

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLE
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1976

**EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT
AND CHANGE IN AFRICA**

by

Marshall W. Murphree



SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

80c

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL
LECTURE 1976

**EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT
AND CHANGE IN AFRICA**

ISBN O 86982 129 6



EDMINSON LIBRARY
EDGEWOOD COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
PRIVATE BAG X03
ASHWOOD
3605

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE

A lecture entitled the Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943, and his wife, Winifred Hoernlé, President of the Institute from 1948 to 1950, and again from 1953 to 1954), is delivered under the auspices of the Institute. Invitations to deliver the lecture are extended to people having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held".

List of previous lecturers:

- The Rt. Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr, *Christian Principles and Race Problems*
Dr. E. G. Malherbe, *Race Attitudes and Education*
Prof. W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Beyond the Union*
Dr. the Hon. E. H. Brookes, *We Come of Age*
Prof. I. D. MacCrone, *Group Conflicts and Race Prejudices*
Mrs. A. W. Hoernlé, *Penal Reform and Race Relations*
Dr. H. J. van Eck, *Some Aspects of the Industrial Revolution*
Prof. S. Herbert Frankel, *Some Reflections on Civilisation in Africa*
Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Outlook for Africa*
Dr. Emory Ross, *Colour and Christian Community*
Vice-Chancellor T. B. Davie, *Education and Race Relations in South Africa*
Prof. Gordon W. Allport, *Prejudice in Modern Perspective*
Prof. B. B. Keet, *The Ethics of Apartheid*
Dr. David Thomson, *The Government of Divided Communities*
Dr. Simon Biesheuvel, *Race, Culture and Personality*
Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet, *Can Africa Come of Age?*
Prof. D. V. Cowen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—Today*
The Most Rev. Denis E. Hurley, Archbishop of Durban, *Apartheid: A Crisis of the Christian Conscience*
Prof. Gwendolen M. Carter, *Separate Development: The Challenge of the Transkei*
Sir Keith Hancock, *Are There South Africans?*
Prof. Meyer Fortes, *The Plural Society in Africa*
Prof. D. Hobart Houghton, *Enlightened Self-Interest and the Liberal Spirit*
Prof. A. S. Mathews, *Freedom and State Security in the South African Plural Society*
Prof. Philip Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*
Alan Pifer, *The Higher Education of Blacks in the United States*
Chief M. Gatsha Buthelezi, *White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Future of the Homelands*
Prof. Monica Wilson, “. . . So Truth be in the Field . . .”

EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN AFRICA

Introduction

In the determination of tonight's subject, four considerations were prominent in my thinking. It had to be a topic of contemporary relevance and it had, if possible, to be a subject of cognate interest to the Institute's concurrent conference on "South Africa in Africa". It had to be a topic related to at least one of the Institute's central and continuing concerns, and finally these considerations had to be related to the fact that I am not a South African specialist and that my competence relates rather to a colonial and post-colonial Africa north of the Limpopo. This is an area in which vast political and social changes have taken place in the last decade-and-a-half, changes of such magnitude that the analyst is likely to overlook the continuities which exist in the situation in his preoccupation with the permutations of structure and culture that are taking place.

These continuities exist across a range of institutional complexes within the societies concerned, one of the most important being the educational one, as embodied in formal schooling contexts. It is a central and critical issue in national development, which in its turn is an issue which can and should link the Republic to the African states to the north. It is a subject about which we have recently collected considerable empirical data in Rhodesia, and about which I can speak with some competence. Finally, I think it is clear that, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, education has consistently been assigned a central role by the Institute and those associated with it in the effort to produce changes leading to a diminution of the importance of ascriptive racial criteria in South African society. These, then, were my reasons for the selection of the topic we have before us tonight. What I propose to do is, first, to review traditional perspectives on the liberalizing, equalizing and developmentalizing influences of education, to then examine some of the contemporary critiques of this view of education and, finally, to draw a few implications of this examination for educational policy in respect of development and social change.

Education in the Liberal Perspective

The persistent faith by liberals in education as an agent of social change to which I have already alluded is part of a larger, diffuse but ubiquitous strategy which can be detected in various strands of liberal thought regarding the elimination of racial discrimination, not only in South Africa but also in other societies characterized by this feature. Together with postulated economic developments associated with industrialization and increased economic interdependence, educational development has in fact been conceived by liberals to be the most important single mechanism leading to this desired end. Meyer Fortes, in his 1968 Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, gives oblique acknowledgement to the emphasis of liberalism on these two 'tools' for social change:

I suppose we would all agree that the Hoernlés were representative, in the views they had, of many liberal thinkers of their generation. For them, as I see it, the case against a social system based on the ascription of politico-legal status, and the allocation of occupational roles and of rights of access to the community's resources, by reference to the adventitious criteria of skin colour and race, rested ultimately on moral grounds. But they also sought rational and objective grounds for their principles. An argument much emphasized was the indissoluble and increasing dependence of the South African economy on African labour, with the implication that the more the economy developed, the more would this increase, and the more would reserved skills and, for example, managerial opportunities be shared with Africans and thus eventually render thorough-going apartheid unenforceable.¹

It is the second of these arguments, the thesis that industrial development and economic symbiosis create imperatives which will inevitably erode and eventually change economically irrational institutions, particularly racial discrimination, that has provided the nexus for most contemporary academic analyses of the racial aspects of South African society. It is however with the first argument that we are concerned in this lecture, one with a long history in liberal thought, one which is in a current state of neglect if not disfavour, but also one which in my view remains of considerable substance.

I have commenced by referring to Hoernlé's espousal of this view, but I must hasten to add that Hoernlé's emphasis was not on education *per se*, but on the moral imperatives and impetus of the liberal spirit: "What the liberal spirit is pledged to resist is the denial to any human being, or group of human beings, of

the opportunity of achieving such excellence, or filling their lives with such values as they are capable of. It opposes those man-made inequalities of opportunity and power which secure fullness of life to some whilst denying it to others".²

But, for Hoernlé, if the liberal spirit provides the dynamic towards changes for a more just and equitable society, it is education which provides the vehicle for its expression: ". . . in those who enjoy advantages and privileges, which they recognize to be essential to the achievement of such excellence and worthwhileness as their lives possess, the liberal spirit appears as an urge to share these advantages and privileges and to communicate them to others; and if education and training are required to use these privileges wisely, then as an urge to help others, by extending educational facilities to them, to fit themselves for the enjoyment of these privileges".³ Such educational experience would produce "free minds", and, said Hoernlé, "A world of free minds in free societies is the liberal ideal".⁴

Education was therefore for Hoernlé both an end-in-itself, an inalienable human right to the enrichment of the human spirit (foreshadowing here one of the assertions of the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights),⁵ and an instrument, a means to other equality-related ends. This second, instrumentalist function, received greater stress from many of Hoernlé's colleagues and successors. For them education produced social change because it produced knowledge, knowledge dissipated prejudice because it was based on ignorance, and the disappearance of prejudice presaged the disappearance of racial discrimination, since such discrimination was based on attitudes, and attitudes determined action. Such an equation found explicit expression in Dr. E. G. Malherbe's second Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, delivered in 1946. The object of this lecture, he said, was to ". . . stress the dynamic role of . . . attitudes and valuations and to indicate in general terms the way in which education . . . can accelerate in such attitudes the change which may lead to progress".⁶

Candidly admitting that, as a professional educator, he "put all . . . [his] hopes into the educational basket",⁷ Malherbe commented, ". . . the better educated a person is, the more he is capable of *seeing the whole social picture*. Seeing a partial picture only is the root cause of many of our racial and other prejudices. . . . Tolerance is the outcome of understanding and is bred from an objective study of all the facts".⁸ Anticipating a criticism which I shall make later in this lecture, Malherbe states, "It may be argued that it is useless to try and change attitudes when the whole economic system is wrong. This argument contains a

fallacy . . . behind all political changes, all economic reconstruction, stands living man. Here lies the tremendous power of the educator. It is exactly with these living human beings that he deals . . . What is required is a change of heart. When that takes place in man, then social orders, economic systems alter automatically".⁹

In a racially stratified society, to whom are the beneficent effects of education to be directed, to the superordinates or the subordinates? As far as Hoernlé and Malherbe are concerned, to both. But again for both, education had a special significance and importance for the subordinates, the blacks. For one thing, implicit in their thinking was the assumption that the integrated society which they sought for South Africa was to be dominated by essentially Western cultural modes, one for which the whites were already well equipped as regards to leadership requirements but for which the blacks found themselves in serious short supply in the same commodity. Complaining of the paucity of educational provisions for blacks in 1937, Hoernlé said,

One of the most serious consequences of this . . . lack of education is that it limits the supply of Bantu leaders, especially men qualified to guide their people in their relations to White South Africa, and in the difficult transition from their tribal culture to effective adjustment to the demands and restrictions, but also the opportunities, of the White man's world. If there is to be a 'Bantu nation' inevitably committed to the assimilation of Western civilization, then, above all, there is need of wise and farseeing leadership.¹⁰

In the same vein, Malherbe commented,

Education for leaders should be our first objective amongst the Non-European. To spread mere literacy thinly amongst the masses is dangerous, unless it is accompanied by the training of truly educated leaders who can guide the masses and who will see to it that their little education is not exploited in cultivating more bitterness.¹¹

Education therefore has this elitist aspect to it, the function of producing leadership cadres capable of providing guidance and direction to "underdeveloped" peoples in their emergence into "modernized" society, society characterized by rising material standards of living, urbanization, industrialization and a bureaucratized and centralized government. Education produces and facilitates this leadership in three ways: it trains the politicians and bureaucrats in the techniques required for the performance

of their functions, through the spread of mass literacy, it facilitates communication between leaders and the populace and augments political and administrative efficiency, and finally, in its non-cognitive effects, it inculcates the subjective perceptions and perspectives which are required for leadership—the self-confidence necessary to make difficult decisions, the self-assurance required to give orders with authority.

In its function as a bridge leading to modernization, education also performs another, non-elitist, role. It also has a skill-providing component, raising over-all skills in traditional occupations and providing training for new vocational skills required in the “modern” sector. In this respect Hoernlé, Malherbe and other South African liberals were articulating a view which, in more recent times and in other “developing nation” contexts, has been referred to as the “bridgehead strategy” in which development is seen as a matter of establishing and then expanding a modernized bridgehead within a largely traditional society, rather as if one were “reclaiming a swamp, creating a bridgehead of solid land and gradually enlarging it until the whole swamp is filled in”.¹²

In presenting this sketch of the liberal perspective on the role of education in development and change I have quoted extensively from Hoernlé and Malherbe, two of the figures in the group that can be considered as constituting the “founding fathers” of the Institute and representatives of an important era of South African Liberalism. I have done this not because they have been the only ones to articulate this perspective, but because I consider them representative, and because I wish to demonstrate the pedigree of this type of thinking regarding the role of education in the South African context. Its various components have not, of course, all been the exclusive property of liberalism, nor indeed have they been specific to a given and restricted period of developmentalist thought. Turning for a moment from those scholars and social planners whose main concerns have been race relations and social harmony to those whose interests have focussed on political and economic development, one can find essentially the same perspectives, and essentially the same functions and effects attributed to the educational process. There is, however, one additional developmental benefit quite explicitly attributed to education in the analysis of recent development literature which gains only implicit and oblique reference in the liberal scholarship which I have mentioned. This is the alleged economic benefit of education, the contention that there is a direct correlation between investment in education and economic growth, and

that this correlation implies a causal relationship. The debate over this hypothesis has waxed hot among educationalists, economists and statisticians, and I shall comment on it later. At the moment it is sufficient to note that this alleged benefit of educational development formed an explicit and important aspect of development planning during the 50's and 60's and can, I think, be seen as an implicit assumption in many liberal pronouncements on education in the earlier decades of this century.

To summarize briefly, then, the traditional liberal case for the importance of formal education as a major instrument for liberalizing social change rests upon the following perceptions of its functions:

1. **Education as enlightenment.** In this perspective education is a natural development of the human spirit in rationality: creative, libertarian and innovative. As such it is a human right, an end-in-itself, a consumption item, the provision of which is a duty of any state to its citizens. Its ultimate product is a more rational, just and equitable society.
2. **Education as knowledge-dissemination.** In this function education serves to banish ignorance and prejudice, and the ascriptive, discriminatory distribution of life chances based upon them.
3. **Education as training for leadership.** In this function education acts to provide leadership for racially defined categories of subordinates as they emerge, in an assimilationist model, into a status of equality within the dominant culture.
4. **Education as skill-impartment.** In this mode, education serves to provide the techniques and skill-tools required by the indigenous masses to enable them to move from a traditional to a modernized society and compete on a basis of equality with other, formerly more privileged, racial groups.
5. **Education as investment.** From this perspective, education is seen as an investment yielding rich dividends in economic development, a *sine qua non* for viable industrial "take-off" into a modernized society.

These, then are the arguments for education, most of them clearly formulated and expressed by South African Liberalism by the third and fourth decades of this century. But I have already pointed out that they were not the exclusive product of liberals concerned with social change in a racially stratified society; by the 1950's they had found ubiquitous and enthusiastic espousal by social planners and political leaders in the emergent African nations to the north of the Zambesi, and indeed everywhere

throughout the "Third World", particularly with regard to their developmental implications. As Abernathy states, ". . . the view that education is 'the key that unlocks the door to modernization' has been espoused perhaps more fervently and dogmatically in the new states of Africa and Asia than anywhere else".¹³ In 1958, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia said, "When we were in the opposition, and Tunisia belonged to others, not to us, we planned and resolved that when our country was independent and the state apparatus in our hands we must treat first the problem of education".¹⁴ Or again, the conference of thirty-nine African states, most of them newly independent, held at Addis Ababa in 1961 on Development in Education, proclaimed that "education is Africa's most urgent and vital need at present", and recommended universal, compulsory, free primary education throughout the continent by 1980, as well as rapid expansion of secondary educational facilities.¹⁵

The Role of Formal Education: Contemporary Criticisms

Such was the optimism of the 1960's. And then the reaction set in, a reaction compounded by the various elements of a profound disillusionment over the manifest failure of many of these same states to attain self-sustaining economic growth or achieve genuine political stability and maturity. These states had not "modernized" to any significant degree, and since education had been held out as perhaps the most important single instrument for the attainment of modernization, on it fell also the principal burden of blame. Herein immediately became apparent the error of assigning to one institutional complex — education — a pre-eminent, almost exclusive, role in development. Abernathy puts the point well: "Since the performance of the new states is mixed in the short run, and impossible to predict accurately in the long run, the observer must be cautious in imputing to any one variable — in this case education — all the positive benefits of which it is theoretically capable. Education may perform a particular function, but then again it may not, and to list only the modernizing functions is to offer an incomplete and distorted analysis of the relationship between education and the processes of economic, political and social change".¹⁶

But this balanced view, advocated by Abernathy, was not the one which caught the popular attention of the trendy critics of the colonial/post-colonial situation. Education had been the bright hope, now it was to be the scapegoat. The critique was as radical as it was severe. Not only had education failed to provide expected solutions to the problem of development, it was itself a part

of — a very big part of — the problem. With regard to development, its influence has been negative; education was not for development, it was education for under-development. With regard to the purported liberating and egalitarian influences of education, its actual impact had been exactly the opposite, both in intent and effect. Far from liberating subject peoples — defined either in class or colonial terms — it had in fact been a mechanism for perpetuating their subject status. It was, in the words of the title of Martin Carnoy's book, "Education as Cultural Imperialism".¹⁷ The proposed solution is as radical as the criticism: dismantle the entire fabric of contemporary structures of formal education and reconstruct the educational process — insofar as it is to be structured at all — by eliminating schools, encouraging learning in work situations and creating a world "made transparent by true communication webs" as an alternative to "scholastic funnels".¹⁸ In other words the strategy involves "Deschooling Society", to use once again the words of the title of a book by one of these critics, Ivan Illich. Or, to use the words of yet another title, that of Illich's colleague Everett Reimer, "School is Dead",¹⁹ and one must seek alternatives for the educational process.

In singling out Carnoy, Illich and Reimer and using the titles of their books to characterize their stance I am of course oversimplifying and over-personalizing the contemporary critique of formal education. A wide range of scholars and social planners have contributed to the critique, very few of whom would subscribe *in toto* to the perspectives and prescriptions of the trilogy I have named. Furthermore, many of them have extended their analyses to issues only superficially dealt with by the authors I have mentioned, and with an incisiveness which they sometimes lack. It has been these three, however, who have fired the imagination of the anti-establishment intellectuals and caught the attention of the general reading public, not least because the dogmatic and aphoristic style of their writing makes it ideal material for the Sunday supplements.

Sunday supplements or not, their writing cannot be ignored by all those concerned with development and social change for it has had a significant impact on those concerned with social planning. Furthermore, when combined with the analyses of other critics to whom I have alluded, what they say combines into a trenchant, thought-provoking indictment of the nature and consequences of formal education which cannot be ignored, least of all by those in the liberal tradition which I have described, for, at the minimum, it calls into question the efficacy of formal education as an instrument of liberalising and equalizing social change.

More seriously, it suggests that such education has been a manipulative instrument for perpetuating class or racial dominance, and by extension implicates its liberal advocates as collaborators in that process. It is therefore essential that those who genuinely stand in the liberal tradition, that is, those who are committed to its liberal and egalitarian goals rather than to a simple uncritical identification with its tradition and techniques, should give candid and careful attention to the arguments of the critics. I turn therefore to a brief sketch of these arguments, noting that time does not permit a detailed treatment of the various extensions and refinements of the perspective involved. To keep this summary within manageable proportions I am therefore further going to place the argument within a functional framework, noting that formal educational systems tend to exhibit two central functions:

Socialization, subdivided into:

- (a) the acquisition of knowledge and skills specific to certain occupational tasks or social behaviour, and
- (b) the impartation of given values, the "internalization" of given cultural complexes.

Allocation, the distribution of given economic and status positions within the social structure. Whether they perform this function in a primary or secondary role is largely determined by the structure of the society, and by the stage of development within the society.

Now let us take a look at these two functions of educational systems as they are handled in the arguments of the critics. First of all, in terms of their socializing functions and with regard to the impartation of skills, it is argued that colonial regimes, having established themselves through the exercise of coercive power, find it necessary to expand their economic power, and to this end to invest educationally in human raw material to make it more productive in the economic sphere. Thus Carnoy comments that, in respect of the metropole countries, ". . . the transformation of unskilled man into a valuable input for the capitalist production process became an important function of schooling in capitalist society".²⁰ In their colonial extensions these same countries used schools ". . . to develop indigenous elites which served as intermediaries between metropole merchants and plantation labour; they were used to incorporate indigenous peoples into the production of goods necessary for metropole markets . . .".²¹

Although there is no evidence that Carnoy is aware of the source, his contention here finds very explicit evidence in the work of the French colonial historian, Jean Suret-Canale. Suret-Canale quotes from Albert Sarraut, Minister for the Colonies in 1923 in respect to West Africa as follows:

To instruct the indigenous people is certainly our duty . . . but this fundamental duty is performed as an addendum to our obvious economic, administrative, military and political duties.

In fact the first effect of education is to improve the value of colonial production by raising the level of intelligence among the mass of indigenous workers, as well as the number of skills; it should, moreover, set free and raise above the masses of labourers the elite of collaborators who, as technical staff, foremen or overseers, employed or commissioned by the management, will make up for the numerical shortage of Europeans and satisfy the growing demands of the agricultural, industrial or commercial enterprises of colonisation.²²

Thus indigenous education in the colonies is to be instrumental for the productive processes of industrial and agricultural enterprise, and carefully controlled to ensure its application to low-level labour requirements.

With regard to the second socializing function, that of imparting given values and perspectives, formal education, it is claimed, functions to establish and maintain a cultural ascendancy for the dominant group in the minds of the dominated. The necessity for this function, that of legitimizing the system in the minds of the subordinates — Carnoy's "cultural imperialism" — is outlined by Albert Memmi: "In order for the colonizer to be the complete master, it is not enough for him to be so in actual fact, but he must also believe in its legitimacy. In order for that legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role".²³

It is this acceptance of subordinate roles which, perhaps more than any other, is emphasized in the literature we are examining as being the function of the educational system. In particular this is the burden of the work of Carnoy, who cites Paulo Freire's characterization of the colonial situation as "the culture of silence" and who then comments, "The colonial element in schooling is its attempt to silence, to rationalize the irrational, and to gain acceptance for structures which are oppressive".²⁴ Formal education achieves this, not only by teaching the colonized to accept the superiority of the immigrant culture and the inferiority of his own, but also by inculcating certain life-style aspirations and consumption patterns, making them not only useful productive units in the capitalist system but also its market as well. Schooling participates, therefore, in Illich's words, in a ". . . vast enterprise of equipping man for disciplined consumption".²⁵

In terms of the allocative functions of formal education, schooling systems are seen as operating to ensure that, by virtue of discriminatory access to educational qualification, differential incorporation into the power structures of the society takes place. This operation takes on one of two forms, depending on the type of society concerned. In societies where immigrant whites have existed in significant numbers, this has taken place through the establishment of segregated educational systems, ensuring that whites are better trained and more advantageously placed for competitive entry into the occupational structure. In colonial societies where there were few whites the operation took the form of creating an amenable and compliant indigenous elite of middle-level administrators and functionaries which provided needed expertise, co-opted potential troublemakers and which ensured that power remained in the hands of the metropole. Again, a quotation from Suret-Canale is appropriate here:

The lesser officials were given a purely French training, which convinced them of the superiority of European culture, of which, as a privilege, they would receive a few crumbs; they were indoctrinated with the idea that this placed them well above their brothers, who remained 'savage' and 'uncultured'. At the same time, efforts were made to give them a sound indoctrination. They were to recognize the superiority of the white and his civilisation which had saved them from the cruelty of the 'petty barbarian kings', and they were to pledge him respect, gratitude and, above all, obedience. While they were allowed to reveal the distance separating them from the common masses, they were carefully not invited to forget the distance separating them from their European masters.²⁶

According to Carnoy, this stratagem worked. He discounts, on completely inadequate evidence, the role of indigenous educated elites in nationalist struggles and argues that their central function has been to subvert "the demands of the mass of people for European ouster" in a manner "likely to produce a continuing cultural and economic dependency on the ex-colonial countries".²⁷ Furthermore, it is charged, this elitist aspect to formal education has the additional effect of creating and augmenting new patterns of social and economic stratification *within* the indigenous cultures, cultures that have traditionally been far more egalitarian than those in which the formal educational systems under examination have had their genesis.

This new, emergent stratification, in which social and economic status *within* the black populations (leaving aside such other forms

of stratification as may exist in the larger society based on race or ethnicity) is determined largely by formal educational qualifications, is concomitant with a further developmentally dysfunctional effect of the educational system which has drawn the attention of analysts. This is the over-emphasis on its allocative aspects to the detriment of its socializing functions. Dore, who has written incisively on this subject, refers to it as the "ritualizing disease of qualificationism".²⁸ Since, in the developing countries, formal education was the "bridgehead" to the "modern sector", and since entry into the modern sector meant vast differentials in social and economic status, it became the major avenue for upward social mobility, highly prized and sought after by both students and their parents. Education was not desired for the intrinsic value of the knowledge and attitudes it imparted, but rather for the qualifications it provided for this mobility. This "qualificationism disease", says Dore, is particularly virulent among the developing countries since the economic and social remunerations of certificate-acquisition are, relatively speaking, so much higher. Furthermore, these countries lack "the pre-industrial traditions of Confucian or Christian societies" and it is therefore "harder to sustain the fiction that education *is* about personal development and spiritual enrichment rather than money-earning opportunities — fictions which, in the older societies, do derive some strength from traditional ideals and do operate to mitigate the withering effects of the qualification disease".²⁹ Moreover, these older countries have had a counter-tradition, whereby placement into most occupations was via some form of apprenticeship. This has, almost without exception, never been the case in the developing countries; here, because of the close association between formal education and entry to higher paying occupations, pre-career qualifications have become a requisite to this entry, to an extent not pertaining elsewhere. Hence stems qualification earning — ". . . ritualistic, tedious, suffused with anxiety and boredom, destructive of curiosity and imagination — in short, anti-educational".³⁰

Associated with qualificationism is the qualification spiral. Since the social and economic benefits of the educational qualifications mentioned derive, in this situation, not so much on any actual capabilities they may represent as on their scarcity, there is pressure for a constant escalation of qualification requirements, and consequently for the growth of facilities providing these requirements. As long as primary education certification is in short supply, the value of this certification is relatively high. When the provision of primary education expands the value of this qualifi-

cation drops and pressure increases for the provision of higher, secondary education. Secondary school qualifications then become necessary for jobs once filled by primary school leavers and pressures develop for the provision of yet higher educational qualifications — and so the qualification spiral continues its inexorable upward course.

The consequences of qualificationism and the qualification spiral can be disastrous for economic development on the national scale. For one thing, there is a tendency for the students in the system to see their task not as knowledge or skill acquisition, but qualification acquisition with inevitable long-range deleterious effects on the national store of human competence and innovation. For another, since certification is so important for individual mobility, the demand for expanded educational facilities carries important implications which the political system finds difficult to resist, educational budgets increase at the cost of other development projects which might have provided employment for the products of the enlarged educational system, and who as a result have little chance of doing other than inflating the ranks of the educated unemployed.

One final criticism voiced in the literature I am surveying should be mentioned, since it has particular reference to the liberal faith in education as an instrument to the enlightenment and expansion of the human spirit. Far from being instrumental for this objective, it is contended that formal education has produced the opposite effect. Particularly for Reimer and Illich, genuine education has as its objective that definition given it by Freire, i.e. the process of “becoming critically aware of one’s reality in a manner which leads to effective action upon it”.³¹ But schools, because of their closely structured, system-serving nature, blunt rather than sharpen this critical awareness. Instead of encouraging initiative and innovation, they become “hotbeds of conformity”, likened by Reimer to other “total institutions” of society such as armies, prisons and insane asylums.³² Schools, he says, “. . . treat people and knowledge the way a technological world treats everything: as if they could be processed . . . Some of the by-products of educational processing are already evident. The greatest danger, however, lies in the prospect of success. A successfully processed humanity would lose the little control of its destiny which has always distinguished man from the rest of the world”.³³ This being the case, it is not surprising that this type of education has failed, to quote Carnoy, “to produce a mass of innovative, highly trained, and self-actuating individuals . . .”.³⁴

A Critique of the Critics

The format of this lecture does not allow me the space or time to explore the multi-faceted detail of the attack on formal education launched by Messrs. Illich, Reimer and Carnoy, nor have I been able to more than touch on the developmental problems which it has provoked, and which have been ably analysed by scholars like Abernathy and Dore. I believe however that the main points of their argument have been sketched here, and urge my audience, if they have not already done so, to examine this literature in detail. In my view it is of great value in correcting a facile, unsubstantiated optimism regarding education as a liberalizing and liberating force in our societies, ubiquitously contributing to economic, political and social development. Many of its perspectives are not only provocative but also essentially correct, including the central insight that the power structures of racially-stratified societies — colonialist, post-colonialist, internal colonialist or otherwise — *do* attempt to manipulate education to preserve inequitable social structures. But the arguments presented by Illich, Reimer and Carnoy also contain numerous points of factual inaccuracy, inadmissible inference and analytical deficiency, all of which combine to produce the spurious implication that the potential of formal education to produce system-mutation is a complete fabrication, that it can only contribute to system-stasis and that it should be abandoned in favour of new and as-yet-untested forms of learning and communication. The uncritical espousal of such a tactic by those who stand in the tradition of Hoernlé and his colleagues would in my view be a reckless abandonment of one of the most powerful mechanisms for social change which their tradition has bequeathed them, a mechanism which could well be modified in the light of the criticisms made, but for which the proper prescription is modification rather than rustication. (If I may be allowed the educational idiom!) I propose therefore in this final section to critically examine the critics, confining myself to a scrutiny of their central thesis — that formal education contributes to system-maintenance rather than system-change, concluding with an attempt to find a constructive synthesis between what I regard as positive aspects of their analysis with more traditional perspectives of the uses of education in inducing social change.

I shall not, for purposes of focus, take up one valid area of criticism that can be made regarding the deschooling position — that of the inadequacies of the alternatives that are proposed. This task has already been done effectively by Dore in regard

to the writings of Illich and Reimer.³⁵ Dore indicts their proposals on a number of counts: they largely ignore the placement functions of schools and offer no adequate surrogate to perform these functions; they assume that the production problems of human society have been solved, that current technology is now at a stage where it constitutes an “all-facilitating cornucopia”, provided that consumption and distribution patterns are restructured. In this, their model of technological inputs appears to be the industrialized West, although they address themselves to poor societies as well as rich ones. Finally, according to Dore, their assumptions about the transformation of human values and social structures through the operations of free consumer choice contain a large element of naiveté regarding the nature of individual and collective human choice. But these criticisms, although of relevance to this lecture, fall outside its central focus which is the question, “Has formal education, schooling, been, in societies like ours, a force for system-stasis or for system-mutation?”

First of all, a more peripheral criticism, a *caveat* if you will, to the unwary reader regarding much of this literature. Much of it is written within the framework of a larger ideological commitment; as is the case with so much of this type of writing, it is polemical and exhibits a lack of balance, restraint and objectivity. This leads to a selective presentation of data, poor documentation and a tendency to over-generalization. For example, Carnoy opens his attack on schooling by associating it with the alchemists: “The ‘Traditional’ theory of schooling is based on the widely held view that Western education brings people out of their ignorance and underdevelopment into a condition of enlightenment and civilization. This idea probably had its origins among alchemists in the seventeenth century”.³⁶ He then goes on to quote Illich’s reference to Comenius as one of the founders of modern schools. Comenius “adopted the technical language of alchemy to describe the art of rearing children”, Comenius lived in a period influenced by alchemy, “the Great Art of the waning Middle Ages”, *ergo* schooling had its genesis in alchemy. Again, Carnoy in his attempt to downplay the importance of the indigenous educated elite in nationalist struggles, assigning them a “mediating” (i.e. “moderating”) role, offers as his only evidence the following statement — embedded in a footnote! — “The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (conducted by uneducated Kikuyu), for example, was mediated by educated Kenyan nationalist leaders. Senghor, educated in France, has kept close ties between Senegal and France, while Toure, a self-made man, has followed a much more independent route for Guinea”.³⁷ One

wonders where Nkrumah, Nyerere, Cabral, Obote, Abbas and Ben Khedda fit into Carnoy's scheme of things. But I need not press the point. All this is extremely tenuous scholarship, dangerous and misleading because it is presented with all the trappings of scholarly investigation.

But this, as I say, is a peripheral criticism relating to style and accuracy, and I turn now to more substantive criticism. Essentially my argument is a simple one, and it is a criticism which can be levelled against much of the macro-system analysis which is currently in vogue in the social sciences, which tends to see social and political systems as comprised of institutional components all operating with monolithic correspondence and efficiency for system-perpetuation, with an integration and efficacy which can only be changed by the radical confrontation of emergent class consciousness and conflict. That societal systems evolve institutional mechanisms to perpetuate themselves is undeniable — this is, after all, their functional *raison d'être*. That individuals and groups holding power positions within societies likewise deliberately try to manipulate these institutions to maintain their positions of privilege is equally undeniable. But the inference from these observations that these systems therefore operate with some kind of integrated ontological efficiency to attain their function, or that the deliberate attempts of the power incumbents in such systems to manipulate their component institutions for the same purpose exhibit the same efficiency, has no corresponding general validity. All social systems, to a greater or lesser degree, have their institutional incongruities, and purposive social action often has its unanticipated and unintended consequences, which can be dysfunctional for a designated system. Merton long ago taught us that there was a tendency in functional analysis, of which systems theory partakes, "to confuse the subjective category of *motive* with the objective category of *function*". This tendency, he maintained, "requires us to introduce a conceptual distinction between the cases in which the subjective aim-in-view coincides with the objective consequence, and the cases in which they diverge".³⁸

This is precisely the kind of distinction that Carnoy, Illich and Reimer fail to make. In stressing the manipulative, system-sustaining aspect of education in the colonial setting, the analysis glosses over the unplanned, unintended consequences of education for the system. Casual, incidental acknowledgement is sometimes given to the fact that education produces inconvenient aspirations in the subordinates, that it has produced at times a leadership for nationalism (although, as I have commented, Carnoy is even loath

to do this), that it makes subordinates more skilled, more expensive to employ. But in the over-all analysis, these facts are made to fit the Procrustean bed of their system analysis. Koehl, in his review of Carnoy's book, catches this point effectively. He says,

He is persuasive in his insistence at looking at schooling as a reflex of the power and production relationships, but much less so when he refuses to acknowledge significant "feedback" of the reflex upon the power and production system . . . Having convinced himself that education was always *intended* as cultural imperialism for everyone except the children of the ruling class at home in the metropole as well as in colonial societies, Carnoy proceeds to deny the efficacy of education beyond its dependent setting.³⁹

The effect is that, in the over-all analysis, the *effort* at dominance is transposed, often spuriously, into the *reality* of manipulation.⁴⁰ Or, as Merton would have put it, the subjective aim-in-view is assumed to coincide with the objective consequence. But formal education rarely operates *simply* as a dependent variable, always subordinate to some larger economic variable. There is considerable truth in the assertion, made by Carnoy, that schooling in its present form and purpose cannot be separated from the context of the spread of mercantilism and capitalism.⁴¹ But it is not the whole truth, any more than other forms of causal reductionism can encompass the whole truth. One is reminded here of Memmi's comment, "Psychoanalysis or Marxism must not, under the pretext of having discovered the source or one of the main sources of human conduct, pre-empt all experience, all feeling, all suffering, all the by-ways of human behaviour, and call them profit motive or Oedipus complex".⁴² Economic factors may be central in the analysis of power structures, but they do not operate autonomously or in isolation. Other institutions generate their own initiatives and act reflexively on the economy and the polity. Indeed it is my own hypothesis that education, together with, perhaps, religion, is in the long run the least manipulatable of all the institutions of society; it is the "wild card" in the pack dealt to those who seek to control the structure and direction of society for their own ends. I say "hypothesis" advisedly, because I cannot at the moment prove this. What *can* be proved is that there are sets of data implying that in the contexts we are examining the educational system, and developments in related institutions, have produced forces contributing not to system-stasis but to system-mutation.

My argument rests on two sets of data, one set relating to the

content of what is evoked and transmitted in the educational process, and the other relating to the interaction between the aspirational impact of schooling and the political process. Firstly, in respect to education's socializing function of inculcating norms, values and perspectives regarding the educated's role and status in society, it is clear that, Messrs. Illich and company notwithstanding, the impact of education for subordinate populations in Africa *has* encouraged the exploration of alternative modes of thought and life and broadened the expectational horizons of its products in a way that has made them highly critical of the social and political *status quo*, encouraged a new, politically charged awareness of their own identity and created a hostility to any continued subordinate status for their own race. A wide range of studies support this view; a recent report by a study team from the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut in Freiburg on empirical research conducted in a number of African and Asian countries documents the politicizing effects of schooling in these countries, particularly in their pre-independence stages.⁴³ Our own research in Rhodesia provides the same evidence. A study of the black school leaving population at the Form IV and Form VI levels in 1971 revealed a highly motivated group with high career aspirations which could only be predicated on assumptions of a radical change in the socio-economic structures of the country. They were acutely aware of the occupational and social disadvantages imposed upon them by the segregated social system and many of them expressed a commitment to careers dedicated to its change.⁴⁴ This kind of evidence is replicated in numerous other studies. It must be admitted that the research instruments required for the precise measurement of the contribution of schooling to these kinds of values and commitments are as yet poorly developed and that not all schools produce this kind of result in all their pupils.⁴⁵ Nevertheless the weight of evidence from the African data is overwhelming: formal education, on balance, *has* done what the liberals claimed it would do and what the critics denied it would do. It has produced products who are critically aware of the social reality surrounding them, aware of their own potential and whose awareness has been shaped in a manner more adequately preparing them for effective action within these contexts. It may not have done these things as effectively as it could have, but it *has* done them. In doing so it has provided a vivid example of the functional contradictions which exist in any societal complex and of the ambiguities which exist in the functions of education. System-maintenance requirements, from one perspective, call for education to provide productive skills and

training for docility. But the content involved in such education, even in its attenuated and manipulated form, still involves ideas — challenging, questioning, innovative and volatile, and the process evokes a product which not only has challenged the system but is in a better position to do so. The French historian, Suret-Canale, saw this long before the critics had come on the scene:

For the colonial system, the education of the masses presented a dual danger. In raising the qualifications of its sources of manpower, it also made them more costly to employ. Further, it led the masses of the people to become aware of the exploitation and oppression to which they were subjected . . . Among the positive elements were the involuntary consequences of the spread of education — namely, that it opened up the outside world and brought an awareness to some of the educated elite both of their own condition and that of the masses. . . . It was thus that the “work of education”, so often invoked as an excuse if not a justification for the colonial system, acquired its real proportions and its true context”.⁴⁶

The development and enhancement of such dynamic drives of human spirit and perspective require, unless one is dedicated solely to anarchy, direction and leadership expertise. Any survey of African political leadership in the independent black states will show that such leadership has come, almost exclusively, from the ranks of the schooled, mostly those with at least secondary education. African nations have not always used this educated leadership wisely, nor has the educated leadership itself always been wise. But the requirement remains, and no one has yet presented evidence to refute what Lipset asserted in the late fifties, that “if we cannot say that a ‘high’ level of education is a *sufficient* condition of democracy, the available evidence suggests that it comes close to being a necessary one”.⁴⁷ The liberal notion of education as training for leadership remains therefore a functional necessity for those committed to the development of democratic institutions, and the fostering of such institutions in Africa will depend increasingly on an educated black leadership. Formal education appears to be a necessary component to the formation of such leadership — no convincing evidence to the contrary has been produced, least of all by Messrs. Carnoy, Illich and Reimer — and liberal commitment to it on this score is sound.

So far my argument for the liberalizing, change-provoking potential of formal education has rested on the unintended consequences involved in its content, the incongruence between its

intended function of role-performance and role-acceptance and its unintended consequence of role-rejection through the dynamic of the ideas and perspectives that it generates and develops. The second set of data upon which my argument stands, dealing with the interaction between the aspirational impact of schooling and the political process, relates to what Merton referred to as the "net balance of an aggregate of consequences".⁴⁸ Put simply, my argument here is that the functional imperatives of any given institutional complex within a societal system inevitably interact with those of the other institutions of the society, the aggregate consequence of this interaction being either functional or dysfunctional for system-maintenance, depending on specific circumstances. In this analytical context, the interaction between two institutions, education and politics, is of particular interest, for an ample body of evidence has now been built up demonstrating conclusively that in the developing countries (and not just those characterized by racial discrimination) this interaction has led to endemic system instability, an instability requiring constant micro-shifts within the system, shifts which stochastically presage larger system change.

The operational dialectics of this interaction are embedded, on the one hand, in the qualification spiral of which I have already spoken, and on the other in the perceptions of the political power incumbents regarding its short- and long-term political consequences. Here I argue that politicians have a tendency to take a short-term view of education, because they tend to see it largely in its skill-training rather than its value-inculcating aspects. As such, the short-term political functionality of its provision to the consumer is seen to outweigh any long-term dysfunctionality that its content may generate.

Let me illustrate with the Rhodesian case. Expansion in the Rhodesian African educational system has been noteworthy in recent years, particularly since U.D.I. in 1965, and particularly in the realm of secondary education. In 1964 there were 59 secondary schools in the system, in 1972 there were 140. In 1964, 8 846 students were enrolled in these schools, in 1972 there were 29 012.⁴⁹ Why this spectacular increase? Because the Rhodesian Front Government was committed to the intrinsic value of the liberating ideas in educational content? Parliamentary pronouncements on the subject do not imply this interpretation. Rather, in part, the expansion can be explained in terms of manipulative system requirements, the demands of the economy for skills at certain levels — first the primary, then the secondary and now the tertiary. But this cannot be the entire answer, because

at each stage of expansion there has been an “overshoot” effect — the system has expanded beyond economic requirements, as evidenced by the large number of unemployed school leavers now flooding the streets of our cities.

This “overshoot effect” can be partly explained in terms of inept educational planning. But only partly — our planners are not as inept as all that! The substantial explanation lies in the “qualification spiral” and the political response — the perceptions of parents and children regarding the allocative potential of the system, and the diffuse political pressures that these anticipations produce. The dialectic tends to operate in the following detail:

1. (a) A segment of the population perceives education as a vehicle for social and economic mobility.
(b) This segment increases.
2. (a) If the demand for places in the educational system exceeds the supply,
(b) then the socio-economic system articulates a request for the expansion of educational facilities to the political system.
3. (a) This request is registered by the political system.
(b) The request is accepted as being viable, because the political system sees its provision as politically expedient, a relatively cheap way of purchasing further compliance.
4. (a) Expansion is decided upon.
(b) The required resources are allocated and thereby withheld from alternative investment.
5. (a) The educational system is expanded.
(b) Its output of aspirants to jobs in the modern economic sector increases.
6. (a) The output significantly exceeds the available jobs.
(b) The socio-economic system demands that the political system create more jobs.
(c) This demand is accompanied by threats from the unemployed to diminish their support for the political system.
7. (a) The political system registers the demand and the threat.
(b) It perceives the threat to the system to be relevant.
8. The decision is made to expand continuing education, to absorb unemployed school leavers.
9. The entire cycle is then likely to be repeated until a certain critical stage is reached when the lack of support for the system is transformed into attacks on the system.⁵⁰

This whole process has been analysed in detail by the Freiburg research team which I mentioned earlier. Their conclusion is that “. . . as long as educational expansion exceeds the expansion

of jobs the interaction between the educational and the political system tends to destabilize the latter".⁵¹

I do not present this aspect of my analysis with any great relish. The process I have just described is a developmental problem for all African societies, not just those characterized by great racial inequalities, and political instability *per se* can hardly be the objective of any constructive analyst, let alone those who stand in the tradition of Hoernlé and his colleagues. But it is an analysis which, more than any other, refutes the argument that formal education in the African context is pre-eminently a conservative, system-maintaining force. Hoernlé and his liberal colleagues were right; in the long run education contains the dynamic for vast social and political change. This dynamic cannot indefinitely be frustrated, only channeled and directed.

What are the inferences that can be drawn from this analysis for the current stance of liberalism on the issues of formal education? There are many, none of which I can develop fully here, and I shall confine myself to four points in outline:

Firstly, that the traditional liberal faith in education as a liberalizing, equalizing and developmentalizing force is a valid one, notwithstanding its contemporary critics. It is, properly utilized, a potent element in social and political change, which liberals can only abandon to the detriment of their objectives.

Secondly, education is an institution which operates in reciprocal relationship with other institutions. Educational changes cannot be effected in isolation from changes in other institutions, neither can education be expected to carry the entire burden of social and political change. It is unwise to think in terms of educational solutions for problems which are essentially economic, or political, problems.

Thirdly, the many deficiencies of our current educational systems, effectively demonstrated by the critics, should be acknowledged and attacked with vigour. This applies particularly to qualificationism and its attendant phenomena, the prescription probably involving a shift in emphasis to on-the-job training and qualification, the raising of primary enrolment ages to coincide with this shift, more emphasis on the results of aptitude testing and less on the results of conventional academic examinations, and a change in inequitable salary structures to diminish the remunerative advantages of formal educational qualifications.

Fourthly, changes in policy and practice designed to rationalize the political response to the educational spiral are required. Rational, hard-headed development planning decisions are

needed to break this spiral at the point where the political system, in response to the demand for more jobs, must decide whether to provide them, by sound long range allocation of national resources, or follow the temporary expedient of expanding the absorptive capacity of the educational system. But — and this is the point — such sound development planning is only politically viable when two elements are present: a) when economic development is such as to make this a reasonable possibility, and b) when occupational placement for the jobs made available is non-discriminatory, and made on the basis of aptitude. Until this is done, ascriptively defined subordinates within the system will continue to seek the surrogate qualification road to occupational success, and the political system will continue, in the interests of short-term stability, to augment the spiral. South Africa, by virtue of her advanced economic development, is well placed with regard to the first of these elements. In regard to the second she is handicapped by the traditions of a racially segregated society, a feature of her social structure which those in Hoernlé's tradition are pledged, for sound developmental reasons, to change.

A Concluding Postscript

Allow me, like Kierkegaard, a "concluding unscientific postscript". In a book written sixteen years ago on Africa, one which was remarkably perceptive for its time, the journalist Peter Ritner made allegorical reference to the position of those who, in various ways, had to do with the destiny of the Continent in the following manner:

Somewhere off the Malabar Coast a poor Fisherman, hauling in his empty nets for the umpteenth time, caught a glimpse of a glittering object lodged in a knot of one of the ropes. He retrieved it, and after rubbing off the encrustations instantly recognized it for what it was, an otherworldly purple bottle containing a Djinn who had been condensed therein by Ormazd, Master of the Cosmos. The Fisherman shipped his oars, trimmed the little vessel, and smashed the bottle across one of the gunwales.

At once the gigantic, fiery-red Djinn leaped from the pieces and, wrapping a finger around the Fisherman's neck, began to strangle him like a boa constrictor.

"Stop! Please stop!" cried the Fisherman. "Do you know what you are doing? How can you be so ungrateful as to murder me when I have just freed you from eternal incarceration?"

"Ah", replied the Djinn, continuing to compress his liberator's

throat. "There was a day when I should have agreed with you — but that day is long past. For nine hundred years I have lain imprisoned in that bottle. During the first three hundred years I vowed that the man who released me should command my powers for all time; I should make him Emperor of Creation, possessor of every lovely girl and shining jewel. No man came. During the second three centuries I had time to reflect on the superficiality and egocentricity of mankind. Why should I raise the specimen of such a race to a rank equaling my own? Granting his first three wishes should be enough for him. Still no man came. So for the last three hundred years I have burned with a consuming hatred of human frivolousness, and I have sworn to destroy the tardy scoundrel who finally sets me at liberty."

And he did.⁵²

Now the moral of the story, Ritner rather flippantly suggests, is that, if you have to deal with a djinn, you should do so swiftly, and if possible while he is still in the bottle.

But that was sixteen years ago, in 1960, and those who had to deal with Africa's destiny appear not to have taken Ritner's advice. They neither dealt with the emergent African giant wisely before it burst from the confines of political subordination nor have they, since that emancipation, treated with it swiftly or with particular insight.

An important component of the explosive frustration in Africa to which our allegory refers is the dynamic impact of education within the Continent over the past 100 years. This dynamic can be unstable and destructive, in the manner which I hope this lecture has shown. It can be creative and constructive, as I hope I have also implied. Here in South Africa you have certain advantages enabling you to channel your educational forces along the constructive lines of sound national development. You have a great educational tradition. You have an economy which could permit you to rationalize and synchronize productive activity with the educational spiral — a spiral which may have reached a point of no return in some parts of Africa. You have, also, great disabilities imposed upon you by your racially divided social structures. You have, perhaps, a little time. Use it wisely, and well.

REFERENCES

- ¹ Meyer Fortes, "The Plural Society in Africa". Hoernlé Memorial Lecture, 1968, reprinted in *South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change*, A. Leftwich, ed. London: Allison and Busby, 1974, p. 2
- ² R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*. University of Cape Town, 1939, p. 130
- ³ *Ibid*, p. 150
- ⁴ *Ibid*, p. 151
- ⁵ cf. David B. Abernathy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 5
- ⁶ E. G. Malherbe, *Race Attitudes and Education*, Johannesburg: S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1946, pp. 3-4
- ⁷ *Ibid*, p. 23
- ⁸ *Ibid*, p. 25. Italics are those of the author.
- ⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 9-10
- ¹⁰ R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, *Race and Reason*, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1945, p. 120
- ¹¹ Malherbe, *op. cit.*, p. 26
- ¹² Ronald P. Dore, "The Future of Formal Education in Developing Countries", *International Development Review*, 1975/2, p. 8.
- ¹³ Abernathy, *op. cit.*, p. 4
- ¹⁴ Speech at Sadiqi College, Tunis, June 25, 1958, quoted in J. Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 157
- ¹⁵ UNESCO and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. *Final Report, Conferences of African States on the Development of Education in Africa*, Addis Ababa, 15-23 May, 1961. New York: UNESCO 1961, p. 19. Quoted in Abernathy, *op. cit.*, p. 4
- ¹⁶ Abernathy, *op. cit.*, p. 11
- ¹⁷ Martin Carnoy: *Education as Cultural Imperialism*, New York: David McKay Company, 1974.
- ¹⁸ Ivan D. Illich, *Deschooling Society*, London: Calder and Boyars Ltd, 1971, p. 104
- ¹⁹ Everett Reimer, *School is Dead: An Essay on Alternatives in Education*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971
- ²⁰ Carnoy, *op. cit.*, p. 4
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16
- ²² Quoted by Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945*. London: C. Hurst and Co., 1971 (First published in French 1964), pp. 380-381
- ²³ Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, pp. 88-89. (First published in French, 1957)
- ²⁴ Carnoy, *op. cit.*, p. 19
- ²⁵ Illich, *op. cit.*, p. 46
- ²⁶ Suret-Canale, *op. cit.*, p. 380
- ²⁷ Carnoy, *op. cit.*, p. 143. Note also footnote 140, p. 155
- ²⁸ Dore, *op. cit.*, p. 7
- ²⁹ Dore, *op. cit.*, p. 10
- ³⁰ Dore, *op. cit.*, p. 7
- ³¹ Paulo Freire, "The Adult Literacy Process as Cultural Action for Freedom". *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1970, pp. 205-225, quoted by E. Reimer, *op. cit.*, p. 137
- ³² Reimer, *op. cit.*, p. 25
- ³³ Reimer, *op. cit.*, p. 42
- ³⁴ Martin Carnoy, "Education as Cultural Imperialism: A Reply". *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1975, p. 289
- ³⁵ R. P. Dore, *False Prophets: The Cuernavaca Critique of School*. University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies, Discussion Paper No. 12,

- Oct. 1972, and R. P. Dore, *Deschool? Try Using Schools for Education First: The Educational Impasse in the Developing World*. University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 6, revised Jan. 1974
- ³⁶ Carnoy, 1974, p. 4
- ³⁷ Carnoy, 1974, p. 155, f.n. 140
- ³⁸ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: The Free Press, 1957, p. 51
- ³⁹ Robert Koehl, "Cultural Imperialism as Education: An Indictment". *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1975, pp. 277, 281
- ⁴⁰ cf. Koehl, *op. cit.*, p. 277
- ⁴¹ Carnoy, 1974, p. 15
- ⁴² Memmi, *op. cit.*, p. xiii
- ⁴³ Theodor Hanf, Karl Ammann, Patrick V. Dias, Michael Fremery and Heribert Weiland, "Education: An Obstacle to Development? Some Remarks About the Political Functions of Education in Asia and Africa". *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, February 1975, pp. 68-87
- ⁴⁴ cf. B. J. Dorsey, "The African Secondary School Leaver" in *Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia*, M. W. Murphree, G. Cheater, B. J. Dorsey and B. D. Mthobi. Salisbury, ARTCA Publications, 1975, pp. 15-174
- ⁴⁵ cf. Kenneth Prewitt, "Some Doubts About Political Socialization Research", *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1975, pp. 105-114
- ⁴⁶ Suret-Canale, *op. cit.*, pp. 380, 391
- ⁴⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*. New York: The Free Press, 1959, p. 57
- ⁴⁸ Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 51
- ⁴⁹ Figures from *Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education for the Year Ended 31 December 1972*. Salisbury: Government Printer, 1973, pp. 31-32
- ⁵⁰ The schema represented in points one to nine above are taken verbatim from Hanf *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 84, with the exception of points 3 (b), 8 and 9, which I have adapted for this lecture
- ⁵¹ Hanf *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 84
- ⁵² Ritner, P. *The Death of Africa*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960, pp. vii-viii