

WORK 17
IN
PROGRESS

IN THIS WIP:

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- **East London workers**
- **profits and poverty**
- **Mavi trial**
- **housing**

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SOUTH AFRICA.

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This issue of Work In Progress edited and published by an editorial collective of 40 jorissen street, 2001 braamfontein, and printed by sached, 54 simmonds street, 2001 johannesburg.

The nature of Work In Progress, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views on a wide range of subjects, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial collective.

by the workers.

Representative democracy and juridical-legal freedoms are compatible with this situation on the factory floor where production takes place.

Clearly then, the existence of a regular vote, coupled to formal freedoms, is not an adequate programme for democracy. For this, the idea of democracy has to be broadened and expanded to include active participation as well as representation.

At the same time democratic practices need to be extended into all important spheres of society, not just into the formal political structures - extended to the factory floor, to the mines, to the schools and universities, the communities and the family. Wherever groups of people are involved in living their lives, real democracy demands that they also be involved in planning and directing.

WIP hopes to open up a debate on the nature and varieties of democracy. It is important for the notion of democracy to become one of the yardsticks by which we measure events and dynamics in South Africa. For example, it is interesting to note that even those who are becoming critical of the PW Botha/Piet Koornhof-type programme of change rarely attack it on the basis of its anti-democratic nature. The assumption is that either what is being done is good, or is not good for those it affects. Whether those affected have been involved in deciding what their interests are or not, is too often ignored in the South African context. This is one of the ways in which even opposition groups in South Africa ignore democracy as a measure.

These issues about democracy,

participation and representation are important at a national level. But WIP is particularly keen to explore these notions in the context in which direct democracy could be on the agenda: in small community organisations, trade unions, educational institutions, the family. For it is within these organisations and structures that progressives will experience and learn about participation and democracy, and it is in these areas that the deepening and expansion of democratic practice can take place.

A letter in Social Review 10, September 1980, sets out how these questions affected the Committee of 81 during the schools boycott in the Western Cape.

Even though we know that it is difficult if not impossible to have any democracy in an undemocratic society, the Committee of 81 was a democratic body at the outset. This meant that even though there were disagreements they were sorted out, even if the meeting took 12 hours. The first problem with democracy came from the quite natural division of labour on the committee. Some people were speakers, others were not; some were on the press committee, others were not; some were experienced leaders, others were not. This kind of division of labour which exists in almost all organisations can lead to problems if it is not checked. The fact that the committee was so large made this problem much more difficult to check. Some would say that what you lose in democracy you gain in efficiency - but does this not sound like just a justification for Fascism? The problems of giving up democracy for efficiency are very serious in the long run.

The problems of the division of labour were made worse by the fact that, to a certain extent, it took place along regional lines. Students and pupils from the Southern regions...tended to dominate the situation. None of these problems were unsolvable, however, until the State repression took its real pound of flesh. The committee was harassed

from the start - but for a while it was not serious. When the state started detaining people on a wide scale...problems of democracy grew. It was more difficult to have meetings, it was more difficult to have continuity in the organisation, and it became more and more urgent to make decisions between meetings.....

As democracy became more threatened, the unity of the students was weakened. This problem was deepened by the undemocratic practices of many of the schools' representatives who were slack in reporting back to their schools and therefore became separated from their base. They began to see themselves as 'leaders' rather than 'representatives' which just had the effect of undermining their role as either.

Some of the problems raised in this letter are relevant to the debate WIP wishes to initiate, and in this context the editors would like to pose a few questions which could form a basis for initial discussion:

- * How is it that economic exploitation is compatible with juridical freedom and equality in some capitalist societies, is that representative democracy and the 'rule of law' can go hand in hand with economic exploitation and oppression?
- * What different forms of bourgeois capitalist societies are there, and how does this affect democracy in those societies?
- * What is working class democracy, and what is the difference between representative and participatory democracy?
- * What of democracy within organisations like trade unions, community groups, etc? How can an organisation function democratically in a highly repressive, anti-democratic society?
- * What about participation as a basis for organisational democracy? The nature of

South African society socialises people out of decision making, participation and involvement. There is, as Turner says,

ample sociological evidence that participation in decision-making, whether in the family, in the school, in voluntary organisations or at work, increases the ability to participate. (Turner, 1972:36).

But how does an organisation involving people who have been trained not to participate, to be passive, both get its work done, and ensure participation? Or is part of every progressive organisation's work to train its members in participatory democracy?

• What is the relationship between participation, representation and leadership? How does an organisation prevent representation and leadership from blocking participation? Isn't one of the functions of leadership to encourage participation by others? But if this is so, how do leaders learn this lesson?

The danger of losing sight of these and other questions in a repressive, anti-democratic environment is great. At the same time, it is important that the question of democracy - its forms and practices - be put back on the agenda in South African debates.

WIP hopes to be one of the forums through which this can be done, and the editors invite contributions on this topic. These can take the form of articles, brief suggestions or even letters in which problems are raised, and organisational experiences shared with other readers.

Note: The book by Richard Turner referred to is The eye of the needle, published by SPRO-CAS in 1972, and recently re-issued by Raven Press. It remains a useful and very readable introduction to some of the

questions raised about democracy. See especially the two chapters on participatory democracy.

This edition of WIP, as always, carries articles on a number of diverse topics. The first article, on rugby in the eastern Cape, traces out some of the struggles associated with black and non-racial rugby in that area. Sport has for a long time been an area of struggle in South Africa, and the international and local efforts of SANROC and SACOS have had considerable impact. The issue of touring teams, the sports 'blacklist' and state strategies to 'de-racialise' sport have combined to give the issue considerable importance in the past few months. In this context, struggles around sport - especially non-racial sport - have taken on special significance. The article on rugby details the history of rugby in the eastern Cape, and focuses on the relationship which rugby and the commodity built up through KWARU (the Kwazakhele Rugby Union).

A number of contributions deal with the question of the rising cost of living and the ways in which the working class is responding to falling real wages. The causes of inflation, and declining wages, remain an area of confusion and the editors hope to run an article on inflation in the near future.

Related to the rising cost of living (and falling wages) is the material on Labour Action, as well as the contribution on East London workers. Together with the article on pensions, these give something of a picture of inadequate social security in South Africa, growing unemployment and

poverty, and worker response to this situation (including attempts to organise workers into trade unions).

Finally, there are two contributions on housing, taking very different approaches to aspects of the 'housing question'. The article on squatter housing deals with the question from a largely architectural perspective, and examines the way in which squatters adjust to changing environments. At the same time, it involves an implicit methodology with social implications. This methodology is, by inference, criticised in the second contribution on housing, which spells out a very different way of looking at housing in a South African context.

-THE EDITORS.

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RUGBY IN THE EASTERN CAPE: a history

BLACK rugby has always been more closely associated than its white counterpart with the central concerns of its community. Much more than simply a recreation or an entertainment, rugby served as a vehicle of popular culture and as an outlet for personal achievement and ambition. Wherever it took a firm hold - almost exclusively in the cities and towns of the Cape Province - many of the leading black civic and intellectual figures were also enthusiastic rugby players and administrators.

The history of black rugby divides into two distinct periods, breaking roughly in the 1960s with the advent of mass political action. In the early period, the social role of black rugby resembles a secular equivalent of the independent Zionist churches. Deprived of legitimate means of self-expression, energies which might otherwise have been devoted to local or national service were displaced into rugby. Sport thus became a substitute for politics, not promoting political objectives in any way. In the later period, black rugby acquired a political consciousness which transformed it into an arena of the national struggle, attacking a particularly vulnerable heel of the apartheid state. The purpose of this article is to trace the transformation of black rugby in the Eastern Cape, where it began.

PERIOD ONE: RUGBY BEFORE POLITICS.

According to tradition, rugby (mboxo - a thing which is not round) was introduced to the Xhosa by a Reverend Mullins. The earliest black rugby teams were institutional: Lovedale, Healdtown and others. The first adult club still remembered is the Union Rugby Football Club established in Port Elizabeth in 1887. Other clubs followed, leading to the creation of the Eastern Province Native Rugby Board in 1905. The spread of the game was due not so much to continuing white interest as to the zeal of the newly converted. Self-appointed rugby missionaries carried the oval ball to even the remoter towns, and many of these still recall the name and date of the first rugby player. Alternatively, migrants might learn rugby in the big cities and take it home with them, together with the name of their club. One might almost trace the spread of black rugby through the proliferation of clubs named Lillywhites, Spring Rose and Home Defenders. Outside the Cape, however, the seed fell on stony ground. Rugby was played for a while at Adams College, but it never took on in Natal. It was played by 'Cape boys' (coloureds and Xhosa) on the Rand Mines, but it was never adopted by the northerners who saw something ridiculous in the spectacle of a grown man running around with a ball in his hands.

Rugby became a vital part of social life, especially in the smaller towns. Particular families were attached to particular clubs, and the walls of their houses might be covered with photographs of great teams of the past. Children and even adults spent hours making banners and carving emblems of their clubs - I particularly remember an exquisite Red Lion in the small town of Adelaide. A fanatical

sportsman might sink his entire savings into a trophy perpetuating his name. Rugby was also played much later into life, in some cases past the age of forty. 'You play backline when you're younger, forward when you're older and heavier'. Rugby dances were a vital part of social life, especially when a visiting team came to town. Witness the visit of the Port Elizabeth Butcher Birds to Umata in 1954:

Our nurses relieved the captain of the club of the duty of entertaining the visitors as early as Saturday night, and up to the moment of their departure they were in the safe hands of these beauties....The captain of the visiting team remarked at the Hall on the warm welcome they had received from the Umata nurses. He assured everybody present in the Hall that night that his boys were really feeling at home.... They were so happy that very few of them remembered or cared to go for supper. While some were busy dancing and jiving inside the sitting room, others were busy chatting outside the nurses' home. It was not until 10pm that the visitors left the hospital.

The game itself was played in appalling conditions. Most fields were without grass, and many were riven by ditches, located on slopes or acting as public thoroughfares. Boots were considered a luxury, and each team had at most a single set of jerseys. Such circumstances bred dedication and selflessness: sacrificing one's wages to buy the team colours, walking all night to be at a match on the following day. It also bred dependence on the local whites. So much was so far beyond the reach of the average man - particularly when a lump sum was suddenly needed for a special purpose such as a distant match or an anniversary celebration - that there was very little recourse but the 'benevolence' of the white man. One informant, who raised the money to take a Transvaal team on a tour of the Eastern Cape, recalls 'I had to cringe'.

The chronic demand of black rugby for money and facilities inevitably meant dependence on whites. It also meant that prominent rugby administrators were those who were either well-off themselves, or excelled at least in asking whites for money.

This meant that rugby generally came under the direction of local notables, that is, well-off men of a particular sort. These local notables were associated at a wider level through the South African African Rugby Board (SAARB), founded in 1935. The chief function of this body was to arrange the bi-annual national inter-provincial tournament. Since this was the premier event in black rugby, it attracted a great deal of sponsorship, not all of which was used for the purposes intended. An official of the rebel Grahamstown Rugby Union commented as follows:

The SAARB Tournament System which started in 1936 in Kimberley, and has been persisted with without any variations worth the name is outdated, old-fashioned, incapable of making the player give of his best, and lends itself to corruption. The Select Committee can cite many occasions when, during the opening day of such tournaments, some officials were seen collecting money outside the grounds, armed with identical tickets, and pocketing the money! Almost invariably the officials of SAARB, some of whom had never touched a rugby ball in the field, or at best had never gone beyond the local 2nd division, find themselves sleeping in cosy surroundings, dining and wining to their hearts content, while the poor players sleep on school desks, and literally starve.

The career of Mr AZ Lamani of Port Elizabeth is illuminating. In 1951, Mr Lamani was Assistant Secretary of SAARB. Two years later he was suspended following 'discrepancies in the financial statement' of the 1951 tournament. In 1954 he challenged his suspension in the Supreme Court and,

since his application was unopposed, he was reinstated. Sadly enough, in this very year of his triumph, he was forced to resign from the Presidency of his province 'when a financial statement tabled by him was declared by the Treasurer ST Ishangana to be fraudulent'. In 1957, therefore, he split his old union to form the Port Elizabeth and Districts Rugby Board, which lasted until an arbitration saw him back in his old position as Secretary for the 1961 tournament. Strangely, 'at the end of the tournament he failed to present a financial statement'. That finally ended his career in rugby administration, but readers will be pleased to know that his talents were not altogether lost to his people. He subsequently became a Minister in the Ciskeian 'government'.

Not all the difficulties within the SAARB were financial in origin. There were differences in delimiting regions: was Queenstown part of Border? Was Aliwal North part of Queenstown? If a strong personality split a union, should the SAARB recognise the original union, or the union with the larger following? Some unions, particularly those in the hinterland of larger cities (Grahamstown or King Williams Town, for example) felt that their players were overlooked for provincial selection. Possibly such situations are basic to all sports unions, but in the case of black rugby at least part of the problem derived from the fact that many of its administrators derived their power from access to money rather than to the support they commanded from the players or the community.

PERIOD TWO: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF BLACK RUGBY.

In 1969 the secretary of the SAARB and the president of the Port Elizabeth African Rugby

Board (PEARB) was Mr NM Singaphi. Mr Singaphi - now chairman of the Port Elizabeth Community Council - has never enjoyed universal admiration. His political opponents describe him, doubtless unfairly, as 'always after money' and 'the sort of man who would threaten to physically assault you at a public meeting'. Trouble began when Singaphi, WL Dwesi (coach to the 1979 SA Barbarians tour of Britain) and GC Mdyesha (now president of the pro-Craven SARA) held their own tournament in Port Elizabeth in opposition to the official national tournament in Umtata. As a result of this and other dubious financial arrangements, opposition to Singaphi and his friends arose within the PEARB, led by its vice-president, Mono Badela, who was the Port Elizabeth correspondent of The World. The dissidents opposed Eastern Province's participation in the Pretoria-sponsored South African Games, and also to the proposed ethnic matches against the 1972 British Lions. The crisis came when the PEARB refused to cancel fixtures which clashed with the funeral of a rugby player killed in a car crash. In June 1971, ten out of the twelve first league clubs withdrew from PEARB to form KWARU, the Kwazakhele Rugby Union. The new union adopted as its crest a rhinoceros, and the motto Facta non Verba - Deeds not Words. It was to live up to its boast.

The KWARU secession was primarily motivated not by political considerations, but by the desire of the clubs to escape the corruption and maladministration of the PEARB. In the initial stages of the breakaway, the KWARU executive did not contemplate abandoning the SAARB which was still committed to the official government policy of multinationalism in sport. They applied to the Eastern Province Rugby Board (composed of delegates from Uitenhage,

Grahamstown and Singaphi's PEARB) for recognition as a separate union, but were turned down. They then appealed to the SAARB, but this decided (under pressure from the PEARB) that it was bound by a 1965 resolution prohibiting the recognition of 'mushroom' unions. The cream of Xhosa rugby was left without anyone to play against. On the advice of Eastern Province, their coloured sister union, they applied to the South African Rugby Union (SARU).

The story of SARU began in 1959, when Cuthbert Loriston (now a star of South African and foreign television) led - for reasons that had nothing to do with politics - the Western Cape clubs out of the old South African Coloured Rugby Union and formed the South African Rugby Federation. Coloured teams had always played against africans, but - and more especially with the advent of Group Areas - there were few cases of coloureds and africans playing for the same club. Loriston was caught firmly by the carrot of multi-national sport and opposed any racial mixing whatsoever. The City and Suburban Union of the Federation refused to eject its non-coloured members, and opened negotiations with SACRU, stipulating that the word 'coloured' be dropped. Thus was SARU born. It immediately set its face against international tours of any sort until full rugby integration based on merit selection was achieved in South Africa.

KWARU's application was accepted at the 1972 Annual General Meeting of SARU, but its leaders were not yet thinking of overt political defiance. The souvenir programme issued at the end of their first full season included a message from LC Koch, director of Bantu Administration for Port Elizabeth. However, it proved impossible to sustain their neutrality. The South African government was committed to

a policy of 'multi-nationalism' which they saw as a reasonable compromise between the requests of their friends abroad and the demands of their society at home. They were deeply perturbed by the adherence of african rugby players to SARU, which they persisted in viewing as a coloured body. They felt that the KWARU split was an unfortunate accident and had considerable real sympathy for KWARU grievances. On the other hand, they were confronted by the fact that the Federation and the SAARB supported government policy while SARU did not. Loriston and Mdyesha drove the point home:

Dit is hoog tyd vir dr Danie Craven en die SA Rugbyraad om op te hou om soos 'n hondjie agter mnr Abdull Abass en die SARU aan te draf.....(said Loriston). Dit verbaas mnr Loriston dat die regering kan toelaat dat die SARU, wat 'n Kleurlingrugbyliggaam is, Bantoe rugbyunies en klubs by hulle kan inlyf.....Dit is vir my 'n raaisel dat die regering dit toelaat. As dit afsonderlike ontwikkeling en veelvolkige sport moet wees, laat dit dan afsonderlike ontwikkeling en veelvolkige sport wees en hou die groepe apart.

The people who are honouring and supporting their OWN Board and people who are being victimised and thrown out of a stadium set aside for them in their own area. The people who are carrying out the sports policy of the land are being thrown out of the Stadium...We cannot accept a position where we have to watch Coloureds use our grounds and Hall.

(The first quotation is from an article in Rapport, 29.04.73. The second is from a letter, written on official government notepaper, by Curnick Mdyesha protesting against his expulsion by the pro-SARU majority on the Grahamstown Rugby Board).

And so the tail wagged the dog. The Bantu Affairs Department took the line that all 'Bantu' sports facilities were financed out of the Bantu Revenue account, which was 'allocated for the benefit of Bantu exclusively whose sports

bodies may affiliate only with Bantu Sports Associations'. They further upheld the constitutionality of the SAARB ruling (in July 1971, just after the KWARU breakaway) that 'dissident clubs that band together styling themselves as a Province have not status anywhere and must return to their Board'. SAARB/BAD policy was therefore to crush KWARU and any other african union affiliating to SARU by denying them all public facilities.

KWARU was therefore excluded from the Wolfson stadium with its grass surface, proper seating and floodlights. Even more important, the Wolfson stadium had a wall, which was considered essential for the collection of gate receipts. Radio Bantu announcers were ordered to discontinue describing or even announcing KWARU fixtures. Far from crushing the upstart union, government action roused the entire community to the support of KWARU. Local black business and professional men raised upwards of R450 in donations. An active Ladies Section organised sales, raffles and dances. 'Our European friends' earned the right to a vote of thanks. Far from disappearing with the loss of a walled stadium, 'gate' takings at the outdoor matches rose to an unprecedented R2 179.

An outstanding example of the radicalising effect of communal effort is provided by the case of Dan Geqe, a wealthy garage owner from New Brighton. Geqe was a member of the Urban Bantu Council but he also loved his rugby. Through his fundraising activities for KWARU he was drawn into the politics of non-racial sport and from there into other civic activities, which have led him to be detained at least twice. The Kwaru rugby team played as if inspired by the incredible energy called forth in its support. Whereas the SAARB tournaments took

place only once every two years, the SARU unions participated in a national league with home and away fixtures arranged on a regular basis. New to competition at provincial level, lacking even a home ground of their own, and virtually without any experience of playing together as a team, KWARU were not given much of a chance against the better-equipped and more firmly established SARU unions. Immediately however, they made their presence felt, winning their section against Eastern Province, beating Transvaal in the semi-final and travelling to Cape Town for an honourable defeat in the final against Western Province. Each victory for KWARU was a victory not only for the rugby team but also for the entire community which had put them on the road. People who had shared the labour of creating the union felt that they shared also in its triumphs. Rugby fever reached unprecedented heights in Port Elizabeth, with 20 000 watching the semifinal against Transvaal while the remnants of Singaphi's PEARB played to empty seats in the Wolfson stadium. Even in defeat, one journalist wrote

There was no greater sight to see New Brighton and Kwazakhele turn out amidst wild jubilation to roll out the carpet as their heroes returned home with the Bill Meyer Runners-up trophy....The scenes were enough to ring (sic) tears from even the hardened supporter.

This enthusiasm proved to be a sustained enthusiasm. First priority was given to the improvement of playing facilities. KWARU were excluded from all existing stadiums, despite a costly appeal to the Supreme Court. They occupied a vacant lot off Johnson Road in the coloured area of Veeplaas, and set their supporters to clearing the stones and marking out the boundaries. Within a year, the KWARU secretary, Samuel Ngona, was to write that 'the home we were driven to occupy has proved



'Why do they keep bringing politics into sport?'

the Leveller, 09-22.01.81.

to be the real place for us'. Despite the extraordinary expenses of getting a new union off the ground, KWARU ended their first year with a credit balance of R1 165 - after years of financial mismanagement during which the administration rarely reimbursed the clubs for their legitimate expenses. Most of the surplus cash went into the ground, which was named the Dan Qeque Stadium after its most energetic fundraiser. 'Officials went round the crowds asking for donations. Everybody gave. They knew what it was for'. Donors of R10 or more were recorded on plaques attached to the stadium gates. The work of improvement still continues. Today, KWARU are involved in the R30 000 project of enclosing the stadium.

At the same time, KWARU's commitment to the non-racial principles of SARU deepened. Whereas the first souvenir programme carried a message from Louis Koch of the Bantu Affairs

Administration Board, the second carried a message from Abdullah Abass, president of SARU. The KWARU president wrote

All we want is to share the triumphs of our country as a whole on the various sporting arenas at home as well as abroad. But we shall be doomed should we accept the government policy of being compartmentalised into various ethnic groupings.

KWARU was able to absorb without any internal repercussions the brothers Cheeky and Valence Watson, whose patent sincerity was generally recognised. When president Abass (a Kimberley businessman and essentially a hangover from the old SACRU) wavered in the face of Danie Craven's determined attempts at co-option (1976), KWARU was one of the unions which forced him back into line. KWARU now plays a recognised part in communal affairs. Of the four PEBCO officials banned in the wake of the 1980 Ford strikes, two - Mono Badela and Dan

Qeqe - were movers in the founding of KWARU. It is symbolically appropriate that their old enemy, Norris Singaphi, was at the same time chairman of the Community Council. Early this year (1981) KWARU was one of the bodies officially represented at the meetings which ended the schools boycott.

KWARU's example was followed throughout the country. A few months after they left the PEARB, Gugulethu led Western Province out of the SAARB. First to follow in the Eastern Cape was Grahamstown, base of Curnick Mdyesha, now president of SAARB's successor, SARA. The majority of the Grahamstown African Rugby Board constituted itself the South Eastern Districts Rugby Union (SEDRU) and applied for affiliation to SARU. Mdyesha was left with nothing but his own club and half of another. King Williams Town and the two East London unions defected to SARU en masse, except for Mdantsane Police who were held back by direct orders from Pretoria, and now play in the white Border league because they have no one else to play against. The SAARB, now renamed SARA, survived a little longer in the more distant country areas, partly because of the personal loyalty of older officials to Mdyesha, and partly because BAD poured money into the SARA unions: this was an important consideration where the impoverished black townships were usually some fifty to a hundred kilometers apart.

Queenstown, especially, became a major battleground, as the Frontier Rugby Union, a SARU affiliate, confronted a viable SARA alternative. Frontier were refused permission to play on any field in the town, and when they hired the white Agricultural Union ground to stage a major exhibition match against KWARU, government officials waited until an hour before kick-off (thereby maximising costs) and then

warned the Agricultural Union that they were contravening the Group Areas Act. The drift to SARU was, however, irresistible, with Midlands (Cradock), the last major SARA union, affiliating to SARU in 1979.

Undoubtedly the best-kept secret of the 1980 Lions tour was the struggle of SARA to find fifteen 'african' rugby players willing to participate in the token match. The provincial affiliations of the SARA trialists make interesting reading. The traditional strong-holds of black rugby - Eastern Province, Western Province and Border - are virtually absent, while provinces previously unheard of in rugby terms, such as Free State and Natal - hastily organised by local Administration Boards - make their first appearance. It is no co-incidence that 'star' Barbarian full-back Solomon Mhlaba hails from the tiny Karoo town of Hanover, some 80km from Colesberg. In the event, SARA could find only eight black players to pit against the Lions, although they could easily have fielded an army of administrators.

The history of SARU since 1975 has by no means been one of unqualified success. There have been splits and accusations of financial mismanagement. There have been racial incidents, especially in the matches between KWARU and Eastern Province. As a game, rugby is declining in the face of the greater glamour of NPSL soccer. In the Transkei, it has nearly collapsed altogether, partly owing to KD Matanzima's view that SARU is an organisation belonging to another country. And yet the story of black rugby in the Eastern Cape does not lack its points of interest, perhaps even of heroism.

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ALL WELCOME

WORK IN PROGRESS

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WORKERS' STRUGGLE IN EAST LONDON

INDUSTRIAL relations in East London, which is witnessing an astonishing growth in the unregistered trade union movement, hang delicately in the balance at the moment over the sacking of more than 500 workers at the Wilson-Rowntree plant.

The past 12 months in this relative backwater which is fast becoming a focal point in the struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa have been wracked by disputes arising largely from management's intransigent response to the burgeoning militancy among workers, and strikes have become, if not a daily, at least a weekly occurrence. But the sheer scale of the Wilson-Rowntree dispute, the mood of management in summarily dismissing half a thousand workers, the consumer boycott which is being launched on a national scale and the consequences to labour relations in East London if the boycott fails, make this dispute the crucial one which will shape the future attitude of employers, perhaps not only in East London but nation-wide.

The South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), the union which claims to represent the majority of the Wilson-Rowntree workers, has been spearheading the new build up of worker activity in the region. SAAWU has been faced with an immense organisational task not made any easier by hostility from 3 quarters -

the South African government, the Ciskei government and local management. But, as it attracts workers in factory after factory, it is prospering well in adverse conditions and membership, which continues to grow, has passed the 20 000 mark.

Sharing offices with SAAWU in the centre of East London are the local branches of the African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) and the Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU), who have a co-operative relationship with SAAWU. The WPGWU branch has succeeded recently in organising stevedores at the docks, assisted by SAAWU (many of the stevedores were previously SAAWU members) and is continuing its organisational work in industries which the long-established Cape Town branch has experience and familiarity with.

The AFCWU has built up a large and strong following among the workers within its designated territory. While this article will concentrate on SAAWU, it is important to bear in mind the role of the other unions who are as much in the forefront of developments as the 'big daddy' SAAWU.

SAAWU was formed in March 1979 after the splitting of the labour wing of the black consciousness movement, the Black Allied Workers Union. Unlike its predecessor, SAAWU stresses in its constitution that there are no racial barriers to membership. Not surprisingly - considering white labour's historical complicity with capitalism - no white workers have joined the organisation, but the principle of non-racialism is important on at least one very meaningful ground: the area in which the struggle is perceived is the one most fundamental to the needs of workers. It is

a class (rather than racial) struggle.

Sisa Njikelana, the East London branch chairman of SAAWU, said at a recent mass meeting in the city hall:

We are not struggling against a particular race, creed or religion. We are toiling against the exploiters and oppressors irrespective of the colour.

The 'exploiters and oppressors' have not been slow in identifying themselves through the manner in which they have responded to SAAWU. Over 1 000 workers (including those from Wilson-Rowntree) have been dismissed in the past 12 months over issues such as union recognition and pension fund 'agreements' in what national organiser Thozamile Gqweta has called 'systematic victimisation'.

Furthermore, union officials and workers have been detained both in the Republic itself and in the Ciskei region and the state has intervened both directly and verbally in the affairs of East London. It is clear that SAAWU is being treated as a threat to more than the profits of a few businessmen. The message that the authorities seem to be reading is that the stirrings of the working class have broader implications than higher wages.

Among the workers of East London there is a rapidly developing class consciousness, as can be evidenced by the enthusiastic and fiery meetings at the city hall which draw crowds of thousands, and by the extent to which SAAWU support continues to snowball in the face of intimidatory tactics by the state and management.

SAAWU's fundamental principle is mass participatory democracy which means that, hand in hand with the formal organising task, the union is attempting to raise the consciousness

of workers and preparing them to be self-sufficient in the task of representing their own interests, so that this knowledge does not remain entirely in the hands of union officials. SAAWU emphasises the need for workers to make their own decisions as, for instance, at a mass meeting on January 21, when the whole question of registration was discussed and re-evaluated. After much talk from the floor the workers as a body rejected registration in the strongest terms.

Also following from this policy, SAAWU plans that at a certain stage of development workers committees evolve into unions in their own right, organised along industry lines, with SAAWU becoming an umbrella body. This, according to Gqweta, will be to keep control of the worker representation process closer to the shop floor and avoid bureaucratic control from above. Furthermore, if SAAWU is eliminated - through some or other governmental decree - the smaller unions can continue to operate.

The first workers committee to reach this stage of development is at SA Chloride, which also became the first committee to be officially recognised as representative of the workers by management on November 11 last year. The pioneering struggle at SA Chloride can be seen as a model of the path other SAAWU workers organisation are to follow.

The initial organising phase was rapid, say Chloride workers, taking barely three weeks for 80% of the workforce to join up with SAAWU. In June, 1980, a democratically elected workers committee was formed with the aim of supplanting the ineffective and discredited liaison committee as a means of communication with management, but the path to recognition was thorny.

Management at SA Chloride tried with all

the means at its disposal to break the organisation of the workers, but after workers protested at the dismissal of a colleague and a major conflict loomed, management was forced to negotiate with the workers committee, which implied a recognition both of the existence and the strength of the committee. After lengthy negotiations between union officials and management, SAAWU's strength was put to the test in a referendum which it won with a 95% 'yes' vote. The original workers committee was voted back into office, and with the formal recognition by management, the right of workers to be represented by a body of their own choice, representing their own interests, was established.

(This was, however, not the first firm to have recognised an unregistered union in East London - earlier in the year management had recognised the African Food and Canning Workers Union (AFCWU) at Langeberg Koöperasie Beperk and at Western Province Preserving Company).

The deal between SAAWU and Chloride flew in the face of urgings by the Minister of Manpower Utilisation, Fanie Botha, who had visited East London in October and called on employers to 'hold out' against SAAWU until new legislation could be brought out to assist them. There is little doubt that employers in East London have been hiding behind this directive to avoid facing the decision of whether or not to deal with an organisation genuinely representing workers' interests.

This, in fact, is why the developments at Chloride are so significant: they have cracked both the unity of the employers as well as upset state policy of controlling the trade union movement through tame registered unions. It has also set an example which other employers

in the region have been prepared to follow, and thus elevated SAAWU to a 'respectability' which makes it easier for management to take the 'plunge'.

At the time of going to press workers at Johnson and Johnson were to vote in a referendum to decide whether they wished to be represented by SAAWU or not. SAAWU claims 95% membership in the factory.

But representing a different uncompromising faction among East London employers are Wilson-Rowntree and others who believe, by their actions which speak so loudly, that the only way to smooth the unrest is simply to quell the workers. Adherents to this view are probably strengthened by covert state sponsorship.

State interference in industrial relations in East London through the detention of union officials, the use of police to disperse striking workers (at Border Boxes the security police dismissed workers themselves), and the close cooperation between management officials and the Department of Manpower is a matter of concern to the union. An example of this was the dispute at Modern Engineering in February, in which 12 workers were dismissed over the pensions issue.

Workers wanted to withdraw pension contributions and after representations to management with this demand were confronted with the information that through an agreement between the industrial council and registered unions they were contracted into a pension fund agreement by which they are not allowed to withdraw pension contributions until they reach the age of 65 years. However, most workers were not members of these unions who had entered into the agreement, and had no

knowledge of such agreements, and thus told management that they were dissatisfied.

Officials from the Department of Manpower were called in by management on February 19 and told workers that they should delegate six representatives in 15 minutes, failing which they would all be sent home. The workers, who had been meeting and negotiating with management for some two weeks already, refused and went home. The following day all workers returned but were called in to the manager's office six at a time, with 12 being asked to stand aside and told that they were not being 're-employed' because they were 'undesirable elements' responsible for the previous day's work stoppage.

It is clear from this case that management, having revealed the bankruptcy of its own approach to solving the problem, called in the Department of Manpower to 'sort it out' for them. The appearance on the scene of Manpower officials has, in fact, become a common means of settling disputes in East London and the way in which management has become accustomed to 'copping out' of its responsibilities and hiding behind the long arm of the law.

However, this is not always the case. In a dispute over union recognition, at Raylite Batteries in August last year, SAAWU officials and management were on the point of agreement when the security police intervened and detained Gqweta and Njikelana. This, according to Gqweta, was after police had sjembokked, baton-charged and arrested workers and officials. As a spin-off of this dispute Gqweta, Njikelana and four members of the workers' committee (Ndiphiwe Mahatala, Vuyise Pato, David Tudani and Lancelot Booi - who had all been detained for 17 days in

August) were charged with inciting workers to strike. They were due to appear in the Regional Court on February 2, but the charges against them were withdrawn, which was implicit vindication.

While the state sees the long-term 'solution' to industrial unrest as more cunning and ultimately restrictive legislation, and is prepared in the short-term to quell worker action by using coercive measures, the most brutal and blunt weapon at the disposal of both management and the state is to be found abundantly in the East London area: it is, quite simply, unemployment. It is estimated that more than half of the workers in East London are unemployed. This is exacerbated by the huge rural slum inland from East London known as the Ciskei, from which people flood down into this already overloaded and not particularly developed industrial area.

The unemployment factor has been used by management in several specific disputes already, but the general situation is the cause of constant worker insecurity and severely hampers the bargaining power of workers. The most notorious example of management's use of the unemployed as blackmail was at the SATV Manufacturing plant where, after a work stoppage over the right of workers to be represented by their own committee and not by a liaison committee, a long list of unemployed was shown to the workers. Workers were warned either to return to work or their jobs would be taken by the men on the list.

One of the sorest points among workers is the exploitation of the unemployed for profit. At a recent mass meeting in the city hall workers alleged that a certain Joe Menemene was taking money from unemployed

workers desperate for jobs and shipping them in as scab labour during strikes. In this way, it was claimed, he facilitates the action of employers in making mass dismissals. (Disputes in which Menemene did his bit are: Border Boxes, National Converter Industries, Collondale Canneries, East London Furniture Industries, Berkshire, Raylite Batteries and Wilson-Rowntree. Workers say that at one factory they forced management not to use the 'imports' but rather to employ workers arriving at the gates asking for jobs in the usual manner.

It is in this context of widespread unemployment that SAAWU is engaged in the formation of an unemployed workers' union, the first ever in South Africa. Gqweta says the primary purpose of the union, which will be an affiliate of SAAWU, will be to retain the hundreds of recently fired workers within the trade union movement. 'It is important' he says 'for them to maintain their level of consciousness as workers'.

But a second, and equally important reason will be to organise unemployed workers so they will not be prepared to take over the jobs of workers unfairly dismissed. If this pioneering attempt - which is riddled with difficulties - is able to succeed, it will disrupt the strategy of the authorities in the East London area. The first signs that it may work have been seen during the Wilson-Rowntree dispute where several workers - on learning that they had replaced workers sacked by management - resigned their jobs at considerable self-sacrifice.

The vast numbers of unemployed make up the only 'raw material' of the poverty-

stricken Ciskei, and among attempts to use them more productively is a new scheme being devised by the Department of Justice, known as the Ciskei Manpower Development Component. This scheme, which has been described as a totalitarian measure, aims to organise Ciskei's workers for the South African labour market.

Workers have spoken out loudly against this plan because, while it is still to be put into effect and its full ramifications have not yet been spelt out, it has several frightening implications:

1. All details about all workers will be fed into a central computer which will keep tabs on their working records. As an official has said, 'We will know more



about individual workers than they will themselves'.

2. The Ciskei government would probably stand to profit by it - in the same way as migrant workers on the mines are only paid a portion of their wages, the rest going to their governments.

3. According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail, Chief H Njokweni has told the Ciskei Legislative Assembly that

To assist in marketing our labour in South Africa, employees must ensure that desertions, walkouts, expulsions and insubordination are eliminated.

This would seem to deny Ciskei 'citizens' the right to participate in trade unions.

4. The whole concept of marketing labour as a commodity is repugnant and inhuman.

But then again, whereas the implementation of this scheme lies sometime in the future, it will be a mere refinement of the purpose the Ciskei already fulfils. The Ciskei has become a vast and horrific human dumping ground which serves the sole purpose of supplying labour to 'white' South Africa and, as the overseers of this process attempting to outbid its rival bantustans, the Ciskei government can hardly be pleased with the growth of progressive trade unions within its boundaries.

The Ciskei government is threatened by trade unionism on two counts. As South Africa's policeman in the region, the Ciskei would be failing in its duty if it allowed such unorthodox organisations to gain a foothold among Ciskeians. As SAAWU has claimed, in detaining union officials and workers (none of whom have been convicted of any offence) the Ciskei is doing the Republic's dirty work.

Secondly, the Sebe brothers' credibility

is seriously undermined by an organisation which offers a genuine means of resistance for the oppressed people of East London. SAAWU has far more to offer the people of East London than the hollow independence which Sebe plans to deliver,

Not surprisingly, workers view that impending 'independence' with apprehension. The majority of East London's workers live in Mdantsane which is within the boundaries of the Ciskei; they thus commute daily between the 'homeland' and the city of East London. The strange sayings of Brigadier Charles Sebe, head of the Ciskei Intelligence Service, have done nothing to inspire confidence in his belief in worker democracy. The Brigadier has gone on record as saying the Ciskei is against trade unions because the government looks after every worker. The Ciskei government is a trade union itself. Hence trade unions are redundant.

Trade union or not, the Ciskei government has acted in a heavy-handed, bullying manner towards SAAWU, detaining union officials and workers for lengthy periods. There have been numerous other instances of petty harassment as well as an attempt to burn Gqweta's house down last year. It is no accident that SAAWU's offices are in the centre of East London rather than in Mdantsane where it would be more convenient for workers.

The weight of evidence showing the extent to which SAAWU is under fire from the South African government, the Ciskei administration and management can lead one only to conclude that the real 'hard-liners' are those opposed to SAAWU and that SAAWU's demands have all along been, to say the

EDITORIAL

THE absence of democracy in South Africa's political institutions is an obvious feature of the current all-white election: not only is the majority of the population excluded from participation in the formal political process, but even those legal freedoms usually associated with democracy - speech, movement, assembly - are not present.

But it is not only the lack of electoral democracy which is so noticeable in South Africa today: the very term 'democracy' forms almost no part of debates about 'change' and the future direction of society. From the white political parties leftwards, from the community councils through the other state-created 'ethnic' institutions like the South African Indian Council, to the commercial press and registered trade union movement, not even the symbols of democracy and democratic practice are invoked in any real way.

The lack of a democratic 'atmosphere' has, inevitably, also had its effects on certain opposition organisations which, while broadly calling for a democratic future for South Africa, have placed little emphasis on participation, democracy and mass struggle in their organisational activities.

To some extent, this can be explained by the very wide and unspecified use of 'democracy' as a concept. The term can be used as a symbol by almost any interests, from the dictatorial capitalist right to the democratic socialist left.

Current usage of the notion of democracy often limits it to a series of ideas involving a vote for central and regional authorities

every few years, and to an adherence to a set of formal, legally-guaranteed individual freedoms. These aspects of democratic practice should not necessarily be rejected just because they are very limited, and ultimately inadequate. Voting for a national assembly, the right to freedom of speech, movement, belief etc are formal rights, often without much content in the struggle to transform society. But part of progressive struggle and organisation involves giving content and a greater reality to these freedoms; deepening ideas about participation and democracy through struggle.

One of the problems progressives have with representative democracy as practised in some capitalist countries is that its democratic content is very limited. As Richard Turner wrote:

How can the citizen be integrated into the political system? We have seen that the vote itself does not of itself do this. If I merely vote once every five years I have no meaningful control over decision-making. I am not involved in politics between elections, and therefore do not acquire the knowledge on which to base my decision. (Turner, 1972:70).

A vote for a national assembly every few years is not the practise of democracy: but at the same time it must be recalled that the working classes of advanced capitalist society had to struggle to win even the vote, and it was a working class victory when universal suffrage was introduced. In South Africa the demand for universal suffrage is a part of the struggle for democracy: but it is not a demand for real democracy itself.

There is another major limitation on representative democracy, involving an

occasional vote for parliament or similar bodies: as a political process it is perfectly compatible with economic exploitation and oppression. In a bourgeois democracy, the working class citizen is, in law, equal to the capitalist. They both have a vote and are, at least in theory, subject to the same set of laws and institutions.

Even when entering into an agreement to work for the capitalist the worker seems to be entering into an equal agreement of exchange: a certain period of work sold in return for a wage. The law of contracts seems in this case to bind and regulate both worker and employer equally.

But whatever the law may say, whatever equality seems to exist in the sale of work for wages between employer and worker, this is formal and not real. For before the transaction between worker and capitalist, the relationship between the two is unequal: if workers refuse to sell their work capacity, they have exercised their freedom of choice - to starve! This compulsion to enter into wage labour is very different from the choice facing the capitalist when hiring labour - which is ultimately about profits, capital accumulation and re-investment of profits.

The relationship of 'equality' also breaks down once the worker reaches the factory floor, where actual production takes place. Here the power of the capitalist over the worker is based on the employers' ownership of the means of production - the factory, machinery, tools, raw materials. This power enables the owner to exploit the worker, to take over the wealth produced by the working class, paying a wage which is always less than the total value produced

least, moderate. East London industry has become a battlefield not because SAAWU is trying to ferment revolution but because the state and management insist on denying workers the basic human right to be democratically represented.

It is in this context that the unrest at Wilson-Rowntree should be viewed. The dispute began on the evening of February 9 when three workers in the toffee department were ordered by the foreman to fix some belts which had come loose, and to adjust a machine. The workers refused, saying it was not their job (it is the job for a fitter and turner - a higher paid and higher skilled class of worker). The workers also pointed out that some workers had been reprimanded for doing a similar job in October last year. When the foreman insisted, the workers demanded that he give them authorisation to do the job in writing, which he refused: the workers thus refused to do the job.

Without making use of the company's grievance procedure ('refusal to obey an order') the foreman fired the three. When the news spread through the factory, 50 workers in the toffee department and 42 workers in the moulding department downed tools and refused to return to work until the three had been reinstated. Three high officials in management, including the personnel manager, Alistair Lightbody, refused to reverse the decision of the foreman and gave the workers 15 minutes in which to return to work or consider themselves dismissed, which they were when the time was up.

On hearing about the dismissals the following day, the day shift workers sent

their committee on what turned out to be a series of fruitless negotiations with management. The attitude of management was simply that the workers had discharged themselves, that they could re-apply but would be selectively re-employed.

Representations were made to management, a petition was signed by hundreds of workers calling on management to unconditionally reinstate all 92 fired workers.

On February 19 (ten days after the initial dismissals, after virtually every

means of communication had failed), 62 workers in the toffee department dayshift downed tools and demanded the re-instatement of the other 92. Department of Manpower officials were called on the scene and told the workers to return home as they had dismissed themselves. The following morning they returned to work to find themselves locked out.

On Monday, February 23, a further 350 workers downed tools demanding the re-instatement of the other 154. They were



SAAWU's Gqweta and Njikelana enjoy a meal after being released from detention in December 1980.

given seven minutes to return to work failing which they would be regarded as having dismissed themselves. They were then fired and given 30 minutes to collect their goods and leave the premises.

The dismissal of such a large section of the labour force at the plant came about at a time when SAAWU was negotiating with Wilson-Rowntree for recognition. There had been several disputes between management and workers before this, a result of workers being properly organised for the first time ever. Thus there was friction over such issues as

1. Workers being dismissed for complaining about their foreman;
2. A workstudy programme which cut back on the number of workers while requiring the same amount of work;
3. A charge hand who had been ill-treating the workers.

It would not be far-fetched to suggest that the dismissals were related to SAAWU's increased activity within the factory and pressing demand for recognition. The first shots to be fired at SAAWU were from the Sweet Workers Union (SWU), a registered union based in Johannesburg which blamed SAAWU for intimidating their members at the factory. They claimed to have been operating at Wilsons since 1942 and blamed SAAWU militancy for the new friction between management and workers, which had not existed previously.

Eric Mntonga, chairman of the workers committee at Wilson-Rowntree replied that workers at the plant had never even known of the existence of a union before SAAWU came upon the scene. When management found out that workers were joining SAAWU, Mr Mntonga said, they went out and canvassed the SWU. For the first time the SWU was also allowed to

represent africans. The only reason why there had been no friction between management and the workers previously was because workers were not organised and thus in no position to represent themselves when they felt they were unfairly treated by management.

SAAWU sent a telegramme to Wilson-Meckintosh, the parent company of Wilson-Rowntree in England, calling on them to exert pressure on their South African subsidiary to re-instate all the workers unfairly dismissed. Sir Donald Barron, the chairman of the company, replied to SAAWU, blaming them for activities that brought about violence and for intimidation of workers. What it amounted to was condoning the actions of the local management of the firm.

On Sunday, March 1, several hundred fired Wilson-Rowntree workers met and called for a boycott of all Wilson-Rowntree products and called for support from all progressive elements in the South African community. Letters asking for support were sent to numerous organisations in South Africa and internationally.

For the moment the matter rests there, but the broader implications are being felt. On March 27, just before going to press, all 230 workers at the Evarite factory were dismissed for downing tools in sympathy with 2 dismissed colleagues. Like the Wilsons dispute, the dismissal of the workers happened after lengthy negotiations between SAAWU and management over recognition, with management insisting that the liaison committee was perfectly democratic and refusing to recognise SAAWU because of SAAWU's objection to registration.

It is obvious that in both cases the

extreme action in firing hundreds of workers seems a determined effort on the part of management to break SAAWU. Whether this kind of hard-line attitude can win remains to be seen in the weeks that lie ahead. Certainly SAAWU popularity is spreading like wildfire and management will find it no easy task to disorganise the already organised and conscientised workers of East London.



OLD AGE PENSIONS AND THE BANTUSTANS

IN THE more developed capitalist societies (USA, western Europe) the state is involved in providing a certain amount of 'social security' to members of the working class (active members and their families). 'Social security' can include housing provision and subsidies, unemployment benefits, workmen's compensation, disability and maternity grants, as well as pension payments to those too old to work.

These social security benefits were in most cases won after struggle by the working class. They were initially provided by the firms who employed the workers because this is where the workers' struggle is clearest. Later, however, these costs to the employers started cutting too deeply into profits and the capitalist class demanded that the state took over these payments. Such a centralisation was also necessary to avoid the problems associated with transfer of social security benefits. The take-over by the state meant that costs were spread amongst all employers, instead of just among those who had been forced by their workers to provide social security benefits. The degree of state participation varies considerably from country to country (for Africa see, for example, Mouton, 1975:79).

It must be remembered that pensions are

a cost to either individual employers, or to capitalists as a class through the state (the state gets its revenue partly through taxation on profits made by all employers). This expenditure on pensions does not make profits - it is unproductive.

However, at times the state introduces social pensions without great pressure having been exerted on individual employers or groups of employers. This assisted the ruling class to control workers, maintain social stability in periods of mass unemployment, and generally defuse working class militancy.

In peripheral capitalist societies, where capitalism has taken a different path of development from that followed in Europe (the 'birthplace' of capitalism), state-provided social security has tended to be limited or even non-existent. This study on old age pensions (OAPs) in South Africa explores what this issue can tell us about the general nature of society - in this case the relationships that exist between town and countryside, between industrial areas and the bantustans, and between the central South African state and the administrations in what were known as the reserves and became the bantustans.

Old age pensions were only paid out to africans in South Africa from 1944. Whites had been receiving them since 1928. Before that time the reserve regions were expected to provide nearly the full set of social security benefits usually provided in capitalist societies for african workers, peasants and their families.

This paper, very much 'work in progress', provides some background information to the provision of social pensions; and takes a brief

look at the situation as it exists at present and the implications of what appears to be a reduction in the services provided by the state and the bantustan branches of the central state.

For a more complete picture of social security it would be necessary to include unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, and disability grants (at the very least). This has not been possible in this paper. Nor have I touched upon a theory of the capitalist state, increasingly the most important agent in providing social security; nor upon the current debates and moves to alter pension schemes and to introduce a contributory pension scheme. This contribution on pensions has to be situated within the present wage structure in South Africa, within the migrant labour system, and the conditions that exist within the bantustans.

The article is broken down into four sections: the first section deals with some theoretical issues relating to provision of pensions and the functions of the bantustans; the second section looks briefly at the history of pensions in South Africa; section three investigates discrimination and the situation at present; while section four presents some cases and the effects of changes in the system of pension payments.

SECTION ONE: PENSIONS AND CAPITALISM IN THE PERIPHERY

'PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM' is a term that is used to distinguish the capitalism that exists in countries that are commonly called the 'third world', from the system that exists in western Europe and the United States. This term refers to 'imposed capitalist development', through colonialism and imperialism, as distinct from

'organic capitalist development' that characterises the system in western Europe where capitalism 'grew' out of feudalism. Although the latter process of 'organic development' was also full of conflict, it was not as sudden or directly violent as the way that the capitalism that already existed in western Europe established itself in the colonial societies of Africa, Asia and America.

With the 'imposition' of capitalism, for example after the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa, the relations that characterise capitalism have had to co-exist, alter and dominate previous non-capitalist societies in South Africa. Whereas previously the producers (men and women) had direct control over certain land (for grazing and agricultural production) the size of the land was now limited through conquest and legislation. Taxes that had to be paid in money were imposed, adding another pressure to force an ever-increasing number of men (initially, and later also african women) to work on the mines, farms, and later in industry.

But while the men worked for capitalists, the reserves (what are now the bantustans, or 'homelands') served a series of functions for the developing capitalist society.

Firstly, these areas allowed employers to use the argument that wages could be low because every 'native' still had land at 'home' in the reserves (where his wife grew crops, looked after the hut, and where the young and old were cared for). In other words, the wages paid were really just pocket money. This picture, so functional to capital, may have been true for a certain period and in certain places (and even then it was no excuse for low wages, but rather the reason for high

profits). But soon overcrowding and its effects on agricultural production served to destroy (even) the remnants of production in the reserves. The 'excuse' for low wages lived on beyond this time though.

Secondly, the reserves functioned to maintain political control over those who still lived there and those who migrated from there - through tribal chiefs, who were increasingly out of place in a capitalist society, and through the system of migrant labour that frustrated, to a large extent, attempts to form trade unions.

Thirdly, these areas functioned to maintain a belief in the 'correctness' of separation. The 'correctness' of segregation is believed more by those who maintain this system (both white and black) and who benefit from it, than by those who suffer under its controls and repression. This is, however, a very complex issue (of the nature of ideology) and will be dealt with in a later article.

These are some of the most important 'functions' that the reserves played in South Africa. These functions have changed over time, and not only in name (reserves, locations, bantustans, homelands, black states). So, for example, the 'correctness' of racial separation has now become the 'correctness' of national separation, with probably as much effect on the lives of people but as little acceptance.

In this article I will be looking at the role the bantustans have played in regard to pensions and social security, and the way that this role has changed over time.

Duncan Clarke (see bibliography) has discussed the issue of 'post-retirement subsistence' (a more accurate term for

'pensions', which refers only to capitalist post-retirement benefits), in what was then Rhodesia. He stressed that the issue of such benefits has to be looked at historically (changes that have occurred over time) and in regard to the interaction between capitalist and non-capitalist relations.

Clarke refers to the disintegration of the Rhodesian reserves, and remarks that '(t)he rural areas assumed a greater though not exclusive role as "labour reserves" for the unemployed, temporary migrants, the sick, the destitute and the aged for whom in the new (capitalist) State no direct provisions were available' (emphasis in original).

As in the South African case, the aged worker was returned to the rural areas, forced back to the reserves after a life of working on capitalist farms, in mines, factories and domestic employment. The enforced return to the reserves was because no post-retirement subsistence was being paid by employers or the state. Says Clarke:

Housing and influx control, as well as wage policy, forced retirees to 'return home', an expectation typically prepared for by the long-term maintenance of a rural dependence (through the migrant labour system - gm) upon the lineage system of support. Because these costs fell upon and were effectively met by the peasant economy, neither the State nor employers had an interest in providing other means of subsistence (last emphasis added).

It was as late as 1971 that in Rhodesia the state began making moves to extend pensions to selected groups of africans (in the police, defence forces, and prisons (1)). When these changes did come about it was because the non-provision of old age subsistence in the reserves had become very obvious, and (more important) was having disruptive effects on the supply of labour.

The non-provision of pensions for such long periods in the history of capitalism in South Africa and Rhodesia shows something beyond the function of the reserves. It also shows how capitalism is interested only in the ability-to-work (labour power), not in the labourers themselves. When the ability-to-work is absent (because of injury or old age) it was, for a very long time, possible for capitalists to use the excuse of a 'home in the rural areas' to shirk any responsibility to the labourer beyond the period when he/she is actually employed.

Why, then, has the payment of pensions come about at all? It has already been said that these are unproductive payments that do not lead to the creation of profits.

In the introduction it was said that in many, if not most cases in advanced capitalism (eg, in western Europe) pensions were forced out of the employers who paid up to allow the capitalist system to continue. In South Africa the struggle has not been as strongly around the issue of pensions (I am not aware of any study of strikes that has taken place round this demand. However, see the article reproduced below). Possibly this has been the case because of the large number of migrants who have to return to the reserves after they had stopped selling their labour (their ability-to-work). The reserves were the regions where they spent their old age (and still is that area).

However, the capitalist system demands that workers continue to accept that system as adequate, if not just and the most desirable. Part of that acceptance comes from seeing the system as natural - that it will always exist. Part of the acceptance comes from a feeling of security - that maybe the system is interested

in more than the labourers' ability-to-work; maybe there is some care available in old age, during unemployment, after an accident, for the childrens' education, etc.

'Workers fear of pension changes sparked strike'

By Drew Forrest

A proposed change in the law governing pension schemes could become a "major cause of industrial unrest," a senior executive in the powerful Union Carbide mining company has said.

Mr W H McGruder, the company's regional director, was asked to comment on reports of a strike at Tlosetse Ferrochrome Ltd at Steelport, on the Lebowa border. The plant is jointly owned by Union Carbide and General Mining.

He confirmed that a strike by Tlosetse's entire 600-strong workforce had taken place on September 16 and 17. It was sparked, he said, by worker fears that proposed changes in the law might prevent them from withdrawing their pensions on premature termination of service.

He denied independent reports that the workers struck in sympathy with 10 colleagues who had resigned in order to cash in their pensions, and whom the company had refused to rehire.

Mr McGruder said concern over the pension issue had been building for some months among Tlosetse workers, most of whom viewed their pension contributions as a form of saving.

Concern had reached a peak in June this year, with the tabling of the Law Commission report in Parliament. The report - on which new legislation will probably be based - recommends the freezing of pension funds contributions, in order to preserve them for the workers' retirement.

A disturbing feature of the proposed legislation, Mr McGruder said, was its retrospective nature. Workers who had joined pension schemes expecting to recover their contributions might be denied this.

"On the surface, this seems grossly unfair," he said. "And it could lead to considerable worker unrest."

The insecurity of the capitalist system arises out of the nature of the most important relationship that exists in such societies: the relationship between labourer and capitalist. The labourer has nothing to fall back on, once his or her ability-to-work is no longer needed.

And the capitalist is not interested, in the short term, in what happens outside of the working hours and working life.

Now this is not a major problem while the labourer can return to another society where he/she will be cared for while unemployed, in old age, or when injured. When that society collapses insecurity sets in, and with that insecurity possible mistrust of the capitalist system.

As the International Labour Office (ILO) report by Mouton (1975:152) puts it:

It is generally agreed that social security tends to encourage the integration of certain groups in society as a whole and lessen antagonism between groups and classes ('integration' is another word for acceptance, in this case - gm).

This is when the working class fights for its right to security. When workers demand that the system that buys their ability-to-work in order to make profits, also takes responsibility for their well-being outside working hours and their working life.

This is when the state steps in if individual capitalists are not responsive to pressure, or if the costs to individual capitalists get too high and they pressure the state into instituting social security schemes.

So there are times when the state steps in to see to the continuation of the system. The state takes steps that are necessary to make the working class, and other oppressed classes and groups accept the system as it is, or as it is presented to be (either now, or possibly in the future). But the costs of these steps have to kept down, whether it be a cost to the individual capitalist or to the state.

Mouton does, however, also point out

that social security payments (in Africa) can also increase social tensions, and this is especially true in South Africa, by

... afford(ing) additional advantages for the highest strata of the population while disregarding the most deprived masses (Mouton, 1975:153).

Not only are there the discriminations between whites and blacks (see Section Three, below), but it is to be expected that the african workforce with 'permanent' urban rights and steady employment will increasingly benefit from pension schemes paid out by the employers, as opposed to migrant workers. This would reinforce the moves to create divisions within the working class in South Africa.

SECTION TWO: ASPECTS OF POST-RETIREMENT SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

SEVERAL Commissions of Enquiry have been appointed over the years to look at pensions in South Africa.

It is believed that the first form of pension to be paid was to field cornets in 1837. During 1882 a fund was set up (made up of contributions during and after the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-1) to support the wounded, widows and orphans. A controlling Act was passed in 1883.

In 1909 poor relief was entrusted to the provinces. In 1914 the Jeppe Commission in the Transvaal was set up, and reported in 1916. It recommended that the state should be responsible for aid and the provision of homes for the aged and the disabled. This recommendation was turned down by the state.

Until 1927 pensions for africans had not received serious consideration. In 1926 the Piensar Commission was appointed to investigate old age pensions and disability

grants, and social security in general. Its first report (UG 21/27) dealt with pensions and led to the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 (making provision for payment of pensions, excluding africans, subject to a means test. Disability grants were turned down at this time).

The Commission's second and third reports, in 1928 and 1929 respectively, dealt with 'sickness insurance' and 'unemployment insurance' - I will return to this third report below.

As regards africans the first report of the Piensar Commission recommended that rations under the Poor Relief Vote 'should be on a more generous scale'. The Commission continued:

The conditions in which the vast majority of the native population of the Union are at present living makes it impossible in our opinion to bring them within the scope of any scheme of old age or invalidity pensions. There is, no doubt, a section of the native population living in towns and industrial centres under conditions very similar to those of the coloured workers, but the difficulty of applying any statutory distinction between them and other natives for the purposes of this report seems to us at present insuperable (par 48).

In its third report (on unemployment insurance) the Piensar Commission gave a hint as to how it viewed labour, and the functions of the reserves in southern Africa. (This view shows remarkable similarity to contemporary approaches to unemployment and mine labour recruitment in southern Africa):

If through drought or any similar cause the number of natives who elect (sic) to leave their tribal areas at any particular time is greater than the normal, which under ordinary conditions would lead to there being a surplus of labour in the industrial areas, this can be overcome in South Africa by reducing the importation from the neighbouring territories. So far,

therefore, as the natives from the tribal areas of the country are concerned, we feel satisfied that we can assume there is practically no unemployment for such of them as desire to work; ... (par 130).

Underlying this paragraph is a view that the reserves will only fail sometimes, during droughts for example, in their function of providing subsistence for africans who do 'not elect' to work in mining or industry.

Elsewhere in this third report of the Piensar Commission (UG 26/29) the Commissioners draw an even clearer distinction between 'urban Natives' and 'reserve Natives' - the former depending completely 'for their livelihood on their earnings, as is the case with the industrial workers in other countries' (in other words, fully integrated into the capitalist way of producing); the latter group, in the eyes of the Commissioners,

...is domiciled in the Native territories and is living under tribal conditions (and) has a home to which he can resort and a plot of ground or grazing rights from which he can provide for himself and his family the bare necessities of life, without being required to effect payment in money, (while) the Native who is living in a town location has no such reserves to fall back upon ... (par 133).

Despite this, as has been said above, the Commission saw insurmountable administrative obstacles in the path of instituting pensions even for those africans classified as 'urban'.

So no OAPs were instituted for africans.

For whites, pensions for the blind were paid from 1936; for war veterans from 1941; disability grants were introduced from 1937 (a Disability Grants Act was passed in 1946); contributory unemployment insurance began in 1937, and workmen's compensation was introduced in 1941.

Then, in January, 1943, the Social Security Committee (SSC) was appointed. The

appointment arose out of a recommendation from the Social and Economic Planning Council of 1942, which investigated problems that the government might have to face after the war. The increase in the size of the industrial (especially african) workforce, and rapid african urbanisation obviously necessitated a further commission to investigate social security.

The SSC, in the paragraphs devoted to 'Natives', once more drew the distinction noted above: Firstly, paragraphs 130-1 dealt with 'The Reserves' - the 'great poverty' and overcrowding was noted, but despite this the Committee said that the 'peasant class needs relief when crops fail and moderate assistance will be of great value to those who are blind, old or invalids' (emphasis added). The SSC continued,

Otherwise, the vital essentials for improved well-being in the Native areas are more land, education (with a vocational bias), measures to assist improved farming, better transport and a large extension of medical and health services.

The 1936 Land Act had limited areas for african occupation some seven years before the SSC report. This along with the overcrowding *perceived by the SSC itself makes it difficult* in the extreme to see how agricultural improvements were going to help in the reserves. As far as the inhabitants of the reserves were concerned the SSC's recommendations did not differ much from their own characterisation of earlier approaches to pensions for this group:

Rural Natives were excluded from old-age pensions mainly on the assumption that Native custom makes provision for maintaining dependant persons ... In other directions administrative provision has been made for Natives but in giving effect to it the guiding consideration has been that benefits should not be provided in such a form or in such amount

as to conflict with or break down their tribal foodsharing habit. In practice the result of this has been either the provision of very nominal benefits or the virtual exclusion of Natives (par 129).

Secondly, it was recommended that 'Native farm workers', and 'Natives who live in the Reserves, but are employed under contract of service' (eg clerks, teachers), and who have no option on land, be given the option for pensions. It was further recommended that these pensions be at the same level as those for 'rural Coloureds'. Those people who elected 'not to exercise this option can only be treated on a par with the Reserve peasant'.

Thirdly, in the case of 'urbanised Natives', '(t)here must be a test of urbanisation to identify town Natives dependent upon earnings'. This is because

(i)t is apparent that the primitive condition of the Native people and the temporary presence of many Reserve and farm Natives in towns, renders it impossible to make cash benefits available to all Natives employed in towns - ... (par 135. Paragraphs 134-8 dealt with 'urban Natives').

It is clear that the distinction that the Riskert Commission makes between 'urban areas' and the 'black states' (between 'insiders' who have rights to live in the urban areas, and 'outsiders' who live in the 'homelands' and migrate from there), has had a long history in the South African context. As the paragraph quoted above indicates, the SSC desired to find a method of excluding not only those africans permanently in the reserves but also those who migrated for employment in towns and cities. The Wiehahn Report on labour representation similarly had initially recommended that migrant workers be excluded from trade union representation.

The onus of proof of 'permanent

urbanisation' was to rest on the african applicant, taking into account period of residence, 'allotment in a Native area or not' (!), and where the applicant's family lived. The SSC further recommended that the qualifying-residential period in an urban area be 'not less than 5 out of the preceding 7 years, coupled with the proviso that in the case of a married Native, his wife (...) must have been in an urban area for not less than 3 out of the preceding 5 years'. This recommendation was made to stop a potential flow from the reserves to cities and towns in order to make use of the pension benefits, 'which will be relatively attractive compared with the relief available to the tribal section' (!). This is indicative of the intense poverty in the reserves if it is kept in mind that pensions were initially set at R24,00 per year.

The various rates and qualifications were accepted by the government and became part of the legislation (see Draper, 1964:6). Nine areas were classified as 'cities' for pension purposes (eg Witwatersrand, Pretoria, Durban, Kimberley); 'Towns' were defined (for the second pension rate for africans) as those where the white population exceeded 2 000. The third rate was for africans in rural areas. Draper comments that while records do not show how many people fell into each of these categories

it would appear that it is Government policy to apply the various rules and regulations very strictly (especially in recent years) and that many (if not most) Africans who are in fact living in urban areas are being paid at the lower rural rates (1964:6).

Table 1, reproduced from Batson (1944:280) shows the position with regard to social benefits as it stood before the introduction of OAPs for africans and with the new legislation. Batson also calculated figures

TABLE I
THE PRESENT CASH-BENEFIT SOCIAL SERVICES
IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF TOTAL COST

Benefit	Europeans	Coloured	Asiatic	Natives
Old Age Pension	xx	xx	xx	ox
Unemployment Benefit	xx	xx	xx	oo
Child Maintenance Grant	xx	xx	xx	xx
Invalidity Pension	xx	ox	ox	ox
Poor Relief	xx	xx	xx	xx
Blind Pension	xx	xx	xx	xx
Leprosy Grant	xx	xx	xx	xx
Parents' Allowance	xx	xx	xx	xx
Maternity Allowance	xx	xx	xx	oo
Rail Fare	xx	oo	oo	oo

xx Operative at date of publication of Select Committee Report (May, 1944).
ox Budgeted to come into operation September, 1944.
oo Not contemplated under present system of benefits.

that give some indication of how many africans should strictly have fallen into the various 'grades' of pensions:

'(A)n estimated population of 11,677,000 for the year 1946-47 distributed ethnically in the proportions:-

Europeans.....21 per cent
Coloured and Asiatic.....10 per cent
Natives.....69 per cent

..., however, ..., the total cash benefits for the classified contingencies (eg old age, injury, etc - gm) are estimated to be divided in the proportions:-

Europeans.....67 per cent
Coloured and Asiatics.....13 per cent
Natives.....20 per cent

If it be contended that only that part of the population that lives under Western conditions should be taken into account, the population figures must be amended to read as follows:-

Europeans.....48 per cent
Coloured and Asiatics.....24 per cent
Natives.....28 per cent

and the figure for cash benefits as follows:-
Europeans.....75 per cent
Coloured and Asiatics.....15 per cent
Natives.....10 per cent

In either case it appears that the Europeans receive a share of the benefits far greater than their mere numbers alone would warrant, the Native a share far smaller' (Batson, 1944:282).

In 1963 the Survey (SAIRR, 1963:268) reported that relatively small increases in african pensions compared to other 'races', had been justified by the state as 'money had been paid annually to the Native Trust for dis-

bursement through Bantu Authorities to persons in need of financial assistance in tribal areas'. This was no doubt partly to strengthen the position of the discredited Bantu Authorities system, in the same way that pension payments have been handed over to the 'homeland' authorities since the early 1970s (see below).

The situation with regard to african pensions deteriorated during, at least, the first half of the 1960s (see Appendix Table 2). In 1944 african pensions of R24,00 a year were 21,4% of the white pensions; by 1959 it was R41,00 a year, or 15,56 of the white pension. By 1966 it was 12,3% of the white pension (!) (see Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1977:2; and Appendix Table 3). This has to be seen against the cost of living to indicate the utter poverty in which african (and white) pensioners already lived at that time (see Appendix Tables 4 & 5).

Professor Hansi Pollak comments that (t)he Government considered the system of social pensions 'inappropriate' for Africans. Efforts were directed at creating another system 'more in accordance with Bantu custom and tradition' (1976).

Draper, in her interesting article (see bibliography), pointed out that the state's approach was that pensions were meant to be 'augmentative. The individual was expected to

provide for himself against old age and infirmity'.

On pensions for africans she quotes the Minister of Bantu Affairs in 1955:

We want to evolve a system whereby we reinstate the natural obligations of Bantu authorities and Bantu children in regard to their old people, with the support of an equal amount of money to that which we now spend wrongly in caring for them.

In 1959 the Minister said:

Attention is being given to the problem of the aged and disabled, and methods are being investigated to make the Bantu authorities responsible for the care of those in need of assistance, with financial assistance from the state... An experimental scheme has also been started to establish a rehabilitation and social security service for the disabled by the development of home industries in which the Bantu authorities will be concerned.

However, it appears that very little of the money allocated to the 'Bantu authorities' was being spent (see Draper, 1964:54-5).

In 1963 the previous distinction within pensions paid to africans between 'city', 'town' and 'rural' was abolished. The Minister of Finance said (Hansard, 1965, cols 3327-30) that the uniform rate was being introduced 'to avoid providing an incentive to Africans to move to cities' (Survey, 1965:294). The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said that 70% of african pensioners lived in rural areas (Hansard, 1965, col 8365).

From 1 October, 1968, the previous 'rural rate' of pensions paid to indians and coloureds, was abolished - all pensions were to be paid at 'city rates' for these groups.

SECTION THREE - BANTUSTANS AND PENSIONS
DURING 1959-60 control of welfare services for

africans was placed under the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (Horrell, 1973:167). However,

(a)s the various homelands were granted partial self-government, ..., welfare services within their areas of jurisdiction became their responsibility.

What was happening was that the authorities established within the reserves/bantustans were being brought into the contemporary version of fulfilling a social security function. Previously, as has been pointed out in Section Two, above, the reserves fulfilled the function of 'looking after' all except the small, but rapidly growing, urban workforce. Later, as conditions in the reserves deteriorated, this became a burden that could not be met, except in the minds of employers (to justify low wages), or of the state (to justify maintaining distinctions between urban and rural).

Batson made the interesting point in 1944 that the distinction between urban and rural was basically a 'socio-economic', rather than an 'ethnic' distinction. In other words, africans could participate in pension schemes by entering industrial employment (as suggested by the SSC) and were not excluded from participation in pension schemes strictly on the grounds of race. This does not deny that there was racial discrimination within the administration of pensions, eg the enormous differences in pension amounts between say africans and whites (but also between other groups and whites). So, for example, in 1965 the sum of £9 893 597 was paid to whites; while african pensioners received £2 704 878 for the year 1954/5. If we take the maximum pension payable (per annum), the picture was as follows during the same period:

whites	£126 0 0
africans	
- in 9 principal cities.....	£18 15 0
- in smaller towns.....	£15 15 0
- in rural areas.....	£12 15 0

In other words, the maximum amount that a white pensioner could receive per year was more than six times larger than the maximum amount an african pensioner could receive per year.

These enormous discrepancies can be traced through to the present.

Similarly, racial discrimination exists as to the number of pensions paid to pensioners as a proportion of the white population, on the one hand, and the african population on the other.

Discrimination existed, and exists, as to the means test applied (the 'means test' refers to 'the income levels laid down which fix the maximum allowable income including pension'); and the 'free income permitted' (which refers to the income that is allowed a pensioner, 'which does not affect the amount of pension that may be granted') (see Barrett, 1976; and Government Regulation R466, of March, 1970).

As Horrell (1973:167) has noted with regard to the means test:

A means test is applied for applicants of all racial groups, in calculating which income from other sources ... are taken into account. In the case of Africans, family circumstances are also considered: a pension may be refused if an applicant has a son or daughter who is deemed able to support him.

To illustrate the discrimination in maximum free income (which is, of course, directly related to the discrimination in pension amounts) I will, once again, refer to 1955 figures:

	Maximum free income permitted if maximum pension is payable	Maximum pension
whites	£90	£126/0/0
coloureds	£45	52/10/0
indians	£36	45/0/0
africans (cities)	£24	18/15/0
(towns)	£18	15/15/0
(rural)	£12	12/15/0

Later figures indicate the same discrepancy (eg 1977):

	Maximum free income	Maximum pension
whites	R42,00	R79,00
coloureds & indians	R21,00	42,50
africans	R10,50	20,50

(The 1955 figures are per year, while the 1977 figures are per month).

As a final example, to clarify the 'maximum free income', I will quote from Muriei Horrell (1973:167):

If a pension is granted, an African with a cash income of R21 a year or less qualifies for the maximum amount, which in early 1973 was R76 a year (...). As the 'free' cash income rises above R21 per annum the pension is progressively reduced, and is no longer payable when this income reaches the R60 level.

This discrimination cannot be justified. As the Director of the National Council for the Care of the Aged said last year about pensions:

... all pay the same for bread, coal, meat and other necessities of life. The black and coloured people are also affected by rising costs, and have to pay the same 4% sales tax.

Discrimination exists as to the numbers of pensioners in the various racial groups receiving maximum pension amounts. For example:

Calculating from figures given by the Ministers, it transpires that about 94 per cent of the White pensioners, 91 per cent of the Coloured, 96 per cent of the Indians but only 34 per cent of the Africans, were receiving the maximum amounts permitted (Survey, 1974:370).

(See also the table in the Appendix showing average amounts paid out to pensioners).

In 1944, when pensions were introduced for Africans, the R24,00 per year payable was 21,4% of the amount payable to whites. By approximately 1976 pensions payable to Africans were 25,7% of the amount payable to whites.

So, while the ratio of African to white pensions has narrowed slightly over the years (at least as to the maximum amount payable), the number of pensioners within the two groups who benefit from the maximum payable shows an enormous discrepancy.

The tables below speak for themselves. The absurdly small total of 'homes for elderly persons' (especially when compared to those offered for white aged) indicates the extent to which the reserve regions (the bantustans) are still expected to fulfil a social security function.

Government policy with regard to aged Africans was that homes for their care should be built in the homelands and were the responsibility of the homeland governments (Survey, 1978:484);

... the first priority in the provision of care for the aged of all racial groups should lie with their relatives (Survey, 1979:579, referring to parliamentary debates).

The extended family is supposed to live on in an industrialised society based on a migrant labour system that may as well have been designed to destroy any semblance of family life; in poverty stricken rural slums where the wages are hardly high enough to feed those in employment, never mind those who have

HOMES FOR AGED PERSONS

1974	No. of homes		No. of persons accommodated
	State	Aided	
Whites	65	233	16 590
Coloured	1	14	1 149
Indians	—	2	58
Africans	1	22	2 575

1975

Similar information was given by the Ministers about homes for elderly people. Those situated in the common area of SA were:

	No. of homes	No. of persons accommodated
Whites	319	18 926
Coloured	15	1 170
Indians	2	57
Africans	4	about 197

There were fifteen homes for Africans in homelands of the Republic and one in Damaraland, SWA. Between them they could accommodate 1 224 physically able people and 1 252 debilitated aged and other people.

1976

Homelands	No. of Homes	No. of inmates	Run by:
Ciskei	2	433	1 by a Church 1 by Ciskei Govt.
KwaZulu	4	459	Churches
Bophutha-Tswana	7	618	Churches
Lesotho	6	431	2 by Lesotho Govt. 4 by Churches
Venda	2	284	1 by Venda Govt. 1 by a Church
Gazankulu	1	272	Church
Kwaqqa	1	164	Qwaqqa Govt.
	24	2 681	

White Areas

1 home for Africans exists in each of the following places:

	No. of inmates	Run by:
Bloemfontein	38	Bantu Affairs Administration Board
Pietermaritzburg	27	Private welfare organisation
Durban	75	Development and Service Board
Natal	22	Private welfare organisation
Dundee	35	Church
	197	

1977

	Total No. of homes	No. of inmates
Whites	361	21 828
Coloured	16	1 266
Indians	2	83
Africans (in the common area)	4	175
Africans (in homelands)	25	2 682

These tables from Surveys of Race Relations (SAIRR, Johannesburg).

lost jobs, are too old or too young to work, or who are physically unable to work.

As was said above, the various bantustan authorities took over pensions as they 'achieved self-government'. The Transkeian authorities had been responsible for pension payments for a long time.

The tables below (in the Appendix) reflect the position as far as can be established from figures available to me. The figures given are not always directly comparable (eg, for the same year between African and white) as the periods covered may differ by a few months. They do, however, indicate magnitudes of increases and decreases. At times the figures given in different sources differ very widely, and at other times the figures are probably purposely used in a confusing way to give an impression that is favourable to the authorities. I have tried to give two sets of figures wherever they differ by a very large margin, and have tried to comment on the tables when it was thought necessary.

A few points need to be made at this stage though:

1. The central government is increasingly placing the burden of health and welfare on the bantustan authorities, away from the place of employment of migrant workers. This has placed a load on the shoulders of the bantustan authorities that they have not been able to cope with, and also allowed the shifting of blame between different departments;
2. The decentralisation of pension payments places the blame for reduction, cancellation and delays in the payment on the shoulders of the bantustan branches of the central state, while at the same time tying them in more closely to the central government. The demands for social security are made on the

bantustan 'governments' while they, in turn, are dependent on the central government for funds. It appears that with decentralisation very few changes have come relating to the basis on which pensions are allocated (in the Transkei, however, the scaling of pensions in relation to 'free income allowed' was done away, and from 1975 a uniform pension was paid to all pensioners who qualified). There seem to have been no changes in KwaZulu - the method of determination of whether an applicant qualifies has not changed. 'A pension may be refused if an applicant has a son or daughter who is deemed able to support him' (Thorrington-Smith, et al, 1978:104);

3. There has been a noticeable drop in the rate of increase of pensions paid by the bantustan authorities, and at times even an absolute decrease (see, for example, the tables in the Appendix). While the cancellation and re-examination of all pensions in KwaZulu was attributed to corruption that had to be eliminated, it needs to be explained why the (estimated) figures supplied by BENS0 (see tables in Appendix) for 1977-9 should reflect a drop for nearly all the bantustans. While the BENS0 figures were 'preliminary estimates' (and one would expect estimates to be based on the previous rate of increase), these drops have been supported by other reports (see Section Four, below. Personal communications to the author confirm these trends). The effect of the drop has been that new pensioners have been screened far too strictly and in many cases unfairly, while some of those who had been in receipt of pensions have lost them;

4. With the increase in pressure on keeping or qualifying for a pension has come corruption and bribery within the bantustan

machinery that is expected to administer the pensions (see Section Four below);

5. The drop in the rate of increase of numbers and amounts of pensions is further aggravated by the enormous increases in the populations of the various bantustans (see Table 6, Appendix). In other words, the same or slightly increased amount for pensions now has to be stretched to include those people who are technically no longer the responsibility of the central government. This is especially true of the many 'unproductive units' moved off white-owned farms, but also from the urban areas (the very people who are most in need of pensions. This means that those figures for pension payments given in the Appendix Tables have to be read with population relocation figures (see, for example, Maré, 1980);

6. Unemployment and other direct causes of relocation also imply that an ever greater number of people are dependent on each pensioner for their existence. The misery and hardship brought about by non-transfer or delay in transfer of pensions when removals take place extends beyond the pensioner to dependent children of relatives, to the ill, to the unemployed, etc;

7. The question of revenue from the central state passing through the bantustan authorities and of bantustan internal revenue raises many problems associated with the function of the state. It has not been possible to even raise the problems, let alone suggest directions and answers.

SECTION FOUR: BANTUSTANS AND PENSIONS - CASES AND EFFECTS

THERE appear to be a few typical problems experienced by pensioners in the bantustans,

other than the inadequate and discriminatory system of pension payments in South Africa dealt with above. Some of these have been pointed to in the previous section. Most of the issues referred to below relate to the KwaZulu bantustan.

Corruption and bribery: Mary Grice, in her 1976 Black Sash article comments that '(f)requently the chief has to accompany would-be pensioners and they each pay him R2,00'. Indunas have to attest to the financial position of the new applicants, which once more opens the way for bribery and favouritism. Grice also points out that

(1) in certain homelands it would appear that the chiefs have the granting of a limited number of pensions in their giving, and it is possible that they are not entirely impartial (1976:25).

This situation is inevitable when '... the amount of money available for pensions is apparently limited and a pension is considered a privilege granted to a few people'.

Neil Alcock, writing about the Msinga area in KwaZulu, also mentions the payments to Indunas:

The applicant has to pay bus-fare for the local Induna to vouch for his/her age, and feed him for the day. This is usually repeated more than once as clerks keep the queue waiting and demand graft money before they will move.

He also details short-payment by clerks and threats of cancellation of payment if the pensioner should complain.

It seems that corruption related to pensions became most wide-spread when pensions were re-examined on a large scale after several fraudulently issued pensions were alleged to have been discovered. There was, therefore, a need to 're-classify' pensions. I was told, at the time, that up to R25,00 had to be paid for a medical certificate and a further R5,00

to process the applications.

Administrative red tape and incompetence:

An indication of the confused situation, at least as it pertains to KwaZulu, is mentioned in both the Black Sash Reports (see bibliography). It is worth quoting at some length from the Memorandum:

The application forms of Chesterville and Lamontville residents and all 'Durban Natives' are filled in at the Commissioner's office Durban and go to Pretoria for approval. Residents of KwaZulu-controlled areas apply at their Magistrate's office and their applications go to Ulundi for approval. It would appear they also go to Pretoria as well before returning to the applicant...

The inefficiency of all Departments involved means that the processing of applications takes at least 6 months. It is not uncommon for applicants to wait a year for a decision to be reached on the merits of their application. The Department of Co-operation and Development appears to have transferred the administration of the KwaZulu pensions to the KwaZulu Government with negligently inadequate planning (emphasis added, 1980:2).

As is pointed out, the fact that pensions are paid from date of acceptance of the application only means that any delay is money saved by the state. Grice (1976:25) says that (o)ne cannot but feel that all is done to discourage Africans from applying for pensions, and all is done to slow down and reduce payments.

Further administrative delays and inefficiencies relate to difficulties with documentary proof in the rural areas; age estimates and ages recorded; arbitrary decrease or stoppage of pensions; absurdly strict demands for qualification as to age and disability; delays of months and years when a pension is to be transferred, such as after forced removals; demands for KwaZulu citizenship documents (or those of other bantustans, or

party membership forms) in some areas before pensions are paid; fixing of specific dates (eg one day every two months) during which applications are to be made at certain offices, etc, etc.

Reduction in pensions: The reduction in pensions in KwaZulu has already been referred to. All pensions and disability grants were stopped for a while and re-application had to be made. What has this meant?

In Umlazi it has been said that out of a population of about 250 000 people about 12 000 people could receive pensions. In 1979 a total of 2 745 pensions were paid out.

Neil Alcock says that the usual example given of the corruption that is said to have led to the cancellation of pensions is that

(s)ome chiefs were found to have several wives and had arranged that each wife should get a pension. There certainly was and is graft, but the suffering caused by the cumbersome method of cancelling all pensions and making everyone apply anew is cruel beyond description and - worst of all - a futile exercise. Already it has proved incapable of efficiency but it has saved the State tremendous sums of money.

In the DSG/SARS Resource Centre there are many newspaper articles dealing with the impoverishment of the aged, and relating to corruption in the pension system for africans.

y paint a picture of the disrespect and callousness shown the african aged on pay-out day, and of administrative bungling. If yet another indictment is needed of the system of labour exploitation in South Africa the issue of discriminatory and altogether inadequate pensions for all groups, provides it (if comparisons have been made in this article between pensions for the 'racial' groups, this should not imply acceptance of the pensions

being paid to white pensioners. Those pensions are as much in need of revision as are those of the other groups). The indictment in this case relates to the way in which those workers and their families are being treated once they have fulfilled the physical necessity of creating wealth for others in exchange for low wages. If a belief in security through the capitalist system is necessary to maintain that system then it is not coming from the pension system in South Africa.

Gerhard Mareé

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APPENDIX:

Tables 1-5 in this appendix are from Mary Draper's
Fact paper (see bibliography above).

TABLE 1 WHITES RECEIVING OLD AGE PENSIONS (R)

Year	No. of Persons	Total value	Average value per
		P.A.	individual
		R	R
1948	66,000	6,754,108	102.33
1949	67,692	7,833,490	115.73
1950	69,702	8,809,846	126.39
1951	71,358	8,818,462	123.58
1952	72,801	10,919,180	149.98
1953	75,822	13,005,692	171.53
1954	80,124	15,548,238	194.08
1955	83,260	17,249,604	207.18
1956	85,720	19,807,706	231.03
1957	87,038	20,052,600	230.39
1958	87,307	20,142,810	230.77
1959	86,869	20,019,664	230.46
1960	86,853	21,317,968	245.45
1961	86,863	23,238,807	267.53
1962	86,570	23,303,000	269.18
1963	86,236	24,828,000	287.91
1964	86,537	25,731,984	297.35

* Figures for 1948-61 compiled from Table 15 (b)
in Report of the Department of Social Welfare
and Pensions for 1959-62.

Figures for 1962-64 supplied by Department of
Social Welfare and Pensions.

TABLE 2 AFRICANS RECEIVING OLD AGE PENSIONS (R)

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Persons</u>	<u>Total value P.a.</u>	<u>Average value per individual</u>
		R	R
1958/9	214,011	5,563,912	26.09
1959/60	202,206	5,236,670	25.90
1960/1	202,386	5,163,139	25.51
1961/2	204,992	5,241,372	25.57
1964	234,475	?	?

(a) Figures for 1958-9 given in Assembly, 22 January 1960, Hansard 1 cols.215-8.

Figures for 1959-60 given in Assembly, 31 January 1961, Hansard 2 cols. 440-3.

Figures for 1960-1 and 1961-2, supplied by Bantu Administration Department.

Figure for 1964 given in Assembly, 3 March 1964, Hansard 7 cols.2332-3.

TABLE 3 NON-WHITE OLD AGE BENEFITS (MAXIMUM) EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF WHITE BENEFITS (1944 and 1963)

	<u>White</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>African</u>
(a) <u>Maximum total pension</u>				
1944	100	38.89	38.89	22
1963	100	50	41.7	14.7
(b) <u>Maximum Free Means Allowed</u>				
1944	100	60	60	40
1963	100	50	40	13.33
(c) <u>Maximum pension plus free means</u>				
1944	100	46.4	46.4	28.6
1963	100	50	41	14

NOTES

The above Table makes it clear that by comparison with the pension rates of other races and increases granted over the past 20 years, the rates of African pensions have deteriorated very considerably. Considering maximum pension plus free means, in 1944 African benefits were 28.6% of those of Whites. In 1963, they were only 14%. It should be borne in mind that the rates for Africans shown above are the maximum (city) rates. Many - if not most - African pensioners are paid at lower rates.

Considered as a proportion of White benefits, those of Coloured pensioners have increased slightly and those of Indians have decreased slightly. It should be noted (see earlier chapter) that, as from 1965, Indian benefits will be increased to the same level as Coloured pensioners, as was the case in 1944.

TABLE 4

WHITE OLD AGE PENSIONERS
COST OF FOOD IN RELATION TO PENSION
RATES IN 1944 AND 1963
MARRIED COUPLE

	1944	1963	Increase 20 years	% Increase 20 years
Maximum pension (joint)	R18.00	R54.00	R36.00	200%
Cost of minimum food requirements	7.88	13.87	5.99	77%
Balance of pension remaining for other living costs	R10.12	R40.13	R30.01	297%
Proportion of total pension needed for food require- ments	1944:	4%	1963:	26%

NOTES ON ABOVE TABLES.

- All food requirements listed are based on minimum basic diets compiled by the Dietetic Services division of the Government. Two diets have been compiled for White old aged people - the one more generous than the other. For the purposes of these calculations, the writer has selected the cheaper of the two.
- Except where indicated with an asterisk in the body of the tables, all prices shown are taken from the average retail price lists for 1944 and February 1963, published by the Bureau of Census and Statistics. Where official figures are not available, the figures shown are estimates only.

TABLE 5

AFRICAN OLD AGE PENSIONERS
COST OF FOOD IN RELATION TO
PENSION IN 1944 AND 1963.
MARRIED COUPLE

	1944	1963
Cost of food requirements (minimum) for an African old aged couple	R5.47	R9.98
Maximum pension payable (at city rates)	4.00	7.90
Shortfall for food requirements alone:	R1.47	R2.08

NOTES ON ABOVE TABLES.

- All food requirements listed are based on minimum basic diets compiled by the Dietetic Services Division of the Government.
- Except where indicated with an asterisk in the body of the tables, all prices shown are taken from the average retail price lists for 1944 and February 1963, published by the Bureau of Census and Statistics. Where official figures are not available, the figures shown are estimates only.
- In regard to the diet for Africans, the Dietetic Services Division states:
 - these rations are adequate for good nutrition, but more meat, vegetables and fruit, as well as eggs and cheese, are usually preferred;
 - to increase the vitamin C content, fresh fruit is recommended 2 - 3 times a week.

TABLE 6: Bantustan Population Increases

Territory	De Facto Population		
	1970	1980	% Increase
Ciskei	534 732	630 353	17,88
Gazankulu	271 490	476 694	75,58
KeNgwane	119 804	159 882	33,45
KwaNdebele	Not Available	109 149	-
KwaZulu	2 142 293	3 177 569	48,53
Lebowa	1 105 605	1 658 125	49,97
QwaQwa	25 189	232 226	821,93
TOTAL	4 199 113	6 501 326	54,83

(Source: SA Statistical Yearbook, 1976, and BENS0 Calculations, October 15, 1980. Quoted in Cleary, 1980:5).

TABLE 7: Pensions in KwaZulu (OAPs)

	Amount (in Rand)	Numbers
1972/3	4 230 899 (4 313 000)	76 657
1973/4	6 412 650 (5 198 000)	83 582
1974/5	10 882 000 (8 747 300)	84 795
1975/6	15 256 900 (11 630 000)	86 190
1976/7	20 259 700 (13 050 000)	90 854
*1977/8	23 071 300	96 113
*1978/9	24 359 800	95 204

(Source: BENS0, 1979:83)

* Preliminary estimates.

Note: In Sections Three and Four, above, attention has already been drawn to the absolute decrease in the pensions being paid out in the bantustans during the second half of the 1970s. Here it has obviously been anticipated by BENS0 as the decrease shown was an estimate. Bracketed amounts are those given by Thorrington-Smith et al (1978:310) for 'Amounts Budgeted by the KwaZulu Government for Expenditure on Welfare Services' (in this case old age pensions).

The same BENS0 source said that there was one old age home in KwaZulu catering for 79 persons.

TABLE 8: Old Age Pensions in KeNgwane

	Amount (R)	Numbers
1974/5	1 188 200	5 288
1975/6	1 479 000	5 308
1976/7	1 988 800	5 530
*1977/8	2 100 000	5 700
*1978/9	2 300 000	5 900

(Source: BENS0, 1979:83)

* Preliminary estimates.

TABLE 9: Old Age Pensions in the Ciskei

	Amount (R)	Numbers
1974/5	2 457 900	24 863
1975/6	3 696 100	23 021
1976/7	4 388 200	25 147
*1977/8	6 330 000	28 976
*1978/9	7 488 500	33 660

(Source: BENS0, 1979:83)

* Preliminary estimates.

The drop in numbers of pensions in 1975/6 would need to be explained. The amount of money per pensioner is also far below that for KeNgwane, pointing to the need for further research work into the situation in each of the bantustans.

BENS0 gives the Ciskei one old age home, catering for 174 people.

NOTE: The same drop in the number of pensions estimated to be paid out as noted with, for example KwaZulu, is reflected for Lebowa, Gazankulu, and Venda and the other bantustans. This applies to disability grants as well. As pointed out in the article, these figures furthermore have to be read with the population increases as shown in TABLE 6, above.

According to BENS0 the total number of pensions (not only OAPs, but including disability and leprosy grants, pensions for the blind (a small number), and veterans pensions (very few)) to be paid out in the bantustans (including those who are 'independent'), dropped from 447 083 (in 1977/8) to 444 155 (in 1978/9).

TABLE 10: Average paid out and maximum allowable OAPs

	Average Monthly Amount		Maximum Monthly Amount	
	african	white	african	white
1969	NA	NA	R4,50	28,00
1970	NA	NA	5,00	35,00
1971	4,72	35,59		
1972	5,38	39,48		
1973	NA	NA		
1974	*		11,25	57,00
1975	9,25	54,15	15,00	64,00
1976	NA	NA	18,50	72,00
1977	16,54	75,00	20,50	79,00
1978	NA	85,35	23,75	88,00
1979	NA	NA	27,50	97,00

(Source: Surveys, 1969-79)

* 34% of african pensioners received the maximum amount allowable, while 94% of whites did. The figs are allocated to the date of the Survey in which they appeared:

TABLE 11: OAPs paid out to africans by the different authorities

	Bantustans		Central Govt		R'000	Numbers	
	R'000	Numbers	R'000	Numbers			
1974/5	32 371,6	291 182	17 610,7	169 106	49 982,3	460 930	128 645 (1975)
1975/6	47 135,1	308 821	24 734,7	174 501	71 869,8	483 322	133 777 (1976)
1976/7	65 799,2	336 927	33 653,2	182 127	99 452,4	518 054	136 953 (1977)
*1977/8	76 736,2	351 149	41 567,6	191 228	118 303,8	542 719	134 548 (1978)
*1978/9	85 995,5	350 361	47 000,0	195 000	132 995,5	545 361	139 416 (1979)

(Source: BENS0, 1979:83 & 84)

* Preliminary estimates

as This last column indicates the numbers of pensions paid out to whites. The dates in brackets indicate the year in which the figures appeared in Surveys. It appears that not only africans were affected by the decrease in pensions paid out in about 1978.

INFLATION AND THE WORKING CLASS:

(1) falling wages

IT HAS often been argued that if capitalism in South Africa was freed from its 'apartheid fetters', large-scale economic growth benefitting the whole population would take place. In its simplest form, this argument suggests that if a bigger economic 'cake' was produced, there would be more for both employers and workers.

There are at least two mistakes in the argument. Firstly, it has been convincingly shown that apartheid and capitalism are not separate systems in South Africa, with apartheid hindering capitalist growth. Apartheid and segregation in their various forms have been, and remain, largely functional to capitalist development. Apartheid and the state which has implemented the policy have assisted capitalist growth in a number of ways - through lowering wages, controlling the militancy of workers and their organisations, directing labour to the sectors where it is needed most, and maintaining conditions of relative 'stability' in which capitalist production has been able to take place.

The second error in the argument is that a bigger economic 'cake' (ie growth) creates more for everyone. A recent study of income levels in part of Soweto effectively destroys

this myth, showing that even in periods of economic boom, large sections of the working class experience a decline in living standards. As the study concludes,

To those who have expounded so vehemently in the last few years on the improving 'quality of life' in Soweto, it may come as a sobering thought that during one of South Africa's periods of greatest economic growth the number of households below the... (Poverty Datum Line) in one of Soweto's 'better' areas has increased so markedly.

The study, by Dr J Keenan of the University of Witwatersrand, surveyed 50 households in Rockville, Soweto, between 1978 and 1980. The households covered are not typical of the general Soweto home, in that they tended to be more petty bourgeois or middle class than is usual. This is shown in the sorts of occupations the occupants on the households were involved in, as well as income received and home ownership. For example, 7 of the 50 households surveyed involved houses owned on 99-year leasehold.

Rockville itself is relatively more affluent than most other Soweto areas, as shown by the income levels of its inhabitants. In July 1978 average income in Rockville was 25% higher than average household income in Soweto as a whole. The fact that the households surveyed in Rockville are not representative of Soweto as a whole is very important

since it means that the socio-economic conditions prevailing in most other parts of Soweto are likely to be worse than those found in this particular sample.

WHAT DID THE SURVEY AIM TO FIND OUT?

The survey of 50 households in Rockville over a 3 year period attempted to shed some light on whether or not things, in the general economic sense, have in fact got better or worse for the people in Soweto during the last few years. It seems to be widely assumed in many circles that the 'quality

of life' in Soweto and the country's other Black townships has been improving over the last couple of years. The basis for this belief seems to be that the upswing (boom) in the economy which began in the latter half of 1978 has resulted in a significant increase in both job opportunities and earnings for Blacks.

The writer of the survey, Dr Keenan, argues that there is little evidence to support this belief, and that in many areas of employment black working class earnings have actually declined in real terms. A decline in wages in real terms means that, even if take home pay increases over a period, the cost of living is rising at a faster speed than the wages are increasing. As a result, less and less can be bought with the wage, although it may actually be higher than before. For example, if the wage is raised by R4 a week, and the cost of living increases by R5 a week for a working class family, this is a drop in wages in real terms: wages may seem to have risen, but have actually fallen in real terms.

However, while it is true that wages in general have not risen, it did seem possible that income levels in some areas might be rising. Given the increasing difference between urban and rural wage levels, and given that Soweto falls within the major area of industrial and economic growth, it was possible that the income of Soweto residents was rising while income in most other areas declined.

The survey by Dr Keenan aimed at finding out whether this was the case.

MEASURING POVERTY.

One of the difficulties in such a survey is how to measure wages over time, and what to measure them against. Most comparisons of wage levels over time use a form of the Poverty Datum Line (PDL). In essence, this is a level set below

subsistence, in that it includes food, shelter and transport, but excludes education, entertainment, provision for illness and savings, etc. A wage set at the Poverty Datum Line would be just sufficient for a family to survive on a day to day basis, but is totally inadequate for long-term physical survival. In the survey, this level of working class poverty is referred to as the Household Subsistence Level (HSL).

Because the HSL is such a very low and conservative measure of the level of income, a second measure has been introduced, which is called the Household Effective Level (HEL). While still a conservative measure, it does take into account necessities for long-term survival to some extent, which the HSL does not. The HEL is 50% higher than the HSL. It must nevertheless be borne in mind that a wage set at the HEL is still very low, and while sometimes adequate for physical survival over a long period, is inadequate for the development of a healthy life.

As Dr Keenan points out, the use of measures like the HSL or HEL cause problems for a researcher. Some of these problems are listed as follows:

"1. They do not take into account the number of people in the household who are working. Transport costs are based on the assumption that only one person in the household is working.

"2. They assume a stereotype structure of a household consisting of a core nuclear family with a male head cum bread winner.

"3. They assume that households act as rational 'corporate' economic units.

"4. Their overall base calculations are conservative.

"5. They assume that no income goes to

dependents outside the household".

In his survey, Dr Keenan has used a slightly altered measurement of income. The Household Existence Level which he uses is higher than the more conventional one. In explaining the way he has modified the HEL, and in expressing his reservations about the way in which income is measured for a family over time, Dr Keenan has commented on each of the points listed above. His comments on each of the points are:

"1. The HEL has been modified to include a transport cost component for each member of the household in formal employment at any particular moment in time. This is more realistic and more accurately reflects the dynamics of the household itself.

"2. The stereotype of a nuclear family headed by a male (bread)winner is not that common. Most households are extended family units, usually headed by old people, more often than not women who are widowed, separated from their husbands or who may not ever have been married. The rest of the household usually consists of a number of male and female adults still living in their parents home, quite frequently with their spouses, and usually a number of their offspring, about half of whom are illegitimists.

"3. Although the members of a household sleep and eat together, it is very rare that they pool their incomes or act as a single economically rational unit. On the contrary, there is very little evidence of households operating in this way. It is quite frequent for sources of conflict and physical violence between members of a family is that people are suspected of holding back part of their income from the household and consuming it on girlfriends, liquor, gambling etc. For the purposes of (the survey)...it is merely

important to note that much of the income attributed to a household does not actually reach the household. The result of this 'leakage' is that a household which may appear to be well above the HEL in terms of its aggregated (combined) incomes may in fact have several of its members living in a state of poverty. In practice, therefore, the degree of poverty and hardship is higher than the following data indicates.

"4. The value of the HEL is that it provides a base for comparison. As an absolute measurement it is conservative and consequently underestimates the level of poverty.

"5. The HEL....assumes that no necessary payments are made to dependents living elsewhere. In the sample (ie those surveyed in Rockville), 25 (50%) of the households were giving financial maintenance to dependents living elsewhere, usually in the 'homelands'. The amount paid in 1980 was an average of R15,80 per household....These payments are not taken into account in PDLs except in the case of migrant workers".

FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY.

In summary, the survey found that, in the period under consideration, the wages of 70% of those surveyed actually declined in real terms. Average male wages declined by 8,4% while female wages dropped by nearly double that (16,5%).

The main pressure on the income of the households was the rising rate of inflation. By December 1980 this had reached a year-end increase of 20,05%. (The increase is measured in terms of the Consumer Price Index for Lower Income Groups, which is a measure of how inflation is affecting the working class,

and by how much the cost of living is rising).

During the same period (1978-1980) the food price index rose by 29,5%, and during the period July 1978-December 1980 the Consumer Price Index for Lower Income Groups rose by an enormous 38,64%.

This massive increase in the cost of living (which is what the figures quoted above are intended to show) has not been reflected in wage increases. The national tendency in the second half of the 1970s has been one of declining real wages. This decline is clearly shown in the Rockville survey, where the average real wage has dropped by 13,5% over the period involved. These decreases in individual incomes are not limited to a few cases, and it was found that 70,5% of all individuals' wages had declined in the period under consideration.

At the same time, men and women experienced the wage decline in different ways, this partly being caused by sexual discrimination in increases granted by employers: during the period surveyed, male wages declined by 8,4% on average, while female wages dropped by 16,5%.

The question which has to be asked is how have these households attempted to cope with this attack on their previous standard of living. What strategies have they adopted in an attempt to survive the effects of a declining real wage, inflation and an ever-increasing cost of living? In the article which follows, Dr Keenan tries to answer this question.

Note: The findings of Dr Keenan's survey were presented to the History Workshop at the University of Witwatersrand during February 1981. The paper was entitled The 'Quality of Life' in Soweto: some employment and income trends in 50 Soweto households (1978-1980).

(2) survival strategies

The previous article showed how the buying power of working class wages is declining. That article concluded by asking how working class families were adapting to this continual drop in standard of living. Some of the strategies which families in Rockville, Soweto, have used are discussed below by Dr Keenan, who undertook the survey discussed in the previous contribution.

THE MOST obvious strategy is to decrease the dependency ratio - that is the ratio per household between the number of people working and the number of people dependent on the incomes of those people working. This can be achieved by reducing the number of people in a household, increasing the number of people working, or a combination of both. However, neither of these strategies can be implemented overnight. We are looking at responses to prolonged pressure to which people have to adjust. If we were to look at each household in turn we would see a considerable range of comings and goings, many of which have no direct bearing on the economic conditions with which this survey is concerned. Nevertheless, the statistics do indicate what several individuals and households have consciously attempted to achieve, namely a reduction in the dependency ratio. This has been achieved both by a reduction in the number of people living in each house, and an increase in the number of people working.

Both of these strategies have severe limitations. It is not very easy to just get

rid of people. Neither is it that easy to just go and get a job. Nor is there a great deal of freedom from other constraints such as domestic labour or the number of potentially economically active people who can go out to work. In fact, when each household is analysed in terms of its own particular constraints and possibilities, it is clear that there is a relatively low degree of immediate flexibility in both of these options.

Nevertheless, the statistics indicate that these two strategies have been implemented fairly widely across the sample. The total population has been reduced from 385 to 362 in 2½ years, with a corresponding average change in household size from 7,7 to 7,24 people. At the same time the number of people in formal employment has increased from 110 to 117. The reduction in average dependency ratio - the ratio of the number working to the number dependent on income - has been from 3,5 to 3,09.

WHO HAS LEFT AND WHO HAS GONE OUT TO WORK?

The first of these questions is not quite as easy to answer as the second. Each case tells its own story, but the general tendency has been for a decline in the number of girls between 11-14, children of both sexes in the age group 1-6, and old people. In other words, most of those who have left the households over the period studied are people who are least able to contribute to the household either in terms of wage labour or domestic labour.

The increase in the number of people who are in formal employment has come almost exclusively from women. The number of men in formal employment actually declined from 58

Boom that leaves a hungrier poor

ROW
24.10.80

SOUTH Africa is experiencing a boom. The country's 7% growth rate proves it — at a time when many other countries are showing a minus growth rate. But whose boom is it? And why is this boom not turning out to be the panacea for social and political ills that accelerated economic activity is expected to be?

It is true that the rate of employment is increasing and that wage levels are rising. But yesterday's report by Consumer Mail on the Consumer Price Index revealed that the increase in the CPI was steepest for the lower income group, becoming progressively less for the middle and higher income groups.

And the most significant increase revealed by the CPI was in the cost of food, which rose by 20% in the 12 months ending in September, and an even more dramatic 5,6% between August and September this year.

The boom, it seems, is leaving the poor even poorer — and hungrier — and the rich even richer.

The problem is that the country's economy is partly industrial, partly peasant-based. Combined

with internal racial restrictions, the boom is often serving to perpetuate existing discrepancies in income.

But the problem cannot be simply accepted as a fact of life in a developing country. That is why we welcome the proposals put forward by Mr Harry Schwarz, chairman of the Progressive Federal Party's economics commission, at the party's Transvaal congress at the weekend.

Mr Schwarz warned that economic deprivation could only endanger white security. But he was not talking only of black deprivation. He doubted, he said, whether the aged, the pensioners, the lower income groups and the workers, all hit by inflation, were enjoying the benefits.

He stressed particularly the need for urgent action on the cost of basic foodstuffs, pointing out that in a country where there was extreme unevenness in income, indirect taxation such as General Sales Tax worked to the disadvantage of the poor.

This, together, with his call for the freeing of market forces, deserves urgent Government action.

The subordination of these female domestic workers is assured by their illegal status, their lack of any supporting social network and their lack of knowledge of the urban situation. Two of the houses in the sample are actively engaged as agents in this form of exploitation.

A further aspect of this overall decline in incomes has been the increasing dependency of some households and individuals on overtime work. A national analysis of Black earnings indicates that many workers, particularly in manufacturing and construction, are becoming more and more dependent on overtime to survive. In the case of the Rockville study there are two households dependent on overtime work in this way. In one case the husband/father puts in an extra week of nightshift as a security guard every month; this must be at considerable cost to his health as well as his family life. In the second case the man leaves home at 4h00 and returns at 21h00. The nature of the work is very heavy and his mother does not think he will be able to keep it up. She has already begun brewing beer for the first time in many years to meet the impending crisis.

Two other strategies which we might have expected to have been implemented as a way of countering this deteriorating economic situation are

1. attempts to switch into higher paid jobs during a period of rapid economic growth and alleged shortages of certain categories of labour;
2. attempts to expand earnings from 'informal' economic activities (eg beer brewing, hawking, back yard mechanical work, etc).

There is little evidence to suggest that men who changed jobs during this period were able to increase their earnings by changing jobs. On the contrary, the reverse was more

often than not the case. As far as women are concerned, however, some gained from this strategy, although the number concerned was small and seems to have been associated with the movement into clerical and sales jobs in the trade sector.

There is no evidence to indicate any expansion in informal economic activities during this period. On the contrary, there seems to have been a decline. The reasons for this decline seems to be directly related to a tightening up of security in most work places, together with the real threat posed to unlicensed shebeens, several of which have been raided repeatedly during the course of the last year and obliged to pay relatively heavy fines.

It is difficult to know just how much security in the work place has been tightened up in the last year or so, but several people who were involved in stealing or distributing stolen goods in 1978 have now stopped or reduced their activities saying that it is becoming too risky or too difficult.

Nearly all of the women who were engaged in dress making and other related 'informal' economic activity have also commented on the decline in business over the last few years. The reasons that they give for this decline are increased competition from big chain stores which are now catering more for the Black consumer market, and the decline in the use of school uniforms. They also point to church and various self-help organisations which have limited some of their business.

CONCLUSIONS

The final and most important question to ask is whether these strategies have been successful in countering the assault that has been made

to 57, while the number of women increased from 51 to 60.

This increasing rate of employment of women in the formal economy is creating a shortage of domestic labour in the home.

This has been partially overcome by the employment of domestic workers by some of the households surveyed. This is often in the form of a female relative brought to Soweto from the bantustans or elsewhere. But there is also a fairly widespread practice of using illegal 'immigrants' from the Transkei or Lesotho who are brought and placed in Soweto homes by agencies operating in these areas and dealing in the sale of this sort of labour.

30 percent food price increase predicted

Star 11/27

By Charlotte Bolles
Fair Deal Editor

South African economists are already predicting that food inflation will top 30 percent during next year — 18 percent higher than that forecast for the United States.

Food inflation this year is already standing at 35.2 percent for October, this year, an increase of 4.8 percent on last year's figure.

Meat made the highest contribution to the figure, with a percentage contribution of one percent, all other food inputs stood at 9.1 percent.

Food inflation is expected to rise slightly again on the November Consumer Price Index but level off over December, when few price increases are forecast.

Dr Fred du Plessis, of Business, and Mr Johan Willems, economist for the SA Agricultural Union are both convinced the overall inflation rate next year will reach 30 to 35 percent.

Inflation is currently running at 16 percent this year. In June, Dr Johan Cloete, of Barclays Bank, predicted it would top 17 to 18 percent by February 1981.

Mr Willems also warned that food inflation in 1981 would definitely be higher than inflation for a variety of reasons.

One was that although the Government's economic development programme had predicted an increase in food demand

over the next decade of 3.8 percent; actual agricultural production was in fact, increasing only 0.3 percent.

He criticized a lack of Government agricultural planning as advised by the 1979 Jacobs Committee report into agriculture, and warned of food shortages.

However, he said he was sure government thinking was starting to realize this and farmers would get food price increases to match increases in their production costs.

"It depends on the economic policy of the country next year. It also depends on what the government thinks of food exports in line with the constellation of states planning and the realization that food can be used as a major weapon," Mr Willems said.

A senior government economist at the Department of Commerce and Industries said the lifting of import control would play a major role in channeling away inflation.

He predicted an increase in companies asking for import tariff protection but pointed out that this would generally be far lower than the total ban, import control placed on certain goods.

He said import tariff protection was sufficient to protect and bolster local industry and predicted the eventual complete phasing out of import control.

within the households to meet this situation, the number of households below the Household Existence Level increased from 29,4% in July 1978 to 37,3% in 1980. This is after all forms of income (both formal and informal) have been taken into account. During the same period, two men in the sample tried to commit suicide, one successfully, because they felt they could no longer support their dependents.

Given the fact that the HEL is a very conservative measure, and given the large recent increases in rent and a number of consumer goods, it is likely that many more households have fallen below the HEL since the survey was concluded. At the time the survey was completed, it required only a 10% negative change in the relationship between income and cost of living to put more than half of the households below the HEL. It is likely that this situation has already been reached.

Jeremy Keenan.

(3) food

WORK IN PROGRESS has, in previous issues published several articles dealing with cost increases that have affected communities. It has been argued that these cost increases, while affecting most people, do not affect all groups to the same extent or in the same way. For example, bus fare increases obviously do not touch those who have their own transport, while rent increases do not affect those who own their own homes.

It was argued that the working class is most drastically and directly hit by such

increases. This is, firstly, because of the small and necessarily limited share of the value that workers produce that actually goes to the working class in the form of wages. Secondly, because of the manner in which these issues affect the working class (for example, in South Africa the largest section of workers are legislatively and administratively separated from their places of work by large distances — either in townships outside the cities and towns of South Africa or in the bantustans).

In this brief contribution I want to present some material on food price increases, and how this affects the working class.

GENERAL SALES TAX

IN 1978 a General Sales Tax (GST) of four percent was introduced on end users of products and services. To 'cut costs on administration' the state has to date refused to make any exemptions to the goods and services on which GST is levied. From the very start trade unionists, academics, consumer bodies, politicians and many others, warned that the effect of GST will be disastrous to 'lower-income' groups (the working class).

The state did have support in its refusal to grant exemptions on items such as bread, milk, eggs, and flour. This support came from the Federated Chamber of Industries, and the Chambers of Commerce (it appears that Pick and Pay was the only large chain not to support them in this attitude). However, the same FCI that urged the Minister not to exempt basic foodstuffs from the four percent increase of GST, was reported to be appealing for exemptions for industry, where these industries were end-users of some products and services (Star, 05.06.78).

At this point in time (1978), when GST

on the living standards of the households surveyed over a period of time.

The survey shows that, in spite of the considerable changes that have taken place

was introduced, it was already costing african families earning R150,00 per month about 18% more to live than it had done a year before:

In 1980 GST brought in R1 550-million in revenue to the state - revenue that is increasingly being spent on 'Defence' (by 1981 nearly 18% of state revenue was being spent on 'security services'); defence of a system that is rejected by the vast majority of people who are paying GST. A sales tax is being paid on items that are needed to stay alive. People earning about R150,00 per month pay GST on more than two-thirds of that wage.

In 1981 it is expected that GST will bring in revenue to the state exceeding the budgeted R1 550-million by more than R70-million.

ECONOMIC GROWTH - FOR WHOM?

NOT ONLY was the 1980 budget (the state's allocation of revenue/income to the different departments, and the derivation of that income) very favourable to 'defence', but it also made no provision for rural development, where the majority of africans are administratively kept. Furthermore, as one economist commented, while the budget was aimed at stimulating economic growth in urban South Africa, 'economic growth did not necessarily imply an improvement for the bottom 20% of the population'.

And yet Finance Minister Horwood can say that 'South Africans were fortunate to be living in a country in which financial problems - such as inflation - were caused by prosperity'! I will indicate below whose prosperity he was referring to, and whose problems Horwood so easily dismissed.

'Prosperity' for Horwood is measured in terms of 'economic growth'. Alec Erwin has

defined 'economic growth' as

the increase in final goods produced between one year and the next expressed in monetary terms. This monetary measure will be corrected for price increases to avoid the price inflation of a constant (the same size) bundle of goods masquerading as growth - this corrected measure being referred to as growth in real terms.

Erwin then offers the example of 20 Rolls Royce motor cars (R10 000 each) being produced, with an effect on the measurement of economic growth ten times that of 20 schools at R1 000 each. *These widely different goods and services can both be included in the determination of 'growth', it is argued, because there is a demand for both.* However, Erwin points out that this demand that supposedly sets prices that are in turn used to measure growth, is affected by at least two factors:

Firstly, monopolisation of production and distribution of goods, which limits consumer choice and allows for artificially high prices to be set;

secondly, the power of the rich to determine 'demand' for certain products -

We could see the ability to pay as a process of exercising a money 'vote' as to what should be produced, which gives the rich more 'votes' than the poor. That there are so many motor cars produced in South Africa compared to say clinics, and so many medical specialists rather than para-medics can be largely attributed to the simplified analysis provided above.

The prices that are used to measure 'economic growth' are the prices of goods that largely have no relevance or value to the majority of South African citizens.

Says Erwin

The important point discussed here, ... is that economic growth per se is not good. It is rather questions such as what products have been created and how do they affect society, who gets the new incomes and jobs?

Outcry at food prices^{RDM} is well founded^{Oct 11-80}

CAPE TOWN. - A consumer research study says that the public outcry over soaring prices of consumer commodities and the high inflation rate over the past six months is well founded - at least as far as household subsistence level items are concerned.

The finding is reported in the six-monthly update of the HSL survey of the Institute for Planning Research at the University of Port Elizabeth, released yesterday.

The institute says the HSL increase for the five major centres to September is 18% for blacks, compared with 1,1% during the previous six-month period.

And the survey shows Cape Town is the most expensive city for blacks to live in - followed by Johannesburg - as measured by the HSL, which

has now topped the R200 a month mark in these cities.

The report says that during this month's survey update, an increase in red meat prices of more than 70% was noted over the April prices in cheap cuts such as brisket.

At some stores increases of more than 100% were noted.

"It would appear that the high increases occurred mainly during the last four months - indeed, an unhealthy state of affairs," the institute says.

"When studying the list of food items and comparing prices with those of previous surveys, it is evident that the low-income population groups are particularly hard-hit, since it is the basic food items that show the high increases."

It adds: "One can only hope that the sharp rise in the cost of consumer goods over the past six months will level off in the near future."

In the eight urban centres surveyed, the HSL for blacks is: Port Elizabeth R184,16, Kimberley R191,25, Durban R198,27, Pretoria R198,67, East London R198,26, Johannesburg R200,12 and Cape Town R200,59.

The HSL for coloured people has now also exceeded R200 a month.

Johannesburg is most expensive for this group - at R211,27 - followed by Cape Town R208,79, Durban R208,26, Pretoria R204,06 and Bloemfontein R200,23. - Sept.

These are the issues that are not being discussed in the finance pages of the newspapers and by the Minister of Finance.

Answers to these questions will throw a different light on the exceptionally high 'economic growth rate' in South Africa over the last few years, on the enormous profits made by certain companies, on skill shortages amidst enormous unemployment, on strikes for higher wages in companies and industries experiencing the 'economic boom'.

INFLATION - LITTLE CLARITY

AND WHILE the economy is growing, inflation is eroding the purchasing power of the poorest sections of the population - the working

class (and especially the unemployed, peasants and subsistence farmers, and their dependents).

It is not possible even to start to look at inflation in this 'indicator' (hopefully we will soon have contributions on this issue).

I will rather refer to another article by Alec Erwin in which he says the following:

... the overall institutional structure of the whole socio-economic system is intimately linked to both the causes and the effects of inflation. In any economy there is competition on the part of various groups for the goods and services and productive resources produced, this being more particularly so in inflationary situations. It might not be too simplistic to see it as a process of who wins and loses, and how they do it.

Let us look at some of the winners:

while all deny that this has anything to do with inflation, of 41 companies and groups who announced their profit figures in the second half of February (1981), only three showed profits of less than 20%, while three (including strike hit Toyota) had profits exceeding 300%!!

Professor Botha of the Economics Department at the University of the Witwatersrand, and hardly an opponent of the 'free enterprise' system (capitalism, for those who do not know), makes the same point as Alec Erwin:

Companies cannot justify rising prices with profits like this... Inflation is due, not so much to the excess of private money and consumer spending (and then one has to ask which consumers - author) - as Mr Horwood has said - but to the price-forming policies of big business.

Professor Botha and Alec Erwin have not been the only people to refer to this phenomenon. Amongst others Rupert Lorimer (of the PFP) has attacked the agricultural Control Boards for keeping prices artificially high; Metro Cash and Carry has accused the Tiger Oats company of cutting their supplies of mealie meal

because Metro were selling it below the price that Tiger was demanding; manufacturers and supermarket distributors have been accusing each other of price fixing; the Minister of Agriculture has refused to withdraw his criticism of supermarket profiteering; etc. It has just been announced that Woolworths and Truworths are to merge, linking 438 stores with a turnover of R400-million.

'Monopolisation' of both distribution and production in South Africa needs detailed investigation that must be made accessible to labour and consumer groups.

The author of the article in which this statement of Professor Botha's appeared, canvassed business opinion on the views expressed - they did not agree, but their first and surprisingly direct point needs to be quoted:

Companies have a duty - if not an obligation - to their shareholders to make as much profit as possible:

Even within the capitalist system there are moans about the manner in which this 'duty' is being performed.

Let me now turn to the losers in this equation - the working class members who are the producers of the profits that companies 'have an obligation to make', and the buyers of the subsistence goods that cost more every month.

Subsistence goods (food) are the products that have been most drastically affected by rising prices. These are the goods that form the largest part of working class expenditure. This means that while the Consumer Price Index (CPI - which refers to the prices of a wide range of family expenditures, and not only food, and which is the measure used to show price increases) had risen by 15,8% in the year December, 1979, to December, 1980, food prices

alone had risen by 29,5%.

So lower income groups, who spent a larger portion of their income on food than allowed in the calculation of the ... 15,8 percent average increment (increase), experienced a higher rise in their CPI

said Professor Sadie, another economist. The CPI rise for 'lower income groups' is in fact 20,1% for the same period. It seems to be a case of taking away from those who do not have the little that they receive every month or week!

Early this year the situation had worsened with low income groups (earning less than R2 000 per year, or less than R167 per month) being hit twice as hard as higher income groups by price increases.

This is how the CPI had risen

1973	9,9%
1974	14,1%
1975	11,7%
1976	10,8%
1977	11,1%
1978	11,6%
1979	14,0%
1980	15,8%

(keeping in mind that this does not reflect the worse situation of those earning less than R2 000 per year). Also see the tables and articles from newspapers reproduced below.

COMMENTS

* A discussion of the rising prices of food products needs to be situated firmly within the context of struggles over wages (see the 'labour action' information in WIP), over the degree of exploitation and control in the workplace (for example struggles over worker representation), within the context of unemployment and control measures over the unemployed (the bantustans are probably where the effects of rising prices are felt most of all).

As Cherryl Walker argued in her 1977 article in WIP, '... the "Food Crisis" was a vital and immediate issue for a very broad range of women. It penetrated the isolation that surrounds women as housewives and helped channel their domestic concerns into political forms'.

She was writing about the struggles around food costs waged in the 1940s. This kind of struggle does, however, demand organisations that arise out of the people, and involve the people most directly affected by the food price increases. At present there seem to be direct attempts by the very people to blame for the price increases to form committees and hold conferences, and thus to take the initiative from any popularly based organisation that can exert pressure and mobilise people.

Food becomes a real concern to capital only when the 'reproduction of the working class' is threatened - in other words, when too many workers are too weak for the jobs demanded of them (see, for example, the paper by Stadler). In times of mass unemployment that concern fades away, although individual capitalists may be affected.

It was reported a few years ago that despite great numbers of workers applying for jobs on the coal mines (workers from the Nqutu district), the mines were still complaining of 'labour shortages'. This was because they needed strong and healthy people for the type of work expected of them underground in the coal mines. The people applying for jobs were not in such condition, because of long periods of unemployment in the bantustans.

How do people survive under such conditions? For some indications see David Webster's article in WIP 10.

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Food Item	1978 R/c	1979 R/c	1980 R/c
White bread	9	16	21
Brown bread	8	13	21
Maize meal	18	20	22
Tea 250 g	42	57	1,20
Coffee 250 g	47	51	1,31
Milk, ltr	13	25	26
12 large eggs	21	43	73
Butter 500 g	43	66	1,00
Ham steak	1,23	2,53	2,80
Cheese 1 kg	81	1,05	2,61
Tomatoes 1 kg	21	25	26
Potatoes 1 kg	19	23	27
Oranges 1 kg	14	20	43

(Sunday Times, 13.07.80)

SO HET PRYSE GESTYG

Die tabel teen hoe die pryse van produkte en dienste in Oktober vanjaar teenoor Oktober verlede jaar gestyg het. November en Desember se sifers is nog nie beskikbaar nie.

Produit of diens	Syging	Produit of diens	Syging
Groenprodukte	10,5%	Sigarette	4,2%
Wine	88,8%	Klars en alcohol	6,8%
Vis	6,2%	Wolweiding	11,5%
Molk	11,8%	Brandstof	13,2%
Vol en olie	12,2%	Skoubel	16,7%
Vrugte	8,2%	Bediening	5,8%
Groente	16,2%	Mediese dienste	22,8%
Suiker	11,8%	Vervoer	7,2%
Koffie en tee	8,8%	Ontspanning en	
Koolbrenk	16,8%	Vermaaklikheids	18,2%
Drank	8,4%	Opvoeding	14,2%

Cheap mealie meal: firm lashes critics

By Caroline Hobbes
Consumer Reporter

Metre Cash and Carry has denied claims by the Tiger Oats Group that Metre's underwriting of mealie meal prices in the Northern Transvaal has angered and confused traders.

"I cannot believe that traders would complain about being able to buy mealie meal cheaply," said Mr Lionel Katz, chairman of Metre.

"My company is in fact helping the small trader fight back against big supermarkets by wholesaling to them at exceptionally good prices. Small traders are only too happy that they can buy mealie meal so cheaply," he said.

Tiger Oats has cut off mealie meal supplies to the Transvaal and Louis Trichard branches of Metre because Metre is selling the product at cost and below cost prices.

Metre has laid in new supplies of meal from Premier Milling and is continuing to sell at rock-bottom prices.

"It is the other wholesalers in the area who are angered by our prices, not the traders. Tiger Oats has chosen to delist these wholesalers by cutting off our supplies."

'Blacks playing biggest role in food market'

The black consumer was responsible for the real growth rate in the food market between 1970 and 1975 a Bureau of Market Research report has said.

The report said in 1975 food represented 18,2 percent of white household expenditure compared to 40,6 percent of black expenditure. For coloured people, and Asians the corresponding figures were 28,3 percent and 31,1 percent respectively.

The report said the importance of black consumers in the economy was emphasized at the present time.

However, the importance of white consumers was also evident from the fact that the 2,7 m white metropolitan residents who made up 10,6 percent of the total population paid 72,7 percent on the income tax and were responsible for almost half

the household expenditure in the country. Transvaal, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

It said that though whites may be losing importance in the country their purchasing power still commanded respect in most product markets. Their share in expenditure on servants made up 84 percent of total household expenditure in South Africa and the independent homelands.

The report said there was a tremendous difference between income levels of blacks living in metropolitan areas and those living elsewhere. It was necessary that the homelands be consolidated and become economically viable because household expenditure in these areas was only 5 percent compared to 66 percent and 27 percent in white-metropolitan and other areas respectively.

R.D.W. Percentage of pay needed to buy a selected "Basket" of goods or services

Occupation	Experience	Monthly Pay After Tax	Food Basket R57	Selection Women's Clothing (Medium Price) Total R204	Selection Men's Clothing (Medium Price) Total R234	Apartment Rent Average R221	Basket of Services R176
Electrical Engineer	Completed University studies with at least 5 years experience, about 35 years old, married, no children.	R1 044	9%	20%	22%	22%	17%
Department Manager	Technical Manager of industrial firm. Many years experience, about 40 years old, married, no children.	R926	11%	22%	25%	24%	19%
Teacher/Labour Operator	Skilled, with 10 years experience, about 35 years old, married, with two children.	R668	15%	31%	35%	34%	26%
Cook	Deputy Chief cook in a large hotel. 10 years experience, 30 years old, single.	R648	15%	32%	36%	35%	27%
Automobile Mechanic	Qualified with 5 years experience, about 25 years old, single.	R557	17%	37%	42%	40%	32%
Primary School Teacher	10 Years experience in Government schools, about 35 years old, married, no children.	R508	19%	40%	46%	44%	35%
Bank Teller	Completed Bank training with 10 years experience, 35 years old, married, two children.	R405	20%	41%	47%	46%	36%
Secretary	Bilingual secretary to Department Manager, 25 years old, single.	R400	21%	44%	51%	49%	38%
Bus Driver	Municipal employee, 10 years experience, 35 years old, married, two children.	R453	21%	45%	52%	50%	39%
Saleswoman	Ladies' Wear Department of large store, 3 years experience, 22 years old, single.	R236	41%	86%	99%	95%	75%
Communication Worker (Black)	Unskilled or semi-skilled labourer, about 25 years old, single.	R160	60%	127%	146%	140%	110%
Textile Worker (Black Female)	Unskilled or semi-skilled operator in a medium sized plant, 25 years old, single.	R119	82%	172%	197%	195%	149%

Rich subsidised by poor on grocery costs

Secret discounts net chains R35-m

Headline in the Sunday Express

By JEAN LE MAY

WHEN it comes to grocery buying, the poor subsidise the rich in South Africa today. Wealthy shoppers in towns are subsidised by homeland Blacks and people who live on the platteland.

This is because of "the awesome buying power" of the big chain stores which enables them to demand special discounts from food manufacturers, the Grocery Manufacturers' Association said in a statement given exclusively to the Sunday Express this week.

"Through having their profit margins squeezed in their sales to the major chains, manufacturers cannot give equally low discounts to smaller retailers if they are to remain reasonably profitable," said the statement.

"One chain has located its stores so as to draw largely on the White market sector in the average and above-average White income areas."

Mr Philip Cross, chairman of the GMA, commented: "No manufacturer likes

SE PROPS

to see his product sold for substantially more in a platteland store than in a chain store in a wealthy Johannesburg suburb.

"But at present we have the anomalous situation where the better off are being subsidised by those who are less well off.

"South Africa is behind many other countries in legislating to prevent this... there are laws in the United States, Canada, Australia and most European countries to regulate trading practices. It is a hot issue in Britain where the law is being revised.

"The real issue is that there should be open trading - discounts for bulk buying should be the same for small and large retail-

ers alike, subject to the smaller buyers being able to make some arrangement to take the same volumes in single deliveries, possibly through wholesalers or group buying.

"This would mean small retailers could sell at the same prices as the chain stores and people would not have to travel miles to shop more cheaply - itself a waste of fuel."

The big three chain stores - Checkers, Pick 'n Pay and OK Bazaars - exerted their buying power by demanding substantial discounts, said the GMA statement.

"The major chains, and particularly one chain, have used their power to improve their positions... one

chain uses such tactics as threatening to discontinue the stocking of lines (which they do periodically) to obtain higher confidential discounts."

If the present situation continued, said Mr Cross, the food industry would become an unprofitable business from the manufacturing point of view - as it was, many of the main manufacturers were diversifying out of food.

"This cannot be in the country's interests - it could lead to food shortages and thus higher prices, and with no new investment the industry could be landed with antiquated plant and out-dated technology."


The number of small retailers was decreasing substantially with many going insolvent because they could not compete with the big chains, which bought up to 60% of some manufacturers' output, he said.

He called for co-operation between retailers and manufacturers instead of "slanging matches" in the Press.

"Manufacturers act as bankers for retailers as it is," he said. "We sell goods to them on credit which they sell for cash."

He foresaw legislation to enforce fair trading, he said, similar to that in many other countries.

"The GMA is doing everything it can to find a solution."



Shows 0.30c/80 New the milk price has climbed since 1971.

COURTS

Note: The dates which appear in brackets at the end of completed trials refer to the date of sentence or acquittal in the trial. In appeal proceedings, the date refers to the date of judgement, while in the case of part-heard matters, it refers to the last court hearing before adjournment.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS.

Arthur Elliot Phalatsa (22), Thebo Simon Ndlovu (19), Jannitjie Malaya Chiloene (24), William Mtwente Mampuru (18), Tshepo Albert Motlana (23), Ezekiel Oupa Masuku (23) and Matone Joseph Masuku (24).

Charge: The accused all faced one count of attempting to leave South Africa for the purpose of undergoing military training. Oupa Masuku faced a further 2 charges of inciting others to undergo military training, and arranging transport to leave the country. William Mampuru faced a further charge of inciting a certain Gerald Sedutla to undergo military training.

The accused were all arrested near Houtkop on the Swaziland-South African border in July 1980.

The state called only 3 witnesses. The first of these, a youth held in security police custody, testified on the alleged recruitment of Gerald Sedutla by William Mampuru (accused number 4). However, his evidence failed to substantiate this charge, and at the end of the state case Mampuru was acquitted on this count.

The second state witness was an alleged accomplice of the accused, who had been arrested with them on the South Africa -

Swaziland border. He testified that, after Oupa Masuku had made all the necessary arrangements for a group to leave the country for military training, the group had travelled to Soweto. There they had attended a COSAS meeting. Subsequent to the meeting an ANC recruiter called Special (or Sydney) had driven them to the border where they had been arrested. He insisted that their purpose in being in the vicinity of the Houtkop border post was to enter Swaziland, and from there to join Umkonto we Sizwe.

The state's third and final witness was a warrant officer Olivier who told the court that as a result of 'information received', is through an informer, he had heard that the accused intended to leave the country. He accordingly arranged for them to be apprehended near the Swaziland border.

4 of the accused gave evidence in their defence. In essence, they admitted that they had travelled by kombi to the place of arrest, but denied that they were intending to undergo military training. The accused claimed that, as members or supporters of a Funeral Brigade, they had intended participating in an Eastern Transvaal funeral when arrested. There they had intended using the funeral as a way of reaching the youth of that area, and possibly forming a branch of the Funeral Brigade in the Eastern Transvaal.

Verdict: Not guilty. The presiding magistrate found that, while he did not believe the version of the accused, it could reasonably be true. Given that the state case relied on the evidence of a single accomplice witness, the accused were entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and were accordingly discharged. (Pretoria Regional Court, 25.02.81).

Ettiene Pillay (18), a 17 year old student, Pinda Manamela (34), Jonas Motaung (36) and Nicodemus Motapo (35).

Charge: Pillay and the youth are alleged to have consented to undergo military training; Manamela, Motaung and Motapo are charged with inciting people to undergo military training, and arranging transport for recruits to travel from Johannesburg to Botswana.

A state witness told the court that Motaung and Motapo had come to her house on the Botswana-BophuthaTswana border; they told her that 3 people wanted to cross the border without passports.

A second state witness testified that one of the accused asked him to point out an unguarded place on the Botswana border.

One of the accused, Motapo, has claimed that he made a lengthy statement to a magistrate as a result of police threats and assaults.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 21.02.81)

Dr Fabian Defu Ribeiro (48), Jan Ceiphus Mashilo (19) and a 16 year old youth.

Charge: Ribeiro was alleged to have incited a number of youths to leave the country to undergo military training, and supplied some of the alleged recruits with money for train tickets.

The other 2 accused were charged with attempting to leave South Africa for the purposes of undergoing military training.

Verdict: Ribeiro was found not guilty.

The remaining accused were found guilty.

Sentence: Mashilo: 5 years on 2 counts of Terrorism, to run concurrently (is an effective sentence of 5 years);

the 16 year old: 5 years.
(Pretoria Regional Court, 13.02.81).

Raphael Mzikayifani Khumalo (24) and
Raymond Veli Dlodlu (29).

Charge: The state alleges that Khumalo
received ANC training as a guerilla fighter,
and was found in possession of arms
and explosives.

According to the charge sheet,
Dlodlu transported guerilla fighters
between South Africa and Swaziland, and also
harboured them.

The accused were arrested at a roadblock
between Ermelo and Amersfoort on June 21, 1980.
(Ermelo Regional Court, 09.02.81).

Solomon Mosala Sefothelo (27).

Charge: The accused appears to be charged
with a series of activities which relate to
distribution of ANC material, and the
bringing of such material to South Africa
from Lesotho.

(Bloemfontein Regional Court, 02.03.81).

Wordsworth Kholekile Mhlana (25).

Charge: The accused is alleged to have
undergone ANC guerilla training. He has
alleged that while in detention in Klerkadorp,
last year, he was assaulted by security
police. As a result of these assaults, he
made a statement before a magistrate. Police
have denied the assaults.

A state witness, Weaver Magcal, refused
to testify against the accused, and asked to
be charged with the accused rather than called
to give evidence. He was immediately
sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. On
raising his fist in a power salute, the
presiding judge sentenced him to a further

6 months for contempt of court.
(Port Elizabeth Supreme Court, 20.03.81).

Oscar Mpetha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18),
Morgan Makubala (19), Aaron Tshangama (28),
Peter Kube (18), Alton Sebube (18),
Fumekile Bodi (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19),
Johannes Nhlapo (20), Jeffrey Beardman (20),
Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Ampondo (19),
Welile Mazothana (21) and 5 youths.

The accused face a charge of Terrorism,
and 2 counts of murder. The state alleges
that between August 8 and August 12, 1980,
the accused incited people to damage motor
vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs,
and setting alight the vehicles.

They are charged with assaulting and
injuring 6 people, 2 of whom subsequently
died. They are further alleged to have
barricaded Klipfontein Road by placing stones,
tree stumps and tyres in the street; of
marching in singing groups armed with sticks,
stones and other weapons; of ordering the
closure of black schools; and of congregating
in various churches to encourage people to
participate in 'terroristic' activities.

A Cape Town-issued pamphlet focussing
on the first accused, Oscar Mpetha, states
that his arrest in 1980 must be seen against
the background of the boycott of City
Tramways buses by people in the Western Cape.
On August 11 a group of people in Nyanga
stoned and set fire to various vehicles
in a series of incidents associated with the
bus boycott. On the following day, Mpetha was
reported as saying

We are told the police are here to
protect the people from intimidators, but
it is the police who are the intimidators.
When we saw the riot police arrive this
morning we knew there would be some
sort of unrest. It was the action of

the police which caused the riot situation.
Why are they protecting City Tramways?
It seems as if they want the people
to use their money against their will.

The next day Mpetha and another official of
the Nyanga Residents Association were
detained by police.

The pamphlet, after giving a brief history
of Mpetha's work over the years in the ANC,
SACTU and the Food and Canning Workers Union,
concludes by saying

Oscar Mpetha's life has been one of
unbending commitment to both non-
racialism and democracy. His tireless
efforts both in community and trade union
work have established him as a true
leader....Oscar Mpetha's life serves
as an inspiration to all democrats.

The trial thusfar has been marked by
large community support for the accused, and
up to 250 people have crammed into the Cape
Town Supreme Court to be present at the
proceedings. Groups of people have also
been involved in demonstrations outside the
court.

The state applied for the trial to be
held in camera, because of the presence of
a number of accused under the age of 18.
This was opposed by the defence, who argued
that all the accused wanted the trial to be
open to the public. The presiding judge
ruled that 'it would be wrong for me in this
situation to force a sort of semi-private
trial on all 19 accused when not one of them
wants it'.

The defence has successfully applied
for the state to provide further, better and
more comprehensive particulars to the
charges which the accused face. The
trial has been postponed to mid-April for
the state to provide these details.

(Cape Town Supreme Court, 19.03.81).

CONTRAVENTIONS OF BANNING ORDERS.

(Internal Security Act).

Zubeida Juby Mayet (43).

Charge: The accused was alleged to have contravened her restriction order by attending a service to commemorate the banning of various organisation on October 19, 1977. The meeting which Mayet attended was held at Jiswa Centre, Lenasia, on October 19, 1980.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 50 days, suspended for 18 months. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 09.03.81).

Lawrence Molathlegi Ntlokoa (22).

Charge: The accused was alleged to have contravened his banning order by attending a gathering on October 19, 1980, and being on the premises of a school.

During the course of his trial he was arrested in Ermelo, and the prosecutor claimed that it was clear that he intended leaving the country. His bail was accordingly withdrawn.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 6 months imprisonment. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 12.03.81).

Fana George Sithole (38).

Charge: The accused was charged and found guilty of, being absent from his home on two occasions. His restriction order prohibits him from leaving his Umlazi home between 6am and 6pm on weekdays, and during weekends.

Sentence: 6 months imprisonment. The accused admitted 8 previous convictions for contravening his order. (Durban Regional Court, 05.02.81).

SABOTAGE TRIALS.

(General Laws Amendment Act of 1962).

Cynthia Nonkululeko Nduna (20), Dupa Kgoietsiela Lehulere (20), Kent Mekaliti (20), Gladstone Mandla Buti (20), Lomwago Hasen (20) and two youths aged 17 and 15.

Charge: The accused faced three counts of sabotage, with various alternative counts of conspiracy and incitement to commit sabotage, malicious damage to property and arson.

The trial emerges from the schools boycott of last year, and inter alia involved allegations of attacking and burning down the home of a school principal who opposed the boycott.

Certain witnesses called by the state refused to testify against the accused, and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Another state witness was discredited for given evidence which conflicted with a statement previously made. Yet another witness wrote a letter while in detention alleging that she was beaten with chains, dipped in salt water, kicked and punched. When she appeared in court she initially denied writing the letter, but subsequently admitted writing it but said its contents were not true.

Verdict: Not guilty.

(Worcester Regional Court, 11.02.81).

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.

Thomas Mashaba (30) and Augustina Thabo Dibe (29).

Charge: Details of charges were not available at the time of writing.

(Vereeniging Regional Court, 13.03.81).

Themba Shongwe (26), Norman Monyepote (39), Vuyisile Mdlaleni (28), Patrick Gaboatloeloe (49), Siphon Nhlapo (18) and John Motana (24).

Charge: The accused faced a number of counts alleging membership of the ANC or PAC, and furthering the aims of those organisations. Allegations of assault were made by a number of accused, who claimed that while in security police detention they were tortured. One of the accused who alleged a series of assaults asked on 3 occasions to see a doctor, but was attended to by a sergeant in the security police.

Verdict: Not guilty.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 27.02.81).

Guy Berger (24) and Devandira Pillay (21).

Charge: After being held in detention for a number of months, Berger (a journalism lecturer at Rhodes University) and Pillay (a journalism student) were charged with a number of counts under the Internal Security Act, and 3 counts under the Publications Act. The original charges as set out in the charge sheet are summarised in WIP 16, p 12-13.

In essence, the charges related to the provision of information on trade unions to SACTU, the setting up and running of discussion groups which aimed at rendering participants sympathetic to the ANC, and the possession and distribution of literature declared unlawful either in terms of the Internal Security Act or the Publications Act.

The state's three main witnesses were Professor Stoffel van der Merwe of the RAU political science department, security police captain Craig Williamson, and a NIS agent identified as Mr A.

A confession made by Berger in detention was initially contested by the defence, but subsequently admitted as evidence against Berger when the defence withdrew its objection to the admissibility of the confession.

Just prior to the closing of the state case, Berger and Pillay made certain admissions relating to their activities. The effect of these admissions seems to have prevented certain people being called as state witnesses: some of these had been in detention for very long periods, while others had been subpoenaed to give evidence. Once the state closed its case, most of those held in detention were released while those subpoenaed were not called to give evidence.

On the basis of the admissions made, the confession of Berger and the state evidence, both accused were found guilty of two contraventions of the Internal Security Act, and one contravention of the Publications Act. Both accused were found to be members of the ANC, and to have participated in activities which could have furthered the aims of the ANC.

Sentence: For being members of the ANC, both accused were sentenced to 3 years, one year of which was suspended; on the count of furthering the aims of the ANC, Berger was sentenced to 4 years, 2 of which were suspended; Pillay was sentenced on this count to 2 years, 1 being suspended. The unsuspended part of Pillay's sentence on this count is to run concurrently with his other sentence.

On the Publications Act charges, both accused were sentenced to 4 months or R400.

Effective sentences were accordingly
Berger: 4 years, plus R400 or 4 months;
Pillay: 2 years plus R400 or 4 months.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 27.03.81).

There are a number of important issues which have arisen in this trial, but at the same time the exact course of the trial is not very clear. WIP hopes to run more detailed material on this issue at a later stage.

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LABOUR ACTION

Angus-Hawken Fluid Sealing Engineering (Rosslyn, Pretoria): Refer to WIP 16:47 for previous management-worker disputes.

One strike involving 400 workers was 'settled' by 26 January (see previous WIP) with only 150 workers being allowed to return for re-employment. On 27 January, 30 of these 150 workers were again dismissed after refusing to meet conditions set by management for their re-employment (they were asking for wage increases of R1,25 an hour, and management was offering only R1,00 increase).

Montana Hypercellars (Durban): Latest development in the strike reported on in WIP 16:47 (over re-instatement of dismissed fellow workers and recognition of their union, the National Federation of Workers), is that police were called in to move the strikers from the company's premises, and that two employees were arrested.

Rosslyn (Pretoria) strikes: Strikes in nine companies in the Rosslyn area were covered in WIP 16.

A report in the Star (26.01.81) points out that those strikes were largely over wage demands, which is hardly surprising, the reporter says, since the cost of living in Pretoria has risen by 19,3% - more sharply than in any other urban centre except for Umtata - in the space of one year. Now, an african family of six in that area needs at least R195 a month for the bare necessities, although the current starting rate for many of the strike-hit firms is still only R165,60 per month.

Management officials see things differently. They blame the wave of strikes on the fact that many of the workers are from nearby BophuthaTswana, and 'have still to be educated into the idea of representation'. A trade unionist saw some truth in this, saying that most of Rosslyn's major employers had been recently attracted to this border area by concessions and that trade unionism for african workers is still in its infancy there. Because of this, the pattern of striking first and negotiating later would probably continue.

The Rosslyn strikes have also been related to those occurring in the eastern Cape where many of the same companies are involved. The difference has been that the eastern Cape is an area of strong union organisation and many strikes have centred on the issue of union recognition and the victimisation of union members. Most of the Rosslyn strikers are not yet union members.

Coates Brothers (Durban): The strike in demand of the reinstatement of a fellow worker and the recognition of the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) by Coates was partially covered in WIP 16:48.

Fifty-nine workers had been involved. The managing director, DP Jordan, said that he had warned them to return to work on two occasions before firing them. He accused the unregistered union SAAWU of being behind the 'reluctance to work'. He said that there was no question of his management negotiating with SAAWU.

On 28 January, two days after being fired, management set a deadline for rehiring striking workers. Most did return. But they went out on strike again on 29

January after a six-person committee, elected by them to negotiate with management, was fired.

By 30 January the workers had returned to work on the advice of SAAWU. More information is needed on this strike.

(Meanwhile, a report in the Financial Mail (20.02.81) maintains that Coates Brothers is expecting a further 'moderate' profit growth in the year ending October, 1981).

Kriel Power Station (Eastern Transvaal):

An angry crowd of 300 employees of the Kriel Power Station set off on a path of destruction at about 20h15 on 11 March. They damaged buildings, set two cars alight and plundered the compound bar. Damage was estimated at R15 000 by the time riot police were called in at midnight. Teargas was fired into the crowd, and many workers scaled the security fences and fled into the veld.

Nine workers were arrested and were still in custody on 13 March. A spokesperson for ESCOM said that he did not know what the workers had been dissatisfied about; but that the police were investigating (sic).

Seppi Fine Papers (Enstra, Springs): For details of the strike by some 1 000 workers at this paper mill (a strike for higher wages) see WIP 16:47.

The strikers returned to work on 22 January when management expressed willingness to negotiate with their union, the Paper, Wood and Allied Workers' Union, over the wage issue and other matters of dissatisfaction. But tension flared again when management refused to meet basic worker demand for an increase of R1,00 in the hourly minimum wage for

all labourers (28 January).

According to PWAWU, Seppi had begun tightening security at the mill. They cited the erection of security fences within the plant, and a permanent police patrol, both within and outside the plant, as examples. These claims were hotly denied by the managing director, E van As.

(Meanwhile a report appeared in the Sunday Times on 15.02.81 under the sub-title 'Seppi profits leap by more than 75%').

SA Fabrics (Rossburgh, Natal): See WIP 16:48 for previous coverage on the strike of 600 workers on 18 January, which was costing the company about R36 000 a day in losses.

Worker demands were a) immediate recognition of their union, the National Union of Textile Workers; and b) a R15 increase on their wages.

They were refusing to return to work until their demands had been met. SA Fabrics, on the other hand, were refusing to negotiate with the union until they had returned to work. Management's offer of an increase of between R1,25 and R2,50 had not helped in breaking the stalemate.

ID Lintels (New Germany, Natal): All 26 african workers at this concrete manufacturing firm downed tools on 28 January over higher wages and a change in tea and lunch breaks. They started work at 07h00, and so wanted their tea and lunch breaks an hour earlier than the company's 10h00 and 13h00 times.

Officials of the Department of Manpower Utilisation had been called in.

King Edward VIII Hospital (Durban): Three mortuary assistants walked out of their jobs

in protest against poor working conditions and wages (21 January).

Dissatisfaction had been brewing for a long time, and came to a head on 20 January when the three were required to prepare seven corpses for hospital pathologists, despite a staff shortage as two other assistants were away. The three maintained that they could not meet the task without spending the whole day at it, and that they were not prepared to do this for the meagre wages they received.

Everite (Meyerton, Johannesburg): 700 african workers downed tools on 5 February, after management had refused a demand for a wage increase of R3,00 an hour. Appeals by management for them to return to work on 5 and 6 February were not successful, but the majority had returned by 9 February.

Three of these workers were arrested on 6 February and subsequently charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. But the case was withdrawn on 6 March because of insufficient evidence.

Labour lawyers and observers see prosecution of alleged strike leaders as a growing trend, according to a report in the RDM (05.03.81). See for example the coverage in this WIP of the Johannesburg Municipal workers' strike and the Mavi trial, as well as the prosecution of the Natal bus drivers.

Electricity Department (Durban Corporation): About 250 corporation electricians demanded an across-the-board increase of R200 per month on 23 February. They threatened a work-to-rule campaign from 4 March if their demands were not met.

The secretary of the Durban Municipal

Employees' Society (DMES) said, on 4 March, that the work-to-rule threat had not yet been discussed. By 5 March, however, the Management Committee was preparing to discuss it. By 6 March, DMES, in representing some 4 000 white workers, asked the city council for a general wage increase of 16% from 1 April. Management Committee was prepared to negotiate with the DMES.

Dominion Dairies (Johannesburg): About 200 african drivers and deliverymen went on strike on 12 March, when their demand to have a white company accountant sacked was ignored by management. They mistrusted the accountant who, they maintained, both failed to pay them a bonus they were promised every month, and made deductions on their pay without any explanation.

Police were called in to disperse the strikers.

Whites stepped in to scab on the strikers.

By 13 March the workers had returned to work, and management was meeting with representatives of the drivers' workers committee to discuss the issues.

Ezekheni Bus Drivers (Natal): M.J. Khumalo, national president of the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) was detained by the Ladysmith security police in the week of 9 March, and charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act, in connection with a recent Ezekheni bus drivers strike in Natal.

Khumalo's detention follows the questioning by security police of BAWU's Ladysmith organiser, Ms K.R. Khumalo.

Greyhound Bus Lines (Krugersdorp): About 18 bus drivers went on strike on 16 February

for higher pay, leaving thousands of commuters stranded on the West Rand.

Riot police were called in, and the striking workers were kept in police custody for much of that day, before being brought before a special court in the late afternoon.

176 workers were then each sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, conditionally suspended for five years. They were to return to work immediately, otherwise face 18 months imprisonment.

The remaining 12 workers were charged with striking illegally, under the Riotous Assemblies Act (the first 176 workers had pleaded guilty to striking, in contravention of the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act). These workers had pleaded not guilty to the charges under the BLRR Act. They claimed that they had been forced to join the strike, under threats of death. They were acquitted.

The strike had followed attempts on the part of workers to discuss their grievances with management, but management had stalled, and they had seen no alternative but to strike.

Labour lawyers expressed anger at the speed with which the trial had taken place, and with the harsh sentences imposed. Alec Erwin, general secretary of FOSATU, was amazed at the handling of the matter. 'I have never heard of a similar case going through the courts so quickly. This will serve only to polarise industrial relations and discredit any kind of reform' (Star, 18.02.81).

A report in the Sowetan (25.02.81) indicates that nine workers, branded by management as 'troublemakers' during the strike, were fired on the day after the strike.

Putco Bus Company (Johannesburg): See WIP 13:34-5; WIP 14:53-4; WIP 16:45-6, for previous coverage of this firm.

15 of the dismissed Putco workers, most of them popular figures and members of the FOSATU-affiliated Transport and Allied Workers' Union (TAWU), are trying to find ways to fight back against their dismissal.

They are planning to take Putco to the new Industrial Court for employing 'unfair labour practices' (see the result of a similar appeal in the Raleigh Cycles case, reviewed in this section).

They are planning to ask the state to convene a conciliation board to discuss the dismissals. Meanwhile, Putco bus drivers who have been re-employed have started a relief fund to help the dismissed workers (Star, 29.01.81).

Mpumalanga Transport Company (Natal):

44 Mpumalanga Transport Company (MTC) busdrivers were convicted in the Camperdown Magistrate's Court on 23 February in terms of Section 14 of the Riotous Assemblies Act. (See WIP 16:46) Section 14 of the Act bears a closer resemblance to a Sabotage Act provision than a Riotous Assemblies Act provision. In summary, it prohibits the breach of a condition of contract by an employee who works in an industry supplying essential services to a community. The Act provides for a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and/or a R500,00 fine.

The accused were drivers employed by the MTC, a subsidiary of KwaZulu Transport. They reported to their bus depot some hours before they were due to commence their runs, and requested to speak to the group manager.

Their grievance was related to the

dismissal of a colleague over a discrepancy in his takings to the amount of 12c. They were told that the manager was unavailable but that they could wait for him as long as they reported for work. The accused chose to wait for his arrival.

At 06h05 they were arrested for failing to report for work and detained for four days before being granted bail. The accused were eventually convicted and sentenced to R100,00 fine and a six month prison sentence suspended for four years.

In the course of the trial it emerged that the security police had held discussions with management and offered them advice from six months prior to the incident. Police officials were at hand throughout the incident.

A further feature of the trial was the exceptionally meticulous and vigorous way the state pursued a conviction. The case is, evidently viewed as a test case and 'quite a few' cases in the Transvaal are awaiting the outcome of this trial.

After the incident 18 of the drivers were dismissed. In attempting to gain employment at other transport companies they have repeatedly come up against a 'blacklist' on which their names appear. At the date of trial, some four months after the incident, they were still unemployed.

If one may extract any general trends from this case, it would be that transport has been isolated as a 'sensitive' area. This is borne out by the vigorous state response to other transport stoppages, Putco excluded. In particular the 176 Greyhound busdrivers (see above) who were detained, convicted and sentenced to 18 months prison sentences suspended on condition that they report to work. All

within 24 hours.

It may well be that the state has isolated 'essential services' as an area of special concern because of the strategic nature of the services and the ability of such workers to act in support of directly political issues. Hammarisdale itself is regarded as an area with a history of ANC support. The prosecutor in the case, a former police colonel, stated that the Act did not 'intend to preserve the employer-employee relationship but rather to protect the community'.

However, the provision is not a unique way of controlling workers in this area. One might recall that it was under an identical provision that the 'night soil boys' were punished in the 'bucket strike' of 1918.

Toyota Marketing (Sandton/Wynberg, Johannesburg): See WIP 16:39 for previous coverage of this strike.

Management had called in security police in an attempt to stop the ongoing conflict between itself and its workers. Two shop stewards, both members of the FOSATU-affiliated Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), had been detained by security police and held for two days for questioning (week of 19 January). Three more trade unionists were detained at the weekend (24 January) and released on 26 January without being charged.

On 26 February two men, Charles Ngobese and Johannes Ngwenya, were detained by security police. Management had decided to prosecute them for allegedly inciting the strike earlier in the year. They appeared in court on 2 March, and the hearing was postponed to 16 March.

MAWU has protested angrily against this

move, expressing its disappointment 'that the state has once again seen fit to involve itself in industrial relations' (sic) (ADM, 03.03.81). MAWU had taken up the case with the motor industry's Industrial Council, alleging that Toyota was guilty of 'unfair labour practices'.

Meanwhile, the fired workers have approached management in an attempt to be reinstated (19 March). The West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) has refused to register them for other jobs because of their status as striking workers, and they have been unemployed for nearly three months. Management refused to rehire them, saying that their replacements were working well, and that 'productivity was infinitely higher now than in the closing months of 1980' (Star, 20.03.81)

An informal blacklist of strikers is operating, according to workers. Management have denied this, but have said:

If an employer phones about one of these men, we put him straight through to his former supervisor who discusses the man's work performance only. I know for a fact that many of them have new jobs (ADM, 21.03.81).

A report in the Star appeared on 25.02.81 headed 'Toyota's taxed profits soar by 520%'. Toyota South Africa was said to be hitting the number one spot in both commercial and passenger vehicle sales. The chairperson of the company, Dr AJJ Wessels, said that 'the board hoped to maintain further systematic growth and needed the money for reinvestment. In the next three years we will have to reinvest R47 million...'

Raleigh Cycles (Springs): For previous coverage see WIP 16:40.

A labour dispute had led to 800 workers being dismissed, only 300 of whom were subsequently rehired. The remaining 500 brought an urgent application to court, through their union (the Engineering and Allied Workers Union, EAWU), against the company for locking them out, and thus preventing them from returning to work.

They also applied for an interim interdict to protect them against replacement by other workers, until the industrial court had given its final ruling in the matter.

In a disappointing move for the workers and their union, the industrial court decided a) to reserve judgement on the case, and b) that it could not grant interim protection until it had decided on the question of its own powers and jurisdiction. This ruling dealt a serious blow to workers prepared to take their cases before the industrial court. It was slammed by FOSATU and legal sources alike (ADM, 13.02.81). Alec Erwin, FOSATU general secretary, said that the judgement seemed to mean 'that the court can never play the role that it was intended to play', viz to give ruling on issues of 'unfair labour practices' - a wide area of jurisdiction laid down by the Wiehahn Commission, and substantially narrowed by the Raleigh workers case.

The labour lawyers spoke of their willingness to take the case to the Supreme Court, although this was a lengthy and expensive business, and made a mockery of the apparent principle of the industrial court.

Cutrite Apparel (Nancefield, Johannesburg):

On Monday, 2 March, 370 women workers at this clothing factory went on strike for a

R3,00 a week increase (the same as that granted at a nearby clothing factory).

The management accusation that the unions involved (the Garment Workers Union, and the National Union of Clothing Workers - TUCSA affiliated) could not control their members seemed to have struck home, with Dr Anna Scheepers (of the GWU) appealing to workers to return to work, as this would make the 'task of negotiating easier'.

Managing director, Syd Cope, of Cutrite stressed that 'over 50 percent of our workforce are receiving more than that' (the Industrial Council minimum wage), and then concentrated on the individuals who were receiving more than the minimum laid down. These included general workers earning R24,50, while the minimum was R13,00 per week, and machinists earning up to R42,00 per week, as against the minimum of R29,60. Workers said that many people earned R13,00 a week (also then a criticism of the union that had agreed to this), and machinists R23,00 a week.

On Friday, 6 March, workers returned on the understanding that pay negotiations would take place between employers and unions.

The GWU and the NUCW had been involved in wage negotiations, but wanted a 10% increase on the already agreed 10% to come into effect in July. This was to compensate for food price rises (Star, 03.03.81). However, ten days later it was reported that the unions had been negotiating for an immediate 10% with another 4% in July. This was unsuccessful and the unions were granted 11,5% for qualified workers in the clothing industry. Larger increases were to be paid to other wage earners. Beginners' wages were to increase from R12 to R17 per week (and this is in

1981!). Dr Anna Scheepers said that at Thaba 'Nchu some employers in the industry were paying wages of R3,00 to R10,00 per week! Jimmy Thomas of the Industrial Council for the industry said that the overall increase in the industry's wage bill would be about 15% (ADM, 13.03.81).

These increases would come into effect on 1 April.

Irvin and Johnson (Benrose): African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU) chairperson, Anderson Sithole, was dismissed from IGJ during the first week of March. On Wednesday, 4 March, workers decided to strike in support of his reinstatement.

On Thursday Lucas Ngwenya, and AFCWU committee member, was fired for allegedly inciting workers to strike.

Workers agreed to return to work (on the same day) after management had agreed to reinstate Ngwenya (but not Sithole), and to the formation of a joint union-works committee member committee, pending the recognition of the union.

General Hospital (Johannesburg): A reported 20 members of the domestic staff were locked out of the hospital premises on Tuesday, 3 March. This was done by supervisor JA Harmse because the workers had arrived 10 minutes late. The late arrivals were due to delays in the train services.

Harmse said that he had not turned them away but that he had merely warned them not to be late again.

On Wednesday all the workers were allowed into the hospital premises.

Dominion Dairies (Johannesburg): About 200

drivers stopped work at yet another dispute involving the dairy industry (see WIP 16). The workers demanded the dismissal of the company accountant because of deductions related to 'absenteeism', and leave and pay issues. The drivers returned to work on the same day, 12 March, once the matter had been referred to the workers' committee.

Rock Lobster Industry (Lüderitz, Namibia):

On about Friday, 13 March, some 600 fishermen returned to the Lüderitz harbour and went on strike in support of a demand for an increased retainer. It appears that the workers (half from Namibia and the rest from Cape Town and the Transkei region) are paid a retainer of R125 per month (a basic wage of R1 500 per year). They wanted this increased to R10,00 per day (or about R3 600 per year).

Most of the press statements on the strike were released through a manager of one of the factories, Werner Guhring, while two officials from the Department of Civic Affairs and Manpower acted as intermediaries in the dispute. Very little talking seems to have been done with the strikers by journalists.

On Tuesday, 17 March, 350 fishermen were paid off and were put on buses to take them to their homes, and to break the strike in this way. Guhring said that the strike was 'political', as the workers knew what the contracts they had signed said. He said that replacement crews for the 27 motherships would be recruited.

However, Guhring made another last-minute offer which was accepted by all but 40 of the workers (and these 40 were bussed out of Lüderitz). The offer was for a retainer of R11,00 per day during the five

month catching season (January-May), instead of the monthly R125 retainer for the whole year. The offer meant that the workers would receive about R1 650 per year (excluding bonuses), but this would be paid during a five month period only.

The strike was said to have cost the industry about R300 000.

Because of the lack of press communication with the workers it is rather difficult to see why the strikers accepted that particular offer that was made to them. That pressure on anybody with a job in Namibia is great to hold onto that job, there is no doubt. Even more so in the fishing industry.

The fishing industry collapsed rapidly during the 1970s. In 1976 exports amounted to R100-m, while it had declined to R65-m by the next year. By 1981 it was said that some 8 000 contract workers involved in the industry had been sent home. By 1977 the fishing season had been reduced from 6 months to 4½ months.

Initially the Russian, Cuban (who else), Spanish and other fleets were blamed for the disappearance of the shoals. These fleets operate outside the Namibian coastal limits and catch kinds of fish that do not appear closer in, where the South African fleets operate. It is therefore either over-fishing by South African foreign fleets having depleted the fish resources of Namibia, or, as has been suggested, that the pilchard shoals have moved further north because of water temperature changes. And in any case Namibians have never benefitted from the industry beyond the few jobs that had been created.

It has also been said that 'the system of fishing licences applied by the Republic

of South Africa in Namibia is so restrictive that no small scale fishing for the local market goes on (in Windhoek there is not one single fresh fish shop).

In Lüderitz it is practically impossible to buy shell-fish other than from the factories (of which there are five - all subsidiaries of South African companies). The canned and deep-frozen crayfish (rock lobster) is almost exclusively for export to the USA. The 1974 value of the catch was R6,3-m.

The town of Lüderitz was affected even worse than Walvis Bay by the decline in the fishing industry. Firstly, because it is a purely fishing harbour; and, secondly, because it is situated in the south, even further from where the pilchard shoals are said to have moved. This meant that local people are almost totally dependent on the shell-fish season for local employment.

Strikes in the eastern Cape:

About 350 women went on strike during the second week of March at the Regent Neckwear Manufacturing Company (East London). They were demanding a pay increase of R10,00 in their weekly wages, and the reinstatement of a workers' representative. Most of the workers are members of Lucy Mvubelo's National Union of Clothing Workers (NUCW).

The strike, lasting two days, was called off after negotiations. A 5% increase due in July was brought forward to 1 April, in addition to increases already due in April.

At Berkshire International Clothing Factory, also in East London, some 300 african and coloured women workers stopped work on 5 March in protest against an

unpopular production bonus scheme. The scheme had worked smoothly, one worker said, until the production manager was replaced. The replacement had instituted unrealistically high production goals and workers were dissatisfied.

The 300 were ordered to vacate the premises by police. The entire workforce then stopped work in sympathy, and were told to report for re-engagement after the weekend.

By 11 March most of the workers had been re-employed without loss of service benefits. But according to a spokesperson for the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) close to 100 workers had not been taken back.

Early in the third week of February most of the workforce at the East London factory of Wilson-Rowntree (part of the British Rowntree-MacIntosh group) left their jobs in support of dismissed fellow workers.

Workers meeting outside the factory premises on Tuesday, 24 February, were baton charged by the police. Management had told all those who had walked out that they had dismissed themselves (this involved about 500 workers).

The factory has been the site of a battle over union recognition between the company recognised and TUCSA-affiliated Sweet Workers' Union (SWU), and SAAWU who claims about half the 1 500 workers as members.

The SWU has accused SAAWU of intimidation, assault and petrol bombing, accusations since repeated by British chairperson of Rowntree-MacIntosh, Donald Barroon (in a telegram to SAAWU national organiser Thozamile Gqweta). Gqweta has refused to comment and has referred the matter to SAAWU attorneys.

One of several stoppages in protest at the proposed changes in regulations to pension withdrawals (contained in the Pensions Bill) led to the dismissal of 11 workers at SA Television Manufacturing Company (also see Firestone and Murray and Stewart, below). About 900 workers took part in a one day stoppage on Friday, 6 February, 1981. All were re-employed except for 11 workers, mostly shop stewards of SAAWU.

A SAAWU spokesperson said that 'management at Federale Electronics, of which SATV Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary, seemed intent on rooting out all vestiges of the union at the plant' (Star, 10.02.81).

In the last issue of WIP (16:46-7) we reported on two other strikes that had arisen out of the proposed changes in pension legislation, namely those at Tubatse Ferrochrome and Firestone (Port Elizabeth). These firms have now been joined by Murray and Stewart (eastern Cape), where unrest over pension changes have broken out.

However, first let us return to developments at Firestone. A spokesperson for workers made two points with regard to the 1 500 strikers' opposition to the proposals that workers be prevented through legislation from withdrawing pension contributions when changing jobs:

'Lower-paid workers used pension funds for short-term saving, as pensions were too small to sustain them on retirement. Workers wanted access to their funds when they lost their jobs' (Star, 27.01.81).

Alec Erwin, FOSATU general secretary, called for a delay in the legislation. The state seems to have been forced, at last, into paying attention to worker dissatisfaction. (We hope to be able to carry an article on

this issue in one of the future WIPs).

The Firestone strike had started with the night-shift on 25 January. On 28 January the workers who had not returned were considered to have dismissed themselves. Workers dismissed a supposed state 'exemption' granted to Firestone in relation to the 'freezing' of pension contributions, saying that they 'could not trust a white man'. Workers had elected a negotiating committee of coloured and african workers.

By 2 February workers were said to be returning to Firestone and managing director Peter Maun said that production had returned to normal by the next day.

On 11 February workers were paid their pension contributions. It is not clear how many workers withdrew their pensions.

Observers have said that this is a strike 'that need not have happened', but that communication and discussion of the pensions issue was impossible through the state preferred and company used liaison committee system. The National Union of Motor Assemblies and Rubber Workers (NUMARWOSA, a FOSATU affiliate) is said to have only about 250 members, far short of 50% of the workforce. The union has come in for a lot of criticism and seems to have been pushed to the sidelines during the strike.

A later report on the Murray and Stewart strike mentions that it 'follows work stoppages at Firestone and Pyotts in Port Elizabeth earlier this year, and a spate of strikes in the East London area, over proposed Government legislation to stop employees withdrawing pension contributions until they retire' (Evening Post, 17.03.81). Could readers please supply INFORMATION ON

THESE STRIKES.

At Murray and Stewart the strike by about 1 500 construction workers started on Monday, 16 March, disrupting work in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. Workers demanded the option of pulling out of the company pension scheme and to be paid out their contributions.

Workers were told they would have to resign and apply to the Industrial Council for the Building Industry if they wanted to get their pensions back.

On 18 March management started firing workers, but scab labour was said to have been used on the second day of the strike. A spokesperson for the Industrial Council said that even after resignation from the company and the industry, workers would still have to wait three years for their pension contributions. 'However, to meet the workers (sic), we agreed to pay out on April 21 those who wanted their money, provided they resigned from the industry. This was not acceptable to them' (ADM, 19.03.81). No wonder the workers do not trust the pension set-up.

An editorial in the Sowetan (13.03.81) came out with the remarkable statement, on the evidence available, that

There is no doubt that the (pensions) act will be to the good of all people - black and white - and should in fact be welcomed.

What this Bill has to do with 'black and white' is not clear.

Despite this optimistic point of view from the Sowetan, there are several immediately obvious questions in relation to the changes that had been proposed:

Why should workers money be tied up in this way in a mass unemployment situation,

where loss of job means no income for a long time;

Why is the state now trying to shift part of the task of social 'security' onto capital;

Where is all the money held by pension funds invested, and to what extent is it tied up for very long periods of time.

Why do some capitalists also oppose the scheme so vehemently, and who supports it;

How efficient is the pay-out system in tracing pensioners after their forced removal as 'unproductive units' to the bantustans;

etc.

Electrification Project (Soweto): The project has not only suffered under accusations of bribery and shoddy quality, but has also been beset by at least one strike of women trench diggers (Sowetan, 09.03.81).

About 60 women caught a bus to Jabulani and 'mayor' David 'four percent' Thebehali's chambers on Friday, 6 March. The workers demanded to know what had happened to their promised income of R50,00 per week, and also demanded the resignation of supervisor Bernard Crutchurfield, from all reports somewhat of a tyrant.

Crutchurfield said that wages (reduced by him to R5,00 per day) were so low because of the 'idling' of the workers.

Workers were to return to work on 9 March, with a threat from Crutchurfield to fire anyone 'away from her trench at any moment'.

Siemens (Pretoria): See WIP 14:49 and WIP 16:43 for background information. Early in February security police detained three

Siemens workers - Peter Sekade, Matthews Masemola, and Sydney Nkwashu - under 'security legislation'. Sydney Nkwashu was released at the weekend of 14-15 February. As far as is known the other two workers are still in detention.

Sydney Nkwashu said that he did not know under what legislation he had been detained. Police had alleged that he had links with the ANC, he said.

Warehousing and Shipping Services (Durban):

Workers at this Huletts subsidiary went on strike early in February, 1981, over the dismissal (retrenchment) of SAAWU members. WSSS was recently taken over by Huletts, who then retrenched (management's term) 'some workers'. Samuel Kikine, SAAWU general secretary, said that these workers had been members of the SAAWU workers' committee and the dismissals had been part of management's anti-SAAWU and pro-NUSMRE moves.

The National Union of Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Employees (NUSMRE) is said to be an 'in-company' union, formed with the aid of a R10 000 Huletts donation and an office in the prestigious 320 West Street office block in Durban.

After the dismissals 20 workers went on strike in support of the SAAWU members, and were also dismissed (RDM 06.02.81). Management met with SAAWU representatives and agreed to 'examine the strikers' demands'. After this meeting SAAWU agreed to call off a proposed boycott of Huletts products.

On 19 February SAAWU renewed its call for a boycott, saying that negotiations had broken down over the reinstatement of 13 (?) workers dismissed after the earlier strike.

On the same day 40 workers at Ace Haniel

International, on Maydon Wharf in Durban, went on strike in support of the Warehousing and Shipping Services workers. They were also dismissed, said Colin van Rensburg of Ace Haniel.

On Sunday, 15 March, a meeting was called by SAAWU and attended by church and labour organisations in Durban. This meeting called for a boycott of Huletts, Wilson-Rowntree (see above), and Rainbow Chicken products (Rainbow to be boycotted until it produced halaal chickens).

Tongaat Group (Tongaat, Natal): More than 500 workers went on strike on 19 March in demand of higher wages and in protest at the dismissal of 17 fellow workers.

Negotiations were being conducted by Selby Nsibande of the NUSMRE (see Warehousing and Shipping Services strike, above). KwaZulu bantustan officials were also said to be attending the negotiations.

Allied Publishing (Johannesburg): For background to this company (owned by the newspaper industry, most importantly by the Argus company) see the coverage in WIP 12:1-3, and also the coverage in WIP 16 of the strikes in the newspaper industry.

The Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA) provided an organisational structure to bring all the Allied workers together in 1978. After a struggle for recognition during 1979 an agreement was finally signed in April, 1980, between the CCAWUSA and Allied (for details see WIP 12:3).

It was agreed that further wage increases be negotiated in one years time. These talks have been in progress during

the last week or so of March (see below).

On March 24, agreement was reached between the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA) and the management of Allied Publishing on new wage rates for newspaper distributors; these new rates will come into effect as from mid-April. Allied first recognised CCAWUSA as representatives of its employees and negotiated wage rates one year ago.

The wage increases for workers employed before January 1, 1981 will range from 20% (for the more highly paid) to 33%. Workers employed after that date will be paid wages 18% to 31% higher than those now in force. According to the Rand Daily Mail of 25.03.81 the minimum wage paid by Allied after April will be R42,50, as compared to R22 a week in January 1980, before the company recognised the Union.

Weekly hours of work for most of the workforce will also be decreased by 2 hours.

These negotiations follow a 4 day strike during November 1980, and it appears that management feared another. Prior to the wage talks SAAN and Argus management had requested members of their editorial staff to be prepared to distribute newspapers in the event of further industrial unrest. In addition, the Star newspaper had, through advertisements, appealed to 'community conscious readers' to place their names on a register of people who would be available to act as scab labour. (In this connection, see the material reproduced below from the Rand Daily Mail).

The wage agreement has not yet been signed because of disagreement over certain amendments proposed by the Allied management to the recognition agreement. It is

Child sellers and jobs of adult workers

1984
24.03.84

AS YOU probably know, the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA) represents more than 80% of the employees of Allied Publishing, a company which distributes newspapers for various companies including SAAN.

We have been reading with concern the advertisements and articles encouraging young children in the Northern Suburbs to deliver newspapers published by SAAN. It is clear the purpose of this is to deprive some of our members of their jobs.

It is also clear why SAAN is doing this. Your newspaper, and also the Sunday Times and Sunday Express, has urged management in other industries to pay their black workers below wages. We thought you were going to begin trying to do the same when the Allied workers who deliver newspapers received wage increases of more than 50% last year (although not without first having to struggle for them). The present wages, although still not sufficient, were at least a step forward, we thought.

But it now seems that the company which owns your newspaper has decided it would prefer not to employ these delivery men if it means paying them anything more than the starvation wages they need to receive. SAAN is attempting to deprive adult men of work and to replace them with cheaper child labour. And the children who are being employed are those of wealthy Northern Suburbs residents who are told by your articles and advertisements that they will be earning some extra "pocket money".

We are often led to believe that your newspaper wishes to advance the cause of fairness and decency in South Africa. We trust you believe in these principles also where your company is concerned, even where it may cost you a small percentage of your profits. —

MS EMMA MASHINGO, General Secretary, Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers

Union of South Africa, Johannesburg

© MS CLIVE KIMBLEY, Managing Director of SAAN, replied:

"Mrs Mashingo's letter shows the wrong impression of industrial development in the distribution of newspapers. The purpose of encouraging children to deliver newspapers is to ensure that the child who may have to deliver Allied newspapers of jobs, as the children.

"It is not as if a single Allied employee has been deprived of his job as a result of these developments. In fact — we will they had to find Allied employees taking his job.

"The use of children to deliver newspapers is common in a long-standing practice in many parts of the world, and should be seen in this light. Many people now in public life in Britain, America and Europe started their careers by delivering newspapers.

"The recruitment of children for this purpose is not confined to the Northern Suburbs of Johannesburg. The system is also in operation in Lesotho and Botswana. In fact, all major local resident children, as the new system expands, as children who live in the neighbourhood will be used to deliver our respective newspapers.

"The percentage of home deliveries in South Africa is among the lowest in the world — averaging 20% of total sales. In Europe and America more than 80% of sales are home delivered, and we at SAAN seek to improve our penetration into homes by using the internationally accepted method of employing children to make deliveries in the areas in which they live.

"The use of this system allows us to a certain extent to alleviate one of the major areas of concern about the hours of work that full-time staff are expected to put in during a working week.

"Far from curtailing the number of full-time employees, SAAN has in the last year provided employment for an additional 20 people in the distribution of Soweto News, a local community newspaper."

understood that management wishes to place limitations on some of the rights already enjoyed by the Union.

RAND Daily Mail

In the event of industrial unrest, preventing delivery of newspapers to subscribers, this coupon can be exchanged for a copy of the Daily Mail at your nearest cafe/agent.

NAME: _____
ADDRESS: _____

NAME: _____
ADDRESS: _____

NAME: _____
ADDRESS: _____

NAME: _____
ADDRESS: _____

Labour Statistics: It was claimed in the report of the Department of Manpower Utilization that 100 'labour disputes' had taken place during 1979 (130 000 workhours lost, and involving 15 7771 african workers). The report distinguished between 'labour disputes' and 'strikes'. Of the latter there had been 51 (involving 10 515 african workers and losing 110 511 workhours).

Dr Hennie Reynders, chairperson of the National Manpower Commission, said that during 1980 207 'strikes and work stoppages' had taken place, costing 175 000 workhours.

The Minister of Manpower Utilization said in Parliament that there had been 134 'strikes' (67 for higher wages), and 161 'labour disputes', dealt with by labour officers.

THE STATE versus JOSEPH MAVI AND 2 OTHERS.

ON JULY 24, 1980, about 600 black employees at the Johannesburg City Council's (JCC) Orlando power station in Soweto stopped work as a result of a pay dispute.⁽¹⁾ By Tuesday, July 29, they had been joined by about 10 000 black workers from almost every one of the municipality's departments.

By Thursday, July 31, the JCC, with the help of large contingents of heavily armed police, had effectively smashed the strike and were taking workers by bus to the disused City Deep compound for the night, prior to deporting them to their 'homelands'. Many of these workers claimed to have been physically forced onto these buses against their will.

When the Black Municipal Workers' Union (BMWU) and its attorneys received confirmation of these actions in the latter part of Thursday afternoon, they sought an urgent

application for an interdiction seeking to restrain or prevent the JCC and Minister of Police from wrongfully and unlawfully detaining, restraining and assaulting members of the union; and from wrongfully and unlawfully depriving them of their possessions and personal effects contained in their lockers and in the dormitories of the hostels in which they were residing.

As Mr Joseph Mavi, president of the BMWU, other union executive members and their attorneys waited in the corridors of the Supreme Court in the late hours of Thursday night, while lawyers for the union and the JCC sought to reach an agreement, Mr Mavi was identified to the security police, seized and taken into detention. It was an action which in the opinion of Mr Johan Kriegler, SC, 'appears to have been interference with the fundamental right of a litigant to free access to a court of law'.

When the police colonel concerned was asked by one of Mr Mavi's lawyers about the section under which he was being detained, the colonel was reported to have replied, 'Under section 50'. 'Section 50 of which Act?' asked the lawyer. 'Section 50 of the usual Act,' was the reply. (RDM, 02.08.80).

Mavi was not in fact detained under 'section 50' (of the Criminal Law Amendment Act which would have required him to be brought before court within 48 hours), but under section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act which meant that he could be held incommunicado for 14 days.

On Thursday, August 7, the security police raided the offices of the BMWU in Sauer Street and seized several documents. (RDM 08.08.80). A week later (August 14) Mr Joseph Mavi and Mr Philip Dlamini, the

BMWU secretary, were charged in court under clauses (b), (d) and (f) of section 21 (1) of the 1962 General Law Amendment Act, commonly known as the 'Sabotage Act'. This section carries a minimum penalty of 5 years jail and a maximum of death. According to the Act, people convicted under it 'are liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason.

The relevant clauses make it an offence to commit 'any wrongful and wilful act whereby he injures, damages, destroys, renders useless or unservicable, puts out of action, tampers with, pollutes, contaminates or endangers' any of the following:

- * the maintenance of law and order;
- * the supply or distribution of light, power, fuel, foodstuffs or water, or of sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services;
- * the free movement of traffic on land, at sea, or in the air.

Mr Mavi stated that he had been interrogated by the security police 4 times since his arrest on July 31. (Star, 14.08.80). Neither man was asked to plead and they were remanded to a hearing in the Rand Supreme Court on August 28. Applications for bail for both men were refused.

On Wednesday, August 13, it was learnt that a third member of the BMWU executive, Mr Hope Mamabolo was taken from his place of work by men who said they were members of the security police. (Mr Mamabolo later appeared as a state witness in the trial of messrs Mavi, Dlamini and Mazwi - see below).

On Tuesday, August 19, Mr Dlamini appeared briefly before a Johannesburg magistrate to make a fresh application for bail. The application was postponed at the request of the state for hearing on

Friday 22 when he would appear jointly with Mr Mavi.

On the following day, Wednesday, August 20, another member of the BMWU executive, Mr Gatsby Mazwi, acting secretary to the BMWU, was arrested at the union's offices in Sauer Street. Colonel H Muller, security police chief of the Witwatersrand, confirmed that Mr Mazwi was being held under section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and that there was a 'strong possibility' that he would soon be held under section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act which provides for 14 days detention. (Star, 21.08.80).

Mr Dlamini appeared in court on Friday 22 and was granted bail of R1 000 on condition that he report daily at the Jabulani police station and hand over any travel documents in his possession to the police. Mr Mavi was not brought to court by the Department of Prisons. The magistrate, Mr J.J.F. Coetzer, refused to fix bail in his absence, although Mr Basslian for Mr Mavi, told the magistrate that there had been previous precedents where bail had been fixed in the absence of the accused. Mr Mavi was granted bail of R500 (on the same conditions as Dlamini) later in the day. At the bail hearing the state prosecutor said damage resulting from the municipal strike was estimated at between R300 000 and R400 000 and that Mr Mavi was facing serious charges. This is an interesting assessment particularly as the Chairman of the JCC management committee, Mr F Oberholzer, was reported to have said that the strike probably saved the council money.

On August 26, Mr Mazwi was also charged under the same clause of the 'Sabotage Act'. He was granted the same bail and conditions as Mr Mavi.

The 3 accused appeared in court on August 28. Mr Ernest Wentzel, SC, instructed by Priscilla Jana and Associates, appeared for Mr Mavi and Mr Mazwi. Mr Dlamini was represented by Mr Ratha Mokgoathheng. The 3 were not asked to plead and the case was postponed to September 29.

On September 29, the case was again adjourned to October 17 for further investigation by the security police. The men were not asked to plead and no evidence was led. Bail was extended.

On October 17, the 3 accused appeared once more in court only for the hearing to be postponed to October 19.

Finally, on October 19, the state withdrew the Sabotage charges against the 3 accused and charged them instead under section 18 (1), (2), (3) and (5), to be read with section 30 of the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, no. 48 of 1953 (as amended).⁽²⁾ This act carries no mandatory minimum sentence. The accused could receive a suspended sentence or even a fine if found guilty. The case was set down for February 16 - 20, 1981.

THE CHARGES, REQUEST FOR FURTHER PARTICULARS, AND THE STATE'S RESPONSES.

The 3 accused were charged with contravening the above-mentioned sections of the Black Labour Regulations Act:

In that whereas the accused were employed by a local authority, to wit the City Council of Johannesburg; and in that whereas during or about the period July 25 - 27 1980 and at or near Johannesburg in the Regional Division of the Transvaal, the accused did wrongfully and unlawfully instigate a strike and/or incite other employees to take part in or to continue a strike

and/or take part in a strike or in the continuation of a strike, to wit the strike by black municipal workers, by perpetrating one or more or all of the acts or omissions contemplated by section 18(5) of the said act.

(Charge later amended to read 'during the period 25 - 28 July, 1980').

On December 5, Priscilla Jana and Associates, attorneys for messrs Mavi and Mazwi, requested further particulars to these charges.⁽³⁾

THE TRIAL.

The trial began on Wednesday, February 18, 1981 in the Magistrates' Court for the Transvaal Regional Division. The presiding magistrate was Mr IJJ Luther. The hearing lasted 2½ days. The state called 6 witnesses; the defence none.

Witness 1 for the state: Mr LW Petty, general manager of the JCC's Transport Department.

Mr Petty's evidence took up most of the first morning primarily as a result of his evasion of the issues and questions put to him. He described how on Monday, July 28, he arrived at the Bus Depot at about 04h45 and found that the running staff present had gathered in the gymnasium and that they were being addressed by accused number 1 (Mavi) and that accused number 2 (Dlamini) was seated in the front row. Mr Petty did not see accused number 3 (Mazwi). He described how he entered the building with Mr Botha, the area superintendent at the depot, Mr Pretorius, the assistant superintendent at the depot, and a contingent of police. He recounted how Mr Mavi stopped his address as he entered the building. Mr Petty said that he asked Mr Mavi why the running staff had

FURTHER PARTICULARS

The further particulars requested and the state's responses were as follows:

1. Did the accused act in common purpose in contravening section 18(1) of Act no. 48 of 1953?

State: Yes. Alternatively the state will allege that each accused is guilty by virtue of his own acts and mens rea.

2. Was such common purpose as the result of an express agreement? If so, the following particulars are required:

- When was such agreement concluded?
- Where was such agreement concluded?
- The names of the parties to the agreement are required.
- Was the agreement entered into orally or in writing? If orally, the full terms thereof are required. If in writing, a copy of the said agreement is required.

State: This is unknown.

3. Insofar as the state intends to allege that the accused became party to the said common purpose and that this is a matter of inference drawn from the fact, circumstances, utterances, documents or writings, particulars are required to:

- the nature of such facts and circumstances.

State: The state alleges that the facts that the accused acted in the furtherance of a common purpose is an inference to be drawn from inter alia the following facts and the circumstances surrounding them:

- The accused jointly and severally, each with the full knowledge and consent of the other, organised and attended, on various occasions and at various places in Johannesburg meetings of the black members of the staff of the

FURTHER PARTICULARS

Johannesburg Transport Department.

Amendment: Inter alia meetings were held on the 15th and 25th of July, 1980 at Cambridge house, Sauer Street, Johannesburg.

ii. The said meetings were organised in the name of the BMWU of which accused number 1 (Mavi) was the president and accused number 3 (Mazwi) an additional member.

Amendment: The meetings were organised and attended by the 3 accused. Accused number 1 as chairman, accused number 2 as secretary and number 3 as additional member of the BMWU. Accused number 2 instructed accused number 1 and 3 to organise the strike at the Transport Department, which they did.

iii. At the said meeting a general strike of black members of the Johannesburg Transport Department was propagated and/or furthered by various members of the BMWU, each with the full knowledge and consent of all the accused.

Amendment: The strike was verbally propagated.

iv. On various occasions and at various places in Johannesburg the accused, either in concert or severally, in furtherance of the common purpose, propagated the issue of such a general strike to individual members of the Johannesburg Transport Department.

Amendment: Inter alia the strike was verbally propagated during the meeting of the 25th July, 1980 and various social gatherings.

v. On various occasions and at various places in Johannesburg the accused, either in concert or severally, in furtherance of the common purpose prevented individual members of the Johannesburg Transport Department from

FURTHER PARTICULARS

carrying out their duties.

Amendment: Inter alia on the 28th July 1980 at Avenue Road, Johannesburg, accused number 1 and 2 prevented 2 drivers from taking out their bus. They were threatened by accused number 1 and 2.

b. when and where such facts are alleged to have occurred.

State: See 3 a.

c. such utterances.

State: In terms of section 335 of Act 51 of 1977 only the accused are entitled to written statements made to the police. The state therefore declines to provide the contents of any oral statements.

Amendment (to b and c): Inter alia on the 27th July 1980 at the Bus Depot accused number 1 and 2 instructed the drivers that on the 28th July 1980 they must 'down tools'.

d. when and where and by whom such utterances are alleged to have been made.

State: See 3 d.

e. any documents or writing, the date and place of its execution, the identity of the author, the contents thereof or a copy thereof.

State: Declines to furnish such documents at this time.

4. Full particulars are required as to:

a. the exact manner in which accused number 1 instigated the strike.

State: -

Amendment: Inter alia he instructed his co-workers on the 25th and 27th July 1980 at the Bus Depot to 'down tools on the 28th July 1980'; by setting himself up as an example by taking part in the strike;

lending support to or expressing sympathy with the strikers at Orlando power station.

b. when and where such strike was instigated.

FURTHER PARTICULARS

State: Matter of evidence.

Amendment: Inter alia on the 28th July 1980 at the Bus Depot, Avenue Road, Johannesburg.

c. the names and addresses of all persons who were instigated to strike.

State: Matter of evidence.

Amendment: Inter alia employees of the Johannesburg Transport Department.

5. Full particulars are required as to the exact manner in which accused number 1 and 3 incited the strike; when and where such strike was incited; and the names and addresses of all persons who were incited to strike.

State: see 4.

6. Full particulars are required to a & c. the exact manner in which accused number 1 and 3 took part in the strike.

State: see 4.

Amendment: Inter alia they refused or failed to work or to continue to work and/or resume their work.

b. the names and addresses of all persons who took part in the strike.

State: Declines to furnish this information.

7. ad paragraph 18(3) and (5)

The above particulars are required mutatis mutandis in respect of each of the acts referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of 'STRIKE' contained in sub-section (5) of the said Act, and in particular which specific acts are alleged against each of the accused.

State: The state will allege that the accused jointly and severally, each with the full knowledge and consent of the other:

a. refused or failed to continue to work; and/or

b. resumed their work, and/or

FURTHER PARTICULARS

- c. comply with the terms or conditions of employment applicable to them; and/or
- d. obstruct the progress of work; and/or
- e. breached their contract of employment for the purposes of inducing or compelling the JCC to comply with their demands or proposals for higher wages to them and other employees.

Comment: It will be noted that the state, in its responses for these requests for further particulars, has been obliged to circumscribe the charges against the accused quite dramatically. The charges, as circumscribed, cover meetings at the union's offices of July 15 and 25, 1980, and relate only to actions and employees within the JCC's Transport Department.

not taken the buses out, and that Mr Mavi replied that it was due to the City Council's not recognising the BMWU.

Mr Petty said that he then addressed the whole meeting and said that their channel of communication of grievances was through the official works committee, and that he would discuss this matter with the works committee as soon as they had returned to work. He told the court that he also told the gathering that it was not possible to discuss the matter while there was a stoppage of work. He said that he appealed to them, his 'loyal' staff, to return to work, and pointed out to them that it was illegal to strike.

Mr Petty stated that he then left the gymnasium to give them an opportunity to consider his advice and returned again between 05h45 and 05h50. When he entered

accused number 1 was addressing the meeting. He told the court that the police lieutenant with him asked Mr Mavi why the staff present were not operating the buses. Mr Petty told the court that Mr Mavi replied that it was because the JCC did not recognise their union. The lieutenant, Mr Petty said, then appealed to the staff present to listen to Mr Petty's advice and to return to their work.

At that stage, Mr Petty said, Mr Dlamini, who was still seated in the front row, got up and said, 'What do you care about our people? We are being murdered in the township.'

Mr Petty stated that he then made a final appeal to the staff to return to work. There was no reaction. He said that he pointed out to the staff that the peak service must be out before 07h00 and that any staff who did not return to work would be dismissed and must leave the premises. The whole group, he said, then left the premises and gathered outside.

Mr Wentzel, in cross examination, asked Mr Petty whether he knew about the formation of the BMWU in June. Mr Petty, in a series of partial answers, gave the impression that he was not really aware of the BMWU. Under intense cross examination by Mr Wentzel, Mr Petty gradually admitted that the JCC had backed the formation of and had favoured an in-house union, the Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers (UJMW) which at the time of its registration on July 29 (in the middle of the strike!) had only 40 paid up members. Mr Petty admitted that his department had provided transport for JCC workers to attend the inaugural meeting of the UJMW on January 23, 1980, and that the City Council had gone to considerable lengths

to assist the UJMW in other ways, for example by giving workers the afternoon off and providing the Selbourne hall free of charge. Mr Petty confirmed that neither his department nor the JCC, gave any such assistance to the BMWU, although formally requested by it to provide the same assistance. Indeed it was confirmed in cross examination that the BMWU organisers had met with the Staff Board several months before the formation of the union. Mr Petty had been in attendance at that meeting, and he had confirmed to them that the JCC management committee prohibited them from forming a union except in their own transport department.

Mr Petty went on to confirm, under cross examination, that some of the staff in the transport department did not go back to work after lunch on Friday and that he had been advised that there might be 'problems' in the department on Monday. He admitted, however, that he made no attempt to contact the works committee as a result of this information, but instead got hold of the police. He said he could not remember if he got hold of the police on Friday, Saturday or Sunday! Mr Petty went on to tell the court, under cross examination, that there was no dispute over wages among black running staff in the transport department, and that he was not aware of any complaints.

Mr Wentzel pointed out to Mr Petty that there were numerous complaints, some of which were:

1. In spite of the JCC's alleged 'equalisation of pay' the black and white drivers were separated by a so-called 'proficiency barrier'. This was a major grievance: some blacks had longer service than whites,



Flashback to Municipal workers strike

but no whites were below the barrier, even with one month's experience, while no blacks, even with 10 years experience, were above the barrier.

2. The JCC had recently introduced a change from 2-man to 1-man operated buses, as well as new pay scales with special allowances for 1-man bus operators. However, for 3 consecutive pay days to the 'strike' the JCC had not paid drivers the 1-man operator allowance due

to them.

3. After the new scales were introduced, the Council contended that it had inadvertently overpaid the black staff, sometimes by as much as R100. This was denied by the black staff, but the JCC nevertheless went ahead and deducted the appropriate amounts from the drivers' future weekly pay packets.

4. Employees had accused Mr Petty of trying to by-pass the works committee (of which Mavi and Dlamini were chairman and secretary respectively) and negotiating directly with the black staff.

It was not clear from Mr Petty's replies whether or not he admitted being aware of these grievances.

Witness 2 for the state: Mr PJ Pretorius, assistant superintendent at the Bus Depot.

Mr Pretorius confirmed that the staff had legitimate grievances relating to the issues mentioned above and that some of them had in fact been short paid. He also stated that he asked Mr Mavi on the morning of July 28 whether the staff were on strike. Mr Mavi told him that it was a protest and not a strike: the staff, said Mr Mavi, were not on strike but the buses would not leave the depot.

Witness 3 for the state: Mr M Gangxeka, a bus driver.

Mr Gangxeka told the court that when he started to drive his bus out of the depot on Monday morning he saw Mr Mavi stop the bus of a colleague, Mr Nxumalo. He said that Mr Mavi approached Mr Nxumalo's bus and spoke angrily to him as he was about to take his bus out.

Under cross examination from Mr Wentzel,

Mr Gangxeka admitted that Mr Mavi did not stand beneath the driver's window while talking to Mr Nxumalo as had first been stated, but that Mr Mavi had gone around to the other side of the bus, climbed up into the cab, and had spoken to Mr Nxumalo there.

Wentzel: 'You have not got the vaguest idea what they were saying'.

Gangxeka: 'Yes, I did not hear what they were saying'.

Mr Gangxeka was then cross-examined by Mr Mokgoathheng for Mr Dlamini. Mr Gangxeka began by denying that he had ever had anything to do with any works committee. Mr Mokgoathheng put it to him that he had been a member of the transport department's works committee in 1977 and 1978, and that when he was replaced by Mr Dlamini on the incoming committee, Dlamini had had a great deal of difficulty in getting the committee's documents from Mr Gangxeka, which included a money float of about R115.

In his initial evidence Mr Gangxeka had said that Mr Dlamini had threatened him at a meeting at the Bree Street depot on Sunday, July 27, 1980. Mr Gangxeka said that Mr Dlamini had told them they should not work the following day because they were to sympathise with the people at Orlando. (The JCC had dismissed 550 workers at Orlando on Thursday and Friday). Mr Gangxeka alleged that Mr Dlamini had said that anyone who worked on the following day would die. Mr Mokgoathheng contended that no meeting had been held in the Bree Street depot on Sunday, July 27, 1980.

Witness 4 for the state: Mr D Nxumalo, a bus driver.

Under cross examination by Mr Wentzel, Mr Nxumalo agreed that no-one had spoken to him angrily or had threatened him in any way when he started up his bus on Monday, July 28. Mr Mavi, he said, had spoken to him very politely, as a result of which he parked his bus and went to join his colleagues in the gymnasium.

Witness 5 for the state: Mr J Matsana, a cleaner in the Transport Department.

On Friday, July 24, 1980 the JCC tried to move workers from various departments to replace the dismissed 'strikers' at the Orlando power station. Black workers throughout the JCC's employ were becoming incensed by the JCC's hardline attitude to the Orlando power station workers and the way they had been dismissed. By Friday lunchtime they were in a defiant mood. Most of them not only refused to scab, but downed tools in sympathy. Mr Matsana was one of 200 to 300 workers in the transport department who stopped work on Friday, July 25, primarily as a response to the JCC's attempts to draft scab labour into Orlando.

In the witness box, Mr Matsana claimed that during lunch time on Friday, Mr Dlamini had approached him and told him he should not go back to work after his lunch break, because their union was going to speak to the JCC about giving them more money.

His evidence on the meeting in the gymnasium on the following Monday morning was totally confused. He first of all said that there wasn't a meeting in the gymnasium, but after some clarification it transpired that Mr Matsana did not arrive at work until 07h00, after the above-mentioned meeting had taken place!

Witness 6 for the state: Mr Hope Mamabolo, BMWU executive committee member.

Mr Mamabolo began his evidence by recounting a meeting of the BMWU executive at their office in Cambridge House, Sauer Street, on Friday, July 25. He said that Mr Martin Sere and Mr Somdeke arrived and told the executive about the Orlando power station strike. Mr Mamabolo told the court that Mr Mavi then asked Mr Mlangeni (assistant treasurer of the BMWU) if he had told them not to strike as had been decided upon at a previous executive meeting. Mr Mlangeni said that he had not had time. The issue, according to Mr Mamabolo, was left there as Mr Mavi had to leave the meeting to go on shift.

Mr Mamabolo was then cross examined by Mr Wentzel, and immediately became confused saying that the above-mentioned meeting took place on July 15. Mr Wentzel pointed out that that would have been rather difficult considering that the Orlando strike did not begin until July 24!

Mr Mamabolo said that he could only clarify the dates if he could check them against the statement he made to the security police. On that note, the court adjourned for 15 minutes.

After the adjournment, Mr Mamabolo was questioned again by the prosecutor. This time he said that the meeting was on July 25, and that Mr Dlamini told Mr Mazwi to tell the Selby people to go on strike. Dlamini, he said, also told Mavi to tell his people (ie transport workers) to strike. Mr Mamabolo also told the court that Mr Dlamini had asked him if his people (licensing department) were going to strike

as the municipality didn't recognise their union. Mr Mamabolo said that he told Mr Dlamini that his people knew nothing about the strike and it would be difficult for him to tell them to strike.

Mr Mamabolo was then cross-examined for a second time by Mr Wentzel. He confirmed that he had been detained by the security police and locked up in John Vorster Square for 8 days, but without being charged. He confirmed that he had been interrogated while in detention and had made three statements to the police, but had only signed the third one.

Wentzel: What was wrong with the first statement?

Mamabolo: The police said that it was not telling the truth.

Wentzel: Who interrogated you?

Mamabolo: The man sitting next to the prosecutor, and others.

Wentzel: What made you decide to make different statements on three separate occasions?

Mamabolo: When I made a statement which I knew was the truth they refused to accept it and fetched me from the cells.....

The third statement was not very different.

Wentzel: But different in some ways?

Mamabolo: Yes.

Mamabolo then confirmed that the third statement covered the meeting on July 25, as he had recounted it to the prosecutor on the second occasion, that is after the adjournment.

Mr Wentzel asked Mr Mamabolo if the statement about Mavi telling Mlangeni to tell the Orlando workers not to strike was in the first statement.

Mamabolo: Yes, and that was the truth.

Mr Wentzel then ran over the morning's events. 'After the tea break', he said, 'the prosecutor tried againThe story about Dlamini telling people to strike etc was in the third statement but not the first?' Mr Mamabolo replied that the police had told him to include the story about Dlamini telling the people to strike in his statement. The police had told him he could be locked up forever. He was held under section 22 (allowing for 14 days detention), but, he said, the police kept coming to him at night and telling him that section 22 could be changed to section 6 (allowing for indefinite detention).

Mr Wentzel suggested to Mr Mamabolo that he had difficulty in remembering what was not the truth. Mamabolo agreed with him and told the court how he had been called back by the police on the Friday before the trial. The police came to fetch him at home, but he was out so they left a note saying that he had to report to a room in John Vorster Square where he was shown his statement and made some notes. He handed the notes to Mr Wentzel.

After studying the notes and making reference to three meetings, Mr Wentzel handed the notes back to Mr Mamabolo and suggested to him that the reason why he made the notes was because he otherwise wouldn't be able to remember what he had told the police.

Mr Mamabolo agreed that this was so.
Wentzel: When you began your evidence this morning you went back to the truth?

Mamabolo: Yes.

Mr Mamabolo confirmed that it had been recorded in the BMWU's executive meeting minutes that Mr Mavi had earlier told



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members that workers must not strike.

In his final cross examination by Mr Wentzel, Mr Mamabolo admitted that his first statement was true, but that in his first statement he had forgotten to mention the story about Dlamini.

Mr Wentzel told Mr Mamabolo that he couldn't have it both ways - one of his stories was true and one wasn't. Mr Wentzel then summarised the contradiction between the two stories Mr Mamabolo had told the court. 'Which of the 2 stories is the true one?' asked Mr Wentzel. Mr Mamabolo

did not reply.

At this point Mr Wentzel interjected and suggested to Mr Mamabolo that his evidence was so unreliable that it could not be placed before the court.

Mamabolo: I leave that to the court.

Mr Mamabolo was then cross examined by Mokgoatheng, and said that he had been threatened in John Vorster Square, assaulted by fists and that his head had been held and hit against the wall.

Mokgoatheng: How many people assaulted you?

Mamabolo: Four.

No further witness was called by the state.
No evidence was led by the defence.

Argument for the defence.

Mr Wentzel's argument was succinct. He pointed out that the onus was on the state to prove the charges. But the state, he said, was in a dilemma. Mr Petty had told the court that the 'strike' was over recognition of the union. If his evidence was to be accepted then it didn't fall within the indictment which referred only to demands or proposals for higher wages (see 7 a in the further particulars, and the judgement). On the other hand, argued Mr Wentzel, if Mr Pretorius was right, and the issue was over a failure of the employer to pay allowances owed, then the workers' action was legal. If a master does not pay, argued Mr Wentzel, the worker is not obliged to work. In other words, in such an instance, the master is in breach of contract and the employee is legally not obliged to work.

If that was the case, argued Mr Wentzel, it was not a strike but an illegal lock-out by Mr Petty. Mr Wentzel reminded the court that Mr Pretorius had made it plain that there had been a legitimate grievance by the drivers in that they had not been paid money legitimately owed to them by the JCC. The JCC, said Mr Wentzel, was a 'particularly obdurate and obstinate employer'. The witnesses were deplorable with the exception of Mr Pretorius. It is not even worth discussing the quality of the state's evidence'.

Extracts from the judgement of Mr Luther
(March 4, 1981).

'The main issue canvassed in argument is whether the accused took part in a stoppage

of work which is an illegal strike as defined in section 18(5) of the Act.
The relevant part of the section reads as follows:

For the purposes of this section strike means any one or more of the following acts or omissions by any body or number of persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or different employers:

- a. a refusal or failure by them to continue work, whether the discontinuance is complete or partial, or to resume their work, or to accept re-employment, or to comply with the terms or conditions of employment applicable to them, or the retardation by them of the progress of work, or the obstruction by them of work; or
- b. the breach or termination by them of their contracts of employment if
 - (i) the refusal, failure, retardation, obstruction, breach or termination is in pursuance of any combination, agreement or understanding between them, whether express or not, and
 - (ii) the purpose of that refusal, failure, retardation, obstruction, breach or termination is to induce or compel any person by whom they or any other person are or have been employed, (aa) to agree to or comply with any demands or proposals concerning the terms or conditions of employment or other matters made by or on behalf of them or any of them or any other person who are or have been employed.

It appears therefore that before a work stoppage will be an illegal strike, there must firstly be a refusal to work or a retardation of the work progress. Secondly, such refusal or retardation must be by a body or number of persons. Thirdly, the refusal or retardation must be in pursuance of any combination, agreement or understanding between them. Fourthly, the purpose of the refusal or retardation must be to induce or compel the employer to agree to their demands or proposals concerning terms or conditions of employment or other matters.

It is clear from the evidence that there was a refusal to work by a number of bus drivers on the morning of 28th July, 1980. It is a necessary inference that these drivers acted in concert. Regarding the purpose of the refusal to work, Mr Petty testified that when he enquired from accused number 1, accused number 1 informed him that the buses would not leave because of the City Council's failure to recognise their union. This evidence is confirmed by Mr Pretorius. This union, it appears, was formed on the 23rd June, 1980. In terms of section 4 of Act 28/1986 a union can only be registered after a period of three months has lapsed since its formation. At the time of the work stoppage the City Council could therefore not have recognised it. (5)

Advocate Wentzel submitted, and Mr Coetzer on behalf of the state conceded, that because accused number 1 attempted to induce the City Council to do something which it could not and over which it had no control, this was not a strike within the terms of the above mentioned definition. However,.....it is not part of the charge against the accused that they stopped work for the purpose of inducing or compelling their employer to recognise their union. In paragraph 7 of the request for further particulars the state was asked for particulars in respect of each of the acts referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of 'strike', and in particular which specified acts are alleged against each of the accused. To this the state replied that the accused refused to work 'for the purpose of inducing or compelling the JCC to comply with their demands or proposals for higher wages to them or other employees'.

It is clear that the state has limited its case to this allegation.

Accused number 2 did not ask for further particulars. (But) it must... be held that as far as accused number 2 is concerned, the state has also limited its case to the above mentioned particulars.

It must then be considered whether the state has succeeded in establishing that the work stoppage was for the purpose as stated in the further particulars and therefore an illegal strike. The plain meaning of these words is that the accused wanted more money than what they were entitled to receive. Not one of the state witnesses testified that the accused demanded more money than what they were entitled to receive.

The conclusion is that the state has failed to prove that the stoppage of work in which the accused took part was an unlawful strike within the ambit of the charge as amplified by the further particulars.

The accused are also charged that they instigated a strike and/or incited others to take part in a strike or to continue a strike. Not all strikes in the normal sense of this word are unlawful strikes. Before the accused can be convicted on this part of the charge, it must be proved that the strike which they incited others to join or to continue, was an unlawful strike within the terms of section 18 of the Act. Accused numbers 1 and 3 asked the state to furnish particulars as to the manner in which they instigated or incited others to take part in the strike. To this the state replied that they firstly instructed employees of the Johannesburg Transport Department on the 25th and 27th of July 1980 at the bus depot to down their tools on the 28th of

July 1980. There is no evidence on record to substantiate this allegation.

Secondly, the state alleged in the further particulars that accused numbers 1 and 3 set themselves up as examples by taking part in the strike. As already indicated, what the accused did on the 28th of July 1980 was not a strike within the meaning of that word as defined in the Act, and within the ambit of the charge as amplified by the further particulars.

Thirdly, the state alleged that the accused instigated and incited others to take part in the strike by lending support or expressing sympathy with the strikers at the Orlando power station. The evidence regarding the trouble at the Orlando power station is very, very scant. Most of it is contained in the statements which the accused made to magistrates. The evidence adduced is quite insufficient to prove that what happened there was an unlawful strike within the terms of section 18 of the Act.

Accused number 2 did not ask for further particulars. The evidence adduced to prove that he instigated a strike or he incited others to take part in or to continue a strike is as follows: Firstly, Majorety Gangxeke stated that on the 27th of July 1980 accused number 2 told him and others that they should not work the following day, that they should sympathise with the people at the Orlando power station and that whoever works the following day will die. As indicated already, there is no evidence to prove that whatever happened at the Orlando power station was a strike within the meaning of the definition and section 18 of the Act. For this reason alone incitement to sympathise with those people cannot be a

contravention of section 18(1) of the Act. Secondly, Jan Matsana stated that accused number 2 told him not to go back to work after lunch, because their union was going to speak to their employer to pay them more money. This evidence is quite insufficient to support a conclusion that he was incited to join others in a refusal to work for the purpose of inducing or compelling their employer to agree to their demands or proposals for higher wages.

Lastly, regarding the evidence of Hope Mamebolo, it need only be said that for obvious reasons his evidence is not worthy of belief.

The conclusion is therefore that it has not been proved that either of the accused have contravened section 18(1) of the Act within the ambit of the charge and as amplified by the further particulars.

The accused are acquitted.

Footnotes:

- (1) A more detailed analysis of the Johannesburg Municipal strike of 1980 is to be found in the South African Labour Bulletin vol 6 no. 7 and in Work In Progress 14, September 1980.
- (2) Most press reports incorrectly stated that they had been charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act.
- (3) Mr Ratha Mokgoathheng, for Mr Dlamini, did not request further particulars.
- (4) Mr Sere was vice president of the BMWU and Mr Somdake an executive committee member. Both worked as electricians at the Orlando power station.
- (5) It seems that the judgement implies that the JCC was not legally bound to recognise it.

'SQUATTER' HOUSING

The Government is like a man who has a cornfield which is invaded by birds. He chases the birds from one part of the field and they alight in another part of the field.....We squatters are the birds. The Government sends its policemen to chase us away and we move off and occupy another spot. We shall see whether it is the farmer or the birds who get tired first.....
-Oriel Monongoaha, Pimville squatter leader, circa 1946.

INTRODUCTION.

SOUTH Africa's urban housing problem can be traced back to the early days of industrialisation, which had the effect of almost immediately creating a housing shortage. Municipal authorities took measures to relieve the housing plight of white residents, but little was done in the case of the rapidly growing urban black population. By 1902 72 000 blacks lived in the municipal area of Johannesburg alone; this figure had risen to 116 000 by 1922, and by 1945 it was estimated at 395 000. At this stage official figures reveal that 9 573 houses had been built, accommodating an estimated 50 000 people.

Under these circumstances, people were forced to live in the open veld and make do with whatever became available. In this way large areas were created which were, at the time, called 'shanty towns'; today they would probably be regarded as 'squatter settlements'.

During the 1950s a large government-sponsored housing programme, combined with tight enforcement of influx control, reduced the urban housing shortage somewhat. Since

then, however, housing activity has been largely suspended as government increasingly stressed its 'homeland' policy as an alternative to permanent black urbanisation. As a result, the housing backlog increased sharply in the 1960s and 1970s, and for the first time in 25 years squatter camps once again sprang up around South Africa's major urban industrial areas.

SQUATTER AREAS.

Four of the largest squatter areas which arose were:

Crossroads, being a community of some 25 000 settled on duneland 15km east of Cape Town; Malukazi, similar in size to Crossroads, and situated just south of Durban; the greater Winterveld area, just north of Pretoria: estimates of its population range from 250 000 to 750 000; Kromdraai, a community of 16 000 people situated 60km east of Bloemfontein.

This study of squatter settlements does not deal with the complex causes and mechanisms of squatting. Neither does it claim to be suggesting 'solutions' to the problems of squatter settlements. Its scope is narrower, in that it looks at the quality and nature of housing in squatter settlements. The house form and constructional methods used in squatter areas have had to adapt to a new environment and often to new materials, and it is this process of adaption which is investigated below. ⁽¹⁾

SQUATTER DWELLINGS.

With few exceptions, Crossroads was comprised of people of Xhosa origin who came from a society capable of achieving high standards of housing using the natural materials about

them - grass, rocks, soil. When transplanted to the sandy environment of Crossroads, natural materials around them were found to be unsuitable for house construction. As a result, Crossroads squatters were forced to seek out other materials, in this case the cast-offs of consumer society: tin, cardboard, timber from packing cases.

In using new materials in a new environment, solutions had to be found to the new problems of construction - such as elevating floors from the ground to prevent water seepage in winter when Crossroads becomes a muddy bath; such as inventing the chimney which was not previously needed in the rural environment; such as setting a window into a corrugated iron wall.

In such surroundings, familiar materials and objects were given new functions and significance: plastic milk carton carriers turned upside down became doormats and mud-scrapers, coat hangers became radio aerials and food tins became roof gardens. Because the summer temperatures in the Cape can reach 38°C and over, corrugated iron houses become unbearably hot. They also lose heat quickly in winter, and methods of insulating the walls had to be found. In this case, the cardboard of packing cases usually wall-papered over with uncut sheets of food tin labels or old newspapers were used.

In Malukazi, adaptations had to be made to compensate for the shortage of roofing grass and of rubble for wall infill. Thus, most of the dwellings were roofed with timber or reject malthoid sheets, whilst for wall infill people improvised by filling empty beer cartons with soil and used these to replace the rubble needed.

In Winterveld and Kromdraai, the highveld house was the predominant form, walls being

built in sun dried bricks bonded in earth and plastered over with daga. Due to the insecurity of a squatter community the usual problems of holding down the roof sheeting without nailing it through were encountered and some ingenious solutions provided.

Perhaps the major achievement of both Winterveld and Kromdraai, in architectural terms, was the development of a modular dwelling which was able to grow and expand with changing needs and means. Where there is no shortage of land for construction on, there is no reason to seek greater compaction of plan. Within the 'urban' environment of Winterveld and Kromdraai, and in the context of squatter poverty, there were pressures which demanded economy of construction and therefore encouraged the growth of an 'organic' house.

Thus it was found that the structure began as a single-roomed unit; as the family grew a wing would be added to form an L-plan; as a grandparent joined the household or the need for more space arose, the house could move to a U-plan. Ultimately, in many cases recorded, the open courtyard would be roofed over to give a covered verandah. Other variants of plan development were recorded which however could all be traced back to an initial one or two-roomed unit.

BASIC SERVICES.


Crossroads, considered as an emergency camp, probably boasted the best facilities of the four settlements. Water from the municipal supply was free and available at six strategically sited points. Waste was removed twice weekly by a municipal bucket service.

The other areas were not as fortunate. Malukazi's waste was disposed of in pit latrines, but the water supply, although

municipal and free, was from a single 150mm diameter pipe and queues of up to four hours wait developed. Despite the fact that Inkatha officials controlled the water point, friction did occur and recently a man was stabbed to death by a group of women when he attempted to jump the queue.

In Winterveld, waste was similarly disposed of in pit latrines but water, although plentiful, was drawn from boreholes. This means that with time and considering Winterveld's concentrated population, sewage must ultimately seep into the water table. There is presently a rising incidence of stomach disorders among small children and there are fears that sewage may already have affected the water supply.


The supply of water has proved to be a source of friction. In Winterveld, where the




PLAN SCALE 1:50




EAST ELEVATION SCALE 1:50



NORTH ELEVATION SCALE 1:50



WEST ELEVATION SCALE 1:50



SOUTH ELEVATION SCALE 1:50

water supply was controlled by the landlord on whose land the borehole is situated, the charge was 7c per large drum. At Kromdraai water was controlled by Tswana landlords who levied the largely Sotho squatters either 7c per drum or R1,00 per month. At Malukazi, those who could not wait four hours in the queue for free water could purchase a drum for 10c from the nearby indian-owned trading store. In each case squatters resented controllers of the water supply taking advantage of this power, and conflicts were often expressed in ethnic terms (Tswana vs Sotho at Kromdraai, african vs indian at Malukazi).

At both Winterveld and Kromdraai the water shortage had an architectural response in the form of quite complex systems of gutters designed to guide every possible drop of water into the house's reservoir.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.

'Informal' economic activity within the squatter areas involves not only the products of home industries which find an external market, but also the activities servicing the needs of residents and circulating money within the settlements.

If economic activity is a measure of 'community', then Crossroads differed in that respect from the other settlements. The degree of activity was evidenced by the number of signs advertising everything from funeral services to a transport agent running vehicles to the Transkei and Ciskei, from motor spares to spring chickens. Hawkers sold their wares ranging from brooms to batteries and suitcases; a number of cash stores attached to houses supplied basic groceries such as tinned food, sugar, flour

and paraffin; at least two photographers ran studios and manufacturers of ladies' shoes and of steel trunks suitable for railing goods to the Transkei and Ciskei sold their products almost entirely within the settlement. Second-hand goods were sold by people specialising in clothes, furniture and football boots, and by mid-afternoon when the first workers returned from work, women manned stalls selling raw, marinated and pre-cooked meat.

By comparison, there was little economic activity in the other settlements. At Malukazi a shopping mall of stalls flanked the main road, selling mostly meats, fruit and vegetables; footpath intersections with the settlement were also beginning to sprout small cash stores. Fringe activities involving barbers and sangomas were noted, and one woman, having received a loan from the KwaZulu Development Corporation, purchased four knitting machines and employed a number of people to knit garments which were sold both locally and through the OK Bazaars.

Prospective traders at Winterveld laboured under the disability of having to obtain hawkers' licenses from a Bophutha-Tswanan government reluctant to issue them, and a police force which regularly raided unlicensed traders. Nonetheless, garage mechanics, tailors and hawkers were recorded.

Kromdraai, when visited in May 1979, was a settlement of very little activity. Residents knew that their removal to Onverwacht was only days away, and no evidence of trade or manufacture could be found.

SOCIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES.

Another measure of 'community' is the ability

of a settlement to provide for its social infrastructure - education, religious worship, entertainment and places of community activity.

Crossroads included within its confines two schools. One, the KwaNokolo school, was built as a 'self-help' project by residents in conjunction with student groups and the Urban Foundation. The school doubled as a social centre and offices for the committees which ran Crossroads. Churches were active in the area and several functioned as schools and creches during the day. Facilities for entertainment were virtually non-existent and many social functions took place in shebeens, which brewed their own beer, or in the streets which often became an extension of the internal living space.

Few parallel developments were recorded elsewhere. A small creche was found at Malukazi; two schools had at one stage operated in Kromdraai but had closed; a cinema was under construction at Winterveld and several schools operated there. However education was a point of conflict in Winterveld, as the Bophutha-Tswanan authorities insisted on Tswana as the medium of instruction, this being resisted by the 'ethnically' mixed population of the settlement.

THE FUTURE OF SQUATTER HOUSING.

In terms of the nature of housing, both government and professionals have much to learn from the squatter experience. Present government policy is to impose the tried (and rejected) Soweto house prototype. Current professional thinking is in terms of sub-economic mass housing and high-rise flats.

The evolution of housing in Crossroads, Winterveld and Malukazi show both to be



equally wrong. The innovation shown in the construction of housing in South Africa's squatter settlements is bound to be wasted and lost unless the ability of people to participate in the creation of their communities is recognised. If it is not, South Africa's birds will keep on coming back.

Franco Frescura.

Notes:

1. For a discussion of some of the broader issues associated with squatting and squatter settlements, see the various articles in Control (DSG information publication 1, University of Witwatersrand, 1979); Onverwacht: ethnic control in Population Removals (DSG/SARS information publication 3, University of Witwatersrand, 1980); Winterveld in WIP 10, November 1979, and Onverwacht: 'ethnic' division and oppression in WIP 15, October 1980.

This article is an edited version of a draft chapter from a forthcoming book by Franco Frescura, due to be published by Ravan Press in mid-1981. The provisional title of the book is Where your home straddles the earth: peasant architecture in South Africa.



PLAN
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THE POLITICS OF HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA: a framework for analysis

WITHIN THE field of community organisation, a considerable effort seems to have been directed over the last few years towards developing an understanding of how issues arising out of the housing process relate to broader social and political questions. The purpose of this paper is to outline an approach through which this relationship can be grasped theoretically. It is not, therefore, an attempt to analyse the actual day-to-day problems of organising a community around specific housing struggles, but rather represents a framework within which the more general implications of such an analysis can be drawn.

For many people in South Africa, the political nature of the housing process derives primarily from the central role which the state plays in determining how and where they are to live. Thus the typical form assumed by black working class housing in the urban areas of South Africa has evolved from a limited range of minimum-standard house designs repeated endlessly throughout cost-efficient 'township' layouts, usually located an appreciable distance from the major areas of commercial and industrial

activity and other urban facilities. Almost 630 000 'dwelling units' have been built along these lines as a result of state intervention during the last 60 years.⁽¹⁾

The counterpart of this superficially impressive construction effort, however, has been the continuing destruction of housing formerly occupied by black people in what have been deemed to be 'white' urban areas. In this, the razing of District Six and Pageview constitute only the more prominent and recent manifestations of a process which was officially launched as a coherent state policy with the passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950 - although it in fact began during the first decades of the century with the sporadic implementation of 'slum clearance' schemes ostensibly designed to protect the 'public health'. Figures which indicate the full extent of the actual destruction of housing stock that has already occurred are difficult to come by but it was stated by the Minister of Community Development in 1979 that some 72 400 'coloured' families and 34 300 'indian' families (a total of more than 547 000 people) had been moved from their homes under the Group Areas legislation up to the end of 1978.⁽²⁾ The removal of africans has been effected over a much longer period under a range of different legislative measures and it seems reasonable to conclude that the number of people involved and the housing stock destroyed must be correspondingly greater. The removals from Duncan Village near East London, for example, will eventually affect an estimated 100 000 african squatters.⁽³⁾

Large numbers of black people, then, have confronted the state either as the

destroyer of their homes or - in the townships - as their landlord; or they have encountered it in both these aspects. For them housing is, potentially at least, an object of political struggle from the start, precisely because the pattern of their everyday lives has been fundamentally shaped or re-shaped - through the unambiguously political actions of the institution charged with the role of maintaining the existing social order (the state).

There is, moreover, a further dimension to this political moment in the housing process which relates essentially to the adequacy, or rather the inadequacy of the state's response to the problem of accommodating the rapidly expanding urban population of South Africa. In purely quantitative terms the problem is enormous: official estimates, for instance, established the backlog in meeting the housing demand in 1977 at 126 000 'family units' plus 120 000 'single accommodation units' (ie hostel beds) for africans, at 57 000 for 'coloureds', and at 20 700 units for 'asians'.⁽⁴⁾ And these statistics reveal nothing of the qualitative aspects of this problem - the deficiencies of the existing standard house types, the failure to provide certain basic services and amenities in many of the townships, and the total incapacity of these dormitory suburbs to achieve the official objective of self-sufficiency in administration and finance.

The effect of these shortcomings in the state's housing programme is obviously experienced most directly by those people who remain officially 'unhoused', doubling up (legally or otherwise) in the existing housing stock, living out a precarious and

often twilight existence in 'squatter camps' or in illegally rented 'white' accommodation, and so on. It extends, however, to all those whose daily lives have been subjected both to the sterile monotony of the physical environment in the townships and to the indignities and brutalities of the administrative system. For all of this, the state - present here in the form of either the local authorities or the Administration Boards - and hence the political system as a whole is again the obvious, or at least most readily identified cause.

This brief introductory discussion has set out two ways in which the housing process in South Africa can be seen to assume a specifically political character. What is now necessary is to attempt to answer two questions which this interpretation immediately throws up:

- why does the state intervene in the housing process in the first place?
- why does this intervention remain patently inadequate in terms of the problem it seeks to resolve?

In moving towards an explanation of the complex theoretical issues which underlie these questions, our primary objective is to establish the wider context of the social and political relations in which our particular concerns are located. Inevitably, this will involve a degree of abstract conceptualisation, a process of shaking certain ideas free of the often superficial and incoherent associations they retain in everyday life. This process nevertheless remains an essential prerequisite for developing an understanding of how society is structured beneath the level of appearances; this is the level at which

fundamental social relationships - those between classes - are generally obscured in South Africa by racial or ethnic categories. We start with the concept of 'housing'.

The word 'housing' has acquired many connotations in the type of society in which we live. For a large number of people it suggests 'home' - the retreat from the social world into the privacy of family relations that is captured, with some precision in the hackneyed phrase 'an Englishman's home is his castle'. Almost as common is the perception of the house as a status symbol, as a means of expressing one's 'social position' which - importantly - is usually strongly associated with the house's location in a 'suitable' neighbourhood or residential area. Another idea, related to both of these notions, is that of housing form or architecture as a mode of cultural expression - the ways of articulating certain 'value systems' found, for instance, in the traditional layout of Zulu homesteads and in the drive for isolation and enclosure which produces the endless walls and fences of suburbia. Evidently perspectives such as these do reflect certain limited aspects of reality. Our interests, however, lie in conceptualising housing not as an artefact or an expression but as an element of the social totality, the world of social relations in which these ideas reveal a more fundamental significance.

The social relations of capitalist societies develop on the basis of an economic system in which there is generalised commodity production and exchange. Simply, this means that the great majority of goods and services in the system are produced for the market (rather than for personal consumption

or use), and that the object of production is to achieve maximum profits by increasing the difference between money invested to start production and money received for the product.

Under such a system housing is, of necessity, produced as a commodity. (This is if we ignore 'traditional' 'squatter' housing which in a sense remains external to the system and should be treated separately). By definition, therefore, housing has a use value - certain concrete useful properties which satisfy particular human needs - and an exchange value - the property of standing in definite quantitative relationships to other commodities which is expressed, in money terms, in its price. Use value is then a question of quality: what use can something be put to or what need will it satisfy? Exchange value is a question of quantity: how much is something worth?

The major parts of the use value of urban housing, is what it does for its occupants, can be seen as

- * shelter, the physical protection given by four walls and a roof;
- * access to basic services, such as a supply of clean water and the removal of household wastes, which make the house a place of basic preventive health care;
- * an urban place to live, which situates the occupants of a particular house in a reasonably close relationship to work opportunities, shopping and recreational facilities, schools, hospitals.

It can be seen that each of these is in some way essential to everyday life, from the most basic level of physical survival to the more complex aspects of existence imposed on us by our present form of society. (5) This

central importance of housing both explains its status as a central aspect in maintaining a workforce on which capitalist production is based, and also explains how the provision of housing can be used as an instrument of social control.

The former aspect (maintaining a labour force) is associated with the need for state intervention in the housing process, something which we will return to below.

The second aspect, namely housing as a means of control, underpins the whole idea of the 'township' or 'urban location'; in the 1968 embargo on the further provision of 'family housing' for Africans in 'white' urban areas, this aspect of social control was seen and used by the state as a means of bolstering its 'homeland' policy.

In the rather different context of the advanced capitalist societies, but also in the mining areas of South Africa, the phenomenon of the 'company town' or employer-provided housing indicates the direct interest of the capitalist class in this aspect of housing as a use value. (6)

To understand the significance of housing as an exchange value, we need to assume for a moment that state intervention does not take place in the housing process, ie we have to abstract state intervention from the housing process. This means that we need to consider the operations of a 'free' unregulated housing market in which houses are produced solely for the purpose of making a profit. We can then more readily identify certain groups of 'actors' or 'agents' whose differing interests would influence the workings of such a market in various ways:

- * capitalists in the building industry whose over-riding concern is to maximise their

profits from the construction of houses and the provision of services;

- * property speculators who attempt to achieve 'windfall' profits either from the general tendency of urban land prices to rise or from the sudden jumps in these prices which result from changes in land-use patterns (ie re-zoning decisions, the provision of new amenities and services, etc);
- * estate agents whose interest lies in promoting the greatest possible turnover in the occupancy of houses, ie the transfer of houses from one owner to another from which they achieve their income in the form of commission;

- * landlords whose objective is to receive the maximum possible return from their investment in housing by setting their rents as high as possible while keeping their repair and maintenance costs as low as possible;

- * financial institutions, particularly building societies, which enable individuals families to purchase houses and whose central concern is to ensure the security of their loans by limiting eligibility for home-ownership to those people who meet well-defined income and employment conditions.



Noticeably absent from this list are the consumers of housing - the people who, as tenants and owners buy its use value with their rental or mortgage loan repayments. Their omission is deliberate and highlights the fact that in such a hypothetical unregulated market, so-called 'consumer sovereignty' - the right of consumers to buy what they choose - is restricted to those who can raise the money to enter that market. It further emphasises the point that even demand for housing which is 'effective' (the

term used by bourgeois economists) at best exercises a rather limited influence on the 'play' of market forces. (7)


The problem of the high 'threshold' of income or savings which bar many would-be buyers or tenants from entering the 'free' market is made worse by the peculiar nature of the building process. The construction of a conventional house involves a series of sequential operations (plumbing, brick-laying, etc), each of which requires a relatively high level of skill. This fact presents the major obstacle to increasing productivity within the industry and thus imposes definite limits on the level of profits appropriated by the capitalists investing in the building industry. This factor should also be seen in the light of the difficulties involved in the introduction of machinery or 'rationalised' techniques in building which could reduce the need for this relatively skilled labour.

These factors mean that capitalists in general will be reluctant to undertake the construction of housing despite guarantees such as contracts, price escalation agreements, etc. In the continuing absence of state intervention, the resulting shortage of new houses on the market would tend to drive selling prices and rentals even higher; this would exclude a growing number of people from access to the particular commodity of housing.

The absolute necessity of obtaining some sort of accommodation in order to survive forces people in this situation to resort to one of two possible alternatives, both of which involve accepting reduced standards of accommodation and both of which have been taken up by the poorer members of most



NORTH ELEVATION SCALE 1:50



SOUTH ELEVATION SCALE 1:50

capitalist societies at one time or another. The first, what we might call the 'slum' option, necessitates overcrowding - usually, it seems, of the order of one family per room, regardless of either the size of the family or the room. In this way, the landlord achieves a more than adequate return on his or her property and the tenants acquire accommodation of a sort at a price that can be afforded. The second alternative, the so-called 'squatter' option, generally avoids some of the worst excesses of overcrowding since it is usually a relatively simple matter to add an extra room to a shanty. The relatively more spacious arrangements are, however, often acquired at the expense of even the minimal security of tenure afforded by an agreement with a slum landlord, as well as the more substantial shelter provided by a conventional building.

However, despite their seemingly useful function in furnishing the lower strata of society with the accommodation they so desperately require, slums and squatter settlements have, under most historical conditions, been perceived as a 'threat' to the maintenance of the existing social order. There are a number of ways in which this postulated threat acquires a certain validity:

- the squalid conditions prevalent in most slums and squatter settlements pose real, if often only potential, hazards to public health;
- slums and squatter camps are notoriously difficult to regulate and are often regarded - apparently with some justification - as hotbeds of criminal activity and political 'agitation';
- the autonomous organisation of squatter

movements and the illegal occupation of land with which they are associated tend to throw the bourgeois notions of 'property rights' and 'public authority' into question;⁽⁸⁾

* the obviously unhealthy conditions under which many of the inhabitants of slums and squatter camps live tends to reduce their efficiency (and hence productivity) as workers and, if such conditions are sufficiently widespread, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the maintenance of a labour force adequate to the requirements of capitalist development might become problematic.

In any capitalist society, the imperative of capital accumulation - the driving necessity for individual capitalists to continually re-invest their profits in order to expand their productive capacity - is critically dependent on the continuous presence of sufficient numbers of reasonably healthy and competent workers, ready and able to enter the production process. It follows, therefore, that any serious disruption in the process by which the labour force is reproduced will have potentially grave consequences for the capitalist class as a whole. Under capitalism however, it is the state which essentially fulfils the role of guarantor of the general material conditions of production. In other words, it is the state rather than the 'capitalist class as a whole' which is obliged to intervene under these circumstances to ensure that capitalist production and the accumulation of wealth continue without interruption.⁽⁹⁾

The particular threat to the reproduction of the labour force with which we are concerned here takes the form of the so-

called 'housing problem'. In South Africa the state's response to the problem has been to undertake the provision of low cost 'mass housing' on a large scale, by financing low interest loans for approved housing schemes rather than by direct involvement in the construction of houses. The Department of Community Development, which is responsible for the allocation of subsidised finance to the local authorities and Administration Boards (which initiate and implement the housing schemes) was allocated some R217-m to 'augment' the National Housing Fund in the 1979/80 budget vote.⁽¹⁰⁾ Other countries, notably Britain, have supplemented, and at times even subordinated the provision of state-subsidised housing to the subsidisation of individual owner-occupiers by applying tax relief to mortgage loan repayments.⁽¹¹⁾ (Owner-occupiers in Britain represent over 50 per cent of all households). In the less developed capitalist societies, however, it is unlikely that the low overall wage levels which generally prevail would permit state support for such owner-occupier subsidy schemes to develop on anything but an insignificant scale.

It is clear then that, in terms of the conceptual framework proposed here, the state assumes the role of collective landlord to large numbers of people primarily because the unregulated housing market is unable to supply this essential component of their means of subsistence at a price which they can afford. But, in addition, in South Africa the state plays a second and perhaps more overtly 'political' role - that of the agent of urban segregation policy. Certainly it is in this field of operation that it has historically encountered prolonged and vocal

opposition from organisations as diverse as the militantly political ANC of the 1950s and the ostensibly apolitical Institute of Race Relations.

Any attempt to unravel the intricate web of social and political relationships which surrounds the history of urban segregation policy in South Africa would be a complex and difficult task which lies well outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, a few speculative comments on the origins of the policy and the reasons for its systematic tightening up and ruthless implementation after the National Party electoral victory in 1948 may perhaps be in order. For the sake of brevity, these are presented in note form.⁽¹²⁾

* Competition between the black and white sections of the urban proletariat over access to residential land in proximity to the centres of the major urban areas developed during the early phases of urbanisation in South Africa, at the beginning of this century. Crystallised into a racist ideology of segregation and weighted in the whites' favour by their freer access to the political arena (in terms of the racially differentiated franchise) it led to the incorporation of the Stallard doctrine - africans are permitted to remain in the urban areas as long as they continue to 'minister to the needs of the white man'. This was set out in the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act.

* Under the prevailing racist ideology, white property owners in general and many white traders operating at the lower end of the market considered that the accommodation of a permanent african presence in the 'white' areas represented a threat to their

economic interests - a decline in property prices in the case of the property owners, and increasing competition from an emerging african petty bourgeoisie in the case of traders. Accordingly, in Johannesburg at least, they seem to have thrown their considerable local influence behind the segregationist movement.

a The virtual abandonment of influx control measures in the major urban areas and the massive increase in the number of africans in 'permanent' industrial employment during the Second World War increasingly threw the policy of 'total segregation' (segregation at the political level based on geographical segregation into urban 'locations' and rural 'reserves') into question. Proposals to 'stabilise' the african urban-based labour force were perceived as direct threats to the privileged position of white workers within the production process, while the wave of black squatter movements in and around Johannesburg between 1944 and 1947 provided evidence of the state's inability to contain african demands for residential accommodation under the United Party government's 'laissez-faire' policy.

a The National Party's manifesto on the 'colour question' (the Sauer report) introduced a clear and coherent statement of intent into the ideological ferment of the 1948 election campaign and provided a platform on which the fears of the white working class and the aspirations of an ambitious 'culturally - defined' Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie could be successfully expressed. The narrowness of their electoral victory, however, obliged the Nationalist government to move rapidly to give legislative and material substance

to the rhetoric of their manifesto.

Hence, among other measures, the passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950 and, in 1952, the first substantial steps to initiate the long-considered Western Areas removal scheme in Johannesburg.

a The extension of urban segregation policy under Group Areas legislation to sections of the population other than those defined as african confirmed an already present trend as consistent with the logic of overall policy. Its subsequent implementation against 'coloured' and 'indian' people living in 'white' areas seems to have developed more in response to local pressures and interests than to the 'national' imperative invoked in the removal of african people from the same areas. It is also possible that the Group Areas 'machine' has by now acquired sufficient internally-generated momentum to run, to some extent, independently of 'external' developments.

The South African state's continuing commitment to a policy which can only further alienate its black population and make worse the 'housing problem' is not readily explicable. The purpose of the highly schematic and obviously tentative account presented above is to suggest a possible interpretation of this complex phenomenon which does not immediately and simplistically reduce it to an all-embracing but irrational 'racism'.

Nevertheless, this interpretation clearly does raise a number of very problematic issues for those involved in organising communities which have undergone the traumatic collective experience of removal. In what way, for instance, does this experience affect social relations within

the resettled community in which certain groups such as shopkeepers and transport operators may have realised substantial economic advantages from the newly-imposed geographical isolation of their customers? (Retail prices in township shops are often much higher than prices for equivalent goods in the 'white' areas, which are better served commercially). What effect has the fragmentation of social networks and other groupings which inevitably accompanies the drawn-out process of removal had on the 'community consciousness' of the people involved? What material losses in the form of community facilities (halls, parks, schools, creches, etc) have resulted from the move to an area which is more than likely underprovided in this respect, and what basis does this situation establish for organisation? And so on - the list of such questions could evidently be extended and refined with little difficulty.

But perhaps the single most important point made above is that removals, at least those which affect 'indian' and 'coloured' people, appear to be state responses to pressures developed specifically at the local level. The obvious implication is that analysis which is intended to facilitate an understanding of the position of a particular community should focus more on local rather than national conflicts; more on the specific rather than the general issues. This statement is not merely an obvious one; for the reverse may be applicable when the object of analysis is state housing policy as such, ie the subsidy structure, moves to promote home ownership schemes, etc.

Before we attempt to draw some conclusions

or at least to pose some important questions along these lines, there remains the problem of explaining why the state's intervention in the housing process should fail so comprehensively to achieve its intended aims. In other words, why does the housing shortage persist and why is the form of housing that the state does provide so inadequately realised as to continually raise doubts concerning its habitability?

Superficially, of course, there is an immediate answer to these questions: the adequacy of the state's response to the 'housing problem' is proportional to the adequacy of its funds. But this merely recasts the matter as one concerning state revenue and expenditure and the basic questions remain unanswered. The field of public finance and state fiscal policy which we would have to enter to obtain completely satisfactory answers is, unfortunately, riddled with conceptual difficulties. We will confine ourselves here, therefore, to identifying two parameters which fundamentally determine certain limits to state intervention in the provision of housing.

First, the taxation which is the major source of state revenue in a capitalist society is largely derived from capitalist profits, together with other sources of revenue such as customs duties, levies, etc. If the working class is too weak or too disorganised to resist the imposition of an effective wage policy or to negotiate successful wage claims,⁽¹³⁾ then the working class assumes an increasing proportion of the tax burden as taxes rise.

In any event, whatever the precise distribution of tax liability between

capitalists and workers, the rate at which revenue is appropriated by the state is limited by the need to maintain an 'acceptable' overall rate of economic growth through the reinvestment of capitalist profits in the expansion of productive activity. Furthermore, although intervention to secure the reproduction of the labour force is a fundamental aspect of the state's role as guarantor of the general material conditions of production, other aspects of this role which involve state expenditure can be considered to be no less fundamental. In particular, this refers to the provision of physical infrastructures of production: road and rail networks, harbour and airport facilities, telecommunications systems and so on. It could, of course, be argued that since the expenses incurred in maintaining a large military apparatus - an estimated R1 583-m during 1979/80⁽¹⁴⁾ - constitutes part of the necessary cost of preserving the capitalist class's freedom to accumulate in South Africa, this falls into the same category. But this introduces conceptual problems which lie outside our immediate concerns.⁽¹⁵⁾

The essential point to emerge from this is that fiscal policy formulation in a capitalist state is ultimately a matter of reconciling the claims of various 'fundamentally important' branches of the state apparatus with a revenue that is always insufficient to accommodate the demands made on it. The process involved is always political, not merely because political parties enter the annual budget debate in parliament, but because the decision to allocate roughly eight times as much revenue to military expenditure as to the 'augmentation' of the

state's capacity to provide housing at a time of massive housing shortages is a movement of more profound political consequence.

Second, the state's intervention in the particular field of commodity production and exchange constituted by the housing market is also contained by the need to avoid any blatant challenge to the dominant ideology, the 'free enterprise' ethic. The principle of subsidisation which underlies state intervention in the housing process can be seen as a direct challenge to what we may call the principle of 'affordability'. This means that it is 'right' or 'proper' that people should be entitled only to that share of the social product for which they can afford to pay. (Social product is comprised of the use values which added together comprise society's real wealth). If this principle lies as close to the heart of the 'free enterprise' system as its most passionate proponents would have us believe, then it is understandable that the principle of subsidisation should be seen as altruistic or as 'charity'. Any suggestion that it might possibly be a necessary or logical consequence of the prevailing economic system should, in these terms, be rejected.

This, of course, would reflect only the views of the more fervent adherents of the 'free' market idea, but it has sufficient coherence in terms of the generally accepted notion of capitalism to ensure that subsidisation is always begrudged, always subject to the threat of being stopped, and that its field of application is always restricted to a minimum. A similar perspective seems to have shaped the recent

enthusiastic support by representatives of organised capital of the idea of 'self help' in housing.⁽¹⁶⁾ In this case, the 'sweat equity' which people 'invest' in building their own houses is presumably to be seen as the antidote to the shame they will experience at being forced to accept state subsidisation of their housing costs.

It should now be evident that state intervention fails to solve the 'housing problem' and fails to establish either 'viable communities' or an adequate living environment. This is essentially because it is not 'free' to do so. This does not mean that the state has become an instrument of the capitalist class which can be wielded at will in the pursuit of profits. On the contrary, the state must remain autonomous in relation to the dominant class if it is to fulfil its role in regulating the fundamental class antagonisms of a capitalist society. But this in no way implies that it can function as a 'free' or 'neutral' agent in that society. It is always subordinate to the overarching need to maintain the economic system on which its own existence is based. It is, in other words, subject - at one remove as it were - to the 'laws' of capital accumulation. In relation to its intervention in the housing process, this subordination takes the forms outlined above. In effect, the state fails to solve the 'housing problem' because it is subordinate to those same 'laws' of accumulation whose operation has produced the problem in the first place.

This failure, however, although it is ultimately to be located in the nature of the capitalist economic system - the mode of production - is mediated by the political




'instance' (political relations). It appears to be the result of the political 'system' in much the same way that the form of the intervention itself (the 'township' concept, Group Areas removals) appears to have originated in specifically political concerns. This appearance is not 'false' or 'illusory': real political struggles arise out of the state's role in the housing process. But unless a more fundamental understanding of how society is structured shapes these struggles, they will remain isolated and only incoherently linked to the struggle for genuine social transformation.

In this paper, I have tried to indicate how the housing process in South Africa takes on a political character. But at the same time I have attempted to show how this political dimension is linked to, and ultimately determined by, the nature of the economic system which we call capitalism. This is a limited objective and many important aspects of the 'housing question' which might be pertinent to the problems of organising a community around housing issues have not been explored at all. We have, for instance, failed to develop any adequate conceptualisation of the relationship between the local authorities and the central

government, and to draw the implications of any conflict of interest within this relationship for community struggles. Nor have we examined the role played by the management committees, local affairs committees and community councils within the communities they supposedly represent. This could be of major strategic significance, in rent strikes particularly. And finally, there is the extremely difficult question of 'housing classes', which has been completely ignored here although it is clearly central to the development of an effective organisational strategy and is likely to become more so as the 'home ownership' programmes presently being promoted by both the state and organised capital take effect.⁽¹⁷⁾

This is by no means an exhaustive list - it focusses essentially on questions which relate to communities in the townships. It



is obvious that a different set of questions would emerge if we were to shift our attention to 'squatter' communities. There is, therefore, an enormous area in which useful theoretical and empirical research needs to be done. If this paper has stimulated any interest in such work it will have served its purpose well.

Peter Wilkinson.

NOTES.

In part, this paper represents a recapitulation and development of certain points in an earlier paper, 'The "housing question" reconsidered: towards a political economy of housing in South Africa', first published in WIP 11, February 1980, subsequently republished in Debate on Housing, DSG/SARS information publication 4, Development Studies Group, University of Witwatersrand, 1981.

1. (Comprising 363 741 units for africans, 200 383 units for 'coloureds', and 43 577 units for 'asiens'. In addition 69 450 units were provided for white occupation. Report of the Secretary for Community Development for the period 1 October 1978 - 30 September 1979 [RP 28-80], pp 44-48.

2. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1979, SAIRR, p 464.

3. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977, SAIRR, p 455.

4. D Dewar and G Ellis: Low income housing policy in South Africa, Urban Problems Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 1979, p 149.

5. A matter examined in a stimulating, if rather esoteric, work by Henri Lefebvre: Everyday life in the modern world, Harper and Row, 1971. See also Lefebvre's The survival of capitalism, Allison and Busby, 1976.

6. See, in relation to the British and North American experience, D Harvey: 'Labour, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist

societies'. Politics and Society 6, 1976: 265-295.

7. This is obviously impossible to demonstrate empirically on the basis of our assumption of an unregulated market, is one in which the state plays no role. However, David Harvey's analysis of the operation of the housing market in Baltimore ('Class - monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution', Regional Studies 8 (4), 1974:239-255) clearly reveals the limitations of the 'consumer sovereignty' thesis in a society which is commonly regarded as approaching most closely the ideal of the 'free' market.

8. Hence, presumably, the most hysterical attempts of the Johannesburg municipality's Native Affairs Department to discredit the leaders of the wave of squatter movements that took place in and around Johannesburg during the mid-40s. See AW Stadler: Birds in the Cornfields: Squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-47, in B Bozzoli (ed): Labour, Townships and Protest, Raven, 1979.

9. This formulation draws on aspects of the work of J Hirsch: 'The state apparatus and social reproduction: elements of a theory of the bourgeois state', in J Holloway and B Picciotto (eds): State and capital: a marxist debate, Arnold, 1976; and B Fine and L Harris: Re-reading Capital, Macmillan, 1979, particularly chapter 6.

10. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1979, p 461. For a brief outline of the system of state housing provision see D Dewar and G Ellis: op cit, chapter 8; details of the revisions to the subsidy structure introduced during 1980 will probably be included in the forthcoming (1980 edition) Survey of Race Relations.

11. See S Clarke and N Ginsburg: 'The political economy of housing', in Political economy and the housing question, Political economy of housing workshop, CSE, 1975.

12. These notes are derived from preliminary work on a study on african housing policy in Johannesburg during the late 40s and early 50s. André Proctor's study of Sophiatown, 'Class struggle, segregation and the city: a history of Sophiatown 1905-40', in B Bozzoli (ed): op cit, has been an important source of both ideas and information. Martin Legassick's 'Legislation,

ideology and economy in post-1948 South Africa', in Journal of Southern African Studies 1 (1), 1974, has also been useful.

13. Although tax may actually be deducted from the gross wages earned by workers, this merely establishes the fact that the significant quantity in relation to the value of labour power is the net wage - which must then be sufficient to purchase those consumer goods and services essential to the maintenance of the labourer's capacity to work at a certain level (of skill, intensity, etc). Increases in the tax of workers generate struggles to increase gross wages so that the net wage maintains its original relationship to the value of labour power. In the absence of an effective wage policy, successful wage claims of this nature prevent the redistribution of tax liability from capital to the working class. See Fine and Harris: op cit, pp 134-135.

14. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1979, p 77.

15. On this see I Gough: 'State expenditure in advanced capitalism', New Left Review 92, 1975:53-92; and B Fine and L Harris: 'State expenditure in advanced capitalism: a critique', New Left Review 96, 1976:97-112.

16. I have briefly examined this development in an earlier paper: 'The "housing question" reconsidered'; for publication details, see above.

17. For an empirical analysis which examines aspects of the problem, see 'A "plain" solution?', Social Review 12, February 1981: 25 - 34.