


# PROGRESS



**Cheryl Carolus**  
on chocolates, sunny  
skies & women's rights

## Sitting out the transition

Unravelling the IMF ● Tackling media monopolies  
Investigating social contracts ● Restoring the land

US: **Communism in India**



WORK IN  
**PROGRESS**

March-April 1992 No 81  
Published by the Southern  
African Research Service  
(SARS)  
P O Box 32716  
Braamfontein 2017

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# EDITORIAL

**WELCOME TO** the new design of *WIP*!

The white referendum has come and gone. But certain things remain — like the township violence, slumlord exploitation, unilateral economic restructuring, IMF machinations, Ciskei repression, gender discrimination. These, and other issues, are addressed in this issue of *WIP*.

We also look at continued domination of the mass media by a few white, middle-class males. While we welcome the Yes vote, SABC and newspaper media bias against the No vote does not necessarily mean a bias in favour of democracy. It is a bias in favour of the interests of big business, at home and abroad.

In future non-racial elections, the ANC and others who strive to represent the interests of the poor and down-trodden can expect similar treatment from the mainstream media. Unless drastic measures are taken soon to correct this imbalance, 'free and fair' elections will remain a farce.

The alternative press plays a vital role in tipping the balance (ever-so-slightly) the other way. Despite the funding squeeze, and the hostile market-place, we intend to continue playing our role in creating a culture of democracy.

To this end *WIP* is slowly changing. Last time we introduced you to our exciting new venture *Reconstruct*, which is

specifically devoted to urban development issues.

This time there is more good news. *WIP* is on the verge of merging with *New Era*, the Cape Town-based magazine that recently underwent an exciting facelift. *The merged publication will draw on the strengths of both magazines, as can be seen with this issue already.*

So — help beat the media monopolies and subscribe now!

## STAFF CHANGES

SARS' manager, Paul Maseko, has left us to join Idasa in Durban. We wish Paul every success in the heat of Natal!

SARS is pleased to welcome Michael Herman as our production editor. Michael comes from Cape Town, where he worked for Intec College.

Our editor, Devan Pillay, is now managing editor.

## CORRECTIONS

We apologise for the following missing credits in *WIP* 80:

Cover pictures & p1: Shariff

Picture p8 top: ANC DIP

Pictures p5 & p17: Third Eye Story (Muslims) p35: Africa

Information Afrique (AIA)

In *WIP* 79, page 33 (Farm schools) the reference should read: Copies of the original paper can be obtained from Adele Gordan at the National Institute of Personell Research, Braamfontein. ■

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## Incompetent Monetary Fatcats

The IMF's recent economic report on SA is shoddy and predictable, argues *PATRICK BOND* — PAGES 28-29



## Media Monopolies

Is media bias in the white referendum campaign a preview of what the liberation movement can expect in future democratic elections? — PAGES 10-13

PIC: ABDUL SHARIFF



## Inner-city blues....

Hillbrow's black residents battle with landlords and security guards at home and in hospital — PAGES 18-20



## SACP conspiracy?

*JEREMY CRONIN* reviews a controversial new book that alleges an SACP conspiracy to dominate the ANC — PAGES 35-36



## Africa's brain drain

Most African people are not welcome in their motherland. This situation prevails in Africa primarily because of the nature of underdevelopment and the restricted job and security opportunities that go with it.

This can only be minimised through development and true co-ordination of the state and the people.

Historically, people used to walk from as far as Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to the Union of South Africa in search of employment.

Today, people are still expatriated into other states by their own countries' governments, to work earning a minimum wage. The bulk of the money accrued from their labour is sent back home to contribute to the economy. Malawi is a country where workers have been contracted to work as cheap labour in South African mines.

To change this state of affairs, most African governments should create true democratic institutions where construc-

tive criticism is welcome. This will facilitate the recognition of past failures and encourage prosperity.

Harsh government policies have forced professionals to emigrate from their motherland and seek greener pastures abroad. The effect of these movements is the devastating brain-drain which has retarded progress towards the development of most African countries.

It falls to reason, then, that the conditions that have led to coups, civil wars and underground political parties, have also caused frustration among citizens, including elites such as lawyers, medical practitioners, social theorists, planners, professors and others.

If true democracy like that in developed countries were to be implemented, stability would prevail and we could forge ahead in an effort to realize a true developed African continent. This will restore humanity.

Luke Madidi  
USA

## Socialism in one country

In *WIP* 78 (p31) Ben Turok says: 'Certainly Lenin had no thought of building socialism in one country prior to the opportunity arising'.

However, he had one such thought at least when, back in 1915, before the 1917 revolution, he spoke of the victory of socialism in a single country in his article 'Slogan for a United States of Europe' (*Collected Works* 21, p342). He said: 'Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several, even in one capitalist country alone.'

He also said elsewhere that the success of revolutions in economically backward countries would be relatively easy, but it would be difficult to build socialism in such countries. But in highly developed countries the success of revolutions would be difficult to achieve, but the building of socialism after such a revolution would be easy.

However, in view of the remarkable adherence to pre-revolutionary notions in post-socialist societies in Eastern Europe, I think that it would take a long time for Americans to change their ideas.

Lenin even envisaged that the building of socialism in the Soviet Union might fail, in which case they would have to begin again. Let us hope that it will be soon.

About democracy, while the principle of accountability, transparency and participation may be admirable, Lenin, Luxemburg and Castro, among others, have maintained that the guarantee of democracy is that the people should be armed. Well, in South Africa, that is happening even though the people are having to do it themselves.

I wish that people would study Lenin more thoroughly than they do. Many of his concepts are under question in view of the Soviet Union's demise, but at least he provides a starting point for new conceptions.

David Kitson  
Harare

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## Alexandra residents flee hostel area

IN TEN days, since violence flared in Alexandra on 7 March, nine people have died, 256 have been injured and an estimated 2 000 people have fled from homes near the Madala hostel. As a result, residents called a stayaway on 26 March, and march on the hostel.

'Here we are better, more comfortable than near the hostel,' says Jacob Dibetso, one of those who fled from his home near Madala hostel and took refuge at Ikageng Primary School. Dibetso, 52, laments the effects of the violence presently tearing the township apart. His family is sharing a classroom with three other families. They are supplied with food by the Red Cross and sympathetic business people.

Three streets away at 10th Avenue, the effects of violence are more devastating. Nine families have been accommodated at the Presbyterian church. The floor is filled with furniture. Families are divided by wardrobes and kitchen suites.

Mary Selala, 32, is at the church with her husband and two children. She cannot go to work as every day she must escort her daughters to and from school, which is near the hostel. Her elder daughter, Mpho, 11, is suffering from psychological disturbances caused by the violence, say doctors at the local clinic.

Selala shares the agony with her mother, Martha Ramaisa, 51, who is also at the church. Ramaisa's house is next to the hostel. She has seen people dying at the hands of hostel inmates. She has, she says, called police many times when people were attacked. 'Police will either turn up late or not at all,' she says, adding that she had an Inkatha membership card forced on her.

By 21 March, 583 families had notified the ANC's Alexandra office that they had moved. Twelve centres in the suburbs are accommodating Alexandra students, residents and furniture.

The peace committee, of which the ANC, Azapo and the PAC are part, is also trying to get refugees and furniture to be accommodated at the police station and council office.



Houses vacated by the residents are alleged to have been taken over by Inkatha supporters

## FUNERAL SPARKS VIOLENCE

The local ANC secretary, Obed Bapela, and local Inkatha chairperson Simon Nxumalo, agree that violence flared around attempts to bury Inkatha member Thokozane Xaba. Xaba is alleged to have been killed over a girlfriend in a nearby nightclub. He was to have been buried on 7 March.

According to Nxumalo, Inkatha members were frustrated on 7 March when the undertaker brought the wrong corpse. After the right corpse had been found, the funeral procession went up 16th Avenue. According to the ANC, Inkatha members in the procession stabbed a man to death, after which someone fired on the procession. Nxumalo says an Inkatha member was shot dead first.

In any event, after the shooting the funeral was postponed to the following Saturday, 14 March. On their way back to the hostel, Inkatha members attacked residents. Those near the hostel were told they would pay for what had happened at 16th Avenue. According to the ANC, two

women were killed and houses were looted. People then started to leave the hostel area which, they say, was declared an 'Inkatha village'.

On 13 March, Alexandra was declared an unrest area. On 14 March, Nxumalo and Inkatha regional leader Humphrey Ndlovu reached an agreement with police that the Inkatha members would leave their weapons at the hostel during the funeral. But Inkatha members refused to leave their weapons behind.

Inkatha members shot at police from the hostel, and police then surrounded the hostel and refused to allow the funeral to go ahead. Nxumalo and Ndlovu later acknowledged to the media that they could not control their members, while residents claim many of the hostel dwellers were drunk.

Houses vacated by the residents are alleged to have been taken over by Inkatha supporters. Meanwhile, at the time of going to press, Xaba's body was still lying in a mortuary, after three weeks. □

— Mosito Raphela

## The Vaal killings continue

THIRTY TWO years have passed since police shot dead 69 protestors in Sharpeville, yet Vaal residents are still being mowed down — often in mysterious circumstances.

On 22 March, Saul Tsotetsi — an SACP PWV regional executive member and chairperson of the ANC's Evaton branch — died in a handgrenade explosion. While police claim Tsotetsi died by his own hand, the SACP says he was killed after being attacked by five men.

Before Tsotetsi's death, an unemployed man claimed in a statement to the Independent Board for Inquiry into Informal Repression (IBIIR) that he had been recruited to inform on the activities of ANC and SACP members. The man was specifically told to 'get close to' Tsotetsi, a former Robben Islander. He was also told of attacks planned on Vaal ANC leaders' homes.

The man was recruited by someone called 'Oupa', who lived in Sebokeng's Extension 1. Oupa said he worked for the Transvaal Provincial Administration.

In another sinister incident, a young man — Doctor Motsitsi — was found dead outside his relative's home on 10 March. Motsitsi was an eyewitness to the murder of his friend, Andries Molebatsi. Motsitsi claimed Molebatsi was shot dead by Constable Skuta Marumo on 1 March after the policeman had followed the two from a party. Marumo had then allegedly threatened Motsitsi before his death.

The SAP's public relations officer in the Vaal, Captain Piet van Deventer, said police did not dispute that Marumo had shot Molebatsi, but that the policeman had acted in self-defence after being attacked by three people. While the matter was still being investigated, there was 'little evidence to suggest the contrary', said Van Deventer.

Meanwhile, four of the seven people suspected of robbery and killing a policeman in Vanderbijlpark on 30 December, have been shot dead. One man was allegedly killed while fleeing from the scene of the incident, another died in a shootout with police in Soweto and two others died in police custody.

Tshepi Lengwati, 24, was the last of the four to die. He died on 27 January, after being shot 17 times while in police custody. Lengwati had been handcuffed at the time of his death and all 17 bullets penetrated him from the front. According to police, Lengwati was shot by an attacker while travelling in a police vehicle in Sharpeville.

A policeman investigating the case showed a Sunday paper the bullet-ridden police vehicle. On investigation, it was found that the vehicle's number plate — NHD017T — was false. Van Deventer said the use of false number plates was contrary to police policy, and the matter would be investigated. He later said that 'sometimes it is necessary, in the nature of some investigations, that the SAP makes use of other plates', but that this was 'strictly controlled'.

Shortly before his death, Lengwati had laid an assault charge against the officer investigating his case, Sergeant Pedro Peens. Peens had opposed Lengwati's bail application a week be-

fore his death, claiming that he would be safer in prison. Peens was also the last person to see Lengwati alive when he fetched him from the prison hours before he was shot dead.

Meanwhile, eyewitnesses claim that two 21-year-old men, Rangwani Lifiedi and Thabo Mosebi, were shot dead by police on 24 January. The eyewitnesses claim that the two were killed during a raid on a Sharpeville home. A handgrenade was allegedly placed in Lifiedi's hand and arms were planted in the garden.

Lifiedi's brother claimed in an affidavit that Constable Marumo had arrested him a week before the raid, and asked him where his brother Ephraim (Rangwani) was. Marumo allegedly said he would hunt Lifiedi down.

According to Van Deventer, the two had thrown a grenade at SAP members then had died instantly after the policemen had shot at them. □

— Kerry Cullinan

Sharpeville rally — 32 years after the massacre, Vaal residents are still being mowed down.



## Cops face murder raps

FOURTEEN POLICEMEN are presently facing murder charges in Natal, and the attorney general is considering charging seven others for their role in the necklacing of a Marianhill activist.

Of the 14, six riot policemen have been charged with kidnapping and murdering a man named Moboneni Jama near Elandskop. Seven others are facing 11 counts of murder arising from the deaths of activists in the Trust Feeds area outside Pietermaritzburg some years ago.

According to the Trust Feeds inves-

tigating officer, Captain Frank Dutton, there has been a police 'cover-up' of the incident. Dutton himself has been threatened for uncovering the role of the SAP in the killings.

Meanwhile one of the accused, Captain Brian Mitchell, has made some startling revelations to the court. Mitchell, who says his confession was prompted by his conversion to Christianity, claims that he told special constables to kill UDF members in Trust Feeds.

He also said that the special constables acted as a 'back up' for Inkatha warlord Jerome Gabela, who wanted to eliminate the UDF. The case is continuing in the Pietermaritzburg supreme court.

— Kerry Cullinan

## ZAMBIA

### Mixed reaction to Chiluba's first budget

ZAMBIANS HAVE responded with mixed feelings to the first budget in a multi-party state after 27 years of one-party rule.

In the new ZK90.3 billion 1992 budget, which finance minister Emmanuel Kasonde presented to parliament on 31 January, the kwacha has been devalued by about 30% and is now pegged at ZK125 to one American dollar.

Kasonde said Zambia would move towards the market exchange rate over the next year. As inflation subsided, a stock exchange would be set up and a secondary market for bonds developed and new currency units would be introduced, he added.

The budget is expected to halt decline in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the economy and achieve a moderate rate of growth in 1992. It aims to limit growth in money supply to around 25%; reduce overspending and restore medical and education services.

Many Zambians predict industrial



Frederick Chiluba greets supporters.

unrest in the country's major towns as workers try to adjust to the new economic scenario. - AIA

PIC: FOCUS ON AFRICA

## ZAMBIA

### Women claim the hour

CLAIMING WOMEN have been 'denied the hour' in the recent political changes in Zambia, women's groups are supporting women candidates to help them win seats in local government elections.

Aspiring women candidates are learning how to devise campaign strategies, handle media interviews and file nomination papers for civic elections, expected countrywide in the next few months.

The National Women's Lobby Group and the Young Women's Christian Association have prepared trainers and promised some financial support to women candidates, regardless of their party affiliation.

Zambian women represent 53% of the population and 51% of the eligible voters. But only seven women won seats in the country's 150-member parliament, and no woman was on the list of cabinet ministers later announced by President Frederick Chiluba.

Earlier in his tenure, Chiluba came under fire after telling a church congregation that 'women should submit to their husbands'. - AIA

## TANZANIA

### Women are casualties of IMF plan

THE EDUCATION cost-sharing package implemented last month as part of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) economic recovery programme is set to have a far-flung effect on the provision of education -- and women will be the major casualties.

Until recently, Tanzania was one of few countries where education provision was the responsibility of the state. But with the IMF and World Bank sponsored economic recovery programme, the cost of meeting education and other social services has been shifted to parents. And with a tradition oriented towards men, parents are more likely to fund their sons' education than their daughters.

Students and parents argue that although they were not paying directly for education, they paid indirectly through taxes. They argue that if the government feels parents should now foot education costs, taxes should be reduced. - AIA

## NAMIBIA

### Gays let old laws go unchallenged

GAY PEOPLE lost a golden opportunity to make Namibia's already progressive constitution truly revolutionary.

Members of Namibia's homosexual community blame Swapo for not ensuring that gay rights were enshrined in the constitution. But the complete absence of a debate about homosexual rights should be blamed.

Like in South Africa, gays can be prosecuted in terms of Namibia's as yet unamended Criminal Procedure Act. And recently the deputy minister of information and broadcasting, Daniel Tjongarero, asked the Namibian press to uphold standards by not printing pornography or promoting Nazism, bestiality or sodomy.

Strangely, the brand-new labour bill currently being debated in parliament stipulates that no one can be dismissed on the basis of 'sexual orientation, family responsibilities or disability'. - AIA

## MOZAMBIQUE



### Preparing for the Olympic Games

WHILE THE ODDS are against them, this has failed to dampen the spirits of the Mozambican swimmers and athletes preparing to represent their country at the Olympic Games in Barcelona this year.

Hopes rest mainly on swimmer Maria Matola, 19, who came 5th in the women's 800 metres at the World Athletic championships in Tokyo last August.

Matola is currently training in the USA, but other athletes and swimmers are not so fortunate. They are preparing under pitiful conditions. The only pool in Maputo is half an Olympic size and has little chlorine. There are only two running tracks for Maputo's estimated 1.5 million residents, and neither have a surface for runners. - AIA

# The world of Babes Mabida





# Political theatre

## ...to maintain white rule

By MOELETSI MBEKI



Now that FW de Klerk and his National Party have pulled off their well-planned and exquisitely executed high-wire stunt, those with weak stomachs can return to their normal lives, if such a thing is possible in South Africa. The fact that there was never a chance of the NP losing the referendum, and even if the impossible did happen and they tumbled, there were several invisible safety nets to break the fall.

So was the whole referendum exercise nothing but pure political theatre? The answer is yes, though not wholly.

### WHITE PATERNALISM

The referendum revealed nothing not already established by the September 1989 elections about white opinion on reform and power-sharing. That election showed that Afrikaners are more or less evenly divided between die-hard disciples of apartheid and middle class 'verligtes'. English-speakers, give or take a Derby-Lewis, are predominantly 'verligte'.

If you add Afrikaner and English 'verligtes', you get a guaranteed 'yes' vote for reform of a power-sharing variety. De Klerk knew this, which was why the referendum was largely theatre. It

was theatre designed to make the 'verligte' feel good about their 'generosity' towards their less fortunate black brethren, while losing nothing by so doing. The 'yes' vote was therefore yet another expression of white paternalism.

As in all cases of paternalism, the referendum assured the whites — most whites — that nothing will change in this country unless they agree to it changing. Put simply, the referendum reassured the whites that they are the ruling class and that De Klerk is working to keep things that way, though with some modifications.

De Klerk's 11 principles, which he drove home relentlessly throughout the referendum campaign, are about maintaining the whites as a ruling class with the addition of a significant element of the black elite. The 11 principles will, however, ensure that this addition does not affect the interests, life styles and privileges of whites.

### STALEMATE

This brings us to the nub of the South African political equation. The broad liberation movement is strong enough to stop the white regime and its allies from

doing what the liberation movement does not want it to do, but not strong enough to make the present ruling class do what the liberation movement wants it to do. The converse is equally true.

We therefore have a classical political stalemate that liberal, bourgeois democracy has evolved to resolve. What is even more important, South Africa has not only the political conditions but also the social conditions to make liberal, bourgeois democracy possible.

During his recent visit to Johannesburg, former Zambian president Dr Kenneth Kaunda pointed out that the multi-party system — both a cornerstone and building block of liberal, bourgeois democracy — failed in independent Africa. The reason is that Africa did not have a well enough established system of class division to anchor the multi-party system.

But South Africa is a peculiarity in Africa in that it does have a fairly mature social stratification or class division. There are all the social classes that constitute a capitalist society. An equally striking feature of our country is that the peasantry and upper classes associated with them are absent.

# A hollow victory

*The referendum served to reinforce a sense of group identity among whites, and did nothing to build the non-racialism needed for the future South Africa, argues RUPERT TAYLOR.*



PHOTO: ROBBIE BOYD

*De Klerk's victory does not mean that the book on apartheid is closed*

POLITICAL ANALYSTS predicted that the contest between the National Party (NP), Democratic Party (DP) and the Conservative Party (CP) would be close.

No one predicted the landslide 'yes' victory, yet the patterns in the 17 March referendum were similar to those established by the 1989 whites-only election and the 1983 tricameral referendum. The 1989 election showed a 37% difference between the same two contenders. This referendum gave a 38% difference. As with the 1983 referendum, the only area in this referendum to say 'no' was Pietersburg.

In this context then, the 'landslide victory' should have been predicted. Clearly the string of CP by-election victories since 1989 worked to mislead voting projections. The experts failed to see the by-elections as once-off events influenced by local factors and protest voting.

But although the CP was defeated, it received an almost 30% increase in votes in comparison to the September 1989 whites-only election.

In the broader sense, though, the result is a hollow victory. What the white referendum did was to provide a ready-made vehicle for the promotion of racism. As the whole issue was conducted on a 'whites-only' basis, it not only gave space to those to the right of the NP to articulate their racism, but it ensured that non-racialism would be downplayed.

The racial form of the referendum worked to reinforce group identity amongst whites. The 'no' campaign focused on the CP's vision of a white nation, while the 'yes' campaign

focused on white fears and self-interest.

Instead of trying to stress a bright, non-racial future, the 'yes' campaign emphasised the negative consequences of a 'no' majority. Particular focus was placed on the international implications of a 'no' vote.

Through a multi-million rand media blitz, promoted by Saatchi & Saatchi, the 'yes' campaign focused on stark pictures of the AWB, swastikas, empty factories, overgrown cricket pitches and deserted Formula 1 race tracks.

Where were the pictures portraying a spirit of non-racialism? Why were there no pictures of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk shaking hands? The fact that it is not only whites that watch television and read newspapers seemed totally irrelevant to the 'yes' strategy.

Thus, not just the form of the referendum, but also its content clearly revealed that the NP still sees South Africa in terms of race.

In his victory speech, De Klerk declared: 'I think there is an element of justice that we (whites) who started this long chapter in our history were called on to close the book of apartheid'.

Crucially the referendum assured many voters of their 'white' identity being protected in a new constitution, as well as enabling the far right to solidify their utopian vision of white supremacy. This is diametrically opposed to what a non-racial democratic South Africa demands. And it means that the 'book of apartheid' is far from closed. ■

— Rupert Taylor teaches politics at Wits University

## THE NEW WORLD

It is often said that South Africa is a combination of the First and Third World. On the surface, this may be how the country looks. However South Africa used to be seen as part of the New World along with North and South America, the Caribbean, Australia and New Zealand.

Vast hordes abandoned their homes in western and northern Europe and crossed the oceans in pursuit of instant wealth in the New World. Even in more recent times, large numbers of people like Ernest Oppenheimer and Cecil Rhodes were still emigrating from Europe to find their fortunes in the New World.

The reason for the mass exodus from Europe was largely due to the introduction of a capitalist system there from the 15th century onwards, which created something that had never existed before in human history: a surplus population.

However, these 'surplus' people could not simply occupy the New World since these lands were already inhabited. So the indigenous people were slaughtered.

This is what distinguished the colonial world — later renamed the Third World — from the New World. In the colonial world, the indigenous peoples and their economies were exploited, but they survived. In the New World, the indigenous populations were destroyed.

An important difference thus emerged between the colonial world and the New World. In the New World, a new economic system — capitalism — took root. In the colonial world, the economic systems of those lands were undermined by plunder and to this day are still reeling from the effects.

What has all this to do with the white referendum and Codesa? The answer is a great deal. It defines the parameters of change in South Africa.

Whatever the eventual outcome of the political negotiations, the socio-economic system of South Africa will remain capitalist. What the implications of this are going to be, especially for the liberation movement, is the million rand question of South Africa today. □

— Moeletsi Mbeki is Cosatu's head of communications

**T**HE BORDER ANC's campaign for democracy in the Ciskei, see-sawing between the confrontational and the more polite, has highlighted the differences between national and regional agendas in the organisation.

National leadership, anxious to avoid rocking the boat of negotiation politics, intervened more than once to have the campaign toned down.

But in the region, patience with the regime of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo has long been exhausted, and grassroots activists were left severely demoralised by the national office's intervention.

The campaign was to include a 'referendum' on whether there should be an interim administration in the territory and a 'symbolic' occupation of Bisho. It was to culminate in the announcement of a people's assembly by ANC president Nelson Mandela on 3 April.

But at South African-brokered talks in Pretoria, the ANC agreed to 'review' its campaign in return for the Ciskei agreeing to review aspects of its security legislation.

A day later, however, Border ANC announced the launch of the campaign, from which plans to defy repressive laws and the occupation of Bisho had been dropped. The following day, a delegation from the ANC's national office flew down to East London. After lengthy talks, another revision to the campaign was announced. It would now be part of a national campaign for an interim government.

## TENSIONS RISING

Since then, however, tensions have continued to rise. Ciskei announced it would not change the controversial Section 43 of its National Security Act, and went to court to obtain an interdict against the ANC. At a rally last weekend, there was a call for the Ciskei to be made ungovernable. Regional publicity secretary Marion Sparg also said she had been teargassed by Ciskei police on Sharpeville Day.

It seems that despite interventions by the national leadership, grassroots anger is driving the campaign into a more confrontational mode, fuelled also by Ciskei's own behaviour.

But the curtailment of the campaign demoralised branches, as they had been organised to 'get rid of Gqozo'.

'People are disappointed. They were

# Ciskei campaign: ANC national in a quandary

By *CLAIRE KEETON*

geared up to fight. The day national and regional leaders met to revise the campaign, people were picketing in Alice and Peddie,' said a senior regional activist.

Nor is Border isolated. The Eastern Cape and Transkei have promised to back Border and there is also talk of activists in other bantustans launching their own campaigns.

ANC national spokesperson Saki Macozoma denies that ANC national had clamped down on Border's programme of action.

'We may have different strategies, but the regions have a fair amount of autonomy and we believe Border has a right to protest against the Ciskei government,' he says.

But it is not the first time that differences have emerged between national ANC and Border activists. Mandela's contact with Gqozo at the height of Ciskei's state of emergency last year also caused unhappiness.

Border ANC is aware that the need to tread carefully with Ciskei in national negotiations could weaken its programme of action in the region.

'But the need for negotiators to thrash out some compromise in the negotiations should not undermine their constituencies,' says Mike Kenyon, fieldworker for the Grahamstown Rural Committee, which does extensive work in Ciskei.

## MEDIA SYMPATHY

Tension in the region has been fuelled by Ciskei's attempts to extract maximum mileage from the issue. The episode won the bantustan sympathy in the media and gave it a presence on the national stage.

Gqozo also used the issue to withdraw from the regional peace structures, claiming the ANC had acted against the

National Peace Accord. He had been facing embarrassing questions in the peace committee on his security legislation.


Ironically, Gqozo signed the National Peace Accord on the same day that the Ciskei withdrew from the regional dispute resolution committee.

'It is a public relations exercise,' said Numsa regional secretary, Enoch Godongwana. 'Gqozo likes to portray the image of a reasonable man and national leadership has reinforced this impression.'

Concern that Gqozo is using Codesa to prop up his precarious position is widespread in the region. This was exacerbated when Gqozo, backed by bantustan leaders like Gatsha Buthelezi, demanded that Codesa be suspended until the ANC stopped its campaign against him.

*Daily Dispatch* news editor Patrick Goodenough commented that the media outcry over the campaign overlooked the central issue — that Gqozo was negotiating at Codesa without a mandate. □

- *elnews*



Oupa Gqozo — at Codesa without a mandate



# SABC — still a government pawn

*BRONWYN KEENE-YOUNG monitored the SABC-TV's coverage of the white referendum, and found that the public service is still a pawn of the National Party*

**T**HE SABC defends its political integrity by maintaining that its policy of 'impartiality' is affirmed by the daily criticism it receives from all sections of the political spectrum. However, as its coverage of the white referendum campaign illustrates, the SABC continues to act as a National Party pawn.

## SCHIZOPHRENIA

SABC television's coverage of the whites-only referendum campaign was an indication of the ideological dilemmas facing TV1 as a 'white' channel. While it continued to highlight De Klerk as the initiator and navigator of the negotiations process, its formerly adverse disposition towards the ANC and the SACP necessitated a *particular* 'yes' strategy.

The SABC was disadvantaged by its own 'total onslaught' policy, successfully used by the National Party for so many years. The unbanning of leftwing organisations required a more enlightened attitude by SABC news. However, no effort was made to redress the myths perpetuated in the mind of the white viewer.

This was not an oversight on the part of the SABC. It was a clear attempt to

PIC: THIRD EYE



SABC's Johan Pretorius — the SABC insists that it is impartial.

undertake its new role within the parameters of the apartheid amnesia created by the government. The 'new' SABC discovered it was possible to provide coverage of the left wing while maintaining the view of the National Party as the foundation of the new South Africa.

The manner in which it dealt with its referendum schizophrenia is indicative of a certain ideological desperation. In the absence of an informed viewing public, the SABC had to rely on the superhero status which it has afforded De Klerk.

Much of the news time spent on the 'yes' campaign revolved around emphasising De Klerk's personal affinity with the white population. Reports of him 'receiving a hero's welcome', and of the crowds 'pushing each other to get closer to him', were thus not uncommon.

The coverage of the 'yes' campaign was always presented as a list of De Klerk's daily activities, including joking with toddlers, presenting awards and morning tea with the aged. By contrast, coverage of the 'no' campaign merely involved much shorter extracts of addresses made by the Conservative Party and its allies.

However, the SABC's referendum bias was more subtly portrayed in its treatment of issues which were not immediate to the campaign. From the time the referendum was announced, TV1 news daily listed countries that were waiting to engage in South African trade and investment in the event of a 'yes' vote. It broadcast interviews with numerous diplomats and international figures, all of whom praised De Klerk's reform initiatives and warned of the dire consequences of a 'no' vote.

The SABC also took every opportunity to present De Klerk as the exponent



PIC: ROBBIE BOUTH

The SABC has maintained the view of the NP as the foundation of the new SA.

of South Africa's return to international respectability.

A conspicuous example was his resounding 'yes' message to the South African cricket team after their victory against Australia — a lengthy filmed telephone conversation to the SA captain, conveniently recorded in both official languages so as to be appropriate for the 6pm and 8pm news broadcasts.

## TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE DOWNPLAYED

However, the SABC's coverage of township violence during this period provides the clearest illustration of its referendum dilemmas. In the past, allegations of a third force, or SADF involvement in destabilisation, has always been insufficiently covered by TV news.

Recently, daily newspapers carried reports of the Goldstone Commission and witnesses' allegations that the SADF was implicated in political destabilisation. However, the commission was only reported in TV1 news on the occasion of

the PAC's Clarence Makwetu refusing to give evidence on violent actions by Apla.

During the first weeks of the referendum campaign, the SABC played down the issue of township violence by inserting it as late as possible in the news bulletin. However, when the escalation was significantly linked to the referendum, it became increasingly difficult to ignore. TV1 news then began to couple items on township violence with acts of rightwing terrorism. Initially, this was not intended to imply rightwing involvement in the townships; rather, it seemed an attempt to condemn 'radicalism' in any form.

However, on Friday 13 March, Alexandra and Sharpeville were declared unrest areas. Most newspapers carried reports of a concerted attempt to encourage a 'no' vote through organised chaos. In the 8pm news broadcast, the SABC came the closest ever to admitting the existence of a third force, without actually stating it.


The first item on the news was the violence in Alexandra. This was directly followed by a report on the bomb explosions at National Party offices. Immediately after the report, the newsreader stated that the National Party believed that the violence over the last few days was a tactic of the Conservative Party.

**UNCERTAINTY ABOUT 'BLACK ISSUES'**

This ambiguous portrayal of township violence was part of a broader uncertainty as to the representation of 'black issues' during the referendum period. This manifested itself most blatantly in the lack of newstime given to the progress of Codesa working groups.

It was also evident in various minor omissions. One such example was a report on the dramatic response by the ANC's Steve Tshwete to the South African cricket victory over Australia. Newspapers and commercial radio widely quoted Tshwete as saying that he had never shed a tear on Robben Island, but had cried three times during the match. TV1's news report conspicuously omitted any reference to Robben Island!

A more important issue which had crucial implications for the 'yes' vote was the relationship between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Afrikaner Weer-



standsbeweging. The signing of the non-aggression pact was given limited time and attention by TV1, reported near the end of a news broadcast. SABC clearly would not allow it to be used as a CP argument for Zulu support in the referendum. However, a subsequent broadcast gave prominence to Buthelezi's emphatic denial of the pact and his support of a 'yes' vote in the referendum.

Perhaps TV1's split status as both a 'white' channel and a medium of the new South Africa is not as irreconcilable as the referendum coverage seemed to indicate. It appears to have resolved its dilemma by portraying De Klerk and his reform initiatives as the single directive within the negotiations process. In this way, it continues to keep white viewers within an acceptable frame of ignorance while appearing to enable free political expression.

After years of National Party disinformation, intervention in public ignorance will only be achieved through an

active political awareness campaign in the broadcasting news services. This, however, is not in the interests of the government, and therefore of the SABC.

The manner in which the National Party propaganda laager was used during the referendum campaign provides valuable insight into the threat which the SABC poses to future democratic elections. As long as the current structure of the SABC remains unchanged, it will continue to present De Klerk as both the saviour of white South Africa and the sole determinant of Codesa. □

— Bronwyn Keene-Young does media research at Wits University



# Press monopoly?

## What press monopoly?

*Blatant press bias during the white referendum campaign is an ominous foretaste of what the opposition movement can expect in future democratic elections — especially if 'liberal' media interests remain hostile to any moves to ensure media diversity. ERIC LOUW examines their responses*

**A**DVERTISING CONTROL of commercially oriented media in South Africa translates into an information flow in favour of minority interests in society (see also *WIP* 80).

In 1990 the Rhodes Media Workshop discussed the limitations of a 'free market' media, and proposed the creation of a media subsidy system designed to ensure that all constituencies are guaranteed access to a media of their choice.

The proposed subsidy system draws heavily upon the Dutch 'verzuiling' formula, which dispenses subsidies to pub-

lications in proportion to the proven size of constituencies. Underpinning this scheme would be a fund, created by the state, to pay for media diversity.

The ANC's Media Charter proposes entrenching freedom of speech in a new constitution and Bill of Rights. However, it notes 'a declaration of media freedoms on its own is not enough. It has to be underpinned by an equitable distribution of media resources, development programmes and a deliberate effort to engender a culture of open debate. In our society, this also implies a measure of affirmative action to redress the injustices of apartheid.'

The issue of a mixed economy media system has now been placed firmly on the agenda of the new South Africa. Responses from established media interests, however, have generally been hostile.

### 'SOCIALIST PLOT'

The commercial media commanders are clearly deeply concerned their 'free market' media will be tampered with. Proposals for a mixed economy approach are viewed as the thin edge of the wedge by which 'socialist' control will be imposed onto the media industry. Most of the discussions have remained in-house se-

crets securely lodged behind the closed doors of Mahogany Row in the key media organisations.

However, some of the commercial media's thinking and counter-strategising has emerged into the public domain.


Leading advertising executive Reg Lascaris' rather strident opposition to the proposal for a mixed economy media model for South Africa provides some insight into the paranoia felt by the free marketeers. Lascaris' argument is simple: I work in the media, I understand the media and I know there are no problems with the way a market-driven media operates.

His crude free market ideological position makes him incapable of distinguishing between a proposal for a mixed economy as opposed to an East European-type centrally controlled command economy.

For Lascaris a media subsidy system is simply another 'socialist plot'. He sees no structural flaws and distortions in the market-driven media.

### CRITICISM MISINTERPRETED

Argus Group senior manager Peter Sullivan refuses to engage with the problems of a free market press — that is, the emergence of press 'monopolies' and



'market censorship'. He is pedantic over the term 'monopoly'.

Sullivan misinterprets criticism of the way in which the commercial press has curtailed information flow. He suggests that a 'capitalist conspiracy' is implied. But those proposing a mixed economy approach have merely suggested that market forces inherently steer a market-driven media towards greater and greater concentration of ownership (monopoly?).

Further, 'editorial independence' within a market media system is prescribed because the market automatically imposes limitations upon the editors. In simple terms, no editor running a profit-driven medium can afford to alienate those with disposable income (a minority in our society). To alienate this minority would be to lose the advertising life-line. This inherently skews the worldview presented by a market-driven media.

Sullivan cites the existence of six major metropolitan dailies in Johannesburg as proof of a healthy 'competitive' press situation. But this is a competition over who gets the profits, not a competition over editorial content.

Both Argus and Times Media Limited (TML) represent the same narrow sectional interests; their news practices reduce information to profit and promote the liberal free-enterprise ideology which so neatly services the needs of mining-finance-capital. From the point of view of news content it is irrelevant who wins this battle.

If we are to reform our press (or media) system so that it caters for all the interests in our society, we need to start by abandoning Sullivan's assumption that a liberal press can speak for everyone in society. A liberal press is well placed to serve liberals. Those who are not liberals need their own press.

## LIBERAL AGENDA

Argus Group Board member Harvey Tyson's response has been more sophisticated. In an address to the Free, Fair and Open Media Conference early this year, he recognised that each interest group in society needed its own media-voice. He further recognised that certain sectors of society would be denied that voice without some form of media sub-

## 'No editor running a profit-driven medium can afford to alienate those with disposable income.'

sidy system.

Tyson proposed that the commercial media create an independent media trust which could provide seed money to help struggling media ventures off the ground. Tyson is, however, silent about how to overcome the longer-term structural problems faced by media serving an audience unattractive to advertisers.

Tyson also offered assistance to the alternative press at the Rhodes Workshop. His liberal agenda is clearly to prevent the state from making any inroads into the print media realm, because this might lead to bureaucratic interference in the print media.

In the wake of Tyson's offer, some limited assistance has been forthcoming from the Argus Group, such as in the cases of the *Weekly Mail* and *Vrye Weekblad*. However, to date, Tyson's promises have been more rhetorical than real. Is the commercial media waiting to see how serious the threat of a state-run subsidy is before actually committing itself?

At least one of the press groups is also known to have held high-level discussions on how to deal with the leftwing 'threat' to tamper with the free market media model. The Argus Group put together an in-house task group drawn from senior staffers. At least two strategies appear to have been seriously debated.

One concerned an imagined threat of 'nationalisation'. The proposal was to break up the Argus Group and sell off the constituent newspapers. However, since it has become clear that nationalisation of the press is not a serious leftwing agenda item, this scheme seems to have been dropped.

The second proposal was to make the Board of Directors more 'representative'. From 1991 onwards this board-

rigging, of course, became a favourite strategy in South Africa with both the parastatal and the private sector. Only when the Argus Group implements this strategy will it become possible to say whether the 'restructuring' represents a real exercise in change or whether it is just another exercise in tokenism.

## URGENT STEPS NEEDED

The transition to a democratic South Africa requires diversity of print media voices. Codesa will hopefully take seriously the proposal to appoint a task group to examine the issue of press diversity.

This issue is given greater urgency by the present financial plight of the country's small alternative press, given the imminent withdrawal of overseas funding for these projects.

From leftwing media practitioners and theorists we need workable proposals on the restructuring of the South African press system, a press subsidy model and debate on the advisability or otherwise of formulating anti-monopoly legislation aimed at the media sector. □

— Eric Louw is based at the Centre for Cultural & Media Studies, Natal University.

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PIC: ANNA ZIEMINSKI



# Cheryl Carolus

## Your first thought this morning?

Does my chairing of the session at the education summit clash with the input I have to give as the opening address to the health conference?

## The second thing you did this morning?

I watered the garden.

## Who cooks and cleans in your home?

Whoever comes home first cooks. That includes squatters. And with cleaning we take turns, but anyone who has time can do it.

## Your favourite meal?

Good bean curry and chocolate mousse

## Tell us your favourite Carolus joke.

I am afraid you are not going to be able to print it!

## Any addictions?

Chocolate.

## What or who would you die for?

No one or nothing! Forget it, I am into living.

## What do you no longer believe in?

That I can change everything in the world.

## What animal best characterises you and why?

I cannot think of one but it must be the animal that loves life in the sun; that loves water.

## A crocodile, perhaps?

[A roar of laughter] But definitely not PW, die Groot Krokodil.

## What is the best thing about living in Johannesburg?

Kippies and the sunsets (because of the pollution).

## Your favourite city and why?

Cape Town. It is so friendly and has mountains and sea.

## Your biggest regret?

Not having enough time to be very active in women's organisations.

## Your favourite pop artist?

Mango Groove.

## One song that gives you goose flesh?

In fact there are two. One is 'The first time ever I saw your face' by Roberta Flack, and the other is 'Summertime' by Ella Fitzgerald.

## What physical exercise do you do?

I run.

## Complete this sentence: If I were a dictator for a day ...

...I would ban meetings, nuclear bombs and speeches that take longer than five minutes. And I would ban spinach.

## Is it difficult to be a woman on the ANC NEC?

Yes, it is. Women the world over have to perform twice as well before they are taken seriously, especially in politics. Men are allowed to get away with mediocrity, but women are expected to always be exceptional.

## Your least favourite politician?

I am not sure whether it is Ronald or Nancy Reagan.

## Favourite TV show?

'Golden Girls', if ever I have time to watch it.

## What would you change about yourself?

My lack of faith in people to do anything properly or competently, and much better than I would do.

## What do you miss most about your childhood?

My father's pot of soup on a Saturday. He would start cooking very early in the morning, cook it all the day and only allow us to eat late in the afternoon. It became a social institution for family and friends.

## What makes you feel secure?

My electric blanket when I am tired on a cold, stormy winter night.

## Your biggest fear?

Whether we are going to be able to run the sewerage system and the trains on time in the new South Africa.

## Favourite cliché?

'Whether you like it or not, the reality out there is ...'. Someone was saying that to me this morning.

## Complete this sentence: I think Madonna is ...

... very dangerous because in her



songs she seems to be romanticising violence against women as something sexy and just part of sex life.

**And South African idiom or expression?**

Ag, sies man!

**What is the worst job in the world?**

Being the president of ANC or head of the Department of Economics. Imagine the expectations of the people. Imagine their disappointment when their expectations are not realised.

**A secret desire?**

To be able to surf really well.

**Your happiest moment?**

When Nelson Mandela walked free. I still get goose flesh when I think of it. We all just wept and wept.

**What do you feel about green issues?**

Very important. But I am still worried that we are not placing green issues high enough on the agenda.

**If you were not a political leader, what would you be doing?**

I would be a forester in Knysna, or the Amazon.

**What does FW get for Easter?**

A free weekend for two in Phola Park.

**And Carolus?**

A big, big dark chocolate Easter bunny.

**Who is the apple of your eye?**

Walter Sisulu [spontaneously].

**Your favourite place in Africa?**

There is a place in Lesotho called Sani Pass. It is very high with the most magnificent views.

**If hell were a place, where would it be on a South African map?**

There is a place called Hondeklipies Baai, on the north west coast of South Africa near Namaqualand. The water is terrible and there is no transport there. There is no work, only hardship.

**And if heaven were a place?**

The Wit Els River. I think you should go there as well

**How did you feel when South Africa beat Australia at cricket?**

The win was great, but what spoilt it for me was that stupid flag of white South Africa, and the wish that more black

South Africans should have been part of the team, part of the victory.

**An experience or image that for you sums up SA?**

Black women looking after white children. Blacks are hated and regarded as incompetent yet they are entrusted with the lives and minds of the future!

**Who do you reveal your secrets to?**

No one [emphatically].

**What chore do you dislike most?**

Drying the dishes.

**Should employers be allowed to have workers tested for Aids?**

No. The way to deal with Aids is not to victimise people. It is to accept that Aids is a threat to all of us.

**When was the last time you used public transport?**

Oh! Some 10 days ago.

**What makes you feel guilty?**

When I insist that I need a break and I then see the schedules of older comrades like Ray Alexander, Walter Sisulu, Madiba and others.

**And accomplished?**

When I manage to clear my desk [looking at the overflowing table].

**Complete: At the end of a hard day, I ...**

... switch on an Ella Fitzgerald tape and do my garden.

**Do you smoke?**

No, rather an ex-smoker.

**Should WIP carry cigarette or alcohol ads?**

No. I don't think we should promote substances that are harmful. Ads always romanticise smoking and drinking. They often project women as sex objects.

**What do you think of WIP?**

I think it is nice. WIP has been trying to contribute to debates as well as giving constructive criticism.

**A music instrument you'd most want to be able to play?**

Definitely a saxophone.

**The person you most want to meet?**

Domitilla, the woman of the book 'Let me speak'.

**Why?**

Her thoughts were an inspiration to many women like myself. Through her own experiences, her oppression as part of the working class and as a woman, she got involved in women's organisation. She was imprisoned, tortured, harassed, and even called a communist bitch.

**Who should answer this questionnaire next?**

Nelson Mandela. ☐

— *Mosito Raphela asked the questions.*



PIC. ANNA ZIEMINSKI



## Women want representation at Codesa

THE ANC Women's League (ANCWL) is determined that women are represented at Codesa, because it believes that its working groups have implications for women.

'Our task is to ensure that the principles of non-sexism and equality, adopted in Codesa's Declaration of Intent, are institutionalised in the transition to a democratic South Africa,' the League said in a press statement recently.

To this end, the League has made written representations to Codesa which outline in detail some of their objectives.

The point, according to the ANCWL, is to ensure that women participate in the political process and are part of drawing up a new constitution. So far, Codesa is a male-dominated body. Only three ANC women are involved in working groups, but their power is limited as they only have advisory status.

Mavivi Manzini, executive member of the ANCWL, said that the exercise of civil liberties; the Peace Accord; the role

of the police force; the role of the media and violence discussed in Codesa, all had to be looked at from a gender perspective.

'Do they facilitate or further inhibit the participation of women in the political process, or do they just preserve the status quo which already mitigates against women's participation?' she asked.

The League has rejected the 'solution' proposed by Codesa's management committee that political parties include women in their delegations.

'We feel this response denies the fact that gender oppression is actually structured in society and permeates all aspects of life. We cannot rely on political parties to deal with the situation. To solve this dilemma we need to create

special mechanisms to redress the problem.'

The ANCWL's suggests that Codesa forms a gender advisory committee. The committee would receive all documentation from the Working Groups of Codesa, review the gender implications of such documents, and return them to the working groups for amendment.

'Our conception is that this working committee would say: if you're looking at this issue — then this is what the gender implication will be,' said the ANCWL's Frene Ginwala. She stressed that the League did not see such a committee as a 'special interest group', because 'we represent the majority of South Africans'. □

PIC: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



ANCWYL: Codesa needs a gender advisory committee. Mavivi Manzini, Feroza Adams and Frene Ginwala face the press (L-R).

## International Women's Day

SOUTH AFRICAN women celebrated International Women's Day on 8 March by focusing on political, educational and social activities in the different regions and on the coalition of women to form the Women's Charter, a spokesperson for the ANCWL said.

She said the original plan was to have a cultural arts festival, but because of a lack of time the event has been postponed to 9 August, National Women's Day.

ANCWL executive committee member Thandi Modise said some regions had workshops, but often they did not go off well because of poor attendance. This was because women 'were still taking orders' from certain quarters (men) not to attend.

'Freedom of Movement' was the theme for the celebrations in Soweto,

said the League's Feroza Adams. She said it was a time to enjoy, socialise and celebrate and not be bogged down with the usual Sunday activities of cooking, cleaning and caring for children.

Adams said there was music and singing and the interaction among women was wonderful. (see also page 5) □

— all reports by Glenda Daniels



## Black Sash National Conference

AT ITS national conference in March, the Black Sash called on Codesa to set up a women's rights review committee drawn from the parties represented at Codesa.

This would examine the effects of the working groups' brief on women; direct the working groups of Codesa towards issues of particular importance for women; investigate how Codesa's decisions affect women, and make appropriate recommendations and work out mechanisms by which these would become binding on Codesa.

The Black Sash also called for a formal commission to inquire into the present law on abortion and implementation. The members of the commission should be appointed for their special knowledge of women's health; commitment to non-racialism and non-sexism and their experience in or openness to interfaith dialogue and relations. □

# Dilemmas of difference: the Women's National Coalition

By SHEILA MEINTJES

**T**HE MOST VITAL and far-reaching change in South Africa is in the political arena, specifically through Codesa. In order to intersect with this process and have an impact on the decisions made about a transition to a democratic South Africa, a national coalition of women's organisations was formed late last year.

The Women's National Coalition (WNC) was formed on 27 September 1991, after women from about 40 women's organisations met at the initiative of the ANC Women's League, to discuss women's equality and the new South African constitution.

## COMMON INTERESTS

The WNC has found common interests and concerns in a number of crucial areas, such as:

- \* gender oppression, which is conceived of as the subordination of women, affects all South African women;

- \* the fundamental changes taking place in South African society must eliminate not only racism, but also sexism.

The WNC also sees it as important to encourage women to participate fully in the negotiation process.

The ANC's Frene Ginwala, in her address to the September inauguration, said: 'Women will have to make sure that the constitution goes beyond a ritualistic commitment to equality and actually lays the basis for effective gender equality.' The coalition agrees that women themselves will have to make sure that the new constitution provides for this.

Ginwala suggested that 'we need to make sure that South Africa is explicitly characterised as non-sexist as well as non-racial'. This would give priority to non-sexism where there might be a conflict of rights. She also suggested that the state should be responsible for ensuring that women's equality is enforced.

The coalition recognises that in countries where declarations about women's equality are not accompanied by proper protective mechanisms, women's human rights become a dead letter.

It has agreed on a campaign to formulate a 'Woman's Charter' and to 'secure acceptance of such a charter as an integral part of the new South African constitution'.

A 14-person voluntary task force, the Interim National Committee, has been set up to broaden the coalition, and to make it as representative of South African women as possible.

It also has to clarify the objectives, terms of reference, process and structures of the coalition. The committee has called a national workshop of the regional representatives and national women's organisations to discuss these questions, and effectively launch the Women's Charter Campaign nationally.



Gill Noero, a member of the Democratic Party's Women's Forum and chairperson of the Women's Bureau, Southern Transvaal Region, is a driving force in the WNC. She argues that because of the voluntary nature of the Interim National Committee, the workshop will be important to establish accountability.

'Traditional discussion forums and deliberative bodies have always excluded women — this is no way forward for a new South Africa,' added Noero.

## WOMEN'S LOBBY

But the coalition is not the only alliance of organisations concerned with women's human rights. In late 1991, the Women's Legal Status Committee (WLSC) called a meeting to form a Women's Lobby to lobby leaders in the media, politics and business about women's concerns for the future South Africa.

Some argue that such an organisation should concentrate on assisting the WNC to publicise and raise awareness about the campaign for women's human rights.

But in its newsletter, the WLSC argues that one needs to distinguish between two kinds of issues — 'societal or national issues that include the constitution' and 'women's issues based on women's biological functions and society's attitudes to women'. The WLSC argues that the focus of the coalition would confine lobbying to women's issues and strongly advocates a broader view.

There does not appear to be a contradiction in the objectives of the two organisations, however. The WLSC and other organisations in the Women's Lobby have also joined the coalition.

The struggle against the male-dominated political process in South Africa needs the support of all women and women's organisations in the country if it is to achieve non-sexism, both in the constitution and in society.

As Frene Ginwala said: 'Women must start thinking about getting women into the constituent assembly or whatever final constitution-making body is agreed. If we elect a body dominated by patriarchal men, then all our efforts will be in vain.'

□  
— Sheila Meintjes teaches Politics at Wits University

# Flatland of misfortune

*Apartheid mentality still dominates in Hillbrow as a fierce war between landlords and tenants rages on. MBULELO MDLEDLE probes some of the tension points.*

**M**UCH OF HILLBROW'S flatland — which was one of the first areas to become 'grey' during the era of the notorious Group Areas Act — has now become a slum under the rule of tough landlords. This flatland, once a hive of social activity, is now a battlefield as tension mounts between landlords and tenants. Lately, the municipality and financial houses have joined the war in pursuit of monies owed to them by landlords.

Gone are the days when tenants used to succumb to the rule of landlords in the Hillbrow area. Tenants have their own civic organisation, Actstop, to protect them against exploitation and other unfair practices by landlords.

As a counter to Actstop, landlords have grouped themselves under the umbrella of the Organisation for the Protection of Property Owners of South Africa (Oppossa), a no-nonsense organisation manned by landlords in collaboration with security companies.

Grievances from tenants and landlords are similar throughout the flatland. Tenants complain of dilapidated, squalid conditions and curfews. Landlords complain that their properties are being destroyed by tenants through over-crowding, shebeens operating from the flats, drug dealing, crime, and a failure to pay rent. They also complain about the 'revolutionary spirit' of Actstop.

Some landlords, however, have a particularly hostile relationship with their tenants — as in the case of Waldorf Heights.

## WALDORF HEIGHTS

At Waldorf Heights, the bone of contention is the appalling conditions, and a father and son team allegedly hired for their strong-arm approach to 'solving' issues.

Elevators in this block have not



Tenants' belongings lie strewn in the corridor at Waldorf Heights — they were accused of not paying rent.

worked for two years. Every corridor of the 12 storey building has the stench of uncollected garbage. There are leaks, dampness and vermin. Electricity was cut off in 1990, while the gas supply was disconnected in July last year. As a result of the disrepair, tenants resolved in August last year to withhold payments to Data Investments, the company owning the block of flats.

According to Matthew Chaskalson, an attorney who has been handling the block's cases for the last two years, the conflict is the product of the Group Areas Act. As black tenants were 'illegal', they had no say and had to contend with whatever landlords were offering.

The father and son duet, Peet Van Loggerenberg Senior and Peet Van Loggerenberg Junior, have been served with interdicts from the Johannesburg Supreme Court restraining them from harassing and attacking tenants.

After a Supreme Court case brought against the Van Loggerenbergs by Eliza-

beth Xosa and Ivy Nkomo — supported by a host of affidavits by other tenants — an interdict was served on the two men restraining them from denying the applicants or their invited guests access to the block of flats.

The case arose from an incident on the evening of 2 October, 1991. Armed security guards prevented Nkomo, who earns her living as a hawker, from shifting her vegetables to her flat.

## MOTHER LOCKED OUT

Van Loggerenberg Jnr refused to let Nkomo leave the building, saying he was sick and tired of her going in and out. He also refused to let her mother into the building as he 'did not like her face'.

Nkomo's mother, who had come to Johannesburg from northern Natal, was forced to sleep in bus shelters until the court interdict preventing the Van Loggerenbergs from harassing her was served.

One of the most serious charges facing Van Loggerenberg Jnr is that of rape, which police say they are still investigating. The alleged rape victim is a tenant at Waldorf Heights.

In a affidavit to the Supreme Court, Van Loggerenberg Snr confirmed that his son had been identified by the alleged victim as the rapist, and he and his son were arrested and spent the night at Hillbrow Police Station.

## CRESTHILL

At another trouble spot, Cresthill, a 14-storey block in Pieterse Street, the situation is more complicated. Since 1991 the block has been co-owned by former military intelligence officer Nico Basson, who caused a stir last year when he revealed De Klerk's destabilisation agenda in Namibia and South Africa (see WIP 79).

Tenants have not been impressed with Basson's anti-government creden-

tials. He has been accused of evicting tenants, and forming a management committee which was not affiliated to Actstop. After winning a substantial number of tenants to his side, Basson barred Actstop from holding meetings in the block.

But even John Nkhata, chairperson of the management committee, says that most of the tenants' grievances are legitimate. He claims Basson conducted the management committee elections, at which tenants were not allowed to nominate candidates.

Nkhata says the committee has never functioned as Basson did not consult with it, and that the 'whole episode' had become an embarrassment to committee members as they shared the same grievances as tenants.

Basson also offered to improve security. But one of the results of the 'improved security' was that each tenant had to carry an identity document to prove that he/she was a bona fide resident.

He also put in a number of foreign security guards on the 13th floor of the building. These people, according to Actstop assistant general secretary Vivian Klaas, were used as bodyguards and to intimidate rent defaulters by Basson. According to Basson, the men came from Zimbabwe and Zambia and have since left his employ.

A curfew on tenants, imposed by Basson, has also infuriated tenants. No visitors were allowed between 10pm and 8am. Another complaint was that Basson charged rent per individual, not according to a flat's size.

On 7 March, there was a demonstration after Cresthill tenants were told rents would be increased from R320 for a bachelor flat to R400. One bedroomed flats went up from R420 to R520. Twelve flats were also to be leased to companies while another 12 were to be converted into a hotel, they were also told.

Tenants marched to Basson's office to demand an explanation, but he called the police. The women then toyi-toyed outside the flat. Meanwhile, security guards allegedly locked a tenant known only as Wayne in a glass cubicle. When Basson failed to open the cubicle, the tenants smashed it to free the man.

On 9 March, Basson is alleged to have loaded up his office furniture and



Cresthill — after intense battles, tenants are now considering buying the building.

left the premises. Since that day, Red Heart Security Services has taken control of the block.

On 13 March, two white men in a blue Nissan bakkie with registration numbers PNR363T came to the flats to 'arrest' Wayne. They are alleged to have handcuffed him and taken him off. However, a fellow tenant, Elvis Phakathi intervened. After a scuffle, both Wayne and Elvis ended up at Hillbrow police station.

Some Actstop members followed the van to the police station while others contacted lawyers. Wayne was then released later on bail of R150 without having seen a magistrate.

### ANC SUPPORTER

Tenants allege that Basson claimed to be an ANC member. This was denied by the Hillbrow-Berea branch of the ANC. The ANC's head of security, Terror Lekota, said Basson's only relationship with the ANC was that he had revealed to the organisation FW de Klerk's destabilisation campaign in Namibia and South Africa.

Basson denies that he claimed to be an ANC member. He says he is an ANC supporter, and had been advised not to seek membership at the moment.

Basson says the massive unemployment rate is the main cause of the problems in the area. He claims that landlords are not like the government that people have been fighting for all these years.

Actstop member and resident, Joyce Tamane — keeping a watchful eye on landlords.

They were simply trying to deal with 'massive debts and overdrafts caused by the rent boycotts'.

Basson concedes, however, that some landlords think 'white' and their objective is to maximise profits at the expense of their tenants.

He claims Cresthill has a R2.5-million overdraft caused by rent boycotts. He says rents will have to be increased to cover arrears, claiming that he owes the municipality R300,000 for electricity.

Despite the deep mistrust that continues to exist between Actstop and Basson, the two sides are negotiating. This is in stark contrast to the situation in places like Waldorf Heights.

An executive member of Actstop, Steve Modise, has met Basson, who agreed to drop charges against Wayne. He has also agreed to allow Actstop officials access to the building.

On 18 March the Actstop executive and Crestview committee members met with Basson to try and resolve the crisis. They agreed that the tenants should consider buying the block of flats, and that Basson gives them an income and expenditure statement. Basson feels that the Anglo-American Corporation might finance such a venture. □



# Hospital of horror

*Nepotism and apathy seem to rule at Hillbrow Hospital as security guards allegedly beat up staff members and patients, reports MBULELO MDLEDLE*

**H**illbrow Hospital, which falls under the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), is allegedly being run along prison lines, with security guards acting as policemen.

The De Klerks — a father, mother and son team — have reportedly entrenched themselves at the hospital. Frans de Klerk, the father, is deputy director of the hospital and a senior member of the hospital's disciplinary committee. The mother, Elizabeth, is the chief administration clerk, while their son, Japie, manages the feared Pro-Active security guards.

## NEHAWU MEMORANDUM

According to a memorandum to the director-general of Transvaal Hospital Services by the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu), Frans de Klerk 'influenced the granting of a tender to Pro-Active (security firm), which is more expensive than that of the more competitive Pritchard and Peace Force Security Companies'.

The union also alleges that De Klerk promoted his wife to become a sectional head although she is 'under-qualified and less experienced'.

After appeals by Nehawu for a commission of inquiry, the TPA has decided to investigate. According to Elsabe Ferreira, the TPA's public relations officer, one of their officials will conduct a week-long investigation and give a reportback to Nehawu. If the De Klerks are found to be at fault, official action will be taken.

But Nehawu is not happy with the steps taken by the TPA, as the union wanted to be part of a commission of enquiry. It accused the TPA of 'covering for (its) fellow white brothers' and 'insensitivity to the problems experienced by the workers and patients in this hospital'.

An official of the SA Health Workers' Congress, Dr Aslam Dasoo, said the attacks on staff and patients by the security guards were 'racially motivated and ethically wrong'.

Dasoo said Sahwco supported

Nehawu's demand for a commission of inquiry and that Pro-Active's services should be suspended immediately.

In her correspondence, Mrs De Klerk uses the letterheads of Pro-Active. However, she told WIP that she was not part of the company. The superintendent of the hospital, Dr Trevor Frankish, explained that the use of Pro-Active letterheads was a form of advertising 'like all companies' do.

## BEATINGS

The reportedly 'vicious' Pro-Active security guards are causing an outcry amongst staff members. Both staff and patients claim to have been beaten in the hospital's basement.

One of their alleged victims is Vusi Ndlovu, who says he was beaten up by security guards on 4 December last year after a quarrel in the casualty ward.

According to a Nehawu shop steward, Sipiwe Mabaso, the second victim, David Moyo, was a patient suffering from neurological problems. He was beaten up for refusing to take his treatment. It is alleged that after Moyo refused treatment, the security guards were called and they took him to the basement where he was beaten unconscious.

An eyewitness, Richard Gosa, said in a sworn statement to a hospital matron that, on 15 January, a man known as Du Plessis, accompanied by two black security guards and a white security guard, came to the basement dragging Moyo. Two were holding his legs and the other two were holding his hands. They banged his head on concrete pillars and then took him into an office.

Gosa followed them and 'saw Du Plessis trampling on the patient's body repeatedly'. When Du Plessis saw Gosa, he told him to 'f--- off'. After some time, Richard saw doctors and nurses going into the same office. They emerged later carrying the unconscious Moyo on a stretcher. Moyo suffered multiple fractures.

A porter, Alfred Maluleke, also claims to have been beaten on 31 December 1991. He sustained a fractured pelvis in the assault.

According to Frankish, the issue is 'dead'. When WIP asked him to qualify his statement, he said it was 'an old story'. □



Is the hospital basement used as a chamber of horror?



PIC: DYNAMIC IMAGES

*A response to Blade Nzimande*  
By MZWANELE MAYEKISO

**T**HE LAUNCH of the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco) in mid-March is an auspicious contribution to the struggle for a firm civil society that serves the working class.

Within the current fluid political situation, local civics have needed self-confidence, strategic co-ordination and protection from rivalries with political organisations.

But there is also a need for constant debate with those comrades who display anti-civic tendencies like Cde Blade Nzimande, who works with Cde Mpume Sikhosana.

In the current *African Communist*, they refer to 'a rather strange assumption: the notion that organs of civil society will create democracy only if they distance themselves from political organisations. And consequently for them democracy means civil society distancing itself, or disengaging from, the state.'

Another version of this position in the June 1991 issue of *Mayibuye* suggests that the two comrades believe civics should actually cease to exist.

Cdes Blade and Mpume claim those who believe 'civics should take up issues of rent, electricity, roads, etc... fall squarely within the strategy to separate the ANC from its mass base.' This should not be left unanswered.

To begin with, the ANC is not alone in facing divide-and-rule tactics from the state and capital. The civics are under massive pressure. The state works against us through violence, while capital views civics as a communist plot against their for-profit development interests.

We hear from the PAC, from Azapo, and of course from Inkatha, that we in the civic movement are puppets or at best proxies of the ANC. So we are surprised to hear Cdes Blade and Mpume say WE SHOULD BE THE ANC.

Cdes Blade and Mpume say when the ANC was banned, the civics were doing a good job. After unbanning, they say, the civics should have become mere conveyor belts of ANC programmes.

But when people are organised by the ANC to do something in the community (for example a clean-up campaign), what role is there for the other political parties (PAC, Azapo, even Inkatha, which tried its own clean-up in Alexandra recently)? Are they meant to have their own bread-and-butter campaigns that are different from those of the civics?

Of course, political organisations should maintain their



strong voices in the national policy debates, informed by what happens in the township. For example, the local political organisations must help their national office develop a policy that ensures 'housing is a right,' not a privilege for the middle-class.

Meanwhile, civics must maintain their independence and ability to fight for the rights of constituents of many political perspectives, even if that is against a leading political party's short-term interests.

Statements like those by Cdes Blade and Mpume play into the hands of those who thrive on tensions between the ANC and civics. Some local ANC branches and civic locals aren't working hand in glove at present in Natal, the Eastern Transvaal, and Alexandra, for example because one feels threatened by the other. It is no wonder the Natal Midlands civics are barely surviving because, tragically, they are under ferocious attack from Blade and others.

In the interests of our common progress, influential comrades like Blade and Mpume must pay closer attention to the positive aspects of civics and promote these. As top regional ANC leaders, they must be sure both sides of the debate are heard so their followers are well-informed. And they must help the ANC address bread-and-butter issues as *policies*, not just as local campaigns, and always in the interests of the grassroots.

In this regard, the civics would only support political programmes by political organisations that benefit the grassroots, including the present Codesa negotiations.

The article in question challenges the independence of civil society, even in the future post-apartheid era. Many people in the civic movement now believe if a national civic organisation enters into any alliance, it should be with the labour movement, not political parties.

Nevertheless, it is with deep appreciation that the civic movement receives the support of many comrades from the NEC of the ANC. But in view of the debate that is going on, perhaps now it is time for the NEC to make very clear the *official position* of the ANC on the question of the civic movement and civil society. □

— Mzwanele Mayekiso writes as an individual, but is a member of the ANC as well as a member of the Alexander Civic Association. He is currently drafting a book on civics for Ravan Press.



## BUDGET DAY PROTESTS

BUDGET DAY — March 18 — saw thousands of workers around the country marching in protest against unilateral government restructuring of the economy as part of a Cosatu-ANC-SACP campaign.

A memorandum was sent to President FW de Klerk and finance minister Barend du Plessis to demand negotiations on important economic issues, an interim government by June and a Constituent Assembly by the end of the year.

Workers are demanding that the government bring down food prices and make changes to VAT — particularly exempting basic foods, not just mealies, milk and samp from VAT. They are also demanding that there be no VAT on electricity, water and medical services.

General secretary of Cosatu, Jay Naidoo, said Cosatu did not intend using mass action recklessly. Rather, the federation was appealing to the government to enter into negotiations.

There are 16 million living below the poverty line, he said, yet the government behaves recklessly by stopping zero ratings on basic foodstuffs.

'We're giving the government the option to negotiate. If they fail to respond, we will have to take mass action,' Naidoo said in a recent press conference.

Cosatu and other organisations also demanded that:

- \* defence spending be cut;
- \* secret funding of Inkatha should end;
- \* 'corrupt apartheid fat cats' should be retrenched, instead of workers.

Other demands include a poverty relief programme; a drought relief programme aimed at all affected communities; equal pensions; equal education and an end to unemployment.

The tripartite alliance said in a statement that the budget 'will do little for social and economic progress' as the government had not specified how the money allocated to social services, housing and education would be used. □

PIC. ELMOND JIVANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



Cosatu demands: Bring down the food prices and make changes to Vat!

## 'UNCONTROLLED FREE MARKET HAUNTS US'

NOW THAT the 'Marxist Leninist fantasy that the all-pervasive tyranny of the communist world would usher in paradise' had vanished, the spectre of an 'uncontrolled, unregulated free market' haunted the world.

This is the view of the general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), John Vanderveken, speaking on the eve of the ICFTU's 15th congress, held between 17 and 24 March in Caracas, Venezuela.

'What is fascinating about both arguments is their quasi-mystical aspect. Both describe processes that seem to operate without human intervention. Both seem to be saying to people: don't do something — sit there!' added Vanderveken.

'The only way to guarantee social and economic progress is through political freedom,' he asserted. 'You cannot contract out, nor can you trade off one for the other. This is one of the clearest messages of the last 20 years, as witnessed by the economic catastrophe that has befallen the developing world and Central and Eastern Europe.'

Aside from building international solidarity, Vanderveken said trade unions had a 'powerful role to play in protecting the environment'.

'Pollution does not respect national boundaries, and only by working together internationally can we stop unscrupulous companies from seeking to evade poor regulation by simply decamping to countries with lower standards.' □

## NACTU IS 'RESTRUCTURING'

AS A RESULT of 'rationalising and restructuring', some Nactu offices will be closed down, said the federation's general secretary, Cunningham Ngcukana.

Nactu plans to reduce its regional offices from 21 to 11. It will, for example, have one office for Durban and Pietermaritzburg instead of one in each

centre. It will likewise combine the Tembisa and Johannesburg offices.

Ngcukana said employing organisers to service affiliates had proved to be inefficient and unproductive. Organisers and offices would now be moved to individual affiliates.

'The overheads of those offices will now be borne by those affiliates. We want affiliates to take more responsibility and build structures so that Nactu can play a co-ordinating role,' said Ngcukana.

He added that the restructuring also

represented a move towards self-sufficiency, as Nactu was reducing its dependency on international funding. 'While Nactu will be leaner, it will be more effective,' Ngcukana said.

The move to restructure 'in these new circumstances', said Ngcukana, was more in keeping with Cosatu's structure. It thus appears that Nactu's restructuring will facilitate a merger between the two federations. Nactu is the second largest federation after Cosatu with some 250 000 members. □





PHOTO: BOBBIE BETHA

# Will labour agree to a social contract?

*Organised labour has proposed the formation of a national economic negotiating forum (NENF) involving itself, business and government to make policy on the economy. GLENDA DANIELS reports on the debates emerging in labour and business circles about the forum, and a social contract that may result*

**T**WO MEETINGS between labour, represented by Cosatu, Nactu and Fedsal, and business, represented by Sacob, AHI, Fabcos, Nafcoc, Seifsa, Saccola, Chamber of Mines and CBM, have been held this year. Both parties have agreed that the formation of a NENF is essential and urgent. So far, the state has refused to commit itself, as it seems to feel all negotiations should take place at Codesa.

Arising from the two meetings, an eight-sided working group consisting of labour and business was set up. Its task is to identify areas of agreement and difference between labour and business, and to try to get the state to commit itself to the NENF.

If the NENF succeeds in reaching consensus on how to resolve areas of conflict, a social contract could arise involving the parties in an agreement.

## **NENF 'VITAL'**

For Cosatu, the formation of the NENF is vital to stop the state's unilateral restructuring of the economy. It feels that all economic issues should be discussed by such a forum and agreements reached there before any changes are made. This

would mean that issues such as the budget, privatisation, tariff policies, VAT and other taxes and retrenchments would have to be negotiated through the NENF first before becoming law or state policy.

Meanwhile, Nactu general secretary Cunningham Ngcukana does not think that entering into the NENF will mean that a social contract exists or is inevitable.

'I view the forum not as a form of social contract, but rather as a forum to deal with specific economic issues. For instance we don't know where pension funds are being invested and we intend to find out.'

He says 'you can't agree with the process of negotiations and be opposed to the NENF. Also, when you enter into negotiations you know there will be compromise. There might be agreement or there might not be. In Nactu, we are not talking of a social contract, but about specific economic issues. A social contract is about wider issues'.

Ngcukana feels that the government is not yet involved because of 'fear' and 'not wanting to lose the prerogative' about future decision making.

As Ngcukana has pointed out, nego-

tiations involve compromises on all sides. Some unionists fear that a social contract may mean a setback to workers in terms of incomes and prices, a lack of independence from government and employer structures, and strike or picket restrictions.

But others feel that the union movement has little choice but to engage the state and business on economic questions if real gains for the entire working class are to be made.

## **NOT ENOUGH DEBATE?**

For Chris Bonner, the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) national education co-ordinator, there has not been enough debate within Cosatu on either the NENF or social contracts. 'The federation is certainly not ready to take a stand on social contracts at this stage. There is a reluctance to take on the debate because it could polarise the union movement and people might adopt rigid positions. However, the debate must take place,' she adds.

In CWIU, workers started discussing both issues before Cosatu's 1991 congress. However, says Bonner, the social contract did not get discussed at

the congress, mainly because 'economic issues were pushed towards the end'.

She says economic negotiations could be interpreted as a social contract, 'but this is still very much up in the air. The problem is that it's not debated seriously. In some ways we've been dodging a contentious issue'.

Salim Vally, education officer of SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union's (Saccawu) Johannesburg branch, agrees that there has been little 'proper' debate. He adds there is a big difference between union leadership and workers. 'Even some union office bearers were not consulted about whether there should be a NENF or not,' he claims.

But Geoff Schreiner, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) national organiser, says the idea for a NENF was first discussed in mid-1991 by the National Campaigns Committee. A recommendation endorsing the idea was taken to Cosatu's national executive. The issue was then discussed over a period of nine months. Initially there were individuals who were sceptical 'but now there is strong endorsement of it, if one looks at how unanimous the decision was at congress', says Schreiner.

He believes that the concept of a social contract is misunderstood by some and disagrees that there has been a lack of debate.

'There are a lot of different perceptions of a social contract,' says Schreiner. 'There is a tendency in South Africa to try and fetishise the social contract.' One school of thought, he says, sees the contract as a national agreement between government, trade unions and employers, focusing on wage restraint and prices and incomes policy. Those who characterise a social contract in these terms are hostile to the idea, as it implies unions giving up important rights and becoming

part of the system, he explains.

'A social contract can, in content, comprise any set of variables. I would characterise the LRA accord as a social contract which involved the major players in the industrial field and the state, and in content didn't compromise unions in any way. In fact, it was to the benefit of unions,' says Schreiner.

Schreiner adds that 'the grand theories associated with social contracts have not extended down to grassroots, but the practical details of accords have been debated and discussed'.

### 'SERIOUS PROBLEMS'

For Vally, who is also a member of Workers' Organisation for Socialist Action (Wosa), a social contract will mean labour will have to compromise too much. 'The state, even if it is the ANC, will never be neutral in class terms. It will be bound by the capitalist framework within which it works. Social contracts cause demoralisation, demobilisation and division among workers.'

While Bonner agrees with this view generally, her position is more flexible. She believes that a social contract is possible with a future state if it has working class interests at heart.

But Vally believes that 'the union movement must resist the idea of a social contract. It must be seen as a state-structured, class collaboration phenomenon which enforces union bureaucratisation undermining democracy and accountability. The problem is that leadership will have to collaborate with corporate structures'.

Another problem for Vally is that it will bring a loss of independence.

'Once there is an agreement, you

tend not to do things that will weaken that particular government. This happened in Britain and Sweden,' he says.

He argues that trade unions can 'become incorporated into state structures and can function as part of state control; there is a real danger of that happening here, as it has happened in other countries.'

For Vally a social contract 'rescues capitalism', and the union movement should instead concentrate on the Living Wage Campaign, building strong working class organisations, democracy and working class struggle.

Schreiner feels that perhaps there are people who want to debate about a lack of accountability of union leadership and unions being too compromising, but have instead decided to seize upon the social contract as a way of raising these issues.

He contends that business and unions make agreements daily so he does not see why there should be a major distinction made between the two.


'The one problem is that national agreements tend to be further away and more complex, and that's why report backs and mandates have to be stressed so that rank and file can keep control over the process; of negotiations,' he says.

He responds to Vally's comments by saying that the debate has become too abstract. 'People look at the UK and Australia, and say that what they have there is a social accord, and if we have [a social accord or contract] here, then we will experience the same problems. But we want *concrete* debates in South Africa. The questions are: Should we have a Peace Accord? Should we have an LRA? And so forth.'

### BENEFITS TO THE UNIONS?

Bonner feels that 'at this stage' a social contract should not be considered. 'Workers on the ground are just beginning to discuss the issue of the NENF, if at all.' During the VAT strike, she says, workers all said they were striking against VAT. They did not talk of the demand for a NENF.

Vally says there could be 'temporary gains for a minority of organised sectors, but these gains will be at the expense of the marginalised sectors, which would be detrimental'.



*Does a social contract mean gains for a minority of better paid workers — or can it deliver benefits to the unemployed and society as a whole?*

PICTURE: V. MBALO (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

Schreiner disagrees: 'The idea of a prices and incomes policy doesn't horrify me in principle. I envisage a situation one may want to consider — wage restraint in return for social wage benefits for the unemployed can be immensely progressive. Instead of Cosatu negotiating on behalf of privileged workers only, it can do so on behalf of everybody.'

'National negotiations involving the state and civil society are a good thing and should be encouraged. The idea of a strong civil society appeals to me. I think it will exercise some pressure on a future state to operate in a democratic way,' he asserts.

The NENF, Schreiner feels, will be an interesting barometer of ANC's future approach to civil society.

### TACTICAL NECESSITY

For Tony Ruiters, Numsa's PWV regional secretary, the positions adopted by Bonner, Vally and Schreiner are too polarised. His solution is to 'contextual-

ise' the debate.

'Cosatu is trying to democratise South Africa politically and economically, and therefore has to be involved in the unfolding process: negotiations,' he says.

For Ruiters, Schreiner's point that the LRA is a social contract is incorrect because 'contracts have to involve the whole society, not just capital and labour'.

But he also does not agree with the view that the NENF compromises principles and policies Cosatu has always stood for. Instead, he says, it allows the federation to have a say in such things as job losses, retrenchments and price increases.

The NENF, he feels, is a tactical necessity — but not to harmonise relations between capital and labour. He adds that Cosatu is on record as saying the NENF is not a rescue mission for capitalism.

Ruiters agrees with Schreiner that there has been debate around stopping retrenchments and privatisation, and that

Cosatu was mandated to approach capital and the state on this. But apparently most unions did not realise the implications of this in terms of a social contract, he adds. 'Around the social contract, there was little debate. It is just starting now and is still limited to union leadership.'

As the debate continues, the issue will only become clearer when there is a common understanding about a social contract. □

PIC ABDUL SHARIEF



*Cosatu, Nactu and the ANC want a national economic forum to halt unilateral economic restructuring*

## The state and big business

AT THIS STAGE, the state is making no signs of joining the NENF.

Manpower minister Piet Marais told an Institute for Personnel Management meeting in Stellenbosch in February that centralised forums had retarded economic growth in Sweden, Italy and Belgium, so there was no reason to believe that it would work here. An economic forum established for political reasons rather than economic expansion would fail, said Marais. (Business Day, 13-02-92)

Big business, on the other hand, are more keen on becoming part of an NENF, although many within their ranks are also cautious about a social contract.

JCI's group economics consultant, Ronnie Bethlehem does not like the term social contract, preferring the word accord. 'Contract', he says, 'implies clauses and sub-clauses which would have to be enforced in a court of law. It would be rigid and contractually binding.'

He says neither Cosatu nor business would want to give away their freedom of actions. 'In the context of a market economy, where South Africa has not only a market economy of it's own but is part of a global system, prices will fluctuate so you

can't talk in terms of a fixed contract,' says Bethlehem.

To draw up a social accord between government, business and labour, Bethlehem says you have to have consensus about the important strategic objective of the economy.

'The purpose of a social accord is to generate a common ownership of what has to be done about the broad objective about the future South African economy.'

For Bethlehem, the NENF is 'an important vehicle in the achievement of critical strategy and policy issues. Labour and business are beginning to evolve a framework for accords to play an important role in the future. The discussion on an NENF is an exciting and wonderful thing. It is unprecedented anywhere in the world.'

Debra Marsden, Consultative Business Movement (CBM) national organiser, says one does not only need economic debate at national level, but at sectoral, regional and company level too.

'There is no certainty at national level that there will be a social accord. We are still dealing with process issues: what the aims are, who the participants are, whether it will be long- or

short-term.'

Accords, says Marsden, are 'incredibly important for the economic life of the community. An economic forum could work towards consensus on issues, then seek practical ways to give effect to that consensus. Depending on the issue, this could require action from business, labour, government or all three'.

She adds that, while there are obvious benefits to all parties, there are also costs. 'Cooperation requires compromise and it is beneficial if that compromise is equal'. Benefits for business, says Marsden, include 'a stable environment, more investment, improvement in productivity levels. Workers benefit by having a say in the economic life of the community. For government, a recommendation or backing from business and labour can strengthen their decisions.'

She says it is understandable that there are reservations about social contracts. 'We're dealing with uncharted terrain. No doubt labour would harbour concerns that employers would pursue social contracts to encourage wage restraint or control strike activity. Employers could also be concerned that an economic forum could create tension and pressure points around issues not resolved in the forum. Pressure not there before could overflow into mass action. ■



# Direct action to restore land

*The Transvaal Rural Action Committee's HARALD WINKLER describes recent attempts by dispossessed communities to re-occupy their land, and warns that unless government acts more positively, direct action will escalate*

**B**ETWEEN 1960 and 1982, over 614,000 black people were removed from 'black spots' in terms of the National Party's homeland consolidation policy. With the more open political climate since 2 February 1990, rural people expect that things will change for them too. Many of these communities are now seeking to return to their land by all means — land occupations, negotiations and submissions to government commissions.

## RE-OCCUPYING LAND

Communities who suffered forced removals generally resisted fiercely, and tried all means to return to their land. In some cases, this has taken the form of physically re-occupying the land.

The Mogopa community was forcibly removed in February 1984. Despite a supreme court decision declaring their removal illegal, and negotiations with several cabinet ministers, they could not return to their land. In 1988, they obtained permission to clean their ancestral graves. They then remained on the land and were charged with trespass. Eventually in 1991, the community was given *de facto* permission to stay on their land.

Other communities have tried to return, but have been arrested and stopped. The Barolong people near Machaviestad were arrested for trespass in December 1990 on land which had been granted to them by Boer leaders in the 19th century.

The Mfengus in the Eastern Cape are

still seeking ways to return to their farm, granted to them by Queen Elizabeth. Numerous Natal communities, including Charlestown and Crimen, have also been stopped by Natal Provincial Administration officials from returning. The Macleantown community in the Border region attempted to re-occupy their land, but were arrested by police and charged with trespass.

## REMARKABLE PATIENCE

In each case, the struggle has been a long one. Communities have shown remarkable patience in writing letters, drawing up petitions, and talking to government officials. Dispossessed communities show little bitterness and a continued willingness to negotiate with those who dispossessed them. As an old man from the Magogoane community, removed from the Koster district in the Western Transvaal in 1978 to Bophuthatswana, put it:

'If you see a beautiful woman, you cannot just marry her, you must first speak to her of love. And so with negotiations, you should open the issue as early as possible. We should sit around the table with the government and listen to each other. But the government must listen to us more, since we are the ones who have been dispossessed... We should try to relate to people as human beings even if the person has proved to be terrible in the past.'

South Africa treated the Magogoane people, and many others, as 'somebody else's problem', by pretending they were citizens of Bophuthatswana. Nonetheless, communities were still prepared to talk even after 15 years of unsuccessful petitions to the government. It was only when government policy seemed to rule out restoration of land, that some com-

munities took direct action. Before describing a re-occupation, one should consider the context of government policy.

## GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

Towards the end of 1990, it became clear that the government was intending to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936. What was much less clear, however, was what would replace the racist legislation,



*Goedgevonden, after an attack by white farmers*

and what impact legal changes would have on the reality of unjust land distribution.

In March 1991, the government published a White Paper on Land Reform, accompanied by five Bills to make new arrangements for land affairs. The repeal of the legislation was a major victory for the majority of South Africa's people. The negative aspects, however, overshadowed this victory.

The White Paper unequivocally rejected restoration of land to the victims of forced removals on the basis that it had 'vast potential for conflict', that its implementation would be very difficult because of 'overlapping and contradictory claims to such land'.

Government policy made no mention of a Land Claims Court, or any other mechanism by which land claims could be settled. The only way in which black people are going to get land is by paying



PHOTO: PAETORIA LINC

market prices.

After years of destitution caused by forced removals, very few black communities are in a position to buy back the land. They also do not see why they should buy land which they regard as having been stolen from them by the government.

Given the government's refusal to address restoration, many communities felt that their only chance was to take action by occupying their land to make their claim known.

### GOEDGEVONDEN

The Goedgevonden community was removed in 1978 from trust land they had occupied for 31 years, and incorporated into Bophuthatswana against their will in 1984. Thirteen years of petitioning the government to talk to them about their plight fell on deaf ears.

On 9 April 1991, 450 members of the community re-occupied Goedgevonden. A week later, they were attacked by rightwing farmers. They then lost a court case brought against them by the government together with seven white farmers. They were granted leave to appeal against the decision, which opened up space for negotiations.

The resolution of the Goedgevonden crisis has become a major political issue. The government has established a 'task group' to seek a resolution to the situation. It wants to solve the problem on a technical basis, using land use and agricultural potential as the criteria. While the good use of agricultural land is important, the roots of the conflict are obviously political. The only just solution will be one which reverses the injustice done to the Goedgevonden people.

Such a solution is possible. The land is owned by the state and could be returned after the termination of leases to the white farmers, who only use Goedgevonden for additional grazing.

All the above cases — whether return was negotiated or the land was occupied — demonstrate that it is the physical presence of communities on the land that often leads to effective negotiations. Without the leverage of occupation, communities are stalled in endless bureaucratic processes. The government often uses negotiations as a delaying tactic.

Direct action often breaks the dead-



Goedgevonden residents: government has refused to address the issue of land restoration.

lock. At the same time, communities are fighting for a better forum in which to present their land claims, in particular a Land Claims Court.

### LAND CLAIMS COURT BATTLE

One of the major demands of rural communities in response to the White Paper has been that a land claims court (LCC) should be created to hear the land claims of those disadvantaged by apartheid policies, and to adjudicate conflicting land claims. The government's initial White Paper completely ignored this suggestion. After some lobbying, the government came up with a half-hearted compromise, the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation (ACLA).

This commission has no decision-making powers and it is appointed by the state president rather than elected. The commission will deal with 'the allocation of undeveloped State land ... In other words, this is not about claims of right: it is about state largesse. Rights do not enter into it at all'.

In August and September 1991, 20 communities working with affiliates of the National Land Committee (NLC) came together to consider the proposed ACLA. The communities outlined clear principles for an acceptable commission, namely it should:

- \* be based on land rights, not the discretion of the state;

- \* be legitimate, so it cannot consist

of the state president's appointees;

- \* accept the principle of restoration;

- \* have the power to make decisions, in particular awards, whether in the form of land, money or divided ownership.

To add insult to injury, the government rejected the names put forward by the 20 restoration communities to sit on the commission. After several meetings between community representatives and the then minister of development aid, Jacob de Villiers, the communities identified five people who would have their confidence if they were appointed. Not a single one was included.

When questioned about the decision of ACLA on the *Agenda* programme, De Villiers was vague. All he would say was that 'after cases have been defined and substantiated, the Advisory Commission will give its advice to the state president'.

Despite the inadequacies of ACLA, the 31 communities who participated in the third National Restoration Workshop on 22-23 February this year decided to engage the commission. This does not mean that they are abandoning other forms of struggle. In making submissions to ACLA, the communities are demanding that reasonable processes be followed. In particular, the government must make its information available, decide on the basis of equity and not use technicist criteria to block communities' return. Hearings and findings must be made public. However, the commissioners have indicated that they will not agree to publish their reports.

The struggle for the restoration of land has a component of legal proceedings and negotiation, accompanied by direct action. Rural communities are coming together to demand an LCC to make negotiations more effective. They are also considering returning to their land 'by force, the same way in which we were removed'. As long as the government's reformist initiative, the Advisory Commission, lacks the power to actually return land to dispossessed people, re-occupations will continue. □

—Harald Winkler is an environmental fieldworker for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee. Part II will be printed in the next edition of WIP.





# IMF report:

## shoddy and thoroughly predictable

**W**ITHIN DAYS of its February public release, the International Monetary Fund's *Economic Policies for a New South Africa* reached bible-thumping status for business elites (especially *Business Day* editors). No surprise, for one bottom-line IMF demand for a democratic SA is, 'real wage growth must be contained'.

Hear that, Cosatu? Here are some other reasons the IMF is the fair-haired boy of smart capitalists:

- \* the report slates SA for high corporate taxes, and argues against both higher taxes and a higher government deficit (except when it comes to expensive foreign loans from the IMF);

- \* it blames sanctions (not the move to white-dominated high tech production in the context of capitalist stagnation) for a slow-down in the equalisation of 'non-white' and white wages;

- \* it finds 'the main effect of imposing higher real wage growth is to reduce the demand for labour' (thus supporting capital's wage restraint campaign, and downplaying the potential for a basic-needs consumer-led economic recovery); and

- \* it claims 'over the past several years there has been a shift in spending priorities toward social ends' (thus miti-

**PATRICK BOND**



gating demands for decisive fiscal reform).

The above IMF positions on the post-apartheid economy illustrate the New World Order assault upon progressive fundamentals. But on closer examination those missiles are scuds, scary but always far off the declared target.

### ANC MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Nevertheless, the IMF will play a crucial role in the post-apartheid economy. The ANC has missed a golden opportunity to limit IMF damage here: After meeting managing director Michel Camdessus in February 1991, movement officials inexplicably failed to put forth a public case against IMF involvement in the VAT debacle.

The IMF will probably make loans to an interim government within the next 9-12 months. This will drive South Africa's hard-won 'balance of payments' surplus into deficit, on the assumption that a foreign financing binge will finally get the economy growing again. George Bush declared this intention openly when told of the whites-only reform vote, promising this country its first access to the IMF and US Export-Import Bank in nearly a decade.

The IMF loans will be expensive (26% is the average cost of foreign loans when rand depreciation is taken into account, Nedbank economist Ed Osborn calculates). They will also come with harsh conditions attached, and probably be used to pay off multinational corporations and wealthy speculators holding

R15 billion worth of 'financial rands.' South Africa's dual currency system is considered heresy in the IMF Old Testament, even if it does help curb capital flight.

### SHODDY REPORT

The IMF report is a shoddy piece of work, partly because the Fund's six economists failed to engage with most of the restructuring arguments advanced by the ANC and Cosatu, and because of the way it deals with subjects like manufacturing output, labour productivity, and housing that will be serious sites of struggle well into the post-apartheid era. (See Box)

The report says nothing about *redistribution of investment* away from the overtraded luxury consumer goods sector and into either the basic needs consumer goods sector or the neglected machinery sector (a key Cosatu Economic Trends group demand).

Nor does the IMF report consider expanding budget options beyond mere taxation, to take advantage of *enormous bank and insurance company liquidity* (for example, using 'prescribed asset' requirements mooted by the ANC). This overwhelming problem, which has caused the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to explode with speculation, goes totally unremarked upon.

The IMF report's clear call is for the lowering of the benefits the state currently provides whites, while granting only meagre increases to blacks. 'Politically, it would be potentially disastrous to implement their recommendations on social spending policy,' argues Professor Robert Davies of the University of the Western Cape. 'You would be substantially stoking up the social base of the far right.'

Davies also criticises the emphasis on export-orientation because, in pushing for a deregulated ('liberalised') internal economy, 'the IMF fails to recognise that most of the successful exporters had very unliberal internal economic policies.'

### BLANKET PRESCRIPTIONS



South Africa seems set to fall into that notorious IMF economic quicksand: blanket prescriptions for different diseases. As one IMF staffer concluded after reviewing glaring mistakes in his institution's study of the tiny Caribbean island of Trinidad, 'We trash around in frustration in the South, intent only on giving more and more unworkable medicine to its peoples.'

Davison Budhoo, himself a Trinidadian, wrote those words in his resignation letter (subsequently published as *Enough is Enough: An Open Letter of Resignation to the International Monetary Fund* by New Horizons Press, Montreal). During a mid-1980s stint as a top IMF economist, Budhoo was surprised by his colleagues' finding that labour costs in Trinidad rose by 145% from 1979-84. Budhoo recalculated and put the figure at 69%. Budhoo alleges IMF directors then organised a 'massive cover-up' on the issue in order to 'force austerity down the government's throat'.

The IMF subsequently put Trinidad under the thumb of structural adjust-



ment, including a 44% currency devaluation, privatisation and cuts of tens of thousands of government jobs, lockout-enforced wage concessions, and a 15% value-added tax.

Budhoo says such 'Fund-related fraud' (a term coined by former IMF managing director Jacques de Larosiere) goes on in many countries, and cites his own IMF mission experiences in Venezuela and Guyana. The same negligent staff seem to have been sent to South Africa.

According to Budhoo, who was earning R421 000 a year when he quit, an average IMF economist on overseas assignment takes home tax-free salary and perks worth *several hundred times* the per capita income of the lowest two thirds of the world's population. Given the quality of the recent report, it is reasonable to enquire as to who might be getting their money's worth. □

— Patrick Bond is the author of *Commanding Heights and Community Control*

## STATISTICAL FRAUD

### MANUFACTURING OUTPUT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY

The IMF model for the economy cannot stand rigorous inspection, says Charles Meth, a University of Natal lecturer working with Cosatu's Economic Trends group. One reason is the Fund's uncritical reliance on government data. 'The IMF report is as unreliable as the poor data upon which it's based,' says Meth, whose demolition job of the state's National Productivity Institute was so convincing that even *The Financial Mail* featured him in a story last year.

Meth says the manufacturing sector data are vastly distorted by the NPI, which permits that pro-capitalist body to continually harp on labour productivity as the basis for stagnant economic growth. 'Because the manufacturing sector output estimates are incorrect an error that has been conceded by Central Statistical Services labour productivity is wrong, capital productivity is wrong, unit labour costs are wrong, and multifactor productivity is wrong.'

But, says Meth resignedly, 'Conservative economists in SA have taken great joy from the IMF report. 'Science' has appeared obligingly to confirm prejudice. Utter insensitivity to data weakness and an indecent scramble to use poor statistics are the hallmarks of the propagandist, not the scientist.'

Perhaps the IMF, the international agency with more resources for economic research than any other, should do its own data gathering. But at one point in the report, the IMF openly admits using 'industrial country standards' as a proxy for South African wages.

### GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON HOUSING

While underestimating labour productivity, the IMF economists vastly overestimate the government's social expenditure on housing, claiming it *quadrupled* from 0,2% of GDP in 1982 to 0,8% in 1987 (the latter figure is four times as great as that of the average of all upper-middle-income countries).

This is an interesting sleight of hand, given the awesome depth of the low-income housing shortage (now well over two million units, contrary to government claims cited approvingly by the IMF that the shortage is just

1,5 million units). After all, during the 1980s housing privatisation was the rule, and we are all aware of the lack of new public housing built in townships.

But let's concede that with so many obscure racially defined government departments spending money on housing, it's hard to come up with an exact figure. Taking a reasonable proxy for housing expenditure gross domestic fixed investment in residential buildings my own figures (from the Reserve Bank *Quarterly Bulletin*) show that 'public authorities' and 'public corporations' together built housing worth 0,9% of GDP in 1982, 0,5% in 1987, and 0,4% in 1990. Intuitively, that seems about right, since the 1980s were years of growing township neglect.

So how does the IMF arrive at its 1987 contention of a figure 60% higher than mine with a trend going the opposite direction? The figure appears to derive from the following sentence: 'In the past year, off-budget funds totaling R2-billion (0,8% of GDP) were established to develop the necessary infrastructure, secure the plots, and erect structures for the underprivileged.' The IMF refers here to the Independent Development Trust, which in fact was established with the R2-billion in early 1990 (not 'in the past year' nor in 1987).

The IDT has so far committed only about one% (less than R20 million) of its funds for the provision of housing 'structures' and this increasingly via extremely expensive IDT Finance Corporation loans at a 32% interest rate, *not through grants* (therefore the R20-million should not be counted as 'social spending'). Moreover, the 'infrastructure' and 'plots' the IMF refers to were budgeted in early 1991 for R750-million, an amount of money spread between mid-1991 and late 1993. Using these figures, therefore, IDT site-and-service grants amount to R375-million a year, a figure equal to only 0,25% of 1987 GDP, and 0,1% of 1991 GDP. (See *Reconstruct*, No 1 (WIP 80), for a critical evaluation of the IDT.)

It's not terribly hard to see why IMF economists think SA workers are paid too much or how they conclude the rate of state spending on housing is growing. As IMF-outcast Davison Budhoo says, it's just another case of 'Fund-related fraud'. ■



# Sink or float

## Palestine and the New World Order

MARK TAYLOR, reporting from Ramallah on the West Bank

ONCE UPON a time, Scorpion was travelling across West Asia when his path was blocked by the Jordan River. Unable to swim, he asked Frog to carry him across. 'But you'll sting me,' said Frog glumly. 'No!' cried a scandalised Scorpion. 'Why would I want to do that? Then we'd both drown!' Unconvinced but under pressure, Frog agreed to carry Scorpion across the Jordan on his back. Just past the halfway mark - Zap! - Scorpion stings Frog. As paralysis takes hold of them they begin to sink, Frog looks up desperately and asks, 'Why?! Why?!' Scorpion looks up, shrugs and murmurs, 'Oh, y'know ...that's the Middle East for you.'

### US FOREIGN POLICY

A year after the Gulf War, US foreign policy is firmly established as the centre-point of power in the region. Talks-about-talks are underway between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. The Middle East is on the brink of basking or frying in its very own version of the New World Order. But, stability — the watchword of the Order — requires first dealing with a few 'problems', prime among them being the Palestinians. Like the Scorpion, the US conception of a New World Order in the Middle East will sink or float depending on how the Palestinians are dealt with.

Long content to let its regional allies set about persecuting the Palestinians, Washington now seems adamant to float its New World Order in the Middle East by 'solving' the Palestinian 'problem'.

Yet, behind Washington's official bluster and determination, the US still does not accept an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Since the start of the current peace process in Madrid last October, the situation

in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has worsened rapidly. The building of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories has accelerated, and the Israeli authorities have unleashed a sweeping campaign of mass arrests and attacks on Palestinian institutions.

Blanket 24-hour curfews are now imposed with devastating regularity. Torture in Israeli prisons is being used as an indiscriminate tool for intimidation. The Co-ordinating Committee for International Non-Governmental Organisations (CCINGO) warns in a recent statement that 'army violence has escalated as the Israeli authorities announced an increase of 20% in the number of military personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip...Israeli settlers have continued to carry out attacks on Palestinian property and homes.'

The Israeli security apparatus is well aware that the political initiative gained by the Intifada — already waning by late 1990 — was obliterated by the Gulf War. The heightened repression is a clear attempt to play on scepticism within the

community over whether a US-brokered peace process can deliver anything but bad news for the Palestinians. Palestinian intellectual, Azmy Bishara, seems to reflect public opinion when he says: 'I don't think the talks will lead to a Palestinian state in the near future.'

But many Palestinians say they can't simply walk away from the process. The mainstream leadership has calculated that to remain out of the 'peace process' is much more dangerous than to enter into it in the hopes of turning it to the Palestinians advantage.

The Left shares a generally dismal analysis of the situation, but disagrees about the wisdom of participation. Those opposed are extremely critical but admit that they have no real alternative strategy. Leftists who are participating in the peace talks say they hope to use the process to settle a few old scores (PLO representation and so on), gain a little ground, and create more space for Intifada activists on the ground.

The Intifada has entered its fifth year with little let-up in activism. There has been a sharp turn towards selective armed attacks, especially against settlers. But the uprising has not been able to halt the settlement on Palestinian land. Words like 'canton' and 'bantustan' are now being used to describe the land that would be left for Palestinians in the occupied territories if a political solution is not soon reached.

The settlements affect the central element of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: territory. A recent report by the Palestinian Geographic Information Centre details how the pattern of settlements is carving the West Bank into half-a-dozen 'cantons'. Every time US Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Israel last



Raids by Israeli settlers and the military have increased dramatically in recent months



summer, he was confronted with the establishment of a new settlement. The message was clear: don't even think of trading land for peace because these houses, 'these facts on the ground' make that impossible.

Yet, only 5% of the land seized by the Israeli authorities in the West Bank have been built on. Some of the settlements created in retaliation to Baker's visits are standing empty. Vacancy rates in the built settlements range from 30 to 40%.

Still, the absence of political will to stop settlement expansion means that an independent political and economic future for Palestinians is rapidly disappearing.

The Israeli magazine *New Outlook*, Azmay Bishara makes it clear what the Israeli version of Palestinian autonomy means: 'The kind of autonomy Israel is suggesting for the West Bank and Gaza is not a model for decolonisation. Israel is proposing to non-citizens the kind of cultural and administrative autonomy granted in Europe to minority citizens of a state.'

## INDEPENDENCE

The Palestinian negotiating team in the talks has insisted that what the Israelis call 'autonomy' cannot be anything more than the 'transitional period' towards independence for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That period will include Palestinian control over land and water, as well as a freeze on settlements. Palestinian professor Salim Tamari says: 'We see the negotiations as a starting process that will ultimately lead to sovereignty.' Perhaps diplomacy can succeed where the Intifada failed.

But, try as they might, even conservatives in the Palestinian leadership may find that there is no place for an independent Palestine in the New World Order. The long term success of US designs for the region seems to depend on Arab-Israeli economic integration and strategic co-operation in defence of US interests in the region. The US can push for regional economic integration between Israel and its Arab allies, under the threat of a clearly demonstrated willingness to use overwhelming military power to keep break-away states in line. It will be a long process, but in a unipolar world there is little standing in the path of an end to

Israel's regional isolation.

So far, the Palestinian 'problem' has been the hurdle holding up the peace process and the thorough integration of the region into the New World Order. But there remains the danger that the US could cut a deal with other Arab states, including Syria and the Gulf States, leaving the Palestinians floundering in the wilderness of occupation.

'If you look at the last 30 years,' says Palestinian analyst George Giacoman, 'the Arab position has moved from one of

total liberation (of Palestine), to a secular democratic state, to a two-state solution, to a federation with Jordan and it is now approaching some sort of autonomy under Israeli rule.'

The Palestinians have embarked on a voyage into the New World Order, knowing that they have seldom been so vulnerable to US aims. They are hoping that maybe, just maybe, they can get the diplomatic ball rolling in the direction of independence. But it might be a strategy of desperation. □



PIC: FOCUS ON AFRICA

# Indian communists in power

*In Part II of his interview, SITHARAM YECHURY, a member of the secretariat of the central committee of the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M), spoke to DEVAN PILLAY about the Left in power in India, and the role of the socialist opposition*

## **What is the strength of the Left in India today?**

There are two major leftwing parties, the CPI-M and the Communist Party of India (CPI), as well as the Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), the Forward Bloc and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. In addition, the CPI-ML has split into numerous factions.

The CPI-M is the largest party, with 600,000 members, and 51 MPs, as well as an affiliated mass organisation following of 25 million. We control the state of West Bengal at the moment. The CPI has less than 500,000 members, and 16 MPs, while the Forward Bloc and Revolutionary Party have three and four MPs respectively.

Over the last three years these four parties formed the Left Front Committee to fight elections. We have managed to work out a united position on all the main political issues. An important change in the Indian political situation has been the emergence of what has been recognised as a left force.

Before we used to talk in terms of individual parties. And particularly with the defeat of Rajiv Gandhi at the last election, and the emergence of the Janata government, the Left became crucial in terms of the number of votes it held in parliament. That could decide whether this government could form or not. In that sense the Left's position in the government grew beyond its strength.

The Left traditionally has been strong in the south and the east. In Kerala in the south the Left gets between 42-44% of the vote. But this time it lost the election because the other front, led by (the Indian

National) Congress, got 45%.

In Bengal it is between 45-48%. All four parties of the Left Front are represented in West Bengal, while in Kerala the Forward Bloc is not represented.

We attach a great deal of importance to Left unity. In Bengal, for example, our party has over 50% of the seats — so we can form a government on our own. Yet we still insist on a coalition government with the other leftwing parties, because we want to project the Left alternative.

## **Which are the most prominent mass organisations?**

The Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), and the peasant organisation, which are the largest (about 12 million). More than 70% of India's population is in the rural areas. And then, not in terms of strength but in terms of its high profile and political impact, there is the students' organisation.

Every party has its own mass organisation. We have been arguing that there should be one national body, within which the different political trends can contest against each other. We find this acutely necessary for the trade unions, because by being divided along political lines, their effective bargaining strength is reduced. There needs to be one union, one industry.

The main obstacle to this comes from the ruling Congress Party's trade unions. Because of the political clout they enjoy, they manage to get recognition. One of the biggest struggles is to get unions recognised on the basis of a secret ballot, to see which is the most representative. At the moment the secret ballot

exists in some industries only.

## **What is the underlying political philosophy of the CPI-M?**

We were formed in 1964, when we broke away from the CPI. One of the fundamental issues over which we broke was on the assessment of the Indian ruling classes. Our understanding was that the Indian bourgeoisie had a dual character.

On the one hand, it is aligned with imperialism to the extent that it requires foreign capital and technology in order to build capitalism. But it is also, on the other hand, in conflict with imperialism, because it does not want to give up its market, its economic space, to the multinational corporations.

This dual character has a number of manifestations, one of which is India's apparently progressive, non-aligned foreign policy. This was our fundamental understanding which we retain today.

The CPI's understanding, which came from Moscow, was that the bourgeoisie was completely anti-imperialist. Therefore, any advance towards socialism in India will have to be in association with them.

Then there was the Chinese variety, which held that the Indian bourgeoisie was completely dependent on imperialism.

From this flowed different tactical positions. The Soviet line talked of collaboration with the Congress, to the extent that the CPI was in an electoral adjustment with the Congress until 1977. And the Naxalites of the CPI-ML talked in terms of the total overthrow of the Indian government through people's war, because it is a puppet of imperialism.

So, in terms of Marxism, we have adopted two fundamental principles. Recent experience has vindicated them. Firstly, Marxism is a creative science that has to be applied to concrete conditions of each country. Secondly, the revolutionary process in each country cannot be a replica of any other country. Because in communist literature you will always come across terms like the 'Chinese path' and the 'Soviet path'. We have said that it cannot be either path — it has to be an Indian path.

This is a fundamental tenet that we continue to hold on to. The failure to hold to this is what has prevented the other Indian communist parties from growing.

Therefore, while retaining its revolutionary essence, each party has the responsibility to adapt Marxist ideology to the concrete conditions of their countries. The failure to do so will lead to distortions, as it is now shown.

**In terms of this perspective, how did the state governments that your party controlled, function?**

India has a peculiar federal structure, where you have a central government, which controls the essential powers of the state. And you have state governments, which have very little power in their hands. They deal primarily in local law and order. One meaningful power they have is in the sphere of land reforms. All other decisions, such as industrialisation and taxation, are taken at the centre.

So the states of India have by constitutional law very limited powers to enact meaningful legislation to change the direction of the all-India pattern.

The first time a Communist government came into power in Kerala was in 1957 — the first time it happened in the capitalist world, where we were suddenly elected into power. And we were faced with the question: what do we do with this power? We could not do what we wanted to do, for example nationalise or rationalise industry.

So it is from there that we had to evolve true practice, a certain method of functioning. We tell people very frankly: these are the powers we have, and this is what we can do. If we had power at the centre, then we would do this. But since we cannot do that within this limitation, this is what we can do.

This frankness helped, because it lowered people's expectations. There was obviously a great deal of anticipation. So, despite being in power in West Bengal for 15 years, unemployment has not been eliminated, poverty continues, but the levels are much better than in the rest of the country.

This has been primarily because, in the spheres where we have power, like land reform, where there is still a deep-rooted feudal structure, we succeeded in breaking it up, by handing over land to the peasant.

This has helped reduce poverty in those regions, and achieve agricultural



*Yechury: We have reduced infant mortality, poverty and illiteracy to levels comparable to some developed countries*

growth. The states of West Bengal and Kerala have become self-sufficient.

The other achievement is in education. In Kerala, because of having come to office before Bengal, we had initiated a process which even our opponents could not withdraw. Kerala is now the only state in India which is totally literate.

And because of these reforms in land and education, you find in Kerala today the overall rates of growth in the normal indices — infant mortality, poverty datum line, literacy etc — not only the highest but, according to a recent UN study, comparable to some Western, or developed, countries.

**But is this not a form of social democracy?**

We have been accused of being a 'Stalinist' party in name but a 'social democratic' party in practice, because we run these governments. But what we emphasise is that the presence of these governments themselves are an important achievement in the Indian people's struggles. And because these governments were there, a lot of things have been implemented in the country which had not been there before, for example unemployment allowances. The West Bengal government was the first to introduce this scheme, and the other states followed suit.

So there have been advantages like this which people outside Bengal noticed. We have also provided a government which is sharply different to what



*Yechury: British rule was to a very large extent responsible for the massive poverty you see in India today*

the people are used to, in terms of corruption and inefficiency. So the absence of these have made these governments more attractive.

Because of India's federal structure, there is a constant threat of the centre against a hostile government in the state. In 1957 there was a Communist government elected by the people in Kerala, but in 1959 it was toppled by the centre. The centre has the authority to impose central rule in any state it feels is not being run properly. The government of the CPI that was elected in 1967 was again toppled in 1969.

In Bengal in 1969 you had a United Front government, where we were the largest party. It was dismissed in 1971. This is one sphere where the class struggle is expressed in India, between the ruling class parties and between the communist parties.

The central government is no longer able to dismiss an elected state government as they could do earlier, which is a reflection of how the class struggle has shifted, to a limited extent, in our favour. Because, frankly, when we again came to power in 1977 in West Bengal, we thought that it would only be for one term, and didn't take it seriously. But we were re-elected in 1982, 1985 and 1989. They are no longer in a position to remove us.

That is where we attach importance to these governments, as an expression of the class struggle in India. This has to be seen within the framework of our Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is not so much

wanting to cling to power in these states, as some of our detractors accuse us, but not being in power in West Bengal, or losing power, would mean a set-back to the forces of the Left.

#### **What were the shifts in CPI, that caused them to join the Left Front in 1982-3?**

Since the split in 1964, the CPI adopted the Soviet perspective, which meant forming an electoral alliance with Congress. In 1977, when Indira Gandhi was forced to withdraw the state of emergency, the CPI contested the elections with the Congress Party, and were mauled along with them. They came very close to risking their status as a national party.

After that there was a lot of re-thinking within the CPI. In 1978 there was a major break in their understanding. They concluded that it was wrong to go with the Congress, and have retained this position.

But a contradiction emerged. Their tactical position shifted towards ours, in opposition to the Congress, but their programmatic position remained the same, namely that the only route to socialism is in alliance with the national bourgeoisie of the Congress party. But in practice they are in opposition to the Congress party, and with us. They have not yet resolved this contradiction.

Secondly, after all these developments in the Soviet Union, they are in a state of difficulty. They are unable to come to terms with what has happened.

We have been critical of aspects of

Gorbachev's policies since 1987. We felt that there was a need for reform, but we criticised what was brought into being as undermining socialism itself.

The CPI continue to say that Gorbachev brought in all those reforms to improve socialism — so now they are in a fix. So they cannot satisfy the Indian people by saying that what has gone on in the Soviet Union has been an anti-communist frenzy.

The present political situation in India is very complex. You have a very rapid advance of the rightwing forces. This has been on the basis of exploiting religious sentiment, and attracting a section of the traditional Congress support towards the BJP, the major rightwing party.

This reflects a rightwing shift within the ruling classes. In this situation it is all the more necessary for the Left to unite. This objective situation is also a propelling factor, pushing the Left together.

#### **What, in your opinion, is primarily responsible for the widespread poverty in the cities of India?**

Primarily, it is because of the existence of feudal relations of production in Indian agriculture, and the inability of Indian capitalism to expand and absorb the growing differentiation that was taking place in the rural areas. So the rural unemployed would leave for the cities.

The feudal relation is an extremely complex form of exploitation. You have a feudal landlord who has thousands of acres of land, managed by persons who give to the landlord an income ranging from two to four fifths of the produce. They retain one third or one fifth, which does not sustain their families even on present levels.

Then the dual exploitation begins. They can neither leave the land nor reap. So what happens is that they just run away in order to get out of the situation. This situation worsened under British rule, [when feudal relations were entrenched as part of their divide-and-rule-policy]. Thus British rule was to a very large extent responsible for the massive poverty you see in India today. □

— Part I of this interview was published in WIP 80.

## GRAND CONSPIRACY EXPLANATION

It seems to me that Ellis and Sechaba do not take nearly enough care to uncover this kind of sociology of political exile. Instead, they construct a grand conspiratorial explanation for realities that often have more banal causes.

Their argument goes as follows:

*Step one — some bouquets for the SACP:* The SACP plays an absolutely central role in helping the ANC to survive exile. 'The Communist Party showed itself more resilient than the ANC, perhaps because of its greater discipline and longer history of underground existence, or perhaps because of the greater ideological commitment required of its members, which guided them through hardships unacceptable to others.' (p41)

*Step two — then damn the SACP for the qualities you have just acknowledged:* The greater discipline and commitment are turned into sinister powers enabling the party to carry through what is supposed to be the 'cornerstone of its strategy (since the 1950s), the effective takeover of the ANC' (p10). To sustain this allegation often requires imaginative prose-work on the part of the authors.

## PALLO JORDAN'S DETENTION

Consider, for instance, their account of Pallo Jordan's deplorable detention by ANC security (Mbokodo) in 1983:

First, they imply that ANC security = the SACP:

'The atmosphere of intimidation created... by the work of security men trained in Eastern Europe spread from Angola to other sections of the ANC.' (p120)

Then the authors imply that Jordan was detained because he was opposed to the SACP:

'A good illustration of just how pervasive the intimidation exercised by Mbokodo became in the fullness of time concerns Pallo Jordan...Jordan was detained for six weeks after a dispute with a Communist Party member who was a senior official of Intelligence and Security...' (p120)

And finally: Jordan is rescued from the clutches of the SACP-Mbokodo by *non-Party leaders in the ANC*:

'...Jordan was eventually rescued only by the intervention of Oliver Tambo...' (p120)

When this shameful episode was first publicised by the *Weekly Mail* last year, with the same anti-SACP innuendo, Pallo Jordan demanded a correction, pointing out that he owed his rescue to two prominent SACP members, Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils.

It may very well be (I simply don't know) that an ANC security man who was also a party member was implicated in Jordan's detention. Either way, I am not trying to exonerate the party from the shortcomings and blunders of its principal ally or the actions of individual members. My point is that these shortcomings need to be understood not as part of some grand communist conspiracy, but much more in the context of the sociology of exile, the paranoias, factionalisms, and tendencies to bureaucratism that stalk exiled movements.

## MASSAGING INFORMATION

In virtually every ugly episode recorded in this book, the authors manage to find among the wrong-doers some party members, but in virtually every case it is also party members who are to the fore in seeking to redress the problem.

In other words, the authors' own facts continuously point to underlying causes of ANC exile problems which *cannot* be mapped into a simple SACP conspiracy. But they expend considerable energy counteracting their own evidence.

Indeed the authors are adept at massaging information. See, for instance, the sleight of hand in their suggestion that Operation Vula was an SACP affair, 'known to few beyond those involved, a select group under the chairmanship of Oliver Tambo, who seems to have been one of only a handful of non-communists informed of the operation' (p194).

If you stop to think, you might notice the contradictions. The authors simultaneously concede that Tambo was in charge of Vula while implying that he was, as some kind of afterthought, merely 'informed' about it! Moreover, since Vula, on their own admission, involved only a select group, presumably it was not just a handful of non-communists, but also only a handful of communists that were *ever informed about its existence!*

## ARMED STRUGGLE

*Step Three — having claimed a success-*

*ful SACP takeover of the ANC, then impute a strategy to the party which it is supposed to have foisted onto the ANC:*

'For all the period of exile, the Party put its faith in armed struggle, believing not merely that this was necessary for its success, but, really, that it was at the heart of its strategy.' (p200)

This was never the programmatic perspective of the SACP, although in practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a tendency for both the party and ANC to overemphasise armed struggle.

But Ellis and Sechaba completely ignore major strategic developments within the ANC-alliance during the exile period.

Howard Barrell, by contrast (*MK, the ANC's armed struggle*, 1990), records the major strategic shift of 1978, influenced by the '76 uprising and also by a seminal ANC study tour to Vietnam. According to Barrell, from 1978 the ANC began to emphasise that the 'major immediate task of the underground must now be to build a broad democratic front of organisations inside South Africa, mainly by legal and semi-legal political means.' (Barrell, p40)

MK's armed activity was now explicitly described as secondary. Ellis and Sechaba ignore this major strategic development, just as they ignore the strategic core of the SACP's 1989 programme, which elaborated and extended the ANC's 1978 perspective.

Instead, the 'SACP dominated ANC' in exile is supposed to have focussed narrowly on a military seizure of power.

*And finally, Step Four — having caricatured SACP-ANC strategy, you can claim the strategy has failed because there has been no armed seizure of power. Therefore...despite the extensive popularity and legitimacy the ANC enjoys today; ... despite the fact that the ANC is on the threshold of power; ... the SACP has betrayed the ANC into failure!*

## FASCINATING STORY SQUANDERED

It is a pity Ellis and Sechaba squeeze their book into this mould. The squeeze raises doubts about all their rich factual information. They squander an otherwise fascinating story on a conspiracy theory.

Question: is it perhaps not THEIR book which is the real conspiracy? □

# COSATU - A VIEW FROM THE INSIDE

*STRIKING BACK: A history of Cosatu*

By Jeremy Baskin, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, R33 (466 pages)

Reviewed by **KERRY CULLINAN**

**A** BOOK WRITTEN FROM within an organisation by one of its officials does not usually make gripping reading. But Baskin's *Striking Back* is an exception. While his account is partisan, he does not take the lap-dog approach.

His account of the federation's short history makes easy and often exciting reading (yes, all 466 pages!). Baskin's access to minutes of Cosatu's meetings, as well as having been a key unionist in a Cosatu affiliate, means that the book is a balance between facts and personal accounts and interpretations.

Through *Striking Back*, Baskin reminds us that Cosatu was given very little time to consolidate its structures before the state struck back with its state of emergency on 12 June, 1986.

'In the Eastern Cape, there was hardly a factory which did not have workers detained, often for periods up to three years... In Northern Natal, every organiser and many key shop stewards in the region were detained... In a number of areas, police showed no hesitation in detaining an entire striking workforce.' (p138)

Cosatu managed, however, to hold a central executive committee (CEC) meeting shortly after the emergency was declared, where delegates arrived 'in suits and ties and carried briefcases. Some had rapidly grown beards and moustaches or now wore spectacles to help alter their attire'. (p140)

## UNPRECEDENTED INDUSTRIAL ACTION

By mid-1987, largely due to the courage of its rank-and-file members, Cosatu had learnt to operate under the state of emergency. Indications of this are the unprecedented industrial action in that year: the 350,000-strong mineworkers strike, Sats

strike and the OK Bazaars strike.

That same year also brought Cosatu's second national congress, which concentrated on developing the federation's political policy. A 'harsh' merger policy taken by the CEC resolved that only merged unions were allowed to attend the congress. This saw the federation's 33 initial affiliates reduced to 13, with Potwa (Post and Telecommunications Workers Association) as observers, at the congress.

The mergers, achieved within 19 months, may have been 'over-hasty', says Baskin. But 'the merger process, while causing tensions in the short term, was essential for medium-term unity and development'. (p223)

By 1988, the state's attack on Cosatu had taken a new line with the proposed Labour Relations Amendment Act. This resulted in a special congress and an unprecedented mass stayaway on 6, 7 and 8 June. A new agreement was eventually struck with business and the state, which set the stage for today's national economic negotiating forum.

## DEFEATS AND FAILURES

But alongside the victories and strengths, Baskin also recounts the defeats and failures of Cosatu.

'The participation of women in Cosatu's leadership is, if anything, becoming less,' states Baskin. (p373) Only affirmative action and confronting the 'whole structure of relations between men and women' will bring women into the forefront of the federation and its affiliates.

Then there is Cosatu's failure to organise farmworkers and the unemployed and to strengthen weaker affiliates, which has led to 'enormous imbalances of power, experience and structures of the various Cosatu unions'. (p455)

For me, one of the most valuable parts of the book — and one in which Baskin's understanding of the inner workings of the union movement is demonstrated — is the last chapter, 'Inheriting the past'. In it, Baskin weighs the federation's achievements against its failures and weaknesses and looks at the challenges ahead.

One of his key criticisms is the fact that the federation is becoming more official- rather than worker-driven. 'Increasing the mass base of Cosatu campaigns is essential for the re-invigoration of union democracy', he asserts. (p457)

He also identifies a lack of professionalism, poor training programmes and unsuitable constitutional structures as hampering Cosatu's ability to meet the challenges of the 1990s.

## PPWAWU BIAS

'Striking Back' has some drawbacks, though. I found some repetition in chapters and a disturbance in chronology because information is grouped according to themes.

It also has a bias towards Baskin's former union, the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppwawu). But perhaps the biggest drawback is the fact that little attention is paid to Cosatu's international relations, which appears to encourage what Baskin himself identifies as the 'excessive self-centredness of South African unionists'. □



# WOMEN AND WAR

*COLONELS AND CADRES: War and Gender in South Africa*

By Jacklyn Cock, Oxford University Press, 1991, (R32.99)

Reviewed by **MUFF ANDERSON**

**W**HAT IS SO terrifying about racism in this country is not so much its stupidity and cruelty but that it allows the most violent, psychopathic white thugs to strut their stuff in uniform in the belief that they are society's protectors.

'If we saw a well-built kaffir, we'd know he was a terr. If he had soft feet that would prove it beyond doubt, at least if we were out in the bush, because who else wears shoes?...We'd interrogate him, and if he was stubborn he could have trouble. Maybe we'd tie him to the front of the Buffel and do a little bundu-bashing. Feel it? Why should I feel it? I wasn't

on front of the Buffel...'

A quote in Jackie Cock's book from a 'normal' white South African, a boy who went to the army because that was his inescapable destiny, same as that of almost every other white boy in the country.

The South African Defence Force (SADF) is the institution through which white boys are supposed to turn into men, and as Jackie Cock points out with one chilling example after another, the point at which they are considered to be men is when they have become immune to the suffering of others, even deriving pleasure from that suffering.

She recounts incidents of SADF cruelty to children, rape of women in the townships and acts of savagery that are beyond imagination. In one incident a sergeant-major, corporal and private, play a game with three kittens — and kick them around until two are dead. A black worker is called to clean up the mess. Cock alludes to an SADF special elite training programme where puppies are carried around and cared for by the soldiers for four days and then killed with bare hands.

## NOT MEN ALONE

But it is not men alone who hold up military institutions like the SADF. One of the book's most riveting chapters is 'The protected: white women and the SADF' wherein Cock explores ten typical roles in which women have historically been incorporated into war: as pretexts for war — 'the Helen of Troy syndrome'; as wives and prostitutes 'to provide for the warrior's rest and recreation'; as entertainers, a la Vera Lynn and Pat Kerr; as victims; as sympathetic nurses — 'the Florence Nightingale syndrome'; as seductive spies, a la Mata Hari and Olivia Forsyth; as cheerleaders who shout support from the side of trains; as 'castrating bitches who belittle and berate men for refusing to become macho murderers'; as mothers of soldiers; as cooperative citizens.

She looks at the type of training women at the SADF camp in George receive and the reasons for undertaking this training, as well as the bias towards some of the women who see themselves as soldiers: 'Many of the instructors were very butch...All the lesbians joined the Permanent Force', Informant 16 tells Cock.

She also interviews the few women who 'made it' to high-ranking positions within the SADF, as well as their counterparts within Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).



## MK WOMEN

I'd expected, before reading the book, that the section on MK would be sketchy, especially since the book was researched before the ANC was unbanned. The research here is indeed much thinner than that on the SADF, but Cock has done quite a remarkable job of ferreting about for facts. I doubt if a researcher in 1992 would find out much more about MK and gender relations than she succeeded in doing in the '80s.

Now, if you approached MK's current leadership and asked to interview 'MK women' you would probably be referred to Jackie Molefe, Thandi Modise and Marion Sparg. These are the very people Cock did succeed in interviewing or writing about. She also has several unidentified 'informants', one of whom I suspect is Thenjiwe Mtintso. The result is a set of quotes saying different things: In MK men and women have identical training; in MK men treat women as equal; there was sexism in the camps; MK men expected women to be docile and subservient.

These statements, contradictory as they may seem, reflect the very real different levels of political awareness and gender consciousness that exist within MK women and men. Cock launches into a fairly controversial debate with comparisons between SADF and MK:

Unlike in the SADF, men and women train side by side in MK. Like in the SADF, MK men and women are deployed differently and women mostly find themselves in non-combat situations (and combat is here being looked at more as exposure to danger than to actual combat in the traditional sense of the word). Like in the SADF, notions of patriotism exist within MK. Like in the SADF, MK soldiers are supposed to be macho. Unlike in the SADF, MK soldiers are taught to respect humanity. Unlike in the SADF, in MK there are women like Thandi Modise who say: 'I'm a guerrilla because I'm a mother.'

There was only one time when I found the parallels between SADF and MK galling and misleading. In the opening chapter Cock states that in the '80s both the SADF and MK developed an inclusive concept of total war, or war which involved the entire population. She describes this as what was called



'people's war' by the ANC or 'total strategy' by the SADF.

I don't think comparing them in this way allows for an accurate definition of the concepts involved. While it is accurate to say total strategy was the 'launching pad for the militarisation of South African society (occurring)...at political, economic and ideological levels', the concept of 'people's war' was never supposed to be a mirror of this.

It was rather a threefold approach to armed struggle, utilising an advanced detachment (MK), underground units and elements of mass resistance. The grenade squads which emerged in this period could be seen as one small example of co-operation between training emanating from exile, underground participation and township activism.

## INQUISITIVE AND BROAD-MINDED

Apart from that, I can think of no theme more interesting than one exploring the link between militarism and gender. It's at the core of what is most distasteful about life in general and South African life in particular. Cock's approach is hard-hitting and unusual. Her inquisitiveness comes through clearly and overrides the academic style with which she has, as a Professor of Sociology at Wits University, obviously chosen to present her facts.

One has a sense of a very curious, broad-minded investigator approaching the subject from a number of different angles, peeping under rocks and finding scorpions, but not allowing that information and horrifying detail to swamp her. There is a feeling that Cock is thinking: This is just the beginning, this is just tapping the tip of the whole shebang.

She hints at other areas that could be explored at a later stage, and while she's

disciplined enough not to divert from her theme, they give the book a strength and personality that makes it worth taking a long time over.

Women and men and the military trickle into tasty bites of other sub-themes, each of which could happily burst into a book on its own.

There's an analysis of the 'twilight war' that existed in South Africa in the '80s; references to the status of women beyond our borders in other conventional armies and in other guerrilla struggles; a discussion about the definition of combat; a chapter on the politics of gender that in 27 pages incorporates everything from a breakdown of where women work and have abortions in South Africa to what the ANC's constitutional guidelines have to say about women's liberation. Along the way she takes in the views of big business, Inkatha and even the Conservative Party. Did you know, for example, that the CP constitution 'contains a requirement that all decision-making bodies should contain a significant proportion of women'?

## SHOULD WOMEN BE CONSCRIPTED?

The book ultimately focuses on a single point: Should women be conscripted? Cock asks if equal rights means equal responsibilities, including military service; and if so, whether such military service should include combat roles?

She looks at two strands of feminist argument which both argue that women should not be conscripted: in the first, women should be excluded because they are seen as morally superior beings to men, nurturing, creative, and pacifist. In the second, women should be excluded because men are viewed as the controllers and dominators of the military machinery. Ironically both these arguments reach the same conclusion as the male sexist perspective that women are physically inferior: that women and combat don't mix.

Cock herself believes it is necessary to break the link between men and militarism and ultimately to transform gender relations to reduce the risks of war. This book is essential reading as we move towards discussions of integrated armies in a post-apartheid South Africa. □  
— AIA





# Left behind

## EERIE SMUDGES

YOU WATCHED or listened to the World Cup cricket shebang, right?

Now think back to 26 January ... a Sunday if it refreshes the memory. Were you one of the thousands of South Africans flipping TV channels and twiddling radio knobs in the hope of catching commentary of the Africa Cup soccer finals? Shame.

Here at Left Behind we spun the dials frantically, but came up blank, except for DJ twaddle, Australian tennis and northern suburbs golf tournaments. The next day we combed the newspapers for the results, and were rewarded with a couple of tiny reports, buried between used car ads and news of the exploits of Aryan sports heroes.

But, during the cricket World Cup you had to duck to avoid the bombardment of media coverage.

Just goes to show that in the minds of our media managers, SA remains an island drifting about somewhere off the coast of Africa — and the continent is still an eerie, foreboding smudge on the map.

For the record, Ivory Coast beat Ghana 2-1. And the crowd rose as one to cheer when the public address system announced South Africa's official re-entry into African soccer. Not that we seemed to give a damn.

## POLA HIE', POLA DAA'

IT'S NO secret that we South Africans have a lot to learn about democracy.

So, as a small public service, Left Behind has decided to provide updates on little-known democratic principles applied in other countries.

With unification of the two Germanies, authorities in Bonn felt that it was only fair that the houses, business and land confiscated by the East German state be returned to their former owners.

The move, said Bonn, was in keeping with the 'well-known democratic principle of restitution before compensation'. In plainer English it meant that if you owned land which was forcibly taken

from you, then you have the democratic right to have that land returned to you -- before any compensation is paid to the guy who seized it from you.

Now, why do we have the sneaky feeling that this is one democratic principle we won't be hearing a lot about in the new SA?

## THOU SHALT BE KNOWN BY ...

ONE'S FRIENDS can be such an embarrassment — especially when they're people like David Irving, guru of *neonazis worldwide*.

Irving, of course, is the British rightwing historian who claims that there were no gas chambers used during the Nazi Holocaust. He has also busied himself for years by disputing the body count of the biggest massacre ever in human history.

In an interview shortly before a recent visit to SA, Irving was asked who he would be dropping in on during his stay. Along with the usual band of CP hacks, up pops the name of a prominent SABC-TV host. The name? John Bishop. Irving calls him an 'old friend'...

## AS THE STOMACH TURNS...

MEDIA COVERAGE of the referendum campaign had its stomach-churning moments. But one Sunday episode on Agenda had Left Behind running for the bathroom.

There sat Jaap Marais, jittery and inflamed, squaring off against Law and Order Minister Hernus Kriel, straining to appear composed.

Marais came out of his corner firing on all cylinders, accusing the NP of responsibility for everything short of the hole in the ozone layer. Kriel soaked up the punishment, and countered with bland, inoffensive replies, spiced with taunting smiles — a style the NP is getting right more frequently these days.

But then the act short-circuited. Marais blamed the government's reform policies for the upsurge in violence and lawlessness, and Kriel forgot his lines.

What upsurge? he asked, and went on to explain that before 2 February, violence was directed against whites and the state. Now, he reminded Marais, it was basically restricted to blacks fighting for the political upper hand. So what's the problem? was the unspoken punchline...

Which goes to show that New South Africa or not, some leopards still can't change — or hide — their blind spots.

## NO PLACE LIKE HOME

THE SHODDY treatment suffered by returning exiles is fast becoming a national tragedy. Whether it's finding a job, somewhere to stay or adapting back to life in this utterly weird place we call home, too many exiles are finding themselves left out in the cold.

Their experience contrasts bitterly with the reception extended to new immigrants — 'settlers' as the 1820 Settlers Association of South Africa likes to refer to them.

It's the Association's business to make life in SA as smooth as possible for new 'settlers'. 'The sooner (new immigrants) feel settled and at home, the sooner we all can benefit from their contribution,' says a brochure of the Association.

Check out these goodies:



Why not plumb the depths of their generosity by applying for membership to see just where, if at all, the buck stops? The Association's address is: 601 Norvic, 93 De Korte St, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2001. Contact numbers: Tel (011) 339-3063/4; Fax (011) 339-6879.

Membership costs a mere R30.

# RECONSTRUCT

APRIL 1992

A WORK IN PROGRESS SUPPLEMENT **issue no. 2**

PIC: PEN



Henry Fazzie (centre) is congratulated by delegates

first general council, which is expected to meet by mid-May.

The veteran leader of the Eastern Cape Civic Organisation (Ecco) and Pepco chairperson, Henry Fazzie, was elected unopposed to chair the seven-member national executive, reports Shadley Nash (Pen).

The leader of the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (Cast), Moses Mayekiso, was elected president. The multi-'hatted' Mayekiso — who is also general secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa), an SACP central committee member and head of the Alexandra Civic Organisation — beat ANC executive member Thozamile Botha, who holds the portfolio of local government, by 84 votes.

The only other executive member not from the Eastern Cape-Border is the vice-president, Lechesa Tsenoli, who is from Southern Natal.

'This is an historic day. Our people died fighting to see the day that such a body was instituted,' said Fazzie in a short address to delegates after his election.

Meanwhile Botha, who was elected as an additional member, said that the role of civic organisations was changing.

'Civic organisations were protest organisations, but now the stage has changed. Civics must begin to enter a phase where developmental programmes are introduced.'

He said civic programmes were not in conflict with those of political organisations 'because they are working on the same issues'.

'But on a local level, civics have an important role to play in the One-City debate. They are in the position of informing authorities about the needs of the people and how they see development. Their role is not to replace elected local authorities, but to inform them.'

He warned however, that civics should not sign any agreements at a local level as this 'may have implications for national negotiations'. ●

*\* Other members elected to top positions in Sanco are: general secretary, Grahamstown Civic Association and Ecco executive member Dan Sandi; assistant secretary, Border's Penrose Ntlanti; treasurer, Transkei Civic Associations' Thobile Gidigidi.*

## CIVICS GO NATIONAL

✂ ABOLISHING ALL apartheid structures and building strong, united structures are the key tasks the SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) set for itself at its launch in Uitenhage on 13-15 March.

Sanco is also committed to drawing up a Civic Charter 'as soon as possible to address the imbalances in our society', says the organisation's publicity secretary, Max Mamase. The charter campaign will also help build organisation.

Mamase, who is from the Port Elizabeth People's Civic Organisation (Pepco), says the fact that most of the national office bearers were from the Eastern Cape and Border did not mean that these regions would dominate Sanco.

'The chairperson and secretary of each region will also be on the NEC, which will meet once a month,' he says.

Discussion on issues such as local government, development, Codesa negotiations and the relationship between civics and political organisations have been deferred to Sanco's

INSIDE

**2** NATAL'S 'HAPHAZARD' STATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

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# STATE METHOD OR MADNESS?

WHO CAN EXPLAIN THE HAPHAZARD STATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN NATAL? THE ANC'S DR MIKE SUTCLIFFE AND THE NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS' (NIC) PRAVIN GORDHAN, TELL **KERRY CULLINAN** THAT THERE IS METHOD IN STATE INITIATIVES, AND THAT THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT IS FIGHTING BACK.

PIC: CECIL SOLS / DYNAMIC IMAGES



*Inkatha impis*

STATE DEVELOPMENT forums lie thick on the ground in Natal, from the giant RSA/KwaZulu Development Project (RKDP) which claims it will be involved in over 100 development projects this year at a cost of more than R140 million, to Natal Provincial Administration (NPA) and KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC) projects.

While the RKDP is committed to promoting private land and home ownership and local entrepreneurs, from the outside there seems to be little in its approach that suggests it has a clear plan for the region. Much the same can be said for the KFC and NPA projects.

For Dr Mike Sutcliffe, the ANC Southern Natal Regional Executive Committee member responsible for local and regional government, there is a certain coherence in the state's approach even if there is no strategic development plan.

'There is a racial basis to their development plans. Indian areas are used as buffers between whites and africans.

'Any squatting that takes place does so in indian areas.

'One can see a racism emerging in the conflicts between indian homeown-

ers and the african squatters, but what the two groups don't see is that the cause of this conflict is the apartheid government. The ANC and the civics have a huge role to play in bringing the communities together.

'Middle-income africans are also used as a buffer between very poor and richer whites.

'The state is also implementing a host of silly little projects, mostly on the fringes of Durban, about 35km from the city centre. The purpose for these projects is to keep the poor far from the city.'

## The 'Volker option'

The NIC's Pravin Gordhan, who is also a leader of the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and chairperson of Codesa's management committee, also believes that the state does not have a coherent development strategy, but 'what it does is tied to its regional political strategy'.

'A very good example of what the state is up to on a political level is reflected in how the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) Tino Volker is

operating on local government here,' he adds.

'We call this the "Volker option", where Black Local Authorities (BLAs) and coloured and indian Local Affairs Committees (LACs) are being integrated administratively and sometimes politically into adjoining white councils. Examples of this are to be found in about 14 areas in Natal, including Pietermaritzburg, Stanger and Ladysmith.

'This is an attempt on Volker's part to subvert any democratic process and keep the movement forces out of any local level development.'

For Sutcliffe, the 'Volker option' has begun to assert itself strongly in local level negotiations.

'A year ago, we would sit with just the NPA at negotiations. We now meet NPA, LACs and BLAs.'

For Sutcliffe, the NPA and not KwaZulu, is the driving force in the region.

'As far as KwaZulu is concerned, they attend meetings with the NPA but have no strategy for the region. They are usually armed with consultants at these meetings, and the consultants do all the talking.'

## KwaZulu's agenda

But while KwaZulu may be in the dark as far as development is concerned, Gordhan believes it has a clear regional political agenda.

'The KwaZulu government's strong support for federalism at Codesa indicates that it wants regional political power,' says Gordhan.

'Then there is the rumour that Buthelezi may leave Inkatha and base himself in KwaZulu so that, if he fails at a national level, he has an ethnic regional base from which to intervene. There are also rumours that the KwaNatal Indaba has been revived.

'All these things indicate there is a kind of regional political option the government and KwaZulu are trying to play out. The development strategy they would pursue would be in that context.'

There is also KwaZulu's insistence that civics won't be given the space, which for Gordhan indicates that KwaZulu's development strategy would be linked to winning voters' support and credibility.

Interestingly though, many Inkatha supporting chiefs are opposed to RKDP development plans as they will result in chiefs losing power, says Sutcliffe.

But he cautions against dismissing the entire KwaZulu government. 'The ANC believes a lot of comrades in KwaZulu, once shackles of Inkatha are thrown off them, have the potential to play an important role in the future government in a way that the dummy BLAs and LACs will never have,' he adds.

'Another area where the state's development strategy can be seen is at informal housing settlements,' asserts Gordhan.

'There again is the use of underground forces to undermine political organisations in these communities and discredit the ANC.'

And Sutcliffe believes that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is still operating, especially in informal housing areas.

'The area where the ANC is weak nationally in the battle against the right wing is in informal settlements. The right wing are going to exploit this and cause violence in these settlements because these are the most defenceless people. At a local level, the ultra-right is recruit-

ing NPA officials. These are the people who are demolishing squatter camps, while their bosses are meeting us in negotiating forums.'

Progressive movement's response 'Hit with so many battles, it is difficult (for the progressive movement) to develop a coherent approach,' admits Sutcliffe.

The ANC has set up a local and regional government committee made up of representatives from ANC zones, Cosatu, SACP and civic association representatives, convened by Sutcliffe to tackle local government issues in Southern Natal.

## Alliances

'The way to build a local government front is to build alliances with the civics on a programme of action to win over a range of people, including the major local authorities,' says Sutcliffe.

'The authorities must start talking to us now, because by the time we have an interim government, possibly by July, we have to have a solution.

'That's going to terrify most local authorities. We are not interested in talk shops. There is a shift in power and within a year, real power will be in the hands of the majorities.'

Sutcliffe believes the progressive movement should target the five key local authorities: Durban, Pinetown, Amanzimtoti, Westville and Umhlanga. Meetings should be held with them which

should then lead to structures being formed.

To Gordhan, the progressive movement's response to local government has tended to be 'isolated, fragmented and issue-oriented'.

'There's a gap between struggles on the ground and policy formulation at a regional level, largely by academics. There is also a gap between long-term planning and immediate responses. Clearly we need to look at this,' says Gordhan.

'We need to take a formal initiative with white municipalities that will begin the process of forming an interim government structure regionally, which can be in place at about the same time as a national interim government.

'The interim governing council, which will take over certain state functions including local government, could be in place within the next four months. We've got to act within that context, not initiate processes that will take years of discussion.

'We hope that at Codesa level, agreement can be reached on a set of common principles and criteria by which all local authorities in the country would have to engage in local interim structures by a certain period.'

These negotiations would have to take place hand in hand with mass action and campaigns 'to ensure that the interim structure is balanced in favour of the democratic forces', concludes Gordhan. ●



Mass action and campaigns must continue.

FIG. ELMOND JIVANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

# CATO MANOR'S GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATO MANOR — A VAST AREA A MERE 8KM FROM DURBAN'S CITY CENTRE — PROVIDES A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE THE CITY'S APARTHEID PLANNING AND BRING LOW INCOME PEOPLE CLOSER TO TOWN, REPORTS **KERRY CULLINAN**.

MOST OF the 2 000 hectares of Cato Manor is publicly owned — by a myriad of government structures. All the land-owners have agreed in principle that a holistic development plan should be drawn up.

But a number of issues still have to be thrashed out in the 'mini-Codesa' forum that has been set up to deal with Cato Manor's development.

## Durban's Sophiatown

In many ways, the old Cato Manor was to Durban what Sophiatown was to Johannesburg. It was a vibrant, non-racial area: home to some 120,000 people by the early 1950s. It was also a stronghold for the Congress alliance.

But by the early 60s, this non-racial society had been destroyed by apartheid removals. African people were removed to KwaMashu and Indian people to Chatsworth and Phoenix. All three areas are

on the periphery of the city.

With the fragmentation of the central state, land ownership has been 'tricameralised'. It is scattered between the House of Delegates (HOD), House of Assembly, the Natal Provincial Administration, three councils — Westville, Ningizumu and Durban; the Durban corporation, the University of Natal and a few private land owners.

Some piecemeal developments have been undertaken by various local authorities, but no overall plan for the area has been formulated.

## Community structures

'We first got involved (in Cato Manor) as the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) in the late 70s and helped to form the Cato Manor Residents' Association (CMRA). The CMRA can take the credit for laying the basis for the kinds of developments we have at this time,' says DHAC and Natal Indian Con-

gress (NIC) leader Pravin Gordhan.


'Initially, the campaign focused on the right of people to remain in Cato Manor and the demand for affordable housing.

'In the late 80s, this process was taken further when the CMRA and consultants formulated a vision for the development of the area, calling for non-racial development and low cost housing.'


The community then presented its vision to the authorities. The Durban Functional Region's (DFR) economic development initiative, Operation Jumpstart, then set up an action group to look into the area.

'A coalition of the CMRA, Chester-ville Residents' Association, the ANC, SACP, DHAC, the Civic Working Committee and informal housing organisations in the area then formed the Cato Manor Development Committee (CMDC) in early 1991,' says Gordhan.

Service organisations such as the Built Environment Support Group



Shacks mushroom among the mango trees



(BESG) and Centre for Community and Labour Studies (CCLS) were also brought into the committee.

BESG's Clive Foster says the CMDC identified two phases in development:

'In the first phase, the committee would negotiate with all the various landowners for Cato Manor to be consolidated under a new vehicle,' says Foster.

'It was felt that, with the demise of the Group Areas Act, it was not appropriate for the land to be owned by racially defined bodies or for development to happen along racial lines.

'In the second phase, the CMDC wanted the land to be reconstituted under a non-racial trust, which could then implement its development,' says Foster.

Meanwhile in a bid to counter the CMDC, the state formed its own group, essentially made up of state structures.

### Meetings with the state

There was much opposition to the state's group, with some bodies refusing to cooperate with the state structure. Eventually community and state bodies involved in the area met in May 1991.

This meeting was followed up in July 1991 by a meeting of 'all interested parties' called by the deputy minister of planning, Andre Fourie.

At this meeting, a technical work group made up of the NPA, department of planning, CMDC, Operation Jumpstart, HOD and the Durban corporation was set up to compile a report on possible approaches to developing the area.

This report was presented to a meeting on 16 August, 1991. Agreement was reached that development of all vacant land in Cato Manor should be: holistic,

non-racial and aimed at low to middle income groups.

It was also agreed that a 'non-racial, democratic, consensus based trust' made up of representatives of all involved parties should be set up to guide the area's development. The state agreed to look into what land it could make available to this trust.

But after that meeting, central government threw a spanner in the works. Fourie was to get cabinet endorsement for the agreement in September. However, after a long delay, Fourie convened a meeting on 9 December, where he presented a substantially different proposal.

Central government seemed to fear that pooling land ownership would remove power from its local authorities and the NPA.

'There was a major clash between Fourie and the CMDC,' says Gordhan.

ANC Southern Natal executive member, Dr Mike Sutcliffe, reportedly called the deputy minister a liar, and the CMDC representatives walked out of the meeting.

This year, attempts were made to heal this rift. Finally agreement was reached that Cato Manor Development Forum steering committee (SC) should be formed to address the questions of development.

The forum's SC, which is chaired by an advocate, operates along the lines of Codesa, with consensus needed for progress.

For Sutcliffe, the steering committee 'has the potential to become an interim government structure'.

It consists of 'all interested parties' including the main political organisations, and government structures. Ten

representatives of local authorities and ten community representatives, including Inkatha and a conservative white residents' organisation, make up the SC. Seven of ten community organisations are in an alliance, explains Sutcliffe. These are essentially the bodies that made up the CMDC.

### Compromises

But the CMDC was forced to compromise on a key aspect of its approach: that all Cato Manor's land is pooled under a trust. This means that the land, finance and to a large extent the planning capability, still lie in state hands.

While the individual landowners have agreed to submit their plans to the SC, the extent of power the SC has over the land owners is unclear.

Also unresolved is the question of who will finance low cost housing. So far, the CMDC has been unable to fundraise for this as it does not own the land.


Doubts have also been expressed about whether the SC is capable of implementing development. But this will soon be tested as, now that agreement has been reached on the broad principles of development, the actual foundations for a development plan have to be laid.

Gordhan agrees that fragmented land ownership and the uncertainty about the SC's power to implement agreements are disadvantages.

But both he and Sutcliffe are confident that, with the imminent establishment of an interim government, the balance of forces will shift significantly in favour of the community organisations in the Cato Manor forum. ●

# BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC DURBAN

A UNITED REGIONAL CIVIC STRUCTURE, THE SOUTHERN NATAL CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS (SONACA) WAS LAUNCHED ON 6 MARCH. ORGANISATIONS ARE ALSO DISCUSSING HOW TO REVIVE THE DEMOCRATIC DURBAN CAMPAIGN (DDC). **KERRY CULLINAN** SPOKE TO SONACA DEPUTY SECRETARY **LECHESA TSENOLI**, ABOUT THE CHALLENGES FACING THE CIVIC MOVEMENT IN HIS REGION.



**IN RECENT years, the Joint Rent Action Committee (Jorac) split into the Southern Natal Interim Civics (SNIC) and Natal Interim Civics Organisation (NICO). Does the new regional civic structure incorporate both these structures and how did it come about?**

I am not the right person to talk about the unity process. Others must be credited with that. But what I can say is several meetings were held between SNIC and NICO, and late last year they resolved to work together. The Civic Working Committee (CWC) was then established as a temporary structure to ensure the formalisation of interim structures in the whole of Natal. The CWC has already overseen the launch of

the Civic Associations of Northern Natal and Sonaca. The North Coast has launched. The Midlands is relatively weak, but we are hoping that, in time, that region will also launch.

**What area is covered by Southern Natal, and what is the Durban Functional Region (DFR)?**

Southern Natal stretches to Stanger in the north, Hammarsdale in the west. In the lower south, Matatiele is the furthest point with Port Shepstone the furthest in the upper south. The DFR is also pretty big. It covers a total area of 2,940 square kilometres. In the east, we have the Indian Ocean as the boundary. In the west, Cato Ridge; in the south, Umkomaas is

our boundary and then on the northern part, Salt Rock.

### **What is KwaZulu's response to the civics in the region?**

The KwaZulu minister of interior, Steven Sithebe, has declared war on civics. He has said as much in public meetings. And Inkatha has decided to fight any initiative that is not theirs.

We also almost always suspect the NPA and others of trying to prop up KwaZulu, so that when they oppose what civics have to say it is because it goes against what they have decided with KwaZulu at a regional level.

One example is in KwaMashu's L Section. People were negotiating with the interior minister about their problems, but he indicated that he was not interested in talking to civic structures. The residents then negotiated with the NPA but while they were negotiating, the NPA apparently received a document from the KwaZulu government saying that if the NPA wanted to negotiate about KwaMashu they should do so with the KwaZulu council, not shadowy groups.

What is now emerging in that same section, which is a civic stronghold, is gangsterism. But these gangsters are openly against the civic. They are expressing political objections to the civic activists. We don't think this is a coincidence.

There is also the question of squatters, who have been attacked with brute force in areas that fall under KwaZulu. The Durban council has also been using its security department to set people's shacks alight and destroy people's property.

### **Aside from having to build structures and deal with the violence, what are some of the other problems facing the civics in the region, and how are these being dealt with?**

There are many problems. For one, the NPA has failed to implement agreements reached in meetings with community representatives on the development of townships.

For example, areas that fall under the Ningizumu town council (NTC), that is Lamontville, Chesterville and hostels in Durban formed the Joint Areas Committee (JAC) about four years ago to negotiate with the NPA about these problems. Last year, the NPA unilaterally suspended these negotiations but we pressurised them, the Durban city council and the Ningizumu council into meeting us a few weeks ago.

In Tokoza women's hostel, Inkatha members are given preference on the waiting list and are allowed to stay with their children. JAC submitted proposals to the NPA and NTZ some time ago on upgrading and ultimately converting the hostels to single and family units. But when the NPA got money for hostel upgrading, they pretended it was their initiative, and called a broad meeting to discuss the matter. We are currently negotiating with them around upgrading.

But now that Sonaca has launched and can co-ordinate activity, JAC may fall away.

### **How did the Democratic Durban Campaign (DDC) come about and why is it important to it revive now?**

Townships around Durban have always resisted being incor-

porated into KwaZulu, as we are an integral part of Durban. The various civic associations have also been demanding a single, non-racial and democratic local authority for the entire DFR as we believe that our problems will only be solved by a democratic city.

The demand for one democratic city was also raised during the 1989 Defiance Campaign.

Some white residents also started a campaign for an open city. A workshop involving a wide range of organisations was convened in February 1990. This led to other meetings and then to the launch of the Civic Forum, which is made up of a wide range of organisations.

The campaign is being seen as important now because with the talk of an interim government, the question of local government is becoming critical. We have to ensure that we have ideas and policies concretised. We are planning a policy conference to look at some issues.

### **Can you tell us more about the Civic Forum (CF)?**

The CF is probably going to be the campaign structure that takes forward the campaign for a democratic Durban. It is very broad-based and cuts across a number of municipalities. It could act as a reference point when we move into interim government arrangements.

In all there are about 70 organisations in the CF. There are three types of organisations represented: civic associations, which are divided into the north, south and west zones; sectoral organisations in fields such as education, sports, culture, health, religious and the environmental and political organisations — the ANC, SACP, NIC — and trade unions.

The forum was formed in mid-1991, and a council made up of representatives from the zones and sectoral and political organisations was set up to see to the running of the CF.

### **Do the civics in Southern Natal have any united approach to development?**

At the moment, we are developing a united approach. We have also been persuaded by attending National Development Forum meetings that there is a need for a regional development structure to ensure that we formulate our own policies. Civics also do not have the skills to take on development projects and we need a vehicle of this kind.

We need to get other sectors to join us in forming this structure so that we develop a systematic approach to development. We have to have community involvement and control over the processes, as well as access to funds. Development projects must also create jobs in our communities. The key is to see development in a holistic manner, not just in a technical light.

We also have to ensure that there is a moratorium on unilateral decision-making by all levels of government.

Not only the NPA has its own development plans. There are the big companies like Tongaat-Hulett's. Their plans are all finalised without any input from the civics. ●

\* Tsenoli was recently elected vice-president of the SA National Civic Organisation and is full-time co-ordinator of the DDC.



# PIETERMARITZBURG'S WAR VICTIMS FIGHT BACK

FOR MANY VICTIMS OF NATAL'S VIOLENCE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LOVED ONES, HOMES AND LIVELIHOODS, LIFE IS HARDLY WORTH LIVING. BUT THOSE WHO HAVE WON THE RIGHT TO LAND IN COPEVILLE PROVIDE A BEACON OF HOPE TO OTHERS DISPLACED BY THE KILLINGS, REPORTS **KERRY CULLINAN**.

ONE OF the saddest effects of the violence in Natal is the thousands of people who have been forced onto the streets after their homes were burnt down, or they were driven from their areas by vigilantes.

While some are now living in displacee camps, others have built their own homes in areas free from the violence. But the reception to these people — now seen as 'squatters' by homeowners in the peaceful areas — has often been hostile, sometimes even violent.

## Ray of hope

One displacee community in the Copesville area offers a ray of hope to those who have fled from the violence. Armed only with strong organisation in the form of the Copesville Residents Association (CRA) and an ANC branch, and supported by the Built Environment Support Group (BESG), the community has successfully negotiated 1,044 sites for themselves very close to where they are now living.

'This was the first african community to lay claim to a permanent place in Pietermaritzburg. The situation arose prior to the Group Areas Act being scrapped, when there was no such thing as an african ratepayer, not to mention a whole community of dispossessed, unemployed and poverty-stricken people, who cannot even afford basic shelter, services and land,' says BESG's Anton Krone.

The majority of the displacees moved to Copesville, an indian residential area north east of Pietermaritzburg, in 1990. They came mainly from Edendale, Sweetwaters, Maqongqo and Table Mountain areas. Most had fled during Edendale Valley's *seven-day war* in March 1990, during which thousands of Inkatha impis led by local warlords invaded the area and indiscriminately attacked homes. Others have been living in Copesville for some eight years.

## Racial tension

There are presently about 5,000 displacees in Copeville. A



A single tar road separates these 'squatters' from an HOD housing development

single tar road separates their mainly wattle and daub shacks from the new low-cost indian housing estate being built by the House of Delegates (HOD), which owns the land.

The HOD planned to build 3,000 homes in the area, but in some areas building has stopped because the displacees' shelters are in the way. Racial tension is riding high between the indian and african communities, with all crime in the new housing estate being blamed on the displacees.

'Many of the indian people carry guns. Sometimes you can be assaulted if you are walking alone at night,' a Copesville resident told *Reconstruct*.

Initially developers and the HOD also declared war on the community. A private developer hired by Allied Grinaker Properties destroyed one of the settlements near Copesville, while other residents complained of harassment and threats by security firms in the pay of the HOD.

And then there are the lack of facilities and jobs. There are only two taps for the entire area. The only jobs available are on a casual basis in the indian housing estate.

### Authorities opt out

Initially the Pietermaritzburg City Council refused to become involved in Copeville.

'The land is still registered in (the HOD's) name and they must attend to the problem,' said Mayor Mark Cornell (*Natal Witness*, August 1990).

The Natal Provincial Administration (NPA) also opted out, saying that 'in terms of the Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, the primary responsibility for the removal of squatters rests with the owner of the land in question'.

A series of meetings between the HOD and the CRA were held in August 1990 but little progress was made. While the HOD promised not to use force to remove the displacees, it also tried to persuade community representatives to police the area and prevent other families from moving in.

By late September, negotiations between the HOD and the communities had broken down, mainly because the HOD did not have the resources to offer new land to the Copesville community. As a result, the CRA called on other homeless people in the city to invade the Copesville land in a bid to force the NPA and city council to intervene.

'If the NPA and the city council are prepared to accept responsibility, then the civic committee is prepared to reopen negotiations. In the meantime we are calling on people to come into the area,' said a CRA spokesperson (*Natal Witness*, 27/9/90).

By early October, following a meeting between the CRA and the deputy minister of provincial affairs, Tertius Delpont, the NPA and the city council were reluctantly drawn into negotiations about Copesville.

The NPA eventually bought a nearby farm, Whispers, for the 1,044 families it originally surveyed. The Independent Development Trust (IDT) has agreed to fund the sites provided that agreement is reached between all parties.

A Joint Steering Committee comprising of the CRA, NPA, city council, BKS developers and BESG are in the process of drawing up a participation contract to ensure that every aspect of the development — due to start within weeks — is negotiated.

A community development trust made up of four Copes-



PICTURE: KERRY CULLINAN

'Comrade Julius' feels the long struggle is finally worthwhile

ville people and prominent Pietermaritzburg leaders from the ANC, civics and technical, legal and accounting professions has also been set up to get access to and hold funds for needs such as housing.

### Full cost recovery

But two problems stand in the way of the Whispers development project.

'The council believes in full cost recovery for services. This is very difficult for the Copesville people, who will be expected to pay about R85 a month for refuse removal and water-borne sewerage,' says Krone.

'In all other african townships in the country, monthly service charges are subsidised by 80-90 percent. So in effect, africans are being penalised for staying in the city.'

Given that the monthly income of 497 Copesville households out of 787 questioned is less than R300, while only 134 households earn more than R500, the community is hardly in a position to pay the full costs of services.

Thus while the IDT subsidy is enough to cover the costs of water-borne sewerage, the council is reluctant to agree to the installation of such a system as it is unsure if the poverty-stricken community can pay for it.

The other potential stumbling block is the Copesville people's resolve not to leave their settlements unless everyone in the area has access to a serviced site.

However, Krone believes the development will go ahead within weeks, and that service charges will be negotiated later.

'If the Copesville people can negotiate a revised service policy with the council, it will ease the burden of others in the city facing similar conditions and make it more feasible for the poor to locate themselves close to the city centre,' says Krone. ●

# A REFUGEE DUMPING GROUND

THE NATAL PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION'S (NPA) RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IS FAR FROM ADEQUATE. **KERRY CULLINAN** VISITS AN NPA RESETTLEMENT AREA FOR REFUGEES.

ON A MUDDY hill some 25km from Pietermaritzburg a collection of tattered, leaky tents flap in the wind. Women are removing stones from their 16 square metre 'yards', while a few men are digging ditches to stop the rain from flooding sites.

This is Ambleton farm, the NPA's answer to the problem of homelessness and refugees.

Since 20 January, 52 families have moved onto the farm, which the NPA expropriated together with neighbouring Shenstone farm late last year. The two farms cover some 1,200 hectares, and the NPA estimates they can accommodate between 15,000 and 20,000 families.

But the farms are far away from jobs. Transport is scarce and the nearest schools are at Imbali, some kilometres away. The first people to take up the NPA's offer were living in a refugee camp in Howick after their homes in Mpophomeni were destroyed.

## Abandoned and desperate

'I still work in Howick. It costs me R8 every day for transport. I have five kids. Four of them go to school and I must pay R50 a month for each child for transport to school. That makes R360 and I earn R400. All I do with the R40 left over is buy a bag of mielie meal,' one of the new residents told *Reconstruct*.

Those who have moved to Ambleton were desperate and felt abandoned by community and political organisations. As they had nothing left to lose they decided to take up the NPA's offer.

'We moved because we did not have



Home is a leaky tent and a tin toilet

a choice, but we don't know if the NPA will help us to build houses or if we must pay for services,' said a Mr Msomi.

The Ambleton-Shenstone farms are the potential dumping grounds of the city's poorest people who have nowhere to go and nothing to defend themselves with.

'Most of the people here are widows whose husbands died in the violence. They have no jobs. They are just here with their children,' said committee member Cori Majozi.

And the community has been told to expect people from Richmond and Edendale in the near future.

At present, the NPA is employing some of Ambleton's men at R15 a day to prepare land for more families. But once the sites have been levelled and ditches dug, the NPA is unlikely to pay much attention to the area.

The lack of resources, jobs, tiny sites, limited services and the fact that a range of different communities are being settled on top of one another is a recipe for conflict.

Meanwhile the settlement poses a dilemma for community organisations, the ANC and service organisations. They opposed the development from the start because the sites are so far from town.

## Land for golf

Instead communities supported by the

Built Environment Support Group (BESG) have been busy identifying land within Pietermaritzburg's boundaries that can be set aside for low cost housing projects.

A 32 hectare tract of land five kilometres from the city's centre has been identified as potentially housing 1,000 families. However the city council has earmarked the land for a golf course, and plans to spend R2-million developing it.

'It is ridiculous that such valuable community resources are to be squandered in this way,' said BESG's Anton Krone.

'Is the council saying that hundreds of poor people must pay high transport costs to get to town each day to enable a handful of golfers, many of whom own cars, to play golf once a week?'

## Forced removals

Another small area of land between Imbali and a low-cost area of Westgate could also potentially house homeless people. However Westgate residents are opposed to the scheme as they believe their houses will be devalued. Ironically many of those opposed to the development are former township dwellers who say they moved to Westgate to escape from township poverty.

But it is likely that only the well organised and better informed displacee communities will be able to resist the move to Ambleton and Shenstone.

'The city council and the NPA are presently preparing to forcibly remove homeless families from the city and dump them out on the periphery at a place with no social infrastructure or employment,' said Krone.

'This amounts to little more than old style force removals of the 1960s. The result will be further marginalisation of the poor.'

Community and political organisations now have to decide whether they allow the Ambleton-Shenstone development to proceed and pressurise authorities for improvements, or call for a freeze on development and demand viable alternatives. ●

# REGIONAL BOUNDARIES

## IS THE ANC GIVING IN TO ETHNIC FEDERALISM?

THE ANC'S PROPOSAL TO DIVIDE SOUTH AFRICA INTO TEN REGIONS AND THE CODESA AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SEEM LIKE CONCESSIONS TO FEDERALISM, WHICH WILL ALLOW CURRENT RACIAL AND ETHNIC STRUCTURES TO CONTINUE, ARGUES **LAURINE PLATZKY**.

THE ANC proposal for ten regions seems to be a negotiating tool to appease current sub-national power blocks, demonstrating that the negotiators favour 'good government'. But 'good government' in this sense will not address decades of apartheid engineering such as the bantustans, the relocation of more than 3.5 million people or the centralisation of power and privilege in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) region.

Firstly the question should be asked: why ten regions?

Regional boundaries should come about through the analysis of a problem, as defined by those drawing the lines. It seems that the ANC wanted to address the reintegration of the bantustans into South Africa. But for this purpose, they reverted to 1910 boundaries — which reflected Boer/British conflicts and ignored the vast majority.

The Development Bank of SA (DBSA) came up with a similar proposal for nine regions, as did the SA Law Commission.

If existing structures are to be considered, why adapt the DBSA proposal and ignore metropolitan areas and Regional Services Councils (RSCs), which are more viable functional units?

A realistic assessment of forces and development goals must inform both the devolution of power and the boundaries in which they are executed.

### Analysis needed

To draw borders that will make regional decisions meaningful for the majority, a clear analysis of historical processes is needed. This includes analysing economic, social and political forces at a national and international scale, the role of the state and private sector and the needs of civil society.

If different social processes were

considered, 16 or 30 or more regions to cater for various forms and processes — such as urbanisation, industrialisation, the urban-rural dynamic, trade links, commuting patterns, and cultural links — might be proposed.

Secondly, regional structures should implement affirmative action policies decided at national level. Structural changes in our system of regional government are therefore needed.

Entrenching existing structures, although simpler to administer in the transition period, will not necessarily facilitate regional development.

### Deprivation

Historical processes, which led to the present uneven pattern of development, explains why some people are deprived of adequate education, health, housing and employment. The geography of this unevenness also contributes to deprivation, as some people have less access to services and facilities than others. Strong national action has to be taken to reverse these processes.

But well-intentioned attempts to decentralise political power in view of increasingly concentrated economic power may be useless for development — but handy to create or maintain power bases.

Three factors are vital for develop-

ment: progressive policy, effective administration and coordination. Accountable decision-making about the allocation of resources is also essential.

We may not need regional legislature to achieve these goals. Regional offices of central state departments, commissions and tribunals focusing on development sectors such as land and housing can perform these functions.

Communities could then approach these commissions and tribunals with their needs. These commissions could be made up of representatives from the local and metropolitan level — politicians, bureaucrats, experts and sectors.


Co-ordinating committees between these commissions would be necessary. The first priority should be extensive policy programmes for restructuring and affirmative action, decided on by a legitimate central legislature and implemented locally and regionally, according to demand.

The 1910 compromise between Boer state and British colony, involving a measure of autonomy to the four provinces, proved to be an expensive experiment that was inappropriate to the needs of the majority.

Ill-conceived devolution of power, to a weakly defined regional level may become a buffer between a well-meaning central state and desperate local communities, if ethnic regional groups manage to control regional development initiatives.

Careful attention should be given to regional government, as it offers the potential to overcome the local government divisions formed by Group Areas and the rigidity of national politics.

Regional government allows new faces in new structures to implement desperately needed development policies to raise the quality of life of the majority of the future electorate. ●



# FACELIFT FOR INNER-CITY SLUMS

BY PATRICK BOND AND MONTY NARSOO

'INVEST IN Hillbrow or Joubert Park? Never!' This is the prevailing attitude of bankers and many developers, who view parts of inner-city Johannesburg with the same disdain they have for townships.

This is just one of the barriers to making Hillbrow and Joubert Park liveable for thousands of residents. Crime, violence, lack of facilities and deteriorating environmental conditions are commonplace in the area.

But there are other economic barriers, less visible but perhaps ultimately more important:

- \* slumlords set on maximising rentals without maintaining buildings;

- \* speculators who hold on to land without developing it, in the hope that it will soar in value;

- \* huge property developers whose postmodern skyscrapers have pushed central Johannesburg land values far beyond historical levels;

- \* financiers who have a blanket 'redlining' (discrimination) policy.

Consider first the slumlords (see also main section, pages....). Gorfil Brothers has had a love-hate relationship with the inner-city tenant organisation, Actstop. Since becoming more active in residential properties in the mid-1980s, Gorfil has milked the buildings, delayed maintenance, failed to pay hundreds of thousands of rands in city service charges and evicted tenants on flimsy grounds.

Actstop organised Gorfil's buildings, and after tough negotiations and protest action, he was forced to take a more enlightened approach.

But Gorfil tired of using his Hillbrow and Joubert Park buildings as a tax loss. Interest was shown by an out-of-town buyer who had made a fortune in the minibus taxi trade. Gorfil even made financial calculations which showed that even if he emptied all the flats in his buildings, leaving only the ground floor shops, he would still make a profit from rents.

Before going that route, however, Gorfil allowed the 'Seven Buildings Working Group' set up by Actstop, to investigate tenant ownership. The working group is composed of tenant representatives, lawyers, architects and service organisation members.

The group began to meet weekly and soon confronted a variety of challenges, mostly brand new in South Afri-



Evictions in the city happen daily.

can development:

- \* how to determine the socio-economic status of tenants so as to assess affordability, tenant aspirations and the degree of overcrowding;

- \* how to assess the value of the buildings and prepare for rehabilitation where necessary;

- \* how to set up a non-profit company under tenant control which will own the building;

- \* how to raise the money on appropriate terms;

- \* how to educate and train tenants to manage the buildings through collective ownership, also known as 'social housing'.

The last challenge will prove most enduring. Individual sectional title ownership is simply too expensive for the low-income tenants.

The working group is expected to make an offer on the seven buildings this month. A long organising, education and development campaign lies ahead.

But if social housing can gain ground in the hostile climate of Hillbrow and Joubert Park, scourge of major developers, the campaign will be a success worthy of replication elsewhere. ●

*\* Patrick Bond works for Planact and Monty Narsoo for Cope, both Johannesburg based service organisations involved in the seven buildings project.*

## BRIEFS

### Rich whites get cold feet

WHITE RATEPAYERS in Johannesburg's affluent suburbs of Bedfordview and Sandton are getting cold feet about forming single council structures with their black neighbours.

Recently the Bedfordview council pulled out of negotiations to form a single non-racial council with neighbouring Katlehong, Germiston and Ivory Park after protests from residents.

And in Sandton, councillors issued a special newsletter reassuring residents that a merger with Alexandra and Randburg was not a foregone conclusion, but was still being explored.

### Citrusdal goes non-racial

THE 'WHITES only' town council of Citrusdal in the Cape has resolved to dissolve and form a non-racial council in terms of the Interim Measures of Local Government Act. Elections for the new council will be held in October.

### Natal's multi-racialism

The administrator of Natal, Con Mulder, announced last month that white councils in the region were working towards merging with neighbouring black local authorities and Indian and coloured lo-

cal affairs committees. This, said Mulder, would ensure that the councils represented 'all residents'! (See Page 2)

### KwaThandeka negotiations reopen

AFTER A protracted battle, the TPA has accepted in principle the KwaThandeka community's proposals for the redevelopment of the area along non-racial lines. In the last issue of *Reconstruct*, it was reported that deadlock had been reached after the TPA refused to accept the proposals, which call for a sub-regional development plan involving the state, private sector and residents.

# WHAT HAPPENED IN EXILE?

*COMRADES AGAINST APARTHEID: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile.*

By Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba. James Currey, London & Indiana University Press, Bloomington (1992)

**P**OLITICAL EXILE is a life-style devoted to the place where one isn't. Or is it?

It is the exile years of the ANC and SACP which are the focus of this recently published book. Stephen Ellis is the former editor of *Africa Confidential*, and 'Tsepo Sechaba' is the pen-name of his collaborator and principal informant.

Sechaba is described in the book's introduction as 'a man who joined the ANC illegally inside South Africa, left the country after 1976 and was recruited to the SACP.' (p6) There is no reason to doubt this claim. Indeed Sechaba is almost certainly a former ANC intelligence officer based in Lesotho, then Zimbabwe, and currently studying in the US.

Exile for the ANC/SACP/MK was relatively long — some 25 years. It was also often distant, dispersed and dangerous. You could be poisoned in Lusaka, bombed in Maputo, kidnapped from Mbabane, and even gunned down in far-away Paris. To its immense credit, the ANC-led alliance came through the miserable experience of exile fairly well. It has returned stronger, relatively unified, and more legitimate than ever before.

## DIFFICULTIES OF EXILE

But of course there was an immense price paid, and there were numerous problems. Consider some of the objective and subjective difficulties that exile tends to provoke:

- Political exile might be devoted to the place where one isn't. But in order to survive at all, some energy has to be invested in exile itself. Lives have to be led. A degree of integration has to take place. And so exile invariably opens up tensions between the realism of building infrastructure and the militancy of wanting to devote everything to the home-front.

The distance between this realism and complacency, and between complacency and corruption is often subtle. So too is the distance between militancy and a dangerously impossible romanticism.

**JEREMY  
CRONIN**



The young Chris Hani, *after* the Wankie Campaign in 1967 (and not before, as Ellis and Sechaba claim on p47, making one of a number of factual errors) found himself in the midst of precisely this tension. On behalf of a number of Wankie combatants he submitted an angry memorandum, charging the then MK leadership with incompetence and complacency. Was he right? Looking back today on the event, Hani feels there were good grounds for complaint, but he also believes his own attitude at the time was way over the top.

- Exile means dependence, to a greater or lesser extent, on foreign assistance or, at the very least, foreign tolerance. On the whole the ANC alliance managed to turn exile into a diplomatic triumph. It was able to inspire a worldwide, anti-apartheid movement of unparalleled breadth and strength.


Just how much this redounds to the alliance's credit is underlined by the degree to which exile has so often opened up political movements to foreign rivalries and manipulation. This has been one of the great tragedies for the Palestinians, for instance.

But the very success of the ANC-alliance's international effort had its negative flip-side. Unlike many other guerrilla movements which have to rely on their own internal resources, MK had a ready supply of arms. This led, in my view, to a grave neglect of internal supply work, not least work amongst black troops in

South Africa. It also meant that outgoing recruits and returning, trained cadres and material, had to be funnelled through highly predictable and therefore vulnerable, small towns of Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho.

Above all, the very success of the ANC's exile perpetuated the outside as the centre of gravity for far too long. In exile, you tend to see the solution to problems as coming from exile itself.

- Exile also creates enormous difficulties for many technical functions, like counter-intelligence for instance. If you are based on home soil, and better still, if you have state power, then checking on someone's alibi becomes relatively easy. But if you are sitting in Lusaka trying to get to the bottom of a mysterious death of a comrade in Cape Town, things can become exceedingly frustrating. Some of the excesses, and the ANC has admitted there were excesses (like the holding of suspects for very long periods in detention centres) often need to be understood, not excused, in terms of these kinds of exile-induced difficulties.



**Comrades  
Against  
Apartheid  
& Tsepo Sechaba**  
by STEPHEN ELLIS  
and TSEPO SECHABA

# G L O S S A R Y

**alibi** — someone who will support a person's claim to have been elsewhere when an event happened; an excuse  
**auspicious** — favourable

**banal** — ordinary or trite  
**bestiality** — sex between animal and human  
**buffer (zone)** — an area placed between two potentially hostile areas to reduce the chance of conflict.  
**butch** — 'mannish' woman

**canton** — sub-division of a country  
**caricature** — bad representation of a person or thing  
**castrating** — make men feel weak  
**coherent** — consistent, easy to follow argument  
**complacency** — self-satisfaction  
**conspiratorial** — involved in secret plotting

**daub** — to cover with mud or clay  
**debacle** — confused rush or collapse  
**de facto** — in fact  
**deficit** — loss  
**deliberative** — advising  
**demise** — downfall  
**depreciation** — decrease  
**destitution** — poverty  
**devaluation** — impaired  
**diametrically** — divided  
**dilemma** — predicament  
**displacee** — someone who has been forced to move  
**docile** — obedient

**entrepreneurs** — businesspeople  
**exacerbated** — made worse  
**exonerate** — forgive, clear of blame  
**expropriated** — property taken

**federalism** — form of government, where power is decentralised to regions  
**ferreting** — searching  
**fetishise** — make into an idol, remove from reality

**hack** — a person who does not think for him/herself  
**holocaust** — scene of terrible event

**macho** — overly masculine, aggressive  
**manipulation** — attempt to control or guide secretly  
**marginalisation** — make less important  
**mechanisms** — means or ways  
**mitigating** — extenuating; factors that could excuse certain behaviour  
**modifications** — changes

**WIP strives to communicate with as diverse a range of readers as possible. To this end, we give the meaning of some of the more difficult words found in this issue.**

**moratorium** — temporary end to something, usually while negotiations on the issue are taking place  
**myriad** — many

**nub** — centre

**obliterated** — destroyed  
**ominous** — bad signs

**paranoias** — things that make a person unnecessarily worried  
**paternalism** — the act of condescending  
**patriarchal** — male-dominated hierarchy  
**pedantic** — narrowly academic  
**periphery** — outskirts, edge  
**pervasive** — widespread  
**precarious** — unsafe  
**prerogative** — one's right  
**protracted** — drawn out  
**psychopathic** — mad

**redounds** — to one's advantage

**resilient** — enduring  
**restitution** — reparation for injury  
**riveting** — exciting (slang)

**schizophrenia** — mental disease when a person shows signs of a split personality  
**scepticism** — doubtfulness  
**scourge** — oppressor, someone who hands out punishment  
**shebang** — affair or matter  
**sodomy** — anal sex  
**subservient** — servant-like  
**sleight** — cunning, deceptive trick  
**slumlord** — landlord of squalid flats  
**stagnation** — left to stand  
**skews** — distorts  
**spectre** — ghost like presence that haunts

**terr** — slang for 'terrorist'  
**technicist** — person who sees things in technical terms alone  
**tenet** — a principle

**unprecedented** — unparalleled  
**unequivocally** — unmistakably  
**unilateral** — one-sided, done without consultation  
**utopian** — ideal place  
**unscrupulous** — shameless, unprincipled

**verligte** — Afrikaans word meaning enlightened or liberal  
**vermin** — disease carrying rodents  
**vindicate** — justify or clear of suspicion

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