reality

MARCH 1978 35 cents

Cost of a new prototype bomber with full equipment =



Photo Peter Larsen Unesco

One year's salary for 250,000 teachers

Photo Mireille Vautier Unesco

OR

30 science faculties each with 1,000 students

Photo Dominique Roger Unesco

OR

75 fully equipped 100-bed hospitals

A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL AND RADICAL OPINION

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in this issue . . .

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There were only 5 issues of Reality in Vol. 9 instead of the usual 6. A volume will now extend from January to November appearing every alternate month.

Articles printed in Reality do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Editorial Board.

EDITORIALS

1

RICHARD TURNER

The assassination of Dr Rick Turner, following closely as it did on the death of Mr Steve Biko while in the custody of the Security Police, has come as a heavy blow to all South Africans who cherish the ideals of truth, justice, and liberty. The memorial service in Durban, primarily one of celebration, though also one of mourning, was attended by a thousand people of every kind and condition, many of them young.

Rick Turner had been isolated from public life for nearly five years, but it was manifest that he was remembered with an intensity of admiration and devotion that is given to few to inspire. REALITY joins in these tributes, to the honesty and clarity of his mind and the courage and strength of his spirit.

These two deaths raise profoundly disturbing doubts in the minds of those South Africans who have a concept of justice that is not to be identified with the security of the State but has much more to do with the security of the individual, and the right to protection from violence to his life and person.

Dr Turner's death raises certain fundamental questions to which no confident answers can be given. Is any person who is known to reject racial discrimination, racial piivilege, and compulsory racial separation, given this protection in the same measure as any other person? Has South Africa reached such a stage that a violent crime against the militant and articulate opponent of Apartheid is more likely to go unsolved than other kinds of violent crime?

The fact that persons responsible for violent attacks on militant opponents of Government policy are seldom brought to trial gives rise to the fear amongst certain people that they themselves may figure on a list of persons who may be assassinated with a measure of immunity.

If these fears and suspicions are true, then justice in South Africa is in a sorry state. That which should be safe and sure is indeed variable and inconstant. Many of us become increasingly uncertain in our attitudes towards Parliament, the Courts, the Police, the Prisons. But especially are we uncertain in our attitude towards the police. We have been forced, most of all by the revelations of police treatment of

Mr Steve Biko, to distrust those whom we should regard as the custodians of the law, the protectors of ourselves and our homes, and the implacable opponents of all kinds of illegal violence.

At the head of the great hierarchy of justice stands the Minister of Justice, and above him the Prime Minister. Neither of them has said one word about the revelations of inhuman treatment of Mr Biko. Do they approve of the keeping of a prisoner naked in detention for long periods of time? Or of the transporting of a prisoner naked in a police vehicle for a distance of over 700 kilometres? The harsh truth is that we do not know. And therefore we are compelled – some willingly, some with great reluctance – to assume that the Prime Minister and his Minister of Justice just do not care, or at least do not care enough, to make a statement that would reassure the public.

The Prime Minister, or his Minister of Justice, or both, should have said publicly that the Government would not tolerate inhuman treatment of any prisoner, detainee or otherwise. This would not only have reassured many South Africans, but would have done a great deal to lessen the incalculable damage that the Biko inquest did to the reputation of South Africa abroad.

Do not the repeated accusations of police assaults in political trials suggest that laws which allow detention without charge, but above all, detention without access, can lead to one result, and that is that some policemen feel free to use secret and illegal methods, which could cause the death of some of the persons in detention? That some of these methods will be brutal and inhuman, is certain. Mr John D'Oliviera, in his recent biography VORSTER – THE MAN, writes this sentence of the Prime Minister – "if his policemen had to err, then he would prefer them to err in the direction of excessive zeal in protecting the interests of the State."

What is excessive zeal? Is it the kind of zeal that allows the security police to treat a prisoner in such a way that he dies? That is what many of us fear. And it is a fact that many white South Africans who should know better, believe that if a prisoner dies in detention it is because he has behaved in a manner so intolerable that death was the just consequence of his acts.

Does our Government want to be recognised as part of the world that respects the rule of law? It has no hope of this so long as it retains its present laws of detention in their extreme form. That there are other governments as bad or worse is no argument in our defence. It is a terrible thing when a life of 36 years duration, a life devoted to the pursuit of reason and justice, can be destroyed in one minute by a thug with a gun. But more terrible is the fear that the assassin can sleep well at nights, confident that he will never be discovered. □

2

EARLY DAYS OF '78.

For thirty years now it has become steadily more difficult to wish any opponent of apartheid a "Happy New Year" with any conviction that that is the kind of year he is about to enjoy. With whatever faint hopes for better things one might have embarked on any new year after 1948 it usually only needed the opening of Parliament in January to put an end to them.

This year we did not even have to wait for the opening of Parliament: Before then Dr Rick Turner had already been murdered and the 10,000 residents of the Unibell "squatters' camp" had seen the Government raze their homes to the ground.

The murder of Rick Turner is only the latest and most monstrous of many attacks on critics of apartheid which the police seem unable either to prevent or solve. The destruction of Unibell is only the latest in a long series of attacks on settled communities carried out with deliberate violence, by those with power against those with no power, in the sacred name of apartheid. The only difference in the case of Unibell is that the community seems to have been destroyed in defiance of an undertaking given to the Transkei government that this would only happen once alternative accommodation for the victims had been provided. So much for any ideas any Bantustan leaders might have had that by accepting independence they would gain leverage to improve the lot of the black people they have abandoned in white South Africa. Unibell has shown that they have no such leverage.

Shortly before Parliament opened the Nationalists made two announcements. The first of these was that Dr Connie Mulder had been appointed to succeed Mr M. C. Botha as Minister of Bantu Administration. Is this going to be important? We doubt it. Dr Mulder may not be as reactionary as Dr Treurnicht, who was also tipped for the job, and he may be more "human" and "approachable" than his predecessor ever was, but everything he has said since his new appointment has emphasised that he will do nothing which goes outside the limits of apartheid policy. So what better chance has he of ever satisfying black aspirations than had the disastrous Mr Botha? The second announcement was that PISCOM, the Internal Security Commission, will go into action this year. Consisting of politicians the Commission will meet behind closed doors to 'investigate' people and organisations the Government doesn't like. Under its jaundiced eye the prospects for those who refuse to toe the apartheid line are grim.

Add to these events we have mentioned above the "No-Change" speech made by Mr Vorster at the opening of Parliament and it is obvious that those committed to the white laager offer no more hope for the future in 1978 than they ever have done. From outside the laager, however, there have been one or two encouraging signs. The new alliance between Kwa-Zulu's Inkatha movement and the Coloured Labour and Indian Reform Parties represents a sensible coming together of people pledged to fight apartheid from within its structures. Inkatha itself scored its overwhelming victory in the Kwa-Zulu election on a radical platform calling for the release of all political prisoners, the return of exiles, and the creation of a society in which people of all groups would enjoy equal rights throughout a united South Africa. This is the kind of society we would like to see in South Africa and it is the kind of society the new black leadership of the townships would like to see. What is needed now is an accommodation between all those who hold this vision of the future to work together for it. Does Chief Buthelezi's recent successful visit to Soweto mean that such an accord might now be possible? If it does, then something good may yet come out of 1978. □

3

MONTY NAICKER

Dr Monty Naicker, former president of the Natal and South African Indian Congresses died in Durban in January. We applaud his brave fight against apartheid over many years, a fight he carried on despite gaol, detention and repeated bannings. We will miss him. □

COMMENTARY
by Vortex

UNIBELL

The bulldozer trundles along
and knocks down
the house made of corrugated iron.

The police watch,
their dogs growl.
The squatters weep or sing.

What does it all matter?
It is only people who are suffering.
It is only homes which are collapsing.
It is only love
which is ploughed under
into the fertile earth.

ACADEMIC QUESTION

"At which university
did you gain your experience,
your sense of heaven and hell?
Perhaps at Unilever?"
"No. At Unibell."

RICK TURNER



Rick Turner

Diakonia (Crispin Hemson)

ELEGY

by Vortex

I

Our friend Rick Turner,
sturdy, steady, gritty,
kind,
intelligent,
working for the new society,
banned by the present old one
is dead –
shot in his house in the night:
his lung pierced,
his bloody head drooping
in the arms of his young daughter.

II

What can his friends do now?
How can we face the years without him,
and without so many others dead or fled?
What worth has our work now, or his?
How can one struggle when nothing is achieved,
when brute power seems permanent,
humane effort hopeless and weak?
When all we can offer for our country
is death, despair, defeat?

III

But perhaps this death –
this negation, this blankness, this annihilation –
has some meaning,
is a part of some pattern we can hardly sense.
Rick Turner has moved suddenly
out of flesh and blood –
flesh that is too frail,
blood that is all too fluid –
into a sculptural clarity
beyond our minds' rules.
The fierce bullet,
fired by a man with death in his soul,
has transformed Rick
into one of all mankind's
unyielding jewels. □

Review of Simkins and Clarke:

STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By D. C. Hindson

Unemployment was not much of an election issue, despite its prominence in the news at times over the past year. In fact, lack of interest in unemployment amongst those who do not experience it directly, appears to be the norm in South Africa. Although the country has had chronic unemployment since the Second World War, it is, oddly enough, "labour shortages" that have usually been talked about. Only in the last year or two has unemployment attracted much attention from the press or, for that matter, from academic researchers.

One of the important results of some of this academic research is to show that unemployment is far greater and much more long-standing than had previously been recognised and that it is likely to get worse, not better, in the near future.

The interest in unemployment results from the fact that it has grown sharply since the late 1960s due to worsening economic conditions. Accordnng to Charles Simkins, the level of unemployment in South Africa nearly doubled between 1960 and 1977 and the rate of unemployment increased from 18,3 per cent to 22,4 per cent in the same period.[1] These estimates are admittedly open to fairly wide margins of error due to the limitations inherent in South African labour statistics. But there can be no doubt that they reflect a human plight of massive proportions.

How bad is unemployment in South Africa compared to other countries? It is not possible to make any comparisons with semi-developed or underdeveloped countries due to the absence of statistics. Of the countries which do record unemployment, only a few have estimates which are readily comparable with those that have been made available by researchers in South Africa. Even here it is necessary to be cautious in making comparisons, due to the tentative nature of South African estimates. Table 1 gives comparable rates of unemployment in a number of economically developed countries and Charles Simkins' estimate for South Africa.

TABLE 1 **Unemployment as a Percentage of the Economically Active Labour Force, Various Countries, 1961 and 1976.**[2]

Country	1961	1976
Australia	1,5	4,1
Canada	4,7	6,6
Italy	3,7	3,5
Japan	1,1	1,9
South Africa	19,0	21,4
U.S.A.	3,5	8,0

As the table suggests, few capitalist countries have escaped growing unemployment since the 1960s (exceptions are Denmark and Sweden) but nowhere amongst the major industrial countries for which comparable estimates are available is there a recorded rate of unemployment even half that estimated for South Africa. It must be remembered that these estimates are not indices of the material hardship accompanying unemployment. We can be sure that the hardships are far greater in South Africa, where the bulk of the population has little in the way of social security to fall back on, than in Western Europe and America, where the benefits of social security are widely dispersed.

Charles Simkins and Duncan Clarke's book **Structural Unemployment in Southern Africa** which has just been published by the Natal University Press is important because it presents the results of the most recent and carefully researched study of unemployment in South Africa and it provides an interesting analysis of labour movements in Southern Africa as a whole.

The two papers in the collection, "Measuring and Predicting Unemployment in South Africa, 1960-1977', by Charles Simkins, and 'Foreign Labour Inflows to South Africa and Unemployment in Southern Africa', by Duncan Clarke, are revised selections from the workshop on **Unemployment and Labour Re-allocation** held at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, in March 1977. The papers are complementary: Charles Simkins' paper deals exclusively with unemployment within South Africa while Duncan Clarke's focuses on labour flows between South Africa and neighbouring countries and also presents provisional estimates of unemployment in a number of Southern African countries. I shall discuss Simkins' paper first.

The measurement of employment and unemployment in underdeveloped countries is complicated by the co-existence of and interrelationships between capitalist and non-capitalist sectors. This not only makes data collection difficult in practice but the concepts of 'employment' and 'unemployment' are more ambiguous than in the relatively homogenous economies of the advanced countries. What Simkins has managed to do is construct a coherent index of unemployment for the entire economy, capitalist and non-capitalist, on the basis of fragmentary data and various assumptions about conditions of employment in different parts of the economy. His painstaking research has taken us as far as we can fruitfully go with the existing statistics.

What I will do in this section of the review is discuss what employment means – some of the conceptual difficulties

– and show how, by using information about different aspects of employment, Simkins has constructed an overall index of unemployment.

Let us begin with the concept of an economically active labour force. This is fundamental to the measurement of unemployment. It is usually defined in such a way as to include people in a certain age category, say 16 to 65, who are willing and able to work. The economically active labour force is composed of those who are working, the employed, and those who are not working, but seeking work, the unemployed. An immediate difficulty is that the number of people seeking work may be influenced by the level of unemployment itself. If it becomes very difficult to get a job, people give up trying. They then fall out of the economically active population. Another problem is that some people, although they are unemployed in the sense that they are seeking work, may be prepared to accept only very specific types of work. An extreme example are the 'educated unemployed' in countries such as Sri Lanka. Their expectations effectively exclude them from the economically active labour force. The 'educated unemployed' can afford to be choosy because they are supported by other members of their families who are employed. This alternative is normally strictly limited for the mass of unskilled workers.

The size of the economically active labour force also depends on the levels of income being earned. Usually, within a certain range, the greater the level of income being earned the greater the supply of labour. It has often been argued that the opposite is true for African workers in South Africa but this is no more than a rationalization for paying low wages.

The South African censuses of 1960 and 1970 used a definition of the economically active labour force similar to that given above. With certain modifications this forms the basis of Simkins' estimates of labour supply. The estimates of **unemployed** in the censuses are entirely unreliable so that unemployment figures had to be obtained by subtracting employment from labour supply. Statistics on employment are better than those on unemployment, but by no means comprehensive.

In order to see how Simkins has constructed employment estimates for the different sectors we need to distinguish three aspects of the concept: production, income and recognition.[3] Economists dealing with the problem of 'surplus labour' in underdeveloped countries usually focus on the production aspect. For example in a subsistence sector, such as the Reserves in South Africa, where land and other resources are scarce in relation to the number of people available for work, a family may share its annual work load amongst all its members so that each works only part-time (or full-time, but at a low intensity). If one member leaves the family production unit, the rest may merely increase the number of hours they spend working and thereby make up the lost labour time. This would leave output unchanged. From the individual's point of view participation in family production is employment because he works, contributes to output and earns an income. From the point of view of the family or society he is unemployed (or **under**employed) because his absence has no effect on family output, and actually raises that of society if he enters employment in a sector where productivity is higher.

Essentially, Simkins relies on the production approach to measure employment in the South African Reserves, since estimates of Reserve output are the only reasonably reliable statistics available. Following the Tomlinson Commission Report he assumes that an individual would be prepared to work full-time in agriculture only if he earned at least a minimum level of income, associated with a given level of output. By dividing this level of output into total recorded Reserve output an index or equivalent of full-time employment in the Reserves is obtained. Unemployment is the difference between this equivalent and the economically active population in the Reserves. This method of estimation is probably the best available in the circumstances but it produces results which may considerably under- or over-estimate actual unemployment. The statistics themselves are collected under difficult conditions given the lack of records of output in the Reserves and the variation in agricultural conditions from one area to the next, which makes sample surveys complicated. Another problem is that changes in output from year to year often have little to do with employment and a lot to do with the weather. Finally, there are indications that concentration of land holding or access to land has taken place in the Reserves since 1955 when the Tomlinson Commission produced its report, which may mean that fewer people are producing the same levels of output as before. Less employment may be generated by agricultural production than Simkins' results indicate.

The production approach could also potentially be applied to the so-called 'informal urban sector', that is petty commodity production, small-scale trade, services and some wage-earning activities in the towns. But if little is known about the Reserves, even less is known about the urban informal sector. Theoretically, the industrial censuses include all establishments which operate as a separate entity and for which all elements of basic industrial statistics can be recorded. In practice most informal sector activities are excluded from the censuses due to their small size, lack of records and, in many cases, their illegality.

Studies of the informal sector in other African countries show that it provides employment for large numbers of people and incomes which are often well above those earned in the rural areas.[4] The informal sector in South Africa has been inhibited by influx controls and regulations governing productive activities in the urban areas, but there can be no doubt that many people are engaged in informal productive activities. Simkins' estimates make no allowance for this and insofar as such employment has gone unrecorded, he understates the level of employment.

It should not however be concluded from this that the problem is therefore substantially less serious than his results suggest. The informal sector provides employment in the sense that the individual produces an output and earns an income but typically it involves long hours of intensive work with relatively low output and/or low earnings. This phenomenon has been called the problem of 'the working poor' in an attempt to distinguish it from the case where low incomes are associated not with low productivity but enforced idleness. This leads us to the second aspect of employment which is that it provides an income.

Not all incomes are earned, and not all work yields an income. But few people would refer to work which did not yield an income as employment. Income and employment are closely linked, and this allows the one to be used as a proxy for the other in some circumstances. To use income as an index of employment it is necessary to assume that a certain level of income represents what a full-time worker would normally earn in a given period. This is how Simkins estimates employment amongst 'casual' workers on 'white' farms. The difficulty he found was that the agricultural and population censuses count the total number of 'casual' workers but do not give the number of days they work in a year. In order to calculate a full-time equivalent he takes the wage rate per annum of 'regular' farm workers, who are assumed to work full-time, and divides this into the total annual wages of casual workers. As in the case of the measurement of employment in the Reserves, the results only approximate the actual level of employment.

The third aspect of employment is 'recognition'. Some people who are 'employed' in terms of output and income criteria may nevertheless feel that they are unemployed and register themselves as such. This often happens when a

person's work does not meet up to his or her expectation either in terms of income, output, status or job satisfaction. It is the exact opposite of the case of the 'educated unemployed' mentioned earlier. Most employment statistics, including those of the Department of Statistics in South Africa, are based on recognition. This does not mean that they are therefore necessarily unreliable. In countries where non-wage employment occupies a small fraction of the labour force and where there is general acceptance of a 'normal' working day, statistics collected on the basis of recognition may be reliable. These conditions are in fact approximated in the capitalist sector of the South African economy, but by no means in the non-capitalist sector. Here, non-wage labour still plays the dominant role and the concept of a 'working day' is different from that known in the capitalist sector, varying in intensity and duration according to the seasons. Little is known about the 'working day' in the informal sector. All this means that when a person is asked whether he is employed, his answer may or may not tell one what one wants to know.

A further ambiguity relates to the concept of unemployment when applied specifically to a sector or a geographical area. Simkins attempts to measure the extent of agricultural and non-agricultural unemployment. The difficulty with this is that neither a person's geographical locality or last occupation at the time of the census necessarily determines whether he or she is unemployed 'in' one area or sector. In South Africa the legal restrictions on the movement of African workers between regions and economic sectors means that unemployment may be officially attributed to one or the other but, with the possible exception of workers in 'white' agriculture, local African workers are still sufficiently mobile to make these categories questionable.

Almost exactly the same issue can be raised about foreign African workers. Should South Africa's potential supply of workers from neighbouring countries (those able and willing to work in South Africa – many of whom might have previously been employed here) be included as part of the economically active labour force? Simkins has included only those actually resident in South Africa. This is arguably a necessary expedient but underestimates the true impact of changes in South African economic conditions on a section of the Southern African labour force traditionally dependent on South Africa for employment.

These are some of the major conceptual and practical difficulties confronted by Simkins. There are many more and it is an outstanding achievement that he has been able to construct a single, coherent measure of unemployment from the existing official statistics and to show within limits the range within which actual unemployment is likely to lie.

Now let us turn to the question of the explanation of unemployment. Simkins' paper does not explicitly attempt an explanation of the causes of unemployment in South Africa, but his analysis of changes in the structure of the economically active labour force and in employment patterns provides some interesting clues.

He found that the economically active labour force as a whole grew at a rate of 2,47% per annum between 1960 and 1970. Surprisingly, the share of the white labour force in the total actually grew from 16% in 1960 to 17,8% in 1976, whereas the share of African workers dropped from 73,1% to 71,2%. The reason for this was that the proportion of White males under 20 years fell, while the proportion of African workers under 20 years rose over this period. In addition a greater proportion of white than African women joined the labour force. This pattern is likely to reverse itself as the present African male population under 20 years of age begins to enter the labour force.

Between 1960 and 1969 employment increased at an average rate of 2,34% per annum and between 1969 and 1976 at 2,06% per annum. This is explained in terms of two opposing tendencies: the economy as a whole grew less rapidly thereby reducing the increase in employment and the sectors which grew fastest, manufacturing and government, were relatively labour-using which helped counteract the first tendency. The increase in the economically active labour force and decrease in the rate of employment growth together account for growing unemployment, especially in the second period.

Simkins distinguishes between two forms of this unemployment – cyclical and structural. The first term refers to unemployment which occurs during economic depressions. In these circumstances, although an economy's productive equipment is potentially capable of providing more employment, it is under-utilized due to insufficient demand for commodities. The second term refers to unemployment which persists even when productive capacity is fully utilized, and may be defined as the difference between the trend level of employment and the economically active labour force at any point in time. One of Simkins' most important findings was that cyclical unemployment has been relatively unimportant in comparison with structural unemployment, except since 1974. The point is that a very substantial section of the work force remains unemployed even at the peak of the business cycle. Simkins' estimates only go back as far as 1960, but there is evidence to suggest that structural unemployment has been a chronic feature at least since the war and probably throughout most of this century.[5] It is important that this point should be emphasised, particularly in view of the impression often given in the press and in some academic writing that unemployment is a recent phenomenon. Cyclical unemployment is merely the tip of an iceberg most of which is hidden from sight in the South African Reserves and in the rural areas of neighbouring countries.

I now turn to Duncan Clarke's paper. The basic objective of his paper is to explain the impact of unemployment in South Africa on the use of foreign workers and, indirectly, on levels of unemployment in countries supplying labour to South Africa.

His explanation is framed in terms of two basic concepts – 'labour displacement' and 'marginalization'. Displacement refers to exclusion from employment. It can result from the substitution of capital for labour in productive processes, from depressed economic conditions or the substitution of one part of the labour force for another. Although it can affect all workers, Clarke focusses primarily on the displacement of **foreign workers** in South Africa. He distinguishes two forms: 'relative displacement', which refers to a fall in numbers of foreign workers relative to total employment, and 'absolute displacement', which refers to a fall in the absolute number of foreign workers employed in a sector or in the economy as a whole.

Clarke argues that displacement has occurred virtually throughout this century, in distinct phases. At first the sections of the economically active labour force excluded from employment on the South African mines were women, and men unable to meet the mines' selection criteria. But in recent times even ablebodied workers meeting these criteria have been increasingly excluded; foreign workers more so than locals. Since about 1950 relative displacement of foreign workers began to take place and after 1972, with the increase in unemployment in South Africa, this changed to absolute displacement.

A question that has often been raised about foreign workers in South Africa is why they continue to be employed here at all, despite the existence of surplus labour amongst South African workers. Clarke suggests a number of reasons for this. One is that the Chamber of Mines has followed a

deliberate policy of drawing labour from diverse sources in order to reduce the possibility of workers combining to push for higher wages and to reduce dependence on any one source. A second reason is that the use of foreign workers lowers labour costs by doing away with certain reproduction costs such as unemployment insurance and social security for the workers during retirement. In addition, certain costs such as family housing, schooling and family subsistence are avoided. This applies, if to a somewhat lesser extent, to South African migrant workers as well. Other reasons are the scarce skills supplied by some foreign workers, regional shortages of labour in certain agricultural areas in South Africa and the political leverage which South Africa maintains over countries which are dependent on South Africa for earnings and employment for their workers.

All these factors help explain the continued use of foreign workers and make it unlikely that they will ever be excluded entirely from the South African economy. However, the recent increase in cyclical unemployment within South Africa and the uncertainty about future supplies of foreign workers from countries such as Mozambique, Rhodesia and Malawi have provoked an unprecedented degree of substitution of local for foreign workers, especially on the mines. Clarke estimates that in 1970 the number of employed foreign African male workers in South Africa was 443 000 or 15,3% of permanent ('non-casual') employment in the country. By early 1977 the number had fallen to 290 000 and the rate to 8,7%.

Displacement of foreign workers has been advocated by some writers as a means of coping with local unemployment.[6] Indeed, one writer, P. J. van der Merwe, goes as far as to suggest that such a measure should be applied to certain categories of local workers. In his view, Africans with residential rights in the white urban areas should be given priority over those from the Reserves.[7] In fact this view merely endorses existing government policy. Not only are workers with urban rights favoured in relation to migrant or contract workers from the rural areas but the minister is empowered to close off a rural district to all recruitment or restrict recruitment to particular categories of work – mining or agriculture for example – or to particular employment regions. This means that a district may be effectively cut off from employment opportunities outside its own bounds. There is evidence to show that these measures have already been implemented in some areas.[8] Very recently legislation has been passed which makes it possible to evict from urban areas even those with rights of residence, if they become unemployed.

Academic writers advocating such measures, whether applied to local or foreign workers, contribute directly to the ideology which presents African employment and residence in parts of the country called 'white' as a privilege which can be withdrawn when a worker becomes unemployed or too old or sick to continue working for his employer.

A distinctive contribution of Clarke's paper is that it shows that the problem of unemployment cannot be meaningfully understood within the context of the South African economy alone. (Nor can the problem correctly be seen as one of particular sectors or regions within South Africa). The effects of capitalist production based within the major industrial centres of South Africa have permeated the entire sub-continent for over a century, producing employment but also displacement and marginalization of sections of the population. The process of marginalization has been speeded up since the early 1970s and its impact has been greater on foreign than local workers due both to deliberate policy on the part of the Chamber of Mines and to stricter enforcement of laws relating to the movement, employment and residence of foreign workers in South Africa. Removal of these workers reduces the impact of cyclical unemployment in South Africa but increases it in neighbouring countries.

Clarke estimates that between 1969 and 1976 countries supplying South Africa with labour have experienced rates of growth of employment which are less than the growth in prospective new entrants to their labour markets. To these numbers must be added workers displaced directly from employment within South Africa, who make up some 35-37% of the growth of the wage labour force in the supplier states. In other words, structural dependence on South Africa has made these countries doubly vulnerable to economic depressions.

What conclusions can be drawn from these papers? First, unemployment is not the recent phenomenon it is sometimes made out to be. Substantial and possibly growing structural unemployment is a chronic feature of South and Southern African experience. The indications are that it is likely to get worse in the foreseeable future.

Secondly, employment and unemployment take different forms. We know least about conditions of employment in the subsistence sector and about structural unemployment. This calls for detailed research into the structure and dynamics of the subsistence sector and its relation to the capitalist sector. There is also an urgent need for theoretical work to explain the process of capital accumulation and its relation to both cyclical and structural unemployment in its historical context.

Finally, Simkins and Clarke's book raises a fundamental question. Is unemployment an inherent result of the existing political and economic systems of Southern Africa? It is important how this question is answered because this determines what strategies are appropriate, whether radical or reformist, in dealing with this pernicious feature of life in Southern Africa. □

FOOTNOTES

1. C. E. W. Simkins and D. G. Clarke, **Structural Unemployment in Southern Africa**, Pietermaritzburg, Natal University Press, 1978, table 20.
2. **Sources:** (i) United Nations, **Statistical Yearbook, 1970**, New York, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971, table 22.

   (ii) International Labour Office, **Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1976**, Geneva, ILO, 1971, table 22.

   (iii) C. E. W. Simkins and D. G. Clarke, **op. cit.**, table 20.

   Notes: The estimates of unemployment in the countries other than South Africa are based on sample surveys of each country's active labour force. The 'unemployed' include persons 14-16 years and above in age who had not been working and were looking for work during the week of the survey. Given the widespread acceptance of a standard working day in these countries (with the possible exception of Italy which has a large subsistence sector) these estimates correspond closely to Simkins' concept of 'man-years'.
3. A. K. Sen, **Employment, Technology and Development**, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975.
4. International Labour Office, **Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya**, Geneva, ILO, 1972.
5. J. B. Knight, 'Labour Supply in the South African Economy and its Implications for Agriculture', **Saldru Farm Labour Conference**, University of Cape Town, Saldru, September 1976.
6. P. J. van der Merwe, 'Black Employment Problems in South Africa, **Workshop on Unemployment and Labour Re-allocation**, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Development Studies Research Group, March 1977; J. B. Knight, **op. cit.**
7. P. J. van der Merwe, **op cit.**, pp. 28-29.
8. S. Duncan, 'The Central Institutions of South African Labour Exploitation', **N.U.S.A.S. Labour Week**, 23rd to 27th May 1977, Johannesburg, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS— critic, poet, author — accepts the Pringle award

Introduction: Thomas Pringle and the Pringle Award

by Marie Dyer.

Early in 1824 Thomas Pringle, emigrant Scottish poet and journalist, founded the first magazine to appear in the Cape Colony: **The South African Journal,** a monthly periodical issued alternately in English and Dutch. In the same year he was appointed co-editor with his friend, James Fairbairn, another Scottish emigrant, of a weekly newspaper, the **South African Commercial Advertiser,** owned by a third recent arrival in the colony, the printer George Greig.

The Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, was autocratic by temperament and despotic by political conviction. The editorial policy of the **Commercial Advertiser** was bold — in its first 17 numbers it published several political articles in support of constitutional freedoms and freedom of the press, as well as reports of libel actions involving colonial officials and even the Governor himself. In May 1824 the Governor, through an official called the Fiscal, demanded a proof copy of no. 18 for scrutiny before it was distributed. The copy was submitted; no changes were made; but the number when issued contained a postscript announcing that the paper was to be suspended. Fairbairn and Pringle had resigned as editors, refusing, in Pringle's words, to "compromise (their) birthright as British subjects by editing any publication under censorship". Greig announced his intention to publish the **Facts connected with the stoppage of the press and the censorship of the Fiscal.** The Fiscal entered the printing-house with a warrant to seal the presses before the pamphlet could be printed; but the type was already set up, and Greig and his staff worked all night printing individual copies by hand. The following morning the **Facts** were distributed free to the public, mainly by being thrown in bundles from the upper-storey windows of the printing-house. According to Pringle "the greatest consternation and excitement prevailed" and "a petition to the King-in-Council for a free press was signed by a large proportion of the English merchants."

A week later Pringle was summoned to the Fiscal's office and informed that several articles in the second number of his other periodical, the **South African Journal** had been offensive — particularly a critical account by Pringle himself of the condition of the 1820 settlers and the conduct of the emigration scheme. The Fiscal demanded a guarantee that no future articles would be obnoxious. Pringle responded by announcing his intention to withdraw the journal from publication, explaining that he was incapable of determining whether any article was offensive or obnoxious, or not.

Somerset, whose dictatorial attitudes were under increasing pressure from the Government in England, attempted in a "stormy interview" to bully or cajole Pringle into continuing with the journal, asserting also that Pringle's attitudes and his signature of the petition were incompatible with his position as a Civil Servant (he was a sub-librarian in the Public Library). Pringle immediately resigned his post.

His income and prospects thus completely sacrificed, Pringle who was a cripple decided to return to England He became the active and energetic secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society; and was still holding this post when the Abolition Bill was passed in 1833.

Somerset returned to England in 1826, and in the same year Greig and Fairbairn re-established the **Commercial Advertiser.** Their (less dramatic) efforts towards a free press continued until 1829, when the **Ordinance granting Freedom of the Press to the Cape Colony was passed.**

Unaware, perhaps, of the lasting significance of his political gestures, Pringle hoped to achieve some fame as a poet (and in fact Coleridge declared that his poem **Afar in the Desert** was "among the three most perfect lyric poems in our language".) But today his most highly valued literary word is probably his vivid and graphic autobiographical **Narrative of a Residence in South Africa.**

In commemoration of Pringle's achievements and his contributions to South African society, the English Academy presents an annual Pringle Award for creative writing published in South African periodicals and journals. In 1977 the award was shared by Lionel Abrahams and Sidney Sipho Sepamla, for their poems in **Contrast, New Classic,** and **Donga.** The speech made by Lionel Abrahams in acceptance of the award, follows.

Lionel Abrahams speaks:

I am more than honoured, more than grateful to have this Pringle Award. I am moved at receiving from a body like the English Academy a signal of encouragement and friendliness at a time when the signals from the country as a whole tend to fill one with confusion, disgust and dismay.

We seem to be in the heyday of a spirit of power-lust that makes a god of security, and sacrifices a thousand joys and freedoms and truths to that god – to say nothing of lives.

Censorship, which particularly concerns us here, is an expression of that same spirit – though I am convinced that censorship, as applied against South Africa's literary authors at the very least, has no genuine connection with security, or with moral standards.

It has to do with a natural enmity between the creative writer and that lust for power. The bully has constantly to prove his power by pushing people around, and the writer makes a convenient target. Moreover, the writer's creative truthfulness makes it impossible for him to fall in with the fiction about security. He sees no point in giving up a joy here, a freedom there, a truth anywhere, in the futile hope that death can be bought off or bought over. He insists on knowing and living the whole of life to the limit of possibility.

Many of my friends have left South Africa. Others are talking of doing so. As for myself, I acknowledge that there is always the possibility of the unimaginable fright or hurt that could turn me inside-out and make me need to leave. But my intention is to stay. I feel that this is my place. My work relates to this place. I tell myself that even if privilege and comfort and prosperity and safety were taken away, I would still find my meaning in this place. To be forced to leave would be a moral disaster for me.

The award which the English Academy has bestowed on me is a sign of your recognition which will help me to hold on to my resolve to stay where my life has meaning. □

THE DARK WOOD

by Peter Wilhelm; Ravan Press 1977.

Reviewed by Jill Arnott

Dominating the plot of Peter Wilhelm's **The Dark Wood,** are the differing choices and destinies of two brothers; David and Jan van Vlaams: sons of a wealthy, conservative Johannesburg businessman who is deeply concerned with the protection and preservation of what he sees as an embattled Afrikaans tradition and heritage. It is in relation to their father's society, its values, policies, and customs, that the brothers must mould their lives; giving their loyalty to, or withholding it from, the system he represents. The nature of this society is such that acceptance or rejection of its primary values must to some extent dictate the shape of their respective futures, for it is a society dedicated to the protection of its own, and the elimination of those who threaten its structure and security.

To this extent, then, the concerns of the book are political, but only on a relatively superficial level. "The Exorcism", the Theodore Roethke poem from which Mr Wilhelm draws his title, is about identity and the nature of selfhood; and it is the individual personalities of Jan and David, their needs and weaknesses, rather than any external circumstances or events, which finally influence their separate decisions. David, the elder, despite the advantages of an overseas education, remains true to the tradition which has the most to offer him personally: the South African way of life as exemplified by the upper echelons of Afrikaans-speaking, Johannesburg-northern-suburbs society. He does try to rationalise his need for a structured, stable, static environment into political terms: "We're a young country still . . . we can't afford liberalisation at this stage . . .", but these naïve over-simplifications cannot deceive even himself. His real nature, his need to be both dominated and protected, is revealed by his grateful submission to his power-hungry stepmother. David is less a patriot than a man with a highly developed sense of self-preservation, and it is this instinct that dominates even his love-life. He chooses his woman, Marika Marais, not only because she is the daughter of a useful business contact, but also because she is traditional White-South-African womanhood incarnate: "a product of decency and sun, of Cape rectitude and racial purity". Mr Wilhelm's satire is here, as elsewhere, a little heavy-handed; but the point he makes, and the inescapable parallel with Hitler's ideal of Aryan maidenhood, is certainly relevant.

With David exposed as spineless, self-seeking, and wilfully blind, it might be expected that his sibling, Jan, representative of the liberal-thinking counter-culture, would emerge as a more attractive personality. But if anything Jan strikes the unbiased reader as even less sympathetic: his progressive ideals marred by personal bitterness and a childish desire to revenge himself on a society in which he has failed to realise himself. His desire for revolution is less a commitment to freedom than a morbid fascination with violence: "In his mind he had stripped the guests,

but not for orgy. He had made streaks of dark blood run down their white skins". The "whiteness" here is not of any social relevance, but serves as a foil for the exciting darkness of blood. Like David, Jan uses political phrases to justify his attitudes, but again these are just a cover for more personal needs and motivations. Seeking integration into the anti-establishment culture he has opted for, Jan gets involved with a black woman – an affair which culminates in a disastrous climax; disastrous rather than tragic, because the affair is based neither on love nor on deeply felt ideals, but upon Jan's desire for integration and acceptance in the black community. The woman, Crystal, is for him "the adjunct to a pose".

Significantly, both men achieve their only moments of true integration, of real insight into the cultures with which they have chosen to identify, when they cease to intellectualise their attitudes and respond instinctively and sensually to the essentials of that culture. David, on the Marais' estate, finds that closeness to the land itself awakens in him an awareness of the vital rhythms of an agricultural, rather than a political tradition, and he finds himself meshing with those rhythms. A similar "meshing" takes place between Jan and a Nigerian drummer at a Swazi pop-festival, and this primitive but valid contact achieves what Jan's forced identification with black attitudes and problems never could.

Apart from these brief moments, **The Dark Wood** paints a depressing picture of the choices open in white South Africa today; and the gloom is deepened by the author's apparent lack of affection for any of his characters.

However, the final effect of the whole book is no more tragic than the fate of Jan; partly because the characters are occasionally in danger of becoming caricatures, and partly because there are moments and phrases in the novel which are trapped uneasily between the dramatic and the absurd. Mr Wilhelm's Customs officials "snarl like dogs", and David, hearing from Marika of a previous affair, is haunted by an image of her "as slimy as truth".

Peculiar as the latter phrase is, it is not inappropriate in Mr Wilhelm's work: he does seem to see any truth in a South African context as inherently "slimy". The moments of reckoning for both brothers are ones of degradation, not achievement: Jan's ignominious and futile death, and David's equally ignominious marriage to a girl he has never really loved.

The ending of the book, cast in the form of Jan's dying dream or hallucination, seems to be an attempt at resolving some of the issues raised. The central figure, whether old man, primitive god, or spirit of Africa, seems to represent the older, stronger, and more mysterious African culture which provides both touchstone and perspective for the futile culture-clash which has destroyed both brothers. This is never made explicit, however, and the whole scene seems too nebulous and surreal to provide a satisfactory solution to any of the very real problems that Mr Wilhelm has thrown up. The old man may contain within himself both the corruption and the wholesome energy of Africa (the "rotten meat" and the "milk and honey") but these are not so easily reconciled in present-day society. □

SOWETO
A People's Response

A survey conducted and published by the Institute for Black Research, Durban.

Introduction by Peter Brown

Two weeks after the first outbreak of violence in Soweto in June, 1976, a group of black students in Durban met to discuss these events. They drew up a questionnaire, submitted it to 500 people of all races in Durban. The results were not written up for more than a year because of the banning of leading members of the Institute for Black Research, the organisation behind the survey. The report has, however now appeared. It has lost nothing of its value through this delay. It reflects attitudes which every South African should be made aware of and for this reason, in spite of the fact that the report has been fairly widely reported on in Natal, we quote extensively from it in this issue of REALITY, so that our readers elsewhere know something of the reactions of people in a City remote from those events of June 16th. It is clear that while Durban was virtually untouched by the violence of those days, their impact on its people was profound. Some of the more interesting and important points to emerge from the report were, I thought, these:

> Blacks saw the events of Soweto and after in political terms, Whites as an outbreak of lawlessness;
> Fear of the police amongst blacks is pervasive;
> All groups saw the enforcement of Afrikaans as the trigger to violence – so much for Dr Treurnicht's "master-mind" behind it all!;
> Africans are as afraid of a violent solution to South African problems as are the members of any other group. What is more, 80% of Africans who rejected violence in **all** circumstances, had little or no formal education, thus exposing another white-propagated myth, that of the "uneducated savage";
> In spite of this fear of violence a growing number of Africans now see an armed struggle as the only way to change and see that the consequence of such change will be that white domination is succeeded by African domination or an Africanist government.

Most interesting of all is the number of black people who would still prefer to see some kind of non-racial government succeed apartheid. The report should be compulsory reading for all Cabinet Ministers. They would learn from it that they still have time, though not much, to change, before committing suicide. Here are some quotations from the report.

The group administered its questionnaire to 500 Durbanites in an attempt to gain some insight into (1) how they saw the events, (2) what influenced their conceptions, (3) what effects they thought the events would have on government policy and (4) how they visualized change.

"The questionnaire proved both provocative and intimidating. Far more people refused to be interviewed than consented to do so. The result was that a research designed to be random became skewed in the direction of the youthful and less vulnerable section of the population – the more educated, more politicized and the less impoverished."

"Interviewers reported a pall of police fear among Africans and Indians in particular and made such observations as 'People refused to be interviewed saying that they did not wish to become involved'; 'People questioned the motive of the survey and said that if they answered the questions they would get into trouble with the police'; 'Remarks such as "I'll become politically involved", "I'll be put in jail" ' were heard repeatedly."

"Indian women in Grey Street simply put off the interviewers by declaring that they had no education and they knew nothing about the 'riots'."

"Most black respondents, (69% Coloured, 64% African, and 54% Indian) saw the disturbance in political terms – as a rebellion, revolution, mass protest, mass demonstration, boycott and strike. Fifty seven per cent of the whites described it more in terms of violence and lawlessness. In contrast to the other groups, a large proportion of Africans described it as a strike, which is not surprising since in the absence of trade union rights African labour disputes are often subdued through police force. Far more (30% each of African and White, 29% Indian, 28% Coloured) saw it as a powerful and significant protest, rather than as an unlawful act, or a protest that had got out of hand. No African saw it as unjustifiable mass violence, though 4% of Indians and Coloureds, and 11% of Whites saw it in this light."

"THE TARGETS

Most respondents saw whites as the target of black violence. No African saw it as directed against other blacks, though 7% of Indians, 8% of Whites and 3% of Coloureds saw it as including Coloureds and Indians. A very small proportion of Africans, (8%), saw it as directed against institutions rather than against persons. By contrast, 34% of the Coloured, 33% of the White and 31% of the Indian respondents saw institutions as the target of black violence."

"THE POLICE

The overwhelming African response was that the police acted brutally or were trigger happy (76%). Fifty per cent of the Coloureds, 34 per cent of the Indians and 36 per cent of the whites shared this opinion. The majority of whites and Indians (52%) saw the police as having done either a remarkable job, or their duty. By contrast only 10 per cent of the Africans and 15 per cent of the Coloureds saw the police in such positive terms."

"THE ISSUE

All respondents saw the enforcement of Afrikaans on Soweto school children as the fundamental issue in the disturbance. Whites and Coloureds placed greater emphasis on the refusal of the authorities to negotiate with the children. More Africans (13%) saw the killing of the children as the causal factor in itself."

" CONTRIBUTARY FACTORS

African respondents discounted the action of external factors, including Black Power, in staging the disturbance. They saw it as spontaneous and unplanned, recognizing the stated reasons and the surrounding circumstances as explosive in themselves to trigger off the mass violence.

Indians and Coloureds were more inclined to see other causal factors – Indians more so than Coloureds. Eight per cent of Indians and Coloureds admitted to the work of unknown agitators, 7 and 3% respectively saw the hand of some underground movement and 10% of Indians attributed it to Black Power. But the majority saw it as did the Africans – as spontaneous and unplanned."

"The white respondents tended to see it more as a planned affair, which had exploited the issue of Afrikaans to stage an international scandal."

"THE SCENARIO

The most common sequence agreed upon was that the children resented the imposition of Afrikaans, they organized a mass demonstration, the police tried to disperse it and began shooting, thereby wounding and even killing some children. The children retaliated by throwing stones – the police lost control and other unruly elements exploited the situation and escalated it into a general riot on the second day. Whereas the Africans saw the killing of the children as the precipitating factor, the Indians and Coloureds emphasized the enforcing of Afrikaans, and the whites, the refusal of the authorities to listen to the children."

"FEAR

Far more Indians and Coloureds expressed themselves as unafraid or unmoved by the disturbance, 53 and 52% respectively, than Africans and whites, 37 and 40% respectively. Just under a half of the respondents, 47% white, 45% Indian, 44% African and 41% Coloured admitted to being afraid during the disturbance."

"CHANGE – POSSIBILITY, HOW AND WHAT FORM

Effective Means of Change

Indians placed slightly greater emphasis on the use of such non-violent pressure tactics, as protests and strikes, particularly strikes, than did the other groups who emphasized the use of negotiation. Coloureds and Africans preferred direct negotiation with the Prime Minister and his cabinet, to working through the C.R.C. or the Homeland Governments. Indians saw the S.A.I.C. as more effective than direct negotiation. Only 1% of the Indians against 6% of the Africans, 3% of the Coloureds and 9% of the whites saw the usefulness of lobbying through members of Parliament."

"Africans placed greater importance on an armed struggle to effect change than did the other groups – 19%, Indians 12%, Coloureds 17%, white. However more of the groups saw armed struggle as the most effective means for change."

Probable Means of Change

A large proportion of the respondents – (43% African, 21% Indian, 9% Coloured and 25% white) declined to answer how they thought change would come to South Africa. Of those who responded, the largest proportion in each group predicted that change would follow a violence worse than that of Soweto and that would bring down the Government. It is highly probable that those who declined to respond also saw great violence ahead."

"More Indians and whites – 19% saw peaceful change than Africans and Coloureds – 13 and 10% respectively."

"More Indians and Coloureds, 15 and 25% respectively, (than did Africans and whites, 6 and 11% respectively,) saw the Nationalist Government finally abandoning apartheid and negotiating with blacks."

"No Africans saw an introductory stage of Prog./Ref. rule. Negligible percentages of the others – 6% Indian and Coloured, 4% of the whites – saw this as a possibility. Slightly more Africans and Indians – 14%, saw change through foreign intervention than Coloureds and whites – 11 and 4% respectively. Foreign intervention is more of a black than white reality. Indians see America as having the most powerful influence, Africans and Coloureds the Russians."

"FUTURE GOVERNMENT

Respondents were asked to state what Government they saw in power and what Government they wanted to see

in power in the next ten years. There was some relationship between what they saw and what they wished to see."

"While more Africans saw and wished a black or Africanist Government in power – 44 and 46% respectively, a significant proportion saw and wished (20 and 31% respectively), a non-racial, multi-racial federal, socialist or communist Government in power."

"Three whites and one Indian saw a Buthelezi headed government; 3% of the Coloureds and Africans and 2% of the Indians saw a government headed by Mandela and as many Blacks saw one with Sobukwe at the head."

"More whites – 6%, than blacks – Africans 3%, Indians 2%, and Coloureds 1%, saw military rule in the next ten years."

"Generally thus, the majority of Africans opted for an African or Africanist government in the next ten years and saw such a government in power in that time. They were far less inclined to name the first head of a Black South African government. Whites desired and saw a white government in power in the next ten years. Slightly more desired to see the Prog./Ref. in power (16%) than the Nats. (13%) but considerably more (36%) saw the Nats. in power than the Prog./Ref. (7%)."

"Indians and Coloureds by contrast, wished above all for a multi-racial or non-racial democracy, but were pessimistic about realizing it in the next decade."

"THE INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON ATTITUDES

The study shows that there is no significant relation between education and attitudinal response, except in one respect. Eighty per cent of the Africans who rejected the use of violence in all circumstances had little or no formal education. Among non-Africans, the 'pacifists' were well educated." □

THESE ARE THE LAST DAYS

Extracts from an address delivered in Pietermaritzburg at a meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations.

by Dr Manas Buthelezi

These two last years have made us witnesses of the great dramatic exercises marking the passing of the old order, and the pangs and agonies preceding the birth of the new. There is, however, no guarantee that we shall all live to see the dawn of the new day. Under the firm conviction that the South Africa that lies ahead of us cannot afford to be the same as the old, I am addressing you tonight on the theme "These are the Last Days".

I am saying to you these are the last days for old attitudes.' Attempts to create better race relations have been made by many generations of South Africans since 1662 when South Africa for the first time became a multi-racial society. After the banning of the Christian Institute, the Institute of Race Relations is now about the only remaining organisation of its kind and stature. One may ask "Does this mark the beginning of failure to bring about change in South Africa on the level of race relations and attitudes?" Some articulate voices have questioned the wisdom of putting all the efforts into improving race relations on the ground that the deterioration of race relations is only a symptom of the basic problem which is the political setting that divides and polarizes racial groups. According to this point of view, the problem is not just that we should be nice to one another, but that we should remove what polarizes in the first place. Of course, having said this, we must admit that it is important to keep bridges standing. It is important lest people forget, that once upon a time it was possible for blacks and whites to be together without all these floods of laws. This reminds me of what somebody said last year. It was the Reformation Day, and many congregations, black and white, were together. Then somebody stood up, a white farmer, and said "We must really thank the Government that it is now possible for us to have this kind of service". This shows how people can forget quickly.

In times of transition, while it is difficult to tell what is coming and going, what is passing or permanent, it is necessary to raise these questions. As a Minister of the Church, I am among the first to admit that it is a horrifying spectre to imagine life in South Africa without any form of organised contact between the various racial groups. Maybe some in our society, including politicians, do not have a full impression of what it would mean when groups in South Africa are strangers to one another, to a greater extent than now. How horrifying, how dreadful, and what kind of consequences this will entail.

The more I study the Christian faith, the more I am overwhelmed by its relevance and the far reachng possibilities in the application of its teachings to our contemporary life situation. These are the last days of the old racial attitudes that have come to characterise the South African way of life. What we see happening around us, even that aspect of it which is frightening, is nothing but the manifestation of the death throes of a way of thinking based on racial paternalism and feelings of racial superiority. It is true that those who have laboured most against these attitudes have had their wings clipped. I am persuaded to say that during these last days the occasion will arise when South Africa will openly and officially thank God for having demonstrated through Beyers Naude and those whites whom he represents, that South Africa is not without its built-in redemptive forces. The contribution of the Institute of Race Relations belongs to the same class of constructive effort.

Secondly, these are the last days to old structures. It is a

universally accepted principle that no system of government, regardless of the legal trappings it may have, can survive if it is not representative and does not capture the aspirations of the people whom it governs. No social, economic or political system devised in our country thus far, meets the demands of this basic principal. You know that what is not acceptable now, as apartheid, will be even more unacceptable in years to come. I do not need to get a certificate of being a Prophet to convince you that this is true. As we move on in our history, apartheid and separate development will become more and more distasteful. There is no evidence that the policy of separate development will all of a sudden become popular or ingratiating in the manner in which it is being carried out, and enforced upon black people. The present political structures are not adequate, as you know, as vehicles of goodwill between the various racial groups. It has often been said that there is a lot of goodwill among the people of South Africa, black and white, but I dare to say that what we lack are the structures for communicating this goodwill. You cannot have goodwill where people cannot meet together and express that goodwill, just as you cannot have love when two lovers cannot meet and be together.

The political structures in our country have a polarizing effect, that is why they are inadequate for transmitting whatever goodwill there is. Over the years, it has appeared as if it is impossible to implement the policy with any measure of humaneness. Mass removals of people, separation of husbands from wives under migrant labour, the hardships of bannings, and detentions, are just a few examples demonstrating that we are faced with a policy that can only be implemented in an unpleasant manner. Great empires of the past, like the Roman, the British and others, were able to last for a considerable length of time, because they had the capacity for absorbing and ingratiating their conquered subjects into the system of the conquering race. In the short term at least, they succeeded in creating an impression that it was possible for a loyal subject to share in common with the conqueror some of the cherished fundamental rights. That is why Paul was so proud of his Roman citizenship and referred to himself "As a Jew, a Tarsian from Silicia and a citizen of no mean city". When he was tortured under interrogation he invoked his Roman citizenship. He said "Can you legally flog a man who is a Roman citizen?" As you know from the Bible, this was not without effect, since we are told that the Commandant himself was alarmed when he realised that Paul was a Roman citizen, and that he had put him in irons.

You will remember that there was once upon a time "exempted 'natives'" under the British system. Of course, this was bad, but it does serve to illustrate that the old empires tried at least to create an impression that they were catering for the interest of their subjects.

But the present empire of separate development does not belong to that category. We are roughly twenty years away from the 21st Century. The whole world is moving towards the creating of democratic institutions. Even the worst of nations at least pays lip-service to democratic processes. I cannot think of any Western oriented country, apart from our own, which unashamedly cherishes and espouses a political theory which the rest of humanity finds to be patently undemocratic in spirit and letter. I cannot see how social, economic and political structures based on the theory of the separation of races which have had a common history can survive alongside the Christian principle of reconciliation according to which it is possible for even enemies to become friends. I cannot see how a country can claim to create lasting political structures for a future if, in so doing, Christian love and fellowship among the citizens is prevented from taking its course and moving people where they will. How can the Christian faith survive simultaneously with unChristian political structures? Apart from other considerations, this fact alone convinces me that any structuring of our political and social life that is based on separating rather than reconciling those who feel estranged to each other, is doomed to fail.

The apartheid ship is bound to sink because it has very big holes, and anyone who wants to save his life should get out of the ship before it sinks. Let me demonstrate my point on the basis of the very Christian heritage South Africa claims for itself. From the Bible we are taught that when sin caused estrangement between God and man, God did not try to resolve the tension by means of separate development. In other words, God did not solve the problem by dividing the universe into his own and into that of sinful man. God did not see separate development as being in the interests of his survival as a holy God against sinful man who was out to dethrone him. These days we hear a lot about group survival. Everything is being said in the interests of saving a particular group, but how do you cater for group survival? Let us look at what God did when he tried to work in the interests of his own survival as a holy God vis a vis sinful man. He did not invent separate development. On the other hand, for his own survival as God, as well as for the survival of sinful man, God devised the plan of forgiveness and reconciliation in Christ. In other words, the solution was in coming together, in bringing together those who were estranged. It was in finding mutual interest that the very survival of the two parties was catered for. The solution was in bringing God and man even closer together. There must be something wrong in the notion of survival for any racial group in South Africa if that should necessarily lead to the imposition of separation and further alienation of all the racial groups in South Africa. It is for this reason that I am saying that the apartheid ship is bound to sink, since it runs contrary to what God himself did when he was faced with the same situation. For separate development is out of harmony with the method of resolving issues which God has taught us and shown us, in Jesus Christ.

Thirdly, these are the last days of the old generation. When I say that these are the last days of the old generation of South Africans, I am not necessarily thinking in terms of age in the sense of the number of years. In all historical epochs there are some who are born too late in the sense that in their thinking they belong to the past era, and also there are others who are born too early because they are far ahead of their time. With this I am trying to demonstrate that when I am saying that these are the last days of the old generation, I am not thinking in terms of years. It is natural that those who no longer have strength to adjust to a fast changing world, should use up whatever energy they still have in defending the past as well as its values. They feel an obligation to resist change because it will introduce them to a new set of circumstances to which they may be unable to adjust.

It is very regrettable that the concerns of white youth have not made a breakthrough in white politics. We have all heard people saying that University students, while they are still in the University are very progressive in their views, but as soon as they leave University they vote differently. It is for this reason that I am saying that they have failed to create an impact in white politics. In black politics young people are today a force to contend with. I believe that this is proper. Those who will lead in the future must have some say in the shaping of that future. In spite of their idealism, white youths have so far not succeeded in selecting and articulating issues which capture the imagination of the white community. Black youth, on the other hand, have been very successful in doing just this. Even though adults do not agree with all aspects of their strategy, they definitely support them in their objectives. Had this not been the case in Soweto and other places, the black youth would not have created the kind of political impact which they have. It is simply because they were shrewd enough to select issues which captured the imagination of their parents. One of the explanations for the current

political deadlock in South Africa, is that white politics is dominated by the values and ideals of the past in a situation where black youth, concerned about their future and destiny, have become a resourceful and innovative political group in South Africa. There is, thus, a wide communication gap between old white politicans who are jealous to nurse and protect the values of the past which seem threatened, and the black youth who are concerned about what the future has in store for them. Had the white youth been able to play a role similar to the one played by the black youth the present political situation would not be as frightening as it is. There is at the moment a conflict of interest. Those who are in power are not the group who will have power in the future. On the other hand, there are the black youth who are concerned about their future. There is a deadlock because there is no communication. We know that after the members of the older generation have left the political scene, it is present day young people, black and white who will have to live together. White youth may not be in power today, but it is a fact that they will live side by side with the youth of Soweto and other places. It is in their interest that they now create good neighbours for the future. A wise man always tries to cultivate good neighbours. We have been told and given advice to try and understand the thinking of white people. It has been said that whites are the minority – if you could place yourself in their boots, don't you realise that you would also have the same fears that white people have? And that is why, seeing that they are in power, they try as much as possible to claim power. My response to that type of reasoning is that if you belong to a minority, fear in itself will not solve your problem. It will only serve to complicate it. It will frustrate you and you cannot think clearly because you are afraid. Fear is a negative reaction in itself; it does not get you out of the ditch. You must follow a positive way. The positive way is for the minority group to make friends with the majority. If you cannot win them, join them. I do not know any other way except that.

If you begin to analyse the situation closely, you will discover that essentially it is not a question of a polarisation between white interests and black interests, even though there is an element of this, but basically it is a polarisation between a concern for perpetuating the past and a concern for shaping a new future. Unfortunately, those who are concerned with the past will not lead in the future, and that is why they are reckless. They are insensitive towards the concern of those who will live in the future. It was ordained by God that the past will give place to the future at some point in the medium of the present. No matter how those who see themselves as guardians of past values feel disgusted about the new development of the future, they cannot stop the future from becoming the future. No one has power to prevent the whole generation of the future from articulating and realising its aspirations. Old people cannot force those of the younger generation to love and worship the past. All they can do is to make them respect it by showing them that it is an asset rather than an obstacle to the unfolding of the future. There is something wrong in a situation where concern for the values of the past is expressed in such a way that young people are prevented from organising themselves and giving expression to those qualities of leadership which shall be an asset for the future. It is definitely not in the interest of the country to prevent black young people from openly organising themselves and canvassing their ideas about the future they would like to have.

We all know that change in South Africa is inevitable. We cannot explain how it will take place, all we are sure of is that it will come about. All we are sure of is that there will come a time when justice will prevail over injustice, when liberation will prevail over bondage. We are certain of this because God created us all and God created this country. For that reason, it is important to have available contributions from the whole spectrum of the leadership resources in our country. No black leader can claim that he has qualities which are adequate for articulating all the black aspirations. For we heed them all. With all the bannings of black organisations and the detentions of articulate leaders, the black community has been severely immobilised. (At least for the moment.) Dialogue between black and white is impossible without a free flow of ideas from both sides, and without dialogue, racial fellowship is impossible. Where there is no fellowship, there is polarization, and where there is polarization, there is conflict. Is that what we want? It is important that we should not allow the inevitable calls of history to overtake us at a time when there is no dialogue and no meaningful communication between the various racial groups. We all have to make a contribution in bringing about desirable change rather than by being overtaken by history while resisting change. □

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

Gloom over findings . . . expressions on the faces of people leaving the Old Synagogue, Pretoria, told their own tale after people heard the Biko inquest findings.

Photo: Peter Magubane

LIMEHILL REVISITED

Selections and Comment

by Peter Brown

One of the last things Cosmas Desmond did before his recent departure from South Africa was publish the results of a survey into the present situation at Limehill. The survey *(Limehill Revisited – A case Study of the Longer-term Effects of African Resettlement)* was carried out under the auspices of the Development Studies Research Group of the University of Natal. It presents a picture of Limehill ten years after the first removals to that place occurred, an event which, through the efforts at that time of Mr Desmond and others, was widely publicised, in all its grim detail, in South Africa, and further.

The following extracts from Mr Desmond's report show that life at Limehill in 1978 is in few respects less grim than it was ten years ago and in some respects more grim. The difference is that a situation which in 1968 might have seemed to be only a passing catastrophe, to be followed by better days, has now clearly become permanent. For the African people whom apartheid moved to Limehill the future promises a life whose grimness will never end.

These extracts from the study are supported by a large number of tables giving details of the responses to the questionnaire on which Mr Desmond's report is based, and which the quotations we have chosen below summarise.

"The Survey

Limehill was chosen as the subject of this study because the history of the settlement and the background of the people involved were well known to us personally and have been well documented. The timing of the survey was influenced by the fact that 29th January 1978 marks the tenth anniversary of the first removals from Meran to Limehill.

A full-time interviewer, who has had considerable experience in similar field research, spent five weeks at Limehill in December 1977 – January 1978 interviewing individual representatives of 101 households and filling in a questionnaire in respect of each. Households were selected at the discretion of the interviewer.

The number of households covered by the survey represents approximately one-third of all those moved to Limehill in 1968/9; those who have been resettled there more recently were excluded.

In evaluating the effects of the resettlement at Limehill and the findings of this study it should be borne in mind that the people concerned did not come from impoverished, broken-down communities. They were from stable, well-established communities and were relatively prosperous compared, for example, to many of those removed from white farms. Virtually all of them had land and cattle and many were able to do occasional work in Wasbank to supplement the income from their migrant workers. The fact that they were a healthy, prosperous community, (many of them had savings to fall back on), probably accounts for their surviving as well as they have done.

General Description

Our interviewer, who has been familiar with the settlement since its establishment, reported, 'There is very little improvement at Limehill. The only new thing is that they built an office'. This office, however, was unable to furnish him with accurate population figures for the settlement.

There are now approximately 350 houses, of which about 40 are occupied by more recent residents. The average family size was found by the survey to be 5,3, which gives an estimated total population of 1850.

The original residents have now completed building their own houses. It took them on average 3 years to do so, with 5% taking 6 years. The vast majority of the houses are built of mud (83%) a few of blocks (14%) and even fewer of bricks (3%); roofing is of thatch (63%) or corrugated iron (37%).

Many of the mud houses are showing considerable signs of wear and tear. This is attributed to the fact that the people were forced to build in an exposed place and thus the houses have no protection from the wind and the rain and the presence of termites in the soil.

The dirt 'road' that runs through the middle of the settlement is potholed and corrugated, while some of the side 'streets' are now completely overgrown. There is thus a general air of dilapidation, desolation and isolation about the place.

Facilities may be described as follows:

Water is obtained from taps in the 'streets', though by no means in every 'street'. We were able to locate only 10 taps in the whole settlement, i.e. one tap to serve 35 families.

There is now a clinic with a resident nurse, but no doctor. Since there is no phone and no ambulance the nurse has no means of communicating with a hospital or a doctor in an emergency. Private doctors hold surgeries at the clinic. The fees are:

30 cents for a visit to the nurse
R2 for a visit to the doctor
R5 for childbirth

There are two primary schools, which also serve other parts of the complex. The main problem is over-crowded classes. One teacher, for example, is responsible for 120 children in a double session.

There are two general dealers and one cafe/store. These have limited stocks and, owing to transport costs, prices are higher than in the towns. Nevertheless most people (94%) do at least some of their shopping in Limehill, since the high cost of bus fares makes it uneconomical to go to Ladysmith, Dundee or Wasbank except for major shopping.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES

Arrivals and departures

88 of those interviewed arrived at Limehill in 1968 and the other 13 in 1969. They came from places considerably nearer to the neighbouring 'White' towns of Wasbank, Dundee and Ladysmith than Limehill is.

11% of the children who were aged 5 years or less at the time of the removal are now dead.

Some young people have gone, either as individuals or as family units, to settle elsewhere – presumably illegally; others have simply 'disappeared' and their families have no knowledge of their whereabouts.

Present population

(i) Children born at Limehill

Almost 20% of the children born at Limehill have not survived until the survey date. If children born in the last two years, who have not yet survived the danger period for infant mortality, are excluded, the percentage is slightly higher at 23%. This is considerably lower than the infant mortality rate in some 'homeland' areas, where it is estimated that 40% of children born do not reach the age of five. But there is no reason for judging Limehill by this norm. As has been mentioned, the people at Limehill were not from an impoverished community and, although their standard of living is falling, they have not yet sunk to the same level of deprivation that prevails in some 'homeland' areas. The mortality rate, which is excessively high by any civilised standards, takes on an added significance in the light of the low total number of births.

No figures on the mortality rates in the former places of residence are available. But it can be established that either the mortality rate was considerably lower and/or the birth rate considerably higher, since the ratio of children under 10 to women in the child-bearing age group (assumed to be all those between 16 and 50) in 1977 was **half** what it had been in 1968/69.

(ii) Present population

The high mortality rate and the low birth rate have produced an obvious imbalance in the present composition of the population. Whereas one would expect the 0-10 age group in any community to be the largest of all ten year old cohorts, in Limehill this group is consierably smaller than the 11-20 age group – i.e. those who were 0-10 at the time of the removal.

(iii) Growth Rate

The annual rate of growth for the Zulu population group for the years 1970-1977 was 2,7%. In Limehill, over the past ten years, it was at most half of this; i.e. if one assumes that all those who have emigrated, married or disappeared are still living.

School attendance and employment

The one positive fact to emerge from the survey was that those children who manage to survive do attend school. Only 5 children out of 104 in the 6-14 age group were not attending school.

Places of work

There never has been, and there is not, any intention on the part of the government to provide employment opportunities in or near Limehill. The nearest border industry area is Ladysmith, from where they have been moved **further away**. Limehill is just over 50 kms from the Ladysmith border industries.

None of those interviewed were employed in Limehill itself. 2 were employed by the Kwazulu government in Uitval, about 5 kms away, and 1 in the tribally owned area of Tholeni, about 5 kms away in the opposite direction. For the rest, 58% of the men were long-term migrant workers in Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria, Vryheid, Newcastle and Estcourt; the other 38% were daily or weekly commuters to Wasbank, Dundee or Ladysmith. One of the women was a long-term migrant worker; the others commuted to the towns mentioned. (Those who commute to Ladysmith leave at 5 a.m. and return between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. Many, therefore, 'prefer' to return home only at weekends).

Problems experienced and their possible solutions

The most frequently mentioned problem was the absence of job opportunities and the distance from places of possible employment – 45 times. Only fractionally less frequent were such stark statements as 'hunger', 'poverty' 'we have no food' – 44 times.

3 respondents described life at Limehill as 'good'; another 4 considered it 'fair'.

The vast majority described it as a 'place of suffering', 'a land of sorrows', (34) a bad and difficult place to live in, (19) as causing increased deprivation, (23).

One respondent commented: 'I do not think there is anyone who does not know that Limehill is a place of suffering'. Another: 'Life at Limehill is half-prison'. A more biblically-minded person: 'Life at Limehill is half Egypt for us'. 'Limehill is the land of the outcast people and we feel it'.

In the light of the above it is not surprising that 84 respondents said that they would return to their former place of residence if given the opportunity; 14 said they would not; 2 questionnaires were incomplete."

The facts presented by Mr Desmond's study, based on the answers given to his questionnaire, by people who know from bitter experience just what a Blackspot removal means, explode two more Nationalist myths. The first, propagated amongst others by the late Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, is that 'the Bantu people like being moved". The second is that once the initial shock and hardship of a removal have passed the people concerned prefer living where they are to where they were before. This survey shows just how insubstantial that cynical claim always was. □

NEWS RELEASE —

LITERARY PRIZE AWARDED TO BOOK UNDER EMBARGO

The second annual Mofolo-Plomer Literary Prize has been awarded to Dr J. M. Coetzee for his novel, *IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY* The judges were Prof. André P. Brink and Mr Peter Strauss, both well-known South African writers.

The Mofolo-Plomer Prize, named after two distinguished South African authors, is awarded annually to an unpublished literary manuscript in English by a Southern African writer.

IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY was published in the United Kingdom in June 1977, but was eligible for this year's Mofolo-Plomer Prize as the closing date for entries was 31st May, 1977.

The British edition of the novel has been embargoed by the South African customs, and the censors are at present considering it.

Dr Coetzee lectures in the department of English at the University of Cape Town. He has published a previous novel, *DUSKLANDS* (Ravan Press, 1973).

The Mofolo-Plomer Prize was instituted by Nadine Gordimer, the South African writer, in 1976. The prize money of R500 is donated jointly by Miss Gordimer and three Johannesburg publishers, Bateleur Press, Ad. Donker and Ravan Press.

Entries for the 1978 competition must reach the Mofolo-Plomer Committee, c/o Ravan Press, P.O. Box 31910, Braamfontein, 2017, by 31st May 1978. Further details may be obtained from the committee.

PETER RANDALL
for the Mofolo-Plomer Prize Committee

P.S. THE BOOK HAS NOW BEEN CLEARED BY THE CENSORS

30/9/1977

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