

WORK 21 IN PROGRESS



MONOPOLY
CAPITAL
-how
THE
dice rolls!



INDEX

FOOD SHORTAGES IN ZIMBABWE.....page 1

RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS: a response.....page 11

ORGANISING WOMEN?.....page 14

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY

part 3.....page 23

DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALISATION: the

SA case.....page 26

TRAINING FOR CAPITAL: De Lange

reports.....page 34

INFORMATION

courts.....page 42

wilson-rowntree.....page 46

labour action.....page 49

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EDITORIAL

AS our cover indicates, one of the themes in this, the twenty first, issue of Work In Progress is that of the dominance of monopoly capital, and the effects of this dominance, in South Africa.

There are qualitative, as well as the obvious quantitative, differences (from small-scale, 'competitive' capital) in the way that monopoly capital structures a society (the relationship between classes); in the demands made of the state and limitations placed on the activities of the state; and in a range of effects that monopoly capital has in many areas (such as education and training, sub-continental politics and economics, internal political structures, employment and unemployment, etc).

These differences arise out of such characteristics of monopoly capitalism as the need for long-term planning and social stability in which to plan (it does not matter all that much whether it is achieved through repression on concessions, or, as in most cases, both); the need for a reasonably skilled and stable labour force (with high productivity, arising from the use of sophisticated technology, interruption of production is even more serious than it is for small-scale capital); the way in which monopoly capital is tied into a world system of capitalist production (through investment, supplies, technology, markets, etc).

The article by Graeme Bloch is directly concerned with these issues, as he traces the growth of South African monopoly capitalism in industry, in a world context and, therefore, largely placing both monopoly and competitive

capitalism in a dependent position in that system.

It is from this dependent position that, for example, the extreme unemployment in South Africa arises. Changes in technology or in the world market directly affect South African capitalism, with labour having to bear the brunt of it. In our Labour Action section we point to two recent cases of retrenchment in the motor industry, viz at Datsun and at Sigma (both of them good examples of multi-national companies - MNCs).

Another way in which monopolisation hits the working class is through price setting (made possible through control of markets). This is especially serious in the food industry (see several articles in previous WIPs).

The contribution on the De Lange Report on education draws the links between the recommendations of the Committee and the needs of large-scale capital operating in industry for workers with greater skills than had been provided under the Bantu Education system.

Our first article, by Richard Carver, returns to food production and consumption - this time in a different context to that of the contributions in WIP 17 and 20. This article deals with food production, both as an international and national economic concern as well as a political tool.

There are, of course, many immediate and obvious parallels to be drawn with the situation in South Africa - for example malnutrition while harvesting record crops; starvation while exporting and dumping food. But probably the most important aspects of the contribution on Zimbabwe are, firstly, the southern African context and the dominance of South Africa within the sub-continent (see, for example, the article in WIP 19 on Botha's 'constellation'); and,

secondly, the impossibility of changing such aspects of the new Zimbabwean society as distribution of food, while production occurs under the same relationships between classes as previously. Here valuable lessons can be learned from what has (not) been achieved in Tanzania, and what is being attempted in Mozambique.

In the Labour Action section certain indicators also emerge, other than the obvious one of the extent of the resistance to and victory against arbitrary introduction of pension legislation. The increasing involvement of the bantustans in labour repression stands out - whether it be in the Ciskei, or in BophuthaTswana. What needs to be examined is both the direct and crude repression (through detention, arrests, shootings) and other methods (labour screening, involvement in dispute settlement, etc).

Another indicator in this section points at a deterioration in the already bad conditions in the bantustan regions and, in fact, in all areas outside the main cities in South Africa - people are going on strike, not from a position of strength but from a situation of desperation, where strikes would 'normally' be most unexpected (and those are the few strikes that become known). Workers are willing to risk being fired (more of a certainty than a risk in present-day South Africa) in situations where unemployment is most immediate - because conditions are so bad and wages so low that loss of those wages cannot hold people to their jobs.

As always, the editors would welcome contributions on these and other matters of importance in contemporary South Africa. Short (about two pages) comments on issues that have been raised in articles are also welcome.

The editors believe that WIP is filling a gap in the spreading of information, ideas, and analysis of trends in South Africa. We also believe that WIP is a long way off reaching as many people as would find it a useful publication.

To remedy this situation we are asking readers to get others to subscribe, or to ask for a few copies for themselves (three or more) to distribute on a regular basis.

For such distributors the price of WIP will be R1,00, while the subscription price is R1,50 per copy.

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FOOD SHORTAGES IN ZIMBABWE

Is this a holy thing to see,
In a rich and fruitful land,
Babes reduced to misery,
Fed with cold and usurous hand?

William Blake

ZIMBABWE'S maize crop this year will be a record one. In December (1980) the Commercial Farmers' Union, which represents the 5 000 large and mainly white-owned farms, predicted a crop of between 1.6-2-m tonnes - more than double what was produced in 1980. Even if the harvest is nearer the lower figure it will still beat the 1.4-m tonne record set in 1973.

When that announcement was made I had just finished several weeks of travelling in the 'tribal trust lands' of Zimbabwe - the rural areas where the bulk of the black population lives. It was hard to believe that we were talking about the same country. I had seen little evidence of record crops and abundance - and plenty of evidence of malnutrition, occasionally of starvation, and of nearly a million people having to be fed by a relief programme.

Perhaps Zimbabwe's problem is that its food crisis is not spectacular enough. One case among many summed it up: a nine-year old girl who did not match the identikit picture of a malnourished child. There was no distended belly or pencil-thin limbs. Yet shortage of food had permanently disabled her - she was blind, a

common occurrence when measles is accompanied by severe malnutrition.

The blind girl was waiting at a clinic at Dindi in the remote north-east of the country, 200 kilometres from the nearest tarred road and hospital. Sue Hunt, a doctor sent out by the British charity Oxfam, was paying her fortnightly visit to the clinic. She said the case was typical: 'Malnutrition' underlies the illness in all the children. This alters many aspects of their diseases, measles being a particular example. This is a terrible problem, particularly when you think that in Europe it is not a serious illness'.

More acute, but equally forgotten, is the fate of the Tonga people, who live on the southern shores of Lake Kariba. Their troubles began with the flooding of the Zambezi valley to make way for Lake Kariba in the late 1950s. The Tonga had lived by fishing, as well as farming the well-irrigated river banks. Without consultation they were moved up onto the escarpment. The fertile riverine farming areas no longer existed and fishing rights on the new lake were sold commercially. The Tonga began to die out.

The effects of the eight-year liberation war on food supplies accelerated that process. In 1976 the infant mortality rate among the Tonga was reckoned to be 300 for every 1 000 live births.¹ In March 1979 the question of 'current starvation among the Batonka people of Omayi and Binge' was raised in parliament. The co-Minister of Internal Affairs said in reply that he was aware of food shortages in the area and appropriate steps had been taken.² Six months later a bulletin of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICEC) spoke of a 'high prevalence of malnutrition' among Tonga children and predicted that 'conditions in the area can

be expected to deteriorate over the next six months'.³ They have.

The areas worst hit by food shortages form two broad crescents on either side of the country: from Sipolilo in the north to Chipinga in the south-east and from Omayi in the north-west to Beit Bridge in the south. Not only are these the areas where the war was hottest. They also take in most of the tribal trust lands.

When Oxfam did a nutrition survey in five rural areas soon after independence it got some horrifying results. In one area 40% of one-to-five-year-olds were undernourished and 15% severely undernourished. In another area the figures were 56% and 30%. These were worse than a Red Cross survey while the war was still going on. (The main technique used in each case was to measure the child's upper arm circumference, which should be at least 13.5cm in a well-nourished child between one and five.)

Bill Chinyuky, co-ordinator of the charity Christian Care, says that those figures are part of a continuous downward trend. He points out that the Oxfam survey was done soon after the harvest, when food stocks would have been at their highest. This is borne out by Ministry of Health figures released in December 1980. The Ministry's research, carried out in September showed that in the Binge area, where the Tonga live, near Gwanda, near West Nicholson and around Matibi there was 60-80% undernutrition among children from one to five. Other areas suffered 40-60% undernutrition: Mtoko, large parts of Victoria Province, Beit Bridge, Nyamandhlovu and Lupane. Undernutrition is also serious in a number of other areas.

The food relief programme is funded by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and organized by the Department of Social Services. Officials from both organizations say


that their programme is dealing with shortages and certainly it is the main thing standing between Zimbabwe and mass starvation. They are getting food to 800 000 or so people through 570 distribution points at a cost of Z\$3-m (about £2-m) a month. The programme was originally planned to feed 500 000 at most. Each person gets 1 600 calories a day, made up of maize meal, soya flour, sugar, milk powder, dried kapenta (a small fish), beans and salt.⁴

The food programme is only part of the UNHC plan for resettling those who fled the country during the war, as well as 'internal refugees'. But according to Brian Beecroft, Director of Social Services, people are being fed on the basis of need, regardless of whether they have been refugees.

Social Services has between 400 and 500 staff running the programme. This sounds a lot, but they are not able to monitor who needs feeding in a population of 7.5-m spread over nearly 400 000 square kilometres. Yet by comparison with similar operations elsewhere wastage and theft are low. A bigger problem is that many people assume that relief is a reward for their support for the majority ZANU (PF) during the war. One ZANU(PF) MP says, 'People see that we are now in power and this is the first time anyone has ever brought them mealie meal. They feel that because they supported the liberation struggle it is a right that they should get some sort of help. Even those who have plenty might feel that they should register to get mealie meal.'

However, this sort of problem is unavoidable. More serious still is the fact that relief is not reaching significant areas where it is needed. UNHCR and government officials admit that they cannot reach everyone, but Chinyuku says that the problem is more serious than that:

'The food is there but it's not reaching the right people. It's only reaching areas where the roads are good and these are the places where people are better off.'



map Star, 03.11.81

What I saw confirmed this impression. In the north-east, for example, people may have to walk several miles to get to the distribution point. Those most in need are least able to make the trip. No real check can be kept of whom the food is reaching and few people are sufficiently well off to save food for those who cannot manage.

In Matabeleland, which embraces two of the areas with 60-80% malnutrition, things have been made worse by the government's attempt to deal with abuses by cutting off supplies. Most of Matabeleland did not get a delivery in November and Binga, the worst spot in the whole country, has only ever had one.

The problem in Zimbabwe has never been that

there was not enough food. Until after independence white farmers produced maize for export, even in periods when starvation was widespread. 'We were exporting food at the expense of our local populace', as Beecroft admits. So, apart from a few dribbles of food aid, it has been possible to supply the entire feeding programme out of Zimbabwean produce.

However, the cost of the programme is inflated by its dependence on private companies. All commercial agricultural produce is bought at fixed prices by statutory agencies. In the case of maize, the staple food, the government has been obliged to push up the price it pays to commercial farmers so as to keep them growing the crop. Before maize reaches the relief programme it has to be sold to a private company for milling and packaging and bought back by Social Services. Brian Beecroft says that the government would save nothing by eliminating the middlemen, but his calculation is based on the assumption that the feeding programme will be over in a few months.

Allegations that companies are stockpiling food are widespread but firm evidence has yet to emerge. There is such an abundance of most foodstuffs that stockpiling probably wouldn't work. Some companies who recently tried to hold back beans to push up the price found themselves left with an awful lot of beans on their hands as the market got glutted. But if there were stockpiles it would be nothing new. A year ago an official admitted that there were 'embarrassing surpluses' of food, but under war conditions it was impossible to tell how embarrassing. Certainly the government has always had a policy of maintaining 'buffer stocks' of maize.

However, there is a more fundamental problem with the programme and that is the belief

apparently shared by most aid and government officials that the food crisis is mainly caused by returning refugees. The UNHCR's mandate runs out in April and food relief is planned to stop in March. The accepted view is that with reasonable rains this season everyone will have enough food. One official told me 'There wasn't a problem last year. There's never been a problem. There is a problem now but things aren't really serious. There has never been starvation in this country'.

That is wrong on every count. As long ago as March 1979 the co-Ministers of Agriculture announced that 'Many tribal trust lands are facing famine in the months ahead'.⁵ In July 1979 the then president of the Commercial Farmers' Union, Dennis Norman, warned of the 'dangerously low' level of food supplies.⁶

'Malnutrition among children in some areas is terrible and many of them are not immunized against infectious disease,' said Dr Alan Pugh, the Provincial Medical Officer of Health for Matabeleland, in August 1979. 'This is making the infant mortality rate among the under-fives climb rapidly, in spite of our past successes.'⁷

A good gauge of the problem before the war ended and the refugees returned is the extent of the operations of the relief agencies. The ICFC in Zimbabwe had the largest Red Cross team outside Kampuchea - 202 in all.⁸ Its bulletins were full of reports of 'serious nutritional problems. Three-quarters of the population of the Mzarabani tribal trust land, for example, were living off wild fruit: 'The reserves in the granaries are running low, the last crop having been particularly bad and the next one not being due for several months.'⁹

The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission reported that, 'Food is scarce in many areas, and in the coming months will be in even shorter

supply. For most people basic services are no longer provided and in many areas the administration has completely broken down'.¹⁰

After a visit to missions in the east of the country, Rev David Ayling of the Elim Pentecostal Church concluded that 'there is widespread malnutrition among adults as well as children' - a sure indication of the extent of the problem.¹¹

At least one refugee, found dead after stumbling across the Zambian frontier, had only undigested grass in his stomach when doctors performed a post mortem.¹²

The medical consequences of malnutrition were also serious. In Que Que the Medical Officer of Health reported a general deterioration in health standards as a result of the war. This included an increase in cases of malnutrition and malnutrition-related diseases such as measles.¹³

'When measles is associated with malnutrition, the effect is disastrous,' a Rhodesian Secretary of Health once observed.¹⁴ And so it has proved. In the last months of the war Salisbury was hit by a measles epidemic¹⁵ and Dr Pugh said that in Matabeleland 'Children are going blind from measles and vitamin deficiencies.'¹⁶

A study of admissions of children aged one to ten in July 1979 at St Joseph's clinic in Chishwashe tribal trust land near Salisbury showed weight loss which could be directly attributed to undernourishment. At one end of the age range, children between a year and eighteen months averaged only just over two-thirds of the normal weight for their age. For nine-to-ten-year-olds the picture was the same: an average of 21,5 kilograms compared with a norm of 30.¹⁷

The significance of all these examples is that they date from before the return of the refugees. But if it was not the refugees who

caused food shortages, what did?

Drought goes some of the way towards explaining the problem. There were two successive years of low rainfall. But this happens once every four years on average. There must be a more specific reason for the acute crisis. The reason the Commercial Farmers' Union was agitating over the drop in maize production was so that it could use the issue to argue for higher prices to be paid to the producer. 'The value of gross output in agriculture has remained static or declined,' said David Spain, then vice-president of the CFU, 'whereas the prices of input items have continued to rise, mainly due to imported inflation'.¹⁸

The real cause is much simpler: the war. And food shortages were not just an accidental result of the conflict between the illegal white regime and the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. They were a matter of deliberate policy on the part of the Rhodesian government. This is why white civil servants are reluctant to acknowledge that the problem is not new.

A direct cause of malnutrition in many areas was the government's policy of 'protected villages.' The idea, which originated with the British in Malaya and was practised by the Americans in Vietnam, was to isolate the civilian population from the guerillas by forcing them to live in these compounds. Three-quarters of a million people were moved into 220 protected villages (PVs), often many miles from their fields. Curfew hours were usually 6pm-6am, though in one PV I visited they lasted until 11am and there were even cases of 22-hour curfews. Curfew-breakers were shot. The combination of distance and curfew meant that some people could not cultivate their fields at all and everyone had their working hours cut short. It was also impossible to guard crops against predators,

such as baboons.

The result was a breakdown of normal agriculture in much of the country. In the first year of protected villages in one area, deaths increased by 37%. Eighty per cent of these were from starvation and one in every five adults suffered from malnutrition.¹⁹

One MP from the white regime's parliament described what things were like in the villages:

The people are hungry; where food rations have been given out they are inadequate and food at the stores in the keeps where it is stocked is priced exorbitantly high; there was no expansion of health facilities, contrary to the government claim to the contrary and only minor medication was available; sewage and water facilities were rudimentary and the smell from the toilets in some camps was appalling; outbreaks of diarrhoea, sore eyes, bilharzia and kwashiorkor were commonplace; in the rains the roofs leaked and blankets and household effects became saturated with water.²⁰

After September 1978 some 70 of the protected villages were opened up, but farmers returned to their land to find a shortage of seed and fertilizer and often their homes destroyed too, ostensibly to deprive the guerillas of shelter.²¹

The most serious legacy of the protected village system has been the loss of cattle, which everyone needs to plough with. Again this was recognized in 1979. The Deputy Minister of Lands said that 1-m out of the total of 3½-m cattle in the tribal trust lands had died.²² According to the Minister of Home Affairs, over 90% of the cattle in the Honde Valley had died.²³

Both men attributed this solely to the guerilla campaign of destroying cattle dips. This undoubtedly did cause serious problems but it was only part of a general breakdown of veterinary services.²⁴

What it also leaves out of account is the effect of protected villages on cattle. They could not be taken inside the PVs so they were

often lost or stolen. Many people talk of the security forces having a deliberate policy of shooting cattle. A survey by the then University of Rhodesia found that 38 people in the Mukumbura tribal trust land lost a total of 516 large stock units when they were moved into protected villages. (Cattle are one large stock unit. Small stock such as goats, pigs, calves and sheep are considered 0.2 of a unit.) 130,4 large stock units were taken by the government, 300,6 were stolen or strayed, 73,2 were sold and 118 were lost in other ways. -five out of the sample of 38 owned cattle before they were moved; at the time of the survey only three owned any livestock - just 12,4 units between them.²⁵

Anthrax now affects all areas and the tsetse fly has climbed out of its usual valley areas up the escarpments. An average plot would need four or five strong oxen to plough with. Many have none.

For the last planting season, which began in November, officials said that people could till by hand. This ignored the fact that in many cases land had not been ploughed for two or three years (because of the war and protected villages) and the topsoil is like concrete. Devag, the agricultural development department of the Ministry of Lands, has a well-organised scheme for training heads of families in farming, providing seed, fertilizer and tools, and ploughing where possible. Seed packs have been widely distributed but training only reaches 150 000. Most crucially, at the beginning of the planting season Devag had just 46 tractors to make up for the depletion of the cattle herd. A senior Devag official reckons they need at least 550.

This, then, is a major reason for thinking that the UNHCR and the Zimbabwean government

are being over-optimistic when they say that the feeding programme can end in March (1981). In many areas people have not been able to plant enough food to live on because they have no means of ploughing.

The outlying areas where there were most protected villages are worst hit. But there is not much cause for optimism in other regions. One MP from Victoria Province, where there were few PVs, says: 'The enemy was very ruthless. As a result some people spent most of their time in the mountains. They could hardly plough. In one place there was a group of people who'd never eaten anything like mealie meal for three years. They had simply lived on meat. They had turned into wild animals.'

In parliament in early 1979 one MP drew attention to 'the burning down of numerous kraals and granaries, the shooting of cattle, the closure of shops and grinding mills, the denial of tribesmen of the right to buy mealie meal, the forced labour of tribesmen on the upkeep of roads.'²⁶

This was Operation Turkey, the military codename for the destruction of food supplies that the security forces reckoned could reach the guerillas. Under the martial law which covered 90% of the country the troops were empowered to destroy crops, livestock, huts and personal property of those suspected of collaborating with the guerillas.

The stated aim of Operation Turkey was to allow only the barest minimum of food to reach the local population so that they would have none to share with the guerillas. Grain silos were destroyed or left with tiny stocks, large numbers of bush stores were closed, and people entering protected areas were restricted to no more than 10 kilos of grain or its equivalent. Anything above that amount they were forced

to dump or, in some cases, to eat before proceeding.

Even when shops were still open, people faced serious hazards. Often the shops were a long way - up to 20 kilometres - from the protected villages they were supposed to serve and were difficult, or impossible, to reach during the hours available under curfew regulations. In some districts, even if people reached the store they could still be required to produce written authority - signed by the district commissioner - before they could buy food. This food could still be confiscated by the army if the local commander had any suspicion that it might have reached the wrong hands.²⁷

This policy undoubtedly had an effect on the course of the war. It greatly increased most people's demoralization and war weariness and played a part in forcing the leaders of the nationalist parties to accept less favourable terms for independence than they might otherwise have done. Its effects are still felt in the dislocation of agriculture and the lack of the usual grain stores to cover periods of shortage.

The present acute food crisis therefore predates the return of the refugees and is the direct result of the war policies of the former white government. But there is a chronic food problem that goes back much further than that.

For example, a study of paediatric admissions to Harare hospital in Salisbury in 1973, when the guerilla war was hardly underway, found that malnutrition was the first, second or third diagnosis for about a third of all children admitted. The vast majority of those admitted were found to be underweight for their age.²⁸ Transport costs and hospital fees meant that the majority of malnourished children would not have been included in such figures.

Professor M J Riley maintained that the Harare

admissions 'probably represent less than one tenth of the clinically apparent patients with protein energy malnutrition.'²⁹

It has been estimated that each person needs 385lbs of maize a year. The Agricultural Marketing Authority's chief economist reckoned that even in 1962 the maize available in the tribal trust lands only averaged 352lbs per person. In 1977 it was 231lbs.³⁰

It has been estimated that in one tribal trust land in a drought year 37% of the families fell below subsistence and 38% into the subsistence category.³¹ Drought, remember, comes once every four years on average.

Black workers employed on white farms are no better off. A University of Rhodesia survey found that of all farmworkers' children under five who were sampled, 90% were malnourished.³² In the case of waged workers low pay is a major cause. In June 1977 over 80% of farm labourers received less than the poverty datum line wage of Z\$20 a month. The food rations which often supplement the money wage have been described by one medical specialist as wholly inadequate.³³

For most rural blacks the food problem is a direct result of the system of land tenure - which in many ways was the central issue in the liberation struggle. At independence the rural areas were divided almost equally (18-m hectares) between European and African land. Although the formal racial allocation of land had been abolished by an amendment to the Land Tenure Act in 1977, the reality remained the same. On the one hand were more than 15-m hectares of white farms plus forests and parks. On the other, 16-m hectares of tribal trust lands plus 'African purchase areas' designed to encourage a small class of black commercial farmers. (The last Minister of Lands before independence spoke of 'lazy people' not being

allowed on the land.) There were roughly one hundred times as many African farmers as European. The African rural areas contain some 80% of the total rural population.

White farms are concentrated in the centre of the country in natural farming regions II and III (the first an intensive farming region with good rainfall, the second a semi-intensive farming region with moderate rainfall, suited to livestock raising or production of cash crops.) Seventy-five percent of the tribal trust lands are concentrated in natural farming regions IV and V. Both are affected by drought, region V more seriously, and neither is suitable for cash cropping. Region V covers large areas of the Zambezi valley and the Lowveld area in the south-east. Region I, which covers small areas in the east of the country, is a high rainfall region suitable for plantation farming.

The tribal trust lands were the least favourable farming areas to start with. They suffered worse erosion and include 65% of the country's dwalas or 'domed insleberg terrain' - massive domes of infertile granite which cut down the amount of farming land and increase erosion in the surrounding area. It is possible to superimpose a number of maps: limits of dryland cropping, rainfall, endemic malaria, erosion hazards and domed insleberg terrain. The resulting montage corresponds fairly closely to the tribal trust lands.

To these initial disadvantages has been added population pressure. One geographer has described the carrying capacity of land thus:

Any area of land will support in perpetuity only a limited number of people (and livestock) ... if this limit is exceeded, without a compensating change in the system of land use, then a cycle of degenerative changes is set in motion, which must result in deterioration or destruction of the land and ultimately in hunger and reduction of the population. 34

In nearly 40% of the tribal trust lands the ratio of population to carrying capacity is three times as great as it should be. In 13% it is five times or more as great. A recent geographical paper estimated that:

Land degradation is widespread in many of these tribal areas and in some cases has reached such advanced stages that regeneration processes will take several decades to restore the vegetation and soil cover to a productive state; that is assuming population pressures can be drastically reduced and active measures are taken to encourage regeneration. ³⁵

Since 1900 the area under cultivation in the tribal trust lands has increased from about 215 000 hectares to about 2,5-m hectares. This was for three main reasons:

- An increase in human population from about 0,5-m to over 4-m.
- Introduction of cash crops.
- Declining yield from the land, which meant that more land had to be farmed.

Bearing all this in mind it is not surprising that the productivity of the tribal trust lands is low. In 1978 the total value of farm production in the white areas was Z\$428,4-m, compared with production for rural household consumption in black areas of Z\$90,1-m and official sales worth Z\$26,7-m. ³⁶

When it comes to maize, white farmers produced some 60% of the total crop in 1978. ³⁷ Many tribal trust lands regularly have to import maize and maize meal from other parts of the country. This made them particularly vulnerable to the security forces during the war.

The additional irony is that many white farms are not especially efficient. In contrast to black farmers who find it impossible to get access to credit facilities, white farmers have been featherbedded. In 1976 about 1,2-m hectares of white farming land was not being used at all.

As long ago as 1972 30% of farms in south-west Matabeleland were unoccupied or used only for residential purposes. In 1976 only 15% of potential cultivable land in white areas was being used. ³⁸

A number of things now fall into place. The apparent contradiction between food shortages and the record maize crop is resolved. It becomes clear how Rhodesia was able to export food 'at the expense of our local populace'. In fact, Zimbabwe will continue to export part of its grain 'surplus'. One reason for the increased commercial maize production is that the independent Zimbabwean government quickly agreed to give white farmers the massive increase in producer prices refused by its predecessors. Although this has had the desired effect of increasing the amount of maize, the government is only able to meet the increased cost by starting exports again. So little of the increased crop will reach the starving and the malnourished.

The distinction between the acute food problem caused by the war and the chronic problem caused by the land system is a bit artificial. It was the fact that the white community had such a hold on commercial food production that allowed it to use it so effectively as a weapon of war.

The use of food as a weapon is as old as war itself. Armies have always tried to stop food reaching the enemy and usually civilians have been the main sufferers. In the American Civil War the Federal General Sheridan laid waste the fertile Shenandoah valley so that 'a crow flying across it had better carry his own rations'. Since 1945 the problem has got worse. In wars of revolution and counter-insurgency the civilian population is considered a participant and therefore a legitimate target.

That was the rationale behind Operation Turkey. That too was the Indonesian government's attitude when it invaded East Timor in 1975. The Red Cross said in July 1979 that of 75 000 refugees in 13 government camps, 60 000 faced starvation. The government says that this is inevitable and cites the disruption of agricultural production by the 1975 civil war before it invaded. But eyewitnesses maintain that since 1975 there has been a systematic policy of destroying crops and displacing the population.

But food is a more subtle weapon if it can be both withheld and offered at appropriate moments. Thus in the 1979 'internal settlement' election, at the height of Operation Turkey, supporters of Bishop Muzorewa distributed sacks of maize to win votes for their candidates. ³⁹ Pfumo reVanhu, the Muzorewa 'auxiliaries', maintained their own food supply to use in this way. ⁴⁰

Something similar is happening on a world scale. According to one US president, food has become 'a tool in the kit of American diplomacy'. ⁴¹ The northern hemisphere produces a disproportionate amount of the world's food. US farmers now account for 57% of world grain exports, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and that figure will probably rise sharply in the next 20 years. ⁴² A CIA study explained the implications: 'As custodian of the bulk of the world's exportable grain, the US might regain the primacy in world affairs it held in the intermediate post-World War II era'. ⁴³

Henry Kissinger created a 'zap office' in the State Department. This monitored politically suspect Third World countries and recommended when they should be 'zapped' - have their food aid cut off. One of the first targets was

Salvador Allende's Chile.

In 1974 the US was using food aid to revive its prestige in South-East Asia. Seventy percent of its allocation of money for concessionary grain purchases went to the pro-Western governments of South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea. When the Communists took over in South Vietnam in 1975 the country was zapped.⁴⁴

In 1979 the British government used the plight of the 'boat people' as the occasion for cutting planned food aid to Vietnam worth £4-m. Under British pressure the EEC followed suit and stopped a 100 000 ton food shipment. As the scale of starvation in Kampuchea became apparent the food exporters actually hardened their attitude. Both the British and American governments initially refused aid on the grounds that they did not recognize the Vietnamese-backed regime in Kampuchea. This prompted the then head of the World Bank - Robert MacNamara, a former US Defence Secretary - to attack the American government for holding up food aid to one and a quarter million people. He contrasted the attitude of Vietnam, itself facing famine, which remained Kampuchea's only reliable source of food.⁴⁵

This same combination of destroying food and sometimes supplying it can be seen in both Rhodesia and South Africa's relations with the 'front-line states'. If the food situation inside Zimbabwe was a major factor pushing the two nationalist parties into a compromise at the Lancaster House pre-independence conference, another was the desperate problems facing Mozambique and Zambia, hosts to the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerilla armies respectively.

In the week before the Lancaster House talks began, Rhodesian troops launched a three-day raid on the Limpopo valley, Mozambique's main food-producing region. The area is the

main source of rice, the country's staple, as well as yams and tomatoes. The attack was timed to coincide with the end of the rice harvest and the large warehouses where the crop was stored were one target. Another was the Chokwe-Maputo road, the main route for transporting foodstuffs to the rest of the country. The raiders destroyed agricultural machinery and one of the four sluices of the Aldeia de Barragem dam, 272 km from the border, which provides irrigation for the rest of the region.⁴⁶

Zimbabwe Project said at the time that: 'bombings have disrupted communications between areas; there is a serious lack of transport facilities and grave shortages of all kinds, particularly food.'⁴⁷

This particularly affected the many Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique. Sister Janice McLaughlin of the London-based Zimbabwe Project who visited the camps in September 1979 said this: 'I was told that there was only enough food to last until November and there was no guarantee that the World Food Programme's next shipment would arrive in time to avert a crisis. I also learned that the World Food Programme had only budgeted for 80 000 people and the number of refugees is now double that. Food was named as the number one priority by everyone I met in Mozambique.'⁴⁸

This was confirmed by the Zimbabwe Project on a visit to Matenje refugee camp, which housed 5 000 refugees, mostly under 16: 'The only food available was rice and the storeroom stocks appeared only sufficient for one further day's supply. The majority of children were pot-bellied and clearly desperately undernourished.'⁴⁹

In mid-October 1979 Rhodesian troops destroyed a bridge on the Tazara railway from Zambia to Dar es Salaam. Over the next month this was followed by raids on Zambian road and

rail links to Malawi and Tanzania. The only source of maize remaining was the 150 tonnes being transported daily through Rhodesia and across the Victoria Falls railway bridge - which the Muzorewa government promptly closed.⁵⁰

This was not the first attack on the Zambian economy. Its link with the west coast, the Benguela railway through southern Angola, was already effectively closed by the activity of South African-backed guerillas. Then in April 1979 Rhodesian forces sank the Kazungula ferry which crosses the Zambezi between Zambia and Botswana where the borders of those two countries touch on Zimbabwe and South African-occupied Namibia. The Rhodesians maintained that the ferry was being used to transport guerillas. What it was in fact carrying was 14 000 tons of goods worth about £24-m from Botswana to Zambia each month. The Rhodesians refused to allow the Zambians to replace the ferry, despite written guarantees that it would not be used to carry arms. The South African authorities co-operated by refusing to allow hauliers to cross the river at Katima Mulilo, 65 km west of Kazungula.⁵¹

Yet the Zambian food problem goes back even further than this. Partly Zambia too suffered from the same drought as Zimbabwe, as well as having a communications system that is unreliable at the best of times. But the crisis was severely aggravated by the shortage of fertilizers late in 1973. The American shippers insisted on discharging all their cargo in the Mozambican port of Beira, creating a bottleneck and refusing to meet Zambian requests to go to Dar es Salaam. In August Mozambique and Zambia agreed that the fertilizers should avoid the bottleneck by being shipped south to Maputo and thence through South Africa to Botswana and Zambia. South African Railways agreed, but then

said that they could only take 200 tons a day. After consultation with the Rhodesian government they maintained that the cargoes should go through that country. When eventually in September a trickle of supplies began to move through Botswana, the Rhodesians, by then well forewarned, attacked the road on which they were travelling.⁵²

From March 1979 Zambian delegations secretly trailed back and forth between Lusaka and Salisbury with requests for maize. The Muzorewa government put increasingly stringent conditions on such a deal - for example the complete reopening of the frontier - and claimed that its railways did not have enough capacity to take all the maize supplies Zambia might have bought in South Africa. Only a week after the Rhodesian government had closed the Victoria Falls bridge in November 1979 - and while Rhodesian jets were still destroying Zambian crops and bridges - a delegation visited Salisbury with what was described as a 'huge shopping list of foodstuffs'.⁵³

Nor did Zambia's problems end with the ceasefire in Zimbabwe. In mid-1980 Ministry of Health officials urged that the Imusho area on the borders with Angola and Namibia be declared a disaster area because of widespread malnutrition caused by South African attacks. The incursions were supposedly directed at SWAPO, the Namibian liberation organization. Other observers claim that South African troops had occupied the region south of Mingo and west of the Zambezi almost continuously for a year. The troops had tanks, armoured cars and air support. They set up road blocks and seized Zambian government vehicles.

A Zambian businessman accused of selling food to SWAPO had his house and Land Rover blown up and his two children shot. The district

medical officer says that this is only one of many attacks on individuals. Repeated military occupation of Imoshu has driven people out of the region and brought cultivation to a standstill. The public health co-ordinator for Sisheka district reports that out of a sample of 251 children, 184 were found to be malnourished. It is thought that similar problems affect Maknda, Ngweze and Simuchanbela.

As a result of all this Zambia has become increasingly dependent on imported food - mainly, of course, from South Africa. In the year June 1980-1 Zambia will have imported more than 450 000 tonnes of maize.⁵⁴

By now it will be clear that it is hardly possible to separate the food policy of the former white regime in Rhodesia from that of white-ruled South Africa - a conclusion which is rather important since the apartheid regime is still in power and still capable of using the food weapon.

South Africa is the major food producer in the region, exporting regularly to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Zaire. It has an efficient marketing mechanism, sophisticated storage facilities and a food processing industry. (It also has a severely malnourished black population in many rural areas.) It sees this as an important element in realizing its strategic aim of a 'constellation' of favourable black-ruled states to its north. Speaking at a recent congress of the South African Agricultural Union, State President Marais Viljoen said: 'It is imperative not only for us to produce sufficient food for ourselves but also that we shall have more than enough of the basic foodstuffs so that we can help our neighbours when they experience problems.'⁵⁵

It is to counter this that the nine member states of the Southern African Development Co-

ordination Council are evolving a regional food policy and have decided to set up a Food Supplies Commission based in Zimbabwe, which is seen as the bread basket for the independent states in the area. But that in itself will not have the desired effect. One reason, in Zimbabwe's case, is that with much of the old white state apparatus still intact, top officials will tend to have more than a sneaking sympathy with South African aims. Take, for example, the strange case of Zimbabwe's maize imports from South Africa. Just after independence in March 1980 South African white maize began arriving in Bulawayo by rail. The total amount expected was equivalent to two-thirds of Zimbabwe's monthly consumption. Yet there was no need for the imports at all. In mid-1979 Dennis Norman had predicted that stocks were enough to take the country through to mid-1980. And when the trucks started arriving in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe was still exporting maize to Zaire. A spokesman for the Ministry of Agriculture admitted that 'The level of the current crop is quite ample to meet our requirements' and rather gave the game away by adding that the South African maize would leave 'that much more to export later in the year'.

The decision to import (for the first time since 1965) was taken in January 1980, when the country was supposedly under direct rule by the British government but in fact was wholly in the hands of the civil servants. The Grain Marketing Board was paying the South Africans Z\$125 a tonne - Z\$50 a tonne more than domestic producers were being paid at the time. This placed an intolerable pressure on the new government. It could leave the producer price of maize at Z\$75 a tonne which would have meant that a large number of white farmers would not have planted maize the next year - thus creating

a genuine dependence on South African imports. Alternatively it could raise the producer price to the same level as the price it was paying South Africa. It chose the second. The civil servants responsible for this manoeuvre are still in office. Dennis Norman is now Minister of Agriculture. These are the people who will be responsible for the Zimbabwean end of the regional Food Supplies Commission.

If the Food Supplies Commission is not going to solve Zimbabwe's food problem, what is? In the short term the government will have to maintain a food relief programme, even if it is on a smaller scale than at present, in recognition of the fact that shortages are not going to end this harvest. If the UNHCR is unable to carry on funding the programme, then pressure will have to be put on other UN agencies and, more especially, on countries like Britain, the former colonial power.

The UNHCR/Social Services programme has been a good one and the diet it has offered has generally been nutritious. But a better model is the supplementary feeding programme for one-to-five-year-olds. This programme aims to provide one full meal a day for children whose upper arm circumference is below 13cm. The supplement consists of maize meal, beans, ground-nuts and oil.⁵⁶ The programme is under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and backed by a consortium of aid agencies. Its drawback is that it too will end by April (1981).

But what distinguishes the supplementary feeding programme from most similar ventures is that it aims to provide nutritional education and encourage self-reliance.

A key role is assigned to former ZANLA and ZIPRA medics who form a link between the government departments involved and the local committees which supervise feeding. The scheme's organisers

see it as a priority to encourage the children's mothers to run the feeding points themselves. They hope that after the programme has stopped, its effects will still be felt in the greater use of energy-rich foods.⁵⁷

However, all the feeding programmes in the world will not break the nexus between South Africa and the white farmers of Zimbabwe - and that is the real cause of the problem. If there is to be a long-term solution, everything hinges on an effective redistribution of land. The Zimbabwean government has begun a resettlement programme which had moved about 1 500 families (10 000 people) from the tribal trust lands onto former white farms by the beginning of the rainy season. All the resettled land has been bought at agreed rates from owners who had either abandoned their farms or were anxious to stop farming, often for political reasons. The aim is to resettle over a million out of Zimbabwe's 7.5-m population at an overall cost optimistically reckoned at Z\$60-m over three years.

That figure of people already settled is tiny - 10 000 out of 4.5-m people in the tribal trust lands. One reason why the scheme has gone so slowly is cost. Under the Lancaster House settlement the government is not allowed to take over land without paying compensation. To get the nationalist parties to agree to this, the British government made vague promises of aid to meet the cost. Sydney Sekeremayi, the Minister of Lands, explains what has in fact happened: 'No money has been earmarked for land acquisition and when we discuss with various donor countries and you take up the question, they simply become very pale and don't want to discuss the matter'. Shortage of aid holds up the programme in other ways: there is not enough equipment and skilled personnel, and not enough money to develop a rural infrastructure - schools,



hospitals, roads and so on.

But ultimately the Zimbabwean government cannot blame all its problems on reluctant aid donors. It has made a definite political choice not to challenge the white commercial farming sector. Even the Commercial Farmers' Union says that the resettlement scheme is going too slowly.

This explains why at the beginning of the rainy season a number of landless people began to occupy white-owned land. The government took a tough line towards the squatters at first - with elaborate security and jail sentences - but in the end had to let some of them stay on the occupied land for this season.

The last word should go to one of the people who squatted on Lord Salisbury's 12 000 hectare farm in Manicaland. When farm staff tried to turn the squatters off, he said: 'This is Zimbabwe, not Rhodesia - you don't have to buy land'.

Richard Carver (January, 1981)

Footnotes

1. Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference, Commission on Social Services and Development, 'Starvation in Tongaland', 1976 (mimeo). Information in this article which is not referenced is generally first-hand material which I gathered while travelling in Zimbabwe from October to December, 1980. Other material is taken from an article jointly written with David Sanders (now Oxfam's Medical Adviser in Zimbabwe) in late 1979, which appeared in a shortened version in the London Sunday Times.
2. Herald, 1 March 1979.
3. Herald, 22 September 1979.
4. This would meet the average energy requirement for a child up to about four years old. The daily requirement for a moderately active adult man is about 3 000 calories a day.
5. Herald, 3 March 1979.
6. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), 26 July 1979.
7. Herald, 9 August 1979.
8. Richard Carver and David Sanders, 'Why Soames will have to speed food to the war zones', Sunday Times (London), 23 December 1979.
9. Rand Daily Mail, 10 November 1979.
10. Southern Cross, 21 October 1979.
11. Herald, 24 April 1979.
12. 'Position paper on starvation in the rural areas of Rhodesia', Zimbabwe Project, 4 August 1979.
13. Herald, 4 August 1979.
14. Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Health for the year ended 31st December 1966, Salisbury 1967.
15. Daily Dispatch, 16 August 1979.
16. Herald, 9 August 1979.
17. Information from Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, November 1979.
18. Rand Daily Mail, 23 May 1979.
19. 'Some aspects of the dehumanising effects of the war', report submitted to the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference, August 1978.
20. 'A look at life in the protected villages of the north eastern districts - part of the Nemakonde constituency', 1978 (mimeo).
21. John Gilmurray, Roger Riddell and David Sanders, The Struggle for Health, CIIR, London, 1979, p31. See also National Observer, 28 June 1979.
22. BBC, 30 July 1979.
23. BBC, 3 August 1979.
24. New Statesman, 17 August 1979.
25. The Voice, 1 April 1979.
26. Parliamentary Proceedings, (Hansard), 7 February 1979.
27. War on Want Outlook, No 2, August/September 1979; Financial Times, 1 May 1979; 'Report on a visit to Rhodesia, 10-22 January 1979', SANA.
28. JHM Axton, 'Analysis of medical paediatric admissions, Harare Hospital, 1973', The Central African Journal of Medicine, Vol 23, No 9, September 1977, p199.
29. MJ Riley, 'Protein and energy requirements and the effects of their deficiencies', The Rhodesian Science News, Vol 9, No 6, June 1975, p175.
30. EG Cross, 'The tribal trust lands in transition: the national implications', The Rhodesian Science News, Vol 11, No 8, August 1977, p188.
31. Vincent Tickner, The Food Problem, CIIR, London 1979, p10.
32. *ibid.* p17.
33. *ibid.* p17.
34. W Allan, Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No 15, 1949.
35. JR Whitlow, 'Environmental Constraints and Population Pressures in the Tribal Trust Areas of Zimbabwe', Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, July-August 1980.
36. Tickner 1979, p19.
37. *ibid.* p51.
38. Roger Riddell, The Land Question, CIIR, London nd, p13.
39. The Rise 29 April 1979.
40. African Confidential, 18 July 1979.
41. Quoted in The Profits of Doom, War on Want, London 1976, p13.
42. Financial Times, 14 November 1979.
43. The Profits of Doom, p13.
44. New Statesman, 21 September 1979.
45. New Statesman, 12 October 1979.
46. 'Rhodesian Raid on Mozambique - the Facts', MAGIC, London nd; Natal Daily News, 10 October 1979; New Statesman, 14 September 1979.
47. 'Critical food shortage in camps in Mozambique', Zimbabwe Project, 12 November 1979.
48. *ibid.*
49. *ibid.*
50. For damage caused by raids see BBC, 21 November 1979; for their effects on food supplies see, among others, The Guardian, 11 December.
51. New African, August 1979.
52. Full account in Zimbabwe Information Group Bulletin, No 9-10, December-January 1978-9.
53. The Times, 19 November 1979.
54. The Economist, 24-30 January 1981.
55. Rand Daily Mail, 17 October 1979.
56. Portions per person as follows:

	gm	cal	protein (gm)
Maize meal	50	175	4,5
Beans	15	49	3,8
Groundnuts	15	88	3,5
Oil	10	90	-
		402	11,8
57. The following notes, prepared by David Sanders for the supplementary feeding programme, explain why this is important. 'Recent and authoritative research has shown that undernutrition syndromes previously

This supplement is in accord with the World Health Organization recommendations.

attributed to protein deficiency are in fact due to general food and energy deficiency. When the total food intake is inadequate in energy terms, protein (which may not necessarily be inadequate) cannot be utilised and extra protein will be of no value. The main reason for this energy-deficit is that the staple in under-developed countries is usually an unrefined cereal (maize in Zimbabwe) whose bulkiness when cooked makes it difficult for a child to eat sufficient in one sitting to satisfy his/her energy needs unless - as is unlikely - she/he has frequent meals.

'This new thinking on what was previously thought of as "protein-deficiency malnutrition" has profound implications for nutrition supplementation/rehabilitation. In short, it is now accepted that energy-rich foods - fats and oils - are more important in correcting under-nutrition than the traditionally-used protein. (JC Waterlow and PR Payne, 'The Protein Gap', *Nature*, Vol 258, No 5531, pp113-117). For, in addition to being useless as "tissue-building food" until energy requirements have been satisfied, protein provides less energy per unit weight than fat and oil. In fact, both protein and carbohydrate provide 4 calories per gram as opposed to fat/oil which provide 9 calories per gram.

'Hence the strategy in nutrition supplementation/rehabilitation should be to increase the energy content of the staple (maize) /legume (bean, groundnut) mix by the addition of oil or fat. Vegetable oil is generally cheaper and easier to use than animal fat. In Zimbabwe groundnut oil would probably be most appropriate'.

RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS: a response

IN Work In Progress 18, 'trade unionist' begins his/her note on recognition agreements by asking what a recognition agreement is. He/she poses the question: is it a document conferring rights of representation on workers, or is it a deal between management and 'paid union officials' to rationalise their relationship? Central to the author's entire critique is this supposed separation of interests between workers on the one hand, and 'paid union officials' on the other. All the dangers to which 'trade unionist' alerts his/her readership flow from this contradiction within the bounds of the trade union. The joint SAAMU - SA Chloride commitment to profitability is cited as 'an unfortunate attitude by union leadership' and one which 'may well set the stage for a relationship between management and the union leadership which is conducted on a false basis'.

A second related problem then noted is the undertaking to negotiate wages and working conditions at an industrial council level. This removes the focus of struggle from the factory floor 'leaving it in the hands of a few union leaders'. The conceding of management prerogatives in respect of dismissals and interference in shop steward elections are all 'likewise argued from the standpoint that they are against the interests of workers, and by implication in

the interests of union leadership (why else would they sign away these rights?).

Again, where registration is made a condition of recognition, the author notes that 'it is a question that should be decided only after lengthy and open discussion amongst union membership. It is certainly not a decision that can be imposed on membership in this manner'.

'The treatment of anti-strike clauses is the same. The union leadership, 'overwhelmed by the generosity of the company in affording 'recognition' sign away the 'legal right' to strike. And having so signed, if workers go on strike, 'the union bureaucracy would stand to lose stop order and organising facilities and many other carrots offered by recognition'. All the 'dangers and pitfalls' flow from this basic dualism underlying the agreement. It is symptomatic that 'trade unionist's' prescription for overcoming the dualism should be 'strong organisation in the workplace and a high level of participation by the company's workers in the negotiations for recognition'.

Our first objection then, is that there is a tendency to fetishise the 'agreement' in 'trade unionist's' argument. It is not the agreement that causes 'highly bureaucratized or undemocratic unionism', but by the author's own argument it is the union bureaucracy that causes the objectionable agreement.

Our second objection is that the article locates the problems associated with agreements at the level of the union bureaucracy only, (and its counterpart, the 'enlightened' and 'generous' employer). There are more insidious problems associated with the recognition strategy than the problem of union bureaucracy.

Our third objection is the assumption

that these dangers are associated with the recognition agreement only. The dangers highlighted by the author are not peculiar to the recognition strategy but to all union strategies. The article as a consequence fails to identify the differing potentialities for such dangers in different strategies.

Our fourth objection is that the agreements are treated separately from the underlying strategy. All agreements that have as their heading 'recognition agreements' are lumped together, even when they accord no recognition at all.

Our fifth objection is the static nature of 'trade unionist's' analysis. The article presents a snapshot of one feature of the present labour scene, and fails to locate it in the context of a developing worker struggle. The article consequently misses the point that management's recent initiatives with agreements are essentially counter-offensives aimed at gaining control of a terrain which has hitherto largely been of the trade union's choosing.

We wish to begin where the previous article on recognition agreements leaves off. In that article, the author prescribed the remedy to the problems identified: 'strong organisation in the workplace'. This is part of the propaganda armoury of all the 'progressive' unions. Its elaboration in practice is more complex. It is not simply a matter of choice or assertion. It has to be forged in an often bitter struggle with capital.

The modern factory is a hostile environment for worker organisation. Highly sophisticated modes of control and supervision do not stop with the organisation of production, but quite deliberately attempt to disorganise attempts by workers to challenge this control.

Scientific management, time and motion studies, and increasing use of modern video technology impose greater detailed control over worker behaviour and swifter disciplinary responses to stepping out of line. A shop steward at Colgate put it simply: 'You can't even piss without permission'. In Smith and Nephew management introduced different coloured overalls for each department to discourage movement from one department to another. In this way, management was able to pick out the worker leadership in the 1973 strike.

Everyday communication between worker and worker is either prohibited during work (they fire workers at a textile factory in Benoni for talking to each other during work), or prevented by the noise of machinery or the all-day barrage of Radio 5 on the loudspeaker system. Tea times and lunch times are staggered, thereby hindering everyday access of one worker to another. Shift systems ensure that most of the workforce never meets together at the workplace and make it almost impossible for the worker leadership in the factory to meet as one. Indeed, during the Frame strike in Pinetown (with three different shift systems operating), one of the shop stewards remarked that 'we have to have a strike in order to have a full shop stewards' meeting'. If this is true of worker leadership, it is all the more true of general meetings of workers, so essential to democratic shop floor organisation.

It is obvious that the degree and extent of control will vary with the size of the factory and the nature of the industry. Service industries like transport and the docks are less difficult for work place organisation. But the bulk of South African industry, such as iron and steel, mining, textiles, automobile and chemical reveal these characteristics.

Translating the slogan 'shop floor power' into a reality in this environment is problematic and should never be underestimated. Certain basic concessions have to be won in order to ensure the survival of strong, democratic shop floor organisation. These concessions have to be extracted from capital which has generally resisted the workers; demands for the right to hold general meetings within working hours (whether to democratically elect or mandate their worker leadership). Much the same applies to the right of worker leadership as a group to hold regular meetings during working hours. More generally, in order to ensure worker control over a trade union as a whole (precisely to avoid the bureaucratisation of the union leadership), workers have also demanded the right to be given time off to attend union meetings or to attend to other union business. There is no universal 'week-end' on the three shift system. The sabbath no longer has organisational significance.

The recognition strategy involves primarily the recognition of the union's organised presence in the workplace. Any agreement that does not contain these concessions is not a 'recognition' agreement. It is not a matter of definition. There is no need to come to an agreement to 'recognise' a trade union if the trade union does not demand an organisational presence in the work place. It is not so much a danger of 'recognition agreements' that unions agree to negotiate wages and working conditions at the industrial council, so much as a fundamental difference in principle. It is the difference between a union that insists on the principle of shop floor power (such as the FOSATU-affiliated Chemical Workers' Industrial Union did in the Colgate dispute), and a union which does not (such as the CUSA-affiliated Chemical

Workers' Union which agreed with AECI to negotiate at industrial council level only). The proper focus for critique in this case is the industrial council strategy, not its written expression in an agreement.

It is not only the democratic needs of worker organisation that need to be struggled for, it is often the very existence of shop floor organisation. Dismissal is a powerful weapon, particularly in times of high unemployment. It is wielded by capital deliberately to undermine shop floor organisation by weeding out workers' leadership. Quite apart from workers' individual interests in job security, the limitation of managerial prerogatives to hire and fire has important organisational significance. Many struggles for recognition have focussed specifically on this limitation of the right to fire. What is at stake is capital's right and power to discipline labour. Any simplistic notions of 'economism' or agreements serving as 'forms of control' overlooks the impetus and main thrust of the recognition strategy.

The problems associated with agreements are not contextualised by 'trade unionist'. The author's concerns and examples in respect of 'profitability', 'matters for negotiation', 'company interference in union affairs', and 'strikes' all reflect an important shift in capital's strategy towards the thrust of working class organisation in the work place. Capital's first line of resistance was the blanket refusal to negotiate at plant level and to insist that all relations with the trade union be restricted to the industrial council. Various individual capitals have begun to break ranks after long and bitter struggles (Colgate, Premier Paper, SAPPI). The second line of response is to try and extract counter concessions from the union. This shift in

strategy presents an important challenge to the working class movement in South Africa.

'Trade unionist' locates the problem primarily as one of diverging interests between rank and file and union officialdom. The whole drift of his/her argument is to stress the 'function' of recognition agreements as a new form of control, despite the qualification at the end of that contribution. We would argue that the agreement should be seen as both an expression and a site of struggle. Capital's new counter-offensive is the outcome of the increasingly effective use of agreements to entrench and buttress organisational rights in the work place. The fundamental objection to the approach of 'trade unionist' is the failure to see that it is capital's power that forces these counter-concessions, not those facile reasons advanced such as the 'unfortunate attitude by union leadership', or their being 'overwhelmed by the generosity of the company'.

The underlying 'danger' that 'trade unionist' seeks to expose is the opportunism of the union leadership. This is certainly a danger to all working class organisations - but this approach tends to conflate necessary compromise with opportunism. And surely this is the proper locus of debate? Agreements have no universal character. They have no special properties which exist independently of the struggle from which they spring. Agreements reflect temporary outcomes of struggle between capital and working class organisations, and their form will tend to reflect this relative power at any one time.

The fundamental strategic problem is the nature and extent of the concessions that can be compromised in order to achieve significant organisational rights in the work place. It is this approach that would defend SAAWU's declaration of their commitment to 'profitability,

growth and stability' in their agreement with Chloride. As 'trade unionist' rightly says, 'this statement in itself need not have any direct consequences for workers on the shop floor'. This might well be the type of concession the working class can live with, while it builds up shop floor power. On the other hand, it might have important ideological repercussions, though not to the extent one imagines: it could blind workers to the fact that presently one of the key areas of dispute is precisely the relative distribution of wages and profits. In any case, our intention here is merely to point out the proper parameters of the debate over such a concession, and to reject 'trade unionist's' simplistic treatment of compromise in terms of leadership 'attitudes'.

The dangers of these recognition agreements must be studied within a theoretical and strategic understanding of intermediate struggle. But there are dangers and pitfalls that are specific to these recognition agreements and which need to be more fully debated and discussed.

* One of the dangers we have experienced has been the tendency to individualise the procedures. Rights against dismissal and disciplinary action should not be individualised and settled in a 'rational-legal' manner; they should be seen as and translated into collective rights.

* Procedures should avoid, in our view, joint decision-making. Worker leadership should avoid being implicated in management decisions. The concession, for example, that no worker will be dismissed without the worker leadership's consent and agreement is a very far-reaching inroad into managerial prerogatives, but it carries with it a hidden penalty, since it

some time the worker leadership may be identified with the management's discipline.

a There is a danger that once the concessions have been won, the struggles may be viewed as being over. Workers and worker leadership must remain vigilant and not fall into the trap of fetishising the agreement. Just as the concessions were won through struggle, they can only be defended or extended through struggle. For this to be achieved, the agreement must be the workers' agreement. It must be an expression of their demands in legal form, and hence readily comprehensible to and workable by them.

a The legally binding agreement may not be the appropriate instrument for advancing the workers' struggle in all instances. Once workers' rights are so strongly entrenched in the factory that it would entail a protracted and debilitating struggle for management to overthrow them, it may be better to allow an agreement to lapse, and leave the union unconstrained by reciprocal obligations.

The development of the debate in this direction, we believe, will materially assist in translating the slogans of shop floor democracy and shop floor power into daily practice and concrete reality.

Johannesburg trade unionists

ORGANISING WOMEN?

This article was written collectively by a women's study group in Johannesburg. It is the result of 18 months of discussion and research by individual members of the group.

The questions to which we addressed ourselves involved the basis of women's oppression and exploitation in South Africa, and how women have organised against this. In trying to find answers to these questions, we began looking at other issues: how do working class women in South Africa actually experience wage labour? How do they spend their time at home? What sorts of organisations are they involved in?

What follows are some of the answers we found to these questions. They are by no means final or definitive, but we do feel that they begin to tackle some of the important issues.

We would appreciate responses to, and comments on what we have written.

We women share with our menfolk the cares and anxieties imposed by poverty and its evils. As wives and mothers, it falls upon us to make small wages stretch a long way. It is we who feel the cries of our children when they are hungry and sick. It is our lot to keep and care for homes that are too small, broken and dirty to keep clean.... These are evils that need not exist. They exist because the society in which we live is divided into poor and rich, into non-European and European.... We women have stood and will stand shoulder to shoulder with our menfolk in a common struggle against poverty, race and class discrimination.... We shall teach the men that they cannot hope to liberate themselves from the evils of discrimination and prejudice as long as they fail to extend to women complete and unqualified equality in law and in practice.

-from the Women's Charter of the
Federation of South African Women, 1954.

FOR the first time since the 1950s we are seeing the beginnings of women's political organisations which are capable of bringing together all women who are committed to the national democratic

struggle. We are also seeing the increasing involvement of women in community struggles - for example against rent increases in Soweto in 1980 and 1981, and in the Durban townships of Phoenix and Newlands East in 1980. Women have also been part of the growing worker militancy and strikes; the Sea Harvest strike in Cape Town and the Frame strike in Durban have involved large numbers of women workers. The resistance of women against forced removals at Nyanga was yet another battle in women's resistance to influx control.

Despite these struggles there are still many women who have not become involved in resistance to their oppression as workers, women and as blacks. Those women who have been involved in specific community or worker struggles often do not sustain their involvement once the immediate issue is over.

This raises for us many issues that question the nature of women's oppression, and its relation to the broader struggle against apartheid. There are two questions that immediately come to mind. Firstly, why do we need to organise women, and secondly, do we need separate organisations for women? In answer to the first question we will try to show that we need to organise women so that they can win their liberation in the process of involvement in the struggle against apartheid and capitalist exploitation. In answer to the second question, we will try to show that there are specific ways that different groups experience their exploitation under apartheid. This goes for women just as it does for students, workers and different communities in a racially divided society.

To answer these questions we will look at two main issues: at the specificity of women's oppression in South Africa; and at the forms

which women's organisation has taken both formally and informally.

The Specificity of Women's Organisation

WOMEN make up half of the oppressed people in South Africa. Together with the oppressed masses they are separated from the means of production and forced into wage labour. They receive very little of the wealth that they produce for others. They are excluded from political power and control over the most basic decisions which affect their lives. Influx control determines where they can live and work. Like the rest of the working class they are forced to endure a constantly decreasing standard of living as inflation eats into meagre wages; they suffer the effects of overcrowding due to shortage of housing and inadequate health facilities.

At this stage we need to draw a distinction between exploitation and oppression. When we say that women and the working class in general are exploited, we mean that they do not own the means of production (factories, farms and mines), and that they are forced to work for the owners of the means of production (the bosses) for a wage. The working class is exploited because the value of the wage earned is equivalent to the value of the goods which the bosses consider that they need in order to live (that is, the value of their food, clothes, rent and transport). The wage is not equivalent to the value of all the goods which the worker produces. The difference between the value of a worker's wage and the value of the goods he/she produces is profit. It is this profit which the bosses keep for themselves.

When we speak of oppression we are talking about the way in which working people experience the effects of this exploitation in their

daily lives. For example, lower wages mean inadequate food, poor housing and inferior education.

We said earlier that women experience both exploitation and oppression in the same way as the working class as a whole. However, they also experience exploitation and oppression in specific ways which we will go on to discuss now.

Women in Wage Labour

Women in all capitalist countries work in the lowest paid, least skilled occupations. They are usually the last to be hired and the first to be fired. They are part of what we call a reserve army of labour. This means that they are drawn into production during periods of industrial growth and fired during recessions. Thus, women form the largest group of unemployed people.

In South Africa, working class women experience the sorts of exploitation and oppression which we have described above. However, because of the racial character of South African capitalism, it is black working class women who experience this exploitation and oppression most intensely. Influx control together with an ideology that says that domestic labour and work in the clothing and food industries is 'women's work' force women into specific sectors of employment. The following table shows that two-thirds of african women in employment work in agricultural or domestic sectors; the rest are spread amongst the food, catering, clothing, textile and service industries - all of which are traditionally regarded as areas of 'women's work' in capitalist societies.

Table A: Employment patterns amongst african women, 1970.

Wood and paper manufacturing	5 000
Agriculture	655 000
Domestic services	633 000
Medical and welfare	43 000
Education	33 000
Wholesale and retail	29 000
Clothing manufacturing	21 000
Catering and accommodation	20 000
Textile manufacturing	15 000
Food manufacturing	13 000
Public administration and defence	6 000
Laundry	4 000
Other manufacturing and services	21 000
Unclassified	216 000
<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>165 000</u>
<u>Total economically active women</u>	<u>1 889 000</u>

(Source: 1970 Population Census)

The conditions of work in domestic and agricultural sectors are generally the worst in South Africa: there are no minimum wage agreements covering these workers; they are excluded from membership of the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Workmen's Compensation Fund which means they cannot get unemployment pay, sick pay or maternity leave; they are not covered by any legislation limiting the number of hours they can work. They are excluded from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, which means that they cannot organise into registered or state recognised trade unions.

A few examples show the effects of this. Domestic workers in Johannesburg earn an average of R57 a month,⁽¹⁾ and in the Eastern Cape as little as R30 a month or less.⁽²⁾ Women farm workers in the Eastern Cape earn even less, sometimes as little as 60c a day.⁽³⁾ For these miserable wages women work as long as 84 to 85 hours a week.⁽⁴⁾

The position of women in industrial employment in the cities is marginally better. But they are still employed in sectors which are relatively labour intensive, eg food and clothing, and they are employed at the lowest wages to do the most unskilled work. The average weekly wage for women in the Transvaal clothing industry is about R25 per week for a qualified worker and R15 for an unqualified worker. (5) It takes a woman between two and four years to qualify in this sector.

As we said earlier, women are also excluded from industrial employment by the racial nature of South Africa's capitalist oppression - the influx control laws being the cornerstone of this. In 1964 women without urban rights were prevented from entering an urban area unless they had a specific job to go to. Since 1974 this regulation applies equally to african men and women: neither are permitted to look for their own jobs in an urban area. The tightening of influx control represents part of the common oppression experienced by the african working class of both sexes.

Women and Unemployment

Table A above defines 1 889 000 women as economically active. According to the 1970 census there are 7 797 000 african women in South Africa. This means that about three quarters of african women are not in formal employment. Many african women are not employed and probably never have been. This is not because they do not want to work - extra income would be useful to most working class families. It is rather because apartheid policy has involved attempts to prevent women from leaving the bantustans and forming part of an urbanised working class. The ideology of apartheid specifies that women are supposed to

be engaged in subsistence farming in the bantustans to provide for their families. The reality of this situation is that there is no land available for most rural women to work. As we said above, the jobs defined for women are so bad that many women choose to remain unemployed rather than work long hours doing heavy manual work for starvation wages.

A woman from Winterveld who was unable to find work because she did not have the 'right stamp in her pass', described her situation like this: 'I have never worked. I would like to work, but there is no work and too much unemployment. So because there is none I clean, and then I sleep'. (6)

Unemployment is oppressive not only because it excludes women from earning a wage, but also because of the effect which it has on women's consciousness. Unemployed women are isolated from the rest of society. They remain at home, with nothing but housework to occupy their time. This life-style reinforces subservience, passivity and the lack of self-confidence.

Unemployment also forces women into many 'informal' (and sometimes illegal) occupations such as hawking, liquor brewing and prostitution. For the many women who are widowed, divorced or abandoned, these activities are the only means of support for themselves and their families. Like the rest of the unemployed in South Africa, women with families to support can expect very little in the way of state assistance for themselves and their families.

Women's Experience of Daily Oppression

We said earlier that women share problems in the community with the rest of the working class - overcrowded living conditions, high rents, inadequate health facilities. Even within this situation, however, women are comparatively

more disadvantaged. For example, they are legally discriminated against so that they cannot rent houses (they can only keep a house if widowed or divorced). Women also face oppression on a personal level within the family. Domestic work in their homes is considered to be the traditional role of women. Once again ideology plays a powerful role in reinforcing this oppression. The ideology which says that women are the homemakers and men the wage earners, entrenches domestic work as women's sphere of responsibility.

Domestic work is both oppressive and indirectly exploitative. Firstly, it is a 'free' service which bosses get from their workers' wives. The wife of a Bolivian mineworker, Domitilla Barrios de Chungara explained it like this:

Generally we can't count on someone else to help around the house. What the husband earns is so little and really we all have to help out..... Well, I think that all of this proves how the miner is doubly exploited, no? Because, with such a small wage, the woman has to do much more in the home. And really that's unpaid work that we're doing for the bosses, isn't it?..... One day I got the idea of making a chart. We put as an example the price of washing clothes per dozen pieces and we figured out how many dozens of items we washed a month. Then the cook's wage, the babysitter's and the servant's. We figured out everything that we miners' wives do every day. Adding it all up, the wage needed to pay us for what we do in the home, compared to the wages of a cook, a washerwoman, a babysitter, a servant, was much higher than what the men earned in the mine for a month. (7)

Secondly, many working class women are in fact engaged in some form of wage labour outside the home. They thus experience a 'double day'. After working for their employer all day they must come home and look after their families. Most urban working class

women rise before 05h00, get home after 18h00 and go to bed between 21h30 and 23h00.

A woman who works 6 days a week at a knitting factory described her situation as follows:

My husband doesn't cook. He thinks it is a women's job. I think so too - what can I say?...He tells you he is tired, that he needs to relax. When I get home I don't relax, I have to cook. (8)

Most of the women interviewed at this same factory simply laughed when they were asked whether their husbands helped with the housework:

One thing in common to every woman interviewed was 'no time'. The responsibilities of housework and childcare in most cases operated in such a way as to circumscribe their thoughts and activities. Weariness is a theme which runs throughout. (9)

It is this lack of time and weariness which ties many women so closely to domestic duties. 'How can you have time to visit when you have two families to look after?' (a domestic worker in the Eastern Cape);⁽¹⁰⁾ 'I never go to films or live shows. I just work' (factory worker, Johannesburg).⁽¹¹⁾

Thus, for many women leisure time activities - reading, listening to music, visiting friends - are not possible. The drudgery of their daily lives must be seen to be as much an aspect of their oppression as oppression in the workplace and community.

Abuse of Women

It is important to recognise that working class women also experience their oppression in the form of physical and sexual abuse by men. Most women in this country do not dare walk in the townships at night. The incidence of rape is one of the highest in the world. Domestic battering of women is commonplace. It is not sufficient simply to hope that this brutal manifestation of the division between

men and women will disappear if the structures of oppression and exploitation are removed at the general level. It is something which needs to be confronted and challenged as part and parcel of the process of social change. For if working class women continue to experience men as 'rubbishes' and 'bullies' (common terms), and men continue to regard women as 'causing trouble', then how will solidarity ever be possible?

We have attempted to show, then, that working class women experience exploitation and oppression both specifically as women, and generally as members of a black working class. We will now look at how working class women in South Africa have responded historically to their oppression. What forms of organisation have they been attracted to? Do these organisations (or could they in the future) cater for the aspirations of women's liberation? To what extent has the specificity of their oppression been addressed by the major political movements over time? These are the questions we will consider in this next section. Examples of organisations will be drawn on to illustrate points. Our assessment will conclude with some discussion on the question of the 'separate' organisation of women.

Trade Union Organisation

Participation in the process of social production (wage labour) has historically provided the basis for the development of 'class consciousness' amongst workers (is a consciousness of the exploitation of workers as a class). For it is in the process of social production that workers become aware of the advantages of collective action. We are not suggesting that workers become 'class conscious' automatically if they are involved in wage labour. Neither are we suggesting that only

those engaged in wage labour can potentially become class conscious. However, the common experience of exploitation at the workplace is an important starting point for the development of worker consciousness.

We have shown that women in capitalist societies generally, and in South Africa in particular, tend to be employed in sectors which are badly paid, unprotected by legislation and relatively unstable within the general economy. Not only this, but within these sectors women workers tend to get the worst deal. Organisation on a large scale for better working conditions, wages and benefits is thus very difficult in these sectors. Particularly in domestic and farm labour, the possibility of women organising to improve working conditions is limited. These workers are highly controlled, and isolated. They often live on their employer's premises and even their leisure time is controlled. Resistance in any form is often met with harsh punishment: docking of wages and beatings are not uncommon. The absence of large scale trade union organisation of women in South Africa, then, must be understood as a function of the forms of wage labour women are engaged in, and not simply as a result of women's passivity.

This is not to say that women are entirely unorganised in the trade union movement. Over the past years there have been fine examples of action on the part of women workers. For example, in 1979 women workers at the Sea Harvest factory in Saldhana Bay led a militant and successful strike against low wages and management's refusal to recognise their union, the Food and Canning Workers' Union. Women also played important roles in the Fattis and Monis strike of 1980, and the Frametex strike in Durban

in the same year. In addition, the development of a number of General Workers' Unions, organising largely in the service sector, has meant a vast increase in the number of women organised in unions over the past few years.

Then, of course, there is the National Union of Clothing Workers, a TUCSA union which is parallel to the Garment Workers' Union. One of the largest unions in the country with a mainly female membership of 23 000, it is well known for its general conservatism. Lucy Mvubelo, general secretary of the NUCW since 1953, stated in 1974 that

An organised labour force is beneficial both to the employer and the employee... the female worker is disciplined and has the full knowledge that she is part of the establishment and thus contributes to better productivity and less absenteeism; she feels the responsibility she has to play in the establishment. (12)

Again, in 1980 she said of her union:

If the production drops the employer always phones us and says: come and talk to your people - I don't know what is happening, and so on. We speak to the workers and try to tell them that we won't be able to get more money for you at the next negotiations because you people don't want to produce. (13)

Workers are organised in the union via stop orders. A shop steward at a Johannesburg factory had this to say: 'It is a disappointing union. There is nothing they can do to help the workers. They never come to address the workers - only when there is something important to tell the people (like when there is going to be an increment or additional deductions). That is usually about 2 or 3 times a year'. (14)

Commenting on the absence of a shop steward in her section of a knitwear factory, a worker stated:

They say they are scared because Naidoo (a production manager) fired two shop stewards two years ago...They are scared

because if the union has got nothing to threaten the employers with then they can do nothing as a shop steward. And that is why I am also frightened and scared...So I am lazy to talk up...For what if you are fired. One person said the union must threaten the employers not to fire - the union just said they must come and they will find them another job. But then you are working from factory to factory...You must find something to threaten the employers. (15)

The stated conservatism of the union, then, clearly reflected in factory floor organising strategies. Women in the garment industry, then, are only organised in so far as the NUCW has a large membership on paper.

Even those trade unions which are far more progressive and efficient in their organising strategies than the NUCW have yet to address themselves to some of the issues facing women workers in particular. For example, trade unions are still to face the fact that women workers often feel reticent about remaining after working hours to attend union meetings on account of their domestic responsibilities (determined by the very rigid sexual division of labour in the household which was referred to earlier).

The responsibilities of children, in the absence of child care facilities, are often central in the exclusion of women from full participation in union affairs. Not only this, but there are conditions of work which are specific to women which need to be recognised - for example maternity leave and pay; sexual abuse of women workers by supervisors and bosses (widespread, it seems, but virtually unrecorded); humiliating body searches by men; and the absence of child care facilities. It is sometimes claimed that to take up such issues might be divisive of the working class as a whole. We would assert in turn that not to address such issues is to reinforce an

already existing division of the workforce along lines of sex. To ignore these issues is to, in effect, exclude many women from organisation, and also to run the risk of excluding women's demands from programmes for social change.

The fact that women workers are largely unorganised, that what organisation there is, is inadequate, and that many working class women are not employed in wage labour points to two important things: firstly, it is obvious that the scale and quality of union organisation amongst women needs to be drastically improved. Secondly, the organisation of women outside of the workplace (in the reproductive sphere) is absolutely vital if working class women are to become an integral part of the process of political opposition in this country.

Community Organisation

The organisation of women in the reproductive sphere (what we will broadly term 'community organisation') has historically been strong in South Africa. In the 1940s women were involved on a large scale in the campaigning for food rations and the organisation of food co-operatives during a time when food prices were rocketing. In the early 1950s they were instrumental in organising 'Cultural Clubs' as alternative schools during the schools boycotts of the period. Throughout the first part of this century they fought against betterment schemes which were designed to deny women of their primary means of subsistence - land. Resistance to resettlement has also been ongoing and militant on the part of black women.

More recently, women have been involved in organisation around rent increases, transport increases, and squatter removals. The women of Crossroads in 1978, and the women of Phoenix

township, near Durban, in 1980, possibly serve as the best examples.

Women have also been involved in community organisation on the Cape Peninsula on a large scale. The women of Soweto were hailed for leading militant protests against rent increases in September 1980. It would be true to say, however, that despite the determination and militancy displayed by women in all these instances, their involvement by no means represented mass participation. In Crossroads, for example, no more than 300 women came together at any one time. And in Soweto a total of a few hundred women marched on the Community Council Chambers. This is not to diminish the significance of these events, but simply to assert the importance of avoiding making generalisations about 'the women' of Soweto or Crossroads as a whole. The fact is that in cases such as these only the already politicised women tend to participate.

We are not to assume, however, that the absence of mass participation in community organisation necessarily reflects a lack of consciousness on the part of women in South Africa today. Women workers interviewed in Johannesburg had the following to say about conditions in townships:

The houses are matchbox houses. And we are also taxed for the electrics but our houses are not electrified. You can't do anything about rents.....Thebehali, he is selling us.

Now the rent is a very big problem....If you don't pay they'll knock in the night and take you to the rent office. We are all crying. Everybody is crying with the rent.

Its old Thebehali who made all this trouble with the rents. I should shoot him if I saw him - lots of people have been like that for him. They say he is getting a lot of money....

The rent goes up every day. There is no

saying....especially for me because I am alone with the kids.

The same women, without exception, explained that they did not have the time to participate in protest and resistance against conditions of life in the townships. For example,

My husband has the time...He has a lot more time. I would like to go to the meetings. Sometimes he tells me about them, sometimes he doesn't. There are mostly men who go to the meetings.

Some women do go, but none of my friends.

Fear of the police was also a factor for many of the women interviewed. A number also stated that their husbands did not allow them to participate in 'community organisation'.⁽¹⁶⁾

Women's participation in community organisation has been historically influenced by a paradox. On the one hand, because of their structural position in society, black women in South Africa have experienced the brunt of working class oppression, and have thus become extremely militant in some circumstances. They take on a disproportionate load in the reproduction of their families, and their structural position has also meant exclusion from employment for many. This perhaps has left them 'free' to participate in civic affairs. On the other hand, this same structural position has defined them primarily as wives and housekeepers, with neither the time nor the disposition to become otherwise involved.

Political Organisation

If the community organisation of women has historically presented problems, what of political organisation? National political organisations in South Africa have recognised the specificity of women's oppression. In 1954 the Federation of South African Women was established with the express purpose of confronting problems experienced by the oppressed

women of South Africa. With a broad range of organisations federated to it, it could claim to represent many thousands of women.

The Federation was responsible for spearheading a particularly militant march of 20 000 women to Pretoria, in protest against the pass laws. It drew up and adopted a Women's Charter, which even today still shows remarkable integration in its approach to the relationship between women's oppression and the oppression of the working class as a whole. At the same time, the ANC Women's League operated as a branch of the African National Congress. One of the League's stated aims was to work actively against the 'tea-making role' which women were tending to take on in the national political movement. Even today the ANC in exile has an established women's section. The particular strength of both the FSAW and the ANC Women's League in the 1950s lay in the fact that both operated in close association with the major generalised political organisations of the time. Thus the possibility of their work becoming cut off from mainstream political trends was minimised. Although the FSAW was never officially banned, its activities petered out with the banning of the largest generalised political movement of the time - the ANC - in 1960.

In more recent times, a number of women's political organisations have been established. The United Women's Organisation (UWO), based in the Western Cape, and the Women's Federation based on the Rand, are two current examples. Both organisations have drawn inspiration from the historical example of the FSAW. They have organised very differently, though. The UWO has a federal structure, with branches in almost every township in the Western Cape. Significantly, its composition is completely non-racial, as was the composition of the

FSAW in the 1950s. The Women's Federation, on the other hand, appears to be organised on the basis of individual membership at present.

Both the UWO and the Women's Federation are organising women in separate political organisations but with the intention of involving them in the broader struggles of the oppressed. For example, rent protests, struggles around education, consumer boycotts (such as the boycott of Wilson Rowntree sweets), as well as support for overtly political issues such as the anti-Republic Day campaign and the anti-Ciskei campaign, have all been part of their activities.

We have looked at three areas in which women are being organised - at the workplace, in the community, and in political organisations. However, what becomes clear from these examples is that there is very little mass organisation of women. This does reflect, to a certain extent, the level of organisation of the South African working class in general. But we have tried to show that there are a whole range of factors which further exclude women from participation in organisation. These include the 'double day', isolation, passivity, and subservience to men.

What becomes evident is that it is necessary to explore the areas in which women are already informally organised. An assessment of the possibilities that these forms of organisation present for the mobilisation and conscientisation of women against their oppression would be useful. We hope to make some tentative suggestions, based largely on research conducted in early 1981 amongst women in a clothing factory.

Informal, 'Spontaneous' Organisation

Of a group of 25 women interviewed at a clothing

factory in Johannesburg, every one participated in a church activity, or a co-operative of some kind, or both. Some of the women described their participation in such activities in the following ways:

Kathy Gumede belongs to an organisation called 'Secretat Solidarity'. It has a membership of 35 women, and its expressed purpose is that of 'offering prayers for the sick and for each other'. The members meet once a month on a Sunday. 'If you have got problems you raise them to the women. They give you a prayer to give you hope'.

Pauline Sikupele described her time outside of work: 'You know a woman is always busy at home...it is a double job...you just get a rest when you go to the mtshaolo or to church - That is where you get a little bit of rest (laugh)'. She described the activities of the Mtshaolo (literally translated, meaning 'give each other a helping hand'): each Sunday Pauline and 11 other women meet at one of their respective homes with R10 in hand. Each member takes a turn in taking the total of R120 collected each week. 'Then the MP is a little bit less... After producing money we have tea and maybe some cake. We also make jokes of things in our lives. We pass the problems as jokes there'. Pauline also used to belong to the 'Housewives League' in Soweto:

I left after three years when I was a little bit tired. There was no time. The purpose was to try and give us some ideas in our families...Even if you have got a broken heart. They unite and connect us together so we are not alone. Sometimes if you have got difficulties at home they put you nice. (17)

Mary Mantlaneng attends a Roman Catholic Church on Sunday mornings. After the service she attends meetings of what she calls 'temple'. There, 'they teach me how to sew, to learn the

bible, and they take us on trips. The men learn agriculture and gardening'. (18)

The patterns described above were common to almost all the women interviewed. There were a few, however, whose sources of social intercourse were even more limited. Julie, for example, stated: 'I am not going anywhere because I haven't got the money - If you just move an inch you must have money...How can I have a stokvel (similar to an mtshaolo) when I have got children and not enough money?' (19) And for Maggie, the only sources of social interaction were regular attendance at Lutheran church services (with no organisational involvement in the church), and attendance at school parents meetings three times a year. (20)

The husbands of most of the women interviewed did not share their involvements. While the women were almost without exception regular church-goers, their husbands rarely accompanied them. They were on the whole close soccer followers - either players themselves, or regular match attenders. They were not joined by their wives in this. 'I stay at home to do the washing and take care of the house', said one woman. In addition, most of the husbands of the women interviewed belonged to a saving co-operative of some form. A male worker interviewed described his participation in such a co-operative:

It is like a syndicate, a stokvel. We go on Sundays. There are about 85 people, but only 30 attend every week. The others just send the money. Everybody pays R15 a week. Some goes to the burials, the rest to the bank. At the end of the year the money is shared between us, and the interest. No women are allowed - wherever there is a woman there is always trouble.

The men drink together over the collection of the money, and those who wish to eat have a meal prepared by the wife of the host. (21)

The co-operatives mentioned (the stokvels and mtshaolos) obviously form an important part of the social network of both men and women in the townships. They have a crucial economic function. Banking facilities, credit facilities, insurance policies, etc, are generally speaking not easily available to the working class in South Africa, and therefore the co-operatives are a crucial intermediate form of organisation which enables people to save, and to keep out of debt.

Church activities are clearly an enormous source of 'release' for the women interviewed. Church very often takes precedence over other activities. One woman stated:

I have never been to a protest meeting about the rents. Sometimes my husband goes, but I have not time. They are usually on a Sunday, and I must go to church, and then I am busy with the washing. (22)

What is particularly interesting about the co-operatives and church activities is their sex-exclusive nature. The mixing of men and women in the same stokvel or church group is socially inconceivable to most. The expressed interests and needs of the average working class man and woman, which may coincide at the workplace, appear to radically part ways outside of workplace activity. Energies are channeled into entirely different forms of activity. Ideologies of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' clearly inform these separate activities, and the sexual division of labour in the household is both reinforced by, and reinforces, the sex-exclusive nature of activities.

This is not to deny that both men and women derive some valid pleasure from these activities. They cannot be dismissed as a manifestation of some 'false consciousness'. They must be taken

seriously, for it may be possible to use these widespread and existing forms of organisation and transform some aspects of their content; while continuing to deal with some of the day to day problems which working class women experience as women, they begin to raise the consciousness of their participants to a point where they clearly perceive the link between their problems as women, and their exploitation and oppression as part of the black working class as a whole.

These organisations are already serving to connect working class women, and are providing an arena in which women are able to learn skills of leadership and self-assertion without the constant and critical surveillance of men. Potentially they could also be forums in which women could work against the fatalism they tend to express about their oppression as women, and exploitation as workers - giving them the confidence and insight to work actively against their conditions of life through participation in formal organisations (trade unions, local civic associations, national political organisations, etc).

Grassroots organisation into relatively informal and spontaneous small groups is obviously no substitute for national mobilisation against oppression. However, such organisation is absolutely necessary.

For we can see that in the case of women, such organisation serves two vital purposes: on the one hand, it is able to meet some of the immediate needs of women, by addressing their day to day problems. On the other hand such organisation could act as a means of incorporating women in the broader political struggle against exploitation and oppression of the working class as a whole.

Conclusion

During this article we have argued that there are specific ways in which women are oppressed and exploited. We have also argued that women remain the least well organised section of the oppressed masses.

We have explored the different forms of organisation of women in South Africa - both formal and informal. We argue that the issues which oppress women in particular cannot simply be defined as 'women's problems' to be fought against only in separate women's organisations. We feel that to assume that separate women's political organisations have the capacity by themselves to deal with all issues faced by women is to make a number of serious mistakes.

Firstly, it assumes that at this point in time the majority of women are ready to participate in mass politics. We have already argued that this is not the case. Secondly, there is a danger of inadvertently encouraging separatist politics - of forcing all politically conscious women to work in women's organisations to the exclusion of all other sites of organisation. This is not to diminish the importance of separate women's political organisations. For example, while a women's organisation struggles against the specific forms of exploitation of women in the workplace, this also has to be an issue that is confronted in day to day trade union organisation. So too with community organisation. A women's organisation can bring women together around issues such as child care, or high food prices. But this does not mean that these should not be confronted in broader groupings, and that women shouldn't be involved in other community issues. But it is to argue that these can only be effective if they exist within the context of the organisation of women, and of men and women,

at different levels.

In conclusion we would like to comment on a position which is sometimes held in political circles - the suggestion that women need to be organised only in order to draw them into the mainstream of political organisation. We contend that this position is an expedient one, for it denies the specificity of women's oppression. It ignores the very real problems faced on a day to day basis, which some of the women quoted in this article identify. It also assumes that the liberation of women will automatically come about with the achievement of democracy in South Africa. Historically, it has been shown that this is not the case. In countries like Mocambique, it has been necessary to formally entrench the equality of men and women through legislation for equal wages, shared housework, equal legal status, etc. This formal entrenchment of equality has been seen as the basis for the ongoing emancipation of women in every sphere of their lives. It is only through the equal and active participation of women in all organisations, now, that women's basic minimum demands will be met in a future democratic South Africa.

Notes

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3. Cock, 1980.
4. Cock, 1980:42
5. J Barrett. Knitmore - a study in the relationship between sex and class. 1981:39
6. J Yawitch. Black women in South Africa: Capitalism, employment and reproduction, 1979:51

7. de Chungara, Domitilla Barrios and Moema. Let me speak. 1978:34,35.
8. Barrett, 1981:94.
9. Barrett, 1981:94.
10. Cock, 1980:53
11. Barrett, 1981:95
12. South African Outlook, 26 February, 1976:110
13. Interview conducted by Paul Hendler, 1979.
14. Barrett, 1981:88
15. Barrett, 1981:90
16. Barrett, 1981:105-107
17. Barrett, 1981:99
18. Barrett, 1981:100
19. Barrett, 1981:101
20. Barrett, 1981:100
21. Barrett, 1981:101
22. Barrett, 1981:106

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INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, part 3

WE began this series as an attempt to explain the way in which the capitalist system works. Initially, we were not concerned with any particular capitalist society, but rather with capitalism in general. Part 1 of the series tried to answer a specific question: where does capitalist profit come from, and how is it produced?

To deal with this question, we began by examining the smallest, most basic unit of the capitalist economy - the commodity. We found that commodities are goods which are produced for exchange, rather than for the use or consumption of the direct producer. But if commodities are produced for exchange, there must be some way of comparing them to each other. We had to find something which all commodities have in common and which allows them to be exchanged, or to be equal to each other in certain proportions or ratios.

This feature which all commodities share is that they are products of human labour. They are produced by people working on raw materials with machinery and tools. The way in which labour is expended in the production of commodity is measured in labour time.

Each and every commodity, is produced in a specific period of time, be it a minute, an hour or a full day. It is the amount of time which it takes to produce a commodity that enables dissimilar commodities to be compared and exchanged.

But it is not the passing of actual time which is the basis of labour time; it is not the real time which it takes to produce a commodity which is important, but the time which it should, on average, take to make. For any commodity there is a period of time which is considered average or 'normal' for its production. Because this average is established in changing circumstances, and is established through the operation of a whole series of societal factors, it is referred to as socially necessary labour time. 'Socially necessary' can be taken in the widest sense to mean 'in the general conditions applying in a particular society'.

Commodities are therefore produced for exchange (to be bought and sold). They must have a use or function or else they would not be bought. But their use and physical features are not the basis of the way they are exchanged. Their exchange value, or the way in which commodities are compared for the purposes of buying and selling, is based on the average; socially necessary amount of time it takes to make the commodity. This time, labour time, is not the same as the actual time which production takes: it is decided upon in terms of average conditions of production (speed of work, machinery, skill, amount of work involved, etc).

The average amount of labour time involved in the production of commodities is the measure by which commodities are compared. One can say that the value of any commodity is based on the

amount of time which it takes (under average conditions) to produce that commodity.

We then went on to consider a special commodity - labour power: this, we found, was the capacity to work productively. Under a capitalist system, labour power is a commodity, and is bought and sold in the market place. In concrete terms, this involves people selling their capacity or potential for work to another. This capacity, labour power, is sold for a wage, and it is workers who sell their capacity to work to employers.


The production and reproduction of labour power involves the maintenance of the owner of the labour power (the worker). The maintenance of the worker involves a certain basic minimum of food, clothing, shelter, etc. The value of labour power is therefore equivalent to the average labour time necessary to produce those goods which are necessary to maintain the worker. As with all commodities, 'necessary' here means socially necessary - and this changes in different circumstances. The value of labour power includes a number of different components, which change depending on the circumstances of society - the relative power of the capitalist and working classes, the sort of government in power, etc.

We found that labour power had a special feature which no other commodity possesses: it has the capacity to produce new value in production. The collective labour power of the working class is the basis of all new value produced under the capitalist economic system. Labour power is able to produce more than its own value.


Finally, in the first part of the series, we tried to find out where capitalist profit comes from, and how it is produced. To explore this, we went back to the idea of

labour time, ie the length of time in which work is actually performed by the working class.

Imagine that this block below represents the length of the working day (the time in which commodities, and value, are produced):



During the course of the working day, the working class has to produce sufficient value to cover the value of its own labour power, which is paid to it as wages when the capitalist purchases labour power. So during part of the working day the working class is effectively producing the value of its own wages:



This period of the working day is called necessary labour time, in that it is the time in which the working class produces value equal to the value of the goods necessary for its subsistence and maintenance. If the working day ended after the passage of necessary labour time, there would be no profit for the capitalist class.

But as our diagram indicates, the working day is divided into two parts, and during the second section workers are producing new value solely for the benefit of the capitalist class. This is why it is called surplus (or additional) value: it is value produced in the time worked

once the workers have already produced value equivalent to their own subsistence needs. This time is called surplus labour time.

necessary labour-time (N)	surplus labour-time (S)
value of labour-power produced	surplus value produced

N, necessary labour time, is the period in which the working class produces the value of its own wages; S, surplus labour time, is the period in which the working class produces surplus value. Surplus value is the basis of capitalist profit, as well as the other expenses necessary for the maintenance of a capitalist order.

The value produced in surplus labour time is then taken over by the capitalist class as surplus value, and this is the way in which capitalists exploit workers - they live off the profits from their labour. Exploitation is thus a relationship involving the taking over of the value produced by the working class during surplus labour time.


In part 2 of the series, we examined two very important sets of relations in capitalist society: one of these involved the ways in which the capitalist class attempts to obtain more surplus value from the working class, ie the different ways in which the degree of exploitation is increased.

In order to generate more and more profit, the capitalist class has to change the relationship between necessary and surplus labour time, continually attempting to increase surplus labour time (S) relative to necessary labour time (N).


One way we examined of increasing surplus labour time was to increase the length of the

working day: this means that while necessary labour time remains the same length, surplus labour time (and hence surplus value) is increased.

But there is another way of changing the relationship of necessary to surplus labour time without actually changing the length of the working day: this involves a change in the divisions within the working day. Let us imagine a working day of 8 hours, divided into 5 hours necessary labour time, and 3 hours surplus labour time:



The line dividing the working day into surplus and necessary labour time (A-B) can be moved, thus changing the relative division of the working day:



In this case, necessary labour time is cut down to 4 hours and surplus labour time is increased to 4 hours, thus giving the capitalist a greater rate of exploitation, and more surplus value.

The labour time necessary to produce the value of wages can be changed because it represents what is socially necessary to survive. Thus, the power of the capitalist class may, at certain stages, be such that it actually reduces what is considered socially necessary for working class survival. In practical terms, this depressing of working class consumption means that workers eat less, and that the

quality of what they eat is poorer; the quality of housing and clothing may decline, there will be less money available for health care, schooling of children, etc.

The different ways in which the capitalist class attempts to increase surplus labour time (and surplus value) is one very important relation in understanding why there are different types of capitalist societies. We can now move on to see how this relation explains some of the ways in which South Africa developed as a capitalist society.

In some sorts of capitalist societies, the value of the wage received for necessary labour time worked covers not only the individual worker, but the whole family unit. In other words, the value of the goods produced during necessary labour time is equivalent to the value of the goods needed to maintain and reproduce both the individual worker and his/her family.

This is not the result of any charitable instinct on the part of employers, but is rather a necessary part of the maintenance of a capitalist economy. For if the labour power of workers wears out as it gets used up (ie as workers get old, exhausted, and die), then it is necessary for new labour power to be produced.

Because labour power, as a commodity, is not separable from its owners, the workers, the production of new labour power involves biological reproduction as well as the maintenance and training (education) of the children of the working class.

One way for the capitalist class to increase its rate of exploitation (represented by the relationship of necessary to surplus labour time worked by the direct producers) is to lessen necessary labour time. As discussed earlier,

this can be done by altering, through repression, what is considered socially necessary for working class consumption. Another way involves the speeding up of production in the sectors in which consumption goods are produced, thereby lessening the value of the wage, and socially necessary labour time.

But the mechanism dealt with here involves setting the value of the wage at the level of the individual worker, rather than the whole family unit: this means that the capitalist class is able to lengthen surplus labour time at the expense of necessary labour time. Diagrammatically, this is represented in the sketch above, where the internal division of the working day (A-B) is moved leftwards (A'-B').

But if this occurs, you may ask, how is labour power produced and reproduced in the long term? If the worker receives a wage sufficient only for his/her own daily needs, how does the family - the institution through which new labour power is produced - survive?

In an earlier period of South African capitalism, we can partially explain this by looking at the function of the reserve areas (later called bantustans or 'homelands'), and the policy and practice of segregation. One effect of this system involved the separation of the worker from the rest of the family unit, which remained in the reserve area, while the worker was employed in the urban areas (usually the mines). This system of separation of wage-earner from family was entrenched and enforced by the influx control laws, which are the basis of the migrant labour system.

In some cases of the development of capitalism, the whole family was proletarianised in order to meet the labour

needs of capitalist production. Proletarianisation entailed the separation of producers from their traditional means of production, so that they were forced to sell their labour power in order to live. In practical terms, this usually meant the forcing of non-capitalist agricultural producers from their land.

But the development of South African capitalism took a slightly different path - largely because of the specific labour requirement of the gold mines, about which we need not go into any detail here. It is sufficient to note that

1. the mines had to keep wages as low as possible in order to keep functioning. This was largely because of the low grade of the gold ore that was being mined, and the international setting of the gold price. Increased costs could not be passed on to gold buyers, as often happens with other commodities;
2. the South African gold mines could not make any extensive use of female or child labour because of the very physically demanding nature of the work involved in mining.

The mine owners thus faced a dilemma: they had to have very cheap labour, but could not employ whole family units in production. They were only prepared to pay the equivalent of a single person's wage, but still needed family units to reproduce and maintain new labour power.

It was in this context that a system of migrant labour was developed. In this way, families were only semi-proletarianised; the male worker was employed on the mines on a contract basis, being forced to return 'home' after each contract; while the family unit was expected to maintain itself through the limited agricultural potentials in the

reserve areas.

To ensure the maintenance of these inadequate reserve areas, segregation (including the various Land Acts) was enforced. To ensure that families did not join workers in the towns, influx control was enforced, and in this way mining capital was able to pay the worker a very low wage, while production in the reserves was supposed to be sufficient for the rest of the family (and new labour power) to be reproduced.

This way of depressing necessary labour time has obviously had profound implications for the way in which South African society has developed. The racial nature of capitalism, involving a segregation principle, is one of its effects, as is the history of the policies involving reserves/bantustans. While this manner of changing the relationship between surplus and necessary labour time can not on its own explain these difficult notions, it remains a key to understanding the way in which capitalist societies develop; it is also an important factor in understanding why capitalism develops differently and unevenly in various countries.

GM

DEPENDENT INDUSTRIAL- ISATION: the SA case

This paper is based on my MA thesis presented to UCT in January, 1980, The Development of Manufacturing Industry in South Africa 1939-69, where relevant references and bibliographies may be found, as well as more extensive and detailed arguments. It was originally written for use by students in the Industrial Sociology course at the University of Cape Town.

IN any society, the way in which people produce and who controls the product are crucial in understanding a range of aspects of society as a whole. Although this article concentrates on the economy, and more particularly on manufacturing industry, it should be borne in mind that the analysis needs to take account of the inter-relationships of economics, politics and ideology to obtain a fuller picture of social life in modern South Africa.

South Africa is a capitalist economy, fully integrated in the world economy. To understand economic developments inside South Africa, it is thus necessary first to survey the effects of imperialism and international economic processes. These shaped South Africa's economy largely through the effects of competition on an economy geared to profit. In order to ensure and increase the profits in their own hands, South Africa's capitalist bosses had to organise

production in particular ways. These ways took account of the special circumstances inside South Africa, and so ensured that South Africa's path of capitalist accumulation (or 'development' had its own specific characteristics. By examining these characteristics and the particular path of accumulation, we can get a better understanding of some of the economic forces that have shaped the various classes in South Africa. This will give us a background to the struggles being waged by the different components of our society; on the part of the working people a struggle to organise and overcome the poverty and misery that is the other side of the bosses' wealth, and so ensure democratic control over their lives at their places of work as well as in their political and social life.

The International Economy and the New Forms of Imperialism

THE years of the Second World War consolidated a number of tendencies in the 'world economy' that were first manifested in the 1930's. These changes took place in the national economies of the advanced capitalist centres of Europe, North America and Japan, whose pace of development determined the rhythms of the entire imperialist system. The most decisive indication of the new imperialist order was seen in the United States, under whose impetus and domination the shattered war-time economies of Europe and Japan were restructured and rebuilt. The war years marked a qualitative shift in social relations, ushering in a new era of capitalist development.

What did these changes in the economies of the advanced capitalist countries imply? How did this affect the nature of imperialism? What were the implications for the underdeveloped countries? The most important aspect of these changes was an incredible rise in productivity.

For the same amount of labour involved, there was a vast increase in the quantity of products output. This meant continual changes in technology with the use of highly sophisticated machinery and techniques. Scientific developments became closely integrated with industrial production. New fields of production were opened up, with the development of synthetic materials such as textiles, plastics and chemicals. With the growth of electronics and computer industries, the pace of technological change was speeded up even further. Large amounts of money were ploughed into research and development (R+D).

These new forms of industrialisation meant production on a mass scale. Only large enterprises could mobilise the finance, know-how, and machinery to produce cheaply enough. Tasks became increasingly specialised; for example, huge factories would produce only one or two small parts that were components for other units produced elsewhere. Different plants became specialised units in a long and complicated process of production. No single factory produced the total product that was finally sold. All sorts of complicated techniques were developed to ensure the efficient integration of the various aspects of the production process.

But specialisation did not imply more decentralised control. The large companies attempted to bring all aspects of the production process under their single control: raw material production, components, assembly, marketing, and so on. This was called 'vertical integration', where the different stages of production that feed into each other are all controlled by a single centre. This is the basis of monopoly capital. Often companies might appear independent at a legal level, but all sorts of hidden financial controls, share-holding, licensing agreements, and so on, were used by the giant companies to

establish firm control...

At the factory-floor level, workers found their various tasks broken up and fragmented. They lost sight of the process of production as a whole, becoming increasingly like a human part of the machines. On the one hand there developed a mass of 'semi-skilled' machine operators; on the other hand, technicians and engineers with scientific experience and training increasingly found ways to extend technological development to increase the profits of capital.

In one way it is misleading to overstress the monopoly aspect of capital. Competition between the giant producers was incredibly fierce. By developing new and cheaper techniques, and selling at the old price till all producers had introduced the new technology and prices fell, these companies sought to make super-profits or 'monopoly rents'. To compete and survive, companies were forced to continually adopt new techniques. To do this, they had to equal the scale and sophistication of the giants in industry.

This competition had important implications for the 'periphery' of underdeveloped countries that had previously been suppliers of raw materials in the main. Now the giant companies sought to extend their competitiveness. These companies were called multinational, or transnational, companies (MNCs). Capitalist production, using the high technology and sophisticated techniques of the capitalist centres, could now take place in select countries of the periphery where conditions were 'right'.

But this was not independent industrialisation. The forms of production, the kinds of techniques, the research and development, the actual supply of sophisticated machinery or components, were still set by the rapid developments in the advanced centres. In the periphery, there was a continual 'chase' to

reproduce the conditions of advanced capital in order to produce competitively; but the dominant impetus came from outside the periphery. This was dependent industrialisation. The MNCs were thus well-placed to play their competitive game on a world-scale, shifting their production and profits to various parts of the globe as conditions suited them. For the labourers in the peripheral countries, this game meant new forms of capitalist domination and control over their lives.

South Africa in the War Years

WAR-TIME has often marked watersheds in capitalist development. Competition from overseas falls away; special orders are placed regardless of cost; new supplies of raw materials and machinery have to be found and locally developed; economic planning is used to more efficiently use and allocate resources. There is often extensive social mobility, as social or sexual categories of workers replace others who have gone off to fight.

In South Africa, the Second World War was no exception. For the first time, manufacturing contributed more to Gross National Product than mining or agriculture. Manufacturing output grew 81,6% from 1939-1944, and local materials from 51,7% of input in 1938 to 60% in 1945. This was achieved largely through more intensive use of machinery and through reallocating jobs. White employment grew 24% from 143 532 to 178 543 (especially for women) and black employment rose 57% from 216 924 to 341 128. From 2,5% blacks to every white in 1939, by 1945 there were 3,1%. These changes indicated an increasing move to repetition work with semi-automatic machinery, especially in engineering and light metal industries, that grew rapidly. Other areas that grew were food and drink, clothing, textiles,

and chemicals - mostly consumption goods or war-related goods. However, this expansion was achieved by 'quantitative' growth, on the whole, rather than by qualitative changes in methods and techniques of production.

Production was very skewed within industries. In food and drink, 3,5% of establishments produced at least half of the output; 5% in metal and engineering; 3,9% in clothing and textiles. In 15 major industrial categories, 3,2% of firms produced more than half of the output. The average value of plant and machinery was £4 500; but nearly 75% of establishments had under £1 000. Similarly, gross output was £23 100; 60% of establishment output less than £5 000 per annum.

These figures show a huge gap between small and large undertakings. Indeed, when the war-time production and post-war boom ended in about 1949, many of the smaller firms would not be able to survive the renewed competition from overseas. There was a profound difference between the abilities of smaller- and large-scale capitals to adapt to the changing requirements of the new capitalist era. Above all, small capital could not rely on productivity increases to remain competitive; only keeping the costs of labour extremely low would enable them to survive.

A number of government commissions commented on the problems of manufacturing industry. In 1949, it was said:

At present, with few exceptions, South African manufacturing industries work on a small scale, are not highly mechanised and are largely dependent on protection ... the position created by the small local market has been aggravated by the erection of a multiplicity of factories mostly below optimum size and also working below capacity (UG 40/41: para 38-9).

The famous Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) Investigation No 282 into Manufacturing Industries (of 1945) was even more explicit about

the tasks facing industry in the new era:

Important technological developments have taken place prior to and during the present war - much of the Union's industrial plant will have to be scrapped and processing radically redesigned if the challenge of a highly competitive post-war industrial and commercial world is to be effectively met (para 207).

Competition from overseas was not the only problem for capital. Inside South Africa, a new mood of militance was rising amongst working people and other oppressed groups. This found expression at a number of levels: in townships such as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare; in increasing organisation amongst squatters around Johannesburg; in transport boycotts; in the growth in the number of black workers on strike, from 730 in 1940 to the massive 84 035 in 1946. The African Mineworkers Strike of 1946, crushed by the State, showed the potential of even migrant workers, and sent shockwaves through rulers and ruled alike. Black workers were joining unions on a wide scale, with some 258 000 workers in 119 unions under the Council of Non-European Trade Unions in 1945 - all in all, 40% of African workers in industry were unionised.

On the political level, there was increasing contact between the ANC, Communist Party, and Indian Congress, with widespread support for their joint campaigns. The ANC Youth League under Mandela, Tambo and others gave impetus to the adoption of the militant Programme of Action, in which the people themselves would spearhead confrontation with the state for their demands to be met. A combination of rising wages, expanding employment, popularisation of democratic ideas, and organised dissatisfaction over the conditions of people's lives, was also forcing on capital and the state the need for new responses to re-create capitalist stability

and expansion in the post-war era.

The Post-War Response

A 'Rationalisation' of Manufacturing Industry MANUFACTURING industry sought its economic solution in part through the process of 'rationalisation'. (The political effects are beyond the scope of this paper, but should be discussed in order to understand the complex relation between apartheid and monopoly capital.)

Rationalisation involved two main aspects:

- i) the reorganisation of productive processes to encourage plant specialisation and standardisation, to be discussed later under sections on technology and the labour process;
- ii) the second aspect was seen by the BTI as concentrating production in large firms by 'reorganising downwards', and encouraging 'combination as a means of allocating production between firms, concentrating output in the most efficient plants, and of closing down the less efficient ones' (para 233).

Later BTI Reports saw it as inevitable that various criteria of economic performance (optimum use of capacity, technological development, cost cutting) would lead to there being only a few large producers in each industry.

This tendency became even more marked as light consumer goods and intermediate goods were increasingly produced locally rather than imported, in the mid-1950's. The newer fields of heavy intermediate goods and capital goods industries (machinery, components, engineering products, etc) required 'large markets and economies of scale for their economic viability' (UG 36/58, para 14 p29).

An indication of the growing size of manufacturing plants, is given by the change in the percentage of plants with over 300 employees

- in 1953 this was 3,1% of plants; in 1967, the figure had grown to 5%. At the same time, these factories accounted for 43,6% of total employment in 1953, and 52% in 1967 (in 1916, virtually 100% of plants had fewer than 200 workers).

The larger firms were also the most competitive. In 1972 it was clearly stated that 'the mere size of investment and the need to integrate production processes vertically are almost natural factors in forcing conglomerate control' (RP 69/72, para 232, p228). Indeed, by 1977, the tendency to 'large units and conglomerates by mergers, takeovers and other means of acquiring control' was seen as likely to accelerate (RP 64/77, para 91).

One of the classic South African examples of 'rationalisation' was the textile industry. War-time technological developments and the increasing use of artificial fibres, forced the use of heavy capital expenditure. Yet in the 1950's most firms were scattered and small. With the help of the state-funded Industrial Development Corporation and a number of large international firms such as Calico Printers of Manchester, Courtaulds of Britain, and Snia Viscosa of Italy, 'rationalisation' was encouraged to achieve a large-scale, concentrated industry. Modern equipment, association with the technical know-how of overseas firms, and the advantage of raw materials from a chemical industry closely linked to the state-backed giant SASOL schemes, contributed to the boom of the textile industry in the 1950's and 1960's.

B Concentration and Centralisation of Production

IF the increasing size of establishments under 'rationalised' production serves as one index of the growth of monopoly capital in South Africa, another set of indices relate to the

proportion of firms controlling various shares of the market.

It should be noted that there are problems with such indicators. For example, many firms appear nominally independent, yet on closer examination are shown to be owned by a single firm. Anglo-American holds shares under names such as Dido, Fermain, Petard, Resident, Sharestock and Taurus; Barlow Rand does the same using such names as Amosite, Bentonite, Cryolite and Dolomite.

Very often control of firms is possible without any legal ownership, such as when a single large buyer controls its supplier. Often monopoly capital encourages smaller firms, so that it may move in when they have already taken initial risks or developed new products; and control of output within a particular industry does not show the various controls and linkages between different industries.

Furthermore, very little detailed study has been done to monitor the extent of control by monopoly capital. Indeed, as late as 1977, a Government Commission argued that:

A comprehensive empirical study of the structure of the South African economy has never been undertaken before, with the result that data on firm sizes and the measures of concentration in industry are on the whole fragmentary and incomplete (RP 64/77).

In part, this is due to the state's extraordinary toleration, indeed encouragement, of monopoly industry.

Taking all this into account, it is nevertheless clear that South African industry is highly concentrated and centralised. As early as 1940/1 in 15 specified industrial categories, 3,2% of establishments produced 50% of gross output. One observer in 1954 found that 'rather frequently .. the position is one of monopoly or near monopoly'. The frequency of firms with one plant dominating

the market was even higher than in the advanced capitalist centres. Iron and steel, sectors of engineering, textiles, chemicals, explosives, cigarettes, rubber-tyres, all showed high concentration/centralisation indices.

In 1958, another government commission noted how increasingly it was the 'strong industrial or financial organisations' that were playing the central role in manufacturing industry (UG 36/58, para 317). In 1977, it was found that in one-third of industrial sub-categories, the three top firms controlled 70% or more of turnover. The top 5% of firms controlled 63,1% of turnover; the top 10% controlled 75,9%.

In passing, it is important to note the role of banks and other financial institutions in encouraging the growth of large firms. It was only after the war, with substantial state encouragement, that an adequate money market for industry was established. These brought together isolated savings of individuals and firms for investment in areas that would bring the highest returns. In the first place, the banks themselves were highly centralised: the two top commercial and merchant banks (Barclays and Standard) controlled more than two-thirds of assets. Secondly, the banks utilised their own staff, experience and facilities to encourage specific undertakings. By 1957, one large financial institution spoke of the 'virtual elimination' of investment in small companies. By assessing their economic gains, the banks avoided 'competitive and democratic' small industry. 'The trend is towards the establishment of larger industrial units ... new concerns of any considerable size have to be established or sponsored by strong industrial or financial organisations' (UG 36/58, para 317).

It was through financial institutions that mining houses gained an entry into monopoly

industry, as well as elements of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. The 1939 *Ekonomiese Volkskongres* secured the backing of the nationalist movement for Sanlam: 'what the Broederbond were recommending to the Volk were Sanlam's plans for expansion' (O'Meara, 1979: 108). Ten years later, these companies had already given up their talk of Christian-national 'business morality' and 'communalism' for the 'hardnosed reality of an effective fast developing modern capitalism' (Keizer, 1965:45). By 1946, *Federale Volksbeleggings (FVB)*, the industrial arm of Sanlam, had already taken policy to avoid small undertakings. By 1954, the Afrikaner *Handelsinstituut* was calling for consolidation of monopolies in a monopolistic world - only 'well-disposed and powerfully-capitalised' institutions should be supported. Today, Sanlam and FVB are giants of the financial and industrial world.

A recent researcher was clear about the dominance by the giant firms in South Africa:

Should the present situation be allowed to continue unabated the South African economy may in due course be dominated by government enterprises on the one hand and only a few large conglomerates on the other' (du Plessis, 1978:269).

To talk of 'free enterprise' with so much economic power concentrated in the hands of a small number of producers is indeed a misnomer. The existence of monopoly capital points to the path of highly-integrated, dependent industrialisation in South Africa.

C Technology

It is when we look at technology, that the importance of South African integration in the imperialist system becomes clear. The term 'technology' embraces many facets: production materials, patents (legally-captive technology), technical assistance through experts, production

processes embodied in machinery, factory layout and design, work programmes, specifications, etc. It is important to note that changes in technology - the continual revolutionising of the instrument with which man transforms nature - occur under specific social relationships. Forms of technical production are also forms of domination by one class over another.

The chase after productivity, increasingly involves the continual increase in 'dead' labour (machinery, that embodies labour performed in previous generations) relative to active, living labour. Machinery takes over the functions of human labour. This goes hand-in-hand with a more scientific application of knowledge to production processes, summed up in extensive Research and Development (R+D) costs. As the Viljoen Commission argued, productivity rises were heavily dependent upon 'the rate of improvement of the quantity and effectiveness of the capital equipment ... and improvement in industrial organisation.'

The war saw heavy and intensive use of plant with maximum capacity use, and many make-shift solutions to extend, instal and repair capital goods. After the war, with the changes in production overseas, much of the plant was outdated and economically obsolete.

High profits from the war, improved financial efficiency, import control measures, and the existence of large firms with an ongoing process of concentration and centralisation, ensured conditions under which massive outlays of capital could occur to re-equip industry.

Between 1946 and 1950, fixed investment per annum was 3½ times greater than during the war-years. A massive rise in fixed capital stock of 6,9% pa 1946-54 showed the gearing of industry to monopoly production. This tendency continued, with a 4,5% rise in 1954-62, and an increase to

5,8% pa between 1963-72 as foreign capital extended its involvement in the South African economy. Manufacturing industry between 1946-57 contributed 29% of South Africa's domestic capital formation, as compared to mining's 18%. Much of this was due to the state's involvement in infrastructural and basic industrial development, such as ISCOR and SASOL. All in all, from 1946 to 1970, the ratio of capital (in R1-m) to labour (per 1 000 workers) rose from 447 to 806. The ratio rose some 1,8% pa over the period 1946-75, increasing faster in the 60's at 2,6% pa.

Most of this rise in capital embodied new techniques developed overseas. The larger firms were far more inclined to adopt capital-intensive (ie labour saving) machinery. Capital-labour ratios were on a par with advanced industries in the capitalist centres. As has been argued: 'technological changes in the more advanced countries determine to a large extent changes in the capital-intensity and typical plant size of South African manufacturing industries' (Brown, 164). Because these techniques involved production on a mass-scale, the limited South African market could not sustain more than a few producers, increasing the tendency to monopoly production.

Lastly, it is important to note that South African technology was still a step behind the latest on the drawing-boards of European and American producers. The small market made it difficult to compete at the optimum levels of production. (For example, in chemicals, overseas plants could produce and sell 1 000 tons of chlorine a day; local markets could buy only 600 tons maximum, for similar-sized plants; yet this plant-size was still more economically viable than a smaller plant!) Machinery had to be mostly imported, and this caused problems

for the balance-of-payments situation (finding foreign currency to pay suppliers).

In short, although local producers were forced to adopt the most-advanced technology in order to compete, there were local limits that hindered the effectiveness of their efforts. By increasing the degree of monopoly control, they could still ensure that they remained profitable; but they were caught in a never-ending 'chase' to keep up with a pace of technological development set in the imperialist centres. This might be necessary in the interests of profit but it did not necessarily work to the benefit of South Africa's people as a whole (eg saving labour by using machinery contributed directly to the vast number of unemployed in South Africa).

B Foreign Capital: The Multi-National Corporations

The effectiveness of high-productivity industry forced producers in South Africa to reproduce relations and techniques of production developed overseas. It also put them in a dependent position in relation to these developments. This gave overseas firms the possibility of investing in South Africa and profiting directly from the vulnerability of the South African economy. The multi-nationals (MNCs) could maintain their dominance directly by owning productive centres in South Africa, and indirectly by keeping control of access to advanced technology that they developed. In this section we look at the extent and nature of foreign investment in South Africa, and the controls that the MNC exerted over the forms and pace of industrial development.

We start by looking at an example. A South African company, Premier Metals was active in construction equipment and mechanical handling equipment, with expansion closely tied to mechanisation of other areas in the economy

(eg containerisation). It was decided to move into industrial equipment in the 1950's, and Premier obtained licences from Clark USA, which took some 22% of its shares. Licences later included Clark's Michigan earth-moving equipment, with many components locally machined.

Clark operated in nine US states, and had fifteen subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, France, West Germany and United Kingdom. Overseas licences grew from 8% of sales in 1950 to 35% in 1974. Clark Equipment AG (CEAG) in Switzerland licensed and administered patents, trademarks, and production technology for Clark USA. It regularly sent engineers to Premier to 'discuss problems' and help 'integrate' Premier's local processes into its international operations. CEAG controlled technology changes. CIMSA (another Clark subsidiary) in the United States controlled supply of certain components. At one point, when Premier tried to expand local production against Clark's wishes, CIMSA simply stopped component supplies for seven months. When Premier 'reanalysed' its position, it had to buy certain component kits from Clark and subject itself to various quality specifications. This ensured that its plant set-up was totally integrated into Clark processes. A Clark subsidiary in France controlled and limited the rights of local firms to export.

Thus, Premier took most of the business risks and advanced the capital. Premier had to buy Clark components, at Clark-stipulated prices. Technology was controlled in key areas by Clark and involved payment of vast licencing fees. Premier's 'South Africanness' enabled it to get state tenders and protection; but despite minority share-ownership, Clark was able to ensure a crucial degree of foreign control. Similar situations faced most local firms: to produce locally they needed overseas support, particularly

in high-technology fields. Some 70% of firms in one survey used overseas-developed techniques. This tied them into the pace and direction of development set by the MNC; their only choice would be to find a minimally less-dependent relationship with another MNC, or produce at prohibitive cost.

Foreign firms financed some 70% of their investment in South Africa from profits generated locally. There were thus not large inflows of finance. Foreign investment did not mean foreign funds as such. Yet, without a high degree of ownership of local companies, foreign firms exerted vast influence on the economy. Foreign firms flooded into manufacturing. For example, United States firms held 34% of their investment in manufacturing in 1969 (27% in mining). This figure grew to 46% by 1970. They also held their interest in direct investment, as against portfolio investment, thus ensuring more overt control. In 1968, foreign investment accounted for some 36% of total investment. United States firms in particular increased their involvement in South Africa.

Access to foreign technology involved many costs, often paid directly overseas to the 'parent' companies. This gave the MNCs leeway in shifting finances around the globe. In chemicals in South Africa, R3,7-m was spent on R+D in 1968, as against say R200-m in the United States by Du Pont. Foreign firms recouped these costs through charges for royalties (R45,3-m in 1973). Vast incomes were generated locally, and often repatriated. Managerial and technical fees had to be paid. Components and machinery had to be imported from the MNCs concerned (some 70% of fixed investment between 1954-64 involved imported capital equipment). This increased balance-of-payments strains. Often, this technology was second-hand or slightly out-of-

date, enabling MNCs to recover losses on machinery otherwise not economically the most productive. Local firms also sometimes had to bear their own costs adapting technology to local conditions. Local production under licence usually involved producing 'to a fixed specification on a contractual basis, or (producing) ... as specialists, standard parts' (RP 69/72; 29), ensuring standardisation and integration into the MNCs overall productive processes. Furthermore, some 86% of foreign firms forbade exports of goods utilising their technology, making it difficult to achieve effective and competitive mass production locally, because of the small market.

All in all, then, it may be said that foreign investment had two main effects - firstly, it increased the tendency by 'local' firms to use expensive, capital-intensive, imported technology; and thus to operate on a massive scale in a monopoly situation. Secondly, it resulted in South African productive processes being closely integrated with the imperialist dynamics of capital development. Numerous joint projects tied South African monopolies in close relationships with MNCs - for example, the Federale Volks/Sanlam chemical giant, Sentrachem, worked closely with firms such as the UK Distillers Corp, the US Uniroyal, the Swiss Maurer, Du Pont, Geigy, Hoechst, Bayer and others. Often, this partnership was encouraged by the state, usually with its direct involvement.

The differences between 'foreign' and 'local' capital were blurred in a common interest in high-technology, capital-intensive production under monopoly relations. Within these boundaries, 'South African' producers could fight for slightly more advantageous terms, but could not escape their dependence on a rhythm of accumulation

set in the imperialist centres.

E The State¹

THE state in South Africa, through its economic policies, showed itself highly sensitive to the needs of profitable expansion in manufacturing. It actively encouraged monopoly production, with its concomitant aspects of capital-intensity and a strong foreign presence.

In the first place, effective legislation on monopolies has been close to non-existent. Indeed, the BTI, the first body set up to monitor monopolies, as early as 1945 urged the state to support only those industries where plants could supply at least half the market. As the Minister of Economic Affairs argued in debating the 1955 Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act:

This is not anti-monopolistic legislation ... even though a monopoly exists and even though combines exist they can still be justified in South Africa if they do not have a deleterious effect on the public ... There is not another Act on our statute book under which accused persons have as many opportunities as under this Bill.

Of only 18 investigations ordered between 1955 and 1976, in only one case was there a prosecution. As a 1977 Commission said:

It cannot be said that these few cases represent a considerable contribution towards enhancing and maintaining competition (RP 64/77, para 145).

Tariff protection (ie artificially protecting local goods by taxing imports) was minimally used in South Africa. There was a danger that tariff barriers would raise the costs of local intermediate and wage goods, thus affecting the agricultural and mining sectors on which the economy depended for foreign exchange. Where tariff barriers did exist - in industries which, following state policy, had to control a substantial share of local production - this only encouraged the more established large firms by

keeping out competition. Further, what such restrictions meant (and others such as 'local content' programmes, or direct import controls) was often the 'development of local overseas-controlled companies', who took advantage of their freedom to produce at higher prices and with state support. The right to use tariff or import controls was also severely restricted by South Africa's participation in international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).

Government tax concessions encouraged the use of machinery. Measures such as the control of specific imports were applied so as not to affect imports of plant, equipment and machinery. State expenditure on R+D was some R45,2-m in 1968/9, as against the R35-m in overseas payments for licences, etc: a minute attempt at freedom from overseas-developed technology.

In relation to foreign investment, the State encouraged this, particularly for the technological know-how it brought. There were very few substantial restrictions on foreign capital, and even less monitoring of their activities. Tax arrangements allowed certain categories of payment (for technology transfer) to be taxed in their 'country of origin'. Curbs on finance and credit were flexibly applied, and profit repatriation was unrestricted within a specific period. The state attempted to encourage firms to actually site their productive processes within South Africa, but realised that their primary inducement was a profitable environment.²

The state-funded Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), originally established to help small industry, soon found itself involved almost exclusively with monopoly capital, and foreign partners. It assisted in 'rationalisation' of firms, and often brought the giant parastatals

(ISCOR, SASOL) into association with foreign companies.

The parastatals (semi-private state-established companies) encouraged large-scale production. They often provided a subsidised base on which other industries could develop, such as the growth of AECI and Sentrachem utilising many by-products from SASOL. As their size and increasing efficiency brought them into competition with private sector firms, the private monopolies often called to take them over. Although the parastatals increased the amount of plant set up inside South Africa, they did so on terms set by international cost-efficiency criteria, and often in association with foreign firms. For example, the 'South African' SASOL firm has the US Fluor Corporation as its overall managing contractor, and includes co-partners such as the German Lurgi, Air Liquide of France, Badger (US), Mobil, and Universal Oil.

The state could not oppose the imperatives of cost-efficient production. This meant concentration, high-technology production and close-collaboration with foreign capital as the suppliers of know-how and advanced equipment.

The Implications of Dependent Industrialisation in South Africa

One of the most important factors arising from South Africa's path of manufacturing growth is the emergence of a small and powerful capitalist class closely linked to foreign interests. This 'domestic bourgeoisie' includes elements of financial capital, the mining-houses, capitalists in the Afrikaner nationalist movements, the parastatals, and foreign companies. Capitalist competition between firms does not disappear; but a broad consensus has emerged amongst the bourgeoisie about the economic path to follow. However, consensus does not eliminate the

contradictory nature of accumulation.³

Although firms were geared to high-productivity industry, they could not afford to incorporate drastic changes in the living standards of the black oppressed classes. There were too many limits on successful production to end dependence on 'cheap labour'. For example, the small market (itself partially caused by low wage levels) made it difficult to produce on the same scale and as cheaply as in the capitalist centres. The more the complexity of technology rose the higher was the propensity to import capital goods. These had to be paid for in foreign exchange. Economic boycotts especially preventing access to African markets, competition from South East Asia, export curbs, and other limits, made manufactured exports difficult. Only the gold mines and agriculture could ensure foreign exchange in sufficient quantities. These sectors in turn relied on a low level of wages. Even if manufacturing could afford to increase its payments to workers it could not afford to risk the cost structures of these primary industries. Further, the small industrialists maintained a constant pressure for low costs in order to survive at all.

Within manufacturing, however, there was a steady increase in real black wages until the recent economic crises of the late 60's and 70's. This was based on a changing productive process. Jobs previously performed by skilled whites were broken-up and changed into semi-skilled operative tasks. White workers were upgraded into supervisory positions, losing much of their previous bargaining position. Blacks were 'upgraded', at lower-wages, into the newly-created machine-oriented tasks. This increased their place in the productive process, and there was a rise in black-white ratios from 3,1 in 1946 to 4,2 in 1970. The black proletariat grew in muscle

and strategic position.

At the same time, the simplification of tasks enabled new categories of labour to be employed. These could often be played off against one another. In the textile industry, african men and coloured women replaced white women in the 1950's, and were in turn replaced by african women in the 1960's. This was partly done to break the unity of organised labour in the textile industry. The proportion of women in industry grew from 1% in 1951 to 7% in 1970, and their relatively inferior position was reinforced by wage-rates not geared to family support.

The use of machinery rather than labour increased the problem of black unemployment, to a level of about 19% in the late sixties. Again, employed and unemployed could be played off, and used to divide on sexual, racial or even 'tribal' lines.

Conclusion

IN conclusion, it must be stated that the limitation of this paper lies in its narrow, economic focus on manufacturing industry. The ultimate blockage to successful capitalist accumulation, and the increasing tying-in of South Africa to imperialist producers, lies in the activities and organisation of the people who actually produce. Thus, the workers and the their allies amongst other oppressed black classes in South Africa put forward demands for a structure of production that can meet their needs rather than those of a small profit-hungry bourgeoisie. Increasingly organised in a nationalist movement whose roots go back to the early part of this century, their demands are coalescing in struggles for democratic control of the processes that affect their lives. The particular path of accumulation in the post-war period has provided some of the framework within

which these struggles occur. But it is not a process independent of their activities. The ways in which the people are organising, the demands they put forward and the movements within which they organise, will play the crucial part in determining the structure of the future.

Graeme Bloch

FOOTNOTES

1. This section only looks at the state's economic policies. Yet the question of the state involves, above all, political forces. There is no direct link between economic dominance and political dominance. In South Africa, we have to look specifically at a number of (white) classes in conflict with monopoly capital - the white petty-bourgeoisie, small capital, farmers - as well as the effects of the activities of the popular classes. The specific way in which politics is organised - an exclusive, white 'democracy', the role of the National Party, the broad alliance amongst popular classes against racialism - all have effects in determining political outcomes and possibilities. A more concrete look at political organisation, the rhythms and intensity of struggles, is needed. This paper only hints at some of the forms that shape these struggles.
2. This 'environment' includes political and social stability. Following the Sharpeville massacre and the crushing of peaceful african political protest in the early 60's, foreign firms expanded their involvement in South Africa to a large extent. They thus savoured the benefits of apartheid controls in a period where there was little overt opposition from the popular classes.
3. And does not solve the problems of 'practical' solutions at a political level.

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TRAINING FOR CAPITAL: De Lange Reports

THE Commission of Inquiry undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) was set up to investigate the 'crisis' in South African education and to put forward recommendations on how to solve it. Both the role of the Commission in the political economy of South Africa and the nature of the educational crisis have to be examined to understand the implications of the recommendations made by de Lange's HSRC Commission.⁽¹⁾ Although there has been much publicity given to the government's rejection of the report, there is evidence (a) that some of the recommended changes are completely compatible with state policy and are, indeed, already being implemented, and (b) that the significance of the report lies as much in its effects on the educational system as on the nature and scope of political struggle in education.

To untangle the different elements of the report and to understand its significance within the totality of society, one needs to find out who is talking through it, ie which class interests it represents, what the political objectives of these are, and how they are represented in the report.

The overriding concern of the report lies

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with the so-called mismatch or incompatibility of the economy and society, as compared to the skills made available through the current education system. This theme of 'manpower shortages' and the role of education in meeting such skill shortages is reflected in capital's many speeches and reports on the question. From the Urban Foundation to Manpower 2000, from Anglo-American to Barlow Rand, the argument has consistently been made that unless South Africa's education system is restructured, 'economic growth' will not be maintained. Calls for reform have been made so stridently over the last year that the relationship between manpower needs and the role of education in meeting these has been accepted as obvious, involving 'common sense'. This was expressed by Mike Rosholt, chairperson of the giant Barlow Rand group, in the following way:

Where knowledgeable people call for a common educational system for all race groups, they are expressing the view that there is no other way that the educational system will be able to provide the level of skilled manpower we need in the future - indeed, what we require now. (2)

It is accepted that 'economic growth' (or 'economic emancipation' as the report phrases it) demands a non-racial system of education, and that it is only 'politics that is blocking reform'. (3) It is in this way that government rejection of the report has been interpreted: as a typically narrow, backward response to a 'revolutionary' proposal for the overhaul of the education system.

At the outset, we need to understand the reality of 'skill shortages' a little better. Where do they lie? What is their significance?

Statistics on the question of the shortage of skilled labour abound. At a Manpower 2000 convention in November 1980, for example, it was estimated that 700 000 'fully-trained

workers' would be needed by 1987 in all sectors of the economy. But, as Charles Meth has pointed out, 'statistics on skill shortages...share an important characteristic and that is their almost complete unreliability'. Irrespective of whether there is a shortage or not, 'it is obvious that...a persistent belief that there is such a thing, particularly a belief that such shortages are widespread, is likely ultimately to have important political consequences'. (4)

Although there might not be clarity on whether there are any 'real shortages', and if there are in what sectors of the economy these lie, it is true that the development of monopoly capital in South Africa and the correspondingly sophisticated technology that has been put to use in the production process has, amongst other things, introduced a new industrial division of labour between semi-skilled operatives on the one hand, and technical supervisory labour on the other. This has replaced the previously dominant unskilled/skilled division of labour on which the South African economy has historically rested. This process has also marked a decisive shift away from the reliance on cheap, unskilled migrant labour towards the consolidation of a stable, semi-skilled workforce.

How such a working class is to be reproduced has become a much-debated question for both capital and the state in recent years, and its partial resolution has found expression in commissions of inquiry such as Wishehn, Riekert, and now the de Lange report. The resolution of the problem from capital's point of view has become urgent, particularly in the light of recent worker and student struggles. The 1976 uprising and the boycotts of 1980 have revealed a profound crisis in the educational

structure. For future workers to be reproduced with the required level of skill, and with the requisite societal values, it has become imperative for their consent to be won, and for at least some of their demands to be met - even if in changed form.

It appears that the HSRC report represents an attempt to restructure education from this perspective; that this restructuring aims to prepare a section of the working class for a changed division of labour and to give an appearance of reform. As Dr PJ van der Merwe of the National Manpower Commission has said,

Structural change in the economy demands a different kind of labour force. The growth of giant high-technology firms, and of manufacturing and public services, demand both skilled black labour and a higher level of general literacy....(T)he de Lange proposals (which I helped frame) are tailored to produce such a workforce. (5)

It is not co-incidental that this semi-skilled workforce is one which is to be 'rewarded' for its pains with section 10(1)(a) or (b) rights, recognised unionisation, etc. As Peter Buckland has written, these are mechanisms 'whereby sufficient blacks can be incorporated into high-income positions to maintain the present balance of power'. (6)

It is important to bear in mind that the extent and nature of reforms in education depend to some extent on the balance of forces within the state itself; this balance of power between contending interests determines whether and how changes will take place. It is thus of importance to look at the class basis of the report, the balance of forces within the state, and the question of whether the recommendations were formally rejected by government because of a narrow response.

The Class Basis of the Report

The Main Committee of the HSRC was headed by Professor de Lange, rector of the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU). His commitment to a process of restructuring or 'reform' was well known before publication of the recommendations. The committee consisted of some twenty six members drawn either directly or indirectly from government-supporting educational institutions, and from 'private enterprise' in the shape of Anglo-American. Indeed, the composition of the Main Committee reflects the alliance only recently consolidated in the broader political sphere, viz that between the upper echelons of state power, and monopoly capital. It is an alliance which indicates a shift in the balance of class forces in South Africa, involving the emergence of a distinct state element representing the interests of monopoly capital. In a recent paper,⁽⁷⁾ Dan O'Meara has shown how the Information Department scandal associated with Muldergate allowed a reformist element to gain dominance in the state, reflected in the coming to power of PW Botha and his generals. Botha then appointed a new Minister of National Education, Gerrit Viljoen, and it was Viljoen's associate at RAU, de Lange, who was appointed to head the Commission.

The political interests of this new alliance in the state has found expression in what some have called 'total strategy'. Not much need be said of this here, except that it includes an attempt to win over and co-opt a small number of blacks to the 'free enterprise' system. This total national strategy was intended to work in all spheres of society: thus, Wiehahn and Riekert proposed that certain restrictions on africans be lifted, harsher forms of discrimination be relaxed, and that trade unions be incorporated into the industrial relations system. This gave

an impression of reform, but at the same time rationalised and streamlined control of the working class.

The HSRC commission of inquiry into education fits into this broad pattern. It involves an attempt to win the consent of the governed through the apparent deracialisation and reform of education, while at the same time streamlining and restructuring the education system. This aims at the more adequate training of a potential workforce for an altered division of labour involving changing skill needs.

It must be borne in mind that the state is a unity of contradictory class interests, involving struggles for dominance by different fractions of capital, changing alliances, and altering balances of power between contending interests. The current alliance between big capital and a certain group in the state does not mean that conflicts within both state and National Party have ceased. Indeed, there continues to be a fierce struggle for power between the wing of state power represented by Treurnicht, and that represented by Botha and his generals. It is therefore not surprising that Minister of Education Viljoen trod very carefully when the report was published attempting not to convert the recommendations into a terrain of struggle between contending interests within the state.

As Viljoen notes elsewhere, nothing in the report actually contradicts the principle of segregated education, and some of the recommendations and all of the principles have in fact been accepted by government.⁽⁸⁾ The apparent rejection of the report by government immediately after its release must be seen in a context where the Botha faction is not fully assured of its dominance in all the state apparatuses, and in the light of what is

actually happening within educational restructuring.

To all intents and purposes, many aspects of the report are already being implemented. In the statement mentioned above, Viljoen said that⁽⁹⁾ steps were being taken to create the South African Council of Education which the report suggests should advise the Ministry of Education. Moreover, there is evidence that schools in Soweto are being transformed in the manner recommended by the report: capital is playing a large part in the provision of vocational education, and in many schools plans are under way for converting them into technical and commercial high schools.⁽¹⁰⁾ Decentralisation of powers to regional bodies dealing with salaries and appointments is also taking place, and negotiations for the establishment of a statutory teachers' negotiating body are under way.

The HSRC report is thus linked into the interests of the ruling alliance, and although its recommendations were formally rejected, some are already being implemented. But it should be recalled that the inquiry was set up in the midst of the 1980 education crisis, when school boycotts spread to both large and small towns. To argue that educational restructuring is simply a response to technological changes, or to changes within the ruling class, is to neglect the intense struggles which gave rise to the restructuring programme. This involved struggle and organisation by workers in the form of strikes, stay aways, strong union organisation, and by students in the uprisings of 1976 and 1980. There can be no understanding of the dynamics at work here without an understanding of the way in which processes are structured and effected by the actions of both the working and popular classes. To some

extent, then, the HSRC report must be seen as a response to the demands put forward in struggle. (11)

However, the HSRC recommendations attempt to come to terms with these demands within the context of a capitalist and racist division of labour - and thereby co-opts and transforms the demands within its own frame of reference.

The Move to Technical Education

As mentioned above, there is an extremely close connection between the recommendations of the HSRC report, and interests of a more explicitly monopoly capitalist origin. To see this, a comparison between the de Lange Commission and SYNCOM, a 'think tank' for capital which has done work for General Mining and on subjects involving 'constitutional models for change in South Africa', is of value. This comparison covers priorities and financing, and the structure and content of education.

Priorities and financing of education:

For de Lange, 'the priorities (of education) should be determined in the context of the current and expected manpower needs of the country' (p 13).

Seen from a socio-economic point of view, it is recognised that the demand for education, explicitly or implicitly formulated by individuals or groups does not always take practical realities into consideration. In the RSA all population groups are to a greater or lesser degree guilty of having unrealistic expectations of education, with the result that to a large extent the present system...has not been able to succeed in creating harmony between the human material it produces and society's manpower needs (p 71 - emphases added).

For SYNCOM, the education system must be 'linked to the realities of future society and the demands of economic progress'. (12)

Education has been 'irrelevant in promoting

development and stifles, rather than stimulates entrepreneurship, the lifeblood of free societies'. Moreover, 'black demands for a massive input of money to achieve white-type education and facilities for their children are economically unrealistic and will serve neither society nor the black community in the best possible way'.

While the HSRC is undoubtedly far more euphemistic than SYNCOM, and masks its intentions more carefully, for both the priority is maintaining economic growth in its present form.

This highlights the unproblematic and technical way in which the HSRC report treats both the economic development of the country and the development of the education system. Individuals are regarded as factors of production in an education system whose 'natural' purpose is meeting the manpower needs of capital which, in turn, are defined as the needs of both pupils and workers. Phrases such as 'realistic' and 'normal' abound in the report; these all appear to relate to an analysis which sees South African economic development as neutral and conflict-free. From the report it would appear that the investigation was instigated, not in the context of a crisis for the state and capital, but because of 'disharmonisation' between the educational structure and the manpower needs of society. Disharmonisation is reflected in 'drop-out' rates from schools and the quantitative differences between South Africa's 'distinct' education systems. The solution put forward to the problem of disharmonisation is a technical one, not a political one: the provision of an education of 'equal quality' for all.

Education of equal quality means simply equal but separate education, with equal resources to be spent on the different parts of the

education system. One is urged to be 'realistic' about the state's financial contribution. There is to be parity of expenditure, but 'it is inevitable that realistic norms be set to determine the financial needs in respect of provision of education' (p 72). These norms are never spelt out, but it is assumed that they are the norms of manpower development.

What is recommended in terms of financing of education is that state resources be shifted to the first 6 years of a child's schooling, which should be 'equal and compulsory' for all. Thereafter, if the pupil continues through to secondary (formal) education, s/he should be financed by the 'individual and the community to supplement the state's contribution', ie by his/her parents. If the pupil on the other hand proceeds to non-formal (vocational) education, this will be largely the financial responsibility of capital. What this, in effect means, is that wealthier communities will be able to afford and therefore have access to largely unsubsidised secondary schooling, while the children of the working classes will be channelled into technical and vocational education (heavily subsidised by capital).

The reduction in the length of formal education implied in the recommendations for the majority of pupils, and their channelling into technical education, suggests a shift in the criteria of differentiation and selection rather than an end to differentiation. (13)

Thus a meritocratic education is envisaged whereby selection takes place according to social class rather than race, and is legitimated by an ideology of 'parity for all' and 'equality of opportunity'. In this regard, it is important to note that amongst the values identified by SYNCOM is 'the ability to cope

with failure and to learn from it'. Failure, as in all meritocracies, must be seen to lie with the individual and not outside of him/her. The individual must learn to cope with failure, not learn to change the social circumstances that produce it!

Structure and Content of Education

A highly-differentiated, vocationally oriented education structure is envisaged by both the HSRC and SYNCOM. South Africa's needs for a differentiated system of education is supposedly derived from 'scientific research':

The integrated curriculum....is regarded in many countries as the ideal educational model. However, nowhere is it possible to obtain confirmation that integrated curricula are the answer. It is evident from the research that attention should be given to the establishment of a national policy for differentiated curricula. This differentiation will differ considerably from the current system of differentiation (p 41).

A note regarding differentiated education, from an earlier WIP article, is useful here:

There appears to be an assumption that the class structure is immutable, and this assumption is fuelled by the vicious cycle effect of providing an education which trains people according to their 'opportunities in life'....(It) takes as given the problematic notion that working class children, or black children, or minority group children, have restricted futures. By accepting this without question, and providing a limited education to match the restricted future, differential education ensures the continuation of the cycle. Bantu Education is par excellence an example of this. But it is worth noting that the removal of (this) education does not imply equality....if it is not accompanied by the removal of differential socio-economic conditions and values...., is you can't have equality...without a good deal of equality of condition. (14)

To compensate for this inequality of condition, the commission predictably did not address itself to broader inequalities - that

was not its mandate, and it would be petty to quibble over this. Rather, it proposes a form of pre-basic education (pre-primary), which is to prepare kids for schools. The entire restructured education system is also designed to have various other compensatory programmes. But these programmes can nevertheless not begin to deal meaningfully with wider socio-economic inequalities. As recent research in England, for example, has shown, 'education cannot compensate for society'.¹⁵⁾

Both SYNCOM and HSRC recommend a 3-phase formal education structure, the end of the first phase leading to either non-formal education or academic education. The basic phase is to last for 6 years while the post-basic (non-formal or academic) is to last for another 3 years. Streaming at all levels is to ensure that there is no 'wastage'. The basic phase is to be free and compulsory. The Commission has some nice semantics regarding compulsory education: education is to be free and compulsory for the first 6 years; thereafter the pupil must be engaged in compulsory learning but not necessarily 'education' for another 3 years. In other words, students can be streamed into technical education from the age of 12.

HSRC and SYNCOM also conceive of the school as a Community Learning Centre (CLC). Says de Lange, 'our redefinition of a school: it will be a community learning centre which will open up its facilities after hours for the community'.⁽¹⁶⁾ And, at the heart of SYNCOM's new education system, reports the Star newspaper, is the Community Learning Centre, serving 4 target groups. These involve: headstart (compensatory) programmes, 10 years compulsory schooling, ongoing educational programmes, and socio-cultural programmes for the community.

These are all to take place within the CLC

to 'guarantee maximum use of a facility 7 days a week instead of the present uneconomic 7 hours a day, 5 days a week'.

Here we see a rationalisation of the school facilities in a way in which the student will appear to have 'a lot more education', a 'greater number of choices'. However, the number of choices, and the increase in the amount of education available should not blind us to the fact that for the worker this does not amount to democratisation. The manual worker can now become a skilled worker, but he still does not have control of the work process, and his education does not put him in a general condition to plan and make decisions.

An indication of the content of this type of education is to be found in the broad specifications given by SYNCOM that

There will have to be a shift away from communicating what there is to know in the expectation of its being relevant at some future date, towards learning the means of finding out what one wants to know when the need arises. This means learning 'informatics' - how to learn, unlearn and relearn and how to use the information process.

In other words, education is to make the worker a better worker by making him/her more adaptable. Technical education is to prepare the worker for production with skills that can be flexible and built on. As a teacher of on-the-job training described this kind of education,

You've got the flexibility to work for 500 different bosses; but this education ties you to the firm, and it does it in such a way that you can never escape. In a sense, you become a better slave. The worst, though, is that because they've given you a little more knowledge, you're that much higher up than the next man down - so you're also a more loyal slave. (18)

There is thus a split into formal and non-formal education, academic and technical

education. It is clear that if working class education is being upgraded to technical education, then the contribution of capital in the funding of that education will determine, to a large degree, the content of that education. The level of 'individual' contribution to the formal structure for academic education in the post-basic phase will also be an important determinant in ensuring that formal education will be open only to certain social classes.

Education as an Agent of Social Change

De Lange, in various public statements, has asserted that 'the present system of education is far too academic', and that 'it is important to realise that formal schooling is not necessarily the effective instrument for bringing about social change'. He has also claimed that the greatest misconception to be overcome is that kids learn best through compulsory schooling, but that they learn best on-the-job. Therefore, it is argued, 'non-formal education should become an indispensable part of the planned provision of education in South Africa'. He interestingly places South Africa in the same category as newly-independent countries, arguing that experience here has proven that 'formal education slows down economic emancipation and political development' (p 19).

SYNCOM similarly argues that 'formal education has not narrowed the income between rich and poor as planners indicated', that it is, in fact, 'irrelevant to development, that more than half all new jobs in future will have to be in the informal sector....This will require totally new education targets and ways of continually learning outside a formal school environment'.

Thus, both the HSRC report and SYNCOM

argue for a highly-differentiated system of education in which non-formal (technical and vocational) education will play at least as important a part as formal education - especially 'for blacks, coloureds and Indians' who are the target group to be trained for places in the economy created by a changed division of labour and where there is a 'shortage'.

It is an essential tenet of liberal thought that education will lead to social change. In South Africa liberal educationists such as Hoernle and Malherbe have argued that education, through providing skills and knowledge (which in itself is assumed to banish ignorance and prejudice) has an egalitarian, liberalising effect). In the 1950s and early 1960s, modernising developing strategies in Africa also placed educational provision at the centre of development programmes. By the mid-1960s, however, in the light of endemic underdevelopment and continued political instability, the relationship between education and social change came to be questioned.

For some analysts formal education is now seen to be a manipulative instrument for perpetuating class or racial dominance since it selects and trains an indigenous class of collaborators. Education, rather than the answer to development, is now placed at the centre of an explanation for dependency and underdevelopment.⁽¹⁹⁾

In the Latin American context, Ivan Illich argued that the solution lay in the 'deschooling of society'; that schools are the source of all social ills and that children should, because they can, learn through experiencing the world at an early age. Thus, by linking education with active work, education will be an active, liberatory process.

If we follow Illich, (whose criticism of

capitalism amounts to a critique of consumerism and passivity rather than its class relations and resultant inequalities, hierarchy and alienated work), children will be channelled into a capitalist work-environment without the intermediate schooling process. For Illich it is not the work-environment and lack of control that is at issue here - it is the schooling. If the problem is social inequality, hierarchy and a capitalist division of labour, then Illich's solution is no solution at all. The de-schooling of society will address inequality even less than the schooling of society. Linking education with active work in the capitalist context becomes a surer means to subordination.

It is interesting to note that de Lange adopts Illich's argument that children learn best on the job (not an entirely incorrect or even undesirable option within changed social relations) to justify their early extrusion from school into restricting, vocational, on-the-job training. Given our earlier criticism of Illich, it is clear that de Lange is co-opting an argument from a radical education tradition, though not a revolutionary one, for his own very different purposes. The bankruptcy of Illich's proposals within a capitalist society is thus seen when we see the consequences of it here.

It is also important to note the earlier argument that 'education cannot compensate for society'. In this context, de Lange argues by a strange sleight of hand that while formal education will not lead to social change, technical education is 'the key to a better life, the gateway to more money and the power exercised by whites'⁽²⁰⁾ for blacks. While the liberal illusion that educational change on its own is able to lead to social change has long since been discredited, the report uses a part of this

argument and distorts it to justify further differentiation. For the HSRC Commission, formal education will not lead to social change; technical education, however, will!

As mentioned earlier, de Lange must be seen in the same light as the reports of the Wiehahn and Riskert Commissions - a response to the crisis of accumulation of capital and intensified class struggle, designed to win worker consent with the appearance of reform but simultaneously rationalising control and dividing workers.

We have seen how technical education can be introduced on a large scale and how this can appear to be providing both more and better education while at the same time streamlining the operation of the education system. This will ensure that pupils leave school very early (when seen in the context of the leadership of resistance in schools being drawn from the older age group, this can also be viewed as a tactic for pre-empting such resistance); it will also ensure that social selection takes place not on the overt basis of race, but on the basis of 'wealth' and 'merit' - since all education, albeit different kinds of education, will be 'of equal quality'.

It can also be noted that

1. equal funding and parity of facilities alone will not create either an equal or a non-racial education system;
2. changes in the education structure alone, without corresponding changes on the factory floor, are hardly 'revolutionary';
3. 'politics' is not blocking 'reform', in the sense understood by the HSRC commissioners: reform itself is political in the educational as much as in any other.

But we also need to look a little more closely at technical education: the education

that will provide workers with the technical competence, in some cases, but not the tools for understanding and controlling the social forces which determine their lives; workers will thus be rendered more dependent on the factory or firm as a whole, and therefore on capital. They will be technically subordinated to the 'uniform motion of the instruments of labour'. To grasp this notion, it is necessary to say something about the division between mental and manual labour.

The Division of Labour

The division between mental and manual labour makes its first appearance with the emergence of private property. As a consequence of the alienation of the direct producer from his/her product, there occurs the concentration of intellectual activity at one end of industry, and the purely practical activity of the workers at the other. This is a separation between theory and practice which is reflected in divisions between classes, and within education in class society. Marx, quoting William Thompson in Capital, writes

The man of knowledge and the productive labourer come to be widely divided from each other and knowledge, instead of remaining the handmaid of labour in the hands of the labourer to increase his productive powers...has almost everywhere arrayed itself against labour.... systematically deluding them and leading them (the labourers) astray in order to render their muscular powers entirely mechanical and obedient. (21)

This separation of the intellectual powers from manual labour is finally completed by modern industry. The workman becomes a 'living appendage of the machine'. Such work in which s/he is engaged, 'does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in body and

intellectual activity'. Work is organised and fragmented in such a way that the worker loses all control over the production process.

Increasingly, with the emergence of monopoly capital, there has developed a class of engineers, scientists, technicians and supervisory workers whose job it is to co-ordinate work (mental labour) and to control workers. Even here, though, as Bowles and Gintis write,

The compartmentalisation of white-collar skills (is) an essential aspect of capitalist 'divide and rule' strategy for the control of the labour force. Even in well-paid and high-status jobs the worker's discretion and participation is increasingly limited. (22)

The worker is thus kept ignorant of the process of production and social relations are mystified for him/her. S/he is kept ignorant of the political, economic and social forces that determine the organisation of production and life itself. This is a product of the fragmentation and specialisation of jobs, and the hierarchical division of labour in capitalist society.

An educational strategy that aims to overcome this division, that attempts to restore the physical, cultural, intellectual and spiritual integrity of the worker must then be one that restores to the worker the knowledge and power of decision-making and control. Such an education must combine mental and manual labour, must embrace both technical education, an education to understand the process of production, and an education which will enable the worker to understand social relations. The aim of 'polytechnic' education must be the fully-rounded, politically conscious individual able to take control of his/her life and work.

Technical education, it seems, is a bastardisation of this. Within capitalist

social relations, technical education provides skills of a kind that separate the tasks of conception and execution, thus furthering the mental/manual division of labour which reduces the worker to 'an appendage of the machine'. It is the kind of education likely to leave the worker more vulnerable than before. Technical change is a constant feature of capitalist development. Equipped with specific skills the worker can be made redundant in the case of technical change and replacement.

As long as technical education is part of the maintenance of capitalist social relations, it can do little more than further degrade the worker.

Democracy and Control in Education

There is one further aspect to consider, and that is the question of educational management which, says the HSRC report, can be regarded as 'the philosophy and practice of decision making, while effective teaching and learning are the ultimate aim of educational management' (p 87). As such, a 'total curriculum strategy' is necessary (p 41).

A 3-tier system of educational management with strong, 'built-in structures and procedures for participation, consultation and negotiation at each level, ensuring that all the people and interests concerned have a "say" and can influence both educational policy and practice' appears to embody the demands of students in their struggle for democratic education. A relatively decentralised structure of education is proposed with one ministry of education served by a South African Council of Education to provide broad national policy. The second level is based on regional educational authorities which would be served by different bodies for curriculum development and examinations, adult

and non-formal education and education planning. The third level is based on the local school district 'that could make up units of management smaller than the "region" or "sub-region";. Here key roles are to be played by principals and circuit inspectors in reform.

Here more than anywhere else, the nature of the report is exposed. Demands by students for a democratic education have been linked to the demand for a democratic society. In the present context, within the present dictates of power and control, the SACE can only play the role of a President's Council, a single Ministry of Education can only involve the streamlining of operations, the central role of principals and circuit inspectors can only imply continued hierarchical control.

Management Strategy and Monopoly Capitalism

The language of the modern corporation is used throughout the HSRC report, and provision for an 'effective system of education management' is considered one of the most important preconditions for the restructuring of education.

The monopoly stage of capitalism is characterised by an immense growth in the scale of management operations - the functions of management are broadened in the modern corporation in such a way that different functional departments concentrate specific aspects of the management function in them. The proliferation of administrative units and subdivisions within the entire corporation involves the reorganisation of management into 'a complex of staff organisations' which 'represents the dismemberment of the functions of the enterprise head'. The purpose of this is control, which is an essential feature of management throughout its history.

When we look at the proposed education management structure we see the same kind of proliferation of planning and administrative bodies which essentially concentrate in themselves functions previously undertaken and performed by the individual teacher or school, viz those of decision-making and control. This involves the setting up of new bodies for 'curriculating'; the creation of 'curriculum specialists'; the creation of a research body, the results of which are to be passed on to 'curriculum planners'; the establishment of bodies to co-ordinate curriculum design; evaluation and development 'with related services such as evaluation, examinations, certification and educational technology'. This will in turn lead to the creation of subsections for examination and certificating bodies, educational technology units, curriculum packages, etc.

In conclusion, then, we can see that some of the demands for which students have laid down their lives have been conceded in the proposals of the HSRC report - parity in expenditure, one national education system. But these have been proposed by the de Lange Commission in such a way that ultimate control is maintained in the interests of capital. As such, any restructured education system will involve formal equality - but continued separation; it will be controlled from above rather than below; and it will serve the needs of the monopoly sector of the capitalist economy, rather than the interests of the working class.

Notes

1. An interesting analysis of some of these aspects is to be found in Peter Buckland's paper, 'The HSRC Investigation: another brick in the wall?', presented in Cape Town, December 1981.

2. RDM, 21.12.81.
3. RDM, 30.06.81.
4. Charles Meth, 'Shortages of Skilled Labour Power and Capital Reconstruction in South Africa', African Studies Institute seminar, University of Witwatersrand, October 1981, p 1.
5. Sunday Tribune, 31.12.81.
6. Sunday Tribune, 13.12.81.
7. Dan O'Meara, '"Muldergate", the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism and the Crisis of the Capitalist State in South Africa', Dar es Salaam, 1980.
8. Star, 25.11.81.
9. Star, 25.11.81.
10. In conversation with Soweto teachers.
11. Buckland emphasis this point too.
12. Star, 17, 18.11.81.
13. Ather Hussain develops this in 'The Economy and the Educational System in Capitalist Societies', in Roger Dale, Esland, Fergusson, MacDonald (eds), Education and the State: Schooling and National Interests, Open University Books, 1981.
14. Work In Progress 14, 1980.
15. B Bernstein in Stoneman (ed), Education and Democracy.
16. Star, 11.12.81.
17. Gramsci on education.
18. A teacher who would prefer to remain unnamed.
19. Marshall Murphree, 'Education, Development and Change', SAIRR, 1976, deals with this in greater detail.
20. Star, 17.11.81.
21. See Capital, volume 1, chapter 14, sections 3 and 5 for a more detailed analysis.
22. Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, RKP, 1976.

INFORMATION

Courts

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS

Oscar Mpetha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18), Morgan Makubala (19), Aaron Tshangama (28), Peter Kube (18), Alton Sabuwa (18), Fumanikile Boodi (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19), Johannes Nhlapo (20), Jeffrey Beardman (20), Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Amaondo (20), Wellie Mazothana (21) and 5 youths.

Charge: The state alleges that between August 8 and August 12, 1980, the accused incited people to damage motor vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs, and setting alight the vehicles. The accused are charged with assaulting and injuring six people, two of whom subsequently died. Other charges relate to the barricading of Klipfontein Road by placing stones, tree stumps and tyres in the street; marching in singing groups armed with sticks, stones and other weapons; ordering the closure of black schools; and congregating in various churches to encourage people to participate in 'terroristic' activities.

For background to the trial, see WIP 20:38-40.

When the court adjourned in mid-December, 1981, the trial had already run for just under 100 court days, and 60 state witness had been called to give evidence.

The evidence of the witnesses has concentrated on the meetings at the Assembly of God Church in Nyanga East and the Roman Catholic Church in

Gugulethu on August 11, 1980, a 'march' from these two venues to Klipfontein Road and the stone throwing and car burning incidents there. In addition, evidence has concentrated on the burning of a Post Office vehicle at the Nyanga bus terminus on the same day.

The state has led its evidence in an attempt to prove that various of the accused incited others at these meetings to participate in acts of violence, that various of the accused participated in the march and attacked cars driven by whites with petrol bombs and stones.

There has also been evidence of meetings at Noxolo School in Crossroads on August 11 and 12, 1980.

No evidence implicating veteran trade union and community leader Oscar Mpetha has been led since October 16, 1981. On that day, the Rev Vena, minister of the Assembly of God Church testified, saying that Mpetha had approached him on Sunday, August 10, 1980, with a view to booking the Church on the following Monday to hold a meeting to discuss the bus boycott then in force against City Tramways. Mpetha, who is over 70 and not in good health, is in custody with the other accused, and approaches by his counsel to the attorney-general for bail to be granted have been unsuccessful.

Various members of the Riot Squad have given general evidence as to township happenings during the period in question. Certain of them have conceded under cross examination that tensions in the townships are reduced when they remove themselves from sight. The Riot Squad policemen have said that they went into the townships on August 11 to 'prevent intimidation' of people wishing to use buses during the bus boycott. Considerable animosity was shown to them when they went

in and tried to prevent people from using 'pirate taxis'.

As the case is sub judice, there can be no comment on the quality of evidence at this stage, but it is significant that the state has had to lead so many witnesses in an attempt to prove its case. Previously made statements inconsistent with evidence given in court have been handed in as exhibits during cross examination of state witnesses. In respect of three witnesses presiding judge Williamson has recommended that the attorney general investigate charges of perjury, and in respect of one witness the judge has taken the extraordinary step of indicating to defence counsel that he saw no point in continuing to cross examine a witness. This was after previously made statements inconsistent with the evidence given had been put to the witness, the versions in the statements and the evidence being totally irreconcilable.

The trial has been characterised by various procedural applications. The state initially sought to hold the trial in camera, and this was opposed by the defence. The judge ruled that the trial be held in open court except when witnesses were under 18 years of age; in that case, each accused, regardless of age, was entitled to have two members of his family present in court.

An application was made by defence counsel for further particulars to the indictment as well as the summary of substantial facts. The judge ruled in favour of the accused describing the summary provided by the state as 'a travesty of what such a summary should be. Even to call it a mini-thumb nail sketch would be to elevate it into something more than it is'.

An application was also brought to order the Commissioner of Prisons to allow the accused

to write instructions to their counsel in prison without these being censored by the prison authorities. The application was abandoned as the risk of costs being awarded against the accused was considered too great to justify the application.

The trial is now at the stage of what is commonly called a trial within a trial. Here, the admissibility of certain admissions and confessions contained in statements made to magistrates is being contested by the accused. Five of the accused made statements to magistrates but deny that these were freely and voluntarily made. The magistrates and interpreters involved in taking the statements have now given evidence, and the defence has argued that it is the state's onus to prove that the statements were made freely and voluntarily. The judge has been asked to infer from certain comments made in the statements that it is not clear that they were made voluntarily, and that if this is the case, it is for the state to prove the admissibility of the statements rather than for the accused to disprove this.

The judge has also been asked to take into account the evidence of magistrate Croome who, under cross examination said that the reason why he asks persons making statements if they have been threatened or assaulted by the police is 'so that they cannot come back later on and say they were assaulted by the police'. Croome took statements from four of the accused. Judgement on this question - whether the onus rests on state or defence - will be given when the trial re-opens on February 9, 1982.

Certain of the accused made statements while in detention alleging that they had been assaulted by police before making confessions. The defence has asked the state for copies of these statements, as they bear

on the circumstances under which confessions were made. The state has refused to hand them over, claiming that they are privileged. On December 15, 1981 - the last day of the trial in that year - the presiding judge ruled that the state was bound to hand over these statements.

The trial re-opens in the Cape Town Supreme Court on February 9, 1982.

Klaas Thapela Seoka (28).

Charge: The accused, an ex-convict, was charged with inciting fellow prisoners at the Barberton jail to leave the country and undergo military training under the Pan Africanist Congress. In addition, Seoka was also charged with attempting to leave the country with the intention of undergoing military training.

Seoka, who made a statement to a magistrate after being arrested by security police, claimed that he had confessed as a result of assaults on him by security police.

Verdict: Guilty on both charges. While addressing the court on sentence, the prosecutor blamed certain churches for the appearance of people in court charged with inciting violent change. In this connection, he mentioned the decision of the Presbyterian church decision to marry people of different races!

Sentence: 5 years on each count, to run concurrently, is an effective sentence of 5 years.

(Krugersdorp Regional Court, 25.10.81).

Sibusiso Godfrey Mabaso (19).

Charge: The accused first appeared in court on August 16, 1979, where it was alleged that he had incited two people - Edward Buthelezi and Patrick Nzumkulo - to undergo military training. He was also alleged to have arranged

transport for the two recruits to leave South Africa.

At his trial Mabaso, who was legally unrepresented, pleaded guilty, and no evidence was led by the state. He was accordingly found guilty, and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.

While serving his sentence on Robben Island, he contacted a Johannesburg firm of attorneys, and review proceedings of his trial were instituted. In these proceedings, the Supreme Court held that Mabaso had incorrectly been found guilty, as his plea in the lower court had not established his guilt. The case was accordingly referred back to Regional Court for a re-trial.

When Mabaso was brought back to court, the state withdrew all charges against him, and he was released.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 26.10.81).

Robert Martin Adam (26) and Mandla Mthembu (25).

Charge: The accused, both detained by security police in late September 1981 appeared in court on December 24, where they faced three counts under the Terrorism Act, and various alternative counts under the Internal Security and Sabotage Acts.

Adam and Mthembu are alleged to have conspired with the African National Congress to obtain information regarding the transmission system and other aspects of the SABC TV tower in Brixton. During July 1981, it is alleged that they visited the tower and obtained information about it, including the taking of photographs.

Adam is alleged to have then drawn up a report for the ANC entitled 'Report on the Reconnaissance of the SABC-TV system in Auckland Park', which was placed in a dead letter box together with certain

photographs. These were to be collected by the ANC.

The accused are also jointly charged with attempting to recruit a person for ANC military training.

Their trial is due to begin in the Rand Supreme Court on March 15.

Khotso Sydney Seatlholo (25) and Mary Masabata Loate (23).

Charge: The state alleges that Seatlholo, a former president of the now-banned Soweto Students' Representative Council, formed the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) while in exile. According to the charge sheet, SAYRCO aims to incite blacks to overthrow the government by violence, and in achieving this, to recruit people for military training. The state also alleges that SAYRCO made contact with certain organisations within South Africa in an attempt to further its aims.

Among the acts detailed in the charge sheet, it is claimed that SAYRCO pamphlets were distributed at a meeting in Soweto on June 16, 1981; that Loate arranged a meeting between various AZAPO and AZANYU members and SAYRCO; and that she arranged a meeting between Seatlholo and Thami Mazwai, news editor of the Sowetan newspaper.

The trial is due to begin in the Vanderbijlpark Regional Court on February 8.

Fana George Sithole, Jabulani Wilfred Ngcobo, and Titi Alocia Mthenyane.

Charge: The accused face 2 counts under the Terrorism Act, and accused number 1 (Sithole) faces a further 15 counts relating to the breaking of his banning order.

The state alleges that the accused formed

an organisation known as the African Youth Congress with the intention of furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress. They are alleged to have incited others to leave the country for military training, and assisting them to leave via the organisation of transport.

The accused are also charged with obtaining information regarding security arrangements at the Caltex Oil Terminal in Durban, and to have obtained explosives.

The accused, who first appeared in court on January 5, 1981, were remanded in custody to February 23, when they will again appear in court in Durban.

SABOTAGE TRIAL

Geina Malindi (22), Sydney Masoka (24), Stan Kubheka (22), Mandlenkosi Tshabangu (20), Lucky Twala (22), Gordon Kubheka (21), and Tsako Johnson (22).

Charge: The accused, all students and members of Cosas, were charged with committing acts of sabotage and public violence. These included burning down a school in Evaton, and setting fire to two Vaal Transport Corporation buses. They were also alleged to have dispossessed the bus drivers of their vehicles by violent means.

All accused pleaded guilty to the alternative charge of public violence, and the state withdrew the main charge of sabotage.

Verdict: Guilty of public violence. Passing judgement, the magistrate presiding said that while the accused were all first-offenders and of high academic quality, the offence was a serious one which 'no community can afford'.

Sentence: R300 or 1 years imprisonment. In addition, a further 4 years imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 5 years, was imposed.

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

Gerhardus Hendrikus van der Werff (20).

Charge: The state alleged that Van der Werff handed over sensitive documents to a man believed to be a member of a banned organisation. The accused allegedly committed these offenses while attached to the SADF.

The trial was heard in camera in the Johannesburg Regional Court. Van der Werff pleaded guilty to the charge, admitting that he had handed documents to Benjamin Greyling (see below). He also admitted that the documents contained information which could be useful to people intending to endanger the security of the state.

In mitigation, Van der Werff said that he realised that he had made a mistake, and wanted to start a new life.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Four years, of which 40 months are conditionally suspended for five years. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 30.10.81).

Benjamin David Greyling (20).

Charge: Greyling was alleged to have contravened the Official Secrets Act by instigating Gerhardus van der Werff (see above) to make a sketch, and to provide secret documents which could be of use to South Africa's enemies.

He first appeared in court on November 5, 1981, having been in security police detention with van der Werff since July. An application for bail was refused. During this application, Greyling agreed that he was opposed to the present government, but denied being a member of the ANC or any other banned organisation. He admitted going to Swaziland and meeting an employee of the Swazi government who wanted to introduce him to representatives of certain organisations. He was not informed that the

organisations were against South Africa as a country, but that they were opposed to the current government. He had taken van der Werff with him because the Swazi official wanted to meet him. He was aware that Van der Werff was at the time in possession of certain secret documents.

Greyling's trial was held in camera, and at its conclusion he was acquitted. The magistrate presiding said that the state had only one witness, Van der Werff, who had been convicted of a similar offense and was said to be an accomplice in Greyling's case. The state had not been able to prove its case against Greyling beyond reasonable doubt. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 20.01.82).

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

Elaine Mohammed (20), Leslie Lax (23), Michael O'Donovan (21) and Benjamin Greyling (20).

Charge: The accused are charged with producing and distributing posters which celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding of the South African Communist Party. Their trial is due to begin in the Johannesburg Regional Court on February 8, 1982.

Jarius Mphahle (36).

Charge: Possession of ANC literature. The accused admitted that security police had found 113 copies of the ANC publication 'Mayibuye' and 12 copies of VOW (Voice of Women) at his house. However, the accused claimed that he ran a shebeen, and that many people could have left them there.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: R300 or 100 days. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 27.11.81).

Mohammed Abba Omar (25).

Charge: Photocopying and distributing an ANC pamphlet. The accused claimed that he had received the pamphlet from an unknown african man, and read it. It contained a message by Oliver Tambo on the ANC's 69th anniversary. He knew that the ANC was banned, but did not know that the pamphlet was unlawful. He gave the pamphlet to a friend, Sandra Chetty, and asked her to make copies as he intended taking them to a political science class which was part of his journalism course. Omar denied being an ANC member, or having any connection with the organisation.

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

Mophibi M Tsetse (25).

Tsetse was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in the Ermelo Regional Court for refusing to testify in the Terrorism Act trial of Raphael Khumalo and Raymond Dlodlu. Both accused were acquitted at the end of their trial.

Tsetse appealed against the severity of his sentence, and particularly against the trial magistrate's decision that refusing to testify in a Terrorism Act trial was as serious as committing an offense under the Act.

On appeal, the presiding judges held that the magistrate had erred in his ruling, and reduced Tsetse's sentence to one year. (Pretoria Supreme Court, 13.11.81).

Wilfred Sebonego Marwane (20).

Marwane was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for taking part in guerilla activities in November 1979. The case was heard by the BophuthaTswana Supreme Court, the charge being in terms of South Africa's Terrorism Act. In summing up in the trial, the judge

said that while the Terrorism Act was passed in South Africa, it still applied in BophuthaTswana after 'independence' because it had not been repealed. Leave to appeal was refused.

Subsequently, leave to appeal was granted on petition to the Appeal Court, which continues to have jurisdiction over the 'independent' bantustans. The appeal is due to be heard on February 15, by 11 Appeal Court judges, as it involves a constitutional issue of importance.

Marwane intends arguing that the Terrorism Act was in violation of the BophuthaTswanan Declaration of Fundamental Rights, enshrined in its constitution, and that as such, he should not have been convicted.

Renfrew Leslie Christie (30).

For details of this trial, see WIP 13:36-37. In July 1980 Christie was convicted of five counts under the Terrorism Act, and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. However, because the various sentences were to run concurrently, effective sentence was 10 years.

He appealed against conviction, mainly on the grounds that a confession made to police while he was in their custody should not have been accepted as evidence by the trial court.

However, the Appeal Court ruled that the confession was admissible as evidence, and that all but one of the convictions stood. In the case of one count, the Appeal Court upheld the appeal, but because sentence on this count was concurrent with other counts, effective sentence remains 10 years.

(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 06.11.81).

Mahwibi John Phala and 5 others.

In November 1978, Judge De Villiers of the Transvaal Supreme Court found that all of the

accused in the Springs trial had been involved in a 'bomb' factory, and that they had conspired to sabotage various railway lines. For details of this trial, see WIP 6:39-45).

Phala was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, John Thabo to 20 years, Letsi Ben Masinini to 12 years, Bafana Vincent Nkosi to 12 years, Philip Khoza to 15 years, and Solomon Musi to 5 years.

All but Musi appealed against sentence, and were unsuccessful except for Phala, whose sentence was reduced from 30 to 20 years. (Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 29.09.81).

Jan Caiphus Mashilo and Joseph Mashigo.

For details of this trial, see WIP 17:35-36. Both appellants were found guilty in terms of the Terrorism Act, in that they attempted to leave the country for military training. Both were sentenced to 5 years.

Both appealed successfully against conviction. (Pretoria Supreme Court, 20.10.81).

Alphius Mathope (22), Karabo Mediba (18), Gerald Seabelo (19), and Manuel Mediba (21).

These four appellants were convicted of furthering the aims of the ANC by a Ga-Rankuwa magistrate in BophuthaTswana. They were sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, 4 years of which were suspended.

They appealed successfully against conviction.

(BophuthaTswana Supreme Court, 20.10.81).

Wilson-Rowntree

STATEMENT BY THE WILSON-ROWNTREE SUPPORT COMMITTEE (JOHANNESBURG) - A REPLY TO MANAGEMENT

The dispute between Wilson-Rowntree factory owners and the 500 workers they dismissed has already gone into its eleventh month. The boycott called for by the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), the trade union representing the sacked workers, continues. Three powerful British trade unions are showing their solidarity with SAAWU by putting pressure on Rowntree Mackintosh, the parent company of Wilson-Rowntree.

These developments have been played out against a backdrop of increasing violence and brutality in the eastern Cape.

The period leading up to the 'independence' of the Ciskei was marked by violent hostility, directed against SAAWU.

The most recent example of this violence was the killing of Diliswa Roxisa, aged 20 and a close friend of SAAWU president Thozamile Gqwetha. She was shot by the Ciskei police who, unprovoked, opened fire on a crowd of funeral mourners getting off a bus in Mdantsane. The mourners were workers and unionists returning from the funeral of Gqwetha's mother and uncle. They were burnt to death after their house had been gutted by a fire bomb. As if to crown this, soon after the funeral Gqwetha, along with SAAWU's vice president, Sisa Njikelana, were detained by the South African security police. They are both still in jail.

This violence has reached an intense level in the past weeks but it is not new to the area. Union leaders Gqwetha and Njikelana have been repeatedly detained (five times each), their houses fire bombed, and union members harassed. In September last year a bus load of 205 workers were detained en masse - for singing songs on their way home from a union meeting! Earlier in the year 34 of the fired Wilson-Rowntree workers were detained. Soon after, a number of them were taken to hospital as a result of a hunger strike.

These events show starkly that the role of the Ciskei government is to run a vast pool of cheap and intimidated labour on behalf of the South African state and the factory owners in the eastern Cape.

In this context, management have produced a memo that attempts to justify their sacking of 500 workers and their refusal to deal with SAAWU. This document has been distributed to a number of organisations in an attempt to block the boycott of their goods.

The memo quotes Sir Donald Barron, chairman of the parent company Rowntree 'Mackintosh. He sent a telegram to SAAWU saying, 'We have very good relations with trade unions around the world but it is not possible to have a relationship with a trade union which condones intimidation and violence by its members and has so little regard for truth.'

This statement is a reference to the attack on the houses of three scab workers who had replaced some of the sacked 500 workers.

In the context of the authoritarian response to union organisation in the area, this is extremely misleading. While not denying that these attacks took place, it is also important to note that the Wilson-Rowntree management also has 'very good relations' with the South African and Ciskei security police. To



give some examples:

At the time of the strike the South African Police were used to expel the workers from the factory. Also, according to a SAAWU spokesman, 'after the large scale detentions of the Rowntree strikers, Major General Charles Sebe, chief of the Ciskei security, told their mamas who came to look for their husbands that he had detained on the basis of a list received from Wilson-Rowntree'.

Management denies this, but has never publicly condemned the more violent activities that have been associated with the strike at the Wilson-Rowntree factory. This is not surprising given that Wilson-Rowntree, together with other employers, benefit from the repression of independent trade unions and the cheap labour provided by the Ciskei - a service that has been refined by the creation of the Manpower Development Centre in the Ciskei. This is a computerised screening process which,

weeds out workers who have been active in trade unions, to ensure a submissive labour force for employers.

The dishonesty of the memo becomes clearer when it is realised that to date neither the union leadership nor any of its members have been found guilty by a court of bombing the three houses. This despite charges of arson and incitement that have been brought against some of the detained SAAWU members.

In fact, the official policy of SAAWU is tolerant of workers who replace others on strike. This is based on the union's understanding of the effects of unemployment in the eastern Cape (40%). SAAWU has in fact attempted to form a union to cope with this problem.

Wilson-Rowntree is a signatory to the EEC Code of Conduct whose first and most fundamental clause states that workers 'must be able to choose freely and without interference their form of representation'(Code 1a). The bosses

of Wilson-Rowntree benefit, directly or indirectly, from the brutality of the state in the eastern Cape.

In this light, and in view of their refusal to condemn the harassment of SAAWU and its members by both South African and Ciskei authorities, their claim that they cannot deal with a union 'that provokes violence and intimidation' sounds hypocritical and throws doubt on the credibility of their whole argument.

However, it is necessary to take up at least one example of misrepresentation in the memo. The immediate cause of the strike was the dismissal of three sweetwrapping machine operators because they refused to fix a machine without written permission from the night-shift foreman. The workers' demand was based on two reasons.

In October, 1980, workers were reprimanded for damaging a machine after making a similar repair. They were told never to repair any faults of that nature again. In the factory a reprimand is followed by a dismissal, and the workers were clearly afraid of losing their jobs.

Secondly, the repair was not part of their job, and in fact had to be undertaken by a more highly-paid skilled worker.

These job definitions are unequivocally laid down in the agreement of the industrial council for the sweet making industry, which is legally binding on management and all employees in the Wilson-Rowntree factory. Clause 3 of the agreement defines the task of a Grade 1 employee as being, 'operating a machine which wraps sweets with foil, cellulose film, wax-paper, or any other material'. Nowhere is it stated that such an employee may adjust or repair the machines - these are tasks reserved for a

'handyman', the name for an 'employee who is engaged in making minor repairs or adjustments to machinery, plants or other equipment'. From the agreement it is also clear that the worker repairing and adjusting machines must be paid more than a Grade 1 employee.

Despite this clarity in the agreement, management still claims in its memo that the 'Industrial Council has ruled that the job in question is indeed the normal function of wrapping machine operatives and the allegations of the 3 workers were completely disproved'. If this is accurate, it means that the industrial council has made a decision contrary to its own legally binding agreement.

If we take a closer look at the industrial council for the sweet making industry in the eastern Cape, this becomes less surprising. Management attempts to portray the council as a neutral outside body. Most industrial councils are made up of representatives of management and workers of a number of factories. In this case, the council is made up only of representatives of Wilson-Rowntree management and of a single trade union - the Sweet Workers' Union.

The Sweet Workers' Union is a tame union that excluded africans from membership until late in 1980. It only opened its membership to africans after management encouraged it to do so, fearing that SAAWU would soon organise the whole of the workforce. SAAWU alleges that workers at the factory only join this union because they fear losing their jobs. The workers believe that the council, far from being a neutral observer, is simply there to carry out the wishes of management.

Conclusion

The boycott of Wilson-Rowntree products, together with the threat that three British trade unions -

the Transport and General Workers' Union, the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers, and the General and Municipal Workers' Union - may boycott the parent company's goods, has recently resulted in new tactics by management.

According to a reliable trade union source, the parent company last year gave the three British unions assurances that at least 300 of the striking workers would be re-employed. The management of the local factory then offered to re-employ the workers, but only when vacancies occur. This was a clear attempt to confuse the issues and to break the solidarity shown by the British unions with SAAWU.

SAAWU has rejected this tactic and the striking workers stick to their original demands of unconditional reinstatement and the recognition of SAAWU. In the meantime management is once again benefitting from state repression. Most of SAAWU's eastern Cape leaders are in jail, including the chairperson of the Wilson-Rowntree workers' committee, Eric Mntonga. Clearly encouraged by this, management hopes to hold out against SAAWU.

SAAWU, however, is determined to win this struggle, and support groups all over the country appeal to all those who support the workers and the principle of free trade unionism to intensify the boycott of Wilson-Rowntree goods.

Labour Action

As we have explained before, this section will have to be typed in single spacing because of the space that it would otherwise take up in every issue of WIP. We apologise to our readers.

The first section provides a chronology to the 'pensions issue', the cause of a large number of strikes that have been reported on in this issue of WIP, and is the background against which the strong working class resistance must be seen. This resistance has not only been to the obvious issue of the money involved, but also to the extremely undemocratic way in which the whole issue has been handled, by both the state and employers. As is increasingly the case with a range of such issues of control over the working lives of people, it is being met with worker rejection.

The section on detentions, trials and harassment of trade unionists is not complete by any means. Factors of space and incomplete information limits us in what we can report on. Work In Progress is largely dependent on newspaper reports for its section on labour action. We, therefore, appeal to our readers, especially those in the union movement, to inform us of 'labour action'.

THE 'PENSION ISSUE'

27.08.81 Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU) sent a letter to the Registrar of Financial Institutions condemning the proposed new draft Pensions Bill, pointing out that no attempts had been made by government to find out how workers felt about the proposed changes which would come into effect if the Bill was passed.

Other unions also criticised the proposed Bill: general secretary of the General Workers' Union (GWU), Dave Lewis, and secretary of the National Union of Sugar Manufacturers and Refining Workers (NUSMRW), Selby Nsibande, said that the Bill was unacceptable and would lead to unrest if passed.

28.08.81 Draft legislation under the title 'Preservation of Pension Interests Bill' was published in the Government Gazette, keeping close to the recommendations of a committee which had reported on the issue 18 months

previously. Government invited interested persons to comment before 23 October, 1981.

In terms of the proposed legislation, workers would not be able to withdraw their pension contributions when leaving employment, unless they were retiring. This did not include contributions made before the Bill became law.

The Bill made provision for various options:

- * to put cash into a retirement annuity fund;
- * to put cash into a new employers' pension fund;
- * to keep cash (if it exceeded a certain amount) into a special frozen account to be opened at a post office, building society or bank.

Provision was made in one of the Bill's clauses for employers to apply for exemption from the Act if it could be shown that labour unrest would follow its implementation.

31.08.81 TUCSA came out in support of the new Bill 'in principle'. Arthur Grobelaar, general secretary of TUCSA, expressed certain reservations about the Bill's effect on unemployed workers. He suggested that provision be made to pay out workers who could not find work. He stressed that it was not correct to pay out striking workers.

01.09.81 A major pensions company, Old Mutual, welcomed the Bill as a big step forward in the development of adequate pensions for everyone in South Africa. General manager of the company, Manus van den Heever, said that the government was determined to go ahead with preservation of pensions through the private enterprise system, as opposed to a national pension fund run by government itself.

Labour unrest erupted at Hulett's Amatikulu plant, immediately after 250 workers at Mt Edgecombe decided to call off their three day strike. 600 workers downed tools in protest over the same issues that had sparked off the strike at the Tongaat Group's food and sugar plants.

Hulett's public relations manager, Ron Phillips, said that the firm was not willing to pay out the pensions money, but had agreed to put it into a trust fund to be administered jointly by the trade union and management.

Selby Nsibande, secretary of NUSMRW, said that workers rejected the Hulett's offer. However, they had returned to work on condition that the union took up the matter with the industrial court.

02.09.81 600 workers at Darnall sugar mill stopped work, but returned the next afternoon. Once more the fear was expressed that pension contributions were going to be frozen by planned government legislation.

01.10.81 1 100 workers in the Natal sugar

industry downed tools only hours before a meeting of the industrial council which had been called as a result of the September strikes. Three Hulett's sugar mills were forced to close down as a result of the strikes. A spokesperson for Hulett's expressed surprise at the action taken prior to discussions, putting this down to 'a very serious climate of distrust; workers don't trust the government or the company'.

Workers at Seppi Tugela pulp and paper mill in Zululand resumed work after Seppi arranged a bank guarantee regarding payouts of pension money.

Following the industrial council meeting of the sugar industry, the chairperson of the council announced the appointment of a sub-committee to deal, on an urgent basis, with the issue of the Pensions Bill. The industrial council stated its intention to request immediate clarity from government as to whether it intended granting exemptions or not. NUSMRW's Nsibande said that he was satisfied with the industrial council meeting and described the work stoppages as a 'successful and historical event for workers in the Sugar Industry'. Workers' demands remained the same: full refund of pension contributions, although they were satisfied with Hulett's temporary suspension of contributions and had returned to work.

03.10.81 The Durban Chamber of Commerce was reported to be considering plans to get government to shelve the pension law proposals for at least three years. Failing this, the proposal was made that a cut off point be set to exclude those earning less than R7 000 per annum which would then exclude the majority of black workers from the provisions of the planned legislation.

05.10.81 A sub-committee of the Natal Chamber of Industries met to decide what recommendations would be made to the Registrar of Financial Institutions in response to the draft legislation. Referring to the strikes which had taken place over the issue, A Freales of the Chamber said 'We believe the matter is taking on such important connotations that we may this week have to call a general meeting of members directly involved to give them an opportunity to discuss the sub-committee's recommendations'.

06.10.81 The Federated Chamber of Industries issued guidelines to its members as a short-term response to the mounting labour turmoil. It was stressed that black workers see the compulsory transfer and preservation of pensions as 'depriving them of access to

savings'. The FCI recommended 'meaningful negotiation with employee representatives'.

These representatives should be offered a 'three way choice':

1. remaining in the existing pension fund without being paid out;
2. resigning and reclaiming pension contributions with attendant loss of long-term benefits;
3. opting into a savings fund which could yield a lump sum payment on resignation.

It was recommended that companies hit by unrest stress to workers that the draft Bill may still be amended and that the industry is negotiating with authorities to have it changed.

06.10.81 The Registrar of Financial Institutions stated that there was no possibility of the Bill being withdrawn or unduly deferred. 'It is going to go through, as certainly as I am sitting on my chair', he said to reporters in an interview in Pretoria. It was 'utter nonsense' to suggest that the government was having a rethink on its plan. The Commission of Inquiry into the Bill had already made its recommendations, and those who had given evidence had supported the draft legislation. 'There is more support for the Bill than there are people against it,' said the Registrar.

Ken Hobson, general manager of the Durban Chamber of Commerce stated that the Chamber was in fact still considering its comments to the Registrar in the wake of the recent strikes. Two solutions were being considered - deferment of the Bill, or its amendment. He did not expect government to take kindly to deferment, so the best that could be hoped for was amendment.

Hobson said that a major issue pointed to in considering the Bill was that it had come so soon after the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, and that both employers and union leaders were still 'playing around with union recognition'.

07.10.81 Southern Life, one of South Africa's biggest administrators of pension funds announced its intention to produce a video programme on details of the Bill. The film, to be made in all major african languages, was a response to what they saw as government's failure to communicate the 'pro's and con's' of the proposed legislation to black workers.

08.10.81 Affiliates of FOSATU in Durban and Pietermaritzburg rejected the Bill outright, and called for workers to have a direct say in the running of pension funds. This resolution was adopted by more than 500 workers and worker representatives, and was put on the agenda for the FOSATU central committee to

discuss. The Bill was seen to be 'ill-timed', because workers were earning low wages and because South Africa has a totally inadequate system of social security for workers.

The meeting condemned the 'undemocratic practices of the majority of state, company and industrial council pension funds', and called for workers and worker organisations to have

- * the right to withdraw from any pension fund without prejudice;
- * access to 'all information regarding pension funds';
- * a say in the rules governing pension funds, their day to day operation, investment and loan policies.

08.10.81 Pension fund representatives opposed several clauses of the draft Bill at the Association of Pension and Provident Funds meeting in Johannesburg. They approved 'in principle' the idea that pensions should be preserved. The Registrar of Financial Institutions told the meeting that 'there is no going back'. The delegates agreed unanimously that the clause exempting government pension funds from disclosing their finances should be dropped. Chairman of the Association, Geoff Faulding, said that 'we have torn the Bill to shreds, now it is for us to suggest constructive changes'.

One of the most fiercely contested clauses of the Bill was draft 15, demanding that employers operating pension funds publish the position of the fund - together with any deficit - with the company's annual report. Some funds evaluate their assets annually, while others do this only every five years.

Southern Life Association also organised a country-wide series of seminars. At one of these, held in Durban, an executive member of the Huletts Group said that in the recent work stoppages, the pensions Bill had been a major factor. The reason for this was that coloured and indian workers generally received wages so low that they used their pension funds as 'savings' which they could draw on in times of need. While the Bill was aimed at job-hopping workers who cashed in their pension entitlements when they changed jobs, it did not provide adequately for the old age of workers. It was clear that black workers viewed the issue differently to whites. Short-term needs far outweighed long-term benefits and refunds, and pension contributions were often necessary for survival during periods of unemployment.

Workers fear they will lose track of their frozen contributions, particularly if they change jobs often. Black workers mistrust employers'

administration of pension funds and resent having no control over investment policies.

Delegates at the seminar concluded that the new law should not be introduced for three-five years to provide for a longer period of preparation for the idea of pension preservation.

09.10.81 The Registrar of Financial Institutions flew to Durban to meet a group of Natal employers, who had become increasingly concerned about the proposed Bill. A representative from the Registrar's office stated that workers did not understand the contents of the proposed legislation and that the strikes revealed the work of agitators.

The Natal Chamber of Industries and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce held secret meetings with the Registrar of Financial Institutions and a representative of the Department of Manpower. A spokesperson from the Chamber of Industries said afterwards that discussions had been good, but did not reveal the nature of these.

10.10.81 The Registrar of Financial Institutions announced that the provisions of the new draft Pensions Bill would come into effect three years after the Bill became law. 'This means that should legislation be passed in 1982, it will become operative only during 1985'.

Employees who voluntarily wished to avail themselves of the benefits provided for in the Bill would be able to do so as soon as it became law. The concession, according to the Registrar, had been made because reaction to the draft Bill indicated that there was a great deal of uncertainty existing amongst certain groups of employees. The postponement had been granted in order for the members of funds to have the opportunity of becoming more informed with regard to the benefits of the system.

This announcement was particularly well-received by the Durban Chamber of Commerce and the Natal Chamber of Industries, who felt that it would help defuse labour unrest and allow for more time to establish a secure system of industrial negotiation.

13.10.81 Durban trade unions warned that the government's action in deferring the implementation of the Bill would not on its own satisfy workers, and that what was needed was full consultation with them. Alec Erwin, former secretary of FOSATU, said that it would be a mistake to believe workers did not understand the Bill and that all that was required was more time to explain the situation to them. 'They understand the Bill...and they don't accept it'. He laid the blame for the

controversy with government and their lack of consultation: this should have been done before legislation was drawn up. Erwin suggested that the deferment period could be constructive if it was used to consult with worker organisations.

Sam Kikine of SAAWU suggested that only 'yes men' among trade unions had been consulted over the Bill. The deferment was a 'tactic' and workers were asking for their pension contributions to be refunded irrespective of when the Bill came into effect.

Certain Transvaal employers voiced scepticism as to whether the deferment would in fact defuse labour unrest. 'Black workers are so suspicious of government intentions that I doubt whether even that will help', said one.

14.10.81 The pension issue continued to cause unrest among workers in Natal industry. A Hulett's plant closed down after what management called a 'partial work stoppage' involving 300 employees. This followed the resignation of 130 hourly-paid workers.

Durban workers at a stevedoring company returned to work after management decided to repay their pension fund contributions.

15.10.81 Workers involved in two Natal work stoppages made it clear that they did not trust the government over the proposed legislation and for that reason intended to continue rejecting the proposals. The decision to down tools and demand repayment of their pension contributions was not forced on them by the unions but had been decided upon after discussion among themselves.

19.10.81 A spokesperson from Hulett's claimed that workers were being intimidated to strike. This was sharply denied by a spokesperson for the union involved at this Hulett's factory (the Metal and Allied Workers' Union). The director of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Industries said that 'On the basis of reports received there are clear indications that some intimidation has taken place'. But, he added, 'I don't think the unrest in Pietermaritzburg was due to intimidation in the first instance. It was probably due to a genuine concern by the black workers. It is well meaning legislation, to ensure that people get proper retirement benefits. Employers have explained to workers time and time again what it involved, but they are coming up against an unreasonable and irrational element which demands payment now of pension contributions.....'

20.10.81 The executive council of the Federated Chamber of Industries met in East London where strong differences of opinion emerged among

employers. Some industrialists argued that the pension plan had been drawn up in 'ill-conceived haste' and was causing genuine anxiety among blacks. Others argued that it was being used as an excuse by militant trade unions to create labour unrest. The president of FCI said that the attitude taken by the trade unions was 'shockingly irresponsible'. They were motivated by 'power and political gain' without concern for the consequences.

The FCI council did, however, agree that the three year delay did not solve anything, and that the basic issue still had to be faced.

After the meeting, FCI director Arthur Hammond-Tooke stated that the general policy was that pensions and other forms of remuneration should be negotiated between employer and employee without state interference. It was suggested that a distinction be made between a pension fund subject to preservation and a provident fund which was not. Workers should be able to opt for either.

The exclusion of women from the provisions of the Bill was sharply attacked by Rebecca Johnson, co-convenor of the Women's Legal Status Committee.

FOSATU issued a memorandum which was a summary of the views of shop stewards and rank and file membership in the Transvaal. The document stated that in spite of postponement, workers were still suspicious of the Bill because it 'entrenches and extends a system which they know is not meeting their needs'. The Bill had merely brought to a head long-standing worker grievances over the operation of existing pension schemes.

23.10.81 This was the closing date for objections to the Bill. Officials reported that they had received 'a growing stream' of comments on the Bill which were 'still coming in thick and fast'.

01.11.81 The director of a large group of companies in Natal suggested that the pensions issue 'should have been left alone until meaningful discussions could have been held between employers and unions with a view to coming up with a satisfactory pension scheme.

The deputy managing director of CG Smith Ltd said that 'The whole theme of the Wiehahn Commission was self-determination in the field of labour relations and collective bargaining'.

The Bill was thus seen by many employers to be premature and should be scrapped until living standards, employment conditions and opportunities have improved to a point where workers no longer need pension money to cushion them against unemployment.

04.11.81 The Department of Information was reported to have circulated leaflets in Soweto entitled 'A Pension is the Thing', in an attempt to curtail growing unrest over the issue.

At the bi-annual central committee meeting of FOSATU a resolution was passed calling on government to withdraw its proposed legislation so that the pensions question could be negotiated with organised labour. There was a call for adequate non-racial state pensions. It was also suggested that as the life expectancy for blacks was 53, retirement age should be lowered to 50.

SEIFSA took the attitude that they would not alter the rules of the metal industry's pension fund. A leading board member stated that SEIFSA supported preservation and believed it was in the interests of workers. The unrest was, he said, the result of misunderstandings.

05.11.81 FCI called for the Bill to be scrapped.

It was stated that FCI believed that reforms in private pension schemes could best be achieved by negotiation between workers and employers. The chairman of the FCI labour affairs committee said that 'to defuse and normalise the industrial relations situation, the proposed legislation on the preservation of pensions must be withdrawn and a fresh start made'. FCI added that it still supported the concept of preservation, but private pension reform could be helped by the development of a code of pension practices through negotiation between employers, employees and managers of pension funds with the absolute minimum of state interference.

06.11.81 The Director of Manpower and the Registrar of Financial Institutions announced that government would not be going ahead with the Bill. It was hinted that legislation on the issue would be introduced in the future but would not be done without consultation with all involved.

07.11.81 The government rethink was welcomed by businessmen. The president of the Natal Chamber of Industries and the executive director of the FCI expressed the hope that the move would ensure industrial peace.

The general secretary of SAAWU said that while he welcomed the move, the decision did not necessarily imply that worker grievances had ended.

09.11.81 Strikes involving 450 workers from Ilco Homes in Isipingo, Natal, and 800 workers at the SAICCOR mill in Unkomass,

broke out. Workers again demanded repayment of pension monies. SAAWU's Sam Kikine reiterated that the withdrawal of the BILL did not solve the problem - both the building and steel industries still had a preservation clause in their pension schemes.

10.11.81 Ron Miller, Natal leader of the NFP and party spokesperson on Manpower Utilisation, said that the withdrawal of the pensions Bill should be a lesson to the government that change in South Africa could only be implemented if all parties were consulted.

10.11.81 FOSATU-affiliated Metal and Allied Workers' Union released a resolution adopted by the Transvaal executive stating that there was 'nationwide worker dissatisfaction' with the metal industry's group pension fund, one of the largest in South Africa. They warned that there could be widespread labour unrest on this issue. The resolution called for a wide range of changes including demands for 'worker control of the fund'.

Officials of SEIFSA engaged in talks with unions not represented on the industrial council. They reportedly told unionists that if their members were not satisfied with the pension preservation scheme they could seek legal advice.

13.11.81 The chairperson of the Association of Pension and Provident Funds in South Africa said that the scrapping of the preservation legislation could cost the taxpayer billions of rands - because pensions were not being preserved when workers reached old age. They had to rely on state assistance funds met by the taxpayer. While black workers should have a say in the administration of their tax money, he felt that the massive labour unrest had been caused by misunderstanding and agitators.

A FOSATU organiser in Pietermaritzburg said that because workers' labour had been responsible for producing the wealth of the land, a portion of that wealth should be paid to them in the form of pensions. He stressed that the pensions issue had forced management to come out from behind their 'agitator theory' and to negotiate with worker representatives.

14.11.81 The decision of government to withdraw the Bill was heralded as an important victory for workers by the branch secretary of the FOSATU-affiliated National Union of Textile Workers.

14.12.81 SEIFSA announced its intention to hold face to face negotiations with all trade unions in the metal industry - both industrial council members and other - with a view to changing the industry's controversial pension fund. Comments were invited from the respective unions, to reach the pensions' board by December 31, 1981.

NATAL

African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AЕСCI) (Umbogintwini): On Friday, 4 December, a strike over a demand for pension funds to be paid out started. Initially only the day shifts (between 600 and 800 workers) were involved, but they were joined by the night shift, bringing the number of strikers to close on 1 400 at this firm.

This strike followed the freezing by the state of the worker-rejected proposals for the transfer of pension contributions between jobs.

The workers demanded that their pension contributions be paid out without having to resign from the jobs they were holding at the AЕСCI plant.

Union leaders were said to have met management after the strike started (Star, 05.12.81).

It was reported that AЕСCI started taking on a new workforce on Monday, 7 December, after the strikers had ignored a call to return to work. 'Former workers' would have their pensions paid out, said management. Many workers were said to have re-applied for their jobs. All 1 400 workers had been re-employed, said a later report (RDW, 08.12.81), and would be allowed to withdraw their pension contributions (Daily News, 08.12.81).

Both The South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) and the CUSA-affiliated SA Chemical Workers' Union were said to have been involved at the AЕСCI plant.

Alexander Hamilton Construction (University of Zululand site): On Wednesday, 9 September, 60 workers demanded a pay increase to 80c an hour. They left the site in support of this demand.

The workers returned to work the next morning, having been granted a 15% increase, to 55c an hour!

Said Finley Hamilton of the firm, 'The increase will bring construction workers' wages in line with the market wage', which, according to this exploiter, 'is between 50c and 60c an hour' (Natal Mercury, 11.09.81).



Bank employees (Durban): A meeting of 7 000 bank employees was being planned in Durban for officials from Standard and Barclays Banks.

The employees were, amongst other points, protesting a 'Reef allowance of R80 a month', in order to keep bank staff in Johannesburg. (This is nearly as much as the full monthly wage of the construction workers discussed in the report immediately above).

At the meeting the general secretary of SASBO (The SA Society of Bank Officials), André Malherbe, came in for a lot of criticism, especially with regard to the grading system used by the banks. Nearly 1 500 employees attended.

Bester Home Builders: A report, based on a police statement, said that workers at this firm had gone on a brief work stoppage on Monday, 16 November. They appear to have returned to work on the same day (Natal Mercury, 17.11.81).

Chick's Scrap Metals (Durban): A day-and-a-half long strike over the 'pension issue' ended on Thursday, 5 November. The company said that they had re-employed about 90% of the 120 workers fired (on 5 November).

The workers had also been on strike over the unfair dismissal of a union official.

Croda SA (Prospecton): The entire workforce (about 30 workers) downed tools on Monday, 2 November. This followed the non-resolution of pension demands (Natal Mercury, 03.11.81). The workers returned the next day, after management had refused to pay out their pension money.

SAAWU was attempting to negotiate in this dispute.

Defy Industries (Durban): (See the South African Labour Bulletin 2,1 (1975) for a discussion of a previous strike at this firm).

More than 1 000 workers were involved in a pension dispute in October. Workers were demanding the refund of pension money; management was caught by the metal industry's Industrial Council agreement which does not allow individual companies to refund workers' pension money. Employees have to resign or die before they can draw their pension contributions.

Hopeful observers suggested that this impasse would encourage big concerns, such as Defy, to lobby for an alteration of the IC ruling. At present, neither management nor workers are said to have room to negotiate, and many wasted hours result. This would seem to be a case where the IC system has backfired on management.

In the meantime, workers were told to return to work after the three-day stoppage, under the

DEFY

threat of losing their jobs if they didn't. Defy agreed to make representations to SEIFSA about their demands. 1 300 workers booked in on the allotted day, the fourth day of the strike (03.11.81), but refused to work. Defy fired them and began taking on new workers.

Police dogs and riot police were called in to disperse the protesting workers. The workers then decided at a meeting not to collect their pay and not to accept dismissal, but to continue with their demands for their pension fund repayments. SAAWU has been representing them, according to reports.

More information is needed on this strike.

Empangeni Transport Ltd (Empangeni): Workers at this firm stopped work on Monday, 21 December, over dissatisfaction with bonuses.

From press reports it appears that 229 of the workers were given the option of R70 or 70 days imprisonment after being found guilty on the same day of 'striking illegally' (Section 14(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act) (Natal Mercury, 23.12.81; RDM, 23.12.81). After this the workers returned to work on the next morning.

The Transport and General Workers Union said that it would pay half the fine in each case. A union spokesperson said that 'the workers had downed tools without consulting the union, and in terms of an agreement existing between the union and Empangeni Transport Ltd certain drivers of public vehicles were not allowed to strike' (RDM, 23.12.81).

Ensor Plastics (Prospecton): On Wednesday, 28 October, 150 workers went on strike over pensions. They were dismissed. By the next day 35 had been re-employed. Police were called in to disperse strikers (RDM, 30.10.81).

Game (Durban): On 28 September (Monday) more than 100 workers stopped work briefly at the West Street branch of Game Discount World over wages and union recognition. Management met on the next day to consider recognition of four shop stewards of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA); a minimum starting wage of R220 and a general increase of R50; and a request that grievances of 12 workers at another branch be investigated (Daily News, 29.09.81).

Company president, John Dobbin agreed to the demands (or at least to investigate them), except for wage increases. Vivian Mtwa of the CCAWU said that the average wage was R145.

It appears from reports that the stoppages and dissatisfaction continued, leading to the dismissal of 140 workers on Wednesday, 13 September. The stoppages had involved Game workers at branches at West Street, Brickhill Road, Fresh Market Game, and Furniture Game. At Home Improvement Game and Point Road warehouse workers returned to work after a brief stoppage.

It was now stated that Game did not recognise the CCAWU (Natal Mercury, 01.10.81). Dobbin said that the starting wage for men was R160 per month, and R125 for women.

Police were on standby on Thursday, 1 October, 'as a precaution against any possible unrest'. Workers refused to accept the pay and did not leave the premises until forced to do so by police. Dobbin said that altogether 100 dismissed workers had returned to their jobs.

The general secretary of the CCAWU, Emma Mashinini, said that management had refused to meet with her. Dobbin replied that they would only 'consider recognising the union if they registered' (Natal Mercury, 08.10.81).

Management had set a deadline of 7 October for re-employment of strikers. However, on 14 October it was reported (Natal Mercury 14.10.81) that 40 (52 in another report) of the dismissed workers had returned, and that all were being screened and re-employed 'if their stories of intimidation sound feasible'.

A Game workers support committee subsequently distributed information pamphlets in Durban.

It was reported in November (Post, 11-14.11.81) that the support committee would continue with its campaign to have 90 dismissed workers

reinstated. This was after the Game manager, John Hopewell, had agreed to see Emma Mashinini in Johannesburg. She has since been detained.

Grinaker (Pinetown): For previous strike, see WIP 20:46-47.

About 150 workers went on strike on Tuesday, 8 December, over the provisions at the firm's Christmas party. They were all dismissed the next morning for refusing to meet a return to work deadline set by management.

The amount of drink at the party had been limited, said management, 'for fear that things might get out of hand' (Natal Mercury, 10.12.81). Workers wanted all to be present when the strike issue was discussed with management.

The firm closed a few days early for the

annual Christmas construction and builders holiday.

No further news.

Grindrod Cotts Stevedoring (Durban): On 14 October workers at this firm returned to work after having been on strike. Management had agreed to repay their pension fund contributions (Natal Mercury, 15.10.81). The strike started on 12 October, with some 200 early day shift workers (Star, 13.10.81).

Henkel Chemical Works (Prospecton): More than 200 workers downed tools on 19 October over a wage and pension payment dispute. Discussions had been under way between management and representatives of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) for some months without resolution. After two days of striking the men were starting to get restless, observed one of the workers. But a report on 25 October did not show any sign of resolution of the conflict (however, another report (Natal Mercury, 22.10.81) said that workers had returned on 21 October).

The company is German based.

Huletts Aluminium (Pietermaritzburg): On Tuesday, 13 October, most of the morning shift went on strike ('and intimidated the minority which tried to clock in', said the Daily News, without quoting anybody or offering any evidence (14.10.81)). This dispute also related to the 'pension issue'.

The stoppage followed demands on the previous day for pension contributions to be refunded. When management said that this would only be done if workers resigned, 80 did so (followed by another 50?), while 40 returned to work.

The total work force (of 1 800) in Pietermaritzburg is made up of 300 whites, 500 indians, and about 1 000 african workers (Daily News, 14.10.81).

On Wednesday the 800 workers had not returned. By the next day management complained of 'severe intimidation and coercion' (quoting the Daily News?) by the first workers who had resigned. However, more than 300 workers had met at the Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre and had elected a negotiating team (Sowetan, 16.10.81).

Management set a deadline for return to

work of the first shift on Monday, 19 October, and said that those who did not return would be taken to have resigned (Natal Mercury,

THE
GAME
GROUP OF
COMPANIES

You always win at Game



19.10.81). Later on that day it was reported that about half the morning shift had resumed work (Daily News, 19.10.81). About one third (600 workers) were said to have resigned (Natal Mercury, 20.10.81) - this would be more than half of the african labour force.

By 23 October, 200 of the workers who had resigned had been re-employed ('selectively'). Bishop Alpheus Zulu, ex-Anglican Bishop of Zululand and now chairperson of the board of directors of the KwaZulu Development Corporation, 'agreed to intervene on behalf of workers at Huletts Aluminium company' (Star, 28.10.81). (Dr Zulu is also speaker of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly).

On Friday, 30 October, Zulu met with Huletts management. They subsequently agreed to re-employ another 100 workers of the 217 who had not been re-employed at that stage (650 had originally been fired). This meeting followed the failure by the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) to get the workers re-employed (Natal Mercury, 31.10.81). Those not re-employed included nearly all of the 30 members of the MAWU's steering committee - so much for divine intervention.

Huletts Sugar Mills: See WIP 20:47 for previous coverage. Also the article in the South African Labour Bulletin 6,6, dealing with sugar mill workers.

On Thursday, 1 October, labour unrest returned to the giant Huletts company. Three of their mills, including one at Amatikulu (the largest in the company) stopped work when some 1 100 workers demanded pension refunds and downed tools - the other mills affected were those at Mt Edgecombe and at Darnall. At Felixton shop stewards (of the National Union of Sugar Manufacturers and Refining Employees - NUSMRE) were meeting with management.

Huletts refused to refund pensions, saying that they would keep those funds in a trust until the state's intentions had been clarified.

On Monday, 5 October, the Felixton mill shut down, bringing the total number of Huletts work workers involved to about 2 000. This left only the Espangeni mill functioning.

A sub-committee of the Industrial Council for the industry was said to be deadlocked on the issue of pension refunds.

The Chamber of Commerce in Natal was now, in desperation, calling for a three-year suspension of the proposed pension legislation.

On Wednesday, 7 October, 400 workers at the Huletts refinery in Durban went on strike over the same issue, effectively putting all 1 100 workers at the plant out of work (Star, 07.10.81). On this same morning the NUSMRE was to report back to workers at all the plants.

Later that day the Mt Edgecombe mill started production, and by the next day all the mills were operating once more.

Management had agreed to suspend all pension deductions and to continue negotiations on refunds.

On 9 December it was reported (Star) that management had agreed to pension refunds and that 'several hundred' workers had already withdrawn their contributions. Huletts' Ron Phillips said that it was hoped that after discussions the workers would decide to return to the pension fund.

On Friday, 16 October, the Darnall mill closed down again when workers stopped work in support of a demand to have a fellow worker re-employed (ADM, 17.10.81). No further information.



Ilco Homes (Natal): See WIP 20:47 for previous references to this by now notorious firm.

On Monday, 9 November, Ilco managing director fired the entire work force of 450 at the Isipingo site. This followed demands that pensions be refunded.

It appears from press reports (eg Star, 12.11.81) that the workers had been on strike and were given a 30 minute deadline on Monday ('29 minutes too long', said Ilco's Demmers).

Demmers said that this opportunity would be used to weed out 50 'troublemakers', as he had disbanded the workers' committee after the strike in July. He said that dismissals were the most effective way of dealing with strikers.

Sam Kikine of SAAWU (now in detention) said that he hoped to hold talks with Demmers. By 13 November Ilco was taking on new workers (Star, 13.11.81).

International Harvester (Pietermaritzburg):

About 400 workers went on strike on 31 August in support of a request for a 30% pay rise to offset the increase in the cost of living in the area. They agreed to return to work after management had offered a 20% rise for all workers who had not had an increase during the past year. This was on 2 September.

The Metal and Allied Workers' Union negotiated for them initially, but management refused to recognise this union, so the workers had appointed a six-person committee.

It is indicative of police interference that in this particular strike the reporter saw fit to comment on the absence of police harassment.

Natal Sweet Manufacturers (North Coast):

Indian and african workers went on a two day strike following a wage dispute in September. During the strike one of the workers was shot and wounded in the chest. AD Noorgat appeared in the Verulam court on charges of attempted murder and illegal possession of a firearm.

Natal Tanning Extract Company (Melmoth):

It was reported that on Friday, 9 October, 'hundreds of cane cutters and other agricultural workers' employed by NTE went on strike at Melmoth (Daily News, 13.10.81). Managing director Bill Zeller, who travelled from the firm's Pietermaritzburg head office to Melmoth, said that while 'some requests...were very reasonable...others, such as extremely high wage demands were unacceptable.

On Monday, 12 October, they were joined by workers from the extract factory, bringing about 1 000 NTE workers out on strike.

Workers were said to be returning slowly by Tuesday. 75 workers arrested by police on Tuesday appeared in court and were fined R100 (or three months) on the same day 'for holding an unlawful meeting'.

AJ Maphalala, an organiser with the National Federation of Workers (NFW), said that strikers were demanding R8 a day for labourers, R12 a day for those employed in the workshop, and R125 a week for drivers.

On Wednesday, 14 October, the strike ended, with the company having rejected the 'extremely high wage demands' (Daily News, 14.10.81).

Natalse Landboukorporasie (Wasbank): Another

indication of the extreme poverty that marks the condition of workers in rural and small-town areas, is the strike by about 30 women 'pickers' (cleaning seed by picking out foreign items and malformed seed) at the NLK. Under 'normal' circumstances the precarious job position of such workers would effectively wipe out any chance of strikes.

The women stopped work during the week of 1 October, and returned early the next week, in support of a wage demand after bus fares in the area had gone up.

Grain depot manager, J Wolfaardt, said that the women had returned 'on our terms' (Daily News, 07.10.81).

National Cooperative Dairies (NCD) (Mooi River):

60 workers at NCD were dismissed after being on strike for one day.

Apparently the strike started when 21 workers refused to work overtime unless they were paid overtime rates. They were dismissed.

On Friday, 11 December, they were joined by the other workers after a workers' committee had unsuccessfully called for their reinstatement, said the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (Star, 16.12.81).

No further information.

Ninian Lester (Pinetown): An unknown number of workers at this textile firm returned after one day (Monday, 2 November) after management had refused to meet a wage demand.

Reckitt and Colman (Mobeni, Durban): Workers returned on Monday, 2 November. This followed a strike by 700 (400 in another report) workers during the previous week over a pension dispute with management (Natal Mercury, 03.11.81). The strike appears (from reports) to have started on Wednesday, 28 October.

Rheem SA (Isipingo): 90 workers at this metal containers firm went on strike on Friday, 6 November, over pensions. By Monday the firm's deadline had passed and 27 workers were dismissed (Star, 09.11.81).

Ridge View Quarry (Cato Manor): On Monday, 12 October, workers at the quarry stopped work. By the next day they had resumed work (Natal Mercury, 14.10.81).

Saicoor (Unkomaas): A 'pension-related dispute' occurred at this rayon pulp firm during early November - starting on 6 November (Star, 09.11.81). On 11 November it was reported that the strike, involving about 700 workers, was continuing, with workers demanding pay-out of their pension contributions.

Riot police used teargas on about 400 workers on the first day of the strike. OW Tainton, managing director, parroted the 'agitator thesis'. To his/her credit the Natal Mercury reporter said that:

During the day the Mercury had seen no evidence of agitation and all the workers spoken to had understood the pension fund issue (07.11.81).

Sasko Bakery (Malmoth): An unknown number of workers stopped work at midday on 9 October.

Matthews Oliphent, secretary of the NFW said that it was over no overtime pay, compensation for injury, protective clothing, and recognition of the NFW-affiliated National Commercial Distributors Workers' Union.

Management denied that a stoppage had taken place.



SANDOCK AUSTRAL

a member of the Gencor Group

Sandock Austral (Durban): It appears that at 15h00 on 21 October about 800 workers stopped work to show their dissatisfaction with certain aspects of their pension fund.

Manager AJ Kruger said that it was not a strike, but merely 'negotiations' with part of the work force.

The stoppage continued the next day. No further information.

South African Stevedores Company (Sassco) (Durban): On Monday, 28 September, nearly 1 000 stevedores (employed by this, the largest, stevedoring company in Durban) went on strike.

Management said that they had no idea of what the strike was about, even after the workers had agreed to return to work the next day - while negotiations with a workers' committee was in progress. Wilson Sidina, national organiser of the General Workers' Union (GWU), representing stevedores in most South African ports, said that workers were unhappy with 'management's attitude to the works committee' and with wages. The FOSATU-affiliated Transport and General Workers' Union is also said to be competing for members in the docks in Durban (Natal Mercury, 29.09.81).

Eleven ships had been tied up by the strike.

Seppi (Mandini): On Wednesday, 30 September, workers (one report said 1 650) downed tools in support of a demand to have their pension contributions refunded.

The FOSATU-affiliated Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union, entered into negotiations with management.

General manager, Bernard Chamberlin, said that arrangements had been made with a bank to have R1,5-m ready to pay out pensions, if workers should resign or be fired.

By the next morning workers had returned, on the understanding that negotiations would continue over fears that their contributions would be frozen. Workers also objected to police presence at the mill.

Management was said to have agreed to work on the pensions issue, and not to fire any workers who had been on strike (Star, 01.10.81).

Seppi was also indirectly in the news at the beginning of October when a nine year old african child was found guilty in the Howick magistrate's court of starting a fire that extensively damaged Seppi plantations and seven farms. The child was given four strokes with

a light cane before the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg, on review, had set the sentence aside.

On 16 November 300 shift workers refused to start work, once more related to the pension issue.

Both SAAWU and the PWAU apparently have members at the mill.

No further information.

Tongaat Town Board: The entire african workforce employed in the Tongaat Town Board's electricity department (30 workers, later joined by about 140 workers from other departments) went on strike on Thursday, 22 October (the first 30 went on strike on Wednesday). They were protesting at the unfair treatment by a white foreman (demanding his dismissal), and also the refund of pension contributions.

The next day the town clerk, VB Parkhouse said that a 'number of striking workers' had been dismissed.

It was reported that half of the Tongaat Town Board's african labour force was paid off on Monday, 26 October (173 workers). Police were present.

Umzinto North Town Board: 70 labourers went on a brief strike on the morning of Monday, 19 October. They returned to work after officials of the Department of Manpower had said that they would take up the workers' case. The officials, along with worker representative, Gilbert Mkadi, met with the Umzinto Town Board officials. Mkadi said afterwards that the Board had been given 48 hours to upgrade wages.

Workers were earning from R76 - R150 a month, and were granted a R20 a month across-the-board increase. It is not possible, here, to enter into the whole complex issue of the relationship between Provincial Authorities, the UTB, and the state.

Zinkwazi Caravan Park (North Coast): The 44 workers at this caravan park who went on strike on Saturday, 31 October, over the dismissal of two fellow-workers, were arrested by police on Tuesday, 3 November - for trespassing.

TS Kumalo, general secretary of the African Allied Workers' Union, said that workers would be bailed out (Daily News, 04.11.81).

On 26 November, 43 workers appeared in court for the first time. The case was remanded to 13 January, when it was again adjourned to 25 January, because one of the accused was drunk.

Zululand Food Producers (Richards Bay): Another case of extreme labour exploitation has been exposed through the strike at this firm.

On Friday, 4 December, shop stewards of the FOSATU-affiliated Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU) demanded an increase in minimum wages for the workers from 22c to R1 an hour.

SFAW's general secretary, Maggie Magubane, said that a report-back meeting was broken up by an armed management representative. Workers were locked out and dismissed.

Workers returned on Monday, 7 December, but walked out when management offered to re-hire all except the eight shop stewards.

At this stage, the 370 workers at the canning factory were demanding the recognition of the SFAWU, the re-instatement of the shop stewards, and negotiations on their wage demands (Star, 08.12.81).

Management offered 'selective re-employment' until Monday, 14 December, and a 5c an hour increase on the minimum (of 82c an hour) (Star, 10.12.81).

White school children were soon brought in as scabs (also see Triomf strike in this issue). Meanwhile the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (60 affiliates with about 2-million members) called on ZFP to reinstate the workers and to negotiate (Star, 11.12.81).

It was later reported that talks between the SFAWU and management were deadlocked over the re-employment of a shop steward (Star, 16.12.81).

On 22 December, workers returned 'to ensure the union had access to negotiations with management next month' (said the union) (Star, 23.12.81). All but Israel Myeni, worker-elected chief shop steward, whom the firm refused to take back, had gone to work (Daily News, 29.12.81).

No further news available.

TRANSVAAL

Allenwest - GE Manufacturing (Benoni):

About 150 workers downed tools on 23 November demanding that bonuses be linked to the company's wage rates. They were rejecting the system laid down in the metal industry's Industrial Council agreement. Management refused to accede to demands made by MAWU shop stewards. Workers returned to work the following day.

BMW (Pretoria): At the BMW car plant in Rosslyn, about 1 300 hourly paid workers struck on Thursday, 19 November, over the wage increases proposed for 1982. Wage talks had been in progress during the past week between management

and an elected worker council. Rumours were circulating that management was proposing ridiculously low increases.

On Friday riot police entered the plant. No incidents were reported. That day the new increases, which would push up BMW's minimum wage from R1,80 to R2,10 an hour, were announced, and some workers returned to work. By Monday, all 1 300 workers were back at work.

Boksburg Foundry: 160 workers downed tools. Management warned that if they did not return they would be paid off (Daily News, 06.10.81). No further news.

Bowthorpe-Hellermann-Deutsch: A dispute involving wage demands occurred at B-H-D on 7 October, 1981 (Star, 07.10.81).

Captain Dorego (Johannesburg): On 21 September 10 employees of Captain Dorego's (fast fried fish), Marshall Street, struck after R5 had been deducted from their pay packets. According to a Captain Dorego spokesperson, workers get an extra R5 winter bonus, because winter is their busiest period. Once spring comes, they forfeit this bonus.

After talks between the union and management, it was agreed to pay the workers their 'winter bonus' throughout the year - the Industrial Council agreement states that bonuses of this kind must be treated as wages. The workers accepted the settlement and returned to work.

This strike revealed some interesting functions of the industrial council system in South Africa. Emma Mashinini, general secretary of CCAWUSA, accused the industrial council for the trade of recruiting scab labour for strike-hit shops - 'What gives them the right to take sides in a strike by recruiting strike-breakers?' (ADM, 24.09.81).

While the chairperson (D Michos) of this industrial council denied the accusation, he did reveal that it was "a normal function of the council" to put employers who needed labour in touch with work seekers'.

Contract Packaging Company: About 30 workers employed by the company were sacked on 11 January. The company had failed to pay them on Friday, and when they demanded their wages on the following Monday, they were dismissed.

The workers complained that they did not get fringe benefits, were subjected to insults from white employees, and were paid poor wages (Sowetan, 12.01.82).

The company agreed to re-employ all except two of the striking workers. Two more were

fired later (ADM, 14.01.82). Four who were sacked were accused of rushing to the union and being instigators of the strike (Sowetan, 19.01.82).



Cobra Brassware (Luipaardsvlei, West Rand):

For background, see WIP 20:42-3.

13 workers, dismissed after the strike at Cobra Brassware, appeared in the Krugersdorp magistrates' court charged with incitement to strike under the Industrial Conciliation Act (Star, 03.10.81). They were acquitted on 14 January, 1982 (Star, 15.01.82).

Crescent Pottery (Krugersdorp): More than 40 workers went on strike in protest against the dismissal of a union shop steward on 4 December, 1981. Management fired them and said they would re-employ selected workers.

The workers have all decided not to return unless the shop steward is taken back and they are all reinstated (ADM, 05.12.81).

D & H Quarries (Johannesburg): An employee of D & H Quarries was fired for being an active member of a registered, TUCSA-affiliated union, the African Transport Workers' Union. The employee, Lawrence, Segale, is trying to lay a charge of victimisation against the firm. It appears that the union has been unwilling to help him (ADM, 11.12.81).

Datsun-Nissan (Pretoria): 200 workers were dismissed at this car plant. The dismissals follow a similar retrenchment of 507 workers at the Sigma Motor Corporation. However, Datsun does not possess an equivalent benefit scheme.

Management claims that they prepare for the 1-3% of the workforce which usually does not return to the company after the end of year break by taking on extra workers. This year more workers came back than were expected, and the workforce had to be 'pruned' (ADM, 09.01.82; Sowetan, 12.01.82).

The state of, and retrenchments within, the motor industry will hopefully be looked at in a future edition of WIP. It is to be expected that the South African motor industry will be affected by the world slump in that industry.



Dorbyl Railway Products (Boksburg): 400 metal workers at this firm went on strike on 28 September, 1981. Workers demanded a 60c across-the-board increase in their hourly wage. The demand was first raised by MAWU shop stewards, but was turned down. Management agreed to reopen negotiations on the next day with union officials and shop stewards, and the strikers returned to work (Star, 29.09.81).

Edgars Warehouse (Johannesburg): About 350 workers went on strike on 10 December. The workers demanded: the reinstatement of three of their colleagues; recognition of their trade union; the transfer of a white supervisor to another department; non-victimisation and payment of their full salaries while on strike (Sowetan, 11.12.81).

Talks between management and the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union were held and the company agreed to re-examine the dismissals. The Edgardale warehouse was closed down as a result of the stoppage. On 14 December the workers returned to their jobs (Star, 14.12.81).

Edgars signed a 'partial' recognition agreement with CCAWUSA (Sowetan, 16.12.81).

Electric Centre (Doornfontein): Five workers were dismissed for incompetence. Ten others walked out in sympathy and were subsequently dismissed. They complained that management arbitrarily hired and fired workers (Star, 02.10.81).

No further news.

Electrolitic Metal Corporation (West Rand): On 20 October, 1981, more than 140 workers at the EMC were fired. They had downed tools in protest against the state's pension bills. When management was informed that the workers did not like the new pension scheme they told the workers that their wages would be increased. An increase of R1 an hour was demanded, but management felt that this was too high. Some workers decided to strike, while some returned to work. The strikers were locked out. All those who had not been permitted to enter were asked whether they were on strike or not. Those who decided to strike were fired (Sowetan, 20.10.81).

No further news.

Federated Timbers (Witbank): 218 workers struck and demanded a 23% increase in their minimum wages. It is not clear when they returned to work (Star, 16.10.81).

Femco (Brits): About 600 workers went on strike on 12 January 1982 in protest against the retrenchment of eight of their colleagues. The MAWU says that all eight, as well as over 400 of the workers, are union members.

The company originally fired the workers, but after negotiating with MAWU agreed to take them back with the exception of the retrenched workers (RDM, 15.01.82).

On 14 January the company retrenched another 10 workers. According to MAWU, these 10 were all semi-skilled labourers and union members who had been recruiting for MAWU.

The retrenched workers were only given one days notice. MAWU is taking the matter up with the Industrial Council for the Engineering Industry. Femco workers also met and decided to send a delegation to management (Star, 19.01.82).

Hall, Longmore and Company (Weddeville): A dispute at this firm was settled on 23 November. About 600 workers had been on strike for two days while MAWU shop stewards negotiated the reinstatement of a worker fired after a quarrel with a white foreman (Star, 24.11.81).

Hartleyvale factory (Boksburg): In December the company broke an agreement with workers over late night shift work. Some workers who refused to work their shift were fired. On 13 January workers staged a strike which lasted two days. The company reported on 15 January that all workers had either returned or been replaced (RDM, 15.01.82).

H Lewis and Company (Kempton Park): Trouble started at the factory in about early August when the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU) began organising there. Some workers were fired and matters came to a head when workers felt that their colleagues were being victimised for joining the union.

When a time clerk was fired for allegedly forging his clock card, more than 560 workers struck in support of him.

The workers called their union to solve their dispute, but management would only have talks if the workers returned to work. Management threatened to fire them if they did not return by 08h00 on 1 October. The workers ignored this deadline and were fired.

At a meeting in Tembisa on 1 October the workers pledged solidarity with the dismissed

worker and decided to continue with their strike (Sowetan, 02.10.81).

No further news.

Johnson Tiles (Olifantsfontein): For background information, see WIP 20:43.

The 300 striking workers at Johnson Tiles applied for re-employment at the factory on 13 October and were told that they could not be re-employed as there were no more vacancies. Most of the vacancies were said to have been filled while the workers were on strike.

Most of the workers who live in the bantustans decided to go back home. Those who qualified to stay and work in the area went to the labour bureau in Kempton Park and were told that they were still needed at Johnson Tiles. At the firm they were told that there were no vacancies.

L&F Metter (Boksburg): Workers protesting against the dismissal of some of their colleagues struck for two hours at L&F Metter (RDM, 07.10.81).

Litemaster (Weddeville): 22 workers were fired after demands for a R2 an hour minimum wage - the firm offered a 10c increase. A spokesperson for MAWU said that management had failed to reach agreement with the shop stewards and by not calling in union officials had violated their agreement. About 20 workers were employed to replace those sacked (Sowetan, 27.10.81).

MAWU has referred the incident to the Industrial Council for the metal industry. If a matter can't be resolved at this level, it is referred to the Industrial Court (Star, 10.11.81).

This issue was not settled by the Industrial Council, and was passed on to the Industrial Court on 8 December. The hearing date has been set for late January.

Amongst the issues to be raised will be the dismissal of workers during wage talks in order to thwart the negotiating process, the refusal to negotiate with a union which was representative and with which the company had agreed previously to negotiate, and the imposition of employment practices which deprived workers of common law rights.

It was also argued that the company had failed to comply with its employment codes in dismissing the workers.

The case will be a crucial test of whether employers are bound by their own industrial relations procedures. It may also establish as an 'unfair labour practice' any unilateral change in employment conditions which prejudice existing worker rights, and may also

decide whether unfair dismissal falls within the local definition 'unfair' labour practice (Star, 09.12.81).

National Spring Manufacturers (Wadeville): 300 workers struck for two days over the dismissal of two colleagues. They returned to work although the sacked co-workers had not been re-hired (RDM, 22.09.81).

Pigott Maskew and Company (East Rand): Pigott Maskew withdrew recognition of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union following two recent strikes over wages by 450 workers. 20 strikers were dismissed (Star, 17.11.81).
No further information.

Pipekor (Pty) Ltd (Krugersdorp): 300 workers at Pipekor Ltd downed tools over the 'pension issue'. The workers decided to return to work after a meeting between management and the industrial council had been convened (Sowetan, 06.11.81).

Plus Insurance Brokers (Johannesburg): On Monday, 16 November, 8 employees went on strike. They demanded a 50% wage increase which was refused. On Tuesday a meeting between management and the workers ended in deadlock. The workers decided to ignore a deadline and resign (Sowetan, 18.11.81).

Poolquip (Wynburg): For background information see WIP 20:45.

FOSATU advised the five workers to return to the firm while they talked to management. When the workers arrived at the firm they were paid off (Sowetan, 24.09.81).

Power Steel (Wadeville): More than 500 workers went on strike on 25 September after a colleague had been unfairly dismissed. They returned to work on 28 September.

Rely Precision Casting (Boksburg): For background, see WIP 13:44 and WIP 14:49. 40 workers are suing the Minister of Police for a total of R60 000. The workers allege that they were beaten up by police after being arrested for striking at Rely in May 1980. The case was heard in the Boksburg magistrates' court and is continuing (RDM, 15.01.82).

Salcast (Benoni): At this firm, 444 employees struck on 2 November because of problems encountered with a white supervisor. The workers demanded that the supervisor be fired. About 230 decided to stay and 188 resigned (Sowetan, 03.11.81).

Scaw Metals (Wadeville): A dispute arose at the Anglo-American firm due to the dismissal of an african worker who had allegedly assaulted a white worker who had verbally abused him. 2 000 workers went on strike. They returned to work when the management agreed to re-employ the african worker and give him the same punishment as the white worker (RDM, 23.09.81).

Sigma (Pretoria): For previous information on strike action at Sigma see WIP 19:54 & 50, and information on Sigma in WIP 20:45.

At the inquest of Paulus Mahlangu, who was shot dead on 15 April during the Sigma strike, the magistrate found no one responsible for his death (RDM, 17.10.81).

In early January Sigma Corporation retrenched 507 workers and temporarily laid off 348. The reason given was the introduction of more modern engineering techniques. Sigma has, therefore, had to reduce the size of its labour force (RDM, 06.01.82).

The National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union (NAAWU) and Sigma agreed that Sigma would pay the workers supplementary unemployment payments of 70% of their normal wages. They would also receive retrenchment pay of between one and three months of their regular pay (Star, 06.01.82).

Workers who were worried that they would lose their official Unemployment Insurance Fund money were reassured that this would not be the case. They could still claim UIF benefits. Sigma and NAAWU were trying to place workers in new jobs and have found employment for 50 (RDM, 12.01.82). At Sigma, NAAWU and the company have a written agreement over severance pay for retrenched workers. With the recession expected later in the year the issue of retrenchments are likely to become more common.

NAAWU have already stated that it is committed to fighting lay-offs. The union says that its demand will be that workers go on to short time rather than be retrenched. An employer source says that large companies will opt for lay-offs. Short time led to worker resentment because all workers suffered a drop in pay. Some employers believed that it was this that contributed to strikes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They would prefer to penalise only a section of the workforce.

The unions, however, prefer a drop in wages to a situation where large numbers of workers have no jobs at all.

If work has to be cut back, NAAWU wants consultation with workers on ways of avoiding retrenchment - such as juggling staff through short time. It wants agreement between unions

and employers on retrenchment procedures, which have already been included in many recognition agreements. As at Sigma, the union will insist on some form of severance pay or an unemployment benefit (RDM, 13.01.82).

Skeerpoort farmworkers (Pretoria area): About 40 contract workers - some of them aged between 12 and 14 - stopped worked on a farm at Skeerpoort on Monday, 21 December. They had been promised their pay that day and had not received it. Furthermore, they had been promised between R25 and R40 per month, and had to date only received a portion of their wages (RDM, 23.12.81).
No further news.

Stamcor (Boksburg North): 70 workers went on strike on 6 October demanding higher wages. FOSATU says that management is refusing to negotiate (RDM, 07.10.81). Managing director John Rohman, confirmed that there had been a 'minor stoppage' at the firm and that certain workers' wages had been increased (RDM, 08.10.81).

Telephone Manufacturers of South Africa (TMSA) (Springs): Three workers were fired at TMSA on 1 October for allegedly playing cards during working hours. About 1 500 workers who went on strike in their support were dismissed. TMSA refused to meet with MAWU, but was prepared to negotiate only with the Radio and TV Workers' Union, and the TUCSA-affiliated Radio, Television, Electronic and Allied Workers' Union.

On 13 October, nine TMSA workers appeared in court in Kwa Thema charged with assault. Bail was granted. At the trial two fellow workers were arrested (Star, 14.10.81).

Police interference throughout the strike was blatantly obvious. The riot squad appeared during the second morning and a number of workers claimed that they were assaulted. All public meetings in the Springs area were banned for the weekend 10-12 October, and at least five workers were arrested. FOSATU had organised a meeting to discuss the strike, and claimed that TMSA was co-operating 'hand in glove' with the police to keep 'a democratic union out of the factory'.

TMSA rehired all but about 200 of the striking workers (RDM, 29.10.81).

Toyota (Sandton): Four men appeared in the Johannesburg regional court on 5 October, charged with trying to prevent workers from going back to work during a stoppage at Toyota in January (see WIP 19:53 for previous references). Unionists were delighted when they were acquitted (Star, 08.10.81).



Triomf Fertilisers (Chloorkop): 500 contract workers went on strike at the plant on 2 October. They were objecting to the fact that they had to contribute to the administration of a social club when they were dissatisfied with their September wages (RDM, 05.10.81).

The SA Chemical Workers' Union (SACWU) claims that company officials arrived at the hostels and forced workers on to lorries, took them to the plant, where they were forced to collect their pay. After that some were told to start working and others told to go back to the 'homelands'. Company officials denied this (RDM, 08.10.81).

Schoolboy scab labour was also used in this strike.

United Tobacco Company (Industria): 26 workers at UTC who refused to join the TUCSA-affiliated African Tobacco Workers' Union were fired on 15 October (Star, 15.10.81).

United Transport Holdings (Middelburg): A work stoppage occurred on 23 December. Workers claimed they had not been given their Christmas bonuses. The drivers stopped work when talks between their liaison committee and management reached deadlock. (No further news) (RDM, 24.12.81).

Veal Transport Company: Workers at Veal Transport struck in early December over a pay dispute. Police were called in, several drivers were allegedly assaulted, and arrests were made. Many were released, while some ten bus drivers appeared in the Vereeniging magistrate's court charged with engaging in an illegal strike and holding an illegal gathering (RDM, 09.12.81).

CCAWUSA agreed to help the workers with legal costs and bail after the Transport and Allied Workers' Union (TAWU) had refused (?).

A week later the company entered into a preliminary recognition agreement with TAWU (RDM, 10.12.81).

Viljoen's Transport (Wadeville): Workers who struck at this firm in mid October over wages were sacked. The firm had not paid leave pay for 12 years. Workers whose contracts were expiring soon were demanding payment. They returned to work after Department of Manpower officials told them that action would be taken within two weeks (RDM, 17.10.81).

EASTERN CAPE

Aberdare Cables (Port Elizabeth): Workers downed tools on 26 October. The strike occurred because a fellow worker had been dismissed (Sowetan, 29.10.81).

No further news.

African Hide and Trading (PE): The entire african labour force was dismissed after they went on strike on 2 November (Transvaler, 03.11.81).

No further news.

Appletiser (Grabouw): Workers at the factory struck on 19 October when their demands for pay increases were not met. Appletiser began negotiations with the Food and Canning Workers' Union (Sowetan, 21.10.81).

No further news.

CDA Mercedes (East London): 2 600 workers went on strike in early October. It was the third strike in less than a week. After talks with management, the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers urged workers to return. They agreed but stoppages in some departments within the plant continued.

The major complaint by the workers was the dismissal of a fellow worker. Officials of the NUMARW had talks with management, and although all the grievances had not been met by 8 October it was reported that there was a full turnout at the plant (Natal Witness, 08.10.81).

On October 23, 258 workers went on strike, but returned to work after the weekend. The strike was in support of a worker who had been dismissed. After further talks between the NUMARW and CDA it was decided that the man's work had not been satisfactory.

Dorbyl (Uitenhage): For previous coverage see WIP 19 and WIP 20:50.

Five workers were found guilty of public violence in the Uitenhage magistrate's court on 3 December. The charges related to incidents of intimidation and assault and stone throwing during the labour unrest at Dorbyl components. Three of the workers were fined R400 each along with suspended sentences, one was fined R60, and the other two were sentenced to two year's jail with one year suspended.

Dunlop Flooring (EL): In early November workers at Dunlop Flooring went on strike because they had discovered that they would not receive their pensions after the Ciskei became 'independent' (Star, 16.11.81).

The Ciskeian authorities assisted with the recruitment of replacement labour. More than 150 job seekers had been screened by the

Ciskei Central Intelligence Services and sent to Dunlop. General Sebe, head of the CCIS, said that the Ciskeian authorities had become involved because the lesson he had learned after the Wilson-Rowntree strike had sunk in. He said that many of those workers had taken jobs at Car Distributors Assembly (CDA, see above) and that management had been unaware that they had lost their previous jobs over a strike. What followed was a strike at CDA, reasoned Sebe. Industrialists began to realise the need for screening (Star, 10.11.81).

No further news.

Epul (EL): 283 workers struck, demanding that their pension contributions be paid out to them. After negotiations with the African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) the company agreed to refund the workers' contributions. However, they would have to resign and be re-employed. The workers agreed and called off the strike (RDM, 09.10.81).

Faltex Foam (PE): About 400 workers downed tools on 20 October. They were demanding their pension contributions. Management had told them that they would have to resign from their jobs before they could be paid out (RDM, 21.10.81).

They returned to work the following morning, pending talks between management and the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers' Union (MACWUSA) (Star, 21.10.81).

Hodgetts Timbers (EL): Workers at this firm went on strike over an attendance bonus on 9 November. They told management that a bonus based on punctuality and attendance was unacceptable and should rather be incorporated into the basic weekly wage. This was refused. Management reported that about 85% of the workers had been re-employed (Star, 16.10.81).

Imperial Cold Storage (Addo): At ICS 300 workers settled for an 80c an hour wage agreement. They originally asked for R1 (Star, 16.10.81).

Johnson and Johnson (EL): An alleged unfair dismissal led to a strike by about 600 workers. Management alleges that the dismissed worker stole a toilet (RDM, 17.10.81).

SAAWU officials met with management, who agreed to institute an appeal committee to investigate the case, provided the workers returned to work. Sisa Njikelana, vice president of SAAWU said that he would convey the matter to the workers, but that the union could not decide for them (Sowetan, 19.10.81).

The workers decided not to return to work until the company had reinstated the dismissed

worker. A week after the strike began management threatened to dismiss the workers if they did not return to work. Furthermore, they threatened to declare their recognition of SAAWU null and void if this did not happen.

At a mass meeting SAAWU officials recommended a return to work. The workers agreed, pending negotiations between management and the union, provided the negotiations did not last more than two days.

The strike was called off on 23 October, although negotiations were still continuing (Sunday Times, 25.10.81).

Metal Box (PE): 300 workers at Metal Box went on strike in sympathy with a dismissed fellow worker. Maxim Mxoxo was fired because he had allegedly arrived late 47 times that year (Transvaler, 19.12.81).

No further news.

Motorvia (Uitenhage): On 12 October about 100 workers went on strike over wage demands and union recognition. Workers called off the strike on 15 October.

Post Office (PE): Strikes took place at two post office branches in Port Elizabeth during October. Security police subsequently detained several workers (Star, 14.10.81).

A GPO spokesperson said that 'about half of the 180 workers who walked out last week had been replaced' (Sowetan, 15.10.81).

SA Bottling (PE): A strike by about 250 workers occurred at SA Bottling on 6 October. Workers were demanding wage increases and year-end bonuses. They also objected to coloured workers being trained to replace africans. They claimed they had not been dismissed and refused to return to work until the company met with the General Workers' union of SA (GWUSA) to discuss the strike (Evening Post, 09.10.81).

On 15 October, 18 members of GWUSA were detained in connection with the strike. Seven were workers at SA Bottling (RDM, 15.10.81).

On 19 October, 59 workers appeared in the Port Elizabeth magistrates' court. They were charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. The 59 were held in connection with two post office strikes and one at SA Bottling (Star, 20.10.81).

By December the striking workers had still not received their benefits due to them and claimed that they had been locked out when they arrived at the firm (RDM, 18.12.81).

Table Top (George): About 220 workers were dismissed and paid out after they had protested about 14 of their colleagues. They claimed that

management had broken an undertaking to re-employ these 14 workers as vacancies arose.

A settlement was reached between Table Top and the Food and Canning Workers' Union. Table Top undertook to re-engage 30 of the 220 dismissed workers before the end of the month, and the rest as vacancies arose (Star, 20.10.81).

TFM (EL): 50 workers at this firm, which 'handles motor products', stopped work 'in sympathy with seven of their colleagues who had been dismissed, reportedly for being unproductive' (Star, 08.10.81).

No further information.

Volkswagen (Uitenhage): Thousands of workers staged a boycott of the canteen at Volkswagen in Uitenhage. African and coloured workers rejected the fact that Fedics, the giant catering firm, was operating the canteen. The eight day boycott ended after management had assured workers that the canteen staff would not be laid off as a result of the presence of Fedics (Star, 22-9.09.81).

Western Province Preserving (EL): The third in a series of strikes at this firm resulted in 580 workers downing tools. The dispute arose around the payment of bonuses.

On 9 November, when the workers struck for the third time, management called in the police. Several workers were arrested for assault, and five were arrested after management had pointed them out to the police. The five were subsequently charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act.

By 17 November management had agreed to re-employ most of the workers except for 27 'troublemakers'. The issue of bonus payments would be discussed in January.

After a meeting with the company and the FCWU, management agreed that it would re-employ 11 of the 27 workers previously rejected. The future of the other 16 would be discussed at a later meeting.

No further news.

Wilson-Rowntree: See the statement by the Support Committee, above, in this issue.

WESTERN CAPE

British Petroleum (Cape Town): About 50 workers downed tools over pay demands and working conditions. The workers went back on the same afternoon - 1 December (RDM, 02.12.81).

Cape Foundries (Cape Town): At the Cape Town Murray and Roberts subsidiary, Cape Foundries, 80 workers went on strike in protest against

the dismissal of a colleague. Three days later, on 16 November, they were paid out, and a spokesperson for the company said that the strikers were no longer regarded as employees.

The dismissed worker, a General Workers' Union member, was fired for being late. Two other men, members of the recognised TUCSA-affiliated union had not been victimised.

Production at the plant was reported to have come to a standstill. Most of the workers are skilled and could not be replaced by scab labour.

Since the GWU had begun organising at the foundry, 'management had waged a complete war of attrition against the union and its members in the factory', the union claimed (Sowetan, 13.11.81).

Management refused to negotiate with the GWU until it registered in terms of existing industrial legislation (Cape Herald, 21.11.81).

MINING

ERP (Boksburg): An argument between a store owner and a mine worker occurred at ERP's Cinderella mine compound. The store owner opened fire at the miner and about 100 other miners. The crowd swelled to about 500 and the riot squad were called in. A mineworker was shot dead (RDM, 10.11.81).

ERP (Germiston): About 400 mine workers rioted over a dispute between a shop owner and one of their colleagues. Police were called in. Three people were admitted to hospital with gunshot wounds (Star, 20.11.81).

General Mining (Randfontein Mine): About 700 workers refused to come to the surface when there was a delay of about half an hour in bringing them to the surface. Sources said that the workers who had started 'rioting' were subdued by mine security men using batons. The dissatisfied workers returned to the surface after being addressed by the mine manager (RDM, 22.10.81).

NAMIBIA

Damites Copper Mine: A two day strike over pay occurred at this mine. The workers returned to work without receiving increases. They were told that they would have to lose two days leave to avoid losing bonus benefits for being absent during the strike (RDM, 16.10.81).

Policemen's strike (Kaokoland): About 90 policemen 'downed tools' (weapons) in the Kaokoland area. The head of security police in the territory said that there had been a dispute over

administrative matters (Sunday Times, 06.12.81).

According to a constable the strikers were 'koevoet' men. Koevoet is a special 'counter-insurgency' unit that operates in an unconventional manner in Ovambo and Kaokoland (RDM, 07.12.81).

All the police were dismissed, but were then reported to have returned to their duties. The head of the security police reported that the 'ringleaders' had been dismissed from the police force (RDM, 08.12.81).

STATISTICS

According to the Minister of Manpower, Fanie Botha, there had been 54 'work stoppages' in 1980 (34 in 1979), and 105 'strikes' (37 in 1979). Altogether 167 'labour disputes' were handled during 1980 by the various levels of state industrial relations machinery (75 in 1979) (Transvaler, 25.09.81).

Beeld (22.09.81) reported that there had been 130 strikes in the period January-July, 1981 (61 of these in the eastern Cape). Workdays lost totalled 118 550 (55,9% of these in the eastern Cape). Altogether 35 094 workers had been involved (12 731, or 36,3%, in the eastern Cape).

Die Transvaler (08.10.81), commenting editorially on the report of the Director of Manpower Utilisation called for a distinction to be made between 'political' and 'legitimate' aims of strikers, and called for the state to 'hit hard' at the former. This report had blamed unregistered unions for the increase in 'illegal strikes' during 1980.

Tony Davis, writing in the Star (09.10.81), isolated five contributory factors to the approximately 18 strikes involving 13 000 workers during the first week of October, last year. These were:

- proposed pension legislation;
- union recognition demands;
- worker dismissals;
- wages and working conditions;
- strikes as 'a means of affecting change'.

There were some gems in an article by the Business Editor of the Sunday Express, Tony Hudson (SE, 25.10.81):

One of the reasons unrest is so feared in Natal is that the workers are mainly Zulus - which means there is no possibility of inter-tribal friction weakening moves towards strike action.

Another varying factor (in Natal) is that many labourers work close to their kraals and can, in an extended strike, move home and live off the land.

One wonders why workers bother to work at the

wages paid by capital in South Africa when they can so easily 'live off the land'. The answer does, of course, lie in the actual conditions that exist in the bantustans, and not the imagined conditions that are thought up in the plush offices of the SAAN group's senior staff.

The National Development and Management Foundation (NDMF) calculated that there had been 119 'illegal strikes' between September, 1980, and end-August, 1981 (45 more than the previous year, according to the NDMF). The PWV area had had 56 strikes (27 of these involving 1 000 or more workers). About 78 000 workers had been involved. In 36 strikes 10 000 workers lost their jobs, while the police intervened in 20 of the strikes (Star, 09.11.81).

The NDMF said that 41 of these strikes were over wages, while 23 were solidarity strikes; 27 of the strikes lasted one day or less, 27 two days to seven days, six one week to a month. There were no strikes of more than one month in duration.

The NDMF admitted that, because their statistics were based on press reports, represented only 60% to 80% of the actual number of strikes that had taken place.

The state has issued new regulations that make it compulsory for firms to report on 'discontinuance of work' (previously an inspector of the Department of Manpower visited the firms - this 'involvement' had been objected to by employers who felt 'the disputes could best be handled between management and workers') (Daily News, 04.12.81).

Witwatersrand University researchers, Eddie Webster and Ari Sitas, found that between July and November, 1981, there had been 23 labour disputes in the metal industry on the east Rand, in which the FOSATU-affiliated Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) had been involved (10 772 workers, or about 11% of the african engineering workers in this region, had been involved). Half of these disputes involved 'worker dismissals and another six involved worker demands for the dismissal of other staff' (Star, 10.12.81). Six involved wage demands.

These researchers spoke of 'demonstration stoppages' which 'appear to be highly effective in hastening disputes towards acceptable outcomes for the unions and workers' (star, 10.12.81).

It was reported (Natal Mercury, 01.01.82) that more than 62 strikes had taken place in Natal during 1981.

TRADE UNIONS AND UNIONISTS

On Monday, 23 November, three organisers of the NUMARW/UAW, Taffy Adler, Martin Ndaba and Nelson Rekeu, were arrested by the Bophutha-

Tswana police at a union meeting in Ga-Rankuwa. The next day they appeared in court, charged with 'holding an illegal gathering' in the bantustan. The meeting had followed a strike at the BMW plant in the nearby Rosslyn industrial area. The trade unionists were released on bail of R20.

Some 15 armed BophuthaTswana police, carrying teargas cannisters, were involved in the raid on the meeting. All workers at the meeting had their names taken (RDM, 25.11.81; Star, 25.11.81).

After several appearances the case has been postponed to 5 April, 1982. Prosecutor, Shadrack More, told the court that he was not sure 'whether the law on illegal gatherings applied in BophuthaTswana' (Star, 01.12.81), while defence counsel, Martin Brassey, said that 'it would be argued that the section of the Internal Security Act at issue conflicted with the Bill of Rights in the BophuthaTswana constitution' (!) (Star, 11.01.81).

In the Ciskei bantustan region repressive action aimed at the working class continues (see, for example, WIP 20:50-1). In WIP 20 the detention of 205 trade unionists by the Ciskei security police was reported. 183 of these people were subsequently charged 'alternatively with violence, violations of the Riotous Assemblies Act and under Ciskei's Proclamation R 252' (Star, 02.10.81).

On 2 October an interim interdict was issued in the Grahamstown Supreme Court 'restraining certain Ciskeian department heads from further alleged assaults on a detained trade unionist' (Boyboy Mpulampula, a SAAWU member held under R252 at the Dimbese police station) (Star, 05.10.05.10.81).

On 14 October it was reported that 'a number of trade unionists' had been detained by the Port Elizabeth security police the day before (Star, 14.10.81). This was said to have been in connection with strikes at two PE post office branches, and the dispute at the SA Bottling Company (see above). A little more information came to light the next day: it was reported that at least 18 trade unionists (including Themba Duze, organiser for both MACWUSA and GWUSA) had been detained - Colonel Gerrit Erasmus, head of the eastern Cape security police, said that 'more would be "locked up" if they continued to "intimidate" other workers' (Sowetan, 15.10.81). Duze's detention was said to bring to six the number of MACWUSA officials held by the security police.

Die Transvaler (15.10.81) called the detentions 'arrests', and said that more could be expected.

On 16 October a further 60 workers were taken in by the security police during a meeting in a hall in Kwazakhele organised by GWUSA. These workers were all fired post office workers. The report on this incident (Die Transvaler, 17.10.81) said that 24 workers had been detained earlier in the week, and that these workers would appear in court on Monday, 19 October.

At the request of the security police a ban was placed on meetings arranged by GWUSA for the weekend of 17-18 October (Transvaler, 17.10.81).

Events in the eastern Cape took a nastier turn early in November. On Sunday, 8 November, as workers were returning from the King Williams Town funeral of the mother and uncle of SAAWU president, Thozamile Gqwetha, Ciskeian police opened fire on them at a bus terminal in Mdantsane township. A woman worker, Diliswa Roxisa, was killed - it was later reported that she was Thozamile Gqwetha's girlfriend - and several other people wounded. Gqwetha's mother and uncle had died when their hut burnt down.

A trial of 42 SAAWU members in East London was postponed to January, 1982, after a few appearances during November last year. These people have been charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act (charges relate to 'incitement to violence', 'holding an unlawful gathering', and others) (Star, 30.11.81).

On Tuesday, 8 December, both the president and the vice president of SAAWU were detained (Thozamile Gqwetha and Sisa Njikelana) by security police. On Thursday, 11 December, the SAAWU East London branch chairperson, Eric Mntonga, was detained. The General Workers' Union (GWU) subsequently said that it would boycott an investigation by the National Manpower Commission - an open letter from the GWU said:

The detentions and Security Police actions against sections of the union movement make a mockery of any attempts to reform and democratise the country's labour policies (RDM, 29.12.81).

With the November detention of SAAWU national organiser, Sam Kikine, it means that the state has wiped out most senior officials of the union.

Late in December Roger Ngomo, a GWU organiser, and another man were arrested by railway police for distributing pamphlets on a train (Star, 29.12.81).

On Friday, 27 November, after a national sloop the security police detained several other trade unionists and labour-involved people, including Merle Favis (editor of the SALB); Dr Neil Aggut (regional secretary of the FCWU, in the Transvaal); Emma Mashinini (general

secretary of the CCAWU); Sampson Ndou (president of GAWU); Dr Liz Floyd (worker with the IAS); Rita Ndzanga (organising secretary of GAWU). Earlier detentions had included Alan Fine (organiser with the Hotel, Liquor and Catering workers' organisation). Newspaper reports said that 15 unionists had been detained during the 27 November raids.

Protests have been voiced nationally and internationally, for example from: GWU; SAAWU; FOSATU; a joint statement was issued by the unions who had met in Cape Town earlier in Cape Town in 1981 (see WIP 20 for their statement), representing more than 200 000 workers; six CUSA-affiliated unions; the ILO; ICFTU; and Dr Anna Scheepers (president of TUCSA).

The SAIRR revealed that until the end of November, some 280 trade unionists had been detained by the security police during 1981.

Four post-office workers from Soweto who had been in detention since March, 1981, were released in October (see previous WIPs for brief reports).

In Cape Town the security police raided the offices of the GWU and the FCWU on 6 November.

In Melmoth, Natal, the general secretary of the NFW, Matthews Olyphant, and a union official, Vincent Mkhaya, were arrested (14 October), charged under the terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act, and released on bail of R150. No further information on this matter.

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