


# WORK IN PROGRESS

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## DEFIANCE

A MEASURE OF EXPECTATIONS

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This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority.

This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament.

The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule.

The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this.

The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression.

Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests.

The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South

African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans.

Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible.

The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power.

Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feeling that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable.

The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider.

At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment.

De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power.

Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.



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# Taking the politics out of political trials

**T**welve trialists face death in yet another wide-ranging 'common purpose' political trial to be held in Delmas.

The accused, all but one of whom are from Pretoria's Mamelodi and Atteridgeville townships, have been charged with four counts of murder, three of attempted murder, and nine of terrorism. They face six further charges under the Internal Security and Arms and Ammunitions Acts.

When the group first appeared in court, they were charged with high treason.

But in line with a number of recent political trials, the state withdrew treason allegations in an apparent attempt to depoliticise the charges, and present the alleged actions in a criminal light. In addition, conviction for murder carries a mandatory death sentence unless mitigating circumstances are proved.

For treason the death sentence is discretionary, and many judges in South African courts have been loathe to impose death sentences in such circumstances.

The state claims all twelve on trial are party to the same conspiracy, and hence jointly responsible for all acts set out in the charge sheet. They are:

- Moeketsi Rodney Aberham Toka (25), of Mamelodi;
- Godfrey Velaphi Mokube (41), of Bloemfontein;
- Francis Pitse (24), of Atteridgeville;
- Ernest Thoboki Ramadite (24), of Atteridgeville;
- George Mathe (21), of Atteridgeville;
- Johannes Maleka (25), of Atteridgeville;
- Peter Holmes Maluleka (34), of Mamelodi;
- Phuti Bernard Makgonyana (26), of Mamelodi East;
- Joseph Nkosi (39), of Mamelodi East;
- Thapelo Reuben Khotsa (23), of Mamelodi East;
- Reginald Noah Legodi (22), of Mamelodi East; and
- Alfred James Kgasi (25), also of Mamelodi East.

**A**ccording to the state, the accused are members of the African National Congress, and have undergone military training. The state alleges two of the accused were trained in Angola, and two in the Bophuthatswana bantustan. The remaining eight, according to the state, underwent military training in South Africa.

They were initially under the command of an ANC guerilla named Odirile Meshack Maponya, who used the alias of 'Mainstay'. He, however, was killed in a sabotage attack near Pretoria's Sterland theatre complex on 15 April 1988. Toka (the first accused) took over as commander of the unit.

In its summary of facts, the state claims the accused conspired amongst themselves and other members and supporters of the ANC, to advance certain goals of the ANC. These included the collection and transmission of information to the ANC; recruitment of people to join the ANC and participate in its activities; and identification of targets for sabotage.

Accused 1 and 2 (Toka and Mokube), according to the state, illegally entered South Africa by climbing over a border fence between Botswana and South Africa. They recruited the remaining accused to ANC membership, and instructed them in the use of weapons and explosives. Training was also given in 'the mobilisation and politicisation of the masses'.

The state alleges the accused were in possession of sketches locating various 'dead letter boxes' (DLBs), where arms were stored. The ANC had supplied Toka and Mokube with sufficient funds to purchase a motor vehicle, which was used to supply various ANC units with weapons, ammunition and explosives housed in the DLBs.

**B**etween April and June 1988, the state argues, the accused planned and implemented 11 military actions in which five people were killed, a number injured, and property damaged:

- \* on 18 March, three Atteridgeville policemen were shot dead, and two other people seriously wounded;
- \* on 8 April, a limpet mine exploded at the Atteridgeville municipal offices, seriously damaging the building;
- \* on 15 April, a bomb blast at

Pretoria's Sterland complex killed the unit's commander, injured a by-stander, and damaged vehicles and buildings;

- \* shortly after this blast, a limpet mine explosion damaged shops in Church Street, Pretoria;
- \* that same night, a hand grenade was thrown at a house in Mamelodi East;
- \* early on the evening of 10 May, a grenade was thrown into the Mamelodi house of a police officer. In the ensuing explosion, the policeman's year-old daughter was killed;
- \* 15 May saw a grenade attack on another Mamelodi house, damaging the building and a vehicle parked nearby;
- \* at about 1 pm on 26 May, a limpet mine exploded in the centre of Pretoria, seriously injuring five bystanders, and damaging nearby buildings;
- \* later that day, a second explosion in the centre of Pretoria destroyed one vehicle and damaged two others;
- \* on 4 June, an F1 defensive hand grenade damaged a Mamelodi house;
- \* and the next day, 5 June, a mini-limpet mine damaged an electrical sub-station at the Saulsville railway station.

**N**one of the accused were found in possession of any arms, explosives or ammunition when arrested. However, the state will attempt to prove that all the accused were legally responsible for possession of the following:

- \* 12 SPM limpet mines;
- \* 26 158 mini-limpet mines;
- \* 24 RGD-5 offensive hand grenades;
- \* 5 F1 defensive hand grenades;
- \* various detonators for limpet mines and grenades;
- \* 5 AKM and 1 R1 guns, together with ammunition, magazines and cleaning materials.

Lawyers for the accused have expressed concern about the breadth of the conspiracy alleged by the state. It is a common legal principle that participants in a conspiracy are responsible for each other's acts. But legal commentators have argued that there must be limits to an accused's responsibility for the acts of others.

In the Silverton treason trial, for example, the state attempted to hold ANC members responsible for an attack on a Silverton bank they had no

although they had no involvement in the attack or with the ANC group which undertook that action. On the state's argument in that case, membership of the ANC as a guerilla was sufficient to link an accused to a totally separate ANC action. The court rejected this argument.

The limits of conspiracy and common purpose are likely to be central to the forthcoming Toka trial, which begins on 31 October. Observers will be asking whether involvement in certain ANC activities renders an accused liable for a far wider range of activities. And if Justice van der Merwe, sitting in yet another specially convened Delmas court, finds in favour of the state on this question, twelve accused may face the gallows.

For murder, in South Africa, carries a compulsory death sentence unless extenuating circumstances are proved.  
*Glenn Moss*

## Durban bus drivers strike

In the largest and longest running bus strike ever in this country, three unions joined forces in an unusual show of unity and co-operation in Natal.

The Durban Integrated Municipal Employees Society (Dimes) - an independent union, the Natal Municipal Transport Employees Association (Namtea) - an Uwusa affiliate, and a Cosatu affiliate - the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), together embarked on a strike involving close to 1 200 workers.

The strike affected all areas of Durban - 200 000 commuters were stranded daily and had to scramble for alternate transport.

The dispute centred around wages. The Durban Transport Management Board offered a 16% increase, while the drivers demanded a 20% hike.

But the strike only began after DTMB insisted on referring the dispute to industrial court when a conciliation board failed to break deadlock. This is a strategy unions have been actively opposing - a court case could drag on for many months, in some cases up to two years.

By law, municipal disputes must be referred to the courts for arbitration. But the unions believed that DTMB, in the interests of good faith bargaining,



*Striking DTMB bus drivers outside Cosatu house in Clairwood on the first day of the strike*



*The empty bus terminus on Soldier's Way in Durban during the strike*

could have opted for private arbitration.

According to Lungelo Phakathi, TGWU's Durban branch secretary, the strike may have been averted had the parties gone to arbitration.

Instead, DTMB's hardline attitude

cost the company over R4- million in a three-and-half-week strike. The company is 100% unionised and the entire workforce stopped work.

Settlement was finally reached after a marathon 18-hour mediation session

on 9 September. But when workers returned to work, management asked them to sign forms with changes in the conditions of employment. This issue was not part of the agreement reached at mediation. As a result workers staged a further four-day strike until management withdrew the forms.

In terms of the settlement reached at mediation, the parties agreed on an across-the-board 17.6% increase on current wages which ranged from R900 to R1 200 a month. A large number of workers, particularly Dimes members, have worked for DTMB for over 25 years - some for up to 40 years.

The agreement also included the following: all workers dismissed during the strike shall be re-employed on the same salary notch as before the strike; compulsory medical aid which costs workers on average R150 a month will now be changed to a voluntary scheme; workers' disciplinary records relating to the strike shall fall away and previous disciplinary records will not be used to victimise strikers; the DTMB's disciplinary and grievance procedure as at 15 August 1989 shall apply to employees - any changes to this procedure must be negotiated; and each worker shall be entitled to 96% of the annual bonus for 1989, a reduction of 4% because of losses sustained by the company during the strike.

Commenting on the settlement Phakathi said 'it was a compromise, but a fair compromise'. Dimes general secretary, Nad Murugan, viewed the settlement as a victory.

An interesting feature of the strike was the strong unity among workers belonging to unions with different ideological positions. 'We were not different unions in this dispute but one body, and all meetings and caucuses were held jointly in planning a common strategy', said Murugan. 'If anything the strike proved to be a political victory for workers'.

Of Dimes's 5 600 members - all Indian - 300 are based at DTMB and the rest at Durban City Council. Previously a conservative union, Dimes is now moving into the arena of radical trade unionism. High on its current agenda is the question of one union per industry, and Murugan is optimistic that the union is moving

towards affiliation to Cosatu.

Nantca chairperson Henry Gumede believed the unity displayed by union officials and workers during the strike was a positive sign, but he could not comment on broader unity in future.

Whatever the outcome, the unions believe a precedent has been set for unity in action.

*Shareen Singh*

## Transkei workers face emergency charges

**T**ranskei postal workers struggling to form a union were charged under security laws after a dispute, which began in June and culminated in solidarity protests and work stoppages.

The case, which will be heard in late September, may well indicate the route Transkei authorities intend to follow in dealing with organised labour.

For the workers involved, the heavy-handed government response to labour action raises questions about their union's strategies, and about the future of union organisation in the Transkei. While the Transkei has no laws which forbid unions, the authorities are obviously afraid of the development of a militant labour movement.

Workers in many sectors in the region appear to be organising, following the precedent of the Transkei Postal Workers Association (Trapowa). At present, Trapowa is the only elected workers' association, although management-established worker committees exist in most sectors.

More than 1 400 of the 1 800-strong Transkei postal workforce are Trapowa members.

The association was formed in October last year because workers were frustrated with the inefficient running of the postal services, corruption in the administration and discriminatory job reservation. Workers also felt the Transkei Public Servants Association (Trapsa), a management-nominated body, did not represent their interests.

The association soon faced threatening action from both police

and the administration. Harassment culminated in the sudden transfer of Trapowa's national organiser, Nokulunga Dlakwene, and the subsequent disallowance of her salary. After many attempts to negotiate the transfer, and after being shunted back and forth by numerous officials, Dlakwene collapsed with exhaustion. Trapowa met with postal management and demanded that Dlakwene's transfer be withdrawn, that outstanding salaries should be paid and harassment of members should stop.

The Trapowa executive then met with government ministers, demanding recognition of their association. During this meeting a group of 180 workers from the Umtata Trapowa office arrived, but authorities refused to admit them. The workers decided to wait until the executive came out of the meeting with government ministers.

When police ordered the crowd to disperse, the workers decided to march to the police station. It is understood that they believed it would be illegal to gather anywhere else.

Much to their surprise, they were arrested and charged under the security laws. For two weeks bail was refused while the attorney-general considered the issue.

Solidarity action by workers in other areas took the form of protests and work stoppages. It was met with similar force: workers were arrested.

Transkei postmaster-general Gobindhlovu Madebanc called in the army to take over the running of the postal services.

Most Transkeian postal workers are women and a number of those arrested were pregnant or had young children.

Finally the arrested workers were granted bail, but there were stringent conditions:

Trapowa members could not take part in any further strikes; they could not speak to other Trapowa members; and they had to stay away from the post office and refrain from meeting as Trapowa. All those charged were suspended from work.

Trapowa's demands are very basic compared to those of unions in other parts of South Africa. The charges mean the Trapowa workers face between 12 months and three years in prison if convicted of staging an illegal strike.

*Thumida Maistry, eNews.*


# DEFIANCE



Benny Good - Afsajix

## a measure of expectations

*The success of the MDM's defiance campaign indicates more than mass rejection of apartheid and the repression which maintains it. It is also a reflection of the enormously increased expectations ordinary South Africans have about their future. JO-ANNE COLLINGE reports.*



Cape Town school protests - August



During the defiance campaign

Cedric Nunn - Afsajix

**W**hen, on 15 September, South African Council of Churches general secretary Frank Chikane marched to John Vorster Square at the head of thousands, his mission was directed at the police station where, eight years before, he had been detained in the cell next to Neil Aggett.

At the end of the march, Chikane and other leading clerics handed a memorandum on police brutality to the station commander at John Vorster Square. Then he turned to face the crowd massed outside, under the twin flags of the ANC and the Communist Party, to lead them in singing Nkosi Sikele' iAfrika.

The significant - but incomplete - twist of history that the scene represented did not escape the man who had witnessed Aggett's inert body removed from his detention cell.

After the march, Chikane commented to the press that the official decision to grant permission for mass demonstrations in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria did not reflect a 'change of heart' on the part of the government. It was, Chikane said, a necessary state accommodation of persistent mass struggles.

The protest marches were largely part of the month-old Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) defiance campaign - a campaign designed to challenge both the racial discrimination of apartheid and the security laws underpinning the survival of the minority regime.

The overwhelming size of the Cape Town march on 13 September and the speed with which the Johannesburg and Pretoria marches gathered ground two days later - in the absence of any burning local issue - magnified a central feature of the defiance campaign itself: the existence of a widespread political consciousness which enabled people to be mobilised even where organisational networks had not recovered from three bruising years under state-of-emergency rule.

**I**t was surely this consciousness which gave the defiance campaign its wide appeal. What else could have drawn thousands to picnic on

'all white' beaches? What else caused students to march in remote Phutaditjaba, prompted workers to challenge residential and canteen segregation on the mines, drew pupils in the Border region to demand admission to white schools and prompted challenges to hospital apartheid even in Free State towns like Welkom.

The massive stayaway on election day - the largest in South African history, estimated to have been observed by three million workers - signified that a very broadly-based political culture had taken root. Vast numbers of people knew what action was expected of them even where the state of emergency made it impossible for this to be conveyed openly through mass communication media.

There are suggestions of an additional dimension to this upsurge in political activity. At an anti-election meeting in Actonville on the East Rand, National Union of Mineworkers general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of 'the sweet smell of freedom' permeating the villages, townships and workplaces of the country.

Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, addressing the Cape Town march, was more forthright. 'We say, hey Mr de Klerk, you have already lost... Our march to freedom is unstoppable. It is the march of all of us South Africans, black and white'.

Put in more mundane terms, the tide of expectations is swelling in an unprecedented way. There is the prevalent belief that this time increased political pressure will deliver the real prize: a non-racial, democratic system of government.

The second salient feature of the mass protests in particular and the defiance campaign as a whole was the obvious and unrestrained support for the ANC.

In Cape Town, where a human mass of anything between 25 000 and 80 000 marched behind the ANC flag, Congress of South African Trade Unions general secretary Jay Naidoo addressed the crowd, saying: 'Today we have witnessed the might of our people. We have witnessed the might of our people under our flag - the green, black and gold flag'.

He went on: 'We are saying that our leaders Oliver Tambo and Joe Slovo are indeed the people who will

be sitting in the parliament of the future'.

In Johannesburg, where both the ANC and SACP flags were prominently displayed and where a greater proportion of the crowd comprised seasoned activists, pro-ANC freedom songs were sung for the duration of the one-hour procession.

**I**n the defiance campaign a large number of activities related to the 'unbanning' of organisations outlawed under emergency and security laws. This involved meetings being called under the auspices of organisations prohibited from doing so; banners and T-shirts of these organisations being displayed; and office bearers and representatives of the organisations appearing on public platforms.

Where such 'unbannings' of MDM-aligned organisations took place, a simultaneous defiance of the ban on the ANC almost invariably occurred. Where people unbanned the Congress of South African Students (Cosas), they also unbanned the ANC. Where they illegally flaunted their UDF T-shirts and banners, they also unfurled the black, green and gold flag. They did so even while enjoying the unlawful pleasures of Durban's officially-white Addington Beach.

The first month of the defiance campaign was, in large measure, about legitimising the ANC. Even the anti-election campaign, in contrast to that waged during the 1984 tricameral elections, had little to do with discrediting the candidates for the houses of delegates and representatives. The campaign was much more concerned with establishing an alternative vision of the future, using the ANC's constitutional guidelines as a touchstone.

The third observable trend during this time of mass protest has involved the alignment of groups and individuals outside of the main extra-parliamentary resistance movement with activities enacted by this dominant oppositional force.

The number of clerics, professionals, liberal politicians, academics and high-profile business people on both the Cape Town and Johannesburg marches was highlighted in the commercial press.

While few of them would themselves hoist the ANC flag, it is significant that they would rather be associated with those who do so than with the apartheid regime and the actions of its armed forces.

It is not far-fetched to speak of the attainment of hegemony by forces representing the Congress tradition.

The non-violent nature of the marches, which took place in streets bare of police, was trumpeted by the SABC. In truth, despite the grim utterances of law and order minister Adriaan Vlok, the defiance campaign protests were equally peaceful in their execution, but were often met with state violence which drew occasional retaliation.

**V**iolence - or at least the potential for violence - lies not in the mass defiance campaign at all, but in the government's response to the moving force behind these demonstrations - namely, the enormously increased expectations ordinary South Africans have about their future.

It is trite to say that the desire for change arises from the conditions of apartheid itself - the experience of poverty, discrimination and wholesale subjection to the powers of the armed forces. It is more useful to note that this desire is channelled and formed both by historical factors and present reality.

There are several elements in the immediate political climate charging the hopes of the oppressed.

\* Firstly, there is the widely-reported fact that the South African government is under concerted pressure from its traditional Western allies to negotiate a transfer of power with representative leaders of the people.

\* Secondly, with Namibian independence unfolding next door there is evidence that Pretoria can be induced to surrender power. The success of struggles against colonialism in Southern Africa has always given South African resistance a fillip - Namibia more so than any other, because the colonial power in question is the apartheid government itself.

\* Thirdly, there is tangible evidence of the international credibility of resistance forces with even Pretoria's allies. Not only has the Bush administration talked of



Benny Good - Atapix

### *School protests - Cape Town*

expanding contacts with the ANC, but the UDF has secured talks with key heads of state.

\* Fourthly, there is the emotionally-charged climate that elections for the minority parliament have come to generate. This time the tension has been heightened by the 'reform' campaign of the National Party itself. The disenfranchised have read the campaign for signs to confirm international pressure on Pretoria. State President FW de Klerk's statement that the door is open to those who seek change and that there is no need 'to batter it down' is received with both scepticism and optimism.

There can be little doubt that popular expectations are fixed on a particular form of change, involving no less than the transfer of political power to the majority and, in many cases, a restructuring of the economy.

To the extent that political movements shape popular consciousness over and above the teachings of experience, two traditions have moulded the ideas of the supporters of the present MDM - the 77-year-old nationalist tradition of the ANC and, to a lesser degree, the socialist course pursued by the South African Communist Party. After the banning of these organisations, their guiding ideologies found only intermittent expression in mass organisation - until the late 1970s and early 1980s.

This era saw the emergence of

militant trade unions which won legitimacy for organisations of the working class, and student organisations openly basing themselves on the Freedom Charter.

The overtly racist and anti-democratic nature of the tricameral parliament galvanised those who supported the notion of a non-racial democracy into action to form the UDF in 1983. The legitimacy of state structures was challenged at every level; township struggles - around housing and education - were at one and the same time about power and poverty.

**T**he wildfire multiplication of UDF affiliates and the consolidation of unions in Cosatu - the country's biggest labour federation - is history. So too is the insurrectionary form that resistance took after the Vaal uprising of September 1983. These circumstances enabled the outlawed liberation movements to expand their underground political work, consolidating their traditions of struggle.

When the national state of emergency was declared in June 1986, Cosatu and the UDF had already adopted the principle of pursuing 'unity in action'. It is this strategy which is embodied in the notion of the MDM. Whether the notion of an active alliance would have solidified as the 'MDM' if the UDF had not been effectively banned is open to question.

The elusive MDM, so real an influence but quite without structure, is an illustration of how the state of emergency failed. State security systems could outlaw organisations, but they could not remove from activists the experience of organisation. They could inhibit communication, but they could not control thought.

South African liberation forces, without recovering their organisational ground, are still readily mobilised. And this, it can be argued, contributes another crucial factor to the present escalation of expectations: a sense that resistance can survive the might of apartheid, that there is something to the slogan 'people's power'.

The government, as much as anyone else, must be conscious that failure to meet the expectations generated by this combination of

developments and perceptions could be disastrous.

It must be asking whether for the first time the potential does not exist for widespread insurrection, which could occur across the land, outstripping even the impact of the regional uprisings from 1984 to 1986.

**I**ronically, moves by the government to accommodate expectations in some measure may also fuel resistance, in that they would confirm people's sense that their own actions can achieve results. Increased demands would be made. Organisation would feed off its own success and the pressures for change would be incremental.

Both the hopes of the oppressed and the resignation of sections of the ruling group to change are pinned on a reading of international opinion that concludes even Pretoria's traditional allies are not prepared to tolerate apartheid.

The defiance campaign, though referred to by some MDM representatives as an effective 'dismantling of apartheid', has been largely an exercise in strategic protest. As explained by Mohamed Valli Moosa before his detention, it was devised particularly to expose the National Party 'reform' plan as a sham and underscore that what FW de Klerk had on offer did not represent an end to apartheid.

The greatest danger for the MDM is that the international community - especially Britain and the United States - might relieve the pressure on De Klerk on the grounds of his promises and his appearance of moderation; they might accept token human rights concessions as down payments on future unspecified moves to democratic rule.

If this happened, demands inside the country would not dissipate, but De Klerk would have a freer hand in countering resistance. He could return to the tactics of his predecessor.

Indeed there is still some doubt as to whether he has forsaken these tactics, a doubt based on the strangely dualistic character of state security responses to the defiance campaign, including its anti-election component, and to the schools crisis in the Western Cape.

At the level of rhetoric, heavy 'law

and order' utterances by National Party candidates - most notably Adriaan Vlok - in the run-up to the election can be ascribed to the need to secure the right-wing element in its ideologically spread-eagled constituency.

Daily, the press and SABC announced government crackdowns on the MDM. And while certain actions were taken, detentions did not even begin to approximate the pattern which was maintained almost consistently for 30 months of the national state of emergency - that is, until the hunger strike in February and March this year.

Nevertheless, repression remained a major issue, even if there was a gap between the Vlok rhetoric and the reality.

Repression generally took on quite new contours: those of containment or pre-emption, rather than confrontation. In many cases this required huge contingents of police and soldiers. Where this general strategy was not observed and confrontation did occur - as in the Western Cape and some remote areas - the force used by the state was considerable.

This force was nearly always disproportionate, since it was generally inflicted on people whose sole offence was to attend a meeting prohibited in one way or another.

Aware of the damage that the sjambokking of civilians does to its foreign image, government attempted to prevent meetings happening rather than breaking them up. It did this by a combination of banning orders, flooding the proposed venues with armed forces and armoured vehicles and roadblocking either supporters or scheduled speakers.

In many cases those committed to the principle of defiance held meetings at alternative venues despite the imposition of bans. The replacement meetings were - inevitably - smaller than the originals would have been. When, equally inevitably, they were disrupted by police, the confrontation was reduced in scale.

The Human Rights Commission calculates that at least 56 meetings were broken up by the armed forces from the start of the defiance campaign to election day and that the state refrained from violence in only 19 instances. It commented that there

appeared 'to be no policy of "minimum force"'.

Where meetings were not banned, a different form of pre-emptive state intervention frequently applied. Large contingents of riot and security police were deployed inside and outside meetings, apparently in an attempt to deter attendance, dampen the militancy of speeches and curtail open debate. This tactic was used extensively against the anti-election campaign of the Transvaal Indian Congress and, more prominently, at the workers' summit.

In another image-conscious move, the authorities substituted mass charge-and-release procedures for detention without trial in the case of activists apprehended during protest action. At least 2 000 people were arrested and charged in demonstrations within the space of five weeks, according to the HRC.

In the Western Cape the alleged brutality of the police in the build-up to the elections and on the night of the poll has been widely reported. It is common cause that at least some of the 23 deaths reckoned to have occurred that night were caused by police shooting.

It is equally clear that the level of resistance in the Cape had far exceeded the dimensions of protest. The defiance campaign there fed into well-organised and long-standing resistance focused on education.

The HRC observes: 'The severity of police repression in this area also indicates that police are acting to smash the well-organised and highly-motivated Western Cape Students Congress which has been rebuilding itself despite being restricted'.

The fact that two people were killed in the Peninsula at a vigil held on the very night of the peace march, and that kits konstabels (instant cops) are alleged to be implicated in this, underscores the suggestion by the HRC.

The Western Cape experience also suggests that any attempts by De Klerk to curtail security action without simultaneously moving to address the fundamental political questions will necessarily be self-defeating, since popular opposition will not find indefinite expression in protest marches. Those who marvel at the Pretoria Spring of 1989 would do well to heed this.

# Liberating 'liberal' freedoms



FREE  
THE PRESS  
TO TELL  
THE  
TRUTH

Left: the Black Sash, part of South Africa's liberal tradition. Top right: Joseph Stalin, Soviet leader who abandoned basic freedoms. Bottom right: Mikhail Gorbachev, current Soviet leader responsible for the relaxation of many repressive traditions.

*No democracy - bourgeois or socialist - is possible without a massive extension of freedoms of expression and association. DARYL GLASER argues that socialists ignore the 'traditional liberal freedoms' at their peril.*

Eric Miller - Alrapix

**T**he spectre of 'liberalism' has long haunted the South African left. It has typically been perceived as something to be fought at all costs.

Revisionist academics of the 1970s expended their energies debunking liberal historiography. National Forum affiliates hold up 'anti-liberalism' as a premise of their unity. Socialists in the Congress movement feel compelled to justify their association with liberals in terms that are often purely tactical and instrumental.

These critical appraisals have one kind of liberalism in mind - the liberalism of capitalist privilege. This proposes that apartheid and capitalism are incompatible, that capitalism will or can sustain an institutional framework of non-racial democracy, and, above all, the assumption that such an outcome would be desirable.

This form of liberalism would create a 'formal' democracy based on universal franchise and civil liberties but leave the foundations of economic inequality intact.

Pro-capitalist reformism has indeed constituted the dominant tendency of South African liberalism, and the critique on these grounds is well-founded. But it has its limits - and its share of dangers.

The principal danger is that it could encourage South African socialists to think goals like political pluralism and civil liberties as 'bourgeois' or 'elitist' - purely because of their historical association with liberalism.

In countries of 'actually-existing socialism' it is clear that subordinating pluralism and liberty to statist pursuits of general welfare, under the banner of proletarian (or other) dictatorship, has absolutely denied the democratic rights of the working class. And this has frequently happened without offering people a commensurate improvement in material living standards.

But the assumption that freedom of expression, for example, concerns only the bourgeoisie or intelligentsia, reveals a massive contempt for working people. It assumes that - at the end of the day - they are merely consumers of material goods with no interest in expressing intelligent

views or being culturally creative.

Only slightly less paternalistic is the view that it is 'good' for working people to be creative. Here, all views and creations of the working class must be politically acceptable - in the opinion of self-styled vanguards claiming to understand their best interests.

The gains achieved by working people through the franchise and trade union rights in capitalist democracies, and the massive repression and privations they have suffered under so-called workers' states, should be sufficient to persuade socialists that no democracy - bourgeois or socialist - is possible without a massive extension of freedoms of expression and association.

Indeed, the best argument for socialism is not that it fills workers' stomachs or puts shelters over their heads, but that it alone has the potential to generate the equality of social power which makes possible full and equal public enjoyment of rights and liberties.

**T**he problem with the left's 'anti-liberalism' is that it conflates two quite distinct aspects of South African liberalism. The one is the concern to protect South Africa's capitalist order from egalitarian and levelling pressures emanating from the black majority. Pro-capitalist liberals may want to protect capitalism in its laissez faire or social democratic permutations. And their motives might be to protect their own privileges or to preserve private economic power as a counterweight to bureaucratic domination.

No matter what motive they may have in mind: from a democratic socialist point of view the position is mistaken.

Socialists argue - in my view correctly - that political power in capitalist societies is not counterposed to private economic power, but ultimately reinforces it.

Any society where a small capitalist minority monopolises decisions about production and investment remains vulnerable to capitalist blackmail, whether from local business elites or international financial agencies.

It is therefore entirely appropriate, from a socialist viewpoint, to

challenge those aspects of liberalism bound up with the defence of private property in the principal means of production. (Questions left open for debate here are markets, co-operatives, small enterprise under socialism, as well as time scales for the socialisation of economic resources. What *can* be confidently asserted is that indefinitely preserving large scale capitalist property or largely unregulated markets is incompatible with attaining an egalitarian and fully democratic order).

But liberals also articulate a second concern - that a post-apartheid regime in South Africa should institute, extend and defend freedom of expression and association for its opponents. This view has always appeared inherently 'liberal' (and indissolubly linked to capitalism) only because liberals alone have thus far verbalised it.

If such freedoms existed in a post-apartheid system, they would of course be 'used' by opponents of that regime (that is tautologically true), and indeed by opponents of socialism.

But that is what democracy means - as Rosa Luxemburg herself boldly reminded the Bolsheviks in 1917. The consequences of the Bolshevik failure to follow her injunction are all too apparent.

The right of different and diverse subjects to dissent openly is part of the democratic process. Once a regime withdraws that right from one dissenting party, the way is opened to widespread repression and to the indefinite demotion of civil liberties to the status of an unaffordable luxury.

The liberal defence of freedoms of expression and association, indeed of multi-party democracy, is therefore well grounded in the lessons of history and should be wholeheartedly embraced by the left (including the revolutionary left). The expansion of those freedoms is integral to any defensible socialist project and their promotion should not be abandoned to liberals.

**W**here does this leave the question of alliances with the liberals?

One approach may be to distinguish pro-capitalist from anti-capitalist liberals and to seek to

work only with the latter as allies. But this seems too restrictive. It leaves out of any prospective alliance thousands of liberals who do not hold strong views about capitalism. It also leaves out those who, despite being mildly pro-capitalist, are sincere in their commitment to liberties.

There are times when the distinction between pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist liberals might indeed be appropriate, especially in demarcating intimate from distant allies. But it abandons to the enemy large numbers of people who could potentially be reconciled to a post-apartheid order, including a socialist one, provided it respected political pluralism and civil liberties.

A much more fruitful distinction can be made between two kinds of alliance with liberalism: a class compromise alliance and a principled alliance.

Far-left critics of alliances with liberals usually have the former in mind - an alliance with liberals-as-defenders-of-capitalism.

This conception of alliance underlines Popular Front thinking. Liberals are assumed, in a reductionist fashion to represent the 'progressive' or 'enlightened' wing of the bourgeoisie. An alliance with liberalism is in these terms, by definition an alliance with the bourgeoisie and can only take place on the basis of a deferment of socialist goals.

This kind of alliance could be either (or at once) too close or too distant. Too close because the imperative of maintaining an alliance with capital could lead to a steady dilution of socialist commitment, a demotion of militant sections like trade unions or township youth, and an insidious bourgeois penetration - in terms of both personnel and ideology - of Popular Front leadership.

At the same time such an alliance is too distant, because - reducing all liberal discourse to class interests - it encourages the left to think of liberals in largely instrumental terms. In turn, the left may not take

liberal commitments to political and civil liberties seriously enough.

The worst of all worlds could result - as happened in Spain: an abandonment of socially radical goals coupled to Stalinist and

trial, protection from torture and capital punishment, and other such liberties. Socialists with this view would seek to win over liberals to the socialist cause on the basis of a principled and shared commitment to these values.

In the present South African context, the left would join forces with liberals to fight against torture, hangings, detention, bans, restrictions, censorship as well as against all racially discriminatory legislation. They would also co-operate in building a genuinely democratic post-apartheid order and in vigilantly monitoring and scrutinising the human rights record of post-apartheid governments.

Socialists would also take seriously current efforts to think about a 'Bill of Rights' for a post-apartheid order and seek to amplify the commitment to civil liberties codified in the African National Congress's constitutional guidelines.

Similar things are happening in contemporary Britain, where socialists around the left of the Labour and Green Parties are debating sympathetically proposals to provide the United Kingdom with a written Bill of Rights, to devolve power to the regions and introduce proportional representation into the electoral system.

Until now these proposals have largely been the preserve of liberals and disillusioned ex-marxists.

This kind of debate has opened up the possibility of linking socialists and democratic liberals in common struggles without sacrificing a vision of radical economic transformation.

The alternative to such politics could be a barren, unnecessary and ultimately self-defeating battle-to-the-death between liberals and the left. Here the most vivid and unhappy recent precedent is Iran. After the fall of the Shah, socialists occupied themselves with ensuring that 'liberals' did not come to power.

Those who did take power have since given Iranian socialists cause to regret this.



Mike Olivier of Five Freedoms Forum, an Atrapix organisation which has members from the business and professional classes.


authoritarian politics by the left.

Popular Front or class compromise alliances with liberalism are therefore doubly flawed - indeed flawed in more senses than its far-left critics acknowledge.

**H**owever, a principled alliance with liberalism would combine the struggle for socialism with the struggle for political democracy and civil liberties. It would not prioritise one of these goals at the expense of the other, consign them to separate 'stages' or see either as 'means' to higher 'ends'.

The idea here is that the only kind of socialism worth fighting for is one that extends freedoms of expression and association, the right to a fair

Afrapix



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# The last white hope ELECTION '89

Stewe Hilton-Barber - Afrapix



**A**michand Rajbansi was heard to say of the election that it was 'more political than the last one'. It is not clear what *he* meant, but on the day the continuing polarisation of South African society was certainly very evident.

A lot of whites and a trickle of Indians and coloureds made their way to the polls. The majority of South Africans of voting age had no candidates, parties or votes. In Cape Town probably 23 people were killed

in clashes with police as the defiance campaign mounted by popular organisations country-wide reached a peak.

The National Party returned to power with 93 seats. It lost 17 seats to the Conservative Party and 12 to the Democratic Party. One seat, Fauresmith, was a NP-CP tie.

Most interpretations of the results have called the DP 'the big winner', saying that the NP was 'mauled' at the polls. The CP was seen to have failed to live up to its promised threat - CP head office had predicted winning 60 seats.

But the election was neither a big victory for the Democratic Party, nor did it show a major rejection of the National Party.

The DP - ending up with a total of 33 seats - won over many of the voters who deserted the PFP and NRP in the 1987 election. But DP support still fell short of the 34 seats and 27% share of the vote captured by these parties in the 1981 election. And in fact, almost all the seats the DP gained were PFP or NRP in 1981. This raises the question whether the DP managed to woo any long-standing, rather than wavering supporters at all away from the ruling party.

Mass support for the DP was largely confined to English-speaking upper-middle and middle-class urban areas of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Natal. In Cape Town the DP gained Simonstown and Wynberg; in Johannesburg it captured Edenvale, Hillbrow and - the most spectacular gain - Bezuidenhout; in Natal the DP took Pietermaritzburg North, Pietermaritzburg South, Umbilo and Umhlanga.

Although challenged to do so, the Democratic Party failed to develop multi-faceted strategies for progressive change together with the mass democratic movement and proceeded to participate in the election for the House of Delegates. But the party's new dynamism did appeal to young voters as well as many of those who boycotted the poll last time round.

It was also true that much of the National Party's support base in urban areas that was gained in the 1987 election crumbled away. Yet the DP did not manage to win over significant numbers of NP supporters to capture seats like Durban Point, Helderberg, South Coast, Stellenbosch and Waterkloof.

On the right, the Conservative Party also failed to make serious inroads into the NP vote. Winning a total of 39 seats the right-wing party managed to break out of its Transvaal heartland.

The major gains were in the Free State; Heilbron, Ladybrand, Parys, Sasolburg, Smithfield and Welkom. In the Cape the CP took Kuruman and - its most spectacular gain - Uitenhage. These were all victories with very narrow margins, mostly under 500 votes. The CP failed to



*The last white election, said some political commentators. Only time will tell whether this turns out to be true or not. RUPERT TAYLOR, of the Wits Political Science Department, argues that nobody made great gains on 6 September, that the core of National Party support stood firm. Now, he says, the ruling party is faced with trying to construct the impossible - a halfway house between democracy and apartheid.*



take even one seat in Natal.

In the Transvaal the party gained nine seats. But allowing for the benefits the CP gained through the collapse of the HNP vote, and the DP presence in some constituencies, this was not an unexpected advance. The party's gains were mainly restricted to solidly Afrikaans-speaking areas in which small farmers and blue-collar workers predominate.

Outside of Pretoria, the NP held its established ground. In fact its majority increased in some seats - Brentwood, Innesdal, Krugersdorp, Potchefstroom, Springs, Vanderbijlpark and Verwoerdburg.

All told, the CP did not gain much support beyond that of Afrikaners in those social classes most severely hit by economic recession and disillusioned - or frightened - by the National Party's limited reform measures.

Although the threat of the CP was contained, it still remains. An additional 600 votes for the CP in each of nine marginal NP constituencies would have brought the prospect of a hung parliament - where the NP failed to get an absolute majority of 84 seats - very close.

The National Party however, only lost, to the right and left combined, some 30 000 votes on its 1987 showing. And half the seats it lost, the other parties won with majorities of less than 800 votes. The NP's core support held firm.

**W**hy did so many still vote for the National Party? The answer lies in the success of the NP's elusive election campaign of trying to present a position of ambiguity somewhere between apartheid and democracy - in their terms avoiding either the 'CP road to poverty and conflict' or the 'DP road to radical domination'.

The NP's Five-Year Action Plan charted this middle road. It attempted to give hope and promise to a future built on both the principles of apartheid and democracy. Talk of human rights, a Bill of Rights, a just society and a commitment to a universal franchise sounded well and good to those wedded to liberal values. Expression of a continuing commitment to 'group rights' played to the values of those socialised into

Verwoerdian apartheid, but who feel more comfortable with its current expression as 'reform-apartheid'.

This position was supported by the promise of a directed new leadership in the form of FW de Klerk. With a halo constructed by media image building, De Klerk talked of being committed to new action for a great and just South Africa. On the SABC the NP engineered a 'least-of-evils' position between the CP and DP, one day countering the claims of the right, the next day the claims of the left. And National Party adverts promised that 'After the 6th September a new future begins for South Africa'. All this fed an ever growing 'let's give FW de Klerk a chance' sentiment.

The NP's campaign was ambiguous, it lacked content. But precisely because of this it was able to give the illusion of substance to the deep longing for security and justice among white voters. In the end they were guided more by wishful thinking, tradition and party identification, and less by a deep analysis of the issues. The NP provided mental comfort - it offered consistency between existing feelings and beliefs, relieved voters fears and justified a comfortable position.

What was distinctive about the NP's campaign was that its promises lacked any concrete form. Throughout the campaign statements on policy never went beyond the level of sheer cloudy vagueness. They did not specify how they would concretely construct this clear-cut position between apartheid and democracy, how exactly they would accommodate the contradictory needs of this position. The Five-Year Plan - with its emphasis on group-based decision-making with protection against 'domination' ensured by group consensus - provided more questions than answers.

How is a group to be defined? And what happens if consensus is not reached? Emphasising De Klerk's new leadership managed to shift attention away from these rather crucial issues towards questions of style and appearance. And no one asked the NP publicly why South Africa had to wait until after 6 September for new action when the party has been in power for 41 years?

In reality, attempts to construct a halfway house between apartheid and

democracy must always elude the National Party. Such a state cannot possibly exist - for apartheid and democracy are diametrically opposed to one another.

And this is why, in many areas, NP policies have increasingly become ones of improvisation. Despite popular and some local government pressure to change them, there are, for example, no substantive plans for scrapping the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act or the Group Areas Act.

The resignation of Chris Heunis, past Acting State President and Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning, was instructive. Before the election Heunis argued for the need to allow forms of freedom of association through the creation of an 'open' or non-racial grouping. Even though the DP quickly pointed out the absurdity of a non-racial grouping alongside other racially defined groupings, for the NP caucus Heunis had definitely gone too far in spelling out a concrete position. In the face of party pressure he resigned.

National Party leaders have also been taken in by their illusory campaign. But the hard truth that the party is incapable of fully resolving the contradictions inherent in South African society can be kept repressed as long as new campaigning and partial successes continue to meet expectations and provide a sense of promise.

The NP vote also can certainly not be seen as a vote for reform, particularly when specific proposals for reform were nowhere to be seen in the party's campaign or programme.

It is also patently wrong to argue, as NP leader De Klerk has, that the election results reflected a new mood among the white electorate with over 70% voting for reform. This conveniently adds together the NP and DP votes - and then gives them a value.

The DP's views on reform are far removed from the National Party's (the DP are, for example, committed to a common voters roll as opposed to the NP's talk of separate voters rolls given on a group basis). And it cannot, with any certainty, be said what the 1989 election was supposed to be about - and what people



Left: The NIC and TIC mounted vigorous anti-election campaigns. Right: The day of the election saw approximately 3-million black workers stage a nation-wide stayaway

thought it was about. Most people had only the vaguest notions of what the issues were.

The issue of reform was one of many factors that lay behind individual voting behaviour. It can be argued that many people voted for the NP despite its position - confidential NP opinion polls have shown that 60% of white voters agree with the basic elements of CP policy.

At the end of the day all the NP was given was a rather generalised support for its record in power.

Observers who interpret the election as a clear signal to press ahead with reform, that the results augur well for 'real' negotiation, have failed to distinguish the rhetoric from the reality.

So where does the National Party go from here? The truth is that it is trapped. If the Five-Year Action Plan is given any real substance it will have to be either in terms of Verwoerdian apartheid or liberal democracy. Whichever path is taken will inevitably lead to splits in the NP caucus, an erosion of NP support

and continued resistance from the mass of South Africans whose basic demands will continue to be denied. And yet the NP, after having generated new hopes and expectations, cannot do nothing. As the contradictions continue to play themselves out the twilight of National Party rule will come ever closer.

**T**o many white voters the election seemed to be a good representation of the democratic process. The National Party, however, received a mandate only from 48% of white voters, who represent a tiny percentage of the total South African population of voting age.

Other factors in the electoral system made the perversion of democracy worse - there were various underhand electoral tactics; certain constituencies were unjustly loaded in number of votes; and, as always, the first-past-the-post system instead of proportional representation meant that the voices of significant minorities could not be heard.

Taken as a group, less than 50% of those permitted to vote for the House of Assembly, House of Representatives or House of Delegates did so. One candidate in the election for the House of Delegates made history by getting no votes - he did not even vote for himself! Over 70% of South Africa's population who should be voters, were unable to cast a vote.

In liberal democracies the ballot has a moral justification by virtue of a universal franchise and the open and genuine debate offered by *all*. What possible moral justification can be given in South Africa, in a country under a state of emergency?

With so many excluded from and/or rejecting the electoral process, it is completely unrealistic to expect meaningful change to be achieved through the parliamentary process alone - although it may have a role to play at some stage. The future then rests not on the results of the election but on the mass democratic movement's struggle for change outside the parliamentary system.



The ANC's Alfred Nzo and Steve Tshwete at the OAU meeting in Harare

# Scoring points off Pretoria

*With the entry of negotiations into the political agenda, a certain fuzziness developed around the African National Congress' strategic perspective. But there has been some clearing of the air as a 'spring offensive' for the home front joins a now well articulated and advanced diplomatic offensive. JENNY CARGILL reports.*

**A** new confidence is evident in the African National Congress as the outlawed liberation movement registers recent diplomatic successes and prepares for a home front offensive in a climate of growing political ferment.

But its operational commanders are disinclined to euphoria.

Acknowledged difficulties in building the underground have prompted more sober assessments than was apparent during the 1984-86 uprisings.

On 21 August in Harare, the ANC

won its most significant advance by ensuring international acceptance of its proposals for a negotiated settlement on the South African conflict.

Except for a small amendment, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa accepted the ANC's negotiations recommendations as its own Declaration. The committee undertook to lobby for it internationally - the first taker was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in early September. NAM in turn will take the Declaration to the United Nations Security Council, and the October

Commonwealth Summit is also expected to consider it.

ANC handling of this diplomatic offensive has highly impressed world leaders, say diplomatic sources. It succeeded in striking a fine balance between making sure that its proposals were widely canvassed, both in and outside South Africa, and not letting the regime know what its next move was.

While its first document on negotiations was widely circulated, the Declaration itself - which, according to ANC sources, included inputs from debate on the first document - was kept under wraps until the OAU Ad Hoc Committee meeting.

In brief, the Declaration calls for the creation of a climate for negotiations by, for example, lifting the state of emergency. Thereafter negotiations would kick off on the issue of a cessation of hostilities. Then the principles for a new constitution would have to be agreed upon - the ANC document outlines it believes must be included. This in turn would be followed by negotiations on international involvement in this process and on the establishment of an interim government, which would draw up a new constitution.

Few doubt that South Africa is still in the 'pre-pre-negotiations stage', as one western analyst put it. But the sensitivity of the ANC to the current international preference for negotiated settlements to conflicts has enabled it to score some important political points:

- \* first, the process of winning international acceptance of the ANC setting the agenda for negotiations is well under way. Pretoria's earlier international offensive has undoubtedly been neutralised, with the regime's focus still locked into breaking its isolation;

- \* second, and most important for the ANC, the OAU has accepted the principle that the people of South Africa should be responsible for negotiating their future, rather than having it imposed from outside.

The actual constitution-making mechanism would have to be negotiated. 'But,' said a leading ANC official, 'our proposals uphold an important principle of the ANC: that the masses are involved in the re-making of their country. We are

very concerned that the process of negotiations is accepted as legitimate at all levels so that the product it produces becomes legitimate';

\* third, underlying the proposal for a ceasefire between the ANC and Pretoria is an acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle. The South African demand - backed by key Western governments - that ANC renounce violence is, says one ANC official, 'a very strange notion, a new principle in international relations: that the use of force to achieve political objectives is unacceptable'.

'No such principle was applied to the Vietnamese, Zimbabweans, Angolans, Mozambicans, or even Swapo. It was kind of cooked-up for us'.

That notion, the ANC argues, is now in retreat, with even Pretoria vacillating in its demand for a renunciation of violence.

The return of exiles, which has featured in other formulations on creating a climate for negotiations, is not mentioned in the ANC/OAU proposals. Said an ANC official: 'Logically, we do not think the return of exiles can be a precondition. It is a matter which is related to the cessation of hostilities. If you put it as a precondition, and the regime accepts it before a ceasefire is negotiated, what guarantee is there for the safety of our cadres?'

Similarly, the document makes no mention of the shape of the negotiating table. But the absence of a metropolitan colonial power to act as the midwife of independence, such as in Zimbabwe, means the ANC sees Pretoria negotiating as an equal partner. The table is thus necessarily two-sided. 'On the one side there are those forces that recognise a non-racial democracy and on the other there are the forces that represent the perpetuation of racism and apartheid', said an official.

He added: 'What is happening in South Africa is precisely the formation of those two sides. The whole notion of an anti-apartheid coalition - the conference banned last year and planned for this year - is of building those forces that represent a non-racial democracy, the group which would sit on one side of the table. And whether there will be negotiations or not, in the end that united anti-apartheid force will be

the basic engine for change in South Africa - whatever form that change takes'.

The entry of negotiations onto the political agenda created some fuzziness around the ANC's strategic perspective. The notion of seizure of power through insurrection - the articulation of which grew out of the township rebellions of 1984-86 - appeared for a time to have been usurped by the prospect of a negotiated settlement.

But the ANC has argued assertively that there is no contradiction between its strategy of seizure of power and acceptance of the possibility of negotiations.

One official argued that seizure of power, as a means of transferring power to the people, cannot 'be a matter of immutable principle'. But, he said, it would require more than the possibility of negotiations to change ANC strategy; it would require a change in conditions. No such change had taken place.

Negotiations, the ANC has argued, are themselves part of the terrain of struggle, and it cannot be left to others to call the shots.

Underlining its unchanged strategy is the ANC's 'spring offensive', articulated in part in a new *Call to the Nation* under the slogan 'Press Home the Attack'. The leadership has also announced its intention to intensify armed struggle as part of this offensive.

The key elements to the call are:

- \* intensification of mass activity, particularly through the defiance campaign;
- \* a defence of revolutionary gains through the formation of paramilitary formations such as defence units;
- \* the transformation of armed campaigns into people's war through the joining of the masses in combat with Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres;
- \* the building of a broad anti-apartheid force.

A number of factors underlie the call, particularly for the defiance campaign, argues a leading ANC official.

Repression in the last few years has made it necessary to re-define the legal space of the mass democratic movement: 'If the MDM was to base itself on legality, it would find itself not acting at all, since the legal space has been progressively narrowed since the declaration of the state of

emergency in 1986'.

Mass action should complement the current need for consolidation of organisation.

Mass action would also help to 're-emphasise the question of political power, and the need for the transfer of power to the people', he said.

The official argued that the popular refusal to accept Pretoria's repressive measures would force the government to retreat to another line of defence.

Finally, economic, international and white political pressures make the regime particularly vulnerable to heightened political opposition.

But, he said, 'as the revolt assumes more revolutionary forms, a point will be reached at which the MDM will not be able to take it further. This is where the ANC and its underground becomes crucial'.

The 1985 Kabwe Conference put insurrection on the agenda, endorsing the view of many ANC militants that classical guerilla warfare could not constitute the main thrust of the ANC's efforts. The experience of township struggle at that time gave content to this strategic outlook.

Since then the ANC has grappled with the strategic problem of drawing the masses into insurrectionary struggle. Among the most pressing problems has been organising an adequate underground, and transforming armed campaigns into sustained revolutionary armed activity.

These difficult problems, say ANC officials, involve tackling issues of tactics, organisation and logistics.

The outlawed organisation believes conditions in South Africa support the overall strategy of the insurrectionary seizure of power as the means of achieving liberation. But the ANC's strategy and tactics are still in the making - a process which ANC cadres say they are being drawn into in preparation for the third Consultative Conference next year.

They say cadre involvement in questions of the shape and character of the underground struggle, for example, is evidence of the leadership's desire to deepen democracy within the liberation movement.

# NAMIBIA



J Liebenberg - Afrapix

## To the victor the spoils

*After 30 years of fighting to end South African rule of Namibia, Swapo is set to win the country's first free elections. And although there are still questions around Swapo's treatment of detainees, it appears that the majority will 'put their cross for Swapo'. DAVID NIDDRIE reports.*

**T**here little doubt that Sam Nujoma will lead Swapo to victory in United Nations-monitored elections to a Namibian constituent assembly at the beginning of November.

And the sheer size of the welcome accorded Nujoma himself on his return home indicates that Swapo could well take the two-thirds of the national vote it needs to dominate the constituent assembly.

This is not yet assured, however. Swapo faces several serious obstacles, and even strong Swapo sympathisers in the African diplomatic corps in Windhoek have

been wondering aloud for some time about the movement's ability to overcome them. 'I arrived here assuming that it was no contest, that Swapo would walk away with far more than 66%', said one recently. 'Now I don't know'.

A clear 66% victory for one party - or a rapidly-negotiated deal giving control to a single bloc of parties - is essential if the assembly is to avoid getting bogged down in interminable squabbling.

United Nations Resolution 435, under which the independence process is taking place, gives no clear indication of how the process

should proceed between elections in November and next 1 April, when the UN's monitoring mandate ends. By omission, it leaves South Africa's administrator general, Louis Pienaar, in control - and if Namibia's 72 elected representatives are fighting each other, he will have a free hand to do pretty much what he likes.

Before that point is reached, however, Swapo and Namibia's anti-colonialist formations generally, face several problems.

The first of these involve the election process itself.

**N**amibia's exact population is not known, nor is the number of potential voters (Namibians over 18). Voter registration officials therefore estimated their target at the number of adults recorded in a 1981 South African census plus 6%, or just over 650 000. The registration process rapidly indicated they had substantially under-estimated. In many areas the percentage registered quickly pushed past the theoretical 'one hundred percent' mark - in Keetmanshoop, for example, 130% of the original estimate had registered by August, with almost a month of registration to go.

Only in Ovamboland - home of half the Namibian population, and an area solidly supportive of Swapo - have registration percentages stayed in double figures.

Swapo information secretary Hedipo Hamutenya argues that the official estimate of 280 000 voters in Ovamboland is too low by almost a third.

So even if election officials achieved their theoretical 'one hundred percent' in Ovamboland on September 15 - scheduled closing date for registration - Ovamboland would be heavily under-represented at the polls.

As the registration deadline approached, Hamutenya's prediction seemed increasingly accurate: with half Namibia's population, Ovamboland had just 41% of the national voters.

For Swapo this could mean the loss of 10% of its potential vote.

Several reasons have been put forward for the low registration in Ovamboland.

The first and simplest is the relatively small number of

registration posts in Ovamboland. More important, by the end of July, election officials were operating just six mobile registration units to visit isolated communities, of which there are many.

Although helicopters were called in as back-up, these were used mainly to visit villages and settlements identified by South African-appointed and paid chiefs and headmen - not a group generally sympathetic to Swapo. A second point is that the helicopters were precisely those used by South Africa during Namibia's 22-year guerilla war, most of it fought in Ovamboland. The arrival of such vehicles was thus not likely to have been regarded with great enthusiasm by Swapo supporters.

**A** second reason, however, was the presence of South Africa's widely-feared, 1 200-strong Koevoet ('crowbar') unit in northern Namibia through the first four-and-a-half months of the seven-month pre-election process.

And for this Swapo should accept at least partial responsibility.

Its decision, in the hours before the UN-monitored process began at mid-night on 31 March, to send up to 2 000 of its guerillas across the Angolan-Namibian border into Ovamboland has not yet been clearly explained.

It appears, however, that the movement was attempting little more than a propaganda coup - the guerillas were to give themselves up to members of the United Nations' Untag monitors and, as happened in Zimbabwe, spend the election campaign in assembly points as a highly-visible symbol of Swapo's 30-year struggle to end South African rule.

As it was the organisation drastically miscalculated. Superpower quibbling over the Untag budget had led to major delays in deployment of the UN monitors - there were literally only a handful in northern Namibia when the guerillas crossed.

So it was South African patrols which saw the huge arrows and the words 'Swapo this way', written in the blinding white sand of Ovamboland by guerillas looking for ways to give themselves up.

The furious South African reaction

left more than 300 Plan fighters dead and four times that number fleeing to Angola. It provided the South Africans with all the justification they needed to keep their military and paramilitary police in the field, delaying the freeing of the political process envisaged under UN resolution 435.

Administrator Pienaar twice used the threat of Plan incursions to head-off attempts by Ahtisaari to restrict South African military activity, particularly in northern Namibia.

Only in mid-August, six weeks after the official start of the Namibian election campaign, did Ahtisaari finally manage to force the confinement to barracks of South Africa's 1 200-strong Koevoet counter-insurgency unit.

**T**he potential damage of this delay to the Swapo campaign was clear. 'By the time Koevoet was restricted', says an African diplomat, 'it had done enough in northern Namibia to persuade many rural people of the danger of having anything to do with politics. Registering for the election and attending meetings all brought the risk of a visit from Koevoet'.

As far as voter registration goes, there are several other factors:

- \* the likely participation by guerillas of Jonas Savimbi's Unita army, many of whom are now based in Namibia;
- \* the participation by several thousand South Africans who will be bussed in from South Africa to vote;
- \* the difficulties placed in the way of 15 000 Namibians living in Walvis Bay - under 435 it is a piece of South African real estate - but eligible to register and vote. They have to travel 35km up the coast to register and to vote - although for most of the period South Africa has allowed the major electoral rival to Swapo, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), to operate an office in Walvis Bay.

A further factor on the voting itself is that, unlike South Africa's parliamentary and other elections, it will not be based on a 'first past the post' system with the country divided into constituencies.

In Namibia, voters will vote for the party they favour. All votes will then be sent to Windhoek for counting - a

process extremely vulnerable to abuse.

Constituent assembly seats will then be allocated on the basis of the proportion of the vote won by each party. For example, if Swapo wins 50% of the vote, it will be given 36 seats in the 72-seat chamber. If the DTA wins 25% of the popular vote, it will get 18 seats.

In terms of a complex process of dividing out any leftover votes, each party actually represented in the assembly is likely to get an additional seat - a fact extremely favourable to smaller parties.

Individually, none of these factors has the potential to tip the scale against Swapo. Combined, however they could spell the difference between gaining the 48 seats it needs to dominate the assembly, and failure.

**A**nother negative factor for Swapo is that most of the 40-odd contesting political parties in Namibia are fighting not so much for a place in an independent Namibian government, as they are fighting against Swapo.

In the wry assessment of a Swapo activist: 'Swapo has contributed to the achievement of a political consensus in Namibia - at least among the smaller parties. The consensus is: stop Swapo'.

The South African-run SWABC national broadcasting service reinforces this position. It has made little effort to change its pre-1 April biases or to grant air-time to parties other than those favoured by South Africa - Dirk Mudge's Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in particular.

Pienaar, with little pretence of neutrality, routinely uses what legislation he can to restrict and hamper Swapo's election campaign. Several Swapo rallies have been forcibly broken up by the South West African Police. Swapo activists still experience the harassment that characterised life under direct South African rule.

As physical clashes between the parties have become increasingly part of campaign routine, Swapo officials charge that South Africa is approving dozens of fire-arm licenses for members of other parties.

Though all these factors are real, Swapo officials acknowledge that conditions are better than they were

before the arrival of Untag's 4 000 monitors and officials.

**N**evertheless, the party has been demonstrably unable to seize the initiative, allowing Pretoria and the gaggle of smaller parties to define the election agenda.

Increasingly, the campaign has turned into a question-and-answer session over Swapo's human rights record and economic plans.

Dirk Mudge's DTA has in fact concentrated its election campaign on portraying itself as 'the wealth-creating party', and portraying Swapo's economic policies as guaranteed to scare off vital foreign investment - particularly South Africa.

Although for the last two years, Swapo has been undertaking a major economic review, backtracking substantially from earlier plans for large-scale nationalisation of the mines and agricultural lands, Swapo was slow in responding to the DTA challenge, and when it did, did so clumsily - resulting in an impression of ill-considered policies based more on rhetoric than reality.

In the past decade, more than 700 Swapo members in exile were detained in harsh conditions, and brutally treated by Swapo security units in southern Angola. Inside Namibia it was known that Swapo was holding some spies and suspected spies, but only some of those within the organisation realised the numbers of detentions.

In terms of the independence process Swapo and South Africa were obliged to release detainees and prisoners. South Africa's foot-dragging was overshadowed by the growing realisation in Namibia that Swapo had not only detained members and held them for years without trial, but that it had treated them with a brutality matching anything the South Africans had managed.

Some of those who died in Swapo detention camps - most notably Swapo central committee member Victor Nkandi - were veterans of South African detention.

Detainees, many of them former leading Swapo figures, began returning to display scars and offer accounts of torture and confinement for months on end in underground pits in Swapo camps in southern

Angola.

At the height of the detentions, Swapo officials toured Europe and attempted to calm members' growing fears by playing a video in which two young women claimed they had been recruited to seduce the Swapo leadership after having had razor blades strategically placed in their vaginas by South African agents.

Swapo officials have since acknowledged that 'mistakes were made' and have attempted to explain the sustained purge by saying it took place under war conditions. They have also said they will act against any individual in their ranks who is found guilty of irregularities.

They have, however, been unable to account for the fact that fully three-quarters of the detainees originally came from southern and central Namibia - they were non-Ovambos who made up just 10% of the Namibian exile population.

**A**mong African diplomats, and within Swapo, there is concern that the leadership has neither the will nor the intention to act. 'The responsibility leads too high', says a former Swapo member who left the organisation after discovering that relatives had died in its detention camps.

Certainly, no action has yet been taken against Salomon 'Jesus' Auala, deputy head of Plan and head of Swapo security, despite the fact that he has been named as the man responsible by the bulk of the 200 returning detainees.

'The fact that Swapo has done nothing, taken no disciplinary action, is worrying', says an African diplomat. 'All is not well in the organisation'.

Returning detainees have been divided over the correct political response. Some have combined to form the Patriotic Unity Movement, while others remained in or returned to Swapo. Few turned to the DTA or other South African-backed parties.

But many who were detained believe Namibia would be safer, in the immediate post-independence years at least, if Swapo does not attain the 66% it is seeking.

Others acknowledge that, come election day 'we will put our crosses for Swapo - despite what it did to us, it is the national liberation movement'.

# The detentions

*Swapo commands huge support among the Namibian people. But its role as leader of the liberation struggle in that country has not been without problems. In every such struggle, liberation movements have to deal with spies and traitors. However, earlier this year it was revealed that Swapo's treatment of its detainees, and its process of identifying spies, left much to be desired. DAVID NIDDRIE interviewed a number of ex-detainees.*

**T**he process Namibians call the 'Swapo spy drama' began in the early 1980s as the organisation struggled to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.

These changes can be traced back to 1971 when the International Court of Justice declared that South African rule of Namibia was illegal. This ruling led directly to a wave of protest action throughout Namibia, fed into worker dissatisfaction to spark the country's first national strike and a bitter rural revolt in northern Ovamboland.

Tough South African reaction pushed thousands of Swapo supporters across the borders and into exile. In sharp contrast to the predominantly Oshiwambo-speaking, migrant-worker profile of Swapo's founding membership, many new exiles were young, articulate and from central and southern Namibia.

Many were also better educated than Swapo's middle-aged leadership - a worrying factor for the leadership, already facing a political challenge from within its own ranks.

At the 1973 congress of Swapo's


internal wing, held in Walvis Bay, chairman David Meroro had, with difficulty, contained strong pressure for the replacement of President Sam Nujoma.

A full Swapo congress scheduled for the following year was cancelled (no party congress has been held since) and opposition to Nujoma's leadership began to concentrate around information secretary Andreas Shipanga.

In 1976, as pressure for a party

congress mounted and there were reports of mounting unhappiness in Plan camps, Zambian officials responded to an appeal from Nujoma by arresting more than 2 000 Swapo members, among them Shipanga and nine other members of the national executive as well as several Plan commanders.

The tension in the camps appears to have related to the consequences of the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in 1974. This eventually opened



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up the crucial northern front and enabled Plan to massively escalate its guerilla campaign against South African rule.

But before this happened, the Portuguese withdrawal led to South Africa's invasion of Angola in support of the Unita guerilla movement - with which Swapo had, until then, enjoyed a close working relationship. Swapo immediately switched sides. However politically correct this may have been, it sent a wave of tension through the ranks of Swapo's army, elements of which had worked closely with Unita.

With the northern border now open for infiltration, Swapo steadily escalated its guerilla challenge. By 1980 South African authorities were acknowledging an average of three 'incidents' a day in their attempt to contain Plan incursions.

The South African response - a series of strikes into southern Angola to hit Plan bases. By the early 1980s South Africa was a permanent military presence in Angola - this was a major setback for Swapo.

**A**lthough guerilla incursions into Namibia continued, the bulk of Plan activity increasingly took place in Angola. Logically, this South African 'total strategy' of taking the war to its enemies would include attempts to infiltrate agents into Swapo and Plan. The period certainly saw South African agents captured in virtually all frontline states.

This, coupled with the military setbacks (and the need to find those responsible), and with ongoing insecurity within the organisation's leadership appears to have tipped the organisation's security structures over the edge. Security units raked Swapo and Plan structures in search of 'Boer spies'.

Initially, Swapo secretary for defence Peter Nanyemba acted as a buffer between the spy-catchers and the rank and file. But by 1982, he was losing ground. When he raised the issue at a Politburo meeting, Nujoma ruled discussion premature. It was not, say authoritative Swapo officials, formally discussed again. Nanyemba died in a car crash in southern Angola nine months later.

Intentionally or otherwise, Nujoma's generation provided the focus for the purge. The war, the

rigours of exile and the organisational challenges of the previous decade had taught them to be suspicious of strangers.

And increasingly for them, Swapo was an organisation peopled by strangers: young, non-Oshiwambo speakers, educated, confident in their dealings with foreigners and - in the case of a growing number - avowedly and openly Marxist.

As the search for spies continued, these attributes themselves became the basis for suspicion.

Members were arrested for having passports ('why have the Boers given you a passport?'); because they had not been detained before fleeing Namibia ('if you were truly Swapo they would have detained you'); because they had been detained ('the Boers turned you in detention'); for expressing concern about the purge ('the Boers have told you to spread alarm in Swapo'); and, in one breathtaking case, for opposing his own detention ('if you oppose the party's decision, you must be a Boer agent').

The security units were able to report continual success by the simple expedient of torturing their suspects until they confessed.

And they identified an ever-widening circle of suspects simply by demanding that detainees finger others. By 1988 more than 700 members had been detained. Some former detainees claim the figure runs into thousands.

A disproportionate number were young, educated, non-Ovambos. The detainees included eight former central committee members and two members of the Swapo central committee's politburo.

Central committee member Tauno Hatuikulipi died during interrogation. Swapo claimed publicly that he had swallowed a poison capsule hidden in a tooth five years earlier in case of capture.

Three other central committee members have simply disappeared.

Nor did Plan escape unharmed: the spy-catchers netted its chief of personnel, chief and deputy chief of military intelligence, the chief of protocol at Plan headquarters and dozens of veterans of the war against South African occupation forces.

Freed detainees have since painstakingly compiled a list of those held with them but never released. It

runs to 13 foolscap pages - almost 500 names.

## Case 1

**S**aul Motinga was doing post-graduate work at Sussex University when persistent rumours of mass detentions in Swapo began to ripple through the Namibian exile community. Motinga had been in exile for seven years - undergoing military training, then studying in Zambia, Yugoslavia and Britain.

Unable to get clarity from Swapo officials in London, the exiles sought it elsewhere.

'In 1984 we were preparing for the 100-year commemoration of German seizure of Namibia. Ndilimani, the movement band, was coming to play. But its arrival kept being delayed.

'Eventually it arrived, but all the key players we knew, the band's founders, were gone - detained. We realised something was very wrong.

'At that time I had been communicating with my family in Namibia openly, by letter and phone. My parents were Swapo members.

'I knew they would ask me what was happening in the movement. I also knew I had no answers. So I severed all contact with my family. I thought Swapo just needed some time to sort itself out.

'Then Moses (Garoeb, Swapo administrative secretary) came to London. He said even our friends were accusing us of crucifying people - Damaras, Namas, non-Ovambos. We weren't crucifying people, he said, although some had been taken in for questioning. He showed us the videos to prove there were spies'.

Motinga discussed the issue with a few close friends: 'We concluded we should go back to Swapo in Angola even though we had serious, radical criticisms. Some Swapo comrades urged us not to go, saying we'd be detained - some of the same ones who now denounce us as spies. When the time came, I went back to Luanda. Then, on orders of the president, I was sent down to Lubango for what they said would be three months of military training.

'The beatings started immediately. They wanted answers to the standard three questions - where and when did the Boers train me, what was my mission.

'For two days I refused to confess. Then I thought: for god's sake, why not? I had rejected similar confessions when I saw the videos in London, so what difference did it make? So I told them I had come to assassinate the president.

'Those of us who saw the videos in London were lucky: we knew what they expected us to say.

'They asked for the names of other spies. I gave them names of people already arrested. But they wanted new names - of spies in London.

'Eventually I gave them names of people I knew there. I had to address the president directly: "Comrade president ... under your leadership Swapo has come through difficult periods. I am sure you will resolve this issue with the wisdom you have always shown" ...and all that crap. It all went on video.

'In the morning, the day of my confession, they put me in a truck - under the seat, as always - and took me to a deserted piece of bush. They tied my arms and legs behind me, threw the rope over a branch and pulled me up. It is called a helicopter. Then they beat me.

'While they beat me, they hinted - Afrika, the chief interrogator, is good at hints - about what the correct story was, who I had to implicate. Eventually I conceded on everything. I told them my sister was a Boer agent. She was three years old at the time'.

From there Motinga was sent to the pits.

'There was a young teenage boy from the north (of Namibia). He had stopped talking. When he talked the interrogators told him he was lying, so he just stopped. He just sat there.

'We tried to persuade him to walk, to talk. We told him he would die of beri-beri if he didn't move. But by then the saliva was just pouring down his chin, he couldn't eat. He died the next day.

'There was a Bushman herdsman from the Caprivi. He didn't know anything, he didn't know Nujoma, he probably didn't even know Swapo. How could he be a spy?

'It is inconceivable that the leadership didn't know. How could they not know? The president spoke to some of the detainees - he told them they would be tried in Namibia after independence. Tried before the people and executed'.

## Case 2

**S**teve Kahuika had been in exile for eight years when rumours began to filter through in 1984 of 'friends being detained, and of a Boer spy ring'. At 31, he had undergone military training before furthering his studies at the Namibia Institute in Lusaka, in Yugoslavia, and finally at university in Norwich in Britain.

'In December, Moses (Garob) called a meeting in London of Swapo people - only the exiles based originally in Lusaka and Angola, no one from inside Namibia. 'Moses said there were problems in the movement, a big spy ring. He allowed no questions afterwards.

'In April, he again called us to London. He showed us videos of confessions - Ben Boois (a former Swapo central committee member), Andries Basson (Plan's chief of protocol). He saluted the security for doing a brilliant job.

'He also showed us some videos of two Ovambo girls who confessed the Boers had given them razor blades to put inside themselves - their mission was to seduce the Swapo leadership.

'Saul and I agreed we should go back to Angola, even if it meant being arrested. We knew we weren't spies. I flew back on 17 November 1985. I was placed in the economics office under (economic affairs secretary) Ben Amathila.

'A month later, I was told to pack my things and go for military training. I flew to Lubango and landed straight in the pit.

'They beat me and I told them I had been recruited by a farmer called Jan Kloppers in Keetmanshoop. My mission had been to study Swapo documents and report back to Kloppers, but I was not able to do so. They tried to get me to implicate (Hage) Geingob, but I refused.

'The beatings stopped as soon as I confessed. As long as you confessed, the details didn't matter. You lived. Everyone who is alive today confessed, although some refused for many months.

'They took me to a detention camp. They made us travel under the seats of the transport vehicles (apparently to keep detainees hidden from the Angolans). It was dark when I got there and the guard warned me: "You

are going into a hole, watch for the ladder". I stepped on the zinc which collapsed and I fell down six metres into the pit.

'I spent the next two years in that pit. First there were two of us, then three, and finally five of us.

'On 15 September 1987, they moved me three holes down. A month after that Siziki, who was with me, died in that hole. He had been beaten badly and was coughing a lot.

'He died screaming that Swapo had been arresting innocent people, and that in a liberated Namibia he would prove his innocence.

'It was a bad time, very hot, and for about three months we got nothing but rice. At dawn every two or three days we carried out someone who was dead or dying. There were 63 of us in that pit. Between September and January, 25 died.

'On May 15 this year, Jesus (Salomon Mattheus Auala, 53, deputy Plan commander and head of Swapo security) came. He took 84 of us and said: "I am going to release you, but first you must swear allegiance to Swapo on video. If you don't, I'm going to throw you in the bush". He gave us shirts and filmed us signing our oaths of allegiance. He left 70 in the pits. We know the identity of 30 of them. None has so far returned to Namibia'.

## Case 3

**P**etrus Schmidt was Swapo's permanent representative on the Prague-based International Union of Students' secretariat when he fell victim to the purge.

'Then I lived in the dungeons. The dungeons were holes in the ground, generally about five to six metres deep, and anything between three and ten metres wide and long. You got in and out by climbing a ladder through a hole in the zinc roof.

'We ate, usually once a day - mostly either plain boiled rice, without even any salt, or dry porridge. Every few weeks it was interspersed with sardines or other fish. We lived in blue shorts and vests supplied by the Russians.

'We were allowed out once a day - to wash and go to the toilet. We slept like sardines, one row this way, one row that way, on the raw earth.

'There was no medical services, nothing. People just died'.

# Tampering with tradition



Gill de Vlieg - Atrapix

## fighting over chieftainships in Bophuthatswana

*Leaders of independent bantustans find themselves in a political cul-de-sac. In Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope nonetheless continues to fill chief and headmen positions with people loyal to himself rather than to the tribes concerned. JO-ANNE COLLINGE unravels some of the recent history.*

**L**ucas Mangope, following closely in Pretoria's footsteps, is using his power to hire and fire traditional chiefs and headmen to shore up his shaky position.

Armed with a recently amended Tribal Authorities Act, which gives him additional powers to depose and install traditional leaders, Mangope imposed acting chiefs on two of the largest tribes, the Bafokeng of the Phokeng area and the Batlhaping of Taung.

These moves call to mind Pretoria's application of the Bantu Authorities Act in the 1950s when chiefs - throwing in their lot with the people resisting cattle-culling and land 'betterment' schemes - were deposed and usually banished from their areas.

It is surely no coincidence that both Chief Lebone Molotlegi of Phokeng and Chief Samuel Mankuroane of Taung, the men who have been replaced by Mangope's chosen, refuse to participate in Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and indeed oppose the institution of independent bantustans.

Likewise, it is surely more than a matter of chance that both Taung and Phokeng were known areas of support for the Progressive People's Party. The PPP became the official opposition in 1987. It was banned the following year after the abortive coup in which PPP leader Rocky Malebane Metsing was the military's choice of replacement for Mangope.

**T**here are also indications that Mangope wishes to tame the resistance of the people of Braklaagte and Leeuwfontein, who were very unwillingly incorporated into Bophuthatswana earlier this year, by replacing those leaders who oppose him.

Braklaagte and Leeuwfontein form part of the Bafurutse area, west of Zeerust. The Bafurutse cannot have forgotten how their paramount chief Abram Moiloa of Dinokana refused to comply with the Bantu Authorities Act - to order the tribe's women to take out passes. This action led to his summary deposition in 1957.

The issue of passes divided the chiefs into men of the people and men of Pretoria. Mangope, a junior chief in the Bafurutse village of

Motswedi supported the issuing of passes to women - and was physically attacked by his tribesmen for doing so.

Just two years after the outrage of the firing of Moiloa - an inefficient chief, by many accounts, but after all the most senior chief in the most senior of all Batswana tribes - Mangope presided over the ceremony to set up the first regional authority in the Transvaal.

At this ceremony, Israel Moiloa was installed as chief of Dinokana and Mangope reportedly asked the Minister of Bantu Administration to 'lead us and we shall try to crawl'.

It could be argued that Mangope - a former clerk and teacher - was made by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 with its network of tribal, regional and territorial authorities. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that he continues to live by laws just like it.

**A**t Taung, the issue of chieftainship came to a head more than a year ago. Police forcibly removed chief Samuel Mankuroane's property from the tribal office, preparing for the installation of Mangope's chosen man, Stephen Molale.

Mankuroane acted as an assistant to the previous chief, Scotch Mankuroane, for almost a year prior to the chief's death. He was Scotch Mankuroane's designated successor, and had the approval of the royal family and the tribe at large.

After the chief's death in 1987, the royal family chose Mankuroane as acting chief or regent, due to hold the position at least until Scotch's son was of age to be considered as chief.

Mankuroane is a young man - 34 years old - and with a BComm degree from the University of Zululand is the most highly educated of the Batlhaping royal family. He believes his personal history, rather than his fairly low rank in the line of succession, is what disqualified him in Mangope's eyes.

Mankuroane says he was approached by a number of government members, including ministers, to join the Democratic Party soon after he was summoned from university to assist the ailing Chief Scotch. He declined: 'I believed it was not proper for a chief to support a particular party'.

He also had a long history of student activism, starting during his time at Pinagare College at Taung - a special school for the sons of chiefs and headmen. In June 1976 - days before the Soweto uprising - he participated in a 'strike' at the school and was one of four pupils identified as ringleaders. He was arrested and eventually sentenced to a month in jail or R60 fine.

Expelled from Pinagare College after a government investigation into the boycott, he completed his schooling in Rustenburg before going to Fort Hare in 1980. There, his first year was interrupted by protests. He moved to the University of Zululand during a particularly turbulent period, when students were involved in bloody clashes with Inkatha and boycott action.

During his student years, Mankuroane also challenged the Bophuthatswana authorities over the administration of the parastatal development agency, Agricor, which had left many residents, including his mother, landless. He petitioned the government and led a delegation to Mmabatho.

It was quite clear that Mankuroane was not a pliable man and, from his talks at various community functions, it was evident that he did not see bantustans as a long-term answer to the questions of popular representation and economic development.

After Mankuroane's selection as acting chief in late 1987, Mangope twice summoned the royal family to Mmabatho and tried to get them to change their selection of acting chief. A small faction was prepared to support an alternative nomination, but the majority was not.

Eventually in May 1988, Mangope sent officials to advise the Batlhaping that he had chosen an acting chief - a certain Boitumelo Lefatshe Mankuroane (whose nomination was subsequently dropped in favour of Molale when it was discovered he was illegitimate).

The tribe's reaction to the choice is clear from a transcript of the meeting. After introductory comments in which Samuel Mankuroane is described as 'merely a helper assisting in this kingdom', the official says: 'Batlhaping nation, we now announce that your interim leader is going to be Boitumelo

Lefatshe Mankuroane'. The transcript notes at this point 'noise ... noise', and the official appeals: 'Please, Batlhaping, I can't continue in this noise'.

Another official takes over, appeals for quiet, and eventually hands over the platform to a member of the royal family, Rex Mankuroane, who is greeted with ululating. He says: 'I honour our visitors and in short I will say what has just been said here is not acceptable'. Another wave of ululation is recorded.

After this, Mankuroane and his supporters in the royal family went to court to seek his restoration as acting chief. They succeeded in obtaining an interim order, which would hold good until review proceedings on Mangope's decision to depose Mankuroane could be heard.

But the review proceedings were rendered academic by an amendment to the Traditional Authorities Act, which effectively ratified Mangope's actions.

Mankuroane, still under the impression that he was protected by an interim court order, was rudely awakened to the new reality when police arrived at the tribal office last September and ordered him to vacate it.

The police also ordered him to attend a meeting at the magistrate's office. When he failed to appear, they started to scour the village in search of him. Villagers realised something was amiss and congregated at the kgotla. Seeing police break into the tribal office and remove their chief's goods, they began to protest. Teargas and shots were fired, residents say. Skirmishes broke out with the police, whose vehicles were stoned as groups of residents ran through the village shouting their support for the chief.

Meanwhile, Mankuroane had slipped through the roadblocks and headed for the Reef. He had already been detained without trial on one occasion during the chieftainship battle and was not prepared to face a second bout. There were also those who warned him that his life was in danger.

**I**n the old days of the Bantu Authorities' interference with chiefly powers, Pretoria often had to supplement deposition with

banishment. Mangope, however, has powers which Pretoria then lacked: detention without trial. This means that out-of-favour chiefs don't have to be banished. They can be persuaded to simply take themselves into exile.

This was the course followed by Chief Lebone Molotlegi, paramount of the wealthiest tribe in Bophuthatswana. The Phokeng area, occupied by the Bafokeng, is rich in minerals and the tribe - some 250 000-strong - receives an average of R5-million a year in royalties from the Impala Platinum mine situated on its land outside Rustenburg.

After the 1987 Bophuthatswana elections, Mangope found himself for the first time facing an elected opposition - six members of the PPP. All six were returned by voters in the Bafokeng area.

This might have been assumed to be the reason for Mangope's clampdown on the Bafokeng - and on their chief's family in particular - after the bungled coup of February 1988.

A day after the coup, Molotlegi and his wife, Semane, were in Johannesburg where he had gone for medical tests for a serious heart condition. Armed men burst into their hotel room, demanding to see their passports. After these were produced, the guns were put away. The intruders allegedly said they were South African policemen, apparently on the lookout for PPP leader, Metsing.

The following day bantustan police raided the chief's residence and tribal offices in Phokeng. According to Semane Molotlegi, who obtained a court order to restrain the police from harassing her, the premises were visited and/or searched by police on no less than 19 occasions in five months.

During the third police visit, Molotlegi and his wife were detained and taken to Rooigrond prison near Mafikeng.

His health deteriorated rapidly during only two days in detention and he was transferred directly to hospital - but not before he had been subjected to ten hours of interrogation. He spent the following fortnight in a private clinic.

Semane Molotlegi was freed without charge after ten days, when

her lawyers threatened court action. She returned home to face repeated police visits, a ban on meetings of the Bafokeng Women's Club which she headed, and the closure of Mahube Fashions, a clothing manufacturing project she had set up to fund community projects. When she launched a successful legal challenge to the ban on meetings and closure of the project, Mangope outlawed both schemes outright on the grounds that they endangered public order.

The chief did not return home for long. Believing he might be redetained, he left for Gaborone, where he has lived for the last 18 months.

In his absence, Mangope has installed Molotlegi's brother, George Mokgwaro Molotlegi, as acting chief. This is contrary to the chief's wishes - he has nominated his rrangwane (youngest paternal uncle), Cecil Molotlegi Tumagole, to act during this period of absence as he has done on other occasions.

The matter of the rightful acting chief will be fought in court later this year.

Mangope, it is believed, argues the case for installing George Molotlegi as acting chief in terms of tribal tradition and the powers the president has in law over the selection of traditional leaders.

But he has been locked in conflict with the chief for several years and the question arises as to what role this played in Mangope's seeking to thwart his choice of a deputy.

The conflict between the Bafokeng and Mmabatho ran so deep that in 1983 the tribe applied to secede from the bantustan - a request that was never seriously considered.

Molotlegi is entitled as a chief to occupy a seat in the Bophuthatswana Assembly. He has never done so - not even when ordered by Mangope to be there. Unlike other chiefs, he refused to fly the bantustan flag outside the Bafokeng tribal offices.

Molotlegi's stance might have baffled those who know that he participated actively in the Tswana Territorial Authority, a forerunner of the bantustan.

He is understood to believe that tribal and ethnic structures have a place in society, but that it is ridiculous to elevate them to the status of nationhood.



*Lucas Mangope - the independent bantustan leader may be at a dead-end politically, but he has a lot of time to meddle with traditional hierarchies.*



*Chief Samuel Mankuroane of Taung*

**A**n additional area of friction with Mangope has been in the court battle between the Bafokeng and Impala Platinum mine. With independence, Mangope inherited from Pretoria the position of trustee of the Bafokeng lands.

The Bafokeng went to court to try and secure the right to examine the financial documents of Impala Platinum - presumably to check that they were receiving the correct royalties. The practice had been for Mangope, and not the tribe, to have access to these financial records. The court action made it quite clear the tribe did not trust the trustee the apartheid system had foisted upon them.

Molotlegi lost the Impala Platinum case and was set to appeal against the judgment. With his brother now in charge, it is less certain that the appeal will be lodged.

Lebone Molotlegi is not universally liked. For instance, in the early '80s his tribal police acted brutally against the families of non-Tswana miners who had come to live in the area. But among ordinary Bafokeng he is said to have a strong following.

Mangope has made much of Molotlegi's links with the PPP. Undoubtedly the chief knew Metsing (who lived in the area of the Bafokeng), but both he and his wife have denied being members of the PPP.

After the coup, Mangope no doubt has a deep suspicion of PPP supporters. But in relation to the Molotlegis, it is difficult to judge where his suspicions end and propaganda begins. For instance, it was asserted in court that the Bafokeng Women's Club, including Mahube Fashions, was a danger to state security because it had links with the PPP. The actual existence of these links remained at issue in the court case. But the question arises: did Mangope really believe his assertion or did he secretly agree with Semane that it was 'preposterous' to suggest a sewing club endangered national security.

**I**n Taung, certainly, the chieftainship tussle started before the coup and the threats to popular traditional leaders in Braklaagte are directly linked to the community's resistance to bantustan incorporation.

Braklaagte and the adjoining farm of Leeuwfontein, with a combined population of some 25 000, were incorporated into Bophuthatswana early this year despite opposition of the residents and despite Braklaagte's attempt to block the measure by court action.

As soon as the court action failed and the bantustan authorities were assured that they had Braklaagte in their grip, conflict began as Bophuthatswana police and soldiers tried to force people to declare allegiance to the bantustan. People who resisted were allegedly assaulted and police moved into the village over Easter and broke up gatherings. Collaborators' homes were stoned, many youths were arrested and they were brutally tortured at Motswedi police station while their lawyers were unlawfully refused access to them.

The conflict also embraced Leeuwfontein. A dynamic of school boycotts, mass arrests of students, large-scale movements of temporary 'refugees' to 'white South Africa' and increasing tensions between the masses, on the one hand, and Bophuthatswana forces and supporters on the other, was set in motion.

The conflict culminated in the deaths of 11 people - nine policemen and two civilians - at Leeuwfontein in July when the forces moved in to break up a gathering on the farm.

**T**his is the context in which Braklaagte's chief Pupsey Sebogodi has come under attack from the bantustan authorities.

Pupsey Sebogodi is the man residents have chosen to succeed his aged father, John Sebogodi, as chief. The Sebogodis have set a tradition of no compromise. Both the old chief and his wife were jailed during the pass resistance of the 1950s. So it came as no surprise late last year that Pupsey Sebogodi was prepared to lead his people's fight against incorporation.

This year he has been detained under security laws, charged with public violence and also murder - the latter charge arising from a killing that occurred while he was detained.

It is not yet clear whether Edwin Moilola, the Braklaagte villager favoured by Mangope, has any official standing there. What is

known is that on 12 May Mangope paid a surprise visit to Braklaagte. Former chief John Sebogodi was in his yard, dressed in his pyjama top and feeding his pigs when the police took him off unceremoniously to see the president.

According to the Transvaal Rural Action Committee: 'Mangope ordered him to ignore his son, Pupsey, and to work only with Edwin Moilola'.

Moilola's leadership style had already been experienced by the people of Moswewu, a farm about 20km from Braklaagte. It was bought by the Braklaagte people years ago as a cattle post but later turned into a substantial settlement.

Moswewu was incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1983, well ahead of Braklaagte itself.

The practice of Braklaagte's chief designating a headman for Moswewu was immediately overturned and Moilola was installed by Mmabatho.

'Edwin's lack of legitimacy and the refusal of the tribe to deal with him resulted in his attempt to force his authority on the residents of Moswewu. In late 1987 he and his men raided a building built by pensioners to be used as a meeting place. They seized all the furniture from the place', Trac alleges.

'In early 1988 the same men raided the village claiming to be carrying out a Bophuthatswana government census. People were assaulted and property confiscated. They were told they could get their belongings back if they paid a fine'.

Moilola is also alleged to have denied residents their customary use of the quarry for building sand and to have entered into a private contract with a Dinokana company for the right to work the quarry.

His existence in Braklaagte is safeguarded by the establishment of a police camp next to his house.

In Leeuwfontein the chief, Godfrey Moilola, has taken the course of least resistance to Mangope. At a meeting on the farm in May, attended by Mangope, he said: 'Initially I was confused. The Bafurutse said they do not like the Bophuthatswana government and want to remain under the Republic of South Africa. I followed them but I realised later that I was wrong. Now I want to remain in Bophuthatswana and would like the president to offer the necessary

protection for my life'.

Whether there will be any further moves on the leadership question remains to be seen.

Mass arrests followed the July killings. Weeks later, Braklaagte and Leeuwfontein residents working on the Reef were captured and taken into custody in the bantustan Reports of torture of Braklaagte residents persisted into September. It might well be that Mangope will rely mainly on the armed forces to keep the areas in line.

**T**here are those who view Mangope's propensity to dispose of his critics and opponents by bannings, demotions and firings as a sign of irrationality.

The 1988 coup put paid to any such over-simplified explanations. The president was not paranoid in imagining he had many enemies who would rejoice at his downfall. This was the reality.

While Mangope was in the grip of his disaffected military officers, being 'slapped around' in a fruitless attempt to force him to resign, people celebrated in the streets of Mmabatho.

Many came to regret their unrestrained expressions of joy. Restored to power by the South African Defence Force, Mangope carried out a thorough purge of coup sympathisers. The PPP was banned and people were sacked from key government positions - from the deputy secretary of internal affairs, MJ Moeletsi, to the director-general of the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation, David Mothibe.

A former PPP executive member Jacob Setlogelo observed that whites were being appointed to important positions. 'We are not trusted as black people', he said. 'Mangope does not want any opposition'.

Certainly, Mangope will not tolerate the consolidation of bases of oppositional power, which is precisely what the chiefs represent.

Last year, he asserted that his policy was to avoid upsetting 'the traditional norms and vested rights of our people' but that it had been necessary to 'enhance and adapt' these to the 20th Century.

What Mangope really meant was that it was necessary to adapt them to the peculiar position of a bantustan more than a decade into



Braklaagte

'independence'. He is acting as a leader in a political cul de sac.

**O**f all the principal players in the grand apartheid scheme, few have reached so dead an end as the leaders of independent bantustans. While leaders of the non-independent bantustans are still essential to the Nationalist government in its 'reform' strategy and may have a sense of political choices and potency, Mangope and his peers have a finite role. They are not envisaged as participants in the Great Indaba; they must fulfil their agreement to preside over the dumping grounds for black people.

KwaZulu's Gatsha Buthelezi, with his efforts to transcend his ethnic

base via the Indaba and enter the realms of national politics within a federal scheme, and kaNgwane's Enos Mabuza, with his ongoing communication with liberation forces, both stand in sharp contrast to Mangope.

The Bophuthatswana president's position is unidimensional. His quest is to gain international recognition for the bantustan as an independent sovereign state. Of late he has taken to referring to Bophuthatswana as a frontline state. He has asserted that his people's forefathers 'never wanted to be part of South Africa' anyway. And he looks to African states to set a precedent in recognising Bophuthatswana.

The people of Bophuthatswana are

far less committed to 'independence'. A large proportion of those who are eligible, are applying to have their South African citizenship rights restored in order to secure access to jobs which they have learned the bantustan cannot provide.

Many are migrant workers in the towns of the Western Transvaal, on the mines and in the PWV. It is not unusual for migrants to belong both to urban branch committees of their tribes and to more broadly based organisations, like trade unions.

This means that resistance to Bophuthatswana can to some degree be pursued beyond its boundaries; that it is developed in relation to broader forms of resistance in South Africa 'proper'; and that exiled chiefs may be away from their land but they are not necessarily divorced from a large section of their popular base.

So, for instance, chief Mankuroane of Taung continues to meet tribal representatives at various centres of employment and even to hold mass meetings. And, despite Taung's remoteness, when Mankuroane felt forced to flee in September 1988, an organisation calling itself the Taung Support Committee immediately issued a pamphlet in the area: 'Hands off our chief'.

In language appropriate to the democratic movement, it demanded 'the immediate withdrawal of the army of occupation from the village and the release of all detainees' and urged: 'Let us organise ourselves into village committees to defend ourselves'.

Mangope might perceive the removal of resistant chiefs as necessary to secure his position. It appears he ignores its contradictory effects in uniting traditional and progressive forces in the communities affected.

Anglican minister Charles Hooper served the Bafurutse when Abram Moiloa was deposed more than 40 years ago. He observed its impact. 'Abram had become a symbol. His personality no longer mattered, nor would it again affect the tribe's affairs. But his chieftainship, his position as the head of the senior Bechuana clan, his identification with his people in their relation to white authority - these things did matter. Abram the man became vague; Abram the chief was a lion'.

The ANC's constitutional guidelines state that a post-apartheid government will have to take affirmative action to eliminate inequalities and discrimination between men and women.

Is this being taken seriously by the trade union movement, which represents a large number of exploited, oppressed women workers?

While women's committees and structures are emerging in most Cosatu unions, those involved acknowledge that there is a difficult struggle ahead - that it will take more than token women representatives in organisations and government to solve the problems.

At the recent Cosatu Congress in July, the Transport and General Workers Union - which has a majority of male members - tabled two of the most controversial resolutions of the congress: one on sexual conduct and another on women leadership.

The first called for 'tighter sexual discipline' within Cosatu and its affiliates to counter the detrimental effect on the

organisation of male comrades engaging in 'unequal relationships' with newly recruited women members.

The second urged that a conscious effort be made to ensure that women were elected to leadership positions at all levels of Cosatu and its affiliates and that practical barriers to their participation should be tackled.



*INGRID OBERY spoke to TGWU general secretary Jane Barrett about the congress resolutions and the issues they raised.*

One third of TGWU's 26 000-strong membership comprises women - who work mainly as cleaners.

But the motions to congress were presented by TGWU's male leadership - not because women were afraid to, but because the men themselves felt the issues were important.

At congress, the debate raged for four hours, revealing many opinions and positions.

TGWU's reports in recent years show that the resolutions arose out of extensive discussion among its members.

Most importantly, worker representatives recognised that the lack of women leadership in the union movement is directly linked to issues of sexual oppression and harassment.

Women's active participation in the union is not only hampered by the lack of childcare facilities or heavy household responsibilities. Women also face 'wrong approaches by male shop stewards and organisers, ridicule of women's issues', and sexual exploitation by more senior male union members.

# Challenging sexual exploitation

**Y**our union posed two of the most controversial resolutions to Cosatu congress. What practical experiences prompted them? And to what extent did men in your union participate in drawing them up?

Over the years there have been many complaints about sexual harassment and exploitation of women members by management and particularly middle management such as foremen. An example is women giving sexual favours for jobs. There have been extensive discussions, many struggles and much publicity around this issue.

What became clear to us was that it is all very well discussing the issue as it manifests itself with management, but sexual exploitation was taking

place within our own union structures. This was particularly apparent in relation to young male organisers and newly recruited young female members.

Complaints began to filter up through the ranks of Cosatu unions. It was mentioned at the Cosatu national women's conference last year, and again at the March 1989 national seminar.

We heard the same complaints in our own union.

This was clearly a question of power relations. Union officials and shop stewards, well entrenched and secure in their positions, were often getting involved with more than one new young woman at one time. The women were inexperienced and new to organisation and felt afraid of

exposing the issue.

Some of our male office bearers began to identify this problem. They had noticed a more general problem both in Cosatu and TGWU - women members get involved and then drop out of organisation. We felt one of the reasons was sexual exploitation.

So the congress resolutions arose out of the experiences of our rank and file. They should in no way be seen as an attack on male leaders.

In TGWU the issue was broadly discussed in union structures. Although we see the importance of separate women's structures, it is as important that the rest of the union's structures are discussing issues around women.

In mid-1988 our NEC spent a full day discussing issues of concern to



women in the unions including the issue of sexual exploitation.

The congress resolutions were prepared by a national sub-committee which did not have a majority of women by any means. And not long before the congress TGWU's national women's committee met for the first time. It endorsed the resolutions and prepared motivations. These were presented to the congress by our senior male leadership. This was not because women members did not want to speak to the resolutions. In fact, it was mainly women who spoke to the resolution on women leadership. But the delegation felt that generally people expect women to motivate 'women's issues', and it was important to get the congress to

understand that this was not an issue which was just a complaint from women but was a serious political problem - a problem which both the men and women in TGWU took seriously.

TGWU's concern with the issues of sexual conduct and women in leadership can be traced back firstly to the Cosatu resolution of 1985 which resolved to fight all discriminatory treatment of women at work, in society and in the federation. Secondly, TGWU resolutions at its 1987 and 1988 congresses resolved to fight sexual harassment 'wherever it happens', and to 'review all our customs so as to advance our struggle'. Thirdly, TGWU's recent NEC meeting spent a day discussing the ANC's

constitutional guidelines, including points about the ANC's recommendation for affirmative action.

In preparing for congress we discussed new Cosatu leadership and whether there were any women candidates. Very few names were thought of. And this highlighted the lack of women leadership at all levels in all the unions, so that inevitably Cosatu's leadership would be all-male.

**W**hat was the reaction of TGWU membership to the Congress's negative response to these resolutions? Will the union be taking the resolutions back to the next congress?

We do not view the congress responses as negative. It was no surprise that there was not overwhelming support for the resolutions. And we were aware that positions taken in our union may not necessarily be shared by members of other unions - particularly those with a majority of male membership who have never really had to face these issues. But the issue got debated, and that was positive. Initially FAWU seconded our sexual conduct motion, but then withdrew. In the end only CWIU pledged full support.

We have no doubt that the next few years will see a shift in consciousness among the unions. We will monitor this carefully, and if we feel there is not significant change then we will bring these issues to the next congress.

During the four-hour debate NUM put forward an amendment which dealt with what they termed working-class morality. We viewed this as a counter motion to our sexual conduct resolution. What working-class morality involves was unclear. But in NUM's motivation it was argued that because we live in a bourgeois society, workers have bourgeois morality imposed upon them. This morality is one of the capitalist bosses and it leads workers astray. NUM argued that workers must go back to their roots, reject bourgeois morality and develop working class-morality. What this involves was not specified.

TGWU felt this did not accommodate the specific points around sexual conduct which we wanted emphasised. We looked

seriously at their resolution, but there was no way to combine theirs and ours.

Even before the motion went to congress, some unions suggested we take the resolution off the table and refer it to smaller sub-committees. These unions felt we would lose a showdown on the issue. But TGWU members felt that even if the majority at the congress disagreed with the motion, what was important was the opportunity to give this serious problem expression in a forum of more than two thousand people.

A number of positions were argued. Some delegates said there was no such thing as sexual exploitation - that women asked for it and that women can say no. Others argued that it was a problem of discipline, but it did not warrant debate at national congress.

And yet other delegates said we need to educate our members first, and that it should not be isolated from other discipline-related problems.

Ultimately there was a decision, in accordance with a Ppwawu proposal, that the issue of sexual conduct be incorporated into a discussion around a general code of conduct.

**W**ould linking the issue of sexual conduct to other issues of discipline not take it out of the realm of being a 'women's issue' and take it into the realm of being a union issue? Isn't this desirable?

We felt it was a specific issue which merited special attention. The delegation did not accept that it should be shifted into the discussion of a code of conduct. But at that stage it was clear we would have to compromise. The alternative was going to a vote - which many of our delegation were keen to do. But in the interests of reaching resolution of the debate we accepted Ppwawu's proposal.

Members were disappointed, particularly shop stewards. But all were galvanised to promote our position and put the resolutions into effect through whatever means possible.

**T**here are varied initiatives within Cosatu unions around the organisation and

**mobilisation of women. What is happening in TGWU and how do you relate to initiatives in other unions?**

TGWU has set up a national women's committee with representatives from each branch. The first meeting identified a few issues to be used as a catalyst for mobilising women members.

We have also encouraged branches to have women's meetings. Women were keen, but were finding it difficult to isolate concrete issues of interest. The national meeting suggested cervical cancer and pap smears as a starting point. This was an issue which concerned all women, and we also had access to resources - health groups who were willing to provide education and information. Also, there are very simple demands which can be attached to the issue.

Hopefully the structures will begin to generate their own local issues.

Like other unions in Cosatu, over the past few years we have succeeded in getting to a stage where shop stewards don't think twice about including certain issues in collective bargaining demands - most notably maternity rights. Just two years ago this would have been an after-thought.

We have made some progress on maternity rights - most importantly the right to job security, in a few cases some payment over the leave period, and the right for time off for ante-natal classes.

**T**here has been debate about whether Cosatu should have internal women's structures, or whether women workers should only participate in women's organisations in the community. Can you detail some positions in this debate?

Whatever the debate, structures are developing in the unions. The debate about a women's structure within Cosatu was hotly argued at its women's conference last year. At the time only Numsa had a functioning national women's structure. This made it very difficult to practically present the advantages of having an internal structure.

The debate is not resolved, but over the past year a much more common understanding has developed: that it is useful for women to come together, not just as

individuals, but as representatives of women in their own union structures, to discuss issues of national importance to women in unions.

At the Cosatu congress this year, delegates agreed a national committee of women representatives would be formed to discuss the revival of the national women's organisation, Fedstaw.

This too represents progress. The resolution acknowledges the importance of women discussing the issue on behalf of a constituency, to whom they have a responsibility to report back. Hopefully the committee will generate a more long-standing commitment to come together to discuss other issues of importance to women union members - these could be issues of political importance or bread and butter issues.

At the time of the Cosatu women's conference some people feared that a national Cosatu structure would merely duplicate existing community structures and draw women away from them. Those in favour of a Cosatu structure agreed that the union structure should never be a substitute for community women's organisations, but still felt there was merit in drawing union women together to talk about problems they faced as workers or union members.

Unfortunately the divisions coincided with a range of other political divisions. Things have changed since then, and there is openness to resolve the issue.

When the issue gets re-negotiated, hopefully internal union structures will be in a better position to demonstrate what role they play for women union members.

**I**n your experience, if women have participated in women's organisations or women's structures, does this provide them with a good basis for active and equal participation with men in other union structures and activities? Or do women tend to want to remain in 'women's only' structures?

Separate women's structures are important. They provide a forum where women can learn to articulate their own point of view. Often women do feel more free to talk (among themselves), and these structures mean many more women can take part in discussions - since so

Paul Weinberg - Atrapix

few occupy positions in other union structures.

But this does not mean women's issues must be relegated to those structures. Whatever is discussed in the women's committees must be integrated into general union structures - and not just in the form of a report-back. The members of other union structures must fully confront those issues.

It is also important not to overload the women's structures, so that those involved become reluctant to participate in other union structures because of lack of time.

**H**ave there been any responses from men to issues brought from women's structures for debate in general union forums? Is there any sense that they feel these issues have already been dealt with in the women's structures and therefore do not need to be discussed again?

Our structures are still embryonic, so this has not been tested at branch level. But at national level, the NEC became very enthusiastic during the day-long discussion of women's issues. There is every indication that more and more members - both men and women - are viewing issues traditionally seen as 'women's issues' as important.

**T**here has been a lot of talk over the years about the need for housework and child care to be shared so that women have the space to participate in union activities. How much has this remained at the level of talk, and how much has really filtered down to change men and women workers' attitudes to traditional gender roles? For example if housework is being shared, is it shared with other women family members or with male family members?

This is very difficult to answer. But there have definitely been some shifts. Five years ago men would have been totally outraged at the suggestion of shared housework. Now there is a sense that men are far more involved with their children.

At the level of talk there is a lot more acceptance of the concept of sharing housework. But those of our women members who do take on some leadership positions still



*There is every indication that more and more members - both men and women - are viewing issues traditionally seen as 'women's issues' as important.*

complain that no one shares their load at home.

**O**ften women who are involved in union activities are single. Has there been any change in the numbers of married women participating?

Generally speaking most of the more active women are single. And, the more active they become the more likely they are to become single! I'm aware of a number of senior women in other unions whose marriages have broken up in the last while because of their increasing involvement in union affairs. Very often these husbands tend not to be involved in any union or other organisation themselves. However, even when the men are involved in their own union, they often feel they have more of a right to be involved.

**W**omen in unions have become more aware and conscious of issues which affect them specifically. Have they been able to extend this consciousness to unorganised and unemployed women in their communities?

The positive effect of organising women around specific women's issues in the unions has enabled them

to identify what affects them specifically as women in the community. Many women active in union structures - both women's and general structures - have become important in local community organisations. Their experience may help to transcend the notion of seeing women as 'mothers', and to try and identify what it is that makes them a particular category of people in the community with a specific set of problems - just as for instance students have their own problems and issues.

**D**o you think there is a resonance among community women who are not organised in any other forum, of their position in society as people and participants in their own right, rather than just as 'mothers'?

This is not an easy shift and will take a long time. And it depends on the extent to which women begin to actively participate in organisations. We have noticed, for example, that youth organisations are becoming increasingly male dominated. In some areas women are completely absent. And if some women are recruited they are treated as honorary men rather than women comrades representing a big constituency.

**D**o you think that women's lack of participation in union leadership has affected their ability to organise effectively in their community and home environments?

The fact that women in leadership are still the exception rather than the rule, and the lack of experience of large numbers of women in key positions, have inhibited their ability to take the lead outside of the union. Their experience in the union does allow them to give input to their community organisations, but they still tend not to play leadership roles. Those women who are involved in union leadership are often so tied up with responsibilities that they have no time to participate in structures outside of the union. And there are not sufficient numbers of women in middle-level union leadership - like shop stewards - who could be leading community activists as well. It is most often male shop stewards who play this kind of dual role.

# Who foots the bill?

## No one wants to build houses

*Decades of official neglect under apartheid have made mass homelessness a fact of South African life. TAFFY ADLER argues that current strategies by capital and the state will continue to deny millions of black South Africans access to basic shelter.*

**T**oday, five million people in South Africa live without permanent shelter - a direct consequence of apartheid's policy of regarding black people as temporary sojourners in 'white' urban areas.

The existing housing shortage has been estimated to be as high as 800 000 units. Overcoming this shortage would require one house to be built every three minutes for the next 20 years.

Equally staggering are figures which show that extensive overcrowding is normal in black urban households. In some townships an average of 14 people share the standard four-roomed house - while in other townships as many as 22 people are crammed in.

This is aside from the hundreds of thousands who live in squatter camps. National estimates of the number of squatters in both urban and rural areas are hard to come by, but few urban areas will not be able to boast a shanty town or two (or three, or four, or more). In 1986 the Nationalist government finally abolished influx control and acknowledged the right of Africans to remain permanently in 'white' South Africa. Freehold rights were finally, and in all probability irretrievably restored to black urban residents. But, as with most other 'reforms', this about-turn by the



*New houses built by private developers are only affordable to middle- and high-income earners.*

party of apartheid meant controls were tightened up in other areas. The most visible of these was the promulgation of ferocious anti-squatting laws with penalties ranging from large fines to jail sentences.

Operating at a more subtle, and infinitely more pernicious, level has been the strike by both the state and capital against investment in affordable mass black housing.

This refusal to put money into housing, camouflaged by the slogans of 'privatisation' and 'reform', has ensured that the majority of black South Africans are effectively being denied access to shelter. The little investment there has been is aimed at facilitating home ownership for middle- and upper-income blacks.

This selective investment policy has both political and economic motives. In a crisis-ridden South

African economy, both the state and capital are trying to avoid the financial burdens of providing housing for the poor. They are also creating a class of black homeowners whose commitment to stability, so the argument goes, will dampen township support for revolutionary change. The control of surrogate class forces will then replace the more direct coercion of the state.

**T**he South African state has effectively withdrawn from directly providing houses and shifted this function to the private sector.

Between 1980 and 1985 the private sector increased its contribution to urban housing stock by approximately 33% while the state's contribution dropped by about 11%. This trend has accelerated to the point where the state is no longer

building *any* new houses in the black urban areas.

And all the new houses are being built by private developers - under conditions which mean only middle- and high-income earners can afford them.

Land is also still allocated on a racial basis, despite the state's commitment to the free market. It is true that this restriction is gradually being removed. But newly created market forces mean that the land shortage, coming at the same time as privatisation of black housing, has propelled the price of land in black areas skyward. Land speculation is rife, and the cost of raw land earmarked for black residential development has increased by as much as 1200% in a very short period.

Bribery and corruption, too, have flourished as a result of this politically created shortage, making even raw land beyond the reach of the dispossessed.

However, the state has not entirely abandoned its commitment to the poor. The two mechanisms aiding them have been the provision of low-interest loans, and the extension to blacks of existing state subsidies for home purchase. Both mechanisms are wedded to the principles of the private market.

R400-million has been made available at a low rate of interest to a newly created private company, the SA Housing Trust, (SAHT) which subsidises the development and purchase of new, low cost, homes. Low cost in this instance means houses costing more than R15 000. More than 90% of black wage earners could never afford this.

Attempting to overcome the affordability problem, the SAHT is currently considering the development of serviced land which may bring the cost of shelter down below R10 000. However, SAHT policy remains committed firstly to the principle of private ownership, and secondly to the requirement that within a stipulated period, expensive bricks and mortar structures must be built on the land which has been purchased.

It should also be pointed out that R400-million is vastly inadequate in the context of a housing shortage which - to be solved - needs an annual investment of R3-billion.

This minimal amount speaks volumes about the state's commitment to this area of social expenditure.

At this point state subsidy policy only applies to home ownership, not rental. Percentage-based subsidies, together with the high cost of houses and high interest rates, means middle and high income groups, particularly civil servants (teachers, policemen, nurses), have become the major purchasers of new homes in the black townships. They can do this because of generous civil service benefits. This goes right along with the attempt to divide the black community into the housed and the homeless.

In the period of 'reform', state subsidy policy has changed, but has remained racially biased. A recent concession changed the provisions of the subsidy to first-time home purchasers from covering only newly built homes to including *any* home - as long as it was the first time the purchaser had acquired property. But this is only applicable to white buyers.

The subsidy for other racial groups only covers newly built homes, which means older, and probably cheaper, housing outside white group areas does not qualify for a government subsidy.

And finally, the state has withdrawn any support for the rental sector. Old government-owned houses and hostels which were available for rent in the townships are now being sold off and no new units for rent are being built.

**S**tate policy in this area flies directly in the face of the obvious fact that home ownership at current prices and interest rates is beyond the means of the vast majority.

The reasons for this illogical situation lie in the political realm. In the era of 'reform' both the state and capital want to create a stable home owning group in the black townships whose commitment to capitalism, they hope, will be bolstered by the ownership of their own particular castles.

The private sector, in the form of financial institutions, township developers and building contractors, has willingly gone into the black housing market where acceptable risks provide a profitable return on

investment.

Secure in the new legislative environment of black urban freehold rights, private enterprise believes its investment risk is minimized because it may foreclose on any owner who defaults.

This level of housing starts at R30 000, and given rising interest rates and building costs, is going up all the time.

But the higher-income black market is small. As a result private enterprise is now beginning to seriously broach the question of providing homes and sites for below R20 000.

But its ability to do so is made more difficult by the activities of its fellow travellers in the financial institutions and the property and building-supply industries.

The self-interest of these groups has fuelled increases in the cost of land, building materials and in interest rates.

However, all endeavours to make shelter more affordable, even at the level of R500 sites being made available by the Transvaal Provincial Administration, are within the framework of the private ownership of land. Certainly, the formal private sector shows no inclination to take up the rental gap left by the state.

**E**ven if the building industry can build homes costing less than R20 000, at this stage banks and building societies are not willing to make loans available. They complain that servicing such small loans is not profitable, and the risks of default are unacceptably high.

They have made exceptions in two circumstances. The first is where they can cover their administration charges by hiking the interest rates above the existing mortgage bond rates.

This charge has ranged from 1% above prime (currently running at 20%) to 31% in the case of institutions dedicated to offering small loans. This is the maximum permitted by the Usury Act.

The second exception is where employed workers organise repayments by stop-order. This minimises the bank's risk of default and reduces administration costs.

In this case borrowers are required to cede the amounts in their pension

fund to the financial institution in the event of a default.

But these policies are only really available to employed workers whose wages could service a loan repayment of R300 or more a month. Less than 10% of the South African population could afford these repayments.

**S**o where will the money for black housing come from? It has become increasingly common to look to trade unions and their influence over pension and provident funds as a solution.

Many 'experts' who make their money by observing the industrial relations scene have argued that trade unions will be able to force a new policy of socially responsible investment which will transform the housing crisis.

Union pressure could divert the approximately R65-billion under the control of pension and provident funds to the housing market, drawing it away from the stock exchange, where it is currently invested. And the trade union movement has been examining this strategy closely - but increasingly critically.

Why have capital and the state maintained an investment strike in housing, and why are they now looking to workers' money to fill the obvious gap? Clearly capital is unwilling to invest money where a profitable return cannot be guaranteed. Investing in low-cost housing to people with low levels of financial security is viewed as risky. The return may not be high enough, or, given the kind of borrower, the money may not come back at all.

While capital is not willing to place its own money at risk, it is willing to steer workers' money into this area.

Indeed some banks and building societies have made a virtue out of their tightfistedness by offering administrative support in distributing pension fund money into these high risk areas.

As far as the state is concerned, the pension pile represents an obvious way to deflect the demand for investment in housing. Yet again, under the moral banner of privatisation, the state is attempting to avoid responsibility for providing



*In different townships, up to 14 or 22 people may share the standard house.*

housing.

The state's current R400-million contribution to low-cost housing would pale against a potential R16-billion investment from worker pension funds. This amount is the legal investment limit of one quarter of total assets permitted by pension fund legislation. And the state would have a convenient cover under which to reduce its own financial commitments in this regard.

Negotiations in the various pension and provident funds around the issue of investment in housing have raised the thorny question of subsidy.

Spurred on by the desperate need for funds, and unwilling to charge themselves exploitative rates of interest, workers in some provident funds have agreed to a small-loans facility for housing purposes at a 16% interest rate.

Given that the fund could be earning around 20% interest if they money were invested elsewhere, the 16% rate is effectively a subsidy by the benefit fund to the individual borrower.

Why have the state (in the form of the registrar of pensions) and capital (in the form of company representatives on benefit fund boards of control) agreed to this?

Simply because such a subsidy does not effect their own assets.

The losers here are the majority of pension and provident fund members who forfeit the difference between the subsidised interest rate and the

market rate of return.

And because workers receive the subsidised interest rate from the benefit fund, both the state and capital can then avoid worker demands for direct subsidies.

In a low-wage economy like South Africa, where the demand for a subsidy in areas such as housing are inevitable, capital and the state will encourage any formula which would deflect their responsibility for a housing subsidy.

In view of this, trade unions are revising their ideas and are increasingly wary of any attempt to use the pension pile to allow the state and employers to avoid their responsibilities.

Some unions are beginning to argue that pension and provident funds must be used to provide for the purposes for which negotiated funds were originally set up.

While union trustees should be prepared to use money in these funds for socially responsible investment, such investment should not be to the detriment of the fund's members. They may even be willing to invest in housing provision, but will require guarantees about returns and the security of their investments.

This is a challenge to the state, employers and financial institutions.

By refusing to take responsibility for providing subsidised finance for cheap housing, union trustees will maintain the pressure on the state, employers and financial institutions to provide direct subsidies from their own resources, thereby forcing them to face up to their responsibility for the years of neglect of housing. And they will be required to provide the institutional framework to facilitate investment in affordable shelter.

For the state this will mean tax relief and guarantees for investment in housing.

For banks and building societies, it means adapting levels of loans and security appropriate to the needs of the poor.

And while employers pay low wages, they will be required to give their workers direct housing allowance subsidies.

*\* Taffy Adler is employed by the Labour and Economic Research Centre.*



Marig Mathlabegoane outside her Jabulani, Soweto home, after being evicted during the rent boycott - April 1987

# Soweto rent boycott

t h e d e b a t e c o n t i n u e s

**D**oes the initiative by the high-profile Soweto People's Delegation to negotiate an end to the rent boycott on terms favourable to the people provide a model that can be implemented elsewhere?

Two researchers from the

Wits University Centre for Policy Studies disagree on the issue.

KHEHLA SHUBANE, in the first of the articles below, argues that multiple factors combine to make the Soweto case unique and not easy to repeat.

MARK SWILLING responds

with the view that the SPD was not the first venture into local-level negotiations, that it conforms to a certain broad pattern - and that there is no good reason why the SPD initiative should be the last of its breed.

**KHEHLA SHUBANE**

**T**he attempt by Soweto Peoples Delegation (SPD) to negotiate a solution of the three-year-old rent boycott in that township has led to a plethora of attempts to implement the same strategy in other areas.

So deep is the interest raised by the SPD, that residents in townships not boycotting rent have seriously considered similar negotiation initiatives to tackle their local problems. In other townships, residents have actually begun to implement the strategy.

In Alexandra and Tumahole, local organisations - the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) and the Tumahole Civic Association respectively - represented residents at several meetings with local councils where various problems were discussed.

An argument gaining currency among civic organisations and others concerned with local-level struggles, is that the SPD experience constitutes a way forward and should be implemented more widely.

The contrary view argues that the SPD strategy is specific to Soweto, where it evolved organically in the course of the rent boycott. Those involved in the current negotiations seek to end the boycott on terms favourable to residents. But if that does work out, conditions in Soweto are such that the community retains a capacity to continue the boycott action.

The issues the SPD is attempting to resolve in Soweto are certainly common to many, if not all, South African townships. But the existence of similar problems does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a strategy appropriate to one township would work elsewhere.

The relative success of the SPD strategy in Soweto rests finally on subjective and objective factors which have interacted in a unique way:

- \* a relatively well organised community which retained a capacity to defend itself against attacks by the council;

- \* deep-rooted support for the rent boycott among large numbers of residents;

- \* a council dominated by a populist

organisation (the Sofasonke Party) determined to build mass support in competition with a popular civic organisation;

- \* support within the Sofasonke Party for some of the objectives of the rent boycott;

- \* the practical difficulties of policing a large community like Soweto.

These factors blended and played themselves out to produce a unique situation which made the emergence of the SPD a viable strategy.

**S**owetans began their rent boycott in June 1986 as a result of a combination of long-standing grievances. The boycott was not triggered off by the imminent rise of rents as was the case in many other townships.

Though there were economically related problems in Soweto which partly under-pinned the rent boycott, political objectives were also clearly discernible.

The Soweto Council and other councils in Greater Soweto - the Diepmeadow and Dobsonville councils - had reached record lows in popularity. Their corruption, inefficiency and failure to provide sound administration to the township together with a steady and thorough organising effort led by the civic association resulted in a strong rejection of the councils.

Keen to rid themselves of the councils, residents embarked on a rent boycott which they saw as the most effective way of causing the collapse of the councils in a short time. It was seen as inconceivable that these bodies could continue their functions without revenue.

Some months before the rent boycott began, the civic organisation was fundamentally transformed with the emergence of new structures - street committees - throughout the township. This gave the community considerable power and created a large pool of leaders who played an important role in weaving together a sophisticated network upon which the rent boycott would later rest.

The influence of the Soweto Civic Association extended well beyond political issues into a variety of day to day problems facing ordinary people. Street committees created a network, for example, which could be used by people for social purposes.

**S**oweto residents had a coherent civic organisation in place, and they clearly perceived the inadequacies of the black local authorities system.

With a national rent boycott movement on the ascent, it was a matter of time before people in Soweto decided to test their newly acquired strength through the rent-boycott strategy which seemed to hold such bright prospects of success elsewhere. At the time, the rent boycott in the Vaal townships had been in force for two years, providing a persuasive example of what might be achieved.

The web of street committees acted as a support mechanism for families who were singled out for eviction by the council. Upon the eviction of a family, large numbers of people would be mobilised to literally block the removal of furniture from a house. If the furniture had already been moved out when the crowds arrived, they would simply restore it to the house.

In addition, it was constantly made clear at street-committee meetings that a house from which a family had been evicted for boycotting rent should never be occupied by another family.

On 26 August 1986 in the Soweto township of White City, more than 20 people were killed by security forces after residents mobilised in response to fears that some families were to be evicted.

The killings, known as the White City Massacre, contributed to a deeper determination on the part of residents to resist the authorities.

**S**trategies to break resistance, employed with a degree of success in other townships, did not yield the same results in Soweto. Organisational roots were too deep there to be easily broken.

Soweto's sheer size makes it difficult for all the activists to be rounded up and detained - something that appears to have been achieved with ease in other townships.

This could also explain the failure of Joint Management Centres, with their disorganising security strategy, to displace popular organisations.

The advantages of living in an organised community were not lost on a large number of Soweto residents. Suddenly, with accessible

organisations, scores of ordinary people found themselves able to take part in socio-political debates from which they were previously excluded.

The October 1988 municipal elections saw the Sofasonke Party (SP) winning a majority of seats in Soweto. This development had significant consequences for township politics.

The SP won the elections chiefly on the basis of its support - albeit limited support - for the rent boycott. Soon after the boycott started, the SP urged its members to refuse to pay rent, and to pay a flat rate of R15 for services, ignoring the rates set by the council.

The people of Soweto, the SP contended, should consider their rented houses as their own properties because they had, in some cases, been paying rent for more than 50 years and had more than paid for their homes.

The effect of the SP's position was to align conservative members of the community with radical sectors, thereby widening support for the boycott.

In the wake of the SP take-over of the council, the strategy of negotiation emerged as a critical need for both the community and the council.

Until then, all the council's coercive measures had failed to break the boycott. On the other hand the community had also not succeeded in securing total victory in their demands concerning the council's resignation, the cost of services and ownership of housing.

By 1988 - two years after the start of the boycott - it was clear to all that total defeat of one or other party was not in sight. To break the logjam and create a new climate both the community and the council agreed to negotiate.

**T**he Soweto community did not agree to negotiate in order merely to win time to build its organisation. This is a critical difference between Soweto and townships where organisation has been destroyed and processes such as obtaining mandates and organising broader consultation would be impossible.

In conditions of disorganisation leaders at the negotiation table would be under no obligation to deliver. And the council, in the event of negotiating with a weak community, would not feel pressurised to negotiate in earnest.

The basic ingredients for meaningful negotiations are in place in Soweto. Both parties to the process recognise the other's strengths. Herein lies the specific promise of the SPD strategy.



Anna Zeminski - Afrapix

*For not paying rent during the boycott - evicted in Jabulani, Soweto*

## MARK SWILLING

**T**he argument that the initiative of the Soweto People's Delegation is not transferable to other townships because the local conditions that produced and sustained it are unique, poses some serious strategic questions for grassroots organisation.

The immediate context of the debate is the suggestion in Mass Democratic Movement circles that the SPD strategy be replicated at a national level in the same way that the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee became the National Education Crisis Committee.

Shubane, who advances the argument against replication, is convincing because he refers to specific material and political conditions in Soweto which make the

strategic leap from the Soweto context to a national one untenable.

He implies that conditions in Soweto are unique, and that the strategy of 'local-level negotiations on urban issues' via an SPD-type formation is *only* applicable in the Soweto situation.

He fails to recognise the historical precedent for local-level negotiations on urban issues in the 1984-86 period and how they may become tactically useful in various

communities in future.

The roots of local-level negotiation strategies reach as far back as the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation in 1979, the Cape Town civic movement in the early 1980s that gave rise to the Cape Housing Action Committee, and the Joint Rent Action Committee in Durban in the 1981/82 period.

More significantly, at the height of highly effective consumer boycotts and stayaways in the Eastern Cape during 1985/86, community organisations entered into negotiations with chambers of commerce and local government officials.

The civic associations embarked on these negotiations because although they had achieved political dominance in the townships, they did not have control over the provision of services and housing. This posed a problem as they needed to demonstrate their ability to meet their communities' needs.

Knowing full well that short-term gains were needed in order to sustain collective action over a long period, they put forward urban demands that were realisable and backed up with organised mandates.

It is important to note that mass-based organisations did not negotiate constitutional issues, such as the establishment of a non-racial municipality or alternative forms of political representation.

Constitutional issues were seen as national issues and hence negotiable only on a national level under conditions laid down by the liberation movement.

Urban issues, however, were seen as negotiable because they affect daily life and hence grassroots structures had an obligation to address them prior to the resolution of the constitutional problem.

The Eastern Cape example is significant because it reveals that local-level negotiations became an important tactic only after communities had gone through the process of mobilisation and organisation.

In other words, the community was mobilised in reaction to some state initiative - such as rent increases or brutal police action. As mobilisation intensified, organisation gradually began to develop and so the street committees emerged. It was only

after organisation and political consciousness had reached a certain level that local-level negotiations emerged.

When they did, the aim was always to strengthen organisation by winning gains that could be used to demonstrate the utility of collective action. This is how trade unions operate and, as in the labour sphere, the strategy worked for community organisations until the state of emergency was declared.

**T**he SPD strategy follows the Eastern Cape model. The Soweto community was first mobilised and this was then translated into grassroots organisational power. Eventually it became clear that the leadership was under popular pressure to find ways to end the rent boycott on terms dictated by the community's interests. The only way this could be done, as Shubane correctly shows, was via local-level negotiations over urban demands.

For the sake of the argument, the above processes can be summarised as the 'mobilise-organise-negotiate' dynamic. This is not to imply that all areas that were mobilised and organised ended up negotiating. They did not. Everything depends on the specific conditions pertaining in each community - for instance, the nature of local white interests, the responses of the security forces, the balance of power in the black local authority, the level of division in the white business and political establishment.

What is significant is that the 'mobilise-organise-negotiate' dynamic emerged in areas with widely varying material and political conditions. There is no need to list the numerous differences between the big-town Soweto situation and the small-town conditions in numerous Eastern Cape townships. What is important is that Shubane is pushing the uniqueness of Soweto too far.

Local-level negotiations were not invented by the SPD and were used under different circumstances long before they were seen as useful in Soweto.

It is important to consider Shubane's response to the question being asked in presently unorganised or organising communities as to whether the SPD's local-level negotiations tactic will yield positive

results for them. Shubane's answer is in the negative.

But his reasons once again rest on the uniqueness of Soweto. This, in turn, implies that local-level negotiations will never be appropriate in other communities.

To date the tactic of local-level negotiations has been part of the 'mobilise-organise-negotiate' sequence. Like trade unions, civics did not negotiate until they had an organised grassroots base. It follows, therefore, that it is not an appropriate tactic in unorganised and organising communities at the moment.

But there is evidence that the applicability of the tactic in a given community could change precisely because the process of organisation is underway in many communities.

In such communities, activists are committed to first organising residents on the basis of the high levels of political consciousness that exist at the moment. This will then facilitate controlled forms of mobilisation around local demands that affect the community in question (and, of course, around longer term national demands).

This process of 'organisation before mobilisation' will more than likely culminate in local-level negotiations precisely because the winning of short-term gains does help build long-term organisation. This, then, will strengthen strategic - as opposed to uncontrolled - mobilisation which in turn reinforces, rather than over-stretches, organisation.

Evidence of this 'organise-mobilise-negotiate-organise' cycle has already emerged in certain communities.

In short, it is correct to say that an SPD-type strategy is counter-productive in unorganised and organising communities because in these communities the 'mobilisation-organisation-negotiation' dynamic is absent.

But it would be short-sighted to ignore the importance of a new dynamic which puts 'organisation before mobilisation' and which may well lead to local-level negotiations on urban issues at some later stage. This possibility cannot be discounted on the grounds that conditions in Soweto are unique.



# A plug in the sanctions loop-hole

*Financial sanctions have been more effective than any other economic measure aimed at ending apartheid. But Pretoria has found a partial loop-hole in the form of trade credits.*

*JO-ANNE COLLINGE reports.*

**A**nti-apartheid forces are pulling out the stops to persuade international banks to take a hard line against South Africa when the rescheduling of foreign loan repayments comes up for renegotiation next year.

How well targeted is this campaign? Are there not other, more fertile, financial sanctions fields to plough?

The questions are raised by the report of Keith Ovenden and Tony Cole, *Apartheid and International Finance*, commissioned by the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Committee on Southern Africa (CFMC).

The loans up for rescheduling are by and large a lost campaigning cause, the report argues. They were caught in the 'net' in August 1985, when South Africa unilaterally

suspended repayments of many of its foreign debts, and international banking convention almost dictate they will be repaid at a pace decided by South Africa.

Far more fruitful, the report argues, is the tactic of extending financial sanctions to short-term loans - most of which take the form of trade credits - and consolidating the embargo on long- and medium-term loans.

Financial sanctions, the Cole-Ovenden report states, have been implemented with 'near perfect unity'. They have been more effective than any other measure taken against the South African government precisely because 'the financial sanction works with and not against tendencies inherent in the economy of international finance'.

It suggests that future sanctions campaigns would do well to heed this logic and to continue to swim with the tide of international finance

considerations.

Cole and Ovenden's views will have the backing of the eight-member foreign ministers' committee when the report is placed before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Kuala Lumpur in October.

**M**ax Coleman of the Human Rights Commission attended the recent CFMC meeting in Canberra, with Moses Mayekiso of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Smangalis Mkhathshwa of the Institute for Contextual Theology. He confirmed: 'The foreign ministers agreed that financial sanctions were being especially effective and that they should be tightened, particularly with regard to trade credits, because that's where further possibilities lay.'

'As far as the non-rolling over of loans and the non-granting of new loans was concerned the position was

already solid, due to bankers' decisions backed up by government policies'.

The Canberra meeting was the last of four meetings of the CFMC, a grouping set up at the last Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in Vancouver in 1987. The committee, comprising foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, also commissioned a report on trade sanctions.

The trade report, compiled by a team headed by Canadian Joe Hanlon, made explicit a principle inherent in the Cole-Ovenden study: tighter targeting of sanctions rather than generalised support for comprehensive mandatory action.

While the foreign ministers made no secret of their approval to the Cole-Ovenden report, their decision on incremental trade sanctions recommended by the Hanlon report has not been made public.

Cole and Ovenden believe the Namibian settlement illustrates how effective financial sanctions are. They assert that the settlement, widely billed as a return to reason by the South African regime, would be better viewed as an attempt by Pretoria to manoeuvre its way out of the economic squeeze brought to bear by international financiers.

'It is one of the ironies of the peace process in southern Africa that it owes its existence, at least in part, to the actions of western bankers'.

Cole and Ovenden stress that 'South Africa is being excluded from the world stock of savings *not* because bankers and financiers are ideologically united in their detestation of apartheid', but because 'most of them now see South Africa as a bad risk'. Like the rest of the world, bankers' views differ about apartheid's importance vis-a-vis other considerations - in their case such matters as shareholders' interests or the legal requirements of banking procedure.

**T**he perception of risk grew with the unrelenting political violence which took root after September 1984.

Exactly a year later the government briefly suspended trading on the stock and foreign exchange markets.

It also declared a unilateral

moratorium on repaying commercial loans which fell due in the last four months of 1985.

About 250 foreign banks, owed something like US\$13,6-billion, were caught in the 'net' of this standstill on repayments.

The government had no option, states the Cole-Ovenden report.

By the end of August 1985, a month before the standstill, it was due to have paid back \$4-billion in short-term loans - an amount more than double its foreign reserves at the time.

South Africa's renegeing on loan payments in a climate of continued conflict was enough to destroy what little foreign investor confidence remained.

Capital began to pour out of the country - R25-billion (\$9-billion at current exchange rates) between 1985 and 1988.

A small portion of the \$13,6-billion debt was subsequently repaid on conditions set during two rounds of rescheduling negotiations. A further \$4-billion was converted into long-term loans. The remaining \$8-billion is subject to an agreement that falls due in June next year.

South Africa does not have the current capital or the foreign reserves to repay these loans. Coleman has documented how South Africa's balance of payments position has become 'a struggle to keep its head above water'. He writes: 'The surplus declined from R6,1-billion in 1987 to R2,9-billion in 1988, a drop of 52%, brought about by flagging exports in the face of international trade sanctions and by rising imports, largely of capital goods, needed to replace obsolete and worn out plant and machinery.

'The balance of payments surpluses over the last four years have been insufficient to service South Africa's foreign debt payments and as a result it has been necessary to dip into foreign reserves'.

In other words after paying for its imports, Pretoria did not have enough left over from what it made on its exports to repay what it owed outside the 'net', nor the interest on debts inside the 'net'. So it had to dip into its 'savings', held in foreign currencies and gold.

At the end of 1988 the net reserves stood at R4,9-billion (about \$2-billion) - clearly not enough to

pay off the outstanding debt. According to the Reserve Bank governor's report of 1989, which gives its figures in higher gross quantities, the downward trend continued into 1989, with gross reserves dropping from R8,2-billion in March 1988 to R7,4-billion in June 1989.

**T**he government's weakness in facing the loan payments issue has provided an obvious target for its opponents. There have been significant attempts to get affected banks to refuse to roll over the loans one more time.

The United Democratic Front delegation made this pitch during its extensive Western tour in July.

At its recent Moscow meeting, the World Council of Churches central committee called on bankers to say no to rescheduling.

And the newly established British anti-apartheid alliance, the Southern African Coalition, sees as a priority the campaign to persuade National Westminster, Barclays and Standard Chartered banks to put the brakes on rescheduling.

But the Commonwealth, if it follows the Cole-Ovenden view, is likely to take a less optimistic view of the degree of leverage the 1990 debt predicament presents.

'The scope for achieving faster debt repayment is limited', the report concludes. 'The banks have very little freedom of manoeuvre in what they can demand and reasonably expect to get. By introducing the moratorium in the first place, South Africa indicated its intention to behave unilaterally and, as far as the rescheduling discussions are concerned, this remains an option that is available to it.

'The money is in the "net" and the pace at which it will be released is something that the South African authorities will decide'.

The banks are further constrained by their primary responsibility to safeguard investors' money and comply with the domestic legal requirements of their own countries.

Consequently Cole and Ovenden recommend that governments, shareholders and the public should encourage the lending banks 'to use what leverage they have to press for repayments at the highest rate'.

Recently South African Reserve

Bank governor Chris Stals, who was directly involved in negotiating the previous rescheduling agreements, indicated what he intended to do. 'We will not accept unrealistic conditions. We cannot pay more than we can afford and we will not sign an agreement without being sure that we are able to meet the commitments.

'In the unlikely event of foreign banks refusing to reschedule South Africa's debt we will propose a unilateral rescheduling agreement to them. We want to continue repaying our debt'.

**F**ew anti-apartheid organisations appear to be paying attention to the 'exit' options already open to banks covered by the present rescheduling agreement.

Basically this gives lending banks the option of converting short-term loans into ten-year loans maturing in 1997 or converting the loans into cash inside South Africa and investing in the local stock market.

The terms of the first option dictate that for two years from June 1990 the banks would receive no repayments. After that they would get the principal amount back in ten half-yearly payments ending in 1997. This obviously relieves the pressure on South Africa in the short term. Already some \$4-billion has been converted into long-term loans.

The Cole-Ovenden report comments that banks have been 'playing their hands very close to their chests about whether or not they are prepared to accept the ten-year option'. But they believe German, Swiss and French banks are tending to stick by their short-term loans (which are subject to rescheduling) while 'British banks will split their loans between the two and American banks will prefer the ten-year option'.

Both the South African government and anti-apartheid groups see the fact that about one-third of the debt is already headed for the 10-year scheme as an indication of support for the regime.

'This perception is probably false', argue Cole and Ovenden. 'One major international banker expressed it to us in the following way: that the 1997 option offered them an opportunity to say once and for all that they were done with South Africa; that they did not even wish to



*FW de Klerk - his options are limited*

be involved in renegotiating short-term roll-overs; and that the 1997 option at least offered the prospect after 1992 of getting their money back'.

**A**reas offering greater leverage to anti-apartheid sanctions campaigners are those of monitoring long- and medium-term loans and extending sanctions to the area of short-term loans, especially trade credits.

Public opinion and government intervention interact with the risk factor in restricting foreign loans to South Africa, Cole and Ovenden argue. Especially in the Western world 'the pressures of local governments, university institutions, some commercial enterprises, churches, shareholders and clients have all led banks to reassess the risks inherent in lending to South African entities'.

With regard to medium- and long-term loans they propose greater 'transparency' (legally-enforced disclosure) in lending arrangements with South Africa. This may create conditions where 'diplomacy might be brought to bear' to persuade certain interests to refrain from financing apartheid.

'We think there should be a greater diplomatic effort to draw the rapidly growing economies of the Far East

Eric Miller - Apartheid  
into the shared Western active disapproval of apartheid. This is particularly the case with regard to Taiwan and the Republic of Korea'.

But the greatest gap for action exists in the area of trade credits - which involve short-term loans.

The authors of the report are careful not to exaggerate the role of trade credits in alleviating South Africa's financial distress. They point out that this kind of credit does not guarantee sustained access to financing, but it could help meet foreign debt repayments.

Trade credits of \$7,25-billion represented by far the greatest proportion of foreign debt left outside the 'net' at the time of the 1985 moratorium. An estimated 90% of this was owed to German, British and French government trade agencies.

Trade credits are advances of money to facilitate long-distance deals. They cover periods ranging from 30 days to ten years - depending on the nature of the commodity being purchased. Typically ordinary manufactured goods would be financed for 30 to 180 days, whereas heavy industrial equipment, for instance, would be accorded credit from 180 days to five years.

While the credit is extended by commercial banks to either the buyer or seller, it is usually guaranteed or insured by a state credit agency or a state-sponsored agency, thus limiting the risk of, for example, goods getting lost, damaged or destroyed in transit.

These guarantees are vital, but credit agencies will only provide them on deals involving countries considered reasonable trading risks - a status known as being 'on cover'.

'Having a country "on cover" is therefore the critical issue. Without it, Western banks are reluctant to lend for trade purposes because of the risks. With it, they are only too delighted to do so because it is effectively risk free'.

Already South Africa's access to short-term credit is limited. Many countries have lowered the ceiling on the volume of permissible trade-credit business with South Africa and enforce this strictly.

Still, says the Cole-Ovenden report, more could be done. 'In our view it would make sense to allow

the market to accept rather more of a risk. There seems no good reason why, in the current state of its internal socio-political relations, South Africa should be "on cover" for short-term trade credits in official export credit agencies. All that this does, in the case of loss, is to transfer the restitution costs, indirectly, to the tax-paying public of the country concerned'.

This move, they predict, would have the added advantage of hitting exports harder than imports, and aggravating South Africa's balance of payments problems.

**J**oe Hanlon's trade sanctions report to the Commonwealth foreign ministers follows the Cole-Ovenden logic in going with the flow of the economy and international trade. 'Our package would significantly widen existing Commonwealth (trade sanctions) measures', it states.

'It excludes all the commodities normally considered problematic, such as ferro-alloys and precious metals. Instead it concentrates on bulk commodities where it is quite easy to replace South African supplies; South Africa will have trouble finding alternative markets, so these sanctions will have an impact even if only some countries impose them'.

The Hanlon report shows a sense of urgency, which activists would probably consider to be a serious omission in the Cole-Ovenden study. 'Hitting South Africa with new sanctions during the 1990-91 debt bulge could have an important multiplier effect, while delaying might make even a larger sanctions package insufficient. Thus it is essential to hit South Africa during the 1990-91 period'.

The Hanlon report includes a lengthy list of recommendations, of which the first six form a priority package.

Recommendation 1 calls for a statement of intent. 'Governments must make a public commitment to a steady reduction in trade with South Africa, setting a date to end trade if no progress has been made to a negotiated settlement. We suggest government leaders announce that they plan to phase out trade over five years, if Pretoria does not accept the five steps of the Commonwealth



*On an anti-apartheid march in Toronto, Canada*

Accord on southern Africa'.

The following five recommendations are for immediate implementation.

Recommendation 2: 'Importation of all South African agricultural products (including non-edible products) should be banned'.

Recommendation 3: 'Importation of all non-strategic South African minerals should be banned, including coal, base metals, iron ore, uranium and non-metallic minerals'.

Recommendation 4: 'Importation of all South African manufactured goods should be banned'.

Recommendation 5: 'The production and sale of all platinum coins and small bars for investors should be prohibited'.

Recommendation 6: 'Trade credits for sales to South Africa should be phased out over three to five years'.

The report estimates that if the five recommendations were 'rapidly adopted by enough countries, the economic impact would be sufficiently harsh to create a strong lobby for negotiation'. To have a political impact, per capita Gross Domestic Product would need to fall by at least 5% a year, the report reckons. The present decline of 2% a year 'has caused discontent, but it has not caused enough white people to question the basis of apartheid. And with good reason: white living

standards remain high'.

Coleman says he detected solid support among the foreign ministers for the thrust of both reports (although comment on the Hanlon report was withheld). 'At the opening, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clarke and Commonwealth secretary Shridath Ramphal made it very clear that they were conscious of continuing repression in South Africa.

'They were fully aware there had been no move towards the dismantling of apartheid and that there were things going on that showed that apartheid was being reinforced (so they were not about to be taken in by the blandishments of De Klerk). And finally - that sanctions were working.

'There was total agreement on the necessity to tighten sanctions to pressurise the South African government to move to the negotiating table in a meaningful way'.

Britain was not represented at Canberra but all delegates were aware that Margaret Thatcher would be very much present at Kuala Lumpur when the foreign ministers' committee gave its concluding report on two years' work.

Thatcher's strident anti-sanctions voice is expected to be heard in Malaysia but she is also expected to produce some evidence of the effectiveness of her 'quiet diplomacy' with South Africa to mitigate her isolation in the Commonwealth.

Although Britain remains the key to effective Commonwealth pressure (her trade with South Africa exceeds that of all other member nations combined), Coleman believes the other members are unlikely to allow placatory gestures by Thatcher to dilute their overall strategy. 'I got the impression that they believe there should be no kind of staged or step-wise lifting of pressures. You know, "release Mandela and lift that particular sanction; release Sisulu and we'll lift another sanction".'

'The first moment that there should be any lifting of pressure, including sanctions, should be when the apartheid system has been dismantled entirely'.

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Anna Zernicki - Atapox

# Thoughts on a planned economy

*ALEC ERWIN, of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, puts the case for an economy based on careful socialist planning. Workers, he says, are central to this reconstruction. And without it, the prospects for material well-being and social justice for the majority are slim.*

If the working class is to escape its chains of poverty and unemployment far greater attention must be focused on the present and future political economy. The prospect of substantial political change has become real rather than mere hope. Therefore it is time for the working class to carefully take stock of its position.

In debating the future economy we have to move away from ideological cliches where capitalism means success and freedom, and socialism means failure and totalitarianism. The issues at stake defy such simple definitions.

Surely the goal of a mass democratic movement must be a future economy in which South Africa's great potential wealth benefits the majority of its people and not a minority? If this is not the case, then the working class should seriously consider why it plays a major role in such a movement.

If - as we believe it must be - that is the goal, then working class leadership must ensure that it is reached. But only a planned reconstruction of the economy can ensure that its wealth benefits the majority.

Such a reconstruction process is socialist in the sense that productive capacity will be utilised to the benefit of the majority in society and not the minority.

There are a few crucial questions when debating a planned economy in South Africa:

- \* what is the essential nature of our present economic crisis?
- \* can free market capitalism solve the crisis?
- \* can a planned economy solve the crisis?
- \* and finally, is such a planned economy feasible?

**M**edia coverage of the economy looks exclusively at short-term changes and never provides any structural

analysis, and media thinking is dominated by the relatively affluent white community. But most often the burden or effects of economic crisis falls on the disenfranchised working class. These different experiences of economic crisis mean the depth of the present crisis is not understood or presented.

In 1986, Cosatu commissioned an Economic Trends project to examine all aspects of the South African economy. The project's first report, which came out in October 1988, states that there are very substantial structural barriers to economic growth in South Africa.

In a capitalist economy, accumulation is the process whereby capitalists - responding to market incentives - reinvest profits earned in order to expand profits in the next production period.

Such reinvestment has two possibilities. The first is reinvestment in existing productive capacity to increase productivity and output. This can be termed intensive accumulation. The second is using profits to open up new productive capacity - new mines, factories, shops or farms. This we can call extensive accumulation.

Clearly the two processes are not mutually exclusive.

But when one comes to significantly predominate over the

other than there are definite consequences.

If intensive accumulation dominates then output will increase and profits and wages will rise - at rates largely determined by the balance of power between capital and labour. But employment will rise or fall very slowly. This is because the investment is in more efficient machinery, which needs less labour for a given output. Because this equipment is so expensive, this process tends to be concentrated in large corporations - which in turn undercuts the smaller, more competitive business sector.

If extensive accumulation predominates, productivity remains static, employment increases and output increases. But wages and rates of profit are likely to remain static - again around levels determined by the balance of power between capital and labour.

So the absolute amount of profit increases and employment grows, but workers' standards of living remains static because productivity is not rising in existing production capacity.

The above is a rather schematic description of very complex processes. But it does show that a balance of these two processes would be a desirable economy.

**I**n the South African accumulation crisis, capital is attempting to maintain profitability by intensive accumulation. At the same time capital is determined to alter the balance of power in its favour and against labour. However, even the rate of reinvestment within this intensive path is relatively low.

This predominance of intensive accumulation has two clear consequences.

Increased unemployment - existing employed are being retrenched and new entrants to the labour market are unable to find jobs. Growth of large conglomerates - they can afford the high costs of new machinery. This undercuts smaller enterprises that would, as a group, offer a substantial amount of employment.

Both of these effects create and make worse existing unemployment and poverty. The already-massive wealth disparities are widened and numerous new stratifications emerge both within employed wage labour

and within those struggling to escape poverty by means fair or foul.

In summary, therefore, there are no market incentives - or profitable opportunities - to increase the rate of reinvestment with the intensive path or to open up an extensive path.

The Cosatu Economic Trends project highlighted a number of interacting causes for this. Sanctions, it seems, are not the major or very significant cause.

Briefly then: the South African path to industrialisation has depended heavily on migrant labour for the mines and apartheid for manufacturing - with devastating social and economic effects. Migrant labour, apartheid, and the particular import substitution growth path that emerged in South Africa, have left a massive structural legacy.

Regrettably this legacy will not be removed even if apartheid were suddenly done away with tomorrow.

The economic legacy means our manufacturing sector produces at higher costs in relation to world prices of manufactured goods. And the system has not benefitted the majority of South Africans either - they bear the burden of the cheap labour policies of migrant labour and apartheid.

As a result, growth through manufactured exports and/or growth through supplying the low income market with manufactured goods are both paths that offer little hope given the present structure of our economy.

The economic theorist Keynes developed an idea of fiscal and monetary interventionism: the state could increase investment by lowering interest rates; or it could encourage extensive accumulation by state expenditure which gives rise to a multiplier effect.

In South Africa now, the precarious position of the balance of payments limits the use of this monetary policy to lower interest rates.

The magnitude of the structural problem that now exists in South Africa is so large, and the state so heavily committed to totally useless apartheid wastage, that there is no prospect of the state using fiscal policy to encourage investment.

**T**here are two capitalist solutions proposed: those who argue that greater free

enterprise in a 'pure' capitalist economy is the solution; and those who argue that we should strive toward inward industrialisation to open new domestic markets.

Both argue that apartheid laws will have to go. The former believe the state must get out of the economy. The latter propose a package of policies broadly within the Keynesian tradition.

The free enterprise argument is that the state sector - exacerbated by apartheid legislation - is inefficient. In a competitive market, the private sector would raise efficiency and increase profits which would be reinvested to create more jobs. Greater efficiency may also make us competitive in international markets.

Inward industrialisation proponents want the state to intervene to change key relative prices - particularly that of capital - to encourage more employment-creating production techniques. Rising employment will expand the domestic market and have a multiplier effect leading to extensive accumulation.

Neither of these positions takes into account the inertia of market forces and the inertia of private property relations.

A free enterprise economy *will* respond to existing price signals - but these reflect a structural situation where prices are too high to compete internationally and too high to expand into low income markets.

What will change this? The real issue at stake is whether the state's withdrawal from the economy and the removal of apartheid would cause market forces to lower the relative prices of manufactured goods in order to open up new export and internal markets.

This is a complex issue, and free marketers are too complacent about the efficiency of their solution.

The inward industrialisation position requires a high degree of state intervention. Two problems emerge: would capital accept such changes, given that production is dominated by multinationals who now make trans-national investment decisions? And would the relative price changes they envisage be sufficient in themselves?

It is likely that the degree of state intervention required means inward industrialisation would only be feasible if inroads were made into the

rights of private ownership. This harsh possibility seems unattractive to this school.

However, the unions are developing ideas to confront this.

**T**he starting point is that the present levels of unemployment and poverty are totally unacceptable. Getting rid of them rapidly should be our prime policy goal. And a market-dominated capitalist economy is structurally incapable of achieving these policy goals.

The best we could hope for is a society with 50% employment and continued repressive structures to ensure that the other unfortunate 50% do not cause political instability. In short, the prospect is for an undemocratic and repressive society for the have-nots.

Given the problems in the South African economy, there is little prospect that we could follow the highly specific development patterns of the social democratic mixed economies of Scandinavia.

The other option, therefore, is a planned economy.

The Soviet economy is the dominant experience in actually functioning socialist economies.

Much has been said about current changes within the socialist block - much of it ideological wish fulfilment. But it would be very unwise not to study these changes carefully.

There are three salient points in the Soviet experience which may help illuminate our own way forward.

Firstly, that in resource-rich economies such as the USSR - and for that matter South Africa - a system of command planning can, through extensive accumulation, achieve substantial structural changes, particularly in employment.

Secondly, however, the command economy promotes extensive accumulation at the expense of intensive accumulation. This leads to static living standards and low quality products. It also leads to inefficient use of resources.

Thirdly, the command structure of planning destroys democratic control over production which has increasingly serious political, social and economic effects.

But market exchange relations are not a magic panacea for all three

problems. Where there is large scale unemployment and under-utilised resources, the market will not necessarily solve this.

What the market does do, is encourage more efficient use of inputs. In striving to achieve this, enterprises use and generate new technology. In an unfettered market economy this can have high social costs in terms of unemployment and environment impact. Planning would have to address both these issues.

As regards democratic control of production, the market is at best neutral but tends towards hierarchical control within enterprises.

What has to be defined for South Africa is a planned economy where extensive accumulation takes place to absorb unemployment and provide basic products to eliminate poverty. This will require restructuring production and very definite constraints on private ownership of the means of production.

But nationalisation is also not a solution in itself. More complex ownership structures are necessary - ranging from nationalisation, to state-capital partnerships, to worker-controlled enterprises, to co-operatives and to private enterprise. Such an ownership structure will be within a democratically established plan to undertake the necessary restructuring of production.

A key goal of restructuring must be to lower the prices of manufactured goods and raise real incomes. To do this, market forces will have to be used - to facilitate intensive accumulation in order to raise productivity and lower relative prices.

This is a simple description of complex issues and more research would be needed to develop systematic policy alternatives. But central to these changes must be democratic planning structures and worker participation and control over the restructuring process.

Difficult choices will have to be made and there is the ever present threat of economic sabotage. The argument presented here is not for a centrally planned command economy.

The critical implication of this is that a political process of negotiation, discussion and consensus will be necessary within

the planning process. This can only be achieved if both producers and consumers are democratically represented and if there is the lived experience of the democratic process.

A democratically planned economy will not emerge from the blueprints of experts but will emerge out of concrete struggles in the next few years.

**I**n a nutshell, a market-dominated capitalist economy cannot alleviate or eliminate mass-unemployment and poverty. If we look to a planned socialist alternative we must carefully absorb the experience of the Soviet command type model. This means creating a democratically planned economy which goes beyond simplistic notions of nationalisation. Both these forms must be examined more fully and more systematic and coherent policy proposals put forward.

Organised workers are central to such a reconstruction, but they cannot do this on their own. Intellectuals, skilled managerial cadres, consumers and the petty bourgeoisie have to be won over to participate in such a reconstruction. And this will only be possible if the idea of a democratically planned economy is well understood. In turn the ideological horror, cultivated in the media, of anything smacking of socialism must be changed through rational debate and analysis. To move in this direction the question of the economy must come out of the wings and move centre stage.

Hopefully, the forces of opposition will force a change of government fairly soon. It is in the interests of the poor that this leads to a new political economy based on material well-being, social justice and a socialised economy democratically governed.

Is this feasible? In all political and social change nothing is easy. However three basic preconditions are favourable in South Africa: we have a resource-rich land; a well developed productive capacity; and workers and communities have developed increasingly democratic structures in their struggle for liberation. The potential exists, it is for political leadership to weld this into a democratically planned economy to the benefit of all of South Africa's people.

# Labour trends: 1 August to 8 September

In the midst of large scale defiance action involving all facets of the liberation movement, organised workers continued their struggle on the factory floor for bread and butter issues.

Sars monitored 25 strikes involving 19 952 workers during the period 29 July to 8 August - 15 of which were over wages and working conditions. In addition, a large number of short work stoppages were held against the LRA on 1 September at factories throughout the country.

Several anti-LRA protest marches and demonstrations were held, particularly in the Western Cape - which tied in with the general high level of resistance in the area.

The number of workdays lost in the six-week period leading up to the elections, including strikes, work stoppages and the 5, 6 and 12 September stayaway, does not appear as staggering as the 3-day June stayaway last year. The Labour Monitoring Group reported a 72% stayaway in the PWV area on 6 September, 41% in the Western Cape, 80% in the Eastern Cape and 80% in the greater Durban district. The figure was significantly lower the day before with 39% in the PWV area and 25% in Western Cape, and 68% in the Durban area. The Eastern Cape - historically an area with strong support for stayaways and industrial action - saw more than 80% of workers staying away on both days.

Significantly, the stayaway this year was supported by

mineworkers. NUM reported 57 000 members at more than 28 mines stayed away on 5 September and over 100 000 on 6 September.

Unionists attributed the low percentage stayaway on 5 September to confusion among workers who were not sure whether there was a call for a stayaway on this day. The second Workers Summit on 26 and 27 August took a decision to call for a week of action to protest against the LRA and the 6 September elections, but the length of the stayaway was not finalised at the summit. While delegates seemed to be in agreement about a stayaway on election day, differences emerged about the other two days. Nactu delegates called for 12 September - Biko Day - in addition to the two days around election time. The summit decided that unions should consult with their members and finalise a decision at a follow up national meeting - a process which did not prove very successful.

The Biko Day stayaway went unmonitored, but appeared to be negligible and confined mainly to factories organised by Nactu.

**W**hile police brutality dominated the scene during defiance campaign actions, bosses followed a similar trend on the factory floor. There was a definite increase in lockouts, dismissals and police involvement in industrial disputes.

Over 9 000 workers were involved in ten reported lockouts, some of which were implemented immediately after deadlock in wage negotiations. For example, at Mama's Pies, 450 Fawu members and at Plessey SA, 440 EAWTU members were locked out after the respective managements gave workers an ultimatum to accept wage offers. In both cases, workers were not on strike at the time of lockout. At Macsteel, Samcor, Toyota and Eveready, a total of 7 400 Numsa members were locked out during wage strikes.

At City Bag Depot, Mama's Pies and Eveready, management called in police to enforce the lockout. Gathered outside factory gates, workers were vulnerable to teargas and baton charges. At Mama's Pies police fired on workers, leaving 19 injured.

However, on another level bosses appeared more accommodating. A relatively small number of workers were dismissed or faced disciplinary action following LRA protest actions on the factory floor and after the stayaway. According to Numsa's regional organiser Chris Ndebele, this year 'casualties were low in Numsa', with less than 1% of members dismissed or subjected to disciplinary action at factories in the Wits region. In nearly all cases where management took action, the charges were subsequently dropped. Similar reports were received from other unions.

## Strikes and Disputes

### Strikes and Disputes: TRANSVAAL

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events
Academy Brushware Germiston	Numsa	98	29.08-	Workers stopped work in sympathy with a dismissed shop steward. Management refused to discuss reinstatement with the union. By the third week, the strike was still unresolved despite mediation.
Afcol	Ppwawu	1 100	August 89	Afcol workers at six plants accepted the company's final wage offer. Workers were to receive an increase of R30 a week raising the minimum weekly wage to R187.
Alexandra Town Council	Samwu	1 000	22.08.89	About 1 000 Alexandra Town Council workers stopped work demanding higher wages. Samwu and management began negotiations to resolve the dispute.
Amalgamated Beverage Industries Hercules	Fawu		01.08 -	Workers at ABI stopped work in protest against newly introduced working conditions. Workers now must report the time each spends in the toilet; drivers must write down the time spent when stopped by a traffic officer or when they ask someone for directions during deliveries. Workers were still out when Fawu and management began talks.

Besaans and Du Plessis Pretoria	Nusaw		14.08.89	Nusaw filed a court application against Besaans and Du Plessis over the company's refusal to enter into a recognition agreement with the union. Nusaw said management was only prepared to deal with the union at Industrial Council level despite the fact that Nusaw was not a member of the metal industry's industrial council. Nusaw claimed membership of over 50% of black workers at the company.
Carlton Hotel	Harwu	500	07.08.89	Harwu and Carlton Hotel agreed on wage increases of R127 a month or 15%, whichever is higher - bringing the minimum wage to R670 a month. The agreement also provided the following: 1 May, 16 June and 21 March recognised as paid holidays; free transport for nightshift workers; and paid maternity leave - 33% pay for five months and another month's unpaid leave.
Dorbyl	Numsa	7 000	07.08.89	A threatened strike by 7 000 workers at 50 Dorbyl plants was averted by a last-minute settlement. Dorbyl agreed to the union's main demand that individual dismissals be referred to private arbitration rather than the industrial court. The company also agreed to grant limited paid leave for shop stewards on training courses. Numsa dropped demands for long-service allowances for employees, and for a formula on retrenchment pay.
Edgars Johannesburg and Pretoria	Ccawusa		24.08.89	Ccawusa, already in dispute with Edgars over wages, declared a second dispute with the company after workers in Johannesburg and Pretoria were given warnings and locked out for a day for 'shabby dress'. The union said that if workers were not given uniforms they could not be expected to wear expensive clothes - their meagre salaries made this impossible. The current minimum wage at Edgars is R455 a month. Ccawusa demanded an increase of R230 a month while management offered R130. The dispute continues.
Everite	Cawu	3 000	29.05-28.08.89	A three-month old strike at four Everite plants ended after lengthy negotiations. Agreement, reached between Cawu and the company, reflected no change in management's final wage offer but a few concessions were granted by management. In terms of the settlement: wage increases scheduled for 1990 will commence earlier than normal; the company undertook not to claim for damages against the union in the event of strikes; there will be no changes in conditions of employment; and workers would receive an increase of 50c an hour on the current minimum of R3,35 an hour.
Farmfare Wynberg	Fawu	200	11.08.89	Fawu declared a dispute with Farmfare when the company refused to negotiate wages. Farmfare, previously owned by Premier, was sold to Bokomo. Management argued that the recognition agreement settled under Premier ownership no longer applied. But Fawu said management was not prepared to negotiate a new agreement, saying the plant was set to be closed before the end of this year.
Fedics East & West Rand	Ccawusa	1 500	14.08.89-	More than 1 500 workers employed by Fedics, a catering company, went on strike over wages. According to the union, 400 workers were out on strike at Jan Smuts Airport, 450 at Airchef RSA, 150 at Airchef International and a further 500 at about 150 canteens. The union demanded an across-the-board increase of R180 and a minimum wage of R800 against management's offer of R90 and a minimum monthly wage of R400. Ccawusa also demanded national negotiations with the Fedics group. The strike stretched into its fourth week but the union had still to receive a reply from management on its proposal for mediation.
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp.	Numsa	3 000	22.08.89	Numsa declared a dispute with Highveld Steel following deadlock over management's final wage offer. The union demanded increases of R1 an hour or 25% across the board - whichever was greater. Management refused to budge from its final offer of an hourly increase of 56c at the bottom rate and R1,48 at the top rate. A Numsa meeting organised to discuss a strike ballot was banned by a Witbank magistrate in terms of the Internal Security Act. The union has since been struggling to get a venue in the area to hold a general meeting.
Macsteel Germiston	Numsa	600	31.08-	Workers went on a legal strike following a breakdown in wage negotiations between management and the union. They were then locked out after a management ultimatum to accept its final wage offer of 89c an hour. Numsa demanded R1,50 an hour across the board. The strike was continuing at five Transvaal plants.
Mama's Pies Malvern	Fawu	450	19.08.89	Mama's Pies bakery in Malvern locked out 450 workers after wage negotiations between the company and Fawu deadlocked. Police called in by management used shotguns to fire at workers, injuring at least 19. Fawu and the company were negotiating.
MRT Bartons Benoni	Numsa	200	16-19.08.89	A three-day strike was sparked off at MRT Barton after management issued written warnings to a few nightshift workers who made a small fire on factory premises to keep warm. The workers were suspended and given written warnings at a disciplinary hearing. Management subsequently withdrew the written warnings.
Nampak	Ppwawu	3 000	24.08.89	The dismissal of 320 workers at two Nampak subsidiaries - Transvaal Box and Quick Box - sparked off a dispute between Ppwawu and the company at eight factories in Transvaal, Natal and Cape. The 320 workers were on strike over the company's reluctance to negotiate changes to a recognition agreement with the union. All workers except two were reinstated. Ppwawu said the dispute would continue until the two were also reinstated.
Samcor Pretoria	Numsa	3 000	01.08.89	A wage strike by over 3 000 workers at Samcor's Pretoria plant brought production to a standstill. The strike ended after two weeks when Numsa and the company reached agreement. On the second day of the strike management locked workers out and closed the plant. Workers returned to work during negotiations.

Southern Suns Holiday Inns	Harwu	142	07.08.89	In an out-of-court settlement between Harwu and Southern Suns, the company agreed to reinstate 142 workers dismissed at six hotels last year after the 16 June stayaway. In terms of the settlement, which later became an order of the industrial court, all 142 workers were to be unconditionally reinstated with two weeks back-pay. The company agreed to make up all lapsed pension benefits.
Tedex Booyens	Numsa	500	21-30.08.89	Over 500 Numsa members staged a sleep-in strike over wages and working conditions. They demanded an increase of R1,50 an hour across the board against managements offer of 56c an hour. Settlement was reached - 61c an hour across the board back-dated to 1 July; 16 June as a paid holiday; and 1 May as a swop for Labour Day.
Toyota Sandton & Prospecton	Numsa	3 500	01-14.08.89	About 3 500 Toyota workers in Transvaal and Natal returned to work after a two-week strike over workers' dissatisfaction with progress during wage talks. Three days into the strike the company locked out 500 workers at its marketing division in Sandton, dismissed a further 3 000 at its Prospecton plant and withdrew from the national negotiations between Numsa and motor manufacturers. Workers were reinstated after an agreement between management and Numsa. The company rescinded its decision to pull out of national talks. Negotiations were continuing.
Vital Engineering Benoni	Numsa	90	21.08-	Vital Engineering's refusal to back-pay wages owing in terms of an IMF-Seifsa agreement, sparked off a strike by 90 Numsa members. Management said the agreement was not yet gazetted and it was under no obligation to pay. Numsa and management began talks to resolve the dispute. The strike continued into its third week.

### Strikes and Disputes: NATAL

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events
City Electrical Department	Dimes	1 000	08.08.88	Labourers at the City Engineers department went on strike over wage increases at six depots in the Durban area. Workers were not happy about the increase of R11 a month and a monthly minimum of R680 negotiated between Dimes and the city council. Workers representatives were meeting with management.
Consolidated Waverley Textiles	Actwusa	4 000	July 1989	Actwusa and Consolidated Waverley Textiles, a company belonging to the Frame Group, were locked in dispute over wages and working conditions. The union was demanding a minimum R13-a-week increase from July and a further R13 from January 1990. Management offered R11,50 a week from July and R10 from January 1990. Minimum wages at the company's Harrismith branch stood at R98,10 a week and in Durban R109,02 a week. Negotiations continued.
Spar Phoenix	Ccawusa	500	16.08.89	About 500 Spar workers stopped work in protest against management's wage offer. Workers returned to work while the dispute was referred to mediation.

### Strikes and Disputes: CAPE

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events
Aurokab Parrow	RTEAWU	40	July 1988	About 40 employees were dismissed by Aurokab after they ignored written warnings that a go-slow was in contempt of an industrial court interdict. But the union denied the workers were involved in a go-slow. The Radio, Television, Electronics & Allied Workers Union claimed management was looking for an excuse to dismiss union members and employ new staff at lower wages. The union planned an appeal against the dismissals.
Cape Bag Depot Woodstock	Sacwu	40	03.08.89	Cape Bag Depot locked out and suspended 40 workers who staged a wildcat strike to pressurise management into wage negotiations. The company called in police to supervise the eviction of workers who refused to work. Sacwu was planning court action against the company.
Eveready SA Port Elizabeth	Numsa	800	04-23.08.89	Eveready locked out its entire PE workforce of 800 workers after Numsa and the company failed to break a deadlock on wages at conciliation board level. Numsa pointed out that its opening demand for an across-the-board increase of R2 an hour was very reasonable considering that many workers - including some who have been with the company for 20 years - were still earning well below the union's national demand for R4,50 an hour. Workers compromised and dropped their demand by 50% to R1 an hour. But management would not shift from its offer of a 32c-an-hour increase split over two six-month periods. After the conciliation board failed to break the deadlock, management announced workers would face being locked out if they refused the offer. They refused, were locked out, and two weeks later were dismissed. After 19 days settlement was reached - the dismissals were withdrawn, workers accepted management's final offer and returned to work.
Plessey SA Retreat	EAWTU	440	August 89	Plessey SA locked out 440 workers who did not accept management's final wage offer. EAWTU, the only union among six others to reject the offer, demanded a 26% wage increase against management's final offer of 17%.
SAMIEA and SAVBRA	Numsa	160 000	30.07.89	Numsa walked out of negotiations and declared a dispute with employers in the South African Motor Industry Employers Association and the South African Vehicle Body and Repairers Association. The union was protesting against the employers' wage offer. It also objected to a proposal to vote on the issue which was put forward by two other unions on the council. These unions with largely white membership, the Motor Industry Staff Association and the

Motor Industry Employees union had already accepted the offer. Numsa said these unions were being undemocratic in insisting on a vote. Most of Numsa's membership falls into the lower grades - with wages of R1,90 an hour while artisans get R8 an hour.

Employers offered: a 12,5% increase on gazetted grades, excluding clerical workers, shop assistants and sales personnel in smaller towns with three or more years service, and petrol pump attendants who would get a 5% increase; and a 20% increase on gazetted grades for employees in vehicle body rebuilding, manufacturing and reconditioning establishments.

Numsa demanded that no employee be excluded from the increases, that increases should not be less than 20% of workers' actual wages and that for employees in smaller towns there should be a wage increase from R1,24 an hour to R2,50 an hour.

Tecoknit Claremont	Gawu	700	11.08.89	About 700 workers at the Tecoknit knitwear factory in Claremont went on strike over the proposed retrenchment of 50 workers. Gawu rejected management's offer to grant workers a week's paid leave to look for new jobs.
Volkswagen Uitenhage	Numsa	5 000	01-14.08.89	The Volkswagen plant closed for a few days following a wage strike by the entire workforce. Workers were not happy with progress during wage talks. Following talks between Numsa and management, workers resumed work while negotiations continued.

### Strikes and Disputes: MINES

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events
Rustenburg Refiners	NUM	100	03.09.89	Angry workers downed tools in protest against the killing of their colleague, Jeffrey Njuza, by a white supervisor. The killing happened after black workers defied segregation and used white canteen facilities. Njuza died instantly after being shot and the supervisor committed suicide a few minutes later. Workers blamed management for the killing. They said it was caused by 'white racism against blacks who tried to use segregated facilities'. They demanded that management end discrimination in the workplace and guarantee workers' safety.

### Repression Monitor

#### Bannings and restrictions

In the month leading up to the 6 September election, meetings called by trade unions and other organisations in the mass democratic movement throughout the country were either banned or restricted. The restriction orders were similarly worded in nearly all cases - people were not at liberty to discuss the LRA, consumer boycotts, the elections or the defiance campaign, and meetings called by trade unions were restricted to only trade union members. And at numerous meetings, police were allowed to observe and video-tape entire proceedings. Some of the incidents were:

27.07 - LRA meeting in Sebokeng banned. Police surrounded a hall and prevented thousands of workers from defying the ban.

23.08 - A meeting organised by Numsa members at Highveld Steel to discuss a strike ballot was banned by a Witbank magistrate in terms of the Internal Security Act.

26.08 - The Worker Summit at Shareworld was

restricted to discussing only labour issues, and a large contingent of SAP and riot police was present during the entire proceedings.

31.08 - At Wits University, a defiance campaign meeting to unban Cosas and Sansco was prohibited. Police harassed students on campus throughout the day.

31.08 - The Port Elizabeth Cosatu local meeting was restricted. Police video-taped proceedings and controlled access to the venue.

01.09 - A teachers unity meeting at Cosatu's Eastern Cape office was served with a restriction order. Two hippos and a large number of policemen in trucks and vans waited outside while the order was being served.

02.09 - The Western Transvaal Cosatu Regional Congress was restricted under the same provisions as the Workers Summit.

#### Arrests and detentions

In just over one month, more than 2 000 people were arrested and charged - or are due to ap-

pear in court in the coming months - while many others are still in detention. Daily, police arrested scores of defiance campaign protesters throughout the country. In several instances police arrested over 100 people at a time, particularly in the Western Cape. Accurate monitoring of police harassment and detentions was difficult in this climate. A few cases are listed below:

18.08 - Mohammed Valli Moosa, acting general secretary of the UDF was detained from his office in Braamfontein under emergency regulations.

19.08 - Ten people protesting against Valli Moosa's detention were arrested in Johannesburg.

19.08 - Sixteen people were arrested in Durban during a protest against the World Fifteen rugby tour.

20.08 - Twenty people were arrested at Wits University after police prohibited a meeting to unban the UDF and other organisations.

25.08 - Twenty-five people holding a placard demonstration were arrested in Pretoria.

26.08 - In the Western Cape, 30 people were arrested for protesting against the controversial rugby tour.

28.08 - Western Cape UDF activist Trevor Manuel was detained from his home in the early hours of the morning.

30.08 - During a protest march in Cape Town's city centre, 170 women were arrested and released the same evening. They were told to appear in court in October. The women were marching to the British embassy to deliver a note calling on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to intervene and stop capital punishment and detentions in South Africa.

30.08 - Police prevented protesters from entering white buses in Pretoria. Eight people were arrested.

01.09 - Several trade union and community organisation leaders were detained. They included Zwelenzima Vavi, Cosatu Regional Secretary in Western Transvaal; Amos Masondo, Cosatu Education officer in the Wits region; UDF official Mandla Dlamini; and Dennis Neer, the Cosatu Regional Secretary in the Eastern Cape.

01.09 - About 119 Soweto College of Education students were detained.

02.09 - Five hundred defiance campaign protesters were arrested during marches in Cape Town city centre.

05.09 - In Stellenbosch, 33 students were arrested during a march.

#### **Police raids on offices and homes**

Police went on a massive nation-wide raid of community organisation and trade union offices. Many activists and leaders also had their homes raided. SARS monitored 28 cases of such raids. Under emergency regulations police have exten-

sive powers to raid and search all kinds of premises.

20.08 - Security forces searched the Cosatu office in Empangeni, Natal.

22.08 - Police raided the homes of six ECC members in the early hours of the morning.

29.08 - Security police raided the homes of Alexandra Action Committee leaders, Zwanele Mayekiso, Obed Bapela and Richard Mdakane and SACC communications director Saki Macozoma.

30.08 - About 50 armed policemen raided the Boksburg office of the Food and Beverage Workers Union and video-taped the offices while the search was being conducted.

30.08 - Nactu's Vereeniging office was raided by police.

31.08 - Security police visited the Numsa and Ccawusa offices in Roodepoort.

31.08 - Nactu head office in Johannesburg was raided.

01.09 - Cosatu General secretary Jay Naidoo's Bellevue East home was raided. Security police photographed and video-taped every room in his house. He was then accompanied to the Cosatu Head Office in National Acceptances House where the police spent over five hours searching the office.

01.09 - NUM's Empangeni office was searched for LRA protest pamphlets.

#### **Killings and confrontations**

At least 27 people were killed - most of them in police action - between the beginning of August and 6 September. On 5 and 6 September alone, at least 23 were killed on the Cape flats - many shot by police. Among the dead were young children (the youngest was six years old), youths, a 16 year old pregnant girl and a Fawu member.

The Western Cape was like a war zone with police using buck-shot, bird-shot, teargas, batons and quirts to attack crowds of demonstrators. Hundreds were injured and many hospitalised.

19.08 - Police opened fire on workers locked out by Mama's Pies in Malvern. Nineteen were injured and many arrested.

19.08 - Hundreds of people demonstrating at Blouberg Strand were beaten up by police.

20.08 - Sipwe Satin May, a 23 year-old youth from Adelaide in the Eastern Cape, was shot dead by a municipal policeman after police broke up a defiance campaign meeting.

25.08 - An unknown youth of about 18 years was killed in De Aar when police opened fire on a group of protesters.

28.08 - Police used teargas, stun grenades, quirts and batons in dispersing demonstrators in Queenstown, East London, King William's Town and Fort Beaufort. A large number were injured.

01.09 - Riot police violently broke up a protest march by about 300 workers in Ndabeni in the Western Cape. Many workers were injured.

01.09 - In Paarden Island, riot police broke up a protest march by 500 Numsa and CWIU members.

01.09 - Two workers were hospitalised and several others injured when police attacked 200 Samwu members from behind without any warning. The workers were about to enter their factory gates after a protest march.

03.09 - Jeffrey Njuza, a NUM shop steward was shot dead by mine security police for using whites-only amenities at the company. The security officer shot himself a few minutes later by shooting himself.

06.09 - A Pick 'n Pay worker was allegedly picked up by police and beaten.