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KWAZULU IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA :
A CASE-STUDY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

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PREFACE

This thesis is a study of KwaZulu and the policy of Separate Development to which the "homeland" owes its existence. Because the project was conceived as an exercise in macro-analysis, a conventional historical introduction, as well as a study of "contemporary history", were considered necessary. Both are designed to give body to the political, social and economic discussion that constitutes the core of the thesis.

An imbalance between powerless and undeveloped people and the centres of control that generate development characterizes the relationship of Blacks and Whites in South Africa. This means that the "core-periphery" theoretical framework, which scholars have recently been at pains to elaborate, is of great relevance here. In modified form it has proved a useful conceptual tool for synthesizing a welter of empirical detail.

The study of "contemporary history" (a phrase which is almost a contradiction in terms) poses considerable problems of method. The necessary depth, provenance and perspective are often missing in available sources. Parliamentary debate, public statement, mass-media

reporting and comment, and private discussion all reflect what could be mere passing points of view, pressures and changing moods. To this extent the writer was inhibited by the limitations of some of her research material of a more contemporary nature. Future events will no doubt provide a clearer pattern to trends that are now only incipient and too indefinite to interpret precisely. Yet it is hoped that the study of KwaZulu and Separate Development, run in harness, will help to clarify and to expose certain key issues and attitudes which, to a significant extent, are likely to affect this future pattern of relations in South Africa. On the restful plateau of academic analysis new and hopeful ideas and approaches could perhaps also crystallize more easily in the light of such findings, perhaps even in this sub-continent's turbulent society.

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This thesis on KwaZulu follows a lengthy period of gestation, and was nurtured to a large extent on the news media and on personal interviews and observations since few in-depth analyses on the subject have thus far been produced.

I have been greatly helped by the co-operation of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who extended a warm invitation to me to visit KwaZulu and its various institutions as often as I needed to do so. I express my deep gratitude to him. If at times some of my interpretations do not square entirely with his reading of events, I would note that it is always easier to stand outside the action as an observer like myself than to be involved as a principal actor at the centre. My appreciation of his many kindnesses and my admiration of him remain undiminished.

I am greatly indebted also to the people whom I interviewed. I was cordially received by all and their frankness was of inestimable value in the writing of this work. My thanks are due to Brenda Robinson, my well-informed friend and travelling companion on many journeys to KwaZulu, and also to Tim Muil for his co-operation and helpfulness.

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NOTES

Nomenclature in an account of South African affairs is, at this time, subject to alteration. According to the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 102 of 1978, of the *Government Gazette*, 30 June 1978, "change of name or official title of certain institutions and holders of offices, and of 'Bantu' and derivatives thereof" was announced. A selected few are appended here. Many are not yet in common usage and so remain in the thesis in their original form.

The "Department of Bantu Administration and Development" is now the "Department of Plural Relations and Development";

the "Department of Education and Training" was formerly part of the "Department of Bantu Administration and Development";

the "Department of Information" is now the "Bureau of National and International Communications";

the "Bureau of State Security" is now the "Department of National Security"; and

the "Bantu Investment Corporation" (B.I.C.) is now the "Economic Development Corporation" (E.D.C.). (This body is an independent organization, not a State Department.)

The Act substitutes for the words :-

- (a) "Bantu Affairs Commission", "Commission for Plural Affairs";
- (b) "Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner", "Chief Commissioner";
- (c) "Director of Bantu Labour", "Director of Labour";
- (d) "Bantu Affairs Commissioner", "Commissioner";
- (e) "Bantu Appeal Court", "Appeal Court for Commissioners' Courts";
- (f) "Court of a Bantu Affairs Commission", "Commissioner's Court";
- (g) "South African Bantu Trust" and "Bantu Trust", "South African Development Trust" and "Development Trust" respectively;
- (h) "Bantu Homelands", "Black states";
- (i) "Bantu beer", "sorghum beer";
- (j) "Bantu Affairs Administration Board", "Administration Board";
- (k) "Bantu Trust and Land Act", "Development Trust and Land Act".

Ministers and portfolios in the South African Cabinet have also very recently been changed and may be changed again. Among the more significant for this thesis are :

Mr. B.J. Vorster is now State President;

Mr. P.W. Botha is now Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and National Security;

Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof is now Minister of Plural Relations and Development;

Mr. T.H. Janson is now Minister of Education and Training; and

Mr. W.A. Cruywagen is now Minister of National Education.

It should be noted that "Native" and "Bantu" are only used in this thesis in regard to official documentation, so titled and so known. Otherwise "African" and "Black" are used throughout. Attention must be drawn to the fact that the KwaZulu capital, Ulundi, is referred to in some KwaZulu official documentation as "Ondini".

The system of reference adopted in this thesis is derived from Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 4th Edition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

INTRODUCTION

The policy of Separate Development envisages the territorial partition of South Africa into an axial White-controlled heartland and a constellation of Black "homelands". This policy has already led to two grants of "independence", to Transkei and to Bophuthatswana; yet Separate Development cannot be said to have successfully passed its crisis until so large and important a homeland as KwaZulu has conformed to its theoretical role. The thesis examines both this theoretical role and its practical reality within the framework of which the two have come to diverge.

The first chapter defines the terms of reference and presents a conceptual structure. Because the present is the inevitable outcome of the past, Chapter 2 traces central developments in their historical context. Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of the economics and society of KwaZulu. Chapter 4 discusses the internal politics of

KwaZulu and examines specific problems as they beset the homeland administration in its relationship with South Africa. A major facet of development is political mobilization, so the role of Inkatha is reviewed. The attitudes and actions of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, KwaZulu's most influential figure, are also discussed in this regard. Chapter 5 delineates possible constitutional models for a country fragmented by Separate Development. The conclusion to this study reviews findings with an eye to the possible role that the more irreversible aspects of Separate Development could be made to play in helping to resolve South Africa's racial dilemma. Thus an attempt will be made to determine whether Separate Development can be implemented, or could emerge, in a form that would allow a devolution of power and a sharing of wealth; for unless such a devolution occurs in South Africa, there is a danger that the "entire sub-continent may be engulfed in a race-war with incalculable results".¹

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The principal feature of South African society is its racial diversity. The White group exercises ultimate political power which is based on statutory and customary

¹P. Randall, gen. ed., *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, Sprocas Publication, No. 10 (Johannesburg: 1973), p. 56.

colour-bars and is reinforced by its monopoly of coercive power. In the last two decades the armed forces, the police and the security service have played an important part in suppressing radical opposition. The political system for Whites is based on the Westminster model of parliamentary government and, fundamentally, government is by consent through adult suffrage and competing parties. Divisions within the White oligarchy have been prominent. However, Randall notes that since decolonization in Africa began in the 1950's, the upsurge of non-White militancy, White fears of guerilla incursions and the pressures of hostile international opinion have served to lessen antagonism between the Afrikaans and the English speaking groups. Since 1948 the National Party has dominated South African institutional politics. Its continuing supremacy is the principal factor in perpetuating the *status quo*; up to the present time there has been a lack of alternative policies regarded as "workable and therefore acceptable by the White electorate".¹

The transformation of South Africa from an agrarian society into an industrialized one has resulted in social and economic processes that have effectively integrated the various population groups into a unitary economic system. For the Black population this has resulted in a breakdown of traditional social systems, the alienation

¹P. Randall, gen. ed., *Anatomy of Apartheid*, Sprocas Publication, No. 1 (Johannesburg: 1970), p. 10.

of tribally-occupied land and a loss of autonomy.¹ The ascendancy of White power in South Africa has had as its concomitant the erosion of Black rights; and the advance of industrialization has helped to institutionalize the disparity. The Black response to White rule has varied and has given rise ultimately to African or Black Nationalism, the roots of which can be traced back to the nineteenth century when missionary-educated Africans questioned the morality of a social and political order which denied them any measure of racial equality.²

Historically the thrust of African political organization was toward inter-racial cooperation in a common society;³ it was not hostile to Whites as a group. The consistent refusal by successive White governments to countenance African demands, and security action against African political organizations, finally led to African Nationalist movements functioning either in exile or covertly and to their stance becoming increasingly strident. The present political deadlock is intensified by a perception of divergent political interests. Since Separate Development aims at discrete societies, there

¹Randall, *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, p. 42.

²Ibid. See also S. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion. The 1906-1908 Disturbances in Natal*. Oxford Studies in African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 357.

³P. Walshe, *Black Nationalism in South Africa. A Short History*. Sprocas Publication (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1973), pp. 6, 9.

are few opportunities to realize common objectives, and little stands in the way of complete racial polarization.¹

Without institutionalized access to power Black expression is generally muted. The non-recognition of African trade-unions and attempts to destroy indigenous Black political organization and leadership within the country, have diminished Black ability to bargain for political and economic rights. Yet the Black presence is everywhere felt in South African politics. Sporadically it finds potent expression in strikes, labour protests and boycotts, which suggests that, while Blacks presently lack the power to change the system by force, they could ultimately extract political concessions by use of their gigantic, but constrained, economic bargaining power.

Whether or not economic factors can effect political change is an issue that divides observers. Two major views prevail, the "conventional" and the "revisionist".² The former believe that economic growth is likely to modify the socio-political structure of society, and that economic pressure will break the barriers of segregation.³ "Economic rationality urges the polity forward beyond its

¹Randall, *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, p. 45.

²L. Schlemmer and E. Webster, eds., *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978), p. 12.

³Ibid. M.C. O'Dowd, "The O'Dowd View", p. 37.

ideology", wrote Ralph Horwitz.¹

At variance with the conventional view is that of the revisionists. Broadly Marxist in outlook, revisionists view the South African economy not as a market economy of demand and supply, but as a "labour repressive" economy in which the political machinery of oppression assumes the continued subservience of Black workers.² In their view, White prosperity and White supremacy reinforce each other. The homeland policy is seen as an attempt to institutionalize economic exploitation and to freeze the class system within a rigid, legitimized, national scheme. The political structure, revisionists believe, can be changed only by the overthrow of the capitalist system by radical means.

Whether it is economic forces, international ostracism, an increasingly precarious security situation, or a combination of the three, which has brought about some flexibility within the system, the Government has nevertheless felt obliged to show some latitude where there was previously no compromise. At the 1974 session of the United Nations General Assembly, South Africa's

¹R. Horwitz, *Political Economy in South Africa, 1957*. Quoted in T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa. A Modern History* (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1977), p.371.

²H. Wolpe, "Capitalists and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa from Segregation to Apartheid", *Economy and Society* vol. 1 (1972).

See also Schlemmer and Webster, *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa*, p. 12.

representative, Mr. Roelof Botha, told the United Nations: "My Government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race and colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour."

For Blacks, however, changes in rhetoric are not necessarily indicative of changes in attitude or approach. And even when they are, some Black leaders have stated that minor modifications of the system without a redistribution of political power will not satisfy Black aspirations. Mr. Gibson Thula expressed the new dimension thus:¹ "Concessions and better deals," he said, "will not, alone, ameliorate the position. They might have done so in 1912. Now Blacks no longer want palliatives. They want rights."

A message from the Black Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, the Very Reverend Desmond Tutu, one of the country's most influential and outspoken Black church leaders, warned of the terrible consequences faced by South Africa in terms of human suffering and bloodshed if a solution to the race problem was not found soon. In an impassioned appeal for change, he warned that Black patience was running out and that unless fundamental social changes were introduced,

¹Mr. Gibson Thula, Principal Urban Representative of the KwaZulu Government, in an interview in Johannesburg in 1976.

there would be a violent confrontation.¹ He said he believed that Blacks did not want violence, but he eloquently stated the case of a people who, through their anger at injustice and oppression, were forced to resort to desperate means. "I am frightened ... that we may soon reach a point of no return when events will generate a momentum of their own, when nothing will stop their reaching a bloody *denouement* which will be 'too ghastly to contemplate'...." Blacks, he said, were aware that politics is the art of the possible and that leaders cannot move too far in advance of their voters. But he pleaded for some sign which would demonstrate to Blacks that Whites really wanted meaningful change. The Bishop called for a National Convention of leaders, recognized as such by their groups within the community, to try to work out an orderly programme for evolutionary change in South Africa.

Dr. Schalk van der Merwe, a Cabinet Minister, has attempted to justify the Government's stand in resisting such change.

We as a group are jealous of our own rights to decide on our political, educational and cultural future. If we are allowed to keep those rights in any constitutional set up, as long as we have the absolute certainty

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 23 May 1976. The Soweto riots broke out on 16 June 1976.

that they will be preserved and guaranteed - there should not be any real friction. The world does not understand this policy because of the complexity of the situation, and because it fails to realise that the numerical relationship of the people of South Africa is completely different to those elsewhere in the world.¹

In the Government's view the policy of Separate Development fulfils the requirements for a stable South Africa; in the view of its opponents the policy will culminate in disaster. This study, concluding as it does that the former position is untenable, does not necessarily conclude in accord with the latter. Through this policy rural Blacks have received a platform for self-expression and limited jurisdiction in their own areas; yet no machinery exists for input from urban Blacks to the White authorities. The policy facilitates organization of the homelands and the creation of an administratively trained Black cadre; yet the Central Government remains adamant that it will not avail itself of such experience in a common society.

For the present the Government has the power to disregard exhortations in this regard. Whether it will acknowledge the inevitability of change in time to avert

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 25 April 1976.

violence is debatable. If it does, and if all South African institutions are not to be swept away in an orgy of revenge and self-defence, there is a possibility that a severely modified form of plural accommodation may provide a conceptual basis for a practical and equitable solution to the complex problem of conflicting nationalisms and competing claims. In a country where racial diversity has usually resulted in conflict, under different conditions cultural plurality could provide the material for a rich and colourful society.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

It is a prerequisite to any discussion of KwaZulu that "Apartheid", "Separate Development" and "KwaZulu" itself be defined with precision. "Apartheid" describes the nature of South African society and "Separate Development" is the system the present Government advocates. "KwaZulu" is Separate Development's creation. Its true nature is best understood when it is discussed in terms of the conceptual model of core and peripheral entities.

"Apartheid" is an indigenous term; translated into English it means "apartness". It is viewed as both "separation" and "segregation". Yet the two are different. In 1941 Professor Alfred Hoernlé said that "segregation ... is most perfectly realized in a multi-racial caste society. Separation ... is most perfectly realized when the different racial groups are sorted out

into their own territorially distinct societies".¹

Schlemmer has defined Apartheid as the current reality of the South African political system, the *status quo* in which Whites have social, economic and political privileges, and Blacks, with whom they live in close proximity, have few.² Apartheid defines an existing "segregated" society. It encompasses the policies of the present Government as well as the system of inequality maintained by previous governments, now more rigid under National Party rule.

"Separate Development" is a political slogan of the present Government. It is the conceptual framework within which current policies can be rationalized and defended. It relates to present policies in the sense that it legitimizes continued White domination in areas common to Whites and Blacks and envisages the gradual devolution of political power to Blacks in embryonic, geographically distinct units presently called homelands. It is a policy, not a description of status, and is aspirational. The proponents of Separate Development want a "separated" society. Any signs that may manifest themselves of the failure of Separate Development do not automatically mean the breakdown of Apartheid. For the

¹Quoted in Davenport, *South Africa. A Modern History*, p. 331.

²L. Schlemmer in Randall, *Anatomy of Apartheid*, p. 19.

present, Apartheid, with or without Separate Development, exists.

Domination of land and natural resources has given Whites not only the material advantages of the spoils of conquest, but the "ethos" of the conqueror. Schlemmer draws attention to this factor reinforcing Apartheid.¹ Apart from the belief among many Whites that Blacks are inherently inferior, the system itself actually causes the rank and file of Blacks to feel inferior. A lack of privilege and of educational advantages and a low status weakens morale and personal confidence and inhibits the development of a spirit of protest.² The literature of colonized people reflects the feelings of inferiority and insecurity which result from economic, political and cultural domination by members of a different race. Malcolm X, in his autobiography, describes how he tried to straighten his hair in order to be more like White people.³ Franz Fanon, the Algerian psychiatrist, wrote vividly of his own and his patients' neuroses and complexes which had their origin in French domination.⁴

¹Ibid., 68.

²See N.C. Manganje, *Being Black in the World*, pp.51-52 and 31. Quoted in evidence presented in Supreme Court of South Africa, Case No. 18/75/254, vol. 56. 1976, 3146-3148.

³Malcolm X, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X. As told to Alex Haley* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966).

⁴F. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington. Preface by J. Sartre (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

In South Africa, too, the White power structure has become the lynch-pin of the South African cultural constellation. The White group, its predelections and its political and economic system, set the stage for Black perspectives of themselves; Black culture is peripheral in the country of its origin. White culture is at the core of South African society. What Fanon had to say about the French is being said by radical Blacks about White South Africans.

Although in South Africa basic economic and political interests have been rationalized in terms of race, the present Government insists that its aim is to produce a society that is both separated and just. Yet in 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided in *Brown v. Board of Education* that it was impossible for different races to live in a common society both separately and equally.¹ The decision lumped together "segregation" and "separation" and found no place for either in a just society. The proponents of segregation, the Court found, had as their ulterior motive the perpetual division of society into a dominant group and a quiescent, powerless sub-culture within it. There was separation only in that the group from which the segregationists wanted to be separate were not allowed to share in the benefits that the society as a whole made available.

¹Opinion of the Supreme Court of United States of America in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).

The proponents of Apartheid maintain that equitable separation is possible in South Africa's "unique" society without the defects attributed to segregation in Topeka, Kansas. In South Africa, if not elsewhere, the debate rages whether in 1978 it is possible for racial separation to characterize a society without concomitant inequity.

In order to achieve the desired racial separation, Separate Development has "transformed" some rural Black areas of South Africa into potentially independent countries in which Blacks can exercise separately those rights denied them in the common region. These economically depressed areas, peripheral to the centres of industrial and commercial activity, are themselves to become centres of growth. Yet interaction between a developed cosmopolitan "core" and an undeveloped, predominantly rural "peripheral" area generally redounds to the disadvantage of the peripheral area. Rauoul Prebisch, Gunnar Myrdal and others have made this observation. It is for this reason that separation under Separate Development is inequitable; moreover, it is cumulatively so and some believe can only be ended with violence.

The core-peripheral model usually describes the relationship between rich and poor nations; while it often leads to the Marxist conclusion that the "cumulative

cycle"¹ can only be broken by revolution in peripheral countries, this conclusion is not necessarily the only one. Indeed, "core-periphery" is the chosen conceptualization in this study; for while it emphasizes disparities in wealth and power, and the potential for an escalation of these differences, the model itself allows consideration of geographical, historical, statistical and racial factors, and does not preclude the possibility that the core-periphery cumulative cycle can be broken by means other than revolution. Gunnar Myrdal points out that unbridled market forces feed the disparity. Yet he notes one respect in which the core-periphery cycle of inequality can be broken without political revolution. "(A)fter independence", he writes, "the underdeveloped countries have gained opportunity to plan purposive interferences in the play of the market forces in the interest of their own development."² And while he admits the limited impact which poor and undeveloped countries can have on market forces, in the South African context there is an additional reason why the cycle need not be broken only by revolution. If the motivation of the South African Government were to match the rhetoric about its homeland plan, *it*, with its adequate economic strength, could so affect market forces as to break the cycle.

¹G. Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty. A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 278-280. See also T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Independence", *American Economic Association. Papers and Proceedings* (1969), pp. 231-235.

²Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, p. 284.

This could be done by subsidization of KwaZulu's products on the open market, by infusions of capital into the KwaZulu economy, by provision of experts to plan for development, or even by remedying the considerable advantages which South Africa has of an economy of scale.

This study does not in any way aim to suggest "improvements" to the policy of Separate Development. Nor is the assumption made that KwaZulu is, can or ought to be an entity apart from the Republic. Yet KwaZulu offers a microcosmic view of development problems in a growingly discrete and quite underprivileged sector of South Africa. The conclusion is forced upon one that certain aspects of Separate Development are, if not unalterable, probably likely to be of lasting duration. KwaZulu is here to stay, and if it were not, that part of the country that is KwaZulu would have to be developed anyway and those people who live in it mobilized and modernized. It is in the light of this that the study analyses KwaZulu as a discrete entity and examines the possible advantages and means of implementing Separate Development as equitably as circumstances permit.

The core-peripheral relationship, however, as mentioned above, has a Marxist perspective which is significant in today's society. The premise of some neo-Marxist writers is that the cumulative cycle which leads

to this relationship can only be broken through revolution in the peripheral countries.

Neo-Marxists, it has been averred, are frustrated by their inability to effect, by peaceful means, a more equitable society;¹ they seek, therefore, to change the *status quo* through revolution.

In this context the South African state is seen as an instrument of class rule. Apartheid, including Separate Development, can best be understood as the mechanism which maintains a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour force.² Labour is drawn from the peripheral areas and this is a contributory factor in the poverty and lack of development which characterizes these regions. Revisionist Marxists, for example André Gundar Frank and Paul Baran, argue that capitalism has had an exploitative and destructive impact on non-capitalist peripheral societies, both in a world and a national context. Frank uses the phrase "development of under-development" to emphasize that the lack of development in the peripheries is the product of an historical process brought about by the destructive impact of a worldwide

¹Harrison M. Wright, *The Burden of the Present. Liberal-Radical Controversy over Southern African History* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1977), p. 13.

²Wolpe, "Capitalists and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa from Segregation to Apartheid", *Economy and Society* vol. 1 (1972), pp. 426-433.

capitalist system.¹ Underdevelopment, he maintains, cannot be eliminated now by still further capitalist development. Present-day policy demands liberation from capitalism itself through an immediate socialist revolution.²

The Italian economist, Giovanni Arrighi, supported this radical analysis, based on his findings in Rhodesia. He argued that Blacks in that country, in the late nineteenth century, had responded positively to market forces.³ White capitalists, however, through the application of political and economic pressure, succeeded in destroying their independence and forced them to serve as migratory labourers on European mines and farms.

The parallel with South Africa is obvious. The obtaining of labour is facilitated by coercion through the application of various kinds of political, legal and economic pressure. These have been available through racial oppression and political separation, culminating in the stringent apartheid legislation in the years after 1948.⁴

¹G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 95.

²Ibid., pp. 8-9, 13.

³G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, "Class Formation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", *Underdevelopment and Development. The Third World Today*. Selected readings, ed., Henry Bernstein (England: Penguin Books Inc., 1973), pp. 286-290.

⁴See C. Bundy, "Emergence and Decline", *African Affairs* vol. 71: No. 285 (October 1972). See also M. Legassick, "Legislation Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa", *Journal of Southern African Studies* (October 1974).

The core-peripheral model, however it is viewed, is more than a tool in the analysis of the system. If, as this study concludes is the case, the South African-KwaZulu axis is a core-peripheral one, the core-periphery model brings with it empirical data relating to comparable situations and may offer an insight into likely future consequences of present action or inaction.

South Africa with its amply developed industry, mineral wealth, cosmopolitan cities and effective internal and external communications network, undoubtedly qualifies as a "core"-country. It is, amongst other things, KwaZulu's size that makes it "peripheral". According to Maasdorp, the "smallness" of the homelands is an important element in their "core-peripheral" development.¹ Small countries are usually more dependent than large because of their small and poor populations and limited domestic markets. They are dependent on the export of a very few commodities, have a greater dependence on foreign trade and foreign sources of capital and skills, and are invariably dominated by large multi-national corporations and other countries. In order to overcome these difficulties small countries tend to enter into economic alliances, for example customs unions, with neighbouring

¹G. Maasdorp, *The Development of the Homeland with Special Reference to KwaZulu*. Department of Economics, University of Natal (Durban: 1975), pp. 1,2.

countries.¹ A process of polarization between core and peripheral countries is often inevitable, as the core, through its industries, drains resources from the periphery. It is thus able to develop to a much greater degree than the periphery which, as a result, falls behind. The relationship then becomes one of dominance and dependence.

In conceptual terms the core-peripheral relationship in a national context is best explained in terms of "Authority-Dependency relations in a spatial system".² Friedman develops this view in relation to what he calls a cumulative process of innovation, which tends to have its origins in a relatively small number of centres of change located at the points of highest potential interaction within a communication field. Innovations tend to spread away from these centres to areas where the probability of interaction is lower. Major centres of innovation are the core regions, while peripheral regions are sub-systems whose development path is determined by core region institutions. This is the result of earlier and critical innovations that were incorporated into the central authority structure of the system.

¹This core-periphery model is particularly relevant to an analysis of the Southern African Customs Union. See P. Selwyn, *Industries in the Southern African Periphery* (London: Groom Helm, 1975).

²J. Friedman, *A General Theory of Polarized Development*. School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of California (Los Angeles: 1969).

Major propositions may be advanced concerning the relations of core regions to their peripheries. Core regions impose a condition of organized dependency on their peripheries, which result from a penetration of the periphery by institutions that are effectively controlled by core region authorities. Peripheral elites may attempt to resist these innovations as threatening their own authority. From the standpoint of the periphery, core region elites may be viewed as usurping peripheral authority, although where structural conditions are roughly compatible, certain core innovations may be integrated into the periphery relatively easily. Peripheral regions possess a weak degree of internal integration and their linkages with the core tend to be stronger than internal linkages. Psychological and material resources at the disposal of the core region elites give them an advantage and reduce peripheral areas to a status of dependency; in the result successful penetration by core region institutions implies that decisions in peripheral regions may be made by relevant core region authorities. The process by which core regions consolidate their dominance over the periphery may lead to a steady weakening of peripheral economies, which results from a transfer of natural, human and capital resources from the periphery to the core. The core itself would grow in population, production and income, and these in turn would produce a psychological effect that would generate further innovation. Introducing core region innovations into the periphery may tend to augment core region dominance and, by

arousing the peripheral population to possible new ways of life, could cause discontent in the peripheral region with its own comparative dependency and powerlessness. This could lead to demands for greater regional autonomy, and conflict with the core. Alternatively, those who are discontented could emigrate to the core and be drawn into its established structures of authority.

The dominant-dependent relationship of the core-peripheral model is clearly recognizable in the case of KwaZulu and White South Africa. There is a large flow of migrant and commuter labour to the core which shows the extent to which the homeland has been unable to provide sufficient job-opportunities for its residents. The homeland is unable to meet its budgetary expenditure from revenue raised internally. Financial institutions such as banks and building societies are established in the core and their policies are determined by the needs of the core. Management, enterprise, capital and technology in the modern industrial sector of the homeland derive mainly from White South African entrepreneurs. KwaZulu is dependent on the core for the transportation of its imports and exports, and even the communication media, the press and radio are centred in the core and are weak, or non-existent, in the homeland.

According to Dos Santos, the dependence to which a country like KwaZulu is subjected will lead to its underdevelopment and to a "dependent structure that deepens and aggravates its fundamental problems". Its economy is

conditioned by the development and expansion of the economy to which it is subjected. "Development of parts of the system occurs at the expense of other parts."¹ In his view dependence cannot be overcome without a change in their internal structures and external relations. How, if at all, such dependency can be ended, or limited so as not to sap the peripheral entity of all vitality and creativity, is a question which repeats itself throughout this study.

¹Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence", p. 231.

CHAPTER 2PART IPRELUDE

In Chapter 1 the difference between Apartheid and Separate Development was discussed. It was suggested that Separate Development may be no more than a political slogan by means of which the *status quo*, Apartheid, can be rationalized and defended. Whether Separate Development is indeed a new concept or only a rationalization, it has its roots very firmly in Apartheid, and in turn, in the historical development of South Africa. Natal, the province in which KwaZulu is situated, was the crucible in which the policy of Separate Development was largely forged.

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The point at which the Bantu-speaking Nguni, of whom

the Zulu people were to form a component, penetrated into the south-east of Africa is obscure. It appears that, originally, Zulu organization conformed to that of other Nguni tribal groupings, but a process of amalgamation was initiated under Shaka. He borrowed elements from the consolidation process that had occurred among the Mtetwa under Dingiswayo, and perhaps even earlier.¹ Basing his government and monarchy largely upon a system of brigaded age-regiments, Shaka extended his power in varying degrees over most of the chiefdoms of present-day Natal. In the process, his military expeditions and those of insubordinate chiefs and allies set up a chain reaction of internecine tribal warfare which drove hordes of semi-detribalized refugees to seek asylum in and beyond the Drakensberg.

This series of wars, the Mfecane of the 1820's, the "crushing",² changed the demographic pattern of Black settlement in the sub-continent, and opened the road to the Boer migrants of the Great Trek 1836-38.³ The Boers descended into Natal and made contact with the small group

¹M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, eds., *Oxford History of South Africa* vol. 1: (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1969), Chapter 8.

²Difaqane in Sotho dialect. Word means "forced migration". See Wilson and Thompson, *Oxford History* vol. 1: p. 391.

³J.A. Benyon, "The Process of Political Incorporation", *The Bantu-Speaking Peoples of South Africa* ed., Hammond-Tooke (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 375.

of White settlers who had been tolerated by the Zulu monarchy as traders and hunters in and around Port Natal. Not long after the assassination of Shaka in 1828, Dingane came face to face with the Boers whose land-hunger, numbers and firearms he greatly feared.¹ In the clashes that followed Dingane was defeated and Mpande was installed as his successor. He enjoyed authority over the Zulu beyond the Tukela. South of the Tukela the Boers broke up the coveted land of Natalia into farms, a process which led to friction with the Hlubi and other coastal Nguni chiefdoms. Posed with this threat of upheaval beyond the eastern frontier, the British interfered more and more in Natal affairs. They finally annexed the area in 1843,² and in 1845 established an administration at Pietermaritzburg.³ Disillusioned, most of the Republic-minded Boers trekked back to the Highveld.

Among the first British officials who arrived in 1845 was Theophilus Shepstone, former Cape Government agent at Fort Peddie. He had been appointed diplomatic agent to the Native tribes in Natal. He faced the problem of organizing and resettling an African population that was

¹Wilson and Thompson, *Oxford History of South Africa* vol. 1: p. 351, and E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, *History of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1965).

²J. Bird, ed., *The Annals of Natal. 1495-1845* 2 vols. (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis, 1888), vol. II: p.467.

³*Ibid.*, p. 380. Despatch 25 May 1844.

increasing rapidly in numbers south of the Tukela owing to the return of the refugees of the Mfecane. He had also to concern himself with establishing diplomatic relations with the largely intact Zulu monarchy beyond the Tukela. The new administration, faced with the task of ruling about 100 000 Blacks, appointed the Natal Locations Commission of 1846 to investigate the establishment of locations and reserves, "in the best disposable situations",¹ a measure proposed by Britain's Natal Commissioner, Henry Cloete, in 1843.²

In its recommendations, the Commission accepted the principle of dividing the land between Black and White to prevent any collision of interests, and of interspersing locations among the European farms.³ The object was to prevent any combination against the Government.⁴ Ten locations were mooted, each averaging approximately 340 square miles and accommodating approximately 10 000 people. One hundred acres of arable and grazing land were to be allotted to each family. Locations were to be selected with reference to the nature of the ground and to the people's preferences.

¹*Locations Commission 1846*, p. 248.

²E.H. Brookes, *White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1974), p. 41.

³*Locations Commission*, pp. 250, 280.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 242.

In its first report of March 1847, the Commission recommended that each location be governed by a superintendent or resident agent of the Government, with one or more assistants, according to the size of the location.¹ Order was to be maintained by a Black police force of 25 Native policemen, officered by Europeans, and in each location a model technical school was to be instituted. Here the arts would be taught, agricultural instruction given, and industry, other than livestock, encouraged. A poll tax and a head tax were recommended to supply a portion of the money necessary to maintain the establishment. Every male over 18 had to be available for military service, and 15 000 to 20 000 men were to be at the disposal of the Government for the defence of the district.²

The report of the Commission appeared in 1848 and laid the foundations of the land system that has since endured in Natal.³ The original plan of 10 locations was never completed. It would appear that this was due to the adverse reaction of the colonists, who were concerned about access to cheap labour. In February 1848 the

¹Ibid., pp. 275-278.

²Ibid., p. 282.

³See Appendix 1 for illustrative maps:
Map 1 shows the start of the Locations System,
Map 2 the situation of the locations and the boundaries of the divisions,
Map 3 pinpoints the localities occupied by African tribes which were to be grouped in locations.

Commission was dissolved.¹

The problem with which the Commission had to contend concerned competing claims to the land - namely those Boers who wished to remain, land speculators who had appeared with the British occupation, and the Colonial Government, especially Lieutenant Governor Martin West, who had hoped to use the proceeds of land sale to attract immigrants. These factors meant that the reserves which were set aside were not adequate for the increase in population that took place, nor did they always consist of the best land. The Locations Commission lacked the money necessary to mount an adequate programme of betterment, or to fulfil its administrative recommendations. Thus Shepstone was forced to resort to the tribal system to buttress the authority of the Colonial Government. This did not provide for the civilizing influences for which he had hoped, but it enabled him to institute a relatively successful system of control in peacefully settling about 100 000 Nguni in areas reserved as locations.² He solved the closely related problem of law-enforcement by modifying Native Law to make it "compatible with general principles

¹Wilson and Thompson, *Oxford History of South Africa* vol. 1: p. 375.

²The word "location", in Natal, has continued to indicate a rural reserve. In other areas of South Africa it generally refers to Urban African Townships.

of humanity observed throughout the civilized world".¹ Substantially this, then, was the Shepstone policy of legal differentiation and territorial segregation.² The Natal Native Policy of 1845-75 and its institutions and laws remain a monument to Shepstone's work and constitute a significant factor in the present configuration.

The Locations Policy did not prove popular with the colonists who resented the size of the locations and the fact that there was little inducement for Africans to seek work outside the locations.³ The Natal Commission of 1852-53 reflected these objections and the opposition to Shepstone's policy of tolerance for African traditionalism. As Welsh points out, the more land Africans possessed and the more they could practise a traditional economy, the less likely would they be to enter the service of the colonists.⁴

Despite the strictures of this Commission of 1852-53, Shepstone continued to reject the distribution of Natal

¹Brookes, *White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910* p. 50.

²Benyon, "The Process of Political Incorporation", pp. 375-378.

³*Natal Commission 1852-53*; pp. 15-30. See also Wilson and Thompson, vol. 1: pp. 383-384.

⁴D. Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal 1845-1910* (Oxford University Press, 1971).

tribesmen among European farms and to pursue his policy of securing location lands to Chiefdoms occupying them.¹ At the end of his era, some 2 million acres were allotted. The boundaries of the original locations have since been slightly modified, and hence also the acreage, but the policy had entrenched itself against major modifications. By 1864 the land situation in Natal was essentially what it was to be for the next 100 years.² There were 42 location areas (2 067 057 acres) and 21 mission reserves (174 862 acres). From as early as 1849 it was apparent that the reserves were not large enough to be economically self-sufficient and Africans were forced to seek their livelihoods in industry.³ Although the Natal Native Trust, which was instituted in 1864, was not legally prevented from acquiring further reserve land, there was virtually no increase in land provision for Africans between 1864 and 1913. Migratory labour, with its attendant ills, had begun.

The Commission of 1846-47 had recommended that the Government reserve the right to convert these lands into freehold grants where it was merited. In 1864 the policy

¹Brookes, *White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910*, p.55.

²E.H. Brookes and N. Hurwitz, *The Native Reserves of Natal*, Natal Regional Survey, vol. 7: (Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 6.

³Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, p. 178.

was altered and the Natal Native Trust was established. One of the objects of the Trust was the elimination of the risk of alienation of location land to White purchasers. A general title to all locations and mission reserves was issued to the Executive Council of the Colony of Natal in trust.¹ The original system would have prevented the Government moving Chiefdoms and reallocating land without the consent of Chiefs; under the 1864 system, and the present system, it can. The South African Native Trust, established in 1936, has absorbed the Natal Native Trust of 1864 and is based on the same principle.²

In 1864 the exemption from Native Law (Law 11 of 1864 and amended Law 28 of 1865) was introduced. This recognized the distinction between detribalized and tribal Africans. It was not mandatory and few Blacks availed themselves of its privileges. One of these was the granting of the franchise to exempted Africans under certain stringent conditions.³ The prevailing attitude then was similar to that which exists today, a fear of "swamping" if too many Africans received the vote. The measure of 1865 was not a popular one. In 1903-05, after

¹Brookes and Hurwitz, *The Native Reserves of Natal*, p. 9.

²T.R.H. Davenport and K.S. Hunt, eds., *The Right to the Land* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1974), p. 3.

³Brookes, *White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910*, p. 56. See also Wilson and Thompson, vol. 1: p. 382.

39 years, only 3 Africans in the whole of Zululand and Natal had the vote. Brookes regards Law 11 of 1865 as a disenfranchisement, as the "Charter of Natal" of 1856, which created Natal as a separate colony and gave it a limited form of representative government, had no colour bar.

In assessing Shepstone's actions it must be remembered that his policy was a pragmatic response to financial shortage and colonist pressures. Although colonists talked piously of assimilation, in fact they meant economic integration under a system of social and political differentiation.¹ It was as a response to this latter attitude, which implied exploitation, that Shepstone defended the locations system. The point must be made that he did not act from a belief in racial equality. His attitude to traditionalism appears to have been influenced by the hope that it would impede a desire for racial equality in a people he regarded as different.² He was aware of a small, vocal, educated class of Blacks pressing for greater racial equality, and he seems to have recognized the multi-racial nature of the society and to have believed it inevitable that Blacks would want to abandon their traditional culture and become more involved in a multi-racial society.³

¹Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, p. 40.

²Ibid., pp. 209-210.

³Ibid., p. 215.

While colonists opposed his efforts because they enabled the African to continue to live largely independently of White employers, he also met with opposition from the economically disinterested missionaries. Securely established in Natal by 1850, they condemned traditionalism because it created difficulty and conflict in their task of making converts among people who were encapsulated in a pagan environment. Colonists, however, were opposed to missionaries too, for they were producing a literate, Christianized African with another kind of independence based on the acquisition of new skills and values.¹

In 1879 the Zulu War broke out. It was to result in the destruction both of the Zulu military system and of the hereditary monarchy. Wolseley's post-war settlement divided the land into 13 separate units under "kinglets", a procedure which dismantled the monarchy and led to a process of national disintegration.² Predictably, civil war broke out in 1887, and Zululand was annexed by the Crown in that year. In 1893 Natal acquired Responsible Government as a result of which the colonists had more definite control of Native policy. In 1897 Zululand was

¹Ibid., p. 49.

²C. de B. Webb, "Great Britain and the Zulu People", *African Society in Southern Africa*, ed., L. Thompson. Published under the auspices of the African Studies Centre, University of California, Los Angeles (London: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 302-323.

incorporated in colonial Natal.¹ Zulu nationhood had formally come to an end.

Between 1891 and 1904 the White population of Natal had more than doubled, from 46 000 to 97 000, and there was a resultant expansion of industry and farming and a desire for the extension of boundaries.² The Zululand Delimitations Commission of 1902-04 was faced with the task of delimiting sufficient reserves for the use of the Africans, and of "recommending sparsely populated portions of the country ... for the beneficial occupation by Europeans".³ The partition of "that part of Zululand annexed by our Government"⁴ into White farmland, Crownland and African Reserves, followed. The Commission issued nine preliminary reports and a final one. Reserves totalling 3 887 000 acres were demarcated and 2 613 000 acres were excluded, much of this area being given over to privately-owned European interests in Zululand.⁵ It was noted that "Natives, in common with other British subjects, would be allowed to purchase land if they so wished ... notwithstanding the fact that reserves are now being delimited for their occupation".⁶

¹Wilson and Thompson, eds., *Oxford History of South Africa*, vol. II: p. 266.

²S. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 6.

³*The Zululand Delimitation Commission, 1905*, p. iv.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁵Brookes and Webb, *History of Natal*, p. 186.

⁶*Commission, 1905*, p. 3.

In presenting its findings, the commission reported on specific areas in each of nine *Ad Interim* reports, and in its final report recommended grouping adjoining tribes into more limited areas. Cognizance was taken, amongst other considerations, of revered kraal sites containing ancestral graves.¹ In this way, it was reported, "a large portion of the Province could be thrown open for European occupation". This was considered the only way in which tribal lands, occupied for generations, could be curtailed. The Commission trusted it had "acted fairly and justly."

Some observations should be added in connection with the fourth *Ad Interim* report in the light of present-day race relations. Although many chiefs accepted that the conquering race had a right to occupy the country, they "trusted that the land being thrown open would be occupied by Europeans - not by people of other coloured races." "If it was for the benefit of the latter they should feel compelled to protest strongly."² The Commission expressed the view that if land alienated from the Zulu was to be acquired by Indians, trouble would ensue. A further observation is pertinent. The Commissioners commented that in all the published criticisms of the settlement, not a voice appears to have been raised in the interest of Africans.³

¹Ibid., p. 45.

²Ibid., p. 13.

³Ibid., p. 46.

A poignant reminder of the fate of Zululand, in the light of later developments, also appeared in the final report.¹ It was embodied in the hope expressed by the Commissioners that the uncertainty in regard to land settlement with which the Zulu lived, would now be ended.²

Attention at this stage must be drawn to the change of heart experienced by colonists in relation to traditionalism. Whereas the concept had been regarded with hostility at the time of Shepstone, it was viewed favourably by the end of the century. The change is related to a disappearance of that optimism with which colonists believed that Western culture could be impressed on Africans. Instead, a sense of uneasiness at the possible consequences of social change had become evident. Colonists resented the "cheekiness" of the less deferential missionary "kaffir" and the threat he presented to the cheap labour market.³ Traditionalism came now to represent stability. In addition, the colonists realized that maintaining the tribal system was the cheapest way

¹Ibid., p. 47.

²See Maps 4 and 5 in Appendix 1.

Map 4 is a sketch by the writer of the thesis of the original since technical reasons precluded its reproduction. It shows the definitions of boundaries of the 21 reserves delimited by the Commission, and indicates some of the Tribes and Chiefs involved.

Map 5 shows land settlement in Natal and Zululand in 1905. It shows the frontier between Natal and Zululand along the line of Buffalo and Tugela (Tukela) Rivers.

³Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, p. 217.

of governing Africans, of maintaining law and order, and of obtaining docile and amenable African labour.

Opposition was now directed increasingly to educated Blacks. They seemed to present a greater threat to the way of life of White people through their wish to share political power and to assimilate modern culture.¹ Tension was growing, and there was every sign of impending conflagration.²

With the object of arriving at a common understanding on questions of Native Policy as a preliminary to Union, Lord Milner set up the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-05, to be presided over by Sir Godfrey Lagden. It took evidence from a variety of witnesses across the political spectrum. Most of the Natal witnesses were strong advocates of tribalism and rule by chiefs, an inheritance from Shepstone. Almost all opposed the extension of the franchise to Africans because they considered nominated representation by Whites enough.³ The recommendations of the Commission, and the attitudes revealed, were significant to policy makers after Union.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 228-231.

²Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. xvii.

³S.A. *Native Commission 1903-05*. Vol. 3: pp.213-230.

⁴C.M. Tatz, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa. A Study in Land and Franchise. Policies affecting Africans 1910-1960* (Pietermaritzburg University of Natal Press, 1962), pp. 6-11.

One must concur with Tatz that recurrent themes in South African Black-White relations - the setting aside of land for Africans, racially exclusive occupation of land areas, the "Black voters swamping White voters" complex, the abolition of African franchise, separation of voter's roll, African Communal representation - all gained impetus from the 1905 report.¹ After Union, the Native Land Act of 1913 was based on the Commission's recommendations on land; the land and franchise recommendations of the 1903-05 Commission received legal sanction in the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act and the Representation of Natives Act of the same year.

Natal took no action on the Commission's report. The tribal system continued with no relief for population pressures and no heed was given to the desire for political expression and representation. The underlying causes of the Rebellion of 1906 can be traced, in some measure, to this systematic neglect of Black welfare in which the African was regarded only as a potential labourer. Widespread discontent was the result. It culminated in the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906 which was sparked off by the intransigence of a minor chief on a poll-tax matter. A commission of enquiry appointed to investigate the disturbance followed. The report of the Natal Native

¹S.A. Native Commission, vol. 1: para. 193.

Affairs Commission of 1906-07, which took evidence from a considerable number of Europeans and Africans in many areas of grievance, seriously indicted the policies that had led to landlessness, poverty and the decimation of political rights.¹

This Commission, too, did little to redress grievances. It sought instead to take Native affairs "out of politics".² The result was Act 1 of 1909 which attempted to provide for the better administration of Native affairs through the appointment of a Council of Native Affairs. The Council had no legislative powers and was merely a deliberative, consultative and advisory body. Its efficacy was not tested since it was abolished by the Union Act of 1912. Such an administrative innovation, however, highlighted African potential for active participation which Natalians suddenly realized could have an effect on the political structure. The result was an attempt to remove unnecessary friction, but only in limited areas, and issues such as direct African representation, labour and additional land were ignored.³

A heightened African political consciousness henceforth

¹Welsh, *Roots of Segregation*, p. 233. See also Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 14, 353.

²Brookes and Webb, *History of Natal*, p. 228. See also Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 343.

³In 1909 the Administration banned a meeting proposed by Africans to discuss the forthcoming unification of South Africa. *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352.

manifested itself. According to the Report of the Commission of 1906-07 it was moderate. The Commission noted the readiness of Africans to accept representation by Whites as an "exhibition of moderation, political wisdom and confidence in the European".¹ The formation of the African National Congress followed in 1912.² John Dube, elected president, in explaining the new movement, said: "I thank Bambata very much, not the Bambata of the bush who perished at Nkandhla, but I mean this new spirit we have just heard explained."³

After Union in 1910 some of the policies that had originated in Natal were applied to the whole country; supreme Chieftainship, demarcation of reserves, the use of Chiefs, the recognition of customary law. All of these were inherited from Shepstone. Apartheid can, in many of its origins, be directly traced to English-speaking Natal.

¹*Natal Native Affairs Commission 1906-07*, p. 24.

²See P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa. African National Congress 1912-1952* (London: Hurst & Co., 1970).

³Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 365.

CHAPTER 2PART IILAND ACTS OF 1913 AND 1936

The location, size and fragmentation of KwaZulu is the result of processes begun during the nineteenth century and legislatively confirmed in the twentieth. A brief reference must be made to two specific land Acts on which the geography of the homeland is based, those of 1913 and 1936.

Following the decision to establish the Natal Native Trust of 1864, it was implicit, according to the Natal Native Commission of 1881-2, that the locations, once surveyed, should be conveyed to the Trust.¹ In 1881-2 this was not done. In addition, uncertain boundaries which led to the removal, on occasion, of African occupiers from land they believed was location land but which in fact the Government had sold to White people, resulted in great resentment. It is significant that, apart from some buying of Trust farms between 1936 and 1953 (farms not previously included in the location and mission reserves), the provision of land for Africans in Natal was stationary for about ninety years.

¹*Natal Native Commission 1881-2, para. 24.*

Brookes and Hurwitz, in discussing Trusteeship, remark that it should consist not only of preserving, but of improving, the Ward's property.¹ Instead, little had been done in four decades of existence, a fact which was deprecated by the Natal Native Commission of 1906-07.² In 1909 the whole Zululand Reserve Area of 3 887 000 acres was vested in the Zululand Trust, which was the Governor-in-Executive Council.

The Zululand Delimitation Commission of 1902-04 made its recommendations on the basis of a population of 210 053 distributed as follows :-

On the coastal belt, altitude 5 metres, that is the Durban area, 77 189; in the middle belt, at an altitude of 684 metres, in the Pietermaritzburg area, 88 006; and in the upper belt, in the Newcastle area, at an altitude of 1 200 metres, 48 058. Respective population densities were 15,5, 20,5 and 35,0 per square mile.³ In demarcating reserves the population was provided for at an average of 17 acres per person or 85 acres of arable and grazing land per family of 5. The reserves totalled 3 887 000 acres,

¹Brookes and Hurwitz, *The Native Reserves of Natal*, p. 12.

²"(B)eyond some tree-planting ... no attempt has been made to improve the vast estate which is controlled by the Trust in order to make it more habitable or carry a larger population." *Natal Native Commission 1906-07*, p.39.

³Annexure A to *Final Report of the Zululand Delimitation Commission 1902-04*, p. 270.

from which 2 613 000 acres (given over to European interests) were excluded. It will be remembered that under the Locations Commission delimitation 100 acres was allowed per family, so this represented a substantial reduction.

In 1913 the Native Land Act was promulgated. It did not allocate additional land for Africans although population increase was marked. The object of the Act was to segregate; it did not emerge out of a desire to provide a territorial base for a separated society.¹ It arose as a response to the undisguised desire of the White farmers for continued access to cheap labour. Additions to the land were to be determined by the Beaumont Commission, appointed for that purpose in 1916.² The recommendations of the Beaumont Commission encountered much opposition from, amongst others, the farmers of Natal. The same fate befell the report of local committees in 1918, and the position remained virtually unchanged until the passing of the Native Trust and Land Bill of 1936.³ The Native Land Act of 1913 proscribed the acquisition of land in existing reserves by any person

¹Tatz, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa*, pp. 294 and 159.

²Brookes and Webb, *History of Natal*, p. 294.

³The two Acts, the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, must be seen as a totality.

other than a Native.¹ In confirming reserves in both Natal and Zululand, the Act made land acquisition outside their boundaries, except from other Natives, subject to the approval of the Governor-General-in-Council. Until 1913 Africans had been legally entitled to acquire land from Whites in parts of the country outside the Reserves in accordance with the undertaking given by the Zululand Delimitation Commission. The 1913 Act prohibited this.

Consequent overpopulation and overstocking made it difficult for many occupants to remain on the land. They were left with no option but to seek their livelihoods in the developed White sections - on White-owned farms and in the White-dominated cities.

In partial recognition of these realities the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was passed in conjunction with the Representation of Natives Act (Act 12).² This Act envisaged the acquisition of 7,5 million morgen (15,2 million acres) for Africans. Of this, 526 000 morgen were allocated to Natal and Zululand; only 288 718 morgen were designated released areas, and the Trust had to acquire 237 282 morgen outside of the released areas with the proviso that at some point such land touched existing Native areas.³

¹See *Union Statutes 1910-1947; Vol. 10: 1952*. The Native Land Act of 1913, p. 135.

²*Ibid.*, Native Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936, p. 149.

³Brookes and Webb, *History of Natal*, p. 294.

The 1936 legislation set up a South African Native Trust which absorbed existing Trusts and which was to be used for the settlement, support and benefit of the Africans of the Union. All Crown land reserved or set aside for occupation by Africans, all Crown land in scheduled areas, and all Crown land within released areas was to be vested in the Trust which was empowered from time to time to acquire land for African settlement and generally carry out the provisions of the Act. In Natal, 45 949 morgen of Crown land in released areas was vested in the Trust.¹ The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was also expected to eliminate competition for land between Whites and Blacks, and in areas scheduled to be transferred Whites were to be compelled to sell land to the Native Trust for inclusion in the reserves.² "Black Spots", that is, land acquired by Africans prior to 1936 in the "White areas", were to be eliminated. The process of returning land from Whites to Africans was, however, delayed as Natal farmers remained opposed to the extension of the Natal Reserves and impeded further acquisition. If individual farmers were co-operative in proposed purchase deals, farmers' associations often remained hostile. Public opinion in Natal, according to Brookes

¹Ibid., p. 14.

²J. Butler, R.I. Rotberg and J. Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu*. Perspectives on Southern Africa, 21 (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 13.

and Webb, has done much to obstruct the acquisition of more land for Africans.¹ In 1974 20% of the quota land of 1936 remained to be acquired.²

More than a decade later the Tomlinson Commission drew attention to the fact that when all the land in released areas had been acquired, the total of the Bantu area, much of it well-watered, would approximate to 19 611 000 morgen or 13,7% of the whole area of the Union

Mention must be made in passing of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936. It gave to the Africans of Natal and Zululand representation in the South African Parliament through one Senator who would be elected by chiefs, local councils, municipal advisory boards and *ad hoc* electoral committees. In addition, there would be one nominated and three elected African representatives on the Natal Representative Council which the Act established.

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 remains the controversial basis on which additions of land to the homelands are considered.

¹Brookes and Webb, *History of Natal*, p. 295.

²*Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1974)*, p. 181. Quoted in Butler, Rotberg and Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 12.

CHAPTER 2PART IIITHE TOMLINSON COMMISSION

Development in the African reserves, in Shepstone's time, as has been noted, received little Government aid. Effective extensions and improvements were only undertaken after the passing of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, when to develop became policy. These areas, thus, almost from their inception, have been poverty stricken and undeveloped. After 1948 and the accession to power of the National Party, a new emphasis was placed on Apartheid. Attention was focused on this lack of development in the reserve areas and on the migration of Black workers to the towns. In 1950 a Commission under the Chairmanship of Professor F.R. Tomlinson was appointed to investigate the situation in the reserves and the possibilities for their socio-economic development, with a view to reversing the flow of Blacks to White areas.¹

The Commission conducted a far-reaching survey and the findings it presented were to exert profound influence.

¹*The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa.* UG 61/1955. In 1956 a Summary of the Report was published by the Government Printer, Pretoria, and Professor D. Hobart Houghton has précised its main recommendations. These are the sources for the information in the following pages.

In brief, its main recommendations were as follows:¹ The Separate Development of South Africa's two main racial groups and not their integration. The Bantu areas, which should be consolidated on the basis of the historic-legal homelands of the principal ethnic groups, should be comprehensively developed. Such development should comprise a fully diversified economy in which the Bantu would be prepared to occupy all posts, and every facet of human endeavour, including ecclesiastical, social welfare, education and health should receive attention. A Bantu farming class and a true urban population should be established and security of land tenure based on private ownership should apply in both rural and urban areas. The Commission envisaged a *de jure* population of the Bantu areas of 10 000 000 within a period of 25-30 years. Of these, 8 000 000 should be wholly supported from activities in the European sector. It pointed out that if the Bantu areas were not developed, the European sector would have to accommodate 17 000 000 Bantu by the close of the century. To assist the Native Affairs Department in the envisaged development programme, the Commission recommended the establishment of a Development Council for research and planning, and a Development Corporation for the promotion of Bantu enterprises and enterprises on its own account for eventual transfer to Bantu ownership. It

¹H.D. Houghton, *The Tomlinson Report. A Summary of the Findings and Recommendations in the Tomlinson Commission Report.* Published under the Government Printer's Copyright Authority, No. 2316 of 30 May 1956 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations), pp. 3, 4.

recommended that the South African Native Trust should be relieved of executive functions and become merely a Trust Fund and Central Treasury for the Bantu Areas. It estimated that the first 10-year development programme would require R104 000 000, of which R55 000 000 would be privately obtained, interest-bearing and recoverable. R49 000 000 would be of a social-economic nature and presumably non-recoverable.

The Commission noted that between 1904 and 1951 the total population of South Africa had increased by 144%, from 5 176 000 to 12 646 000. It projected growth until the year 2000 as follows :-¹

	<u>Year</u>		<u>Year</u>	
	<u>1951 (Census)</u>		<u>2000</u>	
European	2 643 000	(20,9%)	4 588 000	(14,7%)
Bantu	8 535 000	(67,5%)	21 361 000	(68,4%)
Coloured	1 103 000	(8,7%)	3 917 000	(12,5%)
Asiatic	367 000	(2,9%)	1 382 000	(4,4%)
TOTAL	12 646 000	(100,0%)	31 248 000	(100,0%)

A demographic study in 1972 shows population increases undreamt of by the Tomlinson Commission.² Sadie's

¹Official Summary, p. 25.

²I.L. Sadie, *Projections of the South African Population of 1970-2020* (University of Stellenbosch, 1972).

projected figures up to the year 2020 are as follows :-

	<u>1970</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2020</u>
White	3 822 000	6 890 000	9 204 000
Asian	651 000	1 215 000	1 617 000
Coloured	2 097 000	4 890 000	7 720 000
Bantu	15 468 000	37 293 000	62 798 000
Aggregate	22 038 000	50 288 000	81 339 000

The Commission found that the concentration of urban population was in the 4 main industrial areas of the Southern Transvaal, Western Cape, Durban-Pinetown and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. It estimated that the population of the Durban-Pinetown complex would, in the year 2000, be :-¹

Total	2,4 million
Europeans	0,4 million
Bantu	1,0 million

According to the Census of 1951, the total population of Natal at that time was 2 408 433. The total European population was 274 468 and the total Black population was 926 000. (The discrepancy is accounted for by Coloureds and Indians.)

In 1954 the Bantu Areas comprised 17 500 000 morgen

¹*Official Summary*, p. 34. H. Houghton, *The Tomlinson Report*, précis, p. 6.

or 12,9% of the land of the Union. As has already been noted, the Commission anticipated that when all the land in the "released" areas had been acquired, the total that would be allocated to Africans would comprise 13,7% or 19 611 000 morgen of land. These areas embraced varying climatic zones, some less important minerals and few principal ones; there was practically no industrial development or urban areas and minimal transport facilities.¹ Emigration to European areas was considerable, and in Natal especially, where territorial additions had been small, migratory labour assumed large proportions.

The economic implications of migratory labour were significant. It drew away from the reserves, at the most productive times of their lives, about 12% of the total population of the Bantu areas. This represented more than 40% of males between 15 and 64 years of age, at least two-thirds of whom were between 20 and 39 and nearly 94% of whom were younger than 50. In addition, of the 569 000 temporary absentees in 1951, 503 000 were men and only 66 000 were women.² (Current figures in Natal are discussed in a later chapter.)

The Commission was concerned at the great speed at which urbanization was occurring, and which would be

¹*Official Summary*, p. 47, Houghton précis, p. 8.

²*Official Summary*, p. 53, Houghton précis, p. 8.

attributed, in large part, to the insufficient remunerative opportunities for Africans offered in rural areas. It noted that the Black and White population groups had become increasingly interwoven, politically and economically. It feared that the end result of such a process, if it was not controlled, could be racial assimilation leading to the creation of a new biological entity.¹ It faced the dilemma confronting South Africans - that of a European population determined to maintain its identity and right of self-determination, and the growing conviction among Blacks that they were entitled to a greater share in the wealth of the country and in its control.² The Commission took its stand in support of a policy of segregation and concluded that the process of integration, with its political and social consequences, must be restricted and the economic structure of the country re-orientated on a comprehensive scale. It argued that proper development of Bantu areas would render them adequate in size for their populations, and that the development of "border industries" would enable them to support increased populations.

The Commission defined the advantages of Separate Development.³ For the African it meant his own inalienable territory, national development and the opportunity to take charge of his own affairs. It meant economic opportunity

¹*Official Summary*, p. 101, Houghton précis, pp.11-12.

²*Official Summary*, p. 105, Houghton précis, pp.14-15.

³*Official Summary*, p. 106, Houghton précis, p. 15.

and the possibility for realizing individual potential within a new social order. And for the Europeans, the policy was presented as an opportunity to ensure an unfettered future, provided there was a willingness for the necessary action and sacrifice.

A development programme was presented as essential from three points of view: as a means of implementing separate development, for the welfare of the Bantu themselves in their areas, and for the general good of South Africa. A prerequisite was the development of a Bantu farming class on units of land large enough to accommodate a family, and an urban society with the means of an assured livelihood in secondary and tertiary industry.¹ Industrial development rested on the provision of essential facilities and training opportunities. Bantu Areas with low carrying capacity of 3,6 million in 1954 could, with good planning (and a maximum planning period should not exceed 25-30 years), support a population of about 10 million.² A pace of development was suggested which would achieve a population of 9 million in the reserves by 1981. Of these 7 million would depend solely on the Bantu Areas for their support, and 2 million would live on the earnings of migrant workers.³

¹*Official Summary*, pp.150-180, Houghton précis, pp.20-21

²*Official Summary*, p. 179, Houghton précis, p. 21.

³*Official Summary*, p. 184, Houghton précis pp. 22-23.

This objective necessitated the creation, on an average, of 50 000 employment opportunities a year, of which 20 000 would be in secondary industry and 30 000 in tertiary activities. At this rate the Bantu areas could accommodate 60% of the Bantu population by 1981, and 70% by the end of the century.¹

Land tenure was, and remains, one of the difficulties in homeland development. The Commission differentiated between communal tenure, that is, land occupied by the tribe as a whole, an adaption of the traditional system, and individual tenure. The former is the more common.² A system which allows no private ownership is considered one of the reasons for the deterioration of the Bantu reserves. The Commission, therefore, regarded a revision of this system as essential for the stabilization of land and full economic development.

It recommended a division of population into a genuine agricultural class who would live exclusively from farming, and others who would support themselves in other occupations.³ It further recommended that land

¹*Official Summary*, p. 184, Houghton précis, p. 22.

²For further discussion see *Official Summary*, pp. 69-71, Houghton précis, p. 23.

³*Official Summary*, p. 152, Houghton précis, p. 24.

in town and village, and land used for agricultural purposes, be granted freehold title conditional on good farming practices. It recommended the abolition of one-man-one-lot and provision instead of holdings large enough to ensure the utilization of progressive farming techniques; 52 morgen was the minimum area considered necessary to provide a family with an adequate income. Special technical and agricultural services and training were to be introduced. It was deemed essential that there be a revision of the traditional attitude to stockowning which emphasized quantity and not quality and which resulted in overgrazing and widespread soil erosion. A "betterment" scheme for all land within the Bantustan areas was projected, each betterment area to be divided into residential, arable and grazing areas, and subject to strict controls.¹ The Commission estimated that such intensive cultivation as was envisaged could, in time, support about 51% of the 1951 population. The other half of the population would have to earn a livelihood by activities other than farming.²

A programme of industrial development, both primary and secondary, occupies a central position in the general

¹*Official Summary*, pp. 117-118, Houghton précis p. 29.

²*Official Summary*, pp. 114-129, Houghton précis, pp. 29-33.

scheme of Bantu areas;¹ to this end, the Commission stressed education and vocational training. With regard to remuneration and a free labour market, it cautioned against Trade Unions and recommended Wage Boards, and suggested that labour matters be dealt with by the Department of Native Affairs.²

The siting of industries was controversial and the Commission was not unanimous. It recommended the selection of European areas, adjacent to Bantu areas, to be known as "Border Areas", which would offer to Bantu employment nearer their homes, obviate distant travel, alleviate the social and political problems of having large numbers of Bantu in distant European industrial cities, ease the pressure of population on the agricultural resources in the Bantu areas and provide additional sources of income.³ The establishment of such border industries, it was anticipated, would be cheaper and would avoid the need to have European settlements in the Bantu areas. However, the disadvantages of border development were acknowledged. Such development schemes would remain in European areas and legal restrictions on Bantu working in them would apply. This would prevent Bantu development to its full extent and not necessarily stem the tide of

¹*Official Summary*, p. 137, Houghton précis, pp. 34-37.

²*Official Summary*, p. 138, Houghton précis, p. 38.

³*Official Summary*, pp. 140-143, Houghton précis, pp. 40-41.

integration with Europeans.

At the same time industrial development in the Bantu areas was to remain an integral part of the overall economy. Such development was to be undertaken by Bantu entrepreneurs, the Development Corporation and European entrepreneurs. The latter would, however, not receive permanent landrights in these areas. Only those industries in which a large, White labour force would not be necessary were to be encouraged. A minority of the Commission, however, feared that granting concession to Europeans to establish industries in Bantu areas might lead to claims for rights and privileges contrary to the concept of Separate Development. They accordingly opposed the establishment of industries in Bantu areas by persons other than Bantu and bodies controlled by the State.¹

The commission recommended the establishment of urban centres, of which none then existed, in the Bantu areas. It was estimated that 1,5 million persons would have to abandon agriculture and make a living in other ways, and in these towns Bantu would enjoy the same rights and privileges that Europeans enjoyed in their towns. Three types of urban centres were suggested - the rural settlement, villages and towns or cities.² Rural

¹*Official Summary*, pp. 142-143, Houghton précis, p. 42.

²*Official Summary*, p. 145, Houghton précis, p. 44.

settlements were seen as a transitional stage between rural and urban life and as part of the agricultural planning. The Commission recommended the establishment of 34 Bantu townships in Natal, to be sited adjacent to European centres.

The consolidation of the Bantu areas is of especial concern to this study. The Commission found that there were approximately 8 million Bantu in the Union. 42% lived dispersed in 110 territorial units in the Bantu areas, and 58% lived in nearly all the towns and villages of the Union and on European farms.¹ The development plans of the report are based on the geographical pattern of the Bantu areas. The Commission concluded that general policy should aim at the consolidation of the Bantu areas and be directed to the systematic expansion of seven main blocks around the historico-logical centres of the groups it mentions.² In terms of the Bantu Authorities Act, the Bantu themselves were to exercise administrative functions in their respective areas as soon as they were able to do so. Ten years was regarded as an approximate "commencing" period for development which it estimated would cost R104 486 million, a figure it believed would have to be doubled in the following ten years.

¹*Official Summary*, p. 207, Houghton précis, p. 55.

²These are Tswanaland, Vendaland, Pediland, Swaziland, Zululand, Xhosaland and Sotholand.

The Commission believed that the possibilities for political expression which the scheme offered the Bantu would provide the driving force for progress. They would progressively assume control over their village boards, municipalities and eventually all functions of government in their own areas in accordance with a system similar to the present provincial system in South Africa.¹

In 1956 the Government published a White Paper in which it defined its attitude to the Tomlinson Report.² It accepted the main recommendation, the acceleration of agricultural development as much as possible, but it rejected the substitution of tribal land tenure with individual tenure based on purchase in the Bantu areas. With regard to industrial development, Bantu enterprise should develop in the Bantu areas uninfluenced by European competition or financial help. The Government preferred to appoint a special officer in the Department of Native Affairs rather than to establish a Development Council or a Development Corporation as was recommended by the Commission. It nominated the Department of Native Affairs as the instrument for providing planning, encouragement and the financial assistance that Bantu industrialists would require. The Government strongly favoured the development of Border Industries and made

¹*Official Summary* p. 211, Houghton précis, p. 58.

²*White Paper on the Development of the Bantu Areas, 1956.*

clear its intention to create the desired conditions for attracting industries to such areas. It accepted the Commission's recommendation in regard to urban development, and in general was sympathetic to the recommendations regarding social welfare, health, education and religious affairs. The Government accepted the principle that territorial authorities be founded on ethnic bases but would not commit itself to detailed boundaries "at the present time". Nor was it prepared to fix the amount of money needed for the various projects though it accepted the fact that large sums would be needed.

Although the Government and Commission differed in some aspects of the Commission's recommendations, this Commission provided the basis for the Separate Development policy. Its proposed sweeping reorganization in the economic and social life of the reserves, for example moving half of the population from the land to areas where they and those who might return from the White areas could earn their livings in commerce and manufacturing, did not, however, materialize. The Government did not accept the land tenure system recommendations, and as a result it was not possible to implement the proposal. The consequence was that the old tenure system was rationalized in "betterment schemes" which, it was hoped, would effect necessary improved agricultural methods. Similarly, fear of creating "White spots" in the Bantu areas, as expressed

in the minority view, precluded White-owned industries contributing to industrial development in the reserves on which hinged, in part, the provision of the proposed 50 000 jobs *per annum*.

Despite these qualifications to its success, the Tomlinson Commission has not been without success in its attempts to "bridge the ideological rhetoric of Apartheid, and the need for positive action to deal with economic conditions in the reserves".¹ It remains, thus, one of the most important commissions ever appointed by the Nationalist Government, and its Report provided the theoretical basis for the transformation of the dispersed remnants of the Zulu kingdom into the new "State" of KwaZulu.

¹Butler, Rotberg and Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 160.

CHAPTER 2PART IVBANTU AUTHORITIES SYSTEM

The Tomlinson Commission had simply been vested with powers of investigation, report and recommendation. The implementation of a policy of Separate Development depended on the legislative enactments and administrative decisions of Government. In terms of Section 147 of the South African Act, 1909, and of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927, as amended, the Governor-General was Supreme Chief of all Africans in the Republic.¹ He was empowered to legislate by proclamation in all Bantu areas, subject to modification or repeal if Parliament so decided.² The 1927 Act authorized the Governor-General to define the areas of the various tribes, determine rights to the occupation of land in Bantu areas, appoint Bantu Authorities and chiefs, and generally regulate government in Bantu areas. New legislation was needed to give effect to the concept of Separate Development, and before the Tomlinson Commission had even reported, the National

¹M. Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973).

²D. Welsh, "The State President's Power under the Bantu Administration Act", *Acta Juridica* 1968, 1970. Published under the Auspices of the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town (Juta, 1976).

Party majority in Parliament passed the necessary legislation.

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 abolished the Native's Representative Council in favour of the Bantu Authorities system. The objective of this system was the restoration of the prestige and authority of Native Law and Custom through the provision of executive, administrative and judicial powers to the Bantu authorities. At the lowest level there would be tribal authorities headed by Chiefs, followed by regional authorities created by 2 or more tribes, communities or combinations of tribes and communities, and finally the "apex of that Pyramid"¹ would be territorial authorities under African control. Detailed provision for these territorial authorities was to be provided in the 1959 legislation, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act.

During the years after 1951, Bantu Authorities were established in many parts of the country. The scheme, however, met with opposition in some areas on the grounds that it "reinforced tribalism, enhanced the powers of chiefs, divided the people into separate ethnic groups and made little provision for commoners to participate in the elective process in the constitution of authority".²

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 18-21 June, Cols. 9808-9809.

²Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 41.

While the Government sought to promote acceptance of the Bantu Authorities system, Nationalist African leaders were opposing it. In 1956 a Conference sponsored by the Inter-denominational African Minister's Federation rejected the Tomlinson Commission report on the grounds that a policy of separate national homes was intended to deprive Africans of rights in the rest of the country.¹ They considered the repudiation by the Government of some of the economic recommendations of the Commission as an indication that the Government was not acting in the interests of Africans.²

In 1958 Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd became Prime Minister and in 1959 one of the most important Bills in South African history was introduced in Parliament. This became the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, and with its acceptance, the era of "full political and partial territorial separation" in South Africa was under way.³

A preamble to the Bill and an accompanying White Paper clearly explained the rationale of the Government in its Bantustan policy which encompassed the principle of

¹G.M. Carter, T. Karis and N.M. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei. The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 18.

²Statement by the All-in African Conference held at Bloemfontein, October 4-6, 1956. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³*Ibid.*, p. 52.

the eventual partition of South Africa.¹ In speeches made at the time, the Prime Minister made it clear that although large numbers of Africans would live in the towns for many years to come, the White man would retain domination over his part of the country and the Bantu would be compensated by receiving full rights in the areas allotted to him.²

In the course of the debate on this Bill it became clear that its purpose was to enable the Government to embark on a policy in race relations that would make it possible for the major Western powers to support South Africa in the United Nations and, in particular, in its South West Africa stand.³ The United Nations had persistently maintained that South Africa's Trusteeship of South West Africa had lapsed with the dissolution of the League of Nations and it used South Africa's internal policy as a justification for this attitude. The Act was intended to vitiate the argument that South Africa's policy was one of discrimination. By offering full political rights to the newly conceived Bantustans, the

¹Memorandum explaining the background and objects of the Promotion of Self-Government Bill of 1959, No. 3/1959.

²*House of Assembly Debates*
 24 March Cols. 3072, 3076-8.
 10 April Col. 3364.
 20 May Cols. 6214-6242.

See also article by Dr. W.W. Eiselen, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development (now Department of Plural Relations and Development). *Optima* (March 1959).

³*House of Assembly Debates*, 20 May, Col. 6240.

policy was to be given an acceptable moral tone.¹

"Bantustan" appears to have been first used in a speech made by Dr. Verwoerd in 1959, in which he elaborated on the aim of complete separation and, in so doing, said there was no reason why South Africa should not follow Britain's example, as in the case of the Protectorates, of creating "Bantustans" within South Africa.² The White Paper, in dealing with the intention behind the recognition of the Bantu areas, discussed setting aside areas for Africans ensuring that each community would retain such land. In keeping with this aim, "'homelands' were created for the major African units".³ This would appear to be the origin of the use of the word "homelands" for the "Native areas" or "reserves". The Government explained its action as "a realistic approach (to) the expectations of Africans and their demand(s) for self-determination and political rights, which was in line with the objects of the world at large". Up to this time there is no evidence to show that any of South Africa's "segregationists" were concerned with the provision of land for specific ethnic groups. General Hertzog had steadfastly desired the territorial segregation of Black and White - not White from Zulu, Tsonga, Xhosa, or Zulu from those, or Xhosa from Venda.⁴

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 20 May, Cols. 6221, 6222-6227.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 27 January, Cols. 61-68.

³Tatz, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa*, p. 159.

⁴*Ibid.*

The debate also made it clear that whatever differences of opinion existed among the White electorate of South Africa, there was basic agreement on the necessity of maintaining White supremacy for the foreseeable future.¹ Nevertheless a great deal of cynicism manifested itself in regard to the Government's real intentions and the ultimate objective of the Bantustan Policy. There was patent incredulity that the Government really intended partitioning South Africa "without prior consultation with the Natives"² as speakers articulated the dangers they saw inherent in a fragmented country. Members of the Opposition showed concern for a White economy that would be dependent on foreign labour and noted the inherent military insecurity in a situation in which Black States extended, in the "shape of a horseshoe",³ from Bechuanaland to most of the eastern sea-board. Moreover, they were alarmed by the possibility of direct relations between southern African and Communist States, and the chance that the former could evolve into vehicles for the propagation of foreign ideologies in South Africa. It was doubted, too, whether South Africa could endure the economic sacrifices such total

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 18 May, Cols. 6024, 6029-6035, 6039-6231; 19 May, Cols. 6125-6126 ; and 2 June, Cols., 7111-7114.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 18 May, Col. 6046. The Minister of Plural Relations and Development said it was unnecessary to consult the Natives since the Bill was a logical outcome of the Bantu Authorities. *House of Assembly Debates*, 10 April, Col.3363.

³*House of Assembly Debates*, 18 May, Col. 6023, 6034; 19 May, Cols. 6124-6127; 2 June, Cols. 7113-7114.

territorial separation would entail.

Dr. Verwoerd, however, left little doubt that he would pursue the course he had set out upon. Nor was there ambivalence on the issues of additional land for Bantu areas and their consolidation within regular boundaries.¹ It was clearly enunciated that any future land allocations would be made in strict accordance with the 1936 legislation and that no other land would be purchased. This remains a contentious issue, and KwaZulu's reaction to it will be discussed later.

At the time of the debate, Nationalists expressed the opinion that the achievement of self-government by the Bantustans would take a long time, "if at all".² Demands for precision in regard to territorial borders were therefore considered unrealistic and premature. The issue of scattered, unconnected homeland areas was not the crucial issue. What was being promoted was less territorial separation than political Apartheid. "It makes no difference where a member of ... (an) ethnic group finds himself ... It has nothing to do with borders ... He can be governed wherever he is."³

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 27 May, Cols. 6731-6733, 6781, 6799; and 10 June, Cols. 4021-4022.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 26 June 1959, Col. 9494; 19 May, Cols. 6169-6176.

³Dr. L.I. Coertze, Nationalist expert in Constitutional Law. Quoted in G.M. Carter et al., *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 63.

As a result, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act provided for the recognition of eight national units, the "historico-logical centres" referred to in the Tomlinson Report,¹ the appointment of Commissioners-General to represent the Government in African areas, a new official territorial authority in designated urban areas referred to as "Ambassador" in the debate but simply as a "Bantu person" in the Act, and African advisory boards in the urban townships who would, in time, be replaced by boards formed by new "Ambassadors". The Act made it possible to transfer, systematically, the legislative powers of the Governor-General to the Territorial Authorities. It amended the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 to empower the Governor-General to transfer land held in trust to African representatives whose powers, functions and duties were laid down. The Bill gave wide powers to the Government to rule by delegation. Although it did not give any important new powers to the Bantu authorities, it did give the territorial authorities new "status".² And it became the legal cornerstone for all subsequent homeland development.

¹Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. No. 46 of 1959.

²See Horrell, "Second Interim Report on the Establishment of Bantu Authorities". *Race Relations Journal*, No. 2 (1959).

CHAPTER 2PART VTRANSKEI - A PROTOTYPE

Transkei was the first homeland to follow to its conclusion the course set for it by the South African Government. Its acceptance of independence in October 1976 was an important historical step with far-reaching consequences for the territory itself and for South Africa. There is no escaping its significance as a possible prototype for similar development in other homelands, and especially in KwaZulu. Despite total international rejection Transkei's "independence" is a South African political reality which will have to be taken into account whatever the future holds.

By the Transkei Constitutional Act of 1963, as amended, the "African" part of the Transkei became a separate territory.¹ Its citizens were to be Africans born in Transkei or legally domiciled there for at least five years, and those outside the territory who derived from, or were members of, tribes resident in Transkei.

¹The Act is known as the "Act to Confer Self-Government in the Transkei on the Bantu-resident in the Transkei and on certain Bantu related to the Bantu of the Transkei and to provide for matters incidental thereto". The Republic of South Africa, Act. No. 48, 1963. See also Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 44-49.

Some facts in regard to Transkei's early years of self-government must be noted. An election in 1963 presaged the formal organization of political parties, and within three months of the selection of Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima as Chief Minister, the first two officially accepted African political parties in the history of South Africa confronted each other.¹ The Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) headed by Matanzima endorsed the policy of Separate Development and the system of chieftainship; the Democratic Party (DP), led by Paramount Chief Victor Poto, considered that homelands should be regarded merely as provinces of the Republic, that their citizens should have a voice in the government of the country as a whole, and that the chiefs should gradually have to surrender their powers to the democratic will of the people. In 1960 an emergency regulation for the Transkei (R-400) was introduced to provide for rigid security control and for detention for interrogation for indefinite periods. A matter of weeks prior to the granting of independence to the territory this emergency regulation was invoked, and the entire National Executive of the Transkei Democratic Party, which was openly opposed to the granting of independence, was detained.²

The Government White Paper on the Tomlinson

¹G.M. Carter et al., *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 153.

²*Sunday Tribune*, 1 August 1976.

Commission Report had rejected the recommendation that private White capital be utilized for development in the homelands. Chief Kaiser Matanzima repudiated this rejection, asserting that it was essential to admit such capital to Transkei. In recent times he (and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi) has sought financial assistance abroad and has returned with promises of aid which it is hoped will help alleviate the lack of "non-agricultural wage employment opportunities".¹

In his first year as Chief Minister, Kaiser Matanzima questioned the value of border industries for Transkei, and rejected the philosophy of "Bantu education". While on the one hand these attitudes raised doubts about the ability of the National Party Government to control developments within Transkei itself, on the other hand they did not appear to have had any effect on the lives of 1 million Transkei citizens and millions of other Africans living outside the homeland. Nor did their occurrence appear to weaken Dr. Verwoerd's hold on the White electorate of South Africa. They did, however, suggest that Transkeian "self-government" had little to contribute to reducing race tension in the Republic.² This probably remains true today. While opportunities in Transkei have

¹Hobart D. Houghton, "Economic Development in the Reserves", *Race Relations Journal*, No. 2 (January-March 1962), p. 15.

²Carter et al., *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 170.

remained minimal, resentment at discriminatory practices within South Africa has increased.

Paradoxically, Bophuthatswana has also accepted independence despite the fact that its Chief Minister Mangope is on record as repudiating the status of the Transkei Act as "despicable arm-twisting by the South African Government".¹ It is not known why Mangope, despite his stated views, opted for independence; the example of Transkei must certainly have influenced the decision. While independence has deprived Transkeians of any future claim on "White" South Africa's wealth, the record is not all negative. For the first time Africans have taken leadership in officially sanctioned party political activity, and for Transkeians, inside and outside the territory, the principle within the territory of one-man-one-vote has been accepted. By implication, members of any African group accepting a comparable semi-autonomous status can enjoy the opportunity of exercising limited legislative and administrative responsibilities. This has had both practical and psychological effects.

An independent, multi-racial Transkei has exposed paradoxes and conflicts in Separate Development. Thus, despite independence, the migrant labour system will endure and the massive flow of workers to and from

¹*Natal Mercury*, 2 August 1976.

centres of employment will emphasize the dependence of any state in similar circumstances on the economy of South Africa. Many Whites have elected to remain in a territory where they are destined to be a small, racial minority, which is ironic since Apartheid, originated to accommodate White fears and prejudice, has proved to be the first casualty of Separate Development come to fruition.¹ Transkei, contrary to the wishes of Pretoria, has elected to become completely non-racial.

The major conflict that has emerged concerns the issue of citizenship. On October 26th 1976, when Transkei became independent, Transkeians living and working in "White areas" ceased to be South African citizens and automatically became citizens of Transkei.² Paramount Chief Matanzima, however, has maintained that Transkeians living in the Republic, many of whom were born there, should be allowed to choose their citizenship. The then South African Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, insisted that if Transkei refused to grant these Transkeians citizenship they would become "stateless", and by an Act of the Transkeian, not the South African, Government.³ It does not appear that

¹*Sunday Times*, 25 September 1976.

²"Status of the Transkei Act No. 100 of 1976".
Government Gazette 5198, 9 July 1976.

³Citizenship clause, see *House of Assembly Debates*, 7-12 June, Cols. 8317-8319 and 8419.

South Africa can give way. The independence of Transkei is a major landmark in South Africa's policy of Separate Development, the central philosophy of which has always been that all Blacks in South Africa would eventually become citizens of one of the African homelands.¹

The conflict between the two Governments can have wide and unforeseen repercussions for KwaZulu. One-and-a-half million Xhosas, and probably about 7 million more other urban Blacks who may not elect to become citizens of a homeland, may lose their South African citizenship even though they were born in South Africa and have always lived and worked there. As the actual Balkanization of South Africa begins, serious flaws therefore become manifest. The possibility that South Africa's urban Blacks could become stateless by default or by decree could mean that they would turn into jobless and homeless squatters in White South Africa. Depriving urban Blacks of a country to protect them and to which they will owe allegiance, and of a stake in the country in which they were born, may have repercussions which cannot yet be determined. In such circumstances the accusations and arguments levelled at South Africa's race policies would, in the words of Professor Jack Spence, be given new "relevance, immediacy and impact". They would seem to bear out the argument of

¹*The Times*, London, 11 May 1976. *Daily News*, 20 and 27 May 1976, and 1 June 1976. *Natal Mercury*, 20 May 1976, *Sunday Times*, 30 May 1976.

the opponents of Separate Development that the system is at best a rationalization of a policy of discrimination, and at worst a deliberate attempt to deceive the world about the true meaning and consequences of Apartheid.¹

The issue has not been resolved and concerns the entire urban African population in South Africa. The matter drew protests from the Transkeian Ambassador to South Africa early in 1977 and was the subject of discussion at meetings between representatives of Transkei and South Africa that year.² Discussion under these circumstances could be an international matter, which means that international norms in law could apply, and International Law outlaws discrimination on racial grounds.³

At the time of writing there is a further *dénouement*. A break has occurred in diplomatic relations between Transkei and South Africa. The ostensible reason for the break is a land claim by Transkei which South Africa has ignored. This could be allied to political problems within Transkei itself, but the details are outside the scope of this study. At present diplomats have been recalled. The financial dependence of Transkei on South

¹Professor Jack Spence, Leicester University, in an address to the Foreign Affairs Association Symposium, Umtata, April 1976.

²*Natal Mercury*, 10 February 1977.

³*Ibid.* Comment by Professor John Dugard, Professor of Law, University of Witwatersrand.

Africa has not been affected and South Africa still supplies about 70% of Transkei's Annual budget. Also, arrangements concerning migrant workers continue, as does normal commercial activity. The limits within which Chief Matanzima can assert his independence have been made vivid.

Pretoria's dilemma is to respond aggressively without destroying the entire experiment by exposing the illusory nature of Transkei's independence. Matanzima's dilemma is to display his independence without provoking a show of its frailty. KwaZulu, watching, has to evaluate its role in the experiment.

The importance of Transkei in this study rests, thus, on the fact that it represents Separate Development in practice and not just in theory. While for some the experiment of an independent Transkei may be exciting for KwaZulu it has served as a reminder of the limits of the policy, rather than of its opportunities.¹

¹Carter et al., *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 184.

CHAPTER 3

KWAZULU: THE PERIPHERAL ENTITY EXAMINED

PART I THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KWAZULU;

PART II THE LAND: ACQUISITION AND
CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS.

PART III DEVELOPMENT.

(A) KWAZULU'S FINANCES.

(B) AGRICULTURE.

(C) COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

(D) MIGRANT LABOUR.

(E) TOWNSHIPS AND URBANIZATION.

(F) EDUCATION.

CHAPTER 3PART IESTABLISHMENT OF KWAZULU

KwaZulu and its institutions are the result of a detailed blue-print provided by the South African Government in accordance with its policy of Separate Development. In terms of the theoretical masterplan, KwaZulu is presently on the road to independence which former Prime Minister Vorster has emphasized "mean(s) independence in the normal sense of the word".¹ Yet the official view of independence has changed greatly in the last decade, and this is of importance to an understanding of KwaZulu since the nature of its existence is defined, to a great extent, by the future which is envisaged for it. A vibrant economic independence would necessitate a different present dispensation than would an economically dependent "independent" state that was little more than a vassal state labour reservoir.

In 1968, the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development outlined certain prerequisites necessary for a

¹Prime Minister Vorster, *House of Assembly Debates*, 1972, Col. 5280.

homeland to attain full independence.¹ It had to have administrative experience in the management and control of government departments, show reliability in all actions, especially in the control of finance and budgeting, and display an integrity of purpose in public affairs. It had to pursue a democratic way of life, have a sense of responsibility and a desire for peaceful co-existence at home and with its neighbours. Furthermore, there had to have been some economic development, with a displayed ability to provide jobs for homeland citizens.

In 1970 this statement was qualified to the extent that homelands did not necessarily have to be economically self-supporting to obtain independence.² In April 1972, former Prime Minister Vorster emphasized again that economic viability was not a condition for commencing independence negotiations.³

The pattern provides grounds for cynicism. When the grant of independence to an integral part of the Republic of South Africa was considered inexpedient, at best, and unthinkable at worst, the conditions set for such independence to be granted were both vague and unrealizable. As the perceived advantages of actually making such a move

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 1968, Cols. 6656-6661.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 1970, Cols. 3501-3507.

³*House of Assembly Debates*, 1972, Col. 5280.

began to outweigh its perceived value as a mere ideological manoeuvre, the preconditions for independence were minimized. Now, independence, which will deprive Black South Africans of all claims to political rights in common areas and relegate them to citizenship in homelands which are peripheral to the centres of activity, is available almost for the asking. Economic underdevelopment in the homeland area is no longer a convenient excuse for denying independence; it is a means by which continuing dependence on White South Africa will be assured. Moreover, it is a devolution of problems, as much as of power, to homeland leadership.

The legal framework within which this transformation of South Africa is to take place has been assiduously developed. The emergence of KwaZulu may be seen as the closing phase of the structuralization period. From the outset of this period the Zulu leadership has not played a passive role in the attempted imposition of Separate Development on their people.

Initially, Government plans for the creation of a "Zulustan" were supported by the Paramount Chief of the Zulu, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, whose view was that "we must work with the Government - without them we can do nothing".¹

¹*Daily News*, 28 March 1963. See also M. Horrell, *The African Reserves of South Africa*. South African Institute of Race Relations (Johannesburg: 1969).

However, at a meeting of 200 Zulu chiefs called in the early 1960's on the advice of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development to discuss a Territorial Authority in Zululand, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the Buthelezi tribe in the Mhlabatini district, opposed the system because of its basis of "divide and rule" and because of his belief that chiefs alone were not competent to take decisions which affected urban dwellers without consulting them.¹ There was also a feeling in the meeting that the area of jurisdiction of any Territorial Authority should embrace the whole of Zululand and include White farming areas and crown lands.

Buthelezi's view prevailed. He wished, he said, to see the effect of the system in operation before committing himself to it.² In 1964 a letter from the then Bantu Affairs Department made it clear that opposition to a Zulustan was no longer a matter of choice and that Zulu did not have the right to accept or reject the system.³ The Chief Bantu Commissioner for Natal at the time, Mr. J.O. Cornell, told a gathering of 300 tribesmen that although the Bantu Authorities were compulsory, the State President would not establish such an authority without consideration of African laws and customs. "All we ask,"

¹Ibid.

²*Daily News*, 18 June 1963.

³*Daily News*, 12 March 1964.

he said, "is for you to recognise the system."¹

Buthelezi's response was that "it would be in the interest of all if the system were adopted here - as far as I am concerned we must obey the Government ... the only alternative is revolution."

In the meantime interest in Government plans for Natal and Zululand was being aroused by Transkeian developments and was reflected in "train and bus" talk through phrases such as "half a loaf is better than none", "if you cannot beat them, join them", and "is it wise to reject something we have not even tried?"²

In 1967 it became clear that the Government intended to expedite the establishment of the Territorial Authority and more regional authorities were constituted.³ In 1968 the Government, apparently losing patience with the Zulu people, summoned the Paramount Chief to Pretoria to secret talks with Mr. M.C. Botha and top officials.⁴ It was believed that a joint statement would result from the meeting which would indicate that Zululand had requested the establishment of a Territorial Authority. Press comment at the time suggested that the Government was

¹*Daily News*, 28 April 1964.

²*Daily News*, 23 July 1965.

³*Daily News*, 25 November 1967.

⁴*Daily News*, 13 August 1968.

taking an enormous risk in pushing Zululand "too far and too fast" given the circumstances of a truly independent Swazi nation on its borders on the one hand, and increasing terrorist activity on the Mozambique border on the other".¹ Shortly after this visit the Paramount Chief died, and the Government produced a letter signed by him requesting the establishment of a territorial authority. Buthelezi said the letter was authentic.² Prince Israel Ncwayizeni, Cyprian's sibling brother, was installed as the Regent Paramount Chief pending the coming of age and marriage of the direct heir, Prince Goodwill Zwelithini Zulu, and he declared his intention of continuing with plans to establish a Territorial Authority.

Buthelezi had, in 1968, become the head of the Mashongagashoni regional authority. His attitude was that the Bantu Authorities Act was passed without the consent of the African people who were thus under no obligation to express either acceptance of, or objection to, the proclamation of the regional authority. They had learned from experience that their feelings were irrelevant and that acceptance of Government policy was compulsory, not optional.³

¹*Daily News*, 13 August 1968.

²Interview with Brenda Robinson.

³*Drum Magazine*, October 1968.

A leadership crisis was looming in Zululand. A rift between Buthelezi and some members of the Royal family had developed and Buthelezi laid responsibility for its existence at the door of the Government.¹ He substantiated his accusation by saying that Cyprian, shortly before his death, had told him about "pressures brought to bear on him to sever relations with me because I was *non-persona grata* with certain individuals and groups".²

Plans for the establishment of a Zulu Territorial Authority continued despite the opposition of many Zulu to a Zulustan that was not a solid, single territorial entity.³

In addition, urbanization, which had split the Zulu geographically, had become a compelling issue. As a homeland, Zululand had more contacts with Westernization both within its territory and on its doorstep, than had Xhosa in Transkei. Only half of its population was living in the Zulu reserve. A bitter debate ensued between Government officials and Zulu leaders in Nongoma. The latter believed that the urban Zulu, the "link between the literate and the illiterate, the lifeline that would

¹*Daily News*, 11 May 1969.

²*Daily News*, 25 June 1969.

³*Daily News*, 5 April 1970.

help uplift",¹ should be included in the proposed new Zululand Territorial Authority.²

A meeting was called, not to reject or accept the Territorial Authority nor to discuss its detailed powers on issues such as territory or representation. The question of Zulu agreement did not arise since the creation of the Territorial Authority was at the discretion of the Minister of Plural Relations and Development once a sufficient number of regional authorities had been created. The intention of the meeting was to discuss the proposed draft for the establishment of the Territorial Authority prepared in Pretoria. In other words, discussion was limited to the mechanism of setting up the Authority. Had no meeting been called, it had been the intention of the Government officials to visit each regional authority individually. The Minister reiterated that the development of a Bantu Homeland should take place in consultation with the traditional ruling authority of the particular homeland people.³ The existing regional authority of the Zulu was thus being consulted so that the form of government suited to the people's own traditional pattern could be taken into consideration. In the case of the Zulu, cognisance had to be taken of an existing monarchy.

¹*Natal Mercury*, 11 June 1970.

²*Daily News*, 15 April 1970.

³*Daily News*, 6 May 1970.

Many Zulu had expressed the opinion that unless the Authority was led by Buthelezi "it would not be done properly", since there were too few Zulu with his insight and training in Zulu affairs.¹ Finally, a Zulu Territorial Authority was constituted, and on 9 June 1970, Buthelezi was unanimously chosen Chief Executive Officer. His acceptance of the Authority was apparently attributable, in part, to events in Transkei and its enhanced status, and in part to pressures from his own people, including a considerable number of Zulu intellectuals who were of the opinion that more attention should be paid to development matters including employment, health and education.²

Urban Zulu could not participate in the jurisdiction of the Authority which was, in consequence, deprived of the much-needed participation of the more sophisticated and educated sectors. Urban African inclusion at that time might have prevented the schisms of later years and might have obviated the accusation that the homeland leader did not represent urban interests. Although the homeland leader had constitutional authority over all Zulu, urban residents could communicate their requirements and grievances only through urban Bantu Councils and "diplomatic" representatives, and not through direct representation on the KwaZulu Legislative body. Over the

¹Ibid.

²*Daily News*, 8 May 1970.

years the less educated "ordinary" Zulu had looked to his educated counterpart to "tell" the White man the story of his innermost feelings, as he carried the brunt of hardship imposed by Nationalist ideological legislation.¹ The inauguration of a Territorial Authority was, thus, to create a vacuum in African affairs. "We are Zulu," urbanites said at the time, "and we don't stop being Zulu just because we are living in Durban and not in Nongoma ... If we are not going to be governed by this body, who is going to govern us? ... All we ask is incorporation in the Territorial Authority, and that urban residents have adequate representation." At the opening ceremony of the Zulu Territorial Authority, the Minister responded to this plea by saying that the Zulu Territorial Authority "could nominate representatives to look after the interests of those members of your nation who are not in your homeland".²

The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act No. 26 of 1970 provided for every African in the Republic who was not a citizen of a self-governing territory to become a citizen of one or other Territorial Authority area. In international relations an individual would continue to have the status of a citizen of the Republic, but franchise rights would be available to him only in his own territory. A citizen of a particular Territorial Authority was

¹Ibid. See also *Daily News*, 9 June 1970, and *Natal Mercury*, 9 June 1970.

²*Daily News*, 11 June 1970.

defined as a Bantu person born in the area, and/or domiciled there; a Bantu person born in the Republic but speaking a Bantu language or dialect thereof used by the Bantu people of that area; or as a Bantu person in the Republic related to any members of the Bantu population of the area, or who had identified himself with any part of such population, or who was associated with any part of such population by virtue of cultural or racial background.¹

An explanatory memorandum issued with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act No. 21 of 1971 confirmed the Government's intention to lead each individual nation to self-government and ultimate independence. The new Act applied to all Bantu areas, except Transkei, in matters of common interest. Issues peculiar to a particular area such as the Constitution of a legislative body, would be determined by the State President, by proclamation, after consultation with the territorial authorities concerned. Legislative Assemblies were to replace Territorial Authorities, have jurisdiction in the same areas, and be constituted from citizens of the area concerned. Some matters were not to be transferred to a Legislative Assembly, even after self-government was granted; these included defence, foreign affairs and questions of peace and security, postal, telephone and related services, immigration of non-citizens, currency and banking, and

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 23 February 1970, Cols. 1782-1789, 2000-2001, 2011. See Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 50.

customs and excise. In the early stages of development there would be considerable State control, even in matters transferred to Legislative Assemblies, for example laws applicable to homeland citizens who resided outside its areas, to the establishment of factories, to appointment or dismissal of chiefs, or to educational matters. Even in the second stage of self-government matters transferred to Legislative Assemblies would require the State President's approval and could not be inconsistent with Acts of Parliament. Executive Councils would be constituted, and later Cabinets. Various departments would be created, revenue funds, subject to the Controller and Auditor-General, made available, and public servants from the Republic would be seconded to assist in the administration until they could be dispensed with. When self-government was granted, the areas concerned would be entitled to have their own flags and, with the State President's approval, their own National Anthems. Matters not controlled by the Legislative Assembly could be legislated for by proclamation of the State President of the Republic. An amendment to the South African Constitution Act in 1963 recognized an African language as an additional official language in any Bantu area. (English and Afrikaans were already so entrenched.) The Constitution Amendment Act No. 1 of 1971 substituted the words "Bantu Territory" for "Bantu Areas" and Act No. 23 of 1972 provided for the establishment of public holidays in substitution for

those in White areas.¹

The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 was followed by the Constitution of New Territorial Authorities during 1968 and 1969 for the Ciskei, Tswana area (named Bophuthatswana), South Sotho area (Basotho Qwaqwa), Shangaan area (Gazankulu), North Sotho area (Lebowa) and Venda. Self-government was granted to KwaZulu, the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Lebowa in 1972, to Gazankulu and Venda in 1973, and to Basotho Qwaqwa in 1974. No final decision has been taken on the Ndbele. A large portion of the Ndbele people live in Lebowa, others in Bophuthatswana. There are four Ndbele tribal authorities, but they fall under the Lebowa and Bophuthatswana Governments. There are 3 regional authorities in the Swazi areas, but as yet no central territorial body.²

In 1972 a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was created to replace the existing Territorial Authority.³ ("We all hope that this is not a fool's errand," Alan Paton quipped, since the Zulu acquired their Legislative Assembly on April 1st.)⁴ At first its membership consisted of those who were serving on the Territorial Authority and it was

¹House of Assembly Debates, 8 February 1971, Cols. 477-486. House of Assembly Debates, 9 February 1971, Cols. 504-511, 598-604, 1544.

²Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 54-61. See also *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974), pp. 189-205 and (1975) pp. 126-140.

³Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 53.

⁴Alan Paton, in an article in the *Sunday Tribune*, 26 March 1972.

granted "first stage" powers as provided for in the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act. It was responsible for the departments of Authority Affairs and Finance, Community Affairs, Works, Agriculture, Education and Culture and Justice. A Constitution was drafted in which the members of the Legislative Assembly, having refused to swear allegiance to the South African Government, were required to swear allegiance to the State President and the Paramount Chief. The personal representative of the Paramount Chief was to remain a member of the Assembly but the Paramount Chief himself, it was decided, should hold himself aloof from party politics. The Chief Executive Councillor was to have a considerable voice in the election of other Executive Councillors. The Paramount Chief was to personify the unity of the Zulu nation. He was to be kept informed of business pending in the Executive Council and could meet with Councillors for discussion if he so desired. He could, too, address the house on request.

Initially, a power struggle seemed imminent between Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini.¹ Many observers believed a South African Government campaign to promote the King at the expense of Buthelezi was being launched. Certain Government officials were said to have been disappointed by the failure of an attempt to have the King instead of Chief Buthelezi made Prime Minister, apparently

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 2 July 1972.

because it hoped that traditional institutions and leaders should play a more important role, and because it was believed that the King would be more docile and compliant than Buthelezi. The King, however, denied attempts to cause rifts between himself and the Chief. Despite an apparently peaceful facade, however, there surfaces, not infrequently, intimations that forces and parties opposing Buthelezi are "using" the Royal House in their own interests. The KwaZulu Constitution is unique in that the Zulu are the only South African people governed under homeland law who have a king. In this sense they are similar to the people of Lesotho, where the King also has a history of conflict with the Legislative Authority and Prime Minister. The Swazi, too, have a king and he has again taken over power.

The Constitution was finally approved by the Authority and the Republican Government and was gazetted as Proclamation R69 of 30 March 1972. It created a Legislative Assembly composed of members of the existing Territorial Authority with Chief Buthelezi remaining Chief Executive Officer. A new Assembly would come into being at a date to be determined by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, at the request of the Executive Council. The Assembly would comprise the personal representative of the Paramount Chief, 3 Chiefs (or Chairman of Community Authorities) appointed from amongst its members by every regional authority (there

were 22 regional authorities at the date of the Proclamation which would thus appoint 66 representatives), the Chief of each tribal authority or the Chairman of each community authority deemed a regional authority (3 such bodies then existed), and 55 members to be elected by the voters of KwaZulu.

The electoral divisions for the election of the 55 members would be the areas of regional authorities, and representatives would be elected in proportion to the estimated total number of citizens resident there. Voters would be citizens of KwaZulu over 18, domiciled in any electoral division, or whose districts of origin or those of their antecedents were in such areas. Each voter would cast as many votes as there were members to be elected in the electoral division concerned, but only one vote in respect of any one candidate. Those standing for election would have to be citizens of at least 21 years old. A term of imprisonment or a conviction for corrupt or illegal practice under laws governing election were disqualifications. The Legislative Assembly would run for 5 years and it was obligatory to hold at least one ordinary session annually, although special sessions could be held if necessary. The Commissioner-General for the Zulu was eligible to attend meetings and to address the Assembly. Freedom of speech and debate would apply and sittings would be open to the public. The Executive Council would consist of the Chief Executive Councillor who was to be a chief, and 5 other members of the Assembly to be elected by secret ballot, of whom 2 were to

be chiefs. The Chief Executive Officer, elected first, would nominate 10 candidates for the other seats, of whom half were to be chiefs. No debate was to be allowed prior to the vote. The Commissioner-General had the right to attend Executive Council meetings and give advice on matters discussed.

The Chief Executive Officer might be removed from office by resolution of the Legislative Assembly and other Councillors by resolution of the Assembly but on the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer. Proclamation 73 entrusted each Executive Councillor with a department, as previously listed. The election of the Executive Council was to be followed by the election of a Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Assembly. Proclamations R71, R72, R74, R75, R76 and R77 established the rules of procedure for the Legislative Assembly, the conduct for election of members, regulations for regional, tribal and community authorities, salaries and allowances for Legislative Assembly members and members of regional authorities and general financial regulations. Proclamation R69 transferred the powers, functions, assets and liabilities of all regional authorities in KwaZulu to the Legislative Assembly. A Government Notice 1024 of 16 June set out citizenship regulations, and 24 September was set aside as King Shaka Day.¹ The Capital is now sited at Ulundi but in past years the Government operated from

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 55.

Nongoma and Pietermaritzburg.

The Constitution for KwaZulu only comes into effect after the territory has held its first election. This occurred in February 1978, and all the constitutional details will now become operative. Buthelezi initially insisted that elections would not be held until reference books, required under the Pass Laws for election purposes, had been abolished and had been replaced by conventional citizenship cards.¹ In response to criticism that he was stalling and thus did not hold office as a result of a democratic election, he agreed to proceed with the use of reference books. The election was postponed more than once as various snags, such as the non-completion of a final definition of the boundaries of KwaZulu districts under the Government consolidation plans of May 1975, were encountered. Buthelezi, replying to accusations that he and his Government were delaying elections, pointed out that the issues determining the election date were all in the hands of Pretoria's officials. The elections are discussed in Chapter 4, Part III.

The start of "independence" in KwaZulu was not auspicious. At its first sitting the KwaZulu Legislature learnt that its Budget for 1972-3 was R32-million. This

¹Ibid., p. 56. See also *Natal Mercury*, 2 October 1972; *Star*, 18 January 1973.

was its allocation for the development of the State.¹ Having been forced to accept what was called the "dubious benefits" of Separate Development, for which they had never asked, the Assembly was sceptical of what independence could be bought with R32-million.² Their Works Department was allocated R13-million, of which R10-million was to be used to help develop townships close to White areas for workers who would work in White areas and quite certainly spend their money in White areas. Less than R300 000 was allocated for roads and bridges in an area in which there were 5 000 miles of road and any number of bridges. Buthelezi pointed out that since 90% of Zulu lived off agriculture, the fiscal allocation of a little under R3-million for agriculture was ridiculous.³ At least R50-million, it was estimated, was needed to buy the kind of technical services, research training and development that KwaZulu needed. The Commissioner-General for the Zulu, Mr. P.H. Torlage, announced that 18 business undertakings were available in KwaZulu - the population was 4-million. In Isithebe, designated a growth point for White industrialists, about R1 500 000 was invested on infrastructure where a few factories employed Zulu at wages much lower than those in the cities. The Legislative Assembly seriously questioned the nature of an independence in which South Africa would control trade,

¹ *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1972), p. 188.

² *Natal Mercury*, 31 May 1972.

³ *Ibid.*

foreign relations, defence and internal security. Economists expressed the opinion that KwaZulu would be a mere client state for South Africa, little more than a vast labour farm for White South Africa.¹

Functions of the KwaZulu Government were to be carried out by Cabinet Ministers, each with specific mandates and with responsibility to the Legislative Assembly. Each was assisted by White officials seconded by the Republican Government. KwaZulu authority was thus subject to limitations in law, and restraint in the exercise of those powers delegated to it. KwaZulu thus remained effectively subject to the Government of South Africa.

¹G. Maasdorp, *Focus on KwaZulu*. South African Institute of Race Relations (Durban: 1975).

CHAPTER 3PART IITHE LAND: ACQUISITION AND CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

The homeland territories owe their existence and configuration to the haphazard allocation of land to Africans during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the proclamation of particular areas as reserves, no heed was paid to certain coherent criteria. Size of population and cultural identity were sacrificed to expediency and practicality. KwaZulu is, as a result, not a homeland in any meaningful historical sense.¹

Although the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 aimed at adding land and reducing fragmentation of Black areas, it was certainly not intended to be the territorial base for what were eventually to be independent sovereign states. Yet the consolidation proposals of later years conformed to its allocation of land and the Central Government has refused to extend those allocations. The consolidation proposals of 1972, 1973 and 1975 were unsatisfactory both from a planning and a geopolitical point of view, and could not realistically have been expected to satisfy

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 2.

homeland leaders. Nor could it be expected that the delay and limited consolidation offered would appease external critics in the sense anticipated by Dr. Verwoerd in 1959.¹

Homeland leaders have long expressed dissatisfaction with their land allocations in terms of the 1936 Trust and Land Act and most have demanded more land than the Government plans to add to their areas. In February 1972, Paramount Chief Matanzima stated that Transkei would not seek independence until the land issue had been settled to his satisfaction.² Minor land concessions were made to him, and Transkei became independent in 1976.

Other homeland leaders have made similar demands in regard to land allocation. Chief Mangope of Bophuthatswana, in a press interview, required as well, apart from the resolution of the land issues, that the Tswana people be "compensated" financially for the contribution they had made to the economic development of South Africa for, he said, present votes from Central Government funds were sufficient for administration only and did not allow for development.³ In 1976 the leader of Bophuthatswana also

¹See Appendix 1 for Map 7, which shows the African Reserves in South Africa in 1969.

²*Rand Daily Mail*, 18/19 February 1972. *Star*, 9 February 1972.

³*Star*, 26/27 January 1973.

changed his mind and has opted for independence. In 1975 it was reported that the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr. Cedric Phatudi, had rejected independence and warned other chiefs not to be enticed into accepting the idea of independence.¹ Speaking at the inauguration of the Regional Urban Representative Board for Lebowa, he emphasized the injustice of establishing independent units on 13% of the land, when the population ratio was five Blacks to each White.

KwaZulu's problem is complicated by the fact that KwaZulu is not a homogeneous land mass. In 1975 the homeland consisted of 48 separate units which were to be consolidated into 10 blocks. Its area of somewhat more than 3-million hectares comprised approximately 35% of the Province of Natal and extended from the Mozambique border in the north to the Transkei border (the Umzimkulu River) in the South, from the Indian Ocean in the east to the Drakensberg, Qwaqwa and Lesotho in the west. According to the issue of "*Bantu*", 1972, the total area was given as 3 144 421 hectares - 12 141 square miles.

The Tomlinson Commission drew attention to the differences in topography and climate in different parts of Natal.² Fifty-eight percent of Zulu land was found to be mountainous - areas in northern Zululand and

¹*Daily News*, 23 September 1975.

²Chapter 12, in the official Summary of the Report.

Tongaland are semi-highlands - or coastal flats. In the latter regions the climate is hot and unhealthy and the country thinly populated. The highlands, except for their deep bushy valleys, have a more pleasant climate and could be productive if irrigated. They are also suitable for afforestation. The higher land of the Tugela region is bushy country suited to cattle. Dryland cultivation can be practised in selected localities only.¹ Grossly overpopulated Black areas, many of which have already been eliminated under the "Black spot" removal scheme, lie along the foothills of the Drakensberg Mountains. In the southern semi-coastal region the terrain is hilly. The climate is mild with good rainfall and is suited to farming, but the population density is extremely high. In 1954 it averaged 350 to 400 people per square mile in the Umlazi Reserve.² The average population density for the Bantu areas in Natal was 82 per square mile (excluding absentees) when the Tomlinson Commission reported, 95 per square mile, if absentees were included. The comparative figure in 1970 was 173 *de facto*, and 332 *de jure*.³

According to the 1970 Census, the Zulu population of

¹Horrell, *The African Reserves of South Africa*, p. 20.

²Ibid.

³"Bantu" (1972).

South Africa was 4 026 058,¹ constituting 26,7% of the total African population. There were 2 134 951 Zulu in the homeland and 1 891 107 in "White" areas. *KwaZulu Economic Revue* of 1975 gives different figures.² According to it the *de jure* Zulu population in 1970 was 4 017 820, and over 51,3% (2 061 620) of the total Zulu population was in KwaZulu. Also resident in the homeland were 44 760 people who were not Zulu. In 1970, 77 420 Zulu lived in other homelands. The 8 621 non-Blacks, representing only 0,4% of the *de facto* population of KwaZulu, were mostly Indians and Whites.

The Bantu Administration Act of 1972, as amended, empowered the Minister of Plural Relations and Development, wherever he deemed it expedient in the public interest, and without prior notice, to order any tribe, portion of tribe, or individual African to move from one place to another within the Republic.³ Such an order was enforceable through a resolution being adopted by both Houses of Parliament.⁴ The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1973 altered this; tribes or individuals ordered to move would no

¹Department of Statistics, 6 May 1970. Report 02-05-01. Quoted in Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 37.

²*KwaZulu Economic Revue* 1975. Compiled by the Bureau of Economic Research re Bantu Development at the request of the KwaZulu Government. Benbo No. 20375 15 BNO 909063 02 (Pretoria: 1976).

³Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p.14.

⁴*House of Assembly Debates*, 19 April 1972. Cols. 5281-5282.

longer have recourse to Parliament if they objected. The 1973 Act laid down that before issuing a removal order the Minister was to consult with the African Government concerned. During the second reading the Deputy Minister conceded that "consultation", and not necessarily 'agreement", was all that would be required, and it was made possible for the Government to reserve, for African occupation or ownership, land in an urban area which is surrounded by, or adjoins, a scheduled or released African area.¹

Consolidating land set aside for ethnic groups has involved the clearing of so-called "Black spots", patches of land acquired by Africans prior to 1936 which are surrounded by White-owned farms. This process has been slower in Natal than elsewhere, one of the reasons being that land in these spots is much sub-divided and it has sometimes been difficult to trace all the owners.²

"Closer Settlement Areas" have been established in the homelands to cater for families rendered landless by the elimination of "Black spots". Villages grow in "Closer Settlement Areas" as families settle near each other. Such villages may also be planned to cater for the overflow from tribal areas, for those endorsed out of towns, for squatter labour tenants or for old people required to

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 15 February 1973. Col. 2.

²Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Development in a speech to the Senate, 28 May 1969. See also Horrell, *The African Reserves of South Africa*, p. 19.

leave the farms of Whites.

The problem in KwaZulu is exacerbated since about 400 000 Africans (and this is a conservative figure) have been "phased-out" of the labour-tenant system from farms of Whites in Natal. This has resulted in considerable pressure from displaced families for Chiefs inside the reserve areas to accept these "nomad" families into their already overcrowded tribal reserves. Unless these former tenants can find full-time jobs on farms elsewhere and are allowed to take their families and cattle with them, they qualify only for the small plot of land in a resettlement village. The problem is further complicated by the fact that families are being removed from areas designated White to resettlement areas in Bantu Trust Land which are also, at present, White-controlled. The KwaZulu Government is therefore powerless to take any action. In an article entitled "Ghost Village", Tim Muil drew attention to the embitterment and resentment which resulted from the implementation of the Separate Development policy through "Black spot" removals. In effect this has meant whole communities of Africans being moved from one place to another.¹

Interviewed on the effects of these removals, Buthelezi said that "there is here unfolding one of those

¹*Natal Mercury*, date unknown.

great human tragedies for which South Africa is becoming well-known. Thousands of evicted Zulu are wandering homeless through northern Natal and Zululand, a great 'black trek', preferring to keep on the move than lose their cattle".¹

Each family in a closer settlement area is allocated a small plot of land, about one-fifth hectare, too small to grow maize in sufficient quantities or to keep livestock. Those removed from "Black spots" must dispose of their cattle and those moved are paid compensation for immovable property. Owners of 17 hectares or more are offered alternative land in the homeland; those occupying less move to a closer settlement area.² Many of these settlements have no economic foundation, though this may gradually develop. There are limited opportunities for local employment and most of the younger people seek work as migrant labourers and leave their families behind. Sometimes the barest minimum of facilities is provided in the new settlement areas, sometimes none as happened at the resettlement area of Limehill, to the south-east of Dundee and Glencoe in an area adjoining the Msinga Reserve. This first removal led to a country-wide protest because advance preparations for those who were to be resettled in the new area were totally inadequate and much hardship

¹*Sunday Times*, 18 April 1971.

²Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 137-138.

was endured.

Invariably the work of resettlement is undertaken by the women who do the moving and erecting of huts because the men are away in employment. Prefabricated houses, if available, may be bought or rented, or plots on which residents may erect their own houses may be bought and paid for over a number of years. Destitute families are allowed rent-free dwellings. Invariably these settlements are inhabited by women and children, old people and the disabled. Gradually conditions improve and minimum facilities are provided, but there is much poverty.¹

"Black spot" removals have presented innumerable difficulties and it was necessary to appoint a Commissioner for each such spot in an attempt to ascertain which people were entitled to compensatory land. The issue was complicated by plans for the development of Richards Bay, for the establishment of a projectile site at St. Lucia, and for building the Strydom Dam at Josini. Resultant alterations in the boundaries of certain reserves caused considerable confusion. Besides clearing "Black spots", various isolated smaller scheduled areas, or portions of such areas that jut out into White farming areas, are gradually being eliminated. In some cases these are being exchanged for White-owned land adjoining existing homelands.

¹Tim Muil, African Affairs Correspondent, *Natal Mercury*, in an interview with the writer.

Buthelezi, in his inaugural address when the Zulu Territorial Authority was created in 1970, and again in 1972, indicated that a meaningful state could only be created in terms of Government-stated policy if KwaZulu was provided with more land to consolidate the state.¹ The Prime Minister maintained that he was not prepared to grant any more land than that promised in 1936, but that leaders could ask for full independence even before this land had been allocated.² Outstanding quota land would be added when the Republican Government had money available to buy it from Whites. Buthelezi is reported to have issued a statement, signed by all the members of his Executive Council, arguing that land promised in the 1936 Lands Act was promised long before the Nationalist policy of setting up separate Black states had been enunciated, and at a time when it was never envisaged that these reserves should become viable foreign states. Population pressures then were infinitely less than at present.³ It was, therefore, not realistic to set up an "independent" country in the way envisaged, by the consolidation plans. Blacks were not prepared to participate in a scheme "to defraud us by asking for

¹*Rand Daily Mail*, 4 April 1972.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 19 April 1972, Cols. 5281-5282.

³*Rand Daily Mail*, 22 and 26 April 1972, and Horrell, *African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 20.

so-called independence before land consolidation, and without the purchase of foreign territories within our boundaries".¹

During June 1972, draft plans for the consolidation of KwaZulu were released as a basis for discussion at public hearings and a "final" consolidation plan, accompanied by a memorandum, was published on 27 April 1973.² These proposals entailed adding 28 pieces of land owned by White farmers or the state to KwaZulu to round off the boundaries or join smaller reserves to one another. Forty small isolated reserves or outlying parts of scheduled areas were to be excised, involving, in time, the removal of approximately 133 000 Africans. (The number of Whites affected was not stated.) These arrangements meant transferring 300 000 hectares of African land to Whites, and the addition of 463 000 hectares, including 227 000 hectares promised in 1936, to KwaZulu. Some of the 239 000 hectares offered to the homeland was to be taken from state-owned territory, and the remainder was to be purchased from White farmers.³ Approximately 30 000 hectares remained in accordance with the 1936 Act to be

¹*Diamond Fields Advertiser*, 29 April 1972.

²Final Consolidation Plans recommended by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Bantu Affairs, 27 April 1973. See Horrell, *African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 21.

³Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 93.

held for future corrections and minor adjustments to the boundaries.¹ Mr. Botha stressed that in future it would be possible for Black and White Governments to exchange land, and even theoretically possible for Black Governments to buy land from the White Government. The former Minister therefore stated that he was reserving a small surface per province for minor adjustments and corrections. In debate he acknowledged that KwaZulu was not satisfied and he defended its scattered geography by saying that while it was not consolidation in the real meaning of the word, it did not mean that KwaZulu could not be an independent state. He rejected suggestions that the 1936 Land Act contained no political content for the Blacks, and reminded the House that General Hertzog had, at the time, said that Blacks could ultimately have control over their own areas.²

Press comment when the plans were first published in 1972 suggested that they made a mockery of Separate Development which was thereby deprived of all morality.³ The Zulu people, it was said, were being offered a geographical area criss-crossed by White corridors, tied to the migratory labour system and virtually isolated from the outside world. The inescapable conclusion was that the morality of Verwoerd's Separate Development had been

¹In terms of Government restrictions on public spending, announced in 1975, the purchase of further land for consolidation purposes was suspended.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 12-16 May 1975, Col. 6173.

³*Daily News*, 7 July 1972.

abandoned to expediency. "The future Zulu State would be nothing more than an impoverished satellite, dependent on White South Africa." "No nation, practically surrounded by White land, devoid of usable coastlines, with no earthly prospect of its own port, given no town or city of any consequence and with the best and most developed agricultural and industrial areas either outside or on its borders, can have much hope of future economic viability."

Chief Buthelezi and his Cabinet refrained from commenting on the grounds that "we find it unacceptable that we should not have been involved at all, as Black people, in the preparation of the draft".¹ In January 1973, all 6 KwaZulu Executive Councillors issued a statement claiming that Richards Bay, all the Zululand game reserves, and all State land in Zululand should form part of KwaZulu.² The Consolidation plan that had been officially proposed was not, the statement said, the result of a negotiated settlement, and if it was what Whites wanted, they "must impose it unilaterally". The Executive Councillors offered an alternative plan, recommending that the South African Government should give the disputed areas to KwaZulu and allow White property owners, if they so wished, to remain there under a Black Government. The South African Government was invited to

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 20.

²*Rand Daily Mail*, 18 and 19 January 1973.

test its consolidation plan by a referendum among all races in Natal and KwaZulu. On 7 June 1973, the Natal Provincial Council also rejected the consolidation proposals.

A few days earlier, on 4 June, the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development had moved, in the Assembly, that the proposals be adopted in order to facilitate the systematic purchase of remaining land promised in 1936 so that those concerned could be advised well in advance of land the Government proposed purchasing in the years ahead.¹ The Minister conceded that the areas were scattered and that it was not possible to achieve the ideal provision of one single territory for each homeland. Within the limits of the 1936 Act, however, the number of scattered areas would, as far as was feasible, be reduced. The situation, he intimated, called for "a policy of good neighbourliness based on mutual respect and a compromise in the areas of common concern to Black and White".

The Government acknowledged the need to spend large sums of money in compensation and in providing services in new areas allocated to Blacks. Where mining operations were in progress on land which was to become part of KwaZulu, the concessionaries would be allowed to continue

¹House of Assembly Debates, 4 June 1973, Cols. 8134-8141, 8275.

operations on an agency basis while rights to the land, but not mineral rights, would in due course be taken over by the homeland government concerned.¹ White farmers would eventually have to leave the new released areas, but projects such as afforestation schemes and sugar plantations would, where possible, be maintained by the responsible authorities.

A significant political comment came from Mr. A.J. Raubenheimer, former Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Development, subsequent to the acceptance by the White Government of these plans. "Future generations," he said, "will have to look at these again."² He refused, however, to make promises for the future in regard to affected areas, saying that such promises were "only for political purposes". Equally significant was a warning from Mr. N.H. Janson, also a former Deputy Minister, that not all Africans would have resettled in the homelands in 20 or 30 years and that "realism demanded the acceptance that the future of Black and White in South Africa was inseparable, and that co-operation was required in finding a compromise to avert the confrontation that loomed".

In opposing the proposals in Parliament, the Progressive Party reiterated its view that the Government

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 25.

²*Natal Mercury*, 5 July 1973.

must completely fulfil the obligations undertaken by the Government of 1936.¹ Indeed, it was on this principle that certain members of the United Party had broken away from that Party in 1959 and had formed the Progressive Party. More land was needed than originally promised, it said, in order to make feasible the concept of ultimate independence that had since been introduced.² Helen Suzman opposed the Select Committee's proposals because they involved extremely large-scale movements of Black people against the wishes of the homeland leaders and without achieving full consolidation. Her Party, she declared, envisaged a geographic federation on a non-racial basis, and until that time the existing reserves should be retained, and augmented, by the land promised in 1936.³

The United Party also opposed the plans and claimed that changed circumstances rendered the Government not bound by the 1936 land quotas. It feared entrusting further agricultural land to people possibly unable to successfully farm it, and recommended instead that land in the area of natural growth points should be added to the homelands so that employment opportunities could be created and home-ownership granted.⁴

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 3 June 1973, Cols. 8207-8216.

²Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p.25.

³*Op.cit.*, Cols. 8207-8216.

⁴*House of Assembly Debates*, 4 June 1973, Cols. 8143-8151.

Debate over the consolidation proposals lasted for almost three years. On 16 May 1975, the Government's "final" final consolidation plans were presented to Parliament and approved, with the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development rejecting criticism and amendments.¹ The proposals were virtually the same as those passed in 1973. Mr. Botha emphasized that this was the beginning of the "last round".² Certain minor matters would have to be referred to Parliament and he expected exchanges of land; but basically these proposals were the final ones. KwaZulu would henceforth comprise 10 fragmented Black areas in Natal in which the following main additions and excisions of territory were envisaged.

The Natal Parks Board will lose large tracts of land, including the Ndumu Game Reserve. The Kosi Bay Reserve will go to KwaZulu, as will a large section of the Umfolozi Game Reserve, a large slice of the Umfolozi-Hluhluwe Corridor, and the small Umtamvuma Reserve near Port Edward. The White Sordwana Bay area is to be increased by about 6 kilometres of coastline. A small triangular area with a wide base along the coastline at Sordwana Bay has been reserved for White occupation; the large portion of land bordering Mozambique running from

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 12-16 May 1975, Cols. 5929, 6195.

²*Ibid.*, Col. 6154.

Sordwana Bay northwest to Swaziland remains in Zulu hands, and includes Impendhle, Hlabisa, near Umfolozi, and Ulundi. Nongoma, Umbombo, Ingwavuma and Pomeroy will become part of KwaZulu. Eshowe will remain White but will be cut off from the coast by KwaZulu; Richards Bay, Empangeni, Mtonjaneni and Babanango will remain White, with White corridors to the coast. On the Tongaland coast the huge KwaZulu bloc will stretch to Mozambique and to Swaziland in the west; 60 000 rural Africans are to be moved from the Upper Tugela River and the Tugela Catchment area which will be a White area.¹ A large tract of land bordering on Lesotho in the south-west and stretching eastwards to the Bergville magisterial district is to be de-proclaimed a Black area. Only White territory would border Lesotho. (The inhabitants of the area have repeatedly vowed that they will not move.²) To the east, in the Estcourt district, locations number 1 and 2 have been enlarged to form a single unit by the addition of White-owned farmlands that will affect 87 White-owned farms. The new enlarged Drakensberg location will stretch to the magisterial boundary of Estcourt in the south and as far north as Frere and the railway line in the north east.³ Two small areas on the Drakensberg side of the locations have been reserved for White occupation, apparently on

¹*Natal Mercury*, 28 March 1975.

²*Ibid.*

³*Natal Mercury*, 15 May 1975.

the grounds of conservation. North of Ladysmith a large African homeland is to be excised, which will mean more resettlement of rural Africans. A very significant change in the final plan is the inclusion in KwaZulu of the corridor stretching from the Mkuzi Reserve in the South to the Mozambique border in the north. The 32 000 hectare Makatini Flats, including Josini in northern Zululand, goes to KwaZulu; it was formerly planned as an area for Black and White to share. It is not considered ideal for agriculture but the possibility of large-scale irrigation is expected to improve the conditions and large-scale sugar developments are considered feasible. An irrigation project planned for the area has, however, been shelved owing to uncertainty about the fertility of the Makatini Flats and, in addition, Swaziland demanded compensation for flooding that might have occurred.

In the south, Harding will remain White and will have access to the coast as a strip of land, formerly of KwaZulu, will be made White. Durban will remain cut off from the South Coast by the homeland which will reach to the coast at Umkomaas and Port Shepstone.¹

¹See Appendix I.

Map 8 shows the propositions published in 1973.

Map 9 illustrates the minor changes made in the "final" dispensation of 1975, and *Map 10* provides some detail of the Consolidation of the 3 Drakensberg African locations.

Map 12 is of the final homelands consolidation proposals for South Africa. *Map 11* is inserted to show the Bantustans' present 13% of the land area of South Africa and the larger consolidated areas the Bantustan leaders are themselves seeking.

Proposed plans also show that the Government has recognized the permanency of Natal's Dunn family, by entrenching, statutorily, their rights to their existing land north of Stanger. The Dunns are descendants of an early Natal pioneer, John Dunn, who became a Zulu chief and close friend of Cetshwayo. After the annexation by Britain, Dunn's territory at Mangete was recognized as a Native Reserve.¹ The family is now a Coloured clan, descendant of John Dunn and his many Zulu wives. In January 1976, the family was finally to receive title deeds to 4 070 hectares of land in the Mangete area of Zululand, made over to them by the Government of Natal of 1902. Up to this time they existed in an administrative no-man's land. Negotiations were subsequently instituted to establish a relationship between the clan and the Department of Coloured Affairs.²

A great volume of criticism attended the final approval of these consolidation proposals. The most cynical, perhaps, concerned the accusation that the criterion for some opposition was related to constituency support. For example, Mr. Bill Sutton, United Party Member of Parliament for Mooi River, pointed out that

¹*South African Dictionary of National Biography*, 1966, p. 106.

²*Natal Mercury*, 26 November 1975, and *Sunday Tribune*, 30 November 1975.

the 1973 plan had been strongly opposed by the Nationalist Member of Parliament for Klip River, Mr. Val Volker, because it would have involved the removal of many White farmers in his constituency. Mr. Volker had accepted the 1975 plans because there would now be no consolidation in his constituency. All the removals of White farmers were to take place in Mr. Sutton's constituency! There was also a prediction by local people in the Tugela Basin of outbreaks of inter-tribal violence and confrontation between feuding tribal factions. It was feared that the mass removal of Africans from the Upper Tugela Reserve to, presumably, the consolidated areas of the Drakensberg Reserves 1 and 2, would bring into contact the reputedly fierce and warlike aMangwane tribe from the north with the supposedly more docile and law-abiding Mtembu and Hlubi in the south. Although reliable population figures for the area are not available, it is estimated that the consolidated territory would be occupied by approximately 200 000 Africans.¹ It was feared, also, that the two big blocs of Zulu, one to the west and the other to the east of the Tugela River, would gradually merge and cut off Johannesburg from the sea. It was pointed out that a potentially foreign state, KwaZulu, would be established astride the main tributaries of the Tugela River and be

¹*Natal Mercury*, 31 March 1975, and *Daily News*, 10 March 1975, and 3 April 1975.

potentially in command of the projected Mooi-Bushman's-Tugela Scheme which is intended to supplement the water supply the Rand is to get from Natal. There is a fear that Estcourt would eventually "go Black" since the consolidation of locations 1 and 2 would form a bloc extending to the town's magisterial boundary. Mr. Barney Dladla, formerly Executive Councillor for Justice in KwaZulu, denied claims by White farmers that consolidation proposals posed a national security threat. He accused farmers of "putting into our minds something that does not exist at all". He considered it irresponsible to create suspicion, tension and misunderstanding between Black and White in regard to serious strategic problems.

He also denied claims of inter-tribal warfare in the Drakensberg, although he did admit that various factions likely to share a common area under the proposals had fought in the past. Mr. Dladla said the proposals did not give Africans enough land. "A fair division would be the Tugela. Let us have everything east of the Tugela. Those of us who are now on the west side would be quite happy to move and join our brothers across the river ... My support," he concluded, "goes to Chief Buthelezi when he says the Africans did not ask for Separate Development."¹

¹Ibid.

It was considered, too, that an African bloc west of the Tugela, in easy contact with Lesotho, posed a strategic threat despite the provision of a buffer area of about 30 kilometres wide of South African owned land between the proposed KwaZulu and Lesotho. Such a corridor, controlled by the South African Government and intended for conservation purposes, was in fact a corridor cut by hundreds of kloofs and almost impossible to police. It was felt that it thus afforded ample cover for guerrillas.¹ Dr. A.P. Treurnicht, Member of Parliament for Waterberg, requested that lines of communications, such as roads and telephone lines should, as far as possible, go through White areas to ensure a feeling of security for the people living there.²

There were criticisms that there was "cynical manipulation" by a Select Committee which dealt with the consolidation proposals. Mr. R.M. Cadman, the then Member for Zululand, reported that the Committee would not hear any evidence except that of the Department of Plural Relations, the requests of all other people having been turned down.³ Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert, Member of Parliament for Rondebosch, was of the opinion that the

¹*Daily News*, 5 March 1975, *Natal Mercury*, 3 July 1975, *Natal Mercury*, 11 September 1975, and SABC Radio Broadcast, 11 September 1975.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 12-16 May 1975, Col.5990.

³*Ibid.*, Col.5939. (See also *Daily News*, 15 March 1975).

Separate Development plan could never succeed on its present geographic basis.¹ He referred to the fact that the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Mr. Botha, had said that the territorial ideal for the homeland plan was one area for each homeland; he wondered whether the Government would continue working towards that ideal.

The overall reaction of local inhabitants to the Drakensberg proposals was that it was "monstrous".² Thousands of Zulu peasants would be reshuffled and an appreciable number of White farmers would be evicted. The proposal had superficial attractions in that it would reduce the number of KwaZulu fragments and move Whites as well as Blacks; it would "skim" Zulu peasants and squatter farmers with their "regrettable" farming practices off the higher catchment zones and move them to lower ground where "theoretically" they would do less damage to water resources, but it would do nothing to consolidate KwaZulu and would entrench the principle of fragmentation by placing a Zulu bloc in the middle of "White" Natal, thus making one of the fragments larger without making it economically more viable. The Minister's plan, it was considered, conflicted with Bantustan consolidation, with national security, with water conservation and with inter-

¹Ibid., Col. 6109.

²*Daily News*, 5 March 1975, and 16 May 1975.

racial *détente*. "At any mention of Mr. Botha's proposals White hackles rise and Blacks shrink into embarrassed silence."¹

The President of the Natal Agricultural Union, addressing the annual congress of the Union in Durban, referred to the Natal of the future, after KwaZulu had been excised, as a "moth-eaten doughnut"² which would have 790 kilometre external borders and 2 500 kilometres of internal boundaries within Kwa Zulu. Commenting on the unique situation he added, "It becomes almost bizarre when we learn that citizens of the separate areas of KwaZulu will be guaranteed transit rights through White Natal while presumably we may expect reciprocal rights through KwaZulu." The reality of the situation could only be visualized if it was believed that relations between White and Black would remain "of the highest order".

Buthelezi, for his part, has never deviated in his resistance to the 1936 Land Act as the basis of present-day consolidation proposals. KwaZulu, he said, must be consolidated into one unit, and he has demanded the area covering the territory originally occupied by the Zulu

¹*Daily News*, 5 March 1975.

²*Natal Mercury*, 11 September 1975. *SABC Report* 11 September 1975.

nation last century before it was "robbed by the Whites".¹ His people, he avers, had not wanted the dismembering of South Africa, but now that the Government had recreated homelands for the various Black nations, they should at least reflect the territories they once held. "We are faced with two alternatives," he asserts. "Either South Africa converts to one-man-one-vote, or it fully recreates the former homelands as consolidated, economically viable units." In this he is strenuously opposed by the powerful Natal Agricultural Union, since the additional land he wants would need to be excised from White-owned farms.

In addressing his KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on the land issue, Buthelezi said: "We can never accept the map which resembles the rags of a tattered quilt as a country for 4½ million Zulu people."² In regard to the Makatini Flats, including the Josini Dam, becoming part of KwaZulu, he cynically observed that "this can bluff only those who do not know that this area consists in the main of State land ... the use of State land for consolidation would seem to be an attempt to placate White voters by touching as little of their land as possible ..." He has said that rumours that the

¹ *Argus*, 18 January 1973. *Daily News*, 5 June 1973. *Daily News*, 17 March 1975, and 1 April 1975.

² Reported in the *House of Assembly Debates*, 12-16 May 1975, Col. 5987, and quoted in the *Sunday Times Magazine*, 21 September 1975.

Makatini Flats have been "fobbed off upon us was because it comprised mainly 'brack' soil which is not productive when I see no outcry about giving such good soil to 'savages' who cannot farm, I begin to wonder if the rumours are true". Buthelezi wants consolidation to include the harbour at Richards Bay and Sordwana Bay, and the White "Corridors" which include the towns of Eshowe, Empangeni and Melmoth. He has refused to accept the allocated "dots" as a country and so sign away "our birthright as South Africans for meaningless rights in KwaZulu which will only serve to legalize our position as pariahs for ever". He does not consider his attitude a matter of confrontation. It is one of "commonsense". The White Government's response to Buthelezi has been that it "is for KwaZulu to make better use of the land at its disposal".¹ To such intransigence Buthelezi has offered equal sternness and he has said in a discussion with former Deputy Minister Mr. A.J. Raubenheimer that if Natal was to be divided, he could not conceive of a Zulu State that did not include Durban.²

In October 1976, the Chairman of the Economic Development Corporation, formerly the Bantu Investment Corporation, Dr. S.P. du Toit Viljoen, postulated a new geographic dispensation for KwaZulu. He proposed that

¹*Natal Mercury*, 19 April 1975.

²*Natal Mercury*, 16 May 1975.

all the territory between the Tugela and the Pongola Rivers be given to KwaZulu, with the exception of the Richards Bay-Empangeni complex, which he suggests could be a White-Black condominium. These, according to du Toit Viljoen, are the historical boundaries of the Zulu kingdom at the zenith of its power, and it could be argued that South Africa was merely restoring to the Zulu the country annexed by Britain nearly a century ago.¹

An impasse on the consolidation proposals has now been reached. These proposals have generated much agonized discussion involving angry and worried White farmers, conservationists and a reluctant and cynical KwaZulu Government. They have done little to make possible a fully independent, economically viable, internationally recognized KwaZulu - and nothing more can be done without revision of the provisions of the 1936 Land Act. The present proposals provide for no more than partial consolidation, and in so doing have significantly hindered progress in several directions. A fragmented KwaZulu has difficulty in formulating development plans, and home-owners and farmers, threatened with removals, do little or nothing to maintain or improve their properties. KwaZulu has gained some additional farmland, not all of it arable, but natural resources in the new areas remain in the control of Whites. There is little access to the

¹*Daily News*, 22 October 1976.

sea, or to South Africa's roads. With such a land base a future Zulu state would be destined to remain immutably South Africa's vassal. Any interaction between Kwazulu and South Africa would be with South Africa dominant, and to Kwazulu's long-term detriment.

CHAPTER 3PART IIIDEVELOPMENT

This chapter describes the political entity known as KwaZulu. If a decade ago there was no such thing as KwaZulu, with hindsight and determinist logic one can confidently say that the correct "mix" of White and Black history was present for it to be created. The first two sections of this chapter have detailed the political and historical components of that creation and have described the geographic entity. This section carries the analysis a step further; having excised the region politically and geographically from the Republic of South Africa, the need arises to imbue the entity with an independent economic and social existence (which is to be distinguished from the ability to exist independently). A description of KwaZulu's politics warrants a chapter of its own, and is the subject of Chapter 4.

(A) KWAZULU'S FINANCES

KwaZulu is almost completely dependent on Republican Government finances. Very little is generated within

KwaZulu.¹ Agriculture is the foremost activity, but it is subsistence and largely non-commercial. Industrialization has hardly commenced and commerce is insignificant as the country lacks the facilities and infrastructure that motivate industrial and commercial enterprises elsewhere. There is an absence of rural co-operatives, private banks and finance corporations; there is little electric power or piped drinking water, and transport facilities are limited.

Although the main source of budget finance for KwaZulu is the Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, the homeland government is not consulted when the allocations are made. In February 1975, it had been moved in Parliament that such consultation should be provided for. The Government rejected the suggestion on the grounds that such a concession implied giving Black governments a say in the affairs of the Republic. The determination of amounts to be paid, it was held, was a domestic matter and depended on whether the amounts were available or not.²

The provision of resources for development work in

¹See Appendix II for table of income generated internally and money received from the Republican Government.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 10 February 1975, Cols. 522-526, 533, 535 and 468.

regard to land acquisition, consolidation and a number of social services in the African reserves has been the responsibility of the South African Bantu Trust which was created by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. Each year Parliament allocates sums of money on the revenue and loans votes of the Department of Plural Relations and Development, to be paid to the Trust as grants-in-aid. A Corporation for Economic Development was established in 1959 by the Bantu Trust to be responsible for promoting investment, especially by Africans, in the homelands.

The Bantu Homelands Development Corporation Act (86/1965) empowered the Minister of Plural Relations and Development to establish a development corporation to plan and promote economic development and the general welfare and advancement of each homeland and its people. According to this Act, such a corporation could itself undertake projects, or help Africans to do so. Each corporation was to be managed by a Board of Directors appointed by the Minister to exercise its powers in an urban area surrounded by the homeland which it serves, but not in an urban area intended for occupation or ownership by non-Africans. The Directors are White, it is non-profit making and shares are held by the South African Bantu Trust. The Corporation may borrow "White" money, call for tenders and employ agents who are allowed a reasonable return on their capital to develop specific projects.

In 1968, the Government set up more specialized agencies through the "Promotion of Economic Development of Homelands Act" No. 461/1968, which empowered the State President to establish corporations for any industrial, commercial, financial, mining or other business undertaking in the homelands.¹ These corporations have White directors appointed by the Minister and may have advisory boards with appointed African members, selected in consultation with the African Government or Bantu authority with jurisdiction in the area concerned. The corporations are subject to the directions of the Bantu Trust, and the Corporation for Economic Development is the co-ordinating body and acts as the Trust's economic instrument. Whites may be employed as Agents or Contractors by the Trust under certain conditions which protect homeland residents, and it was pointed out that conventional considerations of profit should not be applied to projects in the homelands or to a corporation undertaking development projects. The provision of work is considered as important as high profits.

In 1972 Buthelezi, after a visit overseas, called for the right of homeland governments to negotiate loans directly with overseas agencies, not through the agency of the South African Government, in order to avoid accusations that the foreign governments concerned were,

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 71.

by aiding KwaZulu, furthering the policy of Apartheid. In 1973 the Government responded with the Bantu Laws Amendment Act which empowered homeland governments to raise public loans from external sources.

The Corporation for Economic Development and the Mining Corporation have a major responsibility in providing the industry and commercial enterprise necessary to make the homeland more self-sufficient. The White-dominated agencies have become the major source of capital and they make most of the decisions relating to developmental priorities. Broad policy guidelines emanate from the Prime Minister and Cabinet subject to parliamentary approval. The actual operations are performed by administrators of departments of the South African Government, the development corporations and homeland governments; decisions are therefore implemented, and directions for development are determined, by this bureaucracy.

The Central Government deals, through the expansion of the functions of the homeland government and increases in their spending, with problems arising from the impoverished condition of the homeland. In 1965 the Department of Plural Relations assumed responsibility for capital expenditure for hospitals and for major items of medical equipment and maintenance. In 1970 it assumed control of health services and hospitals and in 1973 of

mission hospitals. As health departments are created this responsibility will be transferred to the homeland government. Substantial sums are being devoted to the creation of townships and to providing various facilities within them such as housing, business and sports facilities. This activity is under the aegis of the Bantu Trust and the Corporation for Economic Development.

Expenditure in KwaZulu rose from R73 141 311 in 1974/75 to R101 669 300 in 1976/77 and in every department there is a steady growth. The areas in which most expansion has occurred are "Works" and "Education". In the former the increase is due to the establishment of townships, and this is a controversial area. Township development is related to the resettlement policy which seeks to reduce the number of Africans on White farms and in the common areas. Many Blacks are resentful of what to them is undue expenditure in pursuit of an ideology. The result is a conflict over developmental priorities.

Because employment opportunities are scarce, the majority of able-bodied workers seek employment in the White sectors, and a subsistence economy is sustained in the main by women, dependent males and the elderly. Wages from commuter and migrant labour constitute the greater portion of income from homeland citizens. Over $\frac{1}{4}$ of Zulu income comes from absentee labour, which is a measure of the low level of development and productivity

within the homeland.¹ It is reported that whatever modest growth occurs in homeland average incomes is due to the increased earnings of absentee labour. The average yearly *per capita* income from internal sources grew from R28,4 to R34,7 between 1960 and 1973; average yearly *per capita* income earned inside KwaZulu rose to R92,0 when commuter income was considered. If all migrant income is added, the average income becomes R145,0. The average *per capita* income of all Africans in South Africa in 1973 was R166,0.² The gap between income in the homelands and African incomes in the Republic is, however, partially closed by unmeasured subsistence income.

Income statistics for 1973 show that estimated combined income earned by homeland residents in that year was R79,7 million. By contrast, the gross domestic product of the Republic of South Africa in 1972 was R15,3 billion, to which the homeland contributed less than 1%.³ The income of permanently absent Zulu in 1973 was R368,3 million. It has been estimated that all commuter incomes, $\frac{1}{5}$ of migrant incomes and $\frac{1}{20}$ of earnings of *de jure* citizens living permanently in the White areas, are remitted to the homelands. White average yearly income

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 124-126, 136.

²Ibid, p. 130.

³Ibid., pp. 124-126.

is 13 times as great as that of Black.¹ Comparisons of KwaZulu expenditure with South African expenditure indicate the magnitude of the discrepancy in South Africa between amenities available to Whites and those available to Blacks.²

The KwaZulu Government has imposed a *per capita* tax of R3 which is collected for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by the Government of the Republic from permanently absent persons. This personal tax and township rental constitute significant sources of internal revenue. Remaining income comes from licensing fees and income from small charges for public services undertaken by government departments.

Of the economically active section in the KwaZulu homeland in 1975 the majority work in the agricultural sector (66%).³ Other important sources of employment are the service industry (11,8%), which employs mostly women, commerce (4,8%), and the manufacturing and construction industries (9,4%) where mostly men are employed. In the White areas, 30,8% of the economically active Black

¹Sprocas Commission, *Power Privilege and Property* (1972). Appendices B and C, pp. 115-117. Quoted in Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 131.

²See Appendix II for selected comparisons.

³*KwaZulu Economic Review* 1975, p. 31. Source for these figures: South Africa. Department of Statistics, Population Census 1970. Report No. 02-02-92. (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1973).

population is employed in agriculture, 30,2% in the services sector, 15,9% in the manufacturing industry and 9,2% in commerce. As far as the total Zulu economically active population is concerned, 44,7% is employed in agriculture, 23,0% in the services sector, and 13,3% in the manufacturing industry.

The public sector is responsible for virtually all of the capital formation in the homeland although the agency system does bring some White investment to the growth points. Most of this spending comes from the Bantu Trust but the homeland government is increasingly engaged in expenditure for housing and other capital items.¹

Funds at the disposal of KwaZulu are disbursed according to objective and through the medium of 6 departments. These are the Departments of Authority Affairs and Finance, Community Affairs, Works, Education, Agriculture and Forestry and Justice.² Provincial governments and departments of the Central Government also make some investment in housing and infrastructure.

¹See Appendix IV for a chart of the KwaZulu Expenditure Budget.

²See Appendix III for a comparison of the funding of KwaZulu government departments and South African government departments.

Until 1975/76 the Republic's contribution to KwaZulu's budget was composed of a statutory grant based on the cost of services at the time of their transfer to the homeland government, and additional grants determined annually and drawn from the consolidated fund.¹ In addition, the Department of Plural Relations paid a supplementary amount representing general overhead expenditure such as the salaries of White officials.

For some time homeland leaders have demanded greater fiscal security and the recognition of their claim to certain sources of income which they consider to be their due. In 1974 a change in the formula whereby funds were allocated to the homelands partly met this demand. The change involved the transfer of some indirect taxes such as customs and excise, certain sales tax on goods consumed by Blacks, and taxes paid by companies in homelands and possibly in border areas, whether controlled by Blacks or not. Supplementary amounts would be paid to meet any costs occasioned by the subsequent transfer of any programme to the homeland. The changes were incorporated in the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1975. The overall effect was the raising of the regular amounts which were paid to the homeland and the reduction of the discretionary additional grant. This new arrangement could help reduce

¹See Appendix V containing a Table of Republican grants to KwaZulu from 1974-1977, and a comparison with grants to Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

homeland dependency, but it does not empower the homeland government to tax South African companies operating within homeland boundaries. These companies will continue to be taxed by the South African Government which will remit taxes collected to the homeland. Mineral royalties will continue to be paid by the companies to the tribal and regional authorities, and to the Bantu Trust.¹

It seems certain that only a major shift in policy that would permit the homeland to tax White businesses and mines and allow it to collect income taxes from its absentee population could create a situation of greater fiscal independence for the homeland. This is unlikely to happen and it is estimated that the homeland will continue to receive a substantial portion of its revenue from the Central Government for at least the next 20 years. Relying on funds that are beyond its control is a significant factor hindering the political and economic independence of the homeland.²

¹Ibid., p. 143.

²Ibid., p. 145. See Appendix V, in which allocations by the Central Government to homelands which respond favourably to its policy imperatives are compared with allocations to KwaZulu.

(B) AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is the basis of the KwaZulu economy and its practice is the central feature of "national life". Yet the area is crippled by malnutrition and poverty.¹ For various reasons the factors that have shaped the progress of agriculture in recent decades in the Republic have had little effect on the traditional subsistence economy of the homelands. Although 30% of the Black South African population lives and works on White farms, their exposure to modernizing techniques has been of little benefit in their own areas. The backwardness of homeland agriculture, it seems, must in consequence be explained by the unique structure of that society and not be a disinterested unresponsiveness on the part of the African. Low productivity and stagnation in homeland agriculture are attributable in the main to inadequate modern inputs and poor infrastructure, to obstructive land tenure and labour practices and to shortcomings in teaching programmes and the absence of their extension to farming populations.²

There are 3 agencies concerned with formulating

¹G. Maasdorp, *Economic Development Strategy in the African Homelands. The Role of Agriculture and Industry*. South African Institute of Race Relations (Johannesburg, 1974), pp. 12-16.

²Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 180 and 191.

plans and implementing agricultural policy in KwaZulu. The homeland government itself is concerned with training and extension work, advising on agricultural methods and with erosion and grazing controls; the Department of Plural Relations advocates traditional policies including betterment; and the Corporation for Economic Development concerns itself with large-scale projects.

There are inherent weaknesses in the construction of African society which affect its agriculture.¹ Traditional agricultural practices depend for their success on an abundant supply of land, and Africans have not been able to adapt to a relative land scarcity, nor have they adapted to intensive farming methods. Tim Muil observes that many Zulu have been resistant to current approaches to agricultural planning and to the propagation of improved methods aimed at the promotion of productivity.² He bears out Maasdorp's observations that although progress is being made, the picture remains one of largely subsistence farming with little production of cash crops for the market, a small proportion of commercial livestock sales, inefficient methods and low yields compared with the agriculture of Whites. Overstocking of the land leads to soil erosion and declining land productivity is exacerbated by increasing

¹Horrell, *The African Reserves of South Africa*, p. 32.

²*Natal Mercury*, 29 June 1974.

population pressure. A significant factor is the lack of capital and credit facilities, an absence of developed markets for produce, and a lack of transportation. And compounding an already complex issue is the absence of male labour.

Land tenure and agriculture problems are presently the subject of investigation by the KwaZulu Government. The incompatibility between the tribal system of land tenure and the requirements of progress have become very obvious. Holdings have become so subdivided that modern techniques are almost impossible to apply. Resistance has come from chiefs, and from tribesmen who oppose the chiefs. Many still lack confidence in Government officials and modern techniques, and chiefs who fear losing authority are reluctant to co-operate with each other. The result is opposition to the KwaZulu Government's attempts to pay for expertise, to form buying co-operatives, and to pool experience, effort and costs. Thus, although traditional and anti-modernistic factors are involved, there are national motivations which make agriculture very difficult.¹

Tribal tradition has put a brake on progress. Basically pastoralists with a martial past, the Zulu regard arable cultivation as traditionally the work of

¹Interview with Professor L. Schlemmer.

women, ploughing being the exception.¹ With no marketing system, selling takes place on the roadside or in the kraal, and production is aimed at the support of the family regardless of the suitability of soil or climate; the farmer cultivates what contributes to the families' staple diet. Semi-starvation may not therefore be merely the result of ignorance, but indirectly it could, in part, be attributable to monoculture, for example sugar or maize.²

Government settlement schemes have aggravated the problem. Overpopulation is worsened as Black spots are eliminated and more people are moved into the homeland areas. In any event, land that is allocated often remains unproductive while the men work in the cities where salaries exceed returns they might earn from their agricultural labours. The insecurity of tenure in the cities contributes to the retention of unproductive land in the tribal area, and a vicious circle results. According to Nattrass there is fear of being endorsed out, or if a husband dies, a wife fears the loss of her town home. (The latter has changed since January 1975, and widows no longer are compelled to give up their homes in urban townships.)

¹Ibid.

²Professor Jill Nattrass speaking to the Winter School on "Focus on KwaZulu", Natal University (July 1974).

Although Shepstone acknowledged the need to modernize African farming, it was only in 1929 that the Native Affairs Department established a technical agricultural service. Tomlinson drew attention to the fact that only after World War II was any real effort made to train technical personnel and provide funds. In terms of agriculture, therefore, the priority in KwaZulu is training and a slow start has been made. The Cwaka Agricultural College near Empangeni is designed to train conservation extension officers and it is intended to start agricultural schools to enable boys to matriculate in agriculture. Less formal training centres, to which men and women can go for short courses in husbandry, mixed farming, sugar culture, irrigation and selected other fields, have been established. These centres are staffed by Zulu and the cost is met by the KwaZulu Government. General schemes are being devised by the Corporation for Economic Development for improving the quality of stock and the setting up of marketing facilities.¹ Road-making machinery and agricultural machinery are being presented to local authorities where needed, and the co-operative movement is being given special attention.²

KwaZulu, according to the KwaZulu Economic Review,

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 75.

²*Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975.

is considered to have a high agricultural potential, and consolidation plans have facilitated planned utilization of new land "rather than the replanning of existing over-utilized land".¹ Of the 18,7% of KwaZulu which is arable only 12,1% is being utilized. This compares favourably with the arability co-efficient for the Republic as a whole. The area used as irrigable land will be enlarged as irrigation schemes such as the J.G. Strydom Dam serving the Makatini Flats comes into operation. Potential forestry makes up 4,7% of the total area but only $\frac{1}{6}$ is being utilized. The total gross value of agricultural and timber production for 1968/73 increased by 43,2%. Beef farming made the greatest contribution to stock production. KwaZulu is pre-eminently suitable for extensive stock-breeding and the gross value could be increased considerably by the introduction of more effective marketing and veterinary services, yet the livestock count in KwaZulu for the period 1968/73 has remained fairly static.² Horticulture and crop production could be increased, especially by irrigation.

Inevitably planning is restricted through the need to resettle people evicted from Black spots. The ideal situation would be the re-allocation of arable land to

¹*KwaZulu Economic Review* 1975, p. 39. Source: KwaZulu: Department of Agriculture Annual Reports 1971/73.

²*Ibid.*

those genuinely motivated to becoming successful agriculturists, while encouraging those less interested to migrate to other forms of economic activity. However, with overcrowded housing in cities, influx control and other urban problems, there is little hope of an exodus from the land.¹ Schlemmer has drawn attention to the fact that owing to the many social evils arising from the quality of township life, many migrant labourers are fearful of bringing their families to the urban areas and thus exposing them to these undesirable influences.² The answer could, in part, lie in the settlement of people in rural townships. That, however, is dependent upon the speed of decentralized job-creation, in itself a formidable task. The KwaZulu Government is bringing whatever influence it has to bear on creating such opportunities.

It should be emphasized, however, that agriculture cannot provide a solution to homeland development problems, not because African peasants are poor farmers or because efficient agriculture necessitates large-scale removals from the land, but because of the fundamental issue of a highly unequal distribution of land

¹Urban conditions will be discussed as a separate issue.

²Professor L. Schlemmer, Director of the Centre of Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, in an address entitled "Christian Ministry at a Time of Crises" Symposium, Durban, 4 August 1976.

in South Africa.¹ A shortage of land and capital and an erratic supply of able men necessitate specific developmental strategies. The KwaZulu Cabinet is alert to this fact and is to initiate and sponsor a financial aid fund for farmers, to make agriculture compulsory in all schools, and to establish a number of agricultural technical high schools.² Of far-reaching effect is the decision to make it compulsory for all sons of Zulu chiefs to undergo agricultural training. In the increasing need for basic skills in any economic expansion, the chief's sons will be of special value to the nation. As national leaders they will be in a position to speed up the transformation of a fundamentally pastoral society into a diversified conglomerate of industry, agriculture and mining.

The KwaZulu Government is preparing development pilot schemes in many areas and has plans for a multi-faceted project which will provide roads, clinics, water supplies and other facilities in co-operation with the local people. This is encouraging "planned development", from which it is hoped agriculture will benefit.

Given the rudimentary nature of the KwaZulu

¹In Schlemmer's view agriculture can never compete with industrialization. Agricultural development will therefore suffer. (Professor L. Schlemmer in an interview with the writer.) See also Maasdorp, *Economic Development Strategy in the African Homelands*, p. 13.

²*Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975.

infrastructure, the relative lack of sophistication of homeland Zulu and, most importantly, the channelling of the most productive efforts of the Zulu into the "White" economy and into development in "White" South Africa, it is doubtful that meaningful progress can be made. The view of KwaZulu as discrete from South Africa does not mean approval of separation. Indeed, whether development and modernization of South Africa's rural areas is viewed as such, or as nation-building, is immaterial to the need for such advancement. Yet, as a peripheral area, KwaZulu's development can be expected to lag while the core area needs the labour of its able-bodied and declines to share the product of such labour.

(C) COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

It is recognized that development of the homeland cannot depend exclusively on the agricultural sector. Yet commerce and secondary industry are still rudimentary. Even in the larger settlements there is a lack of the business activity that is usually considered necessary to satisfy just the routine needs of residents. There are many reasons for this, an important one being that opportunities for Black businessmen are circumscribed by political, financial, social, legal and educational

limitations.¹

In 1959 the Corporation for Economic Development was established to encourage homeland industrial and commercial development. Over the years it has become a many-faceted industrial enterprise and has assumed various responsibilities. One of its functions is the granting of loans to Blacks to enable them to establish themselves in businesses of various kinds, and loans have been granted to manufacturers, dealers, butchers, cafe proprietors, bottle store owners, and operators of bus services. Applications are carefully investigated, since loans are granted with limited security, and despite official guidance and advice, the risk factor is high.² Such scrutiny has led homeland leaders to complain about the control over homeland development maintained by Government-appointed corporations.

The Tomlinson Commission's recommendations that White entrepreneurs be allowed into the homelands to assist in establishing industries there and on their borders was finally acceded to in 1968 with the passing of the Promotion of Economic Development of Homelands Act, No. 46 of 1968. This Act enabled White investors to

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 209.

²Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 115-116.

set up concerns in the homelands on an agency basis, and concessions available in homeland growth points are slightly more advantageous than those offered in border industrial areas. In KwaZulu the main selected growth point is Isithebe, near Mandini, where key White personnel are housed and which is situated about halfway between Durban and Richards Bay. In May 1973, the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development indicated that large sums of money had been allocated to the area. In 1975 it was reported that Isithebe had been partly developed by the Bantu Investment Corporation at a cost of R3 million with a small amount of foreign investment also occurring.¹

In his Policy Speech to the Legislative Assembly in May 1976, Buthelezi reported the following KwaZulu industrial development: "At Isithebe Industrial Area, 12 industries providing employment for 61 Whites and 883 Blacks have been established which have the benefit of the existing infrastructure. This industrial estate is being increased four-fold so as to accommodate more industries in the near future. In the rest of KwaZulu, 8 industries providing employment for 23 Whites and 1 152 Blacks have been established. Ezakheni, near Ladysmith, has been approved as an industrial growth point, and more

¹G. Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands*. South African Institute of Race Relations (Johannesburg: 1974).

industries will in due course arise there. Other growth points are being investigated. The development of industries in KwaZulu was essential to provide employment and incomes for Zulu people, and also to help to further diversify the KwaZulu economy."¹ It was anticipated that Ulundi, the new capital, would provide industrial potential in the heart of KwaZulu on the new railway line to Richards Bay 144 kilometres away. The port, which cost Pretoria R252 million, was officially opened on 1 April 1976. (By mid-1978 no industrial development had yet taken place in Ulundi.)

Although Buthelezi has rejected the idea of independence under present conditions and has said that he regards the KwaZulu Government functions as little more than local administrators, he favours a planned economy and a KwaZulu Planning Committee is in existence. Its function is to examine the causes of KwaZulu's continuing underdevelopment, its present role in the South African economy, its long-term goals, the policies it proposes to adopt to take account of its peripheral situation *vis-à-vis* the core country, its urbanization policy, its employment strategy and its deployment of labour in industry, agriculture and the service sectors, the extent

¹M.G. Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech to KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (Ulundi: May 1976), p. 34. See Appendix VI which shows a comparison of trading licences in KwaZulu granted in 1975/76 and 1976/77 which show the type of commercial activity in KwaZulu and its rate of increase.

to which it should concentrate on labour intensive methods of production in industry and agriculture and its wage policy if employment creation is to be encouraged.¹

In 1976 plans were made for the organization of a KwaZulu Development Corporation. There was some delay in proclaiming this Corporation while the KwaZulu Government was establishing the framework within which it would operate. KwaZulu does not have a department of industry and commerce and control over industrial policy rests with White authorities, particularly with the corporations. KwaZulu had little influence over corporation decisions, except in the granting of trading rights to enable Africans to establish businesses, and Buthelezi was concerned. "We find it difficult," he explained, "to have a corporation if it is not going to have industrial and agricultural functions."²

Tim Muil, in an interview, expanded further. Pretoria, it appeared, was against homeland control of industrial development on an agency basis and against homeland control of agricultural and transport development. The reason given related to an apparent insufficiency of experts in these fields, which in turn precluded the

¹Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands* (1974), *Economic Development Strategy in the African Homelands* (1974), *An Economic Development Strategy for KwaZulu* (1974) and *Focus on KwaZulu* (1975).

²Buthelezi (19), *Policy Speech* (May 1976), p. 35.

homeland from having its own expert officers and advisers. Control then would remain with Pretoria and the homeland would take over the present functions of the Corporation of Economic Development, that is, arrange housing loans, loans to businessmen and tripartite agreements. It would have control only over commercial enterprises and small-scale endeavours. What was apparently envisaged with the homeland development corporation concept was the transfer to homeland governments of control of the Corporation of Economic Development structure. Buthelezi was reluctant to accept such a compromise for political reasons. He believes that he must have greater control over development in KwaZulu.

Muil is of the opinion that the claim of insufficient experts to assist the homeland is a political subterfuge. If Buthelezi had control he could, in fact, find developers. They could be brought in from elsewhere, perhaps even on short-term contracts. Development experts are available at Natal University, and he specifically mentions Maasdorp and Schlemmer.

Presumably there has been compromise on both sides, for it was decided that, on 1 April 1978, the KwaZulu Development Corporation would come into operation.¹ It will have a R18 million budget for its first year. The

¹*Natal Mercury*, 7 April 1978.

KwaZulu Government has no shares (the South African Bantu Trust is the only shareholder) but appoints 50% of the board members. All the Zulu directors are members of the Legislative Assembly. Decisions made for KwaZulu in the past by the Corporation for Economic Development will now be taken by the local board without reference to Pretoria. The KwaZulu Corporation will derive its money from the Bantu Trust, from funds it generates itself and from loan capital.

Its functions will be largely commercial but will include the establishment of small-scale industries and the financing of small farmers. The 3 major spheres of development, transport, agriculture and the establishment of large industry, will continue to be controlled by the Pretoria-based Corporation for Economic Development which allocated R27 million in 1978 to these projects.

Buthlezi has met the problem in regard to transport development through the formation of the KwaZulu Transport Holding Ltd.¹ Existing private companies will have shares in this holding company and new companies will become subsidiaries. Shareholding will be restricted to Zulu, Zulu citizens, Black businessmen other than Zulu resident in KwaZulu, and the Corporation for Economic Development which will initially retain the majority of

¹See Appendix G. Ref. 5/4/2/16 in Policy Speech, Ulundi. May 1976.

shares in what Buthelezi called his "transport conglomerate".

Development plans in KwaZulu have included the acceptance of tripartite agreements between the KwaZulu Government, Black shareholders and South African retail companies. These companies are to operate in KwaZulu in conjunction with the KwaZulu Government and the KwaZulu Investment Corporation. This proposal has the approval of the Minister of Plural Relations and Development, and has been accepted by the Liberation Movement, Inkatha. Objections were at first voiced by some Black traders in Natal and Zululand on the grounds that, in terms of the Government's Separate Development policy, they must be allowed to develop progressively on their own and that the financial and buying powers of large White companies would destroy the small African trader.¹ However, Buthelezi's Cabinet has accepted the principle and is convinced that the venture will provide a precedent for similar joint White and Black enterprises to develop the potential of KwaZulu interests.² Initially, it is envisaged that capital will be equally divided between White and Black ownership, the White company setting up the business and training Africans who will later assume managerial responsibility.

¹*Natal Mercury*, 6 August 1975. *Sunday Tribune*, 24 August 1975.

²*Natal Mercury*, 19 December 1975. The African Chamber of Commerce, Inyanda, reserved the right to disagree over this issue.

The introduction of the tripartite companies could bring about a rapid change in development as the homeland generates its own business community. It was reported to the KwaZulu Assembly in March 1977, that 20 tripartite projects had been approved by the KwaZulu Cabinet, and 46 companies were expected to operate in the near future in KwaZulu. For some of the population these schemes offered advantages, including opportunities for jobs and training, from counterhands to managing and company directors.¹ The first tripartite agreement was signed in Pretoria on 26 July 1976, by Chief Buthelezi, Dr. I Adendorff of the Corporation for Economic Development, and 3 large business houses. Zulu financial interests will be offered the opportunity of acquiring equity in the ventures. The contract makes provision for a phasing-out of White interests in a tripartite company over a period of time mutually agreed to, but usually about 10 years. Buthelezi makes a valid political statement in replying to criticism on the tripartite issue. "I want one thing to be understood," he said. "I do not believe there will ever be an all-Black KwaZulu. People all over the world are interdependent, and there will always be people of different race groups in KwaZulu."² The development of retail services is in the public interest because retail prices will thereby be stabilized and

¹Buthelezi (42), Policy Speech (March 1977), p. 41.

²*Natal Mercury*, 6 August 1975.

possibly lowered. However, in terms of job creation, the retail developments benefit relatively few people and will need to be balanced by labour-intensive strategies.

One of the problems facing entrepreneurs in KwaZulu is that of land tenure. Except on a few mission reserves freehold does not exist. Land is allocated for unspecified periods by the chiefs and headmen, which is at variance with the requirements of a developing industrial country. The KwaZulu Executive Committee has appointed a Commission on Land Ownership and Utilization to study land tenure systems with a view to finding an acceptable compromise.¹ As regards Industrial Land Tenure in growth points, the Government of KwaZulu has said it prefers to consider agency agreements of 99 years as opposed to the 25-year agreements granted by the Department of Plural Relations at present.² A Select Committee is considering the possibility of granting long leases to deserving farmers. The Government's final blue-print for territorial boundaries of the Black homelands will involve more than 1 million hectares of land costing up to R300 million in public funds, and is likely to take at least 10 years to implement. It will involve moving more than 200 000 people from land they

¹*Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974), p. 206.

²Announcement 1975 - in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

are occupying for settlement within boundaries determined for them.¹ Up to 1974 the Government allocated only R8 million a year for buying up land, but from 1975 it was envisaged that this amount would be stepped up to R25 million a year. Depending on the escalation of land values, this pace should have been sufficient to enable the Government to acquire more than 80% of the outstanding land within 10 years and to have the whole consolidation plan complete within 15 years. In 1976, the KwaZulu homeland was composed of 3 100 000 hectares. After consolidation it is anticipated that it will encompass 3 239 000 hectares. The recent economic recession caused a cutback in spending, announced by the South African Government, which means that homeland consolidation has been suspended. There are bound to be repercussions on homeland development generally.

In 1955 the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations that White entrepreneurs be encouraged to establish factories on the borders of the African Reserves, was accepted. A border industrial area was defined as an undeveloped area situated near an African area recommended for development so that African workers could maintain their homes and families in their own areas and, travelling backwards and forwards daily or at weekends, go home. The main purpose for the programme was to stop

¹*Daily News*, 4 February 1975.

the flow of Black workers to the "White" centres. Various concessions were to be offered to industrialists to develop industries, which would preferably be labour-intensive and not too highly mechanized, in these areas.¹

In 1940 an Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd. had been instituted to promote industrial development in the country generally, and a new body, the Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry, was established to implement the plan and assist industrialists. This Committee began to function in 1960. In 1971 it was renamed the Decentralization Board and a formula was devised for White labour-intensive and African labour-intensive industries. The former were encouraged to develop metropolitan areas; the latter, as far as possible, were to be situated within or on the borders of Black homelands.

Concessions that have been made to encourage border industries include the offer of services, power, transport, financial assistance, housing for African employees, wage differentiation justified on the basis of an assumption of lower productivity of labour and cost of living in the areas, and tax concessions. These do not apply to all regions, since industrialists need no persuasion to

¹Department of Information Circular 84/64 (K). See also *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1964), p. 168.

establish themselves on the border of reserves near to Durban and Pietermaritzburg.¹ African areas in Natal are so widely scattered that the whole Province is virtually a border area and assistance has periodically been granted to enable factories to be set up in areas such as Ladysmith, Colenso, Estcourt and Newcastle.² Ladysmith was the chosen growth point in the Tugela catchment area, and a large African township to house African workers has arisen at Ezakheni, between Ladysmith and Colenso, on land acquired from Whites and added to the reserve lying to the east. An industrial area called Danskraal was developed at Ladysmith and an industrial township developed at Newcastle. African employees of Iscor at Newcastle, and those of subsidiary undertakings in the area, live at Madadeni or Isizweni, townships established by the South African Bantu Trust in easy reach of the town.

In Natal in 1960 and 1964 concessions were offered in selected areas at Hammarsdale and Pietermaritzburg, and in 1968 attention was focused on Richards Bay and Empangeni. The scheme has not been an unqualified success and progress has been slow. According to the Decentralization Board, between 1960 and 1971 employment

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 101.

²Ibid., p. 111.

was created for 99 771 people of whom 78 451 were Blacks.¹ This development was in border industrial areas but included some employment opportunities in the homelands themselves. Maasdorp notes that between 1960 and 1970 only 68 500 jobs were created for Blacks in border areas and the homelands, at a rate of 6 900 *per annum*.² In 1969/70, 9 850 jobs *per annum* were created in the homelands, border areas and the Durban-Pinetown region, for homeland residents; yet even this figure was only $\frac{1}{6}$ of the annual male addition to the homeland's labour force. In addition, the great majority of these jobs were created in the border areas and not in the homelands. Benbo calculated that from 1974 to 1976, 164 000 additional Zulu workers would have sought employment, 70 100 in the common areas, 91 200 in KwaZulu, and 3 300 in other homelands. It is expected that these figures will be 30% to 40% higher in the 3 year period 1977 to 1980.³

In 1974, industries in the White border areas of KwaZulu provided employment opportunities as follows :⁴

¹Ibid., p. 107.

²Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands*, p. 10.

³Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 206.

⁴*KwaZulu Economic Revue* 1975, p. 47.

Hammarsdale	- an estimated 5 940 Blacks and 363 Whites;
Ladysmith	- an estimated 2 885 Blacks and 205 Whites;
Newcastle	- an estimated 2 207 Blacks and 172 Whites;
Pietermaritzburg	- an estimated 2 267 Blacks and 418 Whites;
Richards Bay	- an estimated 1 192 Blacks and 413 Whites.

Industries thus established in the decentralized industrial areas of KwaZulu, through the mediation of the Bantu Investment Corporation, created work opportunities as at 31 March 1974, for an estimated 20 187 Blacks. Of these 983 (4,9%) worked in KwaZulu, the rest in the White border areas, mainly Hammarsdale, Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith, Newcastle and Richards Bay. A number of industries were established in border areas without the mediation of the Industrial Development Corporation, but full information about such industries, for instance Iscor's third steel works which employed about 3 000 Black workers, and the factory of the Frame Group at Hammarsdale, is not available.

In 1965 a decision was taken to construct a commercial harbour at Richards Bay, in Zululand, and a new railway line linking the Witbank area with Richards Bay

via Vryheid, was planned.¹ KwaZulu's first modern city, on the shores of the Indian Ocean, 20 kilometres from Richards Bay, at Ezikhawini, and costing "several million rand", is being constructed.² It has already cost R10 million for initial services and this will be extended several times in the years to come. Buthelezi has said that the city will eventually be the size of Pietermaritzburg and accommodate about 400 000 people in 22 residential communities. It will, however, remain mainly a dormitory town.

Some economists regard the concept of border areas as "red herrings", a misnomer for White South African decentralization. As a policy for developing the homelands it is regarded as an "economic irrelevance".³ In the opinion of Butler, Rotberg and Adams, it is neither successfully stemming the outflow of labour from the homelands, nor is it generating jobs in quantity. At best it is moving employment nearer to the homelands. The "satellite" townships that are developing do not offer alternatives to migrancy and to employment within the homeland, nor to permanent work in the common area.⁴

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 1971, Col. 217.

²*Daily News*, 20 September 1975.

³Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands*, p. 11.

⁴Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 207.

Buthelezi is opposed to the principle of border area industries for this reason, but he has recognized their value as training ground for homeland industries. "In principle I am opposed to border industries," he explained, "but while Zulu were not exploited the KwaZulu Government would maintain cordial relations with them, and since industrial development, through the agency of foreign investment in the homelands, cannot for years yet supply sufficient work opportunities for the people of KwaZulu, Zulu will continue to seek work in border industries."¹ He accepted that people can acquire skills and know-how by working in these industries, and he thought that people should be free to seek their skills where they wished. An important factor in the creation of a stable work force was adequate family housing, and that being unavailable, Zulu would take the opportunity of training both in the White metropolitan and border areas.

It has been suggested that Buthelezi's independent stance has led to some victimization of KwaZulu. Robinson reports the offloading on the KwaZulu Government of multifarious problems which have to be controlled on a minimum budget. The responsibility of urban Black areas like KwaMashu, in which there are little or no facilities, poor roads and no industry, is burdensome to the KwaZulu administration. In the 1977/78 allocations the homeland

¹*Natal Mercury*, 25 July 1975. Substantiated in an interview with Buthelezi.

was given a budget of R115 million, R31 million of which will come from indigenous resources.¹ This is but R2 million more than the 1976/77 allocation which in any case was overspent by R7 million. By contrast Transkei received a budget, in its first year of independence, of R265 million, of which only R31 million will come from its own resources. In other words, Transkei receives a grant from the Republican Government of R234 million, yet KwaZulu with a larger population and additional responsibilities has been allocated only R84 million from the Central Government. Also budgeted for is an enforced cut of R14 million on roads and works, reduced from R55 million in 1976 to R44 376 000 in 1977/78.

On the other hand, Buthelezi is faced, in regard to his development schemes, by the accusation that he is giving legitimacy and respectability to Apartheid. In reply he stresses the argument he uses consistently:² his people cannot starve to death in the interests of an ideology. Development of KwaZulu must occur in any case, and his first priority is to ensure Zulu opportunities for earning their livelihoods. He deplores, nevertheless, the incentives offered by the Corporation for Economic Development to entice White industrialists to the border. He feels his people are being exploited there and he cites

¹Estimate of Expenditure Revenue Fund of KwaZulu Government. Year ending 31 March 1978.

²*Daily News*, Date unknown.

the application of the Provision of the Wage Act determinants rather than the Provision of the Industrial Conciliation Act. He has shown himself increasingly concerned about the low wages workers earn in many border industries, wages which the KwaZulu Government is powerless to influence. He concedes that strikes are not desirable, but if trade union rights are denied, he concludes there is no alternative.

In 1975, the South African Government announced plans to establish a system of Black "industrial committees" for the resolution of difficulties for Black workers, which will have direct bargaining powers with employers, and represents some shift away from one of the main props of Black labour policy - the Works Committee. The Minister, in effect, has conceded one of the main objections to the Works Committee system, the lack of safeguards against victimization of members. The industrial committee, an umbrella organization for each industry, will go some way towards remedying this defect. The move also suggests that note has been taken of the growth of unregistered Black unions. It is unsure whether this is a step towards full independent democratic unions or towards State-controlled unions with control of the labour movement in the hands of the Department of Labour. Blacks are not universally endorsing this latest move which is seen by some Black trade union officials as an attempt to try to control this growing

power. However, the move may hold promise as an interim measure. On the other hand, it may set back the development of industrial relations affecting Black workers.¹

Maasdorp distinguishes between a view of KwaZulu as an undeveloped, preliterate, pre-exchange economy, and KwaZulu as an example of underdevelopment as a result of its interaction with a settler economy through which Zulu areas assumed a new role of "labour reserves" for the modern sector of the South African economy. Although the Zulu of KwaZulu is integrated into the wider South African economy, this is only in the sense that he supplies migrant labour to the White-dominated economy. He is restricted in his right to remain in urban areas, to join recognized Trade Unions, or to accept jobs of his choice. Racial prejudice and discrimination effectively bar his promotion and opportunities to earn a higher income. The KwaZulu economy receives only about 20% of the earnings that he sends back to his family in the homeland. The work he does in the White areas, for the most part, does not equip him with skills that could be used to transform the homeland when he returns. In the result there is little to initiate development. KwaZulu's underdevelopment is, in part, due to the peripheral relationship it bears to the South African economy with which it has been unable to compete. Maasdorp makes it clear that in his

¹*Daily News*, 19 and 23 September 1975.

view, meaningful planning for KwaZulu will not be possible unless the homeland can be seen as part of the overall South African system. Yet the express aim of Separate Development is further to exclude the area it has caused to become KwaZulu from any development that occurs as part of an integrated South African economy. Such a polarization would redound almost entirely to White South Africa's benefit.

The process of polarisation creates a clear distinction between "core" and "peripheral" countries. The economy of a peripheral country is characterised by a greater dependence on primary production and a less diversified export structure; moreover there is migration from the periphery to the core. Peripheral countries usually possess a weak degree of internal integration - linkages with the core tend to be stronger than internal linkages ... the core periphery relationship is one of dominance and dependence, the core normally being dominant. Important decisions tend to be taken in the core country, financial institutions and potential investors are found there, and¹ the pattern of trade may involve dependence.

In the present circumstances, KwaZulu development philosophy is severely restricted. In a pre-independence period, for example, it should be possible for local political leaders to articulate their development goals and translate these into policy. Unfortunately, KwaZulu is limited by the fact that South Africa has fiscal control and ultimate political power. A conflict of interest

¹Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands*, p. 5.

has crystallized. The central priority of the Corporation for Economic Development is supposed to be employment generation. Instead, its activities have become diffuse and it is sometimes forcing Black development into approved channels like banking and investment instead of permitting it to flow in response to community wishes and needs. In this way some spontaneous initiative is being thwarted in the urban townships, while effort is concentrated on "infusing a commercial spirit in rural areas into single-proprietor dealerships".¹

Buthelezi is obviously concerned about the pattern of development in his homeland and believes that entrepreneurs investing in the territory should make profits comparable to those in White areas.² His choice of pattern of development is clear. He has expressed a preference for an economy based on a blend of free enterprise and African communalism. African communalism, or socialism, is not to be confused with Communism. It emanates originally from Tanzania, and has been partly adopted by Zambia. While not discouraging free enterprise, he wants to ensure that the people as a whole have some stake in the wealth of their own land.³ This would be attained through state-owned organizations

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 214.

²*Sunday Times Business Magazine*, 21 September 1975.

³*Policy Speech* (1974).

which would have controlling interests in all main economic enterprises. The profits earned would be for the nation and would be ploughed back into the country for its development rather than for the enrichment of the individual.

If KwaZulu were to opt for a socialist model it is questionable that there would be scope for it to follow a philosophy so different from the capitalism practised by the core country. At this stage there is no visible discord on this issue, but the proximity of Marxist states on the borders of South Africa and KwaZulu may well have an impact on the future approach.

It is possible that because KwaZulu is dependent on South Africa in so many essential areas it might be less likely to take independent economic decisions than would otherwise be the case.¹ Such a situation could end if KwaZulu was to take independence and attempt to reduce, to some extent, its reliance on South Africa by receiving aid from other sources. The core-periphery situation might present difficulties for KwaZulu in attracting its own industry, since it would be difficult to compete with South Africa. The homeland is favourably placed in that it extends into the Durban metropolitan region and adjoins the existing and future industrial centres of

¹Maasdorp, *Focus on KwaZulu*, p. 17.

Natal. It is not too far from markets and ports, and is as close to highly sophisticated commercial and financial services of the Durban-central business district as it will be in relation to Richards Bay, Newcastle and others. It could therefore attract entrepreneurs, as indeed the tripartite controversy showed. Maasdorp suggests that rather than dissipate its industrial energy and resources over several scattered locations, like Tsitthebe, KwaZulu should consider concentrating on developing existing industrial centres.

The costs and benefits of having a large part of the labour force employed in "another country" is a problem which the KwaZulu planners will have to resolve. Apart from the undesirable social conditions of Apartheid on which the homeland Government may be able to negotiate, it is apparent that it is in a country's interest to employ as many of its citizens as possible within its own borders and to involve them in its own development. If KwaZulu's development philosophy is based on the elimination of unemployment, poverty and inequality, it is important that it create, within its own borders, productive employment for as many people as possible. Nevertheless, the possibility of losing trained manpower to Natal will always be present. Natal requires trained African artisans for its industries and wages in Natal are higher than in KwaZulu, so a type of "skill drain"¹

¹Maasdorp, *Focus on KwaZulu*, p. 4.

can be expected. KwaZulu would thus be, in effect, a training ground for the Natal economy, yet it would receive only that portion of the wages that is not spent where earned. This, in Maasdorp's opinion, is a chance that KwaZulu will have to take. It may become necessary for the KwaZulu Government to impose restraints at some stage, insisting perhaps that trainees work for a stipulated period in KwaZulu or that skilled workers needed for the local economy be refused passports.

Yet, where commerce and industry provide useful illustrations of the imbalance that characterizes the core-peripheral relationship, the problem of migrant labour remains central to any discussion of homeland development. Hence it is the logical subject of the next section.

(D) MIGRANT LABOUR

A study conducted by Natrass estimates that for every economically active man in the Black rural homeland, 6 are absent from home working as migrant labourers in the White sector. Nearly 60% of the Black work force in the modern sector of the South African economy consists of migrant workers and $\frac{2}{3}$ of a typical homeland family's

disposable income is migrant remittance.¹ The total number of migrants in "White" areas was estimated to be 1 750 000. Of these 393 000 are foreigners, and 260 000 are women. In some homeland districts, 7 men were migrant workers for every 3 economically active men in the district and such absenteeism is increasing. From 1936 to 1970 the male migration ratio rose by 36%, from $\frac{1}{4}$ of the males aged 15-64 years to $\frac{1}{3}$ of this age group. In 1970, 2 out of every 3 men aged 25-45 were absent. Male migration from the homeland rises with the standard of education. Thus the rate of migration reaches 90% at an educational level of primary school plus 4 years' education.²

Migration means that men, at the most productive periods of their lives, are not in their ethnic areas but in "White" South Africa. Development of ethnic areas is therefore reduced and education and acquired skills that should be invested in the rural area are utilized in the "White" economy. Income is earned and, with the exception of about 20% which is remitted for the upkeep of dependents, spent outside the homeland. White South

¹In a paper delivered to the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa in Johannesburg, in September 1975. A similar address was delivered by her to the Winter School on *Focus on KwaZulu*, held at Natal University (July 1974).

²J. Nattrass, *The Migrant Labour System and South Africa's Economic Development. 1936-1970*. Department of Economics, University of Natal (Durban: 1976).

Africa, for its part, does not need to provide housing for the migrant's family, and temporary migration holds Black wages in South Africa to a lower level than would otherwise have been the case.

Benbo 1975 has compiled figures on the movement of the Zulu population.¹ In 1970 the distribution, according to economic areas and provinces, was as follows: Of the total Zulu population, 1 878 780, or 46,8%, live in "White" areas and 52,4% of these are in Natal. The male population of Zulu living in "White" areas appeared to number 51,8% against 47,0% of the *de jure* population, indicating relatively more men there. The increase in the economically active Zulu population points to the demand for work opportunities for various periods. In 1974-76, of the average of 54 867 persons who annually became available for the labour force, 33 200 were men and 21 667 women; 42,6% of those entering the labour market would do so in the White areas, the rest in the homelands. Therefore, it was necessary to create about 30 400 work opportunities *per annum*, near or in KwaZulu, for the period 1974-76, to prevent the migration of manpower. In 1970, as many as 15,4% of the male inhabitants of KwaZulu were unable to work in their homeland or in adjoining European areas by commuting, because of insufficient work opportunities.² They

¹*KwaZulu Economic Review* 1975, p. 23.

²*Ibid.*, p. 25.

therefore had to leave the homeland in order to work elsewhere. The male dependence burden of the homeland was nearly 55% higher than that for the entire *de jure* population and was 290,45 per 100 men of 15-64 years, while it was only 187,88 for the entire Zulu population. The consequence of the high adult male dependence burden is that Government expenditure on social services such as health, pension and education is higher than it would have been if the ratio had been lower. The extent of the current expenditure makes it difficult to accumulate savings so that capital-formation from internal sources is not sufficient. Figures also indicate that the urbanization component is larger in the White areas than in the homeland.

Figures in regard to age structure indicate that more than 15% of the Zulu population falls within the age group 5-9 years and 44,3% are younger than 15 years.¹ Those between 15 and 64 years, the nucleus of the labour force, constitute 52% of the population. Most of the pre-school and potential school-going age group live in KwaZulu. Of the 15-64 years age group, 45,7% live in their own homeland, while 52,6% live in White areas. Of the economically active male Zulu population, 61,9% are in the White areas, and 36,7% in KwaZulu itself. In the higher age group, 65 and over, there is a flow

¹Ibid., p. 27.

back to the homeland - 65,2% of this age group are presently in KwaZulu.

Generally, migrants working as unskilled labourers in the White sector do not acquire any skills that could be effectively used in the homeland, and those who do acquire such skills look for better paid jobs in the core area. Since, under the circumstances, the end to a migrant labour system is not in sight, Nattrass is concerned that adjustments should be made from which all concerned could benefit. She suggests that the Central Government should provide housing for married men and their families, either in the White areas or in homeland areas adjacent to existing pockets of employment.¹ At the Free State Congress of the National Party in Bloemfontein in September 1975, a resolution was passed urging the Government to scrap the law that prevented wives from joining their husbands in urban areas.² The motion is indicative of a recognition by some Nationalists that migrant labour is a socially troublesome phenomenon. Nattrass further suggests that there should be an additional impetus given to the decentralization of industry to areas within easy reach of the new homeland

¹Nattrass, *Migrant Labour System and South Africa's Economic Development*, p. 203. Professor Nattrass's general findings on migrant labour are supported by conclusions presented by Professor P.E. van der Dussen, Professor of Economics at Fort Hare, to the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa in Johannesburg 1975.

²*Natal Mercury*, 19 September 1975.

urban areas, both inside and adjacent to the homelands, that are being developed. In this way the migrant will live in the homeland and spend his earnings in it. Some tax, she suggests, should be imposed by the homeland government on the migrant, or on his employer, to provide additional funds for investment in the homeland. Additional subsidies should be transferred for education to the homelands, since the White sector appears to be the major beneficiary of expenditure on Black education. Moreover, the establishment of urban complexes in homelands for the housing of men working in White areas and their families should be financed by the Central Government as the rate of return on this investment will be higher to the White sector than to the homelands.¹

Buthelezi has said that migrant labour "has not only destroyed the fabric of our society, it has destroyed the moral fibre of our people".² The social effects of migrant labour cannot be overemphasized. The breadwinner must leave his family when he goes to work in a White town under a fixed period contract. His employer must house him, but him alone. The result is that the family is

¹Attention has been drawn to Schlemmer's findings on the attitude of migrant labourers bringing their families to town. However, those who had families with them and considered moving back to KwaZulu faced a dilemma. They realised that it was useless to do so because the KwaZulu economy could not absorb them. *Natal Mercury*, 4 August 1976.

²*Natal Mercury*, 12 June 1970.

left alone in the rural area, often in abject poverty and dependent entirely on what the breadwinner remits for their upkeep. Away from home for a year, he forms new liaisons, and his wages must now support two families. The rural poverty may cause a wife or daughter herself to seek employment in White towns, and young children are left in the care of grandmothers or relatives whose ability to care for them is often suspect. A spiral of malnutrition is created even when money is sent home. Most of the diseases treated in rural hospitals are recurring diseases of poverty.¹ The problem is often aggravated by the fact that when the breadwinner or his wife returns to home and family they have grown apart in many different ways. Separate Development has made it virtually impossible for a Black worker in South Africa to make an independent decision in regard to where he and his family would like to live or the conditions pertaining to that residency.

Government policy dictates that Africans employed in White towns fairly close to a homeland should live in a homeland township, usually newly created, in the African area. Sometimes they commute daily between home and employment, or they live in hostels in municipal areas

¹A. Barker, "The Rural Communities", to the Winter School on *Focus on KwaZulu* at the University of Natal (July 1974).

during the week, returning home at weekends if they can afford to do so. Official planners have established the feasibility of transporting daily workers between points of up to 113 kilometres (70 miles) apart, or on a weekend basis of up to 644 kilometres (400 miles) apart.¹ Where possible the State subsidizes transport, and employers - other than those of domestic workers who do not provide free accommodation - are obliged to contribute to the subsidization.² Workers forced to live long distances from their work are sensitive to the injustice of having to pay for their own transport. In urban African townships, where licences are granted almost exclusively to local authorities, 20% of the proceeds of liquor sales must be spent on social, social welfare and recreational services for Africans in the town concerned. The remaining 80% must be paid to the Department of Plural Relations and Development for use in the general interest of Africans. Much of the liquor profits for 1970/71 was spent on subsidizing bus services operating between urban areas and homelands.³ None of the money was spent on housing in the homelands.⁴

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 139.

²Bantu Transport Services Amendment Act 11/1972. See *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1972), p. 156.

³*Ibid.*, p. 141. See also Liquor Amendment Acts of 1961 and 1962.

⁴*House of Assembly Debates*, 14 March 1972. Cols. 555-556.

Such movement of valued personnel from the periphery to the core is consistent with the model; since the periphery cannot sustain its labour market, it loses workers to the core, which develops faster than the periphery. The cycle is thus continued to the periphery's growing disadvantage.

(E) TOWNSHIPS AND URBANIZATION

Black townships may be in White areas or inside the homeland. In either case they are usually African dormitory suburbs adjacent to a White town. Where the township is inside the homeland, Blacks may buy houses or plots on which to build from the South African Bantu Trust. Some White cities make contributions to the development of the homeland townships where their workers live. Financial responsibility and control of developing townships is being handed over to the homeland governments, and the Bantu Affairs Commissioner may administer the townships as agents for these governments.

Regulations for the administration and control of townships in Black areas, and of those urban Black townships in "White" areas, differ in many important

respects.¹ For the latter, a series of changes in policy direction are in progress. For the former, the pattern is relatively stable.

The largest African township in KwaZulu is Umlazi. Geographically a suburb of Durban, it is situated to the south of the city and was developed by the Trust in co-operation with the Durban Corporation. By 1970, 17 000 dwellings had been built, mainly by Africans themselves. There were then 121 000 residents; a vastly greater number lives there now.² It has an hotel and a variety of educational, social and recreational facilities. An anticipated hospital had not been built by 1977. KwaMashu, to the north of the city, was developed by the Durban City Council and is close to the homeland. The homeland boundary has, by the 1975 Consolidation proposals, been extended to include it. The transfer was effected in 1977 and was followed by many problems in regard to administration and responsibility, financial and otherwise, for the poor facilities that exist there.³

¹Proclamation R293 of 16 November 1962, and Proclamation R1036 of 14 June 1968, in relation to provisions of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 as amended. See also Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 142-144.

²No accurate figures are available. The last census was in 1970.

³KwaMashu Urban Bantu Council No. 6 Agenda, 28 March 1977.

The growth of townships in KwaZulu has been rapid.¹ In 1960 Umlazi was the proclaimed town and had 906 homes. By 1970, 14 towns had been developed with a total of 31 527 housing units. In 1973 there were 43 814 housing units in KwaZulu towns, with a population of 301 307, and by 1975 there were 49 890 housing units with a population of 363 497. Population figures should be seen as conservative since, in certain towns, populations are considerably larger than official figures indicate. Population concentrations coupled with housing shortages have led to large squatter settlements too, particularly in the Edendale-Swartkops area where there are believed to be some 250 000 squatters.²

From 1970 to 1975 the number of houses in KwaZulu increased by 36,8% and the total population of the towns by 45%. The ratio of the average number of persons per house was 6,3 in 1970, and 7,3 in 1975 which is attributable to the need to sublet to accommodate relatives. These are conservative figures, but they indicate that the housing shortage is growing.³ According to the Department of Planning Projections, $\frac{3}{4}$ of South Africa's Black population may be unhoused by the year 2000. The amount budgeted for Government

¹ *KwaZulu Economic Review* 1975, p. 33.

² *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1976), p. 200.

³ *To the Point*, 30 July 1976.

expenditure on town establishment and development in 1970/71 was R3,4 million, and for 1975/76, R37,9 million, which reflects the priority that the programme for township establishment and development is receiving.

Blacks living in homeland townships are not as restricted as are the urban township dwellers.¹ All heads of families, including women, may buy sites or houses, for which the Corporation for Economic Development makes loans available, or they can lease houses. They must, unless specially permitted, be of the ethnic group for which the homeland is designated. A widow has prior claim over a house leased by a man who dies. Lodger's permits are obtainable in both types of township. Section 10 (i) (discussed below) does not apply, and leases of dwellings run indefinitely (qualified by payments of rent, behaviour, etc.). Visitors may stay for up to 30 days, after which a lodger's permit must be obtained. Establishing a company, syndicate, trade or profession requires only membership of the appropriate ethnic group and the necessary licence, although only one site may be occupied unless special permission is obtained.

Some townships within the homeland are virtually suburbs of "White" industrial areas. Others are

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 144.

situated further away from towns and cities, and breadwinners are precluded from returning home except at weekends, or less often. It is recognized that in the latter there can be little real family life, and the families concerned often become subject to numerous social problems. An added burden in these cases is the increase in travelling time and cost, especially where a home is hundreds of miles from a place of work.

Homeland townships lack the normal modern amenities provided by the larger, local authorities in urban townships. There are few proper roads and little or no drainage, street lighting, electricity, household water supplies, community halls, sports fields, playgrounds, libraries, recreational services or clinics. The question of supplying electricity to KwaMashu is presently being debated. It is often difficult to visit well-stocked urban shops where prices are invariably lower. People in these areas are isolated from contact with any others than those of their own ethnic group, and they lack the stimulus of life in the towns. In addition, in an emergency it may be difficult to contact a doctor, and the nearest telephone or hospital or police station may be some considerable distance away with no available transport service.

Africans living in White-controlled Black urban residential areas are subject to many more restraints than

their homeland counterparts. They have only leasehold and not freehold rights to land and tenancy may be granted to a male adult who is a South African citizen, qualified to remain in the area under Section 10 (1)(a) or (b) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, and who has dependents who qualify to remain in the area. The Act stipulates that to be eligible a man must have been born in the town concerned or have worked there continuously for one employer for 10 years, or have lived there lawfully and continuously for 15 years, and in all three instances must have lived uninterruptedly in the town. No woman may be placed on a waiting list for a house even if she has dependents living with her legally.¹ Only in very special circumstances may a tenancy become transferred to a woman who is deserted, divorced or widowed. Since 1975 "emancipated" women have been permitted to retain their houses, and widows are no longer forced to move if they have fulfilled Section 10 (1)(a) or (b) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act.² Widows who might remain as lodgers, or unqualified women, had to have been married to qualified men.³ In August 1976, the

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 144.

²Under the Natal Code, Zulu women have a perpetual status of Minor from which they may be released in certain circumstances by the Authority of the Local Bantu Affairs Commissioner. The Zulu Legislative Assembly is in the process of rectifying this Code which Zulu say is a result of "custom" which was petrified when it was codified by Whites nearly 100 years ago.

³*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1975)*, pp. 106-107.

introduction of a new home ownership scheme enabled Black widows and divorcees to buy or build houses if they had permission from the Commission of Bantu Affairs.¹

Residential permits were valid for 1 month, but payment of rent due is deemed to be a renewal for another month. Tenancy was subject to 1 month's notice and was cancelled if the householder forfeited his right to remain in the area in terms of Section 10. Visitors to urban townships for more than 72 hours required accommodation permits.

In January 1975, following discussions between the then Prime Minister and homeland leaders, it was promised that certain matters relating to urban Blacks would receive consideration. On May 1 some decisions were announced in the Assembly.² Blacks were to be allowed to buy houses on land belonging to Administration Boards or to lease vacant plots of land on which they could build their houses. The new announcements offered a form of home ownership on a 30 year lease basis to city Blacks. They were given the right to bequeath or sell their houses, although the sites would remain municipal property. Further details of home ownership were announced by the Secretary of Plural Relations and

¹*Sunday Times*, 22 August 1976.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, May 1 1975, Col. 5231-5234. See *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1976, p. 187.

Development on 28 October 1975. In an address to the Annual Conference of the Institute of Administrators of non-European Affairs, he announced that those wishing to own houses would have to become citizens of a homeland and would be required to produce certificates of citizenship when they applied for ownership.¹ This proviso was opposed by urban Blacks, and the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development, after talks between homeland leaders and Ministers of the Central Government following the Soweto riots, was obliged to remove the qualification. He announced that urban Blacks would be able to build their own homes in urban areas without first having to take out homeland citizenship.²

In April 1978, a further development was announced.³ In an interview between the then Prime Minister and a deputation of the Southern African Freedom Foundation, Mr. Vorster disclosed that legislation was being prepared for submission to Parliament which would give Blacks permanent occupation rights in urban areas. Blacks were to be granted full property rights in all urban as well as rural townships. They will be able to buy, sell and bequeath property in perpetuity. The actual title to

¹*The Star*, 29 October 1975.

²*Daily News*, 14 August 1976. See *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1976), p. 186.

³*Daily News*, 3 and 4 April 1978. *Natal Mercury*, 4 and 5 April 1978.

the land itself would not be transferred, but in practice Blacks would receive all the advantages of ownership including security of tenure and full rights to negotiate loans. This development is a significant advance on the previous situation when a 30 year lease was maximum tenure. It is possibly the most important step yet taken by the Government in its alleged moves away from race discrimination and amounts to granting Blacks permanent status outside the homelands. Ideological orthodoxy, however, is still evident in the Government's reluctance to transfer title to the land. In a television interview on April 10 1978, Dr. C. Mulder, former Minister of Plural Relations and Development, explained that Blacks would not be allowed freehold title to land because this would give them a basis for demanding political rights in South Africa.

Until 1975, numerous restrictions were imposed on the urban business community.¹ An applicant seeking to establish a company or set himself up in a trade or a profession had to be the *bona fide* breadwinner and qualify under Section 10 (1) to remain in the area. He could possess no trading rights elsewhere. His trading permit was subject to annual renewal and no companies, partnerships or financial institutions could be established. Nor could one man carry on more than one

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 144-145.

business. Only businesses catering to the daily essentials and domestic requirements of residents were permitted. Traders were not allowed to erect their own buildings, nor to alter leased shops without permission. Professional men and women were unable, after 1969, to rent consulting rooms or offices in urban townships unless they qualified under Section 10 (1) to remain in the area concerned. The intention of these restrictions was to encourage businessmen to establish themselves in the homelands. The concern with homeownership in 1975 focussed attention, also, on these restrictions on the business and professional communities which were causing friction and insecurity. The result was the announcement of trading concessions. Traders were to be permitted to deal in a wider range of commodities in urban areas, to establish more than one type of business and to enter into partnerships. Medical practitioners and other professional people were to be given the right to possess their own consulting rooms and offices in Black residential areas. People with a business in the homeland were no longer barred from owning a business in an urban area.¹

The increased freedom of action foreshadowed on May 1, 1975, was not, however, embodied in revised

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1975), p. 82.

regulations published in terms of Government Notice R764 of 7 May.¹ The new regulations stipulated that a prior condition for the granting of a business or professional site would be that the applicant should be in possession of a homeland citizenship certificate.² This aroused strong opposition and a change in Government policy was announced. In 1976 some trading restrictions were lifted and citizenship ceased to be a prerequisite for the granting of business licences in urban townships. The Deputy Minister undertook to investigate the possibility of Black businessmen establishing small industries in urban areas. Whereas Blacks had previously to be born in the area or to have lived there for 15 years to be eligible for a trading licence, a minor concession now was that they had only to qualify under Section 10 (1) of the Bantu Consolidation Act, that is, they must have been born in the area, worked there for a single employer for 10 years or lived there lawfully for 15 years. Other minor restrictions have also been lifted, yet freehold rights are still not granted and this has hampered the efforts of businessmen to raise capital to finance their ventures. Following the promised new dispensation in regard to property rights for urban Blacks, this restraint may fall away. However, the actual details of the dispensation have not

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1976), p. 185.

²*Ibid.*, p. 186.

yet been made public.

The crux of South Africa's race problem is the urban Black. In no circumstances can he be regarded, as he once was by Government planners, as a temporary sojourner doing his master's bidding in the modern sector. Most discussions on "change" refer, either directly or obliquely, to him. The homelands will go their way. They will be developed, even if haphazardly, and to a greater or lesser extent accommodate their populations whether as independent entities or parts of South Africa. The urban Black presents a quite separate problem. He lives and works in the urban areas, may have completely severed his links with tribalism, is generally better educated and more sophisticated than homeland residents and frequently is inextricably intertwined with the White economy. He contributes to its development; yet he is denied the benefits, privileges and rights that automatically devolve on his White counterpart.

A number of reasons have been advanced for the rapid growth of Black urban populations. Among these are the rapid industrial development of South Africa since World War II, the accelerating growth of the Black population and the inability of the undeveloped homelands to absorb and provide for their expanding populations. Independence may lessen the phenomenon of migrant labour in the sense that workers would cease to live separately

from their families. Almost every African township in Natal will be situated in KwaZulu. Thus theoretically the KwaZulu Government could encourage families to join workers in the towns and become permanent urban dwellers. This would overcome many of the social problems in the townships and rural areas. In the latter, reduced population pressures could assist agrarian reform.

Urbanization has produced peculiar problems for the homeland leader. Urban leaders constantly demand the recognition of rights in the urban areas where they live and work, and not in a remote homeland. They do not wish their appeal to be compromised by a homeland leader speaking on their behalf. Buthelezi rejects this division between urban and rural Blacks and loses no opportunity to intervene in urban affairs. The wave of strikes that engulfed Natal in 1973 presented such an opportunity for intervention. The first contacts between KwaZulu and the Black urban labour movement occurred in Durban in October 1972, and were not auspicious. Buthelezi's non-intervention in negotiations between the striking stevedores and their employers evoked widespread disappointment. The subsequent intervention of the Zulu King in a strike of migrant workers at a brick manufacturing company was criticized by the KwaZulu leadership; the King's action, though, apparently motivated the KwaZulu leadership itself into considering its own role in urban labour disputes. In succeeding

years prominent Zulu leaders, using Separate Development platforms, appear to have had an effect on the growth of a new self-awareness among Zulu workers. The wave of strikes in Natal in February 1973, established the image of the formidable power of Black labour in the minds of the public, politicians and employers.¹ The threat by the then KwaZulu Executive Councillor for Community Affairs, Mr. B. Dladla, negotiating on behalf of the workers, that he would ensure the withdrawal of labour in a particular dispute, although his threat could not be carried through for the KwaZulu Government does not control the recruitment of labour, highlighted the potential in the situation.² Mr. Dladla's claim that it was within the framework of South African policy for his Government to have control over its labour supply to White South Africa was refuted by the Department of Plural Relations and Development. The Department rejected the KwaZulu Government representative's right to negotiate for Zulu labour in urban areas and favoured the intercession instead of the Durban envoy. It was felt that the envoy should channel grievances to the KwaZulu Government which would then negotiate on an inter-governmental level. The Natal Chamber of Industries and the Federated Chamber of Industries also opposed homeland ministers taking part

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1973), p. 74.

²*Ibid.*, p. 46.

in labour disputes in White areas.¹ Buthelezi supported Dladla's view, arguing that it was an obligation of the KwaZulu Government to protect the interests of its citizens.² This involvement by the KwaZulu Government in the field of labour at the grass roots level is likely to have significant long-term effects as strikes continue to occur more frequently than before. Schlemmer and Muil anticipate that a power confrontation might be looming between the South African Government and White industrialists on one hand, and the KwaZulu Government and African labour movement on the other.³ White leaders of Black trade unions and Black politicians have warned the Central Government that labour disputes should be considered as early warning of serious unrest unless substantial improvements are made in the lifestyle of

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 2 December 1973.

²A dispute arose in the KwaZulu Assembly at the time, over the status and functions of Dladla who is reported to have admitted subsequently that he had acted in emergency situations without consulting the Cabinet. The Legislative Assembly accused him of having exceeded his prerogatives, and after a long dispute Chief Buthelezi demanded "unequivocal and categorical pledges" of loyalty from his Cabinet Ministers, which were given. Shortly afterwards, Buthelezi announced a Cabinet reshuffle. Dladla was given the portfolio of Justice with offices in Nongoma instead of Pietermaritzburg, where he would have little contact with urban workers. Following a further clash he was removed from office. See *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974), p. 194. *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 June and 12 September 1974.

³L. Schlemmer and T. Muil, "Social and Political Change in the African Areas; A Case Study of KwaZulu", *Change in Contemporary South Africa*, eds., L. Thompson and J. Butler (University of California Press, 1975), p. 48.

Black workers.¹

KwaZulu Councillors continue to play a part in labour negotiations. Thus in the forefront of negotiations in Newcastle in 1975, where a bus boycott was provoked by an increase in fares, was the KwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, Mr. Walter Khanya. Inkatha functioned as the distributing agent for pamphlets issued by Mr. Khanya, who exhorted boycotters not to resort to violence and threats, but to be guided by the KwaZulu Government. This action was in line with Buthelezi's guidance when, in 1974, responding angrily to a White trade union leader's comments that he did not want anyone from the homelands telling an industry how to run itself, he said: "This is just White arrogance - we will be involved whenever our people are. We cannot abandon them."² There has to date been no resolution of the recurring issue of homeland "interference" in labour in the urban areas. Schlemmer and Muil have questioned the speed with which the KwaZulu leadership entered the industrial field and suggest that the leadership should have attempted to establish a wider "legitimacy" in the industrial sector through discussion and private agreement with employer organizations before confronting the "establishment". However, the readiness with which

¹*Natal Mercury*, 2 October 1975.

²*Star*, 2 September 1974.

workers have looked to and accepted the KwaZulu Government's intervention seems to suggest that it has established a wide legitimacy in urban labour-management relations and is fulfilling a positive role. There is a growing threat that if conditions of Black workers in urban areas do not improve, strikes may occur on an increasingly widespread and organized scale with KwaZulu Government backing. The South African Government has, in response to industrial unrest, made it possible under strictly controlled conditions for Blacks to bargain collectively and thus legally to strike. They may not, however, establish formal trade unions. The result of such legislation, limited as it might be, is that homeland leaders can claim a favourable association with the granting of some rights to urban Blacks.¹ The same significance can be attached to the further improvements in urban conditions.

The socio-political consequences of African urbanization are great. National Party policy which has hitherto insisted that Blacks are in the White man's area temporarily, on sufferance, and only to perform the function of labour, resulted in a denial of political rights and very little thought being paid to their comfort and well-being. Little in the way of funds has been diverted for housing, hostels have been regarded as

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 102.

adequate since an African worker may not enjoy the company of his wife and family (in 1969 one Cabinet Minister referred to them as "superfluous appendages"), and few or no recreational facilities have been provided. According to National Party ideology it was confidently expected, and Cabinet Ministers have over the years said, that all Blacks would be back in the ethnic areas by 1980.

In view of the history of National Party ideology it came as a surprise, therefore, when Mr. Theunis (Punt) Janson, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, told delegates to the Transvaal National Congress in 1975 that "Africans would be in the urban areas for 50 years or more".¹ This sentiment was endorsed at the Party's Cape Congress, when Mr. J.J. Loots, then Minister of Planning, rejected a resolution calling for an end to servants' quarters in White areas and said the "Government would rather see more facilities made available for servants in White areas". And at the Free State Congress of the Party in September a resolution was passed urging the Government to scrap the law preventing wives from joining their husbands in urban areas.² Further concessions were accepted in September 1976, at a series of National Party Congresses. Thus the Party in the Transvaal endorsed the lifting of the Government's restrictions on multi-

¹*Natal Mercury*, 8 September 1975.

²*Natal Mercury*, 19 September 1975.

racial sport from club level upwards and a decision was taken to allow Coloured and Indian businessmen to trade or establish industries in White areas.¹ In addition, the Minister was quoted as saying that all population groups would be allowed into theatres built with Government subsidies.

This new approach was applied to the migratory labour system as well. A cornerstone of National Party policy for more than 20 years, it was condemned as "at heart not a good system" by the former Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. Theunis Janson.² His views were echoed by Mr. Botha who, in referring to illegal dwellers in urban areas said, "Let's face it, we can't throw them out. These people have families to support."³ These remarks are completely contrary to traditional National Party policy on migratory labour, which in the past has shown little sympathy for migrant workers and their families. Concomitant with these views, Mr. Botha expressed the opinion that homelands themselves could no longer be regarded simply as labour reservoirs, an attitude which over the years has hampered the growth potential of the homelands.

¹*Daily News*, 16 September 1976 and *Natal Mercury*, 15 September 1976.

²*Natal Mercury*, 20 September 1975.

³*Natal Mercury*, 29 October 1975.

If urban Blacks are accepted by the White Government as a permanent feature of the core area, the Separate Development policy will have been dealt a severe blow, even though ideological gymnastics may be performed to illustrate that there has been no deviation from established principles. While the periphery will have been permanently deprived of many of its most talented inhabitants, it could well happen that a more entrenched, organized and powerful urban Black population would be instrumental in focussing attention on the needs of rural Blacks, and thus, having weakened the periphery by leaving it, strengthen it by articulating its needs.

(F) EDUCATION

"Bantu Education", tied as it is to the National Party policy of Separate Development, is designed to reinforce the social, economic and political disparities on which the policy is founded. "Bantu Education" encompasses both an attitude to the education of Blacks and to the provision of facilities.

In 1949 the Eiselen Commission formulated the principles of education for Africans as an "independent race". Although the "extreme aversion" on the part of

Blacks to any education designed specifically for them was expressed, the Commission pointed out that the African child was conditioned by African culture and values, which should dictate the contents and methods of the child's early education.¹ Indeed, one of the terms of reference for the Eiselen Commission was: "The formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitudes and their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration."² Answering the question, "Why Bantu Education?" the Commission had this to say: "(E)ducational practice must recognize that it has to deal with a Bantu child, that is, trained and conditioned in Bantu culture, endowed with a knowledge of a Bantu language and imbued with values, interests and behaviour patterns ... and these facts must dictate the extent and content and method of his early education."³ The Commission added that "(o)ut of school hours (the child) lives in a Bantu community and when he reaches maturity will be concerned to share and develop (the) life and culture of that community". In regard to advanced education the Commission reported on the type of individual that would function to the best advantage in

¹*Report on the Commission on Native Education 1949-51.* UG No. 53/1951. Government Printer, Pretoria.

²*Ibid.*, p. 7.

³*Ibid.*, p. 131.

Bantu society in, "say 1970". It listed as essential qualifications: "A religious knowledge ... literacy in a Bantu language ... in both European official languages for communication with Europeans", and "as a help in economic matters and securing contact with knowledge of a wider world ... (knowledge of) hygiene ... technical skills in agriculture ... professions and trades resulting from industrialization ... (acquaintance with) social pattern and values" ensuring that he become a "good member of his community", and "knowledge and sympathy ... for (the) wellbeing of the Bantu people as well as other groups in South Africa". "The list is not exhaustive," says the report, "but is given to show that Bantu education does have a separate existence just as French education, Chinese education or even European education in South Africa, because it exists and can function only in and for a particular social setting, namely Bantu society."¹

At the time Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, was of the opinion that good race relations could not exist when education was under the control of people who created the wrong expectations among Blacks. If education had to train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, as the Eiselen Commission propounded, and in terms of Government policy, there was no place in White communities for Blacks above the level of certain types of labourers. Bantu education therefore

had to be rooted in the reserves and limited to the opportunities then deemed suitable. It had to be orientated toward African society and make no provision for professional opportunities.

The Eiselen Commission's declaration of aims caused great antagonism among Blacks who maintained that economic and social realities demanded assimilation of Western techniques and values. Serious misgivings arose from the realization that the homelands, by nature of South African society, could never become "galvanizers of African values"¹ until there were places where significant educational development took place. As long as economic opportunities existed in the cities, which were also the centres of science, culture, entertainment and technology, the urban areas and not the homelands would be galvanizers of African values. Because of this emphasis on the importance of African culture in education, Africans suspected an attempt to retard African participation in economic progress. Their suspicions were increased since the Government spent only small sums of money on African education; there was a resultant lack of teachers and schools, education was not compulsory, and parents had to bear the cost of educating their children. None of these deprivations applied to White children. In 1976 African resentment at their "special" kind of education

¹F.E. Auerbach in the *Star*, 13 May 1974.

could no longer be contained, and "Bantu Education" became one of the major stated reasons for violence in Soweto in that year.

Education, at every level, has been separated in South Africa and placed in special ethnic compartments. As a result Blacks are discriminated against very severely. F.E. Auerbach has calculated on the figures available in the 1960 and 1970 Census returns that in 1960, 62,5% and in 1970, 51,8% of Blacks over the age of 15 in South Africa received no schooling at all. The number of persons, as at 6 May 1970, over the age of 18 who had not passed Standard 2 was 4 606 756. A rough estimate of the number of those aged 20 years and over who had passed the following standards in 1970 were :

Standard 6	620 200
Standard 8	144 889
Standard 10 and above	21 370 ¹

The cost *per capita* for school pupils of various ethnic groups, given by the responsible Minister in reply to questions in the House of Assembly and quoted in *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, was as follows : ²

¹*Star*, 13 May 1974.

²*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974), pp. 340-341.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Whites in Natal</u>	<u>Africans in "White" Areas</u>
1972/73	R531,00	R22,51
1973/74	R557,00	R28,56

In 1974/75 and 1975/76 it was as follows :¹

1974/75	R605,00	R39,53
1975/76	R644,00	R41,80

A comparison of the number of pupils and number of ordinary primary and secondary schools in the Republic was given to the Senate on 21 May 1976.²

(a) The number of pupils in each race group in 1976 was :

White	903 062
Coloured	640 476
Asian	184 144
Africans (all ethnic groups)	3 698 921

(b) The number of schools provided for each race group :

White	2 493
Coloured	1 953
Asian	365
African (all ethnic groups)	12 378

¹Ibid. (1976), p. 321.

²Ibid. (1976), pp. 321-322.

(c) The teacher-pupil ratio for the various race groups for 1975 shows an improvement :

White	1 : 20,1
Coloured	1 : 30,6
Asian	1 : 26,9
African	1 : 54,1

From 1955, the financing of African education has been based on the principle that Africans must find most of the money needed for their education. One-fifth of African teachers were privately paid, over $\frac{1}{4}$ of these taught in Church schools, and the rest, about 5 000 in 1973, in State and State-aided schools paid for by parents and community.¹ Individual Africans, until very recently, made substantial contributions towards books, equipment, school and boarding fees and the erection of school buildings. Urgent improvements needed in African education are completely dependent on more generous help from the South African Government. In 1973, 15,6% of Black teachers were paid wages equivalent to those paid to illiterate or barely literate factory workers.² The starting salary of the unqualified teacher with a Junior Certificate was R987,00 *per annum* for men and R917,00 for women.³ Average earnings of Black men in manufacture

¹Ibid. (1974), p. 349.

²Interview with Tim Muil.

³A *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974), p. 349.

and industry were R924,00 *per annum*. The Republican Minister of the Interior gave the following salary ratio between teachers of different racial groups :¹

Whites	100
Coloureds and Indians	72
Africans	52

In March 1978, the then Minister of Education and Training, Mr. W.A. Cruywagen, announced that Black teachers were to receive further pay increases of between 25,5% and 58,0%. These increases would close the Black-White salary differential by an average 9,4%.² The average Black-White teacher pay ratio narrowed from 57,7% in 1974, to 67,1% in 1978. Higher qualified teachers would benefit most from the better pay scales which it was hoped would encourage more trained personnel to enter the teaching profession. The teacher shortage could be relieved, in the short-term at least, by drawing in qualified teachers from the 3 other race groups, and even from other countries. This is precluded by the Separate Development policy.

Prior to 1954, control of African education was divided between the Central Government, the Provincial

¹ *House of Assembly Debates*, 27 February 1971, Col. 86.

² *Daily News*, 29 March 1978.

Administration and Missionary Societies. In 1953, the Bantu Education Act transferred control of African education to the Central Government, and in 1958 the Department of Bantu Education was established. As homeland governments were created, they set up their own education departments, assisted by White officials, and they are responsible for the equipment, construction and maintenance of school buildings, the employment of teachers and control of school boards and hostels.¹ However, they exercise little control over educational budget policy, which remains subject to the White Parliament, although educational finance flows through homeland governments. Early in 1978 it was announced by Mr. Cruywagen that the Bantu Education Act is to be replaced by a new Act to be formulated in consultation with some Black representatives.

The Bantu Education Department, now the Department for Education and Training, is responsible for Black university education throughout the country and for Black schooling in any areas not under a homeland government. The Department gives professional guidance to, and conducts all examinations, in academic schools and in most of the technical and vocational schools. It is responsible for the development of syllabi, the issuing of certificates, educational methods and the

¹Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, p. 128.

maintenance of standards. Within the homelands specialized training such as that required by agricultural extension officers, is conducted by the Department of Plural Relations. The Department of Education and Training is responsible for primary and secondary schooling and for teacher training and vocational training. The Corporation for Economic Development is responsible for management and business training, and the University for academic and professional training. There is also in-service training which is conducted by private firms. The KwaZulu Government may influence decisions taken by these various bodies, but they have no control over them. The KwaZulu Planning Committee established by the homeland Government and consisting of Chief Buthelezi, 6 directors of the KwaZulu departments, representatives of Government development corporations and consultants from outside the Central Government, was intended to oversee economic education and social planning. Its scope, however, has been limited to educational and training programmes under the homeland's jurisdiction.¹

From 1955 to 1973 the African population in South Africa rose by 61%, student enrolment tripled, and facilities did not keep pace. A shortage of teachers makes for such haste in getting a teacher into the classroom that often they are inadequately trained.

¹Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 107.

This seriously affects the quality of education, especially in Black high schools, and contributes to the high failure and drop-out rate. The total output of teachers for the whole of KwaZulu in 1977 was 104. Because of university unrest in 1976, no secondary school teachers were produced for that year.¹

Difficulties range from overcrowded classrooms to teacher poverty. The teacher-pupil ratio is high, desks, chairs and benches are at a premium, and a large number of teachers are required to teach double shift, often without extra pay.² In 1977 the Minister of Education for KwaZulu announced that 2 000 additional teaching posts had been created to improve the staffing situation and to reduce the incidence of double-session schools, which it was planned to eliminate within 5 years. The Department was able to double the allocation for building subsidies for schools in the 1976/77 year and progress was reported all over KwaZulu through the addition of 5 schools and provision of laboratories and classrooms for territorial schools and for schools in townships. An improved allocation for furniture reduced the shortage of seating accommodation in the classrooms.

In 1977, KwaMashu was included within the boundaries

¹Policy Speech of Minister of Education for KwaZulu (1977).

²*South African Women Speak* (1975), p. 22.

of KwaZulu and the KwaMashu education system, formerly under the control of the Department of Bantu Education, became the responsibility of the homeland education department. The KwaZulu Education Department was thus increased by 2 inspectors, 20 lower primary schools, 2 senior secondary schools and 439 teachers. These were additional burdens on an already over-extended budget. The total number of teachers in KwaZulu was increased to approximately 13 464 in 23 circuits. The education allocation in the KwaZulu Estimate of Expenditure for the year ending 1978 is R31 833 000. In 1976/77 it was R24 558 280.¹ Expansion of education in KwaZulu remains dependent on Central Government money allocations. In September 1978, it was reported that KwaZulu schools were short of 3 000 teachers and 527 classrooms. Nine hundred existing classrooms were unfurnished.²

In terms of schools and pupils, the Department is developing, especially in secondary education.³ School population growth during 1976/77 was as follows: 194 new schools were registered, 108 lower primary, 9 combined and higher primary, 72 junior secondary, 1 industrial, 1 apprenticeship, 1 training and 2 senior secondary schools. The total number of schools of all categories

¹KwaZulu Estimate of Expenditure Year ending March 1978; (a).

²J.E. Ndlovu, Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture in KwaZulu. *Daily News*, 26 September 1978.

³Policy Speech of Minister of Education for KwaZulu (1976), p. 6.

in KwaZulu in March 1977 was 1 963. Twenty-eight schools wrote the Form V examinations in 1975, 34 in 1976, 40 in 1977, and 48 will write in 1978.¹ The KwaZulu Department allocated R50 000 for bursaries for the year 1976/77 and 387 students benefitted from bursary awards.

There were 554 658 pupils, 10 423 teachers and 1 588 institutions involved in primary education in KwaZulu under the aegis of the KwaZulu Government in 1975/76. Comparable figures for 1974/75 were 529 404 pupils, 8 441 teachers and 1 448 schools, indicating an overall improvement. The teacher-pupil ratio in 1975/76 was 1:53, the number of schools where double sessions still existed was 832, and the number of candidates who passed primary education in 1975 was 21 305.²

The medium of instruction in primary schools is Zulu and in higher primary it is English. Afrikaans, but no other language, is also taught. Mathematics and Science are inadequately taught, there being few well-trained teachers available in these subjects. Classes are too large for individual attention and the drop-out rate between classes is high. In March 1975, there were 140 051 pupils in sub-Standard A and in March 1976, in

¹Ibid.

² Department of Education and Culture. *KwaZulu Annual Report (1976)*, pp. 5 and 7. *KwaZulu Economic Review 1975*, pp. 54 and 56.

sub-Standard B there were 112 293 pupils, a difference of 28 758, or drop-out rate of 14%. The average growth rate for 1976 was 13%.

There were 226 Junior and Senior Secondary Schools in 1976, staffed by 1 718 teachers and attended by 89 697 pupils. The ratio of pupils to teachers was about 52:1. In 1975, 5 842 pupils passed Junior Secondary School and 1 083 matriculated. The average drop-out during the course of the year was 7%, and between the years 1975 and 1976 it was 33%. The average pupil growth rate for 1976 was 47%. The problem is doubtless compounded by Government policy which dictates that Senior High Schools that have matriculation classes must be established in the homelands. Therefore, large numbers of town-dwelling pupils who wish to go beyond Standard 8 are forced to become boarders in the homelands and bear the cost that this entails.

There is a dearth of laboratories in both Junior and Senior Secondary Schools and facilities for other practical subjects are virtually non-existent. Text-books are often not available and a lack of transportation and accommodation in some areas hampers both teachers and pupils.

There were 2 254 pupils enrolled in March 1975, in

trade and industrial training schools of all natures.¹ The number of candidates who qualified to teach in 1975 was 925. A KwaZulu Institute of Technology is to be established in Umlazi, and technical training is offered at Edendale Technical College and Umlazi Trade and Technical High School. Training is unsatisfactory at both. Trade and vocational education is available at Edendale, Nongoma, Umlazi and Amanzimtoti, and an Apprentice School is planned for Madadeni. Three more Trade and Industrial Schools are planned for Ezikhaweni, Ezakheni or Madadeni or both, and Gamalakhe. There are 4 *ad hoc* Industrial Schools at Isithebe, Ezakheni, Ntuzuma and Enseleni. The first 3 have been in existence for some time and that at Enseleni was scheduled to open in 1977. The Minister of Education, in his Policy Speech at Ulundi in 1977, reported that Africanization of personnel had begun and was to receive encouragement.

Homelands are eroded, overgrazed and badly farmed and yet there were only 4 Black agricultural high schools in the Republic in 1975. Agriculture is offered as a subject in Standard 8 at many schools, but it appears that more effort needs to be devoted to overcoming what Muil regards as an innate hostility to farm work and to inculcating a love for the soil.²

¹Department of Education and Culture. *KwaZulu Annual Report 1976*, p. 8.

²Tim Muil in an interview.

The question of free text books and compulsory education has been a perennial subject in regard to Black education. Neither has been available to African school children although KwaZulu is making very slow advances.¹ In 1974 the Department of Bantu Education issued reading books in home language and official languages to primary schools on the basis of 1 book to 2 pupils. Other books and all stationery had to be bought by parents who also bore all additional costs relative to school and examination fees. This has changed in some respects. Free text books are now supplied to all classes from Standard 3 to Form V.² Readers from Standard 3 to Standard 5 are already supplied free. All text books in 6 subjects of the curriculum have been supplied by the Department from Standard 5 to Form II, although prescribed works, that is books specified for particular courses of study, are excluded in Forms I and II. With the exception of prescribed works, books have been supplied in full from Form III to Form V. The parent has now to pay only for stationery and prescribed works.³ Pupils are unable to take text books home. This is self-defeating since interested parents are still required to purchase their children's needs.

The decision to initiate and implement free and

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²In South Africa, classes in primary schools are frequently referred to as "standards" and in secondary schools as "forms".

³Question by S.Z. Conco. House of Assembly, Ulundi (March 1977).

compulsory education for the nation has been taken by the KwaZulu Government. It is a step with far-reaching consequences.¹ Mr. G.J.M. Coetzee of the Department of Education and Training has estimated that compulsory education for African children between 7 and 15 would cost R245 million to provide. It would cost at least R400 million to bring education facilities to a teacher-pupil ratio of 1 to 30. In 1974, 3,6 million African children between 7 and 15 were taught by 63 000 teachers at 11 800 schools at a cost of R131 million. This represented 75% of children in the age group. If all children of that age attended school it would need 84 000 teachers to instruct 4,8 million pupils at 15 800 schools. Hence the total of R245 million. As a beginning, parents have now to undertake to keep their children at school for up to 4 years without a break. Compulsory education among impoverished people has of necessity to be a coercive arrangement since the earning capacity of children from underprivileged homes is of great account in the upkeep of the family. The Zulu Government has therefore begun a process of "conscientization" of the parents towards the intended goal of free and compulsory education.²

There are other factors which inhibit Black education. Malnutrition which limits learning capacity

¹*Natal Mercury*, 30 July 1975.

²Policy Speech, KwaZulu Education Minister Nxumalo (1977), p. 6.

is rife, and J.W. McQuarrie, a noted educationalist, in explaining the importance of the family in education, especially in infancy, drew attention to the destructive influences of migratory labour, which disrupts family life.¹ One of the most critical problems facing South Africa is that of motivating Blacks, yet job reservation limits skilled and semi-skilled job opportunities. Wages are low, chances of promotion remote, and as a result there is little incentive for Blacks to better themselves.² Hundreds of Black teenagers wandering idly around the townships corroborate this view. Some young Blacks ask aggressively: "Why should I get my matric - look at my brother, he can't get a job. He's been looking for a whole year. How will my matric help me get a job that merits a matric, with my Black skin?" And after the disturbances in Johannesburg in 1976 it was cynically remarked in the townships that matriculants would end up as messengers, whatever they did.

Some observers see Government insistence on mother-language instruction as an impediment to constructive education. Many Zulu have decided that they want their children educated in English. Whereas a White child will receive all his basic instruction from school entry in his mother tongue, a Black child must learn in Zulu

¹*Natal Mercury* - date unknown.

²*Natal Mercury*, 19 February 1977.

up to and including Standard 2 in the Black areas and Standard 4 in White-controlled Black areas.¹ After these standards he must be taught examination subjects in Zulu, English and Afrikaans. His basic instruction is therefore in 3 languages. This anomaly is the result of a disagreement between the Departments of Bantu Education in Pretoria and the KwaZulu Government which wanted all education from Standard 2 in English. Buthelezi was told that this would only be permitted from Standard 5 in White-controlled Black areas. One of Transkei's first acts as a semi-independent entity was to institute English as a medium of instruction. Buthelezi speaks of English as the "bread and butter language of the world". Many Black teachers find the exclusive use of the vernacular, with which the majority of Black children leave school, an enormous handicap. In the teaching of science and technology, for which little Zulu terminology exists, artificial words have had to be created which makes teaching and learning even more difficult. Professor E.G. Malherbe has been heard to quote a Transkei Chief who said: "It is good to know one's mother tongue. If I know that, I am like a chicken picking inside a hencoop. But when I know the White man's language I can soar like an eagle."

KwaZulu has a "Zulu" university, controlled by the

¹*Daily News*, 21 June 1976.

Republican Government, where specialized training is available, and extra-mural courses may be taken through the University of South Africa in those courses which are not available. Attendance at universities willing to take Black students, particularly those of the Witwatersrand, Cape Town and Natal, may be allowed by the Minister. Medical students can attend the Medical School in Durban. The Government of KwaZulu has not influenced the running of the University of Zululand and until recently the University Council had no Zulu members.

In 1975 the South African Government took a decision to phase out Black students from the Natal Medical School, the country's only Black Medical school, and to establish a new university for Blacks at Garankuwa, near Pretoria, which would include a medical faculty. Public protest resulted in the deferment of the date of transfer, but not the decision. There is a great discrepancy in the doctor-patient ratio between Whites and Blacks. For the former it is 1 doctor to 400 patients; for the latter, in rural areas, 1 doctor has to attend to the needs of 40 000 patients.¹ Buthelezi has expressed concern at the establishment of a new Black Medical School in another homeland which could, at some stage, take independence. He believes that there is ample room for the two universities to co-exist. But in

¹Professor John Reid, the then Dean of the Medical School.

the event of the Natal School ceasing to cater for Black students, the position of Zulu students in a foreign state could become tenuous and they might even be denied entry. Replying to a question on the Education Vote, KwaZulu Assembly Session beginning 16 March 1977, he said that the proposed Black Medical School should not be in any homeland; when the project was first broached he had suggested Soweto as the best location.

Problems at university level in KwaZulu stem, in part, from the isolation of the university from contact with the expertise and knowledge of Western academics and technocracy. The young University of Zululand is like an "academic oasis" in the desert of underdevelopment that is KwaZulu. Buildings rise out of veld near Empangeni in a *milieu* bare of factories, towns, office blocks, cities and businesses which could absorb the graduates. University education for Blacks is designed, it would seem, to produce Zulu who incidentally have degrees. A Senior Academic has said that this is the extent of the failure of the Separate Development policy. Most of these graduates could not compete with White graduates "and unfortunately," he added cynically, "under present policy won't have to." Within the framework of Nationalist policy the university appears to be viable. In 1976 the University of Zululand had 2 Black Professors on its staff and 24 Whites, 4 Black Senior Lecturers and 47 Whites, and 17 Black Lecturers and 24 Whites - a total

of 23 Black and 95 White members of staff.¹ Although a small minority of Blacks continue to oppose university Apartheid, the majority have had no alternative but to accept the institutions, and enrolment grows. While Blacks are barred from entering White universities of right, enrolment of Blacks at UNISA, a correspondence university, increases annually.² It was reiterated by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education that applications from Blacks for admission to universities for Whites would be considered only in respect of courses which were not offered at Black universities.

A feature of tribal universities militating against Black students is that, if for any reason they are not acceptable to the university of their ethnic group, they have no other university to go to and their professional ambitions could be at an end. This became particularly apparent in the 1976 academic year when 200 students were refused readmission after unrest at the University of Zululand. In June part of the buildings of the University of Zululand were destroyed, cars were set on fire and Whites had to flee for their lives when rioting broke out on the campus near Empangeni. The destruction was caused to express sympathy with the Soweto student riots and the university was closed for the rest of the

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1976), p. 367.

²*House of Assembly Debates*, 23 March 1973, Col. 507.

year. In May, students at the university had demonstrated against the "Bantustan system" at a graduation ceremony at which an Honorary Doctorate of Law was conferred upon Chief Buthelezi. His car was stoned, and a clash ensued between these students and Buthelezi's supporters. The burden of the confrontation was Buthelezi's acceptance of an honorary degree from a "Bantustan institution".¹ Buthelezi reported in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in March 1977, that attempts were made by the KwaZulu Government to get those students who had been expelled from the University of Zululand either readmitted or admitted elsewhere. Mention has been made that not a single teacher graduated from the university in 1976. Owing to the unrest there were no graduates at all from the University of Zululand in that year.

Apart from the circumscribed education at an ethnic university which causes resentment, an important result of university Separate Development is the hostility many Black students feel at their implied rejection by the White establishment. The mere existence of ethnic universities seems to have contributed to an increasingly militant Black Nationalism.² This attitude is substantiated by lecturers at the University of Zululand

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1976), p. 370, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 May 1976.

²*The Snyman Commission Report* (1975), is of the same opinion.

who report that many of their students do not accept the principle that any education is better than none at all. Many accept what is presented sullenly, and only because they have no alternative.

The gap between matriculation and university for White students is a source of anxiety among White educationalists.¹ For Blacks it is compounded by an impoverished school education system. In spite of the apparent intention of the Government to "make Zulu out of Zulu", the university must also give its students the knowledge and expertise of Western technocracy in order to equip them fully. Acculturation would be more complete in a racially mixed campus where students could learn from each other academically and socially, and where the by-product would be possibly closer, more harmonious race relations.

"Africanization" is official policy at the University of Zululand, although Buthelezi has expressed doubt in this regard on the grounds that an unhealthy "intellectual inbreeding" could ensue. Different salary scales obtain but apparently the Black staff is "not hysterical about it".² Philosophically they accept that adjustment will

¹The Snyman Commission accepted the fact that the gap between school and university is much wider for the Black student than it is for the White; p. 159.

²Professor Nzimande, Head of the Psychology Department, in an interview with Tim Muil.

take time and at the time of writing such adjustment is under discussion. The University's own graduates are apparently now beginning to return as staff members and are finding a place in the administration. As mentioned, the University is controlled not by Blacks, but from Pretoria. Buthelezi fears that this could mean that an indigenous orientation, vital in a liberation struggle, could be muted or missing. He compares the situation to that of the Afrikaner's struggle for liberation from British Colonialism when such an orientation was an important element.¹ However, in March 1977, steps were taken toward greater autonomy for Black universities. Legislation contemplating this move was introduced in the Senate by Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr. Treurnicht.²

On September 25, 1974, violence erupted at the University of the North, Turfloop, and the Government set up the one-man Snyman Commission to investigate the disturbances. The report appeared in February 1976, and suggested that the university reflected the conditions within the society in which it functioned. It concluded that the policy of Separate Development would not, without adjustment, ensure racial harmony and orderly progress in

¹Report of a speech he made on a visit to Canada.
Daily News, 6 March 1975.

²
Radio Broadcast, 2 March 1977.

South Africa.¹ Government assumptions and White attitudes led Mr. Justice J.H. Snyman to conclude that, although the militant Black students organization, SASO, and the rise of Black consciousness, could be blamed for the anti-White hostility on the Turfloop campus, there was "no doubt that the causes are rooted in the broad patterns of life of both White and Black in South Africa", and were not solely the responsibility of leftist agitation.²

The Commission raised a series of profound questions about issues central to Government policy. Although it indicated that direct causes such as disparity in salaries and a lack of autonomy and control in the affairs of the university caused the immediate disturbances of September 25, 1974, it drew attention to much more deeply-seated causes. The decrees that a Black man must be confined in his social existence, his work and study within his own ethnic group, White paternalistic attitudes, and statutory and traditional restrictions imposed on the Blacks mainly in the interests of Whites, the often unpleasant personal experiences many urbanized, sophisticated and Westernized Blacks were forced to endure at the hands of many Whites, made clear to the Commission the reason for the hostility discerned. Rejection of Separate Development, of the university and of anything

¹*Snyman Commission Report* (1975), pp. 144-164.

²*Ibid.*, p. 151.

that was planned for them, and their acceptance of SASO's policy, "all these things actually sprang from the sense of impotence and frustration built up in them in the face of the White's position of power over them and their powerlessness to fight it and to obtain what they believe to be their due".¹ Apart from Separate Development itself, the manner in which measures are implemented, the lack of consultation and the sacrifices Blacks are expected to make while most of the benefits go to Whites, bred fierce resentment. The many restrictive rules that take no account of a new dimension among sophisticated, educated and Westernized Blacks led Mr. Justice Snyman to conclude that if attitudes on both sides of the colour line did not change, the potential for country-wide revolutionary activities would be enormous.

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This overview of the development process of KwaZulu and of land consolidation issues does little to discourage the impression that KwaZulu is anything other than the impoverished periphery of a wealthy core. Made up of scattered land blocks, all poor, backward, overcrowded and unhealthy, it is dominated by the Republic of South Africa, fiscally dependent on it and little able to

¹Ibid., p. 154.

influence its own developmental policies. It has limited legislative competence and even after achieving self-government needs the approval of the Central Government in a large number of areas. Unless KwaZulu acquires a fairer distribution of the resources of the Republic and adequate international assistance, it is doubtful to what extent it will be able to be economically independent and to generate sufficient employment at home for a growing population, or to possess the ability to produce sufficient physical and human capital to achieve self-sustained growth.

The South African Government's approach to KwaZulu rests on the basic assumption that an economically undeveloped area is capable of political independence and economic advance despite its proximity to a powerful, politically cohesive, economically dominating state. Nominally such autonomy may be achievable; but economically and socially it may not be a realizable objective without radical change in both core and periphery, as the core-periphery model predicts. This chapter, by concentrating on the details of KwaZulu's economic, social and educational status, seems to a large extent to illustrate how necessary such radical change is.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICS OF KAWZULU

- PART I PERENNIAL CRISES AND CONFLICTS:
AN OVERVIEW.
- PART II KWAZULU'S ABSENT "CITIZENS"; URBAN
AFFAIRS AND ATTITUDES.
- PART III INKATHA AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION.
- PART IV CHIEF MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELEZI.

CHAPTER 4PART IPERENNIAL CRISES AND CONFLICTS: AN OVERVIEW

Inadequate and undeveloped though KwaZulu may be, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, as a homeland leader, has become a major figure in South African politics. Despite criticism from the left, and harassment from the White Establishment, he continues to operate within the Separate Development framework and takes advantage of the opportunities it provides for political manoeuvre. Yet his Administration is faced with a plethora of problems and potentially disruptive conflicts.

One such problem is the limited leverage KwaZulu has as a result of its undevelopment, which is reinforced by Buthelezi's "less than successful" drives for foreign investment.¹ On his return from a visit to Canada, he reported that it was often impossible to discuss investment in South Africa because of the hostility shown by many of the groups he was invited to address. "I have noticed that the farther away from South Africa one goes,

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 30 November 1975.

the bigger and better the blood-bath certain extremists, resident out of the country seem to want - in South Africa," he said.¹ The lack of development which such attitudes reinforce impedes the advance of the homeland and strains the credibility of homeland politicians. Moreover, alternative means of enhancing economic prospects, such as steps to impose agricultural discipline on some Zulu farmers, have been vigorously resisted, both of which kinds of failure leave Buthelezi in the position of having to depend more heavily than he would choose on what the White Government often sees as its *largesse*. White politicians and officials condemn underdevelopment as "cultural backwardness", and use this as a justification for not considering larger land allocations for the homeland.² The problems of underdevelopment and poverty in KwaZulu seem, therefore, to be self-reinforcing.

Buthelezi thus has to fashion a course between demands for sharing, requests for aid, attempts at self-discipline, and drives for foreign capital which have produced little concrete results while earning him the enmity of radicals in South Africa and abroad who favour "disinvestment" from South Africa.³ In January 1978, he

¹Ibid.

²See, for example, remarks of Mr. B. Dladla, former KwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, in *Natal Mercury*, 5 January 1974.

³*Natal Mercury*, 8 and 29 October 1973, and *Sunday Times*, 18 November 1973.

sharply condemned a call for sanctions against South Africa by exiled editor Donald Woods.¹ On this issue he finds himself siding with the White *régime* against many prominent Black spokesmen, anomalously supporting the entrenchment of the system in the hopes of changing it. It would not be surprising if it were true, as Buthelezi reported to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1976, that a directive had been issued to guerrilla trainees in Dar es Salaam, that one of their first targets on their return to Natal should be him.²

KwaZulu's economic weakness reinforces itself also in classic peripheral style; limited employment opportunities in industry and the low wage structure accelerate migration to the White areas, and Buthelezi is unwilling to alienate those Zulu prepared to travel to core areas in search of higher salaries by preventing such movement. Added to the drain of labour is the depletion of skilled Zulu available to KwaZulu development programmes. An attempt in 1975 by well-meaning Whites to ameliorate the shortages that result from migration was thwarted by the White Government. White teachers had volunteered their services in the homelands at the same salary as is offered to Black teachers but, although the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was prepared to allow these teachers to live in White areas and teach in nearby

¹*Natal Mercury*, 30 January 1978.

²Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech (May 1976), p. 24.

KwaZulu schools, the Central Government rejected the request for permission to establish the scheme on the grounds that it would be impractical to control such a service, and that volunteers would be unable to enjoy conditions of service such as pension and medical aid schemes.¹

Frustration in so many facets of corporate existence in KwaZulu is reflected in social and productivity issues, in low morale, in social dislocation and dissension and in an induly high rate of alcoholism and corruption, especially among civil servants. Allegations of widespread fraud, forgery and theft within the KwaZulu Government Service have been reported, and although refuted by the authorities concerned, it has been alleged that as much as 10% of the annual budget could be involved in these practices. Buthelezi himself constantly inveighs against Zulu alcoholism, which he has described as a "cancer eating into the fibre of our Society".² Such problems of morale and dishonesty are, while of course not confined to peripheral countries, often characteristic of peripheral status.³

Another problem facing both KwaZulu and Buthelezi

¹*Natal Mercury*, 16 October 1975.

²*Daily News* and *Natal Mercury*, 15 October 1975, 12 November 1975. *Sunday Tribune*, 14 March 1976.

³Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, p. 227.

is the latter's "inhibiting political dominance".¹ He is kept under close surveillance by the Central Government and accuses some seconded White officials of deliberately going out of their way to make life unpleasant for Zulu servants loyal to the KwaZulu leadership by trying to focus the frustrations of African work-seekers on homeland leaders, for example, with the taunt, "Go and ask Buthelezi for a job". The South African Government Department of Information, now disbanded, has in the past given open publicity and perhaps covert support to opposition to Buthelezi. In 1972, for example, Buthelezi found it necessary to complain about a journal entitled "Africa South". This journal, he said, "was conducting a campaign denigrating me and was distributed by certain government agents and was freely available in government offices, and even on display in the office of the Commissioner General of KwaZulu, Mr. Henry Torlage. I made a formal complaint to Mr. Torlage because it was found in government offices and it disappeared".² The KwaZulu leadership took umbrage too, when a party of 40 White politicians toured the area to get a "broad view" (described by the homeland authorities as an "expensive window dressing jaunt"), yet could not keep an appointment with Buthelezi because they had to attend a reception

¹L. Schlemmer and T.J. Muil, *Social and political Change in the African Areas*. Paper prepared for conference, *Change in Contemporary Africa*, Wesleyan/Yale Universities (April 1974), p. 20.

²*Daily News*, 26 January 1972.

given by the local Member of Parliament.¹

Anti-Buthelezi political parties have intermittently surfaced, although all have been short-lived.² In 1972 a group of city dwellers, backed by traditionalists and led by Mr. Lloyd Ndaba, a Soweto businessman, formed the Zulu National Party. In 1973 Umkhonto Ka Shaka (Shaka's Spear) was organized. In favour of Separate Development and opposed to Buthelezi's notion of African solidarity, it met with representatives of the Republic's Bureau of State Security and is suspected to have had its financial backing. One of its leaders was Chief Charles Hlengwa, former chairman of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. In 1975, White men were alleged to be offering bribes to officials of the KwaZulu Government to set up national organizations to oppose the chief.³ In 1976 Buthelezi publicly castigated those whom he believed to be involved, including Chief Hlengwa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republican Government, and officials of the South African Government in South Africa and abroad.⁴

There has been more formal interference as well. Buthelezi was not allowed to have a White secretary of

¹*Daily News*, 1 August 1975.

²Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 56-57.

³*Natal Mercury*, 21 August 1975.

⁴Buthelezi (16) speech at a KwaZulu Prayer Breakfast, (Durban: April 1976), p. 21.

his choice and a highly-trained private secretary from abroad was refused permission to enter the country.¹ In January 1976, a visa was refused to Mr. Andrew Clark, who was being seconded to KwaZulu by Oxfam, an international organization committed to peaceful development. Mr. Clark was a specialist in community development and held a Master's degree in his subject, and would have been an asset to the KwaZulu development programme.² A request for an autonomous radio station, after funds from abroad were promised, was refused.³ South African broadcasting services in Zulu over Radio Bantu have been unsympathetic to Chief Buthelezi, and his speeches for broadcasting have been censored and criticised.⁴ The Department of Bantu Administration and Development has tried to impose curbs by means of a protocol guide on the travelling and political contacts of the homeland leader.⁵ These have often been ignored, but they have caused resentment and inconvenience.

Buthelezi is well aware of a growing governmental impatience with him which, he says, "exists in high

¹L. Schlemmer and T. Muil, *Social and Political Change in the African Areas*, p. 20.

²Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech (May 1976), p. 33.

³A resolution in this regard was one of the first passed by Inkatha.

⁴*Natal Mercury* 16 June 1972. Buthelezi's rejection of the consolidation proposals, for example, was regarded by Radio Bantu as "immature".

⁵*Daily News*, 5 July 1972.

places".¹ He remarked to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in May, 1976, that an international journalist had once told him that the Secretary of Information had volunteered the information that no effort would be spared to have Buthelezi removed from his office and disclosed to the Assembly that there were people who would swear on oath that there was up to R80 000 available to anybody who would eliminate or kill him.² He drew the attention of the House to an editorial in the Afrikaans press in which his authority in KwaZulu was denigrated.³ The editorial indicated that his position of leadership was far from being unchallenged, both from the political right and the left. It accused the KwaZulu leader of conjuring up before unsophisticated people visions of Black rule over the whole of South Africa and of undermining other homeland leaders with the accusation that they showed no loyalty to their birthright by accepting the "so-called" independence.

Conflict between the Chief Executive Councillor and the Zulu Royal House has been the source of much bitterness. Despite the King's acceptance of his role within the Constitution, a role that was reaffirmed in later years by both the Assembly and by Inkatha, there have been attempts to involve him in efforts to oust the chief on a number of

¹Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech (May 1976), p. 11.

²Ibid. See also *Daily News* and *Natal Mercury*, 18 May 1976.

³*Die Burger*, 16 March 1976.

occasions. He has been involved in attempts to form opposition parties by members of the Zulu Royal House antagonistic to Buthelezi, and by opponents of Inkatha, in particular businessmen from urban areas opposed to certain KwaZulu economic projects. At the Nongoma celebrations of the King's fourth year as Paramount Chief, to which Buthelezi's Cabinet was not invited, a White official employed by Iscor, where members of the Royal House are also employed, collected a large sum of money for the occasion. While the implications are far from clear, Buthelezi referred the matter to the Security Police of the Central Government.

There is also alleged to have been an attempt by the King to enlist the support of KwaZulu tribes astride the Mozambique-KwaZulu border, presumably in a bid to oust Buthelezi.¹ It appears that, with the consent of Frelimo, and accompanied by a member of the South African Police, the King travelled to Mozambique to visit the Tembe tribe who were part of Shaka's original empire. The visit was described by the Security Police as "nothing out of the ordinary". During 1975, a Transvaal organization called Abelvi Benala, backed by King Goodwill, apparently attempted to discourage the growth of Inkatha in that Province. To counter these moves, Buthelezi summoned a National Council of Inkatha early in 1976, and

¹*Natal Mercury*, 13 and 15 December 1975, *Sunday Times*, 14 December 1975.

it prevailed upon the King to sign a declaration pledging the cessation of political activity. The position rests there.¹ The King attends meetings of the Legislative Assembly in his constitutional, non-participatory capacity, escorted by Chief Buthelezi, and is greeted on entrance and exit with the royal chant of "Bayete" by members present. He has always been empowered to address the House should he so desire, and a more recent decision has been taken that when the King is in the House he, and not the Speaker, is addressed.

Another problem with which Buthelezi and KwaZulu have had to contend is that the policy of Separate Development could be nurturing, and even provoking, enmity between different Black races within the borders of South Africa. The portents for future friction are ominous and arguments in regard to border boundaries have already manifested themselves. The Ingwavuma district of KwaZulu has, for example, been claimed by the Ngomezulu Chief, representing those who were "seeing themselves not as Zulu subjects, but as Swazi subjects", which claim has been seen by Buthelezi as "an attempt to rob us of the little land we occupy".² The dispute which has resulted has the potential of a serious international incident as the "brewers of this trouble have sought refuge in

¹*Survey of Race Relations of South Africa* (1976), p. 248.

²*Daily News*, 26 May 1976.

Swaziland and continue to operate from there". Similarly, debate in the Transkeian Legislative Assembly has indicated that the KwaZulu southern areas were being claimed as Transkeian territory. Since Transkei is an independent state, such claims on KwaZulu territory could have significant repercussions.¹ Transkei, soon after independence, claimed as its territory the towns of Harding and Port Shepstone.² The claim was countered by KwaZulu's assertion that Shaka's land extended as far south as the Umzimvubu River and thus some parts of Transkei in fact belonged to KwaZulu. The KwaZulu Councillor of Roads and Works, Everson Xolo, went so far as to point out that Transkei should have sorted out its land boundaries before it opted for independence.³ Transkei subsequently declared that it was prepared for an armed struggle with South Africa to get land in East Griqualand and part of Natal unless South Africa ceded it peacefully. Chief Kaiser Matanzima, opening the Annual Congress of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party, is reported as having said: "It was our strategy to take what we did in order to get what we want."⁴ Buthelezi has, in consequence, suggested that the Organization of African Unity be approached to "minimize fraternal conflicts in our country in an independence

¹*Daily News*, 6 May 1976.

²*Ibid.*

³*Sunday Tribune*, 6 March 1977.

⁴*Natal Mercury*, 9 March 1977.

situation, by convening a Pan-African Treaty Conference to help decide these issues".¹ An approach has been made to this Organization, and in 1977, while on a visit to America, Chief Buthelezi repeated his call for such a conference.² He has based his suggestion on the fact that KwaZulu has common borders with internationally recognized Mozambique and Swaziland, and with independent Transkei. Such a Pan-African Treaty Conference could help to reconcile the views of those who believe in independence and those who believe in majority rule in one common area. "This should not be taken as political heresy by the South African Government," added Buthelezi, "since South Africa is intent, anyway, on coming to terms with Black Africa, and such a meeting could provide the opportunity for finding common ground with the rest of Africa."

Buthelezi is obviously concerned about relationships with Transkei and he used the opportunity of his policy speech to the Legislative Assembly in May 1976, to highlight what he considers the major areas of conflict. He expressed surprise that Matanzima had not, in view of their common strategy, taken his fellow Black leaders into his confidence when he made his final decision to opt

¹Buthelezi (19), *Policy Speech (1976)*, p. 19.

²Buthelezi (37), *Past, Present and Future Strategies in the Black Struggle for Liberation in South Africa*. Convocation address, University of Williamete, Salem, Oregon (United States: February 1977).

for independence; instead, he had denied such a rumour at the time of the Umtata Summit Meeting in 1973.¹ Matanzima had also been instrumental, prior to Transkei independence, in arranging meetings with the Prime Minister, and in the light of the situation in southern Africa Buthelezi had been keen to have another such meeting but Matanzima had not initiated one. Meetings with the Prime Minister may well have been "ongoing things"² as far as Matanzima and Mangope were concerned, but the leader of about 4½ million Zulu, the largest race group in the country, had been excluded. "They treat me as a naughty child," he said in an interview.³ A meeting was finally arranged in October 1976, but Buthelezi had not met with the Prime Minister for a year prior to that date.

Buthelezi's clashes with Matanzima, acrimonious at times, led him to tell his Assembly in 1976 that he would be afraid to attend the imminent independence celebrations in Transkei, even if he were invited.⁴ Buthelezi has also taunted Matanzima on the acquisition of some

¹See also Lawrence, *The Transkei: South Africa's Politics of Partition* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976), pp. 98-103.

²A view expressed by the Prime Minister and the Nationalist candidate in the Durban North Parliamentary By-election in May 1976.

³Interview with the writer, 1976.

⁴See *Daily News*, 6 October 1976.

impressive farms for himself and his colleagues from land ceded by White South Africa in response to persistent demands from Transkei.¹ Buthelezi declared that he himself had no intention of obtaining farms since the land was for the use of his people. Despite such public feuding and differences of attitude and approach, Buthelezi observed, in a private discussion, that whatever stance Matanzima assumed, when the "noise (of independence) has died down, he will still be in the same boat as I am. Half the Xhosas live in South Africa, and in fact the dynamics of the political situation will not have changed at all".

Another area of internecine conflict is that which surrounds the debate of "legitimacy". Mrs. Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela, former leader of the African National Congress now held in detention on Robben Island, levelled what Buthelezi saw as a vicious attack on him in a funeral address for Joseph Mdluli, who died in the custody of the Security Police soon after he was arrested. The attack was based on Mrs. Mandela's assertion that Buthelezi was a stooge of the South African Government and not a real leader of the people, since the "real" leaders of the people were banned. Buthelezi reminded Mrs. Mandela in a speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, that he had very early appealed to the Central Government for the release of Mandela when others had been "afraid to bell the cat". By contrast,

¹ *Sunday Tribune*, 18 April 1976.

"Matanzima's position on Mandela has been ambivalent, despite the fact that Nelson is not only a Transkeian but a relative of the Matanzimas". In a pre-independence interview, Matanzima declared that he intended to take up the matter of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners who were "prominent Transkeians". "I think the Republic will listen to me ... I have grounds for it," he is reported as saying. In response to the question "would Mandela ... not find it difficult to accommodate to Transkei because of his opposition to the partition of South Africa into Bantustans", he replied that Mandela and others like him "will come to a partitioned Transkei. If they cannot find themselves happy in the Transkei, they are free to go and live elsewhere".¹

In drawing attention to the friction potential between Blacks for which Separate Development may be largely responsible, reference must be made to one further development. Subsequent to the funeral of the nationalist leader Robert Sobukwe, informed commentators observed that extremists to the political right and left are now seeing Buthelezi and his Inkatha organization as a powerful threat to themselves and this may have tribal connotations;² the observation was made that those groups that reviled Buthelezi at the funeral ceremony spoke in

¹*Natal Mercury*, 23 October 1976.

²*The Economist*, 18 March 1978.

Xhosa. Speakers at a subsequent meeting of the Central Committee of Inkatha, and at an Inkatha Youth Brigade meeting, deploring the attack on the Chief by Mrs. Mandela, put it this way. "You are polarizing black Africans from other black Africans. You are creating a precipice for your own black brothers of South Africa."¹

The dilemma is, of course, that for those Blacks who refuse to have anything whatsoever to do with Separate Development or its institutions, rejection of Buthelezi and Inkatha is a rational choice. The polarization that may then be inevitable will be one which will divide Blacks into potentially hostile camps, thus delaying, or introducing the element of violent civil dissension, into any programme of power-sharing. A fusion of the two views - those who believe that most can be achieved by working within the system, and those who reject it utterly - might not be impossible to achieve at the incipient stages of the breach. As it develops, however, this task will become harder. Power-sharing will no longer be adequate for the radical group, and its authoritarian or socialist alternatives will repel the more moderate faction.

Such a conflict, with the monarchists perhaps also asserting their presence, even within the Zulu group and

¹Inkatha Central Committee Meeting (Ondini: 31 March - 1 April 1978).

inter-tribal tensions aside, will confuse and possibly retard the liberation process. But the drive for radical change within KwaZulu structures is almost certain to parallel Black frustrations in growth; revolutionary change will become, if it is not already, the objective of the radicals. This alternative may seem increasingly attractive to the Zulu masses, and the predictions of the radicalization of the periphery if change is not forthcoming may be realized in this way. If improvement of conditions in the periphery is not generated under the present system, those who see radical change as essential to real autonomy and development may be vindicated.

CHAPTER 4PART IIKWAZULU'S ABSENT "CITIZENS";
URBAN AFFAIRS AND ATTITUDES

Blacks constitute almost 71% of South Africa's labour force.¹ Of the 100 000 workers whom it is estimated the homelands add to the labour market annually, 34,8% do not find employment within the homeland or border areas.² Many of these migrate to the "White" urban centres, and it is anticipated that by 2000 A.D. there will be between 20 and 30 million urban Blacks.

Black urban areas are administered by 22 Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. (See Appendix VII for the hierarchical structure of the Administration.) In accordance with Government policy, these Boards have to be completely self-sufficient, and they are constantly short of funds. Their 3 basic sources of revenue are housing rents, fees from service levies and registration, and revenue from the sale of "Bantu" beer and liquor over which the Boards have a monopoly in the Black townships. With the exception of levies paid by employers of all

¹*To the Point*, 30 July 1976, pp. 7-9.

²*Ibid.*

except domestic Black labourers, all the Boards' revenue comes from Blacks themselves; yet Blacks have little, if any, say in its expenditure.

Although Black townships are allowed to elect Urban Bantu Councils or Advisory Boards, these bodies have a purely advisory function in relation to the Administration Board which, in effect, is the sole administrative body in the area, and which refers its most important decisions to the Department of Plural Relations and Development. Urban Bantu Councils are ineffective.¹ They have been referred to as nothing more than "toy telephones", instruments which appear to have a communication function but which have nothing more than a decorative purpose.² Legislative machinery necessary to create executive powers for the Urban Bantu Councils exists in the Act that established the Councils in 1968, and although Urban Bantu Council members have been asking for these powers to be made effective, little has been done.³ However, in April 1978, elections were held in Soweto for a Community Council instead of an Urban Bantu Council. This is seen by many as a possible

¹Pierre Hugo, UNISA Development Administrator and Politics Lecturer. See also *Race Relations News*, August 1976, p. 1.

²Ibid.

³Brenda Robinson, *Daily News*, 4 August 1976.

forerunner to an autonomous City Council in Soweto.¹

South Africa, according to Professor Philip Mayer, is facing, in the Black agglomerations which exist in every town and city, an "American style Black Ghetto" problem as well as a "British style - decolonization" crisis.² The Government seeks to cater to both problems through bestowing a Bantustan Nationality on all Blacks, those in designated homelands as well as those who live and work mostly in "White" cities. The intention is that city dwellers, like residents of Bantustans, will acquire a new concept of South African society and re-define their political identities not as South African nationals, but as non-resident "Bantustanees". Urban Blacks, the policy's proponents hope, will then feel "a sense of belonging", the absence of which a prominent Black editor warned could lead to indifference to the welfare and stability of South African society.³ Yet it is the Black town-dweller who stands to lose the most by the implementation of Separate Development, since he will be deprived of even the hope of achieving those rights in "White" South Africa which his rural counterpart is often

¹Television Interviews, 5 and 10 April 1978.

²P. Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, The Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, South African Institute of Race Relations (Johannesburg: 1972), p. 2.

³Mr. Obed Kunene, Editor of *Ilanga*, in an address to the Institute of Race Relations in Pietermaritzburg. *Daily News*, 21 May 1976.

too far removed to claim.

The urban Black's view of South African society seems to be conditioned by two social facts, the experience of being discriminated against and the fact that the basis of discrimination is his colour; and because he cannot change his colour, he is unable to change the circumstances of his life. The result is a sense of crushing hopelessness.¹ Although in recent times the Government has said that racialism is no longer an officially recognized basis of policy in South Africa, privileges and opportunities remain available on the basis of colour and not on merit. Mayer's investigations bear out that Blacks are resentful of the restrictions to which they are subjected, and this resentment encompasses all areas in which there is compulsion, discrimination, inequality, inconvenience and degradation. They see themselves as "pariahs"² confined to the lowest status in a society founded on conquest. It is important to emphasize that these impressions are not always the result of the

¹Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, p. 3. See also Dr. Ellen Hellman, "Inevitable Destiny a Shared Society", *Zionist Record and S.A. Jewish Chronicle* (Johannesburg: 18 March 1977).

²In the sociological sense given to it by Max Weber quoted in Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, p. 5. An earlier reference to "pariah" is found in this comment: "Awakening on Friday morning June 20th, 1913, the South African Native found himself not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth." *Plaatjie Sol. T., Native Life in South Africa*, p. 17. Quoted in Tatz, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa*, p. 23.

impact made by political leaders and journalists, for while the media may influence the political socialization of the more educated, most urban Blacks, illiterate and humbly educated, owe their ideas and images to their own life experience. It was Mayer's experience, borne out by interviews conducted by the author with literate Blacks, that the ideal model of society for urban Blacks was not independent Bantustans but a single South Africa where colour would be irrelevant to opportunity. Despite the implementation of the Bantustan policy, such a view has persisted in the cities, and Buthelezi shares it.

The political resocialization of Black people which would cause them to think of themselves not as citizens deprived of equal citizenship in a united South Africa but as nationals of new national units or Bantustans, would need to be based on 3 elements - attachment to their respective ethno-linguistic groups or tribal loyalty, attachment to the land itself and the geographic regions allotted as their homelands, and pride in the new independent governmental structures.¹ The urban Zulu would thus identify with the Zulu language, Zulu customs, his notion of Zulu history, and his structured links with a community in KwaZulu through his dealings with relatives there or with chiefs and headmen.

¹Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, pp. 8-10.

Schlemmer found in 1971 that 60% of African town-dwellers paid allegiance to a Zulu Chief and over 50% had land rights in country areas.¹ However, maintaining status in tribal society is not always motivated by tribal loyalty. The reason often is a purely pragmatic one that results from a profound sense of insecurity in urban areas and has little to do with any deep intellectual or political conviction.² Tribal feeling would appear to be strongest in the older generation and in people with conservative rural backgrounds who accept the official view that they are strangers in town, there for the specific purpose of earning money and pleased to return to their country homes as soon as it becomes economically possible for them to do. As Mayer points out, however, modern influences make it difficult to encapsulate oneself among a few similarly tribal-minded associates, and he believes that in time this old-style tribal pride and identity will cease to provide a solid foundation for a Bantustan national loyalty among town-dwellers. It could, on the other hand, were it to remain, either combine with a greater South Africanism which could include the Whites, or with an aggressive Black nationalism merging the tribe with a general Black resistance against

¹L. Schlemmer, "City or Rural Homeland. A study of patterns of identification among Africans in South Africa's Divided Society", reprinted *Social Forces*, vol. 51, No. 41. Copyright University of Natal (Carolma Press: December 1972).

²Jill Nattrass in an address on *Focus on KwaZulu* at University of Natal (1974).

Whites. Many town-dwellers, especially the better educated, denounce tribalism as a denial of Black solidarity. It could thus be suggested that the main cleavage would be between Black and White, and that internal division between Blacks would be of little account. Tribal differences in many situations would thus become meaningless.

This could well be so. The Anglo-American Corporation has experimented with a situation in which it has tried to eliminate "tribal Apartheid" among mine workers on its gold mines. Such differentiation has often resulted in rioting and industrial unrest because it accentuates tribal differences. In the past there has been very little ethnic division underground, and often a good team spirit has prevailed. The hope of extending this atmosphere to off-duty periods above ground motivated the introduction in two mines in the Orange Free State of a new arrangement; instead of housing the men in groups based on ethnic divisions, they were housed by what are known as "mine captain sections", or housing in accordance with work groupings cutting across ethnic lines.¹ The experiment proved to be so successful that similar arrangements were made in over 90% of the hostels operating in the 11 gold mines controlled by Anglo-American.²

¹*Daily News and Natal Mercury*, 17 November 1975.

²Information supplied by Mr. Robert Godsell, Industrial Relations Officer, Anglo-American Corporation.

As with tribal feeling, so attachment to regions has not been found necessarily an indication of a nascent Bantustan loyalty.¹ An urban "ethos" existed according to the degree of urban and industrial advancement, and Mayer found that historical regional loyalties and prejudices were not necessarily being deployed in terms of the new Bantustan political structures. Identification was often a matter of being from a region, but not necessarily a "citizen" of it.

In regard to the third element, pride in the new, ostensibly autonomous homeland governmental structures, no conclusive evidence of political re-socialization was found. The creation and impending independence of regions with which urban Blacks were ethnically associated has been variously received by town-dwellers. Attitudes run from indifference to profound interest and from warm approval to passionate antagonism. Investigations suggest that the less educated, but aware, were enthusiastic; the better educated were more reserved and sceptical and held fast to their image of a united South African society, unable to see any point in Bantustan self-government which they suggested encouraged tribalism and the evils attached to tribalism. This latter attitude was expressed as cynicism about Separate Development itself. Even the most positively inclined

¹Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, p. 9.

among the better educated Blacks had doubts about development into "real" countries, with "real" governments and they pointed to the ineffectiveness inherent in the geographical distribution of the homeland. Despite this there was some acknowledgement of the freedom from petty Apartheid and regimentation that the Bantustans offered and the concept of self-government enhanced to some degree this attraction. But it seemed to be that many of those who praised this freedom were in fact town-born with few links to the homeland. Conversely, many born in a homeland and with first-hand experience of it derided a Bantustan system. For some urban Blacks the Bantustan offered the hope of a future escape from hard urban reality while they also felt committed to the city, either by birth, upbringing or economic necessity. However, many believed that they could not earn a living in their homeland area. For all this, it seems likely that there could be Black town-dwellers, whether town or country-rooted, highly or lowly educated, who would welcome the idea of Bantustan citizenship as an alternative to the present pariah existence and as an opportunity to experience the political belonging and self-expression presently denied them.

An opinion poll conducted among 1 000 urban Africans in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging urban complex bore out, to a large extent, Mayer's findings.¹

¹*Daily News*, 3 and 4 December 1975. Project conducted by Market Research Africa.

After 27 years of Separate Development, the majority of urban Blacks regarded their first loyalty as one to South Africa as a whole rather than to any homeland. The question, "Is your loyalty to South Africa as a whole or to your own homeland?" elicited the following response :

To South Africa	58%
To our homeland	28%
Have no homeland	7%
Don't know	7%

The Tswana and the Zulu showed the greatest sense of "South Africa first". Sixty percent of urban Zulu declared their loyalty to South Africa. Among income groups, only the poorest showed more attachment to homeland than to the country as a whole. The wealthiest income group reflected the greatest percentage whose loyalty was to the country and not to a homeland. Results showed that those who considered themselves South Africans first outnumbered others by nearly 2 to 1. The survey as a whole showed how little impact the Government's multi-nation policy has had on urban Blacks and illustrated that many urban Blacks are not resigned to the homeland idea.

Especially among Black intellectuals in the urban areas, there is much disillusionment with the Bantustan concept.¹

¹For example, Paulus Zulu, former KwaZulu urban representative in Umlazi, and Ben Khoapa, Director of the Black Community Programme, represent this view.

Many such intellectuals report "train conversation" which in their view offered an insight into the thoughts of the rank-and-file and which suggested that "bread-and-butter politics kind of individuals" have as their main interests security in the townships, housing, influx control and issues more directly affecting their lives. Many intellectuals believed that KwaZulu's achievements in these areas will be minimal. Buthelezi himself is regarded as an able man of charm and charisma, but this is "reading him and not the system". Many believe that Buthelezi would have done better to have opted out of a system in which "what you can do as a homeland leader is what the Government could, anyway, do in your absence". A homeland functions, in this view, as administrative machinery which can be manipulated. The fact that Buthelezi feels he is better able to watch his people's interests from within the system is criticized in these words: "If a man puts his foot on your neck threatening to squash you, do you say please tell me how to remove your foot?" Khoapa predicts that far from being mobilized, presumably by Inkatha, to support KwaZulu, young people in urban areas wanting to participate in a unitary state will become more politically extreme. The riots that broke out in Soweto in 1976, and the continuing unrest, could prove him right.

Bishop Alpheus Zulu, on the other hand, sees urban opposition to Buthelezi, including his rejection as

leader of urban Zulu, as misdirected. He stresses that Buthelezi was not responsible for the lack of representation of urban Blacks (prior to the 1978 elections in KwaZulu), and notes that Buthelezi was expected to speak and legislate on behalf of the urban Blacks through keeping himself informed of their needs by means of his urban representatives. This he had done, and had even anticipated their needs; the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly's decision that English should be the medium of instruction in high schools, which Umlazi accepted, for instance, was inspired by the Chief. He has, Bishop Zulu feels, in numerous ways demonstrated his concern for all Zulu. The opposition directed against him appears to be part of the overall frustration engendered by the Separate Development system and the search for political symbols as surrogates for strategy. This opposition impels the discrediting of anything done within the system, even if the system is thereby exposed.

Zulu sees opposition to Buthelezi as focussed on his operation within the system of Separate Development. He answers it by asking what else could be done "other than to make the maximum use of an instrument presented by the Government, which can be used in uniting and planning Zulu resources"? The alternative, he says, is openly fighting White intransigence, backed as it is by superior weapons and security expertise. Or, in the final resort, "if one has no desire to slit one's own throat in anguished

frustration, what other avenues of development lay before the Zulu people?" The Bishop believes, however, that new life has been infused into Black communities as a result of Buthelezi's efforts and Inkatha. He regards the radical opposition as unrealistic. Having worked out from their armchairs what should happen in South Africa, radicals thereupon condemn what is not happening. It is a pity, he feels, that Black unity of purpose is thus being vitiated, instead of the opportunity being taken for joint participation in the formulation of plans which could be realizable. Even though the final result could be a unitary state under majority rule, this cannot be an immediate goal. The Afrikaner nationalist would rather face revolution, terror and destruction than concede that. It would seem, in Bishop Zulu's view, practicable and positive to reach for what is within grasp.

The situation in Natal appears to be somewhat different from that in the most turbulent Black urban community, Soweto. Soweto, a township far from rural areas, has a distinct "Soweto culture" endemic to it. In Natal, Umlazi and KwaMashu and other townships are near rural areas and residents move with ease from one to another. Interests are virtually the same for all and issues besetting urban people in Umlazi are not all that different from those experienced in rural Nongoma. The urban-rural cleavage is less pronounced.

In line with South African Government policy, KwaZulu has appointed envoys to the urban areas, the intention being that the envoy would maintain communication between the homeland government and homeland citizens in the urban areas and sit on Urban Administrative Boards.¹ Such envoys, and it is the Government's intention to have them in every major urban area, it is hoped, will accomplish a great deal of political and community organization in the urban areas through liaising with urban workers and their works committees or trade unions, co-ordinating workers' movements, attending to the complaints and problems of people living under restrictive urban influx control and other regulations. KwaZulu, therefore, in theory, has a comprehensive strategy for the organization of its urban people. In the absence of the large paid staff which such a programme necessitates, Buthelezi has been at pains to mobilize volunteers among the educated Zulu, and the number of self-help organizations in the Zulu community is growing. They range from small neighbourhood committees, promoting literacy and education, through Women's Federation Groups, to more broadly based self-help development projects.²

Professor Schlemmer, evaluating the consequences of community development in the urban areas, speculates on

¹*A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1973), p. 127.

²*Daily News*, 10 September 1975.

tensions and conflicts of interest that may arise between homeland governments and organizations representing Blacks in the common area which could produce consequences hitherto not contemplated.¹ It is possible, for example, that economic development could precipitate a widening material cleavage between a privileged Black labour force in the industrial and commercial sectors and the rural peasantry which could, in time, lead to urban Blacks defending influx control for their own protection. The consequences of enhanced occupational status could have political implications, for it implies a social power and a greater bargaining ability in political matters which could, in turn, weaken White resistance to the inclusion of certain Blacks in political decision-making. In other words, the performance of Blacks in positions requiring skill could "undermine rationalizations" for discrimination against urban dwellers, and as the cleavage of material interest unavoidably widened between urban and rural Blacks, so could a difference of approach between urban Black leaders and homeland leaders develop. Homeland leaders have, therefore, seen the necessity of maintaining legitimacy within this urban group and of winning and retaining the confidence of urban leaders. The alternative could appeal to ambitious urban dwellers who may believe that the sooner links between homelands

¹*Race Relations News*, April 1976, and in an interview.

and urban Blacks weaken, the easier it will be for urban Blacks to become the political equivalents of Coloureds and Indians with a greater chance of enhanced status in the common area. Schlemmer suggests that in the long term, inequality of Blacks in the common area and in the homeland could be greater than that between White and Black throughout the country. Buthelezi, conscious of this, is at pains to gain access to the centre and to win the support of the urban intelligentsia. Despite his asserted belief that urban and rural Zulu constitute one Zulu people, he is aware that he does not always have support from all of the former and he deplores this disunity because of the harm he foresees it can do to the cause of Black solidarity.

Buthelezi has constantly addressed himself to the middle-class elite and the intelligentsia among urban Zulu, encouraging and exhorting them to provide leadership and assist in the mobilization of all Blacks. However, the KwaZulu leadership has had difficulty in achieving long-term bargaining power in the urban industrial setting and in procuring improved material security for Zulu in the White areas. These failures have not always been the fault of the KwaZulu leadership. For example, when Blacks were evicted from White-owned farms, they appealed to the Councillor for Community Affairs, Mr. Walter Kanye. They subsequently accused Mr. Kanye of being unsympathetic to their plea for help. His response was that although

he felt great sympathy for displaced people, all he could do was "refer them to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner because the evictions had taken place within his jurisdiction and not ours".¹ Yet many urban Blacks are convinced that the KwaZulu leadership has been ineffective, particularly at the important level of jobs and wages. If, as citizens of independent states, urban Blacks remain prone to regimentation, removals and discrimination, strained relations between the Republic and the homeland Government will be inevitable.² If, on the other hand, the homelands do not protect their non-resident citizens, these people might come to feel that they had sold their birthright as Black South Africans for what Buthelezi calls a doubtful mess of Bantustan pottage, "and identify resentfully with an aggressive all-Black, all-South African nationalism, for which the potential is so strongly present today".

Since urban Blacks bear the major brunt of Apartheid's oppressive laws, the commitment of the Government to eliminate race discrimination is particularly important in a discussion of their status. Mr. Vorster's policy statement in the Senate on October 23, 1974, committed South Africa to the promotion of order and stability in Africa, through technical and monetary

¹*Natal Mercury*, 13 December 1975.

²Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*, p. 19.

assistance, and to the avoidance of conflict in southern Africa. His speech was followed by statements by South Africa's then Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. R.F. Botha, who conceded that South Africa was guilty of race discrimination, based on race or colour.¹ He reminded the United Nations that there were schools of thought, and traditions and practices in South Africa, which could not be instantly changed. "We are, though," he said, "moving in that direction." Since then, several Cabinet Ministers have explicitly admitted that the Government is committed to abolishing discrimination. It appears to have set out purposefully to encourage Whites to liberalize their attitudes to Blacks. Seemingly, efforts are being made to enlist the services of major institutions such as the army, the church, and the Afrikaans universities, to carry abroad a message of *verligtheid*.² An article in the *Sunday Times* of 21 September 1975, by a Coloured journalist, contained the statement that, in his experience, this policy was slowly succeeding.³ Mr. Lawrence expressed himself as "shaken" that Free Staters whom he met at a five-star hotel in Johannesburg accepted him completely and at no stage patronizingly. "My country," he said, "is changing for the better." Attention has been drawn by other

¹A *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (1974) p. 120.

²*Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975.

³Howard Lawrence, *Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975.

journalists to the educative value of speeches by Cabinet Ministers, of the proliferation of multi-racialism in hotels and social occasions, and of the many Black visitors to South Africa. "The more Black and White mixed on levels of equality and with official sanction," Stanley Uys wrote, "the more beneficial the effect would be on race attitudes."¹ Apart from Cabinet Ministers proclaiming the need for change and renewal, General G.J.J. Boshoff, Chief of Army Staff (Logistics) opined that the struggle in South Africa "is only 20% military and 80% a socio-economic one - and if the socio-economic fight cannot be won," he declared, "we need not even bother to fight the military one."²

Despite this verbal support for change, however, there is little indication that it is being backed by advances for a direct participation of all people in a shared decision-making process. The official view, and the Minister for Justice Mr. Kruger has articulated this, is that the country is passing through a process of change and only the Government can be permitted to determine the nature and pace of this change.³ The prospects for civil liberties are therefore bleak as Government speakers continue to make it quite clear that

¹*Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975. Stanley Uys was a senior journalist on the *Sunday Times*.

²*Ibid.*

³*Natal Mercury*, 24 September 1974.

"change" does not mean the sharing of political power, nor does it encompass the removal from the statute books of basic Apartheid laws which particularly affect urban populations. These include the Population Register, Group Areas, the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act and the Pass Laws.¹ There is no doubt that those policy modifications which have been made represent some movement in official thinking. However, apart from the fact that not all the proposed changes have been implemented, it must be recorded that they are, for the most part, not central to the Separate Development policy. The Government has declared its determination not to relinquish White control in "White" areas, and in this whole series of change it has succeeded in creating an ideological vacuum that is "playing havoc with White politics, and stimulating aspirations in Black politics".²

The realization that Blacks as well as Whites are entitled to basic rights and amenities, and in White areas, is in striking contrast to attitudes held in the days when the then Deputy Minister, Dr. Piet Koornhof, talked about making South African cities "white by night". The changed approach has led to some dismantling of so-called "petty apartheid", as it has also manifested

¹Mr. Muller, at the Cape Congress of the National Party 1975. See also *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 October 1976.

²*Sunday Times*, 21 September 1975.

itself in more fundamental spheres, namely the acceptance by many of the permanence of urban Blacks and in discussions on a possible future common destiny for Whites and Coloureds. Four factors have, presumably, contributed to a Government re-examination of its position in vulnerable policy areas. They are pressure by homeland and Coloured leaders for a new deal, the need to establish the credibility of the homeland policy in order to assuage external pressure for a change of policy within South Africa, criticism by the Opposition, and an awareness of the enormous tension which exists in urban Black communities.¹ Having accepted the permanence of Blacks in the so-called White areas, the Government could not logically perpetuate the myth that they are temporary sojourners who one day will return to their homelands. Major concessions for urban Blacks were, thus, announced.

It is interesting to note the results of a survey undertaken for the *Daily News* in 1975 by Market Research Africa to determine the extent to which Africans were aware of Government plans for their betterment. The survey dealt with the 30-year leasehold proposals at that time and was conducted in the Pretoria-Johannesburg-Vereeniging urban complex. It revealed that most Africans were unaware of the new Government provisions.

¹See Dr. van Zyl Slabbert, Member of Parliament and Sociologist, in *Sunday Tribune*, 8 August 1976.

This first poll of urban Black opinion posed the following questions : ¹

Have you heard of the new scheme which enables Black people to buy houses to live in for 30 years?

Do you think this is a good or bad idea?

Will you personally try to buy a house under this scheme?

Do you have enough money saved to put down a required deposit of R200?

The answers showed that :

36% had heard of the scheme;

64% had not;

34% thought it a good idea;

49% intended to buy;

29% would not try; and

11% have enough money for a R200 deposit.

The following major conclusions were deduced from this survey: ignorance of the scheme was directly correlated with poverty; its rejection could mean a rejection to settle for anything less than full freehold ownership of land in urban areas; the survey showed that vital information was not reaching a very large portion of Blacks - this could be considered an indictment of the

¹Market Research Africa. Report in *Daily News*, 26 September, 4 November and 6 November 1975.

Bantu Affairs Board, the Black Press, and Radio Bantu; the fact that only a very small section of the sample interviewed (11%) had saved R200 - this could mean either that most Blacks are unable to save because they are not paid enough, or that many do not bother to save, or a combination of both.

As far as can be ascertained this was one of the first attempts to determine Black attitudes towards social and political questions of the day. Although it was confined to the Transvaal, the views given reflect the opinions of much of South Africa's urbanized Black population - the most sophisticated, active and aware section of the Black population. Early in 1977 Mr. M.C. Botha, reporting on the progress of the home-ownership scheme, announced that 2 244 people had been granted 30-year leases on their houses in Bantu Administration Board areas. This was not a large number considering the numbers of people involved, but it was a start, and in the words of Mrs. Helen Suzman would "help to build up a stable urban community among Blacks".¹

Dr. W. Breytenbach of the African Institute, among others, has predicted that the problem of the urban Black would be the leading question of the Eighties.² In June, July and August 1976, disturbances occurred in

¹*Natal Mercury*, 19 February 1977.

²*To the Point*, 30 July 1976.

10 different Black urban areas, in 3 of the country's 4 provinces. They were accompanied by a toll of death and destruction which has forced Whites to take a new look at what most experts agree is the country's greatest dilemma. Blacks, for their part, also reassessed their situation. The trauma of 1976 played a major part in the expansion of a movement which could supply an unanswerable challenge to White intransigence - Inkatha.

CHAPTER 4PART IIIINKATHA AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Inkatha KwaZulu was founded in 1928 and, although dormant for many years, was officially revitalized in March 1975, by King Goodwill Zwelithini. The choice of name indicates the sentiment behind this movement. The word "Inkatha" means a ring-like bundle or coil in which the national "charms" of the Zulu people were once kept and "very safely guarded" at the King's home. These charms were selected by an "outstanding specialist" known as the "doctor for making the land stand firm". Each king kept a private 'Inkata' which, when he died, was incorporated into the National 'Inkata'. When King Cetshwayo's Ulundi kraal was burnt after his defeat by the British in 1879, the combined 'Inkatas' of all the ages and all the kings were destroyed.¹ Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha is the contemporary political revival of the former Zulu 'Inkata'; national regeneration, the resumption of an active roll in history, these are behind Inkatha's emergence. In the opinion of at least two experienced

¹A.T. Bryant, *The Zulu People* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1940), pp. 475-477.

observers of Zulu development, Brenda Robinson and Tim Muil, Inkatha is one of the most important developments of Black political consciousness since the African National Congress was banned.¹ Its sudden establishment and prominence took many South Africans by surprise.

Inkatha Yenkulule ko Thesizwe KwaZulu, or as it is now known, Inkatha Yenkulule ko Yesizwe, the Zulu National Liberation Movement, appears to be a concerted Black answer to the absence of an accommodation between Blacks and Whites in South Africa, and to Black dependence on Whites. The formation of Inkatha was an assertive step, symbolic of a new Zulu refusal simply to react to White dispensation and to see national energy dissipated by conflict between rival Zulu groups. For Buthelezi, Inkatha has a special function to perform, to combat internal divisiveness and to mould the Zulu people into one cohesive force. Addressing a meeting in Soweto in January 1976, he said that Inkatha had been formed because Africans could not wait until the "Parliament in Cape Town falls before we achieve the dignity which comes from self-help". He accepted that, as the movement progressed from questioning to demands, there was a danger of its being misunderstood. That danger, he said, was to be "considered preferable to the danger of a dependent and subservient mentality".

¹Miss Robinson and Mr. Muil are Senior African Specialists on the two daily newspapers in Durban.

The positive impact of the movement on Zulu national life may be significant. By creating a popular power-base, the Zulu leadership believes it stands the greatest chance of overcoming White oppression without resorting to Marxist methods of achieving the unity, self-reliance and discipline that it believes are prerequisites to liberation. "Before we can do anything we need to organize ourselves into a disciplined society," Buthelezi told a Soweto audience in 1976.¹ "There is in South Africa no blue-print for the society we are striving to establish." Buthelezi has called for a Pan-Africanist conference in which the nature of South Africa of the future could be debated. While there is an awareness that popular interests should prevail, and that the leadership should not impose a political system, there is also a clear trend towards a one-party system which could be inimical to such aspirations.

As much as Inkatha is a reaction to White oppression, it is a defensive step against the appeal of Marxism and the imposition of a Marxist style and ideology on those seen as "authentic" liberators by countries to the north, especially Mozambique which borders

¹Buthelezi (13), *On this approaching Hour of Crisis. A message to South Africa from Black South Africa. Address to Africans, Jabulani Amphitheatre (Soweto: 14 March 1976).*

KwaZulu and has potential as a guerrilla base.¹

Inkatha is also a response by the Zulu leadership to rising expectation among the Zulu people. Over the past few years salaries have been rising and some of the blatant signs of oppression have been made more subtle. In addition, in 1974 the Prime Minister asked the country to "give me 6 months to put my house in order".² When little happened to justify initial expectations, and as it became apparent that few of the changes in the country were more than cosmetic, a climate of despair and frustration resulted; the phenomenon of rising Black expectations nevertheless remained. Inkatha is an attempt to channel these expectations so that the system is faced with a compelling, united Zulu demand.

Tim Muil, discussing the Conference at which the revived Inkatha was launched, was of the opinion that it provided a vindication of the policies pursued by Buthelezi since he became political head of the Zulu. Dispelling rumours that he was losing urban support, or that he was not representative of the Zulu people, Muil disclosed that a resolution proclaiming Buthelezi the "unchallenged

¹Buthelezi (46), *From Poverty to Liberation*, Address to the Association of Third World Affairs, National Press Club, Washington (U.S.A.: 15 August 1978).

²Public Statement, 15 November 1974.

leader of 4½ million Zulu",¹ and empowering him to speak for all Zulu within and without the borders of the Republic, was approved with enormous enthusiasm by representatives who came from almost every area in the country where Zulu are to be found. Although Buthelezi avers that Inkatha is not a political party, Tim Muil, in assessing it, concludes that it will in effect be the Government of the Zulu nation. The movement's massive and complex constitution ensures that no person shall be selected as a candidate unless he is a member of the movement. This has been offset to some extent by Buthelezi's explanation that all Zulu would automatically be members of Inkatha. On the other hand, the constitution does lay down entrance and membership fees for admission.

Somewhat inconsistently, Buthelezi hopes that Inkatha will eventually embrace all Blacks in South Africa. He hopes to see an open and balanced society based on Ubuntu-Botha, which he defines as a "common controlling idea", a concept that was articulated in 1912 when the African National Congress was founded, but because in the present Apartheid society the movement had to have an identity, a logical place for it to begin was

¹Resolutions of the extraordinary session of the General Conference of the National Liberation Movement (Inkatha), Bhekuzulu College, Nongoma, 18 and 19 July 1975.

with the Zulu people.¹ He disputes the claim of "our enemies who are deliberately trying to propagate that I am thinking of the Zulu as distinct from my other African brothers in South Africa". He makes the point that there is no Zulu freedom apart from a comprehensive Black freedom in South Africa. "We have a common destiny, even with our White countrymen - these are the implications of a just and non-racial society." "I do not view Whites as expendable," Buthelezi told a Conference on Race Discrimination in 1976.² "They come from the very soil of South Africa. This is the land of their birth and they have a right to be here. There is no solution in which they are not active parties."

An analysis of the issues with which Inkatha's first Conference was concerned revealed that its concerns are similar to those of many other Black groups and individuals, embracing the entire Black-White conflict, and not distinctively Zulu although the rhetoric is sometimes Zulu-orientated. The Conference, for instance, dealt sharply with militants abroad who, it was claimed, were pontificating without responsibility to any

¹Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech (May 1976), p. 13. There is an affinity between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC) which should be seen in the light of Buthelezi's being an ex-member of the ANC. The colours, songs and slogans of Inkatha are those of the ANC.

²Buthelezi. Speech at Jan Smuts Holiday Inn (3-4 December 1976).

constituency in South Africa. These militants had for years been denigrating the Chief and other homeland leaders, and Conference acclaimed a resolution that stated: "This Conference is concerned by the efforts of certain self-exiled South Africans to denigrate Chief Buthelezi as a stooge of the Vorster regime. This House rejects with contempt such allegations." On the other hand, the Conference wanted it made clear that Zulu had not abandoned the aspirations the exiles had held when they fled the country. The Conference called for a Zulu Radio Station "which would not be a propaganda organ", but a "counter-propaganda organ". It took a decision to establish an Inkatha newsletter, in order to give all Inkatha branches a clear picture of what African democracy was about, and at the same time to "obliterate reports in some news media which try to denigrate Blacks". It approved resolutions which condemned violence and which rejected independence until the land issue had been "satisfactorily settled and KwaZulu had a port and decent schools". The Conference also accepted the tri-company concept strongly favoured by the Chief but opposed by some Zulu traders.

Inkatha is, however, a distinctively Black, if not exclusively Zulu, movement. This emerges in its concerns as well as in its strategy. The Constitution, for example, enjoins its members to "refrain from criticizing publicly the national movement or any of its members, in

relation to its or his activities" in the movement. Members are, however, allowed to criticize the movement's shortcomings at its meetings, and presently do so. In the KwaZulu elections, Inkatha's monolithic existence may have stifled opposition and enhanced Buthelezi's personal position. Yet the attempt at consensus may not be totally undemocratic. On analysis, the Inkatha Constitution reveals that Zulu intellectuals are eager to dispense with the party political system of the Westminster model in favour of what looks like a consensus power structure. This is not difficult to understand since a Westminster type system is foreign to Zulu political history. Although democracy can be defined as government by the people, and while this might mean the majority of the people, this does not, in the eyes of the Inkatha leadership, mandate that factions be represented by political parties. Buthelezi makes it clear that the Zulu does not reject democracy, only the party system, and only at this stage. Yet the Constitution of Inkatha seems to deny the freedom to dissent and it demands conformity to one philosophy, though Buthelezi denies that this is so. His view is that there can be disagreement, but minority opinion disappears on the basis of consensus.

The rationale for what might still strike the observer as undemocratic is that KwaZulu cannot afford splinter groups, or a fragmentation of thrust. Partisan politics are seen as of no value in mobilizing a people

presently factionalized and comprising strong elements which are conservative in approach.¹ The free choices of the Western system cannot be easily grafted on to an authoritarian society whose people in rural areas are used to a hierarchical structure. Zulu, their leaders claim, resent the time spent countering interference in their politics by Whites and by opposition splinter groups. Recognizing the need for rapid development, they have decided to use the political forms the Inkatha leadership sees Zulu culture as having evolved, rather than to allow their unity of purpose to be dissipated in internecine wrangling. While the argument may be self-serving, it is generally true that in Africa change has tended to come from the top, rarely from mass pressure. Mobilizing people is a long-term process and it is considered quicker to inculcate commitment and create change through the enthusiasm, and even insistence, of the leaders. Thus Inkatha seems to promise that the Zulu leaders will lead the people into advancement, and not *vice versa*. An example of this can be seen in the Land Tenure Commission Report tabled at the KwaZulu Assembly meeting in August 1975. For years development experts had advocated the abolition of the chiefs' control over the land. The Commission, however, proposed that chiefs be left in control of land to prevent grave social disruption, and that chiefs be encouraged and educated to take change to

¹SABC-Television documentary programme, week ending about 20 March 1977.

the conservative peasantry. It was considered easier, and faster, to mobilize the chiefs than to inculcate new values in the peasants.

The Zulu are taking Inkatha very seriously and in Legislative Assembly debate attention is frequently drawn to leaders who ignore instructions from the Inkatha command to establish branches in their areas. Failure to do so is regarded as a serious breach of instructions, and strong words are invariably directed at the culprits.

In the short time that the movement has operated it has enjoyed considerable success. In February 1977, the membership roll stood at 90 000; by March 1978, it stood at 130 000, and by July 1978, there were reportedly 150 000 paid-up members.¹ By contrast, the African National Congress, at the height of its power, had a fully paid membership of only 10 000 although there are claims that it was higher.

A flood of new members, apparently motivated to join through election fervour, makes it difficult to reconcile membership with branches. A sketch of branch-spread is nevertheless necessary in order to present Inkatha's dimensions as a growing, nationwide movement. In February 1977, there were 200 rural and 100 urban

¹Information supplied by Mr. J. Kumalo, Administrative Secretary of Inkatha, at Ulundi.

branches in existence; by early 1978 there were 1 000 branches.¹ Roughly 18 of the branches existing in 1977 were outside of Natal, 2 in the Cape and 5 or 6 in the Orange Free State, with about 1 000 members in areas such as Kroonstad, Welkom and Bethlehem. In the Transvaal there were approximately 5 000 members, in 10 branches. About 5 or 6 of these were in Soweto with membership of 100 and upwards. One was in Pretoria with 60 members, 1 in Standerton with about 300 members, and 3 or 4 were scattered elsewhere in the Province.

The majority of the membership is in Natal, and the figures reported show something of the organization that is under way. In 1977 there were about 10 branches in the township of Umlazi, with about 200 members per branch, and 6 branches "who had returned 10 receipt books of 100 receipts in each book" in the township of KwaMashu. Examples of smaller urban townships with some organization were Makuta, south of Umlaas, 1 branch of 500 members, Magabeni, near Umkomaas, 1 branch of 500 members, Madadeni, near Newcastle, about 1 000 members, and Osizweni, near Madadeni, about 500 members. Pietermaritzburg had no established branches, but had about 100 members in the urban complex, excluding the rural areas surrounding the town Ngwelezana, the Township at Empangeni, had 100

¹Later information was derived from an interview with Mr. J.T. Zulu, KwaZulu Urban Representative in Natal and Orange Free State, in early March 1978.

members, while at Gezinsila, at Eshowe, there was uncertainty in regard to numbers.

In the rural areas, Msinga had about 4 000 members and Mnambiti, near Ladysmith, had 1 000. In the Bergville tribal area there were 6 branches, comprising about 1 500 members. Nongoma had 3 tribal areas, 1 such area had 5 branches, the other 6, and in the area of the Paramount Chief there were 10 branches, each with several hundred members. This account perforce omits the names of dozens of other units dotted throughout the homeland and Natal.

One factor impeding growth is the lack of paid organizers. The task of organizing branches is part of the commitment of the 28-member Central Committee, so the level of activity varies in accordance with enthusiasm and available time. Motivation for joining the movement has been articulated in "The Statement of Belief".¹ This was issued early in 1977 and forms the basis for a strategy that would, it is believed, be acceptable to most Black people, and also give direction to branch programmes.

Membership enrolment usually followed the holding of rallies and meetings. These were brought to the attention of inhabitants of both rural and urban areas through the distribution of pamphlets, announcements over

¹ See Appendix VIII.

Radio Bantu, and mobile loudspeakers which toured areas where meetings were scheduled to be held.

Dr. S.M.F. Bengu, Secretary General at the time, attributed Inkatha's growth, in part, to its success in attracting large numbers of Black intellectuals and youth who had become alienated from "straight" homelands politics. In addition, the general unrest in the wake of the Soweto riots in June 1976, may have led to a belief that riots and violence were counter-productive in achieving Black liberation. Blacks may, therefore, be seeking to channel their efforts into more directed and positive avenues. Inkatha offered this opportunity. The banning of the movement's first bulletin in 1976 led to a great deal of publicity, and this too resulted in increased membership.

Membership is voluntary and open to all Blacks, both on an individual and on an affiliate basis. Affiliated membership consists of organizations with interests consistent with Inkatha objectives. Adults pay an entrance of R3 and an annual subscription of R2, and youth pay an inclusive 50 cents. Chiefs pay an entrance fee, and an annual subscription of R11, while an annual levy of R20 is payable by professional people such as doctors and lawyers. All members of the Legislative Assembly and certain high-ranking Inkatha officials are expected to make monthly contributions of 5% of their salaries.

One-third of subscriptions collected is refunded to the Branch which has enrolled the members, for its use in self-help community programmes. Youth membership, those up to 18 years of age, constitutes 25% of the total and is based primarily in the schools, although all youth are welcome to join. Young people still enrolled at school, even if over 18, are considered youth members.

Concentration is on High and Secondary schools. Primary schools will follow. Women are a minority, although there are some prominent women members, and Women's Brigades are being formed in most areas. These are still in the initial stages owing to the cultural background of the Zulu according to which women play a retiring role.

The lack of recorded detail on occupational and regional distribution appears to be a weakness in the structure. If membership is predominantly rural, the co-operation of chiefs could be responsible for the dramatic increase in numbers. Unfortunately no accurate data on urban-rural distribution of membership is available, yet it is apparent that the movement has attracted people from all walks of life, all occupations and all income groups. It is not possible, at this stage, to give specific numbers of members in various categories of employment or professions, since receipt books, from which membership is computed, do not record such detail. However, observers at congresses and meetings of the movement attest to its heterogeneity.

The movement operates at several levels and is structured as follows:¹ A branch is the basic unit and consists of not less than 30 paid-up members. It can comprise a village, a town, an electoral constituency or a district. At local level it is administered by branch and executive committees. Branches meet at least once a month and their activities are mainly organization and recruitment of new members, fund-raising and compilation of financial and membership returns. Each branch has a project of activity such as communal gardens or the provision of scholarships. Women's Brigades concern themselves with family matters, child-care and the like in addition to other branch activity. The organization of rural and township branches differs. Urban branches conform, for convenience, to ward structures of the township administrative boards. Umlazi, for example, has 11 wards and therefore Inkatha hopes to organize 11 branches there on the same geographic pattern. Rural branches depend on chiefly organization. A chief's area is subdivided into smaller areas each under the jurisdiction of an induna. Each induna's area thus becomes a branch of Inkatha.

A constituency comprises a number of approved and registered branches. Constituency officials have direct responsibility over branches in their areas which are

¹*S.A. Institute of Race Relations. Information Sheet, No. 1 66/77 - 18/11/77.*

represented, together with Women's Brigades and Youth Brigades, on Constituency Executive Councils and at Constituency Annual Conferences. In rural areas, the whole area under a chief becomes a constituency, with a committee made up from various branches.

A regional headquarters is formed for any area specified by the Central Committee. Regional committees supervise the activities of constituencies and branches, organize public meetings and seminars and remit money to National Headquarters. Each region holds an Annual Conference attended by representatives from constituencies, branches and brigades. In rural areas, a regional division conforms to a "Regional Authority" in the Separate Development structure.

General Conference is held annually and is attended by National Council and by delegates from regional and affiliated organizations. It elects 20 members to the Central Committee, the other 5 on the Committee being the President of the movement, the Secretary-General and 3 people nominated by the President. The Central Committee is responsible for the implementation of the policy of the movement. Its members must be KwaZulu citizens, paid-up members, over 21 years of age, literate and conversant with the languages of KwaZulu.

The National Council is the policy-making body of Inkatha and meets bi-annually. It comprises the Central

Committee, the Legislative Assembly and representatives of other bodies within the movement, and can overrule the Central Committee. Clashes between the movement and the legislature are unlikely as the National Council has the Legislative Assembly in its body.

The President of Inkatha is its sole candidate for Chief Minister, and only persons over 35 years of age are eligible. The King is patron. He has access to the President to whom he can convey his advice and opinions.

Lines of communication between different tiers of the hierarchical structure are still being established. Where there is no region, branches have direct communication with headquarters at Ulundi. Where the structure is complete, branches and constituencies are responsible to the region and the region communicates with Ulundi. The reverse also applies. The Central Committee holds quarterly meetings and regions and branches submit monthly reports to Ulundi. An Administrative Secretariat processes these reports for submission to the Central Committee meeting for discussion, approval and implementation. Although its structure and Constitution seem complicated, the inbuilt system of representation from local branch level to the policy-making bodies are an attempt to prevent Inkatha from becoming an elitist movement.

If not elitist, the movement has potential for being authoritarian. One of the most important aspects of Inkatha's Constitution, which was revealed by Chief Buthelezi to the Legislative Assembly at Nongoma in 1975, provided that the movement's Central Committee would have the power to overrule the KwaZulu Cabinet. This was amended, under pressure, to declare that in the event of a clash on matters of policy, the Cabinet would seriously consider the views of the Central Committee before arriving at a decision. Crucial to this amendment is the proviso that the President of Inkatha would be the sole candidate for election to the office of Chief Minister and would receive the support of the entire movement. Buthelezi explained that the movement would be a demonstration of African democracy in action. The Constitution's preamble states: "African Political Institutions are not undemocratic", and it rejects "the cultural domination and arrogance responsible for the belief that only the Western, partisan, political system is perfect".

The potential for abuse by those who control the movement is nevertheless great. Intermingling the Legislative Assembly with the National Council and the Cabinet with the Central Committee precludes the growth of effective opposition political parties.¹ In 1974 the

¹*Rand Daily Mail*, 1 May 1974.

Legislative Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Minister of Plural Development to empower KwaZulu to control or forbid parties prior to independence. The South African Government declined to do so on the grounds that such action would be contrary to the spirit of free elections. As a result opposition parties may be organized and they may contest a general election.

The announcement that Inkatha had created 6 departments to deal with defence and security, political, constitutional and legal and foreign affairs, economics and finance, social and cultural affairs, elections, publicity and strategy, and appointments and discipline, confirmed that Inkatha was intended to become the dominant power in Zulu politics, and Buthelezi has not dispelled this suspicion; indeed he has made it obvious that the National Council will be the most powerful political body in the nation. The Council will convey the policy desires of the movement to its executive body, the Central Committee, which will act as the people's direct link with the KwaZulu Government. Therefore the Central Committee, acting as the National Council's agent, and because its President would also be the Chief Minister, will in practice be the supreme political power in the nation.

The movement has acquired a political image at this point in its history, although it is not officially

considered a political party. However, with the advent of the elections, it was used to institutionalize Buthelezi's appeal to the Zulu people and to mobilize votes behind an official slate. Inkatha candidates became the "official" candidate in the contest, with the result that no opposition parties survived in KwaZulu.

Of the 130 members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 55 are elected to their seats. The rest, mainly chiefs, are nominated. In the 1978 election 294 398 votes were cast, but this does not represent the total number of voters as in some constituencies Zulu could vote for more than 1 candidate. The Constitution of KwaZulu does not allow for subdivision of constituencies into individual seats. Thus, for example, 5 candidates had to be voted for in Maphumulo and 4 in Mlazi, and the whole constituency voted for that number of candidates in each case.

The general election commenced on 27 February 1978. For a week voters cast their votes in favour of candidates of their choice at 400 polling stations set up in magistrates courts and in the offices of Bantu Affairs Commissioners throughout the country. There was a sharp contrast in attitude between educated and uneducated people. On the one hand it was often necessary for electoral officers to guide voters in voting procedures and to supply information on candidates prior to handing

over ballot papers. This applied particularly to uneducated rural, would-be voters. However, the educated, for the most part urban, Zulu were aware of the implications of the election.

According to Dr. Dennis Mdadide, KwaZulu's then Minister of the Interior, the election involved a population within KwaZulu of about 2,5 million.¹ Of these about 40% or 1 200 000 were above 18 years old and so eligible to vote. A registration of 629 000 voters represented about 50% of all voters, which he considered high.

The Inkatha Election Manifesto was common to all candidates.² The main platform was the rejection of independence, and its 8 clauses left no doubt as to what Inkatha's priorities were.

On the independence issue Buthelezi had this to say at his meeting at the De Wet Nel Stadium in Umlazi. "Mr. Vorster has stated in Parliament that Zulu people will accept this so-called independence in spite of my attitude. By the manner you vote in this election we will see whether you agree with Mr. Vorster that the Zulu are such nincompoops that they will, on their own, walk

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 26 February 1978.

²See Appendix IX.

into Vorster's snare with their eyes wide open." ¹

Of particular interest, in view of the protracted debate on Buthelezi himself, is the support pledged to him in clause 2 of the Manifesto. The land-slide victory that Inkatha has enjoyed should be an indication that opposition to him, though vociferous and often implacable, is, at this stage, relatively insignificant.

Mrs. W.B. Yengwa, who was returned as an M.P. for Umlazi, referred to herself as "staunch Inkatha, a Buthelezi Woman", and in an interview spelled out in practical terms what the electorate of KwaZulu was supporting in its backing of Inkatha: ² the rejection of independence; the rejection of Apartheid and support of a peaceful transition to majority rule; the holding of a national convention of all people of all race groups; payment of the rate for the job; the formation of trade unions; the introduction of a free and compulsory education for all; the abolition of influx control regulations; the development of a KwaZulu comprising all Natal and not just the areas officially demarcated; and the release of all political prisoners.

Inkatha candidates were returned without organized

¹Buthelezi (47), Election Speech, De Wet Nel Stadium (Umlazi: 19 February 1978), p. 7.

²*Natal Mercury*, 15 March 1978.

opposition in 12 of the 26 constituencies, whereas 4 candidates who had been nominated as independents later withdrew. One withdrew from Ntuzuma (to be discussed below) and 3 from Maphumulo. The 3 Inkatha candidates in this latter constituency polled 11 668, 10 815 and 11 741 votes respectively. The independent who remained in the contest obtained 1 980 votes, the 3 who expressed withdrawal polled 1 155, 904 and 697 respectively. It is uncertain to what extent these 3 actually ceased campaigning. The votes they polled put the issue in doubt.

In the 14 contested seats official Inkatha candidates made a clean sweep. Some polled 10 times as many votes as the opposition candidate for the same constituency.¹ Percentage polls varied from as low as 25,7% in Vulindlela, to 52,5% in Hlanganani. The percentage poll for the whole election was 37,7%. Among Inkatha candidates successfully returned are 3 medical practitioners, a university lecturer and a bishop. Three women have been elected, becoming the first female members of the Assembly. They are all members of the Central Committee.

Inkatha nominated candidates in all electoral divisions. Branches and regions in particular electoral

¹*Daily News*, 13 March 1978.

divisions held nomination contests, and candidates were chosen often on the basis of involvement in community work. In some instances, defeated candidates chose to stand for election as independents, as did the candidate in Mpumalanga Constituency, Hammarsdale. Inkatha played a significant role in the educative functions prior to polling day. Its members visited branches, explained the mechanism of elections and stimulated election enthusiasm. It was largely responsible for "getting out the vote".

Of the 23 who stood as independents against the 27 official candidates all, according to the Natal representative of KwaZulu, expressed membership of Inkatha and loyalty to the Chief and all expressed confusion over the main issue of the election, as did Mr. Majola who withdrew from Ntuzuma. How genuine were these expressions of solidarity, and the reasons each gave for standing as an independent, it is not possible to establish. Information was sought from 3 sources, without success. Certainly there was no unanimity of intent on any one point. On the independence issue, for example, there were 2 points of view; those who declared that if elected they would support independence and those who accepted the Inkatha standpoint, although they were independent candidates.

The Inkatha victories have not been unqualified triumphs. Several allegations of threats and intimidation

have come, in the wake of the election, from various constituencies. The KwaZulu Cabinet has ordered an investigation into these accusations and other alleged irregularities, and at least one court case is pending. Whatever the outcome of the investigations some doubt will have been cast on just how "free" these elections were. For example, the independent candidates in Mlazi have accused Inkatha members of interference in their campaigns, of wrecking their meetings and of threatening Mlazi voters with the loss of their houses if they did not vote for the Inkatha candidates. Some voters, believing that Chief Buthelezi owned Umlazi, accordingly voted for the official candidates.¹ It appears that a stack of blank Zulu citizenship forms was discovered at Mlazi at the time of the elections. This, too, will be investigated. On the other hand, some councillors on the Umlazi Town Council had tried to obstruct Inkatha from holding election meetings in their wards, and they did so, it is claimed, with the connivance of members of the Republican Government's secret police. For some years there has been unpleasantness between the KwaZulu Government and the Town Council of Umlazi. The Council has been accused of adopting "contrary attitudes to our own on fundamental issues affecting the people of Umlazi".² In the result the 4 official Inkatha candidates in Umlazi

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 26 March 1978.

²Buthelezi (47), Election Speech, Umlazi, p. 3.

polled 15 658, 15 657, 15 367 and 15 219 votes respectively, the independent candidates 980 and 891. There were 362 spoilt papers and a 36,4 percentage poll was recorded.

The independent candidate for Izingolweni has also reported a number of irregularities in his election contest, including the bribing of a chief to stay out of the nomination contest, and has claimed that many school principals directed pupils to tell their parents to vote for Inkatha candidates. Frightened pensioners in this constituency were arriving at the polls long after the elections were over. They claimed they had been warned that they would lose their pensions if they did not vote according to the instructions of their chiefs.¹ In this constituency the official candidates polled 11 283 and 11 745 votes, the independent 1 642. There were 186 spoilt papers and a 45,6% poll.

It was reported from the Orange Free State that 3 000 miners were unable to vote because the polls were too far from their places of work. This also will be investigated by the KwaZulu Cabinet.

In the Mpumalanga constituency there had been "a very bad and destructive spirit"² which had necessitated

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 26 March 1978.

²Buthlezi (46), Election Speech at Hammarsdale (Mpumalanga Constituency: 18 February 1978), p. 1.

a special visit from the chief. He feared the election was being used by some candidates as an opportunity to "settle old scores". One of the independent candidates, Mr. S.J. Goqo, was possibly so motivated since he had been involved in political machinations concerning the King which had repercussions in the area in 1976; another independent, however, Mr. R. Mkhize, was a well-known communal worker who was not opposed to the principles of Inkatha nor to Buthelezi. He was, however, opposed to the tripartite agreements because of their possible effect on his own business and, by extension, on other similar businesses. This constituency had been considered a marginal one; in the result the Inkatha candidates won handsomely, although the independents polled more votes than individual independents elsewhere. Inkatha candidates returned 6 636 and 6 279 votes respectively, the independent candidates 1 642 and 2 051. There were 74 spoilt papers and a 32,7% poll. In Mpumalanga there is an allegation of the illicit use of an official stamp during the voting and this is to be investigated.

The personal views of independent candidates in this election are noteworthy. By way of contrast, the attitudes of an independent candidate who withdrew and those of a candidate who fought are presented.

The candidate who withdrew was Mr. Congo Majola, Deputy Mayor of KwaMashu since 1968. He was nominated by the Council of KwaMashu for the constituency of Ntuzuma,

in Clermont, because of his knowledge of civic matters and problems affecting the electorate. He accepted nomination because he had not been satisfied at the manner in which Inkatha candidates were chosen. Ntuzuma has 11 branches of Inkatha, and the selection of candidates, he felt, should have been made from the general membership. Instead the choice was from the officials serving on the regional executive. Majola is a member of the movement but had not aspired to leadership because of his involvement in communal work at another level and his belief that the leadership load should be spread among more people. Thus, despite his many years of experience in the problems of his area, he was excluded from the official nomination.

Mr. Majola would still not have stood, he maintains, had he understood the nature of Inkatha's role in the election. When he accepted nomination he had not regarded Inkatha as a political party but as an all-embracing liberation organization. The decision that all candidates should be sponsored by the movement and the belief of the Central Committee that it would serve no purpose if people stood for election in a system which Inkatha opposed, was not understood, and the limited availability of the Inkatha Constitution left people like himself unaware of this injunction or its implications. The Council of KwaMashu, in sponsoring his nomination, was apparently also unaware of the

Inkatha injunction. Majola believes that, with few exceptions, people were of the opinion that experience should be the criterion for candidacy. It was only once the campaign had commenced that statements were issued to the effect that those standing as independents were considered to be against the leadership of Buthelezi and to be bolstering the system he opposed by turning Separate Development's election into a legitimate parliamentary campaign. Once the election was under way, Majola was much harassed by members of Inkatha and singled out as a spy from Pretoria and a White stooge. His life was threatened and thereafter it was difficult to find people who would identify with him and he was given no opportunity to state his views. Since he did not oppose Buthelezi and supported Inkatha, his position became untenable and after consultation with the Council, he decided to withdraw. He believes that had he realized that the elections, the first to be held by KwaZulu, were meant to demonstrate solidarity and support for the Chief and that local problems were secondary, he would have viewed his participation differently. This election was not based on issues or candidates. It was "for Buthelezi and his leadership of Inkatha". His view was that many of the independents had accepted nomination through the same misunderstanding. He identifies with Buthelezi and believes that Inkatha has great support. The results of the election, once he knew the rationale behind it, are acceptable to him. Nevertheless he believes the 208

votes he polled simply through his name remaining on the ballot paper (his withdrawal after nomination day precluded its removal) was an indication of the success he could, in other circumstances, have enjoyed.

Mr. Majola tells of the voter who came to the polls firmly clutching a picture of Chief Buthelezi and intent on voting only for him. In other words, in his opinion the elections were a referendum based on the acceptance or otherwise of Buthelezi and of the movement of which he is President.

Nevertheless, the harassment which Mr. Majola endured was not isolated; other independents were, he said, subjected to similar treatment by Inkatha supporters. If these reports are indicative of a spirit encouraged by the movement, it is an indictment of its leadership. It is Mr. Majola's opinion that both Buthelezi and Inkatha enjoy overwhelming Zulu support. If this is so, it is difficult for observers to understand the need to employ tactics reminiscent of those written about by Chinua Achebe in "A Man of the People".¹ That novel describes the corrupt election campaign of a charismatic West African chief in his country's last free election, and the behaviour that seems to have characterized the KwaZulu elections and the adulation of the Chief that appears to make it all acceptable, are hauntingly reminiscent of this

¹C. Achebe, *A Man of the People*, African Writers Series No. 31 (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1966).

alarming book. The danger is, of course, that should support for Buthelezi and his movement wane, the machinery with which he could maintain his dominant position, and the anti-democratic methods by which it could work, will have been established.

It was his strong opposition to a one-party state that led Majola's independent running mate, Mr. J. Magasela, to remain in the Ntuzuma contest. After a hard-fought campaign he polled only 196 votes against 8 935 and 8 835 polled by the official candidates. Magasela remarked that despite his membership of Inkatha, no public meetings were held prior to nomination, and he heard of the selection of candidates over the radio. He does not believe that Inkatha should become a political organization, and together with the committee that nominated him, some of whom were also members, plans to review his membership of the movement. At this first election, he believes voters should have been given a chance to hear all views. A one-party state would ensure only the presentation of one view. When the nominations were announced and Clermont (where he lives) in the Ntuzuma constituency had no representative of its own, he decided to stand. He believes that other independent candidates were similarly dissatisfied with a one-party state and believes he would take the same action again. He, too, complained of severe harassment by Inkatha members and threats of death. Although he supports Buthelezi, he does not feel

the Chief was justified in seeking the nomination of Inkatha members only. Clermont has a population of between 70 000 and 80 000, the Inkatha membership is 600, and these 600 were not united. Although Magasele accepts the final results as a possible sign of Black solidarity, he notes that of 19 000 registered voters in Clermont only 8 900 voted. Among those who did not vote, he believes that there were many who did not do so because of their opposition to the concept of a one-party state.

Mr. Majola's election agent, a Mr. Makatini, confirmed that in his view the election was not a true election but "a matter of life and death". He, too, is an Inkatha supporter, but he believes that it is imperative that people have the right to say "yes" or "no" and be governed, not dictated to. His first point of departure with Inkatha was the nomination procedure, although he does not blame Buthelezi for this. Rather he is concerned at the quarrelling among themselves of Inkatha members. He believed, with Magasela, that Clermont should be represented by someone who was aware of problems in Clermont. As it was, neither of the official candidates came from Clermont. He opposes, too, the use of children in the election campaign and was angry at the rudeness and threatening posture shown to his candidate. He is unsure of the procedure used in the nomination of candidates, and would make no guess. Nor does he criticize. He just feels that the procedure was wrong, although he would not commit himself further. He

believes that Inkatha's strength in Clermont cannot be determined because of the internal quarrelling within the movement, but in the long term, "all Zulu will join by virtue of their being Zulu". He is convinced that although the elections may have proved that Buthelezi has solid support, independents have an educative function in the electoral process and have a right to oppose the Chief by proposing alternative points of view. A believing Christian, Mr. Makatini is opposed to a "worship" of Buthelezi which he believes is becoming widespread, and he believes opposition is healthy. He is pleased at the overall results, but stresses that independent candidates fought under great strain and intimidation. A solid mandate for Inkatha under such conditions, he maintains, is not solidarity. Mr. Makatini is proud of the liberal tradition of his family and points out that although he was the election agent for an independent candidate, he had no objection to his teacher-daughter voting for the official candidate. It should be noted that Chief Buthelezi at one time accused Makatini of using Magasela. The former apparently felt snubbed because he had not been made a member of the Central Committee and there is therefore a possibility that a "settling of old scores" is in progress. Nevertheless, the positions taken by Makatini and Magasela are credible.

Despite the opinion of Inkatha's leaders and

spokesmen that opposition to the movement and to its President is diminishing, it must be recorded that there does remain a section of the Zulu population who remain implacably opposed and who cannot be persuaded that any good can come from Buthelezi's operations within the Separate Development system. Those mainly concerned, as far as one could assess the situation, are radical intellectuals. They refused to vote in the KwaZulu elections and are articulate in their condemnation. Just how extensive is this opposition is uncertain, but because it is articulate it could be influential. A group of individuals, separately interviewed, displayed unabated antagonism and a refusal to come to terms with the *status quo*. Nelson Mandela, detained on Robben Island, remains the hero of many despite his total inability to assume a leadership role in present circumstances. He has been "mythologized", and Buthelezi, it seems, has become a scapegoat for Mandela's political emasculation. This element does not eschew violence in its endeavours to shape one unified South Africa, and regrets were voiced by some of those interviewed at Buthelezi's success in staving off violence in Natal when it was rampant elsewhere.

It is difficult to categorize, absolutely, people opposed to the movement. In some instances it is alleged that White official sources have discouraged

potential members from joining.¹ It was believed that teachers at one stage withheld support from Inkatha. Intimidation, both from student radicals and from Central Government sources, was blamed. It was shown, though, that once teachers could be reassured that their contribution to the movement did not need to be a political one which could jeopardize their jobs, and that it could be made in the educational field, this resistance diminished. In fact, one of the irregularities reported to Buthelezi has been an accusation that teachers were influencing voters to vote for Inkatha candidates.

Civil servants, it was believed, had shown antagonism because they were told that there had been, or could be, deliberate withholding of increments and promotions. This agitation was blamed on Central Government agents and it had been necessary to persuade these public servants that a Civil Service Commission made recommendations in this regard. "KwaZulu did not engage in 'witch-hunts'".² This has helped assuage anger and civil servants are now joining the movement in greater numbers.

Businessmen, themselves divided on the tripartite agreements concept, have not all supported Inkatha. Those

¹This was alleged in a discussion with Mr. Winnington Sabela, a Central Committee member.

²Buthelezi (49), Election Speech at Umlazi, p. 10.

who fear competition from co-operative companies and oppose the agreements have not joined, since it was Inkatha that encouraged the introduction of the concept. Those who feel this way seem to be diminishing. A tripartite company was already in operation at Madadeni and it was claimed without dissent at an Inyanda (African Chamber of Commerce) meeting that the small trader there was not being crushed.¹

Black students in Natal are beginning to show support for Inkatha despite earlier reluctance, attributed in part to campaigns of opposition and intimidation by student radicals. Buthelezi has termed the radical opposition of the young a "treacherous stance" that could set Zulu youth on a collision course with the Zulu mainstream.² In July 1976, only 26 students accepted invitations to a training course at Mhlabatini sponsored by Inkatha; in 1977, 400 students from all over South Africa attended a similar course, and a youth rally at Ulundi in 1978 attracted 1 000 students. There is enrolment in Soweto too. An election rally held there attracted 15 000 people, and support came not only from migrant workers, but also from among people long detribalized. Increased numbers joining Inkatha are attributable, believes Mr. J.T. Zulu, to a change of outlook among students.

¹Buthelezi (46), Election Speech at Hammarsdale, p. 4.

²Buthelezi (42) and (49), Policy Speeches (Ulundi: 1977 and 1978).

It is of interest to note that according to Mr. Zulu, Inkatha's main strength lies apparently in the townships rather than in rural areas. In the latter, he says, there have been attempts by Central Government agents to alienate the chiefs, sometimes with success. These chiefs fear that Inkatha is bent on ousting them from their appointed position and so resist it. Inkatha personnel have been at pains to explain that this is not so. In 1977 the chiefs requested a meeting with Chief Buthelezi so that the aims and objects of the movement could be explained to them. The meeting was held and succeeded in dispelling some of the misgivings. There is still resistance but Mr. Zulu believes this is now grounded in ignorance.

The question of continued interference by the Central Government in KwaZulu's affairs remains a source of anger to KwaZulu representatives. The issue was canvassed at several election meetings. Officials of the Central Government, through its former Department of Information and Bureau of State Security, were accused of attempting to drive wedges between citizens of KwaZulu under a philosophy of divide and rule. Attacks on Buthelezi by the newspaper "The Citizen", a National Party mouthpiece with access to Cabinet and such government departments as the secret police, were regarded as proof of the quarter from which such friction

emanated.¹ It would also seem that Radio Bantu openly canvassed for independent candidates.

What is most significant about Inkatha is that it exists at all. Black power or consciousness, much misunderstood and maligned in White South Africa, is nothing other than an assertive resort to Black self-reliance, a conscious reference to the Black way of doing things, and a deliberate attempt to precipitate change in South Africa by working outside of White institutions. Inkatha's "Zulu consciousness" is, while nominally different, not much different at all. It is an aggressive revival of Zulu dignity and, though not by choice, a purely Zulu movement whose aims are the fostering of a Zulu identity and a Zulu presence, politically and economically, in the South African polity. If "Black" were substituted for "Zulu", and the homeland superstructure and nomenclature were removed, what would remain would be a growing, united, consciously Black movement, ready, willing and able to assert Black interests in a changing society. Moreover, Buthelezi's movement, while presently non-violent, will have the capacity for the disciplined deployment of violent tactics should it ever be perceived as necessary. A mass movement, unified, organized and committed, with dissent suppressed and objectives precisely defined by a governing

¹Buthelezi (42), Policy Speech, 1977, pp. 30 and 33.

group, could constitute a potent political, economic or even military force.

What is ironic is that Inkatha and Zulu consciousness are Separate Development's offspring. A peripheral movement was generated by the core in its attempts to justify its retention of pre-eminence, and in the result a threat to that pre-eminence is growing in Inkatha and all that this movement symbolizes. In practical terms the core-parasite phenomenon continues, but Separate Development has spawned and legitimized a movement with a high degree of political organization and mobilization in the periphery - the absence of which generally characterizes a core-periphery relationship. How this political organization develops, and how the strength it produces is directed, could significantly affect the relationship which at present exists between core South Africa and its hitherto subdued periphery.

CHAPTER 4PART IVCHIEF MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELEZI

Inevitably a discussion of KwaZulu becomes also a discussion of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Buthelezi, a consummate politician and representative of a sizeable segment of the Zulu people, has been the lynch-pin of KwaZulu's political development and initiator of much of its philosophy. This forceful spokesman for peripheral forces in the South African constellation is largely responsible for much of the friction between two theoretically complementary institutions, the South African Government and its creation, the KwaZulu organs of government. According to the core-periphery model, peripheral entities lack viable institutions and effective leaders. In Inkatha, Buthelezi has supplied what may become a formidable institutional framework. In himself, the periphery has an effective leader. Thus, demands from the periphery can be expected to grow more strident and, unless they are met, the polity can be expected to become increasingly destabilized.

If developments in the periphery can alter the core-periphery imbalance peaceably by resulting in

meaningful concessions to break the "cumulative cycle", social upheaval could be avoided. If they fail to do so, conflict is inevitable as the periphery gains the confidence and ability to obstruct progress in, and the exploitation of it by, the core.

What is so ironic about Separate Development's attempts to preserve intact the core-periphery *status quo* is that, in doing so, the Central Government encouraged, if not the accession to power of Chief Buthelezi, the accession of the power that inheres in his office. Perhaps another leader would not have so disturbed the model; yet it is difficult to envisage a remotely representative Zulu leader not articulating at least some of the problems already discussed.

Buthelezi is at pains to note that he owes neither his chieftainship nor his stature within the Zulu people to the policy of Separate Development, thus mooting the discussion of what might have happened had another been in his place. "I am," he said, "by birth and tradition a leader of my people, Separate Development politics aside. By decisions of (the South African) Government and Legislature, in which Black people do not participate, I am the Chief Executive of KwaZulu, and if an election was held tomorrow I would be elected still as such. I have been elected by the Assembly voice without any division. I am the President of Inkatha ye Nkululeko

Ye Sizwe, the largest Liberation Movement of its type within South Africa. I am patron of various African organizations representing various Black interests. I am a great-grandson of King Cetshwayo, a grandson of King Dinuzulu and the son of Princess Magogo, the full sister of King Solomon Ka Dinuzulu, and I am a member of the Zulu Royal House in my own right. I am an hereditary Chief of the Buthelezi Tribe, a great-grandson of Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi, who was Prime Minister of the Zulu when were were a Sovereign nation, and who was Commander-in-Chief of the entire Zulu army. My late father, Chief Mathole Buthelezi, was the Prime Minister of KwaZulu during King Solomon's reign. I acted as Prime Minister to King Cyprian, who was my first cousin, for 16 years before there was any Separate Development politics in KwaZulu. I am not mentioning these things to boast, but as a broad hint to ... those who may be misled into thinking that I owe what I am to the Government."¹

Buthelezi's lineage, while muting some criticism, gives rise to other. Colonial rulers often have turned to the traditional structure of native societies in the search for conservative indigenous leadership. Yet Buthelezi is not unaware of the constraints of traditionalism and has shown an effort to blend the

¹Buthelezi (14), *Dialogue or Confrontation*. Address to the Kajuitraad (Umbogintwini: 30 April 1976), p. 58.

traditional with the modern, the relatively unchanging rural ethos with the more dynamic urban. Personal observation backed by people in close association with him over many years suggests that his value to the Zulu lies in this ability to bestride the rural and the urban and to understand and project them both.

He is sceptical of the claim that the "urban intelligentsia" opposes him, and rejects this as a generalization. He maintains that some of his most consistent support comes from educated urban Blacks. He also rejects the accusation that he is not a "legitimate" leader and that the "real" leaders are those who are now banned or in detention, some on Robben Island. Buthelezi reminds one that he had no clash with these people whom the Government has silenced and in fact was friends with many of them. He accuses the present radical leadership of a lack of vision and of romanticizing the concept of Robben Island while denigrating traditional leadership. "The hundred students may have stoned my car at (a) graduation ceremony," he has said, "but 15 000 applauded me. Twenty thousand attended the rally in Soweto that I addressed, and probably as many would attend any rally that might be organized in an urban area near Durban."¹ He is nevertheless aware that some sections of the

¹In an interview with the writer. On Sunday, 24 April 1977, Buthelezi addressed a rally at KwaMashu. It was attended by about 85 000 supporters.

African Press are hostile to him ("The World", subsequently banned, frequently criticized him), and concedes opposition from radical student elements in the Black consciousness movement, ironically themselves products of the Bantu Education system and of tribal universities which they claim breed subservience. He believes that these students were being manipulated by the former Bureau of State Security and by international organizations to discredit him in the eyes of his followers.¹ Thus the car-stoning episode at the University was, he believes, purposefully exaggerated out of all proportion. Buthelezi observes that his denigrators overseas, expatriates from South Africa, do not bear Zulu names, and he asks, "If Buthelezi is so evil, why do mainly non-Zulu know it?"

To assertions that his following is largely among older people who are unmoved by contemporary ideas, he responds that he has as many followers among young people as among old, but that in any event the nature of his particular following is irrelevant. The contribution he is making, he believes, is all that can be made within the constraints of the system, with benefits accruing to all ages and groups. Leaders, he says, are temporary, though like many politicians he has a broad perspective

¹See K. Essack, *The Armed Struggle*, Chapter 7, pp. 111-115. Published in Tanzania. See also *Statement on the Expulsion from the A.N.C. (S.A.) of (8) Members*. Issued by the expelled 8 members of the African National Congress of South Africa (London: 27 December 1975).

of himself and his place in history. Misunderstandings of his hopes and plans for the Zulu people, which may seem trivial to others, are important to him because they are distortions of history-in-the-making, for he sees himself as indivisible from his people.

Attention throughout this study has been drawn to the use he has made of the platform afforded by Separate Development despite his opposition to it. It has also afforded him immunity from possible reprisals; his appeal, unlike that of so many Black leaders who said similar things before him, has been able to reach vast audiences of Black and White in South Africa and abroad.¹ Most of his speeches, usually in English, were originally to Whites, and to his own people. Recently they have also been directed to Black Africa. One could question whether he has always placed enough emphasis on "bread and butter" issues to which the masses may be responsive.² Whether he has or not, he has nevertheless had great impact and has succeeded in raising morale, aspirations, and self-esteem.

His awareness of the need for adult education, community development and community organization has, in great part, been responsible for the stimulation of the

¹*Sunday Times News Magazine*, 13 July 1974.

²Schlemmer and Muil, *Social and Political Change in African Areas*, p. 27

group consciousness which seems to be emerging in KwaZulu. He has directed his efforts towards encouraging the educated and talented Zulu to identify with, and serve, the ordinary people and through self-reliance and self-help assist in bringing about social and economic changes within their own communities. Buthelezi has also shown sympathy for the broader aims of the "Black awareness" movement which has gained momentum in South Africa in recent years, spearheaded by the now disbanded University Christian Movement, the South African Black Students Organization and the Black People's Congress. Directed towards Coloured and Indians as well as Africans, the unifying factor is "Blackness", and Buthelezi has declared himself fully committed to this wider "Black consciousness" and to a shared struggle by all Blacks. He nevertheless has recognized the objective differences in conditions and economic interests between Africans on the one hand, and Indians and Coloureds on the other. Although there is discrimination against all non-White groups, it is the Africans who are most oppressed and in some respects, therefore, their struggle for liberation will be different.

Buthelezi has made it clear that his long-term constitutional preference for South Africa is a multi-racial unitary state. For the foreseeable future, however, the issue is one of participation in a power-sharing process, either through a federation of States,

a system of effective consultation, or even some sort of joint decision-making between Black and White leaders. His constant theme, however, is that the time has passed for unilateral decision-making by White South Africans. He outlines his ideas on Federation in an address in Cape Town in 1974 when he posed the question, "Can the homeland concept be the basis of a formula for a future South Africa?"¹ He prefaced his remarks by alluding to Black disillusion and the doubts that assailed him.² "In our racist society there is today a strong lobby amongst Blacks ...(that)... in the final analysis the Black man is on his own in this battle ... but I am one of those Blacks (who), whilst going along with Black consciousness, believes that the White liberal has not only a right to do his own thing, but that he has an important role to play within his own White group." While acknowledging that Separate Development was conceived by Whites from an all-White perspective, he noted that there were aspects of the policy which, having been established, could not be disestablished. The creation of limited autonomy in the homelands and independence in Transkei would, he suggested, have to be taken into account in future non-racist planning. The homelands as constituted could, for instance, be the

¹Buthlezi (7), *White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the future of the Homelands*. South African Institute of Race Relations (1974).

²Ibid., p. 1.

basis for a federal plan, provided that there was redress in those areas of complaint, primarily land and resource allocation and the autonomy of homeland leaders. Buthelezi reduced his thought to concrete constitutional terms, but in order to avoid debate on the controversial issue of ultimate national power at the centre, and to enable co-operation on matters of common concern to develop, he offered a practical suggestion for their implementation - the enlargement of the Senate to incorporate representatives of African homelands, and made no demand for immediate representation in the lower house of the dominant legislative body.¹ The central objective of this formula seemed to be to offer reassurance to Whites about control over their own affairs and over broad national affairs, for the time being, through the establishment of machinery which would not raise the demand for control of a central parliament until confidence could be established and agreement reached.

Buthelezi visualized three types of states in his eventual Federal republic or commonwealth;² those states in which the interests of an African ethnic group, corresponding broadly to the present homelands, would be paramount; those in which the interests of White people

¹Ibid., p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 14.

would be paramount, and special or federal areas, nature and location unspecified, which would be multi-ethnic or non-racial in character, and in which no particular group interests would be designated.¹ Movement from one state to another would be controlled by internal passports, state boundary controls and a work permit system, which would replace the present processes of influx control. The fixing of boundaries could be guided by what was the historical area of a particular people so that, hypothetically, KwaZulu might include the whole of the territory of present-day Natal, or at least cover the areas over which Cetshwayo ruled before the Zulu war of 1879. The rights of all people permanently resident in such "special" or non-ethnic states would have to be guaranteed and ethnic origins would be irrelevant. All states would have the same legislative and executive powers and functions, the present provincial system and Parliament in its present form would cease to exist, and a Federal Parliament composed of representatives of all the constituent states would be empowered to carry out those functions which, by agreement, would have been vested in it. Foreign policy would be determined by all citizens of the country, regardless of race, for it is only if Africans in South Africa participate in the formulation of South Africa's foreign

¹P. Malherbe, in a book entitled *Multistan: A Way Out of the Southern African Dilemma*, offers a similar solution for Natal which he feels could be used as a prototype for all of the country if successful.

policy that they would want to assist in carrying it out or defending it.

In short, Buthelezi's scheme ensured establishing states with particular group interests that did not necessarily entail the break-up of the highly integrated South African economy. It provided for a common federal citizenship in South Africa, which all South Africans, he believed, irrespective of colour or ethnic identity, would want to preserve. His concern was with time; he considered it urgent for South Africa to move in the direction he indicated if the homeland's policy was to be accorded any credibility in South Africa or abroad.

Schlemmer and Muil, while applauding Buthelezi's federation plan, criticized it on the strength of its failure to acknowledge the importance of the role of Blacks in the economy of South Africa and its bias in favour of the political establishments, both White and Black, rather than the situation of ordinary Black people.¹ It would seem, however, that Buthelezi could not have been unaware of these flaws and that he was struggling to establish meaningful dialogue with Whites without, for the time being, pressing any advantages. Thus he modestly concluded his address on that occasion

¹Schlemmer and Muil, *Social and Political Change in the African Areas*, p. 54.

with these comments: "This ... is no attempt at pontification ... it represents our attempt as Black people to bend over backwards to meet our White countrymen who wield power over us ... we are willing to participate in meaningful dialogue even on the basis of ... Separate Development ... conceived by Whites solely from all White perspectives. What more can we do?"

His plan appeared to receive serious consideration. Prominent Afrikaans academics considered that it had created new possibilities for the reconciliation of Black and White interests and had further established the existence of the homelands as a basis for political change.¹ The discussion of these academics, however, took for granted that homelands would have accepted independence before the implementation of the plan. It is as well to recapitulate the views of Gwendolyn Carter, expressed in connection with Transkei, on the independence that the South African Government was offering.² Such independence, she concluded, "with its extremely limited resources, ... (was) meaningless ... total dependence on the South African economy ... the lack of attractiveness of rural life to Africans brought up in urban areas, and the relatively small numbers affected in relation to the total African population of South Africa would ... make

¹*Sunday Times*, 20 January 1974.

²Carter et al., *South Africa's Transkei*, pp. 180-181.

independence for the Transkei relatively unimportant in the total context. Even if the South African Government should decide to pour massive funds into the Transkei and other African areas ... it can hardly be expected that either the Africans themselves or the outside world would feel that what was virtually a unilateral settlement by Whites for a small, impoverished area could compare with the progressive extension of political, social, and economic rights for Africans within the present boundaries of South Africa." For the present, the Western European powers and the Organization of African Unity have indeed withheld recognition from an independent Transkei because, as the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs has said, "It would not really be independence in the sense that we would normally expect when giving diplomatic recognition."¹ In his federal plan Buthelezi claimed that homelands could not be what he called "disestablished" and he accepted their theoretical viability as a form of transition toward a federal system. Nevertheless, there was always the proviso that there would first be a redress in regard to land consolidation proposals and the authority of homeland leaders. Then, he concluded, the Separate Development concept presented an opportunity for a federal structure in which Black and White fulfilment could be reached. "Throughout history," he has said, "the morality of today

¹*Daily News*, 7 February 1976.

sometimes becomes the profanity of tomorrow. This is true of Apartheid today, and it will be true of Apartheid even in the centuries to come ... the immorality of this society is a monument to the White man's stupidity for not including us in his inner councils, an exclusion that has a two-fold result. One is deprivation in our daily lives, the other is that the White man is at the mercy of our wisdom ..." Buthelezi believed that he spoke for the Black masses when he said that they "desired a peaceful move away from an Apartheid society, to a situation in which South Africans could share a common patriotism and participate as equals in a meaningful and moral political system".

Buthelezi's calls for a "peaceful move away from an Apartheid society" have not elicited a satisfactory response and a perceptible hardening of his position is now occurring. He has, since he gave his federal plan, said to this writer that he had not intended to provide a blueprint but had indulged in what he called "political doodling", the playing around with ideas upon which dialogue could be based. However, he makes the point that times have changed since he made that statement and that it could already be too late for what he had then had in mind. Nevertheless he has not abandoned the idea of discussion, but feels less hopeful of its success, and he did not find the present atmosphere one in which he would be prepared to provide a blueprint on the subject.

At a meeting in Soweto in March 1976, his moderation appeared to falter.¹ He recalled that he had offered, as a compromise solution, a federal formula towards responsible government. The South African Government had disregarded that offer, and since then the climate in southern Africa was less favourable for concessions. "I must say now, and I say it with considerable emphasis," he said, "that such reconciliatory offers as were contained in my federal formula, will be increasingly difficult to offer in the southern Africa which is now emerging." The address contained a blunt enunciation of Black demands and aspirations. He castigated Separate Development declaring that Blacks despised "so-called Separate Development", and charged that those trying to divide the country were attempting to stem the tide of history. "I challenge anyone to prove to me that the majority of Blacks want the so-called independence which is offered to our reserve, now called homelands, and when I speak for my people in this matter, I speak for the majority of Blacks in the country. No single Black leader would dare to go to his people to decide independence on the basis of a referendum."² He declared that the foundations of Apartheid society had been shaken and that Africans had, unilaterally, now

¹Buthelezi (13), *On this Approaching Hour of Crisis*. Speech at Soweto.

²Attention is drawn to the detentions preceding the elections prior to Independence in Transkei, and the subsequent imposition of the death penalty, early in 1977, for those opposing Transkeian independence.

to find alternative solutions. To this end he proposed calling a series of National Conventions. He called for a multi-racial majority government and for the rejection of the policies of the South African Government "because economically they perpetuated privilege, socially they made humiliating assumptions about the Black's dignity, politically they provided a 'moat' around besieged White self-interest, and in the field of foreign relations they pursued ends which support Apartheid and discrimination".¹ The import of the whole speech was directed at the Government's role, through its failure to end discrimination both political and economic, in driving South African Blacks to a hostile, anti-White racism. Later in 1976, Buthelezi told a student audience in Cape Town: "It is too late in South Africa's political day to think of the gradualism which was one of the White's options. Majority rule will have to stand or fall on the preparations already made. Whether we like it or not the generic force of politics in South Africa today is the movement towards majority rule. The rejection of this option is in fact nothing other than the election to solve the country's political ills by violence."² In a subsequent speech he said, "These are times when we have to be blunt with each other. If we cannot pull off any meaningful dialogue we will destroy

¹Buthelezi (13), Speech at Soweto.

²Buthelezi, in a speech at University of Cape Town (8 September 1976).

each other through a bloody confrontation ... that is what the Prime Minister meant by the 'alternative that is too ghastly to contemplate'.¹

Buthelezi's observation about the alienation of Blacks from Whites and their Republic is born out by a survey made by the Black press, which found that 84% of Blacks questioned emphatically rejected the suggestion that they should stand with Whites in the event of an attack.² Buthelezi's speech at Soweto contained this comment: "Mr. Vorster did not bother to consult a single Black leader on his detente initiative. If he thinks he can disclaim Black opinion in this way, and then hope that Blacks will offer themselves as cannon fodder, I think this is a grave mistake."

In a speech to the Kajuitraad, Suidkus, delivered at the Jubilee Hall, Umbogintwini, the first Buthelezi had ever delivered to a wholly Afrikaner organization, he expressed regret that members of the Afrikaans press, who had not been present at his March 1976, Soweto meeting and who neither covered events in KwaZulu nor attended the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, had, after that meeting, "irresponsibly" labelled him an "agitator",

¹Buthelezi (14), *Dialogue or Confrontation*, Address to Kajuitraad, p. 45. See also Buthelezi (46), 1978.

²*Natal Mercury*, 16 March 1976. Report of a speech by Mr. Theo Gerdener, leader of the subsequently defunct Democratic Party, at a meeting in Durban.

a "dangerous revolutionary", "power ambitious" and "impertinent", while one report had "called on the Government to deal strongly" with him. Defending the aggressiveness of the stand he had taken, he stressed that military security and good relations with nations in Black Africa depended on a new approach to South African Blacks. Dialogue, he said, should not be an excuse for "exercises in monologue", but for genuine participation and discussion between Whites and Blacks. Only then could it make any impression on a strong school of thought already existing in the Black community which no longer believed that dialogue served any purpose, and that only confrontation could solve South Africa's problems. Recalling that key personnel invited to KwaZulu had been refused entry by the South African Government, he asked whether that meant that "only advisers who conformed to the Government's vision of our homeland will be allowed to assist us?" "Is it an example of how the development of the Black man is to be seen, as the sole prerogative of the White, while the development of the Black man by the Black man, is frowned upon?" Recalling that sections of the Afrikaans press had suggested that the time had come to formulate constitutional proposals, he reminded his audience that he had made similar suggestions many times, always to be told that it was unnecessary, as the "present Government

¹Buthelezi (14), Address to Kajuitraad, p. 53.

knows what to do". When he told his Soweto audience that it would be difficult again, in the present climate, to offer his proposals for a federal formula, he did so, he said, not in a threatening vein, but as a warning that no one could remain conciliatory when such gestures are met with rigid dogma. Pontification by Whites was no longer acceptable as a basis for meaningful dialogue. Nor was the Black man prepared to sit on the sidelines ("(as) if we know our place") while Whites went into an all-White huddle in the name of White domination, to make decisions concerning the nationhood of Black people.¹ Buthelezi said he was not a revolutionary, but he saw a revolution coming. "Should I not say so? Should I lie and say we are not frustrated and angered by our voicelessness? ... that the quality of our lives is adequate? That the education of our children is in good hands? Is that what it takes to be taken seriously? There is no reason," he added, "why we cannot plan a common future in a united South Africa", but it would be necessary first to abandon the master-servant relationship in order to meet around a conference table as equals in an attempt to lay the foundations for a secure future for all. He demanded to be heard, and added that "my people support my views. My people support my stand."²

In a speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in

¹Buthelezi (14), Address to Kajuitraad, p. 41.

²Ibid., p. 59.

March 1977, Buthelezi restated his belief that there could be no political solution in which Whites were not active partners with Blacks. "It is only if we feel committed to a common destiny with them that there will be no race war." "We are one people in one land," he said, and must "talk to one another within the terms of Western democracy and Christian ethics ..."¹

Buthelezi, in an interview with the author, expressed the fear that despite all that had been said, change would not come "pleasantly" to South Africa. The country's dependence on arms and her "astronomical" defence budget both maintained the *status quo* and were provocative and could not endure. Black population growth, he observed, is high, and Blacks would eventually fight for power, with disastrous results for us all. Buthelezi fears his efforts towards peaceful change are being impeded through constant, overt governmental control over his activities, calculated to block his efforts. To some extent this control was lifted when KwaZulu requested, and was granted, the second stage of constitutional development, a request that had previously been refused. In this phase the Assembly is able to "legislate on more subjects as far as local matters affecting KwaZulu is concerned ... and can amend certain

¹Buthelezi (42), Policy Speech 1977, pp. 8 and 22.

Republican laws affecting Black people who live in KwaZulu".¹ "You can't know," Buthelezi told the writer, "how much legislation passed by the KwaZulu Assembly has, in the past, been rejected by the South African authorities." To this extent, then, he now has a freer hand than hitherto. Speculation among Zulu is that second stage status has been thus far refused KwaZulu because it was considered "too revolutionary", and the authorities hoped that if they could get rid of Buthelezi "things would change".² The suggestion that Zulu were revolutionary is repudiated by members of the Assembly interviewed. It is just that "Zulu will not be bullied", is a frequent response.

White reaction to Buthelezi is mixed. He is admired by many liberals, reviled by many radicals, and either feared or disdained by members of the Nationalist establishment. White opposition parties have made substantial efforts to establish dialogue with him and with other homeland leaders, and in September 1975, there was a Summit meeting between representatives of the then Progressive Reform Party and Black, Indian and Coloured leaders of statutory bodies. The purpose of this

¹Buthelezi (35), *Response to the Message from the Hon. The Commissioner-General of the Republican Government announcing the second phase of Constitutional Development - now reached by KwaZulu*. Commissioner-General's complex (Nongoma: 3 February 1977).

²Interviews with members of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

meeting was to establish a permanent communications link between those who saw an urgent need for political change, and at its conclusion the meeting issued a declaration which criticized the enforced separation of leaders of organizations and statutory bodies. It declared that the leaders of such bodies would nevertheless work together for peaceful change in South Africa because of a shared common ideal, and expressed agreement on the fundamental issues relating to the future. The machinery was therefore created to "(e)xamine and articulate an agreement on fundamental issues, consult at regular intervals during the next year and keep lines of communication open for immediate consultation when necessary." The meeting, "realising that plans for the future will have to be the outcome of frank discussion and exchange of views between representatives of various sections of the South African community, and that to be successful, (these) must have broad national assent, therefore declare(d) the intention to work towards holding a representative convention for the purpose of obtaining a mandate from the people for the constitutional and other proposals which will emanate from the initiative taken today. We are agreed that Apartheid or, as it is called, Separate Development, does not offer a solution, and that any constitutional system must embody a Bill of Rights safeguarding the rights of both individuals and groups. We accept that in one united South Africa, territory and not race must form the basis of government

which should not be racially exclusive."¹ The meeting went beyond a commitment to common aims, and envisaged active co-operation that would lead to the formation of a joint Secretariat.

Mr. Vorster rejected this meeting's findings and accused the group of a deliberate attempt to embarrass the Government. A subsequent Summit meeting in December 1975, reaffirmed the stand it had taken in September, and called on the then Prime Minister to meet its representatives so that they could "submit to him the urgent necessity of convening a National Convention of all the people of South Africa."²

To some Government figures, however, Buthelezi remains "this Black leader who has so much to say and whom I regard as being too big for his boots".³ Such racist buffoonery cannot delay South Africa's day of reckoning; what men like Mr. A.L. Schlebusch, who made this statement, seem to fail to grasp is that Buthelezi is no longer asking for better treatment. He is, while calling for radical political change, also offering to share a country which inevitably the people whom he represents will dominate by reason of their numbers,

¹*Sunday Times*, 28 September 1975, *Natal Mercury*, 29 September 1975.

²*Sunday Times*, 7 December 1975.

³Comment by Mr. A.L. Schlebusch, Minister of Public Works and Information, to National Party members in Bloemfontein. *Natal Mercury*, 24 August 1976.

potential economic power, and because of the inexorable forces of history. Schlebusch's mistake, like Rhodesia's Ian Smith, is that he dismisses as too radical a leader who only the radicalism of others will convince him is a moderate, and then too late. Buthelezi observed, after a trip abroad some years ago, that though he was the leader of South Africa's largest Black nation and had met heads of states throughout the world, he had never met the South African Prime Minister. This omission was speedily remedied, and soon thereafter Buthelezi was invited to a meeting with Mr. Vorster. Predictably, nothing more than an historic "meeting" transpired.

Other conservative Whites, however, are heeding at least some of the calls for a new dispensation, albeit one which would not disturb the equilibrium of the present system. In August 1976, the Transvaal Chamber of Industries, alert to the need to leave no stone unturned in creating a "stable and contented Black community",¹ pledged the full co-operation of industry in assisting the Government to introduce a new blueprint for working conditions for Black workers. "It would be an act of unbelievable folly if such an offer were to be rejected," was the response of the Chairman of the Natal Mercury.²

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 22 August 1976.

²John D. Robinson, Chairman of the Natal Mercury. *Natal Mercury*, 24 August 1976.

Yet offers to modify an exploitative system made at a time when concession is panicked rather than gracious, do not impress or mollify Buthelezi or other Black leaders. Homeland leaders, meeting outside Johannesburg, formulated and presented their joint demands at about the same time as the Chamber of Industries was resolving to create a "stable and contented Black community". They bluntly called for "(a) change of heart, which is more important to racial harmony than gifts lavished out of a Calvinistic sense of duty".¹ The meeting declared categorically that the homeland leaders regarded "themselves, and are considered by millions of their people, as part and parcel of the liberation movement ... we deeply regret the divisions within the leadership of Black people at this moment of crisis. We want to emphasize ... that Blacks must speak with one voice, whatever their differences may be on strategy."² The meeting demanded that all Black leaders presently detained be released or charged, and stressed that continuing to ignore "reasoned and legitimate representations of Black leaders for change ..." will result, "wittingly or unwittingly in promoting the cause of violence".³ The leaders assembled, excluding those

¹*Joint Communiqué issued after the meeting of Black leaders, Holiday Inn, 21 August 1976, p. 3. Issued by leaders of Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.*

²*Ibid., p. 4.*

³*Ibid., p. 3.*

of Bophuthatswana and Transkei, stated that they had "no intention whatsoever of opting for so-called "independence", "as we do not want to abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting our share of the economy, and wealth, which we have jointly built."

An observer at this meeting came away with a strong sense of foreboding at the aggressive anger homeland leaders displayed.¹ The meeting deplored in the strongest terms the "shabby manner"² in which representations on such vital issues as the granting of permanent rights to urban Blacks, the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, security of tenure and influx control, to 2 previous summit meetings between homeland leaders and the then Prime Minister had been treated.³ Had they been heeded, these might have prevented the conflagration which later engulfed many parts of the country. The meeting excoriated the practice of denying fundamental human rights to Blacks until forced by confrontation to do so, a practice which had widely demonstrated that the only language the Government of South Africa was prepared to listen to was violence, "and in so doing they have dealt a severe blow to the philosophy of non-violence as a viable formula for change". The meeting added that it was

1 Brenda Robinson; Daily News.

2 *Joint Communiqué*, p. 2.

3 Held on 6 March 1974, and 22 January 1975.

regrettable that failure to implement the genuine aspirations of Blacks, as presented by the leaders statutorily established, gave credibility to accusations that these leaders, and statutory bodies set up by the Government, "had been foisted on our people and are of no value".¹

In substantiation of the claim that representations from two previous Summit meetings between homeland leaders and the then Prime Minister had been dealt with in a "shabby manner", some selected excerpts are presented here from the proceedings of the *Conference of eight Black leaders with The Honourable Advocate B.J. Vorster, M.P. (Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa), The Honourable Mr. M.C. Botha, M.P. (Minister of Bantu Administration and Development of Bantu Education),*

(1) *The Honourable Dr. T.N.H. Janson, M.P. (Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and of Bantu Education),*

(2) *The Honourable Mr. A.J. Raubenheimer, M.P. (Deputy Minister of Bantu Development) in the Cabinet room, H.F. Verwoerd Building, Cape Town, 22 January 1975.*

The excerpts have been chosen to show that issues discussed were inadequately debated and summarily and inconclusively dismissed. The page numbers indicate the approximate

¹*Joint Communiqué, p. 3.*

length of debate on individual subjects.

On the question of land ownership, the (then) Prime Minister said, after a short discussion, that "it seems clear that there can be no change of policy", but some system of leasehold will be considered and the Government would go into the matter and inform the homeland governments of the outcome of investigations (p. 13). The (then) Prime Minister suggested to the Conference that the Conference move to the next item (p. 14). Discussion on trading rights of the Blacks in urban areas ensued, concluding with the (then) Prime Minister promising the meeting "that he would consider the matter" (p. 18). He pointed out that since Mr. Rousseau, the Secretary for Bantu Education, was leaving after lunch, the next item, on education, be dealt with, at that time, before Mr. Rousseau leaves. He then called on ... etc."

In the course of the discussion on education, the Honourable M.G. Buthelezi asked what was the clear-cut decision or answer on this question of the medium of instruction. The Honourable M.C. Botha said that he had referred to conversations the Secretary for Bantu Education had had with school boards, to which Chief Buthelezi replied "that this question of the medium of instruction went right across the whole principle of self-government. Here were their citizens participating in elections of those legislatures, ... and yet find that a

decision of the legislature does not affect them. This made a mockery of self-government." (p. 27). Debate ensued and the Chief Executive Councillor of KwaZulu pointed out that there has to be a time schedule. "Can there be no indication when this matter will be sorted out? They cannot," he said, referring to homeland leaders, "go to their people and say that the matter is receiving attention, in vague terms." The Honourable M.C. Botha pointed out that the matter could not be rushed and no time schedule could be given. The Honourable M.G. Buthelezi stated that this matter had been going on for some time and that it was high time it came to a settlement. The Honourable M.C. Botha stated that the matter could not be steam-rollered. He said the matter had only once been discussed with leaders at the March 1974, meeting, and only once before that with the KwaZulu Cabinet *2 years before* (emphasis is added). He disputed Chief Buthelezi's contention that the matter had been going on for a long time.

The Honourable B.J. Vorster stated that the matter could not be taken any further at that stage. The meeting proceeded to the next item on the agenda (p. 29).

On the question of influx control, the (then) Prime Minister suggested a sub-committee of 3 Black leaders who, with a senior Government official, could investigate and report on the issue. Buthelezi refused to be a co-author

of such a report as the matter was highly political, and he preferred that governments should submit memoranda and suggestions not as members of a committee (p. 41). To a remark by the Honourable K.D. Matanzima that the Chief Executive Councillor of KwaZulu "will join us and we will elect members of the committee together", Buthelezi responded, "You won't dragoon me." The (then) Prime Minister suggested that the next item be discussed (p. 43). Discussion on the position of professional Blacks in the township followed and twice the (then) Prime Minister suggested moving to the next item with no conclusion being reached. "I think we should not waste time, we have had enough argument on this point and I think we should leave it." (p. 45). A short discussion followed until the (then) Honourable Prime Minister suggested that the conference move to the next item, Civil Rights for Blacks in Urban Areas (p. 46). In this discussion, the Chief Executive Councillor of KwaZulu proposed that the question of Soweto, as a homeland, be looked into. There was, he said, no consensus amongst the leaders, but he felt the issues had to be presented to the (then) Prime Minister for what it was worth. The suggestion had been received with acclamation by a meeting of 15 000 that he had attended in Soweto. Soweto was the fourth largest city in the Republic and in this way "a new and sympathetic machinery will be made in dealing with such cases as influx, married women, widows, etc.". The (then) Prime Minister responded that "(a)s far as the

proclamation of Soweto as a homeland is concerned, it is out of the question". The Honourable M.C. Botha (interjecting), "That is too easy a solution." The (then) Prime Minister (continuing), "but if you asked me whether I am prepared to concede this matter I must say 'no'." At this point a suggestion to move to the next item was made, and the (then) Prime Minister called on the next speaker (p. 49).

Enough has been referred to to suggest that the accusation that representations had been "shabbily treated" is justified. A long agenda certainly had to be contended with in a matter of 8 hours, and doubtless personnel present were hard-pressed and had obligations in regard to other meetings that ran concurrently with this one; but it was disappointing to many that such short periods of discussion, with no apparent intention of reaching conclusions, were considered adequate in such sensitive areas of negotiations. The contention of the joint communiqué of August 21, 1976, two months after the Soweto riots, seems well substantiated that "if the Republican Government had heeded our words of warning concerning the granting of permanent rights for urban Blacks, and the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, amongst other things, this conflagration which engulfs the whole country would not have taken place".¹

¹*Joint Communiqué*, p. 2.

One further homeland leaders' meeting with the then Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet must be alluded to.¹ This meeting lasted but 7 hours, and as at its 2 predecessors, key causes of confrontation remained unresolved. The then Prime Minister rejected the 3 main Black demands - an all-race National Conference, the release of political prisoners, and a new deal for urban Blacks in national politics. On 1 of the primary reasons behind the Black leaders' request for a meeting with the then Prime Minister, the unrest in South Africa, the Prime Minister deferred talks on the matter until the Cillie Commission investigating the unrest had submitted its report. The citizenship controversy was similarly deferred for discussion at a future meeting. Buthelezi, at the conclusion of this summit meeting, declared himself "very unhappy". He had drawn attention, yet again, to the fact that the Government's failure to introduce meaningful change was discrediting homeland leaders in the eyes of their people; those who had been sceptical that homeland leaders would return from this meeting less empty-handed than they had on previous occasions, were proved correct. "Black Solidarity," he said, "is growing out of a call for liberation similar to that which had motivated the Afrikaner in his own struggle for self-determination at the beginning of the

¹Pretoria, 8 October 1976. See *Daily News*, 9 October 1976, *Sunday Tribune*, 10 October 1976, *Sunday Times*, 10 October 1976, and *Natal Mercury*, 11 October 1976.

century." ¹ "The Black man's acceptability is, similarly, being determined by his or her involvement in the struggle for liberation." Homeland leaders were aware that their people would reject them if they did not fulfil their desire for liberation.²

The second Summit Meeting had an important aftermath. Immediately on its conclusion, homeland leaders met in secret and from this meeting a new Black African political front emerged to fight for Black freedom. Piloted by the leaders of KwaZulu, Lebowa and Gazankulu, Chief Buthelezi, Dr. Cedric Phatudi and Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi respectively, and attended by urban leaders, professional men and women, representatives of Black consciousness movements, trade unionists and workers, and representing a cross-section of the Blacks of Johannesburg, the gathering, according to a statement issued at its conclusion, succeeded in bridging the fragmentations and divisions that have existed among Black leaders. Buthelezi said afterwards that "I am committed to the nurturing of (this Black Unity Front). I see in it a future basis for the prevention of a Black civil war in this country either during the course of the struggle for

¹Prepared statement by Chief M.G. Buthelezi, presented to the Prime Minister at the meeting.

²See also Buthelezi (46), *From Poverty to Liberation*, Address to the Association for Third World Affairs, National Press Club, Washington (U.S.A.: 15 August 1978).

liberation or during the post-liberation era."¹ He said, too, that new strategies had been planned against "a common White enemy", but "we cannot disclose this to our enemies through the White press". This latter comment was unusual, for Buthelezi's *rapport* with, at least, the English press in his area has generally been good.

Motivated by the realization on the part of Black leaders throughout the country that they could no longer "go it alone" against a common enemy, Blacks have had to close their ranks at the expense of the further polarization of Black and White in South Africa. "In the face of persistent White intransigence and the determination of Whites, as shown by Mr. Vorster at the second summit meeting on the 8 October, to maintain White domination and Apartheid, we have no alternative," Buthelezi has said. This meeting of Blacks, he added, was all that gave him hope. He regarded it as a watershed. Blacks were now prepared to take their own initiatives. "I now intend to re-examine this exercise of talking to Mr. Vorster," he said, "to see if there is any purpose in meeting him in the future." Delivering his Policy Speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on 21 March 1977, Buthelezi asked the Assembly to advise him on whether to attend future meetings with the South

¹Buthelezi (42), Policy Speech, 1977, p. 19.

African Prime Minister. He reported that the meeting on 8 October 1976, had been a "farce".

It must be added that despite Buthelezi's frustration with these summit meetings, some requests from the meetings have not ultimately fallen on deaf ears. The then Prime Minister's promise "to consider the matter" of Black trading rights in urban areas subsequently bore fruit, as has been discussed. Consequently the rejection of summit meetings as of no value may be an overstatement. Yet the cost to Black leaders of attending them may not be justified by the relatively meagre benefits. Black-White dialogue is becoming less the prerogative of White leaders, to be granted at will, as Black leaders realize the political cost of repeated failure to achieve anything by it. Buthelezi has up till now favoured ongoing exchanges between his government and that of White South Africa; if he should finally decide that such exchanges are of no value and indeed cost him support, one of the few areas of his philosophy that distinguishes him as a moderate will have been altered. The radicalization of the periphery will, as predicted, be closer to realization.

There is little issuing from the governing Party to indicate an awareness of the growing schisms in South African society. "Dawie", columnist of *Die Burger*, indicated in 1976 that there was no need to worry for there was a peculiar kind of Afrikaner chemistry at work.¹ "Afrikaners," he wrote, "are busy listening to more important voices, some inaudible to any but themselves ... The voices of their forefathers and their history, of their conscience and good sense, of people of their own kind whom they trust." Leadership and decision-making, for that writer, remained an Afrikaner monopoly even if shared with spirits.

Deference to a mystical Afrikaner thought process is now less acceptable to many Blacks and their leaders than it ever might have been. When Buthelezi claims that the Zulu will be instrumental in formulating change, he is not underestimating their capabilities. He has few doubts his cause will prevail, but much anxiety about the destruction that may precede this. Yet his dedication is to peacefully advancing the day when South Africa will "move inexorably towards a meaningful redistribution of wealth, franchise and a democratic government for the whole of the country In institutionalising democracy our generation will reflect the brotherhood and unity which we by now should already have been enjoying with

¹*Die Burger*, 9 October 1976.

our Black brothers and sisters across our borders, ...
we look forward to playing a meaningful role in the future
... with the Black sons and daughters of Africa, cut off
from us by the colonial balkanisation of Southern Africa
... we have a role to play, not only in our families and
in our communities, but also in our country, in Southern
Africa and in mankind." ¹

¹Address in Pretoria to the Attenbridgeville
Community Centre, reported in *Daily News*, 15 December 1975.

CHAPTER 5

SOME POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES
AND PRACTICAL OPTIONS

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Separate Development has changed, both in its planning and in its implementation, since the time of the Tomlinson Commission and Dr. Verwoerd. The Tomlinson Commission in 1956 had not envisaged a system dissimilar from the provincial system in South Africa, when it evolved the plan upon which the implementation of the Separate Development policy was to be based. Independent political systems with ethnic groups, sovereign and autonomous in their own areas, would have been regarded as totally unrealistic at that time. In 1959 there was no evidence to indicate that the objective of the policy was anything beyond a territorial separation of the races; and in 1959 urban Blacks were considered "temporary sojourners" in the White areas, there only to work. In 1978 the Government seems to be coming to terms with the unalterable reality of a Black presence in White areas which is dispelling this Verwoerdian dream of "temporary sojourner".

The change in concept has been considerable. Independent sovereign states are now the ultimate objective of Separate Development, and the permanency of

Black people who live and work in the common areas has tacitly been recognized. A Cabinet Minister could now say that the policy was not necessarily aimed at eliminating Blacks from White areas, nor at making life uncomfortable for them.¹ The Minister found it necessary to add a *caveat* that the provision of amenities and facilities for urban Blacks should not "alienate the Whites nor act as a honeypot to Africans". But the very sentiment indicates a change in official thinking which could contribute to an improvement in race relations in South Africa. If KwaZulu (as well as other homelands) was to be developed so that it could offer employment at competitive salaries to the majority of its "citizens" who would not have to go to "White areas" and who would have full political, economic and social rights in Black areas, South Africa's race conflict could conceivably be largely defused. For that to happen, however, there would need to be a cession of much South African territory - a prospect that is highly unlikely. Moreover, Blacks in "White" areas, who are there because they have always been, are needed, and choose to remain, would require a separate dispensation.

Although there is no major political policy change on the horizon, there are indications of a subtle move away from rigid dogma. Whereas National Party ideology had previously insisted on the inferiority of Blacks as

¹*Natal Mercury and Daily News*, 11 December 1975.

the justification for its race policies, it now stresses ethnic differences as a basis for different treatment. The central notion has become "different but equal", and the terminology employed has changed. "Race" has become "nation" and "ethnic group". This was an obvious necessity since a policy of ethnic political independence was incompatible with an ideology of racial inferiority.

Perhaps one of the most significant changes in South Africa is that the future of the country is being determined not only in the Nationalist caucus, but also by Black politicians. Response to demands from Soweto, whether acceded to or not, has frequently been the result of urgings from Black politicians who, a few years ago, would have been either ignored or detained. Change in South Africa is increasingly the product of a process of demand and concession between a White Government and the Black opposition that has emerged, ironically often spawned by the policy of Separate Development. Buthelezi has articulated the acknowledgement by Black leaders that the effectiveness of the official opposition in the central Parliament as a medium of negotiation and as an instrument of change has diminished in direct proportion to the increase in the polarization of the races resulting from events in South Africa.¹ Ultimately it

¹In an address to a symposium to mark Namibia Day of the Coloured National Independence Party, in Windhoek, 26 September 1976.

is only the Government that can set up structures necessary for change.¹

Buthlezi constantly inveighs against violence; he is perturbed at the "intransigence and uncompromising stand"² of the South African Prime Minister which makes his task of leadership from within the Separate Development system increasingly difficult. He is firmly convinced that revolution in South Africa can be avoided only with the help of Whites committed to change. In an address to White schoolboys, he charged them with having a pivotal part to play in solving South Africa's problems.³ It was necessary, he said, that membership of White society should not insulate Whites from playing a meaningful role in solving the problems of the country. He was not threatening, he added. "Only a fool interprets what I say as a threat." His future and that of his children depended on how seriously his warnings were taken. "I am as concerned as anyone that the situation be peacefully resolved. That is why, in spite of so many frustrations, I have not given up my work which is geared to bringing about a peaceful change."

¹Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert in an interview with the *Sunday Times*, 26 September 1976. See also "Relevance of White Opposition Politics", a lecture delivered at the University of Cape Town by Dr. van Zyl Slabbert, reported in *Progress*, October 1976, p. 6.

²*Natal Mercury*, 26 September 1975.

³Michaelhouse School. *Daily News*, 29 October 1975.

There are Zulu who believe that such an objective is not realizable with the Separate Development system. Such a view is expressed by an ex-KwaZulu representative on the Urban Council, Mr. Paulus Zulu. Mr. Zulu resigned his office after a year's service when he realized that for him, his mission was totally without significance or effectiveness. The office was but "an ornamental presence". It operated from no real independent base because the concept of Separate Development was completely without reality. "Let Pretoria do its own dirty work," he said, "without the pretence that goes with the concept of separate development and independent homelands and urban representatives."

Buthlezi, in conformity with his own approach to Separate Development, is antagonistic to those who have "opted out". There is a "multitude of strategies," he says, "that could and should be shared by all ... if we want to bring about liberation in the foreseeable future."¹ Separate Development notwithstanding, Buthelezi and his followers are perpetuating the traditions of the African National Congress, "an inclusionist liberalism with deep roots in South Africa".²

¹Buthlezi (41), *The Dismantling of Racism in South Africa calls for New and Multi-Strategy Approaches*, Portland University, Oregon (U.S.A.: 1 March 1977), p. 3.

²Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, p. 121.

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Eliminating race discrimination does not mean ignoring factors of race, culture, language and religion, all of which contribute to the diversity which enriches South Africa's national life. These factors, while recognized, should not preclude effective participation in political, social and economic decision-making. That Black and White share one country and one economy means that both wield a measure of power within an integrated system. And if Black South Africans are not to express their growing economic and political power in an unconstitutional way, they must be enabled to express it through participation in peacefully established institutions.

There seems to be a growing acceptance of this political fact amongst White South Africans. Possible channels for extended and joint decision-making procedures have been suggested, and these include Presidential government and a Cabinet Council.¹ Often, however, such suggestions represent interim alternatives before a wider, representative franchise formation can be devised and adopted.

¹Randall, *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, investigated a variety of political institutions in regard to their application to South Africa.

Perhaps the most widely discussed practical alternative to the present system is federation, despite its rejection by the former Prime Minister who has made it unequivocally clear that only Whites will be permitted any say in the power structure of areas considered White. Yet federalism may emerge as a compromise solution in a racially polarized country. A multi-racial unitary state in which voting rights would be extended, progressively, to Blacks on an individual basis would appear unacceptable to the majority of Whites if present voting patterns are a criterion;¹ and the replacement of the White Central Government by a Black Government could only occur through violence, a prospect which would destroy any carefully laid constitutional plans. A federal structure would eliminate White domination of all South African groups but has the potential of preserving a measure of White self-rule without which, under present conditions, White acquiescence to any alternative plan would probably not be forthcoming.

Advocates of federal and unitary systems were well represented in deliberations preceding Union in South Africa. The constitution which emerged had federal features, but the relationship between provincial and central government lacked the rigidity that constitutional theorists regarded as necessary to federation. South

¹See P. Laurence and F. van Zyl Slabbert, *Towards an Open Plural Society* (Johannesburg: Sprocas, 1973).

Africa was thus described as a "quasi-federation" at that time. In recent times the Central Government has operated largely at the expense of the provinces so that, despite its federal features, South Africa is clearly a unitary state.¹ The Encyclopaedia of the Social sciences defines federalism as "the mode of political organization which united separate polities within an overarching political system, so as to allow each to maintain its fundamental political integrity".² It distributes power "among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of all the governments. By requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation, in some form, it enables all to share in the system's decision-making and decision-executing processes". Further, "(f)ederalism conceived in the broadest social sense looks to the linkage of people and institutions by mutual consent, without the sacrifice of their individual identities, as the ideal form of social organization", and "as a political device, federalism can be viewed as a kind of political order animated by political principles that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated co-ordination among several power centres". The definition stresses the value of "dispersed power centres as a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties".

¹Randall, *South Africa's Political Alternatives*, p. 7.
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1931), pp. 169-177.

In effect, it allows that "political institutions common to different political systems, when combined within a federal system and animated by federal principles, are effectively endowed with a single character".

Thus, in a federation, governmental authority is shared by the central (or federal) government and the provincial or state governments. This division of functions is precisely defined and can only be altered with the agreement of all or most of the governments concerned. The relationship between them is usually embodied in a "written constitution". Lord Dicey defined the essential features of federalism as : ¹

- (1) Supremacy of the Constitution;
- (2) A distribution among bodies with limited co-ordinate authority of the different powers of government; and
- (3) The authority of the courts to act as interpreters of the Constitution.

In contrast, a unitary government occurs where all power to govern resides in the central or national authority. Although provision may be made for government on regional and local levels in a unitary system, every

¹A.V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution* (London: Macmillan, 1927).

act of the regional or local authority is performed under powers granted by the central government. The central government may revoke this authority at any time.¹

A third category pertinent to these definitions, is that of Confederation. Here sovereignty resides with the member states which delegate limited authority to the central government. Confederations tend either to dissolve or to integrate into federations.

In South Africa there appears to be a tendency to deprecate rigid constitutions as so many pieces of paper, and where there is no respect for agreements or laws, this may be so;² but there is evidence of the successful survival of rigid constitutions embodying federal arrangements in many countries of the world, including the United States of America and Canada. Certain governmental forms suggested under the name of federalism are not that at all. No scheme in which a central parliament has total sovereignty which it delegates to subordinate legislatures is a true federation. The Race Federation of the now defunct United Party was an example of this; subordinate legislatures in this proposal would have had no more real power than municipalities or

¹D. Worrall, ed. *South African Government and Politics* (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1975).

²J. de Beer, *Federation is No Fig Leaf*, Public Relations and Research Department, Progressive Party of South Africa, no date.

provincial councils in South Africa today. If the central parliament is representative almost exclusively of White people, and the other legislatures of Brown and Black as it was proposed they be, this becomes an elaborate scheme for the maintenance of White domination.¹ Similarly, Dr. Verwoerd's concept of a South Africa split up into a number of states, each more or less racially homogeneous, each fully self-governing, but linked in some sort of community or commonwealth, is also not federation. It fails to meet the definition that the sovereignties concerned be co-ordinate and exist within the same territory. Each of Verwoerd's planned states would be as theoretically sovereign as each state in today's European Economic Community.

An important advantage of federalism is that it allows flexibility for provincial legislatures. Different practices may be followed as appropriate to different parts of the country. It also provides a barrier against over-centralized power which could lead to tyranny, and in a plural society like South Africa's this precaution may prove necessary to protect individual liberty. In de Beer's view, civil servants dealing with provincial matters would invariably be local people operating in a local environment which they know and understand, and this would ensure a more sympathetic view

¹Ibid.

on the part of legislators and administrators towards the people for whom they are immediately responsible.

There would certainly be problems in introducing a federal system in South Africa, one of which would arise in the division of functions between the central and provincial legislatures. A resolution of the conflicts that would arise would have to be by negotiation. Another problem could arise if strong provincial leadership representing an ethnic segment developed and threatened national unity. This need not necessarily lead to disintegration provided that the major ethnic or geographic constituencies have sufficient bargaining power to make disintegration unacceptably costly to all participants. It can be argued that federations are inefficient in that they necessitate the proliferation of legislatures and of administrative machines. This may be so. But efficiency involves more than just a count of the number of parliaments or bureaucracies. Federalism's primary attraction is that it provides the conceptual tools for a basic reappraisal of South Africa's political future without emphasizing to White South Africans the inevitability of the relinquishment of ultimate power. Change thus "packaged" could perhaps even be "sold" by White opposition parties.

Unfortunately, the response of the White Government

has been negative thus far. The official attitude to federalism is that states can enter into agreement with each other only after independence. Mr. Vorster's speech in Parliament and his rejection of Buthelezi's federation proposals makes this clear.¹ Although Nationalists have firmly excluded the idea of a federation, or confederation, from their official policy for the political destiny of South Africa, in Nationalist circles there is discussion about its merits. Even Chief Kaiser Matanzima, speaking in Mafeking as the guest of the Bophuthatswana Government, said he had no doubt that Black and homeland people could live peacefully in South Africa on an equal footing with Whites if the whole of South Africa were federated into a single state.² In his first speech as Prime Minister of independent Transkei, he reaffirmed the possibility of rejoining a confederation of southern African states under a new dispensation. It would seem that Nationalists cannot afford to remain indifferent to a policy which has such a wide area of potential consensus and which offers an escape from some of the intractable difficulties that Separate Development has created.

Perhaps a distinction between public statement and

¹*House of Assembly Debates*, 4 and 7 February 1975, Cols. 386 and 399.

²*Natal Mercury*, 24 November 1975.

practical policy should be made in relation to the views of Nationalist leaders on federalism. These leaders require to retain their credibility and that of their party, so that although many have privately asserted that a federal system with direct representation is the only ultimate solution, they dare not say so in public.¹ A deadlock thus exists as far as publicly stated policy is concerned, and Dr. van der Merwe observes that this is largely the result of current political party debate which inhibits honest statement, presumably because parties cannot afford to "lose face". There is, of course, a strong element of racists among those who refuse to share power, but there are many *verligte* leaders who find themselves unable to say publicly what their personal views are.

Government recognition that more effective communication is necessary between the representative bodies of the various racial groups in South Africa led in August 1976, to the formation of an inter-cabinet Consultative Committee between the White South African Cabinet and the executives of the Coloured Representative Council and Indian Council. It met with a mixed reception. The Coloured Labour Party, the elected majority party in the Coloured Representative Council,

¹According to Dr. H.W. van der Merwe, *Race Relations News*, 1975.

rejected the concept as a "window dressing facade"¹ and refused to compromise its demand for political parity with Whites on a common roll. Urban Black participation in this Council was not considered. Questioned on the possibility of African participation, the then Prime Minister's reply was an emphatic "No".² He reiterated the Government's stand that "as far as we are concerned, all Black people are citizens of one or other homeland. They merely live and work in this country". Mr. Vorster also rejected the idea of discussions between the Government and all the Black leaders together. "I see at this stage no occasion or reason why we must talk with them all together. Their destinations and interests are certainly not the same, as far as I am concerned."³

Buthlezi's comment on his possible participation in such a Cabinet Council, were he to be invited to join one, is pertinent. He made it clear that this was a serious matter to be considered when the occasion arose. Events were moving so fast, he said, that he was not prepared to outline a strategy now for the future. He said that he continued to believe in peaceful change, but felt that South Africa had gone beyond the talking stage.

¹*Sunday Tribune*, 15 August 1975.

²Sixtieth birthday interview with the then Prime Minister. Reported in *Natal Mercury*, 13 December 1975.

³*Ibid.*

He would not be easily attracted to a concept that merely involved a few Black faces if, in terms of concrete action, such a Council were to have no meaning. A "shop window" was no longer attractive to Black people, he said. His ambivalence should not be read as an unwillingness on his part to work for less than the ideal ("then I would fold up now," he said). His interest lies in a decision-making body, not a talking shop; that was why he had proposed a multi-National Council which the Prime Minister had rejected. "Some things," he said, "are by-passed by history. What was valid yesterday may no longer apply today; dialogue may once have sufficed; now it must be coupled with action meaningful to a Black leader."

South Africa's present political system consists of an effective combination of parliamentary government in White politics and an extensive and effective administrative rule of Blacks, while on the periphery of the political areas are "fringe structures" representing institutions for communal representation and local government. As presently constituted, the latter structures are of questionable effectiveness, even as advisory and consultative bodies, and of uncertain political status and function. The possible significant consequence of such structures, as seen by du Toit, is

relevant to this discussion.¹ He sees the introduction of further experimental institutions for Blacks of an advisory and consultative nature which could be accommodated in the system, and although never becoming of any real political consequence in themselves, effectively channelling political energies and ambitions of sections of Black leadership. As a result, the outlines of outright coercion would be "blurred" and the present regime enabled to maintain political control and supremacy. For these reasons he believes it is not unlikely that the Government will continue to experiment with "fringe institutions" whose strategic importance in the overall structure of the common area should not be underestimated even if these are presently ineffective and unstable. Short of a radical overthrow of the present oligarchy, this is the area in which du Toit suggests there may be some room for political accommodation and possible innovation. The growing impatience of Black leaders who refuse to participate in such experiments may prove him wrong.

In 1977, the Inter-Cabinet Council was dissolved and a new dispensation announced in the attempt to come to terms with the political complexity of the situation, but still only in regard to Whites, Coloured and Indians.

¹A. du Toit, *The Political Structure of the Common Area*. Paper presented to 45th Annual Council Meeting of South African Institute of Race Relations (East London: January 1975).

The details of this latest proposal have not been made publicly available and do not appear yet to be in final form. In broad outline it is intended that each of the 3 racial groups will have its own Parliament to legislate on matters of exclusive concern to the group. Matters of mutual interest will be dealt with by a Council of Cabinets on which all 3 racial groups will be represented; legislation will be adopted by consensus. Ultimate power will reside in an Executive State President elected on the principle of proportional representation. A President's Council, an advisory, non-parliamentary body which will act as arbitrator when consensus cannot be reached in the mixed cabinet, will also be formed. The dominant position of the Whites is not weakened in this new dispensation and leaders obliged to make decisions in the Cabinet Council are compelled to operate from old established structures.¹ Moreover, the exclusion of Blacks from the plan destroys much of its credibility.

Further scenarios are not impossible. Another overarching body could be created in which homeland leaders could be included to represent urban Blacks, for example in a Southern Africa Council. This type of

¹L. Schlemmer, "Social Implications of Constitutional Alternatives in South Africa". *Constitutional Change in South Africa*. Proceedings of a Conference on Constitutional Models and Constitutional Change in South Africa, held in the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 14-16 February 1978. Edited by J.A. Benyon (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1978).

suggestion would possibly be a ploy to reach a compromise without broaching the ultimate issue of power-sharing. Chief Buthelezi is wary of any scheme in which ultimate power remains in White hands only. He has said that it is not the land issue alone that is delaying his homeland's independence. It was his policy, and that of Inkatha, he said, to see one South Africa with all her people represented in the decision-making machinery of the land.¹

Consociational democracy is a concept which seems to be winning acceptance as a possible option for South Africa. It is applicable to a plural society and seeks to achieve accommodation among the consociated groups through co-operation among the leaders.² Individuals in South Africa have contact only through their own groups; separation has prevented cross-cutting of vertical or horizontal cleavages so that it has become necessary, in the interests of stability, to seek a practical political settlement not through the individuals in the society but by means of conciliation among the leaders of the various segments. The consociational idea is that leaders of the rival subcultures should make a deliberate joint effort to "stabilize the system" by

¹*Sunday Times*, 29 January 1978.

²A. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy. Types of Western Democratic Systems". *World Politics* (October 1968 - July 1969).

counter-acting the "unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation" through the formation of a "grand coalition cabinet", or "cartel of elites".¹

Lijphart, in his study "Consociational Democracy", isolates 3 factors which he considers conducive to co-operation in a plural society; external threats to the country, the need to balance power among the sub-cultures and preclude possible domination by one or more sub-groups over the others, and a "relatively low total load on the decision-making apparatus".² A consociational democracy relies not only on a "willingness of the elites to co-operate", but also on their ability to cope with the problems that are presented. Excessive burdens on the system could militate against compromise and stability.

The success of a consociational democracy is dependent on further factors. Assuming that the elites understand the dangers inherent in fragmentation, there has to be mutual tolerance of divergent interests and demands, a commitment to maintain the system and improve its stability, and within the sub-groups there must be a high degree of internal organization and unity of purpose. The latter would enable the articulation of

¹Ibid., p. 213.

²Ibid., p. 218.

particular group interests and would enable leaders to make compromises without alienating the allegiance of their supporters.¹

Insofar as KwaZulu is concerned, Buthelezi has stated his belief that the competitive Westminster system is incompatible with African politics, where debate among the elders of the tribe until consensus is reached is traditional. He has expressed his interest in a one-party state such as obtains in many countries in Black Africa; the model before him, however, has often been authoritarian. It is significant, therefore, that a representative of the KwaZulu Government has said that his Government could be interested in a consociational democracy.²

However, Schlemmer notes that certain preconditions would have to be met if such a political arrangement were to offer any hope of success in South Africa.³ These include the recognition of urban Blacks as a separate segment within the polity; the institution of devices for dealing with conflict within the society, for example,

¹Ibid., p. 219.

²Mr. O. Dhlomo, Minister of Education and Culture in the KwaZulu Cabinet, at a Public Meeting in Durban (28 July 1978).

³Schlemmer, "Social Implications of Constitutional Alternatives in South Africa", p. 272.

the establishment of trade unions and urban Black councils; the removal of White-controlled bureaucracies from Black areas and their replacement by trained Black administrators; improved training for Blacks and the ending of controls on their job mobility; an increase in the number of Blacks appointed to various boards of control and commissions; vigorous political development in Black areas to encourage coherence and enable the leaders to negotiate successfully; and involvement of Blacks at the local and provincial levels in order to train them for their participation at higher levels.

Some constitutional proposals for South Africa have consociational features. They have, though, been referred to as "sham consociationalism"¹ for they involve the predominance of White power. However, the very conflicts that the proposals generate could lead to mutations and a policy that allows for a broader-based consensus could be developed.

¹At the Conference on *Peaceful Change in South Africa* held in Freiburg, West Germany, in June 1978. Reported in *Daily News*, 29 July 1978.

CONCLUSIONS

The overriding conclusion from the study undertaken in these pages is that peace in South Africa is contingent on a radical redistribution of power and an equitable sharing of privileges and resources. Such evolutionary change involves, as Davenport notes, the willingness of the South African Government to change its policies and the preparedness of the outside world to allow it time to do so.¹ At present, although the Government has shown some agility in its international relations, and that includes the acceptance of majority rule for Rhodesia, it has shown little inclination to make meaningful changes in South Africa.

A previous chapter has presented the core-peripheral model of development as a tool in the analysis of KwaZulu.

¹T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa. A Modern History* (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1977), p. 376.

It was claimed that the inequality which exists between Black and White South Africans is the result of a protracted historical process.

By circular causation with cumulative effects, a country superior in productivity and incomes will tend to become more superior, while a country on an inferior level will tend to be held down at that level or even to deteriorate further - as long as matters are left to the free unfolding of the market forces.

The former country will continually acquire more external and internal economies. And from every center of growth emanate backwash effects to the other countries on the "periphery" ...¹

Myrdal's view of the international order is singularly apposite to the South African. The technological superiority of Whites in South Africa has resulted in material, economic and social advantages which have grown in magnitude as the country developed. As Myrdal notes, it is not necessarily by design that an advanced group "denies" access to its benefits to others.

But then South Africa is not itself an international community, despite an ideology which would imply that this could be so. Underdevelopment in the periphery could have been offset by a fostering and subsidizing of industry by the Government. This is not the same as

¹Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, pp. 279-280.

saying, however, that the process of underdevelopment in the periphery is the result of deliberate exploitation.¹ Although in the Shepstone dispensation Natal farmers had a powerful vested interest in cheap labour, it is doubtful that cheap labour served as the sole motivation for race discrimination either then or later, such as in the rejection by the Verwoerd Government of some of the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission for the rehabilitation of the African areas. Wolpe's claim that Separate Development emerged specifically as a means of maintaining cheap labour in the reserves complementing that which existed in urban areas, and that border industries could only be understood as an alternative to migration and as a mechanism for producing cheap labour, seems unwarranted.²

The Marxist conceptual view of race relations in South Africa is suggestive of a "conspirary theory" and would appear to be very narrowly focussed. The idea that Separate Development deliberately aimed at securing control of cheap labour and at creating a bourgeoisie supportive of capitalist development is a limited approach to what underlies the system. Such an attitude would

¹Wolpe, "Capitalists and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa from Segregation to Apartheid", p. 448.

²Ibid., pp. 449 and 451. See also Schlemmer, "Economy and Society in South Africa", *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa*, eds. Schlemmer and Webster (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978), p. 114.

appear to be an inadequate explanation of a phenomenon unique to South Africa. The accumulated evidence suggests that it is not possible to ascribe to the machinations of capitalism the impact of African Nationalism, struggling for an identity of its own, upon a minority White group fearful for the preservation of its identity, privilege and control.

Economist Norman Bromberger has argued that although White prosperity and White security could be symbiotic, as Wolpe maintains, they could also prove incompatible.¹ As Africans improved educationally and advanced themselves in employment, they could become resentful of the White man in their midst. In that case a Bantustan policy was not designed to conceal a system of exploitation, but was a strategy necessary to avert disaster in the long term. The imperatives of race and national identity can not be omitted from an evaluation of the forces at work in the South African system.

Maasdorp regards the homelands not as separate countries but as backward regions.² While such a statement offers criticism where criticism is due, it is

¹L. Kuper, *Race, Class and Power*, quoted in Dvenport, *South Africa. A Modern History* (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1977), p. 375.

²Maasdorp, *Economic Development for the Homelands*. pp. 2-7.

perhaps too cryptic a comment when seen in the light of possible alternative development strategies. Some approach reserve areas as backward regions in a common society with little contemplated effort to change the *status quo*; others would like to see every effort expended to develop them through a decentralized policy under a federal system; a third view is of these areas as both backward and nominally independent, with the backwardness ensuring compliance.

This last seems to be the model operative in South Africa. Homelands are regarded as backward regions and evidence suggests that they are not likely to achieve economic viability, although Government strategy purports to be directed towards their eventual economic independence, with strong links with South Africa being retained. It is difficult to detect purposeful intent to retain the homelands in a state of perpetual vassalage, and it seems that the Government plans to help develop these areas through industry. Yet not enough is being done, and the pace is too slow. It seems probable that the kind of independence encouraged will not make homelands independent either in spirit or in attitude. This in turn leads one to view the homelands as backward regions with the overall result pointing to development of "independent dependencies".

It would seem that the decentralization of industry

to border areas poses a threat to homeland industrial growth. These industries are more attractively located than the designated homeland growth centres. Any success border industry development may have could detract from the competitive ability of the homeland centres.

Homeland growth areas tend to be situated in unproductive rural areas and not in parts which are favourably situated in core areas. For example, no homeland growth centre has been designated close to a major urban area. The reason would appear to lie in a desire to develop the heartlands of the homelands. Taking into consideration the limited potential for such development, growth there is restricted and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

It has been argued that although interdependence between homeland-peripheral and South African-core economies has effected many links between them in fiscal, employment, investment and other matters, the interdependence has served to maintain Zulu dependency in economic and administrative affairs. Buthelezi is aware that the existence of the homelands has always served the domestic needs of South Africa and observes cynically that progress in the homelands is intended to avert a growing international protest over South Africa's domestic policies.

If viability is defined as the "ability of a

country to find its recurrent budget",¹ it is difficult to conceive of KwaZulu becoming viable unless there are significant changes in economic policy. Homeland areas should continue to be economically developed, but it is debatable whether internationally accepted independence can be achieved. In these circumstances, the Central Government's economic policy towards the homelands must be considered either "naive",² or as a deliberate attempt to retain economic power in White hands while perpetuating the homeland as a labour reservoir. The revisionist school of writing on South African political economy would take the latter view, as Maasdorp points out.

For Blacks enmeshed in the system which has given rise to this debate, the comment that "capitalism has a white face"³ is eloquent, and the Marxist-Socialist alternative is becoming increasingly attractive because it offers an explanation of their situation and at the same time promises a solution to their problems. Unless the free enterprize system can be seen as one that will

¹Maasdorp, *The Development of the Homeland with Special Reference to KwaZulu*, p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 8. See also A.C. Best and B.S. Young, "Homeland Constitution: the Case of KwaZulu", *South African Geographer* Vol. 4: No. 1 (1972), pp. 63-76, and A.C. Best in a paper read to a Seminar at the University of Natal entitled *Focus on KwaZulu* (July 1974).

³*Sunday Times*, 27 June 1976.

allow the removal of disabilities and afford increased opportunities, the potential for conflict in South Africa will assume a class orientation. If urban Blacks are kept in their present position, they will be increasingly receptive to Marxist ideology. Even some supporters of free enterprise acknowledge that increased wages may not be sufficient to preserve industrial peace, and that workers should be conceded part of the ownership of the means of production.¹ The situation relative to Black workers and the economic system within White South Africa may be analogous to the core-peripheral model of development delineated for homelands and White South Africa. Here, too, the system works to the advantage of the core (White South Africa), at the expense of the periphery (Black workers), and Marxists believe that the cycle can only be broken by radical means. If there is no intervention by the South African Government, such a result may indeed be inevitable. However, this need not be so. Timely action by the South African Government to end job reservation and the practice of discriminatory salaries, and to provide Black workers with a political environment which is not oppressive, could avert disruptive labour unrest. Disrupting the parasite-core phenomenon for the homelands and for urban Black workers are related tasks, with the possibility that significant

¹Ibid. For example, Mr. Harry Schwartz, Chairman of Federal Council of the South African Progressive Reform Party, now the Progressive Federal Party (PFP).

emphasis on either will not have a noticeably positive impact on the other. Attention to homeland development might mean less pressure on rural Blacks to migrate to White centres. A "Rooseveltian New-Deal" for urban Blacks might obviate any need that might exist for rights in a developing homeland. The Government, however, is committed to the homeland plan, which is the focus of this dissertation. The comparable core-peripheral situation in the economy of South Africa has been introduced to indicate another channel through which South Africa's race conflicts could be resolved.

The American economist M. Friedman expressed the view that South Africa's principal problems were likely to be political rather than economic.¹ He saw opportunities rather than problems in Separate Development, with a large, underdeveloped sector offering great potential for increased productive capacity. However, he saw obvious political problems. Once development begins, expectations rise faster than the means to realize them. Buthelezi's attitude is that although he values the emergence of a Zulu *entrepreneur* class, he is concerned with the poverty of the masses and is opposed to unfettered capitalism. He therefore takes the position that his Government would support the development of free enterprise which was part of Zulu cultural patterns, but would require that it be blended with a

¹*Sunday Times*, 28 March 1976.

"pinch of African communalism".¹ He tends, thus, toward a one-party state based on a socialist model. State control of basic resources is envisaged, while privately-owned industry would be allowed subject to the State exercising some control in order to achieve the maximum redistribution of wealth.² In the case of Transkei, the retention of some degree of leverage by the South African Government through the compulsory Citizenship Clause illustrates the difficulties a politically and economically assertive homeland leader might face. The South African Government is adamant that this law be operative. Without it, as was earlier discussed, millions of stateless Blacks would exist in the body politic of White South Africa and the policy of Separate Development would be vitiated. Despite the present break in diplomatic relations with Transkei, Matanzima will presumably have to concede the point. Any urban disturbances could then be disposed of through the repatriation to the homeland of Transkei citizens who might be involved. South Africa will thus be able to deflect problems away from herself. Moreover, any strategic alliances that Matanzima may attempt to effect with other homeland leaders could immediately be controlled by a reminder that his "independent dependency" owes more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of its budget to the South African

¹Buthelezi (19), Policy Speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 1976, p. 36.

²Ibid., p. 37.

Government, as well as employment as migrant labourers for a large number of its citizens. On the other hand, various interests in Transkei itself will have developed, eager now to sustain the new *status quo*. For example, civil servants and traders will have found opportunities for personal advancement denied them prior to independence. Marxist suspicions would seem vindicated, for there would ensue the formation of a *bourgeoisie* within the dependency, willing to perpetuate a relationship that is in its own interests but conceivably against those of the working class.

One can begin to see the rationale behind Separate Development as a mix of ideology and strategic motivation. If it is correct to assume that the *Verkramptes* (conservatives) of South Africa have decided that they want to keep control of the whole common area, and they can persuade enough homelands to opt for independent dependent status, they will have succeeded in their strategy. There may, of course, be disadvantages for South Africa. For example, there is a possibility of security threats, and one presumes that security surveillance would have to be maintained in these areas. Concerted action on the part of homelands cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that Transkei could sustain itself by means of international finance, as is the case with some other Black states on the sub-continent. In practice, patterns are less definitive

than is here suggested.

However, in the light of prevailing circumstances, the creation of independent homelands is not, as National Party supporters believe, solving the problem of White security needs and Black demands. The country's *Verligtes* (enlightened) increasingly see homeland development as only a partial solution and not as the answer to the demands of urban Blacks in the townships. Schalk Pienaar put the matter succinctly:¹ "To think that the creation of the homeland offers a solution for urban Blacks is nonsensical."

His view, of course, constitutes a complete contradiction of the belief hitherto held by the Government that the establishment of homelands, where the urban Black would be able to exercise political rights, would remove his desire for political power in the place where he lives. The status of the Transkei Act has strengthened the resolve of some Zulu leaders to resist the offer of independence. The Act, seen as a device for ensuring that there are no Black South Africans, has motivated increased effort on the part of Inkatha to act as the catalyst in effecting multi-racial majority rule as the only form of government that would

¹*Deurbraak*, June 1976, p. 3. Schalk Pienaar is a Nationalist political commentator.

ensure peaceful co-existence.¹

In this critical phase of its development, KwaZulu is subject to organizational splits which, if not checked, could be to its detriment. Reference has been made to them; divisions between rural and urban Blacks, the peculiar problems affecting banned and exiled people and organizations, and the question of Buthelezi operating within the Apartheid system. These issues are inter-related. One view from the inside would have it that those opposing Buthelezi's leadership are urban elitists and student radicals who hope to attain a privileged place alongside Whites, Coloured and Indians and therefore desire to maintain the *status quo*.² The argument that acceptance of homeland leadership would make it possible for the Government to ignore their existence and jeopardize their urban status would seem to be spurious.³ In any event, and irrespective of who the leader might be, these aspirations, in the present climate, are doomed to non-realization. The Transkei constitutional crisis and the eruption of violence in Soweto have made it clear that issues affecting Black people, whether urban or rural, are basically inseparable. Ethnic divisions were

¹See Buthelezi (22), *We Struggle to Build a Nation*, Presidential Address to the General Conference of the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Ondini, 9 July), pp. 34-36.

²Discussion in an interview with Dr. Sibusiso Mandlankosi Emmanuel Bengu, former Secretary General of Inkatha.

³*The World*, 25 June 1975.

of little consequence as Buthelezi and other homeland leaders took a stand in the former, and appealed for calm in the latter.

There is ample evidence to justify this assertion. Over recent years it has been homeland leaders, notably Buthelezi, through whom grievances of both urban and rural Blacks have been channelled for presentation to the Prime Minister, and even anticipated. The issue that sparked off the Soweto disturbances, compulsory tuition through Afrikaans in township schools, was the subject of special representations by the homeland leader to the Prime Minister in 1975. It would seem that conflict within KwaZulu is both political and commercial, and the homeland leadership has not been slow to point out the distinction between self-interest and the interests of KwaZulu. The parties to these conflicts do not seem to separate along strictly ideological lines, and perhaps this was realized when many businessmen, previously antagonistic to the homeland leadership, gave their support to Chief Buthelezi in the KwaZulu elections.

The unity of urban-rural interests must be seen in the context of South Africa as an industrial state dependent on cheap, migrant labour and in which workers and peasants alike have no legitimate power to affect the Government in its promulgation of laws which govern all their lives. The constitutional issue of

statelessness illustrates the concerns facing all Blacks, rural and urban. Urban Blacks are, through the compulsory Citizenship Clause, to be denied citizenship in the areas of progress to which their labour has contributed; and rural Blacks are offered citizenship in underdeveloped areas which may not presently be capable of development. In Wolpe's terms, the exploited comprise not just urban Blacks, but all Blacks. Separate Development, the political experiment taking place within the context of South Africa's socio-economic framework, has failed to satisfy the aspirations of critical categories of Black people. Redress of this failure must include the redistribution of the benefits of South African society. The constitutional issue and the urban issue are fundamentally interrelated. They must be solved not by palliatives, but by a political process accessible to all South Africans.

An issue that excites constant comment is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's leadership within the Apartheid system. It would appear from KwaZulu election results and from discussion with Blacks in many walks of life, that there is not extensive opposition to him. What opposition there is, is nevertheless vociferous and is associated with a call for the release of banned and exiled Black leaders whose claims to leadership are of assertedly greater legitimacy than those of Buthelezi. He and his supporters, although they do not attach undue

significance to this opposition, are concerned about its effects on Black unity. It is debatable whether the mystique surrounding the banned leaders would endure if they were present and operative. Any form of opposition which is as strong as Buthelezi, but outside the framework of Separate Development, is not likely to be allowed to continue. Suspended as he is between the Black masses and the White oligarchy, he has realized that he can do very little for Black political advancement outside the system. Within it, he increasingly finds his position invidious; he must be an instrument, temporary or otherwise, in the execution of policies which he hates, and is rewarded by the use of a political platform. Threatened with rejection by some of his own people, he is obliged to manipulate two different systems.¹ He must maintain his affiliation to the regime or give up his position, and at the same time he must ensure his acceptance within the African community. He has resolved this conflict by complying with the Government in essential respects; yet he displays hostility and independence within carefully defined limits. Although he has attempted to make clear that he has operated within the system not from free choice, he has nevertheless to endure such epithets as "stooge" and "sell-out" from those who think he should take no part

¹L. Kuper, *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 317-318.

in the implementation of Separate Development.

Buthelezi believes he has made the right choice. His position has often enabled him to articulate a perspective which might otherwise not be heard and to oppose, from a protected position within the system, those policies which show no sign of being reformed. Knowing the determination of the Nationalist Government to pursue its policies, it is doubtful whether "letting Pretoria do its own dirty work" would have been a practical alternative. Despite the strength of his position, it is conceivable that Buthelezi's attempts to comply with the minimum dictates of the South African Government may result in his significantly advancing the aims of Separate Development.

One of the factors that contributes to the tenuousness of Buthelezi's position is the rapidity with which events occur and political moods change. It seemed in 1975 that liberalization may have been imminent. By 1977 that seemed less likely. International pressures against Apartheid increased and, domestically, political attitudes hardened, furthering the polarization of South African society.¹ Former Ambassador Botha's admission at the United Nations that race discrimination existed in South Africa, and his promise that it would be

¹*Race Relations News*, January/February 1978.

eliminated, led to confusion in the National Party which had no authoritative framework for such change. Right-wing elements within the party appear to have been on the ascendant, driving it back to closer adherence to its fundamental, Verwoerdian ideology. The impetus for conciliation caused largely by a reluctance to accept responsibility for any split in Afrikaner ranks that a policy deviation might precipitate, has diminished the impact of the *Verligtes* on the present leadership. The result is a closing of ranks and the dominance of what is known as the "*laager* mentality". It is not surprising, therefore, that this attitude has been countered by a change in Zulu attitudes, reflected in Buthelezi's speeches. In less temperate language, these indicate growing impatience and fewer conciliatory gestures to Whites. Bishop Alpheus Zulu, in an interview, distinguished between "patience" and "endurance". The Black man, he contends, has been "enduring" not "patient". That is a misnomer. He has been forced to live in a situation not of his choosing, and "patience", in the Bishop's view, implies choice. Buthelezi has made it clear that he has set about formulating a strategy that would enable Blacks eventually to act unilaterally.¹ Thus Inkatha.

Inkatha is seen as pivotal in the power struggle developing. The KwaZulu leadership is sensitive to the fragmentation that characterizes freedom movements and the energy-consuming confrontations that result. It is

¹Buthelezi (22), *We Struggle to Build a Nation*, p. 36.

committed to peaceful change and is concerned that when success comes it should not be vitiated by freedom movements acting in opposition to each other. The Inkatha movement is radical in that it calls for change, but it is, as yet, unsympathetic to those who advocate violence. It is doubtful whether it can, at this time at any rate, be radicalized to that point. Nevertheless, it is intended that the principles and philosophies of the National Liberation Movement should be communicated to foster political awareness and Black solidarity. Many Zulu are becoming aware that aspects of their social system are anachronistic in the contemporary world and hinder progress. Inkatha has called for "education for nationhood" with particular stress to be placed on the importance of culture and self-identity, and in this mood it has opened its doors to all ethnic and Black consciousness groups. The result has been the organization of the Black Alliance, now in its initial stages. Because it is co-existent with Separate Development and operates within the system, Inkatha has met with opposition, but it could have potential as a catalyst for unity and change.

Basing the movement within the KwaZulu ethnic group and linking the movement to present KwaZulu structures has helped to avoid provoking official opposition to what might have been construed as an attempt to unite the Black people of South Africa against the regime. It is

significant that the name of the original organization was Inkatha KwaZulu. It is now Inkatha Kenkululeko Yesizwe, National Cultural Liberation Movement. Presumably there is no reason why, if other groups adopt its principles, a national movement, capable of electing its own national leader, should not emerge. The Government is aware of this possibility and Minister Kruger has warned Buthelezi against the involvement in Inkatha of any group other than Zulu. The warning is belated, since there is already considerable participation by members of other ethnic groups; moreover, men as differently placed as Bengu and Khoapa agree that if Inkatha can be established as a power base, it might be supported by radical intellectuals as well. The concept of statelessness has provided the movement with an acceptable and universal rallying cry for its initial thrust. Debate in Inkatha will almost certainly result in political action.

Inkatha's emergence is not without historical precedent, yet it differs fundamentally from older Black opposition organizations like the ANC and the BPC in its relative immunity from retributive action on the part of the South African Government. Founded by a "legitimate" political entity (KwaZulu Legislative Assembly) and protected by the KwaZulu Government, Inkatha cannot, one assumes, be harassed into insignificance. Such action would seriously damage stated goals with regard to one of

the most important homelands, and for some supporters of the policy would undermine the legitimacy of the entire programme. However, in the South African situation of conflict, a confrontation between the Government and Inkatha is possible at any time. Inkatha's first bulletin, which discussed the reasons for the movement's existence, was banned by the South African Government before it could be distributed. Buthelezi, aware that many were watching his reaction and convinced that the bulletin had not been subversive, defiantly printed it in his Ulundi office and distributed it. He referred to the incident as the "politics of impasse".¹ An appeal against the banning was launched, and an investigation by the Minister of Police into the matter was announced. In viewing the significance of this episode, the aims and intentions of Inkatha, as they appeared in the bulletin, must be briefly restated.

Inkatha is intended to be an instrument of liberation dedicated to evolving alternatives to the Separate Development system now operating in South Africa. "Inkatha will see to it that Blacks do not lose their birthright." "It is a people's organization run by the people for the people." "It is of the people and of Africa." It rejects the Westminster model of divisive partisan politics, as it rejects

¹*Natal Mercury*, 11 October 1976.

unfettered capitalism which it claims gives rise to oppression by economic elites. Significantly, "Inkatha will not do anything in the name of liberation which will result in the defeat of Apartheid but at the same time reduce South Africa to an ungovernable conglomerate of conflicting interests."¹

It is believed by the Inkatha-KwaZulu leadership that there will be no "liberation politics" if independent homelands are established, and the "ruthless desperation"² with which Pretoria will implement its policy thus to thwart collective Black action has not been underrated. The Constitution of Inkatha has purposefully erected barriers to possible success by Pretoria; linking Inkatha to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was designed to ensure that Pretoria would not be able to run the Assembly through puppets and that *de facto* power lay in the hands of members of the movement. This would prevent what had happened in the case of Transkei, where the ANC, PAC, BPC and SASO were not able to prevent independence, presumably because they had not been able to mobilize grass-roots support.

There is no doubt that SASO and BPC have had input

¹Buthlezi (34), "Inkatha: An Instrument of Liberation", *Inkatha Bulletin*, Vol.1 No.1 (September 1976).

²S. Bengu, "Black Solidarity", *Inkatha Bulletin*, Vol.1 No.1 (September 1976), p. 8.

into the South African system, but the fact that they lack discernible constituencies has enabled them to indulge in "extravagances".¹ Those Blacks who stand aloof from Inkatha because it has emerged from within KwaZulu may be rejecting a potentially invaluable organization representing a sizeable constituency in South Africa. The result of the KwaZulu elections indicate that Inkatha has considerable backing. Buthelezi himself could hardly have received a more convincing mandate for his policies. A study on urban Africans conducted in Soweto, Pretoria and Durban revealed that 60% knew of Inkatha. In Soweto $\frac{1}{5}$ of both upper and lower social economic status groups were positive in their attitudes. Twenty-seven per cent of upper social economic status and 13% of lower social economic status groups were opposed to Inkatha.² The study showed that in these 3 important geographical areas Chief Buthelezi "had more support than any other Black leader or grouping, free or imprisoned".³

Attention has been drawn to the increasing

¹Ibid.

²T. Hanf et al., *Südafrika: Friedlicher Wandel? Möglichkeiten demokratischer Konfliktregelung - Eine empirische Untersuchung* (Munich/Mainz: Kaiser. Grünewald, 1978), p. 378.

³L. Schlemmer, *The Stirring Giant: Some Observations on Black Political Movements in South Africa, with particular reference to the late Seventies*, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal (Durban: October 1978), p. 25.

aggression of statements issuing from KwaZulu. The emergence of Black power groups must bear some responsibility for this radicalization. One also recognizes an element of despair in a remark such as, "Inkatha observers see while White churches have opted for non-violence, their White members will be joining pistol clubs and buying arms. They will learn how to shoot, and they will do so in order to shoot Blacks."¹ Yet Inkatha is by no means an embodiment of the politics of despair. KwaZulu, apart from its possible significance as a regional administration, could be an instrument of change as a medium for the implementation of the aims of Inkatha. It provides a governmental structure within which Black nationalism could thrive to the point where a Government ban would be ineffectual, or detrimental, because of the Black backlash such a ban could engender. A monolithic Black nationalism could possibly also retard the growth of schisms in the ranks.

Yet the schisms exist, and if Inkatha is to contain them, it will face formidable obstacles. Subsequent to the KwaZulu elections, Buthelezi was attacked by a small group of youths at the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, former Pan-Africanist leader. The attack was apparently instigated by the Black People's Convention and

¹"Nought for Your Comfort". Author unknown. *Inkatha Bulletin*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (September 1976), p. 10.

"stage-managed" by the Communist wing of the African National Congress.¹ The latter, although banned in South Africa, is still a contender for Black leadership within the country and has campaigned resolutely to discredit all moderate Black leaders. Although it has met with some success, there is considerable evidence of Inkatha's appeal across the ethnic spectrum.² Inkatha has been accepted by several homeland leaders including Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, Mr. Kenneth Mopeli of Basotho Qwa Qwa and by the Black Unity Front on the Reef. The PAC and the Nationalist wing of the ANC have maintained cordial relations with Buthelezi, Inkatha's President, and some exiled Blacks have joined the movement and have tendered subscriptions. In April 1977, Dr. Bengu, the then Secretary-General of Inkatha, reported that support had come from many nations in Europe and Africa, and the Constitution of Inkatha had been sent, on request, to several governments in Africa. In addition, senior officials of the organization have visited countries on the Continent.

Of significance, too, is the enthusiastic reception accorded Chief Buthelezi in February 1978, after an address given by him in Soweto to students from the Universities of Fort Hare and Turfloop. Although many

¹*Natal Mercury*, 11 March 1978. *Sunday Tribune*, 12 March 1978.

²See *Sunday Tribune*, 12 March 1978.

Blacks in Soweto remain adamant that they wish to "go it alone" and that what happens to a homeland, and its leader, has little to do with them, they nevertheless appeared impressed by Inkatha's proving to be a well-organized and disciplined movement. There remains, however, the possibility that an organization started in one region by one ethnic group, irrespective of intentions to transcend that definition, could find itself having to accommodate regional and ethnic interests. An overview of Buthelezi's activities show no sign, at this stage, of that happening. On the contrary, it seems that Inkatha has highlighted conceptual defects in the idea of disentangling South Africa's plural society. Separate Development could provide the medium through which Black Nationalism can be mobilized and grow unhindered to spread across ethnic barriers. That which Soweto lacked, a concrete political force, a power-base, a strategy, a structure of alliances and an ability to formulate demands, will be supplied by an Inkatha that has prepared for itself a political programme.

Inkatha's role has assumed a new urgency in the aftermath of Soweto, where some young Blacks, no longer able to contain their frustration, showed a willingness to die for their cause. The Black power ethic, according to Professor Gerhardus Oosthuizen, is that freedom is not cheap, that one must be prepared to die, and to be human is to find something worth dying for. Exponents of

Black power maintain that this is the only way White society will recognize the humanity of Blacks.¹

Though often ridiculed by radical Blacks, Buthelezi does not discount the contribution they may be capable of making. He has accepted a multi-faceted programme for change in which he regards radical policies as not less valid than his own. He accepts that full power-sharing will not be won by one technique alone, and he is going out of his way to broaden his base. Muil sees him as an indigenous Martin Luther King whose strategy, aimed at Black solidarity, implies similar techniques to those used by King, and could include civil defiance and strikes. However, Muil doubts whether Buthelezi will, at this stage, radicalize his policy to the point where he advocates violence. If he pursues his policy of non-violence and conciliation and it fails, and forceful resistance ensues, Muil believes that it will have been made justifiable by the continued increase of institutionalized violence.² If Oosthuizen is correct, the prospect of power-sharing will now have to be seriously entertained by Whites, if for no other reason than out of self-interest. Buthelezi has summed up the situation by saying that the limit has been reached with the negation of Black citizenship by White definition.

¹Professor Gerhardus Oosthuizen in an address in Durban. *Daily News*, 24 September 1976.

²T. Muil, *Profile of Buthelezi*, unpublished.

When Transkei applies its constitution to Xhosa living in urban areas who do not apply for citizenship, the consequences may well vindicate the KwaZulu decision not to follow the same road to independence. "It may yet be judged," Buthelezi said, "that it was necessary for Matanzima to say 'yes' for the point of Buthelezi's 'no' to emerge in its full political difference."¹

Both the Nationalists and Buthelezi have come to be pitted against each other in the same arena, playing the same game, with similar rules. It is this that makes many people afraid of Buthelezi's stance, not because he is a "sell-out", but because of the stakes and the implications. If he can mobilize support from Black consciousness groups and the emergent income groups, the South African Government will not only have to defer to his decision not to accept independence, but will also be obliged to allow him the power-base their ideology facilitated. If he cannot mobilize support, the experiment will boomerang against him and Verwoerd will have won in a situation of very long odds.

Buthelezi must be aware of international pressure on the South African Government; his demands on them are but part of a larger scenario and if the present

¹Buthelezi (23), *Presidential Address*, to Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe National Cultural Liberation Movement (Ondini, 8 July 1976), p. 17.

Government is often guilty of callousness in its handling of the internal situation, it is doubtful that it can refuse to recognize the dangers of a Soviet presence on the country's borders in any way other than to increase the military budget. Events since 1974 have focussed attention on the time-scale for implementing homeland policy and the Government may be forced to change its tactics, even if it is unwilling to change its objective. Given Russian pressures, and internal discontent, there is not enough time to effect the land purchases and the population removals that the Separate Development policy envisages. It is possible, therefore, that the South African Government will reassess the position, give greater attention to development imperatives, and make some of the territorial concessions that leaders like Buthelezi demand.

Buthelezi has intimated, however, that the question of land consolidation is not the only factor to be considered in KwaZulu's acceptance or rejection of independence as mentioned earlier. The exercise of political influence, both within industrialized "White" South Africa and a South Africa as a whole, is of equal significance to the KwaZulu leadership.

It is possible that if homeland leaders could improve conditions for urban Blacks and achieve political power for them, urban hostility toward the homeland

leaders may be contained. It is clear, too, that concessions made to homeland leaders will depend on what bargaining strength they have. South Africa's security problems play a part in this strategy.¹ In the first place, the South African Government has found it necessary to co-operate with some of the governments of Black Africa on certain mutually defined objectives. The governments are interested in the welfare both of the homelands and of urban Blacks. Secondly, the South African Government has transferred some large Black townships from White to Black control. These townships abut important industrial areas, so it is essential to the South African Government that it ensures the loyalty of the township residents. In order to satisfy both these imperatives, it is necessary for the Central Government to consider a major shift in policy. For example, it could permit consolidation of homeland areas to include presently excised portions. The prospects of integrated territory could prove more acceptable to homeland leaders. Buthelezi has repeatedly favoured such a move. KwaZulu, it is suggested, could be given control of most of northern Natal, including Richards Bay, from which White residents would not be removed.² Such a concession, implying increased bargaining power outside of the present framework of homeland government,

¹For more extensive treatment of this subject see Butler et al., *The Black Homelands of South Africa*, pp. 219-231.

²*Ibid.*, p. 229.

could possibly make independence more attractive to KwaZulu.

The South African Government would need to make concessions to urban Blacks too. If homeland leaders are to control their legally defined homeland populations, they will need to show that they are able to exert influence on their behalf. This could manifest itself in the granting of greater rights to urban Blacks. At the same time, some forum would need to be established, possibly developing out of existing summit meetings, where Black and White leaders could periodically meet to discuss problems. It is implicit that there would be a real sharing of privilege and power in such an institution; dialogue alone will no longer suffice.

By thus conciliating Black leaders and giving them increased political power, it is possible, indirectly, to help solve through Separate Development the problem of urban discontent. External pressures have already been responsible for the accelerated implementation of homeland policy. In the future, homeland leaders could be subjected to increased foreign influences and they will need to demonstrate that they are not stooges. If they are unable to exert and maintain authority over their urban citizens, the result could be a radicalization of city Blacks. The involvement of outside military help, with all the consequences attendant on such an eventuality, would become more likely. It is possible, of course,

that urban populations could prove unwilling to accept homeland authority. In that case the situation might require the development of institutions in the cities comparable to those developed in the homelands after Sharpeville.¹ Were that to happen, homeland leaders would be deprived of much of their base in the cities, and they would find themselves confined to representing only rural people and rural interests, without the strength of economic and political influence that is provided by an urban population. As Butler, Rotberg and Adams comment, independence then, for a leader like Buthelezi, would hold even fewer attractions than it does now.

For the present, however, concessions to Black demands for power-sharing do not seem to be forthcoming. While among Whites there are those willing to negotiate with Blacks, a majority of the electorate still supports the present Government, as the 1977 general elections made clear. And among Blacks, while there are leaders prepared to accept minimum changes during a transition period, the majority would appear to expect instant change. In White terms this latter view is tantamount to a demand for "capitulation".² In a situation in which race

¹See Appendix X.

²*Sunday Tribune*, 27 February 1977. Interview with Professor L. Schlemmer, Director of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal, Durban.

relations are deteriorating, it is with justification that one concludes that the policy of Separate Development and the system under which South Africa is being governed, has not resulted in a secure society. Some progress has been made in a modicum of development in the homeland areas, but with 67% of able-bodied homeland men permanently in the White complexes, that progress has nowhere adequately approached the needs and objectives of the policy. Nor do they seem attainable. Insofar as constitutional development in KwaZulu is concerned, in the event that it is tied to the deprivation of political development for Blacks in a wider South Africa, it has been categorically rejected.

The place of KwaZulu in this failure is noteworthy. Nowhere else have the weaknesses of Separate Development been so exposed. The geographic dispensation for KwaZulu makes any expectation of a cohesive state optimistic; in all other facets of its development the homeland falls far short of any hope of viability. These weaknesses Buthelezi has not been slow to expose. In return he has apparently been subjected to a financial "squeeze" (as a comparison of the budgets of KwaZulu and Transkei would seem to indicate). The object of the squeeze would appear to be to discredit him and to bring about his downfall. In the final analysis, however, this could serve further to discredit the Separate Development programme and to create further instability.

It is necessary to distinguish between the consequences of the policy that were intended, those that failed, and those that are, in a number of ways, uncertain. One of the unintended consequences has been the emergence of an articulate Black leader. It has been edifying to observe what can happen within an undeveloped geopolitical region in a core-periphery situation. Invariably such an area has no avenue for expression and it takes a long time for its interests to be articulated. One of the unintended consequences of Separate Development has been the emergence, aided by the core, of a spokesman for the periphery. Although Separate Development has made possible some opportunities for Blacks, both because of and despite partial autonomy, the system's greatest fear may be that it rationalizes the withholding of rights in common areas.

It would seem that as long as such a significant component of the whole as KwaZulu stands aloof, success cannot possibly be expected for the Separate Development programme. In 1977, a Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill was introduced in the South African Parliament which seemed, tacitly, to accept this fact. The Bill appeared to legitimize, and to make it appear a Government programme, not necessarily to have independence. The Government itself, it would seem, was trying to turn failure into success. The new Amendment proposed to add a "third stage" to the development of self-government,

permitting a self-governing homeland to become an internally autonomous entity. The KwaZulu Cabinet, as was to be expected, rejected this idea of "semi-autonomy" which would, according to ex-Minister Botha, have had virtually all the trappings of independence without the necessity of taking the prescribed legal action.¹

In March 1978, following the success of the KwaZulu elections for Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement, Dr. Cornelius Mulder, the then newly-appointed Minister of Plural Relations, in a realistic assessment of KwaZulu's mood, announced his preparedness to consider a new dispensation for homelands who refused independence. "There is no way," he said, "of forcing any homeland leader to accept independence."² The announcement appears to give notice of greater flexibility through negotiation rather than by edict. No indication has been given of what new dispensation is envisaged other than that it would not involve any form of direct power-sharing with Whites; it must be concluded that the Government is looking at ways of accommodating a homeland that has refused independence within the existing constitutional framework. That the Government does not

¹*KwaZulu Government Service Memorandum re the Proposed Bantu Homeland Constitution Bill (10 February 1977). From the Secretary, Department of the Chief Minister and Finance, KwaZulu Government Service, Ulundi.*

²*Daily News and Natal Mercury, 15 March 1978.*

necessarily regard full independence as the only consequence of its homeland policy is a major departure in National Party thinking. It emphasises the conclusions drawn above - the Government may eventually be forced to concede that at least a confederal but probably federal, or a consociational arrangement is best suited to the needs of contemporary South Africa.

One prominent Afrikaner academic, Professor N.M. Rhodie, has written explicitly to the effect that by 1980 hard realities will have compelled the Nationalist Government to change its framework of options and that political thinking will involve a radical new approach to the concept of federalism.¹ He accepts that a shifting ideological spectrum within the establishment will mean that intergroup accommodation will have to be negotiated, and as Black living standards and levels of educational attainment increase and as discriminatory practices cease, the question of decision-making power will become more pressing. A growing *stratum* of sophisticated economically-integrated Blacks, hostility from outside South Africa and a greater sensitivity about human rights will motivate the Government to some measure of "innovation and experimentation" which will manifest itself, in the first instance, in an attempt to integrate the Coloureds

¹*Daily News*, 19 May 1976. Professor Rhodie is Head of the Department of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Plural Studies, University of Pretoria.

and Asians into the White group. Demographic realities will compel Nationalists to recognize that a considerable segment of the Republic's Black population have become permanently rooted in the urban areas and are thus no longer capable of being politically accommodated in the homelands. By then, Dr. Rhodie asserts, the majority of the National Party will accept that inter-community accommodation on a federal or confederal basis is the most pragmatic way to meet contemporary political demands. With regard to the homelands, whether independent or not, a system could be devised that would allow for mutually advantageous co-operation on matters of common interest. By 1980, Rhodie believes, the White establishment will not so much debate whether federalism is "politically respectable", but the mechanics of its implementation.

This thesis supports the need for such a new political dispensation. Separate Development has been described as a "shambles".¹ Any claim that the policy has failed, however, would appear to owe its origins to opposition party-political ideological rhetoric rather than to fact. A deepening conceptual analysis relating to a range of variables compatible with change in South Africa will inform such a conclusion.²

¹D. Welsh, *Sunday Times*, 19 November 1978.

²See Erwin and Webster, "Ideology and Capitalism in South Africa". *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa*, eds. L. Schlemmer and E. Webster (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977), pp. 91-105.

A definition of the core-peripheral model applied earlier in this study allowed for consideration of geographical, historical and statistical factors. In the present context a further dimension must be added in the form of an elaboration of the notion of "peripheral capitalism" which is seen as a particular conjunction of structural features. It embraces the broader social and political consequences of the subordinate position occupied by peripheral territories in a capitalist production system.¹

The central South African economy can be used as an apt illustration of the conjunction of structural features. Originally itself a peripheral area dependent on a colonial metropolis, the State, after 1924, successfully reduced the level of dependency of the South African economy. This was achieved largely as a consequence of the goals of Afrikaner nationalism and the objectives of Afrikaans political and economic institutions. South Africa, following the emergence of its primary industries, was characterized, in its initial stages, by a production sector that was externally orientated. The internal market was satisfied largely by its imports.

¹Many of the same consequences may flow from a core-periphery distinction in a non-capitalist context. The Soviet Union also has its satellites. The term "capitalist production system" is used here in order to maintain the connection with the theoretical position of the author's references to Erwin and Webster.

Capitalist production, to be competitive, was necessarily dependent on foreign investment. What is referred to as a dependent "comprador *bourgeoisie*" was thus developed, reliant on foreign aid for its privilege and with its interests closely intertwined with those of the externally based companies. Such a "partnership" is deprived of any significant elements of independence and is content with this status in view of the material rewards that accrue to it.

After 1924 the government of the day encouraged internal development through state intervention and the imposition of tariff protection. An indigenous set of powerful economic interests emerged, making the central South African economy a "core" in its own right with a "periphery" in the form of satellite or economically dependent states in Southern and some parts of Central Africa. The elites which fostered the process were of a type usually called a "national" *bourgeoisie* as contrasted with a "comprador" *bourgeoisie*.

Among satellite territories in Southern Africa the reserves, or homelands, are of particular interest in this analysis. Dependency on the "core" is here secured rather more firmly than in the case of the general model. Elites of various types present themselves. For example, the Central Government has attempted to shore up the power of the traditional elites (excluding Buthelezi

whose influence appears not to be dependent on this assistance) whose authority would otherwise be waning under the impact of education and urbanization. Relations, hence, of obligation to Pretoria are a possibility.

The Central Government has, too, hitherto encouraged, by design or otherwise, the development of a trading class above the development of a class of producers. Traders have ample rewards and they are linked firmly to the products of the core economy. As the economic elite *par excellence* in the homelands they have, at best, no incentive to strive for greater independence of the South African economic system.

The position of a third elite, comprising the civil servants, is ambiguous. Political and administrative independence increases the size and complexity of homeland government service, so one must assume that they would be tempted by political severance from South Africa. They have much less to gain by economic independence and hence are possibly neutral on this dimension of concern.

Dependency in yet another group is secured more directly by the "foreign aid" received from South Africa. This aid takes the form of secondment of officials and the provision of budget and development finance. Further dependency is secured by a flow of migrant labourers whose remittances are vital to homeland economies.

The core-periphery dependence is thus one which will allow development towards political autonomy without encouraging a stance among elites in these satellites which would be inimical to dependence on the South African economy. Dependence, in turn, would secure a compliant political attitude.

Countering this pattern of interrelationships between core and periphery would be the concerns of those elites which identify with interests of the rank-and-file in the homelands - migrant workers and subsistence agriculturists, and with the interests of those "extensions" of homeland populations in urban areas.

In terms of the model of capitalist development espoused by the authors quoted (Erwin and Webster), the capitalist system is associated with the emergence of a liberalism. Liberalism is defined, in this circumstance, as the expression of the interests of a rising capitalist class anxious to emphasize the freedom of individuals in a market society. Peripheral capitalism does not express class interests yet conventional liberal ideas appear to have been transplanted from the centre to the periphery.

Opponents of the conventional viewpoint, that economic pressures will break down the barrier of segregation in South Africa, argue that economic change was reinforcing

White supremacy, and they cite institutionalized migrant labour as an example. They believe that the focus on race as the primary determinant of conflict has legitimized, and at the same time clouded an understanding of the nature of the South African socialist formation. In other words, it is argued that the "dynamics of development have been obscured by focussing on the irrationality of race prejudice without really understanding its role in the political economy".¹ If this is so, one would not expect the emergent middle-class *entrepreneurs* in the homelands to have attitudes inclining them to take the interests of the rank-and-file seriously (except at the level of superficial rhetoric).

The situation, then, is one which might very well spell the success of Separate Development as a political elaboration of core-periphery relationships. Some factors intervene, however, and obscure the hypothetical relationships outlined.

The desire for more land, for example, and the perception of restricted territorial dispensation induces hostility to the Central Government among a range of elites in homelands. Buthelezi's land demands are a case in point.

¹Erwin and Webster, "Ideology and Capitalism in South Africa", p. 91.

With Buthelezi and the KwaZulu leadership, the contradictions to the hypothetical core-periphery relationship outlined above are even more strident. The orientations of Buthelezi and Inkatha, as outlined in the body of this analysis, are rather more typical of those of a "national" *bourgeoisie* as described earlier, than a "comprador" *bourgeoisie*. Buthelezi and Inkatha appear to be fast establishing sufficient control over the trader, civil servant and traditional elites to produce a fairly coherent "national" stance.

Why should this exception to the postulated model be emerging? The answer would appear to lie in Buthelezi's personality and in his political orientation. Other homeland leaders have at first rejected independence, only to accept it subsequently. And assuredly the "comprador *bourgeoisie*" within KwaZulu itself would similarly be content to accept what Pretoria is offering, in its own interests. Buthelezi, however, articulate and emphatic, expresses cogent reasons for his deviation. They are alluded to throughout this thesis. In summary Black politics in South Africa has a long, integrated unitary state tradition. There was no prior political autonomy; this has been imposed. And where a satellite has a prior autonomy, leaders do not necessarily lay claim to a whole system. Buthelezi does. He is sensitive to the contribution his people have made to the enrichment of South African life and he refuses to countenance a future

in which their share of the country is limited to a fragmented periphery which can have no expectation of cohesion. In addition Buthelezi is a traditional chief. He has to identify with the rank-and-file of his people, which constitutes yet another reason why he is not a "comprador". He has, he believes, a responsibility for all Zulu everywhere, in industrialized White South Africa and in South Africa as a whole; he rejects an independence that is tied to the deprivation of political development for Zulu anywhere.

South Africans generally, and Zulu in particular, are cognizant of the significant role played by the National Party and Afrikaans political and economic institutions in the regeneration of Afrikaner identity and power. They are aware of the part they played in successfully breaking the dependent nature of peripheral development. Inkatha is therefore being groomed to fulfil a comparable role for Zulu. A National *bourgeoisie* is being established which is concerned with Zulu claims to the centre, and the Afrikaner Nationalist Government is being coerced into recognizing, in some form, that claim.

The conclusions to this study are compelled. A leader as prominent and influential as Buthelezi must be accommodated in some manner within the power structure of South Africa, both as a South African and as an ethnic

leader. The *status quo* is untenable politically and the longer it persists or is maintained, the greater is the likelihood that conflict and instability will become a permanent feature of South African life.

The present core-peripheral structure severely retards development in KwaZulu yet liberation is not imminent. While the military superiority of the core precludes change through radical means, the normalization of relations between Black and White is prevented by the degree of autonomy that ideological factors have acquired. There are those who believe that economic growth will lead to a modification of the socio-political structure of society - the "proletarianization" of African peasants, it is held, would lead to a weakening of race prejudice. In effect, the advent of technology has advanced some of the Black peasantry and workers, but the present pattern of development has restrained their upward mobility and they have not assumed the dominant role liberation would require.

On the other hand, the absorption of advanced technological skills has led to the full integration of a small section of the African working class into the wage economy. But this group has chosen to sever its links with the peasantry for a share of some of the privileges enjoyed by the elites. It seems willing to perpetuate a relationship that is in its own interests. The Marxist

suspicion, discussed above, that a *bourgeoisie* would develop within the dependency, seems to have been vindicated. The optimistic view that economic expansion could lead to the liberalization of Apartheid is apparently illusory. The Apartheid system has proved capable of absorbing skilled Black labour while maintaining racist discrimination. The focal point for change, it seems, must be the political arena.

Buthelezi has recognized the futility of assuming an "immediate White political abdication".¹ Simultaneously he articulates the futility of talk about the viability of the "homeland" policy. He has, therefore, evolved his own strategy for dealing with the *impasse* - the mass mobilization of Inkatha.

This could be effective at 2 levels. With African domination of South Africa's labour force, Inkatha could initiate formidable strike action at great cost to South Africa's economy.² The second level at which this strategy must be evaluated is rooted in the political leverage Inkatha will be able to command. The strike option, one presumes, is limited. There are no accumulated resources to sustain strikers' dependants, so

¹*Natal Mercury*, 10 November 1978.

²Buthelezi has warned of this possibility in a speech at a Shaka Day Rally, 24 September 1977.

a strike would necessarily be of short duration and thus less effective. And the action may provoke the South African Government into military retaliation. Buthelezi has declared his preference for peaceful and not radical change, and one presumes he will not seek confrontation with the Central Government. For all that, Inkatha has involved itself, in a monitoring capacity, in the affairs of industry to ensure the observance of codes of employment practice laid down by the United States Sullivan Code and that of the European Economic Community.¹ The threat of Inkatha action against any industry that defaults could be a valuable deterrent.

The second option has great potential for peace, and that is the application of political leverage. This is a longer term goal. Inkatha would appear to have been responsible for the relative peace in the province of Natal when violence was erupting elsewhere, and Buthelezi has opposed disinvestment of foreign capital in South Africa and KwaZulu. Both these facets of its activity suggest that the organization serves a useful purpose in the present climate in South Africa and that it could muster sufficient political leverage, through the vast support that it commands, to persuade the South African Government to make fundamental policy adaptations. The

¹Announced in a speech at a Black Alliance Rally, Chatsworth, 24 July 1978.

aftermath to the KwaZulu elections is a case in point. Following Inkatha's success in the elections, as was noted earlier, the Minister of Plural Relations announced an accommodation of homelands who refused to take independence, and suggestions were made of confederal links between KwaZulu and South Africa. Buthelezi has consistently refused a "Pretoria-style" independence; he has, however, retained his option to negotiate if a federal state concept was to be accepted and an enlarged territory for KwaZulu was envisaged.

There are advantages for South Africa, as well, in such an accommodation. The Central Government could press for a confederal arrangement in which there would be a minimum of power-sharing and in which South Africa could retain its White identity. In return, it could have a powerful ally in the Central Government in the event of internal and external pressures. Further progressive developments, however, could follow which could ultimately be formalized in a constitution grounded perhaps on a consociational power basis.

A readiness on the part of some Afrikaners not previously amenable to such a suggestion, to find common ground with the Black man in South Africa, is now occasionally manifesting itself. Buthelezi, for example, was recently involved in a 6-hour private discussion with

4 prominent and influential Afrikaners, including Professor Gerrit Viljoen, Head of the Broederbond, a most influential Afrikaans organization.¹ It is unlikely that such a meeting would have occurred without at least the prior knowledge of the Nationalist Government. It could mean that Professor Rhoodie's constitutional analysis discussed above is correct and that a new political dispensation may be at hand.

The kind of dispensation envisaged in this thesis and which would involve an adjustment of territorial boundaries could help to solve, if necessary, some of KwaZulu's economic problems which arise from its core-peripheral status. Industrial developments could come to be sited where an infrastructure already exists. A viable socio-political community could then grow around such projects, attractive to workers and with place in it for all interests and *strata* of society. At present these projects are planned in areas where there are few, if any, available facilities. Development is minimal and migrant labourers have little choice other than to seek employment in the core.

A federal system *per se* is, of course, no guarantee that the economic relationship would be radically changed. Peripheral underdevelopment could remain unaffected unless the leadership of the peripheral area was able to exert sufficient influence at the centre of power to

¹*Natal Mercury*, 11 November 1978.

ensure that the new political dispensation was accompanied by the redrawing of territorial boundaries that took cognizance of KwaZulu's development requirements.

The need to acquire the political leverage that would affect KwaZulu's economic status is implicit in Buthelezi's speeches and actions. Decentralized economic growth requires economically developed areas. His request that Richards Bay be incorporated in KwaZulu is explicit of this need. Presumably his request will be met when he is in a position politically strong enough to demand it. Alternatively put, a federal or consociational structure would necessarily require to be accompanied by the redrawing of boundaries which would encompass a relocation of resources. Then parts of the core would be shifted into the periphery and core-peripheral polarization, with its disadvantages for the peripheral area, could be reversed.

Despite the initiative taken by the men alluded to above, the reality of the situation reveals no sense of urgency on the part of the South African Government to hasten the kind of dispensation outlined here. As Separate Development progresses, as yet more Black "nations" veer towards "independence", the less likely it seems that the machinery that would appear necessary in a potentially crisis situation, will be timeously established.


A recent writer on South African history has produced an appropriate conclusion for this study.¹ Using the parable of an edifice, he compared Separate Development to a large structure arising from the earth. In the construction it required much scaffolding which hid the beauty of the building but which it was intended should ultimately be removed. The scaffolding did not come down, and as the edifice grew into a tower reaching into heaven, the scaffolding grew into the edifice itself and its removal became impossible. The Afrikaner, builder of the scaffold, is torn, not only between power and conscience, nationalism and true love of country, but also between rationality and the deep forces of the tribal psyche. He is hoping for a miracle, "for it is only a miracle that can save his people". Alan Paton, reviewing the book, concludes that the world does not yet know whether the South African story will turn out to be a tragedy, but he believes it is "moving either to a tragedy or a miraculous end".² He asks whether men can turn or, like Samson, do they bring the house down on themselves and on their enemies? So many South Africans of all persuasions are, similarly, hoping for the miraculous end.

¹W.A. de Klerk, *Puritans in Africa* (London: Collings, 1975).


²*Sunday Tribune*, 14 December 1975.

APPENDIX I

MAP 1




Map of the Colony of Natal, 1859. - The start of the Location system. (With acknowledgements to Brookes and Hurwitz; 1957,p7.)



Map "Shewing, approximately, the Number and Situation of the Grants, under the Proclamations of 1843 and 1848, and the Situation of Native Locations, Crown Lands already Surveyed, and the boundaries of the Divisions. September, 1850."

A sketch, by the writer of the thesis, of a Map of Zululand compiled from Surveys by L.M. Altern under supervision of C.R. Saunders, Natal Commissioner for Zululand Lands - Delimitation Commission. Prepared in the Surveyor-General's Office, 17th March, 1905.


PORTUGUESE TERRITORY



SCALE BAR: 1 inch = 5 miles

- Boundaries of Districts -----
- Boundaries of Reserves xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Tribal Boundaries -.-.-.-.-
- Railways ++++++
- Roads _____
- Coastline and Rivers ~~~~~


MAP 5




The land settlement in Natal and Zululand as it stood in 1905. The frontier between Natal and Zululand ran along the line of the Buffalo and Tugela Rivers. (With acknowledgement to Davenport and Hunt; 1974, p.28.)

AFRICAN RESERVES IN SOUTH AFRICA

SEPTEMBER 1969




Implementation of the Native Trust and Land Act (Document 72)




With acknowledgement to Davenport and Hunt; 1974, p.46.

MAP 8




On 2 May 1973, the *Natal Mercury* published this map of the Government's "final" consolidation proposals for KwaZulu.

MAP 9




This map, produced by the Bantu Administration and Development Division, and published in the *Daily News*, 31 March 1975, shows the Government's final consolidation plans for KwaZulu.

MAP 10



This sketch, published on 5 March 1975, in the *Daily News*, shows the proposals put forward by the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development for the consolidation of the 3 Drakensberg African Locations into KwaZulu. According to the proposals, the whole of the Upper Tugela location plus the striped positions of Locations No.1 and No.2 will revert to White ownership, while 2 large blocks of what is presently White land (dotted) will be added to Locations No.1 and No.2.

MAP 11



Published in the *Sunday Times*, 5 January 1975, this map shows the Bantustan's present 13% share of South Africa - and the larger consolidated areas, which, according to the *Sunday Times* of that date, the Bantustans are seeking.

APPENDIX II

The monies generated internally and monies received from the Republican Government in 1974/75, 1975/76 and 1976/77 are as follows :-

	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>	<u>1976/77</u>
Total Grant (in terms of Bantu Homeland Consolidation Act)	R56 177 000	R71 996 000	R 78 386 000
General Revenue (internally generated)	16 964 311	20 589 558	23 383 300
Total Expenditure (under votes)	65 828 520	87 042 954	113 628 200

SOURCES :

- (1) Republic of South Africa: Estimate of the Expenditure to be defrayed from the Revenue Account during the year ended 31 March 1976. 2nd and Final Print (R.P. 2 & 6 - 1975).
- (2) Republic of South Africa: Estimate of the Expenditure to be defrayed from the Revenue Account during the year ended 31 March 1977. 2nd and Final Print (R.P. 2 & 5 - 1976).
- (3) Budget Speeches: 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77.
Published by authority of Mr. Speaker.

- (4) Report of the Controller and Auditor-General on the accounts of the KwaZulu Government and of the Lower Authorities in KwaZulu for the financial year 1974-75.
- (5) Report of the Controller and Auditor-General on the accounts of the KwaZulu Government and of the Lower Authorities in KwaZulu for the financial year 1975-76.
- (6) *A Land Divided Against Itself - A Map of South Africa.*
A Black Sash Publication, 1977.
Compiled by Barbara Waite.

The amount of <u>R56 177 000</u> comprised :	(<u>1974/75</u>)
Grant - Bantu Homelands Constitution Act.	R19 767 000
+ Additional amount in terms of the above Act.	36 410 000
<u>R71 996 000</u> comprised :	(<u>1975/76</u>)
Grant.	R40 936 200
+ Additional amount.	31 059 800
<u>R78 386 000</u> comprised :	(<u>1976/77</u>)
Grant.	40 071 000
+ Additional grant.	38 315 000

General revenue was generated as follows :

	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
General Tax	9 981 539	11 427 105	
Local Tax	66 426	69 905	
General Levy	266 452	478 444	
Licences (General)	41 294	51 903	
Rentals of Government Property	189 769	148 651	not yet available
Interest	761 104	1 710 628	
Forest revenue	197 829	208 243	
Townships (rents, rates)	3 466 200	3 598 189	

TOTAL FIGURES FOR KWAZULU FROM THE REPORT
OF THE CONTROLLER AND AUDITOR-GENERAL

	<u>1974/75</u>
Grant (in terms of Bantu Homelands Constitution Act)	R56 177 000
+ General Revenue	16 964 311
	<hr/>
	73 141 311
- Total Expenditure (under votes)	65 828 520
	<hr/>
Surplus for the year	R 7 312 791
	<hr/>

	<u>1975/76</u>
Grant (Bantu Homelands Constitution Act)	R71 996 000
+ General Revenue	<u>20 589 558</u>
	92 585 558
- Total Expenditure (under votes)	<u>87 042 954</u>
Surplus for the year	<u>R 5 542 603</u>

In 1974/75 - Additional expenditure (R40 685 638) was incurred by the Republican Government on services rendered in KwaZulu;

- Further movable property (R5 513 580) was transferred free of charge to KwaZulu;
- Bursaries (R45 032) were awarded to KwaZulu nationals.

In 1975/76 - Additional expenditure (R55 482 227);

- Movable property taken over (R835 936).

	<u>1976/77</u> (Estimated)
Grant (Bantu Homelands Constitution Act)	R78 386 000
+ General Revenue	<u>23 383 300</u>
	101 669 300
- Total Expenditure (to be voted)	113 628 200
+ Nett surplus from prior years	<u>12 958 900</u>
Anticipated balance	<u>R 1 000 000</u>

APPENDIX III

1974/75 1975/76 1976/77

(1) National Education Expenditure for Whites only, as compared with KwaZulu Expenditure on Education and Culture

Central Government	R168 944 000	R226 552 000	R261 813 000
KwaZulu	17 039 500	18 832 720	24 558 200

(2) Child Welfare

Central Government	24 838 000	28 258 000	29 223 000
KwaZulu	211 655	238 873	322 500

(3) Social Pensions

Central Government (Veterans, Blind, Old Age, Disability, etc.)	116 206 000	134 649 000	152 557 000
KwaZulu (Aged, Unfit, Indigent, General Welfare)	10 497 269	14 623 933	15 719 000

(These figures are not absolute. For example, some monies were spent by the Central Government on African Education and on African Child Welfare, to this order :

1975/76	R 959 000
1976/77	1 228 000)

(4) Agricultural Expenditure

Central Government	227 655 000	290 604 000	334 511 000
KwaZulu	6 037 100	7 247 250	8 662 700

Central Government expenditure was extracted from various Budget Speeches in the relevant years, as delivered by the Minister of Finance.

APPENDIX IV

The KwaZulu Budgets of Expenditure indicate the following disbursements :-

EXPENDITURE

	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
(1) Authority Affairs and Finance	696 580	1 413 310	1 606 380
(2) Community Affairs	13 799 700	17 627 640	19 546 900
(3) Works	32 784 000	46 996 090	57 882 090
(4) Education and Culture	17 039 500	18 832 720	24 558 200
(5) Agriculture	6 037 100	7 247 250	8 662 700
(6) Justice	877 500	904 590	1 371 930

A Breakdown of Expenditure of the various Departments for 1974-1977 is as follows :-

(1) AUTHORITY AFFAIRS AND FINANCE

	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
Financial assistance to Tribal/Community Authority	133 500	233 500	283 500

(2) COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	1974/75	1975/76+	1976/77
Number of townships administered	21	23	not available
Number of houses built or taken over in year	3 492	2 241	
Pensions and <i>ex gratia</i> assistance to indigent Africans	10 497 269	14 623 933	15 719 000
Child Welfare	211 655	238 893	322 500
Aged, Unfit and Indigent Africans, General Welfare	251 952	346 108	302 200
Clinic services	309 683	380 692	419 500
Training and Employment in Handicrafts	18 998	19 497	27 500

+ The 1975/76 figures differ in the Auditor-General's Report from the Estimate of Expenditure, 1977. Reasons are unknown.

(3) WORKS

	1974/75	1975/76+	1976/77
Roads and bridges	2 122 266	3 454 758	3 080 000
Buildings (excluding townships)	1 415 835	2 368 058	2 551 600
Engineering services (e.g. water supplies)	158 737	164 383	345 000
Establishment of townships	19 959 540	24 327 017	38 367 290

+ These figures (1975/76) again differ in the 2 publications consulted.

(4) EDUCATION AND CULTURE

	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
Supplies and services - territorial schools and hostels	304 147	670 425	1 011 050
Community schools (subsidy)	13 638 028	16 307 110	19 690 600
Bursaries and loans	10 679	42 880	50 000

(5) AGRICULTURE

	1974/75	1975/76+	1976/77
Agriculture, planning and development	1 013 755	1 015 500	1 368 200
Forest management and utilization	246 963	207 315	273 050
Authority projects	22 973	64 368	101 000
Training centres	38 874	53 355	102 200
Agriculture, engineering services	495 293	717 972	1 034 300

+ There is again a discrepancy in the figures.

(6) JUSTICE

Most of this took the form of salaries, wages and allowances, as follows :-

	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
	658 205	797 646	1 194 480

APPENDIX V

The annual *per capita* grant to KwaZulu, derived from the *de jure* population and the total grant in the relevant years is as follows (population figures as at 1970 being derived from Black Sash compilations) :-

	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>	<u>1976/77</u>
<i>de jure</i> population 4 018 000	13,98	17,92	19,51

(The *de facto* population 2 062 000 would produce a similar trend.)

It is of interest compare this *per capita* grant with grants to Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>	<u>1976/77</u>
Transkei 2 997 000 (<i>de facto</i> 1 645 000)	20,29	20,98	31,81
Bophuthatswana 1 680 000 (<i>de facto</i> 597 000)	15,63	22,87	25,08

Whether these figures are indicative of a trend or not is speculative, but the comparison must be made with homelands having smaller populations, but who had indicated that they were to take independence.

A comparison of grants to KwaZulu and to Transkei, in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act 48 of 1973 and

21 of 1971 is as follows, and is of similar interest :-

	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>	<u>1976/77</u>
KwaZulu	19 767 000	40 936 200	42 386 000
Transkei	16 568 000	53 129 000	57 033 000

Budget figures released in their respective Assemblies in 1977 allocated a budget of R115 million to KwaZulu, and R265 to independent Transkei.

APPENDIX VI


A comparison of trading licences in KwaZulu granted in 1975/76 and 1976/77 show the type of commercial activity in KwaZulu and the rate of its increase.¹

NATURE	1975/76	1976/77	INCREASE
Aerated Mineral Water Dealers	468	500	32
Barbers or Hairdressers	2	7	5
Bakers	2	3	1
Beer Hall Keepers	182	192	10
Bicycle Shops	1	Nil	Nil
Board and Lodging	22	37	15
Bottle Stores (on and off consumption)	73	90	17
Brokers and Agents	14	21	7
Building Service Contractors	2	4	2
Butchers (Retail)	340	371	31
Clothing Manufacturers	1	Nil	Nil
Commercial Travellers	7	10	3
Dealers or Speculators (Livestock Produce, Hides and Skins)	478	513	35
Driving Schools	2	Nil	Nil
Eating House Keepers	292	348	56
Fresh Produce Dealers	701	795	94

¹Buthelezi (8), Policy Speech, KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 1977, pp. 55-56.

NATURE	1975/76	1976/77	INCREASE
Furniture Manufacturers	Nil	Nil	Nil
General Dealers	1 714	1 873	159
Hawkers	570	633	63
Laundries	1	2	1
Millers	105	107	2
Motor Garages and Filling Stations	12	15	3
Patent and Proprietary Medicines	531	550	19
Pedlars	536	540	4
Photographers	11	16	5
Restaurant/Tearoom and Refreshment Keepers	322	340	18
Shoe Repair Shops	Nil	Nil	Nil
Undertakers	3	5	2
Wholesalers	2	Nil	Nil

APPENDIX VII

TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATION

APPENDIX VIII"THE STATEMENT OF BELIEF"
ISSUED TO BRANCHES OF INKATHA¹

We can only move from where we are on the basis of strategies acceptable to most people. I think it is relevant that I should inform members of this House about "THE STATEMENT OF BELIEF" I have mentioned above, because I would be grateful to know what members of this Assembly think of it. And here it is.

- (1) We believe that respect for individuals and the value placed on cultural and large groups is synonymous with progress towards a politically stable society.
- (2) We believe that political rights of all national groups should be protected within a constitutional framework which outlaws discrimination based on colour, sex or creed.
- (3) We believe in individual equality before the law, equality of opportunity and equality of benefits from the institutions of the State.

¹Presented to the Legislative Assembly in Buthelezi (8), 1977, pp. 14-17.

- (4) We believe that the identity of an individual within a particular cultural milieu is essential to his identity as a South African, but we believe also that culture belongs to all men and that no social, economic or political impediments which hinder the free movements of individuals from one cultural milieu to another are in any respect justified.
- (5) We recognize that there are privileged communities and underprivileged communities and we believe that it is the very special duty of the State to provide the opportunities and back those opportunities with resources to enable every individual who is underprivileged to develop to the maximum of his ability.
- (6) We believe that the resources of the country and the wealth which has already been created which is controlled by the State, belongs to all the people of South Africa, and we believe that the resources and the wealth of the country should be utilized for the greatest good of the greatest number.
- (7) We believe that we are facing a grave crisis in which the poor are threatened with greater poverty and we believe it essential that all men join hands

and enter into a partnership with the State to effect the greatest possible redistribution of wealth commensurate with maximizing the productivity of commerce, trade and industry, whether State-controlled or privately owned.

- (8) We believe that fiscal control is essential to regulate the quantity and flow of money and near money, and we also believe that State control by equivalents of the Reserve Bank are essential for the utilization of land, water and power in the interests of the economy and in the interests of developing underdeveloped areas and populations.
- (9) We believe in the elimination of secrecy in public administration and we believe individuals should have rights of appeal to the courts to protect his or her privacy in the pursuit of that which is lawful.
- (10) We believe that practices acceptable in civilized nations should characterize the methods and the procedures used by the police in the enforcement of law.
- (11) We believe that the enforcement of law is devoid of meaning outside of the rule of law, and we believe that there should be both a criminal

code and a justice code in which rights to appeal to the highest courts of the land are the rights of all persons, and we believe that upon pronouncement of an impartial law society, the State should bear the costs of appeal where the appellant pursued a course of action to protect his individual rights.

- (12) We believe that in living the good life in a just society an individual should be free to attend any educational institution in which he has entry qualifications, reside where he wishes, own ground where he wishes, become qualified in any trade or profession for which he has the required degree of competence.
- (13) We believe that the development of trade unions, guilds and associations should be encouraged by the enactment of enabling legislation and courts of arbitration.
- (14) We believe that the accumulated injustices of the past and the injustice now present in the institutions of our country have created a bitterness and anger among the underprivileged sections of our populations, and we believe that growing fears of this anger and bitterness make the privileged sections of our population intransigent in the face of the need for change.

- (15) We believe therefore that the transition from an unjust society to a just society will be difficult.
- (16) We believe that in this eleventh hour of South Africa, responsible leadership must publicly declare its commitment to bring about a just society within the foreseeable future, and we believe that leadership must meet the demands of responsibility by taking whatever steps remain from time to time to avoid a race war.
- (17) We believe that the mobilization of constituency protest and a refusal to act within the restrictive confines of race exclusively holds a promise we dare not abandon.

We, the undersigned, pledge ourselves and our constituencies to supporting a movement which for want of a better designation will be known as the PEOPLES' MOVEMENT FOR RADICAL PEACEFUL CHANGE.

APPENDIX IXKWAZULU ELECTIONS 1978CANDIDATES' MANIFESTO

We, of the National Cultural Liberation Movement, INKATHA, stand for the following :

- (1) The KwaZulu election gives an opportunity to black people of KwaZulu to indicate their abhorrence and rejection of apartheid.
- (2) This election gives the black people of KwaZulu the opportunity to indicate through their vote that they stand for all the things that our President of Inkatha stands for and that they support him in that stand.
- (3) This election gives us the chance to identify with our black people and to make it clear that we stand for all the things that the majority of the black people stand for in South Africa and that we stand for majority rule.
- (4) Through this election we black people of KwaZulu want the development of the whole of the KwaZulu area in a way which advances the interests

of the community of KwaZulu. By standing for the development of KwaZulu, we do not mean thereby that we stand for any independence of KwaZulu as a separate country.

- (5) This election also gives us the opportunity to make it clear that we reject the consolidation of KwaZulu under the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act. We say that KwaZulu includes all parts of this region known as Natal from the border of Umzimvubu in the south right up to Piet Retief in the Transvaal and to the neighbourhood of Standerton. If by this scheme the intention was to return the land that belongs to KwaZulu, then those are the boundaries which we accept as the boundaries of the area known as KwaZulu, not the remnants which today are called KwaZulu.

- (6) Through this election we want to make it clear that the whole of South Africa belongs to all the people of the various race groups in South Africa regardless of ethnic affiliation.

- (7) Through this election we deny that there are any parts of our country where we should be regarded as foreigners. We therefore do not agree that there is any part of the country which belongs to whites only, as happens whenever there

is any place such as a city that is properly developed. We dispute that these areas belong to whites only. They have been developed by the whites together with us.

(8) Through this election we want to make it very clear that we reject the acceptance of pass and influx control regulations under the guise of travel documents as was done at the meeting that the Prime Minister had with other black leaders last October. We want to make it clear that we agree and support our leader, the President of Inkatha. We will not be party to this deception about travel documents. Even knowing the government rules by force, we will not be made to swallow this bitter pill against our will.

(9) Through this election we demand a free and compulsory education such as is available to whites.

(10) We demand the rate for the job for people of all races. We reject the monetary disparity scales based on race for people doing the same jobs and who have the same qualifications.

(11) Through this election we demand the formation of trade unions for our workers so that in common

with other race groups our people, wherever they work, can have proper negotiation machinery with management.

(12) Through this election we would like to express the view that we stand for a National Convention for people of all races, as was called by our leader a few years ago, as the only first step towards the establishment of a just society in South Africa and towards a sharing of decision-making by all the people of South Africa.

(13) Through this election we as Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe support the request that was made by our President some years ago when he called for the release of all political prisoners. We further demand the return of our brothers and sisters and children who have become displaced people in foreign countries so that we can make use of our collective wisdom in finding a solution to the problems of our country without violence.

(14) We want to make it clear during this election that we are not cowards but that we realize that violence in the modern context means that too many lives are lost once violence is unleashed. We are not ashamed to stand for the saving of human life. We are therefore not apologetic about our stand on this particular issue.

APPENDIX XSHARPEVILLE AND LANGA

Sharpeville and Langa have become signposts in South Africa's political history. The 21st March 1960, had been declared an Anti-Pass Day by the Pan-African Congress. On that day Africans were called upon to leave their "passes" at home and surrender themselves to the police. A non-violent demonstration was intended and those taking part were urged to accept no bail, offer no defence and pay no fine. Opposition to the Pass Laws was widespread and bitter, and large crowds converged upon police stations in a number of urban areas. Twenty thousand people assembled at Sharpeville, an African township outside Vereeniging, to hand in their passes. The police ordered their dispersal. They refused, and their behaviour grew menacing; gates and a security fence around the police station were smashed and it seemed that the station would be overwhelmed. The police opened fire into the mass of people who, panic-stricken, fled. It transpired that riflemen continued shooting at their retreating backs. Sixty-nine people were killed and about 180 seriously wounded. The leader of the House of Assembly at the time, Paul Sauer, said subsequent to this tragedy, "the old book had closed on South African history, and the country faced

the need to consider, earnestly and honestly, its whole approach to the 'Native Question'".¹

On March 30th, a young African university student, Philip Kgosane, led a march of about 30 000 Africans from Langa to the Caledon Square Police Station near the Parliament Buildings in Cape Town. The marchers were without reference books and planned to offer themselves for arrest. The police promised Kgosane indemnity from arrest and an interview with the Minister of Justice if he dispersed the mob. Believing he would be given the opportunity of putting Black grievances before the Minister, he asked the marchers to return home, which they did. Kgosane was immediately arrested and, while awaiting trial, escaped and fled the country.²

The promulgation of the Unlawful Organizations Bill, Act 34 of 1960, followed these events and the African National Congress and Pan-African Congress were declared unlawful.³

¹J. Strangeways-Booth, *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree* (Hutchinson of South Africa, 1976), p. 184.

²Ibid., p. 180.

³M. Horrell, *Legislation and Race Relations* (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971), p. 95.

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- (D) PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES.
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(G) INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED with :-

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

Dr. Sibusiso Mandlenkosi Emmanuel Bengu, then Secretary-General of Inkatha.

Mr. S.C. Conco, Msinga Regional Authority.

Mr. Bennie A. Khoapa, Director, Black Community Programme.

Mr. Tim Muil, African Affairs Correspondent on the Natal Mercury.

Miss Brenda Robinson, Specialist Writer in African Affairs on the Daily News, formerly of the Sunday Tribune.

Mr. Winnington Sabela, Member of the Central Committee of Inkatha.

Professor Laurence Schlemmer, Director of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences and member of the KwaZulu Planning Committee.

Mr. Gibson Thula, Principal Urban Representative representing the KwaZulu Government and Publicity Chairman, Inkatha.

Bishop Alpheus Zulu, former Bishop of Zululand.

Mr. Paulus Zulu, former KwaZulu Urban Representative in Durban.

Individual urban Blacks - Zulu and Transkeian.

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