

# DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

MONTHLY NEWSLETTER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

APRIL 1990

## The killing fields of apartheid

By Ian Liebenberg  
and  
Shauna Westcott

**THE** carnage in Natal – “nothing short of a national disaster” – is “essentially about Inkatha’s desire to maintain its support (or at least to maintain its ability to claim such support without contradiction)”.

This is the view of the joint working committee of Cosatu and the UDF. But it is also the view spelt out in a nuanced paper by John Aitchison of the Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal.

Aitchison, who is also a member of the Pietermaritzburg Crisis Committee, presented a sombre report on the Natal situation to a press conference held at the University of Cape Town early in April.

In the nine days between March 25 and April 3, in the Maritzburg area alone, over 80 people were killed, hundreds injured, scores of homes razed to the ground, and at least 11 000 people turned into refugees.

“Whole communities have become traumatised. Schools have closed. Public transport has been halted and many people have not been going to work. An atmosphere of fear, suspicion and aggression abounds,” a UDF/Cosatu memorandum



**READY FOR BATTLE:** Inkatha impis at Elandskop near Maritzburg.

picture: GUY TILLIM, AFRAPIX

presented by Aitchison said.

The memorandum blames Inkatha. It notes that violence escalated wildly after an Inkatha rally and that “after every Inkatha rally there have been complaints of attacks on ‘UDF’ areas”.

It criticises the “highly dubious role” of the police, who are accused of failing to disperse or disarm Inkatha impis; failing to protect people against violence or the destruction and looting of their property; and of siding with Inkatha in the conflict.

### Press

The memorandum also criticises the press for failing to portray the position adequately.

“Most press reports have either explicitly or by implication suggested that most of the current violence has been a 50-50, tit-for-tat series of Inkatha-UDF clashes,” it says.

If this were a true reflection of the situation, the following questions should be answered:

Why do there seem to be so few Inkatha refugees, if any?

How does one explain that all the 11 000 or so refugees have sought refuge in “UDF” areas?

Why is it that the major areas which have been devastated have all been “UDF” areas?

Why is it that most

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# DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

IDASA's goals are:

- To encourage South Africans of all races to reject apartheid and discover an alternative that is non-racial and democratic in the true sense of the word.
- To assist people to accept and work for a post-apartheid society as a way of allaying their fears.
- To mobilise the skills, knowledge and experience of all those who can assist the communities in the crisis areas of South Africa.
- To provide forums and opportunities on a nationwide basis to find democratic solutions to South Africa's problems.
- To assist in creating a climate for genuine negotiation towards a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

## IDASA Offices

### HEAD OFFICE:

Hill House, 1 Penzance Road, Mowbray, Cape Town, 7700 (Tel 021-473127; Telefax 477458)

WESTERN CAPE: 6 Faircape House, Orange Street, Gardens, Cape Town, 8001 (Tel 021-222150; Telefax 237905)

JOHANNESBURG: Fifth Floor, Norvic House, 93 De Korte Street, Braamfontein, 2107 (Tel 011-4833580/1/2/3; Telefax 3395301)

PRETORIA: 203 Hatfield Forum, 1077 Arcadia Street, Hatfield, 0083 (Tel 012-3422335/6; Telefax 3421926)

DURBAN: 1206 Sangro House, 417 Smith Street, Durban, 4001 (Tel 031-3048893; Telefax 3048891)

PORT ELIZABETH: Fourth Floor, Standard House, 344 Main Street, Port Elizabeth, 6001 (Tel 041-5533801/2/3; Telefax 522587)

EAST LONDON: 5a Stephenson Street, East London, 5201 (Tel 0431-430047; Telefax 438682)

## EDITORIAL

# The best and worst of times

**"T**he best of times, the worst of times," - so it seems in South Africa at the moment.

Violence rages almost out of control in Natal, signs of it flash in other parts of the country. Extravagant, irreconcilable demands are made on the polar opposites of the political spectrum; those who drive the centre towards "talks about talks about talks" get bogged down in position bargaining and internal constituency urgencies, and so on. And yet, come to think of it, we are complaining about more interesting, relevant things now than we did last year this time.

Then PW Botha ruled and "the total onslaught" was still in place. Now our pain and trauma can be related to the birth of a "new South Africa". All the major factors that shape our future are geared towards a positive outcome: the international community wants negotiations to succeed; the region desperately needs it, and domestically, despite the distressing signs of conflict and tension, we find the major players still committed to avoiding catastrophe and finding a workable consensus for transition away from domination towards democracy.

We must not lose the long view now. What makes our dilemma compelling is not the prospect of failure - societal skeletons lie strewn around us - it is the tantalising possibility of success. The consequences of us "making it" will reverberate through our continent and around the world. Those of us who are in a position to help dare not flag now.

We must point out that harbouring unrealistic euphoric expectations complicates the matter. Too many people treat the Mandela-De Klerk saga like a

TV soap-opera - two fireside chats and a handshake and away we go. They epitomise the history of struggle for liberation and political domination - the one intimately intertwined with the other. But they also give hope of resolving the conflictual dynamics of that history in shaping a common future.

The experience of oppression and struggle and the comforts and insulation of domination do not evaporate overnight. We are beginning to move from structural inequality and discrimination towards liberalisation and democratisation. Only beginning. It is going to be a painful learning process for all concerned - and we have no option but to go through it.

Idasa as well. We played an important role in preparing the climate for liberalisation, that is, getting ostensibly irreconcilable and hostile individuals/organisations to talk to one another. Now we have to anticipate the problems of democratisation, in other words, how do competitive political organisations with differing agendas and charters shake out constituency-wise and resolve their differences democratically rather than through protest, intimidation and violence.

Idasa must seek to provide a forum for such resolution without becoming partisan and part of the problem. This does not mean that we are above the battle or apolitical. Our commitment to our core values, stated repeatedly in this publication, remains the same. But this commitment must now be tested and reflected in anticipation of our country's shift from the "normalisation" of politics to democratisation.

Van Zyl Slabbert  
Director Policy and Planning

## JA-NEE

### Cold comfort

TIMES are hard for Idasa organisers. A rushed written report from one of us, about a particularly gremlin-fraught township tour (the bus didn't pitch, catering was tricky, tempers were frayed) concluded with the observation: "I put the perishable staff in the fridge."

-Better to be out to lunch?

### It's a start

WOMEN are not exactly overwhelmed with gratitude at the inclusion of Cheryl Carolus and Ruth Mompati in the ANC delegation for talks about talks with the NP government. But it's a start.

- Where are your token women, FW?

### Champagne heir

A PROMINENT Cape Town gynaecologist and his wife, sparkling after summer luncheon on a friend's Boland estate, stood next to their gleaming white Mercedes Benz out-

side Paarl to wave at the cavalcade carrying Nelson Mandela to freedom. One of a group of farm workers standing nearby waved a fist at the gynae and said: "Amandla, baas!"

- Mers you think.

### Gravy-training?

WAS IT coincidence that a week before Education and Culture minister Piet Clase announced that white schools could be opened to accommodate pupils of all races, the Teachers Federal Council left on a trip for the United States and Europe to look at the privatisation of schools?

- A ministerial sillybus?



## Idasa reports 'biased'

I REGULARLY receive and read your journal. I have noticed an apparent bias in favour of socialism and against the conservative liberal traditions of democracy. This bias is apparent in the selectivity of reporting, the relative amount of print allocated to the opponents of free enterprise democracy and those in favour of subsidies and other forms of planning and statist interventionism, and in the choice of people for your platforms. An example is the reporting of your Democratic Accountability conference in your February 1990 edition. On the press, very little was reported on the views of Mr Mulholland while more extended coverage was given to the (fallacious) views of a Mr Van Niekerk who is in favour of subsidies for the press à la Sweden.

His view that the press should function under a system which promoted diversity, quality and equality ignores the important principle of responsibility or accountability. A subsidised press would be undemocratic in the liberal tradition because it would entail the redistribution of funds to enable a few people to disseminate ideas mostly not supported by those from whom the funds have been expropriated.

Another example regards the comments of the Urban Foundation's Ms Ann Bernstein. Ms Bernstein's views are clearly undemocratic in that she favours a system where the state is not merely accountable to the people. To her a political system should also encourage certain ends or results which she lists. It is clear that government "planning" aimed at achieving certain re-

sults is impossible simply because the law makers (or anyone) cannot know what unknown individuals in a community want or what the effect of their end-orientated laws on the unknown individuals will be.

Ms Bernstein is also given prominence in her attack on direct democracy. Ms Bernstein calls it "the permanent dynamic of the people's participation", which is verbose English for "referenda" or "voting on issues" and is very disapproving of this concept.

If Ms Bernstein is not in favour of democracy and accountability she should say so directly and not attempt to define her version of authoritarianism as democracy.

Idasa should also take care to whom they allow platforms in a journal dedicated ostensibly to "democracy in the true sense of the word".

Gavin Weiman

Executive member of the Democratic Party in the Northern Transvaal and an executive member of Groundswell SA, Pretoria

Philip van Niekerk delivered the keynote paper for the debate on the press and his presentation accordingly received more attention in our report; it was not a question of "selecting" opinions.

You seems to have misunderstood Ann Bernstein. Precisely because she was advocating accountability and democracy, Bernstein questioned the meaning of certain slogans behind which authoritarianism often lurks.

Editor (letter shortened)

Opinions expressed in Democracy in Action are not necessarily those of Idasa.

## No belt prize

A KARATE Springbok invited to conduct training classes in Port Nolloth was refused use of the town hall when municipal authorities discovered he was "coloured". After a hasty meeting, in which the city fathers sought guidance from the Almighty, the same decision was returned - no go. So the instructor took his students to the beach to train as his wife observed that "even in Port Nolloth the beaches are open to all".

- One wonders if martial arts practitioners in the Port will ever progress beyond their white belts.

## Darkest SA

A LETTER to the editor of Democracy in Action from a final-year Australian high school student asking for information about apartheid and addresses of organisations, concluded with this question: "I am planning on visiting South Africa in the next few years: do you think this is advisable?"

- Ja, nee.

# Batting on a sticky wicket

**Sport and politics was the name of the game, but it was politics that underlined and undermined Idasa's "Sport and Non-racialism" conference in Port Elizabeth at the end of March.**

**Sue Valentine reports.**

The delegates to the conference came largely from the complex (and often intrigue-filled) world of sports administration. They were there to discuss exactly what is meant by non-racialism, what obstacles exist to its implementation in South African sport and how administrative structures can become non-racial and democratic.

However, at the eleventh hour, after months of consultation and initial support, the National Sports Congress (NSC) decided it could not participate – leaving the conference the poorer for its absence. Also missing were Sacos (SA Council of Sport), the SA National Olympic Committee (Sanoc) and the Confederation of SA Sport.

From the outset Sacos had said they would not be there, reiterating their position that: "We will not deviate from our principled stand by engaging in discussions with some of the very people who enjoy the fruits of the present racist regime."

At one stage the Confederation were due to send speakers but later decided that it was inopportune. A similar decision was taken by Sanoc and, finally, despite late-night, last-minute talks, the NSC also withdrew.

However, in spite of the initial disappointment – mirrored in the grey Saturday morning sky – the 60 delegates who did attend ultimately pronounced the conference worthwhile for the range of approaches and ideas aired, compared and discussed.

Delivering the opening address, Idasa director Van Zyl Slabbert said South Africans needed to see themselves in a fundamental process of transition which would affect all the old structures in "rather painful and fundamental ways" and which would affect the traditional sports culture to which whites were accustomed.

Slabbert said South Africans should remember that two thirds of the countries of the world were in a process of fundamental transition. "All the frameworks for under-

standing international politics have gone into a meltdown . . . We must see how we are going to adjust. What kind of sports administration and culture are we beginning to promote?"

Pointing to Namibia, he said that within a week of independence a Namibian 15 had been invited to play rugby against an official Zimbabwean team. He said there was little need to ask what had happened – a fundamental issue of conflict had been resolved, white domination had ended.

"We do not have a midwife like Lord Soames or Resolution 435. In the South African context, for better or for worse, people have decided that negotiation is the way to get rid of white domination and to put a democratic structure in its place. It has

never happened before. We must keep that in mind when we made quick and glib comparisons with Africa or Eastern Europe. We must find unique ways for a solution."

Asking whether a cultural infrastructure existed that could carry and sustain a democratic constitution, Slabbert said: "We cannot impose a democratic constitution and pray for a miracle. Only a strong democratic culture can sustain a democratic constitution. We must promote a democratic culture."

A constitution could not fabricate consensus or unity, it could only reflect it. "The fabric of consensus comes from the everyday community, from transport, telecommunications, schools, religion and sport.

Sport can become an important symbol of unity," he said.

Issuing a challenge to sports administrators, Slabbert said it didn't matter how much they had already tried to promote sporting unity and non-racialism, the challenges were not going to stop. The old structures would either adjust to the new reality or they would become redundant. The major dilemma should not be how South Africa gets back into international sport.

"The central thrust is, how do we become a genuine democratic, non-racial society? If we don't solve this problem then I'm afraid the other issues, including sport, will be pulled into a vortex."

He concluded by saying that, on the sym-

**'The major dilemma should not be how SA gets into international sport. The central thrust is how do we become a genuine, democratic, non-racial society.'**

bolic cultural level, sport could be an important cutting edge for change towards a non-racial democratic society. But it could also reflect the tensions, problems and aggravations of our society in a very emotional way.

The challenge was to undercut the threat and promote the promise.

Speaking as an individual involved in sports administration within the black community, Idasa co-ordinator in Port Elizabeth Max Mamase said he supported the sports moratorium, but added that South Africa was entering a phase in which a non-racial content was being introduced into the structures and processes that were in place.

It was time for groups to begin debating





**DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE:** (from left) Vuyisile Cekisani, Peter Glover and Tex Harris.



**SPEAKERS AT THE CONFERENCE:** The president of the SA Cricket Union, Geoff Dakin, (far left) and Tommy Bedford, a former Springbok rugby captain (left).

**‘T**oo many factions are doing their own thing. The fundamentals of unifying South African sport should be foremost in our minds.’



**SPEAKERS AT THE CONFERENCE:** The president of the SA Hockey Union, Steve Jaspan, (far left) and Mick Winn, chairman of the SA Road Running Association (left).

with each other about the differences they encountered.

“We are not saying the structures which exist must disappear, but they must merge and integrate; we must have one rugby board. Before we talk of international sport, let’s address ourselves to the practical realities in this country,” he said, urging sports administrators and players to become social forces for change.

**T**HE president of the SA Cricket Union, Geoff Dakin, launched the session on “Our experiences in attempting to introduce non-racialism into our sport” with some sharp words for those organisations which had chosen not to attend the conference.

He said he had opposed the idea of the recent rebel cricket tour last March, but as a loyal member of the SACU he had gone along with the decision of the board.

Referring to the efforts of the SACU to have cricket grounds, change-rooms and bars opened to all races, Dakin said he was not trying to “score points” but added: “We believe we have been the leading, driving force in sport in South Africa. We were the first to take on John Vorster.”

After citing the achievements of the SACU since its inception in 1976, Dakin conceded that although there was some mixing at club level and a little in provincial teams, it had not gone far enough because of the discrepancies in South African society. He said the SACU had failed miserably at school level but said this was because they had been opposed in their efforts by the Department of Education and Training.

He railed against those who accused the SACU of being racist and re-iterated the SACU’s non-racial position. “We want unity. We’re not saying we’re the big white boss.”

Replying to critics from the audience who said the SACU still had a long way to go and who asked where the SACU saw itself heading in the future, Dakin replied that cricket was a vehicle towards brotherhood and a single nation.

SA Hockey Union president Steve Jaspan said the disease of apartheid was the biggest problem facing sport, and the lack of facilities was one of the major tasks ahead for administrators.

He said the SAHU was a non-racial body which administered 95 percent of the game

while the other five percent fell under the SA Hockey Board – a Sacos affiliate. Despite numerous overtures by the SAHU to the SAHB, Sacos had, in consistency with their stance, refused to enter into talks.

“Too many factions are doing their own thing. The fundamentals of unifying South African sport should be foremost in our minds. The time has come for men of integrity and vision to come together.”

Chairman of the SA Road Running Association Mick Winn said road running was a relatively new sport which had emerged in the last two decades and was a sport for the masses.

Giving a brief history, he told of how black runners, denied official entry into races, had nevertheless competed and won and how white winners had handed over their prizes in recognition of the true victors.

In 1975 black runners still had to wear ethnic labels on their running vests and only in 1976 were they allowed to run the Comrades Marathon. Women (of all races) had to wait until 1977 before they were allowed to compete in the Comrades.

"We had to fight for changes," he said, "and had to threaten to break away from the SA Amateur Athletics Union. At long last we have a situation where we can further our own ideas."

SARRA supported the sports moratorium and believed that the tax rebates companies received for supporting international tours could be better spent in South Africa. Winn said SARRA hoped to establish an All Africa Road Running Association – a goal they believed was of "paramount importance".

**NEWLY** elected executive member of the SA Rugby Board Arrie Oberholzer appealed for an acceptance of both the SARB's bona fides and its shortcomings. He said that if other groups were willing, the SARB would happily offer to disband and form a new board.

"We must stop looking at inconsequential barriers and do what we have to do. I don't think we have a moment to lose. Please accept that we have the best intentions in the world, but also accept that we have an obligation to our players and supporters," he added.

Oberholzer said the problem with the SARB was that it had taken them since 1977 to get where they were and they were still a long way from where they should be.

In the concluding address, former Springbok rugby captain Tommy Bedford said the difficulties being experienced by sports people and administrators arose simply because they lived in South Africa.

"This debate today is illustrative of the dilemma apartheid has brought upon us," he said. "The mere fact that not everyone is here is because of this bloody thing called apartheid."

"One could cry, listening to the questions I've heard today. Sport is about winning, about competition, about outwitting the opposition. We've had no winners – not today at this conference and not since 1910 – every single one of us has been a loser."

Bedford said the ultimate goal of sport was to compete at the top levels – at Lords, Twickenham or the Olympics – which had been denied to all South Africans. He said only by examining the history of sport in South Africa would people be able to go forward.

"I believe one of our difficulties has been that we have not created black heroes in South African sport. Sport is not about officials but about participants, about players, about youngsters. In South Africa 60 per cent of the population is under 18."

Bedford told of his experiences in trying to get rugby started in Umlazi and the total lack of support offered by the Natal Rugby Union for the project.

"If the heart of the matter was addressed we could have moved light years ahead; we've kept the international thing going because that is what the white community wants. We won't catch up as long as the black community feels hard done by."

Venturing the opinion that those who had boycotted the conference were the poorer for not having attended, Bedford said that ultimately it was not through meetings that things would change. Rather it was through friendships and trust that South African sport would get anywhere.

Sue Valentine is Publications Assistant with Idasa.

# PERS Wie is 'n Afrikaner?

Deur At van Wyk

**GESOEK:** 'n Afrikaner. Drie eeue lank is hy al soek, want die naamdraer wil hom nie laat uitken nie. Hy is wit, maar ook bruin en swart, en hy praat Hollands/Afrikaans, maar ook Engels en enige van die swart tale. Wie is 'n Afrikaner?

Kyk éers na die variasies van die naam in die geskiedenis: *Afrikaander*, *Afrikaander*, *Afrikaander*, *Africander*, *Afrikaner*, *Afrikaan*, *Africaander*, *Africane*, *Africanda*. En wéét dat dit óók staan vir 'n soort skaap, bees, geweer en blom, en vroeg aangeneem is as van deur 'n groep gekleurders onder leierskap van Jager Afrikaner.

In September 1683 skryf Olof Bergh oor 'n binnelandse ekspedisie: "Spanden de beesten daar uyt en stuerden 2 man van ons blancken uijt met twee Afrikaenders."

Dit is duidelik dat *Afrikaenders* (met sy wisselspelling) hier gebruik word vir inheemse swartes.

In 1707 mor die koloniste rondom Stellenbosch teen die Hollandse bewind en goeweneur Adriaan van der Stel. Toe die jong witman Hendrik Bibault en ander na Van der Stel se ontslag uit pure vreugde Stellenbosch op horings neem en die landdros hulle met die rottang bykom, roep Bibault uit, "Ik wil niet loopen, 'k ben een *Africaander*."

Daarmee gee hy te kenne dat hy 'n boorling van die Kaap is – 'n *Africaander*, nie 'n Hollander nie. En dit was destyds 'n gangbare betekenis van die woord: 'n witmens wat aan die Kaap gebore is en van Hollandse, Duitse of Franse afkoms kon wees.

Daarnaas, grootliks met dieselfde betekenis, is *Afrikaan* gebruik, of *African* op Engels. Só staan dit in geskryfte sedert die begin van die 18e eeu. Die Voortrekkers het na hulleself verwys as *Afrikaanders*, maar ook as *Emigrant*, volk en *Afrikaner*.

Die verskillende variante was tot in die tweede helfte van die 18e eeu sonder 'n eksklusiewe betekenis of sterk gevoelswaarde, want dit was ook van toepassing op Kaapse gekleurdes, insluitend slawe, en later Engelse.

Om te onderskei kom Dutch *Afrikaander* en English *Afrikaander* in omloop, en word *Afrikaander* soms vir Brits- en dan weer Hollandsegebore Suid-Afrikaners toegeëien. Laasgenoemde maak in toenemende mate aanspraak daarop en stig in 1875 die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaanders – om te "onderskei . . . tussen Afrikaners met Engelse, Hollandse en Afrikaanse harte", met laasgenoemde groep die *Regte Afrikaanders* (Afrikaanse Kultuur Almanak).

Dit kry stukrag met die stigting van die Afrikaner Bond in 1879 en die gevoelsoopbruising na die Eerste Vryheidsoorlog van 1881. So kom dit dat *Afrikaander/Afrikaner* in die tagtigerjare staan vir 'n politieke ideologie, met die kreet "Afrika vir die Afrikaanders" – dus Hollandsegeborenes. Dit is steeds nie eksklusief nie, want vóór en ná die eeuwending word dit ook op Engelse van toepassing gemaak, en in geringer mate op Kaapse gekleurdes.

Vóór die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog sê generaal JBM Hertzog dat Afrikaner Hol-

landse- en Engelssprekendes insluit wat hul belange met Suid-Afrika verbind. Dis in 1899 ook die standpunt van Ons Land en later van Di Patriot (JC Steyn, *Trouwe Afrikaners*.)

James Molteno skryf dat hy op 4 Oktober 1899 die woord *Afrikaanderdom* in sy breë wit betekenis die eerste keer uit die mond van die imperialis Alfred Milner gehoor het. In 1906 kies AR Colquhoun *Africander* met opset in sy *The Africander Land*, omdat dit vir hom albei wit taalgroepe insluit. In 1910 gebruik Abraham Fischer dit ook só, en in dié jaar verwys 'n briëfskrywer in The Natal Mercury (3 Mei 1910) na *British Africanderism*.

Maar toe Hertzog hom in 1912 teen "vreemde fortuinzoekers" uitspreek en sê die Afrikaner is baas en sal baas bly, bars 'n bom. Hoe hy ook al verduidelik het dat hy met *Afrikaner* Hollands en Engelssprekende bedoel wat Suid-Afrika eerste stel, is hy nie geglo nie.

Midde-in die krisis skryf generaal Louis Botha daarvoor aan president MT Steyn en verwys na Engelse *Afrikaners* en Hollandse *Afrikaners*, terwyl De Volkstem (3 Des 1912) die Engelse Ralph Tatham "'n gebore Afrikaner" noem en terme gebruik soos *de Hollandse Afrikaner* en *de Engelse Afrikaner*.

Dit klink na baie lawaai en min wol, maar destyds was die betekenis wat geheg is aan Hertzog se gebruik van *Afrikaner* as "baas" van die land naas "de vreemde – voornamelik Engelssprekende fortuinzoekers", 'n gewigtige saak wat as hefboom gebruik is om hom in 1912 uit die kabinet te lig.

Vir Hertzog en ander het die benaming *Afrikaner* sy betekenis as Suid-Afrikaner behou, maar met die ontwaking van Afrikaner-nasionalisme sedert 1912, en veral ná 1934, het dit die eng betekenis verkry wat dit vandag nog plek-plek het: 'n wit Afrikaanssprekende Christen-kerkklidmaat van die "volk".

Enkeles het nie die eng betekenis van *Afrikaner* aanvaar nie. In 1960 pleit NP van Wyk Louw om die voortbestaan van "my volk, blank en bruin, en die taal wat ons praat". In 1921 het Hertzog al die swart vakbondleier Clements Kadalie gevra om vertroue "between the white and black *Afrikaander*".

**NOU** sê die ANC in die jongste tyd *African* beteken vir hom nie net swart nie, maar almal wat saamstrewende om 'n toekomstige Suid-Afrika. Dalk is dit sommermaar woorde, maar as die strewende sou eindig in 'n eenheidstaat met vryheid vir almal, sal *Afrikaner* of *Afrikaan* as gemeenskaplike noemnaam sekerlik van pas wees. Dan het die naam 'n volle sirkelgang geloop sedert 1683.

Tot dan bly die vraag wat ook die einde vorm van MDW Jeffreys se grondige artikel in *Africana Notes & News*, Sept 1971, 19/7, waarvan grootliks in hierdie artikel gebruik gemaak is:

Wie is 'n Afrikaner?

(Met erkenning aan Rapport)

# Killing fields of apartheid

From Page 1

of the dead have been in these "UDF" areas?

Finally, the memorandum criticises the local authorities for their "unwillingness to assist", asking simply "whether the municipality would have shown the same qualms if the victims had been white"?

Aitchison's paper, titled "What happened in Pietermaritzburg", supports the UDF/Cosatu analysis.

He sketches the evolution of political formations in the area since 1976, presents statistics "quantifying death and destruction", and poses six questions in an attempt to interpret the war:

Is the Maritzburg conflict simply part of the general revolt against apartheid and its structures that flared up in late 1984 and which the succession of states of emergency has suppressed elsewhere?

What is the origin and dynamic of the conflict?

What role have Inkatha and the UDF played?

Has the state sided or colluded with Inkatha?

Why have peace initiatives not succeeded so far?

In whose interest is the continuation of the conflict?

On the first question, Aitchison concludes that while the revolt against government-installed structures was spreading to Natal, "the conflict has been essentially about Inkatha's desire to maintain its support (or at least to maintain its ability to claim such support without contradiction) among black people in Natal".

He cites statistics from another study showing that between 1977 and 1988 Inkatha support in the PWV industrial heartland shrank from 30 percent to 5 percent, while the allegiance commanded by the broad ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance had grown to 70 percent. The same trend threatened in Natal.

"All the available evidence seems to say that it was Inkatha's attempt to aggressively recruit membership and also to recruit



Homemade guns on display in Natal.

AFRPIX

membership for its trade union wing Uwusa that created the situation that led to the dramatic rise in violence in 1987 and 1988," Aitchison says.

Nevertheless he acknowledges that there was a "ripeness" for conflict in peri-urban and rural areas of Natal "which everybody seems to have underestimated".

On the question of collusion with Inkatha, Aitchison finds the state guilty, quoting in support a speech made in February 1988 at a police ceremony in Maritzburg by Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok:

"The police intend to face the future with moderates and fight against radical groups. Radicals, who are trying to destroy South Africa, will not be tolerated. We will fight them. We have put our foot in that direction, and we will eventually win the Maritzburg area."

Aitchison notes that police behaviour in the field "appeared to many observers to have been supportive of Inkatha".

This need not be a matter of conspiracy, he says. It may simply be "a natural tendency of an apartheid-nurtured police force to side with what they perceive as the forces of conservative tribalism".

A statement by one Colonel J Fourie in

Durban after killings in KwaMashu "explains much", Aitchison says. The colonel opined that while an Inkatha crowd might look armed to "outsiders", it was not in fact an "armed group" because "traditionally, Zulu men carry arms".

Aitchison notes that the continuation of the conflict is "not in the interests of the UDF or the ANC or anybody espousing a democratic, non-racial unitary state position". But he goes further.

"It is not actually in the interests of Inkatha, for apart from destroying the very basis of its realpolitik moderacy - its non-violence and associated willingness to enter into acceptable compromises with the existing white order, particularly in the economic sphere - it is fast losing international credibility and has fashioned for itself a long-term burden of revengeful hatred.

By contrast, Aitchison argues, perpetuation of the conflict "can be seen to be in the (short-term) interests of the South African government" because it is cheap, keeps Inkatha and therefore KwaZulu occupied, and keeps pressure off the state.

Among the complicating factors - apart from the appalling conditions in which so many are forced to live - are "the business sector's tendency to favour Inkatha and particularly Chief Buthelezi, and to discount negative reports about them".

Aitchison observes that in the context of decades of experience in "setting up and co-opting traditional elements in collapsing tribal societies", and "growing experience with destabilisation, often of a violent kind", the South African government faces in the Natal midlands conflict the ultimate and bitter fruit of its own policies.

The burning question is whether "Pretoria'sroika" now encompasses a will to find a peace for the area (and others, like Crossroads, in danger of succumbing to the same fate). And if there is a will, is there a way?

Ian Liebenberg is Idasa's Director of Research. Shauna Westcott works in the publications division.

## Learner peacekeepers for Natal

**A TRAINING** course for peacekeepers in the Natal conflict was run jointly recently by Idasa and the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. About 30 people attended.

The objective was to equip the participants with the basic practical skills necessary to play a role in preventing violence. This covered two essential aspects: skills for intervention and possible mediation in a conflict situation, and knowledge of the law to assist in the process of bringing perpetrators of violence to book.

A number of factors led Idasa and CSLS to begin offering the course. Most important of these is that the police force operating in most of Natal's townships is seen by

many victims as a major perpetrator of violence, or at best is seen to have simply dispensed with normal police investigative procedures.

The consequence is that township residents, who live in fear of their local police, are relying increasingly on outside civilians to contact a different police force or the SADF to prevent armed attacks. This breakdown in the policing system has led to the demand for a civilian-based, peacekeeping approach in preventing violence.

Idasa's hope is that the course will build up a body of experienced people who can monitor the conduct of parties in the violence, and mediate between them.

This communication is an essential part

of the negotiation process which is currently under way. A political settlement will demand as one element the political rehabilitation of the police and army in the eyes of black people.

Both forces live at present with their legacy as enforcers of pass laws and other apartheid legislation, and as defenders of apartheid in the low-level civil war between the government and the ANC which we have experienced in recent years.

The Training for Peacekeeping course will continue to be run by Idasa and CSLS on an occasional basis. Inquiries should be directed to the Natal office of Idasa.

Gary Cullen  
Regional Co-ordinator

# New wind of change blowing in Africa

**A new liberation movement against undemocratic, unsuccessful and unpopular governments is under way in Africa, says a well-known political analyst. Shauna Westcott examines an article in the Washington Quarterly by Colin Legum.**

**FOUR** decades after the anti-colonial storm began to sweep foreign rule from the continent, Africa stands poised for a second period of liberation. The targets of the new wind of change are "unpopular, unsuccessful and undemocratic governments".

Five developments are cited in support of this assertion, argued in an article titled "The Coming of Africa's Second Independence" by political analyst Colin Legum, and published in the Winter 1990 edition of *The Washington Quarterly*.

They are: the breakdown of political and economic institutions, the growing number of countries abandoning the experiment in one-party states, the establishment of centres for the promotion of pluralist political systems in the continent, a "growing chorus of outspoken dissent", and the spread of an African human rights movement.

Legum notes that over the last three years, the number of African countries with a multi-party political system has increased from six - Botswana, Gambia, Djiboutie, Mauritius, Tunisia and (arguably) Morocco - to eight, with a ninth, Nigeria, set to return to parliamentary government in 1992.

The two new recruits to the multi-party system are Senegal and Algeria, with the latter particularly significant in Legum's view because dissent was rigorously repressed by the single-party government formed in 1962 after a long and bitter independence struggle. When repression was lifted, formerly clandestine resistance surfaced in 20 political parties.

"Senegal, which had a brief flirtation with single-party rule, now displays a vibrant open political system with no fewer than 17 competing parties (seven of them Marxist factions). This new system already has stood the test of two elections," Legum says.

He concedes that some countries with one-party rule, like Tanzania, "provide for a reasonable level of genuine democratic participation in the election and deselection of members of parliament".

He concedes also that the collapse of liberation movement coalitions with the departure of the common enemy and the ensuing danger of ethnic or regional conflict, civil war and partition, were factors making a widespread choice of single-party rule

"understandable".

But, he says, in many cases the choice was made "not because of any serious danger to the state, but simply in order to entrench the power of a particular ruling group".

Thirty years on, the two major arguments advanced in support of single-party rule - that it was the most effective means of containing the conflicts and integrating the interests of plural societies, and that it offered the quickest way to promote balanced economic development - are revealed as seriously flawed.

"There is no evidence," says Legum, "that the half-dozen African states that have re-

ness, nepotism and corruption" that seem to flourish in the absence of democratic space and procedures.

Legum acknowledges that political systems alone cannot be blamed for the "grave decline in most African countries", citing as contributory factors an inequitable world trading system, quadrupling of oil and fertilizer prices, drought, locust plagues and climatic conditions.

But he argues that the consequences of these "negative factors" would have been less severe had state bureaucracies been responsive to popular opinion, especially from the peasantry that constitutes over 70 per cent of the population of most sub-Saharan



**SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE:** Robert Mugabe's plan to turn Zimbabwe into a one-party state seems to contradict a new trend in African politics.

tained multi-party political systems have fared worse in the promotion of national unity or economic development than those governed by a single ruling party.

"Botswana with its nine ethnic groups and Mauritius with its dynamic heterogeneous society are, in many respects, prospering more than most other countries. The experience of other countries has been like that of Kenya, which today is more ethnically divided than before the government of President Daniel Arap Moi turned the country into a single-party state."

The failure of one-party systems to build unity is matched by their failure on the economic front, a consequence of the "slack-

countries.

"Ethiopia, to cite but one example, is in desperate economic straits not just because of drought and eroded land, but because a tiny elite of soldiers and intellectuals have remained determined to nail down an unpopular Marxist system on an unwilling population," he says.

Noting that the vogue is passing for dismissing partisans of democratic practice as slavish imitators of the West, Legum points to Senegal's Centre for the Study of Research of Pluralistic Democracy in the Third World as an example of a new trend.

The president of the centre, Professor Jacques Nzouankeu, has spoken of an "atlas of



## COMMITTED TO A MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY:

The new president of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, swears in Hein Geingob as prime minister at the independence celebrations in March this year

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democracies" beginning to spread across the continent. Citing recent elections in half a dozen countries, he observed: "In every case, democratic principles were put to the test and in every case those countries showed that they are moving away from authoritarianism and towards greater democracy."

A similar centre, the African Leadership Forum, has been established by the former Nigerian head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo. Its aim is to prepare African leaders for the "profound changes" necessary to stop the continental drift into escalating poverty, and to correct "our false political start".

The problems facing Africa, in the general's view, "stem from a human failure to establish institutions that make for a human society". He emphasises that "only we ourselves know what is really amiss with us and only we Africans can tell it like it is to ourselves".

**LEGUM** argues that the movement towards democracy is fueled by the "increasingly outspoken dissent" of academics, journalists and politicians - including some formerly prominent in single-party systems.

Among those he names are Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka of Nigeria, former Organisation of African Unity secretary-general Edem Kodjo and a dozen African academics who recently produced a book on Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa (see Book Review) which condemns one-party states as "not only sensitive and insecure, but also very oppressive and unresponsive to the demands of the mass of people whom they rule".

Another current in the democratic tide is a growing campaign in the Third World for human rights. Ratification of the Charter of Human and People's Rights by over two-thirds of the 51 members of the OAU is evidence, as is the establishment by the OAU of the African Commission for Human and People's Rights.

Legum acknowledges that the possibility of new tyrannies in the mould of Idi Amin's Uganda cannot be ruled out. But he argues that the African silence that shrouded the misdeeds of such despots is "much less likely to occur in the future". At the same time, however, he is uneasy about the fact that criticism of Gaddafi (Libya), Mengistu (Ethiopia) and Mobuto (Zaire) "remains

muted".

Legum notes that "many, if not all the nastier regimes were able to survive in Africa because of their client relationship with some of the major powers".

"The Americans have supported and continue to support Mobuto's regime in Zaire and, formerly, President Jaafar al-Nimeiri's in Sudan. The Soviets supplied arms to Amin and give strong support to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. The British provide substantial aid to Moi in Kenya. The French encouraged and supported Bokassa until nearly the end."

He expresses the hope that the major powers will in future "withhold support from crass offenders or, at least, speak out against them". But he adds that African democrats perceive the new thrust of Western pressure to be "exporting the idea that capitalism is the answer to the continent's problems".

Legum notes that new tensions are likely to be produced among Africans as a result of this kind of pressure and asserts: "What African democrats are seeking is both freedom from their own unrepresentative gov-

**The failure of one-party systems to build unity is matched by their failure on the economic front, a consequence of the 'slackness, nepotism and corruption' that seem to flourish in the absence of democratic procedure.**

ernments and freedom from foreign economic dictates."

He argues that "undiluted capitalism" has little support in Africa and that communism is "no longer a lodestar" - except in South Africa, where "apartheid is understandably linked to capitalism", and the bitterness of the anti-apartheid struggle has "bred a new generation of younger black leaders who see a Marxist state as the only way of transforming the country's inequitable political and economic system".

However, Legum argues that the rigor mortis of Eastern European communism and the consequences of Gorbachev's perestroika cannot fail to affect the evolution of

political life on the continent, even in South Africa.

Among other developments which could check progress towards democratic practice in Africa is what Legum calls "the Islamic factor".

"Whereas frustration and disillusionment in sub-Saharan Africa have led to an awakening of interest in the alternative of multi-party parliamentary government, in countries with strong Islamic ties (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and (arguably) Morocco, as well as Egypt, Sudan, and, more marginally, Somalia), such frustrations and disillusionment have produced a reaction favouring religious fundamentalism," he says.

Nevertheless, he avers that "the current dominant trend strongly favours the seeding of democratic ideas", giving the all but last word to Ghanaian journalist Baffour Ankomah, who wrote after the Tiananmen Square fiasco:

"The ignorance of the Chinese people about politics made it possible for the dictators to hold power so tightly for so long. It used to be so in Africa, today it is all changing.

"Like Chinese students, Africans are now a widely travelled people and can compare the differences between countries. They know we have chains to break at home, and are angry.

"The fact that so few African leaders have condemned the killings in China shows how guilty they feel about repression at home.

"But, thank God, Africa has precedents and time on its side. We can begin, today, to reform our political systems, to do away with the 'culture of silence', to restore basic personal freedoms to our people - before the bubble finally bursts."

Shauna Westcott works in Idasa's publications division.

# Heart to heart in a common cause



Constitutional expert, Gerrit Viljoen.



One of two women in the ANC team

**DURING** the 1980s, "negotiation politics" became a fashionable phrase in South African government circles. But it usually referred to a strategy of consultation with and co-optation of black leaders operating within government-appointed structures.

Since February 2, with the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and PAC and the lifting of restrictions on a number of other organisations, the political terrain has radically altered. For the first time the government has acknowledged the legitimacy of the extra-systemic opposition, and is preparing for constitutional negotiations with an open agenda.

Thus despite the government's failure, so far, to meet all the ANC's preconditions for negotiation as endorsed by the OAU in the Harare Declaration, and despite setbacks such as the temporary suspension of talks by the ANC following the violence at Sebokeng, South Africa has now entered a pre-negotiation phase of "talks about talks".

Discussions between the government and the ANC on April 5 have established better communications and led to certain concessions on both sides. Pre-negotiation talks have been rescheduled for early May at which the stumbling blocks in the way of negotiation will be addressed.

Formidable obstacles to a negotiated settlement in the near future remain. It is doubtful if either side would choose to negotiate just yet were it not for economic and diplomatic pressure to do so, as well as a volatile security situation which threatens to get more out of hand the longer negotiations are delayed.

A legacy of mistrust on both sides, exacerbated by decades of polarisation, intensifies the problem of selling new insights to angry and frightened constituencies, who will tend to distrust any deviation from previously held hard-line positions. This is a situation which the right-wing in particular is ready to exploit to the full.

The threat of a massive right-wing backlash and other manifestations of vigilantism in response to escalating public unrest and vio-

**Formidable obstacles to a negotiated settlement in the near future remain all around us. H W van der Merwe and Gabi Meyer of the Centre for Intergroup Studies explore the issue of negotiations.**

lence is a cause for grave concern. Violence, especially in Natal, has highlighted the widespread socio-economic grievances and frustrations of the poor which must be satisfied by any future political dispensation in South Africa.

It is sobering to reflect that the most devastating protest violence by blacks in the United States occurred in the 1960s after they had attained civil rights. Political liberation in South Africa will continue to raise the economic, social and educational expectations of the disadvantaged, and violence will continue if these aspirations are not met.

One of the greatest obstacles to a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Africa is the recent upsurge of violence, especially in the so-called homelands and in Natal. The ending of the state of emergency and the removal of troops from the townships are two of the ANC's preconditions for negotiation, as expressed in the Harare Declaration. Yet the deteriorating situation would seem to preclude an early response by government to these demands.

At the same time, the ANC's continual adherence to the armed struggle appears to the government to contradict Mandela's appeals for an end to the current wave of violence.


It is important to view these anomalies in the context of the heated debate on the legitimate use of force, which statements such as the Kairos Document have given rise to in the last few years.

Virtually all church leaders on either side of the South African conflict support the doctrine that violence is justifiable as a last resort. In other words, they hold to the theory of the just war rather than to the doctrine of total pacifism. It is inevitable that political leaders should adopt a similar position.

It is also a misconception that negotiation and coercion (with violence as its extreme form) are mutually exclusive. In practical politics this is not so. It is not unusual for warring factions to step up attacks on each other whilst their leaders are sitting down to negotiate.



Mompoti.



Thabo Mbeki, ANC negotiator.



FW de Klerk, leads the government negotiating team.

**The ending of violence is one of the purposes of negotiation, not a precondition.**

The role played by coercion in bringing unwilling parties to the negotiation table should not be underestimated. Thus it is unreasonable to expect any party to suspend coercion or renounce violence as a precondition to negotiation. The ending of violence is one of the purposes of negotiation, not a precondition.

But an overemphasis on coercion and negative tactics over the years has contributed to the cycle of polarisation. It has produced a siege mentality in large sections of the white population and a boycott mentality among anti-apartheid activists.

When this approach becomes an end in itself, a principle instead of a strategy, the result is a stalemate. The chances of the constructive accommodation of conflict become increasingly remote.

Conciliatory gestures and flexibility on both sides are essential to creating a positive negotiating climate, if concrete progress is to be made and the process itself is to gain any credibility with the constituencies on either side.

**NEGOTIATION** is traditionally equated with an adversarial bargaining approach in which each side tables hard-line proposals and attempts to gain the upper hand by various tactics.

Typically, after a protracted period of hard bargaining, a compromise solution may be reached and implemented, but only with heavy reliance on external mechanisms and safeguards to maintain the agreement. Trust levels between the parties remain low.

In a situation such as the South African conflict, where the parties are so interdependent, this type of outcome would be less than satisfactory.

A growing body of international research on negotiation in deep-rooted conflicts comes out in favour of an alternative approach to negotiation.

In this scenario, parties refrain from putting forward their preferred solutions as a first move. Instead they attempt to jointly de-

**No party with the potential to overturn an agreement should be excluded from negotiations.**

fine and analyse their common problem and to identify their real needs. New and creative solutions may then emerge from discussions. It may become possible to meet the needs of each party to a greater extent than was previously assumed.

This might sound utopian, but the approach has been successfully applied to various conflicts in different parts of the world. It's an approach that merits serious consideration in South Africa, where it is clear that the issue of endemic and growing violence should be jointly addressed by both the government and the mass-based opposition.

It has already been suggested by political observers that the upsurge of violence could, paradoxically, serve as a unifying factor to parties involved in negotiation.

There are other factors which would maximise the chances for the acceptability and stability of any future agreement. One would be the parties' commitment to the negotiation process above other means of coercing opponents.

Another would be to refrain from trying to weaken or divide the opposing party. Solutions cannot be effectively implemented by weak partners lacking a mandate from their constituencies.

Allied to this principle is the need to include all parties in national negotiations. No party with the potential to overturn an agreement should be excluded from the negotiating process.

Finally, negotiations need to be supported by a simultaneous process of public education. Especially at a time when rapid developments are taking place, constituencies need to be reassured, not allowed to become alienated and aggrieved.

Positive gains must be seen to be worth concessions made, on the part of both the white electorate and the black masses. Otherwise agreements reached by leaders on both sides may fail to gain general and lasting acceptance.

**H W van der Merwe and Gabi Meyer are director and librarian, respectively, at the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town.**

# Complex issues underline Ciskei violence

By Hermien Kotzé

**THE** violent aftermath of the Ciskei coup d'état in Mdantsane left many white East Londoners stunned, angry, scared and confused. Most reacted with stereotyped racial comments and white fear intensified. There was even talk of leaving the country.

The African community was also shocked at the fury of the violence and the extent of the damage. MDM leaders tried to intervene but to no immediate avail. They eventually attributed the looting and burning to the "criminal element" in Mdantsane, an explanation that Idasa in the Border region felt needed more in-depth investigation.

Although we could in no way condone the violence, we felt that its root causes were numerous and complex and needed to be properly analysed. It was also seen as crucial that people in the East London and Border region should be informed, so an emergency meeting entitled "Why the Violence?" was called.

We were very fortunate to have Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, leader of the new Military Council in the Ciskei, UCT economics professor Francis Wilson and UDF Border president Mluleki George as speakers. The turn-out of an estimated 700 to 800 people was an all-time record for Idasa in East London.

Before attempting to analyse the events in Mdantsane, it is important to give a brief background on the months preceding the coup in early March. The seeds of the rebellion that culminated in the removal from power of Lennox Sebe can probably be found in the much publicised Peulton issue.

The struggle of the people of East Peulton, who were forcibly incorporated into Ciskei in August 1988, made it clear to other people living in Ciskei that it was possible to take on the Ciskei regime.

In January this year rumours started circulating that villagers from the Chulumna area near East London were collecting their Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) membership cards and returning them to the tribal authorities or burning them.



It is important to know that without these cards, which have to be bought, access to any facilities or social services in the Ciskei - including pensions, housing, education, health services, trading licences - was impossible.

By returning or destroying these cards, villagers obviously risked losing their livelihoods, but they were so fed-up with the Sebe regime that they went even further, publicly rejecting the Ciskei government and expressing their desire to be part of a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

The rebellion quickly spread throughout rural Ciskei.

Eventually rumours of a full-scale popular uprising were rife and a week before the coup, young comrades were reported to be collecting CNIP cards in wheel-barrows in the streets of Mdantsane. It was also rumoured that on the morning before the coup, villagers were already dancing in the streets in celebration of Sebe's fall from power.

Even if it was the military that finally got rid of Sebe, it seems that it was the struggles of the people of Ciskei, especially those in the rural areas, that finally made



**ABOVE:** Looting and burning followed Ciskei's coup on March 4.

**LEFT:** Brigadier Oupa Gqozo addresses a crowd in Bisho after the coup.

**RIGHT:** The UDF president in the Border region, Mluleki George, at the Idasa public meeting in East London.

his political survival impossible. These people, seemingly, had simply had enough after decades of extreme poverty, unemployment, excessive and unfair taxation, a bias in "state" expenditure for urban/prestige projects, and massive repression.

The new political climate in South Africa raised people's expectations of a better future, while Sebe responded with a state of emergency and renewed police brutality.

Over 30 people were shot by police in different parts of the Ciskei during celebrations for the release of Nelson Mandela. In Mdantsane, police drove into the crowd and started shooting at random, killing at least 10 people. In Alice three days later, the head of the Ciskei security police drove his car into a crowd, injuring 22 people including a 12-year-old girl who subsequently died.

Sebe's alleged hit squad was also rumoured to be very active at this time, attacking well-known activists, among them Jeff Wabena, in their homes in Mdantsane.

It is thus quite clear, even before launching into a more complex analysis of the situation, that there had been an incredible amount of extreme anger brewing all over the Ciskei and that an explosive situation



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Poverty: The South African Challenge".

According to him, roughly 50 percent of all South African households and 60 to 65 percent of black households live below the poverty datum line. In the bantustans, four out of five families live below the breadline.

Poverty in South Africa is inextricably linked with inequality. Wilson quoted a 1978 survey that found South Africa to have the highest degree of inequality of all the 57 countries for which statistics were available.

"In a society with too high a degree of inequality, human community becomes impossible," he said.

**AN IMAGE** summoned by Wilson to illustrate this situation was that of an elderly black woman in the rural areas, trekking home with a bundle of precious fuel – firewood weighing between 30 and 50kg – on her head.

She walks 5km in five hours and on her way passes underneath an Eskom power line shunting electricity to switches for stoves and lights far away.

South Africa supplies 60 percent of Africa's electricity while 80 percent of black households in this country have no access to this labour-saving and cheaper form of power.

Another index of the extent of poverty and inequality in South Africa is the infant mortality rate (IMR), the number of babies per thousand who die before their first birthdays, used internationally as an indicator of the wellbeing of a country's population.

Figures for 1981 to 1985 in South Africa show the IMR for white babies is 12 per thousand, while for black babies it is between 94 and 124. Thus a black mother is eight times more likely to lose her baby than a white mother.

Overcrowding in black townships is another manifestation of poverty and a direct result of government policy. In Soweto an average 15 to 20 people live in each of the standard "match-box" houses. The situation in Mdantsane is very similar.

This situation arose because the government refused for many years to accept the

existed before the military takeover. In retrospect, the eruption of seemingly senseless violence should have been predictable.

It would be shortsighted, however, to look for the causes of violence only within the Ciskei. Many have to be sought in the wider political and socio-economic context of South Africa.

**THE** first issue that needs to be addressed is the violent nature of the apartheid system itself. Mluleki George began his address by making this point.

Small wonder, he said, that after living with all the feelings of frustration, anger and hopelessness created by the violent system under which they have been forced to live, African people finally respond with counter-violence.

This statement can be interpreted in at least two ways. Firstly it says that people resort to violent actions as an expression of their political powerlessness. Secondly, it says that people resort to violence because it has become institutionalised in society, or, to quote George: "It's the only language the white government understands."

It is particularly the latter that should be of grave concern to all South Africans.

Black children grow up with a continual and often provocative police and army presence in the townships. They have often been bystanders at, sometimes participants in, the most horrific scenes imaginable. Many, some as young as 10 years, have passed through detention cells. Many have never really experienced childhood as it is generally perceived throughout the world. And they are the leaders of tomorrow – as politicians are so fond of proclaiming.

Most white children, on the other hand, grow up in a protected environment, but often exposed to racist attitudes, whether by osmosis or by direct tutelage. Schooled in the Christian National tradition and raised in a militarised society, they often take racism and violent action against black South Africans for granted.

These children are also supposed to be the leaders of tomorrow. The question is how can these young South Africans – and in fact our whole society – be "de-programmed"?

Another cause of violence in South Africa and specifically the Ciskei, is the massive poverty experienced by the majority of black South Africans. This is the opinion of Francis Wilson, co-author of "Uprooting

permanence of black people in the urban areas of South Africa and refused therefore to provide adequate housing.

Overcrowding, coupled with increasing landlessness, is also a major problem in the rural areas of the bantustans. Again it is the direct consequence of government policy aimed at preventing black people from settling in the urban areas of "white" South Africa.

Population density figures provided by Wilson show that people live in the Cape at a density of two people per square kilometre, in the Free State at nine people per square kilometre, and in Ciskei at 82 people per square kilometre.

**In 1951** the Tomlinson Commission recommended that at least half the then population of the Ciskei would have to be moved if the agricultural potential of the land were to be developed. The government paid no heed and between 1970 and 1982 the population of the Ciskei doubled.

Increasing landlessness is thus the plight of the people who live there. In the Keiskammahoek district, for example, the average size of landholdings fell 75 percent between 1946 and 1981, from 1,7 hectares to less than half a hectare.

Overcrowding, in conjunction with political and socio-economic dilemmas, exacerbates situations, causes family tensions, adds to instances of wife-battering, incest, rape and so on. Wilson said the degree of overcrowding and its consequences was one of the most seriously damaging manifestations of poverty in South Africa today – "the bitter fruit of powerlessness".

Another factor is unemployment, which has been rising steadily. In 1970 it stood at 12 percent of the workforce, in 1981 at 21 percent and today at 25 percent. In Mdantsane it could be anything from 30 to 50 percent.

Wilson emphasised the human suffering caused by unemployment. Apart from the obvious implications of unemployment on peoples' levels of living, it seems that it is the destruction of human dignity that is the fundamental problem.

Unemployed people interviewed for the Second Carnegie Inquiry into poverty stressed their feelings of not being useful, not being able to make a contribution to society. Wilson quoted an unemployed Lesotho man as saying: "It is as if these hands of mine have been cut off and I am useless. I can do nothing, I cannot contribute."

The psychological impact on a people experiencing such high degrees of unemployment together with the dehumanising experience of decades of apartheid can only be speculated upon.

If one adds that the bantustans have the highest incidences of unemployment and that unemployment affects the youth in particular, it all adds up to an understanding of the pent-up frustrations that exploded in Mdantsane in March.

But why all these explanations and statistics? What have they to do with the violence in Mdantsane? "Everything", we were assured by Wilson, "because as we are examining the why's of poverty, we get closer to the whys of violence."

He attributed poverty to a complicated network of causes but stressed that they were all man-made, with their origins in the history of the last 300 years: a history of

conquest, slavery, pass laws, migrant labour, segregation and, finally, apartheid.

The system of migrant labour and its implications for life in the "reserves" – as the bantustans were then called – needs special mention. The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) set South Africa's industrial revolution in motion. It was, however, an industrial revolution with a difference, in that black workers were not allowed to bring their families with them. They had to come as "single units" on contracts ranging from six months to two years.

Wilson quoted a journal published by Lovedale Press in 1940 as writing: "Is it possible that the government does not realise that areas like the Ciskei are in effect being converted into mining villages and that the mainstay of the population is becoming dependent on the wages earned in that industry?"

The Ciskei was in effect already a "satellite" of the central economy. Wages earned in Johannesburg and other urban areas were spent there, while the Ciskei (and other reserves) and its people became increasingly impoverished. Workers from all the reserves (and further afield) contributed their labour and spending power to the wealth of the urban areas, but were not allowed to "inherit" that wealth. They and their children and grandchildren had to "live" elsewhere.

The important point, said Wilson, is that the poverty we find in the rural areas of

**Wilson said the degree of overcrowding and its consequences was one of the most seriously damaging manifestations of poverty in South Africa today – "the bitter fruit of powerlessness".**

South Africa is not poverty which has always been. It is a poverty produced by the very same process that produced the wealth of Johannesburg.

A last facet of the man-made causes of poverty is the pattern of state expenditure in South Africa. This expenditure shows a constant and dramatic bias in favour of the white population. Given the well-known differentials in state expenditure on education, it is not surprising that whites are at present better educated than blacks and thus employed in higher salaried jobs.

I would also like to speculate that a real "frustrated consumerism" is rampant in the townships, especially among the youth.

Television and radio daily proclaim the "good life" as consisting of the use and/or possession of a variety of luxury goods. This message is enhanced by the example of the lifestyle of most whites and nouveau riche or homeland bourgeoisie in the townships.

The result is a revolution of rising expectations: expectations that can certainly not be met in the near future, since most people do not earn a fraction of the money needed for the proclaimed "good life".

It is mostly to this factor that I would attribute the looting of shops and factories in Mdantsane and not to the much cited

"criminal element".

With regard to the seemingly irrational burning of factories and the resultant destruction of thousands of jobs, it is important to look briefly at the nature of the industrialisation that took place in the Ciskei.

The establishment of industries in this region took place in terms of the South African government's policy of decentralisation which in turn should be seen in conjunction with apartheid and the government's homeland and anti-black urbanisation policy.

In order to lure industrialists away from their normal urban settings, a very attractive package was designed, eventually consisting of various forms of low-interest loans, subsidies and tax concessions. The fact that trade unions are outlawed in all the bantustans and that a monthly subsidy of R120 was paid towards the wage of every worker, made the opportunity even more enticing.

Rumours are rife in East London that many industries add nothing to that subsidy, while others do not even go that far and pay a monthly wage of only R60 and pocket the rest. Rumour also has it that some really big name companies pay about a tenth of the union wage they pay in East London to workers in their subsidiary companies in Mdantsane or Dimbaza.

If one heeds the rumour that "close connections" to Sebe were an "informal requirement" for the acquisition of an indus-

try, it all becomes more understandable that people destroyed the very factories that gave them work. They were seen as symbols of the hated system.

A final point made by Mluleki George at the meeting, is the disruptive effect the states of emergency had on the work and organisation of MDM structures. He felt that if, for example, a well organised system of street committees had existed at the time of the outbreak of violence (as was the case before 1986), the whole situation would not have occurred since the preventative action would have been taken.

It is probably necessary to delve deeper into the "culture of violence" in South Africa – especially in the light of other recent occurrences of violence. It is also necessary to look further into the role of the youth and their political and material expectations – but I prefer to leave that to people who know more.

I will conclude by asking, along with Francis Wilson: "Can we as whites, responsible for the violence of the migrant labour system and the other oppressive structures in our history, point at others? Should we not first remove the beam in our own eye?"

**Hermien Kotzé is Regional Director of Idasa in the Border region.**

# Anatomy of an unknown quantity

By Sue Valentine

**GENERAL** secretary of the Pan Africanist Congress-Internal (PAC) Benny Alexander claimed in a recent interview that support for his organisation included about 400 000 signed-up members, wider support numbered "millions".

While other sources are sceptical about these figures, there is no doubt that the PAC, while something of an unknown quantity, represents a potentially significant force.

The PAC's present low profile is in sharp contrast with the prominence it enjoyed in 1960, when it received worldwide attention, largely as a result of its organisation of the pass law protests that ended tragically at Sharpeville.

Within a year of the formation of the PAC in 1959 and eight months after Sharpeville, a survey of middle-class African men by the SA Institute of Race Relations showed significantly more support for the PAC than the ANC.

The poll indicated 57 percent favoured the PAC while 39 percent supported the ANC. PAC president Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe emerged from the poll with a higher profile than ANC president Chief Albert Luthuli.

However, state repression and the imprisonment of PAC leaders, notably Sobukwe, severely weakened the PAC. The most important consequence, says SA Institute of International Affairs researcher Gary van Staden, was the series of leadership and policy crises which dogged the PAC for the next two decades.

"The quality of leadership and the frequent, often violent, disputes which erupted around it were sufficient to render the PAC all but useless," Van Staden says.

During this period rival leaders were assassinated and the PAC was linked to gun-running and drug-dealing.

But a revival of the PAC has been evident since the mid-1980s, says Van Staden, who attended a PAC consultative conference in Harare towards the end of 1989.

The three days of talks covered a range of topics, but focused particularly on negotiations, the armed struggle, internal mobilisation and unity with other groups.

**VAN STADEN** says the new clout of the PAC was reflected in the attendance at the conference by representatives of the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union.

He notes that the PAC has tripled its diplomatic representation since 1985 and now has more "foreign envoys" than the Republic of South Africa and only a few less than the ANC.

Among the positions which emerged at the conference were:

- \* An indication of a more flexible approach than the PAC has been credited with previously;
- \* Unconditional negotiations are out of the question, certain conditions must be met first;
- \* The "time is not right" for negotiations at this point in South Africa's history;
- \* A shared perception that the South African government is not serious in its stated intention to negotiate;
- \* No negotiated settlement which involves the concept of groups



**LEFT:** The secretary of the PAC-Internal, Benny Alexander, claims the PAC has 400 000 signed-up members.

**ABOVE:** Seventy-six-year-old PAC president Zeph Mothopeng.

*pictures: AFRAPIX*

can succeed.

Consistent with its position since its inception in 1959, the PAC declared itself willing to consider participation in negotiations only if the "five pillars" of apartheid were removed first. These include the Population Registration Act, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Acts which created the bantustans, the SA Constitution Act of 1983 which created the tri-cameral parliament, and the Bantu Education Act.

Van Staden finds it significant that the possibility of negotiations at some future date was not ruled out at the conference. This, he says, represents movement in the PAC position.

On the question of unity with other organisations, the major issue separating the Africanists from the Charterist position remains the suspicion with which the former view the South African Communist Party and the role of "white organisations" such as the Five Freedoms Forum and the Black Sash.

Van Staden says the PAC draws a clear distinction between individual white South Africans who accept African socialist majority rule (who are welcome), and whites who see themselves as part of a "group" wishing to influence the course of the liberation struggle for (usually) selfish ends. These whites are not welcome.

According to Van Staden, the favourable circumstances in which the PAC finds itself at the moment are based largely on two variables. The first is the increasing radicalisation of the black political milieu. The second is the failure of the ANC to take full advantage of the current situation.

But the PAC remains enigmatic to those looking in from the outside because information about it is as sketchy as its public image. This situation is largely a product of internal leadership squabbles and lack of internal structure, as well as the ANC's dominance of the media.

Sue Valentine is Publications Assistant with Idasa.

# ANC, PAC share info platform



ANC spokesman Isu Chiba.



PAC official Philemon Tefo.

**ABOUT** 100 people, mostly white, attended the last in a two-part Idasa information and discussion series - "Actors on the Extra-Parliamentary Stage" - held late in March at Barnato Park High School in Johannesburg. The "actors" were the ANC and the PAC.

The ANC spokesperson was Isu Chiba, who served 18 years on Robben Island for Umkhonto we Sizwe activities. The PAC view was presented by Philemon Tefo, the assistant national general secretary of the PAC-Internal.

Both men were asked to base their presentations on a brief history of their organisation, its structure, its economic and political policies and its current and future role in South African politics.

Among the key ideas pre-

sented by Chiba was the ANC concept of "the national democratic revolution".

"National" is not merely of geographic application, he said, it is a political concept.

The struggle unites oppressed black people and democratic whites into a fighting alliance, irrespective of the classes to which they belong. The struggle also involves the forging of a new, single South Africa. True democracy involves the participation of all people in shaping the future.

On the economy, Chiba said the ANC firmly holds the view that it is unacceptable that a half-dozen conglomerates and multi-nationals control over 80 percent of the economy. The vast profits which flow into private pockets should actually flow into state coffers for utili-

sation in the interest of the people.

He said the ANC envisaged a mixed economy for the future. It would have a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and small-scale family sector. Key sectors would be nationalised.

Tefo countered by presenting the PAC interpretation of non-racialism and its policy of "non-collaboration with the enemy".

He said that by non-racialism the PAC means that there is nothing like a black or white race, but only one race, the human race. As long as people from the "settler community" (whites) can identify themselves with Africa and everything in it, they will be accepted as Africans.

He said the PAC rejects any form of collaboration with the East/West powers. It also rejects "any form of negotiations as long as the regime is still talking about the protection of the minority".

He said it was "pure rubbish" that the PAC planned to "push whites into the sea", but warned that both economic and political power would have to be transferred to the "African majority".

He said the PAC believes in socialism, "a planned economy that will progress and address the problems of the oppressed majority".

He concluded by saying that the PAC-Internal's current programme was one of "mass action" through "mass mobilisation", while the external PAC's task was to continue to embark on and strengthen the armed struggle.

**Patrick Banda**  
Southern Transvaal Regional  
Co-ordinator

day conference - May 12 to 13.

The intention is to draw up to eight students from each of about 20 schools - English and Afrikaans, government and private, segregated and non-racial, as well as the so-called "fly by night" private colleges set up as a response to the crisis in township schools.

The aims of the conference are to enable students from high schools across Johannesburg to meet each other and share experiences and views as well as to explore ways in which school students can contribute to social change.

Joyco and Idasa have now set up a working committee with interested students and organisations to plan the conference.

**Lisa Seftel**  
Regional Co-ordinator

# June conference on transition

**PORT ELIZABETH** has been chosen to host what is likely to be one of the year's most significant conferences.

Entitled "South Africa in Transition", it will set out to provide a clear perspective of the steps in the process of transition towards a democratic form of government.

The conference, to be held from June 21 to 23, will be addressed by national and international speakers, and delegates from around the country are encouraged to take part.

The most deep-seated fears of white South Africans will be tackled in a non-threatening, yet uncompromising fashion as the conference attempts to unfold the hidden pattern of transition for our country.

Several factors set this conference apart from anything that has yet been held in South Africa. Chief among these is that spokespeople from neighbouring states will have the chance to trace the transition process as it was experienced in their own countries. They will elaborate on lessons which might have particular import for South Africa as it stands on the verge of its own period of transition.

Six general themes - economic justice, education, local government, the judicial system, civil liberties, and the media - will be outlined. Speakers will be expected to focus on their country's experience in each area through the transitional phase.

Discussion will then move to workshops focused around the six topics, with additional comparative input by two recognised South African speakers. Throw in a few intense panel discussions, along with some speakers not yet heard in our country, and the stage is set for a watershed conference, given the current political scenario.

Inquiries should be directed to Max Mamase or Keith Wattrus at Idasa's Port Elizabeth office: (041) 55-3301.

The conference begins on the evening of Thursday June 21 and ends in the late afternoon on Saturday June 23. Cape schools break up at about the same time, so it is suggested that any flight reservations be made as early as possible.

**Keith Wattrus**  
Regional Co-director

# New mood in Jo'burg schools

**THERE** is a new mood in the schools. Students are increasingly aware of the changing political situation and don't want to just sit back.

As a result, the Johannesburg Youth Congress (Joyco) decided to hold a school students' conference and asked Idasa to co-host it. We approached pupils and teachers at black, white and non-racial high schools in Johannesburg and the response was "we are interested".

Joyco also consulted with representative student and community organisations. These included the National Education Crisis Committee, Actstop, the National Union of SA Students, SA National Students Congress and Young Catholic Students.

A date has been set for a two-



## REGIONAL FOCUS

# In the web of council spies

**THE** Johannesburg City Council "Spy Scandal" exposed by *The Star* newspaper reveals Idasa directors Van Zyl Slabbert and Peter Vale as among those who figured in the spies' reports.

The city council has been operating an intelligence system since 1983, according to *The Star*. The spy units consisted of at least 14 hand-picked secret agents who convened meetings held by opposition organisations, monitored their activities and reported directly to their "handlers".

Senior intelligence officers at "The Fort" in Johannesburg, compiled reports based on the information fed to them by the agents and passed them on to senior personnel in the security department.

*The Star* established that several of the council officials supervising intelligence gathering were previously employed by either the SA Defence Force, the National Intelligence Service or the security police.

One of the people spied on was activist David Webster, who was gunned down outside his Troyeville home on May 1 last year. Organisations in Johannesburg have raised questions about possible links between city council spying and the assassination of Dr Webster.

In a statement to the *Sunday Star*, the Webster Trust said: "There is a rottenness that has pervaded government at all levels for many years. It has its origins in secrecy and lack of accountability to the South African people.

"The shocking revelations that a secret security network exists within the Johannesburg City Council and that it spies on legitimate human rights organisations and activities, including Dr Webster, demonstrates the

need to eradicate secrecy and the corruption it breeds in government. A first step in this direction would be the immediate dismissal of all the council's employees and members associated in any way with the spy network and the bringing to trial of those who have acted illegally."

The spy scandal has outraged many. A memorandum, endorsed by the Black Sash, Idasa, End Conscription Campaign, Five Freedoms Forum, the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (Jodac), SA Municipal Workers' Union and the Wits SRC and delivered to the town clerk, expressed deep concern over the council's spying and the manner in which the council responded to the unmasking.

"We believe there is overwhelming evidence that the town clerk and the security department of the city council have withheld from ratepayers, funds used for purposes at no time agreed to by ratepayers or their elected representatives," it said.

However, a Democratic Party motion calling for the suspension of officials such as town clerk Manie Venter, who authorised the allocation of funds from the city security budget to pay informers, public safety director Mr John Pearce and security officer Mr Frikkie Barnard, failed.

Nevertheless, the scandal led to a motion of no confidence in the council and the election of a new management committee led by the DP.

One now awaits the findings of retired judge Mr Justice Hiemstra, appointed to conduct a commission of inquiry.

Liesel Naude  
Regional Director



David Schmidt (left) and Silumko Mayaba, new regional co-ordinators in the Western Cape.

## Welcome aboard Silumko and Dave

Idasa's Western Cape office has two new hands.

Silumko Mayaba joined Idasa in April as a regional co-ordinator and will be involved largely in organising township visits and interaction.

"Idasa's work is very important in terms of shaping a better future for all South Africans," he says.

Silumko, who is studying part-time for a BA degree in political science and industrial psychology at the University of the Western Cape, comes from a sales and marketing

background with a cooldrink company.

The other new regional co-ordinator is David Schmidt, who takes up his position in May.

David has an honours degree in economics, has taught English at high school and was involved in research for the Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty.

He has just reached the end of his term as national organiser for the End Conscription Campaign. He says he is looking forward to working with Idasa in educating South Africans for the "challenge of change".

### SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION

JUNE 21 - 23

A conference to be hosted by Idasa in Port Elizabeth to explore the steps in the process of transition towards a democratic government

#### Topics for discussion include:

- \* The causes of the transitional situation in South Africa
- \* Mechanisms of transition and those applicable to South Africa
- \* Lessons of transition from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia by government spokespersons
- \* Panel discussion on neighbouring states:
  - SA government Foreign Affairs spokesperson
  - Internal MDM spokesperson
  - Renowned SA academic

#### Workshops will be conducted on six themes:

- Transition and economic justice
- Transition and education
- Transition and local government
- Transition and the judicial system
- Transition and civil liberties
- Transition and the media.

# Dit was nog altyd só . . .

## Die kinders is vriende met hul eie soort

### “AAN

die begin was 'n paar kinders vryandig . . . daar was selfs 'n paar 'fights',” sê 16-jarige Johann du Preez, 'n standerd agt-leerling aan die Sekondêre skool Swakopmund, “maar nou aanvaar die kinders mekaar en is dinge maar soos altyd.”

Johann sê dit is baie voordelig dat skole oopgestel is “omdat meer mense nou die kans sal hê om werk te kry omdat hulle 'n beter opleiding ontvang”.

Sowat 40 uit die net meer as 300 kinders in sy skool is swart.

Volgens Johann is min wit en swart kinders vriende hoewel daar nie meer rassekonflik is nie. “Die kinders is maar vriende met hul eie soort.”

Hy sê daar is 'n paar onderwysers wat rassitiese opmerkings maak. “Die een onderwyser het aan 'n swart leerling 'n leër gegee en gesê sy weet wat in die leër is en hy mag niks daaruit steel nie. Sy sou dit nooit aan 'n wit kind gese het nie.”

Hy sê ongeveer 30 kinders se ouers het hulle na die wit skool in Walvisbaai gestuur.

Christo la Cock van dieselfde skool sê die oop skool pla hom niks omdat hy dit verwag het.

“Dit maak mos nie saak dat die skool oop is nie, hulle mag ook leer waar ek leer, want hulle is ook mos mense soos ek. Aan die begin het kinders grappies gemaak oor die swart kinders en soms in die klas het iemand 'kaffer' gesê.”

Volgens Christo het van die onderwysers opmerkings gemaak soos: “Hierso moet julle leer en jul huiswerk doen. Dit is nie hier soos in julle skole nie.”

“Ek en my vriende het besluit om met die hoof te gaan praat as 'n onderwyser wêr so iets sê.

“Hier's geen tension meer tussen die kinders nie,” voeg hy by. “Dis maar soos altyd.”

Marnus Smith, ook van Swakopmund, sê die oop skole is vir hom 'n probleem, “want hulle skep probleme”.

“Dis moeilik met die swart kinders in die klaskamer, want ek kan nie met hulle kommunikeer soos met my pèlle nie.

“Alles verskil tussen ons en hulle. Ons is mos nie eintlik vir hulle nie, maar miskien is dit nie so 'n groot probleem nie – dis net ongemaklik.”

**Suid-Afrika sal binnekort die pad moet loop van oop skole vir alle rasse. In Namibia is skole al sedert die begin van die jaar oop vir almal.**

**Pearlie Joubert het onlangs met skoolkinders, skoolhoofde en die Departement van Opvoeding in dié jong onafhanklike staat gaan gesels.**

Hy glo ook nie dat die situasie sal verander nie, “want buite die skool meng ons nie eintlik nie. Nee, ons sal seker nie pèls word nie, want ons woon nie saam nie”.

Hy sê party van die swart kinders is baie teen die wit leerlinge gekant, “maar dit kom seker maar van altwee kante af”.

Volgens hom hou party van die onderwysers ook nie van die oop skole nie, maar aanvaar dit maar so.

“Ek sal graag na 'n eksklusiewe wit skool wil gaan, maar kan dit nie bekostig nie – dis nou maar soos die land is en ek sal dit seker maar so moet aanvaar,” sê Marnus.

Samuel Angolo van die tegniese afdeling van die Akademie in Windhoek is in standerd 9 en sê hy is baie bly die skole is oopgestel.

“Dit het sleg gegaan in die verlede. Ek het altyd begeer om na die wit skool te gaan, maar vir my was dit net 'n droom. Nou sien ek 'n mens kan maar droom.”

### HY VERTEL

van Bantoe-onderwys: “Ons het skeinat en biologie gedoen en die mense het vir ons vertel van molekules en atome, maar daar was nie 'n laboratorium nie en ons het nie geweet hoe om eksperimente te doen nie. Ons het niks toerusting gehad nie – die regering het net sekere mense getel. Ons is nie getel nie.”

Samuel is tans saam met wit kinders in 'n skool. “Ag, man, ons kom reg. Ons maak grappe en oordeel nie vir mekaar nie. Daar sal altyd mense wees wat nie van mekaar hou nie. Die een wit ou sê nou die dag vir my dat hy van my hou, maar nie die ander ou nie, want hy is 'n Afrikaner en die ander ou is Engels.

“Die wiel draai nou stadig, maar eendag sal dit loop.”

Skoolhoofde van verskillende skole in Namibia het positief reageer op die oopstelling van skole.

Bertus Gouws van die Hoërskool Windhoek sê hy ondervind geen probleme sedert skole oopgestel is nie.

“Sosiaal het die kinders en onderwysers maklik ingeskakel. Enkeles sukkel met 'n akademiese agterstand, maar almal aanvaar

dinge soos dit nou is.”

Die skoolhoof van Goreangab Junior en Sekondêre skool, mnr Witbeen, sê die wortels van apartheid is reeds te diep vasgelê. “Ons sit nog in Namibia met die idees van verdeel en regeer. Ons geslag, die ouers en ouer kinders, sal eers moet doodgaan – ons sal dit nie maak nie. Die klein kindertjies sal – hulle sal aanpas. Die nuwe geslag sal dit maak, want hulle word nou groot en sal leer.”

Hendrik Carstens, skoolhoof van die Laerskool Dr Van Rijn, se daar is geen rassekonflik in sy skool nie.

“Kinders is mos wonderlik en is seker die mees aanpasbare van alle mense. Hulle het baie gou ingeskakel met die oopstelling en ons ervaar geen probleme nie.”

Een van die redes hiervoor, volgens hom, is die lang pad wat Namibia reeds kom met nie-rassigheid.

“Ons het die nuwe dinge sonder groot probleme aanvaar en gaan maar soos gewoonlik aan.”

Hy sê dit is moeilik om die effek van die oopstelling nou reeds te bepaal.

“Die akademiese standaard gee vir party nuwe kinders nog maar opdraande en die sogenaamde wit skole is nog maar nuut vir party swart en bruin kinders, maar dit is oorkombaar.”

Volgens hom is daar soms 'n taalprobleem. “Hoewel die swart en bruin kinders ook Afrikaans praat, is dit nie heeltemal dieselfde as die Afrikaans wat ons praat nie. Die sinsbou verskil soms.”

Jan Basson, hoof van die Hoërskool Augustineum, sê daar was nog nooit enige beperkings op wie inskryf by sy skool nie.

“Natuurlik is dit 'n goeie ding dat skole oopgestel is – dis mos 'n normale ding en dit is soos dit hoort.

“Ja, dit is 'n nuwigheid vir baie mense, maar ons moet gewoon raak daaraan. Ons kan nou nuwe vriende maak en daar is nog maar skugterheid – 'n man soek mos maar sy eie vriende en omgewing op, maar dit sal verander.”

### VOLGENS

die sekretaris van Opvoeding en Kultuur van Swapo en die aangewese minister van Opvoeding, Nahas Angula, was die probleme met die oopstelling van skole “meer emosioneel van aard”.

“Ons het nog geen amptelike klagtes van rassekonflik ontvang nie – die oopstelling was eintlik 'n groot non-event. Daar was individuele gevalle van konflik waarvan ons gehoor het, maar ouers of onderwysers het nie eintlik gekla nie.”

(Met erkenning aan *Vrye Weekblad*)

# Waste no time, Hofmeyr warns

**A NON-RACIAL** government of national unity is so close that business should "waste no time in examining what its role under such a government is going to be".

This is the view of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments chairman Murray Hofmeyr, who addressed the first of the Natal Idasa office's Future Forums in March.

Speaking to a full house of 60 people, Hofmeyr stressed the need for business to assume a leadership role in shaping the non-racial democracy of tomorrow.

He said the gap between the ANC and the government had narrowed remarkably over the past year, mainly because the government's position had undergone a fundamental change, but also because both parties showed a willingness to compromise.

"Once the initial phase of talks about talks is over," said Hofmeyr, "we must brace ourselves for the prospect of a government of national unity."

"Even before a new constitution is agreed upon, we could have a non-racial government."

Of prime importance was restructuring the economy, Hofmeyr said.

This was necessary because of serious imbalances in housing, education, health, the balance of payments, government finance, and macro demand and supply.

"At the heart of the problems of the economy is the inequality of income and wealth distribution . . . It will compete with efficiency for top place on that agenda."

However, Hofmeyr argued that business should oppose a state-led restructuring of the economy. A non-racial democratic state would have to establish a framework within which market forces could operate, but the market could not be dominated by the state.

Business had three options. "Either it can do nothing, preferring to wait for such a government to emerge before adapting to any measure it might take.

"Or it can accept that such a government is bound to come into existence, in which case it has a role to play in anticipating the changes such a government is likely to bring about.

"Or, thirdly, it can exercise a leadership role of its own, knowing that whatever a future non-racial government might do, it will have to have regard to the basic structural problems in the economy.

"If the matter of restructuring the economy is not to be left entirely to the state, business will have to come forward and play its part without state prompting."

(The Future Forums are a monthly get-together to facilitate greater understanding of the future political environment within which business will be conducted.)

Gary Cullen  
Regional Co-ordinator

## BOOK REVIEW

# A must for political animals

By Ian Liebenberg

**DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AFRICA**, edited by Walter Oyugi, Atieno Odhiambo et al; Heinemann and James Currey Publishers, London, 1988; 237 pages including index, R53,65.

**THIS** is the literary outcome of a workshop held to reflect on and evaluate the post-colonial transformations which took place in Africa. Essentially the book focuses on the theory and practice of democracy in Africa.

It is divided into three sections: (1) The Idea of Democracy, (2) The Democratic Practice and (3) Democracy and National Development.

Part one provides background and introduces the concept of democracy as well as the uses and abuses of that concept. Gitonga argues in this conceptualisation that, in order to succeed, democracy needs to be firmly anchored on three levels, material (infrastructure), institutional (technostructure) and cultural (superstructure).

Ideological dogmatism and the values of democracy are dealt with by Masolo. The political-philosophical question of what constitutes "good" democracy is explored without pretending to offer a solution.

Part two is an enlightening and critical appraisal of democratic practice in Africa. Holy cows - be they Western or African - are eliminated. Simiyu argues that the traditional truth of "African democracy" is a myth, and substantiates his argument with historical examples.

Peter Wanyande deals with democracy and the one-party state (a common characteristic of the post-colonial era in Africa).

He argues that "despite the many reasons advanced by African leaders for their preference for the one-party system of government, experience derived from the manner in which states have conducted politics tends to reveal that issues of democracy were not necessarily what these statesmen were interested in confronting". Specific case studies in a chapter by Mugaju deserve attention.

The problems created by the juxtapositioning of bureaucracy and democracy in Africa are dealt with by Oyugi, who concludes unpretentiously that, in the circumstances prevailing in Africa, "it is unfair (and unlikely) to expect of a bureaucracy that it can be a 'friend' of democracy".

Atieno Odhiambo provides fascinating reading for South Africans with a case-study on democracy and the ideology of order in Kenya - mostly because

an ideology of order is not unknown to us. An observation like "by the mid-1980s, the state is the presidency, the bureaucracy and the security apparatus" could have been written about South Africa. The "contest between freedom and authority" continues not only in 'black' Africa, but also in minority-ruled South Africa.

Maria Nzomo tackles the contentious issue of women, democracy and development in Africa. She demonstrates in her contribution that freedom in a democratic state is indivisible from gender issues. Her argument that women are excluded from the democratic process and land tenure by the traditional patriarchal system is important. Radical feminists from the pacifist school would, however, disagree strongly with her argument that more women should be allowed in the military. Within the Kenyan context, however, this argument rings true.

**THE** third part of the book deals with democracy and national development. Oyugi, Meddi Mugenyi and Chege make interesting, if somewhat problematic contributions, arguing that where democracy preceded the imperative of development, societies tended to degenerate into the "development of underdevelopment" (perhaps a notion derived from Dahl's *What after the Revolution?* See the chapter on "the democratic Leviathan"). Mugenyi opts for minimalist democracy combined with development, an argument which will be criticised strongly by democracy-first supporters, be they political scien-

**In Africa, totalitarianism does not lead to development-oriented discipline, but rather to chaos and poverty.**

tists or laypeople.

Subsequent chapters deal with African economic crises, with Kenya and Tanzania serving as case studies in the relation between economic progress and democracy. The observation that "examples from some African countries are a clear demonstration that in Africa totalitarianism does not lead to development-oriented discipline, but rather to chaos and poverty" contains a lesson for South Africans, whether they be totalitarian from the right, left or centre.

*Democratic Theory and Practice* is a highly relevant contribution to the debate on democracy, transformation and development. The insightful, bold and self-critical approach of the contributors should be complimented. Definite reading for political animals!

Ian Liebenberg is Idasa's Director of Research.

Wits University recently conferred on Athol Fugard, South Africa's internationally acclaimed playwright, the degree of Doctor of Literature in recognition of his achievements as a writer, for his contributions to the theatre and for his efforts to counter the "drought in the human heart". Here is an edited version of his address at the graduation ceremony.

# Trust will be 'cornerstone of the future'

**L**ike most South Africans, I have felt profoundly challenged by the dramatic developments of the past two months: challenged, among other things, to think about myself and my role as a writer in the free and open society everyone is talking about.

How would that role differ, if at all, from what it was in the brutally oppressive South Africa we are trying to break with? That thinking has involved something of a stock-taking of ideas, values, prejudices and ideals I have as a political animal.

And it involves a few questions. What do I need to keep? What should I get rid of? And, most important, what do I need that I haven't got?

A great deal has been said since that remarkable speech (by President De Klerk) in Parliament on February 2 about the climate of trust needed to usher in the brave new South Africa.

Trust is going to be the cornerstone of the future. It would be very short-sighted of us to think that external political devices evolved or dismantled at the negotiating table will by themselves be enough to ensure a just and decent society.

Namibia's marvellous constitution, for example, will become the basis of a truly democratic society only if the ideals are matched by a deep moral commitment on the part of its citizens.

I have always believed that when the time came I would be able to make that trusting commitment without too much trouble or effort. I was wrong.

To put it bluntly, I am going to have to do a lot of hard work on myself in order to come up with the degree of trust – with any degree of trust – asked for.

That stock-taking I referred to has been a very sobering experience. It has ended with me realising that after 40 years of trying to survive the pressures of an apartheid

society, I have brainwashed myself into a set of hard and unyielding political attitudes.

They are characterised by a deep scepticism and downright distrust of anything coming from the government.

One of the most subtle but at the same time devastating assaults on the quality of our lives has been the climate of suspicion created by the government – suspicion not only of the government and its agents but in our own personal relationships.

I will never forget how that whispered and hated word "informer" became part of my daily life down in the Eastern Cape. Judging from the ongoing revelations of the Harms Commission and the reports about the Johannesburg City Council's own network of informers, I am not talking about

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past history.

Distrust, deception and plain, no-frills dishonesty – those are now the real elements of the traditional way of life apparently kept very much alive by a government now asking for my trust.

There was a report in a radio news bulletin on Monday evening of an appeal by a cabinet minister asking, and I quote, "for South Africans to change their attitudes and have respect for each other's lives and goals".

The next day's headlines reported eight people shot dead in a clash between police and protest marchers at Sebokeng. It is not easy for me to generate trust in the face of these contradictions.

And, if that is the case with me, what

must it be like for one of those protest marchers who left a friend or relative dead on the ground when they fled the police fire?

In a recent television broadcast, another cabinet minister said the time had come to forget the past. Full stop. That was it.

The ease with which he said it left me speechless. It reflected a total insensitivity to, and a total lack of awareness of the damage done, the waste of human lives, during decades of National Party rule.

Instead of disarming me, it, in fact, feeds and deepens the distrust with which I now habitually examine anything coming from a government source.

It strengthens my suspicion that the reform initiative does not represent a change of heart asked of me but is rather a last-


ditch political manoeuvre to stave off the loss of white privilege and political power.

There are most likely many other white South Africans who feel the way I do and almost certainly millions of black South Africans. This is a tragic state of affairs because unless the trust in the reform initiative is forthcoming, this society is headed for chaos.

As is already obvious, the political temperature of South Africa is at boiling point. The onus is on the government to bring down that temperature. The only way to do so is to stop talking about dismantling apartheid and to do it.

The euphoria that followed February 2 has worn off.

(With acknowledgement to *The Star*)



Athol Fugard

picture: RUPHIN COUDYZER