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Reserve

The Fourteenth Hoernlé Memorial Lecture

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THE
**GOVERNMENT
OF DIVIDED
COMMUNITIES**

Dr. David Thomson

SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF
R A C E R E L A T I O N S



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GOVERNMENT
OF DIVIDED
COMMUNITIES**

*Delivered under the auspices of the
South African Institute of Race Relations*

by

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Nineteenth Century", "Europe Since Napoleon" etc.*

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THE HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURES

A LECTURE entitled the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of the late Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations for 1934 to 1943), is delivered once a year under the auspices of the Institute. An invitation to deliver the lecture is extended each year to some person having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held."

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THE GOVERNMENT OF DIVIDED COMMUNITIES

I FEEL doubly honoured by the Institute's invitation to deliver the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture during my short stay in the Union of South Africa. First, because it is an honour for anyone to have the opportunity of commemorating that very distinguished scholar, Professor Alfred Hoernlé, of joining the list of eminent men and women from Jan Hofmeyr onwards who have in former years delivered these lectures, and of addressing an audience such as this: and secondly because I can lay no special claim to expert knowledge either of racial problems or of conditions in South Africa. It must therefore have been supposed that a student of modern history and of political theory, which is all I can claim to be, may have some ideas of relevant interest to contribute to discussion of the problems of racial relations.

The World's Great Fears

The world at present is haunted and hag-ridden by mighty fears—by many different fears, but two in particular overshadow all others. One is fear of the destruction of European civilization by nuclear warfare. It is a fear felt particularly in the United Kingdom and Europe, because it is there that the first targets of nuclear and hydrogen bombs are most concentrated: but it extends across the Atlantic and the Pacific too, if only because it was in the Far East that the first atomic bombs were in fact dropped by the United States in 1945. The other fear is inter-racial fear—fear of the white peoples that they will be submerged by the coloured peoples, and fears of colonialism among the coloured peoples. This second fear is felt most acutely, perhaps, in this country, though it also exists in many other lands.

Each of these fears rests on a division within the whole community of mankind. Fear of nuclear destruction rests on the world schism into communist and non-communist governments. Fears of racial submersion or domination rest on the world division into white and coloured races. Both, therefore, are fears of other men and of what they may do. They exist in the minds of men and derive from the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of men.

But both, equally, are based on objective facts as well as on mental attitudes. One rests on the undoubted fact that there are communist and non-communist governments in the world, which

have fallen into postures of intense mutual hostility. The other rests on the equally undeniable fact that there are different races in the world, varying greatly in their social and economic development, who have also, because of colonialism in the past, fallen into postures of mutual distrust. It would be senseless to pretend that these divisions do not exist or that these fears are somehow unreal. The only realistic course is to accept the fact that they exist, but to try to find ways of changing their meaning and their consequences. I am not among those who preach that these divisions and issues can be eliminated merely by persuading people to adopt different opinions. The objective facts and conditions have to be somehow changed, as well as men's opinions, before we are likely to be able to exorcise these haunting spectres of hatred and fear.

It is not my purpose in this lecture to discuss the first of these fears and schisms, but only to use it as a foil for looking more comprehensively at the second. It may be that by assembling the comparisons and inter-actions between these two prevalent fears we can see more clearly some ways to ease and transform, if not to escape entirely from, our present predicaments. The iron curtain and the colour bar have both been erected by men, and so can be demolished by men. But having been erected by men and given concrete shape in political forms and organizations, they call for programmes of political change and social ingenuity and effort, as well as changes of heart and belief, before we can be rid of them. We must expect, too, if historical experience is any guide, that these two schisms will profoundly interact, and that in whatever direction either of them develops it will greatly affect the pattern of the other. Anti-colonialism merges into communism, and makes an explosive mixture. Already we are aware of the enhanced power of the Asiatic peoples (especially of India and Pakistan) and of the Arab world, because the communist and non-communist camps tend to bid against one another for their support or even their neutrality.

The closeness of the parallel between the two divisions is still somewhat obscured, for the white peoples at least, because the possibility of nuclear war seems to be very much closer at hand than the possibility of racial submersion. But if we see both predicaments in clearer focus, I believe that there is an exact parallel: and the real threat to mankind is, in each case, more immediate than we are apt to think. Let me try to restate them in sharper focus.

The iron curtain exists because communist and non-communist governments are convinced that peaceful co-existence is impossible,

or at least unlikely, unless each remains strong enough to defend itself against the other's attack. The extraneous fact which has turned this division into a peril equally deadly for both is a revolution in the nature of modern warfare. This has produced weapons of attack so devastating that any war in which they are used would mean mutual destruction. The colour bar exists, likewise, because some of the white races of the world believe that peaceful co-existence is impossible, or at least unlikely, without strong defensive measures and segregation. But the extraneous fact, comparable with the coming of nuclear warfare, which makes continuance of the division a peril common to both sides, is less generally and less vividly appreciated. I suggest that it does exist, that it is hardly less urgent than the danger of nuclear destruction, and that if we put it into its proper place in the world picture we may see more clearly the whole issue before us. It is, I suggest, the threat of world starvation.

The Unseen Danger

Four years ago the United Nations held a Conference on Population in Rome. The most cautious estimate of the expert demographers there assembled was that by the end of this century—only forty-two years ahead—the present world population of roughly 2500 million will have risen to at least 4000 million, and may even have doubled to 5000 million. We have all learned to be sceptical of the predictions of demographers, and to distrust them as soothsayers. Certainly any projection of past and present trends into the future is always liable to be upset in its calculations by quite unforeseen factors. But the position has gone already far beyond the point of mere guess-work. Existing facts in themselves are startling enough to warrant our attention. Let me quote the comment of Sir Charles Darwin—an appropriate man to quote in this centenary year of his grandfather's momentous theory of evolution. In his Rede Lecture, given in Cambridge earlier this year, Sir Charles Darwin said:

At the end of every twenty-four hours there are nearly ninety thousand more people in the world than there were at its beginning. In planning for the future of our world the central thing to consider is this figure of ninety thousand extra lives every day. What are we going to do either to provide living conditions for them, or alternatively to discover means of checking this continual increase?¹

1. *Sir Charles Darwin, The Problems of World Population: The Rede Lecture*, 1958. Cambridge University Press, 1958. Page 6.

The *present* fact is that a whole new nation of thirty or thirty-five million people is being added to the world every year (more than one every second), and however fast may be the growth of the world's food supplies it certainly is not yet so fast as to keep pace with this tremendous increase in the number of mouths to feed. This fantastic multiplication of mankind happens mainly, of course, in Asia and the Far East and Africa. Indians increase at the rate of nearly five million a year, and the rapid increases in Russia and China are well known. But, as Sir Charles points out, the increase is by no means confined to these continents, or to peoples with a low standard of living. The United States of America—the most prosperous country in the world—is at present increasing at a ratio faster even than India. The division between slow-growing and fast-growing populations does not fall along entirely racial lines, though it does so enough to intensify racial anxieties among white peoples, if only locally. And certainly, even if European peoples multiply faster than is expected, it is the peoples of Latin America, Asia and the Pacific whose natural increase is likely to be greatest. The United Nations experts predicted:

Growth will be most rapid in Latin America and least rapid in Europe. A belt of countries from Morocco through the Near East to the Philippines will show accelerating growth: populations which numbered 1,300 millions in 1950 will reach 2,000 millions by 1980.²

This inherent tendency of the human race to multiply in geometrical ratio, whilst the food supply could increase only in arithmetical progression, was of course first pointed out by Thomas Malthus more than 150 years ago. He foretold increasing misery and starvation for the human race, except in so far as the natural checks of disease and local famines and the human checks of wars and individual restraint in procreation should operate to delay it. The nineteenth century, with its bounding optimism and its gospel of progress, dismissed his gloomy predictions with ridicule, and they indeed seemed to be disproven by the widespread improvements in the standard of living and feeding which coincided, in the nineteenth century, with an exceptionally rapid increase of population.

But we in the twentieth century have to reconsider this cheerful dismissal of Malthus's teaching. What seemed to belie his

2. Proceedings of the World Population Conference: *Summary Report*, United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, New York, 1955, page 78.

prophecy of doom and gloom was expansion into the New World, the invention of railways and steamships to bring the rich harvests of the New World to Europe, and the great development of more scientific agriculture throughout the world. But the world's frontiers have been reached, the possibilities of growing food fast enough to keep pace with the tremendous increase of population made possible by the improvement of medical science have diminished, and now, 150 years later, we are once more confronted with the ineluctable truth of Malthus's arguments.

So great is man's tendency to close his ears to unpleasant truths, so inherent his incorrigible optimism, that even now few of us appreciate the dimensions or the urgency of this problem. The Food and Agriculture Organization and other United Nations agencies have done much to make the problem better known, and much to increase the world's supply of food. But they are fighting, so far, a losing battle. We know much more about how to make the desert fertile, how to draw more food from the sea, how to unearth the wealth of the world's remotest regions, even the polar regions. But still the multiplication of human beings outruns the production of food. Still over half the world's population is undernourished. Between 1947 and 1953 the world's production of food was increased by about 8 per cent—a most remarkable achievement so soon after the dislocations of the Second World War. But during those same years the numbers of mouths to feed increased by 11 per cent. It is, I repeat, a losing battle so far.

The dimensions of contemporary increase are so vast in comparison with historical rates of growth that little comfort can be derived from the past. World population in 1950 was more than five times what it was in 1650. The increase in Asia alone during the first half of this century (463 millions) was roughly equal to the population of the entire world in 1650.³ What the current increase means in terms of increasing food supplies was also estimated at the Rome Conference. It had before it rough estimates of the supplies needed to feed a population expected, by 1980, to have increased by about 40 per cent. These estimates assumed only a moderate improvement in nutritional standards, mostly in the poorly fed countries.

They showed that cereals would have to be expanded by 50 per cent, meat and milk by 70 per cent or more and fish by

3. *ibid*, page 162.

90 per cent . . . Rough as they are, they showed the magnitude of the task facing the world during the next few decades.⁴

The great underlying issue, much discussed but by no means answered at the Rome Conference, where the demographers tended to split into Malthusians and anti-Malthusians, is whether it is enough to rely on expanding food supplies, or whether it is not essential to tackle the other horn of the dilemma and to encourage a deliberate checking of the rate of expansion of population by eugenic methods. But that proposal raises such a host of intractable problems that everyone shies away from it. Much of our present increase is due to prolonging the span of life and to the miracles of preventive medicine, to what may be called death-control. Can it be checked from reaching disastrous proportions only by birth-control? Since 1945 two nations, India and Japan, have officially adopted policies of population control. Impelled by necessity they have tried to diminish the pressure of fast-growing population on slow-growing resources by campaigns to encourage limitation of the size of families. Neither, however, has been strikingly successful. Concerted action along these lines encounters formidable obstacles of human emotion and prejudice, of national anxieties and pride. These problems may, however, have to be tackled before long. And unless we show supreme wisdom they could exacerbate racial and national divisions rather than weaken them.

This, again, is a vast subject that I have neither the time nor the competence to pursue further now. I can only emphasise that these gloomy Malthusian predictions cannot be dismissed from our minds with the wishful thought that things won't turn out as badly as that, and somehow natural checks will operate. Mr. Micawber is no match for Thomas Malthus. These are present facts—these hordes of new mouths to feed now exist and continue every day to come into existence; so that by the time I finish giving this lecture there will be at least 3750 more people to feed than there were when I began speaking.

I mention these facts only in order to suggest that here—in the growing threat of human starvation from over-population—we have the real counterpart to the more widely appreciated threat of nuclear destruction. Here, I believe, is an impersonal threat to survival, constituting a common cause which the white and coloured peoples share equally, and it corresponds on the world scale to that threat of nuclear destruction for the communist and

4. *ibid.*, page 165.

non-communist peoples. Each menace can be tackled only by very complete co-operation between both sides of the iron curtain, and both sides of the colour bar. Both barriers will have to be lowered, if man is to control his destiny on this planet—or on any other. And if the diabolical thought has entered anyone's mind that these threats might cancel one another out—that nuclear destruction might exert that check on growth of world population needed to keep it within the world's resources of food—let me hasten to dispel it. It is quite certain that nuclear war would so drastically diminish the production and distribution of food supplies that it would hasten, not retard, the coming of starvation in the world, even to peoples beyond the battle-zones. Some ten million people were killed in the First World War. That loss is now being more than replaced every four months.

It is just conceivable, of course, if the use of atomic energy for peaceful uses could be developed fast enough, and thereby the world's resources of energy and power made almost limitless, that many other threatening shortages could be overcome. Means of production, at present prohibitive because of the expenditure of energy and fuel they would entail, could be adopted. How far this would open up new supplies of nutriment for men I do not know at all, and I do not think anybody knows. But these means would have to be discovered, and put into very general use, in remarkably short time if they are to help us much in the urgent tasks of the next generation. Our governments have no time to lose in diverting their best energies to the job, if it is to be accomplished in time.

Those of you who have recalled that the title of this lecture is "The Government of Divided Communities" may reasonably have begun to wonder what this analysis of the world's vastest dilemmas has to do with the subject. Let me now, therefore, try to convince you that I have not simply brought along the wrong set of notes.

The barriers of communist ideology, like the barriers of race, do not exist only between the present states of the world. They also exist within the present states and civic communities, as I need hardly remind anyone in South Africa. And what happens within states closely affects what happens between states, just as what happens between states has repercussions on what happens inside them. Indeed the conventional distinction between internal affairs and international affairs becomes more and more blurred and meaningless in the present century, when for example revolutions and wars become almost inseparable. The world

divisions I have spoken of so far have their counterparts within the communities in which we live and of which we are citizens; with the difference that we can sometimes do more about them close at hand and in personal ways, than we can do about world problems.

I want, then, to set alongside all that I have said already, a similar brief analysis of the relations between state and society—or if you like government and governed—within existing communities.

The Modern State

The most startling feature of our modern state, whatever the political ideology that lies behind it, is its novelty. It tends to demand and to produce an ever greater cohesion and organic unity in the community that it governs. Until the late eighteenth century most governments—even strong and active governments—demanded little cohesion or unity within the peoples they governed. Feudal monarchy and dynastic monarchy neither enjoyed nor sought any great homogeneity among their subjects as regards race, or culture, or economic conditions, or nationality. They were for ever adding to their domains, by marriage or inheritance or conquest, new territories which only added to the diversity of peoples they governed. Such loose diversity was counted a gain, not a loss. Their subjects had very strong loyalties towards locality or class or even national or racial communities which often conflicted violently with their allegiance to the king; yet such conflicts of loyalty continued for centuries without destroying the states concerned. Then one form of internal division appeared which every government decided could not be tolerated. That was the division of religious belief.

The one form of cohesion that most monarchs regarded as completely indispensable was religious conformity. Throne and altar were so closely associated, kingship needed so desperately the sanction and support of religious faith, that disunity in this respect was thought quite fatal to government. Religious loyalty to an authority external and possibly hostile, such as the Papacy in the time of Elizabeth I of England, or religious nonconformity in the shape of the Puritan appeal to the inner light of private conscience, were felt to be direct and deadly threats to the very survival of state and society.

The immediate result in every state was religious persecution. Devoted Catholic monarchs crushed heresy. Less devoted Catholic

monarchs encouraged Gallican or Anglican churches, claiming independence from Papal control as "national churches". They inflicted every kind of civil and political disability on dissenters to exclude them from any share in running the state. The more long-term results were civil war and religious wars between states. The ecclesiastical schisms of the sixteenth century were followed by the religious wars of the seventeenth. The present division between communists and non-communists has very close parallels with the divisions between Catholics and Protestants three centuries ago. Then, too, the schisms fell within states as well as between states, and civil war blended into international war. The Jesuits were the Comintern of the Counter-Reformation.

Toleration of religious nonconformity—the discovery of the art of peaceful co-existence — came about largely from sheer necessity. The point beyond which men refused to fight for heaven in the after-life by making hell in this was reached at last. But it was the point of deadlock and exhaustion that forced governments and societies alike to the reluctant conclusion that, since religious differences could not be eliminated after all, they would simply have to find ways of comprising them within one political structure. The makers of the modern secular state were the monarchs and classes who found intolerance intolerable—like Henri IV of France and Elizabeth I of England. They held that "the state must not perish for conscience's sake".

The point I want to emphasise is that this conclusion, that society must remain divided about religion or else it must perish altogether, was reached only at great cost to civilization and to humanity. It took a relapse to cannibalism in the heart of Europe—in Germany devastated by the Thirty Years' War—to teach that the government of divided communities was not only possible but essential; and this was true even at a time when governments were perfectly well used to governing communities already divided by race and nationality and all the other things which we are now apt to regard as essential forms of cohesion.

From the whole record of the genesis of the modern secular state two undoubted truths are plain. One is that the kinds of social unity and conformity needed for good government are relative and not absolute; they are relative to time and place and circumstance, and any one of them seems indispensable only because men are reluctant to discard old assumptions even in face of new necessities. The other is that time can indeed be a great healer—that the attitudes of fanaticism and intransigence which inflame social divisions and make tolerance impossible can be modified and moderated with experience. The greatest enemy of

human progress is human inertia; but necessity is the solvent of inertia.

Let me give one example from English history. Eighteenth-century England was a tolerant country, and its ruling classes lacked the spirit of persecution and fanaticism that marked the previous century. Even so, the Test and Corporation Acts which imposed on Protestant Dissenters and Roman Catholics the legal disability to hold civil or military office in the state, were not repealed until 1828 and 1829. What forced Englishmen to see these petty discriminations as a positive menace to the security of the state was experience of the Napoleonic Wars. By alienating a large and influential section of the population in England, Scotland, and above all Ireland—by treating as outcasts men and women whose loyal support was needed for the life-and-death struggle against the tyrant of Europe—these out-of-date laws exposed the country to attack, especially via Ireland. Even then, only a few perceptive men drew the logical conclusion that these laws ought to be discarded. In 1807, when Napoleon's power in Europe was at its height, an Anglican clergyman—a leading member of the established Church, for he was a Canon of St. Paul's—wrote and published a series of letters called "The Letters of Peter Plymley to his brother Abraham who lives in the country". They were an eloquent, timely and very effective plea for religious equality within the state, for the abandonment of the age-old assumption that churchmanship and citizenship must go together. His argument was that such discriminations had come to be simply old-fashioned and irrelevant to the conditions of the time. The United Kingdom was fighting the wars as a very disunited kingdom, a divided community no less bitterly at cross-purposes within itself than many of our modern nations. Sydney Smith, a famous wit in a period of great wit, ridiculed the system out of existence. He said:

The effects of penal laws, in matters of religion, are never confined to those limits in which the legislature intended that they should be placed; it is not only that I am excluded from certain offices and dignities because I am a Catholic, but the exclusion carries with it a certain stigma, which degrades me in the eyes of the monopolising sect, and the very name of my religion becomes odious. These effects are so striking in England, that I solemnly believe blue and red baboons to be more popular here than Catholics and Presbyterians; they are more understood, and there is a greater disposition to do something for them. When a country squire hears of an ape, his first feeling is to give it nuts and apples;

when he hears of a Dissenter, his immediate impulse is to commit it to the county jail, to shave its head, to alter its customary food, and to have it privately whipped.⁵

England remained, in short, a divided community and extremely difficult to govern, only because the state clung to discriminatory legislation that had become quite irrelevant to its new needs, and because Englishmen had forgotten their common Christianity and their common humanity. The shock of a common danger was needed before the very possibility of a new outlook was forced upon them. The dawn came only 130 years ago.

Nationality and Democracy

During the last two hundred years, this belief that a society must be uniform in religion or it would perish has been in many ways replaced by a new belief; that a society must be uniform in nationality (or in race) or it will perish. This new superstition reached its climax as recently as 1919 throughout Europe and much of Asia. In the doctrines of national self-determination—oddly enough proclaimed jointly in 1919 by President Woodrow Wilson on one side and by Lenin on the other—the merger of the ideals of nationality and democracy became complete. It was right that a people should be politically independent and “a people” was taken to mean a linguistic and cultural national group. It was also right that *the* people should govern itself. It followed, it seemed, that independent and sovereign democratic nation states were the only good and stable units of human organization in the modern world. National minorities unfortunately existed, so special minority treaties were framed to try to give them some protection against persecution by the majority nationalities of the states in which they survived.

It is odd that the leaders of the American and Russian peoples should be the two leading champions of this doctrine in 1919; for both the American and the Soviet Unions in fact were—and still are—living denials of the doctrine. Both were—and are—federal states; both contain a wide diversity of races, languages, nationalities, and religions; both have followed the old dynastic kingdoms in devising a form of state which can govern large territories and diversified societies effectively. But the doctrines of national self-determination, already in 1919 inapplicable to America and Russia and little favoured by Britain or France,

5. *Sydney Smith: The Letters of Peter Plymley. Edited by G. C. Haselvine (Dent, 1929), p. 35.*

spread fast over the whole non-European world in the inter-war years.

They spread overseas just when Germany once again—as in the Thirty Years' War—was demonstrating that the uni-racial state, like the uni-national state, could bring the doom of European civilization. Just as it had taken cannibalism in the heart of Europe to teach that religious uniformity was unattainable without destroying civilization, so now it took the enormities of Dachau and Auschwitz and Hitler's experiment in genocide to demonstrate that racial supremacy is unattainable without destroying civilization. But have we, even now, drawn the right deductions from this demonstration? Have we even realised that this is what it did demonstrate? It is nearly a century now since Lord Acton remarked, in his famous essay on *Nationality*, that “where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-men”; and added that “A State which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself.”⁶

Our record of constructive statesmanship since 1945 hardly suggests that we have learned the lesson. Consider how often partition of older unities has been adopted as the only discoverable *modus vivendi* in the trouble-centres of the world—in Palestine, in India, in Korea, in Indo-China, even in Germany itself. Such partitions, in an attempt to produce undivided communities, as alternatives to mutual toleration and peaceful co-existence within a larger community, are admissions of the failure of the modern state—the state of national self-determination. They continue the process of Balkanizing the world, and what is Arab nationalism or African nationalism but an extension of the same principle?

New Trends

Whatever may be the merits of the uni-national state or the uni-racial state, it is a fact that the greatest political power-units of our contemporary world are not themselves national or racial states. The world's greatest Powers this coming half-century are already designated: they are the United States of America, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China. Not one of these is, or can attempt to be, other than a multi-national and multi-racial community, divided within itself by differences of every sort, yet they are also undeniably political entities of a highly

6. Lord Acton, *The History of Freedom and other Essays*: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1907 pp. 290 and 298.

effective kind held together by working political institutions. A possible fifth Power, the French Union, is passing through a phase of great internal crisis. But if it survives as a Great Power it, too, will certainly be perforce a multi-national and multi-racial community. The tide of world affairs seems firmly set, therefore, against the predominance of the integrated nation-state or race-state, and in favour of decisive power lying with the multi-national and multi-racial communities.

There is evidence, too, that this fact has been realised and acted upon by some of the most advanced nations of the world. The partial merger of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg into "Benelux", despite a long history of divisions and differences between them, works well because these countries share very obvious and fairly simple common purposes. The Coal and Steel Community, which comprises such traditional enemies as France and Western Germany, has so far worked reasonably well because it came into being at a magic moment when all the participants perceived the common interests they shared in this field of heavy industry. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization involves a degree of pooling of military resources and an integration of systems of defence that was unattainable in 1919. Wherever nation-states have been driven by necessity or guided by intelligence to recognise common interests, they have in fact succeeded in setting up political or economic or defence organizations which transcend the functions of separate national governments.

At the same time some divisions within states, which were once regarded as fundamental and as involving necessary discriminations, have come to be relegated to the limbo of irrelevance. In most European countries at least, and in many others too, differences of sex have ceased to be treated as a reason for inequalities of legal, civil or political rights — or even of economic rewards. Differences of social class tend to get blurred and more irrelevant in a Welfare State which ensures full employment and distributes social services according to need, and not according to capacity to pay for them. More and more divisions within the community are coming to be treated as unimportant in the eyes of the state, and irrelevant to the tasks of good government. This, surely, is an advance in the right direction, and a consequence of profound long-term historical processes of change.

The central world problem, as I see it, is to extend these processes and tendencies in world affairs, and to find on a global scale other urgent and worth-while purposes which transcend the divisions within and between communities. And this is where

I would return to my brief analysis of the world's great fears. The fear of nuclear destruction is already, I believe, fermenting in the Great Powers of the World, and compelling them to look for some escape from this terrifying prospect. There is no assurance that they will find it, or will find it in time to avoid yet more tremendous human suffering and destruction. But there is, on historical experience, some slight justification for hoping that they may. The fear of world starvation has, as yet, caught the imagination and therefore attracted the intelligent thinking of relatively few people. One constructive thing we can all do is to study, understand, and make better known the reality of this danger, which affects the coloured races of the world almost as urgently as the danger of nuclear war affects the white peoples. But we can be certain that both dangers affect both, and that the two dangers have the closest possible connection with one another. Compared with these supreme tasks confronting mankind, the divisions within even the most divided communities sink into relative insignificance and irrelevance. New forms of organization, domestic and international, are needed to tackle these tasks with any effect.

I should expect that, within the next ten or fifteen years, the outline shape of these new forms of organization will appear more clearly. I suspect that they will be extensions of the present trend towards a less sharp distinction between national administrative and political government and international functional co-operation. We think, traditionally, of the supreme function of the state as being the total government and administration of all the territories and inhabitants within its frontiers. That way of thinking no longer matches the realities of the world economy or the common world problems of the twentieth century. It has already been greatly modified by the sheer compulsion of conditions and events: a compulsion which has led to such bold experiments as Benelux, the Coal and Steel Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the various very important functional agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the many other new kinds of inter-state collaboration. If this tendency continues, and already it has been going on continuously for some fourteen years, then the scales may begin to tip the other way in our whole mode of thinking about the purpose and functions of the modern state. It will be the area of international co-operation which will, more and more clearly, be the area most concerned with the tasks that are most urgent and most important for the survival and material welfare of us all. The area of internal state action will remain, of course, of great meaning and importance for us too. But

domestic administration and government will be seen for what it is, a function incapable of performance apart from the equally essential functioning of international administration and organization. One essential function of the state will be, therefore, to lend full support to the international agencies, to work in partnership with them, even to hand over to them those jobs of organization which only they can adequately do.

The essence of all statesmanship is to have and to hold an appropriate sense of proportion and priorities, an ability to put first things first and to discover modes of action that are adequate to social purposes. The twin dangers that I have described, of nuclear destruction and world starvation, may increasingly assert themselves as top priorities in the agenda of world statecraft. To prevent them is a challenge capable of transcending even the barriers of iron curtain and of colour and also, I hope, the barriers of national frontiers. Of course these things may not happen. We may have nuclear war, and the effects of radio-activity so released may decimate the population, leaving behind an impoverished and suffering humanity. But I do not think they need to happen. Our statesmen do not all need to be Neros, fiddling while Rome burns.

I am not, I hope you will notice, advocating world government, or world federal union, or any of the other simple panaceas that are often prescribed as the solution to our problems. I do not think that human progress comes as simply as that, or that such remedies are acceptable to the peoples of the world at the present time. Progress is more likely to be tentative and piecemeal, and to suffer all sorts of setbacks. What I visualise is a gradual shifting of emphasis and balance between what the state as we know it attempts to do on its own, and what it will increasingly find can be done effectively only in very close collaboration with other states. In theoretical terms, this will mean a return to a more pluralistic concept of society and the state, a redistribution of functions between state governments and international agencies and organizations. And the dynamism behind this trend, which is already there plainly enough in existing organizations, will be the pressure of necessity.

Let the energies, spiritual and physical, of even a majority of men and women within the world's Great Powers, be directed and concentrated more and more intensively on these common needs and ends—these dramatic and heart-stirring challenges to the very survival of mankind—and then I believe we could relegate our present obsessions with divisions of political ideology or of race to that category of relative insignificance where they properly belong in the second half of the twentieth century.