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THE DEVELOPMENT
BANK?**

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supplement**

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CHANGING THE GUARD

Can the armed forces be transformed?

RAMPHELA RAMPHELE speaks personally

SEPTEMBER 1992 NO 84

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Editorial

DOES 'MASS ACTION', as some commentators argue, bring us to the precipice of anarchy, to the delight of both the romantic insurrectionists on the one hand, and the state militarists on the other?

Following the liberation movement's failure to secure decisive international intervention to break the current political impasse, and the less-than-overwhelming support for the tripartite alliance's mass action campaign, some hard calculations have to be made.

There is strong evidence that, in some townships, organised formations have little control over groups of young activists who, in the face of consistent brutality from state or state-sponsored forces, have taken matters into their own hands. Long-term strategic calculations, which delicately weigh up the balance of forces at a national and international level, rarely feature in the minds of such brutalised, deprived and angry youth.

In such an environment, the law of the jungle operates. And in the jungle, angry squirrels are no match for blood-thirsty hyenas, waiting for the slightest excuse to tear their opponents apart.

Does mass struggle deepen the level of anarchy, or can it, on the contrary, build organisation and discipline, such that the militancy of unorganised youth is channelled into creative and effective resistance?

It can go either way. There is no preordained outcome, as some would have us believe.

Where the liberation movement has been unable to establish credibility in a community, or where local ANC or MK leaders still dream about insurrection, then 'mass action' is likely to disintegrate into anarchy.

This will invite the full might of the security forces. In a straight physical battle, where the prospects of external sympathy and intervention are low, the liberation movement will come off second best. It may then find itself compromising on some of its basic demands.

But where the ANC and its allies have established themselves as credible representatives of local communities, then ongoing, disciplined and non-violent mass struggle - which focuses on local grievances - is likely to prevent any descent into anarchy.

Such a strategy will most likely force De Klerk to give in to democratic demands.

Non-violent mass struggle, despite the risks, is the only weapon left in the hands of a people still being dictated to by a violent minority. Those who disagree have yet to present an alternative that does not amount to submission. But to be effective, the actions have to be more imaginative than what we've seen thus far.

It is clear that the ANC needs to convene its scheduled special consultative conference soon, so that a coherent national strategy, as well as an intensive assessment of the way the organisation has operated thus far, is mapped out.

DEVAN PILLAY

24 AUG 1992
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CHANGING THE GUARD

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LEFT ALIVE

Jeremy Cronin begins his regular column with a critique of *Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert's* 'cynical' approach to democracy



How to transform the armed forces

Judging by Cock and Williams' comments (*WIP* 83), there are huge problems with our armed forces; they are not just incompetent, they pose a threat to the state. This should have been foreseen, and one of the errors of the ANC has been to neglect the flourishing anti-militarisation movement (apart from raiding it for activists); the movement itself, of course, has been slack.

It is at least heartening to see the latest *Mayibuye* (July 1992) running a forthright article calling for an end to conscription, although it is dismaying to see that the photographs illustrating the article were of a black SADF volunteer and of the SACP's 'Internal Stability Unit' hassling people.

Evidently there is a general shortage of knowledge about the armed forces, which poses a problem in curing the military disease. Herewith a suggestion for what an interim government might do to straighten things out:

The following should be done as a beginning, and simultaneously. End conscription, send conscripts home and relieve reserve forces of all duties. This greatly reduces the risk of a coup. Negotiate with the pilots of the SAAF, exchanging security and improved pay for support. With their aid, an interim government could crush any armed resistance and they would deter foreign aggression while the army was being restructured.

Negotiate through the UN for a large force of police, combat troops, support troops and the instructors to come to South Africa on two year contracts at favourable rates, under interim government control with UN observers. Swear in a large force of special constables with non-lethal weapons under interim government control.

Next, bring the mercenaries to South Africa as quickly as possible. They and the special constables should lock and guard all heavy arms, equipment and all ammunition. They could give the special constables on-the-job training.

Non-combatant personnel of the SADF, SAP, Correctional Services and all homeland forces should be sent on a year's half pay leave (giving them time to seek other jobs); commandants and staff forces should be disarmed and confined to barracks.

All ranks above Commandant, and lower ranking CIS, Staff and Special Forces members should be detained for investigation. Reward and indemnity should be offered for information received.

Next, open recruitment for a new SADF and SAP, giving preference to trained personnel with clean records; at least half of each force should have no political commitments. Quickly process lower-ranking armed forces personnel to see if they are innocent (hence eligible to seek reinstatement). Start with the confined-to-barracks commandants, so that they could be released or charged or sent home.

After a year, the new SAP and SADF could be deployed. After another year, the mercenaries could be phased out and sent home.

During the interim period, although

the disarmed forces would pose no serious threat, they might make considerable trouble. Since the mercenaries would have to concentrate on serious crime and political conflict, being overstretched, there would probably be a general increase in crime at this time.

However, this would probably diminish once reliable, popular and competently-trained armed forces were available, growing in strength and experience. These forces would have to be impartial; if the future force were as politically and socially corrupt as the present one, all this would be in vain. Hence foreign training with UN observation would be useful.

All this should be done entirely in the open. No secret army or police force should be set up until a democratic government has been in operation for some time and the question had been freely debated. Secrecy is one of the sources of the problem which we now face, and trust cannot be restored in an atmosphere of covert operations.

MF Blatchford
Mtunzini

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Misleading coverage of Nehawu strike

intends to provide accurate and impartial information to the viewers about acute matters of public interest, it has once again failed miserably. Instead, it has succeeded in criminalising the strike to the government's advantage.

The strike coverage testifies to the fact that the SABC

Land and housing for all...?

RECENTLY, THOSE holding the purse strings for development have tuned in to the empowerment of women, especially in rural areas. But affiliates of the National Land Committee (NLC) network have long worked with urban and rural women on housing and land issues.

Even where women are heads of households and the main breadwinners, they are usually denied access to land and housing because of patriarchal structures like marriage and traditional values: despite all the obligations of running the home, including agriculture, women have few rights to land and affordable housing.

The Transvaal Rural Action Committee (Trac) discovered that after years of organising with women they could challenge male control over decision-making. The Surplus People Project (SPP) realised that women who had started struggles for land, often saw men take over their committees when negotiations with authorities began.

Since forced removals have abated somewhat (after 2 February 1990), the network's orientation has shifted from crisis intervention to more long-term development strategies, which emphasise women's specific concerns relating to land and resources. To ensure that it was not mere lip-service to gender, workshops were organised with affiliates to examine the question. While some focused on organising women, others approached the gender question from the re-

once informed its viewing public of the labour issues out of which the strike arose. Strike reports have consisted almost exclusively of descriptions of incidents of intimidation and TPA or police statements regarding strike action.

Actualy programmes have covered topics such as intimidation, the rights of non-strikers, volunteers, the plight of patients, etc. These are important consequences of the industrial action and should not go unnoticed. However, emphasising them while completely ignoring the hospital workers' grievances, can only be regarded as deliberately misleading public opinion.

If the SABC, as it claims,



Nehawu strikers: Victims of SABC bias

has more concern for the protection of other government departments, than a sense of duty to its public.

— Bronwyn Keene-Young

Bullet or ballot?

THE PAN Africanist Congress (PAC) will only support mass action if its aim is to overthrow the regime, according to publicity secretary Barney Desai.

The PAC is sceptical about a short-term strike in which people will die, but will only achieve "a cup of tea with De Klerk", says Desai.

The PAC believes that if mass action is pushed to its logical conclusion, people can free themselves. An economic crisis can be turned into a revolutionary situation by skilled negotiators, says Desai.

However, the PAC also

asserts the need for mass action to be properly organised, and people to be committed to strike action if it is going to lead to insurrection.

"Only agent provocateurs, political amateurs and enemy agents are the only people to play games with insurrection," he adds.

The PAC, reports *Joe Thloloe*, feels vindicated by the collapse of Codesa. But what role did the organisation play in that collapse?

Codesa was finally crippled not by the PAC's campaign, but when the ANC walked out in frustration at the process and the growing violence in the country.

They also argue that it is a measure of the anti-Codesa

campaign that there are rumblings within the ANC. These rumblings, however, have not led to defections from the ANC to the PAC.

"It is not obvious yet, but there is a massive hemorrhaging in ANC grassroots support," says Desai.

But how does he explain that the ANC has been able to mount the present mass action campaign, and that the PAC has not been able to benefit from its correct predictions? The PAC does not yet have the capacity to turn its vision into reality. It still has to do something about its lack of resources, its administration, and its inability to fire the masses into action as it did from 1960 to 1964. — AIA

search angle or the organisation's structure.

In June, ten members from eight affiliates attended a national gender workshop which led to the appointment of a national gender coordinator with considerable experience in gender work, and a background in land development issues. She will coordinate the national gender programme, train women, evaluate research, facilitate policy formulation and lobby.

Although some affiliates' resources were stretched thin, everyone felt committed to taking up the challenge in one way or another. Most felt that a gender analysis should be integrated into ongoing work for issues such as land claims, housing, local government, and land rights.

It was agreed that gender task and reflection groups could provide an opportunity to develop confidence in strategising around gender, while devoting time to gender inequalities within other parts of the work and organisation.

SPP jumped in the deep end by employing consultants to help them address gender in every aspect of their work. Some development projects do not see women's needs differently from community needs, while others are concerned with women's needs without trying to challenge oppressive gender relations. The approach which focuses on the structural transformation of gender oppression requires changing relations between women and men in every sphere.

This type of change challenges deep-rooted social relations, requires commitment and a great deal of courage. The NLC and some of its affiliates have taken up this challenge.

—Mikki van Zyl

The other economic summit

THERE WERE three shows, not one, in Munich recently and the G7 meeting of heads of state lost much of the lime-light to the other two.

There were the 20,000 protestors who laid siege to the G7, especially the 400 who were arrested and held for eight hours without access to lawyers, food or toilets.

Then there was The Other Economic Summit (TOES), where prominent Third World and non-governmental movements of the north met to condemn the self-serving policies of the G7, and present an alternative scenario to save our planet.

The G7 event was to chart new directions for the world economy. Decisions on world trading conducted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the fate of Russia were on the agenda.

Although the G7 and its institutions — the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank — control the world economy, it seemed unwilling to take big moves to solve major global concerns. The main purpose of the leaders, it seemed, was the protection of their own economic interests, despite the consequences for the rest of the world.

There had been hopes that Third World debt would be reduced from \$1,200-billion. Africa, the poorest continent, owes \$270-billion alone. But the G7 merely uttered platitudes.

Leaders from India, Brazil, Philippines, Malaysia and Africa spoke at the TOES conference about the reverse flows from the Third World to the IMF and World Bank. Some \$1,300-b has been paid in interest and capital in the last nine years.

Despite these payments, debtor countries are now 61% worse off than in 1982. Africa is paying off more in service charges than it originally owed. The IMF was identified as the main debt collector and profiteer.

The final communique of TOES stated that "the time has come to bring down the curtain on this self-selected [G7] circus and replace it with a democratic approach to solving global problems".

TOES called for a representative World Economic Council, with Third World and civil society representation, to replace the G7. It also called for the IMF, World Bank and GATT to operate within the constraints of sustainability and "come under the one member, one vote system rather than the present one dollar, one vote rule".

Although the G7 leaders do not seem to have forward thinking policies, the Third World and its allies clearly hold the moral high ground. Moreover, as the North requires the cooperation of the South in cleaning up the world environment, there is a new basis for exerting political pressure.

—Ben Turok (who presented a paper at TOES on behalf of the Institute For African Alternatives).

Myths, Monuments and Museums

THE WITS History Workshop drew a wide range of academics and museologists to discuss the future of museums and national monuments in a post-apartheid South Africa. It was a heated debate over the public representation of South Africa's history.

Delegates pondered how museums and national monuments would display the history of apartheid in their exhibitions, and asked how to democratise the historical record to reflect the experience of all South Africans. However, there were very few answers.

Spencer Crew of the American Smithsonian Institution spoke about the experience of addressing these issues in America. The only way to integrate a wider audience that reflects the multi-cultural character of society, says Crew, is to encourage museum curators to work closely with their local communities in shaping exhibitions. This strategy requires museums to give up their power over representation of the past and develop exhibitions in cooperation with the community they are obligated to serve.

It was agreed that museums should become places for people to confront their stereotypes of different cultures.

Although conferees agreed that an "open door" policy for museums was the way of the future, there was little discussion about how the transition would take place.

The key to the future of museums and monuments in South Africa is to unlock the doors of power within these institutions and invite wider community participation and accountability in the reconstruction process. It looks like a long haul, but the first tentative steps have been taken.

—Kerry Ruth Ward



NAMIBIA

After Rio, the doomsday scenario

"MY JOY was tainted with the shock I felt at seeing what had been a well-wooded savannah now deforested".

Namibian President Sam Nujoma expressed these mixed feelings about his homecoming after 30 years in exile, when he addressed other world leaders at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in June.

Deforestation and desertification in Nujoma's home region of Owambo, are the most vivid signs of the degradation of natural resources which has taken place during Nujoma's years abroad. The Namibian government now

supports sustainable development, which safeguards and renews the environment.

Although Namibia's 1.4



Nujoma: Concerned about environment

million population is relatively small, the pressures on

the few areas of habitable land are immense. This is particularly so in the northern areas of the country, where more than a quarter of the population live in the 10,000 square kilometres of central Owambo. Some planners are already predicting a doomsday scenario.

As a result of this increasing strain on the land, the loss of trees and desertification will accelerate. Over-grazing will increase, leading to more soil erosion and lower crop yields. Ground water quality will get worse and people will be forced to relocate to water sources near roads, and to urban

centres in search of an income. Malnutrition will also rise as

food supplies become limited. There are also problems caused by international companies in Namibia. Accusations are being levelled against SA-owned Consolidated Diamond Mines, of endangering marine resources through their under-sea mining operations (having exhausted most of the diamond supplies under the land surface).

Rossing Uranium, controlled by British mining multinational RTZ, are also coming under fire for allegedly flouting radiation and environmental standards in the early 1980s, and so putting the workers and the inhabitants of the mine town Arandis at risk.

— AIA/Graham Hopwood

POSTERS OF detained Malawian trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana, emblazoned with the slogan "FREE CHIHANA! DEMOCRACY FOR MALAWI NOW!", plaster the walls of the crammed Lusaka office of the *Malawi Democrat*.

Veteran Malawi exile Frank Mayinga, co-editor of this bi-monthly, sits at his desk crowded with high technology computers.

"The exact location of this office remains a closely guarded secret," Mayinga says smiling, "just say it's somewhere in Lusaka." Mayinga has good reason to be cautious. Several Malawian opposition leaders have been assassinated in the last decade while in exile.

The *Malawi Democrat* is the newsletter of the Interim Committee for a Democratic Alliance (ICDA), which was established in Lusaka in March this year after a conference of

MALAWI

Exiled Democrats fight for change

Malawian exiles. It is chaired by the detained Chihana.

The Alliance is not just another exile movement. It is believed to have a firm base inside Malawi. Chihana was given the mandate to go home and rally support for the establishment of the Democratic Alliance on Malawian soil. But he was arrested as soon as he stepped on the tarmac at Kamuzu International Airport.

A Lilongwe high court granted Chihana bail on 10 July, but he was redetained four days later, after he told the BBC he would continue campaigning for democracy and fighting against the Banda regime.

The 44-year-old Mayinga co-edits the *Malawi Democrat* jointly with Mapopa Chipeta, an academic based in

Harare. The publication, which is produced fortnightly and is distributed all over the world, publicises events in Malawi, especially Chihana's fate.

"We are not a propaganda newsletter; rather we cover current issues in Malawi. And we are used as a forum for discussion of various ideas, like how plural politics can be achieved in our country," maintains Mayinga.

Mayinga and Chipeta spend much of their time rallying support from exiled Malawians in Zambia, getting funding for the *Malawi Democrat* from western embassies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and finding ways to sneak the newsletter into Malawi.

The newsletter is faxed

into Malawi, where it is photocopied and widely distributed. It is also smuggled across the Zambian border. The KDA also sent pamphlets into the country encouraging people not to attend the 14 May Kamuzu Day celebrations

On that day, the 50,000-seat stadium in Blantyre was less than a quarter full, and those attending were mostly schoolchildren.

In the June one-party parliamentary elections, faxes were sent into Malawi urging people to stay at home and not to vote. "No Choice! No Vote! Free Chihana Now!" was the slogan. The election turnout, according to western observers, was the lowest ever.

Chipeta concludes: "Our hope is that the newsletter will form the nucleus of a pluralist press in a future democratic Malawi. We have learned a lot from the Zambian experience, a free critical press is necessary." —AIA/Melinda Ham

The world of Babes Mabida

BIG BUSINESS NEARLY JOINED IN A NATIONAL SHUT-DOWN!



BUT THEN CODESA FLU STRUCK...



SYMPTOMS OF "CODESA FLU"

1. Confusion over who is selling out to whom.
2. cold feet.
3. Complete collapse.



AT FIRST GOVERNMENT APPROVED OF A "DAY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.."



"LOVE AND PEACE TRA-LA"



BUT I DON'T WANT TO BE RECONCILED...



TO THIS GANG OF CROOKS AND MURDERERS STAYING IN POWER!



THEN GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO SACK BIG BUSINESS IF THEY WENT ON STRIKE



SO BUSINESS THREATENED TO SACK US WORKERS IF WE WENT ON STRIKE



ME, I COULD ONLY THREATEN TO KICK THE DOG



ARE YOU LISTENING, F.W.?



So... FORWARD WITH MASS ACTION!



DISCIPLINED, ORGANISED, IRRESISTABLE!



HONEY! I STILL CAN'T FIND MY STRUGGE T-SHIRT!



we hope





PIC. ABDUL SHA

FOCUS MASS ACTION

MOVING THE MASSES

Will mass action, the ANC-led alliance's only remaining weapon, be enough to force the government to give in to democratic demands, or will the alliance be forced to compromise? KERRY CULLINAN wades through the issues

THE COSINESS THAT DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE ANC AND THE National Party (NP) at closed sessions of Codesa is lost forever. The Boipatong massacre and the ANC-SACP-Cosatu mass action campaign has made sure of that.

But it is simply a matter of time before talks get back on track, perhaps using the Cosatu-Saccola draft charter for peace, democracy and economic reconstruction as the basis for an action-oriented way forward.

The National Party (NP) would like to go back to holding closed meetings with the ANC, as decided by its recent 'bosberaad'. But there is a strong feeling within the alliance, particularly from the SACP and Cosatu, that future negotiations be open to the public.

Compromise?

Compromise to get the talks back on track is inevitable, but what is the minimum the ANC will accept? One suggestion floating in ANC circles is that political compromises must be made in exchange for government compromises on security.

But SACP central committee member Jeremy Cronin says "a sovereign, elected constituent assembly is precisely the demand we can't compromise on". Cronin says he sees no evidence that this view is gaining ground within the ANC, pointing out that even Herman Cohen, the US secretary for African Affairs, recently expressed support for an elected body to draw up the constitution.

ANC leaders' recent talk about a 'constitution making body' instead of a constituent assembly may represent a

compromise on terminology, but not on content, says Cronin.

But the weakening of international support for the ANC may mean that the organisation has to compromise more than it would like to. The United Nations Resolution 765 emphasises "the responsibility of the South African authorities to take all the necessary measures to stop immediately the violence". But its main concern seems to be ensuring the "co-operation of all parties in the resumption of the negotiating process as speedily as possible".

However, the ANC leadership is now tied by decisions adopted at the organisation's policy conference, which include its commitment to a single chamber constituent assembly. If political compromises are to be made, the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) will be obliged to call a national meeting.

The policy conference has already directed the NEC to "convene a special national conference ... to map out an integrated strategic perspective for the transitional period" after regions expressed unhappiness with the way in which negotiations had been conducted.

Saccola agreement

Although the Boipatong massacre on 17 June shifted the balance of forces in favour of the alliance, the shift was not big enough for De Klerk's old allies to make a decisive break with the past.

Cosatu was unable to get the SA Coordinating Council on Labour Affairs (Saccola) to agree to a 24-hour shutdown for

peace, democracy and economic reconstruction.

Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo said the negotiating teams on both sides had "acted in good faith" but that Saccola had been prevented from getting a mandate to endorse the agreement by "an intransigent element in big business who was influenced and lobbied by the government".

But even within Cosatu, the agreement was greeted with a degree of suspicion. One of Cosatu's biggest affiliates, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa), abstained from voting on the agreement at a recent central executive committee meeting.

Many within the tripartite alliance secretly welcomed Saccola's failure to agree to the shut-down. It would have caused confusion and dampened mass action, they argued.

Had business also persuaded the state to let public servants observe the day of reconciliation, business would have been seen as the conciliators and 'rolling mass action' would probably have stopped in its tracks.

However, a key aspect of the Cosatu-Saccola talks was discussion around the 'draft charter for peace, democracy and economic reconstruction'. Naidoo says there was general agreement on the charter which, for Cosatu, still stands.

This charter, which church leaders are trying to sell to other parties, has the potential to get talks moving again. One of the key sections of the charter deals with political transition, calling for "an elected constitution making body unfettered in its capacity to agree and adopt a constitution which shall also perform the dual function of a transitional parliament". Aside from committing parties to principles, the charter contains a series of concrete steps to combat violence and poverty.

But while mass action has not isolated the government in the way that the alliance hoped it would, the NP's decision to stall the Codesa negotiations to give it time to win black voters has also backfired.

For a start, it made a strategic blunder at Codesa II by choosing to dig in its heels over percentages. A popular joke in the tripartite alliance is that the NP's stubborn attitude saved the ANC from selling out at Codesa.

The ANC's very generous — and unmandated — offer that the new constitution be passed by a 70% majority will not be repeated. The ANC's policy conference, convened shortly after the deadlock, resolved that the constitution should be passed by a two thirds majority.

Had the NP seized the ANC's 70% offer, the ANC would have lost support among its supporters for "selling out".

Preventing anarchy

Mass action also provides the ANC with a tremendous opportunity to recruit new members in the run up to national elections. SACP central committee member Jeremy Cronin says mass action, while guided by the strategic aim of transferring power, is also aimed at "organising, helping and facilitating grassroots struggle".

"Some problems have occurred because insufficient attention was paid to organising grassroots struggles," continued Cronin. "We have to show that we are committed to helping people on a constant level; that we will not turn them on or off

or walk away from their problems."

He argues that unless there is organised, directed mass action, the result will be anarchy as people will act in anger.

The Vaal is probably the best example of how individuals acting outside of organisational control, motivated by fear and anger, can bring anarchy. There have been numerous reports of armed youths patrolling the streets of Vaal townships.

Many of these youths do not know the political leadership in their township and have become a rule unto themselves. As a result, technicians are too afraid to enter the townships to repair broken services, something that can only have a negative effect on the community.

The tripartite alliance is also closing ranks and attracting more allies. The recently formed Coalition On State Murder and Corruption — which draws together a wide range of political, civic, union, church and human rights bodies — has the potential to become a popular movement for democracy, once again bringing the mass democratic movement to life.

Reassessing negotiations

The deadlock has also allowed the tripartite alliance to reassess its negotiations strategy. At its recent living wage conference, Cosatu delegates said Codesa "excluded the masses, was too technical, long and uncoordinated".

Cosatu says it wants "a new kind of negotiations process which is simpler, has clearer time frames and is controlled and guided by the masses. There should not be a long, drawn out process". The federation and the SACP are also calling for Codesa proceedings to be public.

The ANC has not yet decided whether it wants the form of Codesa to change. However, there is agreement within the alliance that the content of negotiations must change. The alliance wants negotiations to focus on the transfer of power.

In his open letter to De Klerk, ANC president Nelson Mandela said the "constitution making body" had to be the focus of the negotiations. The NP, said Mandela, has "elevated the transitional arrangements to the central focus" which



People's referendum: The demand for an



BOU SHARIF

an elected CA remains at the centre of struggle

betrayed its "pre-occupation with obtaining guarantees of a constitutionally entrenched role for the NP".

ANC chief negotiator Mohammed Valli Moosa explains that the democratic movement is no longer prepared "to go back to the table to debate whether there should be a democratic process. There must be agreement upfront on democratic elections".

Moosa adds that the ANC "accepts the need for a legal and constitutional framework to work towards a constituent assembly", but that it did not see this framework as the interim constitution being demanded by the government.

"We want the 1983 SA constitution amended to make democratic elections possible. But we are opposed to the NP's position that Codesa drafts an interim constitution, which will then be virtually impossible to change as the NP wants all constitutional changes to be made by a 75% majority," said Moosa.

struggle with limited consultation. It also 'turned off' the Border region's mass action campaign in March, aimed at unseating Ciskei's Oupa Gqozo. ANC president Nelson Mandela then told the June 16 rally in Soweto that the mass action campaign was aimed at "breaking the Codesa deadlock".

Unless regional structures of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu assert themselves now, before they know it negotiations will be back on track and rank and file members will be informed of what is happening through the press.

Cosatu affiliates have asserted their commitment to continuous mass action. Their position can probably be summed up by Numsa's resolution that mass action "should continue until the transfer of power is agreed".

Cronin and ANC political education head Raymond Suttner take this further. They argue that mass action must continue even after the transfer of power is achieved, to ensure that power is not simply transferred from one political party to another, but that ordinary people have control over their lives.

A strong feeling surfaced at a recent Cosatu central executive committee that the federation needed to be more assertive in the alliance. Until now, say some unionists, the ANC did the strategising and expected Cosatu to provide the muscle power.

It is possible that when negotiations get back on track, Cosatu will expect to be included in strategising about negotiations in a more meaningful way.

But there is also opposition to this from within Cosatu. Jerry Majatladi, information officer for the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), says the negotiation process "moves too quickly" for Cosatu — with its limited and inexperienced person power — to keep up.

"Cosatu should concentrate on strengthening its regions and building unity with Nactu," said Majatladi. "Cosatu can rather lobby the ANC and the Party. It can even set up a political desk to do this."

Routes to negotiations

But as Cronin points out, the ANC is not homogeneous in its approach to negotiations. He argues that "real unity of strategic purpose not apparent unity" based on a "realistic, revolutionary, mass-based strategy" is the only way forward.

He identifies three broad strategic positions within the ANC since 2 February 1990:

- Those who do not want to "rock the boat" of negotiations as they believe that the path to democracy depends "primarily upon negotiated pacts between elites. Elites 'delivered' their constituencies. The job of constituencies is 'to be delivered'".
- Those who see mass action as "a tap to be turned on and off" to pressurise the state at the negotiations table. This outlook, he says, also sees "elite negotiations as the royal road to the 'transfer of power to the people'".
- Those who favour the "Leipzig" way, a mass uprising in which the people transfer power to themselves "in an insurrectionary moment". While this approach is not elitist, it is also unrealistic given the "relatively coherent and relatively powerful repressive machinery of the apartheid regime".

Most of the ANC's National Working Committee (NWC) seem to see mass action as a 'tap'. It 'turned off' the armed

Industrial action

Many Cosatu affiliates are also taking advantage of the mass action mood to settle what the Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu) assistant secretary Mike Madlala calls "outstanding issues" with employers.

Over the past few years, unions have often had to shelve demands for centralised bargaining, job creation and a moratorium on retrenchments once a wage agreement has been reached. These are being taken up with fresh vigour by unions.

Unions involved in wage disputes have also been given new courage by the campaign. Cosatu's Living Wage Conference on 30 June resolved to "coordinate to ensure that major strikes ... should-start at more or less the same time".

Industrial action is set to sweep the steel, engineering, commercial, catering, chemical, paper, food, mining and public sectors.

The SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu) is in dispute with Checkers over retrenchments and shop steward victimisation and it plans to ballot OK workers on wage and retrenchment demands.

The Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppwawu) held nationwide marches on 29 June, demanding a

Youth leaders 'obsessed with prolonged strike'

THE PREOCCUPATION OF KEY YOUTH LEADERSHIP WITH A "prolonged general strike" is partly to blame for the failure of the ANC Youth League to build a proper programme of action.

This is the view of the SACP's Jeremy Cronin, who believes that the "insurrectionary orientation" of the ANCYL leadership has "tended to become an elite, conspiratorial fixation at the expense of developing a broad-based, grassrooted, multi-pronged youth programme of action".

However, ANCYL chairperson Peter Mokaba says that the League decided to campaign for a protracted general strike as the shortest route to peace and democracy.

It is unfair to say that the ANCYL does not have a programme of action, says Mokaba. Violence prevented the programme from being implemented in many areas.

"This led us to the conclusion that we needed to concentrate on removing the regime as the shortest route to peace and democracy. It was for this reason that we proposed a protracted general strike," he says.

"We have not abandoned our programme. But De Klerk is dictating the terms of development, so it is a priority to remove him as he is an obstacle to everything."

Cronin agrees that the strategic challenge is to remove De Klerk as quickly as possible. However, he says that if the ANCYL's programme has been so hampered by the state, he "wonders whether we have the capacity to mount a protracted general strike".

"In other words, I support what the ANCYL leadership is trying to achieve, but not how they aim to achieve it," says Cronin.

Mokaba concedes that "we do have the minimum required organisation for mass action", but says that mass action would "spread and deepen organisation".

"We don't agree that a general strike excludes organisation. In fact, when there is action, organisation develops. A protracted strike would need thorough preparation, strong organisation, good local leadership and cadreship at all levels to act as transmitters from national to local levels."

However, Mokaba says that the ANCYL did not want to "return to the ungovernability of old", where structures served only to mobilise people.

"We want the townships to be ungovernable for De Klerk, but governable for credible organs of people's power. Our people must be able to attend to their lives and have their socio-economic needs dealt with The ANC must also give leadership to all action, including the armed actions that people are taking to defend themselves, otherwise there will be anarchy."

moratorium on retrenchments and centralised bargaining. Sappi tried to tie a 12-month moratorium on retrenchments to some Ppwawu members working during mass action. The union rejected this.

The Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) has called all employers in the petro-chemical, consumer chemical, rubber, plastic and glass sectors to a meeting on 26 August to establish a centralised bargaining structure. If employers refuse — which is likely — the union plans to declare a dispute with the entire industry and ballot for industrial action. There is also the real possibility of 5,000 CWIU members going on strike at Sasol collieries, and another 4,000 striking at Sasol itself.

Fawu has sent letters of demand to employers, covering a range of issues from job creation and a living wage to the extension of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) to farmworkers. The union also wants an industry-wide meeting with employers to discuss food price hikes, the drought and food distribution.

Mlungisi Hlongwane, general secretary of the Post and Telecommunication Workers Association (Potwa), says Potwa is linking Cosatu's demand for an end to unilateral economic restructuring to an end to the privatisation of the post office and the resignation of Telkom's board of directors.

"The demand for the resignation of Telkom's board is linked to the demand for independent control over the SABC. You can't discuss independent control over the SABC in isolation from Telkom, as it is completely dependent on Telkom for its networking," said Hlongwane.

The Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) is campaigning for centralised bargaining, an end to retrenchment and the reimposition of bus subsidies. T&GWU assistant secretary Randall Howard said some 15,000 contract cleaners were being balloted after efforts to form an industrial council has failed in all regions except Natal.

At the time of going to press, the NUM had held 17 mass marches at mines around the country involving over 100,000 workers, aimed mainly at ending retrenchments.

Delivering the goods

The NP, portions of business and the media have labelled the mass action campaign as ineffective on the one hand and bringing anarchy on the other.

Yet no other campaign could better demonstrate the central demand of the alliance: one person, one vote. Mass action and the withholding of labour are the 'traditional weapons' of the democratic movement, whose members do not have access to the corridors of power.

However, what seems clear is that people are getting tired of the same forms of protest. It is no longer possible to attract large numbers to frequent marches and pickets. Such actions appear to achieve little for the majority, whose material conditions have generally worsened since February 1990.

Unless the alliance is seen to be delivering to people, both in national negotiations and at a local level, it is certain to lose support. However much the NP is blamed for apartheid, if it succeeds in persuading people that it can improve their lives, it will win votes. □

TRIANGLE OF VIOLENCE

The Boipatong massacre has at last focused world attention on the Vaal Triangle, a region that has suffered from two years of intense destabilisation. KERRY CULLINAN and PROFESSOR MALEMA report

THE VAAL TRIANGLE HAS ONCE AGAIN become South Africa's killing centre. Between January and June, 244 people were killed and 215 injured in its seven townships — Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Boipatong, Bophelong, Evaton, Orange Farm and Palm Springs. Ninety nine people died in June alone. (Human Rights Commission figures)

Over the past two years, normal life in the Vaal has been shattered. Shebeens, beerhalls, parties, vigils, taxis, trains, buses and homes have been attacked, and innocent individuals have been attacked and killed.

Why the Vaal?

It is difficult to determine exactly why those behind the violence have targeted the Vaal.

Many blame the racism that thrives in the Vaal's white towns — Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Meyerton and Sasolburg. UCT academic Jeremy Seekings says the success of consumer boycotts in the Vaal's white towns is a good indication of how deeply township residents resent racism.

The Vaal police force is also to blame, not only for its maltreatment of residents, but for its racist behaviour from within.

In the last five years, at least 20 suspects have died or been severely assaulted in police custody according to lawyers.

On 8 March this year, women and youth marched on Sharpeville police station to demand the withdrawal of white policemen from the township.

In the late 1980s, black municipal

policemen mutinied because of the racism behaviour of some of their white colleagues according to a source. Their grievances were eventually handed to the commissioner of police.

Recently black policemen — often prompted by their wives — have initi-

the SAP appears determined to maintain control over the Vaal for political purposes, rather than to aggressively fight crime or violence.

Workplace conditions

Cosatu's national organiser, Zwelinzima Vavi, believes that employers must also bear blame for increasing conflict. According to Vavi, many employers — particularly Iscor, the area's biggest employer — favour Inkatha's United Workers Union of SA (Uwusa) over Cosatu unions, as Uwusa rarely takes industrial action.

"Iscor is involved in a conspiracy against the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa)," said Vavi, who was Cosatu's Vaal regional secretary until recently. "It knows that if people are intimidated by Inkatha, they will not participate in Numsa activities and profits will tilt in Iscor's favour."

Wits University's Professor Tom Lodge believes that "structural characteristics" have played a part in the "extraordinarily high level of conflict" in the Vaal.

There is little opportunity for skilled, white-collar work. Township residents are generally either blue-collar workers, often living in hostels, or unemployed. This lack of access to opportunity has contributed to the rising town-

ship anger.

Lodge also says he suspects "political competition" plays a role in heightening tensions in the area. In the Vaal, the PAC has a particularly strong presence, more so than in other areas such as the East Rand, which has similar problems.



Despair: Why has the Vaal been a target of violence?

ated meetings with ANC structures to denounce the violence from within the force and that imposed on Vaal residents.

As evidenced by the recent *Weekly Mail* exposé of secret police bases intended for monitoring, infiltrating and disrupting popular political organisations,

Weak organisation

Although the Vaal is best known as a flashpoint — the 1961 Sharpeville massacre, the 1984 uprising and the subsequent Delmas trial, and now Boipatong — the area has a history of weak organisation.

The first black local authority was set up in the Vaal as the area was considered quiet. During the 1970s, the Sebokeng local authority was seen as a "model", says Seekings.

Although the Vaal exploded in September 1984 over rent hikes, there were neither youth nor civic structures at the time. The 1984 uprising can be explained in socio-economic terms, say academics. Vaal townships were paying far higher rents than other areas as the Development Board was committed to making the area finance itself. Rent increases were introduced, during a bad local recession, by councillors who had been exposed as thoroughly corrupt.

Today ANC structures are relatively weak in the Vaal. This has been exacerbated by the violence which has made organisation-building difficult. Many of the armed youths at barricades in the townships are not accountable to any political structure, and could potentially bring anarchy to the area.

Security force involvement

The Vaal Civic Association's (VCA) organiser, Sello Morake, and the Vaal Council of Churches' (VCC) Human Rights desk chief, Gift Morane, both blame the covert police operations and the heavy presence of the security forces for the bulk of the violence.

A number of activists, particularly Umkhonto we Sizwe members, have been killed by police, including:

- MK members Rangwati Lefiedi and Thabo Mosebi, who were shot dead in Sharpeville on 24 January this year;
- MK member Andries Molebatsi, who was shot dead by a municipal policeman, Sergeant 'Skuto' Marumo on 1 March. The eyewitness, Doctor Motsitsi, was found dead nine days later.
- MK member Mzwakhe Nhlapo, shot on 26 April.
- ANC member Tshepi Lengwati, suspected of killing a policeman during an attempted robbery, died in police custody on 27 January. He was shot 17 times

in the chest while handcuffed. Police claim he died when unknown attackers shot at the police vehicle he was being transported in.

The two cases in which the security forces have appointed independent inquiries after shooting incidents, seem to have merely been public relations exercises:

- After police killed five people when they fired into a Sebokeng crowd on 26 March 1990, Judge Goldstone recommended that the policemen involved be prosecuted. No action has been taken.
- Judge Stafford recommended that the SADF members who killed four people in Sebokeng on 4 September 1990, be charged with murder and assault. He also described the SADF's internal inquiry as a "whitewash". To date, no action has been taken.

In addition to direct security force involvement, Vavi points out that police were told of planned attacks on residents in "at least eight cases since July 1990," but they failed to act.

A clear example is the 17 June Boipatong massacre. Police were called to the area by a petrol attendant, Meshack Theone, and Peace Action, but failed to act.

Dr Peter Waddington, a British criminologist assisting the Goldstone Commission, describes the police actions in the Boipatong tragedy as "woefully inadequate" and "incompetent". He also slams police for discriminating against residents in favour of hostel dwellers.

KwaMadala nerve centre

Most attacks on Vaal residents can be traced back to Iscor's KwaMadala hostel. Situated 2km from the nearest township, with an SADF base across the road, the hostel is effectively a fortress.

Until recently, Iscor turned a blind eye to the many unemployed people and gangsters, such as a man known as Khetis, who stayed at the hostel and were implicated in attacks on residents.

A delegation of church leaders and women met Iscor management on 15 August 1991, and asked them to stop housing "enemies of peace and life." Shortly afterwards, the parastatal published advertisements claiming that all KwaMadala occupants were Iscor employees, and there was no evidence that hostel dwellers were attacking residents.

But an unemployed KwaMadala resident this year told lawyers that he had



Spllt: Sotsu is at the centre of a conflict with Numsa shop stewards

been trained to use weapons at the hostel. The weapons — AK 47s and spears — were brought to the hostel by Inkatha members from Natal, he said.

Residents also claim that the SADF has trained some of the those living at KwaMadala.

Many attacks are random. Their only apparent aim is to strike terror into residents' hearts, such as the spate of attacks on beerhalls and taverns. Between May 1991 and May this year, 17 people have been killed in attacks on Sebokeng's Kooperasie beerhall and Erica Tavern, and Sharpeville's Ha-hlo-ho-ya-peye and Chiefs Taverns.

But a number of attacks are directed at activists, particularly MK members, and their families. Cases include:

- The massacre of 39 people at a night vigil for ANC organiser Chris Nangalemba in Sebokeng on 12 January 1991.
- The murder of ANC leader Ernest Sotsu's wife, daughter and grandson on 3 July 1991.
- The massacre on 19 April this year of seven members of Rangwati Lefiedi's family in Sharpeville. Lefiedi, an MK

Youth moves to defend the Vaal

The youth of the PAC and ANC in the Vaal have come together to defend their communities — but important differences remain, reports
MOSITO RAPHELA

member, had been killed in January by police (see above).

● The mysterious death on 22 March of Saul Tsotetsi, SACP PWV executive member and chairperson of the ANC's Evaton branch, in a hand grenade explosion.

● The death of the mother of ANCYL Vaal executive member Ntswaki Smith in a hand grenade explosion.

Residents retaliate

VCA's Morake says people have no confidence in the dispensing of justice in the country, as the SAP has failed to act upon evidence provided by eyewitnesses.

"Out of so many killings, there were only 137 arrests and no one has been found guilty since the region got engulfed in massive killings," he pointed out.

Anger spilled into the streets on 1 June, when Sergeant Marumo, his nephew and Lekoa's former mayor, Esau Mahlatsi, were necklaced.

Since the Boipatong massacre, the SAP says nine people have been necklaced. In addition, the SAP's Captain Piet van Deventer says eight policemen have been killed in unrest in the Vaal this year.

Morake says this is a direct response of residents to the status quo, which is aimed at "eliminating the key figures in the struggle for democracy."

"The situation is so ugly that the families of police officers are now staying in the police cells to avoid attacks," he said.

Divided defence units

According to Vavi, the attacks made the formation of self defence units (SDUs) necessary.

"The defence units are well organised and members of the units are chosen by the community, rather than being self-appointed. If we tolerated that, some undesirable elements might hijack the main goal of securing peace in the community," he said.

Despite Vavi's claims, the SDUs have been plagued by division. The SDUs were based at KwaMasiza hostel, an ANC stronghold in Sebokeng. But a split developed between Numsa and ANC Vaal chairperson Ernest Sotsu, resulting in two separate defence structures.

SINCE THE BOIPATONG MASSACRE ON 18 June, the youth from different political organisations in the Vaal have made efforts to unite to defend their community against attacks, which they believe are perpetrated by security forces.

The youth hope to bring about unity at two levels. Firstly, among the ANC-aligned defence units, and secondly, between the youth from the different political organisations. Until recently there were two rival defence units in the Vaal, one accountable to the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) and another under Ernest Sotsu, chairperson of the ANC's Vaal sub-region (see main story). Although this division is still being resolved, there has been great progress in bringing together the youth of the ANC and PAC.

Youth come together

Sakhiwe Khumalo, the ANC Youth League's interim political education secretary in the Vaal, says it is imperative that youth unite. The aim of unity is to bring about peace, and a greater sense of responsibility among the youth. Khumalo sees a youth front as the only structure that will be able to champion the interests of the youth, not only in the Vaal but throughout the whole country.

According to Maurice More, ANCYL Vaal interim publicity officer, "We youth leaguers don't have problems with other formations." However, there seems to be fierce competition for members. More claims that the league's Vaal membership has swollen to 6,000, with at least 2,000 members in Se-

bokeng alone, which is among the largest branches in the country. Many people have been put on a waiting list due to a shortage of membership cards, he adds.

Thabiso Mosokotso, Sharpeville chairperson of the Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu) — the PAC's youth wing — says his structure was launched mainly to organise and politically educate the youth.

So far, Azanyu has five branches in the Vaal and two more will be launched within the next

PIC: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



Defiant: PAC youth have joined hands with their ANC counterparts to defend their communities

three months, says Mosokotso. Although Sharpeville seems to have the strongest branch, Mosotho Petlane, Azanyu's Vaal regional chairman, says Zamdela, which includes Evaton and New Farm, is the largest. He estimates that Sharpeville's signed up membership is around 300 while in Zamdela, the figure is well over 900. He goes on to challenge anyone who claims to be stronger or larger, to prove their claim.

Beyond this competition for members, the youth, regardless of political ideologies, are holding joint meetings to work out effective means of combatting violence. "We need to close the gaps that may be there between ourselves and other political structures,"

says Mosokotso.

He is convinced that those behind the violence have noticed that disunity among different organisations holds back the liberation struggle.

Initially, it was decided that the self defence units would be accountable to the community, a view held by a wide range of people, including Azanyu. But Petlane says "unfortunately posters were flown around as if SDUs were but a cocktail party." The challenge is to find ways to be accountable and security conscious.

Different approaches

Although the ANCYL and Azanyu agree on the need for the defence of communities, there are differences in approach.

Azanyu has reservations about the ANCYL's call that streets be barricaded, as they believe it is only the taxis and private cars that suffer, while hippos and casspirs drive smoothly. But the Youth League's Khumalo is convinced that street barricades are one of the most effective means of self defence.

Azanyu is also concerned that, in bringing together black youth against the 'enemy', Inkatha will be left out. To remedy this, Azanyu has invited the Inkatha Youth Brigade (IYB) and Azapo's youth wing, the Azanian Youth Organisation (Azayo), to become part of a united youth front. A preparatory meeting for this youth front took place between the ANCYL and Azanyu on 6 July.

Khumalo is very sceptical of IYB's participation in the youth front, in light of Inkatha's involvement in the violence. "It is known that Inkatha is not a mass organisation," he adds; however, the IYB will be accepted "as soon as they improve their way of operation, especially on violence."

Meanwhile, the regional secretary of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, William Nhlapo, says his organisation has never been invited to unity talks, as Petlane claimed.

Nhlapo added that although the brigade indicated their willingness to be part of the youth front to ANCYL, they are not liked by the

majority of people.

"We were part of the Crisis Committee after the Boipatong massacre, but were not invited to the broad forum," he said. IYB is anxious to be part of the youth front, as much as they are convinced that the defence of the community is paramount.

White enemy?

But the definition of 'enemy' may pose problems for the unity of the youth. The ANC is adamant that Inkatha is a part of the state, while Azanyu seems to see their enemy only in terms of whites.

As Petlane warned: "Every person, young or old, aligned or non-aligned, is beginning to develop a hatred of whites. To attest to this, let a white man drive here (Sharpeville) during the night.

"It is these white people who have voted for De Klerk, and the people want De Klerk removed from power," he said, adding that one day maybe every white will be seen as the enemy by blacks.

Both Mosokotso and Petlane are weary of the noise made about white journalists being attacked at the Boipatong funeral.

"How many black people have been killed — whether necklaced by fellow blacks or shot by white police and SADF? Yet when a white journalist is assaulted, then there is noise," they pointed out.

Petlane adds that the SABC had sent white journalists to cover the funeral in the midst of the strike by the Media Workers Association of South Africa (Mwasa).

But Mosokotso argues that Azanyu was not responsible for the attacks, and blames a splinter group, the Revolutionary Watchdogs from the East Rand. Azanyu is consulting with the PAC's publicity secretary, Barney Desai, to discipline those responsible.

In response to Azanyu's assertion that the Vaal is a no-go area for whites, the ANCYL has invited white people to go into the Vaal and see if they will be attacked. Khumalo also urged the PAC to discipline those responsible for attacking white journalists, if they are members of the organisation. ■

The split seems to have emerged after Iscor introduced the 'Omega system,' a forum supposedly aimed at ensuring worker participation in company decision making. When Iscor started retrenching people, some workers accused the shopstewards of siding with the management through the 'Omega system'.

Sotsu then allegedly accused Numsa shop stewards of being 'bought' by Iscor at a rally at KwaMasiza hostel, and urged the workers to revolt against the shopstewards.

Five Numsa shop stewards were mysteriously killed. Publicly their deaths were blamed on Inkatha members within Numsa, but this may not be the case.

Vavi says the situation was saved by the intervention of the ANC leader Nelson Mandela and the Cosatu leadership, who promised to set up a commission of inquiry comprised of members from the two factions. Sotsu also says the matter has been resolved.

However, while the 'formal' SDUs may be trying to overcome their differences, the self-appointed SDUs that have sprung up pose huge problems for community organisations.

Killings likely to continue

The undeclared war in the Vaal is unlikely to end unless the security forces are brought under neutral control, covert police operations are stopped and Kwa-Madala is closed.

But the burning question for those living in the Vaal is: how long will this take and how many people will have to die waiting for this to happen? After all, it took the Boipatong massacre for the world to notice what had been going on in the Vaal over the past two years.

Also, what will happen to those living in the Vaal in the meantime? The Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) has warned that services are about to collapse as only 11% of residents are paying service charges.

The defence units saga also shows how easily splits and tensions can develop in communities racked with poverty and violence. These splits are open to manipulation by outside forces, and it takes strong organisation to overcome such problems. With the current violence, it is impossible to build strong organisation. □

CHANGING THE GUARD?

Hopes for a future stable political culture lie in bringing the security establishment to heel — a demand that has support from within the armed forces, argues ROCKLAND WILLIAMS

FOLLOWING THE BOIPATONG MASSACRE, THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT is at last beginning to give security issues the serious attention it deserves. However, the movement needs to think bigger than mere control over the security establishment and the integration of previously warring structures in the interim period.

Control and integration may not radically alter the culture, political orientation and balance of power in the transition. *Complete restructuring* is required to achieve the goal of an accountable and representative security community.

This should embrace national security strategy and security structures; the roles, missions and organisational culture of the security establishment; the professional ethos and ethical basis of intelligence, policing and soldiering; and the racial imbalance within the various organs of the security community.

Basis for future defence force

Although mechanisms of control continue to be the bone of contention, there is some agreement — between senior MK commanders, senior ex-SADF officers, serving SADF Citizen Force officers, senior officer corps of most TVBC armies, establishment and progressive defence institutes plus a variety of major political groupings — over the principles which should govern a future defence force:

- a defence force subordinate to parliament that will respect the principles of civil supremacy;
- a civilian defence ministry that will have direct political control over the defence force;
- the primary role of a future defence force to be confined to a conventional military brief;
- a defence force excluded from an internal policing role;
- a new defence force to be created out of both the personnel

and traditions of the existing armed forces — the SADF, MK, the TVBC armies and possibly other para-military formations;

- a future defence force that enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the country's people;
- a redefinition of 'professionalism' — a thorough retraining programme for all military personnel is recommended;
- confidence-building measures between the different armies to facilitate the process of restructuring and integration;

PIC: ELMOND JIVANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



MK's Sipiwe Nyanda: Has the democratic movement given sufficient thought to the security question?

- an affirmative action programme to be implemented to ensure that a future defence force accurately reflects the gender, national, regional and racial composition of South Africa.

However, key differences and unexplored issues continue to stall the creation of a legitimate and representative defence force.

Modalities of operational control

During the transition the real battle in the defence debate will be waged around the forms of political and operational control over the armed forces.

The SADF's technocratic obsession with its 'professionalism' reflects a far more naked concern: the preservation of institutional privileges.

Consider the measures being proposed by the

democratic movement for the transition. These can be divided into formal and informal mechanisms of operational control.

Proposed formal measures include:

- the introduction of an *international monitoring* presence — not to be confused with an international peace-keeping presence — to oversee the activities of the security forces during the transition. Whether implemented at a symbolic level (a few thousand international monitors) or a substantial

level (20 - 30,000 personnel), such a presence will inhibit the armed forces from pursuing their own agenda and institute impartial accountability over their actions.

- the creation of a *joint command* council (or similar structure) to oversee the activities of the SADF, MK and the TVBC armies. Such a body will serve as a basis for confidence-building measures between the different armed forces, but will also ensure a measure of executive control over the personnel and equipment of the respective formations. It will also provide the initial basis for integration.

- *dishanding special forces* (SF) regiments and restructuring the brief of military intelligence (MI). The justification for the retention of SF and MI units hardly exists in a country facing a vastly reduced international, regional and domestic military threat scenario.

- the right of the soldier to full *constitutional rights* such as recourse to the civilian courts, protection via a code of conduct and the right to vote and belong to a political party.

Informal mechanisms of operational control include measures to curb the abilities of the officer corps, or sections therein, to influence the political process.

The numerical and technical dynamics of the integration process will limit the ability of the SADF officer corps (who will undoubtedly remain influential within a future defence force in the short to medium-term) to use the armed forces in support of covert and controversial military projects. This process will restrain sectors of the SADF from interfering in the political process and from supporting partisan interests both regionally and nationally.

An ongoing democratisation process should include: a redefinition of professionalism, the disciplinary codes and offensive nature of the armed forces; and a weeding out of racially and ethnically determined practices within present military culture.

A future recruitment debate (voluntary service versus conscription) will challenge the monopoly over the combat and operational musters presently held by white conscripts. A voluntary system of service (whether professional, part-time or both) will ensure greater representativeness.

Police and Spies

In the long term, the restructuring of the military culture of the armed forces — its strategic doctrine, its disciplinary culture, its ethnic and racial traditions — will be the most powerful factor restraining the corporate ambitions of sectors of its officer corps. The whole process could take more than a decade to accomplish.

It is also important to consider mechanisms of control over other members of the security establishment. The scenario regarding control over the South African Police (SAP) remains much bleaker than that facing the armed forces — although there are more african, coloured and indian members of the SAP than there are in the SADF (60% in the SAP vs 52% in the SADF).

The reasons for this include the strategic and political direction of the SAP's present command echelons, the social backgrounds of white SAP personnel, and the largely or exclusively white composition of its key branches (ie, Crimi-

nal Intelligence Services, Riot Squad and CID).

Unlike the military, where a large standing body of non-SADF military personnel is awaiting integration — drawn mainly from the ranks of the TVBC armies and MK — the SAP only really faces integration with the numerically inferior homeland police forces. Unlike the homeland armies — some of whose officers and rank-and-file have displayed a progressive political orientation — the homeland police forces are mostly known for their conservatism, thuggery and brutality.

It might be easier to restructure and control the National Intelligence Service (NIS) than the SAP. The urban membership, its civilian ethos and its academic orientation makes it more receptive to theories of accountability than the militarised sectors of the security establishment.

National Co-ordinating Mechanism...

The democratic movement has ignored crucial aspects of security force restructuring in its recent debates and demands, relating to the activities and mechanisms of control over the National Co-ordinating Mechanism (NCM, formerly known as the National Security Management System).

The continued existence of the NCM shows the state is being less than honest in its pursuit of the negotiating process. The NCM does not differ much from the NSMS. Although there has been an executive demilitarisation of the NCM by De Klerk, its strategic orientation remains within the framework of classic counter-insurgency strategy.

Also, the structures of the NCM at a local, district and regional level have remained virtually unaltered.

Although there has been a partial re-orientation towards a welfare brief, these structures are still dominated by the Joint Security Committees (JSCs) and the Joint Intelligence Centres (JICs).

What is the evidence to suggest this?

On 25 September 1989, the State Security Council (SSC), with De Klerk in the chair, issued an instruction to the Work Committee of the SSC to investigate and make recommendations on the workings of the NSMS. The reasons for this revision, De Klerk stated, were the unnecessary duplication of departmental activities by the NSMS, the hours wasted on NSMS meetings, and the international perception that the state under PW Botha was, de facto, a military state.

On 15 November 1989, the Commission of Enquiry delivered its report to the Cabinet and the following measures were adopted. Four Cabinet Committees were created: Constitutional Affairs; Economic Affairs; Welfare Affairs and Secu-



Protectors?: A new army should not b



Involved in internal policing

PIC THE STAR

Security Affairs. The SSC was replaced with a Committee of Departmental Heads. Its responsibility was to ensure inter-departmental coordination in the execution of national security strategy. A new security committee (the NCM) was formed to coordinate security activities at a national, regional and local level.

Executive authority has been provided to this committee through the creation of a Joint Security Staff consisting of senior officers from the SADF, SAP and NIS. It has responsibility for the execution and overseeing of all security force operations.

...still pursues 'counter-insurgency'

Yet, despite this shift towards the control and civilianisation of the executive reaches of the security pyramid, the regional, district and local levels of the NCM remained unchanged. Joint Management Centres were simply renamed Joint Coordinating Centres and the same division of labour within their structures persisted — Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Security Committee, Strategic Communications Committee and Welfare Committees.

The manual upon which state security strategy is based — the State War Book or 'Administration Total War' — remains virtually unaltered.

In certain areas — particularly the Northern Transvaal — the SADF structures within the NCM are now trying to win 'hearts and minds' among the local population using newly created black battalions (117 and 118 Infantry Battalions) rather than white troops to accomplish this mission.

The stated goal of their strategy is to counter 'revolutionary activity' in the area and they have created a new military HQ with the purpose of coordinating these efforts in the area (Group 45 HQ based in Pietersburg). Troops are being used to distribute literature, food and services in an attempt to curb the influence of 'insurrectionist' tendencies.

Democratic demands...

The democratic movement must demand the following:

- Complete transparency of structures and strategies of the NCM. If negotiations are to be characterised by 'good faith', then the retention of clandestine and covert counter-insurgency structures is a violation of this commitment.
- Disbanding or restructuring of the NCM network.
- The revision of the entire national security strategy upon which the present state predicates its security policy.

With the demise of the Cold War and in the light of regional and domestic developments, it is important to move beyond the narrow confines of traditional security strategy. A new approach to security strategy should seek to emphasise the socio-economic, developmental, psychological and regional dynamics of security strategy.

Security can be sought through a sustained effort to allay the insecurities of people on the ground (hunger; poverty; illiteracy; violence and so on).

These structures, integral to the total strategy, have operated particularly in the rural areas. The Group HQ and Commando system, for example, provide the structural basis for the Joint Intelligence Committee network of the NCM.

The continued retention of the NCM — and any other covert counter-insurgency structures — remains a vivid testimony of the extent to which the state is continuing to pursue a double agenda.

...are not unrealistic

These demands are not unrealistic in either political or military terms. Joint control and integration will prevent the chaos and lack of control that will confront a defence establishment that is politically and militarily divided (the action of the SAP in Boipatong being a classic example).

It is ironic that despite the progress made in the negotiating process, the SADF has still not sat down with the other military forces in a military Codesa. The inflexibility of the SADF on these issues raises doubts about its — or at least that of its dominant factions — genuine commitment to the transition in general.

Although the consensus that emerged around the principles of a future defence force is an encouraging sign, it should be borne in mind that the parameters of future civil-military relations will be determined, to a great extent, within the womb of present civil-military relations.

Important issues relating to restructuring of and operational control over the armed forces cannot be allowed to pass undebated. These demands should not be diluted by the democratic movement and should be further refined and developed in the future.

The democratic movement should not underestimate the extent of the support that exists within the different armed forces for both these proposals and desired mechanisms.

Not only must the democratic movement broaden its hegemony amongst the people, but it must also broaden its influence among the soldiers themselves. □

— Williams, a former soldier in both the SADF and MK, coordinates the independent Military Research Group



JEREMY
CRONIN

IN SEARCH OF A RELEVANT STRATEGY

*Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert's recent book is a useful
challenge to revolutionary strategy*

FREDERIK VAN ZYL SLABBERT HAS PRODUCED A book (*The Quest for Democracy. South African in transition*) with which I agree and disagree quite fundamentally. To put it another way, I find Slabbert's sarcasm by and large good, and his cynicism altogether bad.

"If one listened to the speeches at CODESA [One]..." Slabbert writes, "it is easy to be deluded into thinking that a democratic South Africa is only a few handshakes and a backslap away." (p78) Slabbert's dry wit is at its best when, like this, he is challenging lazy assumptions about democratisation in South Africa.

"There is no way negotiaton can be regarded as a panacea for all our social malaise", he quotes PAC's Benny Alexander as saying. "Therefore it is bound to fail". (p46). It is this "therefore", this pursuit of a magical "panacea" that particularly (and justifiably) brings out the best in Slabbert's sarcasm.

I suggest that we need to take seriously the strategic implications of Slabbert's criticisms. But there is another side. In fact, as one proceeds through this book, Slabbert slides from effective sarcasm into elite cynicism.

Democratic consensus

Slabbert's point of departure is that, in the decade of the 1990s, a universal consensus has begun to emerge around the meaning of "democracy". It is a consensus which he summarises in two basic principles to which he gives somewhat inaccessible labels: *contingent consent* and *bounded uncertainty*.

The first principle refers basically to the rules of multi-party democracy — if you win elections, you do not use your power to cancel all future elections; if you lose, you accept the right of the winners to rule until the next time round. The second principle refers basically to the need for constitutionality.

For Slabbert, who agrees with this consensus, "democracy" is a very narrow reality. It is

simply these two basic (albeit important) "rules of the political game". He is very dismissive of any broader ambitions for democracy. He would scoff at any notion of democracy as a process, for instance, of self-empowerment by ordinary people in an ever wider sphere of their daily lives.

Slabbert believes that this new, and limited, "world-wide consensus" around democracy also now has support from the leaderships of the two major power blocs in South Africa (the NP and the ANC). And so, this is the second main step in his argument, the best way of ensuring democratisation in South Africa is: "Don't rock the boat". Leave the transition to the negotiators.

Elitism

It is in making these two foundation points in his argument that the sharp edge of Slabbert's intelligence deserts him.

Certainly, the broad ANC-alliance now accepts more fully than ever before, both multi-party democracy and constitutionality. Of course, most people within the alliance would enrich these bare-bones "rules of the game" with a much fuller conception of democracy.

But does De Klerk accept even the very lean, scaled-down Slabbert version of democracy?

The plain fact is that De Klerk does not. In particular this applies to the sting in the tail of Slabbert's first principle — namely "the losers will accept the right of the winners to govern for the while and take binding decisions." (p3) De Klerk is actively seeking to ensure that winners will only be allowed to govern if they co-govern as equal partners with the main losers.

What is more, in order to soften up ANC resistance to this undemocratic demand, the regime has unleashed a systematic low inten-

Left Alliance

sity war against township dwellers. It is simply not viable to tell the ANC-alliance: "Let the elite negotiators get on with it". Apart from anything else, the regime itself is not following this path, whatever its protestations to the contrary.

Burden of democracy

Instead of being sceptical about De Klerk, Slabbert's scepticism comes to be directed at ordinary people at large. Democracy is something too delicate to allow the servants to handle. There are too many noisy, popular expectations surrounding democracy. This is the "burden of democracy" (the title of a recent paper delivered by Slabbert to the SA Institute of International Affairs). It is a burden for which elites (like the "white man" of colonial mythology) must now assume responsibility.

The greatest threat to democracy is the people themselves, they must be kept at arms length from it:

"One of the most daunting challenges facing [a future interim government of unity]", we are told, "is to protect the new political space created by negotiations from being used to contest the historical imbalances that precipitated negotiation in the first place..." (p90).

What on earth does Slabbert imagine millions of people are struggling for?

Slabbert, I am sure, imagines that his position is more or less even-handed, neutral as between the two major parties. But in practice the entire thrust of his argument is to call for the demobilisation of our one major strength, mass support, and to vest a great deal of naive trust in De Klerk.

Where has all his cynicism suddenly gone?

In essence, Slabbert is asking us to believe that De Klerk is a democrat. He is asking us to believe that the less pressure upon De Klerk, the better the chances for democracy.

I disagree fundamentally with this the major assumption within Slabbert's argument. But his book still poses an important strategic challenge.

Realistic yet revolutionary

Since February 1990 the broad national liberation alliance has vacillated between a less cynical version of Slabbert's position and an ultra-militant reaction to it. We have moved back and forth between "Don't rock the boat because negotiations are about to deliver the transfer of power" and periodic bursts of rhetorical militancy. These bursts are often not very

positions all greatly exaggerate the simplicity involved in empowering the people of our country. They come in several variants — among them the notion of the transfer of power as a flag-down-flag-up event, or as an imminent popular seizure of power. Against these utopian, once-off events, Slabbert is correct to underline soberly the balance of forces.

"De Klerk...has not precipitated transition because his regime is on the point of collapse... He did so in a deliberate and pre-emptive fashion..." (p40)

Likewise, Slabbert is right to chasten utopian dreams with some basic reminders about state power. Even if the ANC were to handsomely win elections within an altogether democratic constitution, could we speak easily of a "transfer of power"? What about the "largely

PIC: DECIL SOLS (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



Elite convergence: But without mass support, a settlement is not possible

distinguishable from Benny Alexander's "Negotiations can't solve *everything*, therefore they are bound to fail."

Slabbert is quite right to unleash his sarcasm against utopian positions. These

hostile or apathetic civil service" (p63), not to mention the security forces?

My problem with Slabbert is that he raises these points in order to disarm us. In effect, Slabbert is telling us: "De Klerk

is a democrat... and I'm warning you, you had better believe it because he is not about to meekly hand over power, or collapse".

What if the latter part of this view is right, but the former is absolutely wrong? Or, to put it another way, is there a path



Slabbert: Good sarcasm, bad cynicism

between utopias on the one hand, and Slabbert's brand of elite cynicism on the other?

I believe there is. Indeed, the most useful thing about Slabbert's book is that it challenges us to formulate a more adequate revolutionary strategy.

Understanding constitutional negotiations

In the first place such a strategy needs to be rooted in a firm grasp of the fundamentally contradictory character of the interests represented by De Klerk on the one side, and by the liberation movement on the other. Exaggerating the degree of consensus, pinning hopes on the 'integrity' of regime personalities, are fundamentally futile.

Equally futile, and equally reformist in the long run, are the positions that seem to be ultra-militant: "We will never

negotiate with the regime until they have accepted all our principles". Negotiations are not based on a present or future miracle conversion of the regime.

The present negotiations, deadlocked as they are at the moment, are based on an extremely limited consensus between the regime and the liberation movement. Both want (or need) to move away from the present racial constitution. Both, as Raymond Suttner has put it usefully, "want to move away from X (an apartheid constitution). But De Klerk wants to go to X1, we want to go to Y." This extremely limited consensus presents a window of opportunity for a revolutionary strategy that includes negotiations as an important component.

But if we mistake the limited consensus on DEPARTURE for a consensus on DESTINATION we will simply end up in X1. The task is to use the opportunity of a limited consensus to bend the direction of transition towards an ongoing process of democratisation. How?

A mass driven process

The process of democratisation must be mass-based. A successful national democratic transformation will essentially be a process of self-empowerment by the popular masses spearheaded by the working class.

To speak of the self-transfer of political power to the people as a process (not an event) does not mean that we should fall into an evolutionary reformism. Precisely because of the deep-seated contradiction between two different blocs of class forces, democratisation cannot be approached as a slow, incremental winning of partial reforms.

While a struggle for reforms is not in itself wrong or reformist, a strategy based on the simple accumulation of reforms is. The process of transformation must be one of both reforms *and* qualitative breaks, significant, if still partial, ruptures. What will be critical in this process is our ability to actively and energetically use the platform of each of these breaks (eg phase one interim government, or constituent assembly elections) to develop our mass striking capacity and

to deepen the momentum towards our fuller objectives.

Related directly to this is the fact that the actual detail of negotiated arrangements, as important as it may be, is *less* important than ensuring we carry a mobilised, organised mass constituency *into* and *through* the process of constitutional negotiations, and onwards.

Turning on the tap?

Our present resort to mass action following the Codesa deadlock is not wrong. But if there had been a breakthrough at Codesa 2, mass struggle (in different forms) would have been equally essential to ensure speedy and honest implementation of the agreements.

In short, it is critical that in the present we coordinate our principal weapon — mass support (along with other things like international solidarity) — so that we bring it to bear effectively upon the constitutional negotiations process. But *we must not confine or inhibit* mass struggle to this purpose. Instead we need to encourage, facilitate and indeed build the kind of fighting grassroots political organisations that can lead and sustain a thousand and one local struggles against the numerous injustices our people suffer.

Above all, we need to move away from an understanding of mass struggle as simply opposition to an undemocratic government. When we have a democratically elected government, mass mobilisation will be critical to enable the implementation of its popular mandate. The struggle against illiteracy, for instance, or the struggle to defend democratic economic policies against the International Monetary Fund, will require mass mobilisation and campaigning. To make these points in 1992 is not an irrelevancy. It should tell us what kind of liberation movement we are trying to build now.

Democracy is self-empowerment of the people. Unless the broad popular masses are actively and continuously engaged in struggle, we will achieve only the empty shell of a limited democracy.

In short, moving from Slabbert's generally correct and sober assessment of the actual balance of forces in our country, we need to develop a strategic programme that is exactly the opposite of what he recommends. □

FREE ENTERPRISE IS WORKING?



By Patrick Bond

NOTWITHSTANDING BILLBOARD MIRAGES ERECTED BY THE SMALL Business Development Corporation, combi taxis are mired in a massive crisis. Meshack Khosa, a twenty-seven year-old Sowetan, is one of the few with sufficient guts and analysis to reveal why.

During a brief stay at Oxford University in late May, I met an exhausted but happy Khosa, who had just tumbled out of his oral doctoral examination. Khosa impressed his DPhil supervisors liberal South Africa expert Tony Lemon and international Marxist scholar David Harvey with a thesis entitled *Capital accumulation, the apartheid state and the rise of the black taxi industry*.

By all accounts it is a magnificent piece of work, and should be required reading for free enterprise hucksters in both Pretoria parastatals and township taxi-ranks.

Khosa begins his 400-page thesis with a giddy quote from the *Star* newspaper's Patrick Laurence: "The robust, competitive taxi drivers can be seen as evidence that capitalism is alive and well, and that even within apartheid South Africa, where for decades Black business was shackled, the capitalist ethos is strong and growing."

For a few years, Khosa concedes, the combi system generated enormous profits for fleet-builders. But capitalism, for all its advances over prior modes of human organisation, has in-built crisis tendencies: "Capitalist penetration led to the revolutionary growth of the taxi industry. Unavoidably, crises associated with capitalist accumulation are evident in the industry."

Khosa studied "five dynamic tendencies" which developed during the 1980s:

- First, capitalism expands the geographical limits of its markets and transforms more areas of social life into profit-making activities. The infusion of large-scale industrial and financial capital into the taxi industry heralded the commodification of the indigenous mutual aid system (eg, *stokvels*) in the black community in general, and in the taxi industry in particular.

- Second, capitalist penetration tends to increase the size of corporations and concentrates the control and ownership of capital in proportionately fewer hands. There is emerging a class of taxi barons who occupy powerful positions within taxi associations.

- Third, accumulation spreads wage labour as the prevalent system of production and draws a larger proportion of the population into wage labour status, replacing family or individual labour in the taxi industry.

- Fourth, capital keeps changing the labour process through the imposition of increasingly sophisticated labour control strategies: recruitment of labour from rural areas; pacification

of drivers; use of the quota system (daily income targets); and use of spies in monitoring driver performance and loyalty.

- Fifth, accumulation crisis becomes evident over time: lower rates of return on investment; low levels of liquidity; steady build-up of debt.

Association members declined by 50% in recent years. He documents record levels of default on taxi loans; over-supply of vehicles in the taxi ranks; desperate monopoly pricing practices; intensified exploitation of labour; driver speed-up; and violent taxi feuds, which all reflect the growing intensity of the crisis.

All transport taking a commodity form is subject to crisis, Khosa insists. Free transport would solve the problem, but is a long way off in South Africa. Khosa aims to begin research into "establishing co-operative taxi systems and lift clubs which might allow community control of capital" as the beginning of a real solution to the transport problems facing black South Africans.

In the meantime, I remind Khosa, the Small Business Development Corporation and other charlatan development agencies still promote economic 'empowerment' using the

PIC: SAMSON SE



Making money: But the industry is in a crisis

taxi industry as a model.

Khosa decries this as "enforced entrepreneurship through unemployment and the government's privatisation and deregulation policies."

Even on their own terms, measured in hard profits, such policies are now failing miserably. "Can we, therefore, conclude that poor and working people are eagerly embracing entrepreneurship and the enterprise culture?," Khosa asks. "Evidence in most cases suggests otherwise." □



C. ABDUL SHARIFF

A democrat's guide to the **DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA**

Will the DBSA have a role to play in the new South Africa? Drawing from the latest annual report and sources inside and outside the bank, WIP has compiled this report

THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SA (DBSA) was in the news recently when protests led to Barend du Plessis withdrawing as a candidate for its president. The announcement that Professor Wiseman Nkhuhlu is to become the bank's vice-president, with Dr Ntatho Motlana and Eric Molobi of the Kagiso Trust joining him on the board of directors, once again raises questions about the democratic movement's relations with the institution.

The DBSA was established in 1983 by the SA and TBVC governments. Initially, the intended beneficiaries were people living in the homelands.

However, in the homelands many of the normal activities of a government and an economy were described as 'developmental activities'. These were supported by non-accountable external agencies (like DBSA) or direct grants from central government. Over time, DBSA became an important channel of control, particularly over the TBVC states.

The focus of DBSA today includes black urban areas and is being gradually extended to include some non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Lending is still overwhelmingly to homeland or black urban authorities.

Hundreds of millions of rands have been sunk into projects that have served to entrench apartheid. However, the DBSA has also helped, citing rational planning, to stop 'stupid' and 'corrupt' projects.

The DBSA's long term strategic objectives include:

- continuing as a major source of support for 'development needs' of poor communities;
- channelling and management of foreign aid flows;
- promotion of regional development in a new context within South Africa;
- regional development finance in Southern Africa.

According to the latest annual report, the DBSA currently has assets of over R4,5-billion, mostly in loans to homeland governments or their parastatals. These assets were largely built up using grant funds from the SA government totalling R2,9-b to date, with the balance financed by borrowing. The DBSA's net income from interest on these loans is nearly R140-million. This income is assured by the government, which finances homeland budgets.

The DBSA is an inefficient agency. Its latest annual report shows that the



Molobi: On the board of directors

1991/2 expenditure of R86-m was over 11% of the value of loans advanced (R760-m). This compares unfavourably with agencies like the IDT, which operates at around 2%.

The difficulties of engaging effectively with the DBSA and turning it into an agency which could serve the broader SA community should not be underestimated. Increasing the DBSA's legitimacy and improving its image — which has been an important objective for the DBSA staff.

Du Plessis: Withdrew as a candidate for president



PIC ROBERT 80

The difficulties of engaging effectively with the DBSA and turning it into an agency which could serve the broader SA community should not be underestimated. Increasing the DBSA's legitimacy and improving its image — which has been an important objective for the

What of the DBSA's future? Since most homeland and black urban authorities will disappear under a new constitution, the DBSA will only survive if a new government underwrites their debts. This may be appropriate if it is decided that an institution like the DBSA is useful, but it

will require the commitment of government funds at a time when there are many other demands on these.

A decision will thus have to be made at the time of constitutional negotiations as to whether the DBSA should continue to exist.

In the regional context, there will be a clear need for a development finance institution. Some elements within the DBSA see this as their long term future role.

But on political grounds, it would be unwise to look at this as a solution. A growing regional concern is the threat of South African economic domination. The location of a regional development bank outside SA is the logical option to address this fear.

ANC policy

What should the policy of the ANC and other liberation movements be towards the DBSA? If we believe that we are moving towards an interim government, there may be advantages in closer en-

gagement. It would arguably be easier for democrats to gain real control over the DBSA than over a Pretoria department — and it could provide a useful training ground for this.

It is also apparent that the DBSA's weaknesses offer scope to determine the terms of such engagement. There is potential to open up further existing contradictions within the state; between the rational economists and the more intransigent white supremacist politicians, for example. It may also be possible to gain access to the research resources of the DBSA, as appears to have happened with the production of a draft National Development Strategy prepared for the ANC

and the politicians within state structures between the rational economists is potential for opening further contradictions to be gained. For example, there are benefits to be gained. Thus the issue is whether there are benefits to be gained. For example, there are benefits to be gained. Thus the issue is whether there are benefits to be gained.

Do we need the DBSA?

The annual report explains that the DBSA is not reimbursed for providing support services to the government and that inefficiencies are now being addressed through an in-house cost control drive. The main problem is staffing, which is high in relation to the resources available for distribution. The DBSA currently has some 700 staff who accounted for over 75% of operating costs in recent years.

One of the areas in which the DBSA has been particularly active is in formulating and promoting policy. This is in part a reflection of relatively lavish staffing, which enables the DBSA to devote considerable resources to discussing policy issues with borrower institutions. This 'policy leverage' — the use of lending power to influence policy of borrowers — is used widely by international development aid agencies, notably the World Bank. In the urban debate, the DBSA's relatively positive initial role (putting the reality of urban development in white SA on the political map) has not been matched by the allocation of major financial resources to support the breakdown of the apartheid city.

In entrepreneurial development, the focus has been almost entirely on home-land development corporations which have specific local political functions with a virulent 'anti-cooperative' stance. However, previous student demands for the privatisation of functions, promoting entrepreneurship and generally reducing the role of the state, have been calmed recently as the political realities became apparent. The ideological background for policy is less and less clear, probably as a result of the changing external environment.



Dr Mamphela Ramphela

Ever since her pioneering health and community work in the Eastern Cape two decades ago, prestigious awards, appointments and achievements have become the stuff of Dr Mamphela Ramphela's remarkable life. But out of the public eye, who is this dynamo?

Your first thought this morning?

It's a hard world. Why must I get up when I've got flu? I should be in bed.

Who cooks and cleans in your home?

I have a very good support person who has been staying with me since 1977, and she's really the housekeeper in every sense of the word.

Your favourite meal?

A very well-prepared piece of fish, with fresh vegetables.

Any addictions?

No, thank God not. I used to smoke and I stopped. I don't even think it was an addiction because I woke up one day and said "I'm not going to smoke" — after smoking 30 cigarettes a day. That was in '81 or '82 and I haven't for a moment thought of having a cigarette.

What's the worst thing about living Cape Town?

Gosh. I really have to scratch my head. I don't know.

It's all good?

It's excellent. I mean, where else can you want to live in SA? The day I leave Cape Town, I leave SA. This is it.

What or who would you die for?

Let me tell you: When you are young,

there are lots of things you can die for. And I think as you get older it gets to be very difficult to see what you will die for ... certainly my kids. But you wouldn't get me dying for causes any more.

What do you no longer believe in?

I don't know whether it's a question of no longer believing in something. It's a question of having a broader insight into things, seeing that issues are not black and white, they are very complex. And, therefore, one has to be open to many possibilities. I think that's a great relief.

Is there an animal that characterises you?

No ... in terms of the horoscope I'm supposed to be a Capricorn, but whether that has anything to do with who I am, I don't know. I'm sure a lot of people don't know that I'm very shy. I forget sometimes — until I catch myself being shy.

Your biggest regret?

1977.

Favourite pop artist?

Mmmm ... I haven't listened to pop for



Ramphela: The day I leave Cape Town, I leave SA

quite some time — that gives away my age [laughs]. I listen to classical music and I find it really is calming.

Your favourite composer?

Mozart. But Beethoven I sometimes find even more relaxing because he has that kind of deeper sense to his music.

What physical exercise do you do?

Walk. It's a pity that I have this operation on my feet. But otherwise, every Saturday, I walk for four hours minimum.

On the mountain, of course ...

Indeed.

Complete this sentence: If I were a

dictator for a day ...

I think I would get everybody to consider how best they can arm themselves, to protect themselves against dictatorship.

Your thoughts on detention without trial?

I think it is horrible, to say the least. And in this country it has cost so much in terms of lives that it is a history we should put behind us.

Your least favourite politician?

[sighs] In this country there are so many ...

Something that makes you feel proud being South African?

I think it's the capacity of South Africans to really keep going. My God, we've been at this for some time and we don't seem to lose hope.

One excuse you're tired of?

The "I didn't know" excuse.

An excuse you still use?

The "I had no choice" kind of excuse. Like, when I overburden myself and I find myself with a thousand things to do in one day and I say "I couldn't help it". It's ridiculous.

What would you change about yourself?

I think very little, quite strangely. Though I would have wanted to come back to university life much earlier than I did.

What makes you feel secure?

It's the sense of freedom inside me. That kind of thing when we talk about the new SA and liberation as if they're going to happen out there ... Once I became liberated inside, that really gave me a lot of security.

Your biggest fear?

Violence. The fear of being violated as a person.

Your favourite South African cliché or expression?

'Nogal'. I love it.

Do you have a secret desire?

Yes. It is to retire now and spend life reading, writing and reflecting.

Your happiest moment?

When my eldest son was born.

In a previous issue of WIP, Benny Alexander called homosexuality "unAfrican" — what are your thoughts?

I take a very dim view of anybody labelling things as African or unAfrican, European or unEuropean.

It's a dangerous generalisation because the fact that people didn't admit to homosexuality does not mean it didn't exist.

What do you think about green issues?

They are life and death issues. And it's a pity that they tend to be seen as things that happen on the fringes of society. I believe very strongly that if we don't take care of our own environment, we're literally going to drown in our own mess.

Who's the apple of your eye?

My sons, of course.

The chore you dislike most?

Ooh. I don't like domestic chores generally — whether it be dish-washing or doing the laundry. But at the same time I dislike filth. So, either I get somebody else to do it or I get a machine to do it, so I have all the mod equipment to get it all done [laughs].

Is there an image that sums up this country for you?

A plant that's struggling to emerge behind a big boulder, that's crooked and yet really determined to grow.

Should employers be allowed to

have workers tested for AIDS?

No, I think that's a violation of their integrity. What we need is a much broader campaign and approach than thinking we can just identify the 'witches' and get rid of them — that's not going to solve the problem.

When was the last time you used public transport?

In Germany in May ... trains. They were excellent. It's a pity this country doesn't have a good public transport system.

What makes you feel guilty?

Sometimes, looking at myself and how successful I have become in relation to other people I feel a little tinge of guilt. But it's a misplaced guilt, it's the guilt of a survivor. I shouldn't be feeling guilty, it's the system that should be feeling guilty.

And accomplished?

The feeling of peace within myself, and the self-confidence that I can set myself goals and achieve them.

Complete: At the end of a hard day, I ...

... get home, get into my shoes and just walk up this hill [points] because I live just around the corner. And just get fresh air into my lungs and look down on the peninsula and think "Well, there is still life".

Is there a person you'd want to meet?

Yes. Vaclav Havel, the president of Czechoslovakia. I've read a lot of what he's written and he comes across as a real 'mensch'.

What do you think of WIP/New Era?

I get it regularly. I've always used it as a very important source of information about NGO politics and the news behind the news. And I've found it quite useful.

Who should answer this questionnaire next?

Frene Ginwala.

— *Hein Marais asked the questions*

A response to Mayekiso

'CIVIL SOCIETY' DOES NOT EQUAL DEMOCRACY

How independent should civics be from political organisations, and does a 'vibrant civil society' necessarily serve the interests of the working class? BLADE NZIMANDE and MPUME SIKHOSANA lock horns with Mzwanele Mayekiso

SLOGANS LIKE THE HEADLINE 'HANDS OFF THE CIVICS AND CIVIL society' to Mayekiso's article in *WIP* 81, can never substitute for proper theoretical and political debate to clarify our strategy and tactics in the national liberation struggle.

Mayekiso gives the impression that if the ANC adopts an 'official position' on civics, then the debate is/should be closed. Such an attitude is an attempt to avoid carefully considering and debating one of the key questions facing the South African revolution in transforming apartheid into a people's democracy.

Factually incorrect

First of all, it is factually incorrect for Mayekiso to simply 'pigeon hole' our serious attempt at debating the question of civics and 'civil society' into an 'anti-civics' stance. Let us point out a few things to correct this wrong impression.

Our *Mayibuye* (June 1991) article was a very specific intervention directed at what we saw as a lack of debate about the relationship between civics and ANC branches during the period immediately after 2 February 1990. It stems also from the tension we saw developing between these two formations in some townships.

We are not cashing in on this tension, as Mayekiso seems to suggest — we are not as irresponsible as he thinks. The *Mayibuye* piece was aimed primarily at combating what we saw as a dangerous political practice of dichotomising 'civics' and 'ANC branches', instead of seeing them as part of the national democratic revolution — each distinct, but nevertheless converging and complementary.

We also strongly believe, as we argue in our *African Communist* article, that the compartmentalisation of 'civic' and 'political' issues, with each belonging separately to civics and ANC branches respectively, is not only politically dangerous, but is also a misrepresentation of the situation in our country.

This does not suggest that civics should be dependent formations, or that civics should be mere transmission belts of the ANC. The danger that we were highlighting was that when

ANC members are faced with civic issues, they then rush to build civics, sometimes at the expense of building ANC branches that are also able to deal with such issues.

Civics born out of ANC

In fact, in many townships civics are born out of attempts by the ANC to tackle local community issues. Some take the form of ANC initiated ad-hoc committees dealing with specific matters, eg transport, roads, services, rent, etc. In other areas they ultimately become full-blown civics.

Yet, in some townships like Edendale in Pietermaritzburg, ANC branches have become active local structures that initiate mass campaigns on local issues. Such developments do not in themselves mean that civics are not important, nor do they preclude the formation of civic organisations.

At Edendale the ANC branches have launched mass campaigns for the upgrading of services in the township, dealing with crime, and a campaign to have the Edendale hospital transferred from KwaZulu to the Natal Provincial Administration. In these campaigns landowners, traders and other sectors of the community have been drawn in under the leadership of the ANC zonal committee.

It is possible that these structures and struggles can evolve into civic organisations. The point we are making is that one cannot be too prescriptive about the form community struggles should take. In any case civics are by their very nature born out of local struggles and not simply imposed on people, in the form of blue-prints.

As we said in the *Mayibuye* article — 150 ANC branches must not shy away from civic issues. The nature of struggles and formations that emerge at local level will be determined by the composition of local communities, the political forces present within particular communities, etc. In some areas it is possible for ANC branches to act simultaneously as civics, in others it is impossible.

We find it unacceptable that Cde Mayekiso accuses us of blocking the development of civics in the Natal Midlands, instead of engaging with the issues we are raising. As a matter of fact one of us (Mpume Sikhosana) is secretary of one of the

strongest civics in the Natal Midlands, the Sobantu Residents Association.

It is unfortunate that when a comrade is forced to debate and question what he has come to accept as 'conventional wisdom' — 'civil society as a watchdog of the state' — he avoids the content of the debate. We want to make a few brief

comments on some of the substantive issues raised by Mayekiso.

Firstly, the quotation he has from the *Mayibuye* article is carefully selected by him in order to try and prove that we are anti-civics. The complete quotation goes like this: "The danger of the argument that civics should take up issues of rent, electricity, roads, etc, and the ANC branch takes up (undefined) political issues, is that it falls squarely within the strategy to separate the ANC from its mass base."

Here we were highlighting the *danger* of this approach, which can lead to the ANC branches abandoning civic issues.

This is a very real possibility that should not be lightly dismissed. Rather let it be debated.

Civil society and democracy

The other issue we would like to take up is his rather bold but problematic assertion that the launch of the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) "is an auspicious contribution to the struggle for a firm civil society that serves the working class".

While we agree with the fact that the formation of Sanco is a major contribution to our struggle and we fully welcome its launch, it is not necessarily true that a firm civil society will in itself serve the working class.

In fact this is precisely the point we are trying to raise in our AC article in particular: a firm civil society can act against the interests of the working class.

The advanced capitalist countries have a very firm civil society that does not serve the interests of the working class in those countries. 'Civil society' there is an institutional expression of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the exploitation of the working class.

Another point is that because of the uncritical use of the notion of 'civil society', there is also an assumption that civil society has a harmony within which civic organisations can be protected 'from rivalries with political organisations'.

Civics should not aim and can never succeed in their attempts to insulate themselves from the expression of differ-

ent political tendencies from within their own ranks. Civics will always be contested terrains for different political tendencies that may represent interests of members belonging to various political organisations or parties, or even from members belonging to the same political organisations.

Civics also represent different classes or class fractions within them (mainly the working class and elements of the petty bourgeoisie). These different class interests may translate into competing political approaches and programmes of action. The fact that civics in the township are predominantly working class in their membership, does not in itself mean that they automatically express working class interests. This has to be struggled for within civics themselves.

In short, the approach adopted by civics in dealing with local issues will be informed by their understanding of the political economy of South Africa, the nature of the apartheid state and the necessary strategy and tactics to be adopted. By the very nature of civics, different approaches to these issues will be found within them. An attempt to deny these will be tantamount to 'depoliticising' the civic organisations and civic struggles.

Mass organisation

Lastly, Mayekiso tends to confuse or conflate mass organisations with 'civil society'. This assumption underlies many of the arguments based on the notion of a 'vibrant and independent civil society'

Mass organisations do not equal 'civil society', and a 'vibrant civil society' does not equal democracy. When people argue for an 'independent civil society', they often actually mean autonomous mass organisations. Strong and democratic mass organisations can maintain their autonomy even if they operate within the state structures.

The Nicaraguan example is instructive here. For the first three to five years of Sandinista rule, many of the mass organisations directly performed state functions at local level after the collapse of Somocista state institutions, and while the new state was trying to build its own organs. These mass organisations did not merely become extensions of the Sandinista state, mainly because they were able to actively maintain their accountability to their mass constituency. □

— Nzimande and Sikhosana are leading members of the ANC and SACP in the Natal Midlands



Mayekiso: Confuses mass organisation with civil society



Nzimande: It is dangerous to compartmentalise 'civic' and 'political' issues



PAY AS YOU LEARN

NAZIR CARRIM and **YUSUF SAYED** argue that Model C schools are designed to maintain existing inequalities in education well into the New South Africa

EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT announced that all white schools should convert to Model C. This has once again drawn attention to white schooling in South Africa. The Model C conversions highlight the job insecurities of white teachers, the unilateral decisions taken by the De Klerk government about issues of national concern, and the 'rationalisation' and privatisation of education.

In October 1990, the then Minister of Education and Culture, Piet Clase, announced three models that white schools could choose in order to enrol black pupils:

- Model A, where the school closes down as a state school and reopens as a private school;
- Model B, where the school remains under the state but with an open admissions policy;
- Model C, a semi-private and semi-state aided school.¹

By the end of 1991 a fourth model, Model D, was announced. Model D was like model B but had no restrictions on the number of black pupils.

White schools were expected to go through stringent voting procedures in order to gain the consent of the school's white parent community to convert to a particular model. By the beginning of 1992, 98% of those schools which had voted, opted for Model B and about 2% voted for Model C. Despite the overwhelming choice of Model B nationally, the Minister of white education asked all of these schools to convert to Model C.

Minister Org Marais, the current Minister of Education and Culture, argued that he was forced to convert white schools

to Model C because the government could no longer fund white education as before. Under the old system, at least 10,000 white teachers would have to be retrenched. With the Model C conversions, it will only be necessary to retrench some 4,000 teachers, said Marais.

Model C requires the school's parent community to pay for the school's daily operating costs. These costs seem to include the maintenance of buildings and administrative costs. It is not clear whether operating costs would also include the purchase of books. The state would pay for teachers' salaries.

From race to class

To meet costs, Model C schools would have to consider increasing school fees, hiring out school facilities, fundraising ventures and private sponsorship. The school is expected to become a commercial enterprise, subjecting itself to the play of market forces. 'Good' schools would come to mean schools that are profitable and able to attract investment.

Increasing school fees would render education a privilege of the few who could afford it. Parents would now be expected to pay an estimated R1,200 - R1,500 a year per child in contrast to the previous fees of R420 - R650. Parents who have more than one child of school-going age may even be forced to choose which of their children to educate.

One consequence would be that Model C schools would increasingly take on a distinct class character. Generally, working class children would not have access to these schools.

The increase in school fees would also inevitably decrease the number of

black pupils at Model C schools. Generally, black parents would not be able to afford such high school fees. Thus, while Model C schools would technically be able to enrol black pupils, in reality black pupils may not be able to afford to attend such schools.

Hiring out school facilities and soliciting private sector sponsorship would inadvertently transform the school into a business venture. It would then become necessary for schools to appoint people with entrepreneurial skills and business acumen to run the affairs of the school.

Fundamentally, then, the Model C conversions commodifies and privatises white education, as in other sectors like health, telecommunication and transport. One could 'shop' for the type of knowledge one wants, if one could pay for it.

Locking away privilege

One of the reasons for subsidy cuts in white education is because government wants to rationalise and equalise its per capita expenditure for education across all races, seemingly in response to progressive demands.

On the surface, it seems as if such cuts on white education were inevitable. At the end of 1991, every white child received a R4,103 state subsidy, while every black child received R777.73 and R1,560.47 in primary and secondary schools respectively.²

However, there is a more fundamental issue at stake here. Semi-privatising white education at this point in South Africa's history insulates white schools from any future redistribution of educational resources. A future government would be unable to take control of white

schools because they would then be owned by a plurality of actors, both in the private sector and civil society.

Thus, although the Model C conversions appear to be an attempt at equalisation, they ensure the maintenance of white privileges in education.

Such rationalisation means that South Africa is likely to have Model C, private and state schools in the future. The majority of South Africans are likely to go to state schools. Although cleverly deracialised, these school types would maintain existing social inequalities.

More parental control?

However, the Model C conversions do enable parents to have a greater and more meaningful say in the running of school affairs — albeit at a price. This is a positive feature, because parents will be able to comment on the type of education their children receive and render teachers more accountable to them.

Given the historical manipulation of education under apartheid, greater parental involvement could ensure that such schools would no longer be ideological playing fields for the government of the day. Teachers would have to be accountable to the people they serve, since the parents would have a greater say in employment policies.

But such newly acquired powers might be abused by parents and school communities. 'Radical' teachers may be summarily dismissed and Model C schools may steer clear of employing black teachers.

Apart from the potential retrenchment of some 4,000 white teachers, Model C conversions have made teachers insecure. Although the state will still pay their salaries, teachers may be hired or fired on the recommendation of the school's management council or community. Teachers would thus constantly walk on eggs, having to win the favour of the management council, school community and state at the same time, all the time. This, however, could mean that Model C teachers would become unionised to secure their own interests and gain more job security.

Possibilities for transformation

The opportunities created by the Clase Models for progressive intervention are

now effectively narrowed. In line with privatisation and rationalisation strategies, Model C conversions again remove white schools from the wider reality of education in South Africa as a whole.

Implicit in the increased parental control in Model C schools is the shift of educational conflict from the state to the school community, in particular between

and deepening the meaning and processes of democracy. More people would also be involved in defining the nature of the school so that it reflects the interests of the community, rather than a privileged few.

The Model C conversions attempt to place class at the centre of the stage while deracialising educational provision. In



Race to class: Model C schools will not be accessible to working class kids

PIC: ABDOUL SHA

teachers and parents. At the same time, the state also increases its legitimacy by appearing to give parents more choice. This enables the state to project itself as the chief custodian of democracy.³

The shifting of conflict into the community means that particular parents' views, norms and values would be placed above others.

But this also opens up the possibility of contesting predominant views and the extent to which they reflect the majority of the community, thereby contesting

this way, inequality is perpetuated in the name of 'choice' and 'democracy'.

The demands of the progressive education movement still remain. These include transforming the educational system to redress apartheid inequalities and increase access to education for all South Africans. □

— Carrim and Sayed are based at the education departments of Wits University and the University of Western Cape respectively

FOOTNOTES

1. See Carrim & Sayed in WIP 74, May 1991, for a more detailed discussion of the Clase models.
2. SA Institute of Race Relations annual survey 1991/92.
3. It is also possible to view these strategies as being part of the discourse of the 'new right'. See Bennel, P and Swainson, N in *Education and the 'new right' in South Africa* by Elizabeth Dostal, Education Policy Unit, Wits University, 1990 and Tickly, L: *Thatcherism and Education*, EPU, Wits, 1991 for more detailed discussion on the 'new right's' discourse.



BACK TO THE BRANCHES

– Abortion and ‘prostitution’ get the cold shoulder

Within current policy development discussions there are two issues that keep getting nudged aside ‘for further discussion’. The ANC, in particular, seems loathe to commit itself policy-wise to the issues of abortion and commercial sex work — yet both have enormous implications for women’s rights and health policy in a future democratic South Africa, argues ANNE HILTON

THE ISSUES OF ABORTION AND COMMERCIAL SEX PRACTICE (OR ‘prostitution’) have plenty in common besides being considered ‘too sensitive’ for upfront political discussion. Both deal with gender power relations in society and both are often marginalised because of religious and moral objections.

Yet if women are to become fully and meaningfully emancipated in order to participate in a future democratic South Africa, it is essential that these issues are resolved.

Illegal abortions risky

Between 200,000-300,000 women seek illegal abortions every year at great risk to their health, life and fertility.

Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto admits approximately 15,000 patients a year with infections related to illegal abortions. Of these, three or four women die, unnecessarily. By contrast only one percent of legal abortions become infected.

These figures do not take account of the complications which may result from these infections — like infertility. Most victims of restrictive abortion facilities are oppressed and poor women, inevitably black women in South Africa.

Women seek abortions when their jobs are at stake; when they are financially insecure, and cannot afford the burden of another mouth to feed; when contraception has failed; and when partners desert them or are unwilling to accept the consequences of their sexual activity.



Selling sex: The rights of sex workers cannot be ignored

Two positions on abortion can be broadly identified.

One, often referred to as pro-life, assumes the rights of the foetus over the mother and defines life as beginning at conception. This position regards abortion as murder of a living organism and will only condone abortion under very restrictive circumstances, such as danger to the mother’s life. Pro-lifers deny women’s rights, undermine the impact of patriarchy and oppression on pregnancy, and hold strong moral and religious opinions on the matter.

Arguments pushing for the availability of abortion, on the other hand, recognise the need for abortion in the face of overwhelming statistics, and take into account patriarchy and women’s oppression which often deny women control over their own lives and bodies.

During the recent policy development process of the ANC, both pro-life and pro-choice views were strongly voiced.

Only one ANC region discussed the abortion issue in any depth. The health commission of the PWV region suggested abortion should be made available, together with pre- and post-abortion counselling and appropriate support systems.

This recommendation was taken to the broader PWV regional conference where it was subjected to considerable debate. There was a strong reaction against the idea, with very clear pro-life sentiments being expressed. In a male dominated audience, the pro-choice position was motivated but outweighed by the more aggressive and emotional arguments against. The meeting acknowledged the importance of the issue, but felt it should be referred back to branches for further discussion.

At the National Policy Conference, there was a similar response. Again unable to reach consensus, the health commission and the ANC Women's League noted the impact of illegal abortions on women's health, and asked conference to refer it back to regions and branches for discussion.

Commercial sex workers isolated

The issue of commercial sex practice met with a similar response. Also emanating from the PWV region's health commission, the issue was raised in the context of the high risk commercial sex workers and their clients face with regard to their health, particularly in the light of HIV and AIDS.

It was noted that commercial sex workers are an isolated and marginalised group in society. They are subject to many prejudices, and the risks to themselves are compounded by the illegal status of their activities.

It was suggested they be integrated into health and gender initiatives, have access to regular health checks and be encouraged to develop strategies which would empower them

to make the kinds of demands on clients which would protect their health — like demanding that clients use condoms. This would protect the lives of the commercial sex workers, their clients and the families of both. This strategy has been very successful in many other countries.

When raised at the PWV regional conference and later at the national policy conference, the issue met with a number of similar responses. Many respondents were unwilling to acknowledge the need for such discussion, and in some cases were even unwilling to acknowledge the practice of commercial sex.

"We don't have such things where I live," was a typical response.

Many delegates seemed to be concerned that the ANC should not be seen to condone the activity: "We simply don't want such things to happen."

Yet commercial sex practice exists — it has always existed

(as the world's 'oldest profession'), and as long as society remains male-dominated, it will always continue to exist. It cannot and should not be ignored. Our society has to be willing to engage with ideas which ensure that commercial sex workers, mostly women, cease to be invisible members of society, simply serving the needs of men.

ANC members conservative

Both of these issues were referred back to ANC grassroots structures for further discussion.

What both sets of discussions reveal is the large diversity in understanding and consciousness about these issues. It illustrates how conservative many ANC members are, despite their commitment to the broad political objectives of the organisation. More especially, it shows that the fight for non-sexism and the struggle for women's rights is far from over.

Clearly the strategy for further discussion at branch and regional level is critical, but there is also a great need for the spread of education and information, so people can make informed decisions about topics they 'feel' rather than *know* about.

People often argue about abortion in a mechanistic way, which undermines the ideological issue of women's rights and focuses the debate on the procedure of abortion. People need to know the facts, need to be informed of the objective realities of abortion and how it affects women's lives.

Effective use of both print and audio-visual media, as well as face-to-face contact, may be necessary to spread information and canvass opinion as widely as possible.

Developing policy

To develop a policy on abortion, it is necessary to canvass broad opinion both within the ANC and beyond, in a way that ensures that women, both rural and urban, have access to this process.

Changing the abortion laws requires that a number of issues are resolved. These include legal viability (when does the foetus become a person with rights?), whether abortion should be freely available or restricted but flexible, who should pay and so on.

If abortion laws were made more liberal, women would have the right to choose. This does not force women to have abortions, nor does it infringe on anyone's right to object to having an abortion for religious and moral reasons.

A substantial and constructive effort to tackle the controversial issues of abortion and commercial sex practice is long overdue and needs very serious attention.

The ANC can play a very constructive role if it takes the lead in this. By encouraging discussion amongst its own membership, it will establish the base line for policy within its ranks.

But, above all, these are women's issues and it is the women of this country who should have the final say. It is women, after all, who will one day soon constitute some 50% of the electorate. □

— Anne Hilton is a member of the ANC's regional health committee



BEYOND FUNDAMENTALISM

The struggle for a democratic Palestine

While Israel's new Labour government opens up the prospects of a negotiated solution to the Palestinian crisis, the struggle to forge a democratic, non-fundamentalist Palestinian movement is likely to continue. Palestinian activist RITA GIACAMAN speaks to HEIN MARAIS about some of the issues

WIP: The Palestinians are involved in talks with the Israelis, punctuated by long pauses — what is going on?

Giacaman: I'll tell you what the problem is — the context of the peace negotiations is not acceptable to the Palestinians. First of all, the balance of power is in favour of the US and its ally, Israel. And secondly, the discussions are about 'autonomy', something which has very little to do with the legitimate rights of Palestinians — which is for a state of their own.

So, what is being talked about is municipal council elections, how we can take over garbage disposal and so on, but *not* political rights. It's a sad degeneration. We are not asking for much. We are asking that the remaining part of Western Palestine — West Bank and Gaza — be our own land, our own country.

I want to tell you one thing that bugs us a lot. On the one hand, the atmosphere of the international conference is totally unacceptable to us and you wouldn't accept them either. On the other hand, people feel there is no choice. If they don't go to the negotiations, more land will be confiscated, there'll be more control of water resources and there is this fear that we will be annihilated as a people and as a culture. This is what has driven the Palestinians to accept going to the peace talks in the hope of continuing to struggle to raise issues of nationhood.

Some observers here notice a separation between leadership, which is forced to concede at the

bargaining table, and the masses — are you looking at something similar in Palestine?

It's an interesting question. I think there are parallels and there are differences. Among the differences is that you won your negotiations through struggle and through some sort of victories — Angola

PIC: CAROLYN KOOPMAN



Giacaman: The Palestinian struggle does not have the sympathy of the West

etc — and we didn't, we were just forced into it.

There are other differences. Here you have a history of struggle that's different because the numbers involved are much bigger — I mean, there are hardly two million Palestinians living in

the occupied territories.

And here you have had the almost total sympathy of the Western world — we don't have that, America is not with the Palestinians, it didn't apply sanctions to help us.

However, in terms of similarities, there are sectors among the population who don't agree with joining the peace talks. Their approach is to watch: Let's take a look and see where this will lead. And there are people within the negotiations team who are trying to push major issues that the large majority of Palestinians would agree to. But maybe the dissidence here is a bit stronger.

An Israeli historian once wrote that the basic goal of Israeli strategy was the elimination of a Palestinian people as contenders for, and even as inhabitants of the same territory — is this still a basic goal?

Of course.

Why?

There's a very good reason. Zionist ideology is clear — I've seen lots of people, including leaders of the very rightwing organisations, saying to people who want a two-state solution: "Look, if you want democracy, you can't be in the state of Israel; Israel is a Zionist state".

Zionism is not democratic. By definition it means this land is for the Jews to the exclusion of everybody else, whether they're Muslim, Christian or anything. So by definition their call is for taking the land without its people and that means

that Palestinians are to be resettled somewhere else, ie in the Arab world.

So, we're talking about mass expulsions as the 'solution'?

Yes.

What you're saying sounds almost like the old 'zionism is racism' slogan ...

It's a complicated issue. It's as close to racism as you can have. Yes, it excludes other people — in that sense it is as racist as the South African regime is. But it's not a matter of colour, it's a matter of creed mixed with culture.

We're in the fifth year of the Intifada. What changes in social relations has it led to?

It provided people with something very important in their lives, which is consciousness. They have learnt something called participation — they had never learnt that before at a mass level. In the past there were a lot of struggles, but never in a mass movement way.

So the Intifada left this consciousness among sectors that never knew participation, especially women and the youth. There is "a revolution of rising expectations", in the Laclau terminology. At the moment there is no chance to express those democratic values of participation etc and if there is no way to express them, then they're bound to explode somehow. And they will.

This consciousness relates to the way in which Palestinian society is organised. For instance, women have more consciousness vis a vis not only the national, but also their social position within the Palestinian setting. The youth are also grumbling about more participation, who is making the decisions. Big questions are being raised about who is in power, who is deciding — the inside/outside, young/old, men/women tensions. And I think this is the legacy of the Intifada that will remain with us, because once you have that kind of consciousness it's very difficult to forget that experience.

We shouldn't see the uprising in terms of beginning and end. The uprising is a form of struggle that worked for a while, but it can't go on working, it's impossible. We say that new forms have to arise now and we are in the process of



Women in the forefront: A teenaged Palestinian girl is arrested by Israeli Border Patrol officers

transition where the struggle might actually have been transferred to the negotiating table (something similar to SA). And many people at the mass level resent that, because they now have to find an alternative role.

What organisational roots have been sunk that will allow this leap of consciousness to be expressed — during and after the boardroom phase of struggle?

Several organisations began before the uprising and were crucial in making the uprising. I'm talking about the committees. All sorts of committees began to take shape — voluntary work committees for the students, women's committees, health, agricultural etc.

These structures made the uprising. The committee principle was the principle around which all the uprising activities took place.

These are localised structures?

Localised structures that usually start from the village upwards, and they have great impact. They are able to organise and be informed by grassroots. They fend off the attacks of the Israeli military and they are much more democratic than most other structures in Palestinian society. Indeed within the Palestinian political spectrum you'll find some people

who don't want the committees to develop precisely because they carry with them elements of democracy.

A Palestinian writer said about three years ago: "The Intifada was a great opportunity for Palestinian women to change their situation, especially their social situation, but they haven't". Is that true?

I worry about that kind of analysis, because it takes the Intifada as a kind of blob and treats change as something that is fast and quick. It doesn't work like that. Change is a process that requires time and practice.

There is no question that the uprising provided women with the chance to move into roles that were previously unheard of. And the visibility of women in the street and so on was very high in the first two years.

Then they went back, because the neighbourhood committee structures were destroyed by the Israelis, the men that were in prison came out, and that form of struggle (street struggle, stone-throwing and demonstrations) no longer worked. So, they left the streets and went into other activities. But that doesn't mean they have lost their chance — I think that statement is incorrect. They have something they didn't have four years ago, which is consciousness.

Today, you talk to the women's committees — it's incredible — they will talk about national, gender and poverty issues. Before the uprising, they didn't do that. That is the difference. You find the women's committees much more critical of the lack of democratic process within the political institutions and of their relationships with the men, including their husbands and their political leaders. I think that is a major change and that is a big victory.

As for structural changes or consolidation of their position, that requires a long process that engages men, a change in the cultural patterns and attitudes. It's a big thing, that's the strategy for the women's movement for the next 50 years. It doesn't just happen in one instant.

Has class affected the rise of a women's movement in Palestine?

It's a good question. The whole notion of class in our situation is a tricky one because classes are in the process of crystallising. We come from a peasant background, a peasant society that was in the process of development, but was distorted by colonialism. That distorted the development of classes. As they crystallise, we find ourselves in a situation where workers don't have a working class consciousness because they work with the Israelis, so the national question is the prime thing that affects their consciousness.

The biggest class that we have is the petty merchants. There are no great riches on the West Bank, and the differences between the rich and the poor are not exactly very big.

Within that context, one can say, yes, a mixture of class and education did make a difference. The development of feminist theory and strategies most definitely came out of what is called the middle class, what I would call the professional and academic sector of society.

But those are not separated from the grassroots. Academics and professionals generally have links to the grassroots — the country is very small and the needs are very big, so we have been mobilised as professionals and academics to do something about the developmental situation in the country, in the face of the feeling that we are all going to be extinguished.

Unlike SA, the grassroots doesn't shun intellectuals. I was quite surprised to find this struggle here between the

grassroots and the theorists. We don't have that kind of rift.

How has the Palestinian women's movement intersected with the national liberation struggle?

Well, I've got to be frank. The women's committees began as arms of the national political groupings. But the women's movement is composed of the committees plus all these women, feminists, professionals and otherwise who were not in the political movement and who work together with the committees in order to improve the status of women.

So, on the one hand, there is a direct link to politics and, on the other hand, there is a direct influence from non-party women.

We are small, very few and we're faced by huge problems. So we tend to cooperate much more than fight, although there are some struggles between us. I don't want to portray just a rosy picture as if we're not divided, but despite some divisions we keep contact.

What are the basic schisms between the fundamentalist and nationalist movements?

It's very basic. The fundamentalists call for an Islamic state, not a Palestinian state (though they mask that these days). They believe in one unified Islamic state all over the Islamic world, where religion is the dominant legal structure. The nationalists demand Palestinian nationhood.

And the chances of 'tactical' co-operation between them?

There are attempts by the Palestinian right to absorb fundamentalists and indeed when the national leadership gains

Climbing high: The Intifada has raised people's consciousness



power some of the constituency of Hamas (the fundamentalist organisation) would move into Fatah (the main nationalist group), and when it's losing power some of the constituency of Fatah would go into Hamas.

But there's a big danger there — remember Iran, remember how its communist party analysed its alliance with the fundamentalists, and look what happened to them. I think one has to be very, very careful about the alliances one makes in a national liberation struggle.

Has the left, itself, managed to achieve unity in action?

It's not united, that's part of the problem. And we have different types of left. We have a left with roots in pan-Arab nationalism (like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP) and you have a left that's more Marxist (sections of the Democratic Front and the Communist Party). And they're at odds with each other.

Sometimes the PFLP aligns itself with Hamas! I find that unspeakable. They would agree with Hamas that the peace negotiations should not proceed, but they forget the social content of Hamas's platform.

In SA the whole issue of civil society has become almost a fad. Is the debate as strong in Palestine?

At one point, two years ago, we thought that nationhood was coming and the whole notion of civil society did become an issue. All sorts of researchers and grassroots people began to raise the questions: What is democracy? What are its elements? On what basis is it built? How do different people understand human rights?

So, we are raising those questions and I think they are extremely important for everybody. How do you construct a democratic society out of a peasant society that had been distorted? It's a big question. Those struggles must be launched now, and side-by-side with political struggles. After all, democracy is about politics, and politics is both external and internal — we have two types of struggles that we have to deal with all the time. □

—Giacaman is a health worker and teacher living in Bir Zeit on the West Bank. The interview was conducted before the Labour election victory.

PIC: NEAL CASSIDY (FROM STONES TO STATEHOOD)



PIL AF

STRAIGHT FROM THE UNDERGROUND

Long before the riots, Los Angeles rappers were telling it like it is. Only, no-one was listening. Robin Kelley tunes in to a crucial flow of rhyme

FOR NEARLY ALL BLACK RESIDENTS OF LOS ANGELES, NOT TO mention most inner-city residents, the videotaped beating of Rodney King was no surprise at all.

When LA rapper Ice Cube was asked about the King incident on MTV, he responded simply, "It's been happening to us for forty years. It's just we didn't have a camcorder (video camera) every time it happened."

The increase in street crime as a result of unemployment and poverty, compounded by the introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s, generated such fear in LA that even some liberals turned their attention away from the chokehold vic-

tims of the police and supported the unconstitutional 'gang sweeps' carried out as part of the war on drugs. With the militarisation of South Central during this period, the emergent LA hip-hop community made police brutality the central theme of their distinctive West Coast rap style.

As early as 1985, much of black LA (myself included) rocked to the rhythm of 'Batteram', a hit single from an obscure local rapper named Toddy Tee that exploded on the airwaves. Ice T's 'Squeeze the Trigger', from his debut album *Rhyme Pays* (1987), continued the trend, warning listeners that "Cops kill kids with warnin' shots".

Not coincidentally, Niggas with Attitude's 'F- Tha Police' from their hit album *Straight Outta Compton* (1988) was released about the time Police Chief Daryl Gates implemented 'Operation Hammer', arresting 1,500 black youths in South Central LA for merely "looking suspicious". While most were charged with minor offences like curfew and traffic violations, some were not charged at all but simply had their names and addresses logged in the LA Police Department anti-gang task force database, which, ironically, is called a 'rap sheet'.

The context is important, since 'F- Tha Police' is still NWA's most talked about song — indeed, it even emerged as a slogan during the demonstrations surrounding Rodney King's beating. Opening with a mock trial in which NWA are the judge and jury and the police are the defendants, the song has each member of the group offer his own testimony. Ice Cube (who has since left the group) takes the stand and explodes with an indictment against racism, repression and the common practice of criminalising all black youth:

*Fuck the police coming straight from
the underground.
A young nigger got it bad 'cause I'm
brown.
I'm not the other colour.
Some police think
They have the authority to kill a
minority ...
Fuckin' with me 'cause I'm a teenager,
With a little bit of fold and a pager
Searching my car, looking for the
product.
Thinking every nigger is selling
narcotics.*

The themes developed by NWA in 1988 evolved into a more systematic effort to understand the relationship between police repression and their own political and economic powerlessness. Rappers like Ice Cube, Compton's Most Wanted, Cypress Hill, Above the Law, Mob Style, King Tee, The Rhyme Syndicate, Poison Clan, Booo-Yaa Tribe, to name but a few, try to place their descriptions of police repression within a broader context of social control.

'One Time's' or 'Five-Os', as the police are called in LA, are portrayed as part of a larger system of racist and class domination that includes black officers. For WC and the MAAD Circle, policing as a form of racial and class oppression is part of a longer historical tradition etched in the collective memory of African-Americans. 'Behind Closed Doors' begins with lead rapper WC writing a letter of complaint to the chief of police describing an incident in which he was beaten and subsequently shot by officers with no provocation. In just a few lines WC links pre-war slavery and Depression-era fascism to the beating of Rodney King:

*Still I stayed calm and took the pain,
Picturing my ancestors going through
the same thing,*



F- Tha Police: LA rap tells it like it is down below

*But then I started thinking about the
brother from Altadena [R. King],
Who was to say I wasn't next on the
agenda,
So I got up, flipped, hurdled, hit the
corner
With flashbacks of Hitler chasing Jesse
Owens ...
I'm paralysed waist down from a bullet
wound
And now I'm being charged for resisting
arrest
But it was either catch a bullet or be
beaten to death.*

Mirroring much current political discourse in urban black America, some LA rappers insist that police repression is a genocidal war against blacks. Ice Cube's 'Endangered Species (Tales from the Darkside)' begins with the voice of a female newscaster stating matter-of-factly that young black teenagers have been added to the "endangered species list". "As of now," she adds, "the government has not made steps to preserve the blacks. When asked why, a top law officer said, 'cause they make a good game.'" Cube's lyrics underscore the point that the role of law enforcement is to protect the status quo and keep black folks in check:

*Every cop killer goes ignored,
They just send another nigger to the morgue.*

*A point scored. They couldn't give a fuck
about us.
They'd rather catch us with guns and
white power ...
They'd kill ten of me to get the job
correct
to serve, protect, and break a nigger's
neck.*

Constant police harassment has had the effect of stripping black youth in LA of their citizenship and, for many, has eroded any sense of justice. The verdict in the Rodney King trial merely made it official. Most LA rappers insist that poor African-Americans are second-class citizens — 'niggaz' — whose collective lived experiences suggest that nothing has changed for them, as opposed to the black middle class. Part of NWA's 'Niggaz4Life', for instance, uses 'nigga' almost as a synonym for 'oppressed' — and at the core of repression is police brutality:

*Why I call myself a nigger, you ask me,
It's because motherfuckers wanna blast me,
And run me out of my neighbourhood
And label me as a dope dealer, yo, and
say that I'm no good ...*

*Why do I call myself a nigger you ask me,
'Cause police always want to harass me,
Everytime that I'm rollin'
they swear up and down that the car
was stolen,
Make me get face down on the street
And throw the shit out my car on the
concrete ...*

The erosion of justice, combined with an intensification of poverty and joblessness, logically leads to a refusal to respect the law. A line from Ice T's 'Squeeze the Trigger' perhaps best articulates a pervasive attitude among dispossessed youth of LA's inner city. He asks, "What is crime and what is not? What is Justice? I think I forgot."

In an era when the mainstream media, conservative policy specialists and some social scientists are claiming that the increase in street crime can be explained by some pathological culture of violence bereft of the moderating influences of a black middle class, LA's rappers keep returning to the idea that joblessness and crimes are directly related.

MC Ren of NWA, for example, blames "the people who are holding the dollars in the city" for the expansion of gang violence and crime, arguing that if black youth had decent jobs, they would not need to participate in the illicit economy. "It's their fault simply because they refused to employ black people. How would you feel if you went for job after job and each time, for no good reason, you're turned down?"

Of course, the successes and failures, benefits and pitfalls of various criminal capers occupy a significant portion of hip-hop narratives about inner-city life, but these artists are just as

quick to turn the labels of 'criminal' and 'violent' back onto the people and institutions that control their lives.

Ice T's 'Street Killer', for instance, is a brief monologue that sounds like the boasts of a heartless gang banger but turns out to be those of a cop. Even more common throughout black inner-city communities is the insistence that the real criminals can be found in government, especially the White House. Dozens of rap artists, both inside and outside LA, indict 'America' for stealing land, facilitating the drug trade and waging large-scale "drive-by-shootings" against weaker countries such as Panama and Iraq.

Some LA rappers insist that crime and violence are both destructive *and* potentially emancipatory. In 'Get Up on That Funk', WC describes the Minority Alliance of Anti-Discrimination as "an organisation of my homeboys/Stealin' from the rich and famous/And give it back to the poor folks in the slums/Cause neither one of us forgot where we came from."

Ice Cube takes the Robin Hood metaphor a step further, calling for the "ultimate drive-by" to be aimed at the US government. In a recent interview, he even suggested that gang bangers "are our warriors ... It's just they're fighting the wrong gang". The gang they ought to be fighting, he tells us, is "the government of the United States".

I'm not suggesting that the hip-hop generation's response to police repression and poverty always offers the most progressive or insightful analyses, and some of these male voices are brutally hateful of women. Nor should music be a substitute for politics.

But knowing how young people see the world around them may provide a few more building blocks for a more radical practice. The folks who occupy the social and spatial fringes of the city experience everyday life in ways that mainstream black political leaders or traditional intellectuals do not.

In my most optimistic moments, I see an army of committed folks — "soulja's", as they say in the hood — informed by lessons of lived experience, daily conversations and a rudimentary analysis of power, which has been acquired not only from the streets but from cassette tapes and pop magazines.

But nothing is certain, except the further deterioration of already unlivable neighbourhoods. The most likely scenario is mo' misery, mo' misery and mo' misery, combined with mo' uprisings, mo' repression and mo' blame placed on single mothers for raising 'violent' children in 'dysfunctional' families.

We won't have to wait until the 2020s for another outbreak like this one. But if we want to know the political climate on the streets, we can't 'truss' CNN; this time, we must read the graffiti on the walls, and, as Ice T puts it, "check the pulse of the rhyme flow". □

— Kelley teaches Afro-American studies in Michigan. Reprinted by kind permission of *The Nation*, 1992, copyright



FIG. RASHID LOMBARD



ASSESSING SOCIALIST STRATEGIES

BEYOND APARTHEID AND CAPITALISM: Conversations with South African Socialists

Edited by Alex Callinicos, Bookmarks, London, Chicago and Melbourne, 1992 (R30, 171 pages)

Reviewed by HAROLD WOLPE

THE PURPOSE OF ALEX CALLINICOS'S book and its six interviews was to explore the connection between two processes: "...the political transition to a non-racial democracy in South Africa and the struggle to shape the 'post apartheid' economy." (p11)

Although Callinicos claims that the "interviews form the body of the book", there is good reason to question this. Apart from his numerous and lengthy questions to those interviewed, about one-third of the book is devoted to the 'introduction' and 'afterword'.

In addition, the interviews (by contrast with the editor's contributions) span a number of questions; they are only indirectly related to the issue of socialist transformation, though some crucial starting points for a debate are made.

These are not merely technical points — they account for the fact that, wittingly or not, the book serves essentially as a vehicle for Callinicos's viewpoint rather than as a forum for serious debate between different positions.

Curbing working class militancy

By way of his two contributions and the many questions that structure the interviews, Callinicos systematically advances the thesis that the ANC and the Triple Alliance, driven by the two-stage theory of the South African revolution, have concluded that socialism is not on the immediate agenda and are opting for a more humane form of capitalism. This has led to strategies calculated to curb the militancy of the working class, and which will ultimately lead to its defeat.

Callinicos argues that certain con-

straints (which were beyond the control of the ANC) have emerged to block the path of a socialist transition. These include the fact that:

- the political balance of forces favours the government (particularly that the state's military power is much greater than that of the liberation movement);
- by unbanning the ANC and other organisations before he was forced to, FW de Klerk put himself in control of the transition to ensure "that the outcome preserved the domination of the existing white capitalist class";
- by developing an anti-ANC moderate coalition of both black and white organisations and by developing Inkatha as a major part of the anti-ANC coalition, De Klerk was able to weaken the ANC and make it less formidable a rival in the negotiations and at the ballot box.

In the face of this, the ANC began to lose the initiative: it could not hold De Klerk to agreements, it was unable to protect township residents terrorised by Inkatha and others, and it was unable to determine the timetable of change.

The reason for this lay in the fact that the liberation movement, despite its rhetoric, prepared the way for negotiations as an alternative to mass struggles. Thus, not only was no attempt made to support negotiations as a 'terrain of struggle' through the organisation of mass campaigns, but trade union struggles were inhibited and worker militancy was curbed.

Humane capitalism

In his 'afterword', Callinicos extends this argument by examining the contention that socialism is not feasible under

contemporary South African conditions. The argument comes in two forms.


The first says that the low level of development of the productive forces and hence the absence of a large, urbanised working class blocks socialist transformation. This, Callinicos argues, does not apply to SA which possesses both a large working class and the other objective conditions necessary for such a transition.

The second variant holds that, since the failure of socialism in the USSR and elsewhere, there is no longer a viable alternative to capitalism.

The corollary is that the best that the South African labour movement can hope to achieve in the present conditions is a more efficient and humane form of capitalism.

The disastrous consequences of this, according to Callinicos, are that: "instead... of exploring ways in which these forms [i.e rank and file, self-emancipatory activity as in the trade unions in the 1970s] — anticipations of a future socialist society — could be further developed, left thinking in SA has come to focus on the search for an alternative capitalist model which would be more favourable to working class interests..."

What is of interest is that in presenting his version of how 'the left' views the obstacles to socialist transformation, Callinicos shows little regard for the content of the interviews he conducted for the purposes of exploring



these very issues!

It is true that the imperatives of negotiation have generated a strong tendency, over the past two years, to concentrate on immediate issues of institutional reform. And it seems clear that these are not being strongly linked to the more general goals of social transformation. Nowhere is this clearer than in the political and organisational work on 'development'. Virtually no attempt is made to define a specific path of development; the term is used in a technical, unproblematic sense without reference to the differences between capitalist, national democratic and socialist development.

Unexplored analogies...

But 'the left' interviewed here are clearly all concerned with what political and economic strategies should (and can) be pursued by socialists, operating in conditions where a socialist transition is not on the immediate agenda.

Callinicos prefers to describe how, in other countries that have faced similar circumstances, strategies like the 'social contract' led to the defeat of the working class and a decline in militancy. The

experience of Europe and elsewhere shows that workers can wrest immediate gains from capital, but: "winning control or even substantial influence over matters of long term policy is, except in highly unusual circumstances, impossible in a capitalist context."

This is what we can learn from the experience in Europe, so why would it not happen in South Africa? seems to be the punchline. But he makes no attempt to analyse those "unusual circumstances", or to situate the failed strategies in an analysis of the prevailing political and economic conditions, or to compare them with conditions in SA. The single variable is worker militancy.

This contrasts sharply with his analysis in the 'introduction' which describes the constraints which flow from objective conditions and which are therefore beyond the movement's control.

...ignore the constraints

The interviewees start off by describing and assessing those conditions. Even Neville Alexander, who rejects the argument that socialism is not on the immediate agenda, is nonetheless obliged to recognise that "...the international conditions which may have made it possible for us to go to the point of saying that a socialist revolution is on the agenda in the very near future have shifted against us."

For Alexander, the path forward is via mass mobilization seen as an alternative to negotiations. For the others interviewed, mass mobilization is seen as a necessary element of the reform process.

The SACP's Jeremy Cronin, for example, argues that the longer term socialist project depends vitally on a democracy that goes beyond multi-partyism: "The challenge is to ensure that the extension of democracy ... becomes a new plateau from which to move forward ... But if the masses are demobilised capital will consolidate on a new high ground".

Moses Mayekiso emphasises the need to distinguish short and long term goals and, like Colin Bundy and Cronin, stresses that the extension of democracy means

also the entry of workers into the structures of economic control.

Building socialist bases

But it is Karl Von Holdt, editor of *SA Labour Bulletin*, who offers the clearest pointers towards a theory of revolutionary strategy under the contemporary conditions in SA, conditions in which capital is likely to remain economically dominant even after the democratic election of a new government.

He begins with the question: "What does one mean by a revolutionary policy in this period?", and argues that insurrection is not a feasible path and that a correct strategy must point towards "... the opening up of transformation, organisational bases, and struggles that can take us in the direction of socialism".

"That might be, say, the power of trade unions and organised workers to intervene in and shape economic policy ... or to make it impossible for management to manage without workers' participation of some sort."

Von Holdt recognises that when "... you raise that you raise the dangers: participation can become co-option, can become absorption into the project of revitalising capitalism ... How do we engage on these terrains without falling into the trap?"

One answer is that mass action must not be abandoned. But this clearly does not go far enough, for as Von Holdt acknowledges "... theoretical and analytical work needs to be done on a whole range of levels — levels of state institutions, economic institutions, political institutions — to see how you can build your bases for socialism".

Unfortunately, this book does not take us far down that road. But, hopefully, by registering some of the political, theoretical and analytical issues at stake, it may stimulate the in-depth work which is needed to underpin the formulation of strategies aimed at a socialist transition in conditions where capital is economically dominant, but where (in contrast to Europe) the political, social and ideological conditions of that dominance are far from settled. □

—Wolpe, a renowned theoretician and former exile, heads the Education Policy Unit at UWC





Left Behind

NO WINNIE IN PALESTINE

During a recent visit to Egypt and Israel, a South African tourist came across some startling truths.

She found that Egyptians are woefully ignorant about South Africa. When told that the predominantly white tourist group were from the southern tip of the continent, the Egyptians refused to believe it. "You are too white", they said.

Contrast that with her encounter with an 11-year old Palestinian boy selling soft-drinks in Jerusalem. Upon hearing that she was South African, he asked:

"Do you like Nelson Mandela?"

"Yes", she replied.

"But not Winnie!" was the quick retort.



'SENSIBLE' POLICIES

Monopoly ownership of the press is not a problem. Editors are completely independent, and in their editorials they support whichever political party they choose.

So said the media moguls at a recent media conference in Johannesburg. They would not sell off any of their newspapers to the ANC, because they do not believe that political parties should own newspapers.

Now I agree that free expression is not best served by party-owned newspapers. It is better for an *independent* left-of-centre trust to run a newspaper that is in broad sympathy with the goals of the liberation movement as a whole.

But we note with curiosity the readiness of the Argus Group to sell off its Natal newspaper, *Ilanga*, to Inkatha a few years ago. More than a mild dose of double standards!

But don't worry, said a media mogul, you'll be surprised how many of our newspapers will support the ANC in the next election. But only if the ANC adopts *sensible*' policies!

In other words, if you do not think like us, you can be sure that no major newspaper is going to support you come election time.



IGNORANCE IS BLISS....

Radio 702 is a neat radio station. But they do employ some odd souls. Take talkshow host David Blood. During a cosy chat over the air to a rightwing pal, he gave this erudite analysis of liberation theology in Latin America:

"The communists discovered that, because the people in Latin America were predominantly Catholic, they could not spread their communist ideology.

"So, like they always do, the communists zipped off to Moscow, and sat down to work out a strategy. Now these guys are very clever, and they thought: 'We will infiltrate the Church, and convince the people that communism and Christianity are the same!'

"And so they came up with liberation theology, and succeeded in duping the people in Latin America. Unfortunately, some of our own church leaders have also been duped by this ideology."

"Jeez", said his pal, "is that right?"

And that, my friends, is what you get for keeping a nation ignorant, and left to toy with their own imagination.



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AUGUST 1992

Bond boycott storm

THE SA National Civic Organisation's (Sanco) plan to hit financial institutions with a bond boycott has raised a storm from financial institutions and within the mass democratic movement.

At the time of going to press, Sanco was due to meet major banks to discuss the boycott and would decide after the meeting if the boycott would go ahead on 1 August. The ANC is likely to decide whether it will support the boycott after this meeting.

Meanwhile, Civic Associations of Johannesburg (CAJ) secretary Cas Coovadia also expressed reservations about the boycott.

The World Bank estimates that township bonds amount to R6-8 billion. Approximately 170 000 families have bonds. Of these as many as 30% may already have stopped paying their bonds. Sanco could thus merely be formalising an unofficial boycott. Many of the bonds were granted in the late 1980s at a 12,5% interest rate. This rate jumped to 21%, and is now 18%.

Sanco believes that financial institutions are a fair target as they have the power to pressurise the government to disband all racial local governments by 1 August.


Civics are also questioning why banks are agreeing to finance central government's long-term bonds, yet are refusing to do the same for local government. By 'redlining' local government, banks are preventing local improvements, particularly to townships. This could mean that financial institutions have to carry some blame for low income houses not appreciating in value.

Civics also point out that bond boycotts have been successful in Crossroads, Khayelitsha and Etwatwa in forcing the authorities to the negotiating table. Bank threats that the boycott may mean that fewer low income bonds are granted may be based on the fact that the market is already saturated, says one observer.

Sanco also plans to call a national rent boycott on 1 August if racial local authorities have not been disbanded. Executive member Kgabisi Mosunkutu said there was "no way that we can continue to pay rents to a corrupt regime involved in killing our people and destroying property".

The civic body has also called off local constitutional negotiations. "Sanco's primary aim is majority rule, not the delivery of services," said Sanco president Moses Mayekiso. "It is possible that civics will decide to stop all negotiations, even those related to service delivery, as this would put more pressure on the government to heed people's demands."

But implementing the programme will not be easy. Regional structures are generally weak, many civics have not carved out a role for themselves independent of the ANC, and the bond boycott will be difficult to monitor.



Housing Focus

2

ANC LEADS
IN
BORDER

GONUBIE
'SQUATTERS'
GET SHELTERS

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THE LONG ARM
OF
DE LOOR

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MAKING
'GREY MEN'
BLACK

ANC leads Border initiatives

By **KERRY CULLINAN**

SOME REGIONS are still debating whether political or civic organisations are best placed to lead negotiations about 'bread and butter' and developmental issues. But in the Border and Eastern Cape regions, the ANC-SACP-Cosatu alliance is the undisputed leader of such negotiations — with the backing of local and regional civics.

In Border, the alliance heads community representation at the Border-Kei Development Forum (BKDF), a broad forum of political organisations, local authorities, businessmen and churches spanning South Africa, Transkei and Ciskei.

The BKDF's main aim is to improve the socio-economic circumstances of the region and its people, especially the poor and marginalised. So far, the alliance's vision for the BKDF seems to be carrying the day within the forum. But this has yet to be tested when the forum tries to implement this vision.

The alliance has also put a lot of person-power into the forum. The ANC's regional vice-president, Andrew Hendricks, is the BKDF's director. Cosatu's Enoch Godongwana is co-chair, while two other alliance members, Chippy Olver and Smuts Ngonyama, are on the secretariat. Although the Border Civics Congress (Bocco) is not on the executive, it is represented at the forum.

Social Contract

According to Olver, a member of the ANC's regional executive and director of Corplan, the BKDF is "regional government in embryonic form" that could "lay the basis of a social contract in the region".

Some of the tripartite alliance's demands to the forum are:

- a moratorium on shack demolitions without decent alternatives;
- identification of residential land for low income housing;
- setting up an infrastructural and electrification programme;
- the redistribution of land, beginning with under-used state land;
- addressing rural people's exclusion from power;
- ending commercial exploitation in rural areas;
- social and community development programmes, including education, health and training;
- promoting industrial development, especially manufacturing and product beneficiation;
- informal sector development.

Four sub-committees dealing with economic, urban, human resource and rural development have been set up.

Hendricks became the BKDF's fulltime director on 1 June. His employer, Mercedes Benz, and the Development Bank of SA are paying his salary for 18 months. By that time, says Hendricks, "the forum should have a momentum and funding of its own".

The SA, Transkei and Ciskei governments are forwarding experts to work with Hendricks in a directorate. By bringing together the three governments, the BKDF will be able to pool state resources and rationalise development programmes. Hopefully this will lay the ground for the reincorporation of Ciskei and Transkei into South Africa.

For Hendricks, the key task of

the executive is to work out a strategic plan for the region. "But the emphasis of the forum should not be on planning and research. We can get access to data and adapt it ...



Andrew Hendricks: "We must address the immense poverty".

Border is one of the most impoverished regions in the country, so the emphasis must be on the causes of this impoverishment and begin to set in plan the fundamentals for people-orientated development."

Given that the region is so poor, the Border Business Action Committee, an alliance of key employers, is in a relatively strong bargaining position. Their agenda is to achieve stability for production, which may mean that they will push for restrictions on industrial action.

But Hendricks believes that the BKDF is not the place where political or labour compromises should be brokered.

"You don't have to introduce all issues in all forums," says Hendricks. "We have reached broad agreement on our direction in the BKDF. Let the disagreements be dealt with in other forums.

"It is understandable though that each party wants its own interests served. But I hope we can rise above the interest-seeking approaches and address the immense poverty and deprivation in the region and empower those people who have been marginalised."

Model Town

However, recent dealings between the ANC and the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) on a proposed development on the West Bank of East London indicates that the state may try to block developments that could alienate it from its white supporters.

A local priest raised money from the Canadian government a year ago for

the development of a low income 'Model Town'. The area is close to the city, has access to the sea, transport and bulk services. It has the potential to house 20,000 people on 5,000 sites. It will be the first significant development in East London in the last 30 years.

The CPA was approached by the ANC, Cosatu and the Border Civics Congress (Bocco) last year and it gave verbal support for the development. But in June, after discussions with the local municipality, the CPA said it wanted land next to the local airport to be developed first. While this land is also on the West Bank, it is furthest from industry, the sea and — predictably — the white suburbs. The CPA claims it has already bought the airport land and cannot make funds available for the rest of the West Bank.

The Canadian government meanwhile will not hand over the money unless there is proof that the land is available and accessible. And even

then, they insist on channelling the money through Canadian consultants, which means that much of the money goes back to Canada in the form of consultants' fees.

The regional representatives of the ANC, Cosatu and Bocco are now consulting their constituencies so that they can apply pressure on the authorities.

Thus, while the BKDF is a vital structure, the Model Town experience shows that the state is likely to block moves that could make it unpopular with its target constituency — the middle class. It also shows the complexities of dealing with foreign developers, and the difficulties of setting up new institutions to manage development.

But most importantly, Model Town and the BKDF have brought to the fore new political forces at a local and regional level, that are engaged in building East London and the Border region into a more hospitable place for all its people. ■

PE Forum takes control

By Kerry Cullinan

PORT ELIZABETH'S ONE CITY FORUM (OCF) HAS BECOME THE de facto authority in the city. The Cape Provincial Council (CPA) has agreed to be bound by forum decisions and has publicly rejected the government's Interim Measures Act.

Significantly, political parties are the driving force behind the OCF. Its management committee consists of one representative each from the ANC, SACP, Cosatu, the DP, NP and PE municipality. ANC Eastern Cape treasurer, Glenn Goosen, is presently its chairperson. The civic associations meet with the tripartite alliance to work out common positions to be presented at the management committee, but do not seem to mind not being directly represented on the structure.

Goosen believes that two recent events strengthened the tripartite alliance's position in the forum, leading ultimately to the ANC becoming the forum's convenor.

The first was a clash between community organisations and city officials over the retrenchment of 300 municipal workers. The clash ended after a far-reaching agreement was reached on 20 May, including:

- a moratorium on retrenchments;
- an investigation by a OCF working group into staffing, service charges and joint administration;
- the PE municipality taking over the functions of the discredited Ibhayi town council.

The collapse of the Ibhayi town council early this year also tilted the balance of forces in favour of the democratic forces,

says Goosen. Huge financial corruption was uncovered in the council. Businesses and the PE council launched legal procedures against Ibhayi to recover money owing to them.

In the past the CPA had bailed out Ibhayi, but the extent of the corruption made it impossible for them to do so now. There were fears that the collapse of Ibhayi would mean the collapse of services in townships. This brought a new urgency to the OCF. In the four months since its inception, the management committee has been able to draft a declaration of intent, a protocol agreement and set up a steering committee.

The management committee identified five key constituencies at the forum, namely political organisations, local government bodies, civics, business and labour.

Each constituency has been encouraged to meet separately and work out common proposals. So, for example, the PE People's Civic Organisation (Pepco), PE Northern Civic Organisation and the all-white Central Executive of Ratepayers met recently and managed to draw up common proposals which they presented to the forum.

By reaching consensus at constituency level first, conflict is avoided at steering committee level. This was demonstrated by the smooth adoption of the declaration of intent and the protocol agreement by the steering committee on 4 June. The process of putting the declaration, which pledges the OCF to promote the well-being of all and start development programmes for the poor, can now begin.



Mthetheleli Pobana

Building Duncan Village

The Duncan Village Residents Association (DVRA) is one of the most experienced civic associations in the country. KERRY CULLINAN speaks to DVRA chairperson **MTHETHELELI POBANA** and treasurer **MFEKETHO TOSE** about their experiences

When was DVRA formed and how is it organised?

Pobana: It was launched in August 1985. It is organised from street to block to area to branch. There are 11 branches which meet weekly. The general council, which is made up of the central executive and the branch executives, meets every Saturday.

Mfeketho: 87% of residents are members. This means they are card carrying members. They pay a R2 joining fee then R5 a year. This has been difficult to administer, but we now have an office and three volunteers so things are going smoothly.

What is life like in Duncan Village?

Pobana: There are about 300,000 people in Duncan Village. Most people live in shacks. There are only about 30,000 people in formal houses. The official unemployment rate is 42%, but we believe it is higher.

What are DVRA's priorities?

Pobana: At the moment we are addressing the housing crisis. Our role is to educate our people to know and demand their rights. We think that the social welfare of the people has to be provided by the state. The state must provide the houses, not the civics. Each area also tries to combat crime, but we don't have people's courts. Serious crimes are handed over to the police.

Many civics are talking of moving from protest to development. Is DVRA also moving towards involvement in developmental projects?

Pobana: We combine protest and development. We do not yet have a people's government and at the same time we have to address development questions. We still have to fight the Black Local Authorities (BLAs), in our case the Gompo town council, and pressurise the government to consider a system to address the damage created by apartheid.

Is DVRA involved in any development projects at

present?

Mfeketho: Yes, the main two are the upgrading of the hostels and Section C. We are in the process of assessing the hostel upgrading. There are about 40 hostel blocks. Hostel dwellers, who are part of DVRA, all agree that they want the upgrading. Section C is a large shack area, and we have applied for funds from the IDT to upgrade this area.

What does your campaign to destroy the Gompo town council involve?

Pobana: We make things difficult for it to work. If the council tries to do anything, the community rejects them saying that they have not heard from DVRA. For example, they tried to conduct a survey in the hostel and were chased away.

Do you think civics should take part in national negotiations, for example at Codesa if it reconvenes?

Pobana: This is subject to discussion. But the members of the civics have different political affiliations, and there are political organisations represented at Codesa.

What is your relationship with the ANC?

Pobana: We relate fairly well, usually according to what issues are being taken up. But we don't align ourselves. We have to relate to every organisation in the community as we must represent the whole community. But we have no problem if DVRA executive members are executive members of the ANC branch. I am one.

In the future democracy, will the civics continue to exist?

Pobana: No matter who is in power, the civics will remain. A civic is an organisation that looks at the government's delivery of goods. If any member of the civics executive stands for council elections, that person will have to vacate their position on the civic. ■

CPA promises funds for shelters

By KERRY CULLINAN

PERSUADING THE people from 'Soweto' informal settlement to move away from Gonubie's main road took more than empty promises from the Cape Provincial Administration and the local council.

Gonubie, a ten minute drive from East London, destroyed its only township in 1968 and moved residents to Potsdam. When people set up home in 'Soweto' in 1989, it alarmed residents of the generally exclusive suburb. The authorities thought they could solve the 'problem' by issuing eviction notices in April 1990. But it was not to be so easy. The informal dwellers formed the Gonubie Residents' Association (GRA) and demanded that they be given a new site with houses.

GRA's secretary, Simon Blandile, said that after "very tough negotiations" with the CPA and the local authorities, the people agreed to move to land on the coast between Gonubie and Beacon Bay.

The site is not ideal. It is far from the main road and transport. It is exposed to the elements and sites

are covered in beach sand. Blandile said the community had had its eye on another site, also near the main road. But this had been rejected by the authorities.

The GRA was forced to settle for second best. But the main drawcard to the area — likely to be called Mzamomhle, a 'good attempt' — was the CPA's promise to get access to National Housing Commission (NHC) funds to build shelters for the people.

The shelters are nothing more than concrete floors and asbestos roofs on poles. But a subsidy from the NHC has also brought flush toilets and a tap for the 600 sites. In "Soweto" there was no water, let alone toilets.

Money has also been set aside to build a school and two churches. This is a victory for the community, in that Mzamomhle will be the first legal low income black settlement in the area.

Corplan, which assisted the GRA, says that the CPA's roofs on poles are not ideal and should certainly not be the goal of a national housing campaign. Especially as, during the 1960s, the government was able to build four-roomed houses for people.

But these structures will have to



Blandile (right) discusses the shelters with Corplan members.

do for now. And it is envisaged that as the residents get more money, they will be able to substitute tin walls for concrete or brick. ■

Violence in informal settlements

VIOLENCE IN 'SQUATTER' CAMPS WAS EXAMINED AT A RECENT Unisa environmental law conference on informal settlements.

The Urban Foundation's Tim Hart argued for the development of "conflict resolution mechanisms" to address the violence.

Hart also said attention should be paid to "transforming the residential environment of informal settlements" as it was "not practical in the short term to rehouse or move informal dwellers".

UND's Dr Mike Morris argued that informal settlements were intrinsically violent places, and that conflict would only be eradicated if people's material conditions were improved.

"The law and the local state don't have status in a shanty town," said Morris. "Whoever has de facto control over resources has power. Shacklords collect rents and levies in exchange for protection, ruling by a combination of fear and allegiance."

Tyranny, he added, was part of life in informal settlements whose power relations were almost feudal. An individual's economic rights were based more on the forceful removal of goods than on commercial contracts. Given that resources were scarce, power struggles often arose. But, argued Morris, "if you only kick out the warlord (who has taken control of the area) and don't develop the area, the compulsion of social forces will lead to the establishment of another warlord. The symbols may change, but the conditions remain the same."

● According to the state's local government and housing department, 1,891,520 people lived in informal settlements in 1991. The Urban Foundation's figure for 1989-90 is seven million. UCT academic Dr Catherine O'Regan argues that one out of six South Africans live in informal housing. Given the drought and worsening economic recession, the figure is probably higher now.

De Loor Report is off the mark

The long-awaited De Loor Task Group housing study was released in April. **PATRICK BOND** looks at its analysis

DR JOOP de Loor's Task Group on National Housing Policy and Strategy issued a recent report that many critics of the current state will simply ignore.

That might be a mistake, for there are useful aspects of De Loor's analysis, and the policy recommendations are evolving in some interesting ways. However, while bits may cheer progressives, the general direction of official thinking is not terribly encouraging.

Consider first how the report poses the central problems. De Loor condemns "economic inefficiency brought about by the spatial structure of SA cities, a dualistic financial system with regard to housing, and a socio-political mind set that will be difficult to change". Bigger issues like the biased structure of the economy, the 40% plus unemployment rate, black workers' low incomes, the rural crisis, are already off the agenda.

'Capital shortage'

Early on, De Loor asks why the percentage of the SA economy devoted to housing has dropped to a puny 2.6%. He answers, with no supporting data, that "the real problem over the last number of years has been the lack of available capital". (If so, one wonders, how the Johannesburg Stock Exchange became the fastest growing major stock market in the world from early 1989 through mid-1992, and how bank credit creation rates topped 30% per year in the late 1980s?). 'Capital shortage' is constantly evoked to lower the state's responsibility for providing a decent standard of shelter.

De Loor is wrong: the capital

exists, but is not making its way from the financial markets down to the ground. De Loor has nothing of interest to say about the tens of billions of loose rands controlled by insurance companies and pension funds. At one point he claims that township bond boycotts and unrest



are "primarily responsible" for the redlining practices of banks and building societies. Nowhere does he acknowledge that shoddy construction is the main reason for bond boycotts to date.

Similarly, De Loor downplays the thorny fact of market saturation of the top sliver of the black population (yet to his credit he does cite the role of skyrocketing interest rates and the depressed economy in limiting affordability of conventional loans).

There is only meagre analysis of other structural barriers to housing, such as access to land and the building materials monopolies, and even less in the way of solutions to such problems.

Moreover, the report's complete lack of attention to women's housing concerns — such as widespread discrimination in legal tenure arrangements and access to credit — is shocking. De Loor acknowledges

that there are "maleless" households in rural areas, and claims to take these into account in analysing housing for urban migrant labour. (This is doubtful since hostels are not considered in calculations of housing 'backlog': 1.3 million urban shacks to be replaced, not including 600,000 hostel beds.)

Urban bias

In general: "No information on rural areas was available and the backlogs in these areas could therefore not be quantified". As a result, the rural housing crisis, especially as it pertains to farmworkers, is simply ignored! Environmental issues raised by housing and urban development do not get even lip service.

Instead, De Loor spends inordinate attention on constructing from the rubble of housing finance a new institution and policy. He recognises that something very different is required to break the logjam. Among the grab-bag of recommendations, he moots some items of interest, along with a complex subsidy scheme. These will be discussed in the next *Reconstruct*.

Based on recent experience, who should carry out the mandate to implement new housing finance policies? It is common cause that most existing public and private sector institutions have made a mess, although De Loor's criticisms are a bit off the mark.

For example, he gives credence to (undocumented) attacks that the Independent Development Trust (IDT) is "politically partial" and endorses World Bank (and KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation) critiques of the IDT that its R7 500

*“Deregulation,
commercialisation
and ... sound policies
which strengthen
market forces ... need
strong promotion and
high priority.”*

Dr Joop de Loor

according to Nedbank).

De Loor's analysis of the foreign input requirements of housing spending (ie, what percentage of a house comes from overseas) is extremely sketchy. There is an assertion — based on an official econometric model which measures mainly luxury housing — that “SA's balance of payments is over the longer term quite sensitive to large increases in housing expenditure”. Again, no data is available.

On the positive side, the report makes a good case for strong investments in housing, citing a study that

to promote the issue of housing stock” in order to boost investor confidence. (It is reliably rumoured that the DBSA will get the nod for this role.)

But the financing problem is not one of mythical investor ‘confidence’, but rather that other investment outlets such as stock market industrial shares provided a 56% rate of return in 1991, in the process drawing money away from socially-useful functions.

However De Loor warns against tampering with the financial markets. Instead, he claims that lotteries are “achieving increasing acceptability”, although he ignores their regressive effects on personal income.



Foreign loans

In addition, foreign loans for housing are sought, which De Loor claims will be available “often at concessionary rates”. There is no evidence that this will be the case on a sustainable basis in view of SA's status as an upper middle-income developing country. Moreover, De Loor is extremely uncritical about the danger of rising SA indebtedness for (locally-produced) goods such as housing, and he fails to note that the cost of foreign loans, given rand depreciation, is extremely expensive (26%

each R1 investment in housing (through deficit financing) leads to an increase of R2,70 in Gross Domestic Product. De Loor recommends that housing expenditure should rise from 3% to 5% of GDP (an increase of about R6 billion).

The question remains, however, what are the best vehicles and subsidy principles for getting this money into well-located housing for those most in need? ■

● *Bond, who works for Planact, will look at De Loor's land, delivery and financing recommendations in the next edition of 'Reconstruct'.*

subsidy is “unrealistically high”. (De Loor ignores progressive criticisms of the IDT's, such as its emphasis on site-and-service and individual ownership requirements.)

While mention is made of the Urban Foundation's (UF) “financial problems”, the implications for drawing below-market rate IDT funds are ignored. De Loor supports IDT and UF group credit and home loan guarantee programmes, neglecting to mention that such schemes are performing well below their projected output.

Model agency?

De Loor even cites Khayelethu Home Loans — the SA Housing Trust (SAHT) loan subsidiary which has been victim of most bond boycotts — as a model for a state housing agency, with no reference to its imminent demise. The Department of Development Aid gets a few paragraphs, but no reference is made to its massive mismanagement. Unspecified “data integrity problems” are cited in other state agencies' accounts.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), main supporter of homelands and black local authorities, is not cited as “politically partial”. Indeed the DBSA illustrates what De Loor calls a “comprehensive and integrated approach to urban development and housing” — although by all accounts the bank has not been especially successful in integrating community-based organisations, and still shies away from direct housing support.

De Loor recommends replacement of SAHT, IDT and UF fundraising with “a single corporate body

Building blocks to better houses

While alternatives to brick and block houses are not always cheaper, they have other advantages, argues **ANDREW MERRIFIELD** from the Development Action Group



THE ESTIMATED housing backlog in the Western Cape is 250,000. Meeting this backlog with concrete block houses will cost R75-million, at a cost of R25,000-R35,000 for a four roomed, 30-40 square metre house.

It is often assumed that innovative building technology will bring housing costs down. But this is unlikely. Alternative building technology does not save costs because building costs make up a relatively small proportion (44-66%) of the overall housing costs.

Other costs, like land (22-44%) and marketing and procedural costs (8-30%), contribute significantly to the final package. There is much less opportunity to cut costs with the building element, and much greater chance of bringing down the land, marketing and procedural costs. But since individual contractors are less able to control land and marketing costs, they generally try to save by building smaller, poorer quality houses.

Most alternative building systems claim to be cheaper because they use cheaper or fewer materials that can be erected in less time by less skilled labour.

More than 450 alternative building systems have been approved by the Agreement Board, and 30 others have been approved under the minimum standards of Mantag (Minimum Agrimount Norms and Technical Advisory Guide), yet there are fewer than a dozen alternative housing systems in active use today.

It is not always possible to assess the cost effectiveness of these systems, but we learn from the Golden Highway Expo that the conventional brick and timber frame houses proved to be the most cost effective.

Although alternative housing systems may not necessarily be cheaper, there are other reasons for using them. For example:

- through incremental housing, people can add on to their homes when they can afford to;
- some alternative materials perform better in particular environments;
- some systems are better suited to local labour and resources and can be controlled locally.

Nearly 75% of final housing costs consist of interest charges on the bond repayment, so it makes sense to encourage low-income communities to pay for as much of their housing as possible in cash. This can best be

achieved through incremental housing. Shell housing is more cost effective than core housing as it provides greater usable space at less than the proportionate increase in cost.

The Western Cape's cold, wet winters and warm, dry summers dictate that houses have to be provide shelter from rain as well as insulation against heat loss.

Alternative building materials which can offer this performance at the same or lower cost to bricks and blocks should be considered. Both timber and aerated concrete are worth investigating. Other products include Timbrex and Terreblok (soil cement blocks).

A variety of materials can be used in a single house to enhance its performance. As the private sector is unlikely to develop composite units because they need greater design input, non-profit organisations should offer alternatives. Through careful selection of appropriate materials and design, we should be able to develop houses that accommodate the country's climate.

Another possible advantage of alternative building technologies is the use of local resources, mainly labour and materials. At present, a number of agencies are promoting the use of labour enhanced technologies, mainly in the provision of services. Although these may not be cheaper, they ensure that a greater proportion of the money spent on construction remains in the local community.

Unfortunately, it is much harder to increase the use of labour in building houses because the process is already labour intensive.

The most effective way to increase the labour content of the building process is to produce a greater proportion of the materials locally. Stabilised soil and compressed soil systems seem to offer the greatest promise, since many other alternative systems require pre-processing before reaching the site.

If the process is locally based, the community can have greater control over housing provision. It provides greater opportunity for building community organisations on the ground because they can get involved in delivering the goods.

This remains the most persuasive argument in considering certain alternatives. ■

Uniting the poor internationally

COLIN MARX from the Built Environment Support Group (BESG) speaks to the secretary of Inanda settlement's Piesang River Association, **PAT HUNSLEY**, about People's Dialogue

How does the People's Dialogue (PD) help informal settlements?

Through the PD, poor people learn how to deal with evictions, land invasions, how to raise funds for development, housing saving schemes and so on. The people that come together are usually from existing organisations in informal settlements and backyard shacks.

You were recently part of a South African delegation from informal settlements who visited informal settlements in India. How did this trip come about?

At a PD workshop in Johannesburg, the National Slum Dwellers Federation of India (NSDF) felt it would be useful if poor people from South Africa learnt from the Indian experience and vice versa. This would help to build unity among poor people. A three-year exchange programme was then set up.

What did you do in India?

We visited three states, and got involved in housing programmes in each state. We discussed how to organise squatters between cities and what the position and role of Indian NGOs should be. SPARC (an Indian NGO) gave us new ideas about NGOs. It keeps a low profile in communities, simply helping people to control the development process.

We also met government housing officials, who spoke to us about policies and problems. In India, they have a good housing policy, but they still can't provide housing for the poorest of the poor.

We also spent three nights on the streets, sharing experiences with people who live on the streets. We

spoke about how governments only make promises to squatters.

How did you find housing conditions in Bombay?

Housing conditions in Bombay are terrible. Shacks are made from sacks and plastic. Out of a population of ten million, six million are unemployed. People simply squat on the roadside. I would estimate that about half the population lives in informal settlements. There is not enough land, let alone housing. And land is very expensive.

What did you learn from your visit?

I learnt that you cannot have democracy without empowering women. In India, women are central to the housing efforts of communities. They have even started their own bank, Mahila Malan. Branches of this bank are located within the community. So money stays in the community and people have control over it. It is only deposited in a financial institution when no one is borrowing money or if the amount becomes too much. Because of Mahila Malan's good record, it can stand as a guarantor for funding development in informal settlements.

Another important lesson was how important cooperatives are in empowering communities.

I also realised that governments cannot provide housing and development for the poorest of the poor. The poor have to organise themselves and present a united front to the gov-

ernment.

But perhaps the most important lesson is that poor people everywhere face the same problems and issues. So it is important for the poor to start getting together to share experiences



and develop their own communities themselves on their own terms. ■

What is people's dialogue?

THE PEOPLE'S DIALOGUE (PD) IS PART OF the Christian Service Commission of the SA Catholic Bishop's Conference (SACBC). It is a network of poor people, mainly from informal settlements, who come together to learn from each other.

It was started after people living in informal settlements challenged the Catholic church to help them. PD was launched in March 1991. It operates nationally, gathering information, arranging exchange programmes, producing newsletters and holding workshops.

For more information contact Iris (011) 614-8071 or Joel (021) 25-2095.

Wits Chamber is 'a site of struggle'

Civics taking part in the Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber have been accused of selling out. KERRY CULLINAN asks Civic Associations of Johannesburg (CAJ) general secretary, **CAS COOVADIA**, why CAJ is part of the chamber

Some people believe it is a compromise to be part of the chamber, as you have to sit alongside Black Local Authorities (BLAs). How do you view this?

Right at the inception of the chamber, the question of the BLAs and the coloured and indian management committees was raised. CAJ's assessment was that we could continue the struggle for their collapse at the chamber. We also felt that there were more gains to be made by joining the chamber. In retrospect, we were correct because although the BLAs and management committees are there, they are totally ineffective. The other players at the chamber recognise this.

Some of the 10 civics that are part of CAJ are not represented at the chamber. Why is this?


Actstop and Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) are not in the chamber. But Actstop's AGM in March mandated the executive to organise a workshop on the chamber. A decision will be made after this. There was no objection in principle to participation.

ACO has informed CAJ that, at its last congress, the executive was mandated to join the chamber.

Do you think it is premature to set up a metropolitan negotiating forum when local forums have not been formed or are not functioning?

One of the problems is that the chamber has mainly been discussing mechanisms for delivery of things and constitutional matters. As a result, people on the ground see it as a nebulous body. We then motivated that the chamber should facilitate the formation of local forums to address local problems. We believe that the chamber is facilitating these forums, rather than militating against them. For instance, the Johannesburg Forum was set up after a recommendation from the chamber.

The SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) has



PIC: ELMOND JIVANE (DYNAMIC IMA)

resolved that local negotiations should be confined to service issues. Constitutional discussions are seen as pre-empting national discussions. What is your view of this?

We don't have problems with local forums discussing bread and butter issues, but even there it is extremely difficult not to touch on constitutional issues.

But at metropolitan level, discussion on future local government is not just the ambit of politicians. The way in which local government is developed will have a critical impact on ordinary people's lives. We believe civics should involve people across the political spectrum in debate on future local government.

But our position has always been that even if we reach consensus on future local government, this must be referred to the national negotiations. So we are not pre-empting decisions, but feeding into the process.

When the chamber met the Codesa secretariat, we got a positive response on this position. The latest ANC proposals are similar to the metropolitan position, so we see no conflict. Hence we have proposed to the chamber that we need a democratically elected metropolitan constituent assembly that includes civil society, to debate constitutional matters.

But in the light of current national developments, particularly the suspension of negotiations, CAJ in-

tends motivating in the chamber that constitutional negotiations be put on hold until the national situation is resolved. We will thus be guided by developments at national negotiations.

Is it a problem that political organisations are not represented at the chamber?

Yes. The chamber's membership committee has proposed that it be mandated to approach key political organisations in the area about their participation in the chamber. That recommendation is going to the next chamber meeting and we believe it will be accepted. The civics have always felt political organisations should be in the chamber. We have briefed the ANC and the SACP on the chamber and we want to continue these discussions with a view to including them.

If we do manage to win a metropolitan constituent assembly, then this will have to be contested on a party political basis.

In some areas, notably Border and the Eastern Cape, political organisations actually lead negotiation forums such as the chamber. How do you view this?

I think we need to take into consideration different conditions in different areas. Soweto, by its sheer size, has been a catalyst for developing negotiating forums in this area. The chamber was a child of the Soweto Accord that developed when the liberation movements were still banned.

Given the new conditions, the absence of political parties is a problem which is being addressed. CAJ would not have a problem if the political organisations — certainly if a metropolitan constituent assembly is established — ran with the chamber. But we would jealously guard our right to give input to the process, particularly on the constitutional debate and day-to-day issues affecting our members.

It has been alleged that the civics' technical advisers are taking political decisions on their behalf. Is this true? Do the civics have the capacity to participate properly in the chamber?

I think here we have to hone in on Planact, which has been the key service organisation working with us on the chamber. Up to now, Planact has never developed policy for us on the chamber. They have tried to ensure that they are not at any forum of the chamber by themselves. There have been occasions when they have been at some working group meetings on their own. But even in such instances, Planact comrades have pushed CAJ to ensure that briefings take place before and after such meetings.

But one of the challenges facing us is to develop the capacity for civic delegates to grapple with the issues raised at working groups. There are problems of per-

son-power, lack of funds and training.

CAJ has identified training as its priority over the next four to five months to empower people to participate properly. We have finalised a five-month training course for two people per civic to be run by Khanya College. These people will be trained in negotiation skills, administrative and financial skills.

The training task team of the chamber has also agreed that the civics should identify 200 people to be trained for middle management positions in local government. The white local authorities have given an undertaking that once such people are trained, they would give them on-the-job training. This depends on how the national negotiations go and how long existing local government is in place.

How are you going to ensure proper reportbacks to make sure that people know what is going on in the chamber?

Reportbacks vary from civic to civic. Our organiser, who is not yet fulltime, will help weaker civics to establish structures for reporting back. We have also given interim civics four months to launch formally. Our information officer has distributed information packages.

Local negotiations forums also involve more people from the civics, which will bring the chamber closer to more people.

But reporting back and getting the chamber to the people has probably been our greatest weakness. That is why we are pushing for the local forums.

What are some of the gains the civics have managed to win at the chamber?

I have already mentioned the training task team. There is also an agreement in principle for the transfer of houses in Soweto. And CAJ's proposal for a metropolitan constituent assembly is now being considered by all parties.

Another gain has been land allocation. After we stopped the TPA (Transvaal Provincial Authority) from developing Rietfontein into another Soweto, the chamber's land task team investigated land available in the Witwatersrand. This was done by RSC (Regional Services Council) consultants and two CAJ people financed by the RSC over five months. A comprehensive CAJ-RSC report found that there is enough land on the periphery of Johannesburg to accommodate the housing and employment needs of all the area's people up to the year 2000.

Then there is the formation of local forums, facilitated by the chamber. Over and above that, the people CAJ has seconded to the chamber have really developed qualitatively, after being thrown in the deep end. These are some of the gains of the chamber that can be built on. ■

Giving birth to a new public service

By **KERRY CULLINAN**

EVEN IF South Africa produces a wonderful constitution, it will be worthless unless the country has a public service that is willing to implement it. This emerged clearly at a recent conference organised by the New Public Administration Initiative (NPAI).

The conference was billed as "consultation on the way forward". It drew together a wide range of people interested in the public service: public servants, academics, NGOs and community organisations. Unfortunately, the state's Commission for Administration (CFA) refused to attend, effectively rendering much of the discussion academic.

Delegates stressed that it was essential to get the government involved, perhaps by meeting administration minister Org Marais. They also stressed that NPAI should try to influence Codesa, if it reconvened.

In an excellent keynote address, visiting US professor, Louis Picard, cautioned the conference to remember three realities:

- there is no existing alternative public service that can replace the present one in a post-apartheid era;
- current negotiations are likely to provide protection like job security and pensions for the existing public service;
- financial constraints will ensure that a future service is not greatly expanded.

"Since February 2, I have seen little to indicate that the public service is getting ready for the monumental changes in store for it over the next few years," added Picard.

But the public servants represented certainly did their best to persuade the gathering that their jobs should be spared.

"The public service is not all that bad," said Hans Olivier, general

manager of the Public Servants' Association. "Most public servants have found a career," he added, pleading for reproaches and bitterness to be put in the past.

The auditor general, Piet Wronseley and his deputy, Bertie Loots, agreed. "Only a small minority of officials have been involved in corruption," said Loots.

The ANC's Sindiso Mfenyana, however, said that it was incorrect to assume that "the current public service is good and there on merit". The public service, he said, had to administer the law and implement parliament's instructions. It had to be impartial, efficient and accountable to the community. It should serve, not direct or instruct. To achieve these objectives, said Mfenyana, new people had to be introduced, particularly at top and middle levels.

While there were real differences of opinion, delegates agreed that:

- the new public service had to be representative, accountable to society and strive for excellence;
- public servants should be appointed on the basis of merit, experience and academic qualifications using affirmative action as a guiding principle;
- the public service had to play a developmental role by ensuring, among other things, that social services were delivered;
- present public servants had to be retrained to meet new needs, while new public servants had to be trained;
- the public service had to be rationalised to include bantustans.

But defining these terms was, to a large extent, left in the air. What happens, asked the ANC's Papie Moloto, if a person has a doctorate in "native administration"? Should this count as an academic qualification when the aim of such training was

aimed solely at working out how to control the black population?

Defining affirmative action afforded a great deal of debate. Job Mokgoro, a lecturer at UWC, argued that affirmative action should follow four phases: desegregation; policy and strategy changes to remove discrimination; fair rather than formal equality of opportunity and lastly preferential treatment against white counterparts.

Picard pointed out that, "in the end, affirmative action is most successful when it starts at the top."

But he stressed that, in applying affirmative action, public sector recruitment should not become "jobs for cadres". Recruitment had to be on the basis of people needed to perform tasks set by the government. A bloated civil service would only lead to severe economic decline in the country. As a result, civil servants' wages would fall, and many would rely on bribes to supplement their incomes.

The Urban Foundation's Anne Bernstein questioned whether affirmative action would not create greater division between different communities and only benefit the middle class. ■



GLOSSARY

acumen - keen insight or knowledge

ad hoc - interim, temporary

allay - put to rest

articulates - put ideas clearly

auspicious - favourable

baron - powerful industrial magnate, a nobleman

bereft - not having

capers - illegal activities, irresponsible behaviour

charlatan - false pretender

chasten - punish in order to correct

chokehold - tight grip

compound - make worse

consensus - agreement

corollary - a consequence

custodian - guardian

cynicism - sarcastic doubting human sincerity

decries - condemns

deluded - deceived

deterioration - worsening

dichotomising - sharply defined division

echelon - a group of people of the same level, class

elite - select group in society

emancipatory - liberating

etched - deeply engraved

ethos - conduct, character

feasible - possible

genocide - extermination of a race or group

giddy - dizzy

hucksters - hawkers

illicit - illegal

imminent - soon to happen

implicit - not obvious

imperatives - important issues

inadvertently - accidentally

WIP strives to communicate with as diverse a range of readers as possible. To this end, we give the meaning of some of the more difficult words found in this issue.

infusion - mixture of things

lavish - plenty, extravagant

loathe - reluctant

metaphor - a symbol for something (eg youth lion is a metaphor for a brave youth)

mirages - illusions

mired - stuck

modes - styles

mythology - popular belief not based on fact

naive - lacking critical ability

obscure - not clear

pacification - restoring calm
panacea - remedy, universal medicine

partisan - loyal to a particular party

pervasive - widespread

pigeon-hole - put into a category, stereotype

pitfalls - traps

plateau - different level

predicate - based on

quest - pursuit, undertaking

reimbursed - paid back

rhetoric - language designed to persuade or impress

robust - strong

rudimentary - basic

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