

BOWDLER

Prime Minister, on behalf of my four colleagues I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to meet with you. Our respective Governments have instructed us to deliver to you an "aide memoire" VERBATIM MINUTES of Namibia. I'd like to give that to you. I think it will facilitate your consideration of this subject to be able to read it rather than to have me read it to you.

M E E T I N G

MR VORSTER

Thank you gentlemen. If you'll just give us an opportunity to read it.

Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Ambassadors of

BOWDLER

Mr Prime Minister, in presenting this to you we also have been instructed to say the following. The five Governments are convinced that acceptable settlements to the Namibian problem must be found urgently. The five Governments are prepared to work with the South African Government in finding such a solution. Views of the five Governments on the nature of settlement are contained in the "aide memoire". The five Governments urge a response and are prepared as a group to enter into discussions with the South African Government to consider its response and to work with South Africa for a solution consistent with Security Council Resolution no. 385.

7th April 1977

MR VORSTER

Anything else?

BOWDLER

That's all Mr Prime Minister, I don't know whether my colleagues wish to say anything.

MR VORSTER

Gentlemen?

Annexure:

AIDE MEMOIRE

AMBASSADORS I

BOWDLER

Prime Minister, on behalf of my four colleagues I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to meet with you. Our respective Governments have instructed us to deliver to you an "aid memoire" on the question of Namibia. I'd like to give that to you. I think it will facilitate your consideration of this subject to be able to read it rather than to have me read it to you.

MR VORSTER

Thank you gentlemen. If you'll just give us an opportunity to read it.

(Reading of document)

BOWDLER

Mr Prime Minister, in presenting this to you we also have been instructed to say the following. The five Governments are convinced that an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem must be found urgently. The five are prepared to work with South Africa in finding such a solution. Views of the five Governments on the nature of a settlement are contained in the "aid memoire". The five Governments urge a prompt response and are prepared as a group to enter into discussions with the South African Government to consider its response and to work with South Africa for a solution consistent with Security Council Resolution no. 385.

MR VORSTER

Anything else?

BOWDLER

That's all Mr Prime Minister, I don't know whether my colleagues wish to say anything.

MR VORSTER

Gentlemen?

MR BOWDLER

Except that I associate myself with everything that the Ambassador has said.

MR VORSTER

Well gentlemen, let me say immediately that I find to say, to put it very mildly, I find this "aid memoire" very strange indeed. You ask us to do something and you go on to say that these conditions include an early exercise for all inhabitants of Namibia of their right to self-determination through a fully democratic process. Now as far as that goes you have noted what has gone on in S.W.A for the last two years. A process, to say the least of it, more democratic than anything that's ever happened in Africa. But apparently I must now take it that that is not good enough. Secondly, you say under the provisions at the United Nations - let me in all fairness point out to you that the Secretary General of the United Nations came out to South Africa - it was agreed as between the Secretary General and ourselves that he would send out a personal representative here. To cut a long story short you know that he sent out Dr Escher and as a result of his talks with us he went to S.W.A. - he came back - he came to a certain understanding with us, reported back to the United Nations and that was the end of the story as far as South Africa is concerned. After that we never heard anything more. Am I correct Mr Fourie?

MR BOTHA

Well, they then passed that resolution - that was the way.

MR VORSTER

Precisely. But as far as South Africa was concerned there was no further contact on this subject with us. You further say gentlemen that the resolution calls for an end to South Africa's administration of the territory. We are on record and I'm saying to you now as I said at the meeting in Pretoria to the peoples of S.W.A. with whom I met there that South Africa wants to end it's administration of the territory. I'm

glad for one thing that we are now properly called the administrative power in the territory and not what we were called before. But our attitude is very clear - that we want to end our administration. We said so in no uncertain terms to the representatives who met at the Turnhalle in Windhoek. So if you ask us this then you're asking us something which we are on record as saying that we want to do. As far as the release of political prisoners are concerned I'm not aware at this stage that there are any people being held in S.W.A. at the moment. I will go into that matter. If you refer, by any chance, to people who have been convicted by the Courts, then I can only say that these people have been convicted of criminal offences and that, I take it, falls outside the scope of this "aid memoire". And as far as the return to the territory of Namibians living in exile I find it indeed strange, gentlemen, that this is put to us in view of the fact that we are on record on so many occasions that these people can come back. Indeed, we invited them to come back and you are aware of the fact that many of them did come back - found no hindrance in their way and no action was taken against those who were coming back. May I now, in all sincerity gentlemen, ask you why do you ask us this in view of the fact that this is known. Or must I accept that this is not known to your Governments.

MR BOWDLER

There are people, Mr Prime Minister who have not returned, I don't know .....

MR VORSTER

And are your Governments blaming me for the fact that they haven't returned in view of the fact that we said they could return and that we begged them to return and told them to come and work for their country and their people? And in view of the fact that so many of them came back and in view of the fact that no action was taken against them, whatsoever. Now we are being nailed that these people are not back in the territory. Are we looking, gentlemen, for a solution to the S.W.A.-problem or are we looking for a pretext. If that is so then for heavens sake your Governments must tell us.

BOWDLER

Mr Prime Minister, may I ask you to elaborate on what you mean by "are we're looking for a pretext". A pretext for what, Sir?

MR VORSTER

That exactly, Mr. Ambassador, is what excercises my mind. Why make this demand upon South Africa when South Africa is on record as having said just that.

MR BOTHA

Mr Prime Minister, may I add, this is my view of the problem. I think we might as well be candid with one another here today. We get absolutely no credit for this kind of thing and the West had a golden opportunity to tell the African States in the United Nations. Kerina is back, Kosanqwi is back. Kerina got phonecalls from all over Africa asking whether he wasn't arrested - then he assured them he wasn't. But this is never used Mr Prime Minister - its never used. That is indeed a problem.

MR VORSTER

We don't want to be unreasonable, gentlemen, but we're not going to be hammered in this way.

MR SCOTT

Mr Prime Minister, I don't think this - if I may say so - this represents hammering in any sense. I think one of the main puposes of this is to enter into a dialogue because there is - whether any of us like it or not - we have to accept the fact there is a difference of view about the international recognition of an independent SWA/Namibia. And one of the great problems, I think that all of us face, is whether we are going to narrow that difference or whether we are going to allow the difference to remain open. In which case there is very little hope of reaching a peaceful and an international recognised solution. And this is why, our governments I think are so very concerned about.

MR BOWLER

MR VORSTER

But in all fairness, Sir David, you've never found me unreasonable in all the years that you have had to contact me in this regard. But candidly there comes a time when, if we don't get credit for what we are doing and if what we are doing is not accepted or recognised then what can we do.

MR VORSTER

MR BOTHA

I must add to that Prime Minister. Sir David now talks about differences. Yes, I am very much aware of the differences. We spell it out and I reply to deny it. But I do maintain that we are getting no credit. I've been to the United Nations very often. We simply get no credit. The Lesotho-case indicates that. With respect, you are too weak, you are simply too weak to resist the emotional black onslaught. You accept lies, with respect Sir David, not you I mean, your country. I've pleaded with your people at the United Nations, I pleaded with the Americans at the time, I spoke to the German. Look this Lesotho story is a lie. Even after the visit here - in their reports submitted to the United Nation they make it off in a sentence or two. It's all clear now that Lesotho wanted 89 million dollars. We don't mind it coming to our area - we like it. But, hell its the way its going about. Now you talk about differences. Now there are the three points that the Prime Minister mentioned. The resolution calls for an end to South African administration. We are prepared to withdraw - to end our administration rather. Release of political prisoners, we'll might have a ..... different opinion. But then - return to the territory of Namibians living in exile - I mean you would not have enumerated these unless you considered them as differences of opinion. This is the point the Prime Minister wanted to make. Why did you enumerate these? And here we say to you that we think we are in basic agreement on quite a number of the points. Now why can't you stand up in the United Nations. Why can't you when a thing is true, right and just? Why can't you then say it? This is the problem. I'm just being frank.

MR BOWDLER

I think with regard to this particular issue, it is one of the elements of the Security Council resolution 385 and this will be one of the points that would be discussed in these discussions which are suggested here. I think that would be the time in which you could make the point which you made Mr Prime Minister.

MR VORSTER

Make it where? Under what circumstances?

MR BOWDLER

In the group that we have suggested here that the discussions with the five Governments to review its response to this "aid memoire" and to work with South Africa in meeting the conditions of resolution 385. If you feel that you have met that point I think it will be useful to discuss in the context of all of the conditions of 385.

MR BOTHA

May I say something?

MR VORSTER

Yes, Mr Botha

MR BOTHA

Irrespective of to what extent, you Mr Prime Minister are prepared to do this, we all know what its about. Let us be frank. The United Nations wants SWAPO to be in power in S.W.A. We know it. Well why should we beat about. That is the crux of everything.

MR VORSTER

They passed a resolution to that effect.

MR BOTHA

That's the crux of the matter.

BOWDLER

I wouldn't jump to that conclusion at this stage. I think it would be useful to sit down and have the discussion suggested here. Let's examine that point.

MR VORSTER

With whom Mr Ambassador do you suggest that this discussion should be?

BOWDLER

As I gave you orally Mr Prime Minister, the suggestion here is that the five Governments urge a prompt response and are prepared as a group to enter into discussions with the South African Government to consider its response and to work with South Africa towards a solution consistent with the Security Council resolution.

MR VORSTER

At what level will this discussion take place and how do you visualise it will go.

BOWDLER

Mr Prime Minister, I cannot answer that other than to say that we look forward to a prompt response on your part to the "aid memoire" and we understand that further guidance on this particular question will be forthcoming from our capitals.

MR VORSTER

Will it be with the five Governments or under the auspices of the United Nations or under the Secretary General or how do you visualise it.

BOWDLER

Our instructions Mr Prime Minister, says "discussions with the five Governments" as a group.



MR VORSTER

Gentlemen, as far as this issue is concerned and again we are on record as having said that we are prepared at all times to have reasonable and realistic discussions on this issue. We were prepared to discuss it with the Secretary General and we are prepared to discuss it naturally with your Governments, but it must be pointed out that as far as S.W.A. is concerned we are not taking any decisions on their behalf. We believe that the peoples are man enough to take their own decisions. We have not interfered in one way or another in the slightest, as far as the Turnhalle conference was concerned and we cannot and we will not prescribe to the peoples of S.W.A. how they should settle their future. It's their country and it's their future. In the framework of that proviso I am prepared to enter into discussions with whomsoever wishes to discuss the S.W.A. issue with us. Just to avoid any misunderstanding for the future, I must just make it plain at this discussion that the territory of Walvis Bay as far as South Africa is concerned is not part of S.W.A. I will however, if you could enlighten me when you talk about a fully democratic process like to know whether you consider what has happened in S.W.A. a democratic process or not. If not - what you have in mind when your Governments talk about a fully democratic process.

MR BOWDLER

I'm not instructed on this point but I would again say that this certainly is one of the topics that would be discussed in any discussions that are held as to what we may have in mind on that subject.

MR VORSTER

You will of course know, Mr Ambassador, and unless my memory is incorrect you sat in on discussions by Dr Kissinger on this subject and perhaps Mr Botha you are more clear on that and having followed it up it is best for you, if you so wish, to say a few words on those discussions.

MR BOTHA

Yes sir. The outstanding point was that we did come to an agreement on the so-called seven points with the with the American Government. And we were told, as you know, that our attitude was, the words used were: it was extremely reasonable. That was way back in September - six months earlier. At the time, we warned the American Government that we could not stop the momentum of the Turnhalle -- it was completely impossible. As a matter of fact, what was taking place there was, at the insistence of the black representatives, the whites wanted to delay things, but the blacks insisted on the interim government being established because they said to you; yourself that there was doubt whether you really were sincere in granting independence to the territory.

MR VORSTER

Precisely.

MR BOTHA

So to prove to the blacks that the Prime Minister was sincere he said to them: All right, go ahead, and in the meantime we waited and waited for the Americans to react and I know there was an election in the United States and I know it takes a long time but I do find this veiled threat in this "aid memoire". I find that rather objectionable in the light of this very history of co-operation which came from your side. We can today, Mr Prime Minister, indeed comply with all the basic ingredients of all the demands made all the years in the United Nations. What are they? The territory can become independent within a reasonably short period as an entity. And there will be no discrimination based on race or colour and the people will decide. Now I frankly must say that this seems to me to have closed the gap, if I may call it that almost completely except for one or two technical aspects. What role the United Nations is going to have, I suppose we can talk about it but I will be frank with you and my understanding is that the role they desire is to support SWAPO, to get into the Angola situation, to bring

SWAPO to power through sheer force of arms. Of course the rest of the people don't have the guns. And this is what we are talking about here - and unless the Western countries very clearly understand this and unless we can talk about that also I don't know where this is going to lead to. Six months ago we were told - this Dr Kissinger said to you personally in my presence - Mr Prime Minister, he said your attitude is extremely reasonable. We can't expect more. We can't ask it. At times he told you that you are too reasonable. These are the facts.

MR VORSTER

Mr Botha the fact remains that the African States don't want to settle the Namibian issue. They don't want to settle it at all. What they are expecting us to do is to hand over meekly and mildly S.W.A. to Sam Nujoma and SWAPO. And now let me be very frank with you, gentlemen, if S.W.A. could be handed over by South Africa it will not be handed over to Sam Nujoma or to SWAPO. But as it happens it doesn't belong to South Africa to hand over to anybody. And South Africa certainly will not pressurise the peoples of S.W.A. to hand over to SWAPO and to Sam Nujoma. If they so wish its their business but South Africa will have no part in it whatsoever to pressurise them to do just that.

MR BOWDLER

Mr Prime Minister, if I may in response to the Foreign Ministers comments, I know that the effort was made during the Kissinger period to try work out a solution. It did not work as you know for the reasons you know. As in the case of Rhodesia, that's not the end of the line - we keep on trying and this is a fresh attempt on the part of the five Governments to sit down with you and discuss these issues in the hope of being able to find an internationally acceptable solution.

MR BOTHA

I appreciate that but ...

MR VORSTER

To whom must this solution be acceptable Mr Ambassador?

MR BOWDLER

I think we cross that bridge Mr Prime Minister after we sit down and talk about it.

MR VORSTER

Because frankly, I'm not asking your comment on it.

Nothing short of handing over S.W.A. to SWAPO and Nujoma will suit the militant African States.

MR BOWDLER

That needs to be explored.

MR BOTHA

But look all over Africa, if I may just continue a little bit. There's no democracy left in Africa. Why must S.W.A. be doomed to go that same way? That's what SWAPO will do. We all know as we sit around - I don't think there is a single gentlemen here who can allege that SWAPO has in mind a democratic system.

MR VORSTER

But there again Mr Botha, I'm on record and I repeat it to you gentlemen that if the peoples of S.W.A. - and they are as representative of the peoples of S.W.A. as you will ever find - if they are prepared to talk to SWAPO I'm on record as saying that they can talk to SWAPO. We never put any spoke in the wheel with regard to that whatsoever. If there are governments who feel that we should pressurise the peoples of S.W.A. then the reply is decided - no.

MR BOTHA

May I just add because there might be colleagues and gentlemen here who were not present, we might as well say it now. After those seven points and the understanding reached on them we waited until the day, I think, before Dr Kissinger left office when I was handed SWAPO's reply to Dr Kaunda. They amount to eight points and all points were simply demands and the gist of it was they demand handing over of power to them. There was no talk with me and when I discussed this problem with Pres Carter, where Mr Vance was present, Mr Vance once said to me: Ambassador, you admit therefore that SWAPO has got the guns and the constitute to continue threat etc. etc. so there will never be peace unless SWAPO can be brought into the picture. I said yes, they will continue to pose a threat but not even Dr Kaunda could get Nujoma - not even Kaunda could get Nujoma to talk peace. Now I notice you've got a word here "and the peaceful participation of all political groups - the peaceful". When I asked Mr Vance whether America would be able to talk SWAPO into accepting a "peaceful participation", Mr Vance said to me he doubted very much whether you could do it. I'm just raising some obstacles in my mind. In other words what we are dealing with here is a situation where you even admit that SWAPO would not be prepared to accept peace and now with respect you make us out to be the villain. The villain after we went out of our way - what will happen if we publish those seven points and SWAPO's eight points? What will happen if we let the public in France, Canada, Britain and United States hear exactly what happened and what South Africa was prepared to do. What would the public in those countries say. Because we feel we are being choked here - unreasonably and we feel we got no credit for it. You were not prepared to stand up in the United Nations or behind the scenes and tell those people. Instead, with respect, the United States permanent representative at the United Nations is going out of his way to tell the world the way he is going to butcher us. With respect, I mean we also got a public - you're stationed in South Africa you know about our problems and you know about our weaknesses sure. But on S.W.A. and Rhodesia gentlemen, you can't fault us - you just can't. Not this way.

MR SCOTT

I don't think Mr Prime Minister, if I may say a word, that we are asking for a substance of discussion at this present time. The points that Mr Botha are making are very, very good points to be made in the discussion that we are suggesting should be set up. I think all said that we are not suggesting that there should be a handover to SWAPO. My Government have never accepted that SWAPO is the only political group or political party that should be treated with or should be allowed to participate.

MR BOTHA

That's true.

MR SCOTT

We have never done that and we have said this quite frankly in the United Nations ourselves.

MR BOTHA

That has been helpful, certainly.

MR SCOTT

So we are not trying to arrive at a preconceived solution on this. And if I may just add one other thing which is a purely personal view, is that I think if you read this document carefully, it is in fact a document intend to be a helpful one, it is not intended to be putting you in the pillory and of course it isn't intended I think as it is now to be published. It is intended to be the beginning of a phase of co-operation. In the past we've tended to state views at long range - we of course, the ambassadors of the nine E.E.C. countries have already made similar views. You've made a very helpful response and as you'll see from what has been said we regard this an honest attempt - in following up of that response. In the context to where the real inner fighting is now taking place which is in the Security Council.

It's a reasonable reply. Next thing we're confronted with  
 MR VORSTER can't understand it. This is not the way we are  
 But then with all respect Sir David, what I cannot understand -  
 in view of the fact that we were at all times prepared to  
 discuss this issue - in view of the fact that we were prepared  
 to receive Dr Waldheim that we were prepared to receive his  
 personal representative - in view of the fact that we went  
 out of our way to discuss this with Dr Kissinger as you  
 yourself know too, why then this veiled threat in this  
 document. You see my people cannot and will not judge it  
 in any other way than that your Governments are trying to  
 force us into a corner. But if you want us in that corner  
 well then let your Government say so. you will have discussions

with the five Western members of the Security Council -  
 MR SCOTT governments we represent - so that we can try and thrash  
 I can say with authority that that is the last thing we  
 want to do. agreement or tentative agreements. Certainly,

some things that have been said here today are untrue as  
 MR BOTHA Government is concerned. We have never said that  
 But this paragraph. This first paragraph at the head of  
 page 2. I find that obnoxious. Its a threat. Only have

said quite the opposite in the United Nations.  
 MR VORSTER  
 Of course it is.  
 But you were a party to the resolutions that were passed,

MR BOTHA  
 Was it necessary to do it that way?

MR GRANDE  
 MR VORSTER  
 It is as if we were never prepared to discuss this with  
 your Governments whatsoever. Where as we went out of our  
 way to discuss it. governments intention that you have this

process of consultation when we can sit down or others take  
 MR BOTHA  
 The last thing we were officially told about S.W.A. is that we  
 adopted an extremely reasonable attitude. The next official  
 thing is a threat, virtually. In the meantime I've had a  
 meeting with Pres Carter. But this is what's bothering me  
 and I had talks with your people. With Ivor Richard and  
 he didn't give me this kind of impression. And I can tell you  
 what Ivor said. On the reply we gave to the nine he said:

Its a reasonable reply. Next thing we're confronted with this. I don't understand it. This is not the way we are going to achieve solutions. No Government can act on a threat.

MR SCOTT

All right - we'll report what your standpoint is.

MR GRANDE

I think, if I may have a word, that my Government too, Sir David .....

intends this to be an appeal that if you will have discussions with the five Western members of the Security Council - the Governments we represent - so that we can try and thrash this question out, and try and reach some kind of an approach, agreement or tentative agreements. Certainly, some things that have been said here today are untrue as far as my Government is concerned. We have never said that we want SWAPO to rule S.W.A. - we never said we want them to be the only representative in S.W.A. - we certainly have said quite the opposite in the United Nations.

MR VORSTER

But you were a party to the resolutions that were passed, Mr Ambassador.

MR GRANDE

We have never agreed Mr Prime Minister, that SWAPO is the sole representative or should be the sole representative in S.W.A. of the indigenous people. So I would really appeal as is my Governments intention that you have this process of consultation when we can sit down or others take place ..



MR VORSTER

May I ask you then in all sincerity, Have we ever refused to discuss this matter with your Government. difficult position if I'm asked, because all the publicity in the MR GRANDE been given to this meeting, if I were asked what in fact was the meeting about.

No.

MR BOWDLER

MR VORSTER at, Mr Prime Minister, I'd like to say that And if that is so and that applies to all your Governments, gentlemen. Then I fail to understand - and again I'm which putting it very mildly - why you say to us on this day that the Governments wish to make it clear that in the absence of early South Africa agreement to pursue a settlement which will meet the foregoing principles and be internationally acceptable, the Governments will be obliged to reconsider their previous positions regarding proposals etc. I find it very strange indeed in view of the fact that we have never refused to discuss these matters with your Government. going to leak somewhere - its leaked before. The leakages MR BOTHA in South Africa and I can give you the assurance. Indeed, our last response was that we think we are basically in agreement with one another and we think the remaining gap can be closed and we suggest the way to close it.

MR VORSTER

Precisely. And it was accepted at that time that as far as South Africa is concerned, S.W.A. is not our property to dish out as we saw fit to do it. these five countries, to be of assistance. As a matter of fact a good office MR BOTHA old but that contradicts this first paragraph on I think it will be helpful if this first paragraph on page 2 could be changed. paragraph cannot be ... Whether you wouldn't like to reconsider the wording of that paragraph.

MR VORSTER

You very well know, gentlemen, that my Parliament is in session at this stage and I will be in a very difficult position if I'm asked, because all the publicity in the world has been given to this meeting, if I were asked what in fact was the meeting about.

MR BOWDLER

On that point, Mr Prime Minister, I'd like to say that we've been given a short statement to issue if we were asked and obviously we will be asked after this meeting, in which we would just say that we presented our joint views on achieving as soon as possible an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem consistent with resolution 385. And there is no intention, that I'm aware of, of releasing the text of this "aid memoire".

MR VORSTER

Then Mr Ambassador, you know this world as well as I do, its going to leak somewhere - its leaked before. The leakages were not in South Africa and I can give you the assurance it won't leak here. But as a practical man I must accept that its going to leak somewhere as things have leaked in the past.

MR BOTHA

The problem is this. I think statements have been made here which are helpful. Orally we have been told that this is an attempt on the part of the West, these five countries, to be of assistance. As a matter of fact a good office sort of role but that contradicts this first paragraph on page 2. Now you have talk us that orally - that's why I wonder whether this paragraph cannot be .. Wether you wouldn't like to reconsider the wording of that paragraph.

MR BOWDLER

I think all we can do Mr Minister would be to report this converstaion to our Governments.

I think if we look at it in this constructive spirit, we  
 MR VORSTER into discussions and see if we can find a satisf

I gave you a very clear reply as to that.

BOWDLER

Would you intend to follow this up with a written reply,  
 is this necessary? to do all along Mr Ambassador. It wasn't

MR VORSTER

No, I don't think so. I don't think at this stage - subject  
 to what my colleague here has to say about the matter -  
 except to say that you have asked us now whether we are  
 prepared to discuss these matters with your Governments  
 and my reply is 'Yes'; Subject to the things I have said  
 a moment ago, the reply is 'Yes'.

MR R.F. BOTHA

Well, on the basis, of course, of the statements made orally  
 here, to the effect that they won't be helpful.

MR VORSTER

Precisely. But if the shole object is to hand over SWA  
 to SWAPO, then we will be wasting our time.

SIR DAVID SCOTT

Mr Prime Minister, I don't think that that is a fair  
 judgement on this conversation that we have had today. I  
 think everybody has indicated that we will not as individual  
 countries, recognise SWAPO and we are not proposing that  
 South Africa turn SWA over to SWAPO. I think it is important  
 to look upon this effort today as another round in the  
 continuing effort to find a solution to the Namibia problem  
 which is internationally acceptable and is no longer a source  
 of controversy and of difficulty.

I think if we look at it in this constructive spirit, we can enter into discussions and see if we can find a satisfactory solution to the problem. that you are demanding all the time, without ever being able to tell his public that, let's

MR VORSTER

That, as my colleague rightly says, is fair, but that we have been prepared to do all along Mr Ambassador. It wasn't necessary to threaten us to come to this point. We at all times have been ready to discuss that very thing. And the fact that the negotiations broke down, cannot be laid at our door, whatsoever.

We all understand that.

Mr Prime Minister, if I just may add, I feel a bit ashamed to launch this in your presence, Mr Botha, but one should not forget to see this all in the context of what is going on at the United Nations at the moment. I think it is fair to say that the West has tried hard in various ways and you of course, know in which ways, to avoid confrontation at the United Nations and worse consequences for all of us in the United Nations, and this, I think, we should look at it as part of the efforts to avoid this confrontation or even worse, the consequences for SA.

SIR DAVID SCOTT

MR R.F. BOTHA

Yes, the problem is this. I have heard the United Nations so well and I know so well that all that is asked all the time of SA is to make the concession. The West does not practice a negotiating hypothesis there. Your role is a reactionary one; you react. You always react to demands and we are then asked to comply with the demands. There isn't in your make-up a firm stand, say, also to Africa, look, on that and that and that point we think you have got reasonable demands, but on these points we think you are wrong. You never do that. By never doing that, you do not assist

MR R.F. BOTHA

us, or my Prime Minister at all. Whatever you think of SA, there is a public in this country; you all know it. He cannot do some of the things that you are demanding all the time, without ever being able to tell his public that, look, by being reasonable I have achieved this from the West. And this is what is at the basis of it. I know the United Nations too well; it is a place where compromises are made all the time against SA - all the time. There is never an instance, look at this last action, I can show you to what extent the African Draft Declaration knocked out the few little bits that you tried to insert. Where you tried to say that there were changes in SA - I welcomed that - but they told you "knock it out." A number of other things which were positives - they knocked them out. Then you are not strong enough to tell them look it is the truth we are dealing with - let's stick to the truth? And this is at the basis of it. This is the heart of the problem.

MR VORSTER

I hope that when we do come to Rhodesia ultimately, as we obviously would come some time in the future, that they will also demand a fully democratic process in Rhodesia.

MR R.F. BOTHA

I think Britain is committed to that, if I may say so.

SIR DAVID SCOTT

I think we all are Mr Prime Minister.

MR BOTHA

MR VORSTER

Well, we will have to wait and see what Mr Mugabe's reaction to that will be.

MR BOWDLER

If we were asked this question we would say that as members

MR R.F. BOTHA

May I just ask you in all kindness, is this not a way to appease some of the people at the UN, say you have now given this to Mr John Vorster in Pretoria -

AMBASSADOR BOWDLER

I will tell you in equal candour that this is a genuine effort for a new round of talks with the 5 governments which are represented around this table, to see if we can find a solution which would be acceptable to you and internationally acceptable.

MR McHENRY

I hasten to say Sir, as an encore to what Ambassador Bowdler has just said that we have all been in on the traffic in this right from the beginning, this has been going on for a long time; the meetings of the five and it is a genuine and sincere effort.

MR VORSTER

Well, gentlemen, I am open to argument; very open to argument. How you can set about it in SWA in a more fully democratic way than they have set about it to find a solution to their differences and as for the other things, I have told you that we are on record as that we do want to do just that, so therefore, I take it that we will hear from you after this in good time, as to how your Governments would want to conduct their further talks with us.

MR BOTHA you; thank you, gentlemen.

Mr Prime Minister, may I just ask Ambassador Bowdler to read again what they want to issue to the Press?

MR BOWDLER

If we were asked this question we would say that as members of the Security Council of 5 governments,

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Could you read a bit slower?

Aide Memoire

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Conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster their joint views on achieving as soon as possible an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem, consistent with Security Council resolution 385.

MR R.F. BOTHA

You see, you will of course, realise that this might force us to issue a statement of our own?

MR VORSTER

Yes, we will have to consider it very seriously; this afternoon still.

MR R.F. BOTHA

This is the problem with this kind of thing.

MR VORSTER

Anything else, gentlemen?

AMBASSADOR BOWDLER

No, thank you very much Mr Prime Minister, and we will report what you and your Foreign Minister have said here this afternoon and we will be back, in touch with you.

MR VORSTER

I thank you; thank you, gentlemen.

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Aide Memoire

A. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, in view of their special responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, have jointly reviewed the problem of Namibia.

B. The Governments are deeply concerned by the situation in Namibia and agree that progress is urgently required to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement.

C. The Governments believe that a Namibian settlement must be acceptable to the international community. The interim Government now being considered by the Turnhalle Conference does not meet the standards of international acceptance and only a final settlement which is based upon the conditions of the Security Council Resolution 385 can obtain international acceptance.

D. The conditions for a settlement in Namibia are contained in Security Council Resolution 385. These conditions include an early exercise by all the inhabitants of Namibia of their right to self-determination through a fully democratic process under the supervision of the United Nations and the peaceful participation of all political groups, including SWAPO, in this process. The Resolution also calls for an end to South Africa's administration of the territory, release of political prisoners and the return to the territory of Namibians living in exile.

E. The Governments wish to make it clear that in the absence of early South African agreement to pursue a settlement which will meet the foregoing principles and be internationally acceptable, the Governments will be obliged to reconsider their previous positions regarding proposals for stern action by the United Nations and will be compelled to examine a new range of measures intended to obtain South African compliance with applicable resolutions of the United Nations Security Council concerning Namibia.

/F.



F. It is the view of the Governments that international negotiations under United Nations auspices continue to be the best way to bring the parties to an agreement on how the process to independence should proceed.

G. The Governments note from the South African Government's reply to the nine countries of the European Community that the South African Government, too, sees virtue in continued discussions. The Governments wish to have the South African Government's views on how the conditions for an internationally acceptable settlement will be met. The Governments request an early response from the South African Government.

H. The Governments have noted the South African Government's reference to the United Nations Secretary-General in its response to the nine countries of the European Community and would welcome the South African Government's views on how his good offices could be used in working towards a settlement.