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From the margins to the mainstream: The antiapartheid movement
and the politics of agenda-setting in the United States

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Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 1990

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FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM:

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

AND THE POLITICS OF AGENDA-SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES

BY FREDERIC IRA SOLOP

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-New Brunswick

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Political Science

Written under the direction of

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
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From the Margins to the Mainstream:

The Anti-apartheid Movement

and the Politics of Agenda-Setting in the United States

by FREDERIC IRA SOLOP, Ph.D.

Dissertation Director: Susan J. Carroll

The relationship between social movements and the policy process is an underexplored area of scholarship. This dissertation addresses this weakness in the political science literature with an analysis of how and why social movements are sometimes able to influence passage of large-scale policy changes, also known as political innovations. The thesis of this dissertation is that social movements need to be brought more centrally into the political science literature as vehicles for citizens to influence the policy agenda of national policy-makers.

This dissertation articulates, and details, the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and United States policy relations with South Africa between 1960 and 1986. The research is based upon an analysis of an original events data set, interviews with legislators, movement activists, and corporate actors involved in the debate over economic sanctions, and a thorough review of Congressional hearings and movement literature.

As demonstrated, anti-apartheid movement influence in the policy process emerged from a dialectical relationship between the capacity of the

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movement to influence policy and a window of opportunity created from tensions between the executive and legislative branches over control of this foreign policy area. The result of this process was that the movement was able to push adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa further and faster than would otherwise have been the case.

This research is significant because it initiates a unique dialogue between the policy process, social movement and agenda-setting literatures. It establishes the importance of bringing social movements into the policy literature as a legitimate mechanism of linkage between citizen interests and the policy process. By extension, this dissertation broadens the political science understanding of the democratic process in the United States.

Furthermore, this research pushes the boundaries of the agenda-setting literature by moving beyond the traditional notion of linear relationships between interests and policy. Relationships between social movements and the policy process are dialectical and complex. This dynamic is articulated in great detail with respect to the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and the policy process in the United States.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

work coding a sample of <u>New York Times</u> articles provided a baseline by which I was able to assess the reliability of my events data set.

Beyond the grants made available to me, Cliff Zukin and Janice Ballou, respectively the former and current directors of the Center for Public Interest Polling, Eagleton Institute, were especially supportive of this project. Not only were they flexible in making resources available to me, their own research exemplified the importance of conducting quality studies of meaningful policy issues.

Many personal friends contributed to this project. I wish to provide a collective "Thank you" to them all. I appreciate their on-going interest, interest which nourished the high periods and sustained my enthusiasm through the low periods as well. I particularly wish to thank Jennifer Shaddock, Nancy Whelchel, Tamar Kievel-Brill, Gary Brill, T Regan, and the staff of the Eagleton Poll.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to highlight the contributions of Nancy Wonders and Brooke Lauhon Wonders to this project. Words are too trivial to express the depths of my gratitude to them. Brooke, in her youthful zest for life, nourished my soul throughout the entire project. She helped me to maintain a healthy balance between intellectualizing life, and living it.

Nancy provided critical support for my work throughout the entire project also. Our ongoing discussions launched insights which became the foundation for many of the ideas presented here. Her meticulous edits of drafts and redrafts were vital to the final presentation of ideas. Without

Nancy's unyielding faith in my work, and her support and contributions throughout every phase of this project, I can truly say that this dissertation would not have come to fruition.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my children. As I add the final words to this manuscript, my children remind me that ends are simply harbingers of new beginnings.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When authorities begin identifying with alienated groups and their causes, presumably changes can come without influence "from below." Until that day, a little influence helps.
    -- Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest

The relationship between social movements and the policy process is an underexplored area of scholarship. This dissertation addresses this weakness in the political science literature by examining the relationship between the United States anti-apartheid movement and U.S. relations with South Africa. It is a case study of how and why social movements are sometimes able to influence passage of large-scale policy changes, also known as political innovations.

The central thesis of this dissertation is that social movements need to be brought more centrally into the political science literature as vehicles for citizens to influence the policy agenda of national policy-makers. Relationships between social movements and the policy process are dynamic and complex. This dissertation articulates, and details, the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and United States relations with South Africa between

1960 and 1986. It demonstrates that the actual ability of social movements to influence the policy process rests upon a dialectical relationship between the capacity of social movements to influence policy and the availability of windows of opportunity for social movements to exploit.

A GAP IN THE LITERATURE

Political scientists underplay the significance of non-institutionalized, collective political activity in the making of public policy. The importance of social movements is overshadowed by the dominance of elite studies of the behavior of political institutions and decision-makers. Citizens are factored into the policy process in so far as they express their interests indirectly via mediating institutions such as the media, political parties, interest groups and elections.

But what happens when citizen interests are ignored, rejected or repressed by mediating institutions and policy-makers? Or, what happens when mediating institutions are no longer capable of linking citizen opinion to the policy process? When interests are denied a "voice" in the system, citizens sometimes organize "challenger organizations"--organizations that lack routine access to the policy process, and challenge prevailing political norms and values--to promote them. Challenger organizations strive to advance large-scale policy innovations in the policy process. Social movements are a primary vehicle for challenger organizations to promote their interests. I argue in this dissertation that social movements can be critical influences in the public policy process, particularly at the agenda-setting stage.

To be clear, political scientists have not ignored social movements. Several scholars have considered mobilization and organizational aspects of social movements (Wilson, 1960; Lipsky, 1970; Pratt, 1976; Costain and Costain, 1983; Costain, 1988). Others have suggested the importance of social movements in the policy process (Polsby, 1985; Jones, 1975; Freeman, 1975). A third group has examined the relationship between social movements and state structures (Tarrow, 1988; Piven and Cloward, 1977). What the literature lacks, however, is an explication of the dynamics that take place between social movements and policy-makers as a specific issue is acted upon in the policy process.

This dissertation uniquely bridges the gap between three bodies of literature: the institutional policy process literature, the social movement literature, and the agenda-setting literature. This dialogue across literatures is necessary to create a more sophisticated perspective on democratic politics in the United States. This dialogue carries particular contemporary significance in light of the increasing frequency of social movement and grassroots politics in the United States, as discussed in Boyte's (1980) The Backyard Revolution, and the ever-weakening ability of political parties to create effective linkages between public opinion and policy-makers (Dalton, 1988).

Research on the relationship between social movements and the policy process has been suggested by a small, but growing, number of scholars. Jack

Walker sent out a call for this type of research more than 20 years ago. He described the problem in these words (1966:293):

> Because so many political scientists have worn the theoretical blinders of the elitist theory, however, we have overlooked the importance of broadly based social movements, arising from the public at large, as powerful agents of innovation and change.

More recently, Doug McAdam (1984:2), a sociologist, captured the essence of the problem:

> Political scientists have traditionally conceptualized power almost exclusively in institutional terms. Accordingly, they have failed to adequately explain or take account of the impact of social movements on the institutionalized political establishment.

Additionally, this concern was the guiding principle of Jo Freeman's scholarship on the womens' movement in <u>The Politics of Women's Liberation</u> (1975:4):

> The study of social movements and that of public policy are two fields that have heretofore been treated primarily as distinct and unrelated areas in the scholarly literature. While some writers have envisioned social movements as incipient interest groups and/or political parties and thus as having a potential effect on policy, no one has tried to trace out the exact relationships between the two and the way in which each affects the other.

My research responds to the gap in the literature identified by these scholars. I apply an agenda-setting framework to a case study of social movement influence in order to better understand how and why social movements are sometimes able to influence the policy process.

The political science literature suggests that if social movements are effective as policy actors, their influence is most likely to be perceived in the formation of large scale policy changes, also known as policy innovations. The

literature also suggests that noninstitutional actors are most likely to have access to the policy process at the agenda-setting stage of policy-making.

To better explicate the relationship between social movements and the policy process, I conducted a case study of a policy area fulfilling two criteria: a clear presence of federal-level policy innovation and a prominent social movement active in the policy area.

The criteria for defining a policy innovation are adopted from Polsby (1984). They include large scale, visible policy change; a break from preceding governmental responses; and, "lasting" policy effects. The definition of a social movement employed here is drawn from Zald and Ash (1984:329): "A social movement is a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions or structures."

I chose to look at United States policy toward South Africa for this research. This policy area fulfills both case study criteria. The Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986[1] is an example of political innovation. This legislation instituted comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa and recognized the legitimacy of black struggle against the Pretorian regime, thereby reversing the course of United States--South Africa relations. Also, the United States anti-apartheid movement had been trying to raise the anti-apartheid issue to the policy agenda for more than twenty-five years in the United States.

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[1] P.L. 99-440

Several scholars have already pursued research on U.S. policy relations with South Africa and apartheid. Much of this literature examines the history of U.S. policy toward South Africa (Coker, 1986; Danaher, 1985; Hero and Barratt, 1981). This research ends, however, before serious consideration of economic sanctions legislation was underway. Similarly, while some research into the anti-apartheid movement has been conducted, it lacks the context of recent shifts in U.S. policy toward South Africa (Metz, 1986; Love, 1985).

Love (1985) looks at the impact of the anti-apartheid movement at the state level. She selects two case studies of successful divestment activity (Michigan and Connecticut) and analyzes movement goals, resources, tactics, and successes. She concludes that the anti-apartheid movement facilitated local involvement in foreign policy issues. However, she has no comment on the impact of the anti-apartheid movement on national policy-making. Her data collection period ends in 1984, two years before comprehensive economic sanctions were instituted.

Metz (1986) considers the tactics and appeals of anti-apartheid activists targeting federal level policy-makers. He argues that the anti-apartheid movement's appeal to populist interests limits its ability to influence national policy. But his research also preceded rapid mobilization within the movement and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. It is not so clear that Metz would reach the same conclusions if he were writing today.

My dissertation research differs significantly from past research in this area in that my focus is both policy-centered and movement-centered. I examine the history of national policy relations with South Africa and the

history of the anti-apartheid movement between 1960 to 1986. I juxtapose government and movement activity against each other to ferret out specific interactional dynamics. My project begins with the understanding that the anti-apartheid issue was promoted by elements "marginal" to the political system at one time. The issue later moved to the policy agenda of national policy-makers in the United States. In this policy analysis, I am interested in understanding how and why the anti-apartheid issue moved to the policy agenda.

This dissertation specifically looks at the following issues:

INTERESTS AND GOALS

What were the interests of the anti-apartheid movement, and how had these interests changed over time? What were the interests of national policy-makers? How had they changed over time? How compatible were the goals of movement activists and national policy-makers in this policy area?

STRATEGIES, TACTICS AND OPPORTUNITIES

What strategies did anti-apartheid activists employ to get their concerns onto the policy agenda? How much influence did the anti-apartheid movement have over passage of the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986? What opportunities facilitated this influence?

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

What does the path followed by the anti-apartheid movement indicate about the role of social movements in American politics? What are the opportunities available to social movements to influence the policy process in the United States? How and why are some movements successful in influencing the policy process, while others are not?

RESEARCH METHODS

From a research perspective, social movements are difficult phenomenon to study. There is little in the behavior of movements that lends itself to quantification. Qualitative techniques, such as participant observation, are costly enterprises and information is ultimately difficult to detach from personal biases. Furthermore, movement records and documents are often disorganized or nonexistent.

The data collection techniques used in this research were designed to overcome these difficulties by providing a replicable source of quantitative information for analysis and by providing for greater depth and data validation through a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative techniques. The techniques employed here include creation of an original events data set by coding events reported in news stories, interviews with public officials and anti-apartheid activists, and examination of published policy histories, literature produced by the anti-apartheid movement, and governmental documents.

Events data sets have previously been used by other researchers interested in quantifying the frequency and nature of social movement activity and other group activity (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1979; McAdam, 1982, 1984; Burstein, 1985, Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Costain, 1988).[2] For a

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[2] When the media reflects political bias, it tends to be in subjective editorializing rather than in the reporting of hard news. Gitlin (1980:7) explains that "media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual." It is possible for researchers to weed through the media frames and extract objective event-oriented information. This is the nature of the information coded in this project.

quantitative source of information, I personally constructed an events data set by coding events reported in The New York Times between 1960 and 1986.

I read the universe of articles reporting on reaction to apartheid and South Africa within the United States during these years. I specifically coded 1353 events[3] for the events data set. This selection of events was determined according to the selection guidelines outlined in Appendix A.

Each event was coded for objective conditions where discernable: type of event, initiators, targets, tactics/events, resources, nature of the conflict, and supporters. A summary of each article was also recorded on a coding sheet. The complete manual and a sample coding sheet can be found in Appendix B.

The actual coding of articles was conducted by this researcher over a period of fourteen months. Intercoder reliability was assessed by having a research assistant independently define codable events for each of five years and then code the selected events. When my work and the research assistant's work were compared, the percentage of overlap in sample selection and coding was consistently high.[4] The events data set, thus, maintains a high degree of data integrity.

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[3] This dataset reflects events reported on in The New York Times rather than articles appearing in the paper. The distinction is a subtle one. In rare cases, two distinctly different events were covered within one article. When this occurred, each event was recorded separately with its own set of initiators, targets and events.

[4] The research assistant coded a sample of 126 articles. Article selection agreed with my selection choices in 92% of articles chosen. Intercoder reliability averaged 82% across all variables.

McAdam (1982:235-236) argues persuasively for use of newspaper

coding for this type of research:

1) Content-coding of newspaper articles, as a methodology, allows for replication by other researchers. As a research strategy, it is well suited to hypothesis testing.

2) It more than adequately allows for a macro-level perspective of patterns of resource allocation and strategic decision-making. It allows a researcher to track shifting locations of activity, changing types of activities, and frequency of activity by members of both sides of an issue.

3) There is a minimum of other data sources that a researcher can systematically utilize for this type of research.

It is generally agreed that this type of data portrays "the rate of

involvement of various groups over time, the different patterns of activity

manifest by various parties to the conflict ... and the interaction of various

groups over time" (McAdam, 1982:235).

While there may be advantages in using more than one news source for

this type of project, there is evidence to support the choice of The New York

Times if resource limitations proscribe use of just one newspaper. The Times

is recognized as the paper of record. Hardly a major event transpires without

some mention in the paper.[5] It is for this reason that The New York Times

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[5] The New York Times is a logical choice of newspapers to code for national government and social movement activity. In the words of Leon Sigal (1973:47), "because of their extensive readership among the politically influential, the Times and (Washington) Post function as something akin to house organs for the political elite." As far as social movement activists are concerned, Gitlin cites movement organizers' respect for coverage of their activities in The New York Times as well. He quotes from an SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) organizer's paper delivered at an SDS conference: "On the West Coast, it is said that you have to read The New York Times to find out what SDS is doing nationally" (1980:300).

has been used in other important studies as an authoritative source of information (Etzioni, 1970; Sigal, 1973; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Gitlin, 1980; McAdam, 1982, 1983, Costain, 1988).

But the technique of events coding does not get at more qualitative dimensions of social movement and state activity. Agenda-setting can be a broad, sometimes nebulous concept. It involves changes in the definition of public problems, changes in the range of solutions available to solve problems, and shifts in the nature of political conflict.

To obtain this type of information, I complemented (and verified) the events coded with personal interviews of important government, social movement, and corporate actors personally involved with the policy debate over U.S. relations with South Africa during the 1980's (Appendix C). I also engaged in a thorough review of previously published literature which considers the history of United States/South Africa policy and development of the anti-apartheid movement, read information produced by organizations actively involved in the anti-apartheid movement (Appendix D), and poured through transcripts of Congressional hearings held between 1978 to 1986 to consider the nature of U.S. policy relations with South Africa.

In sum, my research design consists of a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. The use of an events data set makes it possible to track the frequency of activity, shifting tactics, and changing coalitions of actors along a time dimension. Qualitative research is used to further investigate shifting definitions of the public problem and corollary solutions. This

component of the research also affords a look at dimensions of interactions not reflected in media coverage of events.

OVERVIEW

The traditional policy literature, the social movement literature, and the agenda-setting literature are reviewed in the next chapter. This chapter establishes the potential importance of social movements in the political innovation process and develops a unique conceptual framework for understanding the factors which facilitate entry of new issues onto the policy agenda. This framework is then applied in the research chapters.

Chapter III explores the historical policy relationship between the United States and South Africa, and then examines the origins and development of anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States through the 1950's. This history provides an important context for understanding contemporary activity. Two central points are established in this chapter. First, United States policy relations with South Africa have historically been based in mutual economic and geo-strategic interests. Interest in the apartheid system has traditionally been a secondary concern for U.S. policy-makers. The United States was willing to challenge apartheid only to the extent that primary economic and geo-strategic interests would not be threatened. Second, the stable relationship existing between the United States and South Africa throughout much of the twentieth century was unraveling as the 1960's approached.

Chapters IV, V and VI examine the anti-apartheid movement and United States policy relations with South Africa in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, respectively. These chapters juxtapose social movement activity, including movement development and the deployment of resources, against the evolution of United States policy toward South Africa. An analysis section at the end of each chapter integrates movement activity with policy developments. For heuristic purposes, these chapters are divided and organized by decade. The division by decades is particularly useful given their close correspondence to presidential election cycles.

As the traditional policy literature would suggest, presidential initiatives tended to dominate this foreign policy area between 1960 and the mid-1980's. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations were more critical of South Africa and apartheid than Presidents Nixon and Ford. President Carter spoke out against apartheid as part of a broader concern with international human rights. President Reagan swung the pendulum in the other direction and established a relatively close alliance with South Africa.

On the other hand, anti-apartheid sentiment has deep roots in the United States a broad based anti-apartheid movement with ties to the civil rights, religious, and student communities had been organizing in the United States since the 1960's. In the period between 1960 and 1986, the anti-apartheid movement expanded its base of support, accumulated and mobilized resources and generally developed its capacity to influence policy.

Chapter VI is particularly important because it is during the 1980's that the anti-apartheid movement experienced greatest access to the national policy

process. Comprehensive economic sanctions moved to the governmental agenda in the late 1970's and to the decision agenda of Congress by 1983. This raising of the anti-apartheid issue to the policy agenda was primarily facilitated by legislative actors however, not the anti-apartheid movement. By the mid-1980's, Congress was committed to challenging the Reagan doctrine on South Africa--constructive engagement--and seizing control of this foreign policy area. This battle between the legislative and executive branches reflected a broader set of tensions over foreign policy relations brewing between the two branches since the early Seventies.

At the end of 1984, just after the House supported economic sanctions and the Senate narrowly defeated the legislation, the anti-apartheid movement experienced rapid mobilization in the United States. At this point the movement was able to redefine the meaning of the apartheid issue, mobilize a broad-based coalition of interests, and influence public opinion. More specifically, the anti-apartheid movement successfully redefined the issue, not as an abstract foreign policy concern, but as a tangible, domestic, civil rights issue. In some circles, constructive engagement became a metaphor for the inequities of the Reagan domestic agenda. The anti-apartheid movement was able to promote these themes and mobilize the traditional civil rights constituency in the United States. Also, the movement was able to mobilize public opinion to challenge economic and trade relationships between the United States and South Africa because they offer material and symbolic support for apartheid. Anti-apartheid legislation imposing comprehensive

economic sanctions against South Africa was enacted during this period. Chapter VI closely examines the dynamics behind this policy shift.

Finally, Chapter VII draws conclusions about the ability of social movements to influence the policy process in the United States. A summary of the findings and their implications are presented. Theoretical and methodological lessons from this research are then offered in the form of suggestions for future research.

In brief, while the anti-apartheid movement did not put economic sanctions on the policy agenda, it was able to influence the policy process. It was able to push adoption of sanctions against South Africa further, faster than would otherwise have been the case.

While the movement had been growing stronger between 1960 and 1986, it was only able to influence the policy process once the political environment shifted. A window of opportunity for movement influence was created out of the battle between the legislative and executive branches over control of this foreign policy area. In this case study, social movement influence emerged from a dialectical relationship between the capacity of the movement to influence policy and the window of opportunity created from these tensions.

This research is significant because it initiates a unique dialogue between the policy process, social movement and agenda-setting literatures. It establishes the importance of bringing social movements into the policy literature as a legitimate mechanism of linkage between citizen interests and

the policy process. By extension, this dissertation broadens the political science understanding of democratic process in the United States.

Furthermore, this research pushes the boundaries of the agenda-setting literature by moving beyond the traditional notion of linear relationships between interests and policy. Relationships between social movements and the policy process are dialectical and complex. This dissertation articulates this dynamic in great detail with respect to the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and the policy process in the United States.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVITY: CITIZENS, POLICY, AND DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

The American political system bears the burden of balancing elite control over the governing process with sensitivity to citizen interests. Mediating institutions such as elections, interest groups, political parties, and the media provide essential linkages between citizens and policy-makers. The United States political system is insulated from direct citizen control. Policy tends to change in small, incremental steps.

But there are occasions when large scale policy changes, also known as political innovations, transpire. Very few political scientists have researched this phenomenon, yet the scholarship that exists suggests that social movement activity is a potentially important influence in the production of political innovation. However, the specific dynamics by which social movements participate in the public policy process have yet to be articulated.

This chapter reviews, and integrates, three literatures--the public policy literature, the social movement literature, and the agenda-setting literature--into a conceptual framework for examining the role of social movements in the production of political innovation. The first section examines the phenomenon of political innovation as a public policy construct and argues that social movements can be important to the political innovation policy process.

To appreciate the specific policy role of social movements, it is important to understand how social movements become organized to act as political forces. Therefore, the second section of this chapter reviews the literature on social movement growth and development, and social movement strategy and tactics.

The final section of this chapter argues that the agenda-setting literature provides a useful guide for ferreting out important dynamics between movements and policy-makers which are missing from the policy and social movement literatures. The parameters of an agenda-setting framework, designed to integrate social movement activity into the political innovation policy process, are outlined here.

In subsequent chapters, the agenda-setting framework serves as an analytic guide to understanding the relationship between the United States anti-apartheid movement and the making of United States-South Africa foreign policy between 1960 and 1986.

THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS AND POLITICAL INNOVATION

In the political science literature, policy changes are believed to occur in incremental steps. There are occasions, however, when nonincremental, large scale policy changes take place. These cases of political innovation have received little attention in the political science literature. This section presents a detailed look at the incrementalist and political innovation literatures. I argue that while the study of incrementalism focuses researchers on the policy-making roles of established institutions and elites, the study of political innovation leads researchers to broaden their understanding of the public policy process to include social movements as potentially powerful forces in the making of public policy.

Pluralism, the guiding paradigm of the United States political system, is rooted in consensual assumptions about society. Although people may struggle to have their individual interests represented in the policy-making process, they still share support for the norms and values of society. The outcome of this process--public policy--reflects the equilibrium of citizen interests. Policy changes incrementally as societal interests move from one equilibria to another.

In the United States, politics are said to be "pluralistic" because people are able to organize into groups and express their political interests (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1965). Public officials derive their authority from the citizenry and are ultimately responsible to it. A wide variety of interests struggle to influence the policy process. Pluralist theory draws attention to

how citizen interests are mediated by formal institutions which filter, massage, aggregate, articulate, and ultimately link public opinion to the policy-making role of public officials. These formal linkage institutions include interest groups, political parties, the mass media, and the electoral process. In its most basic form, pluralism considers the government to be little more than a neutral broker of group struggle (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951).[6]

Public policy is considered to be action taken by national, state, county and municipal authorities in response to problems and concerns involving consequences of a public nature (Anderson, 1975). It is a product of a political process which translates citizen preferences into the authoritative allocation of public resources. In brief, public opinion and aggregated interests are inputs into the political system and policy is the output (Easton, 1965).

The policy-making process is generally thought to proceed through a series of discrete phases: problem identification, agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy deliberation, and policy implementation (Anderson, 1975; Jones, 1977). The study of these phases provides a forum for scholars to examine legislative, judicial, and executive branch activity as well as the role of linkage institutions.

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[6] There is a wide range of literatures critiquing this concept of a neutral government, both from within the pluralist model and from outside the model. These critiques are raised in the second section of this chapter.

While it is desirable for policy to rationally proceed through these discrete phases, resource limitations make it infeasible for policy-makers to conduct an objective, comprehensive review of every public issue that comes before them (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1959). The policy process is more realistically characterized by policy-makers "mutually adjusting" their interests through compromise and bargaining as they work to construct supportive majorities at each successive stage of the policy process. Policy-makers engage in satisficing (satisfying and sufficing) behavior: a limited number of policy solutions are considered and the first solution to minimally satisfy each policy-maker's interests is adopted.[7]

The most efficient and practical satisficing strategy is for policy-makers to make minor alterations to previously successful policy decisions. It is for this reason that policy change typically comes in small, incremental steps. Through this process, system consensus and stability is maintained. This model of policy-making has been appropriately labelled "disjointed incrementalism" (Lindblom, 1968, 1959; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).

While stability and consensus characterize most policy-making initiatives, there is current research which argues that elements of conflict and policy change are also present within the American political system. Nonincremental policy change is known to take place, and, social

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[7] The concept of satisficing was first developed by Herbert Simon's (1957) description of human reasoning. Wildavsky applies this concept to the policy-making process in his landmark study The Politics of the Budgetary Process.

movements can, under proper conditions, influence the nonincremental policy process.

Interestingly, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), the pioneers of three decades of scholarship on the incremental policy process, suggest the theoretical possibility that nonincremental policy change can take place. Nonincremental policies, according to Braybrooke and Lindblom, are characterized by a significant departure from past policy choices and minimal understanding of policy consequences. Labeled the area of "Wars, Revolutions, Crises, and Grand Opportunities," Braybrooke and Lindblom suggest that mass (armed) political conflict or natural disasters can be the catalyst to large policy changes. In these situations, legislators may bow to external pressures out of self-interest and forego the standard incremental bargaining process.

Until recently, there has been a paucity of research on the dynamics of policy innovation and change. In 1984, Nelson Polsby began to explore these dynamics with grounded research. In <u>Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation</u>, Polsby raised his own definition of policy innovations (1984:8):

1) Innovations are relatively large-scale phenomena, highly visible to political actors and observers;

2) Innovations embody from at least one point of view a break with preceding governmental responses to the range of problems to which they are addressed; and,

3) Unlike major "crisis," with which they share the preceding traits, innovations have institutional or societal effects that are in a sense "lasting."

Using this definition, Polsby selected eight case studies of policy innovation for close examination: civilian control of atomic energy, creation of the National Science Foundation, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Truman Doctrine, aid to Greece and Turkey, formation of the Peace Corps, the Council of Economic Advisors, National Health Insurance for the aged, and local participation in Community Action Programs.

Examination of these case studies revealed that political innovation may be a byproduct of institutional in-fighting or a reflection of deeper conflict in society. More specifically, according to Polsby, the political innovation process surrounding the selected case studies clusters around two ideal models: the incubated model and the acute model. Slow, deliberate review of policy choices characterizes the incubated model of policy innovation. Policy alternatives are researched thoroughly. Demand for innovation develops at a slow pace and is often embroiled within partisan conflict. Polsby's research demonstrates that passage of Medicare, the Peace Corps, and the Council of Economic Advisors reflect the incubated model of policy innovation.

In contrast, acute innovations develop out of sudden, widespread, public demand for a particular policy solution. The policy process is characterized by a rush to meet new demands rather than based upon thoughtful research and deliberation. Policy solutions are framed in terms of a mass appeal which alienates few members of the public. While the incubated model of policy innovation corresponds more closely to a process dominated by political insiders and bureaucrats, the acute model suggests

the potential of social movement actors to activate public demand and influence policy decisions. In Polsby's research, civilian control of atomic energy, the Truman Doctrine and the Community Action Program fall into the acute model of policy innovation.

Polsby's work, in summary, shows that both institutional and noninstitutional interests can be involved in the policy innovation process. Incubated innovations tend to be based solely within institutional politics. Acute innovations, while possibly initiated by institutional forces, may also be initiated by social movements and protest activity which captures the public conscience and translates feelings of dissatisfaction into broad-based public demand for reforms. As Walker (1966:294) notes:

> One major consequence (function, if you will) of social movements is to break society's log jams, to prevent ossification in the political system, to prompt and justify major innovations in social policy and economic organization.

Charles O. Jones raised the possibility of a relationship between social movement activity and policy innovations in Clean Air, his classic case study of air pollution politics. While pollution had been a concern in local communities for some time, the environmental movement of the 1970's helped to define pollution as a national issue and move the issue to the national policy agenda. The movement began to mobilize national support and focus it into wide-spread popular demand for national anti-pollution legislation on Earth Day, April 22, 1970. As Jones (1975:146) comments:

> Participation proved to be quite phenomenal: literally thousands of schools and organizations staged demonstrations, sit-ins, automobile burials, debates, and harassment of various industries. There was

little or no violence. Television coverage was extensive, both on local and national network news programs.

National policy-makers responded to this intense public pressure with innovative, experimental, legislation. Some policy actors supported this legislation out of their "perceptions of what was necessary to meet public demands" (Jones, 1975:176). Other policy actors, according to Jones, seized upon "grand opportunities" created by the popularity of this issue. Jones (1975:178) gives an example:

> Increased public concern about the environment, therefore, not only provided President Nixon with a theme for the domestic portion of his 1970 State of the Union address, but also served as a diversionary issue from Vietnam. Like many middle-class suburbanites, the president was surely willing to find an issue on which he could join forces with young people.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (amending the Air Quality Act of 1967) passed quickly through the House and Senate. "Instead of a majority having to be constructed for a policy, (this) policy had to be constructed for a majority" (Jones, 1975:176). This legislation mandated compliance with air pollution standards that went beyond existing technical capabilities of implementation. The Clean Air Acts provide an example of an acute innovation where social movements played an intricate role in the policy process. Indeed, a policy analysis of clean air politics would be incomplete without an examination of the contributions of the environmental movement.

When the political science literature moves beyond assumptions of incremental policy change it suggests that noninstitutional forces, such as social movements, can be particularly important in their ability to influence

the public policy process. When this occurs, social movements constitute another form of linkage between citizens and the state. However, though the political innovation literature establishes that social movements potentially play an active role in the making of public policy, this literature is rather vague about the specific dynamics which characterize movement involvement in the political process.

Before understanding how social movements affect the political innovation process, it is important to discern the differences between social movements and more traditional policy influences like interest groups and political parties. Knowledge of these differences leads to an appreciation of the goals and objectives of social movements, and the logic behind social movement activity. These issues are reviewed in the next section of this chapter.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ORIGINS AND ACTIVITY

Social movements are a noninstitutional form of political participation. They aggregate and articulate concerns which lack a voice within more traditional linkage institutions. In this sense, social movements exist in relation to a political system unresponsive to the interests and demands of their participants. Social movements operate, therefore, as an additional channel of linkage in American politics.

As mentioned, the pluralist paradigm assumes that citizens have the capacity to organize into groups, to mobilize resources, to voice their interests in the political system, and that policy reflects the equilibrium of

group interests. This process will not work, however, if the government fails to remain a neutral mediator of group struggle.

The concept of "neutral" government has been critiqued from a range of perspectives, operating within the pluralist paradigm and outside it. Schattschneider (1960) laments that in the United States, "the chorus of democracy sings with an upper class harmony;" democracy favors those endowed with greater resources such as money, prestige, and technology (Schattschneider, 1960; McConnell, 1966; Green, et al. 1972).

From a slightly different perspective, Lindblom (1977) critiques the neutrality of government when he speaks of a "privileged" position in the policy process for corporate interests responsible for maintaining a profitable economy. And, from a third point of view, some argue that government functions primarily to promote the structural needs of capitalism: accumulation and legitimation (O'Connor, 1973).

These critiques share a belief that government acts as a gatekeeper in the political system; it is a biased mediator of group struggle. Government may, at times, limit access to the policy-making process to a narrow range of opinions and interests.

Endorsing this argument, Gamson (1975) believes that citizen interests can be divided into two categories: member interests and challenger interests. Interests that support the values, norms and goals of the political system, and are accepted by the government as legitimate participants in the political process, are known as member interests. They are members of the polity and enjoy routine access to the government

through member organizations such as interest groups and political parties. Member organizations support the polity and the particular social, political, and economic structures which form its foundation.

In contrast, interests which bear an antagonistic relationship to the political system, that challenge the interests of the government, and are routinely denied access to the policy process, lie outside the polity and are referred to as <u>challenger</u> interests. This concept is relational: challenger interests are, in essence, creations of a self-interested, gatekeeping, government. For member interests, the pluralist contention that policy reflects an equilibrium of forces may have some validity. According to Gamson (1975:141):

> (Group) theory is a portrait of the inside of the political arena. There one sees a more or less orderly contest, carried out by the classic pluralism rules of bargaining, lobbying, logrolling, coalition formation, negotiation, and compromise.

But for challenger interests, the pluralist framework is not sensitive to the gatekeeping mechanisms of government and the activities challenger interests must undertake to create a voice in the policy process.   How do challenger interests respond to gatekeeping?   Typically, the costs of continued participation in the political system are excessive (Olson, 1965). Apathy can be, therefore, a rational reaction to an unresponsive political system (Walker, 1966). Another type of response to the denial of formal access to the political system is participation through other channels. Whether people become apathetic or active in the face of unresponsive

institutions is related to the costs, benefits, and perceived opportunities of continued participation (Eisinger, 1973).

In Constructing Social Problems, Spector and Kitsuse make this argument with their analysis of social problem development, also known as claims-making activity. While claims-making activity is rooted in objective conditions, they argue that the nature of the claim itself is socially defined. "Definitions of conditions as social problems are constructed by members of a society who attempt to call attention to situations they find repugnant and who try to mobilize the institutions to do something about them" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:78). Claims are created within a socially defined context and the nature of these claims, in part, reflects the opportunities for resolution created by social-political institutions.

Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that citizens with challenger interests tend to first assume that the greatest opportunities for claims-making lie in electoral mechanisms. According to Piven and Cloward (1977:15):

> In the United States the principal structuring institution, at least in the early phases of protest, is the electoral-representative system...Ordinarily defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether defiant or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur.

Once political actors perceive that elections and other institutions fail to effectively translate their demands into public policy, they may move to other forms of participation.

> But when people are thus encouraged in spirit without being appeased in fact, their defiance may escape the boundaries of

electoral rituals, and escape the boundaries established by the political norms of the electoral-representative system in general. They may indeed become rebellious, but while their rebellion often appears chaotic from the perspective of conventional American politics, or from the perspective of some organizers, it is not chaotic at all; it is structured political behavior (Piven and Cloward, 1977:18).

Political and social conditions thus structure opportunities for citizens to participate in political activity. On an individual level, people may try to express discontent in the electoral process. When their efforts are frustrated, they may rebel, as individuals, against the political system. Or, individuals with challenger interests may group together to promote their interests through noninstitutionalized forms of participation.

Social movements are important vehicles for the expression of challenger interests. They are, according to Jo Freeman (1975), "one of the primary means of socializing conflict; of taking private disputes and making them political ones." They differ from interest groups and other member organizations in their lack of formal access to the political system and their propensity to use disruptive tactics such as direct action and civil disobedience to promote their interests.

Jack Walker (1966) argues that the tenets of pluralism--the importance of elites and institutions, stability, and consensus--have created a bias in the political science literature against studying noninstitutional social movement activity. In fact, there is a body of literature in political science which denigrates social movements as a nonlegitimate form of political expression. Social movements are accused of attracting psychologically marginal people with ademocratic values (Lipset, 1960). They are also

charged with threatening to overwhelm and undermine the political system with excessive demands (Huntington, 1968).

Although political scientists tend to overlook the importance of social movements in the policy process, there is a rich body of sociological literature which addresses many of the fundamental issues surrounding the origins and activity of social movements. The sociological literature on social movements was dominated from the 1960's to the early 1970's by relative deprivation theory. This perspective asserts that social movement activity is rooted in the subjective perception of disadvantage relative to other groups in society. Increased levels of grievance, often attributed to structural strain or dislocation, is a precondition to social movement activity. Collective action is a means for redressing these grievances (Smelser, 1963; Gurr, 1970).

A critique of relative deprivation theory emerged during the 1970's. McCarthy and Zald (1977) found the evidence supporting a relationship between grievance levels and movement activity "ambiguous" at best. Gurney and Tierney (1982:35) attribute the lack of empirical support for relative deprivation theory to internal weaknesses in the "relationship between objective conditions and perceptions." While relative deprivation offers insight into the importance of understanding the nature of grievance, it offers little information about how challenger interests ultimately crystallize into social movement organizations.

Resource mobilization theory was developed as a response to the weaknesses of relative deprivation theory. This theory assumes that

grievance is a constant byproduct of institutional activity and therefore an insufficient explanation of why social movements emerge (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Jenkins, 1983; Tilly, 1978; Oberschall, 1973). Instead, resource mobilization theorists argue that social movements "form because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action" (Jenkins, 1983:530). These resources can be tangible such as money, office space, and sources of publicity; or, resources can be intangible such as organizing expertise, time, communication networks, and other people-oriented resources (Freeman, 1979). According to resource mobilization theory, challenger interests able to accumulate resources are more likely to be transformed into social movements than interests unable to accumulate resources.

In order to analyze why specific interests organize into social movements, Jenkins (1983) suggests "the need for a multifactored approach to the problem of movement formation" (p. 532). He cites Fireman and Rytina's (1982) development of a "threshold model" of resources. Beyond certain thresholds, additional resources add little to the emergence of a movement. Presumably though, threshold levels of resources, grievances, organization and opportunities need to be present for a movement to emerge. "In general, a multifactored approach is more useful than McCarthy and Zald's exclusive emphasis on organizational resources" (Jenkins, 1983:532).

Thus, challenger interests emerge as a byproduct of institutional governmental activity and, under proper conditions, challenger interests may

evolve into social movements. Social movements differ from more traditional linkage mechanism in that they lack routine access to the policy process and are likely to engage in direct action to promote their interests.

A number of questions remain to be answered: How do social movements pursue political goals? Are they able to influence the public policy process? How do social movements interact with policy-makers in their efforts to create linkages between citizen interests and the political system? In the next section, these concerns are considered and a framework for guiding research in this area is developed.

AN AGENDA-SETTING FRAMEWORK

If we are to investigate the relationship between social movements and national policy-making, it is important to first specify the stage in the policy process where social movements can potentially have the greatest impact. Cobb and Elder (1972) and others (Pratt, 1976; Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976) argue that the agenda-setting stage is the most appropriate place for integrating social movements into the policy-making process.

An agenda-setting framework is a potentially useful tool for evaluating the dynamic relationship between social movements and the public policy process (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Pratt, 1976; Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). This framework focuses primarily upon "the process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials..." (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976:126). It assumes that though the policy agenda may be laden with

institutional and structural biases, environmental conditions fluctuate and opportunities can arise for new issues to move to the policy agenda. As Jones notes (1977:36):

> We can simply record that governmental agenda-setting processes may well favor some groups and their problem definitions over others, or even actively prevent access for certain interests.

An agenda-setting framework draws attention to the strategy and tactics interests use to move issues to the policy agenda (Kingdon, 1984). In the case of social movements, an agenda-setting framework is capable of considering the resistance that movement actors encounter from governmental gatekeepers and the special activities movements must initiate to have a voice in the public policy process.

When analyzing the public policy process, it is conceptually useful to think in terms of three types of policy agendas: the systemic agenda, the governmental agenda and the decision agenda. The systemic agenda consists of problems political actors argue are deserving of public resolution. Once policy-makers regard an issue as legitimate and worthy of consideration, the issue moves to the governmental agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1972). Finally, the decision agenda includes proposals receiving the immediate attention of policy-makers (Kingdon, 1984). The decision agenda directly precedes the deliberation and selection of policy options.

In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, John Kingdon presents a succinct analysis of how changes in problem, policy, and political "streams" facilitate movement of issues between the systemic, governmental and decision agendas. Problem streams encompass competing definitions and

interpretations of public problems. Problem streams can be thrown into flux by crises, personal experience, symbol manipulation, and feedback. Policy streams are defined by the range of available solutions to public problems. Factors such as the gradual accumulation of knowledge in a policy area and the generation of policy proposals by researchers and scholars can affect the character of prevailing policy streams. Finally, political streams involve the essence of politics: power relationships among contending interests. Political streams can be influenced by elections, public opinion, the media and deployment of resources by interest groups. Kingdon contends that while changes in any one stream can facilitate placement of an issue onto the governmental agenda, changes in all three streams are necessary for issues to move from the governmental to the decision agenda.

Social movements, like interest groups, strategically manage their resources to influence problem, policy, and political streams (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Tilly, 1978). They may attempt to influence problem streams by focusing attention on new issues or by raising new interpretations of old issues. Movements can try to influence policy streams by critiquing current policies and by promoting innovative ideas. Finally, social movements can affect political streams by building coalitions with other political interests and organizations, and by capitalizing on their access to institutional resources.

Normally, problem, policy and political streams are dominated by the interests of institutional actors. Interest groups, for example, can employ voting, lobbying, letter writing, campaigning, and other institutional forms of

political participation to affect these streams. Since, social movements are composed of interests denied access to institutional paths for influencing problem, policy and political streams, they must turn to noninstitutional paths to influence these streams.

Social movements can attempt to influence streams through two general types of strategies: leverage manipulation and expansion of the scope of conflict.[8] With leverage manipulation, challenger groups attempt to maneuver their target groups[9] into a bargaining position through the use of 'negative inducements' (Piven and Cloward, 1977, Gamson, 1975, Lipsky, 1970). Oberschall (1979:46) describes this situation:

> The challengers make life so unpleasant for the target group that the target's welfare is diminished...The challenger now is in a position to offer the target something that will increase his welfare: he offers to desist from threats, disruption, and violence in return for the collective good he is seeking.

Leverage manipulation through noninstitutional tactics like strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, rioting, sabotage and guerilla warfare can influence problem streams by bringing attention to movement demands, affect policy streams by forcing acceptance of movement solutions, and affect political streams by redefining the bargaining relationship between

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[8] These two strategies are presented as ideal types for heuristic purposes only. In the real world, social movement strategy typically combine these two strategies.

[9] Target groups are those groups which have the capacity to satisfy social movement goals. The target group of political movements is, typically, government policy-makers. In some cases, social movements target corporations whose policies impact directly upon their employees and/or the larger public (Boyte, 1980). Also, challenger groups may simultaneously target governmental and corporate activity.

movements and their targets. In a review of 53 challenger organizations operating between 1880-1945, Gamson (1975) found that those groups which created disruption through use of 'negative inducements' were more likely to have a higher than average success rate in promoting their goals than challenger organizations which employed non-disruptive tactics.

A second broadly-defined strategy that social movements can pursue to affect problem, political and policy streams is altering the mobilization of bias by expanding the scope of conflict. More specifically, movements work to mobilize other interests (both member and challenger) to intervene in the political system on their behalf (Lipsky, 1970; Schattschneider, 1960).

Demonstrations, picketing, general education campaigns, hunger strikes, and other symbolic campaigns are often designed to encourage sympathetic third parties to intervene in the political process on behalf of challenger interests. With support from others, social movements can reshape political streams, as well as problem streams, by building coalitions and focusing new attention on their issues. They can affect policy streams by persuading others to consider their policy proposals.

In summary, we have seen that the political innovation literature suggests that social movements can influence the policy process. And, social movements can be most influential at the agenda-setting stage of this process. The political innovation and agenda-setting literatures are complementary. Both acknowledge that policy agendas are not fixed; there is a sense of "policy windows," known elsewhere as "opportunity structures" (Eisinger, 1973), in both literatures. Conditions can converge to create

open windows or new opportunities for different issues and innovative solutions on the governmental and decision agendas. Changes in problem, policy, and political streams influence the opening of these windows or opportunities (Kingdon, 1984; Polsby, 1984; Levine, 1985; Mumper, 1987).

Also, both literatures assume that a variety of political actors can facilitate issue movement between the systemic, governmental and decision agendas: interest groups, political parties, policy experts and policy-makers are prominent in the incubated model; broad public demand or widespread disruption, sometimes mobilized by social movements, may be prominent in the acute model of political innovation.

In the chapters that follow, a unique and original agenda-setting framework is applied to an analysis of the relationship between national policy-makers shaping United States relations with South Africa and the anti-apartheid movement between 1960 and 1986. The pinnacle of this relationship was passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, an example of politically innovative legislation.

In particular, the agenda-setting analysis which follows considers: 1) the nature of the conflict between social movement and governmental interests; 2) the strategies and tactics pursued by the anti-apartheid movement as it tried to move its concerns from the systemic to the governmental and decision agendas; 3) prevailing problem, policy and political streams shaping U.S. policy, and movement influence over these streams; and, 4) the windows of opportunity which facilitated social

movement input into consideration and passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

CHAPTER III

AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

History provides an important context with which to understand contemporary events. Such is the case with respect to the relationship between the United States and South Africa.

This chapter explores the historical roots of apartheid in South Africa, the foreign policy interests of the United States with respect to South Africa, and the antecedents of the contemporary United States anti-apartheid movement. Three important points are developed here. First, the United States has historically ignored apartheid in order to preserve economic and military/geo-strategic interests in the region. Second, the roots of the Anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States lie deep in our own national history. Third, the relationship between the United States and South Africa was beginning to destabilize by the end of the 1950's.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

If history is written by victors, it is not surprising that the Western understanding of South Africa dates back to 1652 when the Dutch East India Company created a port at the southern tip of Africa to service trade between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Over time small numbers of Dutch East India Company employees settled in this region and the Cape area became a trading colony. A large population of westerners did not populate the region until the British conquest of the Cape area in 1806. By the mid-1800's the British government actively recruited thousands to the area with promises of free passage and land grants to settle in regions beyond the Cape areas as well.

Racial distinctions became ingrained within South African society as early as the founding of the first Dutch East India settlement. The Company actively divided people into two classes: white colonists and black slave laborers. Though the British abolished the slave trade in 1807 and emancipated the slaves in 1834, racial cleavages persisted. One report characterized the situation as follows:

> As elsewhere, the presence of slaves differing in appearance from their owners paved the way for a caste-oriented society. The colonists grew to despise manual labor and to equate inferior status with inferior talent--and both with race (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981:33).

Racial cleavages deepened as the British came to control the Cape area in the nineteenth century and Dutch settlers migrated further inland. The Dutch, joined by French Huguenots and German settlers evolved into

the Afrikaans community. As they moved inland, they displaced many indigenous black people from their ancestral territories. Woods and Bostock (1986:22) refer to this as "territorial apartheid." Apartheid is an Afrikaans word which translates as separate-ness.

The descendants of Dutch and British settlers consolidated their respective power within various regions of South Africa[10] and in 1910 formed the Union of South Africa. The franchise was restricted to white males. Blacks were excluded from participating in politics except in the British dominated southern Cape region. And, by 1936, African voters were denied access to the ballot in this area as well.

During the mid-1930's, political coalitions began to shift in South Africa largely due to pressures generated by a failing economy. Prime Minister Herzog of South Africa allied with Jan Smut and the South African Party to form the pro-British United Party. An oppositional "pure" (i.e. white) National Party was also founded at this time by the Afrikaaners. When the United Party joined the Allied forces in World War II, the National Party capitalized on nationalist sentiment and argued for even tighter control over the "rebellious" black population. One report described the conditions of the day in these terms:

> In the 1948 election campaign, the Nationalists were able to exploit grievances of the sort that had existed in other countries involved in the Second World War, including demobilization and unemployment problems and shortages of housing and some food items. But the

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[10]   By the early 20th century, the British controlled the Southern Cape Area and the Dutch controlled the Northern and Eastern areas surrounding the Cape.

Nationalists also capitalized heavily on the electorate's racial anxieties, and for this purpose they coined a new slogan: "Apartheid"--in English, "apartness" (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981:40).

The National Party won a majority of seats in Parliament in 1948 and proceeded to consolidate their control over the political system. The South African political system was mobilized not only to deny blacks protection under the law, but also to define blacks outside the purview of the legal system altogether.

In 1949, the National Party declared mixed racial marriages to be illegal with the Mixed Marriages Act. Then the National Party adopted the Race Classification Act and the Population Registration Act in 1950 to classify the whole population by race and establish an administrative apparatus to reinforce and oversee the racial classification system. Classifications were a function of appearance and descent; disputes over classification were to be resolved by an established governmental unit.

A completely separate political system was forged in the 1950's with the Group Areas Act which reserved 14% of South Africa's land for the black population which comprised 80% of the entire population. Blacks were forced to live in territories referred to as "Bantustans." A separate economy for blacks was also created in the 1950's by acts which restricted the ability of blacks to engage in trading outside of their homelands.

The National Party was obsessed with controlling the lives of the black people, mixed race, and Indian populations. Pass laws restricted the movement of segregated classes. The Bantu Education Act created a

segregated educational system, The Separate Amenities Act mandated segregation of public facilities, and transportation including trains, buses and taxis were segregated by the Railway Act and Road Transportation Act. The government also assumed wide powers to control dissent through the Suppression of Communism Act. The National Party forced blacks to become "foreigners in the land of their birth" (Lipton, 1985:23).

Like Jim Crow laws in the United States, apartheid legislation was justified in terms of "inherent" differences between the races. Each race, it was thought, should be left alone to live and develop according to its own potential. But the consequences of legal segregation go beyond keeping the races apart. Apartheid has created a situation where the quality of life for blacks remains far below that of the white population. Violence--physical and mental--is a daily experience for blacks living in South.[11]

The issue of apartheid has been particularly troubling for the foreign policy of nations, like the United States, which must weigh moral differences with apartheid against other foreign policy interests. As shall be developed in the next section, the United States has historically maintained a friendly posture toward South Africa. Through the 1950's, apartheid was generally not raised as an obstacle to a stable policy relationship.

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[11] As I complete this dissertation in 1990, it is important to note that pieces of apartheid legislation have been repealed recently in a wave of reform. Mixed marriages are no longer illegal, some public facilities such as beaches have been desegregated, and blacks are no longer required to carry pass books. The underlying elements of apartheid--political, economic, and legal exclusion of blacks--remains in place however. Apartheid can not end until these barriers are removed and blacks gain the right to vote in free elections.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE
UNITED STATES/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

Historically, the United States' relationship with South Africa has primarily been governed by an assumed commonality of interests, both economic and military/geo-strategic (Easum, 1975:68). Concern for apartheid has been a secondary interest; differences over apartheid have not threatened the stability of the economic and military bond formed between the United States and South Africa in the early part of the twentieth century.

Since the turn of the century, an Open Door free trade policy in the United States, and higher than average rates of return, encouraged corporations and entrepreneurs to invest heavily in the South African economy. U.S. miners and business professionals contributed to the rapid development of South Africa's mining and diamond industries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Major companies based in the United States, such as Mobil, General Electric, Ford and Kodak, opened South African offices by 1913. Within 15 years, National City Bank of New York (now Citibank), Prentice-Hall, Colgate-Palmolive, Firestone, and General Motors had also opened branches in South Africa.[12]

Military and geo-strategic concerns constitute a second set of commonly held interests between the United States and South Africa.

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[12]   For an in-depth view of the U.S. role in development of the South African Economy, see Danaher, The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa.

South Africa has been a military ally of the United States since the 1940's. South Africa fought with the Allied forces in World War II. South Africa also helped the United States with the Berlin Airlift in 1948 and had soldiers fighting alongside Americans in Korea from 1950 to 1953 (Easum, 1975:68).

In return, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the United States Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency provided military and intelligence support to South Africa. The United States government also extended nearly a billion dollars of credit to South Africa for development of uranium production. This arrangement guaranteed a safe, plentiful supply of uranium for the U.S. nuclear weapons industry in the 1950's (Danaher, 1985).

Because of South Africa's political history, the United States considers it a bulwark against communism and Soviet aggression on the African continent. South Africa is also of strategic interest to the United States because it controls the Cape area of Africa where the Indian and Atlantic Oceans meet, a major international trading route.

While United States-South African comity has been forged primarily by shared economic and military interests, a secondary interest has also shaped U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. The United States increasingly differed with South Africa over support for the apartheid system. United States antipathy toward apartheid however, has traditionally been a tangential concern shaping foreign policy (Easum, 1975). Until the

1980's, antagonism toward apartheid never seriously interfered with United States economic or military/geo-strategic interests in the region.

The historical reality of discrimination in the United States may have set the stage for U.S. tolerance of de facto and, post-1948, de jure apartheid in South Africa. It was not until race relations began being questioned in the United States, that they began to be actively questioned abroad. However, given the importance of economic and military concerns, the United States traditionally chose not to emphasize concerns about apartheid in its relationship with South Africa (Easum, 1975:67-68). In fact, The United States has a track record of enthusiastically embracing South Africa. The United States was one of the first nations, for example, to establish an ambassadorial level presence in South Africa following the victory of the National Party in 1948.

EMERGING CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

As the 1960's approached, events in South Africa, at the United Nations, and in the United States began to reshape public opinion and destabilize the foundation of United States interests in South Africa.

Four factors came together in the late 1940's and 1950's to bring South African racial policies under close scrutiny within the United States. These factors were the legalization and institutionalization of apartheid in South Africa, emerging independence movements in other African nations,

third world efforts at the United Nations to oppose apartheid, and the burgeoning Civil Rights movement in the United States.

Generally speaking, it is fair to say that the United States' public was not well informed about African events throughout the 1940's and 1950's. Much of this lack of information can be attributed to Western domination of the continent and the lack of media attention brought to indigenous events there. In "Africa and the United States Media," Aaron Segal reports that prior to the mid-1950's, no United States news correspondents were based in Africa. Inattention to African affairs was slowly changing, however.

One major structural factor leading to public awareness of South Africa was the legal institutionalization of apartheid following the 1948 victory of the National Party. The election of the National Party in 1948 and the codification of race-based legislation clearly stated the intentions of the white minority community to deny political, social, and economic rights to blacks, mixed race and Indian people in South Africa.

Black opposition to apartheid took a more militant turn in South Africa at this time. The most prominent of the opposition organizations, the African National Congress, moved away from its long-held policy of passive protest in 1949 and embraced more militant confrontational tactics: strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience. This Defiance Campaign was launched in 1952 (South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency, 1985).

White South African resolve to limit the rights of blacks hardened further by 1956 when the government arrested over 500 black and white

resistance leaders and announced that more than 150 of these activists would be tried for treason. Noer (1983) believes that this announcement set off fears in the United States that the remaining opponents of white rule in South Africa would turn toward further violence and possibly communism in their efforts to overthrow the government.

A second factor increasing awareness of African affairs within the U.S. was the emergence of demands for ending colonial rule in Africa and the proliferation of liberation movements across the African continent. The United States was interested in maintaining a friendly relationship with independent black African nations for the purpose of limiting Soviet appeals in the region. To give closer scrutiny to African affairs, responsibility for South Africa was transferred out of the State Department's European section to a newly created African Bureau in the Fifties. This institutional change offered experts with more African experience and contacts in the region inroads into the United States foreign policy process. These new experts brought to the policy process a sensitivity to African affairs that had not been present at an earlier time.

A third major factor bringing heightened scrutiny to affairs in South Africa was the use of the United Nations as a forum for third world nations to raise grievances of international importance. It was within this context that international disdain for apartheid was first registered. And, it was at the United Nations that the United States was first forced to declare a formal, public position on apartheid.

India initially raised the issue during the early 1950's to protect Asians in South Africa, the status of whom was governed by a treaty between India and South Africa. Apartheid was first confronted directly in 1952 when an Asian-Arab resolution condemning apartheid and South Africa was brought before the United Nations.

The United States tried to subvert this resolution by attempting to redefine the issue as a domestic concern subject to the internal "rule of law" of South Africa and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. When the Asian-Arab resolution was brought to a vote, the United States abstained, thereby committing itself to a non-position which effectively became its stated policy. The Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa (1981:345) characterized the United States' position in these terms:

> The United States 'regretted' certain internal developments in South Africa but felt obliged to abstain from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, particularly one that regularly declared itself a staunch ally in the fight against communism.

The United States first departed from this position six years later. In 1958, the U.S. successfully moderated United Nations' criticism of South Africa by negotiating the word "condemning" out of a U.N. resolution and voting to express "regret and concern" over South Africa's racial policies. But despite attempts to moderate attacks on South Africa, debate within the United Nations heightened awareness of apartheid within the United States.

The fourth major factor leading not only to closer scrutiny of apartheid in the United States, but also to increased sensitivity of the

implications of a U.S. alliance with a regime that practices overt discrimination, was the civil rights movement of the Forties and Fifties. This movement was organized in the United States to raise public awareness of the injustice of racial oppression and to pressure public officials to end segregation. Furthermore, successful black independence movements in Africa began to kindle a Pan-Africanist focus among blacks in the United States (White, 1981), and some civil rights activists began highlighting apartheid and racism in South Africa in their organizing efforts.

Actually, anti-apartheid sentiment has a deep tradition within a particular set of challenger interests in the United States. Its roots are in the black consciousness and liberation movements which emerged from the Pan-Africanist influence of Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois, and Paul Robeson during the first half of this century (Shepherd, 1977). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) offered the first organized opposition to apartheid (Maren, 1984). The NAACP was instrumental in helping to establish the African National Congress in South Africa during 1912. South Africa was important to the NAACP and UNIA because, as African-American organizations, they supported the struggle of blacks throughout the world for independence from segregation and colonization.

The first United States-based organization solely dedicated to anti-apartheid activities was founded by Paul Robeson and Max Yergan[13] in 1937. It was called the Council on African Affairs. This organization attacked apartheid from an anti-capitalist, pan-Africanist stance (Danaher, 1985:59-60). The following passage reflects the politics of The Council on African Affairs:

> South Africa is part of President Truman's "free world." Yes, dozens of America's biggest auto, oil, mining and other trusts have highly profitable holdings in that country.
> Hence it is clear that in raising our voices against the Malan regime we simultaneously strike a blow at reactionary forces in our own land who seek to preserve here, in South Africa, and everywhere else the super profits they harvest from racial and national oppression. United support for our brothers' struggles in Africa is an integral part of our task in achieving freedom for all Americans and peace for the world (Spotlight on Africa, 1952:1)[14]

Following World War II, the Civil Rights movement gained momentum in the United States. Successful independence movements in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Zaire (Congo), and Nigeria ignited a Pan-Africanist focus among many civil rights leaders and activists (White, 1981). Anti-apartheid sentiment further crystallized within the Civil Rights movement with the formation of several interracial organizations advocating

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[13] Interestingly, Max Yergan, an American sociologist, repudiated his earlier Anti-apartheid activities in a celebrated tour of South Africa in 1964. See "U.S. Negro Sociologist Praises South Africa's Apartheid Policy," The New York Times, November 30, 1964.

[14] Originally cited by Martin (1974), page 112.

the end of colonial control of Africa (White, 1981).[15] These organizations included the African American Institute (1952), the American Committee on Africa (1953), and the African Studies Association (1957) [Danaher, 1985; White, 1981].

The American Committee on Africa (ACOA) played a particularly important role in initiating and sustaining Anti-apartheid activity throughout the middle to late Fifties. Founded by George Houser, a white civil rights activist and former founder of the Congress on Racial Equality, ACOA was initially a vehicle for liberal whites and moderate civil rights activists to lend support to African liberation movements.[16]

Of particular importance, was the support by ACOA of the African National Congress Defiance Campaign. Woods and Bostock (1986:99) offer a description of this campaign:

> In what was known as the Defiance Campaign, thousands ignored the curfew and pass laws and marched silently through the white cities, ending their marches at police stations where they offered themselves for arrest.
> The new government responded with violence: hundreds were killed in several cities when police opened fire on the demonstrators.

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[15] During the period after World War II, civil rights leaders in the United States made a conscious decision to forge alliances with white trade union, church, civil-libertarian, and other political activists. This interracial initiative, in addition to national desegregation efforts by President Truman and cold war politics in the 1950's, diffused black leadership on African issues. Interracial Africanist organizations, however, tended to be largely white led (White, 1981).

[16] For an in-depth look at ACOA's history, see George Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa." Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Opinion, 6:2-3 (Summer/Fall 1976). pp. 16-26.

In reaction to a major treason trial in South Africa during 1957, ACOA initiated an educational campaign a "Declaration of Conscience Against Apartheid." This campaign won a substantial amount of mainstream support. Eleanor Roosevelt was the chairperson of the campaign. The campaign was also endorsed by Martin Luther King, Pablo Casals, Walter Reuther and Bertrand Russell. ACOA remained as one of the primary organizations educating the public about apartheid and recruiting anti-apartheid support in the United States throughout the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's (Maren, 1984).

The work of ACOA and other early anti-apartheid efforts embodies important links not only between civil rights interests and anti-apartheid activity, but also between challenger interests marginal to the political system and member interests with access to institutional resources, such as the religious community and other white, middle class organizations. These linkages were important for they created points of access for blacks in the United States to influence public opinion and advance their cause.

With court decisions like Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education (1954) and situations like the integration of Central High School in Little Rock Arkansas (1957), the United States government became more defensive about its national and international reputation with respect to race issues. The federal government was in a position where it had to appear as though it was making progress on race questions both domestically and abroad (Danaher, 1985). Noer (1983:89) describes the consequences of this situation:

Like support of civil rights or opposition to capital punishment, criticism of South Africa emerged as a touchstone of American liberalism in the 1950s. With the continued drive toward racial separatism in South Africa, those opposed to apartheid mobilized to pressure Eisenhower for direct action against Pretoria.

The United States government was in the position of having to appear sensitive to racial issues in South Africa. At the same time, the United States still had to protect its economic, military, and political relationships with a cold war ally. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations balanced these interests by disassociating the United States from apartheid while maintaining an unwillingness to support the black majority in South Africa (Noer, 1983).

As the 1960's approached, United States policy toward South Africa was relatively stable. But this stability was under attack from forces internal and external to the United States.

The next chapter of this dissertation considers anti-apartheid movement growth in the 1960's, United States' policy developments toward South Africa, and the relationship between the U.S. anti-apartheid movement and national policy-makers. These themes are raised using the agenda-setting framework and the concept of policy streams developed in Chapter two.

CHAPTER IV

ANTI-APARTHEID MOBILIZATION AND POLICY FLUCTUATION: 1960 TO 1969

This chapter examines development of the United States anti-apartheid movement throughout the 1960's. The movement is discussed in terms of how it maneuvered to influence prevailing political, problem, and policy streams affecting policy-makers. This chapter also examines U.S. foreign policy developments concerning South Africa during the 1960's. The agenda definition of the South Africa problem changed somewhat during this period and corresponding policy changes were enacted. Finally, this chapter considers the relationship between movement activity and policy developments which took place in the 1960's.

Four central questions guide this chapter: 1) How was the anti-apartheid movement organized during the 1960's? 2) How did the movement attempt to influence policy-makers? 3) How did the policy agenda change during this period? 4) What were the consequences of movement activity during the Sixties?

Due to the historical nature of this research, the argument in this chapter (and in Chapters five and six) is organized as follows. The first part of the chapter presents a narrative description of both anti-apartheid and national policy agenda dynamics. The second part of the chapter analyzes the dynamic relationship between anti-apartheid movement activists and policy-makers using the agenda-setting framework of problem, political, and policy streams, outlined in Chapter two.

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

From the data set of events recorded in The New York Times, it is evident that the anti-apartheid movement was active in the United States throughout the 1960's. As Figure IV-1 demonstrates, the movement was very active in 1960, somewhat active between 1962 and 1964, and experienced a steadily rising level of activity between 1964 and 1969.[17] These three periods correspond to the organization of this section on the anti-apartheid movement. The first portion of this section relates the burst of activity in 1960 to the movement's reaction to the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa; the second portion looks at the involvement of Civil Rights movement activists and leaders between 1962 to 1964; and, the third portion of this section looks at the growing ability of the movement to conduct

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[17]   In terms of using the dataset, Anti-apartheid activity involves the sum total of events critical of apartheid and initiated by all actors, other than people affiliated with the government, corporations, or businesses.

proactive campaigns against domestic targets linked to apartheid in South Africa.

The Anti-apartheid Movement Reacts to the Sharpeville Massacre

Throughout the 1950's, the United States public was becoming more sensitive to racial injustice and African affairs. This sensitivity was underscored by the volume of international attention paid to the Sharpeville Massacre, a horrific incident of state violence perpetrated against blacks challenging the apartheid system in South Africa.

The racial policies of South Africa commanded international attention on March 21, 1960 when South African police fired randomly into a crowd of thousands of blacks protesting national pass laws.[18] Mass demonstrations followed in South Africa and the government declared a state of emergency, arrested thousands of activists and banned the main opposition organizations--the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC).

This incident became known worldwide as the Sharpeville massacre. It functioned to instruct people, almost overnight, about the depth of racial politics fostered by the South African regime (Woods and Bostock, 1986). As one author noted, "It was the Sharpeville massacre, in which seventy blacks lost their lives, which changed the terms of the debate overnight" (Coker 1986:5).

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[18]   "50 Killed in South Africa As Police Fire on Rioters," New York Times, March 21, 1960.

The events of Sharpeville provided a concrete organizing focus for anti-apartheid efforts in the United States. The massacre was adopted by activists in the United States as a symbol of the violence and immorality upon which apartheid is founded. Anti-apartheid activists tried to seize the moment by publicly condemning South Africa and educating the United States public about the evils of apartheid.

As Figure IV-2 demonstrates from a month by month perspective, there was an increase in reporting of Anti-apartheid activity at the time of the massacre--March, 1960. Anti-apartheid activity peaked just after the massacre, and continued at a relatively high level through June, 1960.

According to The New York Times, the anti-apartheid movement was dominated at this time by challenger groups such as Anti-apartheid organizations[19] and member groups such as the clergy (Figure IV-3)[20]. Labor also had an active presence at this time, though it is not included in Figure IV-3 because, according to The New York Times, labor did not play a very visible role in the movement after this period.

The primary Anti-apartheid organization at the time was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). One and a half weeks after the

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[19]   The category "Anti-apartheid organizations" in Figures IV-1 and IV-2 during the early 1960's tends mostly to reflect American Committee on Africa activity.

[20]   Figure IV-3 (and subsequent figures about movement actors) reflects the activity of primary and secondary movement actors. Primary Actors are defined in the database as primary initiators. Secondary actors are drawn from the list of secondary initiators as well as movement connections/support organizations.

Sharpeville Massacre, ACOA ran an advertisement in The New York Times titled "The Shame of South Africa." They solicited emergency donations for the Africa Defense and Aid Fund. Also, in 1960, the American Committee On Africa continued to try to expand the scope of mobilization by initiating a fund-raising drive for the victims of Sharpeville and organizing a conference on South Africa featuring Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC. Additionally, ACOA attempted a leverage manipulation strategy by launching a boycott against South African goods. The American Committee on Africa also played an instrumental role in encouraging labor to protest apartheid.

Labor had been involved with protesting apartheid for some time. Just prior to the Sharpeville massacre, the AFL-CIO Executive Council voted to urge their 12 million members to boycott all raw materials and manufactured goods coming into the U.S. from South Africa.[21] Immediately after Sharpeville, with ACOA's support, the International Longshoreman's Union in New York and San Francisco voted to boycott the unloading of ships carrying South African goods for one day in symbolic support of economic sanctions against South Africa (Houser, 1976:20).[22]

The religious community had been involved in anti-apartheid activity prior to Sharpeville. Following Sharpeville, the following religious group actions were reported in the media: noted Evangelist Billy Graham,

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[21]   "Teamsters First To Get Rail Pact," The New York Times, February 14, 1960.

[22]   "Dockman Ask Boycott," The New York Times, April 6, 1960.

publicly cancelled a South African tour in protest of apartheid[23] and The National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church voted to send $5,000 to the South Africa Anglican church to support the victims of Sharpeville.[24]

After June 1960, anti-apartheid movement activity receded from the headlines. It was not to be revived again until the period between 1962 and 1963. However, the Sharpeville incident did help to legitimate the importance of the anti-apartheid issue. For the United States movement, the massacre symbolized the violence and hatred associated with apartheid. Also, by 1960 it was clear that the anti-apartheid issue was no longer only a challenger issue. Some member group interests also adopted the issue for an organizing focus.

Post-Sharpeville

According to news stories in The New York Times, once the Sharpeville massacre receded from the headlines, Anti-apartheid activity was basically nonexistent in 1961, then somewhat active between 1962 and 1964. As Figure IV-3 illustrates, activity between 1962 and 1964 was dominated by Anti-apartheid organizations like the American Committee on Africa and by the voices of Civil Rights activists.

Actually, ACOA emerged as the predominant voice of anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States. George Houser, Director of ACOA, was

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[23]   "Graham Curbs Tour," The New York Times, February 14, 1960.

[24]   "Church Rebuffs Alabama Bishop," The New York Times, April 29, 1960.

not just interested in raising the issue to the policy agenda but was concerned with actively broadening the base of opposition to U.S. policy regarding South Africa. Houser worked to garner support for African issues within the more mainstream black-civil rights community.

Houser assembled a conference in 1962 with the specific objective of transforming the mainstream domestic civil rights agenda into an international program. From this conference, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) was born.[25] Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Whitney Young, A. Philip Randolph and Roy Wilkins, representing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Congress on Racial Equality, and the Urban League, respectively, were in attendance at the founding conference (White, 1981; Houser, 1976). ANLCA quickly became "the prime institutionalized expression (of black American concerns with African affairs) during the first half of the 1960s" (White, 1981).

At its founding conference, ANLCA resolved to lobby President Kennedy to support economic sanctions against South Africa. ANLCA also resolved to support liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and South West Africa.[26] One week after the conference, ACOA and Martin Luther King announced their intention of initiating a campaign on Human

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[25]   "Leading Negroes Agree On Goals," The New York Times, November 26, 1962.

[26]   "Leading Negroes Agree On Goals," The New York Times, November 26, 1962.

Rights Day (December 10, 1962) to urge the United States government to impose economic sanctions on South Africa.[27]

Also at this time, Anti-apartheid sentiment was flaring once again at the United Nations. Member nations of the United Nations had been passing resolutions which condemned racial discrimination in South Africa as a violation of human rights for quite some time. Now, with the highly publicized massacre at Sharpeville and the defiance of the South African regime to world opinion, third world member-nations tried to move the United Nations to take an increasingly more forceful position on apartheid.

The definition of the issue shifted, especially in the General Assembly, during the post-Sharpeville period to declarations that the South Africa situation posed a threat to international peace and was, therefore, a legitimate issue for the United Nations to act upon.[28] Third world nations eventually pushed the United Nations to endorse the liberationist position as the solution to apartheid in South Africa. This position endorsed the legitimacy of the internal movement to overthrow the South African regime (Özgür, 1982).

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[27] "Group to Seek U.S. Curbs On Regime in South Africa," The New York Times, December 2, 1962.

[28] See Özgür (1982) for an excellent discussion on the redefinition of the South Africa issue from a human rights violation to a threat to international peace within the purview of the United Nations.

In November 1962, the United Nations General Assembly called for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa[29] and established the Special U.N. Committee on Apartheid as a monitoring agency. Also in 1962, the U.N. Security Council called for member-nations to support a voluntary embargo against sales of military items to South Africa.

The United Nations brought clarity to the apartheid issue both in terms of instructing people about the moral implications of apartheid and in legitimating a strong, liberation-oriented response as a policy solution. Following the pace established at the United Nations, activists and organizations throughout the world were inspired to mobilize against the South African regime (Shepherd, 1977). It is during this period (early to middle 1960's) that anti-apartheid sentiment begins to gain a solid foothold within a broader set of member interests in the United States. And, it is the liberationist position being promoted at the United Nations which these interests advance.

The Anti-apartheid Movement Solidifies

After 1960, there were no Sharpeville massacres for the emerging United States anti-apartheid movement to exploit. The 1964 Rivona trials against black leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu made it clear, however, that avenues of protest within South Africa were being

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[29]   Resolution G.A. 1761, November 6, 1962.

continuously choked off.[30] Reform of apartheid appeared as far away as ever.

Despite the absence of a particular crisis in South Africa, anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States continued to build in the middle 1960's due to the mobilization of new constituents and the reactivization of old constituents. As Figure IV-3 demonstrates, anti-apartheid sentiment was largely driven by civil rights and other black organizations in the middle 1960's, then broadened from to include continuous involvement from the religious community and the student community in the latter 1960's.

Between 1965 and 1969, the anti-apartheid movement began to target tangible institutions in the United States as part of their organizing campaigns. Whereas just after Sharpeville, anti-apartheid sentiment was broadly directed at United States policy abroad, by 1965, according to The New York Times, a campaign against the financial community's credit arrangements with South Africa took hold in the United States (Figure IV-4). By the end of the 1960's, sustained campaigns against corporations, universities and colleges were being waged.

Three factors present in the Sixties--sustained activity, multiple constituents, and persistent campaigns against tangible targets--indicate that the anti-apartheid movement was no longer driven by external events; instead it was able to engage in proactive organized opposition to apartheid

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[30]   These highly publicized trials jailed key leaders of the black opposition, some of whom have only recently been released from jail. Walter Sisulu was released from prison in 1989 and Nelson Mandela was released during February 1990.

and its collaborators. The resource base of the movement grew during this period and political opportunities changed in such a way that the movement perceived itself as able to achieve significant gains through this new direction. By the end of the decade, the tactic of lobbying government officials for economic sanctions was replaced with campaigns to challenge the right of institutions to invest their monies freely, without regard for public consequences. This is a rather radical turn in the direction of the movement as it came to challenge one of the fundamental principles of capitalism--the right to private control of investments.

A more in-depth look at the movements' constituents follows:

The Pan-Africanist and New Left Movements

Anti-apartheid activity was fueled in the mid to late 1960's by a social milieu that encouraged a more militant critique of society and which motivated people to organize and participate in political issues. Militant white and black activists framed their concern with apartheid in more radical, anti-racist, anti-capitalist terms. This position is perhaps best identified with activists who tried to push the civil rights movement into the realm of a more radical black power movement.

Leaders such as Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and H. Rap Brown enunciated the liberationist perspective of African events as a context for the struggle for civil rights at home. Frequent reference is made by Malcolm X and leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

(SNCC) to the relationship between liberation struggles in South Africa and other African nations, and issues facing black Americans.[31]

The white, student-based, New Left movement articulated this position as well. African liberation struggles lent a tangible focus to the New Left's critique of Western imperialism and the call for participatory democracy. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) used South Africa as a focus for organizing during a brief period of time. SDS activists mobilized demonstrations between 1965 and 1966 to challenge the financial support received by the South African regime from banks such as Chase Manhattan and First National City, and prestigious Universities such as Princeton. The relative importance of these campaigns to the complexion of the anti-apartheid movement is illustrated in Figure IV-4. However, SDS virtually abandoned its South Africa focus after the escalation of United States involvement in Vietnam offered a more concrete focus to its organizing efforts.

The Civil Rights Community

By the middle 1960's, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the voice of more moderate civil rights leaders on African affairs,

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[31]. See "The Ballot or the Bullet" by Malcolm X. Also see "SNCC Speaks For Itself," "SNCC Position Paper: Vietnam," and "What We Want" by Stokely Carmichael. These documents can be found in The Sixties Papers: Documents of a Rebellious Decade by Judith Clair Albert and Stewart Edward Albert (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1984.) Also look at Southern Africa/Black America--Same Struggle/Same Fight by Bill Sales (Harlem, NY: Black Liberation Press. 1977).

organized itself primarily around South African issues. The organization's South Africa position reflected the tenor of the civil rights movement. ANLCA stood for "stronger U.S. action against South Africa, including prohibition of future investment, discouragement of the continuance of subsidiaries of plants owned by Americans, American support for U.N.-sponsored economic sanctions, imposition of an oil embargo, rigid adherence to an arms embargo, and abandonment of the practice of excluding blacks from the U.S. diplomatic mission to South Africa" (White, 1981).

For the most part, ANLCA and moderate civil rights leaders only took limited action toward challenging apartheid. They essentially vocalized an anti-apartheid perspective but never chose to mobilize people around the issue. Martin Luther King, for example, gave the issue a high profile in his speeches. As he traveled to Oslo, Switzerland to receive his Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, he repeatedly included South African issues in his speeches[32]. To his credit, King did do some fundraising in 1965 to support the efforts of six Zulus seeking asylum in the United States.[33]

But, unlike the Pan-Africanist's and the New Left, ANLCA and the mainstream civil rights leaders never invested resources into a large

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[32] "Dr. King Bids West Act On South Africa," The New York Times, December 8, 1964.

[33] "Dr. King Asks Aid for 6 Zulus Seeking Asylum," The New York Times, April 5, 1965.

education or mass organizing campaign (White, 1981).[34] This prompted George Houser of the American Committee on Africa to label their actions as a "rather elitist, nonmovement approach to Africa" (Houser, 1976:22). Despite this criticism, ANLCA's activity accounted for an upswing in civil rights participation in campaigns against anti-apartheid, as illustrated in Figure IV-3. This activity also largely accounts for the government as target of the anti-apartheid movement between 1960 and 1965 (see Figure IV-4).

Students

The American Committee on Africa continued to push the anti-apartheid movement in a more proactive direction as the 1960's progressed. In league with New Left groups like SDS and students in New York City schools, ACOA initiated, during the mid-1960's, what Metz (1986:383) calls "the first major anti-apartheid effort in the U.S."

This campaign targeted financial institutions. The goal of the campaign was to force Chase Manhattan and First National City Banks to stop lending money to the South African government. The campaign began in 1966 when students at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia

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[34]   One of the few activist projects undertaken by ACOA and ANLCA involved successfully lobbying the U.S. government to stop an aircraft carrier from docking at Capetown, South Africa in 1965. The premise for this effort was that black soldiers would face discrimination when they went ashore. For more information, see Houser (1976); "Call At Capetown By Ship Opposed," The New York Times, February 2, 1967; and, "U.S. Carrier Cuts Visit To Capetown," The New York Times, February 6, 1967.

University, working with ACOA, conducted a depositors withdrawal campaign against First National City Bank in New York.[35]

ACOA broadened this effort in late 1966 by organizing the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid with A. Philip Randolph as co-chair. The Committee's goal was to halt a $40 million dollar credit arrangement held by Chase Manhattan, First National City and a consortium of eight other banks with the South African government.[36] The initiation of this campaign is reflected in the increase in student involvement in the anti-apartheid movement, as recorded in The New York Times between 1965 through 1969 (see Figure IV-3) and in a new focus on the financial community as a target of movement activity (see Figure IV-4).

The bank campaign received significant publicity at the time. It had the consequence of bubbling over into other realms of activity. One specific direction this campaign took was that the students of Union Theological Seminary used the bank campaign to draw attention for the first time to their university's investments in banks such as Chase Manhattan and First National City, and in corporations with operations in South Africa.[37]

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[35]   "Students Urge Boycott of Bank Over Branches in South Africa," The New York Times, March 14, 1966; "City Bank Unmoved By Student Demand," The New York Times, March 19, 1966; "Students Here Stage Bank Run To Protest 'Apartheid Support'," the New York Times, April 21, 1966.

[36]   "Anti-Apartheid Group Tells Of Bank Withdrawals Here," The New York Times, December 6, 1966; "300 Here Protest South Africa Loans," The New York Times, December 10, 1966.

[37]   "Students Urge Boycott of Bank Over Branches in South Africa," The New York Times, March 14, 1966.

Student's concern for their university's investments continued to expand over the next few years into a major tactical campaign for anti-apartheid activists. Students protested at Cornell University, The University of Wisconsin, Princeton University, and Barnard College. Demonstrations turned to sit-ins at Princeton and violence occurred at Cornell University during the latter 1960's.

This university activity fits clearly into a broader cultural and intellectual awakening developing on campuses during the late 1960's to early 1970's. South African investments were raised as a way of accusing universities and colleges for lacking sensitivity to race issues on campus and abroad. Investments were also used to challenge the university's place within a broader world capitalist system. Thus, the South Africa issue contributed vigor to the agendas of various groups on campus, particularly civil rights groups, black militants, and New Left activists.

By the end of the 1960's, university and college administrations began to respond to Anti-apartheid protests on their campuses. Cornell reacted by partially divesting some stock holdings from corporations involved with South Africa,[38] Princeton rejected divestment, though it did pledge to not make new investments in companies with primary operations in South Africa. Princeton also established a faculty-student committee to overcome racism on campus, and in South Africa.

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[38]   "Sale of Bank Stock Disclosed at Cornell After Campus Clash," The New York Times, March 10, 1969.

The growth of student activism on university and college campuses is illustrated by its strong presence in the data set of articles from The New York Times, particularly during 1968 and 1969 (See Figures IV-3 and IV-4). This activity is especially noteworthy because the targets of these campaigns began to respond, concretely, to protester's demands. There were greater opportunities for students, as a marginal group, to leverage their way onto university and college agendas, than for them to secure access to agendas of other institutions, such as within the financial community.

Religious Groups

Just as The American Committee on Africa's bank campaign spun off into campus protests, it also spun off into a stockholders' campaign, first against financial targets, then against corporate targets. These campaigns were, for the most part, promoted by the religious community. The significance of stockholders' campaigns is visible in the record of events in The New York Times data set. Figure IV-3 shows that religious/stockholder activists were visible from 1965 through 1969. Figure IV-4 shows that the financial community was a target of movement activism between 1965 and 1969, and corporations were a target of activity between 1967 and 1969.

The first stockholder resolution involving financial relationships with South Africa was raised in 1967 by James Foreman, former Director of the Congress on Racial Equality, at the national meeting of Morgan Guaranty

Trust. Morgan Guaranty Trust was one of the banks participating in the consortium of financial institutions which held a $40 million credit arrangement with South Africa.[39]

George Houser (1976:23), the Director of ACOA at the time, said this about the implications of the stockholders' tactic:

> Considerable publicity was given to the annual stockholders' meetings of both Chase and First National City Banks. Some depositors and stockholders went to the meetings, or gave their proxies to ACOA representatives, to protest the loans to South Africa. This was the beginning of an effort which rapidly expanded to include investments not only in banks but in large American corporations doing business in souther Africa, particularly South Africa.
>
> Of all American institutions, the churches were the most receptive to this campaign. They were subjected to pressures, particularly from their black membership, to withdraw their investments from those corporations involved significantly in South Africa. This led to organized efforts within the denominations to look into their investments, and to take actions which could influence corporate policy. In the period of the formation of these committees, ACOA played an important role.

Resolutions dealing with credit arrangements were expanded to include corporate responsibility for any economic relationship with South Africa. At first, anti-apartheid activists in ACOA and other organizations conducted investigations into the economic links between U.S. corporations and South Africa investments. Activists then used this information to

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[39]   "Morgan Banik Scored at Meeting On Share in South African Loan," The New York Times, March 16, 1967.

publicize corporate deeds through testimony before the United Nations,[40] and in stockholders meetings.

As indicated by Houser, church groups were very receptive to this campaign. It is well worth noting that church groups have a long history of involvement, primarily as missionaries, with the continent of Africa. The United States churches in particular have been rather sensitive to race issues in the post-World War II period. They played a visible role challenging nazism and fascism during the War, as well as challenging segregation in the United States between the Fifties and Sixties. The World Council of Churches brought the issue of racism to the forefront of church debate with the establishment of the Program to Combat Racism (that program focused primarily upon racism in South Africa during 1972) [Deats, 1981].

During the middle 1960's, churches began to place consideration of racism in South Africa on their own agendas. The executive council of the Episcopal Church, for example, called on all Episcopal dioceses and parishes to consider "the moral dilemma" they face by profiting from church investments in South Africa.[41] Consideration of the moral implications of apartheid characterized the church campaign against corporations. In the

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[40]   "Princeton Alumni Group Set Up To Oppose Coeds and Protests," The New York Times, March 13, 1969; "Wide Drive Against U.S. Trade With South Africa is Expected," The New York Times, February 7, 1971.

[41]   "Kennedy's African Trip Is Praised By Harriman," The New York Times, June 21, 1966.

words of Rev. W. Sterlling Cary, president of the National Council of Churches:

> The United States companies have made huge profits there (in South Africa) while paying their black workers pitifully inadequate wages. They have provided products for the white government and military, thereby strengthening white control. They have helped create a flourishing economy -- for whites.[42]

Church organizations responded to this moral challenge by banding together to wield their large portfolios and raise the issue of apartheid within the board rooms of the corporations themselves. The Board of Missions of the Methodist Church voted to remove a $10 million investment portfolio from First National City Bank in 1967 and the United Church of Christ voted to remove $2 million of investment in other participating banks.[43]

In summary, as the 1960's ended, the anti-apartheid movement maintained a solid base within both challenger interest and member interest constituencies. Although each constituency approached the anti-apartheid issue from a slightly different angle, in general, there was increased support for directly challenging those institutions economically collaborating with South Africa.

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[42] Quotation drawn from "Churches Press Businesses on African Holdings," The New York Times, January 17, 1973.

[43] "Bank Here Facing Church Sanctions," The New York Times, September 30, 1967; "Church Is Leaving Bank As A Protest," The New York Times, February 10, 1968.

The next portion of this chapter examines the changing status of South Africa with respect to the foreign policy agenda of the United States. In this section, U.S. policy interests as well as the changing complexion of policy in the 1960's is investigated.

GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

Federal policy-makers became rather active around South African issues during the 1960's. According to the data set of events recorded in The New York Times, this activity was marked by two peaks: one in 1963 and one in 1966 (Figure IV-5). If legislative and executive level actors are distinguished from one another, it becomes clear that the 1963 peak is driven by executive level activity and the smaller 1966 peak is driven by legislative activity (Figure IV-6).

During the Sixties, federal activity around South African issues is linked to greater sensitivity to the problems associated with apartheid in South Africa. This sensitivity was encouraged by events both at home and abroad. But, this sensitivity had its limits. Policy in the Sixties illustrates the willingness of federal policy-makers to criticize apartheid despite their clear unwillingness to act in ways that might jeopardize the stability of U.S. economic and military interests in South Africa.

This section takes an in-depth look at federal-level policy activity throughout the 1960's. For purposes of clarity, this section is divided into two parts, each reflecting the periods surrounding peaks of federal government activity.

The Early to Mid-1960's

The Sharpeville massacre provoked an immediate response in the United States not just from the community of activists already sensitive to the issue of apartheid but from policy-makers in Congress and the Executive Branch as well (see Figure IV-5). Immediately following Sharpeville, the State Department "expressed regret" over the events[44] and supported international efforts to have the apartheid issue placed on the United Nations Security Council agenda.

But governmental concern with Sharpeville was short-lived. According to the data set of events recorded in The New York Times, there was an immediate flurry of federal government activity just after the Massacre (March, 1960) and virtually no activity for the rest of the year (see Figure IV-2). Once South Africa restored order in their nation with repressive measures, the urgency of the situation appears to have faded away. It was not until the Kennedy administration was inaugurated in 1961 that a more substantive reconsideration of African policy was initiated.

Whereas the Eisenhower Administration paid little attention to African events, the Kennedy Administration seemed more sensitive to the limitations of United States policy toward South Africa. Kennedy had previously chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and in that role spoke out against American duplicity in the region. Referring to Africa, Kennedy said, "We have deceived ourselves into

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[44]   "Police Violence In South Africa Criticized by U.S.," The New York Times, March 23, 1960.

believing that we have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one with this head in the sand policy--when in truth, we have earned the suspicion of all."[45]

Concern for South Africa benefitted Kennedy's campaign as well since domestic racial concerns also played a major role in presidential politics during 1960. Kennedy courted civil rights interests and tore them away from the Republican Party, their political home since the era of Lincoln and the Civil War. Kennedy understood the importance of bringing African-Americans into the New Deal coalition. He brought them in by demonstrating acute sensitivity to their concerns, Africa being one of them (Krieger, 1983).

But Kennedy's concern for Africa was still overshadowed by his support for economic and military interests in the region and by his fervent anti-communist stance. While Kennedy was more attentive to the internal politics of African nations, he still grappled with defining an appropriate balance between his dislike for apartheid and support for "the national interest".

Once Kennedy was in office, South Africa took on a relatively low priority for his administration (Danaher, 1985). Kennedy was overwhelmed by other foreign policy issues including Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam, and the Congo during his short tenure as President. In the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre (1960), however, public opinion about United States policy toward

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[45]   Quote originally cited in Waldemar Nielson, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 278.

South Africa had shifted. The Kennedy administration perceived a broad consensus over the undesirability of apartheid and the issue now was what to do about it. Facing domestic and international pressure for substantive action, the Kennedy administration stepped up its verbal denunciations of apartheid.

International pressure was mounting within the United Nations. On a verbal level, the United States was critical of apartheid; substantively, however, the United States resisted acting upon that criticism with diplomatic or economic sanctions. Within three weeks of asking the United Nations to condemn South Africa in 1962, the United States voted against a General Assembly call for economic sanctions against South Africa.[46]

By 1963 the United Nations was moving closer toward imposing economic sanctions against South Africa, and the United States was prodded by domestic and international pressure to see if its action would finally match its rhetoric on this issue. Responding to its critics, but also to avoid the embarrassment of appearing to be pressured into action, the Kennedy administration declared that the United States would unilaterally halt all

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[46] See "South Africa Pressed by U.S. To Modify Policy of Apartheid," The New York Times, October, 25, 1961 for an example of United States' verbal condemnation of apartheid and see "U.N. Vote Scores South African For Race Policy," The New York Times, November 14, 1961 where the United States votes against resolutions for expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the call for sanctions. This policy of verbal condemnation without substantive sanctions is also captured in the contrast between "U.S. Asks U.N. to Condemn South Africa's Race Policy," The New York Times, October 20, 1962 and "U.N. For Boycott of South Africa," The New York Times, November 7, 1962.

military sales to South Africa just days before the United Nations voted for an arms embargo.[47] This was the first significant anti-apartheid action undertaken by the United States government.

Excerpts from a statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, on this issue reveal the Kennedy administration's sensitivity toward racial concerns at home and abroad which fueled this decision on arms sales:

> It is all too true that there is scarcely a society of the world that is not touched by some form of discrimination...In my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the vigorous official policy of the Government. But such indignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be abolished with all possible speed...Just as my country is determined to wipe out discrimination in our society it will support efforts to being about a change in South Africa.[48]

On a rhetorical level, Ambassador Stevenson paid homage to mounting pressures on the Kennedy administration to directly tackle racial issues. On a policy level though, Danaher (1985) believes that Kennedy's arms embargo was more symbolic than concrete. Danaher notes that Stevenson included the following proviso in this speech: "There are existing contracts which provide for limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines. We must honor these contracts."

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[47]   "U.S. Tells U.N. It Will Halt Arms Sale to South Africa," The New York Times, August 3, 1963.

[48]   This quote was drawn from the excerpts of Adlai Stevenson's speech reprinted in the "U.S. Tells U.N. It Will Halt Arms Sale to South Africa," The New York Times, August 3, 1963.

This caveat allowed the Kennedy administration to honor a previously negotiated contract allowing the United States to maintain a space tracking station in South Africa in exchange for American weapons. Despite the United Nations arms embargo, South Africa was able to continue expanding its military capabilities. Kennedy's position, while lacking in substance, allowed the Administration to symbolically appear to support isolating South Africa from participation in the international community while continuing to protect United States economic and military interests in the region.

In essence, during the early to mid 1960's, President Kennedy continued to walk the line between economic and military interests, and moral concern for apartheid, established by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Forces external to the Administration--particularly activity within the United Nations and domestic pressure from civil rights leaders and public opinion--were able, however, to shape the policy debate surrounding foreign policy relations with South Africa.

The Johnson Administration Takes Over

Between 1964 and 1969, President Kennedy's definition of concern for South Africa (i.e. criticize apartheid while protecting military and economic interests in the region) persisted on the governmental and decision agendas. President Johnson essentially extended Kennedy policies in the region.

South Africa remained a lucrative marketplace for U.S. corporate activities throughout the decade of the Sixties. During this period, United States investments in South Africa continued to expand and yield a consistently high rate of return--between 17% and 23% (Table IV-1). In a U.S. News and World Report public opinion poll, business leaders in America actually expressed support for apartheid as a political system legitimately working to solve South Africa's problems.[49]

But there was increasing momentum within the United States to isolate South Africa as Johnson entered office (see Figure IV-1). The President was unable to devote significant energy to this problem, however, as his resources were largely expended protecting civil rights and battling black militants at home, funding the War On Poverty, and fighting a tactical nightmare in Vietnam.

Johnson officially continued to condemn apartheid while maintaining an amicable relationship with the South African government. Over time, though, even the symbolic denunciations of apartheid became standard operating procedure and nonthreatening (Danaher, 1985).

Johnson did extend Kennedy's arms embargo to cover additional military products such as materials used to construct weapons. Responding to the requests of civil rights leaders in 1964 and 1965, U.S. aircraft carriers were steered away from docking in South African ports for

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[49]   Danaher (1985) reports on the results of this poll which was first presented in Ogene, Francis C., Group Interests and United States Foreign Policy on African Issues (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1974) p. 278.

shore leave because South Africa made it known that apartheid restrictions would apply to minority members of the ship. In 1966, Johnson also prevented the sale of a French jetliner housing General Electric engines to South Africa.

The Johnson administration also followed the lead of President Kennedy by continuing to participate in United Nation's debates on South Africa. The United States even pushed symbolic condemnation of South Africa a bit further in 1964 by supporting a United Nations resolution to study the practical legal and economic consequences of imposing sanctions on South Africa.[50] And in 1967, U.N. Ambassador Goldberg denounced apartheid as "one of the greatest offenses against human rights still existing in the world".[51] One year later, Vice-President Humphrey called for self-determination in South Africa.[52]

Congress Becomes Involved

Throughout the 1960's, United States foreign policy toward South Africa was largely driven by Presidential initiatives. According to events recorded in The New York Times, Congress was not an active participant in the policy debate during the first half of the decade (Figure IV-6).

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[50] "U.N. Will Assess A Sanction Move On South Africa," The New York Times, June 19, 1964.

[51] "Goldberg Assails Apartheid," The New York Times, March 22, 1967.

[52] "Humphrey Scores 3 White Regimes," The New York Times, January 6, 1968.

Congressional voices were beginning to be raised by 1965 however, with a peak of activity in 1966.

Aware of the Administration's weak substantive position regarding apartheid, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa held its first hearings into United States policy interests in South Africa during the middle Sixties. These hearings were designed mostly to serve as information sessions. As a legislative body, Congress gave no indication that it was willing to get involved in making foreign policy.

The boldest signal of legislative interest came from one individual: Senator Robert Kennedy. Kennedy announced in 1965 that he would travel to South Africa in 1966 as an invited guest of the National Union of South Africa students.[53] During his internationally publicized trip, Kennedy labeled apartheid "one of the evils of the world" and likened it to serfdom in India, mass slaughter in Indonesia, and the jailing of intellectuals in the Soviet Union. The New York Times said Kennedy's speech was "one of the most important by a visitor to South Africa."[54]

For all the rhetoric, however, Kennedy still put forth a pro-corporate perspective of South African events. Upon his return to the United States, Kennedy applauded South Africa's economy as "the greatest force in breaking apartheid." He adamantly opposed any cut-off in United States

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[53]   "Robert Kennedy to Visit South Africa," The New York Times, October 24, 1965.

[54]   "Kennedy Denounces Apartheid as Evil," The New York Times, June 7, 1966.

trade with South Africa. Senator Kennedy encouraged big business to maintain their ties to South Africa and to offer racial equality in the workplace.[55] While, Kennedy brought more public attention to the issue of apartheid, he also helped to defend United States' economic and military interests in the region, as traditionally defined.

In summary, the policy agenda regarding South Africa changed somewhat during the Sixties. It became more important to criticize apartheid rather than to ignore it. Importantly though, this criticism continued to be tempered by the government's concern for economic and military interests in the region. Despite the development of a broad-based anti-apartheid movement challenging institutional investment patterns (sometimes successfully), the national government continued to maintain a primary interest in protecting the United States alliance with South Africa, with only a distant secondary interest in raising concerns about the apartheid system.

ANALYSIS

Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, the United States orchestrated a foreign policy which related to South Africa primarily in terms of economic and military/geo-strategic interests. Moral concern for apartheid was, historically, a non-issue as far as the foreign policy agenda was concerned.

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[55] "Kennedy Urges an Equality Policy," The New York Times, June 15, 1966; "Kennedy Says He Favors Johnson Re-election in '68," The New York Times, June 20, 1966.

It was not until the 1960's that the United States took a public, substantive, stand against apartheid.

Problem, political and policy stream changes preceded elevation of concern for apartheid to a more central location on the governmental agenda during the Kennedy administration, and then the decision agenda with passage of the arms embargo against South Africa. This new definition of the South Africa situation persisted on the policy agenda during the Johnson years.

Despite renewed rhetoric over apartheid and policy developments such as the Kennedy arms embargo, this redefinition of the South Africa problem actually deviated only slightly from the Truman and Eisenhower era, however. Economic and military interests continued to reign supreme in the Sixties. Criticism of apartheid was appropriate as long as it was convenient and inconsequential. This analysis considers how Anti-apartheid activists attempted to affect problem, political and policy streams in the Sixties, and also considers how these streams eventually shaped the definition of the South Africa problem on the policy agenda in the Sixties.

Problem Streams

Problem streams contain factors which affect problem recognition and definition. They can be disturbed by crisis, symbols, feedback, and personal experiences. Problem streams surrounding South Africa policy were most profoundly influenced by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. This crisis severely dramatized the violent base upon which apartheid politics was

founded. The massacre captured the attention of the world and altered the terms of debate that persisted throughout the Sixties.

The anti-apartheid movement seized upon the Massacre and tried to use it as a means for educating the U.S. public, but also as a means of legitimating its own existence and establishing a more solid base for the anti-apartheid movement within a broader network of interests. Anti-apartheid sentiment was previously a challenger group interest promoted mostly by supporters of Pan-Africanism. By the Fifties, more mainstream civil rights leaders began addressing the issue. Labor and religious groups (members of the civil rights coalition) also supported these efforts.

The Sharpeville massacre renewed energy within the movement for continued action. It helped motivate mainstream civil rights leaders to internationalize the civil rights agenda between 1962 and 1964, and it helped motivate labor organizations, religious groups, and students--a mixture of challenger and member interests--to solidify their involvement in Anti-apartheid issues by the middle Sixties.

Sharpeville also enraged third world member nations in the United Nations. These nations proceeded to invest energy into calling for United Nations' condemnation of South Africa. The United States was already sensitive to its international reputation regarding its stance toward racial issues. It was also sensitive to how other African nations, recently emerging into independence, perceived the role of the United States in African affairs. Kennedy later responded to U.N. anti-apartheid activity.

Thus, the Sharpeville massacre, as a major problem stream disturbance, indirectly influenced foreign policy in the United States. It encouraged political stream developments by reinvigorating anti-apartheid action, by encouraging international condemnation of apartheid and initiating United Nations debates, and by swaying public opinion swaying against South Africa.

Political Streams

Political streams are the essence of politics because they involve the "balance of power." These streams are defined by the state of conflict between contending forces. Political streams can be influenced by elections, public opinion, media, the interests of public officials, and resources.

The anti-apartheid movement attempted to influence political streams in the Sixties by broadening its base of support and deepening its constituents' level of commitment to battling apartheid. The movement tried to pressure President Kennedy into acting against South Africa. Though Kennedy did raise criticisms of apartheid to a more central location on the policy agenda, it was not a direct response to anti-apartheid movement activity per se, as much as it was a response to broad-based concerns of African-Americans, pressure from public opinion, and anti-apartheid action at the United Nations.

As the data set drawn from The New York Times articles displays, Anti-apartheid activists seized upon the Sharpeville Massacre to renew their call for economic sanctions against South Africa. Within a short period of

time (1962 to 1964), anti-apartheid sentiment gained solid footing within the mainstream Civil Rights movement camp. Civil rights leaders lobbied President Kennedy for economic sanctions.

When the movement was able to expand the scope of mobilization by reaching out to religious groups and students, the anti-apartheid movement took a new tact. This mix of challenger and member interests organized mass mobilizations to attack credit arrangements held by financial institutions with the South African government, corporate operations in South Africa, and college and university portfolios with South African-related investments.

But, despite growing levels of mobilization, the anti-apartheid movement was bereft of direct influence in political streams which might promote criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda and decision agendas. The political stream developments of major influence in this process were the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency, the role of African-Americans in this election, and the state of civil rights in the United States.

The Executive Branch traditionally controls the character of foreign policy. Such was the case with South Africa policy in the Sixties (see Figure IV-5). When President Kennedy came to office in 1961, he was already sensitive to African affairs. This coupled with the fact that African-Americans played a major role in delivering the Presidency to Kennedy, insured that there would be a new sensitivity to African issues at the White House.

Thus, anti-apartheid sentiment was influential at this time in that it resonated with the agenda of African-Americans, not because the anti-apartheid movement was able to create leverage within the political system and manipulate public officials into taking a stand against apartheid.

At the same time, the United States was being maneuvered into an embarrassing position by the United Nations. Given domestic racial problems in the early Sixties, the U.S. was interested in appearing sensitive to racial concerns among its international allies. It had to support United Nations actions, or fear being branded as a racist nation. The United States' international reputation was important as well because of the rising tide of African independence movements. Kennedy did not want to be labeled as insensitive to African issues and shut out of having influence on the African continent.

Thus, it was problem and political stream developments--the election of Kennedy and pressures he faced--that primarily drove criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda. But it took policy stream developments before the issue moved to the decision agenda, preceding imposition of an arms embargo against South Africa.

Policy Streams

Policy streams contain the range of available policy solutions. This range can be affected by scholars and think tanks which research policy areas and make recommendations, or they can be affected by the accumulation of new knowledge by policy-makers.

The anti-apartheid movement tried to affect prevailing policy streams in the Sixties primarily by promoting anti-apartheid policy solutions which lacked a place on the governmental agenda. For the most part, activist initiatives never reached the governmental agenda during the Sixties. Instead, President Kennedy did respond to apartheid with a policy solution raised at the United Nations.

The anti-apartheid movement promoted economic sanctions as their preferred solution to apartheid during the early Sixties when the Movement was dominated by civil rights leaders. When more militant voices were raised within the Movement (The New Left, Black Militants), institutional economic relationships with South Africa were challenged. The Bank Campaign targeted financial institutions which provided revolving credit to the South African government. This Campaign evolved into the Stockholder's Resolution Campaign which directly challenged corporate investments in South Africa, and divestment campaigns on university and college campuses.

The movement had moved to a more confrontational position by the end of the Sixties. Activists called for severing economic relationships with South Africa as a means of isolating that nation from the international community.

Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson accepted this policy solution. Instead, Kennedy seized the moment in 1963 and unilaterally called for an arms embargo to be levied against South Africa. This policy solution was initially raised at the United Nations. Kennedy

instituted the embargo just prior to the United Nations forcing a vote on the issue. By imposing an arms embargo prior to this vote, Kennedy appeared to be sufficiently critical of apartheid without having been pressured into this position, and without jeopardizing U.S. strategic interests in the region.

In sum, anti-apartheid activity was, at best, driven by external events in the early Sixties. Activists were able to use the Sharpeville massacre for educational and organizing purposes and they were able to draw strength and legitimacy from the United Nations debates condemning South Africa.

The anti-apartheid movement strategically chose to confront investment practices of institutional investors (and thereby confront principles of capitalism), a tactic that was moderately successful in the Sixties. The more radical anti-apartheid movement position of severing economic collaboration with South Africa did not move from the systemic agenda to the governmental agenda; however, it is important to note that this position did move to the institutional and decision agendas of various colleges and universities, a precedent that may have helped to shape later governmental events and policy decisions.

Throughout the Sixties, foreign policy was driven by Presidential politics. Legislative entrepreneurs like Senator Robert Kennedy tried to present a more forceful position on the issue, but Congress never seriously became involved in the making of South Africa policy.

The liberationist position was raised in the United Nations, and endorsed by anti-apartheid activists in the United States. The Kennedy

administration preempted this effort by raising a reformist solution--the weapons embargo--to the decision agenda. Because of this development, United States policy appears to have shifted against the South African government during the Sixties. In reality, symbolic appeals won out as the Kennedy administration was able to continue conducting business-as-usual with South Africa as an economic and military ally.

Figure IV-1
Anti-apartheid Activity: 1960-1969

Source: The New York Times

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
Figure IV-2
South Africa-related Activity: 1960

Source: The New York Times

Figure IV-3
Movement Actors: 1960-1969

Events

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69

Year

Anti-apartheid   Civil Rights/Black

Students   Religious/Stockhldr

Source: The New York Times

Figure IV-4

Movement Targets: 1960-1969

Figure IV-5

U.S. Government Activity: 1960-1969

Source: The New York Times

Figure IV-6

U.S. Government Actors: 1960-1969

Source: The New York Times

TABLE IV-1

EARNINGS AND RATE OF RETURN ON
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA .
(millions of dollars)

YEAR	EARNINGS	RETURN (%)
1960	50	17.5
1961	61	21
1962	72	23
1963	82	23
1964	87	21
1965	101	22
1966	224	23
1967	128	21
1968	111	17
1969	127	18
1970	141	18

Source: Francis C. Ogene, Group Interests and United States Foreign Policy on African Issues (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1974), pp. 277-278.

TABLE IV-1 (cont.)

U.S. TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA
(millions of dollars)

CHANGE	1960	1970	PCT.
EXPORTS	277	563	+103
IMPORTS	200	288	+44

Source: Francis C. Ogene, Group Interests and United States Foreign Policy on African Issues (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1974), pp. 277-278.

CHAPTER V

MOVEMENT CONSOLIDATION AND

A CHANGING NATIONAL INTEREST: 1970 TO 1979

This chapter is primarily concerned with the development of the anti-apartheid movement and new policy directions taken by the United States federal government toward South Africa between 1970 and 1979. The Seventies was a dynamic period within which the anti-apartheid movement was able to consolidate its resources and to conduct a national campaign organized around linkages between U.S. corporate activity in South Africa and support for apartheid. By the end of the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement was successfully fighting for divestment on college and university campuses, and in local communities.

During the Seventies, the national policy agenda shifted between ignoring apartheid and condemning it. These shifts directly corresponded with Presidential initiatives toward South Africa. Congress began to assert itself in foreign affairs issues in the Seventies. As the Seventies ended,

legislators were able to move anti-apartheid legislation to the governmental agenda of Congress.

The questions addressed in this chapter include: 1) How did anti-apartheid movement strategies and tactics change in the Seventies? 2) What were the driving forces behind national policy developments during the Seventies? 3) What is the relationship between legislators moving anti-apartheid legislation to the governmental agenda of Congress, presidential initiatives in South Africa policy, and anti-apartheid movement activity?

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT:
CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANDING INFLUENCE

The anti-apartheid movement continued to flourish throughout the Seventies, according to events recorded in The New York Times. As illustrated in Figure V-1, other than in 1970 and 1975, movement activists maintained a visible presence in the media. There was a peak of activity recorded in The New York Times in 1978.

The anti-apartheid movement was sustained largely by religious groups conducting stockholder campaigns in the early to mid-Seventies, and by civil rights/black organizations and students in the latter Seventies (Figure V-2). Campaigns against financial institutions had ceased by 1972. An anti-corporate focus largely dominated the movement in the 1970's and there was a peak of anti-university/college activity during 1978 and 1979.

This section divides the Seventies into two periods corresponding with the pace of anti-apartheid movement activity during the decade.

Movement activity between 1970 and 1975 is first examined, then activity between 1976 and 1979 is developed. In addition to the nature of movement activity--the composition of actors and their targets--this section focuses on the consolidation of movement resources, shifting definitions of the apartheid problem within the Movement, and changes in the policy solutions it preferred.

Consolidation and Conflict: 1970 to 1975

The political and social context of the early 1970's was influenced most clearly by an explosion of social movement participation: The Anti-Vietnam war movement, the Civil Rights movement, and the Black Power movement. Other social movements were also being spawned as the United States entered the Seventies: The Ecology movement, the Womens' Rights movement, and the Gay and Lesbian rights movement. This social milieu combined with President Nixon's reversal of the Kennedy/Johnson position on South Africa propelled the anti-apartheid movement to higher levels of mobilization in the United States.

The primary actors in the anti-apartheid movement continued to be many of the groups active during the Sixties: stockholders, religious groups, civil rights and other black activist groups (see Figure V-2). As the Movement grew during this period, there was increasing support for the consolidation of scarce resources. New organizations, such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, TransAfrica, and The Washington

Office on Africa, were founded to offer better coordination of movement efforts.

Unlike the diversity of foci during the Sixties however, during the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement also became more unified in its anti-corporate focus (see Figure V-3). As the Movement grew and began sharing resources, it reformulated its position with respect to the best strategy for effectively attacking the apartheid system. Two examples of anti-corporate efforts by anti-apartheid movement activists during the early Seventies follow. These examples illustrate not only the importance of the anti-corporate focus to the Movement, they also illustrate the shifting understanding of the best strategy to effectively challenge apartheid.

The Corporate Shareholders' Campaign

The anti-corporate strategy was designed to hold corporations directly accountable for the consequences of their operations and investments in South Africa. It was a strategy which emerged from a growing understanding of the important relationship between economic activity in South Africa and support for apartheid. During the Seventies, this strategy was pursued largely by institutional investors such as church organizations. As one important church leader put it,

> If our corporations make some of the highest profits in the world while doing business there (in South Africa), and we as institutional investors benefit from those profits, we then directly profit from apartheid.[56]

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[56] Quoted in "Churches Press Businesses on African Holdings," The New York Times, January 17, 1973.

The contemporary corporate responsibility movement was kicked off in 1971 with an Episcopal Church-sponsored shareholder resolution asking General Motors to withdraw from South Africa. This resolution was "an early, active expression of the 2.8 million member church's opposition to apartheid" (The Corporate Examiner, 1985:3A).

Investor representatives attended stockholder meetings and directly raised the anti-apartheid issue to the corporate agenda by introducing anti-apartheid resolutions for consideration by the full voting body. These efforts constituted the cutting edge of the anti-apartheid movement between 1971 and 1975, according to The New York Times data set.

In 1971, Protestant churches involved in stockholders' campaigns and working with the National Council of Churches consolidated their resource base and established the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). According to ICCR's current Director of South Africa programs, Donna Katzin, ICCR's mission was "to coordinate the work of our members in promoting corporate responsibility in the areas of priority which our members have selected...The top priority area is South Africa. Other top priorities are militarism, equal opportunity and alternative investments."[57]

Church groups were not unfamiliar with the use of stockholder resolutions as a means of creating a voice in the consideration of broader social goals. Churches first became aware of their investment power during the efforts to challenge U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the latter

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[57]   Interview with author, October 27, 1988.

Sixties. Dow Chemical, for example, was the focus of many church-sponsored resolutions because of their production of Napalm for use in the jungles of Vietnam. "(Our constituents) discovered during the Vietnam War that while many churches were protesting for peace, they were up to their eyebrows in Dow Chemical."[58]

Since its inception, ICCR was responsible for researching social profiles of corporations, exploring alternative socially-conscious investments, and assisting church groups in the filing of shareholder resolutions.

Early church participants involved in challenging corporate activities in South Africa included the American Baptist Churches, The Protestant Episcopal Church in the USA, the United Methodist Church, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Unitarian-Universalist Association, as well as the National Council of Churches, the Methodist Church, and the Roman Catholic Franciscans.[59]

During the early 1970's, shareholder resolutions sponsored by coalitions of these church groups were raised at the national meetings of Chase Manhattan Bank, Fidelity Trust Bank, General Motors, AMAX corporation, AT&T, Union Carbide, ITT, General Electric, Ford, Goodyear, Kraft, Polaroid, Sears-Roebuck, Xerox, Burroughs, Exxon, and Mobil. In 1975, a coalition of 14 Protestant church groups and Roman Catholic orders

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[58]   Ibid.

[59]   "Churches Press Businesses on African Holding," The New York Times, January 17, 1973; "Church Groups Hit Corporations," The New York Times, January 26, 1974.

representing $9 million of stock brought a proposal to the IBM shareholders meeting asking it to stop selling or leasing computers to the South African Government.

During the early Seventies, stockholder resolutions typically fell into two categories: fact-finding resolutions and limited disengagement resolutions. Fact-finding resolutions called upon corporations to either disclose their full range of operations and investments in South Africa or called upon corporations to establish special committees to investigate the implications of their investments in South African projects, paying special attention to employment conditions for black South Africans. The second, less frequently invoked, category of resolutions proposed that corporations cease from directly supporting the institutional apparatus enforcing apartheid in South Africa. Sometimes this included ending sales of equipment to police, and other times this included totally shutting down manufacturing operations in South Africa.

The results of the church-based stockholder campaign were mainly symbolic at the time, but significant nonetheless for potentially influencing national problem and policy streams. First, churches firmly committed themselves to a public, moral stand, not just against apartheid, but against racism in South Africa. They educated millions of lay people about the economic linkages between consumer-oriented, business-as-usual in the United States and support for the apartheid regime. Church-based resolutions effectively legitimated concern about apartheid for a broad middle-class public in the United States. A range of policy solutions

including economic sanctions, divestment and disinvestment were suggested by this activity.

Second, the church-based stockholders' campaign put the anti-apartheid issue squarely on the corporate agenda. Corporate leaders were forced into the position of having to support the moral goals of the churches' battle against racism while simultaneously having to defend their firms' investments in South Africa.

Corporate leaders ultimately responded to this challenge by denying the relationship between corporate investments in South Africa and the continuation of apartheid. They stated very clearly that they were in business to make money, not foreign policy.[60] Some tried to characterize their investments as bettering conditions for their black employees. This excerpt from a newspaper story about General Motors illustrates this point:[61]

> While General Motors recognizes the complex issues that result from race restriction in South Africa, its employment record is an indication of the progressive change which has occurred over the years. The corporation is convinced that its operations in South Africa are helping to build a climate in which desired social changes can be further implemented.

Thus, for the first time, the anti-apartheid movement employed leverage manipulation to maneuver corporations into a position where they had to defend their investments in South Africa. This defensive position-

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[60] "IBM Cites Export Role; Boeing Net Lags; Limiting of Business Abroad Is Held to Lost Jobs Here," The New York Times, April 25, 1972.

[61] "A Black Director of G.M. Will Vote Against the Board," The New York Times, April 9, 1971.

taking by corporate leaders during a period of more generalized public mistrust of corporations in the early Seventies, helped to reinforce, in the publics' mind, the economic linkage argument: corporate investments in South Africa became synonymous with support for racism.

Public pressure against corporations intensified. General Motors was especially embarrassed, in 1971, when the newly appointed African-American member of their Board of Directors, Reverend Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia, voted in favor of an Episcopal resolution calling for G.M. to close its plants in South Africa.[62]

Of course, the corporate rhetoric opposed apartheid, as David Rockefeller said while defending Chase Manhattan's economic activity as a stockholders' meeting:

> "None of us at Chase Manhattan holds any brief for the South African Government's policy of separation of the races," said David Rockefeller while defending Chase Manhattan's economic activity in South Africa at a stockholders' meeting.[63]

But the reality of the corporate position in the Seventies is illustrated by this excerpt from The New York Times:

> Following the growing debate in the last year on American business involvement in South Africa, several United States companies operating in this country have increased pay and improved working conditions for their black employees.
> But recent investigations also show that, out of some 300 subsidiaries or affiliates of United States corporations in South Africa, only a few--probably fewer than 10 per cent --are attempting to improve the lot of their black workers. The rest are largely

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62   Ibid.

63   "New Annual-Meeting Note: Social Protest," The New York Times, May 28, 1967.

content to slouch behind a curtain of apartheid restrictive labor laws that limit opportunities for black advancement in white industry.[64]

Perhaps the most significant development to come out of the shareholders' resolutions campaign was that the anti-apartheid movement was, for the first time, able to construct a national, widely publicized campaign around the connection between corporate behavior, institutional investments and apartheid politics. Anti-apartheid activists used this tactic to demand that the public consequences of private investments--such as the impact of support for racism--be publicly scrutinized.

The Polaroid Workers' Campaign

Just as more militant anti-apartheid activists in the sixties were frustrated with the moderate approach taken by civil rights leaders, some elements of the anti-apartheid movement were frustrated by the moderate approach of using resolutions to challenge corporate activity in South Africa. They wished to make a more direct assault against corporate operations.

This frustration is best symbolized by a highly publicized campaign which directly attacked corporate policies at the Polaroid Corporation. This campaign was orchestrated by workers at a Polaroid Plant working in collusion with the American Committee on Africa during the early Seventies. This effort was called the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement (PRWM)

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[64] "Few U.S. Concerns Aid Africa Blacks," The New York Times, August 19, 1972.

In reaction to public attention on South Africa, Polaroid had previously announced that it would initiate a pilot project to improve black South African salaries, job opportunities and education for its employees.[65] The PRWM launched a pubic campaign to expose the duplicity of this policy (Houser, 1976). They argued that Polaroid's pilot program ultimately supported the continuation of apartheid because it failed to address underlying problems facing blacks in South Africa (e.g. their inability to participate in political and legal structures).

The Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement wanted to initiate a worldwide boycott of Polaroid products. While the PRWM was unable to ever mount an effective international boycott against Polaroid, the controversy drew substantial attention from the mass media.

Why was this campaign significant? White (1981) outlines the implications of this campaign as follows. First, Polaroid publicly committed itself to a policy of opposition to apartheid and it acknowledged the importance of trying to change apartheid through company action. Second, this event signalled the entrance of the black community into the corporate responsibility debate. And third, this entrance pushed the debate about corporate responsibility beyond the church position of responsibility through reform. It raised the policy solution of total corporate disengagement from South Africa as a method for ending apartheid.

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[65] "Polaroid, Under Attack, Plans to Aid Some South African Blacks," The New York Times, January 13, 1971.

This debate of reform versus disengagement pierced through both the black and religious anti-apartheid communities during the early 1970's. In 1972, the World Council of Churches moved toward the more militant approach by "liquidating its financial stake in all corporations doing business with white-ruled African countries."[66] This action, including approximately $3.5 million in corporate stock, was designed to serve as an example for the Council's 250 Protestant and Orthodox member churches. It took until the latter half of the Seventies for other churches to begin totally divesting their own assets from corporations involved in South Africa.

This conflict over policy preferences within the anti-apartheid movement does not overshadow the unity experienced by the Movement during the early Seventies with respect to defining the apartheid problem in both moral and economic terms. The Movement was able to reach out to a large number of people during this period, some consolidation of resources took place, and the Movement moved toward defining the problem with apartheid more forcefully in economic terms.

Movement Mobilization: 1976 to 1979

Up to the mid-1970's overt political resistance to apartheid in South Africa had been driven underground in by the Pretorian regime. During the late 1970's, however, a cultural movement among South African blacks

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[66]   "Church Unit Acts on South Africa," The New York Times, August 23, 1972.

began to fill the political vacuum that had been created during the 1970's.[67] This movement--the Black Consciousness Movement--was particularly popular among urban black intellectuals in South Africa. Political resistance within the urban townships was kindled by internal pressures such as the rapid urbanization of the black population in response to rural poverty and an overwhelmed urban bureaucracy.

Turmoil in the South African townships came to a head when the South African government tried to enforce cultural hegemony through the Bantu Education Act. This policy decreed that black children would be educated in the language of Afrikaans, a Dutch dialect, not in their native Bantu language.

Urban areas exploded in June 1976 under the weight of township pressures and the Afrikaans language policy. Most notable of these explosions was the Soweto uprisings. Six hundred lives were lost when these uprisings were violently suppressed by the South African police. This "marked the culmination of black consciousness as a political force" (South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency, 1986).

The 1976 uprisings brought renewed international attention to the apartheid regime. The depth of the apartheid problem was made apparent when Steven Biko, a popular leader of the Black Consciousness Movement was illegally detained, then tortured and murdered by the South African police in 1977.

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[67]   See South Africa in the 1980s: State Of Emergency (1986) for a history of the 1976 uprising in South Africa.

It was against this background of renewed repression in South Africa that the United States anti-apartheid movement surged in activity between 1976 and 1978. This surge was reflected in The New York Times coverage of United States anti-apartheid movement events (see Figure V-1).

The movement consisted of more ardent activity from its traditional political constituents: the religious community (stockholders), students, the civil rights community (see Figure V-2). Some neighborhood/ community-based activity also emerged during this period. According to events recorded in The New York Times, the anti-apartheid movement primarily targeted the government in the 1976 to 1977 period, corporate targets in the 1977 to 1979 period, and universities and colleges between 1978 and 1979 (see Figure V-3).

The Civil Rights Community

Between 1976 and 1979, moderate civil rights organizations rallied strongly around the apartheid issue. As in the 1960's and early 1970's, traditional black leaders avoided a mass-based mobilization strategy and instead pursued a conventional lobbying campaign. Prominent leaders of the now diminishing Civil Rights movement focused their individual and group pleas on political leaders. This was the case, for example, in 1976 when Rev. Ralph Abernathy, President of the SCLC, and other black leaders appealed to Secretary of State Kissinger not to meet with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.[68]

The election of President Carter and Carter's subsequent appointment of Andrew Young as Ambassador to the United Nations was interpreted by the African-American community as a symbol of greater access to the foreign policy-making process. This effort brought renewed anticipation to the civil rights community and it continued to encourage leaders concerned with apartheid issues to pursue an "inside" strategy more closely associated with the power of member interests rather than an "outside" strategy that challenger interests must follow. Black leaders continued to appeal to President Carter to "leave no stone unturned" in the fight against apartheid.[69]

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[68]   Untitled, The New York Times, June 22, 1976; "U.S. Blacks Meet On South Africa," The New York Times, August 24, 1976.

[69]   "Black Leaders Appeal to Carter For Meeting on Jobless 'Crisis'," The New York Times, November 5, 1977.

Civil rights participation in apartheid issues expanded, and became more radical, when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Task Force on Africa was mandated to develop a meaningful policy position toward South Africa. The report of this committee in 1978 wholeheartedly endorsed corporate divestment and economic sanctions (White, 1981). In 1978, the NAACP membership passed a resolution at their national meeting calling for the total pullout of U.S. businesses from South Africa.[70] Later in the year they called for a wide range of sanctions to be imposed on the Pretorian regime.[71]

Renewed civil rights action was also visible at a conference of black religious leaders in New York City. White (1981:96) describes the significance of this conference:

> Religious leaders from thirty-eight states and fifty-two cities rejected the gradualism of the Sullivan principles, demanded immediate economic disengagement of US corporations from South Africa, and passed a resolution declaring 'its unequivocal support of the national liberation struggle waged by the South African people under the leadership of the African National Congress.'

Jesse Jackson emerged as an outspoken opponent of apartheid in 1979. The New York Times first recorded his participation in the issue when he and other African-American leaders lobbied Sonny Werblin to stop a boxing match arranged with a South African fighter.[72] Later in 1979

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[70] "N.A.A.C.P. Calls for Total Pullout By U.S. Businesses in South Africa," The New York Times, January 20, 1978.

[71] "N.A.A.C.P. in Policy Shift, Asks Sanctions Against South Africa," The New York Times, July 9, 1978.

[72] "Efforts to Stop Fight Continue," The New York Times, January 5,

Jackson toured South Africa and met with blacks in squatter camps and U.S. corporate executives operating in South Africa.[73] While more activist in orientation, Jackson still pursued insider tactics (i.e. lobbying elites) in his efforts.

The insider strategy of civil rights leaders on this issue is perhaps best typified by the role played by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) on African issues. In 1976, the CBC organized the Black Leadership Conference on Southern Africa. This meeting brought together 120 black leaders from major civil rights organizations, business, labor, religion, civic associations and public office. One of the more important developments of this conference was the African-American Manifesto which represented a consensus within the black community for condemnation of United States political and economic support of apartheid and South Africa (White, 1981).

Another important development produced at this meeting was a new organization--TransAfrica. TransAfrica was initiated as the black American lobby for African and Caribbean issues. Randall Robinson was appointed executive director of the organization. TransAfrica's expressed purpose was to "influence the US Congress and Executive branch of Government to fashion progressive and enlightened policies toward the black Third World" (TransAfrica, "History of TransAfrica").

1979.

[73]   "Jesse Jackson Takes Spirited Message to South Africa," The New York Times, July 24, 1979; "Visit by Jesse Jackson Stirs Up a Whirlwind Among Blacks and Whites in South Africa," The New York Times, August 2, 1979.

TransAfrica was initially funded with start-up grants from the National Council of Churches, and the Board of Global Ministries/United Methodist Church. Its goal was to generate elite support and to lobby key public figures in Congress and the Executive branch on issues of importance to the African-American community. Tactically it pursued this goal with cocktail parties, annual dinners, direct lobbying, and testimony at Congressional hearings.

TransAfrica focused primarily upon Rhodesian sanctions throughout its first two years of operation. During this period, Randall Robinson testified several times before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and met with President Carter and Secretary of State Vance on various occasions. White (1981:95) believes that "TransAfrica can claim some credit for the firmness of the Carter administration on sanctions against Rhodesia in 1979-1980." By 1980, TransAfrica set to work almost exclusively on South African policy issues.

The formation of TransAfrica in 1976 represents a consolidation of resources and institutionalization of the "insider strategy" among the African-American civil rights community in the United States. Interestingly, it was public officials who facilitated formation of TransAfrica in order to promote the voice of black Americans in foreign affairs. At this time, the civil rights community identified its interests more as a member of the polity rather than as a challenger of the polity. It responded to prevailing opportunities by avoiding mobilization tactics.

Metz (1986:398) reviews the conditions which fostered this state of

affairs:

> The increase in the number, seniority, and political skill of black congressmen, along with the affinity of the Carter administration for the anti-apartheid program, appeared to create the proper conditions for inside strategies...
>
> This shift to inside strategies, however, took place under very special circumstances. Not only did the anti-apartheid movement have a valuable ally within the administration in UN Ambassador Andrew Young, but it also had the sympathy of the President and the Secretary of State. And perhaps even more importantly, the Soweto riots of 1976 in South Africa and the government crackdown on black opposition to apartheid in the fall of 1977 greatly increased public awareness of the situation in that nation. This meant that the anti-apartheid movement could spend less time on public education and mobilization and more on direct lobbying and legislative activity.

The Stockholders' Campaign

Religious organizations vigorously renewed their attack on the

corporate role in South Africa with stockholder resolutions during the late

Seventies. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility,

the number of proposed resolutions quadrupled between 1975 and 1979

(Figure V-4). Fact-finding resolutions of the early Seventies gave way to

more militant demands for corporate disinvestment in South Africa.[74]

During Spring, 1977, a coalition of Roman Catholic and Methodist

Church groups brought a resolution to the General Electric meeting asking

GE to discontinue their South African operations until apartheid ended. A

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[74] Divestment involves the selling of stock in a company. It can be used by investors to signal their displeasure with corporate policies or practices. Disinvestment is a more militant call for corporations to cease from operating in South Africa by selling their operations there.

similar resolution was brought to the annual meetings of Manufacturers Hanover, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and Goodyear.[75] The United Church of Christ also sent out a broad appeal for corporations and banks to withdraw from South Africa.

The National Council of Churches, representing over 30 million parishioners, urged their member churches to divest their portfolios of investments in corporations and financial institutions operating in South Africa. Local church groups were also encouraged to take independent action with their own investments.

Realizing the potential power of Anti-apartheid activists, corporations seized upon a response that allowed them to seemingly support movement concerns while not harming corporate profit margins. Corporations attempted to coopt movement efforts by supporting a set of fair labor practices devised by Reverend Leon Sullivan, the black Minister sitting on the General Motors Board who voted in favor of the 1971 church-based resolution to close company plants in South Africa.

The Sullivan Principles emerged in March, 1977 as a result of Sullivan's own frustrating efforts to encourage General Motors to leave South Africa. These principles included equal pay for equal work, nonsegregation in the workplace, and development of training programs for

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[75] See "History of ICCR Resolutions on South Africa," from the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility for catalogue of South Africa-related stockholder resolutions proposed between 1975 and 1984.

black workers. In <u>Decoding Corporate Camouflage</u>, Elizabeth Schmidt describes the impact of the Sullivan Principles (1980:811).

> The Sullivan code caught on. In the wake of the Soweto uprisings and the rapid expansion of the divestment movement in the United States, American businessmen had grown apprehensive about the safety of their investments in South Africa. By the end of 1978, there were 105 signatories to the Sullivan principles. One year later, there were 135. The Sullivan plan for fair employment practices received nothing but praise from official circles. Written in consultation with U.S. business leaders, the Principles were hailed by the State Department "as a potentially major force for change in South Africa" and given the "strong support" of the United States government.

The importance of the Sullivan Principles should not be underestimated. Since stockholders' campaigns were first initiated, corporations and banks tried to delegitimize claims made by anti-apartheid activists and defend their financial interests in South Africa. These institutions disavowed any relationship between their operations in South Africa and the system of apartheid.

However, the rapid rate at which corporations affirmed their adherence to the Sullivan principles signalled two new developments. First, by pledging to improve conditions for their South African workers, corporations accepted the anti-apartheid movement's claim that they bear responsibility for the consequences of their activities in South Africa. Second, quick adoption of the Sullivan principles affirmed the mounting power of the anti-apartheid movement. The movement was having more success influencing corporate agendas vis-a-vis the power of investment portfolios, than it was having influencing national foreign policy vis-a-vis lobbying tactics.

The anti-apartheid movement was also able to win other tangible successes in the battle against corporate operations in South Africa during the late Seventies. Polaroid, the company which initiated a pilot program to better conditions for black workers in its South African plants, stopped shipping its products to South Africa after learning that its film was being used by the South African police for passbook identification.[76] Also, Control Data, a computer company, cited repression in South Africa as a reason for adopting a policy of nonexpansion in that nation.[77]

On the other hand, the Sullivan Principles offered a method for multinational interests to substitute reformism for the more militant disinvestment orientation of the anti-apartheid movement. This corporate tactic seems to have been effective since by 1978 the stockholder's campaign became a less important component of the anti-apartheid movement. By 1977 to 1978, students were defining the cutting edge of anti-apartheid movement activity.

The Student Movement

Primarily through experiences with the Vietnam war and civil rights struggles, a culture of protest, so to speak, had developed on college and university campuses in the United States. By the late Seventies, students knew that protest was an effective vehicle for promoting strongly held

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[76] "Polaroid Severs Business Links To South Africa," The New York Times, November 23, 1977.

[77] "Control Data, Scoring Repression, Plans No Expansion in South Africa," The New York Times, October 26, 1977.

concerns. They had the knowledge and experience to assure that their protest campaigns would be effective.

Against this background, student protesters became reinvolved in campus-based Anti-apartheid activity in 1977 and 1978 (see Figures V-2 and V-3). Students campaigned to encourage colleges and universities to divest their portfolios of investments in businesses operating in South Africa. According to Stevens and Lubetkin (1981:126):

> The South African issue tapped into the growing belief, initially by some students and faculty and later by administrators and trustees, that universities did not exist independently from the country's economic system and that by virtue of their ownership of corporate securities they were inextricably involved in the actions of the corporations in which they held investments.

In 1977, Anti-apartheid protests were held at the University of Massachusetts, The University of California at Berkeley (400 arrested), and at Smith College. The student movement picked up steam in 1978 with protests at Stanford University (294 arrested), Ohio University, Princeton University, Brown University, Miami University, Harvard University, Williams College, Rutgers University, Tufts University, Phillip Exeter Academy, University of Michigan, Hampshire College, Brandeis University, and Columbia University. The New York Times reflected on student Anti-apartheid campaigns in 1978 with the headline "South Africa is New Social Issue for College Activists."[78]

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[78]   "South Africa Is New Social Issue for College Activists," The New York Times, March 15, 1978.

Campus protests engendered a variety of outcomes. In some rare cases, such as at the University of Massachusetts, institutions voted for total divestment.[79] More frequently, institutions rejected divestment. Such was the case with the California Board of Regents in 1977.[80]

The most typical reaction by higher education institutions in the late 1970's was a mid-level response. Like corporations, universities and colleges often acknowledged that apartheid was a problem, but, based on financial constraints (or simply a lack of resolve on the issue), they approved resolutions only to endorse investments in corporations which supported the Sullivan Principles. In some cases, schools partially divested themselves of stocks in companies which refused to sign the Sullivan Principles or in companies which refused to adequately respond to inquiries about their South African operations. Such was the case at Smith College and Rutgers University.

The Student campaign experienced rapid growth in 1978. But, this campaign was significantly different from other anti-apartheid activities taking place in the late Seventies. The major difference was that the students had more access to the decision-making structures at colleges and universities than stockholders did at corporations, or African-Americans did with policy-makers. The result was a greater rate of success at promoting

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[79] "University of Massachusetts Bars South Africa Involvement," The New York Times, September 16, 1977.

[80] "California Regents Reject Proposal to Sell Holdings," The New York Times, September 17, 1977.

their interests and moving the issue onto the agenda of targeted institutions. Between 1977 and 1979, 26 higher education institutions divested approximately $87 million of stocks in corporations involved in South Africa (see Table V-1). And, campus divestments were on the upswing as the Seventies ended.

The success of the student campaigns in the late 1970's infused the movement with a sense of empowerment. They brought widespread media attention and public awareness to the apartheid issue. College and university divestments symbolized the power of the public to exert influence over the direction of investment monies. Pressure was increased on corporations to leave South Africa and on policy-makers to respond to apartheid.

The Community-Based Movement

The turn toward local, grassroots action was reflected in another direction of the anti-apartheid movement during the late Seventies. At the very end of the 1970's, a community-based, neighborhood movement began organizing for divestment at local, county, and state levels of government.

This campaign was born in 1979 when Berkeley Citizens' Action, a white, activist organization blending New Left politics with Alinsky-style organizing, placed a binding referendum before voters on city investments in corporations involved in South Africa. This successful initiative, the first of its kind, called upon the city to withdrawal $10 million in city funds from banks with loans to South Africa. Another measure, passed at the same

time in Berkeley, prohibited city investments in banks that make "indirect" loans by lending to corporations operating in South Africa. Sean Gordon of Berkeley Citizens' Action stated that the measures were intended "to stimulate similar initiatives elsewhere in the country."[81]

This grassroots organizing approach proved at the end of the Seventies to be an effective tactic for building local support for opposition to apartheid. It is important to note, however, that this campaign for local divestments first took hold in University dominated towns where the on-campus movement had already been strong or in progressive states with historically liberal governments. In 1980, Cambridge, Massachusetts and Davis, California passed ordinances prohibiting new investments in firms operating in South Africa; and, Michigan passed a law prohibiting the deposit of state funds in banks making loans to South Africa.

As the Seventies closed, the anti-apartheid movement was thriving. Vigorous protests were taking place in a wide array of arenas by a diverse group of actors: African-Americans were lobbying national policy-makers for economic sanctions, religious groups were raising disinvestment resolutions at stockholders' meetings, students were protesting and getting arrested on college and university campuses, community-based organizations were combining elements of protest, lobbying, and electoral politics to encourage local, county and state-level divestments. The trend at this time

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[81]   "Berkeley Votes to Bar Its Funds From South Africa and Curb Marijuana Enforcement," The New York Times, April 19, 1979.

was squarely in the more militant camp of ending economic collaboration with South Africa. Successes were being won within the arenas which offered the greatest opportunities for access to policy by Anti-apartheid activists. The next section of this chapter refocuses attention to national foreign policy developments taking place in the United States during the Seventies.

GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

According to events recorded in The New York Times, the national government maintained a relatively stable level of involvement with South African affairs throughout Seventies (Figure V-5). Brief peaks of activity correspond to the Soweto massacre (1976) and the inauguration of Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy initiatives (1977-1978). Government activity is largely driven by the Executive branch activity between 1970 and 1979 (Figure V-6).

As this section demonstrates, presidential initiatives and events in South Africa had more influence over the national foreign policy agenda during the Seventies than did anti-apartheid movement activity. While anti-apartheid policies did move to the governmental agenda briefly during the Seventies, they did so at the behest of legislative entrepreneurs. Their efforts did not garner enough support, however, to effectively challenge presidential initiatives in the area of South African relations.

Nixon, Kissinger, and the Executive Branch

The Seventies began with policy-makers giving a low priority to South African issues vis-a-vis the governmental agenda. Although President Nixon undertook a policy review of the U.S. relationship with South Africa when first elected in 1969, once his policy course was established (by 1970), the issue took on less importance. The national legislature attempted to consider the U.S. role with respect to South Africa in 1971 but, by 1973, South Africa was off the governmental agenda. It was left to the Ford administration in 1974 and 1975 to revive concern for the policy area.

Upon entering the White House in 1969, President Nixon ordered his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to review major foreign policy issues confronting the new administration. South Africa was included on this list. In December 1969, National Security Study Memorandum 39 was presented to the National Security Council. It outlined the contradictory nature of United States interests in South Africa and assessed the substance of previous South Africa policy choices. This report said:

> The aim of present policy is to try to balance our economic,
> scientific, and strategic interests in the white states with the political
> interests of disassociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes
> and their repressive racial policies. Decisions have been made ad
> hoc, on a judgment of benefits and political costs at a given moment.
> But the strength of this policy--its flexibility--is also its
> weakness...[U.S.] objectives are to a degree contradictory--pursuit of
> one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the

others. Moreover, views as to the relative priority among these objectives vary widely...But the range of feasible policy options is limited.[82]

Kissinger's policy review concluded with a list of options. These options ranged from the U.S. improving its relationship with South Africa to the U.S. disassociating itself from the white regime. Coker (1986:19) summarizes these options:

OPTION 1: Closer association with the white regime in order to better protect America's economic and strategic interests. It assumed that the United States could have no significant impact on events in South Africa, and that the political costs of underwriting the status quo would not be excessive.

OPTION 2: Closer association with Pretoria in an effort to persuade it to reform the political system. It assumed that black violence would be unavailing, even counter productive. Constructive change could only be brought about by the acquiescence of the whites themselves.

OPTION 3: Strictly limited cooperation with South Africa in an attempt to safeguard its interests while at the same time adopting a posture acceptable to world opinion. Such a posture need not entail giving up its material interests.

OPTION 4: Dissociation from South Africa and closer relations with the black nationalists. Since the interests of the United States were not vital, this seemed a reasonable price to pay.

OPTION 5: Dissociation from both sides in an attempt to limit American involvement. The racial conflict in Southern Africa was unmanageable and potentially dangerous and would grow worse despite any efforts the West might make.

It is believed that Kissinger recommended Option 2 (Coker, 1986).

This option assumed that "the whites are here to stay" and the blacks have "no hope" of achieving political rights through violent means. Option 2

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[82]   Excerpts from National Security Study Memorandum 39 are quoted in South Africa: Time Running Out (1981), page 351.

encouraged President Nixon to work for "constructive change" by dropping the rhetoric about racial injustice in South Africa and by encouraging reform of apartheid through friendly support of the white regime.

President Nixon ultimately adopted Option 2. It was, in essence, an extension rather than a challenge to the middle road policy established by previous presidential administrations. It embodied a recognition of the comity of United States and South Africa economic and military interests. But, while Nixon's South Africa policy shifted the balance of policy more in favor of the interests of the white regime, the administration simultaneously recognized the importance of not isolating the United States from the international community--specifically black states in Africa--that opposed apartheid. To solicit the support of these black nations, Nixon offered economic assistance to the Southern Africa region. He was able to justify his South Africa policy in terms of protecting United States interests abroad while working with the South African regime to reform apartheid restrictions. According to Kissinger:

> We can by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial polices [sic] and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states help to draw the groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change.[83]

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[83]   "Kissinger Ordered A Secret '69 Study On Southern Africa," The New York Times, October 13, 1974.

Attempting to encourage the Pretorian government, the Nixon administration offered "positive sanctions" to South Africa.[84] These sanctions were intended to lure South Africa toward reform rather than to reward South Africa for reforms after completion.

Positive sanctions came primarily in two forms: relaxation of credit restrictions established during the Johnson administration and gutting the arms embargo levied by President Kennedy. In the first example, Johnson had authorized Export-Import credit restrictions on South African loans during his administration. The political benefit of this for Johnson, according to Danaher (1985), was to minimize U.S. involvement with the South Africa economy and to resist further domestic and international pressures to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. These restrictions were revoked by the Nixon administration.

Nixon also eased arms embargo restrictions against South Africa. President Nixon authorized the selling of "dual-use" items to the South African military. These items, mostly aircraft, could fall under either civilian or military use categories. President Nixon also allowed items specifically designed for military applications to be sold to civilian buyers with approval from the Departments of Commerce and State.

Nixon's role in the United Nations during the early Seventies also reflected his general strategy of backing away from publicly criticizing South

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[84]   Much of the following discussion about positive sanctions is drawn from "Two Case Studies of Positive Sanctions," Coker (1986), Chapter 5.

Africa while trying to maintain an image of not supporting apartheid. The United States abstained from a 1970 vote in the United Nations to tighten arms embargo restrictions and, for the first time, the U.S. cast a negative vote when the annual anti-apartheid resolution was considered in the General Assembly.

In the final analysis, the means of "positive sanctions" quickly became separated from the ends of reforming apartheid. South Africa benefitted from a more liberal United States policy stance without offering anything in return.

By 1971, Nixon's South African policy was in place. He was now able to push the issue aside and devote more attention to pressing problems in Southeast Asia and to building a detente-based relationship with the Soviet Union. Throughout the rest of Nixon's tenure, his administration gave low visibility to the issue and the policy agenda remained stable. Nixon's policy of "benign neglect" (Coker, 1985) is reflected in the lack of news articles about Nixon's role in South Africa appearing in The New York Times between 1971 and 1973 (see Figure V-6).

But while Nixon was trying to minimize publicity on South African affairs, some legislators and candidates in the 1972 presidential election pushed to have South Africa considered on the foreign affairs agenda.

Legislators and Candidates Attempt to Become Involved

The Executive branch of government (the President, Secretary of State, the State Department) has traditionally had sole charge of defining

and implementing United States policy toward South Africa. Congress has historically acquiesced to this situation. After a series of questionable foreign policy adventures (the Bay of Pigs, the Tonkin Gulf incident, troop escalations in Vietnam, the secret war in Laos), however, legislators, in the early Seventies, tried to position themselves so that they could be more involved with foreign policy issues. With Anti-apartheid sentiment clamoring in the streets, in corporate boardrooms, as well as in college and university hallways, a number of legislators began to raise questions about the United States' role in South Africa and brought their concerns to the governmental agenda.

Nixon's policy of "constructive engagement" outraged an already mobilized social movement during the early Seventies and motivated individual Congresspersons such as Senators Kennedy and McGovern, and members of the Black Congressional Caucus, to speak out against U.S. policy toward South Africa. This voice was registered in The New York Times where a rise in legislative activity can be observed between 1970 and 1972 (see Figure V-6).

Anti-South Africa legislation moved to the governmental agenda of Congress for the first time in 1971. In that year, legislation to extend the Sugar Act of 1948 for three years came before the legislature. Bills to cancel the South African sugar quota, which committed the United States to importing a quota of 60,000 tons of South African sugar a year, were introduced into both the House and Senate. Efforts to prohibit sugar

imports from South Africa were eventually rejected by both chambers in 1971.[85]

Those opposed to canceling the South Africa quota believed that the United States should not involve itself in the internal affairs of its friends. This position sounded very similar to United States attempts during the Fifties to define apartheid as an internal problem not subject to United Nations action. Responding to the Senate bill which was introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Russell Long said that South Africa was a dependable supplier of sugar and "if we undertook to say that we were not going to trade with somebody unless we agreed with their domestic policies about segregation or other matters, we would find difficulty trading."[86]

The House version of the Anti-South Africa legislation was sponsored by Representative Charles Diggs, then Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and member of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC was formed in 1971 to unite African-American members of Congress and to multiply their respective power. Like the rise of urban

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[85] The Senate defeated the Kennedy bill 45-47 in one form, and then 42-55 when the issue was brought up again. The House never voted directly on deletion of South African quotas from the Sugar Bill. Instead, House members attempted to defeat the closed rule with which the Sugar Bill was reported out of committee. Under the closed rule, amendments such as the deletion of South African quotas were barred from consideration. The closed rule was adopted by a vote of 213-136.

[86] Quoted in <u>Congress and the Nation: A Review of Government and Politics</u>, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, Vol. III, 1969-1972, pp. 343.

black mayors, formation of the CBC reflected the electoral power of black voters which emerged from voting rights legislation of the Sixties.

The Congressional Black Caucus was first chaired by Representative Charles Diggs. From the outset the CBC was particularly concerned with representing the agenda of African-Americans. One of these issue areas was United States policy as it affected Africa (Dixon, 1984). Once organized, the CBC quickly moved to apply pressure on the Nixon administration to take a stronger position challenging apartheid in South Africa.[87]

During February, 1971, Representative Diggs and Representative Ron Dellums, another member of the CBC, joined three white Representatives for a House Subcommittee on Africa trip to South Africa.[88] Diggs returned to South Africa in August, 1971 for a fact-finding tour investigating working conditions for blacks in American corporations.

The Congressional Black Caucus attempted to shape South Africa into an election issue for the 1972 Presidential election. The Caucus issued a "Black Bill of Rights" which they defined as nonnegotiable demands for African-Americans to support the Democratic nominee. Included in the list

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[87]   "Administration Under Pressure to Take a Stronger Stand on the White Regimes in South Africa," The New York Times, February 25, 1971.

[88]   "Black Congressman Leave South African and Whites Stay," The New York Times, February 23, 1971.

was the demand that American business investments in South Africa should be discouraged.[89]

Following the 1972 Democratic convention, the Party nominee--Senator George McGovern--established a study group on Africa to outline his African policy positions. McGovern's position was very critical of Nixon's African policy for putting the United States in "league with racist and oppressive forces in Africa." In addition to standing against colonial forces in Africa, this report stated that a McGovern administration would end the system where corporations and individuals are given income tax credits for any payments made to South African authorities.[90]

Thus, despite Nixon's conciliatory policy initiatives toward South Africa, entrepreneurial Black legislators, liberal white legislators, and, generally speaking, the Democratic Party, brought anti-South Africa sentiment into legislative and campaign politics during the early Seventies.

The fact that legislative involvement arose suddenly in 1971 and vanished just as suddenly by 1973, and that the anti-apartheid movement (especially the shareholders' campaign) was waxing in strength at the same time, indicates that the anti-apartheid movement was only tangentially involved in the issue reaching the governmental agenda at this time. The movement may have indirectly created a context within which

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[89] "House Caucus Lists 'Black Bill of Rights'," The New York Times, June 2, 1972.

[90] "Nixon Denounced On Africa Policy," The New York Times, November 5, 1972.

entrepreneurial legislators drew some support, but the dynamics of the issue reaching the governmental agenda suggest that individual legislators acted out of personal concern, or to promote personal gain or institutional gain in a foreign policy battle with the President, rather than as a response to the demands of mobilized constituents.

The next section examines the activity of national policy-makers in the middle to late Seventies.

The Ford Years

The policy agenda concerning South African affairs remained rather constant once Gerald Ford became President in late 1973. Henry Kissinger remained as Secretary of State and the policy direction pursued by President Nixon remained in place. By 1974, however, Portugal's withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola together with escalating racial conflict in Rhodesia put United States policy toward southern Africa into a crisis-management phase of operation during the remainder of the Ford administration (Danaher, 1985).

Liberation efforts in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau had been organized for more than a decade. United States policy-makers neglected to recognize the importance of these movements until it was too late. Once colonial powers were cast off, the U.S. government was left without a base of support among these newly emergent black nations. The Rhodesian conflict was also erupting at this time. To preserve national interests in the region (i.e. economic links between Africa and the West),

the United States tried to mediate between Frontline states, Britain, and South Africa.

In April 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger actively engaged in shuttle diplomacy by visiting Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia and Senegal. He also met with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. With this meeting, Kissinger became the highest ranking United States official to visit South Africa.[91] Kissinger reportedly offered Vorster "incentives" for South Africa to make concessions on Rhodesia. These "incentives" included more liberal International Monetary Fund credit arrangements, in addition to the symbolism of the public meeting.

Responding to African-American pressure to lend greater visibility to African issues, Kissinger initiated meetings with black leaders such as Jesse Jackson and Judge William Booth, Chairperson of the American Committee on Africa, and with organizations such as the National Urban League in 1976 to "sell" Ford's African position.[92]

Danaher (1985:126) describes the substance of these meetings:

Although Kissinger initiated these meetings on southern Africa, the black leaders brought their own agenda. They demanded that: Washington communicate to Pretoria in strong terms its opposition to the race policies that had precipitated recent rioting; Kissinger disclose the content of his talks with Prime Minister Vorster; the U.S. grant political asylum to South African refugees; and an official black American fact-finding team visit South Africa. The black politicians

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[91]   "Kissinger's Meeting With Vorster Opens On A Hopeful Note," The New York Times, September 18, 1976.

[92]   Also see "U.S. Blacks Meet On South Africa," The New York Times, August 24, 1976, for media coverage of these meetings.

and civil rights leaders also suggested that Washington pressure American corporations to improve working conditions for their black South African employees.

By the end of 1976, new conditions forced a shift in the United States policy agenda once again. Urban uprisings and the Soweto Massacre in South Africa forced policy-makers to reconsider the relationship that the United States was procuring with South Africa. This new agenda development meshed with the Human Rights initiatives of the Carter administration, which began in 1977.

The Carter Administration: Human Rights or Rhetoric?

The Carter administration came to office with a new foreign policy team. This team was more sensitive to the internal dynamics of African affairs. It was also more committed to human rights as a guiding principle of foreign policy. Government activity surrounding South Africa exploded in 1977 (see Figure V-5) and this explosion was driven almost exclusively by Executive branch reaction to the Soweto Massacre and Carter's new human rights agenda (see Figure V-6).

The Soweto uprising coincided with the timing of the Presidential primaries in 1976. South Africa was thrown, once again, into presidential politics. The Democratic party accepted platform statements affirming an anti-South Africa position at its national convention during Summer, 1976. The Democratic party adopted all the South Africa-related positions put forward by the leadership of the civil rights community at its national convention, Summer 1976. These positions reflected the policy solutions

defined by the anti-apartheid movement in the early Seventies and signaled an emerging consensus that the United States government needed to condemn apartheid in stronger terms. The Party planks specifically called for:

- An Africa-centered policy, and not a corollary of the kind of antiSoviet strategy that produced the Angola fiasco;

- Increased participation of black Americans in the formulation of foreign policy;

- Strengthening the arms embargo against South Africa; and,

- Denial of tax advantages to all U.S. corporations in Rhodesia and South Africa who support or participate in apartheid practices and policies.[93]

Democratic Party sensitivity to the African-American agenda on African affairs was further concretized when Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States in November 1976. Jimmy Carter moved into the White House in 1977 with moral concern for human rights issues. He immediately nominated Andrew Young, an outspoken veteran of the Civil Rights movement as Ambassador to the United Nations.

Before the new administration was sworn in, Young signalled that a shift in the South African policy agenda would be taking place. This shift was to be expressed both in foreign policy and in the positions adopted by the United States at the United Nations.[94]

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[93]   Quoted in Danaher (1985), pages 137-138.

[94]   "Young Expects New Administration to be 'Aggressive' in Advancing Majority Rule in Southern Africa," The New York Times, January 3, 1977; "Conflict in U.N. Role Is Doubted By Young," The New York Times, January 14, 1977.

Carter assembled a foreign policy team that was quite aware of the track record of "containment," the foreign policy principle justifying intervention in affairs of other nations in order to contain Soviet influence around the world. This track record included humiliation in Vietnam and loss of support among independent African nations. Political leadership in the United States had also been discredited by Watergate and the reports of Central Intelligence Agency abuses revealed in the Church Committee hearings.

Carter's foreign policy team consisted of "a new generation of assistant secretaries and bureau directors, most of whom were critical of the preceding administration's conduct of foreign affairs" (Study Commission of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981:356). They supported a "regionalist" perspective rather than the "globalist" perspective of the traditional foreign policy establishment. The regionalist perspective recognized that problems in world affairs tend to have local roots in the political, economic, and social affairs of nations. This perspective respects the principles of self-determination and human rights.

Carter quickly announced his intention to take a tougher stance with South African affairs. According to Danaher (1985:143):

> The regionalists distinguished their strategy from Kissinger's by claiming that whereas the previous administration had let Pretoria off the hook regarding apartheid and Namibia in return for cooperation on Rhodesia, the Carter administration would press for reforms on all three fronts. Pretoria would be expected to assist Washington in bringing about a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian conflict, but would also be pressured to reform the grosser aspects of apartheid

and cooperate with an internationally acceptable transition to independence in Namibia.

But what did this mean beyond the rhetoric composed for public consumption? How far was Carter willing to go in pushing for the reformation of apartheid? At the outset, Carter came racing out of the starting gate. The Carter administration verbally condemned South African President Vorster's regime in harsh terms.

Within three months of coming into office, Ambassador Young labeled reports of people detained by the South African police and then "jumping" out of windows, "savage incidents."[95] He also chastised Britain as "a little chicken" in facing up to racial issues in South Africa,[96] and created quite a stir by condemning South African rule as "illegitimate."[97]

Vice-President Mondale met with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna during May 1977. The two leaders clashed in this meeting over the role of black Africans in the South Africa's future. The New York Times[98] captured the tone of this meeting:

> Vice-President Mondale said today that he had warned Prime Minister John Vorster that unless he undertook a 'progressive transformation' of South Africa's white supremacist policies leading

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[95] "Young Cites 'Savage Incidents'," The New York Times, February 18, 1977.

[96] "Young Calls Britain 'A Little Chicken' On Racial Matters," The New York Times, April 7, 1977.

[97] "Young Sets Off Furor By Agreeing South Africa Rule Is 'Illegitimate'," The New York Times, April 16, 1977.

[98] "Mondale Meets Vorster in Vienna On Southern African Issues Today," The New York Times, May 21, 1977.

to full political and social equality for the black majority, the United States would be forced to undertake diplomatic steps against that nation.

This meeting was quite significant because it was the first interaction between South Africa and the Carter administration. It was also unprecedented for a high-level United States official to call for full political participation on the part of blacks and an end to discrimination in South Africa. For the first time, Mondale "used the concept of 'one-man-one-vote' to describe the preferred future for South Africa's political system" (Danaher, 1985:157). Mondale said the meeting "cleansed" the United States of the "moral blemish" created by past administration policy toward South Africa.[99]

Andrew Young then rubbed salt in South Africa's wounds when he followed Mondale to that nation. On the day after Mondale's meeting with Vorster, Young was in South Africa espousing use of the civil rights tactic of nonviolence and economic boycotts against the Vorster regime.[100]

Though Carter came on strong in the beginning of his administration, looking good on the race question to the American public, the problem, as Danaher (1985:158) points out, was that "lost in the verbiage was the fact that the Americans planned no specific actions to back up their demands"

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[99]   "Moral Stain Erased By U.S., Mondale Says," The New York Times, May 23, 1977.

[100]   "Young in Johannesburg Urges Boycott by Blacks," The New York Times, May 23, 1977.

An administration review of United States policy toward South Africa came up with these potential actions: (1) withdraw the U.S. military attache from Pretoria; (2) end exchanges of intelligence information with South Africa; and, (3) reduce Export-Import Bank guarantees for investments in South Africa.

These options ranged from symbolic to punitive, but they did not include options which matched the intensity of the Carter administration rhetoric. Nor did these options reflect the systemic agenda of African-Americans. At a time when corporate involvement in South Africa was soaring to new heights--totalling approximately $2 billion in 1976--Carter's policy initiatives did not create room on the policy agenda for the anti-apartheid movement's concern with the linkages between U.S. corporate interests and complicity with racism in South Africa. Also, Carter offered no support for black activists fighting apartheid from within South Africa.

Following the September 12, 1977 death of Steve Biko in South Africa and the government's repressive crackdown on leaders of the black opposition, Carter did support a mandatory United Nations arms embargo against South Africa.[101] However, The United States negotiated to limit the embargo to six months. And, at the same time that he was supporting the arms embargo, Carter vetoed an African-sponsored resolution calling for a ban on foreign investments and credits for South Africa.

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[101] Other Western nations, including Britain, also supported this mandatory UN arms embargo.

A <u>New York Times</u> review of these decisions accurately describes the Administration perspective at the time. Because of the insight of this review, I take the liberty to quote at length from the article:

> In practical terms, the announcement did not really advance United States policy; although Washington has always vetoed arms sanctions against South Africa, it has voluntarily enforced a weapons embargo since 1963. But by supporting the arms sanctions now, the Administration, and the other four Western members of the Security Council, believe that they can soften demands for a blanket embargo on trade.
>
> Washington opposes trade sanctions against South Africa for a variety of political and economic reasons. It also doubts how effective sanctions would be.
>
> Economic. The United States and its allies carry on extensive trade with South Africa, Britain, South Africa's largest trading partner, would have particular difficulty withstanding the financial loss.
>
> Politics. With a strong black caucus in Congress and an outspoken Ambassador in the United Nations and a new policy emphasizing closer ties with black African states, the Administration had to react strongly to South Africa's actions. But other political considerations dictated a more moderate response. South Africa has been a go-between for the United States and Britain with Rhodesia. It has also been negotiating with Western countries a plan for the independence of South-West Africa, a territory it governs in defiance of United Nations resolutions. As the object of trade sanctions, South Africa could hardly be expected to follow Western advice on South-West Africa, Rhodesia, or anything else.[102]

Beyond the rhetoric, economic and military constraints severely crippled the impact of Carter's human rights position with respect to this embattled nation. Though sensitive to the agenda of African-Americans, Carter offered the anti-apartheid movement no substantive inroads into the making of South African policy. President Carter and Ambassador Young ultimately abided by the position that corporate interests can act as a

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[102] "U.S. Goes Just So Far With The Sanctions," <u>The New York Times</u>, October 30, 1977.

progressive force within South Africa. Corporations are, as Ambassador Young told business leader in South Africa, the key to change in that country.[180]

By the end of his administration, President Carter began backsliding on his South African policy. President Vorster of South Africa strategically undertook a counteroffensive to Western "meddling," during South African elections using a platform of anti-Washington rhetoric and political reform. Vorster's National Party won the election with the largest margin of support in its history.

Carter did not respond effectively to this challenge. The globalists among the foreign policy elite began to edge out the regionalists for influence. Carter's position swung back to a position of acquiescence as far as apartheid was concerned. From 1978 to 1980 official U.S. policy preferred to rely upon the idea "that enlightened capitalism would bring interracial harmony and contribute to the eventual demise of apartheid in the same way that it had allegedly undermined entrenched racism in the American South" (Coker 1986:153).

At the end of his term, Carter put his energies into aggressively supporting the Sullivan Code for fair employment practices in South Africa. However, he refused to make the code mandatory and in 1980 refused to link Export-Import credits to observance of this code.

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[180] "Young, in South Africa, Asks Change," The New York Times, May 22, 1977.

Carter maintained a reformist stance at the same time that the anti-apartheid movement was moving toward consensus over the importance of challenging economic linkages between the United States and South Africa and as anti-apartheid issues were moved on to the governmental agenda by a small group of concerned legislators.

Legislators Move Anti-apartheid Policies to the Agenda Once Again

Between 1977 and 1979, a core group of national legislators attempted to bring anti-apartheid policies to the governmental agenda (see Figure V-6). Their efforts reflected the increasing ability of senior liberal, white and black Representatives in Congress to influence the policy agenda. Events in South Africa, cues emitted from the Carter administration, and the increasing popularity of the anti-apartheid movement motivated their actions.

Following the October, 1977 crackdown in South Africa, the House of Representatives passed a bill (347 to 54) condemning the South African regime and called upon President Carter to take effective action. While Carter did temporarily recall the U.S. envoy to South Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus unsuccessfully pressed for more stringent measures: recalling embassy attachés, terminating tax credits for U.S. business with investments in South Africa, downgrading the status of the United States embassy in South Africa, and supporting United Nations resolutions against the Vorster regime (Danaher 1985).

Congress continued to explore new responses to Pretoria throughout the Carter presidency. In January 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa released a report on U.S. corporate activity in South Africa and found corporate racial policies to be "abysmal." Members of the committee urged Carter to do his best to discourage investments in South Africa.[104] Later in the year, members of the Congressional Black Caucus met with Carter to express their support of complete economic sanctions against South Africa.[105] These initiatives, set against the rising tide of anti-corporate resolutions and divestment activities on campuses around the nation, implicitly suggest that this core group of legislators had adopted the economic linkage argument put forth by the anti-apartheid movement at the time.

Punitive sanctions against South Africa were considered by Congress during 1978. This issue emerged during consideration of the Export-Import Bank extension bill, a vehicle that was used to punish South Africa during the Johnson years and then to reward South Africa during the Nixon years. This time, the bill became a "christmas tree" for a variety of legislative "ornaments" including provisions related to trade with South Africa. Anti-apartheid policy items made it not only to the governmental agenda but, briefly, to the decision agenda during 1978.

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[104] "Curb on U.S. Investment In South Africa Is Urged," The New York Times, January 26, 1978.

[105] "Blacks In Congress Seek Curb on Abuse of U.S. Aid," The New York Times, April 27, 1978.

The final version of the bill reported by the House and Senate prevented the Export-Import bank from supporting any export to South Africa which might contribute to the enforcement of apartheid policies, prevented any exports to the South African government unless the President could certify that South Africa is making significant progress toward eliminating apartheid, and prevented exports to any South Africa purchasers unless the Secretary of State could certify that the purchaser has adopted fair employment principles (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1981:63). Carter signed this bill into law during November 1978.

A small group of legislators committed to ending apartheid maintained whatever legislative attention they could to the issue of apartheid. These legislators included members of the Black Congressional Caucus, such as Rep. Charles Diggs, Jr., Rep. Stephen Solarz, Rep. Julian Dixon, Rep. William Gray III, and white liberal members of Congress such as Rep. Howard Wolpe.[106] These House members used the House Subcommittee on Africa as their forum.

While the South African situation had been discussed in committee hearings during the Seventies, until 1978 critical discussions were limited to technical aspects of U.S. policy which resulted in the measures documented earlier: foreign and military assistance, and Export-Import bank policies. Formulation of self-styled anti-apartheid legislation (that is, legislation which directly challenged apartheid politics in South Africa and was designed to

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[106]   Representative Wolpe holds a doctorate in History and is an expert on African affairs.

reshape U.S. foreign policy interests in that area) did not begin in Congress until 1978.

1978 began with the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Rep. Charles Diggs, calling together a hearing to listen to the testimony of Donald Woods, a white South African journalist, former editor of the East London (South Africa) Daily Dispatch. Mr. Woods, one of six whites banned on October 19, 1977 by the South African government, had recently escaped from his country. The following discussion is drawn from the committee hearing:

> Mr. Solarz. Thank you. Mr. Chairman
> Let me follow up on your last observation, Mr. Woods. As you know, I have been working on legislation for sometime now which I am planning to introduce in the very near future, which would legislatively prohibit new American investment in South Africa, and which would also urge those corporations which do have existing investments in South Africa to comply with a kind of good behavior code of corporate conduct involving equal pay, as a condition for various advantages which they are now entitled to, concerning loans and aspects of that sort of thing.
> Given the extent to which the Afrikaner elite has such a deeply rooted commitment, given the extent to which they fear the establishment of majority rule would lead to the undoing of their way of life, in what sense would the adoption of this legislation in any significant way, and obviously I am being the devil's advocate, contribute toward the amelioration of apartheid which we both see. I understand how it would help us politically in terms of our relations with the rest of black Africa and in terms of the way the black majority views the United States, but in what meaningful measurable way could we realistically expect it to contribute to ameliorating apartheid and ----
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> Mr. Woods. You are dealing with the dominant power group, and while his eyes may be shut to reality, and he may be deluding himself, he is no fool. I think that if such a bill could be passed, you would find a perception in the African nationalists, that your country is serious, and he better rethink the entire situation. At the moment, he doesn't think it is serious. The legislation might be able to make the steps progressive and conditional. If by June certain people have

not been freed, this will happen. If by August people have not been unbanned, this will happen. I think you would find that sort of measure would confront the leaders of my country, the white leaders, with, for the first time, the realization they better rethink the situation.[187]

Rep. Stephen Solarz first introduced a bill calling for economic sanctions against South Africa in January, 1978. His bill (H.R. 12463) prohibited all new investments and loans in South Africa and established a fair employment code of conduct for U.S. corporations operating in South Africa beyond 1978. This bill was rather cautiously designed so that a Presidential certification of movement in South Africa toward ending discrimination could be used as a waiver of the prohibition against new investment.

Three additional bills targeting apartheid in South Africa were also introduced in 1978. The strongest of the three bills (H.R. 13272), introduced by Rep. Charles Diggs, was similar to Solarz' bill. It called for a ban on all new loans and investments until the President, concurring with Congress, could determine that substantial progress had been made toward ending apartheid. The mildest of the three bills (H.R. 13262), introduced by Representative Jonathan Bingham, would use fair employment practices as a condition for continued corporate and financial activity in South Africa.

In his testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Africa and International

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[187] "United States Policy Toward South Africa," Hearing held before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations. Washington, DC, January 31, 1978. pp. 10-11.

Economic Policy and Trade, Randall Robinson of TransAfrica threw his organizations's support behind the stronger bill because it would "cause a gradual disinvestment of corporate capital" thus "reducing American corporate support to the Apartheid regime."[108]

Hearings continued to be held in 1979 and 1980 to consider U.S./South Africa political and economic relations, the current status of apartheid, South Africa human rights violations, and consideration of the efficacy of the Sullivan principles.[109] Stephen Weissmann, Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, argues that the authors of anti-apartheid bills felt the mood of Congress was such that economic sanctions legislation would not pass at this time.[110] Therefore, they diluted their bills and continued to search for consensus among other legislators.

Three new South Africa bills were introduced into the House of Representatives during the 97th Congress. These bills were designed to establish fair employment standards for U.S. corporations in South Africa, to ban the importation of South African Kruggerands, and to ban U.S. bank loans to the South Africa government (H.R. 3008); to require the President

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[108] "United States Private Investment In South Africa," hearing before the House of Representatives Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade, September 7, 1978.

[109] See "Current Situation in South Africa," hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, September 6, 1979; and, "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, April 30, May 6,8,13,15,20,22, June 10, 1980.

[110] Interview with author, February 28, 1989.

to issue regulations prohibiting new U.S. Investments in South Africa (H.R. 3597); and to prohibit the sale of nuclear-related materials to South Africa in advance of South Africa compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (H.R. 7220).[111]

Throughout the late Seventies, consideration of fundamental elements of the U.S. policy role in South Africa did not go further than the subcommittee level. Crocker (1981) correctly argues that other than during key periods of crisis (eg. the death of Steve Biko) Africa was not an issue which captured the interest of the whole body of Congress. It remained more within the purview of a small number of African specialists and issue entrepreneurs. However, what Crocker overlooks is that the anti-apartheid issue was planted firmly on the governmental agenda as the Seventies came to a close. The foundation for a continuing battle over South Africa policy was in place as the Seventies ended.

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[111]   Testimony regarding H.R. 3008 and H.R. 3597 was presented during "U.S. Corporate Activities in South Africa" hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 24, October 15,22, 1981, May 18, June 10, 1982. Testimony regarding H.R. 7220 was heard during "Controls on Exports to South Africa," hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 9, December 2, 1982.

ANALYSIS

This chapter has presented an in-depth look at anti-apartheid movement history and national policy developments during the Seventies. During this period, the anti-apartheid movement was able to gain a solid foothold among its traditional constituents, consolidate its resources, and mount successful campaigns throughout the United States. The Movement strategized to economically isolate the Pretoria regime. Movement constituents pursued this goal by targeting a diverse group of institutions to which they had the most access: African-Americans targeted national policy-makers, religious groups targeted corporations, students targeted universities and colleges, community activists targeted local, county, and state-level governments. Regardless of the forums, the anti-apartheid movement rallied for divestment and disinvestment.

The United States foreign policy agenda toward South Africa fluctuated between Nixon's policy of "constructive change" and Carter's human rights policy. Despite the policy differences, however, both presidents ascribed primary concern to economic and military interests rather than moral interests when dealing with South Africa. Each considered the corporate sector a positive force in South Africa, a force able to secure reform of apartheid.

Genuine challenges to apartheid reached the governmental agenda during the Seventies. This was evident in the rhetoric of individual legislators, bills considered by Congress, in the issues relevant to the

presidential contests in 1972 and 1976, and in Carter's early entanglements with the Vorster regime in 1977. The questions posed in this analysis are (1) How did the Anti-apartheid attempt to influence problem, political and policy streams in the Seventies? (2) Which developments within these streams were most responsible for influencing the policy agenda during the Seventies? and, (3) What was the nature of interactions between the anti-apartheid movement and national policy-makers as Anti-apartheid legislation was brought to the governmental agenda and decision agenda?

Problem Streams

Problem streams were relatively stable during the first half of the Seventies. No new crisis developed in South Africa. The public's understanding of apartheid had not changed. Problem streams did become disturbed during the middle Seventies as independence movements throughout Africa came to fruition, the Soweto Massacre occurred in South Africa, Steven Biko was killed by the South African police, and repression in South Africa was sustained.

While there had been general agreement throughout the Sixties and Seventies that apartheid was wrong, the events of the middle Seventies brought forth renewed condemnation of apartheid.

The anti-apartheid movement tried to affect problem streams in the Seventies by raising a new understanding of the problem. To the Movement, the problem was not simply that the Pretorian regime was perpetrating injustice through apartheid laws, the problem was also that

U.S.-based corporations and institutional investors were perpetuating apartheid through economic collusion with Pretoria. Though this understanding emerged during the end of the Sixties, during the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement moved centrifugally toward consensus for this position.

This consensus is evident in the predominance of corporate shareholders' campaigns and the proliferation of divestment campaigns on campuses, and in local, county and state-wide communities. The anti-apartheid movement was able to construct a national, widely publicized campaign around the connection between corporate behavior, institutional investments and apartheid politics.

These problem stream developments are significant for two reasons: First, crisis situations raised people's consciousness about problems and they demanded an immediate response. Such was the case in 1976 when there was a significant rise in both Anti-apartheid and government activity.

Although problem streams were disturbed by crisis situations like the Soweto massacre, reaction to these events seemed to fade away as quickly as they appeared. In other words, crisis situations did not provide durable justifications for policy changes. Carter's human rights policy was less motivated by crises in South Africa, and more influenced by the principles Carter held deeply. So too, legislators working on African issues were motivated by their personal beliefs about what is right for the people of South Africa and what is wrong with apartheid. Crisis situations, and displeasure with the U.S. policy response, may have given these legislators

more impetus to promote anti-apartheid issues in Congress, but they did not directly influence the governmental agenda.

The second reason that these problem stream developments were significant is that, generally speaking, problem streams carry the potential of redefining how people understand the nature of issues. New problem definitions may lead toward disturbances in policy streams: new policy solutions may be placed on the agenda. In this situation, when progressive legislators grew impatient with Carter's policy toward South Africa, they raised the economic linkages argument to the governmental agenda. While this understanding of foreign problems was not new to policy circles, the application of the argument to the apartheid issue was new. The anti-apartheid movement did not invent this definition of policy issues but it did promote it vigorously by the end of the decade. Progressive legislators may have drawn some comfort from knowing that an active cadre of their constituents endorsed this position.

Political Streams

Changes in the policy agenda with respect to South Africa during the Seventies were most clearly dominated by political stream developments. Presidential initiatives continued to dominate the political streams surrounding South Africa policy. An emerging battle over the substance of foreign policy between Congress and the President became apparent in the Seventies. Also, liberal, white and black legislators rose to senior positions in Congress and were able to influence the ability of anti-apartheid issues to

come to the governmental agenda. Finally, political stream developments fostered the growth of the anti-apartheid movement, consolidation of its resources, and its deployment of resources in grassroots campaigns during the Seventies.

Official United States policy toward South Africa vacillated between constructive engagement and human rights during the Seventies. These policies were closely associated with the changing of the guard at the White House. Presidents Nixon and Carter were able to dominate the foreign policy agenda while they were in office. Each brought his own policy experts with him and each seized control of the foreign policy establishment to reverse preceding policy trends.

It was a group of progressive legislators, elected to office during an era of government distrust and criticism of Presidential adventurism abroad, who rose to senior positions in Congress and raised anti-apartheid issues to the governmental agenda during the late Seventies. These legislators were motivated by personal conviction but the timing of their actions corresponded to the availability of specific opportunities. Entrepreneurial legislators tried to raise the South Africa issue during the 1972 presidential campaign and then as a rider to a Sugar Quota Act; however, at that time, they were not in a very good position to raise specific anti-apartheid bills to the governmental agenda.

This situation changed in the late Seventies as many of these same public officials rose to positions of seniority within Congress. They had more structural control in their possession and they used it to promote their

own issues. Their actions corresponded with the growing power of the Congressional Black Caucus. They primarily used the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa as a platform for their issues between 1977 and 1979. These legislators also drew some support from the highly publicized activities of the anti-apartheid movement in the late Seventies, particularly the actions on college and university campuses.

The anti-apartheid movement mobilized to influence political streams throughout the Seventies. The anti-apartheid movement grew tremendously during the decade and was able to deploy resources in a variety of political arenas. The Movement developed a solid base among civil rights leaders, the religious community, students and community activists. It was able to consolidate its resource base and to force its concerns onto the agendas of corporations, universities, colleges, and local communities. By the end of the decade, the movement experienced some success with divestment campaigns.

It is interesting that each of the constituents of the anti-apartheid movement took a different route to promote their goals. These routes reflect the resources and windows of opportunity available to each at the time. African-Americans, particularly moderate civil rights leaders had been developing their access to institutional policy circles since the Voting Rights Act of 1964. They were rather successful at this. Several black legislators were elected to Congress in the late Sixties to early Seventies. These public officials formed the Black Congressional Caucus to enhance their voice.

Civil rights leaders chose to exploit their access at this level rather than go to the streets to mobilize their constituents, as they had done during the Fifties and early Sixties. African-American legislators worked with civil rights leaders to establish TransAfrica as an institutional lobbying voice on African affairs. Formation of lobbying organizations like TransAfrica symbolize the attainment of member group status for African-Americans. Protests and other disruptive tactics would only threaten potential access to the policy process.

Because of their perceived legitimacy, religious groups can also be considered member groups, although they typically lack direct access to the policy process when they promote challenger interests. The stockholders' campaign was a method for religious organizations to peacefully promote their interests without the use of disruptive tactics. It was a wise choice since these groups were able to use their large investments in corporations as leverage to raise anti-apartheid issues to corporate agendas.

Students, while largely resourceless, have greatest access to the institutions they participate in: universities and colleges. Students were able to employ disruptive tactics on their campuses to maneuver their way onto institutional agendas. Students protested, often successfully, for divestment from South Africa. By the end of the Seventies, there was a rapid escalation in student campaigns on university and college campuses. Community activists were also able to successfully raise anti-apartheid issues in their communities. The grassroots campaigns of students and community activists brought a significant amount of publicity to the Anti-apartheid

cause as they continued to disrupt political streams. This in turn helped legislators to promote anti-apartheid bills on Capitol Hill.

Policy Streams

Policy streams fluctuated significantly during the Seventies. The sources of these fluctuations were linked to previously discussed political stream developments. Both the Nixon and Carter administrations brought their own policy-makers to Washington. Each President relied on his own people to outline policy options for his administration.

As African affairs became more polarized, domestic conflict over African policy heightened and policy cleavages developed within the ranks of policy-makers. The battle between "globalists" and "regionalists" was played out during the Carter administration. Carter empowered regionalists to design his South Africa policy. Following a backlash by Vorster in South Africa, Carter moved toward more traditional globalist solutions.

The anti-apartheid movement successfully generated strength for another policy solution. Based on their growing understanding of the importance of economic linkages between U.S. corporations and investments, and the South African regime, Movement activists raised the issue of divestment and disinvestment through anti-corporate stockholders' resolutions and organizing on campuses and in local communities. Anti-apartheid activists demanded that the public consequences of private investments be publicly scrutinized.

The divestment/disinvestment position took hold as people gained a clearer understanding of the economic links between institutions and policies internal to foreign nations. People attempted to isolate South Africa from the international community by influencing policies in the economic institutions to which they had the greatest access. This "new" solution was then thrown into the policy streams influencing the character of the national government's policy agenda.

Acceptance of demands for divestment, by local governments and by university and colleges, signalled the legitimacy of this policy solution. Also, university and college divestments threw institutional support behind anti-apartheid movement demands and thus created a disturbing effect on prevailing political streams.

The economic linkages argument was also supported by legislators trying to push anti-apartheid issues onto the governmental agenda. While economic sanctions are a traditional foreign policy tool, application of this tool to South African concerns was unique in the Seventies. At a minimum, these legislators knew that there was some support for their legislation. While they understood that support was not widespread, they chose to raise the issue in the late Seventies, to elevate it to the governmental agenda, and to try to organize more support for anti-apartheid actions both within Congress, and outside it.

In summary, the anti-apartheid movement created a supportive societal context for the elevation of anti-apartheid policies to the

governmental agenda during the Seventies. But because Congressional entrepreneurs and executive level policy-makers, not the movement, were the force behind placement of the issues on the agenda, agenda status was rather fleeting. It varied with election cycles, legislation cycles (the anti-apartheid issue was tacked onto the Sugar Quota Act in 1972 and renewal of Export-Import Bank funds in 1978), and events in South Africa.

It would take more widespread public and Congressional support for the anti-apartheid movement to push the issue into a firmer position on the governmental agenda, and for the issue, at a latter point in time, to be moved from the governmental to the decision agenda.

Figure V-1

Anti-apartheid Activity: 1970-1979

Events

Year

Source: The New York Times

167

Figure V-2
Movement Actors: 1970-1979

Events

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Year

Anti-apartheid Orgs.   Civil Rights/Black
Students   Religious/Stockholdr

Figure V-3

Movement Targets: 1970-1979

Source: The New York Times

169

Figure V-4
Anti-apartheid Stockholder Resolutions

Number of Resolutions

Year

TABLE V-1

DIVESTMENT ACTIVITY ON UNIVERSITY AND

COLLEGE CAMPUSES:

1977 - 1979

	1977	1978	1979
Amount Divested*	$ 1	$65	$21
Number of Institutions Divesting	3	10	13

* Millions of Dollars

Source: The American Committee on Africa

Figure V-5

U.S. Government Activity: 1970-1979

Source: The New York Times

Figure V-6

U.S. Government Actors: 1970-1979

Source: The New York Times

CHAPTER VI

MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL INNOVATION:
1980 TO 1986

The United States anti-apartheid movement experienced rapid
mobilization during the 1980's. Between 1984 and 1986, media headlines
were dominated by arrests at the South African Embassy in Washington,
D.C. and sit-ins on university and college campuses, billions of dollars
invested in corporations operating in South Africa were divested, and public
opinion supported imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.
In 1986, Congress reversed the historic course of United States-South
African relations by imposing sanctions against the Pretorian regime with
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

What factors lay behind this incidence of large scale policy change,
what Polsby labels "political innovation?" How did anti-apartheid concerns
move from the governmental to the decision agenda, and eventually become
codified into law in the Eighties? Why did the President lose control over
foreign policy relations with South Africa at this time?

This chapter explores the dynamic relationship between anti-apartheid activists and national policy-makers in the Eighties. An analysis of the factors fostering movement mobilization in the Eighties is presented first. The chapter then explores how economic sanctions moved from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda. An integrated analysis of these dynamics is presented at the end of the chapter.

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT REDEFINES THE ISSUE AND UNDERGOES RAPID MOBILIZATION

Between 1980 and 1983, anti-apartheid movement activity was not very visible (Figure VI-1). During this period, according to events recorded in The New York Times, the anti-apartheid movement experienced its lowest level of mobilization since 1960. For the broad African-support network, this period was most consumed with the emerging visibility of hunger in Africa, especially in Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and his agenda priorities for South Africa policy were quite clear. Reagan, like Richard Nixon, strongly favored friendly persuasion, rather than confrontation, as a way to move South Africa toward reform. The appointment of hard-line conservatives like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Chester Crocker to Reagan's foreign policy team, curtailed any influence the anti-apartheid movement may have hoped to have over the foreign policy process.

If we look more carefully at patterns of mobilization between 1980 and 1983, as revealed in events recorded in The New York Times, it is clear

that civil rights groups like TransAfrica continued to work on South African issues during the early Eighties, as did anti-apartheid groups like the American Committee on Africa, and religious groups like the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (Figures VI-2 and VI-3). Their work was mostly behind the scenes, however. These organizations were rethinking tactics rather than deploying resources to further organize the mass public at this time.

The churches provided perhaps the most visible source of opposition to apartheid within the United States between 1980 and 1983 (see Figure VI-2). By the end of 1980, most major churches in the United States had adopted policy statements condemning apartheid and endorsing economic pressure against South Africa. The list of these churches includes The American Baptist Church National Ministries, United Presbyterian Church, South Africa, The American Friends Service Committee, The United Methodist Church, Reformed Church in America, The United Church of Christ, The Lutheran Church in America, The Episcopal Church, and the American Lutheran Church.[112]

Though anti-apartheid activity was ebbing from 1980 through 1983, campus and community-based divestment activities continued. During that four year period 18 colleges and universities divested more than $69 million

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[112]   Position statements from these churches are drawn from "U.S. Corporate Activities in South Africa," hearings and markup before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, September 24, October 15,22, 1981 and May 18, June 10, 1982., pp. 276-278.

dollars in stocks from businesses operating in South Africa, including partial divestments at Harvard University, Rutgers University, Oberlin College and Williams College (Tables VI-1a and VI-1b).

Four states and 12 cities and counties also passed either divestment or selective purchasing agreements during the early Eighties. Thus, while the movement was ebbing from a national focus, local divestment activity continued throughout the nation during this period.

Beginning in late 1984, the anti-apartheid movement in the United States began to experience rapid mobilization, which continued through 1985 and 1986. (see Figure VI-1). The catalysts for this mobilization were the rise of state sponsored violence in South Africa and an organized campaign, initiated by TransAfrica, to redefine the South Africa issue as a national civil rights concern.

The first factor, state sponsored violence in South Africa, eroded U.S. public confidence that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement would successfully encourage reform efforts in South Africa. The second factor, the Free South Africa protests, refocused anti-apartheid movement energies toward pressuring Congress for national Anti-apartheid legislation. In the following section, these factors are explained in greater detail.

South Africa Erupts

During the mid-Eighties, as in previous decades, events in South Africa inspired United States anti-apartheid movement activists to more vigorously oppose apartheid. In early 1983, the military arm of the African

National Congress initiated a campaign of urban guerilla warfare in South Africa. In August of the same year, regional anti-government organizations from throughout South Africa created an umbrella organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF quickly became a powerful, nationally-visible coalition of 650 civic, religious, union, womens, and cultural groups embodying "the greatest upsurge in black politics since ... the early 1950's" (South Africa in the 1980's: State of Emergency, pp. 7-8).

Formation of the UDF was a national response to "the reign of terror" blacks in South Africa had been living with since 1980. This terror took a particularly brutal turn during 1983 when 90 people were killed by state authorities trying to suppress a bus boycott in Ciskei (South Africa in the 1980's: State of Emergency, 1986:7-8).

The United Democratic Front allied itself with the trade union movement in South Africa and mobilized blacks against a new constitution designed to create a tri-cameral, ethnically-based, legislative system. This proposed legislative structure would give minimal representation to mixed race people and people of Indian descent, and once again deny representation to the black majority. The UDF attacked this plan as a Pretorian reform effort to divide and conquer racial opposition in South Africa.

Between 1980 and 1985, the South Africa government responded to internal opposition with extraordinary brutality. By 1985, Pretorian authorities killed 700 anti-apartheid protesters. In 1986, South Africa declared a state of emergency which effectively denied opposition groups

the right to protest and allowed the regime to undertake extreme efforts to root out opposition leaders from society.[113]

The other major South African event to enhance U.S. anti-apartheid movement mobilization efforts was the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Reverend Bishop Tutu, Anglican Archbishop of Johannesburg, for his persistent opposition to apartheid. When Tutu's 1984 award was announced, the world's eyes turned toward South Africa.

Bishop Tutu was in residence at a church in New York City at the time the announcement was made. Tutu immediately assailed President Reagan's posture toward South Africa and an exchange between Tutu and Reagan was initiated. Tutu accused Reagan of bolstering the South African regime by soft-pedaling United States criticism of apartheid. Reagan responded by denouncing apartheid as repugnant but standing firm with his policy of constructive engagement. Reagan and Tutu met one month later (December 7, 1984) and publicly disagreed about the effects of Reagan's policy.

Bishop Tutu successfully shifted public attention to the inadequacies of constructive engagement. Alan Karcher, President of the New Jersey Assembly and author of New Jersey's $3 billion divestment bill, identified this event as one of the major factors lending impetus to divestment in New Jersey.[114]

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[113]   This state of emergency remains in place today, four years later.

[114]   Interview with author, February 17, 1989.

Other than token denunciations of the violence in South Africa,[115] President Reagan remained firm on the South Africa question. Reagan was quickly becoming out of touch, however, with public opinion in the United States. Anti-apartheid protesters in the United States saw this as an opportunity to increase their efforts to challenge constructive engagement, and force the United States government to publicly, and substantively, opposed to apartheid.

The Free South Africa Movement

The second catalyst to rapid mobilization was a year-long, TransAfrica-initiated, civil-disobedience campaign involving celebrity arrests at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. This campaign, dubbed the "Free South Africa" campaign, was inaugurated immediately after a House-passed economic sanctions package failed to successfully proceed through the Senate. It was an effort not only to focus attention on South Africa sanctions legislation, it was a conscious attempt by civil rights leaders to renew public interest in their social agenda.

> ... the reelection of Ronald Reagan and Senator Jesse Helms, the failure of Jesse Jackson's presidential bid to garner tangible gains for blacks, the Democratic party's attempts to refocus its priorities in an attempt to win back the support of white males, and continuing cuts in the social programs were all counted as political defeats by the black leadership.

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[115] See "U.S. Disturbed by Arrests," The New York Times, August 24, 1984; "U.S. Voices Concern," The New York Times, September 5, 1984; and, "U.S. 'Deeply Regrets' Action," The New York Times, October 24, 1984.

It was clear that something was needed to rejuvenate black political morale and activism, and the apartheid issue, because of its emotional impact, provided the perfect opportunity (Metz, 1986:390).

On November 21, 1984, just after the 1984 General Election and following years of failed legislative initiatives for economic sanctions against South Africa, Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, Walter Fauntroy, District of Columbia Representative to Congress and former civil rights activist, and Mary Frances Berry, Professor of History and member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, were arrested for sitting-in at the South African Embassy in Washington, DC.[116]

Three days later, TransAfrica announced the formation of a national campaign called The Free South Africa campaign to protest apartheid in South Africa from a domestic civil rights perspective. This movement organization was formed with the modest goals of (1) having all black leaders imprisoned in South Africa since 1961 released; (2) encouraging dialogue between black South Africa leaders and the South African government over power sharing; and, (3) abandoning Reagan's policy of constructive engagement.[117]

For the next year, civil rights leaders, labor leaders, religious leaders, legislators and other public officials, movie stars and other celebrities protested apartheid, and were arrested, at the South African Embassy every

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[116] "Capital's House Delegate Held in Embassy Sit-In," The New York Times, November 22, 1984.

[117] "U.S. Drive Opposes South African Racial Policies," The New York Times, November 24, 1984.

day. By the first week of December, the Free South Africa campaign extended protests to South African Embassies in New York City, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and Seattle.[118]

Within five months, more than 1800 people had been arrested at the Washington, D.C. embassy, and another 1000 had been arrested in South Africa protests around the nation (Metz, 1986). Like the lunch counter protests spearheaded by students in 1960, civil disobedience campaigns flourished throughout the nation. "It seems as if we struck a chord," said Ceclie Counts of TransAfrica.[119] South Africa was back in the headlines.

The Free South Africa campaign revived the traditional civil rights coalition and focused their energies on opposing apartheid. In so doing, apartheid became a metaphor for social problems in the United States. Blacks in South Africa were denied a voice in public affairs, and African-Americans as well as other minorities in the United States were denied a voice under the Reagan administration. Constructive engagement promoted, rather than challenged, apartheid; so too, Reagan's domestic agenda advanced social and political inequality in the United States. Reagan's stubborn attachment to constructive engagement paralleled the inability of African-Americans and other minorities to alter the course of policy.

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[118] "Protests Spreading in U.S. Against South Africa Policy," The New York Times, December 5, 1984.

[119] "South Africa Protesters Take Part in Daily Drama," The New York Times, December 16, 1984.

Civil rights leaders reconsidered their strategies and reverted back to the tactics of the Civil Rights Movement. As Metz argues, the complexion of support for the Washington sit-ins reflected the elements of the old civil rights coalition. Prominent Civil Rights movement figures such as Jesse Jackson, Coretta Scott King, and Ralph Abernathy, sat in at the Embassy with prominent white liberals such as Senator Edward Kennedy and Reverend William Sloan Coffin. Leaders of the Women's movement such as Gloria Steinem sat in with labor leaders. Endorsements poured forth from national Jewish organizations such as the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.[129]

In recasting opposition to apartheid as a civil rights issue and in refocusing anti-apartheid movement energies toward national legislation, Randall Robinson and other leaders of the Free South Africa campaign strategically presented the issue in consensual, moralistic terms. They focused on the immorality of apartheid without venturing to endorse militancy in South Africa or daring to define "the" solution for America to take with its South Africa policy. The movement pursued sustained activity at the Embassy, rather than at the White House, as a calculated way of

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[129] Also see "Rights Coalition Seen As Reviving In New York City," The New York Times, December 6, 1984 for information about the local view of the re-emerging civil rights coalition.

maintaining a noncontroversial position on the issue.[121] There was also an attempt to maintain a clean-cut, non-militant appearance to the protests.[122] The tactic of sitting-in was a throwback to the nonviolent campaigns against segregation during the Civil Rights Movement. The nonthreatening character of the protests even encouraged elite liberals such as Rutgers University President Edward Bloustein to participate in the protests and be arrested.

Free South Africa campaign leaders were able to successfully focus the protests and abundant media coverage on the need for a national economic sanctions package to send a signal to South Africa that the United States abhors apartheid in no uncertain terms. Public pressure turned on Congress to challenge President Reagan and deliver an economic sanctions package.

Protests Continue

While the Free South Africa campaign reinvigorated the anti-apartheid movement beginning in 1984, the movement was sustained in 1985 and 1986 by the work of other constituents, most notably students and

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[121]   Martin, Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria, cites Juan Williams, "Black Leaders Find a Hot New Issue," The Washington Post, December 12, 1984 for this information.

[122]   This effort to avoid a militant look at the sit-ins prompted a series of Doonesbury cartoons where protesters in fashionable suits cooperated with the police by handing them detailed lists of all sit-in members to be arrested.

community-activists. The American Committee on Africa, in particular, channeled resources into grassroots protests in 1985 and 1986.

The media coverage of Embassy protests created opportunities for students to wage renewed divestment campaigns against their schools' South Africa-related investments. Student campaigns took off in 1985 and 1986, according to The New York Times data set (see Figures VI-2 and VI-3).

During the first week of April, 1985 students at Columbia University blockaded Hamilton Hall to publicize their demands for total divestment. Five hundred students at Rutgers University initiated a blockade of their own student center in a similar effort one week later.

The student movement soon escalated. One hundred fifty eight students were arrested at the University of California, Berkeley after hearing Mario Savio, a leader of free speech protests in the Sixties, address a rally. By the end of April there had been sit-ins and demonstrations at Cornell University (330 arrested), Princeton University, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Wisconsin, University of Massachusetts, and Grinnell College, in addition to a number of other institutions.

Coalitions of diverse, ideologically-Left, campus groups and causes came together to support the "National Anti-Apartheid Protest Day" on April 24th. This event was coordinated by the American Committee on Africa. Demonstrations, sit-ins, the construction of Shantytowns to represent the living conditions faced by black South Africans continued through Spring 1986. By the end of 1986 more than 125 schools had

divested approximately $3.9 billion in investments (see Tables VI-1a and VI-1b).

Community coalitions, including Left, labor, civil rights and religious constituents, also came together to work for local, county and state-wide divestment actions. Divestment actions, measured in terms of amounts divested, took a quantum leap 1985 and 1986 (Figures VI-4a and VI-4b). Sixteen state resolutions supporting either selective purchasing agreements or divestiture, with a combined value of more than $13.5 billion were passed during this period (see Tables VI-1a and VI-1b). Another $1.6 billion was divested by 105 cities and counties between 1985 and 1986. When the total of all state, city, county and campus divestments are added together, the anti-apartheid movement can claim direct responsibility for creating enough leverage, through the mobilization of public influence, to force the divestment of more than $20 billion of public and private investments between 1977 and 1986.

Anti-apartheid influence goes even beyond this, however. Between 1984 and 1986 the movement directly targeted corporations involved in South Africa through stockholder resolutions, public protests and national boycott campaigns.[123] Corporations attempted once again to invoke the Sullivan Principles in their defense. This defense was not well received, however. By the mid-Eighties, according to Rob Jones, Projects Director for the American Committee on Africa, the general public instead

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[123]   The AFL-CIO and TransAfrica took part in an international boycott of Shell Petroleum Company.

supported the economic linkages argument put forth by the anti-apartheid movement. In Jones' words:

> It took a long time for people to understand economic links between companies that they knew and bought things from and were part of their lives and apartheid. The concept that these companies were doing something that would help keep apartheid running is a difficult one to get through...(Now you have) fifteen years of divestment movement (activity) behind you such that people on a state and local level understand that 'Yes, these companies are doing business with South Africa, that they are profiting from apartheid. No, we don't want to be involved in doing business with them.'[124]

As violence increased in South Africa and an unstable business climate prevailed in that nation, as public municipalities and universities divested themselves of corporate stocks, as the media highlighted apartheid for an extended period of time and public opposition to apartheid mounted, and as economic sanctions moved to the decision agenda by the mid-Eighties, many corporations began to rethink their role in South Africa.[125]

By the end of 1986, a large number of corporations had pulled their operations out of South Africa. Some like IBM, Honeywell, and Coca-Cola sold their South Africa operations to local managers and continued to be the primary suppliers of merchandise. This tactic offered the appearance of pulling out of South Africa without affecting profit margins. Other corporations, such as Kodak, withdrew from South Africa and refused to

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[124]   Interview with author, February 13, 1989.

[125]   In a conversation with the author, Robert Fetterman, Director of Acquisitions for Johnson Brothers, Inc., pointed out that public awareness of apartheid had the greatest impact on investment decisions of public companies, those tendering stock to the public. Companies that rely upon private capital sources were more insulated from the public debate (May 30, 1989).

continue marketing their items in that nation. General Motors, for instance, currently refuses to sell trucks to the South African police.

Thus, the eruption of violence in South Africa and the Free South Africa campaign protests in the mid-Eighties put the anti-apartheid movement on the trajectory of rapid mobilization between 1984 and 1986. The Movement successfully fought for billions of dollars worth of divestments on campuses around the nation, and in city, county, and state governments. Corporations were on the defensive as the mass public accepted the Movement's argument about the importance of economic linkages between corporate activity and support for apartheid, and as concern for apartheid became redefined as a domestic civil rights issue. The stage was set in the middle 1980's for Anti-apartheid legislation to move from the governmental to the decision agenda of Congress.

GOVERNMENTAL ACTION: CONGRESS VS. REAGAN

President Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and, like the Presidents before him, exercised near-total control over relations between the United States and South Africa. He redesigned U.S. foreign policy to reflect accommodation, rather than confrontation, with South Africa. Reagan adopted Nixon's policy of constructive engagement.

At the same time, a historical battle over foreign policy had been brewing between Congress and the White House since the early Seventies. One articulation of this battle was over the relationship between the United

States and South Africa. The pace of Executive and Legislative branch action surrounding South African policy can be observed in the data set of events reported in The New York Times. According to this data set, government activity surrounding this issue had been on the incline since 1980 (Figure VI-5). After a peak of activity in 1981, there was a slight increase between 1982 and 1984. This was followed by a rapid climb in activity in 1985 and 1986.

Figure VI-6 reveals that the incline in 1981 is mostly rooted in Executive branch activity. This corresponds to the first year that President Reagan held office. As with previous administrations, there was a brief flurry of activity as new policy initiatives were put into action.

The rise in government activity between 1982 and 1984 is rooted more in legislative behavior according to The New York Times data set. It was during this time that economic sanctions legislation made it to the decision agenda in Congress and neared passage. A closer examination of the particular legislative actors confirms this assertion. According to Figure VI-7, by 1982 legislative activity is not just rooted in the behavior of a handful of entrepreneurial legislators; instead, Congress, as a legislative body, is involved with debating sanctions legislation.

According to Figure VI-6 the rapid rise in government activity from 1985 to 1986 involves all three government branches. The legislature and the Reagan administration are battling over the complexion of policy at this time, and the judiciary becomes involved when it begins to prosecute the large number of protesters arrested at anti-apartheid rallies.

President Reagan Initiates Constructive Engagement

South Africa was an issue that divided the candidates in the 1980 campaign for President: the Democrats were critical of apartheid, the Republicans supported accommodation. Once Ronald Reagan was elected, he put the Republican perspective into immediate action. As was true with past Presidents, Reagan was able to exercise significant control over United States-South African relations.

Although President Carter moved, during his administration, toward a more conciliatory tone on South African issues, Carter ultimately agreed with Ted Kennedy during the 1980 Democratic presidential primary to include a policy plank in the party platform urging all institutions to divest from South Africa.[126] In marked contrast, a top foreign policy aide to candidate Ronald Reagan said he would urge Reagan to end the arms embargo and to support South Africa if elected President.[127]

Once Ronald Reagan was sworn into office, "constructive engagement" with South Africa became the policy buzzword once again. This time, the policy was authored by Chester Crocker,[128] an Associate Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Reagan's new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Constructive engagement was a

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[126]   "Kennedy Backers Challenge Carter On Platform's Foreign Policy Ideas," The New York Times, June 21, 1980.

[127]   "Aide to Reagan, in South Africa, Says Arms Embargo Should End," The New York Times, June 13, 1980.

[128].   More information about Chester Crocker's philosophy of Constructive Engagement can be found in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980-1981.

repudiation of the Carter approach. Instead of threats and empty rhetoric, constructive engagement recognized South Africa for its geostrategic importance as a bulwark against regional communism. The globalists triumphed over the regionalists to elevate anti-communism as a central tenet of southern African policy.

Crocker's policy centered around two additional principles. One principle was the belief that reform, rather than revolutionary change, was the more likely scenario in South Africa. The other principle was that positive support for the Pretoria regime would do more to encourage internal changes than would external incrimination (Coker 1986). Quiet diplomacy was considered a better approach to dealing with apartheid because it did not put South Africa in a defensive position (Manzo, 1986). Officially, Crocker's position was that the United States opposes apartheid but remains neutral in the conflict between blacks and whites.[129]

A major component of constructive engagement was a tacit agreement between South Africa and the United States that the U.S. would undertake diplomatic initiatives to seek withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia in exchange for United States efforts to resurrect South Africa's status as a full member of the Western alliance of nations.[130]

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[129] "Official Says U.S. Will Be Neutral On South Africa," The New York Times.

[130] This position was outlined in documents leaked to The New York Times by Randall Robinson of TransAfrica. See "Documents LInk Namibia Solution To Better US Ties to South Africa," The New York Times, May 30, 1981.

President Reagan agreed that the United States should work with President Botha's government to create the appearance of an ongoing commitment to internal reform in South Africa (Danaher 1985). Within the first month and a half of taking the oath of office, President Reagan publicly praised the South African regime during a television interview with Walter Cronkite. Reagan asserted that the Botha government was committed to reform and should be helped along in this process.[131]

One week later, five South African military intelligence officers illegally entered the United States for meetings with officials from the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and Congress. United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick met with these officers, though she later claimed to not know of their affiliation with South Africa's military. Danaher (1985:193) characterized this incident as marking "a clear break with traditional U.S. policy of no visits by South African military officers, and was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the U.N. arms embargo." Danaher further commented that "this visit by high-ranking military officials was to be the first in a long series of exchanges that would mark a new level of US-South African collaboration." Shortly thereafter, Reagan met with South African Foreign Minister R. Botha to discuss South Africa's occupation of Namibia. This meeting was termed "friendly".[132]

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[131] "Reagan's Views on South Africa Praised by Botha," The New York Times, March 5, 1981.

[132] "South African Aide Meets With Reagan," The New York Times, May 5, 1981.

Toward the end of 1981, Reagan expanded sales of items to the South African police, military and nuclear agencies including medical equipment and supplies, and crime-fighting equipment. In February, 1982, the Reagan administration relaxed an export ban, imposed by the Carter administration, on sales to the South Africa police and military by removing licensing restrictions for many "non-military items" such as computers.[133]

Perhaps the most heinous symbol of the alliance between President Reagan and South Africa came when the Commerce Department approved the sale of 2,500 hi-voltage shock batons to the South African police for crowd control.[134] When confronted with the fact that this sale violated a prohibition of sales to police and military authorities in countries with repeated violations of human rights, the Reagan administration apologized by calling this "a simple mistake" (Danaher, 1985).

Big business supported constructive engagement with a flow of investment dollars to South Africa. In 1981, U.S. investment in South Africa rose by 13.3% to $2.63 billion according to the United States Department of Commerce. Danaher (1985) notes that these figures only reflect direct investment. Considering indirect investment by U.S.

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[133] "U.S. Said to Ease South Africa Curb," The New York Times, February 27, 1982.

[134] "High Voltage Batons Sent to South Africa," The New York Times, September 21, 1982.

subsidiaries based in third world countries, short-term bank loans to South Africa, and South African stocks owned by Americans, the level of economic engagement was upwards of more than $14 billion by mid-1983.[135] As this quote from The New York Times makes clear, constructive engagement created a positive business climate for investments in South Africa:

> There is little doubt, however, that the interest of American companies in South Africa would have been more muted were it not for Washington's current policy of "constructive engagement" toward this nation. "Things certainly have improved under the Reagan administration," said Clark Else, director of the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa.[136]

But constructive engagement was not without its critics. Simultaneous to the imposition of constructive engagement and a renewed alliance between the United States and South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement was mobilizing and anti-apartheid legislation was on the governmental agenda of Congress, and moving quickly toward the decision agenda.

Congress Responds to the Reagan Agenda

During the Seventies, a core group of legislators was able to put anti-apartheid legislation on the governmental agenda of Congress. While small policy gains were made during the Carter years, such as the limitations upon

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[135]   Danaher (1985) refers to a study entitled U.S. Investment in South Africa: The Hidden Pieces for this information.

[136]   "South Africa Draws Investors," The New York Times November 3, 1982.

Export-Import Credit placed on South Africa, Congress, as a legislative body, was not particularly interested in African policy.

Economic sanctions legislation remained on the governmental agenda throughout the early Eighties. As the political climate changed, more support was generated in the House of Representatives for sanctions legislation. Presidential accommodation with South Africa, continuing violence in South Africa, combined with regressive social policies at home created the opportunity for legislators to move sanctions to the decision agenda and challenge the Reagan doctrine.

It was the convergence of forces in late 1984 which moved sanctions legislation toward final passage: violence in South Africa; Tutu winning the Nobel Peace Prize; the failure of constructive engagement to achieve apartheid reforms or a reduction in violence in South Africa; redefinition of the issue as a civil rights concern; and a shift in national public opinion toward support for economic sanctions against South Africa. These events shaped Congress' desire to make a statement about where the U.S. stands on apartheid.

Economic Sanctions Legislation Moves to the Decision Agenda: 1983-1984

By 1983, President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was under attack as violence raged in South Africa. Congressional leaders (Democrats and Republicans alike) began to question whether U.S. policy actually encouraged violence rather than reform. Legislators wanted their

opposition to apartheid to go on record and they turned to a policy innovation, economic sanctions, as the vehicle to express their opposition.

Sanctions had been on the governmental agenda since the late Seventies, but between 1983 to 1984 they moved to Congress' decision agenda as increasing violence in South Africa, particularly state-sponsored violence, made relations with South Africa a 'hot' policy issue. Legislators knew they had to respond to events in South Africa, and at home, in some way. The momentum was not strong enough at this time to carry sanctions legislation to passage, however. An economic sanctions package passed through the House in 1983, but failed in the Senate as 1984 came to an end.

Representative Julian Dixon (1984:15), Chairperson of the Black Congressional Caucus, described the situation confronting legislators in 1983:

> The (Reagan) administration is duplicitous when it winks at UNITA or the antigovernment rebels in Mozambique, while inveighing against the ANC and SWAPO. It is deceitful when it avoids the international arms embargo against South Africa and licenses the sale of equipment on the State Department munitions list to that outlaw nation. It is naive if it supposes that constructive engagement has had any discernable positive impact within South Africa's borders...
>
> In sum, the United States alone cannot eliminate apartheid. It must be pragmatic, though, and attempt to deal with all the parties in the conflict, especially the groups that are clearly the most important to black South Africans. The US by pursuing this course, could bring about real and lasting progress.

With events in South Africa erupting and the domestic anti-apartheid movement reviving itself, a consensus emerged by 1983 for Congress to challenge President Reagan and make an unequivocal statement against apartheid.

Five new bills were introduced into the 98th Congress (H.R. 1693, H.R. 2761, H.R. 3008, H.R. 3231, and H.R. 3597). Serious hearings were only held on Representative Solarz's bill--H.R. 1693. The provisions of this bill were similar to those Solarz raised in the late Seventies: require U.S. companies in South Africa not to discriminate against black workers; prohibit U.S. bank loans to the South African government unless the money is for desegregated education, health or housing facilities; and, prohibit the importation of Kruggerands. In 1983, six Democratic Presidential candidates helped create momentum for this bill by endorsing its passage.[137] This was the first anti-apartheid economic sanctions bill to be passed out of Congressional committee.[138]

Another bill containing anti-apartheid provisions--H.R. 3231--was also reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Rules Committee in 1983. This bill extended the Export Administration Act of 1979 for two additional years. The Export Administration Act authorized the President of the United States to restrict exports for national security or foreign policy reasons.

Some House members wanted to use this bill to weaken the President's ability to control South African exports. Representative William Gray (D-PA), a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, proposed an

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[137] "Democrat's Ask Curb on South Africa," The New York Times, September 24, 1983.

[138] "House Panel Votes Pretoria Curbs," The New York Times, May 5, 1983.

anti-apartheid amendment to this bill. This amendment included

restrictions on United States business activities in South Africa. The Gray

amendment contained these provisions:

- Bar all new investment by U.S. firms and individuals in South Africa;

- Ban U.S. banks from lending money to the South African government. Loans to educational, housing and health facilities open to members of all groups were exempted;

- Require all U.S. companies in South Africa that employed more than 20 people to establish fair employment practices. These practices included equal opportunity for employment, equal pay, a minimum wage, and improvements in workers living conditions such as housing, schooling, transportation, recognition of labor unions,and fair labor practices;

- Prohibit imports of Krugerrands and other gold coins minted by the South African government;

- Permit the president to waive the fair employment provisions of the bill if compliance would harm U.S. national interests. A waiver could be overridden by enactment of a joint resolution disapproving the action; and,

- Permit the ban on all new investment in South Africa to lapse if the president determined--and Congress passed a joint resolution supporting the presidential findings--that the South African government 'has made substantial progress toward the full participation of all the people of South Africa in the social, political, and economic life in that country and toward an end to discrimination based on race or ethnic origin.'[139]

The Gray amendment to the Export Administration Act was adopted

by the entire House of Representatives. Presence of the amendment became

a major issue when House and Senate conferees clashed over whether it

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[139] This summary of the Gray Amendment is drawn from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, D.C. Vol. 24 (1983) p. 257.

should be included in the final bill. Ultimately the conferees were unable to come to an agreement. Moderate Senate Republicans like John Heinz supported the bill but Senator Jake Garn, Chair of the Conference Committee, refused to report it out of committee with his signature.[140]

The Senate tried to salvage the Export Administration Bill by offering a five year extension of the 1979 Act excluding the South African loan ban and another controversial provision which would increase Defense Department controls on licenses for high-technology exports. The House moved one day later--October 11, 1984--to renew the South African ban with bi-partisan support, effectively ending Senate chances for passage. The final House vote was 269-92 with Democrats 172 to 12 and Republicans 96 to 50 in favor of the South African ban (Congress and the Nation, 1985).

Other anti-South Africa measures were also raised in the 1983-1984 Congress. The House and Senate considered a reauthorization for International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. The Black Congressional Caucus took a stand favoring a provision requiring that United States representatives to the IMF oppose loans to South Africa. The House supported this provision. The Senate compromised and supported a weaker provision stating that the U.S. "actively opposed" South Africa loans unless

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[140]   Author interview with Steven Weissmann, Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, February 28, 1989.

the Treasury Secretary could certify that the loan would benefit the majority of people in South Africa and reduce labor constraints in that nation.[141]

Also in 1983, serious consideration was given to The Mandela Freedom Resolution (H. Res. 430). This resolution declared that South Africa should release Nelson Mandela from prison and revoke the banning order on Winnie Mandela. The House also considered H. Con. Res. 122 which proposed that South Africa should cease its policy of forcibly removing and relocating black South Africans from their ancestral lands, and H. Con. Res. 42 proposing that the State Department should refuse to approve the opening of honorary South African consulates in the United States.[142]

The 1983-1984 legislative session was significant because anti-apartheid legislation moved to Congress' decision agenda during this period. A bi-partisan consensus to push South Africa further and faster toward reforming apartheid was forming. This consensus is illustrated by a letter

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[141]   See "The Apartheid Clause," The New York Times, November 16, 1983 and "Senate Votes I.M.F. Increase," The New York Times, November 8 1983.

[142]   Hearings for H.R. 1693 can be found in "South African Restrictions," hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance, House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, June 8, 1983. Hearings held for H.Res. 430, H.Con.Res 122, and H.Con.Res. 42 can be found in "South Africa Legislation," hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 10, August 1, and September 6, 1984. Also see "House Panel Urges U.S. Ban On South African Consulates,"The New York Times, September 7, 1984, for a report on the nonbinding resolution calling on Reagan to ban honorary South African consulates as a sign of displeasure toward apartheid.

jointly written by the ranking Democrat and Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa--Representative Howard Wolpe and Rep. Gerald Solomon. This letter to President Botha warned that relations between the U.S. and South Africa would never be normalized until segregation and repression ended in South Africa.[143]

Though the Gray Amendment to the Export Administration Act did not ultimately succeed through the legislative labyrinth, its significance should not be underestimated. It was the first piece of legislation calling for economic sanctions to be levied against South Africa that successfully passed through the House of Representatives, and also seriously considered by the Senate.

The support that the Gray Amendment garnered indicated a growing consensus, in both the House and the Senate, that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was a failure. Constructive engagement appeared to assure the South African government that they need not fear international condemnation, rather than encourage them to move away form apartheid. Congress needed to make a statement against apartheid, and that statement had to be a significant departure from President Reagan's position. Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Africa when sanctions legislation was being debated, put it this way:

> I think they (South Africa) misread and clearly believed that with President Reagan's help that we were going to continue to be a

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[143]   "Pressure on South Africa," The New York Times, December 2, 1983.

partner...They (South Africa) misread the signals and we just weren't tough enough at that point in clearly indicating, I think, the firmness of the position that we had.[144]

Legislators sought to use economic pressure as the means for making this statement. The Gray amendment targeted U.S. corporations by constraining their current activity with Sullivan-like principles, and limiting future investments in South Africa until such time as South Africa was certified to be making progress toward the elimination of apartheid.

1983 was the first year that economic sanctions were endorsed, not just by African specialists and issue entrepreneurs, but by bi-partisan support in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Despite rejection, it was clear that sanctions legislation had made it to the decision agenda and would be raised again.

The Year of Sanctions:1985

Following the failure of economic sanctions to pass through Congress in 1984, the Free South Africa campaign was initiated and the anti-apartheid movement began to undergo rapid mobilization. During this period, a different milieu surrounded consideration of economic sanctions. Congress was under the public spotlight on this issue as the Ninety-ninth Congress got under way; legislators seized upon the surge of anti-apartheid activism and the broad base of support accompanying the redefinition of the issue as a domestic civil rights concern, as a mandate for economic sanctions.

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[144] Interview with author, April 27, 1989.

1985 began with Senator Edward Kennedy spending 11 days in January touring South Africa, speaking to black South Africans and to South African government officials throughout his trip. Later in the year Kennedy testified to the increasing polarization between blacks and whites in South Africa and the radicalization of blacks. Testifying about his sponsorship of a new economic sanctions package, Kennedy had this to say:

> My brother, Robert Kennedy, visited South Africa in 1966. At that time the United States was looked on as a model, a way in which those that had been oppressed by apartheid in South Africa could achieve equal opportunity even in South Africa because of the success of the civil rights movement here in the United States where we had courageous church leaders, such as Martin Luther King and many others, who believed in nonviolence...
>
> When Robert Kennedy visited South Africa, the United States was recognized as a role model for millions of whites and blacks alike for being able to achieve some of the most basic and fundamental rights. The United States had faced this issue, and we had really set an example for the world.
>
> That concept and model has been crushed, dashed, and destroyed, Mr. Chairman. The United States now is thoroughly and completely identified with the policy of constructive engagement which is, as Bishop Tutu has stated, an unmitigated disaster...The hostility to the United States is increasing dramatically. And the United States, I fear, Mr. Chairman, is in a dangerous position. We have not only lost the rightful position as a moral leader on the questions of rights and liberties, but also we endanger our position in South Africa for the future. South Africa will be free some day and, make no mistake about it, those in that government when it is free are going to ask whether the United States was the last country to go down with apartheid. And it certainly appears to blacks in South Africa today that this is the case.[145]

Kennedy introduced legislation calling for the United States to levy economic sanctions against South Africa. His bill (co-sponsored by Senator

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[145] "The Anti-apartheid Act of 1985," hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the United States Senate and the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, April 16, May 24, June 13, 1985, pages 6-7.

Lowell Weicker) contained provisions for a ban on new investments and bank loans to South Africa, prohibition of computer sales to security agencies, and a ban on the importation of Kruggerands.

Several other anti-apartheid bills were also introduced during this legislative session. These bills ranged from a call for a total trade embargo and divestment proposed by Representative Ronald Dellums, to a call for implementation of the Sullivan principles by companies new to South Africa from 1987 onward, introduced by conservative Republicans Robert Walker and Newt Gingrich. Other anti-apartheid bills were introduced by Representatives William H. Gray, Stephen Solarz and Howard Wolpe. The consensus for sanctions seemed unanimous when Senator Richard Lugar, Republican Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and friend of President Reagan, and other key Republican Senators introduced their own sanctions package in late April.[146]

By late June, 1985, both Houses of Congress supported sanctions packages with bipartisan votes: 29-6 in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 295-127 with 56 Republicans supporting sanctions on the floor of the House of Representatives, 16-1 in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 80-12 on the floor of the Senate.

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[146] See "G.O.P. Senators Ask Curbs on Pretoria," The New York Times, April 25, 1985.

The House package called for:

* A ban on new loans to South Africa;
* An end to the sale of computers to Pretorian agencies which administer apartheid; and,
* Prohibition on the importation of Kruggerands.

The provisions of the Senate package included:

* Banning new loans to South Africa;
* Banning sales of computers to agencies that enforce apartheid;
* Banning sales of goods used in nuclear production; and,
* Requiring American companies to employ more the 25 workers in South Africa must abide by the Sullivan Principles of fair employment.

House and Senate Conferees agreed on a sanctions package by the beginning of August. The final package included provisions for:

* Banning the importation of Kruggerands;
* Banning exports of goods used in nuclear production;
* Banning the sale of computers to South African agencies,
* Banning bank loans to the South African government, and
* Mandatory Sullivan principles for U.S. companies employing more than 25 people in South Africa.

The House of Representatives immediately supported the conference package, but the Senate hesitated. Several conservatives in the Senate, including Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Robert Dole (R-KS), sought to delay Senate consideration before legislative recess in order to give President Reagan time to reassess its South Africa policy, and redeem himself on the issue. Republicans did not want to embarrass their President by reversing one of his major foreign policy positions.

Reagan Tries to Maintain Control of the Issue

The Reagan administration responded to increasing legislative resolve against South Africa by stepping up its rhetorical condemnation of apartheid while continuing to implement constructive engagement and denouncing sanctions legislation. But Congress was determined to condemn South Africa in no uncertain terms. To coopt this anti-apartheid fervor, President Reagan mandated mild sanctions against South Africa in 1985 with an Executive Order.

The Reagan administration was savvy enough to know that, despite its ideological attachment to constructive engagement, it had to respond to the anti-apartheid consensus emerging in the United States. Commenting on protests in the United States and the flurry of legislative activity, Secretary of State George Schultz made this comment:

> We simply cannot afford to let Southern Africa become a divisive domestic issue--tearing our country apart, rendering our actions haphazard and important, and contributing to the ugliest and most violent outcome.[147]

Increasingly, the Reagan administration tried to nurture a public image of opposition to apartheid. Immediately prior to the Congressional conference committee meeting to work out a compromise sanctions package, the United States asked the Pretorian regime to lift the state of emergency in South Africa. The United

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[147] "Schultz Wary of Anti-Apartheid Move," The New York Times, April 17, 1989.

States also called for talks between Prime Minister Botha and Bishop Tutu.

Just after the conference committee reported out a compromise package, Reagan denounced sanctions. Yet, at an August 9th meeting between senior White House and State Department officials and South African officials in Vienna, the United States warned South Africa that its political climate will have a direct impact upon relations with the United States.[148]

On August 12th, the White House and State Department called on South Africa to end the violence and give political rights and equality to blacks in South Africa.[149] Also, as part of the Reagan tact of escalating rhetoric, the U.S. criticized South Africa at the end of August for halting internal reforms and called on Pretoria for a clear cut policy to end apartheid, including talks with the African National Congress. The Reagan administration tried whatever maneuvers were available to appear responsive to anti-apartheid criticism and to prevent Congress from passing a sanctions package.

On September 9, 1985, after the House passed the compromise sanctions package and just prior to the Senate commencing debate on the package, Reagan reversed his longstanding opposition to sanctions and

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[148] "U.S. Is Reported to Warn Pretoria," The New York Times, August 10, 1985.

[149] "U.S. Asks Pretoria to End Strife as Protesters March in Washington," The New York Times, August 13, 1985.

imposed limited economic sanctions on South Africa with an Executive

Order containing these provisions:

- A ban on sales of computers to South Africa security agencies;
- Barring most loans to the Pretoria government;
- A ban on importation of Kruggerands pending consultation with trading partners; and,
- A prohibition on most exports of nuclear technology.

In his call for sanctions, Reagan said that "America's view of

apartheid is simple and straightforward: We believe it is wrong. We

condemn it. And we are united in hoping for the day when apartheid will

be no more."[150] Schultz followed this policy up with statements calling for

political accommodation in South Africa. He also suggested that Nelson

Mandela be freed from jail as a symbol of good faith by the Pretorian

government.

Thus, President Reagan maneuvered to coopt legislative interest in

shaping South Africa policy. The goal of Reagan's Executive Order was to

remove South Africa from Congress' decision agenda and to salvage his own

policy initiatives in the area.

Congress Spars With Reagan: Policy is Made

In the wake of President Reagan's Executive Order, the Senate

Republicans blocked a vote on the 1985 joint House-Senate sanctions

package. The Republican leadership was so committed to supporting their

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[150] "Reagan, In Reversal, Orders Sanctions On South Africa; Move Causes Split In Senate: An Executive Act," The New York Times, September 10, 1985.

President at this time that they removed the official copy of the bill from the Senate chambers to block further voting. Though temporarily derailed, the call for anti-apartheid sanctions had not abated. Economic sanctions remained on the decision agenda of Congress through 1986.

As 1986 began, the state of emergency order continued in South Africa coupled with an almost total ban on press coverage. Archbishop Tutu toured United States again in January renewing his call for further economic sanctions. During May 1986, the world was stunned when the South African military carried out attacks against African National Congress guerillas based in the capitols of independent nations: Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

By this time, the anti-apartheid movement had succeeded in redefining the issue not just as Anti-apartheid,[151] but as a civil rights issue. Constructive engagement symbolized collusion with racists. Members voting against sanctions also risked the potential of being labeled "racist." Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY) noted in the 1986 sanctions debates, "If we are going to stand up against repression in Central America and terrorism in the Middle East, then I think it is time to stand up against racism in South Africa" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1986:363).

On June 10, 1986 the House Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported out a bill designed to strengthen Reagan's sanctions. The bill, authored by Rep. William Gray (D-PA), received a 27-14 vote in the

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[151]   Congress first labeled its criticism of South Africa as "Anti-apartheid" in The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985.

Committee with three Republicans joining the Democratic forces. The provisions of this bill included:

- Barring new U.S. investments and loans in South Africa;
- Cutting off imports of South African coal, uranium and steel;
- Stopping U.S. participation in South Africa energy development; and,
- Threatening to halt all American computer sales to South Africa unless the Pretorian government initiated negotiations with black leaders and freed political prisoners.

In a surprise gamble, conservative Republican House members tried to defeat the Gray bill by allowing a strongly worded sanctions bill to stand as a substitute package on the House Floor. This bill, authored by Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA), was similar to the Dellums bill introduced and defeated in 1985. This bill called for a comprehensive trade embargo against South Africa, with the exception of strategic minerals if the president certified their need for military purposes. The Dellums bill also required all 284 U.S. companies operating in South Africa to leave within 180 days of enactment, called for a permanent ban on sales of Kruggerands in the United States, and denied landing rights to South African airlines.

The Republicans reasoned that the Dellums bill would prematurely end House member's plans to strengthen economic sanctions. Steven Weissmann, Director of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, also believes this bill reached the floor as a test of the rhetoric being espoused by legislators leading the anti-apartheid call.[152]

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[152]   Interview with author, February 28, 1989.

The Dellums bill passed the House by voice vote on June 18, 1986.[153] This vote was a bold assertion of House opinion regarding South Africa and, coming on the heels of the reimposition of a state of emergency and sweeping press restrictions in South Africa on June 12, was interpreted as a major rebuke to Pretoria and apartheid.

Senator Edward Kennedy introduced another sanctions bill into the Senate. Debate resumed in the middle of July with wide support for the measure. In a major foreign policy speech on July 22, President Reagan reaffirmed his rejection of sanctions and called for a timetable for ending apartheid. But, given events in South Africa, Reagan had lost all credibility on the issue by now. Bishop Tutu and Congressional leaders immediately rejected Reagan's statements.[154]

Just two days after Reagan's speech, Senator Lugar, Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, drafted a sanctions package milder than both the Dellums and Kennedy bills. Interestingly, just one week later, President Reagan's envoy to South Africa had the first official U.S. meeting with representatives of the African National Congress, the outlawed black opposition group in South Africa. On August 1, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved strict sanctions against South Africa

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[153]   The Dellums' Bill was defeated in 1985 by a vote of 77-345.

[154]   See "Tutu Denounces Reagan," The New York Times, July 23, 1986; and, "Reaction in Congress to Speech Is Mostly Negative," The New York Times, July 23, 1986.

in a 15-2 vote with only conservatives Jesse Helms (R-NY) and Larry

Pressler (R-SD) in opposition. This bill called for:

- Banning new loans and investments by American businesses;
- Banning coal and uranium imports;
- Denying landing rights for South Africa   airlines;
- Granting the President the authority to deny   visas for South Africans;
- Encouraging the President to sell gold   reserves to undermine the South Africa   economy; and,
- Banning the use of American owned banks by   Pretoria and its state-owned companies.

The Senate rejected the Dellums bill but passed Lugar's version of

the Anti-apartheid Act of 1986, with amendments on August 15, by a 84-14

vote. All "No" votes were cast by Republicans. The Senate version called

for no new investment in South Africa companies, restricted trade embargo

on products from government owned companies, barred coal, uranium and

textile imports, cancelled landing rights for South Africa airlines, and

restricted the use of American banks by Pretoria. House Democratic

leaders accepted the Senate version of the Anti-apartheid bill. The House

passed the bill on September 12 by a vote of 308-77.

Anticipating a presidential veto, Senator Richard Lugar warned

President Reagan that he would personally lead the fight to override it.[155]

Despite that, Reagan vetoed the bill, as expected, on September 26,

claiming that the bill would hurt those it was intended to help--the black

majority in South Africa. The House voted to override Reagan's veto on

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[155]   "Lugar Says He'd Lead Fight To Override Sanctions Veto," The New York Times, September 17, 1986.

September 29 by a 313-83 vote with 81 Republicans voting to override

Reagan, and the Senate similarly voted for an override on October 2, 1986,

78-21 with 31 Republicans voting against their president.

The final law (P.L. 99-440) contained these provisions:

- A Ban on new corporate investment in South Africa and new loans to government   agencies;
- A prohibition on U.S. banks from accepting deposits from any South African government agency;
- A ban on loans to South African government agencies;
- A prohibition on nuclear trade with South Africa;
- A ban on imports of steel, iron, uranium and coal;
- A ban on the importation of Kruggerands;
- A ban on textile imports;
- A ban on imports of agricultural products;
- A ban on computer exports to South African agencies enforcing apartheid;
- A prohibition on petroleum or crude oil exports to South Africa;
- A prohibition on cooperation with the armed forces of South Africa;
- An end to landing rights in United States for South Africa Airways; and,
- A call for release of Nelson Mandela from prison.

The significance of this legislation was quickly noted by

Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986:359) which labeled this vote "the

most serious defeat Reagan had suffered on a foreign issue and one of the

most stunning blows of his presidency." Congressional Quarterly also

pointed out that this was the first override of a presidential veto on a

foreign policy issue since 1973.

President Reagan underestimated how deeply anti-apartheid

sentiment was felt in Congress and among the wider United States public.

As Bob Dole, Republican President of the Senate in 1986 said, economic

sanctions was as much a "domestic civil rights issue" as it was a foreign policy issue. Though Dole was critical of the issue as a "feel-good-vote," he was correct in identifying the symbolism this issue had not just for the anti-apartheid movement, but for the mass public. The redefinition of the issue as a civil rights concern was especially important for swaying Senators and Representatives--Democrats and Republicans--representing large black constituencies, particularly in the South. It is also apparent that Republican Party leaders wanted to avoid offending potential supporters within the black community. In the words of Howard Wolpe, Chairperson of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa:

> A lot of folks, I think, voted for sanctions not because they believed in them or believed they'd make any difference but because they didn't want to be perceived as not sufficiently hostile to apartheid. That's the reality. A lot of folks, in other words, bought into it because they saw the vote being interpreted in civil rights terms rather than foreign policy terms and they didn't want to be on the wrong side of that issue.[156]

A vote against economic sanctions became a vote for racism. And, Reagan's intransigence on South Africa was interpreted as a mirror reflection of his intransigence on domestic civil rights concerns. Anti-apartheid activists, public opinion, and congressional leaders were seeking a method for repudiating constructive engagement. Comprehensive economic sanctions were the anti-thesis of Reagan's policy, and served this purpose well. As such, the sanctions legislation was a political innovation signifying

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[156]   Interview with author, March 23, 1989.

a large-scale policy break with past United States relations with South Africa.

BEYOND THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986

The economic sanctions against South Africa were of great symbolic and material significance. Economic sanctions are traditionally reserved as a foreign policy tool to be used against hostile nations. The Reagan administration levied sanctions against Libya and Nicaragua, two nations considered by President Reagan to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States. On a symbolic level, sanctions, as political innovation, signalled the reversal of the long-held alliance between South Africa and the United States.

Sanctions created an appearance that the United States government was critical of apartheid and concerned with condemning apartheid practices in harsh terms. Sanctions also sent a message to South Africa that the United States considered the black opposition to have legitimate grievances with the Pretorian regime. Economic sanctions were also an act of political innovation which signified the ability of Congress and the public to successfully challenge the Reagan agenda. For Congress, the passage of economic sanctions reflects the culmination of a two decade battle for influence over the foreign policy-process, with respect to South Africa. For the anti-apartheid movement, passage of sanctions seemed to indicate that ordinary people can work together to influence the policy-process.

The symbolic success of the legislation, however, has had a deleterious effect on the United States anti-apartheid movement, because of the perception that something is being done about apartheid. The Movement has not been able to mobilize at a level near that demonstrated in 1985 and 1986. Nor have stronger divestment packages, such as the Dellums bill, been able to move out of Congressional committee since 1986.[157] Though supporters of total sanctions remain optimistic, the prospects of levying additional trade restrictions against South Africa appear dim.

But were the benefits of sanctions purely symbolic? Was this simply a ruse to quell disturbances around the nation? The answer to this questions is "No;" the rewards of sanctions have not been solely symbolic. Important material consequences have accompanied sanctions as well. At the time sanctions were passed, South Africa was a major supplier of diamonds, gold, strategic metals, and military arms to the world market. South Africa did not have a fragile economy like other countries facing sanctions, such as Nicaragua. While economic sanctions have not been as destructive to South Africa's economy, they have had an impact nonetheless.

Economic sanctions sent a signal to major corporations that the United States considered South Africa to have an unstable climate for

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[157] One additional anti-apartheid law has been approved since economic sanctions were adopted by Congress. In 1987, Representative Charles Rangel sponsored a tax measure which prohibited corporations from deducting the taxes paid to the South African government from their U.S. taxes. See "Mobil Reported to Plan South African Pullout," The New York Times, April 27, 1989.

future investments and the United States would no longer protect corporate investments in the nation. Major corporations, such as Mobil, cited U.S. economic sanctions as the reason they were totally pulling out of the South Africa economy.[158]

Corporate pullouts, declining investments, negative publicity from within the United States and abroad, have contributed to the economic and political problems felt by the South African government. Under pressure from a declining resource base, the Pretorian regime became overextended fighting internal opposition movements and illegally occupying foreign territories.

By 1989, the South Africa government seemed to reconsider its priorities. It negotiated a pullout and agreed to free elections in Namibia, a neighboring country which South Africa was illegally occupying against a United Nations mandate. More recently, President Botha, a hardliner, was replaced by President F. W. de Klerk. President de Klerk appears to be taking a more reformist approach toward apartheid. He has relaxed many provisions of apartheid, released opposition leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu from 27 years of imprisonment, unbanned the African National Congress, and suggested the possibility of discussing power-sharing arrangements with the opposition. It is far too early to assess the success of these reforms or to speculate about an end to apartheid.

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[158]   See "Mobil Quitting South Africa Blaming 'Foolish' U.S. Laws," The New York Times, April 29, 1989.

ANALYSIS

The Eighties was a period in which the Executive branch and the Legislative branch of national government clashed over priorities for South African policy. Set against renewed violence in South Africa and a rapidly mobilizing social movement, Anti-apartheid policy shifted from comity with constructive engagement to enmity with economic sanctions.

By 1986, the interests of the domestic anti-apartheid movement became codified as politically innovative law. In some senses, these interests were the same as those espoused by marginal Pan-Africanist activists in the early part of the twentieth century. Anti-apartheid sentiment had truly moved from the margins to the mainstream of public opinion.

This analysis dissects the problem, political and policy streams prevailing in the Eighties. The following questions guide this analysis: (1) Which factors are responsible for moving the anti-apartheid issue to the decision agenda of Congress? (2) Why was Congress able to seize control over the making of South African policy? (3) In what ways was the anti-apartheid movement influential in the passage of economic sanctions?

Problem Streams

At the dawn of the Eighties, President Reagan profoundly affected problem streams by substituting an anti-communist world view of foreign policy relations for President Carter's concern for human rights. Constructive engagement was justified because South Africa was a trusted

friend, a stable trading partner and an advocate of anti-Soviet policies on the African continent.

But state violence persisted in South Africa as opposition forces within the country mounted their most significant campaign in thirty years. Although South Africa had experienced violence in the past, and this violence had little substantive impact upon U.S. policy, during the Eighties continuing violence, the state of emergency decree, and Bishop Tutu's Nobel prize delegitimized Reagan's rhetoric about the capacity of South Africa to reform the apartheid system from within. This reality clashed with Reagan's stalwart defense of constructive engagement. The clash became visible not just to legislators in the United States or to anti-apartheid movement activists, but to the broader public as well. There was a growing consensus that a message needed to be sent to South Africa.

The most significant problem stream development in the Eighties was the calculated efforts of the anti-apartheid movement to reclaim its roots and redefine concern for South Africa as a domestic, racial issue. When apartheid and constructive engagement became a metaphor for Reagan's domestic policies, this issue rose to the top of the list of concerns for African-Americans. The civil rights community mobilized around the issue, by the mid-Eighties, as a vehicle to reverse broader priorities of the Reagan agenda.

The movement positioned legislators into taking a personal stand on racism when they cast a vote 'For' or 'Against' South Africa. If legislators refused to support sanctions against South Africa, they were considered to

be "racist," a label which no legislator with a significant black constituency could afford to wear. By 1985, these problem stream disturbances dovetailed with political stream changes as a broad-based, bi-partisan consensus against apartheid was established.

Political Streams

As in past decades, a new President was able to remodel United States foreign policy to reflect his agenda for relations with South Africa. President Reagan initiated a policy of constructive engagement that went beyond the overtures made by Richard Nixon toward South Africa. Reagan's policies bordered on collaboration with South Africa in the administration of apartheid.

The Eighties bore witness, however, to Congress waging a successful challenge to the President's foreign policy priorities. This was unprecedented. Congress' battle with Reagan over South African policy can be placed within a broader context. Congress had been struggling to restrain presidential foreign policy-making powers since the Vietnam experience in the early Seventies. When it was clear that Reagan was out of step with the reality of events in South Africa, Congress elevated anti-apartheid sanctions from the governmental agenda, where it resided as the late Seventies ended, to the decision agenda by 1983. Upon failure of sanctions to proceed through the Senate in 1984, a third political force joined the debate over South Africa policy.

TransAfrica initiated the Free South Africa campaign protests consisting of a widely publicized campaign of sit-ins and celebrity arrests at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. This tactic redefined the anti-apartheid issue as a civil rights concern and captured the attention of the nation. As more and more arrests occurred, the mass media kept South Africa in the headlines. The Free South Africa protests also translated the voice of grassroots anti-apartheid activists into a national force. Student mobilizations followed. Legislators were put under the microscope on the South Africa issue. They needed to appease their constituents on the issue. Votes shifted in Congress.

The Free South Africa campaign protests raise two important points for this analysis. These points are related to the timing of the Free South Africa protests and rapid movement mobilization, and the initiators of this mobilization. First, it is important to recognize that rapid anti-apartheid movement mobilization began in 1984, after economic sanctions were already on the decision agenda of Congress. The anti-apartheid movement was not responsible for moving the issue to the decision agenda. Instead, the movement was able to redefine the nature of the issue and give impetus to its passage after the issue had reached the decision agenda. Thus, the movement was able to exploit opportunities for access to the agenda that were created once the issue was legitimized by other forces.

Second, the Free South Africa campaign was the idea of Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, an African-American lobby organization. Lobby organizations reflect the institutionalization of access to the political

process and are a tactic available only to member group organizations. Yet, protests, sit-ins, and arrests are tactics are used by challenger groups to expand the scope of mobilization around an issue and to create leverage in the policy-process.

TransAfrica's use of challenger group tactics reflects the frustrations Robinson's organization had experienced attempting to gain access to the policy process during the Reagan administration. The priorities of the Reagan administration conflicted with the goals of the African-American community. Points of access previously available to African-Americans were narrowed, not just with respect to foreign policy issues, but on domestic issues as well. TransAfrica was forced to conduct politics by other means to continue to have a say in the policy-process. It turned to the history of the civil rights movement to find new tactics for expression. In retrospect, the Free South Africa protests were a brilliant tactic. This tactic challenged Reagan's international and domestic agendas by linking powerful memories of the sit-ins and the civil rights agenda of the 1950's and 1960's with the current political crisis in South Africa and the United States. Congress embraced these links for it improved the resources available to them for battling the President.

Policy Streams

For the most part, policy solutions in the 1980's borrowed from the past. Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was an enthusiastic, highly visible, rendition of President Nixon's policy toward South Africa. Several

provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 had been raised by legislators during the late Seventies, though the extent of the provisions was unprecedented. What is new in the 1980's is that a policy of political innovation made it to the decision agenda and was ultimately passed by Congress.

The big policy stream disturbance during the Eighties had to do with the political climate within which the policies were raised. By the middle 1980's, there was wide-spread public understanding of the economic linkages argument. Corporate investments and economic trade with South Africa was regarded as encouraging apartheid, rather than reform. This was the position promoted by some elements of the anti-apartheid movement during the Sixties, and certainly the position promoted during the anti-corporate campaigns of the Seventies. Widespread acceptance of this argument constrained the options available to legislators who wanted to respond in a meaningful way to the problems associated with apartheid.

Thus, problem, political and policy streams were in flux during the Eighties. These conditions created a climate in which anti-apartheid sanctions could be moved from the governmental to the decision agendas, and ultimately on to final passage in 1986. In 1986, Congress sent a hostile signal to South Africa and to President Reagan. It passed a strong Anti-apartheid package and the message was that the time for reform had run out. Apartheid and constructive engagement were declared to be unacceptable. Despite President Reagan's position on the issue, and despite

the power of the Executive branch to dominate foreign policy, Congress seized control over this policy area. Simultaneously, the voice of the anti-apartheid movement was heard; not only because activists made noise, but, more importantly, because Congress found it opportune to listen.

Figure VI-1

Anti-apartheid Activity: 1980-1986

Events

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

Source: The New York Times

Figure VI-2
Movement Actors: 1980-1986

Events

30 25 20 15 10 5 0

80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Year

Religious
Students
Civil Rights/Black
Anti-apartheid

Source: The New York Times

225

Figure VI-3
Movement Targets: 1980-1986

Events

20
15
10
5
0

80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

Government   Corporate   University/College

226

Table VI-1a

Millions of Dollars Divested

	States	City/County	College/University	Total
1977	$ 11	$ 0	$ 1	$12
1978	0	0	65	65
1979	0	12	21	33
1980	0	0	10	10
1981	0	0	54	54
1982	85	100	3	188
1983	105	0	2	107
1984	47	667	56	770
1985	3,414	609	260	4,283
1986	10,076	1,035	3,469	14,580
Total	$13,738	$2,423	$3,941	20,102

Table VI-1b

Number of Divestments

	States	City/County	College/University	Total
1977	1	2	3	6
1978	0	1	10	11
1979	0	2	13	15
1980	0	4	7	11
1981	0	1	5	6
1982	2	3	2	7
1983	1	4	4	9
1984	4	8	8	20
1985	10	45	62	117
1986	6	25	43	74
Total	25	95	157	277

Source: The American Committee on Africa

Figure VI-4a
Divestment Activity: 1977-1986
(log)

Source: The American Committee on Africa

Figure VI-4b
Divestment Activity: 1977-1986
(linear)

Source: The American Committee on Africa

Figure VI-5

U.S. Government Activity: 1980-1986

Source: The New York Times

Figure VI-6

U.S. Government Actors: 1980-1986

Events

80
60
40
20
0

80   81   82   83   84   85   86

Year

Legislature   Judicial/Other   Executive

Source: The New York Times

230

231

Figure VI-7
Legislative Actors: 1980-1986

Events

25
20
15
10
5
0

80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Year

Legislature   Legislators

Source: The New York Times

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM:

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

AND THE POLITICS OF AGENDA-SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES

This dissertation has examined the relationship between anti-apartheid movement activists and national policy-makers between 1960 and 1986. It is a case study of the opportunities sometimes available to social movement activists to influence large-scale policy change, also known as political innovation.

Using an agenda-setting framework, the last three chapters have described how the anti-apartheid movement sought to influence problem, political, and policy streams in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's, respectively. These chapters also examined how disturbances in prevailing problem, policy and policy streams influenced United States policy toward South Africa during each of these periods. Finally, chapters four through six analyzed the nature of anti-apartheid movement influence over U.S. relations with South Africa.

This concluding chapter extends the analysis in the previous chapters by combining the three periods analyzed earlier. It includes a discussion of the conclusions derived from application of the agenda-setting model to this case study, as well as a discussion of the shortcomings and concerns raised in this project relevant to future research in this area. The organization of the section which follows reflects the organization of the research chapters: anti-apartheid movement activity is discussed first; governmental activity is discussed second, and the interaction between the anti-apartheid movement and policy-makers between 1960 and 1986 is discussed third.

THE AGENDA-SETTING FRAMEWORK

Anti-apartheid Movement Activity

According to events recorded in The New York Times, anti-apartheid movement activity grew steadily in the Sixties, peaked in the late Seventies, and experienced rapid mobilization in the mid-Eighties (Figure VII-1).

Table VII-1 summarizes how the anti-apartheid movement attempted to influence prevailing problem, political and policy streams throughout the three decades examined in this dissertation. This table depicts the dynamic nature of social movements. Movements are, in essence, a conglomeration of constituents challenging policy norms. The capacity of movements to effectively influence agenda streams, and thereby influence the composition of issues on the policy agenda, is related to the variety of resources, strategies, and tactics available to movement actors at any one time. It is important to understand the historical trajectory of social movement

development in order to grasp how social movements are able to exploit windows of opportunity when they become available.

As Table VII-1 illustrates, the Movement's definition of the apartheid "problem" evolved between the Sixties and the Eighties to include not just direct violence and discrimination against blacks in South Africa, but indirect support for the apartheid regime by U.S. corporate and financial institutions, as well as broader conceptions of racism abroad and in the United States. In the Eighties, apartheid also became a metaphor for President Reagan's domestic policy agenda.

As far as the ability of the anti-apartheid movement to influence political streams is concerned, the Movement experienced a period of coalition building in the Sixties, resource consolidation in the Seventies, and rapid mobilization in the Eighties. Tactically, the Movement moved from national lobbying and local anti- credit campaigns in the Sixties; to a national stockholders' campaign and grassroots, direct action in the Seventies; and, finally, to a combination of sit-ins, national lobbying, and local divestment campaigns in the Eighties.

Thus, during the Eighties--when the anti-apartheid movement achieved its greatest influence over the policy agenda--a multiplicity of factors had congealed. The movement had evolved to its greatest capacity for influence.

Two important points about the capacity of movements to effectively influence agenda streams can drawn from this case study. First, this research demonstrates that movements do not engage in stream activity in

isolation from developments in other streams. In this case study, political streams and problem streams interacted dialectically, the synthesis of which was reflected in policy stream activity. While problem stream events in South Africa drove the United States opposition movement to newer heights of mobilization, political stream developments such as new constituents, including member group allies, additional resources, resource consolidation and increased institutional access created the capacity for the Movement to organize proactive anti-apartheid campaigns.

One example of how policy streams evolved from interactions between problem stream and political stream developments is drawn from the Seventies. By this period, the scope of mobilization surrounding the anti-apartheid issue had been expanded to a national base. Religious groups dominated political streams in the Seventies. They were able to coordinate their investment portfolios to create leverage within corporate structures. Religious groups attempted to influence problem streams by drawing connections between corporate trade policies and support for the apartheid regime. As more radical African-American organizations and students entered the political stream, the problem stream linkages argument took on a more militant tone. The result of this relationship between political and problem stream developments was that the divestment/disinvestment position dominated Anti-apartheid policy stream activity throughout the decade. Thus, as this example demonstrates, movement attempts to influence policy streams reflected on-going interactions between problem and political streams developments.

Second, opportunities for movements to effectively influence agenda streams change over time. Movement tactics vary with shifting opportunities. For example, in the early Eighties, anti-apartheid activity slowed as Reagan came into office and avenues for access into the policy process appeared closed. This lack of access, coupled with escalating violence in South Africa, motivated TransAfrica to combine traditional lobbying tactics with direct action tactics in their political stream activities by the mid-Eighties. Local level divestment campaigns and national level action co-existed in the mid-Eighties; the Movement simultaneously called for economic sanctions, divestment, and disinvestment. As can be seen, opportunities to influence policy agendas changed over time; when old avenues closed, new ones often opened.

The success of the Movement in the Eighties was due, in part, to its ability to capitalize on the unique resources of individual constituents. In attempting to influence policy agendas, movement constituents possessed different resources and differing potentials for institutional access. African-Americans tried lobbying public officials, religious groups fought for stockholders' resolutions using their portfolios as leverage, and students, lacking any resources, engaged in direct action on their campuses. Thus, anti-apartheid movement activity reflected the structural location of movement participants and prevailing opportunities for access.

In sum, using the agenda-setting framework it is possible to capture the complexities of social movement activity and to grasp the multidimensionality of movements. This research also indicates that the

problem, political, and policy stream activity of social movements is dialectically related, and that the capacity of social movements to exploit shifting opportunities varies with the structural location of movement constituents and the nature of windows of opportunity which become available.

National Government Activity

The agenda-setting framework is valuable, not just for offering insight into the goals, strategies and tactics of social movements, but also because it offers a method for understanding the factors which influence the composition of issues on the policy agenda.

Figure VII-2 presents an overview of government activity surrounding South Africa policy between 1960 and 1986, based on events recorded in The New York Times. As demonstrated here, except for brief peaks of activity in 1963 and 1966 (peaks which correspond to the activity of individual legislators), policy activity is rather stable through the mid-Seventies. Policy activity is then characterized by peaks in 1977 and 1985 to 1986.

Table VII-2 summarizes the problem, political and policy stream influences shaping United States relations with South Africa between 1960 and 1986. The most striking feature of this summary is that political stream developments dominated the formation of United States policy toward South Africa throughout the three decades under investigation. For the most part, presidential initiatives in this policy-area controlled the character

of official U.S. policy: Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were somewhat critical of apartheid; Nixon was more favorably disposed to the South African regime; President Carter was critical (in the early years); and, President Reagan was more supportive of Pretoria than President Nixon. However, in the 1980's, Congress exerted control over foreign policy, a political stream development uncharacteristic of earlier periods, and ultimately the one that created the crucial link between anti-apartheid interests and public policy toward South Africa.

To be sure, other stream activity influenced the making of South African policy. Policy initiatives often corresponded with problem stream disturbances. Crisis situations in South Africa preceded the Kennedy Arms Embargo and Carter's rhetorical condemnation of apartheid. Interestingly, these crisis occurred during the last year of a lame duck Republican president's administration: the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 (Eisenhower) and the Soweto Massacre in 1976 (Ford). While the Republican's may have lacked the support (or political will) to respond effectively, the new Democratic presidents appear to have altered policy in response to the crisis situation.

But, crises, by themselves, do not drive policy. The case in point is that Reagan remained a staunch ally of South Africa during a period of escalating violence in that nation. Instead, problem stream developments accompanied by political stream developments, "encouraged" policy change. For example, Presidents Kennedy and Carter owed election debts to the African-American community. They, therefore, responded more sensitively

to situations in Africa, a historic concern for the African-American community. Reagan, on the other hand, was under no obligation to respond to African-American concerns. He was able to stay the course with constructive engagement without concern for domestic implications. Reagan instituted mild economic sanctions only when politically forced to do so by Congress in 1985.

Thus, use of the agenda-setting framework reveals the subtle relationships between streams. These relationships ultimately regulated the composition of issues on the policy agenda. This case study demonstrates the central importance of political stream activity. Political stream disturbances preceded developments in the other streams. While problem stream changes unfolded independent of the other streams, their policy impact was dependent upon the nature of prevailing political streams.

The Dynamic Relationship Between Anti-apartheid Movement and National Government Activity

The central theoretical question guiding this dissertation has been "What is the relationship between social movements and the public policy-process?" With specific reference to the case study, the question has been, "What was the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and U.S. foreign policy relations with South Africa from 1960 to 1986?" As has been described, the anti-apartheid movement's influence during the 1960's and 1970's was limited and indirect. During the 1980's, however, the movement was able to directly influence the policy process. It is as important to understand why the Movement was unable to directly influence the policy

process during the Sixties and Seventies, as it is to understand why the Movement was able to exert influence over the process in the Eighties.

The anti-apartheid movement played an indirect policy role during the Sixties and Seventies. It articulated African-American concern for African issues and, kept apartheid at the forefront of the African-American systemic agenda throughout this period. Thus, when Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter wanted to appear responsive to African-American interests, they placed special importance on addressing U.S. relations with South Africa. But presidential dominance in foreign affairs, prevented the Movement from influencing the policy agenda during this period. Despite its ability to accumulate resources and expand the scope of mobilization, the anti-apartheid movement continued to lack access to the policy process.

It was during the Eighties that the anti-apartheid movement achieved its greatest success. In this period, Congress legislated comprehensive economic sanctions, a political innovation which codified anti-apartheid concerns as law. What role did the movement play in this process? Recalling the discussion in chapters five and six, entrepreneurial legislators and events in South Africa, not the Movement, were the driving force behind anti-apartheid legislation moving to the governmental agenda between 1978 and 1979, and to the decision agenda between 1983 and 1984. The Movement was able to influence the policy process most effectively after the policy innovation was on the decision agenda. At this point, legislators created an opportunity for Anti-apartheid activists to be heard.

Inter-branch conflict between Congress and President Reagan created the window of opportunity for anti-apartheid movement activists to become active in the national debate over sanctions. Congress had been trying to exert an influence over foreign affairs policy since the early Seventies. As violence escalated in South Africa and constructive engagement appeared to support rather than encourage reform of apartheid, Congress sought to take a substantive stand against both apartheid and constructive engagement, by entering the foreign policy arena.

In 1985 and 1986, legislators capitalized on the efforts of the rapidly mobilizing anti-apartheid movement. The legislature appropriated the Movement's redefinition of the issue as a domestic civil rights concern to forge the level of public support and internal bi-partisan consensus necessary to overturn a presidential veto and redefine the course of United States policy relations with South Africa.

The conflict between Congress and President Reagan, a political stream disturbance, set against a political innovation already on the decision agenda, created an opportunity for the anti-apartheid movement's attempts to influence prevailing problem, political, and policy streams governing the composition of issues on the policy agenda to be effective. The anti-apartheid movement effectively influenced problem streams as the apartheid issue was redefined as a domestic civil rights issue (and to some extent, an anti-Reagan issue). Political streams were influenced because the scope of the issue was broadened. The old civil rights coalition was revived and public opinion heightened the scrutiny of legislative behavior on this issue.

Policy streams were affected by public awareness of the linkages between trading and investment patterns, and the perpetuation of apartheid. Because of its ability to affect these streams, the anti-apartheid movement ultimately became an important force behind passage of comprehensive economic sanctions, and helped to shape South Africa policy in the 1980's.

Thus, application of the agenda-setting framework to this case study has made it possible to articulate the relationship between social movements and policy-makers. More specifically, it demonstrates how movement effectiveness in the policy process may be dependent not just upon the capacity of social movements to attempt to influence agenda streams, but upon the creation of windows of opportunity external to social movement activity.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The agenda-setting framework is useful for examining the relationships between social movement activity and the policy-making process. It offers a tool with which to explain the constraints that shape and delimit expression of challenger interests in a democracy. The agenda-setting framework also facilitates an understanding of how public problems become defined and integrated into the policy-making process. This research raises two broad issues, however, about how agenda-setting studies should be conducted in the future. These issues involve (1) the conceptualization of the agenda-setting framework, and, (2) methodological strategies for pursuing this type of research in the future.

Reconsideration of the Agenda-Setting Framework

As conceptualized by Kingdon, problem, political, and policy streams are little more than heuristic devices which facilitate the categorization of information into discrete boxes. But, real world politics can rarely be broken down into such neatly defined categories. As this research demonstrates, it is important to recognize that events may span across two or three streams and that developments in one stream can influence developments in another stream. When categorizing information, researchers need to delve deeply into their subjects, with a variety of research strategies, to understand the subtle ways in which the political world is interrelated. In other words, politics can be messy and the agenda-setting framework is valuable only if it can account for this messiness.

Ultimately, the agenda-setting framework is only useful to the extent that it helps to develop theory in the area of social movements and policy influence. Use of the agenda-setting framework in this case study has revealed a number of contributions to the development of theory.

First, generalizing from this case study, a theory of social movements and agenda-setting needs to account for the differing ability (or inability) of social movements to directly influence the composition of issues on the governmental and decision agendas. As has been pointed out, at least some explanation for these differing abilities may be found by analyzing the historical context of policy development. In this case study, the anti-apartheid movement was unable to directly influence placement of the anti-apartheid issue on either the governmental or decision agendas. It was only

influential in affecting the character of the apartheid issue once the issue was on the decision agenda.

Second, this research suggests that theory about the relationship between social movements and the policy process needs to account for the fact that movements may not have equal access to the problem, political, and policy streams. Based upon the research in this dissertation, a window of opportunity in political streams external to the anti-apartheid movement created conditions which allowed the Movement to influence the policy process. Due to its rapid mobilization, the Movement was able to exploit this political stream window. Movement influence over problem and policy streams followed.

Finally, a theory of the agenda-setting role of social movements needs to include a dialectical understanding of the relationship between social movement and policy-makers. Unfortunately, the traditional agenda-setting literature conceptualizes events as proceeding linearly: individuals collectively pursue their interests with other like-minded individuals, they engage in strategies and tactics to bring their issue to the policy agenda, legislators respond and include issues on their agenda, and eventually policy is made.

In contrast, as developed in Chapter two, a sociological understanding of the initial formation of social movements is based in dialectics. If interests support the underlying values and assumptions of the political system, group representatives are able to influence the policy agenda through "normal" political channels. If interests are antagonistic to

the underlying values and assumptions of the political system, they are excluded from the polity. Groups representing challenger interests must look to other vehicles, such as social movements, to promote their goals. Social movements are, by definition, a relational concept.

Similarly, this research has found that social movement influence over the policy-agenda is relational. Movements build the capacity to influence policy agendas through the accumulation and mobilization of resources, but, ultimately, effectiveness in is shaped by prevailing opportunity structures. When windows of opportunity are created, social movement influence is facilitated. This finding corresponds with recent scholarship on a political process model of social movement activity.

The outlines of the political process model is suggested by Tilly's work on repertoires of tactics employed by social movements (1979). These repertoires involve the range of tactical options available to social movements at any one time. While a number of tactics from the repertoire may be simultaneously employed, it is not uncommon for one tactic to periodically rise to popularity among movement participants (McAdam 1983, 1982).

Social movement strategies and tactics fade in popularity as policy-makers adapt accordingly and the strategy or tactic becomes less effective as a means of promoting movement goals (Blumberg, 1984; McAdam, 1983, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977). In other words, social control mechanisms force social movements to emphasize different tactics under different conditions.

> The pace of insurgency comes to be crucially influenced by (a) the creativity of insurgents in devising new tactical forms, and (b) the ability of opponents to neutralize these moves through effective tactical counters. These processes may be referred to as <u>tactical innovation</u> and <u>tactical adaptation</u>, respectively. Together they define an ongoing process of <u>tactical interaction</u> in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset the moves of the other. How well each succeeds at this task crucially affects the pace and outcome of insurgency." (McAdam, 1983:736)

Policy-makers and social movements are thus locked into constant interaction where the activity of one influences the activity of the other.

Much of the political process literature has been developed within the context of understanding the formation and development of collective action. Past scholars, however, have simplified the role of social movements with respect to the policy process. This dissertation suggests that it is important to understand the subtle and complex ways in which agenda-setting dynamics are dialectically related.

Methodological Strategies

The data set of events recorded in <u>The New York Times</u>, combined with elite interviews, documentary history and archival research, provide an excellent resource with which to understand how the anti-apartheid movement interacted with national policy-makers. These methodological techniques had two major shortcomings, however, that future researchers in this area should consider. They did not offer a great deal of information about the activity of forces antagonistic to the goals of the anti-apartheid movement, and the ability to generalize the research findings are implicitly limited through use of the case study method. First, it is apparent from

this dissertation research that an organized counter-movement, opposed to the goals of the anti-apartheid movement, never materialized. While individual pro-apartheid acts and anti-sanctions acts appear in the data set, the resources used in this research offer little information about why a successful counter-movement never formed. It is possible, however, to speculate about the lack of a visible organized counter-movement.

One possible reason that a counter-movement never materialized may involve the consensus-orientation of the definitions used by the anti-apartheid movement to describe their concerns. It is difficult to organize people around supporting racism, for example. While opponents surely existed, they were publicly constrained by the way the problem was defined.

A second speculation involves the very origins of social movements themselves. If social movements represent interests denied access to the policy system, and if the pro-apartheid and the anti-sanction forces were already represented in the policy system, then there is essentially no reason why a counter-movement needed to form since such interests already had access to policy. As this research has demonstrated, the anti-apartheid movement was fighting an uphill battle against institutional interests which successfully resisted significant condemnation of apartheid for more than two decades. Also, when anti-apartheid sentiment suddenly captured the nation in 1985, these institutional interests were, in all likelihood, caught off guard. They lacked the time to effectively mount an anti-sanctions campaign.

Additionally, while the methodologies employed here were sensitive to the strategies corporations used to defend their investments in South Africa, the methodologies were not particularly adept at registering the specific lobbying pressures that corporations applied to encourage national policy-makers to resist imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.

Neither the data set, nor interviews with legislators, recorded the magnitude and power of the corporate lobby. My sense is that legislators were reluctant to reveal this information for fear that their autonomy would be called into question. Parallelling this problem, this research did not allow me to specify the relationship between policy-makers and corporate interests beyond specific lobbying pressures. Research strategies designed to reveal the relationship between the corporate sector and policy-makers would clearly be important additions to future research efforts in this area.

A second methodological shortcoming of this research involves the limits inherent to a case study method. A case study of political innovation was selected to investigate the impact of social movements on the national policy agenda. This particular choice of a policy area was directed by the literature which suggested that research into the political innovation process (particularly for acute innovations) is most likely to reveal the influence of social movement activity in the policy process (Polsby, 1985). This makes intuitive sense in that movement objectives challenge current policy norms. Social movements are not likely to be working for incremental change.

In order to specify the relationship between social movement activists and the policy process, it is important to delve deeply into a historically-based context. This context is only knowable through case study research.

However, since only a minority of policy developments involve political innovations, what does this case study say about the role of social movements in American politics? Are they actually inconsequential to the broader democratic system? Or, are social movements becoming increasingly significant linkage mechanisms as other forms of linkage perform less effectively? One case study can not offer a perspective on these broader questions. Only with the development of several case studies which focus on social movements' ability to effectively influence political innovations as well as incremental change, can we begin to answer these questions.

A FINAL NOTE

This dissertation has analyzed the relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and national policy-makers as Anti-apartheid legislation moved to the national policy agenda. Set against the context of history, this dissertation demonstrates that an issue, once marginal to the political system, can be brought to the national policy agenda. It further demonstrates that political innovations can emerge from the policy system with impetus from social movement activists.

Final passage of the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 reminds us that the political environment is constantly in flux. Windows of

opportunity sometimes arise for social movements to overcome institutional biases and realize their own goals.

As we pass the 200th anniversary of ratification of the United States constitution, the nation should pause to reflect upon the Framers' principles. The Framers organized a political framework that limits the expression of mass influence and dilutes direct access to the policy process. Political scientists tend to focus upon institutions which mediate citizen opinion and influence. While it is important to recognize that the mediation of mass expression is central to the United States political system, we must also be cognizant of the need to balance the value of this process against a conception of liberty and freedom which entitles citizens to more control over their lives and direct participation in the political process.

At times, people resist the temptation of apathy in the face of unresponsive political institutions and organize challenger organizations and social movements to directly inject their concerns into the political system. At times, these interests make it to policy-makers' agendas; and, in some cases, these interests are codified as public policy. This dissertation's focus on the opportunities that exist for social movements to influence the policy process ultimately complements the traditional political science literature by yielding a more inclusive picture of politics in the United States.

Figure VII-1
Anti-apartheid Activity: 1960-1986

Source: The New York Times

TABLE VII-1

ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT ACTIVITY

	1960's	1970's	1980's
Problem Streams	Violence Discrimination	Violence Discrimination Economic Links	Violence Discrimination Economic Links Racism (home and abroad) Anti-Reagan
Political Streams	Coalition Building	Resource Consolidation National Stockholder Campaigns Grassroots Direct Action	Rapid Mobilization Sit-ins National Lobbying Grassroots Direct Action Expanded Scope (public opinion)
Policy Streams	Sanctions	Sanctions Divestment Disinvestment	Sanctions Divestment Disinvestment

Figure VII-2
U.S. Government Activity: 1960-1986

TABLE VII-2

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

	1960's	1970's	1980's
Problem Streams	Sharpeville Massacre Rivona Trials Violence	Anti-Communism Preservation of the Western Alliance	Anti-Communism Preservation of the Western Alliance vs.
		Soweto Massacre Violence Human Rights	State of Emergency Racism (home and abroad) Anti-Reagan
Political Streams	President Kennedy President Johnson United Nations African Americans	President Nixon President Ford Globalists	President Reagan vs. Congress Anti-Apartheid Movement Public Opinion
		President Carter Regionalists	
Policy Streams	Arms Embargo	Constructive Engagement	Constructive Engagement vs.
		Anti-apartheid Rhetoric	Comprehensive Economic Sanctions

APPENDIX A

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR EVENTS CODED IN DATA SET[159]

1) Only events appearing under the heading of "SOUTH AFRICA, Republic of" (or similar heading) in the New York Times Index between 1960 and 1986 that are relevant to the issue of reaction to the South African situation in the United States were read for coding. Under this umbrella falls all United States-based actors and events involved in the struggle to support or ireject apartheid in South Africa.

2) The complete newspaper article was read and coded only if there was a lack of ambiguity in the nature of the event(s) and the individual(s) and/or group(s) responsible.

3) Letters (let), comments (com), opinions (op or "article by"), illustrations (ill) or reviews (rev) of movies, television shows and books, or other newspaper generated listings in the Index were not coded.

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[159] These selection criteria and the coding manual appearing in Appendix B are adapted from a coding manual used by Doug McAdam in Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency.

APPENDIX B

DISSERTATION CODING MANUAL

<u>COLUMNS</u>   <u>CODES AND INFORMATION</u>

01-07   <u>EVENT DESIGNATION CODE</u> (NUMBER)
               Format = (Year)(Month)(Event Number)
               For Example— 771101
                    would be 1977, November, first story

09-13   <u>CITATION</u> (CITATION)
                 Format = (date)(page)(column)

15-16   <u>AREA WHERE EVENT TOOK PLACE</u> (AREA)
18-19

99	Unclear Location	29	New Hampshire
01	Alabama	30	New Jersey
02	Alaska	31	New Mexico
03	Arizona	32	New York
04	Arkansas	33	North Carolina
05	California	34	North Dakota
06	Colorado	35	Ohio
07	Connecticut	36	Oklahoma
08	Delaware	37	Oregon
09	Florida	38	Pennsylvania
10	Georgia	39	Rhode Island
11	Hawaii	40	South Carolina
12	Idaho	41	South Dakota
13	Illinois	42	Tennessee
14	Indiana	43	Texas
15	Iowa	44	Utah
16	Kansas	45	Vermont
17	Kentucky	46	Virginia
18	Louisiana	47	Washington
19	Maine	48	West Virgina
20	Maryland	49	Wisconsin
21	Massachusetts	50	Wyoming
22	Michigan	51	New York City
23	Minnesota	52	San Francisco
24	Mississippi	53	Wash. DC (local)
25	Missouri	54	Wash. DC (natl)
26	Montana	55	United Nations
27	Nebraska	56	South Africa
28	Nevada	57	Outside US (other)
		97	Multiple Locations
		98	Other Location
		99	Not Identified

21-23   **EVENT INITIATOR**   (INITIATOR)
25-27

Political
010   Candidate(s) <explicitly acknowledged>
011   Party spokesperson(s)

019   Other Political entity

Governmental
020   Executive Head (Governor, President, Chair)
021   Executive Body, agency or official
         (including Cabinet Members and military)
022   Legislator(s)
023   Legislative Body
024   Individual Jurist(s)
025   Judicial Body
026   Law Enforcement Personnel
027   Law Enforcement Body

028   Multiple persons, bodies, etc.
029   Other Governmental entity

University
030   Executive Head
031   Executive Body
032   Other Executive(s)
033   Faculty Representative(s)
034   Faculty Body (including union)
035   Faculty Member(s)
036   Student Government Body
037   Student Government Member(s)
038   Other Student Organization/Representative
039   Individual Student(s)

049   Other University entity

Corporate/Industrial (Specific entity)
050   Executive Head
051   Executive Body
052   Other Executive(s)
053   Employee Representative(s)
054   Employee Organization (incl. union)
055   Individual Employee(s)
056   Stockholder-related

059   Other Corporate/Industrial entity

South Africa
130 Government body
131 Government individual(s)
132 Resistance Movement body
133 Resistance Movement individual
134 Bishop Desmond Tutu
139 Other South Africa

Movement Personalities/Organizations
140 American Committee on Africa
141 Free South Africa/TransAfrica (Randall Robinson)
142 Washington Office on Africa
143 Martin Luther King
144 Jesse Jackson
145 Other Anti-apartheid org. or spokesperson
146 Other Civil rights org. or spokesperson
147 Other Religious org. or spokesperson
148 Other Black org. or spokesperson
149 Other New Left org. of spokesperson

159 Other specifically identified movement
    organization or spokesperson

Reactionary Organizations (including New Right)
160 Jerry Falwell
161 Specifically identified group or spokesperson
162 Multiple groups or spokespersons

Other
190 Other Individual
191 Other Institution

197 Unclear/Ambiguous
198 Not Identified
199 Not Applicable

29 INITIATOR LEVEL   (LEVEL)
30 (Importance/Reputation/Context of Initiating Individual or
    Organization/Institution)

1 Local
2 County
3 State
4 Regional
5 National
8 Unclear Level
9 Not Applicable

32-33	TARGET OF EVENT (TARGET)
35-36	(Who is the event specifically directed toward? Whose attention is/are the initiator(s) appealing to?)

Government (US)
	10	Local body
	11	Local individual
	12	County/Regional body
	13	County/Regional individual
	14	State body
	15	State individual
	16	Federal (incl. Agencies) body
	17	Federal individual
	19	Other government

Institution (US)
	20	Corporate/Industrial
	21	Bank/Financial
	22	University
	23	Religious
	24	United Nations
	25	Labor or Professional body
	26	Labor or Professional individual
	28	Other Local Institution
	29	Other National Institution

Public (US)
	30	Local
	31	County/Regional
	32	State
	33	National
	39	Other Public

South Africa
	40	Government
	41	Business
	42	People (White)
	43	People (Black) <incl. insurgents>
	49	Other South Africa
	50	Other Nation
	51	United Nations

Political Individual(s)/body
	61	Political Individual
	62	Political Organization
	63	Students
	97	Other Target
	98	Ambiguous
	99	Not Applicable

<u>INITIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA</u>

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
10   Political policy of racial separation
11   Economic discrimination against Blacks
12   State repression/persecution
13   Involvement in neighboring states
14   Moral Outrage
15   Economic Interests
19   Other critical perspective (incl. general)

SUPPORTIVE PERSPECTIVE
20   SA situation improving
21   No problems in SA
22   Self-determination
23   Geo-strategic interests to US
24   Economic interests (private/public)
29   Other supportive perspective
           (incl. general and de facto)

OTHER/AMBIGOUS/NEUTRAL
30   Other SA-related issue (specific)
31   Other SA-related issue (general)
96   Unclear/Ambiguous
97   Neutral/No Opinion
98   Not identified
99   Not Applicable

<u>TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA</u>

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
10   Political policy of racial separation
11   Economic discrimination against Blacks 12State
           repression/persecution
13   Involvement in neighboring states
14   Moral Outrage
15   Economic Interests
19   Other critical perspective (incl. general)

SUPPORTIVE PERSPECTIVE
20   SA situation improving
21   No problems in SA
22   Self-determination
23   Geo-strategic interests to US
24   Economic interests (private/public)
29   Other supportive perspective
           (incl. general and de facto support)

44-45 (cont.) <u>TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA</u>
47-48

OTHER/AMBIGOUS/NEUTRAL
30   Other SA-related issue (specific)
31   Other SA-related issue (general)
96   Unclear/Ambiguous
97   Neutral/No Opinion
98   Not identified
99   Not Applicable

50-51   <u>INITIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE OF TARGET</u>
53-54

10   Supportive of Target
11   Critical of Target
12   Mixed perspective
13   Neutral

96   Other
97   Unclear/Ambiguous
98   Not Identified
99   Not Applicable

56-57   <u>ISSUE AREA</u>   (ISSUE)
59-60

11   The Arts
12   Corporate/Industrial/Trade
13   Education/University
14   Financial/Bank
15   Government/Politics (United States)
16   Health and Medicine
17   Labor
18   Medicine
19   Military
20   Private Funds (investment/divestment)
21   Public Funds (investment/divestment)
22   Religion
23   Sports
24   Legal
25   Sanctions
26   Government/Politics (South Africa)
95   General Areas
96   Other specific Issue Area

97   Unclear/Ambiguous
98   Not Identified
99   Not Applicable

62-63   <u>PRIMARY EVENT</u> (PRIMARY)
65-66   <u>SECONDARY EVENT</u> (SECONDARY)

Governmental Activity (Executive)
11   Speech/Position-taking (News Conference)
12   Executive action/decision/order
13   Institution of new program/policy
14   Establishment of new committee/commission
15   Introduction/Proposal of Legislation
16   Request for Information/fact-finding
17   Report on Information/fact-finding

19   Other Executive action

Governmental Activity (Legislative)
20   Speech/Position-taking (News Conference)
21   Introduction of bill
22   Study of bill
23   Debate on bill
24   Passage of bill
25   Rejection of bill
26   Institution of new program
27   Establishment of new committee/commission
28   Request for information/fact-finding
29   Support of bill/resolution

39   Other legislative activity

Governmental Activity (Judicial)
40   Trial scheduled or held
41   Hearing scheduled or held
42   Speech/Position-taking (News Conference)
43   Convictions/fines/suspensions
44   Finding of innocence

49   Other judicial activity

Governmental Activity (Law Enforcement)
50   Charges filed
51   Indictments
52   Subpoenas
53   Arrests
54   Jailings
55   Charges Dropped

59   Other law enforcement activity

62-63 (cont.)<u>PRIMARY EVENT</u> (PRIMARY)
65-66 <u>SECONDARY EVENT</u> (SECONDARY)

Other Institution Activity
(Corporate/Financial/University/Labor or Professional Groups,
Religious--excepting movement organization, Media)

60 Speech/Position-taking (News Conference)
61 Introduction of resolution/policy matter
62 Debate of resolution/policy matter
63 Support of resolution/policy matter
64 Rejection of resolution/policy matter
65 Study of resolution/policy matter
66 Cessation of activity
67 Initiation of new activity

69 Other Institutional activity

Movement
70 Boycott
71 Campaign--conventional (voting, petitions)
72 Conference
73 Cultural event
74 Fundraising
75 Illegal Acts (incl. Terrorism/Harassment)
76 Internal dynamics of movement
77 Lobbying/Interest group activity
78 Mass Action (rally, demonstration,protest)
79 Proposal constructed/submitted
80 Speech/Position-taking (News Conference)
81 Strike
82 Threat or warning made by group or individual with
    resources to carry it out
83 Meeting
84 Civil Disobedience (incl sit-in)
85 Fasting

88 Cessation of Movement Event
89 Other Movement event
90 Unclear Movement Event

99 Other Activity

68   **DIRECTION OF EVENT** (DIRECTION)

        1   Supportive of South Africa
        2   Critical of South Africa

        3   Other SA
        7   Neutral
        8   Unclear/Ambiguous
        9   Not Identified

70-71   **RESOURCES**
73-74   (What tools were used by the initiating units in the effort to achieve their goals)

        11   Authority / Position (incl. governmental)
        12   Expertise
        13   Legislation
        14   Money
        15   Numbers (bodies)
        16   Prestige (status/reputation)
        17   Program
        18   Technology
        19   Violence

        30   Other resource
        31   More than two resources

        97   Unclear/Ambiguous
        98   Not Identified
        99   Not Applicable

IF EVENT IS DIVESTMENT-RELATED, THEN CODE FOLLOWING:

76   **DIVESTMENT**

        1   Proposed
        2   Ignored
        3   Debated
        4   Accepted (Full)
        5   Accepted (Partial)
        6   Rejected

        8   Other
        9   Unclear/Ambiguous

IF ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT EVENT/ACTIVITY, THEN CODE
FOLLOWING:

77-78   <u>RELATED MOVEMENT (ORGANIZATION) CONNECTIONS</u>
80-81   (CONNECTIONS)

      10   Anarchist Movement
      11   Civil Rights Movement
      12   Communist Movement
      13   Community-based movement
      14   Disarmament Movement
      15   Gay Rights Movement
      16   Labor Movement
      17   Militant Black Movement
      18   New Left
      19   Non-Interventionist Movement
      20   Pan-Africanist Movement
      21   Student Movement
      22   Religious Movement (church)
      23   Socialist Movement
      24   Women's Movement

      30   Other Movement/Organization connections

      97   Unclear/Ambiguous
      98   Not Identified
      99   Not Applicable

82   <u>ARRESTS</u>

      1   No
      2   Yes

      7   Unclear/ambiguous
      8   Not Identified
      9   Not Applicable

267

DISSERTATION
CODING SCHEDULE

NUMBER	☐☐☐☐☐☐☐ 01 - 07	INITIATOR PERSPECTIVE OF TARGET — ☐☐ 50 - 51 / ☐☐ 53 - 54
CITATION	☐☐☐☐☐ 09 - 13	ISSUE — ☐☐ 56 - 57 / ☐☐ 59 - 60
AREA	☐☐ 15 - 16 / ☐☐ 18 - 19	EVENT PRIMARY ☐☐ 62 - 63 / SECONDARY ☐☐ 65 - 66
INITIATOR	☐☐☐ 21 - 23 / ☐☐☐ 25 - 27	DIRECTION ☐ 68
LEVEL	☐ 29 / ☐ ☐ 30	RESOURCES ☐☐ 70 - 71 / ☐☐ 73 - 74
TARGET	☐☐ 32 - 33 / ☐☐ 35 - 36	DIVESTMENT ☐ 76
INITIATOR PERSPECTIVE	☐☐ 38 - 39 / ☐☐ 41 - 42	CONNECTIONS ☐☐ 77 - 78 / ☐☐ 80 - 81
TARGET PERSPECTIVE	☐☐ 44 - 45 / ☐☐ 47 - 48	ARRESTS ☐ 82

TITLE _____

SUMMARY _____

APPENDIX C.

LIST OF SUBJECTS INTERVIEWED:

Government Actors

1)   The Honorable Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KN)
      April 27, 1989

      Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African
      Affairs when Anti-apartheid legislation passed through both
      Houses of Congress in 1985 and 1986.

2)   The Honorable Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI)
      March 23, 1989

      Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
      during 1985 to 1986 when Anti-apartheid legislation passed
      through both Houses of Congress in 1985 to 1986.

3)   The Honorable Assemblyperson Alan Karcher
      February, 17, 1989

      President of the New Jersey Assembly and author of the
      divestment bill when divestment legislation was adopted in New
      Jersey, 1985.

4)   Nancy Stetson, Senate Foreign Relations Staff
      February 28, 1989

      Staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
      Principally concerned with Sub- Sahara African Affairs. Primary
      staff person working on Anti-apartheid legislation during 1985
      and 1986.

5)   Steven Weissmann, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee onAfrica Staff
      February 28, 1989

      Director of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
      staff. Primary staff person working on Anti-apartheid legislation
      during 1985 and 1986.

6) Ann Lewis, Former Political Director, Democratic National Committee
September 28, 1989

Political Advisor to the Reverand Jesse Jackson during his 1988
presidential bid. Ms. Lewis oversaw Rev. Jackson's convention
strategy where he successfully negotiated for a Democratic Party
platform statement identifying South Africa as a terrorist state.
Rev. Jackson is a principle figure in the Anti- aparthied
movement.

Movement Actors

1) Donna Katzin, Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility
October, 27 1988

Director of South Africa office. Advises religious organizations
about corporate investments in South Africa. Coordinates
stockholders divestment campaigns.

2) Rob Jones, American Committee on Africa
February 13, 1989

Program Director for one of the central organizations in the
Anti-apartheid social movement. Jones advises state-wide
divestment campaigns and often testifies about conditions in
South Africa.

3) Valerie Caffee, New Jersey Anti-Apartheid Mobilization Coalition
October 12, 1988.

President of the premiere New Jersey organizations working on
Anti-apartheid issues. Successfully fought for divestment of New
jersey public employee pension fund monies from business with
South African operations.

Corporate Actors

1) Robert Fetterman, Director of Acquisitions, Johnson Brothers, Inc.

Corporate executive involved in discussions related to international
investments.

APPENDIX D

LETTER REQUESTING INFORMATION FROM ANTI-APARTHEID ORGANIZATIONS

Fred Solop
A-222 Lucy Stone Hall
Rutgers University, Livingston College
New Brunswick, NJ 08903
August 17, 1987

To Whom It May Concern,

I am initiating a major research project which focuses on the Anti-apartheid movement in the United States. I am specifically interested in investigating the resources available to the movement, strategic and tactical decision-making processes, and conditions which contribute to successful completion of goals. The information I compile will be included in my doctoral dissertation and perhaps in future journal articles.

I appreciate any assistance that you can provide me. Of particular interest to me are resources you make available to the public, information which documents your history and purpose, and names and addresses of other Anti-apartheid organizations. I am also interested in receiving copies of your newletter (current and past) and other available items.

Thank you for helping me at this time.

Sincerely,

Fred Solop

ORGANIZATIONS LETTER WAS SENT TO[160]

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Africa Faith & Justice Network P.O. Box 29378 Washington, D.C. 20017	X
Africa News PO Box 3851 Durham, NC 27702	X
Africa Resource Center 464 19 St. Oakland, CA 94612	
Africa Report 833 UN Plaza New York, NY 10017	X
Africa World Press of the Africa Resource and Publications Project Trenton, NJ 08608	X
African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) 801 Second Ave., Suite 405 New York, NY 10017	X
African Bibliographic Center 1346 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036	returned
African Research & Publications Project PO Box 1892 Trenton, NJ 08608	
African-American Institute 833 U.N. Plaza New York, NY 10017	X

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[160] An "X" in the "RECEIVED INFO" column indicates that the organization responded to the query letter. "Returned" indicates that the query letter was returned as undeliverable.

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Africare 1601 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20009	X
American Committee on Africa 198 Broadway New York, NY 10038	X
American Friends Service Committee 92 Piedmont Ave. Atlanta, GA 30303	
American Friends Service Committee Jerry Herman, Director Southern Africa Program 1501 Cherry St. Philadelphia, PA 19102	
Amnesty International Washington Office 608 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002	
William A. Au Public Relations Office Archdiocese of Baltimore 320 Cathedral St. Baltimore, MD 21201	X
Art Against Apartheid 280 Broadway, Suite 412 New York, NY 10007	
Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid 545 Eighth., SE Suite 200 Washington, DC 20003	X
Association of South African University Professors in the Americas Secretary, Dr. Gessler Moses Nkondo c/o Department of English Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138	

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Association of Concerned Africa Scholars PO Box 791 East Lansing, MI 48823	returned
Black Scholar PO Box 908 Sausalito, CA 94965	
Black United Front 415 Atlantic Ave. Brooklyn, NY 11217	
Black Vanguard Resource Center PO Box 6289 Norfolk, VA 23508	returned
Black Consciousness Movement of Azania 410 Central Park W., Apt 3C New York, NY 10025	
Black Student Communications Organizing Network PO Box 3164 Jamaica, NY 11431	
Campaign To Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa 1901 Q Street, NW Washington, DC 20009	returned
Center of Concern 3700 13th Street, NE Washington, DC 20017	X
Center Against Apartheid Room 3580 United Nations, NY 10017	X
Clergy and Laity Concerned 198 Broadway New York, NY 10038	X
Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy 712 G St., S.E. Washington, DC 20003	

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Columban Fathers J & P Office PO Box 29151 Washington, DC 20017	
Conference of Major Religious Superior of Men 8808 Cameron Street Silver Spring, MD 20920	X
Congressional Human Rights Caucus House Annex 2, Room 552 Washington, DC 20515	X
Congressional Black Caucus H2-344, House Annex #2 Washington, DC 20515	
Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa 339 Lafayette St. New York, NY 10012	
Harvard & Radcliffe Alumni Against Apartheid 53 Park St. Somerville, MA 02143	
Human Rights Internat 1338 G Street, SE Washington, DC 20003	returned
Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Q Street, NE Washington, DC 20009	X
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 475 Riverside Drive - Room 566 New York, NY 10115-0050	X
International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa 1430 Massachusetts Ave. - Suite 201 Cambridge, MA 02138	X

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Labor Committee--San Francisco Anti-Apartheid Committee and Bay Area Free South Africa Movement c/o Moulders Union Local 164 4425 E. 14 St. Oakland, Ca 94601	
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Southern Africa Project 1400 I St., NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005	X
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 36 West 44th Street New York, NY 10036	X
Leadership Conference of Women Religious 8808 Cameron Street Silver Spring, MD 20910	X
Lutheran World Ministries 360 Park Avenue South New York, NY 10010	
Maryknoll Sisters Maryknoll, NY 10545	X
Maryknoll Fathers & Brothers Maryknoll, NY 10545	
National Namibia Concerns 860 Emerson Denver, Co 80218	
National Council of Churches African Office 475 Riverside Dr., Room 846 New York, NY 10027	X
NETWORK 806 Rhode Island Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20018	

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
New World Resource Center 1476 W. Irving Park Rd. Chicago, IL 60613	
New York Area Labor Committee Against Apartheid c/o Headwear Joint Board ACTWU 49 W. 37 St. New York, NY 10018	returned
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 211 E. 43 St., Suite 703 New York, NY 10017	
Patrice Lumumba Coalition/ Unity in Action Network 243 W. 125 St. Harlem, NY 10027	
Shell Boycott c/o United Mine Workers of America 900 15 St., NW Washington, DC 20005	
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 801 Second Ave., Suite 1401 New York, NY 10017	X
Southern Africa Media Center 630 Natoma St. San Francisco, CA 94103	X
Southern Christian Leadership Conference 334 Auburn Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30312	
Stop Banking on Apartheid 464 19 St. Oakland, CA 94612	
Third World Resources Data Center 464 19 St. Oakland, CA 94612	X

ORGANIZATIONS	RECEIVED INFO
Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa 427 Bloor St. W. Toronto, Ontario Canada	
TransAfrica/Free South Africa Movement 545 8 St., SE Washington, DC 20003	X
UCLA South Africa Task Force 303-Westwood Pl 304 Kerckhoff Hall Los Angeles, CA 90024	
United Nations Council for Namibia Room S-3322 United Nations New York, NY 10017	X
United Nations Center Against Apartheid UN Secretariat New York, NY 10017	X
US Catholic Conference Africa Desk 1312 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20005	X
Washington Office on Africa 110 Maryland Ave., NE Washington, DC 20002	X

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VITA

Frederic Ira Solop

1958	Born September 6, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1976	Graduated from Upper Dublin High School, Upper Dublin, Pennsylvania.
1980	B.A. in Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania.
1982-1984	Teaching Assistant Department of Political Science, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1984	Research Assistant Dr. Michael X. Delli Carpini, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1984-1986	Adjunct Instructor Department of Political Science, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1988-1989	Research Assistant Center for Public Interest Polling, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1989-1990	Research Associate Center for Public Interest Polling, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1990	Ph.D. in Political Science.