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EDITORIAL

MOST readers of Work In Progress will know that, during May, a committee set up in terms of censorship legislation, banned all future editions of the publication. The effect of such a ban was to prevent the production and distribution of further issues of WIP.

The decision of the censorship committee needs to be seen within the context of previous bannings of specific editions of WIP over the years. Numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 13 were all declared 'undesirable' by committees, and distribution of them was prohibited.

When, at the end of 1980, WIP 14 was also banned, the editors decided to appeal against the committee's decision. Previously, the editors had refused to participate in censorship machinery in any way. However, this attitude was modified in the case of issue number 14.

At much the same time, the Directorate of Publications applied to the Publications Appeal Board (PAB) to declare WIP 15 'undesirable' as well. In regard to both WIP 14 and 15, the PAB found them not to be undesirable within the meaning of censorship law.

Presumably as a result of these appeals, the publications committees did not ban either WIP 16 or 17. But from issue 18 onwards, they renewed their vendetta against WIP with gusto. Issues 18, 19, 20 and 21 were all banned for distribution by a committee, which also recommended a prohibition on possession of those editions. Again, the editors decided to appeal against these decisions. However, before the appeals could even be heard, an all future issues ban was imposed on the WIP project.

The editors applied to the Appeal Board to suspend this decision, until an appeal against it could be heard. Recently, the chairman of the PAB agreed to this. Accordingly, this - issue number 23 of WIP - reaches readers not because of any democratic right to present information and analyse society, but by virtue of an administrative decision made in terms of censorship legislation.

In the meantime, the appeals regarding WIP 18 and 19 were heard, and lost. This means that these two issues are banned for both distribution and possession in terms of a ruling of the Appeal Board.

The appeals regarding issues 20, 21 and the all future editions ban, will be heard on 28 June, 1982.

It is not possible, at this stage, to give any indication of the petty and often misinformed and intellectually bankrupt basis on which the committees have banned editions of WIP over the years. However, regardless of the outcome of the pending appeals, a document setting out details of the committees' attacks on WIP will be made available to readers in due course.

In addition, subscribers will be informed of the outcome of the appeals as soon as possible.

The nature of Work In Progress, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views on a wide range of subjects, ensures that the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of members of the editorial collective.

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THE STEYN REPORT: an alternative appraisal

'Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to
he who owns one'

- AJ Liebling, American journalist and
press critic

WITH the release of the Steyn Report on the Mass Media early this year, the defence of press freedom has once again figured prominently in South African political life. However, the debate over Steyn's proposals has been confined mostly to attacks on the breaches they would impose on the liberal ideal of the press. There has been little or no systematic attention given to the role played by the press in the political economy of South Africa, as a mighty instrument of opinion formation in the hands of capital, or how this affects the view one must take of the Steyn Report.

This article is an attempt to fill the gap. It begins with a discussion of the political economy of the South African press. It then considers the background to the Steyn Report, and summarises the salient points of the Report itself. It then suggests the government's main priorities in post-Steyn press controls, and concludes with the questions these pose for progressive journalists and others concerned about the relationship of the press to the forces promoting social change.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PRESS

AJ LIEBLING's famous aphorism - about the freedom of the press belonging to its owners - brings home an essential point: that the primary interests which the press serves are those of its owners and ultimate controllers, along with those of the owning class generally.

There is no escaping the fact that the modern-day commercial press is a big business, or that, in a capitalist society, it is closely linked with the rest of big business. The report of the Hutchens Committee in the US in the late 1940s told much about the press in capitalist society. It said:

The agencies of mass communication are big business, and their owners are big businessmen. The press is a large employer of labour. The press is connected with other big businesses through the advertising of these businesses, upon which it depends for the major part of its revenue. The owners of the press, like the owners of other big businesses, are bank directors, bank borrowers, and heavy taxpayers in the upper brackets (Liebling, 1961:17).

The same kind of linkages between press and capital can be seen here in South Africa, though the groups which actually own the papers are somewhat different. The Afrikaans press is a direct creation of Afrikaner nationalism, and its role in support of the status quo is too obvious to need discussion here. The English-language press, however, is widely thought of as an agency for liberal ideas and social reform. In fact, its role is heavily conditioned by its ties to mining and industrial capital, as will be shown below.

At the turn of the century, the role of the English press was simple: to prop up the mining industry. In 1901, for instance, the editor of The Star received a memo from the managing director of the Argus Company, which owns the paper. The memo informed him that he would from time to time receive directives from the president of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. Since the prosperity of the country depended on the mines, the memo said, 'you will be expected to obey'.

In the early years of Union which followed, the press rallied support for the Progressive Party and later Smuts' South African Party, both pro-mining in outlook. It was also used to create a climate of opinion favourable to the use of harsh measures on behalf of the industry, such as the strike-breaking tactics of the 1910s or the suppression of the Rand Rebellion of 1922.

Little had changed by the 1940s. In 1947,

H Lindsay-Smith - a pioneer South African muckraker who languishes in undeserved obscurity - wrote,

It has been the policy of the greater part of the daily press that *ipso facto* whatever is best for the gold mines is best for South Africa (Smith, 1947:73)

(Smith's little book is perhaps the only serious attempt ever made to analyse the economic and political links surrounding the English-language press).

The reason for the policies of the English press, for Smith, was not hard to find. The Boards of Directors of the great English-language press combines were filled with men from the mining interests. To cite just one case, John Martin, managing director of the Argus company, was also managing director of Central Mining Investment, Crown Mines, and Rand Mines, as well as director of City Deep, ERPW, Goldenhuys Deep, Modderfontein Bee Mines, and 11 other mining or mining-related firms. Smith cited many similar cases.

In the decades since he wrote, the structure of South African capitalism has changed. Secondary manufacturing industry has grown up alongside - though tied to - mining. All sectors of industry have become more and more monopolised.

These trends have also affected the newspaper business. Almost all large English dailies have come under the control of two giant, closely-connected groups. The SAAN group runs the morning papers and the Argus group the evening papers. Their directors reflect a mix between mining and manufacturing, paralleling the changes in the economy. The Argus Board, for instance, today contains directors of Marathon Steel, Chloride SA, and Toyota SA, alongside board members of mining houses like JCI and Rustenberg Platinum and the giant industrial complex of Barlow Rand. In both firms, it is believed that controlling stakes lie in the hands of Anglo-American.

Just as the control of the English press has changed with the evolution of South African capitalism, so has its function. Instead of speaking for the party of mining capital, it has become the spokesman of capital as a whole against the claims of Afrikaans and lately black nationalism. As such, it criticises

minor deficiencies of the political and economic system, while pressing for reforms to ensure its efficiency and stability. But it works hard to promote the acceptance of capitalism as a system, and to ward off threats to its continued existence.

(It is worth noting that Allister Sparks, the self-proclaimed liberal editor par excellence, said his dismissal as editor of the Rand Daily Mail threatened 'the long-term survival prospects of capitalism in South Africa' (Observer, 07.06.81)).

Of course, the control of capital over the press does not occur through regular phone calls from Harry Oppenheimer to his editors. The web of influence is more subtle. The most overt control, as Sparks' dismissal showed, is the directors' power to appoint and dismiss editors. Dismissal is an extraordinary measure, however, because the right men are usually appointed to the positions in the first place. In turn, the editors tend to appoint like-minded men to posts below them, ensuring a predominantly liberal ideological tone. Thus, for instance, when the former leader page editor of a major paper was asked if he would print an opinion piece in favour of socialism, he replied, 'I don't think so. We're a capitalist newspaper'.

Perhaps the most insidious influence which results is a distorted notion of the liberal ideals of 'balance' and 'objectivity' which pervades the English-language press, in which the spokesmen for racism and injustice must be given equal (or better) treatment than their opponents. Thus, for instance, puppet black leaders created by government institutions are hoisted into media prominence, while genuinely popular leaders must struggle to make their views heard. Thus, too, official pronouncements must be printed at face value, no matter how patently false or absurd.

Another good example of the way control of the commercial press is made manifest is its consistent attempt to weaken black popular struggles. From the Defiance Campaign of 1952 to the school boycotts of 1980, to the best of the author's knowledge there has not been one popular struggle, boycott, strike or

stay-away supported by the English press, no matter how peaceful or disciplined. Black-orientated media in particular have been used to say, 'Stop now, you have made your point'.

The liberal papers like to think of themselves as crusading papers, but the issues they crusade around are not linked to mass popular struggles. The Star, for instance, has spent the past two years espousing the cause of relatively well-to-do blacks forced to live in white Group Areas by the housing shortage. While no one would deny the injustice of the Group Areas Act, it would be hard to imagine a more respectable middle-class issue for the paper to take up. On the other hand, when Star reporters went to cover small school boycotts last year, they were told by the news editor to play them down. He said, 'We don't want to encourage this sort of thing'.

Even the so-called black press is an arm of the white liberal press, aimed at selling to and influencing the growing black market. The township extra editions of the Daily Mail and The Star contain most of the same stories as the white editions, in a slightly different order, and are run by the same white bosses at the top. Even the World, Post, and Sowetan - whose outspokenness has enraged the authorities - are all owned by the Argus Company. They rarely move beyond calls to end racial discrimination and extend the franchise to attack the system of labour exploitation in South Africa.

Indeed, the press frequently plays a direct propaganda role on behalf of the present economic set-up. Without end, both blacks and whites are bombarded with stories about the glories of private enterprise. The good works done by the Urban Foundation - the body created by big business to cool down black anger - receive lots of coverage. (Special paid advertising supplements to mark its fourth anniversary, filled with favourable 'puff pieces' written by staff reporters, appeared in The Sowetan and most other Argus papers in 1981). Everyone is repeatedly told that economic sanctions against South Africa would hurt blacks worst of all. All this undoubtedly has an impact: polls have shown that most urban

blacks oppose trade boycotts of South Africa or state ownership of big industries (Star, 24.09.81).

Another way the press helps 'keep the lid on' is in its deference before excesses by the security authorities, which goes beyond even the limits required by law. Thus, for instance, when one reporter brought in eye-witness accounts of police brutality after the suppression of the 1981 Reiger Park riots, his news editor's first reaction was, 'Why are you trying to smear the South African Police?' On controversial matters involving the Army, the posture of the press is virtually prostrate, when not downright laudatory.

BACKGROUND TO THE STEYN COMMISSION

IN view of the symbiotic relationship which exists between the English-language press and capital, it becomes necessary to ask why there has been such an extensive history of conflict between press and government since the National Party took power in 1948.

For the period from 1948 to the early 1970s, one can see a definite clash of interests between the constituencies represented by the two, which took precedence over the relatively weak threats to their common interest in the preservation of capitalism. The press acted as the mouthpiece of the English business establishment, while the Afrikaner government was the spokesman of the aspiring Afrikaans bourgeoisie and sizeable Afrikaans working and smallholding classes. This conflict lay at the root of the repeated collisions between the press and the authorities about policy and even about press freedom itself.

Since 1976, however, the maturity of Afrikaans capital and changes in the ruling party have resulted in a government more closely identified with capital as a whole than at any time since the first half of this century. The continuation of conflict between the government and the English-language press in this period belies the notion of a simple or mechanical link between the two and capital. Rather, it appears that the political authorities who rule in the

interest of capital are increasingly concerned that its very survival is threatened by the continuance of certain traditions which the press inherited from its liberal capitalist origins. The threat of revolution against white rule and capitalism appears to necessitate in their minds a revision of the bounds within which the capitalist press operates a regulatory function typical of a capitalist state.

The nature of the times has changed since 1976, and the consequences of mere reporting of news events have also changed since then. Evidence of unrest, instability, and the abuse of power has become so extensive in the wake of the Soweto uprising that much is publicised in the normal course of events even without the press attempting to seek it out. Reports of riots, strikes, and guerilla attacks make the position of the forces of order look increasingly shaky, while allegations of torture in the protected forums of political trials and parliament threaten to undermine their support. The mere announcement of unrest in one part of the country can in this unstable environment help spread it, as the snowballing of the 1980 school boycotts showed. Thus the authorities can no longer say they are fearful of lies or opposition commentary: increasingly frankly they admit they are threatened by the full reporting of the truth.

This fear is undoubtedly reinforced by the de facto increase in freedom of speech in South Africa since 1976. Since that upheaval, far too many blacks have found their voices and spoken out for the state to silence them all, in contrast to the fearful years of the 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, with the rising guerilla threat, the security authorities have been forced to concentrate on hostile deeds, not hostile words.

The result is that people are more willing to talk politics - in private or in public. Could anyone have imagined a decade ago an anti-South African Indian Council campaign centred upon the Freedom Charter? Likewise, could speakers at township meetings then have made open calls for majority rule, and barely veiled references to armed struggle, as

now? The calls of a Bishop Tutu for a boycott of South African coal would surely have led to a banning order, or worse.

The new outspokenness has fanned the sparks of resistance kindled in 1976 into school boycotts, strikes, and a resurgence of community organisation in black townships. Thus the reporting of black viewpoints feeds black resistance, which in turn makes blacks still more outspoken. Detentions or bannings of individuals may retard the process, but they cannot halt it. One obvious way to limit the effect of the increased freedom of speech, however, is to limit the freedom of the press to report it.

The post-1976 period has also seen a major change in the black orientated press. Since then, black journalists have become politicised, abandoning the old formula of sex and violence even if they remained rather hazy on ideological details. Although their organisation into black consciousness trade unions put them in an ambiguous position between middle-class and mass nationalism, their commitment to black rule was unmistakable, and their dedication sufficient to sustain a painful eight-week strike late in 1981.

The late 1970s also saw the emergence of a new generation of progressive young white journalists. They were dedicated to taking the liberalism of the English press at its word, using the tradition of 'giving both sides' to ventilate popular grievances and aspirations. (For their trouble the Prime Minister described them as 'men with poison in their pens').

It must also be remembered that the English-language press is the main source of news for international press reporting on South Africa. Thus, the turbulence reflected in its pages was bound to have an influence on South Africa's political and economic partners, as well as foreign investors.

These appear to be the considerations behind press policy, at least since PW Botha became Prime Minister. The most important measure in this field in his first year was the appointment of a commission of inquiry under Judge MT Steyn into press coverage of Defence and Police matters, a clear indication of

his concerns.

June, 1979, saw the then Minister of Justice, Alwyn Schlesbusch, addressing the Newspaper Press Union about new ideas for voluntary press curbs. He asked them to accept a highly restrictive Code of Conduct for Journalists, to bar them from writing articles which would endanger 'South Africa's interests', which would have effectively neutered the opposition press. In the wake of the newspaper owners' polite refusal to castrate themselves, a new commission was appointed under Judge Steyn to investigate all aspects of the mass media in June 1980, followed by a public campaign of Ministerial criticism of the opposition press.

THE STEYN REPORT

THE brief of the Steyn Commission was an extraordinary one. Its charge was to determine 'the needs of the times' and how well the media met them. Thus, it began from the authoritarian premise that it is possible to make an authoritative judicial determination of the 'needs of the times', an inherently contested concept, as if they were findings of fact in a courtroom trial. It followed through with a report which mixes an authoritarian philosophy with a bizarre theory of a world-wide conspiracy against South Africa.

The Commission begins with the assumption that South Africa is becoming a democratic society.

That dynamic process of development is continuing and the process of developing and expanding the democratic foundations of the whole community is advancing inexorably. (30)

However, it is difficult to escape the suspicion that the Commission's notion of 'democracy' looks like little more than a revamped version of apartheid when it lists its conception of the needs of the South African community. These include 'removal of the remnants of unjust group domination' (which bits are just?), 'maintenance of own identity in relation to other race groups', and 'homelands'. (108)

Nevertheless, the Commission explains,

In evaluations of the South African situation certain expressions, principles, etc are repeatedly relied upon as criteria, more often

than not in severe denigration of the present dispensation. Such criteria are also employed tirelessly by the Soviet propaganda and subversion machinery. These criteria are also repeatedly resorted to by white and black radicals ... as well as by a goodly number of clerical and liberal groupings and by a large section of the mass media, all seeking to maintain and intensify South Africa's pariah status and to substitute a radically different political and socio-economic order. (30)

These misguided notions - which the Commission proceeds to refute with arguments drawn from the classic Verwoerdian sophistry - include the claim that South Africa is undemocratic, that one-man one-vote is workable here, that civil disobedience can be justified, that South Africa has abandoned the rule of law, and that blacks are denied equality before the law.

Thus implicitly emerges the case for press restraints, in order to prevent the spread of such dangerous ideas.

A population mistakenly accepting certain faulty and or irrelevant criteria as being both true and applicable ... may easily become unnecessarily demoralised and even rendered incapable of defending themselves, if such criteria wrongly cause them to perceive their 'order of things' as being evil and irremediable ... (31)

After all, since in the Commission's topsy-turvy logic South Africa is becoming a democracy, it has the right to protect itself from those enemies of the people who might subvert it. To fully appreciate how dangerous the 'faulty criteria' mentioned above are, the Commission launches on a lengthy exposé of what it considers the country's internal and external enemies, among whom liberals are as dangerous as communists.

The Soviets, misguided Western liberals and the Third World are the main participants in the onslaught. (59)

It is difficult to envision an onslaught more total. But lest national vigilance slips, the Commission is at pains to emphasise that South Africa cannot let down its guard even before self-proclaimed friends like Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher.

It is clear that the Western onslaught upon South Africa is much more serious than many would have one believe. (63)

In a revealing remark, the Steyn Commission shows that it considers advocates of Western democracy as much of a problem as those of the Eastern sort.

The external onslaught has as its aim nothing less than the political and moral subversion of the white man, his replacement by a black majority government in a unitary state with, depending on who wins, guidelines for a Marxist radical socialist or liberal democratic welfare-capitalist socio-political system. (109)

Allied to the external onslaught, wittingly or unwittingly, are various categories of internal opponents of the regime, who can be categorised as knaves, dupes, and traitors.

The knaves appear to include all black political groups to the left of Gatsha Buthelezi. Azapo and the ANC are lumped together as partners in the softening-up process (a claim that their leaders would consider either amusing or libellous). Special fury is reserved for the Media Workers Association of South Africa, both because it struck for unconventional demands, and because of a statement an official once made declaring that black journalists would either be revolutionary propagandists or status quo propagandists.

The other knaves are the proponents of black theology, in particular the South African Council of Churches. Black theology, it emerges, is a dangerous creed which gives scriptural status to demands for black power, developed by an obscure black American theologian called Prof James H Cone in the 1960s. These cancerous ideas infected the World Council of Churches and its South African affiliate, creating a 'very dangerous and potentially lethal theological force'. (88)

The dupes are the white liberals who sympathise with black organisations and black theology, especially liberal churchmen, writers, politicians and social activists.

The traitors are white radicals (particularly journalists), who, in the Commission's view, are treacherously attempting to undermine the developing Utopia under the guise of reporting the facts. Their techniques include 'pack journalism', the 'pariah syndrome', and 'negative climate setting'.

Because of all these threats, the Commission concludes

We are indeed facing great dangers ... which require of our ... media community far greater responsibility of action and circumspection of utterance than would be called for in times more settled and in communities less troubled. (103)

Curiously, these dangers include just about every vocal political opponent of the South African government. Thus the Commission insists that

Society and the media should increasingly be de-politicised in the sense that clearer distinctions are to be made between matters belonging to the level of statecraft, and therefore of national importance, and matters which are partisan and party-political. This constitutes an important task for media men. (150)

This attempt to sharply restrict the scope of political conflict through press controls reflects a conception of the key role of the press as a conduit of political ideas.

The mass communicator is a 'gatekeeper' - he is situated at the point where decisions and selections are made, which determine the content, structure, and prominence of messages. (115)

Because of its adherence to the traditions of liberal journalism, even the kind of information which South Africa's capitalist press prints is a threat to the house of cards which Steyn envisions as the country's future political system.

The leftist (!) press (eg the English-language opposition Papers) in general is persistently engaged in the process of socio-economic demolition. (125)

Examples of this 'demolition' include press coverage of ANC trials, the Matola raid, and the Nyanga squatters.

As for the black press, the Commission is even more scathing. Of the late Post, it writes,

Post was radically leftist, challengingly sharp, totally unsympathetic towards the government's steps for reform, incitory against institutions of its own people (?) such as the community councils. (125)

Once all this dangerous stuff is toned down, the media can get on with its real job: selling South Africa.

All concerned - government, opposition, press broadcasting media, and private enterprise - will

have to co-operate in conveying a true and authoritative (story) to the world. This does not mean that all have to speak with one voice. The art of diplomacy is to say the same thing in different ways, for the benefit of different audiences, but with honest and sincere intentions.

The Commission also warned that if the alternative is majority rule,

it is likely that the Afrikaner will curb the press for as long as he has political power, and for as long as he anticipates that it will be an instrument to maintain power.

It is in this context that the Commission's main proposals must be appraised.

The key one called for the establishment of a statutory register of journalists, from which they could be struck off for violations of a vaguely-worded code of conduct. If struck off, a person would be banned for life from the journalistic profession. Although the proposed code of conduct was no more than a general collection of platitudes, the unmistakable intent was that its loose terms be used to enforce the sort of restriction of expression outlined above. The Commission's draft bill also gave absolute discretion in the placement of journalists onto the register at its creation, allowing a house-cleaning of journalists already at work.

These measures seem to have been regarded by the Commission as largely supplanting the existing system of punitive press legislation. The Commission recommends the pruning of unnecessary statutory restrictions on press reporting, and also implicitly criticises the policy of banning whole newspapers. Far better, the report intimates, to control the reporters themselves:

A newspaper is merely a neutral instrument, incapable of conveying any seditious intentions. It is the spirit engendered by the journalistic corps serving such a paper, and reflected in it, that creates the reputation of the paper. The real perpetrator of subversion is the journalist who abuses the paper to further his own ends. (19)

The other major recommendation was for a restructuring of newspaper shareholdings. In place of the large blocks of shares now in the hands of mining houses and Anglo-controlled trusts, no one would be able to own more than 1% of the shares of a paper. This may have been a bid to grab the ownership

of the English papers out of the hands of the big companies with whom it now rests, and put it safely into the hands of government supporters.

THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES

EVEN by the standards of the National Party government, the Steyn Commission seems to have gone 'over the top' in its findings and recommendations. Its picture of the total onslaught is exceptionally crude, and certainly far less sophisticated than that of the Army and Security Police. Its criticism of newspaper shareholdings came only weeks after the Monopolies Commission gave them a clean bill of health. As soon as the report was released - to a firestorm of criticism, both from English and Afrikaans journalists here and newspapers overseas - the Prime Minister was at pains to say he would not rush into implementing its proposals. These, he stated, would be the basis of negotiation with the press.

Yet it is impossible to believe that the government did not know what sort of report to expect when it appointed the Commission. The analysis and some of the recommendations were similar to those of the first Steyn Commission on defence reporting, and three of the five commissioners were also the same. Moreover, during 1981, a parade of civil servants from various departments appeared before the Commission to accuse the press of inciting black people and to call for a statutory journalists' register. At the time rumours in Pretoria said that they were marching to Cabinet orders.

The most reasonable conclusion seems to be that the government appointed the Commission in the expectation of an excessive report, to give it bargaining chips in the negotiations with the press. It can now aim for voluntary curbs or perhaps a professionally-imposed registration system, with the threat of a statutory measure in the background. The threat of massive shifts in shareholding patterns could be another effective bludgeon, since the newspaper owners are anxious to avoid the complex manoeuvres required to blunt it, while government appears not to care one way or the other.

The real question is thus: what is the government's bottom line? An answer can be gleaned by reading the Commission's report together with the submissions it received from the military and the security police, the bodies who appear to have the Prime Minister's ear. It seems they are most sensitive about four types of stories:

- * Articles which reflect favourably on banned organisations like the African National Congress, such as the 'Free Mandela' campaign;

- * Articles which reflect badly on the security apparatus, such as criticism of detentions or of the military;

- * Articles which suggest South Africa is sliding into revolutionary war, implying that the state is not invulnerable;

- * Articles which forcefully present black grievances or vigorously criticises the government, for creating a 'negative climate'.

This impression was reinforced by comments in parliament by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Chris Heunis, the responsible Minister in the debate on the report. He said that the main aim of the report was 'arming this country against terrorism' (RDM, 16.02.82).

CONCLUSION

THE struggle for control of the press, with all its imperfections, has become one of the key points in the political struggle in South Africa today. The issue now is no longer the right to campaign or criticise, but merely the right to reflect reality. What it boils down to is that the authorities want to cut down the flow of news, statements, and ideas which invigorate black resistance to apartheid.

So the papers are likely to come under pressure to play down the ANC, guerilla strikes, and criticism of the security forces, as well as to tone down reports of black grievances and community struggles. An onslaught can also be expected against Mwaesa, and a ban on The Sowetan is quite possible. These restrictions will attempt to blindfold the public before the intense conflicts in society, to smother popular

leaders and organisations in black communities, and maintain white morale.

Progressive journalists of all colours will have to consider carefully their response to this challenge. It will be tempting to strike a heroic posture and refuse to carry on if new curbs are imposed, but they will have to ask what gains kamikaze tactics would really bring. They may find it wiser to swallow their pride, even if it means signing a register, so as not to leave the media to the time-servers and reactionaries. It is an unpalatable choice, but progressive journalists may soon be confronted with the alternatives of a fighting retreat or a doomed stand.

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DETENTIONS: tampering with the mind

THE aim of most detentions under South African security legislation is the extraction of information. Detention is therefore inextricably linked with interrogation. Various means are used to get the information presumed to be in the possession of the detainee. Access to the detainee by lawyers is not granted by the detaining authorities; nor to friends or family, except in special circumstances. Thus, anything that might bolster morale is forbidden, as it may make information required more inaccessible to security police.

The detention period can be divided into three stages:¹

- 1). The initial change in the detainee's environment and his/her response to this;
- 2). The interrogation situation;
- 3). Waiting for release.

There is not much information available on the initial response to detention. Two ex-detainees have noted that it is a time of its own in the whole experience:

.....those first two days is just so different from the rest of the period inside - its like a separate kind of experience because it's just such a difference between living your own life outside, and the first two hours inside is the crucial area, if you can survive that you can hopefully survive the rest of the time....The first thing that strikes you is the sense of being in a completely different world down to taking away things associated with your everyday life.....

Then you look at your cell and it looks like a really dirty dreary place, there are no sheets and no pillows, just blankets, sometimes you have a mattress, the toilet hasn't a handle, there are no windows, you notice just little things like that. The lights are turned on and off depending on what the people outside feel like. Your meal hours are different, the food initially

is far shittier....you're not told why you're detained and they're very threatening and aggressive. So immediately because you live in a kind of secure environment and you're taken out and faced with people who're hostile to you. You feel they're looking and feeling you're rubbish, just dregs. 2

.....When they finally locked me in my cell that was probably the worst time of the whole period, those first couple of hours when I realised that I was actually physically incapable of leaving the area. I remember pacing around and trying to look out - coming to terms with the physical restraint. 3

It is a sudden and extreme change from one's daily environment, coupled with uncertainty of the unknown, of the reasons behind one's detention, and the hostility and aggression of one's captors. It is a time of total aloneness and fear - of acute stress.⁴

Then comes the interrogation period. It is in fact artificial to separate this out. The period of social isolation is in itself setting readiness for interrogation. As Storr (1960) points out:

When all ties with the outside world are severed, the detainee is simply left alone with his fears, knowing that he is entirely at the mercy of his captors. Since a man's sense of his own identity as a person depends upon communication with other persons, he soon ceases to behave as himself.

According to Storr, a person needs only 4 weeks of solitary confinement before being reduced to a state of severe depression, closely akin to a state of chronic schizophrenia:

After about four weeks of complete isolation, most prisoners become severely depressed. They cease all spontaneous activity, take little notice of their surroundings, and become dirty and dishevelled. They may become incontinent and sit all day muttering to themselves.

Interrogation being offered at this point is often a welcome relief, and should the interrogator then play out his hand a little longer by refusing to notice or acknowledge the detainee, the experience of confusion and loss of identity is drastically increased. An interrogator suddenly becoming warm and friendly at this point provides the relationship-deprived detainee with much-needed affirmation of him or her as a person. It is very difficult not to

Star Sun City Worker Raped

Crime Reporter
A young Sun City employee was raped at gunpoint by a hitch-hiker yesterday after offering him a lift to Rustenburg.
The woman, aged 27, was driving to Sun City from Johannesburg wearing a pair of tight-fitting shorts, a T-shirt and was braless.
She picked up the hitch-hiker along the way and while driving, he began molesting her. When she struggled, he pulled out a revolver and forced her from the road at a place called Nival Nool, where he raped her.
No arrests have been made and police are searching for the attacker.

SE 114382

HIDE-SAFE soldiers can forget about getting a lift from Mrs Magda Coetzee.

Mrs Coetzee, 28, gave a lift to a soldier, was almost and then had to pull a handgun on the soldier to force him out of her lobby.

But it is her treatment by a person - whom she cannot identify - at Defence Headquarters that has hardened her resolve to cover again stop at a hide safe sign.

She was accused of provoking the attack by someone at the Army Officer's Club.

It made this deduction because she explained she gave the soldier a lift with only her 18-month-old daughter in her lobby.

When approached by the Sunday Express a spokesman for Army Headquarters said abusive or disrespectful remarks towards the public by members in uniform were not condoned by Army.

It will do about.

'talk' under such circumstances.

In an experiment conducted by Zubek et al,⁵ where volunteers were held in solitary confinement, all demanded release before three days were up. They were experiencing mental confusion, disorientation, a lack of concentration, and an inability to think logically. EEGs showed up a profound disturbance in the functioning of their central nervous systems.

It is important to note - in any attempt to relate experimental evidence in this area to the actual experience of detention - that there are crucial differences between the experiments and a real detention experience:

- 1). experimenters are not hostile to their volunteers;
- 2). the termination of the experiment is absolutely under the control of the volunteer;
- 3). 'the volunteer volunteers for his/her role in the experiment, and gets something out of it.

The process described above by Storr is a relatively straight-forward one. Combine it with any of the following techniques, and the effect is more disastrous from the point of view of the detainee's psychological hold on his/her reality. The basic principle is a simple one - break down anything that might be providing the detainee with internal strength, ie (a) break him or her down on a physical level, or (b) break him or her down on a psychological level.

(a) The brain needs at minimum three things to function adequately, according to Storr:⁶ sensory stimulation, oxygen, and proteins or sugars. Sensory stimulation can be prevented in any degree of intensity - from the sheer monotony and boredom of prison existence, through to more sophisticated techniques; those either geared towards the prevention of all stimulation (darkness, loose clothing, blindfolds, gloves, earplugs), or those geared towards the prevention of patterned stimulation (fierce white light, translucent goggles, white noise). In an experiment where patterned stimulation was prevented, 75 percent of volunteers gave up before 48 hours, because of unbearable anxiety and tension, panic attacks, and unbearable dreams of drowning and

suffocation.⁷

Oxygen can be restricted by the use of hooding, or by placing prisoners in a highly confined space. Sugars and proteins are easily restricted by providing only a very sparse diet, or only water. This deprives the brain of coenzymes which are necessary for normal cerebral metabolism.

In addition, the following manipulations can occur: sleep disturbances, which lead to gross disturbance in higher cortical functioning; lack of proper hygiene and induced illnesses; prolonged interrogation under extreme tension; the abuse of chemicals, eg laxatives; fatiguing physical exercises; and electroshock.⁸ The Amnesty International Report on Torture (1975) notes that

Allegations have been made that there is an appliance for administering electric shock torture in almost every police station in South Africa, but the uniformity of the methods even in small local police stations, and the fact that some interrogators seem to travel from one centre to another, led the UN investigators to suggest that the police must receive some training in the use of torture (1975:131).

Further, the Amnesty Report relays this information about electroshock:

Even in medical use when it is given twice a week, (electroshock) may induce mild confusion and memory impairment for a short period. When repeated many times in a day it causes such cerebral disturbance as to render men demented and incontinent and is analogous to a severe head injury. Paulo Schilling points out the other effects of electricity when applied locally to limbs as a torture:

'The electrical discharge causes a sensation which is difficult to describe: a physical and psychological commotion filled with electric sparks, which together with convulsive shaking and loss of muscular control, gives the victim a sense of loss, of unavoidable attraction for that turbulating electrical trituration. The shock causes a stimulation in the muscle which is identical to the stimulation of the nerve fibres and the muscle responds with a contraction. The extensor muscles extend and the flexors flex, causing disorderly, uncontrollable movements similar to epileptic convulsions. The tortured victim shouts with all his might, grasping for a footing, somewhere to stand in the midst of that chaos of convulsions, shaking and sparks. He cannot lose himself or turn his attention away from that desperate sensation. For him in that moment any other form of combined torture...would be a relief, for it would allow

him to divert his attention, touch ground and his own body which feels like it is escaping his grasp. Pain saves him, beating comes to his rescue. He tries to cause himself pain by beating his head repeatedly on the ground. But generally he is tied...and not even that resource is available to him' (1975:59-60).

It is interesting to consider the different effects of 'externally' and 'internally' induced pain. 'Externally' induced pain allows detainees the possibility of remaining resistant through hatred and anger at their interrogators. 'Internally' induced pain on the other hand, is debilitating (eg sitting for hours in a seated position without a chair, holding bricks in upraised hands, standing on tiptoe with only the fingertips pressing against a wall). The victim has to cope with self-inflicted pain - the contest becomes one against oneself.⁹

With gradual physical breakdown, detainees become restless, talkative, delirious. Information derived from past experience becomes less potent as a guide for action; information from the present (pain, thirst, discomfort, threats to life) becomes more potent.¹⁰ Experiments show a diminished capacity to reason abstractly, to think in a concentrated and coherent manner, a heightened level of suggestibility, disturbance in the power to recollect (especially events of a complex nature), uncertainty of the detainee in his or her beliefs and their truth or falsehood and the development of dependence upon guards and interrogators.¹¹

(b) To break detainees on a psychological level, all the above techniques apply. In addition, use can be made of mock strangulations, mock executions, mock drownings, threats of what is being done to loved ones, humiliations and degradations.

In essence, the detainee is trapped in a situation in which the stresses are manipulated so as constantly to frustrate the need to behave in a consistent, learned, personal behaviour pattern, and in accordance with an esteemed self image - both of which are necessary for the protection of basic self-identity.¹²

An additional point can be made about the interrogation situation. Very deeply instilled in us

through socialisation is a stress reaction when asked a question, which can only be relieved by answering the question. It is possible to decline an answer to a question, but each refusal requires an effort which cannot be sustained in the long run.¹³

The varied conditions of interrogation have been aptly summarised by Biderman, into the three aspects of Dependency, Debility and Dread.¹⁴ Physical dependency lies at the basis of the relationship between interrogator and detainee. Paradoxically, the detainee is totally dependent on the very person who withdraws those things he or she needs to retain their strength and morale. Psychological dependency is inextricably linked. So strong is the need of one human being for another (particularly on the level of physical survival) that, rather than feel completely abandoned, a detainee will attach him or herself even to their persecutors. Most of us will cling to anyone, rather than face a loss of personal identity, and the disintegration of personality which is the result of complete emotional isolation.¹⁵

Debility is engineered through the deprivation of food, sleep and human contact. Dread is experienced during respites between interrogation sessions: fear of death; fear of pain; fear of deformity, or permanent disability through neglect or inadequate medical treatment; fear of violence against loved ones at home; even fear of one's ability to satisfy the demands of the insatiable interrogators in order to get released.

Under 'DOD' a resistant detainee becomes completely compliant. Mathews and Albino (1966:33) sum up the position from a psycho-legal point of view:

.....solitary confinement combined with interrogation may cause the subject to become confused and uncertain of his facts and to doubt himself and his recollections. He may become suggestible and strongly subject to the influence of his interrogator who can make suggestions to him directly or indirectly sometimes without even being aware of it. In his state of confusion and impaired mental powers, he may abandon his original reconstruction of events and substitute one to please his interrogator. Thereafter the detainee may believe the second reconstruction to be true and

for this reason his demeanour may be no guide to his credibility. He may be convinced of the truthfulness of a false reconstruction and indications of deliberate lying will be absent.

Again and again, literature in this area leads us to this conclusion - that the basic position of the courts should be to disallow statements unless they are proven to have been made freely and voluntarily in all respects.¹⁶ In sharp contrast, the South African courts have tended to accept statements of accused people, and evidence of witnesses, when they have been in detention for lengthy periods, and have claimed duress and coercion.

There is no personality that can withstand extensive interrogation techniques. Assessment of previous personality cannot predict endurance under such stress. Under experimental conditions, neurotics and those defined as 'social misfits' often did better than 'normal' people.¹⁷

Finally, for the detainee, the detention experience is not yet over, once interrogation has ceased and the 'statement' made. He or she simply has to wait an unknown period before release. Francis (1974) conducted an experiment testing the effects of perception of time on endurance. The best endurance occurred in the group who knew when the experiment was to end, and who were given a record of the passing time. Those who fared worst on endurance, were those who knew how time was passing, yet who had no idea of the termination date of the experiment. Such is the position of most detainees in South Africa.

THE INTERROGATOR

FINALLY, perhaps we can look at the profile of the torturer. Unbelievably, he is as often as not a sentimental family man; he goes along with authoritative demands for obedience (even when this means inflicting harm on others);¹⁸ he has pronounced conformity to his group; carries out his 'work' as part of a collective system; and finally, he has a strong tendency towards sacrificing his own personality in inter-relationships (which leads to a build-up of frustration and hostility which is then unleashed on

hostile images and minority groups).

Where there is any likelihood of the humanity of the detainee touching that of the interrogator, a bag is often thrown over the detainee's head; or he or she is strapped to the other end of a machine; or made to wallow in his or her own excrement so that the humanness is no longer so dangerous.

SOCIETIES ALLOWING FOR TORTURE

AMNESTY International conducted a thorough investigation of societies operating from a standpoint of torture/interrogation (1973). They found that there was always a need to justify torture - that it was a pre-condition for interrogation that the interrogator hold a world-view which divides people into categories of torturable and non-torturable. Then, once one group of people has been set on one side as licensed to torture, and another as a group so far beyond consideration as human beings that any brutality can be inflicted upon them, the fatal step has been taken. From there, the group of victims is rapidly enlarged, while, at the same time, the apparatus of the state moves in to protect the interrogators from punishment, or even from inquiry.

The more authoritarian the society, the more prevalent the torture. Torture in the name of the state is in effect nothing other than a direct and immediate form of domination of one person or group over another. This is the essence of authoritarian politics.

To close with a quotation from Charles Dickens:¹⁹

I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body: and because its ghastly signs and tokens are not so palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a secret punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up to stay. I hesitated once, debating with myself, whether if I had the power of saying 'yes' or 'no', I would allow it to be tried in certain cases, where the terms of imprisonment were short; but now, I solemnly declare, that with no rewards or honours could I walk a happy man beneath the open sky by day, or lay me down upon my bed at night, with the consciousness that one human creature,

for any length of time, no matter what, lay suffering this unknown punishment in his silent cell, and I the cause, or I consenting to it in the least degree.

NOTES

1. Following Sandler, 1981.
2. Quoted in Sandler, 1981:10.
3. Sandler, 1981:11.
4. Ref Sandler, 1981.
5. Quoted in Mathews and Albino, 1966:24, from British Medical Bulletin, 20, pp 38-42.
6. Quoted in McGuffin, 1974:40, from Storr, 'Why Hooding is Mental Torture', in Sunday Times, 21.11.71.
7. Experiment quoted in Amnesty International, 1973: 47, from Lancet, 12.09.59.
8. Amnesty International, 1973:43.
9. Amnesty International, 1973:46.
10. Amnesty International, 1973:46.
11. Mathews and Albino, 1966:31-32.
12. Amnesty International, 1973:52.
13. *ibid.*
14. *ibid*:49.
15. Storr, 1960.
16. Dr Charl Vorster, Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit, has pointed out that statements made under detention conditions are as invalid as statements made while under the influence of alcohol, or when mentally unsound. Rapport, 14.02.82.
17. Amnesty International, 1973:43.
18. Ref. Miligram's (1973) experiment, where subjects administered 'lethal' doses of electroshock to volunteers, on the understanding that they were contributing to research knowledge. Reported in Amnesty International, 1973:67.
19. Charles Dickens, American Notes and Pictures from Italy, (Oxford, 1957:99-100), quoted by Mathews and Albino, 1966:25.

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CHOLERA: a social disease?

DURING the 'no confidence' debate in parliament, Dr Marius Barnard (PFP) described the current cholera epidemic as the 'inevitable bitter price we have to pay for the implementation of the homeland policy, the migrant labour system, resettlement of Blacks, the breaking up of families, and the criminal neglect of primary health care facilities among the disadvantaged people in the country'.

The Minister of Health, Dr Lapa Munnik's counter-attack was that his opponent was 'part of the total onslaught against South Africa'. He demanded to know, 'why nothing positive was said about health in South Africa'.

The debate reinforces the notion that the 'quality of a nation's health overwhelmingly is a response to the nature of its political, social and economic environment'. It is therefore essential to examine diseases such as cholera within this context. Analysed in isolation from its environment, cholera, although dangerous, does not have as high a fatality rate as other socially related diseases such as tuberculosis.¹ Its immediate symptoms, when recognised, can be treated effectively. However, when viewed in the social, political and economic conditions in which it breeds, cholera becomes both a symptom and an indicator of the injustices which pervade South Africa.

This article aims to examine the factors which cause cholera, the infected areas, the state's response to the crisis, and the potential for community organisations to take united stands on the causes of ill health. Issues such as forced removals, the role of industry, health legislation, provision of services, the involvement of the SA Defence Force, and community responses are of paramount importance


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to an understanding of the true nature of health and ill-health in South Africa.

Cholera is a disease of poverty - a condition resulting from a society in which there is a maldistribution of resources. Poverty-associated diseases are regarded as features of developing countries with a small affluent elite and a poor majority, where basic facilities are not adequately provided.

Certain disease patterns in South Africa are similar to those of underdeveloped countries. The incongruity lies in the fact that a state whose medical services have been acclaimed as being 'as good as America'² (where such diseases have been eradicated), and which boasts of having 'First World' advanced technology, cannot prevent outbreaks and recurrences of such epidemics. Eighty kilometres from Durban's modern medical services and industrial sector over 50 000 people have been affected by cholera due to lack of basic essentials conducive to a healthy life.

KwaZulu's cholera epidemic is a case of history repeating itself. The environmental conditions and the disease's course replicate - on a larger scale - KaNgwane. Only the names of the afflicted areas differ. In October, 1980, KaNgwane was ravaged by cholera which infected thousands and killed about 30 people. The 1981/2 epidemic has affected more than 50 000 people so far, with about 200 fatalities.³ In both bantustans the cycle was initiated by the transmittance of the organism through human faeces. In summer the organism multiplies rapidly due to the high temperatures and humidity. Rain also spreads the contaminated faeces from pit latrines into wells, dams and rivers. The real 'instigator' of the disease is overcrowding, inadequate water supplies and sanitation - conditions prevalent in the bantustans. In a wider context the root causes of cholera are forced removals, migrant labour and poverty under the policy of 'separate development'.

With the discovery of gold and diamonds, rural africans were driven off the land and forced into an

area equal to about 13% of South Africa. Large numbers of the population were forced into the cities to work on the mines as cheap labour, for South Africa's rapidly developing economy. Traditional rural economies collapsed due to overcrowding, erosion and migrant labour.

These factors are inseparable, reinforced by legislation such as the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963. This was introduced for the tightening up of the labour bureaux system, to funnel labour and to entrench the migrant labour system. Opposition to the legislation was voiced by Helen Suzman, who condemned the Act as one designed 'for cheap labour supply. Huge labour reserves to feed hungry white industrial complexes while absolving whites of the responsibility for providing rights and facilities to workers who return at the end of their annual contracts to live, languish and starve comfortably out of sight'.⁴ In the same year 16 000 people were forcibly evicted from Besterspruit, near Vryheid, to Mondlo in KwaZulu, where the most basic necessities were absent. The veld was bare and arid. Water rations were collected by cart and there was sparse food, fuel and building materials. The result was an outbreak of typhoid and diphtheria. The pattern has been prolonged and repeated.⁵

It was estimated in 1980, by Professor Hanks of the Institute of Natural Resources in Natal, that KwaZulu 'has 20% of South Africa's population on roughly 7% of the total land. The fragmentation of land holdings in rural areas to house the increasing population means that huts replace arable land'. The calculated de facto population of KwaZulu is 2 898 100, de jure 5 304 500.⁶ Consequences of such overcrowding are evident in areas like Msinga, which has a population of some 20 000 on a strip of land 8-10 km long and about 0,2 km wide. The soil is eroded, facilities are scarce, and the land is agriculturally unviable.⁷

In 1975 it was calculated that KwaZulu supplied 269 000 migrant workers to the industrial areas.⁸ In view of population expansion and land unproductivity, the number is sure to have increased.

The young, the aged and the infirm are left behind to languish in abhorrent conditions which cause and aggravate the maladies associated with deprivation and exploitation.

On 2 November, 1980, Dr van Rensburg, Natal's Regional Health Director, claimed that there were no cases of cholera in KwaZulu. Exactly a year later, cholera strains were found in the Ingwavuma River of northern KwaZulu. The river joins the Usuthu and Pongola Rivers within a 6 400 square km region, populated by 25 000 people. Ten deaths were reported.

The 153 beds at Ingwavuma's mission hospital were ill-equipped to cope with the flood of patients. The crisis warranted the establishment of emergency chlorination points, of which there are at present (March, 1982) 600. Emergency tents were also erected at Ndumu clinic and Mosvold mission hospital in the region. It was estimated that at least 50% of the 25 000 inhabitants suffered from the disease, as the entire water supply fed by the Pongola and Ingwavuma Rivers had been infected.

The most virulent outbreak was officially recorded on 2 December in Stanger and the surrounding areas, after six people from Ncheweni (Ncholweni) shanty town had died. At first the cause was not attributed to cholera, but to a 'mysterious water-borne gastric infection with similar symptoms', as was emphatically affirmed by Dr Küstner, an epidemiologist. Subsequently, it was conceded that the mysterious killer was indeed cholera.⁹

Squatter settlements in Inanda, near Durban, also showed potential for outbreaks of cholera and typhoid. Consequently, the inhabitants were threatened with eviction before Christmas, as the settlements posed a health hazard to the surrounding 'white' areas.¹⁰

On 23 December, the Parakabad state-owned indian school, near Glendale Sugar Mill (30 km from Stanger) was converted into a makeshift clinic. The 10 beds proved insufficient for the daily influx of patients. Mapumulo school was also converted into a clinic and surplus patients were transferred to Stanger hospital.

Thus far, the disease had struck 'systematically' every underdeveloped area in northern Natal. The threat of its spread to Durban was intensified when Clairwood hospital reported on 28 December, the death of a worker from Molweni.¹¹ The hospital has treated cases from Umlazi, Kwamashu, Ndwedwe and Stanger. Durban's King Edward VIII hospital also sent surplus patients to Clairwood as it did not have sufficient isolation facilities.¹²

The Welbedacht area in Pinetown was the next under surveillance following fears of a rapid increase in victims. By 15 January, contrary to official reports that the epidemic had abated, the crisis had worsened, particularly in Stanger, Mapumulo and Empangeni districts.

By the end of January, the official figure stood at 3 000, with 44 deaths.¹³ On 2 February, health authorities declared that the situation was sufficiently under control to spell the end of the epidemic. However, the next day a new rehydration centre at Ntuzana had to be opened for Amaoti squatters, as was the case at Adem's mission hospital for the Umbumbulu area.

Pietermaritzburg became the next cholera epicentre with five deaths reported on 9 February.¹⁴ The disease continued southward, striking Scottborough on the coast.

In March it was confirmed that shellfish from the Umgeni River to the Umhlanga Canal and along the entire Natal coast had been polluted by cholera.¹⁵ This reinforced the nation-wide danger that was being posed.

To date the official number of confirmed cases is 12 000, although it has been estimated as being probably five times that number.¹⁶ It has finally been acknowledged that the disease cannot be stopped because only a tiny percentage of the victims are hospitalised - the rest unknowingly spread the epidemic. The current El-Tor strain is also more resilient and can survive higher temperatures and drier conditions. 'There is no way to stop the disease - only the dying!'¹⁷

PROVISION OF CLINICS

PROVISION of clinics has been scant and inadequate. Stanger provincial hospital caters for an average of 500 patients per day (excluding cholera victims) and there are bed provisions for a maximum of 400 patients. The overcrowded hospital caters for the people from surrounding areas, and although it is not meant to, in terms of provincial regulations, patients from the bantustan areas are also treated here due to the chronic shortage of hospital amenities.¹⁸

At one stage the overcrowded Ndumu clinic was treating two patients per bed. In Glendale an indian school was converted into a makeshift clinic. Ten beds are insufficient for the 30 or more suspected cases who congregate daily there. There are no resident medical teams - health teams travel stretches of 200 km per day to treat sufferers at these improvised hospitals. If patients miss the health teams, or they do not arrive (which is not uncommon), sufferers must trudge home and return another day.

PASSING THE BUCK I



At Glendale clinic, although taps have been provided, there is no water to flush the toilets. Thus, the cholera cycle can be repeated even at the clinic itself.¹⁹ Dr Van Rensburg attributes the recycle to lack of education. Culpability rests with sheer negligence and shortsightedness on the part of the authorities.

FACILITIES

SIGNIFICANTLY, Natal's metropolitan areas, although in close proximity to infected areas, remain relatively free from widespread infection. For example, Stanger, a predominantly white town 80 km from Durban, is populated by about 3 000 who live in sprawling houses and farmsteads. On its periphery is Ncholweni, whose 30 000 inhabitants subsist in slum conditions without basic amenities. There is no sanitation to speak of and few taps are provided by the Stanger municipality. Only 20% of homes have access to purified water, the rest rely on the river.²⁰ Shelter consists, in the main, of one or two rooms for



families of up to 10 members. Ncholweni was the most virulent epicentre of the cholera outbreak. Stanger hospital, in the centre of the town, had to accommodate the sufferers and those from surrounding areas. Yet not a single case of cholera has been reported for the white residential area.

A similar situation exists in Melmoth, a small town near Empangeni. Due to rapid industrialisation of nearby Richards Bay, Empangeni has evolved into a thriving commercial centre. However, within Melmoth there lies a slum suburb called Makhala-fukwe, in which some 800 people exist without toilets. The residents themselves regard the place as a health hazard. Melmoth has joined the cholera statistics.²¹

One need not expand on the deprivation of each cholera-infested area. Let it suffice to state that the areas without adequate living and sanitation amenities are almost exclusively vulnerable to the epidemic. Even the most basic hygiene facilities would reduce considerably the threat of infection. Sporadic cases in metropolitan areas, such as Durban, are carried from the poverty-stricken areas by migrant labourers who work in the cities.

CAPITAL

NATAL's cheap labour supply is dependent on industry for its subsistence. Therefore, it is important to examine the role played by private companies towards the workers' welfare and their response to the cholera epidemic. Enterprises, such as the South African Sugar Association, have been praised for their sponsorship of the 'Buy a Borehole' campaign. Over R100 000 has been allocated for the sinking of boreholes in KwaZulu. More than 50 boreholes and handpumps have been established in Msinga, Tugela Mapumulo, and Ingwavuma districts. At the Glendale Sugar Mill taps have been inserted in workers' compounds.

Efforts to reduce the spread of the disease should be commended. However, it must be stressed that a proper water supply is adequate only in the short-term, and is just one of many factors essential

for maintenance of good health. Other preventable diseases, like typhoid, caused by the same conditions as cholera, are contracted from milk. In the light of this, private industry's provision for their labour should be closely examined from a realistic perspective.

Companies are responsible for the welfare of thousands of workers and it appears that piped water has been provided at the expense of and as a poor substitute for the essentials.²² In 1976, requests for water were made by the citizens' committees on the outskirts of Stanger, in response to a study by the Urban Foundation. However, no response from industry was received. Plans were shelved because Ncholweni was considered to be 'temporary', despite the fact that the 30 000 inhabitants have lived there for up to 20 years, and initially erected shacks to be close to their place of work.

At Glendale Sugar Mill, houses have been allocated according to salary scales. In the labour hierarchy cane pickers, for up to 12 hours work per day, receive about R20 per week. Slightly higher up the scale, workers may earn about R125 per month in cash. Houses allocated for such families are two-roomed compartments in row upon row of densely packed sub-economic shelters. Families of up to 12 members are housed here. In higher employment echelons, boiler-makers may earn up to R1 000 monthly, for less time worked, and are provided with houses in accordance with their wages. Thus, family size and labour hours are not taken into account in the provision of services; employee status is the only criterion upon which the size and standards of housing are dependent.²³ This places capital's economic considerations in a more realistic light. Private capital has funded health campaigns, emphasising personal hygiene for workers. Their willingness to supply clean water in response to the cholera outbreak ensures that workers will not be exposed to contaminated water, thus productivity will not be affected by absenteeism. When people are regarded as cheap, saleable commodities, the quality of their lives after working hours is of no consequence to those responsible, unless profits could be adversely



affected.

THE STATE

'CHOLERA reflects the tie-up between infection, malnutrition and overcrowding, caused by poverty, unhealthy environment and inadequate health facilities'.²⁴

In 1980 the state released the updated National Health Services Facilities Plan to present an enlightened view of social services. The plan emphasises the need for provision of basic subsistence needs, primary health care, education and hospital services.²⁵ Different departments have been co-ordinated to provide services for the community. While this suggests an acknowledgement that cholera is not solely a medical phenomenon, the state's implementation of the Health Plan reveals an attempt to coerce communities and to evade responsibility for ensuring their fundamental welfare.

This is revealed by the state's attitude towards the provision of basic subsistence needs.

It is acknowledged that 'everyone needs drinking water, food, a house and services to help with the disposal of sewage and waste to maintain a complete basic level of minimal health'. As the cholera epidemic highlights, this plan has been at the level of words - the Department of Health has proved to be incapable of providing these basic essentials. Instead it has shifted responsibility onto the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.²⁶

Even the provision of piped water by local authorities is no guarantee of improved health. In the Welbedacht area, where a cholera outbreak has been imminent, the tap water is filthy. It is pumped from Shongweni dam to the Umlaas filter works to be purified and the residents of Welbedacht receive it between these two stages. The pipes are clogged with insects and sand, so it makes no difference whether tap or polluted river water is used.²⁷

The second level of the Health Plan emphasises health education. In response to the cholera epidemic huge publicity campaigns have been launched, emphasising the need for personal hygiene. Slogans, such as 'Clean People make Healthy People make Happy People', succeed in deflecting attention from the neglect of facilities to the victims' supposed primitiveness and ignorance. Health education has effectively camouflaged the root causes of the disease.

Suspicion of the state's motives is reinforced by the National Health Budget for 1982.²⁸ Ninety five percent is allocated to curative services - advanced hospitals and equipment - and five percent for preventive measures in rural communities. If the state's plans were genuine, provision for preventive services, as laid out in the 1980 Health Plan, would far exceed that miniscule amount.

The 1980 Health Plan is, therefore, another attempt to co-opt and convince communities that the state sincerely has the welfare of all at heart. It is part of the attempt to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people, in terms of the state's Total Strategy.²⁹

The cholera crisis is exacerbated because so

many authorities are responsible for health prerequisites. There is great confusion concerning the jurisdiction under which certain areas fall. For example, the thousands of Inanda residents are not represented by a local authority. KwaZulu refuses to undertake the provision of facilities because at present the area is not part of KwaZulu. Ironically Inanda is to be incorporated into the bantustan. Residents now fall under the authority of the Department of Cooperation and Development, who likewise refuse to provide facilities and insist on evicting residents as they pose a health hazard.³⁰

Bureaucratic ineptitude can be traced to the lowest government level as well as to the highest



central authority. In 1981 the Department of Community Development was warned about the cholera threat in New Glasgow, near Verulam, yet the Department's representative claimed that 'he had never heard of the place'. The Department's response to pleas for piped water was that as the residents do not pay rates they are not eligible for such services. The residents were prepared to pay, but were given no option.³¹

The Department of Cooperation and Development uses the water issue as a lever to implement evictions and forced removals. Recently the Department ignored a report drawn up by the Umgeni Water Board. AK Barnes, chief engineer, said the Urban Foundation had requested a report on the feasibility of supply mains and reservoirs to feed Inanda from the Hazelmere dam near Verulam. Nothing has been heard from the Department and the dam has since been polluted with cholera.³²

In 1980, James Rivett-Carnac of the Urban Foundation, designed a water reticulation scheme for Inanda, at a cost of R1,76-m which was rejected by the government as being exorbitant. Ironically, the temporary water tanker scheme undertaken by the government is costing more than that. It is evident that instead of a viable solution, the state, intent on its prohibition of spontaneous settlements and the removal of 'black spots', uses the cholera threat as an excuse to evict tenants. The area is a health hazard due to sub-standard conditions, but as the example of the Nqutu area reinforces, forced removals result in worse living and health standards. Furthermore, the rehousing of the Inanda squatters would cost 300 times more than Rivett-Carnac's scheme. Perhaps the only satisfactory effects of forced removals from the nearby white areas' point of view, is that the cholera threat is moved comfortably 'out of sight and mind'.

It is not the sole responsibility of the Department of Health to guarantee good health, as communicable diseases such as cholera demonstrate the inextricable relationship between health and social, political and economic factors. Efforts to

coordinate different departments imply the acknowledgement that it is the duty of all those concerned with the community to play a constructive role in the eradication of diseases. However, instead of formulating and implementing positive methods, the state, through secrecy and manipulation of the media, have distorted the issues for which they are culpable.

The state has responded to the cholera epidemic in three ways: Initially information on the KaNgwane crisis was suppressed and underplayed. The state then deflected responsibility from the departments onto personal hygiene and the bantustan authorities.³³

KwaZulu, until recently, was swamped with publicity in the form of widespread campaigns, pamphlets, lectures and broadcasts on personal hygiene over Radio Zulu and Port Natal. Thus the second response emphasised the victims' personal cleanliness and under-played long-term causes.³⁴ Socio-economic factors were mentioned by Dr Van Rensburg, but the facts were manipulated in terms of state policy. He attributed the disruption of health standards to the breakdown of social order through civil wars and civil disobedience in southern Africa resulting in an increase in diseases.

Likewise, in the recent SABC 'Midweek' documentary on cholera, facts were presented on the basis of selection and omission. The sufferers' 'superstitions', 'ignorance' and 'primitiveness' received much coverage. All relevant and potentially controversial investigations into economic, sociological and political factors were conveniently omitted.

The third strategy has been the official ban on all comments on cholera, besides those of the official health spokesperson, Dr Gilliland (secretary general for health).³⁵ Coincidentally, when the blackout was imposed on 1 February, he was reportedly overseas and therefore unavailable for comment. According to Dr Botha, health director, the clamp-down was to 'protect laboratory scientists who are busy with extremely important research and should not be disturbed'.³⁶ This explanation proved to be fallacious when Professor Margaret Isaacson of the

South African Institute of Medical Research was barred from making press statements after she had warned the public of the potential threat of cholera in sea food. Obviously the government's 'protective policy' is designed to protect commercial interests so that coastal towns can continue to profit from tourism.

Ironically, the government's latest ban has been on the selling and eating of all shellfish. Professor Isaacson's prophecy has been fulfilled - all shellfish along the Natal coast are polluted with cholera.³⁷

Several discrepancies exist in the cholera statistics. The official number is 12 000. However, Dr Gilliland claims that there are over 20 000 cases.³⁸ According to Dr F Clarke (chief of hospital services), and Dr Mhoosa (head of paediatrics at Natal University), the number is more likely to be around 50 000. This gross under-estimation results from the Health Department's methods of calculation. Only those cases which are confirmed in laboratories are considered. Patients who are treated for the disease but from whom specimens are not sent for tests, are not taken into account.³⁹

Dr Clarke has accused the government of subterfuge and demanded - 'When things go wrong why don't they say so instead of covering up?' Unfortunately this strategy is consistent with the South African system of medicine, which is organised not to promote health but around the attempt to deny disease.

THE SADF

ONE feature of the cholera crisis has received much publicity, put out by the state and by the media, namely the role of the South African Defence Force in the fight against the disease. Soldiers have been recruited to erect emergency tents, and aid medical staff in KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana. The military have also established chlorination points to make cholera-polluted water fit for consumption. Army tankers with daily supplies have been used extensively by the state. Significantly, few, if any, permanent water sources such as dams or boreholes have been erected by the army. Proper water supplies in rural

areas are perhaps not considered as part of the solution to the cholera crisis.

Other than the obvious aspect of presenting an image of the SADF as provider of health and security, the employment of the military in this way reinforces the trend towards greater dependence on the 'military might' of the state to ensure people's welfare.

COMMUNITIES AND HEALTH

IT is important to assess community response to the epidemic. Unlike crises in housing, transport and education, health issues have drawn limited reactions from communities. This reflects, to an extent, the success in camouflaging the real causes of ill-health.

People are often ignorant of the root causes of diseases such as cholera, and constant high-profile health propaganda convinces them that their stupidity is to blame, not the inadequacy of state services.



This renders communities vulnerable to repressive action, as was demonstrated by the eviction of Inanda squatters over Christmas.⁴⁰

However, the potential for strong community organisation has increased. In Stanger 17 organisations have formed the Groutville Relief Committee. They have consistently demanded that the authorities improve conditions in Ncholweni, and aim to ensure permanent fresh water for surrounding areas. Currently tankers are used to deliver daily supplies, but their long-term aim is to install a tap on every street.

In Melmoth's slum suburb, Malhafukwe, residents have formed an organisation 'Iso Lomazi' to demand basic services - sanitation, taps and toilets. Their requests were granted by the town clerk of Melmoth, but improvements have been delayed as funds are still awaited from Pretoria.

These examples of residents' demands indicate the potential for community organisation around issues such as water supplies and health facilities. However, increased participation in understanding the nature of health problems is essential for positive long-term results.

Cholera has become an entrenched feature of our unhealthy society. Its spread and recurrence is imminent and inevitable. The disease has highlighted inextricably related factors such as poverty, forced removals, and repression. Furthermore, it has exposed the inadequate provision of community services, ineffectual health planning, and the state's evasive and manipulative response to the epidemic. This is the obvious response to Health Minister Munnik's question as to why nothing positive has been said about the local health system. Until the state acknowledges culpability for the health crisis and implements constructive, long-term improvements, the absence of health will remain another negative feature of South Africa.

Hazel Friedman

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COMMENT ON 'MULDERGATE'

DAN O'MEARA ('Muldergate', supplement to WIP 22) must be congratulated on a most interesting and accurate analysis of splits within Afrikaner political ranks, and realignments within the dominant classes and apparatuses.

I wish to add some supporting information to his general argument on the 'openly political role of the military', and the growing alliance between the military 'and the most powerful of South Africa's capitalists'.



O'Meara says that 'Afrikaner capital was able to establish its political dominance within the NP over the other forces in the nationalist alliance only because of broader political support outside of the NP from other bourgeois organisations and institutions, and the army itself' (p14), and that '... the reorganisation of the government and state apparatuses has for the first time given the military a vitally important institutionalised role ...' (p17).

While agreeing that the military has been drawn into a range of apparatuses of the state (General van der Westhuizen of Military Intelligence, and General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, were two of the top five negotiators at the recent Maroela Meeting with Kenneth Kaunda), I would argue that the basis for this involvement lies, at least partially, in the structural economic involvement of the military, as a state apparatus, with productive capital in South Africa. In other words, at one level, it is not possible to clearly distinguish the military from 'other bourgeois organisations and institutions', or to distinguish those organisations from the military.

I am, of course, referring to the massive, and still growing, local arms industry. Even the limited glimpses South Africans get of the extent of this industry are enough to indicate a firm and extensive (and lucrative) structural relationship between

private capital, on the one hand, and the state and its military apparatus, on the other.

The Star newspaper carried a story on 31 March, 1982, under the headline that South Africa was now the world's number 10 arms producer. The asset base of Armscor had risen from R200-m, in 1974, to R1 200-m in 1981, while the numbers of employees had increased



from 12 000 to 29 000 (Financial Mail, 11.09.81, article entitled 'Behind the Secrecy Shroud').

Armscor (the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of SA, Ltd) was established in terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act (57 of 1968). 'The Board of Directors would be appointed by the Government, and shares would be taken up by the State only' (Horrell, 1978:448). However, there had been moves to establish an armaments industry earlier in the 1960s, following United Nations resolutions 181 and 182 of 1963 (imposing an arms embargo against South Africa). There was, for example, the announcement in 1964 that South Africa was to have an aircraft factory (Survey, 1964:34).

Armscor was to meet its objective by 'taking over existing undertakings or establishing or helping to establish new undertakings' (Survey, 1968:38). During the policy speech of the Minister of Defence in 1968, he gave details of a range of items already manufactured in South Africa, such as armoured cars, grenades, explosives and mines.

An idea of the size of Armscor can be gained from the facts that the Corporation is at present the third biggest industrial grouping in South Africa (after the merger of Anglo American Corporation and De Beers industrial interests this conglomeration takes top honours, followed by Barlows - see RDM, 10.11.81; Sunday Times, 29.11.81 and 24.01.82); that the industry is the largest in the southern hemisphere (Sunday Times, 29.11.81) and, as said above, the world's tenth biggest; Armscor delivered equipment to the value of R1 400-m to the SADF in 1981 (Sunday Times, 29.11.81); that R628-m has been spent on 'expanding Armscor's facilities since the arms embargo' (RDM, 19.09.81).

It is, however, not only in terms of sheer size that the importance of the military productive machinery lies, but also, primarily, in its qualitative aspect. While Armscor and its subsidiaries account for a large proportion of production

up to 60% of the corporation's production (much of it in the form of components rather than finished products) is contracted out to the private sector as is much of the research.

This partnership with private enterprise is seen as crucial to Armscor's efficiency (FM article)

The 'partnership' is large: there are said to be about 50 'main contractors' who are 'directly involved in the manufacture ... of arms, 400 sub-contractors supplying major components and about 1 500 firms which supply the "nuts and bolts" to keep the war machinery running' (Star, 13.03.82). While Armscor and its subsidiaries directly employ about 29 000 employees 90 - 100 000 workers (most of them skilled) are employed in the arms industry as a whole (Financial Mail, 11.09.81; Sunday Times, 29.11.81).

In other words, the private sector is tied into the arms industry through a technical division of labour on a large scale. The extent of production also has to be continually expanded to benefit from economies of scale (ie to increase production runs and, thereby, to decrease costs), which can only be done through exports or the large-scale destruction of military equipment in war. The ROM article referred to above (29.11.81) called Armscor a 'significant exporter'; the Financial Mail article spoke about economies of scale; while Fred Bell, chief executive designate of Armscor, said that 'one of the prime objectives of Armscor is to establish South Africa as an arms exporter on the international market' (Star, 13.03.82).

One of the few cases of alleged arms export publicised in censored South African newspapers has been that of the sale of 60 IML 90 'tanks' sold to Morocco (and the training of personnel to use them against the Polisario Front) (for example, Transvaler, 01.04.82).

Earlier this year the Armaments Development and Production Act was amended (64 of 1982). The amendment means that development and manufacture of arms has now been placed under the control of the Minister of Defence; and, secondly, certain types of arms are identified, the import or conveyance through the Republic (including harbours) of which is only allowed with a permit from Armscor.

At the level of management there is also apparently considerable overlap with private sector management. John Maree, himself released from Barlow Rand, where he was an executive director, to head Armscor for three years (and named one of the Sunday Times' 'Top Five Executives of 1981' for these activities), is said to be a firm believer in PW Botha's moves towards 'harnessing (by the state) of the talents, skills and ideas of businessmen in private enterprise' (Sunday Times, 29.11.81). (Maree attributed his previous success as chairperson of Barlow's RMP to 'close cooperation and good working relations with the Government at all levels'). The partnership with private enterprise has been described as 'crucial to Armscor's efficiency' (Financial Mail, 11.09.81), and among Maree's achievements at Armscor has been listed 'the heavy private sector involvement, both at board and production levels, in armaments production' (Financial Mail, 11.09.81 - emphasis added).

It needs to be stressed that not only are the contracting firms structurally tied into the supply of goods for the state, but the nature of the commodities being manufactured means that there is no other market, other than with state permission.

If PW Botha 'concentrates within his own political person the interests of the Cape party organisation and the political outlook of Cape finance, as well as those of the military high command' (O'Meara, 1982:15-6), then Armscor concentrates the interests of capital intensive, mainly monopoly capital, the military apparatus, and the political organs of the state.

MG Paul

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This comment has been in response to Dan O'Meara's article, 'Muldergate' and the politics of Afrikaner nationalism', in WIP 22 (April, 1982). Other than the newspaper and journal articles cited reference was made to the annual Survey of Race Relations (SAIRR, Johannesburg), and Muriel Horrell's Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa, 1948-1976 (SAIRR, 1978)

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SENTENCING POLITICAL 'CRIMINALS'

THE recent decision by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, confirming the death sentences imposed by the Supreme Court in a 1980 treason trial, indicates something of a shift in approach by the courts.

The treason trial in question involved 9 guerillas trained by the African National Congress. 6 of the accused were sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 20 years for various acts which they had committed on behalf of the ANC, including the plotting of attacks on strategic and symbolic installations, possession of arms of war, and the undergoing of military training.

However, three of the accused were sentenced to death by Justice JPD de Villiers of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. The three - Johnson Lubisi, Petrus Mashigo and Naphtali Manana - appear to have been singled out by the trial judge for the death sentence because of their involvement in an ANC attack on the Soekmekaar police station in January, 1980.

According to evidence in the trial, Mashigo and Manana were actually involved in attacking the police station, while Lubisi's role involved the driving of a truck used to transport the guerillas to and from the police station.

In the attack, no-one was killed, and the only injury was the light wounding of a policeman, caused by shrapnel released from an exploding hand grenade.

The three involved in the attack all testified that they had carefully planned not to kill anyone in their assault on the police station: indeed, they explained their motive as one of 'armed propoganda' rather than death and destruction. The Soekmekaar police station was singled out for

attack because of its proximity to an area where the Batlokwa tribe were at the time waging a struggle against their removal from the area to another place.

Over the years, South African courts have viewed offences committed for political reasons in a particular way. As recently as 1973, the Acting Judge President of the Cape Provincial Division put it in the following way:

One must remember that it is a political offence, and one must remember that the people who commit political offences are frequently people of high political morals and ideals who commit these offences not for personal gain but because of the beliefs they have, things they believe in very strongly. An offence of this nature carries for a certain section of the community little or no social opprobrium. It may even carry approval.....

This is not something new in South Africa. Any one of us who cares to turn back the pages of history will find that these circumstances have applied at one time or another to practically every race and language group in this country, but it has always been the duty of the courts to try and sit with cool heads with the necessary humanity to see that people who have transgressed on account of their differences are not unnecessarily harshly dealt with.

Acts of violence motivated by political considerations have, over the years, been treated with a degree of understanding by South African courts. For example, acts which took place in the context of the 1914 rebellion and the 1922 mineworkers' strike were often dealt with in a lenient way by the courts. Generals de Wet and Kemp, both leaders of an armed rebellion, were charged as a result of the rebellion. De Wet explained, in a letter, the rebellion in the following way:

We are on our way to Maritz and we are convinced through his means to be armed to the teeth. From there our object is to trek to Pretoria and hoist our flag and proclaim our independence. Our object is solemnly and truly to fire no shot unless the Government fires upon us. If it should happen that we are fired upon by the Government forces then equally solemnly and truly we shall defend ourselves and fight to the death.

De Wet received a sentence of 6 years, Kemp 7 years imprisonment - which is barely more than the minimum sentence which must currently be imposed in

terms of the Terrorism and Sabotage Acts. (It should be noted that the abolition of minimum sentences is proposed in the report of the Rabie Commission into Security Legislation).

In the context of the 1922 strike, an accused by name of Jolly was charged with wrecking a train in order to block the railway line. The trial court sentenced him to 4½ years imprisonment - which the Appeal Court referred to as a severe sentence.

It is in the context of this history that it becomes interesting to examine the sorts of sentences which have been handed out to political trialists in the past few years.

1977 saw the imposition of the death sentence on ANC guerilla Solomon Mahlangu, for his part in the shootings which occurred in Goch Street, Johannesburg. It will be recalled that Mahlangu had not himself fired the shots which killed certain civilians, but was convicted of murder because of his association with the guerillas who did open fire. Leave to appeal to a higher court was refused by the trial judge, Justice C Theron, and a petition to the Appellate Division asking for leave to appeal was also turned down. Mahlangu was accordingly executed.

In a subsequent case dealing with extensive ANC activities, the state called for the death sentence to be passed on 5 of the accused. Inter alia, they had been convicted of throwing a hand grenade at police in an escape attempt, sabotaging railway lines, possession of arms, ammunition and explosives, and undergoing military training as ANC guerilla fighters.

In this trial (S vs Sexwale and others), the judge declined to pass the death sentence on any of those convicted, imposing instead sentences ranging from 18 to 7 years imprisonment.

However, in a 1979 treason trial held in Pietermaritzburg, (S vs Sekate and others), the trial judge passed the death sentence on one of the accused, James Daniel Mange. Mange was an ANC guerilla, who had undergone military training. On his return to South Africa, he had planned a

mission to attack the police station and local magistrate's office in Whittlesea, Eastern Cape. However, before the attack could take place, he was arrested by police at a road block. For these activities, he was sentenced to death by Justice Heefer. He appealed against sentence, and in what might be seen as a crucial turning point, the Appeal Court upheld the appeal, and substituted a term of imprisonment of 20 years in its place.

But although the appeal against the death sentence in the Mange case was upheld, the Chief Justice made certain comments in his judgement which seemed to open the way for the imposition of death sentences in political matters. In the Mange judgement, Chief Justice Rumpff said:

It was also submitted (on behalf of Mange) that though High Treason is a serious offence, it is not a crime for which the death sentence has ordinarily been imposed in this country. To this was added that it has been held in this Court that in cases in which the death sentence is discretionary, it is a sentence that should only be imposed in extreme cases. These submissions are correct.

It is to be pointed out, however, that in our turbulent history cases of High Treason mostly originated from situations in which military forces were openly engaged against persons who could be called rebels. At the present time, this country has been subject to blatant terrorism. I use the word 'terrorism' to describe violent attacks on inter alia completely innocent persons, more often than not committed by people from the Republic who have undergone military training in foreign countries. In other words, trained terrorists seek inter alia to kill innocent people in order to overthrow the State. This is terrorism in any language. In common law, if committed by persons owing allegiance to the State, it is also High Treason. However lenient the attitude of the courts may have been in the past in regard to our own historical brand of High Treason, a complete change now in regard to the present type of High Treason would not be surprising, nor, in the circumstances, be unjustified.

It is this change in sentencing of political offenders referred to by the Chief Justice which seems to be exemplified in the appeal of Lubisi, Mashigo and Manana. During their trial, it was argued by the defence that the history of South Africa indicated that the rebel of today often became the leader of tomorrow. This was accepted by the

trial judge, who then posed the question: 'What is one to do with the rebel who is caught?'

It will be a matter of considerable concern to many that the highest court in South Africa seems to have decided that it is legitimate to hang some of those 'rebels' who are apprehended in the course of their activities. In particular, it appears to involve a bitter irony that convicted people can be sentenced to death for attempting to overthrow a state in which they have no right to participate - and which has in certain cases actually deprived them of citizenship.

Certainly, the death sentence has been passed in respect of political offences in South Africa before. Vuyisile Mini and others were hanged for alleged complicity in an attempt to murder a state witness; John Harris went to the gallows for the bomb placed in the concourse of the Johannesburg station; and Solomon Mehlangu died as a result of a shooting incident in Goch Street in June 1977. But these sentences appear to have been exceptions to the general sentencing policy of South African courts. The Lubisi judgement suggests that the imposition of death sentences, especially on ANC guerilla fighters who return to South Africa, may become a common feature in trials where accused persons have committed acts for political reasons.

'PRETTY PICTURE POSTCARDS'?

During the 1913 General Strike in Johannesburg, workers watched from behind their windows as the mounted police came down the deserted main road. Suddenly, one of the striking miners rushed out into the deserted street, arms raised above his head, in open defiance of the law: 'Shoot me!' he yelled. They did, and he died on the spot.

But this moment was recorded by a photographer at its most dramatic moment, and the photograph was made into a postcard. This image of worker resistance has not been taken up as a genre in South African postcards. Nevertheless, it does raise the question - why have certain traditions persisted, and others not?


I had recently returned from a stay in England, and I wanted to send reassurance to friends there: yes, I was fine, wish you were here, etc. It seemed that the most efficient thing to do would be to send off some postcards. I was looking for the 'typical', recognisably South African image, for people who had never been here. I felt sure that the photograph on the postcards would be cheaper, and technically more competent, than anything I could achieve on my instamatic. With these thoughts in mind, I set off to the nearest news agent.

Postcards are displayed attractively on racks outside bookshops, tourist/gift shops, cafés: rows of bright colour gleaming on high-gloss paper. They are remarkably lacking in variety. Most of the post cards I found in Johannesburg were products of 'Art Publishers' of Durban and Johannesburg. Their main photographer is Johan Hone, and the company seems to have a virtual monopoly of the industry. The range of subjects cover two areas: urban and rural. The urban images reflect the neon and concrete of our constructed (Johannesburg) city environment. Spiky Post Office Tower, silver skyscrapers, snaking highway systems. 'Rural' South Africa encompasses the 'untouched scenic': rolling hills; endless white beaches; indigenous flora. There is also the 'untouched wildlife',

typically a zoom-lens close-up of a yawning baboon, a lioness feeding her cubs: scenes which are hardly part of the everyday in South African rural areas. The photographs themselves, however, give no visual clue that 'South African wildlife' is found only in specially created environments, like zoos or reserves. A somewhat similar omission is made in the depiction of people in South African rural areas.

Images of people in 'rural' South African postcards are predominantly those of 'tribal' black women and children. I found no pictures of white farmers, or of rural whites. There is no indication of the capitalisation of agriculture, of the proletarianisation of peasant producers. South African rural life is presented as black african tribal life and culture: a static picture of primitive exotics. The smiling black faces are identified ethnically, as Zulu, Fingo, Swazi. They are generally dressed in 'traditional' garb: bones, beads, animal hides. They are placed against their 'natural' setting of a mud and straw kraal, or brightly painted hut. It is this particular genre of South African postcards that I would like to examine more fully.

The postcard is called The Language of Beads. It is a photograph of the head and shoulders of a young woman, holding up a small child. Both are wearing layers of coloured beads. The background is in soft



focus, showing a grass hut and fence (presumably the perimeter of the kraal), and the shrubbery on the hillside beyond. The baby is being held at an uncomfortable angle, towards the camera. The woman looks upwards and outwards, into a mysterious middle distance. A caption describes the photograph:

An African maiden and her 'charge' display the intricate designs of colour beads with which the Zulus can communicate their feelings.

The photograph is entitled The Language of Beads because the 'Zulu maiden' is depicted as a child of tribal (Zulu) mythology to which the western/urban viewer/consumer has no direct access. Her 'distant' gaze emphasises her otherworldly considerations. Significantly, her pose is derived directly from the classical (European) tradition of the madonna and child, a pose which persisted partly because it satisfied the conditions of its patrons, that women are portrayed as passive/willing objects for the (male) viewer. The relationship of colonisation is emphasised because this image is on a postcard, ie it can be purchased for a few cents in a shop. To be an effective postcard, a photograph must be eye-catching. Consequently, great attention is paid to careful composition: bright colours splash in striking patterns across the surface, the point of focus is defined: smiling faces, human interest. To achieve this, most of the photographs look posed and/or paid for. The 'Zulu maiden' would not naturally hold her baby up and away from her body, for example. The pose has been set up by the photographer, so that the subject makes a pretty picture.

The aesthetics of the image act to blur its relationship to its context. When we buy a postcard, we tend not to think about the conditions under which it was produced, or the politics of its reproduction and consumption. In addition, postcards produced in South Africa, or with a South African subject, are almost all photographs. They consequently have the additional appeal of being representational: the camera doesn't lie, the image exists, it is real. Because we believe that representational art is 'true', we suspend questions about the politics of its production: was it posed, did the subjects dress

up for the part, were they paid to pose? Similarly, we do not ask questions about the consumption of the image, the relationship between the subject choice of the artist and the demands of the market. In South African postcards, ranges of popular experiences - from bopping at Bapsfontein to malnutrition in resettlement camps - are omitted. Where themes of conflict and contrast are predominant, the silences of South African postcards resonate with political content.


Three smiling black women face the camera directly. They are wearing colourful cotton cloths - crisp blue, yellow, green - wrapped around their waists; beads and porcupine quills around their necks. The background, once again in soft focus, is filled with greenery. The caption reads:

ZULU BELLES, Natal, South Africa. Wearing the maidens wide belt and displaying necklaces where yellow coloured beads depict 'wealth' and blue, 'faithfulness'.

The imagery here is consistent with that of the Language of Beads, but here it is more specific. The smiling faces and healthy bodies re-inforce the ideas of 'wealth' and 'fertility' as representative adjectives for rural black women. It also introduces the idea of choice: black women remain in rural areas because they are happy and healthy there, because it is there that they can best participate in the reproduction of their families and tribal culture.

It is a picture of rural life remarkable in its clarity. Tribal people live content in their rural idylls. Theirs is a world removed from the gleaming capitalism of the city. Rural - urban contact is not entirely ignored, however. It does emerge, as a minor theme, obliquely. The syndrome of a single male migrancy, for example, is referred to mainly by omission: men are remarkably absent from postcard images of South African tribal life. The absent male migrant is sometimes brought into the picture indirectly, as in

A HOME WELCOME, NATAL. A smiling Zulu family greeting at the entrance to a typical reed hut. This nation is renowned for its intricate beadwork which communicates a language of love in its colour and patterns.



Women and children, attractively framed by the arched reed entrance to the hut, look out expectantly to the (imagined) returning 'head' of the family. The implication is that this is the true metier of the male migrant, this is where he belongs. His participation in urban life is temporary: he receives material and cultural support from his rural home, to which he will inevitably return.

Discretionary participation in urban life is well illustrated in a postcard of a young boy in tribal costume, dancing.



YOUNG MINE DANCER. Dressed for the part, an African child faithfully enacts the actions and rhythms of his elders - who take part in the tribal dancing displays at mine compounds on the Witwatersrand.

The boy is being groomed for his role as a male migrant. There is no indication of the coercion involved in the migrant labour system, the irrevocable results of proletarianisation for rural blacks, the (new) meaning given to ethnicity and 'tribalism' in the compound culture of the mines.

In the occasional depiction of changing rural culture, the image of discretionary participation in urban life is reinforced. One fascinating card, AFRICAN LIFE, shows a woman and three children outside a house. The woman stands on a straw mat. She carries a walking stick and holds a plastic umbrella with blue floral patterns, open above her head. She is wearing

'tribal' dress, but the bead work incorporates plastic belts and buckles, and a comb. The door handle to her decoratively painted home is metal. Through the window we can see curtains of factory printed material. The 'imported' articles are all luxury items, the product of rather quaint taste: this demonstrates choice on the part of the women/consumer, rather than making a statement about changing cultural aesthetics.



The penetration of a cash economy into rural life is interpreted as generating positive possibilities for creative capital accumulation. If not (by men) through the sale of their labour power, then by the sale of 'ethnic crafts', as in AFRICAN LIFE, NOBELE, SOUTH AFRICA, where an Ndebele woman sits outside her

home and sells beadwork; or in SWAZI CRAFTSMANSHIP, where a woman sells Swazi cotton shirts and other items at a market stall. What is not stated is that these 'tribal crafts' are now manufactured for a tourist market. They have been emptied almost entirely of their original use values: the Ndebele axe and axe head are covered with beads. The woman selling 'ethnic crafts' is herself wearing Western synthetics.

A postcard is intended to be a way of communicating verbally: but it is the picture which sells the postcard, and the picture which takes on significance for the recipient. The message on the back of the card is invariably dashed off at a post office or train station. It is an open, public note, and space hardly allows for the development of a considered argument. This means that the image attached to the words is especially important. It is the image which will look out from the wall of my friend's apartment. The image takes on particular significance when the postcards are photographs, because this lends an apparent verity to the subject on the card.

Perhaps the most salient point to bear in mind is the market for which postcards are intended. Tourists might expect to be shown only the prettiest parts of the country they are visiting. But the selection of images in the South African postcards I have been discussing is not made on aesthetic grounds alone. Photographs of sunny South Africa, and happy homelands, are part of the visual imagery which affirms the respectability of apartheid.

Riva Krut, April 1982

THE CURIOUS BUSINESS OF THE 'AFRICAN CURIO' BUSINESS

WHERE does it come from, our 'African art'? The copper keyrings, the ostrich-foot lampstands, the ivory pendants, the bead bangles. Looking around the Johannesburg shops, it is clear that the 'african curio' market is more 'curious' than 'african'.

One shop in the Carlton Centre specialises in selling 'trophies' of 'african wildlife'. I asked the proprietor of Pula-Pula what kind of market he had for the Kudu head looming above his counter. His biggest customers for these are Japanese tourists, he told me. 'I don't know if they say they shot them, or what. They pay as much to export them home as to buy them'. Without experience, it is arrogant to predict the tastes of this market. Not yet seen in this country, for example, is the new craze amongst US trophy collectors. The 'African horned rabbit': rabbit heads, stuffed, mounted on wooden shields, with antler horns added. (Have you heard the one about the 'Great White Hunter in Darkest Africa...and then his tale about the one that got away...?') Eccentric, perhaps. But not as odd as it might seem. For what is the 'authentic african' content in african 'art' and 'curios'?

I went to Diagonal Street, looking for some 'african' print fabrics - those bright cotton cloths worn by Northern Transvaal women across their shoulders, or seen on the coffee tables of radical-chic homes. In the gloomy and bustling shop, I asked for one of the black-and-red-and-white kinds, with vivid geometric patterns, and a Sotho inscription printed across the bottom. The indian shop assistant

unpacked the cloth from a package marked 'Made in Japan'. I was baffled. 'How is it', I asked, 'that a Sotho cloth can be manufactured for a Sotho market, in Japan'? He shrugged: it's always been like that, in his experience. 'All the cloth is printed in the East: In China, Japan, Hong Kong, India'. He showed me one length, with the Swazi flag printed on it. In the corner was the inscription 'Bizandje KUDK Zanzibar'. This was the name of the company manufacturing these cloths, which used to be based in Zanzibar, but with independence and the rising cost of african labour, had moved to cheaper production sites in the East.

The other people in the shop were african women wearing combinations of these colourful cloths wrapped around their torsos and heads. They didn't share my concern with the 'authenticity' of the material. Experienced eyes appraised the shelves; an excited babble of voices exchanged opinions on the merits and demerits of each. Like shoppers anywhere. The type that they found most appealing were the ones with clear, gay colours. Orange and purple, lime green and shocking pink, thrown together in happily clashing combinations of florid and geometric pattern. In the complete outfit, these are put together with high colourful hats, plastic hatpins, metal anklets, and heavy cotton beaded petticoats. The distinctive eclecticism which results is unmistakably African; yet it has nothing in it which is African in origin. Does this make it less 'authentic', less 'african'?

I asked David Fisher, dealer in African Art, for some clarification.

Authentic? What do you mean, 'authentic'? 'African ivory jewellery' sold in curio shops here, has already done a world circuit, having been manufactured in the Far East. 'Swazi mats' are woven in factories all over southern Africa. Or take semi-precious stones: Malachite is mined in Zaire, cut as beads in Hong Kong, sent back to Africa to be once again re-exported by tourists. Authentic? What does it mean, 'authentic'?

The problem is clearly one of chasing the cheapest labour to points of production around the world. In many ways, the end product 'African curio' can

tell us more about the state of the international market, than the origin of the item.

One of the biggest buyers of african articles is America, especially the big museums.

The Smithsonian, for example, will take 'authentic' goods. But they're killing the market. They want authentic goods. Then they advertise in a brochure for it...they order 20 000 articles....like a drinking gourd. They want it authentic. Now where in hell are you going to find 20 000? You go to a village, you buy 20 from them. You go to another village, you buy another 20. And after two days, you get sick of looking for 20, and 20, 'authentic'. So you go back to the first village and say 'Make me 2 000 this month'. And you go back to the second village: 'You make me 2 000'. They go off to the Smithsonian, everyone's very happy. All of a sudden, the African starts thinking, 'that boss took 2 000, let's make another 2 000: we made a lot of money out of that'.

This, of course, floods the market with 'authentic' goods. Their 'value' plummets, and the 'authentic' african work can now only be marketed as african 'curios'.

This is why Africa is becoming too commercial. Basically, the market doesn't demand one or two of an item. You get firms who are ordering thousands of one item which are hard to come by, so you have to have them made. Made specifically for that. Before, they were making what they were using and bartering what they could not produce amongst themselves. All of a sudden, they've found a market. So today, instead of making a stool and carving it ornately, they make a rough carving on a crude stool - and they're getting away with it! They can sell a rough stool just as easily as an ornate one, so why go to the trouble? It's like a production run. In a factory it would be on a conveyor belt. In a mask, for instance, one family cuts the wood, another carves it, a third family stains it, a fourth family puts the sisal on. What's the difference?...it's a production run. Bushman 'survival kits' are manufactured in Botswana, copied 100%. 'Authentic?' Anyone can make something 'authentic': just bury it next to a white ant heap for a couple of weeks.

The mass market in curios makes it increasingly difficult to find the genuinely untouched, authentically african, items. In the quest for these, it is clear that there is still an appeal reminiscent of the merchant adventurers of a hundred years ago. In search of 'authentic art', the trader packs up a four wheel drive with packets of (Hong Kong!) beads, lengths of cotton fabric (printed in Birmingham),

steel pots - 'anything he can lay his hands on' - and goes out into the bush looking for a camp. He barter these goods in exchange for items of 'tribal art'. A Bushman 'survival kit', for example, is traded at roughly the equivalent of R10 of goods, and is sold to a collector in the US for R600 - R700.

It's all barter. A Bushman can do nothing with money as such. Basically, they have some of the goods already, or they've seen it...you can in fact trade quite successfully with these groups.

What about the implications of this for Africa?

David shrugs:

Africa is becoming more western. It's changing.. even in the outlying areas, culture is slowly permeating right through Africa....It's bad in some ways, because a different culture is being forced on them. But you must look at it from the point of view of everyone naturally wants to better themselves, even the african in the outlying areas. Of course, some Bushmen will shun civilisation. Some run a hundred miles when they see you coming down the road.....

Riva Krut

BOOK REVIEW

The Crisis in South Africa. Class Defense, Class Revolution (Monthly Review Press (1981))
John Saul and Stephen Gelb.

AT the core of Saul and Gelb's fascinating and readable analysis of the crisis in South Africa, is Gramsci's concept of 'organic crisis'. A crisis is organic, they suggest, when it is so embedded in the structure of society that solutions involving a new balance of forces are demanded.

If the crisis is deep - organic - these efforts (to defend and conserve society) cannot be merely defensive. They will be formative: a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc'....a profound restructuring of the state and ideological discourse...(will emerge) (p 3).

Categorising South Africa as a form of 'racial capitalism' they spell out the key dimensions of this 'organic crisis' in chapter 1. Essentially contradictions arise, they believe, out of economic growth and they involve the limited size of the consumer market, a high rate of black unemployment and a shortage of skilled labour. But, crucially, the crisis is not simply economic; it includes political and ideological elements.

In chapter 2 the authors consider in detail the concrete strategies that are being mounted by the dominant classes to defend the system. They deal firstly with 'separate development' where they suggest that the bantustans have worked so well at co-optation that the dominant classes are now trying the same tactic in the urban areas with the community councils and President's Council. But, they suggest, formative attempts are always potentially two-edged swords for the dominant classes.

In the game of reform the dominant classes stand to win most when they put themselves most at risk - precisely at the point, that is, where the attempt at co-optation could most easily collapse into significant concession (p 57).

In the urban areas, they argue, this 'threshold of meaningful risk' has not yet been crossed. These

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strategies are too 'risk free' to be effective and consequently do not de-racialise adequately.

Wiehahn and Riskert, however, they see as more serious attempts at a formative strategy. Concessions and privileges have been given to african workers that do open up space for new forms of struggle. But, again, to be effective real concessions have to be made.

If they are to have any hope of preventing union activity from spilling over into outright opposition to capitalism, the most sophisticated strategists of capital must seek to give their 'concessions' a basis in reality (p 75).

The chapter concludes with the need to give central prominence in any analysis of state strategy to continuing political and military repression.

The third chapter focuses on the centrality of the african working class in the 'revolutionary project which seems so clearly to be on the agenda in South Africa'. But, they stress, this does not mean that the contradiction is simply one between capital and labour; it reflects also a contradiction between 'the oppressed people and the state (or black versus whites)'. 'It should', they assert, 'come as no surprise then - and indeed must be welcomed - that "political ideologies" of nationalism, racial consciousness and democratic self-assertion are so much a complement to proletarian consciousness' (p 49). In more theoretical terms, they suggest that

There is a dialectical relationship - and a necessary simultaneity - between these two levels of conceptualising, and acting politically upon - or, to put it in Laclau's terms, these non-class contradictions must be articulated with proletarian ideology and practice in order to guarantee their revolutionary provenance' (p 100).

This they see happening most clearly through Luxemburg's notion of the mass strike.

The last, and most interesting chapter, deals with the ANC. The ANC, they suggest, has a 'gravitational pull' on a new generation of activists involved in the South African revolution. In part this is because it is the only oppositional group that has the military capacity to engage the South African state. A second factor is the movement's

hard-earned legitimacy, its centrality within the long history of resistance and, in particular, within the vast popular struggles of the 1950s.

They dismiss PAC and Black Consciousness positions as 'race-baiting' and focus instead on the left critique of the ANC. They make clear that they believe the ANC to have moved 'well beyond the Freedom Charter in underscoring the importance of the large and well-developed working class whose class consciousness and independent expressions of the working people - their political organ and trade unions - are very much part of the liberation front (p 141). Nonetheless they mention writers who have argued that this apparent privileging of the proletarian movement in the struggle remains as much rhetorical as real. They mention that this position has found most open expression in the 'Workers Tendency of the ANC'. This has led some to argue for a working class political party.

This position, they argue, is too schematic and one-sided, and they offer four criticisms of it.

- (a) This position overestimates the spontaneous clarity of proletarian revolutionary consciousness underestimating the possible hegemonic contributions of a more broadly based nationalist project;
- (b) It carries with it the danger of handing over the highly charged nationalist-cum-racial card to demagogues;
- (c) It downgrades much too sharply the ANC's experience;
- (d) That class is never 'pure' and it should be seen as existing coterminously with national demands.

This critique of the workerist position concludes with the important proviso that working class leadership is never automatic within liberation but needs to be asserted.

Saul and Gelb's account of the crisis in South Africa is not orthodox Marxism. This is its strength - but also a limitation. Its great strength lies in its sensitivity to the basic difficulty of analysing, in class terms, a problem that is seen by most of the protagonists in racial terms. Thus, early in their analysis, they acknowledge the problem.

One must avoid taking too reductionist a position. It would be a bold observer indeed who suggested that racism and Afrikaner nationalism did not have some 'autonomous' resonance of their own beyond the economic-cum-class determination which shape and structure their impact (p 11).

They get over the difficulty by classifying South Africa as 'racial capitalist'.

Furthermore, by analysing the political and ideological forms of the crisis, they move away from a narrow focus on 'the economy' to the way in which all the social relations of domination of capital over labour are structured. This restructuring, they believe, can only be achieved by struggle - a struggle in which the dominant classes are failing to 'structure a political process compatible in the long run with the continued reproduction of South African capitalism'.

But to adequately capture the depth of the crisis facing South Africa, a materialist analysis would have to locate itself more firmly in the contradictions generated within the accumulation process. In particular such an analysis would have to recognise the implication of the growing concentration of economic power and the transformation of the labour process in South Africa for the possibilities of creating a workers' movement. It is not enough simply to assert the centrality of the working class within the national liberation movement (p 143). The question surely is how this centrality is to be asserted.

Eddie Webster

PC: the reality of reform?

TO Sonny Leon, the new constitutional proposals are 'the fulfilment of his wildest dreams'. While there are probably not that many people who share his feelings, this brief contribution suggests that the Presidents' Council (PC) recommendations should still be taken seriously.

It is too easy to reject the proposals as just one more piece of bluff from government. The reforms may be very real: they are a risky step for the government to take, and they are only being taken because the rulers hope to make some real gains through them. If we simply dismiss this possibility, and ignore the proposals, developments that have real effects on the struggle for a just society may be ignored by democratic forces.

The proposals come against the background of 'total strategy's' range of attempts to divide people and create a black 'middle class' as a buffer in conflicts between rulers and ruled. But struggles by trade unions, community groups, students and other democratic organisations brought the impetus of total strategy to a grinding halt. The central question which mass organisations raised was the issue of political power.

What therefore became clear to the ruling classes was the need for a political solution to the crisis. Even at the risk of dividing their own ranks (eg the NP split), changes had to come at a political level. While many of these changes may mean little in terms of the conditions of people's lives on a day to day basis, they do have other implications. In the words of PC member S Mayet, 'If we do not reform, revolution, unrest and instability will be our fate'. Reform is geared to this main purpose: 'Reform will enhance the

legitimacy of the political system in general and the government in particular'.

The ruling classes thus show some intention to re-organise themselves: at the same time, their programme also involves moves to disorganise the popular classes, warding off democratic forces through the sowing of confusion and division.

Against this background, it is important to look at some of the areas where the PC proposals may have effects. There are questions which need to be discussed, debated, understood and organised around. What follows are merely some preliminary observations, put forward in a spirit of questioning rather than prescription.

1). Democracy: In recent times, the rulers have had very little to offer even their own supporters at an ideological level - witness the paucity of content and inertia in last year's Republic Festival. Now at least they have come forward with 'positive' proposals. They are trying to take up the popular cries for 'democracy', 'a real say', 'negotiation'. The state wishes to give these terms their own meaning, and thus undercut many of the demands that are being put forward from below.

More than that, they are attempting to define the terms of discussion - what kind of constitution, what powers for the president, what form of representation for different 'race groups', and so on. These are all paper solutions, juggling around with formulas to impose a solution from above. Against this, democratic opposition organisations need to define the content of demands acceptable to their constituencies. Above all, democracy needs to be put forward as a process of popular participation; and negotiation can only be acceptable if it is with the people's freely chosen leaders.

2). The organised centre: There will be many who reject aspects of the PC proposals - the exclusion of africans, the powers of the new president, the continued existence of Group Areas. Starting off from these objections, organisations of the political centre will attempt to build their own credibility. The Labour Party, perhaps the PFP, Buthelezi's

Inkatha, may put themselves forward as the real opposition to the PC. Already, for example, the Buthelezi Commission proposals are being put forward (with the help of a wide liberal campaign) as the alternative to the current political dispensation. It is important that such groupings do not dominate the grounds of opposition, dominating discussion, playing on racial divisions where these exist, and thereby setting themselves up as popular leaders.

3). Working the system: The PC proposals imply that groups other than whites must gain access to various organs of state power. Not all of these organs will be as obviously toothless as the CRC or SAIC. In particular, at a local level there are likely to be municipal arrangements that give some elements of real power to those who participate in them. Consequently, these institutions are going to have to be taken more seriously than their predecessors, and are likely to attract more middle class support than has thusfar been the case.

To take account of the effects of decentralised, limited, but real power, democrats may have to go beyond the purely negative call of non-collaboration. A positive programme of building popular organisations at local level may be important. The civic organisations that already exist around the day to day issues of people's lives, thus take on even greater significance than before.

4). The iron hand: The PC proposals involve risks for the ruling classes; it is an unknown road they are setting out on. For this reason, and because of the increased organised power of the people, the PC has recommended a president with wide-ranging powers. This will give formal backing to the tendency that has been growing for some time. Anyone who threatens the narrow limits of the PC proposals is likely to be harshly dealt with. As Mayet has said, 'The reformer's task in our set-up is not and will not be an easy one, and unfortunately there are people in South Africa who cannot or will not adapt. They will have to be led into the future with a firm but sympathetic hand'. He then refers to

'those who would like to use the transitional years to bring about chaos and revolution. They will have to be put in their place with an iron hand'.

5). Division or unity: The biggest weapon the state can use is to sow division within and between democratic organisations. The PC proposals will require responses, and they will require creative thinking to ensure appropriate responses. In the process, there will be much debate and discussion, and disagreement over the implications of concrete developments, strategies and tactics. Such debate and discussion is both healthy, and a necessary step in investigating appropriate responses. But ideological disagreement need not lead to division. The creation and maintenance of unity is an important task as opposition to the reforming measures of the PC grows.

SWAPO AND THE ANTI-COLONIAL STRUGGLE

RESISTANCE to colonial rule in Namibia has had a long history, but it was only with the development of African Nationalism in the 1950s that anti-colonial activities began to take on a more organised form. Even then, efforts which included preliminary labour organisation and localised strikes (eg Luderitz Bay 1952, 1953) as well as individual petitions to the United Nations, were largely unco-ordinated and unsuccessful. By the late 1950s it was realised that the establishment of a political organisation was the only way in which the problems and aspirations of the Namibian people, and in particular the contract workers, could be given articulate expression.

Nearly half of the black labour force in Namibia consists of male contract workers, who are recruited in the Northern areas - mainly Ovamboland - by Labour Bureaux on the basis of 'orders' placed by white employers. Once recruited, the worker is transported to his place of work and there housed in a white-controlled, ethnically-segregated compound for the duration of his contract, after which he is repatriated back to the reserve. Movement outside the compound and workplace is severely restricted by a barrage of 'pass laws'. While the worker is theoretically entitled to lodge complaints about wages and working conditions with the local Native Affairs Commissioner, to do this requires a pass from his employer - a perfect Catch 22 situation.¹ The fact that workers see themselves as 'chained' to the system is expressed in the Ovambo term for 'contract'-odalate - derived from the Afrikaans word 'draad' meaning 'wire'.

THE FORMATION OF OPO


THE Ovamboland Peoples' Organisation (OPO), founded in 1958 by a group of Namibian contract workers and students in Cape Town under the leadership of Herman Toivo ja Toivo, had as its primary aim the destruction of the system of contract labour, since it was felt that 'the oppressive and exploitative conditions and long-standing abuse to which Africans are subjected in the contract system were the most immediate and burning issues around which Namibian workers could be organised and politicized'.²

The fact that the leaders of the OPO were inspired by nationalist goals is important, because while the origin of SWAPO as an organisation created to protect the interests of migrant workers has been well documented, most writers have tended to stress the fact that the workers were mainly Ovambos, thus emphasising SWAPO's ethnic origins rather than its class basis and nationalist objectives.

Herman Toivo ja Toivo, who was born in Ovamboland in 1924, had spent many years in South Africa as a migrant worker. After serving in the Union of South Africa's Native Military Corp during World War II, he worked as a clerk on the Reef's gold mines and as a SA Railways policeman before taking up employment as a shop assistant in a grocery business in Cape Town. It was here that Toivo met Emil Appolus, Andreas Shipanga, Jacob Kuhangua, Kozonguizi and others, as well as coming into contact with members of SA's ANC and the then SACP. The Ovamboland Peoples' Congress was formed, later to become OPO, and a centre for meetings was established in a barber's shop.

By the end of 1958 however, Toivo became known to the Security Police when he smuggled to the United Nations a taped message (hidden in a copy of 'Gulliver's Travels'), outlining South African repression in Namibia. He was arrested and escorted under police guard from Cape Town to Ovamboland where he was kept under house arrest until 1967 when he was rearrested and subsequently jailed for 20 years.

OPO members in Cape Town had in the meantime however fostered links with groups and individuals in



The border areas where war rages. . . .

Star, 09.12.81.

Walvis Bay, Luderitz, and in mining compounds at Tsumeb and elsewhere, and by the time of Toivo's arrest the organisation had already gained support in Namibia. In April 1959 Sam Nujoma assumed leadership of the movement in Windhoek and became its fulltime organiser, with the help of Jacob Kahangua and Louis Nelengani establishing a number of branches in industrial areas. Vinnia Ndadi, who became secretary of the Walvis Bay branch, describes Nujoma's visit to the compounds there:³

On 25 June, Sam Nujoma came to Walvis Bay. After meeting with some friends in the location he came round to the compounds, going first to the railway compound where he addressed a big crowd of contract workers. Then he went to the Tuna Company compound and then our compound at the Ocean Fishing Company. ...Almost everybody came out. The word got around fast and the men were eager to hear. We gathered at our usual meeting place. Sam introduced himself, then asked if we had heard about OPO. I said, 'Yes, we heard about your organisation being formed in Windhoek'. 'Actually', he said, 'we started in Cape Town, but now we are trying to bring together all the people of South West Africa in OPO. He then talked about the need for freedom and an end to the contract system. 'We all know, especially you contract workers, that we've suffered much under this system. Our people have been forced to work for slave wages under miserable conditions - dictated by these racist Boers. Families are broken up and we're made to live in lousy compounds like this ... not treated like human beings, but like cattle! One day we'll bring an end to this system, however and we'll work like free men, each and everyone choosing his work according to his desire and his needs, without force.'

Then he asked us, 'Will you join the struggle to abolish contract labour?' Everyone shouted 'Yes, yes! That is what we want!'

Ndadi, who had played an important role in the cannery strike earlier that year, was elected branch secretary, and he recalls:

For the next few months we continued collecting money for the organisation and holding meetings in the compound. Branch executive meetings were usually held at night in the location. We discussed politics whenever we could; talked about day to day problems, news from Windhoek and the rest of Africa, and our dreams of freedom in Namibia.

Within three months that particular branch had a membership of several thousand (is the vast majority of the contract work force), and had collected

over £800. This was matched by a similar response to the OPO's recruiting campaign elsewhere, and with the scope afforded by the compound system for rapid and centralised communication, in little more than a year the OPO became a mass organisation, its political strongholds and branch structure based solidly (though not exclusively) in the contract workers' compounds of the towns and mines. However, while the compound system facilitated the formation of collective consciousness and solidarity and the circulation of leaders and information at the local level, distances between the towns and mines presented formidable problems for nationally co-ordinated campaigning, and it was only with the transformation of the OPO into SWAPO in 1960 that this problem began to be tackled.

Meanwhile the OPO had forged good working relations with other anti-apartheid groups in the country such as the late Chief Hosea Kutako's Herero Council, and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) which had been formed by students and intellectuals originally as a culturally oriented organisation, called the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA).

In December 1959 these three groups jointly organised a mass campaign against the forced removal of Windhoek's 30 000 black residents from the so-called 'old location', where many of them had freehold rights and lived for several generations, to an arid and sterile township called 'Katatura' (ironically meaning 'we have no fixed abode'), five miles from the city.

A demonstration of women in front of the Administrator's office was followed by boycotts of buses, cinemas and beerhalls, and finally a demonstration on 10 December at which the police opened fire on the crowd, killing 11 and wounding 54. While at the UN petitioners protested against the threatened removals to Katatura, events in the streets of Windhoek showed not only that such petitions would be ineffectual, but that local efforts at peaceful persuasion and popular mobilisation would be ruthlessly crushed.

SWAPO IS FORMED

IN an attempt to curb african nationalist activity in the urban areas, the South West African Administration began to issue banishment and deportation orders against leaders of emerging organisations - among them Sam Nujoma who was sent back to Ovamboland under police guard after the Windhoek shooting. He subsequently left the country, making his way through Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia to Tanzania where he was helped by Nyerere to travel to New York and present SWAPO's case to the UN. Nujoma returned to Tanzania in January 1960 where he opened an office, but subsequently based himself in Lusaka where he has remained as Swapo President, co-ordinator of all diplomatic and military efforts.

The OPO was in 1960 re-named SWAPO in order to emphasize national rather than regional considerations, and in order to broaden its basis for popular participation. National branches, the basic working units of the organisation, were established throughout the country and a full scale campaign was launched to organise both the workers in the mines and factories and the peasants in the rural areas. Vinnia Ndadi describes a meeting at Endola in Ovamboland at which people were told about SWAPO:

The day was extremely hot, yet over three hundred people came out to hear what we had to say. The crowd of men, women and children came from many areas - Omundundu, Omakango, Ehafo, Onandi etc. Some walked twenty miles. Kahumba spoke first. He was well known, having spoken frequently as an OPO member. He spoke about the change from OPO to SWAPO. To most people it didn't matter. They said, 'Whatever will help us we support, whether OPO or SWAPO.' I explained that OPO was a regional organisation ... and was a workers' union against contract labour. SWAPO's main objective, on the other hand, was to help liberate all the peoples of South West Africa from Boer oppression and win national independence.

At another meeting at Dhalushu, attended by more than five hundred people, Ndadi spoke of the need for unity.

Look at the Boers. They have united in order to oppress us, to exploit our labour and our land! If we were to join as one we could surely defeat them...

At this meeting Kaukungua gave the example of a bunch of sticks. He picked one up.

This single stick you can break easily, but ten sticks at once? No. It's the same with our struggle; if we are divided the enemy can infiltrate and break us one by one, but if we're together as one strong force determined to rid ourselves of colonialism and oppression, then we will surely win!

The meeting closed with handclapping, freedom songs and slogans.

PREPARATION FOR ARMED STRUGGLE

IN 1961 a national congress was held in Windhoek where SWAPO members examined progress made since 1958 in particular the results of its diplomatic efforts at the UN. Jaireretundu Kozunguizi and Mburumbu Kerina had been the first two Namibians at the United Nations - originally on behalf of Chief Kutako's Herero Council, but since 1959 when Kozunguizi was elected President of SWANU, Kerina had chosen to represent SWAPO. Confidence in the UN's ability to force South Africa out of Namibia had been nurtured by innumerable resolutions passed to this effect; by 1961 however (and particularly in the light of the events of December 1959), SWAPO began to lose faith in the ability of any outside organisation to intervene on behalf of the Namibian people. This realization, as well as the fact that the ANC and PAC had reached a similar position concerning South Africa, led to the decision at the 1961 Congress to prepare for the eventual armed struggle in Namibia.

(This is according to Shipanga. Ndadi also records that at about this time armed struggle came to be regarded as the only solution.)⁵

By 1962 SWAPO accordingly started a military training programme. Volunteers (more than 200 that year) went for training to Egypt, which was then the only independent African country with a capacity for training guerilla fighters. In 1963 Algeria gained independence and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) came into being; both pledged to aid SWAPO in its armed struggle. Later other African, Asian and European nations accepted SWAPO guerillas for training.

Meanwhile SWAPO and SWANU had continued to organise side by side within the country (while at the UN there was some leadership rivalry), and in 1963 formed the South West Africa National Liberation Front (SWANLIF) in Windhoek. This body was given a R20 000 grant by the OAU's African Liberation Committee for the purpose of 'furthering its efforts against apartheid and pro self-rule inside the SWA borders rather than at the UN.'⁶

However, with SWAPO's decision to combine political and military efforts in pursuit of national liberation, differences between the two organisations became apparent and the attempt at uniting them was short-lived. (These differences derived perhaps from the fact that the two organisations had distinct bases of support and therefore of policy direction - SWANU's leadership and membership being more intellectual and ideologically oriented, while SWAPO's approach was more 'populist' since its support lay with the workers and peasants.)

Thus during the early 1960s SWAPO continued to broaden its popular base by developing the system of national branches within the country, each unit representing at least 200 but not more than 600 people. Political education was carried out by means of public rallies and demonstrations which met with such enthusiastic response that the SWA authorities banned SWAPO from campaigning publicly, in 1963. The meetings did not stop however, and SWAPO continued to organise among the people both openly at branch level, but now also with cells working underground.

These cells, while continuing to organize and conduct political education among the masses, became more and more involved in recruiting guerillas and supplying our fighting units in the field.⁷

In October 1964 a regional organisation in the Caprivi Strip, an area on Namibia's north-eastern boundary, known as the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), abandoned its goal of independence for Caprivi and joined SWAPO. CANU, which had comprised more than 3 000 members, declared its intention of 'working for the separation of South West Africa from

South Africa, with majority rule'.⁸ Bredan Simbweye, CANU's President, was subsequently appointed SWAPO vice-president, and Meshak Muyongo, CANU vice-president was made SWAPO's chief representative in Zambia. He later became SWAPO vice-president but was expelled, along with eight others, in July 1980 for 'attempting to revive CANU' and 'forming a Caprivi clique in SWAPO'. Mr Muyongo was also said to have had 'capitalistic ideas' and 'had been working for himself'. When SWAPO moved its headquarters to Luanda in 1979, Muyongo apparently refused to leave Lusaka. He set up a new office for himself in Lusaka and 'established a comfortable life-style'. According to newspaper reports, Muyongo also opposed the relocation of Caprivan refugees from Southern Zambia to Angola.⁹

THE ARMED STRUGGLE BEGINS

EVENTS at the UN between 1962 and 1966 served to confirm SWAPO's disillusionment with the international community. The General Assembly had decided to seek a final judgement on the SWA question which could be enforced by the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice was called upon to determine the legality of South Africa's continued control of the territory. When, on 18 July 1966 the Court announced that it had no power to arbitrate in the dispute, this amounted to a decision in favour of the South African government, and led to SWAPO's declaration (press statement) from Dar Es Salaam that

We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom. And as sure as night follows day, victory will be ours.

In August 1966 SWAPO launched its first guerilla operations beginning with an attack on Nkurumbaje in the North-West. Two days later the Administrative centre at Oshikongo was destroyed. On 26 August 1966 South African helicopters spotted a guerilla training camp (which had been established 11 months previously) at Ogulambashe in Ovamboland. Two guerillas were killed in cold blood before a group of 27 were captured, amongst them Eliaser Tuhadeleni who was

accused No 1 in the trial that followed after two years of alleged interrogation, intermittent torture and solitary confinement.

The response of the SA authorities in Namibia to the now established fact of guerilla infiltration was immediately to intensify repression of SWAPO activities and the arrest and harrassment of its members inside the country. In December 1966 three top SWAPO leaders, Gottlieb Nathaniel, acting president, John ya Otto, secretary general, and Jason Mutumbula, secretary of foreign affairs, were detained under the Suppression of Communism Act 'on orders from the Commissioner of Police in Pretoria'. This was the first time that people were held under this law in SWA; the three were not however found guilty of any 'communist activities'.

In February 1968 27 SWAPO guerillas and 10 SWAPO leaders, including Herman Toivo ja Toivo, were brought to trial in Pretoria on charges of participating in terrorist activities, with alternative charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. During the trial one accused was found not guilty and one died of natural causes in detention. Another, G Mbindi, complained of ill-treatment by the police during the trial and was discharged before judgement was given.

TOIVO SPEAKS

JUST before the conclusion of the trial, Toivo made a long statement in court which has remained one of the most eloquent condemnations of SA rule in Namibia and is an important reflection of the developments which led to armed resistance.

Declaring that the accused were not South Africans but Namibians, who were being judged by foreigners, Toivo said that they had found themselves 'voteless in our own country and deprived of the right to meet and state our political opinions'.

Is it surprising that in such times my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country.

I tried to do what I could to prevent my people from going into the bush... My

organisation could not work properly - it could not even hold meetings...

I had no answer to the question 'Where has your non-violence got us?' Whilst the World Court judgement was pending I at least had that to fall back on. When we failed, after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my people.

Even though I did not agree that people should go into the bush, I could not refuse to help them when I knew they were hungry... I was not and I could not remain a spectator in the struggle for freedom.

I know that the struggle will be long and bitter. I also know that my people will wage that struggle, whatever the cost.

Toivo was sentenced to a term of 20 years imprisonment on Robben Island, even though it was proved in court that he had not been involved in the organisation of guerillas as such, but had merely found himself morally bound to assist them when they entered Ovamboland to which he was confined. Twelve years later, his spirit remains unbroken and he continues to be viewed by the people of Namibia as a future leader of SWAPO.

SWAPO IN EXILE

SWAPO continued to organise itself as a political party within the country, but as a national liberation movement was increasingly forced to operate in exile. Since 1966, when a state of emergency was declared and the repression of SWAPO activities intensified, SWAPO's National Congress - the supreme policy making body of the organisation - has not met inside the country as it used to do (on an annual basis). The function of the National Congress is to elect (or suspend) members of SWAPO's two other party organs, the National Executive and the Central Committee. The National Executive is composed of eleven members selected from the Central Committee and is responsible for the day to day implementation of SWAPO policy - seeing to it that Congress resolutions are carried out by various organs, including the military. The Central Committee, with thirty five members, instructs and oversees the work of the Executive; all major decisions of the Executive must have the approval of the Central Committee.

(Inside the country, SWAPO branches co-ordinate

their activities at district level by meeting with SWAPO regional leadership, which is then directly responsible to national leadership. Constitutionally, SWAPO inside the country still has the right to elect Congress leadership - hence the re-election of exiled leaders at the 1975 Walvis Bay Congress - according to Tjongarero. The fact that real power lies with the external leadership was demonstrated however when Tjongarero was sacked as deputy chairman inside the country by the Luseka administration.)

The most recent meeting of the National Congress, ie the Executive and the Central Committee, was held at Tanga, Tanzania from 26.12.1969 to 1.3.1970.

ice bearers elected included the following:

Sam Nujoma - president
Brendan Simbwaye - vice president
Meshak Muyongo - acting vice president
Moses Garoseb - administrative secretary
Gottfried Geingob - organising secretary
Peter Mueshihange - acting sec. for Foreign Affairs
Andreas Shipanga - acting sec. for Information and Publicity
Peter Nanyemba - secretary Defence and Transport
Solomon Mifima - secretary for Labour
Peter Katjevivi - sec. Economic and Judicial Affairs
Dr Libertine Appolus - assistant sec. for Health and Welfare

Where acting appointments were made, this was done in place of SWAPO members who were either serving prison sentences in SA or who were living in Namibia.

The portfolio structure illustrates that SWAPO regards itself as an alternative government for Namibia.

Although no party political programme as such emerged from the Congress, various bodies were inaugurated which would carry out SWAPO's multi-level strategy. These included the SWAPO Youth League (SYL), the Women's League, and the Namibian Liberation Army.

THE 1971 ICJ DECISION

IN June 1971, the International Court of Justice met again to consider the question of South Africa's presence in Namibia, since the termination of the mandate by General Assembly Resolution 2145 (1966) had been neither recognised by South Africa nor enforced by the world body. The Court's judgement this time was that South Africa was under obligation to withdraw from SWA since its continued presence

was illegal, and that UN member states were to recognize this illegality.

This decision came at a time of increasing militancy on the part of Namibian students, workers and church leaders in the country, and its effect was to heighten anti-colonial feeling above its already high tension level. Demonstrations were held in Ovamboland (where guerilla activity had also recently increased), as well as in Windhoek where the situation had been aggravated by police raids on the compounds in Katatura. Statements were issued by students in support of the World Court's ruling, and at the end of June 1971 an open letter was addressed to the Prime Minister, BJ Vorster, by the heads of the Ovambo-Kavango Church (to which more than half the population of Ovamboland belongs) and the Lutheran Evangelical Church, also endorsing the Court's judgement. The same church leaders, Bishop Auala and Moderator Gowaseb, met with Vorster in August. They called for 'unity and fraternity between races' and told Vorster that 'South West Africa should remain a unit and become independent'. In this they were strongly supported by the Anglican bishop of Damaraland, the Rev Colin Winter (who was subsequently deported in 1972, together with three fellow church workers). The importance of the political stand taken by church leaders should not be underestimated, since the open letter, for example, reached nearly every community in Namibia through the pulpits of their churches.

CONTRACT WORKERS STRIKE

THE role played by students in mobilising opinion around issues like the World Court ruling or the contract labour system was also important in providing the conditions for mass action, but ultimately the underlying cause of the nationwide strike held in December 1971 was the contract system itself.

The conditions under which men were employed as migrant workers have been mentioned above but since the end of 1970 these conditions had actually deteriorated, with the implementation of tighter pass controls and the compulsory wearing of identity

photographs - amongst other things.

A statement made on 15.11.1971 by the SA Commissioner General in Ovamboland, J de Wet, was the final catalyst that prompted mass action. De Wet replied to church criticisms that the contract system was a 'form of slavery' by saying that it couldn't be compared to slavery since workers came forward voluntarily for recruitment.

When this statement was put to workers themselves at mass meetings in Walvis Bay and Katatura, the response was overwhelming. Within the next few weeks more than 10 000 workers chose not only to stay away from work (as did many thousands more), but to break their so-called 'voluntary' contracts completely by returning to Ovamboland. Various commentators have pointed out that the strike, which became nationwide within a few weeks and eventually involved some 20 000 workers from different sectors of industry, appeared to spread spontaneously. The only proof found of any organisation were some hand-written leaflets, yet within a few days, thousands of men, at extremely widely-dispersed centres, had followed the pattern first manifested at Walvis Bay. SWAPO was immediately accused by the authorities of 'instigating' the strike, but this could only be said to be true in the sense that SWAPO had laid the ground work for action by drawing attention to the evils of the contract system and 'politicizing' workers. Others have argued¹⁰ that the strike was not 'merely a mass spontaneous outburst ... but was a calculated political campaign', ie that the issues were exploited for the purposes of consciousness-raising and with the objective of political action. This may have been true for some, but I think to argue that the strike itself was orchestrated, is to deny both the very real grievances that the workers had, as well as the fact that the strike was organized and led by the contract workers themselves.

An ad hoc Workers' Committee was meanwhile elected in Ovamboland, with representatives from the various regions, under the chairmanship of Mr Johannes Nangutuuala. The committee drew up a list of the strikers' grievances and demands, which formed the

basis for a series of resolutions passed at a mass meeting of some 3 500 people held at Ondangwa on 10 January. Briefly, the strikers called for freedom of movement (ie the abolition of passes), and the right to take up employment where they wished, as well as much higher wages.

They complained of the break up of family life and of conditions in the compounds. It was decided that the men would go back to the lands and raise as big a food-crop as possible. It must be noted however that the effect of capitalist penetration of the rural economy had been such as to erode the self-sufficiency of traditional subsistence farming, since in order to obtain cash for buying consumer goods and paying taxes to the colonial regime, the men were forced to work as migrant labourers in the South. It was probably this reason more than any other (including the token concessions and marginal improvements in wages and conditions offered by the government and employees), that led to the decision by workers to return to work after some 6 to 8 weeks.

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS AND 'ELECTIONS' IN OVAMBO

UNREST in Ovamboland did not end with the strike however. At the beginning of February it was reported in Parliament by the Minister of Police that several 'acts of violence' had been taking place in Ovamboland including attacks on headmen and policemen, stoning of Railway and other official vehicles and burning of huts and shops belonging to Legislative Councillors and Chiefs. Police reinforcements had been sent in and units of the Defence force were being used to patrol the border fence which had been 'cut and flattened' along a distance of over 100 km, but all these measures were 'insufficient'.

The response of the SA government was to declare a state of emergency in Ovamboland and to introduce emergency regulations some of which came into effect immediately. Proclamation R17 of 4 February (amended by Proclamation 26 of 14 February, but henceforth known as Proclamation 17), prohibited all meetings, gatherings and assemblies, with certain exceptions, unless they had been authorized in writing by the

Native Commissioner, who could also specify conditions. (One of the effects of this measure was that church and other 'non-political' meetings were used more and more to channel political grievances.) It also became an offence to do or say anything which could 'undermine the authority of the State, the Ovambo government, or a chief or headman', or to enter or leave the territory without permission.

Widespread detentions and intimidation took place under these emergency regulations - by April 1972, 267 people had been arrested, most of whom were never charged. These included scores of SWAPO supporters, almost rendering superfluous the Ovambo Legislative Council's request that SWAPO be banned.

At the beginning of 1973 the SA government announced its intention, in accordance with its policy of setting up 'independent Bantustans', to make Ovamboland a self-governing territory. Plans were made to hold elections for the Ovamboland Legislative Assembly in August. SWAPO had long opposed the implementation of South Africa's Bantustan policy in Namibia, and calling for a boycott of the scheduled elections, SWAPO leaders proceeded to organise protest meetings in defiance of the ban on all gatherings of a political nature. In May 1973 3 000 people staged a demonstration outside the offices of the Chief Minister of Ovamboland, Philemon Elifas, and Johnny Otto, Johannes Nangutuuala and Andreas Nukwawo, who were held responsible for the meeting, were detained under the provisions of Proclamation 17. A few days later several members of SWAPO's Youth League were arrested after seeking permission to hold a meeting - these included Ezekiel Nathaniel (son of acting SWAPO president Gottlieb Nathaniel who had recently been served with the first banning order issued in SWA, and was restricted for five years to Kuiseb township, Walvis Bay), Frans Nangutuuala (younger brother of Johannes), Patrick Hadibo, Patricio Shelinge and Thomas Kamati.

On 24 July 1973, three SWAPO branch officials were arrested after a meeting which Ovambo officials had been unable to prevent, despite smashing a loudspeaker and threatening to shoot anyone who

attended. Two days later, before any protest could be mounted or defence procured, the three, Phillipus Shilongo, Willem Nankondo and Petrus Moongo were found guilty of holding, addressing or attending an illegal meeting and were jailed for 12 and 8 months without the option of a fine.

Repeated requests by SWAPO to hold public meetings were refused, but the Youth League in particular continued to organise meetings in the face of arrests and the type of intimidation described above. SWAPO's reasoning was as follows (according to Ndadi): any legal organisation could hold a public meeting as long as it had applied for a permit...even if the application was turned down! The reality was in any case that nothing could stop people from flocking to the meetings, often held around a makeshift platform of oil drums, or just a truck, or in the open veld under some trees.

At this stage the Press, except for SAPA, was banned from entering Ovamboland on an order from the Commissioner General. All these measures, aimed at producing a favourable election result, failed however when only 2,6% of the 50 000 eligible voters turned up at the polls. SWAPO followed up its successful boycott of the elections with a mass meeting at Oshakati on 6 August, attended by an estimated 3 000 people. This time no arrests were made.

FLOGGING OPPOSITION

FROM September 1973 however, a new type of political reprisal began to be used - public floggings of political opponents by the Ovamboland tribal authorities. Andreas Nukwawo and Johannes Nangutuuala were the first to be given this treatment by the Ondangwa tribal authorities, the latter having to receive hospital treatment afterwards. Youth League member Thomas Kamati was stripped and flogged until he lost consciousness by the Okwanyama tribal chiefs, again without any formal charges being laid, other than that he was a member of SWAPO.

An application for an interdict against the above-mentioned tribal authorities made by Bishops Wood and Auala in November 1973 was rejected in the

Windhoek Supreme Court in March 1974, but the appeal was subsequently upheld in March 1975. This meant that in the interim however, the Ovambo authorities had a free reign to continue this form of torture, causing thousands of people to flee across the borders into Angola between 1974-1975.

Events outside Ovamboland were no less dramatic. On 12 August 1973 a mass rally was held in Katatura, followed by police action which resulted in the arrest of about 300 people and the death of one in several days of rioting and violence. Five Youth League members were arrested, three of whom - Jeremiah Ekandjo, Jacob Nghidinua and Martin Kapawasa - were subsequently charged under the Sabotage Act in the Supreme Court, Swakopmund. The accused were said to have told the audience that 'Blood will flow before Namibia is independent' and 'Freedom is in your hands. Don't wait until tomorrow, start today'. The trial was adjourned for a day at the outset when the three accused tore up their charge sheets, refused pro deo representation by a local attorney and demanded the sending of an attorney from the UN.

Mr Ekandjo denied that he had advocated using arms (or 'pangas') to kill whites. He said that he had urged people to use their weapons and that SWAPO's weapon was the loudspeaker and not violence. He told the judge that he would refuse to recognise any sentence passed by the court, because the ICJ had ruled that South Africa's presence was illegal. Therefore the court had no jurisdiction over him and his associates, and the ordinance under which they were charged was not legally in effect in Namibia. He demanded the right to be tried by Namibians and not by foreigners.

The three Youth League leaders were sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. After the Katatura rally, police instigated a massive manhunt for the other seven SWAPO youths who had addressed the rally, mainly David Shikomba, Joseph Shelua and Jacob Shindika. Twenty-one police officers and 137 men, including special investigators who had been flown from Pretoria, were involved in the dragnet which took the form of house to house searches as well as a country-

wide manhunt. Shindika and another Youth League leader, Ezriel Taaipopi, were subsequently arrested near the Botswana border, and Shikomba was apprehended in Ovamboland 5 months later.

ARRESTS AND TRIALS

IN the meantime, petty harassment of SWAPO members continued; in January 1974 police with automatic weapons and tracker dogs arrested 127 SWAPO supporters who were on the way to a public meeting in Reheboth, south of Windhoek. Most were refused bail and remanded in custody for a week, when they appeared on the trivial charge of not having had travel documents.

Despite such measures, aimed at intimidating SWAPO members and discouraging potential members, support for SWAPO continued to increase, and police began to fear that the publicity given to incidents involving SWAPO might be doing the organisation more good than harm. On 16 January 1974 Brigadier Louw declared that the police would furnish no information on SWAPO in future. Administrator Van der Walt would be the only person authorised to give such information. Later this was changed to the effect that only the security police could make statements concerning SWAPO.

On 16 January police swooped on Katutura in a massive 04h00 house to house raid involving 360 policemen, 50 riot trucks and other vehicles. One hundred and eighty-six people were arrested, bringing the number of people held in the past week to 313. By mid February, 9 members of SWAPO executive and all the Youth League office bearers were in detention. These included Ezriel Taaipopi, who had been rearrested after being acquitted (24 January) on a charge of 'attempting to resist arrest', and Axel Johannes, the Windhoek secretary, as well as David Meroro, SWAPO chairman. Most were being held under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, and it was reported that Taaipopi and Joseph Kasheba were to be tried summarily on charges of 'instigating people to commit murder, to engage in public violence or malicious damage to property'. A month later, on 15 March 1974,

Youth League secretary David Shikomba was found guilty of 'endangering public safety and the maintenance of law and order by attempting to cause insurrection or forcible resistance to the government', and was sentenced to six years jail under the Sabotage Act.

By the time Taaipopi and Kasheba were brought to trial in June 1974, they had been kept in solitary confinement for four months and were not in a fit condition to stand trial. A postponement was requested by the Counsel for the Defence on the grounds that the accused were not only in a weak physical condition but had suffered loss of memory and confusion, and even hallucinations, while in detention. The case was postponed for a week, and on their reappearance in court (17 June), the two youth leaders were charged (under the 1962 Riotous Assemblies Ordinance) with 'attempting to incite SWAPO exiles and/or the Namibian Peoples Liberation Army to murder various persons in SWA, or to damage/burn/destroy property in various places, or to assemble crowds with intent to assault or defy the police, or to disturb the peace and stage riots'.

The kernel of the state case was a letter written by members of the Youth League Executive to Sam Nujoma, as well as evidence given by Shihepo Mvili, who had been treasurer of the Youth League.

Witnesses for the defence described how it had been SWAPO's aim to achieve liberation through non-violence but that their efforts to hold peaceful meetings had met with violence on the part of the police. For example, boycotts and stayaways were considered to be peaceful means of expressing dissatisfaction, but police forced would-be strikers to go to work by means of violence: 'Police came with cannons, guns and dogs. They hit people and ordered them to go to work.'

Another witness, Alexander Nashilungo, told how he was fired from his job as a cleaner at the SABC because he was a member of SWAPO. (This was in fact a common occurrence.) Despite this sort of intimidation, argued the defence, SWAPO Youth League had shown a persistent determination not to resort to violence. Nevertheless, on 26 July 1974 the

Counsel for the State declared that it had proved 'beyond reasonable doubt' that Taaipopi and Kasheba had 'engaged in a deliberate and systematic campaign to bring about violence in SWA'. They were sentenced to five years in jail, with three years conditionally suspended, and were refused leave to appeal.

Several other Youth League members, many of whom had been kept in solitary confinement for six months, were released in July 1974, but one of them, Thomas Kamati, was immediately charged with malicious damage to property for having written the words 'One Nation - One Namibia' on his cell wall. He subsequently jumped bail and was one of the hundreds of SWAPO leaders (amongst them Johnny Otto and Andreas Nuukawo) who fled to Angola that year.

SWAPO would never surrender though, said Youth League vice-chairman Shindabih Mashalaleh; 'If our leaders are arrested, we shall elect new leaders. We are many. The police will have to jail the whole of Namibia to break us.'

In September 1974 Axel Johannes and Lot Zacharia were released on bail after 7 and 8 months in detention. In the trial that followed, where Zacharias and another man, George Itenga (charged as an accomplice) were alleged to have attempted to leave the country illegally and Johannes to have assisted them, the accused said that they had been assaulted in prison. Itenga claimed that he was blindfolded and handcuffed, and tortured by means of electric shocks. This was one of the many instances where SWAPO members claimed torture in detention - either for the purpose of extracting information from the detainees, or simply because they were members of SWAPO. The years 1973 and 1974 had seen a marked increase in this kind of heavy-handed repression of SWAPO, with mass arrests, detention without trial, torture and public floggings. At the same time, SWAPO had shown a degree of organisation and militancy within the country that would probably not be possible again, since the treatment meted out to the organisation's leaders had convinced thousands of its supporters, especially among the youth, that the only course of action open to them was to flee across the borders to receive

training in guerilla warfare. (Between June 1974 and January 1975 it is estimated that about 6 000 people left the country, mostly from Ovamboland and because of police and army action during the 'election' period. Of these a significant amount were SWAPO supporters who went for guerilla training, whilst others were simply refugees for whom SWAPO set up camps such as that at Cassinga in Southern Angola...)

THE 1975 OVAMBOLAND ELECTIONS

IN January, 1975, elections were once again held in Ovamboland in an attempt to 'set right' the fiasco of August 1973. This time the SA government claimed to have procured a result - a 55% poll - which it could hold up to the outside world as proof of support for its 'Bantustan' policy in Ovamboland. Overwhelming evidence suggests however, that these results were 'unreliable, artificial, and did not reflect the views of the majority of the Ovambos'.¹¹ Affidavits submitted by church leaders and others tell of blatant coercion and trickery employed to bring voters to the polls - particularly at labour recruiting centres where thousands of work-seekers were told 'Vote and work; otherwise starve'.

South African army and police presence was a major factor in intimidating people to vote, as was the role of the Ovambo chiefs and headmen who threatened that nobody would be allowed to cultivate land without having marked the ballot paper.

Other threats included denial of the use of hospital and health facilities, and refusal to issue travel documents to those who did not vote.

On 4th April it was reported that Sam Shivute, SWAPO secretary in Ovamboland, was in hiding after tribal police had threatened to kill him. Shivute had been investigating reports that tribal police armed with rifles had forced people onto trucks which had taken them to polling stations to vote against their will. After a SWAPO meeting in Oshakati had been broken up by baton-wielding members of the tribal police and several people injured, Mrs Elizabeth Shivute brought an urgent court application for her husband's protection. Despite the granting of an

interim order, Shivute was admitted to hospital less than three weeks later after tribal police had 'beaten him with sticks and kicked him' in Okaheo/ Ngandjero.

SWAPO BREAKS WITH THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

IN Windhoek, meanwhile, SWAPO had decided to withdraw its membership of the 'National Convention', an alliance of 9 opposition groups formed in July 1973 whose aims included 'the total and complete freedom and independence of the population of Namibia, and the elimination of group, tribal and racial identity based on colour and economic station'. The purpose of forming a Convention was to 'unite the oppressed peoples of Namibia in one national unit' in order to achieve these aims.

However, by early 1975 SWAPO had become disillusioned with the Convention because it 'lacked political direction, had been ineffective and had failed to live up to the expectations of the people'. (Another reason was that it was said to be 'infiltrated by BOSS'.) In February 1975 the National Convention accordingly split into two groups, with SWAPO, SWANU, the Rehoboth Volksparty and the Damara Tribal Executive forming the 'Namibia National Convention' (NNC), leaving Chief Clemens Kapuuo and his National Union Democratic Organisation (NUDO), plus the Herero and Nama Chiefs Councils, to comprise the 'National Convention'.

Political activities organised under the NNC banner consisted mainly of marches and demonstrations in opposition to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The first such march took place on 14 June 1975, despite an order prohibiting it (under Ordinance 9 of 1930 and Article 19 of Act 25, 1969). Three truckloads of police in battledress carrying automatic weapons swooped on the orderly crowd and arrested 18 NNC members, among them NNC Chairman Pastor Zephania Kameeta, and NNC secretary, Mrs Martha Ford. When the 18 appeared in court a few days later they were told that the case had been dismissed, but 'the charges could be reinstated any time'.

It was at this stage that the Church became more

outspoken about its decision to involve itself politically. SWAPO members and members of the two Lutheran Church congregations especially (the latter representing about 70% of the Namibian population), had always aligned Christian teachings with the struggle against colonialism and oppression in Namibia. Thus Ezriel Taairopi said at his trial (July 1974) that 'Christ, the Black Messiah, was the Deliverer who would free blacks from slavery', and Thomas Kamati, addressing a rally shortly after his release from detention, paid tribute to 'the Black Messiah' for his freedom. In another incident (June 1975), more than 1 000 Ovambos crossed the border into Angola to hold a church service 'as a gesture of defiance against Vorster's government'.

Pastor Zephania Kameeta, as NNC Chairman, explained the Church's involvement as follows:

The struggle in our land has not only to do with the liberation of Namibia, but it goes further and deeper than that. The presence of the South African government is not just a political question but it is a threat to the gospel of Jesus Christ! Thus I see it as the task of every Christian to work for the knocking down of this government... Why should the Church be silent and do nothing in the face of racism, exploitation and violence, when these are committed in God's world?

The numerous affidavits and open letters drafted by the Church in previous years had shown that its leaders were not prepared to be silent in the face of injustices perpetrated against the people. Now, more than before, church leaders and spokesmen began to publicly argue a position that was not at all dissimilar from SWAPO's own, even as far as the need for armed struggle was concerned. Thus during the latter half of 1975, both Anglican and Lutheran ministers were to issue statements to the effect that 'violence as a means of political action could not be entirely rejected' (De Vries), or that the church should openly side with 'the oppressed who take up arms' (Wood).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

THE South African government was meanwhile declaring loudly at the UN and in the press its

willingness to hold a 'constitutional conference' in SWA. In June 1975 SWAPO issued the following list of conditions which would have to be met before it would be willing to participate in such negotiations: That SA (1) publicly accepts the right of the Namibian people to independence and national sovereignty;(2) announces that SWA's territorial integrity is absolute and not negotiable;(3) releases all political prisoners including Yoivo and 'the many other leaders and colleagues on Robben Island and elsewhere';(4) sets aside the banning order applicable to Nathaniel Maxuirili;(5) removes Proclamation 17 applicable to Ovamboland;(6) permits all political exiles to return without fear of arrest or victimization;(7) commits itself to removing the police and the army;(8) agrees that the talks take place under international supervision and are aimed at the holding of free elections also under international supervision.

(SWAPO has been consistent in requesting these particular conditions, and has in fact compromised on a number of the above listed points in order to attempt reaching a settlement with South Africa. It is important to note this when SA and the press talk later of SWAPOs 'new demands' as 'wrecking' the settlement proposals etc.)

Coinciding with developments preceding the constitutional, or 'Turnhalle', conference to be held in Windhoek in September, SWAPO's central committee in Lusaka issued a 'discussion paper on the Constitution of Independent Namibia'. This document contained the first detailed proposals for an independent state under SWAPO, although it did not specify a socio-economic programme but confined itself to constitutional matters. The Press, when it received the document a month later, made much of the fact that its tone was 'surprisingly moderate', but in fact the proposals were not inconsistent with any previous SWAPO policy statements. The future Namibia is seen as an independent, unitary and non-aligned state, committed to parliamentary democracy, the entrenchment of human rights, the rule of law and the eradication of racism in all its forms. The paper makes no mention of questions such as the nationalization of resources or

enterprises, but says that it will be for the future government to decide whether the country's economy should be capitalist or socialist.

To some observers, the moderate tone of this document made a mockery of the fact that SWAPO was to be barred from the 'constitutional conference'. According to Dirk Mudge however, the reason that SWAPO was not to be represented was that the talks were to be held 'on an ethnic basis, not a political one'.¹²

THE ELIFAS ASSASSINATION

THE assassination of Chief Philemon Elifas, Chief Minister of Ovamboland, on 16 August 1975, provided SWAPOs opponents with the perfect excuse to take action against the movement's leaders. On 18 August a number of SWAPO officials were abducted from their Katatura homes by what the press described as 'squads of Herero militia' - in fact Chief Kapuuo's vigilante group and members of NUDD. Amongst those seized and handed over to the security police (after they had been manhandled for some time) were Othniel Kaakunga, SWAPOs organising secretary and publicity officer, Axel Johannes, SWAPO secretary, and Aaron Muchimba from the Youth League. An attempt to grab SWAPO chairman, David Meroro was unsuccessful when he locked himself inside a room. Meroro went into hiding and subsequently fled the country when (despite his denial that SWAPO had been responsible for Elifas' assassination, or that he knew anything about it), it was reported that police were hunting countryside for him. Meroro, who claimed torture whilst being detained for five months in solitary confinement in 1974, was described by the press as being 'a shattered man' who had never recovered from the psychological and other suffering he had undergone while in detention.¹³ (Meroro later gave an account of the alleged torture when he addressed the UN on 15 October.) As both SWAPO chairman and a Herero, he was a prime target for Kapuuo's thugs, and his decision to flee probably saved his life. Later his daughter had to request a court order protecting her from NUDD Youth League members.

By the beginning of September at least nine people had been detained under the Terrorism Act, whilst about 19, including Sam Shivute, Skinny Hilunduwa and Reuben Hauwanga, or more, had been held in Ovamboland under Proclamation 17. Despite repeated calls that the detainees be brought to trial or released, most were kept for months incommunicado and subsequently released without any charges being brought.

INCREASE IN GUERILLA ACTIVITY

DURING the latter half of 1975 there was a considerable increase in SWAPO guerilla activity, which was now no longer confined to the Northern areas (Ovamboland and Kaprivi), but increasingly within the so-called 'Police Zone' - South of Grootfontein. The overthrow of the Portuguese colonial regime in Angola by the MPLA forces significantly favoured the strengthening of SWAPO's position in that country, and in August SWAPO in London formally announced the existence of PLAN - the People's Liberation Army of Namibia. The massive exodus of Namibians to both Angola and Zambia in the previous two years had swelled the number of exiles receiving both academic and guerilla training to an estimated 3 000-4 500,¹⁴ and by 1976 at least 2 000 guerillas were fully trained and under arms. After a series of border incidents during which several tribal policemen and headmen were killed, the SA government did two things which indicated that it perceived guerilla warfare on a classical pattern to be developing there: it started to create a buffer zone along the border by forcibly resettling thousands of civilians from the Kwanyama area, and secondly, began to strike at SWAPO camps within Angola in so-called 'hot pursuit' operations.

The extent to which SWAPO guerillas had infiltrated much further south than Ovamboland only became evident when attacks began to be made within the so-called 'white' areas of the territory, mainly in the farming areas around Grootfontein, but also as far south as Okahandja. The fact that many of these incidents were concealed from the public, emerged

during a terrorism trial in May 1976 when the State claimed that between July 1975 and April 1976 there had been 59 cases of 'terrorism'. Most of these had not been reported in the press.

SWAPO members of the NNC however, continued to make assurances that they were not protagonists of violence. Tjongarero declared in December 1975 that 'our struggle is a peaceful one in a violent situation'. The position of SWAPO's external wing however, contrasted with this; in January 1976 SWAPO's platform at an International Legal Conference in Dakar was 'the justice of a war of liberation against South Africa'. The conference ended with a declaration by SWAPO that South Africa would never willingly end its occupation of Namibia, and that the restoration of fundamental human rights therefore depended on armed struggle. (It is possible that SWAPO internal's insistence that its policy was non-violent, was a matter of expediency - that while many of SWAPO's leaders inside the country may have supported the aims and methods of the external wing, they could not, for obvious reasons, say so. However there have also been very real differences - both personal and ideological - between the two wings, a fact which was sometimes attributed to a lack of contact between them.

THE MUSHIMBA TERRORISM TRIAL

SUPPORT for SWAPO, traditionally displayed at trials of SWAPO members, was once again witnessed during the Terrorism Trial in which Aaron Mushimba, Hendrik Shikongo, Andreas Nangola and three others were charged with terrorism linked to the assassination of Elifas. The trial began in Windhoek Supreme Court in December 1975, but was moved to Swakopmund when hundreds of SWAPO supporters gathered outside the courtroom and chanted freedom songs. The demonstrations continued at Swakopmund however, with police using dogs to disperse about 200 people when the trial resumed on 17 February. A South African journalist, Mr Eric Abrahams, claimed that he was assaulted by police during this incident.

Police intimidation of witnesses was also

claimed during the trial. The three women, Ms Rauna Nambinga, Ms Nami Mombowa and Ms Anna Nghihoudjwa were charged with raising money for SWAPO. In order to procure witnesses, South African troops had surrounded the Engela Hospital in Ovambo and arrested ten nurses - one of whom, Ms Eva Maudengi, gave the following evidence on behalf of the State. She said that the people who had fled Ovamboland the previous year were 'SWAPO soldiers who intended to liberate Namibia by force', and that certain women had agreed to give shelter to underground guerillas, and collect money for their cause. In reply to the first allegation, the defence submitted a memorandum drawn up by a number of church groups on 'Why People left Ovambo in 1974'. Reasons included:

- the enforced carrying of identity cards bearing fingerprints 'which made people feel like criminals';
- a constitution forced on the people under which they could be flogged and tortured by means of an electric current;
- claims that racial and ethnic segregation was only strictly applied against blacks;
- the oppressive powers of the police 'which caused fear and hatred instead of respect'.

The counsel for the defence argued that to attribute all the problems in Ovamboland to SWAPO (as the State was attempting to do), was therefore 'grossly oversimplifying matters', since according to the memorandum, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Ovambo people.¹⁵

The State's reply was to submit a list of 'Fifty-nine Acts of Terror' committed by SWAPO since July 1975, including the assassination of Elifas. On 12 May Mushimba and Shikongo were sentenced to death and Misses Nambinge and Nghihongiwa to 7 and 5 years respectively. This case marked the first use of the death penalty in Namibia under SA's Terrorism Act. A year later however, on 17 March 1977, Mushimba and Shikongo were acquitted after their appeal was upheld in the Bloemfontein Supreme Court. It emerged during the appeal case that Mr JA Smit, from the firm of instructing attorneys, Lorentz and Bone, had supplied confidential information about SWAPO to the Security Police. This constituted a breach of privilege between attorney and client, and the case was subsequently reviewed.

1976 WALVIS BAY CONGRESS

THE fact that constant harassment of SWAPO in the form of detentions¹⁶ and banning orders would have an effect on the organisation vis-à-vis leadership continuity, was evident at the National Congress held at Walvis Bay in May 1976 when none of the executive members elected in 1973¹⁷ were able to attend.

Recognition of these leaders was reaffirmed by a motion giving the top executive positions to those in exile, banned or in detention. These were:

Sam Nujoma (president)
Meshak Muyongo (vice-president)
David Merero (national chairman) - all in exile;
Nathaniel Maxuirili (acting president) - banned and restricted to Walvis Bay;
Axel Johannes (secretary general) - jailed for 12 months for refusing to give evidence in the Swakopmund trial;
Aaron Mushimba - recently given the death sentence - was elected treasurer.

New posts included:

Secretary for Foreign Affairs - Rev F Naholo;
Secretary for Labour, Culture and Economic Affairs - Jason Angula;
Secretary for Transport - Frans Kambangula.

Daniel Tjongarero was elected Secretary for Information and Publicity.

The congress reaffirmed its support for a peaceful struggle and challenged the SA government to hold elections under international supervision. At the same time, the Congress would not condemn alleged acts of terrorism in the North, and neither could it speak for the external wing. (At a press conference after the Congress one SWAPO leader said that they 'couldn't oppose or support the actions of the external wing because we have no contact with them'.¹⁸) Negotiations with Pretoria however could never take place without the external wing. (This issue had also proved contentious. Naholo had made a statement to the press to the effect that the question of SWAPO exiles being allowed to return before SWAPO would hold discussions with Pretoria was 'negotiable'. Kaakunga denied a few days later that this was SWAPO policy, saying that SWAPO would never negotiate with Pretoria unless exiles were allowed to return - ie that in no circumstances would the internal wing negotiate without the external wing.)

The so-called 'External Wing' was in the meantime reported to be in the throes of a major power struggle caused by dissatisfaction with the leadership of Sam Nujoma on the part of certain members of the executive, viz Information Secretary Andreas Shipanga and Labour Secretary Solomon Mifima. The origins of the dispute seem to have been allegations made by the military wing (Nanyamba) concerning conditions on the frontline, where guerillas were said to be in critically short supply of arms and food. Complaints about conditions in the military camps were followed by demands that SWAPO hold a party congress with new elections for executive seats. The latter issue in particular (ie overdue elections) seems to have been seized upon by individuals wishing personally to challenge Nujoma's leadership, notably Shipanga (who was later accused of having received money and an entertainment allowance from BOSS). The Zambian government in the meantime took into 'protective custody' 52 SWAPO dissidents, including Shipanga and Mifima, whilst a meeting was convened by Nujoma in Lusaka in an attempt to resolve the crisis.¹⁹

The repercussions inside Namibia itself seem to have been minimal; if anything, Nujoma's re-election at the Walvis Congress implied a vote of confidence in the existing leadership.

During the latter half of 1976, support for SWAPO increased dramatically throughout Namibia and particularly amongst population groups other than the Ovambos. The decision by the Rehoboth Volksparty to disband and join SWAPO²⁰ was followed by a similar decision by the leaders of an estimated 10 000 Nama-speaking people in the Southern region. The groups concerned were the Royal Hoachanas tribe, the Witboois, the Valgras Damaras and the Democratic Party of Namibia. The reason for the massive swelling of SWAPO's ranks at this time seems to have been mainly the Turnhalle's loss of credibility and impatience with the Western initiative (Kissinger), but events in Angola and Mocambique certainly contributed toward the growing support for SWAPO - which according to SWAPO now stood at between 60-70% of the country's total population. (SWAPO/NNC would get 80% of the votes

in a free election said Tjongerero in March 1976. In August 1980 former BOSS spy and foreign affairs official Ivan Himmelhoch said that SWAPO has 83% support and that SA intelligence sources had established this figure.)

THE 1976 POLITICAL PROGRAMME

In August, 1976, SWAPO's Central Committee in Lusaka issued a revised Political Programme based on the 'ideals and principles of scientific socialism'. SWAPO's goals were described as the following:

1. The realization of genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs.
2. To combat all manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation and racial discrimination in order to cement and advance the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.
3. To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and the building of a classless, non-exploitative society based on scientific socialist ideals and principles.
4. To sever all relations with the South African racist regime until there is a democratic government in the country based on the principle of majority rule.
5. Economic reconstruction...aiming at the establishment of a classless society.

Means to effect the above goals will include:

1. The abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the destructive spirit of individualism and aggrandisement of wealth and power by individuals, groups or classes.
2. Bringing all the major means of production and exchange into the hands of the people.
3. The creation of a national economy in which there is a proper balance between agriculture and industrial development along the following lines:
 - the establishment of a processing industry;
 - comprehensive agrarian reform aimed at giving land to the tillers;
 - the establishment of peasants' or farmers' co-operatives or collectives;
 - the establishment of state-owned ranching and crop farms, aimed at making Namibia a self-sufficient nation;
 - the development of the skills, knowledge and cultural creativity of the masses through free and universal education, literacy and teacher training programmes, and the expansion of technical, professional and health services etc.

Whilst this programme is phrased in socialist terminology, it does not go into any detail on the question of ownership, and in this sense is more a

statement of SWAPO's aims than a concrete development programme. The external wing later drew up a 'national programme' which included the following principles:

- a. There shall be four types of ownership, viz state owned, partially state-owned, co-operative and privately-owned enterprises;
- b. Natural resources and the principal means of transportation, communication, radio, post and telecommunications etc, as well as the means of information and mass media will be owned by the state or by the people's organisations or societies;
- c. Private ownership of property and means of production will be allowed only if it serves the interests of the people and is useful to the economic development of Namibia;
- d. Where privately owned enterprises already exist, new agreements will be reached between the government and these enterprises;
- e. Private property (eg dwelling houses, saving accounts) resulting from labour performed, or justly acquired, will be inviolable;
- f. There shall be land reform: those who acquired land during colonial times (in whatever way) will be required to enter into new agreements defining the terms by which the land or parts thereof may be owned;
- g. There will be a central bank and 'people's owned' commercial, agricultural and co-operative banks, but no private or foreign owned banks, except for those already existing which must enter into new agreements with the government;
- h. The government will work for the total elimination of unemployment...a fair salary and equal pay for equal work, will guarantee pension and other social benefits, and a system of payment according to one's contribution...
- i. There shall be trade union freedom to defend workers' interests which shall participate in the management of the country's economic sectors;
- j. Schools will be state-owned as well as owned by eg co-operatives, trade unions, religious groups and other organisations...

Thus while SWAPO inside the country at this stage (1976) refused to commit itself to a future socialist or capitalist economy but declared that this issue would have to be decided by the people, the external wing was clearly basing its political programme along the lines of a 'socialist democracy'. At the same time, the provision for some degree of private enterprise meant that the system envisaged would be quite flexible, and could hardly be described as 'Marxist'/'Communist' in the strict sense, but would be closer to what has been called 'African Socialism'. Later the internal wing began more openly to espouse the cause of economic socialism (the Youth League

in particular), although SWAPO spokesmen have been careful to emphasize that what is envisaged is not a 'Marxist State'. Dan Tjongarero said the following when interviewed in September 1978:

We are neither Marxist nor Communist. We have tendencies toward socialism, particularly African Socialism. But we are not dogmatic. Ours is a pragmatic approach towards socialism which would be for the betterment of all the peoples of Namibia.

Asked to define African Socialism, Tjongarero replied:

Examples are Tanzania and Algeria, particularly their economic policies which indicate the kind of ideology they follow. The motivating factor for us is that we want to retain a percentage of the profits flowing out of the country for further development. In certain areas we would think of nationalisation, for instance of the uranium mine. In some other sectors of the economy the tendency would be to buy shares, or majority shares within the mining industry, and in that way retain profits.²¹

Although Tjongarero claims that he is 'politically moderate', subscribing to non-alignment, a multi-party system and a 'mixed economy' for Namibia, he also says that Marxism and democracy are 'not necessarily contradictory, but can be complimentary' - especially as far as the concepts of 'collective rights' and 'worker control of the means of production' are concerned. Even the concepts of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' and 'vanguard party' are democratic, he says, 'because they have the interests of workers at heart.' (Tjongarero personally rejects the atheistic features of Marxism however, as he is strongly religious in his own beliefs. This is another area where there is some difference, though not irreconcilable, with some leaders outside the country. These leaders would never deny however, the important motivating role that religion has played in the struggle and the recognition that must be accorded the church in the post independent state.)

Thus SWAPO is basically a socialist organisation, says Tjongarero, 'but in its real essence it is nothing less than a national movement harbouring a number of different ideologies within its rank and file.'

The view that SWAPO is primarily a nationalist organisation is substantiated by Article III of

SWAPO's constitution which describes the organization as the following:

SWAPO is a national liberation movement rallying together...all freedom-inspired sons and daughters of the Namibian people. It is the organised political vanguard of the oppressed and exploited people of Namibia. In fulfilling its vanguard role, SWAPO organises, unites... and leads the broad masses of the working Namibian people in the struggle for national and social liberation. It is thus the expression and embodiment of national unity, of a whole people united and organised in the struggle for total independence and social liberation.

The reason for SWAPO's widespread support is thus not so much because of its policies, ie ideologically based, as because it is perceived as the only organisation that could liberate the country from colonial rule. It is true however that SWAPO's initial basis of support was amongst the Ovambo contract workers because SWAPO promised an end to the contract system, and that further support for the organisation derived from the fact that it opposed the implementation of South Africa's 'Bantustan' policies in Namibia. In this sense support for SWAPO was due to the organisation's declared aims and objectives, but these aims were seen as 'nationalist' and anti-colonial, rather than 'pro-worker' or 'anti-capitalist' etc.

The fact that SWAPO's military wing receives more aid (in the form of goods and equipment) from Eastern Bloc countries than from the West is often cited as evidence of its 'communist orientation', but SWAPO has repeatedly declared that the organisation is non-aligned and will take help from whoever offers it. (In any case, as far as direct financial aid is concerned, SWAPO receives more 'money' from the West - the irony is that this is then used to purchase for example, Russian weapons.)

SWAPO spokesmen inside the country are emphatic that Namibia 'will not be used as a tool in the super-power struggle' and that if the country has to be seen as lying within one or other 'camp', Namibia under SWAPO 'could well become a member of the British Commonwealth'.²² However, disenchantment with the Western group who are meant to be mediating between

SA and SWAPO has rapidly increased, as it has 'failed to bring about a transfer of power to the Namibian people', and has 'enabled the South African regime to consolidate its hold over the territory, to create puppet institutions and to undermine the territorial integrity of Namibia'.²³ It is a fair guess that SWAPO will insist on a non-aligned status for Namibia rather than inclusion in any Western alliance.

THE YOUTH LEAGUE

SWAPO's Youth League has been less compromising on the question of what type of economic system should follow Namibia's political independence:²⁴

Comrades, the struggle we are waging is aimed at doing away with the present capitalist-oriented economy and to replace it with an economy which will be geared towards catering for the needs of the masses of our people.

Articles in the publication 'Ombuze ya Namibia' have argued the necessity of socialism, and seminars organised by the Youth League have examined the practical implementation of socialist policies in a future independent Namibia.

The Youth League sees its main role as being that of politicisation and conscientisation of the masses - this is the purpose behind public rallies - as the youth of the country is seen as the 'bearer of the ideology of the revolution'.²⁵

A significant feature of this ideology is that it is specifically not anti-white. The philosophy of Black Consciousness, still popular among a section of black youth in South Africa, is spurned by SWAPO, who in a way foreshadowed such thinking by always keeping membership of the organisation open to anyone who supported its aims. This has included a few whites, one of whom (Peter Manning) is now SWAPO information secretary in London.

Anti-SWAPO propaganda has been effective in presenting SWAPO to the white population as a group of terrorists intent on killing all whites and robbing them of their property, but this picture is in sharp contrast with that given by SWAPO members themselves:²⁶

Ours is not a struggle of black against white... We are fighting against a SYSTEM of oppression. (Secondary school pupil from central Namibia).

Let me make it quite clear that our struggle has never been against individual, minority white settlers. It has been a system which denied our people basic human rights. It is for that reason that we took up arms in 1966 - in order to bring about change in that repressive situation. Therefore, I want to assure the minority white settlers in Namibia that there will be no question of robbing individuals of their properties or their belongings. We are fighting also for the liberation of the whites.....(and) we would welcome the whites who want to live in peace with us.....

THE WOMEN'S LEAGUE

WOMEN have played a particularly important role in the Namibian struggle, and recognition of this fact led to the formation of SWAPO's Women's League as early as 1969. That women had shown a particular militancy since SWAPO's earliest days, was a point made by Shipanga in an interview in 1973, when he recalled a public rally in Walvis Bay in 1959:

We were speaking about petitioning the UN to come to Namibia. Just at the close of the meeting a woman came from a section of the crowd where a number of women had been talking among themselves. She asked for the bullhorn. 'I have only a short message', she said. 'It seems that the men are only concerned with talking about the United Nations. We say: let them look after the children and prepare food for just six or nine months and we'll see quite another solution to our problems in this country'.

This critical message, said Shipanga, had an impact on the organisation, and led to the involvement of women in all aspects of the struggle, including the military. There are now at least two women field commanders on PLAN's Military Council (the 15 member Supreme Military body), as well as several hundred trained women fighters, many of whom have been involved in operations against the South African forces.²⁷ Inside Namibia, women give food, shelter and medical aid to SWAPO combatants, hide weapons and ammunition, and form groups (often under the guise of sewing or church groups) to plan future resistance.

The Women's League itself is mainly concerned

with the political education of Namibian women, and has been particularly active in the central and southern parts of the country. Seminars are held, to which men are also invited, which focus on the 'double oppression' of women under both colonialism and the traditional values which confine them to domestic duties. Material drawn from the experiences of women in Mozambique has been particularly useful in this regard.

Generally, the aim of the Women's League has been to show that the liberation of women is not separate from the struggle for the total liberation of Namibia, but is a fundamental part of that struggle. The success of their conscientisation campaigns is born out by a remark made by Zephania Kameeta in June 1977:

A liberation of the country which doesn't also include the liberation of women...is not a liberation at all. When I, as a man, participate in the liberation struggle of women, then I also liberate myself.²⁸

At SWAPO's national conference in March 1977, Martha Ford, then chairperson of the Southern Branch of SWAPO, was elected Secretary of the Women's League (or Women's Council, as it came to be known). A particularly active and militant SWAPO leader, Martha Ford was reported to have been detained in Angola after she left Namibia in 1979, for reasons which are difficult to ascertain.

1977 NATIONAL CONFERENCE

AT the 1977 National Conference, held in Katatura, SWAPO's National Executive was enlarged in accordance with the revised constitutional proposals drawn up in February, 1977. These provided for a greater measure of decentralisation of SWAPO leadership, with the creation of new executive portfolios as well as Regional Councils. These measures were also designed to accommodate the groups in the south which had recently joined SWAPO, the latest being the Namibian African Peoples' Democratic Organisation (NAPDO), which in November, 1976, became the seventh political party to join SWAPO. (A month later an organisation comprising 17 000

Herero royalists - the Association for the Preservation of the Tjenuaha/Merero Royal House, in opposition to Kapuuo - aligned itself with SWAPO. The reason for this move was given as 'the intensified divide and rule tactics by South Africa'. At this stage, what remained of the NNC and NC merged to form the NNF - SWAPO having absorbed half the members of both organisations).

Amongst those appointed to new positions on the SWAPO executive were Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi (secretary for education and culture), Alexander Gaomab, ex chairperson NAPDO (secretary for economic affairs), and Lucia Hamutenya (secretary for legal affairs). Daniel Tjongarero was appointed vice chairman of the organisation, to replace K Katamila who had left the country (this was new policy), and M Thlabanello replaced Tjongarero as secretary for publicity and information. Nashilongo Taapopi was elected secretary for the Youth League. The rest of the executive remained as it was, with Nujoma president, Muyongo vice president, and Maxuirili (whose banning order was renewed in June), chairman.

Besides the executive, however, SWAPO leadership structure now consisted of branches, districts and regional councils. (An example of the role of regional councils in the decentralisation process would be the appointment by each council in the north, south, east and west, of, say, a secretary for publicity and information, who would then assist and be responsible to the national secretary for publicity and information).

Meanwhile, it was reported in the press that hundreds of schoolchildren in Ovamboland had been 'abducted', ie forcibly recruited, by SWAPO during the past year; the latest incident being the disappearance of 110 pupils from Ohanamulenge Catholic Mission near Ombalantu on April 21, 1977. SWAPO denied that it was its policy to 'force people into the independence struggle' - in fact the organisation had appealed to young people to stay in the country - and said the question should be posed as to whether the pupils had not possibly requested

assistance to leave. This in fact seemed to be the case when 240 pupils from St Mary's Anglican Mission in Odibo crossed the border in February, 1978. Mission spokesmen denied that the students had been abducted or forced to leave, and Anglican minister Ed Morrow confirmed that the account he had received contradicted the 'abduction' theory. He said that students outside the fence surrounding the mission had seen SWAPO soldiers and told them that they wanted to leave for Angola. SWAPO men then went into the school and said they would take anyone who wanted to go. The pupils were said to have taken their leave from the primary school principal before departing.²⁹

A few months later 20 more pupils and three teachers left the school for Angola. Amongst them was the mission principal, Frank Bokhorst, who said later that there had always been lots of support for SWAPO at the school and confirmed that the departures had been voluntary - even though he himself had 'involuntarily' been taken along with them. In a statement to the press after his release nine months later, he said that he had been 'highly impressed' with the behaviour of SWAPO guerillas, and that SWAPO was 'a disciplined and well controlled organisation'.³⁰

Support for SWAPO guerillas was evidenced at the Terrorism Trial in Windhoek in May 1977, in which Reuben Ilengala, Michael Shikongo and Lazarus Guiteb were charged with infiltration and possession of Russian weapons. Hundreds of supporters packed the galleries of the courtroom and marched through the streets of Windhoek giving power salutes and bearing placards saying 'SA has no right to try Namibians', 'The struggle continues' etc.

As 'evidence' that SWAPO was a 'communist organisation', the head of BOSS, Col Ferreira, quoted from the document issued by SWAPO in Lusaka in 1976 which declared that SWAPO's aims were 'to unite all Namibian people...in a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building up a classless, non-exploitative society based on the principles of scientific socialism'. The three men

were convicted and sentenced to 12, 8 and 5 years imprisonment (the State asked for the death sentence). Passing sentence, Justice Strydom said that the men had transgressed 'because they had been members of SWAPO'. He said that SWAPO was a 'legal political organisation with illegal aims'.³¹

(At this stage it was estimated that the number of Namibians in exile may be as many as 40 000 (UN figure), at least 10 000 of whom had been trained as guerillas. According to Muyongo, there were 15 000 in Angola and many more in Zambia and elsewhere.) However, SWAPO continued to declare itself prepared to participate in 'free and fair' elections. The Western plan was thus far unacceptable though, because it did not comply with UN Resolution 385 concerning SA's withdrawal from the territory. As Tjongarero put it: SWAPO would not send Namibians to the polls 'with guns in their backs' - 'the South African army is an occupation force, not a defence force'.

TURNHALLE'S 'OVAMBO CAMPAIGN'

THE Turnhalle group was in the mean time making plans for a 10 day campaign in Ovamboland consisting of 12 meetings starting in the operational area. The announcement met with extreme anger from SWAPO (who had been prohibited under Proclamation 17 from holding a public meeting in Ovambo for five years), and they demanded that the emergency regulations apply to the Turnhalle as a political group, or else that SWAPO be given permission to hold similar meetings. Continued requests to hold a meeting met with no reply from the authorities however, so SWAPO proceeded with plans to hold a meeting at Oshakati on 9 October. (Permission was later given, but under stringent conditions - 2 till 6pm only, no weapons, no speeches undermining law and order or 'promoting violence' etc.) A newspaper report, headed '1 000 clenched fists at SWAPO Oshakati meeting' described the rally as follows:

More than 1 000 Black Power-saluting men gathered in Oshakati on Sunday at SWAPO's first meeting in war-torn Ovamboland since 1972. It marked the start of a concerted campaign planned by SWAPO

in the restricted border areas of SWA as the territory moves haltingly towards one-man-one-vote elections.

The cry 'Victory is ours' was greeted with a sea of clenched fists and chants of 'One Namibia - one nation'.

...A few policemen in camouflage uniform kept watch with binoculars on top of a nearby watertower while a large contingent of men from the Ovambo Battalion stood by in the town of Oshakati.

However, the four hour meeting ended without any incidents. Mr Moganedi Thlabanello, SWAPO's publicity secretary, accused the SA government and the Five Western nations of complicity in keeping SA troops in SWA to help UNITA rebels fight in Angola.

Mr Thlabanello said he had it on good authority that SA refused to withdraw her troops from SWA because they were busy training and arming UNITA forces in Angola. 'Suddenly UNITA is a factor in southern Angola. They have manpower, weapons and striking force.'

He said that SA was attempting to create a buffer zone in southern Angola with the help of UNITA forces. This would isolate SWA from the 'so-called Marxist' MPLA government in an effort to stop SWAPO infiltration.

...Chanting SWAPO slogans and singing freedom songs, the crowd paid tribute to Herman Toivo ja Toivo; SWAPO fighters operating in the area; and the children who had left the country to continue the armed struggle.³²

If SWAPO meetings took place without any incidents, the Turnhalle meetings did not. The Rand Daily Mail reported on 20 August 1977 claims made by the local population concerning misconduct by the SA security forces, including the killing of 18 civilians, at a Turnhalle meeting in Ovambo. At another meeting, SWAPO staged a walkout, leaving a third of the audience who proceeded to deride the speakers.

Further incidents of violence took place when DTA supporters and riot police attempted to disrupt SWAPO meetings - first at SWAPO's 'Namibia Day' celebrations on 26 August, when a group of 100 'Hereros' armed with sticks and clubs attacked SWAPO members and civilians, killing one person and injuring many others. (These were later found to have been NUDD members.) At another SWAPO meeting in Eastern Caprivi (Katime Mulilo) a group of 40 DTA supporters attempted to disrupt the proceedings, followed by riot police intervention with teargas etc. SWAPO declared that it was 'a lie' that they were allowed to campaign freely, and accused the

SA government of trying to create a civil war situation in SWA to justify its military presence.

In the meantime, SWAPO's Central Committee held its annual conference in Luanda at the end of September, to 'discuss the political and military questions of armed struggle and map out new tactics'. The Committee noted that the diplomatic initiative of the Five Western members of the Security Council 'has not changed anything, but the balkanization of the territory continues unabated, as do arrests, detentions, trials and executions'. SA's violation of Namibia's territorial integrity (Walvis Bay) was also noted, as well as the fact that SA was developing nuclear weapons and was using a testing site in the Kalahari.

SWAPO's stand therefore was that a negotiated settlement was only possible on the basis of the withdrawal of SA's armed forces, of which there were an estimated 50 000 .

MORE DETENTIONS

AT the end of 1977, Proclamation 17 was replaced by District Security Legislation, notably AG 9, which forbade people from entering certain areas and made provision for the detention of people for up to 96 hours, after which permission had to be sought from the Administrator-General (Steyn). Seven members of the SWAPO executive were immediately detained under the provisions of this legislation, including Tjongarero, Hautikulipi, Charles Sihani, Geoffrey Maezi, Simon Hiskia, and Bernadus Petrus. Whilst he was in detention, security police produced a letter signed by Tjongarero in which he denounced 'SWAPO violence' and resigned as deputy chairman. Police claimed that Tjongarero had been shocked into drafting the letter when he had been taken to see the victims of landmine explosions. After his release however, Tjongarero repudiated the letter, claiming that he had been threatened by security police until he signed the document. He said that the police had 'produced a state of disorientation by way of discomfort, menace, threats and unrelenting intimidation', keeping him standing for hours and in solitary confinement.

During this time, nine people submitted affidavits

before the Windhoek Supreme Court claiming that they had been tortured by means of electric shocks while in custody. An application for an order restraining the South African police from assaulting Youth Leaguer Bernadus Petrus (21), brought by his father who claimed that his son had been assaulted and tortured by means of electric shocks, was however dismissed by the Court on the grounds that it was not urgent. The application was supported with over 100 pages of affidavits in which 13 detainees claimed they had been tortured, nine of them with electric shocks to the body, including the genitalia. Five photographs were submitted which showed the results of electric shock treatment to the legs and genitalia of Mr Reinhold Ipinge. The application cited the Minister of Police, Mr JT Kruger and Col WF Schoon as the respondents. Two months later, in February 1978, the applicant (Mr Petrus) was granted leave to appeal against the judgement dismissing his urgent application...

During 1978, attempts to discredit SWAPO in the SA media reached an unprecedented level. In one particular incident, an SABC interview with Sam Nujoma was edited in such a way as to make it appear that Nujoma planned to seize power in Namibia regardless of elections or majority rule. Nujoma was widely quoted in SA and Windhoek newspapers as saying

The question of majority rule is out. We are not even fighting for majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in Namibia for the benefit of the Namibian people. We are revolutionaries, not counter-revolutionaries. You can talk to Kapuuo, Kerina and all those reactionaries about Majority rule, but not to SWAPO.

(In fact Nujoma was quoted completely out of context, since the previous remarks of the interviewer (Cliff Saunders) were omitted from the broadcast. The 'majority rule' being spoken about was in fact that envisaged by the SA government under the ethnically-based Turnhalle plan, which Nujoma on behalf of SWAPO was perfectly entitled to reject.) Other attempts to discredit SWAPO included the issuing of false SWAPO publications, either fake editions of 'Ombuze ya Namibia' or else purporting to be drawn up by PLAN or the external wing. In March 1978 SA claimed to

have discovered secret military plans (the so-called 'Mongolia Document') to 'seize Namibia by force' etc. SWAPO denied that this was an authentic document, saying that this and other examples of 'cheap propaganda' against SWAPO were being planted in order to 'lay the psychological ground for an internal settlement'.

CASSINGA AND AFTER

THE fact that SWAPO was more interested in an internationally acceptable solution than was SA, became more and more obvious as SWAPO prepared to make certain concessions (eg regarding the number of SA troops to remain in the country during an election period), while SA continued both its military offensive in southern Angola, as well as its repressive activities inside Namibia. On May 4, 1978, SA forces launched an attack on a SWAPO refugee camp near the town of Cassinga, 200 km from the Angolan border, killing nearly 600 refugees, mainly women and children. The SA version of the attack was they had destroyed a SWAPO military base (code-named 'Moscow') and seized a number of 'secret documents', 'terror plans' etc, but photographs taken by a number of international news agencies of a mass grave at Cassinga show that those killed (582) were refugees.

Meanwhile the assassination of Chief Clemens Kapuuo on 27 March led to the arrests of at least 42 SWAPO members under section 6 of the Terrorism Act, in the following two weeks. Twenty were released after interrogation (in what police described as 'routine' procedure), but by the end of April another 15, including senior members of the SWAPO executive, had been detained under a new security law, A-6 26. Among them were Festus Naholo, Jason Angula and Frans Kambangula, as well as several others who had participated in a celebration of Victor Nkandi's release. (Nkandi was acquitted in May 1978 after more than two years' detention on charges of murder and terrorist activities.)

At the end of May 1978, Shipanga and 18 others were released from detention in Tanzania. Shipanga was then formally expelled from SWAPO for having

plotted to overthrow Nujoma, as well as for 'misappropriating party funds'. He immediately announced his intention of returning to Namibia and forming a new party - 'SWAPO-Democrats', called SWAPO-D. Shipanga also called on Vorster to release Toivo and other political prisoners, as SWAPO had now released its 'political prisoners'. (Shipanga subsequently sought permission to visit ja Toivo on Robben Island in order to persuade him to consider joining SWAPO-D, but he was unsuccessful.)

THE 'INDEPENDENCE' ELECTIONS

IN June 1978, the SA government began its campaign to register voters for the forthcoming 'independence' elections. The press reported that even at the start of the campaign there were 'signs of resistance' from the local population, with leaflets urging people not to register appearing in Grootfontein, Tsumeb and Walvis Bay.³³

The DTA had in the meantime been conducting its recruitment drive with the help of airtransport and other gifts from 'unidentified donors', as well as from more obvious sources. These gifts included Dakota aeroplanes (plus pilots and fuel and maintenance costs), bullet proof cars, and the financial assistance necessary to buy voters' support by whatever means - whether by supplying large amounts of food and drink at DTA rallies, or by buying out newspapers (Die Algemeine Zeitung and the Advertiser). As the registration of voters campaign proceeded, evidence of SA government/DTA intimidation became more obvious: patients at mission hospitals in the north were told that if they did not take DTA cards they would not be treated, employers forced workers to register or else lose their wages or their jobs, people in the north without voter registration cards were prevented from travelling south for employment etc. Moreover, not only were people forced to register, but there was also evidence of both the illegal registration of voters and the registration of illegal voters. In the first case, the names of residents in eg Katatura were taken under false pretences, viz 'for census purposes', and then

registered, and other names were taken from graveyards. In the second case, as many as 60 000 Angolan refugees were registered as voters although they were not eligible...all this so that by the end of November, SA could claim a 93% voter registration.

Steps taken to prevent SWAPO from campaigning successfully against the election included the arrest of 70 SWAPO members at the start of the election, and their release only after SA had claimed a 78% poll in favour of the DTA. (81% in some reports.) Declaring that this result was a 'fraud', SWAPO challenged the DTA to repeat its 'success' in a UN supervised election, but the only response to this request was a thinly-veiled threat to ban SWAPO, as well as several death threats against the organisation's leaders.

FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SWAPO

DURING 1979, action against the internal wing of SWAPO under new security laws (giving the Administrator-General the power to deport people and to keep detainees for 30 days without charges), reached the point where SWAPO virtually became a leaderless movement. On 8 May, the SWAPO offices in Windhoek were ransacked and extensively damaged by what the press described as 'politically motivated thugs', later identified as a right-wing Afrikaans group called 'Die Witweerstandbeweging' (White Resistance Movement). After continued death threats to SWAPO office workers as well as the arrest of 50 members during May, Tjongarero decided to close SWAPO's National Headquarters and disband the National Executive, because 'I can't take decisions on my own'. SWAPO branch offices would remain open though, in what Tjongarero described as 'a scrapping of bureaucracy and becoming a pure people's movement'. Tjongarero was subsequently sacked as deputy national chairman by the external wing (in September), but he declared that he had no intention of giving up his SWAPO membership.

Mokganeidi Thlabanello and Lucia Hamutenya left the country after they were released from detention in July-August, and SWAPO's offices were only re-opened in March 1980. (Efforts to re-open in them in October 1979 were shortlived when Youth

League secretary Kanjore and others were detained.)

Several SWAPO members released from detention have been banned to certain districts with severe restrictions put on their movements, whilst others have fled the country having given up the long struggle to operate within the territory as a peaceful political organisation.

Nevertheless, the organisational framework continues to exist in all districts, rural and urban, and grassroots support for SWAPO is probably at least on the scale of that enjoyed by ZANU in Zimbabwe (who won 96% of the popular vote in the March 1980 elections)

It is SA's awareness of this fact that probably accounts, more than anything, for its stalling on the independence negotiations, and it is SWAPO's similar awareness (of overwhelming support for the organisation) that makes for its continued willingness to stand the test of internationally supervised elections.

Sue Cullinan

NOTES

1. R Gordon. 'Some organisational aspects of labour protest amongst contract workers in Namibia', in South African Labour Bulletin, Jan-Feb, 1978.
2. Hamutenya and Geingob. 'African nationalism in Namibia', in Potholm and Dale (eds), Southern Africa in Perspective, p 89.
3. V Ndadi. Breaking contract. LSM Press, 1974, p 64-5
4. R Moorson in South African Labour Bulletin, Jan-Feb, 1978, p 127-8.
5. Breaking contract, p 86.
6. Star, 13.11.63.
7. Shipanga.
8. RDM, 15.10.64, 07.11.64.
9. RDM, 24.07.80.
10. R Moorson in South African Labour Bulletin, *ibid*, p 124ff.
11. Serfontein.
12. Quoted in Sunday Express, 24.08.75.
13. Windhoek Advertiser, 02.09.75.

- 14. Windhoek Advertiser, 19.09.75.
- 15. RDM, 06.04.76.
- 16. Over 200 SWAPO leaders detained since August 1975.
- 17. RDM, 31.05.76.
- 18. RDM, 31.05.76.
- 19. Windhoek Advertiser, 24.05.76.
- 20. August, 1976.
- 21. Interview with Dennis Gordon, RDM, 13.09.78.
- 22. Tjongarero in Windhoek Advertiser, 22.09.78.
- 23. RDM, 15.09.80.
- 24. Opening speech, SYL Congress, March 1978.
- 25. The role of the youth in the liberation struggle, March, 1978.
- 26. Sam Nujoma - interview with AM du Preez, RDM 11.04.80.
- 27. Sunday Times, 06.02.77.
- 28. Article in Tanzania Sunday News, 03.07.77.
- 29. Star, 24.02.78.
- 30. Sunday Post, 16.09.79.
- 31. Citizen, 16.07.77.
- 32. Windhoek Advertiser, 11.10.77.
- 33. RDM, 27.06.78.

INANDA SUPPORT GROUP REPORT

What follows was prepared by the Inanda Support Group (ISG), and represents a preliminary analysis. The analysis should be seen in the context of the article on Inanda which appeared in Work In Progress 20, October 1981.

The aims and objects of the Inanda Support Group are as follows:

1. There is a great deal of confusion over the future of the Inanda area and the people who live there. To aggravate matters, the representatives of the vast majority of Inanda residents are not being consulted in any way about issues which directly affect their lives.

2. The Inanda Support Committee has been formed by residents and non-residents of Inanda in specific response to the threat of state eviction of residents.

3. The committee does not purport to act on behalf of any particular group or groups of people in Inanda but is an attempt to provide an external support structure to act wherever possible in support of those who face forced removal from Inanda.

4. The committee has two basic functions: to gather research and information, and to act as a pressure group.

- (i) Gathering research and information:
 - (a) One of the greatest needs is to gather as much information as possible on the state's plans for the future of the Inanda region;
 - (b) Pending the confirmation of development plans, the committee undertakes to monitor the situation in Inanda (eg removals);
 - (c) Events such as court cases related to eviction notices, etc, will also be monitored;
 - (d) The intention is that the findings of such research are conveyed to organisations and individuals within Inanda who aim to represent the majority of Inanda people (this would mean primarily tenants).

- (ii) Acting as a pressure group:
 - (a) To keep the plight of Inanda residents well publicised by liaising with the press, Members of Parliament, etc;
 - (b) To create awareness and support among the general public about Inanda;
 - (c) In order to clarify matters, to liaise with provincial and local authorities, etc.

5. The committee regards it as a priority to establish rapport with community groups from within Inanda in order that the work done by the support committee complements that being done by such groups inside Inanda.

6. The community can be strengthened in its position vis-a-vis the authorities only if its own resources (leadership, etc) are relied upon more, and the dependence upon 'outsiders' to 'do something' is lessened.

7. The support committee needs to be in a position to respond for calls for support from community groups within Inanda, if such calls are made.

UNTIL the recent prosecution of some residents of Released Area (RA) 33 under the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936, the area had been accorded de facto recognition as part of the Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA). Following the typhoid epidemic in 1980, the Department of Co-operation and Development (CAD), started a site and service scheme on land owned by the South African Development Trust (SADT). This scheme, now known as Inanda New Town, houses approximately 25 000 people and constitutes official recognition of Inanda as an urban area within the DMA.

Piped water to stands, pit latrines, a refuse removal service and graded roads have been provided by CAD. People have been allowed to build shacks (mjondolos) which they are then encouraged to upgrade over time. Further evidence of CAD's recognition of Inanda as an urban area is the fact that CAD commissioned professional consultants to prepare a structure plan for the development of the greater Inanda area (including RA 33) as a town. CAD officials, the Chief Commissioner, R Blumrick, the Verulam Commissioner, du Randt, sat on an advisory committee to the structure plan team. The structure plan advocates the acceptance of the squatters in RA 33 and argues that their settlements should be upgraded. The authorities have accepted the report.

For example, CAD deputy minister Morrisson, in a speech to parliament on April 22, 1982, stated that none of the present squatters would be moved, and that only 'new' squatters would be moved. He indicated that it was the intention of CAD to upgrade the area. He also recognised that RA 33 supplies the DMA's industry and commerce with a significant portion of its labour force (see Hansard, April 22, 1982, col 5133 - 5136).

The majority of the residents are of long standing (\pm 10 years); those who have moved to RA 33 from urban areas within the metropolitan area have done so because of overcrowding in the formal townships resulting from insufficient housing provision by the government. People who are prosecuted and evicted will therefore merely find another site within the metropolitan area on which they can build their house, or rent/sub-let a room. By removing people from Inanda, RA 33, the authorities will not solve what they see as the 'squatter problem'. They will merely transfer the 'problem' to somewhere else within the DMA, where presumably the squatters will once again be prosecuted, evicted and removed.

It should be noted that the authorities have resorted to the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 in order to remove the residents of Inanda. This legislation was intended to control settlement in the released areas, which were rural at the time. Initially, in 1981, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act was used against RA 33 residents. However, section 1(a) of the Act permits people to live on land with the permission of the landowner. This is the case in RA 33, where the land is held under freehold title by african and indian landowners. They have given permission to the squatters to live on their properties. Following the outbreaks of cholera and typhoid, the Commissioner in Verulam threatened landowners, particularly indian landowners, with prosecution unless they provided adequate water and sanitation services to their tenants, or failing this, evicted them.

Since CAD had not put in any of the bulk main infrastructure, it would have cost the landlords millions of rands to do so. This was an obvious ploy by the authorities to hide behind the backs of the landowners, and for them to be seen to be 'responsible' for evictions. However, this strategy failed because african landowners ignored the threat, as did the tenants on indian-owned land. The indian landlords are in a more vulnerable position since CAD, through the SADT, has threatened to buy

up their land. They, therefore, were under greater pressure to issue eviction notices to their tenants, which some did - and which were mostly ignored since the people had nowhere to move to.

A new tactic has been adopted by the Verulam Commissioner's office. They had pressurised an indian landowner into collecting all the names and reference book numbers of his tenants. The ISG believes that the Commissioner will try to use these to determine who is employed/unemployed, and then evict the unemployed. This tactic would be designed to divide the community, and further destabilise it. Evidence of the Commissioner's attitude is contained in a letter, dated 11 March, 1982, to the lawyers of some Nhlungwane residents:

The employment position (of Nhlungwane residents faced with eviction) is no concern of mine at all, as every person in registered employment assured the labour officer, Durban, that he/she has approved accommodation in either KwaMashu and Ntuzuma or the other residential areas such as Umhlabi, Chesterville, Lamontville and the hostels. These people must return to such approved accommodation described above or that which was assured them by the employer on his premises and return their families to the areas where they were not unlawfully squatting. Failing this, I will have to complain to the authority that they are squatting in my area and this could result in hardship.

It is this Group's belief that the strategy and tactics of the authorities are deliberately designed to create racial tension and to divide the community against itself.

However, since the strategy has failed, the Commissioner's office has resorted to using the Development Trust and Land Act. At the same time the whole picture has been obscured and confused by authorities taking different public stands on the right of the residents of RA 33 to remain in the area. From a reading of deputy minister Morrisson's statement in parliament, 22 April, 1982, it is clear that he means that only people who move into RA 33 after that date will be regarded as illegal residents, and, therefore, prosecuted and removed. Yet, the legal document makes it clear that the Commissioner at Verulam, Mr du Randt, has

embarked on a programme of evicting all persons who are illegally resident in RA 33 in terms of the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. What follows is a quote from a document, prepared by the Durban LRC.

In December 1981 an unknown number of residents of an area known as Nhlungwane within the trust-owned land, had numbers chalked on the doors of their houses by officials from the Department of Co-operation and Development. No reason or explanation was given.

On 22 January, 1982 18 of these people were arrested, jailed and those who could afford bail were released pending a court hearing in February 1982.

On 9 February 1982 the first accused pleaded not guilty to charges in terms of Section 1 of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, 52 of 1951. He alleged that land upon which he lived was sold to him by an elderly Black man who held himself out as the owner of the land.. He accordingly 'purchased' the land in good faith and had no knowledge of its ownership by the Development Trust. He had legal representation and was acquitted on the basis of lack of wilful intention to commit a crime. The remainder of the cases were postponed until 19 May 1982.

The commissioner for the Verulam area Mr B du Randt then instructed agents to serve eviction notices on residents in the area concerned. 259 notices were issued and 1 April 1982 was given as a deadline date for voluntary removal, failing which demolition would take place.

A temporary reprieve in respect of these evictions was granted by the Verulam commissioner following an admission made by Department officials in Cape Town that the issuing of the notices was a misunderstanding. (See Sunday Tribune article, 4 April 1982). Following this incident the Assistant Mr P Webber stated in public that only persons who entered onto trust owned land after the date of its purchase from an Indian landowner, would be prosecuted i.e. June 1981. He also advised residents that each proposed eviction would be investigated on its merits. The Chief Commissioner for Natal Mr R Blumrick has also stated (telex to Sunday Tribune 2 April 1982) that only persons who arrived after the purchase by the trust would be prosecuted. Both the Chief Commissioner and the Verulam Commissioner have stated that the eviction of illegals would continue despite prior undertakings to stay evictions - in fact the reprieve or stay or eviction is not presently acknowledged by the Verulam commissioner. Certain of the squatters in the Nhlungwane area who are currently being prosecuted arrived in the area many years before June 1981. Further prosecutions have

occurred in the past weeks - on 23 April approximately 23 persons resident on privately owned (Indian) land within the released area were arrested and imprisoned on charges in terms of Section 26(1)(b) of the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. Bail was granted and the accused appeared in court on Verulam on 6 May 1982. None of the accused had received charge sheets prior to their appearance and the charge sheets were drafted at approximately 8:45 on the morning of the hearing. A magistrate had been arranged specially for the hearing, in normal circumstances he is a Commissioner in Pinetown. Legal representatives applied for a remand which was granted, until 10 June 1982.

The landowner of the property in question charged under Section 26(1)(b) of the same Act and also appeared on the same day. The case was remanded until 10 June 1982.

From discussions with the commissioner at Verulam Mr du Randt, his assistant Mr Webber, and Mr Engelbrecht, an additional commissioner, it is clear that there is little appreciation of the implication of the eviction of 96% of illegal squatters in the area. Mr Du Randt stated when asked where he expected people to go upon being evicted that it was not incumbent upon him as commissioner for Verulam to cater for people not legally resident in this area. He expressed the view that the men were hostel-dwellers from Durban and that the women and children were from the rural areas of KwaZulu and had illegally joined their menfolk in contravention of the influx-control laws. Mr Engelbrecht denied that the majority of the people comprised the overflow from townships like KwaMashu and Ntuzuma and also was of the view that the vast majority of the illegals in Inanda had families and farms to return to in KwaZulu rural areas. He appealed to the accused's legal representative not to inform the press of proposed evictions and court hearings, as the adverse publicity had the effect of delaying matters and creating an awareness among other residents. He stated that the intention of the commissioner was to secure efficient eviction and demolition, and to transport people so affected by bus and truck to the areas from whence they allegedly came.

By Du Randt's own admission illegals constitute 96% of the population. Just how many people this involves, would vary according to which population estimate is correct. Deputy minister Morrisson spoke of 300 000 squatters in his speech to parliament. Urban Foundation estimates put the figure at 100 000 - 120 000. What is interesting to note, however, is that in May, 1980, a survey by the Port Natal Administration Board, estimated the

population of RA 33 to be 58 000. On the other hand, Urban Foundation estimates, based on dwelling counts from aerial photographs of November, 1979, arrived at 86 000.

If one is to believe the authorities, then there has been a 500% increase in the population of RA 33 in two years. This would bolster the deputy minister's argument that 'people were streaming in by the thousand' (Daily News, 23.04.82). This Group rejects the official population estimate as spurious and inaccurate, as one designed to give a false picture of the situation in RA 33, and thus enable the authorities to argue that prosecutions, evictions and removals are necessary.

The actions and statements of the commissioner's office, with respect to lands purchased by the SADT, are similarly contradictory. First, Du Randt issued eviction notices to the residents on the SADT lands. Second, the chief commissioner announced these were a mistake. Third, the assistant commissioner stated that only those who moved onto the land after June, 1981, would be prosecuted. Fourth, prosecutions against the residents are proceeding, whether they were on the land before or after June, 1981.

This Group believes that the public statements by the authorities have been designed to mask the real intention of wholesale evictions and removals of the residents of RA 33. Further, it endorses the statement in the legal documents that 'the commissioners responsible for the administration of the area...embarked on a policy of destabilisation of illegal resident...'

The strategy of the commissioners and CAD becomes clearer, when an analysis of the whole water issue is made.

In June, 1979, the Urban Foundation produced a report and plan for the installation of piped water supply to RA 33. This would cost R1,8-m as at 1980. The report also investigated alternative methods of supplying water, such as by mobile water tankers, but rejected these. For example, concerning the water tankers, it concluded that:

This system holds no hope for improving the present situation in respect of increasing the per capita water supply. It would without doubt create major operational problems...and would create an ideal situation for exploitation and corruption (see Inanda Water Supply document, June, 1979:5).

In 1980 a typhoid epidemic broke out in RA 33. A number of authorities and interested parties (excluding community representatives) established a committee in March to tackle the water problem. Represented, at a meeting on 15 March, were the Natal Provincial Administration, the Urban Foundation, Port Natal Administration Board, the Durban City Engineer's Department, PUTCO, the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Co-operation and Development, the Commissioner's office, and the SADF.

An emergency tanker service, operated by the Department of Water Affairs and the SADF, was initiated on Monday, 17 March. Within weeks, 23 distribution points had been established. Costs were running at R8 400 per week. Meanwhile, the Urban Foundation, the Department of Water Affairs and the Umgeni Water Board all proposed that a piped water supply be installed as a long-term measure.

The Umgeni Water Board had studied the Urban Foundation report, and had concluded that it was 'feasible and could be implemented by the Umgeni Water Board' - and that the scheme would provide the residents of RA 33 with 'an assured portable water supply' at a 'lower unit cost of water'. However, the Board noted that 'before it could undertake the above proposals the Umgeni Water Board would require an agreement by exchange of letters with the Local Authority or Government Department responsible for the area' (see letter from the UWB chairman to the Urban Foundation, 5 June, 1980).

At that time it had not been established which the 'Government Department responsible' was. It was only after the March, 1980, crisis that the CAD accepted that it was responsible for the area. It then took over the tanker supply system, reducing the number of distribution points to seven (Daily News, 04.06.81), and has operated ever since at a

cost to date which exceeds that of the original estimate of installing a permanent water supply (Sunday Tribune, 13.12.81; Daily News, 05.12.81). However, on one occasion, October, 1981, the Department stopped supplying water to RA 33. As a result of the public outcry which followed, the Department 'reconsidered' its action and resumed the supply.

Shortly thereafter, the Department began to threaten the indian landlords to install a water supply or evict their tenants.

In the 1982 budget money was made available for the installation of a bulk main reticulated water supply system and standpipes for RA 33. Whilst the ISG is not in possession of clear information, our information does indicate that the following events occurred: The technical division of CAD briefed engineering consultants to install the water system; the consultants designed a system with standpipes which would make available clean water to all RA 33 residents; that the consultants planned to put standpipes on private land; and that the first standpipes would be operational by June, 1982. However, it appears that the Chief Commissioner was unaware of these intentions and will only allow bulk water mains to be installed along the public road reserve and that no standpipes will be put in until next year.

The picture is, therefore, somewhat confusing. On the one, hand, the authorities appear to recognise the permanency of the squatters, and intend supplying urban services to them. Yet, on the other hand, some appear to be set on withholding these services until they have cleared out the squatters.

This Group can only conclude, along with Mr J Rivett-Carnac, the Urban Foundation engineer who drew up the original water report and plan, that 'the Government is using the water supply as a weapon to clear the area, because there is no other logical reason for not installing a bulk water supply'(see Daily News, 05.11.81).

The Inanda Support Group calls for all prosecutions, evictions and removals by the authorities of residents of RA 33 to be stopped, and for the authorities, in

consultation with democratic community leaders, to develop the area.

WAGES IN THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY

IN February and March about 1 800 workers - african and coloured - went on strike in at least 20 clothing factories on the Witwatersrand.

The stoppages lasted from a few hours to two to three days. Workers demands were uniform - a R3,00 immediate wage increase.

In most cases the unions representing the workers, the National Union of Clothing Workers (african) and the Garment Workers' Union (coloured and whites) were called in to settle the disputes. In all cases workers received or were promised wage increases ranging from R2 - R4 per week. In other instances, however, employers refused to grant wage increases but were prepared to grant increases in either attendance or production bonuses. Attendance bonuses (forfeited if a worker is half-an-hour late in any one week) are set at R1,00 for an unqualified worker and R1,50 for a qualified worker, although some employers pay more. Increases in attendance bonuses ranged from R1,50 to R5,00 and in production bonuses to R5,00.

The stoppages had a ripple effect throughout the industry with other employers granting their workers R3,00 increases to avoid the outbreak of workstoppages at their factories.

This unrest was not an isolated phenomenon, however, but part of an emerging trend. Clothing workers have struck for higher wages in the beginning months of the year for the last three years. It is no coincidence that the unrest has occurred then -

because it is in these months that workers feel the financial pinch the most: they return from the holiday break with little money and have to face expenses such as school fees, etc, in addition to normal price increases. Furthermore, the fact that the first few months tend to be slack periods in the industry as opposed to the months leading up to Christmas when workers augment their wages by working overtime, increases their poverty at such a time.

The strikes reflect worker dissatisfaction with the low minimum wages set out in the 1979 industrial council agreement for the Transvaal which laid down rates for the three years to 1982.

This agreement allowed for a 7,5% increase in 1979-80, a further 7,5% increase in 1980-81, and a 5% increase in 1981-82. Thus, a qualified machinist's wage rose to R26,35 per week from September, 1979, to June, 1980, to R28,20 from 1 July, 1980, to 30 June, 1981, and R29,40 to July, 1982. Given that at the time the agreement was negotiated the inflation rate was above 14% and showed no signs of abating, the parties to the industrial council were in effect negotiating wages for the following three years which would lead to a real drop in workers' wages.

The strikes in 1980 and 1981 led the unions to seek a remedy to the situation and resulted in interim agreements being reached in those years which amended the main agreement. In 1980 the unions negotiated a 10% increase instead of the 7,5% set out in the 1979 agreement (they originally asked for 12,5%); in 1981 an 11,5% increase was agreed to instead of the 5% due, with the agreement coming into effect in April rather than in July. This brought a qualified machinist's wage to a still low R33,00 per week. Machinists form the bulk of the workforce. This year, however, employers turned down a union request for an interim wage increase to meet the rise in the cost of living. And it was this decision which seems to have been the main factor in precipitating the recent worker unrest.

In support of their refusal to grant interim increases in 1982 employers argued that as the unions were party to the 1979 agreement they should not ask

for interim wage hikes for the workers. Before this year's wage talks the unions stated that they would not negotiate a three-year agreement; however, they have not adhered to this, and the latest agreement again allows for set increases for the next three years.

In terms of the agreement negotiated in April, wages for machinists increased by 27,3% from R33,00 to R42,00, as well as across-the-board (ie all workers receiving the increase for their class, no matter what the wage is). The increase after 01.01.83 will be R3,06, bringing the wage to R45,00, and R4,00 (8,9%) after 01.07.83, bringing the wage to R49,00. The wage hikes received by the workers as a result of the strikes, however, will be offset against these increases.

Although a 27,3% increase is an improvement over that of the previous year, absolute wages remain very low. Moreover, the increases for 1982/3 and 1983/4 will predictably fall well below the rise in the cost of living index for those years, thus again leading to a reduction in the workers' real wages. One can only assume that workers will again show dissatisfaction with these increases.

Exactly how abysmally low clothing workers' wages are in the Transvaal is illustrated by comparing their wages with those of Australian garment workers. The current rate for a machinist in Australia is R187,91 per week. Since December, 1980, a machinist's wage was increased from R143,45 per week to R187,91. The relevant union in Australia estimates that the wage will rise to over R199,00 by July, 1982, as a result of a 6,4% mid-term adjustment and claims for supplementary benefits. Thus, garment workers' wages in the Transvaal compare very unfavourably with those of Australian clothing workers even allowing for a slightly higher cost of living in that country. Workers in the Transvaal receive less in one month than what workers there receive in one week!

The question to be asked, obviously, is why are wages so low? Part of the reason has to do with the historical entry of women (and after 1945 in particular black women) into the production process, the conditions

under which they entered the industry, their position in the industry according to their levels of skill, and the development of the trade union movement. This article, however, will not explore this earlier period, but rather concentrate on more recent times.

One of the main reasons for workers' low wages seems to lie with the nature of the wage bargaining process. Minima negotiated at the industrial council level are generally set downwards, that is to take into account the position of the smaller, less profitable concerns. The absence of plant level bargaining means that there is little pressure on the larger, more profitable companies, who could afford to pay more, to raise their wages substantially above these minima.

Furthermore, one must also ask why the unions have been party to agreements which have allowed for such poor increases on prescribed minima. The unions themselves give two interrelated reasons for this: the economic constraints governing the clothing industry, and the intransigence of employers at the negotiating table.

The unions say that in the past they have been unable to ask for increases in line with the rise in the cost of living as this would have adversely affected the industry in the Transvaal. They, along with the employers, argue that certain constraints facing the industry make it impossible for higher wages to be paid. The major constraint, it is that the industry is labour intensive, thus any increases in wages would drastically affect the amount spent on labour as a percentage of total costs. This together with the factors below, they claim, make the payment of higher wages prohibitive. What is being raised here, is really the tricky question of company profits.

What are the other factors in working against a higher payment of wages? One of them, according to employers, is the strong competition from other areas, both locally and internationally.

'Homeland' and border area employers are exempt from wage regulating measures, enabling them to pay lower wages than Transvaal employers. Wages in wage

determination areas are also lower: the minima in terms of the 1981 wage determination for certain areas are as follows:-

Magisterial Districts	Qualified Machinist*		Learner*	
	May 1981	May 1982	May 1981	May 1982
Harrismith Klip River Port Shepstone	R24,80	R27,40	R13,60	R16,20
Camperdown Uitenhage Umzinto	R28,00	R30,80	R15,50	R18,30
Mossel Bay Newcastle Rustenburg *Wages per week	R26,40	R29,20	R14,40	R17,20

Thus wages for a qualified machinist vary from R11,21 to R14,60 per week less than those in the Transvaal industry. However, as one wage board area employer pointed out at the 1981 wage board hearing for the clothing industry, this difference is offset by the advantage which metropolitan employers experience regarding lower transport costs, closer proximity to markets, etc. Wage determination area employers also face problems with less skilled and, therefore, less productive workers, a higher rate of turnover, etc.

Employers also argue that they have to pay lower wages because they face competition from the Far East. They cite, for example, the Government's relaxation on the granting of import permits as a major threat to the industry. This, however, only occurred in 1980, and local employers still enjoy a virtual monopoly situation, producing 85% of the value of goods for the local market, as opposed to 90% previously. At the same time, however, 1980 and 1981 have been boom years for the clothing industry with rapid expansion and growth; thus it seems unlikely that the increase in imports has really adversely affected the industry. Furthermore, as has been seen, Australian employers pay considerably higher wages even though Australia is on the doorstep of the Far East.

Employers and the unions argue that the industry in the Transvaal was also badly hit by the introduction of section 3 of the Environment Planning Act (1967),

which pegged the numbers of africans employed on the Witwatersrand to January, 1968, levels, thus preventing expansion of the industry in this area, then the home of the majority of factories in the Transvaal.

There is little doubt that this measure did retard the expansion of the industry in the Transvaal - so between 1966 and 1975 there was a growth of only 2% in the Transvaal urban centres, while in the western Cape there was a 98,4% growth, and in the Durban and Pinetown areas a 112,5% growth. Numbers in the Transvaal dropped from 27 500 employees in January, 1968, to 18 803 in February, 1980. This reduction was not only due to the Planning Act, but also to the 1976-77 recession. Since 1977, however, exemptions from the Act have been granted to Transvaal employers and this, coupled with the boom in the industry, has brought numbers up to about 25 000 at present. The employers' argument that the Planning Act measure necessitated the payment of low wages is open to question. On the contrary, it could be argued that it was necessary to pay higher wages to attract highly skilled workers in order to increase productivity, and the quality of the garments produced.

One of the threats commonly used by employers is that the payment of higher wages will lead to cutbacks in staff and thus unemployment.

A closer examination of unemployment patterns in the 1970s, however, reveals, firstly, that unemployment is linked more to the general state of the economy - ie to periods of recession - than to the other constraints mentioned.

Secondly, however, not all workers are equally threatened by possible redundancy during recession. For example, during the 1976/7 slump, it was mainly the general workers who were affected, and not the skilled workers such as machinists. Currently, there is full employment and even a shortage of machinists.

Thus, while unemployment may be a problem for certain classes of workers during certain times, it is not as severe as employers tend to make out.

As mentioned earlier, employers argue that given these constraints, higher wages will put them out of

business. Insolvencies do occur - there were 17 in 1979. These are obviously the smaller employers who are more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market. However, there are many large employers who could arguably withstand a drop in profits without going under. An examination of the 1981 financial statements of a number of public companies indicates that they realised very healthy profits in that year. W and A, for example, showed a taxed profit of R8 447 000 in 1981 (69% higher than in 1980). The question is, of course, whether all workers should suffer from low wages in order to subsidise the poorer factories. In the words of one garment worker - 'It is better not to work and starve, than to work and starve'.

It seems then that although the industry does face constraints, the employers' arguments are not sufficient to suppress wages to the extent to which they have. It seems too, that the unions have internalised most of the employers' arguments, and, therefore, their standards of profitability and have accepted over the years that companies can only pay what they say they can. (One of the problems facing the unions at the wage talks is the fact that the companies' financial statements are not made available to them - thus they have only the employer's word regarding the real financial state of the company).

However, not only have the unions asked for lower wages to start off with, they have also compromised on these demands to reach a settlement with employers. Unions say that they are forced to do this because they have no other option. Wage negotiations have tended to end in deadlock with employers then refusing to go to arbitration, leaving the unions with the option of calling a legal strike or giving in to employer demands. And workers, they say, have been reluctant to strike. It is not possible to test this claim absolutely, but the fact that about 4 000 workers went on strike in 1973, and the outbreak of strikes over the last three years leads one to question this view.

There is no doubt that the unions themselves have shown a cautious attitude to striking, especially

where strikes are wildcat in nature. This year, for instance, Dr Anna Scheepers, president of the GWU, appealed to striking workers

not to take things into your own hands. It is illegal to strike and by doing so you put yourselves and the union in a difficult position. The unions are about to negotiate a new agreement which will of course cover all factories. Until then workers should not do anything to disrupt the industry and undermine their own case. Above all, workers must not think they can strike and negotiate their own increases over and above the union increases.

The irony is that it is this worker action which has led employers to grant interim increases, and that workers have reached a point where they are prepared to 'take things into their own hands' to ensure they do get more substantial increases. Although the unions may be convinced by the employers' arguments, it seems increasingly that the workers are not. By striking they are in a sense 'making up' for the lack of militancy of the union officials at the bargaining table.

Questions, however, need to be raised not only on the unions' performance at the bargaining table but on their organising strategy in general.

The unions at present represent workers in the major metropolitan areas and some towns in the Transvaal - however, there are areas, for example those covered by the wage board, where workers remain completely un-unionised. To date the NUCW, in particular, has shown little interest in organising among these workers in order to raise their wages. The irony is that it is these workers' employers whom the unions say are holding down wages in the metropolitan areas by providing unfair competition.

At the 1981 wage board talks the industrial council in the industry for the various provinces did present proposals on raising wages in the wage determination areas - however, this is no substitute for direct bargaining at those factories. The lack of active organising at plant level in the metropolitan areas has already been pointed to as one of the probable reasons for low wages there.

What the recent strikes also reveal, perhaps, is a growing distance between the union officials and

rank and file and a feeling on the part of the workers that the union has failed to represent them adequately.

While much more research needs to be undertaken on the union organisation on the factory floor, a recent research work suggests that organisation amongst the shop stewards in the NUCW is poor, that workers in the factory have little confidence in the ability of shop stewards to fight for improved conditions on their behalf, and that the shop stewards themselves feel unsupported by the union.

Workers also complain that they only see union officials when there is a dispute.

This lack of communication suggests that workers have no way of making their own demands known. Indeed, there is an indication, as evidenced in the statement quoted earlier, that the unions feel that it is not the workers' business in any case ...

LIST OF STRIKE HIT FACTORIES

Factory	Number of workers on strike
Elmer (cutting dept)	about 30
Jays	unknown
Lovable	unknown
Pride Knit	about 200
Ram Sam Clothing	about 30 - 60
Elmer Clothing	about 200 - 300
Lesero	about 70 - 80
Navada	about 200 - 300
SA Weatherwear	about 100
Henochsberg	about 475 - 500
Adonis Knitwear	about 200
Remarque Wear	about 150
RMB Dress	unknown
Suki Crawford	about 40
Tesnem	about 40
SM Nudulman	about 42
JC Belts	5
Braeder Belts	about 30 - 40
CMT Undies	about 6
Blue Line	about 60

SOURCES

1. Interviews with Dr Anna Scheepers of the GWU and Mrs S Chitcha of the NUCW.
2. Interviews with Transvaal and Cape clothing industries' industrial councils.
3. Interviews with Mr F Whitacker of the National Federation of Clothing Manufacturers.
4. Barrett, J - 'Knitmore: a study in the relationship between sex and class' (unpublished dissertation, 1981).

5. Annual Survey of Race Relations for the years 1970-81 (SAIRR)
6. Lewis, Jon - 'Solly Sachs and the Garment Workers' Union', in *SALB*, 3,3 (October, 1976).
7. Various editions of 'Saamtrek', the newspaper of the Garment Workers' Union.
8. Press clippings for the years 1970-81.
9. Wage Board Report on its investigation into the clothing industry, 1981.
10. Various wage determinations and industrial council agreements in the industry.

INFORMATION

Labour Action

INTRODUCTION

SEVERAL issues have dominated the labour scene in the past few weeks, the most important being further moves at uniting the independent trade unions.

Industry-wide clashes between the owners of the means of production and workers have been going on for a while now - in the metal industry (see *WIP* 22), in the clothing industry (see above), and in mining between unions representing white miners and the Chamber of Mines. Another issue of growing importance has been that of retrenchment, cuts in overtime, and shortening of working time as capitalism goes into another deep crisis in South Africa (with negative growth rates being predicted). The working class is being made to suffer for the ills of capital (even sportspeople receiving and continuing to receive their cut of profits - see SA Breweries strike below).

It is not possible to go into any of these issues in any depth. A few comments will be made, introducing the strike information below.

In a statement made by the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), the union rejected low wages and management threats of retrenchment. The MAWU pointed to the enormous profits being made while the cost of living (COL) was soaring and wages for workers falling behind (*Sowetan*, 24.03.82).

The spate of strikes on the east Rand have centred around both the stalled, and widely rejected, industrial council negotiations, and retrenchments (eg at the Genrec subsidiaries - see below). Strikes and the dismissal of strikers have been used to retrench 'surreptitiously', in that not a full complement of workers are taken on again.

In the eastern Cape there have been retrenchments at several factories (eg Volkswagen, Bosal Afrika, SKF, National Standard (*Star*, 31.03.82)). The workers in the motor and allied industries, both in this region and in the rest of the country, have been hardest hit by capital's cutting of costs and,

therefore, of labour. The Sigma Motor Corporation has retrenched 507 workers, Datsun 150, Volkswagen 316, while Ford has announced short time.

With wage negotiations in this industry in the eastern Cape due shortly, employers are expected to warn workers of 'harm to the industry' through 'excessive' wage demands, and consequent (!) retrenchment. Isn't it strange how profits are never 'harmful'.

The building and construction industries are also said to be entering a slump with many projects being cancelled. This cannot but lead to more retrenchments (see, for example, article in *Sunday Times*, 09.05.82).

The Bureau for Economic Research at Stellenbosch has predicted that unemployment in South Africa will rise by 66% in the next five years, following a 100% increase during the previous six years (*Star*, 17.05.82).

ST 140382 Little rise in labour

By Elizabeth Rouse

SOUTH Africa sailed through the biggest boom in its history on a remarkably small increase in its mining and industrial labour force.

The workforce of the mining, quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity, transport and communications sectors rose by a mere 6% from November 1979 to November 1981 from 2 668 000 to 2 845 000.

The increase from November 1980 to November last year was a mere 2.4%.

These small percentage increases in the labour force reflect the greater degree of mechanisation in South Africa's industries - a trend which started in the 1970s.

The high degree of mechanisation could have been achieved only in a young industrial country. Even the labour-intensive mining and construction industries underwent a transformation.

The number of black workers, who make up 63.7% of the total workforce in these sectors, increased by an overall rate of 6% over the two years, while the number of white workers rose by 5%.

Last year the monthly wage bill of workers in these sectors showed an increase of 25.2% to R1 634-million at November 1981. Since November 1979 it had leapt by 56.7%.

On a year's basis whites earned 24.5% more and on a two-year basis 46.8% more, with their total wage bill at over R200-million in November 1981.

On similar bases, blacks earned 27.6% and 54.4% with their total wage bill at R205-million in November last year.

In the mining industry talks between the Council of Mining Unions (representing 25 000 whites) and the Chamber of Mines ended in a second deadlock on 13 April. The chamber had offered a 5% increase, rejected by the CMU, who then declared a dispute (the CMU is asking for a COL increase of between 15 and 16%).

Arrie Paulus, of the Mineworkers Union (MWU), was blunt when the Chamber argued that they could not pay more 'due to the general state of the economy'. 'It's not the Chamber's problem to worry about the economy. We have a government to do that and they set a good example by increasing their own salaries 15% and their allowances 20%' (*Sunday Express*, 02.05.82).

In the metal industries a dispute was declared by the unions in wage negotiations affecting some 450 000 workers (ADM, 15.04.82). Seifsa had offered the workers a 25c across the board increase and a minimum rate of R1,38. The unions were demanding a

minimum rate of R1,63, and an increase of 50c an hour for artisans and 30c an hour for 'lower grades'.

The metal industries industrial council was set to meet again on 11 May. Further developments will be too late to discuss here.

NATAL

Consolidated Textile Mills (Jacobs): On Friday, 7 May, 150 spinning workers went on strike at this Frame group firm. On Monday, 10 May, 1 000 fellow workers joined them and gathered at the factory gate the next morning.

The spinning workers went on strike due to a cut in the hours they could work overtime, said, by managing director Selwyn Lurie, to be due 'to the economic downturn'. This cut had affected only the spinning department.

It is some comment on the wages being paid these workers if they are willing to go on strike for the 'favour' of working overtime.

The outcome is not known at the time of going to print.

Corobrik (Durban): On Monday, 1 March, 52 workers stopped work. This action followed a refusal by six workers, on the Friday before, to do certain kinds of work in the intense heat - and management responding that they would then be 'considered to have dismissed themselves' (Natal Mercury, 04.03.82).

By Wednesday (03.03.82) 'everything was back to normal', according to management.

Henkel (SA) (Durban): See WIP 22:29 & 31. On 9 March the workers at Henkel went on strike - workers and the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) claim that the strike was provoked by management (through repeated refusal to negotiate with the union) in order to be able to fire workers and re-employ non-unionised workers at a lower rate and at longer hours of employment (see the CWIU's booklet entitled *The Workers' Struggle at Henkel*).

Two hundred and thirty workers were dismissed immediately and scab labour employed (under worse conditions), including 75 of the striking workers.

The Henkel company is owned jointly by Anton Rupert's Rembrandt company and the West German Henkel chemical company.

Late in March the Rembrandt group refused to enter the conflict, on the grounds that it was not involved in the management of the Henkel factory.

BEAT THE WHITE GIANT
BOYCOTT
Henkel
PRODUCTS
SUPPORT THE CHEMICAL WORKERS

ISSUED BY CHEMICAL WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION



Rembrandt

The CWIU then called for a boycott of the company's products. The CWIU was demanding negotiating rights and the reinstatement of fired workers.

On 7 April Prof Swart, chairperson of the National Manpower Commission's industrial relations committee, entered the picture with an announcement that he would participate in negotiations (because of the position that Rupert occupies in the new direct links between state and capital?).

In mid-April it was announced that the strike had been settled. The Fosatu-affiliated CWIU won the reinstatement of 100 workers, a ballot on weekly working hours, a timetable for union recognition, and a retrenchment procedure was worked out. The boycott was dropped.

KwaZulu Shoe Company - Bata (Loskop, near Estcourt): See WIP 22:31. It appears that there have been two strikes at this firm. The first over a dismissal and union recognition and the second in mid-March (12 March) over the dismissal of a shop steward (see, for example, Natal Mercury, 20.03.82).

The Canadian Consulate in Johannesburg was reported not to have known about this particular factory in which Bata (a Canadian company) has majority shares, and which pays bantustan wages of about one third industrial council rates.

By 23 March all but 100 workers were said to have returned to work. Management still refused to negotiate with Fosatu's National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW).

A reported planned meeting between KwaZulu Minister of the Interior (!), Dr Frank Mdlalose, proved to be impossible when Mdlalose and Gatsha Buthelezi left for Germany.

Five KSC workers appeared in the Estcourt magistrates' court on 26 March, two of them charged with assault and all five with malicious damage to property. They were to reappear on 15 April.

Dr Mdlalose (on his return) said that the KwaZulu 'government' expected companies to listen to workers grievances and allow them to establish their own trade unions' (Natal Mercury, 09.04.82).

In mid-April workers were said to be returning to work, having been 'betrayed' by the KwaZulu labour officer, ZA Khanyile, sent by Dr Mdlalose to settle the dispute (Star, 16.04.82).

An NUTW statement issued as comment on the strike read as follows:

The struggle for union recognition at the Loskop Bata Shoe factory has taken a new turn. The workers, who have been on strike for over a month, at a meeting on Wednesday 14 April, decided to return to work.

The decision follows the complete failure of the KwaZulu appointed Mr Khanyile to mediate in the dispute. The bitter frustration and disappointment with Mr Khanyile reached a climax

when it became known that Mr Khanyile had been to the factory secretly and had formed his own committee amongst the strike-breakers. Mr Khanyile claims to have mediated between that committee and the company, thereby fully satisfying himself that the workers' claims were unfounded, their grievances false and the union completely unrepresentative. Workers resolved that the union should formally write to the KwaZulu Minister who appointed Mr Khanyile for clarity as to whether the KwaZulu Government is satisfied that Khanyile properly represented the intentions of the KwaZulu Government, and if so whether they are satisfied that the company is complying with their labour policy.

... An official complaint will be launched with the ILO in connection with the company's anti-union practises and its policy of paying wages approximately 20% of that recommended by all international bodies, including the Canadian Government and the ILO itself.

This disgusting piece of public relations appeared in the Natal-based Sunday Tribune, shortly after the strike. Note the prominence given to the exploitative bantustan factory belonging to the company (arrowed for the convenience of our readers).

BATA walks it ^{STB 040582} after a modest start

BATA started to become a world name in shoe production from the time that Thomas J. Bata's Czechoslovakian father founded a factory in that country in 1894.

Eighty-eight years later it is a success story that has crept into the economic annals of more than 100 countries with almost as many factories churning out millions of shoes, boots, slippers and other footwear each year.

And so it is with SA Bata Shoe Company, a factory set in park-like surroundings on five hectares in the industrial complex of Pinetown.

For, from a modest start with 428 staff and

an output of 750 000 units in 1955, SA Bata's development has taken them to the stage where, within a quarter of a century, they produce 7 500 000 pairs a year.

Their footwear market share in South Africa is now 18 percent and their customers among retailers, wholesalers and their own depots number about 7 000.

When one in every four South Africans is tramping round in a pair of Bata products, standards have to be kept high and sources of raw materials carefully watched and cultivated.

Which is why 45 percent of SA Bata's leather comes from a tannery the company owns in Uitenhage.

And to streamline the distribution of their goods, Bata have seven area sales depots and sales offices in Mafikeng, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Windhoek, East London and Bloemfontein.

The Pinetown plant is not the only manufacturing operation Bata have in South Africa although this central plant is the head-

quarters of the company's South African operations.

Smaller factories are based at Greytown and two in KwaZulu, at Keste's Drift and Loskop.

Getting back to raw materials the Pinetown factory uses 60 percent leather and 40 percent synthetics in the manufacture of shoe uppers.

These materials go into the making of a wide range of goods from industrial, steel toe-capped boots to sandals for infants.

Management officials, however, make no bones about the fact that Bata's success formula is in sticking to basic lines like school shoes in the medium to lower price ranges, casual week-end shoes, moccasins and slippers.

Mazza block factory (near Verulam): '... there was a partial return to work at the Mazza block factory near Verulam following a walkout by almost the entire workforce at the beginning of the month' (?) (Sowetan, 21.04.82).

Natal African Blind Society (Umlazi): See WIP 21:46; 22:32.

On 18 March the dispute was resolved when all but two of the workers were reinstated. Another term of the agreement was that deductions be increased, across the board, by R1,00. Any future disputes are to be referred to the KwaZulu Minister of Health and Welfare (Natal Mercury, 19.03.82) (May they have better luck than the KSC workers - see above).

This strike has drawn attention to the completely inadequate facilities for the employment and rehabilitation of handicapped black people in Natal, and in the rest of the country.

Ninian and Lester (Pinetown): See WIP 21:55 for coverage of previous strike.

On Monday, 26 April, 500 workers at this textile firm went on strike over union recognition (the Fosatu-affiliated NUTW), and the issue of the dismissal of a fellow worker.

The next day enough progress had been made in negotiations for workers to agree to return to work (Natal Mercury, 28.04.82).

Progress Knitting Mills (Hammarsdale): See WIP 22:32 for previous coverage.

Early in May 1 500 workers (Star, 06.05.82) went on strike again, after six fellow workers had been dismissed. The NUTW said that it had been unsuccessful in its attempts to meet with management.

A week later (Star, 14.05.82) it was reported that 600 workers (all the strikers?), who had been on strike for a week, went back on Thursday, 13 May - this after Department of Manpower officials had 'intervened'.

South African Pulp and Paper Industries - Sappi (Tugela mill): Workers at this mill had been boycotting canteen food (because of poor quality) and demanding to be paid 30c an hour extra instead of the rejected canteen facilities, when a worker who had broken the boycott was assaulted.

Two workers were arrested for the assault and refused bail. This angered the more than 1 000 (1 200) workers at Sappi. They refused to work on Monday, 29 March. They were also infuriated because they claimed (and denied by management) that the company had called the police in to arrest the two men. They were joined by thousands of other workers from factories in the Mandini-Isithebe KwaZulu growth point.

The Fosatu-affiliated Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PWAU) represents many of the workers at this, the largest, Sappi mill (employing 2 250, 1 600 of whom are african workers).

Police claimed that the men arrested were members of a vigilante group operating in the Sundumbili township, beating up people. The reality was slightly



**sappi
limited**

different. The men were members of a vigilante group, formed to meet the threat of crime in the township, and allegedly having some success in their effort. Their popularity, as evidenced by the support from within their own factory and, more importantly, from the other workers in Isithebe, indicates that they were respected in the community.

A KwaZulu 'labour representative' was reported to have entered these worker-management discussions as well (see above) (Natal Mercury, 30.03.82). We have been able to find no further reference to this intervention.

Police used teargas (or tear smoke, as they would have it) on the first day of the strike to disperse about 5 000 workers, gathered in groups near the factories and in the Sundumbili township. Forty two of them were arrested and fined.

A third worker was arrested in connection with the assault on the boycott breaker. Thembinkosi Ngwaba, Shefika Mabaso, and Mbongeni Zulu appeared in the Inyoni magistrate's court and the men were released until a further appearance on 15 April. They were taken into the township by the police, and were given a welcome by the crowds there.


The striking workers returned to work on Wednesday, 31 March, after a meeting with shop stewards. The workers from other factories had said that they would let themselves be guided by the Sappi strikers. The return to work followed the release of the three charged workers. PWAU organiser, Pat Horn, said that the negotiations over the canteen issue would continue. Management was offering 7c food allowance instead of the 30c an hour demanded by the workers.

Police claimed that there had been an average of 30% attendance at Isithebe factories on the first day of the strike. Colonel Gijssbers, Eshowe district commandant, commenting on the Riot Police presence, said that, 'contrary to claims by the workers, "the police do not take sides in any dispute as we have a law-enforcing function"' (Natal Mercury, 31.03.82).

While Sappi management had sanctimoniously denied calling in the police in connection with the alleged assault, while the strike was in progress, they changed their tune once the workers had gone back. Personnel manager, Nick Bartich, admitted that the firm had called the police - 'We had an obligation to inform the police about an incident which happened on our property' (Sunday Tribune, 04.04.82). Earlier general manager Bernard Chamberlin had said there was 'no way' in which the company could 'intervene in a police matter' as the assaults took place off

company property (ROM, 30.03.82).

The chairperson of the Sundumbili town council, AM Gcaleka, said that at times police 'were engaged in a running battle with more than 10 000 striking workers'. He said that he had refused a police request at 03h00 on the first day of the strike to go and address the Sappi workers.



Novoboard bought by Sappi for R20-m

Sappi has bought for R20-million to make and share Novoboard, a producer of chipboard products for the building and furniture industries. The acquisition fits neatly with our strategy of building a broader base for Sappi in the forest products industry, and enables us to add further value to one of our basic fibre resources - timber," said the Sappi chairman, Mr Basil London. Novoboard's main business is the manufacture of particle board from wood chips sold under the Novoboard and Novobon brand names to makers of partitions for office buildings, kitchen cabinets and domestic and office furniture. It employs 1700 people nationwide, and is expected to have sales topping R40-million in 1982. Novoboard's main plant is in Port Elizabeth, but R10-million production will come from new production at White River, Eastern Transvaal, close to Sappi plantations and sawmills. At Waterfall, Transvaal, Novoboard has a treatment plant that gives wood-relevant varnishes surfaces on the particleboard, and in Karlsruhe there is a glue factory that uses multi-wood extracts as one of its main raw materials. -- Sappi.

(Sunday Times, 10.01.82)

Interim Sappi dividend up 46%

SAPPI has followed last year's 78 percent earnings increase with a 46 percent gain to 97.2c a share in the six months ended June.

The directors said it was anticipated that group profits during the second half of 1981 would not be less than those of the first half.

The interim had therefore been raised by 47 percent, from 15c to 22c.

"As the higher level is covered 1.5 times by Sharehold earnings, there is every prospect of an increase in the final dividend (50c last year) as the company moves towards its target of 2.5 times cover on average," the directors said.

It is against this background of strongly rising earnings — higher in the six months just ended than in the whole of 1979 — that Sappi last week announced details of the increased dividend which will be paid in the second quarter of a year later than the current dividend at a cost of R200-million.

Analysis of the results and the provision balance sheet little more than two weeks after the first half

Multi-million Sappi deal

By Kerry Clarke

A 25-MILLION RUFEE contract for Sappi's 1982-83 financial year has been awarded to a consortium comprising

"Local companies" — demand for all the company's products remained strong during the half-year, although export prices came under pressure, the interim report states.

"The dramatic increase in interest rates has caused our major customers to reduce stock levels, which resulted in a slight drop in sales during the latter part of the period under review."

"This has enabled the Group to reduce its level of finished goods which were depleted during 1980, when demand outstripped supply."

Sappi had a strong financial position following the raising of R15-million variable rate convertible preference shares. — Sappi.

the general distribution system during the period, which has made arrangements to include their facilities — they can be employed to perform a number of different functions, their reliability and their self-diagnostic ability.

"It is important to have a conventional instrumentation system, very often the operator doesn't know what it will do or how to use it, so the manufacturer must be able to react to critical faults."

"By the time the plant has been erected and the operator has reacted to the instrument malfunction, the product quality has already been affected."

"Our system, by detecting its own failures, avoids plant breakdowns and off-spec product due to instrument failure," says Mr. Butler.

The South African digital control market is estimated to be worth R20-million to R25-million this year and it is increasing in size at a rate of approximately 10 percent yearly.

Merle Miller, manager of

weekly newspapers. About 40 distribution workers went on strike on 21 April. They struck over pay increases, overtime grievances and unfair dismissals. They also demanded the recognition of their union, CCAWUSA.

Union officials intervened on the workers' behalf. Management agreed to recognise the union and to hold future talks. CCAWUSA claimed that the workers, all of whom returned to work, were told they would not have to have pay deducted for the period while they had been on strike.

Asea Electric (Rosslyn): About 900 workers struck on 23 April in protest against the dismissal of a union shop steward. They returned to work on 26 April, although their colleague had not been reinstated. Management undertook to investigate the matter.

Auto Press Engineering Components: As a result of the dismissal of a colleague, about 40 workers downed tools. The company fired all of the strikers (Star, 06.05.82).

Bandag Incorporated (Alrode): 140 workers stopped work on 20 April. The dispute arose out of wage increases, and workers returned to work two days later after they had been promised a weekly increase of R8,00.

Betsak Monteer (Germiston): In January, 1982, workers demanded increases of 50c an hour. They struck on 19 April when they were told that the increases would come into effect in July, 1982.

No further news.
(Sowetan, 20.04.82)

Buffalo Salt (Industria): The Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU) has accused the Buffalo Salt company of refusing to negotiate and dismissing members of the union at the factory.

Management claimed that 'These (were) retrenchments and have nothing to do with the Union'. The union has been threatening a boycott of Buffalo's products unless the company reinstates the dismissed workers and gives recognition to their union.

Cargo Carriers (Booyens): 95 workers were fired on 13 May after they struck in protest against the behaviour of a supervisor. They alleged that people were being fired almost every day at the slightest provocation. If they complained they were insulted, called 'kaffirs' and sometimes assaulted. They said that they had struck because they had had enough. (Sowetan, 14.05.82).

Colgate-Palmolive (Boksburg): For background, see WIP 18:44-5; 19:54-5; 20:43 and 22:29.

Dissatisfied workers at the plant marched on the company premises protesting against the hiring of an Indian man to replace an African foreman who had left the firm.

The dispute arose out of an agreement between the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and Colgate-Palmolive which laid down that workers from

within the plant would be screened for supervisory jobs when they arose. The replacement had not been chosen from amongst the existing employees.

The union also claimed that jobs were advertised outside the plant, although African workers were fully qualified to fill those vacancies (ADM, 27.03.82).

No further news.

Contract workers (Witwatersrand area): Contract workers who have to travel vast distances to reach their homes in the Ciskei and the Transkei are dissatisfied with the length of their annual leave.

Workers on the Rand receive two weeks annual leave, including public holidays over Christmas. Fosatu has undertaken to solve their problems.

Whereas several factories have considered extending leave to three weeks, the workers are in favour of a month's annual leave (Sowetan, 05.04.82).

Defy (Benoni): For previous coverage, see WIP 21:52 and 22:31.

About 460 workers downed tools demanding wage increases prior to the outcome of the industrial council negotiations for the metal industries.

Workers returned to work the following day pending further discussions between management and worker representatives (Natal Mercury, 30.04.82).

The Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) won a 6c an hour increase in wages after the negotiations (Star, 08.05.82).

Edenvale Electro-plating: 200 workers downed tools on 14 May, demanding recognition of their union, the MAWU. A union organiser, Babakhe Makama, was arrested, and released after paying a R30,00 fine. By 6 May union sources claimed that all but 45 workers had returned to work.

No further news.

Edgars: A strike which started on 4 May at Edgars Stores Distribution Centre spread to the company's Sales House and Jet Stores outlets. About 800 workers joined the stoppage which resulted in some stores being forced to close. Management had denied the closure of its stores. The workers' demands are that their union, CCAWUSA, be recognised and that their wages be increased by 50%.

The company refused to negotiate on either of these issues until the workers returned to work.

The stoppage lasted four days, and was called off when union shop stewards and management agreed to further negotiations.

Femco (Brits): For previous coverage, see WIP 21:57.

After retrenchments at Femco in January, 1982, MAWU complained to the industrial council for the metal industries. MAWU claimed that Femco had not complied with the council agreement on retrenchment procedure. The council replied that the retrenchments were justified.

More than 600 workers came out on strike on 4 May in protest at the January retrenchments.

Tongaat Milling (Estcourt): See WIP 22:32.

The entire workforce of 150 had gone on strike on Wednesday, 3 March, demanding the dismissal of a supervisor. The supervisor was transferred and made a clerk in another department. This happened after the workers had returned to their jobs the next day.

However, on 11 March, workers went on strike again to show their dissatisfaction with the result. The workforce was later dismissed. On 23 March it was reported (Natal Witness) that all but 17 of the workers had been re-employed. The Fosatu-affiliated Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU) had been representing the workers.

Union Co-operative Bark and Sugar Company (Dalton):

See WIP 21:48 for previous coverage.

The workers and their union, the Fosatu-affiliated SFAWU, lost their appeal against ejection from the company compounds after a strike during 1981.

Justice Booyens said that the men would be charged with trespassing if they remained on the premises of Union Co-operative Bark and Sugar Company (Natal Mercury, 27.03.82).

TRANSVAAL

Almeks Engineering (Industria): Between 80 and 90 workers struck demanding an increase of R1,00 an hour. Negotiations between the liaison committee and management took place. Management's position was that the workers should return to work or lose their jobs, as wages could only be discussed through the industrial council. Workers said that they would not return until they had been promised an increase.

No further news.
(Sowetan, 23.04.82)

Amalgamated Press (Benoni): Amalgamated Press publishes the Benoni City Times and several other Transvaal

Flekser (Wadeville): For background, see WIP 22:29.

Flekser eventually fired its african workforce after strikes in protest against the retrenchment of three workers.

Thirteen former Flekser employees have referred their case to the industrial council. If the council cannot settle the dispute, the matter will be referred to the industrial court.

The workers have accused Flekser of unfair labour practice in the dismissal of three workers and the selective re-employment of workers after the strike.

In another sequel to the strike two Flekser employees appeared in the Katlehong circuit court, charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act for intimidating other workers. Another three were told to report to the Germiston police station.

Fry's Metals (Wadeville): At this firm 130 workers struck demanding wage increases. They were dissatisfied with having to wait for the outcome of the industrial council wage talks. They agreed to return to work after management had offered them a 15c an hour increase, pending the resolution of the wage talks (Star, 22.04.82).

Genrec: At Genpipe, Wadeville Engineering and Power Steel (all subsidiaries of Genrec) about 150 workers were retrenched. As a result 1 100 workers at the three plants went on strike in protest (RDM, 01.05.82).

At Power Steel management withdrew a decision to fire the workers, but refused to re-employ the retrenched workers. Strikers had not decided whether to return to work at the time of going to print.

At Genpipe 150 strikers were dismissed and told they would be rehired selectively.

MAWU claims that Genrec, in retrenching workers, had failed to comply with a retrenchment procedure which the company had promised to adopt.

Genpipe (see Genrec, above)

Haggie Rand's Jupiter plant (outside Johannesburg): 1 700 workers downed tools in support of higher wages on 26 April. Management alleged that a leaflet circulated at the plant, threatening to assault strike breakers.

MAWU intervened on behalf of the workers. Haggie Rand would not agree to a pay rise unless the workers returned to work. A compromise was accepted whereby the workers agreed to return if management agreed to talks on union recognition. MAWU membership increased from 150 to 900 during the strike.

Hawker Siddeley Africa (Wadeville): For background, see WIP 22:29.

150 workers who had protested over the dismissal of two of their colleagues were sacked on 24 March.

Insulation Products (Vanderbijlpark): Eight workers were fired on 22 January. Management told their union, the Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union, that they had been retrenched and would be re-employed as vacancies arose. The workers, when they re-applied, were told that they could not have their jobs back because they had taken the matter up with the union.

Insulation Products, according to their employees, had begun employing other workers in place of those dismissed (RDM, 20.04.82).

Jagmar Motor Spares (Pretoria): 69 workers were fired as a result of a dispute over wages at this firm (Sowetan, 12.05.82).

Metal and Chemical Industries (Heriotdale): 200 workers downed tools in support of demands for pay increases on 29 April. They were all dismissed as a result, and were told that they could reapply for their jobs on existing wage terms (Star, 30.04.82).

Moser Hardchrome Plating (Wadeville): 60 workers stopped work, demanding the reinstatement of a dismissed colleague. All were subsequently dismissed. MAWU said that they were unable to arrange a meeting with management (Star, 20.04.82).

Nampak Corrugated Containers - Transvaal Box (Industria West): A strike by 350 workers took place on 20 April. Workers were demanding pay increases and improved working conditions. They returned to work the following day. Management said that wage negotiations were proceeding (Sowetan, 21.04.82).

No further news.

Nampak Products



An Equal Opportunity Employer

Nampak Polyfoil Company (Nancefield): 30 workers were retrenched at this firm. The company undertook to re-employ them if the opportunity arose (Sowetan, 23.03.82).

200 workers at this firm have gone on strike in support of an 85% wage increase. The strike is continuing (Sowetan, 19.05.82).

The wage dispute at Transvaal Box (see above) and at Polyfoil may be viewed in the light of figures released by the RDM. Nampak's total income for the six months ending March, increased from R19,5-m to R24-m. The directors of Nampak state that while the income for the next six months is unlikely to be maintained, Nampak is well placed to 'meet the challenging times ahead' (RDM, 11.05.82).

National Bolts (Boksburg): 800 workers struck on 3 May, demanding wage increases. Management told MAWU that it was only prepared to negotiate on wages once the strikers returned to work.

Strikers returned on 5 May, but resumed their strike after they rejected management's offer. The workers were, as a result, all dismissed the following day.

National Spring (Wadeville): For previous strike action, see WIP 21:58.

A strike by 380 workers in protest over a dismissed colleague occurred at this firm on 26 April. The company then dismissed all the striking workers and

later offered to re-employ them on a selective basis. MAWU shop stewards at the firm rejected the offer.

As a result of the strike the Ford plant in Port Elizabeth was forced to close for two days in early May as National Spring is one of the major suppliers of motor components. The strike would definitely have affected Volkswagen in Uitenhage if the plant had not itself been closed by a strike.

MAWU resolved to call on motor unions to boycott National Springs products. Its shop stewards will also attempt to dissuade people from taking jobs formerly held by strikers.

On 4 May, 225 workers returned to work at the plant. MAWU denied that they had agreed to selective re-employment. The union claimed that scabs were being used, and that it was decided to 'carry on fighting inside the plant'.

Power Steel (see Genrec, above)

Rely Precision Casting (Boksburg): For background on the damages claim against the Minister of Police by workers at this firm, see WIP 21:58.

A Boksburg magistrate awarded damages with costs to 33 of the 40 workers who had sued the Minister of Police. Seven of the men had their claims withdrawn, as they were not present at the hearing. The workers originally sued for a total of R60 000, but agreed to accept a total of R9 595 in damages (RDM, 30.03.82).

Republican News Agency (Vrededorp): At this Perskor company, 20 workers complained to management that there had been irregularities in their wages. Their union, CCAWUSA, reported that they were all fired as a result. The union also claims that this firm has on a previous occasion dismissed six workers who were union members (RDM, 11.05.82).



Admark Recruitment Advertising

Scaw Metals (Germiston): For earlier strike information see WIP 21:58.

2 800 workers who struck in support of wage increases were fired on 29 April. The company offered to re-employ the workers selectively.

Management said that it would not consider wage increases until the outcome of the wage talks through the industrial council for the metal industries. This dispute at Scaw reflects the increasing demand by workers in the metal industry for negotiations at plant level, instead of through the industrial council system.

According to MAWU Scaw, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American group, is one of the most influential companies belonging to Seifsa, the employer body represented on the industrial council. Scaw is also considered to be one of the strongest adherents to

the policy of negotiating through the industrial council.

L Scott King (Alberton): A brief stoppage occurred over retrenchments. MAWU claimed that the dispute had been resolved (ROM, 21.04.82).

Screenex (Alberton): 200 workers struck on 20 April demanding wage increases. MAWU attempted to arrange talks with management (Star, 22.04.82).
No further news.

Sigma (Pretoria): For previous disputes at this firm, see WIP 19:54; 20:45; 21:58.

The National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union which was recognised as a result of last years strike at Sigma, has demanded a R2,00 an hour minimum wage. Sigma has refused to increase wages to higher than R1,91. Workers voted to boycott the Sigma canteen on 3 May, in protest against management's offer.

No further news.

Simba Quix: Three workers were forced to resign for pilferage. Six of their fellow workers then resigned as well. Simba denied that this was the cause of the resignations. They claimed that workers who were suspected of pilfering had money deducted from their pay packets (Star, 28.04.82).

South African Breweries (Alberton): The entire workforce of 450 people struck at this factory on 24 March in support of wage increases. They returned to work on 31 March after management undertook to negotiate the issue with worker representatives. This was in accordance with a grievance procedure followed at SAB whereby it is stated that negotiations may only take place once the strikers have returned to work.

The effects of the week-long strike resulted in most shebeens in the PWV area being 'dry' for the following weekend. WRAB claims to have lost thousands of rands in profits from beer sales during the shortage, which also spread to other urban areas in the Free State and the Transvaal and only returned to normal three weeks after the strike began.

SAB has said that it will not recognise the Food and Beverage Workers' Union, because it is



unrepresentative. Although the union represents most of the workers at the Alberton plant, management says it does not have substantial representation throughout southern Transvaal plants.

The workers' demands at SAB should be seen in the light of SAB's profits on beer sales, which have increased by 38% to R167-m. Managing director, Dick Goss, has prided himself on this increase which he says has occurred despite the slump in the economy. SAB also owns Southern Suns hotel group, OK Bazaars, and Scott Stores, amongst others. Edgars and Jet Stores, also owned by the SAB, were the scenes of a four day strike over wage increases (see above).

SAB has also been involved, and is still involved, in enormous sport sponsorship, including the notorious mercenary bunch of cricketers, the 'Kruger Rands XI'. Said one worker at SAB, 'We bring in profits but get peanuts in return. What have the English cricketers done for the company to deserve so much money?' Paul Winslow of SAB said that he did not think that the amount of money given by the company for sport sponsorship would be decreased due to the unfavourable economic climate.

SAB last year gave some R1,5-m and is due to sponsor to the tune of R1,8-m this year (Rapport, 25.04.82).

SAB's former industrial relations adviser, Dick Sutton, said, in an interview with the Star (28.04.82), that 'a sound industrial relations policy for the South African Breweries group of companies was evident by the lack of labour unrest over recent years'. He also spelled out the company's union recognition policy, which is not based on plant level representativeness but the degree of support a union has within a 'subsidiary industry on a provincial basis' (!), making it just about impossible for any union to gain recognition.

Stag Packaging (Springs): For background information, see WIP 19:53.

The appeal lodged by seven sacked workers against unlawful dismissal and victimisation was heard in the Pretoria Supreme Court on 5 May. The workers were all members of the National Union of Textile Workers.

Judgement was reserved.

Unilever (Boksburg): See WIP 22:31.

13 dismissed workers were reinstated after an agreement was reached between the Cusa-affiliated Food, Beverage and Allied Workers' Union and Unilever. The workers, who were dismissed in February, were supported through a brief stoppage by their colleagues. (Star, 06.05.82).

Univa (Alrode): A dispute concerning wage increases resulted in 600 workers downing tools. Management refused to consider the workers' demands, and gave them an ultimatum to return or be discharged. The workers chose to discontinue the strike.

This is a further indication of discontent in the metal industry over management's refusal to negotiate at plant level.

Versatile Engineering Corporation (Elandsfontein): 100 workers were dismissed when they struck in protest against the dismissal of a colleague (Star, 20.04.82).

Wadeville Engineering (see Genrec, above).

WESTERN CAPE

Parow General Galvanising (Cape Town): Workers demanding to be consulted before dismissals and alleging that factory conditions were unsafe struck at this firm. 14 of the 89 workers claim to have suffered serious injuries - either by steel falling on them or by being burnt by acid. Another ten claim to have been treated for lung diseases. In 1980, Sipho Mvemvati died after falling into a bath of acid at the plant. Many of those who have been injured say their accidents have not been recorded and as a result they have not been paid workmen's compensation.

The strike which began on 1 May is continuing (ROM, 11.05.82).

Van Riebeeck Dairies (Parow): About 500 workers went on strike on 3 May, demanding a minimum wage of R300,00 a month. The starting wage before the strike was R175,00 (Sowetan, 04.05.82).

No further news.

EASTERN CAPE

Post Office (Port Elizabeth): For background, see WIP 21:60.

52 workers were charged with intimidation under the Riotous Assemblies Act, following a strike in October. They appeared in the PE magistrate's court in early January.

Towards the end of March, 16 were convicted and received jail sentences of up to a year. The remaining 36 were either acquitted or received suspended sentences. Bail, pending appeal, was given to five men sentenced to imprisonment of one year.

SA Bottling Company (Port Elizabeth): For background, see WIP 21:60.

The General Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA) and the Motor Assemblies and Components Workers' Union (MACWUSA) have called for a boycott of this firm's products to begin on 1 May.

The boycott action is a result of a strike which began in October last year, concerning working conditions, wages and non-recognition of the union. It will affect the sale of all Coca-Cola products (Star, 07.04.82).

In Geneva the International Union of Food Workers (IUF) came out in support of the boycott and announced plans to make representation to the Coca-Cola group.

GWUSA say that they have received support from township traders in the PE area for the boycott. A boycott committee has been formed.

A spokesperson for Coca-Cola headquarters in Johannesburg said that the management of SA Bottling had indicated a willingness to discuss the recognition

issue with GWUSA. He said that they could not comment on the in-plant conditions of their PE franchise (Star, 12.05.82).

Volkswagen (Uitenhage): See WIP 20:49; 21:60; 22:32.

316 workers were retrenched (out of a total workforce of 8 700) on 21 April. Volkswagen claimed that the retrenchments only affected unskilled labourers. They received three shifts severance pay, a pro-rata bonus and leave pay from January to date (Star, 22.04.82).

The entire african workforce of 5 600 workers downed tools in protest against the retrenchments. Workers were demanding that those retrenched be allowed to work every alternate week. They also demanded a complete list of all those retrenched. They returned to work on 23 April, after an appeal by shop stewards and after an ultimatum from management that it would only negotiate if work had been resumed.

Workers downed tools again at the end of the month as negotiations between the National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union and Volkswagen reached deadlock - Volkswagen refusing to concede to any of the workers' demands. As a result Volkswagen was forced to close down the plant for five days. On 5 May the striking workers agreed to return to work on condition that negotiations about their retrenched colleagues would continue.

Wilson-Rowntree (East London): See WIP 20:50; 21:46-8; 22:32.

The Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust and Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, which own 11% of Rowntree-Mackintosh shares, intend pressurising the other shareholders into condemning the company's South African subsidiary, Wilson-Rowntree. A motion which the trusts want the shareholders to adopt called for the recognition of SAAWU and reinstatement of dismissed workers.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement in London has called for a week of protest against Wilson-Rowntree, timed for 16-23 June. It will involve picketing Rowntree-Mackintosh factories and lobbying support among MPs, trade unions and student groups (Sowetan, 11.05.82).

MINING

Seaplaas Gold Mine (Welkom): An argument in the food queue led to a riot by miners. Six change rooms and living quarters of three miners were set alight and windows were broken (ADM, 11.05.82).

Winkelhaak Gold Mine (Evander): 500 mineworkers 'rioted' on 24 April over wages and shifts. A spokesperson for Gencor, owners of the mine, said police were called in and the 'situation returned to normal'. (Star, 26.04.82).

TRANSPORT

South African Transport Services - SA Railways: A dispute between SATS and the General Workers' Union was settled out of court. The case would have

established the right of african workers to become either 'temporary' or 'permanent' workers in terms of the Railways and Harbours Services Act.

Mr Tolwana, a Port Elizabeth dockworker was fired by SATS after being given 24-hours notice. The GWU claim that Tolwana was classed as a 'casual' worker, but because he had been working continuously for SATS since 1969, he was not 'casual' and was, therefore, entitled to 30 days notice.

SATS sent Tolwana a cheque for 30 days notice pay and have thus prevented the matter from being tested in court in this particular case (ADM, 06.05.82).

TRADE UNIONS AND UNIONISTS

National Union of Clothing Workers' organiser Tom Mashinini has resigned from all official positions he holds in the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). Mashinini, whose wife Emma is general

secretary of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA), is incensed by TUCSA's refusal to condemn the detention of unionists by security police. Emma Mashinini was herself only recently released after over 5 months in security police custody for the purposes of interrogation.

TUCSA's equivocal position was demonstrated when general secretary Arthur Grobbelaar refused to support a petition calling for the release of all detainees and the abolition of security-related detention legislation. In a circular sent to TUCSA affiliates, Grobbelaar said that while TUCSA opposes detention without trial, they 'cannot subscribe to the abolition of all laws in respect of detention since this would imply that TUCSA sought the abolition of the rule of just law'.

Trade union related people known to be in detention as at 15.05.82:

Date of detention	Name	Union/Organisation	Section
09.11.81	Jabu Ngwenya	Organiser, GAWU	12(b) ISA
23.11.81	Monty Narsoo	ex-Jhb Municipal Combined Employees	12(b) ISA
25.11.81	M Taho	SAAWU member	6 TA
11.12.81	Eric Mntonga	Branch chair, SAAWU	12(b) ISA
? .12.81	Gaba Mpumelo	SAAWU member	6 TA
? .12.81	Taho Mpilo	SAAWU member	6 TA
13.03.82	Mathews Olifant	Gen-sec, NFW	6 TA

Trade union related people released from detention as at 15.05.82:

27.11.81-06.05.82	Emma Mashinini	Gen-sec CCAWUSA	6 TA
27.11.81-06.05.82	Rita Ndzanga	Sec GAWU	6 TA
27.11.81-06.05.82	Merle Favis	Editor, SALB	6 TA
27.11.81-07.05.82	Samson Ndou	President GAWU	6 TA
27.11.81-26.03.82	Liz Floyd	IAS	6 TA

Trade unionists released from detention, charged under the Terrorism Act, and refused bail:

24.09.81-26.03.82	Alan Fine	Ass sec, Liquor and Catering
27.11.81-06.05.82	Sam Kikine	Gen-sec SAAWU
27.11.81-03.03.82	Thozamile Gqwetha	Pres SAAWU
08.12.81-06.05.82	Sisa Njikelana	V Pres SAAWU

Trade unionists banned from trade union and other activity for two years in terms of the Internal Security Act:

Maxwell Madlingozi	Official, MACWUSA
Zandile Mjuza	Official, MACWUSA
Sipho Pityana	Organiser, MACWUSA and GWUSA.

Prior to being banned, the above were detained under section 6 of the Terrorism Act from 03.06.81 - ±15.02.82.

STATISTICS AND 'EXPLANATIONS'

MANPOWER Minister Fanie Botha said:

We have no problems with unions. We have problems with certain militant people who try to lead unions in the wrong direction. It is union members who must decide who their leaders are.

But in case he should be misunderstood as being in favour of trade union democracy and non-interference in union matters, he added,

They must beware of militants (Star, 20.04.82).

ATTIE Nieuwoudt, president of the SA Association of Municipal Employees, appealed to the government 'to ensure that black trade unions did not call for "unnecessary and undesirable strikes"', these being 'the instigators of chaos and the destroyers of the economy in any country' (Star, 15.04.82).

In the same tradition, the SA Confederation of Labour called for the mass-rejected Pension Bill to be brought back (ADM, 31.03.82).

AN article in the Sunday Express (02.05.82) revealed that at least one security firm claims to be 'infiltrating' trade unions at factory level, to identify 'ringleaders'; inform management of 'unrest'; and prevent industrial sabotage.

Archie Griffiths, of Security Service Consultants, echoed Minister Fanie Botha:

Even genuine unions have been manipulated by subversives for their own ends.

He claimed that unions 'with strong ANC links' exploited worker unrest, 'creating grievances out of nothing'.

STATISTICS AND WORK STOPPAGES IN 1980 AND 1981

Year	Number of work stoppages	Number of employees concerned		Number of man-days lost	
		All workers	Black workers	All workers	Black workers
1980	70	4 300	3 250	4 520	*
1981	66	4 052	4 057	3 437	*
1982	71	9 234	8 712	14 167	*
1983	276	90 575	80 052	229 201	*
1984	284	90 244	57 000	90 244	90 244
1985	274	23 323	22 540	30 700	30 775
1986	345	30 013	20 201	30 001	22 001
1987	90	25 304	14 000	30 471	14 007
1988	100	14 100	13 571	30 500	30 500
1989	201	22 000	15 000	37 000	30 500
1990	207	61 700	50 200	174 000	140 000
1991	242	92 000	54 700	220 000	200 000

* Not available.
Source: Department of Statistics.

ADM 110572

Courts

TREASON TRIALS

Thelle Simon Mogoerane (23) and Jerry Semano Mosololi (25).

Charge: In addition to a main count of Treason, the accused face charges of murder, terrorism, robbery, and possession of arms, explosives and ammunition.

It is alleged by the state that the accused underwent military training in ANC camps in Angola and Tanzania, and with others infiltrated South Africa between April and November 1979.

Mogoerane is charged with being involved in the attacks on the Moroka and Orlando police stations in Soweto. During these attacks, policemen were injured and killed, and this has given rise to the charges of murder and attempted murder which the accused faces.

Mosololi is charged with attacking the railway line near New Canada station, Soweto, in May, 1981. Together with Mogoerane, he is alleged to have launched a limpet mine attack on the Capital Park power station in November 1981. The accused are also charged with attacking the Wonderboom police station in December 1981, which resulted in the death of a policeman, and the wounding of others.

The accused pleaded not guilty to all charges on their first appearance in court, and the trial was postponed for hearing in the Pretoria Supreme Court.

Patrick Ntobeko Maqubela (32), Mboniswa de Villiers Richard Maghutyana (29) and Seth Mfumulelo Gaba.

Charge: The accused face a main count of Treason, together with other charges of terrorism, sabotage, possession of arms and ammunition, attempted murder and malicious damage to property.

According to the charge sheet, the accused were involved in 8 explosions which occurred in and around Durban during 1981. These involved a Field Street post box, the Cenotaph explosion, the bombing of two motor car showrooms, two government offices, the SADF recruiting centre, and a railway line to Umhlanga.

Each accused is alleged to be a member or active supporter of the ANC. They are claimed by the state to have recruited people for military training and acts of sabotage, and established arms caches. They are also charged with training people inside South Africa to commit acts of war and sabotage.

The accused are charged with possession of hand grenades, limpet mines, a machine rifle, Makarov pistols, ammunition, an AK 47 rifle, plastic explosives, TNT and detonators.

According to the charge sheet drawn up by the state, Maqubela was based in Durban, where he served as a link between the ANC and others in Swaziland. He is alleged to have arranged for the hire of vehicles to convey explosives, people and information to and from Durban.

Maghutyana is alleged to have taken part in the organisation of arms caches near Umhlanga township; together with Gaba he allegedly underwent military training in Swaziland.

The trial has been remanded to the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, to begin on June 1.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS

In regard to three part-heard Terrorism Act trials, it has not been possible to obtain sufficient additional information to warrant further reports in this edition of Work In Progress.

The trial involving Oscar Mpetha and 18 others continues in Cape Town, but it has not been possible to update the report which appeared in the last issue of WIP.

In the case of the Kimberley trial of Neville Motshabakwe and 4 others, last reported on in WIP 19, it has proved impossible to obtain information on the progress of the trial. At a certain stage of proceedings, both national and local press coverage of these proceedings, which arose from the school boycotts in Kimberley during 1980, ceased.

The trial involving Robert Adam and Mandla Mthembu was adjourned shortly after the appearance of the last issue of WIP. At the time of writing, court sittings were about to begin.

It is hoped that full reports on all these trials will become available after their completion.

Fana George Sithole, Jabulani Wilfred Ngcobo, and Titi Alocia Mthenyane.

Charge: The accused face 2 counts under the Terrorism Act, while Sithole faces a further 15 charges relating to alleged contraventions of his banning order.

The state has alleged that the accused formed an organisation known as the African Youth Congress with the intention of furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress. They are further alleged to have incited others to leave the country for military training, and assisting them to leave through the organisation of transport.

The accused face a second charge alleging that they obtained information regarding security arrangements at the Caltex Oil Terminal in Durban, and that they obtained certain explosives.

A state witness, Bhokife Ngobese, told the court of a meeting of the AYC which elected ex-Robben Island prisoner Philip Mathews as its president. According to the witness, Mathews said he would write to Oliver Tambo of the ANC asking for financial assistance. Mthenyane then allegedly said that a reply from the ANC would indicate that 'we would be having recognition from the ANC and (we) would know the AYC is one with the ANC'. The meeting then decided to send messages to Mandela and Sisulu on Robben Island via a lawyer.

At a stage in proceedings, state lawyers indicated that they intended producing as evidence tape recordings of conversations allegedly held between detainees held at CR Swart police station in Durban. At the time of writing, the presiding magistrate had not yet ruled whether these were admissible as evidence.

The state called as a witness an urban representative of the KwaZulu 'government', Joshua Thembinkosi Zulu, who refused to take the oath claiming that he had diplomatic immunity. According

to his lawyer, the court had no jurisdiction over the witness, and he was not obliged to give evidence. KwaZulu had its own government, and therefore fell under the Diplomatic Privileges Act.

The prosecutor responded by saying that KwaZulu was not an independent state, and therefore no member of its administration could claim diplomatic immunity. The presiding magistrate reserved his decision on this matter.

The trial continues in the Durban Regional Court.

William Mabone Duma (31), Dumisane Bizette Maninjwa (31), Bayi Keye (52), and Luyanda Mayekiso (52).
Charge: The Ciskei authorities allege that the four accused were actively engaged in operational activities for the African National Congress between June, 1980, and August, 1981. They are also alleged to have recruited people for military training and to have possessed banned literature. They pleaded not guilty.

For previous details, see WIP 22:35-36.

Ciskei's first Terrorism Act trial reopened in camera on 11 May, after a lengthy adjournment. Explaining the reason for closing the courtroom doors to the public, the bantustan's Chief Justice de Wet said there was evidence that one of the accused had written a letter informing state witnesses that they would be 'dealt with'. The letter was allegedly found in a sock.

The commercial press has been allowed to continue covering the trial provided they do not identify state witnesses, and provide proof of their identity to attorney-general WF Jurgens, who is prosecuting.

At the resumption of the trial, Jurgens said that 17 state witnesses would be called. The first of these, a 31 year old Mdantsane man, claimed that Maninjwa had given him several books to read, together with a copy of the Freedom Charter. A 17 year old girl testified that she had been taught freedom songs, such as Hambe Kahle Umkonto we Sizwe (Go Well, Spear of the Nation). At a November, 1981, meeting held in Mdantsane, which she claimed had been organised by Duma and Keye, another witness said that Duma had invited her to attend an ANC and SAAWU meeting. She had also been taught freedom songs, she said.

A fourth witness testified that he had been beaten up by security police, who punched him and pulled a canvass bag over his head to make him talk. He had reported his injuries to a doctor, but had not told a magistrate or the inspector of detainees because he feared further assaults.

A 21 year old witness, who spent six days in the witness box, claimed that during the 1980 school boycotts, Keye had told him to attack an informer's house. Keye had also arranged for him to go to Lesotho to receive military training. Both these allegations were denied by lawyers for the accused.

The state produced letters allegedly written by the witness to a friend hiding in the Transkei, and to Keye. In one of these letters, the writer said that conditions in his Dimbaza police cell were better than those at his home in Duncan Village.

The witness said he found detention a terrible experience, especially his time in Dimbaza under Ciskei security police.

There were several clashes between defence advocate TM Moerane and judge de Wet during cross examination of this witness, with the judge cutting defence counsel short during questioning. Moerane asked for security police warrant officer Eldson to be ordered out of court after it was disclosed that the witness had signed a confession in Eldson's presence. The policeman left after prosecutor Jurgens indicated that he had no objections.

The next day, Moerane claimed that he was having difficulty cross examining the witness because judge de Wet overruled his questions.

After eight days in the Zwalitsha Supreme Court, the trial was adjourned to 19 July, 1982.

Akila Mapheto and Thabo Lerumo.

Charge: The state has alleged that, between the period August 28 and October 11, 1981, the accused took steps to undergo training which could be of use to a person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order in South Africa. Alternatively, it is claimed by the state that the accused assisted another person to take steps to undergo such training.

The alleged offences took place in the Johannesburg area.

The trial is set down for hearing in the Johannesburg Regional court for July 26, 1982.

Size Michael Christian Hlongwa.

Charge: The accused faced 4 counts framed in terms of the Terrorism Act. These counts all related to a set of acts allegedly undertaken by the accused, involving

- 1). Conspiring with ANC members and supporters;
- 2). Recruiting a certain Leonard Khumalo to undergo military training;
- 3). Recruiting Jeremiah Dube for military training;
- 4). Possession of arms and ammunition.

According to the schedule of acts provided by the state in the charge sheet, Hlongwa undertook the following:

During the period 1977 to 1980, he left the country, and underwent military training under the auspices of the ANC in Angola;

On his return to South Africa, he had in his possession two fire arms similar to a Makarov pistol;

The ANC instructed him to kill black policemen on his return to South Africa;

On various occasions, the accused received letters and money from an ANC member based in Swaziland, known as Dubu or Obed Masina;

During 1979, he received money and or a parcel containing a fire-arm and ammunition from Dubu;

The accused showed the fire-arm to Leonard Khumalo, and invited both Khumalo and Jeremiah Dube to undergo military training;

The accused hid a fire-arm in a house in White City, Jobavu;

During 1979 to 1980, he kept a certain house under observation with the intention of killing a black

policeman.

At the beginning of his trial, Hlongwa pleaded guilty to parts of count 1, to count 3 and to count 4. This plea, together with the plea of not guilty on count 2, was accepted by the state. In a statement submitted to the court, Hlongwa admitted the following:

In December 1977 he left South Africa with the intention of furthering his education in Swaziland. However, there he found that his education plan was not possible, and he was recruited into the ANC. Subsequently, he went to Angola where he underwent military training.

During his stay in Angola, he underwent training together with the twin brother of Jeremiah Dube. During 1980 he met Jeremiah Dube who asked him about the whereabouts of his brother. The accused informed Jeremiah Dube that his brother was still out of South Africa. The accused then agreed to assist him to leave South Africa both so that he could see his brother, and to undergo military training.

Hlongwa also admitted that he was in possession of a Makarov pistol, but did not use this weapon save on one occasion when he was threatened by hoodlums at a shebeen. On this occasion, he fired a shot into the air to disperse them.

Verdict: Guilty on 3 counts of Terrorism, in terms of his plea.

Sentence: 5 years on each count, with parts of the sentences to run concurrently. The effective sentence was therefore 9 years imprisonment. (Heidelberg Regional Court, 05.05.82).

Barbara Hogan (30), Cedric Mayson (54), Alan Fine (28), Sam Kikine, Sisa Njikelana, and Thozamile Gqweta.

Charge: The accused face unspecified charges in terms of the Terrorism Act. Hogan and Fine were detained by security police in September 1981, the other accused being held in November and December of last year. Despite this length of time, the office of the attorney general has not, at the time of writing, provided a charge sheet. All the accused are in custody, having been refused bail in terms of an order by the attorney general.

The trial will be heard in the Supreme Court, and is not expected to begin until the second half of the year.

Abel Mazala (33).

Charge: The accused faces a main count under the Terrorism Act, with two alternative charges in terms of the Explosives, and Arms and Ammunition Acts. The charges relate to a live hand grenade of foreign origin allegedly found in his garden.

Raymond Dlamini, in giving evidence for the state, told the court that Mazala, alias Sipho Mandela, had told him that he had been trained in the use of weapons in various African states. According to his evidence, Dlamini then called the police and told them of Mazala's claim. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 13.05.82).

EXPLOSIVES ACT TRIALS

Sesoon Khumalo.

Charge: The accused, brother of Robben Island prisoner Eddie Khumalo, was injured in a hand grenade explosion on February 28. When he appeared in court, his right leg was in plaster, and he was walking on crutches.

He is alleged to have caused the explosion in which he was injured, and illegally possessed a hand grenade.

Bail of R500 was allowed, and the trial has been set down for hearing in the Johannesburg Regional Court on June 17.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS

Hannchen Elizabeth Koornhof (27).

Charge: The accused faced a main charge under the Terrorism Act, and an alternative count in terms of the Internal Security Act. In addition, she faced charges in terms of the Publications and Customs Act, relating to the possession of banned literature.

The state alleged that, during April 1981, the accused travelled to Botswana where she learnt an ANC code, and agreed to pass on this code to Cedric de Beer. This was allegedly to enable de Beer to pass on coded information to Marius Schoon and Patrick Fitzgerald, both claimed by the state to be ANC members in Botswana.

At her trial, Koornhof pleaded guilty to the Internal Security Act charge, as well as some of the allegations relating to the possession of banned literature. This plea was accepted by the state. In a statement to the court, the accused said that she had twice been approached by Schoon in Botswana to learn a code. On the first occasion she had refused, but on a second occasion she had agreed to pass on the code to Cedric de Beer. As far as she was aware, de Beer had not made use of the code to pass on any information to Schoon.

Verdict: Guilty, as pleaded, in terms of the Internal Security Act, Publications Act, and Customs Act.

Sentence: 21 months imprisonment, 20 of which were conditionally suspended for 5 years; R200 (or 50 days) for possession of a German edition of the Communist Manifesto; R300 (or 75 days) for possession of two banned books.

Koornhof had been in custody since October 12, 1981, when she was detained by security police. When she appeared in court at the beginning of April 1982, she was refused bail in terms of an order issued by the office of the attorney general. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 23.04.82).

Strike Ismael Bila (28), Bernard Makgonyana (19), and John Qotso (35).

Charge: The accused face 10 charges. Count one relates to the illegal possession of a large number of ANC and South African Communist Party publications. Counts two to nine involve the putting up of prohibited posters, signs or marks at various places in and around Mamelodi and other Pretoria townships;

Count ten involves furthering the aims of the ANC by acting as ANC messengers, visiting people in Botswana associated with the ANC, distributing ANC literature, and recruiting people for ANC membership. The case has been remanded to June 28 for trial. (Pretoria Regional Court, 07.05.82).

PRISONS ACT TRIALS

Prasa Naidoo (37), Shirish Nanabhai (44), and Michael Jerkin (31).

Charge: The accused were alleged to have harboured an escaped political prisoner, Stephen Lee, who broke out of Pretoria Central prison together with Alexander Mousbaris and Timothy Jerkin in November 1979.

All three accused pleaded guilty to the charge. Nanabhai explained that he had been contacted by Michael Jerkin, who told him of Lee's escape. Nanabhai then met Lee, who asked him to provide accommodation for him. Nanabhai then contacted Naidoo.

Naidoo told the court that he did not personally know Lee, and at no stage was in contact with him. He merely arranged accommodation for him and gave the accommodation address to Nanabhai. Both Naidoo and Nanabhai denied prior knowledge of the escape.

Jerkin, in a statement to the court, said that Lee was a friend of his brother, Timothy Jerkin. Lee had asked him for assistance after his escape. A meeting was then arranged for the purpose of providing Lee with accommodation.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 3 years, 2 of which were conditionally suspended for 5 years. The accused had each spent a number of months in custody before conviction, initially as security detainees, and subsequently as awaiting trial prisoners.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 01.04.82).

Graham Dyson (30).

Charge: The accused, a Johannesburg attorney, is alleged by the state to have attempted to smuggle a letter out of the Fort prison, Johannesburg. The letter was allegedly written by Elaine Mohammed, at the time an awaiting trial prisoner charged under the Internal Security Act.

According to a defence statement, Mohammed placed a number of tissues in Dyson's pocket which he had intended throwing away for her. The state claims that the tissues contained writing on them. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 10.05.82).

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

Archibald Monthy Mziyathi (31).

Appellant was convicted in the Johannesburg Regional Court in October 1980, in terms of the Terrorism Act. It was found that he had undergone military training in Russia, and he was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

During the trial, Mziyathi applied for permission for evidence to be taken on commission in Lesotho. According to affidavits placed before the trial court, this evidence could establish that at the time

the state alleged Mziyathi was in Russia, he was in fact in Lesotho. However, the presiding magistrate refused permission for such evidence to be taken on commission.

On appeal, this was found to be a miscarriage of justice, and after 3 years in prison, Mziyathi was released from Robben Island. (Pretoria Supreme Court, 28.04.82).

Thami Mazwai (38), Martin Carter Seleke (24), Thebo Ndebeni (25), Alex Selami (27), and Sipho Semecele (28). All 5 of the above refused to testify for the state in the trial of S vs Seathlolo and Loats (see WIP 22:35). They were sentenced to between 9 and 18 months imprisonment. A bail application made on behalf of them, pending an appeal against sentence, was refused by the presiding magistrate.

They then appealed to the Supreme Court, asking for bail pending the hearing of an appeal. This was refused.

(Johannesburg Supreme Court, 22.04.82).

Ncisibithi Johnson Lubisi (28), Petrus Mashigo (20), and Nephthali Manana (24).

Appellants were found guilty of high treason during November 1980, and sentenced to death. The basis of the conviction involved their participation in an attack on the Soekowkaar police station during January 1980, their military training under the auspices of the ANC, and their possession of various arms, ammunition and explosives.

They appealed against sentence. In particular, it was argued that the 3 had refrained from killing anyone in the attack on the police station, and no one had been seriously injured.

The appeal was turned down, and the death sentence confirmed by the 5 judges of appeal sitting.

According to the Chief Justice, Justice Rumpff, mitigating factors were cancelled out by the callous and cowardly manner in which the accused planned to kill innocent people for political purposes. The men were assassins who were not prepared to engage the authorities in open conflict.

(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 07.04.82).