

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1975

**“... SO TRUTH BE IN THE
FIELD ...”**

by

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SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

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THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE

A lecture entitled the Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943, and his wife, Winifred Hoernlé, President of the Institute from 1948 to 1950, and again from 1953 to 1954), is delivered under the auspices of the Institute. Invitations to deliver the lecture are extended to people having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held".

List of previous lecturers:

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Dr. E. G. Malherbe, *Race Attitudes and Education*
Prof. W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Beyond the Union*
Dr. the Hon. E. H. Brookes, *We Come of Age*
Prof. I. D. MacCrone, *Group Conflicts and Race Prejudices*
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Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Outlook for Africa*
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The Most Rev. Denis E. Hurley, Archbishop of Durban, *Apartheid: A Crisis of the Christian Conscience*
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Sir Keith Hancock, *Are There South Africans?*
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Prof. D. Hobart Houghton, *Enlightened Self-Interest and the Liberal Spirit*
Prof. A. S. Mathews, *Freedom and State Security in the South African Plural Society*
Prof. Philip Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*
Alan Pifer, *The Higher Education of Blacks in the United States*
Chief M. Gatsha Buthelezi, *White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Future of the Homelands*

“... SO TRUTH BE IN THE FIELD ...”

“What is truth?” A Roman officer administering an occupied territory nearly two thousand years ago asked the question¹ much as it is asked today. I judge the topic appropriate to a remembrance of Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé since they were conspicuous among those who “seek truth and ensue it”; Alfred as a philosopher, Winifred as an anthropologist, both as responsible citizens active in public life.

History and Myth

Anthropologists have long been arguing that the history a people relate about themselves provides a justification for their existing social order, and history is modified to fit existing social conditions.² I, myself, heard an old man in Tanzania hastily silenced by the chief of a minority lineage because it was feared lest the genealogy he was relating might invalidate claims to land occupied: the old genealogy told of the arrival of a founding hero from elsewhere: the new version stressed that the ancestors of the minority had “always” occupied that land.

Most people think that while such stories may be true of pre-literate peoples who have “no real history”, only myth, it is not true of literate societies with written records, professional historians, and all the paraphernalia of scholarship. Without much reflection, most people take it for granted that what appears in history books is true. We must distinguish two things: the deliberate distortion or stifling of truth in order to foster a sectional interest or maintain a particular group in power, and unconscious selection of evidence. The silencing of the old man reciting his genealogy was a deliberate distortion, but a young man later repeating the new version he had heard might speak in good faith, unaware of omissions. So conscious and unconscious distortions merge into one another.

I shall argue firstly, that history is never wholly objective: the interpretation is related to the premises from which one starts; secondly that history must always be, in Maurice Bloch’s phrase, a “patient quest for truth”; that for the academic the pursuit of truth is an absolute obligation from which nothing absolves him; thirdly that the only means of arriving at truth is free and open discussion of different viewpoints; and fourthly, an understanding of social facts is one stage in the resolution of social conflict.

Many of you will have heard Sir Robert Birley speak of his experiences in reorganising education in Berlin after the last war, and of how the one thing the British and Russian occupying forces

could not reach agreement on was the teaching of history. "As a result no history was taught in Berlin after the end of the war until the city was split by the Russians in November 1948."³ In a brilliant lecture recently delivered in England on *The Dangers of Teaching History* he elaborated on the difficulties of objectivity. But one does not avoid the dangers by ceasing to teach history. No people can exist without some view of their past: the young invent history if they are denied some account of it by older generations, and in so far as inventions differ from what really happened self-understanding is limited.

The influence of the premises from which one starts is true not only for history but for social studies generally — anthropology, sociology, politics, economics. There is a classic statement of how premises modify conclusions by the Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, in *An American Dilemma*,⁴ published in 1944. This was a study of "the Negro in the United States" — blacks we would say now — and Myrdal, an outsider, working with a team of Americans, became acutely conscious of how bias operated in the questions posed, the fields of research undertaken, the topics for which money for research had been granted over a period of years, the persons to whom it was granted in the United States. He showed how it was considered "more academic" to avoid controversial issues — political issues — and this excluded many important topics from scholarly investigation. Argument about what really happened in the American South is still going on. A currently controversial book, in England as well as in the United States, is Fogel and Engerman's *Time on the Cross*, which discusses what the conditions of slavery were really like in the American South, and whether the factors that led to its abolition were primarily economic or primarily religious. Did slavery cease to pay or was it abolished because people came to think it wrong? Fogel and Engerman argue that it was profitable to slave-owners right up to the civil war. The fact that *Time on the Cross* is a sociometric study, including statistical analysis of material available, does not preclude argument about bias.⁵

Contradictions in the accounts of South African history are sharp. The most egregious myth, asserted by a South African Minister, and an Ambassador abroad,⁶ is that whites occupied an empty land. One version of the myth is that Bantu speakers first crossed the Limpopo when Van Riebeeck landed at Table Bay. Portuguese records which have long been available in English translation show this to be false. In 1593 people speaking a Bantu language close to Xhosa or Zulu were on the Transkei coast, and there is no evidence to suggest that they were then recent arrivals there.⁷ A second version of the myth states that only land now defined as

Bantustans was occupied when whites arrived. In fact the land where Cape Town now stands was used by herders who called themselves Khoikhoi, and were called by the settlers "Hottentots". The Khoikhoi did not live there all the year round but returned each spring, moving with cattle and sheep on a regular beat. Van Riebeeck admitted the occupation of Khoikhoi land and wrote to the Council of Seventeen "they think that they have cause for revenge and especially, they said, upon people who had come to take and occupy the land which had been their own in all ages, turning with the plough and cultivating permanently their best land, and keeping them off the ground upon which they had been accustomed to depasture their cattle, so that they must consequently now seek their subsistence by depasturing the land of other people, from which nothing could arise but disputes with their neighbours; insisting so strenuously on the point of restoring to them their own land, that we were at length compelled to say they had entirely forfeited that right, through the war they had waged against us, and that we were not inclined to restore it, as it now had become the property of the Company by the sword and the laws of war".⁸

Archaeological evidence, now accumulating fast, shows that an iron-working people, who kept cattle, occupied the Transvaal from the fifth century A.D., and in the iron age village which Professor Mason is excavating at Broederstroom in the Transvaal, a negro skeleton has been found. The charcoal is dated to A.D. 460 ± 50.⁹ The spread of iron age settlements through the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal is being plotted and dated. Iron workings do not talk directly, but the combination of archaeological and linguistic evidence has convinced scholars in the field that the iron workers who spread so fast down Africa and through the Transvaal in the fifth century A.D. were Bantu speakers. The distribution of Sotho speakers, as asserted in oral tradition and recorded by eye-witnesses between the Orange and the Limpopo before 1822, and between 1822 and 1840, has been plotted on a map by Dr. C. C. Saunders of the University of Cape Town¹⁰ and that also reflects a wide occupation of the highveld.

Cattle remains have been found near Keiskammahoek in the Eastern Cape dated to the eleventh century A.D.¹¹ These cattle-owners were probably Khoikhoi who, at least from the fifteenth century and probably more than a thousand years before that, stretched around the coast and some way inland, from the Orange to the Transkei, mingling at many points with Bantu speakers. Sheep were kept on the Cape coast 2 000 years ago, and skeletal remains suggest the owners were physically like the Khoikhoi.¹²

The latest version of the "empty land" myth is that the population when whites landed was very small, but the evidence on which this statement is made is not cited. The air photographs of remains of settlements in the Transvaal and Orange Free State do not suggest a very small population, and the eye-witness reports of Robert Moffat, John Campbell, and others between 1820 and 1825 suggest Tswana settlements larger than Cape Town then was, in what was now the Transvaal. Like many other once isolated people, the Khoikhoi and their neighbours and kinsmen who lived solely by hunting *diminished* after early contacts with whites and only began to increase later, mingling with people of other stocks to form the Coloured population of the Cape.¹³

Zulu-Xhosa and Sotho-Tswana peoples did not diminish when they encountered whites: it is likely they were already increasing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and since 1911 the African population of the Republic as a whole has more than quadrupled. In the same period (1911-74) the white population has more than trebled. The "empty land" myth is no longer tenable in any of its forms. Scholarly local histories, such as are being planned, must take cognisance of occupation of a locality before whites arrived.

Another current myth is that before whites came Southern Africa was in a permanent state of turmoil in which life was always insecure and cannibalism rife. For a generation, from 1818, there was a period of slaughter and turmoil in Natal and much of the highveld. Then cannibalism did occur.¹⁴ But remember that there was slaughter and turmoil also in much of western Europe, during the Thirty Years War, which ended just before the settlement at the Cape. During that war, cannibalism occurred in Europe also, and nearly half the population is thought to have been killed or died.¹⁵ In Southern Africa, the *mfecane*, like the Thirty Years War in Europe, was remembered as a period of disaster, not as normal life. During the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries, in areas of South Africa for which we happen to have written evidence by outsiders, the orderliness is what is chiefly commented upon. The areas where order was least was where settlers were pressing on other peoples, hunters and cattle owners. A survivor from the Stavenisse, wrecked on the Natal coast and rescued in 1686, commented that: "One may travel 200 or 300 mylen through the country without any cause of fear from men provided you go naked and without any iron or copper for these things give inducement to the murder of those who have them."¹⁶

Colonel Collins, a British army officer who visited Hintsas's country east of the Kei in 1809, found a boy of eight left alone in charge of

200 head of cattle overnight. He commented: "This incident is sufficient to show the security of person and property under Hintsa's government: it does not, however, proceed from severity in punishing crimes, for no person has ever been condemned by him to suffer capital punishment".¹⁷ Collins was a soldier, keenly aware of the danger of Xhosa raids on frontier farmers, and no protagonist of Xhosa interests.

John Philip, the missionary, noted in 1820 how free men were to criticise a Tswana chief — more free, he suggested, than citizens to criticise authority elsewhere, and in traditional Tswana law, as in Swazi law, a chief could be tried and fined by his own councillors.¹⁸ Indeed, the development of law and the dignity and equity of legal proceedings among both Nguni (Xhosa-Zulu) speakers and Sotho-Tswana speakers was repeatedly commented on by travellers, and is reflected in traditional law still applied, and in such accounts as Mqhai's *Ityala Lamwele* describing Xhosa argument and procedure in a difficult case concerning twins, and using the rhetoric that was associated with the courts. The chief's court at which disputes were publicly tried, and every adult man had the right to attend and speak, was the pivot of the legal and political structure.

When people talk of "barbarism" I remember, also, that the frontier wars of the Eastern Cape were *limited* wars in which women and children were not deliberately killed. In 1880 Walter Stanford ordered a white trader in the Transkei not to return to fetch his wife from the trading station saying "The Xhosa and Thembus in warfare . . . do not injure women and children, but you they will kill before your wife's eyes".¹⁹ The Xhosa distinguished between ordinary warfare and *mfecane*, the total destruction of the wars spreading from Natal after 1818. According to A. C. Jordan, *mfecane* was first applied again by Xhosa to the blitz in London; it was never used of ordinary warfare.

A Xhosa interpretation of the frontier wars of the Eastern Cape has yet to be written, a Zulu account of the growth of the Zulu kingdom, Sotho, Tswana, and Ndebele accounts of war in the highveld. These will certainly differ from accounts by whites. And how far will the views of black historians coming from different groups differ, particularly on the *mfecane*? Will differences which once loomed large in oral tradition be played down or not?

Differences in Afrikaner and English interpretations of South African history are already familiar. Professor Van Jaarsveld has successfully communicated something of the Afrikaner view to many

English speakers.²⁰ The courage and adventures of the Trekkers excite many English-speaking as well as Afrikaans-speaking school children. What still awaits analysis is first, the part played by Coloured people in the Great Trek — L. M. Thompson tells us that there were nearly as many Coloured dependants as there were whites on the trek²¹ — and secondly, a comparison of the various treks that took place at much the same time. Two parties of warriors who became known as Ngoni left Zululand in the early eighteen twenties, one crossing the Zambezi in 1835 (on the day of an eclipse) travelling up west of the lake now called Malawi, and heard of by Burton on Lake Tanganyika near Ujiji in 1858. Another party turned east of Lake Malawi to Songea. Between 1823 and 1838 Ndebele under Mzilikazi travelled from Zululand to Bulawayo. Kololo moved from the Orange Free State to the upper Zambezi. And each party had women and children with them. Some had pack animals, others none, nevertheless they arrived. People from the same families trekked in two directions for the same names — Mbeya, Mzimba, and the salutation “Jili” — appeared both in Malawi or Tanzania and in the Tyhume valley of the Eastern Cape. A comparative study of all the treks would be instructive.

An analysis of missions as part of what is called the “colonial assault on indigenous peoples” has begun: written by both white and black.²² Missionaries are seen as tools of imperialism who furthered trade, fastened the yoke, sapped the will to resist, and made people feel that what they had was not worthwhile. They are described as having destroyed traditional culture and created elites divorced from the common people. In so far as these elites were assimilated into the ruling group colonialism was perpetuated.

The reality was not so simple. The first Moravian missionary, Georg Schmidt, was tolerated for six years from 1737, then opposition to his work by the Reformed Church at the Cape drove him out. Moravians were able to begin work again only fifty years later, in 1792.²³ Neither Van der Kemp nor John Philip was exactly *persona grata* with successive governments or with the settlers. Certain missions not only established literacy among their converts but sought to provide education without a ceiling. James Stewart was already advocating provision for university education for Africans in 1878²⁴ and the standard of education at Lovedale where he worked was exceedingly high a generation ago. I know because I was a pupil there myself. But of course it is true that christianity is a revolutionary force and missionaries sought to change traditional societies more or less radically. Literacy itself changes societies profoundly. Many early missionaries had a Victorian preoccupation with clothes: some

had a yet odder preoccupation with squareness as opposed to roundness in building as a mark of civilisation; among others there was evidence of race and class consciousness, and the relegation of Africans to the back door. The missionaries who explicitly sought to maintain aspects of traditional culture are criticised even more than those who explicitly sought to change it, on the ground that they refused equality and wished to maintain differences. An early complaint against Lovedale was that it did not teach Greek as English public schools then did. (The complaint was made to my father.)

To some critics now writing, anthropologists were even more nefarious agents of colonialism than missionaries because, it is said, they taught imperialists how to manage indigenous populations.²⁵ Again, the fact that anthropologists were often hard put to it to secure permission to work and go on working, or that they published facts unpalatable to the governments concerned, is overlooked. Godfrey Wilson's evidence that in 1941, 69% of men employed in Kabwe (Broken Hill) had spent two-thirds of their working lives in town and were becoming settled in town, was published just at the time the Governor of Northern Rhodesia stated publicly that no urbanisation was taking place, but all town workers were migrants. My own criticism of migrant labour published in 1936 after work in Pondoland and the Ciskei, was hardly in conformity with South African government policy even then.²⁶

The Obligation of the Scholar and the Stifling of Truth

Given differences of interpretation with differences in the social position of the observer — I mean race, language, class, sex, age, education, job, religion — given such differences in viewpoint, is there any use in seeking for truth in the social field? Can there only be "committed history" — history from "our" point of view? Is there in fact any distinction between history and propaganda?

As I said at the start, the pursuit of truth is an absolute obligation of the academic, an obligation from which nothing ever absolves him. Scholarship implies a scrupulous regard for facts: a care not to ignore evidence, not to distort facts, a search for opposite evidence, a testing of hypotheses and rejection of those not supported by the facts. The last is quite difficult: one tends to fall in love with a good hypothesis and hate to part with it. The scrupulous regard for fact is the difference between the scholar and the advertiser, or propagandist. The scholar is not concerned with what he can persuade other people to believe but with what he himself believes to be true.

This is where what is sometimes called “scientific history” comes in: the accumulation of evidence, the testing of evidence, the search for opposite evidence, making the evidence available to others. In natural science experiments are usually repeatable: in the social field there are rarely repeatable experiments but one can provide the evidence on which conclusions are based. A passion for truth breeds a certain kind of person. Have you ever noticed that great scientists and saints — if you are so lucky as to know any — begin to wear the same sort of expression? Is not the passion for truth indivisible and do not those who hunger and thirst after it begin to look alike! As the preacher remarked: “a man’s wisdom maketh his face to shine”.²⁷

The pursuit of truth has repeatedly been unacceptable to those in power. A classic example of preventing scholars from following the evidence where it leads was the medieval insistence that nothing be taught which was contrary to Christian dogmas as interpreted by the Holy Office. In 1616 the Inquisition censored a book by Galileo, and in 1632 condemned him for continuing to defend the view that the earth moved, the sun was fixed. Galileo was then seventy and he formally recanted. The sentence on him was read before mathematicians and philosophers in universities throughout Catholic Europe, and when he died in 1642 a public funeral in Florence was forbidden. But until his death he managed to go on writing, publishing in Holland, and there is a portrait of him, thought to have been painted in the year of his death, with an Italian phrase written in one corner: *Eppur si muove* — “none the less it moves”.²⁸

The pursuit of truth as an absolute obligation may be contrasted also with the Nazi view as expressed at the time of the burning of the books in Berlin and the five hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the University of Heidelberg. I quote the account of E. M. Forster, published in *Nordic Twilight*. “On the night of May 19th, 1933, 25 000 volumes were destroyed outside the University of Berlin, in the presence of about 40 000 people. Some of the books were by Jews, others communist, others liberal, others ‘unscientific’ and all were ‘unGerman’. It was for the Government to decide what was ‘unGerman’. At the five hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the University of Heidelberg the Nazi Minister of Science and Education said: ‘The charge of our enmity to science is true . . . if the complete absence of preconceptions and predispositions, unrestrained objectivity, is to be taken as characteristic of science. The old idea of science is gone for ever. The new science is entirely different from the idea of knowledge that found its value in an unchecked attempt to reach the truth’.”²⁹

Another example of the stifling of scientific research comes from the Soviet Union in Stalin's time. In 1935 there was argument among biologists about the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lysenko claimed to have experimental evidence of such inheritance in plant breeding, but it was judged inadequate abroad and by many biologists in the Soviet Union. Lysenko accused Vavilov and others who disagreed with him of being wreckers and reactionaries — genetics was practically important in animal and seed selection and the Soviet Union was very short of food. Vavilov had an international reputation as a scientist and was indeed a foreign member of the Royal Society in London, but he was arrested in 1940 and died in prison in 1943. Critical reviews of Lysenko's work were banned in the Soviet Union; those who opposed him were not given passports to attend the International Congress of Genetics in Canada in 1958, for which some had prepared papers. With the cracking of the genetic code, biology advanced very fast in England and elsewhere, but in the USSR it lagged until after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. Then Lysenko was dismissed from his post as director of the Institute of Genetics and a new biology syllabus introduced into Soviet schools. The significance of the case lies in how Lysenko remained in power for so long. Medvedev, the Soviet writer, concludes that it was because "censorship stood guard over all officially supported concepts"; that "under a free exchange of opinions Lysenkoism could not have lasted one or two years". He notes also the protracted isolation of Soviet scientists and the extreme centralisation of administration of science and education in the USSR as strangling development, but concludes: "no methods of administrative suppression managed to stop discussion".³⁰

The Clash of Ideas and the Discovery of Truth

Truth emerges from the clash of ideas: no one arrives at truth by himself in total isolation. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis is the perennial intellectual process. As every student learns, the clash of ideas is creative and continually one finds fragments of truth in views contrary to those most acceptable. As a child of twelve I became aware of two viewpoints on South African frontier history, for a well-meaning teacher at Lovedale — white — began by explaining that she had to use the text-book set and the terminology in it. The lesson was on "kaffir wars" and the mixed class grew mutinous. As we scattered after it my school fellows were talking about their grandfathers and great-grandfathers who had fought on the black side. Looking back, I know this to have been a critical point in my intellectual development.

In Europe today there are six schools organised by the European community: in each there is a rule that secondary pupils must learn history in a language other than their home language. Just supposing that happened here! Supposing English-speaking children read South African history not only in Afrikaans but also in Zulu-Xhosa or Sotho-Tswana; and Afrikaans medium schools did the same! The teachers in the schools of the European community are finding it necessary to prepare new text books. We might do so also. And supposing we went on to read poetry, novels and plays!

All South Africa is being prevented by censorship from considering the ideas of other South Africans even in one language. I am precluded in this lecture from quoting or even summarising much South African writing which has appeared overseas: a scholar must holiday abroad if he is to keep up to date with history, literature, or even theology written by black South Africans. Is it not *dangerous* for us to remain so ignorant?

History elsewhere has been predominantly a study of political institutions and the actions of leaders. This is defended on the grounds that it is the leaders who shape society, and political institutions that give it form. Karl Marx took a different view and the systematic study of economic history sprang from the impact made by his writings. Social history has followed. G. M. Trevelyan wrote a generation ago that "Without social history economic history is barren and political history is unintelligible",³¹ and now in England there is a flood of studies of rural life and labour, and of urban workers.³²

The interest in economic and social history, and the life of ordinary people as well as leaders, is also becoming visible in Africa. Until 1945 little history of black Africa was written: most historians believed that there were no sources. This has been proved untrue, but in the Republic "African history" is generally taken to mean history north of the Limpopo, not south of it, and "South African history" is taken to mean the history of whites. In the standard text, *500 Years, a History of South Africa*,³³ blacks are consigned to an appendix.

The writing of history by black Africans that is proceeding fast further north — notably in Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda — has scarcely begun in the south. The writings of oral traditions, begun in Lovedale in 1878 with the publication of J. K. Bokwe's *Ntsikana*, and flourishing in the decade after 1918, dried up,^{34, 35} and S. E. K. Mqhai, the Xhosa poet and novelist, who taught history at Lovedale for a time, resigned because his "views on South African History and how it should be taught in

African Schools had undergone such modification that he found himself compelled either to be false to his own convictions and teach history as the authorities would have him teach it, or give up teaching altogether".³⁶ The centenary of Mqhai's birth is celebrated this year so the questioning of school text-books is nothing new. In 1974 there was an exceptionally high failure rate in the Senior Certificate examination of the Bantu Administration and Education Department. Many African university students and high school pupils believe that any departure from orthodox interpretations is likely to be marked wrong in examinations, and they link the failure rate to examiners detecting unorthodox views. Even the *Oxford History of South Africa* has drawn adverse comment from BOSS and the Schlebush-Le Grange Commission. Neither BOSS nor the Commission dispute the facts cited but they note that the history was favourably reviewed in the *African Communist*, and *Die Transvaler* quoted General Van den Bergh as saying that the *Oxford History of South Africa* volume 1 is "consciously aimed at disturbing race relations in the crudest manner".³⁷

There are also long standing disagreements about the use of words: were the followers of Maritz in 1914 patriots or rebels? Are the blacks who are fighting on the Zambezi frontier freedom fighters or terrorists? Are the countries north of us Rhodesia and South West Africa, or Zimbabwe and Namibia?

L. M. Thompson and I have argued that the crux of South African history is the interaction between peoples of different languages and races between whom there has been and continues to be co-operation and conflict.³⁸ Some critics insist that it is more illuminating to fasten on isolation as the characteristic of South African groups; others that conflict is the key, indeed that all history is the history of conflict between classes. Such differences in viewpoint add to understanding: they help us to see the extreme complexity of change in society. This complexity of process has impressed itself on me in studies I have recently been making on a people in Tanzania and Malawi, the Nyakyusa-Ngonde. I have been looking closely at changing relationships between generations and sexes over the past hundred years and what emerges is the zig-zag line of change. In the early colonial period there was a rise in the rate of polygyny then a fall in it; a fall in the marriage age for women and then a rise, and so on: it was never a single straight line of change.

I spoke earlier of the connection between one's experience of contemporary society and one's view of history. Anthropology, sociology, politics, economics, all include a historical dimension,

however much they reject history or historians reject them. For the anthropologist static models are too far from reality to be useful, and the historians' documents are, after all, reports that someone once wrote down. I'm growing old enough to have produced historical documents myself. So the gap between these disciplines is less than some suppose. Like history, none of them is wholly objective (though each may claim to be more objective than the others) and each is a "patient quest for truth". In so far as they are scholarly disciplines they are bound to a scrupulous regard for facts. These disciplines are all concerned with understanding changing human society and all are relevant to understanding contemporary South Africa.

Every human group needs to be realistic about itself. Of individuals we say that ability to make an honest appraisal of self is the mark of an adult. Individuals who are totally unrealistic about themselves and their abilities are mad. And I suggest that groups also may suffer delusions and become alienated from reality. The Nazis of Hitler's Germany were an example. If Amin of Uganda has followers who really believe in his claims they may be another example, but it has not yet been demonstrated that Ugandans, other than he, are so deluded.

I fear the gross distortions of current reality in South Africa, and I fear, above all, the confusion between a demonstration that conflict exists and advocacy of conflict. To point out that many murders occur is not to advocate murder. In its self-assessment an intelligent community is helped by knowing what outsiders generally, and non-conforming insiders, think and say about it. South African citizens — those vested with political power — need desperately to understand the realities of South Africa, and it is here that the Institute of Race Relations has made such a notable contribution, steadily publishing factual material, most notably the annual *Survey of Race Relations* which has an international reputation for its reliability and accuracy. I am indeed indebted to the Institute for providing me with statistical material on a number of points for this paper.

As I have tried to show you from historical examples, factual material is not and never can be totally separated from analysis. The check on one-sided analysis is to provide a forum for the expression of different points of view with free discussion. The interpretations of black nationalists and white nationalists, of marxists, christians, liberals, and others, all contribute to full understanding. The Institute has sought to provide such a forum at

its annual conferences, but open discussion is constantly being limited by banning and censorship, as well as by the reluctance of those with differing views to meet together.

Realism about South Africa

Trying to draw from discussion on South Africa which has been going on I wish to emphasise certain facts which we, as South African citizens, must keep in mind, though it is impossible on this occasion to discuss any of them in detail.

One fact of the South African situation is that people of the negro race and the caucasian race are *visibly* different. But the visible differences are magnified by a body of legislation which attempts to keep apart people who are registered under the Population Registration Act as different. The illogicalities are legion. We are told that people who are physically different *wish* to remain apart and "naturally" do so, but legislation is thought necessary to compel them to do so in marriage, residence, education, recreation, travel, and industry. We are told that physical differences are something absolute, but the difficulties of definition by race are such that definitions vary with the Act: brothers and sisters have been differently classified; families and individuals repeatedly re-classified.

Some people suppose that there are racial differences in *innate* ability, though despite a great body of research these have never been proved. In 1969 A. R. Jensen published an article in the *Harvard Educational Review* in which he drew attention to differences in performances in I.Q. tests between American white and American negro social groups, and maintained that it was plausible to postulate a genetic component in this difference. Note that this was put forward as a hypothesis, not as a proven thesis. The article and two subsequent books³⁹ published by Jensen raised a stormy controversy in America and Europe. Students disrupted some of his lectures and certain reviewers claimed that his ideas should never have been published because no *between* group tests have been devised which are wholly culture free, even though there is evidence that *within* group I.Q. variance has a genetic component.

If we value free discussion then of course we defend Jensen's right to publish and lecture, but also we exercise the right to examine his conclusions critically. In a review article in *Nature*, Professor Thoday of the Department of Genetics in the University of Cambridge, concludes: "there is no evidence which reveals whether the negro-

white I.Q. difference has any genetic component or any environmental component. Both hypotheses (or any intermediate hypothesis) are equally consistent with the facts". He goes on to note, however, that "United States negro women score higher than United States negro men, a difference for which no genetic model seems to fit the facts".⁴⁰ The male-female difference is *less* than the negro-white difference in Jensen's figures, or his argument for a genetic difference in race ability would be wholly untenable.

Thoday goes on to comment that "No statement about causation of I.Q. variation should be taken at its face value whoever the authority. Every statement requires most careful consideration of the detailed data on which it is based"; and "the more we would like to believe some statement about the causation of I.Q. variations, the more closely we should examine the data and logic behind it".

What is demonstrable is that differences in interest, observation, skills are modified by environment from birth, even by the nutrition of the mother before birth. One difference that interests me is what catches the eye of a young child. We are told that every child from a hunting group in the Kalahari recognises its own mother's footprint in the sand, as a very small boy in Johannesburg recognises his own mother's car. I heard a grandson of my own not yet two, shriek *Mama* when, in the midst of heavy traffic, a shabby Volkswagen the model and colour driven by his mother, came into view. It was not, in fact, his mother's car, nor was she in it, but I could only tell it was not her's by looking at the number plate. But Johannesburg children don't recognise individual footprints.

So long as nourishment and educational opportunity differ so greatly according to race in this country, less than R30 being spent annually by the State on educating an African child and more than ten times that on educating a white child,⁴¹ we cannot begin to compare group achievement with any precision.

Cultural differences, by which I mean differences in language, custom, way of life, which exist in South Africa, do not coincide at all exactly with physical (that is racial) differences. Again and again race and culture are confused in the attempt to prove a lasting difference between peoples. A colleague in the University of Cape Town once remarked to me: "Even you have never known a Bushman who has become civilised". I pointed out that a workman then in the building fitted exactly with the physical description of "Bushman" but immediately the ground for differentiation was shifted. The workman, I was told, was no "Bushman" because he lived in town

and spoke Afrikaans. He had become a "Coloured" man. This is why it is essential to clear thinking to use *different* words for physical type, language, and economy, when classifying people.

Cultural differences, as well as racial differences, have been magnified and made compulsory, with the deliberate intention of dividing people. What is called in America "ethnicity", i.e. identity as a member of a group distinguished by language, custom, and tradition, or one of these, and interacting with other such groups, is a factor in the modern world. Very often the ethnic group is a minority within a wider society. As Glazer and Moynihan have shown, the absorption of ethnic groups in New York has not gone as far as was expected — the melting pot has not quite melted.⁴² Ethnic identity is cherished in a large world as "a place to feel at home". Differences are preserved in language, literature, history, dress, music, dancing, cooking. People want diversity: it is something attractive in itself. But directly a diversity becomes compulsory it is resented: directly an ethnic quarter becomes a ghetto within which a category of people are obliged to live it becomes a prison. As a Scot by descent I may or may not enjoy listening to bagpipes and eating haggis and oatmeal porridge with salt, no sugar; if I am compelled to confine myself to these, and am refused other music and food I am likely to detest them. The "home boy" groups — *abakhaya* in Xhosa — formed by migrants from the country coming into town are very important indeed to newcomers in the city, but the individual who is forced to conform may resent it. He is told: "Don't pull your own way", "Don't be a goat amongst sheep". It is this, said Dr. Mafeje, "that makes life in barracks intolerable for certain types of men".⁴³ So long as a man is free to break away and become absorbed in other more compatible groups all is well, but if he is forbidden any choice and compelled to remain with "home boys" then such compulsory differentiation becomes discrimination. As Keith Sutton says: "Diversity is God's gift, but separation is man's betrayal of that gift".⁴⁴

"Ethnicity" is something commonly magnified by politicians seeking a following and used for their own aggrandisement. In a recent book *The Hidden Frontier*, on two alpine villages on the boundary between Austria and Italy, the authors, Cole and Wolf, speak of ethnicity as "primarily a political tool", not as something "ultimately given" but something used, and the manipulation of ethnic differences for political purposes has been demonstrated in a wide range of societies by Abner Cohen and others.⁴⁵ The claim made by a former Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in the House of Assembly in 1966 that "numerically the white

nation is superior to all other nations in South Africa"⁴⁶ cannot be taken seriously as a statement of fact, but it indicates the reasons for fostering ethnic divisions in education and administration since 1954.

In any realistic assessment of our situation the proportions of population defined as differing in legal status must be considered. In the Republic the proportion of whites has been larger than elsewhere in Africa, reaching 21,9% in 1921. It has fallen to an estimated 16,4% in 1974 but is still much larger than in Rhodesia or Kenya, with 4,49% and 0,37% respectively.⁴⁷ Note that the white minority in South Africa has been twice the size of the black minority in the United States, but it is unlikely to retain that proportion. Black and white have been in South Africa for over 300 years, whereas in most of the rest of Africa, from Rhodesia northward, the colonial period has lasted less than a hundred years. Only in Angola and Mocambique has it lasted longer than in South Africa.

The skill, education, and wealth of whites in the Republic is manifest, and there is a history of resolution and steadfastness stretching far back and apparent not only in those in power but also in those who oppose them. Isolation from the outside world has gone: there is a mutual dependence between South Africa and the world at large in economic, political, intellectual and moral fields. Here, as in so many countries, nostalgia for the village persists, but no village is independent of foreign trade. South Africa cannot both sell gold and remain isolated: we cannot both be small scale and large scale at the same time.

What are the implications of these familiar facts? First, dominance by a racial minority cannot survive indefinitely. South Africa is attacked by the outside world primarily because a racial basis for dominance is built into our law. And the racial basis of society is felt to be immoral by an increasing number of whites within, just as it is more and more resented by blacks. I, myself, have never known any black who accepted it as just. Neither is division of South Africa into independent Bantustans, and a purely white state, acceptable to any black I know, not even to those who are prepared to use Bantustans as a means of establishing a measure of local self-government, and a power base.⁴⁸ Whites cannot retain the rich parts of South Africa whose wealth has been created by the labour of all races and cut off the poor parts; blacks cannot be contained in Bantustans, nor can industry in cities operate without black labour. The conspicuous increase in productivity over the past three hundred years which is still continuing in South Africa, has been due to co-

operation between black and white in farms and industry. It can be attributed neither to whites alone nor to blacks alone. But to a great degree in industry, and a limited degree on farms, the co-operation has been through migrant labour, black men being brought to the place of work without their wives and families, and returning more or less frequently to distant homes. Migrant labour has been and remains the price of apartheid, of a measure of racial separation in different territorial areas.

Migrant (oscillating) labour continuing over a long time and involving a substantial proportion of the population is, I believe, the single most destructive force in our society. Already in 1936, after field-work in Pondoland and the Ciskei, I wrote that "The aim of an administration anxious to avoid social chaos will be to stabilise town and country communities". After a life spent enquiring into how societies work, both in country and town, here and further north, I find no reason to change my views: evidence for it has continually strengthened. The territorial separation which can be pursued only through compulsory circulation of workers is itself destroying our society.

Some argue that migrant labour is widespread throughout the world and though not ideal, it is better than starvation, and something to which communities become adjusted.

There are three sets of figures to watch: the period over which oscillating labour has taken place; the proportion of the population involved; and the trend. Is the trend towards stabilisation or continuing circulation? In South Africa, oscillating labour has continued on a large scale since the development of the diamond diggings in Kimberley in 1870, though it had existed long before that with the recruitment of labour for farms. For at least forty years more than half the able-bodied men have been away from large areas all the time. In 1932 the proportion of men between 18 and 54 who were absent was 67% in Sekhukuneland and 72% in Middledrift District in the Ciskei. In 1951 the figure was 54% of men of working age. In 1971, 53% of the able-bodied men of the Transkei were recruited for work outside the Transkei. The policy, pursued since 1948, of reducing the number of Africans in towns, has not resulted in any reduction of the number of men employed, but in an increase in the proportion of migrants. This is most conspicuous in Cape Town. In 1953 Langa had a male:female ratio of 4:1. In 1974 the ratio was 11:1. On the Reef in 1971-2 over half the black men employed were living in single accommodation, and it is concluded that 57% of Africans in registered employment in South Africa were

oscillating migrants. In 1971, 53% of the able-bodied men of the Transkei were recruited for work outside the Transkei.⁴⁹ Left to themselves, migrants have tended to settle at their place of work in South Africa as elsewhere. Such settlement has been conspicuous further north in Katanga, the Copperbelt, and the sisal plantations of the Tanzania coast over the last thirty years. It has been prevented in South Africa by the explicit policy of confining families to "homelands".

I can find no evidence of any community which has exported such a large proportion of oscillating workers over such a long period as the Ciskei and Transkei, Zululand and Sekhukhuneland, except the adjoining states of Lesotho and Mocambique. Malawi has also exported many migrants but over a shorter period. The migrant labour which is now causing so much concern in Western Europe is a post-war phenomenon, developing after 1945, much of it after 1965, and the proportion of men away from an exporting country such as Turkey is a fraction of that away from the Transkei. In 1967 there were a quarter of a million migrant men from a population of 34 million in Turkey — at the most one able-bodied man in twenty, or five per cent.⁵⁰

There is a vast difference between a community in which perhaps 5% of the adult men are always away as seamen or soldiers or emigrant workers, or one which exports a large number of workers for a short period of years, and South Africa in which half, or more than half the able-bodied men have been away for two, and sometimes three generations.

South Africa has lived on the capital of a very strong African family system and that capital has been squandered. Traditionally, children were trained at home in respect and in regard for law. The old family system is now deeply undermined by the separation of husband and wife, the lack of supervision of children, the high illegitimacy rate, all of which are immediately and directly linked with migrant labour. There are very many children both in country and town who have grown up without fathers; thousands of men who have spent their working lives separated from their wives; an equal number of women forced to live apart from their husbands; and the frustrations engendered boil up.

South Africa is not now, as is claimed, an orderly society. Life is extremely insecure in African townships: the murder rate and capital punishment rates are higher than most countries: the prison population is exceptionally large.⁵¹ The number of those imprisoned

is immediately linked to pass laws regulating the movement of population to work. Prosecutions under the pass laws rose from 176 thousand persons in 1948 to 620 000 in 1970,⁵² and since pass laws are regarded by Africans as wholly unjust, and prosecution under these laws carries no stigma whatever, the whole system brings the law into disrepute. This was recognised a generation ago by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Mr. Denys Reitz,⁵³ but though passes may change in name they do not change in substance, and the frustration and disrespect for law engendered increases rather than diminishes. The constant complaints against passes, the repeated pass-burning campaigns, the widespread corruption in the sale of passes, the number of men and women in the cities and on farms who are there illegally,⁵⁴ are evidence of the rejection by the majority of the population of the whole migratory system.

The fighting in barracks of mine-workers which led to 132 men killed and 496 injured in 18 months between September 1973 and March 1975⁵⁵ is the latest manifestation of the seething frustration amongst migrants. So long as migrant labour continues, I believe that conflict will increase, not diminish.

What then do we do? As I see South Africa, the first aim must be the settlement of families at the breadwinner's place of work. This is already happening at the De Beer's mines in Kimberley. It was happening in the Cape until the trend was reversed by government pressure. It was happening on the Reef among those employed in secondary industry, as opposed to mines. If it were once accepted in principle as something to aim at it could proceed very fast. And it would enormously facilitate development in the "homelands", for it has been shown repeatedly that their problem is too large a population, and a disproportion of dependants.

Given South African history, and the proportion of whites, I do not imagine a solution can be found by all whites moving out of the Republic. It is true that the vision of a whirlwind which will sweep all us whites back into the sea whence we came continually recurs, but there have been repeated statements from black leaders that this is not what is sought⁵⁶ even if it were a possibility. I, as a white South African with deep roots, totally reject it.

But South African realities do require a society which is *not* built on the principle of race, and that implies the dismantling of legal separation and discrimination; of economic separation and discrimination; of educational separation and discrimination. The process has been spelt out in some detail in the SPROCAS reports.⁵⁷

The crux, as I understand it, is diversity, opportunity and choice, as opposed to the imposition of a rigid system in which people are compelled to be different according to racial category, and in a lesser degree, according to ethnic group.

The hope of minorities lies in building a non-racial society: one in which race is played down at every point, just as it is played up in our contemporary society. And the framework of a rigid constitution, with a Bill of Rights, is of support to minorities. In his presidential address Dr. Friedman spoke of the need for a new constitution which would provide such a framework.⁵⁸

South Africa has a tradition of the rule of law stemming from Roman Dutch Law, from English Common Law, and from the law of traditional chiefdoms where the chief was subject to the law. During the past twenty-five years the rule of law has been eroded and imprisonment without trial become commonplace. No law of *Habeus Corpus* is now effective in the Republic: very many people have been held without trial and released without any charge having been brought against them. Charges that cruel and inhuman forms of interrogation were used in certain cases have been brought. "There have been at least fourteen deaths of detainees, many of them as the result of suicide."⁵⁹

It is argued that emergencies make suspension of the rule of law necessary, but so-called emergencies continue from year to year and, as I shall go on to show, it was during the period of deepest conflict in England that the law of *Habeus Corpus* was forged, for it was just then that it was so desperately needed. It seems extraordinarily unintelligent that white voters do not recognise the direct link between the security of a minority and maintenance of the rule of law.

In South Africa, the question is not: Will change come? but How will change come? As a South African, and a student of society, I find no security in a white laager: as a Christian I find such exclusiveness contrary to all I read in the gospels. We are told that "no people has ever given up privilege voluntarily". But of course many groups have been *compelled* to give up privilege. A recent, not far distant example was the Tutsi rulers of Rwanda who formed a dominant caste for perhaps four centuries. They were about 10% of the population.⁶⁰ And it is intelligent to anticipate change by violence through constitutional reform as England did in contrast to France at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries.

Inevitability?

Philosophers divide in their views on inevitability. Marxists argue that change necessarily comes as class conflict, and some urge the need for confrontation to hasten change; they hold that dialogue prolongs the agony. Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin do not accept such a doctrine of inevitability⁶¹ and Popper advocates piecemeal experimental change, formulating problems, proposing and testing solutions. I stand on Popper's side in this. General change in a given direction appears to me to be inevitable: change from isolation to wider interaction, from small scale to wider scale, from a simple technology to a more elaborate one. But in the detailed process of change I believe there is choice.

I share profoundly the Christian belief in the power of love: I do not see love as "a white liberal justificatory myth" as some do. But love does not permit quiescence. Hatred is real also, piling up like thunderclouds, generating further hate. The most frightening study I made abroad was to compare the first and second editions of Ezekiel Mphahlele's *African Image* and note the increasing bitterness of an exile. I am not permitted to quote either edition to you: South Africans should not know these things. Beside Mphahlele put recent reassertions made by Ministers of their determination never to abandon race separation or diminish control by whites. At the same time, I have seen the astonishing absence of racial bitterness in some of those who have come out after long periods in gaol, and I remember that on Robben Island a memorial service was celebrated for Leo Marquard.

I have argued that it is from the clash of ideas that intellectual understanding emerges and intellectual understanding is part of the resolution of conflict. Freedom of thought and communication, open discussion of our "present discontents", is a condition of peaceful change. In conflict itself lies the possibility of creativity, not only in ideas but in institutions. Once race is abandoned as the basis of society we can look at a future not in shivering despair but in expectation of a new creation. In the present society the confidence of blacks has been sapped by conquest and domination: black consciousness is the reaction to that. White confidence is sapped by a sense of guilt, most obvious in the young; a deep conviction that the existing form of South African society is indefensible. To create something new one thing above all is needed: courage.

Thinking about South Africa today I take comfort in reflecting on seventeenth century England, a country in which there was civil war, the execution of a king believed by many to be God's divinely

appointed instrument whose execution was worse than murder; a country in which accusations of witchcraft and trials of supposed witches were frequent and this, as some of you will know, is to anthropologists a sure symptom of deep conflict in society. Seventy thousand men and women are said to have been executed in eighty years under an anti-witchcraft law passed in the time of James I.

It was in such a society that John Milton entered the struggle for freedom of speech and publication. In the *Aereopagitica*, from which my title comes, Milton insisted that censorship will "bring a famine upon our minds". "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple: whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter. . . . For who knows not that Truth is strong, next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings to make her victorious, those are the shifts and defences that error uses against her power."⁶²

Travelling in Italy, Milton "visited the famous Galileo, grown old, a prisoner of the Inquisition, for thinking in astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licensers thought". Note that Milton was no wild student, or journalist, or academic. Four years after the publication of *Aereopagitica* he became a civil servant responsible, as Latin Secretary of State, for foreign correspondence with the great powers of Europe.

John Locke, writing his *Treatise of Government*, passionately supported Milton in his plea for a free press: "For truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself . . . if truth makes not her way into understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her".

The struggle for freedom of speech went on at the same time as the struggle to ensure that those arrested were brought to trial and not held without trial. The *Petition of Right* was brought before Parliament in 1627, the *Aereopagitica* was published in 1644, and the *Habeas Corpus Act* was passed in 1679. Three points about the struggle are worth noting: the first is the part played by individuals. Milton's own share in achieving freedom of publication was enormous, and the passing of the *Habeas Corpus Act* is considered to have been "largely due to the experience and energy of Lord Shaftesbury".⁶³ The second point of particular interest and relevance is that it was men of education and position who fought for these things in England. The struggle was not left to the dispossessed

alone. Thirdly, the political struggles were followed by a flowering of science, partly expressed and maintained by the founding of the Royal Society.

Nothing will persuade me that all this was inevitable. When one examines the history of the period it seems that innumerable choices by individuals were made, and most important among them were the choices of certain leaders. Open discussion was one of the means of resolving conflict. Poets other than Milton himself were deeply involved in the theological and political conflicts of the day, and they shared that quality which we need above all in South Africa, courage. I conclude with some verse of Milton's friend and colleague, Andrew Marvell, which is relevant to our time.

Courage my Soul, now learn to wield
The weight of thine immortal Shield
Close on they Head they Helmet bright
Ballance they Sword against the Fight
See where any Army, strong as fair,
With silken Banners spreads the air
Now if thou beest that thing Divine
In this day's Combat let it shine;
And shew that Nature wants an Art
To conquer one resolved Heart.⁶⁴

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The figure for Great Britain is approximately one murder per 140 000, that for the U.S.A. one per 12 000, and for Zambia (1969) one per 14 000.
Source: Reports of Governments concerned and *Statesman's Year-Book*. 1972-3.
S.A. has a daily average of 417,0 prisoners in contrast with Britain with an average of 72,5 or France with an average of 70,0 per 100 000 of the population. Mr. Justice H. J. Steyn, *The Role of Punishment in the Maintenance of Law and Order*, Institute of Race Relations, 1972.
In South Africa from 1950-1974 executions have averaged 74 a year.
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Prisons.
I am indebted to Miss M. Horrell of the Institute of Race Relations for providing me with these and other figures.
- ⁵² F. Wilson, *Migrant Labour*. Table of pass law contraventions, 1921-1970; graph. pp. 163-5, 232.
- ⁵³ In his address at the centenary celebrations at Lovedale in July 1941. The table of pass law contraventions shows a fall during the following four years.
F. Wilson and Perrot, pp. 10, 454-5.
- ⁵⁴ F. Wilson, *Migrant Labour*, pp. 24, 41, 53, 55, 59.
- ⁵⁵ F. Wilson, 'Compound Confrontation', *Sunday Tribune*, 9 March, 1975.
- ⁵⁶ Lusaka Manifesto, April 1969, quoted in full, *South African Outlook*, September, 1969, pp. 142-4, 150.
Paragraph 8 reads: 'Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racialist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on the grounds of racial origin'.

Statements by South African homeland leaders rejecting racialism, made in London, are reported in the East London *Daily Despatch*, 4 July, 1975.

⁵⁷ Peter Randall (general editor), SPROCAS Reports, *Education beyond Apartheid: Towards Social Change; Power, Privilege and Poverty; Apartheid and the Church; Law, Justice and Society*, Johannesburg, 1971, 1972.

⁵⁸ Bernard Friedman, *Parliament in a Caste Society*, S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1975.

⁵⁹ A. S. Mathews, *Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa*, Juta, 1971, pp. 133-163.

The quotation is from p. 163, note 171.

Barend van Niekerk, *The Police in the Apartheid Society*.

Peter Randall (editor), *Law, Justice and Society*, pp. 56-64.

⁶⁰ J. J. Maquet, *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda*, Oxford University Press, 1961.

⁶¹ K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.

Isaiah Berlin, *Historical Inevitability*, August Comte Memorial Trust Lecture, 1, Oxford University Press, 1954.

⁶² John Milton, *Aereopagitica*, London, 1644.

⁶³ 'W.F.C.' *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Eleventh Edition, *Habeas Corpus*.

⁶⁴ Andrew Marvell, *Miscellaneous Poems*, 1681, The Scholar Press, Menston, 1973.