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# Mayibuye

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
## SOVIET UNION

*Survival of democracy*



## NEGOTIATIONS

*Removing the  
major  
obstacle*



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**M**ore and more voices are being heard demanding an impartial Interim Government of National Unity. Inkathagate has shown that De Klerk's administration cannot be trusted to supervise the transition.

The forces which see eye to eye on this issue have started to consult and to act together. Parallel campaigns around the same demand are also being witnessed.

As VAT D-day approaches, many forces are joining hands in a campaign against its more reprehensible elements. As a result, the government has been forced to rethink its approach.

With the adoption of the draft accord, the Peace Initiative is starting to bear fruit.

This is mainly due to the overwhelming sense of national outrage against violence. The schemes of those who might have wanted to shoot the initiative down have been frustrated.

Before the end of September, a wide array of patriotic forces which seek democracy and a free and fair transition will be meeting to chart the way forward. On those issues on which there is agreement, programmes will be worked out for joint actions.

There is certainly disagreement among various organisations around many issues. But the interests of each organisation are served best when it is able to identify issues on which it

agrees with others and act together with them to realise the common objective.

The overwhelming majority of South Africans want peace, political tolerance and speedy movement towards a negotiated solution. It is necessary that those who support these principles work together.

The danger posed by opponents of peace cannot be underestimated. While the draft peace

accord was being finalised, violence escalated in Natal, the PWV and the Eastern Transvaal. Familiar accounts have been given by familiar victims about familiar attackers.

The scourge of intolerance is playing itself out in the threatening noises and actions of the extreme right-wing.

There is a small clique against peace and negotiations – small, but vociferous and bloodthirsty. The government's patience with these forces and its involvement in the violence demonstrate that it is part of the problem.

This places enormous challenges on the ANC not only to intensify the campaign for an Interim Government and for speedy movement in negotiations. The ANC must act in such a way that it leads the whole of society to see this process through.

The greater the unity among forces for peace and democracy, the greater the chance of decisive movement forward. ♦

# Unity across the board

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**FROM AFAR**

Dear Comrades

Congratulations on a great magazine. *MAYIBUYE* gives a foreign reader the feeling that he is aware of a cross-section of current developments in your country.

*KA-A, Ghana***GATSHA AND NEGOTIATIONS**

Dear Comrades

I am an observant onlooker from Lesotho. I would like to express my surprise and fear as to how the Inkatha Freedom Party has been trying to hijack the struggle. It is true that the recent meetings and joint efforts by both the ANC and the IFP were necessary in fighting violence.

But don't you comrades think this hitch-hiking will turn into hijacking of your achievements one day? Today Gatsha confidently thinks that he is a strong opponent to the ANC. He bravely opposes the ANC on his visits abroad. At the same time he is going up the ladder at your expense.

Can't you devise another way of achieving peace which does not require Gatsha's co-operation?

*WM, Maseru*

**Ed:** Inkathagate and revelations of SADF involvement in training Inkatha members confirm some of the issues you raise. However, it is necessary to continue with the multilateral peace initiative in order to save lives.

**SPORTS DEBATE**

Dear Comrades

I am seeking clarity about the re-admission of South Africa to the international sport arena.

Soccer has been a multiracial sport for a long time. Unity in this sport is better than other codes, with the exception of SAN-FA, which is affiliated to SACOS. But what about other codes like athletics, rugby, swimming, etc?

We blacks do not have proper



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or adequate facilities. Some sports executives are saying that facilities in white areas will be used by all races. But what about those towns who are under Conservative Party controlled municipalities?

I am not discouraging readmission to the international sports arena. I am just saying that we face many difficulties. Whites are happy because they know that they will outplay us in the sports field and fill their pockets with money.

*AC, Meadowlands*

**Ed:** We hope you found the articles in the previous issue of *Mayibuye* useful. It is clear that many people share your sentiments. Nevertheless, the debate must go on.

**MEDIA COVERAGE**

Dear comrades

I am very unhappy with the image being painted of the ANC in the media which is owned by the minority supporting the government. I appeal to the ANC to launch a newspaper in order to project our side of the story. All the press spokespersons we have will not be enough.

Here in the townships we rely on newspapers like "The Citizen" which is aligned to the government. This government supports police action against us even if we have done no wrong. See how the *Citizen* reacted to the attack on the Ventersdorp squatter attack: it criticised the government for

having acted against white people. If black people had carried out the attack, it would have supported the police.

*AC, Meadowlands*

**Ed:** We live in a country where the media is in the hands of the government and a few monopolies. Investigations are underway to establish the feasibility or otherwise of setting up more "alternative" newspapers. However, the present situation can only be finally altered if a democratic media policy is followed under a democratic government. In the meanwhile we have to fight to get the viewpoint of our people heard through the media of this country.

**LEADERSHIP VISITS**

Dear comrades

I think it is time the ANC tells us whether we in the Far North (Venda) are part and parcel of it or not.

To be honest and straightforward, the ANC does not consider our region as one of its regions. They do not like to visit our place even on special occasions such as commemoration services.

I would like to tell them that they are making a big mistake because the ANC has lots of committed and disciplined support in our area. Our leaders are lowering our morale because our people do not know them except through the television and newspapers.

It is different in places like Soweto where the ANC is always present. We are all equal and we all need to see and speak to our leaders about our problems.

*SC, Shayandiwa, Venda*

**Ed:** Nelson Mandela and other leaders have addressed rallies in your area. However, as you indicate, this is not enough. We trust the NEC takes note of your letter. ♦



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### Women's Day remembered

To mark the 35th anniversary of South African Women's Day the PWV ANC Women's League hosted a seminar on August 10 at Wits University. Under the theme: "Women raise your voices in the future constitution" the seminar's aim was to bring together women from different political perspectives to discuss and share ideas on issues facing women and how best to entrench gender equality in a future dispensation.

Organisations and parties attending included the Democratic Party, National Party, Black Sash, Women for Peace, Five Freedoms Forum, Nusas, Women's Legal Status, SA Association of University Women, SACC, Wosa, Institute for Contextual Theology, YWCA, Sadtu, Lekang Project, ANC Youth League, Women for Peace, People Opposing Women's Abuse, Central Islamic Trust Women and the Women's Health Project. The IFP, PAC, Azapo and the Conservative Party were also invited but failed to attend.

Issues discussed were:

- unity and alliances – moving women's voices from the margins to the centre;
- raising women's issues in the future constitution; and
- an alliance of South African women: towards a Women's Charter.

The seminar agreed to convene another meeting on September 21 1991 whose agenda will focus on the campaign for the Charter for Women's Rights.

### ANC branch suspends Ramodike

Chief minister of Lebowa Nelson Ramodike, a member of the Lebowakgomo ANC branch, has been suspended by the branch. The suspension follows his announcement that ANC President Nelson Mandela was going to address a meeting in Lebowakgomo. Without any consultation with Mandela, he sent a circular to school principals and invited chiefs and other people.

In his speech at the meeting he tried to create an impression that Mandela knew about the meeting but had other important matters to attend to. He wanted Motsoaledi and Nkadi-meng, two NEC members who were at the meeting, to apologise. In his speech Motsoaledi had to repudiate Ramodike's claim and made the people aware that Mandela was not aware of all the arrangements.

Ramodike's problems have intensified after the formation of the United People's Party (UPF) which creates lots of tensions in the villages as he frantically tries to entrench himself.

The ANC Northern Transvaal region issued a statement to the effect

that the branch has a constitutional right to suspend any member. It has informed him and the branch that he has a right to appeal to the region and to the national office if he is not happy with the decision of the region. The region hopes that the matter will be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

### Whither Soviet Union?

As *MAYIBUYE* goes to press, things were still in a state of flux in the Soviet Union following the August 19 ousting and reinstatement of Gorbachev (See p40). The seizure of power was clearly unconstitutional. Joe Slovo, the General-Secretary of the SACP issued a statement two days later in which he expressed hope that the takeover was not a signal for a reversion to everything which in the past discredited the socialist cause and the image of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The statement dismissed as petty propaganda the suggestion of any special relationship between the SACP and some of the personalities involved in the coup, stating that in April last year a delegation of the SACP met a delegation of the CPSU, headed by Gennady Yanayev (the coup leader) who was then deputy general-secretary of the CPSU.


At the meeting the

SACP reiterated its complete support for the reform process underway in the Soviet Union and explained the SACP's complete commitment to multi-party democracy in South Africa. Yanayev reiterated the traditional policy of the Soviet Union in support of the South African struggle.

With regard to Viljeon's intention to use the events against the SACP and the ANC, Joe Slovo's statement said that it would be far more plausible if Viljeon's party's record in regard to direct involvement in military and unconstitutional takeovers elsewhere was cleaner. "We hope that Viljoen, as the government's key negotiator, whose task it is to attempt some form of reconciliation, will not allow his nostalgia for the cold war and his anti-communist hysteria to outweigh his concern for the negotiations process."

### Peace meeting in the Border

In spite of all the information that has come to light about the existence and activities of a CCB-type unit in Ciskei (see p 39), it has received little attention in the media. It was only after the convening of a Border Peace Conference by the ANC Border Region and the Border Business Action Committee (BBAC) that reports began to appear in the local and national press. The SACP and



**The Transvaal National Education Coordinating Committee's one-day symbolic occupation of three empty white schools on 22 August was prevented by heavy police presence and arrests. Protestors at the Blairgowrie High School in Randburg (seen above) were arrested and are to appear in court on charges of trespassing. Organisers point out that the action succeeded in highlighting the crisis in black education and the wasteful misuse of educational resources by apartheid.**

Cosatu also took part in the meeting.

In discussions between the Alliance and the BBAC, which comprises most major business interests in the region, it was agreed on the need to convene an urgent peace conference to look at the security situation and find ways to prevent the outbreak of violence in the region.

The Alliance also raised the urgent need for an Interim Government arrangement in Ciskei and South Africa as a whole. All interested parties and organisations were invited to the conference, including the National Party,

Democratic Party and Lawyers for Human Rights. Azapo and the PAC were also invited but did not attend. Gqozo backed out of the conference at the last moment, describing it as a "kangaroo court".

#### **Barend backs down on VAT**

Pressure has forced the government to back down on value added tax. Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis has announced the reduction of VAT from 12 to 10%. State services such as hospitals and clinics will be exempted.

ANC concerns and condemnation of VAT

still remain. The introduction of such a new major tax system in this period of transition is completely unacceptable and should be suspended until democratic structures are in place, says the ANC in a statement. (See p 17).

A new organisation, the Dispensing Family Practitioners Association, was among the many calling for the scrapping or review of VAT.

This organisation focussed on the fact that South Africa would become the only country in the world to impose VAT on health care. It called upon people to demon-

strate their opposition to VAT by writing to the Minister of Finance and supporting local action.

Meanwhile, the 2% reduction in VAT may be annulled by the expected increase in transport costs. This follows the increase in petrol and diesel prices announced the same day. The prices are to go up by 13 and 8 cents a litre, respectively.

#### **The Third Boer War?**

Unsuspecting blacks travelling through Ventersdorp on August 9 were attacked by mobs of rightwingers. Trouble started when AWB supporters attempted to prevent De Klerk from addressing a NP meeting in the small western Transvaal town.

In the ensuing clash between the police and rightwingers, 3 rightwingers were killed and 58 people injured, among them policemen and innocent blacks. Rightwing leaders have referred to the incident as signalling the beginning of the third Boer War, while others have likened it to the 1922 Rand Revolt, saying it is the first time since 1922 that white has shot white.

Nelson Mandela condemned the incident and blamed the rightwing for lack of political tolerance, calling on De Klerk to act against it. Jeremy Cronin of the SACP blamed De Klerk himself for the incident, accusing him of attempting to divert attention from Inkathagate. ♦

# Removing the

**The government is the major obstacle to negotiations. The response of the De Klerk administration to revelations about state involvement in the violence has shown this clearly. South Africa urgently needs an Interim Government of National Unity.**

**L**ong after FW de Klerk, hand on his heart, sought to reassure the nation that the government did not have a double agenda, more information on state involvement in the violence continues to come out.

Accusations by former SADF members have been reinforced by evidence in Natal about police involvement in brutal massacres and the arming of death squads. More than the funding of the government's political allies is at issue. Revelations about government complicity in the violence lie at the very core of this scandal.

The brutal facts reflect much more than an aberration in government behaviour. It is not a matter simply of corruption or immorality. It is less still the ridiculous sop about fighting sanctions. Rather what has come to the surface reflects a well thought-out strategy of the state machinery towards negotiations and the transition.

It sounded rather hollow and churlish, therefore, when an attempt was made to defend the continued existence of SADF Special Forces such as 5 Recce regiment and their foreign mercenar-

ies whose role in the massacres has been documented. Many were stunned when a leader who has committed himself to end apartheid tried to justify the continued usage of secret funds to "fight sanctions", knowing fully well that sanctions are there to fight apartheid.

## **CABINET RESHUFFLE**

But there is much more than meets the eye. The praises that have been showered regarding the cabinet reshuffle have ignored other salient facts. For instance, the new Minister of Defence is also to be in charge of the government's communications services. And those who are aware that billions of rands have been committed to the secret disinformation network of the SADF will certainly not be amused. Is a way being found to legitimise the criminal involvement of the SADF in political campaigns against the NP's opponents?

The matter has certainly not been laid to rest. And there is no way in which the decks can be cleared while this government is still in place.

If anything, the scandal has



**Walter Sisulu, Albertina Sisulu and Oliver Tambo talking to a victim of the recent Mzimphophe train massacre**

further underlined the fact that this government is illegitimate. Parties which were arrogating to themselves the status of "major player" have shown how "major" they are: major allies of the government, major obstacles to negotiations.

No one can fault the Nationalist Party and Inkatha for seeking to work together. But when the public is informed that the platform of their co-operation is adorned with taxpayers' money and corpses of victims of mass murder, it has got all the right to demand that this government must go.

The Nationalist Party government is the major obstacle to negotiations. It has in the past operated on the basis of denying opponents the right to express their views. When it decided, under pressure, to unban political orga-



# major obstacle



Pictures: The Star

**Malan: proud of a murder machine?  
Inset: Pik Botha not looking very proud of Inkathagate**



nisations, its state machinery had already been geared up for "low-intensity" destabilisation against the ANC and other democratic organisations.

The playing court was opened for all. But the field was made rough and bumpy on the side of those whom the government did not like.

If this major obstacle is left in place much longer, the process will become more and more complicated.

Elements within and outside the state who are altogether against negotiations will always be given the space within which to carry out their evil deeds – as

long as this benefits the Nationalist Party and its allies. Because these elements do have the capacity to create havoc, they are then able to pile obstacle on top of obstacle to block the path of negotiations. As a result, the pace of this process and even the agenda would be determined by them. In other words, the democratic movement can easily cede the initiative to elements who are either not yet ready for negotiations or who are against this process.

In the meantime, these elements are able to cloud issues, and divert attention from the fundamental objectives of our struggle: the questions of power and

transformation. On the other hand, the regime is virtually given the free hand to delay the process. It is then able to decide when to introduce a reform here and an amendment to its laws there. When it does so, praise is levied on the government, not at the mass of the people and the democratic movement who fought and sacrificed for such changes.

### TRANSITION


Inkathagate has added more reason to the argument that we should move as speedily as possible to the setting up of an Interim Government of National Unity. Such a government, made up of various parties, will clear any remaining obstacles to free political activity and ensure that, both in word and in deed, the playing field is truly levelled. Then, the first significant step in addressing the monopoly of power of the white minority will have been taken. The transition to democracy will have started in earnest.

What this means is that the process leading up to the All-Party Congress has to be speeded up. This is the forum which will discuss the form and content of transitional mechanisms and adopt the principles on the basis of which the new constitution will be drafted.

How then does this relate to the release of political prisoners, security legislation, the return of exiles and demands around the issue of violence?

Identifying the government as the major obstacle does not mean that the other obstacles become irrelevant. Neither does it mean that these demands can now be shelved until an Interim Government is in place. Rather, all the efforts on various fronts towards clearing these obstacles should be intensified.

The agreement with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees on the return of exiles is



one such example. But as can be seen from the government's interpretation of this agreement, there will always be attempts on its part to muddy the waters and delay things. As long as the government is in charge we will have to struggle every inch of the way to ensure that free political activity is realised.

### PEACE ACCORD

The draft national peace accord should also be seen in this context. It is as a result of pressure that some of the forces behind the violence have agreed to the measures proposed. But resistance – including new acts of violence – should be expected. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the process is not derailed, so as to allow a more systematic and multilateral approach to the resolution of this problem. Those who rely on violence will be exposed.

But, as with other obstacles, we should expect all kinds of forces to put spokes into the peace process. And the problems can never be dealt with satisfactorily before an Interim Government is installed; they can never be finally resolved while apartheid is still in place.

It is therefore argued that while progress is being made in

clearing the remaining obstacles, including the problem of violence, steps must urgently be taken towards an Interim Government of National Unity. This progress will be refined and consolidated by the Interim Government, not the De Klerk administration.

By advancing the demand for an Interim Government as the most urgent issue, the ANC has placed enormous challenges on itself and the people in general. Greater pressure than ever before will be needed to ensure that such an impartial institution is set up.

The regime will devise all kinds of schemes to resist this demand. At the negotiating table – before and during the All-Party Congress, in the media and in the townships – it will use all means at its disposal to defeat the people's aspirations.

Even when the Nationalist Party does bow down to the demand for an Interim Government, it will find ways of sabotaging the process. It will seek to discredit and weaken the ANC and other democratic forces. This is exactly what the violence, propaganda and other state measures are all about in this phase of "talks-about-talks".

This time around the democratic movement should not be caught napping. ♦



Picture: The Star

**Police teargassing youths in Kagiso in August last year .  
Will the era of genuine free political activity ever dawn while the NP stays in power?**

# Inkathagate: time for a neutral referee



Picture: The Star

**A** clear message emerges from the revelations of government secret funding for Inkatha and other political groupings and state involvement in the violence. An Interim Government is needed urgently to supervise the transition to democracy.

This position is attracting support from a broad spectrum of forces at home and abroad. Across the country there have been pickets, boycotts and stayaways in support of this demand.

**MAYIBUYE** looks at the implications of Inkathagate: the meaning of the demand for an Interim Government, the peace process, the importance of a Patriotic Front as well as the programme of mass action.

*Grief in the wake of an Inkatha attack in Vosloorus*

# Interim Government?

## Why is the IG the most central demand of the current period?

Recent exposures have shown most strikingly that the apartheid government cannot be trusted to supervise the transition. It is using its monopoly of power to tilt the balance in favour of the Nationalist Party and its allies.

The government is neither willing nor capable of clearing obstacles to negotiations. It is in fact piling up new ones. The government is therefore the major obstacle to negotiations. There cannot be any serious movement forward if De Klerk's administration is still in place. Power must be transferred to an IG.

## What is an Interim Government?

It is meant to be the supreme authority, the government to supervise transition from apartheid to democracy.

Its main tasks will include ensuring peace and normal political activity. It will also administer the country and create the socio-economic foundation for the future.

## How will it be constituted?

The IG should be a government of national unity. As many parties as possible should take part in it.

But it is not possible to include all the parties without creating an unwieldy and ineffective structure. The All-Party Congress (APC) will have to decide on the "major parties" to form the IG. This could be made easier if alliances emerge in the build up to and at the APC.

## What happens to the state machinery?

New rules will be introduced for the army, police, Civil Service and judiciary in line with transition to democracy. There will be restructuring in accor-

**In this article, MAYIBUYE briefly tackles some of the questions being raised about the Interim Government (IG).**



**Neo Potsane, (left), MK combatant recently released from death row, joins a picket to protest government funding of Inkatha, 29 July**

dance with broad guidelines worked out by the APC and IG.

## What about external forces?

South Africa will most certainly benefit from the experience and expertise of other countries and international bodies. Impartial international monitors will help ensure that the process is free and fair. This will also ensure that the ultimate result receives international legitimacy.

But the basic tasks will be done by South Africans.

## How will the IG ensure freedom and fairness?

This will be guaranteed by strict control over security forces

and other bodies of state. Laws which inhibit political freedoms including those which discriminate against blacks and prevent free association among South Africans will be abolished.

A "transitional" Bill of Rights will set out people's rights during this period.

## What is the approach of the regime?

They argue that the present government and parliament must be retained during the transition.

De Klerk can bring in some people into the cabinet. Other parties can also advise on the introduction and removal of laws. But supreme authority will reside in the hands of the white minority.

## How then is the gulf to be narrowed?

Good moral arguments are not enough. It is necessary to unite the overwhelming majority of the people and organisations behind the demand for an IG. The latest scandal has persuaded many forces – both here and abroad – that there should be a neutral transitional authority. This must be consolidated.

Effective and creative united mass action will bring pressure to bear on the government. ♦



Picture: The Star

**Soldiers patrolling Jeppe station last year after one of the notorious train attacks - this type of violence threatens to derail the peace process**

## The Peace Train: Will it remain on track?

**The main parties in the peace initiative have finalised the draft Accord. It has now been passed on to others for amendments. A MAYIBUYE correspondent comments.**

**F**ortune tellers attach significance to numbers, months and seasons. It is Spring. And on September 14, a month to the day after the adoption of the draft peace accord, various parties

will meet in a Convention to adopt this comprehensive document.

The adoption of the draft National Peace Accord by the ANC/NP/IFP on its own is an important development. The ANC represents communities which are under attack. Inkatha is implicated in the violence. The NP government is seen as the initiator of the violence.

Immediately after the adoption of the draft, religious and business facilitators mailed it and the invitations to other parties. Religious leaders' moral commitment to peace and the efficiency of business houses have added the potion necessary to meet the fortune teller's dreams.

At the core of the whole document is the recognition of the need for free political activity and for all parties to promote peaceful

transition to democracy.

The basic motivation for the operation of security forces should be to serve communities and liaise with them. Special investigation units and courts to deal with political violence have also been proposed.

The draft recognises the right of communities to form non-partisan self-protection units. At the same time, clear rules have been put forward to root out covert anti-people actions by the security establishment.

In order to ensure impartial supervision and monitoring of the process, a Commission of Inquiry is necessary. Government legislation in this regard will have to be amended in line with the accord. In addition, a national committee and secretariat, dispute-resolution committees and other structures are to be set up - all with the necessary powers to follow the agreement through.

On socio-economic development, priority is given to providing relief to afflicted communities and those areas such as hostels and "squatter camps" where social conditions have a direct bearing on the violence.

Some might argue, with justification, that this sounds all too familiar. Agreements have been reached before. Besides, the recent escalation of violence shows that there are forces not happy with this initiative. They will outdo themselves to try and sabotage it.

Those who are committed to peace must close ranks and develop the capacity to overwhelm the saboteurs.

Come September 14 and the foundation of South Africa's body politic will not be the same - at least on paper. The significance of the measures proposed runs much deeper than the present initiative. They have the potential to become a stepping stone towards the laws and the political culture of the transition period. ♦

# ANC demands: what do they mean?

The current Inkathagate scandal has exposed the government as the major obstacle to negotiations. The demand for the removal of the regime and the setting up of an Interim Government is now high on the agenda. What do some of the demands related to Inkathagate mean?

## Multi-party Commission

**T**he ANC and others are demanding a multi-party commission of enquiry to investigate government involvement in the violence and secret funding of political activities. Why a multi-party commission and not a judicial one?

The outcome of the Harms Commission into the activities of the CCB and other special forces made a mockery of the independence of the South African judiciary. This is a judiciary which for years has applied apartheid law, handed down blatantly racist sentences and accepted the lies and cover-ups of the security police against victims of torture. The few counter-examples are unfortunately only exceptions which prove the rule.

The apartheid administration in all its facets is tainted. The system that is accused of malpractice cannot be trusted to investigate itself. A multi-party commission of enquiry is the only way a proper investigation can be conducted, because it will be independent of the present regime and its administration, with representatives seconded by all major parties. ♦

## Secret Funds

**A**nother demand is that the secret fund budgeted by this government, amounting to billions, must be opened up to public scrutiny. De Klerk claims that all governments have secret funds and blandly pronounces that the secret projects which are continuing are in the "national interest".

He has proposed that a collection of private sector individuals chosen by him should oversee the usage of these funds. He rejects the democratic call for an Interim Government, because

South Africa is a sovereign state.

These arguments, like Pik Botha's arrogant assertion that everything he did was within the letter of the law and quite justifiable, overlook one basic problem. The white minority government has no legitimacy. It has no democratic mandate to determine what is in the national interest. Its laws are racist and unjust. That is why negotiations have to happen in the first place.

The South African people have suffered the abuses of a government that saw no need to

## Special Forces

**O**ne of the most important demands of the ANC and other democratic forces is the public dismantling of all SAP and SADF special counter-insurgency units, including those composed of mercenaries. For decades, apartheid's most vicious weapon against its opponents has been covert violence: death squads, vigilantes and assassins. More recently the killers on the trains have tried to terrorise the people into submission.

De Klerk promised to put an end to repression to create a climate of free political activity. Even as *MAYIBUYE* goes to press, the killing is escalating. An orchestrated campaign of assassination of ANC activists is hitting communities nationwide. Indiscriminate violence like train massacres also continues. We have been told that the CCB is disbanded, but CCB-style operations continue. There is no chance of a peaceful transition to democracy while these murderous forces are allowed to continue operating. If De Klerk is serious about negotiations, he has to act decisively on this front. ♦

account for its actions. If today that government finally recognises that South Africa has to be transformed into a democracy, then the playing field must be levelled.

The public has a right to know how its taxes have been spent and to be sure that the abuses of the past are really over. Which is why it is so important for the slush funds to be frozen. ♦

# Towards the Patriotic Front Conference

**The long awaited Conference of Patriotic Forces is finally set for September. In this article Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim of the Conference's Preparatory Committee gives a broad outline of its aims.**

**C**o-sponsored by the ANC, PAC and Azapo, the conference is expected to reach broad consensus on the approach to the present phase of the struggle.

## **TRANSITION**

In the current period of transition there is an imperative need to unite all the anti-apartheid formations. At the 48th National Conference of the ANC in July, a resolution on Strategy and Tactics called on the ANC to move speedily towards the building of a broad patriotic front to further the achievement of a common democratic order.

The ANC has historically been committed to the aim of uniting all progressive forces to speedily bring an end to white minority rule and lay the foundations for a united, non-racial society. After the unbanning of political organisations it became even more urgent to work for a united front.

Since February 2 1990, the regime has adopted a two-track policy. While on the one hand it unbanned political organisations



with the stated intention of allowing free political activity, the regime on the other hand plans and executes a campaign of mass terror to intimidate the people and destabilise the ANC and other progressive organisations.

## **REGIME'S STRATEGY**

Part of the regime's strategy is to create a "Christian Democratic Alliance" by which it hopes to gather under its umbrella all the forces of reaction and put into power an anti-progressive regime which will follow policies favouring white interests and privileges.

It is only a united people that will be able to effectively counter the state-sponsored violence and foil the attempts of the regime to weaken the democratic forces.

## **INTERIM GOVERNMENT**

A patriotic front becomes more urgent if viewed against the need for a common strategy on the question of a Constituent Assembly, an Interim Government and an All-Party Congress.

The patriotic front conference is expected to discuss and reach consensus on all these issues. Formulating a common approach to these questions will also enable us to pursue a common strategy to the negotiation process and will minimise friction and disagreement among the forces interested in the fundamental transformation of our society.

What will also flow out of the Patriotic Front Conference is united mass action to back the demands for a Constituent Assembly and an Interim Government. A united programme of mass action, involving the broadest possible mass participation will advance the struggle to a new level of revolutionary action. The success on the negotiation table will be a reflection of our strength in grassroots mobilisation. It will hopefully minimise conflict amongst our people and enable us to direct the main blow at the apartheid regime and its surrogate forces.

Over fifty organisations will be invited to the Patriotic Front Conference. These will be across the political spectrum and will include organisations and parties in the "homelands" and even those presently working in the bantustan structures.

The only qualification is that the invited organisations should be committed to the idea of a Constituent Assembly and the logical measures which would flow from such an approach. ♦

# Inkathagate:

## Pressing home the demand for an Interim Government

In this article, *MAYIBUYE* reviews some of the actions undertaken in various parts of the country in response to Inkathagate.

The public has been correctly outraged at the recent revelations of SAP and SADF involvement in the funding and training of certain groupings.

The revelations have proven our point: the de Klerk administration must hand over power to an Interim Government of National Unity.

Communities in various parts of the country responded in various ways to press home that demand. These include:

- In the **PWV region** a three week consumer boycott (see box for full story).
- In the **Western Cape** the holding of a lunch-time meeting demanding an end to the present government. The meeting, held in the Cape Town City Hall, was chaired by the mayor, Gordon Oliver, and addressed by Archbishop Tutu.

Messages supporting the demand came from a broad range of organisations including the Democratic Party, Muslim Judicial Council, Jews for Justice, as well as the SACP, Cosatu, PAC, and Wosa.

- In the **Northern Cape** a picket outside the Receiver of Revenue offices.

- The **Northern OFS** ANC re-

gional committee, after consultations with the Women's and Youth Leagues, launched a consumer boycott in Virginia, Welkom and Odendaalsrus on 5 August. As *MAYIBUYE* went to press the boycott was continuing. In response the AWB is trying to disrupt deliveries to black-owned shops.

- In the **Southern OFS** region a week long consumer boycott was launched from 7-14 August. This decision was taken by a meeting of the ANC, the Cosatu local, Mangaung Civic Association, the SA Democratic Teachers Union, and representatives of black business, including taxi owners and small traders.

- In the **Northern Transvaal** a picket outside the Pietersburg prison on 19 August demanded the release of all political prisoners and an Interim Government.

Whilst the revelations have outraged broad forces here, it is unfortunate that most of the actions undertaken have been largely at the initiation of the ANC and involved only the Tripartite alliance. The exception is Cape Town where the actions undertaken allowed for the full involvement of all people sharing this outrage. ♦

### Signature Campaign

The number of signatures submitted to the Campaigns Committee has increased by another 70 000 since *MAYIBUYE* published the last figures available. This is despite the fact that the previous set of figures had the Northern Cape tally at 55 000 when it actually is 7 431.

Mandia Dlamini of the Campaigns Committee says that many signature forms, almost 10 000, had to be returned to the regions because one person had signed on behalf of a number of people. "If people are unable to sign then we must at least obtain a mark or thumbprint."

The demands of the campaign, an Interim government and constituent assembly, have gained ground. Today just about every grouping opposed to the government and in support of a non-racial democracy has thrown its weight behind the demand for an Interim Government.

The following updated figures have been submitted by the Campaigns Committee:

|                    |                |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Eastern Transvaal  | 2 610          |
| Northern Transvaal | 27 000         |
| Western Transvaal  | 17 207         |
| Southern OFS       | 15 873         |
| Northern OFS       | 6 420          |
| Eastern Cape       | 96 030         |
| Western Cape       | 31 425         |
| Border             | 30 750         |
| Northern Natal     | 10 500         |
| Transkel           | 140 000        |
| Northern Cape      | 7 431          |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>385 246</b> |

(NB PWV, Southern Natal and Natal Midlands have not submitted figures) ♦





**Protesting government involvement in the violence**

## Diary of violence

**The revelations unleashed a fresh wave of violence throughout the country. The violence is spreading further and further around the country. Gangsters, rightwingers, undercover operatives - in fact a motley of despicable forces - are being instigated to go on an all out attack against the people. The following are but a few examples:**

### **Ermelo, Eastern Transvaal, 30 July**

A 45-year-old woman was fatally shot and her home destroyed by a grenade by members of the Black Cats gang.

On the same day an 18-year-old youth was shot while alighting from a taxi.

### **Ermelo, 10 August**

After the funeral of a leader of the Black Cats, a group of IFP members marched through the streets, firing randomly. Six residents, including a 70-year-old woman, were killed. This attack went ahead despite ANC forewarnings. The bus transporting

the mourners and attackers was traced and 79 IFP members have been arrested. Seven pistols and a number of "traditional weapons" were confiscated.

### **Ermelo, 11 August**

Two youth were shot outside their homes.

### **Swartruggens, Western Transvaal**

On the weekend of August 10 -11 a group of Koevoet commandeered Borolela Location, creating a situation fraught with violence. (Residents of this small town had been attacked in June).

### **Koster, Western Transvaal**


Between 24 and 27 July there were at least three grenade attacks.

### **Sannieshof, Western Transvaal**

The house of a local ANC executive member was petrolbombed. It seems that violence follows in the wake of Themba Khoza - he had just visited the area.

### **Western Transvaal REC call**

On 5 August the ANC Western Transvaal regional committee called for a multi-party commission to investigate police involvement in the above incidents as well as the joint vigilante/police attack on a peace rally in Tigane on 4 May. ♦



Victim of Jeppe Station shooting, September 1990

Picture: The Star

## PWV Consumer boycott

**MAYIBUYE spoke to some PWV organisers about lessons from the recent consumer boycott.**

**T**he PWV consumer boycott demanding the removal of obstacles to real negotiations and in protest against government involvement in funding and training reactionary forces began on July 25 and was lifted on August 14.

There were no serious incidents of violence or intimidation, but there were dirty tricks aplenty against the boycott. Thousands upon thousands of leaflets with confusing messages were distributed throughout the region.

Organisers have identified the following problem areas:

- the question of providing alternatives to communities living outside townships.
- branch delegates obtaining mandates from ANC members without considering community views.
- the boycott having too many demands.
- the relationship to be struck with supportive traders.
- the possibility of a total boycott of the Johannesburg CBD given the vast number of people who shop there and the spread of the areas they come from.

The Pretoria boycott was considered particularly successful. This, according to the organisers, was due to:

- that it is smaller than Johannesburg, and therefore the areas to be organised are fewer.
- active participation of branches. The Pretoria zonal meetings were attended by about 300 members.
- close liaison with the Cosatu locals. ANC organisers regularly briefed Cosatu members about ANC positions and developments.
- the establishment of a joint monitoring committee.
- close consultation with Indian traders who backed the demands being made.

The regional consumer boycott overlapped with local ones. The Vaal had already launched a consumer boycott against the violence while Krugersdorp and Carletonville were boycotting against CP-domination of the municipalities and facilities.

"In such cases", reads the statement calling off the boycott, "the lifting of the boycott will be left to the specific communities."

The following are some of the suggestions the boycott organisers will be forwarding to the REC for adoption and implementation:

- that ANC branches must be constantly involved in all facets of the struggles in their communities so that activists can obtain accurate assessment of community feelings.
- that mechanisms must be found to identify progressive traders who can be patronised during the boycott.
- given the size of the Johannesburg CBD and the places from which people come to shop at the CBD, future boycotts will have to be more focussed. An example of this is the boycott of Beacons which has sponsored Inkatha to the tune of R100 000. ♦

**The government intends introducing Value Added Tax (VAT) on September 30. But while radios blare and bill boards declare: "VAT a better tax for a new South Africa", the public remain unconvinced.**

# The public vetoes VAT

**S**eldom has so broad a coalition of organisations agreed on one issue. Trade unions, political, consumer, social welfare, medical and even business organisations are beginning to say, with one voice: No to VAT.

If the government is sincere about wanting a better tax for a new South Africa, why do they not let the government of a new South Africa decide!

There is increasing evidence on how VAT will in fact redistribute money from the poor to the rich and cause widespread suffering for the poorest section of the people.

## MAJOR OBJECTIONS

What are the major objections to VAT?

- VAT is being introduced at a

very high rate of 12%. It has been calculated that this can push up inflation by about 2.5%

- VAT is being imposed on basic foodstuffs previously exempt from GST. Only mealie meal and brown bread will not be taxed.

- Medicines and medical services will be subject to VAT. Already health care is above the reach of many people.

- New machines for industry will not be taxed under VAT. This will much more likely lead to more retrenchments as companies buy new machines which will replace workers.

- Trade unions are angered by the imposition of VAT on trade union subscriptions and affiliation fees. This amounts to "double tax" on workers.

- The costs of administering VAT, especially for small busi-

ness are expected to increase by about four times. This additional cost will inevitably be passed on to the township communities who often rely on small business.

- Already food prices are rising drastically. Many businesses are going to use VAT as an excuse to increase their prices.

VAT is going to mean starvation for the very poor. The cost of living for the majority will go up by 5% overnight on September 30.

The government acknowledges that the poor will suffer. To alleviate their plight they plan to introduce targeted poverty relief programmes. However, as even the South African Chamber of Business acknowledges, these schemes are hopelessly inadequate.

While manufacturers will get a R3.75-billion tax break from VAT, only R220-million has been allocated for these schemes. And this is in the face of the government receiving an extra R1.22-billion from consumers by removing GST from basic foods.

## POVERTY RELIEF PROGRAMMES

It has also become obvious that the government does not yet have any clear ideas on how they are going to implement these so-called poverty relief programmes.

Most Cosatu and Nactu affiliates are instructing their wage negotiators to start demanding a 5% across the board wage increase if VAT is introduced. One can expect unprecedented strike action, if the government and employers ignore these demands.

In addition, campaigns have been started – and new organisations have sprung up – with the aim of stopping VAT. Cosatu has attempted to bring these initiatives together to launch a coalition of organisations calling for the postponement of VAT. ♦

# A peaceful army?



**Following the decision of the ANC's 48th National Conference that Umkhonto we Sizwe convenes its own conference, MK held its first ever national conference in Thohoyandou, Venda, on 9-11 August, 1991. MAYIBUYE spoke to Damian de Lange, a PWV delegate.**

**T**he Durban conference specifically resolved, among other things, that:

- MK remains in place and combat ready;
- the ANC accepts full responsibility for MK cadres arrested and tried in the execution of their duties;
- the ANC establishes MK structures throughout the country; and
- the ANC continues developing MK until a democratic constitution is adopted and a new defence force is created.

Explaining the need for the conference, De Lange says: "There are a number of problems facing MK cadres and there was a lot of pressure to deal with them.

"MK cadres were part of an armed struggle which is now suspended. The agreements reached definitely throw up the need to examine MK afresh, how it exists and what role it should play now and in the future. Funding now enters directly into South Africa, which means a struggle for funds to maintain an army outside. At the same time there is a big recruitment drive which has also compounded logistical problems.

"There were a number of other issues. For instance, there are

cadres from as far back as the Luthuli Detachment who have been part of MK, have seen action in MK, and now face problems which are probably closer to welfare or of an educational nature. They still see themselves as part of MK and in a way MK should help solve their problems."

The conference was broken into four commissions, namely:

- negotiations and the armed struggle
- security forces in the future democratic South Africa
- restructuring of MK
- welfare

Conference thoroughly discussed the Groote Schuur, Pretoria and DF Malan Minutes and noted the regime's skillful use of the media to distort these agreements. These have a demoralising effect on our members and supporters. The conference mandated the NEC to reopen discussions with the government with the view to extending the October 8 1990 cut-off for indemnity, given the violence in the communities. It resolved to urge the NEC to report timeously about meetings and agreements with the government.

The conference recalled that the issue of Self-Defence Units has been discussed at all ANC

conferences and numerous resolutions taken with little practical implementation. It reiterated that the ANC and MK have a central role in this process, while recognising that SDU's are community structures and accountable to the community. The conference also resolved that SDU's should not be isolated from ANC branch activity.

Asked if all these problems were addressed satisfactorily, De Lange says: "My personal opinion is that there was far too little time and not enough preparation before conference. Discussion documents were made available late. MK is not properly structured inside the country which makes it difficult to get cadres together, forge a common understanding of issues facing them and the way out. I must hasten to add that I was impressed by the amount that was covered despite the little disorganisation. Another element is that some issues, especially those relating to welfare, were at an emotional level, making it difficult for conference to solve."

The conference resolved that the ANC should begin formulating policy and programmes on issues related to security, defence and policing in the transition period and the future democratic state. The following issues were identified for specific attention:

- Formal ceasefire
- International monitoring force
- Integration of armed forces
- Creation of the new defence force
- Transformation of the police

The conference recommended that the NEC explores these issues and formulate policy options and programmes.

On his overall feeling about the conference, De Lange concludes: "Like all conferences, the real acid test for the MK conference is going to be the implementation of all the resolutions taken."

# Coloured people and the ANC

*"We should not be afraid to confront the real issue that these national minorities might have fears about the future, which fears we should address".*

Nelson Mandela,  
opening address to  
ANC National  
Conference, 1991.

**T**he 3,5 million-strong coloured community of South Africa displays certain specific features. In this two-part series *MAYIBUYE* looks at the coloured people in different parts of the country.

In this issue we look at experiences in the Western Cape and Natal, and the state of play in the Labour Party. In the next issue we will look, inter-alia, at experiences in the Transvaal and the mass upsurges in the Eastern Cape last year.

The use of the term "coloured" is not a pandering to the race classification of the apartheid regime. It is used here to reflect the reality of a grouping which has experienced apartheid in a specific way; which has developed specific responses to apartheid.

## ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE

The composition of the ANC leadership and membership does broadly reflect the important place and role of the coloured community in the anti-apartheid struggle. However, as National Conference pointed out, much work needs to be done to ensure that the whole community is galvanised behind the ANC.



The 1980 school boycotts and the boycott of the 1984 Tricameral elections, with their distinctive organisational forms and mass actions, displayed the specific responses of the coloured people.

While these articles look at the specifics of the coloured people it does not mean that the coloured community stands isolated from the rest of the oppressed and democratic forces. Their experiences have allowed them to make unique inputs to the broad stream of struggle. At the same time, as is evidenced by these articles, they have also been influenced by current national trends.

We hope through these articles we will help to deepen organisers' understanding of the challenges on this front. ♦

# How the Western Cape came to swing behind the ANC

**The strides made by the ANC amongst the coloured people over the past 15 years is probably the greatest progress the ANC has made inside the country.**

It is commonly accepted that one of the more serious organisational problems confronting the ANC is its inability to transform the deep and wide support it enjoys into signed-up membership.

This is clearly noticeable not only in the Cape Peninsula but also in scores of rural towns where large masses of people had no hesitation in demanding the redress of their many grievances under the banner of the black-green-gold.

The growth of this support occurred along a unique path. Some insist that it is the synthesis of the battles which raged between the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM).

For many years the NEUM enjoyed the ideological high ground within the coloured community. This was seriously challenged with the coming of the Black Consciousness Movement during the early seventies in the Cape.

The major force within the BCM which brought about the unseating of the NEUM was, undoubtedly, the students from the University of the Western Cape. As qualified (or drop-out) students they took the ideas of the BCM to the schools, the church and the many areas where coloured people lived.

The centrepiece of BCM campaigns was the unity of all black people, that is African, coloured and Indian people, against a common enemy – the white minority government.

Following the 1976 uprising BCM activists developed serious misgivings about ability of their movement to lead people to true freedom. A broad, politically amorphous, group of activists emerged

incorporating the vigour of the BCM and the purist class analysis of the NEUM.

A new approach to struggle had to be found. Given the shortcomings of the BCM, particularly its failure to connect with ordinary people, grassroots organisation was developed.

The building of civic organisations, during the early eighties, was an expression of this new approach. The Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (Cahac) was formed as an umbrella body to strengthen these budding organisations. Organising residents around their problems and at the same time introducing ANC slogans and symbols became the new method of advancing the struggle.

Building on the efforts of the Black Women's Federation, the United Women Organisation was formed. The first Youth Congress in the country was formed in the Cape which inspired the creation of youth congresses throughout the country.

## GRASSROOTS ORGANISATIONS

The inter-community newspaper, *Grassroots*, started in 1980. A true collective organiser, it made an outstanding contribution in supporting the work of these grassroots organisations. A host of supportive and service organisations, dealing with community problems at many different levels, like health, education, unemployment, etc, were formed to further strengthen the work of these democratic organisations.

It was due to the work of these different organisations that the United Democratic Front was launched with such success. The development of the UDF activated the Cape hinterland as never before.

The many battles fought by these communities in the Cape developed to such a high point during the mid-eighties that the state was forced to declare the Peninsula a pre-insurrectionary area. It was therefore not unexpected that many young activists, during this time, found their way into the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

The upsurge and combativeness of the coloured people in the Western Cape has a great influence among coloured communities across the country. ♦

**ANC**

Coloured people  
and the ANC

**LISTEN  
TO OUR**

**TEACHERS  
PLEASE!**

ALLEN HENDRICKS  
FORGET ABOUT BEACHES  
THINK ABOUT TEACHERS



**Coloured teachers marching to the Education Department in Johannesburg to hand in a memorandum listing their demands, 14 June 1991**

## Who makes up the coloured community?

Structurally located between Africans and whites, coloureds are further divided into different class categories. These range from an underclass of unemployed individuals to an upper middle class. The latter grouping includes a small group of businessmen, lawyers, doctors, teachers and artisans.

In the Western Cape, the overwhelming majority are employed in clothing and textile industries, building trades and municipal areas. Many of these workers have provided leadership in working class struggles in the Western Cape. This has increased the level of politicisation in coloured areas and strengthened organisations.


Forced removals of coloureds from areas such as District Six and Harfield Village resulted in the establishment of coloured areas

which contain both middle and working class families.

This has helped in the creation of an identity which has isolated coloureds as a social entity. The differential access which coloureds have enjoyed to social and economic rewards, relative to Africans, has further led to an identity crisis amongst coloureds.

Political uncertainty, following the unbanning of the ANC, has worsened the identity crisis coloureds experience. While many coloureds previously identified strongly with the UDF, and held leadership positions, recent surveys suggest that coloureds feel insecure about their future in the new South Africa. Given their complex class structure and ideological outlook, to ignore this reality is to disarm oneself both strategically and tactically. ♦

**Natal has a particularly small coloured community: fewer than 200 000 people. But this does not mean that they should be ignored.**



Picture: The Star

# Coloured community in Natal:

## an organiser's experience

**T**he ANC has failed to attract large numbers of coloured people in Natal, although branches of the ANC do exist in some coloured areas in Durban and Pietermaritzburg.

The presence of these branches involving people from areas such as Wentworth, Newlands East, Marrianridge (all in Durban), Woodlands and Eastwood (in Pietermaritzburg) and even a rural area like Harding, shows that the ANC does have the capacity to attract support from this community. However, their concerns, conditions and fears must be taken into account if these successes are to be consolidated.

There is no deep history of

anti-apartheid struggle among coloured people in the province. Early Labourites did see themselves as vociferous anti-government opponents, but this is an era of the past. There is widespread rejection of the Labour Party especially in the urban areas, where polls in the tricameral and LAC elections proved this.

### LABOUR PARTY

However, the Labour Party has been able to take advantage of many people's alienation and their feeling of marginality. In the rural areas, where progressive organisations have made no impact, there is a greater degree of con-

servatism with more people supporting the Labour Party and even Inkatha.

Of course, low polls also indicate political apathy and wariness. Since the early 1980s, there have been attempts to involve urban communities in progressive organisations. Whilst communities have become involved in heightened struggles, eg around high rents, evictions and water tariffs, sustaining their ongoing interest in organisation has been an uphill task. In addition there has been a tendency to shy away from political issues and organisations.

These problems have been perpetuated with the unbanning of the ANC. Over the past year, many coloured people in Natal have tended to reflect confusion and apprehension about the future, rather than hope and inspiration.

Many ordinary people feel very threatened by the impending "African takeover". The ANC is not seen by them to be providing a guarantee for them as a minority. Many people see themselves more as a minority than as part of the oppressed masses.

The following images of the ANC persist: that it is an organisation for African people and is not concerned about coloured peo-



ple; that it has been responsible for violence over the years and recently in the townships (although the recent Inkatha funding scandal may have changed that perception); that it is soft on Communism (which people in the highly religious, predominantly Christian community have very strong, negative feelings about); that it is responsible for sanctions and thus unemployment.

### PERCEPTIONS

People's perceptions are shaped by the commercial and state media, with the alternative media being little read. The movement does not have a strong propaganda impact. With all the confusion, fear and apprehension,

people in large measure have decided not to take sides politically and remain non-committal. There is a danger in this because it means that this unorganised mass of people will be persuaded by the political party/organisation that comes up with the most attractive package. A number of people have already joined the National Party and Inkatha. FW de Klerk certainly is viewed favourably, and seems a "safer option" for many people.

But the ANC has got vast possibilities to change this. There is a large measure of sympathy and unorganised support for the ANC. The movement must now give greater emphasis to organising in the coloured communities, with greater resources and full-time

organisers employed. Campaigns of the ANC must be designed in manner that shows sensitivity to the specific conditions in this community.

### RACISM

Moreover, there is a strong case for a concerted, unashamed "Call to Whites, coloured and Indians" campaign. This, however should go hand-in-hand with an effort at building a national consciousness, and an eradication of racism.

It is racism which over the years has poisoned the minds of our people, in order to prevent them becoming a united, formidable force to make the apartheid rulers shudder. ♦

## State of play in the Tricam

**T**hough the Labour Party has been plagued with defections since it entered the tricameral parliament the most serious challenge to its control of the House of Representatives came at the end of May this year when De Klerk's National Party made a bid for control of the coloured House.

A few days before the end of the 1991 parliamentary session De Klerk's party narrowly failed to snatch power from the embattled Labour Party in a no-confidence vote.

The slim 43-40 majority of Labour temporarily warded off the all-out onslaught that was launched by De Klerk's party on Hendrickse's MPs. During the no confidence vote the 35 National Party MPs managed to win the support of the single Freedom Party MP as well as the four independents including the MP for Border, Peter Mopp.

The most serious of all these defections for Hendrickse happened when Abe Williams, Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, and Andrew Julies, Minister of Agriculture and Local Government, crossed the floor to join the Nats.

After this the scene was set for more waverers to follow. Contrary to their explanations that they had consulted their constituencies before crossing to the National Party no such evidence exists.

The tenuous position of the Labour Party within the Tricam, combined with its gross alienation from the coloured community seem to have started its final disappearance from the South African political scene at this time when racist politics is on its way out.

The militant position adopted by Labour at the end of the last parliamentary session and its subsequent statements supporting the ANC's demand for an Interim Government reveal the deep-seated crisis within which it is caught up in the tricam system.

The NP's raid on the LP would therefore push some of the remaining leaders towards the democratic movement, if only in an attempt, on their part, to regain credibility. On the other hand, the NP, by absorbing elements from the coloured community who are thoroughly discredited, has inherited a weighty millstone in stormy waters. ♦



# SADF Special Forces and the killing fields

**What is the nature of these military units and regiments that have systematically terrorised the peoples of Southern Africa? The answer lies in the formation of a unit known as 1 Reconnaissance Commando based in Oudtshoorn in October 1972. In this article, a researcher outlines the history and current activities of these forces.**

**T**he armed forces of all countries require specialist units with certain specialised functions – be they airborne infantry, parachute battalions or explosive experts, for instance. By the late 1960s the SADF possessed such a unit called 1 Parachute Battalion, which was located at Tempe Military Base in Bloemfontein.

However, sectors of the SADF's General Staff felt that 1 "Parabat" Battalion was limited in the tasks which it could execute. It was felt that it was necessary to create units that could, if required, operate clandestinely behind "enemy" lines. To maximise their efficacy it would also be necessary, they argued, to cloud their activities in a veil of official secrecy. In the SADF's own words (taken from a Special Forces Manual) the role of these units would be "to inflict the maximum disruption on the enemy of the state by means of special actions".

The functions of these units would include the sabotage of

strategic installations, the assassination of individuals perceived as threats to the regime and the gathering of strategic intelligence for use in future operations. Using foreign "advisors" (mercenaries) and those SADF officers who had had British SAS and USA Special Forces experiences, a new unit called 1 Reconnaissance ("Recce") Commando was established in 1972. Between 1972 and 1980, seven more Special Forces Regiments were established with the following functions:

1) 1 Reconnaissance Regiment: moved to the "Bluff" in Durban. In 1975 it provided basic training for all Special Forces personnel and fielded a number of operational commando units in the frontline states.

2) 2 Reconnaissance Regiment in Voortrekkerhoogte provided Citizen Force (part-time) manpower to Special Forces HQ.

3) 4 Reconnaissance Regiment at Langebaan near Saldanha provided personnel for seaborne operations who also specialised in div-



# The SADF's policy of domestic and regional destabilisation



**Mshenguville, scene of repeated Inkatha attacks, 30 July 1991**

ing, underwater demolition, etc.

4) 5 Reconnaissance Regiment based at "Skietog" Military Base at Mica near Phalaborwa fielded five operational commando units and consisted mainly of black Mozambican troops.

5) 3 Reconnaissance Regiment was formed in 1980 to absorb members of the Rhodesian Special Forces into the SADF's Special Forces Division. In 1981 it changed its name to "Project Barnacle" and in 1986 it became known as the Civilian Cooperation Bureau (or "The Organisation").

6) 6 Reconnaissance Regiment was also formed in 1980 to absorb Rhodesian Special Forces personnel but in 1981 it was absorbed

into 1 Recce Regiment in Durban. 7) 32 Battalion was formed by Colonel Jan Breytenbach in 1976 out of soldiers from the Chipenda faction of the FNLA. The formation of 32 Battalion was, in Col Breytenbach's own words, cynically motivated. It was felt that the loss of too many white soldiers in Special Forces actions would lead to demoralisation amongst the white community and cause political embarrassment for the regime. Black soldiers were a preferable option – especially if they were foreign nationals who would not be missed if killed in combat.

8) Special Forces HQ (known amongst Special Forces personnel as "Die Gat" and based on a farm

on the southwestern border of Voortrekkerhoogte) was established in 1980 to coordinate Special Forces deployment and provide financial, operational and logistical support for Special Forces units.

During the 1988-90 period the size of the Special Forces Division was once again increased through the translocation of 32 Battalion and 31 Battalion (Namibian Bushmen) to bases in the Northern Cape. Special Forces effectively constituted a fifth unofficial arm of the SADF (the other arms being the Army, Air Force, Navy and Medical Services) and fell directly under the command of the Chief of the SADF himself. Special Forces strategy was controlled by the "powerhouse" of the SADF – the Department of Military Intelligence – whilst its clandestine deployment was overseen by a special sub-directorate within DMI called the Directorate of Special Tasks. All Special Forces operations had to be approved by the Minister of Defence and sometimes the State President himself.

## ROOTS OF DESTABILISATION

Special Forces units were to become the sharp end of the SADF's strategy of regional destabilisation in the 1980s. Their first limited experience was to occur in the 1975/76 invasion of Angola.

In 1980 the regime adopted its policy of destabilisation after it had become obvious to Botha that Zimbabwe was not interested in his Constellation of African States initiative. The intentions

of regional destabilisation hereafter became quite simple – to blackmail the frontline states economically and terrorise them through military measures into a state of submission to South Africa's hegemony in the region.

Zimbabwe was to become the first target of this strategy and 1980-81 saw 1 Recce and 3 Recce personnel being deployed in Zimbabwe in a number of operations – the assassination of Joe Gqabi, the sabotage of the Nkomo barracks, the sabotage of the Thornhill Air Base and even the attempted assassination of Mugabe and his cabinet in 1980.

The 1980-81 period also saw the initiation of the SADF's destabilisation inside Mozambique (the SADF had taken over control of the MNR bandits from the Rhodesian army in 1978). Codenamed "Operation Punda Milia" it involved the training, supply and coordination of the activities of the MNR bandits from 5 Recce Regiment, a number of secret farms in the Eastern Transvaal and Military Intelligence HQ in Poyntons Building, Pretoria. Special Forces personnel also launched a series of "punishment" raids against the frontline states for their alleged harbouring of "terrorists".

### **FAULTY INTELLIGENCE**

Often based on faulty intelligence but mostly intentionally barbaric, these raids witnessed the killing and maiming of thousands of innocent people. Attempts were also made to sabotage the infrastructure of the frontline states, thereby increasing their dependence on South Africa. Special Forces regiments sabotaged the Cahora Bassa power grid, the Beira Corridor pipeline and the harbour and oil facilities in Luanda and Beira harbours. SADF Signals Intelligence facilities (based at their various Bush Reconnaissance

Units around the country's borders) deliberately interfered with and jammed the radio grids of the frontline states and provided information for Special Forces operations in the area.

The formation of the Civilian Cooperation Bureau in 1986 heralded an even more sinister pattern emerging in Special Forces operations – the deployment of Special Forces personnel against targets within South Africa. Previously Special Forces deployment had mainly been within a regional context and their training reflected this – bushcraft, tracking, survival courses and rural counter-insurgency tactics.

Now Special Forces personnel started specialising in urban tactics and urban survival courses – during which Special Forces personnel would have to survive, undetected, in a township for a number of days. Special Forces personnel – in the form of the CCB – were now deployed against internal leaders and organisations. Indeed CCB operations were to become so clandestine that they were even instructed not to use the various agencies of the SA "intelligence family" for their information but rather cultivate their own network.

Regardless of whether Special Forces personnel were deployed within or without the country, their operations invariably followed similar patterns. They were deployed in "teams" which would include a team leader, a medic, an intelligence operative, a signaller, an explosives expert and a navigator.

Special Forces personnel travelled on foreign passports and would often "lie low" in a country for some months before executing an operation. They would use a number of "covers" while operating in the field – posing as businessmen, researchers, labourers, journalists, etc. To ensure secrecy, large numbers of Rhodesian, American, British, Mozambican

and Angolan citizens were recruited into the Special Forces, most of whom had military experience elsewhere.

### **SPECIAL FORCES AFTER DE KLERK:**


In 1989 Malan announced that SADF personnel would no longer be deployed in an operational capacity against South Africa's neighbours. He was right – now they would simply be used against the "enemy" within the country's borders! In a wilfully arrogant gesture, the SADF – or factions therein – even went as far as to relocate two Special Forces units from Namibia to the Northern Cape – a total of 35 000 new Special Forces personnel! It was clear that senior elements within the SADF were working according to a definite agenda even after De Klerk was elected.

Recent revelations by certain patriotic soldiers have indicated that the Recce Regiments continued to be used after De Klerk's election. This time they are used to destabilise the ANC. DMI and Special Forces are attempting to undermine the negotiations process. Is it possible that De Klerk did not know about this? Certainly not. Some observers make the point that De Klerk's difficulties are made even more problematic by the presence of an anti-De Klerk faction within the National Party consisting of Magnus Malan, Barend du Plessis, Herinus Kriel and Piet Clase.

### **FACTION**

This faction, it is argued, believes that De Klerk does not possess the political astuteness or the managerial experience to secure a favourable outcome for the NP at the negotiating table. They also believe that De Klerk's counter-revolutionary strategy remains too "civilian" in nature. What is needed, they argue, is a

## Structure/hierarchy of SADF Special Forces



much more aggressive campaign against the ANC, in which a variety of destabilising measures should be used – death squads, slush funding and propaganda.

Military Intelligence and Special Forces are well situated to realise these objectives. Indeed, the present Chief of the SADF, Kat Liebenberg, was Officer Commanding Special Forces between 1982 and 1985, a period when the bulk of Special Forces external operations were conducted and the CCB was formed. It is significant that De Klerk, supposedly committed to democracy, appointed a Kat Liebenberg to this position.

DMI and Special Forces control the R4,1 billion Special Defence Account which is not susceptible to public audit. They also possess the structures to launch this destabilisation. The propaganda and slush funding is handled by one of the SADF's three Chief Directorates – the Chief Directorate Communication Operations. A number of organisations are funded through its structures.

The combat edge of the internal destabilisation strategy involves the deployment of Special Forces units against the ANC. Three units are involved in these operations: 5 Recce Regiment in

Phalaborwa used in the train massacres – often posing as Inkatha impis; 2 Recce Regiment is involved in a number of "contracted" operations; 1 Recce Regiment fields personnel in the Natal killing fields in conjunction with DMI's regional office in Durban.

They have also been involved in some attacks against Inkatha, the aim being to sabotage peace initiatives where they are taking root, and to fan the flames of communal violence. The activities of these killing units are coordinated by Special Forces "projects officers" based at SF Headquarters and Defence Headquarters.

What is to become of these Special Forces?

### PRESSURE TO DISBAND

A combination of mass, international and even civilian pressure from within the National Party can ensure that the Special Forces Division of the SADF is disbanded once and for all. A number of suggestions are raised in this regard:

1) All Special Forces units must be disbanded and their personnel retired, returned to their country of origin (as is the case with 32 and 31 Battalions).  
2) Specialist functions in a future

SADF can be fulfilled by a conventional Parachute Battalion. Their specialist functions must be of a purely technical and not clandestine nature.

3) A Code of Conduct must be introduced for all future military personnel.

4) The Ministry of Defence must be demilitarised and become totally civilian in nature. This will prevent powerful factions like Military Intelligence and Special Forces tending to dominate the political direction of the defence force.

5) The activities of the Department of Military Intelligence must be reduced to that of a limited tactical intelligence function. Strategic intelligence must become the sole preserve of a civilian intelligence agency.

6) All Special Forces and Military Intelligence personnel involved in the recent terror attacks must be removed from their posts, barred from future service and charged for their activities.

Without the disbanding of the Special Forces Division the violence will continue, and the negotiations process will be delayed. The future government will inherit a monster capable of destabilising even a post-apartheid South Africa. Remember Chile? ♦

# Workers in the transitional period

**From 24-27 July, Cosatu held its 4th National Congress in Johannesburg. A MAYIBUYE correspondent reports on the shifts in emphasis.**

tral Executive Committee (CEC) to urgently prepare for a conference to adopt Cosatu's economic policy framework. This would reflect Cosatu's commitment to building a democratic socialist system, where the economy is democratically planned and the interests of the urban and rural working people are put high on the agenda.

The input on economic questions proposes a mixed economy, founded on the fundamental restructuring of the current socio-economic framework. In pursuing this objective, short and medium-term demands would have to be identified so as to set urgent priorities.

The urgent demands were formulated broadly as follows:

(i) Job creation and an end to job losses.

(ii) An end to privatisation, commercialisation and investment of state money without negotiation with the labour movement.

(iii) Workers should be retrained and not retrenched. There should be a nationally integrated education and training framework.

(iv) No VAT on basic foodstuffs, medicines and trade union subscriptions.

(v) Saccola (the employers' body) should agree to fund a feasibility study on the reconversion of hostels to housing units.

(vi) The government must stick to its commitment to restructure the National Manpower



Commission and negotiate all legislation which affects workers with the labour movement.

The demands on fundamental restructuring apply in the main to the future society. However, the struggles waged today around immediate demands will help to create conditions for a democratic economy. At the same time, while Cosatu's draft proposals do tally with those of the ANC, it is necessary that workers themselves should campaign vigorously for the implementation of programmes which serve their interests. This will take the form of continuous engagement within the ANC/Cosatu/SACP tripartite alliance around economic questions, as well as joint and parallel actions around these and other demands.

This constitutes one example of the dynamic relationship within the alliance. The Congress resolved to further strengthen the alliance in concrete action to bring a speedy end to the system of apartheid oppression and exploitation. Where "many caps" on

**T**he theme of the congress was: *Organise for democracy, economic reconstruction and socialism*, reflecting the new strategic challenges facing workers in this period.

The presidential address identified the task of the congress as assessing the climate in which the process of transition is taking place and whether in this situation there are all the necessary ingredients for a peaceful transition to democracy.

Since the trade unions are basically concerned with the economic interests of the workers, it was logical that a lot of attention was paid to the future of the economy and the interests of the workers in that economy.

The finalised input paper on Economic Issues stated in detail the steps to be taken towards the formulation of an economic policy framework for Cosatu; the campaign for jobs for all and the Cosatu approach to the Value Added Tax (VAT) system (see article on page 17).

Congress mandated the Cen-

for democracy, economic  
reconstruction and socialism



National Congress  
Johannesburg  
24 - 27 July

the part of the leadership do not conflict with the interests of any of the organisations, this was seen as one mechanism to help build especially the ANC and SACP which had been forced to operate underground for many years. ◆

## Negotiations

**T**he Congress reaffirmed Cosatu's position on a democratically-elected Constituent Assembly as the central mechanism for drafting a new constitution. It was emphasised that this assembly's proceedings would have to be public.

This is one of the most central issues to be discussed at the All-Party Congress (APC). The APC will also determine transitional arrangements such as an Interim Government and the process towards the election of a Constituent Assembly. This congress would have to be open to all parties and organisations and decisions made in it should be public and subject to ratification by the participating organisations. Decisions of the APC should not in any way restrict or limit the scope and powers of the Constituent Assembly.

The Congress resolved to campaign for a sovereign Interim Government, consisting of representatives of major political parties, to administer the country in the transitional period and supervise elections to the Constituent Assembly. The urgency of this demand was reinforced by the revelations of state involvement in the violence, which came out around the time of Congress.

The Congress also addressed the burning question of measures to control security forces during the transitional period. It was felt that the most effective measure could be to confine these forces to barracks and get an international force to ensure peace and combat crime.

In what was regarded by many as leaving Cosatu's options open, the Congress saw a need to empower the CEC to review the negotiations process and Cosatu's participation in it (including whether or not to participate in the All-Party Congress) on an ongoing basis. ◆

## Sanctions and disinvestment

**T**he resolution on Sanctions and Disinvestment emphasises that international pressure, including sanctions and disinvestment, have played an important role in weakening the apartheid regime. Congress felt that it is important that a decision be made as to when, and under what conditions, the allied organisations should call for the lifting of sanctions. The enormity of the issue, Congress resolved, is such that Cosatu alone cannot make the decisions.

The proposal that Cosatu, together with its allies, urgently convene a conference to develop a common approach to sanctions was considered. This conference would be as broadly representative as possible, involving all forces which have supported the sanctions campaign, including political organisations, unions and religious bodies.

This conference would also review progress towards a democratic political solution.

As a political contribution to the envisaged conference, the Cosatu Congress included in its resolution that any call for the relaxation of sanctions be linked to the imposition of an investment code which sets socially acceptable standards for trade and investment. Such a code would oblige employers to recognise internationally-accepted worker rights. Cosatu's allies would have to be consulted in the process of developing this code.

The congress also urged the maintenance of all present measures against the regime, in the context of the present disclosures about state funding. These would have to be in place until clear transitional arrangements towards a democratic South Africa have been sorted out. ◆

# Glasnost or co-option?

## NUM and the Chamber of Mines

**T**he 270,000 strong NUM negotiated wage increases that were linked with the gold price bonus and profit-sharing schemes covering workers in gold mining.

This novel approach to negotiations between unions and bosses could mark a turning point in industrial relations in South Africa. The agreement will affect the almost 500,000 black mineworkers employed under the Chamber of Mines.

Profit-sharing schemes are usually seen as part of the bosses' strategy to co-opt workers in managing their own exploitation, creating a false sense of ownership of property amongst workers with consequent blunting of their militancy.

### DEFENSIVE POSITION

NUM entered annual negotiations with the Chamber from a defensive position due to the crisis in gold mining. With about 80,000 miners having lost their jobs since the crisis started to bite in 1989, the union had to contend with an extremely difficult position.

The NUM National Congress held in April this year decided to suspend the wage policy adopted in the 1989 Congress for gold mining in this year's negotiations. It was this tactical retreat that shifted the focus of negotiations from wages to non-wage social and economic demands.

On gold mines the union settled for an average wage increase of six percent on basic pay – the lowest since NUM started negotiating with mine bosses in 1983. The settlement also entitles

**The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Chamber of Mines reached a unique settlement after two months of hard bargaining on wages and conditions of employment.**

mineworkers to a bonus if the average gold price rises above R1050 per ounce on the international market between July and September 1991.

The profit-sharing scheme negotiated with Harmony Gold Mine (owned by Rand Mines) is linked to an across-the-board wage increase of R25. Only when the mine is profitable, 15 percent of the profits will be put aside for workers.

The maximum profit-share of workers will be R4 million. The first R1 million will be shared equally by all workers. With the current labour force, a R1 million profit will entitle each worker to a R60 share.

Harmony has agreed to disclose information on its profits and costs to NUM to make the scheme workable. In the collieries the union won straightforward wage increases ranging from 6,3 percent to 19,5 percent.

NUM made significant gains in

winning ground on non-wage issues affecting the rights of mineworkers. The concerted effort on the part of the union against mine repression was successful as the two parties signed an agreement on the following issues:

- Access and access facilities;
- Guidelines for worker participation in decision-making processes in hostels;
- Improvement of facilities for visiting wives of mineworkers;
- Full-time shaft stewards;
- Increased paid educational leave for shaft stewards;
- Simple method of membership verification;
- New guidelines governing medical examinations.

Since the historic miners' strike of 1987, mine bosses have been on the offensive to destroy NUM, using various repressive measures including arbitrary dismissals of union leadership.

### TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE

The recovery of NUM from the blows delivered by the Chamber proved the union's indestructibility. The bosses had no choice but to live with the union. The terrain of the struggle under current conditions has now shifted to negotiations for consensus as a method of dealing with management-worker conflict.

The organisational capacity of NUM will ultimately determine the real gains to be made. It is not the power and skill of negotiators that will alter the balance of forces in favour of the workers. Retrenchments remain the key issue to be overcome if mineworkers are to survive. ♦



# Why is Aids political?

**This article is a response by the South African Health Workers' Congress to a letter in the last issue of MAYIBUYE.**

**A**ids is no different from all the other diseases such as TB, measles, malnutrition, gastro-entiritis and many others that have become rampant in our communities. These diseases have been with us for decades. Yet to some it may seem strange that with all the scientific technology and cures available, they have not been eradicated.

For us in the South African Health Workers Congress (Sahwco) who view health much more broadly the reason for this is self-evident. It is the result of the failure to locate and address these diseases in the socio-economic and political context which has borne and nurtured them into existence. It is a well known fact that any attempts to intervene on any disease would fail unless it addresses the underlying factors that cause the disease. Furthermore, the priorities of addressing these factors is to a great extent dependent on the political will and powers at play in South African society. The same applies to Aids.

Once the Aids virus has entered a society, it tends to follow the path of least resistance. This means that those communities that are the poorest, disadvantaged and least powerful in society. These are the communities worldwide which have a disproportionately large section in their midst infected with the Aids virus. In South Africa this is no different as we begin to witness a pattern similar to other communities in Africa.

Let us look at some of the fac-

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*"Let us not make a political issue of this [Aids], rather let's keep the population alive"*

*Letter from Sandton*

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tors that have eroded our communities thereby making them more vulnerable to infection by the Aids virus:

- The migrant labour system, single sex hostels and the endemic violence have resulted in the disruption of stable family life and sexual relationships.
- Poverty and malnutrition cause weakening of the body's defenses making individuals more susceptible to infection.
- The provision of inadequate and inaccessible health care services contribute to the poor health status of the community.
- The maldistribution of resources and the inferior education infrastructure makes it impossible for information on Aids in reaching the majority of the people.
- The patriarchal nature of South African society in which the domination of gender relations by men and the low status accorded to women have made women a more vulnerable group.

Any attempts to curb the spread of the disease without seeking to address these factors would prove to be futile. There are numerous other issues that

demonstrate the inadequacies of state efforts in dealing with Aids. These are all related to the political commitment or lack thereof, demonstrated thus far in dealing with the Aids epidemic.

A decade has passed since Aids emerged as a serious reality to contend with, yet there exists no fully fledged Aids education programme at grassroots level. Those vested with this task have thus far failed to use their state-controlled media effectively in their Aids awareness programme. Instead they have created suspicion amongst our communities because of the racist and stereotyped messages contained in some of the media that has been developed.

The state has in the past colluded with big business and sanctioned screening for Aids to discriminate against migrant workers from neighbouring countries. Hence it has failed to protect the basic human rights that individuals are entitled to.

## SOCIAL CONTEXT

Facilities for the care and support of persons with Aids are few and far between and in most communities non-existent.

No attempts have been made to make drugs such as AZT freely available to persons with Aids. This drug is available to the rich and privileged section of the community.

Access to freely available condoms is an issue that still remains to be adequately addressed.

As long as this or any future government views Aids as a purely medical issue, and fails to address the broader social context of Aids, the struggle against Aids would have to be fought at a political level as well. ♦

**D**espite years of lofty policy statements on women's emancipation and affirmative action, effective steps have not been taken by the ANC to translate these into meaningful action. The debate at the ANC's July National Conference revealed a lack of understanding and sometimes backwardness of the cadreship of the ANC.

Affirmative action is a type of "positive discrimination" as a measure to correct imbalances created by centuries and generations of gender oppression. It cannot be a permanent feature of society or an organisation, but rather an interim measure and a means towards full equality and an end to discrimination.

The legacy and ravages of apartheid and gender oppression have completely marginalised women in all spheres of life, reducing them to "junior" citizens in society. Gender oppression will not automatically disappear with the fall of apartheid and the dawn of a democratic South Africa. Practice in Africa and elsewhere has taught us that contrary to expectations, national liberation did not usher in a new era of women's emancipation. If anything the situation of women worsened. One former woman freedom fighter from Zimbabwe aptly described the process when she said: "Liberation dropped us in a parachute from the bush to the kitchen!"

In countries like Cuba, the USSR and the USA, while legislation outlawed discrimination and extended equal opportunities to all citizens, it failed to redress historic imbalances and thus rendered "equality" a mockery.



# Affirmative action

**It is imperative for the ANC and all the democratic forces to seriously debate the issue of affirmative action and come out with mechanisms for its implementation. This article is the second in a series on this issue.**

A cursory glance at the decision-making structures of the ANC at all levels reflects a yawning gap be-

tween theory/intent and practice. For instance, statistics in August 1991 show that there are nine women in an elected NEC of 55; two women on the 26-person National Working Committee; one woman in the nine-person Military Headquarters and most regional and branch executives have less than ten percent of women. All this in an organisation that is politically advanced and democratic. Clearly "merit" and "democracy" alone cannot resolve this problem.

Women the world over can do all the work and participate in all struggles, but come election time they seem to vanish and are not seen. At the time of elections the notion of democracy and merit becomes gender-clouded. Some of the men appointed to responsibilities or elected to positions do not get there necessarily because of merit. The correct understanding of merit includes qualities, capabilities, experience and training

which together enable an individual to contribute at the level of analysis, guidance and leadership in theory and in practice. Personality and inter-personal relations are also relevant.

Surely, after decades of struggle, with all the women's activities in the national liberation movement at home and abroad, the ANC cannot argue that there are no women lawyers (except one) for its Constitutional Committee; no women for its army; no women to head its departments and so few for national leader-



ship! While women cadres were there with the necessary qualities and qualifications, they were not elected.

This was not out of malice or a conscious wish to undermine women. Rather it is a consequence of the way people have been conditioned and socialised about gender roles from earliest infancy. Gender oppression, tradition and culture, and the attitudes they generate, negate the very essence of merit and democracy.

The ANC does recognise and respect women for their contribution, but come appointment or election time, women seem to play a disappearing trick and become **invisible**. Worth noting is that even women themselves fall into this trap. They themselves elect men – capable or otherwise. After all, they have been socialised to believe that men are “leaders”, “heads of families” and

“decision-makers”. This shows that negative attitudes do not automatically disappear with mere membership of the ANC or declarations of democracy. One male delegate at the National Conference summarised it very well when he proudly stated: “Asina kuphathwa ngabafazi” [“We can’t be ruled by women”].

Conference once again committed the ANC to women’s emancipation and affirmative action. The MK Conference held in August passed a resolution for affirmative action in training and promotion of women. However there was in both conferences a loud silence on the fundamental issue of mechanisms to implement this.

Various mechanisms have been tried in a number of countries and we can learn from that experience and work out those suitable for our situation. The im-

portant point is that there can never be affirmative action without clear mechanisms to implement it. Otherwise it remains an empty slogan. The quota system stipulates a minimum number or percentage of women that must be appointed or elected to certain responsibilities at all levels. This has been used in Britain, Norway and Uganda. A variation of this, used in Norway and the USA, is the target system. This means that within a specified period, the representation of women is expected to meet a stipulated level. Constituencies, regions or branches failing to achieve the target would have to account for their failure. This enables regions or branches to evaluate their programmes in each area.

### PROCESS SYSTEM

The process system would imply in the ANC a deliberate drive by the organisation, and in particular the Women’s League, to ensure that women are recruited, “developed” and “forwarded” for responsibilities to counter the favourite argument that “there are no suitable women”.

Another approach, used in countries like Uganda and Zambia, is “mandate representation” which in the ANC would mean the League electing a stipulated number of women to represent it at all leadership levels in the ANC. Yet another method is block voting, which implies that the women canvass for their candidates and vote as a block for them.

Each option has its own advantages and disadvantages. A hybrid could be used or a completely new mechanism could be created. It is vital that the ANC and the Women’s League consciously and deliberately address this as a matter of urgency. Otherwise our future will be the poorer due to the marginalisation of women. ♦

# Democratic development: lessons from Tamboville

**In September last year MAYIBUYE published an interview with Abie Nyalunga of the Wattville Concerned Residents Committee (WCRC) on the occupation of Benoni-controlled land by the community of Wattville. In this issue we publish an account by Planact, a progressive development agency, of community participation in development.**

**O**ver the past year the community of Wattville has engaged in an actual physical development project. The complexities of the development process has meant that the community and the WCRC have undergone an intense period of learning and skill acquisition. It has become clear to the community that development is not an isolated event but a process in which there are many inter-linked components. For example, all of the following issues arise in physical development projects:

- land availability;
- access to the city;
- appropriate housing density and land use;
- procedures for handling wait-

- ing lists for housing;
- forms of ownership of land and housing;
- finance for development;
- needs for services;
- affordability of services;
- quality of services such as water, electricity, sanitation, refuse removal, etc;
- prioritising the needs of the community;
- the roles of civics, local authorities, and other agencies in development;
- how to control a development process.

After the occupation which led to the creation of Tamboville, it was decided that a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) should be established. This committee is made

up of representatives from the Benoni Council and its advisers and the WCRC and advisers. The JTC adopted terms of reference which have guided its activities throughout the development process.

So far there have been about 30 meetings of the JTC. These meetings have been structured around the planning, finance and local government issues of the development process.

## **COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION**

Issues arising from each meeting of the JTC are reported to the community by WCRC representatives. In this way the community is able to shape the planning process which takes place in the JTC.

For instance, the Benoni Council had intended to install services in Tamboville in the orthodox fashion. However, as the WCRC had already workshopped a layout with the future residents, it was not prepared to accept a layout suggested by Benoni. On the other hand the WCRC layout had not taken into account some features of the land and drainage that were unknown to the committee which drew up the plan.

A series of workshops dealing with these and other planning problems were structured and run by the WCRC in consultation with their technical advisers. These workshops covered issues of the following nature:

- the location of major and feeder roads, taking into account likely taxi and bus routes;
- whether a particular piece of land should be used for a school or for more sites for houses;
- the location of the school in relation to main roads and open spaces near the occupied land;
- whether there should be a standard grid system or whe-



**Oliver Tambo on a recent visit to Tamboville**

ther cul-de-sacs and other devices should be used for slowing down traffic;

- the size of the sites.

Decisions reached in this and similar processes of participative planning determine the positions taken by the WCRC in meetings of the JTC.

### **MOVING ONTO THE LAND**

After the initial phase of participative planning was completed and basic services had been installed in one section of Tamboville, the community decided that a group of people from the waiting list should begin moving onto the land. This was agreed to in the JTC.

It was hoped that this "pilot phase" would provide valuable lessons which could be generalised for the future when all of Tamboville would be inhabited.

To facilitate the process, workshops were held which dealt with issues such as the legal basis on which people would occupy the land, the principles which would guide this process and practical

details of physical settlement. These workshops produced a set of interim rules and regulations which were adopted in the JTC.

### **THE WCRC WAITING LIST: THE NEED FOR MORE LAND**

In order to maximise community participation, and also speed up decision-making, the WCRC decided to restructure itself. Office-bearing structures and decision-making processes were reorganised and a formal election took place.

The civic has been able to break the development process into manageable components. Work on these components is the responsibility of various sub-committees. For instance, the Planning and Development Committee will now take responsibility for everything related to these issues in the township.

The principle here is that certain groups of people in the civic will develop a level of expertise in particular areas. This improved understanding will then be passed on to the wider communi-

ty in a more accessible manner. This will aid the decision process considerably.

The experience of Wattville highlights the following:

- development is a process which involves all issues at once, from layouts to clinics from finance to policing, and from community participation to efficiency of delivery;
- development requires strong community organisation in terms of extensive structures in the community (to ensure accountability, and in terms of administrative capacity to ensure fast and efficient decision-making and responses);
- it is important that community organisations get technical support;
- community control over development processes is not only possible but essential for success.

### **NOTE:**

A video which describes community participation in the development of Tamboville is available from WCRC and Planact. ♦

**T**he NP government is abusing the concept of justice and morality to sidestep the basic issues facing South Africa. De Klerk has entered the struggle for the moral high ground. By virtue of throwing the dice, he is the first player and was therefore ready before the NLM to do battle on this new terrain.

On the other hand, arguments about moral shades of grey have to a large extent fallen into disuse in the national liberation movement (NLM).

Central to De Klerk's claim to the moral high ground is his call for "national reconciliation" and unity. This issue:

- is widely considered to be an "intellectual" issue to be discussed by academics and the white left
- has been placed on the back burner by the liberation movement
- is successfully being flirted with by the government
- is resented and feared by white conservatives.

The issue of a visible and active moral bottom line is, however, first and foremost, practical politics.

### **"NATIONAL RECONCILIATION"**

De Klerk has called for the past to be forgotten, and for all South Africans to build national unity. Using this as his point of departure, he labels the NLM as divisive and obstructionist because of its stand in favour of sanctions, its repeated calls for mass action, and its refusal to forswear a possible return to armed struggle. Obviously there are good reasons for this opposition to De Klerk's "reconciliation". But they are not obvious. Opponents of the government basically have to take it on faith that the NLM is correct in its positions, and is not simply being

# The struggle to be holier than thou?



**FW de Klerk looking uncertain as he faces the media in the wake of Inkathagate.**

**In recent months public attention has been captivated by epoch-making events and statements of intent. In this article, Hein Grosskopff and Stiaan van der Merwe argue that the debate on values and principles is being distorted by millions of pious words.**

The reason for the NLM's opposition to De Klerk's version of reconciliation is the fact that the NLM has a fundamentally different moral bottom line. However, until it exposes the fundamental and fatal flaw in his moral bottom line, the NLM will continue to be perceived as less "moral". And everything – from the ANC membership drive to international solidarity to success or failure of a consumer boycott – depends on the common perception of a political position's moral bottom line. It is therefore very practical politics.

### **FREEDOM CHARTER**

When the ANC suspended the armed struggle it was a recognition that the form and arena of the struggle has changed. In content the struggle has remained the same. It is, essentially, still a national liberation struggle. The Charter is a crystallisation of the socio-moral content of hundreds of years of struggle. The Charter is nothing more or less than the written expression of the moral bottom line that was the original basis of the ANC when it was formed in 1912.

All that has and must continue to change is the way we intend achieving the objectives contained in the Freedom Charter. Even at the time of its drafting the Charter enshrined conventional liberal values. It was "radical" in a non-political sense: in that it offered a radically different alternative to

violence, oppression, exploitation and social and political intolerance.

The Charter did not then, and never can, provide justification for a dictatorship of whatever group. Even in the economy the Charter propagates old-fashioned common decency; enlightened self-interest within a basically capitalist economy.

### **THE PAST 30 YEARS**

During the past thirty years of exile and the armed struggle the NLM understandably became preoccupied with achieving certain tactical gains, such as opposition to the dompas system, the bantustans, tricameral rule and township councils. During this period we tended to define success as the amount of damage done to what we saw as the "reality" of apartheid, and lost sight of the immoral basis of apartheid.

Achieving these tactical gains became the bottom line of the struggle. Whether it became our bottom line in actual fact or not, it was perceived as such. By publicly saying, time and again, that the State of Emergency, the pass laws, the Group Areas Act, etc must go, by saying – at least implicitly – that this is the essence of apartheid, we are caught on the defensive now that this legal superstructure of apartheid has in fact gone, leaving its socio-historical base intact.

People make history, but this

is not creating it from nothing. We make history because there is a history. There are basically three options when choosing one's position relative to history:

- continue with it as it is (the position of the AWB, HNP, CP, etc);
- reform it and then continue with this panel-beaten history (the position of the De Klerk government);
- break with it in order to offer a radically different alternative (the position of the NLM).

This interpretation determines one's moral bottom line, and it is along this line that the battle-lines are finally drawn.

De Klerk and others are trying to get away from the past by saying something like: "We should now get rid of the baggage of the past, stop trying to apportion blame for the past, and look forward to a "new South Africa". How right he is, and how wrong. The question is whether he understands what he is saying, or whether it is a way of getting away cheaply with a history of oppression, and ultimately using it as a trick to pursue the history we are supposed to forget.

Apartheid – and its history of repression – is founded on intolerance. Intolerance – in all fields of life – has achieved the status of a culture in South Africa. On the other hand, the ANC's "mild" Stalinist past, within the broader confines of the world-wide Cold War, led to some excesses.

That some proscription of civil liberties within the underground had to occur was inevitable. When the NLM was forced to resort to the armed struggle the stakes became much higher, and the consequences of enemy penetration so much serious. The fact that the ANC's armed struggle was suspended as soon as possible means that the fundamental character of the armed component of the struggle – that it was reluctant warfare forced upon us

— had not been forgotten. But, unfortunately, this fundamental moral underpinning is not always clear. The NLM is not always able to challenge anybody, friend or opponent, to test it on this moral bottom line.

That the liberation movement acted as guardian of the moral high ground for decades is true. But the moral plane has been redefined. We have allowed the NP to play our game, to use our terminology and dominate our issues. In essence the game of practical politics is, and should be, to find who is most "decent", and is seen to be so.

### ADMITTING THE PAST

If we truly believe that our position remains the only moral one, we will have to start by defining it, to ourselves and the outside world.

Only then will we be able to expose the fact that repealing the Land Act is meaningless unless the legacy of the Act is also repealed. Only when our own focus has changed from the "whole picture" and we are able to see all the component parts clearly, will we be able to do battle on this "new" battleground.

This will only be possible if at the same time we admit our past. When Nelson Mandela admitted at Heathrow that the ANC had at some stage detained agents of the regime, the sky did not fall, nor did the ANC disappear in a cloud of smoke. Neither did these excesses continue.

Only if we admit how close to the surface the dark streak is in all of us, can we guard against it. We can only know and eradicate our own intolerance if we actively look for it.

Our willingness and ability to honestly analyse our own history, in the short and long term strengthens the strategic and tactical position of the NLM. No matter how much the regime



Picture: The Star

### *The ANC's legitimacy comes from the enormous popular support it enjoys*

managed to define the new moral ground, it is actually also the ground for their own defeat. They are by no means innocent, to say the least. De Klerk has shown his lack of moral integrity, for instance, by allowing the carnage in the townships to continue.

### THE REAL BOTTOM LINE

If De Klerk is truly against apartheid, and not only against the legalistic manifestations which have now mostly gone, then he will have to prove it. Even more important is the fact that all future government action, regardless of the government, will have to be judged by these fundamental moral criteria. This will also offer protection and reassurance to all those "national minorities" that fear "oppression by the majority".

Africa and the world have shown us that all oppressive sys-

tems have built-in self-destruction devices that are activated as soon as the moral bottom line is lost.

Establishing consensus around a generally understood and accepted moral position will provide a national rallying point that should also be the basis for genuine reconciliation. The battle is not about being holier than thou, but about establishing, for the common good of South Africa, an unequivocal moral bottom line. For the NLM it means establishing a bottom line that is clearly visible through every action and decision, a bottom line guided by the principles of common decency, pursuit of justice, tolerance and acceptance of a truly pluralist society.

The much-vaunted "new South Africa" will have to be based on a truly new moral bottom line, to enable all of us, together, to create a truly new history. ♦



**It is now clear that the ground is being prepared in the Border region for killing fields such as we have in Natal and Transvaal, writes a MAYIBUYE correspondent in East London.**

## **Brigadier Oupa: a case of hopeless ignorance?**

In one of the first meetings that community organisations held with the military ruler of Ciskei, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, the vice-chairman of the ANC in the Border region, Smuts Ngonyama, left with these parting words: "Brigadier, since you have called us here today, please call us again before you change the agenda." It was not to be. The man had changed his agenda.

Gqozo has virtually declared the ANC an illegal organisation in Ciskei and fans the fires of conflict by threatening to shoot MK Chief of Staff Chris Hani and all returning exiles.

But what did happen? When Gqozo first came to power in a coup in March 1990, he openly embraced the ANC.

Things began to change in about August last year. A small group of white men were employed by the Ciskei government.

This was the beginning of a covert military operation whose members called themselves International Researchers. The top three men in the unit are all former officers in the SADF - Jan Niewoudt, Ted Brassell and Clive Brink. ( See Box)

These three set up a structure which employed men from both the Ciskei and Transkei police

and army. The unit however operated independently. For a long time senior Ciskeian army officers did not even know of the unit's existence.

It is now clear that this trio arrived in the region with one brief: control Gqozo and salvage him from ANC influence.

The unit has massive resources at its disposal. Niewoudt, Brink and Brassell are believed to be paid between R130 000 and R140 000 each a year with full benefits. In September last year they each paid an East London dealer R119 000 in cash for a BMW.

International Researchers does not simply gather information. The unit has been stock-piling arms for some time. In February this year a delivery of arms arrived at the unit's base in the Ciskei government ministers' compound. The cache included a SAM 7 anti-aircraft missile launcher, AK47 rifles and Semtex explosives.

The unit has been implicated in a wide range of actions in the Border area. Foremost among these are attacks on ANC members. For example, IR has been linked to the attack on the home of Smuts Ngonyama himself in May this year.

### **HIT LIST**

In February this year the ANC received confirmed information that a hit list had in fact been drawn up and that action would soon be taken.

The SADF has denied any knowledge of the unit and its leaders, despite the fact that these are all former SADF officers. However the Chief of the SADF, Kat Liebenberg, visited Ciskei last month with the apparent aim of investigating the unit and ensuring some kind of "accountability". Few believe that the unit will be properly disbanded. ♦

## **Who are the controllers?**

**A** brief profile of the three top officers gives some indication of what the unit is about:

**Niewoudt**, the head of the unit, is a former colonel in the SADF and has been linked to a secret SADF camp called HIPPO in northern Namibia which allegedly trained Inkatha fighters in guerilla warfare.

Niewoudt's deputies are **Clive Brink** and **Ted Brassell**. Brink has been linked to South African military intelligence. He has been referred to as the unit's "technical man".

The third man, Brassell, was a major in the SADF and was based in East London as a Staff Officer at the SADF's Group 8 Headquarters during the '80's. He is also a former deputy mayor of East London. ♦

# Soviet Union:

## Struggle for democracy's survival

**A**ugust is holiday month in the Soviet Union. After his vacation, President Mikhail Gorbachev was to sign an agreement granting greater autonomy to the fifteen republics which make up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But on August 19 a group headed by the Soviet vice-president, Gennady Yanayev took over power and declared a State of Emergency.

While claiming that he stepped down due to ill-health, the group expressed serious concern with Gorbachev's policies and their consequences.

Whatever the reasons behind Yanayev's actions, what is absolutely clear is that the decision was taken by a section of the leadership – outside the elected bodies of the Soviet Union.

The event bore unhappy resemblance to the ousting of Nikita Krushchev in the early 1960s. But unlike then, Gorbachev's reforms have gone quite deep within society. And the new leadership was poised for serious confrontation with the masses who had not taken these developments lying down. Reports received as *MAYIBUYE* went to press indicated that the Yanayev group was backing down to national and international pressure.

Actions of this nature, in as big and as influential a country as the Soviet Union, have dire consequences beyond its borders. If Gorbachev's propagation of common human values – including democracy and the rule of law – had a positive ripple effect



*Mikhail Gorbachev*

**As *MAYIBUYE* went to press the Soviet Union stood on the brink of upheavals paralleled in its history only by the Civil War after the 1917 revolution. For a preliminary assessment, we spoke to Lightboy, an ANC diplomat who has just returned from the Soviet Union.**

throughout the globe, the actions of Yanayev's group were bound to achieve the opposite.

What made this abrupt palace coup possible?

"The opening of politics under Gorbachev had seen the flourishing of a myriad of factions within and outside the Soviet Communist Party", says Lightboy.

"They have been, somewhat inaccurately, lumped into two camps: the democrats and the conservatives. The democrats consisted of a variety of groupings some of whom supported a return to monarchical rule; others wanted a laissez faire capitalism; yet others believed that socialism could work if a programme of radical reform, including the introduction of market principles, was carried out.

"The conservatives consisted largely of people committed to the retention of the socialist system with most of the elements of the pre-Gorbachev days."

Perestroika and glasnost had brought about significant changes in the political sphere. Freedom of expression and association was being increasingly guaranteed. Citizens of the Soviet Union granted Gorbachev a high degree of credit in the early days. They liked what they heard and experienced in the form of political freedoms. But the gains of glasnost were matched only by the deterioration in the living standards of ordinary citizens.

Gorbachev warned at the very beginning that the economy was in a state of collapse. This is what he had inherited. He spoke of

dynamising socialism so that communism would be within reach.

But was there a clear programme for perestroika? Did the Party simply lurch from one approach to another in order to placate the various groupings? Was there deliberate sabotage by those who saw his programme as a threat to their vested interests as long-standing bureaucrats?

"A situation of multi-power had developed", says Lightboy. "Party officials, government bureaucrats, smugglers and mobsters all wielded some power. The Arabat, one of the first sites for private enterprise, (which looks like Smal Street in Johannesburg), was characterised by a black market which operated with impunity.

"This is what the Yanayev group exploited to remove Gorbachev from power", observes Lightboy.

### ACHIEVEMENTS

However, this cannot detract from the achievements of Gorbachev in bringing out the humane elements in the socialist system in which he believes. Internationally, he turned perceptions and realities upside down, bringing forth those elements in international relations which helped to reduce tension and create the basis for progressive solutions to many regional and local conflicts. For the first time in many years, the Soviet Union became a successful initiator on behalf of mankind, not a respondent to programmes of others.

Like at home, Gorbachev enjoyed the accolade of a variety of international forces for a variety of reasons. It is the mighty Gorbachevian irony that his removal had provoked the anger also of the Conservative Party in our own country!

Whatever the final outcome of this debacle, the actions of the Yanayev group threatened to discredit the cause of socialism. For the world was starting to doubt whether socialism and communism – at least in the Soviet Union – could stand the strains and rigours of democracy!

Within our own country, all democrats have to ensure that this development is not used by opportunists to derail the negotiations process. ♦

## Mandela takes six nations by storm: a member of the delegation reports.

**J**ubilant and pledges of support greeted us on every step of the six nation tour. I realised that South Africans have to learn to share Nelson Mandela with other peoples of the world.

In Spain Mandela met the Spanish President, Felipe Gonzales, and King Juan Carlos. The delegation visited the cities of Madrid, Toledo and Barcelona, meeting Anti-apartheid groups, city and state governments and addressed anti-apartheid rallies.

Kingston, Jamaica was the next stop where Michael Manley, the PM of Jamaica, invited all the prime ministers of the Caribbean islands. We were greeted by what seemed like the entire population of Jamaica. The ANC President addressed the joint session of the Jamaican parliament.

Havana, Cuba – at long last! Country of our freedom songs. Mandela was warmly received by President Fidel Castro whom he briefed on developments in South Africa and the region.

The visit culminated in

Mandela's address to a rally of 50 000 in Matanza, to commemorate the 38th anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle in Cuba.

Venezuela and Mexico were the next two stops. Mandela met the presidents of both countries and they promised to hold the line in support of our struggle.

Brazil – the last leg. The ANC president met the governors of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bahia, Spinto Santo and Brasilia. Because of remnants of racial inequality in Brazil,

many groups look up to our struggle for inspiration.

The reception underlined the strong bonds between South African and Latin American/Caribbean people.

This is due to the struggle we have waged against brutal dictatorships, the similarity in levels of economic development and our common interests being in the Southern hemisphere.

Besides, many of the people in these countries were shipped from Africa centuries ago as slaves. ♦



**Nelson Mandela**

# Working, learning

**The right to learn, recreational facilities and the right to work: this, decided the Eastern Cape regional conference of the Youth League, will be their rallying focus.**

About 20 000 members were represented by about 300 delegates. Sansco, Nusas, and Cosas attended the entire conference while Azayo and Azanyu were represented at the opening session.

Lulu Johnson, former president of Cosas (the black high school student organisation) was unanimously elected chair of the regional committee.

Vuyo Bontiya will serve in both the publicity and administrative secretary posts.

The regional conference is one of the steps towards the full national conference of the Youth League – the first since the unbanning of the ANC – which will be held later this year.

Militant singing and toyi-toyi tinged an otherwise somber and businesslike conference opened by ANC and SACP leader, Raymond Mhlaba.

His address took the form of a report from the ANC Conference as well as an analysis of the State of the Nation. Commenting on developments in sports he said: "We insist that the unity programme is accompanied by training of our sportswomen and men, the opening up and development of sporting facilities from school to national level."

Raymond Mhlaba described contemporary politics as the "new politics of alliances". He explained: "There has been a polarisation of political forces in South Africa since the unbanning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990. The two major contenders in this struggle for power are the National Party, backed by the state security apparatus, the SADF, the media and big business; against its major contender, the ANC and its allies, the SACP and Cosatu. Circling around these two contenders are minority parties, organisations, and floating individuals and tendencies, who alone have no hope of securing power in a democratic South Africa."

## RESOLUTIONS

Seven key resolutions were adopted, the majority of them concentrating on organisational questions. This reflects the key problem faced by the Youth League: consolidating and directing the energy of millions of supporters.

Organising has to occur in the face of new forms of repression adopted after the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations. A pre-conference news release

stated: "We as the youth league are aware of the plans that the regime is busy working out in order to transport this violence into the region. The formation of the African Freedom Party in the Border region by Gqozo is one of the mechanisms that was worked out by the regime.

"The distribution of strange pamphlets in our region by unknown people condemning our democratic structures is part of the dirty tricks by the regime to undermine democracy and the liberation of our people. The deployment of Inkatha members in Somerset East and Steynsburg under the disguise of being SAP is looked at with a critical eye."

## STRENGTH

The region's twenty thousand members are spread through 54 African, coloured, white and Indian areas. The areas fall under one of the following five zones: Port Elizabeth, Albany, Midlands, Tsitsikama, and Karoo. At the moment 31 branches have been launched while 26 Local Youth Committees have been established.

Delegates identified the following problems inhibiting the growth of the League: majority of youth are unclear about the direction of the struggle; lack of a clear programme addressing on-the-ground issues; lack of leadership skills especially amongst rural



# and recreation

youth; poor co-ordination among branches in the same vicinity and the weakening of relations with the student movement.

The incoming REC has been charged with the task of formulating responses to these problems.

Given the largely rural nature of the region, discussions on rural organising predominated. Exploitation of youth by white farmers, illiteracy especially among rural youth and intimidation at the hands of police and farmers were cited as factors limiting the growth of the organisation in the rural areas. Areas such as Noupoort, Cookhouse, Steytleville and Kliplaat have no high schools.

## RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Apart from noting the reluctance of the regime to develop rural infrastructure, the conference adopted a number of suggestions concerning the development of the League there. These include working with National Association of Democratic Lawyers and the Legal Resources Centre to protect youth against intimidation, and coordinating a literacy campaign with the assistance of the South African Democratic Teachers Union, NECC and Cosas.

The incoming regional committee has been charged with the task of placing more resources at

**MLUNGISI "LULU" JOHNSON, 27, recently elected chair of the Eastern Cape Youth League, has spent about two and a half years of his life in detention. Lulu joined the Young Christian Workers in 1979, and by 1981 was elected its regional secretary. He was elected general secretary of the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) in 1982 and head of the organisation in 1983. He served in this capacity until 1985 when the organisation was banned and he was detained for four days. He was redetained in 1986 under the state of emergency - this time for 29 months. In 1990, he was appointed as Eastern Cape regional coordinator of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC).**

the disposal of the rural areas and to run courses on administration.

In what could develop into an important clarification of the approach to be used, the conference isolated the right to learn, recreational facilities and the right to work as the major interests of the youth. It also adopted a programme for struggling for these rights. Branches are required to submit a report of the state of each of these rights in their areas by mid-September.

The Tripartite Alliance, civics and the NECC are also expected to contribute in the fight for these rights. This will probably be the

main platform for the Youth Front, the creation of which the conference described as necessary to channel the might of youth.

The conference also addressed the thorny issue of the relationship between the Youth League and the ANC. The conference adopted the following principle: "That young people can play a progressive role if they are under the guidance of a revolutionary movement with the working class playing a central role; that this guidance cannot be construed to mean the youth must passively follow their elders on everything and draw uncritically from the experience of previous battles." ♦

**A great deal has been written about the heroic struggles on Robben Island.**

**Little, though, has been said about the cultural struggles and achievements of the Robben Islanders. In this edition**

**MAYIBUYE introduces the Robben**

**Island Music Forum, a union**

**of three musical**

**groups of ex-**

**Islanders.**

# The Robben Island Music Forum



**James Mange (right) and the Whiplashes**

**T**he inhuman conditions of imprisonment on Robben Island failed to destroy the will of artists who wanted to voice their achievements and failures, hopes and frustrations, and the inevitability of their release and

ultimate liberation through music. Artists who were converging on Robben Island, serving various sentences, founded the Robben Island Music Association in 1987.

The pioneers of this initiative were:

- **James Mange** of the 1980 Pietermaritzburg Trial. Sentenced to death at the close of the trial, the regime was forced to commute his sentence to twenty years imprisonment. He founded and leads the James Mange and the Whiplashes, an outfit of reggae musicians.

- **Naphtali Manana** of the 1981 Soekmekaar Trial. He was also sentenced to death, and had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. He learned and mastered the clarinet and alto saxophone. He formed an Afro-Jazz group, the King Force, dedicated to the late King Siljee.

- **Ronny Mabena.** He, together with David Jwara (Shuffle) and Curtis Mhlanzi formed a group called Roots in exile in Angola in 1980. Their reunion on Robben Island led to the rebirth of Roots, an Afro-Marabi outfit. Roots was also joined by Frank Thabane who was captured during a long skirmish in the Eastern Transvaal in 1986.

To pool resources, the three groups came together upon the release of many political prisoners from the Island late last year and beginning of this year, and formed the Robben Island Music Forum. Their music being this diverse, the product is innovative and a real listening pleasure.

The Robben Island Music Forum has performed at the FNB stadium in Johannesburg, at the rally after the ANC's 48th National Conference at King's Park stadium in Durban, and briefly at Kippie's during Mandela's 73rd birthday celebration. The group is about to embark on a country-wide tour and has already been invited to play in Amsterdam and Scandinavia. ♦

**MAYIBUYE: Given your background - the world of business and advertising management - what was the basis of your appointment?**

**MADALA MPHAHLELE:** It will be naive not to consider that they had a factor within their choice, a choice which could probably be translated like this: given a black guy with the expertise and a white guy with expertise it is rational to choose the black guy. So it's not the colour issue which came upfront. It was the exper-



**Madala Mphahlele**

tise. The balance was made by the right colour. That's the story of my life: being at the right place at the right time.

**MAYIBUYE: How do you marry personal political views with working for a state corporation?**

**MM:** It's not impossible. The delicate balance comes with having political leanings and allowing those to impact on the performance of the job at hand. With that starting point it becomes untenable for me to even start apologising for where the SABC comes from. There is little doubt about it, the leanings of the SABC were driven by the exposition of certain political ideologies. This is why the Broederbond was such a political force, hidden or not hidden, in the appointment of people.

**MAYIBUYE: How confident are you that you will be able to implement the changes you hope for?**

**MM:** If I wasn't confident you wouldn't find me here. The chal-

lenge is to make the broadcasting medium play its proper role according to my perceptions. These are based on certain basic tenets: I am a South African. I have been all the time bleating to prove that I am South African. The destiny of our country is in our hands - some more so than others. This has given me an opportunity to contribute, not in an altruistic way, to achieve those commonalities.

**MAYIBUYE: Is there a will to steer the SABC away from being a party political organ?**

**MM:** It would appear so, since my views are not private. They are known throughout the corridors.

**MAYIBUYE: What concrete changes have been made? For example programming has always been dominated by whites - has this changed?**

**MM:** There has been some amount of legacy. Now we have two options: axe your whites to prove you really mean what you are saying and collapse the commercial base on which your success lies. Or conversely get your black guys in there, give them the exposure with a view to opening things up. It is the latter view that the SABC seems to be following now.

**MAYIBUYE: Your brief is to weld TV 2, 3 and 4 into a single multi-cultural channel. Is this correct and how do you intend doing this?**

**MM:** That is the central part of my brief. I detest the term multi-cultural. It's the way apologists have used the multi-element of South Africa. They used it to point out and perpetuate the differences.

I believe we can amalgamate three disparate things like TV 2, 3 and 4 on the basis of what we call the CCVs - common contem-

# Right place at the right time?

**Madala Mphahlele made broadcasting history by being appointed head of the SABC's "black channel" - TV 2, 3 and 4. MAYIBUYE spoke to him about his background and attitudes.**



Pictures: The Star

### Campaign for Open Media demo

porary values. It is a dynamic concept – it does not pander to the multi-cultural, lingual, religious or whatever as differences but goes for the common. That is common in similarity.

Good TV should essentially entertain but it has a very big social responsibility of informing. There is a difference between informing and educating. The latter is seen as something formal, didactic, something boring – to be avoided.

There is a myriad of contemporary issues which can be informing as well. That is why I ran the Cosatu 26 minuter. I am quite happy to get people to debate issues, whatever their political angle, to allow the viewer to make up his mind.

Values are basic human values – no matter where you come from. It is enshrined in man's humanity. Those three things put together are the cornerstone of my mission. So programmes will be in different languages as long as they meet the CCVs, and still fulfill the role of what good TV should be.

**MAYIBUYE: Was the placing of the Cuba filler after the Cosatu item deliberate?**

**MM:** Cosatu was programmed for 26 minutes. There were 4 minutes to be filled in. Someone in final control with a sense of humour must have found the Cuba item fitting in perfectly and decided to use it. I thought it was a nice and fortuitous one.

**MAYIBUYE: The SABC Task Force looking into its restructuring has submitted its report to the relevant Minister. How do you view the composition of the Task Force which has members of the NIS and the SADF?**

**MM:** Characters like that should have fallen off. Let's be honest, we are carrying a lot of baggage from the past.

These securocrats are part of the baggage. Restructuring has everything to do with sharply focussing on what is in fact baggage. I would have axed a helluva lot of those guys. My terms of reference would have been different.

**MAYIBUYE: How do you feel about the call a number of democratic organisations have made for the SABC to be placed under a transitional multi-party authority?**

**MM:** I would be uncomfortable with that. I intend divorcing politics from what is commercially viable. It should be left to the professionals.

**MAYIBUYE: Privatization and deregulation are the buzzwords for public corporations today. What do you say to the privatization of SABC?**

**MM:** I cannot support that. TV is too strong a medium to be left in private hands. I would think that the sense of public service would suffer if it is in private hands. I would like a situation to be reached where public information has about a 30% content in the TV programmes.

**MAYIBUYE would like to hear from TV viewers their response to the interview. Please do write in.** ♦



## MAYIBUYE XWORD No 1 CLUES

### Across


1. Biggest trade union in the country.
4. ANC Deputy President.
9. Inscribed on tombstones
10. Organises secondary students.
11. Merging with Sansco.
14. Funded by the police to destroy the ANC.
16. Cape Town trade unionist who was murdered in detention.
17. Inkatha member of the Central Committee.
18. John Gomomo is its president.
21. Ounce
22. Successor of Boss (Bureau for State Security).
24. Was in alliance with the ANC, SAIC, CPC and Sactu in the 50s.
25. Foot of animal having claws.
26. Non-governmental organisation
27. Organisation of African Trade Union Unity.
28. Organises technicon and university students.

### Down

1. ANC Treasurer-General.
2. Numsa's Secretary general.
3. Celebrates its 80th birthday on January 8 next year.
5. Oil producing country.
6. Vice-president of the ANC Women's League.
7. Opposite of down.
8. Inkatha's "trade union".
12. Distress signal.
13. PAC's preferred name for South Africa.
15. An explosive.
17. Recently toured Latin America and the Carribeans.
18. President of Cuba.
19. Azapo's youth wing.
20. Was a federation of women's organisations in the Western Cape.
22. Formed in 1913.
23. Led the liberation struggle in Namibia.

### Rules

1. The first correct entry drawn wins.
2. The judge's decision is final and no correspondence shall be entered into.
3. Mayibuye, DIP, Department of Political Education and Movement Enterprise staff members and their immediate relatives may not enter.
4. Send answers to Mayibuye Xword No 1, Box 61884, Marshalltown, 2107.
5. Closing date: 15 October 1991.
6. See answers and winner in *MAYIBUYE*, Vol 2 No 10 November 1991.



Name: .....

Address: .....

.....

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Postal code:.....

**Test your knowlegde about the  
ANC and win R100 and a  
MAYIBUYE T-shirt**

### MAYIBUYE LUCKY NUMBERS DRAW

4000 copies of the July *MAYIBUYE* were numbered. 20 lucky numbers were to be drawn at the ANC National Rally on Sunday 7 July but the draw had to be postponed. The winners are required to cut out the number from the front cover of the July *MAYIBUYE* and send it as proof with name and address to *MAYIBUYE*, Box 61884 Marshalltown, 2107.

Here are the winning numbers:

- 1st prize R400: 3483
- 2nd prize R250: 3451
- 3rd prize R150: 728
- 4 consolation prizes R50: 3067, 1865 798, 3121
- 13 special prizes of the new Mayibuye T-shirts: 2453, 552, 3229, 3267, 3044, 1029, 3849, 3055, 2261, 1747, 2386, 881, 1366.

**CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL!**

# Order Form

| CODE | ITEM                   | UNIT PRICE | QTTY | TOTAL | CODE | ITEM                        | UNIT PRICE | QTTY | TOTAL |
|------|------------------------|------------|------|-------|------|-----------------------------|------------|------|-------|
| 001  | Tambo T-shirt          | 12.00      |      |       | 096  | Big ANC tr/st/b             | 72.13      |      |       |
| 002  | ANC T-shirt            | 12.00      |      |       | 097  | Small ANC tr/st/b           | 72.13      |      |       |
| 003  | Andy cap               | 13.65      |      |       | 098  | Big Spearman sw/tp/b        | 40.00      |      |       |
| 004  | Magnum cap             | 9.38       |      |       | 099  | Small Spearman sw/tp/b      | 40.00      |      |       |
| 005  | Super golf cap         | 12.73      |      |       | 100  | Big logo sw/tp/b            | 40.00      |      |       |
| 006  | Lumber jacket          | 165.60     |      |       | 101  | Small logo sw/tp/b          | 40.00      |      |       |
| 007  | Football umbrella      | 41.40      |      |       | 102  | Big ANC sw/tp/b             | 40.00      |      |       |
| 008  | ANC wristwatch         | 115.00     |      |       | 103  | Small ANC sw/tp/b           | 40.00      |      |       |
| 009  | Road to Peace          | 4.50       |      |       | 104  | Big Spearman sw/tp/w        | 40.00      |      |       |
| 010  | Joining the ANC        | 4.50       |      |       | 105  | Small Spearman sw/tp/w      | 40.00      |      |       |
| 011  | Africa earrings        | 5.52       |      |       | 106  | Big logo sw/tp/w            | 40.00      |      |       |
| 012  | Pendant                | 9.11       |      |       | 107  | Small logo sw/tp/w          | 40.00      |      |       |
| 013  | Tie pin                | 12.79      |      |       | 108  | Big ANC sw/tp/w             | 40.00      |      |       |
| 014  | ANC 1991 calender      | 1.26       |      |       | 109  | Small ANC sw/tp/w           | 40.00      |      |       |
| 015  | ANC poster             | 2.58       |      |       | 110  | Labour Bulletin             | 6.00       |      |       |
| 016  | A4 note pad            | 4.42       |      |       | 111  | Work in Progress            | 2.50       |      |       |
| 017  | A5 note pad            | 3.84       |      |       | 112  | Const Assembly T-shirt      | 6.96       |      |       |
| 018  | A5 letter pad          | 3.15       |      |       | 113  | ANC metal badge             | 2.40       |      |       |
| 019  | A6 pocket book         | 1.77       |      |       | 114  | Logo metal badge            | 2.40       |      |       |
| 020  | Large travel bag       | 33.46      |      |       | 115  | Spearman metal badge        | 2.40       |      |       |
| 021  | Small travel bag       | 23.87      |      |       | 116  | Youth Lgue metal badge      | 2.40       |      |       |
| 022  | ANC 1991 diary         | 1.00       |      |       | 117  | People Shall Gvn badge      | 2.40       |      |       |
| 023  | Gold ANC keyring       | 7.14       |      |       | 119  | Seat/walking stick          | 22.40      |      |       |
| 024  | Logo lapel badge       | 2.80       |      |       | 120  | Men's pad. takkies          | 62.38      |      |       |
| 025  | Greetings cards        | 0.43       |      |       | 121  | Men's pln takkies           | 53.18      |      |       |
| 026  | Pack greetings cards   | 1.70       |      |       | 122  | Lumber jacket kids          | 135.60     |      |       |
| 027  | Tambo poster           | 0.85       |      |       | 123  | Ladies takkies              | 35.26      |      |       |
| 028  | Peace poster           | 1.60       |      |       | 124  | Kiddies takkies             | 26.94      |      |       |
| 029  | Logo earrings          | 12.79      |      |       | 140  | Video Mandela's Release     | 50.00      |      |       |
| 030  | Flag earrings          | 12.79      |      |       | 141  | Video Fruits of Defiance    | 50.00      |      |       |
| 031  | Africa cufflink        | 15.18      |      |       | 142  | Video The comrade king      | 50.00      |      |       |
| 032  | Flag lapel badge       | 4.80       |      |       | 143  | Video Isitwalandwe          | 50.00      |      |       |
| 033  | Logo cufflink          | 15.18      |      |       | 144  | Video No Mdle Rd to Fredm   | 50.00      |      |       |
| 034  | Conference poster      | 2.61       |      |       | 145  | Video Sophiatown            | 50.00      |      |       |
| 035  | Leather keyring/red    | 4.05       |      |       | 146  | Video A Savege War of Peace | 50.00      |      |       |
| 036  | Leather keyring/brn    | 4.05       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 037  | Leader card            | 0.46       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 038  | Chequerboard card      | 0.41       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 039  | ANC woolen belt        | 2.02       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 040  | Grey stripe tie        | 22.08      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 041  | Blue shield tie        | 22.08      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 042  | Blue flash tie         | 22.08      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 043  | Shield white scarf     | 25.58      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 044  | Grey stripe scarf      | 25.58      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 045  | Flash white tie        | 25.58      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 046  | ANC table flag         | 8.28       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 047  | Paper flag             | 1.04       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 051  | Liberation cloth badge | 1.56       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 052  | ANC logo cloth badge   | 1.56       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 053  | Spearman cloth badge   | 1.56       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 054  | SACP cloth badge       | 1.56       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 055  | Umsebenzi              | 1.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 056  | African Communist      | 5.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 057  | The Red Flag           | 5.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 058  | Mayibuye               | 3.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 059  | Bill of Rights         | 5.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 060  | The New Constitution   | 7.20       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 061  | Women's Rights         | 7.20       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 062  | Path to Power          | 5.00       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 063  | ANC logo T-shirt       | 6.96       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 064  | Govern T-shirt         | 12.00      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 065  | Mass Action T-shrt     | 13.57      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 066  | Equal Rights T-shrt    | 6.96       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 067  | Spearman T-hirt        | 6.96       |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 068  | Peace/Freedom T-shrt   | 12.00      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 069  | Nylon tracksuit        | 81.36      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 083  | ANC flag belt          | 38.88      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 084  | ANC logo belt          | 38.88      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 085  | ANC belt               | 38.88      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 086  | Big Spearman tr/st/w   | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 087  | Small Spearman tr/st/w | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 088  | Big logo tr/st/w       | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 089  | Small Logo tr/st/w     | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 090  | Big ANC tr/st/w        | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 091  | Small ANC tr/st/w      | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 092  | Big Spearman tr/st/b   | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 093  | Small Spearman tr/st/b | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 094  | Big logo tr/st/b       | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |
| 095  | Small logo tr/st/b     | 72.13      |      |       |      |                             |            |      |       |

Total of the above purchases \_\_\_\_\_  
 Plus postage (if order less than R50.00) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Contribution to the work of the ANC \_\_\_\_\_  
 Total enclosed \_\_\_\_\_

Mayibuye

## NOTE


1. If you are ordering a single item than add R3.00 for postage.
2. If you are ordeing items for up to R50.00 then add R6.00 for postage.
3. For orders above R50.00 postage is free.
4. For orders outside the republic please add R5.00 for clearance of foreign cheques and an additional R15.00 for postage.
5. Unfortunately, we cannot accept COD orders.
6. All prices include GST.
7. Please allow 4 (four) to 6 (six) weeks delivery.
8. Cheques must be crossed and made payable to Movement Enterprises (Pty) Ltd.
9. For more information please phone (011) 29 3032/5.
10. Please indicate which size t.shirt you require.
11. A full colour catalogue will be sent to you.

**Please  
send your  
orders to:**

**Movement Enterprises  
PO Box 1092  
Joubert Park, 2044  
Johannesburg  
South Africa**


I enclose crossed cheque/postal order for  
 R..... made payable to the ANC  
 Name:.....  
 Address:.....  
 .....  
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# Now available...



**These and much more ...  
See order form opposite**

# We asked Alex about our new So Curl



Alex Molokoane is a classical example of black success against all odds. From humble beginnings, with one Hair Salon in Soweto, he is now the proud owner of a Chain of Hair Salons in and around Johannesburg.

We at Mashmol Laboratories, salute the likes of Alex. As a black Company we are proud to be associated with success, black success that is. We asked Alex to try our New So Curl for long lasting Curls. His response was overwhelming, "Spot on brothers ... Spot on" he said with enthusiasm.

We are inclined to agree with Alex. After months of research we have developed a Product to match the best. A no drip Spray and Gel that gives hair a wet look yet maintains hair curly and dry looking.

You can ask Alex about our New So Curl or better still try it yourself. It is available at all leading Hair Salons country-wide.



So Curl for long lasting Curls from ...

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