

PROGRESS



THE DUEL OVER DUAL POWER

Should the ANC share authority with De Klerk?

INSIDE: * Political prisoners: No Easy Talk To Freedom * The LRA Disaster, Part 2

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2nd Floor
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c/o Smif and Biccard
Streets
Braamfontein 2017
Johannesburg

Phone: (011) 403-1912
Fax: (011) 403-2534

Editorial

The climate for negotiations promised with such optimism after the Groote Schuur talks is not yet upon us. The joint communique following the talks between the government and the African National Congress effectively acknowledges that the first steps towards creating this climate must come from FW de Klerk and his government.

The National Party created the existing climate; only it can change it. It has not yet begun doing so.

Nearly two months on from Groote Schuur, thousands of political prisoners remain behind bars - 80 of them on death row. And tens of thousands of political exiles wait in foreign lands for the go-ahead to come home.

While there are obvious complications in negotiating the release of political prisoners without a ceasefire in place, the failure to move on prisoners and exiles is only one symptom of a political stasis.

New police attitudes and actions are vital to any real normalisation of South African politics.

But evidence emerging from the commission of enquiry into the Sebokeng killings bears a striking resemblance to testimony on police actions and attitudes presented to the enquiry into the Langa massacre of 1985. Both draw a graphic picture of men equipped not for crowd control but for war.

Both vividly demonstrate that police reactions are based on an underlying assumption that protest action of any sort is criminal.

Lifting the emergency has done little to change this.

Elsewhere too De Klerk has shown a marked disinclination to ease political tensions.

The retention of the emergency in Natal is a meaningless gesture: the civil war being waged there with such brutality started months after the national emergency was imposed in 1986. An emergency is clearly no solution.

Gatsha Buthelezi's KwaZulu police and their role in sustaining the conflict are an increasing focus of criticism. But De Klerk has chosen to leave in place the vast and often arbitrary powers the emergency grants the KwaZulu force, the SAP and the SADF.

In the increasingly turbulent field of labour relations, too, the National Party government has shown little sign of concern at what threatens to be a massive wave of conflict.

Quite the reverse: offered a solution that could substantially ease escalating worker-employer tensions, De Klerk has turned his back on it. The Saccola-Cosatu-Nactu proposals for changes to the Labour Relations Act are unique: the major elements of capital and labour have voluntarily tied themselves to a set of rules by which future industrial relations will be played out.

There is a clear link between popular resistance and industrial action - both currently creeping back towards levels last seen between 1985 and 1987.

Promulgation of the proposals would substantially de-escalate industrial tension and, through that, ease political tensions.

Instead, De Klerk has postponed amending the LRA until next year.

All of this calls into question the good faith which De Klerk claims to take with him to the negotiating table.

Rather, it suggests that the underlying intention is not to participate in - or even preside over - a process of normalising and transforming South Africa. De Klerk looks increasingly like a man whose main aim is to get sanctions eased, and who is doing so by creating a veneer of change over a substantially unchanged reality.

* A new daily newspaper has hit the streets just in advance of this edition of WIP.

As an initiative of the journalists who launched the Weekly Mail four years ago, the Daily Mail promises to be a vigorous and articulate addition to this country's anti-apartheid press. And with its staff controlling the largest single block of shares in the publication, the paper also represents a welcome change in forms of media ownership in this country.

The editorial collective of Work In Progress welcomes and supports the Daily Mail.

WORK IN PROGRESS PROGRESS



THE DUEL OVER DUAL POWER

Should the ANC
share authority
with De Klerk?

INSIDE: * Political prisoners: No Easy Talk To Freedom * The LRA Dilemma, Part 2

Duelling over dual power: the leader of a Soweto student protest enjoys a rare moment of cooperation and shared authority with police - 'dual power' in practice. On Page 13, WIP assesses arguments from within the ranks of the opposition that the democratic movement must set 'dual power' as a key strategic aim.

Picture: The Star

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LRA: Two wasted years

By delaying a decision on joint employer-union proposals on the LRA, FW de Klerk's government has missed the change of substantially easing mounting industrial relations tensions. **Robyn Rafel** reports on Page 8



Fighting for the right to be happy

Like South Africa, Brazil's economy and wealth are controlled by a tiny minority; like South Africa there is a strong racial element in access to political and economic rights. There are also similarities in the democratic opposition that has developed. **Gay Seidman** reports

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The shifting sands of Natal

Oscar Dhlomo's resignation points to shifting interests in Natal. But these offer no solution to violence in the province, argues **Gerhard Mare**

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Picture credits

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Thin Black Lines: © MacNelly Page 31, © Ken Alexander Page 34

Workers' World, © ILRIG 1990, Pages 20 and 22

Coming out of the closet

MAJOR changes are underway in the South African Communist Party (SACP), which launches as a legal party in Johannesburg on 29 July.

The party will emerge from the rally - its first legal public meeting inside the country in the 40 years since its banning - as a mass party, actively recruiting members.

The rally will also see the announcement of the names of a national interim leadership group (ILG) - expected to number between six and a dozen. They will be the first South African communists - other than the chairman and general secretary, currently Dan Tloome and Joe Slovo - to formally acknowledge their affiliation.

Legalised with the African National Congress (ANC) on 2 February, the SACP has used the intervening period to discuss within its ranks the form of its public reappearance and the nature of its functioning under conditions of legality. Open organisation has been possible for only 29 of the SACP's 69 years in existence.

Consultation within the SACP and with its allies culminated in a secret consultative party conference held inside the country, apparently some time in the past two months. The changes accompanying the shift towards seeking mass membership, were prefigured by the comment of general secretary Joe Slovo on the party's 'vanguard' role.

The SACP still sees for itself a vanguard role, but acknowledges that it must


work 'to win a primary place as political leader of the working class'. And it accepts the need for 'political pluralism now, for the post-apartheid phase and in the period of socialist construction', according to a report submitted by the SACP politburo to the secret conference.

The report has since been discussed and endorsed by the SACP central committee.

As part of its move to establish a mass base, the SACP is also abandoning probation for potential members, who used to be required to serve several months before acceptance into SACP ranks.

In future applicants for membership will be required to accept the party programme, The Path to Power, and SACP resolutions, and to commit themselves to abide by a code of conduct and 'to engage actively in the pursuit of the party's objectives'.

The SACP will also expect members to 'be activists, doing agitational and propaganda work', according to a central committee report issued in mid-June. 'It is essential that all communists worthy of the name grasp that the crucial question is that of humanity. This humanity derives from being active in the struggle, from knowing what our people's demands are, from suffering with the people and knowing what workers are struggling for and demanding', it adds. Internally, the party will



General secretary Joe Slovo: major changes

implement a phased process towards full democracy. Changes to the existing SACP constitution, with its rigid lines of authority, can only be formally introduced at the next party congress. This will take place on 29 July 1991, a year after the SACP's legal launch and on the 70th anniversary of its formation.

The establishment of the ILG - whose composition is currently under discussion with 'fraternal organisations', particularly those whose members or officials are likely to form part of it - is part of this process. It will be followed by the establishment of regional and district leadership groups.

As soon as possible, the central committee report urges, 'we must aim to have all levels of our leadership directly elected by the membership'. The central committee also wants to see all levels of leadership directly accountable to membership and subject to recall, and branches directly represented at party congresses.

The report urged affirmative action to ensure the presence of women in party structures.

The central committee report justifies delaying the public re-appearance of the SACP as follows: 'The

party has been outlawed for 40 out of the 69 years of existence; laws such as the Internal Security Act are still in operation; and many of our leaders have not been able to freely enter the country. The question of the party's re-emergence also arises at a time when communists throughout the world, confronting distortions in the construction of socialism, need to subject themselves and their parties to rigorous critical appraisal and change'.

The central committee report throws some light on SACP views on the future of its alliance with the ANC and with Cosatu, which has succeeded Sactu as the third element in the 'revolutionary alliance'.

Emphasising the need for 'a powerful mass offensive on the principal political demands of the day' by the alliance, the report also focuses on the need to establish 'local joint organs', comprising members of the three formations. And while it does not specifically address the question of ANC membership by SACP members, it describes the need to build the ANC and trade unions as 'vital tasks for all party members'.

Coupled with the SACP's continued recognition of the ANC as the leading formation in the struggle for national democracy, the very least that can be expected is that the party will strongly encourage its members to join and actively support the ANC.

In transforming itself into a legal, open party, the SACP



In transforming itself into a legal, open party, the SACP is also having to address the question of identifying its members. In future, 'except in special cases where there are security or other considerations', members will be admitted to party structures - and their membership thus made public knowledge.

One way or another this will answer the question raised repeatedly by critics of the liberation movement of SACP strength on the ANC's national executive committee (NEC).

'Once we're legal, they'll find we have 37 of the 35 NEC members', jokes an SACP source. - *David Niddrie*

ANGOLA

Talks loom as pressure mounts

FRESH peace talks between Angola's MPLA Workers' Party government and Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels are set to start soon - against a background of mounting pressure on the MPLA from across its borders and from within Angolan society.

Likely to take place secretly in Portugal, the talks have been preceded by a major increase in military pressure on the Luanda government. Developments in June alone include:

* A United States decision to increase by R30 million this year's covert aid to Unita - officially already running at R120 million a year, but probably far higher.

* A major increase in Unita sabotage attacks throughout the country. As *WIP* went to press, Savimbi's guerrillas again hit Luanda power supply installations, forcing an extension of electricity rationing in the capital, imposed since the



**Angola's Dos Santos:
Facing a coup**

first such attack in April. Luanda's power supply has been a favourite Unita target, but the current rationing is the longest so far in Angola's 14-year civil war.

Angolan officials say more than 4 000 people have died, almost 6 000 have been wounded and 2 500 abducted in Unita attacks in the past year.

Angolan authorities claim these attacks are part of a build-up to a planned coup initiated by Israeli and US intelligence agents and aimed at ousting president Jose Eduardo dos Santos' government towards the end of this year.

Angolan diplomat Andre Panzo, told journalists in Harare recent sabotage attacks on fuel stocks and power lines to Luanda and other cities were intended to create a climate of dissatisfaction in which such a coup could be mounted with popular support.

He linked neighbouring Zaire to the plot, describing the close US ally as 'the main, if not the only, point of transit for sophisticated war material, which forms part of the considerable US aid to Unita, through the Kamina base'. According to Panzo, the coup was to have put in power 'certain

Angolan personalities who would form a transitional government and then rapidly conclude accords for national reconciliation with Unita'.

The Angolan government has made other coup allegations in the past, but the most recent charges were backed by details including names, dates and places. A document, entitled 'Angola: portrait of a conspiracy', claims that the coup operation is code-named COMA and is the 'brainchild of a retired Israeli colonel called Mayhos Maair, who is presently living in the Republic of the Cameroun, where he works in the security section for the president'. The first stage of the plan, to be put into effect 'next summer', was to undertake 'deliberate initiatives' to worsen food supplies and living conditions, especially in Luanda.

Then mass demonstrations were to be incited, coordinated by radio propaganda from the CIA-financed 'Voice of the Black Cockerel'. It was hoped that this would provoke the security forces, inexperienced in crowd control, into an 'excessively repressive reaction' and increase opposition to the government.

In the final stage of the plan Unita agents, 'in collusion with Mossad, Boss (sic), CIA and Zaircan agents' would attempt to assassinate important MPLA and government figures.

The document claims that finance was to be provided by sources in the US, South Africa, Israel, Zaire and Brazil.

Although the government does not explicitly name the 'personalities' who would form the transitional government, it pointedly refers to recent initiatives

involving Jonas Savimbi and estranged ex-MPLA cadres such as Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (a priest around whom the Angolan Civic Association has formed in recent months as a political 'third force' between Unita and the ruling party).

The coup claims come against a background of increasing political tension in the Angolan capital - a consequence both of division within the ruling party over the benefits of talking to Unita and of the emergence of several shadowy political groupings that have recently fired statements across the ruling party's bows.

With government denunciations of Unita's backers sounding increasingly shrill and embattled, the MPLA also turned its attention to these 'enemies within'.

Just who they exactly are isn't yet clear - but with two foreign journalists given their marching orders in recent weeks, no one in Luanda wants to be the first to speculate in public. The first sign of trouble came in mid-May when an open letter to 'militants of the MPLA Workers Party' began to circulate in the city.

Signed by three doctors, an accountant and a journalist, it accused the government of using the promise of reforms to entrench privilege and unequal opportunities and said the proposed changes came too late and had been overtaken by events.

The political model chosen by the party did not correspond and had never corresponded to Angola's historical, political and economic reality and benefited only a tiny fraction of the people, they said.

The signatories said that every Angolan should have

an equal political voice and equal rights and argued this was incompatible with the single party system.

The letter mocked the promise contained in the party's discussion document that Angola could eventually 'evolve into a multi-party state', pointing out that this made nonsense of the party's insistence that a single party system was democratic.

Attacking the very foundations of the MPLA government, the document accused all signatories to the Alvor Accord (signed in January 1975 and intended to regulate the transition to independence) of having breached the agreement, and added that the subsequent 15 years of strife were a logical consequence of the accord's collapse.

This letter was followed within days by a second document issued in the name of a group calling itself the *Catana Ardente* (Burning Sword). Founded in one of the capital's poorest shantytowns, the group claimed to include members of the MPLA, the now defunct FNLA and Unita.

The document seemed to follow no particular ideological line, but accused all three organisations of being responsible for Angola's present predicament: after setting out a mishmash of 'positions', it invited the government to sign a ceasefire and proceed to free elections.

If there were no signs of compliance by May 27, the group would initiate a campaign to 'liquidate hardliners' in the MPLA, kidnap or assassinate Angolan journalists and foreigners who supported the government, attack strategic installations and shoot down Soviet aircraft and those belonging to the

commercial carrier TransAfrika.

The document ended with a salute to the memory of Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem, two leaders of a failed 1977 coup attempt from the left of the MPLA. Either because of the appearance of the two documents or because of the generalised increase in political debate in the last few months, nerves in ruling circles seem to be jangling.

The MPLA political bureau, sounding unusually embattled, issued a statement on May 31 warning that 'fifth columnists' were at work in Angola sowing fear, confusion and discontent, and called on citizens to be on the alert.

The two documents combine with the emergence of De Andrade's Angolan Civic Association - which attracts widespread interest though its support is untested - to challenge the past MPLA monopoly on political life.

But the intensity of the ruling party's response and its expulsion of two foreign journalists - apparently for publishing 'rumours' - indicate the limits of the government's recently introduced political liberalisation. - *SouthScan Features*.

THE MINES

Ailing - but not terminal

What are the implications of the almost daily news of fresh plunges in the gold price for this year's wage negotiations between the National Union of Mine-workers (NUM) and the Chamber of Mines?

In the days leading up to the first conciliation board

meeting on 18 June, the chamber announced that 18 mines were in danger of running into the red. This figure is based on a graph produced earlier this year using a projected gold price of R33 400 a kilogram - a price that has not been attained - which showed that 15 mines would become economically unviable by July if capital expenditure is not included. The mines in question are: ERPM, Durban Roodepoort Deep, Western Areas, Marievale, West Rand Cons, Venterspost, Loraine, Braken, Harmony, Blyvooruitzicht, Barbeton, Grootvlei, Libanon, Doornfontein and Stilfontein. If capex is included, Randfontein Estates, Leslie and Free State Cons would also become marginal.

Hard on the heels of this came the announcement that Anglo American had decided to curtail operations at Freegold's South Region, Vaal Reefs' No 6 and 7 shafts and at Afrikan-der Lease which would see at least 7 800 jobs being lost. Genmin also stated that 500 people at Stilfontein had been laid off and a further 600 workers were retrenched at Loraine. Sobering stuff. But is the outlook really that bleak? NUM assistant general secretary Marcel Golding does not think so. 'We accept that certain mines like ERPM and Stilfontein are in trouble', he says. 'But the industry as a whole is not in a crisis'.

There is some support for Golding's view among stockbrokers. 'The chamber's assessment of the marginal mines and their closure is correct if you assume that mine managements are not going to make an effort cut operating costs', a leading broker, who did not wish to be named, told WIP. 'But to talk of total closure is

unnecessary'. In his view two factors have contributed to the development of an unprofitable industry. Both are unrelated to the inherent problem of the ageing of many mines and stem from government policies. One is the debase-ment of the rand and the other is tax structures which have penalised highly profitable mines.

'The net result was that people did not work in a profit-conscious way. Harmony, for example, retrenched 8 000 workers last year without showing any gains', he says. 'The mining houses should have acted to change things one to one-and-half years ago'. Some steps have been taken to ameliorate the macro-economic situation. Government has, for example, committed itself to putting the mines on the same tax basis as industry in a phased operation over seven years. We are now in year two of this process. 'In general this means that some of the disincentives are fading', this broker believes. 'Nevertheless, we are in for a rough ride for next two to three years and not many jobs are likely to be created'. Unions, he adds, are going to find it very difficult to satisfy workers' wage demands, but managements may be more willing to countenance 'political demands' like paid holidays on June 16 and March 21.

It would, however, be short-sighted for the chamber to ignore the need to pay more. The mining houses are showing a greater readiness to accept responsibility for the evils that have accompanied the migrant labour system they created. But black miners are only going to believe them if their employment conditions improve. After all, mining is an inherently dangerous job and they do

not receive the pay miners get elsewhere in the world. And is it too outrageous to suggest that the government should direct part of the billions it has set aside for social upliftment to help out mines like ERPM which, should it close, would make Boksburg a ghost town? - *Robyn Rafel.*

POST OFFICE

Dividing into difficulties

WHILE privatisation of the Department of Posts and Telecommunications is not on the agenda in the immediate future, the prior step of 'commercialisation' in itself represents a threat to workers and consumers. Before the department can be privatised it has to be run on business lines for two to three years. The government intends this year to split posts and telecommunications into two state-owned corporations - Telecommunications and Postal Services - which will start operating as separate entities in 1991. Iscor held the status of a state-owned corporation before it was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and sold to private shareholders last year. Eventual privatisation seems uncertain, given that government officials (and business people) have recently been expressing doubts about the strategy. But even commercialisation could have negative consequences for both workers and consumers. The Department of Posts and Telecommunications has for some years been recording healthy surpluses, but these come from the telecommunications operations. The postal

services record substantial deficits, which are subsidised by telecommunications. According to figures given in Parliament in March, the postal service was expected to show a loss of R183,5 million for the latest financial year - up on the R168 million loss recorded in 1988/9. The figure excludes services like telex, which also runs at a loss. Telecommunications was expected to have an operating surplus of R880 million. The cross-subsidisation of posts by telecommunications will cease once they operate as separate corporations. The move will be tough for Postal Services, which is likely to want to rationalise to cut costs. Presenting the Post Office budget to Parliament, minister of public enterprises Dawie de Villiers attributed the postal losses to uneconomic tariffs and high labour costs. Even ahead of commercialisation a few

jobs have been lost. While the total number of employees increased marginally in the 1988/89 financial year, the number of full-time Post Office workers fell by 0,15%. This was the second successive year which saw a decrease in staff numbers. Retrenchments may not be far off. The Post Office may also be looking at cutbacks which would affect consumers. Already there has been talk of it curtailing street deliveries of mail, since this is very labour intensive. It seems unlikely postal delivery will be improved despite organised business's complaints about letters taking longer and longer to reach their destination. The Post Office also runs extensive banking services, offering savings accounts at attractive rates. Although this is a source of funds, the Post Office may be forced to surrender it, given the intense competition in the South African banking industry. Without special dispensations, such as its

tax free savings instruments, the Post Office probably could not compete. On telecommunications, profitability is less of a problem. But it has been established at some cost. Capital spending of the department has been falling in real terms and this could mean South Africa falling behind in the high-tech field of telecommunications. More than 90% of investment goes to improve the telecommunications infrastructure. The capital budget for 1990/1 is up by only 5% (from R1,3 billion last year to R1,4 billion). With inflation expected to be about 14%, the figure represents a fall in real terms. Demand for telephones is growing steadily, especially in the townships. By March the national backlog was 96 000 units. This was, however, a considerable improvement on last year, when officials put the backlog at 240 000. - *WIP Correspondent*



Post Offices workers marching through Johannesburg against privatisation

No easy talk to freedom

Trade-offs, names and numbers have been the focus of media reports on the expected release of political prisoners in the wake of the Groote Schuur talks between

the government and the African National Congress.

Will the ANC have to concede the release of hit squad members held in the Frontline states (or even racist mass murderer Barend Strydom) in return for its own cadres - especially those on death row?

And will the ANC be able to budge the government from president FW de Klerk's narrow 2 February definition of political prisoners, to include the thousands whose offences are 'related' to politics but do not constitute 'pure' political transgressions?

Such a shift in definitions would increase the numbers eligible for release from about 350 to between 2 500 and 3 000, the Human Rights Commission estimates.

While both the above questions are significant, neither fully reflects the complexities with which the joint Working Group, set up at Groote Schuur, has had to wrestle.

Bound by a clause on confidentiality in their brief, neither government nor ANC members of the group have been prepared to divulge the proposals in the report drawn up by 21 May and submitted to their respective principals.

But the actions of De Klerk, who returned from Europe flush with success and accused the ANC of delaying matters by failing to respond speedily to the recommendations of the Working Group, suggest that the report has given the government fewer headaches than it has given the ANC.

Jacob Zuma, heading the ANC Working Group team, indicated in mid-June - almost a full month after the recommendations were made - that the organisation's leadership had completed its study of the report 'and observations by the ANC are at this stage being conveyed back to the government'.

Only the most superficial reading of the context of the release of South African political prisoners could have raised the expectation of a more rapid response.

The proximity of the Namibian case to that of South Africa invites comparisons. And indeed, the Groote Schuur Minute directs the Working Group to

'bear in mind experiences in Namibia and elsewhere'.

The contrast between the Namibian and the present South African situation is undoubtedly more instructive than the similarities.

* In Namibia, by the time the release of prisoners was undertaken, an official ceasefire was in place between easily identifiable military forces. There are no outward signs of an imminent 'ceasefire' in the infinitely more complex South African situation.

* In South Africa, in accordance with spirit of the Harare Declaration, the release of political prisoners is being pursued to eliminate obstacles to negotiation. In Namibia it occurred much further along the settlement process - to create the conditions for free and fair elections to the constituent assembly.

* In Namibia, under Resolution 435, constitutional political rights - that is, the right to engage in party-political preparations for constituent assembly elections - were conferred on the people as the prisoners went free.


The two developments went hand in hand, without time-lag, as part of a virtually guaranteed package. In contrast to South Africa, there was little risk that the exercise of democratic rights through universal franchise would be delayed long after the amnesty took place.

* A corollary to the above is that extra-constitutional political mobilisation (which has in any event played a more weighty role in the South African struggle than in Namibia) will continue in South Africa after the obstacles to negotiations are removed and even as talks proceed.

Mass campaigns are widely viewed as the key to securing popular demands at the negotiating table. ANC national executive member Joe Slovo, who urged supporters on the eve of the Groote Schuur talks to make sure the atmosphere 'vibrates' with demands, was delivering a message repeated in almost every public ANC pronouncement.

All of the above could, in theory, add up to a South African scenario where first, agreement is reached between the ANC and government on who to release. Then dates are set and the releases accomplished. And subsequently guerrilla attacks or politically motivated acts of public violence (very possibly pro-

Jo-Anne Collinge examines the implications of negotiating the release of prisoners of the apartheid war before the peace has been concluded



Pushing the negotiation process: activists demand the release of prisoners

voked by security force actions) land a fresh group of people behind bars - after the amnesty and thus without the prospect of a negotiated release.

It is unlikely that anyone on the Working Group would want to see the notion of the amnesty so grotesquely distorted. To prevent this, talks on mechanisms and time-scales for release must have been far-ranging.

From the ANC perspective a central imperative must surely be to devise a mechanism for overcoming the contradiction of effectively demanding the release of prisoners of war before the peace has been concluded.

In the light of the ANC's clearly unshaken commitment to maintaining the

armed struggle until democratic rule is secured - a commitment the movement's opponents have found alarmingly present even in those members they would style 'moderates' - a formal ceasefire may be considered appropriate, at least in some quarters.

No doubt serious debate is underway within the ANC on the implications of a ceasefire - especially its impact on the movement's capacity to re-launch its armed struggle should conditions change.

No less significant to this debate, from the ANC's point of view, would be how to reap real returns from what might seem on the surface a unilateral ceasefire. If it is too far-fetched to expect the South African (and bantustan) police

and military to be confined to barracks, in what other ways can they be restrained?

The review of security legislation is clearly crucial in dislodging the police from the political trenches. As long as laws exist which justify police incursions into the political realm, they will surely make use of them. As long as outdoor gatherings are unlawful, police will be 'forced' to fire on them. As long as 'terrorism' and 'subversion' (for instance) remain defined in their presently unacceptable Internal Security Act terms, people will be jailed on that basis. As long as indefinite incommunicado detention for interrogation remains on the statute books, police will resort to it - and people will die as a result of it.

The Groote Schuur Minute entrusts the review of existing security legislation to the government. But it is impossible to believe that the ANC has ceased to press the issue.

For it relates closely to the question of mass mobilisation and to securing consensus with the government that this is an area of struggle that is legitimate.

In marathon political trials like the first Delmas treason trial, an official dogma solidified in which mass protest action was seen not as intrinsically political, but as unavoidably insurrectionary.

Evidence has been led on numerous occasions on the role of the police in generating uncontrollable violence, in the conversion of protests and funeral processions into riots.

The Langa Massacre of 1985, in which (according to the findings of the Kanne-meyer Commission) a police unit ill-equipped for riot control opened fire on a crowd considerably less menacing than originally portrayed in police reports, was just one example of an official intervention that tipped a community into uncontrollable violence.

Effective control of the police is at least as necessary as discipline in ANC and other opposition ranks to ensure that mass mobilisation remains true to its essentially political character.

Without the establishment of new mechanisms of control on the armed forces to ensure a more favourable climate for mass mobilisation, it is difficult to see how the ANC would suspend armed struggle - even in the interests of a workable amnesty. ●

LRA: two wasted years

After two years of painstaking negotiations, South African trade unions and employes have finally reached a unique agreement on reforms to labour legislation - only to find De Klerk's government in no haste to make the changes they're suggesting. Robyn Rafel reports

The most puzzling aspect of the government's 13 June announcement that the accord on the Labour Relations Act (LRA) reached by Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola will not be promulgated during the parliamentary session which ended on 22 June is why the decision was taken in the first place.

In a conflict-ridden society, the labour arena was the one area where there was a real possibility of creating greater harmony. But the government failed to grasp this opportunity and there is general consensus among labour observers that strife is certain to follow.

What prompted the government to take the decision? manpower minister Eli Louw answered this question in the press release he issued shortly after the cabinet met to deliberate the issue. Contrary to the expectations of the parties involved, the minister said, the representations received after the accord was published in the government Gazette of 23 May for comment, indicated that the time allowed for the proposals to be studied was too short. The proposals drastically alter the rights of both employers and employees and have economic implications which require further investigation.

But is this really a true reflection? Saccola speaks for 70% of private sector companies outside agriculture. Collectively they employ 60% of this country's economically active workforce. Cosatu's credentials as the largest labour federation in South Africa are undisputed. And even though Nactu is considerably smaller, some of its union affiliates are eminently capable of delivering a few powerful punches.

So who do the parties that objected to the accord represent? The box on Page 10, which lists some of them, contains some unlikely names. Why, for example, is the Rand Afrikaans University suddenly so concerned about industrial relations? And is it likely that the concerns of the companies and employer organisations in the list are radically different to those of Saccola members?

The facts of the matter are that the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola accord, which was signed on 11 May this year, is not a poorly-conceived document but the product of over two years of negotiations, involving at least 20 meetings lasting some 250 hours. Admittedly, there were managements who were delighted with the 1 September 1988 amendments to the LRA which so galled Cosatu and Nactu because they did alter the balance of power in favour of employers. But after unions refused to intervene when workers embarked on wildcat strikes without an undertaking from managements not to sue them for damages - as required in the amended Act - it became apparent that this potentially crippling employer weapon against workers also had the potential to harm the employers' cause.

The amendments also meant that employers, who had gained the moral high ground in 1987 following the violence that accompanied strikes at OK Bazaars stores and Sats, began to lose their advantage. And the ever-increasing worker action against the LRA was also a factor which made negotiations more compelling.

According to Saccola's Bobby Godsell, the fact that the amendments were enacted by a parliament which excludes blacks obliged



him and the other employer negotiators to go about their task of determining what constitutes acceptable labour law in a vigorously bi-partisan manner. The process was difficult and very exhausting, he says, but the constant need for debate and obtaining mandates forced all concerned to confront and resolve complex philosophical issues and was ultimately mentally exhilarating.

As far as the unions were concerned the negotiations with Saccola were viewed as an interim measure to redress the power imbalance created by the 1 September 1988 amendments. The unions' ultimate aim is a totally revised LRA which will take the aspirations of all workers - including those presently excluded under the Act such as farm and domestic workers and public sector employees - into account. They regard the report by a technical sub-committee of the National Manpower Commission (NMC) containing proposals for consolidating the LRA published for comment on 30 May this year as a useful starting point for this process.

'Our basic argument is that any law must enjoy the confidence of the people if it is to have legitimacy. We can't have legislation imposed from above without consultation and with the trade union movement', says Marcel Golding, a member of Cosatu's negotiating team.

But that is a battle to be fought in the years to come. As far as the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola negotiations were concerned, there were two components to the 1 September 1988 amendments which Cosatu and Nactu felt had to be addressed. In their view both were designed to increase the dominance of capital.

The first was the measures which restrict trade union members from participating in strikes. These included the provision for employers to sue unions for damages incurred in illegal industrial action referred to before, the provision which permits the industrial court to grant interdicts to stop workers from striking regardless of whether the actions are legal, and the complex disputes procedures.

The second was the provisions which increase management's capacity to dismiss workers. These include denying new employees' job security - any dismissal during the first six months of employment cannot be deemed unfair - and the provisions regarding retrenchment and sanctioning selective re-employment.

Despite the achievements which the unions made in the negotiations with Saccola, the fact remains that government has chosen to ignore the accord. And the question of why it has done so has not yet been answered.

'One can only assume that the government's hesitancy has been prompted by a desire to pander to the Rightwing', says industrial relations consultant Theo Heffer. 'It is only people on the Right who indicated that they want some of the aspects of the 1988 amendments to be retained. I am very disappointed that the government appears to be looking over its right shoulder. I thought that kind of behaviour was a thing of the past.'

'In theory the government is committed to a policy of non-interference in union-management relations', says Heffer. 'It is

De Klerk's eagerness to tie literally every element of South African life into the negotiation process seems to be the key to the delay in changing the LRA

well known that Saccola had enormous difficulty in obtaining mandates for its negotiations with Cosatu and Nactu. But it finally obtained sufficient unanimity to enable it to sign the accord. It is tragic that smaller and less relevant parties have been allowed to mar its achievement. And it is the very employers who fought for the accord who are now going to have to pay'.

As for Cosatu and Nactu, the federations hold that the technicalities that have been raised over the time required for consultation and promulgation are a smokescreen. It was, they believe, always a question of whether the government had sufficient political will.

'The cabinet's decision to delay promulgation of the accord confirms the view of the trade union movement that the apartheid state does not intend to take the aspirations of black workers into account', says a Cosatu official. 'It is a measure designed to frustrate unions and pander to the interests of minority employers and trade unions who enjoy little, if any, support. The flagrant disregard of an agreement reached by the principal actors in the labour arena reflects the government's unwillingness to move along the path to democracy'.

That there will be much conflict over this issue in the future is indisputable.

'We listened to what the minister had to say and do not accept his reasons. We will be meeting with Cosatu soon to determine our response to this development', Nactu first assistant general secretary Mohlomola Skosana told *WIP*. Cosatu says it and Nactu intend to have an urgent meeting with Saccola.

Meetings with the ANC and other 'relevant organisations will also be held.

Does this mean the LRA will be a

stumbling block for the ANC's negotiations with the government?

It is probably too soon for a clear answer - but in the meanwhile employers will have to bear the brunt of worker anger.

This raises an intriguing possibility: As De Klerk moves to clear the obstacles to negotiations with the ANC, many of his actions seem to be designed to lock the liberation movement into the process, making it increasingly reliant on the talks and correspondingly less committed to other options.

Is De Klerk gambling that something similar can be achieved in the field of labour relations? Tying employers and unions into mutual reliance and a social contract which depoliticises industrial relations?

Saccola, Cosatu and Nactu began an emergency meeting following the Cabinet decision. And although the outcome had not been announced as *WIP* went to press, it is clear that if the accord is to be salvaged, there is a powerful logic arguing that neither side can afford to alienate the other.

The Act vs the Accord

The Act

Scope of application

The Act does not apply to farm and domestic workers, officers of Parliament, state employees, the chief administrative officer of a local authority and people who work for charities for no pay.

Unfair labour practice definition

An 'unfair labour practice' means any act or omission which infringes or impairs the labour relations between an employer and employee in an un-

fair manner. It includes:

(a) Any dismissal not prompted by a valid and fair reason and effected in terms of a fair procedure. In this regard, however, the following shall not be regarded as an unfair labour practice:

(i) Dismissal during the first six months of employment, or any other agreed period, provided that this is effected in compliance with a fair procedure;

(ii) Dismissal when the industrial court decrees that the employer had good reason not to conduct an enquiry or that the outcome would not have been any different if an enquiry had been conducted, i.e. when there were grounds for summary dismissal;

(iv) Dismissal when the employer complies with the terms of any agreement relevant to such dismissal to a substantial degree;

(v) Selective re-employment of dismissed workers provided that fair criteria are applied and that any decision not to re-hire is not based on a desire to victimise employees for their trade union activities.

(b) Dismissal on grounds other than disciplinary action, except when:

(i) The dismissal occurs during the first six months of employment, or any other agreed period, and does not contravene any relevant agreement, wage regulating measure or service contract; or

(ii) (aa) The employer gives the employee or his/her trade union prior notice of the intention to terminate in accordance with any agreement, wage regulating measure or service contract;

(bb) The employer consults with the employee or his/her trade union beforehand;

(cc) The dismissal occurs on terms consistent with any agreement or service contract regulating how employment is to be terminated;

(dd) Employment is terminated because an employer decides to re-trench. In determining which employees are to be retrenched, however, the selection must be made in terms of reasonable criteria, including, but not limited to, their ability, productivity and conduct and the operational requirements and needs of the employer's undertaking, industry, trade or occupation.

(c) Dismissal when an employee is

Those opposed ...

The 80 organisations which objected to the promulgation of the draft Bill drawn up by Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola include: Rand Afrikaans University; Kimberley Municipality; Dunlop Ltd; Eskom; Sasol; the (white) Mineworkers' Union; the Council of Mining Unions (representing 22 000 mainly white mine workers); Gold Fields; and the Cape Chamber of Industries.

suspended unfairly and unilaterally;

(d) Dismissal when an employee's terms of employment are amended unfairly and unilaterally, except in cases where this is done to give effect to any relevant law or wage regulating measure;

(e) A trade union or employers' association using unconstitutional, misleading or unfair recruiting methods. If, however, a trade union refuses to admit an employee in accordance with its constitution, that action will not constitute an unfair labour practice. In other words, racially exclusive unions have a right to exist;

(f) Any trade union or employer's organisation refuses or fails to comply with the provisions of the LRA;

(g) An employee or employer is intimidated to agree or not agree to any action affecting the employment relationship;

(h) A trade union incites anyone to support a boycott;

(i) An employer discriminates against an employee solely on the grounds of race, sex or creed, provided that any action carried out in compliance with any law or wage regulating measure shall not be regarded as an unfair labour practice;

(j) Any employee, trade union, employer or employers' organisation directly or indirectly interferes with an employee's right to freedom of association;

(k) An employer or trade union fails to comply with an agreement;

(l) An employer is not directly involved in a dispute giving rise to a strike, lock-out or work stoppage;

(m) A dispute between an employer and employee giving rise to a strike, lock-out or work stoppage is the same or virtually the same as any dispute declared during the previous year;

(n) Any strike, lock-out or work stoppage which contravenes s65 of the LRA;

(o) Any labour practice or change in labour practice has or may have the effect that:

(i) Any employee's employment opportunity or work security is or may be unfairly prejudiced or jeopardised;

(ii) Any employer's business is or may be unfairly affected or disrupted;

(iii) Labour unrest is or may be created or promoted;

(iv) The the relationship between

employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected;

(v) Any employee is dismissed or his/her conditions of service are unfairly prejudiced by an employer solely or principally on the grounds of any compulsory service or training performed or undergone by such employee in terms of the Defence Act.

The Accord

Basic rights

All workers are entitled to be covered by legislation which encapsulates the following basic rights:

1. To be a member of a union without fear of victimisation.

2. To bargain collectively, including the right to organisational facilities such as check-off and access, the right to shop steward representation, and the right to negotiate alterations to terms and conditions of employment.

3. To withhold labour.

4. To work.

5. To protection.

6. To development.

Where these rights are not enshrined in legislation the parties will do all that is necessary and reasonable to have them translated into legislation. The parties also agree to prevail upon their constituent members to act in a manner consistent with these basic rights.

Scope of application

The Act shall apply to:

1. Every undertaking, industry, trade or occupation including those on or above the continental shelf in connection with surveys, research, prospecting or exploitation in respect of natural resources; or

2. Any association composed wholly or partly of persons employed by the state whether the association exists at the commencement of this Act or is established after that commencement.

Any association composed wholly or partly of persons employed by the state may object to the registration or variation of the scope of registration of any similar association in the same circumstances in which a trade union would be entitled to in terms of the LRA.

Unfair labour practice definition

An 'unfair labour practice' means:

(a) Any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other than a strike or a lock-out, which has the

effect that:

(i) Any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his/her employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or may be prejudiced or jeopardised;

(ii) The business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or disrupted;

(iii) Labour unrest is or may be created or promoted;

(iv) The relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected; or

(b) The dismissal or termination of employment of an employee if it occurs without good and sufficient cause connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service, or without due compliance with a proper procedure. A procedure will not be proper unless:

(i) The employee has been given an opportunity to defend him/herself if the dismissal or termination arises out of his/her capacity or conduct and the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this opportunity;

(ii) The dismissal or termination arises out of the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service, and the employer:

(aa) Has first consulted in good faith in an endeavour to reach agreement with the appropriate collective bargaining representative of those likely to be affected over the need to effect the dismissal or termination, the manner of dismissal or termination, the selection for dismissal or termination, and the means to be adopted to ameliorate the hardships of dismissal or termination; or

(bb) Has, in the absence of an appropriate collective bargaining representative, given due notice of the dismissal or termination to each employee selected for dismissal or termination and consulted with him/her over the need to effect the dismissal or termination, his selection for dismissal or termination and the means to be adopted to ameliorate the hardships of dismissal or termination; or

(c) Any other labour practice or any other change in any labour practice which has or may have an effect which is similar or related to any effect mentioned in paragraph (a).

The rocky road to the accord

* December 1986 - The draft Labour Relations Amendment Bill is published for comment. It is based on recommendations made by the National Manpower Commission (NMC) in 1984 and proposes far-reaching changes to the Act.

* September 1987 - Having collated the responses, the Manpower Department republishes the Bill in a slightly amended form. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour Relations later sits to obtain further comment on the Bill. Among those who make representations are Cosatu, other union groups,

employers, academics and union service organisations.

* 22 March 1988 - Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola begin deliberations to determine measures which would render the Bill more acceptable in their eyes. Cosatu had previously accepted a Nactu proposal that they should act as a single unit in the negotiations. This is the first time that the two federations have cooperated to achieve mutual aims and objectives.

* May 1988 - Cosatu convenes a special congress to discuss the Bill and calls for three days of 'national peaceful protest'.

Nactu supports the call and the subsequent stayaway on 6, 7 and 8 June by some 2,3 to 3 million workers is the most successful action of its kind in South African labour history.

* 9 June 1988 - The director-general of manpower, Saccola and Cosatu's lawyers meet to discuss the Bill. This is the first contact with the government to be sanctioned by Cosatu and represents an important shift away from its boycott tradition.

* August 1988 - Saccola, Cosatu and Nactu dispatch a letter to the government requesting that six contentious clauses in the Bill not be promulgated. These clauses deal with unfair

dismissals, indirect and intermittent strikes, procedures for union registration, time limits for the resolution of disputes, secrecy on industrial court judgments, and the presumption of union guilt for unlawful strike action by members.

* 1 September 1988 - The Bill becomes law with the six clauses included. Unions cry foul and accuse Saccola of negotiating with them only because it knew all along that the government would promulgate the Bill. The accusation is denied. For its part, the Manpower Department shifts the blame onto Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola saying they failed to meet pre-arranged deadlines for submissions on the Act.

* October 1988 - Cosatu and Nactu indicate a reluctance to continue talks with Saccola. The federations consider it unacceptable to negotiate while employers take advantage of the new legislation. They also point out that the major employer associations which formed Saccola - Assocom, the Chamber of Mines and Seifsa - are deeply divided and express doubts about organisation's ability to maintain unity. Cosatu indicates that the unions are to lobby the International Labour Organisation (I.L.O) to support changing the Act. It is also suggested that the Act be submitted for judicial scrutiny to determine whether it is fair. Later that month the federations announce they will arrange a meeting to discuss their approach.

* 4 and 5 March 1989 - Cosatu convenes the first Workers' Summit in which workers are called upon to formulate their own LRA to cover all workers, to submit their demands in this regard to Saccola; and to declare a dispute should the employers' response be unfavourable. The demands include that the right to strike and picket and engage in sympathy strikes be recognised; that no dismissals should take place without a proper hearing; that employers should recognise majority unions and that companies should consult with representative unions before retrenching workers. Nactu refuses to attend the summit, but 10 of its affiliates and individual members of six other affiliates defy the ruling.

* 26 and 27 August 1989 - At the Second

* Continued on Page 26



The duel over dual power

A growing number of voices from within the ranks of the opposition are raising the concept of dual power. David Niddrie reports

There is little doubt that South Africa's African National Congress-led opposition enjoys a moral authority and emotional support easily as great as that of President FW de Klerk's government.

A growing number of voices from within the ranks of that opposition argue that it actually exercises, or has the potential to exercise, 'dual power' alongside the power of the state.

The idea was first raised by assistant United Democratic Front (UDF) secretary general Mohammed Valli Moosa at the organisation's national workshop in April. It surfaced briefly at the South African Youth Congress' national gathering three weeks later and again in early June, in the form of an anonymous contribution to the latest edition of the South African Communist Party (SACP) journal, *Umsebenzi*.

Although the idea is not incorporated by any opposition formations as part of their formal analysis, it is nevertheless gaining currency in sectors of the liberation movement as a convenient means of characterising the post-February 2 situation in South Africa.

The concept of dual power has its origins in the period between the fall of the Tsar in imperial Russia in March 1917 and the Bolshevik seizure of power in October of that year.

During those seven turbulent months state power theoretically vested in a provisional government headed by Alexander Kerensky's Social Revolutionary Party. But, from the outset and increasingly until the Bolshevik uprising broke the deadlock, its control over the institutions of state was challenged by local Soviets (councils of workers, peasants and soldiers' deputies), and particularly those in the capital, Petrograd.

Increasingly, in the run-up to the October revolution, the provisional government exercised power only as and when the Soviets allowed it to do so.

There are obvious comparisons with South Africa today: the existence of two contending focuses of political authority, one a government-in-waiting the other a government increasingly acknowledging its own impermanence; and a highly volatile political climate in which both are attempting to stamp their perspectives indelibly on public opinion and on the future.

Dual power in South African terms, Moosa argued at the UDF April workshop, is 'a situation ... where the regime no longer has the sole monopoly over the control of all institutions (including state institutions), geographical areas and other aspects of people's lives.

'Building dual power should be the most important strategic objective of the liberation movement in this period'.

In South Africa, Moosa continued, 'it is unlikely that large geographical areas can be brought under the administrative and political control of the democratic movement (although we may have to re-visit this long-held position with the recent developments in the bantustans).

'There is no fixed formula - we must develop our own creative methods of exercising dual power, in accordance with the dictates of the South African reality. This calls on us to take a closer look at the organs of people's power which emerged in the '86-'87 period'.

Backing Moosa, the anonymous *Umsebenzi* contributor asserts: 'There are clearly two powers within South Africa today. These powers exist side by side and are contesting for political control.'

'On the one side is the regime, with its administration, army, police and other machineries. On the other is the as-yet fledgling power, the democratic movement led by the ANC. In what form then does dual power manifest itself?'

Both the contributor and Moosa argue the case for characterising contemporary South Africa as being subject to 'dual power' by highlighting certain features of the context in which this plays itself out. These include:

- * Recognition by De Klerk's government (as a result of mass action, international pressure and other forms of opposition) that it must abandon apartheid. Both stress, however, that South Africa's rulers have not yet accepted the need to replace apartheid with an unrestrained democratic process.

- * The collapse of township administrations and homeland authorities - also under popular pressure - and the resultant transfer of loyalty to the democratic movement by many within these structures.

- * The growing conflict of loyalties within the ranks of black members of South African security forces - most graphically demonstrated by the wave of strikes among prison warders.

- * Surging support for the ANC and its opposition partners and the re-emergence of nascent 'organs of people's power' in the form of street committees and other civic structures paralleling state-linked institutions of authority.

In this situation, the two proponents of the dual power perspective argue, De Klerk and his administration are increasingly unable to unilaterally direct all aspects of state policy. They are forced, to an ever-greater extent, to look to opposition formations either to guide or to sanction their actions.

Both, however, argue strongly the need for the opposition to increase its strength if dual power is to be fully realised and the ability secured to enforce a transfer of power by other means should negotiations fail to achieve political democracy.

'The approach to dual power rests on the building of people's committees and the people's forces in general,' the *Umsebenzi* contributor argues. 'But it also depends on our ability to put to good use the space we win in struggle'.

The idea of dual power in South Africa has evolved from discussions within the opposition in the past three years on the possibilities and opportunities of a negotiation process.

Until the mass uprisings of 1986 and Pretoria's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale combined with international pressure to force Pretoria to negotiate military withdrawal from Angola and the independence of Namibia, ANC thinking leaned heavily towards the perspective that armed insurrection and seizure of state power was the most likely means of ending white rule and establishing democracy.

Since then (and particularly since the ANC began formulating the document on which both the Organisation of African Unity's *Harare Declaration* and the United Nations *Declaration on apartheid and its destructive consequences in southern Africa* are based) a thesis has evolved in ANC ranks arguing for the negotiating process itself to be used to gradually but consistently strip the apartheid government of its control over the institutions of state and over society generally, rather than expecting Pretoria to hand over power in one go at the conclusion of the negotiating process.

This is implicit in the route the ANC envisages for the negotiation process: from talks-about-talks, where its pre-conditions are achieved - release of political prisoners, an end to the emergency and other changes the movement believes are essential for normalisation of South African

politics - to round-table negotiations, on to election of a constituent assembly and the replacement of the National Party government by a mutually-agreed interim authority. The possible final element in the process is the participation of an international force similar to Untag in Namibia.

The ANC holds strongly to the view that keeping the process on this track will require continual mass pressure, but several examples of its thinking have emerged since its legalisation.

The first can be extracted from the response of deputy ANC president Nelson Mandela to De Klerk's decision to deploy troops in the strife-torn townships of Pietermaritzburg: Mandela's key criticism was directed at the fact that De

Klerk had taken his decision without consulting representative black leaders, and less at the decision itself.

And during the Groote Schuur talks, ANC foreign affairs secretary Thabo Mbeki demanded an end to exclusive government control and access to SABC radio and television. With the National Party about to become only one of many parties to negotiations, it must abandon its monopoly control of the airwaves, he said.

The underlying logic of these demands is that of steadily stripping De Klerk's government of its ability to revert to the old way of doing things, should negotiations move beyond its control.

A consequence of this move would be to lock De Klerk's government into the negotiating process.

But neither of the above examples - Mandela in Natal and Mbeki on SABC - requires of the ANC any reciprocal obligations, locking it into a reliance on negotiations as the only route forward.

For the ANC, this is crucial.

A widely held view within the movement is that De Klerk's negotiators are attempting to 'tie the ANC into joint authority'.

One example cited is Pretoria's attempt 'to make the ANC carry the can for policing the townships and imposing political peace'.

If the ANC was to accept the task, it would find itself, without a formal police force and only its moral authority



Moosa: dual power - the strategic objective

and organisational discipline to draw on, increasingly forced to rely on the physical presence of government police or military personnel.

And in what may be an equivalent process in education, the Department of Education and Training (DET) has formally requested the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) to put forward suggestions on how best to use R800-million in one-off funding.

The DET request may be a clear example of Moosa's 'situation where the regime no longer has the sole monopoly over the control of all institutions'. But it also has the potential of locking the NECC into joint responsibility for implementation of any proposals it makes - while the actual execution of decisions would still rest with DET and remain entirely beyond NECC control.

NECC general secretary Ihron Rensburg acknowledges the danger. While the organisation is discussing how the money would be best spent, it is also examining the problem of its engagement with the government.

It is in this area of joint responsibility that the concept of aiming for dual power stumbles.

A recent adage from within ANC ranks holds that 'if you aim for dual power you'll get joint authority'.

The concept of dual power - even as a springboard, as Moosa seems to suggest in urging 'creative methods' in its exercise - implies the presence of two contesting powers within the institutions of state themselves.

And as the presence in the institutions of state of both the National Party and the ANC, although with vastly disproportionate authority, is precisely what De Klerk is seeking to achieve, there are clear dangers.

But there is a second significant difficulty in asserting that 'building dual power is the most important strategic objective of the liberation movement', say critics.

The ANC has already defined its most important strategic objective as taking state power: any attempt to superimpose a second 'most important' strategic objective will have the effect of obscuring state power as the primary

target.

And it will do so at a time when the thrusting energy that characterised opposition political activity towards the end of last year has already been muted.

'February 2 knocked our programmes of action - both that outlined in the ANC's January 8 message and that arising from the Conference for a Democratic Future - completely off track', says an ANC official.

In addition, the legalisation of the ANC has placed a huge burden of activity on the layer of several thousand political activists who have in the past provided the co-ordination and linkages which united local actions of resistance and protest into a national whole. The massive and time-consuming task of signing up members for the ANC, establishing branches, linking grassroots support to regional and national structures has fallen to that layer of activists.

Coupled with the transfer of overt leadership from the internal 'mass democratic movement' structures to the ANC, the result has been a discernible de-mobilisation.

In addition, both Moosa and the *Umsebenzi* contribution attempt to forge a link between the collapse of homeland and township councils and their assertion of the need for dual power.

While there may be an initial attraction for the idea of replacing proxy apartheid authorities with democratic authorities controlling and accountable to large sections of the population, this is a rather different thing from the exercise of dual power.

Those institutions are available to the democratic movement precisely because De Klerk's government has effectively abandoned them - because their continued defence and support have become too politically and financially costly.

And at its root, the notion of dual power assumes that the 'power' under examination is central state power. A diversion into byways already abandoned by Pretoria will only further obscure this, argue critics of the idea. ●



Bop: a bantustan under pressure

The shifting sands of Natal

The resignation of Inkatha's Oscar Dhlomo is a highly visible manifestation of shifting interests in Natal. But these changes offer no solution to ongoing violence in the province, argues Gerhard Maré



The new South African politics has done vastly more than change the balance of forces between the major players - the African National Congress, the National Party and the handful of other organisations - in the arena of political power.

It has created a fluidity which has unleashed class and social interests never before offered the opportunity of a say in central power.

This makes it increasingly necessary to move away from political analysis based on the idea of *organisations* as the basic political unit and look rather towards the *interests* and *positions* arising from the class structures and racial and ethnic divisions of South Africa in the 1990s.

Analysis of the new politics must go beyond assessment of apartheid and its main 'enemy'.

In Natal this is particularly so. Recent events in the province demonstrate this.

* The province's civil war continues. And while five years ago the regional state of emergency specifically excluded Natal, early this month the four-year national emergency was lifted everywhere but in Natal.

* The Natal Indian Congress, South Africa's oldest political formation, has decided to disband - but only if the Indian community can be organised into the ANC.


* Within the white community the result of the Umlazi by-election indicates substantial and ready support for the racism and fanaticism of the Conservative Party.

* And Oscar Dhlomo has resigned both as secretary general of Inkatha and from all the other positions he held. Shortly after his resignation, Dhlomo expressed a regret that the Indaba proposals had not been implemented three years earlier.

The reasons for its past rejection by the state have been dealt with elsewhere. But the context in which the Indaba arose is relevant to an understanding of current politics.

It came towards the end of a 10-year Inkatha initiative to secure a regional base from which to launch into national politics: this initiative covered the Buthelezi Commission, the Indaba itself, creation of the Joint Executive Authority with the Natal Provincial Council and the Joint Services Boards (as an alternative to state-conceived Regional Services Councils) and strongly ethnic politics.

Inkatha chose that route in 1980 when its links with the



ANC were cut and its control over the region brought it into increasing conflict with struggles against the apartheid state.

The behaviour of Inkatha supporters in crushing the 1980 KwaMashu schools boycott set the trend for the future. Since then it has suffered several other set-backs.

Its alliance with other 'black' political organisations came under strain when the Labour Party decided to participate in the tri-cameral parliament.

Then the UDF's launch in 1983 offered an alternative model for resistance politics. And two years later the formation of Cosatu drove another nail into the coffin of Inkatha's hope for organised worker support for the movement.

In consequence Inkatha has not reaped the full potential benefit of the alliance it forged through the Indaba with business and with tri-cameral parties.

Organised business has already had to weather the storm

over Inkatha supporters' role in the Pietermaritzburg violence.

The possibility of the ANC as a future government has increased pressure on business' support for Inkatha. And further pressure has come in the form of the recent successful stayaway protesting the continuing violence and the action of KwaZulu police (ZP). Another stayaway is looming - bringing the options facing business starkly to the fore.

On the other hand, opposition to Inkatha, in an organised regional form, has not been markedly successful - except from Cosatu. But the union federation is not structured to fight a township and rural civil war.

The NIC, revived early in the 1970s, had the structures - but not the numbers or the organised presence beyond the 'Indian community'.

The fledgling unions that became Fosatu allowed, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the space for dual membership between themselves in the factories and Inkatha in political society.

In the townships the KwaZulu authority, controlled totally by Inkatha, did what the bantustans were designed to do:

Gerhard Maré teaches in the department of sociology at the University of Natal, Durban, and is co-author of: *An appetite for power, Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of 'loyal resistance'*.



A house in flames in the Ntuzuma township

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deflect much of the anti-apartheid struggle away from direct confrontation with the central state.

The newly-arrived legal ANC, already subject to pressures determined in Pretoria and the capitals of the West, has enormous obstacles to overcome in Natal.

It is opposing an organisation which has had 15 years in which to integrate itself into every aspect of society and which cannot simply be equated with the bantustan.

Inkatha has established administrative links that go beyond KwaZulu. It has experience of working with the major industrial and agricultural interests.

And while it is still possible to criticise Inkatha for its failures in the spheres of social welfare and education and to condemn the atrocities of the ZP, the ANC's regional structures are soon going to have to provide the answers Inkatha has been unable to give to these problems.

It is not obvious where the democratic structures are to be found to give a new, disciplined direction to social reconstruction.

The unions have been offered as one source, but they serve an employed constituency based in productive units in which the primary struggle will be to defend the gains fought for and won over the past five years. Their own fight is going to increase in intensity.

The unions do not serve the 'youth' or the unemployed (where these two are distinguishable); they do not serve many of the other social groups available for alternative mobilisation - the petty bourgeoisie, competitive capital, 'traditional authority', white workers and commercial agriculture.

With the weakening of NP support - there is no reason why the Umlazi result should not repeat itself in an economically depressed northern Natal - it might very well mean that the NP turns to alliances sooner than it might have wanted to.

The Indaba model - its language, emphasis on 'voluntary

background groups', federalism and unequivocal support for capitalism now adopted by constitutional development minister Gerrit Viljoen - is the logical rallying point for such an alliance.

The agreement between Cosatu/Nactu and Saccola around the Labour Relations Act has not found universal favour with capital: some vocal elements argue the accord, rolls back gains by capital over the past few years.

In Natal, specific mention is being made of Uwusa, the Inkatha-formed union, as an 'ignored' grouping in the labour field.

Especially located in the smaller scale competitive sector, there is still support for an option that relies on a fight rather than diplomacy and compromise. And there are other factors directing the attention of whites to Inkatha:

- * the perceived failure of the ANC to bring peace to the region;
- * recent, highly publicised criminal violence against the white farming community;
- * the reality of lower living standards when the demands made by the unemployed, the homeless and the ill-educated are addressed in future; and
- * the wave of excited support for the Conservative Party; probably representing aspirations of the majority of whites. This support will have none of the selective squeamishness of liberal Natalians of the past.

But there is little doubt that the general direction of Inkatha politics has become an embarrassment to supporters with aspirations in the central social and political processes of change in South Africa. The murder trial of KwaZulu cabinet minister Samuel Jamile is an example of this. Similarly damaging have been the mass assault by Inkatha members on townships around Pietermaritzburg at the end of March; the negative publicity Inkatha is receiving internationally through its own activity and the exposure of these actions by Cosatu; and the behaviour of the ZP as a direct arm of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and hence of Inkatha.

Under these conditions, formerly loyal implementers and defenders of the Inkatha line and policy have to reassess their future.

Oscar Dhlomo appears to be a case in point: his sudden resignation, and the uncharacteristically mellow response from Buthelezi, has yet to be adequately explained. With his business interests as well as professional distance from any effective social base, Dhlomo has decided to ditch that structure of apartheid that so effectively advanced the interests of traders and the top echelons of ethnic rule - the bantustans, institutions which no longer enjoy the support of FW de Klerk.

As for the mellow tones of their parting, both Buthelezi and Dhlomo clearly know enough of each other's secrets - personal and political - to want to avoid airing them. The nature of this political divorce is in sharp contrast to the treatment of both Barney Dladla, removed from Inkatha in 1974 and Sibusiso Bengu, the first Inkatha secretary-general, removed in 1974. Dladla's sin was the support base he had gathered in the working class; Bengu's was his popularity among students and youth.

The cordiality surrounding Dhlomo's resignation stems from the fact that he has no support base of his own. With a style perceived by some as more even-keeled than his president, it was precisely his lack of a base which made Dhlomo such a long-lasting colleague. Buthelezi could trust him with negotiations - in the Indaba, the JEA, with the central state, or in talks with the UDI/Cosatu Joint Working Committee on peace in Natal. Dhlomo could never do more than talk on Buthelezi's behalf.

So, while his departure will decrease Buthelezi's already-limited standing with a 'liberal' and business constituency, it means little in terms of organisational politics.

Thus, whatever changes have taken place, there is nothing to suggest that negotiations between leaders, or mediation, will stabilise politics in the region: that will require organisation on the ground. And that is a most difficult task to undertake under conditions of civil war, in which one side has the agents of 'law and order' on its side and under its control.

The pressure that has been mounted to remove the ZP from the bantustan's command is an essential part in the moves to allow a form of politics other than violence in the region. ●

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Six months ago Brazil held its first open presidential elections in 30 years. Workers' Party candidate Luis Inacio da Silva came within a hair's breadth of winning. Sociologist Gay Seidman interviews a founder member of the party, Maria Helena Moreira Alves, about its structures and the strategies underlying the extraordinary electoral showing



**Fighting for
the right
to be happy**



Brazil's model of industrialisation has been strikingly parallel to South Africa's. After the 1964 military takeover, all independent political parties were repressed and militant trade unionists were jailed or exiled. At the same time the military actively sought to attract foreign investors and to support local business and joint ventures with subsidies, protective tariffs and cheap industrial inputs provided by parastatal companies.

Rapid industrial growth rates in the 1960s and early 1970s earned authoritarian Brazil a reputation among businessmen as an 'economic miracle' - until a world recession in the 1970s brought hyperinflation, indebtedness and unemployment.

Although Brazil is still one of the largest industrial producers in the Third World, most of its 140 million people live in abject poverty. Wealth in Brazil is concentrated in a handful of people: 10% of the population earn nearly half the national income, while 1% of landowners owns nearly half the country's land.

PT has tried to organise and represent the 90% of the people who share the other half of the nation's income. Their needs are obvious. About one third of families lives on less than \$15 (or R40) per person per month. Brazil's infant mortality rate is the sixth highest in the world. One third of the population goes hungry, including over 32 million children. About one in three children under 17 years is not in school.

Racial discrimination makes the situation even more serious for the half of the population who are black: 40% are illiterate and one in four earns \$30 (or R80) a month.

Since the early 1980s successive governments have imposed austerity programmes in order just to pay the interest on Brazil's foreign debt. In 1988 about 60% of export earnings went on debt repayment.

Brazil's transition from military rule has not been an easy one. Faced with a deepening recession and a massive foreign debt, along with human rights abuses that began to touch the middle class, Brazil's industrialists began in the mid-1970s to call for greater participation in government. From the late 1970s, a growing popular movement, based initially in the large industrial centres and poor neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and spreading gradually to smaller cities and rural areas, challenged reforms designed to restrict political control to the country's political and economic elites. These reforms were often suggested as a model for South Africa during National Party discussions leading up to the 1984 constitution.

Through Brazil's 10-year transition - through 1982 municipal elections in which true opposition candidates ran for the first time, through the 1985 indirect presidential elections and the Constituent Assembly, to open presidential elections last year - the PT has fought for full citizenship for all Brazilians, with access to the country's wealth and social services as well as broad political participation.

Today the party controls all Brazil's major industrial cities and many smaller ones as well as several state governments.

Along with its simple campaign slogan - 'Not afraid to be happy' - the PT offered concrete proposals designed to carry out full land reform, to guarantee urban land and housing, to redistribute income and wealth, to provide guarantees for women workers, to fight racial inequality, to improve public education and health, to protect working children and provide for Brazil's seven million abandoned children and to institute a moratorium on Brazil's foreign debt repayments.

Q: What was the origin of the PT and what were the conditions under which it emerged?

A: The party was born from the understanding of people who were organising in the resistance (to military rule) and in social movements - in trade unions, in neighbourhood organisations and in the countryside - that it was not sufficient to have social movements.

When they started to organise strike movements and unions, people assumed you could pressure the military government into negotiations or even overthrow it through a vast strike movement.

But in 1979, when there were more than three million workers on strike, it became evident you could have the whole country on strike and not change anything - because employers would make concessions, the military would agree and then they would change the overall law to take away the gains in some other way.

For example in 1979 they gave workers a 10% pay rise and then changed the way salaries were calculated so that they ended up taking away 30% of salaries - basically to pay the international debt.

So we started to think seriously about how to win political power within the context of Brazil. We had the experience of armed struggle, which we lost. We believed that, given the size and diversity of Brazil and the size of the standing army, it would be very difficult to win.

The consensus in 1979 was that a political party was necessary, both to channel working-class demands to the political sphere and to coordinate all the different social movements and the trade union movement and to start winning political posts even within the restrictions of the Brazilian electoral laws.

So the PT has a contradictory origin. It is made up of people who had been in the resistance to the military but who made a conscious decision to work within the political system that the military had set up, although in opposition to it.

It is a party that exists legally, so it has no clandestine activities. It is a mass party, organised openly to win elections and gain representation. But it also seeks to build popular participation at grass-roots level.

A lot of discussion within the working-class movement examined the strategies of the old Left and populists, who wanted to negotiate an inter-class compromise with the military, giving a lot of

concessions, including an undertaking that workers wouldn't strike against national capital.

In 1979, after the huge strike wave, a lot of people joined the PT because they believed that national and foreign capital are basically one class with the same interests. As Lula pointed out, when you struck against Brazilian capitalists they called the police even before Ford did.

Trade union leaders did not believe that you could have a negotiated transition without the working class losing out: concessions to national capital meant giving away everything.

The idea of the PT was to show people there was an alternative to a negotiated transition and a possibility of a different kind of democracy - participatory democracy - which the PT wanted to build.

Q: What is the PT's social base and what social movements, along with the new labour movement, formed the party?

A: Originally the party was working class, mostly urban, with middle-class intellectuals who worked in the progressive movements of the Catholic Church, and a handful of upper-class members. That composition changed in time, with the growth of rural movements.

Now it's about 60% rural, with the agricultural workers' unions, with the movement for the defence of the Amazon, with the rubber tappers' union and the movements of the peasants for land.

The social movements in which the party originated have a long history. Brazil had a long history of urban organisation, which became more of a base for resistance under the military. People who live in a particular neighbourhood register as a civic association with an elected board and mobilise the population to force local government to provide services that they don't have - such as electricity, water, sewage, improved schools, housing. Because governments pay no attention to poor areas, investing only in rich areas, this was a way for poor communities to enforce their rights.

The civic associations grew a lot under the military government, because poor people were even more neglected, and then they took on the role of organising the defence of human rights and resistance to the military. By 1978 it is estimated there were 1 800 such associations in Rio alone.

Associations varied, but in some areas they had elected representatives from each street making up a general council.



Six months ago, Brazil held its first open presidential elections in 30 years. To the astonishment of political analysts, the Workers' Party candidate, Luis Inacio da Silva - a charismatic metalworker known everywhere as 'Lula' - came within two percentage points of winning the presidency of the largest country in Latin America. Lula, who had never attended high school, called for full political participation from the grassroots, broad land reform and redistribution from 'those who have to those who have not'. The party he represents, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, the Workers' Party), sees itself as building democratic socialism.

By 1978 they began forming federations, so you had the different associations of, say, Rio united in a federation.

The *favelas*, or shanty-towns, had a separate association, also with elected representatives. Some of these communities became so well organised that there are places where they have their own judicial system, their own school system and the police don't go there at all. It's literally another nation.

Most of these organisations didn't initially support the PT which really had its origins in the new, combative trade unions which emerged in the late '70s. But their members began to join the party as it grew and the majority of members of grassroots movements even-

tually went to PT.

The federations and associations don't belong to the PT as organisations. They are separate and there are many different political parties represented in them.

The same is true of the CUT, the union federation. All the combative trade unions formed a central labour federation independent of the PT, with different political parties represented.

Q: What is the relationship today between the PT and these independent social movements?

A: We feel that social movements have to remain autonomous. They should not become part of a political party, subject to its disciplinary measures or have to answer to party rule. They should be independent. The party should work within social movements, but it should also have its own political space, because it has the primary function of government, of gaining political office. The PT was born with the goal of breaking clientelist relations which have always dominated in the past. The minute a party gets to be in government, if all the organisations of civil society are in the party, they are immediately co-opted into government and lose a lot of their autonomy and their critical powers. From its inception the PT attempted to avoid this.

The influence has been from the grassroots movement to the party, not the other way round. We have a policy, for example, when somebody from a base Christian community becomes a candidate for the PT, he won't run as a candidate from the base community, he's a candidate of the PT - and this has to be very explicitly stated. His primary role is in the party.

A member may represent the interests of the section of the working class with which he works within the party. But he does not function as a member of the PT within the social movement.

The party has no mechanism to tell a member: 'You're going to vote this way in your meeting in the bank workers' union', for example, or to have a party line within, say, the bank workers' union. This doesn't happen. The bank workers in the PT bring proposals to the party after they have been voted and discussed in terms of the interests of the membership. So it's from down up, not the other way around.

A double militancy is simple when you're not in government, when you're in opposition. But when the PT becomes government, it's very important to remain

separate.

The only way to keep the party really in touch with the rank and file, and responsive to the real needs of people, is when these groups are independent enough so that they feel they can strike against the party, they can protest, they can do whatever they want.

This is something we still haven't solved altogether: there's such an overlap of social movements within the party. We haven't gone so far as to prohibit people from a neighbourhood organisation from being civil servants, but this has been discussed. Because when it has happened such members immediately became co-opted, lost a lot of their critical powers and lost touch with their base.

In Diadema (a town near Sao Paulo, where the PT had its first experience in municipal government and where Maria Helena was head of public relations and information), this became such a problem that the party had a policy against incorporating top leaders of neighbourhood associations in civil service jobs.

The danger is the demobilisation of social movements, of co-option and of selling out. These are poor people, who often don't even have jobs. So when you get a nice secure government job, you change. You start making a little fiefdom and hiring people who are loyal to you.

The entire pattern of Brazilian society is very clientelist. To get a job, to get scholarship, to get anything, you have to get a patron. As soon as we got people elected to office we had a long line of people from social movements asking for favours.

After a debate we decided we would never grant any individual favours, we would always do things collectively. So if somebody came with a problem about schools, we would suggest that they get their neighbourhood mobilised to propose a solution that would help all of them and we'd introduce it as a law rather than just granting one person's son a scholarship.

People didn't understand it at all and we lost a lot of support at first. But it's a process of raising political consciousness and now it's party policy.

Q: How do you enforce party policies?

A: I think the biggest problem for democratic socialism is how to ensure fidelity to the programme of the party without falling into purges and disciplinary tactics to repress debate. But then how do

you enforce discipline?

We err on the side of anarchism which runs the risk that you don't enforce representation and people can do whatever they want and not represent the party.

For instance, the mayor of the city of Sao Paulo (with about 15 million people, the world's third largest city) is from the PT, but she was a leader of the homeless movement. She feels as mayor she represents all the people of the city and she represents the social movements more than the party. She says she has the legitimate mandate of people who are not in the PT as well as the party. And she says she has to be responsive to her constituency.

It's been true of every mayor we've elected that when the party tries to impose policies that are in its programme, they say: 'We can't. We have to negotiate with the business sector, the multi-nationals. We have to represent all of the people'. And it's true.

The problem of trying to impose party discipline on someone like the mayor of Sao Paulo is that you can really become isolated and sectarian. So somehow you have to find the middle course. It's one of the contradictions of working within the capitalist system.

There are some areas where the party has been successful in changing norms. If you're elected to political posts, you give 40% of your salary to the party. At first it was a huge fight, then it became the norm. Any post you occupy as a representative of the PT, you have to give 40% of your salary. Secondly, when the party decides it will not do something, any PT member who does it will be expelled.

Remember, the PT was born out of a refusal to participate in negotiations with the military to have a controlled transition when all the other opposition parties were participating. In 1985, when the Congress formed an electoral college to choose a presidential candidate acceptable to the military, the PT decided - after a heated

debate at all levels of the party - to refuse to vote to show that we should have direct elections.

The year before there had been 11 million people demonstrating in the streets for direct presidential elections, so we were pretty angry about indirect elections. Two of our Congress representatives decided to follow their individual consciences, so they voted in the electoral college. They were both expelled. Neither was re-elected. After that, key political decisions became easier to enforce.

Q: What was the PT's position during the Constituent Assembly, where elected representatives spent more than a year designing a new constitution for Brazil?

A: The PT had proposed a sovereign and independent Constituent Assembly, with people elected purely to vote on the constitution - to decide what the balance of powers would be; what the role of the congress and the executive should be; to decide whether it should be a parliamentary or presidential system - and so on. After this, they proposed that the assembly should dissolve. Of course the conservatives didn't want that and the military supported them. They wanted a regular Congress to become a Constituent Assembly. So what we got was a regular election for Congress and then when they took office, the elected congressmen declared themselves a Constituent Assembly.

They spent a year drawing up a constitution and then went back to being regular congressmen and senators.

This obviously meant the government didn't legislate ordinarily for a year. It allowed the president to rule by decree. But even more importantly, the participants had their own interests (to defend) - for example, how much congressmen should be paid, what were their rights.

Also, all the regulations governing Congress were in effect in the Constituent Assembly. For example, laws introduced by the president have urgent priority in Congress - which wouldn't have been true with an independent Constituent Assembly. So the proposals he introduced for the constitution had to be voted on, and he had a lot of clout. For example, he gave himself another year in office. And of course it was all tied to the military.



In the Constituent Assembly, the PT had only 19 out of more than 500 representatives. Our attitude was to try to have as many social reforms passed as possible.

We won some significant things, though not all. Perhaps our most interesting initiative was that the Constituent Assembly should accept something known as 'popular amendments'. This meant that any amendment with over 30 000 supporting signatures would be considered by the Assembly. That elicited an immense popular mobilisation, which introduced a lot of social clauses - for women's rights, for black people's rights, rights for the handicapped and the defence of the Amazon.

One of the things that we successfully introduced into the constitution was that presidential elections would always be in two rounds. This was so that you could have all political parties run their own candidates, with their own ideas, so you'd have as much debate as possible. And then you would have the two most popular candidates in the run-off election, one month later, where you could form alliances.

This is also the way all governors will be elected. It allows all of you to present your platforms but also to form alliances.

In the presidential elections last year, we ran almost alone in the first round and won second place. Then we had the run-off in December, with the right-wing candidate, Fernando Collor de Mello, against Lula in a very tight race. We formed a popular left-wing alliance and Lula won more than 31 million votes - close to 40% of the vote. Collor got only 1% more.

From the election we learned that you have to think of the destabilisation that the Right will carry out. We made a terrible mistake - which probably cost us the election, since we only lost by three million out of 80 million votes.

The Right knew they could control the votes of peasants, so they wanted to reduce the vote in the urban areas. Using public opinion polls, they identified the cities where Lula would have 60% or more of the vote. Wherever there was strong support for Lula, there was a boycott by the (private) bus companies on election day. So there was a high rate of absenteeism in these cities - as much as 30% - because there were no buses. We figure we lost a million votes in Rio alone.

Q: How is the party organised?



'We are a party with different ideologies - there are former communists, there are socialists, people from the Catholic Church and Trotskyists'

A: The party is organised in two ways. As a legal party, we have to comply with the law. This is meant to enforce conservative parties which are organised vertically. For example, you had to include incumbents and you had to have official conventions. Also you had to have 30% of members registered at the electoral tribunal, supplying their addresses - which facilitates police control.

So we devised a parallel structure. First we had to convince 13 congressmen to join us. Then we have three different levels of membership. About 400 000 members are registered. They are people like me, a university lecturer, who can fight off police pressure.

Then there are over a million militants, who are members of the party, who sign internal documents and participate in conventions but don't sign the forms as party members.

And then we have a third level of about four million activists, who participate in campaigns but don't go to the conventions.

Party decisions are made in the parallel structure, not just by the registered members. Party militants are formed in *nucleos*, based in the workplace and the neighbourhood. You don't have to belong to *nucleos* in both, but you have to belong to one. I'm a member of the *nucleo* of the University of Rio and I'm a member of my neighbourhood *nucleo*.

You meet once a week or once a month with your *nucleo*. The policies of the party are discussed at that level. Then the proposals are brought by the representatives elected by the *nucleo* to the municipal meeting.

Rio has 200 neighbourhoods. They elect representatives depending on their size. At the municipal convention you make decisions pertaining to the municipality, based on proposals from the *nucleos* and elect representatives to committees that deal with different issues - like health and transportation.

Then you elect representatives to the state convention, where you have the same thing. All the proposals from the municipal conventions are discussed, sieved through, voted on and incorporated into a proposed programme.

Finally you have the national level, which has the same structure.

The PT has one other thing that is unusual. We are a party with different ideologies - there are former communists, there are socialists, people from the Catholic Church, Trotskyists - who form different tendencies within the party. We want to have as much internal debate as possible.

So we came up with the *tendencias*, which are formal groups which exist within the party, with the right to present their own positions on party platforms as well as their own slate at each convention.

To decide the party platforms, we have a majority vote. To decide on posts in the executive committees we have proportional vote. Depending on the proportion your slate gets, you get that proportion of representatives on the board.

One of the party's rules is that once we make a decision, you have to defend the party programme and go out onto the street and campaign. But sometimes people act against the party.

The party is now discussing whether a group that does not accept the majority position should stay within the party. Now that we're probably the biggest party in Brazil, a lot of people think members should be accountable to the programme once it's decided.

The campaign coordination committee is also chosen from different *tendencias* and we have various committees - to deal with finances, written propaganda, electronic propaganda.

Our campaigns are entirely financed by selling stuff on street corners. All *nucleos* are responsible for selling a certain amount of buttons, shirts, tapes, videos - all kinds of stuff.

This way we don't get attached to business concerns and rely on donations and every single person feels they can contribute.

We see campaigns as a part of education, of mobilisation, so we emphasise campaigns on the streets, rallies, door-to-door visits, discussions. We use a lot of videos - we have our own television, TV dos Trabalhadores, which is given a lot of leeway in producing technically good material for the party. It is mostly staffed by militants who do this as their contribution to the party.

By law it is forbidden for three months before any election to have paid ads on television and each party has a set amount of free television time on all channels. The conservative parties hate it, of course, but we used it very well for public education. Our audience was an estimated 90 million people.

Q: What will the party do now, in the aftermath of the presidential election?

A: Mainly continue the same thing. We now have mayors in 34 cities so we'll continue the administration of those cities, because the party wants to establish itself as an alternative administration.

Then there's a congressional election in October. This congress will be important, since in 1992 there will be a referendum on whether to have a presidential or a parliamentary system. At the moment the opposition supports a presidential system because, historically in Brazil, the parliamentary system has prevented Left presidents from doing anything - although it's still a debate.

In October we also have elections for governors of states, again in two rounds. The party is considering fielding its own candidates for the first round and forming alliances for the second round.

We also have a shadow cabinet, so that whatever policies Collor introduces, we'll have alternative proposals, to mobilise the population and increase political debate. The PT has publicised an 'Alert to the Nation', showing how Collor's new economic policies will concentrate capital by virtually eliminating small and medium size companies, and enabling big companies to buy out bankrupt ones. We analyse how this will affect employment - there are already 2 million unemployed after two months - and trade unions.

The PT has a very strong role as an educator. Paulo Freire, who's now the PT's secretary of education in Sao Paulo, used to call the PT a big school, a popular educator, and said the party's



'Some communities became so well organised that they have places where they have their own judicial system and their own school system'

primary function was to raise the consciousness of the Brazilian people.

I think it still is, even though it's now such a large party.

Q: Could you say something on the PT's administration of cities?

A: The main point we want to make in city administrations is to increase the actual participation of workers in city government. If someone asked me what was PT's definition of socialism, I'd say that was it, to increase (worker) participation at all levels.

Because we inherit tenured civil servants - who are often reactionary, who are all hired through clientelist relationships - we have a problem right away: how to incorporate participation in decision-making.

So we set up popular councils, which have a similar composition to the *nucleos* and the neighbourhood committees, as a kind of parallel structure to the municipal administration.

Essentially there are two kinds of representation. First, there are popular councils, which are popularly elected by district to work with the administration. They serve as an advisory body, especially to set budget priorities.

Then we have a system of citizens' committees on issues like health, education, transport, which are also elected in popular secret elections and they also

serve as advisory boards.

For example the transport committee of Diadema worked with technicians and so on to determine the true cost of transport. They organised a whole survey to see how many passengers there were and then their findings were used by the council. From then on the fares were not raised. And the council required all private bus companies to open their books. This became a model for all PT city administrations.

Eventually, because the private companies kept causing problems, the citizens' committee suggested that the mayor should take over the companies. This was passed and the new company is run by an elected board which has joint management with the workers.

We're really taking the democratisation of administration seriously.

For example, in Diadema, the third most densely populated urban area in Brazil, a third of the population lived in shanty-towns, in cardboard and wood shacks on hillsides that would wash away in the rain.

The shanty-town committees, composed of elected members of communities, worked with the municipal government and technicians hired by the city to first conduct a census, then to design the general layout of the area, showing where they wanted community centres, daycare facilities, health clinics and playgrounds.

The architects, engineers and urban planners then discussed alternative proposals and brought them back to the committees. House sites were drawn and measured to fit the new design. This was the hardest part because not everyone could fit into the planned area. But because it was done by the elected community representatives people at least felt it was their own decision.

Then the shanty-town council organised residents to tear down their shacks, saving material to re-use it, and later to reconstruct them according to new plans while the city installed water pipes, sewerage and electricity.

Technicians taught new building methods to residents - for example, they invented a simple machine to build bricks from cement and soil.

Finally the city government negotiated with landowners to give residents complete title to their land, by giving the landowners tax breaks and municipal bonds.

These are modifications that any city government can make, even under capitalism. ●

The rocky road to the accord

* From Page 12

Workers' Summit proceedings are severely inhibited by the presence of over 200 heavily-armed police in the conference hall. Nevertheless, a call is made for a week of protest against the LRA and the September 6 general election. This follows an announcement that over 300 000 workers have voted in favour of industrial action against the LRA in a strike ballot conducted in terms of the declaration of a dispute with Saccola.

* 13 October 1989 - A notice is published in the Government Gazette by the NMC inviting proposals for consolidating the LRA. This initiative is not related to the negotiations between Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola and is prompted by the widespread recognition that the Act has become increasingly contradictory and ambiguous as a result of the many

amendments.

* December 1989 - At the Conference for a Democratic Future delegates resolve to continue the anti-LRA campaign.

* 30 March 1990 - The NMC publishes its proposals for consolidating the LRA in order to stimulate debate on the principles which should form the basis of a revised or consolidated LRA. Among the proposals is a recommendation that **all** workers should be covered by the Act.

* 11 May 1990 - Cosatu, Nactu and Saccola sign their accord after two years of deliberations.

* 15 May 1990 - A Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola delegation meets with manpower minister Eli Louw in Cape Town to discuss the accord and suggest a timetable for translating it into legislation before the end of the parliamentary session on 22 June. Louw undertakes to take all 'reasonable' steps to achieve this. The parties agree labour legislation should be the subject of the widest possible consultation.

* 23 May 1990 - The Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola accord is published in the Government Gazette for comment. Wednesday 6 June is set as the closing date

for submissions. The three bodies also meet with the NMC.

* 11 June 1990 - The NMC, responsible for collating responses to the accord, submits its report to minister Louw.

* 12 June 1990 - A Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola delegation flies to Cape Town at the request of Louw. When they meet, the minister makes two proposals. One, that more time should be allowed for further comment and consultation. Alternatively, that those elements of the accord on which 'adequate consultation' has taken place be introduced to Parliament before the end of the session; and that an enabling provision be included in the Act, to give legislative effect to accords reached by parties. The implication of this last proposal is that the accord would be legally binding on Saccola, Cosatu and Nactu but nobody else. The delegation rejects Louw's proposals and reiterates its demands for the entire accord to be translated into legislation this year.

* 13 June 1990 - Following a Cabinet meeting, Louw announces the government has decided that the process of consultation on the accord should continue with a view to amending the Act in 1991. ●

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*In WIP 66
Mark Swilling
examined changing
state and business
strategies on housing
and related social
services. Here he
discusses some
considerations in
developing democratic
urban policy*

Planning a democratic urban policy

Jan Steyn, head of the government's R2-billion special trust fund for social development, has begun canvassing prominent members of the democratic movement to ascertain their attitude to participating in the policy think-tank to determine how this money is spent.

The fund might well provide some of the resources needed to initiate an urban development strategy which prevents finance capital from becoming the dominant element in the urban power structure and which develops homes for the majority who cannot afford market rates.

Whether the fund is actually turned to this use will depend largely on whether mass-based political organisations decide to participate - and, equally important, whether they define clear-cut objectives and pre-conditions for their participation.

Land, services and houses are the three basic elements of the

urban environment. An adequate urban policy for the poor must stipulate in detail how these elements will be provided, who will pay for them and what regulations will govern them.

The following are essential points of departure for such a policy:

- * The constraints on access to housing and services for the urban poor are not simply racial; they have become increasingly material in nature.

- * Given that the market cannot be eliminated, it must be regulated in specific ways.

- * Collective forms of social control and not simply individual private ownership should be seen as the basis for development.

- * Grants, subsidised capital and loan capital must not only be made accessible to the urban poor, they must be brought under direct community control.

- * Community participation and control must be the guiding principle of all urban development policies.

- * Finance capital should not replace the state as the dominant power in the urban structure.

- * Spatial dislocation must be prevented wherever possible.

- * Municipal financing mechanisms must stabilise communities, not divide and dislocate them.

- * Urban goods must not become commodities that can be traded and exchanged for profit.

A democratic urban policy should aim to devise mechanisms to improve the use value of land, services and houses for the urban poor without making the poor more vulnerable to the market as development programmes cause an increase in the exchange value of the urban goods.

Throughout the developed and developing world, there have been urban development and renewal programmes that have improved the exchange value of urban goods, but have also caused displacement of the urban poor via market-determined choices.

The question this poses is whether there are mechanisms that can lock the urban poor out of the conventional market so that their land, services and houses can be expanded and upgraded without exposing the beneficiaries to market pressures they cannot collectively resist.

This question contains the seeds of an answer: it should be possible to devise a multi-dimensional approach to urban development that envisages three

Community-controlled Financial Institutions

Community development credit unions (CDCUs) emphasise cooperation and community improvement.

Everyone who opens an account with a CDCU becomes a member of a cooperative and is entitled to vote for the board of directors which oversees the CDCU's day-to-day operations.

CDCUs receive people's savings just like banks or building societies, but they don't try to make a profit from the savings. They keep money safe and pay interest to the saver. This means that if R100 is invested for a year at a 10% interest rate, the investor gets R110 back.

In turn, the CDCU lends money to members of the community - to enable them to build houses, to establish small businesses or to finance purchases. The interest rate charged to borrowers is somewhat higher than the return to those who save with the CDCU. This is in order to cover administration costs.

The Cape Credit Union League, for example, encourages CDCUs to begin issuing savings accounts for deposits as small as R2 a saver. CDCUs belonging to the League pay savers interest rates ranging from 5% to 8% and charge borrowers 12%.

Community Development Loan Funds (CDLFs) are generally larger and more project-related than CDCUs. They try to avoid competing with CDCUs for community savings and attempt to gain access to outside finance - such as the Steyn Fund.

CDLFs have the power to borrow money from the state, from companies and individuals and to make loans to suitable projects. They are managed by community-based trustees elected by the people. Examples include a German fund which has raised R14 million from 13 000 progressive individuals organised in the environmental, peace and women's movements. This money is allocated to new productive enterprises, mostly of a co-operative nature.

In the United States a network of 30 CDLFs in various cities controlled R64 million by 1987. They have granted 1 100 loans to community development projects and much of their success is due to a sharing of resources and information.

sectors. Firstly, a state sector will be required to take responsibility for the rental sector (that will need to continue), subsidised bulk infrastructure (like roads) and the financing and planning of other collectively consumed services.

In the second sector, all development projects should be fully financed by private capital. In other words, no subsidies whatsoever should be provided for the purchase of land, installation of services and construction of houses. Nor should loan finance to the home buyer be subsidised in any way. Tenure in this case should probably be private and individualised.

In other words, this sector will comprise urban goods in which private capital can invest at full profit rates. The value of these goods will be determined by the market. The building industry, the construction industry and financial institutions will all take their cut and, in return, home buyers who can afford these values will have houses.

However, because this sector will be

totally unsubsidised and based on profit-seeking investment and finance capital, no more than 20% of the market will be able to afford the accommodation it offers.

The third sector should comprise urban goods that are not subject to market-determined valuations; profit-based cost structures; and unsubsidised development and finance capital.

Instead, land, services and housing should be made available to the urban poor on the basis of subsidised development capital; non-profit development organisation; non-profit loan finance; and collective tenure arrangements of an anti-market nature.

It is a global truth that successful development programmes for the urban poor are inconceivable without subsidisation.

If choices must be made about which elements of urban development to subsidise, the ranking would be land, services and housing - in that order.

Leaving aside for the moment the tax

base from which subsidies should derive - that is, local, regional or national - there are two ways that subsidies can be utilised. Firstly, they can be used to balance out the consequences of 'market failure', to close the gap between what the market offers and what the poor can afford either by contributing to the price of the goods supplied or the purchasing power of those seeking homes.

This is, in essence, the preferred policy in South African business circles.

The last option is a policy that envisages the use of subsidies as stimulants and incentives for non-profit development programmes. Also motivated by a desire to rectify market failure, this policy option seeks to achieve its goal by using subsidies, via mechanisms like the Steyn Fund, to stimulate and support the creation of non-profit (and preferably community-controlled) organisations to deliver goods.

The differences between these two approaches are significant. Firstly, the latter approach does not envisage the use of subsidies to simply expand consumption by bringing a greater number of consumers passively within reach of the market. Instead it conceives of consumers as individuals embedded in collectivities engaged in struggles over power. And it envisages a linking of organisational empowerment to material improvement and development.

Also, proponents of the second approach do not believe that taxpayers' money, in the form of subsidies, should be used to enhance the profit-making capacities of private capital. The fact is that urban subsidies in the first approach benefit finance capital, construction capital and the building materials industry.

Finally, because organisational empowerment and non-profit development are the objectives of the second approach, the urban poor can develop independent economic power bases that are not subordinate to either finance capital or construction capital.

Non-profit development organisations have begun to emerge worldwide as the most effective way of organising and financing development in poor communities.

In the United States, for example, there were 3 000 Community Development Corporations (CDC) in 1989. These 'non-profits' have built 80% of Boston's low-cost housing over the last few years and will handle the bulk of New York city's \$5,1-billion, 10-year housing programme for low-income areas.

In developing countries, 'non-profits' (or 'non-governmental organisations') have emerged as financially more efficient and organisationally more democratic than either state-run or capitalist development organisations.

South Africans Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele accord non-profit organisations a central role in their study on 'uprooting poverty'. They state, 'Our analysis suggests that independent, generally non-governmental, organisations have a vital role to play in the wider liberation struggle provided that their goals are carefully thought through so as to be consistent with the long-run goals of a truly free society and that the methods they use are consistent with, and help towards achieving, the ends they seek'.

Some of the qualities of a non-profit organisation are that:

- * No individual owns the automatic right to a large share in the profit or surplus made by the organisation.
- * The organisation is accountable to the consumers of its services rather than to the state or private shareholders.
- * It is a dynamic and flexible entity, responsive to rapid technological innovations and changes in the social composition of local communities and able to meet heterogenous consumer demands more effectively than the state or large-scale private corporations.

The significance of all this for urban development is that it signals that non-profit, non-government development organisations controlled by the community could be viable.

If so, the twin goals of building community power and delivering urban goods could be met.

If the establishment of these organisations is identified as a primary policy objective, then it becomes possible to conceive how subsidies could be used to support them and how urban goods can be delivered as a public rather than as a profit-generating commodity.

Non-profit development organisations can be structured in various ways. They can be co-operatives, membership-based associations, development organisations with a community elected board, trusts or any other form that suits the community.

It would not be advisable to turn civics into development organisations. Civics should remain autonomous representatives of the grassroots. However, they might have formal links or even control of development organisations by repre-

sentation on boards of management.

Non-profit loan finance has also emerged internationally as an important ingredient in effective urban development programmes.

Locally, the Development Bank has become the largest provider of subsidised low-interest loans and the Urban Foundation has launched a Group Credit Company to provide small loans to groups, using the 'stokvel' principle. The Development Bank and UF, however, are not accountable to the local communities.

To ensure the ongoing provision of small loans and the utilisation of subsidies to make non-profit loan finance available to the urban poor, there is going to be a need for 'community development credit unions' and a non-profit development bank.

The roles of non-profit loan finance institutions would be twofold:

- * They would provide a conduit for state, corporate and international aid capital. In other words, instead of moving development capital through the conventional profit-making financial institutions, this capital could go through non-profit financial institutions that are accountable to the lenders rather than private corporate shareholders.
- * They would also guard against finance capital becoming dominant in the urban power structure.

Finally, we come to the question of anti-market collective tenure arrangements.

The urban market operates most effectively when the dominant form of legal tenure is based on private ownership. This facilitates rapid market transactions between private individual interests that ensure that value is determined primarily by the market.

As has already been pointed out, this can work against the urban poor if their urban goods increase in value as a result of a development programme without a concomitant increase in the average income level of the affected group.

There are, however, ways of ensuring that the urban poor are not ousted from their location by the market when their urban goods improve in value. The two most important mechanisms are land trusts and housing trusts or housing cooperatives.

It is stating the obvious to say that the urban policies proposed above are not, at this stage, practical. A whole number of obstacles exist.

These include a shortage of skilled person-power for these kinds of deve-

lopment agencies and the virtual absence of training facilities to produce this kind of skilled person.

Additionally, community-based organisational structures are generally too weak to sustain development initiatives.

The policy research infrastructure is inadequate and the financial institutions generally hostile.

Furthermore there is a strong bias in the Urban Foundation's policy positions towards conventional urban development approaches.

For these reasons, the urban policy framework sketched out above cannot be used at this moment as an operational alternative to the framework that has been worked out by the UF and the state (See WIP 66).

However, if the mass-based political organisations and social movements decided to participate in the special fund under Steyn's administration, setting clear-cut objectives and pre-conditions

for participation, then the resources may well become available for removing the obstacles identified above.

The possibility seems all the stronger if one reasons that there is no way that these huge quantities of development finance are going to be spent without community participation. In other words, in return for conditional co-operation from the community, directors of the special fund may well agree to deploy resources to establish structures that could, in time, evolve into the formations recommended above.

The special fund could be re-oriented as follows:

* If the ANC or some other formation within the MDM decided to participate in the special fund, it should do so on condition that the fund does not make national-level decisions about the allocation of resources at the local level. Instead, local structures should be established comprising representatives of

a coalition of community-based formations, on the one hand, and the fund, on the other. These structures should function as bargaining forums that attempt to reconcile different interests - not as consensus-oriented boards.

* A specific sum of money should be earmarked for funding a training school to equip people for development administration, policy formulation and planning. This would need to be professional, legitimate, large-scale and under a representative board of control.

* Prior to participating in the special fund or a similar initiative, the formations in the MDM could constitute a Development Policy Unit. This could be funded from MDM resources and should draw on expertise that already exists in organisations like Planact, Urban Research Services, Labour and Economic Research Centre, Built Environment Support Group, Development Advice Group and the Local Government and Planning National Study Commission of the Centre for Development Studies. The board of this policy unit could comprise representatives from the national executives of the major MDM formations. This would prevent the MDM from having to seek policy advice from organisations sponsored by a different set of interests - such as the Urban Foundation.

* Work could commence immediately to formulate a detailed proposal on how a People's Development Bank could be established. This is within the present resource constraints of the MDM.

* Research into the practicalities of establishing non-profit development organisations should also start immediately. This could include an analysis of the many existing structures as well as an assessment of the policy environment necessary to sustain such development institutions.

If these realisable and feasible objectives are initiated, then engagement with the huge resources that the state and capital are putting together for urban development becomes a realistic possibility and not a suicidal mission.

The reality is that the state and capital will proceed with these strategies regardless of whether the MDM agrees to participate.

In the absence of a considered intervention by the MDM, the balance of power between the state, capital and the community will be changed by the new development initiative - but not in favour of the interests represented by the MDM. ●

Protection from the market

Land trusts are democratically-run, non-profit institutions that pool land so it remains in the hands of poor and working-class people, instead of being bought and sold at the whim of the market.

A land trust can be launched with a dozen or more properties, attached or separated, which fall under joint ownership by all the members of the trust. Portions of the land are then leased back to the members at very reasonable rates for as long as they want. This ensures community stability.

Any increase in the value of the land remains captured within the land trust so as to discourage speculation and 'cashing out' on property sales.

In the US, there are more than 30 land trusts operating in poor neighbourhoods, and they are proving effective at combatting housing displacement caused by increases in land values that arise as capital flows unimpeded through communities.

People form housing cooperatives for better housing in two ways; organising towards production or consumption. In housing production cooperatives, worker-owned enterprises specialise in home construction and begin to compete with private developers. Another version especially popular in Zimbabwe is simply a pooling of resources by people who need homes so that materials and loans can be produced and acquired jointly where they were unavailable on an individual basis. But usually the houses built by such cooperatives are individually-owned.

The other housing cooperative model is joint ownership. Like a land trust, a housing ownership cooperative promotes community control of resources and guarantees its members shelter forever. Houses or flats that are part of the cooperative are rented to the members at a cost that is usually much less than the monthly payments on an individual housing bond. The cooperative tries to control enough houses and flats so that private developers are unable to enter the area, buy up houses for speculation or redevelopment, and displace existing tenants. Housing cooperatives may be useful in areas like Hillbrow where hostile landlord-tenant relations or large-scale renovations of buildings pose a serious displacement threat.

The World Bank rummages through the Third World, transforming economies and - its critics say - ruining the lives of millions of poor people. Now the Bank has its eyes set on South Africa. Patrick Bond reports



Money mandarins meet the movement

Pretoria's ascendant 'econocrats', preparing to negotiate away some substantial chunks of state power, must continually ask themselves: how can we guarantee that a post-apartheid government will offer big corporations - both local and international - a 'good business climate'?

Nothing short of an invasion will work, the econocrats may well conclude - an invasion by teams of World Bank bureaucrats empowered with free market formulas, social democratic/Green rhetoric, fistsful of dollars, the mandate to sign up progressives for research and

implementation contracts - and the unparalleled economic policy leverage that comes with holding a mortgage on a country's future.

If so, Pretoria must have been heartened by the possibility that ANC vice-president Nelson Mandela would meet World Bank president Barber Conable during his United States trip.

Last month there were meetings between the ANC and Bank officials in Johannesburg, part of the Bank's broader effort to reach out to potential opponents.

Increasingly vocal US and Common-

wealth officials are insisting that the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), be assigned a guiding role in the social and economic reconstruction of South Africa.

The Washington DC-based World Bank is among the most powerful financial institutions on earth. The Bank and the IMF were founded 45 years ago as the cornerstone of the post-World War 2 dollar-dominated international finance system. The Bank's mandate was limited to project lending, while the IMF was merely meant to ensure that its

members' balance of payments were in tune with their currency valuations.

But as major US and European multinational commercial banks began redirecting funds away from stagnant Northern economies to the South in the mid-1970s, the IMF and World Bank increasingly performed the role of debt collectors - or policemen, some say - for the big banks.

The awesome power of these two institutions during the last decade stemmed from the excessive indebtedness of wretched Third World economies which were in dire need of an IMF credit fix - often simply to keep up with interest repayments on old loans that had been rescheduled at the unprecedented interest rates introduced by the US Federal Reserve in 1979.

Under such loan-shark conditions, the IMF encountered hostility in the mid-1980s. So the World Bank switched a quarter of its funds out of specific development projects and into 'structural adjustment' lending to take up the slack. This meant directing general revenue funds to the treasuries of debtor nations on condition that painful economic changes were made in these countries.

The IMF and the Bank began to play interchangeable roles in imposing aus-

terity on masses of poor and working people.

The recent visit of the Bank's urban, health and macro-economic teams to South Africa gives some clues as to what is in store in coming years. In keeping with the sensitive nature of the mission and the Bank's tradition of secrecy (its influential country reports are classified for 'restricted distribution' and 'official use only') these clues remain tentative.

However, the broader objective of many international financiers - to reintegrate South Africa into the world economy - is self-evident. And perhaps one need look no further than the Zimbabwe experience to find a prototype of the World Bank's particular intentions. (See Pages 36 and 37).

What was undoubtedly most important for that country's post-independence development was the considerable pressure local and international elites put on Robert Mugabe to take a 'responsible' position on external debt. Ironically, this meant initially borrowing much more.

At independence Zimbabwe's debt was just Z\$673 million, and required 9,5% of hard currency earnings to service. By 1987, the debt was Z\$4,3 billion

and needed 33% of hard currency earnings to service. This forced reductions in foreign currency allocations for crucial social expenditure - especially in health and education - in order to make debt repayments and maintain a sterling credit rating.

Like Zimbabwe at independence, South Africa is today considered 'underborrowed' in international markets, with debt of around US\$20 billion (R50 billion). Having once had the financial rug pulled from under them - during the 1985 debt crisis led by Chase Manhattan - the Pretoria econocrats' top priority is to rapidly take on more foreign debt now that the red carpet treatment has been extended by various European politicians.

'We need more than a symbolic lifting of sanctions', finance minister Bar-end du Plessis told London journalists during the government's successful European tour last month. 'We need access to banks and the IMF'.

A substantial IMF loan package may well be in the offing, thanks to sophisticated behind-the-scenes politicking by former US ambassador Herman Nickel and a host of mainstream US politicians.

In addition, a major Swiss lender made a rare personal visit to South Afri-

The bank that runs

With more than US\$700 million in loans to Zimbabwe since independence, the World Bank can put the country's economy through the structural adjustment wringer and make crucial policy decisions for individual borrowers.

'In the final analysis', says Zimbabwe's leading political economist, Ibbo Mandaza, 'the government finds itself increasingly having to follow the broad guidelines of international finance capital, even when those directly responsible for economic policy may want to think that these policies are "home grown" and independent of external influence'.

The enormous World Bank stake in Zimbabwe means that the 'broad guidelines' about which Mandaza and certain parliamentarians have complained have been translated into specific 'conditionality' on project loans.

Though less public than the usual menu of enforced currency devaluations, cuts in food subsidies and the education budget or 'wage restraint' (all of which

Zimbabwe has suffered), the Bank's project loan conditions can be just as devastating to progressive experiments in development.

For example, the Bank has successfully demanded that subsidies to agricultural co-operatives be terminated; that interest rates on government loans to small black urban businesses be increased from an average of 14,3% to 18%; that parastatal agencies engage only in market-oriented pricing and get Bank approval for hiring and borrowing; and that an agricultural credit scheme emphasise cash crops though finance is short for many starving peasants.

The list is not complete - much of the Bank's conditional lending remains highly confidential.

On urban development the Bank has been especially cavalier. The role of urban forces in the independence struggle was not overwhelming and Zanu's base continues to be the isolated peasantry. Perhaps this explains what the Bank acknowledged were its 'quite conserva-

tive' recommendations for developing the post-colonial cities.

The Bank played down the crucial issue of urban squatters shortly after independence, suggesting that 'Zimbabwe's cities and towns have coped successfully with the demands that have been placed on them'. Just a few months later the Zanu government harshly displaced 50 000 squatters from the Epworth suburb of Harare.

To solve the problem of urban overcrowding the Bank would have to concede the need for radical land reform. But that, clearly, would be beyond the realm of market solutions and therefore an unlikely project for the Bank.

To deal with Zimbabwe's broader economic crisis the World Bank has adopted a different approach from that in, say, Zimbabwe where agro-mineral exports are just about all that can be milked from the forlorn economy.

As in South Africa, Zimbabwe's manufacturing base contributes about a quarter of the national product and as a result

can corporate chiefs in late May, amid reassurances by Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals that foreign debt repayments would be made 'comfortably' this year despite the collapsing gold price and general economic slump.

This is background to understanding the World Bank's recent entree.

If, after widespread development disasters in the 1980s, there is a single place for the Bank to flex its muscle and claim credit for any successes in the 1990s it is, more than likely, South Africa.

Although Bank officials still seem careful about where and how they will tread, one thing is certain - the Bank has lots of cash it wants to unload and even committed socialists will be targets of its largesse.

In 1988 the Bank received an enormous US\$85-billion capital boost from its member nations, which along with the proposed new US\$60-billion allocation for the IMF, has again put the pair on top of the international financial hierarchy.

This follows an uncomfortable period in which dozens of unorganised yet chillingly serious 'IMF riots' left hundreds dead and more than a few governments in tatters across the Third World.

Vast swaths of environmental de-

struction stretching from Indonesia to Amazonia are credited to insensitive World Bank project design. These have smeared the Bank's reputation among the liberal internationalists who are traditionally its most loyal supporters.

The Bank also faced a broad progressive attack from the likes of Unicef, Unctad and other Third World advocacy groups, as well as author Susan George, academic development experts and progressive trade union federations.

So the Bank and the IMF swallowed hard, accepted some blame, hired a few experts on the social and ecological costs of structural adjustment. They even adopted some of their critics' rhetoric - terms like 'enabling environment' and 'building capacities' are strewn throughout the report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, that Bank officials distributed during their recent visit to South Africa.

But the reform of the World Bank was skin deep. After last year's annual meeting of the Bank and IMF, progressive economist Dough Henwood commented in the New York-based magazine, *Nation*: 'Unfortunately, little of substance has changed. The environment department is kept safely quarantined from the power elite - the opera-

tions staff - which is rewarded for pumping out loans, not obstructing them'.

Now greatly enriched, emboldened by the failure of countries like Zimbabwe to even broach the idea of a debt cartel, and apparently unburdened by a variety of ameliorative debt relief 'solutions' advanced periodically, the Bank is back to business as usual.

In short, this means that more Northern tax revenues will be funnelled to the Bank and IMF, then channelled to generally corrupt Third World treasuries from which much will be drained off either as debt servicing to New York or London banks or directly into the Cayman Island coffers of petty bourgeois politicians and various unpatriotic national bourgeoisies.

The peasants and workers are made to foot their rulers' bills in the form of drastic cuts in living standards and the imposition of cash crop/mineral export policies - in spite of the seemingly inexorable falling of commodity prices - instead of producing food and basic goods for the local market.

As a member of the United Nations, South Africa has always had access to the IMF and World Bank. Until 1982 it regularly used IMF borrowing privileges. The US\$1.1-billion IMF loan to South Africa in 1982 raised social and economic controversies, including criticism of Pretoria's unrestrained budget (especially for defence), of the Reserve Bank's insufficient monetary control and of distortions created by apartheid. Natal economist Vishnu Padayachee comments that 'South Africa received a more favourable reception at the hands of the IMF than the merits of the application warranted'.

This can be explained, Padayachee argues, in geopolitical terms. 'South Africa's particular role within the global structure of capitalism is, like some other specific regimes, that of serving to limit the scope and possibilities for political and economic changes within smaller and weaker states in the region', he writes in the forthcoming Cosatu/Economic Trends book, *South Africa's Economic Crisis*.

By many accounts then, the IMF helped to prop up apartheid, especially during liquidity crises, like that of the early '80s caused by the gold price collapse. But what of the future?

While the Bank's strategy is under tight wraps, its seriousness about South Africa should surprise nobody.

Bank officials are likely to try and distance themselves from apartheid ad-

Zimbabwe

there is a fairly powerful industrial class that recognises its long-term interests and acts on them through the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries (CZI).

The CZI recently developed a programme of trade liberalisation that not only met with Bank approval but secured tens of millions of dollars in new Bank lending in 1990.

The liberalisation programme is comparable to what South African economist Stephen Gelb has called the 'neoliberal export-oriented growth model' that is all the rage in Pretoria since the De Klerk econocrats edged out that sanction-era advocates of inward industrialisation.

Zimbabwean companies have a new-found ability to borrow more foreign funds to import state-of-the-art machinery so that more manufactured goods can be produced as cheaply as possible. Capital intensity and flexible production processes will replace the labour-intensive, import-substitution model that was so successful from 1965-75.

The shift is apparently part of the Bank's perennial search for a country's 'comparative advantage'. The new manufactured goods are not primarily meant for local markets - where consumer durables are already in short supply - but for regional and international buyers.

In Zimbabwe the successful manufactured exports will be in non-traditional areas, says the CZI. Comments University of Zimbabwe economics professor Logan Pakkiri: 'This kind of thinking reflects the bankruptcy of that whole development model. What on earth are these "non-traditional" exports that we can produce more cheaply than anyone else?'

The liberalisation plan comes fully on line next month.

Give Zimbabwe a year or so and the results of the CZI-Bank approach of ignoring the local demand while trying to compete in a hostile global market, straitjacketed by the protectionism of the European, North American and East Asian geopolitical blocs, should be clear.

ministrators, even as the Bank begins preparatory research into the workings of the South African economy later this year. Such a preliminary audit would give Bank economists a sense, among other things, about where a post-apartheid South Africa could be vulnerable to financing pressure.

NUM leader Cyril Ramaphosa said after meeting Bank officials: 'They were arguing that in terms of World Bank procedure such research would have to go through the government. But in terms of the sanctions issue they would need the endorsement of progressive organisations before they could do this'.

Ramaphosa added: 'There is no possibility of us endorsing the World Bank working through the government at this stage. We would only consider endorsing such research if it was done with the ANC and other progressive organisations as partners in setting the terms of the research'.

From the Bank's standpoint, this would not be an inconceivable concession. Indeed, in early stages of its work here, the Bank may even criticise the slow pace at which development bodies like the Urban Foundation and the Development Bank are moving to deracialise urban capitalism.

The Bank will probably send over a dozen of its most liberal, non-racial technocrats from Washington and - like the Urban Foundation in recent years - will also try to co-opt progressive potential critics by hiring them as consultants. And like local development agencies and philanthropists, the Bank will make a token gesture of supporting cooperatives - which the Zimbabwe experience suggests is just a baiting technique.

All these potentially progressive initiatives are likely to be undertaken within the context of a drive to build a broad social contract between unions, powerful political parties, capital and the state. The big questions on distribution of wealth, posed by the Freedom Charter, will ultimately be downplayed, ignored - or even squelched - by Bank representatives.

As Ramaphosa warned after his meeting: 'No research takes place outside of some kind of ideological or policy framework and we asked them to clarify what their framework is.'

'We would want a better understanding of the role the World Bank has played in intervening in the economies of other countries before endorsing any engagement with them'.

Under the extraordinary conditions



that South Africa presents international finance, it is not impossible that the World Bank could contribute to progressive visions of development in the short-term. Although the Bank will probably deny intentions of imposing major doses of structural adjustment on South Africa - whether they be the classic agro/mineral export model or the Zimbabwe manufacturing-liberalisation model - it is here that the Bank's role will probably come full circle.

It is here, for example, that trade unions' forceful demands for a living wage run up against the laws of motion of international capital (which has for 15 years been intensifying the attack on wage levels) and therefore against the very logic of the Bank.

It is here, too, that principles of community control of development will involuntarily be sacrificed on the altar of Bank dogmas like tight monetary policy or financial deregulation.

All this raises a post-apartheid scenario that the Bank would most like to avoid: the widespread realisation that a default on the foreign debt would clearly serve the broad national interest.

It wouldn't be the first time a government came to this conclusion, as Latin American nations demonstrated some 60 years ago when they set in motion a wave of foreign debt repudiations.

Of course South Africa's banking establishment toyed with the notion more recently. In late 1986 financial reporter Alec Hogg recorded some South African bankers' opinions that 'a South

African default will give the excuse which countries like Argentina, Brazil and a host of other debtors need to refuse repayment themselves.

'And that would probably cause the collapse of the Western world's financial system, pushing the gold price - and with it South Africa's economic prospects - into orbit. They have a point, one which has obviously been noted by the politicians if the recent (default) threat of former British ambassador Denis Worrall is anything to go by'.

The conditions for not only a South African default, but ultimately a general Third World debtors' cartel, could quickly surface as a democratic post-apartheid state wrestling with the huge fiscal demands inherent in addressing the Freedom Charter.

The World Bank may appear to be an appealing source of financing for expanded health, education and housing programmes. But as Zimbabwe learned so painfully, not without considerable medium- and long-term costs.

Ultimately, the question before the South African democratic movement is whether the World Bank meets it where it is vulnerable - in terms of a lack of information, a limited understanding of what lies behind the Bank's progressive rhetoric and a desperate need for funding.

Or whether, for the first time in history, the money mandarins will meet a movement geared up for resistance on turf it knows better than the bankers - turf covering international financial independence, trade union autonomy and local democratic processes. ●



Taking the third road

Daryl Glaser assesses the continuing relevance to South Africa of the two-stage theory and the notions of permanent revolution

South Africa has entered waters poorly charted in revolutionary theory. After years of debate between those who sought socialism immediately and those who believed the priority was armed or insurrectionary conquest of 'national democracy' we now find ourselves along a seeming third road.

The third road is that of negotiations between former enemies of relatively equal strength which might issue, at least this time around, in something less than the fully unitary and majority-ruled state which both 'workerists' and 'populists' took for granted.

In trying to make sense of this, some will seek recourse in traditional dichotomies.

Many on the Far Left offer this as a salutary example of what happens to a revolutionary struggle that is not pursued resolutely to its socialist conclusion. In the Congress camp there are others, equally mired in the categories of debates past, who reassure themselves (and their followers) that this is, after all, just a first intermediate stage on the long road to socialism.



Circumstances inside South Africa and internationally, in particular the crisis of Stalinism and the upsurge everywhere of demands for basic democratic rights, require that we rethink the terms of such disagreements.

They do not require, as some pessimists and 'new realists' argue, that we abandon the socialist project.

They do demand that we cast aside all mechanical theories of revolutionary time and historical direction; all notions that revolutions only go forward in linear fashion and that the only question is whether they proceed fast or slowly, in stages or in perpetual motion. Instead of binding ourselves to static, theoretically pre-given stages or to the imperatives of continuous forward movement, we need to learn a logic of democratic preparation: we must do everything possible to prepare and strengthen the bases of a democratic-socialist project, but pro-

ceed no further than levels of popular consent and participation permit. While socialist debate and mobilisation should be encouraged, no programmes should be implemented for which there exists insufficient mass support or active commitment - and from which there is no option of future democratic retreat.

The two-stage theory of revolution (national democracy, then socialism) appears on the face of it to take democracy seriously. It does encourage - prior to its followers' achievement of power - a form of mobilisation that is, if not always democratic at a grassroots level, at least popular. And it does demand a programme of action that includes references to basic democratic rights. However, even a cursory examination of the theory's career in other countries and struggles reveals how tenuous the thread connecting it is

to any kind of democracy.

While the 'national democratic stage' sweeps away certain key obstacles to democratisation - colonial overlordship, military occupation or institutionalised minority rule - it also provides a cover for the implantation of 'national' elites reluctant to grant to their subjects even the most basic 'bourgeois democratic' rights, such as freedoms of expression or association, or the right to strike.

Though eager to harness popular energy behind developmental tasks, these elites in practice have come to preside over authoritarian, increasingly centralised, 'mixed' or 'state capitalist' economies.

The second or 'socialist' stage has frequently witnessed the disappearance even of the limited freedoms which existed in the first. Under the pretext of building socialism, dominant elites have transformed popular fronts into prole-

tarian vanguard parties, suppressed what little remained of independent political or grassroots activity, and established bureaucratic command economies.

Ruling parties merged with the state which in turn sought to absorb all autonomous social life.

Thus was set in place - from Eastern Europe and Cuba to South-East Asia and Lusophone Africa - the Stalinist state system whose crisis has recently shaken the world.

The two-stage theory is of course a plastic doctrine available for many uses. There is no automatic reason, inscribed in the theory itself, why it should always produce authoritarian outcomes, even if it has usually done so in practice; not *a priori* basis for assuming that a first stage could not be democratic, a second stage democratic and socialist. The theory itself has many different incarnations, and much depends on the calibre and world-view of those who seek to put it into effect, as well as the circumstances in which they do so.

However, there are serious grounds for doubting whether the two-stage theory provides a secure theoretical anchorage for the urgently needed recombination of democracy and socialism. There are three reasons for this:

* Two-stage theory linked to a discourse of 'national democracy' exists uneasily at best with political pluralism. The 'people' is often represented within this discourse as a homogenous entity whose interests can be exhaustively represented by a single national liberation movement and its allies. Confronted by the urgent tasks of nation-building and economic development, the 'national democratic' movement places a high premium on unity and tends to view dissent as 'sectionalist' or divisive. It is reluctant to acknowledge the existence of distinctive interests and constituencies in the ranks of the 'people' or that this might require a differentiated, open-ended system of political representation. The leadership of the national liberation movement also tends to be wary of devolving power to local or grassroots bodies whose activity might contradict or undermine its role as unifier of 'the nation'.

This is sometimes conjoined to a view of the liberation movement, or some part of it, as the special representative of the leading class within the people, usually the working class.

However, this class tends to get rep-

resented - like 'the people' - as a homogenous social aggregate with a unified general will, capable of being represented through a single vanguard organisation.

Little allowance is made for the possibility that the working class might itself contain distinctive interests, or that different parties might legitimately compete to represent its general interest.

* Secondly, two-stage theory licenses the view that democracy is merely a stage to be passed through on the way to socialism. Some defenders of the theory argue that the second stage involves a higher form of democracy. But the kind of democracy thus consigned to the first stage usually includes a commitment, however attenuated, to the rights and institutions wrongly considered exclusive to 'bourgeois democracy': free expression, competing parties and so on. To the extent that these are treated as ephemeral or as playing an instrumental role in the achievement of the second stage, the theory sanctions second-stage abandonment of elementary forms of pluralism and basic human rights.

It also encourages a commitment to democracy which even in the 'national democratic' stage is superficial at best.

* Thirdly, two-stage theory sanctions attempts by 'national democratic' elites to regulate from above the timing and direction of the building of socialism.

In its efforts to control and absorb the social radicalism unleashed by the revolutionary process, the 'first stage' regime is tempted to suppress debate about socialism and to silence rival sources of socialist influence. The destruction of autonomous left-wing culture and organisation deprives socialism of any popular or democratic anchorage, ensuring that the second stage, when it arrives, does so in the form of bureaucratic paternalism.

Does the theory of permanent revolution get us out of these difficulties?

There are grounds for doubt.

Like the two-stage theory, it offers a formula for the timing and direction of socialist change which could become rigid and prescriptive, neglectful of democratic preparation, intolerant of disagreement. It could encourage a politics in which a revolutionary 'vanguard', rooted in an 'advanced' minority of workers and intellectuals, imposes programmes and institutions lacking broad popular support.

If two-stage theory encourages governing elites to control and absorb the

most socially militant sectors, a theory of permanent revolution can license more-militant sectors - of youth, organised workers, or whatever - to impose their will on a more cautious or conservative population. Permanent revolutionaries would be reluctant to counsel patience, to heed cautionary voices, to 'hold' social change within bounds acceptable to a popular majority, to concentrate on political work required before further advance.

They might rush into hasty and ill-conceived nationalisations and planning schemes, generating animosity and putting into place economic structures dependent for their vitality on a proletarian minority whose levels of enthusiasm are unlikely to be permanently sustained.

Finally, they might be tempted, under the pressure of social conflict, economic scarcity or external encirclement, to suppress those advocating slower advance, or retreat or - indeed - the restoration of capitalism.

Whether permanent revolution gives way to repression of legal, democratic opposition would, of course, depend on how resolutely its proponents are committed to pluralism.

However, while many on the Far Left are indeed committed to pluralism, others are, if anything, even more dismissive of 'bourgeois democracy' and 'liberalism' than the Stalinists.

Some would countenance competing Left parties and factions, but relatively few are ready to accept the right of bourgeois parties to compete for power and to actually dismantle large parts of the socialist project should the bourgeois parties win a large and durable majority of popular support.

Yet that right is the precondition of democratic socialism itself.

Both two-stage theory and permanent revolution thus impose logics of revolutionary timing and direction which could find themselves out of synchrony with popular sentiment or the level of democratic preparation for socialism.

Subordinated to the strategic wisdom of supposedly far-seeing revolutionary elites, democracy would lose its place as the governing principle of political action.

A logic of democratic preparation, by contrast, rejects the imposition of rigid theories of revolutionary timing and direction upon unwilling or unready subjects.

It is committed to an integral project of democratic socialism, or socialist

democracy (call it what you will) - the idea that democracy and socialism must be pursued together, each as a precondition of the other's fullest and richest development.

Democracy without socialism is limited democracy. Socialism without democracy - if it is possible - would not be worth fighting for. There can be no separation of democratic and socialist stages. At the same time socialism cannot be imposed on a population that has not granted its consent or is not durably committed to it. The timing of its introduction cannot be telescoped by the militant impatience of permanent revolutionaries. Nor can socialism be rooted exclusively in advanced minorities of radicalised youth, workers or whatever. It is the level of preparation amongst the oppressed, and of consent in the population at large, which alone can determine the shape and rhythm of socialist construction.

The logic of democratic preparation would constantly test the limits of democratic and social radicalisation, keeping alive the ideals of socialism, making every effort to stimulate, rather than silence or defer, discussion of its possibilities and prospects.

It would encourage the emergence of an autonomous and diverse socialist culture - a community thick with parties, unions, newspapers, 'new social movements' of feminists, ecologists and so on.

Socialists would struggle for local-level democratic organisation in factories, neighbourhoods, schools and universities.

They would contend for democratic control of the state and for a popular mandate to use the state's power and resources in a redistributive and empowering way. Preparations for socialism would thus proceed from below as well as from above.

At the same time a logic of democratic preparation would go no further in extending organisation, or implementing socialist policies, than the rules of democracy permit.

For there would be competing socialist parties advocating different programmes, tied to different speeds and distinctive theories of implementation. Moreover socialists at every level would have to compete - in the field of ideas, but also electorally - with parties and organisations hostile to socialism.

As elective offices and elections grow in number and frequency, newly empowered electorates (in localities,

workplaces, unions, regions and at national level) would be entitled to choose which policies to pursue and which leaders to mandate.

If an electorate votes for one socialist party rather than another, the defeated socialists would be obliged to accept the verdict. If it votes for a pro-capitalist party the whole socialist camp would have to agree to go into a democratic and legal opposition, fighting for small gains, building up local democratic bases, biding its time.

Unlike two-stage theory or permanent revolution, a logic of democratic preparation allows for going backwards too. It would sanction a democratic 'counter-revolution'.

What about South Africa now?

Here we have a seemingly intractable paradox.

If free elections were held today on the basis of universal franchise and a common voters' role (what De Klerk calls 'simplistic majority rule' but the rest of the world calls democracy) there seems to be little doubt that political parties of broadly socialist persuasion would secure an absolute majority. Yet the likelihood is that the constitutional set-up arising from negotiations, as well as the growing power and mobility of international capital, will delay meaningful socialist advance for some time. It is a scenario in which neither stage theory of a traditional kind, nor our own logic of democratic preparation (let alone the maximalism of the permanent revolutionary), seems to carry much purchase.

Yet it would be a mistake for socialists to boycott or disengage from the negotiating process, or to assume that it leaves no room at all for democratic-socialist preparation.

Socialists must stand by the principle of non-racial and democratic majority rule and defend the case for a central state able to address historically-accumulated social inequalities. But provided that negotiations issue in some approximation of a liberal-democratic state, the struggle for a more advanced democracy should be able to shift from a military and insurrectionary to a political terrain. And on that terrain there will be a good deal that can be done by way of democratic preparation for socialism.

For if majority consent is a crucial precondition for an advance to democratic socialism, it is not the only one. Support for socialism must be given

depth as well as breadth. It should be committed and informed support rather than some vague affinity for populist and egalitarian notions. That means rooting it in popular culture, in everyday experience and in local struggles.

If nationalisation is not on the agenda, the continued consolidation of union power and workplace organisation, buttressed in future by more sympathetic labour legislation, certainly is.

There already exists in South Africa the embryonic form of an independent socialist culture set within a diverse and assertive civil society. A future South African state - whatever its ideological hue - will have to negotiate with civic organisations, industrial unions, movements campaigning around women's and environmental issues.

Rooted in society, these organisations are likely to resist attempts by a post-apartheid state to control or co-opt them. Their further development is essential to the vitality of socialism.

So is active debate around the meaning, potential and limits of socialism - a debate already actively underway in university institutes, grassroots bodies and newspapers.

At the same time groups and movements on the Left should use the time prised open by negotiations to learn to live with each other, as well as political organisations outside the Left.


This coexistence may be in solidarity or open competition, but it is essential to democratic politics. At the very least socialists must seek the widest possible acceptance of basic democratic ground rules so that, should they come to power and attempt to implement their programmes, they will not face extra-constitutional opposition or preside over civil war.

The quid pro quo is that the Left must abide by these rules: if they are voted from office they must abide by electoral results. These rules, and the common acceptance, are especially vital in South Africa, given its history of violent inter-organisational rivalry and the current civil war in Natal.

In this respect the ANC's formal acceptance of multi-party democracy, its recognition that it has no automatic claim to government, is encouraging.

But this is an area in which much more needs to be done, not least amongst the ANC's allies and supporters.

All this does not quite constitute a process of permanent revolution, nor even a stage of 'national democracy' in the traditional sense. ●



Johannesburg teachers on the march - part of the 150 000 NTUF Initiative

Wages, Natal strife at core of action

WIP monitored 46 new industrial actions in the seven-week review period. Of these, 42 were strikes and 4 were stoppages. Figures on the number of workers who participated in these actions could not be obtained in two cases, but the remaining 44 actions involved 56 100 workers.

In 12 cases these actions were triggered by demands for increased wages. This finding is consistent with strike trends in the past few years and demonstrates yet again that the pressures arising from the economic squeeze have made wages workers' first priority. Unfair dismissal was the trigger in three of the 46 actions.

The only strike undertaken on a national basis is the action at OK Bazaars, where members of Cosatu's Saccawu are demanding an R800-per-month minimum wage, and across-the-board increase of R160 and other improvements in working conditions. This is the second strike at OK stores in recent years. The OK strike in 1987 was a bitterly fought dispute characterised by high levels of violence. This year's strike seems to be heading the same way.

Numsa and TGWU top the strike poll; their members were involved in 10 actions respectively. CWIU comes a

close second; nine strikes involving its members were monitored. Potwa members have also engaged in industrial action in a big way; six actions at Post Office centres were monitored.

The data reveals high levels of spontaneous action. Only five of the 46 actions are legal strikes. This would seem to indicate that the new political climate continues to influence worker aspirations and that greater militancy can be expected.

The decision by JCI's Lebowa Platinum mine, to reinstate workers dismissed for going on strike in an effort to get management to recognise NUM, is most revealing. The reinstatement came about on orders from the bantustan government after NUM, the MDM and the ANC asked it to intervene. This unprecedented action is a telling illustration of the changing nature of bantustan politics. The strike by 15 000 public-sector workers in QwaQwa, which was settled when the authorities negotiated with a Cosatu official and conceded the legitimacy of the strikers' demands for trade union and collective bargaining rights, is a further demonstration that bantustans are no longer a no-man's land for unions.

● The Natal violence is to be the focus of

a week of action involving a range of different protests at national and local level by Cosatu and the rest of the MDM during the first week of July. The exact form of the protests will be decided at the end of June after nation-wide consultation.

According to Cosatu press officer Neil Coleman, it is likely that there will be a day of 'national action' - presumably a stayaway - and a day of protest marches. In addition, there will be factory demonstrations and other forms of workplace action.

Cosatu's strategy on the violence has now shifted from emphasising the role of Inkatha and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, says Coleman. Instead, the spotlight will fall on the state. 'We have tried everything in Natal. Inkatha has torpedoed all the peace agreements that have been reached and it is clear that the organisation's leadership has neither the will nor the capacity to bring peace to the strife-torn region. Only President FW De Klerk and the state can do that', he says. Cosatu is likely to meet with De Klerk prior to the week of action.

Cosatu believes the violence can be stemmed if decisive action is taken to meet a variety of demands. These include arresting and jailing the 'warlords', disbanding the KwaZulu police force and stripping Buthelezi of his position as the bantustan's KwaZulu's Minister of Police, appointing a judicial commission of inquiry into the role of the police in the violence and installing an impartial police force. Cosatu also wants the state of emergency in Natal lifted. The federation's rationale for this is its conviction that far from resolving the problem, the emergency exacerbates it as it provides a cover for the 'warlords' and security forces to terrorise Natal residents and prevents the media from reporting on what has happened.

'We need to guarantee the right of all organisations to exist and to engage in political activities without intimidation', Coleman says. And there are increasing signs that negotiations between the government and ANC could be derailed if Cosatu's demands are not met.

Says Coleman: 'Ending the Natal violence is inextricably linked to creating a national climate for free political activity. In the Groote Schuur Minute drawn up by the ANC and the government after their consultations in Cape Town at the

beginning of May, the state undertook to end violence and intimidation. We cannot see the overall peace process proceeding if Natal remains in turmoil'.

● Industrial relations practices in the Barlow Rand (BR) group were spotlighted on 23 May when members of eight Cosatu affiliates - Sactwu, Numsa, Ppwawu, CWIU, NUM, Fawu, Saccawu and Cawu - embarked on a series of protest actions. During these protests workers demanded centralised bargaining and various job security rights. The latter included undertakings from BR companies not to hire casual labour, no fixed term contracts, no subcontracting, no retrenchments, a 40-hour week with no loss of pay, maternity leave of six months with guaranteed job security, and equal pay for equal work.

BR's antipathy to centralised bargaining through industrial councils, as opposed to plant-level bargaining, has become a key issue of contention in recent years. The irony is that when the unions which today dominate industrial relations in South Africa were in their infancy, BR companies were among the first to agree to recognise and bargain with them. But in the late 1980s, when these unions became increasingly powerful, BR indicated that it was no longer in favour of industrial councils or any other forums for centralised bargaining.

Cosatu holds that the change of heart occurred when it became clear that the days were drawing to an end when conservative, undemocratic and management-orientated unions dominated industrial council proceedings. And although BR claims that its subsidiaries make decisions autonomously, Cosatu firmly believes that industrial relations policy is centrally determined.

Tying unions to plant-level arrangements stretches unions' limited union resources and weakens workers' power to correct management abuses, says Cosatu. Constructive relations are best served when there is a balance of power between capital and labour - not a situation where capital is dominant.

Cosatu is also of the opinion that BR's current restructuring programme constitutes a serious attack on the job security of all workers at BR plants. As reflected in the demands made on 23 May, the chief concerns in this regard are wide-scale retrenchments in BR companies and extensive use of tempo-

rary workers, the use of sub-contracted labour, and BR's support for the government's deregulation initiative and its backing of industrial parks in particular.

The decision to stage protests on 23 May came after BR reneged on an undertaking (made during a meeting with Cosatu officials and ~BR shop stewards on 9 April) in which the corporation undertook to respond to a Cosatu memorandum detailing its concerns by 3 May.

● Government is displaying a growing readiness to bring industrial relations practices in the public sector in line with prevailing conditions in commerce and industry. Recent actions by National Education Minister Gene Louw epitomise this. At a meeting with the National Teachers' Unity Forum (NTUF) in Cape Town early June, Louw committed himself in principle to addressing several issues which have long been a bone of contention.

The NTUF, which claims a membership of 150 000, is composed of several established teacher organisations and some newly-formed groups. The established groups are the 'coloured' Union of Teachers' Association of South Africa (Utasa), the 70 000-strong African Teachers' Association (Atasa), and the 10 000-strong Indian Teachers' Association of South Africa (Tasa). The NTUF hopes to launch itself as a unitary and non-racial teacher body in September. Its aim is the establishment of a single non-racial education system.

Although Louw did not commit himself to recognising the NTUF, he has acknowledged that teacher's have the right to associate freely and negotiate on matters affecting them. Louw has also agreed that they should be paid a living wage and indicated that he would like to see the gap between male and female teachers' salaries closed as soon as possible. He has in addition accepted that qualified teachers should, in principle, be entitled to job security and that the question of temporary appointments should be addressed with urgency. And he and the NTUF agreed that eradicating apartheid and discriminatory practices in education should be managed on an on-going basis through consultation.

After the meeting with Louw the NTUF indicated it would soon be submitting an application for formal recognition as a negotiating body. ●

STRIKES AND DISPUTES: 1 May - 13 June

Company	Union	No	Date	Events
TRANSVAAL				
Astas Benoni	Numsa	213	23 November	Workers struck when management failed to discipline a white worker who assaulted a black worker. The strikers were dismissed and management obtained an interdict to keep them away from the plant's gates. The dispute has been referred to the industrial court for a final determination.
Autona Kempton Park	Numsa	58	5 April	Workers struck demanding that a director who assaulted a Numsa member be disciplined. Management issued disciplinary warnings and when the strikers resumed work two days later, nine were dismissed. This led to a second strike which management responded to by dismissing them all. Management thereafter offered 27 re-employment and proposed a financial settlement for the others. When the dispute was heard at the metal council on 18 May Numsa demanded that 95% of the workers be reemployed without loss of benefits and the company signalled a readiness to reassess its position. A meeting was scheduled for 13 June but on 8 June management stated it stood by its original offer and that if workers failed to report on 11 June, a new workforce would be hired.
Automatic Mass Production Johannesburg	Numsa	32	4 April 4 May	The workforce went on strike after shop stewards were accused of intimidation and suspended. The shop stewards were later dismissed. The union has declared a dispute.
Ciba Geigy Brits and Spartan	CWIU	200	8 May	Workers at the company's Spartan and Brits plants went on a legal strike after negotiations over management's refusal to participate in the Chemical Industries National Provident Fund broke down.
Daggafontein Brakpan	NUM	300	8 May	Workers struck demanding 20% increase for the lowest-paid and 18% for the highest after management offered a 16% wage hike.
Eclipse Foundries Benoni	Numsa	300	13 February	The company allegedly hired Zulu hostel dwellers as scabs after dismissing workers who went on strike for better working conditions and improved health and safety measures. Management rejected a union proposal for arbitration on the dispute. Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers.
Ergo Brakpan	NUM	800	8 June	Workers went on strike after management offered a 16% wage hike in response to their demands for increases of 20% for the lowest-paid and 18% for the highest-paid.
Fast Lane Jet Park	TGMU	60	28 May 29 May	Workers at this Grindrod subsidiary were locked out after going on strike for refusing to work overtime. Barring one shop steward whom management claimed was responsible for the action, all were reinstated. The shop steward's case has been referred for arbitration.
H L Hall and Sons Welspruit	Fawu	3 000	11 May	Workers at this large Welspruit farm - some earning only R80 a month - were dismissed after striking for higher wages. Management then went to the Supreme Court to apply for an order to evict them, but after talks between lawyers for both sides an out-of-court settlement was reached in which the company agreed to re-employ all the strikers with no loss of benefits. Fawu also agreed to cooperate with the workers' committee and community structures on the farm to establish peace and order and ensure that intimidation is eliminated. Management in turn agreed to recognise and negotiate on wages and conditions of service with Fawu provided the union provides written proof of majority support by 1 October.
Lebowa Platinum Mine Lebowa	NUM	1 500	3 May 22 May	Workers at this JCI mine struck demanding recognition of NUM. They were dismissed on 14 May but were all later reinstated on orders from the Lebowa government which had been asked by the ANC, the MDH and NUM to intervene.

Pilkington Flat Glass Springs	CWIU	600	16 May 22 May	Workers struck in protest against a retrenchment package offered to 14 workers who were being laid off which contravened the terms of CWIU's recognition agreement with the company. A conciliation board has been established to try to resolve the dispute.
Post Office Pretoria	Potwa	550	7 May 8 May	Workers at the Post Office's Pretoria engineering workshops staged a one-day strike rejecting of government's 10% public sector pay rise in terms of which the minimum monthly wage would be R627.
Post Office Germiston	Potwa	70	28 May	Workers at two post office engineering yards in Germiston downed tools protesting against management's harassment of union members and shop stewards. This followed a management decision to transfer Potwa regional education committee vice-chairman Abraham Mathebula and shop steward Reuben Shange to another section. Workers also called for the removal of a manager.
Post office Germiston	Potwa	600	28 May 28 May	Workers at two Germiston post offices embarked on a one-day work stoppage in protest against alleged harassment of the local Potwa shop steward chairperson and the vice-chairperson of the union's regional education committee. Other demands included the right to have unrestricted worker meetings, an end to intimidation of Potwa members and recognition of shop stewards.
Post Office Giyani	Potwa	11	23 May	Telephonists at the Giyani post office went on strike after management deducted amounts ranging from R231 to R543 from their salaries in the wake of work stoppages by all civil servants in Gazankulu from 2 March to 14 May. Management then replaced them with 4 white scabs.
Post office Boksburg	Potwa	225	6 May	Postal workers went on strike to protest against racist incidents. In one of these incidents a security guard spray-gunned a worker leader. Strikers also called for the removal of a senior superintendent for ill-treating workers.
Pritchard Security Sandton	TGWU	77	23 May 24 May	Pritchard Security workers embarked on a one-day strike when one of their fellow workers was retrenched after Stuttafords, where the worker had been contracted to work, decided her services were not required. They returned to work after Pritchard Security agreed to reinstate her.
Putco Wynberg	TGWU	400	26 February	Workers at Putco's Wynberg bus depot in Johannesburg went on strike demanding the resignation of a divisional manager over an unfair disciplinary action. The manager resigned, but the workers then demanded pay for the time they were on strike. Management refused and they were all dismissed. Workers are planning joint action with the Alexandra Civic Organisation.
Rand Rubber Boksburg	CWIU	180	14 May	Workers embarked on a legal strike when the company reneged on an agreement to bargain on wages and working conditions with CWIU.
Reckitt & Colman Spartan	CWIU		7 June 7 June	Workers staged a 2-hour work stoppage protesting against the company's refusal to participate in the Chemical Industries' National Provident Fund.
Rustenburg Plats Rustenburg	NUM	3 000	8 April	Workers at Bleskop shaft, which falls under Bophuthatswana labour law, went on strike demanding the reincorporation of the homeland into SA and recognition of the union. Workers also made demands for the scrapping of racial discrimination at the workplace and for the reinstatement of workers dismissed during a strike in February. Mine security used rubber bullets and teargas to disperse toyi-toying workers.
Sage Properties Johannesburg	TGWU	500	23 May 24 May	Cleaning and security workers at Sage Properties struck for one day after management threatened to retrench some of their number. They resumed work after management agreed to negotiate with them.
Steiner Services Alberton	TGWU	171	21 May 21 May	Workers staged a one-day strike for union recognition. They returned to work after management agreed to recognise TGWU and to make stop-order facilities available to the union.

Xeratech Johannesburg	Numsa	160	6 March 2 May	Workers went on a legal strike after mediation failed to break a deadlock that arose when management rejected their demand for a 21,5% across-the-board wage hike, offering only merit increases of between 13% and 15%. They returned to work after the company offered to increase the monthly pay of the lowest-paid workers from R850 to R1050.
CAPE				
Cape Town City Council Cape Town	Samwu	5 000	13 June	Samwu members staged a sit-in at the Cape Town Civic Centre to back demands for improved wages and working conditions while union leaders were inside negotiating with the council. The workers are demanding a R5-an-hour minimum wage, an increase of R60 per week, a 40-hour working week with no loss of pay, June 16 as a paid holiday a housing allowance and an end to casual employment.
Continental China Cape Town	CWIU	600	11 May 25 May	Workers struck when management offered to pay a wage of R4.45 an hour in response to their demand for a minimum hourly wage of R5. The dispute was resolved when management upped its offer to R4.50 an hour.
Fine Chemicals Cape Town	CWIU	100	21 May 22 May	Workers downed tools after a worker was killed while doing overtime. The strikers demanded an independent inquiry into the worker's death and resumed work after management acceded.
Irvin & Johnson Cape Town	Fawu	600	17 May	The workers, who earned R142 a week, went on strike after management offered to pay R172 weekly in response to their demand for a minimum wage of R200. Workers also demanded a reduction in working hours from 46 hours per week to 40 hours.
Post office Uitenhage, Somerset E, PE, Cradock	Potwa	600	15 May 15 May	Workers at post offices and engineering yards in Uitenhage, Somerset East, Port Elizabeth and Cradock embarked on a work stoppage demanding a living wage of R1 100 monthly, re-employment of colleagues dismissed in 1987 after the nation-wide strike, and permission for Potwa organisers to enter premises. They resumed work after management agreed to meet Potwa representatives on 4 June to respond to the demands.
Southern Star East London	TGWU		22 May 22 May	Workers downed tools demanding the reinstatement of two dismissed shop stewards. The company later reinstated them.
Welfit Oddy Perseverance	Numsa	600	9 Jan 4 May	The entire workforce was dismissed after striking when the company refused to pay full attendance bonuses to employees who participated in a stayaway on 5 and 6 September last year at the time of the general election. Over 30 strikers were arrested and charged for violence against non-strikers during the strike. When mediation and arbitration failed to resolve the dispute, MDM community leaders intervened and their efforts were rewarded when management agreed to re-employ some strikers and undertook to assist the remainder. The parties also agreed to further negotiations on a procedural relationship, to prolong the validity of the current wage agreement, and to restore a climate conducive to harmonious relations.
NATAL				
Chrome Industries Merebank	CWIU	220	2 April 13 May	This five-week wage strike was resolved during mediation on 8 May when workers accepted a management offer of a R1 044 basic wage for grades 1A to 2A and a 16% increase for grades 2B to 4A backdated to January 1 1990. Workers have now vowed to fight for improved health and safety measures.
Dorbyl Shipbuilders Durban	Numsa	500	26 March	Workers downed tools to protest against the recruitment of Portuguese nationals and were dismissed. Strikers complained that foreign workers are paid far higher salaries and accommodated in hotels at company expense and argued that the company should rather upgrade their skills. The strikers, many of them members of the Boilermakers' Union, also began signing up with Numsa after the strike.

Durban office cleaners Durban	TGMU	7 000	22 May 31 May	Cleaners from a host of contract cleaning companies went on strike demanding the establishment of a national industrial council for the cleaning industry, an R800 minimum wage, recognition of TGMU by their companies, six months' maternity leave and a 40-hour week. They refused to negotiate with their respective companies, demanding talks with the Natal Cleaners Employers' Association instead, and returned to work after the employer body agreed to meet TGMU.
Elliot Afrovan Durban	TGMU	40	10 May 11 May	Workers were dismissed after staging a one-day strike for higher wages. Negotiations on the dispute are continuing.
Island View Storage Durban	CWIU	103	7 May 21 May	The strike was triggered by the dismissal of a worker. Strikers demanded that the worker be reinstated. They returned to work after management agreed to arbitration on the dispute and to pay costs.
Lion Match Durban	PPWAMU	400	3 March 13 May	The marathon nine-week legal strike at the Lion Match factory in Durban arose out of the failure to reach agreement during wage negotiations which lasted five months. The strike ended without any gains being made when the workers accepted the company's original offer of 80c across the board.
Norman's Transport Durban	TGMU	26	16 May 17 May	Workers went on strike when management altered the terms of their employment contracts without consultation and were dismissed. With the exception of nine drivers whom management claimed were the instigators of the action, all were subsequently reinstated. The fate of the nine will be determined by arbitration.
Rowen's Auto Jacobs	Numsa	700	25 May	Workers embarked on an illegal strike after management created a forum for discussing worker grievances without consulting Numsa. Workers felt this action undermined the union. The dispute has been referred for mediation.
Toyota Isipingo	Numsa	3 500	25 May 28 May	Toyota workers struck in solidarity with workers at Rowen's Auto.

FREE STATE

Interstate Busline Bloemfontein	TGMU	500	October 1989 April 1990	Workers were dismissed after a strike over disciplinary procedures and corruption in the administration of the pension fund. The dispute was referred to the conciliation board. Scabs have been responsible for attacks on union members and property. Company buses have been burnt out in the townships. The strike was settled when management agreed to re-employ striking workers over a period of months. However, the company is now over-staffed and is planning to retrench.
QwaQwa government Witsieshoek	Nehawu	15 000	10 May 11 June	Virtually all public sector workers in QwaQwa downed tools demanding trade union and collective bargaining rights, a minimum monthly wage of R600, and an end to segregated jobs. They resumed work after homeland authorities and a Cosatu representative agreed to the formation of a joint working committee 'to settle all grievances'. QwaQwa authorities also conceded that the workers had the right to join unions and undertook to make representations to central government to make extra funds available for wages.

TRANSKEI

Umtata City Council Umtata	Samwu	1 114	24 April	Municipal workers were dismissed on 25 April after the town council obtained an urgent interdict against their illegal strike from the Supreme Court. The council later invited the strikers to apply for re-employment. However, a union spokesman said workers had decided not to apply as they still regarded themselves as being in the council's employ.
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REPRESSION MONITOR

March - A Potwa member living on the East Rand was detained by police for four hours on 29 March, a day after participating in a march by members of Cosatu's public-sector unions on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in protest against the government's privatisation drive.

April - The Pretoria street in which Cosatu's Northern Transvaal regional office and several other union offices are located was sealed off on 28 April for five hours. This followed an earlier decision to cancel a proposed march (in support of a workers' charter in a future South Africa) after the Pretoria City Council obtained an interdict to prevent it.

Numbers of policemen, some armed with shotguns, were also seen at Church Square, the starting point of the proposed march.

May - Security Police visited the home of the vice-chairman of Potwa's Southern Transvaal region, Lefty Mnyokolo. According to his wife, the policemen threatened to harm him. Mnyokolo had been elected vice-chairman at the region's AGM the previous day, May Day.

May - An executive member of Mewusa, Kaizer Makapan, was detained by police in Garankuwa.

May - Police arrested 80 workers picketing at the premises of East London Furniture Industries for 'attending an illegal gathering'. The workers had been locked out of the premises after they had embarked on a go-slow to pressurise management over wages.

May - A SARHWU member was shot in the head and hospitalised and two other SARHWU members injured on 14 May as violence

flared between union and non-union members at the Braamfontein railway yards in Johannesburg. SARHWU's regional coordinator Ntai Sello attributed the trouble to Blatu's resentment over a SARHWU recruitment drive.

June - Picketing OK workers, on strike for higher wages, were teargassed at the chain store's Eloff Street head office on 5 June after ignoring a police warning to disperse. Eight strikers at the Delareyville store on the West Rand were also arrested while picketing. In King William's Town a further six strikers were arrested, charged with loitering, and refused bail.

June - Five people were injured on 7 June by police who fired live ammunition at 15 000 to 20 000 public servants marching on QwaQwa's parliament in Witsieshoek demanding the

right to union representation and collective bargaining.

June - An AWB member was arrested and several others were being sought by police after a bomb blast rocked NUM's Welkom office on the night of 9 June. No one was injured. Racial tensions have been running high in the mining town in the wake of a defiance campaign by NUM members against racism on the mines, the murder of two white miners by black workers at President Steyn mine, and vigilante activity by the AWB and the Blankeveiligheidswag (BV).

Intervention by Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok failed to ease tensions.

June - Some 30 workers at Transnet's Kazerne depot were injured when company security guards, who demanded they produce entry permits, allegedly opened fire on them.