classification was formalised in the 1950 Population Registration Act. The political dangers of uncontrolled squatting in the urban areas received attention in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951. A new consolidated, strongly-bound pass book for Africans was required by the first of many euphemistically-named pieces of legislation: the Native (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952. Influx control was tightened with the passing of the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act: all urban areas became "proclaimed areas" into which Africans without permits were only allowed for a period of 72 hours. A system of labour bureaux was established to effect a more "equitable" distribution of African labour between the urban and rural areas. Black resistance to the imposition of these and other controls - as evidenced by the 1952 Defiance Campaign - provoked, in turn, the Criminal Law Amendment Act (which increased penalties for people found guilty of protesting against laws) and the Public Safety Act (which gave the government the power to declare a state of emergency). It is interesting to note that only one measure from this period - the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 - conformed even vaguely to

grand notions of "positive" separate development; and its promotion of "traditional" tribal structures, through the establishment of tribal, regional and territorial authorities, was just as fiercely resisted by rural Africans (49). The NP may have been certain about its major short-term objective - to quickly meet the growing economic and political threat posed by the black population to the interests of the nationalist alliance, and to white privilege as a whole - but the long-term future of apartheid was still hazy.

IV

A final aspect of the NP's consolidation during its first five years in office remains to be discussed: the strengthening of the Party's internal structures. To begin, some general points about NP organisation should be made (50). It is important to recognise immediately that the Party was, and still is, based on federal principles, with the provincial parties jealously guarding their independence. Consequently, structures and methods tended to differ substantially from province to province. By the end of the 1940s, two differences between the Cape and Transvaal parties were especially marked. Firstly, in the Cape the Party was organised around a paid-up

49) T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London, Longman, 1983), p.42.

50) Unless otherwise stated, the information in this section of the chapter was gathered from the Strydom Collection, Vol.167, Constitution of the Transvaal NP, 1953; G. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1958), Chapter 8; interview, 13/1/87, with S.F. Kotze (organiser for the Cape NP, 1946-1958); interview, 15/1/87, with J.T. Louw (NP volunteer in Parow for forty years); interview, 23/1/87, with C. de Vleeschauer (NP volunteer in Johannesburg for thirty years).

rather than a card-carrying membership. Whereas in the Transvaal prospective members were immediately issued with membership cards after swearing a pledge of allegiance, Cape members were required to pay an annual subscription of 1s.6d. This was more than an important source of funds for the Cape Party: in collecting the subscriptions, Party organisers remained closely in touch with members and could perform consistent, sustained organisational work. Records of Party membership therefore tended to be far more accurate in the Cape than in the Transvaal. The second difference between the two largest provincial parties was that the Cape Party employed a greater number of professional political organisers. In the Transvaal, on the other hand, while some organisers were employed for short periods during the 1948 election campaign, only a handful were offered permanent posts.

Yet the provincial structures also exhibited a number of similarities. In all four provinces, the Party relied on a comprehensive grassroots organisation, based on the work of unpaid volunteers. Each constituency (or district, as was the case in huge Cape rural constituencies) which contained an appreciable nationalist presence, was divided into a number of smaller branches, headed by branch committees, which were expected to raise funds and stimulate Party activity. Depending on the province, two or three members from each branch committee came together on a divisional committee at constituency or district level. Elections of candidates were organised, very democratically, by the divisional committees. In the large metropolitan areas, a number of constituencies

sometimes joined together to elect umbrella controlling councils to discuss common problems; otherwise the next level in the hierarchy was the provincial executive committee, consisting of a small number of delegates from each constituency, generally including the MP. Since this committee seldom met, the actual control of provincial affairs lay in the hands of the provincial steering committee, which was comprised of executive members, and professional and administrative staff. The supreme authority of the provincial party - and the highest locus of mass participation - was the annual congress, attended by delegates from each branch (in the case of the Transvaal and OFS) or each divisional council (in the case of the Cape).

Coordination between the provinces was the responsibility of the NP's Federal Council, a body of 25 (later 37) members, composed of delegates elected by each provincial congress, as well as one member of the *Nasionale Jeugbond* (the NP's youth organisation, founded in 1938). While the constitution of the Federal Council recognised the "absolute independence" of the provincial organisations (51), it was through the Council, and particularly its *dagbestuur* (steering committee) of the four provincial leaders, that the federal structure of the NP was centralised. The parliamentary caucus of the NP also provided an organised national forum. Highly disciplined, in contrast to that of the UP, the caucus met at least once a week during parliamentary sessions, under

51) Strydom Collection, Vol.40, pp.48-51, Constitution of the Federal Council of the NP.

the strict control of Party whips, to discuss and endorse cabinet decisions.

How was this tightly-knit organisation consolidated after the 1948 general election? One of the strengths of the NP during the 1948 election was the determination of Party workers to track down every possible name on the voters' roll. Whereas the UP often ignored missing voters, the NP worked extremely hard to provide postal ballots for people who had moved from one district to another. In some constituencies, the NP's advantage with postal and special votes proved crucial. It was this kind of dogged attention to detail that was pinpointed as a priority in the post-1948 reassessment. Thus, for example, each constituency was asked to maintain a "contact list" of voters who were known to have moved to other constituencies. Party workers systematically worked through the constantly-updated list, directly approaching officials in other constituencies to reach the missing voters. In this way, a postal vote could be quickly delivered in the event of an election. The contact list system was particularly successful in the Cape where the collection of subscriptions led to regular updates of Party files, but other provinces also enthusiastically applied the technique. It is interesting to note that the search for elusive voters was generally the only reason for contact between Party workers in different provinces. Due to the Party's federal structure, local branch volunteers had virtually no opportunity or reason to speak to their opposite numbers in other provinces. According to volunteers of the time, this lack of interaction encouraged provincial rivalry and prejudice, and exacerbated the regional

conflicts - especially between Cape and Transvaal - which characterised NP politics (52).

Another NP priority during its period of consolidation was simply to expand. All over the country, but especially in the urban areas, local Party branches proliferated. In the Cape Peninsula, for example, the number of branches increased from nine in 1947 to 24 in 1952 (53). By 1953, the number of branches in Durban had risen to 29, compared with only three in 1948 (54). And in the Transvaal, the number of local branches totalled 1,200 by 1952 (55). The rapid expansion of the Party soon necessitated further changes in the lower reaches of its structure. In 1951, after an investigation by the provincial parties and the Federal Council, Prime Minister Malan called for a completely new tier of organisation. The members of the local branches were ordered to form themselves into geographically-based "groups" of approximately eight, and elect a "group leader" (56). The groups were to be the NP's equivalent of "cells": in the two or three streets assigned to them, the members of the group, especially the group leader, were expected to extensively and consistently canvas newcomers, accelerate recruitment, raise funds and spread NP propaganda. As Carter notes, the groups soon became "the most important units of organisation" in the NP (57).

The group system placed an even greater burden on the

52) J.T. Louw, interview, 15/1/87; C. de Vleeschauer, interview, 23/1/87.

53) *Die Burger*, 21/10/55.

54) Carter, *Inequality*, 232.

55) *Ibid.*, p.223.

56) Strydom Collection, Vol.40, pp.45-47, Report to members of the Federal Council.

57) Carter, *Inequality*, p.222.

shoulders of the Party's volunteers. Despite receiving no remuneration for their efforts, group leaders followed an exhausting schedule. Most volunteers were employed elsewhere during the working day, so were forced to complete their political tasks in the evening. Furthermore, while frenetic extra stints were obviously a predictable feature of election campaigns, group leaders were also expected to consistently perform regular *huisbesoeke* (house visits) and other organisational work between elections. It was, on the whole, a mundane and time-consuming job; and would only be performed by people who fervently believed in the NP and its policies. In the months preceding the 1948 election, the NP had been overwhelmed by volunteer support; now, in its period of consolidation, it constantly sought to renew the enthusiasm and purpose of its workers. Interestingly enough, the top Party leaders very seldom paid visits to small branches in order to motivate the troops. Most local volunteers hardly saw NP luminaries except at congresses or public rallies. Nevertheless, the idiosyncratic but powerful oratory of men such as Malan and Strydom was hugely effective: volunteers of the time seem to have been quite happy to return to their tasks while idolising their leaders from afar. And volunteers were certainly not left completely to their own devices. Local MPs were expected to liaise closely between the branches and structures further up the hierarchy. In addition, the consolidation of the late 1940s and early 1950s also involved employing greater numbers of professional organisers. By 1953, for example, the Cape Party was served by 40 political organisers, whose task it was to meet each branch committee

every two months to advise on political direction, organisational tactics and canvassing techniques (58). In the end, then, the NP's introduction of the group system, with its increased volunteer involvement, entrenched a curious mixture of democratic and authoritarian practice. While volunteers were involved in all activities of the local structures, participated directly in the formulation of policy motions for congresses, and also spoke their minds at the congresses themselves, the NP remained a strict hierarchy. On the one hand, Party professionals constantly humoured the loud demands of their various constituencies; on the other hand, nationalist leaders were accorded god-like status.

Yet another aspect of the NP's expansion and modernisation of its organisational structures was the improvement of fund-raising. Unlike the UP, the NP could not rely on substantial contributions from wealthy donors, and was compelled to devise other strategies. The lynchpin of NP fund-raising was the arrangement of regular *stryddae* (literally "struggle days"), which were normally scheduled for weekends, and consisted of an address by a prominent speaker, followed by a number of other activities, including *braaivleis* (barbecue), folk-dancing, and traditional sports such as tug-of-war, *jukskei* and target shooting (59). All proceeds from collections, and the sale of food and drink prepared by volunteers, disappeared into the Party coffers. According to the 1948 balance sheet of the Transvaal Party's finances,

58) *Ibid.*, p.231. Confirmed by S.F. Kotze, interview, 13/1/87.
59) See Strydom Collection, Vol.154, pp.82-126, Manual for NP organisers.

nearly £10,000 out of a total income of £13,341 derived from *stryddae* (60). Even in the Cape, where approximately £7,500 was raised each year from subscriptions, it was expected that *stryddae* would remain the major source of income after 1948: the NP continued to devote much time and energy to *stryddag* planning. Each constituency was required to hold a *stryddag* at least once a year; in the Cape and Transvaal, Party organisers thus geared themselves for a *stryddag* every month or six weeks. By 1952, well-organised constituences such as Waterberg, Ventersdorp and Wakkerstroom aimed to raise more than £5,000 per year. Between 1948 and 1952, the Transvaal NP collected nearly £160,000 from *stryddae* (61).

Party workers were also instructed to encourage individual donations during their regular visits to NP supporters. In the Transvaal, a number of Party organisers were assigned the task of approaching the growing number of wealthier Afrikaner businessmen and farmers for funding. In the aftermath of the 1948 election, a large "Victory Fund" was created in this fashion. In the Cape, although organisers did not concentrate specifically on chasing donations, preferring to reserve their resources for organisational work, a substantial post-1948 Victory Fund was also raised. Moreover, amidst much publicity, Cape Party secretary P.W. Botha called for contributions to a trust fund named after D.F. Malan, which would function as the "core" of future NP finances. An initial donation of £4,500 from a wealthy farmer named Nigrini soon materialised, and a target of £100,000 was easily reached

60) Strydom Collection, Vol.168, p.179.

61) *Die Transvaler*, 11/9/53.

by 1952, the interest of which was used to finance the Party office and organisers. Trust funds of this ilk bolstered the few small long-standing bequests pledged to the NP. The largest of these was the annual grant from the estate of Judge Beyers, a minister in the first Hertzog government. Income was also received from the Jannie Marais Trust.

One of the first beneficiaries of the Party's improved financial position was the Federal Council. In 1951, after grants from all four provincial parties and the Beyers bequest, the Council set up an information service in Bloemfontein with one full-time employee, Senator M.P.A. Malan. Malan was responsible for the dissemination of improved propaganda material. In addition to *Skietgoed*, a monthly publication of useful facts and figures for Party officials, Malan and his principal aide in the Transvaal, Marais Viljoen, also produced an unending flood of propaganda pamphlets and publications, which increased in volume as the 1953 election approached.

V

To recapitulate, then, the contention of this chapter so far has been that the NP's policy during its first five years in office was motivated, first and foremost, by considerations of sheer survival. The NP leadership grappled with a fluid, sometimes conflicting set of pressures and forces. It needed, firstly, to ensure its parliamentary survival and the continuation of the NP-AP alliance. It also faced a growing economic and political challenge from an increasingly restive

black population. Moreover, not only did the NP need to respond to the exigencies of capitalist economic development; it was also important that the Party leadership continued to satisfy the some of the immediate material and ideological demands of the groupings it directly represented. Finally, the NP was under pressure to begin to incorporate the results of intense discussions in intellectual and church circles concerning the overall ideological thrust, future and justification of apartheid.

Within this general context, one question remains vexing: what exactly was the role of the Afrikaner Broederbond in NP affairs during this period? Was the NP merely a front for Broederbond machinations? Given the obsessive secrecy surrounding the Broederbond, even amongst Afrikaners who were either expelled or excluded from the organisation, it is difficult to produce definitive answers to these questions. There is no doubt that the Broederbond was extremely powerful and influential. By the mid-1940s, it had built up an extensive network, with cells in every region of the country (62). As O'Meara and others have shown, Broederbond members were directly active in all aspects - economic, political and cultural - of Afrikaner nationalist life. More than 60 nationalist candidates in 1948 were members of the organisation (63). So too were at least half of the first

62) See I. Wilkins and H. Strydom, *The Broederbond* (London, Paddington Press, 1979), Part III. See also E.G. Malherbe, *Education in South Africa, Volume 2* (Cape Town, Juta, 1977), pp.663-690 (including diagram of Broederbond structure, p.665).

63) *Cape Times*, 20/5/48. See also Bunting, *Reich*, p.48.

nationalist cabinet, including Malan, Swart, Strydom, Donges and Jansen (64).

At the same time, however, it is presumptuous to assume that the relationship between the Broederbond, the NP and the government was always direct, immediate and totally devoid of conflict. Indeed, historically, this was certainly not the case. As O'Meara has pointed out, after Fusion between the SAP and the NP in 1934, the Broederbond developed most swiftly and powerfully in those parts of the country - the Transvaal and parts of the OFS - where Malan's GNP was weakest (65). In the Cape, cradle of the GNP, although men such as Malan became members of the Broederbond, the Party was always jealous of its independence, and resented Broederbond "interference". Furthermore, when the Party grew stronger in the northern provinces, lines of demarcation became even more difficult to define because of the Broederbond's active political surrogacy. Tensions were further exacerbated by the vicious clashes between the NP and the OB during the early 1940s, when even the Broederbond found itself split between Party and OB sympathisers. Some Broederbond leaders attempted to mediate in the general political melee, but were forced to step back, as other Broederbonders in the Party - men such as Strydom and Verwoerd - demanded Broederbond neutrality while the Party fought to regain its position as the sole political voice of post-Hertzogite Afrikaner nationalism (66). The dispute flared

64) *Sunday Express*, 30/10/49.

65) D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapters 3-4.

66) *Ibid.*, chapter 9. See also M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition 1939-1945* (London, Longman and Green, 1947).

again in the year preceding the 1948 election, when it became clear that OB members might become candidates in those constituencies assigned to the AP in terms of the Malan-Havenga agreement. Verwoerd, one of the politicians most active in the Broederbond, reacted angrily when Broederbond leaders attempted to intervene in arguments between the NP and Havenga. Certain Broederbond activists were accused by Verwoerd of breathing new life into the AP and OB through their "meddling", and asked to refrain from getting involved in "politics" (67).

In other words, notwithstanding the Broederbond's obvious strength, there were important precedents favouring the NP's relative political independence after the 1948 election. Confirming this point, Serfontein notes that "it was widely regarded as unthinkable" that the Broederbond should apply pressure on the NP government (68). Moreover, further down the hierarchy, at a local branch level, NP volunteers active at the time claim, although perhaps disingenuously, that known Broederbond members took care not to impose their views on other workers (69). Finally, it should also be remembered that of the Broederbond's 3,662 members in 1950 (organised in 260 cells), nearly 2,500 were teachers or clergymen, and another 900 were farmers (70). While the NP was

67) B. Schoeman, *Van Malan Tot Verwoerd* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1973), p.24. See also Donges Collection, Vol.86.

68) J.H.P. Serfontein, *Brotherhood of Power* (London, Rex Collings, 1979), p.83.

69) Interviews, 15/1/87 and 23/1/ 87, with J.T. Louw and C. de Vleeschauer. De Vleeschauer claimed that he was not a member of the Broederbond.

70) *Sunday Times*, 5/11/72. See also Patterson, *Trek*, p.254, and Bunting, *Reich*, p.43.

obviously strongly representative of people from such occupational and class backgrounds, it was also reliant on the support of other groupings, and constrained by more general political and economic factors. Of course, some Broederbond members - Albert Hertzog and Piet Meyer amongst them - continued to argue that more direct political pressure on the NP leadership was warranted (71). In addition, in 1950, the Broederbond executive began to provide cells with study documents, prepared by experts for discussion, on "fundamental", often political, matters (72). But, in general, during the first period of NP rule, the Broederbond concentrated mainly on the expansion of Afrikaner cultural activity, discussions about republican ideals and the long-term formulation of apartheid. The NP was certainly not its passive tool.

VI

While NP activists prepared for the 1953 general election with the same single-minded commitment they had demonstrated in 1948, Malan and other NP leaders became increasingly concerned about resolving the ongoing saga of the Coloured franchise. The intricacies of the constitutional crisis provoked by the government's legislation are fully explained elsewhere (73). Briefly, however, the government had argued, in passing the Separate Representation of Voters Act, that a simple majority was all that was required to remove the

71) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.83.

72) *Ibid.*, p.84.

73) See, for example, Carter, *Inequality*, chapter 4.

entrenched Coloured franchise clause, given the provisions of the Statute of Westminster of 1931, the 1934 Status of Union Act, and the 1937 Appeal Court ruling in the case of Ndlwana versus Hofmeyr. But in March 1952, the Appeal Court declared the Act invalid on the grounds that such rulings and measures did not affect the status of the entrenched clauses. Malan and the NP leadership responded, during the 1952 parliamentary session, by forcing through the High Court of Parliament Act, whereby a joint sitting of both houses would have the final say with regard to the validity of acts of Parliament. The High Court would be advised by a judicial committee of ten members which was permitted to review any judgement by the Appellate Division. In August 1952, a joint sitting of both houses rejected the finding of the Appeal Court, and decided that the original Act was valid. Two days later, however, the Cape division of the Supreme Court declared that the High Court Act was itself invalid because it contravened the entrenched clauses of the Union's constitution. In November 1952, this ruling was upheld by the Appeal Court.

Malan and his compatriots shelved their plans, and concentrated on winning the general election. After five years of intensive consolidation, the Party was well-equipped for another campaign. This time, however, it was faced with a broad alliance involving the UP, the Labour Party and the Torch Commando, the organisation spawned by the government's tampering with the Constitution. In response to this challenge, the NP resolved to contest as many seats as possible, pitting 138 candidates against the 154 of the

opposition alliance (74). With one obvious anomaly, the candidates chosen by NP branches reflected the composition of the Party's support base fairly accurately. According to surveys carried out by Carter, 64 candidates were involved in farming, 16 in business, 59 in professional occupations and 22 in education (75). Yet it is interesting to note that not a single Afrikaner wage-earner was even considered as a candidate. While the support of white wage-earners remained essential to the NP, at no stage did Afrikaner workers make inroads into the higher echelons of the NP hierarchy. Although Albert Hertzog was always ready to champion the cause of Christian-National trade unionism, even powerful trade unionists such as Ellis of the Mine Workers' Union and Gert Beetge of the Building Workers' Union failed, despite repeated efforts, to wield much influence in the Party itself (76).

The NP's recent efforts to bolster its financial position and tighten organisational structures proved significant in the 1953 general election. With massive participation from volunteer workers again evident, the NP won 94 seats out of 156 in the House of Assembly. Yet this was not the completely resounding victory that it seemed. Because of rural weighting and creative gerrymandering during the NP's first term, the NP's conclusive majority of seats did not reflect a majority of actual votes: Carter and Kenneth Heard

74) *Ibid.*, p.175.

75) *Ibid.*, pp.180-181.

76) R. Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa 1900-1960* (London, Harvester Press, 1979), p.338.

both estimate that less than 46 percent of voters supported the government (77). Furthermore, the NP was only able to capture 24 out of a total of 79 seats broadly classified as "urban" (78). (Reflecting these statistics, 55 successful NP candidates turned out to be active in agriculture, 22 of them on a full-time basis (79).) Most disappointing for Malan, however, was that the NP victory failed to provide him with the two-thirds majority he needed to overturn the entrenched Coloured franchise clause. When the NP fell short of this target, Malan decided to secure a two-thirds majority by luring disaffected UP conservatives into the nationalist camp. After a flurry of legislative activity in late 1953 and 1954, and repeated guarantees by NP leaders that they would not threaten the entrenched clause in the constitution dealing with equal language rights, six UP rebels finally sided with the government. But the NP discovered that it still needed another nine votes to achieve its aim.

Malan's inability to win the protracted Coloured franchise battle provoked some expressions of impatience from the Party faithful (80). On the whole, however, such disappointments did not dampen the spirits of NP supporters, who celebrated their election win with a bewildering array of aggressive motions at the provincial Party congresses. In the

77) Carter, *Inequality*, p.159; K. Heard, *General Elections in South Africa* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974), p.63. These statistics include estimates of voting patterns in uncontested constituencies.

78) Heard, *General Elections*, p.60.

79) Carter, *Inequality*, 179.

80) See, for example, certain motions in the agendas for NP congresses in 1952 and 1953. See also Schoeman, *Van Malan*, chapter 4.

Transvaal, three Heidelberg branches called for the creation of an Indian "reserve" to which all Indians should be sent, instead of Indian group areas in each town. Explicitly taking its lead from McCarthyism in the United States, another motion proposed that the government appoint "a council of inquiry to investigate all anti-Afrikaans activities" (81). At the OFS congress, one resolution demanded public executions "where the death sentence is imposed in cases of assault"; another called for the abolition of feeding schemes for African schoolchildren; a third recommended that "Native taxation be reviewed and increased" (82). This call was echoed at the Natal congress (83), which also decided that it was unnecessary for industries to supply African workers with a wholesome midday meal: delegates claimed that Africans would only agree to work when they had empty stomachs (84). In reply to another resolution, ambitious MP F.E. Mentz agreed that it was government policy to forbid trading facilities for Indians in African areas:

The Natives should be able to serve their own people in their own areas. Where this cannot be done, trading should be left in the hands of Europeans.(85)

Finally, in Port Elizabeth, the overwhelming sentiment of the Cape Party congress was that the government should stop "pampering" blacks and concentrate on the well-being of whites (86).

81) Transvaal NP, *Congress Agenda*, Pretoria, 1953.

82) OFS NP, *Congress Agenda*, Bloemfontein, 1953.

83) Natal NP, *Congress Agenda*, Greytown, 1953.

84) SAPA report, 15/11/53.

85) *Rand Daily Mail*, 13/11/53.

86) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Port Elizabeth, 1953. See also *Eastern Province Herald*, 20/11/53.

Nevertheless, the most interesting event at the Port Elizabeth congress was Malan's public announcement that he was standing down as leader of the Cape Party. Although he continued to serve as leader of the NP as a whole, and head of the government, his statement immediately encouraged speculation about his successor, which continued throughout the first part of 1954. In fact, when Malan formally announced his retirement from active politics on 11 October 1954, his decision could not have been more inconveniently timed for Strydom, who was leaving the following day on a six-week European vacation. Despite being taken by surprise - and suitably cynical about Malan's motives - Strydom's supporters immediately joined battle against the main opposition candidate, Havenga. According to some sources, Malan and his supporters intended that Havenga would act as a "caretaker" until Donges was ready to take over the leadership; Strydom's health was already poor and could be expected to deteriorate further (87). But Verwoerd, Louw, Swart, Ben Schoeman and others put up stiff resistance. In a series of long letters, Verwoerd implored Strydom not to withdraw his candidacy, accept any deals, or participate in any negotiations. In Verwoerd's words:

If you stand back, it will be your greatest political blunder and a severe shock to many and to your prestige, apart from the injustice to your supporters, the Party and the nation...You simply dare not do it.(88)

According to Verwoerd, any concessions to Havenga, such as

87) See, for example, Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.79.

88) Strydom Collection, Vol.60, p.46, Verwoerd to Strydom, 2/11/54.

granting him a six-month stint as leader, would have grave repercussions:

This would be very sad, because it would be the beginning of an argument about an extended period...and also because the composition of the cabinet could be much more difficult for you later. It could worsen the railway problem...and, even more seriously, place in front of you a new Minister of Finance who could be a problem six months later, This is possibly the most serious because this post is the key to effecting essential policy regarding colour, republicanism and in other areas.(89)

When Malan forcefully declared himself in favour of Havenga at a cabinet meeting on 18 November, Verwoerd and Schoeman responded equally vehemently (90). In-fighting and canvassing continued apace, with Strydom's supporters using Broederbond connections to advance their leader's cause (91). By the time Strydom returned from Europe, Verwoerd and his lieutenants were confident of victory (92). Their confidence was justified: at the crucial caucus meeting on 30 November, Havenga withdrew as soon as he saw that his candidacy was opposed.

The result of the 1954 leadership contest was important because it reflected a shift in the balance of power within the NP. Since Fusion, Malan and his coterie of Cape activists had maintained control of the most important decision-making positions in the NP. Even after the 1948 election, Malan only

89) *Ibid.*, p.51, Verwoerd to Strydom, 3/11/54. In a later letter, Verwoerd was adamant that Cape minister Paul Sauer should not be made Minister of Finance (*Ibid.*, p.76, Verwoerd to Strydom, 15/11/54).

90) See Strydom Collection, Vol.60, p.84, J. Kruger (editor of *Die Transvaler*) to Strydom, 19/11/54; and Strydom Collection, Vol.60, pp.81-82, Verwoerd to Strydom, 18/11/54.

91) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.85.

92) *Ibid.*, p.91.

considered it necessary to include three Transvalers in his first cabinet. In superficial terms, then, Strydom's election signified a victory for the rapidly-expanding northern Party: simply stated, the numerical superiority of the Transvaal NP predictably resulted in the choice of a Transvaler as leader. Indeed, regional rivalries certainly were a factor in the accession of Strydom to power. In any political party, the process of distribution of resources and patronage can be expected to encourage local and regional feeling. In the case of the NP, such rivalry was heightened by the Party's pronounced federal structure, and by the sheer physical distance and dissimilarity between regions. Yet it is too easy to explain Strydom's victory simply in terms of natural, but vague, regional affiliations. How does one categorise then the significant number of "Cape men" - including ministers Eric Louw and S.P. le Roux - who were Strydom supporters, or Transvalers, such as H.G. Luttig, P.W. du Plessis, J.H. Steyn and Avril Malan, who backed Malan to the last? Analysis of the "shift to the North" may begin with regionalism, but it must also extend to the different political traditions and histories embodied by Strydom and Malan, shifting nuances in approaches to republicanism and apartheid policy, and the changing class basis of the different provincial parties. Later chapters will address these questions further.

VII

Strydom's first priority as leader was to confront the issue which had become a question of pride for the NP: the Coloured franchise. He soon succeeded where Malan had failed.

His solution, simple and baldly cynical, relied on two pieces of legislation. In terms of the Senate Act of 1955, firstly, the NP increased the size of the upper house from 48 to 89. As the largest party in the House of Assembly, the NP could elect the majority of the new senators; the number of government-appointed senators was also raised. The NP now easily commanded a two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both houses. But Strydom also acted, secondly, to prevent the possibility of Appeal Court rulings against the government. The 1955 Appellate Division Quorum Act empowered the government to appoint five more Appeal Court judges, and decreed that appellate decisions on the validity of any Act could only be delivered with a quorum of 11. In February 1956, the South Africa Act Amendment Act finally validated the conditions of the original Separate Representation of Voters Act, and removed the entrenchment of Coloured voting rights. Henceforth, Coloured voters on a separate roll would elect four white members to the House of Assembly. One senator would be also appointed to represent Coloured views. Henceforth, too, no court of law was deemed competent to inquire on any constitutional issue except language equality.

While the headlines were dominated by the 1954 leadership contest and the Coloured franchise denouement, most Party activists and volunteers continued to work in much the same way once the excitement of the 1953 election abated. Heartened by the election victory, but not complacent, Party professionals still saw further consolidation as paramount (93). More professional organisers were appointed. New

branches continued to spring up all over the country. And constant appeals for financial backing swelled the Party's coffers. By 1958, in the Cape alone, the number of Party branches was 805; membership had reached 123,209, compared with 102,050 in 1953 (94). In the Transvaal, the 1955-56 financial year saw almost £70,000 raised through *strydag* contributions, compared with only £14,000 in 1948-49 (95).

NP activists were also not found lacking when it came to ideas about garnering easy votes. In the years following the 1953 election, apart from the usual gerrymandering, the NP's principal obsession on this front was the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18. In 1955, a confidential memorandum to Strydom estimated that approximately 80,000 of the Union's 127,400 18, 19 and 20 year-olds were Afrikaans-speaking (96). In spite of the fact that more than half of these prospective voters were resident in rural constituencies where the dominance of the NP was unchallenged, such an expansion in the size of the Afrikaner electorate was highly attractive. At every Party congress between 1953 and 1958, motions tabled by local branches called for the lowering of the voting age. In 1958 the government finally responded, although failed to push through the measure in time for the general election of that year.

While Party activists and volunteers busied themselves with organisational consolidation and expansion, the

94) Donges Collection, Vol.95, Congress in Committee, 1960.

95) *Die Burger*, 21/9/56.

96) Strydom Collection, Vol.45, pp.300-301.

Broederbond also continued to burrow away. In their numerous cells, Broederbond members - including nearly 3,000 teachers and pastors (97) - participated continually in detailed discussions, debates and decisions which often filtered via the classrooms, church halls and the activities of the FAK into the ideological and cultural ethos of the Afrikaner community as a whole. Yet NP politicians still resisted any Broederbond endeavours to become more overtly involved in active "politics". In 1954, for example, the Broederbond executive produced a detailed special study document dealing with republican policy, but was forced by Strydom to shelve plans for circulation (98). The following year, Strydom adamantly refused the Broederbond permission to establish a special parliamentary and civil servant cell during the six months when Parliament was sitting in Cape Town. He suggested that the organisation restrict itself to economic and cultural activities, because involvement with problems dealt with by the Party would only lead to clashes (99). In April 1956, a Potchefstroom cell complained to the Broederbond executive that there was a general feeling that the Broederbond had "no task any longer and no vision", and was being "hamstrung" by the Party (100). Yet, the following year, Strydom again responded negatively when senior members of the Broederbond - including national chairman H.B. Thom and Piet Meyer - proposed that the Broederbond initiate public discussions

97) *MacLean's*, 1/2/52.

98) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.85. A copy of the document - with Strydom's detailed criticisms - can be found in the Strydom Collection, Vol.54, pp.140-152. See also Chapter Seven of this thesis, p.322.

99) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.120.

100) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.85.

about the possible form of a new South African republic (101).

Although Strydom acted decisively in his exchanges with the Broederbond, and in his resolution of the Coloured franchise controversy, there is no doubt that the most dominant nationalist politician of the NP's second term was Verwoerd. When Verwoerd succeeded E.G. Jansen as Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, many observers under-estimated the impact he would exercise. The editor of the opposition *Rand Daily Mail* wrote at the time:

...the present administration does not attach much importance to the portfolio of Native of Affairs, and it seems probable that, since Dr Malan had to find a place for an extremist in his Cabinet, he has given Dr Verwoerd the post that is thought to be of least importance; just as, years ago, British premiers used to make the most junior members of the Government Minister for the Colonies...No doubt he [Verwoerd] does not expect to remain in that post long. There are other and more attractive positions that can be contemplated once one is in the Cabinet.(102)

The predictions of this commentator could hardly have fallen further from the mark. Within five years, after a massive overhaul and expansion of the structures and brief of the Department of Native Affairs, Verwoerd commanded a powerful bureaucratic and political empire, a personal fiefdom in which his authority was completely unchallenged. As editor of *Die Transvaler* in the late 1930s and 1940s, Verwoerd had quickly emerged as Strydom's right-hand man; now the Prime Minister was further behoven to his able lieutenant following Verwoerd's deep involvement in the 1954 leadership contest. Moreover, during his years in the Senate, Verwoerd had managed

101) *Ibid.*, p.121.

102) *Rand Daily Mail*, 20/10/50.

to build a secure and independent power base, and was uniquely placed to take advantage of the NP's expansion of the upper house.

The growing influence of Verwoerd and the Department of Native Affairs was reflected in the direction and presentation of NP legislation during the Party's second term in office. While certain measures, such as the work reservation clause in the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, explicitly pandered to the fears and demands of sections of the nationalist support base, most laws also bore the distinctive stamp of Verwoerd's own ponderous logic. Very practically and pragmatically - and mindful of popular expressions of defiance during the Congress of the People in 1955, the women's anti-pass demonstrations, and other resistance campaigns - Verwoerd and his bureaucratic cohorts systematically tightened a web of controls around every aspect of the lives of black South Africans. Black education was a prime target, with the Bantu Education Act of 1953, and subsequent amendments in 1954 and 1956, ensuring the transfer of control from provincial administrations and missionary groupings to central government. Efforts by resistance organisations to organise boycotts and alternative educational programmes, especially in the Eastern Cape and on the East Rand, were disrupted by the authorities (103). Close attention was also paid to the housing and zoning of black communities in the urban areas, primarily to limit any threat of black working class political organisation. The Western Areas township in Johannesburg - a particularly irritating

103) Lodge, *Black Politics*, chapter 5.

thorn in Verwoerd's side - was earmarked for destruction by the Natives' Resettlement Act of 1954. The 1955 Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act prohibited "locations in the sky" - groups of Africans living on the tops of buildings in white areas - and also gave Verwoerd the power to abolish any location, village or hostel for reasons of "health". Squatting was further restricted by the General Laws Amendment Act of 1955; so too was the attendance of Africans at church services, and other meetings in white areas, by the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1957. When black people responded to the constant harassment institutionalised by laws such as these, by taking their case to the courts, Verwoerd penned the Native (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act of 1956, which decreed that no interdict against a removal order could be issued until the order had been complied with. The Department of Native Affairs was so painstaking about details that it even issued strict guidelines for the number of rows of trees (a maximum of four) and the size of the buffer strips (500 yards) which were required around new "locations" (104).

Verwoerd's motivation of his legislation in Parliament and in private meetings was equally formidable. Speaking without notes for hours on end, and brooking no interruptions, he would eventually bludgeon his opposition into submission (105). But though he was arrogant and often dogmatic, it would

104) U.G. (Union Government, henceforth UG) 37/1955, *Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1951-52*, p.27.

105) Professor Jan Sadie commented (interview, 14/1/87) that if visitors did not state their case within a few minutes of meeting Verwoerd, they would not be given another chance, as Verwoerd would speak for the remainder of the appointment. Dawie, political commentator, wrote (*Die Burger*, 20/9/58): "The United Party in Parliament obviously have no idea how to

be a mistake to view him as a mad, possessed, utopian ideologue. Not only was he often practical and flexible in his treatment of the labour needs of capital, he also firmly rejected the long-term vision of apartheid proposed by the 1956 Tomlinson Commission Report (106). Verwoerd's legislation, speeches, reports and letters indicate that, above all else, he was a pragmatic and ambitious politician whose primary objective was to respond, on all fronts, to growing black resistance, informal or organised.

By 1957, Verwoerd's expanding empire and his proclivity for independent action were beginning to cause concern in certain sectors of the Party. A number of NP activists, including P.W. Botha and others in the Cape NP, objected, for example, to the high-handed manner in which Verwoerd pushed through the church apartheid clauses of the Native Laws Amendment Act (107). Furthermore, in July and August 1957 rumours began to circulate that he was coming under fire from nationalists concerned about the image he projected abroad and the power base he had forged in the Department of Native Affairs (108). Opposition newspapers speculated about an imminent cabinet reshuffle (109). If Strydom entertained any notions about demoting Verwoerd, however, they were soon dissipated by concern over his own continuing ill-health and

handle Dr. Verwoerd. Not that I can give them advice! But I know there is one thing you must not do if you are his opponent: you must not ask him a bunch of questions...If you question him, you get answers - a lot more than you ever could have feared."

106) See Chapter Five below, pp.186-192.

107) Schoeman, Van Malan, p.117.

108) See, for example, *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, 21/7/57.

109) See, for example, *Cape Times*, 25/6/57.

the proximity of the next general election. In April 1958, Strydom rose from his sick-bed and led the Party into a typically intense, well-organised and aggressive campaign. With the UP fatally split between its liberal and conservative wings - and uncertain whether it should attack the government from the left or the right - the NP swept the boards, winning 103 seats out of 156. Carter and Heard again estimate that this tally was gained with less than 49 percent of the vote (110). In addition, the Party's own calculations show that only around 25,000 of the NP's 625,616 votes were cast by non-Afrikaners, an average of between two and four percent per constituency (111). Nevertheless, in many respects, the NP leadership could feel well satisfied; not least because the Party had made huge inroads in the urban areas, taking 32 of the country's 81 urban constituencies, and 15 of the 20 seats on the East and West Rand (112).

VIII

The 1958 election was Strydom's swansong. On 24 August 1958, he died after many years of illness. Within a few days, it became clear that this time the leadership race was to be a three-cornered contest. Ranged against Verwoerd were T.E. Donges from the Cape and C.R. Swart, the OFS leader. Although Verwoerd's candidacy was opposed by most cabinet ministers,

110) Carter, *Inequality*, p.494; Heard, *General Elections*, p.88.

111) See calculations in Strydom Collection, Vol.45, pp.367-374; and Strydom Collection, Vol.154, pp.140-146, Memorandum by J.I. Raats.

112) Heard, *General Elections*, pp.86-88.

including influential Transvalers Jan de Klerk, Ben Schoeman and Tom Naude (113), his base in the enlarged Senate proved crucial. At the caucus election on 2 September, he won 80 votes in the first poll, against 52 for Donges and 41 for Swart. In a second poll following Swart's elimination, 98 votes were enough to give Verwoerd a comfortable victory (114).

Verwoerd's first few months as Prime Minister were nevertheless distinctly uncomfortable. In addition to an unprecedented attack from the white opposition in the weeks following his election, culminating in a scathing dissection of his record by the leader of the UP on September 18 (115), Verwoerd could count on the outright support of only two members of the cabinet (116), and also faced open discontent in the Cape NP. Donges responded to his defeat by insisting on certain concessions for Cape politicians. In private notes, he remarked bluntly that Verwoerd "must pay" (117). His letter to Verwoerd on 28 September indicated the Cape's minimum demand: Verwoerd must allow senior minister Paul Sauer to retain the portfolio of Lands and Water Affairs, and should include P.W. Botha in the Cabinet (118). Verwoerd prevaricated on both issues, offering Sauer the junior ministries of Forestry and Public Works, and refusing to find a place for Botha. Eventually, after a number of meetings - and after Sauer had

113) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, chapter 8.

114) M.P.A. Malan, *Die Nasionale Party van Suid-Afrika* (NP, 1964), p.279.

115) *House of Assembly Debates (HAD)*, 1958, cols.4129-4143.

116) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.147.

117) Donges Collection, Vol.322, private notes, September 1958.

118) Donges Collection, Vol.322, Donges to Verwoerd, 28/9/58.

told Verwoerd on 27 September that his offer was a "slap in the face" to the Cape (119) - Verwoerd compromised. First Sauer was asked to accept the portfolios of Lands, Forestry and Public Works. Then, towards the end of the year, Verwoerd appointed Botha to one of four new deputy minister positions in an enlarged cabinet. Yet in the same reshuffle Verwoerd also brought in four new ministers - Diederichs, Herzog, W.A. Maree, and D.C.H. Uys - who were staunch supporters, and created two ministries out of the politically sympathetic Department of Native Affairs, thus effectively nullifying his concessions to Donges.

The most interesting feature of this in-fighting was Verwoerd's obscure claim, in his negotiations with the Cape leadership, that, while he would personally have preferred to "help" the Cape, he was "bound" (120). Coming from a man who had never displayed great warmth and affection for the Cape Party leadership, this protestation sounded distinctly hollow. Yet, like any other politician, Verwoerd was primarily indebted to those who agreed with his political agenda and had helped him attain a position of power. To whom exactly then did he feel "bound"? One piece of circumstantial evidence is illuminating: all four of Verwoerd's new ministers were Broederbond members. Moreover, both Diederichs, Broederbond chairman between 1951 and 1952, and Herzog, for many years an active member of the Broederbond executive, were especially prominent in Broederbond affairs.

119) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.576, Sauer to Verwoerd, 27/9/58.

120) Donges Collection, Vol.322, Handwritten minutes of private meeting, 29/9/58.

Other interesting details add to the picture. Serfontein reveals that soon after Strydom's death the Broederbond executive's study document on republican policy, restricted since 1954, was quickly circulated to all Broederbond cells (121). Furthermore, on 30 September 1958, Verwoerd delivered an exhortatory speech to the Broederbond's national council in Bloemfontein (122). Then, in mid-1959 he became the first Prime Minister to attend a Broederbond executive meeting; a full six months before publically announcing the date of the republican referendum, he called on the Broederbond to "accept co-responsibility for the establishment of a Republic" (123). One could speculate that Verwoerd's decision to revitalise the moribund republican campaign was partly intended as a unifying antidote to the damaging conflicts that had surfaced during his election as Prime Minister: when it came to the issue of the republic, the Cape Party leaders were obliged, as devoted Afrikaners, to throw their full weight behind Verwoerd. In any case, the point here is that Verwoerd's accession to leadership seemed to release the Broederbond from its shackles.

The growth of the Broederbond over the next few years, both in size and influence, was rapid. By 1960, the organisation had 5,760 members in 409 divisions (124), and this total expanded to 6,768 (in 473 cells) by 1964 (125); the Broederbond was further strengthened by the formation of a

121) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.85.

122) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.182.

123) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.85.

124) *Sunday Times*, 5/11/72.

125) *Sunday Times*, 30/11/64.

youth wing called the *Ruiterwag* (Guard of Riders) in 1958. Apart from its pivotal involvement in the republican campaign, both in terms of the dissemination of propaganda and the raising of funds, the Broederbond increased its sway in a number of other spheres: the SABC, for instance, fell completely under Broederbond control when Hertzog, the new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, encouraged Piet Meyer and Jannie Kruger of *Die Transvaler* to move into the corporation in 1959 and 1960 (126). When Meyer, a close friend of Verwoerd, was elected as Broederbond chairman in November 1960 (127), the cohesive ties between the Broederbond and the Party leader were underlined. Soon afterwards, the Broederbond executive formally established 14 expert task groups to monitor a number of different policy areas, including "non-White" affairs, Coloureds and Indians, the Press, the "Jewish problem", liberalism, defence and education. Special study documents tabling the "findings" and decisions of the various committees were regularly circulated to all Broederbond members for discussion and implementation. While Verwoerd maintained dictatorial control over the activities of his ministers, the Broederbond leadership began to function increasingly as an informal cabinet (128).

Nevertheless, the augmentation of Broederbond power after 1958 cannot be analysed purely from the narrow perspective of NP politics. Verwoerd's tight interaction with

126) *Sunday Times*, 22/5/60. See also *HAD*, 1960, cols.2989-2994.

127) Serfontein, *Brotherhood*, p.87.

128) *Ibid.*, p.88.

Bond activists owed as much to the general political context of the time as it did to his need to consolidate his position as NP leader. What were the features of this political landscape? Most importantly, despite an arduous treason trial and a serious split in the ANC which triggered the formation of the more overtly nationalist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), black resistance to apartheid measures continued to swell. Protracted bus boycotts in Evander and Alexandra between 1955 and 1957 (129) were followed by widespread rural unrest, especially in the Western Transvaal, Sekhukuniland, Natal and the Transkei, and violent clashes in the Cato Manor settlement near Durban (130). In late 1959, Verwoerd unveiled the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, which envisaged the future political "independence" of separate ethnic units. But this more sophisticated version of separate development failed to stem black anger. In March 1960, 69 people were killed by police in Sharpeville during an anti-pass demonstration. As uprisings flared in many other parts of the country as well, Verwoerd declared a state of emergency.

However, the crisis was not yet over. Indeed, black discontent was not Verwoerd's only concern: dissatisfaction with NP policy also began to surface amongst Afrikaner intellectuals and in the Afrikaner churches (131). Furthermore, uneasiness soon spread into the heart of the Party itself. In late March, Dawie (alias Piet Cillie), the influential political columnist of the Cape Party organ *Die Burger*, wrote:

129) See Lodge, *Black Politics*, chapter 7.

130) *Ibid.*, chapters 6, 9, and 11.

131) See Chapter Five and Chapter Six below.

It is clear to me that the future of our country will be decided by our future handling of the urban native. And I am not talking of five, ten or fifteen years from now...Without incitement, I believe, there are certain grievances which the entire black urban mass share. Amongst these are grievances about wages, the pass system and drink.(132)

During a cabinet meeting in early April, Donges, Sauer and Schoeman echoed these sentiments, and asked Verwoerd to abolish passbooks for Africans (133). But on 9 April 1960, Verwoerd was shot by an assailant in Johannesburg. While he was recovering in hospital, acting Prime Minister Paul Sauer delivered a controversial speech at Humansdorp, in which he again called for a restructuring of the pass laws and a reconsideration of the position of urban Africans (134). Then, in July 1960, Dawie, changing tack, expressed the hope of a number of Cape nationalists when he wrote:

The pressure for a forward movement in Nationalist policy towards the Coloureds is getting even stronger. The most dramatic notion is naturally that the principle of representation of Coloureds by Coloureds in Parliament should be recognised, or, stated differently, that the Coloureds should be free to choose White or Brown representatives...My impression is that the National Party is already more than halfway in favour of the principle, and that with strong leadership can be fully won over. The time for a decision draws nearer.(135)

With confidence in the country's economy collapsing - in 1960 South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves decreased by R143-million, mainly because of a huge outflow of foreign

132) *Die Burger*, 26/3/60.

133) Schoeman, *Van Malan*, p.201.

134) K. Meaker (Sauer's daughter), interview, 12/1/87. Verwoerd soon tried to remove Sauer from the cabinet, by offering him the position of Speaker of the House of Assembly. Sauer refused to cooperate (See Verwoerd Collection, Vol.577, Sauer to Verwoerd, 30/11/60).

135) *Die Burger*, 23/7/60.

capital (136) - Verwoerd and the government also had to contend with serious economic problems.

The Broederbond's swift development after 1958 was also conditioned, therefore, by Verwoerd's need to grapple with an escalating economic, political and ideological crisis. In short, from Verwoerd's point of view, extraordinary measures were required: the cohesive and disciplined Broederbond leadership constituted a readily accessible, unencumbered and like-minded crisis management team. Moreover, the Bond's extensive, well-knit organisational network, and deep penetration of all Afrikaner institutions, became an indispensable weapon in Verwoerd's armoury, because he was able to bypass the normal political channels whenever he considered it necessary.

Indeed, Verwoerd and his compatriots soon began to reassert their control over the course of events. The republican referendum in October 1960 ended in success for the Party. In late 1960, Verwoerd firmly insisted on the "parallel development" of the Coloured population; Coloureds would definitely not be allowed to represent Coloured voters in Parliament (137). After a further few weeks of intensive discussions - and a heated debate between *Die Burger* and Minister of Bantu Administration and Development M.D.C. de Wet Nel, during which the newspaper suggested that the Transvaal NP exerted a stranglehold on government policy (138) - the

136) South African Reserve Bank, *A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payments for the period 1946 to 1970* (Pretoria, 1971), Table 1.

137) *HAD*, 1960, col.4191.

138) *Die Burger*, 3/12/60. See also *Die Burger*, 26/11/60; *Die Burger*, 28/11/60; *Die Burger*, 30/11/60; *Die Burger*, 10/12/60.

NP's Federal Council confirmed its support for Verwoerd's standpoint (139). During the next year, open restlessness in the Cape concerning Coloured representation vanished (140). In March 1961, Verwoerd withdrew South Africa from the Commonwealth under threat of expulsion. Two months later, South Africa became a republic. During 1961, too, dissent amongst Afrikaner intellectuals and churchmen was crushed. Finally, and most importantly, the government banned the ANC and PAC, and embarked on a campaign to root out and smash all resistance to apartheid. By the end of 1961, foreign capital was beginning to trickle back into the country (141), paving the way for a sustained economic boom.

As if to emphasise the extent of his authority and dominance, Verwoerd confidently called an election in October 1961. The white electorate did not disappoint him. For the first time since 1948, the NP won an overall majority - 53.5 percent - of votes cast in a general election (142). The government also increased its number of seats in the House of Assembly to 105. With Japie Basson's short-lived National Union winning one seat, and Helen Suzman becoming the sole Progressive Party MP, the UP's share of seats was reduced to 49. In the spirit of recent republican rhetoric, which emphasised the importance of co-opting English-speakers into a

139) *Die Burger*, 23/1/61.

140) That the issue still continued to cause some problems for the NP leadership is indicated by a letter from Hennie Smit to Verwoerd, dated 1/9/61 (Verwoerd Collection, Vol.267): "As you know, Stellenbosch is the focus of resistance to the Party's point of view on Coloured policy...A meeting here is of the greatest importance."

141) South African Reserve Bank, *Balance of Payments*, Table 1.

142) Heard, *General Elections*, p.145.

broadly-defined white South African "nation", Verwoerd immediately asked A.E. Trollip and Frank Waring to join his new, enlarged cabinet (143).

IX

1961 ended, therefore, with Verwoerd and the NP leadership firmly back in the saddle. Yet it is wrong to assume that after the Party had travelled through the momentous events of 1960-61 it could revert unmarked and unchanged to its pre-1960 state. Indeed, by banning the ANC and PAC, stiffening apartheid measures (especially those pertaining to urban Africans) and removing any further possibility of meaningful peaceful black protest, the government redefined the entire political terrain. In general, a new phase of struggle and reaction ensued. Partisan white parliamentary politics was not left untouched. The upheavals and polarisations of the period, following hard on the heels of the formation of the Progressive Party in 1959, seemed to accelerate the decline of the United Party: after the 1961 election, the UP could no longer claim that it posed a significant threat to the NP. For years NP activists and volunteers had furiously consolidated and expanded, motivated, in part, by the belief that the NP's grasp on parliamentary power was continually in danger. Now, the UP was in disarray: no such motivation existed. With well-oiled structures and methods firmly in place, and guarantees of large donations from increasingly wealthy supporters flooding in, Party

workers could finally relax.

Another factor further weakened the incentive of volunteers to consistently and enthusiastically involve themselves in Party affairs. For the NP emerged from the crucible of 1960-61 as a far more authoritarian political institution. Verwoerd's swift and ruthless suppression of dissent, his obsessive centralisation of decision-making processes, and his cultivation of an informal Broederbond caucus all helped to relieve ordinary Party members of any semblance of power they might have exercised. During and after the 1960-61 watershed, therefore, the style of NP politics subtly changed. While the NP could still rely on thousands of volunteers during election campaigns, in general fervent activism seemed to evolve into fervent passivity. For NP volunteers, the 1950s witnessed the apogee of grassroots participation in NP activities (144). By the early 1960s, on the other hand, as one NP volunteer put it:

With Verwoerd in charge, people felt that they did not need to worry.(145)

144) S.F. Kotze, interview, 13/1/87; J.T. Louw, interview, 15/1/87; C. de Vleeschauer, interview, 23/1/87.

145) C. de Vleeschauer, interview, 23/1/87.

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CHAPTER THREE

Afrikaner Social Stratification during the 1950s

I

In 1938, standing in front of one of the replica ox-wagons built for the centenary Tweede Trek (Second Trek) celebration, venerated pastor Father Kestell transfixed his audience with a fiery speech. Pleading for a concerted *reddingsdaad* (deed of salvation) to rescue the Afrikaner nation from poverty, he furnished the emerging nationalist economic movement with an unequivocal slogan: 'n volk red homself (a volk rescues itself).

At the first Afrikaner *ekonomiese volkskongres*, held the following year, nationalist leaders strove to provide a practical foundation for Kestell's emotional appeal. The most important recommendation of the congress was that all unused Afrikaner capital and savings, particularly in the agricultural sector, should be centralised in financial institutions, and transformed into productive capital for struggling Afrikaner undertakings (1). Inspired by such ideas, the Economic Institute of the FAK, the RDB and the AHI emerged, determined to adapt the "foreign capitalist system" to the Afrikaner "national character" (2).

O'Meara and others have documented and analysed the campaigns waged by such organisations over the course of the

1) D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p.114.
2) *Ibid.*, p.111.

next decade (3). However, while the nationalist movement achieved some success in redressing the unequal economic balance, by the time the NP won power in 1948 Afrikaners were still disadvantaged in comparison with English-speakers (4). Most importantly, the Afrikaner share of private sector economic activity remained relatively paltry, especially if one discounts figures for agriculture (see Table 1). In the manufacturing sector, for instance, Afrikaners controlled 3,385 factories, but employed only 14,450 white workers (out of a total of 170,959 in this branch of the economy) (5), and produced only six percent of total industrial turnover (6). More than 80 percent of these concerns were one-man businesses (7). By 1948, nearly 86 percent of white male unskilled

3) See also E.P. du Plessis, *'n Volk Staans Op* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1964); T.D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Civil Religion* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975); D. Welsh, "The Political Economy of Afrikaner Nationalism" in A. Leftwich (ed.), *South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change* (London, Allison Busby, 1974); H. Giliomee, "The Afrikaner Economic Advance" in H. Adam and H. Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilised* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979); R. de Villiers, "Afrikaner Nationalism" in L. Thompson and M. Wilson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa Volume 2* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971); N.M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa 1934-1948* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974); S. Patterson, *The Last Trek* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957); L. Saloman, "The Economic Background to the Revival of Afrikaner Nationalism" in J. Butler (ed.), *Boston University Papers in African History Volume 1* (Boston, Boston University Press, 1964).

4) As mentioned in the Preface to this thesis, the terms "Afrikaans-speaker", "Afrikaner" and "English-speaker" are used here to distinguish members of the white South African population.

5) P.J. Meyer, "Die Afrikaner se Huidige Posisie en Stryd op Ekonomiese Gebied" in *Volkshandel*, 15, 6, August 1954, p.38.

6) A. Rupert, "Die Afrikaner in die Nywerheid" in *Inspan*, 10, 3, December 1950, p.4. This is a copy of his address to the second ekonomiese volkskongres in 1950.

7) J.L. Sadie, *Die Afrikaner in die Landseconomie* (SABC, 1957), pp.25-26.

labourers employed in South Africa's principal cities were Afrikaners, as were 79 percent of mineworkers, 74 percent of railway workers, and 63 percent of factory workers. In contrast, at the other end of the ladder, Afrikaners constituted only five percent of male directors and industrialists in the urban areas, and only 15 percent of all professionals (8).

Consequently, the per capita income of English-speakers averaged more than double that of Afrikaners (see Table 2). According to 1951 census figures, the annual per capita income of Afrikaners in Johannesburg and nine other cities along the Witwatersrand (where Afrikaners comprised 43 percent of the total white population) was R364, compared with R698 for English-speakers. A similar gap was evident in the other main urban areas; even in Bloemfontein, where Afrikaners made up 73 percent of the white population, the equivalent figures were R360 and R636 (9). Expressing the point slightly differently, only one in a hundred Afrikaners in Johannesburg earned more than R2,000 per year, compared with one in ten non-Afrikaners (10). This discrepancy in income was mirrored in the statistics for savings: by 1954, Afrikaner savings still accounted for less than a quarter of the total amount held in South Africa's financial institutions (11).

It is against this background of Afrikaner economic

8) S. Pauw, "Die Afrikaanse Ondernemer, die Verbruiker en die Werker" in *Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres* (Bloemfontein, 1950), p.113. See also *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950.

9) *Volkshandel*, 15, 1, March 1954, p.56.

10) Meyer, "Huidige Posisie", p.41.

11) Sadie, *Landseconomie*, p.34.

inferiority that this chapter will attempt to trace changes in Afrikaner social stratification during the 1950s. Account will be taken of economic, educational and occupational information; attention must also be paid to processes of urbanisation. First, however, it is important to outline several general trends in South Africa's economic development after the Second World War.

II

The most fundamental tendency in the South African economy was established by the rapid growth of secondary industry during the War. This expansion of the manufacturing sector continued apace in the postwar years. By 1950, manufacturing's share of GDP stood at 23 percent; this rose by another three percent to 26 percent by 1960 (12). Other economic indicators can also be used to illustrate secondary industry's growth. Between 1951 and 1961, for example, the number of people of all races employed in secondary industry rose from 559,675 to 664,568 (13). Between 1945 and 1960, using constant prices, the gross output per manufacturing

12) D.H. Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1964), p.273.

13) Bureau of Statistics, *Industrial Censuses 1950-51 to 1960-61; Summary Report: Manufacturing*, Report No. IC.69, 1967, p.3. In this chapter, constant price comparisons will be explicitly indicated. Otherwise, it should be borne in mind that the Cost of Living rose by approximately 4.5 percent per annum in the decade from 1948 (*HAD*, 1958, col.429). More specifically, between 1948 and 1961, the Retail Price Index rose by an average of 4.25 percent per annum, and the Wholesale Price Index increased by an average of 4.9 percent per annum (Houghton, *SA Economy*, p.293). The overall Consumers' Price Index rose by 41 percent between 1950 and 1960.

establishment nearly tripled, while the average investment per establishment in plant and machinery increased by 98 percent (14).

The expansion of South Africa's secondary industry was accompanied by a reduction in the agricultural sector's share of the economy. Between 1950 and 1960, agriculture, forestry and fishing's contribution to GDP fell from 18 percent to 12 percent, although in actual money terms farming's contribution rose by nearly a third. During this period, the proportion of GDP produced by the mining, transport and government sectors of the South African economy remained fairly static: at approximately 14 percent, ten percent and eight percent respectively (15). At the same time, however, the public sector's contribution to capital formation increased dramatically. Whereas in 1951 public authorities and public corporations accounted for 25 percent of South Africa's gross capital formation, in the following ten years this figure rose to more than 38 percent (16).

The expansion of the private manufacturing industry and the increase in public sector fixed capital expenditure were reflected in a marked shift in the composition of South Africa's imports. In 1946, textiles, apparel, yarn, fibres and foodstuffs had constituted nearly 38 percent of imports. Yet, over the course of the next decade producer rather than

14) J. Nattrass, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1981), p.168.

15) Houghton, *SA Economy*, p.273.

16) A.J. Norval, *A Quarter of Century of Industrial Progress in South Africa* (Johannesburg, Juta, 1962), pp.144-145.

consumer goods began to account for a greater proportion of the Union's imports. By 1956, metals, metal manufactures, machinery and vehicles comprised 39.5 percent of imports (compared with 24 percent in 1946), while the figure for textiles, apparel, yarn, fibres and foodstuffs had dipped to 22 percent (17). By the late 1950s, 51 percent of South Africa's imports was made up of metals and machinery (18). Despite the fact that, by 1959, the total local output of metal products, machinery and electrical equipment was nearly double the value of metal and machinery imports (19), it is significant that completely finished capital equipment still accounted for 29 percent of goods purchased abroad (20).

The composition of South Africa's export trade, on the other hand, remained relatively unchanged. Gold continued to be the principal foreign exchange earner, especially once the Free State goldfields had been fully developed: by 1959, gold sales still accounted for 40 percent of exports, with other minerals and metals, most importantly uranium, making up another 19 percent. The sale of manufactured goods, in contrast, earned only 18.3 percent of total export revenue (21); finished capital goods constituted only 5.5 percent of exports (22). Furthermore, despite an overall increase

17) *A Survey of Post-War Economic Conditions in the Union of South Africa and Prospects for 1957* (Stellenbosch, Bureau for Economic Research, 1957), p.22.

18) M. van den Berg and G.J. Hupkes, *A Survey of Contemporary Economic Conditions and Prospects for 1959* (Stellenbosch, Bureau for Economic Research, 1958), p.16.

19) Norval, *Progress*, p.24.

20) G. Marais, "Some Basic Remarks on the Relationship Between Economic Development and the Balance of Payments" in *Finance and Trade Review*, 4, 4, December 1960, p.215.

21) Norval, *Progress*, p.40.

22) Marais, "Balance of Payments", p.215.

in export earnings (23), South Africa's current account continued to languish in the red for most of the 1950s. A nagging balance of payments deficit was only alleviated by an overall net inflow of foreign capital (24).

Notwithstanding these deep-seated economic limitations (25), South Africa's growth rate averaged 4.3 percent between 1950 and 1960 (26). In spite of a mild recession in 1957 and 1958, the country did not experience a serious economic crisis until the Sharpeville shootings induced a rapid outflow of foreign capital in 1960. But it was white South Africans who enjoyed the fruits of this development. While white income soared, black wage levels were strictly controlled. A glance at the figures for the private manufacturing and construction industry is particularly illuminating. Between 1948 and 1961, the average annual earnings of white workers in these branches of industry (at constant 1959-60 prices) rose from R1,437 to R1,907 (an increase of 33 percent). In the same period, average annual earnings for black workers increased from R329 to R365. Significantly, however, black wages actually fell between 1948 and 1953; it was only in 1959 that the average wage rate reached its 1948 level (27). In the mining industry, too, while the average earnings of white workers nearly

23) Houghton, *SA Economy*, p.112.

24) South African Reserve Bank, *A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Balance of Payments for the period 1946 to 1970* (Pretoria, 1971), pp.8-9.

25) It is worth noting that some of the structural problems of the South African economy in the 1950s, particularly the propensity to import finished capital goods, were to have important effects on the state of the economy in later years.

26) Nattrass, *SA Economy*, p.25.

27) W.F.J. Steenkamp, "Bantu Wages in South Africa" in *South African Journal of Economics (SAJE)*, 30, 1962, p.96.

doubled between 1950 and 1960, black wages remained virtually constant: the average annual wage rate in 1958 (at constant 1959-60 prices) was R194, just R6 more than in 1949 (28).

Most Africans continued to experience crippling poverty. In 1950, the average monthly wage for Africans in manufacturing was only just over half of the official Poverty Datum Line calculated for Johannesburg (29). By the end of the decade, this perilous situation had hardly altered. In a document prepared for the Institute of Race Relations in 1959, Joy de Gruchy placed the minimum requirements of a family of five in Johannesburg at R48.32 a month, and found the average annual amount spent by black households in December 1956 and January 1957 to have been R41, giving an average shortfall of R7.32 (30). In Durban, the median household income was R20.80, whereas the corresponding minimum living costs were estimated at R33.64 (31). And while a growing number of Africans desperately fought poverty and unemployment, almost all whites were guaranteed basic material comfort. In 1959, for example, only 13,314 whites - less than 0.5 percent of the total white population, and just one percent of the white workforce - were registered as unemployed (32).

28) R. Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa 1900-1960* (London, Harvester Press, 1979), pp.332-333.

29) F. Curtis, "Contradiction and Uneven Deelopment in South Africa: the Constrained Allocation of African Labour-Power" in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 3, September 1984, p.382.

30) Joy de Gruchy, *The Cost of Living for Urban Africans* (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1959).

31) Steenkamp, "Bantu Wages", p.93.

32) M.V. Piercy, "Statutory Job Reservation: Requirement of a Static or Expanding Economy?" in *SAJE*, 28, 2, June 1960, p.131.

III

This brief sketch of general economic trends provides the background for the main body of this chapter. To begin, it should be noted that in a decade of increasing privilege for all whites, Afrikaners were singled out for preferential treatment by the NP government. Further details of nationalist patronage during the 1950s will appear at various points in this chapter; here, it is sufficient to acknowledge that all sections of the NP's electoral base benefitted directly from government economic support. Afrikaner businessmen received the lion's share of redirected state accounts and contracts; Afrikaner farmers were guaranteed favourable prices for their produce, and received massive government subsidies; the mainly Afrikaner civil service saw the government allocation for its salaries and allowances increase by 133 percent between 1948 and 1958, at a time when the number of public servants rose by just over 25 percent (33); and Afrikaner workers, the poorest members of the white community, in addition to winning legal protection against competition from blacks, were the principal recipients of the R290-million spent by the government on white housing and food subsidies in the first ten years of NP rule (34).

Given this massive injection of government favour, it would have been surprising if a marked improvement in the economic and social position of Afrikaners had not occurred by 1960. Certainly, on first examination, there seems to have

33) *HAD*, 1958, col.634.

34) Strydom Collection, Vol.45, p.307.

been a closing of the gap between the income and educational levels of English-speakers and Afrikaners. An analysis of 1960 income figures (see Table 3) clearly demonstrates that the median income for Afrikaners was between R1,200 and R1,599: the same range in which the median income of English-speakers, and the white population as a whole, can be placed. In this case, however, median statistics are misleading. A closer study of Table 3 produces a number of other interesting items of data. Firstly, despite comparable median figures, the English-Afrikaans ratio in the higher income brackets is clearly not commensurate with the composition of the white population as a whole. While Afrikaners constituted 58 percent of the total white population, only 43 percent of those whites earning more than R2,000 were Afrikaans-speaking; and while nearly 17 percent of the English-speaking population earned R2,000 or more, only nine percent of Afrikaners found themselves in this income bracket. Similarly, Afrikaners comprised only 35 percent of those whites earning more than R5,000. Moreover, 61 percent of Afrikaners earned no income at all, compared with only 51 percent of English-speakers. This fact may be ascribed to a number of factors which need not concern us here, but it clearly indicates that Afrikaner income needed to be spread more widely than the income of English-speakers. The figures in Table 2 confirm this observation: by 1960, the per capita income of English-speakers was still 56 percent more than that of Afrikaners, while the estimated ratio of personal income was

47 for Afrikaners compared with 53 for English-speakers (35).

An inspection of educational data reveals similar trends. There is no doubt that Afrikaner access to educational facilities improved dramatically after the NP's accession to power. In the case of secondary education, for example, the number of Afrikaans-medium schools in the Transvaal more than doubled between 1949 and 1954 (36). Matriculation levels improved accordingly: whereas only 16 percent of Afrikaans Std 6 pupils in the Transvaal had completed secondary education by 1955, by 1960 the proportion had improved to 29 percent (38).

The increase in the number of Afrikaners completing secondary education was accompanied by a sharp rise in the enrolment figures for Afrikaans-medium universities. Between 1948 and 1960 the number of students at Pretoria University leapt from 3,322 to 7,397 (an increase of 123 percent); the student populations of Potchefstroom, Stellenbosch and Bloemfontein expanded by 106 percent, 96 percent, and 72 percent respectively (39). These statistics are especially

35) Measures of personal income estimate "take-home pay", while per capita income is simply GDP divided by population.

36) *Nasionale Partynuus*, 7, July/August 1954.

38) S. van Wyk, *Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe van die Stad* (Pretoria, Academica, 1968), pp.234-235. The equivalent figures for English-speakers were 25 percent (1955) and 34 percent (1960). By 1965, 38 percent of Afrikaner pupils were reaching Std 10, compared with 42 percent of English-speaking pupils. See also Department of Statistics, *Education Whites* 1964, Report No 08-08-01, 1969, p.120.

39) Unless otherwise stated, the figures in this and the next paragraph were gathered from UG 18/1952, *Report of the Department of Education, Arts and Science, 1949*, and RP 24/1961, *Report of the Department of Education, Arts and Science, 1961*.

impressive when one takes into account that, during the same period, the total number of students at white residential universities (40) increased by 52 percent, and the student bodies of the English-medium University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and University of Cape Town (UCT) grew by just three percent and 19 percent respectively.

In addition, at a time when government grants to tertiary education swelled substantially - at constant prices, state expenditure on white residential universities and the University of South Africa (Unisa) increased by 227 percent between 1948 and 1960 (41) - Afrikaner universities received particularly favourable treatment. By 1960, Pretoria University had replaced Wits and UCT as the recipient of the largest government subsidy, after an increase (at constant prices) of 298 percent in its government grant since 1948. (Wits and UCT enjoyed increases of 114 percent and 121 percent respectively.) With government grants to the universities of Stellenbosch, OFS and Potchefstroom expanding (again using constant prices) by 181 percent, 306 percent and 360 percent respectively between 1948 and 1960, the shortfall in revenue of the Afrikaner universities was largely remedied. Huge NP expenditure was rewarded by a significant increase in the number of degrees completed by Afrikaner students. In spite of a poor output of graduates in some subjects - such as medicine, engineering and architecture - by 1960 the Afrikaner

40) The universities of the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Natal, Pretoria, Stellenbosch, OFS, Rhodes and Potchefstroom.

41) E.G. Malherbe, *Education in South Africa*, Volume 2 (Cape Town, Juta, 1977), p.755.

universities awarded well over half of South Africa's bachelor degrees in pharmacy, commerce and education. Two-thirds of all educational diplomas were also completed at Afrikaner universities; so too were 43 percent of bachelor law degrees.

Nevertheless, despite these advances, an evaluation of the information contained in Table 4 indicates that, by 1960, Afrikaners were still educationally disadvantaged compared with English-speakers. Firstly, nearly 55,000 working Afrikaners - nine percent of economically active Afrikaners - had only completed seven years of education or less. (The equivalent figure for English-speakers was 11,648: only two percent of working English-speakers.) Secondly, approximately 297,000 working Afrikaners - 49 percent of the economically active Afrikaner population - had not managed to see out ten years of full-time education. (This compares with a total of 134,709 - 28 percent - of working English-speakers.) Thirdly, only a little over 200,000 Afrikaners - approximately 11 percent of the total Afrikaner population - had finished a full twelve years of education by 1960, in comparison with nearly a quarter of a million English-speakers: 22 percent of the English population. Stating the point another way: only 40 percent of those white South Africans who had completed secondary education were Afrikaans-speaking, even though Afrikaners comprised nearly 60 percent of the total white population. Finally, Table 4 also demonstrates, in almost every category, that fewer Afrikaners had gained tertiary qualifications than their English-speaking counterparts.

In summary, therefore, while the distance between

English-speakers and Afrikaners had narrowed by 1960, at least with respect to educational and income levels, stark disparities remained. To fully understand these, however, it is important to establish how - and where - Afrikaners were employed.

IV

A useful point of departure for an investigation of Afrikaner employment patterns is to divide the Afrikaner population according to agricultural and non-agricultural work. By 1960, with only 16.7 percent of all whites still living in the rural areas, most Afrikaners, like the majority of English-speakers, were fully urbanised. To be exact, 76.5 percent of all Afrikaners - in other words, 1,368,000 out of the total Afrikaner population of 1,788,000 (42) - now resided in the cities and towns, compared with a proportion of 69 percent in the early 1950s (43). Significantly, these figures do not merely reflect a relative decrease in the number of whites in the rural areas. While the size of the white population increased by 16.9 percent between 1951 and 1960, the number of people in the rural areas actually fell from 561,271 to 516,609 in the same period (44). (As an aside, it is interesting to note that the white population of some of South Africa's larger cities grew much faster than that of others during the 1950s. While the total number of whites in

42) Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 1960*, Volume 5: Personal Income, Table A7.

43) Patterson, *Trek*, p.68.

44) Bureau of Statistics, *Urban and Rural Population of South Africa 1904 to 1960*, Report No. 02-02-01, 1968, p.2.

urban areas rose by 23.7 percent between 1951 and 1960, the white population of Pretoria, for example, grew by nearly 38 percent, compared with increases of only 11.2 percent and 14.4 percent in Johannesburg and Cape Town respectively (45).)

As a result of continued urbanisation, only 16 percent of all economically active Afrikaners were employed in agricultural occupations by 1960, compared with more than 30 percent in 1946 (46), and 23 percent in 1954-55 (47). In spite of this decrease, however, it is worth scrutinising changes in white agriculture during the 1950s, if only because Afrikaner farmers had been a vital component of the victorious 1948 nationalist alliance, and continued to occupy a special place in the affections and attentions of the NP government.

Government policies took good care of farmers in a number of ways. Firstly, the government quickly intervened to ease the acute labour shortage that had been experienced by farmers during and after the War. Influx control was tightened; by the early 1950s, a system of labour bureaux was established in order to limit the size of industrial reserve armies in the towns, and ensure a more equitable distribution of labour between urban and rural areas. Accurate statistics of the effects of these measures are difficult to establish. It is clear, however, that, by 1950, the total number of farm labourers in the Transvaal had risen by 27.2 percent since

45) Ibid., Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.

46) Giliomee, "Advance", p.169.

47) Sadie, *Landseconomie*, p.18.

1946, while the number of labourers in the Free State increased by 25.9 percent in the same period (48). Furthermore, by 1953, 21,823 African workers from urban areas had been placed by the labour bureaux in employment in agriculture (49); and between the middle of 1954 and the end of 1957 another 268,705 workers were directed back to white farms (50). With the government also providing prison labour for farmers, albeit in small numbers (51), and intervening to eliminate squatting and labour tenancy (52), the 1957 report of the Department of Native Affairs was able to argue that "the shortage problem in the rural areas has been reduced to a minimum" (53).

The government also ensured that the pricing mechanisms of the 1937 Marketing Act, which had been used by Smuts to hold down agricultural prices during immediate post-war food shortages, were instead utilised to guarantee favourable

48) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.189.

49) UG 48/1955, Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1952-53, p.23.

50) UG 14/1959, Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1954-57, p.40. Speaking at the 1955 OFS NP Congress in Bloemfontein, Verwoerd stated that 25,000 workers had been moved from the Witwatersrand in only five months to help with the maize harvest. Despite the fact that this was the biggest harvest in the country's history, Verwoerd claimed that he "had not been overwhelmed with complaints about labour shortages as usually happened" (*The Friend*, 23/9/55). Special harvesting teams were also put together for the 1954 harvest (UG 55/1959, Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1954, p.11).

51) See F. Wilson, "Farming, 1866-1966" in Thompson and Wilson (eds.), *Oxford History*, pp.147-149.

52) See M. Morris, "The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture" in *Economy and Society*, 5, 3, 1976, and M. Morris, "Apartheid, Agriculture and the State", *Saldru Working Paper No. 8*, UCT, July 1977.

53) UG 14/1959, Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1954-57, p.40.

prices for farmers. The producers' price index for maize rose by more than 50 percent between 1947-48 and 1953-54 (54), while the price of meat increased by 82.5 percent between 1948 and 1956 (55). The overall index of producers' prices for farm products rose by more than 50 percent between 1948-49 and 1956-57 (56). Massive government funding was also provided for other purposes. Between 1948 and 1955, R92-million was spent by the government on irrigation schemes (57), a figure bolstered by another R68-million from official loan accounts (58). Moreover, between 1948 and 1955, as well as creating extremely favourable agricultural insurance schemes, the Land Bank also lent R56-million to farmers for land investment and improvement (59). Finally, the government set into motion several research programs at various agricultural colleges, and actively encouraged the holding of large agricultural shows (60).

All of these measures stimulated agricultural production. The shortages of commodities that were characteristic of the years immediately following the Second World War were soon replaced by surpluses. Indices of the physical volume of agricultural production exhibit a rise of

54) Department of Agriculture, *An Abstract of Agricultural Statistics of the Union of South Africa*, 1958, Table 51.

55) HAD, 1956, col.5118.

56) Department of Agriculture, *Abstract*, Table 55.

57) *Senate Debates*, 1955, cols.2641-2643.

58) HAD, 1956, col.6340.

59) HAD, 1956, col.6809. See also B. Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986), p.372.

60) Wilson, "Farming", p.151.

more than 50 percent between 1948 and 1960 (61); the total value of farming and livestock products, at constant prices, increased by 38 percent in the decade after 1950 (62). And whereas the total production of maize, to name just one crop, averaged 2,098,000 tons between 1944-45 and 1948-49, by the period between 1959-60 and 1963-64 production had risen to 5,128,000 tons (63). In 1962, maize farmers produced 29 million bags of maize more than they could sell (64).

Government concessions to white farmers, especially with respect to taxes and credit, also encouraged considerable capital investment on farms. Not only were huge amounts spent on the construction of dams, contours and closed dongas; expenditure on machinery also increased dramatically. In total, the value, at constant prices, of implements and machinery in use in agriculture rose by nearly 80 percent between 1948 and 1959 (65). The number of tractors, in particular, soared. In 1947, 22,397 tractors were in use on South African farms. By 1950, this figure had risen to 48,423 (66), and it increased to 122,218 by 1961 (67). With combine

61) S.S. Brand and F.R. Tomlinson, "Die Plek van die Landbou in die Suid-Afrikaanse Volkshuishouding" in *SAJE*, 34, 1, March 1966, p.45.

62) D. Cooper, "Ownership and Control of Agriculture in South Africa" (mimeo), paper presented to conference on "The South African Economy after Apartheid", University of York, October 1986, p.6.

63) Houghton, *SA Economy*, p.279.

64) Bunting, *Reich*, p.372.

65) RP 10/1962, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Cost and Profit Margins in respect of Agricultural Implements and the Components Thereof*, 1960. See also *HAD*, 1958, col.447.

66) Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Agricultural Census 24, 1949-50, Special Report No. 1: Tractors and Vehicles on Farms*, p.3.

67) *Agricultural Census 35, 1960-61*, p.111.

harvesters and threshing machines also more popular - the number of wheat and maize combines increased from 5,304 in 1950 (68) to 10,223 in 1960 (69) - it is evident that the mechanised capital goods suitable for economies of scale were becoming more widely available in agriculture by the end of the 1950s.

Indeed it seems that many farmers were beginning to regard it as advantageous to control and work larger units of land. In 1950, the total area occupied by white South Africa's farms was 101,480,108 morgen; this land was divided between 116,848 units, giving an average area per holding of 868.48 morgen (70). By 1960, in contrast, the number of units had dropped to 105,859, but the total area had risen to 107,165,190 morgen, giving an average area per unit of 1,012.34 morgen (71). Furthermore, 80 percent of total farming area was occupied by farms of over 1000 morgen, and 38.1 percent by holdings with an area of over 5,000 morgen each, compared with 1950 proportions of 73.6 percent and 30.5 percent. Expressing the point from a different perspective, by the end of the 1950s, just over one percent of farmers controlled 19 percent (and four percent controlled 38 percent) of white farming area. (Not surprisingly, since government support for maize and, to a lesser extent, wheat farmers had been especially lucrative, a considerable amount of the extended agricultural area was cultivated with these two

68) *Agricultural Census 29*, 1954-55, p.11.

69) *Agricultural Census 34*, 1959-60, p.22.

70) *Agricultural Census 24*, 1949-50, Special Report No. 24, no page number.

71) *Agricultural Census 34*, 1959-60, p.5.

crops. But often this land was not suitable for crop farming, greatly increasing the risk and likelihood of soil erosion: hence the dramatic dust storms which plagued the southern OFS during the late 1950s.)

Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that the South African countryside had become dominated by huge, fully mechanised farms by 1960. While it is true that wheat farming was completely mechanised during the 1950s (72), De Klerk has shown in the case of the Western Transvaal that by 1968 only 25 to 30 percent of the area planted with maize was being harvested by combine, and only 54 percent of the maize crop was being delivered in bulk trailers to centralised grain silos (73). Although some maize farmers attempted to reorganise threshing in such a way that additional labour was saved - by setting up a central threshing point instead of moving the threshing machine from field to field - most were still dependent on human labour. It was only during the late 1960s that extensive mechanisation of South Africa's maize farming occurred.

Moreover, while the number and size of very large farms increased during the 1950s, another interesting trend can be isolated. In 1950, 72,014 farm units - 61.6 percent of the total number of holdings - measured 500 morgen or less. By

72) D. Budlender, "Agriculture and Technology: Four Case Studies" in *Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa* (Cape Town, April 1984), Conference Paper No. 23, p.7.

73) M. de Klerk, "The Impact of Farm Mechanisation on Employment, Incomes and Population Distribution in the Western Transvaal" in *JSAS*, 11, 1, October 1984, pp.88-89.

1954, although the overall area taken up by this category of units had remained constant at approximately 11 percent of total agricultural area, 62.2 percent of all farms occupied 500 morgen or less. (Note that this increase is relative: the actual number of farms in this category decreased absolutely, but at a slower rate than the diminution in the total number of units.) At some point during the middle of the decade, this process was reversed: by 1960, farms of 500 morgen or less constituted 58.7 percent of all units, and occupied only 8.7 percent of total agricultural area. Significantly, however, the average size of holdings in this category had decreased to 149.63 morgen, from 157.9 morgen in 1954 and 165.23 morgen in 1950.

A more thorough statistical analysis is needed to fully understand changes in farm size. However, it does appear that while a process of consolidation and centralisation of agricultural land into larger units was occurring on the one hand, the fragmentation of other land into progressively smaller units was simultaneously gathering pace. This impression is confirmed by evidence gathered by government sources. The 1959-60 *Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of the Rural Areas* was particularly concerned about the proliferation of uneconomic farming units. The commission report noted that in certain areas of the country 70 percent of farming units were uneconomic. One of the regions singled out was the Marico district in the far Western Transvaal. In a case study conducted by the commission, concentrating on 17 farms of which the original average size was 2,590 morgen per farm, it was found that subdivision had resulted in an average

size per holding of 13.3 morgen (74). The traditional Afrikaner system of inheritance, which divided land between sons, was singled out by the commission as one of the principle causes of such fragmentation.

Anxiety was intensified by the fact that many farmers, especially in the Transvaal, had been slow to embrace modern agricultural methods. A growing number of Afrikaners in the rural areas were becoming completely dependent on state support. Speaking to the 1964 Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land (which eventually recommended the establishment of a board to control further subdivision by monitoring bequests), P.W. Vorster, secretary for agricultural technical services, noted with concern:

The *bywoner* system disappeared a number of years ago, but we now have another *bywoner* system, namely farmers who have become *bywoners* of the state.(75)

Clearly, however, farm fragmentation also encouraged rural dwellers to seek their livelihood in the cities. The 1959-60 commission pointed out that the average age of farmers in a peripheral district such as Marico was at least 60 years; virtually no young people and few children remained in the area (76). This was confirmed by S.J.J. de Swardt, secretary of agricultural economics, who told the 1964 select committee:

In order to keep the young people in the rural areas, a higher standard of living necessarily has to be created in the rural areas.(77)

74) UG 7/1959, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of the Rural Areas, 1959-60*, p.24.

75) S.C. (Select Committee; SC) 9/1964, *Report of the Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land*, June 1964, p.41.

76) *Commission on European Occupancy*, p.24.

77) *Select Committee on Subdivision*, p.79.

Yet the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land, and the higher wages available in expanding secondary industries, were not the only catalysts for Afrikaner urbanisation. Agricultural census figures demonstrate that the number of farms managed on behalf of non-resident owners increased substantially during the 1950s. By 1960, 11,411 farming units were owned by people whose main occupation was not in agriculture. In addition, 9,619 holdings covering an area of 18,693,397 morgen (more than 17 percent of white agricultural land) were not managed by their owners; a total of 5,975 of these owners lived in the cities or towns (78). Furthermore, the colour bar that was erected to limit competition from black labour in the urban areas could not be, and was not, applied to farms, leading to a greater substitution of cheap black labour for whites in agriculture than in the urban areas (79). The 1959-60 commission noted, as an illustration, that the number of hired whites dropped from 15,460 in 1946 to 8,040 in 1955, a decrease of 48 percent in ten years.

Furthermore:

Previously the Non-white foreman was simply a leading labourer in charge of a labour gang, but the Commission has obtained considerable evidence that in numerous cases such foremen can be regarded as farm managers rather than mere leading labourers. Witnesses stated that many farms previously occupied by Whites were now managed by Non-white foremen. The homesteads of the White farmers, managers and share-croppers are now either uninhabited, abandoned and neglected, or else are occupied by the Non-white and his family.(80)

78) Agricultural Census 34, 1959-60, p.5. By 1962, according to an inter-departmental enquiry under the chairmanship of P.D. Henning, director of the Department of Agricultural Technical Services, only 80,000 of South Africa's 106,000 white farmers actually worked their land (*Sunday Times*, 16/9/62).

79) Wilson, "Farming", p.145.

80) Commission on European Occupancy, p.19.

As early as 1954, the South African police estimated that a total of 5,419 farms, which in 1945 were still occupied by whites, had since been vacated and were now inhabited by blacks (81). The *Federale Armesorgraad* (Council for Care of the Poor) of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) claimed, in turn, that nearly 18 percent of the country's larger farms were inhabited by Africans (82). According to the 1959-60 commission, this development was particularly prevalent in the southern and south-western parts of the OFS and certain parts of Natal. In the southern OFS, for example, only 75 percent of the land was still occupied by whites, with 13.1 percent of the total area in the charge of black foremen working for white owners (83). In more general terms, between 1950 and 1960 the ratio of blacks to whites on white farms rose from 4.7 to 6.2 (84).

Such statistics aroused uneasiness in all sections of the nationalist alliance. The 1959-60 commission declared that it was essential that a comparatively large white population remained on the *platteland*, as a conservative, stabilising influence on politics:

In a country with a homogenous population, the depopulation of the rural areas would not carry serious dangers, but in this country, with its heterogenous elements, the white *platteland* is largely the pivot of Western civilisation. Should this pivot collapse, white civilisation in the cities, too, would not be able to hold its own in the long run.(85)

81) *Ibid.*, p.19.

82) *Volkshandel*, 16, 7, September 1955, p.60.

83) *Commission on European Occupancy*, p.19.

84) Brand and Tomlinson, "Die Plek van die Landbou", p.32.

85) *Commission on European Occupancy*, p.58.

Church leaders, in turn, talked of a "new and dangerous" problem (86), while ordinary nationalist supporters also expressed their dismay. At congress after congress during the 1950s, local NP branches in every province implored the government to act against *die ontvolking van die platteland* (the depopulation of the countryside). In too many cases, one branch argued, white farms had simply become "cattle stations and native colonies" (87). Various measures were proposed, amongst them a request that the government provide young men with land and cattle in order to keep them in the countryside.

But *ontvolking* was also clearly linked, in the minds of many nationalist Afrikaners, with the actions of the *grootboere* (large farmers). As early as 1948, a contributor to *Inspan* bemoaned the fact that agriculture was increasingly falling into the hands of "large capital" (88). The following year, the Spitskop and Elliot branches of the Cape NP asked the government to protect poor, landless farmers against large landowners who only wanted to employ blacks (89). In 1950, the Petrusville branch of the Party requested that all farmers be made to register, and that farmers who were also employed in other occupations or owned more than 5,000 morgen should be refused registration (90). At the 1951 Cape NP Congress, as many as 13 country branches advocated controls on excessive sales of farms, to prevent the purchase by wealthy farmers of

86) *Die Kerkbode*, 68, 2, 11/7/51, pp.58-59.

87) *Die Volksblad*, 12/9/51.

88) *Inspan*, 7, 12, September 1948, p.5.

89) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Paarl, 1949.

90) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Kimberley, 1950.

blocks of land (91), a call echoed at the OFS NP congress of 1953 (92), and at the Cape synod of the NGK (93). Then, at the 1953 Cape NP congress the Ladismith branch submitted the following motion:

The government is requested to combat the depopulation of the platteland by compelling companies or individuals who own large farm properties to employ a white male over eighteen years at a living wage, and to provide a habitable dwelling, on every farm they possess that makes up an economic unit.(94)

The Burgersdorp branch continued:

This Congress requests that, in the case of farmers, a land tax rather than an income tax is levied. This must be set up to protect the small farmer, and hit the large landowner more heavily, so that the situation where the platteland is depopulated, and belongs to a few, will be prevented.(95)

For the Vakplaas branch in the Transvaal, the solution was obvious: the government must legislate to ensure that landowners must occupy their own farms, or hand over management to other whites rather than to African foremen (96).

For the most part, however, these protestations were in vain. By 1960, a relatively small number of powerful farmers and "land capitalists" controlled a sizeable proportion of

91) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, East London, 1951.

92) OFS NP, *Congress Agenda*, Bloemfontein, 1953.

93) *Die Burger*, 29/10/53.

94) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Port Elizabeth, 1953.

95) Cape NP, *Congress Agenda*, Port Elizabeth, 1953.

96) *Die Burger*, 6/9/56.

South African agriculture. Undoubtedly, some smaller farmers also benefitted from the huge government input into this sector of the economy. But a growing number of poor farmers forsook the land for the towns; the livelihood of those who remained behind on over-divided uneconomic tracts was only guaranteed by government aid. While the *grootboer* grew richer from the fruits of a lucrative decade, the *kleinboer* (small farmer) seems to have become poorer, or given up altogether.

v

It is convenient to begin a breakdown of Afrikaner urban employment with the highest-paid occupational category. Tables 6 and 7 show that just under three percent of all economically active Afrikaners (3.6 percent of Afrikaner males and 1.1 percent of Afrikaner females) in the urban areas could be classed as directors, managers and working owners by 1960 (97). In other words, between 1946 and 1960, there was only a slight increase (just over one percent) in the proportion of Afrikaners employed in these managerial occupations:

English-speaking South Africans retained control of much of the private sector of the economy. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that this small group of Afrikaner entrepreneurs and capitalists made no advances at all between 1946 and 1960.

97) These figures exclude working owners in the wholesale and retail trade. The figures for directors, managers and working owners in Table 5 include statistics for working owners in the wholesale and retail trade: it will be seen that 4.2 percent of the total Afrikaner male workforce were employed in this category in 1960, compared with 13.7 percent of English-speaking males.

For one thing, Afrikaner capital could now rely on a sympathetic government. As Davies et al note:

With respect to Afrikaner capital, a number of interventions were made to protect Afrikaner firms and to integrate them on favourable terms into the emerging relations of monopoly capital. These included handing over "plum" government contracts to Afrikaner firms, transferring the bank accounts of government departments, local authorities and state corporations to Afrikaner financial institutions, and appointing leading Afrikaner businessmen to a range of official boards where they were able to influence decisions in ways favourable to their interests. (98)

Considerably helped, too, by the low level of African wages (99), many Afrikaner firms and corporations found the 1950s to be a relatively prosperous period. For Sanlam, Rembrandt and Volkscas - the three major Afrikaner corporations - it was a decade of lucrative investment and profit.

Sanlam's economic expansion during the 1930s and 1940s is extensively documented elsewhere (100). By the time of the second *ekonomiese volkskongres* in 1950, the Sanlam group had developed into a financial conglomerate which dominated what there was of Afrikaner business. By 1950, the combined assets of the two parent companies Sanlam and the *Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust Maatskappy* (South African National Trust Company; Santam) were valued at approximately R45-million (101). Yet it is illustrative of the group's rapid growth during the 1950s that the combined assets of Sanlam and Santam

98) R. Davies, D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa* (London, Zed Books, 1984), p.23.

99) See p.89 of this chapter.

100) See, for example, O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*.

101) *The South African Financial Yearbook* (Cape Town, Beerman, 1951), pp.1036-1041.

measured almost R190-million by 1960 (102). In the financial year 1959-60 alone, Sanlam's total assets grew by R16-million. Other economic indicators also bear witness to Sanlam's expansion. In 1959, Sanlam, now the second biggest South African insurance company (out of 46), obtained new business for a total sum assured of R340-million (103), compared with a sum assured of R50-million in 1950 (104); by 1960, the company's net income amounted to R34-million per year (105), in comparison with an income of less than R10-million in 1950 (106). Throughout the decade, Sanlam managers ensured that the company declared relatively small dividends, so that profits could be quickly reinvested (107).

Nevertheless, the above figures do not adequately describe the extent of the Sanlam group's proliferation, since the Sanlam management exercised effective control over a number of other concerns, and was thus able to centralise loose money in different ways, drawing on different sources of capital (108). The three most important Sanlam "subsidiaries" were the *Federale Groep* (Federal Group), the Bonus Investment Corporation of South Africa (Bonuscor), and *Saambou* (Build Together) Building Society. The *Federale Groep* arose out of the deliberations of the 1939 *ekonomiese volkskongres*. The *volkskongres* decided to create a finance company - *Federale Volksbeleggings* (Federal Volks Investments; FVB) - to mobilise

102) *The South African Financial Yearbook* (Cape Town, Beerman, 1961), pp.610-613.

103) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, p.34.

104) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1951, p.1039.

105) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, p.34.

106) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, p.1037.

107) A.D. Wassenaar, interview, 12/1/87.

108) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.208.

and centralise Afrikaner capital, and invest in a range of Afrikaner undertakings (109). Sanlam's management was mandated to set up FVB: from that point onwards, Sanlam directors maintained a controlling interest in the new company. FVB soon began to make inroads into various sectors of industry. By the mid-1940s - after establishing toeholds in fishing, the manufacture of farm implements, the chemical industry and coalmining - the company management decided that a division of labour was necessary. Two new subsidiaries were formed: henceforth, *Federale Nywerhede* (Federal Industries) would coordinate the group's industrial interests, while *Federale Beleggings* (Federal Investments) acted as a "pure" investment company, providing management and investment advice. FVB, as parent company, continued to manage the group as a whole, and make finance available for new projects. By 1950, the total issued capital of FVB and its subsidiaries amounted to more than R8-million; while the group directly and indirectly controlled companies with total assets of approximately R15-million (110).

Bonuscor was even more closely connected with Sanlam. The company was set up in 1946 with a specific purpose: to provide Sanlam's financial directors with access to risk capital for further investment, by giving policy-holders the option of converting their dividends into shares in a new investment corporation. By 1950, the company's total assets reached the R2-million mark. With a net profit of more than

109) See O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, pp.108-113.

110) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1951, pp.443-445.

R90,000 it was able to pay a dividend of 5 percent per share (111).

Saambou effectively came into being in 1943 when Sanlam intervened to prevent the *Unie-Bouvereniging* (Union Building Society) - previously funded by the *Spoorbond* (Railway League) and *Volkskas* - from going into liquidation. Saambou immediately moved its headquarters to Cape Town; subsequently, Sanlam's leadership directly supervised the affairs of the new building society. With Sanlam's national networks at its disposal, Saambou was soon in a healthier financial state. By 1950, the fixed deposits and capital of the company had passed R2-million, while its total assets stood at R3.4-million (112).

In the decade after 1950, the expansion of the Federale Group, Bonuscor and Saambou rapidly accelerated. By the end of 1955, Saambou had grown into the sixth biggest building society in the country (out of 31) (113), with total assets of more than R30-million (114). By 1960, Saambou's assets were valued at more than R60-million. Bonuscor's assets increased to R8.5-million by 1955 and totalled R16.4-million by the end of 1960; the company was able to pay out a dividend of 6.5 percent in 1960, on a net profit of R694,000. And the total assets of FVB - without taking into account the holdings of all of its subsidiaries - were valued at almost R12-million at

111) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, pp.197-198. See also SA Financial Yearbook, 1951, pp.228-230.

112) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, pp.195-196. See also SA Financial Yearbook, 1951, Volume 2, p.307.

113) *Volkshandel*, 17, 3, May 1956, p.16.

114) *Volkshandel*, 17, 4, June 1956, p.23.

the close of the 1959-60 financial year, when the company also declared a profit of R597,000 (115).

Equally important, however, was the fact that Bonuscor and FVB procured interests in a number of other undertakings, in all sectors of the economy. Moreover, the thrust of Bonuscor and FVB's investment policy shifted during the 1950s: Bonuscor, in particular, concentrated on the acquisition of mining holdings. (By 1960, 39 percent of the corporation's holdings were in mining companies (116), compared with 22.3 percent in 1956 (117), 14.3 percent in 1953 (118) and only 2.9 percent in 1949 (119).) In June 1953, Bonuscor and the Federale Group merged their mining interests to form *Federale Mynbou* (Federal Mining). From a strong base in the coalmining industry - further consolidated by the award of a government contract to supply all the coal for Iscor - *Federale Mynbou* was soon mining other minerals. By 1960, in addition to a number of coal subsidiaries - including *Klippoortje*, *Koornfontein*, *Blinkpan*, *Alpha* and *Federale Prospekteerders* - *Federale Mynbou* had also acquired *Chrome Mines*, *Rosey Cross Asbestos*, and *Barberton Mines*, a company which owned the *Fairview* and *Three Sisters* shallow-reef gold mines in the Eastern Transvaal. *Federale Mynbou's* management also began to build a substantial portfolio of the quoted shares of other gold mining companies. Eventually, in September 1960, the investment company *Mynkor Beleggings* was set up to "spread

115) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, pp.155-156, 271-272, 307.

116) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, p.156.

117) *Volkshandel*, 18, 3, May 1957, p.52.

118) *Volkshandel*, 15, 4, June 1954, p.36.

119) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.199.

funds over widely distributed and soundly selected share investments in mining" (120).

Yet Bonuscor and the Federale Group did not limit their efforts to the mining sector. Federale Nywerhede soon took control of the fishing and canning industry through its subsidiaries Marine Products, Namib Fisheries, and the Tuna Corporation. The company also established a powerful position in the chemical industry when it acquired a substantial share of the previously state-owned Klipfontein Organic Products Corporation, to go along with its interests in Cape Lime and Agricura Laboratories. Federale Beleggings, in turn, took over Gearing and Jameson Holdings - who owned the important Gearings Foundry - to create Fedmar Ltd. In addition, both Bonuscor and FVB developed significant interests in a number of commercial and financial concerns, including, amongst others, Federale Lenings, Federal Brokers, the Champions Group, W. Woods, the South African Farm Implements Manufacturers, Cape Hotels, Phil Morkel Ltd, the Trust Bank, Wire Industries, Boskor Saagmeule, Motor & Industriële Beleggings, the Central Finance Corporation, Brink Broers, Sonop, Uniewinkels, Nasionale Pers and Veka Ltd (121).

By 1960, therefore, Sanlam had fashioned a wide-ranging economic empire, either directly, or through the efforts of its subsidiaries. How successful were Volkskas and Rembrandt, the two other Afrikaner economic giants? The growth of Volkskas during the 1950s was impressive. In 1948, after 14

120) SA Financial Yearbook, 1961, pp.267-270.

121) The information in this paragraph was gathered from the SA Financial Yearbook and numerous issues of Volkshandel.

years of operation, eight as a registered commercial bank, the company's total assets were valued at approximately R30-million; it declared a dividend of 5 percent per share on a net profit of R198,000 (122). By 1955, Volkskas was the third largest of South Africa's seven commercial banks (123), with assets of R100-million (124). By 1960, the bank's assets totalled R175-million, and its net profit had rocketed to R1.125-million, of which 7.5 percent was issued to shareholders as dividend (125). Furthermore, the number of branches and agencies managed by Volkskas increased from 76 in 1950 to more than 250 in 1960. Significantly, however, Volkskas was much slower than the Sanlam group to diversify its interests. The company began to expand into other sectors with the formation of its wholly-owned subsidiary Volkskas Investment Corporation in 1958, but its activities remained more tied to banking and finance than did those of its rival in Cape Town.

The case of Anton Rupert's Rembrandt Corporation was slightly different. Rupert established the Rembrandt Tobacco Company in 1947 with profits he had earned in the liquor industry, through *Tegniese en Industriële Beleggings* (Technical and Industrial Investment). In 1950, Rembrandt's total assets were worth just over R1-million; the company and its subsidiaries produced a net profit of R211,000 (126). By the end of 1960, in contrast, the Rembrandt group's assets

122) SA Financial Yearbook, 1951, pp.1242-1243.

123) Volkshandel, 16, 3, May 1955, pp.25-26.

124) Volkshandel, 16, 5, July 1955, p.75.

125) SA Financial Yearbook, 1961, Volume 2, pp.333-334.

126) SA Financial Yearbook, 1951, p.899.

were valued at R110-million, and it maintained reserves and unappropriated profits of more than R30-million. The significance of these figures is that they reflect worldwide investment. For while Rupert's interests were almost exclusively confined to tobacco and liquor - the latter through the Distiller's Corporation - he was the first Afrikaner businessman to expand internationally. By 1960, the Rembrandt Group operated 17 factories in ten countries, including the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Holland, Italy and Switzerland (127). Rupert proudly stated in 1960 that one out of every 60 cigarettes being smoked in the world, including Russia and China, carried a trade mark (such as Rothmans) of the Rembrandt Group.

Nevertheless, the spectacular progress of the Sanlam, Volkskas and Rembrandt groups needs to be placed in perspective. Although the three major Afrikaner corporations had closed the gap between themselves and their English-speaking rivals, in general Afrikaner business still languished far behind. By 1956, Afrikaner financial institutions - in other words, Sanlam, Saambou, Volkskas and the recently-formed Trust Bank, plus a handful of other smaller banks - controlled only eight percent of South Africa's banking assets, only four percent of building society assets, and just 16 percent of the assets held by life assurance companies (128). By 1963-64 (see Table 1), the

127) *SA Financial Yearbook*, 1961, pp.536-539. See also *Volkshandel*, 17, 7, September 1956, p.19.

128) *Volkshandel*, 17, 9, November 1956, p.13.

Afrikaner share of the GDP produced by financial undertakings was still only 21 percent. Table 1 also shows that notwithstanding the efforts by companies such as Sanlam to diversify into other sectors of the economy, in 1963-64 Afrikaners controlled just ten percent of South Africa's manufacturing industries, and ten percent of its mining (129). Moreover, as Table 8 demonstrates, only 26 percent of white male directors, managers and working owners were Afrikaners.

Even then, these figures do not paint a complete picture, since it was the large Afrikaner companies which made the most significant economic advances. By the late 1950s - partly as a result of a decision by the 1950 *ekonomiese volkskongres* that the RDB should reserve its assistance for large, well-established institutions rather than small undertakings (130) - the majority of Afrikaner manufacturing concerns were still one-man operations, a trend replicated in other sectors of the economy. While a relatively small network of wealthy directors and entrepreneurs had developed within the Sanlam, Volkskas and Rembrandt groups - and it is illuminating to see how often names such as M.S. Louw, C.F. Albertyn, J.P. Theron, C.R. Louw, A.D. Wassenaar, W.B. Coetzer, C.H. Brink, T.F. Muller, H.S. Marais, S.J. Naude, C.F.J. Human, C.G.W. Schumann, S.A. Hofmeyr, J.S. Marais, G.J. van Zyl and P.R. Rorich crop up in the directors lists of Afrikaner companies of all sizes - most Afrikaner businessmen struggled to penetrate an economic world dominated by English

129) It should be noted, however, that Table 1 does not include income derived from semi-state, mainly Afrikaner-controlled enterprises such as Iscor and Sasol.

130) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.218. See also *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950.

capital.

VI

Further down the occupational scale, two general tendencies immediately become evident. Firstly, although there was only a small increase in the number of directors and managers during the 1950s, the proportion of Afrikaners employed in other "white-collar" occupations rose substantially, from 29 percent in 1946 to 43.5 percent in 1960 (131). It is clear from Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 that the number of Afrikaner clerks and professionals, in particular, increased markedly. By 1960, 25 percent of all economically active Afrikaners in the urban areas were working as clerks, and another 11 percent in professional and technical occupations. Secondly, the proportion of urban Afrikaners employed in "blue-collar" occupations remained fairly static between 1946 and 1960, at approximately 40 percent. Given these broad classifications, the most likely account of Afrikaner urbanisation during the 1950s is that migrants from the countryside found lower-income work in the urban areas, while other better-educated and better-paid workers simultaneously moved up into white-collar employment.

Yet the number of "blue-collar" Afrikaners performing skilled and semi-skilled labour also increased during the 1950s. To take just two examples, by 1960 Afrikaners constituted 45 percent of white male fitters and turners in

131) Giliomee, "Advance", p.169.

the urban areas, and 52 percent of carpenters (132), compared with 1948 estimates of 21 percent and 46 percent respectively (133). At the same time, the proportion of Afrikaners involved in unskilled work fell consistently. Between 1946 and 1960, the number of whites described in censuses as labourers decreased by 61 percent (134): by 1960, only 2.4 percent of economically active Afrikaner males were employed as unskilled workers (see Table 5). Furthermore, the number of white production and maintenance workers in manufacturing fell from 124,965 in 1950-51 (25 percent of the total number of production workers) to 113,911 (19 percent) in 1960-61, at a time when employment of production workers rose by 16 percent (135).

These figures clearly illustrate the effect of a more rigorous application of the industrial colour bar, to the advantage of the NP government's white wage-earning constituency. Indeed, twice in the 1950s, the government acted to legally entrench statutory job reservation: in the construction industry in 1951, with the Native Building Workers Act; and with Section 77 of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, which allowed the Minister to issue a determination imposing legally enforceable work reservation in such a way that racial quotas for particular industries could be prescribed. Yet, as Davies notes, the former was intended

132) Van Wyk, *Beroepslewe*, p.88.

133) Pauw, "Afrikaanse Ondernemer", p.113.

134) Davies, *White Labour*, p.351.

135) Bureau of Statistics, *Industrial Censuses 1950-51 to 1960-61; Summary Report: Manufacturing*, Report No. IC.69, 1967, p.10.

more as a solution to the post-war housing crisis - by providing for the training of African building workers to construct sub-economic African housing - than as a concession to the demands of white workers (136). Moreover, although Section 77 was the government's main legislative concession to white wage-earners, it was never comprehensively applied. Instead, the government continued to enforce a labour policy which "floated" the colour bar: white wage-earners were progressively promoted from "productive" labour to supervisory positions, while lower-paid black workers were permitted to occupy the vacated labour slots (137).

Emphasising this point, some scholars have argued that the majority of the 40 percent of Afrikaners employed in "blue-collar" categories can be classified as members of a "new" petty bourgeoisie (138). Given that 36 percent of Afrikaners in the urban areas were employed either as clerks or professionals, a further six percent worked in sales occupations (category 4 in Tables 6 and 7), and seven percent were employed in other service or "recreational" occupations (category 10 in Tables 6 and 7), one could then postulate that more than 80 percent of Afrikaners in the urban areas - and certainly a good two-thirds of all Afrikaners in South Africa - were members of a broadly-defined petty bourgeois class by 1960.

136) Davies, *White Labour*, p.344.

137) R. Davies, "Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa" in *JSAS*, 5, 2, April 1979, p.185.

138) Davies, particularly, uses work by Poulantzas to argue this point.

It remains necessary, however, to differentiate the constituents of this vast, indistinguishable "petty bourgeois" mass. Although Afrikaner wage-earners of the late 1950s might have belonged, in some extremely rigorous theoretical sense, to a "new", enlarged petty bourgeoisie, it is historically useful to mark them as a distinct sub-group. Clearly, Afrikaner "workers" cannot be described in the same analytical terms as the mainly black, "productive" working class. Certainly, by 1960, the divisions between the "blue-collar" and "white-collar" work performed by Afrikaner wage-earners were blurred. Yet, it is too ambitious to subsume Afrikaner wage-earners - together with intellectuals, professionals and so on - into a supposedly homogenous petty bourgeoisie, and then presume that they held identical ideological positions to their fellow class-members. Nor can one imply that they enjoyed the same access to power, patronage, mobility, and capital. In a similar vein, although just 5,000 urbanised Afrikaners owned and ran enterprises in the wholesale and retail trade in 1960, it seems expedient to retain some notion of an Afrikaner trading group or class. An all-encompassing notion of the "petty bourgeoisie" goes so far as to lump traders together with the clerks and shop assistants whom they employed - nearly 60,000 Afrikaners were involved in the wholesale and retail trade in 1960 (see Tables 9 and 10) - when it cannot be assumed that their material interests and ideological orientation coincided.

Most importantly, in the light of those chapters of this thesis which deal with Sabra and the DRC, it is absolutely

vital to delineate an Afrikaner "intelligentsia". From the 1930s onwards, Afrikaner intellectuals participated in an extraordinarily direct way in both political action and the formulation and dissemination of nationalist ideology. Furthermore, in the context of Afrikaner nationalist politics, the scope of the concept "intellectual" can easily be extended, for it was not only the traditional categories of intellectuals - writers, artists and so on - who were active in intense and rigorous ideological discussions and conflicts. As we have seen in Chapter Two, of the 3,500 Afrikaners who were members of Broederbond cells by the mid-1950s, more than 2,000 were school teachers, nearly 400 were clergymen in the DRC, and another 160 or so were lawyers.

The swift expansion of employment in the public sector further complicates this examination of the occupational status of urban Afrikaners. By 1960, 346,278 white South Africans, approximately 30 percent of the economically active white population - and the overwhelming majority of whom were Afrikaners - worked for public authorities and public corporations (139). Almost 60,000 Afrikaners - about ten percent of working Afrikaners - were employed as civil servants by central government, the provincial administration and the local authorities. When one takes into account that at least another 75,000 Afrikaners worked for the government in transport and communications, and many construction, electricity and steel workers were also on the payroll of the

139) Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 1960*, Volume 6: Industry, Table A9.

state, it is clear that public sector employment - with its attendant in-house ideologies and vested interests - was a pervasive influence at all levels of the Afrikaner occupational structure.

It is equally interesting to note that, although a large number of white-collar civil servants were lowly office clerks, the public service had also become a popular and safe career path for better-educated Afrikaners. Swayed perhaps by a concerted recruitment drive by the Public Service Commission - in 1960 alone, the Commission visited 369 white high schools and all the white universities (140) - many Afrikaner matriculants and graduates began to apply for posts in the burgeoning bureaucracies of the major government ministries. The bureaucracy necessary to administer and implement apartheid grew most quickly. In 1948, approximately 1,750 white public servants were employed by the Department of Native Affairs (141). By 1960, in contrast, more than 3,000 posts were open to whites in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and the Department of Bantu Education (142). Although top officials in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development continually complained about staff shortages, each of the department's official reports

140) RP 36/1964, *52nd Report of the Public Service Commission*, 1963, p.7.

141) UG 35/1949, *Report of the Department of Native Affairs*, 1947-48, p.2.

142) This figure was calculated using RP 78/1964, *Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development*, 1960-62; RP 26/1963, *Report of the Department of Bantu Education*, 1961; Union, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, 39, 7, July 1960, pp.113-114.

included an updated organisational plan to illustrate the increasingly byzantine complexity of the apartheid bureaucracy. Clearly, many jobs in other government ministries also involved the supervision of apartheid legislation.

A final point needs to be made about Afrikaner urban employment. In 1960, the total white population of South Africa's 14 principal metropolitan areas was measured at 1,900,262 (143). Given that the total number of whites in all urban areas was 2,571,883, it is apparent that a significant number (more than half a million) were resident in smaller towns. To be more specific, approximately 131,000 Afrikaner males (37 percent of the economically active Afrikaner male population in the urban areas) were employed outside the fourteen principal metropolitan districts (144). Thus many Afrikaners, while working in officially-designated urban areas, retained much closer links with the traditional *platteland* way of life than their compatriots in the large cities. Furthermore, an inspection of figures for officially-defined "rural" areas establishes that another 50,000 Afrikaners residing on the *platteland* were not employed in occupations directly related to farming: in other words, many Afrikaners lived and worked in tiny villages and hamlets.

143) This figure was calculated using data in Bureau of Statistics, *Urban and Rural Population*. The 14 metropolitan areas are Johannesburg, Germiston, the East Rand, the West Rand, Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark, Pretoria, Cape Town, East London, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, Durban-Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein, and the Free State goldfields.
144) This figure was derived from Van Wyk, *Beroepslewe*, tables 4.2, 6.1 and 6.2.

While it may be tempting to slot these people into the analytical categories applicable to urban areas - in this case perhaps to think of them as members of the sub-groups of that large Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie - their close links with the Afrikaner farming community, and their obvious cultural distance from life in the cities, should always be considered.

VII

What are the most salient economic and sociological trends that have been pinpointed in this chapter? Firstly, although Afrikaner educational and income levels improved considerably during the 1950s, English-speaking South Africans still enjoyed clear advantages. Secondly, Afrikaner agriculture became increasingly polarised between wealthy farming capitalists and poor, struggling farmers. Thirdly, while the Sanlam, Rembrandt and Volkskas groups grew rapidly, only a small number of urban Afrikaners succeeded as entrepreneurs and industrialists. Fourthly, the proportion of Afrikaners employed in "white-collar" occupations - particularly as clerks, teachers and professionals - increased substantially. Fifthly, a growing number of Afrikaners were employed in the public sector. The task of the following chapter will be to relate these economic, occupational and social tendencies to political and ideological developments within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance.

TABLE 1: The Afrikaner's Share in the Private Sector of the South African Economy in the Entrepreneurial Function.

Sector	(Percent of total)		
	1948/9	Year 1954/5	1963/4
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	85	84	83
Mining	1	1	10
Manufacturing and construction	6	6	10
Trade and commerce	25	26	24
Transportation	9	14	14
Liquor and catering	20	30	30
Professions	16	20	27
Finance	6	10	21
Sundry	27	35	36
Total	24.8	25.4	26.9
Total excluding agriculture	9.6	13.4	18.0
(% of GDP if 100% of entrepreneurial activity in the public sector is attributed to Afrikaners)	40.3	41.0	43.0

Source: H. Giliomee, "The Afrikaner Economic Advance", in H. Adam and H. Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilised (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979), Table 3 (based on a table prepared by J.L. Sadie)

D. Welsh, "The Political Economy of Afrikaner Nationalism", in A. Leftwich, South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change (London, Allison Busby, 1974), p.263

J.L. Sadie, Die Afrikaner in die Landseconomie (SABC, 1957)

Volkshandel, 11, 7, September 1950

Volkshandel, 14, 7, September 1953

Volkshandel, 16, 3, May 1955

Inspan, 10, 2, November 1950

Inspan, 10, 3, December 1950

TABLE 2: Ratio of Income of Afrikaners to English

Year	Personal income	Per capita income
1946	40:60	100:211
1954/55	44:56	100:170
1960	47:53	100:156

Source: Giliomee, "The Afrikaner Economic Advance", in Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilised, Table 7 (based on tables prepared by S.J. Terreblanche of Stellenbosch University)

Sadie, Die Afrikaner in die Landseconomie

TABLE 3: Income by Home Language, South African whites, 1960.

Income (Rand)	Afrikaans	English	Other	Total
No income	1,097,941	587,735	78,452	1,764,128
Under 100	13,156	9,224	1,087	23,467
100 - 199	13,609	10,386	1,132	25,127
200 - 299	52,957	26,741	2,853	82,551
300 - 399	26,026	16,483	1,695	44,204
400 - 499	25,184	17,896	1,942	45,022
500 - 599	20,719	14,618	1,721	37,058
600 - 699	38,710	24,285	2,914	65,909
700 - 799	38,438	25,309	2,873	66,620
800 - 999	54,617	40,506	4,726	99,849
1,000 - 1,199	50,667	35,957	4,165	90,789
1,200 - 1,599	87,499	65,055	8,581	161,135
1,600 - 1,999	95,733	65,995	10,026	171,754
2,000 - 2,999	106,668	105,886	14,843	227,397
3,000 - 3,999	27,676	37,268	4,098	69,042
4,000 - 4,999	12,059	19,463	1,882	33,404
5,000 - 5,999	5,109	9,182	845	15,136
6,000 - 7,999	5,162	9,680	788	15,630
8,000 - 9,999	2,591	4,100	339	7,030
10,000 - 14,999	2,391	3,782	270	6,443
15,000 - 19,999	914	1,129	115	2,158
20,000 - 29,999	562	590	57	1,209
30,000 +	401	414	28	843
?	9,613	10,052	1,890	21,555
TOTAL	1,788,402	1,141,736	147,322	3,077,460

Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1960, Volume 5: Personal Income

TABLE 4: Level of Education by Home Language, South African whites, 1960.

Note: E.A.= Economically active N.E.A.= Not economically active

Level of Education		Afrikaans	English	Other	Total
School education only					
?	E.A.	3,945	11,694	4,885	20,524
	E.A. and N.E.A.	21,088	46,419	11,147	78,654
None	E.A.	6,841	2,548	888	10,277
	E.A. and N.E.A.	330,923	155,146	20,957	507,026
Up to Std 5	E.A.	47,758	9,100	4,162	61,020
	E.A. and N.E.A.	405,831	164,270	23,755	593,856
Std 6 and 7	E.A.	242,501	123,061	13,613	379,175
	E.A. and N.E.A.	516,581	260,208	28,066	804,855
Std 8	E.A.	132,979	111,779	13,062	257,820
	E.A. and N.E.A.	234,230	190,457	22,457	447,144
Std 9	E.A.	23,044	24,031	2,313	49,388
	E.A. and N.E.A.	49,598	46,339	4,238	100,175
Std 10	E.A.	74,344	88,876	11,349	174,569
	E.A. and N.E.A.	113,269	143,768	18,369	275,406
Degree only					
Bachelors					
General					
Full course					
	E.A.	4,019	4,798	502	9,319
	E.A. and N.E.A.	5,908	8,095	752	14,755
Part of course					
	E.A.	1,822	1,443	169	3,434
	E.A. and N.E.A.	4,412	3,869	442	8,723
Professional					
Full course					
	E.A.	7,809	12,335	1,524	21,668
	E.A. and N.E.A.	8,754	13,832	1,687	24,273
Part of course					
	E.A.	1,443	1,401	162	3,006
	E.A. and N.E.A.	3,376	3,362	441	7,179
Masters					
General					
Full course					
	E.A.	810	1,240	163	2,213
	E.A. and N.E.A.	982	1,657	208	2,847
Part of course					
	E.A.	338	469	60	867
	E.A. and N.E.A.	481	660	86	1,227

Professional					
Full course					
	E.A.	743	601	137	1,481
	E.A. and N.E.A.	774	663	149	1,586
Part of course					
	E.A.	111	75	6	192
	E.A. and N.E.A.	126	92	10	228
Doctors					
General					
	E.A.	538	516	196	1,250
	E.A. and N.E.A.	588	602	221	1,411
Professional					
	E.A.	421	594	301	1,316
	E.A. and N.E.A.	453	676	339	1,468
Diploma with-					
Bachelors degree					
	E.A.	8,245	5,799	628	14,672
	E.A. and N.E.A.	10,262	7,190	728	8,180
Masters degree					
	E.A.	1,112	729	82	1,923
	E.A. and N.E.A.	1,186	835	95	2,116
Doctoral degree					
	E.A.	262	354	70	686
	E.A. and N.E.A.	276	392	78	746
Std 10					
Full course					
	E.A.	33,673	44,767	6,338	84,778
	E.A. and N.E.A.	50,422	58,961	8,049	117,432
Part of course					
	E.A.	1,503	2,760	183	4,446
	E.A. and N.E.A.	3,381	3,716	274	7,371
Std 9 or less					
	E.A.	18,063	24,913	3,564	46,540
	E.A. and N.E.A.	25,570	30,752	4,568	60,890
TOTAL					
	E.A.	612,324	473,881	64,359	1,150,564
	E.A. and N.E.A.	1,788,651	1,141,781	147,116	3,077,548

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1960, Volume 4: Education
 Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1964

TABLE 5: The occupational structure of the total white male workforce in the two main language groups in different years.

Occupation Group	(Percent of total)					
	1960		Year 1951		1946	
	Afr.	Eng.	Afr.	Eng.	Afr.	Eng.
1. Professionals, teachers, technicians	6.8	14.5	5.0	12.0	4.3	9.9
2. Directors, managers, working owners	4.2	13.7	4.1	13.9	3.1	11.3
3. Clerks	13.8	18.5	10.2	17.8	7.2	15.9
4. Insurance and estate agents, shop assistants, sales travellers, factory reps	2.6	8.5	2.6	7.2	1.9	6.7
5. Farmers, farm foremen, foresters, fishermen	19.9	4.6	27.7	5.9	35.0	6.7
6. Mineworkers, mine supervisors, shift bosses, diggers	4.7	2.2	4.9	3.1	4.5	3.4
7. Sailors, engine-drivers, stokers, conductors, tally clerks, messengers, telephonists, etc	10.2	4.0	9.3	4.2	9.5	6.1
8. Artisans, fitters and turners, toolmakers, mechanics, other skilled and semi-skilled workers	27.1	28.3	23.6	29.3	20.5	30.3
9. Unskilled labourers	2.4	0.5	4.4	0.7	5.5	0.9
10. Policemen, caretakers, cleaners, cooks, barmen, other service workers	6.1	3.5	5.8	4.3	6.0	6.9
11. Unemployed, unidentified	2.2	1.8	2.3	1.6	2.5	1.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: S. Van Wyk, Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe van die Stad (Pretoria, Academica, 1968)
 Bureau of Census and Statistics, Agricultural Census 34, 1959-60
 Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry

TABLE 6: Occupation groups according to home language: white men in the urban areas, 1960.

Occupation group	(Percent of total)				
	Afrikaans	English	Afr./Eng.	Other	All languages
1. Professionals, teachers, technicians	8.2	15.0	10.0	12.8	11.3
2. Directors, managers, working owners	3.6	10.9	6.7	10.3	7.1
3. Clerks	17.3	19.5	18.1	6.7	17.8
4. Working owners: wholesale and retail trade, insurance and estate agents, shop assistants, sales travellers, factory representatives	4.4	11.9	8.4	14.8	8.2
5. Farmers, farm foremen, foresters, fishermen	2.7	1.0	1.2	3.1	1.9
6. Mineworkers, mine supervisors, shift bosses, diggers	5.5	2.3	4.4	3.1	4.0
7. Sailors, engine-drivers, stokers, conductors, tally clerks, messengers, telephonists, etc	12.5	4.2	7.9	1.4	8.3
8. Artisans, fitters and turners, toolmakers, mechanics, other skilled and semi-skilled workers	32.8	29.4	32.8	43.0	31.8
9. Manual labourers	2.9	0.5	1.1	0.1	1.7
10. Policemen, caretakers, cleaners, cooks, barmen, other service workers	7.6	3.6	6.9	3.0	5.7
11. Unemployed, unidentified	2.5	1.8	2.5	1.8	2.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	354,127	300,346	14,145	30,545	699,163

Source: Van Wyk, Beroepslewe
Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry

TABLE 7: Occupation groups according to home language: white women in the urban areas, 1960.

Occupation group	(Percent of total)				
	Afrikaans	English	Afr./Eng.	Other	All languages
1. Professionals, teachers, technicians	18.7	16.3	14.6	21.7	17.5
2. Directors, managers, working owners	1.1	2.4	2.7	3.3	1.8
3. Clerks	46.8	54.0	47.0	34.8	50.1
4. Working owners: wholesale and retail trade, insurance and estate agents, shop assistants, sales travellers, factory representatives	11.6	12.7	13.7	12.6	12.3
5. Farmers, farm foremen, foresters, fishermen	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.3
6. Mineworkers, mine supervisors, shift bosses, diggers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
7. Messengers, telephonists, road transport managers, other communication workers	4.1	1.5	2.4	0.4	2.6
8. Artisans, fitters and turners, toolmakers, mechanics, other skilled and semi-skilled workers	7.1	4.7	8.1	12.7	6.1
9. Manual labourers	0.6	0.3	2.2	0.2	0.5
10. Policewomen, cleaners, cooks, stewards, hairdressers, beauticians, other service workers	5.4	5.2	5.5	9.1	5.4
11. Unemployed, unidentified	4.2	2.8	3.7	4.7	3.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	119,922	143,846	6,135	8,319	278,292

Source: Van Wyk, Beroepslewe
Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry

TABLE 8: Home language distribution according to occupation group: white men in the urban areas, 1960.

(Percent of total)

Occupation group	Afrikaans	English	Afr./Eng.	Other	TOTAL	Number
1. Professionals, teachers, technicians	36.5	56.8	1.8	4.9	100.0	79,139
2. Directors, managers, working owners	25.9	65.9	1.9	6.3	100.0	49,850
3. Clerks	49.3	47.0	2.1	1.6	100.0	124,437
4. Working owners: wholesale and retail trade, insurance and estate agents, shop assistants, sales travellers, factory representatives	27.5	62.5	2.1	7.9	100.0	56,922
5. Farmers, farm foremen, foresters, fishermen	69.9	21.9	1.3	7.0	100.0	13,514
6. Mineworkers, mine supervisors, shift bosses, diggers	70.2	24.2	2.2	3.4	100.0	27,921
7. Sailors, engine-drivers, stokers, conductors, tally clerks, messengers, telephonists, etc	75.9	21.4	1.9	0.7	100.0	58,159
8. Artisans, fitters and turners, toolmakers, mechanics, other skilled and semi-skilled workers	52.3	39.7	2.1	5.9	100.0	222,349
9. Manual labourers	85.8	12.6	1.3	0.3	100.0	11,787
10. Policemen, caretakers, cleaners, cooks, barmen, other service workers	67.8	27.4	2.5	2.3	100.0	39,799
11. Unemployed, unidentified	57.9	36.3	2.3	3.5	100.0	15,216
TOTAL economically active: %	50.6	43.0	2.0	4.4	100.0	
Number	354,127	300,346	14,145	30,545		699,163

Source: Van Wyk, Beroepslewe
Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry

TABLE 9: Afrikaner males by census-designated branch of industry: South Africa, 1960.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing	96,440
Mining and Quarrying	36,774
Manufacturing	
Basic metal industries	12,157
Metal products	8,010
Transport equipment	16,974
Other	35,725
Total	72,868
Construction	43,882
Electricity, gas and water	4,224
Commerce and finance	
Wholesale and retail trade	29,348
Motor trade	12,982
Banks and financial institutions	6,379
Insurance	4,408
Company direction	52
Other	2,872
Total	56,041
Transport, storage, and communication	
Railways, road, water, air	60,512
Other	12,272
Total	72,784
Government, recreation, personal services	
Government	48,822
Educational	13,758
Medical and health services	5,238
Religious organisations	2,530
Legal services	1,404
Other	11,522
Total	83,274
Unemployed and unspecified	15,669
Total economically active	481,956
Not economically active	421,095
Total	903,051

Source: Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry
 Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Censuses 1950-51 to 1960-61, 1967

TABLE 10: Afrikaner females by census-designated branch of industry: South Africa, 1960.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing	2,613
Mining and Quarrying	935
Manufacturing	
Food	2,366
Footwear	1,936
Clothing	1,907
Printing and publishing products	2,326
Chemical products	1,437
Other	5,676
Total	15,648
Construction	476
Electricity, gas and water	125
Commerce and finance	
Wholesale and retail trade	29,923
Motor trade	2,153
Banks and financial institutions	6,022
Insurance	3,414
Other	636
Total	42,148
Transport, storage and communication	11,277
Government, recreation and personal services	
Government	10,937
Educational	12,602
Medical and health services	13,390
Welfare organisations	1,227
Legal services	2,028
Catering	1,473
Accommodation	3,118
Laundries, cleaning services	2,607
Other	4,229
Total	51,611
Unemployed and unspecified	6,755
Total economically active	131,588
Not economically active	754,025
Total	885,613

Source: Population Census 1960, Volume 6: Industry
 Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Censuses 1950-51 to 1960-61

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance and Capital

I

One of the more important conclusions of the previous chapter was that, by 1960, the discrepancy between the economic circumstances of Afrikaners and English-speakers remained significant, despite the advances made by Afrikaners during the 1950s. Afrikaners of all classes were very conscious of their relative disadvantage. On countless occasions after 1948, speakers and writers sensitively chronicled the progress of Afrikaners in the "economic struggle" and bemoaned the fact that they had not yet claimed their *regmatige aandeel* (rightful share) of the country's riches. Afrikaners remained the "drawers of water and hewers of wood" (1). As one writer stated:

Today we have attained political freedom. But we have escaped from our political prison only to find ourselves encircled by the economic blockade of our enemy...We must destroy this economic blockade if we do not want to succumb to its stranglehold.(2)

Furthermore:

...a nation which is economically subordinate quickly loses those other values which make its existence as a nation worthwhile.(3)

Rhetoric of this kind is very evocative of the slogans and maxims which accompanied the birth of the Afrikaner nationalist economic movement in the late 1930s. However, one noteworthy difference is evident. In the earlier period, many

- 1) *Volkshandel*, 15, 1, March 1954, p.63.
- 2) *Inspan*, 9, 5, February 1950, p.1.
- 3) *Inspan*, 11, 2, November 1951, p.4.

prominent nationalists, in the NP as well as in the OB, expressed strong criticisms of "parasitical, exploitative foreign-capitalist interests" (4). The plight of the "small man", and the importance of cooperative structures, were frequently stressed. O'Meara argues that such anti-capitalism was "essentially subjective": "nowhere in the powerful anti-capitalist rhetoric is to be found an attack on the objective condition of capitalism, that is, the capital relation itself" (5). This argument is probably accurate; but it cannot obscure the fact that such rhetoric was fairly popular and pervasive, particularly in the North. By the 1950s, in contrast, the response of Afrikaners of all classes to their disadvantage was devoid of any anti-capitalist sentiment.

The difference in tone between the seminal 1939 *ekonomiese volkskongres* and the second *volkskongres* of 1950 is particularly striking. In 1939, many congress delegates were openly suspicious of the motives and objectives of Afrikaner finance capitalists in Sanlam and Volkscas. A variety of generally utopian cooperative schemes were proposed. Many stressed that service to the nation, and respect for the "small man" - rather than adherence to a naked profit principle - must be the basic aim of Afrikaner business. By 1950, however, directors of Sanlam, Rembrandt, and their ilk,

4) See, for example, D.F. Malan's speech in the House of Assembly in January 1942 (*HAD*, 1942, cols.33-50, especially col.42).

5) D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.163.

were able to openly acknowledge their "economic consciousness", and discuss the consolidation of Afrikaner business, "without having to cower before accusations of emulating 'Hoggenheimer' " (6). M.S. Louw of Sanlam was even prepared to argue that Afrikaners should support established corporations such as Sanlam, rather than small, embryonic undertakings (7); a suggestion which would have elicited a storm of protest a decade earlier.

Between 1950 and 1960, the tiny core of powerful Afrikaner business leaders in the Sanlam, Rembrandt and Volkshandel groups became more overt in their celebration of contemporary capitalist principles. Jan Marais of FVB was just one of a number who supported the implementation of modern, scientific management methods which eschewed "outdated sentimentalism" (8). Other business leaders periodically suggested that taxation should not be allowed to smother "initiative". And men such as Louw, A.D. Wassenaar and Anton Rupert consistently called on Afrikaners to welcome the prospect of keen competition (9).

Nothing less than vigorous support for capitalism could be expected from the captains of Afrikaner business and industry, especially at a time of intense Cold War anti-communism. Yet a full acceptance of an unashamedly capitalist discourse was not confined to the directors of the

6) *Ibid.*, p.249.

7) *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950, p.44.

8) *Volkshandel*, 14, 9, November 1953, pp.11-15. See also *Volkshandel*, 20, 3, May 1959, p.11.

9) See, for example, an address by Rupert to Afrikaner students (*Volkshandel*, 16, 2, April 1955, p.15).

Sanlam, Rembrandt and Volkskas groups. Although members of these conglomerates tended to dominate the AHI (10), the organisation also represented many small traders and businessmen: by the late 1950s, more than 120 chambers of commerce, many in the towns and villages of the Transvaal and OFS hinterland, had affiliated (11). A study of Afrikaner newspapers and journals - especially of *Volkshandel*, the organ of the AHI, and *Inspan*, the journal of the RDB - indicate the extent to which less powerful entrepreneurs accepted the dictates of a capitalist economy as natural and desirable. One T.C. de Villiers, for example, pointed to the Bible, which related how Christ loved the Prodigal Son, who was a capitalist (12). J.D.J. de Necker argued that the Afrikaner did not possess the temperament to be a socialist. "Individualism is too strong in our blood," he stated (13). J.J.F. Lemmer suggested that Afrikaner businessmen could only afford to recognise one law, namely, that the weak and incompetent fell by the wayside:

Business is almost a new religion and until we recognise this attitude, we will always play second fiddle, be pushed out, and see our businesses wither and die...

As for the heroes of the 1930s and 1940s:

There are many of them who deserve awards for what they have done for the Afrikaner's plight...The Afrikaner ought to build a monument to them. Yet they must also realise that their time is gone and that today we need directors with the necessary youth and technical knowledge. (14)

10) For much of the 1950s, M.S. Louw was president of the AHI, and A.D. Wassenaar was secretary and chairman of the executive committee.

11) *Volkshandel*, 18, 4, June 1957, p.11.

12) *Inspan*, 8, 5, February 1949, p.19.

13) *Volkshandel*, 16, 5, July 1955, p.10.

14) *Volkshandel*, 17, 2, April 1956, pp.10-11.

Even J.G. Strydom, erstwhile champion of the small men of the North, indicated his unqualified acceptance of the capitalist road to white equality:

The Afrikaner will only win his rightful place in the business world if it becomes self-evident to all Afrikaners that everyone must do his bit to save and invest in order to build capital...He must be an employer, owner and director as well as a clerk and employee.(15).

The editors of *Inspan* and *Volkshandel* drove home the message. According to the editor of *Inspan*:

In the economic arena, the contest is now between capitalist giants, and we must either adapt ourselves to this fact, or perish.(16)

Moreover:

Today we know that it is only freedom which enables a nation, like an individual, to fulfil its highest calling; and commerce and industry, with the work opportunities that they create, are important elements of a nation's freedom.(17)

The editor of *Volkshandel* claimed, in turn, that "capitalism in the negative sense of the word, i.e. the exploiter of the worker, is already something of the grey past" (18). In addition:

Free competition is an essential component of our economy, and the Afrikaner businessman should embrace it, not only as an incentive to greater efficiency, but also as a means of establishing himself.(19)

15) *Volkshandel*, 17, 2, April 1956, p.12.

16) *Inspan*, 8, 11, August 1949, p.2.

17) *Inspan*, 9, 8, May 1950, p.3.

18) *Volkshandel*, 16, 12, February 1956, p.7.

19) *Volkshandel*, 17, 11, January 1957, p.7.

For the large mass of Afrikaner clerks and white-collar employees, comfortable in the knowledge that the NP was carefully minding their immediate material interests, there was not a huge incentive to risk all in the cauldron of capitalist competition. Yet this group also expressed no serious reservations about the adoption of a set of unambiguous capitalist assumptions in the battle to redress the Afrikaner's economic position. Wealthy Afrikaner farmers, for their part, experienced few qualms about applying modern capitalist methods, with substantial government support, in order to transform agriculture into a more lucrative business. Moreover, many members of the Afrikaner professional stratum and intelligentsia, doubled as aspirant businessmen; by the late 1950s, a number of Afrikaner managers had been originally employed as lawyers, teachers and senior civil servants. Intellectual-entrepreneurs such as Broederbond leaders Nico Diederichs and Piet Meyer (a National-Socialist in the early 1940s, but converted after some years as a Rembrandt manager) became authoritative role models for younger Broederbond members. While rumblings about Southern geldmag (financial power) continued to be heard in the Transvaal and OFS, it was not basic assumptions that were in question, except perhaps amongst some Afrikaner wage-earners and poor isolated farmers.

II

The observation that members of the nationalist alliance generally accepted a capitalist ideological framework does not in itself answer many questions, unless attention is paid to the practical strategies adopted by Afrikaners in their effort

to close the economic gap. One plan of attack stemmed from an acute awareness on the part of members of the AHI and the RDB that Afrikaners desperately needed to acquire and develop appropriate skills if they were to succeed as entrepreneurs and industrialists. As the editor of *Inspan* noted:

Specialised knowledge is an absolute requirement. This is a fact which many of our young, aspiring businessmen still do not realise...It is necessary that the young Afrikaner who chooses business as a career should also understand that his university degree is no longer sufficient. It is essential that he completes at least a recognised professional examination, and that he never ceases to be a student.(20)

Both the AHI and RDB recognised that part of the problem lay in the Afrikaner community's prevalent perception that a career as a doctor, lawyer or teacher was more prestigious than a career in business. Many Afrikaners still associated commerce with itinerant country smouse (pedlars) (21), and found it difficult to accept that the formal development of business skills was even necessary, let alone as important as other professional education. Throughout the 1950s, therefore, with Anton Rupert at the forefront, AHI members stressed the indispensability of practical technical training, and called for an expansion of the role of technical and commercial colleges. This campaign was accompanied by a barrage of "educational" articles in journals such as *Volkshandel* and *Inspan*. Readers were confronted with a range of topics, including personnel management and administration, sales and retailing techniques, employee education, management methods,

20) *Inspan*, 8, 1, October 1948, pp.1-2.

21) *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950, p.12.

industrial relations, advertising, and research and development.

Nonetheless, the effort to place Afrikaner business on a more skilled and professional footing was still overshadowed by the nationalist economic movement's traditional plea for Afrikaner unity. As O'Meara has shown, the cultivation of the Afrikaner community's nationalist sentiments was vital to the progress of Afrikaner business during the late 1930s and 1940s. Afrikaner consumers were encouraged to support Afrikaner traders and manufacturers. All Afrikaners were implored to save with Afrikaner financial institutions, so that capital could be made available to other undertakings. Most importantly:

It was the widespread practice of Afrikaner farmers finally to reinvest hoarded accumulation funds in expanded agricultural production through the purchase of more land. The *reddingsdaad* movement sought to transform this pattern by persuading farmers to invest their accumulation funds in industry and commerce. In other words, latent money-capital generated in agriculture was to be permanently detached from the parent stock of agricultural capital and, through being centralised in such financial institutions as FVB, would be advanced as new money-capital in other branches of capitalist production. (22)

After the 1948 election, the principal strategy of all sectors of Afrikaner commerce, business and industry - from the largest conglomerates to the most vulnerable traders - continued to hinge around the maintenance of Afrikaner unity and nationalist feeling. The editor of *Inspan* expressed the

22) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.184. The analysis in this section of the chapter has been strongly influenced by O'Meara's work.

point in typically forthright terms:

...the first and most important lesson is this: stand by your own people in business, and ensure that every penny you spend goes into the hands of a fellow-Afrikaner...As far as commerce is concerned, it does not help to look for excuses. The grim truth remains: every time an Afrikaner supports a stranger, rather than a fellow-Afrikaner, he commits treason.(23)

This message was constantly echoed, albeit in a milder form, by other writers and speakers. The number of occasions on which Afrikaners were urged to buy from, and save with, Afrikaner concerns are too numerous to mention.

Afrikaner farmers remained the prime target of nationalist appeals. While the mobilisation of individual savings and consumer spending was clearly important, it was still felt that the large-scale investment of agricultural capital with Afrikaner financial institutions would provide the greatest boost to Afrikaner business. Far more capital would come under the control of financial conglomerates such as Sanlam and Volkskas; smaller entrepreneurs hoped, in turn, that they would receive increased support. If, on the other hand, farmers insisted on ploughing their accumulation capital back into the purchase of more land, a dearth of risk capital would be experienced in other sectors. Moreover, the resulting rise in agricultural land prices implied that a growing proportion of the funds available to financial organisations such as Sanlam would be tied up in loans and mortgages, rather than being freed for investment in other areas (24).

23) *Inspan*, 8, 1, October 1948, p.2.

24) *Volkshandel*, 16, 1, March 1955, p.51.

C.G.W. Schumann and M.S. Louw led the campaign to persuade farmers to redirect their capital. Schumann told the 1950 *ekonomiese volkskongres* that investment by farmers in shares and debentures would benefit the farmers themselves, by providing a "good reserve for times of need" (25). By 1955, he was still arguing that "our farming community must make their savings more available to the young Afrikaner undertakings who are employing their sons, thus rousing latent entrepreneurial talent, and giving it a chance to develop" (26). As president of the AHI, Louw utilised a number of platforms to express similar views (27). The AHI followed his lead by drafting and adopting several formal motions, one of which, at the 1953 AHI congress, issued an "urgent appeal" to Afrikaner farmers to invest in business concerns (28).

It is difficult to assess the extent to which Afrikaner farmers responded to this call. Certainly, by continuing to replace Afrikaner farmworkers with cheaper black labour, many of the large landowners demonstrated that their general commitment to the well-being of their fellow-Afrikaners was strictly limited by economic calculation. Given the huge government incentives to invest in land, farm improvements and increased production, it was not surprising that many farmers preferred to pour accumulated funds back into agriculture. By the late 1950s, according to A.D. Wassenaar, nearly ten

25) *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950, p.20.

26) *Volkshandel*, 16, 3, May 1955, p.30.

27) See, for example, speech by Louw to 1955 AHI congress (*Volkshandel*, 16, 8, October 1955, p.10).

28) *Volkshandel*, 14, 7, September 1953, p.11.

percent of Sanlam's and Santam's assets was still tied up in mortgage and investment loans to farmers (29). On the other hand, however, more than half of the amount saved and invested with Afrikaner financial institutions was deposited by farmers (30): there is no doubt, therefore, that some agricultural capital was being channelled into other sectors of the Afrikaner economy.

On the whole, as their rapid expansion indicates, the large Afrikaner conglomerates found sufficient funds to build a stable economic base. Their public affirmation of Afrikaner nationalist unity established the foundation for an effective strategy. Yet, ironically, the very success of this strategy spawned new pressures and exigencies. Economic growth began to release the Sanlam group, in particular, from its dependence on Afrikaner savings and capital accumulation, especially in agriculture. Of course, agricultural capital remained essential to Sanlam's economic objectives. The wealth of many farmers meant that they simply could not be ignored: in 1960, for instance, 54 percent of those Afrikaners earning more than R4,000 per year, and 71 percent with an income of more than R8,000 per year, lived in the rural areas (31). Nonetheless, as the profits of the Sanlam group expanded, so too did the amount available to it for investment. Eventually, Sanlam managers were forced, by the economic necessity of their company's development, to seek out profitable investment

29) A.D. Wassenaar, interview, 12/1/87.

30) *Volkshandel*, 18, 7, September 1957, p.20.

31) Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 1960*, Volume 5: Personal Income, Table A7.

opportunities beyond the relatively small number of Afrikaner commercial and industrial concerns.

The take-over of General Mining by Federale Mynbou in 1963-64 is often singled out as the most important catalyst of the Sanlam group's diversification. Yet, informal meetings between the Oppenheimers of Anglo-American and Sanlam group directors began many years before the General Mining deal was concluded. As early as the mid-1950s, W.B. Coetzer discussed Federale Mynbou's plans and opportunities with Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. Furthermore, in 1960, Federale Mynbou was only able to acquire the Blinkpan coal reserves - and win a contract to supply coal for the Komati power station - because of the cooperation of Anglo-American (32). In other words, while the General Mining agreement certainly heralded a period of more active and overt collaboration between Afrikaner and English-speaking capitalists, the Sanlam group's needs and goals were already changing by the late 1950s, beneath the veneer of staunch nationalism.

At the same time, for most other Afrikaners, the struggle to attain economic parity with English-speakers was predicated on the strict enforcement of Afrikaner unity, not to mention a deep suspicion of "Hoggenheimer". The Sanlam group may have discovered new sources of profit and capital, but aspirant Afrikaner entrepreneurs still relied on the goodwill and support of their wealthier compatriots,

32) W.B. Coetzer, interview, 30/1/87. The Oppenheimers clearly hoped that, by breaking the barriers between Afrikaner and English business, they would ameliorate political divisions.

especially those in the finance houses which centralised and distributed risk capital. Sanlam's rapid growth was therefore not an altogether welcome phenomenon: if the Sanlam group broke free from nationalist constraints, there were grounds for suspicion that Sanlam managers would be tempted to invest in profitable non-Afrikaner concerns, rather than demonstrate support for struggling Afrikaner businessmen.

The Sanlam group found itself in a delicate position. From the outset, Sanlam members had been clearly aware that constant appeals to nationalist sentiment did not always harmonise with the rational capitalist objectives they were so eager to embrace. Notwithstanding his own calls for Afrikaner unity, C.G.W. Schumann warned, as early as 1950, of the dangers of a "Buy Afrikaans" campaign:

...if the Afrikaner businessman wants to succeed then he must not rely on sentiment, but must...provide services at least as good as those of his competitors. It is only on the basis of efficiency and honest service that any merchant, including the Afrikaner, will achieve success in the long run.(33)

In addition, A.D. Wassenaar claimed recently that Sanlam managers always preferred to work on the principle that "we are not here to insure nationalists, we are here to insure anybody who wants insurance" (34). Nevertheless, for most of the 1950s, such contradictions were conveniently obscured by Sanlam's nationalist profile.

By the end of the decade, however, the paradoxes were

33) *Inspan*, 10, 2, November 1950, p.19.

34) A.D. Wassenaar, interview, 12/1/87.

more apparent. Not only was it necessary for Sanlam directors to be fluent in the aggressive rhetoric of the nationalist alliance. In order to successfully develop links with non-Afrikaner business, it was now also important that Sanlam negotiators applied, in practical strategies, the cool capitalist logic to which they also subscribed. Rembrandt's Anton Rupert walked a similar tightrope. Rupert had always won acclaim for the fact that he preferred to employ (and exploit) white Afrikaner women. Rembrandt cigarettes enjoyed the official nationalist seal of approval. Yet, as the previous chapter showed, by 1960 much of Rupert's business was conducted overseas. Negotiations with the directors of Rothmans in London involved an appreciation of international, as well as national, horizons. It was necessary to consider strategies which were quite different from those acceptable to many members of the nationalist alliance.

III

The increasing collaboration by Afrikaners in the Sanlam and Rembrandt groups with English-speaking and foreign capitalists inevitably caused political repercussions. It would be incorrect to argue that Afrikaner business leaders ever questioned the basic premises of racial separation. Nonetheless, it is equally mistaken to assert that men such as Wassenaar and Rupert agreed with every aspect of government policy. Indeed, on certain important issues, significant divisions arose; divisions which could often be traced back to Sanlam and Rembrandt's espousal of notions of capitalist economic rationality.

One disagreement came to light during the deliberations of the Tomlinson Commission on "the socio-economic development of the Bantu areas", and in the aftermath of the commission's report. The full details of the commission's findings, and the implications of the government's response to them, are dealt with in Chapter Five (35). For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to point out that the AHI, in its official memorandum to the commission, was adamant that "industries in the native states can only be developed with white technicians, under white supervision, and, for some years, with white capital" (36). The AHI anticipated the "possible objection" that large-scale industrialisation of the reserves would result in the "creation of small white colonies within the native areas". Consequently, it was suggested that only smaller secondary industry - specialising in the manufacture of clothes, textiles, and footwear - should be established in the reserves, for the immediate future (37). The editor of *Volkshandel* strongly endorsed the AHI delegation's evidence. The most practical policy for the reserves, he argued, was to give whites the opportunity to develop industry and commerce in the reserves, and "derive economic advantage from the capital, skills and experience which they have invested" (38). It was "not a healthy policy" to exclusively reserve commercial and industrial rights for Africans when they did not possess "the necessary knowledge, experience and level of

35) See Chapter Five, especially pp.186-192.

36) *Volkshandel*, 14, 1, March 1953, p.11.

37) *Ibid.*, p.12.

38) *Ibid.*, p.7.

development" (39).

In his response to the Tomlinson Commission report, Verwoerd completely rejected the notion that white industrialists and entrepreneurs should be allowed into the reserves. He maintained instead that white industries and businesses should be created in "border areas", where African labour from the reserves could be easily obtained (40). The AHI publically accepted Verwoerd's argument. A formal memorandum issued by the AHI in March 1957 noted meekly that "far more attention must be paid to the development of industries in the border areas than inside the native reserves" (41).

Although many members of the AHI were now clearly unwilling to contradict one of the most intractable political leaders of the nationalist alliance, the AHI still continued to express some reservations about aspects of apartheid policy. At its 1958 congress, the AHI spoke out against the government's decision to issue trading licenses in African townships near the "white" industrial areas to Africans only. After the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had ignored an invitation to attend the 1959 AHI congress, the editor of *Volkshandel* again criticised the exclusion of white traders from African "locations". Letting slip a traditionally altruistic facade, the editor complained about the channelling

39) *Volkshandel*, 17, 4, June 1956, p.10.

40) *Memorandum: Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South Africa, 1956*, pp.9-10.

41) *Volkshandel*, 18, 1, March 1957, p.13.

of millions of pounds of African buying-power, which was "earned in the white economy", into the "locations" (42). Minister Nel, in reply, told an AHI meeting in Vereeniging that such a "short-sighted" attitude was "immoral" (43).

Meanwhile, influential leaders of the Sanlam and Rembrandt groups continued to pressurise Verwoerd about his approach to the development of the reserves. By the end of the decade, their objections to Verwoerd's policy were beginning to resemble the arguments forwarded by English-speaking capitalists. While still accepting the importance of some form of apartheid, men such as Wassenaar and Rupert maintained, in hard-headed capitalist fashion, that Verwoerd's exclusion of white business from the reserves simply made no economic sense (44). After the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, having failed to convince Verwoerd in private meetings, they began to call for alternatives in public.

Anton Rupert was especially outspoken. He suggested, in open defiance of Verwoerd, that white entrepreneurs should be permitted to establish business concerns in the reserves in direct partnership with Africans. Half of the shares in white companies active in the reserves could be bought by the Bantu Investment Corporation and sold to the "Bantu public", or held in trust until African businessmen were in the economic position to acquire share stock (45). Although Rupert's scheme was endorsed by other leading Afrikaner capitalists, including

42) *Volkshandel*, 20, 8, October 1959, p.7.

43) *Volkshandel*, 20, 12, February 1960, p.24.

44) A.D. Wassenaar, interview, 12/1/87.

45) *Die Burger*, 14/9/61. See also *Die Burger*, 2/12/61.

Wassenaar, Verwoerd furiously refused to countenance any plan which granted residential or property rights to whites in African areas, or vice versa. A later concession - allowing white businessmen into the reserves for ten years, after which they would be required to pull out again - was greeted without much enthusiasm by Afrikaner entrepreneurs.

Interestingly, this dispute between Verwoerd and prominent Afrikaner business leaders seemed to push the latter closer towards some of the erstwhile proponents of total separation in Sabra. Throughout the 1950s, the leading members of the AHI had been implacably opposed to the notions of complete territorial and economic apartheid forwarded by those members of Sabra who are referred to as "visionaries" in Chapter Five. The AHI's arguments were numerous. Firstly, South Africa did not have access to enough capital to implement such a policy. Secondly, black workers were too integrally involved in the South African economy for them to be removed without massive disruption and hardship for all. Whites were certainly not prepared to make sacrifices on that scale. Thirdly, while the use of migrant labour would continue for the foreseeable future, in principle the migrant labour system should be abolished, and a stable, albeit limited, urban African labour force created. Political and social controls, rather than economic separation, would ensure white supremacy. Fourthly, there was a danger that independent African homelands would conduct "economic and foreign policies which did not agree with those of South Africa", and therefore

clashed with the development of the South African economy (46).

The reassessment of total separation which took place in Sabra after Verwoerd's lukewarm reception of the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations did not involve a complete acceptance of these criticisms by Sabra's visionaries (47). Sabra members continued to place a higher premium on committed idealism than on unadorned economic pragmatism. Yet, in crucial respects, the demands of certain influential Sabra visionaries were curiously similar to those of leading Afrikaner capitalists. In the absence of the significant government funding requested by the Tomlinson Commission, for example, Sabra visionaries agreed that it was necessary that white capital should be allowed into the African reserves (48). Moreover, when it became clear - especially after Sharpeville - that the reserves would never serve the function of a "magnet" luring Africans away from the white urban areas, Sabra visionaries called for a "softening" of the regulations concerning urban blacks (49). At about the same time, in a memorandum to Verwoerd about the "unrest" at Sharpeville, the AHI joined the Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom), the Federated Chambers of Industry (FCI), the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (Seifsa),

46) See, for example, *Volkshandel*, 14, 1, March 1953, pp.5-14.

47) See Chapter Five below.

48) See, for example, J.L. Sadie, "The Industrialisation of the Bantu Areas" in *JRA*, 11, 2, January 1960, p.66.

49) See, for example, W.A. Joubert, "Die Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede" in *JRA*, 12, 1, October 1960, p.44.

and the Transvaal and OFS Chambers of Mines, in calling for a new approach to the pass laws, influx control, the liquor laws and curfew regulations. According to the memorandum, the settled urban African population must be treated differently from Africans in the reserves. The granting of rights to those Africans who had worked for one employer for an extended period had created a "loyal, middle-class Bantu": exemption should therefore be extended to greater number of urban Africans (50). In line with this sentiment, Anton Rupert suggested to Verwoerd that urban blacks be granted freehold or leasehold rights (51).

Whether Rupert intended that this concession be extended to the Western Cape is not clear. Certainly, it seems that neither Afrikaner capitalists in Sanlam and Rembrandt nor Sabra visionaries envisaged a cessation of the Coloured labour preference scheme, which aimed to remove unskilled African labour from the Western Cape. As Goldin points out, the leaders of the Sanlam and Rembrandt groups wholeheartedly

50) *Volkshandel*, 21, 4, July 1960, pp.16-19, 27. Almost as soon as the memorandum had been published, the AHI backed off from a confrontation with the government. Editorials in *Volkshandel* in May 1960, October 1960 and February 1961 assured the government that the AHI supported the policy of racial separation, opposed integration, and wanted nothing more than to work closely with the authorities. (See also S. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), pp.202-205.) Serious internal conflict is perhaps one of the reasons why the AHI changed its public stance so quickly. According to J.H.P. Serfontein, divisions in the AHI flared into open acrimony in 1964 when 16 businessmen from the Transvaal urged AHI members not to vote Sanlam's Tom Muller into an executive position. In the end, Muller beat the opposition candidate by 264 votes to 145 votes. See Serfontein, *Die Verkrampde Aanslag* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1970), pp.54-55.

51) *The Star*, 23/9/85.

endorsed Coloured labour preference, in large part due to the fact that it cost them nothing to do so: neither Sanlam nor Rembrandt employed significant numbers of unskilled African workers in the Cape Peninsula (52). Nevertheless, their support for a Coloured labour preference policy did not translate into complete agreement with every aspect of the government's plans for the Coloured population. On the contrary, people such as Rupert and Wassenaar found it difficult to accept some of the other strict apartheid measures which were being applied to the Coloured community. In particular, in typically pragmatic fashion, they failed to see why they should not be allowed to go into business with Coloured partners if it was profitable. In 1959, Rupert informed Verwoerd that he wished to start a business with a group of Coloureds in the Western Cape "on a 50 percent partnership basis". According to Rupert, Verwoerd threatened to close the business down if Rupert went ahead with his plan (53). Rupert would have received sympathy from those Sabra visionaries who supported the Coloured labour preference scheme because they believed that the Coloured population deserved special treatment and favour, but otherwise resented the heavy-handed treatment of Coloureds by the Transvaal-dominated Party leadership.

In previous decades, a coincidence of interests between the small group of Cape Afrikaner capitalists and leading

52) I. Goldin, "Coloured Preference Policies and the Making of Coloured Political Identity in the Western Cape Region of South Africa with particular reference to the period 1948 to 1984" (D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1984), pp.206-208.
53) *The Star*, 29/9/85.

Stellenbosch ideologues would have significantly, if not conclusively, influenced the direction of the Cape Party. The early growth of the Cape NP had been spearheaded, organisationally and ideologically, by ambitious entrepreneurs such as W.A. Hofmeyr, in alliance with Stellenbosch intellectuals, and some of the rich wine-growing Afrikaner dynasties. However, the economic expansion of Sanlam and Rembrandt had weakened the traditional alliance between Afrikaner finance capitalists and wealthy Boland farmers. Furthermore, while the Boland farmers - and most Afrikaner manufacturers in the Peninsula - had patriotically echoed the call for a Coloured labour preference scheme during the 1950s, by 1960 they found to their dismay that the resulting dearth of cheap, unskilled African labour was affecting their profits. As Goldin notes, nationalist farmers and small manufacturers in the Western Cape found themselves in a "confusing and contradictory position" (54), especially since it is not clear that many of them shared the feeling, prevalent amongst some Cape nationalists, that Coloureds were "brown Afrikaners".

In addition, the basis and composition of the Cape Party was changing. Between 1947 and 1955, the number of local branches in the Cape Peninsula rose from nine (with a total of 2,129 members) to 36 (11,599 members) (55). By 1959, 23.3 percent of the total membership of the Cape Party was resident in the urban areas of Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley

54) Goldin, "Coloured Political Identity", pp.209-211.

55) *Die Burger*, 21/10/55.

and Cape Town (56). For all their regional sentiment, many NP supporters in these new urban branches seemed to have more in common with their compatriots in the urban areas of the North than with either traditionally influential finance capitalists or dissenting Stellenbosch intellectuals. In September 1961, for instance, at a time when some leading Cape nationalists were still pleading for a reappraisal of certain aspects of Coloured apartheid policy, especially concerning Coloured representation in Parliament, rank-and-file delegates to the Cape NP congress asked the government to extend job reservation to the Western Cape so that white women typists would not be displaced by Coloureds (57). Furthermore, with regard to the position of urban blacks or the development of the African reserves, there is no evidence to suggest that the average NP supporter in the Cape peninsula was any more liberal than his counterpart in the Transvaal.

In conclusion, therefore, the expansion of Afrikaner conglomerates such as Sanlam and Rembrandt directly conditioned the shift in the balance of power within the nationalist alliance which resulted in the "North" assuming leadership during the 1950s. For the ideological uncertainty amongst Cape nationalists contrasted starkly with the cohesion of the Transvaal NP. Significantly, in spite of its rapid development during the decade after 1950, the Volkskas group - the major capitalist corporation of the North - failed to diversify its interests to the same extent as its southern

56) *Die Burger*, 11/11/59.

57) *Cape Times*, 1/9/61.

rivals. The economic growth of Volkskas was still intertwined with the fortunes of the members of the nationalist alliance: it was not yet necessary for Volkskas managers to begin to grapple with the set of new economic (and political) problems and solutions that confronted the directors of Sanlam and Rembrandt. In any case, however, Volkskas remained firmly under the control of a resurgent Broederbond, which ensured that the rigour and consistency absent in the Cape was maintained in the Transvaal NP.

IV

Bearing in mind the previous analysis - as well as the Broederbond's swift growth during the late 1950s - it is safe to argue that, by 1960, the ascendant constituent of the nationalist alliance was the rapidly-expanding group of more sophisticated, assertive and educated white-collar intellectuals and professionals. This does not imply that the Afrikaner intelligentsia and professional stratum "captured" sole power, and "controlled" government policy, especially with respect to apartheid. Rather, the NP continued to represent an alliance of different classes and factions, all of whom possessed their own levers on power and patronage. Wealthy Afrikaner farmers, for example, continued to wield immense influence, while the powerful capitalist clique in Sanlam and Rembrandt, despite some ideological uncertainty, still remained within the fold of the nationalist alliance. Moreover, an analysis which assumes that power, and the formulation of state policy, were the exclusive preserve of

the Afrikaner intelligentsia, ignores the strength of the nationalism which united Afrikaners of all classes and insinuated its own logic into government responses. In addition, Afrikaners of the same class grouping may also have been divided by urban-rural dichotomies, or their relative access to the Broederbond or state bureaucracy. Finally, government policy was profoundly conditioned by more general imperatives, such as the need to guarantee capitalist accumulation and white domination in the face of black resistance, as well as by the more sectional interests of the NP's electorate.

Nevertheless, by 1960, Verwoerd's principal supporter was that unique brand of aggressive, active and unequivocal Afrikaner intellectual. With the Broederbond at the helm, it was this grouping which was most directly involved in the formulation and implementation of the deeply repressive and unambiguous apartheid policy of the 1960s.

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CHAPTER FIVE

The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs and Apartheid

I

For more than two decades, Sabra has been a haven for acolytes of the late Dr. H.F. Verwoerd. Indeed, during the early 1980s, Sabra became dominated by Treurnicht's breakaway Conservative Party (CP), and has consistently called for the reimposition of the apartheid policy practised by the NP at the height of Verwoerd's power. Yet Sabra has not always been such a predictably rigid and moribund organisation. In the period between 1948 and 1961, both internally and in its relationship with the NP, Sabra was continually plagued by conflict. The purpose of this chapter, in tracing the development of these conflicts, is not simply to reconstruct the history of an influential Afrikaner organisation. Sabra's disputes are especially interesting because they underline the fact that apartheid ideology was a complex, changing and often contradictory mix of both short-term pragmatism and general ideological thrust, rather than an undisputed, immutable "Master Plan" (1). On the other hand, while the direction of capitalist accumulation fundamentally shaped the framework and ambit of Sabra's conflicts, this chapter is based on the belief that it is important to go further than those revisionist scholars who have suggested that apartheid policy and ideology during the 1950s merely "prepared the ground for the establishment of the hegemony of monopoly capital" (2).

1) See A. Hepple, *Verwoerd* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967), p.110, for just one example of the use of this term with reference to apartheid policy.

2) R. Davies, D. Kaplan, M. Morris and D. O'Meara, "Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa" in *Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE)*, 7, 1976, p.28.

II

The idea of creating an organisation to investigate and define the problems and future of South Africa's racial affairs - and to provide an alternative to the liberal Institute of Racial Relations - became increasingly widespread in the major Afrikaner organisations during the course of 1947. In August 1947, the FAK asked the *uitvoerende raad* (executive committee; UR) of the Broederbond for "further direction" regarding the proposed new body: the UR decided at its meeting on 29 August to coordinate the various "attempts" to create a new Afrikaner think-tank (3). Sabra was formally launched in Stellenbosch in September 1948, as an academic institution attached to Stellenbosch University. Despite its Broederbond-inspired origins - illustrated by the election of a number of active Broederbond members, including Diederichs and Herzog, to the first Sabra executive committee - and its obvious connections with the higher echelons of the NP, Sabra insisted from the outset that it was totally independent of any other organisation or political party (4).

Sabra began its work by attempting to make propaganda interventions in the general debate on apartheid. In the very first issue of its *Journal of Racial Affairs* (JRA), an article by Sabra member W.E. Barker starkly presented apartheid as the sole solution to South Africa's race relations problem. The alternative - the UP's policy of "drift" - would lead to integration, which would, in turn, necessarily result in the

3) Donges Collection, Vol.86, Minutes of the meeting of the *dagbestuur* of the *uitvoerende raad* of the Broederbond, 29/8/47.
4) See editorial in JRA, 1, 1, September 1949, p.1.

destruction of the white race (5). This argument was constantly repeated in the JRA and other Sabra publications. Barker's article was closely followed, for example, by a Sabra pamphlet entitled *Separation or Integration?*, which vehemently attacked the "dishonesty" and "immorality" of the integrationists' position (6), as did a polemic by Sabra leaders N.J.J. Olivier and B.I.C van Eeden:

The integration policy is dishonest towards the Bantu population because it creates the impression that their political demands will be fully satisfied, when in fact the integration supporters are well aware that the Europeans will never allow such a development to take place, since their political leadership must of necessity be threatened by it.(7)

Sabra members were also quick to respond to allegations that they refused to discuss the cost of the proper development of the African areas. First, Olivier and Van Eeden published a series of articles which "demonstrated" the "practical feasibility" of apartheid (8). Then, in a statement released following an ongoing debate between the *Cape Times* and *Die Burger* in mid-1952, the Sabra executive retorted:

We could point out that in 1939 neither the *Cape Times* nor South Africa as a whole asked what it would cost the country to take part in the Second World War.(9)

5) W.E. Barker, "Apartheid - The Only Solution" in JRA, 1, 1, September 1949, pp.24-38.

6) Sabra, *Separation or Integration?* (Stellenbosch, 1950). Reprinted in JRA, 3, 2, January 1952, p.47.

7) N.J.J. Olivier and B.I.C. van Eeden, "Die Integrasiebeleid en die Naturellevraagstuk" in *Inspan*, 10, 9, June 1951, p.41. See also Sabra's criticisms of the Fagan Commission Report in *Inspan* during 1948.

8) N.J.J. Olivier and B.I.C. van Eeden, "Die Praktiese Uitvoerbaarheid van 'n Apartheidsbeleid" in *Inspan*, 11, 3-5, 1951-52.

9) *Cape Times*, 11/8/52. See also a letter from B.I.C. Van Eeden and N.J.J. Olivier to the *Cape Times* on 26/9/52.

Questions about apartheid's effect on the supply of African labour to white industries were treated with similar disdain:

The integrationist often seems to think that the Native's labour will always remain cheap, and that it must serve chiefly to maintain the standard of living of the European and to develop the White areas.(10)

At the same time, Sabra did not limit itself to scathing polemics against liberal approaches to race relations. The organisation also busied itself with more practical, short-term problems. Early articles in the *JRA*, for example, bemoaned the low productivity of African labour, planned the development of the border areas in the Union, discussed the most efficient method of building African housing, examined the utilisation of land in the African areas, and formulated the "principles" of "Bantu education". Suggestions such as these were not just aired in publications and at congresses. Sabra ensured that it arranged regular formal meetings with top members of the NP government. In a private meeting in March 1950, for example, a delegation from the Sabra executive discussed the resolutions of the first annual Sabra congress with Prime Minister Malan (11), while the second congress in January 1951 was also followed by a meeting between Verwoerd - by then Minister of Native Affairs - and a Sabra delegation (12).

Sabra's impact on the early legislation of the NP government was substantial. Laws such as the Native Building

10) *Cape Times*, 11/8/52.

11) *Cape Times*, 28/3/50.

12) *Die Vaderland*, 26/3/51.

Workers' Act, the Native Services Levy Act and the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act were passed soon after the Sabra congresses of 1950 and 1951 called on the government to train black building craftsmen, to ensure that only African labour should be used in the building of African housing in the urban areas, to make employers responsible for part of the cost of housing urban Africans, and to refuse recognition to black trade unions in white areas (13). Furthermore, the recurring themes of Verwoerd's departmental policy were also profoundly influenced, both in principle and content, by Afrikaner intellectuals working in Sabra. His major ministerial speech to the Senate in 1952, for instance, emphasised the site-and-service approach to African housing in the urban areas, the careful planning of urban "locations", the labour bureaux system, the decentralisation of industries to border areas, and the creation of profit-making entrepreneurial and agricultural classes in the African reserves (14). Each of these aspects of government policy had been previously discussed in detail in Sabra forums.

III

Despite its agreement with the NP leadership on many of the short-term aspects of apartheid policy - and its united hostility to liberal approaches to race relations - at no stage was Sabra free of conflict. The most fundamental schism

13) "Besluite van die Raad van Sabra" in Sabra, *Die Naturellevraagstuk*, Papers delivered at the First Annual Congress of Sabra, February 1950, pp.107-111; "Resolutions of the Second Annual Congress of Sabra" in *JRA*, 2, 4, July 1951.
14) A.N. Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks* (Johannesburg, APB Publishers, 1966), pp.31-52.

in the organisation centred on the long-term future of the African reserves. All Sabra intellectuals supported the general view that the reserves should serve as the political home of the African population. This was clearly stated by Olivier and Van Eeden:

By a policy of free and separate development, we must understand the territorial separation of white and native, and the provision of areas which must serve as national and political homes for the different native communities...(15)

Here Sabra was not at odds with the expressed policy of the NP government. The apartheid election manifesto of 1948 had insisted on the general principle that "Europeans and Natives must exercise their political rights separately" (16); a principle which eventually resulted, with the aid of Sabra, in the provision of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 for the establishment of African tribal, regional and territorial authorities.

Nevertheless, from very early on in the life of Sabra, some of its leading members began to express disquiet about the way in which apartheid policy was being, and would be, applied. In the first issue of the JRA, for example, W.E. Barker's critique of "segregation" - one "version" of apartheid - was clearly aimed at the nationalist movement as well as at supporters of the UP's Fagan Commission Report:

Segregation is the policy of pushing the Black man out of the way of the White man, in order that the European

15) Olivier and Van Eeden, "Praktiese Uitvoerbaarheid" in *Inspan*, 11, 3, December 1951, p.34.

16) *Eastern Province Herald*, 28/1/48.

can preserve his own racial purity, and keep it free from the so-called impure colour of the Native. But since the cheap labour of the Native would be needed in the European industries, segregation would ensure that this labour would always be available. When the Natives had served their purpose, however, they would be sent back to the locations and left to look after themselves. The Reserves would only exist as a source of even more of this cheap labour, and a dumping-ground for the used-up labour from the cities.

Worst of all, under segregation, the Bantu would remain in a state of semi-slavery for a period that might stretch into centuries. There would be no outlets in any direction, and they would continue to be regarded as an inferior race to the White man...

The possibility of segregation - in its bad sense - becoming the official Native policy of South Africa is greater than many people think.(17)

For Barker, the only moral solution to the country's problems was total separation, of a "vertical" rather than a "horizontal" form:

What apartheid proposes is that the thick horizontal barrier (stretched between the lowest European class and the highest Native class) be removed and in its place a vertical division between the races be established.(18)

This call for a more "positive" approach to apartheid policy was echoed by other influential members of Sabra. Their vision of utopia - in which the races would be completely and "vertically" separated - was based on two premises. Firstly, it was argued, apartheid could not succeed unless the African reserves were consolidated and developed as quickly as possible. F. Language, for instance, used the 1951 Sabra congress to plead for the appointment of a commission to plan

17) Barker, "Only Solution", p.27.

18) *Ibid.*, p.29. Barker even ventured an attack on the "terrible evils" of the migrant labour system: "If real Christian justice is to be given to the working Bantu...migratory labour will eventually have to be forbidden" (p.35).

the economic life and the future of the "Native areas" (19). In similar vein, at the 1950 congress, Olivier insisted that more land must be found for the reserves if they were to be viable homes for the bulk of the African population (20); his suggestion that the British protectorates be combined with the existing African reserves became a common refrain amongst apartheid ideologists. At the 1952 congress, he stated again that without sufficient land it would be a "farce" to talk of giving Africans political and state rights in the reserves (21). Moreover, it was essential that provision for the granting of such political rights was made swiftly. As Olivier and Van Eeden noted:

In the rest of Africa, constitutional developments are swiftly following each other: we cannot assume that these developments will not affect our own Bantu population, or that the Union can continue with a policy which is totally out of line with developments in the rest of Africa.(22)

The demand for an acceleration of the rate of development of the African reserves was inextricably linked with the second visionary obsession: a grave concern about the implications of economic integration in "white" areas. If Africans became settled in the white areas, Olivier and Van Eeden argued, then it would be impossible to permanently deny them trade union rights: whites would inevitably suffer an

19) *The Star*, 10/1/51.

20) N.J.J. Olivier, "'n Positiewe Naturellebelied" in Sabra, *Die Naturellevraagstuk*, pp.66-81. See also *Cape Argus*, 11/2/50.

21) *Natal Witness*, 11/1/52. See also *Die Burger*, 11/1/52.

22) Olivier and Van Eeden, "Praktiese Uitvoerbaarheid" in *Inspan*, 11, 5, February 1952, p.29.

economic "knockout-blow" (23). Moreover, at a certain point, black pressure for political representation in "white" institutions would also become irresistible. It would be "simply nonsensical", Olivier and Van Eeden concluded, to argue that Africans could exercise their political rights in the reserves, when the majority of Africans were permanently domiciled in the white areas (24). Language, for his part, suggested that political and territorial separation, on the one hand, and economic integration, on the other, were not only "unjust", but, in the long run, "untenable". An unhindered process of economic integration would ultimately lead to the "total disappearance" of the policy of territorial and political separation (25).

This point was hammered home to Verwoerd by a Sabra delegation in the meeting following the 1951 congress. The Sabra executive stated publically after the meeting that it had expressed to the Minister its "concern" over the extent to which Africans were being integrated into the European economy:

The committee told the Minister that it was convinced that such integration, if allowed to continue unchecked would have fatal consequences for both Europeans and Natives...It pleaded for a policy of separate development of the two races with proper opportunities for Natives to develop in their own areas. To achieve this, industries should be established and other steps taken for the large-scale development of such areas.(26)

In case Verwoerd had not received the message, executive

23) *Ibid.* in *Inspan*, 11, 3, December 1951, p.33.

24) *Ibid.*, p.34.

25) *The Star*, 10/1/51.

26) *Die Vaderland*, 26/3/51. See also *The Friend*, 26/3/51.

members wasted no time in firmly reiterating their position. An editorial in the *JRA* of April 1951 argued that economic integration not only placed the "sovereign and separate existence" of whites in "decided danger", but also implied a "dark future of uncertainty and strife" for Africans (27).

The Sabra visionaries' attacks on economic integration were delivered with the clear understanding that, if apartheid was to succeed, large sacrifices would be required of whites. Giving evidence before the Tomlinson Commission, Olivier stated baldly that, unless whites were prepared to make sacrifices to implement apartheid policy, they would only have themselves to blame if their survival was threatened (28). Olivier's pronouncements were given full support by the Sabra chairman, Professor G.B.A. Gerdener. Opening the 1952 congress, Gerdener maintained that, under apartheid, Europeans could not expect to be provided with a free supply of African labour indefinitely:

Our whole society is based on what we call cheap labour. Because our coffee is brought to us in the morning and our bedding is unfolded for us at night, we carry on as though this must always be. But it will not always be so...(29)

Yet, notwithstanding the misgivings of its visionary faction, confusion still reigned in Sabra about the future of African labour in the white areas, and the timescales that should be applied to the implementation of "total" apartheid.

27) See editorial in *JRA*, 2, 3, April 1951, p.1.

28) *The Star*, 14/5/52.

29) *Natal Daily News*, 8/1/52. See also *Die Transvaler*, 9/1/52.

Writing on behalf of the Sabra chairman to the *The Star* in January 1951, Van Eeden was adamant that Sabra's approach did not imply that "all, or even the bulk of the Native labourers should be immediately removed from European industry" (30). Certainly, Sabra intellectuals seem to have been very aware of the possible response by whites to demands for greater sacrifices. In an article in the *JRA*, P.A. Theron was quick to point out that whites would "try to maintain their way of life", which was "to a large extent based on cheap native labour":

We must be honest enough to admit that the European in South Africa will do his utmost to resist any threat to his existence...(31)

Even Olivier, one of the most outspoken proponents of total apartheid, in his speech at the 1952 congress, was forced to concede that territorial segregation was a "slow process", which could take three generations to accomplish (32).

By the end of 1952, Sabra's confusion about the issue had not been resolved. This was clearly reflected in its major policy statement of that year, a booklet entitled *Integration or Separate Development?*. On the one hand, the organisation's concern with economic integration was apparent:

The sober truth is that a comparatively large part of the European population wants and makes use of Natives as labourers, but pays little attention to their welfare and future.(33)

30) *The Star*, 23/1/51.

31) P.A. Theron, "A Psychological Approach to Separate Development" in *JRA*, 4, 1, October 1952, pp.16-18.

32) *Natal Mercury*, 11/1/52.

33) Sabra, *Integration or Separate Development?* (Stellenbosch, 1952), p.14.

Greater sacrifices from whites were demanded:

The truth of the matter is that most of us would gladly see the separation policy carried out, because it is realised that the only solution lies in that policy; but as soon as we are personally affected - our pockets, our labour, our comfort - we begin to find all the excuses why the sacrifices should not be asked of us.(34)

However, on the other hand, the booklet was quick to allay any fears:

It is a gross misrepresentation to allege that the introduction of a policy of separate development would mean the large-scale and hurried withdrawal of the Bantu from the European economy...Bantu labour is not only essential to the country's economy at the present time, but will probably remain so for a very long time to come.(35)

Verwoerd, as chief government spokesman on racial affairs, tended to echo the latter point of view. As early as 1948 - even before his appointment as Minister of Native Affairs - he told the Senate that, whilst the NP chose the "ideal" of working in the direction of eventual total segregation, it also saw the impracticability of the immediate application of such a policy (36). His response to the *Integration or Separate Development?* pamphlet was similarly phrased. At the Cape NP congress of 1952, he publically dismissed territorial apartheid as "Sabra idealism" (37), while in a private letter to a Sabra intellectual soon afterwards, he wrote that Sabra visionaries placed so much emphasis on the ideal of total separation that they made it

34) Ibid., p.20.

35) Ibid., p.27.

36) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.14.

37) *Cape Argus*, 19/9/52.

"appear to be a practical end" (38). Nevertheless - as repeated references to the importance of the long-term apartheid "ideal" indicate - Verwoerd was constantly on his guard, throughout the NP's first term in office, not to allow deep rifts to develop between himself and the visionary Sabra intellectuals. Sabra delegations were always courteously received (39); even the 1951 meeting between Verwoerd and the Sabra executive ended with the latter stating that the Minister had agreed in principle with all its recommendations (40).

The statements and publications issued by functionaries of the Department of Native Affairs tend to be more revealing. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of Native Affairs in 1949, W.W.M. Eiselen had seemed to fully support the notion of complete separation. His 1948 article entitled "The Meaning of Apartheid", for instance, clearly recommended significant economic separation (41). Yet, after 1950, there was absolutely no mention of total apartheid in the official reports of the department. For Eiselen and his fellow civil servants - as well as for a substantial number of Sabra members - the Bantu Authorities Act seemed to be the crowning achievement of "positive" apartheid legislation. Even in his discussion of this Act, Eiselen was careful to steer clear of any reference to the questions raised by the Sabra visionaries:

38) F. Barnard, *13 Years with Dr. H.F. Verwoerd* (Johannesburg, Voortrekker Press, 1967), p.43.

39) N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85.

40) See editorial in *JRA*, 2, 3, April 1951, p.1.

41) W.W.M. Eiselen, "The Meaning of Apartheid" in *Race Relations*, 15, 3, 1948, pp.78-79.

In establishing the Bantu authorities the aim is to extend the traditional Bantu system, which functioned effectively within the framework of primitive Bantu economy and culture, that it would also be effective under the new economic and cultural conditions under which the Bantu lives today.(42)

On the question of economic integration, Eiselen also took pains to emphasise that, while agreeing with the necessity to develop the reserves, he felt that they should still "provide manpower for our industrial development" (43). This view was reinforced by the tenor and content of the Department's reports, which were almost exclusively concerned with questions of urban housing, township planning and effective implementation of the labour bureaux. And, in direct opposition to the pleas of Sabra visionaries such as Olivier, the reports also show the inability or unwillingness of the government to "consolidate" the reserves. From the outset, the NP had shown little interest in speeding up the purchase of the "quota land" designated by the 1936 Land Act. In Minister Havenga's first budget of 1948, no grant was made in the loan estimates to the Native Trust Fund for land purchase - in the preceding year there had been a grant of £400,000 - and the grant for the reclamation of the African reserves was also reduced from £600,000 to £400,000 (44). By 1953, 2,756,668 morgen of the "quota" land was still to be purchased; only 232,979 morgen had been acquired in the previous three years

42) UG 30/1953, *Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1950-51*, p.5.

43) W.W.M. Eiselen, *The Development of South Africa's Native Reserves* (Pretoria, 1950), p.6.

44) *Cape Times*, 15/9/48.

(45). Although the Native Affairs Commission claimed that more land had not been purchased because Africans damaged it to such an extent that an amount virtually equal to the purchase price was subsequently needed for its reclamation (46), the government was also concerned about the response of Afrikaner farmers to consolidation. NP leaders clearly hoped that the incorporation of the British protectorates would provide a quick and easy solution to the problem. Unfortunately for them, the British government proved less than amenable to the idea.

The visionaries in Sabra grew increasingly uneasy. Opening the 1953 congress, Sabra chairman Gerdener bluntly stated that whites must be willing to find a substitute for cheap labour "in the kitchens, on the farms, and in the factories" (47). Other delegates, including Olivier and Language, argued that there was no practical use in debating the advisability of separate "Bantu states" if planless integration continued, and Africans were not prevented from leaving the reserves to enter the urban areas. The Bantu Authorities Act also came in for a measure of criticism, with some delegates complaining that the Act had not been based on the principle of creating separate African states: the object of legislation did not appear to be total apartheid (48). General anxiety about burgeoning black nationalism was reflected in a resolution which called on the "Western world"

45) UG 48/1955, *Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1952-53*, p.39.

46) UG 58/1954, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1/1/53-31/1/54*, p.4.

47) *Die Transvaler*, 14/1/53.

48) *Pretoria News*, 16/1/53.

to acknowledge the importance of maintaining "Western civilisation" in Africa (49).

The visionaries' harangues continued unabated once the congress had ended. Gerdener followed his Congress appeal with a fiery speech to an Afrikaner student conference in May 1953, in which he accused even the most convinced supporters of apartheid of a "fatal dualism":

They want separation as such all right, but not at the cost of their own comfort and advantage or the abandonment of so-called cheap labour in the factory or on the farm. One fears that the ruling motive among the great majority of whites in South Africa for supporting apartheid or segregation is egotistical and not altruistic.(50)

W.E. Barker, in an article entitled "South Africa Can Do Without Native Labour" in the *JRA* in July 1953, was equally forthright:

Partial separation has always lapsed and will always lapse into at least partial integration...The argument that South Africa can apply a policy of political and social separation, while at the same time allowing economic integration is wishful thinking, not logic...For years now we have had the repeated claim that "separation is not practical", often voiced by those who from motives of economic self-interest, ideological considerations, or sheer laziness do not want to lose their supply of cheap Native labour.(51)

For Barker, the maximum time that should be allowed for the imposition of total apartheid was 50 years (52). But Sabra

49) "Resolusies Geneem op die Vierde Jaarvergadering van Sabra" in Sabra, *Die Naturel in die Suid-Afrikaanse Landbou*, Papers delivered at the Fifth Annual Congress of Sabra, January 1954, p.108.

50) *Die Volksblad*, 6/5/53.

51) W.E. Barker, "South Africa Can Do Without Native Labour" in *JRA*, 4, 4, July 1953, pp.26-27.

52) *Ibid.*, p.34.

members were even unable to agree about this. J.L.Sadie, speaking to the the 1954 congress, stated that total apartheid would not be achieved for a "long time", perhaps 100 years (53), and was immediately attacked by J.H. Boshof who said talk of a 100-year programme was "fatal": a time limit of 20 to 40 years should be set (54).

In general, however, the 1954 congress seems to have been a major disappointment for the proponents of total apartheid. Minister J.J. Fouché, opening the congress, conceded that separate development would involve sacrifices for whites - and that proof was required that apartheid was an "honest attempt at finding a just solution" (55) - but also immediately warned the visionaries:

I presume that you fully realise that ideals cannot always become practical national policy...So, for example, total territorial separation of the races can be a wonderful ideal, but to embark on it immediately would, in my opinion, be as impossible and disastrous as a bicycle ride to the moon.(56)

Furthermore, with the congress concentrating on the question of African labour on white farms, the visionaries had to be satisfied with predominantly pragmatic discussions about labour productivity and wage levels. This did not, however, prevent the Sabra executive from issuing a "serious warning" against economic integration as a national policy, in a press statement in April 1954 (57).

53) *The Star*, 20/1/54.

54) *The Star*, 22/1/54.

55) *The Star*, 19/1/54.

56) Sabra, *Die Naturel in die Suid-Afrikaanse Landbou*, p.3.

57) *Cape Times*, 1/4/54.

By this stage, any sympathy Verwoerd held for the visionary faction of Sabra seemed to have been tempered by the practicalities of government. In May 1954, he delivered a revealing speech to a NP stryddag meeting in Vereeniging, in which he stated that while the NP had set South Africa on the road to complete separation, it was not necessary for the government to attempt to reach that goal: future generations must decide whether they wished to achieve total apartheid. In what can be construed as a direct response to Sabra's visionaries, as well as to the UP, Verwoerd continued:

I deny emphatically that (economic) integration exists...Because the Native farm labourer helps the farmer on the farm does not mean integration...(58)

This was followed, a few weeks later, by an equally important speech to the FCI in Cape Town, in which he stated that there was nothing in the government's apartheid policy which need create the fear "that the economic development is not being taken into consideration or that there are going to be unreasonably timed changes or that there is an unsympathetic attitude towards the needs of industry" (59). Then, in early 1955, Verwoerd told the House of Assembly that the government had never stated that it was able, or "intended shortly or even within an appreciable period", to remove Africans from white areas, "away from the farms, and the homes, and the industries" (60). His department had concentrated on the development of new urban "locations", precisely so that "family labour" could be housed "on a large scale", near to

58) *Rand Daily Mail*, 11/5/54.

59) *Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks*, p.63.

60) *HAD*, 1955, cols.1315-1316.

the cities and industries (61). Moreover, he was "well aware" of the "economic principle" that there could not be a shortage of labour without a resultant increase in wages; it was essential to ensure a small surplus of labour in the white areas:

...we have in mind a surplus of at least five percent of Native labourers as a normal economic provision.(62)

As far as Verwoerd was concerned, therefore, the existence of a permanently settled urban African labour force was inevitable, at least for the foreseeable future. Consequently, although the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act decreed that all urban areas should become "proclaimed areas" into which Africans without permits were only allowed for 72 hours, the government did not significantly alter Section 10 (1) of the 1945 Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. In other words, those Africans who had lived continuously in a "proclaimed area" since birth, and those Africans who had worked for one employer for longer than ten years, or for more than one employer for longer than fifteen years, were still regarded as being permanently domiciled in the urban areas. 172 Furthermore, the Native Affairs Department positively favoured the employment of Africans already in the urban areas ahead of the thousands of workers who continued to stream in from the rural areas to look for work. In this way, it was argued, the large number of unemployed and "idle" Africans in the cities could be reduced - the "reservoir" of surplus labour "emptied"

61) HAD, 1955, col.1318.

62) HAD, 1955, col.2017.

(63) - and a more equitable distribution of labour between the urban and rural areas effected (64). In conjunction with anti-squatting measures and housing provisions, such a policy would "obliterate" a "fertile field for communism" (65).

Verwoerd's pronouncements - culminating in his statement, during the 1955 Natal NP congress, that total apartheid could take 300 years to accomplish (66) - were clearly unacceptable to Willem Landman, one of Olivier's supporters in the visionary faction of Sabra. In January 1956, he embarked on a one-man "crusade" to convert South Africa to the ideal of total apartheid, stating:

Total apartheid will mean enormous sacrifices. It will mean sweat and effort to the utmost and we cannot draw the veil over that fact. It can also not happen within five or ten years, but I would like to say this: we do not have generations or centuries at our disposal.(67)

Landman's urgent warning was reiterated by Willem van Heerden. In an address to the 1956 Sabra congress, he stressed that the time had come for everybody to face up to the fact that white supremacy was fast disappearing in Africa, and that "our

63) See contribution by M. Smuts, chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Johannesburg, to *Bantu*, 1959, 7, pp.25-35.

64) For a full examination of the theory and practice of influx control policy see D. Posel, "Doing Business with the Pass Laws: Influx Control Policy and the Interests of Manufacturing and Commerce in South Africa in the 1950s" (mimeo), ICS seminar paper, London University, 1986.

65) *Bantu*, 1956, 6, p.3.

66) *The Star*, 25/8/55.

67) *Cape Times*, 16/1/56. See also *Cape Times*, 28/1/56; *Cape Times*, 6/2/56; *Cape Times*, 17/2/56; *Die Burger*, 14/2/56. Landman's crusade also seems to have been prompted by the appearance of theologian B.B. Keet's book *Whither South Africa?* (Stellenbosch, University Publishers, 1956) in which Keet argued that the supporters of total apartheid were "labouring under a delusion that belongs to a world of make-believe" (p.85).

approach to matters in this sphere" must be modified accordingly. "Unless we do this," he concluded, "tragedy may be nearer to our door than we think." (68) But the schism between Sabra visionaries and the mainstream of the NP was clearly underlined when Prime Minister Strydom told the House of Assembly in January 1956:

We as a Government can only announce a policy and try to apply what is practicable and what will therefore be accepted by the country and by the majority of the electorate as they come to understand the implications of it and are then prepared to lend support to it. For that reason, as we have repeatedly stated very clearly in the past, we cannot in the present circumstances propagate or apply a policy of total territorial apartheid.(69)

The tone of Verwoerd and Strydom's responses becomes understandable when one takes into account the views of the overwhelming majority of NP supporters during the early apartheid years. For Sabra's visionaries, the signs were ominous. The provincial Party congresses seldom discussed total apartheid in any form: the discussion points raised by the local Party branches were almost exclusively concerned with issues such as the stricter application of "negative" apartheid, the eradication of leeglopery (loafing) amongst young Africans in both rural and urban areas, and the need to

68) Sabra, *Die Asiaat en Afrika*, Papers delivered at the Seventh Annual Congress of Sabra, Stellenbosch, January 1956, pp.43-44.

69) *HAD*, 1956, col.43. Cape NP mouthpiece *Die Burger* followed up Strydom's speech with an editorial on 18/1/56 in which it stated that the government could not adopt a policy of territorial apartheid because public opinion was not ready for it. According to the newspaper, the government sympathised with the view of the Afrikaner churches and intellectual leaders but could only accept their solution if, and when, the overwhelming support of the country was won for it.

force Africans to pay more for the services that were provided for them. At the Natal NP congress in Greytown in 1953, the De Jagersdrift and Biala branches even called on the government to fence all the African reserves, and to ensure that Africans maintained the fencing (70). In addition, the Party's electioneering strategy continued to revolve around nakedly racist appeals. This was graphically illustrated by one of the NP's slogans in the Wakkerstroom by-election of 1952 - "a vote for the UP is a vote for a coffee-coloured nation" (71) - as well as by the NP's campaign in the 1953 general election.

IV

In early 1956, the Tomlinson Commission, set up "to institute a searching enquiry into and report on the introduction of a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native reserves" (72), released the abridged version of its mammoth report. The commission included a number of prominent members of Sabra, and its report was expected to clarify many of the issues of the apartheid debate.

The commission's term of enquiry had not passed without incident. According to F.R. Tomlinson, the idea for such a commission originated with M.D.C. de Wet Nel - later to become Minister of Bantu Administration and Development - and was taken up by Strydom at cabinet level. Tomlinson was approached to lead the commission in September 1950, at about the time

70) Natal NP, *Congress Agenda*, Greytown, 1953.

71) *The Star*, 21/6/52.

72) *Cape Times*, 24/11/50.

that E.G. Jansen, the Minister of Native Affairs, accepted the post of Governor-General. Although Tomlinson and his aides did not officially begin work until after Verwoerd's appointment as Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd made it clear that he regarded the commission as an invasion of his territory (73). For three years, Tomlinson was left alone to proceed with his research. Then, at the beginning of 1954, after a conveniently erroneous report by an assistant secretary in the Department of Native Affairs, Verwoerd accused Tomlinson of "uncontrolled expenditure". The future of the commission "hung by a thread": it was only after Tomlinson produced a detailed memorandum of his expenses that he was allowed to take his enquiry forward. Soon afterwards, Verwoerd informed commission members that he was not prepared to approve the publication of the commission's report. He suggested that the enquiry's findings be summarised in a memorandum, which would be held in Verwoerd's office as "a source of information". Tomlinson refused, but could not persuade Verwoerd to allow the complete 17-volume report to be published. Eventually, Verwoerd agreed to approve the publication of a summary of the commission's findings.

Tomlinson's travails were not yet over. When he presented Verwoerd with the full report in October 1954,

73) Most of the information in the following few paragraphs comes from F.R. Tomlinson, "Die Kommissie vir die Sosio-Ekonomiese Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede binne die Unie van Suid-Afrika: My Kontak met die Kommissie" (mimeo), Paper delivered to the Development Bank of Southern Africa, June 1985. See also F.R. Tomlinson, "Die Sosio-Ekonomiese Verslag oor die Swart Gebiede: 'n Terugblik" (mimeo), Swellendam, 1986. I am indebted to Professor Jan Sadie for providing me with copies of both of these papers.

Verwoerd intimated that he would oppose a number of the commission's recommendations. After a long discussion, Verwoerd bade Tomlinson farewell with the words: "Now you know what you have to do". Tomlinson presumed that Verwoerd was suggesting that changes be made to the summary report, then in the process of being written. A few months later, at a very late stage in the drafting of the summary report, commission members Young and Prinsloo, who both also happened to be officials in the Department of Native Affairs, insisted on the inclusion of a minority report on industrial development in the reserves. Verwoerd is alleged to have written this minority report himself (74).

The general conclusion of the Tomlinson Commission's report was that the "people of South Africa" had to make "a clear-cut and definite choice" between the alternatives of complete integration of the racial groups and their separation, and that the only real solution was the latter: "the separate development of European and Bantu". But this would involve "altruism and self-sacrifice" on the part of whites (75). In particular, the commission argued that an amount of £104,000,000, over a period of ten years, should be poured into the reserves, to develop the "fully diversified economy" - comprising primary, secondary and tertiary activities - needed to support such a large population (76). A "development corporation" should also be created, and white

74) J. Sadie, interview, 14/1/87.

75) UG 61/1955, *Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, p.106.

76) *Ibid.*, p.207.

industry allowed into the African areas for a short period of time, in order to stimulate secondary industrial development. In addition, consolidation of the reserves was essential and should be embarked on immediately (77).

While government spokesmen refused to comment in public on the commission's findings until the Minister of Native Affairs had formally replied in Parliament, the response of the NP mouthpieces - both in the Cape and the Transvaal - was guarded. Although *Die Burger* and *Die Transvaler* both welcomed the commission's endorsement of the principle of separate development (78), the editor of *Die Transvaler* also argued that "progressive separation" could be damaged just as much by "overhasty" actions as by tardiness (79). In any case, the newspaper warned:

...it must be emphatically stated that the Government is as little bound to the conclusions of the Commission as anyone.(80)

The release of the government's White Paper, drafted by Verwoerd and the Department of Native Affairs, and Verwoerd's subsequent speech in the House of Assembly, confirmed this statement. Verwoerd was only prepared to consent to a qualified acceptance of the commission's findings:

My reply to the first question as to whether we accept the report is that there is certainly not a rejection of the report, but that it is accepted in principle notwithstanding the obvious provisos concerning the methods and measures proposed.(81)

77) *Ibid.*, p.208.

78) *Die Transvaler*, 28/3/56; *Die Transvaler*, 26/4/56; *Die Burger*, 14/5/56.

79) *Die Transvaler*, 26/4/56.

80) *Die Transvaler*, 28/3/56.

81) *HAD*, 1956, col.5297.

In practice, however - in line with his earlier warnings to Tomlinson - Verwoerd rejected most of the important conclusions of the commission. He refused, firstly, to commit the government to the figure of £104,000,000 set by the commission. Using the same War analogy Sabra had introduced in its debate with the *Cape Times* in 1952, Verwoerd insisted that the government could afford the amount suggested by the commission, but "certain psychological factors will operate which will influence this expenditure seriously" (82).

Furthermore:

The extent and rate of development in the different fields of activity cannot be determined in advance with any degree of certainty, and the Government therefore does not deem it advisable to fix at this stage the amounts needed for the various projects...(83)

Verwoerd proceeded to argue that the £104,000,000 could be reduced in a number of ways. To begin with, the government rejected the suggestion that white industrialists be allowed into the reserves:

The Government adopts the attitude that private White undertakings - important, big undertakings - will make no contribution towards keeping the Native areas truly Bantu.(84)

Since the industrial development corporation proposed by the commission was "presumably based upon the principle...of the admission of large European privately owned industries into the Bantu areas", Verwoerd argued that the £25,000,000

82) HAD, 1956, cols.5299-5300.

83) Memorandum: *Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, 1956, pp.15-16.

84) HAD, 1956, col.5305.

earmarked for the use of this corporation could be excluded from any calculation. He suggested instead that white industries requiring large numbers of African labourers should be created in "suitable European areas near Bantu territory" (85), and that purely Bantu capital should be mobilised in a "Bantu Areas Investment Organisation", which would be encouraged by an immediate grant of £500,000 from the funds at the disposal of the Native Trust (86). In addition, Verwoerd maintained that the £34,000,000 estimated by the commission to be necessary for agricultural development in the reserves was based on the assumptions of the "spoonfeeding" pre-nationalist system of development, and could be reduced substantially. Finally, he argued, there was no need to spend as much as the commission's suggested £12,000,000 on urban development in the African areas: "experience" had shown that this could be done far more inexpensively (87).

As far as consolidation of the reserves was concerned, Verwoerd was equally dismissive of the commission's findings. While accepting consolidation "in principle", he stated firmly that it was not a "practical issue" (88). Rather:

...the solution does not lie in increasing the size of the land but in the differentiation of vocational possibilities within the Native areas.(89)

Furthermore, Verwoerd argued, the "possibilities" of the existing African reserves should not be "underestimated" (90).

85) *Memorandum*, pp.9-10.

86) *Ibid.*, p.8.

87) *HAD*, 1956, col.5300.

88) *Memorandum*, p.15.

89) *HAD*, 1956, col.5310.

90) *Ibid.*, col.5310.

Verwoerd's acceptance "in principle" of the Tomlinson Report turned out, therefore, to be a rejection of most of the substantive recommendations made by the commission. The government was committed to the course of separate development; but it would carry out the policy without significant consolidation of the fragmented African areas or a long-term economic programme extensive enough to stimulate meaningful development. The government's response to the Tomlinson Commission was thus a severe dent to the expectations of the proponents of "total apartheid" in Sabra. So too was the attitude of the grassroots of the NP; an attitude illustrated at the Cape NP congress of October 1956, when a motion was tabled expressing support in principle for the Tomlinson Report, but calling on the government to ensure that Africans also bore the costs of their own development (91). And any visionary hopes that Verwoerd and his aides in the Department of Native Affairs might change their minds about the financial recommendations of the commission were dashed by Eiselen in a speech to a conference of Native Commissioners in October 1956:

The (Tomlinson) report emphasises the necessity of increasing the rate of development in the Bantu areas...because it is late in the day and the time passes swiftly. Everybody would welcome it if this could be quickly achieved, but it is also necessary that the son is correctly trained to use the riches of the father, and not to squander them. The great difficulty is not a shortage of money for development of the Bantu areas. If need be, the State could make large amounts available for that goal. But the tempo of development must, of necessity, be set by the slower members of the community,

91) *Die Burger*, 4/10/56.

just as the slower child determines the speed of education.(92)

v

Sabra's reaction to the Tomlinson Report and the subsequent government White Paper was to organise a volkskongres in collaboration with the FAK and the Afrikaner churches, to discuss "the future of the Bantu in South Africa". The voices of the visionaries in Sabra remained surprisingly muted during the course of the congress, held in Bloemfontein in June 1956. Olivier, for example, presented his obligatory defence of territorial separation, but refrained from attacking Verwoerd openly, preferring to reserve his criticisms for the "opponents of the separate development school" (93). The resolutions passed by the congress also avoided direct criticism of the government. One resolution thanked the government for "its acceptance in broad principle of the Tomlinson Report", while another praised Verwoerd for his "leadership, diligence, perseverance and farsightedness". The congress did find it necessary to issue a general rebuke to whites for their attitude to "certain sorts of labour", and to implore the white population to "lend their full and practical support" to the intensive development of the African areas. The only resolution expressing any dissatisfaction was a short motion which asked the government to take into account

92) *Bantu*, 1957, 1, pp.85-86. See also W.W.M. Eiselen, "The Department of Native Affairs as a Department of Development" in Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Official Yearbook 29*, 1956-57, p.369.

93) *Cape Times*, 29/6/56.

the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission concerning homeland consolidation (94).

In other forums, however, Sabra visionaries were less diplomatic. In an article written for the SAIRR in January 1957, Stellenbosch University's J.L. Sadie, who had been directly involved in the Tomlinson Commission, openly challenged Verwoerd's White Paper. He took issue, firstly, with Verwoerd's rejection of the proposed development corporation:

One of the reasons given for its rejection, namely that it was presumably founded on the principle that White entrepreneurs would be allowed inside the Bantu areas - which principle was not accepted by the government - does not represent an entirely correct interpretation of the Report.(95)

He argued, secondly, that industrial development in the border areas could not act as a substitute for industrialisation inside the reserves, which needed to be "initiated and continually stimulated by members and agencies of the developed community" (96). Finally, he criticised Verwoerd's refusal to commit himself to an exact budget as requested by the Tomlinson Commission:

This is, of course, the usual approach of the cautious, but it misses the cardinal point which is that the scope and tempo of development will depend on the amount of effort and money expended.(97)

94) FAK Collection, Vol.1/4/4/2/2, Besluite Geneem op die Volkskongres oor die Toekoms van die Bantoe in Suid-Afrika, Bloemfontein, 28-30 June 1956.

95) J.L. Sadie, "The Industrialisation of the Bantu Areas" in JRA, 11, 2, January 1960, p.61.

96) Ibid., p.66.

97) Ibid., p.71.

His warning was echoed by Afrikaner dissident L.J. du Plessis. Although Du Plessis was sceptical about the possibility of complete separation, he also called for urgent and large-scale development of the reserves along the lines stipulated by the Tomlinson Commission (98). H.J.J. Reynders of Pretoria University was another prominent Afrikaner intellectual who questioned Verwoerd's response to the Tomlinson Report. In the *JRA* of January 1958, he wrote that if the government continued to prevent "private white initiative and capital" from entering the reserves, and refused to establish a development corporation as suggested by the Tomlinson Commission, then it would be foolish to expect "much industrial development in the Bantu areas" (99).

Nonetheless, it is an indication of the conflict within Afrikaner ranks as to the necessity, methods and speed of homeland development that Verwoerd and the Department of Native Affairs were even experiencing difficulty selling the notion of "border industries" to the nationalist rank-and-file. This was clearly illustrated by an extraordinary incident in April 1958, when, after a tour to the "border" areas of Natal, Anna Scheepers and other leaders of the white Garment Workers' Union asked the Minister of Labour, Jan de Klerk, to refuse registration to clothing factories in Natal and the OFS which employed cheap black

98) L.J. du Plessis, *Apartheid: Ja of Nee of Ja-Nee* (Potchefstroom, Pro-Rege Press, 1957), p.32.

99) H.J.J. Reynders, "Bepalende Faktore by die Tempo van Nywerheidsontwikkeling binne die Bantoegebiede van Suid-Afrika" in *JRA*, 9, 2, January 1958, p.60.

labour (100). According to the union, nearly 2,000 white workers in the Transvaal were either unemployed or on short time because factories had moved to "decontrolled" border areas (101). Scheepers told De Klerk that the union was not prepared to see its members, for whom it had "battled" for 30 years, "walking the street, hungry and out of work" (102).

In June 1958, the MPs for Alberton and Pretoria West, Marais Viljoen and P.J. van der Walt, visited factories in Charlestown, Ladysmith and Durban. In a private memorandum to Verwoerd, they argued that the establishment of border industries paying lower wages would inevitably lead to the closure of factories in the white urban areas, and that, under these circumstances, the "days of the white clothing workers were numbered" (103). To avoid a clash between the policy of protection of the white worker, on the one hand, and the border industry policy, on the other, the government must intervene to extend job reservation to decontrolled areas, and to ensure that only goods of a lower quality were manufactured in the border factories (104). In the end, however, Minister de Klerk's solution was to close down a number of the offending factories (105).

100) Rand Daily Mail, 2/4/58.

101) The Star, 24/6/58.

102) Rand Daily Mail, 2/4/58.

103) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.576, Marais and Van der Walt to Verwoerd, 7/7/58, p.5.

104) Ibid., p.8.

105) S.P. van der Walt, owner of the Veka factory in Charlestown, sent a revealing letter, dated 3/5/60, to Jan de Klerk (J. de Klerk Collection, PV.35, INCH, UOFS, Vol.2/3/1/1/6,): "Can you blame some of the Germiston manufacturers that they maintained that the Minister had, by implication, accepted their proposals?...There was unemployment in Germiston. Everyone's venom was directed at

There were other signs, too, that many of the NP's traditional supporters were refusing to accept any notion of sacrifice for the sake of homeland development. In late 1957, a group of farmers in the Northern Transvaal complained that they were being deprived of labour by a Department of Native Affairs homeland irrigation scheme which served to subsidise "idle" Africans (106). At about the same time, a series of articles by Fritz Smit - later to lead an anti-Verwoerd "Back to Strydom" baaskap (domination) movement (107) - accused the supporters of total apartheid of ignoring the fact that the "whole economic system" was "built on White initiative and Native labour". According to Smit, proponents of complete separation admitted that whites would have to sacrifice much, both in the financing and development of the reserves, and "in losing the cheap Native labour in the pure White Utopia" they visualised, but they did not realise how enormous those sacrifices would have to be (108).

Veka in Charlestown and our closure would be the solution...My feelings go even further. What must one do when one feels crushed between two or three government departments? You know that we informed you that we were urged by the Department of Native Affairs to open a factory in Charlestown as soon as possible. We asked that the wage question first be resolved. That department answered - and I have it in writing - that it would delay the issue too long. There would be no difficulty in setting a satisfactory wage...Now it looks as if we should not have allowed ourselves to be talked around. We have also read that one Minister said that some industries - perhaps referring to us - acted too quickly. At that time this Department was his. The hurry came from another quarter. But then Departments should really work together and not let a specific factory be the victim of their differing internal workings...We read that it is government policy to decentralise industries. We thought that we would be performing a service to our people."

106) *The Star*, 23/10/57.

107) *Sunday Times*, 24/3/63.

108) *The Star*, 17/4/57. See also *Cape Argus*, 11/6/57 and *Cape Argus*, 20/6/57.

Significantly, for the local NP branches, sacrifice was not even on the agenda. The NP congresses of the late 1950s witnessed a spate of motions advocating stricter apartheid: from bus apartheid and blood transfusion apartheid, to apartheid amongst nurses, apartheid on aeroplanes, and apartheid in dry cleaning businesses. Yet, as one NP volunteer of the period observed, while NP supporters wanted blacks removed "from in front of the cafe", they also relied on their African maids: if the local branches had preached complete apartheid in their constituencies, "it would have been the end of the Party" (109). As if to dispel any doubts about his position, Verwoerd told the House of Assembly soon after succeeding Strydom as Prime Minister:

We say that when a Native drives a tractor on a farm, he is not economically integrated...Merely because he helps the farmer to produce, is such a Native who operates a tractor integrated into the farmer's life and community? Of course he is not, because the concept of integration applies to people, and here we do not have people whose activities are becoming interwoven. They will only become interwoven in this way if the other forms of integration, namely equal social and political rights result from these activities.(110)

The rhetoric of Sabra's visionaries became progressively more strident and desperate. At the 1957 Sabra congress, Landman, now chairman of the organisation, again argued that there was no "middle way" between territorial apartheid and integration; in addition, territorial apartheid was "morally sound" as well as "practicable" (111). Then, writing in the JRA in October 1957, B. Duvenage implored whites to find the

109) C. de Vleeschauer, interview, 23/1/87.

110) HAD, 1958, col.4164..

111) The Star, 16/4/57.

strength "for a radical change of system". Otherwise:

...we are unquestionably heading towards catastrophe. To talk of the preservation of white civilisation in the political and social domains, and to be the economic slave of the Non-white, is the crazy inconsistency of our race relations.(112)

By this stage, too, the splits within Sabra, and between some Sabra intellectuals and the mainstream of the NP, were being complicated by the government's policy towards "Coloured" people in the Western Cape. The main concern of Verwoerd and Eiselen was to place Coloureds in a position of preference to Africans - in order to defuse broad-based black resistance - while at the same time preventing Coloureds from rising to the level of whites (113). Many Sabra members in the Western Cape - especially certain Stellenbosch intellectuals - found themselves in a confusing predicament. On the one hand, because of a strong feeling that Coloureds should be treated as "brown Afrikaners" (114), they welcomed Eiselen's 1955 statement that the government intended to eventually remove all blacks from the Western Cape, by instituting a Coloured Labour Preference Scheme (115). Yet, on the other hand, for precisely the same reason, a number of Cape Sabra intellectuals were concerned about plans to further separate

112) B. Duvenage, "Nie-Blanke Arbeid as Een van die Kernvraagstukke in ons Rasseverhoudinge" in *JRA*, 9, 1, October 1957, p.6.

113) I. Goldin, "Coloured Preference Policies and the Making of Coloured Political Identity in the Western Cape Region of South Africa with particular reference to the period 1948 to 1984" (D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1984), p.187.

114) *Ibid.*, p.167.

115) See W.W.M. Eiselen, "The Coloured People and the Natives" in *JRA*, 6, 3, April 1955.

Coloureds and whites. Appealing to the "close ties between the European and Coloured people", Stellenbosch academics led by Erika Theron strongly rejected a suggestion by some Sabra members from the Transvaal that complete territorial apartheid be extended to the Coloured community (116). Furthermore, while most Sabra members had supported the introduction of the Separate Representation of Voters' Bill (117), others openly rejected the removal of Coloureds from the common voters' roll. Sabra's confusion was reflected in the conflicting report presented by the organisation to the Commission of Inquiry into the Separate Representation of Voters' Act (118), and was openly acknowledged by Olivier at the 1955 Sabra congress (119). A.C. Cilliers expressed the view of a number of Cape intellectuals when he told the congress that Coloureds should be gradually "economically and politically integrated", as a "fourth group", into the "three white groups - the Afrikaners, the Jews and the English":

A separate voters' roll can only be reconciled with Sabra's fundamental principles if it serves as a practice school for access to the common voters' roll.(120)

When the extended battle over the Coloured vote was finally resolved in 1956, the Sabra executive formally announced itself "in favour of separate group representation for the white and Coloured groups in the Cape Province", but

116) *The Star*, 13/1/55. See also *Die Burger*, 25/1/55.

117) See, for example, *Die Burger*, 2/12/53.

118) Goldin, "Coloured Political Identity", p.166.

119) *The Star*, 14/1/55.

120) *Die Transvaler*, 17/1/55. See also *Die Burger*, 15/1/55.

also referred to the Coloured people as "an irremovable adjunct of the White population" in view of "self-evident historical, biological, cultural and economic considerations" (121). The ambiguity amongst Sabra members over the issue led to growing tensions, especially since the NP rank-and-file continued to demand stricter control of Coloureds. Such demands were not confined to the Transvaal. Just one month before Sabra's statement was released, the government was asked at the Cape NP congress to ensure that municipalities did not employ Coloureds in positions which had been previously occupied by whites; in particular, as firemen, bus conductors and drivers, or as supervisors and ticket sellers at parks or swimming schools used by whites (122).

VI

The 1958 Sabra congress proved to be important in a number of ways. Notwithstanding the feelings of Minister Paul Sauer - who, opening the congress, suggested that Sabra's members tended not to take the "human reactions" of the white electorate into account (123) - the impatience of the Sabra visionaries with the government's attitude to total apartheid began to turn into direct defiance. In a fiery opening speech, Landman told delegates that each one would have to be prepared to make a contribution to the implementation of total apartheid (124). Then, summarising the memoranda and

121) *Cape Times*, 26/11/56.

122) *Die Burger*, 4/10/56.

123) P.A. Sauer, "Openingsrede" in *JRA*, 9, 4, July 1958, p.133.

124) *Die Transvaler*, 1/5/58.

discussions, Olivier claimed that there was a general feeling at the congress that the time had come "for a new approach from the heart and soul of our people":

We do not have unlimited time. Those who think we can wait 50 or 100 years for a solution are living in a dream world. When politicians say we have 100 years ahead of us in which to find the answer, it fills me with the utmost frustration that sincere people can continue to believe this...I wonder if we have even one generation in which to find a solution.(125)

Other delegates demanded firmer government action on the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. J.J. du Toit of Upington, for example, told the congress he could not believe that whites were refusing to pay a mere £15,000,000 a year towards the development of the reserves (126), while Thomas Boydell also asked what was being done to implement the findings of the Commission. Finally, in a not-so-oblique reference to Verwoerd, Japie Basson - purged by the NP in 1959 - argued that the Minister of Native Affairs should be an uncontroversial political figure (127).

Equally problematical, as far as the government was concerned, was the decision by the congress to appoint a committee, with Olivier as chairman, to arrange a formal conference with black leaders (128). While some Afrikaners welcomed the move - L.J. du Plessis of Potchefstroom University actually suggested that Sabra should meet the ANC at the same time (129) - Verwoerd, in particular, was

125) *Cape Times*, 3/5/58. See also *Die Burger*, 3/5/58.

126) *Die Burger*, 3/5/58.

127) *Die Burger*, 2/5/58.

128) *Rand Daily Mail*, 3/5/58.

129) *Rand Daily Mail*, 26/5/58. The retiring chairman of the Port Elizabeth branch of Sabra, H.F. Heymann, also called for a meeting with the ANC. See the *Cape Argus*, 14/6/58.

completely opposed to any negotiations between blacks and non-government deputations (130). The original impulse for such a conference had in fact come from the 1956 volkskongres, which mandated its continuation committee to look into the matter; the continuation committee decided, in turn, in September 1957, that a meeting with "representatives of the Bantu community" should be convened (131). Nonetheless, Verwoerd turned the full weight of his anger on Sabra's visionaries. Despite a public statement by the Sabra executive reaffirming its support of apartheid policy (132), he resigned from Sabra, and refused to meet any Sabra delegations that included Olivier as a member. The Sabra leadership was forced to postpone the proposed conference, and eventually abandon the idea altogether, although the 1959 congress authorised a small Sabra delegation to make a number of informal visits into African areas, urban and rural, during the next few years (133).

The schism between the visionaries and Verwoerd proved to be irrevocable. Believing that they they enjoyed the support of the majority of Sabra's members - by the late 1950s, more than 3,000 individuals, and at least 60 municipalities, nearly 100 church councils, and many other Afrikaner organisations were affiliated to Sabra (134) - Verwoerd's sympathisers unsuccessfully attempted to remove the

130) N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85.

131) Cape Times, 5/9/57. The idea was also discussed by a "prominent Afrikaner" in *Die Burger* during July 1957.

132) *Die Burger*, 1/7/58.

133) N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85. Confirmed by Sabra organiser J.W. Germishuys, 14/1/87.

134) *Die Burger*, 13/1/56.

visionaries from the executive at the 1959 congress (135). Olivier and his compatriots were also dismayed when their evidence to the Commission on the Separate University Education Bill - rejecting the suggestion that black university councils and senates be controlled by government-appointed whites (136) - was ignored in the formulation of the Extension of University Education Act. The divide widened further when Olivier stated that the future of South Africa would be determined by the way in which the problem of urban Africans was handled (137); other intellectuals, such as Hendrik Stoker, also began to argue for an extension of the rights of fully urbanised blacks (138). And three of Stoker's companions at Potchefstroom University - L.J. du Plessis, D.W. Kruger and J.H. Coetzee - clashed publically with Verwoerd over the application of apartheid (139). With the introduction of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 - Verwoerd's final declaration about the future of apartheid policy; and a measure that fell short of the expectations of the supporters of total

135) *The Star*, 28/9/61.

136) UG 32/1958, *Report of Commission on the Separate University Education Bill*, pp.58-66. See also *The Star*, 9/1/58. It was the opinion of Dawie, the political correspondent of *Die Burger*, that the Government should take into account the views of Sabra's "angry young intellectuals". Writing after Sabra's evidence to the commission, Dawie continued: "It would be good, in the right circumstances, to listen more to what they have to say; because they will say it anyway - possibly in less fortunate circumstances" (*Die Burger*, 11/1/58).

137) N.J.J. Olivier, "Ons Stedelike Naturellebevolking" in *JRA*, 10, 3, April 1959, p.67.

138) De Klerk Collection, Vol.2/3/1/1, Stoker to Jan De Klerk, 24/10/58.

139) See J.H.P. Serfontein, *Die Verkrampte Aanslag* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1970), p.56. See also Verwoerd Collection, Vol.274, J.H. Coetzee to Verwoerd, 23/5/59, Verwoerd to Coetzee, 30/6/59.

separation - it became clear how far Sabra's visionaries had drifted from the policy core of the NP.

This trend was confirmed by the events of 1960. Sabra's response to the Sharpeville massacre, after condemning the actions of the world press and "irresponsible elements" amongst the black population, was to call on the government to consolidate the African reserves and effect a "balanced economic development" of the African areas as soon as possible, in full cooperation with organised agriculture, commerce and industry. In addition, Sabra argued, a "thorough investigation" of the position of urban Africans must be carried out, to pinpoint the aspects of policy - particularly those dealing with the movement of Africans, and their share in the management of their townships - which caused "unnecessary friction and discontent" (140).

Yet, a consideration of these issues was nowhere to be found in the responses of leading government officials to the crisis posed by the uprisings. In a private memorandum to Verwoerd in April 1960, M.C. Botha summed up the prevailing attitude when he argued that the "present conditions" were largely attributable to the fact that apartheid was not being enforced strongly enough. According to Botha, Africans should only be allowed into "white" South Africa as long as the "favour" of work was extended to them: all "natives without

140) F.J. van Wyk Collection, AD.1752, University of the Witwatersrand, Vol.3Db, Statement by the Council of Sabra in connection with the Eleventh Annual Congress, 19-22 April 1960.

work or who, as approved workers, have misbehaved, must disappear out of White South Africa, back to the reserves" (141). This chilling presage of legislation such as the 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act clearly indicated that not even holders of Section 10 rights would be safe from the attentions of Botha and other NP strategists: henceforth, the presence of Africans in the urban areas, even if they had lived there since birth, would depend on their efficiency as labour units. Sabra's W.A. Joubert reacted swiftly to the direction of this argument, stating that the "fine principle" that urban blacks were "visitors" in the white areas simply could not be practically applied when the "Bantu states" were unable "to make provision for the needs of the Bantu who are more or less settled in the cities" (142). But Joubert's plea, and a further calls, by men such as L.J. du Plessis (143) and Sabra chairman A.L. Geyer (144), to speed up development of the reserves and "scrap" or "soften" those regulations controlling urban blacks, were ignored by the government.

In the end, however, it was the issue of government policy towards the Coloured population which finally brought Sabra's conflicts to a head. Dissatisfaction with Verwoerd's attitude towards Coloureds was certainly not only confined to

141) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.577, M.C. Botha, "Konsekwenter Toepassing van die Apartheidsbeleid", private memorandum, 6/4/60.

142) W.A. Joubert, "Die Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede" in *JRA*, 12, 1, October 1960, p.44.

143) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.577, Du Plessis to Verwoerd, 14/5/60.

144) A.L. Geyer, "Voorsittersrede" in *JRA*, 11, 4, July 1960. See also *The Star*, 10/9/60.

Sabra (145). Yet it was Sabra's visionaries who continued to be most outspoken in their opinions. Olivier, for example, told the *Cape Times* in October 1960 that the Coloured population should be accepted as an integral part of white society, and that legislation and practices which discriminated against them "merely on the basis of their colour" should be abolished (146). In the House of Assembly in late November, however, Verwoerd insisted on "parallel development" for the Coloured population (147).

Verwoerd's firm ruling, and its subsequent ratification by the NP hierarchy, stifled dissent within the NP. However, controversy continued to rage in Sabra. Early in 1961, Verwoerd's supporters in the organisation contrived to postpone the annual congress, due to have taken place in Bloemfontein in April with the theme "The Coloured Man in the Political, Economic and Social Life of South Africa" (148). Amidst allegations that Verwoerd's faction was exerting pressure on nationalist-controlled municipalities to withdraw their subscriptions from Sabra in an effort to cripple its workings, a series of fruitless executive meetings were held to try to resolve the problems in the organisation (149). The executive eventually decided to reschedule the congress for September; on this occasion, the topic for discussion was to be "Relations between English- and Afrikaans-speaking South

145) See Chapter Two, p.77, and Chapter Four, pp.158-159.

146) *Cape Times*, 11/10/60.

147) *HAD*, 1960, col.4191.

148) N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85.

149) *Sunday Times*, 11/6/61.

Africans".

In the meanwhile, the Sabra delegation which had participated in informal meetings with rural and urban Africans finally produced its report. The delegation noted that Africans born and raised in the cities showed little loyalty towards tribal chiefs and were unwilling to submit to their authority. Furthermore, the system of influx control, and the application of the pass laws, were universally "condemned" by Africans; the passbook was seen as a "symbol" of the government's unwillingness to allow Africans the opportunity to guarantee themselves a decent existence. According to the report, many problems and grievances were caused by the widespread poverty in "large areas" of the reserves and the urban areas. Agricultural development had not improved the ability of the reserves to support greater numbers of Africans: the establishment of industries in and around the reserves was therefore essential. Severe fragmentation was also characteristic of the reserves, the report continued: without consolidation, the political development of these areas appeared to be "impossible". Everywhere, Africans complained about the lack of consultation by the government: it appeared that the Bantu Affairs Commissioners were not sufficiently in touch with the African population to carry out their "manifold duties". Delegation members were struck by the level of suspicion about the conduct and intentions of whites (150).

150) "Verslag van die Projek vir Skakeling met Bantoe" in JRA, 12, 4, July 1961, pp.183-198.

Verwoerd was unimpressed by the gravity of these conclusions, and refused to even discuss the report with the Sabra members who had been involved in the project (151). Between June and August 1961, Verwoerd's faction moved quickly to consolidate its position within Sabra. Advocates of mainstream nationalist policy were signed up as members, and all Verwoerd's followers were instructed to ensure that they attended the rearranged congress (152). When the election for executive positions finally took place, almost all of the visionaries - including Olivier, Sadie, S.P Cilliers, W.A. Joubert and J.H. Coetzee - were defeated by supporters of Verwoerd (153). In addition, the new executive would discuss neither the report by the delegation to the African areas, nor a memorandum by a Sabra commission which had investigated the status of Coloureds in the Western Cape. In a final blow to the aspirations of Sabra's visionary intellectuals, the new editorial board of the *JRA* - for so long a vehicle for the views of the visionaries - announced that it was changing the format of the publication: henceforth, no critical in-depth analyses of government policy were to be published (154).

VII

The picture of Verwoerd that emerges from this examination of Sabra's history is not one of the possessed ideological visionary, committed to the complete

151) N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85.

152) *Sunday Times*, 11/6/61.

153) *Sunday Times*, 28/9/61.

154) See editorial in *JRA*, 13, 3, June 1962.

implementation of a grand apartheid "Master Plan". A true believer in total economic and political separation of the races would have displayed less hostility to the interpretation of apartheid propounded by Sabra's visionaries, and would have welcomed the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. Indeed, by the mid-1950s, it is doubtful whether the NP leadership's immediate agenda even included the granting of political independence to the African homelands, a measure seen by so many to be the cornerstone of a "Verwoerdian" grand apartheid scheme put into motion by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.

Prime Minister Strydom, for one, was vehemently opposed to homeland independence, stating that there could no talk of it, "in our time and for a long time thereafter", because Africans would not be sufficiently developed or advanced "for generations to come" (155). It was perhaps predictable that the champion of *baaskap* would express such sentiments. Nevertheless, another incident serves to highlight the fact that even Verwoerd's coterie in the Department of Native Affairs was in no hurry to consider "independent" political sovereignty for the homelands. A few days before he was due to speak at the 1956 volkskongres, Jan Sadie of Stellenbosch University circulated copies of his paper to various people attending the congress. In the paper, he argued, amongst other things, that he saw no reason why the Transkei should not be granted political independence soon. The evening before his address, however, Sadie received word that Verwoerd's deputy

minister M.D.C. de Wet Nel was unhappy with this section of the paper, and, apparently on higher authority, wanted Sadie to remove it. According to Nel, the granting of political independence to the homelands was not yet government policy, and should not be discussed (156).

Yet, within five years a more sophisticated mutation of separate development emerged: henceforth, increased oppression and control of the black population, especially in the urban areas, would be justified by the claim that Africans were now foreign visitors to South Africa, rather than mere "temporary sojourners". What, then, were the factors which caused Verwoerd and his aides to realise the importance of accelerating the ideological reinterpretation of the *baaskap* sloganising of the early apartheid years? A Machiavellian version of South African history would suggest, perhaps, that no such factors existed: that, from the late 1940s, Verwoerd always intended to make provision for homeland independence in 1959, and merely waited until the strict controls underpinning apartheid policy were in place, and crude *baaskappers* such as Strydom were out of the way. However, a more subtle - and more accurate - explanation can be constructed by considering the direction of certain trends during the 1950s.

The updated version of apartheid developed, firstly, hand-in-hand with the emergence of a powerful, economically ambitious and politically assertive urbanised Afrikaner grouping, comprising intellectuals, teachers, professionals and bureaucrats. Enjoying access to improved educational

opportunities, as well as state patronage and employment - and with a resurgent Broederbond as a vehicle for its demands - this group assumed a central decision-making role within the NP, and in the overall reshaping of apartheid policy. A crude historical materialist framework would perhaps expect Sabra's visionaries to hold exactly the same views as members of this grouping. In fact, as shown above, by the end of the decade, the visionaries' commitment to total separation - and the elimination of economic integration - was beginning to collapse into concern about the status of urban Africans, given the absence of any meaningful economic development in the African reserves, and the firm decision by the British government not to place the protectorates under the jurisdiction of the NP. In contrast, the stratum spearheaded by the Broederbond wanted to pare away any pragmatic concessions to urban Africans, without reducing white South Africa's exploitation of black labour, and without setting aside enough resources for significant homeland development.

Verwoerdian apartheid of the early 1960s evolved, secondly, in conjunction with more general political and economic trends. When the NP government took power in 1948, not only was the anti-colonialist movement in Africa and Asia flexing its muscles; the rhetoric of nationalism had begun to influence a black political opposition in South Africa that was already radicalised by the dislocations of the 1940s. During the mid-1950s, African nationalist campaigns began to achieve their objective, spurring on a more militant black resistance movement in South Africa. The homelands policy which developed by 1960 seems, therefore, to have been

prompted by a realisation on the part of Verwoerd, and the leadership of the NP, that black resistance needed to be quickly channelled if the rigid control that guaranteed white economic and political privilege was to be maintained.

Verwoerd's response to the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya provided the first hint that a change in thinking was in the offing. He noted in the House of Assembly that "tribal authority" urgently needed to be encouraged, since it was "the natural ally of the government of the country against such rebellious movements" (157). The dramatic transformation in government rhetoric over the next few years clarified the way in which tribal structures were to be bolstered. According to Eiselen, South Africa intended to emancipate "the diverse members of its own little Commonwealth on the lines long followed by Great Britain in relation to countries subject to colonial rule" (158). Of course, representation in the "guardian's Parliament" would not follow the attainment of self-government by the "dependent territory":

This appears clearly from the history of the growth of the British Commonwealth, where none of the component territories, which were destined for autonomy, at any time had direct representation in the Parliament of the U.K. (159)

Nel, in turn, pointed out, after an obligatory reference to the Rubicon, that the government "was following a better but similar road to that being pursued by other countries in

157) HAD, 1956, col.6617.

158) W.W.M. Eiselen, "Harmonious Multi-Community Development" in *Optima*, 9, 1, March 1959, p.7.

159) Bantu, 1959, 5, pp.16-17.

Africa with like problems" (160). And Verwoerd waxed eloquent about the "completely new system", in terms of which the "Bantu" would be given far greater control over his own affairs (161). Notions of "leadership with justice" were outdated; in the "new period" which was dawning, discrimination against Africans would disappear (162). It was only a few years later, when Transkeian "independence" was being granted, that Verwoerd confirmed that he had not envisaged that "within ten years the position in Africa and in the world and locally would be such that it would be necessary for these steps to be taken today already" (163).

→ 3

For the more reactionary elements of the NP's electoral alliance - particularly some farmers and white workers - this "new" version of apartheid was clearly rather threatening. On a number of occasions, Verwoerd was forced to defend himself against allegations that he was a *kaffirboetie* who spoon-fed the natives (164). His private secretary wrote:

...I was pained to discover, from countless letters, how bitter the opposition to his policy actually was...He was attacked on every side; even when he was being decried by his opponents as a cruel, merciless oppressor, many of his supporters accused him of pampering the blacks!(165)

Verwoerd's concern about the possibility of a rightwing backlash was illustrated by his introduction of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill without consultation

160) *Bantu*, 1960, 2, p.76.

161) *HAD*, 1959, col.60.

162) *HAD*, 1959, col.64.

163) *HAD*, 1962, col.3940.

164) See, for example, *The Star*, 12/8/57.

165) Barnard, *13 Years*, p.31.

with the NP caucus (166). Although his leadership was never threatened by old-style *baaskappers*, by 1962 a number of splinter rightwing movements had begun to hive off in protest against the government's granting of independence to the Transkei (167).

Yet, as we have seen, for the visionaries in Sabra, Verwoerd's version of apartheid did not go nearly far enough. At the same time, it would be a mistake to suggest that Sabra's visionaries were irrelevant, that Verwoerdian apartheid bore absolutely no resemblance to their impossible dream. Sabra was an important organisation precisely because it contributed towards the formulation of the ideological framework within which Verwoerd and his compatriots were able to shape the homeland policy. Acutely aware of the turbulence of post-war Africa, and the rumblings of black opposition in South Africa, Sabra's visionaries wove the new terminology of equality and self-determination into their language and symbols. Verwoerd and the NP leadership, while rejecting most of the visionaries' demands and conclusions, still managed to appropriate the ideological paraphernalia in terms of which those demands were phrased, in an attempt to bolster white exploitation, domination and control.

The conflicts within Sabra, and between Sabra and the NP leadership, therefore did have a significant effect on changes

166) B. Schoeman, *Van Malan Tot Verwoerd* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1970), p. 173. Confirmed by N.J.J. Olivier, interview, 13/9/85.

167) See, for example, *Sunday Times*, 15/7/62; *Sunday Times*, 17/2/63; *Sunday Times*, 24/2/63; *Sunday Times*, 24/3/63; *The Star*, 28/3/63.

in apartheid ideology. While the analysis of the process of capitalist accumulation and class conflict provides a vitally important framework for the understanding of South African history, it is inadequate to dismiss Sabra's schisms over the definition of apartheid as unimportant, on the pretext that the ultimate overriding effect of apartheid ideology was to guarantee capitalist development. Nor would it be entirely correct to attempt to locate Sabra's splits - and the differing conceptions of apartheid held by its various factions - purely and simply in terms of the demands and situations of differing class groupings. Sabra's membership remained, throughout the 1950s, relatively homogenous: mainly petty bourgeois and intellectual. In addition, the prevalent, rule-of-thumb view that ascribes all schisms in Afrikaner organisations to regional differences between the "liberal" Cape and the "hard-line" North is also far too simplistic. Although it was based at Stellenbosch, the visionary faction of Sabra found adherents in branches all over the country (168), and clearly could not claim the overall support of the supposedly more moderate Cape NP. Finally, while the assumptions of the Sabra visionaries were informed by the same mix of racism and paternalism as their adversaries - and the same desire to maintain and rationalise white domination - their criticisms of Verwoerd and his supporters were not just differences about the most pragmatic, secure way of securing white privilege. When the visionaries were finally purged in 1961 it was also because they had attempted an impossible task - to infuse an inherently exploitative and oppressive programme with a consistent moral framework - but had failed.

CHAPTER SIX

The Dutch Reformed Church and Apartheid

I

The task of this chapter is to chronicle and interpret the conflicts that surfaced in the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church during the late 1940s and 1950s, particularly with respect to apartheid ideology and policy. It is not intended, however, that the chapter should confine itself to examining abstruse theological complexities. While the academic theological subtleties of Afrikaner Calvinism, 1950s variety, may well be interesting in their own right, and should not be dismissed as completely unimportant, to focus exclusively on theological schisms would be to ignore the more concrete political and ideological dimensions of the debates in the DRC.

The important wider implications of divisions in the DRC become especially evident when one takes into account the powerful influence traditionally exerted by the Church in all spheres of Afrikaner community life. In earlier times, one of the principal functions of the three Afrikaner churches - the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK), the *Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk* (NHK) and the *Gereformeerde Kerk* (GK) (1) - was

1) A brief history of the origins of the three churches can be found in J. de Gruchy, *The Church Struggle in South Africa* (Grand Rapids, William Eerdmans, 1979), pp.1-41. The *Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk* (NHK) was formed when the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) refused to sanction the Great Trek of the 1830s. The NHK subsequently became the official church of the Transvaal Republic. In the 1850s, a small group of dissidents, led by staunch Dutch neo-Calvinist Dirk Postma, broke away from the NHK to form the *Gereformeerde Kerk* (GK), the "Dopper Kerk". In this thesis, the abbreviation "DRC" is used to refer to all three Afrikaner churches. This is in contrast to De Gruchy, who uses "DRC" to refer to the NGK.

to unite the fragmented Afrikaner rural community. As Gwendolyn Carter notes:

...whole families journeyed for days to the *Nachtmaal*, the joint communion service which lasted more than a week, and served as a great cementing influence among scattered and isolated Afrikaner settlers.(2)

Given this important unifying social function, it is not surprising that the DRC was influentially involved in the Afrikaner nationalism that burgeoned at the turn of the century (3).

However, it was during the 1920s and 1930s that the DRC began to play a more obvious and direct political role. This shift in outlook - and the vehement theological debates that attended it - reflected a profound transformation in the social and economic fabric of the country, as a result of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. The erosion of the Afrikaner rural communities and the dramatic increase in the number of mainly Afrikaner "poor whites" in the cities, in particular, was great cause for concern within the ranks of the DRC. The DRC's political response to the crisis took place at a number of levels. In terms of concrete practice, the most notable shift was the intensification of a form of *predikant*

2) G. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1958), p.272.

3) The link between Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaner "Calvinism" is the subject of an important debate. See, for example, I. Hexham, "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism" in *African Affairs*, 79, 1980; A. du Toit, "No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology" in *American Historical Review*, 88, 4, October 1983; A. du Toit, "Puritans in Africa? Afrikaner 'Calvinism' and Kuyperian Neo-Calvinism in Late Nineteenth-Century South Africa" in *Comparative Studies in History and Society*, 27, 2, April 1985.

(parson/preacher) activism. Dr D.F. Malan, a churchman turned journalist turned politician, was the most obvious protagonist of active church involvement in the affairs of secular life. But many other clergymen, including men such as William Nicol and the legendary Father Kestell, began to exhibit a very pragmatic - and political - interest in issues such as Afrikaner poverty and Afrikaner education. Clearly, these changes in church practice were accompanied and informed by similar transformations in ecclesiastical theology; T.D. Moodie, for example, has attempted, most especially in the case of the NGK and GK, to trace the emergence of volkskerk and Kuyperian theological tendencies, both of which emphasised the direct and organic relationship between the church and the Afrikaner community (4). However, as Moodie and O'Meara (5) show, these new theological movements did not only shape attitudes and approaches within the DRC. The frenetic activity of Afrikaner churchmen, in conjunction with other Afrikaner activists and intellectuals, was also vital in establishing the ideological framework for the rigorous and extreme Christian-Nationalism which emerged during the 1930s, and in conceptualising the organisational forms through which the new nationalism was to be applied and inculcated. While the DRC publicly claimed to leave "politics" to organisations such as the GNP or the Broederbond, the very choice and use of the term "Christian-Nationalism" - not to mention the obvious

4) T.D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975).

5) D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme; Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983).

overlapping of the personnel of Party, Broederbond and Church - indicates the important position accorded to the DRC, both in the day-to-day struggles of the nationalist movement, and in conceptions of a future Afrikaner republic.

By the early 1940s, then, the DRC's involvement in political issues was fully confirmed. All three of the Afrikaner churches openly signed the controversial 1941 Draft Republican Constitution, which, amongst other things, called for full Church involvement in a 50-member advisory council intended to provide the executive president of the future Afrikaner republic with "expert advice" (6). At the same time, the DRC continued its direct participation in the activities of the Broederbond-inspired FAK. Throughout the 1940s, and into the 1950s, the FAK spared no energy in its effort to disseminate and implement the tenets of Christian-Nationalism, particularly those pertaining to education (7). DRC support and involvement in all of the FAK's endeavours was unquestioned. The Church was also prepared to pronounce on specific (and controversial) contemporary political issues. In 1951, for example, the Federal Council of the NGK issued the *Fundamental Principles of Calvinist Political Science* after its meeting in Bloemfontein. Included in this publication was the contention that the NP government was justified in preventing Communists from forming a political party, on the grounds that while all Christians "must organise themselves into a party to give expression to their political

6) *Die Burger*, 23/1/42.

7) See Chapter Seven below.

confession", to Communists this right should be denied because of their anti-Christian stance (8). Furthermore, the same Council session received a NGK Commission of Current Affairs report which described the Broederbond as "wholesome and sound" since it "confines itself solely to the Afrikaner nation, and does not interfere with other nations". The report was later formally accepted by both the Transvaal and Cape synods of the NGK (9).

Nevertheless, it was apartheid ideology and policy which was undoubtedly the most pressing political issue of the period. From the mid-1940s onwards, the DRC expended a significant proportion of its time and energy debating and clarifying its stance on the implications, justifications and future of apartheid. It is to these debates that this account now turns.

II

During the late 1940s, it became a common refrain in the pages of the DRC's journals that the Church's contemporary apartheid policy was the result of centuries of steady development and progress. In 1948, for example, T.N. Hanekom - assistant editor of the official organ of the NGK, *Die Kerkbode* - wrote:

Our Dutch churches have always been of the opinion that the ideal solution is to be found in the development of separate life-cycles...(10)

8) Carter, *Inequality*, p.274.

9) *Cape Times*, 18/5/51. See also *Die Burger*, 20/10/53; *Die Transvaler*, 23/4/54.

10) *Die Kerkbode*, 61, 12, 22/9/48, p.664. See also the editorial in *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 14, 5/4/50, p.651.

In fact, this emphasis on the continuity of the DRC's position is somewhat misplaced. While clearly there were strong and definite connections between DRC policy during the apartheid era and that of previous decades (just as there were fundamental links between the general theory and practice of apartheid and segregation), it is important to note that the apartheid project involved a comprehensive restructuring of racial policy within Afrikaner nationalist circles.

In the case of the DRC, this reassessment seems to have followed two main courses. Firstly, in parallel with the general trend amongst Afrikaner intellectuals, DRC clergymen began to call for a far more complete application of racial separation. Often this demand was phrased in rather negative terms, reflecting the prevailing *swart gevaar* mentality of the late 1940s. In July 1947, for example, a church *volkskongres* in Johannesburg passed the following motion:

With the intention of ending the clash of interests between whites and non-whites, eliminating miscegenation, and, in general, preserving the identity - biological and cultural - of both the white and non-white race groups, this Congress proposes as its decided position that an all-embracing policy of racial apartheid should be purposefully carried out in all spheres of life.(11)

Statements such as this were predicated on attempts by Afrikaner intellectuals to irrefutably "prove" the existence of "differences" between the white and black races. Typical of these efforts was *'n Tuiste Vir Die Nageslag* (A Home For Posterity), published in 1945 by Dr Geoff Cronje, an academic who worked closely with members of the DRC. Quoting reams of

11) *Inspan*, 6, 10, July 1947, p.7.

supposedly scientific evidence, Cronje confidently stated that "the racial equipment of the native is, in both the physical and spiritual respect,...different from that of the white man" (12). Furthermore:

It has been authoritatively and convincingly proved that miscegenation between the white and black races in South Africa is detrimental from a biological point of view, and produces human material which is physically and spiritually inferior compared with the standard of the European race.(13)

Cronje concluded emphatically:

The policy of complete racial separation (if it is radically and effectively and consistently carried out) will best protect the purity of our blood and will completely eliminate miscegenation.(14)

Cronje's obsession with matters of biology is perhaps attributable to the National-Socialism of his OB background. Yet his point of view, while strongly stated, does not seem to have been out of step with mainstream opinions in the DRC (15). At the same time, however, DRC ideologists were also concerned to portray the apartheid idea in a more positive light. In 1944, at a volkskongres called by the FAK to discuss the "racial policy of the Afrikaner", a church-inspired motion suggested that apartheid would give "the non-white national groups" the opportunity to develop according to their own

12) G. Cronje, *'n Tuiste Vir Die Nageslag* (Stellenbosch, Pro-Ecclesia Press, 1945), p.19.

13) *Ibid.*, p.71.

14) *Ibid.*, p.88. See also G. Cronje, *Voogdyskap en Apartheid* (Pretoria, J.L. van Schaik, 1948), pp.34-36.

15) A cursory glance through the correspondence columns of *Die Kerkbode* (and other Afrikaner journals and newspapers) quickly establishes this point.

nature, in their own areas, until eventually they would acquire full control over their own affairs. (In the meanwhile, of course, it was the Christian duty of the white man to act as the non-white's "guardian" (16).) Over the next few years, and particularly after the vicious and racist 1948 election campaign, the DRC strove hard to develop apartheid's positive face. Part of this campaign involved obvious semantic manipulation. By the time of the Cape Synod of the NGK in November 1949, for example, the church had begun to talk about *afsonderlike, eiesoortige ontwikkeling tot selfstandigheid* (separate, distinctive/autogenous development towards independence), as well as "vertical" apartheid:

The Synod upholds its traditional policy of vertical apartheid...but speaks out against any form of horizontal apartheid which robs the non-white of his general human rights.(17)

Five months later, the Federal Missionary Council of the NGK called representatives of the four white provincial NGK churches, the three mission churches, the NHK and the GK to Bloemfontein to discuss "the relationship between the white and Bantu races". The new language of apartheid was again clearly in evidence, with the congress claiming that "the policy of distinctive development is just a road along which we seek to allow each population group to arrive at its full rights" (18).

Nevertheless, the DRC's reworking of its justification

16) *Inspan*, 4, 1, October 1944, p.21.

17) "Die Rassebeleid van die Ned. Geref. Kerk" in *JRA*, 1, 2, 1950, p.5. See also *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 21, 23/11/49, pp.960-961.

18) *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 16, 19/4/50, p.764.

and presentation of apartheid did not merely involve tampering with linguistic niceties. For many DRC clergymen, as with Afrikaner intellectuals in Sabra, "separate, distinctive development" also implied the imposition of total territorial segregation. In fact, this notion was first publicly mooted by Cronje in *'n Tuiste vir die Nageslag* (19), and then again in *Regverdige Rasseapartheid* (Just Racial Separation) (20) and *Voogdyskap en Apartheid* (Trusteeship and Apartheid) (21). But it was the DRC and Sabra, in close cooperation - it is worth noting that many clergymen, including men such as G.B.A. Gerdener and C.B. Brink, were also active members of Sabra - who refined the concept into a more sophisticated and radical form. Thus, according to delegates attending the 1950 Bloemfontein conference, it was "imperative" that the reserves be transformed into "national homes" for Africans with "ample opportunity for self expression and self realisation", including that of political self-government (22). Furthermore:

Natives must be gradually and systematically eliminated from white industrial life and integrated into their own industrial life in their own areas. For that purpose, it is necessary that the white population must adapt itself to a new policy, which will include a purposeful and healthy increase in the white population, national service for the youth, the labour of poor whites, mechanisation, training for white workers and a cooperation plan with labour...To this end, large sacrifices will be asked of the white population, because if we are not prepared for that, any possibilities for an eventual solution to this question disappear.(23)

19) Cronje, *Tuiste*, p.126.

20) G. Cronje, *Regverdige Rasseapartheid* (Stellenbosch, Die Christen-Student Verenigingmaatskappy van Suid-Afrika, 1947), p.155.

21) Cronje, *Voogdyskap*, pp.44-45.

22) *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 17, 26/4/50, p.818.

23) *Ibid.*, p.819.

It is evident from the concerned response of NP leaders to the DRC's position that the church's pronouncements were more than just glossy, harmless rationalisations of government policy. Referring to the Bloemfontein conference, Prime Minister Malan told the House of Assembly on 12 April 1950:

I repeat that it was a valuable congress which passed those resolutions and sound arguments were advanced in support of those resolutions. What they resolved was that we should have total or complete territorial apartheid. Well, if one could attain total territorial apartheid, if it were practicable, everybody would admit that it would be an ideal state of affairs. It would be an ideal state, but that is not the policy of our party...and it is nowhere to be found in our official declarations of policy.(24)

This clear indication of government opposition to total territorial apartheid - and other remarks by senior NP politicians - forced the DRC to soften its stance. The 1951 *Fundamental Principles of Calvinist Political Science*, for example, made no mention of total separation, and argued that the government was perfectly justified in, firstly, refusing to extend the franchise to blacks (on the grounds that the vote was not an automatic right for all men but "a privilege only to be entrusted to those who have come of age and who are capable of exercising it with responsibility to God"); and, secondly, forbidding the formation of black trade unions (on the grounds that it was the responsibility and role of the State to harmoniously order the interests of its members) (25). Then, in 1952, the Federal Missionary Council of the NGK publicly conceded that the "ideal" of total apartheid

24) HAD, 1950, cols.4141-4142.

25) S. Patterson, *The Last Trek* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p.198.

envisaged a long-term policy of 50 or 100 years, and by no means excluded "the employment of Native labour for the economic machine of the Europeans for many years to come" (26). Despite a plea to the government to purchase all the land still available to Africans in terms of the 1936 Herzog Land Act, the Union Congress held by the Federal Missionary Council with Sotho, Zulu and Xhosa church leaders five months later repeated this sentiment (27). The weakening of its original stand did not imply, however, that the DRC had abandoned its flirtation with total apartheid. The majority of Afrikaner clergymen seem to have continued to subscribe to the ideal (28). Yet it is interesting to note that, over the next few years, the churchmen who most vehemently supported total territorial separation - including Gerdener and Willem Landman - tended to voice their opinions through Sabra rather than through the church. While many clergymen may have had their personal qualms about the direction and application of government policy, the DRC as a whole generally produced uncritical endorsements of the decisions of the NP leadership.

If NP politicians were disquieted by the process which had resulted in the DRC's call for total apartheid, the second main thrust of the DRC's ideological reassessment during the 1940s - the attempt to establish a moral, scriptural and theological basis for racial separation - was much more to

26) *The Racial Issue in South Africa: Being Findings on the Native Problem of Various Congresses Held Under the Auspices of the Federal Missionary Council of the Dutch Reformed Mother and Mission Churches (1950-1952)* (Bloemfontein, D.R. Mission Press, 1953), p.15.

27) *Ibid.*, p.13.

28) Of course, most NP politicians were also happy to support the ideal of total apartheid!

their liking. Clearly, the support of many Afrikaners for apartheid would be cemented if it became evident that the NP enjoyed God's full backing. The first salvos of the DRC's campaign were fired during the 1944 volkskongres in Bloemfontein. Following a paper delivered by J.D. du Toit on the religious basis of Afrikaner racial policy, the congress decreed that apartheid was "based on the Holy Scriptures which teach us that God did not will the uniformity but the multiformity of nations, and that His counsel is realised through the plurality of peoples, races, languages and cultures" (29). This position was very similar to that adopted by the 1944 Transvaal synod of the NGK (30), and it was reaffirmed and expanded a number of times over the next few years. Prominent NGK clergyman E.P. Groenewald was just one of many who publicly expressed their belief in apartheid's biblical grounds when he wrote in Cronje's book *Regverdige Rasseapartheid* in 1947:

...the policy of apartheid and guardianship, as advocated by the Christian Afrikaner with respect to the non-white, can be traced back to the Word of God.(31)

The search for scriptural justifications for racial separation culminated in 1948, with the completion of an official report on the subject by the NGK's Commission of Current Affairs. This report was unanimously accepted by the NGK's Federal Council and referred with recommendation to the four provincial synods. In April 1948, the Transvaal synod accepted

29) *Inspan*, 4, 1, October 1944, p.21.

30) B.J. Marais, interview, 30/9/85.

31) E.P. Groenewald, "Apartheid en Voogdyskap in die Lig van die Heilige Skrif" in Cronje, *Rasseapartheid*, p.66.

the report "with thanks", concluding that the apartheid policy was not just "born out of circumstance", but had its foundation in the Holy Scriptures. However, since it was essential that this scriptural basis should be as "pure and irresistible" as possible, the synod asked the new Commission for Current Affairs to continue to delve for biblical proof (32).

Such proof was constructed by DRC clergymen from a bewildering array of direct biblical references. As stated earlier, it is beyond the intended scope of this chapter to unravel all the twisted knots of the DRC's theological knitting. However, it is illuminating to examine just a few of the more important and commonly-used arguments. DRC churchmen went as far back as the book of Genesis to construct their general justifications for racial separation. Genesis 11, for example, told how God had opposed the building of the Tower of Babel, and had "mixed up the language of all the people, and from there scattered them all over the earth". Deuteronomy 32:8 clearly stated that "the Most High assigned nations their land; he determined where peoples should live". Job 24:2, Amos 17:26, Acts 2:9-11, and Revelations 5:9 all provided further proof that God had created divisions between nations. And Acts 17:26 clinched the argument: "From one man he created all the races of mankind and made them live throughout all the whole earth. He himself fixed beforehand the exact times and limits of the places where they would live". As far as "social" apartheid was concerned, supportive references were equally

32) *Die Kerkbode*, 61, 17, 28/4/48, p.957.

wide-ranging. Deuteronomy 7:1-4, Joshua 23:12 and Nehemiah 13:23-25, in particular, all taught that God had forbade the Children of Israel to marry heathens or foreigners (33).

Notwithstanding the decisions of the Federal Council and the Transvaal synod of the NGK, it would be mistaken to assume, however, that all DRC clergymen accepted, wholly or in part, the scriptural justifications propounded in the Commission of Current Affairs report, and outlined briefly above. At the Transvaal synod, pastor B.J. (Ben) Marais forced a second debate on the Commission's report, and was joined by another nine delegates (including C.F.B. (Beyers) Naude) in voting against its ratification (34). (Marais claims that after the vote he was accused by one churchman of "spoiling the whole [1948 general] election" by his questioning of apartheid's biblical grounds (35).)

The controversy at the synod provoked heated exchanges in the correspondence columns of *Die Kerkbode*. First into the journal was Professor P.V. Pistorius of the University of Pretoria. Endorsing Marais's stand, he suggested that "one could fill pages with the weaknesses of that report...". Pistorius was particularly dismissive of the Commission's arguments in favour of "social" apartheid. He concluded:

I am convinced that this report has made a strong case through weak exegesis...I stand firmly in favour of racial separation, but not on the grounds contained in this report.(36)

33) The biblical references in this paragraph are summarised from a number of articles and letters in *Die Kerkbode* between 1947 and 1951.

34) *Die Kerkbode*, 61, 17, 28/4/48, p.957.

35) B.J. Marais, interview, 30/9/85.

36) *Die Kerkbode*, 61, 22, 2/6/48, p.1279.

A similar point of view was expressed by Marais himself in a long letter to *Die Kerkbode* in July 1948. He began by restating his belief in the necessity of apartheid:

It is, under our circumstances, a practical exigency of life. I honestly believe that it can and will be in the interests of both groups provided it is upheld with Christian responsibility, and not naked selfishness. However, equally decidedly, I wish to assert that most of the attempts which have been and are being employed to demonstrate direct Biblical grounds for a policy of racial separation are extremely unconvincing and, for me, sometimes even shocking.(37)

Marais agreed that the Scriptures left no doubt that God had willed the existence and continued survival of separate peoples, nations and races. However, he argued, new nations were continually being born, chiefly because of the mixing of existing nations and races. If the original division of the nations and races implied, as was claimed by many clergymen, that any subsequent mixing was contrary to God's command, then the birth of all new peoples, including the Afrikaner volk, must also have been in conflict with the will of God. Furthermore, Marais maintained, the Commission's use of the Old Testament history of Israel to support its interpretation inevitably resulted in confusion. Firstly, it was historically and theologically incorrect to treat ancient Israel as a racial or biological entity rather than a religious entity. Outsiders of any race who had accepted worship of the Israelite's monotheism had automatically become members of the Israelite nation. Similarly, Jews were forbidden to marry "heathens" for religious reasons, and not because of fears about racial purity. In any case, Marais continued, it was

37) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 2, 14/7/48, p.1596.

misleading to treat Israel as an "ordinary" (gewone) people:

Israel was a unique people, God's chosen people. The position of Israel among the nations can therefore not throw too much light for us on the principles of race relations in general.

Marais concluded:

What the Scripture teaches, clearly and plainly, is not racial separation, but the separation of sin. The maxim of the New Testament is: the faithful must not mix with the unfaithful. We can supply no direct grounds from the Scripture for our policy of apartheid..., but, at most, inferences or parallels.(38)

The letters from Marais and Pistorius provoked a swift response. While a few correspondents expressed qualified support (39), most were palpably outraged. F.A. Kock of Bloemfontein, for example, attacked Marais's interpretation of Israel's history, stating that "the blood...of a volk may never be separated from its faith and obedience to its covenant". A nation was "qualified" by its culture, but it was "founded" on "biological racial unity" (40). J.F. Cillie of Paarl called Marais's position "untenable" (41), while E.A. Venter of Tarkastad accused Marais of misunderstanding the distinction between volk and race, claiming further that biblical Israel must be viewed as a political and cultural entity as well as a religious entity. This was proved by the fact that proselytes were always treated as a separate group: belief in the Jewish God was thus not the only determinant of

38) *Ibid.*, p.1597.

39) See, for example, letters from J.S. de Villiers of Noordhoek (*Die Kerkbode*, 62, 9, 1/9/48, p.506) and R.H. Venter of Hoopstad (*Die Kerkbode*, 62, 10, 8/9/48, p.572).

40) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 5, 4/8/48, p.265.

41) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 6, 11/8/48, p.316.

membership of Israel. As for Marais's insistence that apartheid could only be justified in terms of practical circumstances, Venter retorted:

What circumstances are being referred to here? Is it the paganism or lack of learning and civilisation amongst natives? And must we then accept that miscegenation should be allowed when these matters are brought to order? This is the point of view of the consistent liberal...and yet Dr Marais would not want to identify himself with that!(42)

Finally, S.H. Roussouw of Maitland, one of signatories of the Commission's report, entered the fray. He repeated a number of Venter's accusations, suggesting that the principle of apartheid was like a "golden thread" running all the way through the Bible. Furthermore, the Afrikaner volk was not, as claimed by Marais, a *baster-nasie* (bastard nation), a "muddled farming and marriage of different races", but rather a "pure, European race" (43).

Marais's response to this flood of approbation - an acerbic letter in which he again insisted that apartheid could only be justified in terms of circumstance and "indirect" Biblical principle (44) - elicited even more vitriolic replies from Venter and Kock (45). Eventually it was left to Pistorius to close this particular phase of correspondence. He noted that nobody had answered his original accusations against the standard of the commission's exegesis:

Have the Commission concerned no interest in this? Or

42) *Ibid.*, p.317.

43) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 8, 25/8/48, p.442.

44) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 11, 15/9/48, pp.632-633.

45) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 14, 6/10/48, pp.807-808; *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 15, 13/10/48, pp.875-876.

must that report now live on in the archive of our Church as a proof to posterity of what we can achieve in the domain of exegesis.(46)

More importantly:

Let me say it straight out: we invite danger when we wish to make the Scriptures serviceable to our own opinions. We are of the opinion that we believe in racial separation. So then our exegesis must simply ensure that the Scripture agrees!(47)

Insofar as the "indirect" grounds for apartheid were concerned, Pistorius suggested, for example, that the principle of love in the Bible obliged the Afrikaner to do "the best" for whites, Coloureds and Africans: and this could imply the application of separation. Similarly, the Sixth Commandment - "Thou shalt not kill" - forbade the Afrikaner to allow *kleurvermenging* (colour mixing) to destroy his volk and culture (48).

The controversy ignited by the Commission of Current Affairs' report did not disappear with *Die Kerkbode's* refusal to publish any more letters on the subject. Nor were the effects of the private and public campaign conducted by men such Marais and Pistorius completely negligible. In November 1949, for example, the Cape NGK's synod tempered its pronouncement in favour of separate development with an interesting, and important, qualification. After a long debate, held behind closed doors, the synod accepted as policy a report by a temporary commission of racial affairs which

46) *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 16, 20/10/48, p.937.

47) *Ibid.*, p.938.

48) *Ibid.*, p.939.

repeated many of tried and trusted theological arguments and references in favour of apartheid, but which also noted:

Moreover, your Commission finds nothing in the letter or spirit of the Old and New Testament which is in conflict with this policy of separate, distinctive development towards independence, although nowhere does the Holy Scripture explicitly, and in so many words, express itself on this question.(49)

But this concession did not satisfy Professor B.B. Keet of the NGK's seminary in Stellenbosch, an eminent theologian and one of the translators of the first Afrikaans bible. In a series of articles published during November and December 1949, he attacked the report adopted by the Cape synod on a number of grounds. He argued, firstly, that the synod's attempt to biblically justify the general policy of apartheid, whatever qualifications it appended, involved the Church in overtly political matters which were not its brief (50), and isolated the DRC from even the staunchest Calvinist members of the Christian church (51). Equally vehemently, he repeated Pistorius's criticisms about prevalent methods of scriptural analysis:

If we want to understand the message of the Bible, we must turn directly, without conditions, to the Bible, and then in accordance with its overall tendency, try to inquire what it is being said to us at a fixed place, so that in this way our practice can be brought into line, and the Scriptures not bound to the practical.(52)

As for the report's claim that it could find nothing in the spirit or letter of the Bible which conflicted with the policy

49) *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 21, 23/11/49, pp.961-962, my emphasis.

50) *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 22, 30/11/49, pp.1004-1005.

51) *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 23, 7/12/49, p.1046.

52) *Ibid.*, pp.1046-1047.

of separate development, Keet retorted that it all depended on what was meant by "separate, distinctive development"; but if the concept was understood the way it was obviously intended to be understood, then it was "in conflict with everything for which the gospel message of both the Old and New Testaments stands" (53). An over-emphasis on separation and difference led to conflict and the disappearance of unity in Christ:

It is diversity in unity and unity in diversity that forms the beauty of God's works.(54)

He might be accused of adopting a weak point of view, Keet concluded, because of his "purely practical" support for apartheid, but he would rather commit that sin than endorse a position which involved bending the Scriptures to fit a principle (55).

Predictably, it was not long before Keet and his fellow-doubters were once again the objects of such an accusation. This time it emanated from conservative Transvaal clergyman A.B. du Preez, in a long and turgid series of essays in *Die Kerkbode*. Du Preez based his attack on a particularly literal reading of the Bible. He argued that it was impossible to defend apartheid, or any other policy, only in terms of practical considerations because this would, in the last instance, result in "petty attempts at self-assertion", which were foreign to the will of God:

So completely must we subject ourselves to God's manifest

53) *Ibid.*, p. 1047.

54) *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 24, 14/12/49, p.1087.

55) *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 25, 21/12/49, p.1137.

will that if it appears from the Scriptures that complete equality and miscegenation - yes, even the disappearance of white civilisation - is the will of God, then we must accept it wholeheartedly.(56)

Du Preez's literal interpretation did not prevent him from making certain puzzling assumptions. In particular:

The fact that the Scriptures do not explicitly talk about races cannot serve as a refutation, because although the scriptural facts principally refer to the separate existence...of nations, we still have the right to apply these facts, and to conclude that whatever applies to separate nations will apply even more strongly to separate races, or nations which above all other differences are separated by colour differences...(57)

In a rigid and dogmatic refutation of the objections raised by Keet, Pistorius and Marais, Du Preez proceeded to justify every aspect of apartheid in direct Biblical terms. He managed, in addition, to introduce a new argument into the debate. The separation of mankind into nations and states, Du Preez maintained, was God's "merciful remedy" for the destructive effect of sin. Sinful humanity, without division into nations and powerful governments to rule them, would have made a "hell" of the earth, because the state was God's means of controlling the "licentiousness" of people (58).

Furthermore:

The Scriptures teach that the restoration of the unity of humankind can only occur with the triumph over sin...But the human attempts to restore unity, and the internationalism and cosmopolitanism which accompany the demand for absolute brotherhood of all people, do not originate from Christian love according to the Holy Scriptures, but come from purely humanistic

56) *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 11, 15/3/50, p.502.

57) *Ibid.*, p.504.

58) *Ibid.*, p.504.

considerations which make the person the criterion and centre of everything.(59)

This linkage of apartheid's scriptural justification with a fierce anti-liberalism and anti-humanism seems to have struck a deep chord with many Afrikaners. Certainly, it was an argument that would be dredged up again and again over the course of the next ten years.

In summary, then, by the beginning of the 1950s, it is clear that the majority of DRC clergymen believed that apartheid was irrefutably based on Biblical laws and the will of God. Ranged against them was a tiny group of outspoken churchmen, who felt that racial separation could only be justified in terms of practical expediency and indirect application of Scriptural teachings. This group seems to have had neither a specific geographical origin nor a defineable constituency and power base. If anything, its relatively important influence derived from the fact that its most notable leaders were well-respected teachers and academics. One should always remember, however, that, within the framework of this debate, support for apartheid was not in question. With regard to ecclesiastical matters, for example, protagonists of both positions firmly supported the DRC's insistence on separate churches for different races; dispute only centred around whether this policy was scripturally founded, and whether it implied that Africans and Coloureds could be prevented from worshipping with white congregations under any circumstances. In general, too, both sides fully

59) *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 12, 22/3/50, pp.554-555.

agreed that racial separation - and preferably total separation - was the best solution to South Africa's political problems. At this stage, even the most vociferous debunkers of apartheid's Biblical foundation were concerned not to run the risk of being branded with the epithet "liberal".

III

The debate about apartheid's scriptural basis continued to simmer throughout the early 1950s. B.B. Keet, in particular, indefatigably and idiosyncratically renewed his attacks on the prevailing view in the NGK. In March 1950, for example, he asked in a letter to *Die Kerkbode*:

When will we be honest enough to acknowledge that it is nothing other than our prejudice about colour which leads us to such use of the Scriptures?(60)

He would have been somewhat pacified by G.B.A Gerdener's opening speech to the 1950 church conference in Bloemfontein. Gerdener repeated the well-worn argument that diversity was willed by God, but also warned delegates about the danger of searching for a series of supportive Biblical texts. In any case, Gerdener stated, apartheid should not be construed as if it released Afrikaners from the obligation "to live out a unity in Christ, in practice, with respect to the Bantu races..." (61). The congress's subsequent pronouncement on the subject was rather vague, but with its talk of the principle of "diversity with unity", nonetheless seemed to have imbibed

60) *Ibid.*, p.577.

61) *Die Kerkbode*, 65, 16, 19/4/50, p.763.

some of the tone of Gerdener's address (62). This could not be said of certain other members of the DRC. In early 1951, Jac J. Muller, theological advice columnist for *Die Kerkbode*, responded to a letter inquiring whether apartheid was biblically permissible with an extreme exposition of its scriptural justifications (63). Then, in April 1951, the NGK's Commission for Current Affairs finally presented its ten-page report on *The Scriptural Grounds of Racial Apartheid* to the Transvaal synod. The synod accepted the report in full, noting that God not only "willed" but also "perpetuated" the existence of separate nations (64); separation within the Church, in particular, was therefore not only permissible but obligatory (65). By this stage, however, Marais, Pistorius and Keet were no longer alone in publically opposing such statements. In April 1952, for example, Lex Van Wyk noted impatiently:

It is not the task of the Church to simply accept political or traditional theories, or to just furnish them with a doctrinal basis...(66)

In late 1952, the conflict again exploded into public acrimony with the publication of *Colour: Unsolved Problem of the West (Die Kleurkrisis in die Weste)* by Ben Marais. Marais had spent some time on study leave in America, and his book was primarily concerned with a comparative examination of race

62) *Ibid.*, pp.764-765.

63) *Die Kerkbode*, 67, 14, 4/4/51, p.722.

64) *Die Kerkbode*, 67, 18, 2/5/51, pp.956-957.

65) B.J. Marais, "Is there a practical alternative to Apartheid in religion?" in *Optima*, 9, 3, September 1959, p.153.

66) *Die Kerkbode*, 69, 17, 23/4/52, p.849.

relations in the United States and Brazil. But his concluding remarks, in particular, referred directly to the South African situation. Marais once again emphasised his support for the general ideal of apartheid:

To speak of racial equality in South Africa today is wholly unrealistic under existing circumstances. Very few whites in South Africa, English or Afrikaans-speaking, would be in favour of racial crossing.(67)

However, he argued that permanent trusteeship of Africans could not be justified under any circumstances, and expressed grave misgivings about the consequences of economic integration:

A policy of segregation, as long as there is economic integration, can never be applied consistently and with decency. Total territorial segregation...is the only real solution. But is it still feasible and will the whites be prepared to pay the price? And where is the necessary land? If we whites are trying to find a solution for our colour relations in a policy of "apartheid", it will have to be a far more radical and comprehensive "apartheid" policy than those in vogue among the political parties in South Africa at the present time. Only a radical policy of huge dimensions, one embracing economic and territorial segregation, can bring about a position that can to any extent influence the trend of affairs in Southern Africa. All other arrangements are purely temporary and in the long run of very little significance...If extensive territorial segregation is finally impossible, or if the whites cannot or will not apply it because our whole industry and economy have been built on the labour of the native; in other words, when once we admit that several millions of non-whites will live permanently among us and know no other home, then there is no honourable manner in which we as Christians and Democrats will in the long run be able to deny them political and other rights...(68)

This forthright prognosis about the future and direction of

67) B.J. Marais, *Colour: Unsolved Problem of the West* (Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1952), p.322.

68) *Ibid.*, p.323.

apartheid - while at odds with the mainstream of NP opinion - echoed the growing impatience of a number of Afrikaner intellectuals in Sabra and the DRC. An attack by Marais on the scriptural basis of racial separation, on the other hand, proved to be more controversial in ecclesiastical circles. Marais repeated a number of his previous criticisms, but this time based them on a systematic historical analysis. He was especially concerned about the question of separate churches. While still in favour of "separate ministration and even separate church institutions", he condemned the prevailing notion in the DRC that black Christians should be prevented from attending services in white churches:

In the extensive literature of the history of the Church till after the Reformation we look in vain for any sign of a racial basis for admission to the congregation.(69)

As for the claim that separate churches were required by eternal scriptural commands, Marais pointed out that it was only in 1787 in the United States that the first church was established on the basis of race or colour. And the NGK synod did not allow separate buildings for black Christians until 1857, and then only with the qualification that it was "desirable and scriptural that our members from the heathen be admitted to and be incorporated in our existing congregations everywhere where it can be done" (70). In other words, the racial church was an 18th Century phenomenon, with its origin in slavery. Marais continued:

The principle of universalism in the Kingdom of God

69) *Ibid.*, p.287.

70) *Ibid.*, p.292.

stands above all doubt, and has characterised the Church from the beginning, even in matters of practical organisation. Nowhere do we read of distinction on the basis of race and country. Still less did the early or later Church ever find that segregation in the sense in which we understand it today, is a scriptural command.(71)

Strongly endorsing this claim were the replies to a questionnaire sent by Marais to thirteen prominent Calvinist theologians, which were attached as an appendix to *Unsolved Problem of the West*. With such noteworthy support for his case, Marais had no qualms in again concluding:

...what the Scripture does teach in clear and unequivocal terms is not racial segregation, but the segregation of sin.(72)

Marais's appeal to the collective wisdom of the international Calvinist community did not impress some of the Afrikaner reviewers of his book. Sabra's chief "expert" on theories of race and culture, J.P. Bruwer wrote a critical review in the *JRA*, in which he pointedly refused to consider the theological questions raised by Marais, preferring instead to cast doubt on the latter's methodological approach (73). The assistant editor of *Die Kerkbode*, T.N. Hanekom, started along the same path by referring to Marais's account as a subjective "travelogue" (74), but was forced to tackle a much wider range of issues during the stormy correspondence which followed his original review. Hanekom's general conclusions are revealing. He argued that the universalism of the early Christian period was to a large extent due to the influence of

71) *Ibid.*, p.285.

72) *Ibid.*, p.296.

73) *JRA*, 4, 2, January 1953, pp.29-31.

74) *Die Kerkbode*, 70, 24, 10/12/52, p.1054.

the early Hellenic and Roman empires, with their emphasis on a "cosmopolitan world citizenship" (75). Once this influence began to fade, the Church divided along national and geographic lines, and its unity was only expressed through a common faith grounded in "the blood of Christ" (76). The contemporary tendency towards universalism was the work of liberalism - the "present European and American pattern of equality and "uniformity", which was being forced on the West by "the court of law and other authoritarian means" (77). In Hanekom's opinion, there was "no agreement between the spirit of Christ and this spirit of our times" (78). And in opposition to this tendency, the Afrikaner churches must "uphold their own point of view" (79). Until now, Afrikaans theology had been "too much...a spiritual protectorate directed from Europe or England". But world opinion was uninformed about South African conditions; Afrikaners therefore had "the right" to introduce "an Afrikaner note" into "a matter which concerns us alone" (80). For Hanekom, this Afrikaner theology still demanded that the separate nations and races must be accepted as a command of God; and, as such, must remain separate (81).

Keet, Marais and Pistorius all furiously attacked Hanekom. Marais accused Hanekom of "unfair" criticism, and

75) *Ibid.*, p.1055. See also *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 4, 28/1/53, p.118.

76) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 5, 4/2/53, p.157.

77) *Die Kerkbode*, 70, 27, 31/12/52, p.1162.

78) *Ibid.*, p.1151.

79) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 2, 14/1/53, p.54.

80) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 5, 4/2/53, p.157.

81) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 2, 14/1/53, p.54.

reaffirmed his belief in the conclusions of *Unsolved Problem of the West* (82). Keet suggested that elevating "practical circumstances" into a Christian "ideal" was a perpetration of treason against Christianity (83). And Pistorius - in the most sarcastic of the three responses - ridiculed Hanekom's notion that the universalism of the early Church had little to do with the teachings of Christianity:

In other words, according to Dr Hanekom, sectarianism, and evidently also segregation within the Church, are natural to Christianity, while unity is the by-product of paganism which crept into the Church via Rome and the Catholic church. It is thus we - who have separate churches on racial and cultural grounds...and who refuse each other the right to pray together - who have correctly interpreted the spirit of Christ! We are then the people who have shaken ourselves loose of that historical contamination! ...Therefore, nothing good can come from a book which literally quotes the views of Protestant and Reformed theologians, because those who are still under the Greek-Roman influence would believe that the Scripture offers no grounds on which we can base our ecclesiastical policy. They are all wrong, and it is only we who are right.(84)

Clearly due, in part, to Pistorius, Marais and Keet's insistence on the importance of seeking universally accepted interpretations of the Bible, Hanekom's celebration of an isolationist Afrikaans theology did not succeed in eradicating the last vestiges of ecumenical spirit in the DRC. In November 1953, the Federal Missionary Council of the DRC convened a large conference in Pretoria, on the theme of *Christian Principles in Multiracial South Africa*. Attended by 117 delegates and 52 observers from the major Afrikaans and English-speaking churches, the meeting was characterised by

82) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 4, 28/1/53, pp.116-117.

83) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 2, 14/1/53, p.53.

84) *Die Kerkbode*, 71, 5, 4/2/53, p.155.

"frank" discussions between the DRC's representatives and those from the other denominations (85). Equally characteristic of the conference, however, was the bickering that took place within the ranks of the DRC. The seeds for conflict were sown by B.B. Keet's outspoken opening address, in which he reiterated his belief in the "essential unity" of the Church of Christ. While this unity was certainly not uniformity, it did imply an identity in the midst of diversity:

With us in South Africa the danger is that we forget the unity and emphasise the diversity in such a manner that we cannot see it as anything but apartheid - separation...I do not think it is necessary at this stage to consider all the evidence of the Scripture. The mere fact that Christian theologians of all schools of thought are unanimous that separation cannot be the model for a Christian community, ought to be sufficient for us.(86)

Apartheid, Keet argued, should not be "unreservedly condemned", especially in view of the "growing independence and development of our coloured churches", but this was no proof that it was the "ideal" or that there was "nothing better". Rather, apartheid should be seen as a "temporary measure" (87).

The rejoinder to Keet's contribution came in the very next speech to the conference, delivered by C.B. Brink, moderator of the synod of the Transvaal NGK. There could be no doubt, he stated, that "God willed the separate existence of nations"; separate non-white churches, in particular, rested

85) F.J. Van Wyk (ed), *Christian Principles in Multi-Racial South Africa*, Report on the Dutch Reformed Conference of Church Leaders, Pretoria, 17-19 November 1953, p.176.

86) *Ibid.*, p.17.

87) *Ibid.*, p.19.

on "profound scriptural grounds". To ignore this would be an attempt to "build another Tower of Babel"; and the products of such attempts were called "beasts" in the Revelation of St John (88). Certainly, the church must attempt to demonstrate its "oneness" to the world (89). At the same time, however, all men were not equal: discrimination was "necessary and even indispensable for an ordered society" (90). This direction of thought was pursued by Rev J.P. Jacobs, secretary of the synod of the D.R. Mission Church of the Orange Free State. In an address on "the contribution that the Non-European can make", he stated:

Another important consequence of the clashes between the cultures is the fact that the Bantu is the defeated party. There is therefore no question of equal contracting parties in the relationship. It is the relationship of ruler to ruled. It means that the relationship is not determined by the Bantu, but for him. In these circumstances, good relations will consist in this, that the Bantu should readily and contentedly acquiesce in the limitations imposed on him.(91)

Other DRC pastors threw themselves into the fray. A.J. van der Merwe wanted to know why, in an opening address at a conference called by the DRC, an attitude in conflict with that of the DRC should be presented. A.C. van Wyk asked Keet about his attitude towards mixed marriages and was told that, under present circumstances in South Africa, mixed marriages were impossible, but that, theoretically, if a white Christian and a black Christian wished to become married, Keet could see no reason for preventing it (92); an attitude immediately

88) *Ibid.*, p.34.

89) *Ibid.*, p.35.

90) *Ibid.*, p.37.

91) *Ibid.*, p.108.

92) *Ibid.*, p.142.

condemned by M.W. Retief (93). Ben Marais, in turn, was repeatedly forced to defend his contention that, in the past - and, in particular at the important 1857 synod - the leaders of the DRC had never quoted the Scriptures in the defence of the policy of apartheid (94).

Nevertheless, Keet and Marais, and the small group of DRC clergymen and theologians associated with them - including men such as Lex van Wyk, Albert Geyser and an increasingly dissatisfied Beyers Naude - could take some comfort from one of the decisions announced by the 1953 conference. While the official statement released after the three-day deliberation consisted mainly of platitudes about the necessity to deal with the "seriousness of racial tensions", it also announced that the Federal Missionary Council was planning a "more comprehensive" multiracial conference at a later date (95), an indication that the hierarchy of the DRC was finally growing uneasy about its isolation from the rest of the Christian community, at home and abroad. During the previous three years, the Federal Missionary Council had in fact convened a number of smaller meetings with the elders of the DRC's black mission churches (including the conference in Bloemfontein in December 1952) (96). Now, these black "leaders" - and blacks from other churches - were to be invited to confer with the English-speaking churches as well. For Keet, Marais and their compatriots, this new attempt at bridge-building was to be welcomed.

93) *Ibid.*, p.146.

94) *Ibid.*, p.169.

95) *Ibid.*, p.177.

96) See, for example, *Die Kerkbode*, 68, 3, 18/7/51, p.116; *Die Kerkbode*, 69, 18, 30/4/52, p.862.

The general hostility towards the DRC's position on apartheid expressed at the assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Evanston, Illinois in 1954 hastened the DRC's moves towards further ecumenical contact (97). Eventually, the proposed conference - entitled *God's Kingdom in Multiracial South Africa* - took place in Johannesburg in December 1954, with the 56 black delegates confined to a separate part of the hall, and forced to take their refreshments in a separate room (98). Not surprisingly, the conference produced very little in the way of controversial political debate. However, one of the resolutions unanimously adopted by delegates called for the appointment of a "continuation committee", which would ensure that the churches remained in consultation with one another (99). In February 1955, the seven-member continuation committee met for the first time in Johannesburg, under the chairmanship of C.B. Brink, and immediately began its work (100).

During the course of the next five years, the continuation committee was involved in the organisation of another four major church gatherings: the 1956 conference on Christian literature for blacks, the Bantu Authors Conference of 1958, the 1959 ecumenical conference on *Christian Responsibility Towards Areas of Rapid Social Change*, and the

97) Patterson, *Trek*, p.206.

98) *Ibid.*, p.206.

99) *God's Kingdom in Multi-Racial South Africa*, Report on the Inter-Racial Conference of Church Leaders, Johannesburg, 7-10 December 1954, p.131.

100) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.2B, Minutes of 1st meeting of Continuation Committee of Inter-Racial Conference of Church Leaders.

Cottesloe Consultation of 1960. With the notable exception of the latter (which will be returned to later), none of these meetings produced any major political or theological bombshells. At the same time, the continuation committee's efforts were important because they induced the DRC to maintain at least some form of contact with the other Protestant churches in South Africa and with the WCC. Even this limited interaction periodically elicited angry responses from many DRC pastors and members of congregations who were concerned about outside "interference". Certainly, the continuation committee's projects did not significantly alter the attitudes of the bulk of the DRC's members, amongst whom hostility towards the WCC seems to have been a kind of litmus test for religious orthodoxy (101). But by exposing some DRC clergymen to more eclectic points of view, ecumenical discussions also lent momentum to the struggle by Keet, Marais, and their compatriots to force a softening in the DRC's theological position on apartheid. And, in fact, after 1953, it seems that the less rigid of the DRC's theologians began to win some ground.

The first indication of this shift was signalled by a meeting in Cape Town in December 1953 between the theological professors of the universities of Stellenbosch and Pretoria. The gathering was convened in the wake of the damaging disagreements about DRC policy that had surfaced at the large church conference a month earlier. According to the editor of

101) Anti-WCC letters appear in *Die Kerkbode* throughout the 1950s. For just two examples, see *Die Kerkbode*, 69, 20, 14/5/52.

Die Kerkbode it was "essential" that the DRC attained some "clarity" about its basic principles, in view of these "unhappy" and "unexpected" splits (102); a statement which conveniently ignored Keet and Marais's consistent opposition to scriptural justifications for apartheid, but was in itself a recognition that their faction was having some effect. After long deliberation, the academic theologians failed to produce a definitive conclusion, and referred the matter to the DRC's Commission for Current Problems (103). The latter's report, presented to a Federal Council meeting in Durban in June 1955, was in turn passed on to an Ad Hoc Commission for Race Relations for "further investigation and formulation" (104).

With the release of the Ad Hoc Commission's statement for publication in South Africa and abroad in 1956, it became clear that some significant changes of direction had occurred. The statement concentrated mainly on the issue of separate churches in the DRC. To begin with, it acknowledged that the decision of the 1857 synod to found separate indigenous churches had been "a matter of practical policy and not of principle" (105), the result of "uncontrollable circumstances and of general human weakness" (106). More importantly, while still emphasising the diversity of the human race, which was "brought about by the creation and conservation of God" (107),

102) *Die Kerkbode*, 72, 24, 9/12/53, p.892.

103) *Die Kerkbode*, 72, 26, 23/12/53, p.956.

104) *The Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa and the Problem of Race Relations*, Report of the Ad Hoc Commission for Race Relations appointed by the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches of South Africa, 1956, p.3.

105) *Ibid.*, p.11.

106) *Ibid.*, p.14.

107) *Ibid.*, p.14.

the statement also strongly underlined the essential unity of the Church in Christ, recognising that this was a "clear demand" of the Holy Scripture (108), which "required concrete expression not only between denominations but also between believers of different nations and races". As a matter of principle, the statement continued, "no person will be excluded from corporate worship solely on the grounds of race and colour" (109). However:

Although we must deplore certain conditions in South Africa, we feel equally strongly that the enforced practice of our unity in Christ will not improve matters, but possibly do more harm than good.(110)

In the end, then, the Ad Hoc Commission still staunchly supported separate churches. Nevertheless, nowhere in this faintly apologetic statement was there an attempt to use direct biblical "evidence" to endorse separate worship, or any other aspects of the general application of apartheid policy. While the conciliatory tone of the statement may well have been for overseas consumption, its overall thrust must be viewed as a victory for Keet, Marais and their supporters.

Of course, the Ad Hoc Commission's pronouncement did not imply that the majority of DRC clergymen - not to mention the members of their flock - now rejected apartheid's scriptural "basis"; a fact acknowledged by Keet himself (111). Rather, conservative theologians soon mounted a concerted counter-attack, this time with the overt blessing of prominent

108) *Ibid.*, p.21.

109) *Ibid.*, p.18.

110) *Ibid.*, p.20.

111) *Die Burger*, 18/6/56.

politicians in the NP (and in the knowledge that they enjoyed the backing of the vast majority of the members of the DRC). Clearly, it had always been in the interests of the NP to have irrefutable proof of divine approval for apartheid; and conservative DRC clergymen had consequently always benefitted from the support of NP leaders. By 1955, however, in the face of the relatively liberal challenge in the DRC, NP politicians had no qualms in interfering more directly in the debate. Only one month after the Federal Council meeting which had appointed the Ad Hoc Commission - in other words, at a time when the DRC had indicated that the issue was *sub judice* - Jan de Klerk, for example, publicly reiterated his belief in apartheid's scriptural foundation (112). Then, in November 1955, arch-conservative A.B. du Preez - conspicuously excluded from the Ad Hoc Committee and its list of collaborators (113) and intent on garnering theological endorsements for his scriptural justifications of apartheid - embarked on a trip to Europe with Verwoerd's full knowledge and backing (114). The fruits of his research became apparent, soon after his return, when he again attacked Marais, claiming that none of the 78 theologians with whom he had spoken in Europe would "dare" to defend the apartheid policy on practical grounds; any solution, they claimed, could only be derived from "scriptural foundations" (115).

112) See De Klerk Collection, Vol.2/3/1/3/3, De Klerk to J. du Pisanie, 17/8/55. See also M.D.C. de Wet Nel, "Die Beleid van Apartheid" in *JRA*, 9, 1, October 1957, pp.16-17.

113) Report of Ad Hoc Commission, p.16.

114) See Verwoerd Collection, Vol.576, A.B du Preez to Verwoerd, 28/11/55.

115) *Die Transvaler*, 18/9/56. Du Preez's "research" was later published. See A.B. du Preez, *Inside the South African Crucible* (Pretoria, Haum, 1959), especially pp.5-9 and pp.111-114.

Du Preez's riposte (obviously intended to nullify the impact of the theological questionnaires reproduced in Marais's book) - and a very heated exchange between Keet and Professor F.J.M. Potgieter about mixed marriages (116) - clearly illustrated the ongoing strength of the debate. But the liberal theological grouping in the DRC also continued to gain ground, at least in the upper echelons of the church hierarchy. At the 1957 Transvaal NGK synod, for example, there was a concerted attempt by an "influential group" to overturn the Transvaal NGK's historical position that no blacks could become members of white churches (117). And the trend was confirmed in Potchefstroom in August 1958 at a reformed ecumenical synod involving ten churches from South Africa, Holland, Britain, France, Australia and the USA. After deliberations lasting four or five days, the synod passed a comprehensive set of resolutions with the full approval of the DRC's delegates. Although no direct reference was made to the South African situation, most of the resolutions posed interesting questions for the DRC's position on apartheid. The synod decided, amongst other things, that "the fundamental unity or solidarity of the human race" was at least as important as "all considerations of race and colour", that "no single race may deem itself entitled to a privileged position and consider itself superior to other races", and that, if the members of another race were "believers", then they should be received as "brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ". In such

116) *Die Burger*, 2/5/57; *Die Burger*, 9/5/57; *Die Burger*, 20/5/57.

117) B.J. Marais, "Is there a practical alternative...?", p.150.

relationships, all human distinctions, no matter how much weight they carried in social life, became "considerations of secondary importance" (118). Furthermore, the synod argued:

No direct scriptural evidence can be produced for or against the intermixture of races through marriage.(119)

According to the synod, none of these points ignored the fact of the "multiplicity of nations", but in that multiplicity the "unquestioned equality of all races...must be recognised according to the Scriptures" (120).

IV

As a result of the DRC's important political and ideological role within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance, theological debates within the Church inevitably had their political ramifications. The definite advances made by the less conservative grouping in the DRC during the mid-1950s seemed to act as a catalyst for overt political conflicts involving the DRC and its members. One of these debates placed the issue of total apartheid firmly back on the DRC's agenda. The controversy began with the publication of *Whither South Africa?* by B.B. Keet in 1956. Keet's book began predictably enough, with his customary demolition of the scriptural justifications for apartheid. It was with his foray into the minefield of political apartheid, however, that the trouble

118) Dutch Reformed Churches of South Africa, *Statements on Race Relations*, 1, November 1960, p.11.

119) *Ibid.*, p.12.

120) *Ibid.*, p.11. See also A.J. van Wijk, "The Resolutions of the Reformed Ecumenical Synod on Race Relations: A Critical Study" in *Race Relations*, 26, 1, January-March 1959.

began. In a nutshell - and perhaps not surprisingly in the light of his speech at the 1953 church conference - Keet now completely rejected the DRC's and Sabra's propagation of total territorial separation. For Keet, total apartheid had become "a flight from reality" (121) and "the dream of a Rip van Winkel" (122), its supporters "labouring under a delusion that belongs to a world of make-believe" (123). With its insistence on enforced migration "conceivable only in totalitarian states like Russia", total separation was actually the "greatest danger for the future of white civilisation", because it encouraged a "steadily growing hostility" amongst those who were just "pawns in the game" (124). In particular, it ignored the position of the many urbanised, educated blacks living in the white areas. Partial apartheid, on the other hand, could still be defended on ethical and practical grounds, provided it was regarded as a temporary measure (125).

Keet developed these themes during a BBC radio programme in June 1956 (126) and at a meeting in Stellenbosch a few weeks later. White trusteeship, he suggested, should in no way be regarded as permanent. It certainly could not be argued that guardianship was purely in the interests of Africans:

...if anybody living in South Africa still maintains that the volk strives towards complete apartheid for the advantage of non-whites, then I say that he is fast asleep.(127)

121) B.B. Keet, *Whither South Africa?* (Stellenbosch, University Publishers, 1956), p.51.

122) *Ibid.*, p.83.

123) *Ibid.*, p.85.

124) *Ibid.*, p.53.

125) *Ibid.*, p.55.

126) *Die Burger*, 18/6/56.

127) *Die Burger*, 2/8/56.

By this stage, Ben Marais was also becoming more outspoken in his political comments. In his 1952 book, he had supported the ideal of total separation (albeit with misgivings about practicalities). Now he expressed grave doubts about the Tomlinson Report, holy book of total apartheid. In particular, he argued that if Africans were allowed to develop a new black nationalism according to their own nature and background, then South Africa would witness a reaction against everything alien and Western, and a return to paganism (128).

Such comments were not designed to attract the goodwill of Keet and Marais's fellow-clergymen. While a growing number of DRC clerics had been prepared to lend their support to the comparatively liberal theological campaign of the previous five years, very few were ready to reject complete apartheid in favour of "liberal" political solutions that smacked of the United Party. *Die Kerkbode's* editors spoke for many when they loudly denounced Keet's book and subsequent statements (129). But the debate had now also moved far beyond the hallowed halls of the DRC. *Die Burger*, *Die Transvaler*, and *Die Volksblad* all editorialised their objections - and, by implication, the objections of the NP - to Keet's pronouncements (130). And Keet's scathing ridicule of the proponents of total apartheid now also brought his small group

128) *Die Burger*, 30/6/56. A similar point of view was expressed by P.V Pistorius in his book *No Further Trek* (CNA, 1957). He wrote of African nationalism (p.46): "...we are the Frankenstein who has created this monster, and need have no illusions on the ability of the monster to survive."

129) See *Die Burger*, 15/8/56; *Die Burger*, 29/8/56; *Die Burger*, 5/9/56.

130) *Die Burger*, 6/8/56; *Natal Witness*, 2/2/56.

of supporters into conflict - although perhaps for different reasons - with members of the idealistic, visionary wing of Sabra, who, despite their disquiet with the government's version of apartheid, still clung fast to the solution propounded by the Tomlinson Commission (131).

This set of crosscutting political and theological allegiances was confused even further by the events of 1957. Early in the year, the DRC found itself embroiled in a fresh political controversy, triggered by the Minister of Native Affairs and his new bill effecting further controls in the lives of black South Africans. The "church clause" of the Native Laws Amendment Bill proposed that the Minister be given the right to prevent Africans from worshipping at any church or religious service in the white areas. Concerned about the implications of the church clause, the Federal Council of the NGK sent a delegation to clarify the matter with Verwoerd in March 1957, having first approved an eight-point statement "as a basis for discussion". The final four points of this statement laid down strict limits to state interference in the affairs of the church. With Verwoerd promising that the Bill would be altered to remove any possibility of interference with freedom of worship, the delegation lamely returned from the meeting "convinced" that the DRC had nothing to fear from the "church clause". The moderator of the Federal Council circulated an announcement to this effect, attaching the

131) It is interesting that B.J. Marais (interview, 2/10/85) regarded Willem Landman's "crusade" for total apartheid in early 1956 as a Verwoerdian propaganda exercise. Evidence suggests, on the other hand, that NP politicians found Landman's escapade rather embarrassing.

original statement minus the last four points. But at the Transvaal synod of the NGK in April and May 1957, it became apparent that a significant number of clergymen were not satisfied with Verwoerd's reassurances. Encouraged by Ben Marais, Beyers Naude, and a number of other delegates, the synod eventually approved the original, unpublicised statement as well as the "conduct" of the delegation, a contradictory decision interpreted by many as a direct rebuff to Verwoerd (132).

Yet this was certainly not the last controversial incident at the synod. The church clause debate had hardly ended when Marais launched himself into an angry condemnation of all secret organisations, formally proposing that churchmen should not be permitted to be members of such societies. Although no names were mentioned, Marais clearly included the Broederbond in his list of undesirables. His motion was easily defeated and the debate closed. Overnight, Broederbond clergymen were summoned to a secret meeting to discuss strategy (133). When the issue was raised again the following morning, the moderator of the synod - Broederbond member A.M. Meiring - ruled that the debate must be confined to the question of Freemasonry. The synod's final decision was that no Freemason could be elected to any official position in the church (134). No mention was made of any other secret society.

Apart from illustrating the extent of Broederbond

132) *Die Burger*, 1/5/57 (two articles). Events confirmed with B.J. Marais, interviews 30/9/85 and 2/10/85.

133) B.J. Marais, interview, 30/9/85.

134) *Natal Mercury*, 9/5/57. See also *Die Kerkbode*, 79, 24, 12/6/57, p.1054.

influence in the DRC, this incident also served to drive a wedge between more liberal churchmen outside the Broederbond, and some members of the organisation who held similar sympathies. On the other hand, in the case of other Broederbonders such as Beyers Naude, Marais's motion and the subsequent debate seemed to push them closer to dissident groupings. After the debate, in direct contravention of his vow of silence, Naude informed Marais of the secret Broederbond meeting, and apologised profusely about the incident (135).

A few months later, in his address at the annual Hoernle Memorial Lecture of the SAIRR, B.B. Keet deepened the schism between himself and most other nationalist Afrikaners. Describing apartheid as representative of "the attitude of the guilty conscience which does not seek the cause of its guilt in itself but in the proximity of those who occasion the feeling of guilt" (136), he called for a qualified common voters roll (137). Again he incurred the wrath of official NP organs such as *Die Burger* (138), as well as that of Sabra (139). For many DRC clergymen, their esteemed teacher - and the last surviving member of the group that had produced the first Afrikaner Bible - had finally allowed himself to become the tool of UP propaganda, or worse.

135) B.J. Marais, interview, 30/9/85.

136) B.B. Keet, *The Ethics of Apartheid* (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1957), pp.3-4.

137) *Ibid.*, pp.14-15.

138) *Die Burger*, 4/7/57. The editor wrote: "For us this is nothing more than the opinion of a theologian who ventures outside his domain". See also political columnist Dawie in *Die Burger*, 13/7/57.

139) *Cape Times*, 27/8/57.

Nevertheless, while many of Keet's views still remained anathema to even the most critical of nationalist Afrikaners, over the next three years a significant number of Afrikaner intellectuals and churchmen slowly and painfully began to realise that total separation was looking increasingly like Keet's "pipedream". The government's clear rejection of the Tomlinson Report, and widespread black resistance to the imposition of apartheid legislation, provoked a process of reassessment which tended to bring together those Afrikaners disquieted by trends in the mainstream of the NP and the Church. Certainly, events such as the important 1958 Sabra congress - where frustration with the government's version of apartheid was angrily expressed (140) - helped to induce a coalescing of dissident Afrikaner intellectuals and theologians. In particular, clergymen who rejected direct biblical justifications of apartheid, but had been alienated by Keet's and Marais's earlier criticisms of total separation, now found themselves in sympathy with some of those very criticisms.

Dissatisfaction amongst DRC churchmen centred on two aspects of applied apartheid policy, both of which had their root in that nemesis of total separation: namely, continued economic integration. Firstly, clergymen began to tackle the question of migrant labour. At the 1958 Sabra congress, for instance, Rev J.C. Oosthuizen proclaimed that the Church could no longer remain silent about the effect that migrant labour was having on African marriages (141). By 1959, this concern

140) See Chapter Five, pp.201-202.

141) *The Star*, 1/5/58.

was not just confined to fringe dissidents. In August 1959, the NGK *Sendingkerk* (Missionary Church) bemoaned the "detrimental effects" of the migrant labour system (142), while the 1959 church conference on *Christian Responsibility Towards Areas of Rapid Social Change* urged an "earnest reconsideration of the policy of migratory labour with a view to the re-establishment of normal family life" (143). Then, in early 1960, a NGK delegation told the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development that the "migrant labour system causes a fundamental breach in the community life of the Bantu...", and suggested a number of ways of alleviating the problem. Minister Nel agreed that it was a "delicate matter", but was otherwise unforthcoming (144).

The migrant labour system, and the second major concern of dissatisfied clergymen - the contradictory and powerless position of the millions of Africans permanently settled in the white urban areas - were sharply highlighted by the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960. The NGK responded officially to the shooting by suggesting that blacks were being "misled by the false promises of agitators", and condemning the "besmirching" of South Africa by the outside world (145). But stunned by events in Sharpeville, Langa and

142) *Die Burger*, 29/8/59.

143) *Christian Responsibility towards Areas of Rapid Social Change*, Report of the Multi-racial Conference held at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 7-10 December, 1959, p.141.

144) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Ba, "Die Trekarbeidstelsel en sy Uitwerking op die Gesinslewe en Sedelike Lewe van die Bantoe", Report of meeting between DRC delegation and Minister Nel.

145) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, "Statement issued by leaders of the Dutch Reformed Churches (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk) on the riot in South Africa".

elsewhere in the country, dissident NGK clergymen - together with NHK notables such as Albert Geyser - intensified their review of the apartheid project. And in a curious development, they were not only joined by a number of their more rigid colleagues, but also by members of the theologically conservative *Gereformeerde Kerk*. In April 1960, soon after Sharpeville, 70 Dopper clergymen gathered at a conference in Johannesburg, and appointed a twelve-man commission to investigate "the factors which are hampering the extension of God's kingdom amongst the non-white people in the urban areas" (146). Writing to Minister Jan de Klerk about the conference, Willem Snyman said he spoke for many delegates in expressing his concern that the application of certain apartheid measures did not always "stand the test of God's word" (147).

The origins of Dopper dissatisfaction are difficult to understand. Steeped in rigid, conservative traditions, and trained in that bastion of Christian-Nationalist thought - Potchefstroom - Dopper predikants were not renowned for dissident political positions. Moodie suggests that the answer lies in the Dopper adherence to the Kuyperian notion of *soweriniteit in eie kring*: the principle of the absolute sovereignty of God in every sphere of life, each independent of each other. According to this view, the misgivings of Dopper theologians stemmed from their objection to the secular neo-Fichtean elevation, during the 1950s, of the ethnic

146) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Bc, Van Wyk to Norman Goodall, 2/5/60.

147) De Klerk Collection, Vol.2/3/1/1, W. Snyman to De Klerk, 28/4/60.

ordinances of creation - the ethnic "sphere" - above the other spheres. Furthermore, features of this ethnically-based separate development system, such as migrant labour, caused radical disruption in other independent spheres, especially in the sphere of the family (148). Whether or not one accepts this explanation, it is certainly true that the crisis amongst Dopper clergymen was deep-seated, and did not disappear when their Johannesburg conference ended. At the beginning of June 1960, an informal group comprising members of all three Afrikaner churches was established under the chairmanship of Dopper Rev. Norval and Beyers Naude, to study the DRC's colour policies. Very soon its Johannesburg meetings were being attended by some 35 ministers (149). Similar groups were formed soon afterwards in Pretoria, and, under the leadership of Willem Landman and A.J. van Wijk, in the Western Cape (150).

The formation of these groups - and the publication of *Delayed Action!*, an "ecumenical witness" by Keet, Albert Geyser, Marais, A.S. van Selms, Gert Swart, J.A. (Lex) van Wyk and Hugo du Plessis (151) - illustrated the growing influence and determination of the dissidents in the DRC. By mid-1960, they had come to see themselves as a far more cohesive and self-conscious conglomeration. This was clearly illustrated by

148) Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, pp.268-270.

149) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Ba, Van Wyk to Claude de Mestral, 23/6/60.

150) B.J. Marais, interview, 2/10/85.

151) A. Geyser (ed.), *Delayed Action!* (Johannesburg, 1960). Van Selms later wrote a pamphlet entitled *Kerk en Geheime Organisasie* (Pretoria, n.d. [1963-64]), in which he attacked the methods of the Broederbond.

a confidential memorandum sent to the secretary of the WCC, Robert Bilheimer, in June 1960. Drawn up by a group which included Keet, Marais, Swart, Van Wyk and J.A. Lombard, the memorandum estimated that approximately 25 percent of the pastors in the Transvaal rejected the "simple" principle that "God made races and nations, and they should not mix". The memorandum pointed out that although the official theological position of the church remained equivocal, it had certainly moved towards this more "liberal" faction. Furthermore, there was "a widespread feeling" that it was "wrong to forbid people to enter a church on grounds of colour or culture". As far as political matters were concerned, the memorandum noted that a "large number" of ministers were concerned about the "practicability" of the policy of total separation. While "very few" considered the policy objectionable in principle, the fact that there were "very few signs" of its being carried out, was causing "growing criticism". In addition, the memorandum continued, it was felt that "the urban Bantu population" and "educated Christian Bantu individuals" should be considered in a "different light" from the population in the reserves. The memorandum admitted, however, that there was no great clarity on the question of an alternative policy to the official one. Nor, it conceded, did dissident points of view enjoy much support from conservative lay membership (152).

152) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Bc, "Notes on thinking about race problems in the Ned. Geref. Kerk", May 1960, pp.1-4. See also Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Bc, G.J. Swart, "Punte vir 'n memorandum", June 1960, and Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Ba, "Further Notes by Professor B. Marais", June 1960. Another estimate of the size of the dissenting group is made by Peter Walshe. He places the number of dissident DRC theologians in South Africa in 1960 at approximately 400 (P. Walshe, *Church Versus State in South Africa* (London, C.Hurst, 1983), p.29.).

The position of the opposition faction was strengthened by the decision of Bilheimer and the WCC to organise a large ecumenical church conference later in 1960. The three affiliated Afrikaner churches - the Cape NGK, the Transvaal NGK, and the NHK - immediately each set up five study groups to report on the five suggested subjects. In the Transvaal NGK, especially, the views of the dissidents were strongly represented, with Marais, Van Wyk, Swart, Lombard, Chris Greyling and other sympathisers being appointed to the study rings. Van Wyk and Beyers Naude were also elected as members of the Transvaal NGK's eight-man delegation to the conference. The inclusion of a fair sprinkling of "liberals" in the Cape NGK's study groups and delegation, and a concerted attempt by theologians such as Albert Geyser to force a minority report into the *Hervormde* delegation's submission to the conference, were also encouraging for the dissident group (153).

In the event, the report submitted by the NHK must have come as something of a disappointment to more liberal clergymen. It strongly reaffirmed the NHK's support for the principle of separate development, and noted that "temporary hardships" (154) might be necessary in order to "establish more lasting peace for posterity" (155). But the confidential memoranda of the Cape NGK and Transvaal NGK, while endorsing the principle of separate development, included a number of more radical demands. The Cape NGK's document, in particular,

153) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Ba, Van Wyk to Bilheimer, 22/6/60.

154) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, Confidential memorandum of the NHK, p.3.

155) *Ibid.*, p.6.

was a significant departure from previous official pronouncements. Reflecting the expressed concern about the effect of the migrant labour system and the position of the "Bantu intelligentsia" (156), the writers of the report also argued that "should it become evident that not all the Bantu can be settled in their own territories on a basis of fullest potential development", then in proportion as they absorbed Christian principles and civilisation, "all rights and privileges" should be accorded to "those Bantu remaining in the white sector" (157). The report noted, in addition, that no scriptural grounds existed for a prohibition on mixed marriages (158), and that no person should be preventing from entering a church on the basis of his or her race or colour (159).

When the Cottesloe Consultation finally convened in December 1960 (160) - after months of controversy over the deportation of Anglican delegate Bishop Reeves - it was the tone and thrust of the Cape NGK's report which permeated the discussions. Notwithstanding heated debate about the meaning and intention of apartheid - and a desperate rearguard action by conservative NHK representatives A.J.G. Oosthuizen, T.F.J.

156) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, "Memoranda opgestel deur die studiekommissie en voorgele deur die 10 verteenwoordigers van die N.G.Kerk van Kaapland aan die konferensie van die Wereldraad van Kerke", p.10.

157) *Ibid.*, p.5.

158) *Ibid.*, p.8.

159) *Ibid.*, p.7.

160) In addition to the Cape NGK, the Transvaal NGK and the NHK, five churches attended: the Bantu Presbyterian Church, the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Congregational Union of South Africa, the Methodist Church of South Africa, and the Presbyterian Church of South Africa.

Dreyer and P.S. Dreyer (161) - the Consultation agreed on a wide-ranging set of resolutions. Most importantly, the Consultation repeated the Cape NGK's assertion that the prohibition of mixed marriages was not grounded in the scripture, emphasised the "disintegrating effects of migrant labour", deplored the low wages which forced the vast majority of Africans to live below "the generally accepted minimum standard for healthy living", argued that job reservation "must give way to a more equitable system of labour which safeguards the interest of all concerned", and called for the direct representation of Coloured people in Parliament. And in a resolution lifted almost verbatim from the Cape NGK's report, the Consultation stated:

It is our conviction that the right to own land wherever he is domiciled, and to participate in the government of his country, is part of the dignity of the adult man, and for this reason a policy which permanently denies to non-White people the right of collaboration in the government of the country of which they are citizens cannot be justified.(162)

161) See Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, confidential record of discussion of the Cottesloe Consultation. One of the more noteworthy features of this discussion was the strong support by F.J.M. Potgieter - previously a vocal proponent of scriptural justifications of apartheid (see footnote 116) - for an extension of the franchise to urban Africans.

162) Cottesloe Consultation, Report of the Consultation amongst South African Members of the World Council of Churches, Johannesburg, 7-14 December 1960, p.75. It is interesting to note that the Cape NGK memorandum had referred to "economically integrated non-white people" ("Memoranda opgestel deur die studiekommissie...", p.8), but the words "economically integrated" were deleted from the final statement. The NGK delegates then issued an additional clarification: "The undersigned voted in favour of Point 15, provided it be clearly understood that participation in the government of this country refers in the case of the White areas to the Bantu who are domiciled in the declared White areas in the sense that they have no other homeland" (Cottesloe Consultation, p.80). See also Walshe, *Church Versus State*, pp.14-15.

None of these resolutions was acceptable to the NHK's delegates, who officially dissociated themselves from the Consultation's concluding statement.

Soon after Cottesloe, Ben Marais wrote to Beyers Naude rejoicing at the fact that while he and Keet and a few others had been "lone voices crying in the wilderness", now they enjoyed the support of dozens of DRC clergymen (163). For Marais, Cottesloe may well have been cause for celebration. But for the NP leadership the Consultation's decisions - coming as they did at a time of disquiet in the Cape NP about the issue of Coloured representation, and dissatisfaction amongst many of Sabra's intellectuals - were reason for grave concern. Dawie, political columnist of *Die Burger*, expressed the problem succinctly when he wrote:

We are confronted with an acute crisis of confidence within nationalist Afrikanerdom about race relations, and it will not help to try to hide it.(164)

In a sympathetic appraisal of the actions of the NGK's Cottesloe representatives, he warned against embarking on a political struggle against church leaders:

The fact is...that the white members of the N.G. churches are overwhelmingly Nationalists. With an eye on the forthcoming Synods, pressure can be exerted on pastors through agitation in the parishes. Attempts can be made to force the Church into line or to exploit the situation to the advantage of other, less critical societies. Pardon the straight language, but it is time for straight language. Let no attempt be made to force Afrikaners to choose between his Church and his Nationalist Party, because then, in more than one sense, our days are numbered.(165)

163) Quoted in letter from Van Wyk to Claude de Mestral, 3/3/61 in Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd.

164) *Die Burger*, 17/12/60.

165) *Die Burger*, 17/12/60.

Dawie's seemingly cynical words proved to be prophetic. Within a few days, a concerted campaign was initiated against the findings of the Consultation. With the notable exception of *Die Burger*, the Afrikaans newspapers launched into almost daily attacks on the NGK's Cottesloe delegates. *Die Kerkbode* - with new editor Andries Treurnicht firmly in the saddle - observed:

The proclamation of justice in the social and political sphere is the responsibility of the church, but when the church concerns itself with political formulas it is an inadmissible coup d'etat.(166)

Treurnicht also pointed out that the Cottesloe statement was "open for discussion" and "did not carry the stamp of Synodal authority" (167), an opinion reiterated by Verwoerd in his New Year message (168). And the executive of the Broederbond called a special meeting in Pretoria to obtain the "necessary information" and plan action "to prevent any serious harmful outcome for our volk" (169).

The Cottesloe delegates were soon forced to publicly justify their actions. First, in an article in *Dagbreek*, Beyers Naude acknowledged that there were "serious differences of opinion within all three Afrikaans churches", but argued that "the findings were in no way meant as attacks in the government" (170). Then, towards the end of December 1960, the Cape and Transvaal delegations released a "further

166) *Die Kerkbode*, 86, 26, 28/12/60, p.917.

167) *Ibid.*, p.916.

168) A.N. Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks* (Johannesburg, APB Publishers, 1966), p.432.

169) J.H.P Serfontein, *Brotherhood of Power* (London, Rex Collings, 1979), pp.170-171.

170) *Dagbreek*, 18/12/60.

explanation", in which they attempted to explain their support for the Consultation's resolutions. The decision on mixed marriages, they argued, did not imply that they were necessarily in favour of marriage across the colour line. As far as urban blacks were concerned, they noted:

If complete territorial separation is not possible, then it must be realised that those who are permanently housed in white areas cannot have these rights withheld from them. Those who do not agree with this must now offer very clear moral grounds in defence of their standpoint. This responsibility may not be shirked. It is not a question of a political formula or an inadmissible hold of the state but a question of justice. The denial of this cannot, in our opinion, be compatible with the Christian conscience.(171)

These protestations failed to halt the storm of outrage from lay members and church parishes. *Die Kerkbode* and other Afrikaans publications were flooded with letters attacking the conference statement and the delegates who had supported it (as well as the views expressed in *Delayed Action*). One letter claimed that the actions of the delegates had placed the "inheritance" of the Afrikaner in danger. Many expressed "deep disappointment". Almost all were united in their condemnation of the WCC, which was accused of association with the Roman Catholic Church and infection by Communist, humanistic and liberal tendencies. A number of NGK parish councils - including Groenkloof, Venterspost, Parys-Wes, Lyttelton-Oos, Sabie and Hartbeesspruit - hastily called for the Cape NGK and Transvaal NGK to terminate their membership of the WCC. A few

171) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, "Further Explanation by the Delegation of the N.G. Kerk, Cape Province, and the available delegates of the N.G. Kerk, Transvaal", 27/12/60, pp.4-5.

clergymen - notably Ben Marais, Ben Engelbrecht and Professor W.J. van der Merwe - continued to express support for the Cottesloe delegation, but were immediately derided as "modern clever churchmen": "inconsistent", "false" and "busy undermining the Christian Church". D.F. Malherbe of Mossel Bay neatly summed up the prevailing view:

If we go, for example, to the Kruger Game Reserve, we find large herds of pure impala, living in peaceful coexistence with a variety of other kinds of wild antelope and animals... "Like seeks like" is the rule in God's creation, but the godless people know better and want to wipe out all differences between different races by bastardisation. (172)

Official voices in the DRC began to take up the cry. In February 1961, the General Synodical Commission of the OFS NGK released a statement refuting the Cottesloe decisions and calling on the Transvaal and Cape churches to withdraw from the WCC (173). A similar position was adopted by the Federal Council of the NGK during its meeting in Cape Town in March 1961 (174). And Treurnicht, together with J.D. Vorster, actuary of the Cape NGK, quickly organised an anti-Cottesloe symposium entitled *Grense* (boundaries) (175), at which the central theme was the lesson of the Tower of Babel. Soon afterwards, the NHK formally ended its membership of the WCC. The Broederbond-inspired campaign had isolated the Cottesloe delegates to such an extent that it came as no surprise when

172) *Die Kerkbode*, 87, 18, 3/5/61, p.597. The letters referred to in this paragraph can be found in *Die Kerkbode*, 87, nos 1-25.

173) *Die Kerkbode*, 87, 12, 22/3/61, pp.402-406.

174) *Die Kerkbode*, 87, 14, 5/4/61, pp.452-453.

175) *Grense: A Symposium Concerning Racial and Other Attitudes* (Stellenbosch, 1961).

first the Transvaal NGK (in April 1961) and then the Cape NGK (in October 1961) repudiated the Cottesloe resolutions and withdrew from the WCC (176).

Liberal clergymen still found signs of hope, noting that nearly 150 out of the 730 delegates at the Transvaal synod had voted in favour of the Cottesloe findings and WCC membership, and another 218 had voted for Beyers Naude as assessor (177). The ecumenical study groups on the Reef and in Pretoria continued to provide a forum and a structure for some of the clergymen who supported the Cottesloe decisions (178). But the campaign to stifle dissent within the DRC intensified, finally culminating in the heresy trial of NHK dissident Albert Geyser in October 1961. By the time Geyser, Beyers Naude and Ben Engelbrecht launched the new monthly journal *Pro Veritate* in May 1962, no more than 80 clergymen were prepared to maintain even discreet contact with them. When the Christian Institute was formed in August 1963, the number of DRC churchmen prepared to publicly and formally support Naude and his colleagues had dwindled to less than a dozen (179).

V

In assessing the importance of the political and theological conflicts which culminated in the Cottesloe

176) *Die Kerkbode*, 87, 19, 10/5/61, p.617. B.J. Marais (interviews 30/9/85 and 2/10/85) states that he has no doubt that Verwoerd and the Broederbond orchestrated the response to Cottesloe.

177) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Ba, Van Wyk to Bishop B. Burnett, 9/5/61.

178) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, Van Wyk to Bilheimer, 1/2/61.

179) Walshe, *Church Versus State*, p.29.

Consultation and subsequent Broederbond witchhunt, it seems advisable to steer a course between two extreme poles. On the one hand, it is obviously incorrect to depict such conflicts as fundamentally important, in the sense that they radically altered the course of the basic South African struggle about power and wealth. On the other hand, it is also mistaken to under-estimate the impact of the DRC's schisms, by treating them as the epiphenomenal illusory contortions of ivory tower ideologists. Certainly, the heavy-handed reaction of the NP leadership and the Broederbond to Cottesloe was an indication that they perceived the DRC dissidents' crisis of confidence in an extremely serious light, as a matter that required immediate, concerted attention and mobilisation.

On one level, this urgency can be seen as a response to the content of the dissidents' grievances. As shown above, by 1960 dissident DRC clergymen were especially concerned about the migrant labour system and the denial of rights to Africans permanently "settled" in the white urban areas. They were not alone in this concern: a number of other nationalist Afrikaners, especially in the Cape, expressed doubts after the Sharpeville massacre (180). Yet Sharpeville hardly seemed to change Verwoerd's belief in the correctness of his policies. And his principal constituency - the powerful, ascendant group of aggressive petty bourgeois ideologists in the Broederbond, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and Sabra - were even opposed to his previous pragmatism on the stable settlement of urban Africans: for them, the correct

180) See Chapter Two, pp.76-77.

response to Sharpeville involved a tightening of the migrant labour system and a further attack on the rights of the urban black population. This would probably still have been acceptable for most dissidents in the DRC, as well as for the marginalised group of "visionaries" in Sabra, if they were convinced that Verwoerd and his supporters were genuinely committed to total territorial separation as embodied in the Tomlinson Commission. But Verwoerd had completely dismissed most of the substance of the commission's report; its champions in Sabra and the DRC subsequently came to be derided as impractical, soft-hearted liberals. The scenario now envisaged by the Broederbond and the Department of Bantu Administration still rejected those of Tomlinson's recommendations and financial estimates - especially suggestions concerning consolidation, agricultural development and the creation of an industrial development corporation - which were intended, however unrealistically, to foster a workable economic infrastructure in the African reserves. Nevertheless, basing its logic on the recently announced chimera of homeland "independence", in conjunction with a reformulated attack on the rights of urban blacks - and even though, in Tomlinson's terms, the basic economic prerequisites for political apartheid were not being developed - the new conception also envisaged a far stricter application of racial and political separation than ever before. The pronouncements of dissident clergymen were therefore directly contradictory to the expressed intention of men such as M.C. Botha to force those blacks who were not capable of productive labour to

"disappear" from "white" South Africa (181).

Equally disturbing for Verwoerd and his supporters was the fact that such opinions were being expressed by prominent members of the staunchly nationalist DRC. While its influence probably waned slightly during the 1950s, particularly in the urban areas (182), the DRC's ability to shape and direct the political lives and views of nationalist Afrikaners was still formidable. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, the DRC's scriptural justifications for apartheid had been a great help in persuading devout Afrikaners to support NP policy. Now, not only had the DRC's dissidents managed to erode the theological foundations of apartheid; they were also spreading the poison of political and ideological doubt. The severity of the Broederbond's response to Cottesloe was very much induced, therefore, by the perception that one of Afrikaner nationalism's most important ideological conduits and organs was in danger of losing its cohesion and purpose. It was necessary for dissident hesitations to be dealt with before they permeated and expanded into a full-blown ideological crisis, at a time when a united nationalist alliance was desperately needed. In this respect, then, the Cottesloe clampdown should be viewed as an important aspect of the nationalist hierarchy's ideological response to Sharpeville

181) See Chapter Five, pp.205-206.

182) An inquiry into Afrikaner family life headed by Geoff Cronje decided, in particular, that city life was not conducive to Afrikaner devoutness. According to the inquiry, only 42 percent of Afrikaner families in the cities attended church regularly, compared with 61 percent of those living on farms (*Dutch Reformed Church Monthly Newsletter*, 23, November 1959).

and its aftermath. The fact that the anti-Cottesloe campaign was so successful speaks volumes for the ubiquity, strength and efficiency of Broederbond networks.

A complete understanding of the conflicts that culminated in Cottesloe will therefore not be reached through an isolated examination of arcane theological debates. The opinions of the DRC dissidents, as well as those of their opponents, were not just the result of theological differences between the various forms of Afrikaner Calvinism. Rather, the conflicts outlined in this chapter arose because of the interaction between theological frameworks and the concrete political and ideological struggles of the day.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Christian-Nationalist Ideology, 1941-1961

I

In October 1960, in a referendum announced by Verwoerd nine months earlier, 850,458 white South Africans declared themselves in favour of a republic. Amidst much jubilation within Afrikaner ranks, the referendum was won by a majority of 74,580 votes (1). Consequently, on 31 May 1961, exactly 51 years after Union, South Africa was formally declared a republic.

But what were the ideological pillars supporting the republic that Afrikaners so solemnly celebrated? How did republican ideology change in the years between 1939 and 1961? And what was the relationship between republicanism and the other strands of Christian-Nationalist ideology, especially those concerned with culture and education? It is questions such as these that this chapter hopes to answer. In doing so, the chapter starts from the assumption that it is a mistake to treat ideologies as static, immutable and self-contained bodies of thought, which can be studied in isolation. An attempt will be made to locate shifts in nationalist ideology within a broader economic and political context. Yet, it is also inadequate to treat Christian-Nationalist ideology as an immediate reflection of material processes. It is difficult for such an account to convincingly explain the obvious and continued power, resonance and effect of Christian-Nationalist symbols.

1) K. Heard, *General Elections in South Africa* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974), p.113.

II

The fundamental cornerstone of the conscious and forceful Afrikaner Christian-Nationalism which developed during the 1930s was the notion that culture, the most important defining characteristic of a volk, must be seen as the "handiwork of God". Separate nations were thus "grounded in the ordinances of God's creation": each one had an allotted structure, task, calling, and destiny, "acknowledging no other master than God" (2). Consequently, service to the nation was viewed as service to the Almighty: individuals could only realise their identity through the national unit. However, as Moodie notes:

...one cannot speak continuously of "calling" and "destiny" without eventually articulating the specific content of the ideal. Whither was the Afrikaner destiny and to what end their call?(3)

For Broederbond leader J.C van Rooy, the answer to this question was two-pronged. Speaking in October 1944, he succinctly expressed the Christian-Nationalist interpretation of the Afrikaner's divinely-ordained purpose. Firstly, it was the Afrikaner's calling to struggle to maintain his language and culture. Secondly, in order "to realise the Divine Idea which was embodied in Afrikanerdom", and to completely fulfil the covenants of the Afrikaner people's

2) T.D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), p.66. See also D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.69.

3) Moodie, *Civil Religion*, p.111.

"sacred history", an independent, Christian republic must be achieved (4).

One of the strengths of Dan O'Meara's study of Afrikaner nationalism is his emphasis on the organisational forms and structures through which these two strands of Christian-Nationalist ideology were disseminated and inculcated; in other words, how "literary forms of ideology" were translated from "intellectual journals and the debates of elite groups into a form of mass consciousness" (5). For O'Meara, a neglected aspect of the study of this transformation is the nationalist "economic movement" of the late 1930s, and, in particular, the way in which "petty bourgeois groups sought to transform themselves into an industrial and commercial bourgeoisie utilising a broad set of organisational, ideological and political means to mobilise mass support from Afrikaans-speakers of other classes for this attempt" (6). Whether or not one accepts this analysis, it is clear that the crucial link between the intellectual and popular forms of the new Christian-Nationalism was the Broederbond's control, through the FAK, of organised Afrikaner culture. By 1937, almost 300 cultural bodies, church councils, youth and student associations, and charitable scientific and educational groups were affiliated to the FAK (7): the Broederbond was thus "increasingly able to delimit the legitimate parameters of Afrikaner culture and to develop and

4) *Ibid.*, p.111.

5) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.74.

6) *Ibid.*, p.16.

7) *Ibid.*, p.75.

direct mass campaigns on cultural issues" (8).

The FAK's focus on *kultuurpolitiek* (cultural politics), rather than the issues of *partypolitiek* (party politics), therefore involved a range of projects, all of which were intended to foster a natural sense of Afrikaner unity. The countrywide centenary celebration of the Battle of Blood River - the *Eeufees* - was, according to both Moodie and O'Meara, particularly important in the forging of a new exclusivist Afrikaner cultural vision. Nevertheless, the most far-reaching and ambitious of the "cultural" campaigns of the period - the core of the mission to protect and advance Afrikaner language and culture for future generations - was the endeavour to formulate a policy and a strategy for Christian-National Education (CNE).

CNE derived its inspiration from the religious "Christian-National" private schools which were set up in the Transvaal after the Anglo-Boer War, in response to a bid by Milner and the British authorities to make English the medium of instruction in state schools, Dutch being taught for not more than five hours per week (9). Although the Christian-National schools virtually disappeared by 1907, later protagonists of CNE argued that its ideals were kept alive by a number of *bittereinders* in the three Afrikaner churches. J.D. du Toit, in particular, is singled out as one of the men who kept the flame of Christian-Nationalism burning

8) *Ibid.*, p.76.

9) A.L. Behr and R.G. MacMillan, *Education in South Africa* (Pretoria, J.L. van Schaik, 1966), p.50.

(10). It was only in the late 1920s, however, that organisations such as the *Christelike Unie* (Christian Union) began to theorise the principles of a more contemporary CNE, which would have Afrikaans, rather than Dutch, as its bedrock. In 1930, Professor J. Chris Coetzee published a booklet entitled *Vraagstukke van die Opvoedige Politiek* (Problems of Educational Politics) through the *Christelike Unie*. His ideas were developed by L.J. du Plessis in a speech to the first conference of the *Christelike Unie*'s successor, the *Calvinistiese Bond* (Calvinist League), in July 1930. Afrikaner church synods, in turn, indicated their support, while further conferences - in September 1934 in Potchefstroom and in October 1935 in Johannesburg - busily continued to discuss CNE theory.

The campaign received a major boost when the 1937 Transvaal synod of the GK established a special committee to argue for CNE in evidence to the provincial administration's Nicol Commission on education (11). All of this activity finally culminated in the decision by the FAK to organise a large conference on the "CNE principle" in Bloemfontein in July 1939. At the conference, papers delivered included "What is understood by CNE?", "CNE and Religious Instruction", "CNE and Language Teaching", "CNE and History Teaching", and "CNE and General School Organisation" (12). The most important practical outcome of the conference, however, was the decision

10) See, for example, J.C. Coetzee, "Ons C.N.O.-Beleid Toegelig en Verdedig II" in *Inspan*, 8, 7, April 1949, p.13.

11) J. C. Coetzee, *Onderwys in Suid-Afrika* (Pretoria, J.L. van Schaik, 1963), p.334.

12) Coetzee, "C.N.O.-Beleid", p.15.

to create the Institute for Christian-National Education (ICNE). Its brief was to propagate and advance the ideal of CNE, to provide it with a more systematic basis, and to monitor developments in education in general (13). The ICNE's central executive and study committees were to be supplemented by a number of local *skakelkomitees* (link committees), through which local FAK affiliates would be coordinated.

The FAK and the ICNE were soon faced with a controversial political issue around which they could mobilise nationalist Afrikaners. Despite strong opposition and a minority report from its chairman, the Nicol Commission narrowly voted in favour of keeping Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking children together at school and using parallel and dual medium wherever possible (14). With the ruling United Party also indicating its intention of extending dual and parallel medium education, in the hope that bilingualism would be encouraged, Nicol spoke for many nationalist Afrikaners when he stated:

There are indications that our church must get ready to fight again for the preservation of our separate schools and thereby to assure the continued existence of our church. It is the firm policy of church, reiterated with emphasis at our last synod, that our children must be educated in separate schools with Afrikaans as medium...Not only the salvation of our volk but the preservation of our church depends in large measure on separate schools.(15)

The FAK and the Afrikaner churches soon burst into a flurry of

13) Coetzee, *Onderwys*, p.335.

14) E.G. Malherbe, *Education in South Africa, Volume 2* (Cape Town, Juta, 1977), p.40.

15) *Die Kerkbode*, 47, 10, 5/3/41, p.415.

activity. Before the 1943 provincial elections, one of the prime issues of which was the UP's plan for education, a number of congresses were organised around the theme of single medium instruction (16). Then, in December 1943, after UP policy was accepted by large majorities in all the provinces apart from the OFS, the FAK convened a large volkskongres in Bloemfontein to reiterate its support for "mother-tongue schools".

The resolutions of the volkskongres provide one of the clearest statements of the Christian-Nationalism of the early 1940s. The congress was adamant, firstly, that religious instruction should be central to Christian-National schools. Not only should religious teaching be of a high standard; the lessons of the Bible must determine the "spirit and direction" of all other subjects. Secondly, the congress argued that the Afrikaans language should be the basis of all education and training, and proper mother-tongue education for Afrikaans children could only be guaranteed in separate Afrikaans schools. Thirdly, the congress expressed its belief in the importance of history teaching:

...through history teaching, Afrikaner youth must be taught how the unity, nature and destiny of Afrikaner volk, which are founded and fixed in the nation's language and culture (material of language teaching), developed according to the divine world-plan of the historical process (the material of general history)...History teaching must be delivered in such a way that the origin, development, destiny and calling of the volk are clearly understood from the history of the volk...(17)

16) Most important of these were the congress on "Mother-Tongue Schools" in Bloemfontein in December 1939, and the church congress on single-medium education in Pretoria in December 1942.

17) FAK Collection, Vol.1/4/4/2/2, Resolutions of volkskongres on "Mother-Tongue Schools", Bloemfontein, 14/12/43.

Finally, concentrating on more practical questions, the congress called on the ICNE to ensure that Afrikaner teachers were made aware of Christian-National principles, so that the moulding of Afrikaner children would be in safe hands. In a revealing explanation of the decisions of the volkskongres, J.C. Coetzee wrote:

Our ideal is not a bilingual volk, because this is an absurdity: no volk can have two languages (or two histories, two cultures, two homelands, etc). A first-rate kultuur-volk possesses only one language...(18)

III

The strongly exclusive and separatist tone that permeated the FAK's "cultural" campaigns, especially the CNE project, was also characteristic of the nationalist movement's attempts to proceed with the primary political dictate of Christian-Nationalist ideology: republicanism. Yet because the question of the republic fell within the sphere of partypolitiek, during the late 1930s, in the interests of Afrikaner unity, nationalist organisations tended to emphasise "cultural" issues which were more likely to resonate with Afrikaner supporters of Hertzog. Even so, by 1936, both the Broederbond and the GNP, the two main political institutions of the "new" nationalism, had included unequivocal republican clauses in their programmes (19).

18) UP Archive, Unisa, Vol.I.2,, J. C. Coetzee, "Memorandum oor Moedertaalskole", 1944.

19) Although, in the case of the GNP, this was only achieved after acrimonious debates between various factions in the party. See Moodie, *Civil Religion*, chapter 7.

The drive for a republic was given a massive boost by the events surrounding the outbreak of the Second World War. Smuts' insistence that South Africa actively support Britain's fight against Hitler led to a split in the ruling United Party, with Hertzog and 37 of his supporters refusing to sanction a South African declaration of war. The Broederbond moved fast to cement the fragile unity produced by Afrikaner opposition to participation in the War. By January 1940, after an emotional unity meeting at the site of the Voortrekker Monument, attended by more than 70,000 Afrikaners, the Broederbond managed, through direct mediation, to produce a shaky alliance between the followers of Hertzog and Malan, in the HNP (20).

Nevertheless, the powerful republicanism and anti-imperialism amongst Afrikaners soon took a number of different forms. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to recount the confusing and intricate conflicts that divided Afrikaners during this period: that is dealt with in detail elsewhere (21). Broadly speaking, however, two main strands of republicanism began to develop. On the one hand, a number of Afrikaners, especially in the semi-militarist OB and Oswald Pirow's *Nuwe Orde Studie Kring*, began to display a growing distaste for parliamentary politics, and an affinity for national-socialist and fascist ideas. Accordingly, the establishment of the future republic would involve sweeping

20) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.122.

21) *Ibid.*, chapter 9. See also Moodie, *Civil Religion*, chapter 11; N.M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa 1934-1948* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974); M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition 1939-1945* (London, Longman and Green, 1947).

away the "paraphernalia of effete liberal-capitalism", including political parties, Parliament, and elections (22). The other strand of republicanism, propounded mainly within the HNP, envisaged that the republic would come about as a result of party political action, and rejected the importation of "foreign" ideologies.

In October 1940, a fourteen-member Broederbond "Unity Committee", chaired by L.J. du Plessis, and including Ivan Lombard, Piet Meyer, Diederichs and Verwoerd, was established to draw up a draft republican constitution that would satisfy the aspirations of the opposing factions, and provide a basis for unity. In June 1941, to coincide with the Union Congress of the HNP, the Unity Committee issued a Declaration on Behalf of the People's Organisations, signed by the representatives of the FAK, the OB, the Economic Institute of the FAK, the RDB, and the DRC. The declaration clearly stated its general assumptions:

The state must be genuinely free and republican and Christian-National. It must acknowledge as basic the eternal legal principles of the Word of God, the clear development of our ethnic history, and the necessary application of this past to modern circumstances.

The constitutional system must not be cast in a foreign mould. It must break away from all which is false or damaging to the People in democracy as it is here known, and must make possible a powerful government built upon the concepts of People's government of the South African republics, with necessary application in an industrial state for furthering the interests of the People.(23)

Attached to the declaration was a draft republican

22) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.125.

23) Moodie, *Civil Religion*, pp.218-219.

constitution, which formally laid down the signatories' conception of the future republic. As the clearest exposition of Afrikaner republican thought - O'Meara, for example refers to it as the "apotheosis" of the Broederbond's "vision of Republican nirvana" (24) - it is useful to examine some of the constitution's articles. Article 1 of the constitution called for "the total abolition of the British Kingship over and the status of British subjects within the republic". Article 2, concerning "The State", suggested that the national flag of the new sovereign state should be the Vierkleur of the old South African Republic, and, referring to the official language, stated:

Afrikaans, as the language of the original White inhabitants of the country, will be the first official language. English will be regarded as a second or supplementary language, and will enjoy equal rights, freedom and privileges with the first official language, everywhere and whenever such treatment is judged by the State Authority to be in the best interests of the State and its citizenship.(25)

As far as citizenship was concerned, the constitution argued that recognition should only be accorded to "subjects of whom it can be expected that they will act as builders up of the nation, whatever status they might have possessed before". Representation by the people was provided for in a 180-member Parliament, in which legislative power was vested, and a 50-member community council, 18 of whose members would be appointed by the State President, the remainder being chosen by "suitable organisations...which represent definite

24) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.72.

25) *Die Burger*, 23/1/42. Translation from Natal Witness, 30/10/49.

spiritual, cultural, or social groups, for example, acknowledged Church organisations and culture institutions of countrywide nature...". The community council would provide the State President and his council of ministers with "expert advice" (26).

Despite unequivocal support for the constitution by the various *volksorganisasies*, the HNP itself responded ambiguously. On the one hand, in the Transvaal, elements of the Party leadership vigorously expressed approval. Strydom's chief lieutenant Verwoerd, in particular, had participated in the drafting of the document, and, when it finally came up for discussion, had no qualms in using his position as editor of *Die Transvaler* to support it (27). On the other hand, the Cape leadership headed by Malan, immediately indicated its reservations. Malan publicly accepted the draft constitution in principle, but did not feel that it should be published. In January 1942 - after the OB had, without authority, already circulated 100,000 pamphlets containing a summary of the constitution (28) - the HNP opened the matter for discussion. *Die Burger*, mouthpiece of the Cape Party, was immediately critical of parts of the constitution, especially those dealing with the official language and citizenship (29).

26) *Die Burger*, 23/1/42.

27) *Die Transvaler*, 23/1/42.

28) O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.130.

29) *Die Burger*, 23/1/42. The editor of *Die Burger* wrote: "Who decides what is "ethnically constructive"? And who will "expect" of the subjects that they display such characteristics? Citizens' rights in a free state cannot be revoked according to a vague measure which can be so arbitrarily interpreted as to ensure the rights of no individual."

In the end, however, ideological differences between members of the the Cape party and Broederbond intellectuals in the HNP in the north - and indeed any ideological agreements between staunch Party men such as Verwoerd and Strydom, and OB sympathisers such as Piet Meyer and L.J. du Plessis - were minimised or forgotten, as the HNP moved to smash the OB and establish its position as the unchallenged political voice of nationalist Afrikaners. However, it is also a mistake to over-emphasise the ideological disagreements within the HNP concerning the nature of the future republic. In June 1941, despite Malan's "misgivings" with the draft constitution, one of the formal resolutions passed by the HNP at its Union Congress called for "the re-creation of South Africa into a free independent republic based on a Christian-National foundation, and incorporating in its nature and character the best which the Boer Nation in the past devised in this sphere, in accordance with its own national nature and traditions" (30). Then, in January 1942, Malan proposed a motion in the House of Assembly, on behalf of the HNP as a whole. Malan moved, in view of the "serious crisis" facing the country as a result of participation in the War:

- (a) that our highest national interests can only be served by the conversion of South Africa into a republic dissociated from the British Crown and Empire and free and independent of any other foreign power;
- (b) that such a republic shall not be cast on any foreign model, but shall be built up in accordance with our own national character and traditions based upon the principles of national government as embodied in the two former South African Republics, departing from anything

30) G. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1958), pp.218-219.

false and dangerous to the nation contained in the British liberalistic democracy as existing in this country and with the necessary adaptation to modern conditions;

(c) that in substance and character it shall be Christian-National, based upon the true observance of equal language and cultural rights of both sections of the European population;...

(e) that it shall be protected effectively against the capitalistic and parasitical exploitation of its population as well as against the undermining influences of hostile and unnational elements.(31)

The obvious difference between this motion and the draft constitution was that Malan at no stage suggested that English should be made the second language of the proposed republic. In his speech to the motion he repeated his assurance to English-speaking South Africans - "there will be no differentiation between English speaking and Afrikaans speaking" (32) - but also argued that as long as the British connection remained, "the sound and friendly relationship" between the two white races was "hopeless" (33). Yet the tone of the remainder of the motion, and Malan's speech, did not differ strikingly from the philosophies expressed in the declaration of volksorganisasies or the draft constitution. On the contrary, Malan firmly reiterated the Party's uneasiness with the British style of democracy:

The premises of the English Liberal Democratic system lay it down that the individual is the inhabitant of the country. If anyone is an inhabitant of a country he ipso facto has a say in that State, and if one deprives him of that say one does an injustice to him. One robs him of something, one deprives him of human rights. If one does this then the result is...that there cannot be unity. The State is based then on the result of internal struggle,

31) HAD, 1942, cols.33-34.

32) HAD, 1942, col.41.

33) HAD, 1942, col.45.

difference in principle, difference in outlook, vital questions between the different elements of the population, and in consequence one necessarily gets a State which has no definite course and no character. And a State without course and without character becomes a prey of whoever is the strongest. It becomes the prey or the seat, the stronghold of the capitalists and of parasitical exploitation. We differ from each other in our very premises. The very starting point of the republic we want is this: we say, lay down the course and then you can take your measures and your steps and give a say to people so that your State will not only be secure from the outside but along that course your State can also be secure inside.(34)

In summary, therefore, it can safely be argued that the Second World War placed the issue of the republic at the very centre of the HNP's political programme and emotional appeal. The republican rhetoric characteristic of Christian-Nationalist ideology ~~were~~^{was} given a concrete direction and thrust. In Malan's own words:

...after the experience which we had on the 4th September, 1939, together with similar experiences before that, it is something more than sentiment. To national-minded South Africa it has become a deep conviction.(35)

Notwithstanding some ideological disagreements within the HNP, by 1943 the Party stood firmly for the establishment of a state which would enshrine the twin strands of applied Christian-Nationalist ideology. Not only would Afrikaner culture and language be buttressed - especially through the imposition of a Christian-Nationalist educational system - but the new Afrikaner republic, basing itself on the traditions of

34) HAD, 1942, col.49. See also Malan's comments to the Union Congress of the HNP, 16/9/42, in Strydom Collection, Vol.53, pp.92-93.

35) HAD, 1942, col.35.

the old Boer states, would also dispense with the evils of British liberal democracy and sever all connections with the British crown.

IV

The first important thrust of Christian-Nationalist ideology - the campaign to strengthen and protect Afrikaner culture and language - was intensified during the mid-1940s. Again it was the question of mother-tongue education which seemed to preoccupy nationalist ideologists in the Broederbond and the HNP. In 1944, Smuts and his UP government followed through their stand during the 1943 provincial elections by proposing in Parliament that dual medium education should be progressively introduced in the schools of all four provinces, "from the stage at which it is on educational grounds appropriate to do so" (36). Citing the promotion of bilingualism and the cultivation of a South African patriotism as the reasons for such a change, Smuts nonetheless took care not to impose strict dictates from central government on the provincial administrations, which were given five years to implement the parliamentary resolution. Smuts was adamant, however, that teacher-training colleges should also be forced to adopt the new proposals: clearly dual medium instruction was impossible if teachers did not have sufficient command of both official languages (37).

The response of the four provincial administrations

36) HAD, 1944, col.1740.

37) Ibid.

varied widely. The OFS basically ignored the proposals, and continued to conduct all classes in the mother-tongue. The Natal authorities had already, in 1942, decreed that the second language should be used as an additional medium for pupils of age eight years and upwards: their response to the parliamentary resolution thus merely involved an extension of an existing plan. The Cape administration immediately passed an ordinance which empowered the Superintendent-General of Education to embark on a series of experiments to determine at what level second language instruction should be introduced, and in what way it would affect the overall standard of education. The experiments, involving about 6,000 pupils in Standards 4, 5 and 6, began during 1945 and 1946. Finally, the UP provincial government in the Transvaal passed a new consolidated education ordinance in May 1945. The ordinance, which came into effect on 1 January 1946, ordered, amongst other things, that second language instruction should be gradually introduced in all classes from Standard 6, so that by 1951 both languages would be in equal use in secondary schools (38).

Despite the fact that in the Transvaal, for example, only 2 percent of pupils were receiving instruction in both official languages by 1946 (compared with a paltry 0.7 percent in 1945) (39), the UP's plan for education was perceived as a direct threat by Christian-Nationalist ideologists. As Piet Meyer noted in 1945:

38) The information in this paragraph was obtained from Malherbe, *Education*, pp.96-99, and Coetzee, "Onderwys", pp.339-340.

39) Malherbe, *Education*, p.98.

The moral values which give expression to the individual's attachment to the nation's group are disturbed by early bilingualism...This leads to a moral relativism which reaches right into the religious life of the individual.(40)

Utilising its tight networks, the Broederbond and the FAK initiated campaigns in all the provinces where dual medium measures had been introduced (41). In Natal, the FAK used the proceeds of a national fund-raising appeal to establish an infant school for Afrikaner children who had been temporarily accommodated in an English-medium school while Pietermaritzburg's Voortrekker School was enlarged (42). In the Transvaal, a letter by M.C. Botha calling for a strike amongst Afrikaner pupils and students was circulated to Broederbond members. Arguing that the true objectives of dual medium education were "simply the sacrificing of Afrikanerdom on the altar of British-Jewish imperialism", Botha demanded that Broederbonders should use their influence in the Afrikaner churches and all other Afrikaner organisations to mobilise support for the strike (43). Although a schools boycott never in fact materialised, the incident reflected the nationalist alliance's implacable opposition to any system of education which exposed Afrikaner children to significant contact with English-speakers.

40) P.J. Meyer, *Moedertaal en Tweektaligheid*, Verkenner-reeks, 8, 1945, p.43. Cited in Malherbe, *Education*, p.102.

41) Malherbe, *Education*, quotes (p.54) secret Broederbond circular No 4/43/44 dated 1/3/44: "Where our beloved little volk is once more involved in a struggle for the preservation of its language, every Afrikaner who honours his mother in the language learned from her pious mouth is commandeered to take his place in the commando."

42) *Ibid.*, pp.52-53.

43) *Ibid.*, pp.691-692.

Throughout the frenetic political activity kindled by the UP's dual medium proposals, Christian-Nationalist ideologists continued to hone CNE principles. A number of conference and journal papers during the period indicated that a more comprehensive CNE plan was in the offing (44). In February 1948, almost ten years after the large CNE conference of 1939, the ICNE finally published the fruits of its labour. As one of the most complete statements of Afrikaner nationalist ideology of the late 1940s, it is important to scrutinise 'n Christelik-Nasionale Onderwysbeleid (A Christian-National Education Policy) in some detail. From the outset, it is clear that the ICNE envisaged far more than just an end to dual medium education. In the foreword to the document J.C. van Rooy noted:

The recognition of our language as a medium of instruction does not mean that we have achieved everything. On the contrary, we have achieved very little. Afrikaans as medium of instruction in a school atmosphere that is culturally foreign to our nation is like a sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The real cultural "stuff" is not yet there. Our culture must be brought into the schools, and this cannot be done merely by using our language as a medium of instruction. More is necessary. Our Afrikaans schools must not merely be mother-tongue schools; they must be in the true sense of the word Christian and National; they must be places where our children are be soaked and nourished in the Christian-National spiritual cultural "stuff" of our nation. The dual medium struggle has opened the eyes of our people, and helped them to appreciate still further this ideal; and it is for the realisation of this ideal that the struggle is coming. We will have nothing to do

44) See J. C. Coetzee, "Die Taak van die Universiteit" in *Inspan*, 6, 8, May 1947; J. de W. Keyter, "Ons Onderwysstelsel" in *Inspan*, 6, 10, July 1947; G.F. de Vos Hugo, "Die C.N.O.-Beleid" in *Inspan*, 6, 11, August 1947; E. Greyling, "Gesondheidsonderwys in die Skool" in *Inspan*, 7, 1, October 1947.

with a mixture of languages, of culture, of religion or of race. We are winning the language-medium struggle. The struggle for the Christian and National school still lies ahead...(45)

A more exact definition of what was intended by a "Christian and National school" followed in the body of the document. Its introduction argued, firstly, that Afrikaner children should be educated according to the world view of their parents. This implied that Afrikaans-speaking children must receive a Christian-Nationalist education, since the Christian and National spirit of the Afrikaner people must be preserved and developed. By "Christian" was meant a world view "based on the Holy Scripture and formulated in the Articles of Faith of our three Afrikaner churches". By "National" was meant "love for everything that is our own, with special reference to our country, our language, our history and our culture". National principles were "under the guidance" of the Christian principle, and must be "rooted" in Christianity (46). The goal of education was to enable the young to take over from their "cultural heritage" everything that was "good and beautiful and noble", and develop it in accordance with their own gifts and the world view of the nation. The necessity of CNE lay in the fact that the child's soul was "undeveloped", its opportunity in his soul's capacity for development (47).

With respect to the specific content of education, the most important conclusion of the document was that religious instruction was the "key subject", and should determine the

45) Education League, *Blackout* (Johannesburg, 1959), p.15.

46) *Inspan*, 7, 6, March 1948, p.24.

47) *Ibid.*, p.25.

spirit and direction of all other subjects (48). The mother-tongue was the "most important secular subject", and should be the only medium of instruction except in the teaching of other modern languages. Bilingualism was not the aim of education: English should not be taught until the child had developed a thorough knowledge of the mother-tongue. Civics must teach the child to respect and preserve the Christian and National character of the family, the church, society and the state. Geography aimed to inculcate the child with a love for his country, so that he would be ready to defend it, and improve it for posterity. History should be seen as the fulfillment of God's plan for humanity, and must emphasise that "the great antithesis between the Kingdom of God in Jesus Christ and the kingdom of darkness runs through everything" (49). Furthermore, Afrikaner youth could only undertake the "task and calling of the older generation" if they acquired a "true vision" of the origin of the nation and of the direction of the national heritage. Next to the mother-tongue the history of the nation was the best channel of cultivating the "love of one's own" (50).

As for control of education, the document argued for a "correct relationship between the family, the church and the state". Each should be given its "proper share" in the "moulding of the child". While neither home, church or state should dominate, education was the first and foremost the right and duty of parents. Accordingly, the parents "as an

48) *Ibid.*, p.24.

49) *Inspan*, 7, 7, April 1948, p.18.

50) *Ibid.*, p.19.

organised group but not as individuals" should nominate teachers and "exercise supervision over their teaching", while the church supervised the "spirit and trend" of education in general and the state ensured the excellence of academic standards (51). Each school should be controlled by a parents' committee. One tier higher, district school boards, consisting of parents, teachers and state representatives, should be created. Finally, the provincial education council should contain representatives from the school committees, the state and the teaching profession, as well as educationists and other experts (52).

The CNE document also paid attention to other forms of education and training. Christian-Nationalist principles were to be applied to infant schools, technical training and adult education. Furthermore, since they acted as "substitutes" for parents, it was vital that Afrikaner teachers received a particularly intensive Christian-National training; otherwise they were a "deadly danger" (53). University education, too, should be "never purely eclectic and never reconciliatory"; science must be expounded in a "positively Christian light" and contrasted with "non-Christian science" (54). (Later, Afrikaner commentators confirmed that this implied a complete rejection of theories of evolution (55).) Finally, the education of Coloureds and Africans must also be conducted according to the precepts of CNE. Non-white education should

51) *Ibid.*, p.19.

52) *Ibid.*, p.21.

53) *Ibid.*, p.21.

54) *Inspan*, 7, 8, May 1948, p.22.

55) See, for example in *Inspan*, 8, 8, May 1949, p.9.

be based on the principles of "trusteeship, non-equality and segregation", and on mother-tongue instruction. While it was important that African education was state-controlled, it should not be financed at the expense of white education (56).

The ICNE's memorandum provoked an immediate response from all quarters. On the one hand, as was to be expected, liberal and English-speaking organisations were outraged, and soon produced a number of pamphlets and articles attacking the CNE document (57). Supporters of the nationalist alliance, on the other hand, universally welcomed the ICNE's policy statement, and forcefully defended it against criticisms (58). In addition to individual endorsements of the memorandum by the three Afrikaner churches and other FAK affiliates (59), support was also forthcoming from the Union's four Afrikaans-speaking teacher associations. Most importantly, by November 1949, all four provincial branches of the NP had formally declared itself in favour of CNE.

56) *Inspan*, 7, 8, May 1948, p.24.

57) See, for example, Education League, *Blueprint for Blackout* (Johannesburg, 1949), as well as the protests by NUSAS (*Cape Times*, 5/2/49), the English-speaking Teachers' Associations, and the League of Women Voters (*The Star*, 14/5/49). See also *The Friend*, 14/4/49; the *Eastern Province Herald*, 14/4/49; and *The Star*, 4/5/49.

58) See, in particular, the series of articles entitled "Ons C.N.O.-Beleid Toegelig en Verdedig" by J. C. Coetzee in *Inspan* during 1949 and 1950 (8, 6, March 1949; 8, 7, April 1949; 8, 8, May 1949; 8, 9, June 1949; 9, 1, October 1949; 9, 3, December 1949; 9, 4, January 1950; 9, 6, March 1950; 9, 7, April 1950; 9, 8, May 1950) and the articles entitled "Die Christelike Onderwys" by C.F. Hoogendyk in *Inspan* during 1950 (9, 11, August 1950; 9, 12, September 1950).

59) See, for example, the CNE resolution at the 1949 synod of the Cape NGK (*Die Kerkbode*, 64, 21, 23/11/49, p.962).

Despite these resolutions - and perhaps because of the furore amongst English-speaking South Africans caused by the 1948 document - the NP government showed some hesitation about the issue. In June 1949, for instance, Minister of Education Stals publically denied that the government had any intention of forcing CNE on the country's educational system (60). Indeed, over the next fifteen years, at no stage was an easily identifiable and discrete CNE plan introduced by means of separate, consolidated CNE legislation. At the same time, there is no doubt that the CNE document exerted a vital influence on the nationalist alliance. Throughout the 1950s, the congresses and publications of nationalist organisations, especially the FAK and the Afrikaner churches, made it clear that the CNE document had established a firm and unquestioned agenda, which was accepted by NP politicians (61). This contention is borne out by an examination of the main thrusts of NP educational policy after 1948.

The most immediate educational priority of the NP, once it had triumphed in the 1948 election, was to reverse the UP's dual medium policy, in line with the recommendations of the CNE document. In the Transvaal, a new language ordinance was quickly drafted and published. From 1 January 1950, it became compulsory for all students in all standards up to and including Standard 8 to be taught in their home language, a

60) SAPA Report, 9/6/49.

61) When the HNP and AP fused into the NP in 1951, the new party's constitution urged the authorities that in carrying out their educational duties, "the Christian-National basis of the State should be fully taken into account" (*Die Vaderland*, 24/8/51).

provision which was reiterated in the consolidated education ordinance of 1953. Soon the other provinces followed suit. In 1954 and 1956, respectively, the OFS and Cape provincial councils passed new education ordinances with clauses similar to that of the Transvaal. Finally, in Natal, the 1942 ordinance was amended so that the medium of instruction of every pupil in government schools should be the official language selected by the parent (62). As a result of these measures, the number of students receiving dual medium instruction steadily decreased. By 1963, only 0.3 percent of all white scholars were taught in both English and Afrikaans (63), compared with one percent in 1957 (64) and approximately four percent in 1947 (65). Equally significantly, by 1963 the home language of well over 70 percent of South Africa's teachers was Afrikaans (66), at a time when only 60 percent of all pupils attended Afrikaans-medium schools (67).

The new education ordinances of the 1950s did not merely restrict their attention to dual medium instruction. Adherence to CNE principles was evident in a number of other clauses. The OFS ordinance, in particular, was fairly blatant about its aims, noting that its general policy was to "reveal and cultivate the Christian principle in education, and to maintain the national outlook" in order to develop in pupils "a Christian philosophy of the world and of life" and "to

62) Behr and MacMillan, *Education*, pp.52-53.

63) Bureau of Statistics, *Statistics of Schools 1963 and Earlier Years*, Report No. 285, p.60.

64) *Ibid.*, p.66.

65) *Ibid.*, p.67. See also Behr and MacMillan, *Education*, p.53.

66) Bureau of Statistics, *Schools 1963*, p.124.

67) *Ibid.*, p.60.

inculcate a healthy sentiment of undivided love for and loyalty to the common fatherland" (68). While the Transvaal and Cape administrations were more circumspect about stating such general goals, they joined the OFS in making provision for the establishment of local control of education through school boards and school committees, as recommended by the CNE memorandum. Both Gwendolyn Carter and Leo Marquard note that it soon became customary in many country districts for the local *predikant* of the DRC to become chairman of the school committee (69). Although the education ordinances forbade religious tests in the choice of new appointments, through the retention of "conscience clauses", Afrikaner teachers were often required to submit a testimonial from the local pastor before they were accepted into a school. Similarly, political considerations could also be crucial in the decisions of school committees. In the Transvaal, the power of parents was extended even further by the decision to restrict participation in the election of district school boards to parents of pupils at provincial schools. Previously all registered voters had been allowed to participate (70).

Other developments in education after 1950 bore a close resemblance to expressed CNE doctrine. Firstly, by the mid-1950s, religious instruction had become a far more integral part of the school system (71). Secondly, the choice

68) Behr and MacMillan, *Education*, p.25.

69) Carter, *Inequality*, p.263; L. Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), p.179.

70) Education League, *Blackout*, p.12.

71) Behr and MacMillan, *Education*, p.49.

of many textbooks, especially in the fields of history and race relations, conformed closely to CNE dictates. Control of reading was taken so seriously in the Transvaal that by the late 1950s a "Book Guide" was introduced: no teacher was permitted to allow any books on school premises which had not been departmentally approved and officially listed in the guide (72). Thirdly, the decision in 1962 by the government to set up a National Education Advisory Council to advise the Minister of Education and generally coordinate educational policy, reflected the CNE demand for a more direct involvement by centralised state structures in educational affairs. Although some non-nationalist groupings also supported the new legislation, the evidence by members of the FAK and Afrikaner churches and educational institutions to a parliamentary select committee indicated very clearly that, for Afrikaner ideologists, the advisory council was based on ideas expressed in the 1948 document and a 1954 memorandum by the *Interkerklike Komitee vir Onderwys en Opvoeding* (Interdenominational Committee for Education and Training) of the DRC (73). Fourthly, during the 1950s Afrikaner tertiary educational institutions began to openly espouse CNE principles. The Afrikaans university at Potchefstroom, in particular, renamed itself the "Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education", and removed from its constitution the "conscience clause" which prohibited the application of religious tests in the selection of staff and students (74). A

72) Education League, *Blackout*, p.12.

73) SC 5/1962, *Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the National Education Advisory Council Bill*, May 1962, pp.129, 234-248, 358.

74) Education League, *Blackout*, p.12.

significant proportion of the university's energy and resources was devoted to the training of Christian-Nationalist Afrikaner teachers. Finally, the establishment of separate state-controlled educational systems for Africans and Coloureds - via the 1953 Bantu Education Act, the 1959 Extension of University Education Act and the 1963 Coloured Persons Education Act - brought to fruition a deeply-held CNE conviction.

The application of CNE doctrine to formal education during the 1950s was reinforced and complemented by the extra-mural activities of the FAK and the Afrikaner churches. Serfontein notes that for most of the decade the Broederbond tended to focus on "cultural" matters (75). Certainly, it seems that the Broederbond-controlled FAK continued in its effort to involve Afrikaner pupils, as well as their parents, in a tight network of Christian-Nationalist institutions. When Afrikaner children left school at the end of the day or the week they were immediately drawn into a wide range of religious and cultural organisations. Some of these, such as the Voortrekkers, the Afrikaner equivalent of the Boy Scouts, had been created in the late 1930s and early 1940s. But new organisations, particularly in the church, continued to spring up (76): their objectives were informed by the constant efforts of the FAK and Broederbond to introduce and popularise "traditional" Afrikaner cultural forms, including volkspele

75) J.H.P. Serfontein, *Brotherhood of Power* (London, Rex Collings, 1979), p.83.

76) Notable amongst these was the *Kerkjeugvereniging* (Church Youth Association), formed in 1951 by the NGK. In 1958, even the Broederbond formed a youth wing called the *Ruiterwag*.

(folk dancing) and boeremusiek (popular music), which would extend the boundaries of Christian-Nationalism (77).

The efforts of Christian-Nationalist ideologists were not always successful. Afrikaner publications often argued that more graduates needed to be drawn into teaching, the lynchpin of Christian-Nationalism (78). Concern was periodically expressed that not enough pupils were studying history at a secondary school level (79). And the Afrikaner churches seem to have been constantly worried about the effect of city life on the outlook and loyalties of Afrikaner children (80). Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, there is no doubt that, in cultural and educational terms, the Christian-Nationalist campaign had succeeded in penetrating and affecting the lives of the majority of Afrikaner children. Equally significantly, the most striking feature of the cultural and educational thrust of 1950s Christian-Nationalism - as exemplified by CNE - was its continuity with earlier forms of the ideology. From an educational and cultural point of view, Christian-Nationalist ideologists were true to the legacy of the 1939 CNE congress.

77) An examination of the congress agendas of the FAK, the agendas of its executive committee (see FAK Collection, Vols.1/2/1/2 and 1/4/4/2), and the pages of *Inspan*, clearly indicate the FAK's concern with all forms of Afrikaner "culture". For an interesting discussion on the importance of *volkspele*, see D.C.S. du Preez, "Jeug en Volkspele" in *Inspan*, 9, 2, November 1949.

78) See, for example, *Inspan*, 7, 5, February 1948, p.23; *Die Kerkbode*, 62, 2, 14/7/48, p.1573; *Die Kerkbode*, 64, 6, 10/8/49, p.299; *Die Kerkbode*, 67, 1, 14/7/51, p.5.

79) F.A. van Jaarsveld, "Die Afrikaner en Geskiedenis op Skool" in *Historia*, 12, 3, September 1967.

80) See, for example, the report on the enquiry conducted by the NGK into Afrikaner family life in the urban areas (*DRC Monthly Newsletter*, 23, November 1959).

It would be a fairly simple exercise to write a straightforward history of Afrikaner republicanism after 1945. Such a history would emphasise the continuation of republican fervour amongst all Afrikaners - notwithstanding other pressing issues, such as the "colour problem" - culminating eventually in the referendum of 1960 and the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961. It would find its proof in the countless speeches by NP politicians, reaffirming their commitment to the republican ideal. It would note the fiery republicanism of Strydom, and the promise by his successor, Verwoerd, to "devote all his energies to the establishment of a republic" (81). It would refer to the various pieces of legislation which paved the way for the republican declaration (82). And it would emphasise the ever-increasing numbers of local NP branches, and newspaper editorials and letters, imploring the government to move swiftly towards the long-awaited republican goal (83). Such a history would therefore see the creation of the republic in 1961 as a logical and inevitable fulfillment, a simple linear development, of the aspirations expressed by Afrikaners in the

81) *Rand Daily Mail*, 4/9/58.

82) The 1949 South African Citizenship Act, the 1950 Privy Councils Appeal Act, the 1957 Flags Amendment Act, the decision by the government in 1957 to declare *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika* to be the only national anthem, and the 1959 Decimal Coinage Act were all important legislative foundations for the republic.

83) The number of NP congress motions dealing with republican issues increased appreciably during the late 1950s. In 1958, for example, 13 local branches tabled motions at the Cape NP congress calling for the establishment of the republic, compared with only two in 1953.

1930s and early 1940s.

However, while some empirical material can be utilised to support such an interpretation, it would be misleading and inadequate to present post-war republicanism in this way. Nearly twenty years of rapid economic and political development, both in South Africa and internationally, separated the draft constitution and the 1961 Republic: the republican ideology that informed and accompanied the latter was substantially different, in many ways, from the seemingly immutable vision of the former.

It can be immediately noted that whereas the NP had fought the 1943 general election with a high-profile republican campaign, by 1948 much of the Party's energy had been redirected towards formulating a platform which would exploit white fears of the *swart gevaar*. The NP still retained a strong republican clause in its manifesto and constitution, noting that it was "convinced that the Republican form of government separated from the British Crown is best adapted to the circumstances and aspirations of the South African people and moreover that it is the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not again be dragged into the wars of Great Britain" (84). Furthermore, in 1948 the Federal Council of the NP passed a strongly-worded resolution stating that when the Party won the struggle for the republic, "the voice of inimical, unnational elements in the affairs of the nation must be eliminated" (85). Nevertheless, it is interesting that

84) *Programme of Principles of the NP*, 1948.

85) *Die Suidersstem*, 14/1/48.

in 1948 the *Republikeinse Strydfonds* (Republican Struggle Fund), formed as a company in 1945, was ordered to cease its activities, after it had collected more than £50,000 for the republican campaign (86). Moreover, despite attempts by the United Party to exploit fears of extreme nationalist republicanism, the issue of the republic seems to have been completely overshadowed by the apartheid debate during the 1948 election campaign.

It was after the NP's victory in 1948, however, that concrete changes in the content and symbolic structure of republican ideology became especially evident. The most obvious shift in the republican rhetoric of nationalist Afrikaners was their repudiation of the draft constitution. Given his initial reservations with the draft, it is perhaps not surprising that Malan was most vocal in his rejection of the 1941 document. At the Cape NP congress in Kimberley in 1950, he stated that the constitution had been formulated by a purely unofficial group and without his knowledge; he had never discussed the document with his colleagues, it had never been discussed by the Party's national executive or at a congress, and it had certainly never been approved by the Party as a whole (87). In a speech to the Senate in June 1951, he repeated this claim, but added that he felt safe in saying the draft was in no way a Fascist constitution. Nevertheless, he had only ordered it to be published because the OB had declared it to be their policy and unofficially publicised it,

86) Strydom Collection, Vol.54, pp.180-190.

87) *The Star*, 4/10/50.

and people were beginning to discuss it anyway. He had never felt himself bound by its contents (88). Malan was certainly not the only NP leader to distance himself from the draft constitution. Even members of the Transvaal NP, many of whom had fully supported the principles of the draft in 1942, now began to dispute its origins. Speaking in Durban in 1952, Ben Schoeman, for example, stated quite baldly:

I do repudiate it. We have repudiated it for years. It has nothing to do with us and we never supported it.(89)

The second interesting development in republican rhetoric concerned attitudes towards Britain and the Commonwealth. It will be recalled that a powerful anti-colonialism, incorporating a clear recognition of Britain as the historic oppressor of the Afrikaner nation, characterised the republican thought of the early 1940s: any links with the British Empire were to be completely severed. The first important shift in this position became evident after Dr Malan's return from the 1949 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. The conference had been called to discuss India's request that it be allowed to remain in the Commonwealth, despite its decision to declare itself an independent republic. After some discussion, the Prime Ministers unanimously agreed that it was perfectly in order for India to retain a place in the Commonwealth after independence. Malan's subsequent speech to the House of Assembly, in which he reported back about the decisions of the

88) *Senate Debates*, 1951, cols.6592-6594.

89) *Natal Mercury*, 6/9/52.

conference, indicated that the NP government would now move towards its eventual goal along a different route. Malan's main contention was that the Commonwealth had "shown an ability to adapt itself to changing conditions in a changing world" (90). The British Empire no longer existed:

...during our lifetime we have also seen the British Empire transformed along peaceful constitutional lines into something else, a community of free and independent nations, as far as the Dominions are concerned, linked together by certain bonds, but where the one Dominion, either with regard to its domestic or with regard to its external interests, did not occupy a subordinate position in relation to any other.(91)

Consequently, as long as the Commonwealth did not act as a "super-State", and respected South Africa's freedom and right to self-determination, South Africa would remain a member (92). Yet it would retain its membership not because South Africa felt any particular allegiance to the King. Malan emphasised that "where the expression "the King is head of the Commonwealth" is used, "it must not be interpreted to mean that it alters any of the existing rights of the various members of the Commonwealth, and that the King - although he is indicated as head of the Commonwealth - fulfils no constitutional function as this" (93). On the contrary, the NP government wished to stay in the Commonwealth because it was a "community of free, independent people with common interests, a community which as such from time to time discusses and furthers that common interest" (94). The reasons for that

90) HAD, 1949, col.5561.

91) HAD, 1949, col.5561.

92) HAD, 1949, col.5564.

93) HAD, 1949, col.5559.

94) HAD, 1949, cols.5660-5661.

common interest were, according to Malan, twofold. Firstly, all members of the Commonwealth were committed to political systems modelled "on the lines of the British constitution" (95). More importantly, however, was the "common political outlook" of the member states; in particular, their united opposition to communism. "Every country must have friends nowadays", Malan argued, given the "threat of aggression from Russia, from communist countries" (96). Furthermore:

There is the danger of aggression from Russia; from the forces of Communism. What is our attitude? I assume that we are all agreed that it is a good thing that the Western Powers want to stand together, even in the military sphere, and that they have been able to form the Atlantic Pact. We on this side of the House have adopted the attitude that our sympathies lie with the Western Powers. We are anti-Communist and we want to throw in our weight with the anti-Communist countries. If this situation leads to war we cannot remain neutral. (97)

Closely linked to Malan's reappraisal of the merits of the British parliamentary tradition, and the importance of relations with Britain and the Commonwealth, was a clear attempt to begin to redefine the narrow ethnic vision of the predominant strand of the Afrikaner republicanism of the 1940s. As shown above, Malan had always been adamant, even at the zenith of separatist republican feeling in 1942, that the rights of English-speaking South Africans should be respected. However, after the Prime Ministers' conference. Malan significantly expanded and developed his position on the status of English-speakers. Both in interactions with

95) HAD, 1949, col.5561.

96) HAD, 1949, col.5555.

97) HAD, 1949, col.5564.

journalists in Europe and during the subsequent House of Assembly debate, Malan reiterated his, and his government's, belief in "the absolute equality" of the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking sections of the population (98). Furthermore, the government realised that a republic could "only be established on the broad basis of the will of the people":

The Nationalist Party will not call into being or attempt to call into being a republic, unless there is absolute certainty that the majority of the voters in this country, the majority of the people, are in favour of it.(99)

Since the government did not want to make it difficult for those people who opposed the republic, but agreed with the NP on other issues, the question of a republican declaration would not be put to the electorate at a normal general election: a special referendum or election would be called (100). Malan also warned, however, that true unity between the two sections of the white population could only be achieved in a republic. Because the population of South Africa was not uniform, and had a history which differed from that of other members of the Commonwealth, the "Kingship" did not constitute a "bond of unity" (101). The NP wanted to encourage the development of new allegiances:

Our ideal is a united nation in which the two sections are bound together by a mutual respect for each other's language and traditions and by a common patriotism.(102)

98) *Die Burger*, 2/5/49.

99) *HAD*, 1949, col.5659.

100) *HAD*, 1949, col.5660.

101) *HAD*, 1949, col.5563.

102) *Die Burger*, 2/5/49.

Already English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers held the "same views" on the most important issues facing South Africa. In order to fully solve these problems, however, it was vital to eliminate the causes of division; to "seek unity and stand together" (103).

Malan's reassurances to English-speaking South Africans were echoed by ardent republicans Strydom and C.R. Swart in the same House of Assembly debate (104). On the question of South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth, however, Strydom expressed the views of many NP members when he insisted that the Party still aimed to establish a republic "separated from the British Empire and the British Crown" (105). His refusal to endorse Malan's new position marked the beginning of two years of intense conflict within the NP. It soon became clear, however, that Strydom and his supporters would find it difficult to change Malan's mind. In January 1950, in reply to a vehement letter from Strydom (106), Malan curtly retorted that Strydom should have made the effort to meet with him in person (107). Then, in a speech to the House of Assembly in April 1950, Malan stated:

103) HAD, 1949, col.5564.

104) HAD, 1949, cols.5604-5607; HAD, 1949, cols.5640-5644.

105) HAD, 1949, col.5605. A letter to Malan from NP supporter S. du Toit of Potchefstroom, 2/5/49 (Strydom Collection, Vol.53, p.35) is just one example of dissatisfaction: "In all deference, I believe that the principles of the National Party have always meant that we must be completely separated from the British Crown and Commonwealth. Although the King remains just as a "symbol", he is still there, and we shall surely have to periodically receive this symbol here to ensure that we remain loyal within the Commonwealth."

106) Strydom Collection, Vol.53, pp.62-66, Strydom to Malan, 10/1/50.

107) Strydom Collection, Vol.53, pp.67-68, Malan to Strydom, 12/1/50.

It (the British Empire) ceased to exist quite a while ago as far as the Dominions were concerned. The Dominions do not belong to the British Empire...We no longer have the position where England is the ruling country, surrounded by a number of subordinate states. We now have a number of states which are constitutionally equal to one another, and have equal rights.(108)

Moreover, in February 1951, in a reply to Patrick Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Malan wrote:

We follow the policy of the closest cooperation, first of all with Great Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth and further with all the other friendly nations in the world. Apart from all other considerations, we regard this policy in South Africa's own interest, especially in view of the existing dangerous world situation.(109)

Malan also insisted on taking his message to the heart of his own Party and electorate. In September 1950, he told the Natal NP congress that republicanism was not irreconcilable with continued friendly relations with Great Britain and with membership of the Commonwealth (110), and repeated this assertion to the Cape congress a month later (111).

The conflict finally came to a head in early 1951. In a long address to a troubled NP caucus in March 1951, Malan attempted to justify his stand on the maintenance of links with Britain and the Commonwealth. He argued that leaving the Commonwealth would mean opting out of a community of friendly nations with joint interests: since it might not be possible to replace Commonwealth membership in any other way, South

108) HAD, 1950, col.4148.

109) Rand Daily Mail, 10/2/51.

110) Rand Daily Mail, 20/9/50.

111) The Star, 4/10/50.

Africa would become increasingly isolated. Furthermore, because events in Africa as a whole affected South Africa deeply, it was advantageous for the government to have some recognised forum in which to express its views, especially its attitude to colour policy (112). Sections of the NP caucus remained unconvinced; at another caucus meeting a week later, Malan was again forced to defend himself against attacks by Strydom and other nationalist MPs. This time, after repeating his previous arguments, Malan also pointed out that an uncompromising republican stance would lead to allegations that the NP was "anti-British", and could cost the Party the 1953 general election (113). Eventually, a three-man committee was appointed to draft a statement acceptable to both Strydom and Malan. In fact, the statement, endorsed by the caucus in April 1951, represented a victory for Malan:

In the light of the London Declaration of 1949, we consider that the proclamation of a Republic and withdrawal from the Commonwealth are two separate questions which need not be answered at the same time, and in regard to the question it should be judged and decided at any definite time according to the relative circumstances and South Africa's interests and situation internationally.(114)

As far as the NP leadership was concerned, the issue was now completely settled. Malan continued to reiterate his viewpoint; in all his speeches - even in his very last address as Party leader to the Transvaal NP congress in September 1954 - he emphasised that South Africa was "living in a dangerous

112) Swart Collection, Vol.2/1/4, "Koukusvergadering 13/3/51".

113) Strydom Collection, Vol.53, pp.99-100, "Koukusvergadering 20/3/51".

114) Strydom Collection, Vol.53, p.80.

time": in the event of war the country needed allies (115). Other leading lights of the Party also weighed in with their contributions. In October 1951, Donges, the Minister of the Interior, told a meeting in King William's Town:

We are a member of the Commonwealth and have no intention of resigning our membership as long as it is in the interests of South Africa to remain. In view of the general international situation, we see no reason for resigning that membership.(116)

Havenga, addressing a gathering in Dundee, agreed with this point of view, adding that the adoption of a republican form of government would not bring any greater freedom: South Africa was now completely sovereign and independent (117). Even Strydom grudgingly conceded, in a speech to a Party meeting in Cape Town, that South Africa must maintain its bonds of friendship with Britain and the United States, provided they were not injurious to South African interests (118). By 1955, Strydom was underlining Malan's general warning about the grave state of the international situation:

...we will continue with our efforts to promote cooperation with the countries and Powers concerned, for on this will depend the continued existence of our country and nation if the disaster of a third world war should hit humanity.(119)

Throughout the mid-1950s, therefore, the NP leadership insisted that membership of the Commonwealth and a possible

- 115) *Rand Daily Mail*, 16/9/54.
- 116) *Rand Daily Mail*, 15/10/51.
- 117) *The Star*, 13/12/51.
- 118) *The Star*, 13/2/51.
- 119) *The Star*, 22/9/55.

future declaration of a republic were two distinct issues and would be tackled separately. Eventually, in 1957, this position was enshrined in the Party's programme of principles (120). Throughout the period in which Malan and Strydom led the NP, Party kingpins also reaffirmed their promises to English-speaking South Africans: the NP would declare a republic only if a "safe majority" of the voters had expressed their support in a "special election"; the NP would always respect the rights, language and traditions of English-speakers; the NP did not want to declare a republic because it was anti-British, but because the Party was convinced it was the only way to promote a positive unity between the various sections of the white population. In his public statements, Malan took particular care not to offend English-speakers (121). Yet Strydom could also not be accused of insensitivity on this issue: even in speeches to staunchly nationalist audiences, he avoided separatist and divisive republican rhetoric (122).

Furthermore, despite his fiery reputation, and his leadership of the caucus revolt in 1951, Strydom was happy to

120) D.W. Kruger, *South African Parties and Policies* (London, Bowes and Bowes, 1960), p.96.

121) See, for example, Malan's speeches in Durban, 1950 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 20/9/50); in the Senate, 1951 (*Senate Debates*, 1951, cols.6578-6616); in Johannesburg, 1952 (*Die Transvaler*, 10/11/52); in Bloemfontein, 1953 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 21/10/53); in Cape Town, 1953 (*Die Burger*, 19/11/53); in Pretoria, 1954 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 16/9/54).

122) See, for example, Strydom's speeches in Zastron, 1950 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 28/7/50); in Pretoria, 1952 (*The Star*, 20/5/52); in Nigel, 1953 (*Die Transvaler*, 30/5/53); in Nylstroom, 1954 (*Rand Daily Mail*, 6/12/54); in Pretoria, 1955 (*The Star*, 22/9/55); in Port Elizabeth, 1957 (*Die Transvaler*, 23/10/57).

join other NP leaders in soothing impatient rumblings from the Party rank-and-file. It was expected that Malan would constantly emphasise the need for "statesmanship", "patience" and a "controlled struggle" (123); it was perhaps not surprising for Donges to suggest that elements in the NP were only delaying the republic with their "outspoken demands" (124). However, Strydom's insistence that the republic would only come about through "gradual action" (125) seemed quite out of character. Yet he repeated this call on a number of occasions. In 1952, for example, at a NP rally in Frankfort in the OFS, he stated that "the people should not be rash, but should wait for an appropriate time to set up a republic" (126). Moreover, when it became evident at the Transvaal NP congresses of 1953 and 1955 that the Transvaal Party faithful were confused about their leader's caution (127), Strydom still refused to approve a rapid and radical republican programme (128). Fortunately for Strydom - and notwithstanding the appearance of splinter groups such as the *Republikeinse Bond* (Republican Association), and occasional demonstrations by frustrated republicans (129) - impatient NP supporters curbed their demands and maintained Party discipline.

In his private dealings with the Broederbond, Strydom proved to be equally circumspect. As we saw in Chapter Two,

123) See, for example, his speech to the OFS NP Congress in Bloemfontein (*Rand Daily Mail*, 21/10/53).

124) *Rand Daily Mail*, 30/5/53.

125) *The Star*, 13/2/50.

126) *Rand Daily Mail*, 13/11/52.

127) *The Star*, 23/9/53; *Cape Argus*, 29/9/55.

128) See, for example, his speech to the Transvaal NP Congress in Pretoria in 1955 (*The Star*, 22/9/55).

129) Strydom Collection, Vol.45, p.298.

Strydom was consistently opposed to the Broederbond initiating public discussion about the republic. Furthermore, in a fascinating commentary on a major Broederbond study document, Strydom was also overtly critical of a number of the Broederbond's republican proposals, especially those that might alarm English-speakers. In particular, he firmly rejected sweeping suggestions that voting rights for whites might be restricted in a future republic, and confirmed his 1951 conversion by rebuffing the document's call for a speedy end to South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth (130). Interestingly enough, apart from a suggestion that the Vierkleur of the old South African republic should be the flag of the new republic, the Broederbond's document did not propose a complete return to the traditions and constitutional forms of Paul Kruger's republic. On the contrary, reflecting changes in nationalist republican rhetoric, the document argued that "account must be taken of the fact that time does not stand still and thus also with the demands of modern life, so that we are not restricted to that which fitted previous centuries but which is now obsolete" (131).

By 1958, Strydom was prepared to gently release his brake on the republican campaign. Both *Die Burger* and *Die Transvaler* began to strengthen their editorials on the subject (132). In addition, in June 1958, *Die Transvaler* published a series of general articles on republican options. Significantly, however, these discussions clearly emphasised

130) Strydom Collection, Vol.154, pp.140-152.

131) *Ibid.*, p.147.

132) See Dawie in *Die Burger*, 29/3/58 and *Die Transvaler*, 9/5/58.

that "a return...to the position which the presidents held in the two Boer republics would...produce large difficulties in practice" (133). Furthermore, in a letter to P.W. Botha in June 1958, Strydom still claimed that "the time was not ripe" for intensive public discussions about the republican constitution (134). In the end, then, it was only after Strydom's death in August 1958 that the republican campaign regained its momentum. In contrast to Strydom, Verwoerd was extremely eager to involve the Broederbond in preparation for the advent of the republic (135). With the SABC broadcasting a series of panel discussions on the subject (136), and the publication of a growing number of exhortatory editorials in nationalist newspapers (137), republican issues were placed firmly back on the agenda.

Yet the intensification of the republican campaign did not imply an abandonment of the ground staked out by Malan a decade earlier. In his first major speech as Prime Minister in the House of Assembly, Verwoerd made this quite clear. First, he put the final seal on the Party's rejection of the 1941 draft constitution. In 1942, Verwoerd himself had written in *Die Transvaler* that the draft could be "taken as an indication of the general direction which the party has already adopted" (138). Now he stated that it was merely something drawn up by

133) Strydom Collection, Vol.159, p.107.

134) Strydom Collection, Vol.54, pp.132-134, Strydom to Botha, 9/6/58.

135) See Chapter Two, p.74.

136) See transcript of one of these programmes in Swart Collection, Vol.3/1/60, and *The Star*, 30/10/58.

137) See, for example, *Die Burger*, 29/11/58.

138) *The Star*, 20/6/51.

a group of young intellectuals as a reflection of their ideas. He had been associated with them and knew of the work they were doing, but the document had never had anything to do with the Party. "I hope we have heard the last of this story," Verwoerd stated (139).

Then, with respect to Commonwealth membership, Verwoerd declared emphatically:

...we stand unequivocally and clearly for the establishment of the republic by the correct methods and at the appropriate time; but...the decision as to whether the republic should be within or outside the Commonwealth will depend on what will be in the best interests of South Africa under the prevailing circumstances. I stand by this standpoint as unequivocally and as firmly as my predecessors.(140)

Furthermore, Verwoerd argued:

We shall remain a valuable ally to the countries of the western world. we shall contribute our strength to its cause. If a struggle with Communism should break out, if a struggle should arise between the East and the West, they know where we stand...Every Prime Minister to date has made this clear.(141)

Verwoerd continued to repeat these assurances during the build-up to the republican referendum and the republican declaration. In January 1960, he told the House of Assembly that it was in the interests of South Africa to remain friends with Britain and the other African countries (142). On 21 March 1960, he stated again that the Commonwealth provided the mechanism for nations to stand together if "some great

- 139) HAD, 1958, cols.4150-4152.
- 140) HAD, 1958, cols.4161-4162.
- 141) HAD, 1958, col.4158.
- 142) HAD, 1960, cols.107-108.

international struggle were to develop against communism", and also benefitted South Africa economically (143). Then, in the public broadcast announcing the referendum, he said that the government had no "hesitation" in asking voters to vote for a republic which would seek to retain its membership of the Commonwealth (144). Even after South Africa's resignation (under threat of expulsion) from the Commonwealth in March 1961, Verwoerd claimed that a republic within the Commonwealth had been his preferred option (145).

In his major policy statements on the republic Verwoerd also clarified any possible misconceptions about the NP's attitude to the British parliamentary tradition. To begin with, the NP was committed to a separation of head of state and head of government:

I think everybody realizes that this country as it is today with a much more heterogeneous population, with greatly increased State activities, with a much bigger and more widely distributed population, cannot simply accept the system of republics of President Steyn and President Kruger, as far as the presidency is concerned. In other words, the system under which the people elect a President, who at the same time is head of the state and head of government, is not suitable in these circumstances for the modern republic which South Africa would want to be.(146)

In addition, Verwoerd argued, the NP saw no reason to dispense with a parliamentary form of government; it would not be necessary to make "radical changes" to the parliamentary

143) HAD, 1960, col.3778.

144) A.N.Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks* (Johannesburg, APB Publishers, 1966), p.408.

145) *Ibid.*, p.514.

146) HAD, 1960, col.101. T.E.Donges, leader of the Cape NP, also strongly advocated this position, and it was endorsed by almost all the speakers on the SABC's panel discussions. See *The Star*, 30/10/58.

institutions or constitutional practices of the country (147).

Verwoerd's speeches and statements during this period also reflected a more general trend in Afrikaner thinking which became more marked and overt as the 1950s drew to a close. Hand-in-hand with the depiction of South Africa as the natural ally and friend of Britain and the Western nations, notwithstanding disagreements over the government's apartheid policy (148), went a curious redefinition of the nature and history of colonialism. No longer was it axiomatic to South African history that the Afrikaner nation, a People of Africa, had been continually oppressed and persecuted by foreign colonialists, and like other oppressed peoples had been forced to fight for liberation and self-determination. On the contrary, now it became evident that Afrikaners had willingly participated, despite their often violent differences with the British, in the great colonial mission to bring white civilisation to Africa. For Verwoerd the issue was quite clear:

The white man brought civilisation to this country and everything that the Bantu is inheriting today with us, was created by the knowledge and diligence of the White man...If we had not been here or cared for them throughout hundreds of years, they would have perished of

147) HAD, 1960, col.106.

148) It is worth noting here that, in February 1960, British Prime Minister MacMillan delivered his famous "Winds of Change" speech, in which he clearly expressed misgivings about the NP's apartheid policy. A month later, in an address to the House of Assembly, Verwoerd stated bluntly: "If one has in mind protection in connection with the greatest problems, the greatest difficulties, that we face and may face because of our colour problem in this country, then it must be clear that the Commonwealth cannot help us much in that sphere. Britain could not give us protection if we had to resist armed attacks upon us from outside with regard to these matters." (HAD, 1960, cols.3777-3778)

hunger or murdered one another, and might not have been in existence today.(149)

Unfortunately, it was a sad fact that Africans were ungrateful for all that had been done them:

Whoever brought civilisation here, whoever saved the people from mutual extinction, whoever provided shelter and food to greater masses than the country could carry previously goes unthanked for the life, for the prosperity, for the knowledge, and for the Divine Enrichment of primitive minds.(150)

Furthermore, the role of the white man in the world was not receiving sufficient attention:

It appears that a world psychosis has arisen of thinking only of the rights and privileges and freedoms of the non-whites, whilst in fact the white man is responsible for everything the black man has in the way of ideals, ambitions and opportunities.(151)

Despite the increasing willingness of the colonial powers to make concessions to the emerging black nations, Verwoerd and the NP refused to appease, or abdicate to, this "flood of colour" (152). He and his followers would not become "hands-uppers" (153):

We shall remain the outpost of western civilisation in the possible struggle between East and West; we shall still remain the outpost on the southern tip of Africa, *inter alia*, for spreading civilisation through the rest of Africa.(154)

With Verwoerd's accession to the Party leadership, the

149) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.377.

150) *Ibid.*, pp.208-209.

151) *HAD*, 1960, col.3013.

152) *HAD*, 1960, col.3022.

153) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.281.

154) *HAD*, 1958, col.4158.

NP's republicanism also became broader and more inclusive. Not only did Verwoerd continue to repeat the mandatory reassurances about the rights of English-speakers (155), he also began, albeit halfheartedly, to eulogise the role of the English in South African history, and open the doors of the NP, chink by chink, to conservative English-speakers. His Union Day speech on 31 May 1959, for example, was almost exclusively concerned with cooperation between English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers (156), while, in Bloemfontein in October 1959, he stated that he "would like to acknowledge the part played by the English-speaking population, the constructive role they played and the courage they displayed" (157). Then, at a huge republican rally at Meyerton in March 1960, Verwoerd appealed to both English and Afrikaans to forget their historical grievances:

...besides history there is the present which passes quickly away, and then there is the future. Each generation must work for the future. In that future we see the revolution of Africa and the growing problems of South Africa. For the sake of that future we must stand together as whites. We, both English and Afrikaans-speaking people who believe in a certain colour policy, wish to work together in this direction.(158)

The establishment of the republic was therefore essential to the solution of the country's "colour problem"; "not because the republic will have another policy concerning it, but because the unnatural way that people are kept apart who

155) See his maiden speech as Prime Minister in the House of Assembly in 1958 (HAD, 1958, cols.4143-4173), and his reply to the parliamentary No Confidence motion in 1960 (HAD, 1960, cols.97-109).

156) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.298.

157) *Ibid.*, p.300.

158) *Ibid.*, p.381.

actually approve the same policy, will disappear" (159).

Verwoerd returned to this theme again and again. In July 1960, in a private letter to an English-speaking supporter, he wrote:

...the world and African situation is such that the white men of South Africa must stand together as one nation in future.(160)

At the Union Jubilee in Bloemfontein in May 1960, he stated that, once the constitutional issue had been settled, he was sure English and Afrikaans-speakers would find themselves in greater agreement on "matters of racial and economic policy" (161). Then, at the NP's Union Congress on the republic in August, he announced that he was proud of the English supporters of the NP: their "chance" would come once the republic had been declared (162). In October 1960, immediately after the republican referendum, he called on those who subscribed to "the conservative as opposed to the liberalistic approach" to get together (163). Finally, in his New Year message to the country at the end of 1960, Verwoerd appealed to English-speakers to join the NP "openly and in greater numbers" and provide suitable candidates for cabinet rank (164).

Verwoerd's acceleration of the republican programme took the sting out of any accusations of over-caution by the

159) *Ibid.*, p.384.

160) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.276, Verwoerd to E.A. Bartel, 22/7/60.

161) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.403.

162) *Cape Times*, 30/8/60.

163) Pelzer, *Verwoerd Speaks*, p.411.

164) *Ibid.*, p.430.

nationalist rank-and-file. Any other open criticisms of the government's position were defused by Verwoerd's clear acknowledgement that he was aware of the compromises that the Afrikaner people were being asked to make, but that compromise was necessary to attain the republican ideal (165). Certainly, deep reservations with the government's stand were not evident amongst the huge numbers of Afrikaners who applauded Verwoerd and his compatriots at republican rallies, donated generously to republican campaign funds, and, in the end, voted victoriously in the referendum. Yet, ironically, the establishment of the republic they so staunchly supported was accompanied by a recognition of principles which had been widely opposed less than twenty years before. Not only were British parliamentary traditions now sacred (for the time being at least), but, in Verwoerd's words, which could only have been uttered openly by proponents of Herzog's two-stream nationalism two decades previously:

The English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking sections have become like the bride and bridegroom to enter upon a new life in love to create together and live together as life-mates. (166)

165) *Ibid.*, p.436.

166) *Ibid.*, p.427. It would be an interesting exercise to carefully trace changes in the nationalist definitions of the terms race and nation. It is worth noting, though, that, as late as 1949, there still seemed to be confusion as to whether English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers belonged to "two white races" (*HAD*, 1949, col.5607), or whether they constituted a single white race. Similarly, nation seems to have been interchangeably used to refer to either the Afrikaner volk or the broader South African nation, or both. By 1960, however, the rhetoric had become less confused. English and Afrikaans both belonged to the dominant white race and were members of a South African nation.

VI

From the above account, it could be construed that the twin strands of Christian-Nationalist ideology had diverged considerably by 1961. On the one hand, Christian-Nationalist culture, and particularly Christian-Nationalist education, still promoted a strong and rigid Afrikaner exclusivity. On the other hand, Afrikaner republicanism now argued for a political solution which would include English-speaking South Africans, supposedly on equal terms, and which was certainly not intended to re-enact the traditions and institutions of the old Boer republics. Is it possible to find an explanation which will reconcile these superficially contradictory tendencies?

It seems appropriate, firstly, to attempt to understand changes in republican ideology in terms of a broader political and economic context. A good point of departure would be to note the rapid acceleration of certain trends in the South African political economy during the Second World War. The massive expansion of South African manufacturing caused by wartime demand, and the patent inability of the African reserves to provide even a semblance of subsistence for the majority of rural inhabitants, stimulated a huge influx of Africans into the urban areas. By the late 1940s, the increasing militancy of the African working class, and the emergence of a more radical and politically sophisticated leadership in organisations such as the ANC, clearly indicated the need for new forms of control by the white minority. The NP government's attempted solution, after 1948, was a broad

assault on the rights and living standards of the black population. Yet state strategies were resisted in various ways, formally and informally, at every step. It is against this background of political and economic struggle that the whole question of republicanism needs to be viewed: the constant assurances by the NP to English-speaking South Africans after 1948, and the call for the "upholders" of "white civilisation" to unite in the republic, were clear responses to the rumblings of an increasingly impatient black majority. The lesson was obvious: privilege and power could only be maintained if whites attempted to bury their differences. Or, stating it another way, the age-old grudges held against each other by the two sections of the white population, were minor in comparison to the threat posed to white privilege as a whole by growing black resistance.

The NP leadership's uneasiness about the "flood of colour" in South Africa was exacerbated by the explosion of nationalism in the rest of Africa. Colony after colony set off on the road to independence, with a stark and emphatic rejection of the oppression and paternalism of white colonialists and settlers. Even though their history emphasised the suffering wrought by foreign colonial powers, it would have been unthinkable for nationalist Afrikaners - despite their claim to understand and sympathise with black nationalists - to actually side with the African liberation movements, and preach the demise of their own privilege and power. A rejection of colonial oppression was soon transformed into a glorification of colonial civilisation.

The anti-communist element of the new republicanism also had its internal and external aspect. The NP government's attempts to fight the "communism" gaining a foothold amongst newly proletarianised urban Africans, and its constant battle against "foreign" influences in its own Afrikaner working class, were complemented by the generalised Cold War climate of the late 1940s and 1950s. Any effort to isolate the country - and to remove it from initially friendly support systems such as the Commonwealth - would have seemed foolish given the perceived threat to the alliance of Western nations. Neutralism was no longer on the agenda: it was right and proper to actively support "friends" such as Britain and the USA in their battle against the Soviet "danger".

Developments within the Afrikaner community itself also played a vital role in reshaping republicanism between 1940 and 1960. Most important was the shift in the political balance of South Africa, speaking purely in terms of white politics, after 1948. With access to state power and political patronage at its disposal, the nationalist alliance soon began to make inroads into the kinds of inequalities that had motivated an exclusivist republicanism in the first place. By the late 1950s, after nearly a decade of furious and concerted consolidation of their hold on power, the factions of the nationalist alliance were far more interested in the maintenance and strengthening of the existing state structures and social relations than in a dramatic reconstruction along the lines of the isolated Boer republics. As we saw earlier (167), Afrikaner workers were guaranteed preferential

167) See Chapter Three.

employment, remuneration and benefits by direct state intervention. White-collar workers flooded into jobs in burgeoning state bureaucracies and parastatal corporations. Many budding capitalists in the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, with the weight of government legislation and patronage behind them, were poised on the threshold of prosperity. And Afrikaner agricultural and financial capitalists had not only benefitted hugely from massive government subsidies and plum contracts, but had a direct economic interest in maintaining close links with Britain and other members of the Commonwealth (168). In a more general sense, too, the rapid growth in the number of better educated, urbanised Afrikaners, and their increasing exposure to modern international capitalist culture, began to encourage lifestyles and interests more congruent with those of English-speaking South Africans, even though the material and cultural gap between English-speakers and Afrikaners still remained wide.

Nevertheless, it is insufficient to merely treat the changing republicanism of the 1950s as an essentially reactive and defensive, if not passive, response to a set of altered political and economic circumstances; in particular, to the intensification of black resistance and protest, at a time when the nationalist alliance's hold on power was rather fragile. Rather, the republicanism of the 1950s also contained a very active and aggressive dimension. For, as is clearly

168) 60 percent of South Africa's exports in 1958 went to Commonwealth countries (F.F.Winkle, "Changes in the Union's Merchandise Exports 1938-1958" in *Finance and Trade Review*, 4, 1, March 1960, p.12).

evident in the imposition of apartheid legislation, in grappling with the testing political climate of the decade, Afrikaner nationalist leaders were absolutely determined that their conservative, anti-humanist and anti-liberal (although not anti-capitalist) "solution" would underpin the white minority's overall response to its predicament. To ensure this, it was necessary for the nationalist alliance to consolidate and unite the vast majority of Afrikaners behind its ideological and political programme, while at the same time attempting to fracture the English-speaking liberal community and delegitimize its Euro-centric, liberal and humanist ideological assumptions. As a Broederbond circular of the early 1960s stated:

We must do everything in our power to persuade English-speaking people to cooperate with us on the basis of the principles of the NP. We should constantly be on our guard that this does not result in the Afrikaner becoming more anglicised in the way that the English-speaking person is being Afrikanerised. It is not they who must assimilate us into their circle, but we who must assimilate them into our circles.(169)

The declaration of the republic was a vital component in this double-edged process. On the one hand, the republic, still a resonant and powerful symbol, was guaranteed to enjoy the active and united support of most Afrikaners. At the same time, by severing the link between South Africa and the British Crown, the republican declaration was also intended to destroy the relationship between English-speaking South Africans and one of the last concrete symbols of their unity and their connection with liberal and humanist Western

169) *Rand Daily Mail*, 22/11/63.

European traditions. Viewed from this point of view, the republican campaign of 1960 was a rather calculated risk on the part of Verwoerd and the nationalist leadership, because a lost referendum would have had serious repercussions for the nationalist alliance's ideological and political objectives. In fact, Verwoerd was only able to intensify the republican campaign precisely because of the conscious and rigorous effort by nationalist organisations to disseminate and inculcate Christian-Nationalist tenets, particularly through CNE. The active "Afrikanerisation" of culture and education consolidated the ideological foundations of the nationalist alliance to such an extent that it gave the NP a solid base from which to proceed with the republican programme.

Yet the fact remains that the republicanism of 1961 was very different from that of 1941, even while other facets of Christian-Nationalism retained their original content and logic. The lessons that can be learned are therefore twofold. Firstly, it is inadequate to treat nationalist ideology as an eternal, cohesive and frozen set of symbols. Secondly, however, it is also misleading to view Afrikaner nationalist ideology as an unproblematical reflection of changes in the material conditions of the time. Certainly it is true that shifts in republican ideology occurred as the class factions of the nationalist alliance actively grappled with the general economic and political processes of post-war South Africa. Nevertheless, in attempting to make sense of the world around them - and to mould it in terms of what they perceived as their own economic and political interests - members of the

nationalist alliance were limited by the more than these general processes, trends and struggles: they were also directly influenced by the ever-present legacy of a world view, a set of perceptions and a history which had developed in order to understand and shape earlier processes and struggles. The Christian-Nationalism of the 1950s was therefore, like all ideologies, a compound - an often uneasy and contradictory compound - of old answers interacting with new imperatives, in a dynamic web of symbols and talismans that still managed to strike a deep emotional chord with many Afrikaners. Yet, although the network of Afrikaner cultural organisations continued to strain the experiences of a new and changed society through the filter of old answers, in the process - a slow and painful process - the structure of the filter itself was altered. Thus, by 1961, even though most Afrikaners still passionately wanted a republic, a testament to the strength and resonance of ideology, it was a different republic from the one they had equally passionately demanded twenty years before.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

I

Any examination of Afrikaner nationalism can quickly become trapped within the confines of white South African electoral politics. After many hours immersed in Hansard speeches, or political reports in *Die Burger* and *Die Transvaler* - and at the point when broader perspectives begin to fade into the distant background - it is all too easy to believe the recurring myths of the 1950s. Yet so many of these notions need to be challenged, or at least contextualised: the belief that Verwoerd, with the shadowy figure of Eiselen at his right shoulder, was the omnipotent "architect" of a consistent apartheid plan; the tendency to explain South African politics purely in terms of the machinations of a Broederbond elite, or an Afrikaner ethnic "tribe"; and the obsession with parliamentary and electoral clashes between the NP and the UP.

What, then, are the foundations of a more general, more complex, explanation of the period between 1948 and 1961? As the introduction to this thesis pointed out, the primary method employed by a number of revisionist scholars over the past fifteen years has been to emphasise the class struggles concomitant with the development of capitalism in South Africa. In the view of such revisionists, therefore, Afrikaner nationalist politics, and apartheid policy, can only be understood when related to the processes of capitalist accumulation. Many recent studies, including this thesis, owe a huge debt to the revisionism of the 1970s: its new perspective encouraged a reappraisal of all aspects of South

African history, and generated the conceptual categories which this study has utilised, and sought to refine.

Arising out of this process of refinement, it emerges that while apartheid was certainly not an irrational invention by the ideologists of a homogenous Afrikaner ethnic group, nor was NP government policy during the 1950s directly and wholly determined by the immediate exigencies of capital accumulation and the economic needs of the capitalist class. Stripped to its bare bones - and notwithstanding protestations to the contrary - such an economically reductionist version of historical materialism essentially views the state as nothing more than a mere instrument of capital. Moreover, since state policy is seen to automatically flow from contradictions in an economic "base", apartheid is then regarded as the only logically possible response by capitalist forces to the struggles sparked off by a particular phase of economic development (1).

The shortcomings of this position can be demonstrated with a few simple questions. How, for example, does one explain the fact that Harry Oppenheimer and other leading English-speaking capitalists were consistently opposed to most apartheid measures, and envisaged other solutions? Or, more importantly, how was it possible that, by 1960, the wealthiest Afrikaner capitalists in the Sanlam and Rembrandt corporations were at odds with the NP hierarchy over certain apartheid

1) See D. Posel, "Rethinking the 'Race-Class Debate' in South African Historiography" in *Social Dynamics*, 9, 1, 1983.

provisions, and, as O'Meara himself suggests, led the faction in the Cape NP which became "virtually an official opposition within the NP" (2) ? Clearly, a significant proportion of South Africa's industrial and financial capitalists could have happily adjusted to a (relatively) different set of state strategies. Indeed, it cannot even be argued that, by the late 1950s, Afrikaner agricultural capital was the dominant influence on apartheid policy. Although Afrikaner farmers remained powerful, the most assertive and effective constituent of the nationalist alliance was the large Afrikaner intelligentsia and professional stratum, spearheaded by the Broederbond.

It is incorrect to suggest, on the other hand, that the NP government was unsympathetic to capitalist demands. As this work has demonstrated, the growth of Sanlam and Rembrandt during the 1950s was spectacular, while wealthy farmers also received huge government support in their bid to transform agriculture into a lucrative business. More generally, too, it should be remembered that the NP government was always completely committed to capitalist forms of economic organisation and production, and remained very conscious of the state's responsibility to regulate and promote economic growth. Notwithstanding the bottlenecks and shortages caused by the tortuous workings of state bureaucracies and the ultimately distorting effects of the employment colour bar

2) D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.251.

(3), apartheid was never intended to jeopardise the labour supply of any sector of industry (4). Furthermore, although many capitalists were critical of the NP's colour policy, the government's relaxed attitude to monopolies, and its fiscal, taxation and tariff protection policies, fell well within the accepted norms of the captains of commerce and industry (5).

Given these conclusions, it is important to reformulate the reductionist account of the relationship between apartheid and capitalist development. It seems much more useful to regard racial policy during the 1950s as having both positive and negative effects on economic growth (6). Reverting to traditional historical materialist nomenclature, this immediately implies a loosening of the strict bonds - the causal links - tying the "superstructural" spheres of politics and ideology to changes in some economic "base". Indeed, a completely rigid and predetermined methodological framework can only result in the massaging of empirical material, and a failure to appreciate the unique complexities of each

3) By the mid-1950s, even members of the AHI acknowledged a growing shortage of skilled labour. Rather than suggesting a relaxation of the employment colour bar, however, they called for greater white immigration, and improved technical training for white workers. See, for example, *Volkshandel*, 16, 10, December 1955, pp.12-13.

4) For a full discussion of the design of the NP government's influx control policy, and its effect on the labour supply of manufacturing and commerce, see D. Posel, "Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid, 1948-1961" (D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1987). See also M. Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid* (Aldershot, Gower Publishing, 1985), especially chapters 2, 5, and 6.

5) See, for example, the annual surveys of business by Assocom.

6) Recent work by both revisionist and liberal scholars makes this point. See, for example, Posel, "Rethinking the Race-Class Debate", pp.62-63, and Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid*, p.251.

historical period. Primary questions about the nature and direction of class struggle and capital accumulation fundamentally affect the thrust and limits of the process of inquiry, but many other questions then need to be asked, and answered, before a complete picture emerges. In other words, state policy after 1948 - as well as general trends in Afrikaner nationalist politics - can only be fully understood when the complexity and the impact of political and ideological variables are acknowledged (7).

Most significantly, the fact that the economic exploitation and political oppression of black South Africans have always been inextricably connected does not obviate the importance of examining the political struggle which accompanied the nationalist alliance's bid to strengthen white supremacy. The rapid influx of Africans into the urban areas during the 1940s caused much more than a severe shortage of labour for Afrikaner farmers: the political implications of uncontrolled squatting and urban unemployment, at a time when a new militancy was transforming the ANC, constantly exercised the minds of NP strategists. While early apartheid measures were partly designed to distribute African labour more equally between the various sectors of the economy, the nationalist alliance was just as concerned about what it perceived to be a renewed general threat to white supremacy. The Bantu Authorities Act was not the only piece of legislation devised

7) This thesis has been influenced by Saul Dubow's account of the ideological and political influences on segregation policy. See S. Dubow, "Segregation and "Native Administration" in South Africa, 1920-1936" (D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1986).

to control and deflect black political aspirations; the site-and-service approach to housing, the careful planning of buffer zones and single entrances for new African townships, the elimination of "locations in the sky", and the removal of the inhabitants of "slums" such as Sophiatown, were just some of the measures intended to ensure that the urban areas did not become "a fruitful breeding ground for unrest" (8). It is not a matter for dispute that one of the long-term aims of the NP, in bolstering white supremacy, was to guarantee political conditions conducive to the growth of a capitalist economy. It is important to recognise, however, that state policy was profoundly influenced - at a level distinct from the purely economic - by the increasing militancy of a resistance movement which grappled with the political oppression of all blacks, as well as the economic exploitation of the African working class.

The resurgence of political consciousness amongst South African blacks accorded with post-war trends in the Third World. Appealing to the human rights enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, burgeoning nationalist movements all over Africa and Asia began to reject the legitimacy of colonial administrations, and demand immediate political independence. NP leaders were always keenly aware of these developments, noting with trepidation that, although white Afrikaners intended to remain in Africa, they could "assume the permanence of the European

8) UG 61/1951, *Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1949-50*, p.I.

areas of influence" in the rest of Africa, "only where the degree of European settlement would be sufficient in the event of the withdrawal of the administering power, to maintain and protect local European interests" (9).

As the 1950s drew to a close, and the rate of decolonisation accelerated, the impact of African nationalism on NP thinking became more pronounced. In their less guarded moments, NP supporters talked of the triumph of "non-white heathenism" (10). Verwoerd claimed that it was only because the colonial powers wished to compete with Communism, and "get the so-called uncommitted states to stand on their side", that political independence was being granted to African countries (11). According to the leaders of the NGK, the West wanted "to overbid the East for the favour of the non-whites of Africa with the ideological slogan of self-determination" (12). And Afrikaner ideologists N.J. Rhodie and H.J. Venter argued that the whites of South Africa had always "given ample indication of their loyalty to the West"; if white South Africa was prevented from continuing her existence as a "separate national segment", then the West ran the danger "of losing the proverbial half of the egg so that it can remain sitting on the empty shell" (13).

9) Address by I.F.A. de Villiers of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Native Affairs (*Bantu*, 1954, 8, p.23).

10) *Die Kerkbode*, 85, 8, 24/2/60, p.295.

11) *HAD*, 1960, col.3015.

12) Van Wyk Collection, Vol.3Cd, Statement issued by leaders of the NGK on the riots in South Africa, March 1960, p.1. See also report on violence in the Congo in *Dutch Reformed Church Monthly Newsletter*, 34, September 1960.

13) N.J. Rhodie and H.J. Venter, *Apartheid: A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea* (Cape Town, HAUM, 1959), p.199.

Yet NP leaders also heeded the language and strategies of decolonisation. It was "a mistaken impression", Rhodie and Venter acknowledged, to assume that black nationalism was a dynamic force which was found "only north of the Limpopo River" (14). If an Afrikaner was justified in being a nationalist, they asked magnanimously, "why should the Bantu not be in the same position" (15)? In the space of a few years, amidst a flood of references to "self-determination" and "Commonwealths" - and despite much confusion as to the exact number of African "nations" in South Africa - state policy incorporated the notion of the political "independence" of apartheid's "Bantu authorities".

Another political factor at work after 1948 was the electoral standing of the NP. Although the 1948 election was hailed as an overwhelming victory by NP supporters, the nationalist alliance's hold on power was extremely vulnerable. Indeed, the 1960 republican referendum was the first occasion that the majority of white South Africans voted for the NP government. In the first five years of nationalist rule, particularly, state policy was directly affected by the NP's need to consolidate its position. In many cases, the immediate short-term demands of nationalist supporters received priority over all else, as NP leaders strove to ensure the cohesion of the cross-class alliance which had voted them into power.

The primary ideological influence on the direction of the NP's racial policy was the powerful Christian-Nationalism

14) *Ibid.*, p.247.

15) *Ibid.*, p.254.

which had developed during the 1930s. Early Christian-Nationalism was tinged with a deep suspicion of humanism and liberalism, because their anthropocentric emphasis precluded a recognition of the absolute sovereignty of God. Relying on an incomplete interpretation of theologians and philosophers such as Kuyper and Fichte, Christian-Nationalist ideologists completely rejected any notions of a universal brotherhood of man. On the contrary, they argued, the differences between nations and races were natural and pre-ordained, and must be reinforced. The resonance of Christian-Nationalism cannot be under-estimated. For all that apartheid policy evolved in response to the events and trends of the 1940s and 1950s, it also took on board the ideological legacy of earlier Christian-Nationalism. The rigidly authoritarian style of nationalist government - and its determination to rid state policy of anything which smacked of "liberalism" - followed directly from the original tenets of Christian-Nationalism. Similarly, the deep-seated racism which permeated so many state strategies had been a bulwark of Afrikaner nationalist ideology for decades.

As this study has demonstrated, the Christian-Nationalist obsessions with republicanism, and Afrikaner language and culture, also survived into the 1950s, albeit in changed form. By the late 1940s, however, many Afrikaner intellectuals had shifted their attention from cultural and republican questions to the future and justification of racial separation. The economic integration of Africans - and its effect on a policy of political and

social separation - was loudly debated in Sabra, the Broederbond and the Afrikaner churches. Complete territorial apartheid became the watchword of many Afrikaner intellectuals. Simultaneously, in a conflict which eventually contributed towards serious divisions in the DRC, Afrikaner churchmen argued about the existence of biblical justifications for apartheid. Predictably, dissidents in Sabra and the Afrikaner churches never penetrated the central policy-making circles of the NP; nonetheless, it would be short-sighted to contend that NP policy was wholly unaffected by these splits. Much of the ideological edifice, vindication and thrust of apartheid policy arose out of the conflicts between Sabra and church dissidents, and other members of the nationalist alliance.

In conclusion, therefore, the categories of a theoretical method should help the scholar to rank and organise empirical information, and to ask those questions which will reveal the object of study as a "rich totality of many determinations and relationships", rather than "a chaotic conception of a whole" (16). However, such categories cannot be regarded as definitive answers, which empirical research merely underlines. If, as historical materialism argues, capital accumulation is the "general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity" (17), then it is necessary to carefully establish the tone and intensity of all the "colours" and

16) K. Marx, *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, translated by M. Nicolaus), p.100.

17) *Ibid.*, p.107.

categories in the field of study before a complete and subtle picture can be constructed.

II

It is striking that almost all the trends and conflicts described in the separate chapters of this thesis seem to have come to a head between 1958 and 1961. If it is legitimate to characterise certain phases of South African history as especially formative watersheds, then the period immediately preceding and following the Sharpeville shootings of March 1960 must qualify as a turning-point. Yet, the upheavals of 1958-61 do not seem to have coincided with a pronounced economic depression. While the South African economy slowed down considerably during 1958 (18), it experienced a distinct revival during the second half of 1959 (19). Going into 1960, the traditional economic indicators - such as GDP growth rate - were no worse than at any time during the 1950s.

Of course, such indicators are not designed to reflect

18) Decreases in the export prices of wool and maize, the deleterious effect of unfavourable weather conditions on crop production, a diminution in the rate of expansion of gold mining, and a rapid increase in the number of imports all contributed to a significant decrease in the growth rate. The Reserve Bank and government were forced, in the second half of 1958, to apply monetary measures in order to avert a serious balance of payments deficit. See M. van den Berg and G.J. Hupkes, *A Survey of Contemporary Economic Conditions and Prospects for 1959* (Stellenbosch, Bureau for Economic Research, November 1958), p.9.

19) Higher prices for wool and other primary exports, and an increase of R60-million in gold output, contributed to this revival. See M.H. de Kock, *Address to Volkscas stockholders, 10/8/60, in Finance and Trade Review, 4, 3, September 1960, p.172.*

the effects of the NP's sustained assault on the black population. A consistent economic growth rate did nothing for the millions of black South Africans who continued to live in extreme poverty, amidst the tangled web of NP controls. By the late 1950s, far from eliminating black resistance, the deprivation and repression caused by apartheid legislation continued to trigger widespread black resistance. Furthermore, it became clear that crucial aspects of state policy were simply not working. Despite the government's oft-stated determination to slowly reduce the "reservoirs" of labour in the cities - through preferential employment for urban workers and stricter influx control - in practice many urban employers circumvented the labour bureaux and recruited migrant workers from the rural areas (20). Between 1951 and 1960, the size of South Africa's African population grew by approximately 28 percent. In the same period the African populations of Johannesburg, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth, to take just four examples, increased by 32 percent, 38 percent, 66 percent and 65 percent respectively, while the total African population of the fourteen main metropolitan areas (21) rose by more than 40 percent. By 1960, nearly a third of the country's African population was resident in the officially classified "urban areas" (22). A private memorandum

20) See D. Posel, "Doing Business With The Pass Laws: Influx Control Policy and the Interests of Manufacturing and Commerce in Sout Africa in the 1950s" (mimeo), ICS seminar paper, London University, 1986.

21) Cape Peninsula, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, Kimberley, East London, Durban-Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg, East Rand, West Rand, Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, OFS Goldfields, and Sasolburg.

22) Statistics derived from Bureau of Statistics, *Urban and Rural Population of South Africa*, Report No. 02-02-01, 1968.

circulated in the Department of Native Affairs in 1957 admitted that it was "impossible" to build sufficient housing for the Africans who continued to stream into the main industrial areas (23). Eiselen's claim that Africans were irresistibly attracted to the "city lights" because they loved "the rhythm of the machine", and preferred the monotony of "repetitive work" (24), could not mask the complete inability of the reserves to support even a small proportion of the African population, despite grand talk of homeland development.

The deepening conflicts within the nationalist alliance reflected this increase of pressure in the society as a whole. By 1958, after years of couching their criticisms of government policy in relatively euphemistic terms, Sabra's "visionaries" began to openly dispute the NP leadership's version of apartheid; after its 1958 congress, Sabra was irremediably split into pro-Verwoerd and anti-Verwoerd factions. Similarly, as it became clear that apartheid had failed to solve South Africa's problems in one swift and radical stroke, debates in the DRC shifted into a higher gear, with troubled Afrikaner theologians coalescing into a more identifiable group. The shootings at Sharpeville and Langa starkly emphasised the divisions amongst Afrikaner intellectuals and churchmen, and also accelerated the spread of ideological doubt in the NP itself, especially in the Cape.

23) Verwoerd Collection, Vol.607, Memorandum on "Die Naturellebehuisingsprobleem", 26/2/57, p.3.

24) Bantu, 1957, 12, p.9. This quote raises doubts about Moodie's claim in *The Rise of Afrikanerdom* (p.273) that Eiselen was "never a racist".

Continuing dissatisfaction with the NP leadership's treatment of the Coloured population was coupled with a newer concern about the status of urban Africans. Uncertainty in Cape nationalist circles was compounded by the rapid economic growth of the Afrikaner corporations Sanlam and Rembrandt: by 1960, economic expansion outside the enclosing walls of the Afrikaner nationalist movement had become a very real possibility for Sanlam and Rembrandt directors.

The escalation of political conflict between 1958 and 1960, both in Afrikaner nationalist ranks and in the South African political economy as a whole, inevitably shifted the political and ideological direction of the nationalist alliance. The first moment in this process of realignment occurred when Verwoerd was elected as leader of the NP ahead of two more senior colleagues. Within a year, the Broederbond, which had been held at arm's length by Strydom, emerged from the shadows as Verwoerd's informal political caucus. The NP, a political party which had always been hierarchical, but had also always encouraged active grassroots participation, was transformed into a far more authoritarian institution, under the sway of Verwoerd's tight-knit network. At the same time, Verwoerd began to exercise greater control over the actions and decisions of all the ministers in his cabinet; his own personal bureaucratic empire in the Department of Native Affairs - manned by members of the rapidly-expanding and politically aggressive Afrikaner intellectual and professional strata - divided and grew. An organised campaign against dissident intellectuals and churchmen culminated in a vigorous witchhunt following the Cottesloe church consultation and the

postponement of the 1961 Sabra conference.

Significant changes in policy accompanied the devolution of power to Verwoerd and his Broederbond cohorts. Trusting that a decade of Christian-Nationalist indoctrination had prepared the ground for them, Verwoerd and the Broederbond risked a revitalisation of the republican campaign, in a form which played down the anti-British, anti-imperialist legacy of the old Boer republics, and emphasised the importance of all whites uniting in defence of their supremacy. The version of apartheid policy which had been implemented since 1950 was also placed under the spotlight and adapted to the changing political circumstances. First, the concept of "homeland independence" was hurriedly incorporated into new legislation. This measure was not only intended to channel, deflect and fragment black political demands; it also paved the way for the second aspect of post-1959 apartheid: a renewed onslaught on the already tenuous status of those blacks in the "white" urban areas.

An equally important change in strategy, of course, was indicated by the government's decision to smash popular opposition. The era of peaceful mass resistance to apartheid was forcibly brought to a close with the banning of the ANC and the PAC, and the uncompromising reaction to the national stay-at-home of May 1961. Moreover, the lifting of the 1960 state of emergency did not signal a gradual cessation of the government's attack on popular protest. Significantly, the government permanently entrenched many of the extraordinary powers extended to the security forces in terms

of the emergency: over the course of the next few years, under the supervision of Minister of Justice John Vorster, a number of draconian measures, including the legalisation of protracted detention without trial, were pushed through parliament. The ANC and PAC, in response, decided that they had no choice but to initiate armed struggle.

The political upheavals of the period between late 1958 and 1961, and the concerted effort by Verwoerd and his followers to regain their authority over the course of events, thus marked the beginning of a new phase of South African history. For just as the Sharpeville shooting and its aftermath altered the course of black resistance, so too was the direction of white politics - and, more specifically, Afrikaner nationalist politics - radically affected.

III

Finally, some brief comments about the post-1961 period should be made. How one defines the end of the "post-1961 period" depends, of course, on the perspective of one's research. A general history of South Africa, or a history of popular opposition, would perhaps pinpoint 1973-1976 as the next transitional phase, since it was during these years that a resurgence in black resistance occurred. A more limited history of Afrikaner nationalist politics, on the other hand, would possibly regard the formation of Albert Hertzog's *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (Reconstituted National Party; HNP) in 1969 as a convenient marker.

The way in which one decides to periodise a post-1961

account does not alter the fact that the 1960s witnessed the implementation of an extremely intransigent version of apartheid. Throughout the decade, the government vehemently rejected the notion that any Africans were permanently settled in the white urban areas. Even those who felt that they had attained permanent status in terms of Section 10 (1) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act - either because they had lived continuously in a "prescribed area" since birth, or because they had worked for one employer for ten years, or more than one employer for fifteen years - found their position eroded. In terms of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, Africans with Section 10 (1) rights could be forced to leave a prescribed urban area if a labour bureau refused them registration or cancelled their contracts of service. The grounds for judging who was "idle" or "undesirable" were also widened to include those who qualified under Section 10 (1). In 1968, the Bantu Labour Regulations ordinance R74 finally ensured that no more rural Africans would be able to win permanent urban status by working in the urban areas for extended periods: henceforth, all men and women recruited in an African reserve or homeland were required to return home once a year to register with their local labour bureaux. At the same time, through legislation such as the 1967 Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act, the government tried to accelerate the decentralisation of manufacturing industry to the homeland border areas (25). In addition, large

25) Details of legislation derived from M. Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa 1948-1976* (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1978).

numbers of people were removed from "black spots" in the "white" areas, and forced to settle in the bantustans.

Even so, the apartheid of the 1960s was certainly not the complete separation envisaged by some Afrikaner intellectuals during the 1950s. The government flatly refused, for example, to grant additional land to the fragmented homelands; a measure which had been regarded by the Tomlinson Commission as essential. By 1966, in the Cape alone, 722,189 morgen of the "quota" land designated for the reserves in terms of the 1936 Land Act - out of a total of 1,616,000 morgen - was still to be purchased (26). The record of the government's Bantu Investment Corporation would also not have impressed those proponents of total separation who had supported Tomlinson's call for a far more powerful, and wealthy, "development corporation". Between 1960 and 1966, only 35 new industries, employing just 945 Africans, were established with government assistance in the reserves; the Bantu Investment Corporation invested a paltry R1,100,000 in these industries (27). In the same period, the Bantu Investment Corporation awarded just R2,647,126 worth of loans to African traders, service undertakings and factories in the reserves, and only R260,387 for housing purposes (28). In addition, the state money assigned to Minister Daan Nel's five-year plan for the general development of the bantustans

26) HAD, 1966, col.386.

27) HAD, 1968, cols.850-851.

28) HAD, 1966, col.413.

- launched with much fanfare in 1961 (29) - also fell far short of the total minimum outlay recommended by the Tomlinson Commission.

Government ministers continued to scotch any moves to place total separation back on the agenda. In late 1961, for instance, apartheid hard-liner M.C. Botha told Pretoria University students that complete separation, no matter how desirable in principle or theory, could not be put into operation as a "practicable solution" (30). In August 1963, Verwoerd described a suggestion by some young NP members that South Africa be partitioned as "sheer foolishness" (31). It is a testimony to Verwoerd's authoritarian control of nationalist politics - and the powerful conformist pressures in the nationalist alliance - that those dissidents who had been routed in 1960-61 were never again able to mount an organised challenge. The few who continued to air their opinions were quickly drummed out of Afrikaner nationalist circles. Churchman Beyers Naude, for example, was forced to step down as moderator of the Southern Transvaal synod of the NGK, and also resigned from the Broederbond, after refusing to abandon the ecumenical journal *Pro Veritate*. However, most former dissidents simply remained silent, preferring to submit to party discipline.

29) See RP 72/1962, *Report of the Bantu Affairs Commission*, 1961, p.5.

30) *Rand Daily Mail*, 9/10/61.

31) *The Star*, 27/8/63. See also *Sunday Times*, 4/8/63. It is ironic that Verwoerd's son is one of the leaders of the ultra-right movement which is presently campaigning for full-scale partition.

The majority of South Africa's businessmen and industrialists were also very muted in their criticisms of NP policy. In most cases, this cannot be attributed to a fear of being blackballed. For much of the decade, South African capitalists had very little reason to oppose the NP because a sustained economic boom produced large profits across the board (32). Lipton argues that businessmen were at no stage "converted to support for apartheid labour policies" (33). She adds that such policies "did not contribute to the rapid expansion of manufacturing and commerce", and that the boom "raised the cost of these policies", particularly in the skilled labour market (34). Without plunging headlong into this debate, it should be noted that if businessmen had misgivings about some aspects of apartheid policy - especially those pertaining to labour and decentralisation - they expressed little or no opposition to other crucial elements of state strategy, notably the decision to crush black resistance.

The government's erection of stronger protectionist barriers, behind which expansionary economic policies were pursued, was also beneficial to local businessmen. Unable to get their money out of the country - because strict exchange control regulations had been imposed after Sharpeville precipitated a rapid efflux of foreign capital - local capitalists invested cheaply in a wide range of industrial

32) Between 1960 and 1967, using constant 1963 prices, South Africa's GDP rose by more than 50 percent. See D.H. Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1976), p.274.

33) Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid*, p.304.

34) *Ibid.*, p.144.

undertakings (35). Afrikaner businessmen and entrepreneurs participated fully in this process. Given that they were already poised on the brink of major non-Afrikaner investment in 1960, it is not surprising that leading Afrikaner capitalists in Sanlam and Rembrandt were particularly well-placed to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the economic boom. Collaboration and interpenetration with non-Afrikaner capital became increasingly commonplace. At the same time, economic expansion created the space for smaller businessmen, and more successful members of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, to establish themselves, and ease their dependency on the financial muscle of the nationalist alliance.

The formation of Hertzog's HNP therefore reflected the fact that economic expansion fragmented the solidarity of the aggressive petty bourgeoisie which had come to dominate the nationalist alliance by 1960, and widened those divisions - already apparent in 1960 - between wealthy and poorer farmers. The HNP represented white wage-earners, small Afrikaner farmers, and lower-echelon white-collar workers and bureaucrats: in effect, those members of the nationalist alliance who had prospered least from twenty years of NP rule, and who felt most threatened by any inkling of reform. On the other hand, Afrikaner capital, especially the large finance corporations, became extremely influential in the *verligte* (enlightened) wing of the NP which developed after Verwoerd's

35) R. Davies, D. Kaplan, M. Morris and D. O'Meara, "Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa" in *ROAPE*, 7, 1976, p.28.

assassination in 1966 (36).

Too some extent, of course, this account under-estimates the strength of political and ideological variables outlined earlier in this chapter. While the events of the decade after 1960 seem especially amenable to an analysis which stresses class formation, important questions about Afrikaner nationalist politics still need to be answered. The argument that the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie split into NP and HNP factions according to relative prosperity and status - or access to the Afrikaner bourgeoisie - cannot fully explain why a number of senior Afrikaner intellectuals followed Hertzog out of the NP (37). On the other hand - either because of material self-interest or because of allegiances to notions of Afrikaner nationalist unity - many white wage-earners, small farmers and white-collar bureaucrats remained in the NP, despite sharing certain HNP grievances. This *verkrampte* (reactionary/conservative) presence in the NP was not just confined to the lower reaches of the party machinery. Powerful nationalists such as Andries Treurnicht, M.C. Botha and Connie Mulder were also sympathetic to Hertzog's ideological rigidity. And notwithstanding his decision to support Vorster after the confusing and bloody in-fighting of 1968-1970, Broederbond

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36) See O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p.251. See also D. O'Meara, " 'Muldergate', the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism, and the Crisis of the Capitalist State in South Africa" in *Work in Progress*, 22, April 1982; C. Charney, "Class Conflict and the National Party Split" in *JSAS*, 10, 2, April 1984; H. Wolpe, "The 'White Working Class' in South Africa" in *Economy and Society*, 5, 2, May 1976.

37) To mention just a few HNP supporters: Jaap Marais, Schalk Botha, A.J.G. Oosthuizen and A. Pont of the NHK, A.B. du Preez of the NGK, journalist Beaumont Schoeman, and A. Weiss of Sabra. See J.H.P. Serfontein, *Die Verkramppte Aanslag* (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1970).

chief Piet Meyer can by no means be classed as a *verligte*. In a keynote speech to a meeting of the Broederbond executive in October 1966, Meyer propounded an extraordinarily exclusive, racist and dogmatic Afrikaner nationalist credo (38). He may have enjoyed economic prosperity, but his ideological orientation was very different from the increasingly pragmatic outlook of *verligte* Afrikaner capitalists such as his old boss Anton Rupert.

The formation of the HNP therefore did not resolve the stresses and strains within the nationalist alliance. For a few years, Vorster managed to paper over the cracks. But as Afrikaner nationalism struggled to respond to the resurgence of black resistance, a crisis-ridden economy, and the ideological bankruptcy of apartheid, the pressures became impossible to contain. With the secession of Treurnicht and the Conservative Party, the nationalist alliance which had come to power in 1948 was irrevocably shattered.

38) See J.H.P Serfontein, *Brotherhood of Power* (London, Rex Collings, 1979), pp.230-242; and Serfontein, *Verkrampte Aanslag*, pp.41-48.

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IV. Interviews

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30/1/87

De Vleeschauer, C. (NP volunteer, Johannesburg, since 1947),
23/1/87

Kotze, S.F. (NP organiser, Cape Peninsula and Province,
1946-58; elected MP for Parow, 1958), 13/1/87

Louw, J.T. (NP volunteer, Parow, since Second World War),
15/1/87

Marais, B.J. (NGK clergyman), 30/9/85

Meaker, K. (Paul Sauer's daughter, and active NP member),
12/1/87

Olivier, N.J.J. (Sabra executive member, 1948-61), 13/9/85

Sadie, J.L. (Professor at Stellenbosch University and Sabra
member), 14/1/87

Swart, G. (NGK clergyman), 26/1/87

Wassenaar, A.D. (businessman, Sanlam), 12/1/87