


WORK

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IN

PROGRESS

Caught in the



Crossfire

the war
in
Namibia

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The nature of Work In Progress, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views on a wide range of subjects, ensures that views expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editorial collective.

This edition of Work In Progress edited and published by an editorial collective of 40 jorissen street, 2001 braamfontein.

Editorial

During July 1983, the Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC) announced that it intended increasing bus fares on certain routes. A committee representing commuters objected to the proposed increases, arguing that commuters could not afford them, given the recent price rise in the cost of basic foodstuffs. The CTC - partly owned by the Ciskei government - dismissed these objections, and the committee duly called a boycott of all buses owned by the company.

On 19 July the boycott began. The following day the press reported an 80% drop in the use of CTC buses. From this point on, police, the army, and a private army of vigilantes were used by the Ciskei administration to force commuters to use buses.

In the past two months, Ciskeian authorities have indicated their willingness to use any official and unofficial, legal and extra-legal forms of violence to break the boycott. Violence has escalated, and the conflict has now become a test of strength between bantustan rulers and their unwilling subjects.

The first concerted attempt to break the boycott was directed at private car owners and taxi drivers. Police established road blocks on routes in and out of Mdantsane. From then on, vigilantes under the control of police harassed car passengers, car drivers and taxi drivers. Police manhandled car passengers, using sjamboks on some occasions. Cars have been confiscated, and passengers forced to alight and return to bus stops.

The brunt of the tactics used to break the bus boycott have been borne by train commuters. As with vehicle commuters, the means used to prevent them from catching trains appear to know no bounds. Civilians have been attacked, assaulted and fired on by police and vigilante groups under police control. Residents of Mdantsane put the death toll at over 60.

By September, at least 67 people - most of them trade unionists - had been detained under Ciskei security legislation. In addition, over 1 000 commuters have been detained for technical offences such as curfew

breaking. In September, the South African Allied Workers' Union was banned by the Sebe administration.

On 4 August, the Ciskei's minister of justice declared a state of emergency. No person may be on the streets without permission between 22h00 and 04h00. No more than four people may congregate together in houses or on the streets.

There have been numerous reports of assaults and torture of detainees held in the Ciskei, and a number of detainees have been admitted to hospital at various stages of their detention. As disturbing as are the number of people hospitalised are reports of the failure to hospitalise or treat other detainees injured in assaults.

This is the context in which SARS, in conjunction with the Development Studies Group, is publishing a detailed report on the Ciskei. Produced by Nicholas Haysom, a research officer at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the report covers the political history of the Ciskei, security legislation, torture and repression in the past years, background to the current bus boycott, and methods used by the Ciskei administration to crush the boycott. There is also a section on the current schools boycott in the Ciskei, the involvement of South African security police and firms in the Ciskei crisis, and the response of people resident in the area.

Subscribers to SARS publications will receive this report as part of their subscription. Copies will also be available at bookshops stocking Work In Progress, or directly from SARS.

Caught in the Crossfire:

the war in Namibia

This article, written by TONY WEAVER (Windhoek correspondent of the South African Morning Group of Newspapers), is a journalist's account of the present state of the war in Namibia.

The information in the article is drawn from published sources, interviews and personal observations. The war in Namibia is mainly a war involving a political struggle for liberation from foreign domination, a war which daily sees a terrible toll taken in civilian life and loss of freedom. It is also a war of information, and no truly balanced picture of what is really happening in Namibia will be able to be published in South Africa until the war is over and Namibia is independent.

Besides the lack of widespread access to the war zone and, more importantly, to South African positions in southern Angola held by the Defence Force, the restrictions on what may and may not be published are myriad, and carry heavy penalties if contravened. Section 118 of the Defence Act is the most commonly used counter to the publication of information. Its ambit is wide and, as Senator Hiram Johnson said in 1917, 'The first casualty when war comes is truth'.

Section 118 states, among other things, that 'no person shall publish in any newspaper, book or pamphlet, or by radio or any other means ... any information relating to the composition, movements or dispositions of the SADF ... or any statement, comment or rumour calculated directly or indirectly to convey such information ... or ... any statement, comment or rumour relating to any member of the SADF or any activity of the SADF or any force of a foreign country calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public, except where publication thereof has been authorised by the Minister or under his authority.'

It is within this context that the following is written.

Seventeen years ago, on 26 August 1966, the war in Namibia began. South African helicopters spotted a SWAPO guerilla training camp at Ongulumbashe, and in the subsequent clash two guerillas died and 27 were captured. The previous month, the World Court had decided that it was powerless to rule either way in the long-standing dispute over South African control of Namibia. Immediately after this ruling on 18 July, the South West African People's Organisation, SWAPO of Namibia, released its famous Dar Es Salaam declaration: 'We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom. And as sure as night follows day, victory will be ours.' (1)

Since 1966, the war has undergone many changes, many phases of warfare. This article does not attempt an historical, military analysis of the war - rather, it represents an account of the war as it is being conducted in the latter part of 1983.

To situate this account: the war in Namibia itself is being primarily fought in the Kavango and Ovambo war zones, the two regions corresponding with the bantustan boundaries imposed on the territory by the Odendaal Plan in the 1960s. The western sector of Ovambo is characterised by flat, wide-open plains with little or no ground cover. Palm trees are the main type of vegetation. The east of Ovambo and western Kavango are ideally suited for guerilla activities - thickly wooded with little or no road communication in most areas. Guerillas can often move at will, encountering little or no resistance. When SWAPO makes claims of controlling liberated zones, an essential

organisational base for any guerilla movement, they cannot be faulted. As the popular saying goes in Namibia: 'The SADF controls Ovambo by day, SWAPO by night.'

Increasingly though, as the 'hearts and minds' campaign of the SADF meets mass rejection from the people of Ovambo and Kavango, the slogan has been amended to: 'SWAPO controls Ovambo and Kavango, because the people support SWAPO.'

Half of the population of Namibia live in Ovambo and Kavango, and when the SADF talk of the war being 'contained', they are talking of it being contained in the area where the majority of Namibians live.

THE PATTERN OF THE WAR IN 1983

The most dramatic, and least known, shift in the pattern of the Namibian war began in 1978 with the formation of the Special Police Counter Insurgency Unit, Koevoet (Crowbar). (2)

Looked at in terms of active contacts with PLAN, SWAPO's military wing, and the level of success achieved in locating and killing guerillas, Koevoet has taken over the war in Ovambo and Kavango. Membership of the unit is 90% black, predominantly recruited from the Ovambo-speaking region. Information on the unit is hard to come by, and until recently, the press was barred from even using the name 'Koevoet'. However, it became such a catchword in Namibia that limited information was released.

Because of the ambit of the Police Act, even less can be written on Koevoet than on the SADF, and although knowledge of the unit's operations are widespread within Namibia, this article can only make use of published information, and facts which do not contravene the sweeping powers of the Act.

There is an incorrect tendency to label all police units wearing camouflage uniform 'Koevoet'. Rough estimates (no official figures are available) put the actual number of Koevoet members at about 1 000 men. This does not include the Police Special Task Force, an elite, Windhoek-based 'reaction unit', and who do from time to time take on the same kind of operations as Koevoet. Koevoet, with headquarters in Oshakati, is jointly controlled by commanding officer Brigadier Hans Dreyer, and the direct authority of police headquarters in Pretoria, under the command of Police Commissioner and former security

police boss, General Johan Coetzee.

Membership is a closely guarded secret, and no details are ever released of black Koevoet deaths - 'to protect their families'. But it has emerged from published court records and official police sources, that a number of Koevoet members are captured SWAPO guerillas who have been 'turned' - ie, faced with the option of joining Koevoet or spending their lives until independence in either the Mariental or Ombalantu detention camps. (3)

It is sometimes said in Ovambo that 'to join Koevoet, you have to have a criminal record'. The accuracy of this statement is difficult to gauge, but court cases involving Koevoet members have revealed that in some instances the policeman has a previous criminal record, often one gained before joining the unit. (4) White leadership of the unit is drawn from SAP members doing an annual 'tour' of duty in the war zone, and from former Selous Scouts and other ex-Rhodesian units. The units spend weeks on end in the bush, and are responsible for over 80% of war deaths in Ovambo and Kavango. (5)

In both Ovambo and Kavango allegations of brutalities against the civilian population allegedly committed by both the SADF and the police, have been made. But according to many accounts, the SADF is relatively restrained in comparison to the Koevoet units.

Koevoet members have been accused of employing a tactic of the Selous Scouts - dressing as SWAPO guerillas, and then coming to kraals seeking food and shelter. If the shelter is given, they then reveal their identities, and there have been allegations of kraals being burnt, women, men and children killed and widespread looting taking place. (6) If people at the kraal refuse to give shelter, the pretence of being PLAN guerillas is maintained, and the same routine is followed.

As regards published evidence of Koevoet atrocities, the most damning surrounds the March 1982 massacre of eight people in a village north of Oshikuku, some 50km from Oshakati. Official inquest findings said the eight people died as a result of 'an attack by SWAPO terrorists'. Interviews with survivors of the attack allege the opposite. All those interviewed claimed the attack was carried out by armed members of the security force, and a survivor insisted he recognised one of

the soldiers as a notorious Koevoet commander. (7)

Published accounts of alleged Koevoet brutalities are too numerous to quote individually. Two further accounts will have to suffice. On 18 November last year, it is alleged that Jona Hamukwaya, a teacher at the Namuntuntu primary school and Kaduma Katanga, both from Kakoro village in western Kavango, were beaten to death within hours of being detained by Koevoet for interrogation. The Koevoet men alleged that 'all teachers are SWAPOs'. (8) A preliminary inquest into the deaths of the two men is due to start next month.

In another published account, Damien Haikera, a schoolteacher from Kagunie, also in western Ovambo, told journalists that on 20 September last year, a Koevoet squad arrived at his school and detained him after alleging he had been harbouring PLAN guerillas.

'They took me to their camp, and there we were blindfolded ... they told me I must sleep, but then they began hitting me; they made me lie down and began hitting me with a spade.' He alleged he was repeatedly beaten with a spade and shocked on his buttocks with electrical wires attached to a wall socket, for five hours. On his release, he was forced to walk home to Nkurenkuru, four hours walk from where he was held. (9)

As was mentioned earlier, no publicity is given to black Koevoet deaths - and Koevoet have virtually taken over the war in Ovambo and Kavango. This means security force deaths are even lower than are publically stated, and that the facade of the war being 'low-intensity' maintained. Black Koevoet members have no problems about not having their names mentioned in despatches when they die. The rewards are high - they are paid R2 000 for every guerilla they kill,

Court hears of Koevoet man's dramatic escape

WINDHOEK. - A member of a special police unit, known as Koevoet, evaded arrest by throwing a live hand grenade at a group of policemen in a Coon shop in northern South West Africa, the Windhoek Supreme Court heard yesterday.

The Koevoet man, Mr James Poulos, 28, is appearing with another special constable, Mr Poulos Mathews, 28, on charges of murder, attempted murder, rape, attempted rape, and armed robbery.

They pleaded guilty to some of the charges but the State rejected some of their admissions of guilt.

The offences were allegedly committed on January 8 this year.

A member of the SWA police force, Warrant Officer Simon Ngul, said that on January 8 this year he and a number of policemen tracked down Mr Poulos at a Coon shop in Ovambo.

When Mr Poulos saw them, he aimed a G3 automatic rifle at them but the weapon was grabbed from him.

He then threw a primed TMB2 grenade at

the policemen. W/O Ngul said the grenade hit him on the chest and the policeman ran for cover, but the grenade failed to explode.

In the confusion Mr Poulos escaped, but he was tracked down later that day to a hideout in a tree.

He refused to come down and a number of warning shots were fired.

Mr Poulos climbed from the tree, but then ran away. The policemen opened fire and hit him in the lower part of the body.

Mr Mathews was arrested the next day. According to earlier evidence, Mr Poulos joined Unkati rebel forces in Angola in 1974 at the age of 16.

He later became a member of Koevoet in SWA.

The men allegedly went on the rampage "in search of money and girls" after consuming large quantities of liquor.

They led civilians to believe they were Swapo insurgents, according to evidence. - Sapa.

R1 000 for a captured AK47 rifle, R5 000 for a captured SAM7 missile.

But even more disturbing is that no records are kept of people killed by Koevoet. Provided Koevoet claims a person killed is a 'terrorist', that is that, and the book is closed. There is little or no chance of any follow-up prosecution should the person happen to be a civilian, and in most cases no inquest is held. (10)

The international ramifications of the Koevoet connection in the Namibian war are sinister. Koevoet only came into existence in late 1978, by which time the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag) proposals had already been drafted. In the fine print of the Untag proposals, now accepted as the integral section of UN resolution 435 for Namibian independence, the following is stated: 'Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order (once the SWAPO and South African forces have withdrawn to bases) shall rest with the existing police forces.' (11)

So, Koevoet, responsible for over 80% of the 'kills' and allegedly involved in atrocities, will still be there when the SADF withdraws.

THE ROLE OF THE SADF

The military role in the war zone and beyond is more ambiguous than that of the specialist police units. Within the confines of the Ovambo and Kavango, its function would appear to be more that of routine policing than of an active force participating fully in 'seek and destroy' operations - a function now handled mostly by the police. National servicemen are increasingly employed in routine functions - patrolling areas close to base

2 Koevoet men charged

Small Africa Bureau
WINDHOEK. - Two members of Koevoet, the police anti-insurgency unit in Namibia, appeared in the Windhoek Supreme Court yesterday to face one count of murder, four counts of attempted murder, four counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances and two counts of attempted rape.

Mr James Poulos, 28, and Mr Poulos Mathews, 28, appearing as members of Koevoet, allegedly indulged in an orgy of violence in northern Ovambo, most of it after midnight on January 8.

It is alleged they shot and killed an Ovambo headman, Mr Robert Amurore, shot two women and another person, assaulted and robbed six people of their personal belongings

and tried to rape two women.

Three days later they allegedly threw TMB2 hand-grenades at a Mr Simon Ngul.

The sequence of events took place at three adjacent breaks in central Ovambo.

They were armed with an AK-47 and a G3 automatic rifle.

Both pleaded not guilty to murder.

Mr Pierre Roux, SC, for Mr Poulos, said the two Koevoet men had murdered an "Swapo terrorist" at all three breaks.

They were on a hunt for girls and money, Mr Roux said.

Mr Poulos would not deny he had caused Mr Amurore's

death, but as a member of Koevoet, he was sent on operations to "hunt for Swapo guerillas".

Mr Poulos would testify that "one is entitled to shoot Swapo", and he believed he had the right to shoot.

Alternatively, Mr Poulos reserved the right to kill back on Section 103 (ter) in the Defence Act, which exempted security force members from prosecution if they acted in good faith in counter-insurgency operations.

Mr Poulos faces 11 charges and Mr Mathews 14.

The court adjourned until tomorrow. Mr Poulos was released on his own recognisance, while Mr Mathews was remanded in custody.

camps, guarding perimeters, ensuring that at least some of the normal functions of civilian government continue unimpeded, and filling administrative roles left vacant by the drastic skills shortage in the territory.

'Contacts' inevitably take place, but their frequency has diminished as the police step into the roles formerly occupied by the military. It is now accepted that the major role played by the SADF is that of securing the southern regions of Angola, particularly Cunene and Cuando-Cubango provinces. Since 1978 the SADF have annually mounted at least one major 'raid' into Angola, and now coyly admit that they operate constantly within the country, although denying regular Angolan accusations that the SADF occupies semi-permanent bases in the south of their country. Responding to Angolan claims that SA Air Force Impala jets and Canberra bombers have levelled with napalm the Moxico province town of Cangamba in August, SADF chief General Constand Viljoen, said: 'It is equally obvious that by using psychological pressure through the media, the Angolans wish to force South Africa to reveal its activities in southern Angola.' He added that SAAF planes flew regular reconnaissance missions over Angola. (12)

The occupation of southern Angola, pursued sporadically since the major South African invasion of 1975/6, began in earnest in 1981 with Operation Protea, when the SADF actually fought against MPLA forces at Xangongo and Ongiva. Simon Jenkins claims that: 'Operation Protea in 1981 went much further (than previous raids aimed at SWAPO bases). It was a major invasion aimed, among other objectives, at removing recently installed Soviet SAM missile sites. It was wholly successful. Operation Protea meant that South Africa could no longer deny destabilization. It was more than a pre-emptive incursion or a "hot-pursuit", it was an occupation. It established South African military supremacy over much of southern Angola, partly through the agency of (UNITA president) Dr (Jonas) Savimbi's ... forces. A special secret battalion, the 32nd, was formed of former members of another dissident Angolan group, the FNLA, to operate inside Angola. Another such battalion, the 31st (now designated 201) had been formed of Bushmen in the Caprivi area between Botswana and Angola. South Africa is becoming one of the world's leading mercenary employers.' (13)

Soldier jailed for killing woman

The Star's Foreign News Service

WINDHOEK — A 19-year-old South African soldier who shot dead an Herero woman after she refused to have sex with him, has been sentenced to eight years imprisonment for murder.

Sarel Freddie Williams, of the South African Cape Corps, appeared before Mr Justice Ken Bethune in the Windhoek Supreme Court on a charge of murdering Miss Zamona Herubinda near Opuwe in Kaokoland on February 11.

Four of the eight years were suspended.

Williams had admitted guilt, but said in conducting his own defence that he had merely intended frightening Miss Herubinda by shooting over her head.

The Attorney-General of Namibia, Mr Don Brunetta, appearing for the State, pointed out that Williams's shot had appeared to have been deliberately aimed where it had struck — the centre of the young girl's forehead.

DRUNK

Williams had gone with fellow soldiers to the Oranguati shop near Opuwe on the night of the killing, he said.

There they had got drunk before leaving. Williams told Miss Herubinda he would return later to have sex with her.

He was armed when he returned. When she refused him sex, he shot her in the head.

SOCIAL COSTS OF THE WAR

The escalation of the war since the middle 1970s has seen a severe breakdown in health services and in the general maintenance of law and order. Health workers are restricted in their movements by dusk-to-dawn curfew regulations, and by the ever-present danger of being ambushed or of hitting a landmine. Preventative medicine programs have been curtailed as the rural areas become more difficult to enter, and the spread of bubonic disease has been rapid. At present it is judged that bubonic plague, malaria, tuberculosis, various forms of venereal disease, and, in some areas, typhoid, are epidemic.

The rapid increase in bubonic plague since November last year (450 recorded cases, with 63 cases in August and the first two weeks of September, and three deaths in the same period) is only partly attributable to the devastating drought, which has forced rats carrying plague-infested fleas to seek food close to human living areas. Thousands of civilians have been forced off their land by both military pressure (as the SADF clears fire-clear zones where guerillas can be 'hunted') and by the ever-present threat from both sides in the war. As a result, the area between Ondangwa and Oshakati, a 30km strip of land, now houses close to 250 000 people, a quarter of the total population of Namibia.

The squatter shanty towns housing the

refugees are squalid and have no water-borne sewage or lavatory facilities, with the streets being used as toilets. This strip has been identified by the Namibia health department as the breeding ground of the plague, and as yet, no attempt has been made to improve the filthy conditions. Other than relatively futile treatment programs of people already victims of plague, little has been done to prevent the mass spread of the disease.

The SWA Territory Force announced on 15 September that it had flown five tons of rat poison to the area for distribution around the perimeters of military bases (the 30km strip houses the largest concentration of SADF and SWATF troops in Namibia) but has not extended the same rat elimination program to black civilian settlements - all of whom are forced to live outside the barbed wire encircled, heavily fortified, 'white towns', which contain the major military bases at Oshakati and Ondangwa. (14)

Civilian health services have been almost totally taken over by the military, and civilians are forced to accept treatment from them, often reluctantly. The doctors work in military uniform, and civilians in the war zones fear SADF brown uniforms. Forty-nine of the 58 medical doctors in the Kaokoland and Ovambo war zones are military doctors, while all the dentists, veterinary surgeons and psychologists working in the two areas are military. Five of the eight chemists in Ovambo are military. The doctors treated 248 246 patients in 1982, 72,5% of them civilians. (15)

The same military press statement from which the above statistics were drawn stated that: 'During 1982, the SAAF provided helicopters for the casualty evacuation of the local population free of charge. 180 members of the local population were evacuated to Oshakati Hospital after being injured in motor accidents or by Swapo landmines. Converting flying hours in rands and cents, this service cost the state R720 000.'

In addition to the breakdown of health services detailed above, it is important to note that if a civilian gets seriously ill or has a baby, this has to be done during the day, as no movement beyond kraal perimeters is allowed after sunset.

The maintenance of law and order has become almost non-existent in some areas in the northern war zones. Namibia's

attorney general, Don Brunette, says: 'We try our best to apply civil law in Ovambo, but it is no easy task. The circumstances are troubled and the mental frame of mind of the people has become such that almost everyone carries a gun, many of them illegal. After a few drinks in a cuca shop, there is shooting, murder and rape. The psychological effect of the war is that life has become cheap ... Still, I can say that the most serious cases are nevertheless brought before the courts, but there is quite possibly a body or two under a bush which we don't know about, as recent civil cases before the courts have shown (a reference to the death of Mr Johannes Kakuva, who disappeared while in the hands of the security police, and who was found by the Supreme Court to have died while in detention as a result of torture and/or assault). We can, for example, also not apply the Inquests Law effectively. It is just impossible, for example, to remove the bodies of terrorists in the terrible heat from dangerous areas to a hospital for an inquest. We have about 480 to 500 inquests a year where the magistrate finds that death was caused by unknown people, terrorists or landmines.' (16)

Statistics supplied by Brunette's office show that 42% of criminal cases in the Supreme Court in 1982 involved rape, the majority from the war zone.

A court hearing which is being watched carefully at present, and which could produce dramatic evidence of the extent to which law and order has broken down, is that of State versus two Koevoet members, Jonas Paulus and Paulus Mattheus. They are charged with murder, four counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances, four counts of attempted murder, and two counts of attempted rape. Masquerading as members of SWAPO, they killed a headman, Robert Amunwe, on 2 January, and 5 January threw TM26 handgrenades at Simon Ngosi, it is alleged.

Defence counsel has already indicated they will not deny the charges, but will argue that as members of Koevoet they are trained as killers, with the specific task of 'hunting' guerillas. Paulus will testify that 'one is entitled to shoot Swapo'. Alternatively, Paulus reserved the right to fall back on section 103 (ter) of the Defence Act, which exempts security force members from prosecution if they 'acted in good faith' in counter-insurgency operations. (17) Defence counsel has indicated they will call

senior members of Koevoet to testify that the men were conditioned to kill and attack in the manner they did.

Although South Africa argues that they are bearing the costs (about R1,9-m a day) of the war, it is clear that the people who are really carrying the costs are the civilians of Namibia, the people caught in the crossfire. The breakdown of social structures, of traditional norms and economic activities, of health, law and order, of the environment (the Etosha Pan has to deal with another type of refugee from the war zone - displaced wildlife fleeing the disruption of their natural environment by massive military movements and construction projects), and the daily fear in which the civilian population of the war zone live, will leave Namibia with a fearsome legacy to be overcome at independence.

Since 1966 over 10 000 Namibians - 1% of the population - have died in the war, and an estimated 100 000 - 10% of the population - have fled the country. The figures speak for themselves.

APPENDIX: Edited version of a letter addressed to the United Nations Secretary General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, when he visited Namibia on 26 August this year, by the Council of Churches in Namibia (the CCN, through its member churches, represents the majority of people in Namibia).

We would respectfully wish to draw the following matters to your attention, which arising out of our deep concern we feel necessitate urgent consideration:

1. Over the years, resolutions and statements have been made, frequent international visitors have come to our country and gone, and yet, to our abiding disappointment, the internal situation remains no nearer to a settlement. Far from feeling that some progress is being made, the pace of current negotiations has diminished the hope and expectation of many people.

2. The South African government is continuing with its military buildup in Namibia and especially in the northern region of the country. This illegal and dangerous exercise intensifies the destruction of the lives of the people and further destabilises the whole country. We consider the pre-occupation of the South African government with so-called national security a threat to

southern Africa and to international peace.

3. The rights and the will of the people in Namibia are disregarded by a regime of draconian laws, proclamations and amendments, the most outstanding being: military conscription of Namibians, detention without recourse to legal counsel or courts, and the various laws which force people to divulge information against their will. The extremes of power given by these laws to individuals in authority leads to the malicious abuse of civilian people. Detention and interrogation are accompanied by beating, torture and other psychological pressures, and even killing, as is proved in the recent (Johannes) Kakuva case. In the northern region of our country, the activities of the South African Army and special police units (Koevoet) are destructive of the very lives of our people. For example, in the Okongo area of Ovambo, eight schools are presently closed down, and in the Kavango region, people are being forced to leave their homes and resettle on the river bank - from which they were removed 10 years ago - where the Army has better control over them. In Namibian towns, black people are often subject to harassment and beatings from white rightwingers with police often neglecting to make thorough investigations or apprehend those responsible.

4. The situation is compounded by the extreme mismanagement and plundering of the country's economy. The multiplicity of ethnic governments, their widespread corruption and the exploitation of the country's resources are leading the country to the point of bankruptcy. This results in considerable unemployment among blacks, which leaves them destitute and without hope of livelihood.

5. The proposed State Council, which has neither the mandate nor the support of the majority of Namibians, is an indication of the lack of honesty and seriousness with which independence is viewed by the South African government. Yet again an attempt is being made to impose an illegal and unacceptable system on our people. Actions such as the appointment of Administrators-General and proposals such as the State Council directly contradict the South African government's own pronouncements of allowing the Namibian people to determine their own future. The massive ideological propaganda machinery of the South African government continues to influence and

paralyse any progress towards independence. The insistence by the United States government, South Africa and others on Cuban withdrawal from Angola as conditional to independence of our country is indicative of the widespread effect of this propaganda. We reiterate our dismay at the delay of independence by such irrelevant, deliberate acts of obstruction. We wish to state again that the Cuban presence in the sovereign state of Angola is not a threat to the Namibian people. The historical priority is South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia without the democratic consent and mandate of the majority of the people.

We earnestly appeal to you to use the influence of your office to effect the immediate implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 (for the independence of Namibia). This alone can prevent the escalation of the war, the suffering, bloodshed and loss of human lives.

Signed on behalf of the executive committee by:
The Right Reverend JH Kauluma, president of the CCN, and the Reverend Doctor Abisai Shejavali, general secretary of the CCN.

Selected bibliography

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2 Koevoet men guilty of rape, murder, robbery

The Star Bureau

WINDHOEK — Two constables of the South African Police counter insurgency unit, Koevoet, were together found guilty in the Windhoek Supreme Court yesterday on 18 charges including murder, rape and robbery with aggravating circumstances.

Janus Paulus (28) was convicted of murder, three counts of attempted murder, four counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances and one of rape.

His co-accused, Paulus Mattheus (23), was convicted of rape, four counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances and one of attempted murder.

Paulus had faced 11 charges and Mattheus the same, except for one of attempted murder which was earlier withdrawn against him.

Their convictions stem from one night of vio-

lence in Namibia's Ovambo region, and in Paulus's case, an attempt three days later to murder a policeman who had come to arrest him.

Mr Justice Johan Strydom said that the arresting officer, Detective Simoon Nghoshi, would probably have been killed when Paulus threw a primed handgrenade at him.

"A disturbing state of affairs has come to the fore," said Mr Justice Strydom in reference to the activities of Koevoet in northern Namibia's war zone.

It was clear from Detective Nghoshi's evidence that the conventional police in the territory were afraid of Koevoet, and the court associated itself with an official commendation which had been accorded Detective Nghoshi for his bravery in arresting Paulus at the risk of his own life.

The hearing continues.

General Workers' Union and the UDF

Controversy surrounds the decision of some of the larger trade union groupings to remain unaffiliated to the United Democratic Front. Continuing the debate on political organisation begun in the last edition of WIP, DAVID LEWIS, general secretary of the 10 000-strong General Workers' Union, sets out the union's position.

WIP: Why has the General Workers' Union (GWU) decided not to affiliate to the United Democratic Front (UDF)?

Lewis: The first point to make, which we've stated repeatedly, is that we are committed to supporting any organisation which opposes the constitutional proposals and the Koornhof Bills, and the UDF is obviously primary amongst those organisations. We are also committed to the idea of joint campaigns with the UDF in opposing the Bills and the constitution. But we don't see our way clear to affiliating to the UDF.

Our difficulties there relate to two broad areas, two broad issues. The first concerns the structure of many of the organisations that are affiliated to the UDF, relative to the structure of a trade union. These structures are very distinct and critically different. Our second major area of difficulty relates to the essentially single-class nature, the working class nature, of trade unions, relative to the multi-class nature of the UDF and many of the organisations affiliated to it.

WIP: What do you see as the essential differences in structure between the General Workers' Union and other trade unions, and many of the organisations affiliated to the UDF; and why do you think these differences present obstacles to affiliation to

the same organisation?

Lewis: The answer to that is long and complicated. It's relatively simple, difficult as that has proved to be in practice, for one union to affiliate to another, because trade unions to all intents and purposes have identical structures. They all have factory structures, branch structures, and national structures, so that one union can fairly easily lock into another union at all levels of both organisations. This is simply not the case with a great many of the organisations united under the banner of the UDF.

To take two concrete, if extreme, examples from the western Cape - the ecumenical action group called TEAM, and the Detainees' Parents Support Committee. The former is a grouping of progressive priests, and the latter is a grouping of individuals dedicated to opposing detention, and providing support for those in detention. Let me be clear from the outset that both of these are laudable and necessary ventures, but neither bear any similarity whatsoever to the structure of a trade union. The same can be said in varying degrees of a great number of other organisations affiliated to the UDF, all the youth and student bodies, for example.

The critical feature that all these organisations have in common, as far as we can see, is that they are primarily organisations of activists. To say they are organisations of activists is not intended as a slight in any way, and we believe that there is a great need for this type of organisation in South Africa. But we still insist that they bear no similarity in their structure or organisational practice to a trade union. This problem has been recognised by UDF in the western Cape where some

organisations, referred to as mass-based organisations, have been given a certain number of delegates (to the UDF general council). Other organisations, those that we would primarily refer to as activist organisations, have been given a smaller number of delegates. While this recognises that differences do exist, we believe that it is an inadequate recognition. The difference between an activist organisation and a mass-based organisation is not one of size, and therefore the number of delegates to a central body, but rather of the entire structure and functioning of the organisation.

As we see it, an activist organisation is essentially a grouping of like-minded individuals, who are brought together by a common political goal. Their activity consists of propagating their ideas amongst a constituency which they themselves define. Activists grouped together in this way, in an organisation of this sort, have a great deal of freedom of manoeuvre in the extremely flexible parameters in which they operate. They don't represent members in a strong sense. They propagate ideas amongst a certain constituency, or in a certain area, and as such play a very important political role.

Unions, on the other hand, are not organisations of activists, and union leaders are not activists in the same sense at all, because they are representatives in the strongest sense. Union leaders don't claim to represent the views of the working class. They represent the views of their members.

Church or student activists can claim to represent the broader social aspirations of church congregations or student bodies, and it doesn't really matter whether they are actually mandated by the broad mass of students or church goers, or whether they are not. By propagating their ideas or their line they attempt to make students or church goers aware of their broader interests and their social role. A union leader, on the other hand, can't go to a factory and claim to speak for the working class. He has to be mandated by workers in a factory, and he has to be reasonably sure that the particular workers who have mandated him back up his mandate. In a union situation there is no alternative to working in

that way.

The critical upshot of this is that a union representative has to go through a long and very arduous process of receiving mandates and constantly ensuring that the mandates are backed. Union leaders don't derive their position from discussing ideas amongst a small group of comrades, and then propagating these ideas widely. They derive their position from the members they've organised, and who send them forward with a specific mandate. Unquestionably, union leaders can influence the mandate that is given by discussing them with the rank and file, but ultimately they are very tightly bound to the specific decisions of members.

This is, as far as we see it, what a mass-based organisation means. It's got nothing to do with the size of the organisation, it has got to do with the difference between organisational and activist politics. The structure of a union derives from the relationship between the shop steward committee and the members in a particular factory. It is undoubtedly at that level where the mandated relationship is the strongest, but it works in that way right up to the top of the organisation, all the way up to the national conference. We cannot change our hats to suit different occasions, and still retain our character as representative organisations. We have to go through the process of getting these mandates, we have to know our members are willing to back the mandates and what they are willing to do.

If we don't do that our participation is either meaningless, or even worse than that, our participation could be construed by our members as being in violation of the most basic trade union principle, namely the principle of representivity.

These considerations simply don't apply to a large number of the organisations affiliated to the UDF. Most of the organisations affiliated to the UDF have, as their legitimate political task, to appeal to the masses 'out there'. We have as our task the representation of the workers inside our organisation, and the painstaking process of drawing more and more members into the formal and disciplined structures of a trade union.

This is the major reason why we've

found it difficult to envisage fitting into the structure of the UDF. We've experienced huge difficulty in explaining to our members how we would fit into the UDF as a union; yet conversely we have found it very easy to explain to our members how we would fit into a trade union federation. The difficulties that we have don't arise from the issues which the UDF has been set up to tackle. These have been discussed in the union, and they are very broadly appreciated. But affiliation has aroused very little interest.

There's one additional point that I want to emphasise. We've stated repeatedly that we will encourage our members to join the UDF. Well, given the federation structure of the UDF, that's impossible (as only organisations can join). But we will encourage our members to join organisations that are affiliated to the UDF. Should one of our members rise to become even a leader of the UDF, we would not view that as inconsistent with union policy in the slightest. In fact, it would probably be a source of great pride to the union, just as it is a source of great pride to us whenever any of our members become leaders in their progressive community organisations. But we do not see our way clear to representing our members as a union in the UDF.

WIP: You referred earlier to problems in the relationship between the union as a single-class organisation, and other organisations affiliated to the UDF which are multi-class organisations. Could you elaborate on this?

Lewis: It's not even primarily a question that the union is a single-class organisation, but that it's a working class organisation. A union by definition is open to workers only. This is not to say that there are never divisions in a trade union. There obviously are. There are a group of people in a trade union who are not workers, namely all the full-time officials, and their interests have always to be subordinated to the interests of members. There are also divisions within a union on the basis of the skill categorisation of workers in a factory. In South Africa there are also the inevitable racial differences and potential divisions between section

10 people and contract people. It's these divisions which the constitution and the Koornhof Bills have been set up to widen.

They are divisions that we always have to work on, that we always have to work at overcoming. But notwithstanding these divisions, all our members are working class. They are all factory members, and they are all members of the broader society. This means that they identify, quite correctly, their source of oppression as the bosses and the state. That has bearing on the question of our affiliation to the UDF. For one thing, unions will inevitably be organisations that incorporate a great diversity of political views and affiliations. We'll have in our ranks members with militant political views, and we'll have in our ranks members with fairly conservative political views. We'll also have within our ranks a great many members who have few political views at all, people who have joined the organisation purely to fight their bosses. With a certain degree of tension now and again, these diverse views can all be contained within an organisation, because they are all held by workers.

To a certain extent this could also be said of any other mass-based organisation. It could be said of student organisations where they are mass-based, it could be said of a women's organisation where it is mass-based, it could be said even of a community organisation. It is conceivable that a woman joins a women's organisation to fight women's issues. Such an organisation should be able to contain within it a fair diversity of general political views as well.

But there are two key differences. The first is that student and community organisations, and, although not necessarily correctly, women's organisations, tend to identify the state as their source of oppression. This means that they are inevitably more clearly politically defined, and their membership is a more clearly politically based membership (than a union). They don't have the bosses to intercede in the struggle in the same way that workers in a trade union do. Secondly, the fact of the matter is that in South Africa, most non-trade union progressive organisations

tend to identify themselves quite strongly with one or another political tendency.

This involves particular problems in Cape Town. I don't know if these are the same everywhere else. But here the community organisations are divided quite clearly into two camps. There was a possibility that affiliation to the UDF could jeopardise the unity, if not directly of our union in Cape Town, certainly of some other unions in Cape Town. This is also especially sensitive when we have identified as a priority the formation of a trade union federation, with the even greater diversity of views contained therein. Just as we wouldn't want to do anything that would jeopardise the unity of our union, so too we wouldn't want to do anything that would jeopardise the potential unity of the whole trade union movement.

I'm aware that this opens us up to what has become a currently fashionable charge, namely that we are economistic. Although it is not always clear from those levelling the accusation, I take this to mean that we concentrate our activities exclusively on wages and working conditions, that we are not concerned with political struggle, and that the only basis of our unity is the struggle in the factory, thereby making little positive contribution to the national democratic struggle.

There are two answers to this: the first is that a union must inevitably carry within it the tendency towards economism. A factory-based organisation by definition sets itself certain limits, and the General Workers' Union has never made any claim to mystically transcend these limits. The second answer to the question is that the accusation reflects a very narrow, formalistic notion of what politics is, and that's what really brings us to a point pertinent to the question of the class composition of the union.

It has to be acknowledged that workers are a very special group in society. They are the class, unfashionable though that term might be, that produces the wealth of the country. As such, they are the most exploited and oppressed members of society. This special place of the workers in society is currently recognised in a very peculiar and inverse way by other groups in

society. The way in which it is recognised in South Africa is by frantic attempts by other groupings to eliminate the differences between themselves and the working class. These attempts range from the laughable assertion made some years ago that all blacks are workers; to more serious assertions made by community leaders and often trade union leaders, to the effect that the community are the workers and the workers are the community; or that student activists are the workers of tomorrow; or that women's organisations contain the wives and daughters of the workers. All these assertions have a kernel of truth, but to be a worker of tomorrow is not to be a worker of today.

More pertinently, this does not go any way towards transforming a student organisation into a worker organisation. To say that workers constitute the majority of any black community in South Africa is obviously true, but it doesn't mean that workers constitute the majority of community organisation, of organised community members. In fact it's lamentable, but nonetheless true, that community organisations have had relatively little insertion into the ranks of contract workers, for example. In those rare cases where the majority of a particular community organisation are working class people, it is possible that these working class members will have little influence at the top of the organisation in the decision-making structures.

I want to be clear about one thing: when we say that workers are the most oppressed and exploited members of society, that means at the most general level that they do not have access to the means of production, and that to be workers, they have to be deprived of the possibility of turning themselves into bosses. This, even at that general level, is not necessarily true of other groups in society. It's not, for example, necessarily true of students. But what it means at a more specific level, a level more specific to our problems with affiliation to the UDF, to a multi-class organisation, is that workers as a class are necessarily denied access to skills and education, other than those that are directly required by the bosses in production. They are

denied the skills of articulation and language, of literacy, numeracy, in fact of the whole culture and shorthand which a smoothly functioning organisation seems to require. This is not to mention the fact that workers also have very little time at their disposal, or at any rate the time at the disposal of workers is rigidly controlled. It is in fact control that is a key defining element of what it means to be a member of the working class. Every minute of a worker's time is controlled. He's told when and how and where he'll work; he's told when and where and how he'll sleep; he has no control over whether he is employed one day and unemployed the next. All workers have, in a sense, is their unity. This is why workers tend so naturally to take and implement decisions en masse, and why other groupings in society are so comfortable with taking decisions individually or in small groups, even, which is very characteristic of student organisations, to break up large gatherings into small groups to facilitate decision making and discussion.

The point of this digression is not to say that workers should never co-operate, never work together with organisations on non-workers, of organisations in which non-workers are also members. We would expect this of our members. But we would not be surprised, and nobody else should be surprised, if when our members do work in this way, they insist on carrying into these organisations the culture and demands of the working class, and the culture and demands of a working class organisation.

This is really where I do want to answer the charge of economism. Unquestionably, the democratic union movement in South Africa has won substantial economic gains, and to be sure we've spent a major part of our time and energy in making these economic gains. But in the democratic unions, the workers have also in addition won a new pride and dignity, a self-confidence in their ability to take and implement decisions. This is really the key aspect of unions' political work - the acquisition by our members of an awareness of their own power, an awareness of their ability to participate in their own way in the most complex and difficult

decisions. We don't claim for one minute that this should or does represent the totality of our political work. Nor do we make the claim that this is sufficient to democratise South Africa. But we are absolutely certain that the level of organisation of workers in South Africa has reached a stage where they simply won't settle for any less than the right to participate fully in any political or community organisations that they form, or join. This is especially so if they join these organisations in their capacities as union members. They won't be satisfied with formal symbols of power, nor will they be satisfied with power where the ability to exercise that power resides with the more skilled and educated union bureaucrats, where they become in a sense silent but nevertheless muscular participants in the whole process.

We don't here want to get into a detailed critique of the UDF as such. But the UDF has to ask itself whether its style and tone, whether the language spoken, whether the pace at which it has developed, whether its programme, facilitate the fullest participation by working class people. Our members simply do not feel that way. They've never, for example, appreciated the need for the sophisticated structures which the UDF has introduced. This is not because they are backward or stupid, but because they are advanced leaders of their own organisation, an organisation which has been in existence for ten years. We've never in those ten years found the need to set up a single sub-committee, let alone a highly sophisticated and complex structure. The workers have not felt that they've had the time to participate in the endless debate surrounding the setting up of the UDF. This is not because they are uninterested in politics, but because they do arduous full-time jobs and they believe, unlike activists generally, that meetings are only necessary if they have a clear and defined objective, and when there is the possibility of that objective being fulfilled at the meeting.

We encouraged, for example, our members to attend the launching of the UDF. A fair number attended, but the vast majority of those who attended

didn't understand the meeting because it was in English.

Principally, the workers don't understand what programme of action is envisaged by the UDF, and this is obviously very critical. Given the above, there is a feeling on the part of the workers that they will not be able to participate fully in the decisions that lead to a programme of action, and this is anathema to an organised worker. They are not going to be drawn into an organisation in which they feel that they will have to take action blindly, without having participated in the decision making.

Those are really the key aspects of the class composition of the organisation: firstly, that we draw our membership from a wide and diverse range of political views, unlike most of the other organisations participating in the UDF; and secondly that our members are working class people, and as a working class they come from a culture that is very distinct from that of other more privileged classes in society.

WIP: There has been a lot of talk about the importance of working class leadership in national political organisation. Are you saying that working class leadership does not amount to the presence of individual members of the working class within national political organisations, but rather that the working class should have a leading status within these organisations?

Lewis: I think I mean both. It is essential that working class individuals occupy leading positions in national political organisations inside the country. It's important because I believe the second to be true as well - that workers must have a special status in multi-class organisations. Workers must have the opportunity to lead the pace and style and tone and language - in fact the whole discourse - of the organisation. The reason why it's important, and the reason why I think it's important to examine the questions raised with respect to the UDF, is that democracy in this country is inconceivable without the fullest participation in the national democratic struggle of the working class. This is not merely because the

working class is the largest and most muscular group in society. Simply put, they are the only social grouping with a class interest in democracy. Other social classes or groupings might have an interest in the relative or partial democratisation of society; other individuals might have a moral interest in a thorough-going democratisation of society. But the working class, which has every aspect of its life - its economic and political life, its working life and its leisure life - very rigidly controlled, is the one class in society that has an interest in a thorough-going democratisation of the economy and the polity.

Working class organisation in South Africa has developed to the stage where workers insist on the right to participate fully in the structures of any organisation which they are members of.

WIP: The participation of western Cape trade unions in the Disorderly Bills Action Committee (DBAC) last year seemed to be an unsatisfactory experience, not only for the trade unions, but also for other organisations participating in the DBAC. Very little was achieved after a long series of meetings. To what extent do you think this has discouraged workers and trade unions in the western Cape from participating in the UDF, which is seen as some bigger form of the DBAC?

Lewis: In the initial stages of the formation of the UDF, our experience of the DBAC definitely did influence our feelings about participation in the UDF. The experiences on the DBAC were uniformly negative, in the sense that we found ourselves in the middle of extraordinary squabbles. Sometimes they seemed to be squabbles based on straight power plays, straight questions of dominance between the two factions of the community organisations in Cape Town. The upshot of that was that nothing got done with respect to the Koornhof Bills. I recall a laughable situation - I wasn't present, but our representative reported - where in the same week that the Koornhof Bills were withdrawn, the DBAC met. They sat through an entire three or four hour meeting without once mentioning the Koornhof Bills.

The DBAC seemed to be set up for some other purpose altogether. The purpose seemed to me for one grouping in the community to achieve domination over another grouping in the community.

This did colour our participation in the UDF at first, but it doesn't any more. We, like I imagine other groups who were equally disappointed with their experience on the DBAC, have shaken off the ill effect of that experience. Where it does still colour our decision is that particularly some unions draw their membership from one grouping in the community, but also have members from the other community groupings. We would not wish these differences in the community to intercede in the unity of a trade union, both of the grouping of trade unions in the western Cape, and also of particular individual trade unions.

WIP: You talked earlier about the fact that the General Workers' Union supports the development of other progressive organisations in the community, and that it encourages participation of GWU members in those organisations. In what concrete ways has the union supported the development of these organisations, and how does it aim to do so in the future?

Lewis: The primary way which we attempt to facilitate the development of broader community organisations is by taking up broader issues in our union. This we've always done, and we continue to do so. The issue of the Koornhof Bills and the constitution were very substantially discussed in the union right from the beginning, before many of the organisations that have been set up to oppose the Bills were even conceived of. This is really the primary way in which we support other organisations.

We would also support them, and we've said this repeatedly, by encouraging our members to join these organisations. We've fairly consistently been asked to give our members to other organisations. Well, our answer to that is that our members are not locked in concentration camps, our members are in the community, in the townships. They must be organised, and we would certainly encourage them to join those organisations.

WIP: What is the union's current relationship to the UDF, and what possible future developments do you see?

Lewis: On the question of our current relationship to the UDF, we definitely see a role for ourselves as a union relative to the UDF. We've said repeatedly that we are prepared to engage in joint campaigns with the UDF, and that we are prepared to support UDF campaigns. We hope to be informed of UDF activities, of UDF meetings, to enable us to encourage our members to go to these meetings, both of a local or regional nature. We hope to receive UDF newsletters and information sheets and be able to hand these out to our members. For example, in the very near future in Cape Town the UDF is holding a meeting to discuss what is going on in the Ciskei. We see what is happening in the Ciskei as critically important to us. We also see it as a critically important exposé of the constitutional proposals, and therefore legitimately within the UDF's ambit. We would certainly support them in that campaign.

As to the future, that's a little hypothetical at the moment. I can't ever envisage the General Workers' Union affiliating to the UDF. Although obviously I cannot speak for any other union, I can envisage a situation where a formal relationship develops between a national/political/community centre and a national trade union centre. I should say on that score that there is precedent for this in South Africa, for a relationship between a national explicitly political centre and a national union centre.

It has often been said by the unions that their priority is the formation of a federation, and that is the case. The reason why that priority influences our decision with respect to the UDF is not that we are spending so much time in forming a federation that we don't have time to devote any resources to affiliating to the UDF. Rather, we see that as part of a national trade union centre, workers would have the necessary support, the necessary base, from which to participate in a multi-class organisation.

That is a possible development. Obviously it would be a highly complex development, and one that would require a broad agreement in the trade

union movement. But certainly it's a possibility. It has been done before, and I don't see why it shouldn't be done again

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SADF and the Civic Action Program

This is a second article taken from GAVIN EVANS' dissertation, 'The Role of the Military in Education in South Africa'. The first appeared as 'SADF and Civic Action: blacks in the Defence Force' in WIP 28.

THE HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN IN NAMIBIA

Before examining the activities and role of the CAP in South Africa, the 'Hearts and Minds' strategy followed in Namibia is considered. This is because, 'all the lessons and principles and know-how (gained from Namibia) have been and are being applied in South Africa'.

As early as 1968 the SADF paid lip service to the notion of civic action in Namibia, with a statement that 'military tactics are well and good but they are really quite useless if the Government has lost the confidence of the people among whom it is fighting'. This strategy (then called 'social action') was directly influenced by US military efforts in Vietnam at the time. It was described in an SADF handbook issued to senior officers as the 'application of a well coordinated combination of assistance designed to improve the living conditions of the population, and raise its cultural level. It contributes to winning the "Hearts and Minds" of the population. Social Action is essentially aimed at reaching the population, thus making it more receptive to psychological action'.

However, it was only in 1974, after the military had taken over command in Namibia, that a 'Hearts and Minds' strategy began to be implemented, by which time SWAPO had already won considerable support, and had strong, national organisation. After that, as Major Britz put it: 'In South West Africa the military took over and they made an appreciation. It became clear that the population is the key to victory - so it went into

cultural aspects, medical, socio-economic and so on.'

As in Rhodesia, the SADF's CAP in Namibia is faced with an apparently irresolvable contradiction. On the one hand they are attempting to win the 'goodwill, support and cooperation of the local population', while on the other hand they are engaged in directly repressive activities.

The mistakes of the Rhodesian strategy have been acknowledged, at least in theory, by the SADF. In a research project done for the military, Captain JR Cilliers argues: 'To the White population the threat facing Rhodesia was an external one rather than that of Black nationalism within their own borders. The local population were in fact the determining factor, not the insurgents. What was required was an awareness that the war could not only be won in terms of killing armed combatants but in gaining the active support or at least neutrality of the increasing numbers of the local population ... Army commandos realised too late the potential of a politically matured local militia from the people themselves ...'

Captain Cilliers goes on to examine the gaps in the Rhodesian Civil Action program: 'Proper protection of the local population and assistance to bring back their standard of living to what it had been before they moved into protected villages created by the Security Forces would have won the support and confidence of the local people. Instead by the overly aggressive use of tactics such as the purely intelligence oriented pseudo methods, Security Force Actions tended rather to be aimed at the local population than in defence of them ... In the long term the extent to which those methods were used resulted in an undeniable loss of legitimacy by the Security Forces vis a vis the local inhabitants ... Rhodesian Security Forces were unable to formulate a successful and unified counter-insurgency strategy.'

However, despite this official realisation by military leaders of the problems of the Rhodesian Army's Civil Action program, it appears that as the war in Namibia has intensified, the effect of the CAP has been minimal and has been superceded by directly repressive activities. Nevertheless, the strategy does seem to be more sophisticated than that adopted in Rhodesia. In parts of Caprivi, for example, it appears to have met with some success.

The goals of the CAP (otherwise called the Supportative Services Programme) in Namibia are set out in a recent article in Paratus. 'Supportative services evolve around the principle of building and maintaining a contented, if not prosperous community which otherwise would have fallen prey to subversive S.W.A.P.O. activities which is an imminent threat to all of S.W.A./Namibia's 11 population groups. The discontented community lacking an operational and effective socio-economic structure is the ideal target for S.W.A.P.O. activities ...

'The supportive services programme undertaken by the S.A.D.F. and S.W.A. Territory Force amongst all peoples of S.W.A./Namibia is an effective counter-measure to S.W.A.P.O. subversion of discontented communities and population groups. In cooperation with departmental authorities the military offers assistance in the fields of education, administration, agriculture, health and welfare, nature conservation, veterinary science and technical maintenance ... Besides being an effective tactical manoeuvre, the supportive services programmes encourage the development of a nation that will be the youngest of the independent States.'

In Namibia, as in South Africa, the largest group of Civil Action personnel are trained teachers seconded to schools. In September 1982, there were approximately 100 CAP teachers in Namibia. As Major Britz explained this:

'The way it worked was that these schools found themselves short staffed. At the same time in our appreciation we found that winning the support of the people by assisting in their development was the key to success ... winning the confidence of the people is the main factor in countering insurgency. We've got to show people - or rather teach them - to decide for themselves what's better for them and therefore we must supply them with education. People join S.W.A.P.O. because they promise them education ...'

Without more detailed empirical information it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the CAP in Namibia. It does appear, however, that notwithstanding some success in areas such as western Caprivi, the SADF is faced with a 'vicious cycle'. The more support SWAPO wins the greater the extent of direct SADF repression (combined with widespread intimidation, torture and other atrocities), and this reduces the possibilities for the success of the CAP.

The conclusions of the Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Commission, therefore, appear to be correct: 'The results for the army (of the CAP) seem to be poor because repeated detaining, beating and even killing of civilians overshadow the "positive" aspects and give the people the feeling that they are living in an occupied country deprived of their basic rights.'

Some of these lessons are being applied in South Africa and the SADF appears to be moving as fast as possible to win the 'Hearts and Minds of the people' before the current stage of insurgency develops into a civil war.

THE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

The functions of the CAP were officially passed on to other departments of the SADF on 3 March 1980. According to PW Botha this was because these functions were more compatible with those of other sections to which they had been transferred. However, Civic Action remained unchanged at the level of aims of service. The CAP's activities in both Namibia and South Africa had expanded to such an extent since 1974 that it had become necessary to divide the policy-making and co-ordination functions. Therefore, in January 1978 a sub-section Civic Action was established with policy and co-ordinating functions under Major General Philip Pretorius. The executive functions remained primarily with the army.

In answer to a question in parliament, PW Botha said that Civic Action functions included: 'the planning and coordination of - 1. programmes for the improvement of the conditions of life and advancement of other peoples by means of guidance, education, training ... 2. motivation projects including research, training and production of materials for such projects. 3. public relations.

4. the planning, establishment and maintenance of military museums.'

The CAP involves the deployment of NSM in non-military forms of service. They are usually required to undergo normal basic training followed by a six month Civic Action course at Kimberley's 11 Commando. Most teachers in the army go to Oudtshoorn and some of them are seconded to Civic Action. After the initial training at Kimberley they are posted to their positions in the CAP, usually either to other government departments or to the governing bodies of the various 'homelands' ('independent' or otherwise), or to the South West Africa Command. Under the direction of these bodies they work as engineers, mechanics, sports organisers, teachers, university lecturers, doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, agricultural, legal, and financial advisers, and tourist advisers.

They are required to wear military uniform which usually includes a 9mm pistol. There appears to be careful screening through a strict selection procedure which only allows those whose views conform with the SADF's to participate. Those with views too far to the left or right are not included. This is clearly shown in a letter from Major General (then Brigadier) Lloyd to Vause Raw: 'The basic aim of Civic Action, apart from assisting the Black man in various fields is to project an image of the soldier as a man of action but who is nevertheless a friend of the Black man and who is prepared to defend him. We want the N.S.M. to teach the Black man whilst his rifle is standing in the corner of the classroom. A conscientious objector cannot project this image. The directors of Civic Action programmes consider these objectors to be completely unacceptable.'

Furthermore, CAP soldiers are expected to keep their 'eyes and ears open' and to give regular reports on the mood and feeling of the local community and of particular people if necessary.

The CAP in South Africa experiences continued shortages of manpower. This is indicated by the fact that the demand of the relevant authorities for CAP personnel exceeds the supply both in the bantustans and in the urban areas. The reason for this is, in Major General Lloyd's terms, because 80% of the war effort is social, the military's role in this is a secondary, though important one. The repressive functions of the SADF take precedence over the ideological

ones. This is seen, for example, by the fact that despite the demand of educational authorities for CAP teachers, the majority of teachers in the SADF go to the Oudtshoorn Infantry School.

However, this situation appears to be changing and according to Britz the CAP's activities have expanded 300% since 1980. Nevertheless, there continues to be a fundamental contradiction between the military's repressive activities and its civic action activities. Another comment from Britz brings this home: '... in 1981, just after the schools boycott we went out there in the townships unarmed and soon the people began to see us as protectors whereas the Cops are seen as prosecutors and not protectors - and sometimes by the way they behave towards Black people, I'm not surprised. In the Platteland Black people run like hell from military vehicles and this is usually because they've had a problem with some difficult police sergeant. The army is there as protector but sometimes to defend you have to attack.' What is clear is that in order to be seen in a positive light the military had to appear not to be playing a repressive role.

Another important contradiction is that between the roles of the CAP and other state departments. Steenkamp saw this as a problem of co-ordination: 'There's the old problem of lack of coordination between departments of State - where the Administration Board knocks down your shanty you're not going to be very sympathetic to the State. The problem is that there is not enough coordination between Government departments. You have the Coloured Affairs Department and the Department of Cooperation and Development and they deal with different aspects of policy than the Army. It is important to realise that we're in a pre-insurgency situation at the moment in the urban areas. This means that unlike the operational area you have civilians running the show. In the operational area the admin. officials are subordinate to the military. Here it is different. The Admin. Boards are in charge and the army is subordinate and the Admin. Boards aren't always aware of the problem. While apartheid is still around the credibility gap remains large and you can't work in isolation.'

This was also referred to by Britz who spoke of the instability and problems caused for his work by, for example, the

Group Areas Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and the Coloured Labour Preference policy. He also referred to the problems faced with the Administration Boards:

'In the 5 Hermanus Camps for Blacks we had to work with the Department of Education and Training and with the Admin. Boards and we've certainly had our problems with both of them. With the difficulties we've had with the stubbornness and attitudes of the Admin. Boards, it doesn't surprise me that they've got so little credibility amongst Blacks ... The only solution is to kick their arses and pull them straight because they constantly embarrass us with their attitude to Blacks.'

He went on to explain how they could go about 'putting them straight': 'We in the army realise these things are problems - we can't change them but we certainly can advise ... Our reports go right up to the Minister. Whenever it involves something which affects our aims we just send a report and they soon put a stop to it. And this has certainly happened before.'

THE CAP AND THE ROLE OF THE SADF IN EDUCATION IN THE RURAL AREAS

The aim of the CAP in the rural areas is, as Lloyd put it, to secure the goodwill and co-operation of the local populace in order to prevent or minimise the success of guerilla incursions. The CAP is active in all the 'homelands', independent or otherwise. The Civic Action section at Natal Command Headquarters began to deploy personnel in KwaZulu in 1978, although SADF personnel have been in KwaZulu Civic posts since 1976. In August 1979 there were 58 qualified Civic Action personnel working there. Twenty-eight of these were medical doctors working in hospitals throughout the territory and there were 11 agricultural advisers.

In September 1982 there were ten SADF teachers in the area. Most of them are working in rural areas, although in June 1979 Civic Action personnel began to work in the urban areas as well. All the postings are done jointly by the KwaZulu government and the Civic Action staff at Natal Command which also pays part of their salaries. The KwaZulu officials are responsible for their control and supervision and Natal Command for their discipline. Civic Action personnel maintain regular contact with Natal Command for evaluation purposes.

Relations between the SADF and Inkatha have always been sensitive. Officially there is no formal contact (links being with the KwaZulu government). However, in reality the NSM frequently have to deal with Inkatha. Buthelezi's attitude to the CAP is characteristically ambiguous. In January 1980, while expressing appreciation for the program as a whole, he condemned enforced wearing of uniforms by soldier teachers as he said this created qualms of conscience for blacks as it appeared that the propaganda value of the exercise was a priority rather than a genuine wish to help for humanitarian reasons. A month later the Inkatha Central Committee expressed concern about the wearing of uniforms by teachers and resolved that unless the practice was stopped, it would recommend to the KwaZulu cabinet that use of teachers from the Army be discontinued.

The SADF replied that it was policy that all NSM wore uniform, but a compromise seemed to have been reached when the NSM did away with the bayonets on their rifles and later used 9mm pistols instead. They also started wearing 'step-outs' instead of 'browns'. After this the issue was dropped by Inkatha. This compromise seems to be an exception for the rural areas. From a reply to a question in parliament by GS Bartlett, it is apparent that at least in 1978 SADF teachers were usually armed and dressed in Army uniform. According to Bartlett this was in case 'terrorists came into the school and kidnapped the school children'. He said they were required to carry their R1 rifles at all times because if they put them aside, and their pupils sympathised with the terrorists 'one could then make a dive for the rifle'.

In KwaZulu an incident occurred in January 1983 when Inkatha complained that CAP soldiers had asked Ingwavuma villagers what Inkatha did for them and that it was the Army who helped supply water during the drought in 1980 and during the cholera outbreak in 1981. Buthelezi gave copies of sworn affidavits from the villagers involved to the SADF and said that neither the police nor the Army had political responsibilities in the areas they patrolled. He did not expect them to campaign against Inkatha, although he appreciated what the Army had done to help KwaZulu - for example, there were hospitals which would have no doctors without the assistance of Army doctors.

After a two hour meeting between senior KwaZulu government officials and military officers, including the Chief of the Army, Lt General Jan Geldenhuys, the SADF apologised and assured Buthelezi that incidents such as these would not re-occur.

The SADF is engaged in similar activities in the other 'homelands'. With the possible exception of KwaZulu the CAP appears to be busiest in BophuthaTswana where NSM from North Western Command are serving in the schools, in agriculture, in the colleges and in hospitals. This is done in co-operation with the Bophutha-Tswana government and the government departments.

Most emphasis appears to have been given to agricultural development programs where NSM agricultural advisers are working under the auspices of the BophuthaTswana Agricultural Corporation. Most are soldiers with previous training or experience in agriculture. They provide training for Tswana farmers and attempt to get them to increase production. The SADF seems to be busiest in Tuang in southern BophuthaTswana, which has a population of 15 000. There CAP personnel are involved at the Tuang Agricultural College, the Bathlaping High School, Saint Paul Mission School and the Pinagore College.

In 1979 there were SADF teachers in 16 schools in BophuthaTswana because of the severe teacher shortage. In the african areas of Potchefstroom, Klerksdorp, Stilfontein, Orkney and Carltonville a further education program was launched in 1979, involving school pupils and adults. By June 1979 NSM teachers were helping in about 30 schools every day in these areas. NSM teachers are also permanently based in Mafikeng, near the Army base. As well as teaching they provide sports instruction to african schools co-ordinated from Mmabatho and from offices in the other areas. They are also involved in the provision of sports ground facilities and have initiated the building of a community stadium. The medical services they run include work in both hospitals and clinics.

Groups of BophuthaTswana school children have been taken on trips assisted by the CAP. For example, 30 african standard 9 school children from Maraisdal High School at Tweespruit visited Cape Town under the auspices of the CAP. The school is attended by children of BophuthaTswana VIPs.

Sunday Post claimed that in September 1979 there were between 20 and 30 Civic Action teachers in Ciskei schools. It was reported that the Ciskei ministry of education had said that there was a shortage of teachers in Ciskei schools and had confirmed the presence of soldiers in schools. According to Chief Jongilwana there was no friction or animosity between CAP personnel and students in Ciskei schools. He commended the NSM for the wonderful work they were doing and said that students accepted the SADF teachers. However, the Ciskei department of education was not happy about the teachers wearing SADF uniforms. NSM are also being used in the Ciskei as doctors and as lecturers at Fort Hare University.

In 1980 it was reported that the SADF had helped the Ciskei government set up a work colony of 50 recruits as part of a youth movement program called Insiha Yesizwe (Pillar of the Nation). According to Lennox Sebe his motivation was to establish 'a youth movement that will not only keep the wolf from the door but will also occupy our youth meaningfully and profitably for a whole year'. Some of its aims are: 'to stimulate love of culture and fatherland; to identify future leaders; and to stimulate a sense of discipline, patriotism, nationalism and love of soil'. The SADF advises and trains them and the camps are run on military discipline lines.

In the eastern Transvaal CAP activities have been going on since 1976. In July 1977 the SADF began setting up a permanent presence in Amsterdam, near KaNgwane. The main objective of the exercise, according to Commanding Officer Major PS Grobler, was to 'establish contact with Black people in the area in order to consolidate the bond of friendship and trust between them and the SADF'. According to Paratus the locals were at first apprehensive at the sight of heavily armed men in full kit, but this initial fear gave way to a feeling of trust and co-operation.

In the northern Transvaal, according to a church worker, african SADF trainees are left near villages for two weeks without much food. They are instructed to mix with the locals without wearing uniforms. They then converge on places where there are schoolchildren. In one instance, when asked what they were doing, they said they were recruiting the higher standard of boys for the SADF. He said that in northern Transvaal they assist in drought stricken areas and help with irrigation.

There are also a number of SADF teachers in his area who are assisted by Radio Bantu, which is used in the classrooms.

In June 1981 it was reported that the Northern Transvaal Command had distributed thousands of propaganda pamphlets in KwaNdebele, and had been doing so throughout the year. This was confirmed by the SADF. The pamphlets have pictures with captions in bold letters. One has a picture of men with sad faces as two men with AK47s on their sides happily help themselves to a pot of food. Another has a picture of a soldier pointing to a mealie field with the caption: 'The SA soldier helps you grow them.'

One pamphlet shows a happy african family in their kraal with the caption: 'Live your life as your forefathers did.' Another has a picture of a guerilla with snakes coming out of his mouth with the caption: 'Don't listen to the evil talk of trouble makers. It is poisonous.' Yet another has a picture of a man with an AK47 over his shoulder talking to a

man called Joe. Next to it is a picture with Joe on his back with a knife in his chest. The caption reads: 'Joe listened to the terrorists ...'

Details are not available from the SADF on the total number of NSM involved in Civic Action. The following statistics given by the SADF's Public Relations Department in Pretoria are of the number of CAP teachers in September 1982. They are incomplete, do not cover all the areas of the CAP's involvement, and do not distinguish between the rural and urban areas:

South West Africa Command	98
Eastern Province Command	7
Orange Free State Command	24
Witwatersrand Command	18
Venda	9
QwaQwa	15
Northern Transvaal Command	22
Natal Command	10
North Western Command	53
Gazankulu	3
Lebowa	6
BophuthaTswana	9

The incomplete total here is 276, which probably means that about 300 NSM are involved as teachers in the CAP.

From the scanty and incomplete information available it is difficult to draw more than tentative conclusions on the CAP's involvement in the rural areas. However, the following can be said with some degree of certainty -

1. The CAP NSM are most involved with manning structures in the bantustans where they can be seen to be helping the people. They are most active in education, health, and agriculture.
2. The main reason for their demand, particularly in health and education, is the severe shortage of personnel faced in the rural areas. Partly for this reason there has been virtually no opposition (with the exception of KwaZulu) to their presence.
3. The SADF is also involved in other propaganda activities to complement the above, such as pamphlets and military shows.
4. The CAP NSM are also involved in counter-intelligence work. Here the role of the teacher is particularly central. According to an SADF spokesperson: 'The Civic Action teacher ... offers a contribution of inestimable value. Relations between the Civic Action servicemen (teachers) and the Black students are so outstandingly good that the scholars provide the teachers with information concerning the movement of

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PEOPLE



A Northern Transvaal Command Poster

the enemy.'

5. The rural areas with the largest concentration of CAP personnel seem to be those with the highest reported guerilla presence and the greatest SADF presence generally.

6. The rural strategy seems primarily aimed at countering the reality or threat of guerilla activity.

THE CAP AND THE ROLE OF THE SADF IN EDUCATION IN URBAN AREAS

In the urban areas the CAP's activities are far more diverse than in the rural areas. At this stage they are not aimed at countering guerilla activity but rather at:

1. Contributing to the ideological aims of 'Total Strategy' through promoting a belief in multi racialism;
2. propagandising about the 'Total Onslaught', militarily and politically;
3. improving the image of the SADF;
4. preparing the ground for conscription of coloureds and indians;
5. creating leadership groups sympathetic to the SADF's aims; and
6. performing a guardian, intelligence gathering role.

In the rural areas the CAP's activities in schools are just an aspect of 'Hearts and Minds' strategy. In the urban areas most CAP activities concern schools and the youth generally.

The reason for the 'Civic Action's' focus on urban black schools is not hard to find. It was initially within the educational apparatus that the under-current of black resistance reasserted itself. The rise of black consciousness, combined with other political forces, led to the 1976 uprisings. The initial demand for the scrapping of Afrikaans as medium of instruction lead to demands for the rejection of Bantu Education. By the time of the 1980 education boycotts the level of organisation and political sophistication had developed significantly.

These words of Bowles and Gintis can be suitably applied to black education in South Africa: 'The education system ... has hardly been a fine tuned instrument of manipulation in the hands of socially dominant groups. Schools and Colleges do indeed justify inequality, but they have also become arenas in which a highly political egalitarian consciousness has developed among some parents, teachers and students.'

Formative action has been taken by the state in response to the crisis in education. However, the very real material grievances continue to remain - the shortage and lack of training of teachers, the low quality of facilities, overcrowding, uneven subsidisation of african, coloured, indian and white education, and consequently the high failure and drop-out rates. In some respects this situation has deteriorated since 1976 and 1980 with, for example, the teacher shortage being even more severe than before. The use of NSM as teachers, at least from the point of view of the educational authorities (who in other respects are not always in line with military thinking), has been a stop-gap measure to help ease the shortage.

The role of the Civic Action teacher is very different from that of any other education department functionary. The more he establishes a favourable rapport with his students, the more he becomes a functionary of total strategy. His role is no more to stem the tide of the educational crisis than is the role of the CAP youth camp instructor to give black school children enjoyable weekends or the role of the CAP sports instructor to improve the standard of black sport. In each case these are secondary, the primary role being the political aims of 'Total Strategy'.

THE PRESENCE OF THE SADF IN URBAN AFRICAN SCHOOLS

In 1981 the teacher:pupil ratio was 1:18 for whites; 1:24 for indians; 1:27 for coloureds; and 1:48 for africans. The percentage of unqualified teachers (a 'qualified' teacher has a matric plus a diploma) were: whites 3,36%; indians 19,7%; coloureds 66,14%; africans 85%. In this situation the offer of qualified NSM teachers to educational authorities and principals was one which they could not refuse.

In the urban african schools particularly, the events of 1976 and 1980 had severe effects on the image the SADF was wanting to portray. The SADF exists as a potential back-up to the SAP. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Soweto in 1976, where, despite official denials, there are strong indications that at least commandos and citizen force units were used to quell the uprising. Both military and police units wore camouflage uniforms. SADF troops have also been used

'Nat propaganda' charge as SADF magazine is given to coloured schools

A DEFENCE Force Magazine handed out to coloured and Indian schools suggests that readers should support the government's proposed new constitution. The magazine, 'Contact', which gives its address as the Castle, PO Box 1, Cape Town, was distributed at temporary' expense. Mr Philip Myburgh, Progressive Federal Party spokesman on defence, said this week he had received complaints from principals of coloured schools.

Lieutenant P F Bushell. The principals complained, said Mr Myburgh, that the July issue of the magazine contained an article which — in the guise of a profile of Cape Town's Colours — urged people to accept the new constitution. It reads: "The Colours also has the privilege of witnessing structural changes of - different types. "A --

this beautiful country of ours.

"The 'old dame' is slowly observing, wondering how the people will react to these proposals.

"Surely she is hoping that we shall forget our past differences and take her in making this her own."

In reply, Defence, I believe, and SADF is coloured or ry, seems likely to be

in curbing 'minor unrest' in other areas, in manning roadblocks, and in conducting cordon operations and house-to-house searches. Thus, in moving into the townships in 1979 the CAP teachers started with a considerable credibility gap.

The first report of Civic Action teachers in township schools came in September 1979 when the Post claimed that SADF men teaching in Katlehong's Alafang secondary school were giving out free copies of the SADF magazine The Warrior, as well as The Citizen. One article in The Warrior stated: 'Some of the frustrated agitators are trying to boost the image of a pitiful old man in a prison, a plain convict, who for all we know, does not even feel like these "energetic adventures".'

'Mr David Thebahale (Soweto Council Chairman) and his colleagues are the true leaders of the Black people which the Government is prepared to talk to - not the people who claim to be representing the oppressed peoples of South Africa, yet having their own ulterior motives!'

'The constant claim that the peoples of the Republic of South Africa are downtrodden is sickening, just as naive as the effort to press the Government through Church assemblies to do things which are not the wishes of the majority.'

'Only the Government has the power to do things in this country. Let us speak through our true leaders, not through convicts like Mandela and others.'

The February edition of The Warrior, distributed in schools in Soweto, attacked Bishop Tutu and the Post and accused Umkhonto we Sizwe of being responsible for brutal murders.

In September 1979 the Johannesburg Regional Director of Education and Training, Jaap Strydom, announced that NSM would be 'loaned' to his department to meet the shortage of teachers in Soweto in 1980. He said that at the beginning of 1980 Soweto would be short of 350 teachers. 'These are fully qualified people with degrees and diplomas. They are not soldiers - they are teachers doing their stint in the army. But this is for the people of Soweto to decide', he said. But it soon became clear that the Army had already decided for the people of Soweto..

The Rand Daily Mail conducted a survey of the population of Soweto which, they said, revealed 'mixed feelings' about SADF teachers, while 'top Soweto educationists rejected the idea completely'. At a meeting organised by the Soweto branch of COSAS in which AZAPO and the Soweto Committee of Ten were also represented, speakers deplored the idea of SADF teachers in Soweto and threatened a walkout by students were it ever implemented.



At another meeting Soweto educationist and Wits lecturer, TW Kambule, said that the issue of using servicemen in Soweto had long been decided and that the departments call for black opinion was merely to give the impression that there was consultation on the matter. He also said that the move could cause 'an explosion like that of 1976'.

In response the Public Relations Officer at the Department of Education and Training said that his department might consider recalling the soldiers if the community did not approve of the idea. NSM were only used as a temporary and last resort with the approval of the Department of Education and Training, in order to ease the teacher shortage. At this stage it was reported that there were seven Army teachers, all at Alafong secondary in Katlehong.

The SADF and educational authorities pushed ahead with the plan despite opposition and more NSM teachers were introduced in Soweto schools. In November 1979 students at Umoja Art Centre went on a two week boycott when a NSM was brought in to teach. Their previous art teacher was blamed for the boycotts and fired.

A month later students at Alafong secondary school boycotted classes demanding that the principal be removed. According to the students the principal wanted to dismiss all african civilian staff and bring in a gun-toting battalion to teach them. Earlier an Education and Training official had said that the decision to introduce NSM at Alafong had been taken in co-operation with parents, students and african teachers.

Civic Action NSM are now active in schools in most african townships. A few examples are given below from interviews conducted.

According to a community worker, the SADF called together all high school principals in the Mabopane area and told them to get their brightest pupils for an SADF excursion. They were taken around Voortrekkerhoogte and given lectures on the importance of the SADF, on the career opportunities it offered, and on the virtues of being a soldier and fighting communism. They were then asked to join up on finishing school. They were also given 'Warrior' T-shirts, as were children from Soweto who visited the base.

Children from the Pretoria area with whom the SADF has been working have been told to report the presence of any

strangers to the SADF. This strategy of using children as the 'eyes and ears' of the military seems to be widely used.

An SRC member from a school in Atteridgeville said that the SADF had visited schools in the area, spoken to them about the SADF and tried to recruit them. Some were taken on a tour of Voortrekkerhoogte. He also said that there were an increasing number of SADF teachers in the area.

A Standard 9 student from a school in Umlazi said that the SADF had spoken to Scout leaders in the area who had been taken on a tour of a military base by the SADF. He also said that a school choir had been taken on a compulsory tour by the SADF, during which they were subjected to military propaganda. There was opposition from some of the students but they could do nothing to stop the tour. There were also a growing number of SADF teachers in the area, he said. Some of the non-SADF teachers were aware of the problem but were scared that if they complained they would be fired.

A Catholic nun teaching in Mdantsane said that SADF teachers in the township schools went beyond the syllabus and pushed military propaganda - even as far as using military examples in mathematics problems.

Visits from african schools to SADF bases appear to be a useful vehicle for SADF propaganda. One such visit was made to 21 Battalion by Philade school in Heilbron in the OFS. It involved 200 african schoolchildren from Standards 3 to 5 and 23 teachers. As well as being served with a military display, refreshments and a hot lunch they were addressed by Major GJ Cloete, who told them that they need not fear men in uniform as the Army was there to protect them and help them. He went on to stress that 'the A.N.C. and P.A.C. are our enemies and together we must fight them'. He ended by saying: 'Today we are not going to show you how to kill but how we train soldiers and we hope that one day you will join us.' Thereafter Sergeant M Maji gave them a lecture on the benefits of joining the Permanent Force.

In the western Cape the CAP has been involved in a number of projects in african schools such as training netball players and drum majorettes at Tembani higher primary school, and teaching rugby to african schoolchildren in Paarl with Ian Kirkpatrick.

From the examples given it seems that

despite the early hiccups in 1979 and 1980 in Soweto and the east rand, the use of SADF teachers in urban african schools is now well established. Since 1980 there have been no reported boycotts or other demonstrations of student resistance. From the information available it is impossible to draw any definite conclusions on the attitudes of the african students and their communities to the presence of CAP teachers in their schools. However, if projections can be drawn from Soweto surveys, which showed widespread opposition to the SADF, the presence of CAP teachers is likely to be no more than grudgingly accepted.

THE PRESENCE OF THE SADF AT COLOURED SCHOOLS

SADF teachers have also been making inroads into coloured schools, particularly in the Transvaal, and into indian schools. In October 1979 The Star reported that SADF teachers were teaching at coloured schools on the Rand although it is believed that SADF teachers had been filling vacancies at coloured schools in Natalspruit and Kimberley since the beginning of 1979. The Star said that Eldorado Park high school had nine SADF teachers.

By the end of 1981, 15 SADF teachers had taught there, according to a teacher. She said they carried guns, and attributed their presence to the right wing views of the principal who welcomed them.

The teacher shortage in coloured schools appears to have been most severe on the Rand. In January 1982 it was announced that 14 NSM had been placed in Rand coloured schools. Eden Park high, with 27 classrooms for 1 000 pupils, opened in January 1982 with no teachers, after which five NSM were seconded there.

There have been no reported incidents of resistance to NSM teachers in coloured schools. In the western Cape there are no SADF teachers in either african or coloured schools despite the severe shortage of teachers. The reason for this seems to lie in the likelihood of opposition from teachers, principals and students. This was confirmed by Major Britz, who said: 'We have higher priorities and anyway the department is reluctant and the principals don't seem to want it.'

In the western Cape, however, the Cape Corps has visited some schools. A teacher from a coloured school in Worcester said

that when he was a school child in 1975 the Cape Corps used to come to speak to the Standard 9s and 10s, 'telling them how wonderful it was', and that this continues to happen at a few schools. He said that the Cape Corps would be visiting his school the following month, and that whether or not these visits took place depended very much on the attitude of the principal.

Interviews with residents of Hout Bay in Cape Town revealed that the SADF comes to schools and talks to Standard 9s and 10s about career possibilities in the Army and of the benefits such as free clothing and 'getting your own gun'. Civic Action has also visited a number of schools in the western Cape, mainly teaching sport and showing movies.

A teacher at a coloured school in Bridgetown in Cape Town said that the Standard 7s had been sent to a Cape Corps exhibition in the Good Hope Centre and that a number of them had said that they would join up. When they discussed the exhibition in class she said the children were confused: 'One boy who is seen as a leader by his class got up and said the Army was the enemy and he wouldn't be prepared to fight for it. But others were less convinced. A number of boys said they had already signed up at the Cape Corps exhibition. Their attitude was that it was a steady job, they liked to fight and they wanted to defend their country. When I asked them who they were fighting against they said it was the communists. They seemed very sold on the Big Russian Bear idea. I suppose its all the television they watch. The principal came in while we were discussing this and he confirmed their ideas of Russian imperialism. He told them that the Russians started wars all over the world to get rich from them ...'

'Quite a few of the boys were very interested in joining the Navy. They saw it as just another job where you could get good technical training and said that even after you have left the Navy you can get a job easily because the people saw you as responsible ...'

YOUTH CAMPS FOR BLACK STUDENTS

Since 1976, an important aspect of the CAP's work amongst black school students has been its running of youth camps. SADF camps of this nature are now being run throughout the country but it is in the Cape Province where they seem to have

been most extensive. In 1982, 16 of these camps were held in the western Cape for coloured and five for african students, while six were held in the northern Cape for coloured students. Twenty camps were held in the Cape for coloured students in 1981.

In the western Cape the camps are co-ordinated by the Civic Action Division of Western Province Command and are run with the co-operation of the Administration Boards, the Community Councils and organisations such as Lions and Rotarians. Most are advertised as 'adventure camps', although the programs seem to vary with some camps being more directly militaristic than others.

The Bergzicht senior secondary school youth camp in the western Cape lasted for five days. Activities included PT, sport, films tours of the Castle, the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, the fish hatchery, Jonkershoek, the Simba factory, etc, hikes and picnics, 'discussion sessions' and so on. The propagandistic aspect appears to be subtle - giving the children 'a good time' - although Civic Action T-shirts, and SADF magazines like Contact and Paratus were handed out, political discussions were held.

According to Major Britz the SADF tried to 'find out what the children want. We don't force our ideas on them. Although we are there we get other people to lecture'.

This was confirmed by a mother whose son went on one of the african schools camps: 'They were taken on hikes and taught to swim. They played soccer with Defence Force members. My son did not speak of any open indoctrination but told us how one captain speaking Xhosa showed them how his gun worked.'

However, some of the youth camps have a less subtle tone. According to a mother from Woodstock in Cape Town, boys from her area are regularly approached to go on Civic Action camps. Some 16-year old boys had been approached by soldiers who asked them to go on a five-day camp. Three went and were given wooden rifles and overalls. They were made to drill and push trucks in the sand, and given lectures encouraging them to join the SADF.

A Paratus report on a camp near Atlantis on the west Coast, attended by 112 coloured students chosen by CAP personnel and principals, said that after being divided into groups of 11 and placed in tents they were instructed in,

amongst other things, vehicle maintenance, first aid, and weapon handling. The aim of the camp was to promote leadership among young people.

According to D Nell of the Department of Internal Affairs in Natal, the aim of youth camps in southern Natal is 'to instil leadership in the Youth through adventure, culture and religion'. Activities include negotiating obstacle courses, target shooting and weaponry displays. The students are marked on their performance in these activities. Camps for coloured boys in Middelburg are held with the aim of promoting leadership through sports and encouraging personality development through competition. Another aim was 'to inculcate the South African way of life'.

The camps vary widely in size. One was held for 23 14-year olds from Mbekweni while another (assisted by USKOR, the Stellenbosch University equivalent of UCT's SHAWCO) was for 600 coloured children from Scottsdale. The children are usually chosen to go on the camps by their principals. At most schools 'leadership elements' are chosen although the basis of assessing this appears to vary. At one school brighter pupils were chosen, at another the taller children were picked.

At some camps pupils are accompanied by teachers, at others 'youth leaders' - for example from the University of the Western Cape and the Peninsula Technicon - have assisted. But most are staffed by SADF members. The Bergzicht camp, for example, was staffed by five SADF soldiers (one officer) and two Cape Corps cooks.

The camps are usually free. Some are run during term time with pupils being expected to make up the lost time. According to Major Britz, army instructors on the camps do 'a form of talent scouting to identify leadership elements ... The instructors keep in personal

Students 'no' to holiday camp with SADF links

CAPSTOWN. - Social work students at the University of the Western Cape have refused an invitation to participate in a holiday camp for 40 crippled children because of South African Defence Force links with the camp. The organizer of the Social Work Students' Committee, Mr G Kohler, said this week the invitation for voluntary student helpers was extended by the Orange Cape Association in Athlone. "After investigating we discovered that the SADF was organizing and sponsor-

ing the camp," Mr Kohler said. **SDA 02.04.83** He said "SADF infiltration" was seen as an insult to any progressive organization. "We noticed that similar SADF projects have been undertaken in Mitchell's Plain and Pearl, exposing children to SADF propaganda without their parents' consent." A spokesman for the SADF confirmed that the camp had been sponsored by the SADF, but said the matter "was not political". - Sapa.

contact with these youngsters. Usually they come back to us. If they want to get a project going in their community we help them ... The army is neutral. It is everybody's army. We are trying to make people realise this and win their trust. And we are succeeding in doing so.'

In the western Cape the camps cater for a wide range of school groups. As well as the youth leadership camps there are ones for individual schools, disabled children and cerebral palsied children. Camps have been held for groups in other parts of the country such as the BophuthaTswana camp, and one for 30 prefects from the Ongwedwa Training Centre in Ovamboland. All are at the SADF's expense. The age of the students range from eight to 18.

In the western Cape there has been widespread opposition to the camps from parents, youth groups, women's groups, community newspapers and the PFP. In March 1982, after a series of camps for pupils chosen from five higher primary schools in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu, senior pupils and parents complained to the administration board about them. One of the main objections was that the children were being indoctrinated.

One parent complained: 'This is totally unacceptable and it is clear that even if it appears on the surface as an open, informal thing, its obvious that our children are being indoctrinated ... What is more, we as parents are never consulted about matters like this.'

Another parent said: 'Had I known the defence force had anything to do with it, I would have refused to let my child go.'

Another commented: '... it all seems so innocent which in my opinion makes it more dangerous. It is part of a slow, subtle indoctrination process.'

The source of much of the anger was that parents were informed in a circular letter from the school principal that their children would be participating in the camps and there was no mention of the SADF's involvement. As one parent expressed it: 'No-one asked our permission. Nor were we ever fully informed of the facts. We simply received a circular informing us that our children had been selected to take part in educational camps and would be cared for. The next thing we knew, they were being taken from the school premises to Hermanus in army trucks ... We want to ask one simple question. What business is it for the S.A.D.F. to be involved in so-called educational and recreational camps for our children.'

According to Britz the SADF was in a better position to undertake such projects than other organisations because it had the manpower and means to do so. An administration board spokesperson said that the camps were purely 'informal' and had drawn on other organisations to help as well.

In response to this a pamphlet was widely distributed in the townships warning parents about the camps. It claimed that the aim of the camps was to recruit blacks into the army and that the SADF's 'Total Strategy' campaign was aimed at the black community as a whole and the schools specifically. It warned against people and organisations who supported the army, and went on to say: 'It is not enough that these issues are taken up in Parliament and written about in newspapers. The issue must not be taken out of the hands of the Black community ... We must not allow our vigilance to relax. We must talk about what is happening in our schools. We must speak about it in our civic meetings. We must unite in our efforts to stop the army from interfering with the minds of our children. We dare not forget 1976, and 1980.'

The PFP also expressed concern over the camps, saying that the most disturbing aspect was that parents were not consulted. They called for a full-scale enquiry to establish the motivation behind the camps.

In November 1982 an incident resulted in further organisation around the issue and opposition to the program. Twenty-three primary school children from Mbekweni near Paarl were taken to a CAP/WCAB youth camp in Hermanus. According to parents, the children got their friends to sign for them after they were told they were going on a picnic and would get football jerseys if they went along. They complained that the forms stated that the parents would be responsible. Parents also said they had approached one headmaster and discovered that the inspector had put pressure on him to allow the children to be taken to camps, but another headmaster had refused to co-operate.

A mass meeting of Mbekweni residents was organised by the Mbekweni United Women's Organisation branch and the Western Cape Civic Association, and as a result the parents drove to Hermanus and collected their children.

There appear to be moves to hold youth camps in the Johannesburg Indian and

coloured townships. In Lenasia, for example, the SADF recently called school principals together to get their top students to go on SADF-run youth camps. Similar moves have also taken place in Bloemfontein.

Without more details it is difficult to get a national picture of the extent and success of the youth camps. However, at least in the western Cape their effect should not be underestimated. Between 1 500 and 2 000 students aged from eight to 18, most of them chosen as 'leadership elements', go through them annually. Although some camps are clearly militaristic in tone others have taken a more seductive form. It is likely that the outings, sport, film shows, etc, do succeed in improving the image of the SADF amongst a large number of those who go on the camps, some of whom are unlikely to have had a holiday before. Certainly there have been no cases of opposition from the youth themselves. Contact prints two or three pages of letters each month from youth praising the camps and thanking the SADF. While this of course does not provide an accurate assessment of the responses of the students, it does indicate that the hearts and minds of some of the youth have been well won.

CONCLUSION

Although the SADF generally and the CAP specifically, are active in most urban areas in South Africa, the extent and form of their activities vary considerably. In each area the CAP does a careful socio-political assessment or 'appreciation' on which particular target groups are identified. There does appear to have been some experimentation and certain tactical mistakes have been made in the implementation of the CAP. However, its activities cannot be seen as being random or anything other than carefully planned, and there does appear to be a common thread of direction throughout the country.

Certain strategies receive more emphasis in some areas than in others. On the east Rand, where the educational crisis has been most severe, the CAP has honed in on the schools, putting its resources into teaching. In the western Cape, where a direct presence in the schools would be risky at this stage, the focus has been on youth camps and sport, particularly in the coloured community

where the strength of SACOS and the growth of youth militancy are identified as developments to counter. In the rural areas Civic Action's resources appear to be concentrated on complementing the counter-insurgency effort.

Within the urban areas the responses of the different 'racial' groups seem to vary. Amongst urban africans the possibilities for CAP success are severely limited by the effects of influx control and the migrant labour system, Bantu Education, as well as racial segregation and political oppression. It is significant that vociferous opposition to the CAP (in Mbekweni, Soweto and Cape Town) has come only from african parents and there appears to have been very little vocal opposition from coloured parents. In the indian areas the extent of CAP activity is far more limited. It appears that in the urban areas the CAP has been most successful amongst the coloured youth, although this is in inverse proportion to the level of organisation and general political activity.

Possibilities for success of the CAP are limited by the shortage of manpower which means that in most areas its resources are thinly spread. A side effect of this is that the demand for CAP personnel and resources sometimes outstrips the supply. This means that in some cases it only operates on request. This, combined with the lack of resources in the townships and the extensive resources of the SADF, creates the basis for dependency on the CAP to develop amongst certain groups.

In the urban areas the most significant area of SADF involvement has been amongst the youth and through the schools. However, the SADF's place in black schooling remains less central than its role in white schooling. The SADF's direct role in black education remains at the level of important interventions which have opened up a relation which did not previously exist. For example, the presence of SADF teachers in black schools necessitates not only a new relation between the NSM and the students but also between the SADF, the educational authorities and principals and other teachers. Likewise, the youth camps have involved the very important participation of schools' principals - voluntarily or otherwise - in choosing 'leadership elements'.

Despite its definite limitations, growth of the CAP and of the military's

role in education should not be underestimated. Particularly in the urban areas the last four years have seen a rapid expansion in the ambit of its activities and there is every reason to believe that this process will continue. The development of opposition has tended to lag behind in this respect, and particularly in the rural and coloured areas the ability of the CAP to achieve its aims has been relatively unfettered.

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On 'the Family'

This section on 'the family' continues the contributions started in WIP 27. The contributions in this issue are from CRISTOPHER BALLANTINE (reviewing Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh - The Anti-Social Family [Verso Editions|NLB, London, 1982]); GRAHAME HAYES, with a note on 'the family'; and a report on the activity of an 'Ad hoc group against the venue of the 1983 South African Family Therapy conference'.

the anti-social family

Most of us have a family of our own or hope some day to do so. Getting married and having children seems almost as 'natural' as the process of growing older. It is something we do with our 'private' lives, rather than an action of any political consequence. Or so we think. But in a remarkable and important new book, Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh (both already well known for their socialist and feminist writings) dispel this myth and show this most 'natural' of activities to be profoundly political, and imbued with a deeply anti-social significance. Brief and accessible, painstakingly but compassionately argued, this is a book that challenges what is perhaps our fondest ideology. It may also change some of our lives.

The book's starting point is that the left has failed to develop a socialist position on the family. 'Although Marx and Lenin made some polemical gains from a critique of the bourgeois family, it cannot be said that scientific socialism has developed a thoroughgoing rejection of family life as such' (p18). If contemporary socialists in Britain are adopting a more critical stance now, it is largely because of feminism. 'The women's liberation movement has drawn attention to the violence and degradation

hidden within the walls of the nuclear household, and to the broader social and economic inequalities connected with it' (p19).

One reason for the enormous popularity of the family is the ideology of what the authors call 'familism'. But ideology is not a synonym for illusion; and the family (as the Frankfurt School correctly maintained) is a real ideology in that it is more than a mere lie. Families meet valid - though historically constructed - needs; they offer 'a range of emotional and experiential satisfactions not available elsewhere in the present organization of social relations' (p21). For example, families offer a special kind of security; and through genetically inherited family likeness, they provide 'outward tokens of similarity, familiarity and belonging' (p23). Through marriage, the family also provides 'an opportunity for the expression of emotional need not legitimate elsewhere' (p23). But one of the great disadvantages of the concentration of such needs into marriage is that marriage thereby 'lessens and delegitimizes the emotional value of relationships outside a narrowly defined heterosexual pair-bond' (p23).

Another major source of the appeal of the family is the appeal of having and raising children, an appeal strengthened by the ideological notion that children 'need two parents'. Added to this, is the belief that the prevailing form of the family is universal and biologically determined, rather than the conventions of a particular society; from this, as from the investment of motherhood with 'connotations of maternal instinct', the family draws 'a unique social and moral force' (p27). Yet despite the strength of such familial ideology, in recent years fewer than a third of Britain's households were nuclear residences consisting of parents and their children, and only a tenth were organised according to the

mythical pattern of paternal breadwinner and maternal housewife. And the conception of the family as a natural unit which we discover in all societies is easily debunked. The variation of kinship arrangements documented by anthropologists would render even the loosest definition impossible.

What is the structural role of the family in capitalism? It is the class institution which gives us each our initial class position and, through the rearing of children, it is the main way in which social classes reproduce themselves. That there is nowadays some limited movement from one social class to another in no way invalidates the general truth that 'families pass on advantage and disadvantage in the chances of educational success' (p45). And families also process the reproduction of classes through the intermarriage of wealthy daughters with wealthy sons - thus reproducing the concentration of capital in the hands of a privileged class. Structurally, then, 'the family embodies the principle of selfishness, exclusion and pursuit of private interest and contravenes those of altruism, community and pursuit of the public good. Society is divided into families and the divisions are deep ...' (p47).

Another aspect of the anti-social nature of the family is its tendency to produce children with socially undesirable features: for example, 'a need to form intimate one-to-one ties to the exclusion of a more diffused bond to a wider group, a tendency to go it alone as an individual and a lack of concern for group support and approval or group interests' (p52). Communal societies, on the other hand - such as the Israeli kibbutzim (in their early phase) and the Oneida community founded in the USA in 1848 - often discourage familism, on the

grounds that 'the strengthening of the community enables and requires the weakening of family ties' (p53). The family and marriage, then, are deeply enmeshed in the ideology and the mechanisms of capitalism - which is why they are 'so massively privileged by social policy, taxation, religious endorsement and the accolade of respectability' (p56).

If the family is privileged as an area where certain human needs are allowed to be met, it is so only when it is working well. Often it is a private hell. In Britain, one quarter of reported violent crime is wife assault, and a great proportion of rapes are perpetrated by men upon the women (wives, daughters, nieces) in their own families. The inmates of this hell who suffer most are of course the women - those who do long hours of socially unrewarding work, mostly in isolation, ministering to all the household needs of their families, often caring for senile and disabled relatives as well, complaining that they never have any time off, being treated (far more often than men) for depressive and neurotic mental illnesses. Men, it is sometimes argued, also do work in the home; but for them it is voluntary, whereas for women it is their vocation. At the basis of this vocation lies what the authors call the tyranny of motherhood - by which they mean not that women cannot in principle choose whether to be mothers or not, but rather that what they can seldom choose 'are the social circumstances and pressures that would enable them to resist being swamped by motherhood' (p61). The so-called 'egalitarian family' or the 'sharing marriage' of contemporary rhetoric is no solution to these problems either, since whatever division of labour is worked out, it is 'not a division of

Vatoland
09/02/83

Karen Sichel

MEJ. Karen Sichel is 'n pragtige meisie en was as Mej. Suid-Afrika die bewondering van ons land se jeug waardig.

As 'n openbare persoonlikheid het sy egter ook 'n openbare verantwoordelijkheid. Want daar word na haar opgeleien en in haar optrede 'n voorbeeld aanvaar.

Dit is 'n verantwoordelijkheid wat sy sigbaar nie aanvaar het nie.

Die huwelik en gesin bly steeds die fondament van die gemeenskapslewe

en 'n anker in die persoonlike lewe. Wie dit verwerp, doen nie net hulleself 'n onreg aan nie, maar ook hul kinders. En in die geval van 'n bekende en bewonderde persoonlikheid word dit ook 'n óndiens aan die gemeenskap.

Ons sou graag bly wou wees oor die vooruitsig dat die mooi Mej. Suid-Afrika moeder gaan word. In die omstandighede kan ons net jammer wees.

labour between equals, but an unequal exchange in which the man's interests predominate' (p65).

The spectre of the family also haunts all sexual behaviour in capitalist society. While conceding the gains the sex reform movement has brought, the authors argue that there has been no fundamental change in the gross asymmetry in heterosexual relations. In the thriving system of courtship and marriage that still enshrines male power and female dependence, men and women do not encounter each other as equals. Realistically, a girl's chances of earning good money are lower than a boy's; marriage and dependence on a husband can give her a better standard of living than she could expect if she were single. But this means that before marriage she must regulate her sexual activities to this goal.

When boys 'play around', it is partly to sort out the girls who are marriageable from those who are just an 'easy lay'. Until this form of family disappears, 'sexual enjoyment will continue to be a male privilege and it will continue to take the form of sexual possession' (p75). Real sexual love will not flourish in its own right until its dependence on economic ties is severed. Similarly, the legitimating of a male-dominated sexuality within the privileged sphere of marriage produces the forms of sexuality 'outside' it - prostitution, for instance. It also produces the tragic ghettoisation of homosexual life.

Every gain for the family is a loss for society. People who do not live in families are isolated, deprived and lonely. Families are consumed by their domestic life: whatever little time they have left over, they spend with other families. 'Normality' is the family life portrayed in TV advertisements. The argument is trenchantly summarised by the authors:

'It is as if the family had drawn comfort and security into itself and left the outside world bereft. As a bastion against a bleak society it has made that society bleak. It is indeed a major agency for caring, but in monopolizing care it has made it harder to undertake other forms of care ... It is indeed a place of intimacy, but in privileging the intimacy of close kin it has made the outside world cold and friendless ... Caring, sharing and loving would be more widespread if the family did not claim them for its own' (p80).

Ultimately this book hopes to contribute to a major social transformation that will make the family, as a privileged source of nurturance, unnecessary. This is a long-term goal, but there are two basic political strategies that will assist in its realisation. These are, first, to 'work for immediate changes that will increase the possibilities of choice so that alternatives to the existing favoured patterns of family life become realistically available and desirable'; and, second, to 'work towards collectivism and away from individualism in the areas at present allocated to the sphere of private family life' - areas such as income maintenance, housework, and care of the very young and old (p134).

Concretely, how might this be done? The authors propose several 'basic principles of daily political struggle in personal life' (p140). First, encourage variety and flexibility in lifestyles - specifically in ways of living that challenge the family. These would include: increasing the options for being single, for living together without marriage (and perhaps without children), for homosexuality that does not mirror heterosexual patterns, for developing larger 'households' that might include children and where child care would be shared and children would not be owned, for developing relationships which blur the 'marital' boundary between friendships and love relationships.

Second, avoid oppressive relationships, and the easy path of conformity that leads to them, for such relationships reinforce the institutionalised family form, and typically spell the end of a woman's economic independence and the onset of her career as mistress-and-servant.

Third, beware of domesticity: those who have succumbed to the 'pressures towards cosy domestic self-sufficiency and the privilege of home life' (p147) tend to lead anti-social, privatised lives and are less available for public activities.

Over and above these three proposals about 'personal politics', the authors also outline what they call a key strategy: that of changing 'all the state policies that currently privilege "the family" at the expense of other ways of living' (p148).

The book also devotes a chapter to an analysis of contemporary theories of the family (those of Donzelot, Lasch and others). Dense and closely argued, this chapter is of interest primarily to those already familiar with such debates. Others

might wish to omit the chapter from their reading, since it is not essential to the main argument of the book.

Few people will be left untouched by this serious, caring, and carefully researched book. One must hope it will be widely read and urgently discussed.

a note on 'the family'

In an earlier number of Work In Progress (26:24) I said some things about the working class 'family' and unemployment. In response to the briefs on 'the family' in WIP 27 it seems important to further the discussion about 'family life' in South Africa, and I suppose more pertinent politically, the working class 'family'. Because the status of 'the family' in South Africa, and elsewhere in the capitalist world, is problematic, I shall keep it in inverted commas for reasons which will become clear later on in this short note.

I shall start by elaborating on what I said about the working class 'family' in the 'Madness and Labour' article in WIP 26. I said that the working class 'family' in the townships was finding it increasingly difficult to sustain themselves in relation to even a meagre standard of living. This is not a contentious point as working class struggles are often a call for capital to pay a decent and living wage.

If one looks at the wages of african workers in the Durban industrial area they are often below the household effective level (HEL) - which is a crude concretisation of minimum decent living costs. The present HEL for africans in Durban is R368,82 per month (Race Relations Information Sheet 1, 1983. HEL as at September 1982).

In relation to the above I argued that the working class 'family' is finding it more difficult to support unemployed 'family' members, let alone the mad and unemployed in their 'families'. In the face of this it seems that the working class 'family' is responding in a number of different ways.

In the briefs on 'the family' in WIP 27, and especially David Webster's review of Colin Murray's book, Families Divided (1981), it is noted that there is no typical form of 'the family' for the majority of workers in southern Africa. The political economy of working class life has resulted in a number of

different responses which have affected, and continue to affect 'family' and household structures. In this regard it is important to be clear about what is being said about 'the family life' of workers in South Africa. In arguing against the brutal and destructive effects of migrant labour and influx control, we must be careful not to slip into promoting an ideal of 'family life' which draws its substance, in part or whole, from the bourgeois conception of the 'nuclear family'. The 'family' has become the privileged social structure under capitalism, with the result that other social structures which might satisfy the important social and personal needs of people presently dealt with in 'the family' are not investigated by critics of the 'family', and often consciously undermined by apologists of 'the family' under capitalism.

It is necessary to make a thorough-going critique of the material basis of 'the family' under capitalism in South Africa, while at the same time not unwittingly promoting some vague idealised notion of 'the family' - nuclear or extended, so-called. It is important for us to work towards other more progressive and democratic social structures which might overcome the political and personal problems inherent in 'the family' as the socialising structure in contemporary capitalism.

As a starting point in discussions about 'the family' it might be useful, particularly in relation to the working class in South Africa, to talk about the household (as suggested in the report of Anne Mullins' work in WIP 27) and see if and how this articulates with any particular notion of 'the family'. It is interesting to note that the origins of the word 'family' derive from the Latin word meaning 'household'. Furthermore we need to specify what 'family' forms and structures we are talking about - technically put, we must develop an historical materialist analysis of 'the family' in South Africa.

In this regard some of the conceptions of 'the family' in the articles in WIP 27 are worrying in that, while the authors of these briefs obviously have a sense of the problems entailed in the social organisation of 'family life' in South Africa, there is at the same time a tendency in their arguments to give 'the family' a privileged status among the structures of social organisation that exist in the working class.

For example, '... the destruction of african family life through the migrant labour system and the operation of the pass laws' (WIP 27:36); and '... many others have lost all understanding of normal family organisation and gave up the struggle long ago' (WIP 27:38); and '(I)t has been argued that low wages and the migrant labour system have put constraints on the family ideal for african women (WIP 27:40); and finally '(T)he nuclear family does not exist for the majority of people' (WIP 27:42) - my emphases.

The concern that motivates these reservations about 'the family' in the working class is that it is not clear what the range of 'family' forms are, and especially how these forms are related to the class struggle. What are the other forms of social organisation in the townships, and is 'the family' the most appropriate mode of analysis? These questions are both theoretical and tactical. For example, it would be important to know to what extent the bourgeois ideology of the 'nuclear family' operates as a reality and 'pressure' for working class blacks - see Joanne Yawitch's article in WIP 27 in this regard.

In conclusion, the work done by me on labour and madness (WIP 26) did not directly situate the cycle of unemployment and madness I spoke about in relation to 'family' forms. However, some things can be said about the urban 'family'/household in this regard. The mad, and the unemployed, are becoming an intolerable (economic) strain on working class households, who in the face of the worsening crisis of the capitalist economy - for example inflation and recession - are socially unable to contain and support these people. It sometimes becomes as desperate as Sheena Duncan shows: '... family members who have been turned out of the house by one who now holds the residential permit. Old people, unmarried women and their children are pushed out, something unheard of in traditional society' (WIP 27:38). I would add, the mad and the unemployed. This has resulted in what Legassick calls the individualisation of 'families' as a response to inflation, recession and consumerism. Or in the terms of the articles in the previous WIP - the nuclearisation of 'families'.

This, however, is not the typical form of social organisation in the townships as people - sometimes

'families', though not necessarily blood relations - have come together to form more viable economic household units. Again it would be inaccurate and misleading to designate this social structure as an 'extended family'. Rather we need to understand both the persistence and destruction of the different working class forms of social organisation at the primary level of the 'family'/household.

A short postscript - it is hoped that the arrogance of my theoretical remarks about 'the family' in this short article are taken in the spirit of believing that it is important to be clear about the terms of our political discussions of the black working class 'family' in South Africa today.

family therapy boycott

The SA Institute of Marital and Family Therapy (SAIMFT) held their 1983 Family Therapy Conference at Sun City in the BophuthaTswana bantustan. The conference was convened under the title 'Family Therapy in a Multi-Cultural Society'.

Opposition to the choice of venue was voiced by interested parties from both the left and the right. Conservative members were said to be dissatisfied with the venue's 'sex and gambling' image. This perspective received recent publicity in the trial of AWB members, charges against whom included sabotage of the road to Sun City and the proposed introduction of diseased rats to the complex.

Another line of criticism was raised by an ad hoc group of workers in the social services who called for a boycott of the conference on social and economic grounds. This group focused their attention on the inappropriateness of the venue, emphasising the disruptive effects of the state's 'homelands' policy on family life (see pamphlet below).

However, implicitly they were also questioning the validity of 'family therapy' for the majority of South Africans who live under social, economic and political conditions that militate against stable family relationships.

In addition to the pamphlet, an information sheet providing factual support for their stand, was drawn up.

- This included details regarding:
- the destructive effects resulting from the fragmentation of SA's african population into ethnic 'homelands';
 - the destabilising effects of the relocation policy which has already involved 3,5-million people;
 - the abhorrent migrant labour system which necessitates that approximately 65,6% of the BophuthaTswana labour force work as migrants or commuters;
 - the overcrowding which results from 13% of the land being allocated to the majority of SA's population;
 - the effects of overcrowding, such as poor sanitation, malnutrition, inadequate housing facilities, and an infant mortality rate of one in three african children under the age of five years.

The sheet drew attention to Sun City as 'the glossiest cover the system of economic oppression, enforced political impotence and human indignity (this country) has ever had', and found it ironical that a conference on family life be held against the backdrop of family deprivation and disintegration. It referred to an HSRC report on Sun City (suppressed after a leak in the Sunday Times, 14.06.81), that showed how Sun City contributed to 'increases in crime; truancy; prostitution; venereal disease; alcoholism; and an increased threat to family life and squandering of earnings'.

Two members of the ad hoc group were prevented, by Sun City personnel, from distributing these pamphlets to conference participants. In addition they were handed over to BophuthaTswana police and questioned for several hours. The ad hoc group believes that their message should still be heard and are presently exploring alternative methods of distribution.

(The organisers of the conference, held in July, claimed that Sun City was the only venue capable of meeting their requirements.)

The contents of a pamphlet entitled 'Family Therapy Conference Boycott', issued by the ad hoc boycott group, are reproduced below:

It seems important to bring to your attention that a boycott of the family therapy conference has been organised. The venue has alienated a large section of interested people, namely, those who seriously object to the current political structure of South African society.

You are fully aware that the venue is

situated in a so-called 'black homeland'. The 'homelands' are so impoverished that people there are forced to seek jobs elsewhere as migrant labourers. In South Africa, the migrant labour system completely fragments the family, as the law prevents migrant labourers from taking their families with them. A family therapy conference where there are few intact families is absurd.

Sun City exists as a result of anomalies in the apartheid system. An exploitative situation has thus developed in which an extravagant and opulent structure has been set up within an extremely impoverished area of South Africa. This development, next to extreme underdevelopment, is eroding the surrounding community - examples of which are: prostitution, begging and gambling. It is also seen, by many people, as epitomising the disparity of wealth in South Africa.

The conference has been convened under the title:

'Family Therapy in a Multicultural Society'

(even though very few of the papers have any connection with this title). The term 'multicultural' has often been invoked by the South African government to justify the apartheid system. The concept has served to divert the attention of individuals away from the real issue: namely, institutionalised economic exploitation. It seems that the organisers of the conference have been victims of this mystification.

It is felt that by attending this conference you are expressing a disregard for the above mentioned issues.

Issued by:

Ad hoc group against the venue of the 1983 South African Family Therapy conference.

Endorsed by:

FEDSAW (Federation of South African Women); AZASO (Azanian Students Organisation); Black Sash; DPSC (Detainees Parents Support Committee - Johannesburg, Durban); Descom (Detainees Support Committee - Transvaal); DWEP (Domestic Workers Employment Project); Committee of Ten (Soweto); CRAC (Co-ordinating Residents Action Committee); NEUSA (National Education Union of SA); ICT (Institute for Contextual Theology); Kagiso Residents Association (Krugersdorp); MGWU (Municipal and General Workers Union); SAAWU (SA Allied Workers Union); Soweto Civic Association; SACC (SA

Council of Churches); SABSWA (SA Black Social Workers Association); 'Social Services Group; UDF (United Democratic Front); TIC (Transvaal Indian Congress); NIC (Natal Indian Congress); Anti-Community Council (Soweto); COSAS (Congress of South African Students)■



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United Fronts and Political Unity

With the impending formation of a number of national political alliances, a look at past organisational forms has value. The European United Front experience of the 1920s is discussed in this light.

People trying to understand South Africa have often used theories of capitalism formulated in Europe. However, the possible use of Europe's political experience has been somewhat neglected.

Borrowing from European political experience is just as difficult as borrowing from European theory. In both cases, abstraction has to be made from European specifics. After this, the resulting general concepts/principles/tactics have to be made concrete again and evaluated in terms of their relevance to South Africa. This article, however, does not presume to go much further than setting out some European experience from which the reader can abstract and re-apply what is useful.

The European experience to be discussed is the 'United Front' strategy and tactics practised by communists in the 1920s. However, because communism is illegal in South Africa, it is necessary to make certain points before the discussion proper begins.

UNITED FRONTS AND POLITICS

The question of united fronts, blocs and alliances is, as the conservative US sociologist Selznick notes, basic to all politics. In this respect, abstractions made from this article may be useful to understanding such South African politics as the trade union unity talks, the United Democratic Front (UDF), Buthelezi's South African Black Alliance (SABA), Conservative Party - Herstigte

Nasionale Party relations, the National Forum Committee, etc, and not simply the role of communists in South Africa. In fact, it is even questionable whether the European United Front experience as described in this article is relevant to the activity of the South African Communist Party (SACP). As EH Carr writes of the European experience: 'One of the corollaries of the united front was the increased importance attached to legal as opposed to underground activities: parties were to appear openly and woo the alliance of other parties for limited objectives, while at the same time proclaiming their own wider purposes. But such a policy could have no application in countries where communist parties were under a legal ban, and existed only as conspiratorial organisations'.

The European United Front thus refers to an experience where 'front' means 'an alignment against an enemy formation' (Selznick), and not 'front' in the sense of a 'facade'. For South African relevance then, abstraction needs to be made from the European fact that specifically (open, legal) communist parties were involved. In essence, one is looking at a type of general strategy and tactics. Although this was worked into an explicit policy by European communists in the 1920s, it is an element of politics in general. Needless to say, therefore, a group that makes use of united front strategy and tactics (and probably every political group in South Africa does to some extent), is not thereby furthering the aims of communism. The politicking between the Conservative and Herstigte Nasionale Parties over a conservative united front against the National Party illustrates this point well.

THE UNITED FRONT IN EUROPE

The United Front policy in Europe was explicitly laid out by the Third International (Comintern) in December 1921. The Comintern had been formed in 1919, and helped organise and bring together communist parties from around the world. With some changes in emphasis, the United Front carried on until 1928. That year saw the so-called 'third period' when the Third International dropped the United Front policy in the belief that it would weaken the revolutionary upsurge expected out of the coming capitalist depression. In 1934 the United Front was revived in a new form - the Popular Front - and this continued until after World War II. The focus in this article is on the period before 1928, although some comments will be made on the Popular Front.

In practical terms, the United Front boiled down to ongoing joint action between communist and socialist parties over limited, not especially revolutionary issues in which most workers had a conscious interest. Examples of these issues were bread, clothing, housing, tax, political rights and freedoms, peace and war. Together with two socialist Internationals, the Comintern drew up the following United Front demands: an eight-hour working day; a struggle against unemployment; aid to the Bolsheviks for famine relief in Russia; and so on. The Bolshevik party paper, Pravda, called for world wide demonstrations by a 'union of workers, communists, anarchists, social-democrats (ie socialists), non-party workers, independents, and Christian democrats against capital'. In some cases, joint action was through direct liaison between organisations on specific campaigns. In other cases, intermediate bodies were set up, and organisations in the United Front sent representatives or became affiliated to these. Examples of such bodies were the National Unemployed Workers' Movement and the National Minority Movement in Britain.

There was a lot more to the United Front, however. The reasons for the policy are important. The immediate boost was successful united action against a right wing coup by the German socialist and communist

parties in 1920. But there were also more general reasons behind the communist movement's use and development of the United Front as a longer-term strategy. Reflecting on the Comintern's adoption of the policy, the organisation's president Zinoviev said it was taken up because:

- * communists did not have majority support in the Western working class;
- * the socialist parties were still very strong;
- * communists were under attack and on the defensive;
- * decisive battles were not on the immediate agenda.

This gave rise to the United Front slogan, 'To the masses!'

Clearly, this differs from the context of united mass action in South Africa - not all of which is defensive, for instance. The United Front as discussed in this article therefore must be weighed up in terms of the ebbing of the post-war revolutionary tide in Europe in the 1920s; in terms of a capitalist economic and political offensive against the working class; and in terms of workers still under the sway of reformist parties and unions.

From this outline of the context of the United Front, it is clear that the problem for the communist parties at the time - winning majority support in the working class - depended on destroying the hold of the socialists over the workers. For the communists, this was one key part of the United Front: the policy was partly an offensive against reformism in the working class. The other key part of the United Front was its role as a defensive policy against capital and the capitalist state. But there was a tension between these two parts. The offensive part meant conflict within the working class; the defensive called for working class unity.

The problem of offense vs defence was closely linked to the question of what united action with socialists actually meant in class terms. The United Front provided for joint action between organisations with a worker or peasant base, and even with radical petty bourgeois strata (eg the Radical Party in Bulgaria). But it excluded action with bourgeois groupings. (The Popular Front included bourgeois groupings in the struggle against fascism - the latter being defined

by Dimitrov, a theorist of the Popular Front, as the naked terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary section of the bourgeoisie). The United Front meant the joint struggle of the working masses and their organisations to combat the bourgeoisie as a whole, and not collaboration with it or any of its parties. Such collaboration was seen by communists as subordinating the interests of the masses to the bourgeoisie in return for small rewards to some parties, groups and individuals. While the United Front pooled efforts against capital, collaboration with the bourgeoisie was seen as disorganising workers and their organisations.

The issue in the 1920s was whether the socialist organisations were the left wing of the bourgeoisie, or the right wing of the proletariat. Clearly the socialists were neither purely one nor the other. However, the question of whose interests the socialists objectively served had great importance for the communist parties in deciding whether they should be opposed or won over. If the socialists were the left wing of the bourgeoisie, then a united front with them against the bourgeoisie was a contradiction in terms.

As things turned out, many socialists did form united fronts in the 1920s - but with the bourgeois parties against the communists. Given this role, most communists tended to diagnose the socialists as the left wing of the bourgeoisie. Correspondingly, the United Front became less a joint defence against capital and more a means of attacking the socialists.

The question of the political class character of the socialists is very specific to Europe at the time. In South Africa, not only classes but also internal colonial structures and groupings have a material reality. Thus a national democratic front is probably more relevant here than are the European United and Popular Front experiences. Nonetheless, there may be some general lessons in the European case for understanding South Africa.

The experience of the Popular Front, for example, may be useful in understanding the political class character of the black petty bourgeoisie. The Popular Front - as a defensive unity - was based on the lowest common denominator of anti-

fascism. This explicitly included sections of the petty bourgeoisie and small capitalists. Ruined by the 1929 depression and the resulting monopolisation in industry, these two groups had given crucial support to fascism in a vain search for relief measures. When fascism in fact acted in the interests of monopoly capitalism, these two groups 'came up for grabs' by other interests. The Popular Front hoped to win their support in smashing fascism in the short-term, and also had the long-term goal of winning members over to the proletariat's side - getting them to commit 'class suicide'. This example shows the dire need for united front and popular front tactics to be applied - not formalistically and ahistorically - but with regard to the class and political line-up in each situation. Evaluating the politics of the black petty bourgeoisie in South Africa requires a study of concrete historical realities, and not merely abstract declarations.

Given the reactionary role of the socialists in the 1920s, the United Front came to be seen largely as a way to destroy the influence of the socialists as a first necessary step to winning the majority of the working class over to the communist parties. This did not mean that the role of the United Front as a defence against capital now fell away. Communists still offered unity to the socialists. They argued that if the latter refused the offer, they would be exposed as sell-outs with no real interest in the working class issues to be fought for. The onus for divisions in the working class would be on them, and this could give a propaganda coup to the communists. (This tactic was recently evident in HNP - CP unity overtures in the Soutpansberg/Waterberg by-elections).

On the other hand, the communists argued, if the socialists did agree to united action, this was all the better. Defensive action could be carried out, and if the socialists refused to take this to its logical and eventual conclusion, they would be shown up for what they were. More than this, through the United Front communists would have had access to the socialists' rank-and-file supporters and the chance to win them over. Unity here would at least have served as a bridge

between the communists and the working class majority. Furthermore, out of the united action, the socialist rank-and-file could be won over not just to general communist principles, but also to communist organisational leadership.

In the view of Gramsci, a leader in the Italian Communist Party, the intermediate slogans and demands of the United Front formed a bridge to the Communist Party's own slogans, and helped the party assemble broad forces behind it. Other communists said that the minimum demands and first-level organisations of the United Front would link the masses to the communist parties as a second-level organisation with a maximum programme. Gramsci also pointed out that although the minimum demands of the United Front were the same as those of the socialists, they would serve as a form of struggle against these very people. Faced with the test of deeds, the socialists would unmask themselves. Action on minimum demands could also give communists the chance to expose the class relations and power underlying the daily lot of workers. As the 1920s wore on, and the socialists became more reactionary, the prospects of the United Front became even less an effective defence against capital and increasingly an offensive against the socialists. This is one of the two main differences between the United Front and the Popular Front. The latter was planned and practised mainly as a defensive struggle against fascism. (The other main difference between these two forms of struggle was, as discussed above, that as a defence against fascism the Popular Front included bourgeois democrats. It was therefore wider than the worker (and in some cases peasant and radical petty bourgeoisie) based United Front. The question that could be asked in a South African context is how cases of united action balance the internal-offensive and external-defensive elements.

An important part of the United Front activity was that it needed no compromise from any partner. The communist parties did not abandon any major programme goal, nor their independence as parties in the United Fronts. The United Front for the communist parties was therefore neither a retreat nor an effacement, but a general, concrete, anti-capitalist platform.

One problem in this was that the socialists were wary of a unity that could destroy their influence. Comintern secretary Radek said of the socialists that 'we propose that they should fight with us in order that we may unmask them'. The socialist response - as voiced by the Belgian leader in the reformist Second International, Vandervelde - was predictable: 'An appeal is made for union for the realisation of the united front, but no secret is made of the intention to stifle us and poison us after embracing us'. This is partly why the socialists in general responded in lukewarm terms to the United Front overtures.

On the other hand, the United Front was a two-edged sword: where it was realised, it not only gave the communists access to socialist rank-and-file, but vice versa. The communists began to feel the negative effects of this at a conference with the reformist socialist Internationals in 1922. A problem in united front action, therefore, involves an assessment of which goals the action is advancing most.

In response to this problem, the communist parties by 1923 began to strongly re-emphasize several principles. These were the right and duty of communist parties to keep a separate identity, organisation and doctrine within United Fronts; to keep on propagating their long-term aims; and to criticise their temporary allies in the United Fronts. Unity, it was re-iterated, was to be only in practical action over definite common goals. The problem in all of this for the communist parties was to distinguish unity that compromised their independence from the day-to-day need to work together on issues that all workers had a conscious interest in. The communist parties wanted to take part in the United Fronts - but without becoming dissolved into them.

The problem of the independence of the communist parties needs to be seen in historical context. Most of these parties were only a few years old in 1921, and most had arisen out of bitter splits with the long-standing (reformist) socialist parties. Lenin, in encouraging the formation of the Italian communist party out of the left wing of the Italian socialist party, had advised this wing to first

break with the socialist party, and then to form an alliance with it. This was the same line that Lenin had put forward 20 years earlier on Bolshevik - Menshevik relations: 'Before uniting, and in order to unite, we first decisively and definitely draw a line of separation'. But this was easier said than done. On the one hand, leftists in the new communist parties wanted to keep their distance from their former (socialist) parties. They felt that the communist parties were still immature and would be set back by joint action with the socialist parties. The danger of sectarianism lurked in this leftist argument. On the other hand, rightists in the communist parties leaned towards unity with the socialists at any cost - even to the extent of 'liquidationism', ie the re-absorption of the communist party into the socialist party. In this rightist position was the possibility of getting bogged down in short-term aims, and of opportunism. Between the extremes of giving an icy shoulder to the socialists, and an embrace leading to fusion with them, the United Front had to develop. The United Front was to involve a unity of aims and organisations, not an identity between them.

In Italy, distinctions were made between types of joint struggle in the context of this problem. Gramsci used the concept of fusion to refer to the merging of various political groups with the Italian communist party. This differed from a bloc (or alliance) between the communist party and separate independent political groups. The bloc in turn differed from the united front for Gramsci in that it involved closer collaboration between participants than did the latter. Gramsci at the time was arguing for the formation of a bloc between the Italian communist party and the left wing 'Maximalist' faction of the Italian socialist party. This bloc would, in his view, be part of a wider united front with other political organisations in the working class (as well as from the peasantry). (In South Africa, the UDF may be closer to Gramsci's bloc concept. A united front, in Gramsci's sense, would be the UDF in joint action on specific issues with groups outside it such as certain trade unions, the Black Sash, etc).

Another problem relating to socialists

getting more mileage out of the United Front than the communists, was the actual organisational form of united front activity. After socialists 'sold out' the German revolution of 1923, communists became very critical of 'United Fronts from above'. This type of joint action involved only the leaders of the constituent organisations (as for example in parliamentary coalitions - or the South African Black Alliance). Certain left communists counterposed a United Front 'from below' in either/or terms to a United Front 'from above'. However, the Comintern pointed out that a United Front from above could not always be replaced by one from below - as desirable as that might be. The fact of the matter was that the socialist leaders often could not simply be by-passed or skipped over. Gramsci argued that a frontal attack on socialist leaders from the outside was ineffective, and that real working class unity and mobilisation of socialist rank-and-file was needed to successfully expose the socialist leaders. Gradually the line emerged that United Fronts 'from above' were acceptable only if combined with vigorous propaganda to separate the masses from their socialist 'mis-leaders'. Talks with these leaders were to be public so that the blame for breakdown, or for the betrayal of agreements, could be clearly placed.

Where possible, however, the United Front was to be applied mainly from below. The fourth Comintern congress noted that 'the true realisation of the tactics of the united front can only come "from below", by taking the lead in factory committees, committees of action, and such other bodies in which members of other parties and non-party elements would associate themselves with communists'.

For his part, Gramsci advised:
'1. We must not continue to make en bloc counterpositions, but must distinguish between leaders and mass base.

2. We must find all elements of disagreement between the leaders and the mass base and deepen these, enlarge them, generalise them politically'.

The question of the organisational form - 'from above' or 'from below' - may be relevant to understanding cases of united political action in South Africa.

A further problem about organisational forms in the United Front related to socialist political parties on the one hand, and socialist trade unions on the other. Although not clearly debated or used, it does seem that the United Front was applied differently to each case. With socialist (and other non-communist working class) parties, the United Front aim was generally to split them in the hope of bringing the mass of their supporters over to the communist party. However, in the case of non-communist trade unions, splitting was discouraged. Instead, United Front action with these bodies was aimed at winning support from union members to change the unions from within.

This difference seems to have arisen from the specific political conditions at the time (as in Italy), and was also linked to developments in Profintern, the Red International of Trade Unions. However, it is also possible that the distinction made between parties and unions reflects a more general view that while trade unions are mass worker organisations that can encompass a wide variety of political beliefs, political parties are generally mutually exclusive and competitive. It is worth, nonetheless, noting Gramsci's warning at the time not to fetishise any particular form of organisation, but to adapt to the terrain offered by reality. Again, this may be relevant to South Africa, especially in analysing local experience in the light of foreign experience.

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Information

labour action

TRANSVAAL

Company: AECI (Modderfontein)
Date: 3 - 8 August
Workers: 1 400
Union: SA Chemical Workers' Union
(SACWU)

Over a thousand workers downed tools in protest against a supervisor who allegedly used abusive language. Talks took place between management and union shop stewards. The workers finally agreed to return after management had 'taken action' against the supervisor - this action did not include his dismissal.

Company: Asea Electrical (Pretoria)
Date: 8 August
Workers: 300
Union: Metal and Allied Workers' Union
(MAWU)

Workers downed tools over a demand for a 28% wage increase. They had originally been promised a 40% increase but then management had granted them 12% which came into effect as from 1 August. The workers resolved not to return until management granted them the outstanding 28%.

Company: Autoplastics (Pretoria, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth)
Date: 12 - 14 September
Workers: 1 000
Union: National Union of Automobile and Allied Workers' Union (NAAWU)

Workers struck at these three plants after they were informed by their union that wage negotiations which were being conducted at a national level with Autoplastics had deadlocked. Management refused the union's proposal of a 15c an hour across-the-board increase on a minimum wage of R1,23.

Over 500 workers at the Rosslyn (Pretoria) plant downed tools early on

the afternoon of 12 September. By late that same afternoon workers at the Port Elizabeth and Cape Town plants had followed suit. The strike at the three plants is said to be the first in recent labour history in which plants in several parts of the country owned by the same company have struck at the same time over the same demand.

Due to the halt in production at Autoplastics, which produces motor components, it was also impossible for Sigma (Pretoria) to continue production and about 2 000 workers were sent home that day.

Workers at the Durban plant did not participate in the strike, as NAAWU does not have majority representation there.

After further negotiations with the union management agreed to an 8c an hour increase. The union recommended to the workers that they accept, which they did. Work at all three plants resumed on 14 September.

Company: Checkers (Primrose)
Date: 8 September
Workers: 45
Union: Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA)

A stoppage, chiefly in protest against forced overtime, was staged by the workers at this store. The workers claimed that they had difficulties in working overtime as the supermarket was in an isolated area which meant that they would get home very late. They also claimed that they had not been given the 24 hours notice to work overtime required by law. They returned to work at 12h30 the same day, after management had agreed to pay them for the overtime they had worked and also to investigate their other grievances.

Company: CI Homes (Boksburg)
Date: 31 August - 2 September
Workers: 200
Union: Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union

This company, a subsidiary of Murray and Roberts' Construction, retrenched 25 workers in June this year. The workers were not informed of the retrenchments beforehand. The works council took up the matter with management and the workers were promised that there would be no more retrenchments until the end of the year. However, on 30 August management announced that 36 workers were being laid off the next day.

On 31 August the workers downed tools in protest at the action. The union, which represents less than half of the workers at the firm and which is not recognised by management, offered to intervene and resolve the problem. However, the talks deadlocked with management firing all the striking workers and offering selective re-employment to those who reapplied.

Company: Clinical Laboratories
Date: 15 August
Workers: 100
Union: ?

Workers downed tools in protest against the dismissal of a colleague. Management's reason for the dismissal was that the worker had been talking too much while on duty. Additional grievances which the workers were protesting against were the fact that their teatime had been abolished and their lunch hour had been cut short by 30 minutes. They were also not allowed to eat in the offices.

Management warned workers that if they did not return to work they would be fired. The workers, however, refused to return until their colleague was unconditionally reinstated. A team of Sowetan reporters, who arrived to investigate the matter, were ordered to leave the premises as management said they were trespassing (Sowetan, 16.08.83).

No further news.

Company: Delmas Milling Co
Date: 29 August
Workers: 300 - 800*
Union: Food, Beverage and Allied Workers' Union

Workers struck in support of two colleagues, both union branch executive members, who were retrenched. The workers viewed it as victimisation, as the company, since the beginning of the year,

had shown itself reluctant to hold recognition talks. The only talks held had been informal ones at the union offices, and it was then that the union learnt of the retrenchments. The union's general secretary said that workers should have been given advance notice of the retrenchments. A company spokesperson said that they had informed the workers about the retrenchments before they had taken place.

Management agreed to meet with union officials and the following day the workers returned to work. The company agreed to begin recognition talks and to the reinstatement of the retrenched union members.

*The entire workforce at this company consists of about 800 workers. Reports differed as to whether only 300 participated in the strike, or whether more were involved.

Company: Firestone (Brits)
Date: 9 - 10 August and 23 - 30 August

Workers: About 400
Union: NAAWU

Workers struck in protest against a 5% increase in wages granted by the company. Talks were held following the dispute.

Most of the workforce of 400 downed tools again on 23 August. The security police intervened and warned workers to stop causing 'trouble' at the firm. The strike was finally called off when management and the union reached agreement which laid down the basis for a review of wages to bring Firestone workers' minimum wages nearer 'a living wage of R3,50 an hour'.

Company: Garankuwa Hospital (for background, see WIP 28:50)

Date: End of June to mid-August
Workers: 500
Union: -

Deputy superintendent of the hospital, Dr J Liebenberg, confirmed that the strike was over and 'everything was back to normal' (Sowetan, 17.08.83).

Company: G and W Base and Industrial Minerals (Wadeville)

Date: 15 August
Workers: About 250
Union: Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU)

A ban on overtime work at this firm was implemented in support of a demand for a R2,00 an hour minimum wage. The company was only prepared to offer a 10c per

hour increase, bringing the minimum wage to R1,28 per hour. A union spokesperson said that management had agreed, prior to the strike, to allow the union to examine the firm's books to test whether or not the company's statement that it could not afford the increases was correct. It was discovered that the company had reserves of between R4-m and R5-m, and the workers resolved at a general meeting to ban overtime at the plant. On 18 August the workers were still not working overtime, although the management and the union were continuing negotiations.

No further news.

Company: Indo Atlantic International (Pty), Ltd

Date: 16 August

Workers: 70

Union: ?

Workers downed tools in support of wage demands and better working conditions. Workers stated that management had ignored representations to them concerning their grievances. This was denied by management who said that by striking the workers had automatically dismissed themselves.

Company: International Metal and Machinery Enterprises (Johannesburg)

Date: 1 September

Workers: 14

Union: -

Workers at this firm were made to work a four-day week since May, with reduced wages. Management promised that after two months a five-day week would be reintroduced and wages would be readjusted. However, when the five-day week was reintroduced there were no increases. Workers demanded to know why. According to management one worker said he would resign if he did not get the increase. 'The MD said that those who wanted to resign could do so and the lot walked out', a company spokesperson said (Star, 01.09.83).

Company: Lancet Laboratories

Date: 15 August

Workers: ?

Union: Black Health and Allied Workers' Union (BHAUW)

A One-day strike sparked off by the dismissal of a co-worker has led to significant gains for the union, which represents 95 of 130 black workers at the laboratory. Talks between management and the union are taking place to discuss recognition and management has agreed to wait until the agreement is concluded

before retrenching workers. The union has also been allowed to organise and hold meetings at the plant.

Note: See Clinical Laboratories above, where a strike over a dismissal was reported to have occurred on 15 August. WIP has been unable to establish whether in fact these were two different strikes at two different companies at the same time. We hope to be able to provide more news in the next issue.

Company: Liberty Life Insurance Company (for background, see WIP 28:51)

Date: 13 - 19 July

Workers: Between 90 and 150

Union: Insurance, Assurance Workers' Union of SA (IAWUSA)

After several weeks management responded to IAWUSA's letter saying that the union had given insufficient answers to the questions management had asked them. Management also denied the union's charges that one of their members, S Govender, had been victimised by the company.

Company: Maizecor Milling Company (Watloo)

Date: 30 August

Workers: Over 100

Union: Food and Beverage Workers' Union Management at this company informed the workers that a wage agreement entered into between the union and the company could not be signed immediately because it had to be signed by the directors who were not yet available. The workers refused to accept this and downed tools in protest.

According to press reports there have been several work stoppages prior to the above, which have led to the dismissal of a number of workers during the negotiations for the drawing up of the agreement. The agreement was eventually signed on the weekend of 10/11 September. It includes a wage agreement and retrenchment procedures. Issues still to be discussed are health, safety and maternity leave.

Company: Masterbuilt (Olifantsfontein)

Date: 28 (?) August

Workers: About 100

Union: SA Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) Workers downed tools in protest against the sacking of a colleague. They were subsequently locked out. The strike was called off after the dispute had been settled by the union.

Company: Omega-Barfel

Date: 9 August

Workers: 200 (?)

Union: SAAWU

Workers struck over the dismissal of two colleagues and refused to return to work until they were reinstated. The men, quality controllers in the plastics plant, were summarily dismissed after a client returned a poor quality product. The striking workers claimed that management did not follow the correct reprimand procedure. Management dismissed 55 workers on 11 August for refusing to return to work. Management also claims that this is the total number of workers who went on strike, whereas union sources put the figure at 200.

Company: OK Bazaars (Randburg)

Date: 9 September

Workers: About 100

Union: CCAWUSA

A stoppage lasting 20 minutes was staged by workers at this store. They downed tools in protest at the undignified and insulting conduct of a security guard. The guard was suspended pending an investigation, and the workers returned to work.

Company: Pride Pools

Date: 23 August

Workers: 53

Union: Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union

Workers were dissatisfied because they were underpaid. The statutory minimum wage was R1,11 an hour and in some cases the workers, mostly migrants, were paid as little as 60c an hour. The pool labourers had refused to start work until the company's managing director, R Bester, discussed wage increases with them. The workers maintained that Bester refused to meet their representatives and ordered them off the property. Bester denied reports that he had threatened the men and said that he had agreed to negotiate increases individually and on merit.

Company: Printpak (Industria)

Date: 22 - 24 September

Workers: Over 250

Union: Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PWAU)

The workers downed tools in protest against the dismissal of seven of their colleagues and against the closed-shop agreement, which forces them to join the TUCSA-affiliated SA Typographical Union (SATU). The striking workers demanded the

reinstatement of the seven workers and that they be allowed to join the FOSATU-affiliated PWAU.

After negotiations between the worker representatives and the Nampak group, of which Printpak is a subsidiary, it was agreed that the company would open recognition talks with the PWAU. Only one of the workers was reinstated, although management agreed to inquire into the reasons for the dismissal of the other six. A union spokesperson said that the agreement meant that management had acknowledged their (PWAU) majority presence at the plant. However, this did not mean that the SATU's closed shop at the plant had been terminated, and he said that the PWAU would continue in its efforts to end it.

Company: Standard Brass, Iron and Steel Foundries (near Benoni)

Date: 9 - 12 September

Workers: About 400

Union: Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU)

Management's refusal to recognise their union prompted workers at the foundry to stop work. About 325 of the workers at this firm are MAWU members, yet the company has consistently refused to meet with worker representatives and shop stewards of the union. On 12 September two MAWU representatives were refused entry into the premises by a security guard, but were later allowed in after lengthy negotiations with management.

The workers agreed to return to work that day on condition that management carried out their promise to meet with the union on Thursday 14 September to discuss recognition of MAWU at the plant.

Company: Unipark Potteries (Vanderbijlpark)

Date: ?

Workers: 20

Union: Building and Construction Workers' Union

The workers struck in support of higher wage demands and that they be allowed to join their union. They were all dismissed (Sowetan, 07.09.83).

Company: University of the Witwatersrand

Date: February 1983

Workers: 6

Union: Black University Workers' Association

A dispute between six workers and a supervisor in the Data Processing Unit occurred early this year. The six punch

card operators were reluctant to work overtime as overtime work in their case is 'paid for' through the granting of extra leave time. Their supervisor, J Lehman, allegedly lost her temper and was racially insulting towards the workers over the issue. The workers took her before the University Disciplinary Committee for her conduct towards them.

The result of the hearing took three months, with the committee recommending that Lehman be severely punished for her behaviour. However, the workers seemed unconvinced that conditions would improve after the recommendation. They stated that: 'The seeds of hatred have been planted in the department and Mrs Lehman has indicated that apartheid will be practised in the department and that she intends to rule with an iron-hand' (Wits Student, 35,10).

The workers' assessment proved to be a very accurate one. They staged a go-slow in protest against her alleged continuing racist behaviour. Lehman was, as a result, transferred to another department. Subsequently one of the punch operators was told to allow someone else to use her machine. Another machine was obviously not being used, and the workers felt this was an attempt by Lehman to make her presence felt, although she was in another department. The six workers struck, turning down the authorities' proposal to try working with Lehman again. The result of the strike action was the sacking of the six workers.

Company: Vaness Products (Koedoespoort)

Date: 17 August

Workers: 25

Union: National General Workers' Union
Workers struck for better pay and improved working conditions. They wanted a 30c rise on their R1,30 hourly rate.

Management reinstated the workers a week later after a meeting between the company and union officials. Management agreed to grant a merit increase - originally granted selectively - to all workers; and to establish a medical aid scheme. The company held that there had been a misunderstanding and that the difference between those who had received the merit increase was 3c an hour, or R1,60 a week and not R1,60 per hour as the union had thought.

Company: Watergate and Datco (Alrode)

Date: 12 August

Workers: 7

Union: -

These workers were sacked after approaching management for higher wages. Management claimed that as far as they were concerned the workers had stopped the machines in order to ask for the increase. This was considered to be a strike and consequently they had been fired.

EASTERN CAPE

Company: Autoplastics (see Transvaal, above)

Company: ICS Foods (Port Elizabeth)

Date: 4 August

Workers: 10

Union: General Workers' Union (GWU)

Workers at this plant were told they could go off duty when they had finished offloading cartons. The foreman, however, reversed this decision and ordered them to move more cartons after they had finished the first batch. They refused to move three pallets with 40 cartons each which they claimed were too heavy to move, and needed to be moved by forklift truck. The personnel manager refused to talk to the shop steward over the matter and had unfairly told management that the workers were on strike, a union source said.

Management responded by suspending all ten workers.

Company: Textile factory (Butterworth)

Date: ?

Workers: 90

Union: -

These workers were charged and convicted 'of refusing or failing to work'. They were fined R30 or 30 days each. Four of the men had paid a R50 admission of guilt fine and did not appear in court. The workers who were brought to court and convicted appeared in terms of the (Transkei) Labour Relations Act of 1977 (RDM, 03.09.83).

Company: Transerve (East London)

Date: 5 August

Workers: 55

Union: ?

Workers resigned en masse after a wage dispute at the factory. They demanded a 40% increase, back-dated to June and resigned when this was refused. All

workers were asked to reapply for their jobs and 38 did so.

NATAL

Company: Umhlanga Rocks Municipality

Date: 15 September

Workers: About 140

Union: National Federation of Workers

The workers who downed tools demanding higher wages were all sacked by the municipality. According to town clerk, BD Watson, the workers refused to leave the premises after they had been dismissed. Ninety-two of the strikers are now being charged with trespassing and are due to appear in court on 14 October.

MINING

Company: Iscor's Sishen Mine

Date: 23 August

Workers: 2 000

Union: ?

The strike arose over the repayment of contributions to Iscor's retirement fund. About 400 workers were dismissed for intimidating other workers. The remainder returned to work on 24 August.

J vd Grimes, the mine manager, stated that a small group of workers who were dismissed had caused slight damage to a mine hostel when they broke windows. He said that an information program on the retirement fund would be introduced to iron out any misunderstandings.

The African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) chairperson, Samson Ndou, alleged that the strikers had been beaten up and teargassed - denied by mine management. He also said that the miners had downed tools for four days.

Hlobane Colliery disaster and related events:

In a complicated settlement of a dispute over the supply and pricing of coking coal to Iscor, and involving Iscor, General Mining, and Dunswart amongst others, Iscor got control over the Hlobane Colliery in northern Natal (Star, 04.07.83).

On Monday 12 September 1983 a methane gas explosion ripped through the Boomlager section of the Hlobane Colliery, incinerating 63 miners immediately and badly burning ten others, four of them critically - these four men have also since died in hospital. Sixty-four of the dead miners were african men,

migrants from the Transkei, the Ciskei, KwaZulu and Lesotho.

The Rand Daily Mail spoke to Michael Martinson, of the Department of Mining Engineering at the University of the Witwatersrand, on methane gas and the dangers associated with it: the gas is present in coal and in the rock above and below a coal seam and constantly seeps into shafts. At concentrations of between 5% and 15% it is explosive, but the real danger lies in the coal dust explosion that can follow a methane explosion - the smaller methane explosion having raised the coal dust.

Regulations require methane tests to be carried out before the start of and during each shift. A safe level in South Africa is 1,25% (in Britain it is 1%).

However, as Martinson pointed out, making mines safe 'is a very complex problem and a tremendous hazard. It (the dangers) cannot be eliminated - that would mean virtually not mining' (RDM, 13.09.83). With the central position that mineral, especially gold and coal, exports hold in South Africa's economy that is the unthinkable. Mining continues despite the fact that at least 171 people have died in mining accidents this year, while 'between 700 and 800 workers have died in mine accidents and an average of nearly 28 000 have been injured every year between 1970 and 1977' (Kooy, 1979:43, calculated from Mining Statistics).

Over the last decade 8 209 people have died while 230 000 have been injured on South African mines (Star, 13.09.83). Things have not changed that much from the situation at the turn of the century, of which Moroney (1977) writes: 'In an environment where death rates were sometimes one in ten the choice of mine could be a matter of life and death.'

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), claiming a membership of between 30 000 and 40 000, called for black worker representation on the Mine Safety Committee, and an immediate investigation into the disaster. Only unions with white members are at present represented on the Mine Safety Committee, but it appears only to be a matter of time before the new black membership unions gain representation.

The NUM was joined by the Black Allied Mining and Construction Workers' Union in its call for an enquiry.

The NUM claimed that methane tests had not been carried out on the morning of

the disaster and that out-dated flame safety lamps (Davey lamps) were still in use on South African mines. Iscor spokesperson, Roelf Naude, said that flame lamps were still in use in the USA and that electronic lamps have a 'key drawback'. He was supported in his statement by the mine manager at Hlobane, DW Watson.

On Wednesday, 21 September, the NUM called for a half-hour work stoppage on the following Monday (26 September) to mourn the victims. This call was later supported by the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). Also on 21 September about 40 miners on the Gold Fields Group's West Driefontein mine refused to go underground because they feared for their safety. The mine spokesperson, Helaine Mendes, said that 14 of these miners had later agreed to resume work. The next day 17 workers were dismissed by the mine for refusing to work. In confirming the stoppage, PR Janisch, executive manager of Gold Fields, said that 'this (stoppage) was not an infrequent occurrence'. The NUM has stated that it intends challenging the dismissal of the workers by West Driefontein.


The NUM claimed that 'at least 32 000' miners observed the half-hour stoppage on Monday, 21 September. The Chamber of Mines said that 'It is our impression there was no stoppage at all'.

The tables are from Kooy (1979) and the references are to:

Kooy, Alide - 'Notes on Mine Accidents', 1979 in SA Labour Bulletin 4, 9&10.

Moroney, Sean - 'Mine Worker Protest on 1977 the Witwatersrand: 1901 - 1912', in SA Labour Bulletin 3, 5m

PERSONS EMPLOYED AND DEATH RATE - MINES



Source: Report of the Department of Mines for 1977 (R.P. 27/1978) p. 18.

YEAR	CATEGORY (1)	GOLD MINES		DIAMOND MINES		COAL MINES		OTHER MINES		TOTAL	
		DEAD	INJURED	DEAD	INJURED	DEAD	INJURED	DEAD	INJURED	DEAD	INJURED
1974	1	480	13 876	21	108	64	1 320	164	2 879	709	18 184
	2	20	8 482	2	37	15	274	15	1 380	52	10 183
	3	9	128	0	8	5	22	16	87	30	240
	TOTAL	489	22 484	23	151	84	1 616	195	4 346	791	28 607
1975	1	480	11 814	10	64	83	1 300	127	2 382	670	15 660
	2	29	7 224	1	30	12	278	18	1 180	60	8 713
	3	19	88	2	4	5	28	9	108	35	239
	TOTAL	498	19 226	13	98	100	1 606	154	3 670	765	24 612
1976	1	507	12 817	8	87	73	1 478	122	2 165	711	16 617
	2	26	7 643	3	27	10	285	8	1 356	57	9 311
	3	24	188	-	2	3	18	1	67	28	255
	TOTAL	557	20 728	12	96	86	1 781	141	3 588	796	26 183
1977	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
	2	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
	3	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
	TOTAL	584	19 973	"	"	120	2 081	"	"	880	25 579

* denotes not available

courts

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS

Peter Thabo Moloi (29)

Jacon Mashego (24)

Charges arose in this trial arose from the playing of an African National Congress tape recording in the lounge of a Diepkloof hotel last year. By playing the tape, the accused were alleged to have participated in the activities of a banned organisation, and advocating the achievements of the objects of the ANC.

The tape included music played by Miriam Makheba and Harry Belafonte, as well as other music and slogans of a political nature, for example 'We will destroy Smith and Vorster with grenades and guns'.

Moloi denied being in possession of the tape, while Mashego admitted being in possession of it, but said that he was not aware that it was prohibited or that it had been produced by the ANC.

A black security policeman testified that he and two colleagues had sat near the accused at the Diepkloof hotel on 8 November 1982. They heard them playing a cassette tape of music, and also heard mention made of the ANC. They continued listening for about 15 minutes, during which time they heard speeches and music in connection with the ANC.

A second police witness, Colonel AM Heystek, admitted that he added 19 lines to a transcript of the tape involved. Under cross-examination, Heystek claimed that these additional lines were the result of a typist's error during transcription.

Another police witness said that, after listening to the tape at the Diepkloof hotel, he arrested the accused as they had been playing ANC songs. When asked by the presiding magistrate how he knew that they were ANC songs, the witness said that he had been taught how to identify such music during his police training.

Professor Isaak de Vries, who has completed a Master's thesis at the Rand Afrikaans University on revolutionary parties in South Africa, gave evidence for the state on the ANC. According to de Vries, the ANC is

engaged in an armed attempt to overthrow the South African state, and confronts the enemy on all fronts. These include strikes, school boycotts and the religious front. He said that, through its official mouthpiece, Sechaba, the ANC had accepted responsibility for attacks on 23 railway lines and 25 industrial establishments between January 1977 and October 1982.

The defence did not dispute that the tape involved was found in Mashego's possession. However, it was argued that the accused had merely played a tape issued by the ANC in a noisy bar, and this did not imply that they were taking part in ANC activities.

Verdict: Mashego was found guilty of playing the recording. This, according to the magistrate, was proof that he had furthered the aims of the ANC. Moloi was convicted of being in possession of the tape, but acquitted of furthering the aims of the ANC.

Sentence: Mashego was sentenced to five years, two of which were conditionally suspended for five years; Moloi was sentenced to two years, one of which was suspended for five years.

Mashego and Moloi have since been released from custody on bail of R3 000 and R1 500 respectively, pending an appeal.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 10.08.83)

Joseph Charles (24)

Rufus Radebe (19)

Two members of the reggae group, 'Splash', were charged for singing songs at a University of Witwatersrand concert which allegedly furthered the aims of the banned ANC. The state claimed that, at a festival held in Roodepoort on 12 February, they performed a song entitled 'A tribute to martyrs'.

Charles told the court that the song involved was actually entitled 'A tribute to Mathis', and was freely available in record shops. He described the Rastafarian movement to which he belonged as being a cult that believed in going back to nature: 'We do not believe in organised politics although we sing revolutionary music', he told the court. He explained that the group had sung about Mandela at the festival 'because he has been in jail for a long time, but the song is not an ANC song'.

Constable HJ Nel said that he was at the festival and heard the group chanting 'Yeah Amandla, Yeah Mandela, Yeah Biko, Yeah Tambo, Yeah Aggett'. Nel testified further that Charles told the audience that anyone who believed in Reggae music could be assured of a violent revolution led by the ANC.

Radebe testified that he had lied in police custody, when he admitted singing ANC songs. He claimed that he had been assaulted by security police and told he would be released if he made a statement. A security police lieutenant, however, contradicted this, and denied that promises had been made to Radebe.

Verdict: Guilty as charged.

Sentence: Six years imprisonment each, two of which were conditionally suspended. An appeal has been noted. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 02.06.83)

Moses Langa (38)

The accused was charged with possession of a Russian-made Makarov pistol. It was claimed by the state that he intended to commit acts of terror, and encourage others to do so. He was also charged with furthering the aims of the ANC by gathering information on their behalf. The alleged offences were, according to the state, committed during 1980 and 1981.

Langa claimed that he had been asked by an ANC member in Mozambique to collect names and addresses of security policemen, and send them on to him. While he had agreed to do this, he actually had no intention of ever carrying out the request.

While in Mozambique, he had been promised a Makarov pistol, which a young man had delivered to him in late 1981. He then went to a friend, who sold the pistol for R300, giving Langa half of the proceeds.

When he returned to Mozambique, and it was learnt that he had sold the firearm, the ANC member who had sent it threatened to kill him.

Langa admitted that if he had supplied the ANC with names and addresses of security police, a 'hit list' could have been drawn up. However, he had not done so, nor had he intended to at any stage.

Defence counsel argued that Langa had only been in possession of the weapon for four hours. The fact that

he had disposed of it so quickly suggested that he had no intention of using it to endanger state security in any way.

Verdict: Langa was found guilty of being in possession of the Makarov with the intention of committing acts of terror. In convicting him, the presiding magistrate found that it was improbable that the ANC would send the weapon to an ordinary acquaintance. Langa was acquitted on the charge of gathering information for the ANC.

Sentence: Five years, two of which were suspended for five years.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 13.07.83)

Headley King (27)

The accused was charged with being a member of the ANC, and furthering its aims. Among the activities he was alleged to have been involved in were the receipt of documents and money from the ANC. The state further claimed that King recruited Michael Benjamin Coetzee into the ANC, and submitted reports to the ANC on conditions in the western Cape. It was also claimed that between September and December 1982, King became a member of the ANC, attended ANC meetings and tried to recruit people as members of the ANC.

A trial within a trial was held to determine the admissibility of a confession made by King during his detention. King testified that he had been led to believe by police that he would only be released from detention once he had made a satisfactory confession, and furthermore, that this was the only way he could secure the release of a close friend - Daphne Williams - from detention. The presiding magistrate, however, ruled that the confession could stand as evidence against King.

Two detainees, Michael Coetzee and Zelda Holtzman, were called by the state to testify against King. Coetzee had previously made a statement to police while in custody, but in his evidence stated that the contents of his initial statement were untrue. He has been charged with perjury.

Holtzman did not make a statement while in detention. In her evidence, she said that she was unable to remember the things that she was being asked. She was later released from detention, and charged with malicious damage to property, the state claiming

that she had written a slogan on her cell wall. She was subsequently acquitted.

King, giving evidence in his defence, described his growing political awareness which led to his involvement in community issues. He had learnt about the ANC, and supported the Freedom Charter which was adhered to by the ANC and many legal organisations.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 18 months, six of which were suspended for four years.

(Paarl Regional Court, 02.08.83)

Mosopho Isaac Genu (30)

The accused in this trial was charged with being a member of the banned African National Congress. The state alleged that, because he was found in possession of clothing in ANC colours, there was a presumption of ANC membership. Genu, vice chairman of the Kagiso Residents Association (KRO) was charged in the alternate with furthering the aims of the ANC.

Security police captain P Kruger told the court that Genu's house had been raided in the early morning of 5 March 1983. There police had found a document, Mayibuye, which Kruger said was the official mouthpiece of the ANC. In addition, Kruger testified that police had found various T-shirts with the slogans 'Viva Mandela', 'Mayibuye', 'A luta continua'; and further T-shirts bearing a map of Africa, a woman holding a gun and men carrying spears. All these items were in ANC colours (black, green and gold).

Kruger claimed in evidence that on the morning of the raid, Genu had told him that he was a member of Inkatha, and that the colours of the items found were Inkatha colours. Kruger said that Genu had not been able to prove this, as he had no Inkatha membership card.

A witness subpoenaed by the state, Lettie Nzima, did not appear at the trial, and a warrant was issued for her arrest by the presiding magistrate.

I de Vries, lecturer in political science at the Rand Afrikaans University gave expert evidence for the state. He said that the colours and slogans of the T-shirts found at Genu's home were representative of the ANC. However, he admitted that they could also be used by other organisations.

In this case, argued de Vries, they could not belong to Inkatha, as the local Inkatha representative had disputed this, and Genu had not given evidence to prove the contrary.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Eight years.

(Krugersdorp Regional Court, 09.08.83)

Rejoice Mkwala

The accused in this trial, a member of the South African Defence Force, appeared in the Johannesburg Regional Court charged with attempting to leave the country with the intention of undergoing military training. He was legally unrepresented, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

Mkwala subsequently engaged lawyers to appeal against sentence.

TERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

Peter Mokaba (24)

Jerome Joseph Maake (23)

Portia Nhlapo (24)

The accused faced ten charges under the (now-repealed) Terrorism Act, and the Internal Security Act. All three are former students at Turfloop University. The state claimed that Mokaba joined the ANC in 1980 and received military, economic and political training in Swaziland, Maputo and Luanda. He was alleged to have brought a Makarov pistol into South Africa, to have collected information for the ANC while in Molepo and Lebowakgomo, recruited Jonas Sehlapelo to the ANC, possessed banned literature and used a dead letter box for smuggling ANC letters, weapons and explosives.

Maake was accused of being an ANC member, and of undergoing military training under the auspices of the ANC. He allegedly brought two hand grenades into South Africa with the intention of committing violent acts, and recruited six people to the ANC, including the third accused, Portia Nhlapo.

At the start of the trial, Mokaba told the court that he had made a signed statement to the police under duress. He had been made to stand for long periods, and deprived of food and

sleep. His interrogators hit his head against a wall until he agreed to sign the statement. These allegations were denied by security police.

A detainee, Benedicta Monama, was brought from detention by the state to testify against the accused. When she refused to give evidence, she was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment by presiding magistrate WGM van Zyl.

Subsequently, the defence made an unsuccessful application for the recusal of magistrate van Zyl. The attorney representing Monama submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that the magistrate had asked him to persuade Monama to change her mind about not testifying.

During the course of the trial it emerged that a security police investigating officer had falsified a document dealing with dates on which certain detainees had been interrogated.

Magistrate van Zyl rejected Mokaba's claims that he had been assaulted and forced to make a statement. He said that two doctors who had examined Mokaba after the alleged assault had dismissed the claim that he had been physically mal-treated.

Verdict: Portia Nhlapo was acquitted due to lack of evidence.

Maake and Mokaba were found guilty on certain of the counts they faced.

Sentence: Mokaba was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

Maake was sentenced to an effective eight years.

At the end of proceedings, magistrate van Zyl remitted the remainder of Benedicta Monama's sentence for refusing to testify, and she was released from custody.

(Pietersburg Regional Court, 02.07.83).

Siphiwe Wilfred Makathini (26)

The accused faced allegations of possession of a machine gun and hand grenade; of undergoing military training in Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique; and of planting explosive devices at a number of places during 1982. The explosives were allegedly placed at the following locations: the water pipeline of the Umlazi canal on 25 April; the Department of Coloured Affairs in Durban on 21 May; the Chesterville pipeline on 25 May.

The accused, while admitting that he had gone to Tanzania, Angola and Mocambique as a political refugee, denied that he had received training under the auspices of the ANC in any of those countries.

The entire trial was held in camera. Press and relatives of the accused were barred from the hearing, and only defence and prosecution counsel, and court officials, were present. However, after the evidence had been heard, the presiding judge allowed a summary of the evidence to be released to the press. Defence counsel then produced a draft summary, which was not accepted by the state and the investigating officer. A summary of evidence prepared by the prosecution was then released to the press. In the summary, it was said that after training overseas, the accused and a companion lived in a black township near Durban during April and May 1982. They admitted to being ANC members, and had in their possession certain explosives and machine guns.

At this stage, Makathini changed his plea to guilty on certain of the charges - one of Terrorism, three of sabotage, and two counts of possessing a gun and ammunition without a permit.

Verdict: Guilty in accordance with his plea. The state did not pursue 12 further charges against the accused.

Sentence: 18 years.

(Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 05.08.83)

Siphiwe Wilfred Makathini (26)

Nthokozisi Nobleman Shezi (18)

Shortly after the conclusion of the above trial, Makathini was again charged - this time with another accused. The state alleged that they had jointly established an arms cache at Phoenix, near Durban.

A witness who may not be named testified that on 2 November 1982, the two accused arrived at his home with two other men. One of them opened a trunk, and took out two AK47 rifles and a 'bomb' which they demonstrated how to use.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Makathini was sentenced to ten years, to run concurrently with the 18 year sentence he had already received.

Shezi was also sentenced to ten years. Leave to appeal in Shezi's case was granted by the trial judge.

Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court,
05.08.83)

MURDER TRIAL

Malesele Benjamin Moloise (28)

The accused in this trial was charged with the murder of security police warrant officer Phillipus Selepe on 30 November 1982. Selepe, a member of the security police for more than 30 years, was shot dead with an AK47 rifle outside of his home.

In a statement made before a magistrate made while in custody, Moloise confessed that he had been assigned the task of assassinating another policeman, and that he had been trained to use an AK47 assault rifle. He also admitted shooting Selepe.

A state witness, who may not be named in terms of a court order, said that the accused had disappeared from his Stinkwater home in late 1982. He returned two weeks later with blood-stained clothing, and told the witness: 'There's trouble. I have shot Selepe'. The witness also told the court that Moloise said that he had been involved in the attack on the Wonderboom police station. In addition, he showed her an envelope containing about R300 which she established was payment for having killed Selepe.

Security police major FVP Nel told the court that Moloise associated himself with members of the ANC, and that he had shared a room with ANC guerilla Motaung, sentenced to death for high treason in May 1983). Moloise had refused to give evidence against Motaung and others during that trial. During the trial, Moloise was transported between his house and court by Selepe.

Moloise denied that he was a member of the ANC, or that he had undergone military or other training. He also denied that he had shot Selepe, or ever handled an AK47 rifle. The only firearm he had handled was a Makarov which belonged to an ANC member who had stayed with him at Stinkwater.

The accused claimed that he had initially been arrested by Bophutha-Tswana police on 14 February, and then handed over to South African security police. On 18 February, after questioning, he admitted killing Selepe. 'The confession', said

Moloise in evidence, 'is not true. I was not offered R500 by the ANC nor was I threatened that if I did not kill Selepe they would do something to me. The whole confession is something I made up'.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Death. Leave to appeal was granted.

TREASON TRIAL

Vronda Zeblon Banda (25)

The accused, a former Soweto newspaper vendor, faced charges of high treason, with an alternative count framed under the Internal Security Act. the state alleged that he

- * joined the ANC in 1976;
- * received training in warfare and sabotage in Angola, Russia, East Germany and Zambia between 1976 and 1981;
- * acted as an instructor at an ANC training centre in Angola, and trained ANC members in warfare, sabotage and strategy to enable them to infiltrate South Africa;
- * planned armed violence and warfare or sabotage against police stations, the public, railway lines, power stations and fuel storage tanks from an ANC base in Maputo;
- * infiltrated South Africa to establish hiding places for members of the ANC and weapon supply dumps;
- * established dead letter boxes from where deeds of warfare and sabotage against police stations and other targets could be controlled;
- * smuggled two pistols, ammunition and hand grenades into South Africa from the base in Maputo to use in warfare and sabotage against police stations;
- * during December 1982 and January 1983 hid a pistol, hand grenades and ammunition intended for warfare in Soweto;
- * encouraged Johannes Moripane and Jabulani Ntlaiare to undergo military training from the ANC and, on completion, to return to South Africa with the aim of committing deeds of warfare and sabotage;
- * encouraged Immanuel Mafana Marundla to join the ANC;
- * prepared for the infiltration of trained ANC members in Pretoria and Johannesburg by determining safe routes for them, searching for hide-outs, establishing dead letter boxes,

and collecting provisions.

Security policeman A Grobbelaar testified that after his arrest, Banda had taken police to a house in Soweto where a ,45 pistol and a hand grenade were stored. Grobbelaar also claimed that the accused had showed police a grave in the local cemetery used by the ANC as a hide-out for arms, as well as a spot in the Soutpansberg where an ANC base was to be constructed. Grobbelaar also alleged that Banda drew a sketch of a military training ground in Russia.

A number of unidentified witnesses testified for the state. Their evidence included allegations that Banda asked a person to open a grave so that he could hide weapons there. Two witnesses claimed that Banda left a package containing a hand grenade at their home during December 1982. Another witness alleged that the accused had shown him two firearms and a bomb, instructing him to use them against whites. Banda denied these allegations.

Another witness testified that Banda and another man visited him, and that on this occasion Banda told him that he had been to Russia and Angola for training and asked the witness to keep R1 000 and a firearm for him.

During the second week of the trial the court was closed to the public at the state's request, to enable two witnesses to give evidence in camera.

In his own defence, Banda said that he had left South Africa after clashes around the Mzimhlope hostel in August 1976. A man called Inch persuaded him to leave the country, although he was not told anything about the ANC. He arrived in Maputo, via Swaziland, and was told that he must work to put the situation in South Africa right. This left him no alternative but to join the ANC.

He was trained in Angola, but did not want to become a soldier. In September 1982 he returned to South Africa, having been given R500 cash and instructed to meet his contact man at the Pretoria station. However, he said that he went straight to the home of his parents, despite a warning from the ANC not to do so. After he was arrested on 9 January 1983, he assisted police in tracking down ANC guerillas.

Under cross-examination, Banda said that he had not surrendered himself to

the police when he arrived back in South Africa because he feared for his life. He had been warned that he would be killed if he defected.

Verdict: Guilty of treason. In convicting Banda, the presiding judge said that the acts he had committed were in preparation for the infiltration of other guerillas, and could have led to havoc if they had been allowed to succeed. The judge found that Banda's claim that he was a reluctant ANC soldier was not true.

Sentence: 12 years. Leave to appeal was granted.

(Pretoria Supreme Court, 15.09.83) ■