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EDITORIAL

Disarray in the D.P.

THE PARLIAMENTARY Democratic Party is falling apart, and it couldn't be happening at a worse time.

The DP member for Pietermaritzburg North first flew a kite suggesting that the time had come to form a right-of-centre party as a counterweight to the ANC. Others, after behind-the-scenes talks with the ANC, joined it. Yet others are said to be thinking of joining the Nationalists. All this without so much as a by-your-leave of the people who elected them.

These developments hold serious consequences for the future of the Democratic Party. They could hold serious consequences for a great many more people than that.

Not many organisations at CODESA can claim to represent a real constituency. The DP can. Of the others who do, not many can claim that their supporters have a firmly-based commitment to a democratic culture and the multi-party contest which that implies. The DP can.

The National Party, the ANC and Inkatha all have within their ranks elements which, in one way or another, are associated with violence. All over the country 'territories' have been carved out where public, political debate is non-existent. People either support the prevailing view, keep quiet, or move out.

As for the National Party, its much-trumpeted commitment to "consensus politics" is so shallow that it feels free to introduce such controversial measures as VAT on basic food-stuffs and a return to hanging without even consulting its fellow-members in CODESA.

One may have reservations about DP policy, or some of its actions in the past. One may not like everyone who belonged to it. But at least it is fully-committed to the democratic process in a multi-party system and it has never been in-

involved in violence. This, if nothing else, gives it special status at CODESA and a watchdog role which could be increasingly important as the negotiations towards a new constitution unfold.

To be able to play this role, however, the party needs to speak with a reasonably coherent and united voice. Unity has now been lost. Voices which might have been influential in advocating new approaches to the extremely difficult transition to democracy will be muted as they accommodate to a new party line.

IT IS an illusion to count on new recruits being able to change much the policies and habits of long-established organisations. "Working-from-within" is a long-drawn-out process and, in the rush towards a new constitution, is not likely to be a very effective short-term proposition. On the other hand, views put forward independently at CODESA by an organisation with the DP's background could well have an important influence on the agreements eventually reached there.

There have been serious differences within the Democratic Party's parliamentary team for some time now, but there were certain fundamentals, essential props to a future democracy, on which we thought they were all agreed. They owed it, not only to those who elected them, but to the nation, as a whole, to stick together at least until those had been accepted by CODESA.

After that, and when they had explained to their constituents why they felt they should do it, there would probably have been a reasonable case for individual MPs to go where they thought that those fundamentals could best be defended. ●

Join the debate on changing South Africa. Write to:

The Editor, Reality

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A 'SIMPLE MAJORITY'

DEMOCRACY WON'T WORK

IN A RECENT speech Mr Nelson Mandela was quoted as saying that he wanted South Africa to become 'an ordinary democracy'.

I have no doubts whatever about Mr Mandela's commitment to democracy, and nor do I question his genuine desire

DAVID WELSH, professor of political studies at the University of Cape Town, contends that no viable proposal for effective achievement of national reconciliation has yet been tabled at CODESA and asks: Who can offer a viable alternative to simple majoritarianism?

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Why I cannot support the ANC

BLACK SASH Natal Coastal Region chairperson, Ann Colvin's letter in your January/February issue cannot go unchallenged.

She wonders why there is no apparent commitment on the part of white liberals for the ANC which advocates a non-racial, multi-party democracy and, according to her, best enshrines the values liberals espouse, whilst serving the interests of all.

I regard myself as a white liberal but cannot support the ANC for several reasons. I differ fundamentally with the ANC on major issues of policy, and am suspicious of its links with the SA Communist Party.

The ANC is not the only political party or organisation in our country which advocates a non-racial, multi-party democracy and its depth of commitment to freedom of speech and political tolerance remains to be proven.

For example, DP students in Mashing, near Lydenburg, were recently intimidated and prevented from writing their matric examinations by ANC members. In addition, the local DP organiser's house was burnt down — also by ANC members.

In my opinion it is the Democratic Party which best enshrines the values liberals espouse and which deserves the full support of all liberal South Africans.

ALAN STERNE Regional chairman of Fund-raising, E. Transvaal, Democratic Party

for national reconciliation: but I have doubts about what 'an ordinary democracy' is in the circumstances confronting South Africa.

Liberals (and I include myself here) have tended to shy away from debating some of the difficult issues surrounding the application of democracy to a deeply divided society like ours. Any proposal suggesting that something less than 'simple majoritarianism' might be more appropriate, or that some form of safeguarding of minority rights is desirable, tends to raise hackles as if the proposer is thereby making concessions to racism and/or the apartheid legacy. Nothing less than full non-racialism, it is asserted, will meet the requirements of democracy theory, and a justiciable bill of rights, safeguarding the individual, should take care of whatever 'rights' minorities may claim.

I am going to argue that the vision of a non-racial democracy, based upon 'simple majoritarianism' is not only seriously flawed but incapable of realisation. I will be provocative, not for the

sake of being so, but in the hope that a debate can be started. My further hope is that the debate will be a constructive one because so far no-one, it seems to me, has advanced a viable alternative.

THESE ARE not abstract problems that keep scholars in employment: the issue at CODESA is fundamentally about what kind of democracy South Africa is to have. The Nationalist government has advanced a convoluted scheme for a collective presidency (essentially a forced coalition) and a complex upper house, where regions and minority parties are to be accorded inflated representation. It won't fly.

The ANC, on the other hand, propose a majoritarian system, admittedly one that is limited by a justiciable bill of rights and regional representation in an upper house. It makes no concessions to minority rights (other than affirming very generous provisions for language and cultural rights), but says that a proportional representation electoral



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Tyranny of the majority . . . exacerbated by the minority's inability to become the majority

system will ensure that minorities are adequately represented. It is implacably opposed to forced coalition (i.e. coalition government as a constitutional requirement), but is happy to accept a coalition should this be thrown up by the operation of PR. (As much of European political experience shows, PR tends to encourage a multiparty system, and, in turn, coalition government.)

The ANC's proposals rest upon an implicit view that parties in a democratic South Africa will be (or will shift towards being) based upon common interests and common values, and not race or ethnicity. They will be, to use the technical term, 'classic aggregative parties', like the Republican and Democratic Parties in the USA.

The trouble with this view is that it does not square with the common experience of politics in deeply divided societies, where, overwhelmingly, parties tend to be rooted in one or other segment of the population and few voters 'float', and parties with inter-segmental bases do not prosper.

THE THEORY of representative (or liberal) democracy rests upon the assumption that minorities can become majorities, or that governments will alternate with some regularity. (It is precisely this failure which flaws Italian and Japanese democracy, where, respectively, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats have governed for decades without serious challenge.)

The problem may be illustrated by the extreme example of Northern Ireland where, between 1921 and 1972, the Province enjoyed extensive self-government through its own Parliament, the Stormont.

Northern Ireland is deeply riven by a religious/ethnic conflict, which pits the Protestant majority (two-thirds of the population) against the Catholic minority (one-third). Many Catholics, of course, favour a united Ireland and, consequently, boycotted the Stormont elections; but this does not affect the

issue, which is that over a 50-year period, in which regular and (reasonably) free elections were held, the Catholic parties who participated did not enjoy so much as a sniff of political power. (Only once, in 1931, did a Catholic initiative succeed in Stormont: The Preservation of Wild Birds Act was duly passed, the Unionist majority having convinced themselves that the legislation contained no diabolical plot to undermine the Protestant ascendancy.)

The fact that Northern Ireland is not an independent state does not affect its illustrative value: it largely conformed to the outer trappings of democracy, even though its record on civil liberties (as applying to Catholics) was deeply flawed. It was — and is — a classic case of that major sub-theme in democratic theory, the tyranny of the majority, in this case exacerbated by the minority's inability to become the majority (except, of course, in a united Ireland).

Northern Ireland, I concede, is an extreme case, complicated by an intractable religious issue — always one of the least bargainable forms of conflict. In this respect it bears some resemblance to Israel whose 18 per cent Arab minority (that is pre-1967 borders) has likewise never enjoyed so much as a sniff of power in what is an explicitly Jewish state. So, too, with the Ceylon Tamils who number 12 per cent of the Sri Lankan population; Sri Lanka has a somewhat shaky record as a democracy, but at least it has a record of competitive elections and regular alternation of government. Competition, however, effectively occurs only within the dominant Sinhalese group, who account for 72 per cent of the population.

A SURVEY of the modern world will produce many comparable examples of ethnically divided societies, where majorities and minorities crystallise in permanence, and effective competition occurs only *within* broad ethnic categories, typically in the form of 'ethnic outbidding', i.e. where a more

radical ethnic party tries to draw support from a more moderate one, rooted in the same group, often by accusing the moderates of 'selling out'.

Those who need convincing that this is indeed the dynamic typical of ethnically divided society should consult Donald L. Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, which is a massive survey of the problem. (On a more modest scale F. van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh's *South Africa's Options*, published in 1979, attempted to extrapolate these comparative findings to a future South African democracy — which in 1979 looked a long way away.)

The obverse of this comparative evidence is that the only divided societies that have sustained democracy (and the list is depressingly small) are those where government has been by means of a broad-based coalition, which has enabled any and every minority to plug into power, and exert a leverage that is roughly proportional to its size.

Mauritius is a good example. Malaysia is hardly a model of a democratic state, but its institutionalised (by pact, and not by the constitution) coalition has largely prevented its potentially volatile ethnic mix from exploding. India may be cited by some as a counter-example, but it isn't really, since the Congress Party which has governed India for most of its history as an independent state, has *itself* been a broad-based coalition, providing a roof for many of India's disparate minorities.

A further (gloomy) implication of the evidence is that there is no single case in the modern world that I am aware of where societies with deep ethnic cleavages have transformed themselves into 'non-ethnic' ones. Even the United States, with the most powerful economy in the world and a remarkable history of absorbing immigrant minorities, remains a deeply race-conscious society.

WHAT I have just said must be understood very carefully: I am *not* panning the ideal of 'non-racialism'. On the contrary, I am insisting that non-discriminatory norms are fundamental to any chance of a South African democracy's taking root. All I am saying is that on the basis of the comparative evidence there seems little chance in the foreseeable future (50/60 years?) that 'non-racialism' as an attitudinal predisposition will penetrate the warp-and-wool of society and enable individuals to



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vote on the basis of common interests, values or ideologies.

Voting in a future South African democracy will inevitably be shaped by our long legacy of deep conflict — just look at the way the ANC tried to keep FW de Klerk off ‘its’ turf in Mitchell’s Plain recently, by advancing the profoundly undemocratic argument that it was inappropriate/insensitive for someone so recently associated with apartheid now to appeal to its victims for political support? How long must Mr de Klerk and Co. spend in quarantine before being permitted to campaign in black areas? And shouldn’t the people of Mitchell’s Plain be allowed to decide for themselves?

Critics will aver that South Africa is ‘different’. (Some, a declining number, though, have expressed the comparable argument that while socialism has everywhere else been a lamentable failure South Africa will be ‘different’.) Some may, legitimately, question the validity of comparative politics as ‘pseudoscience’, invalidating whatever extrapolations may be applied to South Africa.

Of course each society is unique, and of course South Africa’s structure of conflict will have important differences from those anywhere else. Black and white are not monolithic categories that will confront each other as titans in a future electoral contest: blacks are politically as divided as whites, and, besides, how the Coloured and Indian votes will be distributed is a matter on which endless speculation is possible.

It could just be that our internal social diversity is so great that two or three roughly equal (in terms of electoral support) ethnically mixed alliances will emerge, so that there is a realistic possibility of genuinely alternating governments. This possibility, I think, presupposes that the ANC will, at some future stage, split: as its leaders repeatedly say, it is a ‘broad church’ unified only by 80 years of common opposition to segregation and apartheid.

Remove that binding force and centrifugal forces may take their logical

course: a certainty? No. A possibility? Yes.

EQUALLY UNPREDICTABLE is the likely salience of intra-African ethnicity. It has been highly salient everywhere else in Africa, and there is no inherent reason why it should not become a factor here. Were it to develop its impact on the emergent party system would be considerable since it would heighten internal diversity and make imperative the building of alliances that almost certainly would cut across racial lines. I remain unconvinced, however, that this type of ethnicity is necessarily on the cards — and Horowitz’s persuasive arguments to this effect in his book *A Democratic South Africa?* deal only with possibilities, not certainties.

It may well seem that the arguments I have presented in the last four paragraphs counter the arguments I presented in the body of the article. The point is that there is no way of predicting what future configuration of parties will emerge in circumstances of democratic competition. As the important theorist Adam Przeworski has argued, democracy is inherently about uncertain outcomes; but he also makes the point that ‘no country in which a party wins 60 per cent of the vote twice in a row is a democracy’. It is by no means impossible for the ANC to achieve just that.

‘No system which perpetually frustrates a majority’s will is likely to endure, but no system that enables the majority to ride roughshod over minority interests can be called democratic.’

Two further considerations: the NP will not acquiesce in a majoritarian system. The entire referendum was fought on the issue of power-sharing, and they are not about to capitulate. In doing so they are not doing anything more than emulating the behaviour of old ruling groups in democratising systems: they accept democratisation only if their interests are protected under the new system. Is this not another reason for supporting the view that a power-sharing coalition is likely to be the most hopeful instrument for ushering in a democratic South Africa?

Secondly, quoting Przeworski again: ‘Constitutions that are observed and last for a long time are those that reduce the stakes of political battle.’

In the case of South Africa one has to project into a hypothetical future and

ask how vigorous an electoral contest the country could stand, if the stakes were control of the state, on a winner-take-all basis? There is every reason to suppose that such an election might blow the place apart: which is to say that it is imperative to lower the stakes.

TO SUM UP the issue: there is no precedent for a (successful) forced coalition — which is the NP’s view; but there is no precedent for a simple majoritarian/winner-take-all system securing democracy in a divided society — which is the problem with the ANC’s proposals.

At the same time, no system which perpetually frustrates a majority’s will is likely to endure; but no system that enables the majority habitually to ride roughshod over minority interests can be called democratic.

Moreover, if the minority is powerful enough its disaffection could destabilise the state.

Constitutions, said Napoleon Bonaparte, should be ‘short and vague’. South Africa’s constitution-makers would be ill-advised to heed his advice. The rules-of-the-game, as codified in a constitution, are critically important: they should seek, in principle to anticipate every kind of political contingency, including worst-case scenarios.

We ignore the possibility of the crystal-

lised majority/minority syndrome at our peril.

How we achieve institutionalised coalition may not be a function of the constitution: perhaps it will be more fruitful to think in terms of pacts, solemnly agreed by the major players.

As the burgeoning literature on transitions shows, pacts have been highly useful instruments for getting new or restored democracies off the ground: they require the building up of at least some limited trust among rival leaderships.

South Africa, alas, is far off that hopeful situation, but at least the leaders seem to recognise that in spite of their sharp differences they are tied together by the bonds of interdependence. Building on that mutual perception may be the most hopeful place to start. ●

Who really knows how black rural masses and shanty dwellers will choose to vote?

THE SILENT MILLIONS

DESPITE all the speculation, claims, posturing and plain bluster, no one really knows what is going to happen in South Africa's first free election.

The fact is that the majority of eligible voters will be under the age of 30 — even under the age of 26, according to some reports — and the majority of the voters will be in the rural areas.

Some two to three million potential voters live in squatter camps in the urban areas of South Africa.

These are the poorest, most deprived and most marginalised people in the country. And if they cast their votes, they will have a decisive influence on the outcome of any election.

Yet, they are never canvassed in public opinion polls. Most South African pollsters rely on the telephone, but the vast majority do not have telephones and as a result they are simply not questioned.

All the opinion polls rely on people in the urban areas for the results, yet the Development Bank of Southern Africa estimates that 54,12 percent of people over the age of 18 do not live in the urban area.

The bank's figures include the four 'independent' homelands, which official figures typically ignore, even though just about everyone knows that these areas will be reincorporated into South Africa by the time a free election is held.

It estimates that 3 191 094 people over the age of 18 — 1,43 percent of the total — live in the TBVC 'states' and a further 4 753 151 — 27,45% of the total — live in the non-independent homelands. How will they vote? No one knows.

Altogether 9 374 870 of the estimated 17 319 120 people over the age of 18 reside outside the urban areas — beyond the reach of telephone canvassers, and usually beyond the reach of newspapers and television, but not the radio.

So, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, claims as he did in Parliament recently, that the National Party was on its way to becoming the most popular party in the country, it was at best an expression of hope.

He could be correct that the NP has the support of 70% of whites, the

BARRY STREEK, political writer for the Cape Times and other Morning Group newspapers, takes a hard look at those who could influence decisively the outcome of the first free election.

majority of 'coloureds' and Indians, and that it was making inroads into the black community, but he could well be very wrong.

The Conservative Party's foreign spokesperson, Thomas Langley, dubbed the loquacious Botha as "Madam Rose" for all his election predictions and reminded Parliament that he had once predicted that Jimmy Carter would win a second term of office, that Bishop Abel Muzorewa would win Zimbabwe's first election and that Swapo would not win an election in Namibia.

Botha was in fact echoing claims made last year by the NP's secretary-general, Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, that the party had now liberated itself because it could now win an election and did not have to rely on minority protection.

In the past, he told the NP's Cape congress in The Strand, the party was restricted to being a minority and it therefore did not have a future. Now, the NP could continue in government after winning a free election.

One might be tempted to dismiss this as wishful thinking, given the NP's history and reputation among the majority of South Africans, but ANC president Nelson Mandela clearly does not do so.

Only ten days before, Mandela told delegates to the ANC's Western Cape congress that they had to prepare for

elections within three years and warned them that the NP was better organised and had experience as well as resources. He also warned that it was making an impact among black people.

Indeed, the ANC's secretary-general, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said at the end of last year that an election would be held in 1992, that the ANC had started preparing for an election "some time ago" and that: "The ANC's machinery for an election is already in place and the membership is conscientised."

What all this means, in essence, is that the NP and the ANC see themselves as serious contenders in an election and, in particular, are competing for the black vote. They are both actively preparing for the elections and, indeed, this is one of the factors influencing their positions and strategies at CODESA.

In short, the NP clearly wants to remain in power and it believes it can do so by winning a free election.

However, as far as the opinion polls have validity, they point to an ANC victory. A Human Sciences Research Council poll, conducted among 2 000 metropolitan residents in October and November last year found that the ANC would receive 37 percent of the total vote, including 67 percent of the black vote, and the NP 38 percent of the total but only 6 percent of the black vote.

A Markinor poll put black support for the ANC at 72 percent, while the University of Western Cape's Dr Vincent Maphai said the ANC was unlikely to capture more than 57% of the vote. He added that a landslide victory was not likely and, initially at least, the ANC would have to rely on alliances with both black and white parties.

Maphai, however, believes that the NP could never win a non-racial election although, as the strongest participants, the ANC and NP were both trying to

‘ PIK BOTHA'S CLAIM THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY IS ON ITS WAY TO BECOMING THE MOST POPULAR IN THE COUNTRY, IS AT BEST AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE. ’



rally the support of a broad spectrum of South Africans. "In fact, the ANC has embarked on a vigorous campaign to establish branches in the traditionally white liberal areas."

With most surveys showing the NP doing surprisingly well among 'coloured' and Indian people, the ANC will have to present a moderate image that recognises minority fears in order to win support from these voters. Its pragmatic approach to the five former Democratic Party MPs, who joined the ANC recently despite remaining members of the tricameral Parliament, reflects such an approach.

The NP, on the other hand, has to demonstrate to the majority that it is a party of the future and that it has really transformed itself from the bad old days of apartheid. Clearly, the highly marketable President FW de Klerk is a key element in this.

The disrupted rally in Mitchell's Plain and rallies in other 'coloured' areas, meetings in Indian areas, taking control of the House of Representatives and the recruitment of Sattie Naidoo, its first MP in the House of Delegates, are all part of the NP strategy to win and consolidate support among 'coloured' and Indian people.

What is less obvious is the overall NP strategy to win black support — particularly among the poor, marginalised and rural voters. It will certainly need a lot more than the 6 percent black support for the NP found in the HSRC poll if it is going to have any realistic chance of winning a free election.

It clearly hopes that the homeland and traditional leaders will decide that an alliance with the NP will be in their interests rather than an alliance with the ANC — and that they will be able to deliver a sizeable portion of the rural vote.

Given the enormous amount of money and energy devoted to promoting tribal authorities and the blatant collaboration between the government and most chiefs in the homeland governments and parliaments over the last 40 years in the attempt to promote separate development, the NP may be justified in its hopes that most of the traditional leaders will support them.

If, however, most of the poor majority opt for the political party that offers them the best hope of real change and the prospects of greater economic advancement, the NP, with its track record, has a serious credibility problem.

The ANC, and the Inkatha Freedom Party and the PAC for that matter, will

not have this problem and they will at least be able to offer greater hope of change than the NP.

The NP also has proven organisation, resources and experience in elections, but whether this will count much amongst people in rural and deprived areas and among young unemployed black people is doubtful.

The ruling party has a proven record of apartheid and repression, and a leadership that remains all-white. The marketability of this image among the majority of the 17 million voters is almost certainly beyond the skills of even Saatchi and Saatchi.

At this stage, it retains control of most of the radio waves, particularly FM, and this will prove an enormous advantage until such time as the SABC is brought under all-party controls and stops being a propaganda service for the government. However, by the time the elections are held, the NP will have lost this advantage.


So, despite the public optimism of Pik Botha and Stoffel van der Merwe about the NP's prospects in a free election, the

reality is somewhat different and the party's chances of winning are not great at present.

In June last year, Drum conducted a survey of 100 people in Johannesburg, Springs, Vanderbijlpark and Pretoria. It found that 39 percent said they would vote for the ANC, 12 percent for the PAC, five percent for Azapo, four percent for Inkatha and two percent for the NP.

But a sizeable 24 percent were too afraid to make any kind of commitment, six percent did not know what all the fuss was about and eight percent said they couldn't care less. Drum said a number of people were terrified of voicing an opinion, felt there was no party addressing their particular needs, or were cynical about the maverick stance of present-day political parties.

If this trend is reflected nationally, as it well might, then there is a sizeable floating vote, but it is questionable whether the NP is a serious option for



F.W. de Klerk, rated by the Nationalists as their most marketable speaker, has begun campaigning for black support.

Giving meaning to 'people's education'

THE NATIONAL Education Consultative Committee (NECC) has come a long way. No longer forced to operate underground, it seems set to play a significant role in policy generation for the not-quite-new South Africa. No longer under constant threat of detention, its leaders are consulted —

From Page Seven

The silent millions

those undecided voters who seem more likely to support one or other of the black-led organisations than the party which forced apartheid on the country.

The University of Cape Town's Professor Andre du Toit said earlier this year that the ANC could find it did not enjoy as widespread support as it believed.

"The ANC people are very sincere in thinking that they speak for 'the people' but I don't think they realise to what extent those they speak for are insiders. A lot of what they say may not have an appeal to those in rural backwaters, in hostels and on the fringes of society," he said in an interview with *Monitor*, the journal of the Human Rights Trust.

Indeed, no one knows how those people will exercise their right to vote for the first time, but in Du Toit's view an election early in the transitional process is urgently necessary.

"Having an election would sort out the issue of who represents what. Right now people are demonstrating support in the most undemocratic ways, violence. Unless we have an election early in the process, this violence will escalate," he said.

And that may well be a more important issue right now — and then both the NP and the ANC as well as other groups will have to take their chances and, hopefully, accept the verdict of the people, as was demonstrated in December last year, when the general secretary of the SA Communist Party, Chris Hani, said the ANC would accept the outcome of an election even if the Government won, and it expected the same from Mr De Klerk should the ANC win. ●

by
A.A. TOTHILL

after a fashion — by both Government and the private sector.


Where does this leave "people's education for people's power" — the rallying cry of the NECC in the dark days of the 1980's? Is "people's education" compatible with the new rhetoric of education for economic growth? Has "people's education" been reduced to a mere slogan?

The NECC, formed in 1985/1986, was most immediately a response to the crisis in black education. Where earlier opposition to Bantu Education had centred on material conditions, "people's education" attacked the very ideological underpinnings of State education.

The most coherent articulations of "people's education" stem from the early days of the NECC's existence: conference resolutions; keynote addresses; interviews with the NECC leadership. The central theme of "people's education" in those days was its rejection of the values of *both* apartheid education and capitalist education. Early conference resolutions set out the tenets of apartheid education, defining the position of the NECC in opposition to them.

Bantu Education was seen as divisive, designed to domesticate, indoctrinate, and to entrench not only apartheid but also capitalism. "People's education", by contrast, was to empower people as workers and citizens, enabling them to understand and resist their oppression. It was to equip them for participation in "the struggle" as well as for their role in a non-racial, democratic and *non-capitalist* system.

Because "people's education" was constructed largely in terms of its opposition to apartheid education, definition remained vague. It was clear enough what "people's education" was *against*; what it was *for* was not always certain. Its terms belonged more to the realm of sloganeering than to rational philosophical discourse. Revolutionary terms-of-trade such as "the people", "democracy", "empowerment" and "equality" are calls to arms, not concepts which are



Ms Tothill

who lectures in the Department of Political Studies of the University of Natal.

easily pinned down — or applied.

This lack of clarity should not be laid exclusively at the door of the NECC. Given the restrictions under which the organization operated, plus its conception of "people's education" as a *process* rather than a theory, little better could have been expected. Since February 2, 1990, however, our expectations have been justifiably higher: we have looked to the NECC to move from a reactive to a pro-active mode, to examine its values, and to provide policy options rather than mere attacks on existing policies.

The NECC has accepted the challenge; whether it has *met* (or can meet) the challenge is uncertain. The NECC's vision of "people's education" is increasingly of a system which will address both the aspirations of "the people" (whoever they may be) and the needs of the economy. Acknowledging that it has neglected the development of "people's education", the NECC has resolved to examine and articulate its values and to translate them into concrete policy options.

THESE TASKS have been addressed mainly under the auspices of the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), which falls under the political arm of the NECC. While NEPI focusses on the identification of policy options, its researchers are aware that policy cannot be formulated in a value-free vacuum, and questions of value are addressed through its Principles and Frameworks Committee (PFC). The task of the PFC is to formulate a set of principles in the light of which policy options may be analysed: some twelve research groups tackle more practical policy matters.



The formation of NEPI is indicative of the NECC's increased awareness of the need to formulate a coherent set of values and to translate them into policy options which will address the needs of all sectors of society, including those of the economy.

Through NEPI the NECC is asking vital questions: how can a non-racial, non-sexist system of universal education be constructed? What do different economic strategies imply for education and training? How can adult literacy and numeracy be achieved? What should the balance be between academic and vocational education?

ALL THESE questions (and many more) must be asked if a future education system is to be able to redress past inequities and contribute to economic growth and development. These issues must be addressed within the wider context of economic and socio-political transformation: education policy cannot be formulated without reference to the society it serves, a point of which the NECC is well aware. Indeed, the "people's education" movement is probably *more* aware of this problem than are the Government or the private sector. The NECC is firmly rooted in the radical tradition, which proclaims that education cannot be discussed in isolation from the rest of society. Education cannot be discussed outside the socio-political setting. To understand education one must of necessity understand the nature of society (Mkhatshwa, 1987:5).

The organization's recognition that education must also be understood within an economic context has brought the NECC closer to the private sector, and developments on the political stage have meant that talk of "education for growth" is no longer anathema. There is a growing realization that any country, any economic system requires skilled workers; vocational education does not *simply* provide fodder for the capitalist economic machine. Capitalism has not been embraced with open arms, but a certain softening of the rhetoric is apparent.

At this point we appear to have a glowing picture of "people's education" and the NECC: after unsatisfactory beginnings (due in part to state oppression), the movement has got its act together, examined its values, and shifted into policy-generating gear. Is it greedy to want more?

Greedy, or pessimistic — or both — I

believe that the NECC and NEPI have a long way to go before they can put their feet up on the headmaster's desk. The tasks facing them are enormous, and the NECC's resources (human and otherwise) are being sapped by the organization's role as troubleshooter to a host of practical crises in black education.

The values espoused by the "people's education" movement are still unclear, and tensions between the liberal and radical aspects of the movement persist. Educators from widely different traditions have found a home in the NECC; now that opposition to apartheid education can no longer hold them together positions must be reassessed. Through NEPI the NECC has made the practical transition from resistance movement to policy player, but it is not certain that its value system has caught up.

Tensions are situated across both the liberal/radical and academic/vocational divides. Liberal/radical tensions within the apartheid oppositional discourse go back a long way, and are certainly not specific to "people's education". Rumbblings along the academic/vocational fault line are of more recent origin.

BOOTH LIBERAL and radical educators have tended to reject the idea of gearing education towards the needs of the workplace. This rejection (sometimes coupled with a conflation of capitalism and apartheid) has led some people's educators to oppose the trade union approach.

A GARGANTUAN TASK COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS A COUNTRY IN A HURRY.

Harold Wolpe, for example, has stated that

Cosatu, in some of its recent papers on the democratically planned economy, deals with education policy purely as 'manpower planning', that is to say fitting education to the needs of the economy. People's education simply goes out the door. (Wolpe, 1990:61).

Andrew Donaldson, on the other hand, sees no contradiction between "people's education" and a concern with economic imperatives. He suggests that for the economist, "people's education" can be understood as shifting the pattern of the economy from a focus on the interests of a wealthy minority to "a pattern which puts people first" (Donaldson, 1990:57). Whether such

arguments will persuade the "old guard" remains to be seen, but the language of instrumentalism is gaining ground in educational circles.

Language is another area to which the NECC will have to pay close attention — the rhetoric of the struggle has a lot to answer for. Although a necessary consciousness-raising tool, it tends to obscure the need for the continuous assessment and re-assessment of values.

Rhetoric can also be a barrier to communication with other stakeholders. The NECC has much ground in common with the private sector, particularly through COSATU, one of its affiliates. Both the NECC and the private sector recognize the need for co-operation in the construction of an equitable and effective education system. Despite this recognition there is much wariness on both sides, due in part to the incompatibility of progressive and business rhetoric.

On one hand similarities may remain hidden under a cloud of people-speak, while on the other the use of the same *words* by the different groupings may obscure differences in their usage: "co-operation" and "consultation" have very different meanings for management and workers.

APART FROM questions of value and ideology, the magnitude of the practical, policy-oriented tasks facing the NECC should not be underestimated. It is beyond doubt that the present education system must be restructured.

It has perpetuated an inequitable distribution of knowledge, skills and wealth. It has answered the needs of neither the majority of this country's inhabitants nor of its economy. NEPI hopes to identify policy options which will remedy this — equitable policies to assist in the development of this country's human and material resources.

This is a gargantuan task complicated by the fact that South Africa is a country in a hurry. There is a great sense of urgency about replacing unsatisfactory policies, aggravated by an edge of competition: proposals not tabled *now* may lose out.

The size of the task along with the pressing need for solutions means that NEPI's task may at times seem im-

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ANC and its alliance with the SACP

EYE-OPENING INSIGHTS INTO WHAT HAPPENED IN EXILE

Comrades against apartheid. The ANC and the Communist Party in exile, by Stephen Ellis and Tsepo and Sechaba (London. James Currey, 1992).

IN THE years after Rivonia, a new study of the ANC and the Communist Party in exile tell us,* few opponents of the apartheid system in South Africa 'at first had the heart to pick up the pieces and start building again. All that was left of the national organization, it seemed, was a few sad exiles out of touch with home.'


This study of the years between then and now, of interaction between the ANC, SACP and their joint fiefdom, Umkhonto we Sizwe, will make eye-opening reading for CP watchers everywhere.

Here at last begins the 'return of history' which *perestroika* brought to the mother-ship, the then Soviet Union, in the late 1980s. Or almost as in Gorbachev's Soviet Union: for though one of the authors writes from inside, as an active ANC and CP member (the other is an academic who for six years edited *Africa Confidential*), he writes pseudonymously. And almost 'begins', since in 1989 delegates to the 7th South African Communist Party Congress in Cuba were told of the deaths of two long-missing early members, the Richter brothers by Stalin's firing squad in 1938 and of Lazar Bach in a labour camp in 1941.

This study is the first to come from one of their own, who 'remains faithful to the ideals of the African National Congress (and) is motivated by a sincere belief that it is important that the South African public should know the broad outlines of what happened in exile, for



CHRIS HANI: 'fearless fighter with a mighty reputation'



RUTH FIRST; at odds with the party

the sake of their country's political future.'

Here are the factions, rivalries, manoeuvrings and schemings of the men and women who picked up the pieces, and the outline of the edifice they built in exile — bearing in mind that CP history is only beginning to return and that those men and women may become 'more inclined to speak of the past as times goes by.'

And what men and women they were. Slovo 'a model of what a South African communist is expected to be. Brave and possessed of the rigorous intellect of a lawyer, he has been utterly dedicated to Party work since his youth'. Hani 'fearless fighter and rising star of the CP (with a mighty reputation within the army and the Party'. Thabo Mbeki 'a brilliant theoretician, charming and highly articulate... his loyalty unquestionable.' Even those of the past 'Uncle J.B.' Marks and the far-sighted Kotane. Of women, though, we meet only Ruth First, already at odds with the Party when a South African bomb ended her fruitful life, and Jenny Schreiner, whose effective Western Cape unit is applauded but their capture rather cryptically described.

They soldiered on, past Nkomati, Hwange, the 'Gang of Eight', the 1984 mutiny, and the December 1988 New York accords ('a bitter pill indeed') until, to everyone's surprise, they all came home.

But what was that about 'a few sad exiles'? By the early 1960s, not content with its home from home in eastern Europe and the then Soviet Union, the SACP had taken over, with breathtaking skill and speed, the two main British

institutions concerned with the struggle in South Africa, the AntiApartheid Movement and the International Defence and Aid Fund.

They even had their own publisher in Ronald Segal, who had flown out of South Africa with Tambo in 1960 and later made over almost all his Penguin African Library series to CP authors and their friends.

Liberal exiles, including those who had followed the same logic as the founders of Umkhonto, albeit a little earlier, found small welcome, and even smaller room to manoeuvre in the European exile world.

And not Liberals alone. When Dennis Brutus, from Robben Island, arrived at London airport he was met by a carload of Coloured People's Congress members and others, to be greeted (one said later) with: 'Dennis, the Stalinists are in power!' The reference was not, of course, to Messrs Wilson, Callaghan et al.

The authors are remiss in passing over the success of the CP in selling the ANC



THABO MBEKI: 'brilliant theoretician, charming and highly articulate'

abroad, and trading in the myth of its mass membership a decade before the events of 1976 and 1984-5 made it a reality, despite its own failure to organize inside South Africa (as is recorded by the authors).

What we do learn from them is a story of three decades of activity round the central, military pillar of their campaign in exile, the CP two-stage takeover of the ANC, conducted, in total secrecy and with all the ruthlessness and duplicity demanded by the task of taking control of a nationalist organization whose ethos, and even ethnic composition, was repugnant, in part to its own.



The ANC rank-and-file seem to have been little affected by the years before exile when, through the popular-frontism of the Congress Alliance, the communist tail had wagged the ANC dog. Nor do the authors seem aware of this, and even endorse the validity of Kliptown.

The hardest fight was, indeed, to get their white, coloured and Indian members, first, at Morogoro in 1978, into the ANC itself, and secondly, at Kabwe in 1985, into the National Executive Committee. It is one of the ironies of politics that among those who voted against the latter were Johnny Makatini and M.B. Yengwa, both sadly no longer alive, and both, in pre-exile days, close to the Liberals, then the pioneers of non-racialism when the Congress Alliance both practised and preached multi-racialism. The authors seem to suggest that it was as Zulus that they opposed the elimination of racial barriers to NEC membership.

Models some may have been of what South African communists were expected to be, yet it was always in those parts of the ANC/Umkhonto of which they had control that the greatest wrongs were done, such as in Mbokodo (the Security set-up), and Military Intelligence.

In the command structure of Umkhonto, crucial to its effectiveness, Party membership could count for more than ability: a case study is that of Steve Tshwete's appointment, over the heads of well-qualified veterans, as army Political Commissar (third in the Umkhonto hierarchy). Hani, Chief of Staff under the army commander Joe Modise, a non-communist, 'was able to pull off this coup only because of the influence of the Party inside the ANC.'

As model South African communists they believed (as they doubtless still do) in 'democratic centralism' which gagged criticism and dissent, fossilizing the movement in policies that were often obsolete and unworkable.

The military struggle, the authors demonstrate convincingly, should long since have given way to political action. The ANC's strongest suit, its political appeal, was sacrificed to its weakest, its military power, whereas P.W. Botha was weaker politically and stronger militarily.

Similarly the rural peasantry might have provided a far better habitat for ANC guerrillas (using Mao's well-worn analogy of the fish and the sea) than the urban proletariat. CP dogma based on ancient decisions dictated otherwise and could not be changed, only justified by



JENNY SCHREINER; her effective unit applauded

theory and analysis.

So the Communists took over the leadership of the ANC.

All the dead theories and counter-productive practices of their creed came with them.

The authors do not spare us the squalor and futility of the Umkhonto camps in Angola, the mutiny and its aftermath (though the popular rehabilitation of seven of the Committee of Ten who led the mutineers is a bright spot in a somewhat dismal chronicle), the series of terrible failures of nearly all the cross-border regional councils which were the ANC's response to the township risings

of 1984-5, the 'modest achievement', as the authors euphemistically call it, of Umkhonto, for all those lives lost or blighted.

They point to the new post-Cold War and post-*perestroika* world, where the very bases of communism and socialism are held in doubt and leave us wondering what path South Africa's communists will follow if they are to put to their country's use their talents and residual idealism.

Perhaps, as an epigraph, an anecdote from Sheverdnadze's memoirs may be appropriate (quoted in *The New York Review of Books*, 19 December 1991). He and Gorbachev, on a Black Sea holiday in the early 1980s, 'confided in each other their disgust for the state of the Kremlin leadership and the country as a whole.'

"Everything's rotten," Sheverdnadze said to Gorbachev as they walked along the beach at Pitsunda. "It has to be changed."

"We cannot live this way any longer," Gorbachev replied." Nor do they, in what was once the mothership. And nor should those dedicated ideologues of the South African Communist Party, as they are revealed to us in this illuminating book.

— RANDOLPH VIGNE

How the violence affects the youth in the townships

Faces in the Revolution: The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South Africa by Gill Straker with Fatima Moosa, Rise Becker and Madiyoyo Nkwale. Published by David Philip, Capetown.

AT LAST we have a book that looks past the statistics and sensation of township violence and attempts to make sense of the material conditions that have caused it and still maintain it.

Although Professor Straker uses a small group of subjects from Leandra, the information and experiences can be extrapolated to hold true for any area in South Africa wracked by civil war. It is a book that should be read by anyone interested in solving the human problems assailing the country today.

The work is scholarly and professional, but entirely accessible to the lay person. It is an absorbing look at the

"individual and psychological" aspects of the violence, and its effect on the people who are suffering through it. She contextualises the lives of victims and perpetrators so that the reader can come to an understanding of the complex forces which have caused the present situation and work through the changes that these high levels of violence have wrought in the psyches of the youth.

Straker was one of a group of psychologists called in to counsel refugees from the violence and the police who had fled from Leandra and sought safety at a church community centre. Finding that she and her colleagues were often handicapped by their "middle-class" techniques which were inappropriate for this situation she set out to analyse and

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WITH THE Nationalist Government facing charges of abuse of power and financial corruption more serious than at any time in its history, has come the bland admission by Cabinet Minister Jacob de Villiers that “apartheid was the problem”.

But, he insists, the irregularities, amounting to seemingly incalculable millions in the often renamed department he now controls, “are in the past. The Government is committed to exposing the truth about them.”

In support of this claim he lists President F.W. de Klerk’s announcement of a judicial inquiry into allegations that members of the security forces were behind the murder of Eastern Cape community leader Matthew Goniwe and two others, the publication of the Pickard Commission’s report of the graft in the Department of Development Aid, and De Klerk’s instruction that the Goldstone Commission should investigate allegations of a secret police base from which ‘dirty tricks’ were planned.

Yet there is a perception in the broader world community and among white South Africans in particular that corruption is especially prevalent in black Africa.

Here COLIN LEGUM looks at why Africa is portrayed as exceptionally corrupt and the reason for the corruption that in fact exists in many African countries.

CORRUPTION

WHEN WILLIAM F. WELD, the US Attorney for Massachusetts, retired after serving in the Justice Department’s criminal division, he wrote: ‘I would like to underscore a concern that increasingly troubled me throughout my years of involvement in law enforcement. My concern is that, while Americans frequently deride other countries for corruption in their public institutions, they greatly underrate public corruption as a political and economic problem at home.’

What William Weld wrote about Americans applies no less to South Africans, the British, the Germans, Japanese and others. Their own record of corruption is generally treated as exceptional aberrations in their system, and not inherent in the system itself. Yet — and this is the first point I want to make — corruption is endemic in every country in the world and under every kind of political system.

As has now been shown, communism produced corrupt societies in the USSR and throughout Eastern Europe despite the high moral tone set by Marxists. Japan — one of the closest regulated countries in the world — has been rocked by a succession of corruption scandals that have toppled prime ministers, finance ministers and other top officials and financiers.

A trial has just concluded in Italy involving a dozen prominent bankers and industrialists, while its recent elections have been shot through with fraudulent practices.

The ‘pork barrel’ politics in the United

States, which involves rewarding politicians and their cronies, remains chronic. It has forced a former Vice President and several Governors out of office; currently threatens scores of Congressmen; involves leading figures in the biggest financial ramp this century (including President Bush’s son) over what we know as building societies; and it has in recent years rocked some of the most illustrious financial companies in Wall Street.

In Germany, there is the recent case of a finance minister being forced to resign over a scandal involving the creaming off of funds for political purposes, while a number of industrialists have been tried over illegal trafficking in weapons and chemical supplies.

Even in puritanical Switzerland, industrialists have been involved in illegal arms deals. This, too, has been discovered in Sweden over the controversial deal by the weapons-makers, Bofor, in a multi-million pound deal with India.

Britain has not yet recovered from the exposure of the role of top businessmen and city financiers over the Guinness affair, while even the prestigious Lloyds is trying to regain its former prestige — ‘A1 at Lloyds’ — after a series of scandals.

Name any country in the Arab world and in Asia (except for Singapore), or in Latin America, and one can list scores of scandals involving corruption. Nearer home, current cases involving corruption during the apartheid years, show that South Africa is among the most corrupt countries in the continent. At

present there are at least a dozen cases involving financiers who are on trial for financial malpractices involving hundreds of millions of rand. At least one former Minister was forced to resign because of corrupt practices; and the country is unable to deal effectively with businessmen who have illegally exported capital out of the country, estimated at some R17 billion. Some of this colossal sum has been transferred — under arrangements which make possible the evasion of laws governing exchange control regulations. For a country desperately short of investment capital the loss of such large sums of surplus wealth, this transfer of funds abroad is a national scandal.

Yet, nobody talks about South Africa, Japan, the United States, Britain or other countries as corrupt societies in contrast with the habitual reference to corruption in Africa.

Why are African leaders and governments stereotyped as corrupt? This portrayal of Africa is by now so imprinted on the minds of South Africans that if any newspaper reader is asked to apply a description of Africa they can usually be relied upon to say ‘corrupt’, ‘dictatorial’, and ‘nepotistic.’

I am reminded of a recent report by an experienced correspondent on African affairs writing for a Johannesburg paper who described the new Attorney-General of Zambia as one of the few lawyers of integrity to serve in such a capacity in Africa. How many attorney generals in the continent does this correspondent know to justify this kind of judgment? I have direct knowledge of at least 30

HISTORICAL NEED TO JUSTIFY WHITE SUPREMACY

attorney generals and other senior law officers in African countries since independence who have proved themselves to be men of scrupulous integrity, some of whom have had to pay the price for their efforts at curbing illegality.

This is not to suggest that there have been no dishonest law officers, nor that corruption does not exist in Africa. It certainly does. But since corruption is a universal phenomenon what lies behind the persistent denigration of African governments and leaders as if all, or most of them, are corrupt?

If I were to list the names of African leaders or governments that I know are honest and clean, this would be taken, quite correctly, as citing exceptional cases to disprove an accurate generalisation. But I cannot help mentioning just three examples of African leaders who have recently been described in the South African media as having secretly enriched themselves — President Mugaba of Zimbabwe, ex-president Milton Obote of Uganda, and ex-president Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The facts are that Obote is living in virtual penury in Lusaka; Kaunda has been left with no resources to sustain himself and his family; while Mugabe himself is completely clean despite the nefarious practices of some of his colleagues.

The purpose of this article is to raise two important issues: what lies behind the portrayal of Africa as exceptionally corrupt; and what are the reasons for the corruption that in fact exists in many African countries?

My answer to the first question is that the almost universal characterisation of Africa as riven by corruption is motivated by racism. It stems from the earlier, and still widely persistent, idea that blacks are somehow inferior and are incapable of governing themselves efficiently and cleanly. Nor is this racism confined only to the white world; it is to be found equally among Arabs, Asians and Japanese. Space prevents me from citing evidence of this non-white racism towards blacks; but if challenged to do so I can produce ample evidence to support this statement.

In the special case of white South

African attitudes there is an additional reason which helps to explain what lies behind the widespread denigration of Africa: it stems from their historical need to justify white supremacy.

This need gained greater significance during the apartheid years when Africa was regarded as the implacable enemy of white-ruled South Africa. It is an irony that a country that has been subjected to single-party, undemocratic and corrupt rule (just look at the government's role in buttressing the corrupt rulers of many of the Homelands) should have accused the whole of Africa with precisely these vices.

Now that the political climate in South Africa has happily changed, white South Africans are still imbued with the racist attitudes of the past. It is likely to take years for this mindset to change. What could help is the cultivation of more responsible reporting in the mass media of the true conditions in the continent now that it is opening up to coverage by South African journalists. One can only hope that the era of generalisations is drawing to a close and that Africa will be treated with greater responsibility in differentiating between what is good and what is bad in its governments and societies.

Accountable government, based on sound democratic principles, is the only sure way of ensuring that the period of the Second Independence won't be blighted by the misdemeanours and mistakes of the First Independence.

Turning now to the second issue — the reasons for corruption which undoubtedly exists in the continent. There are several different reasons to account for it.

First, there has been the absence of democratic government with counterbalancing institutions capable of curbing corruption. (This needs to be qualified by referring back to the universality of corruption even in countries where democratic governments have existed for years.

A second reason is the psychological drive of people emerging from poverty to acquire wealth. This has been true of all societies in the early stages of the development of democratic government; it is not confined only to Africans.

The easy way to achieving wealth has been through the gaining of political power. Gaining power and hanging on

to it have characterised most societies. The emerging new political class often consists of people drawn from an underprivileged society and who, for all their lives, have known dire poverty. Self-enrichment has been a universal feature of the exercise of unchecked power. Already, in South Africa, this process can be seen to be developing, most notably in the system of Homelands.

A third reason is that in the fragile, nascent period of independence those who have managed to gain power have never been sure of how long they will hold office; hence the need to make hay while their usually brief tenure of power lasts. Some African leaders have salted away their ill-gotten gains against a rainy day.

Now, over most of the African continent, has come a day of reckoning for the first generation of the post-independence political class. The coming of this Second Independence has been hastened by popular discontent over the abuse of power, the extent of corruption, and the absence of human rights. Democracy is on the march from north to south and from east to west. But unless the advent of democracy produces effective institutions capable of curbing the excesses of unrepresentative power,

there is the risk of the emergence of a new political class as greedy as the one they have replaced.

Nevertheless, in the longer term, accountable government, based on sound democratic principles, is the only sure way of ensuring that the period of the Second Independence won't be blighted by the misdemeanours and mistakes of the First Independence which was fought against alien rule.

This is a time of hope; but the process of democratic change will not come easily or quickly. It is important that the complexities of change be properly understood, and this calls for responsible reporting which will require, above all, recognition of the racism that is present, to a greater or a lesser extent, in every one of us, no matter how pious we might feel about our success in having overcome our own inbred attitudes. ●

Is the 'end of ideology' nigh?

THE OUTCOME of the British general election confounded the experts and not least the pollsters who consistently put the Labour Party neck and neck with the Conservatives and two points ahead during the last few days of the campaign. This fuelled speculation about the prospect of a 'hung' parliament with no party achieving an overall majority and raised Liberal Democrat hopes of a deal with Labour to form the next government.

Yet to the delight of the bookmakers and the consternation of media pundits (not to mention Mr Neil Kinnock for whom this election was make or break time) the Conservatives won a fourth term with a 21 seat majority. This is more than enough to sustain a government until economic recovery provides a platform for another test of electoral strength and a vindication of the claim that the Conservatives are the 'natural party of government'.

Why — against all the odds — did Labour lose? After all, the election was fought in the trough of a severe economic recession characterised by a mounting tide of bankruptcies, house repossessions by building societies, and an unemployment figure well over the two million which has stubbornly refused all attempts at reduction.

Major derided as a 'nice guy' lacking charisma

After thirteen years of office, cabinet ministers appeared tired and jaded with their leader, John Major derided as a 'nice guy' (but they always lose, don't they?), lacking charisma and banal in style and substance. Indeed, his flat, trite comments, invited derision from the chattering classes, e.g.: "Some vegetables I'm fond of . . . peas I'm relatively neutral about"; watching dog food being transferred from a lorry to a railway truck in a cold, dank Melton Mowbray, he remarked: "This is a very exciting use of old marshalling yards."

And if it is the case — as some political scientists have argued — that British elections are essentially popularity contests between rival brands of prime

JACK SPENCE REVIEWS THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LEFT OF THE RESULT OF BRITAIN'S GENERAL ELECTION

ministerial leadership largely created and projected by a relentless and unending stream of television imagery, then Neil Kinnock should have won hands down. His party — it is claimed — won the campaign and by implication according to a self-obsessed media should, therefore have won the election. That it did not says a good deal about the common-sense of the average voter and the capacity to make rational choices based primarily on economic self interest, and remain unimpressed by the slick professionalism, the half truths of campaign presentation. 'Nice guys' can and do win, therefore, despite the best efforts of Conservative Central Office (appalled as they were half way through the campaign by the 'failure' of their candidate to 'project' himself) to suggest that their leader could indeed 'mix it' rough and tough with the best of them.

Confusion over taxation policy

The explanation for Labour's defeat must, therefore, be sought elsewhere. One reason was the confusion over Labour's taxation policy. Despite denials to the contrary by the Labour leadership, some 60% of the electorate (according to exit polls) believed that a Labour government would increase the tax paid by those on average earnings. Accordingly, the Conservatives targeted the great mass

of voters earning between £10,000 and £20,000 a year. More important, those who *aspired* to earn more and, therefore, remembering the past record of Labour governments, felt vulnerable to Labour emphasis on redistribution as a way of ensuring a fairer society and rectifying the damage allegedly done by Thatcherite policies to the National Health Service and the state education system.

Hence the electoral significance of 'Essex Man' who to Labour's acute discomfort was found alive and well and living in highly marginal Basildon. Here were to be found the so-called C2 class of voters — the skilled workers, the first-time owners of small businesses, many of them hard hit by recession.

Norman Tebbit, a former cabinet minister and the epitome of self-made man was their spokesman: uncompromisingly right wing, brutal in debate (not for nothing did Michael Foot dub him the 'Chingford strangler'), and contemptuous of those who whinged and whined in favour of the nanny-state. Yet paradoxically, they returned their Conservative MP to parliament albeit by a small majority. As the result flashed across the TV screens on election night, Conservative spokesmen instinctively knew that the polls had been wrong, that their leader would remain in Downing Street.

Dominated by two contrasting fears

Vernon Bogdanor, an Oxford don writing in the *Independent on Sunday* (12 April 1992) provides the most telling analysis of the significance of 'Basildon Man' and it is worth quoting at length. He recalled George Orwell's comment fifty years ago that:

The place to look for the germs of the future England is in light industry areas and along the arterial roads. In Slough, Dagenham, Barnet, Letchworth, Hayes — everywhere, indeed, on the outskirts of great towns — the old pattern is gradually changing into something new . . . (the people



there) are the indeterminate stratum at which the older class distinctions are beginning to break down . . .

Bogdanor argues that:

The 1992 general election was dominated by the competition between two contrasting fears: fear of unemployment and fear of Labour. These fears often lie at subconscious level; they are unlikely to be vouchsafed to impersonal pollsters, but may be revealed to those prepared to wait to listen . . . for voters in the new England, a Labour vote reflects the background from which they have come, a background of organised trade unionism and collective provision. A Conservative vote, by contrast, expresses an aspiration . . . to a world in which they can make decisions for themselves, free from the paternalism of trade union leaders or local councillors. The Labour leadership may have understood this, but one suspects that most Labour activists have not . . . to anyone not blinkered by ideology, there is something profoundly moving about the process of upward social mobility which Basildon represents. The ideological bastions of the left, however, lie not in Basildon and Harlow, but in Hampstead and Cambridge which see the aspirations of Essex Man as narrow and materialistic and their political representative, John Major, as nothing more than a glorified bank manager or accountant. Yet for the voters of Basildon, the profession of accountancy represents a prospect of liberation unimaginable to their East End grandparents.

Banking on a change of leader

The question remains: can Labour recover sufficiently to win the next election? Some argue that reducing the Conservative majority from 84 to 21 suggests that 'one more heave' will do it. Others put their faith in a change of leader, pointing to the solid Scottish values of John Smith, the shadow chancellor or, alternatively, the claims of Brian Could, the clever New Zealander

REDEFINING THE LABOUR PARTY'S POLICY WILL PROVE A MAMMOTH TASK IN A WORLD WHICH HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON SOCIALISM AND THE EMPHASIS ON THE FORCED REDISTRIBUTION VIA TAXATION OF A NATION'S WEALTH

whose down to earth 'colonial' style and antipathy to European federalism might well strike a chord among those (and there are many) who distrust foreigners, especially Brussels bureaucrats. But whoever emerges as the leader will face the mammoth task of redefining the Labour Party's policy and role in a world which has turned its back on socialism and, in particular, the emphasis on the forced redistribution via taxation of a nation's wealth in the name of equality and fairness.

In the 1950's and 1960's, it was possible for Socialist theorists such as Anthony Crosland to argue that the inevitability of sustained economic growth could and would lead to redistribution of wealth and income without having to impose electorally unpopular punitive taxation. In other words, decent and efficient social services could be provided for out of the proceeds generated by growth. But as Peter Jenkins has argued, in the difficult economic climate that has persisted ever since the oil crisis of the early 1970's capitalist societies are faced with the problem of how to *create* wealth not once and for all, but repeatedly through boom and depression alike as inevitable ever increasing growth of the kind postulated by Crosland can no longer be taken for granted.

Once this premise is granted, the party with the best hope of economic and presumably electoral success is the one

which puts its faith in market principles before all others. This is precisely what the Conservatives have done in good times and in bad with results which are plain to see. The last Conservative government did not — it is true — pull Britain out of the recession, but the fact that in 1992 enough voters believed that only it could do so indicates the scope of the problem confronting Labour.

Yet if the Labour Party abandons its traditional beliefs in equality, publicly subsidised state provision of social services and an interventionist role for the state, what is there to distinguish it from its Conservative counterpart?

In search of 'a big new idea'

Or, as a Labour Party leader put it, where can Labour find a "new big idea"? Some commentators such as Godfrey Hodgson point to the success with which the West German Social Democrat party transformed itself after 1959 with the adoption of the Bad Godesberg programme. This, in effect, meant an abandonment of traditional socialism in favour of a "broad-left alternative to the Christian Democrats." But the SDP



Delimitation could enhance Tory chances

never won power in its own right: between 1969 and 1983 it shared power, first with the CDU and then subsequently with the liberal Free Democrats. The latter then switched its allegiance to the Christian Democrats and the SDP has been left out in the cold ever since.

That the SDP was able for some 13 years to share power was because of an electoral system based on proportional representation and also because it had leaders of talent in the shape of Willie Brandt and Helmut Schmidt who for a variety of reasons impressed a significant chunk of the German electorate. Moreover, the German economy flourished throughout this period and the Social Democrats could rightly project themselves as efficient partners in the task of managing the economy.

Hence, in the current British context, the call for a revision of the electoral system in favour of proportional representation or, in the short term (i.e., the period before the real election), an electoral pact between Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties. But the Conservatives will not concede the first option while the electoral consequences of a Lib-Lab pact are unpredictable: some 66% of the electorate voted against the Labour Party in 1992 and many of those supporting the Liberal Democrats might desert if the price of a pact was the return of a Labour-led coalition to office.

There is a further difficulty: jettisoning traditional values might help the Labour Party win seats in the critically important south-east; indeed, Ken Livingstone, a left wing Labour MP argued that Labour's tax proposals damaged the

party's prospects among potential middle class supporters in that area. Yet Labour remains strong in the north-east, Scotland and Wales, where orthodox Labour ideology still holds sway.

It is by no means certain that their supporters in those areas would be easily reconciled to an abandonment of traditional attitudes in favour of a platform which stressed that Labour's fitness for office rested *solely* on its capacity to manage a capitalist economy more effectively than its Conservative rivals. But this may be the price which the Labour Party will have to pay for electoral success in a world which has seemingly accepted the thesis that 'the end of ideology' is nigh.

On a more mundane level, changes in the delimitation of constituencies via the mechanism of a Boundary Commission before 1995 are likely to increase the chances of future Conservative success.

Finally, a comment on the role of the polls and the intrusiveness of television in the campaigns. The two are connected if only because poll findings determined

years away from any real contact with the voters who when they did appear on our screens were incessantly shuffled about by their minders to provide sound bites and photo opportunities.

Who was manipulating whom is a good question, but the impression of an unholy alliance between the media and the politicians gathered strength as the campaign progressed.

In the event, one wonders whether the highly charged televisual nature of the rival campaigns made any difference to voters' choices. The voter did what he/she always did, that is mark the ballot paper in the privacy of the voters' booth and succeeded — either by accident or by design — in misleading the prying questions of those who organised exit polls. As E.M. Forster remarked "Two cheers for democracy!"

The Conservatives won 43% of the vote, the Labour Party 35% and the Liberal Democrats 18%. The polls failed to register this crucial difference probably because the swing between the parties they did detect was not uniform across

“ The polls may well have been an accurate reflection of the views of the samples interviewed, but not of the electorate as a whole. ”

the day to day electoral strategies of the parties. (A good example of this tendency was the emphasis during the last week of the campaign on the prospect of a hung parliament which the polls predicted, thereby compelling the politicians to spend hours debating the merits of such an outcome to the exclusion of key policy differences between them).

Invoked at the daily party press conferences, poll findings on the party's current standing and the electorate's attitude on key issues set the agenda for what appeared to be an exclusively media discussion. The politicians seemed light

the country. In fact, the swing often varied considerably between one constituency and another, between one region and another. Thus, as one observer put it: "The polls may well have been an accurate reflection of the views of the samples interviewed, but not of the electorate as a whole".

The politicians and the pollsters will in future do well to remember G.K. Chesterton's lines:

“Smile at us, pay us, pass us;
but do not quite forget.
For we are the people of England,
that have never spoken yet.”

People's education

possible, rather than merely gargantuan. NEPI must juggle the imperative for quick results with the need for depth of research into both practical and philosophical areas; quick fixes all too often rest on shaky foundations.

If the process takes too long its deliberations may become irrelevant; if it is too shallow its policies will not hold

up in the long term. Too much emphasis on values might mean too little on their practical application; too much emphasis on economic factors could mean "People's Education Inc." "People's education" should not be lost in the stampede to table policy proposals; at the same time, the concept requires resolution before it can serve as a basis for policy.

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'America's crisis is not about economics. It is about the very purpose of politics, government and nationhood.'

BEWILDERMENT

PETER VALE, of the Centre for Southern African Studies, is a member of the Pew International Task Force on Global Change and America's Responsibility. He was recently in the United States and gives his assessment of the mood there.

IT'S CHERRY BLOSSOM time in this most political of all cities. Along the Potomac and up The Mall the pink flowers beckon America's faithful — as they have for generations — to do homage to the 'nation's capital'.

And they come of course in their hundreds of thousands: from the Midwest, the South, and California; tourist and child alike, to gaze up at Lincoln's brooding face, Jefferson's graceful pagoda and the deep wound in the turf of The Mall which is the Vietnam memorial. It is a gentle season: the days are warm and the joggers on the many pathways are shirtless in the noonday sun.

But there is a mood in America this spring which belies the seeming normality of the season. It is a sense not of despair (though there is some), nor malaise (of which there is plenty of evidence): it is deep, deep questioning.

How? Why? What's wrong? Where to?

It is certainly true that these and other questions are long part of this — yes — great political tradition but this is something more.

The ring-a-ding of the Primaries (and the looming Conventions) have faded into an empty charade. Arkansas' Governor Bill Clinton — the first child of the Sixties to aspire to the Presidency — was sent home to Little Rock after the New York Primary to rest his voice. Is this a metaphor for a political system in which, as many now think, there is too much talk, too little action?

BUT THERE have been more serious casualties this season than the Governor's voice. The highly-respected Republican Senator from New Hampshire, Warren Rudman, announced he would not seek re-election. His example has been followed by others; at the time of writing, nearly 20 in the Senate and the House of Representatives have announced they will quit.

At a private dinner a Republican Senator ventured a mixture of pain, anger and frustration. Bipartisan coalitions to tackle serious social problems have for 12 years been kiboshed by a White House which had abdicated executive responsibility. The on-going squabble over perks and government pork-barrelling has focused legislative attention on the "profitability of the Senate Gift Shop" rather than the serious national malaise. Then, there was profound anger at politicians: as a result, he, and others, preferred to keep their heads down in Washington rather than visit their constituencies. Small wonder then that he questioned whether he would seek re-election in '96.

This is not, it seems to me, a malady of the vital signs. In contrast to elsewhere, America's look good: inflation is running at 4%, unemployment is slightly more than 7%. Measured in any basket, America's standard of living is probably the best in the world. (Even if this claim is debateable, why is it that so many millions are trying to sneak into the country every year?)

"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" — the great American claim — seems more than a little tarnished this spring. It is wan. In all respects, this is curious — after all, no lesser a figure than George Bush proclaimed America's victory in the Cold War.

But the Cold War, too, has left its scars. Greg Treverton of the Council on Foreign Relations tells of the CIA Soviet analyst who pointed out that "Reagan's huge arms buildup of the 1980s broke both the US and the Soviets: only *they* have realised it".

And yet, as I have tried to stress, America's crisis is not about economics, it's about the very purpose (in this order) of politics, government and nationhood. It is perfectly true that embedded deep within the American political psyche is a streak of anti-politics. The current moment has burnished this impulse with (in the view of many) two potentially reckless outcomes this election season.

One is the re-emergence of former Governor Jerry Brown as a Democratic contender with his "Take America Back" slogan. After his dismal showing in the New York Primary few believe that he can do anything more at this stage than wound the Democratic Party. Brown's politics — with his proposal for a Flat Tax — seem a throwback to the 'moonbeam' politics of flower power of which he was a child.

And then, there is H. Ross Perot, Texas computer billionaire and almost-candidate for the Presidency. Perot has emerged as the anti-politics politician: the self-made man who — as in the Davy Crockett story — will go down to Washington to set things straight. In this age of disillusion, Steve Bosworth of the Japan-America Foundation believes Perot can make a deep impact on the American people. This was confirmed by a barmaid at my Washington hotel who confessed that Perot "excited" her!

From the incumbent President and Republican candidate for the Presidency — George Bush — the message seems to have been replaced by muddle. There are increasing signs that there is a deep conflict between the White House and the Bush campaign. And when the President moves — other than to walk with his wife along the Potomac to

THE ANTI-POLITICS POLITICIANS 'WILL GO DOWN TO WASHINGTON TO SET THINGS STRAIGHT.'



Chronic inability to help those at the margin of the American Dream

watch the cherry blossoms, that is — it ends in panic and bumble.

For all this political spring there really seems no end to America's bewilderment. A rising stock market will provide no jump-start to a public mood which is introspective to the point of despair. How could it? How is one to rejuvenate a social order where one in every four black youths are either in jail or on parole? Where the most common form of death among black teenagers is homicide? Where 60% of black children are born out of wedlock? Where 11% of every cohort (the 4-million births in America every year) will be functionally brain-damaged by the day they get to school?

The list is endless and there is no need to go on, in order to make this point: If American self-esteem is reeling this spring, more than a little of this must be laid at the chronic inability to help those at the margins of the American Dream.

WHILE MUCH of this is structural of course, the problems were compounded during the 1980s by Ronald Reagan's voodoo economics.

Is there a cure? In the short term, probably not.

And yet the thoughtful head of the Pew Charitable Trusts, Tom Langfitt, put his finger on something with his plea for a revival of local politics. Decades of centralised government have alienated America's people from their public life. Their government process is bankrupt with voters and leaders caught in a hopeless tangle. Only at the local level can their trust be rebuilt, can the system regain its ballast.

And where does that leave Washington?

Still in the centre of things, but not promising to deliver what it cannot. Not articulating a "public interest" with no mandate. A place only to be visited in cherry blossom time, not a place to provide the answer to America's every anxiety. ●

Township Violence: A sane and sympathetic analysis

reassess the dynamics peculiar to the situation here. Although she refers extensively to other literature on violence in all parts of the world she isolates factors which are specifically South African and which we will have to recognise if we are to find solutions.

She does this by using her original case histories taken in 1986, and then further interviews done in 1989 with the same subjects. In doing this longitudinal study she is trying to establish the permanent and long-term effects of the violence on the individual.

Unfortunately, like much South African work, the original interviews were done in an emergency and she has little information about the psychological status of these people before the violence. Nonetheless she manages to give a comprehensive and effective analysis of the effects suffered by this group.

She uses the technique of case studies, pointing out in her Appendix that the cases were not those of individuals but composites of clusters of people falling into the four categories she has defined. She examines the entire spectrum of traumas that have befallen them including loss of loved ones, loss of family structures, witnessing or helping to commit an atrocity and coming to terms with apartheid and grinding poverty. Her subjects are all young people aged between 14 and 25, all have been "warriors", most have been injured and detained, and many have lost schooling and any job opportunities they may ever have had. She comes to the conclusion that although all of her subjects have been permanently affected, not all are permanently psychologically disabled.

HER FINDINGS are that 50% of this group have managed to rebuild their lives, still have the ability to maintain caring relationships and are

functioning and concerned citizens despite the fact that their living conditions are basically unchanged. She argues that there is still room for a solution to the "brutalisation" of the youth, and that the negative media perception of a "lost generation" may not be accurate. She points out that the perception of "brutalisation" being a solely black problem is far from accurate, and that the effects of apartheid and violence on white soldiers and policemen has not even begun to be addressed.

Straker sees the solutions coming from the communities themselves, in conjunction with the churches, helping professionals, traditional healers and rituals which enable people to begin again.

She is adamant that there can be no healing until people have worked through the guilt and anger, and redressed the wrongs they have committed. She says you can forgive, but not forget, and that the memories need to be cleansed in order to be healed. She points to the Zimbabwean experience as an example, and lays stress on the building of socio-economic conditions which re-establish the social order and the family.

There are so many facets to this book that no review can do it real justice. It is a sane and sympathetic analysis, which while abhorring the violence attempts to understand and translate it into comprehensive terms that enable concerned people to begin to act constructively.

As a person who has been involved in the effects of the violence and the problems of refugees my only regret is that I did not have the advantage of being able to read the book before my involvement, and I highly recommend it to all those people who are concerned about the levels of violence in this country. ●

— WENDY LEEB

Winnie's failing fortunes

— ANTHONY HEARD

WINNIE MANDELA's fall reflects a wider issue than the toppling of a famous man's wife. It strikes at the heart of what is happening in this democratizing end of Africa. Former saints are now seen as sinners; and former ogres, not that bad after all.

In the hard old days of dirty war between white and black, the country's world was simple. There were the haves, who were white, and the have-nots, who were black. It was a matter of white rulers and black ruled. Depending on one's attitude (or hue), blacks or whites were right. Polarization was complete.

That was a world of awful simplicity.

The Afrikaner Nationalists held absolute sway over the majority blacks and the white liberal minority. In the process the Nationalists ennobled almost every black and liberal who fought them. And the Nationalists demonized themselves.

The Nationalists were seen by the world, and by most South Africans, as a brutal racial oligarchy intent on keeping blacks down forever. The cap fitted.

That started changing slowly with the reforms of former President P.W. Botha, who legalized black trade unions, allowed much social integration and abolished the pass laws which determined where blacks could be and work.

Life became marginally better for most blacks.

But Botha, a stern and irascible militarist, could summon neither the courage nor vision to push his reforms to the logical conclusion: the real emancipation of blacks. He tried to mix repression with reform.

Enter Winnie Mandela.

With her husband locked away seemingly for life on charges of sabotage, and most other African National Congress leaders exiled, jailed or dead, she maintained a faithful holding operation at the gates of the South African hell. Vivacious and quick-witted, she assumed the role of the Mother of the Nation, defied the authorities at every turn and was a prime victim of repression.

To chronicle what she suffered would take columns. Suffice it to say that any ordinary person subjected to that degree of harassment would require permanent psychiatric assistance.

Enter F.W. de Klerk.

He deftly squeezed Botha out of office, succeeded to the presidency and set about emancipating blacks while trying to reassure whites. He legalized all political parties including the communists, struck down repressive laws — and allowed Winnie Mandela's husband to walk out from life imprisonment. Nelson, as it were, came back from the dead.

That in retrospect was the end of Winnie Mandela as she had been known. She failed to adjust to the new times. Her style and her rhetoric were fashioned in a time-frame suited to the dirty days of Botha when, despite modern reform, whites were determined to stay on top. It was as those Botha

days came to an end when she allegedly connived in the murky deeds committed by her soccer-team bodyguard in Soweto in 1988. Youths were kidnapped and thrashed; a 14-year old boy died. The community, including some African National Congress sympathizers, was affronted, and disowned Winnie.

She was convicted by the Supreme Court last year of serious offences: kidnapping and not reporting an assault. She is appealing. Her husband stood by her throughout the trial, but tensions between them grew.

Now, in sadness, Nelson has let go of Winnie.

It seems the differences that have built up between them since his release in February 1990, have become too great and, in his early seventies, he would rather plod on without her.

In doing this, he has cut her adrift. The paradoxical charge that can be levelled against Winnie is this: When Nelson was not free, her support was total and invaluable; but, with him free, she is a liability.

Her extreme statements have cut across what he was trying to do, for instance raising the temperature of the debate when it should have been cooled. She has embroiled herself in highly controversial activities — and, in this sense, let him down.

Winnie is showing no signs of sober reflection about her political and personal style. She is buzzing around the violence-torn townships, visiting the afflicted and enchanting the dancing cohorts of black youngsters who revere her. Re-opened police inquiries into the murky Soweto events could bring her back to court.

It remains to be seen where the truth lies, indeed, whether fact can be distinguished from fiction — and dirty tricks. There has been a hyper-critical rush to judgment over the Winnie affair which has been absent from much of the media's handling of other controversial issues and personalities. This has complicated the public's assessment of the situation.

Whether she will carve for herself a meaningful place in history beyond her hardship years, seems doubtful — though the "new South Africa" promises roller-coaster surprises for almost everyone.

She is a fighter. She resigned as ANC social welfare head, but successfully held her chairmanship of the ANC Women's League in the PWV region in elections early in May.

This writer believes that a key to her future lies in how negotiations turn out. Only if there is a lurch to a really radical order (say, like Libya), could she gain substantial ground, in common with others who were irreparably radicalized by repression and also cannot adjust to new times.

But that prospect seems unlikely as her estranged husband and De Klerk grope toward a stable new order which offers no extremes and therefore a durable future for both black and white. ●

VIVA! VIVA!

by DAVID BASCKIN

MILLIE AND BOONE

BOOK LOVERS throughout the United States are this week deeply embroiled in fevered discussions of a literary nature: the new book not only on Millie, but actually by Millie herself. Millie is President Bush's personal dog, the dog who always attends press conferences on the White House lawn, the dog who accompanies the Prez on his trans-American flights on Air Force One, the dog who features in the Doonesbury strip, the dog whose weekly royalty cheques from the publishers exceed the weekly income of the Man himself. That Millie is privy, so to speak, to every state secret whispered in the Oval Office, gives her a set of insights into Executive policy second only to Nancy Reagan's former astrologer. And when one considers the comparative achievements of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, one begins to wonder whether policy run by an astrologer is necessarily any better than policy designed by a dog. Granted, Reagan's astrologer planned the decline and fall of the Evil Empire. But then Millie saved the gallant Kuwaitis from the Beast of Babylon. Perhaps a third Administration, this time run by some clairvoyant with an ouija board, will be able to solve the secret of the American national debt.

COMRADES AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

DESCRIBED BY some as the Tour de France without France or bicycles, the annual Comrades Marathon is facing a crisis entirely of its own making: a decline in the numbers of first class international athletes, who are not prepared to endure the expense and agony of victory, with glory as the sole reward. In short, the time has come for massive cash prizes to attract the top fifty finalists of this ultra-marathon. Sadly, the Comrades is bedevilled by an archaic commitment to amateurism which prevents the

management even contemplating big bucks for big winners. Not that they would have to chip in themselves; there are massive commercial interests out there just beyond the range of the firelight, their eyes glistening in the gloom, patiently waiting to shower sponsorships and money on the victors. The result of all this would be an opportunity to Mardi Gras the Comrades Marathon, (sub please retain Mardi Gras the Comrades Marathon) to make it into a nonstop street festival in two cities simultaneously. To give new life to the Maritzburg end, a herd of bulls could be released just behind the runners as the starter fires his or her pistol. The ecstatic consequences would not only mirror the festivities of Pampalona, but would add significantly to the times achieved by all runners, regardless of sex, race or creed. Sometime in the Thirties, Bill Payne won the race in rubber boots. Running shoes have come a long way since then. Perhaps the time has come for the amateur-ethic of the Comrades Marathon to go the same way as Bill Payne's curious footwear.

MEANWHILE, BACK AT SUN CITY . . .

ONCE UPON a time, South African millionaires were debonair, high-profile figures, happy to light their Havanas with five pound notes and to scatter uncut diamonds amongst the satin sheets of limitless boudoirs. Now, with the new hex on wealth, a deep and abiding modesty has taken its place. We refer to South Africa's newest millionairess who won R1.6 million at a slot machine in Sun City. To maintain a sense of decorum appropriate to the new South African sensibilities, she elected to accept her megabuck cheque while wearing a plush bunny head complete with ears. Viva! Viva! salutes this daughter of the Revolution.

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