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FIRST MEETING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN/ANGOLAN JOINT
MONITORING COMMISSION : LUSAKA : 16 FEBRUARY 1984

UNITED STATES: Robert Frazure, US Embassy, London.
 J Woods, US Department of Defence.
 Lt.-Col Wenz, US Department of Defence.
 Col D Parker, Military Attaché, US Embassy, Pretoria.
 Ms N Ely, United States State Department.
 Mr M Ranneburger, United States State Department.

ANGOLA: Lt.-Col Ngongo Monteiro, Deputy Chief of Staff.
 Lt.-Col Sabriano Sequiero, Commander, 5th Military Region.
 Major Jose Maria, Security Adviser to President dos Santos.

SOUTH AFRICA: Lt.-Genl J Geldenhuys, SA Defence Force.
 Brig J Joubert, SA Defence Force.
 Col F Oelschig, SA Defence Force.
 Col J Dippenaar, SA Defence Force.
 Cmdt L Le Crerar, SA Defence Force.
 Cmdt P Uys, SA Defence Force.
 Mr D W Steward, Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR FRAZURE said that the Commission did not yet have any rules of procedure and invited comments on how its work should be done.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that the Mulungushi Minute which had been approved by all the parties should serve as a basis

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for the talks.. He wished to mention two points which had been raised by his delegation: Firstly, Angola felt that the Commission should be so located that there would be no South African troops North of it. Therefore, the Commission could not be located at Ngiva until South African forces had withdrawn to the south of the town. Secondly, it had been agreed that the US observers would not enter Angola but would stay in South West Africa and could attend meetings of the Commission on the border.

MR FRAZURE said that it had been agreed on the political side that the Mulungushi text would not be altered. There was an oral understanding that the Commission could from the beginning meet either at Ngiva or on the border. The United States observers would participate only in the meetings on the border. It was understood that the Commission meetings at Ngiva would initially take place behind South African lines, operating on the assumption that the line would be moving south, eventually below Ngiva. Angola had indicated that it was not comfortable with this proposal and that it might be better to have the location of the Commission moving south with the line of South African withdrawal. It was felt that this question could best be discussed in the Commission.

GENL GELDENHUYS, after introducing the South African delegation, said that there was no obstacle from the South African side. The basic point was that South Africa had no troops in the area in question except those which had been earmarked for monitoring. He fully understood the right of the Commission to verify this. Thus if the Commission had its headquarters behind South African lines it could be

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located at any point from Ngiva northwards. South Africa could also accept the idea that the Commission would move southwards with the South African line of withdrawal. When the Commission began to establish its operational capability, South Africa would make the forces now in Angola available to it for the mixed monitoring teams which would be deployed by the Commission.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he thought that the South African forces should be withdrawn stage by stage. If Angola agreed that Ngiva should be the Headquarters of the Commission then all the South African forces to the north of Ngiva would have to be withdrawn to the Ngiva line. When this line had been reached the Commission would begin to function at Ngiva. Would the Commission comprise security forces or working groups?

GENL GELDENHUYS replied that before decisions could be taken on the composition of the Commission it would be necessary to decide what the Commission's functions would be. This in turn would determine the organization, size and composition of the mixed teams. What Angola wished to establish was that there would be no South African troop presence in the area in question. South Africa wanted to have the Commission verify that there would be no SWAPO and Cuban presence in the area in question. GENL GELDENHUYS could not see how the Commission itself could carry out these functions in so large an area. It was therefore clear that it would have to have services which would be able to carry out these tasks. Mixed monitoring teams could carry out this function under the control of the Joint Commission. To determine the numbers of personnel

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individual monitoring teams. South Africa had also said that might be required it would be necessary to visualise what might happen in practice. If there were a breach of the agreement, if for example a South African soldier was found in Xangongo, then two members of the Commission could fly there in a helicopter. Likewise, if a solitary SWAPO soldier was observed in the area then one or two members of the Commission plus one or two soldiers could go to investigate. The other extreme was that if there was an allegation that South Africa had violated the agreement by sending a company of soldiers across the border on their way to Iondi in the bush it would be necessary to take monitoring teams to investigate on foot. The mixed team would have to be large enough to assure its own protection. Between these extremes there would be many cases. The Commission would have to decide on standards for monitoring, always with a section of personnel from South Africa and a section from Angola. There should be a pool of personnel at Ngiva if that was where the Commission would be located. The Commission would then be able to send out two or four teams or however many might be necessary. The troops which South Africa had in the area in question would be made available to the Commission for this purpose. The Commission would then be in a position to satisfy itself about compliance with the agreement. If the Angolans wanted South Africa to give its northernmost forces to the Commission's first, it would do so. Otherwise South Africa could present all its forces remaining in the area in question to the Commission at once.

MR FRAZURE said that he understood that South Africa had agreed to parity of forces which would also apply to

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individual monitoring teams. South Africa had also said that its remaining force in Angola would be available to the Commission. It would be necessary to decide how many personnel the Commission would require. The remaining South African forces would be subject to the disengagement process.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that South Africa had already earmarked those troops which would be required for monitoring.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he fully agreed with regard to the functions of the Commission. The question was the method of control. The Angolan view was that these forces should be concentrated at Ngiva or Mupo or wherever the Commission had its Headquarters. However, no South African forces should be deployed in the area which the Commission would control.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that he would like to clarify two points. There would be no South African troops north of the Commission's Headquarters and those that were there would be presented to the Commission. The Angolans had said that the mixed teams should be located at the Commission. Theoretically South Africa agreed. But the Commission had an obligation to investigate breaches of the accord. If the teams stayed at the Commission's Headquarters at Ngiva then it would mean that they would be able to monitor only in the area of the Commission if South Africa alleged that SWAPO was busy infiltrating along four, five or six routes it was assumed that monitoring teams would be deployed on the routes in question to see whether

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the allegation was accurate. All the monitoring teams could start off at Ngiva but they would have to be deployed in order to be able to carry out their functions.

MR FRAZURE said that there appeared to be a semantic difference between investigation and patrolling. However, there seemed to be broad agreement between the sides. He asked whether the area in question could be discussed.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that he first wished to clear up the question of the location of the Commission Headquarters. In this regard he could make two suggestions. If Angola wanted to start with the Commission further north than Ngiva South Africa would withdraw all its troops to the north of that location and would make them available for mixed monitoring teams and would then move the Commission southward until it was located at Ngiva. However, South Africa would also be prepared to withdraw all its troops north of Ngiva and present them to the Commission, subject to the requirement that monitoring teams would be able to travel anywhere in the area in question.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he would like to refer to the question of the location of the Commission Headquarters. Angola wished to refer to the question of phased withdrawal. In terms of this concept the Headquarters of the Commission would be at Cuvelai during the first week of the process. South African troops would then be withdrawn south of Cuvelai. The next week the South African units could be withdrawn south of Mupa and then the Commission would have its Headquarters at Mupa. The Angolan forces would move into the vacated areas. The next week the

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Headquarters could move down to Ngiva and the Angolans would be to the north of Ngiva. By the time the South African forces had finally withdrawn to South West Africa the Commission would move to the border.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO asked whether South Africa was saying that GENL GELDENHUYS said that this had in fact been the first suggestion which South Africa had made to the Angolans and was therefore acceptable. In terms of it the Commission would move step by step further south with no South African troops to the north subject to the condition that mixed monitoring teams would be able to move to places in the north to monitor allegations with regard to the agreement.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO confirmed that if there were allegations concerning SWAPO presence to the north of the Commission Headquarters there would be mixed monitoring patrols to investigate such allegations.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that this was the same as the South African proposal which had been made a couple of days earlier. There would be Angolan patrols to the north, South African patrols to the south with mixed Commission monitoring teams in the whole area.

MR FRAZURE observed that any allegations from any sources would have to be investigated by the Commission.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that South Africa accepted the general idea expressed by Angola. The Commission should exercise its functions in the area described as the area in question. But if the Commission Headquarters ended up at the border it would not be located centrally enough. It

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should therefore not be on the border but should be in a more central position until the Commission ceased to function.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO asked whether South Africa was saying that after South African forces had withdrawn from Angola the Commission should continue to have its Headquarters in Angola?

GENL GELDENHUYS replied that this was the case, because the Commission's function was to make sure that the disengagement agreement would be respected.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that it had been agreed that Angolan forces should operate to the north of the line and South African forces to the south of the line. The Angolan border police should patrol the South West Africa/Angola border with South African forces on the southern side of the border.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that he agreed that when the two sides had reached this last stage all South African forces would have been withdrawn to the south of the border except those which were part of the Commission monitoring teams. At this stage if there were few incidents the number of monitoring teams could be reduced.

MR FRAZURE said that he thought that this was a semantic problem. As he saw it the movement of the Headquarters would be to the south so that at the end of the 30 day period the Commission would be located at the border. The area in question would however remain an entity and the

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Angolan commitment not to allow SWAPO or the Cubans in the area would remain. Naturally the South African commitment not to allow any South African defence force units in the area in question would also remain. The monitoring team should also remain in the area to operate as discussed. The assumption would be that by that time there would be a stable situation; that the agreement would be honoured by both sides; that all sides would be moving ahead toward Resolution 435 as quickly as possible and that the joint monitoring teams would not have to be used very much.

(NOTE: At this stage Mr Steward sent Mr Frazure the following note:

"Bob,

You are pushing expectations on 435. Don't put us in a position where we have to restate our position too categorically."

Frazure replied:

"Don't forget, Dave, its our position too - indeed, I believe it was our position before it was your position!")

On its resumption MR FRAZURE said that South Africa had LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that the Commission should be established on the border after 30 days at a place to be decided and that the Commission's functions could be extended for another 30 days. Angola did not agree that at that stage the joint Commission should be located at Ngiva. It could be at a place like Ruacana. Perhaps it

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might be at Oshikango. Until Resolution 435 began the Commission would continue with its functions.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that he wished to discuss this question of the final location of the Commission with his delegation. He agreed that the monitoring system could be extended for longer periods. His government saw the monitoring system as necessary to establish whether it should be extended. South Africa was in agreement that the Commission should continue to function at least until it had moved to Ngiva at which stage South Africa would have to decide whether it should be continued. GENL GELDENHUYS said that he understood the Cape Verde agreement to mean that Angola had agreed to re-assert its sovereignty in a gradual manner. He did not know what his government's position would be if the gradual southward withdrawal of the South African forces meant that the Commission would not finally be located at Ngiva. He then suggested that if the final position of the Commission Headquarters at Ngiva was a problem, the meeting should decide where the first and subsequent locations should be. He suggested that the first location should be as Cuvelai.

The meeting then adjourned for luncheon.

On its resumption MR FRAZURE said that South Africa had agreed that final location of the Commission should be on the border.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that the first location should be at Cuvelai but that a meeting should first take place between the commanders of the two military regions. After a week the Commission Headquarters would move to Mupa.

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GENL GELDENHUYS requested that the meeting should consider the timing later and should deal with the locations first.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO then suggested the following series of locations: Cuvelai, Mupa, Evale, Ngiva, Oshikango. The process would cover a period of 30 days. However, he had to inform the other side that a problem had been raised by the presence near Mupa of a brigade of UNITA "bandits". He wished to remind the South African side that this was a problem in the area presently under control of the South African Government.

MR FRAZURE said that all sides should take note of this and discuss it at a later meeting.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that South Africa agreed that each of the phases should last one week. However, he would like to make an observation about the first period. They should agree on a date on which the joint Commission should meet at Cuvelai. A week after that date it would then move southward to the next location.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO suggested 25 February for the first meeting.

GENL GELDENHUYS asked whether this was the date on which the Commission should next meet or on which it would be considered to have started functioning.

It was agreed that this was the date on which the Commission would have been considered to have started functioning.

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LT.-COL MONTEIRO pointed out that between Techamutete and Cuvelai there were mine fields. The Angolan forces would move down to Cuvelai by the 25th of February. South African forces should clear the mine fields. Angola would keep the South African forces informed in this regard.

MR FRAZURE said that with effect from the Commission's next meeting on the 25th of February the 30 day clock would start.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO suggested that a joint force should be established to clear the mine fields.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that this posed no problem. South Africa could include engineers. The Angolans and South Africans could clear the mine fields together.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that the Angolans would prefer to clear the mine fields from the direction of Techamutete toward Cuvelai but it would be necessary to have a meeting of military officers earlier.

GENL GELDENHUYS said that it would be necessary to have a means of communication to discuss such questions. He requested that the Angolans furnish South Africa with frequencies, dates and times to enable radio contacts to be established.

MR FRAZURE said that the United States had reliable same day communications with the Angolan Government in Luanda and would be happy to place these at the disposal of the two parties.

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GENL GELDENHUYS said that he agreed as well but that it

LT.-COL MONTEIRO asked whether communication would take place in English or Portuguese and whether it would be open or in secret.

GENL GELDENHUYS suggested that the United States channel could be used. South Africa would want to send information concerning the arrival, number of personnel, of the mission etc. He asked whether a meeting could be held between the Angolan commander and the South African commander to discuss these problems.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO suggested that a meeting should take place at Chicuo on the 25th February at 10 am. The first meeting of the Commission would then take place on the 1st of March 1984 at Cuvelai.

GENL GELDENHUYS suggested that the meeting might take place at Xangongo.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO replied that Angola had no forces at Xangongo and was nervous about the possibility of a UNITA attack. Angola was aware that UNITA was moving into the area including Mupa and Quiteve. He then suggested that the meeting take place at Chiangi.

MR FRAZURE said he though it would be useful to define the area in question as the area currently occupied by South Africa.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he agreed.

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GENL GELDENHUYS said that he agreed as well but that it would be useful to draw a line on the map. He suggested that the line should go from Marianfluss on the Cunene river to Iona to Oncocua to a point to the south of Cahama then northeast to the point ten kilometres south of Cassinga the area directly eastward to the Cabango river and down the Cabango river to the South West African border.

LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he agreed with this definition since it was an accurate reflection of the actual situation.

GENL GELDENHUYS then said that there was a last point which he wished to make. He said that during the main conference the question of Calueque had been raised. It had been decided by the main conference that this question would be left to the Commission. It was reasonable since it could be regarded as a security question and could be dealt with by the Commission. GENL GELDENHUYS suggested that if the other side felt that this had not the original intention for the Commission it could be agreed that the Commission would be able to give attention to any questions which might be referred to it by the two Governments. He suggested that this question should be considered a later stage.

The meeting then adjourned after an exchange of courtesies.

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"Alexandre Rodrigues, "Vice" Minister of Interior
 Pedro Maria Tavares, "Vice" Minister of Defence
 Venancio Dourado, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Elvino de Figueiredo, Angolan Ambassador to the SW
 Andre Miranda, Angolan Ambassador to Zambia"