

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1978

MORAL SUASION

by

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South African Institute of Race Relations

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THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE

A lecture entitled the Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943, and his wife, Winifred Hoernlé, President of the Institute from 1948 to 1950, and again from 1953 to 1954), is delivered under the auspices of the Institute. Invitations to deliver the lecture are extended to people having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held".

DR. HUGH ASHTON

Dr. Ashton was born on the 18th October, 1911, in Basutoland. He was educated at Bishops in Rondebosch, at Oxford University and at London University. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford in 1931 and received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Cape Town University. After anthropological research in Basutoland, which later blossomed into his book "The Basuto", he was a District Commissioner in Bechuanaland and then Senior Welfare Officer in Johannesburg. In 1949, he became head of what is now the Housing and Community Services Department in Bulawayo, which post he still holds. He was a Trustee of the National Museum for many years and has for long been associated with Jairos Jiri Association, the Bulawayo Art Gallery and with many other public spirited activities. He is a keen and accomplished yachtsman, witness his skippering from Durban to Cape Town an entrant for the recent Cape to Rio Transatlantic Race.

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Prof. Marshall W. Murphree, *Education, Development and Change in Africa*
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MORAL SUASION

"We're no end of moral reformers. It's a trifle exhaustin' . . . our kind of moral suasion" — M'Turk in *Stalky & Co* by Rudyard Kipling.

This lecture was delivered by Dr Hugh Ashton, Director of Housing and Community Services of the City of Bulawayo, in the Beattie Building, University of Cape Town, on January 18, 1978.



S.A. Institute of Race Relations Johannesburg
1978

MORAL SUASION

This title comes from Rudyard Kipling's "Stalky & Co.". The school chaplain put it to Stalky and his pals, boys in the upper school, that they might be able to curb an outbreak of bullying as they exercised considerable moral influence whenever they chose. The boys identified the two culprits, lured them into their study, set about them in earnest, serving them with some of their own medicine and secured their complete reform. They refused to reveal the secret of their success, beyond saying "It's a trifle exhaustin' — our kind of moral suasion."

An alternative title might be "A near miss". Nearly 40 years ago Alfred Hoernlé concluded his Phelps Stokes lectures on "S.A. Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit" by saying "If S.A. continues along its present path of elaborating and strengthening its dominant position in a racial caste-society, it is probable that there lies ahead of it the tragic destiny of furnishing yet another instance of the old historic truth, that the great victories of the liberal spirit have been gained when those to whom liberty had been denied, have successfully achieved it for themselves. All too often in human history these victories have been won by violent means and at a bitter cost in human lives. It may so happen at some future date in the history of South Africa. If South Africa is to escape this fate through the realisation of liberty for all its races by peaceful change, then liberal-minded men and women must continue to bend all their strength to the task of spreading inter-racial goodwill by example and precept." In Rhodesia, liberal-minded men and women did just this; they bent all their strength to the task of spreading inter-racial goodwill by example and precept, and they came within a hair's breadth (albeit a pretty broad hair) of introducing a multi-racial society without great violence and bloodshed. How near a miss was it? Why did they fail? The reforms they struggled for are now about to be won by the very means Hoernlé hoped could be avoided — by Stalky's "moral suasion". Could this have been averted?

I will not burden you with figures, but a few are necessary to give some perspective. Rhodesia is a landlocked country — a factor of considerable strategic significance at the present time. It is about the size of the Transvaal. Its population comprises the same four racial groups as South Africa — whites, blacks, coloured and Asian. The former principally of British stock, many having come by way of South Africa, with a good proportion of Afrikaners and latterly some admixture of Portuguese, many of whom have come recently by way of Mocambique. The blacks belong to the Bantu-speaking group of Southern Africa.

The white population numbers a little over $\frac{1}{4}$ million. Its main growth was before and after the Second World War, with a drop on the breakup of the Central African Federation, then a spurt between 1967

and 1972 and now another drop. The African population has steadily risen from about $\frac{1}{2}$ million in 1896 to $6\frac{1}{4}$ million — almost the same as South Africa's black population when Hoernlé gave his Phelps Stokes lectures. The coloureds and Asians are tiny minorities, numbering about 23 000 and 10 000 respectively. Although they suffer some social discrimination, tend to live in separate areas and attend coloured and/or Asian schools, they are legally classified in terms of the constitution as whites and share with them the same franchise and land rights.

There has been appreciable urbanisation since the Second World War. There are now 14 towns with populations of over 10 000. 80 % of the whites (using this term in its constitutional sense to include coloured and Asian) live there, and 16 % of the Africans. The proportion of white to black is 1 to 4 in the urban areas and for the whole country 1 to 20.

Race relations fall into two distinct periods — first, black majority rule, then white minority rule. We are now approaching a third period which will bring us full circle, back to black majority rule. The first period was brief and simple, the second has lasted nearly 90 years, the third is yet to come.

The first period starts in 1859 with the arrival of the first white missionaries. Before that there were only black people. They were divided into two main groups — Shona and Matabele. Both of them were Bantu speaking. The former was subdivided into tribal groups, speaking a common language, Shona, with dialectal differences and minor cultural variations. Way back their ancestors were part of the empire of Monomotapa, whose name was writ large by early cartographers over far more of South Central Africa than is now covered by Rhodesia. One of the early place names to appear on their maps was Zimbabwe, as variously spelt as it was located. By mid-17th century, the kingdom was beginning to disintegrate and Zimbabwe may even then have been in ruins after reaching its prime in the 13th century.

Portuguese explorers and missionaries penetrated into what is now Rhodesia in the 16th and 17th centuries. But none remained for long and the area was not visited again by whites until the mid-19th century. By then new groups had come on the scene. They were segments of Zulu tribes who fled from Chaka. One were the Angoni who crossed into Rhodesia from the south-east and blasted their way through to the Zambezi and on to what is now Malawi. The other were the Matabele. They first settled near Kuruman but, after a brush with the Boers, took the missionary Robert Moffat's advice and moved further north. They emigrated to what is now Matabeleland about 1838, together with elements of Basuto and Batswana who joined them on their wanderings. The new group was tough, warlike and strongly centralised and had little trouble in imposing itself upon the Shona (Kalanga) whom they found there and whom they rapidly incorporated

into their tribal organisation. They gradually extended their control over an area roughly 150 km radius from Bulawayo and established their influence over 300 km, especially to the east and north as far as the tsetse fly. Beyond that, they made occasional forays, as far as Barotseland and South West Africa. Although Lobengula was never actually the "undisputed ruler over Mashonaland" as the British Prime Minister declared in 1888, his impis plundered, with impunity, the Shona whom they found weak and divided after their mauling by the Angoni. No white stranger visited this vast area unless the king "gave him the road".

Whites began to appear in the country in modest numbers from 1859 onwards. They came as explorers, prospectors, hunters, traders and tourists — as visitors, not settlers. Their movements were controlled by the Matabele king. If they remained for any length of time, they stayed in a defined and segregated area near the king's own village at Bulawayo. The first permanent dwellers were the London missionaries who arrived in 1859, and were given a place 50 km from Bulawayo. Only one other white was given a place outside Bulawayo and he was a sort of consul on the road approaching Bulawayo from the south.

The chapter ended swiftly in 1893. In 1887 Lobengula, who was being pestered by concession hunters, signed a document with an emissary of Paul Kruger. He maintained it was merely an assurance of general friendship but Kruger claimed it bound him to accept a resident consul and to throw his country open to Boer settlers. But before Kruger took advantage of this, Cecil Rhodes leapt in. In the short space of three years, he acquired various other concessions from Lobengula; he launched his B.S.A. Company and got its royal charter, and he organised and equipped an occupation force of just under 200 men. They had been selected from more than ten times that number of volunteers, roughly equal numbers of Boer and Briton. According to Marshall Hole, "no finer corps d'elite had ever been raised", but one of their number was less flattering about his comrades: "Such a mixed lot I never saw in my life, all sorts and conditions, from the aristocrat down to the street arab, peers and waifs of humanity mingling together like the ingredients of a hotch-potch." But what they had in common were courage, ambition and dreams. In 1890, they crossed the Shashi from Bechuanaland, and a few months later hoisted the Union Jack in the empty veld where the city of Salisbury now stands. The Rudd Concession, on which the pioneers based their claim, authorised only mining in Mashonaland, not its effective occupation, so rather than risk a direct confrontation with Lobengula, the pioneers skirted round Matabeleland, keeping a wary lookout, that included a searchlight (operated by a steam engine) against attack from the Matabele impis, who were itching to have a go at them.

Once arrived at Salisbury, the column was disbanded and the pioneers scattered to take up their claims — 15 gold claims and 1 500 morgen of land. They had little trouble in occupying good open land, for Matabele raids had emptied it of Mashona whom they had driven into the hills. A year later, 150 new settlers joined them. There followed a brief period of uneasy peace. The pioneers established their farms and prospected for minerals while the Matabele raided around them. But two bulls cannot live in the same kraal and in 1895 there came the inevitable trial of strength. A Matabele impi, 3 500 strong, raided part of the occupied area, looting the newly-established farms and killing their Shona workers. The reaction was swift and conclusive. Black numbers and audacity were no match for white technology and tactics. Bulawayo, the Matabele capital, was occupied in November and Lobengula, fleeing to the north, died of smallpox and a broken heart in the new year. The new era of white domination had begun.

This new era roughly falls into five parts — culture bar, colour bar, integration, counteraction, and re-integration. None of them is absolutely clear-cut and distinct, but these headings describe their dominant characteristics.

CULTURE BAR 1894–1923

This period coincides with the B.S.A. Company rule. The Company was responsible for governing the country and carried out the responsibilities from within a triangle of competing forces. It was answerable to its patient and unrewarded shareholders who looked in vain for dividends and frowned on expenditure. It is noteworthy that for several decades the cost of road bridges and other economic infrastructure was met by a private charitable foundation, the Beit Trust. It was pressured by the white settlers, who were represented on its executive and legislative councils, and on whose prosperity its own fortunes appeared to depend. It was answerable to the British government, who were distantly concerned with peace and fair play. Its policy was one of live and let live, develop what it could that promised to be profitable, eschew unprofitable public expenditure, and do nothing that would upset the peace or discourage the blacks from working for the whites.

Race relations were confined to master/servant, employer/employee roles, on homes, farms and mines. On the whole, the races lived in separate worlds. Their language and customs were different and most of them dwelt apart, the blacks living in reserves set aside for them or on farms owned by absentee whites. The whites had effectively established their authority in crushing the rebellion of 1896 and there was no way the blacks could challenge it, even if they wanted to. And there is no evidence that they wanted to particularly, for there was little they had in common or in conflict with the whites. They

resented having to go out and work for them but even for this there were compensations.

PHASE II. THE COLOUR BAR 1923–1946

As the economy grew under white enterprise and expertise, in spite of disappointments and setbacks, so did white national consciousness. Whites began to agitate for self-government and the ending of company rule and the company was equally keen to be rid of its administrative responsibilities and be free to concentrate on "business". The views of the blacks, if known, were regarded as irrelevant. In 1921 Rhodesia was offered responsible government subject to safeguards for native interests and provided it was accepted by a referendum which would also consider the alternative of joining South Africa as a fifth province. General Smuts, with the backing of Winston Churchill, then British Secretary of State, campaigned strenuously in favour of union and offered generous terms, but the referendum went against him by 8 774 votes to 5 989. Rhodesia was annexed to the Crown on 12 September 1923 and responsible government introduced on 1 October, with a Legislative Council of 30 elected members.

It is difficult to say whether home rule made the whites more conscious of their position vis-à-vis blacks than heretofore, or whether the same factors that achieved it also created racial competition that stimulated this new consciousness. But it was not long before they began to use their newly-won self-government to formulate a policy for keeping the races apart and preserving their privileged and dominant position. Hoernlés analysis in 1939 of the South African situation could have been applied equally to Rhodesia. The cornerstones of their policy were the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. The former, which — with somewhat muddled logic — has often been called by white politicians their Magna Carta, provided for racial residential segregation and ownership of land and for social and economic separation as well. The latter sought to protect white workers by excluding blacks from wage bargaining machinery and did so by the simple device of excluding blacks from the definition of "employee". It also effectively excluded Africans from apprenticeship training. It did not prevent the formation of African trades unions, but by denying them recognition, it made them pretty powerless and ineffective.

Partly to justify this discriminatory legislation to the British Government and partly because of their own good sense, the Rhodesian government tried to compensate these purely negative aspects of the colour bar with something more positive and dynamic. Hence was born what came to be known as the Twin Pyramid policy. Sir Godfrey Huggins, who had then been Prime Minister for five years and was to con-

tinue as such for another 15, described this policy in 1938 in the following terms:

"The Bantu is resolved to learn, and within as yet undetermined limits is capable of learning. To forbid him opportunities is contrary to natural justice, but are we to allow him to develop and in the course of time, because his requirements are so small, gradually to oust the European? . . .

"While there is yet time and space, the country should be divided into separate areas for black and white. In the native areas the black man must be allowed to rise to any position to which he is capable of climbing. Every step of the industrial and social pyramid must be open to him, excepting only — and always — the very top . . . The senior administrative officer must be white. The native may be his own lawyer, doctor, builder, journalist or priest, and he must be protected from white competition in his own area. In the European areas the black man will be welcomed, when, tempted by wages, he offers his services as a labourer; but it will be on the understanding that there he shall merely assist, and not compete with the white man. If he wishes to stop in his own area, let him. The two races will develop side by side under white supervision, and help, not hinder, each other's progress. The interest of each race would be paramount in its own sphere.

"The policy I suggest enables the two races to live side by side to the benefit of both."

Little was done to implement the positive aspects of this policy. No attempt was made to consolidate the fragmented black areas into blocks, large enough to support a thorough-going policy of separate development, and no fundamental changes were made in rural administration or education policy to fit in with this. Although in Bulawayo and Salisbury, the government developed greatly improved residential areas, hoping this would induce local authorities to improve the quality of their black townships, no special encouragement was given to Africans to develop their own thing or to "protect" them from white competition. For all the verbal window dressing, policy remained as negative as before and the outbreak of war put paid to any chance of anything more positive being done.

INTEGRATION 1946-62

Up to the Second World War, the effects of this policy of separation were still not felt to be as irksome as one might imagine. They were undoubtedly an affront to human dignity but they could be shrugged off as they were only peripheral. Life was still unsophisticated and was lived with very little contact between the races.

The war and subsequent economic development in industry, com-

merce and agriculture began to change all that. Africans developed a raging thirst for education, and where only a few years before children had been bribed with sweets to go to school, they and their parents now clamoured for education. The towns clamoured for labour, thereby increasing inter-racial contact and creating pockets of appalling and unacceptable squalor. "Kaffir farming" gave way to crop production, leading to thousands of Africans being evicted from farm lands they had occupied for generations, if not time immemorial, and resettled in new tribal areas, with sometimes bitter strife and opposition. Political developments in Asia and Africa, such as the granting of independence to India and the struggles for independence in British and French colonies, evoked questioning of African subordination in Rhodesia. New white immigrants, many with fresh ideas, initially challenged the former easy-going paternalism of white Rhodesians, though many of them soon changed their outlook and became as conservative and reactionary as the crustiest Old Rhodesian.

The time had come for change and the Rhodesian Prime Minister, still Sir Godfrey Huggins, rose to the challenge. With inimitable charm and many a witty speech, he gradually led Rhodesians away from the Twin Pyramid policy towards the creation of a multi-racial society and the abolition of racial discrimination. As he disarmingly admitted (1955) "During my 33 years in Parliament I have completely changed my views — my political opponents often taunt me with my early speeches of 20 to 30 years ago when I was in favour of an extreme form of segregation and suggest that I am unreliable or change with the political wind. My stock answer is 'Yes, I was green and inexperienced when I made those speeches and now with more experience I have learned and changed my views.' I am a human being, not a cabbage."

Although he was soon removed from immediate contact with the local scene by becoming Prime Minister of the Federal Government, which he had done so much to create and whose existence, imperfect though it was as a symbol of multi-racialism, widened the Rhodesian horizon considerably, his influence lingered on. Under his successors, Mr Garfield Todd and Sir Edgar Whitehead, considerable changes were made and much discrimination removed. It is ironic that Whitehead, who ousted Todd for being too liberal, later suffered the same fate for the same reason. And now Smith, who had helped topple Whitehead and had restricted Todd, may be leading the country into a greater degree of multi-racialism than either of the others dreamed possible.

Gradually social relations improved. There was still very little social mixing, but a sprinkling of blacks began to be invited to receptions at Government House, diplomatic functions, and occasional business entertainments. The treatment given to Africans in shops and public buildings began to improve. Obvious affronts such as "Europeans

only" in lifts and public benches began to disappear. A few hotels accepted African guests, although most of them, together with cafes and restaurants, maintained a rigid colour bar, and shops serving sandwiches and similar foodstuffs did so to Africans through side-doors or hatches. As a result of a successful court action by an Asian, the colour bar in municipal swimming pools was declared *ultra vires*, although this heated more white emotions than it cooled black bodies.

Industrial relations also improved. Legislation was introduced in 1948 to deal with African wages. The segregatory principles of the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which had been revised in 1945, were adhered to for the time being, but separate arrangements were made for Africans through the establishment of wage boards. African trades unions were recognised and could be — and were — represented on these boards, giving them organisational and administrative experience. Then, in 1959, the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended, sweeping away the old discrimination and bringing Africans fully within the ambit of labour legislation, including apprenticeship, workmen's compensation and wage negotiation.

Nevertheless, there was still considerable colour prejudice among white artisans and other workers and so much opposition to training black apprentices that the Government set up a special Technical Teachers Training Centre to train teachers to teach Africans technical skills outside apprenticeship. At the same time, black employment opportunities were widened. A start was made with giving Africans responsible positions. Africans began to advance in the African education department and big firms, especially those with international connections, began to employ Africans in reasonably high positions. At the local level, the Bulawayo City Council resolved that in its Health and African Administration departments Africans could be employed on the same basis as whites and secured the municipal white workers' support for this unprecedented move.

The pass laws

The pass laws were abolished in 1961. The loss of this discriminatory and detested provision caused no problems, did not lead to the influx into the towns that some jeremiahs had foretold, and removed the source of much black resentment and of friction with the police. There was much talk of a national registration scheme that would apply to all races but this was not introduced until 1977.

The Land Apportionment Act

The Land Apportionment Act, the embodiment of racial discrimination, was amended again and again to take account of these new social and economic developments. African advocates were permitted to occupy

chambers with their white colleagues, white hotels could accommodate visiting blacks and serve meals to indigenous blacks, black staff and students could attend the new university, situated in the white suburbs, and even live on the campus, the students in racially-mixed hostels, Africans could go to private white hospitals (Seretse Khama was even admitted to a white government hospital) and could send their children to private white boarding or day schools.

A measure that had even wider application and more practical value to urban Africans, was the granting of home ownership in the municipal African townships. Initially this was confined to leasehold but was soon extended to freehold. African freehold of white land! This glaring and fundamental breach of the basic principle of the Land Apportionment Act was camouflaged by transferring the black townships from the "European Area" to the "African Area". A year later the breach was widened by declaring all land that had not been specifically coloured black or white to be "open" for purchase and occupation by either race, and owners of "European" land were given the option to open theirs as well. Municipalities were empowered to declare as multi-racial the whole or part of the two lands that had been zoned for industry or commerce and to set aside multi-racial residential areas, and some actually did so.

At local government level, some efforts were also made to break down the colour bar. As the Land Apportionment Act prevented Africans owning or occupying property in their own right in the towns, all of which were in the white area, no blacks were qualified to vote for or be elected as municipal councillors. The most they could aspire to were African township advisory boards. In 1960 the Bulawayo City Council proposed that Africans should come on the Council and cautiously suggested a limited number of 4 (vis-à-vis 16 white councillors).

The combined African advisory boards rejected this and made a take-over bid for 20 seats to the 16. Council in its turn rejected this but the Mayor proposed that the boards should thrash the matter out with the Town Clerk with a view to working out a mutually acceptable solution. The boards were caught up on the wave of nationalist fervour and intransigence that wrecked Whitehead's campaign referred to elsewhere in this address, and rejected this overture. Nothing daunted, the Council appointed a small commission to advise on the issue. This was lead by a prominent advocate who had briefly held the Justice portfolio in Todd's final short-lived cabinet and included the professor of Public Administration from the Rhodesian University with the Secretary for Local Government in Northern Rhodesia as adviser. It did a lot of valuable work and arrived at a compromise proposal to double the Council's offer to 8 for starters; but its report to the Council coincided with the general election of 1962 and that was the end of that.

Successive governments also attempted to transmute and modernise the immensely powerful Native Affairs Department. Its structure and functioning was the epitome of parallelism or the now passing, if not entirely passé, Twin Pyramid system. The Department's origin went back to the very earliest days of white supremacy, when the B.S.A. Company appointed Native Commissioners to govern the native reserves and country areas. Its importance was emphasised by the first constitution, and repeated in 1923, which established the Department, created the position of Chief Native Commissioner and safeguarded the incumbent from arbitrary dismissal. As the years flowed on, it grew and grew until it became a veritable government-within-a-government and took unto itself the control and development of almost every aspect of native life, native administration and native education, native agriculture and marketing, native engineering, native labour, native housing, pretty well everything except native health. A start was made on dismantling it by transferring native education to the Education Department which had hitherto been concerned only with white education, by establishing separate departments of housing and labour and by transferring its magisterial function and native agriculture to the Department of Justice and to the European Lands Department respectively. It was also hoped that changing its name to "Internal Affairs" and giving it wider duties affecting all races, would change its orientation and modify its attitudes.

The knottiest problem of all was the political, for herein lies the source of power. Not for nothing had Nkhrumah coined the slogan "Seek ye first the political kingdom". A common voters' roll had existed since the very earliest days, a symbol of British liberalism and Rhodes' famous dictum "equal rights for all civilised people south of the Zambezi". But it had never been of any use in securing African representation or promoting their interests, as the franchise qualifications were from their point of view impossibly high, and had been kept high by periodic upward readjustment to keep pace with inflation and rising African education and economic standards.

The advent of Federation and a federal parliament, in which there were African members elected both by the two northern states and also by Southern Rhodesian voters, accentuated African demands for fairer and more effective representation in the territorial parliament. This culminated in a constitutional conference with the British Government, which Joshua Nkomo and Ndabanigi Sithole as representatives of the African Nationalist movement attended by invitation from the Rhodesian government. This produced a new constitution greatly extending the vote to Africans.

There is no need to go into detail, but its main features were to split the common roll into two sections, the A with higher qualifications and electing 50 members, the B with lower qualifications and electing

15 members, with provision for cross-voting as well as for preferential voting where there were more than two candidates. Its aim was to discount extremism on both sides of the colour line and to favour moderation and racial cooperation. It clearly provided for the gradual shift of power from white to black and was accepted by the African representatives, who stated "we feel that the new provisions have given us a certain amount of assurance that the country will not pursue policies which mean that Africans would be perpetually unable to control their country . . . Above all we are to have a constitution which is an achievement resulting from the pressure of the N.D.P., a thing never before thought of in this country".

But the proposals were violently attacked by other nationalist leaders, especially outside the country, as "disastrous and diabolical" and within a few days they were repudiated. They nevertheless introduced Africans to the Rhodesian parliament and at the elections 14 were returned. Had the Nationalists thrown their weight into the elections instead of boycotting them, and had they encouraged Africans to get on the roll and use their vote, Whitehead would have won the election and the subsequent course of events might well have been different. This, however, is idle speculation and only one of many might-have-beens with which Rhodesian history is bestrewn.

This period was also marked by unrest, violence and the growth of African nationalist agitation. Soon after the end of the Second World War, there were strikes and riots in most urban centres, the outcome of ignored grievances over low wages and very poor working conditions. The implementation of the Land Apportionment Act in the rural areas and the enforced removal of Africans living on white farms caused considerable bitterness and unrest, which sometimes broke out into localised acts of defiance and violence.

Then came the Land Husbandry Act (1951). This was designed to put African farming practices on a sound footing, by giving proprietary rights to arable land in the reserves and recognised grazing rights. From 1955 onwards, it was implemented with tremendous energy by the Native Affairs Department and even some enthusiasm by some chiefs and tribesmen. But its basic assumption was that tribesmen should stop having one foot in the town and the other in the country, that they should choose between industry and agriculture.

Though brilliantly conceived and theoretically sound from the agricultural point of view, it suffered from two fatal flaws. Psychologically it was too intense and compulsive and was ill adjusted to the traditional social values and attachment to the land — initially this did not matter as there was enough land for distribution, but once this began to go short, problems arose and opposition grew. It also assumed that there would be jobs enough for those who were prepared to

opt for permanent employment. Initially — again — this was no problem, but the doldrums caused by approaching federal collapse slowed and even reduced employment opportunities just when they were most needed.

In the words of one nationalist, "it was the best recruiter Congress ever had" and the resultant unhappiness, coinciding with events elsewhere such as violent agitation in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was fertile ground for political intimidation, arson and murder in the rural areas and rioting in the towns. In quelling one of these riots, two Africans were shot by the police, thus tragically ending a proud record of over sixty years of peacekeeping without bloodshed.

A state of emergency was declared in February 1959 and numerous leaders detained. Shortly afterwards the Unlawful Organisations & Preventive Detention Acts were passed, the first in the series of ever more comprehensive and drastic legislative acts to curb subversion and its many manifestations. African National parties were formed, banned, reformed, banned, reformed and banned again with disillusioning frequency and deteriorating race relations. The culmination came with the repudiation of the 1961 constitution referred to above, with the rejection of Whitehead's strenuous "Build-a-Nation" campaign in 1962 (February to June) which attempted to persuade Africans to register as voters, and which was met by a wave of sabotage, arson and violence, and finally with the boycott of the December elections. In spite of the unfavourable climate created by this African repudiation of the liberalising programme and progressive developments of the preceding decade, Whitehead did not deviate from his advocacy of a multi-racial society and the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.

"C'e tait magnifique mais ce n'e tait pas la guerre."

Without African voting support to counterbalance white reaction, with no sign of black moderation or appreciation of the advances that had been made to allay white misgivings about African maturity, with memories still sensitive to the Congo disaster and with the new medium of television cruelly comparing his owl-like image and fingers nervously fiddling with his pipe and matchbox with the handsome and confident-looking Winston Field, the odds were against him.

Had even the handful of Africans who had registered taken the trouble to vote, he might have just scrambled home. But they didn't. The election was lost by 35 seats to 30. Though this was a small majority, a majority is a majority and the Rhodesian Front became the new government.

1962-76: REACTION

There was an immediate, almost palpable change in atmosphere. The party stood boldly and blatantly for white supremacy, for the reversal of

the liberal trends of the previous governments and for the introduction of a racial policy that would "maintain white supremacy for all time". The unthinkable had happened and one could almost hear the sigh of relief with which a far larger majority than had voted for the R.F. greeted the result. Whites had been on their best behaviour for so long and all they had got for their pains was a kick in the teeth. Now, suddenly, they didn't have to try any more — the government would do their thinking for them and see that everything worked out all right. They had had a bellyfull of multi-racialism and were all set for straightforward white supremacy.

The new government's first concern was to save what it could from the break-up of the Federation, which was dissolved at the end of 1963, and then in 1965 to seize the independence that has been denied to Rhodesia although given to her two erstwhile partners, in spite of their short experience of responsible government. Thereafter it gave its attention to combating sanctions and to implementing its racial policy.

For the time being, there was no need to resort to new legislation as enough could be done without it. White attitudes hardened almost overnight and became less friendly and polite towards blacks. Firms stopped bothering to employ Africans in high positions or trying to break down the social colour bar in employment or in business, doing so of their own accord in response to the new mood and careful not to offend the new government's susceptibilities — especially after UDI, when import and currency control put a powerful weapon into government hands.

The government itself had sufficient authority under the Land Apportionment Act, for retention of which it had campaigned, to prevent further black inroads into white areas and white institutions such as hostels and schools. It also could act administratively to strengthen or re-introduce the concept of separation, to introduce such petty restrictions as banning multi-racial sport in schools or allowing Africans to talk at white schools without special authority, and to rebuild the Ministry of Internal Affairs as an instrument of separate development. Then in 1969 it introduced two interrelated Acts which embodied the most comprehensive degree of racial separation that had ever appeared on the Rhodesian statute book. These were the Constitution and the Land Tenure Act. They were followed in 1973 by the Local Councils Act.

THE CONSTITUTION

The new constitution provided a strange mixture of integration and separation. What it seemed to envisage was an updated version of the Twin Pyramid policy, a society divided vertically into separate racial groups, black and white, but united at the top by a multi-racial parliament, dominated by whites.

It turned Rhodesia into a Republic and thus severed its connection with the British Crown that Lobengula had first established almost a century before. It retained the principle of a parliamentary democracy, with representation of both racial groups, but for the first time it put them on separate rolls. Whites, who included Asians and Coloureds, could only vote for and be represented by whites, and blacks blacks. The common roll, that had existed from the beginning, was abolished; whites and blacks were put on different rolls, and with different numbers of representatives — whites were given 50 seats and blacks 16, 1–1 with provision for the latter to be increased as the proportion of income tax paid by blacks increased. Half this number were elected by 4 African constituencies in Matabeleland and 4 in Mashonaland, and the other 8 by electoral colleges, 4 also in Matabeleland and 4 in Mashonaland, consisting of chiefs, headmen and elected councillors of African councils.

For the first time, a senate was introduced. This consisted of 23 members, 10 whites elected by the white members of the House of Assembly, 10 chiefs (five each from Matabeleland and Mashonaland) to be elected by chiefs who are members of the Council of Chiefs nominated by the President and 3 others, race unspecified.

The cabinet was drawn from Members of Parliament. Normally they were members of the party with a majority in the lower house, but in 1976 the Prime Minister appointed four senator chiefs as ministers, and three African members as deputy ministers. They were not, however, given normal portfolios, but were made responsible for the regional development of African areas. The former attended cabinet meetings but were not fully integrated into the cabinet. (The two senator chiefs and one deputy minister resigned at the end of the year, to form a new African political party, ZUPO.) Later, provision was made for the appointment for a limited period of ministers and deputy ministers who were not Members of Parliament. Several Africans were invited to take office, but none was prepared to do so.

The constitution also specifically debarred Africans from voting for or being elected to a white local authority — and vice versa — and so effectively prevented any possibility of multi-racial councils as had been mooted in the 60s.

It also emphasized the importance placed on the Land Tenure Act by entrenching it, i.e. requiring a two-thirds majority for its amendment, and hoping thereby to keep it inviolate.

Race relations in the two chambers of this Parliament that was to symbolise national unity, offer interesting contrasts. In the lower house, they left a great deal to be desired. There was little mutual respect between black and white members, the standard of debate and the behaviour of each side to the other were often lamentable. The fact that

English is the official language contributes partially to this unfortunate situation, for it handicaps some of the African members and probably adds to the frustration of being outnumbered by 3 to 1. But the root of the problem is the uncouthness of many of the white members and the unfortunate psychological implications of the fact that they are there to represent a dominant racial minority, with the arrogance of an assumed superiority.

By contrast, the senate was and still is a model of decorum. This is immediately reflected in the equality given to English, Sindebele and Shona, each senator speaking in the language of his choice, with simultaneous translation into the other two languages. The standard and tone of the debates are higher and the senators behave with restraint, respect and friendliness towards one another. Several factors besides the language question contribute to this happier position, such as age, and the fact that senators are not party political representatives as directly as members of the assembly and do not take their politics as personally or intensely.

The Land Tenure Act replaced the old and much amended Land Apportionment Act by a much stricter version of separation, and went far to reverse the trends of the past twenty years. It withdrew the safety-valve provision of the old Act which allowed white owners as well as the government to declare land to be "open" and it categorically pronounced that each race should have its own areas, declaring that this division would be fixed "for all time" though allowing for a 2 % variation within these areas, the interests of the race concerned would be "paramount". It realistically accepted that racial inter-penetration, especially in the urban areas, had gone so far that numerous exceptions had still to be recognised, but it tightened the procedures whereby they could be made, and placed the final decision even more firmly in the hands of the Minister of Local Government and Housing. It reversed the provision that African townships in the European area were classified as part of the African areas and reverted to the original attitude that regarded them as black spots in the white areas as temporary blotches that hopefully would one day disappear.

This new attitude became the basis of the government's subsequent efforts to restrict the development of new African housing schemes in the urban areas, to confine township development to tribal trust lands, some distance away, and to try to whittle away rights of tenure and home ownership — though the Prime Minister himself insisted that no rights that had already been granted should be repudiated. The Act also curtailed multi-racial occupation of commercial, industrial and residential areas. It did not whitewash any area that had already been declared multi-racial, nor actually repudiate the concept itself, but it made it more difficult for any future areas to be

declared multi-racial and it limited black rights of occupation to a maximum of 10 years leasehold.

In these and other ways, it attempted to unscramble past multi-racial inter-penetration, to separate the races and keep them separate. But social and economic processes had gone too far in bringing the races together in the urban areas for the government to be able to achieve any fundamental changes.

The Local Councils Act was largely a rehash of the old Municipal Act, dealing with the creation, structure and functions of municipal government. But it also incorporated earlier racially orientated legislation taken from other acts and it introduced two new provisions that linked it closely with the racial "separate development" objectives of the Constitution and the Land Tenure Act. The first of these was to repeat the former's exclusion of Africans from the municipal roll and the right to be councillors, and the second was the provision empowering the Minister of Local Government to establish township boards with executive powers in the municipal African townships. The former made it clear that there was to be no talk of multi-racial councils with African councillors as there had been in Bulawayo a few years earlier. (Multi-racial councils in the sense of having Asian or coloured councillors as well as whites were permitted by reason of the Constitutional definition which included them as whites, and Asians do serve on several town councils.) The latter made it clear that if Africans in the urban areas wanted to and were considered fit by the Minister to run their own affairs, they could do so on their own, by means of a separate board, whose powers and functions would be prescribed by the Minister. The Minister actively fostered the creation of such boards with the assistance of community development officers and successfully established them with limited powers in several towns and in one township on the outskirts of Salisbury.

Elsewhere they failed to get off the ground, either because the Africans concerned were not prepared to support something that took them back along the road of separate development, or because the white councils were even more racially orientated than the Minister and were fearful that even these limited moves would lead to Africans demanding and getting substantially more power than the Minister was proposing.

REINTEGRATION: 1976 ONWARDS

In spite of its apparently unassailable position, the government could not proceed unimpeded along its chosen path of racial dominance. Conferences and proposals for constitutional reform came and went, nationalist leaders were released after years in detention, talks were held, formally and informally, bi-laterally and multi-laterally. The burthen

of every one was the removal of racial discrimination and the dismantling of white supremacy. But all to no avail.

In 1975 the government appointed a commission, under Judge Quenet, to advise on the removal of racial discrimination. It was racially mixed, composed of men and women of both races and conservatively orientated — so conservative that many Africans and African organisations refused to give evidence before it, saying, "what is the point of doing so — its African members know well enough what wants putting right, without having to take any evidence". But these doubts were unjustified for when it reported seven months later, the commission made numerous recommendations in all the "fields of dissatisfaction" that it found affecting Africans, Indians and coloureds. Some of these were quite fundamental, such as a return to the common roll and drastic reform of the Land Tenure Act. But all of them were duly rejected in spite of earlier assurances that they would be seriously considered.

Then came Kissinger with his bundle of carrots and sticks, and the Prime Minister's famous speech of 24 September 1976, one of the most statesmanlike of the decade. In this he conceded majority rule within 2 years. It was an incredible volte-face; once again there was an audible sigh of relief; as Confucius is said to have advised a young maiden "If rape is inevitable, relax and enjoy it".

Well, it wasn't a particularly joyful prospect, but it was a decision that presented some hope of a positive solution and so was better than the slow and agonising dissolution the country was experiencing. Everyone was prepared to accept change and get on with it. Everyone? Well, nearly everyone.

Then followed the tragic debacle of Geneva. But the pressures were still on and bit by bit the discriminatory edifice erected since 1963 began to crumble. The most important change was the amendment of the Land Tenure Act early 1977. This has thrown open all rural land for acquisition and occupation on a non-racial basis and so reverted to the position that obtained prior to 1930. In the urban areas, it has done away with all the ifs and buts regulating or prohibiting African occupation and ownership of land in the multi-racial areas and has widened the scope of municipalities wishing to declare residential areas multi-racial. Administratively, the government also revised its attitude towards African home ownership in the urban townships and towards the extension of such townships on adjacent "European" land. Already an African farmer has bought for cash a \$100 000 farm previously owned by a white farmer, and others are buying plots in the peri-urban areas. In the towns, tradesmen and professional men can now rent premises in the multi-racial commercial area without the humiliating and time-consuming application to the municipality and thence to the Minister. Similarly in the industrial areas, bus owners and other entrepreneurs

can buy the properties they have hitherto leased or any other they may want and can afford. Contrariwise, the Minister has used his powers to prevent any significant conversion of white to multi-racial areas. But in spite of this, the amendment of the Act which the Constitutional Council called "the embodiment of racial discrimination" in 1964, is significant as a portent of more fundamental changes to come, for once residential separation goes, other types of discrimination must follow.

The castle of white privilege has not yet fallen, but a vital outer bastion has been breached.

After some years of dragging its feet, the government has also started to promote Africans into the civil service, one of the recommendations made by the Quenet Commission. The African Education Department has gone furthest with Africans currently occupying positions of Provincial Education Officers. Africans have also been appointed to Customs and Excise, commissioned into the Army (1977) appointed to the same ranks as junior white recruits in the Police, appointed as public prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice (1977) with further advancement as recently as October 1977 with the first appointment of an African magistrate. In November two Africans were appointed directors of the Reserve Bank.

BALANCE SHEET

As the foregoing shows, in spite of determined and genuine efforts to carry out its policy, the R.F. government has been unable to prevent a considerable degree of racial integration and it has publicly accepted the advent of majority rule some time in 1978.

A comparison of Hoernlés five characteristics of what he called "total assimilation" with the present position in Rhodesia, shows how far the country has departed from its previous policies of separation or parallelism and gone along the road of multi-racialism. Indeed it is not far from his "total assimilation". The first criterion is that of cultural assimilation: "For the natives" he says "it means becoming Europeanised — conversion to Christianity in its many divers forms. Schooling of the European type, even being taught in white schools, handicrafts, apprenticeship, special skills such as shorthand-typing, accountancy, professional studies — priest, teacher, lawyer, doctor and engineer." The answer is "yes" — "yes" to all of them. All the major Christian churches are well represented in Rhodesia and many of them control their own affairs, such as the Methodist, Dutch Reformed, Swedish, with others about to take over — quite apart from innumerable splinter groups similar to those found in the Republic and including the far-flung African Orthodox Church. The Anglican Church has numerous African clergy, some of whom have white parishioners to minister to and one of the candidates for Bishop of Matabeleland elected in 1977 was an African

who had strong white support. The present Catholic Archbishop is an African and so is the head of the newly-independent Methodist Church.

In 1959, the Education Act was passed which was designed to bring every African child into primary school by 1964. This ambitious target has not been realised but until the recent troubles it did not fall far short. There has been considerable expansion of secondary schools, both academic and quasi technical, with the aim of absorbing 25 % of the primary output. These schools take a Rhodesian J.C. examination, with Oxford and Cambridge 'O' and 'A' at the higher levels.

A few African children go to private white secondary schools, though none get to any white Government school. African apprentices are now to be found in every trade except aeronautical engineering, and attend technical schools, some of which, including the Government ones, are multi-racial. The University of Rhodesia is multi-racial and has Africans in every faculty.

Economic Assimilation

"Admission of Natives to earn their living by the exercise of their trained skill and professional knowledge alongside of and in competition with whites similarly trained — a society in which whites and natives would be found in every rank of life, doing every kind of work side by side (and doing it without distinction for either white or native customer and client) . . . natives in commerce and industry — native clerks and typists alongside white clerks and typists — natives engaged in their own business on their own account or earning salaries in banks and business houses which themselves might be run by white-native Boards of Directors."

Only a partial "yes", but steadily if grudgingly increasing from a whisper to a confident affirmation. My own Department in the Bulawayo Municipality would pass this test with about a 95 % mark. It is possibly the most advanced in the country in this respect, though others are coming on. In banks, Africans serve side by side with their white counterparts and deal with customers of both races; a few Africans are now serving with the Department of Customs and Immigration in the same way; in the African Education Department, many secondary schools have mixed staff, some under a white head, some under a black one, and Africans have risen to the rank of Provincial Education Officers with white subordinates. But Africans are not yet permitted to teach in European schools, except as language experts, nor may they give talks to the pupils without special Ministerial approval. In commerce and industry, Africans are now appearing at many levels and being served by white typists and other subordinate white staff, and some have their own businesses operating from premises in the "open" areas.

Recently two Africans were elected to the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce — one to the Executive of the Trade Fair Rhodesia and, as mentioned above, one to the Reserve Bank. The Jairos Jiri Association for the Rehabilitation of the Blind and Physically Handicapped, founded by an African and largely run by Africans with a racially mixed top executive, has four shops in the white towns, together with a \$150 000 business block in Umtali and its head office in Bulawayo, besides seven centres in African areas.

Social Assimilation

"Native standards of life would become assimilated to standards of life of whites enjoying corresponding income levels. All differences of clothing, housing, furniture, food, would disappear. Wealthy natives would own houses and gardens in the best residential districts among white neighbours of similar social and economic position, they would frequent the same hotels, concerts, cinemas, the same sports grounds." "Yes" to many of these, except for residence which is still determined by the Land Tenure Act, and being stonewalled by the Minister. Africans still observe certain of their own customs and talk their own language, but they also observe Western custom and speak English fluently (alas, the reverse cannot be said of whites). They also go to the same hotels, cinemas, concerts, golf courses, sports fields (although they also have their own which are not often patronised by whites).

Soccer is the main African sport; the best professional teams are black with an occasional white player. The amateur leagues tend to be mono-racial, but recently in Bulawayo, the white league joined the African Amateur Association for a competition sponsored by the municipal African Beer Division, and a white team reached the cup finals.

Athletics has long been a multi-racial sport with African athletes competing in local championships and competitions and gaining their Rhodesian colours by selection in the national teams. Swimming at club level is mono-racial but inter-racial at competition level. African paraplegics joined recently with their white counterparts in sport, and two recently came to South Africa for international competition. Social intermingling takes place at government and civic receptions, occasional business parties and in a few private homes, and some service clubs such as Rotary.

Political Assimilation

"Natives and whites would vote on the same registers, in the same parties for the same candidates. There would be native as well as white Town Councillors and members of Parliament, native Ministers of the Cabinet, there might be a native Prime Minister." "Yes" and "no" — ad-

vance in some spheres, retrogression in others. There used to be a common roll and some political parties used to be multi-racial. But the common roll has now gone, there are no black councillors although there are black senators and elected members of parliament. There are two African Ministers and two African Deputy-Ministers. There is likely to be a black Prime Minister in the near future!

Racial Assimilation

"Inter-marriage, race fusion." A qualified "yes". Intermarriage is legal and does occur — white men and African women and vice versa, but it is rare and is not approved by either race. Even inter-tribal marriage is not generally approved — Ndebele/Shona or Jew/Gentile. There is still a long way to go to reach Hoernlé's "ultimate formation of one new race", though perhaps one may take leave to doubt whether it is possible or even desirable.

Hoernlé goes on to comment that "there can be little doubt that the overwhelming majority of white South Africans will contemplate this 'fancy picture' with a shudder of aversion amounting to angry horror . . . white South Africa as a whole is opposed to total assimilation with a fierce determination . . . as no development can take place in South Africa except with the consent of the dominant white group, total assimilation must be ruled out as utterly impracticable." So far as Rhodesia goes, or rather went in 1939, this was equally true. Even a few years ago, white Rhodesians opposed any assimilation, let alone total assimilation, with "angry horror". But as we have just seen, Rhodesia has in fact gone a long way along the road to "assimilation". How is it that the "utterly impracticable" has come to be so largely realised?

A wide variety of reasons suggest themselves:

A Liberal Tradition

The early settlers brought with them from Britain and the Cape a vaguely liberal tradition, a feeling that one should respect human rights and treat "the other fellow" fairly. They called on no religious sanction to justify their feelings of racial superiority to the blacks — they simply accepted it as part of the natural order, just as they accepted class consciousness and the superiority of the old school tie. They were the salt of the earth and took it for granted that everyone acknowledged it.

But they were also conscious of Rhodes' famous dictum about "equal rights for all civilised men south of the Zambezi", though they had little idea when or why he said it. This shone like a beacon on a distant hill and was a persistent and troublesome reminder of a path from which they ought not to stray. This wove itself into a Rhodesian ethos that proudly, if sometimes sanctimoniously, compared itself favourably

with what might be happening elsewhere. But when there was competition or threat from their black fellow countrymen, the basic urges of the territorial imperative, self-preservation or sheer selfishness — call them what you will — might rise to the surface and suppress it. Even then it was never entirely obliterated. It was revived and strengthened from time to time by such outstanding men as Huggins, Sir Robert Tredgold, Percy Ibbotson, and leading churchmen, whose voices could be heard the better because the white community was so small. There were also other reminders of the need and rightness of good relations, odd voices in the wilderness, reports such as the Plewman, Quinton and Quenet Commissions, campaigns such as the courtesy campaign, Whitehead's Build-a-Nation campaign, and the current Harmony campaign, and meetings of prominent persons such as the National Convention (1960) and the September Declaration (1976).

The British Connection

From 1896 to 1962, the British Government retained some control over African affairs. The need for this was indicated by the Company's early lawmaking which was observed by Lord Milner to be "rather harum-scarum and exceedingly drastic". Successive constitutions required that the British Government consent was necessary to validate any legislation that discriminated against Africans. This did not succeed in eliminating discrimination, for apart from an occasional bye-law that somehow slipped on to the statute book unnoticed (such as the Bulawayo regulation that forbade blacks to walk on the pavement), certain discriminatory measures were accepted by the British government of the time as justified and necessary. Nor did it prevent discrimination in administration and application. But it undoubtedly prevented the grosser forms of discrimination that some white supremacists would have liked to introduce. It acted as the "still, small voice" of the political conscience and it provided astute parliamentarians such as Huggins with an unassailable excuse for not accepting the wilder propositions that his backbenchers or the opposition tried to press on him: "My dear fellow — I entirely agree with you but we haven't an earthly chance of getting it past the Secretary of State!" It is no coincidence that the most blatantly discriminatory legislation, having regard to contemporary standards, occurred after this provision was dropped from the Constitution.

The Federal Connection

Association with Northern Rhodesia, which was very largely black, and Nyasaland which was practically entirely so, had a broadening influence on white Rhodesians. The concept of partnership was a healthy one, even though it fell short of the ideal, was often ridiculed, and was in-

terpreted by some people, as Huggins pointed out, as the relationship of a rider to his horse. The presence of black members of parliament, four of whom were elected by black and white Rhodesian voters, on a common roll, broke the ice and paved the way for black members in the Rhodesian parliament. One of the former was appointed Federal High Commissioner in Nigeria in 1962 where he acquitted himself with great credit. Other Africans were appointed to the Federal civil service and continued to serve after the federal break-up in the Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs until U.D.I., when they all resigned.

In this atmosphere, it was unthinkable that the University, founded in 1953 with Federal money, should be anything but multiracial. Once established as such, it could scarcely be changed to "whites only" although the R.F. government seriously considered establishing an all black university to enable this to be done. This was not feasible so there it has remained, another shining beacon towards the liberal ideal. There black and white can and do live and work together, as staff and students, although relations between the latter are not the epitome of harmony — or as good as Professor Bozzoli in his address last year found them to be in his experience. Perhaps the reason lies in their different proportions, half and half in the student body, blacks in the majority in hostels, as against 52 to 11 000 at Wits. Nevertheless, considering the pressures and tensions outside, the position is pretty good and the campus is a valuable meeting place between black and white. This year it was one of several institutions that did honour to an African, Jairos Jiri, whose association was mentioned earlier, and so brought public recognition to the outstanding work of a humble school dropout. Even if it doesn't improve the personal attitudes of every graduate of either racial group, it has become the new "still, small voice" of the public conscience. It also removes one element of racial discrimination that would otherwise be causing resentment and it helps create conditions for better racial understanding.

The Post Office is another concern that in Federal days broke the social colour bar colour bar by opening its doors to both black and white indiscriminately and thereby set an example to other concerns, both public and private. Once opened, public opinion (white, black, and international) kept them open in spite of some political pressures to close them.

The Federal Constitution provided for an anti-discriminatory watchdog in the shape of the Constitutional Council. Its duty was to examine both Federal and territorial legislation and draw attention to any that was inconsistent with the Federal Declaration of Rights. In its short life, it reported on about 30 items, including the Land Appointment Act. It had no teeth but its bark had some effect in publicising discrimination

and making the public and the legislature think twice about it, and bringing some pressure to bear on the latter.

Population ratios

The ratio of white to black has always been small. Whites have always been aware that their power was not unlimited and that they should not push their luck too far. This was briefly accentuated in Federal days and though this did not directly affect legislation passed by the Southern Rhodesia parliament, it made whites conscious of being part of black Africa, that "big black brother is watching you" and that they had to take some account of pan African opinion.

Enlightened self-interest

This took many forms — from the blatantly commercial to statesmanlike appreciation of the facts of political life. As far back as 1930, Professor Henry Clay had pointed out the advantages of expanding the local market: "If all the natives lived on a European standard, the population of the country would no longer be 45 000 Europeans and 850 000 natives, but 900 000 persons with a combined purchasing power perhaps ten times that of the present population." His argument fell on deaf ears and was buried in the great depression. But it was resurrected by Rhodesia's burgeoning economy after the war and lent weight to the subsequent liberalisation of labour legislation, to the training and employment of African artisans, operatives and other skilled workmen. White emigration is now having the same effect and is forcing employers to engage Africans for erstwhile white jobs — or go out of business.

Hence the presence of Africans as cashiers in supermarkets, shipping clerks in forwarding agencies, security men at airports, policemen inspecting vehicle licences and roadworthiness, to mention a few positions where they are dealing with the public, black and white alike. The same motivation has encouraged businesses such as hotels and cafés to admit African customers, whereas previously they had to — or pretended they had to — maintain segregation lest they lose their white customers.

Enlightened self-interest has also contributed to some of Rhodesia's excellent developments in community services — to the considerable expansion in African education and the extensive housing schemes which have enabled the cities to keep pace with the enormous demand.

It also played a part in political thinking and motivated much of the progress made in the 1950s; Huggins in 1955 justified his changed political opinion by pointing out "one lesson which stands out very prominently is that a ruling class which attempts to stay as a ruling

class without surrendering any of its privileges to the vast bulk of the population or which fails to adjust its ideas to conform with changing conditions, does not remain a ruling class permanently, and its end is frequently violent”.

Pressure

Pressure has many forms, from carrots to sticks, and comes both from within and without. In the post Second World War period, political thought was dominated by desire for independence. (Dominion status as it was then called) and later by the prospect of Federation. By virtue of the very high personal regard in which he was held internationally, Huggins was a welcome member of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and was well aware of external attitudes towards Rhodesia's "native" policies and their influence on these ambitions. "They have someone in the Commonwealth Relations Office who reads our Hansards and picks out those bits and pieces about 'niggers' and that sort of thing, especially for the edification of the Secretary of State, and irresponsible remarks in this House have been used against me on more than one occasion when I have been pleading the cause of the colony."

Huggins, being Huggins, of course had in mind very much more than just "irresponsible remarks," and constantly worked for an internal policy that he thought not only was right and proper but would also further its external relations. The British Government has seldom, if ever, forced Rhodesia to do something she didn't want to, but it could, and did, use its influence to induce her to pursue more moderate policies than she might otherwise have done. The fear that the British Government might go further, together with the forlorn hope that somehow international pressures would be diverted, were the prime motives for U.D.I.

Other pressures were economic, such as the post-war boom which encouraged training and employment of Africans, and political, such as the "winds" that were changing the old British and French colonial empires; dismay at some of the events occurring in South Africa, the growth of African nationalism inside the country, which revealed the degree of African discontent; the influence of reports such as the Plewman Commission on urban African administration (of which an African was a member) and of the National Convention (1960) attended by blacks and whites of widely differing political persuasions.

All these pressures pushed Whitehead and the white electorate far further than his early backers had expected when they brought him back from Washington to put the brake on Todd's liberalism. They were almost enough to get Rhodesia firmly committed to the total dismantling of racial discrimination, leading to the transfer of power from a

white minority to a multi-racial society and ultimately to black majority rule. But when the crunch came with the 1962 elections, they failed to carry the day. They were beaten by opposition from two diametrically opposite quarters. One was the extraordinary strength of white opposition to so fundamental and final a change. This is not surprising when one realises the very considerable resistance put up by the whites in America to desegregation, although they were a majority that was called upon to do no more than divest itself of privilege while still retaining power, whereas here the whites would be surrendering power, with only a faint hope of retaining some privilege.

The other was the influence of external interests that pressured the African nationalists into rejecting the opportunities offered them, as well perhaps as their own lack of self-confidence. This was the first clear indication that Rhodesian affairs had moved into the cockpit of international politics and were no longer a cosy domestic issue between London and Salisbury.

Economic and political pressure continued to build up, especially after U.D.I. in 1965, and for the first time Rhodesia was subjected to overt international moral censure and economic sanctions. The former were and are often singularly uninformed and partisan but nonetheless disturbing, annoying and hurtful. Rhodesian passports are not recognised by those countries that have subscribed to the United Nations resolution imposing sanctions, Rhodesian sportsmen are denied admission to international events, Rhodesian scientists and representatives of scientific and other bodies are debarred from international conferences — though by no means universally.

Attempts have also been made to cut off trade and commercial relations, with very varying determination and success. Such sanctions are more than a nuisance and deprive Rhodesia of much that would facilitate her economic development. But they are not an unmitigated disaster. They have challenged Rhodesians to use their initiative and ingenuity and to develop their own resources to a remarkable degree, and they have partially insulated the country from some of the world's problems such as galloping inflation and a plethora of non-essential consumer goods. Although they are gathering momentum, they are not likely to bring about fundamental change by themselves, unless they are carried to the extreme of total trade embargo and cutting off our "light and water".

Force

As Niccolo Machiavelli observed centuries ago: "It is not reasonable that he who is armed shall yield obedience to him who is not armed." African nationalists, convinced that this describes their own case, have now resorted to force. When their early attempts to use force internally

through civil commotion, strikes and boycotts failed, they turned to force from without. Here they have had active international support in training, weaponry and bases. The first insurgents crossed the border as long ago as 1965. They were quickly mopped up and were not followed on any scale until 1972. Since then their numbers have greatly increased and the country has been infiltrated extensively. Casualties are heavy, white manpower has been drafted into the security forces to an extent that seriously interferes with the country's economy in spite of its growing replacement by blacks, and the cost of the war effort is considerable. A depressing spin-off is the exodus of whites, depressing from the point of view of morale, the economy and the loss of skills and experience.

Considerable though these pressures are, they too have been insufficient to induce transfer of power, though they too are helping to open up higher job opportunities for Africans and are having an effect on white attitudes — hardening some and compelling others to think more deeply about the basic issues of race policies.

But the cumulative effect of all these factors, culminating in the burly shape of Dr. Kissinger with his armoury of carrots and sticks, managed to extract acceptance of fundamental political change, i.e. majority rule within two years. That was over a year ago. Since then the British White Paper has made detailed proposals for its implementation but the outcome is still in doubt. I would not like to forecast their future for the issues are far too complex and I do not know how much real pressure the powers-that-be intend to put behind it — or in front of it.

All I can say is that there are lots of people, inside and outside Rhodesia, black and white, who want a "settlement". There are also lots who don't. Nevertheless, several organisations such as Chambers of Industry, Farmers' Unions and Local Government Associations are studying the problems of change to majority rule.

The Government is also taking action, though far less overtly, and without talking about it, apart from grudging admissions that such change is inevitable. By amending the Land Tenure Act, for instance, which it did with every show of reluctance, it has opened the way to racial integration, and so made further changes inevitable, which it appears either to ignore or to oppose. It is also slowly and quietly advancing Africans in the public service and public corporations, and these too are having their effect on race relations.

To some, the cautious, reluctant way in which all this is being done is merely mulish, playing for time; to others it is skilful avoidance of the mistakes made by Mr. Smith's predecessors in office, whose clarity of purpose and precipitateness led to white reaction and delayed the very changes they wished to make.

In this emotion-laden scene progress can only be achieved with

the deliberate speed and grinding certainty of a glacier. Certainly the advances towards multi-racialism being made in every sphere of Rhodesian life are remarkable and Smith's playing for time has paid off in that Africans are now better equipped by education and experience to take advantage of these opportunities than they were before.

Similarly, more Africans now have a greater stake in political and economic stability and many are deeply conscious of the complexities, difficulties and problems of majority rule and have no wish to destroy what has been achieved. But others are losing patience, like Marvell with his reluctant mistress, "Had we but world enough and time, This coyness, Lady, were no crime." They are disturbed by the great rift that still exists between government thinking and African aspirations. They are also worried about mounting international involvement in Rhodesian affairs, and by the constant fomentation of nationalistic excesses by external bodies who are not interested in the peaceful settlement of Rhodesia's problems.

The dilemma is an agonising one — how to satisfy black aspirations without destroying white confidence, and to do so while there is still time. The problem is not simply the achievement of Hoernlé's "total assimilation", i.e. a multi-racial state, free of discrimination — although as he recognised this was well-nigh impossible — but how to switch from white minority rule to black majority rule. Multi-racialism and non-discrimination are secondary issues. Under some of the black leaders who are struggling for power, the switch might lead to a multi-racial non-discriminatory state, but under others, it could only lead to black minority dictatorship. In either case, the switch would be irrevocable so far as whites are concerned — and understandably the whites are reluctant to take the plunge.

At the moment there is a great deal of goodwill on both sides of the colour line and a deep desire by both black and white for peaceful settlement and for a transition to majority rule in which whites will still have a vital part to play. But the unanswered question is what are the relative strengths of those same forces that upset the applecart in 1962? Are the moderates of both racial groups going to triumph this time or will the extremists of both sides win again? Will Rhodesians or Zimbabweans, black and white, be allowed to decide for themselves or will they be sacrificed as pawns in an international chess match? Will moral considerations, moderation, common sense and humanism on both sides coat the pill's unpalatability and coax the whites into swallowing it, or will emotionalism and heroics take over? I wish I knew the answer — I hope for the one just as I fear for the other. The only thing that is certain is that if it lies with the second alternative of these questions, it will have been resolved by the naked use of force.

"It is better that we perish in battle than look upon the outrage of

our country." Mr. Smith quoted this from Churchill's famous battlecry in an emotional speech at a boys' high school on 29 September 1977. That he should have chosen to do so practically on the anniversary of his acceptance of majority rule, and in such strong contrast to the moderate tone of his earlier speech, suggests that Rhodesia is still perilously close to the abyss.