WORK IN PROGRESS 11

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

RECENT LABOUR ACTION

'TOTAL STRATEGY'

FEBRUARY '80

INDEX

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This issue of Work in Progress edited and published by an editorial collective, of 40 Joriasen Street, 2001 Braamfontein; and printed by Central Print Unit, of 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, 2001 Johannesburg.

Thanks to Cliff for cover, to Wits Student for illustration on page 42, and to contributors for articles.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES TO WORK IN PROGRESS - see last page in this issue

THe nature of WIP, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors.

EDITORIAL

THIS YEAR, Work In Progress hopes to introduce certain new areas of information and analysis, while at the same time continuing with the themes covered in past issues. In particular, it is the editors' intention to solicit material on repression in bantustan areas of South Africa, as well as on popular resistance to exploitation and oppression. At the same time, features such as 'labour action' and 'courts' will be continued, albeit in an altered form.

Thusfar, these two regular sections have tended to document both political trials, and strike activity. While this is important in its own right, the bulk of the material presented has precluded the detailed analysis of trends, which is so important to an understanding of South African society. WIP intends, in future issues, to attempt to analyse particular strikes, present in-depth information on trials, and undertake a general analysis of the nature and function of political trials in capitalist society. This will not involve the total dropping of the documenting role fulfilled thusfar, but will change the emphasis to an anlysis of trends, rather than the pure presentation of material. The editors will also continue collecting information on trials and strikes, both for the purposes of analysis, and to make this available to readership.

Readers are urged to contribute articles, briefing and information on areas appropriate to WIP. This applies especially to people who are living in regions on which information is generally not available, for example rural areas, smaller centres, bantustans, etc. It is extremely difficult to provide any commentary on events and trends in such regions without the active assistance of our readership.

It will be noted that, while subscription costs have remained stable for 1980, we are now attempting to recover 80c per copy of WIP from those on group distribution schemes. This reflects a rise in costs of printing and paper, and is unavoidable if WIP is to be a financially self-sufficient publication, which it has been up to now. While this increase is regretted, it should be possible to maintain the costs of WIP stable for at least the rest of 1980.

Errata: A layout gremlin crept into the production of WIP 10, for which we apologise. The last column on page 32, and the first columns of pages 33 and 34 became rather jumbled in layout, and while all necessary information exists in these columns, the order of presentation is incorrect.

As always, responses to articles, feed-back and criticism of WIP, and general contributions are valued and requested by the editorial collective. WIP is a growing, changing project, and relies on its readers' active involvement and advice to be able to respond to new and changing needs.

-THE EDITORS.

'TOTAL STRATEGY'

Total strategy is "the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure". (Defence White Paper, 1977:5).

"Total strategy should encompass the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry and organisations like Armscor, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)". (General Magnus Malan, chief of the South African Defence Force).

AT THE LEVEL of description, rather than that of explanation and analysis, "total strategy" refers to the manner in which the contemporary South African state 'functions'. More specifically, it indicates the way in which certain aspects of state activity are changing in the current period. These 'changes' within the state include a number of areas and dynamics: policies and programmes; the relationship between the various state organs and apparatuses, including the relationship between 'ideological', 'repressive' and 'economic' state organs which reproduce and maintain society; the relationships between and within classes; and the relationships between classes, class fractions and the state. Total strategy is thus the term which has gained common currency to describe the way in which certain structures and relations are being altered and reconstituted in South Africa today.

From one perspective, the total strategy initiative appears to be a deliberate plan, conceived and implemented by a certain group within the state (primarily the military), possibly in conjunction with certain other powerful interests such as organised business and commercial interests, academics and researchers, etc. In other words, the development and implementation of a total strategy in South Africa may appear to be a result of the initiatives of a highly-placed group of conspirators with access to the summits of state power. However, appearances may be deceptive, and the conspiratorial explanation of total strategy obscures the major dynamics which have given rise to the whole initiative. This is not, of course, to deny a conspiratorial and orchestrated element in the emergence and development of total strategy. But the more important aspect to note in viewing the changes associated with the total strategy programme is the fact that hitherto partially diverse and conflicting interests have begun to increasingly converge, thus giving rise to a new political-ideological dispensation within South Africa. These interests have converged, not because of any conspiracy, but because the changing position of a number of groups within society have given rise to similar sets of objective interests. It is the changing position of certain fractions of the capitalist class, of 'white' workers, and of certain sections of the dominated classes, together with certain politico-military initiatives, which have given rise to a new balance of forces within the state, and hence to changing state functions and policies.

Thus, the various elements comprising the total strategy initiative emerged relatively independently of each other, and then began converging to form a relatively coherent position. For example, the increasing militarisation of society, coupled with a growing military presence in hitherto 'non-military' areas, and the formation of the Urban Foundation in 1976, were not orchestrated; the military was inter alia responding to what it saw as a 'total onslaught' against the South African 'nation'; the Urban Foundation must be seen partially as the organised embodiment of a collective capitalist interest, aiming at stability in black working class areas. Such stability ensures the uninterrupted production and distribution of commodities which the urban rebellion of 1976 was threatening. In responding to these changing dynamics, these two 'groups' - military power and organised capitalist interests - found that their new interests were converging; a total strategy was being formed.

We must, however, be careful to avoid lumping everything said and done by the dominant classes in South Africa under the notion of 'total strategy'. If the term is to gain any use in explaining certain dynamics in South Africa, or even if it is to be rejected as being too descriptive, then it is important to specify what it refers to - and what it excludes. At the heart of this question is

the nature of 'change' taking place in South Africa today. There are those who would argue that the nature of South African society (and especially the state) is not changing in any real way. They would suggest that the only change is at the level of names, terminology and so-called 'petty apartheid'. They would correctly point to the fact that in the late 1960s and early/mid 1970s (ie before 'total strategy') 'changes' were already taking place within this arena: 'Bantu' became 'Plurals', 5-star hotels were opened to those who could afford them, park-benches and libraries were desegregated, and in 1974 then-Prime Minister Vorster asked the world to 'give South Africa 6 months to change'. The proponents of this view would accordingly argue that the changes associated with total strategy are of the same order - essentially cosmetic. Nothing is fundamentally altered; Cabinet Ministers continue using double-speak depending on which constituency they are addressing; the most expensive hotels and restaurants are opened to a tiny, wealthy black elite; and over 5 years after Vorster's call for '6 months' little alters while Piet Koornhof continues to promise anything to anyone who asks nicely enough!

There are others who argue somewhat differently. Of course, they reject the joy and almost wilful blindness of the English-language commercial press, the official white opposition party and organised capitalist interests who have welcomed the initiatives of total strategy with almost no reservations. Writing in the Sunday Times Business Times (79.11.04) under the headline "Government earns pat on the back", John Spira claims that "Government has done a good deal more than is generally realised to implement its stated policy of commitment to change....", while PFP MP Harry Schwartz has called on all South Africans to support Prime Minister Botha in his moves towards real change. Not only has that embodiment of capitalist interest, Harry Oppenheimer, supported the Botha 'constellation of states' policy, and praised his 'courage', he has also claimed that government and opposition now have unity on goals, disagreeing only on means. The Financial Mail recently named Botha 'Man of the Year' on the basis of his "driving resolve...to move away from the narrow, sectarian approach which has characterised the regimes of other National Party Prime Ministers" (Daily News 79.11.29).

Within this context it is as well to note that a large number of so-called 'opposition groups' have criticised PW Botha's administration not for <u>what</u> it is doing, but because of the slow <u>rate</u> at which it is being done. Despite the rejection of 'opposition' excitement at the changes related to total strategy, a powerful argument can be advanced that important and far-reaching changes have taken place, and are taking place in South Africa at present - that the atmosphere and ideology of 'change' which currently exists within the state and other apparatuses is not merely 'cosmetic' but has real content. If this position is accepted then it becomes important to establish what the content of these changes is, as well as the <u>reasons</u> for them: to establish what 'total strategy' and the programme associated with it is a response to.

This process of change may be referred to as <u>restructuring</u>, in that this term both avoids the euphoria with which certain fractions of the ruling classes greet the notion of in South Africa ('any change is good, progressive, exciting, etc'), while at the same time distinguishing the current processes in South Africa from the 'cosmetic' changes of a slightly earlier period.

'Total strategy' then, is a term coined by a particular group within the <u>state</u>; it refers to the manner in which the dominant and most powerful fraction of the ruling class is attempting to restructure certain fundamental relationships - between and within classes, between classes and the state, between the state and the economy, and within the state itself. Its aim, as portrayed by its formulators, is to defend 'South Africa' from outside attack (especially that of 'Marxism') and to ensure the survival of the 'free enterprise system' and 'the nation'. Its proponents argue that to ensure survival, certain changes must be made which will give all South Africans a material stake in defending society from attack. The ideological symbols which the total strategy initiative invokes revolve around notions of 'survival', 'attack', 'free enterprise','economic growth', etc. As PW Botha has it, "We must adapt or we will die" (Star 79.08.07). Magnus Malan adds that total strategy "means a national re-orientation aimed at survival while at the same time ensuring the continued advancement of the well-being of all South Africans" (RDM 79.09.20).

> "The lesson is clear. The SADF is ready to beat off any attack and although the indications point to a considerable escalation in military operations, we are strong enough to withstand the onslaught - but we must take into account the aspirations of our different population groups. We must gain and keep their trust" (Magnus Malan, RDM 79.06.13).

At one level, total strategy seems to be the response of the military to what they see as a 'total onslaught' against South Africa; this 'onslaught' is perceived to come primarily from 'external' and 'international' forces, and involves South Africa in a permanent 'total war'. As Brigadier Tony Roux, Officer Commanding the SAAF training centre, puts it: "In the face of total onslaught, South Africa must gear itself for total survival" (RDM 78.03.30). Magnus Malan spells out the implications of this more clearly:

> "There are those who see only two basic points of view: on the one side war (which is horrible), on the other peace (which is good)....I do not subscribe to such a simplistic view. There is no such thing as total peace at any given time. A mature or developed state must approach such matters from a basis of complete strategy. This entails a united and collective effort which includes diplomacy, politics, economics, industry, local authorities, the military. None can plan and go its own way independently. There must be co-ordination....(Sunday Times 77.02.13).

While it is no doubt true that one of the elements giving rise to the state's total strategy was the development and intensification of attacks (both military and other) on the South African ruling classes, this is by no means the whole picture. A complex development such as total strategy can never be explained in terms of one simple cause. Rather, total strategy is a response to a number of different, inter-related dynamics and changes, both within South Africa, and in the international context as it affects South Africa. These various dynamics and social forces, despite the differing positions they occupy in the production and reproduction of society, have given rise to a set of similar interests - and this again indicates that total strategy was not primarily developed as a ruling class conspiracy, but by the logical unfolding of conflict and development in South Africa.

I have attempted to isolate six major dynamics which have given rise to the total strategy response. There are of course other factors which are not mentioned below, and even within the areas described there are numerous trends and tendencies. Some may even by conflicting, but then South Africa is comprised of contradictory structures, activities and relations, and one of the functions of the state, and of total strategy in particular, is to manage, contain and make less explosive the contradictory aspects which form capitalist society. The emergence of total strategy was thus not 'inevitable' in any sense, but like apartheid, was one option open to the state in reproducing/maintaining a society based on contradiction and conflict. Total strategy was therefore one <u>possible</u> response to general developments and specific crises which form South African society.

1. The most general factor creating the objective conditions for the emergence of a total strategy is the change in the economic structure of South Africa over the past decade and a half. Precisely because this is a general <u>structural</u> alteration, it sets the context within which total strategy has emerged, rather than given rise to that strategy itself. The changing nature of the economic structure demanded a certain restructuring of politics and ideology. Total strategy was one possible response, but not the only option available to ruling class interests represented by the state. Other factors, some of which are considered below, determined that total strategy was the option pursued in a changing situation.

The most fundamental change to be noted in the South African economy is that <u>monopoly capital</u> has become dominant in all sectors and departments of production. Monopoly capitalism as a phase in capitalist development is here distinguished from <u>competitive</u> capital. Not that competitive capital disappears altogether: it remains as a factor in certain sectors in total capitalist production and distribution, but is increasingly subordinated and taken over by monopoly capital. These two forms of the capitalist way of producing and distributing commodities (monopoly vs competitive) give rise to differing social dynamics and conflicts, and demand different <u>conditions of existence</u> (ie the political and ideological ways in which capitalism is reproduced and maintained in society).

The dominance of monopoly capitalism within the South African economy has involved a number of related factors. Firstly, a great deal of <u>concentration</u> and <u>centralisation</u> of capital (and hence productive units) has occured: this means that certain industrial and commercial interests have both grown <u>within</u> their own field of activity (taking

over smaller enterprises), and diversified into other areas. For example, Anglo-American has both grown in terms of its mining interests, and has extensive investment in iron, steel alloy, chemicals and explosives, civil engineering and construction, drilling tools, textiles, computers and rail locomotives. (On this point see G. Maré: Relocation and Riekert - attempts at urban and rural stabilization. South African Labour Bulletin, 5(4), November 1979:37 and 46n).

As this concentration and centralisation process develops, competition between capitalists becomes increasingly less important as the smaller and weaker productive enterprises are absorbed and taken over by the larger and stronger. The result of this process, together with the interpenetration of 'local' and 'foreign', 'English' and 'Afrikaans' capital, means that a dominant capitalist interest is formed, being that of monopoly capital. Many of the historical explanations of the nature of the state in South African society have revolved around the conflicts between 'fractions' of capital, and their relation to the state: mining vs agriculture vs manufacture; English vs Afrikaans capital; national vs foreign capital. It has been suggested that one major dynamic in South African history has involved the attempts of various fractions of capital to obtain dominance (hegemony) within the state, thereby having their interests represented more strongly than those of other class fractions.

Whatever the validity of these earlier explanations, it is clear that the concentration, centralisation and interpenetration of the various capitals have now formed a dominant monopoly interest. This holds true for all the major sectors of production: mining, secondary industry, agriculture, 'services' and the distributive sector. It is, however, less the fact of monopoly dominance than its effects which are of concern here. Two such effects need to be briefly referred to:

a). While historically capitalist production in South Africa has relied heavily on a mass of 'cheap', 'unskilled' labour, the emergence of a dominant monopoly sector changes this somewhat. Monopoly capitalist production relies to a large degree on the use of capital-intensive, sophisticated technology, the operation of which demands a small semi-skilled stable work-force, rather than a large, cheap migrant labour force. The use of ever-more sophisticated and complex technology is basic to the productive needs of monopoly capitalist production, particularly when it is tied into a world capitalist system of production, as South Africa is.

The importance of this, for our purposes here, is that the dominant level of the economy in South Africa (monopoly) requires semi-skilled operatives, rather than cheap unskilled migrant labour. To an extent, this is not true for the mining industry, which continues to rely heavily on migrant labour. However, there are indications that even this sector of production requires a different type of labour force.

This need for a changing labour force, particularly in terms of skills and stability, places certain demands on the state, which is partially responsible for the training, creation and management of the labour force.

b). Related to the above is the question of the rate of unemployment and underemployment in South Africa. There is a natural tendency of capitalist development, which grows with monopoly dominance: this is the replacement of workers with machinery. In the interests of growing productivity (and hence growing profits), capital introduces, on an ever-expanding scale, sophisticated technology into the production process. This technology reduces the number of workers needed to operate it, as well as introducing the need for semi-skilled operatives rather than unskilled workers. While this is put rather simplistically, it is nonetheless the basis of South Africa's growing 'unemployment problem'. Unemployment is not new in the development of South African capitalism: as early as 1960 there were 1,24million unemployed (including the under-employed brought to a single unit), and unemployment continued as a major factor even during the 'economic boom' of the 1960s. By 1977, Charles Simpkins estimated that unemployment stood at 2,3million and was still growing. He calculated that if the rate of unemployment was to be stabilised (ie if the growth in unemployment was to rise at a constant, rather than an increasing, rate), the economy needed to grow at 5,3% per annum; if the number was to be stabilised (ie remain at 2,3million), the economy had to grow at 6,7% per annum.

Not even the lower of the growth rates (5,3%) has been reached in the past two years. What this indicates is that South Africa has

a permanent, structural unemployment 'problem' of enormous and ever-growing proportions, and that this 'problem' can never be 'solved' within the confines of a monopoly capitalist economy. Accordingly, ways of controlling and managing the unemployed has become a question of major importance for the state. A massive rate of unemployment threatens socio-political stability on a serious level, and total strategy must be partially seen as a response to this factor.

In summary, then, the dominance of monopoly capital in all sectors of the South African economy has both created the need for a new form of exploitable labour (semi-skilled, urbanised, stable) while at the same time creating a massive unemployment problem which threatens the stability necessary for capitalist production and reproduction. The new imperatives of monopoly capital, as well as the need to manage the crises, conflicts and contradictions it gives rise to, thus set the background to, and economic basis for, the emergence of the total strategy initiative.

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2. Based on the changes in the economic structure briefly noted above (ie the restructuring of capital) is a change in the nature of dominant class formation, and the relationship between the dominant classes and the state. The National Party took power in 1948 on the basis of a class alliance - farmers, white workers, and an Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie seeking to transform itself into a fully developed capitalist class. Through the use of state power, and a specific sort of state intervention in the economy, Afrikaner capitalism was developed and expanded in the form of both a state capitalist sector, as well as a private Afrikaner capitalist sector (including agriculture).

The coming of age of Afrikaner capital in the late 1960s and early 1970s logically involved the unification of 'English', 'Afrikaans' and 'foreign' monopoly capitalist interests, and the result of this process is currently leading to a reconstitution of the basis of National Party and state power. The white working class is increasingly being dropped from its position as junior partner in the class alliance which holds state power; having lost its importance economically (skilled, expensive labour being replaced by predominantly black semi-skilled labour), white workers are in the process of losing their direct access to state power; white workers, where they still exist as a force (eg mines, building) are being marginalised (see for example the recent white mineworkers strike, and the response of both the state and capital, both of which showed scant regard for white working class interests; note also the hostile response of the Confederation of Labour, representing white worker interests, to the proposals of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions). This decline in the power of the white working class is reflected in its absolute decline in numbers (although the power of a class is not judged only on the size of its membership): for example, in 1976 27 000 new white workers entered the labour market as job seekers; by 1979 this figure had dropped to 11 000.

In much the same way, small, non-productive, under-capitalised farmers (ie non-monopoly agricultural production), as well as the traditional petty bourgeoisie (small traders and the like) are also being dropped from the alliance which holds state power, as both the National Party and the state are reconstituted on the basis of bourgeois power. (To some extent, the right wing of the National Party, Connie Mulder's party and the HNP can be seen as fighting this trend, in that they embody white worker, small farmer and traditional petty bourgeois interests. The process of reconstituting the basis of party and state power is being resisted both within and without the state apparatuses; part of the 'total strategy' programme involves an attempt to undermine this group's access to state power through the civil service, white trade unions, lower levels of the Broederbond, etc).

The total strategy initiative relates to the changing basis of the National Party (from a 'populist' to a bourgeois party), as well as to the emergence of monopoly capitalist interests as dominant within the state. Total strategy is both a response to these changes, as well as a factor in hastening and consolidating a new form of state power.

3. Thirdly, total strategy is a response to the renewed initiatives of the dominated classes. The 1976/77 urban and rural rebellions, and the resultant increase in the number of ANC and (to a lesser extent) PAC recruits, have culminated in an intensification of

political and military conflict within South Africa. Engagements between SAP/SADF and guerilla forces, sabotage attacks, bombings, attacks on police stations and symbolic institutions have all increased dramatically since the outbreak of the rebellion in June 1976.

Quite explicitly, total strategy is partially a response of the state to the initiatives and activities of the dominated classes; the military has argued that it is necessary to expand the base of people prepared to 'defend South Africa against attack', and that this involves giving them a 'stake in the existing system'.

Magnus Malan has stated that all South Africans must be offered a 'secure and prosperous future' if the country is to withstand a revolutionary initiative. He claims that the most powerful weapon of South Africa's 'enemies' is the psychological campaign aimed at turning black opinion against the country's 'leaders'. The military struggle is important, but when the battle for the soul of the population is lost, everything is lost.

> "Bullets kill bodies, not beliefs. I would like to remind you that the Portuguese did not lose the military battle in Angola and Mocambique, but they lost the faith and trust of the inhabitants of those countries. The insurgent forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population". (Speech to the Institute of Town Clerks, Pretoria. Daily News 79.06.13).

Clearly, then, total strategy involves an attempt to win over (co-opt) the 'hearts and minds' of certain predominantly black strata of society, hithero totally excluded from any of the trimmings of power and material benefits accruing to the ruling classes. This attempt involves the perceived need to defuse areas in which 'grievances', oppression and exploitation render the dominated classes likely to support militant and/or revolutionary activity.

4. The 'total strategy' state restructuring picture cannot be fully understood without reference to the changing nature of class formation amongst the dominated classes of society. An explicitly black capitalist class is emerging, gathered around groups like NAFCOC, Black Bank and other similar institutions. Although this group is very limited in terms of size, access to capital, employment of labour, etc., total strategy aims to encourage and develop the emergence of this class fraction in its attempts to create a strata of blacks who will have an interest in the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist relations in South Africa. It should be noted that there are two aspects to this process: the one involves the formation of a 'black' fraction of the capitalist class, setting up its own productive enterprises, mobilising capital, etc. This group has a rather small area in which to operate, given the dominance of already-existing production and distribution in South Africa. However, its attempts to create a base for its existance as a capitalist class fraction may lead it towards the Bantustans as areas for productive investment. The other prong of the process involves the incorporation of blacks into already-existing capitalist structures as managers, supervisors, directors, etc. Because this does not conflict with established capitalism, this seems to be the strategy more vigorously pursued than that of creating a relatively independent black capitalist fraction.

In addition to this, the dominance of monopoly capitalist production provides the material conditions for the emergence of a relatively privileged, stable urban working class at the expense of the unemployed, subsistence producers in Bantustans, migrant and contract workers, the permanently marginalised, etc. As Gerry Maré has argued, if one prong of capital/state policy

> "is the establishment of a stable, urban-based labour force, then the other prong is the continuation of relocation and control of those excluded as migrants and unemployed within the reserves. The insiders are supposedly to benefit from the 99-year lease scheme, a measure of local autonomy, possibly improved facilities (sporting, electrification, higher salaries etc), and other favours. For the 'outsiders' there are none of these 'benefits', but greater control over migrancy....and the unemployed or future unemployed, largely located in the 'homelands'. (South African Labour Bulletin, 5(4) November 1979:40).

As with the case of the black capitalist class, total strategy aims to encourage and develop the emergence of this fraction of the working class in its attempt to create a so-called 'middle class/labour aristocracy' as a buffer group against the aspirations and initiatives of the majority of oppressed and exploited workers (employed and unemployed), and rural subsistence dwellers.

Total strategy thus involves both a

response to, and development of, changing class formation amongst groups who are 'black', especially with regard to aspirant and actual black capitalists, urban workers with Section 10(1) (a) and (b) rights, unemployed workers, migrant and contract workers, the permanently marginalised, and those banished or contained within the Bantustans.

5. The final two dynamics isolated are somewhat less important in the development of a total strategy. The first of these relates to various Western and North American initiatives in an attempt to 'stabilise' both South and Southern Africa, and secure the region for the continued operation of large multi-national corporations and 'foreign' capital. Concerned with general social instability, strikes, riots and rebellions in South Africa - all of which threaten the continuity of production so important in the current phase of imperialism- the major imperialist powers have adopted a policy of pressure and intervention in an attempt to 'modernise' the processes of production and reproduction in South Africa. The implementation of 'codes of conduct' for foreign companies operating in South Africa, the threat of selective sanctions and the like are all pressures on the South African state and capital which have added impetus to the restructuring associated with total strategy.

6. Finally, a changed balance of forces within Southern Africa, with an independent Mocambique and Angola, the Patriotic Front winning the war (if not the negotiations) in Zimbabwe, and the strong SWAPO presence in Namibia have rendered the South African ruling classes somewhat more vulnerable than they were in the heyday of Portuguese colonialism and Rhodesian UDI. These factors have also played their role in the various responses developed by capital and the state in an attempt to defuse and manage a crisis-ridden and structurally altered society.

> "Total strategy implies a total concept at all levels of planning and execution". (Magnus Malan, Sunday Times 77.03.13).

Chronologically, if not conceptually, the development of 'total strategy' shows three distinct but inter-related phases. Initially a para-military notion formulated by the leadership of the SADF, its strongest component related to a 'total war' scenario. PW Botha's generals argued that South Africa faced a 'total onslaught' by forces attempting to overthrow the established order. This 'total onslaught' was not exclusively military, but incorporated a number of operating factors such as the political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, ideological, cultural, semantic as well as military. According to Magnus Malan, the only possible response to a 'total war onslaught' which ensures survival is the adoption of a 'total war' strategy by the state. This implies that every activity of the state must be seen and understood as a function of total war. As PW Botha wrote in the 1977 White Paper on Defence,

> "The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action.....The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural etc.....(W)e are today involved in a war....The striving for specific aims....must be co-ordinated with all the means available to the state."

At the time of the formulation of the total war scenario, the frontal attack on the South African state was escalating. The 1976-77 rebellion was still in full swing, and military and para-military activity by the dominant classes was growing. This environment gave a certain military and 'war' emphasis to the initial formulation of total strategy. The response within the state was by no means uniform. Conflicts between the military and other state apparatuses favoured by the then dominant Vorster group appear to have occured, and certain National Party-supporting newspapers warned against aspects of the total strategy programme, claiming that it opened 'the way for a dictatorship, was anti-democratic, etc.

However, the military gained an enormous advantage over other tendencies within the state when the PW Botha group took over the summits of state power, displacing the Vorster-BOSS-information department ascendency. With the discrediting, and ultimate removal of both Vorster and Connie Mulder, and the related decline in the state influence of BOSS, a vacuum in state power and state strategy was opened up, which the military-led initiative was able to move into. This, then, is the second phase in the growth of total strategy - the take over of the summits of state power by its adherents, and the

subsequent alteration in the balance of forces within the state apparatuses.

The ability of the 'total strategy' group to begin influencing state power and operation at all levels, rather than just within the SADF, allowed for the beginnings of the third phase of total strategy development - the explicit incorporation of the so-called *'private sector', under the leadership of* monopoly capital, into the total strategy approach.

Implicitly, total strategy incorporated a monopoly capitalist/economic growth initiative from the beginnings of its formulation. Its proponents argued that 'blacks' had to be incorporated into a system of 'free enterprise', whereby they would begin receiving the 'benefits' of that system, and hence become committed to the defence of South Africa. The pre-conditions for an explicit 'alliance' between monopoly capitalism and the state under the umbrella of total strategy were there from early on, but as long as the Vorster group held the reins of government, this was difficult to develop. Vorster responded with great hostility to Andries Wassenaar's book which criticised the relationship between state and economy, and shortly afterwards warned businessmen to 'keep out of politics'. The military, on the other hand, had developed close contacts with monopoly capital, inter alia in the field of arms and munitions manufacture, an area which became crucial with the operation of an arms embargo against the South African state. Thus, while the military wing of the state continued its attempts to forge alliances with the representatives of monopoly, this process could not be extended in the other state apparatuses.

This limiting factor was removed with the establishment of a ruling military presence within the state. As early as December 1977 a conference was organised by the National Management and Development Foundation (NDMF) to which business leaders, key members of *SADF, and representatives of the then* Department of Labour were invited. The intention of the conference was to enable the three groups involved to understand each other's needs. Held at the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), all delegates present were made to sign an undertaking in terms of the Official Secrets Act, forbidding them to disclose certain details of conference sessions which were held in camera. The conference was opened by Magnus Malan, and symbolically was jointly chaired by Ian MacKenzie, chairman of Standard Bank, and Major-General Neil Webster, Defence Director of General Resources.

The incorporation of the representatives of monopoly capital into total strategy developed, and within a short period the ideological symbols of total strategy and general state terminology came to include 'economic growth', 'quality of life', and most importantly, a commitment to the 'free enterprise system'.

As Col de Ridder argued,

+a strong SADF is a guarantee for sound economic development in South Africa;
+a sound economy with a well-developed infrastructure guarentees a strong SADF.

> "The shifting of a significantly larger proportion of the country's resources into defence may not be particularly good for the growth of private consumption in the short term. Heavy spending on defence is rarely popular with the public, even in wartime.....This, however, can be regarded as an insurance policy for long-term benefits such as security, higher standards of living and <u>above all</u>, a guarantee for the system of <u>free enterprise</u>" (Paratus, July 1979:36-37, emphasis added).

No longer was government warning business to 'keep out of politics': the new matter on the agenda involved the <u>nature</u> of co-operation between the state and the 'private sector' (monopoly capital). Dr Schalk van der Merwe, Minister of Industries, Commerce and Consumer Affairs recently spelt out the way he saw the relationship between the government and the 'private sector'. This involved:

+consultation and co-operation in achieving common national objectives;
+limiting state involvement in economic activities to a level more reconcilable with a 'free enterprise economy';
+greater 'private sector' responsibility in shaping, adapting and maintaining the socio-economic environment. (NDMF conference, RDM 79.10.04).

The chronological development of total strategy clearly shows the manner in which it was initially formulated as a para-military notion (total war); how this notion was extended to all state apparatuses with the *emergence of a military dominance* within the state; and the logical extention of total strategy aimed at incorporating a more than eager monopoly capitalist interest. These related processes have both reflected, and hastened, the restructuring of relations

between and within state apparatuses, and between state and capital.

A number of state and para-statal bodies have clearly been granted an increasing importance in order to be able to implement aspects of state restructuring. Four of these are worth giving special mention to, although there are other important state apparatuses involved in developing areas of 'total strategy' operation, eg the Departments of Co-operation and Development, and Manpower.

a). The most obvious state apparatus which holds pride of place in the total strategy programme is the SADF. Sufficient examples have already been given of the role of the military in the formulation of the plan, its implementation, the special position of the military in the state, its early an explicit attempts at forming an alliance with monopoly capital, etc. It should also be noted that in much the same way as the old Bureau of State Security (BOSS) held a unique position in the Vorster government, so the military and Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) now play a similar role vis-a-vis the Botha administration; the once omnipresent Hendrik van den Bergh has now been replaced by the military leader, Magnus Malan; the Prime Minister himself continues to hold the Defence portfolio; and while it is not clear whether the appointment of an obscure 31 year-old OFS academic to head DONS (previously BOSS, and just renamed National Intelligence Service) involves a lessening of that department's influence, it certainly does imply a greater 'military presence' within DONS/NIS (Niel Barnard is in many ways a military academic as both his published writings and linkage to Free State Command suggest. He was apparently personally chosen by PW Botha to head DONS).

b). The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) also appears to hold an important position within the 'total national strategy'. Specifically singled out by Magnus Malan (together with Armscor and CSIR) as an organisation which should be encompassed by total strategy (Sunday Tribune 77.09.11), it was also represented at the 1977 National Management and Development Foundation conference attended by the SADF, business and Labour Department (see above). There a Mr SS Terblanche of HSRC was reported to have looked at military requirements against an analysis of manpower trends in South Africa (Star 77.11.25).

During 1978 the HSRC convened a conference of the major literacy organisations operating in South Africa, and at this meeting held at RAU, the basis for co-ordination of literacy work in terms of a 'national plan' was laid. Since then, HSRC has attempted to monitor the work done by various literacy groups, no doubt in order to be able to determine and implement 'national priorities' for literacy and adult education in South Africa.

More recently (April 1979) the Cabinet took a resolution empowering the HSRC to formulate a 'National Plan for Research in the Human Sciences' (NPRHS), which is clearly and explicitly an attempt to incorporate the field of post-graduate research into the area of total strategy.

c). At present, the South African state involves one of the most complex administrative systems in the worlds. It incorporates 2 000 statutory bodies, and employs 40% of the white male population (Star 79.07.11). Over the past few years, the absolute numbers employed by the state have continually increased, rising from 295 483 in 1976 to 310 539 in 1977 (ROM 78.03.30). It was in this context that the Cabinet announced its intention to streamline public administration, drastically cut down on the number of state departments (from 40 to 18) and centralise and rationalise the state bureaucracy.

This in itself was not a surprising move, given the unwieldy and often contradictory operation of the various state apparatuses. What is of interest is the manner in which this streamlining of state administration will allow a far greater centralisation of state power, as well as enabling the placement of 'total strategy' proponents and supporters in a number of strategic areas currently dominated by other interests.

A number of state departments, as well as some of the numerous statutory bodies existing within the overall state apparatus embody and represent the interests of those classes or class fractions which are loosing their privileged position within the state, ie white workers, small farmers, competitive capital, etc. Part of the restructuring of state power (total strategy) involves the undermining and removal of these interests from their dominance within certain apparatuses.

The specific body chosen to implement this particular aspect of state restructuring is the Public Service Commission under the chairmanship of Dr PS Reutenbach. The potential

power to restructure the form of state which this body has been allocated is indicated by its area for investigation - all state departments, 1 000 agencies and commissions, 1 950 laws and 16 000 proclamations are to be examined by Dr Rautenbach's 21-man commission.

Of note is the fact that the Public Service Commission recently agreed to incorporate senior representatives of monopoly capital in its general deliberations. Dick Goss, chairman of South African Breweries, Jan van der Horst, chair of SA Mutual, and Wim de Villiers, chair of General Mining are three of the monopoly representatives involved in this. While this is portrayed as a technical decision (ie to improve efficiency, increase co-ordination between 'private' and 'public' sector activity), the decision carries with it very specific social connotations, ie the growing representation of monopoly capital at the core of state power.

The recently announced 'streamlining' of state departments, whereby Government Departments were reduced from 39 to 22, is the first manifestation of the Public Service Commission's investigations.

d). At the very centre of the new form of state power emerging around the total strategy initiative is the National Security Council (NSC). In the 1977 Defence White Paper, it was stated that this body was formed to co-ordinate action-planning on a unified basis. Inter alia, it functions to

> "advise the government regarding the formulation of national policy and strategy in connection with the security of the Republic, the manner in which this policy or strategy must be carried out, and a policy to combat any particular threat against the security of the Republic.....
> The aspects of national security which require attention....are the following:
> -Political action
> -Military/para-military action
> -Economic action
> -Psychological action
> -Scientific and technological action
> -Religious-cultural action
> -Manpower services
> -Intelligence services
> -Security services
> -National supplies, resources and production services
> -Transport and distribution services
> -Financial services
> -Community services
> -Tele-communication services" (1977:5).

The NSC, as can be gauged from the all-*inclusive list of its areas of interest*, stands at the centre of state power. The Cabinet has 4 actual committees, (Internal Affairs, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Financial Affairs), as well as the NSC which operates both as a Cabinet committee and a security council. The current composition of the NSC is revealing: the political leaders of 'total strategy' (Fanie Botha, PW Botha, Pik Botha, Alwyn Schlebusch, Louis le Grange, Piet Koornhof and Chris Heunis); the head of DONS, the chief of the SDAF, the secretary for foreign affairs, secretary for justice, commissioner of police, as well as the chairmen of each of the other Cabinet committees.

General AJ van Deventer is secretary to the NSC, chairman of the NSC's working group, and serves on all other Cabinet Committee working groups. A similar person holding a position of centrality is the secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister, JE du Plessis, who is a member of the State Security Council, Secretary to the Cabinet, and on all the working groups of the Cabinet Committees.

A highly-centralised power group has thus been formed within the 'executive' wing of the state, wielding enormous power to restructure and direct events and dynamics. The NSC, originally dominated by the BOSS perspective, has gradually been influenced by the military/total strategy initiative, as is indicated by its personnel.

The operations and influence of this power-clique are shrouded in semi-secrecy, and details are obscure: what is clear is that the formulation, implementation and *administration of a total strategy is largely* located within this nexus of power.

In the interests of brevity, detailed information on the manifestations of 'total strategy'/state restructuring will be excluded from this article. However, a tentative and incomplete list of important areas of restructuring is detailed below. While it is not suggested that every one of these areas can be directly attributed to a 'total strategy' initiative, they do all indicate something about state restructuring, the attempt to reconstitute the basis of the National Party and the state, changing class relations, etc.

a). the reports of, and legislation flowing from, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions are quite crucial in the attempts to encourage a black 'middle class', privileged sectors of urban workers, control of the unemployed and marginalised, and control of working class

organisations like trade unions;
b). the active involvement of the SADF in development, community and educational programmes etc., with the intention of 'winning the hearts and minds of the people'. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas.
c). 'quality of life in black urban areas/ Urban Foundation/housing schemes'and the activities around these areas play an important role in widening the urban/rural distinction, creating privilige for a small strata of workers, etc. See, for example, Louis Rive's Greater Soweto Committee;
d). the constellation of states policy;
e). the van der Walt Commission currently looking at the question of Bantustan borders and land consolidation;
f). The Rabie Commission looking at the form security legislation should take;
g). The Schlebusch Commission looking at questions of new constitutional proposals;
h). The Steyn Commission on Defence, Police and security reporting.
Also important to note and probe is the manner in which a 'free enterprise' ideology is mobilised within total strategy, and the various responses of opposition groups and organisations to total strategy initiatives. In the changed and changing circumstances of contemporary South Africa, previously progressive organisations and activities run this risk of being co-opted in total strategy, either consciously or unconsciously, unless programmes, policies and activities are assessed in a new light.

Finally, it is also important to begin developing a fuller critique of the total strategy initiative. Obviously, it is profoundly anti-democratic, tends to centralise power to an even greater extent than before, and is representative of narrow sectional interests (despite the fact that it portrays itself as being in a general national interest). Equally obviously, it is an attempt to manage and contain conflict, rather than resolving it at its roots. But a fuller assesement of 'total strategy' remains to be made - the way in which it is reconstituting certain relations in South Africa, and what this means for constructive and progressive activity in a changing context.

Glenn Moss.

LABOUR ACTION

FORD REMEMBERS THE DAYS

THE eastern Cape has become the centre of generalised labour dissatisfaction and action. As it has so often been during the stormy history of conquest and domination in South Africa, national and international attention is once more focussed on this area.

Some commentators have suggested that while the Durban strikes of 1973 set the pattern for the 1970s, the strikes in the eastern Cape have set the scene for the 1980s. However, a more useful comparison might be with the earlier strikes of the 70s, namely those in **Namibia** during 1971-2.

The Namibian strike was directly related to an issue that could not strictly be called a 'point of production' issue, but rather related to the worker in society, subject to a number of restrictions - not all of these directly economic, but all essential

to the maintenance of certain economic relations of exploitation.

The strike in Namibia was triggered off by the 'Boer' de Wet's suggestion that contract labour was not slave labour (Jannie de Wet was at the time Commissioner for the Native People of SWA. At present he is more in the news in connection with illegal hunting activities, or reports thereof, than with labour action).

The Ford strike has, similarly, been called a political strike, as many of the issues are not wage issues, and/or a community based group has become involved in the action taken by the Ford workers. While rejecting the narrowness of such a definition of what constitutes 'point of production' issues (and the implications of such a definition for working class strategy), this does not mean that one cannot examine the unique elements and direction of the action taken by the workers at Ford. This case raises many points and problems that face the working class and other dominated classes in South Africa.

The Namibian and eastern Cape strikes have another point in common, viz that they lasted for longer than most strike action by workers in southern Africa. In Namibia workers were out for several weeks, and had in fact returned to their homes in Ovambo. Ford's latest problem started at the end of October and have still not been completely resolved. Without wishing to force similarities we can say that both became community issues in a way that the Durban strikes never did. In Durban in 1973 the workers struck in the main over wage issues, the strikers stayed outside the factories, and the average duration was only a few days - a strike in the textile industry of 7 days deserved special mention as an exceptionally long strike in the survey of the strikes by the IIE. In fact, the Durban strikers did not heed a call to boycott public transport, in order to get to the factories and continue the strikes.

In Namibia the workers returned to their homes in rural Ovambo and did, therefore, have access to some agricultural production. In both the Fatti's and Moni's strike and the Ford action, the workers' demands and organisation and appeals for solidarity were taken into the community - in the former case by the union involved and by the various support groups, and in the latter because the organisation representing the workers (PEBCO) is a community organisation, having its roots in residents' concerns rather than those of the workplace (although this would appear to be an artificial distinction in the eyes of most of the participants).

What I have done in this issue of Work in Progress is to provide a brief chronology of the main events during the strikes. What is now necessary is for someone to write an article to evaluate the many issues raised by the events in the eastern Cape, and to answer some of the questions that those events pose for working class organisation and activity during the 1980s in the South African social formation.

Some of these issues have already been mentioned and discussed in previous issues of Work in Progress, and others are unique to the eastern Cape events:

- the most obvious dynamic within the working class as manifested in the Ford issue, was the tension between the UAW (the non-registered, although management recognised trade union) and the NUMARW (registered union) on the one hand, and the various residents' groups under PEBCO, on the other. Only the right-wing 'labour' reporter of the Star, of all commentators, had unqualified praise for the role of the union. The tension between these organisations raises the problem of the relationship between community and workplace matters. Seeing it as a problem is not to deny the primary importance of production related issues, nor is it an acceptance that working class issues are point of production issues and that all else is 'politics';
- the previous function of the union and the liaison committee through which the union said that it had functioned, needs to be examined. Few unions are willing to be associated with even the slightly preferable works committees under the legislated industrial relations system in South Africa. Why did this union then work through the liaison committee, leading to an admitted breakdown of communication with workers?;
- were other divisions within the working class exploited by management (as they obviously did with the community-union split). Here the ones that come to mind immediately are those between the employed and the unemployed (workers lined up outside the factory to take the jobs of the strikers), and between the 'racial groups' within the working class (it was said that very few of the people willing to take the jobs of the strikers were africans);

- a point that stands out after a preliminary reading of reports on strikes during the past year is that workers are still willing to strike and to lose jobs over wage issues, despite the fact that unemployment stands at millions. Also that workers succeed in these demands in some cases, and lose out hopelessly in others. A systematic analysis of the various instances would probably show that these strikes and their success or lack of success relates to several fators, such as the location of the reserve army of labour (in many cases located in the bantustans, away from the points of production); the selective nature of the function of the industrial reserve army (a factory cannot replace skilled workers with unskilled workers); solidarity on the basis of class or community with the workers who are on strike and a consequent unwillingness to take the jobs of those who are on strike;
- ideological class struggle has not been analysed satisfactorily at all. There is no theory of such struggle that has been applied to an analysis of the relationship between black consciousness and elements of a working class structured ideology. Such analysis is of crucial importance to the point mentioned above, viz that of the conflict, at this time, between trade unions and community organisations;
- the strike at Ford has once more underlined the inadequacy of the so-called Codes of Conduct (see box), but also the rejection by the working class of this attempt to contain struggle within the limits as defined by international capital;
- the strategies followed by Ford and by the other firms during the spate of strikes in Port Elizabeth needs to be examined very carefully. How did they play groups off against each other? Why were the workers working overtime while the factories were operating on a four day week? What was the nature of cooperation between Ford (and the other firms) and the state (especially the police)? How was the international dimension of the conflict utilised by Ford with the help of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha?; etc.

These are a few of the questions that need to be answered and discussed.

Pebco

ON the 23rd September, 1979, a Soweto Civic Association was formed during a conference called by the Committee of Ten (on the latter see WIP 10). The Committee of Ten would form the SCA's interim executive until elections are held, and 33 branches were envisaged throughout Soweto. Many branches have since been formed on the Reef.

It was intended that the SCA would take up local community issues. Since then the SCA and branches have responded and taken the lead in such matters as the recent bus disaster, bus fare increases, rent increases and the boycott of proposed community council elections.

Less than a month after the formation of the SCA, in mid-October, a similar organisation was formed in Port Elizabeth - the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association (soon to be changed to Organisation) - PEBCO. At the formation meeting strong opposition was expressed to community councils, as they were said to represent attempts to link africans in urban areas to the 'homelands' system, while the position of PEBCO was that '(w)e are bona fide residents of South Africa and we are prepared to die in South Africa'.

Other issues that were to be taken up by PEBCO would be rent, bus fare or service charge increases, and ownership of houses - the last mentioned issue being the one receiving most publicity in the report on the formation of PEBCO (Ian Sogoni, steering committee member along with 'professional and businessmen drawn from all the townships', called for 'freehold land tenure and proper title deeds').

At this meeting, called by the Zwide and Kwaford Residents' Associations, Thozamile Botha was elected chairperson. Botha had been a student at Fort Hare until the unrest there in 1977 brought an end to his university career after two years. He then taught at Kwazakhele High School. While a teacher he formed the Association for Science and Technology to raise money for laboratories in the townships.

When more than 400 pupils were arrested during the unrest in the eastern Cape in the wake of the Soweto revolt of 1976, Botha started a fundraising campaign for their defence. He was then detained with others and finally charged with 'incitement' because of remarks said to have been made at a fund raising concert. Five of the six state witnesses were subsequently charged with perjury - all said that they had been forced

Pebco should stick to grass roots demands

LTR — Mr Thozamile Botha's Pebco is a progressive organisation, building up a grass roots mass membership.

But it worries me that Pebco is demanding the right for blacks [illegible] land. This demand is not a grass roots demand. It is a right that will only benefit those wealthy enough to buy property — the small black middle class.

If Pebco wants to cater for the masses on the breadline, it must fight for cheaper rent and transport, and a cost of living allowance against inflation.

These things are real to us.

GRASSROOTS
Ndantsane

to make statements against their will after police interrogation. One of these people died in police custody.

Botha was acquited.

As chairperson of the Zwide Residents' Association he led a delegation to the administration board for Port Elizabeth (ECAB) to protest against electrical sub-stations that were being built in the very small space between the township houses.

It was at a report-back meeting, empty-handed, that it was suggested that an umbrella organisation be formed in Port Elizabeth and for the eastern Cape. This organisation is PEBCO.

Botha had in the meantime been employed by the Ford Motor Company, the multinational that so much dominates, through its employment and proximity, the townships.

From the start PEBCO (with branches in Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, and Uitenhage by early November, 1979) was subject to police attention and alleged employer victimisation. A filing clerk with Barclays Bank who was also general secretary of the Zwide Residents' Association, D May, was dismissed from his job in October. Botha was given an ultimatum by Ford (see below) to choose between his job and his involvement in the civic association. Botha, May and Barney Paulos (of the Kwanobuhle Residents' Association) had all been taken in for questioning by the police.

By mid-November PEBCO was calling meetings that were attended by up to 10 000 people in Port Elizabeth, while several thousand would come to rallies in Uitenhage. Botha was planning to extend to most of the eastern Cape. He was calling for full citizenship rights for all africans within South Africa, while saying that Nelson Mandela and his colleagues on Robben Island 'were the right leaders to negotiate for the black man's freedom'.

Dr Motlana of the SCA visited PE in November and formal links were established between the SCA and PEBCO, although Botha admits (in the interview published in this issue of WIP) that there are minor differences between the two organisations. The Walmer branch of PEBCO vowed to fight the proposed state removals of people from this area to Zwide (Botha was detained in January at a meeting in Walmer to discuss protest strategy against the removals). PEBCO was officially launched at a rally in New Brighton in the first week of November, 1979.

At the beginning of December the vice-president of PEBCO resigned, because he (AT Yeko, a businessman) said that he, unlike PEBCO, was willing to negotiate with the authorities. Yeko said that he would form a counter body.

In mid-January it was reported that a bomb had been left on the window of Yeko's Njoli Road supermarket. It was discovered and thrown into a vacant lot where it exploded. Yeko said that a boycott of his shop had been planned. He would not form a rival body to PEBCO, nor would he go on a proposed tour of Walmer arranged by ECAB.

Early in January, at a meeting attended by about 3 000 people held in New Brighton, it was decided to organise a stayaway in protest at the proposed removal of 4 000 of the residents of Walmer. A boycott of white businesses was planned to show solidarity with the strikers at Ford. This was later cancelled (see below).

In mid-January Thozamile Botha, Mono Badela, and Pahlo Tshume, were detained. They all had contact with PEBCO and with the Ford strike, even if indirectly. THEY ARE STILL IN DETENTION.



1896 - HENRY FORD'S FIRST "CAR" - THE QUADRICYCLE

Thozamile Bothe (December, 1979)

OCTOBER, 1979

31st (Wedeesday): About 700 workers from one of the Cortina plants in Struandale, Port Elizabeth, downed tools and walked out in protest at the victimisation of Thozamile Botha, president of PEBCO and trainee draughtsman at Ford.

(The issue of Botha's 'dismissal' has never been very clear in newspaper reports. The workers were in no doubt that it was a case of victimisation because of Botha's involvement with PEBCO. Botha said that

. Ford said that the issue was Botha's frequent absences from work).

NOVEMBER, 1979

1st (Thursday): Workers gathered at the factory gates at 07h30 and demanded that Botha address them - this demand was made through a foreman as they refused to elect a deputation to see management for fear of victimisation.

Union (United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers' Union - UAW - a non-registered union with mostly african members) officials and management spoke at the gate and then announced that Botha would address the workers the next morning. This seems to have been the start of workers' antagonism to the UAW's role during the strike, in that they were seen to be too closely associated with management. Freddie Sauls of the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers (NUMARW), which has close ties with the UAW (both of them are FOSATU members), said that the 'walkout was not connected to a work related problem' and that the unions 'were not in any way involved in the walkout'.

Later on this day Botha withdrew his resignation

. A meeting had taken place between Botha, Ford (supervisors and industrial relations staff) and a trade union representative, Johnny Mke. Ford public affairs officer, Dunbar Bucknall, said that he 'expected workers who had walked out would have to forfeit some pay'. Bucknall said: 'This misunderstanding has now been resolved upon which Mr Botha requested to withdraw his resignation and will consequently be reinstated in his position as draughtsman trainee'.

2nd (Friday): It was announced that the strike was to end on Monday, and that the issue of pay while on strike would be negotiated between the company and the union. Botha was given a rousing welcome by the workers - he denied

Workers had chanted 'Amabulu Azizinja' (Afrikaners are dogs)

Why the return had been delayed had been to allow management time to make up their minds about pay during the strike.

Over the weekend George Manase, national organiser of the UAW, was reported to have said that the union had supported the strike as 'We have about 60 percent membership of this plant and we had to show solidarity with workers' demands' (it is not clear whether this was a change of position since Sauls' earlier statement, or whether Sauls was speaking only for the NUMARW).

Botha drew attention to other grievances in the plant, such as wages, discrimination and a

5th (Monday): The workers returned to the

Struandale plant. Freddie Saula of NUMARW announced that they would be paid for the strike period.

9th (Friday): A new element was introduced when Henry Ferreira, deputy general secretary of the South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union (ISAIU) flew to Port Elizabeth at the request of about 200 white workers who were threatening strike action because of payment of african workers during the strike of the previous week. They also complained about 'the antagonistic and arrogant attitude of black employees; since integration of all facilities, ... toilets were being messed up; did not see why they had to work short-time at some plants'; etc.

They threatened to strike from Monday 12th.

12th (Monday): The strike did not start and talks between Ford management and the ISAIU continued.

At General Tire and Rubber Company workers started a boycott of canteen facilities.

13th (Tuesday): African workers again downed tools shortly after lunch. Spokesperson, David Skulu, said that workers complaints related to overtime ('they were being treated like prisoners') and to 'humiliation by segregationists' (referring to the complaints about 'abuses' of integration from white workers and the ISAIU).

14th (Wednesday): The boycott of canteens and downing of tools spread to another Ford plant (the engines plant) in Struandale. African workers were demanding a retraction of the racist remarks from the white workers. Henry Ferreira tried, in vain, to smooth things over by saying that 'it sometimes happens that when people are excited they say things they would not say under normal circumstances'. Undoubtedly a little prodding from Ford managed to elicit even that meek statement.

Discussions with the UAW continued, as well as between management and the ISAIU.

Although production was interrupted it does not seem to have been a full strike. Workers were boycotting canteens and apparently refusing to work overtime.

15th (Thursday): Production at the two Struandale plants(engine and assembly) returned to normal. The issues had been postponed to the following week.



1905 - MODEL G TOURING CAR
(FIRST FOUR-CYLINDER FORD)

It was said that workers were to elect committees at both plants to represent them. Manase of the UAW said that 'it appeared that the workers preferred to negotiate direct with management, but the union was prepared to assist at any point.'

Apparently a meeting of 300 workers in the engine plant took place to formulate grievances. A mass meeting of workers in the assembly plant also took place - on the premises and after hours. Thozamile Bothe said that .

the

canteen boycott would continue.

17th (Saturday): Hotel employees at the Red Lion were arrested by police when they turned up to fetch their salaries after striking.

19th (Monday): 600 workers at General Tire and Rubber Company in PE came out on strike over the dismissal of two workers, at least this was the immediate issue.

20th (Tuesday): General Tire managing director, RG Nicholson, said that the workers would be replaced if they did not return to work - he said that he viewed the walkout as an illegal strike and that the dismissed workers would not be replaced as he did not 'want to lose authority in the plant'. Further worker demands were for union representation, and improved pay, employment conditions and integrated facilities. The workers elected a committee of 5 to represent them before leaving the plant.

At Ford (Struandale) 60 paint shop workers walked out over overtime disagreements.

21st (Wednesday): At 09h00 700 hourly paid workers at the Struandale assembly plant at Ford downed tools because their grievances had not been settled. They were dismissed and left the premises after police riot units had been called in, saying that they would return on Friday to fetch their pay. The main issue was reported to be a demand for the reinstatement of a retrenched colleague.

The UAW said that it would be meeting with Ford management, and would be seeking contact with General Tires where the strike was continuing.

Management at Ford said that they would in future only negotiate through the union or liaison committee at the plant (with whom the union had a close connection); that walkouts or refusal to work would constitute resignation; that they would not tolerate mass meetings on the premises.

The sacked workers met at St Stephen church hall. At the Neave plant of the Ford company more than 1 000 workers continued a boycott of the canteen.

At Adamas Paper Mill workers returned to work after talks with management.

22nd (Thursday): Between 600 and 900 workers at General Tire were dismissed by the company on the fourth day of their strike. Police stood by.

A mass meeting of the approximately 1 350 fired workers from the various plants was held, and workers said that they were not prepared to seek re-employment. Botha urged

.

However, it seems that a Ford workers' branch of PEBCO was formed.

Manase announced that 'of 625 workers striking at the (General Tire) plant, 600 had joined the union by yesterday'.

Ford's Fred Ferreira (director of industrial relations) said that Ford would start taking on new workers or re-employing those who had 'resigned', from Monday. Seventeen dismissed men would not be taken on again as their dismissals 'had nothing to do with the strike'. In an interview he said of the UAW that he would prefer to work through this union: 'It's a serious situation when the recognised spokesmen become impotent'.

Sauls conceded that 'Some workers believe we are a puppet organisation controlled by management and government'.

23rd (Friday): At the Adamas Paper Mill manager C Malkin threatened to fire 120 workers who refused to work. This was the second stoppage in two weeks.

General Tires did not pay bonuses to the workers who returned to collect their pay, despite the fact that the year runs from October to September.

Over the weekend Manase of UAW was reported to have said that the union would represent only members, that the srike had been 'political', and that attempts had been made by Botha and PEBCO to undermine the union. The UAW had also become involved in the strike at Adamas, as there was no FOSATU union in the pulp and paper industry in the eastern Cape.

26th (Monday): At Adamas about 100 of 170 workers returned to work. Police stood by. General Tire and Ford workers continued their stayaway - about 400 workers turned up at Struandale for work, only a few of them being african, and fewer than 10 being strikers.

Over the weekend a meeting called by PEBCO was told that Bishop Tutu, Dr Motlana and AZAPO had pledged solidarity with the strikers.

27th (Tuesday): Another 150 workers at Adamas factory were said to have been dismissed. About 40% of the workforce was said to have returned. Malkin said that intimidation was responsible for the stayaway.

Confusion reigned in newspaper reports on the numbers reapplying for jobs at General Tire and at Ford, and as to how many of these were ex-strikers.

28th (Wednesday): A meeting of strikers decided to form a Save the Workers Fund to aid the strikers at the various firms in Port Elizabeth. Money would be handed to PEBCO.

United States diplomatic officials were said to have visited PE to discuss matters in relation to the Ford company's subscription to the Sullivan Code (see box). They were said to have met with Thozamile Botha.

29th (Thursday): About 80 workers were re-employed at Adamas Paper Mill.

Botha said that

Ford Motor Company in Detroit announced that it would not become involved in what was seen as a 'local' matter.

The UAW said that it would now negotiate on behalf of all workers as the executive of the union had given Manase a mandate to do this.

DECEMBER, 1979

3rd (Monday): Management claimed that 'production is returning to normal' at the three main firms affected: At Adamas Paper Mill it was said to be back at full production; at Ford's Cortina plant 263 people had been re-employed, 177 said to be former employees; General Tire did not comment but was said to be back in production.

Both Ford and Adamas were making use of this opportunity to retrench workers (by not taking them on again). At Adamas 200 people were re-employed to do the work of 250; at Ford they were planning to take on 600 instead of 700 - 'The smaller number would enable the plant to return to a five instead of

a four day working week' (increasing unemployment and, of course, allowing management to 'weed out' the activists).

Bucknall of Ford said that management had entered into negotiations with the UAW on reinstatement of the workers.

5th (Wednesday): Ford workers held a meeting and stated that they would return only if reinstated and if they got their bonuses.

Botha appealed to

Ford management refused to take workers back as a group but only as individuals and as 'new' workers (ie without any of the accumulated benefits from long service). They had said, through Bucknall, that the UAW was the official channel of communication and would not talk to PEBCO.

Sauls, NUMARW secretary, appealed to the workers to return to work 'so that his union could put pressure on Ford from inside... The workers were stronger inside the plant' (?!).

Chairperson of the Save the Workers Fund, Government Zini, appealed to 86 township businesses to contribute to the fund to aid strikers and their families and dependents.

6th (Thursday): Twenty-one former Ford workers were arrested by the security police. They were being held in terms of the General Law Amendment Act (which makes provision for 14 days detention without trial) said Lieutenant Colonel GN Erasmus (security police chief for the region).

UAW met with management again. Worker demands were rejected. Sauls now said that the unions were not 'willing to foresake' the workers.

Workers from both General Tire and Adamas said they had been victimised in that workers active in negotiations with management had not been rehired, or were told to report to the factory gate every day in case there should be work for them.

7th (Friday): Jesse Jackson, US civil rights campaigner, demanded the reinstatement of all 700 Ford workers: 'Ford is obviously in complicity with the policy to keep blacks in an inferior status'. Ford responded with the banality, 'we are committed to pursuing equal opportunity at our South African plan facilities as forcefully and quickly as we can'.

South African Secretary for Manpower Utilisation, Jaap Cilliers, said that 'outside interference would not be tolerated'.

Botha said that

Most of those detained were members of PEBCO.

10th (Monday): Manase (UAW) said that workers had stepped down from one demand, viz that of payment during days off on strike. Ford did not want to reinstate without loss of bonus or fringe benefits to the workers.

Security police detained about seven more striking Ford workers. PEBCO was said to be writing to Minister of Justice, Alwyn Schlebusch, to protest at the detentions.

It came to light that General Tire was illegally victimising workers by signing off their Unemployment Insurance Fund cards with the word 'strike' in the space for 'reason for leaving work', instead of saying 'other' as the law demands. This would obviously prejudice any further job opportunity for the workers fired.

Ford said that they would re-employ former workers until the end of the Christmas shutdown (9th January), after which the workers would have to compete with outsiders.

Colonel Erasmus said that the detentions were not as a result of complaints from Ford management but from 'the black public'.

11th (Tuesday): Jesse Jackson was refused permission, by the South African embassador in Washington, to lead a delegation to Ford in PE. Both Jackson and former UN embassador Andrew Young had been approached by PEBCO to put pressure on Ford.

The UAW said that a negotiated settlement seemed to be out of the question. The union went on to say that even the American Automobile Workers' Union had failed in efforts (requested by the UAW) to have the workers reinstated.

12th (Wednesday): 4 more workers were detained by security police, all of them from Ford - one was released immediately.

14th (Friday): The Ford plants shut down for their annual break with 321 workers rehired (207 of them former employees, out of the 700 who had walked out). Manase said that the UAW would have to improve communication with workers and also work through a union committee in the factory, rather than through the liaison committee.



1906 - MODEL K TOURING CAR
(FIRST SIX-CYLINDER FORD)

It was reported that the UAW had 'buried the racial hatchet' at Ford (seen as a 'breakthrough for trade unionism'). George Manase was quoted as saying that 'We have reached agreement with the white union (ISAIU)on the removal of all the existing racial conflict in the company', and that a 'joint list of grievances expressed by all workers of all races' had been drawn up. A few days later the 'capital' reporter of the Star crowed that the UAW had saved the day, brought some of the workers back (with some help from Ford who had 'leaned over backwards' and acted with 'leniency'), and shown up PEBCO for what it was - a political, power-seeking body with no understanding of industrial relations (this all according to Sieg Hannig).

18th (Tuesday): The SACC called a press conference where solidarity was expressed with the Ford workers, by Curtiss Nkondo (then president of AZAPO), Nthatho Motlana of the Soweto Civic Association, and Bishop Tutu (secretary of the SACC) who offered to mediate in the dispute. Thozamile Botha said that .

(obvious references to the UAW's acceptance that Ford would take on individual workers as 'new' workers, and to the union's futile attempt to call on the American Union of Automobile Workers.)

Nkondo criticised unions who avoided political issues as 'spineless' and said that the UAW was a 'glorified committee' - a remark supported by Botha who pointed out that the union had initially refused requests for help 'because they said the strike was political'.

Many at the press conference attacked the Sullivan Code and the Rev Sullivan for its failure - the dispute had been greeted with 'a deafening silence by the Rev Sullivan and his associates'.

20th (Thursday): 24 dismissed Ford workers appeared in court, charged with intimidation (under the Riotous Assemblies Act), relating to events that took place on the 5th December (see above - probably at the meeting). The case was postponed to January, 29th. These workers were the ones who had been detained earlier (see above). No other workers than the ones charged were said to be left in detention. Those charged were released on bail set at R50,00, on condition that they did not enter Ford premises or contact witnesses (for a list of names, see Post, 79.12.21).

Ford made a statement that probably all 500 workers still out could be employed again, because of an upsurge in demand for motor vehicles.

Bus fare increases and rent increases were said to be in store for blacks in PE during 1980.

JANUARY, 1980

2nd (Wednesday): Workers were said to be holding out despite a lack of funds to support them, and ignoring the 'moratorium on their return'. They confirmed at a meeting that they wanted reinstatement and not rehiring.

6th (Sunday): By this weekend only 7 of the dismissed workers had reapplied for their jobs at Ford, that was to start production the next day. At a PEBCO rally at Rio Cinema a call was made on other unions to show solidarity with the Ford workers.

7th (Monday): Ford with half of its normal workforce present, although 100 people were applying for jobs. It was said that it would not take long to fill the vacancies as the moratorium was over and the workers who were applying had previous experience in the motor trade, 'so we (Ford) won't have to spend much time training them'.

The call for support from employed workers from the dismissed workers failed.

8th (Tuesday): Two petrol bombs were thrown at homes of workers who had applied to have their jobs back.



1908 - FORD MODEL T TOURING CAR
(AS IT APPEARED WHEN FIRST INTRODUCED)

Botha condemned

20 more workers were said to have reapplied.

9th (Wednesday): A meeting took place between Thozamile Botha and 4 members of his workers' committee, Alan Lukens (US consul-general in Cape Town), Fred Ferreira and Dirk Pieterse (of Ford's industrial relations staff). Settlement was reached, with victory for the workers on the reinstatement issue:

- Workers will be taken back at the same rate of pay they received before they left;
- Pension, medical aid, sick pay eligibility will remain as before;

- Holiday pay will be calculated as before;
- Bonus accrual rate will be at the same percentage rate as applied before;
- The company will endeavour to complete its reinstatement programme during the month of January subject only to availability of suitable positions;
- That Ford Cortina plant workers would return to work immediately;
- No persons other than former Ford employees will be hired into this plant during January.

10th (Thursday): Botha addressed a mass meeting in Kwazakhele, and

(to which the victory could be attributed). He was reported to have said that

That night Thozamile Botha was again detained by the security police after teargas had been fired into a crowd in the Walmer Location where he had gone to address a meeting on the planned removals from this township.

Two members of the Walmer branch of PEBCO (Alfred Hole and Somzi Conjwa) were detained with Botha, but released after questioning. *The interrogation related to a planned mass* protest against the Walmer removals and also to PEBCO. They saw police struggling to remove handcuffs from Botha.

Teargas was again fired at about 21h00 when a crowd gathered in Walmer to demand the PEBCO's leaders' release.

Later that night Post reporter Mono Badela, who had covered the Ford strikes, secretary of PEBCO Phalo Tshumo, and another man were detained. The third man was released later. A month before, restriction orders had been placed on PEBCO leaders Liso Pityana (former vice-president) and M Cekisani (a Walmer executive member).

All were held under the General Law Amendment Act.

11th (Friday): Jesse Jackson discussed the strike and arrests with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance after meeting with President Carter. Jackson reiterated his wish to come to South Africa to investigate the case.

12th (Saturday): It was announced that a proposed tour of Walmer designed by the Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB) to 'put the position of Walmer township into realistic perspective', had been cancelled after further unrest in the area. The Urban Foundation and Save Walmer Committee were among the groups who would have been taken on the tour.

Township residents accused police of acting in a 'deliberate attempt at intimidating PEBCO in general, and the township in particular, before Monday' (when a protest march had been planned).

Police reinforcements were said to have been flown to PE.

The PEBCO executive cancelled the Monday protest march and a stayaway, and also a boycott of white shops.

13th (Sunday): More than 6 000 people attended a meeting in New Brighton to call for the release of the detainees. A meeting was also held in Uitenhage. Helen Suzman condemned the arrests.

14th (Monday): 25 workers returned for their jobs at Ford.

15th (Tuesday): Dan Qeqe, a New Brighton businessman and PEBCO member was detained and S Mele, a Walmer PEBCO member, was said to have been released after being detained on the 11th January.

Workers said that security police had been present at the Ford labour relations office when they were reinstated. This was, of course, denied by the police and Ford's Ferreira.

23rd (Wednesday): The detentions of Botha, Tshumo and Badela were changed to the Terrorism Act which allows for indefinite detention for interrogation. Acting president of PEBCO, Zolile Skosana, condemned the further detention.

A few days earlier it had been reported that a report requested by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) and financed by Ford, by three Rhodes University academics, had anticipated the unrest at Ford (it had been completed in November). The report had drawn attention to grievances that anticipated those taken up by the workers:

- The cutback in working hours, which meant that between 80% and 90% of Ford's black workers were earning pay below the poverty datum line;
- *That real incomes of workers in the lower* grades had declined over the past eight years;
- That black advancement had not been implemented quickly enough;
- That racism was still apparent, in spite of Ford's commitment to the Sullivan principles.

27th (Sunday): A PEBCO meeting in New Brighton called for the release of the detainees. A suggested work stayaway was rejected. This rejection was seen as a victory for the 'conservative faction' within PEBCO.

The majority of workers had returned to work by this stage.

28th (Monday): Dan Qeqe was released - he described detention as 'inhuman'.

29th (Tuesday): The 20 Ford workers reappeared on charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act. The case was postponed to early February.

FEBRUARY, 1980

8th (Friday): It was reported that L Sokoni, PEBCO treasurer and PE lawyer, had withdrawn from representation of Botha and the other detainees because he felt that this might be drawing more attention to PEBCO and himself from the police.

12th (Tuesday): The SACC paid out R22 000 to Ford workers who had not sought re-employment before the agreement had been reached (about 450 workers) and to a few General Tire and Adamas Paper Mill workers who had not been re-employed.

13th (Wednesday): The last Ford Struandale workers were re-employed. Government Zini, spokesperson for the workers, said he was 'very happy' with the situation.

14th (Thursday): Further tension in Ford was reported. This was related to the IRR report (see above) and its contents; further victimisation of workers who had been reinstated; and a general dissatisfaction with working conditions at the factory.

1927 - FORD MODEL T TOURING CAR
(LAST YEAR OF MODEL T)

Government Zini, head of the Dismissed Workers Committee and PEBCO member, said that 'the black man was not being paid like the white man and many employees saw Ford as an extension of the Government' (this may explain the chants of 'Amabulu Azizinja' when the strikes started).

15th (Friday): Ford's Ferreira warned the US government to stay out of the company's labour affairs. This was after he had had talks with US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Keeley, at a luncheon attended by 'executives of the Port Elizabeth companies which subscribe to the Sullivan Code'. Keeley also met with Government Zini. Zini said that 'outstanding problems will be taken up with management, which is prepared to negotiate with us.'

20th (Wednesday): Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned officials of foreign governments not to interfere in 'domestic affairs'. This was said in parliament in reference to the visit by Keeley to PE.



1929 - MODEL A FORD STATION WAGON
(THE FIRST MASS-PRODUCED STATION WAGON)

United States

There are several important criticisms that can be made of the various employment codes in general, and the Sullivan Code in particular:

- The Code limits the responsibility of US companies in South Africa to the question of racial discrimination. It ignores the fact that the profitability of the companies is drastically affected by factors such as the pass laws, migrant labour, the 'home-

	SULLIVAN
SEGREGATION	Non-segregation of races at all eating, comfort and work facilities.
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES	Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
REMUNERATION	Equal pay for all doing equal or comparable work.
TRAINING	Initiation and development of training for large scale black advancement.
DEVELOPMENT	Increase number of Blacks and other non-Whites in management and supervisory positions.
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY	Improve quality of employees living outside of work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.
TRADE UNIONS	Acknowledge the right of Black workers to form their own union or be represented by trade unions where unions already exist.
MIGRANT LABOUR	Support changes in influx control laws to provide for the right of Black migrant workers to normal family life.

lands' system, extensive repression of black political expression, control over african trade unions, etc, etc.

- The Code is an imposition on workers in that it was drawn up without any negotiation (even consultation) with workers.
- The Code did not, initially, include a clause on collective bargaining rights. Under pressure, the <u>right</u> to form a trade union was recognised, but nothing was said about the enforcement of entering into legally binding agreements with trade unions.
- Only 0,1% of the black labour force is affected by the Sullivan Code. Due to high capital intensity US companies only employ 70 000 workers out of a total population (blacks) of 18,6-million. Of these only 20 000 (0,1%) are employed by signatories of the Sullivan Code.
- By the Protection of Business Act, the SA government can make it illegal for signatories to submit reports.
- There is no legal enforcement of the Codes - compliance is totally voluntary.
- In a society where women are often the chief breadwinner for a family, there is nothing whatsoever in the Codes which 'commit' the signatories to the elimination of sexual discrimination.

Pebco

This interview was conducted with Thozamile Botha, chairman of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) early in January 1980. Shortly afterwards, Botha was detained by security police, together with other leaders of PEBCO. Botha was originally held under the General Laws Amendment Act on January 10th, but shortly before this detention order was due to expire, it was announced that he had been transferred to section 6 of the Terrorism Act, which allows for indefinite detention.

As Work In Progress went to press, he was still being held by security police.

<u>Work In Progress</u>: Mr Botha, could you tell us something about your background - where you were educated, the important influences on your political development?

<u>Work In Progress</u> was already being printed when Tozamile Botha, Mono Badela and Phalo Tshume were released from detention, and immediately banned and house arrested. Dan Qeqe was also banned and house arrested. It is accordingly an offence in terms of the Internal Security Act to quote these people. The editors have regretfully had to withdraw the interview with Botha on PEBCO in order to avoid prosecution; in addition, where Botha is quoted in the Ford chronology of events (page 15 - 21), this has also been removed. Pages 23 and 24 of this issue of WIP have been removed entirely, while page 25 and one column on page 26 is blank.

Mr Thozamile Botha . . . leader of the workers.

STRIKE AT SEA HARVEST

THE dispute at the Sea Harvest fish factory in Saldanha Bay where 700 people - all of them women - went on strike for three weeks ended early last month after satisfactory settlement was negotiated with management by the union representing the workers - the Food and Canning Workers' Union.

Sea Harvest, situated in Saldanha Bay, the SADF naval base, was established about fourteen years ago by a consortium of foreign and local businessmen. The factory is situated in the harbour itself. Divisions of work include gutting, cleaning, cutting, packing, and frying the fish. It was notorious amongst labour organisers in the food industry for its poor working conditions, excessive overtime and low pay:

+ The women frequently worked a twelve hour day and often three weekends in a row. This was particularly hard for those women who had small children. There are no day-care facilities for children and the women had to rely on relatives and neighbours to look after their children.

+ At the time of the strike, their weekly wage was R20,50 per week. This included overtime pay, although workers claim that they were not paid at all for work done after 12 noon on Sundays.

+ The fish is frozen at the factory and so a lot of the work involves going in and out of the freezer rooms. Workers say they had to work for long periods in rooms where there was a blast freezer and as a result there was a high rate of illness amongst them.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE STRIKE

THE women initially walked out in August last year. Their demands were an increase in wages, a higher transport subsidy (many of the workers come from areas outside Saldanha, some from as far as Hopefield, about 40 km away), and the provision of medical aid facilities.

At first management refused to meet with the workers. Then they tried to get workers to sign a document agreeing to a subsidy rate which was unacceptable. The women refused to sign the document and manage-

ment threatened to dismiss all the workers. Workers decided to walk out immediately but were thwarted by the management who locked the gates and refused to let them out. The issue was temporarily resolved but the following week, after two Hopefield workers were dismissed for having left their overalls at home, 400 women walked out in sympathy and gathered outside the factory gates. Their determination to support their fellow workers in such a case of arbitrary dismissal was strengthened when management announced that certain union committee members would not be allowed to return with them.

The following day, management capitulated and agreed to re-instate all the women, including the union committee members and the two workers from Hopefield. This walk-out was followed by a similar walkout, capitulation and return in September. Both strike actions led to minimal increases in wages from an average of R17,00 to R20,50 a week.

On November 20, the union committee met with management and demanded a R30,00 per week basic wage. When this was rejected by management, union officials were called in from Cape Town but it was claimed that the managing director, Mr H Kramer, was the only person who could negotiate with the union and he was overseas at the time. A meeting was held between union representatives and management on December 15. The union demanded a basic minimum wage of R30,00 per week. Management responded with its own complex wage proposals, offering a rate of 50c an hour for unskilled workers (R20,00 a week), 55c an hour for semi-skilled workers (R25,30 a week), and divided wage levels for skilled workers into three categories:

Category 1: 60c an hour;
Category 2: 64c an hour;
Category 3: 68c an hour.

The union rejected this and the workers went out on strike.

Two points need to be made here. Firstly, in terms of management's response to the union - they continually presented their own set of proposals to the union, rather than negotiating on the terms laid down by the union.

Secondly, the reasons for the union's rejection of management's proposals were that it would be entirely up to management to decide who should move up to a higher wage level and when. They rejected a more objective basis for increases such as length of service. The union felt that to leave this *in management's hands would put the job* security of the workers in jeopardy - their increase could be tied to favouritism, victimisation, etc. Also the idea behind this type of system of differentiated wage levels is that one starts off on a low wage but has an opportunity to realise 'individual potential'. What often actually happens is that the vast majority of workers remain at the lowest wage level while only a favoured few ever permeate through to the higher grades, yet management can always claim that the higher grades do exist, the opportunities are there, and it is only the individual's incompetence which keeps her/him to the lower wage levels.

Six days later, management sent out letters to individual workers offering them a different wage scale of up to 80c an hour in the same sort of attempt made by management in the Fatti's and Moni's strike to undercut the union. As in the F&M strike, a mass meeting of workers was held to discuss the issue and they resolved not to return to work until management had reached an agreement with the unidn.

THE SETTLEMENT

FINALLY, on January 7, a settlement was reached in terms of which the starting wage would be R27,50 while workers with more than 6 months service would get R29,80. This includes a transport subsidy and a R2,00 weekly attendance bonus.

A few points to be made about this strike are:

1. Although all 700 workers involved are women, the specific problems encountered by female workers such as maternity and menstruation leave and the non-existence of day care centres were not raised.

2. This strike exposed to the workers management's attempts to divide them and to undercut the union. At a reportback meeting held after the settlement was reached, several workers expressed their realisation that workers solidarity and unity of action was essential for such a dispute to be successful.

Contributors (Cape Town)

Fatti's and Moni's (Bellville, Cape Town): This strike, covered in WIP 10, ended in mid-November with the reinstatement of 56 workers still on strike. The agreement reached stated

- that workers be returned to their old jobs as soon as possible;
- that they receive their old wages plus increments granted during the period they were on strike;
- that migrant workers' contracts be renewed within two months and that buses should be provided for migrant workers to return to the Ciskei for 2 weeks during December;
- that bonuses should not be affected;
- that strikers would be dismissed during the first year after reinstatement only if an offence had been committed and the union had been notified;
- that the union was not to press for wage demands for a year.

The Food and Canning Workers' Union hailed the agreement as a victory, and thanked the public for their support in putting pressure on the company.

Ciskei Transport Corporation: On the 3rd of December, 1979, 35 bus drivers went on strike (or the strike was avoided, depending on which paragraph of yet another confusing report on Ciskei bus drivers strikes one is reading (Post, 79.12.05)).

It would appear that 35 drivers threatened to strike over dismissal over trivial issues, no overtime pay, and having to 'face irate commuters over increased fares which they had to pay despite a court order to reduce the fares'. The strike was avoided after a meeting with Chief Lennox Sebe, chief Minister of the Ciskei, who in turn referred them to his brother Colonel Charles Sebe, head of the Ciskei Central Intelligence Service (CCIS), who arranged a meeting with the group manager of the Ciskei Transport Corporation, H Kaiser. Before the last meeting four drivers were dismissed.

A Mdantsane deputy mayor and said to be 'high' in the Bisho bus company (?) was detained by the CCIS under proclamation R252 in connection with the strike.

See previous reports in WIP on a confusing series of events relating to Ciskei bus drivers (WIP 7 & 8).

(The CCIS was first publicly admitted to exist on the 1st May, 1979, when referred to by Lennox Sebe in his policy speech to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly. The CCIS was taking over from BOSS, he said, and would report to him personally as a branch of his department - 'the activities ... are by their very nature highly confidential and no detailed report will therefore be furnished publicly to this assembly').

The Rand Daily Mail (79.11.01) reported that salary packages worth more than R100 000 per year were being offered in advertisements aimed at executives. This was said to be because of the 'accelerating economic recovery' and consequent competition between companies to keep and/or attract top 'executives'.

BABELEGI: In WIP 8 we ran an article under the title 'Exploiters' Paradise'. Nearly a year later Post once more investigated wages We raproduce two pay slips used by Post in its article (79.12.07). These slips reflect wages at St John's Knitwear (Pty) Ltd.

The National Union of Clothing Workers and the Knitted-Fabric Union said, through spokesperson Sarah Chitja, that they had not yet organised workers at Babelegi but were attempting to do so, and to get Chief Lucas Mangope to accord recognition to unions.

Three articles in Post and the Sunday Times on labour conditions in the 'independent state' of Venda, show a remarkably similar position:

It was found that at a coffee plantation owned by the Venda Development Corporation (VDC) and the tea estate owners Sapekoe men are paid a maximum of R23,80 per month and that for women this figure is R16,10.

These workers come from the Phasvane Boerdery farm at Tshifudi and are engaged in digging pits. Tractor drivers at the farm are paid R38,00 per month (after deductions).

Agricultural co-ordinator for the VDC, F de Wet, said that this pay 'was not too bad'. Venda Secretary for Economic Affairs MR Madula, said that his government had no say whatsoever in wage determinations. However, less than a month later it was reported (Sunday Times, 80.01.20) that Madula had said that 'plantation companies had received a government directive to pay labourers R1 a day'. De Wet said that paying unskilled people R1,00 per day was better than letting them starve.

EARNING DETAILS	HOURS	AMOUNT
NORMAL	45,00	7,00
SICK		
NIGHTSHIFT ALLOWANCE		
OVERTIME 1	2,25	0,47
OVERTIME 2		
OVERTIME 3		

OTHER TAXABLE EARNINGS	AMOUNT
1 PRODUCTION BONUS	
2 HOLIDAY PAY	
3 HOLIDAY BONUS	
4 ANNUAL BONUS	
5 HANDOUT BONUS	
6 ATTENDANCE BONUS	

NON TAXABLE ALLOWANCES	AMOUNT
1 FIXED ALLOWANCE 1	0,50
2 FIXED ALLOWANCE 2	
3 FIXED ALLOWANCE 3	

GROSS EARNINGS	7,97

DEDUCTIONS	AMOUNT
1 PENSION 1	
2 U.I.F.	
3 PROVIDENT FUND	0,33
4 MEDICAL AID	
5 SICK FUND	
6 TRAINING FUND	
7 COUNCIL	1,50
8 BLACK PAY	
9 UNION	
10 SAVINGS	
11 ATTENDANCE BONUS	0,50
12 PETTY CASH	
13 STOP ORDERS	
14 LOANS	
15 GARN. ORDERS	
16 P.A.Y.E./BANTU TAX	
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	2,33
NET PAY CASH	5,62

EARNING DETAILS	HOURS	AMOUNT
NORMAL	45,00	6,00
SICK		
NIGHTSHIFT ALLOWANCE		
OVERTIME 1		
OVERTIME 2		
OVERTIME 3		

OTHER TAXABLE EARNINGS	AMOUNT
1 PRODUCTION BONUS	
2 HOLIDAY PAY	
3 HOLIDAY BONUS	
4 ANNUAL BONUS	
5 HANDOUT BONUS	
6 ATTENDANCE BONUS	

NON TAXABLE ALLOWANCES	AMOUNT
1 FIXED ALLOWANCE 1	0,50
2 FIXED ALLOWANCE 2	
3 FIXED ALLOWANCE 3	

GROSS EARNINGS	6,50

DEDUCTIONS	AMOUNT
1 PENSION 1	
2 U.I.F.	
3 PROVIDENT FUND	0,33
4 MEDICAL AID	
5 SICK FUND	
6 TRAINING FUND	
7 COUNCIL	1,90
8 BLACK PAY	
9 UNION	
10 SAVINGS	
11 ATTENDANCE BONUS	0,50
12 PETTY CASH	0,30
13 STOP ORDERS	
14 LOANS	
15 GARN. ORDERS	
16 A.Y.E./BANTU TAX	
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	3,00
NET PAY CASH	3,50

Madula, in line with pre-independence South African propaganda on the bantustan, said that 'Our people are able to live off the natural resources of our fertile land'. He did not say how he managed to reconcile this with his other statements relating to 'economic development' in Venda:

> 'Many of the men have left the homeland to earn a comparatively better income in the urban areas.'
> ...
> Local women were mostly working as cleaners in the administrative complex at Thohoyandou earning R30,00 a fortnight.
> 'Some till the land and at least 1 200 work on tea and coffee plantations which have created job opportunities. Our goal is to have a sound economic system.'

In February the Post reporters again called on the Pheswana Boerdery coffee plantation and found that the workers had been given an increase of R6,00 per month. Twice a month they are given a 25 kg bag of mealie meal and a number of 'pills for round worms'. The workers are not paid any pension, nor do they work during rainy days which affects the number of pits that can be dug, and for which the worker is paid.

Batswana Gare Transport (BophuthaTswana): In WIP 8 we reported on a strike at this firm that took place during March, 1979. A two-person committee appointed to look into the strike reported in May.

The 10 dismissed workers remained fired 'as they failed to turn up at a meeting called by the commission.' Four company officials against whom the workers had most grievances were suspended for two weeks after the strike. Public relations officer FPW Kotzenberg would not say what had subsequently happened to them, as it was the 'business of the company', and that all parties were satisfied with the outcome.

A further strike took place at Batswana Transport/BophuthaTswana Transport Company/ Batswana-gare Transport, in Mabopane in October, 1979 - no mention was made in any of the reports as to whether this is the same

company as the one above (reported on in earlier WIPs).

The strike took place after a co-worker (Patrick Makhubele) had driven a bus without permission, injured another worker (reports conflict over the seriouseness of the injury), and been dismissed for it. All 264 workers then left the premises where they allegedly were baton charged by police. In the trial it came out that police had thrown tear gas at the workers and bystanders and had not known what crime to charge the arrested strikers with.

In early November the company re-employed all but 143 of the workers (31 of those dismissed being charged with 'public violence'). Those charged appeared in the Odi court on the 19th November, postponed to 18th December, postponed to 29th January, 1980.

The trial was postponed once more to March 3rd, 1980. A police officer who gave evidence said that not only did he not know which charges to lay, but was also unable to identify any of the accused.

SA's newest survival system -

THE state and its ideological apparatuses (schools, churches, etc) and repressive apparatuses (military, police and its branches) has shown remarkable sensitivity to opposition activity from white youth - remarkeble in its vehemence in relation to the threat posed by such opposition.

This sensitivity is evidenced by bannings of student leaders, commissions of inquiry into student affairs, and smear campaigns related to these, blanket over-reaction to student publications, and a veritable host of spies.

The state depends on acceptance and active support by white youth of the 'system' for staffing the civil service, police and army.

So what do we have - ever greater ideological incorpoartion of white youth while the slightest opposition is immediately stamped out. While thousands of black kids attend the funerals of their friends, whites are singing the words of a musical work commissioned by the Transvaal Educational Department, depicting 'the assault on family life and an allegorical conflict between a wise prophet and an anarchist' (Sunday Express, 79.09.23)

Let me turn to a few aspects of the strategy towards white youth: Increasingly university and technical courses are linked to the defence force and their requirements for the skills of students with the minimum of disruption to either study or military service -

> Universities, technikons and similar institutions should consider tailoring their terms and lengths of courses to meet the needs of national servicemen, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr JH Coetsee, said ... (Star, 79.08.22).

Veld schools, run by the TED, are blatent propaganda exercises - even telling pupils that the Department of Information scandal was a 'communist plot'.

Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral RA Edwards, told a Republic Day gathering in 1978 that

> one would have to go a long way to find a better method of ensuring military preparedness than through the new joint cadet system introduced by the SADF and educational departments.
>
> Under this system contract teachers ... would be called up annually in January and during their national service would be trained as commando officers to be attached to the cadet organisation.
>
> In this way meaningful training can be given during school hours in youth preparedness periods.
>
> Training of cadets during school holidays may be further extended by their attending adventure camps, bivouacs and so on (Star, 78.05.31)

A new development has been the direct or indirect involvement of white pupils in police operations. Three of these instances have come to our notice:

Firstly, 20 schoolboys, aged about 17, spent a week during 1979 in the Mkuze area of Natal with the police in trying to catch poachers. They also helped police set up road blocks in order to search for dagga, liquor and weapons. The SAP directorate of public relations said that it was hoped that 'the success of this experimental exercise would spark off similar police-schoolboy operations throughout the country'.

Secondly, early this year (January, 1980) 32 schoolboys were airlifted into dugged terrain in the Paulpietersburg area to help the police destroy a dagga plantation.

Thirdly, between 10 and 20 St Stithian's College schoolboys joined police in a raid on africans living in a forest on the luxury school's property in Randburg. Two of the boys were hurt in the raid that involved assaults on the africans. This raid took place in early February, 1980.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

WE ALWAYS HAVE the poor with us, so the Bible would like us to believe: an unnecessarily gloomy prediction, perhaps. One thing, however, is certain: as long as there is wide-spread poverty, there you will find assorted do-goodere, representatives of the governing classes, and a variety of odd-balls, all singing the same song. 'Self help', 'helping people to help themselves', 'community participation', 'satisfying basic needs', 'community control'. These are the clichéd lyrics that they sing. Their rhythm, however, is hypnotic, and it has the effect of putting the listeners to sleep, and distracting them from dealing with their situation in an organised and rational fashion.

'Community development' and 'promoting self reliance' has been the response of the ruling classes to the threat of widespread unrest amongst the poverty-stricken masses in the 'Third World'. It has also been the response of most aid agencies, the World Bank and, to be fair, a large number of well-meaning, if misguided, people who have been concerned to help 'the starving masses' out of the 'miserable and degrading conditions' in which they live.

South Africa has no shortage of such conditions. Unemployment is rampant, and in rural and urban areas alike there is a near epidemic of malnutrition and other diseases of poverty such as tuberculosis. Millions of people are engaged daily in a desperate struggle for survival, scratching a few vegetables out of the land, living off miserably small pensions, depending on friends and family for handouts. There is a severe shortage of adequate housing. Medical and transport services are hopelessly inadequate, and many areas of the country have a complete absence of sanitation, water, and other basic services. Large numbers of people, *marginalised by the ruthless logic of an* inhuman economic system and its political buttress - apartheid - are in the midst of a grave crisis of survival.

This crisis poses an immediate political challenge to the capitalist state. Those for whom the social order provides a totally inadequate living, have no stake in that social order.

The extent to which this crisis has manifested itself politically since the uprisings of 1976 is demonstrated by the almost hysterical daily warnings of a 'total onslaught against South Africa', and by the rise in obviously-organised revolutionary activity during the past 4 years.

The state and capital, perceiving the threat to their existence, have formulated a number of responses. The most obvious, and probably the most important of these, has been the tightening up of control: through apartheid structures, through the relocation of people in rural ghettos, through increasing repression and a thorough-going militarisation of life in South Africa. This response has been documented and analysed elsewhere (see for example the article on total strategy in this issue of Work In Progress), and falls outside the scope of this paper. But there is another prong to the survival strategy which bears at least a passing reference, as it is not unrelated to the main theme of this discussion.

There has been an increasing emphasis on 'giving the people a stake in the system'. This too has a number of aspects, but the one which *is relevant here has been the attempt to* 'improve the quality of life' in order to 'give people something to defend'. Thus the state and the 'private sector' have developed a combined strategy. The Urban Foundation (and a number of less significant groups) scramble frantically to improve living conditions in urban areas. It works with the full co-operation of the state. At the same time the army, through its 'civic action' programme, is working closely with 'homeland' government departments in an attempt to provide educational, agricultural, medical and other services to the subject population which would otherwise have even less access to amenities of these sorts.

But the state and capital are trapped in a fatal contradiction; it is precisely the historical development of capitalism in its apartheid form which has generated the crisis of survival. It is only through the dismantling of the political and economic structures, and a far-reaching process of reconstruction, that the full human needs of all the people of South Africa can be met.

The civic action programme and the Urban Foundation cannot attain their self-proclaimed goals (the improvement in the quality of life for all) without destroying those institutions - capitalism and apartheid - that it is their real goal to protect.

In their more honest moments, both the army and the Urban Foundation will admit that their work is not aimed at improving the quality of life for all. The army has stated that its programme is directed at winning the hearts and minds of people in the most militarily sensitive areas. It has further stated that if the policy does not succeed, then strong-arm tactics will be used, and people resettled from these sensitive areas. The Urban Foundation, too, has stated that its work is directed at bolstering the 'free enterprise' system, and at promoting a 'black middle class'. Thus both the state and capital are engaged in a cynical attempt to alleviate some hardship by providing a variety of services dressed up in the rhetoric of community development. They hope to convince the recipients of their 'goodwill' that business and the state genuinely have their interests at heart, and should as a result be supported in the growing political conflict.

This strategy may be a cynical one, but it does contain a refreshing degree of honesty. For those who wish to distance themselves from this strategy of co-option, it is necessary that they should be able to show how their actions differ not only in <u>intention</u>, but also in <u>effect</u> from those of the state and groups such as the Urban Foundation. This paper is intended to point out some of the errors that are made, and try to point the way to genuinely progressive forms of action.

Outside of the deliberate plotting of the state and monopoly capital, and operating from more commendable motives, are ranged a whole series of groups which are trying to make good the failings of the system. Here one will find a number of church people, liberal whites wanting to salve their consciences by 'doing something', liberal blacks who want to 'uplift their people' and, indeed, a number of self-proclaimed radicals. These people, operating from a variety of motivations, are usually genuinely concerned by the human misery that they see around them.

The first response to this misery is that which has been characteristic of elements of the church and rich liberals since the opening decades of the capitalist epoch: charity. Poverty and starvation are an affront to any sensitive soul. They also pose a direct challenge to the belief in inevitable human progress, used as part of the ideology which has developed to provide a moral legitimacy to capitalism. If people are starving, feed them; if they are homeless, shelter them; if they are illiterate, teach them; if they are sick, go and live among them and heal them. This has been the rallying cry of many selfless and dedicated people from Albert Schweitzer to Mother Theresa. *Unfortunately, even the most ardent missionary* must admit that the impact of charity on the sum total of human misery has been almost negligible.

This has led to the development of a critique of charity which is now regarded as thoroughly unfashionable, or even as bad and counterproductive. The main points of criticism are that charity is bad because it produces 'dependence on the giver', and also because it is 'degrading to receive handouts'. Charity is accused of 're-inforcing the cycle of poverty' and is regarded as making it even less likely that the recipients of charity will in fact ever improve their lot. In addition, it was felt that charity 'left the basic problem untouched', and that money spent on aid and charity was money thrown down a bottomless pit. It was argued that charity dealt only with symptoms while leaving the real causes of poverty untouched.

In order to make the best use of scarce resources, a new strategy was devised. This strategy is well represented by a much-used quote: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him forever". The hallmark of this new strategy is the belief that through education and motivation you can help people to help themselves, and so promote self-reliance.

As a result of this new wisdom, charities and churches have transformed their activities into 'community development programmes', and their field workers are now 'development agents', promoting self-reliance.

The next important ingredient of the *community development process is 'community* participation' and 'community involvement'. This ingredient grows out of a number of

different needs felt by the community development agent. In the first place,there is the recognition that the problems of the poor are largely social problems, or communal problems, in the sense that they are environmental, and do not simply affect individuals. For example, the lack of an adequate water supply, or overcrowded living conditions, both of which assist the spread of disease, cannot be dealt with by the individual. If problems of this sort are to be dealt with at all, they have to be tackled on the level of the whole community.

In the second place, there is the recognition that the problems can only be tackled if the community provides the necessary labour and support. As such, it is felt that the 'community must be involved from the beginning'. Also, 'they' will ensure the success of the project in the future if 'they' have been involved in the decision-making process from the beginning. In this case, it is argued, the community will feel the project to be its own.

This tendency to want to involve the community is re-inforced by two other elements in the critique of charity. Firstly it is felt that it is necessary to move away from what is regarded as the degrading aspect of charity: receiving handouts and having nothing to contribute and no control over the transaction. Secondly, it is argued, the dependency which is created by charity, lessens peoples' ability to stand on their own feet. Community development, on the other hand, wants to give people greater control over their own lives. For these reasons, it is important that the community 'should be involved from the beginning' and so should regard any project as their own, one which they have initiated and control.

Another criticism against charity is that the giver decides what he/she is going to give. By implication, the giver is deciding the 'real needs' that are to be met. Community development workers, on the other hand, want the community 'to articulate their own needs'. It is regarded as important that a process of consultation with the community should be established. Meetings are called with community representatives, or community leaders, in order to discover these real problems, and what it is that needs to be done about them. The methods of dealing with these problems are discussed and decided upon. Generally, an attempt will be made to find some 'appropriate' solution to the particular problem. By this is generally meant a solution that is low cost, appropriate to the skills and resources the people have at their disposal, is in harmony with existing social relations, and yet will still do the job of work to be done.

This, then, is a brief sketch of what is generally called the 'community development process'. It is now necessary to examine some of the flaws and fallicies within this approach.

DEVELOPMENT OR ORGANISATION?

It is difficult to criticise any single part of the ideology of community development. Part of the difficulty springs from the fact that the individual elements are so poorly defined as to defy proper analysis. But the major difficulty arises from the apparently good intentions of those who propound this ideology. Who, after all, can deny the validity of promoting self-reliance amongst people who have no-one but themselves to rely on? Who can deny that people who make up a community should participate in decisions that affect their lives? Who would argue that people within communities should not articulate their real needs, and then work together to meet those needs? Is it not obvious that solutions to problems must be technically, economically and culturally appropriate to the needs and resources of the communities experiencing those problems?

Unfortunately, however, these principles are all entirely abstract. They do not embody within them an understanding of the real political and economic forces operating in the societies to which they are applied. As such, they are fine sounding principles, but are in fact completely empty of meaning. These principles have no use in the struggle to transform the world, because they include no understanding of the world. The principles are so vague, that stating them creates more questions than it answers: What is self-reliance? What is a community? Is there really a possibility of community participation? What is the <u>cause</u> of the problems that we are trying to solve? Should we not be trying to transform reality, rather than trying to find 'appropriate' solutions to the problems that it creates?

To answer these questions we are required to do something more than take a superficial

look at the problems of contemporary South African society, and then blindly attempt to solve these problems one by one through a series of 'self help' programmes. We are required to analyse the historical emergence of the situation which presents itself to us, and to wield this understanding as a weapon in the struggle to change the situation. In this way, we will rid ourselves of these problems. Through this analysis, we will also rid ourselves of the need to rely on principles so vague that they can be adopted by arch-conservatives and self-professed radicals alike.

COLONIAL CONQUEST AND AFTER

It is not possible here to give a detailed analysis of South African history. But an understanding of the 'problems' faced by the oppressed people of South Africa does require a sketch outline of the development of South Africa from the time that colonial conquest began. In brief:

The period of colonial penetration was marked by a series of conflicts which disrupted traditional patterns of life, and had the long-term effect of driving the local population off the land, which was taken over by white settler farmers. In time, the subsistence existence of pre-colonial times was destroyed. The discovery of gold and diamonds led to the development of a mining industry and the inevitable growth of secondary industries, all of which required a cheap and controlled labour force. At the same time, the development of towns around the industrial sites provided the possibility of rich markets for agricultural produce. This provided the incentive for settler farmers to transform themselves from subsistence agriculturalists into commercial farmers. They too developed the need for a labour force, as well as for more land.

The development of capitalist industry and agriculture thus resulted in a reinforced need to drive african peasant farmers off the land, and into the labour market. This was already happening to some extent, because the declining productivity of subsistence agriculture was forcing africans to seek wage-labour in order to survive. This process was hastened by such measures as the introduction of various forms of taxation, which meant that people had to work in order to obtain money for the taxes. This removal of able-bodied men from the land, and migration into industry, in turn hastened the collapse of the traditional economy, which was by now at any rate deformed by being confined to small reserve areas.

The lives of generations of South Africans have been shaped by the changing needs of capitalist industrial and agricultural development. In time there developed a relatively small population of permanent urban dwellers and a much larger group of migrant labourers whose homes are in the reserve areas, but who come to the towns to work. Their families, and those who cannot get work, are forced to remain in the rural ghettos, trying to augment the small amounts of money that the migrants are able to send home by indulging in increasingly pathetic attempts at subsistence agriculture on progressively deteriorating land.

The movement of this workforce is rigidly controlled by an increasingly sophisticated network of laws and regulations designed to ensure an efficient flow of labour to industry and agriculture. It is also designed to ensure that only as many workers are channelled as are needed, the remainder being confined to the Bantustans, there to survive as best they can.

In recent years industry, and increasingly agriculture as well, has been shaped by the ever more powerful presence of the monopoly capitalist sector. A major consequence of this is an ever-higher level of capital-intensity (mechanisation) which in turn results in a relatively smaller labour force. This, combined with a low rate of economic growth, has led to the rapid expansion in the numbers of unemployed people. In agriculture, the consequences have been particularly devastating. Here mechanisation and the need for political control have resulted in ordinary wage-labour replacing older, more 'feudal' types of labour relations such as labour tenancy, and share cropping. A large number of family groups have thus lost their means of subsistence on white farms.

The unemployed, those who have never been employed, and the many driven off white farms are also confined to the Bantustans, many in landless villages with no visible means of support. Thus the burden on the rural ghettos increases and the plight of the captive population deteriorates.

In the advanced capitalist countries of the West, colonial and imperialist exploitation

has enabled the capitalist system to achieve a relatively high living standard for a large part of the working class. The consequence has been that (at least temporarily) the working class as an organised force has been incorporated into the system as a whole. It is thus possible for a facade of democracy to be maintained.

However, in the ex-colonial countries of the 'Third World' the situation is different. Their economies deformed by the colonial period, and now controlled and emasculated by the needs of international/monopoly capital, these countries have been unable to achieve anything like the economic development of the imperialist powers. The consequence is that capitalist exploitation has manifested itself in dire poverty and deprivation. This has resulted in substantial political turmoil, which in turn has provoked vicious state repression. Here, and this includes South Africa, the state far more clearly plays the role of policeman, protecting capitalism and the ruling classes from the attempts of the subject population to free themselves.

For example, South Africa has an extensive and sophisticated network of political control to protect the pattern of economic development and privilege. The central power of the Pretoria regime is exercised around the country through the so-called 'homeland governments'. These in turn exercise power through a network of tribal authorities that control the day-to-day lives of their subjects. At each level there is an amount of status and privilege granted to those administering the system in order to ensure that they remain loyal servants.

In urban areas, the working class is separated into ghettos from which it is permitted to emerge only in order to keep the wheels of industry and commerce turning. Each aspect of their daily lives are rigidly controlled - by the factories and businesses at work, by the administration boards at home. Compliance is assured by the need to survive, which means the need to work and have a home, which means obedience.

Disobedience so easily means repatriation to the 'homelands', and that is a fate to be avoided at all costs.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT?

Having completed this sketch of the face of South Africa, attention can once again be turned to the problems that community development attempts to deal with. These problems can clearly and easily be demonstrated to be the problems of a brutal economic situation backed by a brutal political system. Further investigation will show just how inadequate the nebulous concepts of community development are for coping with these problems.

Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, the prime motivation of capitalist society is the production of wealth, and its accumulation in the hands of the ruling class. Profit rules all else. The working class produces the wealth, and the capitalists expropriate it. This is the final, determining feature of capitalist society.

In South Africa a weak and disorganised working class has been unable to win for itself a substantially higher standard of living, in terms of either wages or social services. Until forced to do so, neither capital nor the state will provide these of their own accord. The massive power of the state, and the existence of vast unemployment, makes this battle always an uneven one, with the balance tipped very much against the working class. The results of the unevenness of this battle are the 'social problems' that the proponents of community development wish to tackle. But these problems are only symptoms of a much greater problem.

The relative power of the state, combined with the search for profits, means that the lowest possible wages are paid: the consequence is, of course, dire poverty. And poverty itself has many consequences, and causes many social problems.

Capitalism only requires that the working class should live (so that they can continue to work), not that they should live well. This means that there are only two ways for the working class as a whole to get anything but the barest necessities for survival: they must earn enough to buy them, or they must have political power to demand that they be provided by the state. We have already seen that money and political power are in desperately short supply, as far as the South African working class is concerned.

Now we are able to see the origins of the 'social problems' experienced by the poor. They suffer from malnutrition because they are unable to buy food. They live in vastly over-crowded slum dwellings because it is only required that they should live in

an area from which they can get to work, and yet be politically controlled. It is not required that they should have decent housing. (The 'housing problem' is made worse by the number of 'illegal people' seeking illegal work in the towns lest they starve in the rural areas which is where the law requires them to be).

Transport is a permanent, expensive and time-wasting nightmare, because it is only required that people should be able to get to work. It does not matter that trains and buses are overcrowded, or if people have to leave home at 5-00am in order to get to work on time. The 'transport problem' too is made worse by political considerations. Apartheid requires that where possible the workforce should live in the 'homelands'. As a result, whole townships are uprooted and moved to areas as far as 50 kilometers away from the industrial centres that they serve.

Illness and disease are actually caused by inadequate food, inadequate health regulations at work, the stress of survival under difficult conditions, and the unhealthy environment caused by inadequate housing, services and recreational facilities. Adequate treatment is available to those who can afford it. The rest must depend on the totally inadequate health services provided by the state to ensure that there is not a total breakdown in the health of the working class as a whole. This, of course, would adversely affect the smooth running of commerce and industry. Education, too, is provided only to the extent that it is functional to a system interested in profits rather than people. It is aimed not at full human and social development of the individual, but rather at providing the minimum skills to a workforce. Through its authoritarian hierarchy, schooling also develops in students the respect for authority which will be required of them in the workplace and in society at large.

It is possible to produce an endless list of social problems, and their roots in the basic structure of society. It is an exercise which would be both meaningless and boring. The point, however, is clear. The 'problems of the poor' are nothing of the kind. They are simply the logical outcome of a weak and disorganised working class which, because of its lack of strength, is unable to win the victories necessary for it to improve its lot in the short term, and to gain political power in the long term.

Now we must ask the question: in the light of this concrete analysis of reality, what is the use and meaning of the abstract principles of community development that are mentioned in the early part of this paper. The answer is that these principles are in themselves worse than useless. For by focussing attention away from the essentially political nature of the problem, community development has the potential for channeling effort in false direction.

It is from this lack of political understanding that the flaws in the idea of community development are derived. The aim of all community development programmes is to 'improve the quality of life' for some particular target group of people. Without exception, these programmes aim at providing some service, such as health care or water supply; or producing a material result, such as a craft project, or increased agricultural produce.

Inevitably, such programmes can only be aimed at a relatively small number of people, at a particular 'community'. This means that there is no general attack on the problems on a national level. The assumption must be that if only enough people launched enough community development projects, then all the problems would be dealt with adequately. Health services, agriculture and the quality of life would improve without a restructuring of the economic and political situation.

Such an assumption is an absurdity. The initiation of projects on such a scale is in fact a programme of national reconstruction and development. For it to be launched at all requires a substantial change in the balance of political forces. For it to be successful would require a substantial restructuring of the political and economic life of the country. There are interesting examples of countries which have adopted community development and self-help as national programmes without attempting such a process of restructuring. The best known of these is the Harambee policy in Kenya, which inevitably has had no effect on the quality of life.

By focussing on the quality of life rather than the question of political power, community development ignores the basic prerequisite for any such improvement in the quality of life of the working class: its organisation as a political force. This, in

reality, is the fundamental task of all who genuinely wish to see such an improvement.

In fact, community development theorists and practitioners often actively discourage political analysis and involvement, particularly in a repressive political situation. It is feared that 'politics' will jeopardise the programme that they have embarked on. The national political struggle ends up being ignored in order to protect small projects which, by themselves, can have very little long term impact. (There is a tricky question of tactics and strategy here which will be dealt with later).

This isolated-project approach is also an indication of the failure of those involved in community development to analyse adequately the situation with which they are trying to deal. This approach implies that there are a series of isolated problems, each of which can be dealt with by a separate project. Thus, there is a 'health problem' and a 'problem of alcoholism' and a 'housing problem' and so on. Each of these is believed to require a separate solution. To the extent that common linkages are seen, they are seen in terms of the fact that these are problems that the poor have, rather than being recognised as derived from the overall political position of the working class.

Let us turn to an examination of some of the other principles of community development. Foremost amongst these is the concept of promoting self-reliance. This is a myth that needs to be dispelled. In the modern world there is no such thing as a self-relient individual or community. We are all part of a national and international division of labour on which we are all dependent. To pretend otherwise is simply wrong. Mining, primary and secondary industry, agricultural production, the process of distribution, the provision of services, scientific research: all these are an essential part of life, and are beyond the scope of any single country, let alone any community or person, to provide for itself.

If the fruits of these activities are unfairly distributed, if some people are excluded from benefitting to such an extent that survival becomes impossible, then the only solution is to restructure the system that excludes them. To argue that self-reliance is an alternative is to obscure this basic reality.

It may well be that in order to stay alive, and particularly in order to have reserve strength for the political struggle, the working class may be required to rely to an extrordinary degree on its own resources (the strike fund of a trade union is a good example of this sort of'self-reliance'). But to take this short term necessity, imposed by a particular system, and to turn it into a desirable goal in its own right is to commit an extremely conservative act. For it is to argue that the system that imposes this necessity cannot be changed.

Closely allied to the concept of self-reliance, is that of self help. It too is a conservative concept. It assumes that the poor can help themselves while leaving the basic structure of exploitation unchanged. The whole idea ignores the fact that the rich 'help themselves' to the surplus value which is in fact produced by the poor: ie by the working class. So the only true meaning of self-help would be that the working class should gain sufficient political power to control the distribution of wealth that it in fact produces; that it should help itself to the products of its labour. This, needless to say, is not what community development is all about.

The whole of community development is directed at the twin goals of promoting self-reliance, and helping people to help themselves. As the goals themselves have no meaning one might expect that the techniques *used to achieve those goals also leave a* great deal to be desired. Nonetheless, the techniques of community development warrant some attention as they are widely accepted as having great value, and are felt to be 'sensitive to the needs of the people'.

TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The commonly accepted first step in any community development project is to 'help the community define the real problems'. Needless to say, should anyone suggest that the real problem area is the lack of political power, exploitation, or the absence of trade unions, they will be told that these are political questions and that community development is non-political. Once these real problems have been defined, a process of 'community consultation' or 'dialogue with the community' is then initiated, in order to find the'appropriate way of solving the problem' given the 'limited resources at the disposal of the

community'.

Finally a project is launched in which the community is expected to 'participate'. Thus, under the guise of self help, volunteer labour is recruited to ensure that the project is completed.

The whole idea of 'community participation in decision making' is presented as a democratic exercise. But this assumes that there is such a thing as a 'community'. In other words, it is assumed that all the people involved in the process have an equal share of power and that their interests co-incide.

In fact, of course, imbalances in political and economic power and interest are reflected in the smallest 'community'. There exist, therefore, antagonisms rather than a unity of interests. To ignore these conflicts of interest, to behave as if an imbalance of power did not exist, is simply to re-inforce that imbalance. The idea of community participation in fact weights the whole process in the direction of the dominant and powerful groups.

Community participation allows the elite to seize control of the 'democratic' process. They are able to do so by virtue of the real power that they exercise over the rest of the community, outside of the community development process. For example, in rural areas chiefs and headmen have control over many aspects of people's lives, by virtue of the tribal authority system. This makes it very unlikely that ordinary people will go against the wishes of the chief, just because some community development agent has proclaimed a democratic procedure. The same would be true of the relationship between tenants and landlords in a squatter camp such as Winterveld, where the landlord has control over the tenant's access to living space, and often to water as well. If the landlord wants a school, who is the tenant to say that a clinic is more important?

This control operates in other ways as well. The people in the elite are likely to be better educated. Thus they will be more articulate, and better versed in meeting procedure. This will enable them to dominate and control any process of community consultation. This is particularly so, as the development agent or government official is more likely to identify with the local elite, and so overlook the patterns of domination which are being reproduced within the meeting.

The choice of problem, and the choice of solution, is likely to be dictated by the local representatives of the <u>status quo</u>, in their own interests and under their control. Yet, in the interests of community participation, all are expected to do the work. If this does not happen, standard clichés about 'lack of motivation' and 'laziness' on the part of the population are used to explain the failure of the project. Anyone with any experience in community development work will have heard this cry only too often: 'We are doing what we can for these people, but they simply refuse to help themselves'.

Sentiments of this sort are a clear indication of the ignorance of the speaker. If people will not participate there is undoubtedly a good reason: they may have been deceived in the past into participating in a scheme which benefitted only those who were already better off: non-participation may be the only form of resistance possible; it may be that they can see flaws in the project which they are unwilling to articulate; it may simply be that the daily struggle for survival leaves them with neither the time nor the resources to participate.

Rather than recognising that non-participation is a rational response to social conditions, the community development agent is likely to blame the victims of these conditions for their lack of motivation. The next step is to try to find some clever technique to 'motivate the community': in other words, to trick people into participating.

The exercise of victim-blaming is, in fact, an integral part of the ideology of community development. If people must be motivated, then obviously they are unmotivated; if the object of the exercise is to promote self-reliance (no matter how absurd the idea) then the assumption is that people cannot rely on themselves; if people are to be taught to help themselves, then it is assumed that they are helpless; if attempts are made to promote community participation and working together, the implication is that there is in fact a community of interests, but that people do not recognise this or act upon it.

The whole hidden assumption behind the concept of community development is that there are communities that are backward, and that through their own efforts, each individual

community can help itself.

In other words, the idea of community development is, in the final analysis founded on the belief in a dual economy: the belief that there is an advanced and a backward section of society, and that these two sections actually exist independently of each other. All that is needed is for the backward sector, with a little assistance from concerned groups in the advanced sector, to develop itself. Further, this logic would have us believe, this can be done bit by bit, community by community.

This is patent nonsense. The brief historical sketch earlier in this article showed quite clearly that the recent history of South Africa is the history of colonial conquest, and the incorporation of the whole society into the capitalist system. It may be that some of the old forms appear to still exist. It may seem that there are still the old tribal structures, and a subsistence agricultural sector, for example. But these are indeed mere forms; they have been drained of their old content by the growth of capitalism, and they now have an entirely new function and meaning. This function has been changed and determined by the economic and political processes of the capitalist epoch.

The dual economy thesis is nothing but a fraud. It is part of the ideological justification for capitalism. It is the ruling class washing its hands of any responsibility for the plight of the working class. And community development is part of this fraud. It is a strategy of the ruling class directed at fooling the victims of capitalism into believing that their plight is their own fault, and that it is by their own efforts that they must improve their lot. In effect, the ruling class is saying: 'there are two systems, ours and yours. The fact that yours is backward is your own fault. The struggle to improve your system is the struggle for education, for better technology, better communications, better anything. But it is under no circumstances a political struggle - a struggle for working class power, a struggle to change our system'. Thus, to move beyond the mystifications of the ruling ideology is to move from a belief in backwardness to an analysis of exploitation; it is to transcend community development and move into the realm of political struggle; it is to move away from helping the poor to organising the working class.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

None of what has been said sofar is intended to suggest that the kinds of issues that are taken up by community development organisations are unimportant. Nor is there any suggestion that attempts should not be made by the working class to gain improvements in their standard of living. The important thing is that such attempts should be seen as part of an ongoing political struggle which is more important than any single isolated project. This understanding will shape the nature of such organisational projects, and determine the tactics and strategy to be adopted.

Any action should be based on an understanding of the context in which it takes place, and how it relates to long term goals. Thus it is necessary to establish a theoretical base for what will be called community organisation for the rest of this article. (The term is unsatisfactory, as it still perpetuates the myth of community, but it will be used for the sake of convenience).

We have seen that the only rational form of organisation is that which aims at providing the working class with the organisational strength to look after its own interests; to win higher wages, better working conditions and in fact, substantial control over the work place; and to win from the state the kinds of services and amenities necessary to ensure a healthy and human living environment; an environment which is controlled and determined by the working class itself.

Trade unions are an obvious and important instrument of working class strength. They attempt to win power and better conditions for workers at the point of production - in the factories. It is here, after all, that the conflicting interests of capital and labour are to be found in their starkest form. Nonetheless, it is important that trade unions should not be seen to be the only important area of activity. There are other sites of struggle. We have seen how capitalism shapes every aspect of peoples' social, political and economic environment - every aspect of their lived reality. It is worth examining briefly the manner in which this intrusion takes place.

There are three important points here: the first is that every aspect of life is

turned into a commodity, something to be bought and sold. The second is that many aspects of life are determined directly by the needs of the production process. The third is that the defining feature of capitalism is the search for private accumulation, rather than the promotion of human well-being.

If you want anything but the most basic health care, if you want adequate space in which to live, if you want efficient transport to your place of work, you have to be able to pay for them. The same goes for social security, care facilities for children and the aged, and so on. These things are all expenses with no return on the investment. As such, they are entirely foreign to an economic system which has accumulation as its prime motivation. These services will only be produced if they can be sold at a profit. But in the very nature of capitalism, those who need these things the most, the working class, can least afford to pay for them.

The state, as the final protector of the economic order as a whole, is forced to intervene, and to provide the most basic of such services to the working class. It does so for two reasons: to ensure that the working class is physically able to reproduce itself (otherwise the system would collapse); and to attempt to defuse the political time-bomb that lies hidden beneath the desperation of utter poverty.

In most 'Third World' countries, and in South Africa, even these basic services are by and large only provided for those actually in employment. However, as such a large proportion of the working class is unemployed, it means that the services are continually overloaded and are unable to cope with the demands that are made of them.

Here again the system is caught in a fatal contradiction. Capitalist development has had the effect of progressively eroding the living standards of the working class as a whole. Yet the productive forces unleashed by capitalist development have, for the first time, created the possibility of a good life for all. The material abundance in which the ruling class rejoices is living proof of this possibility. The working class is thus given an incentive to improve its lot.

In the working situation, an individual worker may be able to 'advance' through promotion and pay increases. But the working class as a whole must depend on the collective power of the trade union movement to win a general improvement. Similarly, in other spheres of life a worker may, by saving, be able to afford a private doctor. However, it is only as a collectively organised force that the working class will be able to demand a well-run national health service that provides adequate care for all.

Capitalism thus creates the possibility of adequate material wealth and living conditions for all. At the same time it creates the need for collective action by the working class to make this potential a reality. From this analysis, there emerges clearly the need for organisation of the working class in the communities in which they live. Although this organisation may take up the same issues with which the community development school is concerned, it does so in a very different way and from a perspective that is self-consciously political.

Local problems are tackled, not only for their own sake (although this is obviously important if cynical political manipulation is to be avoided), but also with the intention of expanding political understanding and organisational strength. Community organisation seeks to clarify and explain how local problems are in fact linked to, and derived from, the general structures of exploitation and oppression. In addition, such organisation would develop with the intention of contributing to the process of resisting and challenging these structures. In the long run, when sufficiently self-confident, local community organisation will be used to make demands on the system, and to win victories from it. Such victories might include resistance to increases in rental or transportation costs, an improvement in health services, or the creation, at state expense, of adequate health care facilities, to offer only a few examples.

There is an unfortunate tendency amongst self-professed radical groups to dismiss <u>anything</u> given by the state as 'window dressing','irrelevant concessions', or 'attempts at co-option'. Of course, co-option and window dressing are important dangers to be guarded against. But if something is won as a result of genuine organisation, it should be regarded as a victory for that organisation. It not only reflects some small shift in the balance of forces, it also helps to accelerate the shift by giving the community organisation increased

power and confidence.

To argue that any concession to working class demands is merely co-option is to argue that nothing will change until everything does. It is to say that change will only come through a sudden spontaneous show of working class power on a grand scale - although where that power will come from, and how it will be organised and channeled is left unsaid.

A danger to be guarded against is that community organisations may become trapped for all time in small local issues, and so not play their proper role in the struggle for change on a national level. This trap will be avoided if the community organisations do not define themselves too narrowly, and are prepared to enter into joint action with other groups on matters of importance to the working class as a whole. It is important that such organisations should continually examine the possibility of participating in actions such as, for example, the Fatti's and Monis boycott. It is also crucial that the importance of such issues should be discussed with, and explained to, the membership. There are of course tactical questions involved here. Community organisations must ask themselves: is this the right moment for such activities? Do we have adequate support to be able to engage in such activities in a meaningful way? Do we have the organisational resources to do this? These are questions which can only be answered by the specific community organisation at the moment that they become relevant. It is important that community organisations should have a built in commitment to democracy, both as a national goal, and in terms of their own internal workings. Firstly, this will protect them against being manipulated by elitist political groups who wish to use them to gain support for their own political programmes. This is important. There are such groups who, seeing the strength of the working class, hope to ride to political power themselves on the backs of the workers, and in fact have little interest in seeing the workers themselves gain political power.

Democratic organisations are also less susceptible to the repressive power of the state, and are much more difficult to destroy. Such democratic organisations are not leaderless, but individual leaders are less important. As the organisation acts and grows, all participants will gain experience in day to day organisational work, and so the organisation will be better able to survive the removal of individual leaders.

Perhaps the most important aspect of democratic community organisation is that it embodies, in material form, the idea of true popular democracy, of people controlling their own lives and institutions. It puts the idea of such a form of democracy on the agenda for history, demonstrates its possibility, and the need to strive for its development in the face of attempts by the state and capital to increase their control over every aspect of peoples' lives.

'Community participation' as proposed by the theorists of community development is based on a belief of a harmony of interests which can be expressed through a programme of 'community consultation'. This is very different from democratic organisation, which recognises that society is characterised by class conflicts, and seeks to unite the working class to resist the power of the capitalist state, and organises this resistance along democratic lines.

Apart from beginning to create the reality of democracy, there is another crucial way in which community organisation will help to shape the future. By its very definition, community organisation engages in those areas which are most deformed and stunted by the workings of capitalism. It attempts to tackle these issues, to give the victims the power that will enable them to create new and improved conditions for themselves. As such, community organisation is involved with all aspects of life, trying to transform them into something more humane. Those who are involved in community organisation will gain a clear insight into what is wrong with society as it is now, and therefore also into what a new society will look like, in which genuine communities will exercise genuine power over their own conditions of existence. Community organisations will therefore begin to develop the idea of a new society. They will also, through their work, begin to develop the living embryo of this new society within the womb of the old.

In short then, community organisations see themselves as the democratically organised expression of the short term needs, and the long therm goals, of the working class. As such, they must see themselves as part of a

national struggle for the creation of a just and equal society. This means that community organisation is the exact opposite of community development programmes, which are the last desperate efforts of a ruling class to preserve the dying social structure over which it presides.

THE TREASON TRIAL: 'NEVER ON OUR KNEES'

THE LAST ISSUE of Work In Progress (No. 10, November 1979) detailed the course of the Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial from the first appearance in court of two of the accused until the trial judge postponed the hearing for judgement. It will be recalled that this was South Africa's first Treason Trial since the famous trial of 1956-1961, where the state's attempt to prove that the Congress Alliance was involved in High Treason failed when all the accused were acquitted.

The Pietermaritzburg trial involved 12 accused, all alleged members of the African National Congress (ANC). They faced a main charge of High Treason, with 43 alternative counts framed under the Terrorism Act, and further charges of conspiracy to commit murder. As detailed in WIP 10, the accused refused to participate in the trial after the presiding judge, Justice Hefer, ruled that certain state evidence was to be heard in closed court, in camera. The accused dismissed defence counsel and maintained a militant attitude of non-participation throughout the remainder of the trial. During the course of the trial itself, this attitude led to the sentencing of two of the accused, John Sekete and Mandlenkosi Hadebe, to 6 month sentences for contempt of court.

Court reconvened in Pietermaritzburg on 79.11.12 for the passing of judgement. South African Police were involved in highly elaborate security arrangements on this day, and throughout the course of judgement. All people entering the area around the court-house were subject to body searches. Squads of police bearing riot guns, rifles and sub-machine guns guarded all entrances and exits to the court grounds and buildings, while vehicles in the vicinity were searched. Armed police patrolled roads in the vicinity of the court buildings, and took up positions in the grounds of an adjacent college.

While this siege-like atmosphere prevailed outside the court-room, in court the 12 accused filed into the specially-constructed shatter-proof glass dock singing freedom songs, and shouting slogans to the packed public gallery. When the accused turned their backs on the judge, and facing the public gallery gave power salutes and continued singing, presiding judge Hefer found them guilty of contempt of court, and stated that sentence in that regard would be passed at the end of the trial. Despite this, the accused continued their singing during various parts of the judgement, and on a number of occasions burst out laughing. "I will keep this in mind when I come to sentence" warned the judge.

Dealing with the first accused, John Sekete, Justice Hefer found that he left South Africa and underwent military training

in Angola and Russia. During August 1978 he was involved in a running battle with South African Police at Witkleigat in BophuthaTswana. Automatic weapons were used by both the police and guerilla forces, and one of the insurgents threw a hand-grenade at police during the course of the battle. Despite this, there were no casualties. After this engagement, in which Sekete escaped, police found a hand-grenade and pistol at the site of the battle, and discovered nearby a guerilla base camp containing supplies and ammunition.

After his arrest by BophuthaTswanan authorities in November 1978, he led police to his mother's home in Koster where a buried pistol was found. Subsequently, he took the police to Witkleigat where 40 grenades, 62 blocks of TNT, 100 percussion caps and 3,000 rounds of ammunition were found, together with books on Marxism and general information on explosives. As a detainee, he subsequently pointed out other supply depots and base camps to police. His finger-prints were also found on a bottle at a base camp.

One of the allegations against Sekete - that he attempted to recruit people for ANC activities at Phokeng in BophuthaTswana - was dismissed by the judge on the basis of the unreliability of evidence given by two state witnesses.

The second accused, Tladitsagae Moses Molefe, was found to have left South Africa after the Soweto rebellion of June 1976, and undergone military training in Angola, Mocambique and Tanzania. During October 1978 he and two other guerilla fighters were involved in a gun battle with members of the BophuthaTswana Home Guard, which includes members of the South African Police 'seconded' to this 'independent' Bantustan. In the ensuing engagement, two guerillas were killed, while Molefe threw a grenade at one Warrant Officer CR de Witt, and managed to escape. The grenade did not explode. Molefe was subsequently arrested, and identified by de Witt as having thrown the grenade; a torch near the site of the battle was also found to have his finger-prints on it.

Jeffrey Ramaseka Legoabe, the third accused, was found by the judge to have undergone military training in Angola, and returned to South Africa with a pistol and handgrenade which he concealed in a Soweto house.

Ngobeni, Mapheto and Komane, accused numbers four, five and six respectively, were found to have undergone military training. Komane was also found to have been active in the delivery of supplies to trainees, and involved in their actual training itself.

At one stage during judgement, Daniel Mange (accused no. 12) chanted "down with capitalism, down with fascism, down with racism", and also appeared to be leading the others in song. In response, Justice Hefer warned that "You may think that it will not make a difference at this stage what you do in court. I warn you for the last time, particularly accused 12 (Mange), who is the leader of the little sing-songs, that what I do will make a difference".

In another incident, three of the accused managed to smuggle placards into the dock, and turning to the public gallery, displayed the following messages:

"apartheid is high treason";

"apartheid is a crime against humanity";

"never on our knees".

Dealing with the case against the seventh and eighth accused (Titus Maleka and Sydney Choma), it was held that the statements they had made to police after their arrest, 'confessing' to receiving military training in Moscow, were admissable against them, and hence accepted as evidence. In January 1979 Maleka and three others crossed the Swaziland-South African border, and made their way to the Groblersdal area in the Eastern Transvaal. They were carrying a 'fair amount' of arms and ammunition, and once in the Groblersdal district, both Maleka and Choma had access to large amounts of arms and explosives.

Accused number eleven, Vusumuzi Zulu, was found to have undergone military training. However, the allegation that he had investigated the oil pipeline at Merebank, Durban, with the intention of sabotaging it, was not proved against him.

The final accused, James Daniel Mange, was found to have undergone military training in Russia and Angola, and planned an attack on the Whittlesea police station and magistrate's courts. It was intended that law enforcement officers be killed in the attack. While in detention, he had repaired a mal-function in a Russian-made anti-aircraft gun in a fraction of the time it took an experienced SADF officer;

he had also detected and repaired a malfunction in a few minutes which a military officer had been unable to do in half-an-hour. This showed that he had a proficiency and expert knowledge of weapons.

Three accomplices of the accused who gave evidence for the state between them identified all of the accused as having been co-trainees at ANC camps in Russia, Mocambique, Angola, Zambia and/or Tanzania.

In the light of evidence tendered and accepted, Justice Hefer found all accused guilty of High Treason, but not guilty on the counts of incitement to murder. No finding was made on the Terrorism Act charges as this would have duplicated the treason findings.

Despite having been found guilty of offences carrying a possible death sentence, the accused retained their attitude of non-participation in the trial. Asked whether they wished to say anything in mitigation of sentence, one accused replied "I consider the question contemptuous and insulting", while Mange responded "yours is not to ask but to do".

In passing sentence, the judge said that most of the twelve accused had lived in and around Soweto at the time of the June 1976 rebellion, and because the political climate was unusual at that time, he would treat this as a mitigating factor. In this context, the following sentences were handed down:

Sekete, Legoabe, Ngobeni, Komane, Maleka, Choma, Hadebe and Mthetwa (accused numbers 1,3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10):
16 years imprisonment for High Treason;
12 months for contempt of court. (Sekete and Hadebe were already serving 6 months for contempt).

Molefe (accused number 2):
18 years for High Treason;
12 months for contempt of court. According to the judge, only the fact that his throwing of a grenade at the police was not pre-meditated, saved him from the death penalty.

Mapheto (accused number 5):
14 years for High Treason;
12 months for contempt of court.

Zulu (accused number 10):
13 years for High Treason;
12 months for contempt of court.

Turning to the final accused, James Daniel Mange, the judge referred to him as a 'thoroughly objectionable and repulsive character in more ways than one" who had been the "obvious instigator" of many of the disturbances in court during the trial. To a shocked court he passed sentence:
Death, plus 18 months imprisonment for contempt.
On hearing this, a seemingly composed Mange jumped to his feet, raised a clenched fist in the air, and shouted 'Amandla' - power.

Reaction was swift to the passing of these sentences. The Daily News editorialised that

> "in sentencing a black man to hang and eleven others to a total of 184 years in jail.....Mr Justice Hefer....summed up the essence of this stormy episode (as follows): 'Society cannot allow that a man who cannot resolve the position through constitutional means to do it in an unconstitutional manner'. Who or what is it that prevents such people from 'resolving the position through constitutional means'? True, there are avenues, but only the ideologically blinded would dare call them effective in realistic terms....(T)he white rulers and those who support them might pause to ponder the depth of bitterness which will persist unless meaningful change is achieved in South Africa" (Daily News, 79.11.16).

On 79.11.16, the South African Embassy in London was picketed by students, church groups, members of AAM and ANC protesting against Mange's death sentence. In Holland, national Television broadcast an ANC call asking the Dutch people to intervene against Mange's sentence.

The Student Representative Council at Cape Town University called on the State President to commute Mange's sentence. They believed that the 12 convicted in the trial were prisoners of war, and should be treated as such.

> "The behaviour in court of the 12 men illustrates the belief of the majority of South Africans that the laws of this country are neither mutual nor just and simply serve to bolster and secure the interests of the ruling minority".

The Justice and Reconciliation Commission of the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches called the events leading up to the trial, and the trial itself, an

> "appalling tragedy...brought about...by the disastrous policies which have been pursued in this country for many years... only a rapid and basic change in political and social policies can prevent the continuation and escalation of the overall South African tragedy".

Subsequent to the trial, Mange and Zulu applied for leave to appeal. In the application, it was argued that
+the judge had failed to take account of the fact that constitutional means for political

and social reform were not available to the accused;
+no regard was given to the fact that the acts the accused were convicted of were done in the name of social justice and political reform;
+Mange had not caused death or injury to any person, did not have weapons at the time of arrest, caused no damage to property, and had not used any weapons or explosives while in South Africa.

The application for leave to appeal against sentence was successful in the case of Mange, but refused in Zulu's case. Argument on Mange's sentence will therefore now take place in the Appeal Court at a later stage.

COURTS

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS.

Archibald Moaty Mzinyathi (24) and Bingo Bentley (Mbojeni) (46).
Charge: Terrorism. Mzinyathi is alleged by the state to have joined the ANC in 1978 and undergone military training in the Soviet Union between March and July 1977; on his return to South Africa, Bentley allegedly harboured Mzinyathi, knowing that he was a trained guerilla. According to the charge sheet, Mzinyathi was transported to a farm in the Eastern Transvaal to hide from the police; Bentley is then stated to have fetched him from the Eastern Transvaal and hidden him in his flat.

The state's first witness had been in police detention for 160 days when first brought to court to testify. After lengthy argument, presiding magistrate G. Steyn ruled that the evidence be heard in camera and the witness not be identified. The press was, however, permitted to remain during court proceedings.

The witness, warned as an accomplice, testified that, together with Bentley, arrangements were made to both hide Mzinyathi in the Eastern Transvaal, and transport him back to the Soweto area. Under cross-examination, the witness admitted that he was terrified of Major Arthur Cronwright of the security police, John Vorster Square, and thought that at one stage the Major was likely to assault him. After being interrogated he made a sworn statement to a magistrate, and was then held in solitary confinement in a cell at John Vorster Square.

Mzinyathi testified that, while in detention, he was tortured by security police to force him to 'confess' to being a trained guerilla. He described how he was made to strip naked, handcuffed, and made to squat. A broomstick was then placed between his knees and arms, and the broomstick was lifted and suspended between a table and chair. He was hit and pulled while hanging in this position. Mzinyathi also claimed that he was fed drugged coffee by the police, which made him feel weak. When his head was covered with a wet sack, he passed out. In denying the validity of the 'confession' made, as well as the charges against him, Mzinyathi said that he had been in Lesotho during the period the state claimed he was in Russia, and had been granted refugee status there.

The defence then applied to court for evidence to be taken on commission in Lesotho, to prove that Mzinyathi had in fact been in Lesotho at the time the state claimed he was undergoing military training in Russia. Senior officials in Lesotho signed sworn affidavits presented to the court, saying that they had contact with Mzinyathi in Lesotho during the period involved. However, this application was turned down by the presiding magistrate, who claimed that it was important for the evidence to be given in court where he could observe the witnesses, rather than testimony be given on commission in Lesotho.

It is reported that the magistrate's refusal to allow evidence to be taken on commission in Lesotho is to be appealed against. The trial continues in the Johannesburg Regional Court, having been transferred from Krugersdorp, where it was initially heard.

Kedibone Christopher Mathebe (21), Colin Makgalo Kotu (23), Simon Mashigo (19), and Elias Maliga (19).
Charge: Terrorism. The accused, all members of the Soweto Students League (SSL) are alleged to have set fire to a Soweto school on 16th August 1978; incited others to set fire to the house of a school principal in Sebokeng, near Vereeniging; and organised riotous activities at the funeral of Robben Island prisoner Johannes Mateobane.

The trial is due to continue in the Kempton Park Supreme Court at the end of February 1980.

Mandla Jim Magudulela (41).
Charge: Terrorism. The accused, manager of

a Soweto music group, was alleged during 1976 to have transported Petrus Kgwadi and 5 other youths to an ANC house in Swaziland, so that they could go for military training. Magudulela claimed that, while in police detention, he was electrically shocked in a room called the 'waarkamer' (truth room) at John Vorster Square. Police denied this, and presiding magistrate G. Steyn accepted a 'confession' made to the police by the accused as valid evidence.

A state witness, who by order of court may not be identified, testified that he and others were transported to Swaziland by Magudulela in November 1976. There they met a member of the ANC. After three weeks of study they went to Mocambique, Angola and Russia where they underwent military training. The group returned to South Africa in March 1978, but were arrested two days later in Warmbathe.

The presiding magistrate, rejected Magudulela's evidence that he had been tortured by police.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years.

(Kempton Park Regional Court, 79.11.20).

Zinjiva Winston Nkonde (37).

Charge: Terrorism, and Internal Security Act. The accused, detained by security police on 12th December 1979 while on a trip from Swaziland to Lesotho, is an alleged member of the ANC. While in detention his brother, suspended president of AZAPO, brought an application before court to have the detention declared illegal. The outcome of this application is still pending.

In the meantime, Nkondo has been charged, and it is reported that he will appear in the Bloemfontein Supreme Court on March 10th. The state alleges that Nkondo joined the ANC, and underwent training in the German Democratic Republic as a journalist to qualify himself for ANC propaganda activities, and that he headed the ANC Publicity Department in Lusaka during 1978 and 1979. It further claims that the purpose of Nkondo's trip to Lesotho, when he was arrested, was to establish an information and publicity unit in Lesotho, and recruit people for the Lusaka Department. Finally, it is alleged that Nkondo underwent military training in Angola during 1979.

Elias Sana Nkumbi (20) and a 17-year old youth.

Charge: The state claims that Nkumbi tried to recruit the 17-year old for military training, and that together they attempted to recruit a further 6 people to undergo training. The offences allegedly took place in Soweto during January 1979. The trial continues on 14th April 1980 (Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.01.28).

Njegabantu Sithole (21), Mandla James Sibishi (20), Ramatlotlo Moses (21), Christopher Sitembiso Nzuza (20), Stanley Themba Mthembu, (19), and two youths aged 17 and 16.

Charge: Terrorism. All 7 accused are charged with conspiring to leave South Africa for military training, and recruiting 19 others to leave the country for training. The acts allegedly took place during July and August 1978.

Sithole faces a further charge of recruiting 4 youths for training between February and December 1977. The trial is being held in camera because two of the accused are minors. (Durban Regional Court, 80.01.16).

A 17-year old youth.

Charge: Terrorism. The youth is charged with recruiting a person for military training, as well as undergoing training himself between March 1978 and January 1979 in Lesotho, and returning to South Africa with the intention of disturbing the maintenance of law and order. The trial continues on 1st April 1980. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.01.15).

Jeremiah Kgokong Majatladi (23), Thami Mkwanazi (38), Ronald Ephraim Mamoepa (18), Lebogang Christy Mokone (18), Petrus Karel Senabe (22), Andrew Moeti Phala (18), Deacon Sekibela Mathe (22), Cornelius Mapheti Leeuw (18) and a 16-year old youth.

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that the accused conspired to recruit people to leave South Africa and undergo military training; some of the accused are also charged with attempting to undergo training themselves. Evidence of police tapping the telephone of Post reporter Thami Mkwanazi was led during the course of the trial. Certain of the accused were photographed at the Post offices in Pretoria: the state claims that this was a prelude to leaving South Africa for training, while the defence has suggested it was part of a protest campaign against detention without trial. The accused have denied that it was their intention to recruit others, or go themselves, for military training.

Judgement is to be given in this trial on March 11th 1980.

(Pretoria Regional Court, 80.02.06).

Frederick B Phillips (27), Roger A Schroeder (25), James V Issel (45) and Clarence W Johnson (24).
Charge: Terrorism. The state claims that by burning down a hall in Worcester during April 1978, the accused endangered the maintenance of law and order. Some of the accused made statements to the police while in detention, allegedly confessing to various crimes. They claim they were assaulted by security police. In the middle of the trial, advocate BM Kies, a noted Cape political figure who was appearing for the accused, collapsed and died while addressing the court on the admissability of the statements.
(Hermanus Regional Court, 79.12.19).

Sithembiso Ernest Ngobese (26), Themba Patrick Nxumalo (26), Eric Fanavele Mlaba (22), Nhlanhla Victor Ngidi (25), Kwenzakhe Elijah Mlaba (26), Penuel Mpampa Maduna (26), and Ms Sibongile Albertina Kubheka (27).
Charge:Terrorism. All the accused were charged with recruiting 21 people for military training between May and December 1977; Ngobese, Nxumalo and Eric Mlaba faced a second charge of attempting to leave South Africa during November-December 1977 for military training.

At the end of the state case, Maduna and Elijah Malaba were discharged. Eric Mlaba and Ngidi were discharged on one count, but still faced a second count of Terrorism. At the end of the trial, Kubheka, Eric Mlaba and Ngidi were acquitted on all counts. Ngobese and Nxumalo were found guilty on one count of Terrorism, that of assisting people to leave South Africa for military training.
Sentence: 5 years each.
(Durban Regional Court, 79.12.04).

Ally Kholisile Lumkwane (22), David Dumisani Maduna (20) and Bonginkosi Patrick Maisela (24).
Charge: 3 counts of Terrorism. The accused are alleged to have undergone military training under the auspices of the ANC, recruited others to undergo such training, and possessed arms and ammunition. The trial is due to begin in the Kempton Park Supreme Court on March 17th, 1980).

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.

Jaconia Babsy Matabane (32) and Catherine Mathibe (29).
Charge: The accused were both charged under the Internal Security Act (old Suppression of Communism Act), in that they allegedly possessed copies of ANC pamphlets. After a number of court appearances, charges were dropped against Mathibe, and the state proceeded against only Matabane.

Matabane, a Soweto teacher, was alleged by the state to have been in possession of copies of Sechaba, Workers Unity, Mayibuye, and 48 ANC stickers. In evidence, Matabane claimed that he was assaulted by police, and thereby forced to make a statement before a magistrate confessing to possessing the ANC material.
Verdict: Guilty, except for possession of ANC stickers.
Sentence: R120 (or 50 days), plus a further 2 months, suspended for 5 years.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 79.12.04).

Quayum Sayed (29).
Charge: Quoting a banned person, namely Robert Sobukwe. The quote appeared in a BPC pamphlet printed by a business in which the accused had some involvement. One paragraph dealt with 'Background to the Sharpeville uprising', and allegedly quoted Sobukwe in this regard.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 9 months, suspended for 4 years.
(Cape Town Regional Court, 79.10.29).

'Oupa' Setenane Gerald Segone (21).
Charge: The accused, a matriculation student at a Soweto High School, is charged with furthering the aims of the ANC, and recruiting members for the same organisation. While in detention, Segone made a 'confession', but claimed that this was as a result of being tortured and assaulted by security police at John Vorster Square. Of interest is the fact that Segone claims to have been tortured in a room at John Vorster Square known as the 'Waarkamer' (truthroom). Allegations of torture in this room have now become fairly common in political trials involving John Vorster Square security police. The confession was accepted as evidence by the presiding magistrate, JL de Villiers. Judgement will be given on March 12th.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.02.15).

CONTRAVENTION OF BANNING ORDERS:
(Internal Security Act).

Thandisizwe 'Tizzah' Mazibuko (29).
Charge: 2 counts of contravening his banning order. Mazibuko, secretary of the Soweto 'Committee of 10' until his banning, was alleged by the state to have associated with others at a gathering, and attended a meeting of the 'Committee of 10' at the DOCC hall in Soweto.

A security policeman told the court that Mazibuko was at the meeting; an ex member of the 'Committee of 10' denied that the accused was present at the meeting.
Verdict: Not guilty.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.02.04).

Patrick Smangaliso Mkhatshwa (38).
Charge: Contravention of his banning and house arrest order. The state alleges that Mkhatshwa, who is confined to his house in Soshanguve between 6pm and 6am daily, accepted visitors at his house on June 15th and June 20th 1979, thereby contravening his restriction order. The trial is due to be heard on March 7th 1980.
(Pretoria Regional Court, 80.01.30).

Rev. David Russell (40).
Charge: Possession of a banned book, namely 'Biko' by D. Woods; distributing or publishing a document entitled 'Crossroads residents personal accounts of conditions during the period of arrest following the September 1978 police raids; and two counts of contravening his banning order by leaving his home between 6pm and 6am during April and August 1979.

Russell has pleaded guilty on one count of contravening his restriction order, and admitted possession of the 'Biko' book.
(Cape Town Regional Court, 80.02.01).

Govin Reddy (35).
Charge: Contravening his banning order by holding a dinner party at his home on 8th June 1979. The party was raided by police who photographed the accused and his guests.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 30 days, suspended for 3 years.
(Durban Regional Court, 79.12.11).

Eddie Daniels (51).
Charge: Contravention of his recently imposed banning order, served on him after 15 years imprisoned on Robben Island. Early in January 1980, charges were dropped.

SABOTAGE TRIALS.

Ariel Sephiri Hlanyane (20), Andrew Thabiso Ratsomo (20), Abraham Thinane (43) and Solomon Phofu (25).
The accused, together with Elias Jimmy Mabaso and Johannes Matsobane, were charged and convicted of Sabotage in the Vereeniging Regional Court in May 1978. They were found guilty of burning down two schools, and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. Subsequently Johannes Matsobane died while being held on Robben Island; Mabaso was charged with another series of offences (Terrorism, Sabotage, murder) but was acquitted on all counts.

Their original conviction was then taken on review to the Supreme Court, where it was found that there were grave irregularities in the trial proceedings. Sentence and conviction were set aside, and the 5 accused were released. Mabaso, a past member of the Soweto Students League (SSL) went missing, and is believed to have left South Africa; the remaining four accused have been re-charged with the same series of events they were convicted of in 1978.
(Vereeniging Regional Court, 79.12.20).

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.

Ilona Kleinschmidt and Jackie Bosman.
During May 1978 the appellants were subpoenaed in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act to answer questions on a visit they made to Winnie Mandela, who is banned and banished to Brandfort in the Orange Free State. The questions related to a possible contravention of Mandela's restriction order. Both Bosman and Kleinschmidt refused to answer the questions put to them in the Bloemfontein Magistrate's Court: as a result of this refusal, Kleinschmidt was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, Bosman to 4 months.

They appealled against both sentence and conviction to the Free State Supreme Court, but in September 1979 the appeal was dismissed. A further appeal was made to the Appellate Division, but at the end of November 1979 this, too, was rejected.

In mid-December they began serving their sentences. Shortly thereafter, it became known that they were being held in virtual solitary confinement - separated from each other and having no contact with

other prisoners. After representations were made to the Minister of Prisons, it was announced that they would be permitted to spend days together, but would be locked in separate cells at night.

Hlubi Keith Bityana (24) and Douglas Dalisile (25).
As reported in WIP 10, both of the accused were found guilty on charges of Terrorism, which related to undergoing of, or recruitment for, military training. Dalisile received a 7 year sentence, Bityana 5 years. They both applied to the trial court for leave to appeal, inter alia contesting the admissability of confessions made to security police. Leave to appeal was refused by the trial judge.
(Kempton Park Supreme Court, 79.11.27).

Rev. David Russell, Bishop Manwabisi Motalongwa Rev. Dick O'Riordan, and Rev. Moses Molotsane.
The appellants, members of the minister's fraternal serving black congregations, were originally convicted for producing two publications, namely 'The role of the riot police in the burnings and killings, Nyanga, Cape Town, Christmas 1976', and 'Message for 1977 for those in South Africa'. Inter alia, the documents argued that riot police had been partially responsible for the clashes between migrant and other workers in Nyanga, which marked the last week of December 1976.

Russell was fined R350 and given a 180-day suspended sentence, while the remaining 3 accused were sentenced to a R200 fine, and 90 days imprisonment, conditionally suspended.

They have now appealled against both conviction and sentence for producing and distributing 'undesirable' publications.
(Cape Town Supreme Court, 79.11.26).

Petrus Makae and Jacob Tlelema. The appellants, both members of the Young Christian Workers (YCW) were detained by security police in June 1978. Their subsequent appearance in court, charged with Sabotage, followed the detention of numerous members of the YCW. After a trial in the Kroonstad Regional Court, both Makae and Tlelema were convicted of conspiring to undertake petrol-bomb and explosive attacks, and conspiring to organise a strike of black workers on June 16th 1978, so that they could attend June 16th commemoration services. They were sentenced to 5 years imprisonment each.

They appealled against conviction, and in November 1979, after some 17 months in prison, their appeal was successful, and both conviction and sentence were set aside. The original trial was widely interpreted as part of a process of attack by the state on the Young Christian Workers, a group involved, inter alia, in organising workers in South Africa.
(Free State Supreme Court, 79.11.18).

Bethal PAC trial.
16 of the accused in this matter, having been refused leave to appeal against sentence and/or conviction by the trial court, which had found them guilty of undertaking PAC activities, petitioned the Appeal Court for leave to appeal.

All of the petitions were refused, which means that possible appeal proceedings have now reached an end in this matter.
(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 79.12.10)

Joshua Masula (23), Jessjee Hill (19), Shaffel Stevens (18), Johannes Mallies (19), Abrahm Davids (21), Gerald Jacobs (18), Isak Michaels (22), Adam Fortuin (19), and 5 youths.
The appellants were among 21 people convicted of public violence in the Worcester Regional Court in regard to an incident at Robertson on a September night in 1976. Among other things, stones were thrown at police and streetlights, a roadblock of burning tree-stumps was set up, and a security guard was assaulted. Sentences ranged from 3 years to 7 lashes. The accused appealed to the Cape Supreme Court, which confirmed conviction, but altered sentence as follows:
a 17-year old: 2 years to 7 lashes.
Hill and Michaels: 3 years to 2 years, plus 1 year suspended.
Stevens and Jacobs: 2 years to 18 months, 12 months being suspended.
Mallies: 2 years to 18 months.
Davids: 2 years to 1 year, plus 1 year suspended.
Fortuin: 3 years to 18 months.

They appealed further to the Appeal Court, which turned down the appeal, and confirmed both sentence and conviction as altered in the Supreme Court hearing.
(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 79.12.20).

Mountain Qumbela (48) and Mathews Lumka Huna (27).
The appellants were convicted of contravening the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts in

1978 in the Malmesbury Regional Court, and sentenced to 10 years each. Inter alia, they were found guilty of recruiting a number of youths for military training.

They appealed against conviction and sentence: in regard to sentence, Qumbela's was reduced to 6 years; conviction was confirmed.
(Cape Town Supreme Court, 79.12.20).

GENERAL TRIALS OF INTEREST.

Rev. Robert Robertson (52).
Charge: Malicious damage to property. The state claimed that by sticking posters reading "spare this house: people need it" on houses due to be demolished by the Department of Community Development, the accused committed an offence.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: R50-00. Robertson refused to pay the fine, and asked for an alternative sentence involving prison. When the presiding magistrate refused this, Robertson left court without paying. However, on the arrival of a messenger of the court at his home with a warrant to attach R50 worth of furniture, the fine was paid.
(Johannesburg Magistrate's Court, 79.11.27).

William Edward 'Bill' Gardiner (22).
Charge: Possession of literature declared unlawful to possess. The state claimed that Gardiner possessed two publications, brought out by NUSAS, and Students for Social Democracy (SSD). Gardiner admitted that the publications were found in his office, but denied that he knew they were banned for possession. After a police warrant officer admitted that the proclamation prohibiting possession of the publications was published only a few days before the police raid on Gardiner's office, the state accepted the accused's plea of not guilty, and he was acquitted.
(Retreat Regional Court, 79.12.14).

Alf Kumalo (42).
Charge: Photographing people in police custody, and obstructing the police in the course of their duties. The charges related to an incident at a commemoration service held at the Regina Mundi Church, Soweto, on June 16th 1977. After 10 remand appearances in court, spanning a period of 2 1/2 years, charges were finally withdrawn by the state.
(Johannesburg Magistrate's Court, 79.12.04).

Ameen Akhalwaya (33), Mike Norton (40), Shirley Lua (29), Samuel Pop (48), Stephen Young (51), and Alice Jacobus (42).
Charge: The accused, 4 of whom are journalists and members of the Writers Association of South Africa (WASA), were alleged to have entered an african area (Soweto) without permits. They were arrested at a roadblock on April 29th 1979, together with a representative of the International Federation of Journalists, Ole Johan Eriksen, who was released by police after questioning. The accused refused to plead to the charge.
Verdict: Not guilty. The presiding magistrate found that it was not possible to establish whether the accused were within a 'reserved' area at the time of arrest.
(Johannesburg Magistrates Court, 79.12.12).

Terence Charles William Meehan (45).
Charge: Official Secrets Act. The accused, a British citizen, is employed by Atlas Aircraft Corporation. The presiding magistrate has ruled that the whole case is to be held in camera; accordingly, no details of charges are available.
(Kempton Park Regional Court, 80.01.22).

Dilshad Cachalia, Ghaleb Cachalia, Moira Levy, Jenny Schindler, Anton Harber, Joachim Schonfeldt, Jeff Locke, Richard Chambers, Frank van Schaik, and Harriet Gavshon.
Charge: Malicious damage to property. The accused were alleged to have painted a protest mural on a wall of a house in Vrededorp, Johannesburg, in protest against evictions from the area, and its declaration as a 'white' residential area.
Verdict: Not guilty.
(Brixton Magistrates Court, 79.11.06).

TRIALS IN 'INDEPENDENT' BANTUSTANS.

Alpheus Mothipe (23), Karabo Modibe (18), Alpheus Kungwane (20), Gerald Seabelo (20) and Emmanuel Madibe (29).
Charge: Contravention of the BophuthaTswanan Security Laws. Details of the charges were not available at the time of writing.
(Odi Magistrate's Court, 79.12.18).

Florence Mancotywa (48).
Charge: 3 counts under the Transkei Public Security Act. The accused, publicity secretary of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, and representative of Sabata Dalindyebo

in the Transkei 'parliament', was detained by police in July 1979, and appeared in court at the end of November 1979. She is alleged to have made statements likely to cause feelings of hostility between population groups in the Transkei.
(Umtata Regional Court, 80.01.29).

Chief Justice Mpondombini Sigcau (36), Chief Twentyman Ntsikayezwe Sigcau (32), Mahonono Ngcwangule (56) and Ms Tshibani Voko (36).
Charge:Possession of firearms and ammunition. The two Sigcau brothers are the sons of deceased Transkei president, Botha Sigcau, and brothers to dismissed cabinet minister Stella Sigcau.
Verdict: Justice Sigcau and Ms Voko: guilty. Twentyman Sigcau and Ngcwangule: not guilty.
Sentence: Sigcau: R100 or 100 days.
Voko: R20 or 40 days.
(Umtata Regional Court, 80.01.09).

Babini Pikashe (49).
Charge:Transkei Constitution Act. The accused, an organiser for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, was alleged to have written letters to a newspaper which violated the 'dignity' of the Transkei 'state president'.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: R200 or 200 days, plus a further 100 days, conditionally suspended.
(Umtata Regional Court, 79.12.17).

Chief Jeremiah Moshesh.
Charge: Transkei Public Security Act. The accused was formerly a Transkei Cabinet Minister, but after being fired from his post, joined the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. He was charged with making statements likely to undermine the authority of the state, the sovereignty of parliament, or the independence of the Transkei.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 12 months, conditionally suspended.
(Umtata Regional Court, 80.02.14).

Sabata Dalindyebo, leader of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in the Transkei.
Charge: Public Security Act. In terms of the stature the accused enjoys as a symbol of opposition to the whole Bantustan policy, this is probably the most important trial currently before the courts in the Transkei.

The trial appears to deal with the growing opposition of political and 'tribal' leaders to the Matanzima reign in the Transkei. Much of this opposition seems to have roots in the Eastern Pondoland region, an area famous for its resistance to the imposition of the Bantu Authorities schemes.

When the trial was due to begin in Port St Johns, the accused was too ill to appear, and it is now due to begin on March 14th, 1980.
(Transkei Supreme Court, 79.11.09).

Patrick Dalindyebo (21), Zoyisile William Nelani (40), Thembisile Magingxa (21), and Lungisa Va (24).
Charge: Transkei Public Safety Act. Dalindyebo is the son of Sabata Dalindyebo, while Nelani, and ex-Robben Island prisoner, is Dalindyebo's chief councillor. The accused are alleged to have produced and distributed pamphlets calling for the dropping of charges against Sabata Dalindyebo, and attacking Kaiser Matanzima and Brigadier Martin Ngceba, head of the Transkei Security Police.
(Umtata Regional Court, 80.02.10).

REPRESSION IN THE TRANSKEI

WHILE Capital Radio tries its best to project an image of the Transkei bantustan as an idyllic haven of rolling hills and white beaches, even if the night-life should be lacking glamour, the social reality is increasingly one of direct and violent repression - but also of opposition to the policies of the Matanzima brothers and their 'strong man' Brigadier Martin Ngceba (head of the security police).

Horrifying stories of unemployment and starvation are reaching the editors of WIP, and we ask readers to send further material to us. The 'export' areas for those who are not essential to the high profit rates in the rest of South Africa are having to rely on more detentions, more trials, more violence to maintain a semblance of stability in their 'independent states'.

Even the posturing of antagonism to the South African state has come to an end. The Transkei has re-established 'diplomatic links' with South Africa, as though the real links were ever broken. The 'constellation of states' idea is eagerly welcomed for the benefits it will bring to the few in

control of the bantustans of the Transkei, Venda and BophuthaTswana.

Below we provide a list (without doubt incomplete) of the detentions and trials that have come to our attention during the past year. If you have further information, please send it on to the editors.

We also reprint extracts from the songs of Sabata Dalindyebo's bard, composed during the period between 1959 and 1963:

> This is a very important period in the history of the Transkei, as it coincides with the full implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, with the first open revolt by the people against the chiefs, and with the first attempt to establish a Bantustan in the Transkei (Mafeje, Archie - 'The Role of the Bard in a Contemporary African Community' in Journal of African Language 6,3 (1967)).

The editors would like any information that readers could possibly supply on the extent and nature of popular resistance in the Transkei.

●●●●

Call Matanzima to come and decipher for you.
He is not educated but indoctrinated—
The greenish wiry animal of the Mnqhangi Mountains,[38]
The dragon I found with a pile of books,
An expert on law and speculation,
He has been taught even how to achieve chieftainship.
It is for this reason that today the Thembu are stunned and speechless;
They curse modern education and those who have received it.
They have found it ruinous and degrading to the African ethic,
For it has perverted and prostituted chieftainship, as known to them.

●●●●●

I came across the ancestors at the top of Xhalabile's Mountains,
They said we were subverting the country by our great desire for power.
Things are so critical because of Kaiser Matanzima's ambitiousness.
How could he strive to get a higher position than the paramount chief of all the Thembu!
He has shocked me by unleashing such destructive forces.
He has destroyed the reputation of the Thembu nation.
He imagines himself as all powerful and important.
He revealed his true colours by accepting a position that does not legitimately belong to him.
For his coercive ways, he will never be forgiven or forgotten,
No democratic government ever forces people to do things against their will.
Sabata is the servant of Jehovah, our God!

I found Sabata greatly agitated and perturbed,
For what has happened in Thembuland is a disgrace and a scandal.[44]
It has not been done by Thembu but by invaders and foreigners.[45]
A Thembu, a Coloured,[46] and a white is one and the same thing.
We all share a common bond of belonging to a single nation.

●●●●●

Worthwhile decisions come from the people themselves;
They never come from the chief alone.
Nowadays the chiefs make unilateral decisions,
And the result is their having to be protected.
Please tell me, Chief Kaiser Matanzima,
If you express the people's views, why have you been provided with a body-guard?
As a spokesman of the nation, I deny your claim.
You have deviated from the views of the people.
As a spokesman of the nation, I deny your claim.
Turn back and you will see that you are alone, you have no following.
Your chieftainship is founded on a precarious base.

The white Government is your source of strength,
Time and again we find you, son of Mhlobo, in lofty positions,
You fly over us like an eagle.
Honourable chief, take stock and reconsider your position.
Crudeness and barbarity never make a man.
Kaiser Matanzima, you are one of us but you have been misled by our enemies.
You have been misled by foreigners.
You are now too proud and stubborn.
You thought you were being educated, and yet you were being brain-washed.
Chieftainship is one course that is not studied in the class-room.

People are shivering with fear, they are afraid of your striking arm.
They are terrified of Mhlobo's hunting dogs.
What could be your reason for serving the interests of our enemy!
Why are they being so protective towards you!
What have these white officials done for you!
Is it worth the heritage of your forefathers, your rights, and your children's future!
There stand your embittered and wretched fellow-men in front of you.
When their voice reached Jonguhlanga, he responded in a surprising way.
He does not drink European liquor but he swims in it.
He says the difficulties facing him are alarming, and at times he dreads the thought of them.
I found him using brandy as a quencher of his worries.
He has found it a suitable substitute for the traditional amasi.[50]
I found this depressing and distressing.
What can one do! These people are born in their positions!

I still look up to you, though with less hope.
I did not know that you still have some life in you.
Builder of a nation that is being destroyed, I still appeal to you.
To you great king whose power is felt as far afield as Cape Town
And the mine dumps of Johannesburg.
Is it lack of courage, men!
The Mpondo and Gcaleka are willing to join hands with you;
Only they are afraid of the tall and graceful son of Mhlobo.[51]
This is not surprising because he is the Government's favourite.
Even so, we are all agreed that Sabata is the only paramount chief of the Thembu.
He is like Queen Elisabeth to the British.

Jonguhlanga - Chief Sabata Dalindyebo

Mhlobo - Kaiser Matanzima

FEBRUARY, 1979

17th: Skinner detained and deported.

APRIL

4th: BC Pikashe, national organiser of the DPP was detained from the 4th April to the 7th July when he faced charges under the Transkei Consitutáon Act, following a letter he wrote to a local newspaper. He was subsequently fined R200. (see COURTS, in this issue)

JUNE

June 16 memorial service banned.

24th: Call from Chief Sabata to all holders of Transkei passports to surrender these documents.

27th: Sabata Dalindyebo detained and charged under the Transkei Constitution and Security Acts.

JULY

31st: Florence Macotywa, publicity secretary of the DPP and Sabata's representative in parliament, was detained following a demonstration of Tembus protesting Sabata's arrest. (see COURTS in this issue).

AUGUST

22nd: Water Toboti, former Robben Island prisoner, detained.

29th: Clarence Makwetu, former Robben Island prisoner, detained and later banished from the Transkei after 165 days in detention.

Fikile Bam, also formerly on Robben Island, was detained for the third time since Transkei 'independence'. He was released after 84 days in detention.

SEPTEMBER

Rev Mdolo, a minister of the Transkei Methodist Church, was detained for 82 days. He was banished to Xolobe in the Tsomo district.

OCTOBER

Chief Mpondombini, Botha Sigcau's son, was arrested after police found unlicenced firearms at the Qusheni Great Place. He was later charged, along with his brother, Ntsikayesizwe and Ms Tembani Voko.

11th: Three police appeared in court at Mqanduli on a charge of murdering awaiting trial prisoner, Alias Sithetho.

24th: Methodist Church banned.

NOVEMBER

2nd: 34 organisations banned - some of them non-existent.

4th: Chiefs Bezindlovu and Koni Mtirara, both members of the Transkei parliament, were among ten others charged with killing one man and flogging six.

7th: Pamphlets calling for students and workers to stay at home on Friday (9th November) in sympathy with Chief Sabata, circulated in the Transkei. The pamphlets contained death threats against Colonel Martin Ngceba, head of the Transkei's security police, and called for the release of Chief Sabata.

As a result, 2 of Sabata's sons, Patrick and Sonto, were detained, along with 9 others (unnamed). William Nelani (ex-Robben Island prisoner), chief advisor to Sabata, was also detained (see COURTS, in this issue).

30th: Nimrod Mkele, former Black Community Project member, detained.

DECEMBER

1st: All Black Community Project property confiscated.

Hector Ncokazi, a leading member of the DPP, detained. This was his third detention since Transkei's 'independence'. He was held for 212 days in 1976, and again in January 1978. He is currently under a suspended sentence following charges laid against him under the Transkei's security legislation.

7th: Chief Gwebilizwane Sigcau, Chief Botha's nephew, was detained following his suspected involvement in a skirmish between police and Pondos at Nteleni township. One young Pondo was shot dead and a police sergeant hacked to death. 137 peole were arrested, of whom 38 were thought to be involved. Police were subsequently accused of arson.

18th: Chief Sabata was refused permission to address the DPP's first national congress.

JANUARY

1st: Nimrod Mkele deported after being detained for 30 days. He released the following information on security detentions:

Mkele said there were eleven PAC members and sympathisers detained in Transkei. Mr Mkele explained that he saw some of the detainees. A woman, Mrs N Mketi, was released after 90 days in detention. She was detained because she allegedly gave refuge to some PAC members who were returning from abroad.

Other PAC detainees are:

- Mr N Mashoza, an ex-Robben Island prisoner, detained from March 3, last year (306 days in detention),
- Mr S Maalibe, detained on December 18, 1978, (423),
- Mr S Gqweta, detained on November 3, 1978 (436),
- Mr W Toboti, detained on August 22, last year (157),
- Mr Vuyisele Mketi, detained December 13,1978,
- Mr M Mketi, detained October 27, 1978 (433),
- Mr M Vitshima, detained October 27, 1978 (serving a three month sentence at the Umtata Prison),
- Violet Mketi, detained December 8, 1978 (367),
- Mr Z Gushu, detained November 7, 1978,
- Man only known as Lucky detained October 27, 1978 (433),
- Mr S Mapundolo, detained November 6, 1978 (413),
- Mr C Makweta, who was detained from August 29 and later banished from Transkei, had spent 165 days in detention.

Mr Mkele added that eight people have been detained in connection with the Qwa-Qwa dispute. They have been accused of wanting to lead a break-away from Transkei. They have been detained since November 5, last year.

They are Ruben Pitso, 72, Charles Pitso, Peter Maile, Fellang Kobo, Skonyane Kobo, Mäfiseli Mbleko, Malerefere Moleko and Rapitsa Tseana.

Mr Mkele said there are five other Transkeians detained in connection with the distribution of pamphelts. The pamphlets criticised the detention of the leader of the opposition party, Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo.

The detainees are Msekeli Mgudlwa, a student only known as Msekeli, Mimi Dalidyebo, son of Chief Dalidyebo, a member of the Opposition Party, known as Nilani, and Langisa Vakalisa, a typist at All Saints Hospital.

Mr Mkele said there were fourteen security detainees at Umtata Prison including a white financier, Mr Gert Kotze, 37, and an Indian, Mr Ebrahim Nestraden, 29.

RDM, 80.01.03

6th: Peter Honey, Argus journalist detained.

8th: Transkei Youth League banned.

22nd: Teddy Mpahlwa, youth organiser of the DPP, detained under the Public Security Act.

23rd: Sipho Ndaleni, former Robben Island prisoner, detained.

31st: Almost the entire executive committee of the Transkei Democratic Progressive Party and its Youth League were detained. Those detained were the deputy leader, Mda, SA Xolobo, B Pikashe, WM Dweba, J Kati, Zola Duwdunywa, Mazwi Yako, Mzwaldile Mbethe and Mlungisi Mtshontwa.

FEBRUARY

5th: A call was made by Chief William Malefane, for the release of five Herschel Basotho people arrested the previous year following their resistance to the Transkei government's attempt to incorporate them into its territory. Chief Malefane was held in solitary confinement for 6 months during 1979.

6th: Harris Hardy Zwinije, former teacher in Zambia, had his passport confiscated and was questioned by security police.

10th: Chief Mpondombini Sigcau was sentenced to R100 or 400 days imprisonment, and Ms Voko to R20 or 40 days after they were found guilty for possessing unlicenced firearms.

A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS. 1977

Transkei Public Security Act

In terms of this Act all security laws applicable in SA were repealed (including the Suppression of Communism Act, the Internal Security Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Unlawful Organisations Act, and also the Transkei Emergency Laws contained in Proclamation R400). Many of the measures provided for in these Acts, however, are incorporated in the new legislation.

In terms of this Act:

1. Anyone propagating or disseminating views that Transkei, or parts of Transkei, should form another country or part of another country, will be guilty of a treasonable offence, and liable to penalties ranging from five years' imprisonment to the death sentence. (Originally Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima stated that this clause would be retrospective to 26 October 1976, but this is not, in fact, the case.)
2. It is an offence to harbour or help terrorists, the maximum penalty being death.
3. It is an offence to make statements or commit acts causing hostility between population groups.
4. It is an offence to belong to certain organisations declared unlawful by the State President.
5. The State President may authorise a chief to banish any person to another area, either permanently or for a specified period.
6. The State President may order a tribe or part of a tribe to be removed, without warning, to another area if he considers it to be in the public interest.
7. The Minister of Justice may ban gatherings of more than ten people, prevent individuals from attending certain gatherings and declare a State of Emergency if he deems it necessary.
8. Provision is made for the banning of persons, for detention without trial, and for the arrest, without warrant, of any person for interrogation purposes, after which arrest there may be no recourse to the courts to obtain the release of such person.

The leader of the Transkei Opposition, Mr. Cromwell Diko, Opposition politicians in SA and legal experts, all criticised these draconian security measures sharply, warning that they could only do further harm to Transkei's tenuous international position. Despite this, the legislation went through virtually unchanged. One clause, which maintained the banning of organisations prohibited in SA (including the ANC and PAC), was dropped: in doing so the Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima, said that the reason for this was that it would be inappropriate for an independent Transkei to continue the actions of SA.

The two people arrested with them were acquitted. The magistrate did concede, however, that their's was a spetial case since the guns had belonged to Chief Mpondombini's father, former President of the Transkei, Chief Botha Sigcau. According to Chief Mpondonbini, they had been given to his father by the police as protection during the Pondoland revolt of 1959.(see COURTS, in this issue).

15th: Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, cabinet minister and leading member of the DPP, was found guilty after being charged under the Public Security Act (see COURTS, in this issue).

Sydney Moses, a reporter on the East London newspaper, Daily Dispatch, was detained and released the next day.

16th: Two security police detainees, S Gushu and Xola Mketi, were admitted to hospital. Both have been in detention since 1978. Peter Honey, recently released from prison, said in a newspaper report that Mketi 'who had been jailed in November 1978, was on a hunger strike in support of his demands for legal representation, a change of clothing and better food. Throughout my time in Wellington prison (he) lay in his cell, naked except for a covering of blankets and refused any food. On January 21, when I was removed from Wellington, he was in his 21st day of his hunger strike'.

Also arrested are Mketi's two brothers, Meyisi and Vuyisile, and Vuyisile's wife Valentia. They have all been held since November 1978. Their mother was also detained for 90 days when she went to the Transkei to demand their release.

STRIKES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKING CLASS STRATEGY

WHAT FOLLOWS is part two of an article, the first section having appeared in WORK IN PROGRESS number 10. The paper as a whole attempts to explain and understand the difference between strike activity in the 'Third World', and the developed centres of capitalist power (Western Europe, North America, etc). One of the differences suggested relates to the nature of the state, which is far more repressive, and intervenes more directly, in 'Third World' societies.

This section of the paper looks at the way in which the existence of a migrant labour force affects strike activity. Two examples of working class action are looked at in this regard, namely the Namibian contract workers strike of 1971-72, and the Durban strikes of 1973.

Finally, the paper concludes with some schematic suggestions on ways in which contemporary South African society is changing, and what implications this has for working class strategies.

-THE EDITORS.

BEFORE GOING ON to an analysis of strikes in the 1970s, it is necessary to situate the period (starting from the late 1960s) in a context of capital accumulation nationally and internationally. 1940 - 1945 marked the start of the expansion of capital accumulation on an international scale. The origins of this expansion lay in the weakening of the working class through the effects of fascism and the Second World War. This permitted a massive rise in the rate of profit, and hence in general profitability, and accummulation of capital. Newly accumulated capital was initially thrown into armaments production, and subsequently into the general process of cheapening machinery used in production. The world market shrank through 'economic' nationalism, world war, and the extention of non-capitalist areas (Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba; however, the market expanded again under the impact of imperialism, and the beginnings of capitalist industrialisation in the 'Third World'.

The process of industrialisation in the 'Third World' in the post-war period has taken place mainly through the activities of multi-national corporations. Multi-national investment increased considerably in South Africa during the 1960s, rising in leaps and bounds after the suppression of the popular movements (both the ANC and PAC were banned in 1960). Direct foreign investment sought a controlled supply of labour which would cost less than labour doing similar work in the 'rich' or 'developed' countries. In South Africa it was assured of this.

At the same time, the direct penetration of foreign capital on a large scale led to a sudden increase in the amount of sophisticated machinery being used in production. This machinery tended to require fewer workers to perform tasks which previously required the power of many more labourers; as a result, many became permanently unemployed (ie structural unemployment, whereby a large number of people become permanently unemployed because of the very structure of the economy).

With rising structural unemployment, the repressive role of the state in this period was centred on removing the unemployed from the so-called 'white areas' to the Bantustans. The situation worsened considerably for the workers with the onset of the depression in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 'economic boom' which had started shortly after the war on an international scale finally came to an end in 1968. These, broadly speaking, are the material social conditions within which this paper attempts to locate an analysis of strikes in the 1970s.

One must place the 1971-72 Namibian strikes *in the context of the economic* slump of the 1970s. The Namibian economy appears to be dominated by multinational interests in both fishing and extractive industries (ie mining). After farming, also a major sector in the economy, the other smaller sectors of the economy are mainly government, municipal, commerce and domestic service.

Black workers in Namibia have been subject to similar controls to black workers in South Africa. These include restriction on land-holding rights in the reserves/Bantustans, and control by pass laws. Again, we see the specific role of the state as an openly repressive one.

The ability of the Northern reserve areas (Ovamboland, Kavango, etc) in Namibia to support subsistence production seems to have undergone a critical change in the 1950s and early 1960s. Prior to this, the families of migrant workers were able to produce at least some of their subsistence requirements through small-scale agricultural production. After this, according to Mooreom, the families of migrant workers became more and more dependent on the migrant's wage not only for items of equipment, but also for day to day living costs, in particular food (Mooreom 1977:3-6). Clearly, one cannot suggest that an independent pre-capitalist economic system existed in Ovamboland during the 1960s, even though the ability of this area to support the needs of its inhabitants was less damaged and undermined than that of, for example, the Transkei.

The role of the state in allocating labour to different sectors of production was as applicable in Namibia as in South Africa, and by the late 1940s

> "northern labour migrants were being directed to almost every sector of employment: mining, farming, fish canning, government and municipal utilities, commerce and even domestic service. By the mid 1960s they formed 45% to 50% of the total black labour force; some 40% were from Angola, principally Angolan Ovamboland" (Mooreom 1977:3).

The 1971-72 strike in Namibia mainly

involved these migrants from Ovamboland. In this case, sufficient subsistence production has been conserved in the area of migration (Ovamboland) for the migrants to return 'home' for six weeks while on strike. However, after this period the ability of subsistence production to bear the extra weight diminished, and the migrants were consequently forced to return to work.

The strike was undertaken as a conscious political act against the migrant labour system and the repressive laws wielded by the state against the labour movement. In this context the churches played some role by relating the news of the World Court ruling declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal to people throughout the country.

The strike should be seen against a history of worker militancy in the area, starting with the establishment of a branch of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) at LÜderitz. In the 1950s the Food and Canning Workers Union established a branch at LÜderitz but this was smashed by the state in 1952. During 1952 and 1953 contract workers mounted large strikes but were ruthlessly suppressed (several workers were killed or wounded in the 1953 strike. Between 1950 and 1970 43 collective strike actions were reported (22 on the mines, 5 on the railways, and the remainder at Windhoek, LÜderitz and Walvis Bay) (Moorsom 1977:10,11).

The workers also have a long history of acute political awareness which no doubt contributed to the formation of their strategy. This history can be traced to at least 1958 when Herman Ja Toivo formed the Ovamboland Peoples' Organisation (OPO). By 1959 OPO had become a mass organisation with grassroots support in the towns and on the mines. By 1960 OPO had changed its name to SWAPO because years of struggle by contract workers had taught them that their interests as workers could only be served by a struggle for national liberation.

The overall position of these workers in society also contributed positively to the formation of the strike. They experienced the same social conditions in the mining and urban centres where they worked. They were housed together in such a way that they had a minimum of privacy. This, and the fact that they worked in large work gangs made communication between them intense and continuous. In addition to all these factors, their common language, background and culture helped to cement a solidarity between them.

Broadly speaking, the Namibian strike of 1971-72 shows some similarities with strategies adopted by SACTU in the 1950s, although there are naturally differences in each situation as well. That which the contract workers strike shares in common with the SACTU strategy of the 1950s is the fact that the strike was a calculated political act against the migrant labour system, which formed the basis of the accumulation of capital in Namibia.

Criticisms can be made of this strategy. The flight of the workers to Ovamboland must be seen as a major strategic weakness. By leaving the place of production they abandoned a potential vantage point, for ultimately power lies in the control of the factories and mines. In criticising this strategy, one must also be aware of the material conditions facing the striking workers. These relate directly to the awesome powers of repression possessed by the state. State harassment of the labour movement had been growing throughout its history. The ability of the state to attack workers at the point of production should <u>not</u> be underestimated. The police were also quite capable of sealing off the townships and isolating different industrial areas from one another. In fact, even in Ovamboland the strikers were not entirely safe from the repressive state apparatuses, as was evidenced by the moving in of police and para-military personnel to terrorise the workers.

The rising tide of structural unemployment in South Africa, due to the rapid introduction of sophisticated technology requiring less manpower to set it in motion, has tended to undercut the bargaining power of all workers. In the face of the depression of the 1970s, workers are becoming more and more impoverished and are resorting to strike action in an attempt to defend themselves.

During the (early) boom period, and immediately after the massive state repression of the early 1960s, the number of strikes per year remained almost constant. Between 1962 and 1968 the number of Africans involved in officially-reported strikes does not seem to have risen above 2,000 per year. With the onset of depression in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the slowdown of capital

accumulation added to the hardship of the workers. This is indicated by the slight increase in the number of strikes per year since 1969. The Ovambo strike, which has just been analysed, took place at the end of 1971 and involved about 13,000 Ovambo workers in Namibia. In 1972 there was an increase in strikes in South Africa itself. One of the most important of these was that of over 2,000 stevedores in the Durban docks in 1972 (IIE 1976:5).

The working class in Durban in 1973 was a settled urban proletariat. About half of the working africans were probably migrants, that is workers brought in from the rural areas on an annual contract basis. But most of these were 'permanent migrants' who in fact work all their lives in the city on regularly renewed contracts but are legally considered to be rural and have no residential rights in the urban area (IIE, 1976:8).

In the 1973 Durban strikes many of the strikers who would legally be characterised as 'migrants' were actually 'frontier commuters', that is, people who lived in special residential areas which legally formed part of KwaZulu, but are geographically located within easy reach of the factories. These workers lived with their families and commuted to work every day. Consequently, for the purpose of this analysis, it would be more accurate to regard them as a settled urban proletariat. This is borne out by the fact that their strategy during the strikes was to occupy the points of production instead of retreating to the Bantustans as in the case of the Ovambo workers. Clearly this type of strategy grows out of the conditions of a relatively settled urban proletariat.

The 1973 strikes in Durban occurred within the general context of a repressive state, as did all strike action in the earlier period. Nevertheless, the state's response was more an attempt to establish a modus vivendi *with the strikers rather than to openly* repress them. On the other hand, this does not mean that there was any attempt to make concessions to the working class in order to institutionalise and control conflict. This is evident from the terms of the 1973 Bantu Labour Regulations Act which merely provided for the extention of the works and liaison committee system first introduced in 1953. No attempt was made to institutionalise conflict through formal recognition and incorporation of black trade unions within the structure of industrial legislation in South Africa.

One of the reasons for the relatively passive response of the state was the fact that at any one moment there were at least 60,000 workers on strike. As these workers refused to elect a leadership the police did not know who to pick off and it simply was not feasible to jail 60,000 people. Another important reason was that at this stage the economy was under the domination of monopolies which had millions invested in a complex and technologically sophisticated economy. Any form of work stoppage therefore meant the loss of millions of Rand as this vast mass of machinery was brought to a standstill. Clearly the priority for monopoly capital was to get the production line moving as soon as possible rather than to indulge in a massive exercise of repression.

The strikes in Durban in early 1973 were demonstration stoppages, that is they were of a short duration and were only resorted to spontaneously when peaceful negotiation had failed to remedy the workers' grievances. *Their short duration was the result of the* workers' not having access to resources which would have enabled them to conduct a fuller struggle against the capitalists. Due to the shortness of the strike, worker grievances were not removed, although attention was drawn to them in a powerful way.

This in itself indicates the climate of repression within which the strikes found themselves operating. Their strategy was planned accordingly. Due to the relative 'stability' of these workers (ie the fact that they were not 'migrants'), there developed an awareness of the advantages of striking at the factory plant and on or near the factory site. Thus they restricted their action to the location of the plant or factory, a position in which they were strongest. Their strategy also involved not being highly organised around simple issues of particular goals, as this would have entailed the open establishment of a leadership group.

On the one hand it may be argued that the strikes seemed to take the form of a revolt against the oppression which had built up over a period of 12 years, since the banning of the ANC and PAC. As such, the genesis of the strikes can be said to have been 'spontaneous' in the sense that the workers had been subject

to the same sets of pressures and influences, and suddenly reacted in a similar way to these common pressures (IIE 1976:92). On the other hand, action always has to be initiated by somebody and as the action continues, leaders are likely to emerge. They will, however, only be influential to the extent that others recognise what they say (IIE 1976:92). Thus, even in the case of Durban 1973, given the appearance of spontaneity, it is theoretically *inadequate* to explain the strategy of the strikers just in terms of spontaneous mass feeling. One has to take into account both the existence of people not directly associated with the work place, as well as people in the work situation who take the lead in worker action either as formal shop stewards or as informal leaders and decision makers. (IIE 1976:91).

This leads one to <u>speculate</u> as to the exact nature of the strategy of the strikers for although the strike appeared to be an essentially apolitical and disorganised form of revolt, it was nevertheless large in scale and concentrated at the points of production. Furthermore, demands were consistently made by the <u>mass</u> of workers, and no open form of leadership was allowed to develop despite the attempts by capital to flush the leaders out. However, due to the nature of struggles being waged in South Africa, one can do no more than speculate over the existence of underground organisation in the strikes, strategies involving both legal and quasi-legal, political and apolitical dynamics.

Since the 1973 strike the trend towards more exclusive working class action has been accentuated. For example, one witnesses an aloofness which many independent black unions greeted the 1976 civil uprising. This notion of an entirely working class form of action avoiding contact with other classes except in exceptional circumstances, comes across in the newly formed Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). Its constitution says that it has rejected all party political alignment or support, and is pledged to resist any attempt by a party political organisation to control it. Alec Erwin, FOSATU's first general secretary claimed that FOSATU's goals were to build unionism from the shop floor upwards. In South Africa today one can therefore see the development of a definite working class strategy opposed to the earlier strategies of SWAPO and SACTU.

It has been the contention of this paper that capitalism develops unevenly on a world scale, giving rise to both developed and underdeveloped countries. Because of this, there has developed in the 'Third World' a specific form of capitalist state which differs from the form of state in the more developed capitalist centres of power. The state of 'Third World' societies is characterised by its openly repressive role in the class struggle, as opposed to the more co-optive role of the bourgeois democratic form of capitalist state existing in the developed capitalist world. Faced with this specifically repressive state, and given specific social conditions, different strategies have been developed by Southern African workers in different phases of capitalist development.

Obviously each strategy has its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages, and only the working class through its organisations and programmes can confirm or reject a strategy in the course of struggle. Nonetheless, a few points can be made in concluding this paper:

1. Both nationally and internationally, capitalism is undergoing a crisis. The basis of this crisis is a tendency of the rate of profit (and hence general profitability) to decline in capitalist economies.
2. One indication of the crisis at a national level has been a greater incidence of bankruptcies, allowing the bigger firms to continually absorb and swallow smaller firms. This leads to the development of monopolies. This process occurs simultaneously on an international level, hence giving rise to the growth of monopoly power of foreign-based multi-national corporations over the South African economy.
3. This crisis in the very structure and nature of capitalism has also manifested itself within class struggle. During a crisis the dominated classes feel the 'economic squeeze' and have responded through a new spate of strikes, and forms of civil uprisings (eg the 1976 rebellions, guerilla incursions, etc).
4. The changing nature of capitalist production under the dominance of monopoly capital has made smoothly-flowing assembly line production one of the highest priorities for capital. This is because stoppages in the flow of production mean that a mass of sophisticated technology (machinery) is lying idle. Given the rapid

depreciation of modern machinery any stoppage, no matter how short, can involve huge losses on invested capital. To guard against this happening, it is becoming more necessary than ever to ensure industrial peace, as disruptions of production can be calamities for monopoly capital.

5. In the light of this, we may conclude that the repressive apartheid state in its current form is fast becoming irrelevant to the needs of monopoly capital.

6. In the current crisis, monopoly capital is attempting to restructure and change aspects of material relations in Southern Africa. In particular, there is an attempt to move away from the nakedly repressive apartheid state, towards a state form more geared to the institutionalisation of conflict, and the co-option of militancy.

7. In this connection two specific strategies are developing: on the one hand, the strategy of the National Party which aims at reducing the area over which the official South African state has formal political control, while at the same time creating satellite states all around it in which to locate and control the mass of unemployed. Control in these formally independent states takes the form of open repression (witness recent events in the Transkei, some of which are detailed elsewhere in this issue of Work In Progress); at the same time, within the reduced 'boundaries' of South Africa the black petty bourgeoisie and certain elements of the black working class will be co-opted into the institutional framework of the 'new dispensation' (see for example the logical effects of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commission reports).

On the other hand, there exists the strategy of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), which also aims to control conflict and co-opt certain elements of the black petty bourgeoisie and working class; however, its programme sees this as taking place within a unitary state, along lines of a federation. It is safe to assume that in some form this new strategy will develop, possibly as a combination of National and Progressive Party positions.

8. What are the implications of this for the dominated classes, and for the labour movement? Clearly material conditions are rapidly changing and the state is seemingly going to take on a different form from that of earlier periods. Working class strategy in the 1980s is in particular going to have to take into account the strategy of capital and the state to incorporate and disorganise the presently unregistered unions through the extention of general state control. In this context, mechanisms like the National Manpower Commission (NMC), workers committees, works councils, industrial councils and limited form of trade unionism could become a weapon wielded against the working class, rather than a vehicle for worker organisation.

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THE 'HOUSING QUESTION' RECONSIDERED:

TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA

A NUMBER of contributions to Work in Progress have focussed attention on issues related to the provision or, rather, lack of provision of housing in South Africa.[1] The matter is clearly one of some importance and, whether it is identified as the 'housing question' or as the 'squatter problem', it will continue to require theoretically informed analysis by those concerned with the development of a coherent understanding of South African society.

In returning to consideration of this particular problem, my primary interest is to outline a conceptual framework within which some of the issues raised in previous articles, as well as certain trends in the shifting balance of social forces in South Africa, may be critically examined. It should be stressed at the outset, however, that what is to be presented here represents preliminary work. Its purpose is to stimulate further debate and, hopefully, the productive working,

in the form of concrete analysis, of the wealth of raw material that is available.[2]

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HISTORICALLY, the 'housing question' is not the manifestation of a new development in the array of problems that periodically beset capitalist societies. Engels' polemic against 'bourgeois-socialist philanthropist' 'solution' to the housing problem of Germany in the 1870s and Stedman Jones' review of the condition of the working class in Victorian London[3] indicate that it was at least as serious in the nineteenth century as it is now. However, historical antecedents are not explanations and the first question to be answered is why the problem should occupy a comparatively central place in the area of bourgeois concern, at least that of the 'philanthropic' variety.

I think that, in its most basic terms, the reason for such concern is to be located in the contradiction between the critically important contribution made by 'housing' to the continued existence of the capitalist system and the necessarily uneven development of that system, which threatens the 'realisation' of the benefits of this contribution. To understand this, it will be necessary to elaborate on what constitutes the conceptual basis of the category 'housing' and to relate this to the requirements for 'the continued existence of the capitalist system' in terms of its 'necessarily uneven development'.

(In what follows, I will be using a terminology which may, to a greater or lesser extent, be unfamiliar to some readers. The use of certain terms which signify definite, often complex concepts, acting as a 'theoretical shorthand' as it were, is unavoidable if reasonable brevity is to be achieved in a paper of this nature. I have, therefore, added brief parenthetical explanations where I consider them to be required, but clearly these can only suggest the meaning of the more complex concepts in a somewhat crude fashion. Hopefully, increasing contextual familiarity with the terms will to some degree alleviate this difficulty.)

The reproduction of a mode of production, that is, the maintenance of a particular configuration of social relations through a self-sustaining system of production, is dependent, firstly, on the continuous regeneration of the productive forces which are the material basis of its existence and, secondly, on the maintenance of the social relations of production which determine both the way in which raw material is appropriated from nature and the way in which the product is distributed among the various agents of the production process.

In the capitalist mode of production, the productive forces subsume three elements:

- means of production which comprise, on the one hand, the natural materials or forces used in the production process (land, minerals, water, etc) and, on the other, the man-made instruments of production (machines, buildings, transport facilities, etc);
- *labour power which is the capacity of a* direct producer (ie a worker engaged in the immediate production process) to undertake a day's work, the sole source of value in capitalist production (see below);
- indirect or general labour which refers to the 'level of technology' based on the cumulative acquisition of skills and knowledge over time.

Capitalist relations of production are structured on the basis of generalized commodity production and exchange, a system in which all productive effort has the dual object of producing both use values (the useful concrete properties of things) and exchange values (the capacity of things to exchange in definite ratios on the basis of the quantity of abstract 'socially-necessary' labour-time, as the only measure of value, embodied in them). The most important result of this is that both human labour power and the means of production are drawn into the system solely as commodities. It is on this that the fundamental conflict of capitalist society between, on the one hand, the capitalist class which owns and controls the means of production and, on the other, the working class which retains control only of its own labour power, is founded. The conflict is encapsulated in the social relations of production in a complex structure of dynamically interacting forms which will be reduced here, perhaps over-schematically, to the following:

- the 'wage relation' which, as the manifestation of the 'free' exchange between the commodity labour power and capital in its *money form, conceals the objective exploit*ation of labour by the capitalist class through the extraction of surplus value (ie the value over and above that represented

by the value of the commodities required by the worker to sustain and reproduce him- and herself) from the former and its appropriation by the latter;
- the 'property relation' which codifies legally the rights of the capitalist class both to the private appropriation of the social surplus product and to the free disposal of the means of production;
- the 'authority relation' which is the manifestation of the essentially coercive and repressive nature of the relationship of domination between the bourgeoisie (capitalists) and the proletariat (workers).

It should be made clear at this stage that the objective determinant of the structure of the relations of production (in terms of its essentially abstract 'function') is to ensure the maintenance of bourgeois hegemony - the continued domination by the capitalist class, not only of the immediate processes of production, circulation and exchange (the 'economy'), but also of the political and ideological 'levels' of society. This domination, then, is maintained not simply through direct repressive power (formally located in the state - see below), but also through the institutionalization of a hegemonic ideology which 'legitimizes' (and conceals) the essentially exploitative nature of capitalism by representing the class interests of the bourgeoisie as the 'general interests' of society as a whole. In particular social formations (specific, historically constituted 'nation states'), the relative importance of ideology or repression in underpinning bourgeois class hegemony is critically dependent on the actual concrete development of the conflict between capital and labour and the shifting balance of class forces that it embodies.

The fundamental insight of Marx's analysis in Capital is that the process of accumulation, that is, the appropriation of surplus value and its use as productive capital to obtain the means of production and raw materials (constant capital) and the labour power (variable capital) necessary to initiate a new cycle of production, arises out of this domination of labour by capital and that the reproduction of capitalist relations of production demands the continuous expansion of the basis of accumulation (Harvey, 1978: 102). This means that, for capitalists to survive as capitalists, they are constantly compelled to bring larger and larger masses of productive capital under their individual control, which in turn means that exploitation, in terms of the extraction of surplus value from workers as a class, must constantly increase.

The reproduction of the capitalist system as a whole, then, cannot be isolated from the continued (and increasing) exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class. Nor can it be isolated from the struggles of workers to resist the domination of capital as they become conscious of it and its origins in the production process.

In order to maintain the mystification of the 'wage relation', in so far as it conceals this exploitation, while simultaneously reserving the right to ultimately use force to ensure its continued existence, capitalist society requires 'that the direct producers be deprived of control over the physical means of force and that the latter be localized in a social instance raised above the economic reproduction process' (Hirsch, 1978:61). This 'social instance' is, of course, the bourgeois state which, in all important respects, monopolizes the organized, 'legitimate' means of coercion and repression (the military, the police force, the courts and the prison system).

The derivation of the necessity for the appearance of the capitalist state in this form does not in any way preclude it from undertaking other, equally necessary, functions in the reproduction of capitalist societies. In the broadest sense, these relate primarily to its role as the guarantor of the general material conditions of capitalist production and reproduction, that is, its role in ensuring the provision of the complex physical and social frameworks essential for these processes to occur (see below).

While a determination of the role of the state at this level of abstraction tells us very little, so far, about the actual day-to-day workings of contemporary social formations, I do intend to return to a consideration of certain of these functions of the state below, particularly in relation to the object of this investigation: the 'housing question' in the present South African context. It will be useful, however, to first examine, systematically but in general terms, the material basis on which the concept 'housing' is constituted under the capitalist mode of

production.

Clearly, the primary material benefit or use value provided by a house is 'shelter' - the physical protection from the elements afforded by four walls and a roof. However, less immediately apparent but equally, if not more important is the fact that every house occupies a piece of land which is uniquely located in relation to all other pieces of land and the activities (production, circulation, exchange, reproduction, etc) that they support. This property of 'spatial exclusivity', apart from establishing the material foundation for the imposition of differential and monopoly rents (see below, footnote 4), thus represents to the occupants of a particular house a unique use value (or more accurately, bundle of use values) with regard to the physical accessibility (measured in terms of travel time or travel cost) of various facilities: work opportunities, shops, schools, recreational areas, etc.

Furthermore, on a moment's reflection, 'housing' can be seen to subsume considerably more physical elements than the actual house or 'dwelling unit' itself. In an urban situation at least (ie as opposed to a rural situation), a house can only be made habitable by the provision of certain basic services considered essential to the maintenance of public health, notably a supply of clean water and the collection and disposal of household wastes (garbage and sewage removal). These services, together with others less immediately associated with 'housing' as such (public transport, road networks, schooling, health services, recreational and community facilities, etc), are generally organized on a 'collective' basis and constitute what might be termed the 'infrastructure' of the reproduction of labour power, or the 'means of collective consumption' (Castells, 1977:459-462; also 1978:15-36).

It should be understood that 'collective consumption' here refers to the consumption of goods and services not <u>directly</u> provided by capital, either because a sufficient rate of profit cannot be assured in undertaking their production (for example, public transport, health services), or because their provision must remain a monopoly of the state to secure the reproduction of capitalist society as a whole (for example, particularly, schooling), or both. What constitutes the 'means of collective consumption' in a specific historical conjuncture will vary according to concrete circumstances, as may be deduced from a brief consideration of the actual variations in status of such goods and services in different contemporary capitalist countries.

Thus, in all these material ways, 'housing' in the broad sense is a critical element in the reproduction of labour power. 'Shelter' and its associated services as basic to the survival of the individual worker (and his or her family) is the most obvious aspect of this, while the house as a stable location for the processes of individual reproduction, in terms of 'normal'(or 'subsistence') consumption and the domestic labour (housework) which supports it, is another.

In the same way as the 'means of collective consumption' (and in relation to them), 'normal' consumption is subject to what Marx termed the particular 'moral and historical' conditions of time and place. In other words, while as a minimal condition, the worker must be able to sustain his or her capacity to undertake a 'normal' day's work and to physically reproduce him or herself (by having children), the level of the additional elements of 'normal' consumption (ie whether or not workers should own TV sets or cars or whatever) is determined as the outcome of the continuous class struggle. Clearly, the determination of the quantitative and qualitative standards of workers' housing is part of this ongoing process.

In the discussion so far what has been considered has been essentially the use value of housing to the individual worker as a means of physical reproduction and, through this, its value to the capitalist system in general as a means of ensuring the reproduction of one element of its productive forces (labour power).

Under capitalism, however, housing generally takes the form of a <u>commodity</u> with, by definition, both use value <u>and</u> exchange value and it is on the basis of the latter that an important branch of the overall process of capital accumulation, the 'housing market', is established.

There are a wide variety of 'actors' or 'agents' engaged in the production and exchange of the commodity housing interacting, under quite different motivations, in a very complex way. They include: capitalists in the building and construction industries, property or 'real estate' dealers, landlords, the

financiers of 'property development', state agencies and, in a more problematic way, the individual home owner. The link between these very different sorts of people is that all are vitally concerned with the exchange value of housing and the way in which the surplus value generated in its production is distributed among them, whether it take the form of profit, interest or rent.[4]

Hence, merely by embodying exchange value, housing contributes to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, in terms of providing additional areas in which the basis of capital accumulation may be *expanded. But another important way in which* the same end is served relates to the tendency of the capitalist system towards periodic crises of overaccumulation, that is, situations in which there exists a surplus of capital in relation to opportunities for profitable investment.

The theory advanced by Harvey (1978) is that the tendency of capitalists to over-accumulate is accompanied by a tendency to 'under-invest in the built environment (the physical framework which supports and mediates the processes of production, circulation, exchange and consumption, and of which housing and its associated services constitute a major element) relative to their own individual and collective needs.' The periodic surpluses of capital, then, can be employed to make good this under-investment but since there is a limit to productive (ie profitable) investment of this kind, at some point the capital fixed in the built environment must be 'written down' or devalued.

The use value of the investment (the physical infrastructure) is not, however, destroyed in this devaluation and then 'functions as a free good which can help to re-establish the basis for renewed accumulation' (1978:116). The rhythm of investment in the built environment, therefore, becomes cyclical, recurring at more or less regular intervals and following a pattern similar and linked to that of the tendency towards over-accumulation. The process of 'capital switching' which underlies this pattern can only be accomplished relatively smoothly *with 'a money supply and credit system which* creates "fictional capital" in advance of actual production and consumption' (1978:107), because of the large-scale and long term nature of such investment (ie extended capital turnover periods).[5] In passing, it should be noted that the provision of the material conditions which enable this process to occur (the establishment or underwriting of appropriate institutional and legal forms) is a role which must, ultimately, fall to the state.

The third way in which housing contributes to the maintenance of capitalist social relations owes its appearance to the centrality of the use value of housing to the reproduction of the individual worker. The difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of functioning effectively as a 'free' wage labourer in the centres of production without the secure base of a house or fixed accommodation of some sort, in which the processes of individual reproduction may take place regularly and without disruption, is fundamental to the use of housing provision as an instrument of social control. Certainly, it has been so perceived, and employed, both through the agency of the state (with African 'township' housing in South Africa as a prime example) and directly by the capitalist class, for whom it is also an important means of 'managing consumption in the interests of accumulation' (see Harvey, 1976:279-290; in South Africa, the mine compound system for African workers and the 'company town' accommodation provided for white workers provide obvious examples).

Having now developed what I hope is a *reasonably coherent, if somewhat sketchy and* abstract outline of the importance of 'housing' to the reproduction of the capitalist system, the logically necessary step is to examine the way in which the 'combined and uneven' development of that system enters into the problem. In order to do this, we will be obliged to become more concrete in the sense that what is now to come under consideration is the actual historical development of capitalism on a world scale.

If in no other way, the existence of the 'housing problem' of capitalist social formations may be empirically demonstrated in the form of critical housing shortages in their major cities. These shortages may reasonably be described as symptomatic of the process of urbanization - the spatial concentration of an increasing proportion of a country's population in relatively few, relatively large urban centres. But the reduction of the process to demographic statistics tells us nothing of its underlying causes; for these,

we have to turn to a theory of the mode of development of the capitalist system.

Yeung (1979:28) notes that 'towns have historically been founded on the extraction and concentration of a social surplus product from the countryside' and she locates this foundation in the process of primitive accumulation - the forceful dispossession of the *mass of direct producers in the rural areas* (peasants, communalist farmers, etc) from their right of access to the basic means of subsistence production in the land in order that a nascent capitalist class may both take possession of the land as capital and utilize the now 'free' (landless) producers in the process of direct capital accumulation (industrial production). Certainly, in the history of capitalist development in South Africa, the imposition of this 'bloody discipline' has been a fundamentally formative influence and its effects continue to resonate throughout the social formation as it is presently constituted. (For an account, see Legassick, 1974).

It is evident that, with the simultaneous formation of a large class of proletarianized workers (without independent access to the means of production) and the growing concentration of capital (in the form of the means of production, particularly the 'built environment') in the urban centres necessitated by the rise of large scale production, there must arise a concentration of labour power - wage labourers and their families - in these same centres. Hence the processes of urbanization and capital accumulation (or 'industrialization') are inextricably bound up with one another and cannot be considered in isolation. This is particularly relevent in the 'peripheral' (or underdeveloped) countries, and also in certain 'intermediate' (or less advanced) capitalist countries, where the process of the proletarianization of former subsistence producers on the land has not yet fully worked itself through and the remnants of pre- or non-capitalist 'modes' of production[6] may still exist in the rural areas.

However, as Harvey (1978:114) is concerned to point out, 'there are serious grounds for challenging the adequacy of the urban-rural dichotomy even when expressed as a dialectical unity, as a primary form of contradiction within the capitalist mode of production'. The 'urban-rural dichotomy' here refers to the broad division between 'town' and 'country' in terms of the type of production undertaken in each (processing and 'technology' in the former, basic foodstuffs and other raw materials in the latter) and the different labour processes entailed, to which is counterposed their obvious unity in terms of economic interdependence - the one cannot subsist without the other. Harvey notes that, for Marx, this contradiction is to be regarded as 'an expression of the division of labour in society' (the essential process in the progressive development of capitalism's productive forces) and, in this, 'the division of labour is the fundamental concept and not the rural-urban dichotomy which is just the particular form of its expression'.

This means that, however problematic the continued existence of pre- or non-capitalist 'modes' (or forms) of production in underdeveloped or intermediate countries may be, and however much they mediate patterns of urbanization and 'industrialization', it is the laws of capital accumulation and the fundamental class antagonism located within the dominant capitalist mode of production which determine the further development of *such countries*.

Due, at least in part, to their subordinate positions in the international economy which leave them largely dependent on the importation of both capital and technology from the advanced capitalist countries, the trajectory of economic development common to the underdeveloped (and intermediate) countries displays certain well documented characteristics.[7] For our purposes, the most important of these is the chronic inability of such economies to absorb in the 'formal' processes of capital accumulation (ie in regular wage employment) a considerable proportion of the working population pushed off the land. Such people would then tend to become permanently excluded from participation in the capitalist 'sectors' of production, rather than being merely temporarily superfluous to its immediate requirements.

This 'marginalized' working population[8], with negligible opportunities for employment in the rural areas, and in the absence of any extra-economic constraint to its geographical mobility, inevitably experiences a strong pull towards the urban centres where those opportunities for 'formal' employment that do exist are located and where the possibilities of 'informal' income-earning activities are

multiplied by the sheer concentration of both people and wealth. Hence the phenomenon of 'dependent urbanization', 'hyperurbanization', or 'urbanization without industrialization' which characterises the countries of the so-called 'Third World' and is most visibly manifested in the mushrooming growth of 'spontaneous', 'informal' or 'squatter' settlements on the fringes of their more important centres of production.

It is at this point that the real material basis of bourgeois interest in the 'housing question' finally reveals itself, and in its most acute form. On the one hand, housing under the capitalist mode of production represents an essential element of the means of subsistence required to reproduce the labour power on whose exploitation the system is based. On the other, the dynamics of the process of capital accumulation itself, as concretized in the operation of the 'housing market', ensure that the supply of this particular use value, where it is needed and at a price that can be afforded, is always outstripped by the demand.

Three possible modes of response to this failure of the 'free enterprise' system to fulfil its obligations to the 'play of market forces' immediately suggest themselves:

- the state in its role as the guarantor of the general material conditions of production and reproduction steps in to fill the breach by providing low cost public housing, usually on a subsidized or semi-subsidized basis;
- alternatively, the state removes the problem from the vulnerable centres of production to the rural areas by the (superficially) simple expedient of applying administrative constraints to in-migration from these areas (or it combines this course of action with the first);
- the homeless people take matters into their own hands by expropriating whatever land they can and providing their own housing, to a greater or lesser extent independently of the 'formal' system of commodity production.

Without, at this point, wishing to enter the debate as to when and within what limits this last response represents a manifestation of class action, I think it should by now be clear that it must nevertheless be seen to pose a real threat to the maintenance of bourgeois hegemony, particularly in terms of the ideological relations which legitimize 'property' and 'authority'. And it is in the bourgeoisie's attempt to regain control of this situation and to turn it to its own advantage that a fourth possible mode of response emerges - the 'self-help' approach.

This, indeed, appears to be what has taken place in South Africa during the general social, political and economic crisis of the 70s and, before turning to examine the specific ideological content of the form which the response has assumed here, it will be necessary to delineate at least the outline of the contextual situation in which it has developed.

In South Africa, the 'typical' urbanization pattern of peripheral or intermediate capitalist countries described briefly above has, to a marked degree, been mediated by the institutionalization of the migrant labour system and the establishment of the Reserve areas as, successively, reservoirs of cheap labour power, marshalling areas for the labour allocation process and, finally, as dumping grounds for the casualties and expendable members of the working population.[9] The system of 'influx' and 'efflux' controls applied to African workers by the state, largely through the labour bureau organization, has effectively limited the size or displaced the location of 'informal' settlements so that there are no 'problems' here of quite the same magnitude or degree of visibility as those associated with Latin American, Asian, or African 'Third World' countries.

There are, of course, 'squatter' settlements in South Africa, of which the two best known examples are probably Crossroads in the Cape Town area and Winterveld near Pretoria[10], but the urban 'housing problem', at least, has generally taken a quite different form. Its magnitude can be gauged from the following statistics (which, not coincidentally, were assembled in the aftermath of the Soweto revolt): the average occupancy rate per house for africans in ten urban areas in 1975 was estimated to be 17; this reflected an increase from 13 in 1970 (Kane-Berman, 1978:51).

The immediate cause of such severe overcrowding is obvious - state expenditure on african housing in these areas has been massively inadequate, even in terms of meeting the 'legal' demand (ie that sanctioned under Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act). However, this explains nothing, for the real

question to be answered is - why? Once again there appears to be a ready explanation in the state's manipulation of the rate of provision of african family housing as one more instrument in the battery of influx controls. Indeed, there is clearly a degree of validity to this reasoning, at this level of analysis, but further reflection indicates that there must be a yet more fundamental causality operating at a higher level of determination.

This may be demonstrated empirically by a cursory examination of the housing situation of the coloured and asian population groups that, with the africans, comprise the great bulk of the South African working class, but which are not subject to quite the same degree of administrative control and harassment as the latter, particularly in relation to movement to and between urban areas (although the Group Areas legislation provides severe constraints to location <u>within</u> the urban areas). The <u>official</u> estimates of the housing backlogs for these two population groups at the end of 1977 were 57 000 and 20 700 dwelling units respectively.(Dewar and Ellis, 1979: 149). It is likely that the actual shortages are substantially larger, since these figures have almost certainly been derived from housing lists which include only that proportion of the homeless population which considers it worthwhile to apply for houses in the face of the chronic incapacity of the responsible local authorities to reduce the real deficit. If further evidence is required, one need only point to the continued existence of large 'informal' settlements housing members of the two groups, particularly in the metropolitan areas of Cape Town and Durban.

I think that it is now clear that the fundamental causes of the 'problem' are not to be located entirely within the <u>ideology</u> of the apartheid state, since there are no real qualitative differences in the urban housing conditions of these supposedly 'different' groups. The underlying structural causes are to be found, rather, in the historically specific responses of the state to the changing material requirements of capital accumulation in South Africa since the dominance of the capitalist mode of production was first established.

Maré's assertion (1979:43) that 'the enormity of state involvement in the provision of housing demands that a theory of housing in South Africa also be a theory of the state in peripheral capitalist social formations and of state expenditure' is undoubtedly correct (although the use of 'peripheral' to describe South Africa's position in the capitalist world economy might be debatable). As he implicitly acknowledges, however, the use of analyses such *as that developed by O'Connor (1973) to investigate* state fiscal policy in the United States must become highly problematic in the context of South Africa.

The need, then, is for the theory of state intervention in the housing process (and the urbanisation process) which will enable concrete analysis of the South African situation to be undertaken. I consider that a useful starting point may be to attempt to systematically link and develop the basic hypotheses of Harvey's (1978) analysis of 'the urban process under capitalism' with Hirsch's (1978) elements of a 'theory of the bourgeois state' - both arguments evolved at similar levels of abstraction, and both focus, to a greater or lesser degree, on the requirements of the processes of overall social reproduction in relation to the general laws of capital accumulation.

The necessary development of an adequate theory would involve two further movements towards concretisation :

- a reformulation of the basic hypotheses in terms of the interlocking structures of the present 'stage of accumulation', that is, the structurally distinct system of production and reproduction dominated by monopoly capital which has evolved from the imanent tendencies of capitalist accumulation towards <u>concentration</u> (the accelerative accumulation of individual capitals through improvements in productivity, etc) and <u>centralisation</u> (the combining of individual capitals through takeovers, mergers, etc)(see Fine and Harris, 1979:104-119);
- a systematic investigation of the reformulated theory's capacity to explain specific phenomena associated with the provision of housing in contemporary South Africa.[11]

While I am certainly not in a position to undertake such a project at this time, I would suggest that the following comments would have some relevance if it were to be attempted.

Firstly, I condider that Maré's statement (1979:40) that, because of the enormity of state involvement, 'many of the concepts relating to

the provision of housing directly under the conditions of capitalist commodity production are ... not applicable or do not occupy as central a position (as those relating to the reproduction of labour power) within a framework of analysis ' incorporates a basic error which has potentially serious consequences for the direction that further analysis should take.

The source of this error lies, I think, in Mare's attempt (1979:39-40) to isolate the use value of housing in the reproduction of labour power from its exchange value as a commodity, apparently on the grounds that the provision of housing by the 'public sector' (the state) is external to the system of generalised commodity production and exchange. The conceptual framework developed here, however, indicates that under capitalism these two aspects of housing derive from the totality of the system (the'contradictory unity' of commodities) and cannot be fragmented in this way. Empirically, it can be seen that the massive involvement of industrial (building) capital in the construction of 'townships' such as Mitchell's Plain and Atlantis in the Western Cape is clearly not taking place outside the process of 'private' capital accumulation simply because the state acts as a financial intermediary between the 'manufacturers' of such accommodation and the 'customers' who ultimately purchase its use value with their rental payments (and taxes, if the subsidy system is taken into account). It is for this reason, I am sure, that any comprehensive theory of housing in South Africa must take up and develop Harvey's hypotheses on investment in the 'built environment'(see footnote 5).

Secondly, the organisational structure of the state provision of public housing in South Africa - in broad terms, the financing of initial development costs and overall planning control of housing schemes is allocated to the central government while local authorities (or Administration Boards in the case of african housing) are responsible for detailed planning, supervision of construction and the administrative control (rental collection, provision of services and maintenance) of the completed schemes (see Cleary, 1978 for a more detailed account) - demands that a theory of state intervention in the housing process incorporate a 'scale factor' which will account for the mediation of such intervention through the local state organs.

The elements of a theory of 'the local state' and its role in 'securing conditions favourable to capital accumulation' are to be found in Cockburn's (1977) analysis of the British local government system which examines, in very concrete terms, the problem of social reproduction at the local level. While the specificity of the South African state apparatus obviously precludes any direct appropriation of the concepts developed there, I think that the particular perspective adopted and the comparative material that it provides will prove to be of considerable use in undertaking an analysis of the situation in this country. Clearly, such an analysis would have to recognize the overbearing function of repressive control of the black working class embodied in the 'township' system; equally, however, it would have to accommodate the fact that this system is at present undergoing a substantial modification in the face of a manifest need to restructure the social relations of production of the South African social formation.

The explication of the particular mechanisms through which this process of restructuring is to be accomplished is, of course, of great importance, and it is with this object in mind that we return to the point that had been reached when we embarked upon this rather summary treatment of the 'housing problem' in South Africa and the questions of theoretical construction that it raises: the appearance of a 'new' approach to the problem, that of 'self-help'.

The concept of 'self-help' in the housing process is at present being propagated in South Africa by a number of diverse organizations which include the following:

- the National Building Research Institute, which operates under the umbrella of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and acts in both a consultative and a 'research and development' capacity to the building industry and to various state agencies involved in the provision of housing (local authorities, Administration Boards, the Department of Community Development, etc);
- the Urban Foundation;
- certain university research institutions (and teaching departments);
- 'community development' aid organizations of various origins which apparently subscribe to otherwise quite different

programmes and principles.

It is evident that the concept is open to a range of different interpretations but the form in which it seems to have attained its widest currency and in which it is perhaps most explicitly articulated is that associated *with the work of John Turner on low-income* housing policy. The major hypotheses can be summarized as follows[12]:

- housing needs are a matter of <u>access</u> (to resources) and <u>tenure</u> (rights of occupancy) as well as 'shelter'; when alternatives are available, decisions in relation to housing choice reflect a highly personal, 'localised' set of values which are appropriate to immediate 'community' issues and which cannot be realized by depersonalized, centralized housing agencies;
- conventional notions of the 'housing problem' focus on what housing <u>is</u> (ie a material product) rather than on what it <u>does</u> for people; despite being constructed in inferior materials and to space standards that are unacceptably low in terms of conventional housing codes, a house may in fact function in a highly 'appropriate and supportive' way for the particular household that occupies it;
- the solution to the 'housing problem' lies in the maximum use of available 'income' resources' (people and renewable materials) and the carefully controlled use of 'capital resources' (machinery, non-renewable materials and land); in order to achieve this, the 'heteronomous housing systems' ('highly institutionalized, professionalized, monetized and industrialized') which presently control housing policy down to its very last detail (an accurate picture of the existing South African system) must be restructured to become 'autonomous systems' in which people and organizations operating at the local level set their own priorities *and establish the most effective methods of* using local resources;
- action at the central government level should be limited to the setting of proscriptive ('performance') standards rather than the present generally prescriptive ('specification') standards for housing, to the guaranteeing of access to scarce local resources on an equitable basis, to providing 'supralocal infrastructures' and to controlling the price of basic resources and 'money (credit?) itself'; in essence, central government and 'corporate' organizations must act 'in <u>support</u> of locally effective housing demand'.

It is important to note that this formulation of the 'self-help' concept does <u>not</u> reduce the approach to the popular image of the self-built shanty which is in some way a testimony to a native 'folk architecture'. On the contrary, the range of possible physical forms covered by the idea is almost without restriction: from substantial structures erected with contractual technical assistance and labour and employing conventional building materials, through various types of mass-produced 'core' or 'starter' houses which may be added to incrementally over time, to the archetypal shanty built with family labour and using whatever materials are to hand on a site which may or may not be supplied with basic services.

The fundamental condition to be satisfied in this conceptualization of 'self-help' is not whether the occupants of a particular house have used their own labour *to provide themselves with shelter*, but whether they have exercised '<u>self-determination</u>' in selecting the nature and standard of their accommodation, in accordance with priorities established by themselves. Certainly, it is in this sense that the idea may be, and clearly has been, extended into the broader field of 'community development'.

A systematic critique of the Turner 'solution' to the 'housing problem' is outside the scope of this paper.[13] Nevertheless, even in this higly compressed form, the essential criticism to which it can be subjected should be apparent - in its focus on the individual household and the 'local organization' as rational decision-making units opposed to a field of impersonal and indifferent 'bureaucratic forces', the model effectively discounts the limits and effects of <u>structural conditions established on the material bases of capitalist accumulation</u> which have generated the 'problem' in the first place and will continue to do so 'as long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist' (Engels, 1951:552, writing on the 'housing question' in 1872-3).

Turner's prescription, then, represents yet another case of treating the symptom rather than the cause, or of 'shifting problems around without resolving them' and, as such, it does not pose itself <u>directly</u> counter to

the interests of the ruling class. Indeed, as the range of institutions which subscribe to its basic premises indicates, the more or less 'radical' terminology in which it is couched actually facilitates its incorporation by the liberal and reformist ideologies that service bourgeois hegemony.[14]

The most direct and visible instance of such incorporation is to be found in the Urban Foundation's enthusiastic espousal of 'home ownership' which, as the cornerstone of its urban 'quality of life' improvement programme, quite explicitly advocates the development of a 'middle class' of black property owners to champion the virtues of the 'free enterprise' system among their less privileged fellows. the mechenisms through which this is to be achieved, in addition to the establishment of leasehold (or preferably freehold) rights for african 'legally' in the urban areas, range from facilitating access to building society finance, through encouraging 'employer participation' in the housing process by way of making loan finance available to their employees, to 'sweat equity' 'self-help' schemes such as that in Khutsong township near Carletonville.

Whether or not a 'class' which will seek an alliance of interests with the dominant class <u>can</u> be constituted on the basis of the ownership of domestic (ie owner-occupied) property remains a highly problematic issue which cannot be dealt with here.[15] However, the significance of such a strategy in relation to the current attempts of the state to restructure its apparatuses in order to accommodate the now 'permanent' presence of a stabilized and more highly differentiated african urban population (ie the various star strata of the working class and petty bourgeoisie) in the centres of production seems quite clear.

The precise nature of the role played by the Urban Foundation and its implications in terms of the relationship between capital and the state in post-Soweto South Africa are complex questions which require detailed consideration and which I hope to take up elsewhere. For the moment, I can only infer, at a level of almost total speculation, that this relationship is in the process of a thorough-going transformation, which has its roots in the major crisis of South African capitalism in the mid-70s.

Furthermore, it appears that there may be developing a 'division of labour' between capital and the state at the ideological level, with the former assuming a growing responsibility for the task of legitimizing the 'ethic' of capital accumulation while the latter expands and deepens its role as 'defender' of the 'national identity' (however that is to be defined). At one level, this might be deduced from the ever more aggressive and strident apologetics for the 'free enterprise' system which emanate from the representatives of capital while, at another, it may explain the rapid escalation of state expenditure on 'defense' and the accumulation of strategic materials coupled with a simultaneous decline or at least stagnation (in relative terms) of expenditure on 'social consumption' items which, we are told, must now become more directly the business (in more senses than one!) of the 'private sector'.

The way in which the ideology of 'self-help' would mesh with and complement a 'total strategy' of this nature should require no further elaboration, but to conclude, I wish to pose, very briefly and somewhat ingenuously (and in the interests of provoking debate), the question of the contradiction inherent to this ideology, as to all ideologies which seek to legitimize bourgeois domination.

Although, as we have seen, the 'radical' formulation of the 'self-help' concept can be readily appropriated to serve ruling class interests, the same formulation raises at least the possibility that it might instead be appropriated by the working class to become an ideology of 'community' resistance to 'external' control of the local environment. The extent to which such an ideology can evolve into a consciousness of <u>class</u> and, beyond that, be translated into <u>class practice</u> is, however, an issue which, in this paper, must remain open.

Certainly, the numerous accounts of 'community movements' which appear to have dissipated their energy in internecine factional squabbles or to have suffered co-option and subsequent depoliticisation by reformist elements indicate that this particular way forward is not easy. But perhaps it is necessary, finally, to recognize that

> ... The contradictions are not so immobilising as they seem, because in their particular shape and form they are always changing and so opening up new possibilities for action. Uncovering truth by stepping outside the convention-

al ideas of family, school, local government or electoral democracy makes it possible to see the present situation for what it is and at the same time to roll it onward so that a new terrain *comes into sight (Cockburn, 1977:184).*

Peter Wilkinson

Notes

1. The three relevant articles, subsequently republished in Control, Development Studies Information Publication 1, University of Witwatersrand, 1979, are:
   - 'Environmental Planning and Social Control' (16-21);
   - A Younge: 'The "squatter problem"' (27-31);
   - G Maré: 'Further notes on the "squatter problem"' (32-49).

2. Recently published examples of work which falls into this category include A Proctor: 'Class struggle, segregation and the city: a history of Sophiatown, 1905 - 1940', in B Bozzoli (ed): Labour, Townships and Protest (Ravan, 1979:49-89); and R de Villiers: 'The state, capital and labour allocation - the Johannesburg Municipality, 1948 - 62', in Africa Perspective 12, September, 1979:20-39.

3. The works cited are Frederick Engels: 'The housing question', in Marx-Engels: Selected Works vol 1, 1951:495-574; and G Stedman Jones: Outcast London, Pelican, 1976. Both are rich in parallels and analogies of certain developments in the current situation in South Africa, but obviously they cannot directly explain the causality of what are, after all, historically specific processes.

4. The complex operations of the 'housing market' (or the 'urban land market') and their relationship to the theory of rent cannot be discussed here; for a useful, if not completely satisfactory introductory treatment along these lines, see D Harvey: *'Use value, exchange value and the theory of* urban land use', in Social Justice and the City (Arnold, 1973:153-194).

5. The very dense argument presented in Harvey's (1978) analysis of 'the urban process under capitalism' cannot be adequately reproduced here but I have tried to summarize those points that I consider to be relevant to this framework. The need for concrete analysis in these terms of the present situation of the South African building industry *is clear - see* WF Kilian *and* GJV Snyman: Building Survey no 44 - Report on Business Conditions in the Building Industry, Bureau of Economic Research, University of Stellenbosch, January, 1980.

6. The use of the term 'mode' of production (in the sense of a self-sustaining system) in this context is open to some debate since there is a school of thought which claims that what is involved is the continued existence of archaic forms of production which, objectively, are completely subordinated to the laws of motion of capitalist accumulation; for an exposition of this viewpoint, see J Banaji: 'Modes of production in a materialist conception of history', in Capital and Class 3, 1977:1-44; an introduction to the debate may be found in A Foster-Carter: 'Can we articulate "articulation"?', in J Clammer (ed): The New Economic Anthropology, Macmillan, 1978:210-249.

7. A concise outline of 'underdevelopment theory' is given in C Leys: Underdevelopment in Kenya, Heinemann, 1975:8-18; see also E Mandel: Late Capitalism, Verso, 1978: chapters 3, 10, 11.

8. The concept of 'marginalization' is systematically developed in A Quijano Obregón: 'The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalized labour force' in Economy and Society 3,4, 1974:393-428; an examination of the concept's usefulness in the South African context is undertaken in G Maré: Marginalization Theory and Contemporary South Africa, APD No 1, Africa Perspective Dissertation Service, Johannesburg, 1980.

9. This is obviously a crude simplification of a complex historical development - for a more detailed account, see M Humphreys: 'The changing role of the Reserves' in Africa Perspective 6, 1977:32-45.

10. These two settlements were established under very different circumstances and developed in response to highly specific local situations; a serious comparative analysis of their origin and patterns of development remains to be done.

11. The methodology suggested here derives from my understanding of the structure of Kevin French's BA Hons dissertation: 'South African capital restructuring, crises and tendencies in the seventies - for the concretization of theory', University of Witwatersrand, 1979.

12. This summary draws heavily on an unpublished memorandum: Outline for housing action (1978), circulated by Turner's Associated Housing Advisory Services as a working document 'for the participation of the 'Third System' (?) in the elaboration and implementation of a United Nations development strategy for the 1980s and beyond'; the basic texts are JFC Turner and R Fichter (eds): Freedom to Build, Collier-Macmillan, 1972, and JFC Turner: Housing by People, Marion Boyars, 1976.

13. The elements of such a critique are to be found in R Burgess: 'Petty commodity housing or dweller control? A critique of John Turner's views on housing policy' in World Development 6, 9/10, 1978:1105-1133; unfortunately, Burgess' 'shotgun' technique tends to obscure the theoretical framework that he is opposing to the Turner model.

14. Kelwyn Sole suggests that 'the petty bourgeois individual (in this context, particularly the intellectual) poses his or her conflict or contradiction with the state power bloc more easily in terms of ideology and politics, rather than in terms of the nature of the economic system of the society, and especially the nature of ownership and control of the material means of production' ('The abortion of the intellect' in Work in Progress 9, August 1979:17). There remains, of course, the difficult question of how the personal 'internalised' ideology or 'politics' of the individual is transferred to or interlocked with the more abstract and rationalized ideology of the institution in which he or she is located.

15. This aspect of the 'housing question', in relation to the British experience, is examined in P Saunders: 'Domestic property and social class' in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2,2, 1978:233-

251; an analysis in the South African context would, of course, have to take account of the effects of racial ideologies (the 'black consciousness' movement, segregation into geographically isolated 'townships', etc).

16. The issue is discussed in CG Pickvance: 'From "social base" to "social force" - some analytical issues in the study of urban protest', in M Harloe (ed): Captive Cities, John Wiley, 1977:175-186; see also the contributions of Manuel Castells and Pickvance in CG Pickvance (ed): Urban Sociology: critical essays, Tavistock, 1976.

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