

WORK 19

IN

PROGRESS

INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION AMENDMENT ACT NO. 95 OF 1980

[ASSENTED TO 1 JULY, 1980]

[DATE OF COMMENCEMENT: 1 AUGUST, 1980]

(Afrikaans text signed by the State President)

ACT

To amend the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956, so as to delete the definition of "onbehoorlike arbeidspraktyk" in section 17; to amend the expressions "industrial court" and "unfair labour practice" in section 18; to amend the composition and functions of the industrial court, the establishment of conciliation determinations between certain occupations; to effect certain textual alterations; and to repeal certain laws.

1. Amends section 17 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, as follows:—paragraph (a) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (b) amends the Afrikaans text; and paragraph (c) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice".

2. Amends section 18 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, as follows:—paragraph (a) inserts the words "a deputy chairman"; paragraph (b) amends the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (c) deletes subsection (8).

3. Amends section 19 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, as follows:—paragraph (a) substitutes the proviso to subsection (4); and paragraph (b) amends subsection (4).

4. Amends section 20 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, by adding subsections (5) and (6).

5. Amends section 17 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, as follows:—paragraph (a) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (b) amends the Afrikaans text; paragraph (c) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (d) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (e) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (f) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (g) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (h) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (i) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (j) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (k) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (l) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (m) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (n) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (o) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (p) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (q) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (r) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (s) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (t) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (u) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (v) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (w) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (x) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (y) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice"; paragraph (z) substitutes the definition of "unfair labour practice".

6. Amends section 18 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, as follows:—paragraph (a) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (b) amends the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (c) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (d) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (e) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (f) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (g) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (h) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (i) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (j) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (k) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (l) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (m) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (n) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (o) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (p) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (q) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (r) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (s) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (t) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (u) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (v) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (w) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (x) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (y) substitutes the definition of "industrial court"; paragraph (z) substitutes the definition of "industrial court".



THE IC BILL AND INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

MANY OF the responses to the proposed changes in industrial legislation have tended to view capital and the state as a monolithic unity; the specific nature of the changes and shifting responses have also been lost sight of, and subsumed under the single banner of 'total control'.

The first note published below examines the shifts in focus of the latest proposed amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act. The second contribution tentatively explores the increasing pressure on worker organisations to participate in industrial councils.

the 1981 draft Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill

THE purpose of this article is to examine the state responses implicit in the draft Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill of 1981, and to illustrate the nature of these responses by comparing them to the strategies adopted by the state in the legislation that arose out of the Wiehahn Report.

As WIP was going to print, there was speculation that the Minister of Manpower intended to introduce an amended version of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill to Parliament in the new session. Press speculation was that some of the controls on trade unions contained in the original draft had been dropped from the Bill to be introduced.

THE WIEHAHN APPROACH

THE Wiehahn Report has been correctly viewed as a response to the re-emergence of an independent black trade union movement in the early 1970s, and in particular to the Durban strikes of 1973. The Commission saw this re-emergence as posing a number of threats to industrial relations in this country. In particular, they noted the following dangers:

- * that the continued growth of the independent union movement might lead to the existence of an 'informal' bargaining sector (between employers and unregistered unions) outside of the official Industrial Council system; this might ultimately threaten the official system;
- * that unregistered unions enjoyed 'greater freedom' than registered unions as they were free from the 'essential discipline and control' imposed upon participants in the official bargaining system.

The Commission's response was to recommend that all trade unions be entitled to register and take part in the Industrial Council system. By drawing black unions into the official bargaining system, the state would be able to exercise some control over these unions. They saw this process as a form of compromise; in return for the 'advantages' of registration and participation in the Industrial Council system, the unions would expose themselves to administrative controls, and certain controls on

their political activities.

THE POST-WIEHAHN LEGISLATION

THE state's legislative response was slower. In the original amending Act (1979), the possibility of registration was extended only to those unions which did not admit migrant workers and 'frontier-commuters' as members. The black union movement protested against this limited reform, and the response of the state was to alter the position so as to enable all trade unions to register and participate in the Industrial Council system. At this stage, a division developed amongst black unions, with some indicating that they would be willing to register and others remaining adamant in their refusal to do so. The present position is that certain CUSA and FOSATU unions have registered (though the latter have indicated their intention to de-register if they are not granted non-racial status); the GWU has indicated the terms on which it would be willing to register; and SAAWU and MACWUSA continue to refuse to do so.

A RESPONSE TO NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The 1981 draft Bill can be viewed as containing both a partial shift away from the strategy adopted by Wiehahn; and an attempt to facilitate the operation of the reforms introduced by that Commission. The Bill represents a move away from the Wiehahn position insofar as it recognises the failure to impose control on unions by drawing them into the ambit of the official bargaining system. This will be done by introducing an entirely new facet to the Bill - the unprecedented placing of controls on unregistered unions. These controls are partially administrative but will also severely curtail the type of political activities that trade unions can involve

themselves in.

The extension of controls can be seen as a response to the emergence of a new militant unionism, especially in the Eastern Cape. The most significant labour development in recent years has been the emergence of unions such as SAAWU and MACWUSA, the involvement of community organisations like PEBCO in industrial disputes, and the close links that have been established between the unions and community organisations. These developments have placed an increasing stress on the statutory industrial relations framework, and the response of the state to this has been to move outwards the boundaries of control, particularly the control of political activity by unions.

But the effect of placing new controls on unregistered unions has also been to make these unions relatively less 'free' when compared to registered unions. As the activities of unregistered unions are increasingly controlled so, in a sense, the advantage in remaining unregistered is decreased. Although there are dangers in attempting to extract state responses from pieces of legislation, an examination of certain of the controls proposed in the Bill throws some light on state responses to black unionism and, in particular, the new militant unionism.

EXTENSION OF CONTROLS

At the moment, only those organisations whose primary purpose is the regulation of relations between employers and their employees are classified as trade unions. The Bill proposes to extend the definition of a trade union to cover all organisations that intervene, in a single instance, in an industrial dispute on behalf of members involved in that dispute as workers. The consequence of this is that a

large number of organisations, not generally considered to be trade unions, will be potentially made trade unions as soon as they intervene in industrial relations. While previously this would not have affected an organisation significantly, it will now subject them to a number of controls. An unregistered union will have to submit its constitution, head office address (which may not be in an 'independent' bantustan) and the names of its office-bearers and officials to the Department of Manpower Utilisation. In addition, various administrative controls related to the keeping of books and membership lists, the retention of records and the holding of elections will be imposed upon unregistered unions for the first time. Such controls have previously been on registered unions only.

The definition of a trade union is now so wide that organisations which do not conceive of themselves as being trade unions might find themselves being prosecuted for failing to comply with the new Act.

This could occur in the following way: A number of members of a church organisation are employed in the same factory. They are dismissed as a result of a strike and the church organisation approaches the company with a view to getting its members re-hired. In terms of the proposed definition, the church organisation could now be considered a 'trade union'. If it did not comply with the duties placed on unregistered unions by the Act, such as submitting its constitution, the state could commence a prosecution against it.

RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

THE Industrial Conciliation Act currently places restrictions on the political activities of registered unions. They are prevented from

affiliating or giving financial assistance to any 'political party'. A political party here is any organisation that puts up candidates for election to a legislative body, or attempts to influence public opinion to support a political party. Not only are the prohibitions in the new proposed section significantly widened but the political activities of unregistered unions are restricted. These amendments will clearly make the links between the new militant unions and local community organisations unlawful. This will be effected in part by extending the prohibition on political assistance to all 'political organisations'. This new category is exceedingly widely defined and covers any group or individual that promotes its 'political interest' or the political interest of all or some of its members. No attempt is made to define what constitutes a political interest, so this catch-all category will cover a wide variety of organisations including, definitely, community organisations such as PEBCO and, possibly, trade unions.

The type of political assistance that is prohibited is also extended. The granting of any assistance by a trade union to a political party or organisation will be an offence, as will be any attempt to influence its membership to support a political party or organisation. At the moment only the granting of financial assistance is prohibited.

The precise effect of such a wide-ranging provision is difficult to envisage. It is typical of a tendency in South African legislation to cast the net of illegality extremely wide, so as to make a wide series of acts criminal offences. This enables the state to ignore the vast majority of such transgressions, but to selectively prosecute its opponents, when and where it sees fit. This section could be used,

for example, to prevent TUCSA from assisting the NRP in putting up election posters: but it is much more likely to be used to hit at alliances between black unions and community organisations. It could even be used to interfere with alliances between unions, as all unions are potentially 'political organisations'.

(It should be noted that an additional proposed amendment to this section is aimed at the political activities of right-wing unions. An individual standing for election to a legislative body will be considered to be a 'political party'. This is clearly designed to hit at the support given by certain right-wing unions to independent candidates for parliament).

STRIKES

At the moment it is an offence to strike or to incite someone else to strike. (The exception to this is a 'legal' strike which can be staged after certain procedures have been followed). In those rare cases where a strike is political (ie not related to an employment issue), it is an offence to assist strikers.

The new Bill proposes to make all assistance to strikers (except in the case of a legal strike) an offence. This will make any sympathetic action such as collecting or contributing money for strikers, distributing food parcels, organising or even participating in a boycott illegal. Again the ambit of the section is very wide and could potentially include such above-board activities as giving legal advice to strikers. The ability of community and other organisations to give the support they have offered strikers in the last couple of years will be severely affected by this section.

STOP ORDERS

CURRENTLY, the question of a union's right

to stop order facilities (automatic deduction of union subscriptions for members' wages) is largely a matter to be resolved between labour and capital. Management and a union could agree to such an arrangement. But where a registered union was refused such facilities by management, they could apply to the Minister to compel the employer to grant stop orders. In terms of the draft Bill, employers will be obliged to grant stop order facilities to registered unions that request them, but they cannot be granted to unregistered unions unless the Minister consents.

The proposed amendment represents a significant intrusion by the state into a sphere generally considered to be the sole domain of labour and capital. It gives the state the legal power, for the first time, to prevent a stop order arrangement being made between management and an unregistered union despite the fact that both parties to the arrangement want it.

This section is an indication of the way the state views the dealings of certain sectors of capital with unregistered unions. A number of unregistered unions have won stop order facilities and this type of state intervention both shores up the position of management in such negotiations and decreases the number of options open to them. The section is both a potential control on unregistered unions, and a powerful inducement for trade unions to register. (This section is one of those that the Minister indicated would be withdrawn from the Bill and it is interesting to note that it is one that Assocom objected to).

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING

IN addition to the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill, 2 other pieces of labour legislation will be passed this year. They are

the Manpower Training Bill and the Guidance and Employment Bill which arise out of the recommendation of the Rieker Commission that the legislation dealing with industrial training, education and placement be consolidated and rationalised; and that racial differentiations be removed in the legislation. In addition to consolidating existing industrial legislation, the proposed Manpower Training Bill contains severe controls over the running of training centres by unregistered unions. The effect of this section is that no unregistered union may participate in a centre offering training to union members unless the centre is registered with the Department of Manpower Utilisation. Any involvement by an unregistered union makes such registration compulsory, and conditions may be imposed on the registration.

Once a training centre is obliged to register, all training that it conducts in labour relations or union activity must be in accordance with courses approved by the Department. The effect of the section is that, unless an unregistered union registers as a training centre with the state, it will only be entitled to run educational courses for its own full-time organisers.

CONCLUSION

AS yet there is no clarity as to precisely which sections of the Bill will become law. In the light of the concerted opposition to numerous aspects of the Bill from both labour and capital, the state will definitely drop a number of the more contentious sections and has even hinted that the entire measure might be shelved. If the sections extending controls to unregistered unions are enacted as law, the state will for the first time give sanction to a dual industrial bargaining system. The

Wieshahn Commission had hoped that its reforms would stop the growth of the 'unofficial' bargaining system that was developing outside the Industrial Council system. This has not happened and to compound the situation the independent trade union movement has developed an increased militancy. The state's response has been to extend controls, in particular over political activities, to these unions. The bargaining and agreements that do take place between unregistered unions and management will thus enjoy a form of statutory recognition they have not previously had.

As mentioned earlier, the extension of controls to unregistered unions will remove certain of the benefits of rejecting registered status. But, ironically, this extension will also remove an incentive to register. The willingness of a union to register is often taken by management to be indicative of a union's 'responsibility' and 'stability', for with registration comes the subjection to controls. As such, registration can be a strong incentive in inducing management to negotiate an in-house agreement with a union. This will no longer be the case, and perhaps union attitudes on registration will become more directly dependent on their approach towards participation in the Industrial Council system.

Industrial Councils

IN THE debate over the virtues of a 'legal' strike at Colgate, the central issue in dispute was lost sight of. This was the right to negotiate wages and working conditions at plant level. The importance of this issue lies in the increasing pressure on worker organisations, registered and unregistered, to negotiate wages and working conditions exclusively through Industrial Councils or other industry-wide forums.

While not wishing to draw an absolute distinction between employers' interests and the purpose of the state's legal intervention - the relationship between the two is a complex one - it is suggested that the thrust of the legislation is to provide the mechanisms for the institutionalisation and supervision of black trade unions.

Actual participation in the industrial conciliation machinery was initially expected to be its own inducement and reward, to flow automatically from registration as the self-evident benefit, and the legislation has not explicitly directed itself to this aspect. Indeed the state appears to have directed its attention to those unions (particularly the new 'militant' unions) which have chosen to sidestep its supervision by refusing to register. As outlined above, this has taken the form, in the amending draft bills, of extending controls over unregistered unions, and of introducing measures designed to isolate the unions from the current upsurge of popular militancy.

Increasingly, however, employers are being confronted with sharpening industrial conflict,

and the problem posed for them is to establish the industrial framework within which individual employers should confront their workers. With regard to the legislation in general, and the proposed amendments dealing with governmental control, employers' organisations have adopted an uncommitted position. The refusal to deal with unregistered unions by some has reflected little more than their ambiguous attitude to trade unions or worker organisations in general. What is notable, however, is that there has been a shift in management's statements. Whereas there had been emphasis placed on registration as a prerequisite for negotiations with unions, this has shifted to the concepts of 'representivity' and now, more ominously, 'commitment to industry-wide bargaining'. Here Seifsa is illustrative.

The argument is advanced by management that because enterprises are competitive, it is necessary to have industry-wide uniformity in wages and working conditions. Furthermore, a single forum is required to deal with the total spectrum of organisations representing labour in that industry. As capital is comprised of mutually destructive and competitive capitals, it is clear that stronger capitals (particularly highly mechanised enterprises) have an interest in establishing much higher minimums than their less competitive brothers. But the issue is deeper than this and fundamental objections have been raised to the whole Industrial Council system.

It has been argued that the Industrial Council system profoundly affects the power and organisation of trade unions, and that the Industrial Council is in any event an unfavourable forum for the 'independent' unions.

The Industrial Council consists of an equal number of representatives from employer

and employee organisations respectively. The Council drafts agreements which are then given the force of law. The agreements are policed by employees of the Council. A few of the features of the system that have been criticised are as follows:

There is always numerical parity between employer and employee representatives. Should a trade union (employee representative) wish to increase its representation then it may do so either at the expense of another trade union, or else allow the employers to extend their number of seats by the same number. In an Industrial Council there may be up to 80 or more members, including representatives of up to 10 or more registered unions. It is unlikely that a new union will have anywhere near the 'representivity' on a nation-wide basis to command more than a few seats. Furthermore, given the divisions in the South African labour force, workers will present themselves at the table as deeply divided, divisions which will overshadow the divisions between employers.

The constitution of the Council itself forms a kind of contract between the members/parties. Many of these contain dispute procedures which all members are to follow in their enterprises. The most notable of these is the anti-strike/ compulsory reference to arbitration procedure. In such a council, no member may call a strike (see Section 65 (2) (a) of the Act).

The non-participation of a trade union, or its refusal to endorse an agreement reached by the Council, will not prevent the agreement covering that union's members. Indeed, the representivity of employees covered by a Council is gauged by the range of employees employed by the employer representatives (see Section 48 (ii) (c)).

It is possible to improve on the Industrial

Council agreements by entering into private 'house' agreements with individual employers. However, the constitution of some employer organisations bind their members to abstain from entering agreements which cover areas already covered by the Industrial Council agreement.

The more direct criticism of the system and the partisan structure is that the entire process takes place in a manner which effectively undercuts the power of the union to make effective demands. The bargaining process is taken away from the workplace where workers are not only organised, but where they have the ability to back their demands with an organised response such as withdrawal of labour.

But, it has been argued, the most damaging effects of participating in Industrial Councils, or negotiating working conditions in forums distanced from the concrete struggles on the shop floor, are those on the organisation itself. Besides the fact that the negotiations in the Council chambers may have little bearing on concrete struggles, isolated from the effective base and power of the union, the shop floor is denied access to bargaining with their own bosses, and workers come to play a passive role in the process, and consequently in their union. The emphasis on negotiating skills (and specialists, officials etc) grants them a lesser role in the union and diminishes the importance of shop-floor organisation, shop stewards, etc. In particular, the tendency is to cut the shop floor out of the whole process. Instead of accounting to the members and the taking of a fresh mandate during negotiations, there is only the report-back. In some TUCSA unions even that would be good fortune!

It is in this sense that it is argued that

Industrial Councils are not neutral vessels to be filled with whatever content can be poured into them. The view that regards access to these institutions as an 'extension of rights' reveals a limited understanding of concrete organisational questions.

Increasing pressure to participate in the Industrial Council system is being exerted on trade unions. This may take the form of refusing to deal with a trade union unless and until it participates in the Council system, alternatively until it spells out in writing its intention to do so. Behind this position lies the threat of refusing access to the factory or refusing stop order facilities. At the same time management states that it is not hostile to unions, and is merely attaching a 'reasonable' condition to its recognition of the union.

This issue is not confined to registered unions. As employer organisations formulate their common policy, unregistered unions are being informed that wages and working conditions can not be negotiated at plant level.

It must be noted that employers themselves are not at one on the question of Industrial Councils. Some have themselves stated that the Councils are unrepresentative and unsatisfactory (eg Ford's Fred Ferreira). Furthermore, in certain sectors there are major divisions amongst employers which has led to sections distancing themselves from the Councils (for example in the textile industry where there are both capital-intensive and labour-intensive sectors).

The struggle to establish the right to plant level bargaining is a crucial one, and one which affects all labour organisations. In this regard the Colgate workers' victory was significant, whatever the merits of calling for a legal strike might have been. Whatever

conditions employers might attempt to stipulate as the necessary preconditions for recognition, the actual cohesion and strength of the workers in their factories will determine if they are recognised. Labour organisations that exchange this principle of shop-floor based struggles for recognition will effectively be 'scabbing' on labour organisations in general.

PB & FH

THE SUPPORT ALLIANCE: trade unions and community

IN A number of recent working class struggles, links between trade unions and the broader community have been established. This article is limited to a discussion of a specific set of relations in which a community or community organisation supports a workplace struggle. These specific sorts of relations and the problems and questions that surround them are well illustrated in the 1980 Cape meatworkers' strike, and the 1979 Ford workers' strike in Port Elizabeth. Before looking at these two cases in more detail, a brief attempt will be made to theoretically situate the separation between workplace and community, and to discuss some of its effects.

The main problems and questions to be raised and discussed below revolve around

- a the notion of 'community';
- b the nature of the alliance entered into between a working class organisation - the trade union - and a community organisation which includes non-working class elements;
- c the problem of working class leadership in such an alliance;
- d the area of struggle and organisation where the working class has its most powerful bargaining lever;
- e how the link between workplace and community is sustained in non-crisis periods, especially in a situation where no national working class political party legally functions;
- f the specific roles of organisations involved in different areas of struggle.

LOCATING THE SEPARATION

UNDER capitalism the state is not directly involved in exploitation. But it does assist in the process of exploitation. This is done by attempting to ensure the right conditions for exploitation to take place. It involves defending private property, providing the repressive apparatuses necessary for keeping law and order, etc. In South Africa the state is involved in distributing workers to different sectors of the economy through influx control and the labour bureaux, assisting and encouraging economic growth by building roads and railways, etc. It also intervenes to assist in reproducing the working class by providing housing, education, health services and so on. To the extent that the state is not directly involved in exploitation, there is a real separation between economics and the state. This separation is mirrored by the separation between politics and economics. But the two

levels of politics and economics do not operate independently; rather, they are interlinked and the degree to which they link and affect each other differs with different capitalist societies.

One of the effects of this separation between politics and economics is that the state often appears to be a neutral arbitrator in the struggles between capital and labour. However, the class nature of the state is seen when it intervenes in the economy and in the reproduction of labour power on behalf of capital.

A further effect of this separation is the fragmenting and weakening of worker and popular struggles. For example struggles at the economic level, if totally divorced from the political level, confront only individual groups of capitalists rather than challenging the system of exploitation.

The separation between workplace and community also has a physical aspect to it. The site of production is separate from the place of residence: this geographical separation developed historically and in South Africa is intensified through racial segregation and housing policy. However, community and workplace do not exist as two distinct and unconnected spheres; instead there is a real link between the two. Capitalist production cannot take place without the reproduction and maintenance of the working class which takes place in the non-work situation, 'the community'. Economic, cultural and ideological reproduction of the worker must of necessity take place for capital to be able to produce. For workers to return to the factory every day they have to eat, be housed, and kept in a reasonably healthy condition.

In addition, there is a continuous attempt on the part of the ruling classes to mould and control the ideas, perceptions and attitudes of the working class so that subservience to the

social hierarchy can be assured, thus providing a submissive labour force. Reproduction of the working class involves housing, rent, transport and health services as well as cultural and ideological reproduction (which includes education and the media).

After all, what is the non-work situation from the point of view of the everyday practical consolidation of the capitalist system, if not the reproduction of wage-labour itself (Cowley, 1977:227).

It can be seen then that the workplace and the community are interrelated and the apparent separation is a false one.

Problems like high rents and busfares in the community are directly affected by the exploitation in the workplace through the wage which has to meet rent and transport costs. Poverty in the home is caused by exploitation in the workplace (WIP 15:10).

Most often the needs for the reproduction of the labour force are not sufficiently provided for by capital, and the state intervenes on its behalf, providing housing, education, sometimes health and transport services. But as has been argued in WIP 15,

these services cost money, and will ultimately mean that there is less money for capitalist profit and reinvestment. So it is not surprising that...these services are usually little more than the barest minimum needed to keep workers alive, get them back to work each day, with a basic education and in a certain minimum state of health (WIP 15:10).

This briefly outlines some of the ways in which the workplace, the non-work situation and the state are interrelated. The effect of seeing relations in the workplace and in the community as independent is to weaken and localise struggle, with a resultant blocking of perception of the unity of the general structures of exploitation and oppression. Struggles in the community are directed at local state bodies, while struggles at the

workplace challenge individual capitalists; where these are not combined they do not challenge, in the long term, the nature of the state and the overriding system of exploitation.

TRADE UNION STRUGGLE AND THE COMMUNITY

SACTU, at its formation, pledged a policy of non-racialism and support for the struggle for liberation. It was declared that

the organising of the mass of workers for higher wages, better conditions of life and labour is inextricably bound up with a determined struggle for political rights and liberation from all oppressive laws and practices. It follows that a mere struggle for economic rights of the workers without participation in the general struggle for political emancipation would condemn the trade union movement to uselessness and to a betrayal of the interests of the workers.

This approach was shown in the practical struggles that SACTU became involved in: the anti-pass campaign, consumer boycotts, rent reduction campaigns, education boycotts. SACTU directly involved itself as an organisation in non-workplace struggles and in mobilising the broader community.

After state harassment and repression forced SACTU underground, a lull followed in worker activity and organisation until the 1973 Durban strikes, when over 90 000 workers came out on strike. These strikes were largely 'spontaneous' in that they were not associated with any formal worker organisation. The unions that emerged after the Durban strikes concerned themselves largely with workplace struggles and remained distanced from community and non-workplace issues. A number of reasons for their response can be suggested:

- 1 There is a fear of state repression and harassment on the part of some trade unions if they are seen to be involved in 'political' issues and activity. This was, and still is, a

problem in defining strategy;

2 Trade unions were responding to a concern that working class interests would lose out in any alliance with other groups. Involvement in community affairs involves such an alliance, and unionists expressed the fear that worker interests could be dominated by the interests of other classes (especially the petty bourgeoisie). This is a real problem which remains a prominent concern for trade unions forming links with community struggles;

3 Until the mid 1970s the level of struggle around non-workplace issues was not very high. The question of community - workplace links was therefore only posed in an organisational way after the intensification of community struggle and organisation post-1976.

In the late 1970s links between trade union struggle and the broader community re-emerged. These links, however, seem to be of a different nature to the ones that existed in the SACTU case, mentioned above. Unions in the present independent trade union movement that have attempted to establish relationships with the community, have not moved into the community to directly organise around non-workplace issues. Trade unions have not become directly involved in organising and mobilising around rents, housing, transport or education. Alliances between trade unions and the community have been mainly of a supportive kind.

THE NATURE OF THE LINK

THE call for a consumer boycott by the trade union illustrates a situation in which a particular kind of link emerges. Essentially, the trade union attempts to generate support in the community for shop-floor struggles. A consumer boycott cannot be sustained for a very long period of time and is more effectively used

to make short-term demands. Once these have been met, the boycott is called off.

There are two points which arise in this regard. Firstly, can the situation be reversed, with the community calling on the trade union for support? A struggle round a community issue can be backed up by industrial action, 'for example industrial action on the Clyde (in Britain) in the 1st World War led to the introduction of rent control' (Cowley, 1977:244). It does not seem that such joint action over a non-workplace issue has occurred in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. This could be a result of fear of state repression and restrictive legislative measures, employed to crush such action and threaten the continued survival of the organisations involved. On the other hand, it could also reflect a limited perception of what relevant struggles are. For example, if a trade union refused to support non-workplace issues on the grounds that they always represent petty bourgeois interests, this would reveal a limited understanding of the broader totality of workers' lives. Or if such support is refused on the grounds that trade unions should not be involved in 'politics' this would reveal a mistaken belief that politics and economics are independent of each other.

The second point is that the consumer boycott occurs during a crisis situation, the strike, and is relatively short term. How is the alliance sustained after the crisis period, in the absence of a political party able to co-ordinate the activities and programmes of organisations involved in different arenas of struggle? Here only very tentative suggestions can be made. The trade union can attempt to make its presence felt within the community by consolidating itself externally, in the non-work situation. This involves establishing and developing contact

with progressive community organisations, encouraging attendance of their meetings and organising get-together meetings and discussions. In addition, it would be important for the trade union to be in touch with the needs and locally-experienced problems of the community of which its members are a part. Efforts could be made to organise educational and cultural programmes in which the links between the workplace and the non-work situation are explained and illustrated. An example of such action undertaken by community organisers occurred in Britain where

theatre groups such as Combination and Red Ladder have produced plays for tenant groups which illustrate the links (between community organising and struggles that take place in the sphere of production), in particular the links between rents, allowances and wages. A conference of community organisers took as its theme the need for closer links with the unions (Cowley, 1977:7).

Another variation of this supportive alliance involves a specific community organisation becoming more directly involved at the point of production. This is illustrated in the case of PEBCO and the Ford strike and will be dealt with below.

THE MEATWORKERS' STRIKE

IT is not necessary to deal with the daily events leading up to, and during the strike. These have been well documented elsewhere (WIP 13, South African Labour Bulletin volume 6 number 5). An attempt will rather be made to look more closely at the red meat boycott and the community. Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU) - as they were then known - stated in a memorandum that the community from which support was received can be divided into two categories - the liberal establishment, and the black community. In the latter, support took the form of financial

collections, the boycott of red meat and attempts to discourage scabbing. The boycott involved consumers and traders (butchers) in different ways.

It is important to note the difference between the meat boycott and the earlier boycott of Fattis and Monis products. In the Fattis and Monis case, it was a matter of traders refusing to sell a few particular products out of a wide range of their stocks. For the butchers in the meat boycott, however, it meant in effect closing their businesses. There were about 17 african and 100 coloured butchers involved; the african butchers agreed to stop selling meat and, after a few days grace to sell out existing stocks, they stopped selling red meat for about 8 weeks. The coloured butchers agreed to close for 3 days, after which they met and decided to reopen their shops.

A boycott support committee was formed, chaired by a union-elected union member. This committee did not develop into a body with some measure of autonomy but remained union dominated and controlled, as did its support activities.

At a 'relatively advanced stage of the strike', individuals from two church-based organisations, Caminploy and Veritas, approached a union official to offer support. They refused to co-operate with the support committee arguing that they wanted to keep a background role. Later the people from these two organisations met with the Joint Meatworkers Committee asking that the boycott be suspended for two weeks to give the meat bosses the opportunity to make concessions. At this stage meetings had been banned by the state, union organisers had been detained and the flow of information between the Joint Meatworkers Committee and the meatworkers had been affected. These few meatworkers agreed to the suggestion

of the individuals from Caminploy and Veritas, but stated that this would have to be referred to the rank and file. Before this could take place a pamphlet was issued suspending the boycott. The pamphlet was issued in the name of the WPGWU, but they knew nothing about it. Both workers and community were thrown into confusion and attempts by WPGWU to regenerate the boycott were unsuccessful. (This account is largely drawn from SALB volume 6 number 5, as amended by letters from Caminploy and Veritas in SALB volume 6 number 8).

It should be noted that at the same time as the red meat boycott, the level of struggle in the community around education, rent and transport was very intense. This created a politicised, activist atmosphere in which the meat boycott operated. For details see Conflict in the Western Cape, WIP 13.

RAISING THE PROBLEMS

The meat boycott raises a number of important questions and problems. One of these concerns the term 'community'. Thusfar the word 'community' has been used without the necessary qualification. The word

conveys vague notions of harmonious social relations amongst 'the people'... On the contrary one is confronted with a cluster of class positions, conflicts and interests, some of which are irreconcilable (Cowley, 1977:5).

This diversity of class composition and interests within a 'community' is especially sharpened in South Africa where areas of residence are not defined in terms of class, but predominantly in terms of race - the effects of the Group Areas Act. The meat boycott directly involved the support of non-working class groups for the struggle of a specifically working class organisation. These groups included amongst

others students and traders; indeed, the support of the traders was a necessary condition for the boycott. This next section will focus on the involvement of the traders, a petty bourgeois group, in the boycott.

Theoretically the petty bourgeoisie as a class has a contradictory position in society; it is not based in the dominant economic relations of production, but rather stands 'between' them and is pulled in two directions - towards an identification either with capitalist or working class issues. The petty bourgeoisie is not a unified class, for it includes various fractions, such as traders, intellectuals, professional people, and small agricultural producers. Each fraction has a slightly different relation to the major classes (capitalist and working class). The direction in which the petty bourgeoisie or fractions of the petty bourgeoisie will be pulled, will depend on a number of factors:

- 1 The balance of class forces at a particular time, that is the level of class struggle and the relative strength of the major classes and their organisations;
- 2 Some fractions within the petty bourgeoisie will have a greater inclination towards capitalist interests than others, for example the traders have more of a tendency towards capitalist interests than the intellectuals. This is, however, affected to a great extent by
- 3 The particular material conditions existing in a society at any given time. In South Africa, repressive institutions and legislation have tended to thrust sectors of the petty bourgeoisie into an alliance with the working class. For example, pass laws affect and restrict both the african petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Similarly the Urban Areas Act, housing conditions, transport costs,

inferior education and rises in the cost of living all create conditions that are to some extent shared by both the black petty bourgeoisie and the working class. However, it is important to remember that very often these material conditions do not affect all sectors of the oppressed classes in the same way. For example, the coloured and indian petty bourgeoisie and working class are not restricted by the pass laws, but are affected by the housing shortage and inferior education. In some situations this could cause varying responses from each of these groups to a particular situation. This is illustrated in the divided response of the african and coloured butchers to the meat boycott.

The WPGWU argues that the african community was more tightly knit than the coloured community; that there was no direct presence of meat workers in the coloured community. This existed in the african community, allowing for more ideological and political pressure on african traders.

At the same time, the full formation of an african petty bourgeoisie has been blocked in South Africa, through lack of access to trading rights, property ownership and other mechanisms of upward mobility. By contrast, in the coloured community there is a much larger petty bourgeoisie with a larger social base. Currently some of these differences are being removed as the South African state and fractions of the ruling classes embark on a strategy to co-opt certain elements of the african petty bourgeoisie. But there still remain important differences in the material conditions of the african and coloured petty bourgeoisie.

It can thus be seen that very different social groupings, affected by a wide range of social and political forces, exist within the 'community'. This has important implications for the alliance of a working class organisation -

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ADDRESS

EDITORIAL ADDRESS:

PO Box 93174,
2143 Yeoville,
SOUTH AFRICA.

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Cover by Kevin Humphrey.

The nature of Work In Progress, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views on a wide range of subjects, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial collective.

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EDITORIAL

THIS ISSUE of Work In Progress contains a long contribution on the Liberal Party and the South African Congress of Democrats (COD). The focus of the article is on the 1950s and 1960s, and in itself this is an important part of the history of struggle in South Africa. The nature, programmes and policies of both COD and the Liberal Party are not well-known to a new generation of opposition, and they need to be documented and understood.

But it is not only for its historical value that the article is appearing in WIP: for it implicitly raises a number of key questions relating to contemporary organisation and struggle. These revolve around forms of organisation, the content of organisational programmes, non-racialism and multi-racialism, and the nature of liberalism in South Africa.

During the past decade, it has been common for radical groups to attack liberals and liberalism. The initial organisations of black consciousness, like SASO and BPC, explicitly rejected 'white liberalism', and for the first half of the 1970s liberals responded with hostility to the initiatives of black consciousness.

Slightly later, as liberals began to accept and even approve of the black consciousness position, other groupings began to develop a critique of liberalism from a non-black consciousness position. In this critique, liberalism was rejected because of its long-term functionality to certain forms of capitalism, its inability to understand conflict in society, its individual-centred ideology, and its rejection of the key ideas of socialism.

The critique of liberalism in South Africa from the late 1960s onwards is a particularly easy task: the pendulum of liberal thought and action has swung increasingly rightwards. What passes for liberalism today is so integrated with the structures of monopoly capitalism that it has become a rather pathetic ideology, trying to reconcile what it sees as the 'reforms' of the Botha government with the increasing repression and control which dominate a militarised society.

What Levy's article on the Liberal Party shows is that liberalism in an earlier period had a radical element to it, sometimes bordering on social democracy. The 'radical liberalism' of the Liberal Party in the late 1950s and early 1960s was a very different programme to the discredited position called 'liberal' today.

There is a critique of this 'radical' liberal position from a progressive stance - but it is not the same as the attack which can be made against the PFP, SAIRR, the white English-speaking universities, etc. This is an important point - because it is possible to be highly critical for what passes as liberalism in South Africa today from a liberal position.

This is precisely the trap that certain elements of the black consciousness movement fell into - attacking contemporary liberalism while showing important similarities to the earlier 'radical' liberal position. They have rejected 'white' liberalism only to forget that there is a long tradition of black liberalism in South Africa.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the Liberal Party espoused a fierce anti-communism, and in the ANC split of the late 1950s, tended to support the africanists, and later the PAC. The alliance developed between

for example the trade union - with different groups in a locality or neighbourhood.

Class alliance then is no simple matter.

One of the very real problems that class alliances raise is that of leadership. For example, when entering an alliance with petty bourgeois groups, trade unions are confronted with the problem of which class interests or which class fraction will dominate the alliance. In partial response to this problem, WPGWU attempted to strictly control the involvement of 'the community' in the meatworkers' strike. This it did by dominating and controlling the support committee and the support activities, allowing the committee little autonomy and little opportunity for democratic participation. With the detention of five of the union organisers, the union became disorganised and support work became fragmented. This expresses the problem well, with the union attempting to ensure worker domination of the alliance, but in the process hindering the development of democratic structures of co-operation, participation and a broad base of leadership in the support committee.

It is possible that because the support committee did not develop an autonomy allowing for independent initiative and judgement, it could not adequately control the actions of organisations or individuals who wanted to become involved in support work. In such a situation organisations or individuals who do not want to work with a support committee can independently approach groups of workers with suggestions, creating divisions and confusions. While the support committee should be closely connected to the trade union, it seems important that it also develops its own independence and democratic structures of participation. The relation could be such that the union, when approached on the

question of support, channels all such activity through the existing support committees. In this way, all support activities can be co-ordinated and controlled, and progressive forces can co-operate through one body. Boycott or support activities can then operate not only to strengthen the trade union struggle, but also to consolidate progressive forces in the community.

The WPGWU criticised its strategy on another issue - that it did not extend its support to the community struggles around education, rents and transport then being waged, other than in a verbal manner. This relates to the question of a trade union taking up issues which affect non-worker elements as well, and in this way consolidating its presence in the community in order to promote joint action against the integrated structures of exploitation.

A national working class political party could perform the function of co-ordinating different terrains or areas of struggle and mass action. The trade union, however, for a number of reasons not possible to discuss here, cannot replace the political party. In a situation where a political party cannot operate openly, trade union areas for progressive activity have to be defined. As has been suggested, these could include attempts to actively support progressive struggles against all forms of oppression, thereby creating certain links between isolated struggles.

But the working class still has its most powerful bargaining lever at the point of production, where it can withdraw its labour. It has been argued in the American context by John Watson of the League of Black Revolutionary Workers that

When you go out into the community the interests of the people are going to be much

more greatly dispersed...there are greater possibilities in the organisation of the plant...the kinds of action which can be taken (in the community) are not as effectively damaging to the ruling class as the kinds of actions which can be taken in the plant....when you close down Hantrack assembly plant....for a day you cost Chrysler corporation 1 000 cars.... (quoted in Geschwender, 1977:139).

For the trade union, this emphasises the importance of building up strong organisation at the point of production. This can be affected to some extent by particular conditions: for example in South Africa contract workers are in a weak position on the factory floor. If involved in strike action, they break their contracts of employment and can be sent to the bantustans. Their bargaining power at the point of production is thus weakened.

In the attempt to actively support community struggles, the trade union faces a very real problem - that of not overextending its available resources of time, energy, finance and leadership, thereby weakening its organisational programme at the point of production. This problem relates to the specificity of the functions of organisations involved in specific terrains of struggle, and is illustrated in the Ford strike.

THE FORD STRIKE

THE immediate cause of the Ford strike (October 1979) was the forced resignation of community leader Thozamile Botha from Ford. Botha was at the time a leader of the Port Elizabeth Black Community Organisation (PEBCO) and a trainee draughtsman at Ford. He resigned from Ford after he was warned against his PEBCO activities by management, who complained that he was absent from work too often and stated that he would either lose his job or end up in jail. 700 workers walked out in sympathy with

Botha and a pamphlet was issued with the warning that if he was not reinstated workers would down tools for 3 days. Workers gathered outside the plant and were addressed by the Ford labour relations manager and J Mke, then chairman of the United Automobile Workers union (UAW), who advised them to return to work.

Throughout the strike the union became increasingly associated with management. After Botha was reinstated, Sauls of NUMARWOSA, the registered union with close links to UAW, stated that the walk-out had not been work related and disassociated the union from it. There followed a strike in November which was to last until early the next year. During the events of the strike the union became more and more distanced from the workers. Workers preferred to negotiate directly with management and at a meeting it was decided that a committee of 7 be elected to represent the workers; this became the Ford Workers Committee (FWC). Although structurally linked to PEBCO, its members being PEBCO leaders and members, the FWC operated independently, representing the striking workers. The UAW saw this committee as a threat and released a press statement claiming that such a committee would cause problems and that the Ford strikes were political and should be kept out of the factory. This revealed a limited conception, on the part of the UAW, of the wider social and political forces that are ever-present in the lives of workers. The FWC became involved in organising a fund to support the workers. Later an attempt was made to approach management directly, who insisted on negotiating with the union.

Management later issued a moratorium for the re-employment of the workers. The workers, however, demanded reinstatement. After a number

of renewals of the moratorium and very little response, management met with the FWC. Eventually it was agreed to reinstate workers subject to the availability of positions.

A number of important questions arise from this strike. It has been suggested that the UAW union took a background role because it felt that it could not, as a trade union, challenge PEBCO which had very high standing in the community. But why did the UAW see its role as either challenging PEBCO or keeping a background role, rather than co-operating with a community organisation that had such strong support from the workers? And why was the UAW so alienated from the workforce?

This article will confine itself to only one question raised - that of the specificity of the roles of organisations involved in different areas of struggle. In other words, can the trade union perform the function of the community organisation, and vice versa? Why was it necessary in the Ford strike for a workers' committee to be formed rather than for PEBCO to directly represent the strikers?

Within a community, diverse groups and interests are found. Community or civic organisations usually reflect this diversity. They articulate a wide range of demands and interests which do not always have a specific class base but may represent the interests of different classes. The leadership is also drawn from different classes - very often the petty bourgeois groups of teachers, intellectuals, professionals, small businessmen and students. This is illustrated to some extent in the PEBCO case: one of the principles it adopted was to fight for the right of blacks to buy land under freehold at any place of their choice. This is clearly not a working class demand, being of benefit only to those groups which can

afford to buy property. On the other hand, PEBCO attracted strong working class support and mobilised around housing conditions which affected the working class as well as other oppressed classes. Thus, to an extent PEBCO as a civic organisation reflected the different interests and contradictions which are part of the community. Organisations operating in specific areas of struggle are affected by particular forces, conditions and experiences - they experience very specific problems. For example, trade unions are affected by specific laws, institutions, management and state strategies, etc, and hence must develop certain knowledge, strategies and tactics to deal with these. Organisations involved in specific terrains have specific roles and functions. At the same time, however, it has been argued in this article that workplace and community are not separate, politics and economics are not independent, but linked. Struggles in these areas need therefore to be linked. This is shown in the Ford strike - the support that PEBCO generated in the community and the solidarity it encouraged was very important to the workers since it prevented scab labour. A strong community organisation thus strengthened the workers' position.

CONCLUSION

THE intention of this contribution to WIP has been to pose and discuss some of the problems and questions that are raised by the issue of community support for workplace struggles. It has been written in the hope of receiving comments and criticisms.

Some of the very important areas that have not been touched upon are

- management and state strategies with regard to this issue;

- recent labour legislation affecting the support alliance;
- the position of migrant workers in relation to the community;
- other kinds of links between workplace and community struggles.

Works referred to:

Cowley S, Kaye A, Mejo M and Thompson M:
(1977) Community or class struggle?

Geschwender JA:
(1977) Class, Race and Worker Insurgency.

LIBERAL PARTY AND COD: opposition to apartheid

At a meeting in Johannesburg's Darragh Hall in November 1952, a call was made to white South Africans to join the struggle against racism and apartheid. The meeting was addressed by Oliver Tambo, representing the African National Congress (ANC), and Yusuf Cachalia of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). Also on the platform was Cecil Williams, a leading member of the Springbok Legion.

The aim of the meeting was to encourage whites to join a body that would work in close co-operation with the national liberation movement, and that would recruit white support

for the policies and practises of the ANC and the SAIC, who by that time had formed an informal alliance.

At this meeting a split emerged among those present - over the issue of the franchise. There were, in the audience, those who believed that their role was primarily to attract whites to their cause; they felt that many potential supporters among the white population would be alienated and put off by a universal franchise policy. These individuals called for a qualified franchise. For many in the crowd, this was unthinkable. They followed the policy of the ANC and Indian Congress, and adopted a universal franchise policy. Conflict over this issue led to the formation of two organisations. Those in favour of a qualified franchise formed the Liberal Party of South Africa, while those who had chosen the ANC policy of universal voting rights formed a provisional committee which would later become the South African Congress of Democrats (COD).

The differences which emerged at the Darragh Hall meeting ran deeper than the franchise issue, though. Ernie Wentzel, who was later to join the Liberal Party and become a member of its national executive and, for a time, chairman of the Transvaal branch of the party, said that from the start many who attended the meeting believed that it had been 'set up' by former Communist Party members who dominated the proceedings. 'This was the start of the rift,' he said. 'It led to many present at the meeting not being prepared to deal with the group who later formed COD'.

Many past COD members deny this charge, but the point is that the controversy over the franchise that emerged at this meeting was evidence of far deeper ideological differences that existed among non-Nationalist whites in

South Africa at the time.

THE LIBERAL PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE objectives of the Liberal Party were two-fold: firstly the Party aimed to provide a model of multi-racial organisation and secondly, by doing so, hoped to stimulate multi-racialism and liberalism in South Africa. The Party aimed to 'put its policies and principles before the white voters of the country to reassure them that a non-racial democracy is a valid and exciting choice' (Paton, 1958:62). The Party directed its activities primarily at the white electorate, firmly believing that its role lay mainly in winning electoral support in order to defeat the Nationalist government by constitutional means. Consequently its chief focus was the voting public.

In an election notice it was stated that the Party will work to create better understanding among enfranchised Europeans of the severe disabilities under which the non-Europeans are at present labouring, so that public opinion can make it increasingly difficult for the Ministers to invoke the arbitrary provisions of existing laws. (Ballinger Papers, University of Witwatersrand library archives).

LIBERAL PARTY IDEOLOGY

THE stated principles of the Liberal Party were strictly in accordance with liberal philosophy.

The South African Liberal Party is a non-colour bar party which stands for...without hesitancy or equivocation the principle of one community with one form of citizenship open to all its people.

With the recognition of these objectives in view, it declared its adherence to the following tenets which it regarded as fundamental:

1. The essential dignity of every human being irrespective of race, colour or creed and the maintenance of his

fundamental rights.

2. The right of every human being to develop to the fullest extent of which he is capable, consistent with the rights of others.
3. The maintenance of the rule of law.
4. That no person be debarred from participating in the government and other democratic processes of the country by reason only of race, colour or creed.

The Liberal Party stood for the rights of the individual. 'A true Liberal does not think in terms of groups, he thinks in terms of persons' (Paton, 1958:69).

The Party also strongly rejected violence. The Liberal Party, according to Alan Paton, 'will never consent to the use of violence by others, nor encourage it nor connive at it. A Liberal Party can never aid or itself become a terrorist organisation' (Paton, 1958:146).

In a presidential address given in 1964, Paton said

any person who, while a member of the Party, plans to use violence against things or persons, is not only guilty of an offence against the law, he is also guilty of a grave disloyalty to the Party. Above all, any person who calls himself a Liberal and who plans violence against persons is not really a Liberal at all. He may burn against injustices to others, and burn to set these right. He may be a zealot. He may be dedicated to his cause. But he is not a Liberal. And what is more, if he persists in his plans he is likely to do grave damage to the cause of liberalism (Paton, 1958:218).

The Liberal Party was strongly opposed to communism, although individual members were prepared to give communists their due, acknowledging that they were non-racialist and stood for a mixed society. Some members were prepared to co-operate with communists in the

Congress Movement, while others refused to have anything to do with communists.

Finally, in accordance with a normally implicit, but fundamental, tenet of liberalism, the Party advocated the values and principles of Western civilisation. At the core of its philosophy was a belief in parliamentary democracy, strongly influenced by Christian ethics and theology.

The Liberal Party prided itself on its multi-racial membership, on the fact that it was the only party in South Africa to have completely unrestricted membership.

We are not a White party and we do not recognise non-White politics. We recognise only one politics, and that is the politics of South Africa, and that means how to create a society out of the diversity of our people (Paton, 1958:221).

THE POLICIES OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

THE original franchise policy of the Liberal



2. Liberal Party says 'An End to Poverty'

THE LIBERAL PARTY believes that the major political changes which it plans must be accompanied by major economic changes. Only by such changes will it be possible to create a country in which every South African has the opportunity to develop to the full extent of his capacity.

At present South Africa's economy shows great contrasts; grim poverty side by side with tremendous wealth. Twenty per cent of the population consumes over sixty per cent of the country's production. This state of affairs must end.

The Liberal Party proposes four main methods whereby there can be created a non-racial economy with fair distribution and opportunity for all:

- 1. The abolition of the economic colour bar;
- 2. The raising of wages;
- 3. The expansion of industry;

- 4. The redistribution of land.
1. The economic colour bar, whether embodied in legislation or enforced by employers and trade unions, is a grave obstacle to the growth of a healthy economy: it distorts the wage structure, stifles ability and kills incentive. The Liberal Party intends to break down the artificial barriers which have been placed in the way of the non-White worker,

BLUEPRINTS
BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE
 outlines officially Liberal Party policy. The second *Blueprint* discusses economic policy. The third *Blueprint* will deal with social policy.

and to permit equal opportunity to all. All discrimination, whether statutory or customary, must go.

- 2. The general level of wages is too low and the wages of unskilled workers are far below any reasonable poverty line. The Liberal Party believes that

Party caused it to come under much criticism from both blacks and whites. The Party's controversial qualified franchise was changed at the second Party Congress, but not before it had alienated many potential supporters. It was only in the 1960s that the Party came to accept a wholly unqualified franchise. In 1962 the pro-Liberal Party newspaper, CONTACT, stated that

the usual alternative to universal franchise put forward in South Africa is a qualified franchise of one kind or another. It is said that in this way we can be sure that only responsible people voted. The Liberal Party knows from its experience with its own members that there is no way of judging a man's responsibility through any qualifications. Many people in South Africa are both illiterate and poor, through no fault of their own, but are anxious to play their full part in the development of South Africa.

The education policy of the South African Liberal Party was based on the United Nations

urgent steps must be taken to increase the wages of the poorest workers. Methods of negotiation under the Industrial Conciliation Act must be made available to all workers, and the Wage Board must be required to make more frequent surveys in each industry. Wages must be raised, in stages where necessary, to a level which permits a human standard of living.

3. The abolition of the colour bar will release new initiative and buying power: to take full advantage of this, the country's primary and secondary industry must steadily expand. The essentials for such expansion are capital and skilled personnel. The Liberal Party will encourage the mobilization of local capital: the racial peace which its policies will create will foster confidence among both local and foreign investors. The party's education policy aims to utilize to the full all the natural talent of all racial groups, and educate each individual to his full capacity.

Declaration of Human Rights, which states:

Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the fundamental and elementary stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all national, racial and religious groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

The Liberal Party believed in compulsory education for all races. It believed that no school should discriminate on the grounds of race or colour in the admission of pupils. Parents should be free to choose what language their children will be taught in.

The Party's aim was an integrated school system; this objective would be attained in stages, during which time the qualifications, salaries and conditions of service of black school teachers would be improved, and better school buildings would be provided. In the interim period, the Party proposed having both racially mixed and segregated schools, and parents would be free to choose which their children would attend.

The Liberal Party's economic policy was based on traditional laissez-faire doctrines. The main objective of the Party was the 'raising of the standard of living of all South Africans' (Karis, Carter and Gerhart, 1977:350). The Party felt that the private enterprise system, except in special circumstances, was the best means of increasing production, and the best way to secure an adequate standard of living for all.

The Party's economic policy was based on the theory that regards economic expansion and development as incompatible with apartheid. This view, propagated throughout Liberal Party

writings, sees an increasing contradiction between industrial development and the discriminatory racial order.

The Liberal Party regarded the 'homelands' as an integral part of South Africa, and believed in developing those areas so that they are able to provide for the rural population. The Party wanted to advance industrialisation, and consequently urbanisation and migration of blacks to the cities was not restricted. The bantustans were not regarded as the permanent home of africans, and it was hoped that in time they would disappear as industry advanced.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS MOVEMENT

EARLY relations with the Congress Movement were strained. Members of the Congress Youth League scorned the Liberal Party. There were others in the ANC who were more welcoming to the Liberal Party. At the 1954 annual conference of COD, Chief Albert Luthuli said that africans applauded those whites who worked for liberation, and were grateful for their contribution to the struggle. He went on to say that 'we are grateful also for the existence of the Liberal Party between whom and ourselves there exists a warm, sympathetic and understanding co-operation on specific issues where our policies agree'.

The liberals had supported or been close to the United Party in the 1940s. During the early years of the Party there was a growing gap between the Party and Congress, particularly as the Congress became more militant after the formation of the Youth League.

Between 1948 and 1952 the gap between the United Party and the Congress was growing. While many of the Congress leaders were still liberal, there was a growing gulf between them and the white liberals. Black liberals in Congress were reassessing their methods, and beginning to

accept civil disobedience as a viable means of opposition. They were starting to advocate the strike and the boycott as methods of struggle, and were beginning to co-operate more closely with communists. There was a new kind of liberalism within Congress - it rejected gradualism, spurned the old methods of petitions and deputations, and no longer feared communism. In this, Congress leaders differed from the white liberals.

The Liberal Party refused to participate in the Congress of the People. After much deliberation, the Party adopted a motion refusing to co-sponsor the Congress of the People. Behind this decision was the fear that the Congress of the People would turn out to be a 'communist front'. An observer at a Congress of the People meeting, Mr Arden Winch, gave his reasons for non-participation in a memo to the

LIBERAL PARTY RESOLUTION ON THE CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE

1. The Liberal Party believes that it is only in the free association of all the peoples of South Africa that a peaceful solution to the problems of our multi-racial society will be found.
2. The Liberal Party, however, is not prepared to accept the invitation to co-sponsor the Congress of the People without qualification.
3. The Liberal Party is prepared to co-sponsor the calling of a congress of representatives of organisations of all races for the purpose of framing a freedom charter for South Africa.

Adopted by the National Committee in Johannesburg on October 30-31, 1954.

Liberal Party leadership.

It is perfectly obvious to anyone with a grain of common sense that the stated ideas of the Congress leaders that untrained enthusiasts should travel through the country collecting grievances to be discussed by the entire Congress is absurd... Many of the organisers of the Congress are not really interested in the well-being of the people. They are interested in power. They will use any weapon they can find to further their ends. Most of these men are white...they include men and women who set up bogus organisations as cover for the normal communist aims.

The relationship between the Congress and Liberal Party deteriorated when the latter refused to become involved in the Congress of the People. The Liberal Party also rejected much of the Freedom Party as communist doctrine. Alan Paton did praise the Charter for being 'of a truly democratic nature' but said certain passages, for example those on the nationalisation of banks were debatable, and not acceptable to liberals (Paton, 1958:76).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Liberal Party moved closer to the Congress Movement. The Party began to realise the need to attract black support. Calls for co-operation between all non-Nationalists and for a united stand against the Nationalist government were being made at the time. In an article in CONTACT in June 1959 Peter Brown, Liberal Party chairman, said

Let us sink our ideological differences for the moment and get on with the job of disposing of the devil we know, and who daily rides roughshod over so many of our rights, rather than disperse our energies in boxing a shadow which may never develop into anything more substantial.

At a National Executive Committee meeting of the COD in January 1959, the possibility of closer co-operation with the Liberal Party was discussed. The creation of a liaison committee between the two organisations was considered.

Prior to the 1959 general elections, Chief Albert Luthuli sent a message of support to the Liberal Party, calling on white South Africans to vote for the Party. The message read, in part

the Liberal Party has striven fearlessly for the extension of democratic rights and civil liberties to African people. Its steady growth year by year since its formation has been a source of encouragement to the African people in the conviction that more and more Europeans will come to share my belief in the need for a non-racial democracy in South Africa.

In August and October 1958, the Cape division of COD reported meetings where Liberal Party members attended for the first time. In July 1959 the Liberal Party, Natal Indian Congress and the ANC called a joint mass meeting to protest the banishment of Chief Luthuli. The Liberals in Natal were on the committee of the ANC's £1 A Day campaign. In protest against the banning of the ANC from certain areas, the Liberal Party and COD in the Transvaal organised a joint demonstration on the steps of the Johannesburg City Hall.

THE RADICALISATION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

THE Liberal Party started moving closer to the Congress Movement in the late 1950s. At the same time, it can be argued that the party became more radical. Party policy was reassessed, and there were moves away from purely parliamentary activities.

The 1958 elections marked the turning point for the Liberal Party. The Nationalist victory confirmed non-Nationalist whites' suspicions that the United Party would not be able to defeat the Nationalists, and sowed doubts in the minds of liberals about the effectivity of electoral politics. In addition, with the formation of the Progressive Party in November 1959 - which advocated a gradual extension of

the vote to all 'civilised' people - the Party moved further to the left. The Progressive Party offered a political home to those liberals who had resisted the radicalisation of the Liberal Party. Pressure from younger liberals also pushed the Party to the left.

At the end of 1959 the ANC called for an international boycott of South African goods - the Liberal Party supported this campaign. In the same year the Party issued a statement supporting the boycott weapon, a significant change from their earlier insistence on purely electoral and constitutional means of opposition. The statement, by Peter Brown, said

The African people have only one way left in which to register their protests and to seek the redress of their grievances. At the time of the Johannesburg bus boycott the Africans voted with their feet. Now they must vote with their pay packets. There is nothing else left to them. The Liberal Party believes, therefore, that the use of the economic power of the African people can be a justifiable political weapon in view of the complete denial to them of any other means of voicing their opposition to the Nationalist government.

In 1958, CONTACT reported another statement made by Mr Brown when he said that the Party was no longer simply concerned with alleviating the hardships suffered by blacks in South Africa. It voiced its opposition to the exclusion of blacks from trade unions, and protested the inadequacy of training for blacks. The colour bar was also rejected by Peter Brown in this statement.

The Party also advocated the 'radical redistribution' of land, but qualified this by saying that it must not be accompanied by any large-scale drop in agricultural production. In the 1960s the Liberal Party did not consider the removal of racial restrictions on land ownership enough to ensure the redistribution of land, and it believed that the government

would have to assist redistribution.

Party policy also moved towards a welfare state policy, a far cry from earlier laissez-faire economics. In CONTACT, as part of a series on Liberal Party policy, a column entitled 'LP Says Security For All', the writer states

The Liberal Party aims to provide adequate welfare facilities for all South Africans who need them. Its policy embodies the idea of the welfare state in which the government takes responsibility for ensuring that no citizen need feel any anxiety about what might happen to him in case of illness, unemployment or old age....The Liberal Party aims to build up, stage by stage, a complete system of social security in South Africa, including free medical services....The state will ensure that adequate services are provided and will itself provide all services which private organisations cannot or do not provide.

In 1961 the Party adopted a policy of a 'shared economy', and in 1963 appointed a commission to formulate a policy of Social Democracy. Within a year, more than half the commission members had been banned, detained or had left South Africa.

Evidence of the radicalisation of the Liberal Party, according to Ernie Wentzel, was the proposal made in 1961 to change the name of the Party to the Social Democratic Party. Although nothing came of this proposal, Wentzel argues that it revealed the extent to which the Party had moved away from traditional Liberal orthodoxy.

By 1960 the Party was calling for the 'speedy implementation' of one man one vote, and at its 1961 congress the Party stated its support for extra-parliamentary activity and called for foreign pressure on the South African government.

The process of radicalisation of the Liberal Party was begun as early as 1956, and

it involved a struggle between the more progressive-minded, younger liberals, mainly from Natal, and liberals who favoured the more gradual extension of democratic rights to africans. The latter group was based in the Cape, and were close to the old style of Cape liberalism.

Conflict between the two groups arose following a public meeting in Durban addressed by Alan Paton and Patrick Duncan. Here they said that there was no hope for the Liberal Party in parliament, and that the real sphere of Party activity was to be outside parliament, focussing on blacks. Cape member, Mr Molteno, was horrified, and suggested to delegates at the Cape Congress that they resign from the Party and form a Cape Liberal Association. In a letter to Senator William Ballinger, one of the founding members of the Liberal Party, Molteno wrote that 'the cause of liberalism is being damaged - not promoted - by the Liberal Party'.

Paton later tried to retract his statement, saying that he had not necessarily meant illegal extra-parliamentary activity. But Patrick Duncan, in his typically controversial way, insisted that he had meant illegal activity, and gave as an example the encouraging of african workers to go on strike. This idea caused much alarm among Cape liberals.

For years the Cape group resisted the more progressive liberals. In a letter to Peter Brown, in March 1960, a Cape Liberal Party member complained that

A fairly large section of the Cape members are, and have been for some time, unhappy about their position in the Party. We have always been unhappy about the direction the Party has taken about the franchise; we have not liked the manner in which the proper electoral and parliamentary functions of the Party have been neglected for other activities

which, in our opinion, are rather those of a pressure group and not those of a political party; and lately the Party's activity with regard to the overseas boycott have disturbed us greatly....All of us are in favour of a qualified franchise although most of us realise that a universal franchise must at some time or another come....(We) wish the Party's franchise policy to be so stated that it is not possible for anyone to interpret in such a way that the Party can be accused of wanting a universal franchise immediately....The Party has of late concentrated on extra-parliamentary activities and has seriously neglected the true functions of a party. More and more, its attention has been directed to pressure group work and less and less has it paid attention to enrolling potential voters, etc....There even seems to be a move to turn the Party into the spearhead of a mass movement of some kind.

TWO WARRING CAMPS

TWO distinct groups within the Liberal Party membership can be detected, and much hostility and potential conflict existed between them. On the one hand there were those who were much closer to the Cape Liberal tradition. They were the founders of the Liberal Party and they advocated the gradual extension of the franchise to africans, and retained faith in the old Cape institutions. The gradualists rejected any form of extremism or radicalism.

But another group subsequently arose within the Liberal Party, and they became impatient with the ideas of the gradualists. This group supported methods of struggle like pass-burning, strikes, civil disobedience and other forms of mass action. Importantly, the radical liberals wanted closer co-operation with the Congress Movement. For this, they drew much criticism from the traditionalists in the Party. Lodge has suggested that they were divided from their predecessors by their identification with african nationalists. They also wanted to draw blacks into the Party, making it into a mass

movement.

The radicals within the Liberal Party are not an easily identifiable group. They had in common with the gradualists a fierce anti-communism. This, together with their desire for close contact with blacks, led them into a strange partnership. They formed an uneasy, and largely unknown alliance with the Africanists in the Congress Movement. Both shared a strong opposition to the whites in the Congress Movement; both believed they were communists, and the africanists felt that the whites in the Congress Alliance harmed the african's cause.

Those liberals who saw the need for a mass movement, but who feared the communist strain in the Congress Movement, found themselves drawn to the Africanist element in the ANC. They supported the Africanists who were expelled from ANC and formed the Pan African Congress (PAC). Says Lodge,

throughout this period it can be argued that the liberals worked with the aim and actual effect of contributing to the power of the Pan African Congress [Lodge, 1980:119].

Another faction of the radical liberals in the Party broke away in the 1960s, repudiated the Liberal Party belief in non-violence, and formed a sabotage organisation. They kept their Party membership only for cover. These young Party members had become disenchanted with the constitutional methods of the Party and advocated sabotage as a more effective means of resisting the Nationalist government.

Originally the National Liberation Committee, they later became the African Resistance Movement: they began acts of sabotage in Johannesburg on October 18, 1961, when they cut the steel legs of a power pylon. In 1964 a bomb planted by member John Harris exploded in the Johannesburg station. Harris was eventually executed for his part in the

station blast.

In 1960, with the banning of both ANC and PAC, the political vacuum that remained was partially filled by the Liberal Party. Black membership of the Party increased as former ANC members were left politically homeless.

In 1968 the government passed the Prohibition of Improper Interference Act which made it a criminal offense to belong to any political organisation that had membership of different race groups; it was also made illegal for a person to address a political meeting if the majority of people present were of a race different to the speaker. The Liberal Party felt that it could no longer operate under such conditions: the reason for its existence was denied in this legislation. Later that year the Party disbanded.

THE CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS

THE invitation to whites to participate in the liberation movement, extended by Oliver Tambo of the ANC, and Yusuf Cachalia of the Indian Congress, was mentioned earlier. Three meetings followed the initial one, all held in the Darragh Hall in Johannesburg's city centre. They were attended by whites representing a wide spectrum of political opinion - there were liberals, progressives, former Communist Party members, and members of the Springbok Legion. The aim of the meetings was to form an organisation which would co-operate fully with the national liberation movement.

Following these meetings, a provisional committee was formed in Johannesburg to discuss the founding of the organisation that was later to become the Congress of Democrats (COD). The provisional committee lasted for about four or five months. In Cape Town there already existed a Democratic League. Two 'embryo

regions' thus already existed prior to the formation of the South African Congress of Democrats.

In September 1953, the Johannesburg Provisional Committee held an inaugural conference where the Johannesburg Congress of Democrats was founded. Later in 1953, a national conference was held in Johannesburg which was attended by interested persons from Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. They joined the organisation, and the Springbok Legion merged with the Johannesburg COD to form the South African Congress of Democrats.

At that time there were many whites, former members of the banned Communist Party, who were without a political home. Just before the banning of the Communist Party in 1950, communists were moving closer to the Congress Movement. COD attracted many former Communist Party members.

Some have argued that the COD was strongly under the influence of communists, and certain elements believed that COD was a front for the banned Communist Party. Others deny this allegation. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that a number of ex Communist Party members, politically experienced and organisationally skilled, were drawn into COD and influenced the organisation in certain ways.

COD MEMBERSHIP

OFFICIALLY the membership of COD was open to all races. COD wanted members from all race groups but the ANC, as parent body, refused to accept this. They felt that the time was not ripe for a multi-racial organisation.

COD wanted to be a racially mixed organisation and it had non-racial objectives - but it followed the organisational form of the ANC and accepted

a national or racial form of organisation - in this way differing from the Liberal and Communist Parties.

Constitutionally, however, COD stipulated no racial restrictions, and membership was open to all who paid fees and accepted COD policy.

THE ROLE OF COD

THE role of COD was to draw whites into the Congress Movement. COD was to work among whites, winning them over to ANC policy, and gaining adherents from among the white population. Its role lay also in informing the white public about the Congress Movement, about its policies and ideology. Further, COD was to inform whites of the experiences of blacks under the Nationalist regime. Its duty was to bring home to whites the realities of the hardships caused by apartheid, and suffered by the black community in South Africa.

Another function of COD was an unofficial one. The participation of whites in the liberation movement was, in itself, to have an important effect on the Congress and on the struggle. The whites in COD were to be an example to blacks and whites of what it meant to be involved in the struggle against racism. The participation of whites in the Congress Movement was significant in preventing the struggle becoming one between black and white. This unofficial role of COD was often endorsed by the other members of the Congress Alliance. A greeting from the National Executive of the Transvaal Indian Congress to a SACOD national conference read

The participation of Europeans in the Congress Alliance not only inspires the non-Europeans but it also counters the chauvinistic elements which are to be found among the non-Europeans.

THE ACTIVITIES OF COD

IT seems that COD activities were varied; they were directed both to the whites and to assisting their partners in the Congress Alliance. At the COD annual conference in 1961 the chairman noted that 'Our primary task is to work among Europeans, but 90% of our work has been done within the broad Congress Alliance'. COD participated vigorously in the campaigns and activities of the Congress Movement.

One such campaign was against Bantu Education. In 1954, with the passing of the Bantu Education Act, the education of african schoolchildren became the responsibility of the Department of Native Affairs. African parents expressed their opposition to the increased government control over the education of their children, as implied by the Act. At the annual national conference of the ANC in Natal, December 1954, plans were made to resist this legislation. A resolution was passed, calling upon all african parents to prepare to withdraw their children from primary schools indefinitely, as from April 1, 1955.

In March the following year the National Executive Committee of the ANC decided to postpone the boycott, partly because they felt that the campaign had not spread far enough, and had not been properly organised. At Port Elizabeth and along the East Rand, however, organisers had been active, and these branches decided to go ahead with the campaign.

The ANC Youth League and the Federation of South African Women were placed in charge of the campaign, and COD also played its part. An African Education Movement was set up to provide alternative education for african children. The African Education Movement established 'cultural clubs' - they had to be

called clubs as regular schools had to be registered - where volunteer teachers (who could not be called teachers) held classes for children boycotting Bantu Education. COD members were prominent among club leaders, and the cultural clubs featured often in the pages of COUNTER ATTACK, the COD newspaper.

As late as October 1956 the African Education Movement News reported 1 515 children on the Reef attending clubs with an average daily attendance of 1 342. There were similar clubs in many parts of the Eastern Cape as well.

The COD also played its part in the ANC's campaign against the Western Areas Removals and in the Congress of the People.

Other COD activities included conferences and house meetings. Members manned tables set up in the streets where they sold literature and collected signatures - they participated in the ANC's 'A Million Signatures' campaign. The aim of this campaign was to collect a million signatures for the Freedom Charter. COD issued study notes and produced hundreds of pamphlets. Members held discussion groups, and were involved in fund-raising for the Congress Movement.

COD was never a big organisation. It had branches in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban. In Johannesburg there were about 5 or 6 branches - in Hillbrow, Yeoville, Greenside, and there was a small branch on the Wits University campus. Each branch had about 20 members, with a total of over 100 members. The Cape Town branch was strong, and Port Elizabeth had a small but very vigorous group.

AN EQUAL PARTNER IN THE CONGRESS ALLIANCE

THE Congress of Democrats was represented on the Consultative Committee of the Congress Alliance, which was a permanent body existing to formulate Congress policy. Representatives

From the five Congresses (ANC, SAIC, COD, SACTU and CPC) sat on this Consultative Committee, and had to take policies formulated by the Committee back to their Congresses.

COD had the status of an equal partner in the Congress Alliance. They identified themselves completely with the ANC, the senior partner in the Congress Alliance. Though small in numbers, COD played a significant role in the Congress movement. Its members were active, and many who were drawn from the banned Communist Party had political experience to contribute to the movement.

CONFLICT WITHIN THE ANC

NOT everyone in the ANC welcomed COD. Africanists in the Congress resented the presence of whites in the Congress Alliance. Their criticism of the whites was two-fold: firstly they believed, like many in the Liberal Party and elsewhere, that COD was a front for the banned Communist Party, and that COD membership was largely made up of communists using the Congress Movement for communist ends. Secondly, the Africanists objected to the presence of whites working in close co-operation with the ANC as they felt that whites were dominating the movement. This, they felt, stunted the political development of africans. They believed that the strongest weapon they had to resist the Nationalist government was african nationalism, and felt that this weapon was denied to them in a multi-racial Congress Alliance. The africanists did not believe that whites could have the same long-term interests as the black nationalists, and did not believe that whites would ultimately be prepared to jeopardise their privileged position.

The Africanists also objected to the Freedom Charter. They would rather the

Charter began 'Africa for the Africans', instead of its opening line of 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White'. They also objected to the fact that the Charter was drawn up at the multi-racial Congress of the People, believing that whites and communists dominated the proceedings. They rejected the 'socialist-sounding' statements contained in the Charter, like 'the people shall share in the country's wealth'.

THE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES OF COD

THE constitution of COD was based on two corner-stones: endorsement of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and acceptance of the Freedom Charter. The organisation aimed to provide a political home for all whites who believed in multi-racialism and democracy, and who opposed the Nationalist government's racial policies.

COD was never a political party, being open to members of all parties and including various shades of opinion as long as they shared a common opposition to racism. It operated as a pressure group rather than a political party.

COD believed in the need for a united front against the Nationalist government, and in the idea of co-operating with other non-Nationalist groups. Like the ANC, COD saw the struggle as being between the Nationalist government - the enemy - and the total of progressive forces in South Africa. Chief Albert Luthuli told a COD conference that he was prepared to work with communists in the liberation struggle as he believed that the enemy was the government, and he was not prepared to fight on two fronts. COD believed in national liberation - as did the ANC.

The South African Congress of Democrats was banned in September 1962, bringing the

number of outlawed organisations to four. The other three were the ANC, the PAC and the Communist Party. The remaining members of the Congress Alliance were not banned. Why the ANC was banned is obvious - it was the senior party in the alliance. But it is hard to see why COD was declared unlawful and not the remaining legal partners. Protests against the banning of COD were country-wide, and the Liberal Party joined groups like NIC and the Youth Congress in condemning the banning.

THE CONGRESS ALLIANCE MOVEMENT

THE symbol of the Congress Alliance Movement, which was displayed prominently at the Congress of the People, behind the speakers' platform, was a four-spoked wheel. Each spoke represented one of the Congresses. Together they formed a whole, a wheel, possibly symbolising progress and the movement of history towards liberation. Each spoke of the wheel was as important as any other, and all were included in the symbol. The four-spoked wheel stood for the multi-racial alliance of separate, but equal partners in the alliance.

Four strains of thinking were to be found in the Congress Movement at different times. These were Liberal, Non-racial, Africanist, and Communist. Luthuli, who was president of the ANC from 1962, is an example of the liberal thinkers in the Congress. Africanists included Anton Lembede and Robert Sobukwe. National executive members Moses Kotane and Dan Tloome were communists, as was David Bopape, who was on the Transvaal executive committee. Non-racialists appeared in the 1950s, and included Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela.

The african liberals in Congress were strong during the 1940s. The founders of the ANC in 1912, it can be argued, were liberals. Non-violent, they used only constitutional methods like petitions and deputations to government ministers. Even in the 1950s, according to Gail Gerhart, their aims were essentially 'reformist, not revolutionary'. She says that the Freedom Charter, too, was a liberal and moderate document. Underlying all these objectives was a complete rejection of race as a criterion of worth, and the acceptance of liberal, democratic institutions as the ideal form of government (Gerhart, 1978:94). Many would not agree with Gerhart, particularly when she goes even further and claims that on the issue of ownership of the land - 'the land shall be shared among those who work it' - the Charter is both moderate and liberal. Nevertheless it can be said that there were black liberals in Congress, many of whom based their thinking on Christian morality.

African liberalism in Congress increasingly diverged from white liberalism, and a new kind of liberalism among blacks emerged in the 1950s. It included a growing criticism of white liberals, and an increased preparedness to work closely with communists. The new form of african liberalism rejected the gradualism and constitutionalism of traditional liberalism, and began endorsing different methods of protest. Deputations and petitions were replaced by civil disobedience, pass burning and the general strike. African liberals no longer regarded the electoral process as crucial, and 'one man one vote' was no longer trusted as the solution for all ills.

The new liberalism that emerged in the Congress in the 1950s was no longer so obviously distinct from african nationalism. There was a gradual movement in the Congress Movement away

from extreme african nationalism; in the late 1950s struggles arose in many ANC branches, particularly in the Transvaal, between the africanists and others who were advocating multi-racial co-operation, and in all cases the africanists were defeated and overruled, until what remained of their group was expelled from the ANC. The movement in Congress was towards multi-racialism.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COD AND LIBERAL PARTY

IN his book Hope for South Africa, Alan Paton talks of some instances of co-operation between the Liberal Party and COD. He says that co-operation between the two was assisted by the holding of mixed, multi-racial conferences in the late 1950s. The first, organised by the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation, was held in October 1956 to discuss the Tomlinson Report. The following year another multi-racial conference was held in December, jointly organised by the Congresses, the Liberal Party and the Labour Party.

At the Accra All-In-Africa Conference, held in December 1958, the Liberal Party and the Congress delegates stood as a united front.

It can be argued that in their concern with race discrimination and apartheid, and in their opposition to the Nationalist government, the Liberal Party and COD shared some fundamental views. This is more evident in the later years when the Party had undergone a process of radicalisation. (Some COD members argue that the Liberal Party never radicalised at all. Others say it radicalised in its franchise policy only. It is important to place whatever radicalisation took place in its historical context: in the 1960s, when repression was intensifying and all opposition was thrown onto the defensive).

In the 1960s the Liberal Party adopted the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which had been part of COD policy since its inception. Both groups shared a common aversion to racial inequality, and opposition to many of the laws passed by the Nationalist government. The Liberal Party stood for the total repeal of a number of laws which had a major effect on society: the Public Safety Act, Criminal Law Amendment Act, Suppression of Communism Act, Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, Pass Laws, Group Areas Act, Native Resettlement Act, *Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts*, *Bantu Education Act*, *Separate Amenities Act*, and others. Later, the Liberal Party rejected the industrial colour bar and called for trade union rights for blacks. This stand must have been shared by COD and other Congresses.

Many of the principles of COD were similar to those put forward by the Liberal Party. Some have argued that there was a fundamental difference between the two organisations - a liberal, Western ideology versus a marxist, or pro-Soviet, position. These differences do describe the conflict between some individuals in each organisation - but are not the basis of conflict between COD and the Liberal Party.

The main ideological difference between the two organisations lay in their different relationships to the ANC and the Congress Alliance. While there may have been close relations between individuals in the Liberal Party and the ANC, and increased co-operation between them in the later years, basically the difference between the Liberal Party and COD was that the latter was accepted as part of the Congress Alliance. It supported the other Congress organisations, and gained its strength from this alliance. The COD shared the ANC's policy, endorsed the policy of the Congress

movement, and believed in the struggle for national liberation.

Some COD members claim that the Liberal Party resented their closeness to the ANC, and that the Party wanted to get closer to the Congress Alliance. COD does report moves in February 1959 by the Liberal Party for admission to the Congress Consultative Committee.

COLD WAR AMONG SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES

PAST Liberal Party member Ernie Wentzel believes that many members of his party refused to co-operate with COD because they regarded it as a Communist Party front.

There was no doubt that most of them, the active members, the people who mattered, were Communist Party members.

Most COD members have rejected this allegation, frequently made.

Wentzel explains why this issue was such an important difference between the two organisations.

It was the time of the Cold War. The split between the USSR and Yugoslavia had just occurred. The splits and conflicts in the international sphere filtered through into South Africa. It was an intense ideological time.

Wentzel argues that the differences in franchise policy that caused the initial split between the two groups was 'not significant'. He believes that it was not the franchise policy that kept them apart. The point at which the Liberal Party and COD first parted company was the point at which they formulated their franchise policies. Even before the formation of the two organisations, the franchise issue was the one which caused most controversy among non-Nationalist whites. At the meeting to propose the formation of a white body, the issue that caused the whites present to divide into two opposing camps was the issue of the franchise.

The liberals present, who wanted to attract white supporters, refused to accept a universal franchise as they felt that this would alienate potential supporters among the whites. Those who were later to form COD felt that anything but a universal franchise would be an insult to blacks.

But as Wentzel says, the franchise issue could not have been a terribly significant point of difference between the two organisations, for a year later the Liberal Party changed its franchise policy to a universal franchise, though with qualifications, and by 1960 were advocating a completely unrestricted franchise.

Conflict went deeper than this initial difference of opinion. The most important difference was COD's alignment with the ANC, and its partnership in the Congress movement. It is this which explains most of the other differences within the two organisations.

The Liberal Party objected to the separate form of organisation practised by the Congress Alliance. This was an important point of disagreement. COD lost potential supporters - whites who could not accept the need to struggle for a non-racial society as members of racially divided and separate organisations. This apparent contradiction between the aims - a mixed society - and the means of the Congress Movement - segregated organisations - disturbed and alienated many, both black and white. The acceptance of a racial, or national form of organisation, like that of the ANC and the Indian Congress, was a significant point of difference between COD and the Liberal Party. Believing in the principle of multi-racialism, the Liberal Party opposed parallel organisations.

The Liberals also objected to parts of the Freedom Charter, believing it to be supporting socialist doctrine. Statements about

nationalisation of banks and certain larger industries alarmed the more traditional liberals, especially in the early years of the Party.

The Liberal Party decided not to participate in the Congress of the People. Wentzel says this was because it was believed that COD and its supporters were manipulating the Congress of the People, dominating proceedings from behind the scenes.

Another point at which the two groups diverged was over the methods to be used in the struggle against racism. One of the Liberal Party's criticisms of the Freedom Charter, mentioned above, is that it did not state the methods which would be used to change South African society. Particularly in the earlier years of the Liberal Party, it believed that only constitutional methods were permissible. It was only later that extra-parliamentary activity was reluctantly accepted. The COD, as part of the Congress Alliance, was prepared to employ unconstitutional, extra-parliamentary methods of struggle.

While the Liberals were struggling slowly towards the acceptance of extra-parliamentary activity, the Congress had accepted the need for methods like the general strike, and was endorsing civil disobedience and pass burning.

During the 1960s the Liberal Party accepted these methods. By that time, though, the ANC was about to form an armed wing and was advocating sabotage of symbolic structures and strategic installations.

Unco-operative relations between the two were hardened by the alliance between the africanists in the ANC and the Liberal Party. Ideological differences crystallised when members in the Liberal Party began assisting the Pan African Congress.

In spite of these profound ideological differences, there were often close relations between members in the two groups, and according to Ernie Wentzel, there were individuals who were members of both organisations. He says the ideological differences between them did not mean that there were not good personal relations between the members of the organisations. Although Wentzel has reservations about what he sees as 'Stalinists' in COD, he says 'they were splendid people. They were tried in fire. They were prepared to associate with black radicals when others were afraid to, and they should get credit for that'.

The two organisations functioned differently. The Liberal Party, according to Wentzel, was run like a regular political party, while the Congress was a mass movement. 'Ours was an overtly legal political party', says Wentzel, 'we could not get involved in strikes and pass burning. This was the ideological and practical decision we had to make'.

The Liberal Party had a far larger membership than COD. They had far more support from among the whites. While both organisations shared the same avowed aim - of winning the whites in South Africa over to their way of thinking and gaining adherents from among the white population to support the struggle for a democratic South Africa - in terms of numbers the Liberal Party was the more successful of the two. The majority of whites in South Africa did not identify with COD's policy. Stigmatised by its association with the Communist Party - even if the association only existed in the minds of rivals - and shunned by many whites because of its explicit support of, and alliance with the ANC, COD was confined to a small number of very active individuals - they numbered in the hundreds only - whose theory and practice

placed them on the far left of white political opinion.

CONCLUSION

ORIGINALLY I believed that the conflict, and even hostility, between COD and Liberal Party could be explained by the profound ideological differences they had. Although in the course of research I found that there were significant ideological differences between members of the organisations, the final cause of their differences was the fact that COD was affiliated to the Congress Alliance. It took its direction from the national liberation movement, participated in and contributed to the struggle for national liberation, and accepted the leadership of the ANC. This, I believe, ultimately explains the ideological differences between COD and the Liberal Party. The COD affiliation to the movement for national liberation caused it to adopt a philosophy and an outlook that differed in important ways from that of the Liberals; the strategies and methods it endorsed were those of the Congress movement and, particularly in the 1950s, were significantly different from those which the Liberal Party found acceptable.

As the Congress of Democrats, together with its partners in the Congress Alliance, moved in the direction of armed resistance, the Liberal Party was struggling, several paces behind, blocked by a crisis of conscience and a faction of particularly conservative members based in the Cape, to reach a decision on the use of extra-parliamentary, non-constitutional means of opposition.

When COD was formed, it was already part of a mass movement, while the Liberal Party attracted mainly black and white members of the middle class. While the Liberal Party and COD shared the same ultimate goal of a democratic,

non-racial South Africa, COD was part of the african-led movement; the Liberal Party, on the other hand, was for much of its life confined to the exclusive sphere of white electoral party politics.

Moirs Levy.

This article is based largely on a dissertation compiled by Ms Levy, entitled Opposition to Apartheid in the fifties: the Liberal Party and the Congress of Democrats.

It should be noted that the discussion on COD has had to be severely limited because of legal constraints: COD is an unlawful organisation, and quotation of its policy statements and documents could, in certain circumstances, constitute an offence. A number of ex-COD members and officials were interviewed by Ms Levy in the course of her work. WIP has been unable to publish their views and perceptions either because they are themselves banned or listed, or because their statements could be furthering the aims of an unlawful organisation.

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LEGALISM: a further note

AMONGST the various responses to the article 'Legalism and Democratic Organisation' (WIP 18) has been the one the article attempted to distance itself from, viz the rejection of all legal strategies on principle. This interpretation has been placed on the article by both progressive organisers and by despondent lawyers. It thus seems necessary to make some further comments on legalism and legal claims.

The thrust of the article was directed at the particular ways in which reliance on the legal machinery can undercut organisational goals and perhaps grotesquely deform the organisations themselves. In particular it attempted to challenge the prevalent notion of legal strategies as simple, one-dimensional tools of the organisation - the more the better - whereas legalism can be an organisational malaise - and a fatal one at that.

By 'legalism' we mean a reliance on the legal machinery for organisational advances - and it is associated with a perverted understanding of the relationship between organisational advances and formal gains.

However, the rejection of all law is equally misguided.²

Our concern here is to examine the ways in which power relationships may be challenged and transformed. Thus we find Engels - who is noted for his admonishments against those who took the 'juridical illusions of the bourgeoisie' as an expression of justice - stating that the working class must indeed put forward 'specific

legal claims' without which 'an active socialist party and indeed any political party is impossible'.

Whether advancing a specific legal demand, or organising around a legal claim is reformist or not, is not a simple matter. Reforms themselves are contradictory. Indeed, as has been frequently asserted, many of the rights in a society have been extended to the dominated classes themselves as a result of struggle. To argue one-sidedly that these rights are imaginary, and need not be asserted, or else once gained need not be policed or enforced, is to come close to partially disarming the dominated classes. Here, in particular, there is room for taking the juridical apparatus seriously. For example, the development of executive powers, rule by administrative regulation, extension of criminal control into the private sphere, and the erosion of civil liberties (eg in Europe) needs to be confronted. The fetish of illegality can be as damaging as the fetish of legality.

Our more central focus, however, is on collective organisation. Here too much of the above applies, is the necessity of asserting and policing rights. Legal claims have been the catalysts for organisational struggles that have gone beyond the narrow horizon of 'right' to the central question of power. Interdicts can be, and have been crucial in preventing the exercise of coercion that would have had damaging effects on the ability of organisations to persist (eg an interdict restraining compulsory eviction of squatters, or restraining the deportation of striking workers). Our simple point here is that law represents a complex relationship between ruler and ruled, capital and labour. But just as the legal relation is complex, it is also not neutral. And the narrow depiction of 'right' neglects the way the legal form itself intersects with forms of democratic organisation.

For example, the necessary channelling of struggles into the form of claims of individual rights - into struggles based on the outcome of court judgements, into legal strategies that divide communities into the legal categories of land-owners and tenants (eg, on 'black spots'), into struggles in which specialists and bureaucrats have the guiding hand, into struggles in which grassroots struggle is juridified and substituted by court room etiquette (industrial courts), etc - can and does have a profound effect on organisations.

What is required is to situate the merits of legal strategy within the first principles of 'democratic organisation,' together with an understanding of the limited nature of the legal strategy. The challenge then is to use the legal approach as an organisational tool despite the form of law.

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⁽²⁾ This position has been partly ascribed to a theory of law which is derived from Pashukanis' abstract formulations, and attributes a bourgeois 'essence' to the legal form. The problem with these formulations is that their formalism, essentialism and purely logical derivation (idealism) allows for no theory of change in social relationships. The same applies for crude versions of the structuralist theory of law. Law is structurally located in its function in the reproduction of social relations. The grey areas between law as a complex relation and law as an instrument disappears).

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, part 1

THIS ARTICLE is the first part of a series which will try to explain the way in which the capitalist system works. The series does not deal with any particular capitalist society (eg South Africa in 1980; West Germany in 1970). It deals rather with capitalism in general - with its major features, relations and processes. These basic aspects are present in some way in all capitalist societies: but differences in history, the nature of struggles and conflicts, and other factors combine to make capitalist countries different from each other in some ways.

For example, racism is more of a feature in the South African economy than it is in the West German system - but both are capitalist societies. One has to understand capitalism in general before turning to the more specific task of explaining its operation in a particular society (eg the racist features of the South African economy). What the series of articles hopes to establish is what makes a system capitalist, and how such a system functions, rather than why some capitalist societies are different from each other.

This manner of investigating the general nature of a social system involves a particular method - that of abstraction. This is the way in which the most important, the basic features

of a system are identified, and the way in which they are lifted out of (abstracted from) the less important features of that system. This process is something done in the mind in an attempt to find out which aspects of a society are basic to that society - and which are superficial. The method of abstraction - of removing fundamental processes and structures from less important ones so that they can be examined - is tied up with the attempt to understand reality, rather than accepting that things are the way they seem to be.

This is an important idea to grasp - that things are not always simple, nor are they necessarily the way they appear to be at first glance. For example, 'it may seem obvious that capitalist profit comes from selling goods at high prices. But this common sense approach is not completely accurate, as will be shown below. Indeed, 'common sense' is often the same as 'common error', and one needs to go deeper than immediate appearances in order to grasp the difficult realities of a social system. In this introductory article, an attempt will be made to go beyond superficial appearances ('common sense'), and explore the more basic aspects of the capitalist economy.

Some of what follows may be difficult to understand at first: but this is because the real world is complex and confusing. Any attempt to investigate real relations and processes, rather than superficial appearances, is bound to be difficult. But it is necessary to understand capitalism in general if we are to understand particular capitalist societies, such as present day South Africa.

To summarise: it is intended to look at the basic structure of the capitalist economy. This will involve the process of abstraction, or taking away what is unimportant in order to

get to the fundamentals of the economic system. Often the most important aspects of a system are not those which appear to be so at first glance. We will be attempting to move beyond 'first glances' or appearances, and going to the core of the economy.

The economic structure has been chosen for initial exploration because it is the basis of capitalist society in general. This is not to say that politics, law, culture, the state etc are not important - they clearly are, and some of the most important conflicts and struggles are fought out in the realms of politics and the state. But

humankind's first need is to maintain physical life; production of the means of subsistence (clothing, food, housing) and the conditions under which they are produced are of immediate, fundamental and permanent importance....A society can only be built upon such an economic infrastructure, as a house on its foundations (Jalée, 1977:35).

It is our understanding of the economic structures and relationships that will allow us to understand other aspects of society. In this sense it is necessary to first explore the base of capitalist society - the economy - before moving on to the other important features of the social system.

The main question which this article will be dealing with is: where does capitalist profit come from, and how is it produced? It is this problem, and the answer to it, which is the major concern in what follows.

1. THE COMMODITY

IN investigating the source of profit in the capitalist economy, we must begin with the smallest, simplest unit of that economy - the commodity. Commodities are material

goods produced under specific economic conditions. Most goods produced in capitalist society (food, cars, books, medicines) are commodities - although some are not. Basically, a commodity is an object which has some use or function, and is produced with the idea of exchanging (selling) it. Thus, food which is grown to be eaten by its producer is not a commodity because it was produced for personal use, not for selling (exchange). Neither is a table made for the producer's house a commodity, because it has been manufactured for the maker's own use. But motor cars made at the Ford factory are commodities because they both fulfil a need, and are being produced to be sold.

All goods which have some use, which fulfil a need, and which are produced for exchange through market mechanisms, are commodities. (Capitalist market mechanisms involve the way in which commodities are exchanged, ~~are~~ bought and sold). While a commodity must have some use, and fulfil some need, it should be noted that needs themselves are not static, and can be artificially created. This is one of the functions of advertising - to create needs. Needs are thus socially determined, and can be created and manipulated by advertising, the media, socialisation processes, etc .

But if the basis of the commodity is that it can be bought and sold (exchanged), then all commodities must have at least one feature in common. Unless this is the case, there is no way in which they can be compared with each other, and exchanged. For example, 1 motor car might be equal to 20 tables; while 20 tables might equal $\frac{1}{2}$ a truck. But if these commodities are to be compared and exchanged for each other, they must have something in common apart from their

physical features and general use. (How, after all, can one really compare a table and a car? It cannot be on the basis of the way they look, or the uses they have. There must be something apart from use, appearance or physical properties which they share in common).

You might want to say that one compares commodities in terms of their prices: this would be a common sense answer, but as suggested earlier, things are not always as they seem to be. 'Common sense' can often be nothing more than a commonly-held error!

It might be true that

if 1 car costs R1 000

and 1 table costs R10

then 1 car = 100 tables.

But this does not explain how it comes about that the price of a car is the same as 100 tables. Why do cars and tables exchange in the ratio of 1:100? We still have to find something which all commodities have in common which enable them to be exchanged, or to be equal to each other in certain proportions or ratios.

2. HUMAN LABOUR AND LABOUR-TIME

WE have now established that commodities are goods which are produced for exchange, rather than for the use (consumption) of the producer. However, if commodities are to be exchanged, there must be some way of comparing them to each other. Commodities must have some general common feature which establishes a relationship of possible exchange between them. This common feature cannot relate to the physical characteristics and use of the commodities, because these are totally different for each commodity.

All commodities share the feature of being products of human labour. They are produced by

people working on raw materials with machinery and tools. The way in which the labour expended in the production of a commodity is measured is through labour-time. Each and every commodity is produced in a specific period of time, be it a minute, an hour or a full day. It is the amount of time which it takes to produce a commodity that enables dissimilar commodities to be compared and exchanged.

For example, when we say that

1 car = 100 tables

we are actually saying that 100 tables can be made in the time that it takes to produce 1 car. It is the length of labour-time needed to produce the various commodities that is being compared, rather than the actual commodities themselves.

But, you may say, this cannot be so! For it would mean that if worker A took 1 hour to produce a table, while worker B took $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours to produce the same sort of table, the second table would be more valuable than the first. This clearly cannot be the case, for it would mean that the slowest, least efficient workers produced the most valuable commodities.

This objection is quite right. It is not the passing of actual time which is the basis of labour-time; it is not the real time which it takes to produce a commodity which is important, but the time which it should, on average, take to make. For any commodity there is a period of time which is considered average or 'normal' for its production. Thus, if the average time for the production of a VW Beetle motor car is $1\frac{1}{2}$ days, this is the labour-time which represents the value of that car in exchange. It does not matter if, in actual fact, one particular car takes 1 or 2 days to produce: in exchange, in buying and

selling, it will be presumed that the car took $1\frac{1}{2}$ days of labour-time to make. It will then be equal to any other commodity, or number of commodities, which took $1\frac{1}{2}$ days labour-time on average to produce.

So:

1 motor car takes on average 10 hours to produce.

1 table takes on average 1 hour to produce.

Therefore 1 motor car = 10 tables = 10 hours of average labour time.

The fact that the car may have taken 11 hours to make, and each of the tables 65 minutes, does not affect their exchange relationship. This is because, in speaking of labour-time, one is referring to the average amount of time it takes to produce a commodity under average conditions of work. (And because this average is established in changing circumstances, it too can and does change depending on the nature of machinery being used, the level of skill involved, the speed at which workers are expected to produce, etc). Because this average is established through the operation of a whole series of societal factors, it is referred to as socially necessary labour-time. 'Socially necessary' can be taken in the widest sense to mean 'in the general conditions applying in a particular society'. The notion of socially-necessary labour-time sets an average level of productive activity, ignoring any 'wasted' labour-time spent, in comparison with the amount of time others use in producing the same product.

Commodities are therefore produced for exchange (to be bought and sold). They must have a use or function or else they would not be bought. But their use and physical features are not the basis of the way they are exchanged. Their exchange value, or the way in which commodities are compared for the purposes of

buying and selling, is based on the average, socially necessary amount of time it takes to make a commodity. This time, known as labour-time, is not the same as the actual time which production takes: it is decided upon in terms of average conditions of production (speed of work, machinery, skill, amount of work involved, etc).

The average amount of labour-time involved in the production of commodities is the measure by which commodities are compared. One can say that the value of any commodity is based on the amount of time which it takes (under average conditions) to produce that commodity.

3. LABOUR-POWER: A SPECIAL COMMODITY

IT has now been established that commodities are those goods produced for exchange through the mechanism of the market; it has further been shown that commodities have two major features, ie a practical use, and an exchange value. The exchange value, which is the relationship of commodities to each other in buying and selling, is based on socially necessary labour-time, that is, the amount of time it takes to produce the commodity under average conditions.

Most commodities have a physical presence, and can be seen and touched. A table is an object which can be perceived, although one cannot 'see' the fact that its value is based on labour-time. But there is one very important commodity which cannot be seen, although it is subject to the same rules as other commodities: it is produced for exchange in the market, it has both a use and exchange value, and its value is based on the average time taken to produce it. This is the commodity labour-power.

Labour-power, put simply, is the capacity to work productively. All individuals have this

capacity and, as such, they own their labour-power. It is not the same as actual labour (ie work itself), but is rather the capacity or potential to perform labour. Under a capitalist system, labour-power becomes a commodity, and is bought and sold in the market place. In concrete terms, this involves people selling their capacity or potential to work to another. This capacity, or labour-power, is sold for a wage. It is workers who sell their capacity to work to the employers (capitalists).

It is fairly difficult to understand that labour-power as a commodity belongs to an owner. This is because labour-power can never be separated from its owner. The capacity to work only exists as long as it is in a relatively healthy, able-bodied person. As soon as the owner of labour-power is old, seriously ill, or dead, the capacity to work no longer exists, and is no longer present as a commodity.

Workers thus own a commodity - labour power - which is their capacity to work. This commodity is sold to capitalists in return for a wage. The wage represents the value of the commodity, and is to be understood in the same way as the exchange value of all other commodities: that is, the amount of time socially necessary, on average, to produce the commodity.

In the case of labour-power, the owner and the commodity cannot be separated, and the production of the commodity involves the maintenance of a relatively healthy, living worker. The production and reproduction of labour-power thus involves the maintenance of the owner of labour-power (the worker). This maintenance of the worker involves a certain basic minimum of food, clothing, shelter, etc. The value of the commodity labour-power is

therefore the average labour-time necessary to produce those goods which are needed to maintain the worker.

Put another way, the amount of time involved in the production of those commodities consumed by the worker in order to survive is the measure of the exchange value of labour-power. (It must, however, be remembered that what is needed to survive is not constant, but changes in different circumstances. If the working class is strong and organised, it may be able to increase what is considered to be sufficient to live on; if the workers are weak, the capitalists are able to lower the average survival consumption of workers).

Labour-power is thus a commodity like any other: it is produced for exchange, and has both a use and exchange value. Its exchange value is based on the amount of average time necessary for its production and maintenance. But labour-power, the capacity to produce goods through working, has one quality which no other commodity has: human labour can produce new value. Labour-power has the capacity to add value in production. This is the specific use of labour-power to the capitalist, it is why he/she buys it in return for wages. The collective labour-power of the working class is the basis of all new value produced under the capitalist economic system. Labour-power is able to produce more than its own value.

We have already noted that the value of labour-power is to be seen in the same way as any other commodity: that is, by the average labour-time needed to produce those commodities necessary for the production and maintenance of the owners of labour-power (the working class). 'Necessary' here means socially necessary, but what is considered as necessary changes in different circumstances. The value of

labour-power includes a number of different components, which change depending on the social circumstances of society.

It goes without saying that to exist and reproduce itself labour-power requires the workers to be fed, clothed and sheltered from the elements, to be cared for when ill, to have transport to and from the factory, etc. In brief, the production and maintenance of labour-power requires means of subsistence, the value of which represents the value of labour-power. The expression 'means of subsistence' must be widely interpreted. Thus the day will come when the worker is too old to work, and will have to be replaced by his or her children. The means of subsistence have, therefore, to be applied to the worker and the worker's family (Jalée, 1977:25).

As explained earlier, 'means of subsistence', like 'value of labour-power', change in different circumstances, depending on specific historical situations, the relative power of the capitalist and working classes, the sort of government in power, etc.

4. A NOTE ON THE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE - MONEY

COMMODITIES can be compared and exchanged because they share one important feature: they are all products of human labour. As such, their basis of comparison and exchange is human labour. In a simple situation of commodity exchange, any commodity could be exchanged for another. For example, suppose

1 bag of mealie meal = 2 kg sugar = $\frac{1}{2}$ a record (all of them representing 1 hour of average labour-time). In that case, one could swap 2 bags of mealie meal for 1 record. But when commodity exchange becomes more complicated, with more and more commodities being produced, it is obviously impossible to swap one commodity directly for another as a general way of buying and selling. This is where money comes in.

Money is really nothing more than a representative of units of labour-time. In

our previous example

1 bag of mealie meal = 2kg sugar = $\frac{1}{2}$ a record because each of these commodities represented 1 hour of average (or socially necessary) labour-time.

For general commodity exchange, one commodity is needed to represent units of labour-time, so that all other commodities can be compared to just one commodity. This one commodity to be used as a basis of exchange could in theory be almost anything - tables, maize, records, books. But practically, it must be long-lasting, tough and manageable as a unit of exchange. For largely historical reasons, gold and silver were chosen as the basic commodities against which all other commodities are to be exchanged.

For the almost unlimited number of commodities in the market to be exchanged simply and quickly, it was necessary to find a single commodity which would serve as a universal intermediary, playing the role of general equivalent for all other commodities. Gold and silver quickly came to the fore as general equivalents, not because of any mysterious or supernatural properties, but because, while being commodities like any other, they possess certain essential physical qualities to a greater degree: they do not deteriorate, they have low weight and volume in proportion to value, and they are easy to identify and subdivide (Jalée, 1977:21).

The value of gold and silver, like all other commodities, is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour-time to produce (in this case mine) them.

Thus, as in our earlier example, 1 bag mealie meal = 2kg sugar = $\frac{1}{2}$ a record = 1 hour labour-time = 1 milligramme of gold. Gold thus became, with silver, the universal medium of exchange, the commodity against which all other commodities are compared in terms of the average labour-time necessary to produce them. As exchange developed, so money (in the form of notes and coins) came to represent

gold, and be used as the accepted way of buying and selling commodities.

In summary, money can be seen as representing gold, the universal commodity against which all other commodities are compared and exchanged. As such, money is best understood as representing units of labour-time, through which commodities are exchanged.

...The value of a commodity cannot be measured in practical terms....The value of a given weight of bread cannot be absolutely determined. It is not possible to say that such value is contained in the bread; it can only be expressed in relation to that of one or more other commodities... (When a loaf of bread is exchanged for a hundred sheets of paper, bread expresses the value of the paper and vice versa; value can only be formulated through a relationship of equivalence (Jalés, 1977:20-21).

The money form tends to hide the reality of exchange: it appears that commodities are being exchanged for money when in fact money really represents units of labour-time. Money tends to hide the fact that when commodities are exchanged, it is really the labour of workers which is being bought and sold. With money being used as a basis of exchange, the buying and selling of commodities appears to involve a relationship between things (money and commodities). However, our analysis allows us to see that exchange is really the buying and selling of the labour involved in producing commodities. Exchange is thus a relationship between people (their labour) rather than between things.

The way in which exchange appears to involve things, but really involves social relations, is one example where appearances are deceptive and one needs to go beyond 'common sense' to understand how the economy works.

5. THE BASIS OF PROFIT IN THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY

LET us now look at the way new commodities are produced in capitalist society. Put simply, the capitalist uses money to buy two essential commodities for production: labour-power and means of production. By means of production we mean

on the one hand useful materials from natural sources: minerals, coal, petroleum, wood, water, etc.; and on the other hand the instruments of production: tools, machinery, and increasingly advanced equipment which makes it possible to extract or harvest useful natural materials, and then to transport and industrially transform them (Jalés, 1977:10).

Both of these commodities - labour-power and means of production - are absolutely essential for production to take place. Only the working class, owning labour-power, can make a factory function. But without the factory and equipment, workers cannot produce commodities either.

After purchasing both labour-power and means of production, the capitalist then joins them in production - and in this production process a new commodity, different from both labour-power and the means of production used, is made. The value of this new commodity is greater than the value of the means of production and labour-power used up in its making - and hence the capitalist is able to sell it for more money than he originally laid out for the means of production and labour-power. This additional money is capitalist profit.

The process described above can be represented in the following way:

$$M - C_{MP}^{LP} \dots P \dots C' - M'$$

where M is the initial money advanced to buy

C_{MP}^{LP} , which are the commodities labour-power (LP) and means of production (MP).


These commodities are then combined in a production process (P), and the result is C' - a new commodity of greater value than the value of MP and LP. Finally, C' is sold for M' - a greater amount than the amount of money (M) initially advanced. The difference between M' and M is capitalist profit.

Now where does this profit come from?

The only way in which new value is added in production is through the use of labour-power. So in the production process (P), in which the new commodity (C') is made, new value is created, and this new value forms the basis of capitalist profit.


But how is it that the value of the new commodity is greater than the value of the labour-power and means of production used up in making it? To explain this, we must go back to the idea of labour-time, ie the length of time in which work is actually performed by the working class.

Imagine that this block below represents the length of the working day (the time in which commodities, and value, are produced):



During the course of the working day, the working class has to produce sufficient value to cover the value of its own labour-power, which is paid to it as wages when the capitalist purchases labour-power. So during part of the

working day the working class is effectively producing the value of its own wages.



This period of the working day is called necessary labour time, in that it is the time in which the working class produces value equal to the value of goods necessary for its subsistence and maintenance of its labour-power. If the working day ended at that period, then there would be no profit for the capitalist class. The value of the labour-power and means of production consumed in creating the value of the new commodity would be the same. In that case, M and M' would be equal, and there would be no profit for the capitalist class.

But as our diagram indicates, the working day is divided into two parts, and during the second section workers are producing new value solely for the benefit of the capitalist class. This is why it is called surplus (or additional) value: it is value produced in the time worked once the workers have already produced value equivalent to their own subsistence needs. This time is called surplus labour time.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| necessary labour-time (N) | surplus labour-time (S) |
| value of labour-power produced | surplus value produced |

N, necessary labour time, is the period in which the working class produces the value of its

own wages; S, surplus labour time, is the period in which the working class produces surplus value. Surplus value is the basis of capitalist profit, as well as other expenses necessary to the maintenance of a capitalist order.

This, then, is the basis of capitalist profit: the capitalist class has the power to force the working class to work longer than is necessary to reproduce its own labour-power. Having bought labour-power at its value, the capitalist class is able to obtain actual labour for a period longer than is necessary for the working class to reproduce itself. The value produced in this additional time, surplus labour time, is taken over by the capitalist class as surplus value, and this is the way in which capitalists exploit workers - they live off the profits from their labour. Exploitation is thus a relationship involving the taking over of the value produced by the working class during surplus labour time.

6. CONCLUSION

WE have now explored some aspects of the capitalist economy. By starting with the commodity, we have been able to understand where profit comes from in a capitalist society, and what exploitation is. We have also seen that money is really no more than a medium through which commodities are bought and sold, are exchanged.

By abstracting from specific capitalist economies, we have been able to uncover a set of very important relations and processes in society. Starting with the simple, abstract idea of the commodity, we have been led on to exchange, labour-time, labour power, money, and finally, the basis of capitalist profit (the surplus value produced in surplus labour

time).

We have seen how very important aspects of the capitalist economy work in the abstract. But to bring these abstract ideas closer to real capitalist societies, we have to make the abstract more concrete. We have to see what other factors and processes must be added to the above analysis to be able to understand a specific society.

The next part of this series will deal with some of the relations and forces which must be added to what has been discussed above in order to bring the abstract closer to the concrete.

Glenn Moss

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AFRICA PERSPECTIVE, a quarterly journal, started in 1974, attempts to raise the level of discussion on African, particularly Southern African events, through articles that are both theoretical and factual, both historical and current. Some of these have been about resettlement, women, state and labour, underdevelopment, industrial conflict, the role of the reserves in S.A., local political bodies, and the growth of capitalist agriculture. African countries which have been looked at are Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Namibia, and Saire. Issues planned will focus on the social consequences of the use of machinery in S.A. industry, and on the Southern African states.

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PROMISES AND PASSES

"Dr Koornhof has helped the people of Crossroads, let him help us too" - man arrested for squatting illegally near Crossroads.

On the 22nd May, 1981, 55 people, mainly women, were deported to the Ciskei and the Transkei. They were part of a group of people who had been evicted from squatter camps in Hout Bay and Table View in the winter of 1980.

They had been given temporary accommodation at the Zones and barracks in Langa. During early April, 1981, they were evicted to make way for the barracks to be converted into family housing, for those 'legally' in the Cape Peninsula.

They moved to church property in the townships. A month later they had to move on as the stretched church facilities could not cope. They marched to Crossroads and, without consulting the Crossroads people, set up their inadequate shelters.

A letter of appeal went from the limited community and church workers support committee to Dr Koornhof, requesting help. The support for the squatters was not broad based. It came from those individuals, church and community workers, who had had contacts with the Hout Bay and Table View communities. When the people appeared on the Lansdowne Road side of Crossroads, community and committee members of Crossroads were confused as they had not been informed that the people would be moving in.

In Die Burger, of 23 May, 1981, Dr Koornhof is reported to have said that no new squatters in the Peninsula would be tolerated. Eighty-five women and children would be deported

back to the 'black states'. The Minister said that it was his duty to protect africans legally in the area, and he would see that the strongest action was taken against illegal squatters in the future.

On 26th May 200 Guguletu residents pledged help for those stranded in Crossroads.

On the 27th May the Crossroads Executive announced that it was 'strongly opposed' to the arrival of about 80 men evicted from the Langa barracks. 'It is my duty to see that nobody is allowed to put up new shacks in Crossroads. If these people don't want to move, I think the Administration Board will have to deal with them', the Chairman was reported to have said.

Meetings were held, prayer services were organised, there were church people coming in, and the tension mounted.

The Crossroads people had not been consulted. Crossroads feared that their agreement with Dr Koornhof would be jeopardised, particularly for those who had not yet been 'regularised'. The general community looked at the Committee as though they had made arrangements and not consulted with the wider community.

On the 27th May 30 deported women returned from the Ciskei. They arrived in Crossroads at 04h45, and were arrested soon after. This action reminded the Crossroads people of their previous position. They admired the bravery and determination of the women, but when one of the returnees requested shelter and cooking space from a Crossroads woman, she refused because she was so worried and confused.

There was little township involvement at this stage - support coming mainly from individuals, church and outside women's groups.

On the 29th May the Western Province Council of Churches (WPC) met officials of the Peninsula Administration Board. The people were

promised temporary accommodation and permission to stay at another site. The WPC requested to meet with Dr Koornhof.

The people refused to leave Crossroads, refusing to be screened at the new site (KTC). On the 10th June the Chief Commissioner said: 'Don't be hard headed and force me to use force. I still maintain that we can solve this problem in a decent and humane way'.

On 11th June the Vice-Chairman of the Crossroads Committee said that it was not true that Crossroads residents were against the settlement of 50 families in their township.

It is not clear who gave the people permission to occupy the land next to the Nyanga offices of the Peninsula Administration Board.

On 14th July 300 residents marched to the Langa offices of the Administration Board to demand accommodation and the right to be in the Peninsula.

On 15th July 700 residents marched to the Nyanga offices with the same demands. Officials could not cope and closed the offices.

Late on the night of the 15th July 1 000 homeless people moved on to the land between Crossroads and the Nyanga offices of the Peninsula Administration Board (PAB) to join the Langa barracks people.

The people went to squat, making themselves visible, instead of living illegally in overcrowded houses, zones, barracks, etc. They elected a small committee.

At 03h00 on 16th July the PAB carried out a huge pass raid, arresting hundreds of people. The people did not resist. They went into the vans singing.

Those who were not arrested went to the Langa Courts later that morning to be with friends and relatives who had been arrested. They were joined by hundreds of township people.

The crowd sang and offered themselves up for arrest. The scene was reminiscent of the Defiance Campaign. Teargas was fired at the crowd outside the Court.

On 17th July another 140 people were arrested, again mainly women, many with children. Shelters were removed and the Chief Commissioner, Tim Bezuidenhout, announced on TV that 'illegal blacks' in the area were withholding about 800 housing units from 'legal blacks'; that the housing waiting list for 'legal blacks' was 2 300.

Who were these people arrested and squatting? They were those living in crowded conditions in the hostels, zones, flats, other people's houses, and the people of Crossroads who had not been 'regularised' in terms of the Koomhof categories. Many homeless people joined in and squatted on the vacant ground. It became a symbol for those people without 'rights' to be in Cape Town. People came back to the site after they had been remanded at the Court appearances.

The night of the 16th July saw many township people and outside supporters helping to erect shelters for the people. People from coloured and white areas brought food, blankets and material for shelter. Each day the police and PAB officials removed the shelters. It rained non-stop.

The Langa Courts were over-crowded. JJ Fourie, Senior Prosecutor, told a woman charged with being 'illegally' in the area, 'I suppose you sleep with a different man every night', on being told that she had no fixed address. He also said that 'only donkeys, cows and baboons didn't need to carry identity documents'. These comments were greeted with horror by many, including the National Party MP for Bellville.

On the 19th July a prayer service was

supposed to take place. As people stood around in the rain discussing the events of the last few days, a number were feeling defeated and a re-think was suggested. An ad hoc committee was elected to bring together outside support groups and discuss strategy. The meeting was arranged for Monday night.

On Monday morning, the 20th, a further 179 people (including 39 children) were arrested. The Chief Commissioner announced that he would enquire into the remarks made by the Senior Prosecutor. About 200 people were still gathered on the open ground, in spite of the rain. Crowds continued to gather at the Langa Courts in solidarity. Die Burger reported that 179 people were arrested singing freedom songs and giving the 'black power salute', but the people got into the police vans willingly.

Twenty-one community organisations attended the meeting on Monday night. A steering committee was elected to contact other organisations and work on strategies. They called for the immediate and unconditional release of those who had been arrested and for the abolition of the pass law system ('We feel that this is their land and they should be given a place to stay here'). Opposition spokespeople supported their stand and called on the government to stop their cruel actions. The SAIRR and churches made statements condemning the raids.

It was reported that 1 134 people had been arrested over the past week at the site, but the people maintain there are more than 2 000 in jail.

On 21st July the Transkei envoy was reported to have slammed evictions, and the Senior Prosecutor claimed that he had been quoted out of context.

Twenty-nine more squatters were arrested in the fourth raid in the last week. Twenty-four

vans were used.

The Cape Town Community Council called on the government to scrap the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. The Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Accounts rapped Administration Boards for inefficiency and being a potential source of race friction.

The dynamics in the Crossroads community had been changing over this time. There was an initial general meeting when the 1 000 people moved onto the land next to the Nyanga PAB office. The message from the Crossroads Executive was that the community should not become involved because their cases were being processed. Help with food and shelter came from outside. When some of the new arrivals approached the Executive, it was agreed that women and children should be given shelter, but members of the Executive felt trapped.

Then the general Crossroads community became involved as residents were arrested during the raids. Family and friends found themselves at the Langa Courts, no longer special Crossroads residents, but victims of pass laws like the rest.

At the meeting of the 21 community organisations, neither the Crossroads women's nor men's committees sent official representatives. It may have been as they had not had a chance to meet, therefore had no mandate. They had decided not to become involved; Crossroads people were being 'processed'.

Slowly, as the effects of the raids became clear and the number of Crossroads residents who had not managed to get themselves surveyed became visible, tensions mounted between township people and the Crossroads leadership as the former could not understand the reluctance to become involved. Those who had kept quiet during the past two years for fear of criticising

the Crossroads 'settlement' went out and joined those camping next to the PAS offices. Some township people began to see the difficulties of the Crossroads leaders. Other criticised them emotionally.

On the 24th July the Crossroads women's committee came out in support of those evicted and arrested. The men's committee did likewise. At a general meeting in Crossroads on the 26th July, it was decided to send an official delegation to the next support group meeting. The chairman of the Executive explained why they had been so cautious: *those who are being processed should not join the others until it became clear that they would not be included in the New Crossroads - rightly or wrongly they had agreed with the Koornhof proposals and until it is proved that some are left out of the 'deal', they should be careful.* Meanwhile, they wanted to make it clear that they supported the stand of those camping at the Nyanga offices, that they were aware of the confusion surrounding their position and that they saw it as a priority to sort it out. It was not in anyone's interests to prolong the confusion.

Other issues were discussed at the Crossroads general meeting, including problems over the school at the New Crossroads. It was decided that on Monday, 27th July, children and parents would occupy the new school until they had a satisfactory answer from the Department of Co-operation and Development. It was said that they were going forward, that they had a long way to go and that there was no end in sight for the struggle, that they were even prepared to go to Robben Island to get their leaders.

Later on the 26th July a meeting of the support group was held. The 21 organisations were joined by another 22 representative bodies, including members of the Crossroads men's and

women's committees (at the time of writing no further information is available).

Perhaps it is too early to say that the Cape Town community has learned from the Crossroads experience. Certainly the Crossroads people are aware of the ambiguity of their position. They are seeking to clarify that issue with the rest of the African people in the Western Cape.

How to translate the deep concern that most have for those squatting defiantly under bushes in the wet winter weather, into political action is the biggest issue facing the people themselves and the 43 support organisations. The fact that they have come together to support the people materially and politically is an important first step.

WANTED

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CONSTELLATION OR BLACK HOLE

INTRODUCTION

ON the 22nd of November, 1979, a conference of state officials, cabinet ministers and representatives of, primarily, South African based monopoly capital gathered at that tallest monument to capitalism in Africa in the richest city (for a few) in Africa - Johannesburg's Carlton Centre. This gathering became known as the Carlton Conference.

The purpose of the gathering was to discuss Prime Minister PW Botha's plan for closer involvement between state and capital, and Botha's variation on Vorster's earlier 'detente' exercise. This variation was by now known as the idea of a 'constellation of states' (cos).

Briefing documents had been circulated, and Botha set the tone and themes with an introductory talk. A series of the most prominent capitalists present then each had a short say. Token blacks (a coloured, an Indian, and an African) were thrown in - it could hardly be said that Sam Mofokeng, JM Reddy, and Peter Swartz carried the economic clout of the other speakers.

Beneath the clichés, back-slapping and generalities that mark such occasions, a few concerns did emerge. This article will extract the most important of these and situate them within a southern African context.

While the Star newspaper's editorial of a few weeks ago displayed the usual ignorance with regard to socialism, it did point to one of the concerns of the Carlton Conference. Says the editor:

More than a year ago, at what was supposed to be a watershed conference at the Carlton Hotel, the Prime Minister and leading industrialists made a commitment to free enterprise.

The editorial then goes on to quote Anglo-American's Dennis Etheredge saying that socialism (= state involvement in the economy(!)) is rampant in South Africa, and that the little capitalism that is around is restricted to the white population.

The editorial continues:

The only reason that Zimbabwe has not firmly followed the marxist line as Mr Mugabe hoped to do is that capitalism is so deep-rooted. Black Zimbabweans have millions of dollars invested in farms and in their own businesses (Star, 09.07.81).

The same missionary zeal, with the task being to establish capitalism in southern Africa, marked the Carlton Conference. Or else, if the converts already existed in the countries within the southern African region, to ensure that nothing stood in the way of their contributions rolling in to the high priests of capital, based in South Africa.

CONSTELLATION - A TWINKLE IN WHOSE EYES?

BJ VORSTER, hardly the image of the traditional diplomat, with his band of Info scoundrels and 'Lang Hendrik' van den Berg, made the first serious sorties into Africa after many years of National Party rule, shaking and greasing palms as they went.

Their focus was not primarily southern Africa, but rather anyone who was willing openly (or less openly) to receive South Africa's economic and (dubious) political presence. This was called 'detente', and was supposed to break South Africa's international isolation. Many pages of newsprint were devoted to this manoeuvre.

PW Botha, with his long-standing military connections and advisers (General Magnus Malan had not yet been appointed to the cabinet), cemented through his years as Minister of Defence, had a vision of greater defensive and logistical rationality, as distinct from the shady 'diplomacy' of Rhodde and company.

'Fortress southern Africa' seemed to be Botha's line until he was pulled up sharply at the Carlton Conference by Harry Oppenheimer (whose wider interests would not allow any moves to consolidate and withdraw into the planned southern African laager).

Where did it start? In April, 1979, before the Prime Minister's vote in parliament, National Party newspapers prepared the way with editorials speculating about 'the formation of a Southern African bloc'. The newspapers were still, at the time, naively confident of a Muzorewa victory in Zimbabwe, and saw that country joining South Africa and an independent Namibia in such a bloc. They spoke of a 'garrisoned Southern Africa', and an anti-marxist alliance.

Ken Owen of the Sunday Times apparently shared the same Party confidences, and told about the creation of a Southern African sphere of common interest stretching to the Kunene and Zambezi rivers, in which various states would co-operate to check terrorism, to speed economic development and to thrash out new political relationships.

Owen headed his piece 'Fortress South Africa' (Sunday Times, 08.04.79).

(Owen, now managing editor of the FOM, has always been willing to heap credit on anything said in National Party circles left of Dr Treurnicht, apparently operating in the naive belief that state policy responds to praise as a dog does to a pat on the head. Hence his listing of Koornhof's 'reforms' in the same article as proof that the state was serious about this

initiative).

A few days later PW Botha mentioned the idea of a 'constellation of States' in his Prime Minister's vote (Hansard, 19.04.79, cols 4458-9).

It is, of course, impossible to make categorical statements about the details of and motivation for the 'constellation' idea. However, it does appear as though it was initially (before the Carlton Conference) perceived primarily (or firstly) in military terms, as a grouping of 'moderate' and 'anti-marxist' states. Where there was mention of economic development it came across as a necessity to strengthen the countries involved so much the better to withstand the 'marxist onslaught'.

General Magnus Malan, then still Chief of the Defence Force, was prominent in pressing the cos idea, probably as part of 'total strategy', another of the catch-phrases initiated by him. PW Botha stated this aspect quite clearly before the Carlton Conference:

We are not prepared to bow before the force of Russian imperialism in this constellation of Southern African states that we hope for (ROM, 04.10.79).

The day before the Carlton Conference it was reported that Magnus Malan once more defined the cos as being 'non-marxist'.

The focus on a struggle against a 'foreign marxist ideology' and a military and political threat against the state was to shift under the pressure of several of South Africa's biggest capitalists.

FROM FORTRESS TO FREE ENTERPRISE

THE Carlton Conference, in November, 1979, brought the voices of capitalism directly and publicly into the formulation of state policy. What were the most important themes?

Two concerns featured most frequently in the contributions:

a. Unemployment and political instability -

Anton Rupert saw this as the second 'problem' to which he wanted attention devoted. (The first was that of 'urban blacks', and he praised the Urban Foundation for what it was doing in this regard).

Rupert did not see the solution to unemployment lying with monopoly capital, but rather with his proposed Small Business Development Corporation (SBOC. See WIP 16:63). (Rupert quoted figures that showed that in the USA, of 9-million jobs created in the period 1969 to 1977, 3-million were created by the state, 5½-million by small businesses, and only ½-million by the 1 000 biggest capitalist concerns. In Japan 5-million small businesses employ 80% of the population).

This theme of unemployment and political instability was repeated by others, for example by Dr PE Rouseau (Federale Volksbeleggings) and by JG van der Horst (Old Mutual);

b. That there exist, or might in the future exist, political boundaries to the operation of 'free enterprise' (capitalism) in South Africa. This was by far the most important theme relating to cos during and since the Conference.

Harry Oppenheimer set the tone as the second speaker from the monopoly capitalist community:

If business is going to be able to play a real part, particularly by injecting capital into the states which surround us, then we've got to know that in these states the private enterprise system is going to be maintained ... Now, private enterprise really cannot help in a major way in these African states unless we can achieve a condition where the making of profits is regarded as a normal and indeed desirable process, and it is also necessary to ensure that when, in these states, contracts are entered into between the Government and private business people, they are strictly observed by both sides.

Oppenheimer then referred to the possible economic implications of bantustan independence - that it was making 'business people much more wary of investing in those territories than when they were an integral part of South Africa'.

What he then asked for was that the cos idea ensure the economic integration of southern Africa, never mind what the National Party wanted to call its political set-up:

... In the economic field what we have to envisage is the establishment of an area in which there is free movement across international boundaries of money, of goods and of people, and the establishment of a free enterprise zone, an area in which the norms of fair taxation (making due allowance for the different conditions in the various countries) are agreed between the various countries concerned. And of course what the business people want to know is that, if for some reason or another their undertaking is nationalized, they will be compensated in a fair way ... It is because we have conditions like this in South Africa that our economy has prospered as it has (sic).

(See, below, for a response from the state specifically to the problem mentioned by Oppenheimer).

With a stab at the idea of 'an embattled fortress in a hostile world', Oppenheimer ended his contribution, but this theme was developed by many others during the proceedings.

Dennis Etheredge, speaking as President of the Chamber of Mines, reminded all that 'in a primitive sense, there has been a constellation of states surrounding the mining industry for about a hundred years'. He was referring to the labour supplying countries (those from which the mines in South Africa have recruited labour to work for them. Countries such as Malawi, Rhodesia, Mocambique, Lesotho, etc). Etheredge's concern was for 'the free movement of people (labourers) across borders':

The mines would in any case like to go on drawing labour from as wide a sphere as

possible; it's an insurance against disruption of the sort we have had quite recently - as I mentioned about the Malawians and Mozambicans.

He also rejected the idea of 'mopping up' internal unemployment by local recruiting (ie recruiting within the borders of South Africa to meet the full requirements of the mines):

We look upon southern Africa as a region and the transferring of unemployment from one place to another seems to us to present no benefits whatsoever.

JG van der Horst (Old Mutual) said that big business was basically asking the state for two things:

- a. 'orderly government';
- b. 'to allow us to have private property'.

The latter point brought the need to safeguard investments in the bantustans to the fore:

I think we should make a definite effort to clear up the uncertainty of private enterprise in our (sic) national states, in the independent self-governing states and not only clear up the question of private ownership but clear up the question of the quality of the title.

Van der Horst spoke against the 'fragmentation of the economy', and the need for 'harmonisation of the processes of law in our adjoining states'.

The state was in a most direct and unexpectedly public fashion being told what the limits were to its grand political designs and dreams, and presented with its duties to capitalist profit-making (accumulation).

And so they each spoke in turn. Dr F du Plessis (Sentembek) spoke against establishing political borders (arising out of 'ethnic patriotism') that might have to be undone at a later stage because they stand in the way of economic demands, and asked for military and political stability. Jan Bouwer (Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation) said that the cos was in essence a business venture (for more about the Credit Guarantee Corporation, see the

Conclusion below).

Dr WJ de Villiers (General Mining) asked the Prime Minister to ensure an 'acceptable approach to matters 'such as nationalisation of assets and repatriation of profits'.

It was AM Rosholt, of the giant Barlow Rand group, who spelt out this concern in the greatest detail. He said that 'the homelands were seen to be a purely political concept and not everyone agreed with that as such'.

Furthermore, 'economic development' of these regions had not been tackled seriously and this had, in any case, been seen as the responsibility of the Development Corporations for the various bantustans. Finally, he said, 'incentives were quite insufficient'.

However, Rosholt felt that this situation had, or was about to change:

Then, I think today is an example of a genuine attempt to consult with the private sector to find out what concessions and safeguards are necessary to ensure our investment in those areas. (emphasis added)

He felt that part of the answer lay in co-operative ventures between white and black -

Because if we don't go that way the whole development of the rural areas will go the same way as has happened north of us, where there has been chaos and the wrecking of most of those enterprises (!).

Rosholt repeated that 'South Africa is one economic unit', and then listed the safeguards sought by capitalists -

- a 'a guarantee against capital loss due to nationalization or disturbances';
- a 'guarantees against exchange control losses';
- a 'complete ability eventually to remit dividends';
- a low interest rate loans;
- a Tax - 'the very least that I think that we can expect,...., is that interest that we pay on the money we put into our homeland

investment, and the direct expenses to which we are committed because of that investment, should be allowed against our South African earnings';

- a tax concessions in regard to training;
- a 'eliminating the problems that arise, from local laws and red tape';
- a land tenure - 'I find it very difficult to reconcile how modern private enterprise can operate in a tribal tenure system', he said.

PW Botha was overjoyed with this reception and cast aside his military pretensions, all the better to respond to Harry Oppenheimer who had told him over lunch that his (Oppenheimer's) interests go far beyond southern Africa. 'I agreed southern Africa must become, not an isolated fortress, but a bastion of hope for the free world', beamed Botha.

This is how the Sunday Express saw the Conference (25.11.79).

What each side must do to make the Prime Minister's plan succeed:

Business:
 Push in-house technical and managerial training.
 Take greater responsibility for industrial training.
 Develop labour-intensive industries.
 Invest in rural areas.
 Encourage Blacks to start small businesses.
 Use channels for communication with the Government.
 Cultivate a regional approach to business development.

Government:
 Ensure peace and political stability.
 Create physical and social infrastructures.

Shake-out the civil service
 Ensure that Government policies promote employment.
 Rationalise the development corporations.
 Create a corporation to develop small businesses.
 Ease restrictions limiting business activity.
 Reduce impediments on business inherent in the national states.
 Allow Black capital investment in White areas.
 Increase the mobility of labour by relaxing job reservation.
 Relax the Group Areas Act.
 Accept non-independent homelands as political parts of South Africa.
 Start a rapid programme to raise the level of education of Blacks.

However, one Carlton Conference does not ensure a springtime of profitable investments, and a year later Dr Deon Geldenhuys, of the Institute of International Affairs, said that instead of this dream of southern African capitalism, cos was now 'a mere restructuring of relations between itself (South Africa) and the independent black homelands' (ADM, 25.02.81).

The abhorrence that southern African countries feel towards the apartheid system might not overnight abolish the exploitative economic integration of the sub-continent, but it does *motivate action to break such ties*. These ties include the customs union, transport and harbour facilities, power supplies, water supplies, labour flows, investment in mining, agriculture and industry, supply of and control over technology, etc. As Koornhof said:

The constellation might have to be formally established but let it be said that in many respects it is already functioning.

On the other hand, the bantustan 'leaders' have not been slow in public acclaim of the 'free enterprise' system (even if Buthelezi wants it with a 'pinch of African communalism'). Summits have been held, and statements made. The pledges made after the several meetings between the 'governments' of BophuthaTswana, the Transkei, Venda and South Africa, could have been drawn up by Rosholt himself.

The Ciskei's Sebe brothers have not been slack in putting effect to their support, locking up trade unionists at a faster rate over the past few months than the South African central government has done.

A further development that has flowed from the same set of factors that necessitated the holding of the Carlton Conference, has been the new policy of 'development axes' (as is planned at Bronkhorstspuit) - areas that would ignore

homeland boundaries in an economic strategy which unleashes the South African economy from some of the fetters of ideology' (Sunday Times, 25.05.80). Once more it could have been Rosholt speaking.

But this is not enough. As Anglo-American's Gavin Relly said in his support for the cos idea:

(T)he Anglo American Corporation had vast interests to protect in some neighbouring states - particularly in South West Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia (Sunday Times, 27.01.80).

In the meantime southern African states were making their own moves to break the South African stranglehold, or at least to loosen it.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

AT the beginning of April, 1980, a meeting of nine southern African states was held in Lusaka. Present were Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mocambique, Malawi and Angola - a grouping a sight more impressive than the bantustans South Africa had been able to summon to its 'summit'.

A preparatory meeting had been held in Tanzania in July, 1979. The Lusaka meeting was called to work out how to give effect to a declaration of economic liberation from South Africa. In other words, the conference was starting off from a recognition of the reality of dependence on South Africa 'as a focus of transport and communications, and exporter of goods and services, and as an importer of goods and cheap labour'. The central focus of initial moves aimed at disengagement was to be the areas of transport and communication.

The Lusaka meeting of the SADCC agreed on matters ranging from the setting up of a development bank to such down-to-earth concerns as combatting the spread of foot-and-mouth disease.

Sir Seretse Khama suggested that a transport and communications commission be established in Maputo.

In November, 1980, a meeting of the SADCC was held in Maputo to draw finance from industrialised countries for a suggested 95 projects designed to lessen dependence on South Africa and to stimulate co-operative internal development within the member countries. Dr Chidzero, leader of Zimbabwe's delegation, said that most of the money raised would be used to improve transport and communications facilities within and between the nine SADCC countries.

Almost one third (650-million dollars) of the total needed over five years for projects, was pledged at the meeting 'and almost all the donors have made it clear that they will repeat their pledges when the initial cash runs out', said JHP Serfontein in the Sunday Express (14.12.80).

Some of the first projects to be tackled would be the improvement of the harbours at Beira and Maputo and the rail links between Mocambique and Zimbabwe.

A month earlier, in October, a meeting had been held by representatives of Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mocambique, Botswana, Angola and Lesotho to work out strategies with regard to migrant labour to South Africa. More than 250 000 workers were said to migrate to South Africa from these countries annually. Aims were to standardise recruiting contracts to benefit workers more, and to create jobs within supplier countries for those workers who did not want to renew their contracts.

A further meeting of the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC) was held in May of this year in Salisbury, also attended by SWAPO, the ANC and PAC. Zimbabwe said that only 5 000 workers from that country were still finding

employment in South African mines (compared to the pre-independence figure of 30 000), and that the Wensela mine labour recruiting contract had not been renewed at the beginning of 1981.

By June this year 22 of the 97 SADC projects were being implemented. Plans were underway to enlarge and modernise Beira harbour to handle six times the present tonnage by 1987, while a new crude oil terminal was to serve Mocambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and even Zaire (the last mentioned may at some stage become the tenth member of the SADC, especially now that relations with Angola appear to have improved and the border between the two countries reopened). The northern Nacala port was being prepared for container handling, both for Mocambique and for Malawi (AIM 44, February, 1980).

After the Lusaka conference (April, 1980) the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) held a meeting at its Maputo headquarters. The conference defined such objectives as:

- 'to reduce economic dependence particularly but not only, in relation to South Africa';
- 'to forge links that will create genuine balanced regional cooperation';
- 'to obtain the necessary technical and financial assistance'.

On 12 July an agreement on transport and communications was signed between Malawi, Mocambique, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (AIM 49, July, 1980).

A meeting in Beira of the SATCC in September was told by the Mocambican director of ports and railways, Subaschandra Bhatt, 'that economic cooperation was impossible without an efficient transport system'. The upgrading of rail links between landlocked countries and Mocambique's ports was, therefore, a priority.

The second meeting of the SADC (SADC-2)

in November has already been mentioned above. Early in 1981 working groups were set up by the SATCC to facilitate the execution of projects for which funds had been allocated at SADC-2.

In March, 1981, the South African Railways stopped all rail traffic to Mocambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. Ostensibly this was done because too many railway trucks belonging to the SAR were being held up in these countries. However, this followed several articles in South African papers stressing the importance of rail links with South Africa. As AIM speculated:

Was the embargo just a technicality or was South Africa pulling muscle through the guise of an apparently technical matter? (AIM 57, March, 1981).

May, 1981, saw another meeting of the SATCC co-ordinating committee where progress reports were given on a wide range of projects falling within its ambit (see AIM 59, May, 1981, for details).

The Southern African Labour Commission (SALC) also met in May.

SADC-3 has just taken place in Salisbury (July, 1981) and decided to set up a permanent secretariat in Botswana to co-ordinate the tasks being, and still to be undertaken by the nine member countries. These are:

- Mocambique - the already mentioned SATCC;
- Zimbabwe - a regional 'food security plan';
- Zambia - plans for a regional development fund;
- Tanzania - industrial development co-operation;
- Botswana - agricultural development and stock diseases;
- Angola - energy;
- Swaziland - labour resource development;
- Lesotho - food, land utilisation and land conservation;
- Malawi - to host the next donors' conference and report-back.

As Howard Barrall of the Star comments from

Salisbury, 'such limited moves hardly justify the dramatic portrayal of the SADC as an "anti-South African economic bloc"'. .

To evaluate the possibilities of economic independence (and lessening dependence) from South Africa it would be necessary to examine the specific links that tie each of these nine SADC countries to South Africa - links that exist in all the areas already mentioned (such as labour supplies, investment, food, and transport). However, from the moves that followed the establishment of the SADC one must conclude that realistic long-term projects are being undertaken that will not only decrease dependence on South Africa but will also strengthen bonds between southern and eastern African countries. Hence, one must also conclude that this threatens South Africa economically and politically.

DESTABILISING SOUTHERN AFRICA

ABOVE, I quoted Dr Deon Geldenhuys on the failure of the 'constellation of states' (cos), limited as it was to restructuring and (ironically) reintegrating the bantustans (or certain aspects of the bantustans) into South Africa for the benefit of capitalism. The bantustans are increasing in importance as markets and areas of cheap labour for South African based capitalism. This process speeds up to the degree that the SADC succeeds in closing avenues for South African economic and political expansionism.

It is in this context that destabilisation of southern Africa must be seen. If there can be no fortress against 'Russian imperialism' with the South African state as the station commander, then those who would have been included in such a fortress must not be a threat to South African investments and political stability either.

Much more research will have to be done to make a case for the full extent and possible (threatened) and actual destabilisation of southern Africa, but some indications can be given.

Food supplies have offered an immediate pressure point for South Africa to use. Food is a political weapon in South Africa's arsenal. Dr Joop de Loor, Director General of Finance, said at the beginning of this year that 'a well fed Africa was an ally, not an enemy, and African states were realising more and more that Russia could not fulfil their expectations' (Star, 21.01.81).

Sally Gallagher of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, said that southern African countries were tied to South African foodstuffs because of the economics of the regional transport system. Furthermore, as Nicholas Ashford pointed out in an article in the Times (02.03.81), several African states, while suffering from foreign exchange deficits, have surplus rands resulting from the migrant labour system.


Ashford mentioned that Zimbabwe could possibly take the place of South Africa as a grain exporting country.

In March, 1981, PW Botha, after a meeting of the powerful State Security Council, threatened South Africa's 'neighbouring states that they will have their grain supplies from the south cut off if they continue to support sanctions against the Republic... The threat seemed to be aimed specifically at the more militant countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola' (Star, 10.03.81).

In June, 1980, it was reported (RDM, 16.06.80) that South African maize was exported regularly to Mocambique, Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, giving a rather pointed

reality to the threats of using this pressure point.

Transport is, of course, the point at which the southern African countries are structurally most closely linked with South Africa (one might be able to hide investments but it is rather more difficult to do the same with a railway line).



Southern African transport links as at 1976 (Star, 18.06.76).

I have, above, referred to one specific action by South Africa to bring rail traffic in the region to a standstill. At the time of writing (July, 1981) it has been announced that Zimbabwe is suffering from a critical diesel fuel shortage aggravated (caused?) by the withdrawal by South Africa of a large number of diesel locomotives from Zimbabwe. This move has disrupted the import of fuel from South Africa. The shortage of diesel is seriously hampering the distribution and gathering of what has been said to be a record maize crop. This has, once more, rubbed in the extent of dependence on South Africa.

No wonder then that it is the transport ties that are receiving most urgent attention from the SADC countries.

Military and political destabilisation is that aspect most frequently spoken about and alleged, and, in turn, as frequently denied by the South African Defence Force.

The South African invasion of Angola in 1975 was initially hushed up but took place on such a scale that it was an open secret even before South African admissions. Much as the South African occupation of Namibia, this was an attempt to secure or maintain a regime that would be friendly to white South African interests. Whether attacks in southern Angola over the years since Angolan independence are aimed only at SWAPO bases, or not, the effect is that of disrupting a society that has been through an enormous amount of turmoil and misery already.

'Ex'-Angolans, now with unclear nationality serve their new (pay) masters in the Buffalo Battalion and operate in southern Angola, while many speculations link UNITA and the South Africans militarily (eg, the Houston arms dealers' stock of military equipment was speculated to have been destined for UNITA through South Africa (see, for example, Star, 18.05.81; Sunday Tribune, 17.05.81)).

Savimbi twice admitted during July in interviews with foreign newsmen that UNITA was receiving direct aid from South Africa in the form of diesel fuel, trucks, medicine and the treatment of the wounded, food, etc (all except arms, he claims)(see Star, 24.07.81; and interview with a newsmen from the Scotsman, broadcast by the BBC, 23.07.81).

(South Africa can supply diesel fuel in the bush of southern Angola to a movement acting to overthrow the legitimate government of Angola and at the same time withdraws locomotives used to

deliver fuel to transport food crops in another neighbouring country, Zimbabwe).

UNITA had succeeded in sabotaging the Benguela railway line for six years. It was reopened briefly in July, 1981, to carry goods between Zambia and Angolan ports, but has since been sabotaged again.

In Mozambique, other than an attack on alleged ANC bases and a supposed inadvertent border violation, rumours are that South Africa is supporting the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR - Movimento Nacional de Resistencia). This has been denied by South African forces.

In December, 1980, a report in the Star (17.12.80) gave a list of claimed MNR sabotage attacks - several of these relate to power and transport lines.

In February, this year, the Zimbabwe government announced 'that it had captured 40 "South African armed" members' of the MNR inside Zimbabwe.

An article in the Star (16.07.81) was fairly direct in linking internal destabilisation in Mozambique, the SADCC, and South African support for the MNR:

... the guerillas are also threatening important facets of the plan for a constellation of black states to rival the one mooted by the South African Prime Minister, Mr PW Botha.

The rival plan is particularly vulnerable to the activities of the guerillas because its success hangs largely on smooth transport and communication.

On the origins of the MNR the article has this to say:

It is ironic that some of those involved in attempts to crush the resistance movement are likely to be former members of the Rhodesian Security Forces who assisted in its creation.

The movement was built up with the Rhodesian help from former members of elite black units serving with the Portuguese forces

and, it is claimed from disaffected Frelimo troops.

... Western diplomats in Salisbury and Maputo believe that South Africa does support the Mozambican rebels at least with supplies.

It appears that South Africa is still too dependent on power from the Cahora Bassa scheme to allow the MNR free reign in sabotaging the power line linking the scheme with South Africa. About 10% of South Africa's power needs are supplied from this scheme. South Africa would obviously be working as fast as possible to reduce this dependence that was negotiated with the previous Portuguese colonial regime (schemes such as the Tugela-Vaal Project are said to have been initiated or speeded up after the fall of Portuguese oppression). In the meantime various 'interests' are said to be negotiating with the MNR to halt their sabotage (July, 1981).

It is not possible to examine any of the accusations of and destabilising military and political activities undertaken by the South Africans in other southern African countries. Nor will other methods, or potential methods, of disruption of the economies and political structures of these countries be examined - such as manipulation of labour flows to, especially, South African mining, and the power that South African based capital wields through direct investment and control over machinery and technology.

CONCLUSIONS

THE grandiose scheme of a constellation of southern African states was initially conceived of primarily in military terms, defined as 'anti-marxist'. This conception changed as South African based monopoly capital was drawn

into its planning and execution. Capital demanded not a fortress, but directly economic guarantees of profitable investment, safe from political instability and unfettered by the political boundaries of the bantustan policy.

In other words, where capitalism existed it was to be fostered by the state; where obstacles to the flow of profits existed, these had to be removed; where dangers of nationalisation could arise these had to be eliminated.

Little came of either conception. 'Fortress southern Africa' has become 'fortress capitalist white South Africa'; the idea of an economic community was a non-starter, while the SADCC has been formed. The constellation of states has faded, leaving a South African black hole that threatens to suck in and destroy all around it.

Venda, Transkei, BophuthaTswana - regions of South Africa - and the central state, is what the 'constellation' consists of at present (the Ciskei is sure to join, if the Transkei will have it). And even with these regions the farce of their political 'independence' has been rubbed in with the new policy of regional growth zones, areas that know no economic boundaries, exactly as requested by the monopoly capitalists at the Carlton Conference. Those representatives of big business have also received results and assurances on several other requests: promises that the bantustan leaders support free enterprise and will never nationalise; promises of action against, and the detention of trade unionists; investment guarantees on the 'independent states' of the Transkei, BophuthaTswana and Venda from the Credit Guarantee Corporation of Africa (see box);

Extracts from an article headed 'Guarantees for investors in black states' by Mervyn Harris (Star, 03.03.81).

Mr Jan Bouwer, executive director of Credit Guarantee, said the corporation was now engaged in studies in collaboration with Government and overseas investment insurers to draft the necessary documents.

The Government was preparing the necessary legislation to amend the Export Credit Retransure Act so that the risk will be reinsured entirely with the Government in terms of the Act.

"Investment guarantees normally means an indemnity offered in terms of

an insurance policy which protects a South African company against loss due to events in a foreign country where it has business interests," said Mr Bouwer.

Such events included confiscation or nationalisation without fair compensation of undertaking in which South African companies had equity investments or for which they provided loan funds, restrictions on the transfer of dividends or capital, or loss of control over the assets owing to war or other disturbances.

But it is highly unlikely that this will be enough to satisfy either the needs of South African based capital, or the concept of political and military stability (or instability) held by the dominant force within the South African state itself. One could, therefore, predict increasing application of pressure and direct acts of destabilisation against the countries of the SADC, while political and economic links are sought further afield on the fringes of military and other right-wing regimes (Chile, Taiwan, Israel, etc).

The very real danger that closer co-operation between capital and the militaristically inclined state is being fostered by the growing arms industry, also exists. At present some 800 contracts have been issued by ARMSCOR, the body controlling and co-ordinating South African arms production.

The full implications of these possibilities and trends are not at all clear at present, but a certain pattern seems to be emerging.

MG Paul

(Material consulted from the SARS/DSG Resource Centre included press clippings; the Proceedings

of the Meeting between the Prime Minister and business leaders at the Carlton Centre, November, 1979; and the Bulletins of the Agência de Informacao de Mocambique (AIM)).

From AIM Bulletin 53, November, 1980.

PORTS AND RAILWAYS PROJECTS FOR SADC-2

Since the days of Cecil John Rhodes' dream of a Cape-to-Cairo railway linking Britain's colonies in the southern and eastern part of the African continent, railways have been an integral part of colonial policy in Southern Africa. And with the independent countries of the region formulating a strategy to reduce economic dependence, it is not surprising that transport and communications come high on the list of priorities.

The second Southern African Development Coordination Conference in Maputo in November discussed 950 million dollars worth of railway and port projects. This is almost half of the total 1,912 million dollars of projects presented. The first priority of these projects is to renovate and upgrade existing facilities.

In colonial times the two Rhodesias, now Zambia and Zimbabwe, were linked to South Africa only through Botswana, and also had outlets to the sea in Mozambique, a Portuguese colony as it was then.

With Mozambique's independence on the horizon, the South African and Rhodesian authorities rushed to complete a new rail link through Beit Bridge which was opened in October 1974. That railway was crucial to sanctions-busting after Mozambique closed its borders with southern Rhodesia in accordance with international sanctions.

With the independence of Zimbabwe last April, the region's railway network can serve the interests of the peoples of the region for the first time.

A look at the map shows that Maputo and Beira are much closer to Zambia, Zimbabwe and the north of Botswana than any South African port. For Swaziland too the nearest port is Maputo, and Malawi's only outlets are through Mozambique.

The problem is that the ports and railways in the region are not up to the task of serving the developing economies of the independent countries. War and years of colonial neglect mean that a lot of work must be done. The railway line from Nacala to Malawi, for example, was never properly maintained and some of the track is up to thirty years old, with two-thirds of the


sleepers worn out. The Limpopo line in southern Mozambique was severely damaged in Rhodesian attacks last year and it was only reopened last month.

Implementation of the railway and ports projects presented at the SADC-2 in Maputo mean an enormous improvement, and work could start next year on all of them. The biggest projects proposed are: rehabilitation of the railway from Nacala to the Malawi border at a cost of 200 million dollars, the rehabilitation of all the railways in Botswana (these are being taken over by Botswana from the Zimbabwe Railways Corporation) costing 100 million dollars, rehabilitation of the Maputo-Swaziland line at 30 million dollars, rehabilitation of 311 kilometres of line inside Malawi to the Mozambique border at 20 million dollars, rehabilitation of 100 kilometres track inside Mozambique on the Beira-Umtali line at 27 million dollars and rehabilitation and doubling of the track on a 27 kilometre section on the Beira-Dondo railway which serves traffic both to Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Rehabilitation of the Benguela railway line in Angola is also proposed at a cost of 60 million dollars and a number of projects have been proposed for the Tazara railway between Tanzania and Zambia, including the purchase of 25 new diesel-electric locomotives.

All the big port projects are in Mozambique. The access channel to Maputo port is to be

Major existing and proposed rail routes in southern Africa, north of South Africa (Star, 28.07.80).



deepened to admit ships up to 100,000 tonnes, a coal terminal at Matola is to be built and container-handling equipment installed at the Maputo container wharf. The cost of this project is estimated at 183 million dollars. A project to deepen and widen the entrance channels to Beira port and build two deep-water berths in the port will cost 158 million dollars, and Nacala in the north is to have a container wharf and container handling equipment costing in all about 27 million dollars.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

If you want to phone Salisbury in Zimbabwe from Luanda, just 1,800 kilometres away on Angola's Atlantic coast, the call has to be routed through Europe.

This is because Angola's earth station that provides international communications faces the Atlantic satellite, while most of the other earth stations in Southern Africa face the Indian Ocean satellite.

So it should be no surprise that one of the projects proposed by Angola to the second Southern African Development Coordination Conference is for the installation of an earth station facing the Indian Ocean satellite.

About 15 years ago the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) began planning the Panafrikan Telecommunications Network (PANAFTEL). The main aim of the PANAFTEL project was to build up reliable land-based telecommunications systems so that high-quality telephone and telex links between any two African countries would have no need to go through centres outside Africa.

The introduction of large scale satellite communications about five years ago probably had a delaying effect on the PANAFTEL project.

The SADC-2 in Maputo in November considered some 114 million dollars worth of projects to provide high-quality telecommunications in the region in order to do away with dependence on centres outside Africa.

The national and regional telecommunications systems are being considered as an integral part of a world-wide telecommunications system.

More than half of the projects to be proposed next week are for microwave links, both for interstate communications and international communications. The bulk of these projects are in Mozambique and aim to provide cross-border connections to Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania. The cost of the project proposed by Mozambique is estimated at a little over 60 million dollars while the total of micro-wave projects for the region is estimated at 75 million dollars.

Botswana is proposing an African domestic satellite system which would provide high-quality 24-hour telephone services to rural communities, and also improve telecommunications to other African countries.

The estimated cost of the project is one million dollars but the relevance of such a project to a country like Botswana with a small population widely spread over a large area is obvious. Botswana of course could not afford, nor would it need, a satellite for its own use alone. If the proposal is accepted, the authority in charge will be the Panafrikan Telecommunications Union.

Four of the nine SADC countries, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, will present proposals for earth stations for satellite communications, while a fifth country, Zambia, is looking for the extension of its existing earth station. The total cost of the earth stations project is around 33 million dollars, but although the initial investment cost is high, the incremental cost for additional circuits is comparatively low.

The telecommunications system of a country may be compared with the nervous system of a human being. A modern country cannot exist without an adequate telecommunications system. Considering telecommunications on a regional scale it would be impossible to think of effective cooperation without sufficient telecommunications between the countries of Southern Africa.

CIVIL AVIATION AND ROAD PROJECTS

In Southern Africa, travelling by air from one capital to another without being forced to spend days in transit or make innumerable connections, is something of an accomplishment. Flights are infrequent and timetables uncertain. Connections with the rest of Africa and other continents are limited. Often the most practical itinerary is through Johannesburg.

Confronted with similar problems of decayed infrastructure, a lack of qualified personnel and rising cost of materials and spare parts, nine Southern African countries have come up with a number of civil aviation and road projects that will coordinate and accelerate economic development in the region.

Twelve proposed projects totalling 188 million dollars are being suggested to improve air passenger and cargo transport between (SADC members). They include plans to cooperate in maintenance, in the creation of an inventory of resources, in the establishment of a pool of aircraft and spare parts, and in the coordination of routes and timetables.

The most ambitious projects are presented by Lesotho and by Swaziland, both either surrounded by South African territory or very nearly so. The former wants the construction of a new airport at a cost of 14 million dollars, a necessity in order to fulfil the region's primary objective of reducing economic dependence on South Africa. Present installations in Lesotho can accommodate only light aircraft and lack sufficient safety features. Swaziland proposes the renovation and modernisation of its airport at cost of 15 million dollars. The proposed changes would permit the landing of larger aircraft destined for Mauritius, Nairobi and Kinshasa.

Mozambique presented two projects valued at a total of 8 million dollars to renew take off and landing facilities at airports of Maputo and Beira, and to ensure safety standards at international level are maintained.

There are 26 projects related to road transport of which 17 concern overhauling and modernisation of existing roads, four refer to entirely new construction and five are studies suggested for further possible development. The total cost is more than 600 million dollars.

The road network of Southern Africa serves to transport goods short distances and to provide service to regions not serviced by other means. The majority of the projects would improve existing sections of roads to make them accessible in all seasons and to facilitate access to Mozambican ports.

Mozambique has submitted a proposal to upgrade and strengthen a 280 km stretch of road from the Zimbabwe border to Beira, through Chicaco, at a cost of 17 million dollars. This is a main artery for the transport of goods from Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Another project would upgrade and modernise 75 km of the Maputo-Nuanetsi road at a cost of 7 million dollars. On the other side of the frontier a section of 52 km of gravel road must be tarred at a cost of 16.5 million dollars in order to provide land-locked Swaziland with access to the port of Maputo.

Intense international traffic is forecast for the route from the Zimbabwe border to Malawi through Tete and Moatize. Upgrading of the 273 km stretch would cost 12 million dollars.

Another project would realign and reconstruct an access road to the planned Unity Bridge between Mozambique and Tanzania. The 171 km undertaking would cost 30 million dollars.

Malawi has also suggested two projects destined to facilitate access to ports of Beira, Nacala and Pemba, and Lesotho presented proposals for four projects worth a total of 130 million dollars.

TRANSPORT

MUCH as we do with Labour Action and Courts (two regular features in WIP), we intend updating transport issues every few months. This was first done in WIP 15:49-55 (October, 1980). Previous contributions on transport appeared in WIP 10 and WIP 13.

The author of this contribution has been able to use only the limited information resources available in the SARS/DSG Resource Centre.

Regional and in-depth contributions of information and analyses from our readers would be appreciated - on this topic and on other areas covered by WIP.

NATAL

Wembezi - It was reported (Star, 15.07.81) that the bus boycott which lasted for a year had ended after a new bus company had taken over on the route between Wembezi township and Estcourt. The new company had also reintroduced the old fare (25c).

The bus boycott started in July, 1980, after the privately owned Khanyani Bus Service raised its fares on the route from 25c to 32c. Rather than pay the increased fares people chose to walk the 12km. By September Cebekhulu, one of the co-owners, claimed a loss due to the boycott of R80 000 (Star, 28.09.80).

Durban - In May, 1981, it was reported that Putco had applied to the Department of Transport for permission to increase its fares (Star, 27.05.81). The application was opposed by several organisations - the Natal Indian Congress, Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC), Diakonia and Inkatha. The Natal Mercury (27.05.81) quoted Chris Nicholson (appearing for the organisations) as saying that increases in the cost of food coupled

with transport costs of families living far away from their places of work, had dealt a crippling blow to many people. It was further stated that Putco's net profits had increased from R4-m to R13-m, and it could now be placed 76th among the top 100 companies.

The Natal Commuters Association in Chatsworth called on social and civic bodies to register their objections to the fare increases between Chatsworth and Durban (The Leader, 05.06.81). It was argued that no benefits were being offered to commuters in return for increased fares.

CAPE

IN June it was reported that City Tramways had applied for fare increases averaging 12%, while Associated Bus Holdings had applied for an average increase of 28% (ADM, 26.06.81). Between them these two companies control the buses operating to and from Mitchells Plain and Atlantis. If approved, the increases will be effective by the end of July. Last time fare increases of between 30% and 100% gave rise to Cape Town's biggest ever bus boycott. Meanwhile it was reported in the Star (18.07.81) that representatives of 21 community organisations and trade unions had lodged their objections to the intended increases at the Road Transportation Board's Foreshore Offices. They were closely watched by the police as they did so. The memorandum stated among other things that the people could not afford the increases and that the community would be hard hit to meet the added burden. It was further stated that the people resent the monopoly which Tramways has over public transport, and that they believe that the company is making substantial profits without providing a proper service.

TRANSVAAL

Pretoria Area - It was reported (Star, 04.10.80)

that a rail service was to replace the Putco service between the Shoshanguve and Mabopene area and Pretoria. This would mean a serious cut-back in Putco routes in the area. Meanwhile, in December, 1980, Putco announced that a 12% to 14% increase would come into effect on the Pretoria bus routes early in January, 1981 (Star, 5.9630.12.80). The Department of Transport had approved the increases but approval from the Department of Co-operation and Development was still awaited. D Rolt of Putco stated that the wage increases for Putco employees announced by the government were responsible for the proposed fare increases (Star, 29.12.80).

Early in January, 1981 (Star, 07.01.81), Joseph Gomba, a director of the Black Unity Express Bus Service (BUEBS) challenged the Pretoria community to fulfil their promises to fight for fare reductions. He stated that until that time nothing had been done to show disapproval. In March (Star, 10.03.81) it was reported that Gomba had applied for a public road carrier permit for 14 buses, because 'he wants to remove black transport from the hands of white companies'. Gomba accused Putco of operating illegally, in terms of the Urban Areas Act. He stated that his company aimed at providing transport to the residents at a cheaper rate.

Putco and BophuthaTswana Transport Holdings lodged objections with the Pretoria Road Transportation Board, against granting a permit to the BUEBS. Putco argued that the service that it provided was adequate (Star, 30.03.81).

Gomba has been opposing Putco for the past three years, using the government regulation on the control and supervision of trade in urban african residential areas (Star, 12.06.81).

On 9 July it was reported (Star) that the South African Railways and Batswana Gare Transport had asked the Road Transportation Board to

reject the BUEBS application in order to protect their own services. Batswana Gare Transport stated that it provided an adequate service and argued that additional services would result in transport congestion. The SAR opposed the application on the grounds that there was an extensive rail service in the area, co-ordinated with the bus services. There have been no further reports on this matter in the local newspapers.

Meanwhile it was reported (Star, 15.06.81) that in Seshego a black-owned bus service, the Hamba Buva Bus Service (HBBS) had started to run 16 buses on the route between Seshego and Pietersburg. Ben Harris, the owner of the HBBS was granted a licence after repeated applications to the Road Transportation Board in Pretoria.

In February the Seshego bus boycott, in response to fare increases, had entered its sixth month. During the same month it was also reported that the residents of Seshego had called for the HBBS to replace the service run by the Lebowa Transport Corporation (LTC) (RDM, 06.02.81). On the evening of Sunday, 8 March, youths in Seshego had stoned taxis and LTC vehicles (RDM, 10.03.81). At a meeting on Sunday the Seshego branch of AZAPO had reaffirmed its stand to continue the boycott. Lebowa Chief Minister, Phatudi, appealed to Koornhof to use his influence to secure a licence for the HBBS. Koornhof refused on the grounds that Ben Harris had the support of AZAPO (RDM, 16.04.81).

The fight against the LTC continued. On the 21 April the Sowetan reported that six youths had been sentenced to six cuts each after being found guilty of public violence arising out of the LTC boycott. They were alleged to have stoned the car of Colonel Moloto of the Lebowa police.

Two days later the Sowetan reported that the unrest had spread to other areas, and that

people were demanding that the LTC be replaced by the HBBS. 25 people were arrested, including four AZAPO members.

In May a fresh case was presented to the Lebowa Transport Board to get a licence for the HBBS. By the 22nd of that month it was reported that the Seshego bus boycott had spread to other areas (the townships at Tzaneen and Potgietersrus). Chief Seleka, Lebowa Minister of Police, implied that AZAPO had initiated the Seshego bus boycott. Chairman of the Seshego Village Committee (SVC), the Reverend P Malatji, said that the SVC alone had started the boycott.

On 9 June the Sowetan reported that the SVC had announced that the HBBS had been granted a licence to operate between Seshego and Pietersburg. The next day was the first time in many months that people travelled by bus to Pietersburg. BH Brooks, of LTC, was reported as saying that there had been no winners or losers - 'remember the service is run in the interests of the passengers, not the owners of the bus companies' (!).

Meanwhile reports of dissatisfaction with bus services continue. The Sowetan (09.03.81) reports that Isakane (Brakpan) commuters complained of not being provided with adequate services. Several residents have been injured trying to board the full buses.

Kagiso commuters are angry over the 'rude' and 'shabby' treatment they get from the bus drivers. And commuters from Mohlakeng (Randfontein) complain about the very poor service they get from the Greyhound Bus Service. It is stated that there are usually long queues, with passengers waiting for an hour. Complaints were also made about the attitude of bus drivers and inspectors (Sowetan, 10.07.81). In Thokoza (near Alberton) residents had complained of the acute bus shortage, stating that they were always late for work

(Sowetan, 10.06.81).

In Lenasia the Lenasia Transport Action Committee has called for an official investigation into transport facilities. This is part of a set of proposals resulting from a survey of commuter attitudes. Proposals have been sent to the Lenasia Bus Service (LBS), Local Transportation Board and Johannesburg City Engineer's Department (Star, 23.04.81). Commuters complained of over-crowding, long and circuitous routes and the absence of an efficient internal service. Further complaints were around timetables and the bad mechanical state of the buses (RDM, 23.11.81). It was proposed that the LBS press for Lenasia to be declared an 'affected' area so that it could qualify for a subsidy from the state. Manager of the LBS, Denarth, refused to say whether they got a government subsidy.

Eastern Transvaal - Rioting broke out in Embahlanhle (Langverwacht township) near Secunda on the morning of 6 July, 1981 (RDM, 07.07.81). Buses, private vehicles and beer halls were stoned, apparently in reaction to bus increases from 40c to 45c on the routes of the United Transport Company. According to Brigadier Jordaan, Divisional Commissioner of Police, the groups of youths involved in the stone throwing were reacting in anticipation of return to school (!). The RDM (08.07.81), however, reported that the youths were protesting against the fare increases.

Daveyton - The Benoni Town Council announced that fares would be increased to compensate for increased running costs (Sowetan, 26.06.81).

Putco (Johannesburg) - A spokesperson for Putco, D Bradley, announced that Putco fares would be increasing by 5,2%, coming into effect in about two months from the date of the announcement

(RDM, 10.01.81). At a meeting held at the Swiss Mission Church in Soweto, AZAPO stated that Putco buses would be boycotted after the fare increase (RDM, 12.01.81). The Johannesburg Coloured Management Committee called for a commission of enquiry into the operations of Putco, arguing that it was necessary to establish the desirability of having a 'monopolistic profit making enterprise providing a social service ...' (Star, 16.01.81).

At a meeting held at the Roman Catholic Church in Soweto the Diepkloof Civic Association (DCA) pledged that they would join other organisations in the fight against the intended increases. It was further decided to approach the Soweto Taxi Association to lower their fares during the duration of the boycott. Early in March Bradley announced that increases would be delayed until the Department of Co-operation and Development had given them a date on which they could come into effect. The Star (06.03.81) reported that the memorandum submitted by the protesting organisations had been handed to Johannesburg Chief Commissioner, SA van Heerden.

The memorandum condemned the fare increases and called on Putco to improve its bus services and the conditions of its buses and shelters.

In the meantime, Rev Buti, chairperson of the Alexandra Liaison Committee, said, at a reception to mark the opening of a R2-m Putco depot in Wynberg, that if increases came into effect Putco should plough some of the profits back into the community. In an interview Buti refused to say whether he would call for a bus boycott (Star, 19.03.81). He stated that Putco services for black people were not on a par with the services offered for whites; but he praised Putco for holding talks with his Liaison Committee. Putco managing director, Caleo, presented a cheque for R1 000 as a donation to the Liaison Committee.

The Sowetan (25.03.81) reported that taxi operators operating between Meadowlands and the city would be prepared to reduce their fares from 80c to 70c during the boycott.

Meanwhile, the RDM reported (26.03.81), that the interim financial results of the Putco company showed a 41% rise in pre-tax profits (from R3,817-m to R5,398-m) for the six months ending 31 December, 1980. However, both Carleo and IP van Onselen of Putco, stated that the high rate of inflation and wage spirals 'must of necessity lead to an application for a further increase in tariffs'.

Soweto residents stated that the fare reductions offered by taxi owners were inadequate. It was argued that there was no sense in boycotting bus transport that cost 35c only to pay the taxis 70c. Furthermore, residents stated that the organisations calling for the boycott would have to provide alternative transport at reasonable prices. The threats of bus boycotts by AZAPO, the DCA and the Committee of Ten continued, and meetings were held to discuss the matter.

By 23 May Bradley stated that the Department of Co-operation and Development had not yet given a date for the increases to come into effect. He emphasised that the delay was not a reaction to the threatened bus boycotts.

Anti-Republic Day meetings were told that Putco's new strategy was to sell new weekly and daily tickets at the unpublicised increased rates (Star, 02.05.81).

On 22 June it was announced that the government would withdraw its subsidy to Putco as soon as the new fares became effective (Star). This would result in Putco looking for further increases before the end of 1981. People called on the government to subsidise fares (Sowetan, 23.06.81), AZAPO called for a boycott of Putco (Star, 23.06.81), and the DCA appealed to the

Soweto Civic Association (SCA) to attend a meeting to discuss the fare increases.

In July the DCA launched a 'Don't buy Putco's weekly coupons' campaign, protesting against the fare increases (Star, 03.07.81). Meanwhile, at an SCA meeting held at Dr Motlana's home, the decision to use taxis during the boycott was discouraged. It was decided that the boycott would be far more effective with people walking to work.

By the fourth of July eight black organisations had decided to boycott Putco - AZAPO, CUSA, SCA, BMMU, BAWU, MAFASA, MDALI and the TAC (RDM, 04.07.81).

On 6 July the new fares became effective. The Star (06.07.81) reported that the buses were running normally and that the bus boycott was being ignored.

Two buses were stoned in Dobsonville on 7 July, and police were patrolling the routes (RDM, 08.07.81). As soon as the patrolling stopped the buses were stoned again. Police returned and arrested one youth.

There have to date been no further reports of a bus boycott linked to these fare increases.

COURTS

Note: The date which appears in brackets at the end of completed trials refers to the date of sentence or acquittal in that trial. In appeal proceedings, the date refers to the date of judgement. In the case of part-heard matters, the date refers to the last reported court sitting before adjournment.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS

Conrad Lekhumbi (18).

Charge: The accused was alleged by the state to have incited and encouraged 3 youths to leave South Africa and undergo military training. The alleged offences, supposed to have taken place between October and December 1980, had the effect of endangering the maintenance of law and order according to the state.

The quality of evidence produced by the state appears to have been very poor. A number of alleged accomplices gave evidence, some of them being brought to court directly from security police detention. Evidence largely revolved around the alleged advice and assistance which Lekhumbi gave to people he had recruited to undergo military training. Certain of the witnesses contradicted themselves, while others testified about learning statements off by heart before giving evidence. One witness told the court that he had not been assaulted by police in detention, but had fallen and injured his mouth while running in his cell. When asked by defence counsel to demonstrate how he had fallen, he refused to do so.

The state attempted to hand in a confession allegedly made by Lekhumbi: initially defence counsel opposed the handing in of the statement, claiming that the accused had been forced to

make it. Subsequently, however, the presiding magistrate refused to accept the statement on the grounds that the name appearing on its front page did not correspond with that of the accused.

At the end of the state case, an application was made for the acquittal of the accused. This was successful, with the presiding magistrate finding that the quality of the state's evidence was so poor that the accused should be acquitted.

Verdict: Not guilty. Lekhumbi, who was detained under section 6 of the Terrorism Act at the end of January 1981, made his first court appearance in mid-May when he was refused bail. He had accordingly spent some 6 months in custody before being released.

Joseph Bhaki Gumbi (24).

Charge: The accused, resident in Newcastle before his arrest, was charged with inciting Bongani Mpanza to leave the country for military training, and taking steps himself to leave South Africa for training.

The state's case rested primarily on two letters written by Gumbi, a confession made by him while in police custody, and the evidence of Mpanza.

The two letters, written in the second half of 1980, were both addressed to Radio Freedom, the broadcasting service of the ANC. In the letters, Gumbi enquired about joining the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe.

The statement made by the accused while in custody was contested by the defence, claiming that it had been made as a result of torture and assault. Gumbi claimed that police had blind-folded him, tied an elastic band round his penis, and forced him to do

frog jumps. He also alleged that police held him out of a fourth-floor window with his head pointing downwards. It was as a result of this pressure that he made a statement to a magistrate. Despite these allegations, the presiding magistrate accepted the confession as evidence against Gumbi.

Verdict: Guilty

Sentence: 5 years.

(Durban Regional Court, 25.06.81).

Náville Sello Motlhabakwe (19), Johannes Kere (19), Eugene Mokgoatsi (20), Nelson Zenzile Hlatshwayo (20) and Ben Fani (21).

Charge: The charges in this Kimberley trial involve allegations of terrorism, arson, housebreaking and attempted arson. They relate to the schools boycott in Kimberley during 1980, and more particularly to the events of September 8 and 9 of that year (see WIP 16 for an article on the Kimberley schools boycott).

Evidence led has revolved around a meeting of about 1 000 scholars at St Boniface school in Gaieshewe on September 8; just after 11h00 scholars left the meeting and marched off. According to police evidence they disrupted traffic, threw school books over a fence and stoned a building.

Police claim that they then broke up the demonstration with tear gas, after which groups of scholars fled into a white residential area, damaging property in their flight.

Subsequently a beerhall, car, bakery delivery van and policeman's house were set on fire.

According to an accomplice witness, brought to court from detention and giving evidence in camera, the attack on the policeman's house was in retaliation against police because of their attacks on students.

Another accomplice witness told the court that the aim of the schools boycott was to improve education. Scholars had approached the local community council chairman to see the Minister of Education and Training. When this was refused, they decided to dump their text books at the community council chamber in protest.

(Kimberley Regional Court, 23.07.81).

Oscar Mpethe (71) and and 18 others.

This trial was reported on in WIP 18:19-20.

Subsequent to that report, the court sat for only a few days prior to adjourning until August 4. A full report on proceedings will appear in the next WIP.

Norreen Yengeni (22), Edward Mbundu (38), David Linda Mampene (20) and Eddie Bafana Khumalo (30).

Charge: The state alleges that the accused gathered information about major oil refineries for the ANC. In addition, Yengeni is charged with undergoing military training in Angola between April 1977 and October 1980, and attempting to gather information on a Cape Town oil refinery.

Mbundu and Khumalo are charged with undergoing military training in Angola, Russia and Zambia between 1976 and 1980, and returning to South Africa in October 1980 to gather information on an oil refinery at Alberton.

Mampene is alleged to have undergone military training during 1978 and 1979, and to have returned to South Africa in July 1980 as part of an ANC assassination squad. In particular, he is alleged to have conspired with one Johannes Shabangu to assassinate various people. (It should be noted that Shabangu is currently one of the accused in

the Pretoria Treason trial - see below.

Mampene has recently testified in that trial in support of Shabangu's contention that he was tortured into making a statement while in police custody).

The trial is due to begin in the Pretoria Regional Court on August 24.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIAL

Thomas Mashaba (30) and Augustine Thebo Libe (29).

Charge: The accused faced three charges, namely that they were members of the ANC; that they were found in possession of certain ANC pamphlets and documents; and that they displayed these pamphlets.

Mashaba is a former section head of the Sharpeville CID, but had resigned by the time of his arrest. The charges arise from a series of incidents when ANC posters and pamphlets were plastered around Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Boipatong and at Sebokeng hospital.

In evidence, Mashaba admitted that as a policeman he had been involved in covering suspect's heads with two bags - one plastic - to make them talk. This method of extracting information was called 'showing the ghost'. Mashaba claimed that policemen used the 'ghost' method, but denied this when giving evidence because they knew it was illegal. While in detention he had been threatened with police methods to make suspects talk by security police.

The brother of Libe, Pule Libe, was called by the state as a witness. Subsequent to his evidence he was charged with perjury.

Verdict: Guilty of being office-bearers or members of ANC, and of displaying ANC posters in the Vaal area; not guilty of possession of ANC posters and pamphlets.

Sentence: Mashaba - 5 years.

Libe - 3 years.

(Vereeniging Regional Court, 28.07.81).

An appeal has been lodged against both sentence and conviction and Libe released on bail of R1 000. Bail for Mashaba was refused after the presiding magistrate found that he might flee the country if his appeal failed.

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

Linda Mogale (24).

As reported in WIP 10 page 49, Mogale was found guilty of 13 charges of culpable homicide, assault, arson, malicious damage to property, and terrorism. He was sentenced to an effective 7 years imprisonment.

12 of the charges arose from incidents in Soweto during 1976 in which houses were fire-bombed and 3 people died as a result. The Terrorism Act charge involved an alleged conspiracy between the Soweto Students' League (SSL) and the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) to commit acts of violence.

Mogale was the last president of the now-banned Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) and a president of the SSL.

The first 12 charges relating to the fire-bombing of houses in Soweto primarily involved a confession made by Mogale to police after his detention. In his trial, he alleged that he had been severely assaulted by police to force him to make the confession, including having his front teeth broken with a pair of pliers. In support of this allegation, evidence was led from a dentist who confirmed that the broken teeth had been damaged by pliers. Nonetheless, presiding judge FS Steyn found that the confession was admissible as evidence against Mogale.

In the appeal, the judges of appeal found that Mogale had proved that his statement had not been made freely and voluntarily, and that he should accordingly be acquitted on the first 12 counts.

On the terrorism charge, it was held on appeal that the evidence of the state did not constitute proof of the offence as charged, and Mogale was acquitted on this charge too.

Mogale, who had been in custody since 1978, was accordingly released from prison. (Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 02.05.81).

Markus Kuteka (40) and Henri Kariseb (45).

As reported in WIP 16 page 8-9, the accused in this case were found guilty of terrorism; Kuteka was sentenced to death, Kariseb to 10 years.

They appealed against sentence. Both men had been employed as farm labourers in the Grootfontein district of Namibia when a group of Swapo guerrillas attacked the farm. The trial judge found that both accused had given assistance to this group of guerrilla fighters.

On appeal, it was held that there were important extenuating circumstances in the case. Kuteka's sentence was accordingly reduced from death to 17 years, and Kariseb's from 10 to 7 years imprisonment.

(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 09.07.81).

PRETORIA TREASON TRIAL

Anthony Bobby Tsotsobe (25), Johannes Shabangu (26) and David Moise (25).

Charge: The accused face a main charge of high treason, with alternative counts of terrorism, robbery with aggravating circumstances, and four counts of attempted murder.

All 3 accused have already admitted in court that they are ANC members, and have

undergone military training in various ANC camps.

In addition to these charges, Tsotsobe is alleged to have participated in the guerrilla attack on the Booysens police station in April 1980, to have attacked Uncle Tom's Hall in Soweto and set it on fire in May 1980, and to have launched an attack on the Dube railway station in October 1980. He is also charged with hiding ammunition, weapons and explosives intended for sabotage operations.

Shabangu is charged with attacking the home of a South African policeman at Sasfontein, near Mamelane, Barberton, during April 1980.

Moise is charged with taking part in the attack on Sasol 2 at Secunda in June 1980, and returning to South Africa in October 1980 to gather information for a second attack on Sasol.

The trial opened with the defence contesting the admissions which the accused made on their first court appearance. After lengthy periods of detention under section 6 of the Terrorism Act, the accused were brought to court without legal representation. There, in complex legal proceedings, they made certain prejudicial admissions. In the submission of the defence counsel, these admissions made by the accused should not be admissible against them during their trial. However, presiding judge Theron has ruled that these initial concessions made by the accused will be evidence against them.

Judge Theron also upheld a state application, opposed by the defence, that certain categories of witnesses should give evidence in camera. The first of these was a man captured in the Defence Force raid on Matola earlier this year. (It will be recalled that state authorities denied at the time that anyone had been captured in the raid). The witness

claimed that he had been involved in the attack on Sasol 2, and that when captured by the SADF, Moise had also been taken back to South Africa by the attacking forces.

A major feature of the trial thus far has been the allegations of systematic torture levelled against the police by defence witnesses. The first accused has given evidence in a trial-within-a-trial about the circumstances in which he came to make a statement while in police custody. The state has handed the statement in as evidence, while defence counsel claimed that it had not been made freely by the accused.

The defence has also called evidence from a number of ex-detainees who testified to being tortured while in police detention. These witnesses, who were charged and acquitted of furthering the aims of the ANC, all testified about the torture and assaults they endured at Protea police station and elsewhere. In addition, Dr NH Motlana testified that he treated a female detainee who, on her release, had marks and bruises on her back consistent with assault with a baton or sjambok.

A certain Lieutenant A Trollip featured prominently in the allegations of assault and torture at Protea police station. Trollip has had similar allegations made against him in other trials, notably in the sedition trial of Soweto student leaders. In the wake of that trial one of the accused, Daniel Sechaba Montsitsi instituted proceedings against Trollip and others for damages. Montsitsi, a chairman of the SSRC at the time of his detention, alleged that Trollip and others severely assaulted him while in detention. At the time of writing, the Montsitsi claim has not yet been finalised because of delays in court proceedings.

At the time Trollip was featuring in the

Treason Trial, his name was also being heard in another court of law. Detainee Masabata Loate had smuggled notes from prison to her mother: in these she alleged that she was being tortured in detention in a police attempt to force her to admit to certain matters related to SAYRCO. In an application brought by Loate's mother seeking to restrain the police from assaulting her daughter, the name of Trollip featured as one of the police allegedly torturing Loate.

Security police denied that they had been involved in torturing or assaulting anyone, and Trollip told the court that he was surprised when people gave evidence about assault and torture because he was so nice to them.

At the conclusion of the trial-within-a-trial, presiding judge Theron ruled that the Tsotsobe statement was admissible as evidence and had not been made under any duress. Judge Theron said that he would give his reasons for this ruling at a later date.

The second accused, Johannes Shabangu, also alleges torture and assaults at the hands of the security police. He claims that he was suspended head-down from a tree, with rope tied to his leg irons. He was then lashed with a sjambok while being questioned. In support of his allegation, defence counsel called David Mampane, who is awaiting trial in a Terrorism Act trial, and is an alleged co-conspirator of Shabangu (see above). Mampane, who was detained with Shabangu, told the court that while he was being beaten in a room, he could hear Shabangu screaming in another. Shabangu has claimed that police dislocated his jaw while beating him.

After the state led evidence from a district surgeon saying that he had examined Shabangu, and found no marks on him, judge Theron ruled that the Shabangu statement was also admissible as

evidence. The judge will give his reasons later on for this ruling.

The trial continues in the Pretoria Supreme Court.

LABOUR ACTION

NATAL

Burhose (Estcourt): About 1 300 workers downed tools on 25 May demanding double the R15-21 per week presently earned. A spokesperson for the National Union of Textile Workers said that the firm had dismissed all the workers involved, and had rejected union proposals for settling the dispute. Police with teargas were called in to disperse the workers (Star, 27.05.81).

By 30 May management had not acceded to their demand, but was claiming that the workers had gone back to work on the 29th. The workers were to elect a negotiating committee the following week (Natal Mercury, 30.05.81); management had undertaken to negotiate a recognition agreement with the union.

Huletts sugar mill (Felixton): More than 500 workers went on strike on 19 June demanding a R95 a month living-out allowance for married workers not living in company accommodation. Management offered them R50 a month. The National Union of Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Employees (unaffiliated) persuaded the workers to go back to work on 25 June.



Huletts Sugar

The Industrial Council met the next day and awarded the workers R30 a month. The Natal Mercury reported that this resolved the dispute (!) (NM, 26.06.81; 27.06.81).

Richards Bay Minerals (Richards Bay): 650-800 workers, out of 933 at the firm, went on strike on 25 June demanding recognition of the National Iron, Steel, Metal and Allied Workers Union (NISMAWU, affiliated to the National Federation of Workers).

Some workers indicated that they would return to work on Monday. The workers' houses in Esikhawini were attacked over the weekend. The occupants of the 300 houses owned by the RBM company were given 2-week eviction notices. On Friday, 10 african security guards being driven home in company cars were stoned.

Workers returning to work were not satisfied with the situation: 9 workers (3 being union leaders) were not re-employed by the company despite management's agreement to re-employ all unconditionally.

On 29 June 800 workers were fired. They refused to collect their pay. The police were called in and police vans 'escorted' busloads of workers to Esikhawini. Police patrolled the area most of the day and prevented the workers from gathering in groups. One worker, David Sithole, was arrested at home.

Management is demanding that the union show half the workers as paid up members before it will grant recognition, and will not agree to a secret ballot to determine support for the union. NISMAWU claims that it has the support of 65% of the workers at the plant. Management said that it was only prepared to negotiate when the workers had returned to work.

SA Tioxide (Umbogintwini): All 400 workers went on strike in late June (possibly 25 June) demanding that the company's personnel officer be dismissed. The Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU - FOSATU affiliated) was involved in negotiations. The workers went back on 30 June. It was not clear what agreement was reached (NM, 30.06.81; 01.07.81).

SASKO Bakery (Eshowe): The firm has recognised the shop stewards committee of the National Federation of Workers at the bakery (Sunday Tribune, 21.06.81).

Umhlatuzi Valley Sugar Company (Natal): More than 300 workers went on strike on 29 June in support of a demand for a 'workers' liaison committee' (Cape Times, 01.07.81). Management agreed to the demand and the workers returned to work the next day.

Fine Foods (Pty) Ltd (Durban): Three years of attempted negotiations for higher wages finally culminated on 26 May in a 'peaceful sit-in' by 62 workers (according to the workers), or 'strike' (according to the manager) for higher wages. Current wages were R16 per week.

They refused to return to work until the manager had negotiated with their union, affiliated to the National Federation of Workers. Management then fired them all.

On 3 June it was reported (Natal Mercury) that management had agreed to take the workers back, and to negotiate with the workers' committee. This committee negotiated a 20% rise.

Freight Services Warehouse (Durban): Strike action took place on 1 May over a wage dispute. In March workers had requested an immediate increase in wages. Increases were only given in April, and were not large enough to satisfy many of the workers.

Eight african workers and six indian workers accepted the increases.

The striking workers were to be paid off if they did not return to work by May 2.

Tongaat Mill (Tongaat): 17 workers were involved in a dispute with management over their transfer from one section of the factory to another. 800 workers then downed tools for four days in support (early April).

Ezekhani Transport (Ladysmith): See WIP 17: 40 for previous coverage of the detention of the BAWU (Black Allied Workers Union) members by security police.

BAWU claims that five of its members were assaulted while in detention, and that their statements that the union had instigated the strike at this transport firm were made under duress.

Police Minister le Grange denied these claims.

Ilco Homes (Durban): Early in April 1 800 workers (indian, african and coloured) went on strike for higher wages; for wages to be paid fortnightly instead of monthly; and for wages to be paid regularly.

Thirty workers resigned in protest against the low wages. Our next report refers to the 9th July when 2 000 workers were sacked for striking a second time. 'I have no idea why they decided to strike, and am not interested in finding out', said managing director, AC Demmers. These dismissals included skilled workers. The strike had been staged to protest against the dismissal of 40 workers, claimed by management to be 'unproductive'. They also wanted the yards' construction manager to be dismissed.

Management had stated that it would be prepared to deal with the SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) in future, but would not do so over issues related to the July strike.

They re-employed about 1 800 of the workers but did not take on 200 'trouble-makers'.

Ilco homes is contracted to the Durban City Council to build 8 000 housing units at a total cost of R60-m (Natal Mercury, 03.07.81).

Union Co-operative Bark and Sugar Company (Dalton): 414 workers were sacked over a pay dispute on March 31. Workers protested management's withdrawal of their standard food rations without compensation, by refusing to collect their pay packets. The workers were then sacked and charged with trespassing on company premises.

On 9 May the Supreme Court heard affidavits requesting the reinstatement of 186 of the 414 workers (see WIP 18), brought by the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union. If the court decided in favour of the reinstatement a precedent would be created for the rights of migrant workers in urban areas, according to labour lawyers (Star, 27.05.81). The court case is to be held over until August.

350 of the workers carried out a peaceful march of 14km to protest against their firing. A traffic policemen commented favourably on their 'unity' and 'calmness'. The marchers received support in the form of clenched fist salutes from the occupants of passing cars as they marched.

Isipingo Textile Company (Natal): On Wednesday, 20 May, night shift workers at ITC refused to work (management says because of a misunderstanding over a 'previously negotiated amendment' to the 'grading' system). The matter was resolved.

However, workers then expressed dissatisfaction over wages, demanding R2,50 increases. Management's story is that the workers refused to use 'normal grievance procedure' and also refused to elect a new committee. SAAWU's Sam Kikina says that management refused to deal with a committee elected under the auspices of the union (Star, 26.05.81).

On Thursday, 21 May, all 220 workers downed tools. They refused negotiation (said ITC's director, Gunther Beier) and were dismissed on the same day. No workers arrived to collect pay packets on Friday.

SAAWU was reported to be considering 'legal action' (RDM, 28.05.81).

No further reports available.

WESTERN CAPE

Pepsi Cola (Epping): The Cape Herald reported a strike by 70 delivery workers that had taken place on 3 June. The report said that 90% of the workers were back at work the next day (C Herald, 06.06.81).

H Blackman concrete factory (Wetton, Cape): 65 workers, members of the General Workers Union (GWU), walked out in protest on 8 July against the sacking of a fellow worker for making an

error in the cement-production process.

Production at the factory was stopped. On 9 July it was reported (Cape Times) that GWU officials had tried unsuccessfully to see the manager, and that the workers' committee was to try to negotiate with management. On 10 July management agreed to reinstate the dismissed worker. A spokesperson for the GWU hailed the reinstatement as a tremendous victory.

Rutherford Joinery (Parow): Workers at the factory walked out on 15 July over management's failure to give them mid-year increases. They returned to work at midday with the dispute still unresolved. Management was to hold a meeting with the workers' committee that day.

Gourmet Fish Products (Stompneus Bay): Workers stopped work on 13 July in protest against the management's minimum wage offer of R31,28 per week. They were followed the next day by the workers at the firm's factory at St Helena Bay. They were asking that their wages be brought into line with those introduced at the Sea Harvest factory in Saldanha over a dispute two weeks previously, according to the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU).

The manager told reporters that he was prepared to discuss the issue with workers, but that he didn't hold much hope of increases. The FCWU said that the workers believed that there would not be any scabbing (management had suggested that there were many unemployed in the area that they could employ (Argus)).

Workers and management were still deadlocked on 23 July. The workers were to be dismissed if they did not return to work the next day.

Sea Harvest (Saldanha): A dispute over wages occurred early in July, with the FCWU negotiating for the workers and demanding a minimum wage of R40,00 a week, and management trying to bypass the union in making the announcement (about new wage rates) while the union was trying to negotiate an agreement on wages' (Star, 03.07.81).



Action then centred on about 900 workers. The managing director of Sea Harvest, HE Kramer, claimed that the workers 'walked out'. The general secretary of the FCWU, on the other hand, claimed that the workers had been locked out. Both denied that workers had struck.

The workers reported being prepared to negotiate with management through the FCWU, but management remained non-committal weekend when they agreed to meet.

By the Monday, workers were reinstated in their old positions, and with a R40 a week minimum wage. Whether or not the workers have benefitted is unclear, because the Cape Herald (11.07.81) reports that management accepted this wage adjustment on condition that allowances and bonuses would immediately fall away.

Leyland (Cape Town): For previous coverage, see WIP 18:49.

Towards the end of May Leyland said that they had already re-employed 1 491 workers to replace the 2 000 strikers fired the week before. 'At least 40%' were said to be new workers. However, management still appealed to senior workers to return (RDM, 27.05.81).

Early in June several Cape Town based unions expressed their support for the strikers. These were the FCWU, Cape Town Municipal Workers' Union, National Union of Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers, the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa, and the GWU. The National Union of Motor Assemblies and Rubber Workers' of South Africa's (NUMARWOSA) Joe Foster said that only 500 workers had returned to the Blackheath plant.

Counter claims as to how many workers have returned continue. A NUMARWOSA meeting at Bellville on 9 June was said to have been attended by 900 strikers. Leyland management said that this was impossible as the firm was now employing 2 070 workers, 1 500 of them ex-strikers.

While workers were striking for 25c an hour more, it was reported that the ex-South African head of Leyland, Sir Michael Edwardes, had been given a R42 000 a year pay rise, putting his annual earnings from Leyland at close to R160 000! (Star, 09.06.81).
May a Range Rover run him over.

Shop stewards at Leyland in Britain decided to 'black' vital parts and kits destined for South Africa. This was after they had been addressed by officials from the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The Labour Party in Britain also joined the protest at the treatment of the South African workers.

During June the strikers started support-raising activity in the local communities. University of Cape Town's SHAWCO (Student Health and Welfare Centres Organisation) said that they had set funds aside for strikers and their families. By the end of the month support had been pledged by 60 organisations



in the Western Cape.

Early in July a mass meeting attended by 2 000 in support of the strikers, called on the British Ambassador in South Africa to intervene. He refused.

On 8 July, judgement was reserved in the Cape Town Supreme Court on an application declaring the dismissal on 20 May of 9 Leyland workers to be a breach of contract - the contract being the dismissal procedure agreed on between management and NUMARWOSA during 1980.

From Britain it was reported that the Transport and General Workers Union and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers had pressured British Leyland into telling Leyland SA to talk with the strikers (RDM, 11.07.81 and 16.07.81). This was denied by Leyland, but confirmed by NUMARWOSA. The union did have a meeting with management for the first time during this week. Workers rejected proposals that arose out of these meetings.

The RDM, 23.07.81, reported that the strike was over 10 weeks after it had started. Joe Foster said that the terms of agreement were slightly different from those rejected by workers the week before.

Before the end of July, 170 workers would be taken back at the two plants; an additional 200 would be taken back from 3 August, 'when new vacancies will occur'.

EASTERN CAPE

Repco Motor Components factory (Port Elizabeth): 160 workers went on strike on 24 June in protest against the dismissal of 3 workers. The workers demanded the unconditional reinstatement of the dismissed workers and the recognition of their union, the Motor Assemblies and Components Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA). According to MACWUSA the 3 men were read a statement by management which insisted on the company's right to 'discipline' workers and which said that MACWUSA would not be recognised unless it became a member of the Industrial Council.

The workers held a meeting in Kwazakhele on 25 June and elected representatives to meet with management. A management representative said that he was prepared to talk to the union, but not in the presence of Sipho Pityana (a

MACWUSA executive member). Pityana was detained the following day (26 June). On 10 July it was reported that he was being held under section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

Management subsequently said that it was prepared to recognise the union if MACWUSA could show them that half the workers were paid up union members. The workers decided over the weekend of 4-5 July to continue their strike until management had agreed to reinstate them all (it seems that by this stage the striking workers had been fired).

On 7 July it was reported that management was prepared to take back 50 workers over a period of 2 days, and the others later.

MACWUSA had organised a community support meeting for 11 July.

SA Cape Fellmongers (Port Elizabeth): After several work stoppages over a period of a few weeks, 5 workers were dismissed for 'refusing to take instructions from a supervisor'. The entire african workforce (150) then staged a walk-out as an expression of solidarity (9 July). They were immediately dismissed by management and told to collect severance pay.

An attempt to get reinstatement of all workers (including the 5) was unsuccessful, and workers were required to apply for re-employment singly, in order that they might be screened. The workers are members of the GWU.

Federated Timbers (Port Elizabeth): Between 160 (Star, 18.06.81) and 500 (Star, 17.06.81) workers went on strike on 16 June in sympathy with the 1976 riot victims and for higher minimum wages. All were members of the General Workers Union. A management spokesperson said that all of them had lost their jobs by striking.

North Manufacturing Company (East London): A series of events have culminated in the SAAWU considering legal action against the company.

Management had asked for 3 months grace before recognising SAAWU, during which time its works committee was to remain in office. In this period they dismissed a worker. A meeting of the works committee to protest against this move resulted in 2 more workers being sacked, for allegedly instigating strike action. The entire workforce of 70 then walked off the job in protest against this firing (21 May). SAAWU is considering legal action because of the victimisation which sparked off the strike.

Cherry Tree Bakery (Port Elizabeth): A report appeared in the Evening Post (22.06.81) that workers had walked out. No information was given on the number of workers involved or their demands.

Huis Louis Mayburg (Old-age home in Port Elizabeth): 16 women workers were sacked from the home (Evening Post, 11.06.81), because of their becoming members of a FOSATU union 3 months before. Management claimed they were sacked because of a month-long go slow, but the workers denied that they had organised a go slow.

The workers said they were sacked after attending a FOSATU meeting at which they had elected their own committee of 6 workers. 5 were allegedly removed from the home by the police and dropped off at midnight far from their homes.

The management has refused to meet a FOSATU representative. According to the Department of Manpower Utilisation, the workers were not covered by the Wage Act.

BKF Bearings (Uitenhage): The company has undertaken, after negotiations with NUMARWOSA, to abandon Industrial Council wage scales and pay male workers a minimum of R2,00 an hour and female workers R1,80 an hour, in return for an undertaking by NUMARWOSA to make sure that there are no wild-cat strikes. NUMARWOSA says it will make renewed demands for equal wages for women (Evening Post, 03.07.81).

Borg-Warner (Uitenhage): After negotiations with NUMARWOSA the company has agreed to minimum wage rates of R2,00 an hour from April 1982. Management was forced to negotiate with the workers committee after workers had boycotted overtime last year.

Valley Textiles (Middelburg): It was reported in the Evening Post (03.07.81 and 05.07.81) that workers went on strike over a wage dispute but returned on 5 July.

No further information is available.

Wilson-Rowntree (East London): For previous references to this strike and SAAWU, see WIP 17:6-11 and 44 and WIP 18:46. Support for the boycott continues to mount. Boycott committees have been set up in East London, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town.

20 organisations in Johannesburg and 17 organisations in Cape Town have pledged their support for the boycott, and pressure is being put on the parent company, Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd in the United Kingdom, to intervene here. However, the chairman of

Rowntree Mackintosh (UK), Kenneth Dixon, said that negotiations had broken down with SAAWU when SAAWU had refused to negotiate with the Sweet Workers Union. He said that the company would continue to support non-racial trade union representation (SAAWU claims majority support at the factory).

In the meantime, both the president of SAAWU, Thozamile Gqwetha, and the vice-president, Sisa Njikelana, have been detained.

Dorbyl Motor Component factory (Uitenhage):

On 17 June 1 000 workers at 2 Dorbyl plants went on strike over demands for a R2,00 an hour minimum wage. The workers are members of FOSATU-affiliated NUMARWOSA.

Management insisted on sticking to the wage rates in the IC agreement. The strikers were all dismissed, and management tried to recruit scab labour, but there were reports that production at one of the plants had stopped completely (Evening Post, 22.06.81).

On 18 June the workers decided to continue their strike until their union resumed wage negotiations with management on 2 July. On that day NUMARWOSA members met with Ford to discuss the possibility that Dorbyl products would be blacked when and if the Dorbyl plant started operating. They were to meet with Volkswagen the following week.

On 3 July 5 NUMARWOSA members were detained under the Criminal Procedure Act - the chairman of the Dorbyl workers committee, L Benbile and 4 union shop stewards (C Ngwala, R Baartman, L Windvogel and Ms M McCarthy). 3 days later 4 workers were 'detained for questioning'.

On 6 July, 9 people appeared in the magistrates' court in Uitenhage. Benbile, Ngwala, Baartman, McCarthy and Windvogel were charged with taking part in an illegal strike; and 2 of them were charged with intimidation. 4 others - Bob, Ntjanyana, Sinaris (?) and a person whose name is not known - were charged with intimidation under the Riotous Assemblies Act. They were remanded in custody until 9 July, when they were granted bail.

It has been reported that the factory committees of NUMARWOSA have organised community support for the workers.

Firestone and related strikes (Port Elizabeth):

See WIP 16:46-7; WIP 17:44-5; and WIP 18:49-50 for background material.

Firestone SA 'is to spend R22,5-million in the first phase of a R55-million expansion programme to meet tyre demands for the 1980s' (Star, 08.07.81). This would create jobs for 500 semi-skilled workers (R110 000 per job!).



Ford had suspended 1 500 employees by 22 May, and closed down their Cortina plant. At Firestone there was a 'partial' stay away from work (fewer than 1 000 workers). Workers at General Motors were also still out in sympathy with the dismissed Firestone workers.

Dumile Makanda, MACWUSA official, said that Firestone had used the dismissal of 150 workers to 'weed out' older and sick workers. This was confirmed by some of those dismissed (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81).

Towards the end of May talks between Firestone management and MACWUSA were still going on. Rapport, Afrikaans-language Sunday paper, followed the Transvaler-line referred to in WIP 18, and hinted that the strikes were 'politically' motivated and somehow linked to 'republic' day protests.

Wednesday, 27 May, saw a mass meeting of the 3 500 General Motors, Ford and Firestone workers who had been fired or suspended. They stated their intention to continue with their action until Firestone capitulated (ADM, 28.05.81). Government Zini, organising secretary of MACWUSA, announced that he would be having another meeting with Firestone management. The strike had now been going for about 9 days.

Firestone managing director, Peter Morum, showed great concern for workers, no doubt prompted by loss of production, when he said that he was 'greatly disturbed that there are people sitting and not earning any money' (ADM, 29.05.81). The MACWUSA suggested that the 3 strike-hit firms each employ some of the 150 dismissed Firestone workers.

By early June it was reported that the number of workers on strike had grown, to 'well over 3 000'. Ford motor company topped car sales for May, 'in spite of labour trouble.. at the company's Port Elizabeth plant. But the problems only stopped the Cortina assembly line, which lost 17 days output' (ADM, 12.06.81). Ford's Cortina plant production 'would be progressively restored', said the company's industrial relations director, Fred Ferreira. He stressed that no replacements would be taken on for the 1 000 strikers (Star, 03.06.81). General Motors was said to have reopened 'after a week-long closure for an inventory check' (ADM, 03.06.81).

At a report back meeting on negotiations, held at New Brighton on Wednesday, 3 June, Firestone workers accepted an offer of immediate



reinstatement of 21 of their number, while the rest of the 150 would be taken back at the rate of between 7 and 15 per month, depending on vacancies. Jubilant workers halted traffic after this announcement that was accepted as a victory for MACWUSA. Workers agreed to go back on Monday, 8 June.

A statement by Firestone's Peter Morum put the agreement in a less favourable light for the workers. He said that the 21 would be reinstated (all workers over 50 years of age), while the rest would be taken on 'as vacancies arose', while those with 'poor records' would not be employed.

The day after the Ford workers returned, 500 of them went on strike at the engine plant over the dismissal of 2 fellow workers (Star, 09.06.81; RDM, 10.06.81). The situation was further confused when Ford said that not all returning strikers could be taken on at the same time - this depended on where backlogs had developed in the production line.

On Tuesday night the new strikers decided to return to work (following union-management discussion). A few more details of their grievances and intense mistrust of management moves, came to light. The RDM reported that the dispute centred

on workers suspicions after a management instruction involving the training of coloured workers. Workers said they suspected management planned to phase them out after the coloureds were trained (10.06.81).

A worker who was allegedly dismissed said that he had refused to train a new coloured employee and was then told to leave the plant.

Ford was reported to be 'manning up' for the introduction of a night shift, but denied that this was to replace staff.

Workers who returned to work on Wednesday, 10 June, were turned away as the union had not given a days notice that the strike was over (as required by management). 2 white-collar Ford workers, including Government Zini, were demoted. Said Ford's Ferreira:

While we subscribe to freedom of association, we cannot condone situations where salaried officials who have authority over hourly employees, at the same time take a leadership role in the union in which these hourly employees are members. Clearly, such situations constitute a conflict of interest (RDM, 11.06.81).

Clearly management was coming back to reassert authority in the place of employment by hiring, firing and demoting.

On 11 June the new group of 500 strikers returned to work.

Government Zini announced that MACWUSA would not allow Ford to succeed in their strategy of racially-dividing workers and would go on an active campaign of recruiting coloured workers for the union (Star, 18.06.81).

Parthenon Paint (Port Elizabeth): A 'brief' work stoppage at this plant was reported on in the Star (11.06.81). This was said to have been over the dismissal of 2 MACWUSA executive members.

TRANSVAAL

Batswana-Gare Transport (BophuthaTswana): A meeting held on June 24 to discuss working conditions ended in an alleged assault on the company's transport superintendent by 4 bus drivers. They are being charged with attempted murder.

They pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the case has been postponed to 2 October.

Industrial Electrical Company (Soweto): About 60 unregistered black trench diggers were laid off on 11 June because they had got too far ahead of the machine laying cables.

On 19 June a further 200 diggers were told they were to receive pay cuts. All went on strike in protest.

More information needed.

Raleigh Cycles (Springs): See WIP 10:32 and WIP 18:44 for previous coverage. A report in the Star (17.07.81) mentions greater recognition being accorded the Engineering and Allied Workers Union by management.

Bisonbord (Boksburg): The entire workforce downed tools on 15 July over wage demands. Management warned that unless they were back at work by 17 July they would face dismissal.

Talks were conducted through an elected in-plant committee. Management had agreed 'in principle' to recognise the Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union, but the relationship had not yet been formalised.

The reemployment of some 270 workers was then negotiated by union officials (21 July), provided they accepted a R3,22 a week increase negotiated by the FOSATU-affiliated union. General Manager Ron Lucke, said that recognition talks would continue, provided the union accepted 'some basic rules such as our right to manage' (RDM, 21.07.81).

Anglo-American Corporation (Johannesburg): see WIP 18:42 for previous coverage. The dispute over the new pension scheme was still simmering in early July. A meeting held between management and representatives of the AAC head office african staff on 1 July ended in deadlock.

Latest reporting has it that Harry Oppenheimer is being called in to resolve the dispute - this move called for by management in the one version (RDM, 02.07.81), and by the workers in the other (Star, 06.07.81).

Whether he has been successful is not known.

Work In Progress regrets any inconvenience caused to its readers by the reference to this protest as a 'strike', in the last sentence of the previous report on this dispute.

Hendler and Hendler (Boksburg): A management announcement on 13 July that there would be no pay increases sparked off a strike by more than 2 000 workers.

This was the third strike in a fortnight on the East Rand.

The Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) had recently attained overwhelming support from workers, and so stepped in to represent workers.

After an emotion-charged meeting on 17 July, the workers agreed to return to work on the 20th, pending negotiations between their union and management.

They refused to work any overtime until management had granted an additional increase.

Buffalo Salt and Packing (Johannesburg): Several hundred workers downed tools on 15 July and called for higher wages. Police were called to the scene. A meeting with management the next day resulted in management agreeing to the workers' demands.

National Co-operative Dairies (Boksburg): About 600 workers went on strike at the weekend of 8 June, in support of a colleague who had been fired initially, then re-employed but fined R100, for allegedly assaulting a woman during his deliveries.

The worker concerned rejected these allegations, and the work-force went on strike in his support. By Monday, 8 June, however, all were back at work. RDM (09.06.81) reports a spokesperson for the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union as having said, 'we are satisfied that the worker was fairly dismissed'.

Sasol site (Secunda): See WIP 18:48 for previous coverage. RDM (28.05.81) reiterated dissatisfaction amongst skilled Irish workers,



recruited from Dublin by an Irish firm of engineering contractors, MF Kent and Co.

The workers claimed that they had been misled into signing contracts to work in South Africa. A spokesperson for the company denied this.

Auto Industrial Ltd (Johannesburg): 23 workers, all members of the MAWU, succeeded in obtaining an interdict from a Rand Supreme Court Judge on 3 June, preventing any employer from dismissing any workers because they were members of a trade union or because of the union's activities.

The application had been made as a result of the attitude of the firm against the union, according to one of the union organisers.

Bester Homes (Sasol 2): A large number of workers (between 500 and 2 000, according to different reports) went on strike on 1 July over a pay dispute.

Police were called in ('simply on stand-by' (ADM, 02.07.81)), workers were fired and loaded into company trucks to be returned to the bantustans.

The Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union was considering taking legal action against the company.

Toyota Marketing (Johannesburg): See WIP 16:39 for previous coverage. Latest news is that 4 workers from the January work stoppage are being charged under section 10 (a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act, for allegedly compelling workers not to work.

This is the first time that a charge under this section of the Act has been laid against strikers in decades. It carries a maximum 5 year sentence (ADM, 23.06.81).

PUTCO bus company (Johannesburg): See WIP 16:45 for previous coverage (also WIP 13:34-35; WIP 14:53-54). At the time of writing, the Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU) is still awaiting formal recognition from the company. By 24 June the recognition agreement had been drawn up but not yet signed.



Also on 24 June workers decided to petition management to reinstate 15 drivers who were allegedly unfairly dismissed after the December strike.

Telephone Manufacturers of SA (Springs): Workers downed tools in protest against the high volume of work demanded of them by management. They also resented the behaviour of a black instructor who had allegedly been reporting on them to management (early July).

Gundle Plastics (Johannesburg): 200 workers went on strike in protest against the dismissal of a colleague (week of 22 June). A settlement was reached when management agreed to re-employ the man if he apologised 'for the behaviour which had led to his dismissal'.

In a separate development, the MAWU expressed interest in approaching the company for recognition. 'Informed sources' say the prospects of recognition are high (ADM, 27.06.81).

African Malleable Foundries (Benoni): About 2 000 workers downed tools on 3 July in protest against too low an annual wage increase. Although most are members of the MAWU, management refused to negotiate with union representatives, saying they would only talk to the Industrial Council. Later they agreed to negotiate with shop stewards.

By 7 July the majority of workers had returned to work.

An engineering firm (Silverton): Several labourers downed tools on 9 June. The factory manager intervened and was allegedly attacked when he tried to get the labourers to work. 2 shots were fired in the ensuing struggle, and two workers were injured.

A police spokesperson said a charge of attempted murder was being investigated (ADM, 10.06.81).

Ullman Brothers Transport (Industria, Johannesburg): Worker dissatisfaction with wage rates and existing differences in rates paid at various levels, led to about 300 workers walking off the job on 26 May. Armed riot police and Industrial Council officials were called in.

The workers were told to start work by noon or to go home. Most 'chose' to go home.

But by 27 May about 200 workers had returned and been re-employed. They had agreed to elect a new workers committee and to then meet with management the following week to discuss grievances.

Clifford Harris (Vereeniging): A brief strike over weekend leave occurred on 23 July. Many of the workers are members of a newly-formed trade union. Negotiations between management and the workers settled the dispute, and the workers returned to their posts after only 3 hours.

Salcast (East Rand): About 2 000 workers stopped work on 6 July in protest against their new wage increases. Some workers were to receive a 26c an hour increase, while most were to receive only 14c. The workers were calling for an equal wage increase for all of 26c per hour.

They agreed to return to work some hours after the company had agreed to discuss their demands with shop stewards and officials of MAWU, but the atmosphere remained very tense and a lot depended on the talks.

By 14 July the dispute was still unresolved despite negotiations between MAWU and management.

Langeberg Co-operative (Boksburg): On Friday, 17 July, 800 day shift workers went on strike, to be joined by the remaining 400 workers later.

Talks between the AFCWU and management over an interim increase to compensate for cost of living increases had broken down. An agreement between the FCWU and management in the industry had been extended to african workers and this meant that their next increase would have come in October (minimum to be increased from R32 to R35,80 per week).

On Monday, 20 July, workers returned to work after management had agreed to negotiate with the AFCWU. These negotiations brought workers a R5 a week increase for the least skilled. The minimum at Langeberg now stands at R37,90 per week. In higher categories, wages were increased by R4 per week (Star, 22.07.81).

EMI (Steeledale, near Alberton): 60 warehouse workers were reported to have been fired on Friday, 17 July, after a 4 day strike (Star, 20.07.81).

No further information available.

Stag Packings (Belcourt, Springs): This firm was reported to have locked out its entire labour force of 90 'in the presence of security police', on Wednesday, 1 July. The FOSATU-affiliated National Union of Textile Workers applied for an urgent interdict on the grounds

that the workers were being victimised for their union membership (90% were said to be NUTW members, and the union was apparently on the point of gaining recognition).

At one of the recognition meetings agreement had also been reached on 12 workers whose retrenchment had led to a 1 day strike (2 June).

On the Monday before the lockout the managing director (just returned from overseas) ordered compulsory overtime, going against a previous agreement (RDM, 02.07.81).

The application, to the Rand Supreme Court, failed on 6 July, dismissed with costs by Justice Nestadt. Managing director, DG Grobler, had said that the workers had been dismissed because of a drop in production. He said that the 'security police' present had been 'two black security guards with dogs'.

Over the weekend of 11 July a community meeting called by the NUTW was held in KwaThema township. About 500 people were addressed by representatives of AZAPO, COSAS, Committee of Ten and unionists (RDM, 14.07.81), and an appeal was made that no residents accept jobs at Stag. FOSATU said that financial assistance would be provided for the dismissed workers, and also declared its support for the SAAWU-initiated Wilson-Rowntree boycott.

On 22 July it was reported (Star) that the NUTW intended appealing against the Rand Supreme Court decision. This was duly lodged on July 24.

Siemens (Pretoria): See WIP 14:49, WIP 16:43 and WIP 17:45-6 for background information. 3 Siemens workers had been detained in February 1981 by the security police. One of the workers was released later in the month.

On their release from detention 154 days later Peter Fakude and Matthews Masemola discovered that Siemens had fired them one day after their detention. A personnel officer of Siemens said that they were fired because they had been absent for more than a month! Executive director J Troskie said that the security police had informed him that the workers would not be released immediately (they were allegedly held for having banned literature) - 'we found it difficult to keep the jobs open because the company is after production' (Star, 09.07.81).

A week later Troskie said that these men would never get their jobs back as they had been replaced. Siemens in Germany denies bad treatment of its workers in South Africa, giving the rubbish reply that foreign investment 'will lead most quickly and painlessly to peaceful change' (Star, 22.06.81).



Sigma (Pretoria): See WIP 18:50-1 for background to labour action at this firm. Calvin Masala, 36, has been charged with 'refusing to assist the police and malicious damage to property' (RDM, 24.06.81). This arises out of an event on the strike day when worker Paul Mahlangu was shot dead by a woman motorist. Police, immediately after the shooting, ordered that no photographs were to be taken. A man who had continued taking photographs drove off. Police then ordered Masala to give chase. He refused and removed his ignition keys. When arrested he smashed a window in a police van -

Constable Bezuidenhout denied tear gas had been fired into the van which had forced Mr Masala to get fresh air (RDM, 24.06.81).

The hearing was postponed to 30 June. No further reports.

On 30 June the RDM did report that an inquest into the death of Paul Mahlangu would be held 'after the release of an autopsy report'. No further reports.

The 18 dismissed committee members at Sigma were said to be petitioning labour Minister SP Botha on the grounds of unfair dismissal (Sowetan, 19.06.81). No further reports.

On 15 July it was reported that Sigma and NUMARWOSA had reached an agreement. Points included the re-hiring of 400 workers still dismissed, as vacancies arose; elected union shop stewards in the plant, with time off and an office for union duties; rejection of intimidation 'regarding union membership or plant elections'; agreement on grievance and disciplinary procedure (Star, 15.07.81).

Philip Botha, Sigma public relations officer, said that the company knew that the rival MACWUSA claimed (400) members at the plant, but that Sigma would recognise only one union - the one with most members.

NUMARWOSA was to hold a meeting of dismissed workers at the Mamelodi community centre of 16 July. No further reports.

Colgate-Palmolive (Boksburg): For background, see WIP 18:44-5. Management responded to the boycott called by the FOSATU-affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) by putting out a pamphlet saying that it had done everything in its power to reach an agreement

and that the union had minority support in the firm (Sowetan, 05.06.81).

The union accused C-P of misinforming and intimidating workers and of discrediting the union, and stated that they had majority support ('the Government could only establish a conciliation board if it was satisfied that the union concerned was representative'; and that 'management had been against a Union proposal for a secret ballot to test the union's representativeness because management knew it would lose out' (Sowetan, 08.06.81)).

On 11 June it was reported that a strike ballot was underway. FOSATU was said to be satisfied with national progress on the boycott issue. On Sunday, 14 June, shop stewards from 15 East Rand factories pledged their support for a boycott of Colgate products. Shop steward meetings were also held in Vereeniging and Johannesburg. Several speakers were critical of the Industrial Council system (through which C-P insisted that all wage issues be channelled) (RDM, 15.06.81). Similar support came from Germiston.

On 19 June an overwhelming vote in favour of a strike was announced (Star, 19.06.81). 90% of workers voted 'yes', and 4% against. The 30-day compulsory 'cooling-off' period demanded by law was to expire the next day, when the CWIU was to discuss the mandate with workers.

On Monday, 22 June, the CWIU and C-P management issued a statement saying that the strike had been called off while the company 'agreed to recognise in principle the union's right to negotiate directly on wages and conditions at Colgate Boksburg plant' (RDM, 23.06.81).

Commented Steven Friedman in the RDM, 'It may have far-reaching implications because it will be seen as vindication of the view that employers should bargain directly with unions rather than go through industrial councils (RDM, 23.06.81). FOSATU issued a statement on the 'victory for the union and its members' and thanked unions and community groups for their support during the 14-month struggle at C-P.

On Tuesday, 14 July, all 250 workers at C-P downed tools. This followed the failure of conciliation board proceedings the week before over the recognition agreement which the CWIU believes management was using to 'rule out any further strike or boycott action, and to reintroduce, "in disguised form" a liaison committee system' (Star, 14.07.81). Management threatened to fire all workers unless they had returned to work by Friday ('They will be regarded as having terminated

liberalism and the africanists in the 1950s is in some way reminiscent of contemporary black consciousness positions: rejection of the Freedom Charter drawn up at the Congress of the People, anti-communism, attacks on the role of white communists in the Congress movement, rejection of the alliance between the SACP and the ANC. This compatibility between one trend within black consciousness, and Liberal Party policy, can be seen in the article in this WIP.

Not even the divide between violence and non-violence, legality and illegality, is sufficient to distinguish liberalism from a non-liberal position. Certain liberals in South Africa involved themselves in sabotage activities under the banner of the ARM, clearly showing that militant action can be compatible with a form of liberal ideology.

All this does not suggest that 'radical' liberalism is a viable force for progressive change. But what it does suggest is that the poverty of contemporary liberalism in South Africa does not rule out a different form of liberal ideology - more radical, more activist. Neglect of this has allowed contemporary liberalism to be rejected from a liberal viewpoint, disguised as a progressive stance.

This issue has important current relevance: a non-racial alliance calling itself 'progressive' or 'democratic' has been slowly emerging in South Africa. The alliance rejects both black consciousness, and contemporary liberal ideology. In defining its roots and its current position, the danger exists of elements of the alliance falling back into the liberalism of the 1950s and 1960s, as put forward by the radical wing of the Liberal Party, and even by the Congress of Democrats. Conditions of South African struggle have changed in the past years,

and what might have been appropriate policy for COD in the 50s, with its emphasis on national liberation, may not be adequate for the 1980s where the attempt is being made to establish working class leadership of the struggle. The tendency to romanticise, rather than to analyse, the heroic struggles of the 1950s is one indication of the trap some of the 'progressives' or 'democrats' may be falling into.

This leads us into the difficult question of form of organisation: during the 1950s, the Congress Alliance comprised racially or nationally specific organisations, joined together through both organisational structures and common campaigns. It was the Liberal Party which had the multi-racial form of organisation. Progressive organisations of the 1980s have laid stress on non-racialism. This does not, however, necessarily imply multi-racial forms of organisation for their own sake. Non-racialism in this context rather refers to a de-emphasising of race as the basis of conflict in South Africa, and the recognition of class factors as the major social forces. Non-racialism in this sense does not necessarily mean that the multi-racial form of organisation is the correct strategy: to do this would be to reproduce the liberalism of the fifties, which saw multi-racialism in organisation as a principle.

It may be that the realities of racial division in South Africa continue to demand racially-based forms of organisation in some fields: organisations like NUSAS and COSAS may well have non-racial constitutions - and this is in itself an important statement of belief and emphasis. But the realities of the situation determine that NUSAS plays its role mainly in regard to white students, and COSAS

for scholars in black communities. To pretend otherwise, to demand that because progressives have a non-racial outlook their organisational forms must necessarily be multi-racial, is to reproduce the principles of radical liberalism.

Anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa can, and have, taken on various forms within South Africa over the years. These have included multi-racial (eg the Liberal Party, NUSAS in the 1960s, SAIRR); racially exclusive (eg the PAC, SASO, BPC, AZAPO, MWASA); racially specific, but joined in alliance with other racially specific organisations on specific issues, campaigns, some planning, policy etc (eg the Congress Alliance, and various informal alliances).

The issue of non-racialism is not over the role of whites in the struggle - although this is the way some black consciousness groups have chosen to interpret it. Rather it is over the content of organisational programmes and campaigns, and the sorts of alliances entered into in struggle.

A careful reading of the history of COD and the Liberal Party, some of which is presented in this WIP, will go some way to clarifying the important lessons of the fifties that need to be learnt today.

READERS of the regular section on Labour Action in WIP will note that, from this issue, it has been typed in single spacing. While this may make it less easy to read than before, this has been done to lessen the space in WIP which this information service is taking. It is hoped to make the information in Labour Action more useful in the future by providing an index to strikes.

their employment', in the industrial relations language of the 1980s).

Workers voted to end their 2 day strike and return to work on Wednesday. Conciliation board negotiations were to be resumed the next week.

WIP would welcome contributions on the issue of plant-based or industrial negotiations. See, for example, the analytical articles by Drew Forrest (Star, 29.06.81), and by Steven Friedman (ADM, 26.06.81).

MINING

President Steyn mine (Welkom) (Anglo-American owned): 10 000 black miners 'rioted' on 13 July, damaging buildings and injuring a compound superintendent. A black mine worker was critically injured when he was shot by police. That evening, about 7 000 workers refused to go underground to start the night shift. Tear gas was used by police to disperse the rioters after 10 hours and more than R1-million worth of damage.

The workers were protesting against the introduction of a new death benefit scheme, in which compulsory payments replaced previously voluntary ones, and deductions were started before the scheme had even been introduced. This new scheme operated on the same basis as the white miners' pension scheme.

By 14 July all was reported to be back to normal. An AAC spokesperson said that it was significant that none of the workers had asked to be sent home. 'Usually after unrest of this sort at least some ask to be sent home' (ADM, 15.07.81).

East Rand Proprietary Mines (ERPM) (near Boksburg): 3 000 african miners refused to go underground during the night shift on 19 July, expressing dissatisfaction with recent wage increases (17% against 23% the previous year) and a new death benefit scheme (see strike above).

ERPM belongs to Rand Mines.

Unrest started the night before in the compounds and police were called in to protect 'Boksburg's prestige suburb Parkdene'. 2 km of Roodebult Road, which separates the compound from the suburbs were cordoned off (Star, 20.07.81). Shops close by had to close.

Initial reports said only Cinderella Hostel was effected, where police (?) used tear gas. On Monday hostel windows were broken and a nearby barn burnt down (ADM, 21.07.81). Earth moving equipment was damaged and a building at a shaft stoned.

Management said that by Monday afternoon

all was quite and workers had returned.

The deputy chairperson of ERPM said that 'it had been impossible to negotiate with the mob because they insisted that management speak to everyone and not to a group of representatives' (Star, 21.07.81).

40 miners decided to break their contracts and were sent home. This was after all had been warned that if they did not return they would be considered 'to have dismissed themselves'.

It was reported that 110 people had been 'detained for questioned in connection with possible charges of public violence' (Star, 21.07.81).

3 000 tons production (one third of daily output) had been lost.

An early report (Sowetan, 21.07.81) attributed the use of tear gas to the police. Later reports all said that ERPM security guards had used tear gas against the workers, and several photographs showed these guards with tear gas and dogs (see box, below, for a report on this move in direct repression of workers at the level of the production or mining plant).

Buffelsfontein gold mine (near Stilfontein): On Tuesday, 26 May, 1 600 miners stayed underground in protest against long hours of work. The miners had started their shift at 03h00 and were meant to have come off at 14h00.

That night about 50 riot police with dogs had arrived at the mine and more were said to be on their way. Management was said to be negotiating with the men underground.

At one stage miners started congregating above ground as well, but dispersed.

At 04h00 on Wednesday, 25 hours later, the men were hoisted to the surface. No agreement had been reached and, in fact, mine management said that 'their grievances were still not known'. A later report said that 'a police spokesman said that...it was believed they were protesting against delays in bringing them to the surface after their shift. This is a common grievance which has often featured in previous mine disturbances' (ADM, 28.05.81).

Hostels and other mine property was damaged when workers returned to the surface. Damage on Monday night, before the strike, at one of the hostels was also reported.

All 1 600 workers (out of a workforce of 16 000 african miners) were dismissed due to their irregular behaviour, lack of co-operation and the necessity to maintain discipline, said a statement from the owners, General Mining. They were sent home, most of them to the Transkei

New teargas law 'very dangerous'

DURBAN — Regulations governing companies allowed to possess teargas have been slightly relaxed.

In terms of a notice in the Government Gazette, signed by the Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, mining companies and any person undertaking the supply of electricity and who provides accommodation in a compound for more than 100 employees, and companies recruiting labourers and provided sleeping accommodation for more than 100 persons in a compound may possess tear-gas or any article used or intended to be used for releasing tear-gas.

The permission also includes all employees of such companies in the execution of their duties or while acting on behalf of the company.

In terms of the previous notice, issued in November 1978, only such companies with more than 300 people could possess tear-gas.

The permission, granted in terms of the Tear-Gas Act, also includes all people who possess it on behalf of a local authority, a board for municipal or town-management or a board for rural development.

A spokesman for the Department of Justice said the Act and the regulations did not stipulate that the people entitled to use it had to be trained in its use.

The State would not supply tear-gas to such companies, and if they wanted it, would have to buy it privately.

Permission to possess tear-gas is limited to the companies mentioned, and does not apparently include other large employers, such as motor companies or sugar mills.

Meanwhile opposition spokesmen have expressed dismay at the new legislation.

They warned that this move could cause racial friction and could exacerbate "explosive" situations.

The Progressive Federal Party's chief spokesman in labour and education, Dr Alex Boraine, said he was "staggered by the new provision which he found 'highly undesirable'."

He said he was particularly disturbed by the extended powers for the use of tear-gas in respect of labour.

"This is a very far-reaching extension. It is my experience that when people are given power to use material of this kind it is almost a guarantee that it will be used."

"It is clear that teargas can now be used as a normal method of control by local authorities and management in certain industries," Dr Boraine said.

"This is no way to handle already explosive situations," he said.

and Lesotho, and some to Botswana and Mozambique.

Police, dogs and security police were reported to have stood by during the strike.

REPUBLIC DAY STRIKE CALLS

Thousands of pamphlets, issued in the name of the ANC, had been distributed in the Port Elizabeth area, calling for black workers to unite in a 3 day strike to co-incide with the republic day festivities. The Eastern Cape security police alleged that the pamphlets

were responsible for the more than 3 000 workers from 4 different factories (see above) going out on strike during the week of 18 May. However, a union spokesperson denied this as 'nonsense' and said that the two events were unrelated.

Meanwhile, the general secretary of the Mine Workers Union, Arrie Paulus, was also calling on white miners to refuse to go to work on republic day, but his motives were somewhat different - 'we cannot imagine that it is good for our children's respect for our Republic if their fathers work on Republic Day as if it is just another working day', he said (Star, 29.05.81).

TRADE UNIONISTS AND UNIONS

MWASA: T Mazwai and Z Sisulu were detained in mid-June and held under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act. Several South African unions and the American Committee to Protect Journalists have condemned the detentions.

FOSATU: FOSATU offices in Benoni (their Transvaal headquarters) were gutted by fire early on 16 July. The record files of the MAWU were completely destroyed, as were the records of other affiliated unions. It seems that the fire was started in a waste-paper basket and an inflammable liquid used to lead it across to other areas. Several strikes in the East Rand area involving FOSATU affiliates have been reported on in this Work In Progress (see above).

SAAWU: Vice president Sisa Njikelana was detained by security police on April 29 and held under section 22 of the General Laws Amendment Act. After 14 days, he was transferred to preventive detention under section 10 of the Internal Security Act. This is the second time in a year that he has been detained.

Xolani Kota, local secretary, was released on 11 July after being held for 2 weeks.

Thozamile Gqweta, national president, was re-detained under section 6 of the Terrorism Act on 10 July, after being held for 2 weeks under section 22 of the General Laws Amendment Act.

Meanwhile, Lennox Sebe told the Ciskei Legislative Assembly on 15 June that SAAWU was a 'communist front'. Armed Ciskei police arrested 33 members of SAAWU on 13 June, for holding an 'illegal' open air meeting. Police chief Charles Sebe denied that the arrests were connected with union activities.

Another 24 SAAWU members were arrested in

March and are still being held in the Ciskei. All 57 mentioned above have been charged under Ciskei Proclamation R 252.

MACWUSA: Siphso Pityana is presently being held without trial. Dumile Makanda, chairperson, and 3 other members were arrested for entering the Transkei allegedly without travel documents and handed over to the SAP, and are being held in detention.

10 policemen raided the MACWUSA offices during the week of 22 June.

BMWU: Joseph Mavi has just been released from his second spell of detention in a year.

AFCWU: Branch chairperson E Gwesha was detained on 20 May under Ciskei security legislation. He was allegedly in possession of banned literature.

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