

reality

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REMOVALS PRIVATISED: EMZOMUSHA 1988

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in this issue . . .

EDITORIALS	1. THE DELMAS TRIAL	2
	2. CENSORSHIP	3
	3. SELF SUFFICIENCY	3
FROM SLOGANS TO SUBSTANCE by Ian Phillips		3
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS: THE STATE OF PLAY by N. J. J. Olivier		7
ELLIOT MNGADI: A TRIBUTE by Peter Brown		10
THE REMOVAL OF ROOSBOOM by Elliot Mngadi (reprinted)		11
DIPLOMACY AND DELUSION: THE BOTHAS IN SEARCH OF AFRICA by Peter Vale		16
A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE LEGION — A review of R. J. Shorten's <i>The Legion of Christ's Witnesses</i> by Michael Worsnip		19

Cover Picture: An Emzomusha resident tries to salvage possessions from his house, destroyed and burned by a property developer, August 1988. Photograph: John Woodroof, **The Sunday Tribune**.
A forthcoming REALITY will discuss the present state of "Removals" in detail.

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EDITORIALS

1. The Delmas Trial

Reaction to the sentences in the Delmas treason trial of UDF leaders has ranged, amongst anti-nationalists, from relief to shock. Both are appropriate. Relief certainly, because the offence carried the death penalty and the South African experience of mercy in such cases is not altogether reassuring. Shock too, not only at some of the reasoning behind the judgement and the very wide interpretation it seemed to give to the act of treason but also at some of the highly unusual conditions attached to the suspended sentences.

In due course, when the full judgement becomes generally available, we hope to carry a detailed assessment of it. In the meantime the case has emphasised anew the divided nature of our society. The Court and the Government and a large majority of white South Africans saw the accused as dangerous revolutionaries intent only on overthrowing the state by any means. A large majority of black South Africans and a substantial minority of white South Africans saw them as dedicated and courageous young men trying to bring an end to apartheid as peacefully as possible. □

2. Censorship

Censorship is the order of the day.

It comes not only from the all-pervading restrictions of the State of Emergency, it also comes in other forms.

The New Nation can be closed down for three months, the Weekly Mail for a month. The new anti-apartheid Afrikaans weekly, Vrye Weekblad, can be asked to pay a registration fee of R30 000 which it can lose if it doesn't behave itself. Conor Cruise O'Brien has a series of lectures cancelled, Salman Rushdie has an invitation to speak withdrawn.

In the case of the newspapers it is the threat of the law which imposes the censorship, in the case of O'Brien the threat of violence, in the case of Rushdie that of death. In the last two cases the threats came from groups which in other contexts claim to be committed to non-violence.

The Government's censorship reminds us that we live in a society that is not free; the other that, if we are not careful, we may still not be after it has gone. □

3. Self-Sufficiency

The State President has started saying that South Africa must become self-sufficient. We hope he will stop soon.

One of the lessons of the Angolan conflict seems to have been that if you want to stay competitive in the military

world you must have access to new technology. So must you in the economic world.

If Russia, with all its vast resources, cannot compete and survive on its own, what earthly chance is there of South Africa being able to do so? □

by Ian Phillips

FROM SLOGANS TO SUBSTANCE

A perspective on the ANC constitutional guidelines

South Africa's civil constitution has failed in its most essential task: to mediate and control the conflicts that threaten the security and privilege of the dominant. The state has armed itself with a potent military, statutory and judicial arsenal. The majority of its democratic opponents equally are determined not to submit. The rise of neo-fascism, the Strijdom Square massacre, and KP implementation of NP policy are but recent manifestations of apartheid. Coupled to our present economic meltdown, the country endures a deep, all-pervasive socio-political crisis. The brutality of everyday township life is emphasised by the political egg-dancing of arrogant rulers.

Diverse politicians scamper around looking for "solutions". Thus the HRSC, Constitutional Planning and Development civil servants, academics and others produce plans aplenty: partition, the boerestaat, race federations, confederations, the devolution of power, the extension of the tri-cameral system to local levels, fancy franchises. The common denominator, largely, is an oblique one, of trying to identify which democratic principles can be sacrificed to race prejudice and economic privilege in order to retain some quintessential elements of white privilege and domination in disguise.

Political debate is curtailed by many legal and customary restrictions. The statute-book is replete with examples of

the former. The latter reside in a popular, largely white, conception that "democracy" is unsuited to African conditions, and/or is too closely aligned to "communism". Since 1985, information has been further restricted by neurotic Media and Security Regulations.¹ Popular participation and the debates that emerge from and illuminate such activity, have been battered by the States of Emergency and the forces who implement Pretoria's version of "law and order". Pretoria attempts constantly to impose its interpretation of reality on South Africa and the world. It recently witnessed its interpretation of "treason", for example, endorsed in the Delmas judgement.

Debating political options or settlements involves some recognition of the principle of negotiation. There is considerable difference of opinion about the mechanics of negotiated settlements. Should they, for example, emerge from elite discussion and accommodation, the participation of ethnic entities in the nascent National Council, or from a sovereign constituent assembly based on individual selection and universal franchise? Most organisations have acknowledged a principled preference for negotiation. But negotiation also implies the existence of alternative programmes for discussion.

At this stage, the state has not proscribed the ANC's constitutional guidelines as it did the Freedom Charter for

many years. Not that that action would of itself remove the document from public consideration; witness the process that led to the virtual unbanning of the ANC itself during the present period. More significant is the government's recent total ban on the ANC's statement on the question of negotiations itself.² The symbolism of that act speaks volumes about Pretoria's intentions. Will the conflict between "oppressor and oppressed" end "either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes"?³

The ANC's "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" form an integral part of the turbulent context of the present. Not only are they the product of a major actor today, they also are linked to a powerful tradition of political struggle.

GUIDELINES

The guidelines formally have their origin in the work of the National Executive Committee's constitutional committee, the Legal Affairs Department, and a series of "in-house seminars" that drew on many people from all sections of the movement. The seminars, in particular, provided the basis of the ANC's hopes, priorities and plans. They discussed, inter alia, the role of religion and of education in post-apartheid South Africa, women's and workers' rights, the nature of different electoral systems, bills of rights and the resolution of the national question. The constitutional committee conducted comparative analyses of dozens of constitutions: socialist and non-socialist, unitary and federal. Two major concerns, for example, included the ways in which workers' rights are protected both in law and in fact, as well as the relationship of central to local government, and how that affected theories of popular autonomy and accountability.

Debate within the ANC alliance is neither new nor surprising, yet it is clear that a number of influences began to coalesce prior to 1983/84 that merged to form its current approach to a post-apartheid South Africa.

First, there is a long tradition of discussion and interpretation of the Freedom Charter within the movement itself. The Charter occupies a special position within the Congress tradition, and in the history of ANC policy-making in particular. Even before its adoption by Congress in 1956, it had been the subject of numerous exchanges, many of them hostile. Significantly, many contemporary critics seem ignorant of the development of an internal, if at times not wholly public, debate about the meaning and role of the Charter. Nelson Mandela's *New Age* articles of the 1950s, the defence submissions of the Treason Trial, its assessment as a "revolutionary programme" in 1969, and the numerous discussion articles in the official journals of ANC and allied organisations all form part of an interpretative dialogue.⁴ The present guidelines continue the process of elaboration.

Second, the apparent ill-preparedness of Zimbabwe's resistance movement at Lancaster House perhaps played some role in alerting ANC people to the need to establish a coherent set of proposals if negotiations began. Equipped with such a package, the ANC could hold a much stronger position than if they were caught unprepared or were armed only with slogans.⁵ Thus, from the early 1980s at least, more solid proposals than the suggestive clauses of the Freedom Charter were considered necessary.

Another change since 1985 was a transformation in the ANC's status. It became a major contender for power, not only particularly in the eyes of whites locally, but also internationally, given the recognition accorded the movement by Pretoria's traditional allies. The ANC's visibility and obvious popularity within the country increased dramatically in the wake of the national repression that followed the stirring rebellion of 1983/4. That domestic challenge coincided with and reinforced the increasing success that the organisation achieved in its international diplomatic and public campaign to isolate Pretoria and its policies, most notably in western Europe and the USA. Pretoria's dwindling moral authority after its violent response to the events of 1976/7, not least the death of Steve Biko, received another blow with its States of Emergency and the failure of "reform". The ANC's increasing importance internally and as a semi-"government-in-exile" (a status the ANC resists⁶) also focussed critical attention on the organisation and its policies.⁷ Foreign conservative governments thought in terms of their own foreign policy imperatives and the nature of alliances with an ANC controlled government; local critics looked for greater cohesion and sense of pragmatism that they could not find in the Freedom Charter or the general statements of the movement. It is important to note that the constitutional appraisal began prior to the high profile exposure of whites to the ANC,⁸ and the subsequent complaints voiced in the "liberal" press about the ANC's reliance on vague formulations rather than solid proposals.

MOOD OF THE MOMENT

It also seems probable that some people within the movement were also influenced quite considerably by the mood of the moment in 1984/5, when the regime appeared to be under considerable strain and near breaking point. The transition to a post-apartheid South Africa was not far off in these calculations. Essentially though, it was accepted that objective and subjective features/conditions in SA were changing, and that a post-apartheid South Africa finally seemed imminent, rather than a mere vision or future dream. Hence the necessity to convert the Freedom Charter "from a vision for the future into a constitutional reality", or as Zola Skweyiya, chairperson of the Legal Affairs Department put it, "to take the idea past the slogans and towards realisation."⁹ Against this reading, the state's proven resilience might remove some of the urgency of the new guidelines, but may not affect their detail, or indeed their general role, in any particular way. This feature may indeed be the parallel to Swapo's experience that induced it — optimistically, too, as it turned out — to host international seminars under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Namibia on development strategies in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The ANC guidelines have a particular status that needs consideration. Both Skweyiya and President Tambo have stressed that the proposals are "no more than" guidelines.¹⁰ The document itself stresses that it comprises only "basic guidelines for the foundations of government". Originally, the organisation planned to publish a fully-fledged draft constitution. The idea was shelved, it appears, because of its recognition that although the Congress movement is in the forefront of the resistance, Congress itself is not representative of all anti-apartheid organisations. More pointedly, it argues that a new constitution should, ideally, be the product of the deliberations of

a sovereign, popularly elected constituent assembly. In the final analysis, the process will depend on the nature of the transition¹¹ (whether through negotiation or through insurrection and armed overthrow of the state, or, what seems more likely, a delicate combination of both). As guidelines, they are meant to initiate and encourage debate within the country, to assist in mobilisation and the formation of a democratic, broad-based unity against the regime. At the same time, the organisation wishes to clarify its own principal formulations to its constituency and to the country as a whole.¹²

PREAMBLE

The proposals have to be read in conjunction with the preamble, a section that has not been printed by most newspapers. It specifies some general principles. The Freedom Charter is placed firmly at the centre as the embodiment of "the political and constitutional vision of a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa". The removal of discriminatory legislation is not sufficient to create the new society: state structures and social practices associated with apartheid will have to be dismantled and discarded. Corrective action is necessary to guarantee "a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and opening of facilities to all". The protection of individual rights irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed, and the cultural and linguistic rights of all are guaranteed. The protection of group or minority rights based on ethnicity or race are specifically rejected, because such protection would entrench and perpetuate the status quo where the white minority controls/possesses 87% of the land and 95% of the national wealth. The preamble also suggests that the success of the new system depends on the greatest possible involvement of all in every sphere of government and administration.

The guidelines envisage the establishment of "one central legislature, executive and administration" responsible to "the people as a whole", but permits the delegation of powers to subordinate bodies for administrative purposes. Traditional institutions such as "hereditary rulers and chiefs" will be transformed in accordance with constitutional principles. State structures, i.e. "all organs of government including justice, security and armed forces" will be democratised and defined not in terms of loyalty to a government, but rather to the Constitution. The above proposals do not extend much beyond the 1969 Morogoro Conference analysis of the Freedom Charter, which stressed the undemocratic and racist nature of state instruments under apartheid. The 1969 analysis referred more particularly, however, to the abolition of current structures and their replacement with "democratic organs of self-government in all the Provinces, districts and towns of the country."¹³ The current proposals' failure to specify what is meant by "transformation" and democratisation may highlight ANC reluctance to produce a final constitution. Still, the self-evident problem of democratising, say, the SADF, SAP, or Special Branch cannot be minimised.

BILL OF RIGHTS

A Bill of Rights "based on the Freedom Charter" will embody the principles of the Constitution. It would guarantee basic human rights and stipulate pro-active duties of citizens and state institutions to eradicate the social and economic inequalities produced by apartheid. Basic freedoms, such as those of association, worship,

expression, thought, press, and the practice of multi-partyism, are defined by the rejection and criminalisation of racism, fascism, nazism, and the incitement of ethnic and/or regional exclusiveness. The latter confirms, for example, the ANC's rejection of bantustans and ideas such as the "boerestaat", or an independent Kwazulu/Natal. Political parties that endorse racist policies and espouse racial membership, like the NP, KP and others, would also be proscribed. Apartheid and racism are rejected internationally with good cause. Significantly for the ANC, a Bill of Rights should extend beyond justiciable limits to become a legal programme, one that seeks to protect rights and eliminate racism and socio-economic injustice. Practical implementation of the latter desire is formidable: consider the issue of property rights, the unjust 13/87% distribution pattern, in the context of agronomy. That pattern, established by the "hoary segregationist framework", has led to "excessive land use and soil exhaustion in the homelands and its underuse in other areas".¹⁴

The misunderstood "national group" phraseology of the Freedom Charter has been dropped. Instead, there is now a clearer commitment to the creation of one South African national identity. The recognition of the linguistic and cultural diversity that exists in the country remains. Minority rights qua ethnic rights are rejected. Again, the present proposals echo the Morogoro analysis which elevated national and cultural rights to the level that whites had assured for their own culture, to the detriment of others.

ECONOMICS

The economic clauses are less direct than the Freedom Charter in its references to nationalisation. Against the backdrop of the preamble's comments about redistribution of wealth, the current document reserves to the state the right to determine national economic policy and direction. It confirms numerous ANC statements that favour a mixed economy (how "mixed" cannot be determined abstractly). An important attempt is made to draw the rural, peasant agricultural sector into the national economy through the combination of a co-operative sector with village enterprises, small-scale family and farm activities, all supported by the state. Affirmative action in the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills is also promised. Finally, "property for personal use and consumption" will be guaranteed, restrained by the state's right to "direct and limit the rights attaching to the ownership and use of private productive capacity". Like the Freedom Charter, the economic references of the proposals do not envisage an inevitable transition to socialism, but they are not necessarily incompatible with the development of socialism. A restructured economy within the above terms in present-day South Africa would have a remarkable effect. Perhaps the one notable absence in the new proposals is a detailed definition of the land question and the issue of land redistribution. This latter element received more attention in the Morogoro analysis, and its exclusion here may be in deference to the practical problems of destroying the bantustan system, the question of nationalisation without compensation, and the like. The urgency of the question, especially given the phenomenon of resettlement, is paramount. The references to small-scale farm activities and co-ops in a post-apartheid South Africa could indeed refer to the break-up of current ownership inequalities and the redistribution among a newly established peasant class. A good deal has been

said about the inclusion "for the first time" of the rights of workers. The Morogoro analysis stipulated the freedom of "all who work . . . to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers". Furthermore, that analysis maintained that the rights of all "miners, domestic workers, farm workers, and civil servants" were the same as other workers, namely, the right to form trade unions and join political organisations.¹⁵ Teachers also were assured this right.

Finally, the proposals elaborate a policy of non-alignment in international affairs and a commitment to work within the OAU and UN for world peace and disarmament. All the latter featured in the Freedom Charter, the Morogoro analysis and more recent statements as well.

DEBATE

As yet, no definite procedures have been outlined publicly for the ratification or otherwise of the guidelines. Debate around the document is already widespread throughout the country, a process assisted in part by the publication of the major points of the guidelines in sections of the mainstream and alternative press, including a simplified version of the text.¹⁶

Most critics argue that the guidelines are too inspecific and/or are prescriptive.¹⁷ The ANC scotched the idea of producing a detailed constitution as such. To demand too much detail is to contradict the allegation that they are prescriptive. Furthermore, such arguments mistake the ANC for a political party, rather than as a mass movement. The guidelines are not final either, although a major difficulty here is how to engender discussion in such a way that feedback occurs. At the same time, the ANC works from the broad idea that a constitution must not only reflect the formal structures of society but must also provide a programme.

Harold Laski, writing when fascism loomed large in Europe, argued forcefully that "[i]t is not enough within a social system to proclaim the supreme desirability of peace until we are satisfied with the purposes for which peace is made".¹⁸ In the South African context it is not enough merely "to bid the sickness cease". Furthermore, many believe that no concessions ought to be made to privilege that has been the reward of apartheid, to a social order built on the exploitation of the many by the few, to the evil of racism or of ethnicity that has been transformed into an instrument of subjugation and division. Ultimately, the ANC constitutional guidelines form part of a wider democratic tradition. As such, they are part of the wider discourse about the future. That tradition is as rich and fertile as the heritage of Pretoria and sundry schemers is barren and bankrupt. A future dispensation may involve compromise and concession, but these must be defined within particular parameters. As one person put it, "freedom" will be achieved "at all costs, but not at any price".

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SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS: THE STATE OF PLAY

There was a time, particularly during the Verwoerd and Vorster eras, when the SA political situation could best have been described as relatively stagnant and government policy actions more or less certain and predictable. To a considerable extent this is no longer so: there are forces at play, within South Africa as a whole and also within the Government and its political behaviour which defy self-evident predictions of certainty. Ask any thinking South African the following questions: What is going to happen regarding our economic development over the next five years (our balance of payments, the repayment of our international debts, the importation of capital, the economic effects of sanctions and disinvestment, the gold price, the "brain drain", immigration, labour relations etc.) and he is most likely to say: "I do not know" or "I have no idea". And if he is prepared to discuss it any further, probably 90% or more would indicate grave concern and pessimism, even gloom, about the future. And the same applies to the political scene per se. Is the CP really going to "take over" the government? What has happened to Mr P. W. Botha's "reform" movement? Will the NP retain its unity? Who will succeed Mr Botha as State President, and what will be the implications internally and externally? Is there any possibility of a negotiated settlement in South Africa, or is increasing violence inevitable? It is indeed a brave man — or a fool — who can honestly profess that he has the answers.

The most, or best, a responsible observer can hope to do is to try to discover whether there are certain dominant trends which will probably play a major or important role in the shaping of things to come. This is what I will attempt to do in this article, in respect of a limited number of fields.

THE RIGHT-WING THREAT

I think it is highly probable that, party-politically, the right-wing will become stronger; but under the present circumstances, and in the present climate, I doubt whether they will gain more than 45-50 seats in the White House of Assembly, if as many. The real danger does not lie in the possibility of their gaining control of the White House, but in their avowed intention and ability to mobilise political support on the basis of naked racism — outdated as it may be — thereby creating and exacerbating the conditions for racial friction and conflict at the grassroots level. I get the impression sometimes that the CP leadership and supporters are totally unaware of the fact that the days that people of colour were prepared to eat humble pie and to simply accept what the White overlord or baas has decided to do with/to them are irrevocably gone, and will never return. I also believe that the vast majority of Whites recoil instinctively from the re-imposition of the crudest forms of apartheid (as we have experienced lately in the case of a number of CP controlled municipal areas), and will be prepared, far more than in the past, to be actively involved in opposing such measures. It is not impossible that this in turn could lead, for the first time in South African history, to

a joining of forces, not necessarily in a party-political context, of Whites and people of colour in a massive movement against such re-imposition. All that is required to bring this about is strong leadership.

I shall not put it beyond the realms of possibility that the actual implementation of CP racial policy — as in these municipal areas — may prove to be counter-productive for the CP. Although it would be foolish to deny the existence of racial prejudice in South Africa and the exploitative potential of colour/racial differences for political purposes, I do believe that the vast majority of Whites have become far more sensitive about the feelings and aspirations of people of colour and are far less inclined to countenance or support policies which they know are an open insult to people of colour and can only lead to increased friction.

THE NATIONAL PARTY AND NP GOVERNMENT

Let me summarise in a number of points what I believe to be some of the salient elements in this connection:

1. Despite its stated intention to move away from colour/race discrimination, the very basis of NP policy, as enshrined in the tri-cameral parliamentary system, is based on colour/race. That system depends for its existence and implementation on the racial classification of people in terms of the Population Registration Act and on the differentiation made between so-called "general affairs" and "own affairs" — the latter being nothing else out apartheid in another form.
2. Ideologically its policy is thus based upon two non-negotiable principles: that the constitutional system has to be structured on the existence and recognition of the various colour/racial groups and must provide for (a) powersharing between these groups as regards "general affairs" and (b) the maximum degree of self-determination for each of these groups as regards "own affairs" and as regards its "own" "community life".
3. However, as far as (a) is concerned NP policy has proved to be a dismal failure on two points: (i) it has failed to provide for Black involvement and participation in the central government (legislature and executive); and (ii) even within the confines of the tri-cameral parliament it has failed to obtain the co-operation of its other two partners (the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates) in important "general affairs" legislation and in the executive arm of government. The reason for this is to be found in a number of factors, viz. inter alia in the Government's own unwillingness to seek "consensus" (which was to have been the dominant feature of the tri-cameral arrangement), the existence and involvement of the President's Council (with its in-built NP majority) to overcome the resistance of the other two Houses, and its adherence to the concept of "self-determination" for each of the "communities" (leading, amongst other things to its commitment to the maintenance of separate "group areas" etc.).

4. As far as (b) is concerned, the policy has met with a degree of success inasmuch as (i) a number of people of colour have been "co-opted" into the system; (ii) it has placed people of colour in a position to tend to the needs of their respective communities (e.g. in the field of housing) and consequently being less dependent upon the favours and goodwill of White politicians and officials; and has given power to the people concerned (particularly the "own affairs" ministers and administrations). What the system has done is to create a whole range of vested interests in the maintenance of the system itself. In this sense the distribution and disposal of power has in itself become a powerful instrument in the hands of the government in securing co-optation and co-operation.

5. Inasmuch as the "reform policy" of the State President raised expectations that the NP Government would be prepared to move away from the non-negotiable principles mentioned above, those expectations have not materialised (and thence the disappointment, even disillusionment, with the reform process); neither do I think that there is a likelihood of the Government being prepared to do so in the foreseeable future (unless something dramatic happens within the NP itself). My contention is that the "reform initiatives" of Mr P. W. Botha were misunderstood and misinterpreted in the first place: not only because he himself did not indicate clearly the outer boundaries of that process (in other words, how far he is prepared to go), but also because people were inclined to expect the process to achieve what they wanted it to achieve (in other words, interpreting it in terms of their own wishes and expectations). This does not detract from the fact that under the Botha regime major legislative changes have taken place, removing some of the most discriminatory aspects of the apartheid policy; and that the "unintended consequences" of these changes may be as important as the changes themselves.

6. This situation has been and is being aggravated by the political threat posed to the NP by the rightwing-movement, and the Government's reaction to that threat. The CP has taken over from the NP the NP's own former success recipe (an ideological appeal to Afrikaner nationalism and to race prejudice) in the hope or expectation that it will lead to the same kind of success that brought the NP to power in 1948. It is undoubtedly true that the NP has moved away from the crude use of these two forces (although still applying them in the more sophisticated form of the "own affairs" concept), but in the process they have created an ideological vacuum to their own detriment (a vacuum which the CP is exploiting). Unfortunately the NP has been unable to present to the White voter a viable or attractive ideological alternative — mainly for four reasons: (a) the Parties to the "left" of the Government have already claimed patronage of the one logical alternative to apartheid and racial separation; (b) the NP is afraid that if it were to move in a "liberal" direction (which would mean departing from its non-negotiable principles) it would drive more Whites into the arms of the CP; (c) because there are dominant personalities within the NP itself who themselves believe strongly in these non-negotiable principles; and (d) because any fundamental departure from these principles could, and most probably would increase the tensions and divisions within the NP immeasurably and even threaten the unity of the Party.

Under these circumstances it would appear that the NP is constantly "looking over its shoulder", and that it is afraid

that any injudicious move to bring about change will only weaken its position electorally and threaten its internal cohesion. Ideologically the NP is trying to sit on two stools simultaneously: on the one hand, stating its intention to "move away" from racial discrimination and to create a constitutional system which would also provide for effective Black participation; and, on the other, emphasising its belief in and adherence to the concept of "own affairs" and "community self-determination" as essential elements in any constitutional structure.

7. The various bills passed by the House of Assembly during the sessions in September — the trilogy of Group Areas Bills and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill — clearly indicate the Government's continued commitment to the principle of enforced racial residential separation and its unwillingness to accept Black urbanisation as the irreversible process that it undoubtedly is; as a matter of fact, the last mentioned Bill is in total conflict with the Government's own White Paper on Urbanisation issued two years ago, and which was so widely welcomed by people, including myself.

8. The events in the CP controlled municipal area of Boksburg have also clearly illustrated the ideologically impossible position in which the NP finds itself. The Government's unwillingness to scrap the Separate Amenities Act has provided the CP not only with the legislative power to enforce petty apartheid in the areas which it controls, but has also highlighted the conflicts — and hypocrisy — within the Government's policy itself: it is impossible to reconcile attacks on CP actions, when in so many areas under the control of the Government or the NP the same apartheid measures are consistently applied and enforced.

The Parties on the "left"? It is generally conceded that the fragmented nature of the (Parliamentary) groupings "left" of the Government is self-defeating and that the interests of South Africa demand that they should form a united front. Only by doing so could they effectively oppose the Government and its policies and provide a rallying point for those large numbers of South Africans who share a fundamentally "liberal" value system or who find that they can no longer support NP policies, but are unwilling to come out in enthusiastic support for opposition parties which are not prepared to sink their relatively minor or unimportant differences in the broader interests of our country and its future. Whether the present discussions to form a single Party will be successful will become apparent within the next few weeks. There is no sense in denying the severity of the obstacles: past antagonisms, differences in perception, images, philosophy, and the question of leadership.

A NEW NEGOTIATED CONSTITUTION

It would appear that the possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement in South Africa by the creation of a negotiated new constitutional structure providing for participation by all the people, is as far removed from becoming a reality as it ever was. The Government seems unwilling to consider entering into discussions with the ANC and other Black and extra-parliamentary groupings, thereby making it impossible also for other Black leaders and organisations who or which do not subscribe to the "armed struggle" to be seen to be prepared to talk to the Government. The Emergency, and the detention of many leading person-

alities opposed to the Government, have aggravated the situation. Lately, however, there seems to be somewhat of a change in the Government's attitude; if one considers its release of some people who have been in detention for a long time (despite the fact that most, if not all, of them have been subjected to restrictions orders after their release) and its attitude towards the imprisonment of Mr Nelson Mandela. I think it is too early to say whether this is part of a longer-term strategy and what that strategy could entail or lead to.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Government (despite its frequent pronouncements over the last number of years about the need for a new constitution and the political involvement of Blacks), has failed to deliver the goods. One gets the impression that the Government believes that by improving the socio-economic conditions for Blacks, by involving them in the second and third tiers of government and by the process of selective co-optation, Black political demands may be satisfied at least for the foreseeable future. I think this is a fallacy; and that the longer the Government delays the process of true negotiation (in which Mr Mandela — if released unconditionally — may play a major role) the more difficult it may become.

The reasons given by the Government for its unwillingness to involve the ANC in discussions are apparently threefold: it believes the ANC is communist-controlled, that it is dedicated to violence (committed to the "armed struggle"), that it espouses (and will be prepared to support) only a system which, economically, is based on Marxist principles and, politically, upon the majoritarian principle in a unitary state without adequate protection for the rights of minority groups.

Obviously I cannot adequately deal with these various arguments in this article.

However, even if one were to accept that the majority of the members of the ANC executive are dedicated marxists/communists, this is, to the best of my knowledge, not true of the vast majority of ANC supporters in South Africa (or of Blacks generally). The Government itself, in the interests of South Africa and of stability and peace in South Africa, has been negotiating with the marxist regimes in Mosambique and Angola (despite all the talk about the "total onslaught"). A possible step could perhaps be to unban the ANC internally even while countering ANC (or PAC) inspired and controlled violence from outside, as has been done in the case of Swapo in Namibia.

THE WAR IN ANGOLA

It would seem as if at long last South Africa's military involvement in Angola may be coming to an end. I have no reason at this stage to doubt the genuine desire on the part of the SA Government to end the military conflict in Angola, and its willingness to respect and implement any agreement arrived at in the talks that have been taking place over the last number of months. Obviously, this will depend upon satisfactory arrangements regarding the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; but I am very hopeful that agreement will be reached.

NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND RESOLUTION 435

The SA Government has clearly indicated that it has now accepted the independence of Namibia within the confines of Resolution 435. All indications are that the beginning of this process may well take place within the next few months, although one must recognise the possibility of something happening that could retard, or even reverse, the process. It is a wise man indeed who could predict the exact course of events during this process or what may result once independence has been achieved.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

Most South Africans are deeply aware of the mounting international pressure on South Africa and the possibility of increased sanctions and disinvestment. I am inclined to think that the latest developments regarding South Africa's relationship with Mosambique, the talks about ending the Angolan war and the independence of Namibia may have given South Africa some breathing space. It also seems to be clear that until such time as there is a new constitutional dispensation which will include Blacks in the political decision-taking process, it is very likely that the pressure will increase. Apart from the justified accusations of double standards and hypocrisy that could be levelled against some of South Africa's most vocal critics, I personally believe that sanctions and disinvestment are counter-productive (unless one subscribes to the desirability of creating conditions for increased violent confrontation); the best chances for non-violent changes flow from the economic muscle of the Blacks and the economic interdependence of all South Africa's peoples. It is interesting to note that probably the most effective instrument to halt the re-imposition of petty apartheid in Boksburg and in other CP-controlled municipalities will be by the use of economic measures: the buying power of the Blacks is playing an increasingly important role in this connection. In the absence of such economic muscle, there are not many other non-violent avenues open to Blacks to convey their displeasure and opposition.

To the extent that sanctions and disinvestment will lead to greater impoverishment of Blacks and increased Black unemployment (about which there is no doubt in my own mind), to that extent they may become counter-productive and even promote an escalation in the course of violent confrontation.

I am desperately afraid that the campaigners for sanctions and disinvestment (well-meaning as some of them may be), in their capacity for over-simplification and wishful thinking, and their (very often) abysmal ignorance of the harsh South African realities — and particularly of the make-up of the Afrikaner — will actually exacerbate the chances for peaceful accommodation, and even match the Afrikaners' own past stupidity and foolhardiness in their inability to grasp the elemental forces operating in and shaping the destiny of this country. □

ELLIOT MNGADI: A TRIBUTE


On November 20th, 1988, Elliot Mngadi died at his home in the resettlement town of Ezakheni, a very different place from the Roosboom in which he had been born 70 years before.

Roosboom was a black freehold area which straddled the main Durban-Johannesburg road about 7 miles south of Ladysmith. In the early years of the century, before the Natives' Land Act made it impossible, it was quite common for a group of black people to come together in a syndicate to pool their resources to buy a farm. Elliot's father was one of such a group which bought Roosboom, which was then surveyed and sub-divided, each member of the syndicate getting a plot on which to build his home and have his garden, while all had access to the commonage to graze their stock.

Elliot grew up in the comparatively unrestricted atmosphere of this rural community, walking to school at St Hilda's College each day, where the rule of the rather daunting English ladies who ran it was that only English should be spoken on the premises. His weekends he spent caddying and doing other odd jobs in Ladysmith. When his father fell ill he had to give up school. He went to Johannesburg to find work, first as a domestic worker, later as an assistant in a store in the city. No doubt the English he had learnt at St Hilda's was a great help in finding a job and he seems to have been lucky in his employers, who kept strict standards, but went out of their way to help him further his education, which he did through night school and later through correspondence courses. His foreman in the store in which he worked was tyrannical only in his insistence on the proper use of English. Elliot used to relate with a chuckle how they were working together in the basement one day when suddenly the foreman dropped everything and ran up the stairs and out into the street shouting "Policeman! Policeman!". Elliot ran out onto the pavement after him calling anxiously "What's the matter? Why do you want a policeman?". The foreman, who by this time had stopped calling for the policeman, answered fiercely, "To arrest you." Elliot, now thoroughly alarmed, asked "But what for?". "For murdering the King's English," came the stern reply.

By the time the war was over Elliot had had enough of Johannesburg and being separated from his family and he returned to Roosboom to manage a local co-operative. When the co-operative closed down he took on the job of Messenger-of-the-Court, and it was at this point that he came into my life.

The Liberal Party had barely been launched, in mid-1953, when a letter arrived from some people called Hain in Ladysmith, inviting the Party to hold a house-meeting at their home there. "Some people called Hain in Ladysmith" turned out to be Ad and Walter Hain, who soon after moved to Pretoria, there to become involved in one of the Party's most vigorous branches. For that, they were both later to be banned and, when nobody in Pretoria would employ Walter any longer, forced into exile. There they took with them their young family, the eldest of whom was Peter. However, that is another story.



The Liberal Party sent Selby Msimang and myself to that meeting. There were about a dozen people at it, if I remember rightly. Amongst them was this stocky figure with the bristling moustache immaculately turned out in riding breeches and glistening leather leggings. This was Elliot Mngadi, dressed in the outfit he had decided represented the right mixture of dash and authority for a Messenger-of-the-Court going about his duties on a motor-bike.

He listened with great attention to everything that was said that night, asked a great many questions, and then joined the Party. Later he was to tell me that at that moment in his life he was close to becoming a black racist. Instead he became a tough, convinced and highly effective non-racialist.

I soon found that Elliot did nothing by halves. Having decided to become a Liberal he set about persuading friends and relations that they should too. He was so successful at it that when it could finally afford it the Liberal Party in Natal asked him to become its first organiser. He soon set up a network of Branches covering most of the small towns and black areas of Northern Natal. Most of the people he recruited were Africans but certainly not all. He even found a scattering of white recruits from that most reactionary part of the Province.

RESETTLEMENT

During the 1950s the Nationalist Government started planning in earnest to resettle the many black freehold communities in Natal, like Roosboom, which were offensive to its apartheid plans. Being located in what it regarded as "white" South Africa, it had decided that they would have to go. To meet this threat a joint initiative was launched by the ANC and the Liberal Party to help the communities organise against it. Elliot was chosen to canvass these so-called **blackspots** to try to bring them together to fight the Government's plans. As a result the Northern Natal African Landowners' Association was established and affiliated to it were most of the blackspots.

Although it called itself a landowners' association tenants were welcomed as members. It elected Elliot as its organising secretary. This was a high profile position and one not calculated to endear him to the powers-that-be. Not surprising then that he was one of the group of Northern Natal Congressites and Liberals detained in the Pietermaritzburg gaol in 1960. He emerged from that experience unrepentant and went straight back to his work with the Landowners' Association and the Liberal Party. He organised a mass prayer meeting at Roosboom to protest against resettlement. It was attended by over 1 000 delegates from threatend areas and went on for two days. When the National Treasurer of the Liberal Party, E. V. Mahomed, was banned, he took over that post. All this was too much for the Security Police who reacted in the only way they knew and banned him. By the time that ban was over, in the later 1960s, several blackspots had already been removed and Roosboom was high on the list of those to follow. During 1975 and 1976 it was systematically destroyed, its buildings levelled and its people transported to the resettlement area of Ezakheni. That story is told in a paper delivered by Elliot some years later and which we republish as a further tribute to him in this issue. It tells of the terrible conditions they found at Ezakheni but not of how he responded to them.

Elliot always insisted that the only Parliament he was interested in sitting in was the House of Assembly in Cape Town. He was totally opposed to the homeland system but now he found himself willy-nilly part of a homeland and his Roosboom people in a desperate situation. He set out to do what he could for them. If that meant getting involved in local government structures, so be it. Soon he found himself to all intents and purposes the "mayor" of

Ezakheni, a position he held at the time of his death. He also held it in 1979 when an attempt was made to put up the bus fares between Ladysmith and Ezakheni. The community was outraged and decided to boycott the buses, a decision which Elliot supported. He came to play a leading role in what turned out to be a highly successful campaign. Unlike most people, black or white, who hold high office in South Africa, and seem to think that it is for ordinary people to do what they tell them to do, Elliot felt that people holding office were there to be told by ordinary people what they wanted them to do. Each weekend, during the entire boycott, a community meeting was held to report on the previous week's events and to decide on further action. The boycott lasted nearly two months. When it ended fares had reverted to what they had been before it started, not a single violent incident had been reported, and every resident, every week, had had the chance to have their say on how they felt the campaign was being conducted.

Ezakheni remains a grim place but it is a good deal less grim than it was ten years ago, and for that it owes much to the efforts and energy of this one man. His memorial service drew tributes from an extraordinarily diverse selection of people. Who else could bring to the same platform a Kwa-Zulu Minister, a member of the South African Council of Churches, a Magistrate and a former ANC detainee? Their tributes were eloquent and moving but most eloquent and moving was the presence and the singing of the hundreds of ordinary people whose life at Ezakheni he had striven to make just that much more tolerable.

He would have been a good man to have in that House of Assembly. □

by Elliot Mngadi

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THE REMOVAL OF ROOSBOOM

A talk given at a meeting of the Association for Rural Advancement, in Ladysmith, on 30-5-81.

I will start with a short history of how "black spot" removals came about. Before 1913 Africans could buy land almost anywhere in South Africa and were allowed to do so by law. But in 1913 the government of that day legislated a law known as the *Natives Land Act*. That Natives Land Act restricted blacks from buying land in South Africa unless we got the consent of the Governor-General — we did not have the State President then. After that an African could only get land from a white person with permission. One of the reasons whites had for selling their land was that it was unproductive and seeing the blacks had nowhere else to buy land, they of course would buy that land.

Then, in 1936, the law was amended and given a new name it became the *Native Trust and Land Act* of 1936. One of the things that law did was to give power to the authorities — the Governor-General with the Committee working with him — to declare certain black areas in Natal, certain farms, "black spots". They would say: "Alright, Matiwane's Kop, since it is surrounded by white farms — black spot." They wanted those areas to become all-white

and so they planned to remove these farms. That's how then "black spots" came into being. It was before they legislated the *Group Areas Act* which I will leave to the town people to discuss, since it affects them. What I am talking about are the laws affecting rural people. As a result of this 1936 law, in the whole of Natal 242 farms owned by blacks became "black spots".

NORTHERN NATAL AFRICAN LAND-OWNERS ASSOCIATION

After the 1939 war, in about 1956, the government first started moving people from these "black spots". One of the farms they started with was Besters. At that time I was an organiser of the Liberal Party and I was also one of the landowners at Roosboom, near Ladysmith. It was during this time, as part of my work, that I had to organise the African landowners in Natal to form a body of their own. In 1955/56 we formed a body called Northern Natal African Landowners Association. I don't know whether fortunately or unfortunately, but I was elected Secretary of that body.

The main function of that body was to help people resist these removals. We tried very hard at Besters, as some will remember, and I think it took 5 or 6 years before they were moved. Next was Besterspruit, out at Vryheid. We tried to help those people there, but then, of course, the Government steamrollered the whole thing and in 1963 the people were moved to Mondlo. The same with Kingsley, the same with Gardensville, Crane Valley, Kopje Alleen, Waagalles, Siwangu Farm . . .

This last farm was owned by Mr Nyembe who was Vice-President of Chief Luthuli's ANC. Well, the process carried on and on but what I want to talk about now is the removal at Roosboom, where I come from.


THE COMING OF THE LOCAL HEALTH COMMISSION

At Roosboom something very funny went on. In 1960, when we already knew that we were going to be removed — I remember the date very well because I was in gaol because of the State of Emergency — the Local Health Commission from Pietermaritzburg came to Roosboom to introduce their thing of running our area. When we came out from gaol we felt, as leaders of Roosboom, that alright, let's allow this Local Health Commission to come in. At that time, we thought that it would help to entrench us in the area, because we knew that they would spend a lot of money sinking boreholes and so on. Which they did, and then we had water from taps, for which we paid a blanket rate of £1 i.e. R2 today.

As you all know, when you have the Local Health Commission people in your area, you cannot build without a plan. At first that seemed OK and we were happy with that. Then, after about three or four years, they said we must not pay rates any longer but they still insisted that if one wanted to build, one must get a plan. Then, round about 1965, the same people, the Local Health Commission working in concert with government people, started numbering our houses.

At that time too, we were told that we could not extend our houses unless we had a plan, and if one wanted to get a plan from them, the plan was refused. Some landowners were annoyed about this and just started building without a plan — only to find that the officials of the Local Health Commission charged them. They were brought down here, in Ladysmith, and charged in a court of law. The magistrate found them guilty and after one had lost the action here, one had to pay and one's house was demolished.

As a result of that people, both tenants and landowners, were frustrated. They couldn't extend their houses — no



Household goods outside a Fletcraft.

extensions. They couldn't build another house either. Then came a time when those Local Health Commission people said "Alright, if you want to build another house, you must accept the fact that on the day when you will be removed, you will not be paid a cent for it". You had to sign a form of that sort. Now, even with the cheapest house of wattle and daub, you cannot build for less than R500. And no black person can play with R500, can take a chance and not mind losing R500.

In 1973/74 we had a very good rains and as a result of those good rains, houses started cracking — you know wattle and daub houses can't withstand heavy rains. People were glad for the rain, only to find that they could not repair their houses. There was no hope for them in the area with this Local Health Commission.

In fact, when I think of this Local Health Commission, it reminds me of what happens in a war. In a war, say English soldiers against Germans, if one side has a very strong hold, the general of the other side uses big guns in order to soften those people. They will just shoot them, for several hours, and only then will the infantry rush them because they will have been softened by the big guns. In just this way, my people were softened by this Local Health Commission.

RIFT BETWEEN LANDOWNERS AND TENANTS

As a result of what happened, because of the Local Health Commission, a rift was caused between landowners and tenants. Seeing that the tenants had no stake in the land, as far as they were concerned it was now better to go than to stay at a place where they could not make extensions for their children. For them — the quicker they went, the better; the sooner they were removed, the better.

For the sake of those who are not clear about tenants, let me explain how that comes about. In fact, you will find that in any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. The reason is this: for instance, I am Mngadi and I own, let's say, 50 acres of land. I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farmworker. The farmer has given him a trekpass, his animals are in the pound, he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: "Please brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm. I'll just be there for 6 months until I can find another farmer to take me on."

Out of sympathy I do that. Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work. With a job in Jo'burg, he realises that he no longer has his six months to worry about — because you know when you are a labour tenant you have to work six months of the year for the farmer. His children are getting a good education now . . . and I have no way of kicking him out. This man is just there — and that's how these people get onto our farms. They are not invited to come. A question of making business from them does not come into it at all. For instance the rent at Roosboom was £3 a year — R6 a year.

This continues until you find yourself on this 50 acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you R6 a year. You are not making any money out of them; they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living there so in turn, you also go to Johannesburg to work.

That's why on any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. For instance, at a meeting I attended at Jononoskop last year, I was surprised to find

that there are about 300 or 400 households in the area, but only 17 of them are landowners. When the government removes the people, they use this division. The authorities call a meeting without differentiating between tenants and landlords. They simply ask: "Are you happy here?" If the tenants have had trouble with their landlord: "No, no, we're not happy." "Alright, we've come to offer you a good farm elsewhere. Now, those who would like to go there, raise your hands." I've already explained, 300 against 17. The 17 landowners, since they don't want to leave their lands, won't raise their hands. But the rest — the majority — do and, in a democracy they say, majority rules. So then the authorities start to go ahead with the removals.

REMOVALS START AT ROOSBOOM

Coming back to Roosboom then, officials from Pretoria came to the area in early 1975. They used exactly the tactics I've already described. I've already told you too, that people were crowded, they could not build — in fact, they were ready to go. As one of the leaders there, I called a meeting. The attendance was very good — 600 attending a meeting in a place like that is very good. We discussed the issues thoroughly at that meeting, only to find that the majority of tenants told us: "No, you landlords can keep your land, we are going."

When the officials from Pretoria came again, I told them not to do a thing until I had a chance to call a meeting of all landowners to discuss this first — most of them were away working, in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Cape Town, etc. Pretoria agreed to that. In the meantime I wrote letters to all the landowners. The next thing, before they had assembled, I saw trucks, GG* trucks, coming into the area, to remove people.

I was nearly arrested then. I drove to town, to the Commissioner to demand to know what was happening. The chap just laughed at me; he said, "Mngadi, can you read?" He showed me a list — one, two, three, up to a hundred people who had applied. To be removed! In fact when I got to this office, I had made such a noise — kicked desks and whatnot — and if they had not respected me, I would have served a sentence for disturbing the peace. What was happening was that the trucks were only going to certain houses, not moving them all at that stage.

That is how hard it is to be a leader. Many people were really surprised and disappointed. They had expected resistance, especially where I was. I'd been involved in resisting removals at Besterspruit, Besters, Kingsley and all over but when it came to my own area, nothing happened. As far as I'm concerned, we were softened by this

Local Health Commission. People were charged, for instance Mr Kamani who was fined, and went back and built again, was charged again, his house destroyed, until he just had to give up.

EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION

Trying to dig up information for this meeting I came across these documents. This document is what we owned at Roosboom; it is what we called a "Freehold Titledeed". A proper thing — a Freehold Titledeed — and when our fathers bought the land, they were given these documents which gave them the right to own the place for ever and ever, amen. Now this other document is what the people at Roosboom got before they were removed, you must get one of these, a document of expropriation, in terms of the Expropriation Act. Even though people gave themselves up, nevertheless we did not want to be moved and the landowners had to be expropriated.

This expropriation document is where the authorities say what the value of your land and your house is. If you are a landowner, you have to be given one of these before they remove you. You people who have not yet been removed must come to me and see what these things are.

Take this notice of expropriation which I have in my hand. It is for Zebulon Thusi. He had two stands of half an acre each. The heading reads: "Notice of Expropriation under Section 13, Sub-Section 2 of the Bantu Trust and Land Act 1936, Act No. 18 of 1936." In this notice, for his two stands the government offered Thusi R220 as compensation which was not fair at all! For his house — R39! Now, what can you do with R39? I am showing you these documents so that you who are still on your land may die there. Never accept this rubbish!

In fact, nobody was happy with the compensation they got for either their land or their houses. In my case, I had a tearoom which I built in 1964. People here have seen my tearoom; they will agree it was a decent place. You know what I was offered for that tearoom? For the shop I was offered R1 600; for the toilet, R5 (we had an outside toilet); for the trees (we had good trees around the shop), R10; the place was fenced and for the fence I was offered R5. Gross compensation — for everything — R1 700. That is what I was expected to take. But to build a shop elsewhere, today, you need R20 000! I was making a decent living with my shop at Roosboom; but now, because of this removal, I would not be able to build another shop with the money they offered me.

I am coming now to something very important. I was not happy about this. Now, in terms of this same Expropriation



Waiting for relocation.

law, there is a clause which gives one thirty days to say whether you accept the government offer of compensation or not. Here it reads: "You are hereby required to notify me, in writing, within thirty days from the date of notice, whether you accept the said amount of compensation." This part is so important, Mr Chairman. I told my people about this thing — that you have the right to say "I do not accept your offer." You are not breaking the law. But people do not want to fight their own battles. They want somebody else to fight their battles for them. In this case each landowner himself had to write to Pretoria to say he did not accept the offer. But they were afraid to do so because then they each had to be an individual, acting on their own against the government, not through me. So they did not do so.

In my case, I wrote to Pretoria and I refused this R1 700. I wrote to them on the 22nd July 1976. At that time we had already been moved out to the resettlement place where I am living now, Ezakheni. It took them almost a year to reply. I got a reply from them on the 28th June 1977, having written on the 22nd June 1976. I had employed the service of an independent valuator who did a good job and charged me only R9,50. On the strength of his evaluation I claimed R3 500. Then when Pretoria finally replied, they gave me even more money, they gave me R4 225,50!

There is much more I could say about this removal but I am happy to have at least told you about the compensation: that you people who are still to be moved will not get the value of your land. My experience is clear proof. This was robbery: to be offered first R1 700 and then for the same people to give me R4 2250,50. It shows it was daybreak robbery.

What you must understand is that after you have received letters of compensation, if you are not satisfied with the compensation offered, you can fight your way through, with the help of lawyers and other interested people. It is important to know, however, that at this stage it is you who must take the initiative. You cannot wait for outside people to do it for you.

What I am trying to explain is that — you must fight removals where you are. I am happy that most people involved in removals in the Ladysmith area are here. The Matiwane's Kop people are doing just the right thing. Jonono's Kop and Thembalihle people should follow their example and not give in to being moved from your own places. You people who have not yet been moved must learn from us who have been moved, how bad it is. It is proper hell. So what type of fool would you be, after knowing all this, to agree to move to such hell?

CONDITIONS AT EZAKHENI

Before we were removed to this new place, Ezakheni, we were told that we would not be allowed to keep cattle, goats or sheep. So we were deprived of our cattle, when you know that as peasant farmers, you must have your cattle in order to get your milk and goats and sheep to slaughter for your children, particularly in winter. Then, we were not told the size of our new plots. We took for granted that they would be half acre stands as we had at Roosboom. When we got there, to our surprise, we found that we were given a stand of twenty metres by fifteen. Twenty metres this way, fifteen that — just like that, the size of your plot.

Then you found on this site a thing they call a fletcraft. It is a tin hut — twelve by twelve. Tin walls, tin roof. And they also give you a tent, an ordinary tent. Well, you have a family,



Relocation: unloading (1).

but whether ten, twenty or thirty people, you just have to crowd into that thing, twelve by twelve with all your belongings. In my case I had two four-roomed houses at Roosboom — eight rooms. Now I had to squeeze everything I had had in the eight rooms into the fletcraft and the tent. Which was an impossible thing to do and the result was — I lost a lot of my things. Of course I was not the only one. Nearly everybody lost things.

The only good thing was that since this was a site and service place, there were services — a toilet (a flush toilet) and a tap on each plot. Unfortunately, though in the beginning there were breakages in the pipe and sometimes we went for two weeks without water. So how can you flush your toilet without water? (Though now the situation with water is better.)

Another hardship is the rent. When we got there we had to pay a rent of R2,10 per month for the site and the fletcraft. At the end of 1978, the Kwa-Zulu Minister of Interior, Dr Mdlalose, announced that they had decided to double the rent in each township part of Ezakheni. Where there are these four-roomed and five-roomed houses, people were paying R7 so that became R14. In our case, we from Roosboom had chosen to go to the site and service, and in our case the rent rose from R2,10 to R8,07 — for this tin thing! That's what people are paying for that twelve by twelve fletcraft, toilet and water. Eight rand and seven cents!

I told you that the sites are twenty by fifteen. That means that people are crowded like sardines. Even worse, it's dark at night. No electricity. The result is that after dark you cannot just walk in the streets there. And, a part I don't understand, out of every ten people there, eight have guns. I know they don't have licences, but still they have guns. You can imagine. Now at Roosboom, we were a Christian Community. We had no hooligans, no criminals, no people interfering with the stock of their white neighbours. At Roosboom you could walk safely day and night, without anybody interfering with you. But Ezakheni — in fact, I must leave this meeting before five o'clock to get home before it's dark.

I've already said that when my people came from Roosboom we chose to take up the site and service area. People chose that because they were told that they would be allowed to build their own houses with daka. We expected to do that, only to find when we got to Ezakheni that we could not build with wattle and daub there because the soil is clay. You cannot build with clay, so if you want to build at

all, it has to be with cement. But the price of a cement pocket out at Ezakheni is R4,50. If you get it from town, here in Ladysmith, it is cheaper, about R4 but then transport from Ladysmith to Ezakheni will cost you not less than R9, whether for two pockets or ten. So it is very expensive to put up a house there and that is why there are some people there who will never be in a position to build their own houses. They are still in these fletcrafts, after five years.

Transport at Ezakheni is very expensive. At Roosboom we were only 7 miles from Ladysmith, with good roads coming into town. At that other end, Ezakheni, we are about fifteen miles, twenty-five kilometres, away from Ladysmith. Because of the long distance transport is expensive, bus fares high. At Roosboom you could just walk to town; who cannot walk seven miles? But from that other end, you cannot walk twenty-five kilometres. Whether you like it or not, you have to board a bus.

I am just pointing out a few things that are so bad there. I don't know how to word it, how to tell you how dissatisfied

we are with that area. And yet as it is, we are stuck with it. That is why I would like to advise my friends who are still at their own "black spot", not to leave those "black spots" — even if they come to shoot you!

At Roosboom I had planned for my old age — I am well over sixty — that I would just keep five cows and my own chickens. You know, when you have your own milk, your own chickens, what do you want? I get a visitor, I slaughter a chicken. A best friend, I slaughter a sheep. In winter I slaughter a beast for my children — because it's cold, the meat would not spoil quickly. That is the life I had planned for my old age.

But now, in my old age, I have to start afresh, at this new place where I have to be careful that small boys do not shoot me. So that is why I say: you people who are still at your own places, stay there! Sit tight!

(Talk given at an AFRA MEETING, in Ladysmith; 30th May '81) □

* The term "GG" derives from the registration plates on Government vehicles and is often used to refer to the government.



Relocation: unloading (2).

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DIPLOMACY AND DELUSION: THE BOTHAS IN SEARCH OF AFRICA

Each year the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) issues a head count of world armies and weapons called *The Military Balance*. Although weighted in favour of the explosive arms build-up in central Europe, the publication's Third World section has steadily grown over the years.

A few weeks ago the 1988-89 edition crossed my desk and I turned up "Sub-Saharan Africa". It makes dismal reading: increased expenditure, more sophisticated weapons and deepening outside involvement in the region's many conflicts. The phrase which struck me, however, was, "the balance (in the Angolan war) was tilting against South Africa." All the evidence suggests that this is fair comment on what has happened over the past year. But has this setback altered the primacy of South Africa in the region? The answer is obviously, no. Nevertheless, things have changed and the Bothas have sought to carve-out new African trails to counter the reversals.

★ ★ ★

Two refrains — it overstates their importance to call them doctrines — have driven Pretoria's African strategies since the mid-1960s: South Africa is an African power and the route back to international acceptability lies through Africa. John Vorster's trilogy of *African Efforts*² were part of the search to give substance to these understandings; P. W. Botha's much-vaunted "constellation of states" had the same goals. When stripped of rhetoric, all were driven by a fairly base reality: *apartheid* has formally isolated South Africa. Anxiety is added to isolation by boycotts and sanctions. The reaction is to do something close to home which avoids tackling *apartheid* itself: Africa provides thus a diversionary hinterland.

But where do the recent journeys lead? Are they a real breakthrough or was President P. W. Botha exaggerating with his triumphant claim that "Africa is talking to South Africa"? This short article explores these and other questions before turning to reiterate old truths.

NAMIBIA: FREE AT LAST?

Like many other international disputes, the one over Namibia has an intractable quality. The contest for control of the territory — in the United Nations alone, that is — has been going since the League of Nations final session in 1946. Three international court cases and countless deaths later, is the South African government finally willing to settle?

Yes, is the quick answer. Why? Because the tide of the war in neighbouring Angola turned. A more reasoned response holds that a settlement in Namibia can buy time and open periodic — but unstable, as we shall see — contacts with Africa.

On top of these considerations, the post-1945 truism that invading armies lose the battle in their own bedrooms played an immediate role in concentrating the official mind on a peace. Just two examples illustrate this point. *Insig* — the Nasionale Pers monthly news digest — carried a remarkable cover on its August edition. In descending order three banners announced (with translations) "Die oorlog in Angola" (The war in Angola); "Kenners oor Soldates" (Experts comment on stress amongst soldiers); "Raak SA Bankrot?" (Is South Africa becoming bankrupt?). The cover picture however left no illusions about the seriousness of these issues. It showed the near-nude, blood-stained body of a wounded white cradled in an army-issue groundsheet. In the near corner was an army boot; only two visible hands clasped the cradle: one white, the other black.

The second example was even closer to the bone: *Die Kerkbode*, official mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church, asked "whether South Africa would not be acting morally and ethically to withdraw completely her troops from Angola?" (my translation).

Although patently not nearly akin to a Vietnam syndrome, sections of white public opinion have turned against³ the Namibian war. This was underscored by the government's banning of the End Conscription Campaign after they had staged a number of high-profile public meetings on the Angolan/Namibian situation.

But was this enough to abandon long-held interests in southern Angola?

The government's determination to press ahead with talks on ending their presence in Angola took even seasoned observers by surprise. More remarkable was the suggestion that — indeed — Namibia might finally be independent. A series of parleys saw a rhythm emerge which was characterised by Pretoria's determination not to give an inch on Namibia until there were serious concessions on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

The immediate strategic considerations aside, the Cuban factor has been central to South Africa's relationship with the United States these past eight years. President Reagan's determination to oppose "Marxist forces" world-wide dovetailed with South Africa's desire to do precisely the same in its own backyard. But times change, and there were no guarantees that a new President might be so convinced of the need to follow the Reagan Doctrine. Besides, adventuring in blind opposition to Communism does not really lend itself to the new mood — to which we will return — between the Superpowers.

Clearly, it is not possible to set strategic considerations aside and all evidence suggests that the failure of the South African Airforce (SAAF) to lend cover led to a serious reversal at Cuito Cuanavale. Understandably, the SADF and the SAAF, in particular, refute this claim. But informed western sources seem to have no doubt that the siege of Cuito was South Africa's bridge too far. Why the SAAF failed is an important question. The successful deployment of a radar system in south and central Angola was effective against well-trained SAAF pilots. More importantly, the arms embargo and the resulting failure to secure craft which could match what the combined Soviet-Cuban-Angolan forces could put in the air decimated an important strategic advantage.

TURNING POINT

The turning point came sometime in late-February or early-March. Then the Cubans, who had hung back, took a tougher stand turning certain Angolan defeat into victory. Later in May, the Cubans advised the Americans that they were deploying a crack Brigade to open a new front in the south; authorities on the war claim that Washington "did nothing to discourage Havana". By the end of May, the Cubans had 15 000 troops along a 500 kilometer band north of the Namibian border. The subsequent skirmish at the Caleque Dam in which up to thirteen national servicemen were killed was, according to the same American sources, a "sobering experience" for both sides.⁴ Pretoria wanted out.

Serious political problems remain in Luanda — Unita being the most important. Here, South African interests meshed immediately with those of the United States. So, although not at the talks, Savimbi's interests were represented by his most intimate patron, South Africa supported by the United States. Realistically, however, politics are secondary to the agonising process of trying to set Angola back on the path to economic recovery because the war has crippled the country. The haunting question for the Angolans remains: can there be economic recovery without the discovery of some device to include Savimbi in their government?

The South African team at the negotiations, which was led by the talented Director General of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden, was an interesting one because it included Dr Neil Barnard of National Intelligence and the SADF's General Jannie Geldenhuys. Presumably, the possibility that sectional interests within the state bureaucracy might kibosh the separate packages of the peace process as these were cobbled together, had to be avoided. In the entire exercise the self-styled doves in Department of Foreign Affairs were leading, but the gnawing question remains whether the final package will be accepted and implemented by the State Security Council. Parenthetically, diplomatic sources were of the opinion that Geldenhuys was "strongly" committed to the process but that Barnard was "more difficult to read".

Prospects for Namibian independence were sweetened by the persuasive argument that a SWAPO government in Windhoek would have limited manoeuvrability. The degree of economic integration

with the Republic is simply staggering: an estimated 80 cents in every Rand in that country is generated from, or mortgaged to, South Africa. In addition, the very intimacy of the SADF with the country also poses huge problems for the new government. Having been there for seventy years, the SADF knows the location of every lightswitch, every pane of glass. This makes Namibia far and away the most vulnerable southern African state, strategically speaking. As if to emphasise this point, the South African Navy staged a spectacular training exercise in and around the enclave of Walvis Bay, as the talk of independence gained currency.

NKOMATI AGAIN?

The same sets of regional dependencies which may have set Namibia on the path to independence partially account for the rekindling of a relationship with Mozambique. The sheer extent of Mozambique's economic integration with South Africa is difficult to exaggerate. Add to this an horrific war fought against shadowy — to use the Mozambican term — bandits, and it is not difficult to see why the Chissano government has been so keen to talk to Pretoria. Only South Africa can cut off the supply lines which keep the bandits in their murky trade.

But the pressure on Pretoria to enter a rapprochement with Mozambique also follows deepening international concern over the plight of neighbouring states, especially Mozambique. Mrs Thatcher is said to have taken a personal interest in the Mozambican issue; British pressure on South Africa has been immense and seemingly successful.⁵ Both London and Washington see a direct link between their resistance to sanctions, and the need to strengthen the Frontline states.

Symbolism also played a role in the meeting between President Chissano and President Botha. They met at Songo at the very edge of the Cahora Bassa Dam in which South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal have a financial stake. The re-establishment of functional ties of this kind seem still the best guarantor of harmonious relations and, so the Mozambican's argue, can stem the temptation to foster Renamo's cause.⁶

Although Pretoria is keen to be counted amongst the growing international fraternity of Mozambican friends, the Chissano government has some real cause to suspect that South Africa can lapse into delinquency if its interests seem threatened. In short, as the disastrous failure of the Nkomati Accord shows, South Africa does not have a strong record in keeping its word. Hence, the Songo meeting and the subsequent toing and froing of Ministers and officials has not quite reached the fever pitch which marked the March 1984 signing of the Nkomati Accord.

IN THE HEART OF THE JUNGLE

Understandably, the Bothas will regard the day trip to Gbadolite, President Mobuto's birthplace, as the highlight of their African discoveries. This visit makes good sense when seen against the background of the Angolan talks: South Africa's interests in securing a role for Savimbi in Angola are shared by Zaire's President.

While they will be buoyed by the meeting, the Bothas ought, perhaps, to be mindful that Mobuto is not a leader held in high regard in major capitals. This year he has come under intense criticism both from the United States and France, formerly his strongest patrons. An American author noted that in Zaire graft and plain corruption ensured that the country's mineral wealth never bettered "the lot of the ordinary people but . . . (lined) . . . the pockets of President Mobuto Sese Seko and his henchmen."⁷

The point is not further to besmirch Mobuto's record, but simply to record that the high moment of the recent travels was with a leader who — to say it politely — also has bad breath in the international community.

More applause might have been forthcoming from a meeting with the Congolese leader, Denis Sassou-Nguesso who is more favourably viewed in the international community. Indeed, at one moment it seemed as if this might happen until it emerged that the South African government was using its position in the Angolan negotiations to press for bilateral advantage with the Congo. There were some indications, for example, that the Congolese and South African Presidents might meet and, certainly, the SABC TV gave every indication that South Africa's business community could benefit from the contacts made between the two states.

ANY NEW LESSONS FROM OLD TRUTHS?

Given South Africa's isolation and the belief that the path to wider international recognition lies through Africa, the temptation to use all opportunities to press for wider breakthroughs, as in the Congo, is perfectly understandable. However, such efforts are doomed to failure because the essential tenets of Africa's view of South Africa have not altered since the late 1950s — *apartheid* is the wall.

If this is so, how does one account for the periodic cracks which appear in that wall?

With the notable exception of Malawi, South Africa's relations with all African states have been highly unstable, positively erratic. Even the relationship with Lesotho — the clearest example of a "captive state" — has been turbulent. This is an interesting case because more than any other, it demonstrates the power of South Africa's purse: Lesotho will perish without South Africa's economic support. Despite South Africa's strong commitment to make Lesotho "work" — the SADF is building a hospital and South Africa is bankrolling the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme — there was considerable resentment at Pretoria's action during the hi-jack tragedy which marked the visit of the Pope. In anyone's book, this was gross interference in the domestic affairs of another state.

Behaviour of this type highlights the seemingly pathological belief within South Africa that it has a duty to fashion its neighbours (or other African states) into its own version of what is good for them.⁸ There is no clearer example of this than the series of incidents which have become known by the generic term destabilisation. The tell-tale signs of South Africa's hand, especially in the sub-continent, are everywhere to be seen. Even distant Nigeria had cause to sound alarm

bells when it emerged that Pretoria was unduly interested in a small group of islands, belonging to Equatorial Guinea, which are only 20 kilometres from the Nigerian coast.

Exploiting such dependencies, as other states have learnt, both upsets gains and creates wider international suspicion of motives.

States or, rather, individual leaders often take advantage of isolated regimes. This too has also played a role in creating cracks in the wall of isolation, but this also lends itself to chronic instability as the currently strong links with President Banda of Malawi promises to reveal. The end of the Banda era will almost certainly result in new directions.

It is true that international relations turn on opportunism and comparative advantage. However, most modern inter-state relations are conducted within a framework of understandings. This is where the important shifts in the relationship between the Superpowers provide a helpful analogy to this discussion. In the Superpower case, the enthusiasm for the historical changes in the relationship flows from deep-seated paradigmatic shifts within which the United States and the Soviet Union operate. Simply put, the context itself has changed. As a result, the degree of interchanges and the concessions made both publicly and privately between the two sides offer opportunities for new understandings.

In contrast, the relations between South Africa and her new African partners is marked by hesitation which, at times, borders on the grudging. For example, it speaks volumes of diplomatic niceties that South Africa's President still has to visit an African capital, and that no African leader has visited South Africa since 1971.

Thus, for all their claims and impressive list of meanderings, the Bothas have failed in their bid to discover Africa.

Because there are few iron laws in the theory and practice of international relations, it is helpful to highlight them when they do occur. In its search for a wider international role through Africa, South Africa has established such a rule: There can be no lasting breakthroughs with — never mind acceptance of — South Africa until Namibia is independent and *apartheid* ends.

There is no doubt that South Africa ultimately has an African destiny. General Olusegun Obasanjo, the distinguished former Nigerian Head of State and member of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, captured its spirit in closing the Russel C. Leffingwell Lectures in New York in 1987. In a forward-looking and constructive mood, the General writes:

"with the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, whenever it may come, I see an evolving Southern African region of prosperity and stability, making a contribution to the development of the rest of the continent as one of the six confederations of Africa in the twenty-first century."⁹

★ ★ ★

I penned these lines on the eve of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights, and wanted to make the obvious point which follows from the significance of that day. As I did so, however, the latest

issue of *Die Suid-Afrikaan* also crossed my desk. In it Professor J. L. Boshoff, former Rector of the University of the North, put it more strongly than I would dare. He closes a piece entitled, "Veertig Verlore Jare"

(Forty Lost Years), by paraphrasing Shakespeare thus, "The fault, dear fellow Afrikaners, is not in our enemies, but in ourselves that we are the polecats of the world."¹⁰

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1. *The Military Balance*, 1988-1989. London. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988. p. 120.
2. In sequence they were called "The Outward Movement", "Detente" and "Dialogue" and are well analysed in Deon Geldenhuys: *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa Foreign Policy Making*. Johannesburg. MacMillan; for the South African Institute of International Affairs, 1984.
3. Overall public opinion, however, seems to have held fast or strengthened a belief that the war in that country is winnable. For example, in response to the statement, "South Africa cannot win the military struggle against Swapo in the long run" the following percentages disagreed:

Language Affiliation	1988	1986	1984	1982
Afrikaans	86,5	82,5	82,1	81,9
English	65,4	62,5	63,1	59,5

"What do we think? A survey of white opinion on foreign policy issues." No. 4. Analysed by Andre du Pisani. Johannesburg. South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988. p. 16.
4. Private discussion with American colleagues. 9 December, 1988.
5. In a speech delivered before the South African Institute of International Affairs and reported in the *Daily Dispatch*, East London, 8 December 1988, the British Ambassador to South Africa, Robin Renwick, said: "... we have worked hard to

- contribute to the process of attempting to normalise relations between SA and Mozambique, which culminated in the meeting between President Botha and President Chissano."
6. Proof of continued SADF support for the Renamo emerged from a press conference held in Maputo on March 23, 1988, when Paulo Oliveira, a defector from Renamo, named SADF officers who were involved with the movement in Malawi. (Oliveira also named a South African-based university professor who is involved in shaping the movement's political agenda.) *South Africa Dossier*, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, December, 1988.
7. Jennifer Seymour Whitaker. *How Can Africa Survive?* New York, Harper & Row, 1988, pp. 33-34.
8. The Lesotho incident resembles what Dr Gerrit Olivier, Chief Director: Communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs calls "the racialistic and paternalistic overtones which at some stage in the past seemed to permeate our relations towards ... Africa. ..." Contrasting sharply with his claims that "concrete ... (examples) ... of new thinking and innovation in our African policy" ... are now operating. *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 11 December, 1988.
9. Olusegun Obsanjo. *Africa in Perspective: Myths and Realities*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1987. p. 50.
10. J. L. Boshoff. "Veertig Verlore Jare", *Die Suid-Afrikaan*, December 88/January 89, p. 23.

by Michael Worship

A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE LEGION

The Legion of Christ's Witnesses: Change within the Anglican Diocese of Zululand 1948-1984.

R.J. Shorten

Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Communications, No. 15, 1987, 171 pp, R8,00

Richard Shorten has undoubtedly provided Anglican churchophiles with a great deal of information with a certain amount of analysis of the strange and rather curious Zulu-based Anglican movement called *Iviyo lofakazi bakaKristu*, 'The Legion of Christ's Witnesses'. It is exceedingly good that research such as this is being made generally available and as such is a welcome addition to Southern African Anglican studies.

Shorten deals with the movement by tracing its historical origins and development; by looking at its structure and membership procedure; by assessing it as a charismatic movement and by analysing it in terms of its Anglican roots. He goes on to examine the movement in terms of its commitment to holiness, evangelism and prayer.

The movement was begun by two priests in the Zululand and Natal Dioceses in 1948, Philip Mbatha and Alphaeus Zulu. Their desire in starting the movement was to act on the basis of various visionary and paranormal experien-

ces and because of a certain disenchantment with the dryness and equivocation (as they saw it) in the Anglican church. They formed a movement which was essentially extremely High Church in ethos, but which incorporated and encouraged what can only be described as Pentecostal Evangelicalism. The picture which emerges is of a Zulu Anglican Movement which is at one and the same time expressly High Church and which is also consciously charismatic and evangelical. The High Church roots can be explained by the founders' close association with the Community of the Resurrection. The other is more difficult.

Shorten adequately describes the phenomenon but fails to apply any real analysis to it. And in this way, the book is deeply unsatisfying because it never really gets beyond description. Shorten relies heavily on a relatively small body of primary material, which includes laborious use of the movement's prayer book and constitution which are quoted *ad nauseam* and often with little apparent reason. Extensive use is also made of taped recordings of

various addresses given at the movement's 1984 National Conference. These are certainly more interesting than bland constitutional stuff. But I have seldom read more untheological bigotted gumph in my life, and Shorten applies very little or no critical analysis to it. Take the following as an example, which is quoted without **any** theological comment by Shorten:

How can the Church save the world when the Church says homosexuals should get married to each other? It was written in the newspapers – an Anglican priest saying they should be married, that a man should be allowed to say 'my darling' to another man. What does the Word of the Lord say? The Word says: 'Don't you know that sinners won't encounter the kingdom of God.' Do not be misled by fornicators coquettes, idolaters and homosexuals. But the priests today say that homosexuals should be married to each other and be made husband and wife. (p. 111)

Again, there are some extremely interesting examples of testimonies to daemon possession and 'healing', but once again little and (where there is) often facile analysis. I don't think it will do to just report what people say without analysing the social and political **basis** of what they say and what the social and political **implications** of what they say and do are. Perhaps it's OK on Mars, but Zululand is not on Mars.

And this is really my greatest difficulty with the book. It fails completely to grasp the Zulu Nationalist/Inkatha/-right-wing political nettle. It fails to deal with the very real and wide-spread perception that **Iviyo** is Inkatha in pious/enthusiastic/youth-orientated/charismatic religious dress. Shorten skirts around the issue on pp. 44f, where he mentions the problem and the charge that the movement is either apolitical or pro-Inkatha and then suggests rather lamely that:

"negative feelings in Natal towards the Legion predate the establishment, in 1975, of Inkatha" and leaves the matter at that! This is simply not good enough.

There are other curiosities like, for example, the following:

(Shorten is explaining Mbatha's connection with a missionary by the name of John Wall who joined the Community of the Resurrection in the 1930's. I will quote the passage in full because it is so extraordinary)

In early 1934 he left Zululand to test his vocation to the Religious life at the Community of the Resurrection's mother house at Mirfield, England. After professing, he joined the Community at Rosettenville

where he was later murdered by an unknown gunman. Wall's "devout life created a deep impression" on Mbatha. Furthermore he was committed to evangelism . . . (emphasis mine) P.28

Now, I don't know about you, but my curiosity simply **burns** to know just a **little** more about the 'unknown gunman' episode, bugger Wells' 'commitment to evangelism' for the moment!

The phenomenon of **Iviyo** is undoubtedly an extremely interesting one. As a phenomenon of the Anglican church in South Africa it has enormous **political implication**, as does, for example the rise and (perhaps) semi-decline of the charismatic movement in the White churches throughout the country. Both function in a directly **political** way inasmuch as they almost always have a tendency towards a fundamental world-renouncing dualism which focusses on the heavenly and ignores the social and political realities. And both, it seems to me are thus able and often willing allies of a state which wishes Christianity to do precisely that! Thus it is exceedingly odd that the book does not attempt any hardcore analysis of the political thinking of someone as significant as Bishop Alphaeus Zulu for example, who was undoubtedly one of the CPSA's black pioneers in terms of opposing apartheid from the episcopal ranks of the church, but then later aligned himself to Inkatha. This, it seems to me requires considerable explanation in a book on a spiritual movement in the Anglican Church which he was directly involved in founding.

The book ends with a strictly sociological analysis of the movement in terms of J.S. Cumpsty's model of religious change in socio-cultural disturbance which identifies several stages in the phenomenon of religious change as being related to prevailing socio-political contexts. Again, the analysis is largely unhelpful in terms of present day realities, though it does go some way in showing why the movement is quite as popular as it is in certain sectors of the Zululand church. But the analysis is neither in depth enough nor conclusive enough to be of any real value in actually placing **Iviyo** in the wider complex relationship between pointers which could have been very fruitful. but they have been left undeveloped.

In short, the book has a value in that it opens up a previously underdeveloped area. But it is by no means the last word on **Iviyo** nor, I daresay, on the way in which charismatic 'pentecostalism' is used to support the **status quo** in a country where religion is a vital component to the process of 'winning the hearts and minds'.

□