

GEHEIM SECRET

1/33/3/5

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND
AMERICAN DELEGATIONS ON MATTERS CONCERNING
SOUTHERN AFRICA : VIENNA 19 AND 20 MAY 1977

South African delegation:

Prime Minister
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Secretary for Foreign Affairs
General van den Bergh
Ambassador Sole
D.S. Franklin
J.A. Eksteen

United States delegation:

Vice-President Mondale
Mr Aaron : Deputy-Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mr Lake : Director of Policy Planning in the
State Department
Ambassador McHenry : United States Ambassador on the US
Delegation to the UN
Mr Johnson : Executive Assistant to the Vice-
President
Mr Bowdler : US Ambassador in South Africa
Mr Katzen : Foreign Service Officer of the US
Mission at the UN
Mr Clift : Assistant to the Vice-President for
National Security Affairs.

File

The Vice-President opened the discussions by stating that there were three general areas to which his delegation wishes to draw attention, namely

- (a) Rhodesia
- (b) Namibia
- (c) South Africa.

He suggested that a start be made with Rhodesia and enquired whether the Prime Minister would give an appraisal of the situation in that country.

Prime Minister pointed out that it was not clear to what extent we are aware of recent developments on the Owen initiative and asked the Vice-President whether he had recently seen Dr Owen.

Vice-President said he would be seeing Dr Owen shortly. The present position is that the US supports the Owen effort to establish a constitution for Rhodesia leading to elections in 1978. The original suggestion was for some sort of constitutional conference. Now a beginning is to be made with a series of bilateral discussions and the US will be in support of those efforts. Hopefully the discussions would lead to a consensus on what form a constitution should take. The US have appointed Ambassador Low (their Ambassador in Lusaka) as the US participant in discussions (it was mentioned off the record that Ambassador Low would shortly be accorded a higher position in the State Department and that he is experienced on African matters). The US hopes that these consultations will lead to a consensus on the approach to be adopted towards the Rhodesian question. The hope was expressed that South Africa will put pressure on Mr Smith to help the process and to agree to free elections in which all parties will be able to participate for the establishment of a new government in 1978.

US has not outlined or defined a possible constitution for Rhodesia. This will be developed in the course of consul=

tations. The group will be in Salisbury on 22 and 23 May. Although the US will not define in detail what the constitution will be, it will support the ideas put forward by the British.

Prime Minister reviewed the situation briefly. He stated that Mr Smith in 1973 and 74 had certain discussions with him after the failure of the meetings with Wilson on Tiger and Fearless and the failure of the Home initiative. Smith also had talks with Muzorewa which broke down in 1974.

It was during that time that South Africa established contact with Dr Kaunda and we even sent emissaries there. Genl. van den Bergh visited Lusaka five to seven times. A certain rapport was established with Zambia and at the end of 1974 Zambia asked South Africa to get Nkomo and Sithole out of detention, and requested the Rhodesian authorities to allow them to proceed to Zambia for discussions with the Front Line Presidents. We contacted the Rhodesian Government and Mr Smith ultimately agreed to release both Nkomo and Sithole from detention. The South African Government then at its own expense flew Nkomo and Sithole to Zambia in order that they could have the requested talks with the Front Line Presidents. If it was not for South Africa's effort, both Nkomo and Sithole might well still be in detention - so we were as helpful as we could possibly be as we felt that Rhodesians should come together and talk. We also helped arrange further meetings in Pretoria, Salisbury and Lusaka. Subsequently it was felt that they should have a meeting where all black leaders would meet with the Smith Government. There then followed the Victoria Falls conference which was also attended by the South African Prime Minister. We did our best to bring the parties together and played our part, but we could of course not prescribe to them what they should do. If asked whether Mr Smith is willing to come to an agreement, the reply must be yes, he is ready to come to an understanding. He is prepared to accept majority or black rule in Rhodesia and is reconciled to that fact. Mr Smith however faces a difficulty in that he does not

know with whom to negotiate. Geneva had been a shambles and pushed the parties further away from each other - in fact, it was a pity it ever happened.

The position in Rhodesia as far as the black people are concerned is that Mugabe has not got a following of more than 2 or 3%, Nkomo approximately 2 to 16%, Chirau perhaps 15%, Muzorewa approximately 60 to 70% and other parties the rest.

Vice-President What is the Prime Minister's view of the Owen initiative?

Prime Minister He will not stand in the way of achieving settlement. He was sure that Dr Owen will have told the Americans that South Africa's attitude could not be faulted and if it is felt that we can do more, we are prepared to discuss the matter.

Vice-President United States view of the position is that there are many disparate groups with different objectives and in order to have an effective process of government selected by the Rhodesian people, there is a need for a negotiating instrument and a constitution selected by the people of Rhodesia.

Prime Minister agrees.

Vice-President United States does not want to get into a position of electing leaders. It wants the people of Rhodesia and not others to make a judgement about the future in Rhodesia, but there is a big gap between achievement of these aims and the actual position in Rhodesia today.

Prime Minister If there was an election today in Rhodesia, Muzorewa will be elected overwhelmingly.

Vice-President That may be so. United States' personal judgement is that there is no alternative but to accept a

government elected by the people and the crucial elements are fairness, openness and full participation of all peoples of Rhodesia. United States estimates that this will bring about moderate leadership in Rhodesia.

There are many difficulties in arriving at this situation. White leaders feel afraid and wish to achieve some measure of weighting the votes that would frustrate the ability of all citizens to participate. United States strongly support the Owen objective of moving towards a constitution based on consultation of all parties and participation in a constitution on an open basis with free and fair elections.

The United States feels that South Africa can be helpful by pressing those parties with whom it has influence to get them to accept the results flowing from a fair constitution and elections. United States would try and get other parties to agree to this process. United States thinks there is reluctance on both sides to accept what might prejudice victory for a certain group. Mr Smith still thinks of gaining a constitution where he and his other allies have certain blocking powers. United States hopes that South Africa will pressure Mr Smith to agree to the process of the establishment of a constitution and agreement on elections.

Prime Minister points out that with due respect that we have passed that point. Mr Smith has accepted the position already. There has been a revolution in Mr Smith's party and he has expelled the rebels from the party. He has resigned himself to the situation. Mr Smith's difficulty is that he accepts black majority rule, but does not know to which black man he must hand over. To achieve an ideal situation in Rhodesia, there should be a referendum amongst the black people to elect a leader and then Mr Smith and that leader could sit around a table and discuss the question of handing over authority. However, if somebody from outside Rhodesia wishes to put Nkomo and Mugabe in power, then there will not be any prospect of getting anywhere with Mr Smith.

Vice-President United States position is that all Rhodesians, black and white, should choose their leaders. It rejects the internal option where a certain black man is elected from others as a leader. The object of Dr Owen is to agree on a constitution which will ensure an election of integrity and a government which could govern the country. The problem of Geneva was that it became snarled up as to who should take part. The United States want to press for a process which will lead to a constitution followed by an election to elect a Rhodesian Government. It does not believe that Mr Smith has accepted that process. In Geneva Mr Smith pressed for a structure which would lead to disproportionate representation of whites and which would block the will of the people of Rhodesia. This was unacceptable to recognised black opinion in Rhodesia and to international opinion. The United States would like South Africa to persuade Mr Smith to join in the process of the Owen mission and not to limit the South African position to what Mr Smith will agree to, but to press Mr Smith to accept the process they envisage whilst the United States would press others to do so. There are also black leaders who do not want elections. The United States rejects this too, as all Rhodesian people will have to decide for themselves what they want.

Prime Minister When this matter was discussed thoroughly with Dr Kissinger, there was agreement on five points. The Prime Minister said to Mr Smith in front of Dr Kissinger that if Mr Smith accepted the five points and if at any future time he did not adhere to these points, then South Africa would drop him. He could go no further. He had told Dr Kissinger in front of Mr Smith that he would guarantee that Mr Smith would accept the five points. If in Rhodesia they arrived at an agreement that they would have an election to find a black leader with the biggest following, South Africa would be prepared to accept that.

Vice-President United States prepared to agree. One point should be made, however, namely United States always

preferred to state that a government should be headed by the winner of a fair and proper election. Such a person need not necessarily be black. United States has had many experiences where black leaders have been elected by white people and vice versa. Colour does not enter into the picture.

Prime Minister warned the Vice-President that he should not equate the United States position with the situation in Rhodesia and South Africa, because the situation in those countries were quite different.

Vice-President In an election all must participate and none excluded. Those Rhodesians outside the country should be allowed to come home and participate in an election based on universal suffrage.

Prime Minister It is important that there must be some sort of negotiation between Mr Smith and black leaders to negotiate the modalities of an election, etc.

Vice-President His impression is that the Owen Mission is designed to establish a situation under which there would be an election which will establish a Rhodesian Government. It is not a question of electing leaders who will negotiate with Mr Smith.

Prime Minister stated that he was not informed on that score as far as the Owen mission was concerned.

Vice-President If we talk about an election of a black leader to negotiate with Mr Smith, then we are back to the internal option and the United States cannot accept it.

Prime Minister pointed out that Rhodesia is small but sophisticated. He has talked to black Rhodesians and they have told him that they have not got qualified people to run Rhodesia and that as many whites as possible will have to help run it. They do not want a situation of the Angola

type to arise in Rhodesia.

Vice-President would hope that as there is progress towards majority government, that what the Prime Minister wishes will be accomplished. In negotiating a constitution for Rhodesia, provision will be made for protection for persons and their property which would make Rhodesia more attractive and popular for all, including whites.

Prime Minister But then the whites must have guarantees. Unless the United States can satisfy the whites that properties will not be confiscated, businesses nationalized and that there is law and order, they will not remain. If Mugabe and others like him take over, they would proceed with confiscation and nationalisation, would set up peoples courts etc. and if that were to be envisaged, then one could forget about a settlement in Rhodesia.

Vice-President Talks are desirable to provide for protection of property, freedom of speech and religion, right of assembly and an independent judiciary. In the process of these talks these questions referred to would have to be clearly spelled out. The United States desires white people to remain settled in Rhodesia. There will be need for security regulations to secure the safety of the people and also protection of their electoral process. Details could be worked out in bilateral consultations starting up next week in Salisbury.

It would be helpful if the South African Government could say that it would support the process and urge participation in an acceptance of the results. The United States would accept a process leading to this form of government. If there is movement on a course contributing to moderation where the people of Rhodesia would accept free elections properly constituted, the chances of radicalization will be reduced. The longer the delay, the more demanding will the radicals become and the more intolerant the situation becomes, the greater will be the possibility for the Communists to enter the picture because the last thing they want is a stable Rhodesia.

Prime Minister He should say outright that if Dr Owen or the Vice-President were to state their objectives publicly, as now stated, then firstly there is no doubt that white Rhodesians would accept it and the majority of black Rhodesians too. He could add that if these objectives were stated in this way, then they would also have the full backing of the South African Government as far as might be necessary. But these assurances must be given and they must be given in such a way that the Rhodesians can be in no doubt as to what is intended. And if that is coupled with the Zimbabwe Fund already talked about, then there could be a settlement - and then they could look to the South African Government to see that Smith carries out his part and the United States must ensure that Mugabe and Nkomo fall into line.

Vice-President The United States does not know yet whether they could get the support of all the so-called black leaders in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the United States objective is to ensure that the Owen mission achieves its objectives and gains the support of the Front Line Presidents, and it will do everything it can to support such a government once established. The United States would then intend to be active in support of the Zimbabwe Fund and would have Congress behind them.

Prime Minister If that can be established, then it will have South Africa's support.

Vice-President stressed again that he would like South Africa's support in public for the objectives of the Owen mission. Mr Smith must be pressed to negotiate a settlement with majority rule through a fair election in 1978, setting that as the date of independence and to agree with the United States and others to work with the government fairly chosen under such a constitution and assist the United States to reduce tension, that will be trying to break the process apart. He enquired whether these steps make sense.

Prime Minister Yes, if they bring in guarantees such as freedom of property from nationalization, an independent judiciary and so on.

Vice-President He had described what he hoped the constitution would provide and would be pushing for this. They desired a society of Rhodesians which would be multiracial, whose people would be secure and wished to remain there. He would again emphasize the necessity for guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, religion, equal justice before the law and due process for protection of property. That is, no property to be confiscated without due compensation. That would be the general outline including an independent judicial tribunal.

Prime Minister He understood that Dr Owen would consult with various parties and that then the British, with United States backing, would draw up the constitution to be put to the various parties before being passed by the British Parliament. If the constitution is drawn up embracing the points covered during the current talks, then he would feel that the constitution would also have to embody the Zimbabwe Fund, in which case he is certain Rhodesian Whites would accept it.

Vice-President Would the Prime Minister press them to do so?

Prime Minister Did not like the word "press", because he had never pressed Mr Smith. He talked sense to him and pointed out facts to him. He must never be asked to press Mr Smith, because he had never done so and would not do so.

Vice-President Let us say that we are trying to agree on a process which would be internationally acceptable. There exists enormous respect for Mr Smith's obstinacy and before success of the process envisaged, they would encounter obstinacy - not only from Mr Smith, but also from other people. But as far as Mr Smith is concerned, many people are of the

opinion that the Prime Minister can be exceedingly persuasive with him. On the other hand, public opinion has felt that the Prime Minister would support Mr Smith in his obstinacy if he refused to budge. If the Prime Minister did not like to word "press", was there not a different formulation to express how he could use his good offices to get Mr Smith to accept the process envisaged.

Prime Minister The Vice-President is obsessed with the obstinacy of Mr Smith. His assessment is that the problem will not be with Mr Smith, but with Nkomo and Mugabe.

Vice-President There is no doubt that it is not only with Mr Smith that there will be problems.

Prime Minister suggested that it will be 20% Mr Smith and 80% Mr Nkomo and Mugabe.

Vice-President The expectation is that if the process envisaged is embarked upon, the Rhodesian Government would be moderate.

Prime Minister The best procedure would be for the blacks to elect a black leader, but it would seem that this is now impossible. He suggested, therefore, that the best way for Dr Owen to proceed is to draft a constitution and if the various assurances given above were all in that constitution and there are guarantees from the United States and British sides that they would uphold the government elected and that sanctions would be lifted, then they would get all the cooperation they wanted for the completion of the process from both the whites in Rhodesia and from the South African government.

Vice-President Expressed the hope that Mr Smith would take part in the consultations.

Prime Minister Has suggested to Mr Smith that he should. The United States should get terrorists to hold their horses.

Vice-President The United States would hope that Dr Owen would achieve success in having a constitution adopted with all Zimbabweans being allowed to participate equally and fairly in elections - they would then hope to have the Zimbabwe Fund to help its growth, to contribute to its infrastructure and to set it on the path of economic growth - they would also be prepared to consider other forms of aid to a government properly elected.

Prime Minister If that is not achieved, then there would not be a settlement.

Vice-President As he understood it the constitution is such that the United States could not guarantee that the people of Zimbabwe would not elect for themselves a government that believes in some form of government ownership such as the United Kingdom has. But the United States would hope that the constitution would provide for the protection from violation of property, free speech, religion and assembly, i.e. what is legitimate for democracy. He pointed out, however, that most countries have some form of public ownership, for example public airlines.

Prime Minister Let us ask what the ordinary Rhodesian is concerned about. The farmer is concerned about his farm not being confiscated. The pensioner about the security of his pension. The city dweller that his property is guaranteed. If the United States could say they are prepared to uphold the new government and that there would be a fund to repay people for expropriation, then he could see no objection.

Vice-President They envisage that no property would be taken without due process of law and just compensation, but the Zimbabwe Fund could not be used to buy out Whites. The United States sees the fund as a means to help train and promote skills in Rhodesia, to assist the infrastructure for a modern economy and to provide essential capital for Rhodesians and

to get the economy on a sound basis. It would, however, be the responsibility of the Rhodesian government to secure the Rhodesian people against expropriation, etc.

Minister Botha referred to the original purpose of the Fund. He pointed out that in Washington they had reached quite an advanced stage about the objective of the fund in talks in which he had participated. In terms of those talks, the purposes of the fund would also have provided the form of guarantee that if some people wished to leave Rhodesia, there would be a sliding scale on which such people would be compensated.

Vice-President Agreed that that was the original nature of the fund, but the position had since changed.

Minister Botha This is the first time we have heard about it. The first official intimation from the United States. Dr Owen had said the fund was still very much alive a few weeks ago.

Vice-President The fund is still alive, but it has for some time been decided that the fund would not operate on a buy-out proposition. Instead, it would be for sound development policies and programmes and ensure proper and fair treatment of the white population. It would not be possible to pass a bill on the original buy-out proposition and they could not accept the position as outlined previously.

Minister Botha This is a drastic and radical change and he would repeat that it was the first intimation we now had of such change and it made our position very difficult. Dr Owen had had a duty to tell us about this, but he had not.

Prime Minister Confirmed that he had not heard about this change and Minister Botha emphasized that we had been labouring under a misunderstanding.

Mr Lake stated that the fund would underwrite the economy of the nation under the constitution talked about and would contribute to its stability and economy to make it attractive to Whites. But a buy-out could not be financed from the Zimbabwe Fund.

Minister Botha pointed out that this was the whole basis on which this matter was negotiated and that this presents South Africa with severe problems. Both the Prime Minister and Minister Botha emphasized that originally a British paper had described the situation in which the fund would operate to assist in the buy-out operation.

Vice-President It might have been originally so described but since then the matter had been studied in Congress and statements had been made by public leaders that the Zimbabwe Fund would be of the nature he had described and not a buy-out fund.

Prime Minister Originally the fund would have provided infra-structure and also to enable everything possible to be done to encourage all Whites in Rhodesia to stay - but in those cases where some Whites wanted to leave, it was understood that there would be a sliding scale according to which people who wished to leave, could be compensated. The new situation was a radical departure from the previous position.

Vice-President expressed regret at the communications break-down.

Minister Botha returned again to the discussions which had taken place in Washington and pointed out that if he remembered correctly Senator Dick Clark himself had said that he supported a fund for this purpose. The former administration had discussed this with Senators of both parties. In discussions with Mr Smith he was told that a settlement would be accompanied by the fund of the nature originally envisaged. That was the understanding.

Prime Minister repeated that the British Ambassador had said two weeks ago that there was no change in the Fund.

Vice-President emphasized again that the Zimbabwe Development Fund still existed. He was however surprised at the breakdown in communication with respect to the nature of the fund as there had been discussions in Washington and in Congress which had changed the situation.

Prime Minister and Minister Botha both re-affirmed that the British had confirmed that it was their impression that the fund remained as it was.

Vice-President The fund included provision for fair terms to the white people but not for buy-out.

Mr Aaron The basic purpose of the fund had not changed i.e. to keep as many Whites in Rhodesia as possible. To do this, it was necessary to strengthen the Rhodesian economy as much as possible to ensure that the Rhodesian Government has sufficient resources and that the fund will provide the Rhodesian Government with sufficient resources to meet its obligations.

Minister Botha pointed out that the constitution meant nothing if the government in power did not want to abide by it. There was never any doubt about the position of the Fund. He repeated that he had participated in detailed discussions on this question in America with Rogers and the British Representative Duff. There were discussions for example in detail on what prices could be paid. This change thus puts the whole matter in jeopardy. He felt that they could not go back on this.

Prime Minister stated that this point was of such importance that it should have been brought to our attention. He enquired whether the British knew about it.

Vice-President Yes

Prime Minister Then why did they not tell us?

Minister Botha referred to a document dated 11 September 1976 which lays down the functions of the fund and which, inter alia, provided that it would disburse funds directly to emigrants.

Vice-President stated that he would wish to make enquiries from Washington on this question. He had expressed the posture of the new Government and the language was subject to acceptability by Congress. He felt that it should be acknowledged that the nature of the operation of the fund needs further discussion, but he could not pursue the buy-out theory. He would wish to make further enquiries from Washington. The differences described might not be entirely irreconcilable. He had been unaware that South Africa did not know about the new position.

Minister Botha In order to assist the United States delegation, stated that he would like to point out that Senator Clark himself had said something to the effect that when account was taken of the vast sums of money spent in Vietnam, then the amount of 1½ billion for the Zimbabwe Fund was something the United States could support.

Vice-President reaffirmed that during lunch hour he would try to obtain more clarity about the fund.

The Vice-President then suggested that it might be useful in the interim to pass to the topic of violence. He stated that the British had recently relayed a message from Mr Smith to President Kaunda that the Rhodesian Government might have to make strikes into Zambia and that the other day Smith's forces had made a strike into Botswana and Mozambique. He appreciated that there were strikes on both sides. He wished to wind down the level of violence and to elect governments in peaceful elections and expressed the hope that South Africa would help to get Mr Smith's government to tone down its actions.

Prime Minister We have done exactly that. But the Rhodesians point out that they are subjected to strikes in Rhodesia from forces in neighbouring territories - strikes which are aimed at civilians and innocent women and children. Rhodesians say they are responsible for the protection not only of whites but also of blacks and in fact it is mostly blacks whom they have to protect from these attacks. Thus it is important for the Front Line Presidents to get the people making these attacks to desist. Instead they encourage them to attack. It is not only a question of appealing to Mr Smith but also to the black presidents to hold their horses because of the present negotiations.

Vice-President recognises that violence exists on both sides. Would hope that Mr Smith's regime would restrain incursions into Mocambique and Zambia and get a reduced level of activity. Each action led to a counter-action. The co-operation of the Front Line States was needed in order to achieve a possible settlement in Rhodesia. Unless these military efforts were reduced, this would lead to an escalating military embroglio.

Prime Minister He agreed entirely but it was no use talking to Mr Smith only. Mr Smith rightly says that these people attack him and he has to react. It is not only one side which is to blame.

Vice-President In order to reduce the level of hostilities as much as possible, would South Africa use its good offices with Mr Smith and they in turn would try to influence the other side.

Prime Minister We would do our best, but the Front Line Presidents are encouraging attacks.

Vice-President stated that the United States has urged the Front Line Presidents not to encourage violence.

Prime Minister Knowing the Rhodesians as he does, if violence continues they would continue to react. Someone must talk to Mugabe and Nkomo strongly. He was not blaming the United States, but somebody must talk to them and he accepts that the United States has some influence with the Front Line Presidents.

Vice-President concedes that the United States has some influence, but if they ask the Front Line Presidents to end violence now, they will not succeed.

Prime Minister South Africa can be relied upon to assist in de-escalating violence. We could co-operate but this could not be a one-sided effort.

Vice-President stressed the view that discussions on Rhodesia were more or less completed and suggested that the talks should now turn to Namibia.

Prime Minister Before leaving the Rhodesian question, he would like to put one thought. In view of the trend of the discussions and the new trend now taken note of, he felt that it would be far better if a constitution could be drawn up as early as possible and it could then be seen what guarantees are written into it and there could then be a useful exchange which could bring more clarity to the situation.

Vice-President felt that it was not possible to get a detailed constitution now. Vice-President had some of their ablest men working on this question, i.e. the question on what guarantees would be in the constitution.

Prime Minister felt that we could never come to complete agreement until we have a constitution and each party would therefore have to reserve its position until it is seen what form the constitution would take.

Vice-President felt that what we are doing here is trying to agree on general principles. That is all that can be done at this stage.

At this stage the morning negotiations were broken off and resumed in the afternoon at 2.30 pm.

Vice-President Stated that they had tried to deal with the issue arising out of the functions of the Zimbabwe Fund during the lunch hour. They had gone through their notes which were not complete, but nevertheless it was clear to them that the use of the fund for the purpose of simply buying-out white settlers was unacceptable.

Members of the South African delegation re-affirmed their ignorance of the change in the nature of the fund and that Dr Owen had said it was still very much alive.

Vice-President We all support the fund, but could not support buying-out theory, but would attempt to achieve stability by strong guarantees of person and property rights by moving swiftly with elections and he was prepared to explore further possibilities for the development of the fund with respect to such assurances as could be given to persons concerned re property. In reply to a question from Mr Fourie as to the nature of these assurances, the Vice-President stated that the buy-out theory could not be sold to Congress but that there might be ways to ensure that those holding property might be given assurances which could not be spelled out now. The fund is a generalised idea and details would have to be worked out. He added that he would hope that a post-independent government would ensure security for all.

Mr Fourie Would the protection for those holding property also relate to pensioners?

Vice-President They were talking about property rights only and they could not speak for pensioners.

Prime Minister stated that South Africa would have to reserve its position on the question of the Fund and would have to clear up the matter with the British.

Vice-President reiterated that the United States position was clear that they could no longer abide by the previous position.

In conclusion he enquired whether the South African delegation agreed to the following wording on Rhodesia:

"The South African Government agrees to support the British and American Governments to get directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all could take part equally so that Rhodesia/Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace."

Prime Minister He would consider this and at a later stage give his considered reply.

The above wording was carefully studied by the South African delegation at the conclusion of the day's proceedings and the Prime Minister advised the American delegation when the discussions resumed on the morning of 20 May that after careful study the South African delegation was prepared to accept the suggested draft subject to the insertion of certain additional phraseology which covered a very important point. This point related to the question of violence which was uppermost in the minds of the people in South Africa today. Accordingly it was proposed that the following wording should be added to the American draft:

"Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence."

The Americans had some difficulty with this wording and made the following counter-suggestion:

/...

"We agreed that the negotiating process offers the best hope for a reduction of violence and that efforts should be made to this end."

The South African delegation in turn found this unacceptable and suggested the following re-phrasing:

"Likewise every effort will be made to bring about the de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."

The Prime Minister also made the point that he assumed that the 1978 date referred to in the suggested draft presupposes that there would be a constitution by that time. He enquired whether there was agreement on that, to which the Vice-President replied: Yes.

At that stage the United States delegation recessed to discuss the revised wording and eventually returned to say that they could accept it.

The Prime Minister then made a further suggestion that the following wording should be incorporated in the draft after the word "equally":

"In terms of the constitution"

Vice-President reacted by saying that they would rather leave the draft as it is. He stated that everything which is done is greeted by a great deal of suspicion and that if we clarify the wording by inserting the phrase "in terms of the constitution" this could give rise to suspicion and to various inferences being drawn as to its meaning.

The Prime Minister reacted by stating that it was his understanding that the reference to "all" in the wording would mean all "in terms of the constitution".

Vice-President replied that "all" will define the constitution and that the United States would say that this includes universal adult suffrage. He conceded that South Africa understood "all" as meaning all in terms of the constitution whilst the United States took the attitude that this prescribes universal adult suffrage. On that note the meeting departed from the question of Rhodesia with the Vice-President stating that a good step forward had been made.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

At the suggestion of the Vice-President, attention was turned to the subject of South West Africa.

Vice-President enquired whether the Prime Minister wished to give an evaluation of the situation in the territory.

Prime Minister Our attitude was explored in full with the group of five in Cape Town. In a nutshell our attitude is:

That we are not an occupying, but an administering power ever since the Mandate was entrusted to us. Our attitude has always been that we do not desire one inch of South West African soil - we do not want to incorporate it. SWA belongs to the various peoples of SWA and there are different peoples there with different languages, cultures and stages of development, etc. We have never differed on the question that SWA should become independent - we did have a stage where we had independence of each separate national group in mind. But our attitude which was put in writing in 1967 was that the various peoples would through their leaders, organisations and governments decide their own future. We invited Secretary-General Waldheim about two years ago to visit South Africa to discuss this question. As a result of his visit it was agreed that he would send a personal representative to talk to South Africa and the

SWAfrican peoples as Dr Waldheim had done. Dr Escher was duly appointed as the representative of the Secretary-General and he came to South Africa and SWA and an understanding was reached, reduced to writing and signed by both Escher as personal representative of the Secretary-General and the South African Prime Minister. Dr Escher then returned to the United Nations to report back and regrettably that is the last we have heard about his visit. Dr Escher was simply ignored. Be that as it may, both Dr Escher and the Secretary-General Waldheim had pressed very strongly and reproached us that we, through our policy, were keeping the people of SWA away from each other. As a result of that reproach, the South African Government undertook, to the satisfaction of both Dr Waldheim and Dr Escher, to bring the leaders of the various peoples of SWA together so that they could learn to know each other and work together. That undertaking has been abided by, and they have also been brought together in Windhoek, Cape Town and Pretoria when affairs of mutual interest were discussed in depth.

It should be noted that the Ovambos who are 47% of the population of SWA have an elected government - elected on the basis of one man one vote. They have had several elections, the last of which was two years ago. All Ovambos who had left the country were invited to return to Ovamboland to take part in elections and were given a guarantee that no action would be taken against them provided they came back in peace. Many did come back. In these elections SWAPO could have taken part in the same way as any party in an election in the United States. They, however, refused to participate. The Ovambo Government is therefore a duly elected government representing the Ovambo people.

The Okavango also have an elected government (7% of the population). Furthermore, the South African government has since the Mandate was introduced, never governed Ovambo-land or Okavango. We have never passed laws for them and we did not have police there. They looked after these

matters themselves. Another SWA group, the Basters, numbering 16 000 people, have their own constitution. We have never passed laws for them. The other peoples of SWA do not have governments, for example the 60 000 Damaras and the 43 000 Hereros, but they have all asked now to be given their own governments and so we owe this to them.

Flowing from the Dr Waldheim and Dr Escher initiatives to bring the peoples together, the peoples themselves decided to hold a conference which started at the Turnhalle and met there for a period of more than two years and by consensus decided upon a constitution. The South African Government had committed themselves to give them a constitution and all parties were warned that we were committed in this way and that these peoples would come to South Africa during the month of May to present their constitution. The South African attitude has always been that even if they do not like the position, they must accept it and we are in duty bound to give them the constitution they have asked for, and, but for the initiative of the five, that constitution would have been given to them.

At the meeting of the five, objection was raised to instituting the constitution by legislation in the South African Parliament. As a result of this objection the South African Prime Minister stuck out his neck by saying that he would agree not to pass a law through Parliament bringing the constitution into being, but instead would do so by administrative action, i.e. by proclamation of the State President. It was also stressed that the five should talk to the Turnhalle so that they could see for themselves how serious they are about bringing their constitution into being and it should be borne in mind in this connection that amongst the Turnhalle group there are those who are strongly critical of South Africa. That is the present position. It is for the people of SWA to decide their own future and it is not possible to get away from that.

Vice-President As he understood the position in discussion with the group of five, there was general agreement on the necessity for an election in which all Namibians would participate.

Prime Minister We did not actually agree on anything because the five had to go back to their Governments. We said we would also have to go back to the Turnhalle but since then representatives of the five had had contact with the Turnhalle about which South Africa knows nothing. (For the information of the Vice-President and the United States delegation it was pointed out at this stage that on the basis of news just received, the referendum amongst the White population of SWA had resulted in a favourable vote of 95% for the Turnhalle.)

Vice-President The second point agreed to by the five was that the United Nations would be allowed some separate representation together with certain of its officials in SWA to satisfy themselves as to the fairness of the electoral process and elections to be held. In the third place the South African Government had agreed to withdraw its instrumentalities. Or, to put it more plainly, to develop a plan of phased withdrawal after elections had been held. No agreement was reached on detainees or political prisoners or the removal of legislation which might effect the electoral process.

These agreements were found to be helpful because they indicated progress towards independence in SWA.

Prime Minister A date for independence, namely, 31 December 1978, was also accepted.

Vice-President We found that progress and were glad to see it. There were, however, still some problems to be discussed.

Prime Minister agreed that it would be useful to discuss these problems but enquired whether he could be informed how the discussions of the five with the Turnhalle went.

Mr McHenry indicated that the five did, as indicated, brief the other parties concerned about the Cape Town talks. As was known, we sent representatives of the five countries to Windhoek to talk to members of the Turnhalle, with internal SWAPO, church groups, the national front and two or three other organisations. They also briefed external SWAPO, the Front Line Presidents and other members of the Security Council. The reaction of the briefing ran the gamut from significant development on the one hand to no progress at all on the other. A great deal of suspicion existed about the trustworthiness of the South African Government. There was discussion as to what was meant about the Central Administrative Authority and a general belief that this was an extremely important matter and could effect all the other matters to be discussed. There was also concern about the extent of the UN involvement, namely the desire that that involvement should be sufficient in scope to overcome suspicion of the South African Government. There was a general demand that the question of political prisoners had to be resolved. The idea of phased withdrawal of South African instrumentalities was accepted in general. There was, however, a suggestion that the continued presence of South African military forces which could be in a position to intimidate would not contribute to a desirable climate for free elections.

These were the basic points raised.

There was a different kind of reaction in the Turnhalle. There was suspicion of the United Nations and any role it might play but in general the Turnhalle, while expressing disappointment at not having a Turnhalle constitution passed through Parliament during the current session, seemed open to discussion on this point.

Prime Minister told the United States delegation that a telegram had been received that very morning from the Turnhalle pressing for the institution of their constitution.

Vice-President continuing with his exposition of the United States viewpoint, stated that they supported resolution 385. It was felt that the implementation of that resolution required a responsible interim administration which would be acceptable to the participants and which would not prejudice the structure of a future government by pushing it in one way or another. There was need for an entity of stability during this interim phase.

In order to be consistent with the objectives embodied in the UN resolution that the elections be open, honest and that all could equally participate, the authority in SWA must be a neutral authority. The electoral arrangements must provide for equal participation of all Namibians under laws which would provide for the above principles. Elections should be held for the purpose of assembling a legislative assembly to prepare a constitution and establish the structure of a government for independent Namibia and for that reason they would wish particularly to know more about how the Central Administrative Authority would be defined - they would then be able to better appreciate whether it was in agreement with the principles they regard as essential to the evolvement of the constitutional process in SWA.

Prime Minister again pointed out that most people in SWA already govern themselves whilst others have not got governments. The Hereros and Damaras have asked for governments and the United States delegation must please accept that both he and his Government are committed to give them such territorial local governments. In the normal course of events we would have passed a law in Parliament in June to do that, but with the well-meant view of meeting the objections of the five, we suggested instead that this could be achieved by a proclamation of the State President. It was his understanding that the five had looked favourably on that proposition and

that the discussions in Cape Town ended on that note. South Africa was also committed to the position that if these people agreed upon a constitution, it would be given to them and he is again being seriously criticized for not proceeding with the constitution through legislation in Parliament. He felt he must say in all seriousness that as an absolute minimum the South African Government is committed to give the Damaras and Hereros local governments just as he is committed to giving a Government to the peoples of SWA, i.e. what they have asked for, we think it is fair and we have no alternative but to act accordingly.

The Central Administrative Authority would represent all the peoples in which the greater majority would be non-white.

Vice-President How would it be made up?

Prime Minister That would depend upon the thinking of the peoples themselves. In practice the Ovambo represent 47% of the population and should be entitled to 47% representation in the government, but they have said that they would not ask for that. It would be a government having representation from all population groups which would include one or two whites and one from each of the population groups.

Vice-President This was very serious from the US standpoint. It had been the United States hope that the objective of having a national election to elect an Assembly would be acceptable. The election to be based on a plebiscite of all Namibians and the Assembly would shape a constitutional structure for the government of Namibia. That structure could take all forms as long as it was elected by all Namibians in an unintimidated neutral environment. Then it could shape the permanent government of SWA in a way that would represent all the people of Namibia.

The present international attitude and the attitude of the United States is to reject the Turnhalle or its equivalent.

The United States would prefer to see the process develop along the lines suggested - they could react to that. or a government based on ethnic representation. What South Africa

Prime Minister This matter was canvassed very fully - an election was envisaged. Judging from a cable received of from the Turnhalle, they would prefer a referendum of all peoples - one man one vote of all based on adult suffrage, regardless of colour, on the question of the constitution.

group and it need not necessarily be one. In Cape Town the Vice-President Would that be based on acceptance or rejection of the Turnhalle?

He had replied that it would be more or less so. Mr McHenry

Prime Minister Yes. If the United States did not think this the best way of testing it, then they must suggest some other suitable way.

Vice-President found their hopes somewhat dashed. It would

Mr McHenry At the talks in Cape Town it was said that the constitution of the Turnhalle would complicate the position. It was then suggested by the South African Foreign Minister that the legislation envisaged for a Turnhalle constitution would not be submitted to Parliament but that a Central Administrative Authority would be established, dropping the idea of an interim government. The group of five had expressed reservations about the Central Administrative Authority and suggested that to the extent that it represented the Turnhalle proposal, it would complicate the search for an acceptable solution. Reservation was made because this body would be in a position to determine the situation under which elections would be held. This was not acceptable. When the question was raised about this, the five were told that there had not been sufficient time to develop details about the Central Administrative Authority. But per se it seems to be the Turnhalle by another name.

Prime Minister wishes to impress upon the Vice-President that

The reason for the reservation was that it would not be any different from the Turnhalle if eleven representatives were appointed from the various Turnhalle groups. Even if elected, they said there would be serious disagreement on

the extent of representation in those elections and whether they were given a choice between a Central Government or a government based on ethnic representation. What South Africa is saying now was that, as it envisaged it the Central Administrative Authority would consist of two representatives of each tribal group.

Prime Minister No, he had said one representative from each group and it need not necessarily be one. In Cape Town the British Ambassador had put the point whether this authority would not be the ministerial organisation of the Turnhalle. He had replied that it would be more or less so. Mr McHenry had then suggested that we might bring in businessmen or others as well and this had been thoroughly discussed.

Vice-President found their hopes somewhat dashed. It would be essentially the Turnhalle which would be the government represented on a tribal basis. Those participating would be voting yes or no on a proposition put to them by a conference that has caused many to question whether it allows for participation of all Namibians. He felt he was accurate in saying that this approach would not enjoy international acceptability and would be opposed by the United States government. It would result in an aggravation rather than what he had hoped would be an improvement in relations between the United States and South Africa. This was no threat. He would like to return to his suggestion and deal with it again because it would provide for a satisfactory solution of this issue, namely free elections on a nation wide basis for a constituent assembly to propose the constitution for the government of Namibia. That is essential from their point of view.

Prime Minister wishes to impress upon the Vice-President that as much as he wanted to see an end of the South West Africa issue, so did his Government. It was costing us more than we could afford. We want to get out as soon as possible. If we do get out, we will take with us that which is ours

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and the territory will then come to a standstill. We do not want to do this unless we are forced to do so. For example, the railway stock and busses in SWA belong to South Africa and they are run at a loss of millions a year. We desire to bring out our troops and police which are costing us more millions. We are only there because various SWA Governments have asked us to be there. In fact, if we were not there, we would have an Angola situation twice over. So we have a common purpose. But he had to tell the Vice-President frankly that he would rather leave public life immediately than go back on his word and be discredited. He as an individual was absolutely committed. He had given a promise to the people of SWA last year that he would give them interim government. The five had asked that it be called by another name - a Central Administrative Authority. He was committed to do that regardless. And if he did not do so, his credibility with the people of SWA would be totally destroyed.

Vice-President He was not concerned about the name of the authority. He was concerned about the process involved in the formation of the governmental structure and the full participation of Namibians in co-operating in that structure. If that could be accepted, whatever the name of the body, it would have the United States support and the support of international opinion. To digress from the point he wished to point out that the United States have fought Communists in the United States of America and did so successfully by denying them the reasons which gave them support, namely social injustice and unfair treatment. As things were going in Africa, it was not only a case of people being denied their rights, but of the Russians being able to exploit popular discontent to destroy moderate change and escalate hostility and violence. The United States and South Africa would like to see that ended. He felt that such a chance existed in Namibia and Rhodesia if we can pursue a course in these areas which can lead to moderate governments - the same applied to South Africa. He was quite convinced that the

United States wanted, namely, to get the people together. /...

Turnhalle strategy or something similar would lead to a result which would be extremely undesirable and he found it difficult to accept.

The State President remains the ultimate authority. He must with all respect

Prime Minister We therefore differ. the Central Administrative Authority. It is regarded as something sinister.

Vice-President He was not suggesting that the people involved in the Turnhalle be excluded, but he would wish to see all Namibians able to participate.

there is all the more reason why responsible international opinion must be given

Prime Minister pointed out that we have never objected to that. It was agreed that the United Nations representative would have to approve what was agreed upon.

Minister Botha There would still be elections before inde-

Vice-President He applauded that but wished elections to be held for an assembly to draw up a constitution for Namibia.

Vice-President There would be the interim authority which

Minister Botha That was not ruled out. is saying is that

if the central administrative authority is the Turnhalle

Prime Minister We agreed that there would be elections based on universal suffrage. In view of the time factor it had not been possible to clear up these matters with the Turnhalle.

and be sure of its integrity, that there would be elec-

Minister Botha Could he put it this way. If one looked back over the 31 years of this dispute and take into account the situation today, one must say that all the essential elements of the dispute have been met by South Africa. What were the basic requirements? They were:

1. Independence as an entity within a reasonable period;
2. Testing of the Constitution before independence.
3. No discrimination on the basis of colour.

Prime Minister to put it bluntly - would it suit the United

Now there is nothing substantive in the way of a resolution of the problem. Too much was made of the administrative arrangements. United States seems to think that we are setting up the interim government to gain some advantage in the forthcoming elections. But that is not so. The Turnhalle has been there for a number of years. We did what the United States wanted, namely, to get the people together.

This was something not just suddenly thought out - it is not as if the Central Administrative Authority will constitute the independent government. The State President remains the ultimate authority. He must with all respect repeat that much too much is made of the Central Administrative Authority. It is regarded as something sinister, which it is not.

Vice-President As there is suspicion, there is all the more reason why responsible international opinion must be given assurances. Who, for example, would run the interim government?

Minister Botha There would still be elections before independence.

Vice-President There would be the interim authority which becomes crucial. What the United States is saying is that if the central administrative authority is the Turnhalle alone, that will not be acceptable. If it represents a broadly-based group of Namibians, that will be acceptable. If one could add the nature of the functions of the authority and be sure of its integrity, that there would be elections for a constituent assembly, that all could participate and that the United Nations would be involved, then we would be coming close to agreement. But what is the interim government and what is its responsibility? It would be helpful to the United States if this could be thrashed out to some degree so that they could get a better idea as to how it would be made up.

Prime Minister To put it bluntly - would it suit the United States better if we withdraw lock, stock and barrel from SWA?

Vice-President We want suitable progress towards a constituent assembly to establish a constitution and desire South African co-operation to achieve that.

Prime Minister For the South African government there are two alternatives:

(a) Either we pull out, recall our troops, take what belongs to us, stop paying teachers and others and then say to Prime SWA we can no longer assume responsibility as we have up to now - we can no longer provide security or safety; or to leave office if he did not do so.

(b) Do what the people have asked us to do. We sincerely believe that the people of SWA who meet in the Turnhalle are as representative a group of people as one could ever get and we have to accede to their minimum demands for an interim government. We in the meantime must proceed with local governments for the Hereros and Damaras and provide for the interim government to run the affairs of the country until such time as a general election with all the caveats that the five have mentioned can take place so that the territory can attain satisfactory independence as a unit.

Vice-President He would like to explore the Central Administrative Authority.
Vice-President As he understands it, the issue needs to be resolved to give international acceptability to the interests of the people there and this is also in the interests of South Africa and of United States/South African relations. The people themselves some of whom will be from the Turnhalle, should be seen as an impartial elected assembly brought into being in order to draft and prepare a constitution for the people of Namibia. How was the interim authority to be defined and how would it operate?

Minister Botha Let us look at the situation if nothing is done. Then you have the Department of Bantu Administration with ultimate authority over the blacks, you have a white SWA legislature in the south, a Coloured Council with local power and you have a Rehoboth authority. Thus you have the Central South African Government involved. They can do exactly the same and indeed far more manipulating, politically speaking, than in a more open body where the blacks predominate. Could the Vice-President not see the point that the Central Administrative Authority could assist in achieving the purposes they envisage?

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Vice-President He would like some more ideas on the Central Administrative Authority.

Minister Botha It was not possible to give details because matters still had to be discussed with the Turnhalle. The Prime Minister was so firmly committed to institute some central form of authority in SWA that his own caucus would ask him to leave office if he did not do so.

Prime Minister What in effect the United Nations has asked us to do was to make the territory independent as a whole and that is what we intend to do. If they are given independence and it is not acceptable to the outside world, then at least we can wash our hands of the situation.

Minister Botha What is more, that independence would be preceded by a fair and open test of opinion.

Vice-President He would like to explore the Central Administrative Authority with the South African government in a way that would ensure that the process leading to independence would be fair and equitable.

Mr McHenry The interim government, whose responsibility we do not know, is in a position to influence the elections in a certain direction.

Minister Botha But why cannot we do that now on the basis of the present constitutional set-up in SWA? A lot of emphasis has been placed on the interim government and the question of transition. It was not the intention to introduce an interim government on exactly the same lines as in Rhodesia. In SWA it is an exercise going over a period of three years. We are ad idem on all the basic issues and it would be a great pity if we cannot overcome the doubts about the Central Administrative Authority.

Prime Minister The interim government the United States desires to call by another name is not new. It has been well-known. We have said openly what we are aiming at and we are so thoroughly committed that he could not stay in public office if this is not done.

Vice-President United States position on the Turnhalle was clearly stated by the five and by international groups.

Prime Minister Wanted to know whether throughout the period the Turnhalle was in session we have ever received any indication that it should not be proceeded with.

Mr Fourie No, we had not. There were only some doubts whether it would succeed.

Vice-President Kissinger's effort to find a solution to the SWA problem was based on an effort to alter the Turnhalle.

Minister Botha No, that was not right - the issue was whether the conference should be transferred to Geneva and whether SWAPO and others should be allowed to join or take part in the discussions.

Mr McHenry The underlying point of Kissinger's and other efforts was that you can not have a government where all are not represented and the Turnhalle is not representative. Reservation had been expressed about the Central Administrative Authority because it was not clear how close it was to the Turnhalle or not.

Prime Minister The only reservation Dr Kissinger made was on SWAPO. And that is why he advised that talks should be transferred to Geneva so that SWAPO could participate. We gave an undertaking that we would go to the Turnhalle to consult with them. Seven points were put forward but were shot down by SWAPO.

Vice-President Would like to suggest to the Prime Minister that on the issue of an interim authority, its make-up and powers, it would be better if rather than trying to resolve it now, the contact group of five should come together in Cape Town in say two weeks time and review in detail how it might be shaped so as to be acceptable to all the parties. This would give him time to work out its membership and authority. In Cape Town the group could also discuss the phased withdrawal of South African instrumentalities.

Vice-President said he understood the position and accepted.
Mr McHenry Will the South African government prepare a plan for withdrawal?

Prime Minister The South African government will develop a plan for withdrawal, but only at the end of the political process.

Mr McHenry expressed the view that all persons born in SWA.
Mr McHenry That is at independence? But that is a practical matter which cannot wait until independence.

Vice-President Again expressed the suggestion that there should be a meeting in Cape Town in 2 weeks to investigate the matter he had referred to.

Prime Minister suggested 2 June.
group of people from SWA who are being held in detention in Zambia and elsewhere - they must be released.

Vice-President Would the Prime Minister also be prepared to discuss the withdrawal question. It was also his view that political detainees should be released.

Prime Minister Yes.

Prime Minister We distinguish between people who are generally halle, he assumes that there will be no objection to their talking to them in Cape Town.

Mr McHenry Could not speak for the five, but for the United States it would not be appropriate as it could not have the United Nations, SWAPO, national front, etc. there. All parties concerned would be briefed, but could not negotiate with Turnhalle.

like Solzhenitsin and Zakarof who have been expelled from Russia because the Soviet Union does not agree

Prime Minister Would have to have Turnhalle there because would have to consult with them from time to time.

Vice-President It would complicate matters if they met with South Africa and the Turnhalle.

Prime Minister accepted that. Turnhalle would not be in the same room but would be in Cape Town for consultations.

Vice-President said he understood the position and accepted a meeting within the next two weeks, preferably before the end of May.

RETURNEES

Mr McHenry expressed the view that all persons born in SWA should be free to return and participate peacefully in the political process.

Prime Minister that was accepted. However, this should apply not only to people who are moving about freely outside SWA but also to that substantial group of people from SWA who are being held in detention in Zambia and elsewhere - they must be released.

Vice-President That would be their view. It was also his view that political detainees should be released.

Prime Minister We distinguish between people who are merely detained and those people who are detained because of criminal acts committed.

Vice-President He conceded that there had been a lot of talk about dissidents and others being incarcerated outside Namibia. The United States was against all political prisoners. They are in a "hell of a fight" with the Soviet Union just now about people like Solzhenitzin and Zakarof who have been expelled from Russia because the Soviet Union does not agree

with their views. The United States had taken a strong position with respect to these people. It means business about the question of human rights and the silencing of political dissidents through pressure. On this point it was important to the international acceptability of Namibia that political prisoners be allowed to go home. It was possible to draw a distinction between a criminal and a political dissident and as there had been a suggestion that some kind of commission of jurists should be brought into being, that commission could pass judgement on which category detainees fall into. If they could be returned to Namibia under Namibian authority and their case reviewed by the commission of jurists, this might be a way of resolving this question.

Prime Minister stated that South Africa would only be able to release detainees if those outside SWA were released at the same time. Prime Minister intimated that this matter has been discussed before with Dr Kissinger. He suggested that it be left for discussion in Cape Town. It seemed, however, to be a sensible suggestion that the commission of jurists should look into cases of this nature.

Mr McHenry In Cape Town the questions on which agreement had not been reached included detainees and political prisoners. The South African government was willing to release detainees but not political prisoners.

Vice-President He would like to discuss this matter now.

Prime Minister Preferred to discuss this in Cape Town.

Vice-President Certain symbolic things govern our lives in politics. Thus the people in the United States believe that there are political prisoners in SWA because critics and dissidents are held in detention. Such persons should be allowed to participate in the elections if they are to have any credibility. The United States accepted the South African point that there are political prisoners in other

countries also - the United States objected to that also and would say so. He felt that the commission of jurists should determine who are political prisoners and who not.

Minister Botha said that he had a real concern about the SWAPO detainees in Zambia and Tanzania because if it became known that attempts would be made to release these people, steps would be taken to try these people summarily in military courts and they would suffer the ultimate penalty before they could be released.

Vice-President The United States would make the strongest representations on this point.

Prime Minister stated that South Africa would only be able to release detainees if those outside SWA were released at the same time.

Vice-President He had hoped that South Africa would take the initiative in this matter. It would be good for South Africa's image to set an example by releasing political prisoners first. This would put South Africa in a strong position and would help the United States in seeking the release of the detainees in Zambia and Tanzania.

Prime Minister If we do so, we would lose face with the peoples in Ovambo, i.e. if there was release on our side only and not at the same time of detainees outside SWA. The United States should say to those people that they must release political prisoners.

Minister Botha emphasized that we had shown goodwill already by allowing people to return to SWA who had been our strong opponents in the United Nations and elsewhere - people such as Kerina and Kozonguizi.

Vice-President again emphasized that South Africa should set the example.

Prime Minister No, but we could talk about this at the forthcoming meeting in Cape Town.

Minister Botha But on major substantive issues we were already in agreement. _____ moved a vast distance by all standards.

Prime Minister suggested that it might be desirable to adopt a form of wording with respect to the discussions on SWA and he suggested the following:

"Cogniscance was taken of the outcome of the discussions on SWA/Namibia between the South African Government and the representatives of the five Security Council members - Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which had taken place in Cape Town last month. It was noted that certain progress had been made and that the further discussions on other major issues would be continued at an early date in South Africa, hopefully before the end of May."

Vice-President It was agreed that there would be a resumption of the meeting of the contact group at the end of May to discuss the Central Administrative Authority, prisoners and the phased withdrawal of the South African instrumentality. Rather than agree on a wording let us leave it at that.

Prime Minister felt that there should preferably be neutral language and no references to what is going to be discussed.

Vice-President It would assist the ongoing efforts if we could indicate what the talks would be about.

Minister Botha felt that we would invite a negative reaction from the peoples in SWA and make it more difficult if the issues were mentioned here without us having had an opportunity to report in detail to the Turnhalle representatives.

Vice-President What if we were to say that major issues remained without describing them?

Minister Botha But on major substantive issues we were already in agreement. South Africa had moved a vast distance by all standards. The Vice-President expressed him-

Vice-President regarded the Central Administrative Authority as a major issue. It was an important body concerned with functions of government in the interim. In their view therefore substantive difficulties still existed which had to be ironed out. The Vice-President indulged in a fair

Vice-President suggested that thought might be given to the language and could come back to it later.

The Prime Minister in reply made it perfectly clear that like Eventually, however, it transpired that they were not prepared to accept the proposed language on SWA and this concluded the discussions on this topic.

For the record it should be stated here that during the course of the day the Vice-President departed from the specific items down for discussion and acting, we assume, on the instructions of President Carter himself, addressed himself to the South African delegation on the question of human rights. He spoke about the profound changes in United States life during the last ten years. Of the 200 years record of the United States on race relations which was disgraceful. There had been slavery and growing up as a non-White had been a curse. In recent years, however, the United States had moved towards justice. It was not perfect, but was at peace in the systems of laws adopted and the relation of the races to each other. In the course of this quite lengthy homily he repeatedly metaphorically beat his breast about the awful things that had been done to the Blacks in the United States, but then contrasted the situation in the past when there had been increasing violence and riots in American cities with the situation as it existed today. There was a new spirit

abroad in America. A new attitude of the races towards each other which heralded a new phase in the history of the United States where all people of all races were working together in peace and goodwill for the good of their country and where the fastest growing areas were those where discrimination had been worst. The Vice-President expressed himself expansively and in some detail on this subject, but it is not necessary to embellish on this further. It was obviously designed to impress on the South African delegation what a wonderful country the United States had become now that racial discrimination had been eliminated. It is not necessary to say that the Vice-President indulged in a fair measure of hypocrisy because, as every one knows, race relations are anything but perfect in America.

The Prime Minister in reply made it perfectly clear that like the Vice-President, South Africa did not regard blacks as inferior to whites. He had said this on many occasions and Ambassador Bowdler, who was present, would bear witness to this.

The Vice-President should not for a moment think that South African policy is based on the fact that the white man regarded himself as better than the black. But there were certain realities of the South African situation which the Vice-President should understand. The Prime Minister then went on to elaborate very effectively on what the South African government had done for the black man in the field of education, including education at primary, secondary and at university level during the course of his administration and to what extent the racial barriers had been lifted in areas such as sport and promotional prospects for black police to senior commissioned officers. After expounding on the achievements of the black races in various fields in South Africa in recent years, the Prime Minister added that when the South African situation is viewed, the position of the black man in South Africa should not be equated with that of the black man in the United States. In South Africa, as a result of history

and because of the fact that the British tried to anglicise the country, it has developed group wise. Today Africans go to African schools, English to English schools and so on. Nobody can change that. If the United States should demand that we must change, then he must say that we cannot. There were black townships and white townships and in this way opportunities could be created for the different racial groups in their own areas and it was possible to promote the interests of these people in the most satisfactory way.

is considered that it is in South Africa's interest for a positive change to be made. The complexity and difficulty

SOUTH AFRICA

Vice-President Mr Prime Minister in your letter to the President you indicated a desire to discuss the issues of Southern Africa in the hope that the discussions could lead to an end of the disputes in Southern Africa. The United States Government had put in a great deal of time in responding to your request. The subject of Southern Africa is exceedingly difficult and emotional but he hoped that relations can improve there. In a sense the present meeting might be an historic one because the President was anxious that he should explain with clarity what the United States policies are in respect of Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa. The United States required progress as they view it in all three areas. He would like when there is progress to express his appreciation, but fundamental differences on certain issues exist between the United States and South Africa.

The United States wants good relations with the South African
The United States does not believe that Apartheid or Separation is a workable or just policy. A progressive transformation of South African society is necessary, involving the elimination of discrimination. The United States does not believe that people can be separate and equal. Separation amounts to inequality. Furthermore a political society cannot be healthy unless there is full participation of all citizens in the affairs of the national government. It was considered that it would be valuable and helpful

of five would lead to progress on Namibia. If so the United if there was a prompt initiation of dialogue between the South African Government and the leaders of all elements of the South African population. Aggravating laws such as the Pass Laws should be repealed. To be frank to read about the incarceration or banishment of Winnie Mandela is harmful to respectful relations between South Africa and the United States. A continuation along the present course would lead to more violence and international pressure and a growing separation of the policies of the two countries. It is considered that it is in South Africa's interest for a positive change to be made. The complexity and difficulty of the situation is understood. Referring to his homily of the previous day he said he had tried to explain the commitment of the United States to the enduring values to which they subscribe. Today he hoped to positively convince South Africa of the permanence of the United States values and those human rights. This is central to United States values and those who deal with the United States must understand that. History in Africa and elsewhere is against the policies to which they object. They have seen a host of white Governments disappear in Africa. Rising violence there gives the Russians and other pernicious influences which do not have South Africa and United States interests at heart a perfect platform from which they can exploit the situation through violence and the provision of arms. This gives them an advantage. The United States basic argument is, however, that South Africa should embark upon changes not because of the communist threat but because it is right to do so.

whites came to South Africa. He settled certain portions of The United States wants good relations with the South African Government. The President had asked him to come to Vienna not with a view to bringing about a confrontation but in order to explain United States policy in a spirit of goodwill, so that there would be no misunderstanding about that policy and the enduring and fundamental value attached to that policy.

He believed South Africa had made some progress on the question of Rhodesia. He hoped that the talks with the contact group

of five would lead to progress on Namibia. If so the United States will commend it and this will lead to improved relations. But progress is needed on South Africa as well.

Prime Minister The Vice-President had raised an enormous subject. In his brief comment the previous day he had illustrated how the present Government had progressed in the field of race relations in comparison with previous South African Governments. He had said that the mistake must not be made of equating the situation in South Africa with that in the United States. It is totally different. The United States black man such as Mr McHenry is not a black man primarily, he is primarily an American. The blacks who went to America were divested of their culture and background.

Vice-President This had been shameful.

Prime Minister He did not say that. 40 to 50 independent nations of Africa. They have better health and education

Vice-President No, I said it.

Prime Minister If wished to make comparisons then one should really equate the American Indian with the South African black.

Vice-President The treatment of the Indians in America had been shameful too.

Prime Minister The South African black man had never been a slave. He was met for the first time 140 years after the whites came to South Africa. He settled certain portions of South Africa and the whites settled others.

At the time when our forbears went to South Africa there were 300 000 black people in South Africa. Today because of the fact that we have kept the peace in South Africa there are 16 million of them.

work must be paid because we have already done something. Pay rises for the white man have moved up 10% as opposed to rises of 17 to 20% for the blacks.

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The black man in South Africa has never regarded himself and does not regard himself as a member of the white nation. He has kept his own nationhood. Buthelezi has formed his own organisation Ikatha to speak on behalf of the Zulu nation. predecessors combined since 1910. That is progress.

If the British had not annexed the black countries they would have been independent to-day. They are a national people with their own languages, flags, cabinets and ministers. They pass their own laws and budgets. They are a people apart - we did not put them there, they were there when we settled the country. because they cannot find it in their own countries.

Lesotho took the United Nations and the United States for a In 1936 because of the rapid increase in the numbers of the blacks the Government agreed to buy additional land to make the black areas more viable and this is being proceeded with. Early there are nationals of Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique

The black areas are more viable than 40 to 50 independent nations of Africa. They have better health and education facilities than elsewhere in Africa. Labour Agreement they would not be allowed to work in South Africa. If we should

Whether or not the United States quarrels with us about it, the fact is that we are leading the black people to independence in the fullest sense of the word. It is not a policy of pie in the sky but is workable and is being translated into practice. from our policy of making the South African black peoples independent. After independence we will give

It is true that there are black people in our civil service, such as black doctors for example, who are paid less than white doctors. My Government acknowledges that this is wrong and we accept the principle that equal wages for equal work must be paid because we have already done something about it and are endeavouring to close the gap. The Civil Service Commission is looking into the matter. We shall have to start from the top and work down to the lower levels in proceeding to obtain equal pay for equal work. Pay rises for the white man have moved up 10% as opposed to rises of 17 to 20% for the blacks. want to be governed by them. don't want to give up what we have built up.

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The Vice-President had said that we must have discussions and dialogue with the black leaders. Under the present Government there has been more dialogue in 2 years with leaders of the black people than took place under all his predecessors combined since 1910. That is progress.

All black leaders are elected on the basis of adult suffrage. None of them have disowned their people who have come to South Africa to work. Indeed, black people of independent countries flock in hundreds of thousands to South Africa to obtain work because they cannot find it in their own countries. Lesotho took the United Nations and the United States for a ride as a ruse to obtain financial assistance, for the borders with Lesotho have never been closed. There are in fact approximately 140 000 Lesotho workers in South Africa. Similarly there are nationals of Botswana, Malawi and Mocambique working in South Africa. There are 80 000 Mocambicans working in South Africa. We actually have a Labour Agreement with Mocambique and without that Labour Agreement they would not be allowed to work in South Africa. If we should tell them to go then Mocambique would lose something like R300 000 000 in revenue.

Even if the United States were to quarrel with us about it we cannot depart from our policy of making the South African black peoples independent. After independence we will give them substantial financial and technical assistance for generations to come.

If the Vice-President has in mind that we must introduce one man one vote in one central parliament then we must say that it cannot be done because we are dealing with a multinational South Africa. The Zulus number 4 000 000, the Xhosas 3 000 000. They are as proud of their language as we are of Afrikaans. If we were to place them in one parliament we would have to have 10 official languages and that is impossible. We don't want to govern the blacks and we don't want to be governed by them. We don't want to give up what we have built up.

Looking to the future - the blacks will become independent and the rest of South Africa will be shared by the Whites, the Coloureds, and the Indians. We are at present in the process of working this all out. At this moment, however, there is a Commission which is investigating whether As regards Mrs Mandela to whom the Vice-President referred: she is a Xhosa, a subject of the Transkei. She can go to the Transkei if she wishes. One of her daughters is marrying one of the sons of King Sobhuza of Swaziland and she can go to Swaziland to attend the wedding of her daughter. Mrs Mandela is a nurse and is restricted to a certain area. We cannot, however, allow her to pursue the kind of activity her husband did - he wrote a thesis on what a good communist is. To maintain law and order we must take certain steps and we must judge for ourselves as to how we will keep it. We could lock people up but in some cases such as that of Mrs Mandela we for humanitarian reasons restrict them to certain areas.

As far as the pass laws are concerned, they were introduced by the British and we kept them on for a very good reason, and that is that people flock to the cities where there is not enough work for them all - there might be 20 000 jobs available in say Cape Town but 50 000 people flock there to seek them and the result is shanty towns with insanitary conditions which create a health risk and a high crime rate etc. To prevent this pass laws were devised as a policy to ensure that only those people could come to the cities as would be able to find work there. Three years ago this matter was discussed with the various black leaders who criticised the pass laws. I asked them whether they recognised that the flooding of people to the cities presented a problem and they all unanimously agreed that there was a problem. I said to them then, well you recognise there is a problem now I suggest you go and devise some rules or regulations which will ensure that 50 000 people won't flock to a city where there are only 20 000 jobs. They are still studying this matter and if they can come up with a plan for solving the problem then we will scrap our regulations and adopt theirs.

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With reference to job reservation this applies to only about 2½% of the labour force. There are certain poorer coloureds and whites who can only do certain kinds of work. They were asked for and were given protection. At this moment, however, there is a Commission which is investigating whether job reservation is still necessary, and if the Commission recommends that it be scrapped it will be scrapped. We are not as white as we are painted.

I would like to ask the United States a question in a very friendly spirit, namely, which African country must South Africa accept as a model on which to base our society - if you can name one then let's talk about it.

Vice-President The United States does not accept the proposition that the existence of injustice in one country justifies injustice in others. We regard separation as being discriminatory and full participation in political life, the sharing of political power we think are basic to a healthy and just and secure society. That is what we mean by human rights. We are not trying to prescribe a model to South Africa but wish South Africa to understand United States values and principles because this is important for our mutual relations.

Prime Minister Before my Government came to power in 1948 Indians had no vote, and in the Cape some Coloureds (44 000) had the vote. But today the situation is that there is no man who hasn't got the vote and who cannot participate in Government. Perhaps they cannot participate in the same way that participation takes place in the 50 states in the United States, but then you must really equate the position of the Guameese in the United States to that of the black in South Africa. The Guameese are subservient but they have no vote in Congress.

Minister Botha Could we cut this to the bone. If we get to the basic issue of political rights how could the white South African nation accept any dispensation which would

mean its destruction. Let's be frank. Virtually all the African states are dictatorships, without elections to change the Government, without a free press, without an independent judiciary. Racism is not the major issue in South Africa. What is involved is the question of survival of a whole people.

Prime Minister Buthelezi went so far as to request the South Vice-President He had mentioned yesterday the joy in the United States over the new policy there which promoted the economic health and well-being of the nation including the absence of discrimination. One of the interesting aspects of this transformation was for example the fact that the daughter of the President of the United States attends a public school where she is only one of 5 white children in a class of 25. The United States has many classes where there are children of a different language and colour. They are taught first in the home language of the child and are also taught English. So out of the concept of non-discrimination there has come a new strength and enrichment and a more permanent cultural identity. It has not undermined the cultural identity of any group. He would point out again that the Soviet Union and others will become increasingly involved where there is dissatisfaction.

He had stated clearly what United States policies are. They are not at all proud of the treatment meted out to blacks and Indians in United States life. This was one of the least defensible parts of United States history. Most forms of discrimination have been removed, but the United States is not perfect yet because of 200 years of history when a different policy was followed. One of the worst things that could have been done was to the Indians. We created separate nations. We gave them property. But the sad thing was that this had created separateness and there is no part of United States life more riddled with hostility and despair than that represented by the Indian situation today. It is a curse in United States society, but they are making progress in overcoming it.

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Minister Botha What would the United States have done if it had 1 billion Indians? Africa has rejected the American formula of Government. Where would the whites vote? Who would guarantee their values and rights?

Prime Minister Buthelezi went so far as to request the South African Government to pass a law outlawing opposition parties. We refused and he holds it against us.

Regulations which do exist and are based on colour will be eliminated. But what we see as separateness the United States sees as discrimination and we must just differ on that score.

Minister Botha Stated that he had before him a paper respecting an interim report of a duly constituted United States Government Commission regarding the Indians in the United States. The preliminary observations of the report contradict much of the Vice-President's claims as to the acceptance of an integrated society in the USA. There was also a report recently of a fine of 400 000 dollars imposed on an Indian tribe because it refused to move from the land it occupied. What was the position?

Vice-President He was not aware of the case.

At this stage the talks drew to a close and the Vice-President expressed his thanks for the courtesy shown during the talks. He hoped that there would be progress on all the matters discussed and that dialogue would continue.

The Prime Minister replied in appropriate vein thanking the Vice-President for making the meeting possible. It had helped clear the air and it was better to talk than to shout at each other from afar. He would like nothing better than an improvement in United States/South Africa relations but this cannot come only from one side. Unfortunately ever

so many of the things that South Africa does and which he had referred to we don't get credit for. We regard ourselves as a Western nation and the United States, as the leader of the West, as our leader. He would, however, wish to point out that we can take kicks in the pants but not in the teeth.

Vice-President If the United States considers that there has been progress on the issues of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia we will commend you. This could lead to improved relations.

On that note the talks ended.

During the course of the morning after the conclusion of the talks the Vice-President held a news conference and a short while after this was followed by the Prime Minister's news conference. Verbatim texts of both are attached as annexures.

GENERAL REMARKS

The talks were conducted in a pleasant atmosphere throughout and there was never any question of acrimony.

The first impression of the United States Delegation was that of the youth of its members. The Vice-President himself is only 49 years of age and apart from Ambassador Bowdler the remaining members, with the possible exception of Aaron, must be in their thirties.

Mondale was always most polite but could not divest himself from giving the impression of a starry eyed liberal out to reform the world. It became clear during the course of discussions that he was not completely au fait with his subject and relied to a considerable extent on his advisers

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in particular on McHenry on the South West Africa question. The impression was in fact gained that McHenry was the stumbling block on this issue and it is quite possible that if it was not for his influence the quibbling over the question of the Central Administration Authority would not have arisen.

It was difficult in such a short period to gauge with finality the depth of character of a person such as Vice-President Mondale but he did not give an impression of complete assurance in himself nor did he leave an impression of much depth of character.

It is most doubtful in view of his background and outlook that he could be anything but condemnatory of our policies - he is not open to persuasion on this score and as such is representative of a new young generation of Americans who think alike on matters of ideology. The make-up of his delegation on the whole bears this out. It should serve as a warning to us that they are probably the type of Americans we will be compelled to deal with at least during the Carter Administration and that we are not going to get much change out of them.

But forewarned is forearmed and we should plan our policies accordingly.

A plus factor arising out of the talks was the excellent press conference conducted by the Prime Minister at the end of the talks. It was most satisfactory and apparently made a good impression judging from points of view expressed by individual journalists.

Finally it must be said that from the viewpoint of United States/South Africa relations and South Africa's overall position in the world it is important that the talks took place, because it provides evidence of the importance of

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the role of South Africa in the overall scheme of things in Southern Africa. That the United States wished to talk to us is in itself significant, and furthermore the talks also provided a platform which enabled the South African point of view to be heard in international circles through the medium of the Prime Minister.

At the same time one must not lose sight of the fact that there was a certain negative impact as well in that in his news conference after the talks the United States Vice-President made veiled threats as to possible steps against South Africa in the event that it does not review its internal policies. It is also important to note that whereas under the Ford Administration the United States spoke of the necessity for majority rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa it recognised that South Africa would have to be treated on a different basis, whilst now the Carter Administration is demanding eventual majority rule in South Africa as well. It is clear that the present composition of the Carter Administration could be a disturbing factor in United States/South African relations.