



Namibia Resource Package

*Produced by the SACBC Peace & War Committee, Cape Democrats Namibia Information Group, and
Namibia Solidarity Committee (Western Cape)*

Contents

1. General overview

- * Profile on Namibia (CCN)
- * Namibia Constitutional History (SA Barometer)

2. Military rule

- * History of military conflict (NIG)
- * Koevoet (NCC)
- * Caught in the crossfire (WIP)
- * LIC in Namibia (WHAM publication)

3. Economy and living standards

- * Overview of economy (Namibia Support Committee)
- * Overview of economy (Financial Mail)
- * Pressclips

4. Privatisation

- * NUNW pamphlet
- * Pressclips

5. The Church

- * Church history
- * The Resisting Church (Crisis News)
- * Statement to UN
- * Current Role (RRR)

6. Resolution 435

- * Resolution 435 of 1978
- * Summary of 435 & Brazzaville Protocol

- * Timetable for implementation of 435
- * Resolution 435 as amended in 1982 (SA Barometer)
- * History and critique of 435 (Namibia Support Committee)
- * Principle for a peaceful settlement
- * December agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa

7. United Nations and Untag

- * Namibia: Untag (Idasa)
- * Untag (SA Barometer)
- * Pressclips

8. Current situation

- * Why South Africa agreed to the settlement
- * Obstacles to free and fair elections (NIG)
- * Renewed fighting in April (NIG)
- * The bumps along the road to freedom (WIP)
- * Pressclips

9. SWAPO

- * Chronology of Swapo
- * Swapo's economic programme
- * Trade union movement in Namibia (NIG)
- * Cosatu support pamphlet
- * Swapo constitutional proposals (SA Barometer)
- * Swapo Women's Council
- * Interview with Swapo

10. Resource list

1. General overview

* Profile on Namibia (CCN)

* Namibia Constitutional History (SA Barometer)



Miners returning from a shift in Tsumeb copper mine.

Precarious Independence

After a long struggle, Namibia is approaching independence from neighbouring South Africa. In the northern areas, which have been ravaged by South African forces, the end of the war will undoubtedly be greeted with great relief. Throughout the country Namibians hope that independence will diminish their poverty and make apartheid no more than a memory.

But what are the prospects for this late-born entrant to the family of nations? Can it really disentangle its destiny from what is happening in South Africa itself? How can South Africa be prevented from using its remaining administrative, military and above all economic power to maintain its control over the country it has ruled since 1920?

The Political Economy of Theft

Namibia's mineral resources make it potentially one of the ten richest African countries. The country has (or had) remarkable mineral wealth: diamonds, uranium, copper, silver, zinc, lead, precious stones. More recently a gold mine has opened, and discoveries of gas off the southern coast have raised hopes of oil. Until now, however, each

new discovery has made it more difficult for Namibia to free itself from avaricious colonial masters.

Control by South Africa, working with South African, British and other transnational companies, has meant that Namibians have not had their fair share in the wealth generated by these industries. With a relatively small population of 1.5 million, Namibians could be among the richest people in Africa, but the living standards of black Namibians are about the same as those of African states with one-sixth of the annual production per capita. Most of Namibia's wealth has been exported: 85% of goods produced are exported. On the other hand, 80% of the goods consumed are imported, mostly from South Africa. Over half the wealth produced in Namibia goes to company profits, or South African taxes on profit. About half the food consumed in Namibia is imported from South Africa. No other country exhibits such extremes in its economy. It has rightly been described as 'the political economy of theft'.

Mining

Mining is the largest sector, contributing over a third of GDP. Most mines are owned by multinational corporations, including RTZ, Consolidated Goldfields and Charter Consolidated (UK), as well as South African private and state corporations. Namibia's Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), owned by the South African multinational De Beers, produces about one-sixth of the world's annual supply of gem diamonds, and the bulk of Namibia's mining profit. CDM is extremely profitable — the selling price of a diamond is about four times the cost of its production.

The establishment of new mines has been illegal since

the UN revoked South Africa's mandate over Namibia in 1966. A major challenge to this has come from the development of the world's largest uranium oxide complex at Rössing, which reached full production in 1979. The majority equity holder is the British multinational RTZ; until 1983 the British Central Electricity Generating Board was buying uranium oxide, and West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan and the USSR are also implicated. In 1986 the UN began legal action against URENCO, which is jointly owned by the British, Dutch and West German governments, for illegally processing Namibian uranium.

The South African administration has prided itself on the attractive terms offered to foreign companies, including low taxes and no obligation to process minerals locally, to plough back profits into the country, or to recruit Namibians for management posts. Such policies reinforced underdevelopment by limiting the growth of local industries, preventing the creation of a body of skilled Namibian technicians and managers, and reducing the tax from minerals which the government could spend on wider development projects or social services. In March 1986 an official administration report, the Thirion Commission, was itself highly critical of the lax attention to mining, describing the administration's control of the diamond industry, for example, as a sham.

Agriculture

Namibia has a hostile environment — 50% of the territory is desert and only 2% suitable for crops; the remainder is used for cattle and sheep. Incoming white settlers established huge ranches (over 50 sq km) producing beef, mutton and karakul wool for export. They remain dependent on state support, complex technology and low wages.

By contrast African agriculture has been neglected in the interest of creating a flow of labour out of the overcrowded 'reserves'. Crop yields are among the lowest in the world, reflecting poor services and markets and the absence of family members on migrant labour contracts. Very few families can subsist without money sent back from migrants. Meanwhile food has to be imported from South Africa.

Fishing

During the 1970s the rich fishing off the coast of Namibia was exhausted as a result of overfishing by South African companies; further offshore much the same was being done by fleets from other countries, including the USSR and Spain. At its height the operation, based in Walvis Bay, supported eight processing plants and had an annual income of over US\$120m. Warnings from scientists about the effect on fish stocks of such a high rate of fishing were ignored, and by 1980 catches had fallen to one-seventh of their 1968 volume. One of Namibia's long-term assets was thus plundered with no benefit to the Namibian people.

Labour

The economically active population is about 500 000, some 300 000 of whom live in the north. About 110 000 Namibian workers are migrants, most of them on 12- to 18-month contracts living in spartan and overcrowded compounds separated from their families. The system allows low wages, since families supplement the migrants'

remittances by agriculture. These low wages were essential to the early growth of the mines and ranches. However, particularly since 1971, migrants have been active politically and constitute the backbone of the liberation movement. There is now a split among the dominant white groups. The larger mining companies are prepared to see higher wages and an end to migrant labour, since the wage bill is a small proportion of their costs and they have an interest in a settled, skilled labour force. Ranchers, on the other hand, would be hard hit if they had to increase wages, and they constitute the main support for the right wing.

Unemployment has continued to rise, but there is a shortage of skilled labour. Trade-union activity took a remarkable upturn in 1987 and 1988, especially in the mining industry. Although unions were not able to win major concessions, it is now clear that trade unions can no longer be ignored in Namibian industry, and a few larger companies recently concluded recognition agreements with unions affiliated to the National Union of Namibian Workers, which has close links to SWAPO.

There is still a shortage of high-level personnel, resulting in a heavy dependence on South African whites.

Economic Trends

Between 1979 and 1984 the economy experienced a deep slump, only returning to positive growth rates in 1985. In 1984 agriculture and fishing were producing at only half the 1976 level, construction at two-thirds, mining at 94%. The whole country was in the grip of a severe drought, which lasted six years in the south, decimating animal herds. The recovery continued in 1986 and 1987 (with growth rates of 3.1% and 2.9%), thanks largely to the favourable impact of the devalued rand on the primary sector (mining and agriculture). Economic activity has remained heavily influenced by trends in the South African economy. The prospect of independence has led to some revival in investment, notably by CDM in mining, but also to a rundown of plant by whites preparing to leave and neglect by the current administration of major infrastructure, such as water.

Social and Political Policies

Oppression has deep roots in Namibia. The German colonisation, which began in 1884, is still remembered for the way in which the rebellions of 1904 were put down with a policy of genocide. An estimated 80 000 Namibians were killed. Some were driven into the 'thirstland' desert to die. German colonisation ended during the First World War, after which Namibia was allocated to South African administration, as a 'sacred trust of civilisation', under a mandate granted by the League of Nations.

The application of apartheid in Namibia was in some respects more extreme than in South Africa itself. The education of white Namibians to the age of 16 was made compulsory in the 1920s, but there was not a single secondary school for black Namibians until 1953.

All South African laws making detention without trial possible were also extended to Namibia, and these have been supplemented by local proclamations allowing for arrest by South African soldiers, and dusk-to-dawn



Single men's hostel, Katutura.

curfews in large parts of the country. Many Namibians have suffered torture and death at the hands of their South African colonisers, notably from specially trained forces such as Koevoet ('crowbar'), described in one court case as 'programmed killers'. 'Homelands' have also been established in some parts of Namibia, along tribal lines, and the claim made that black Namibians should confine their political and commercial aspirations to these impoverished areas. However, through the migrant labour system, Namibians have been forced to leave their families in these 'reserves', and take up poorly paid employment on white-owned farms and mines.

More recently, as apartheid came under attack internationally and domestically, South Africa tried experiments in the modernisation and rationalisation of apartheid in Namibia. A system of eleven ethnic governments was established in recent years, a modification of the 'homelands' system used in South Africa. A South African-appointed cabinet with black members has even been created.

A black middle class has been fostered, particularly through an increase in teachers' salaries. The effectiveness of this strategy was seen in 1988 when students on strike against the South African policy of placing army camps near to school hostels received little support from their teachers. On the other hand, the upgrading and retraining of teachers has been neglected.

Almost all power has remained in the hands of Pretoria, and of Namibia's 70,000 whites.

The Churches

Strong identification with the colonial system was an early attitude of the German Lutheran and Catholic missionaries, though less marked among the Finnish Lutherans in Ovamboland. Nevertheless the church grew to include the majority of the population: some 70% of black Namibians are thought to belong to the main Lutheran, Catholic, and Anglican Churches. Until the 1960s they were responsible for all education for black people, and the network of missions, schools, hospitals and clinics is still particularly important in the north, despite a recent withdrawal of support by the administration. Many of the founders of the liberation movements were Christians. Gradually the institutional church became more Namibian and more vocal. A turning point came in 1971, when the black leaders of the two largest Lutheran churches issued an open letter repeatedly referring to the UN Charter of Human Rights and denouncing the conduct of the South African administration. Striking migrant workers applauded the Lutheran bishop. In the succeeding decade many missionaries were expelled — including three Anglican bishops — and church sources blamed the South Africans for two bombings of the Lutheran press at Oniipa, in 1973 and 1980, while on the other hand small sections of the church continued to support the status quo. In 1978,

however, sufficient common ground was established for all the main denominations except the white Dutch Reformed to collaborate through the Council of Churches in Namibia. Lutheran, Catholic and Anglican bishops went to Geneva in 1981 to hold discussions at the abortive conference between SWAPO and South Africa. Now almost all black-led, the churches play an active role in drawing international attention to the situation in Namibia, particularly through the London-based Namibia Communications Centre. At the same time they try to foster development in the less war-torn regions of the country.

The churches have come under repeated attack, with members harassed and detained, buildings desecrated and firebombings of both a theological seminary and (in 1986) the offices of the Council of Churches. They have received firm support from sister churches, which have sent successive delegations to Namibia, notably the British Council of Churches, the worldwide Anglican Communion and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference. In recent years the Namibian churches have been active in working for the release of detainees, and in challenging oppressive regulations such as the dusk-to-dawn curfew in Northern Namibia.

The Liberation Movement

South African policies have met with fierce resistance. The 1960s, when many African nations achieved independence, saw the emergence of SWAPO as Namibia's most important nationalist liberation

movement. Frustration with the efficacy of processes at the United Nations and in the World Court at the Hague led to the launching of the armed struggle against South African occupation in 1966.

The fall of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 brought about major changes in Southern Africa, and enabled Namibians to escape into Angola for further education and military training. Embarrassed at South Africa's failure to comply with international law, the five Western members of the UN Security Council (including Britain) worked out a plan for Namibia's transition to independence, known as resolution 435 (1978) of the UN Security Council. Although initially cooperative, South Africa refused to implement the plan and instead set about the installation of a series of 'interim' governments which it hoped would take support away from SWAPO.


In Zambia, Angola, Cuba and the Congo a number of institutions and schools were established by SWAPO and the United Nations to train Namibians for their future responsibilities in the government of Namibia. Embarrassed, South Africa began to establish Namibia's first university in the 1980s.

By 1981 SWAPO's military campaign had become so effective that South Africa decided to step up its intervention in Angola, occupying large areas of the south and providing training and logistical support for the rebel Angolan movement UNITA.

The prolonged battle for Cuito Cuanavale in Southern Angola during 1988 apparently proved a turning point for the war in Angola, as South African-controlled forces were surrounded by the combined forces of Angola, Cuba and SWAPO. At the end of 1988, with its own economy in decline because of opposition at home and financial sanctions abroad, South Africa was finally forced to sign agreements which would allow the independence of Namibia in terms of Resolution 435. Although continuing



After the bombing of the church press at Oniipa.



South African Forces withdraw across the Okavango river from Angola into Namibia.

to supply the rebel UNITA movement in Angola, South African troops had to withdraw from Angola and a joint monitoring commission was set up to patrol the 1000-km border between Namibia and Angola. The agreement also provided for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola by mid-1991.

The Transition to Independence

Under the 1988 agreement a timetable has been drawn up for Namibia's transition to independence under the terms of United Nations Resolution 435 of 1978. The key dates in the process are:

- 1 April 1989 Ceasefire between SWAPO and South Africa. UN forces and officials begin to arrive.
- November 1989 Elections for a Constituent Assembly.
- Early 1990 Independence.


Since Namibia is legally the responsibility of the United Nations, the transition will be 'supervised and controlled' by the United Nations, which is due to have a force of 4650 troops and 1500 civilians in Namibia by 1 July 1989. The administration of the elections, and of law and order

will, however, remain the responsibility of the South Africans, who are also likely to retain control of the media. South Africa will keep 1500 troops in two bases in the north of the country, and the South African Administrator General will have dictatorial powers.

There is little doubt that SWAPO will win the elections, but there is considerable scope for South Africa to influence events, by assistance to the ethnically based coalitions it supports. SWAPO's aim is the two-thirds majority required to carry constitutional measures. In view of the number of right-wing groups active in Namibia, there are also fears that SWAPO leaders may be in danger of assassination.

Independence and Reconstruction

Possibilities for an independent Namibia have been extensively studied under the auspices of the United Nations. SWAPO is not in favour of wholesale nationalisation of either mining companies or land, but will insist that a greater proportion of profits is reinvested in the country and that more processing takes place locally. Land held by absentee landowners will be



SWAPO President Sam Nujoma.

redistributed, and there will be a drive for food production to break dependence on imports from South Africa. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, which coordinates the efforts of the independent states of the region to break their economic dependence on South Africa, has invited Namibia to join, and will be important in giving the country economic links — at present almost non-existent — with the rest of the region.

Education will be a crucial area, having been neglected under South African rule. School enrolments are likely to double within the first few years of independence, placing a great strain on government budgets. SWAPO will want to introduce a new system of basic education, to replace Afrikaans by English as the official language and to introduce a national adult literacy campaign.

A huge investment in medical and social facilities will be required to repair the damage of occupation and war. Medical facilities are more or less confined to urban areas, and in addition to the physically disabled there are thousands of divided families and malnourished children, and high levels of crime, mental illness and alcoholism. South African policies have also exploited ethnic differences, creating another handicap for nation-building.

Finally, defence will be a huge problem for the new nation. South Africa is unlikely to accept any real reduction in control over its neighbours, particularly as the struggle to overthrow apartheid becomes more acute. The remnants of the regular and irregular forces created by South Africa, such as Koevoet, could be used to form a dissident army like the MNR in Mozambique. South Africa's intention to retain control over Namibia's main port, Walvis Bay, is a sign of this attitude. In recent years South Africa has also burdened Namibia with a substantial foreign debt, mostly owed to South Africa. SWAPO has repudiated responsibility for repayment, which would be a tragic waste of resources for the newly independent state.

February 1989

Resources

A Future for Namibia series (London, CIIR, 1986): *Namibia in the 1980s*, *Transforming a Wasted Land* (agriculture), *Mines and Independence*, *Education, Repression and Liberation*, *Exploring the Sea* (fishing).

Namibia: Apartheid's Forgotten Children (Oxford, Oxfam, 1988).

Zephaniah Kameeta, *Why, O Lord?* (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1986).

Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, *Report on Namibia* (Pretoria, SACBC, 1982), available from CIIR.

Namibia. Report to the Archbishop of Canterbury by an Anglican delegation in 1983 (London, 1983).

A People Dispossessed, slide-tape set, available from the Namibia Refugee Project.

Susannah Smith, *Namibia: a Violation of Trust* (Oxford, Oxfam, 1986).

Caroline Allison, *It's Like Holding the Key to Your Own Jail: Women in Namibia* (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1986).

International Defence and Aid Fund, *Namibia: the Facts*, photo exhibition.

Church Action on Namibia: Worship Pack; Parish Education Pack; Photo Exhibition on Namibia and the Churches.

Sources of information

Namibia Communications Centre, 15 Wilmington Square, London WC1X 0ER.

Church Action on Namibia, URC Church, Pott Street, E2 0EF.

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF), Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR.

Basic Facts

Name	Namibia (but formerly referred to by South Africa as South West Africa)
Government	Due to attain independence in 1990 under UN Resolution 435. Illegally occupied by South Africa since 1966, when the UN revoked the League of Nations mandate exercised by South Africa since 1920. SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) recognised by UN as sole representative of the people.
Capital	Windhoek
Area	824 000 sq. km (more than three times the size of the UK)
Population	Approx 1.55m (including 82 000 whites) 70% of 'black' population rural. Growth rate 3.5 per annum.
People	'African' 85% 'Coloured' 10% 'White' 5%
Religion	70% Christian: Lutheran 50%, Roman Catholic 10%, Anglican 9%
Languages	Nine. Ovambo spoken by half the population. Current administrative language Afrikaans, which SWAPO plans to replace by English.
Health	Infant mortality 155 per 1000 for blacks 21 per 1000 for whites (UN, 1984) Life expectancy at birth 68-72 for whites 42-52 for blacks
Skills	Literacy estimate 60% Education: Less than 2% of blacks reach secondary school. In 1981 only 1% of black adults had completed secondary school, and 12% primary.

© CIIR 1989
ISBN 1 85287 037 0



Burnt-out homestead, Ondangwa, northern Namibia.



Australian Catholic Relief, 154 Elizabeth Street, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia.



Canadian Catholic Organisation for Development and Peace, 3028 Danforth Avenue, Toronto, Ontario M4C 1N2, Canada.



Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, 2 Romero Close, Stockwell Road, London SW9 9TY, England.



Catholic Institute for International Relations, 22 Coleman Fields, London N1 7AF, England.



Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace and Development (Aotearoa-New Zealand), PO Box 12-193, Wellington, 20 Barker Street, Wellington, (Aotearoa) New Zealand.



Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund, 5 Oswald Street, Broomielaw, Glasgow G1 4QR.



Trocaire-Irish Catholic Agency for World Development, 169 Booterstown Avenue, Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland.

Namibia: constitutional history

JUNE 12 this year is deadline day for the Namibian Constitutional Council to submit draft proposals for a new constitution to the cabinet of the Transitional Government of National Unity of SWA/Namibia. The deadline was set by the transitional government.

Below is a history of the key constitutional developments in Namibia.

Origins of the dispute: 1920 — 1975

1920

The League of Nations, formed after World War I, places the former German colony of Sudwesafrika under a South African mandate.

1947

After the United Nations Organisation (UNO) replaces the League, South Africa refuses to relinquish its mandate or enter into a trusteeship agreement with the territory.

1949


South Africa claims that the terms of the original mandate are invalid, having lapsed with the demise of the League of Nations. SA continues to administer the territory as an effective "fifth province".

1969

The UN security council declares the South Africa occupation of Namibia to be illegal and calls on SA to withdraw from the territory immediately.

1971

The International Court of Justice, having rejected an earlier request (1966) by several African countries to pass



judgement, issues an advisory opinion confirming the legality of the security council decision.

1973

The UN general assembly recognises Swapo as "the sole and authentic representatives of the Namibian people".

The Turnhalle Conference: 1975 — 1982

1975

South Africa calls a constitutional conference (the Turnhalle Conference) aimed at promoting "self-government" in the territory. Delegates are chosen on an ethnic basis, and are not representative of the entire population.

1977

Namibian voters (except those in Walvis Bay, which is directly administered by the Cape Province) lose their representation in the South African parliament and an Administrator-General, Justice Steyn, is appointed by Pretoria to rule the territory by proclamation.

The five Western nations of the UN security council (USA, France, West

Germany, Canada and Britain) form a Contact Group to negotiate a settlement.

1978

The UN security council passes Resolution 435, the basis of all subsequent international attempts to reach a settlement in Namibia. (See below) After extensive negotiations with the Western Contact Group and Swapo, South Africa agrees to help implement the resolution.

South Africa proceeds with an internal settlement and an election is held for a 50-seat constituent assembly. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), comprised of all but two of the parties represented at the Turnhalle Conference, wins a majority of 41 seats. Swapo does not participate.

1980

The constituent assembly adopts the constitution proposed by the Turnhalle Conference and becomes a national assembly. The new constitution, instituted by proclamation of the administrator-general provides for:

- * A three-tier government based on the division of the population into ethnic groups.

- * Second-tier elections to be held for the separate legislative assemblies for all the ethnic groups, except in Ovamboland (the Ovambos constitute the largest ethnic group in the territory).

- * A national assembly and council of ministers to be granted limited powers of government.

1981

UN negotiators organise a conference in Geneva in an attempt to break the deadlock reached over the implementation of Resolution 435. South African, Namibian and Swapo delegates attend but the conference achieves very little.

The Multi-Party Conference:

1983 — 1987

1983

The national assembly is dissolved to make way for a new interim government.

Direct rule through the Administrator-

General, Danie Hough, is reinstated as an interim measure.

US President Ronald Reagan initiates the notion of "Cuban linkage" to the implementation of Resolution 435.

Six internal parties, including the DTA, Swapo-Democrats and the South West African National Union, form the Namibian Multi-Party Conference (MPC). It aims at formulating joint policy on the implementation of Resolution 435, leading to internationally supervised independence.

1984

The MPC agrees to work towards a political and constitutional dispensation acceptable to the majority of Namibians.

Talks in Lusaka in May between South Africa and Angola result in the Lusaka Agreement in terms of which SA agrees to withdraw its troops from southern Angola.

The withdrawal is to be monitored by a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), to be set up for this purpose. Angola accepts eventual Cuban withdrawal in principle, as part of an overall regional settlement in Southern Africa.

1985

The MPC submits its constitutional proposals to State President PW Botha and requests the creation of a transitional government, comprising a legislative and executive authority, as well as a constitutional council.

The MPC is given the go-ahead, the transitional government is officially instituted in June by an SA government proclamation, and a decision is made to replace the Administrator-General with a low-key governor-general.

The constitutional council comprising 16 appointed members, representing all six parties in the new administration, is chaired by Justice Victor Hiemstra. It is assigned to draft a constitution for the territory within 18 months. Soon after his appointment, the judge says that he believes race or colour should not play any role in the formulation of the new constitution.

In April South Africa announces the completion of its withdrawal of troops from Angola and, in terms of the Lusaka

Agreement, the JMC ceases to function 30 days later.

Pretoria reaffirms its intention to pursue an internationally acceptable settlement, but the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops remains a major issue.

1987

Swapo's Sam Nujoma, speaking in Lusaka on May 4, reiterates his organisation's willingness to sign a ceasefire agreement with SA to implement Resolution 435. Swapo has refused to take part in the deliberations of the constitutional committee, arguing that the body's work contravenes Resolution 435's settlement plan for the territory, to which SA has already agreed in principle.

State President PW Botha, members of his cabinet and members of the transitional government meet in Cape Town on May 22 to discuss constitutional matters, security, the status of the transitional government, international viewpoints on Namibia and the territory's economic and financial situation, including economic and financial assistance from SA.

Exactly what the talks achieved is unclear. A statement issued afterwards by the president's office warned that "steps taken by the transitional government which interfered with SA's international interests and undertakings are unacceptable".

In requesting the meeting, the Namibian cabinet called on SA to allow Namibians to "consider their constitutional future themselves whereupon negotiations concerning final implementation with SA will take place".

The cabinet also invited parties not represented on the council to submit their own proposals. It alluded to a possible referendum; in the event of more than one proposal, the cabinet would decide whether they were capable of reconciliation, whether they should be subjected to popular test and in which manner they should be implemented.

The UN Commission for Namibia, after a four-day meeting in Luanda, issued a statement on May 23 again calling for the immediate implementation of UN Resolution 435 and said that SA and the USA, by insisting on the prior condition

of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, were deliberately trying to delay independence.

Speaking at a meeting on May 27, to mark the 24th anniversary of the OAU, West German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher says Namibian independence can no longer be delayed. "Together with our allies we unswervingly advocate implementation of Resolution 435," he said.

UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)

The council approved the secretary-general's report which stated as its objective the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia, and the transference of power to the people of the country. This goal was to be achieved through:

- * The establishment of a UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the UN secretary-general's special representative in Namibia, in ensuring the early independence of the territory

- * The cessation of all hostile acts by all parties, and the withdrawal, restriction or demobilisation of all armed forces

- * The conduct of free and fair elections to the constituent assembly, under the supervision and control of the United Nations

- * The formulation and adoption of a constitution for Namibia by the elected assembly, to be followed by the achievement of independence.

(Source: Indicator South Africa, Vol 3 No 3, 1986 and press reports)

Subscription rates

SA, Namibia and TBVC states

One year: R95

Airmail: Southern Africa

One year: R135

Airmail: Europe and USA

One year: R180 /\$90/ £60

KSB Publications, PO Box 261-303
Excom, 2023, Johannesburg

2. Military rule

- * History of military conflict (NIG)
- * Koevoet (NCC)
- * Caught in the crossfire (WIP)
- * LIC in Namibia (WHAM publication)

MAY 1989

HISTORY OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN NAMIBIA

EARLY HISTORY

Germany colonised Namibia in 1884/5. Its oppressive rule and seizure of land were fiercely resisted by the Nama and Herero people in the central and southern parts of the country. The German army issued "extermination orders" and embarked on a policy of genocide. An estimated 70% of the Nama and Herero populations were killed. The German colonial period ended when South Africa invaded Namibia during World War 1.

The early years of South African rule were characterised by a series of small scale conflicts between the authorities and local people. The most serious of these was the Bondelzwarts rebellion in 1922, which was suppressed by the Union Defence Force. There was little further military conflict until the 1960's.

1960-1975

Swapo, formed in 1957 as a political movement, embarked on a strategy of armed struggle in 1966. Guerillas began infiltrating Namibia from Zambia. At that stage counter-insurgency was the responsibility of the SA Police. A number of clashes took place between Swapo and the police in the Caprivi region in 1969-72.

In 1971/2 20 000 workers went on strike against the contract labour system. This was followed by a mass peasant uprising in the Ovambo region as dismissed workers returned home. In January 1972 the SADF was deployed for the first time in the north. In February the Ovambo region was placed under martial law, with widespread detentions. This order was later extended to other areas. In 1973 the SADF took control of counter-insurgency operations. Also in that year Swapo formed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (Plan).

MILITARY CONFLICT POST 1975

After Angolan independence in 1975 there was a dramatic increase in Swapo military activity, with Plan establishing bases in southern Angola. There were three times as many skirmishes in 1976 as in the previous 10 years put together. The size of the SADF force in Namibia consequently increased sharply. By the mid- 1980's there were over 100 000 South African controlled troops there.

The north became intensely militarised. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed, and thousands of people were forcibly removed from a 1 km wide strip along the Angolan border. The four northern bantustans were designated the Operational Area. Most of the fighting took place in Sector 10 (Ovambo and Kaokoland), but Swapo guerillas also penetrated the largely white-owned farmlands to the south. Here white farmers were organised into Area Force Units, similar to the commandos in South Africa. By September 1983 as many as 1/3 of the white farms in the north were unoccupied as a result of the war.



In May 1979 emergency legislation was extended to most of central Namibia. From February 1983 there was a blanket ban on reports of military operations. From 1985 police permits were required to enter the Operational Area.

In 1971 the SADF introduced a 'hearts and minds' campaign to improve its image in northern Namibia. SADF soldiers were used as doctors, vets, teachers and agricultural advisers. However the campaign was completely undermined by the army's repressive activities and mass support for Swapo.

Swapo's armed struggle took the form of guerilla warfare, with extensive use of ambushes and landmines. Other activities included cutting powerlines from Ruacana, attacking Ondagwa airforce base and mortaring other military bases. More recently there were bomb attacks in urban areas.

According to official statistics about 10 000 Namibians, 1% of the population, have been killed since 1966. In 1985 the official cost of the occupation was R1143 million.

THE SADF IN ANGOLA

After 1975 the SADF extended the war into Angola, with numerous cross-border raids, full scale invasions and military occupations. Pretoria's objectives were to destabilise the MPLA government, bolster Unita and attack Plan bases. Tens of thousands of Angolans were killed or maimed, and the economic infrastructure virtually destroyed.

On 4 May 1978 200 SADF paratroopers launched an attack on Swapo guerilla and refugee camps in Angola. Pretoria claimed that over a thousand 'terrorists' were killed. Swapo and international observers stated that of the 600 people killed, all but 12 were refugees and half were children.

REPRESSION AND ATROCITIES

The South African security forces have been widely condemned internationally for their repressive measures. Numerous church and human rights groups have documented security force atrocities that include murder, rape, mutilation, torture, destruction of property and theft. Security force members are rarely prosecuted for these offences, and those that are frequently receive extraordinarily light sentences. On several occasions the South African State President has invoked the Defence Act to halt criminal proceedings against SADF soldiers.

The most notorious of the security forces is Koevoet, a special police counter-insurgency unit set up in 1979. It numbers about 3000 men, the majority being black Namibians. It claims responsibility for 90% of the 'contacts' and 'kills' in the north.

'NAMIBIANISING' THE CONFLICT

In 1981 the South African State President extended military conscription to Namibian men. They were called-up into the SWA Territory Force (SWATF), which was set up by the SADF in the same year and remained under its command. In 1985 SWATF had 21 000 members. The introduction of conscription led to thousands of young men fleeing the country to join Plan. There has since been extensive popular resistance to military service, and the SADF did not enforce it in the northern regions where Swapo has substantial support.

Dreaded Koevoet to help with UN plan?

In an interview published in the weekly *Times of Namibia* on 1 February, South Africa's Chief of Police in Namibia, General Dolf Gouws, revealed that almost half of the police he has assigned to enforce "law and order" during the forthcoming UN supervised elections are the dreaded counter-insurgency unit known as "Koevoet". This for implementing the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence which stipulate that Koevoet must be disbanded. Denis Herbstein, of the Namibia Communications Centre, shows how absurd and dangerous such an arrangement would be.

On 23 January, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar stated that "....the counter insurgency unit known as Koevoet was said to number approximately 3,000 personnel. Monitoring the disbandment of the counter-insurgency units, including Koevoet, will be the concern of the military component of UNTAG..." (the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group).

General Gouws, however, argued that the 3,000 Koevoet members would not be disbanded and that they were already integrated into the 6,300-strong police force. He argued that to give them a police role during the transition would keep them employed and prevent them taking up arms against SWAPO. Gouws admitted that during the election campaign, the police would be regarded as "the enemy of the people" but said that "we will just have to take it and bear it".

When off-duty, members of Koevoet sometimes wear T-shirts proclaiming "Murder is our business and business is good." For once, South African propaganda has the ring of truth. In the nine years since Koevoet was let loose on northern Namibia it boasts of killing 25 people to every one killed by the official South African Defence Force (SADF)

One of Koevoet's kills was Kudinu Katanga, who crossed the Kavango River into Angola to cut poles for his hut. On his return he was assaulted by a white Koevoet officer, then kicked by constables and forced to run 10 kilometres in front of an armoured vehicle. Mr Katanga fell down and was hit over the head with an ox yoke. He died. The white magistrate thought the "policemen" had acted "over enthusiastically", fining one of them 15 (British) pounds, and another 30 pounds for common assault.

Koevoet (pronounced "coo-foot") was created in 1979 at the instigation of General Magnus Malan, then chief of the SADF, now minister of defence. He was worried about the growing success of the SWAPO guerrillas in Ovamboland, where the people are especially sympathetic to the liberation movement. Dreyer recruited 200 white South African police officers and 800 black Ovambo and Okavango special constables, as well as some members of UNITA and the FNLA, who were on the losing side in the Angolan civil war.

Many of the black recruits are school dropouts, some with criminal records, all without any hope of jobs in an economy wrecked by the 20 year war. A large number are in fact Angolans. They are paid far in excess of the wages received by migrant workers in the south. There is a large bonus, known as "kopgeld" or head money, for each insurgent they kill. With the result that off-duty Koevoet men must fully-armed 24 hours a day to protect themselves against the hatred of the ordinary people.

Some of Koevoet's victims are indeed SWAPO freedom fighters, but the vast bulk are the elderly, young children, housewives, ordinary villagers going about their lawful business, who have been shot in cold blood or died from torture. Nor does Koevoet's white South African commanding officer, Brigadier Hans Dreyer, publicise the considerable number of Koevoet members killed by SWAPO.

Since the early 1980's, South Africa has claimed that Koevoet is a counterinsurgency unit of the "South West African Police". But they were policemen only in name. They shot first, asked questions afterwards. Their whole purpose was to intimidate Namibians into rejecting SWAPO. The South African newspaper, *The Cape Times*, wrote that "Koevoet is a military unit performing military tasks....The reason is that under the United Nations independence plan all but 1,500 South African soldiers must leave the colony before the November elections. Police would be allowed to stay, however, in order to maintain law and order. In those few vital months, the Koevoet "police" would be able to wreak havoc with the truce. And after independence, Koevoet constables could be used by Pretoria to destabilise a SWAPO government.

With the whole country tied up by a curfew at night, and access tightly controlled by the SADF, the remote Ovambo region of Namibia offered Koevoet unlimited opportunities for terror. But occasionally reports of Koevoet activities filtered to the outside world. They raided hostels to rape the school girls, they went into hospitals and dragged wounded guerrillas out of the grasp of doctors and nurses, they dressed in SWAPO guerrilla uniforms and shot unsuspecting villagers.

Four years ago sisters at the Roman Catholic mission hospital at Oshikuku found the partially decomposed remains of eight Namibian men in a trench nearby. The assailants were never found, but three years before, there had been another mass killing at Oshikuku when eight members of a family died. Koevoet boasted of those killings.

Koevoet achieved public notoriety through the 1983 trial of Jonas Paulus, who spent a weekend on leave disguised as a guerilla,, rampaging through villages raping, killing and looting. A former UNITA soldier, Paulus was later hanged for his crimes, but he had told the court that " we are called members of the police, but we are only taught to wage war...to find SWAPO and wipe them out". A psychiatrist explained that Paulus began life normally, but indoctrination by UNITA and Koevoet had destroyed his "sense of moral responsibility"

In a major anti-SWAPO "terrorism" trial in 1987, a white Windhoek supreme court judge recommended that a Koevoet officer be investigated for his "inhumane behaviour" and "unmerciful

Caught in the crossfire

This article, written by Tony Weaver (Windhoek correspondent of the South African Morning Group of Newspapers) is a journalist's account of the state of the war in Namibia during 1983.

The information in the article is drawn from published sources, interviews and personal observations. The war in Namibia is mainly a war involving a political struggle for liberation from foreign domination, a war which daily sees a terrible toll taken in civilian life and loss of freedom.

It is also a war of information, and no truly balanced picture of what is really happening in Namibia will be able to be published in South Africa until the war is over and Namibia is independent.

Besides the lack of widespread access to the war zone and, more importantly, to South African positions in southern Angola held by the Defence Force, the restrictions on what may and may not be published are myriad, and carry heavy penalties if contravened. Section 118 of the Defence Act is the most commonly used counter to the publication of information. Its ambit is wide and, as Senator Hiram Johnson said in 1917, 'The first casualty when war comes is truth'.

Section 118 states, among other things, that 'no person shall publish in any newspaper, book or pamphlet, or by radio or any other means ... any information relating to the composition, movements or dispositions of the SADF... or any statement, comment or rumour calculated directly or indirectly to convey such information ... or ... any statement, comment or rumour relating to any member of the SADF or any activity of the SADF or any force of a foreign country calculated to prejudice or embarrass the government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public, except where publication thereof has been authorised by the Minister or under his authority.'

It is within this context that the following is written.

Seventeen years ago, on 26 August 1966, the war in Namibia began. South African helicopters spotted a SWAPO guerilla training camp at Ongulumbashe, and in the subsequent clash two guerillas died and 27 were captured. The previous month, the World Court had decided that it was powerless to rule either way in the long-standing dispute over South African control of Namibia. Immediately after this ruling on 18 July, the South West African People's Organisation, SWAPO of Namibia, released its famous *Dar Es Salaam* declaration: 'We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom. And as sure as night follows day, victory will be ours.'

Since 1966, the war has undergone many changes, many phases of warfare. This article does not attempt an historical, military analysis of the war - rather, it represents an account of the war as it is being conducted in the latter part of 1983.

To situate this account: the war in Namibia itself is being primarily fought in the Kavango and Ovambo war zones, the two regions corresponding with the bantustan boundary by the Odendaal Plan in the 1960s. The western sector of Ovambo is characterised by flat, wide-open plains with little or no ground cover. Palm trees are the main type of vegetation. The east of Ovambo and western Kavango are ideally suited for guerilla activities - thickly wooded with little or no road communication in most areas. Guerillas can often move at will, encountering little or no resistance. When SWAPO makes claims of controlling liberated zones, an essential organisational base for any guerilla movement, they cannot be faulted. As the popular saying goes in Namibia: 'The SADF controls Ovambo by day. SWAPO by night.'

Increasingly though, as the 'hearts and minds' campaign of the SADF meets mass rejection from the people of Ovambo and Kavango, the slogan has been amended to: 'SWAPO controls Ovambo and Kavango, because the people support SWAPO.'

Half of the population of Namibia live in Ovambo and Kavango, and when the SADF talk of the war being 'contained', they are talking of it being contained in the area where the majority of Namibians live.

The pattern of the war in 1983

The most dramatic, and least known, shift in the pattern of the Namibian war began in 1978 with the formation of the Special Police Counter Insurgency Unit, Koevoet (Crowbar).

Looked at the terms of active contacts with PLAN, SWAPO's military wing, and the level of success achieved in locating and killing guerillas, Koevoet has taken over the war in Ovambo and Kavango. Membership of the unit is 90% black, predominantly recruited from the Ovambo-speaking region. Information on the unit is hard to come by, and until recently, the press was barred from even using the name 'Koevoet'. However, it became such a catchword in Namibia that limited information was released.

Because of the ambit of the Police Act, even can be written on Koevoet than on the SADF, and although knowledge of the unit's operations are widespread within Namibia, this article can only make use of

published information, and facts which do not contravene the sweeping powers of the Act.

There is an incorrect tendency to label all police units wearing camouflage uniform 'Koevoet'. Rough estimates (no official figures are available) put the actual number of Koevoet members at about 1 000 men. This does not include the Police Special Task Force, an elite, Windhoek-based 'reaction unit', and who do from time to time take on the same kind of operations as Koevoet. Koevoet, with headquarters in Oshakati, is jointly controlled by commanding officer Brigadier Hans Dreyer, and the direct authority of police headquarters in Pretoria, under the command of Police Commissioner and former security police boss, General Johan Coetzee.

Membership is a closely guarded secret, and no details are ever released of black Koevoet deaths - 'to protect their families'. But it has emerged from published court records and official police sources, that a number of Koevoet members are captured SWAPO guerillas who have been 'turned' - ie, faced with the option of joining Koevoet or spending their lives until independence in either the Mariental or Ombalantu detention camps.

It is sometimes said in Ovambo that 'to join Koevoet, you have to have a criminal record'. The accuracy of this statement is difficult to gauge, but court cases involving Koevoet members have revealed that in some instances the policeman has a previous criminal record, often one gained before joining the unit. White leadership of the unit is drawn from SAP members doing an annual 'tour' of duty in the war zone, and from former Selous Scouts and other ex-Rhodesian units. The units spend weeks on patrol and in the bush, and are responsible for over 80% of war deaths in Ovambo and Kavango.

In both Ovambo and Kavango allegations of brutalities against the civilian population allegedly committed by both the SADF and the police, have been made. But according to many accounts, the SADF is relatively restrained in comparison to the Koevoet units.

Koevoets members have been accused of employing a tactic of the Selous Scouts - dressing as SWAPO guerillas, and then coming to kraals seeking food and shelter. If the shelter is given, they then reveal their identities, and there have been allegations of kraals being burnt, women, men and children killed and widespread looting taking place. If people at the kraal refuse to give shelter, the pretence of being PLAN guerillas is maintained, and the same routine is followed.

As regards published evidence of Koevoet atrocities, the most damning surrounds the March 1982 massacre of eight people in a village north of Oshikuku, some 50km from Oshakati.

Official inquest findings said the eight people died as a result of "an attack by SWAPO terrorists". Interviews with survivors of the attack alleged the opposite. All those interviewed claimed the attack was carried out by armed members of the security force, and a survivor insisted he recognised one of the soldiers as a notorious Koevoet commander.

Published accounts of alleged Koevoet brutalities are too numerous to quote individually. Two further accounts will have to suffice. On 18 November last year, it is alleged that Jona Hamukwana a teacher at the Namuntuntu Primary School and Kaduma Katanga, both from Kakoro village in western Kavango, were beaten to death within hours of being detained by Koevoet for interrogation. The Koevoet men alleged that 'all teachers are SWAPOs'. A preliminary inquest into the deaths of the two men is due to start next month.

In another published account, Damien Haikera, a schoolteacher from Kagunie, also western Ovambo, told journalists that on 20 September last year, a Koevoet squad arrived at his school and detained him after alleging he had been harbouring PLAN guerillas.

'They took me to their camp, and there we were blindfolded ... they told me I must sleep, but then they began hitting me, they made me lie down and began hitting with a spade.' He alleged he was repeatedly beaten with a spade and shocked on his buttocks with electrical wires attached to a wall socket, for five hours. On his release, he was forced to walk home to Nkurenkuru, four hours walk from where he was held.

As was mentioned earlier, no publicity is given to black Koevoet deaths - and Koevoet have virtually taken over the war in Ovambo and Kavango. This means security force deaths are even lower than are publically stated, and the facade of the war being 'low-intensity' maintained. Black Koevoet members have no problems about not having their names mentioned in despatches when they die. The rewards are high - they are paid R2 000 for every guerilla they kill, R1 000 for a captured AK47 rifle, R5 000 for a captured ASM7 missile.

But even more disturbing is that no records are kept of people killed by Koevoet. Provided Koevoet claims a person killed is a 'terrorist', that is that, and the book is closed. There is little or no chance of any follow-up prosecution should the person happen to be a civilian, and in most cases no inquest is held.

The international ramifications of the Koevoet connection in the Namibian war are sinister. Koevoet only came into existence in the late 1978, by which time the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag) proposals had already been drafted. In the fine print of the Untag proposals, now accepted as the integral section of UN resolution 435 for Namibian independence, the following is stated: 'Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order (once the SWAPO and South African forces have withdrawn to bases) shall rest with the existing police forces.'

So, Koevoet, responsible for over 80% of the 'kills' and allegedly involved in atrocities, will still be there when the SADF withdraws.

The role of the SADF

The military role in the war zone and beyond is more ambiguous than that of the specialist police units. Within the confines of the Ovambo, its function would appear to be more that of routine policing than of an active force participating fully in 'seek and destroy' operations - a function now handled mostly by the police. National servicemen are increasingly employed in routine functions camps, guarding - patrolling areas close to base camps, guarding perimeters, ensuring that at least some of the normal functions of and filling administrative roles left vacant by the drastic skills shortage in the territory.

'Contacts' inevitably take place, but their frequency has diminished as the police step into the roles formerly occupied by the military. It is now accepted that the major role played by the SADF is that of securing the southern region of Angola, particularly Cunene and Cuando-Cubango provinces. Since 1978 the SADF have annually mounted at least one major 'raid' into Angola, and now coyly admit that they operate constantly within the country, although denying regular Angolan accusations that the SADF occupies semi-permanent bases in the south of their country. Responding to Angolan claims that SA Air Force Impala jets and Canberra bombers have levelled with Napalm the Moxico province town of Cangamba in August, SADF chief General Constand Viljoen, said: 'It is equally obvious that by using psychological pressure through the media, the Angolans wish to force South Africa to reveal its activities in southern Angola.' He added that SAAF planes flew regular reconnaissance missions over Angola.

The occupation of southern Angola has increased sporadically since the major South African invasion of 1975/6, began in earnest in 1981 with Operation Protea, when the SADF actually fought against MPLA forces at Xangongo and Ongiva. Simon Jenkins claims that: 'Operation Protea in 1981 went much further (than previous raids aimed at SWAPO bases). It was a major invasion aimed among other objectives, at removing recently installed Soviet SAM missile sites. It was wholly successful. Operation Protea meant that South Africa could no longer deny destabilization. It was more than a pre-emptive incursion or a "hot-pursuit", it was an occupation. It established South African military supremacy over much of southern Angola, partly through the agency of (UNITA president) Dr (Jonas) Savimbi's ... forces. A special secret battalion, the 32nd, was formed for members of another dissident Angolan group, the FNLA, to operate inside Angola. Another such battalion, the 31st (now designated 201) had been formed of Bushmen in the Caprivi area between Botswana and Angola, South Africa is becoming one of the world's leading mercenary employers.'

Social costs of the war

The escalation of the war since the middle 1970s has seen a severe breakdown in health services and in the general maintenance of law and order. Health workers are restricted in their movements by dusk-to-dawn curfew regulations, and by the ever-present danger of being ambushed or of hitting a landmine. Preventative medicine programs have been curtailed as the rural areas become more difficult to enter, and the spread of bubonic disease has been rapid. At present it is judged that bubonic plague, malaria, tuberculosis, various forms of venereal disease, and, in some areas typhoid, are epidemic.

The rapid increase in bubonic plague since November last year (450 recorded cases, with 63 cases in August and the first two weeks of September, and three deaths in the same period) is only partly attributable to the devastating drought, which has forced rats carrying plague-infested fleas to seek food close to human living areas. Thousands of civilians have been forced off their land by both military pressure (as the SADF clears fire-clear zoned where guerillas can be "hunted") and by the ever-present threat from both sides in the war. As a result, the area between Ondangwa and Oshakati, a 30km a strip of land, now houses close to 250 000 people, a quarter of the total population of Namibia.

The squatter shanty towns housing the refugees are squalid and have no water-borne sewage or lavatory facilities, with the streets being used as toilets. This strip has been identified by the Namibia health department as the breeding ground of the plague, and as yet, no attempt has been made to improve the filthy conditions. Other, than relatively futile treatment programs of people already victims of plagues, little has been done to prevent the mass spread of the disease.

The SWA Territory Force announced on 15 September that it had flown five tons of rat poison to the area for distribution around the perimeters of military bases (the 30km strip houses the largest concentration of SADF and SWATF troops in Namibia) but has not extended the same rat elimination program to black civilian settlements - all of whom are forced to live outside the barbed wire encircled, heavily fortified, 'white towns', which contain the major military bases at Oshakati and Ondangwa.

Civilian health services have been almost totally taken over by the military, and civilians are forced to accept treatment from them, often reluctantly. The doctors work in military uniform, and civilians in the war zones fear SADF brown uniforms. Forty-nine of the 58 medical doctors in the Kaokoland and Ovambo war

zones are military doctors, while all the dentists, veterinary surgeons and psychologists working in the two areas are military. Five of the eight chemists in Ovambo are military. The doctors treated 248 246 patients in 1982, 72,5% of the civilians.

The same military press statement from which the above statistics were drawn stated that: 'During 1982, the SAAF provided helicopters for the casualty evacuation of the local population free of charge. 180 members of the local population were evacuated to Oshakati Hospital after being injured in motor accidents or by Swapo landmines. Converting flying hours in rands and cents, this service cost the state R72 000.'

In addition to the breakdown of health services detailed above, it is important to note that if a civilian gets seriously ill or has a baby, this has to be done during the day, as no movement beyond kraal perimeters is allowed after sunset.

The maintainance of law and order has become almost non-existent in some areas in the northern war zones. Namibia's attorney general, Don Brunette, says: 'We try ourbest to apply civil law in Ovambo, but it is no easy task. The circumatances are troubled and the mental frame of mind of the people has become such that almost everone carries a gun, many of them illegal. After a few drinks in a cuca shop,there is shooting, murder and rape. The psychological effect of the war is that life has become cheap ... Still, I can say that the most serious cases are nevertheless brought before the courts, but there is quite possibly a body or two undera bush which we don't know about, as recent civil cases before the courts have shown a reference to the death of Mr Johannes Kakuva, who disappeared while in the hands of the secerity police, and who was found by the Supreme Court to have died while in detention as a result of torture and/or assault). We can, for example also not apply the Inquests Law effectively. We have about 480 to 500 inquest a year where the magistrate finds that death was caused by unknown people, terrorists or landmines.'

Statistics supplied by Brunette's office show that 42% of criminal cases in the Supreme Court in 1982 involved rape, the majority from the war zone.

A court hearing which is being watched carefully at present, and which could produced dramatic evidence of the extent to which law and order has broken down, is that of State versus two Koevoet members Jonas Paulus and Paulus Matteus. They are charged with murder, four counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances, four counts of attempted rape. Masquerading as members of SWAPO. they killed a headman, Robert Amunwe, on 2 January, and 5 January threw TM26 handgrenades at Simon Ngosi, it is alleged.

Defence counsel has already indicated they will not deny the charges, but will argue that as members of Koevoet they are trained as killers, with the specific task of 'hunting guerillas. Paulus will testify that 'one is entitled to shoot Swapo'. Alternatively, Paulus reserved the right to fall back on section 103 (ter) of the Defence Act, which exempts security force members from prosecution if they 'acted in good faith in counter-insurgency operations. Defence counsel has indicated they will call senior members of Koevoet to testify that the men were conditioned to kill and attack in the manner they did.

Although South Africa argues that they are bearing the costs (about R1,9-m a day) of the war, it is clear that the people who ard really carrying the costs are the civilians of Namibia, the people caught in the crossfire. The breakdown of social structures, of traditional norms and economic activities, of health, law and order, of the emvironment (the Etosha Pan has to deal with another type of refugee from the war zone - displaced wildlife fleeing the disruption of their natural environment by massive military movements and construction projects), and the daily fear in which the civilian population of the war zone live, will leave Namibia with a fearsome legacy to be overcome at independence.

Since 1966 over 10 000 - Namibians- 1% of the population - have died in the war, and an estimated 100 000 - 10% of the population - have fled the country. The figures speak for themselves.

APPENDIX: Edited version of a letter addressed to the United Nations Secretary General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, when he visited Namibia on a 26 August this year, by the Council of Churches in Namibia (the CCN, through its member churches, represents the majority of people in Namibia).

We would respectfully wish to draw the following matters to your attention, which arising out of our deep concern we feel necessitate urgent to consideration:

1. Over the years, resolutions and atatements have been made, frequent international visitors have come to our country and gone, and yet, to our abiding disappointment, the internal situation remains no nearer to a settlement. Far from feeling that some progress is being made, the pace of current negotiations has diminished the hope and expectaion of many people.

2. The South African government is continuing with its military buildup in Namibia and especially in the northern region of the country. This illegal and dangerous exercise intensifies the destruction of the lives of the people and further destabilises the whole coutry. We consider the pre-occupation of the South African government with so-called national security a threat to Southern Africa and to international peace.

3. The rights and the will of the people in Namibia are disregarded by a regime of draconian laws, proclamations and amendments, the most outstanding being: military conscription of Namibians, detention without recourse to legal counsel or courts, and the various laws which force people to divulge information against their will. The extremes of power given by these laws to individuals in authority leads to the

malicious abuse of civilian people. Detention and interrogation are accompanied by beating, torture and other psychological pressures, recent (Johannes) Kakuva case. In the northern region of our country, the activities of the South African Army and special police units (Koevoet) are destructive of the very lives of our people. For example, in the Okongo area of Ovambo, eight schools are presently closed down, and in the Kavango region, people are being forced to leave their homes and resettle on the river bank - from which they were removed 10 years ago - where the army has better control over them. In Namibian towns, black people are often subject to harassment and beatings from white rightwingers with police often neglecting to make thorough investigations or apprehend those responsible.

4. The situation is compounded by the extreme mismanagement and plundering of the country's economy. The multiplicity of ethnic governments, their widespread corruption and the exploitation of the country's resources are leading the country to the point of bankruptcy. This results in considerable unemployment among blacks which leaves them destitute and without hope of livelihood.

5. The proposed state Council, which has neither the mandate nor the support of the majority of Namibians, is an indication of the lack of honesty and seriousness with which independence is viewed by the South African government. Yet again an attempt is being made to impose an illegal and unacceptable system on our people. Actions such as the appointment of Administrators-General and proposals such as the State Council directly contradict the South African government's own pronouncements of allowing the Namibian people to determine their own future. The massive ideological propaganda machinery of the South African government continues to influence and paralyse any progress towards independence. The insistence by the United States government, South Africa and others on Cuban withdrawal from Angola as conditional to independence of our country is indicative of the widespread effect of this propaganda. We reiterate our dismay at the delay of independence by such irrelevant, deliberate acts of obstruction. We wish to state again that the Cuban presence in the sovereign state of Angola is not a threat to the Namibian people. The historical priority is South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia without the democratic consent and mandate of the majority of the people.

We earnestly appeal to you to use the influence of your office to effect the immediate implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 (for the independence of Namibia). This alone can prevent the escalation of the war, the suffering, bloodshed and loss of human lives.

Signed on behalf of the executive committee by:

The Right Reverend JH Kauluma, president of the CCN, and the Reverend Doctor Abisai Shejvali, General Secretary of the CCN.

LIW - A Strategy to maintain order and control in the Southern African Region

1. NAMIBIA: South Africa's testing ground

This year Namibia will have been under the yoke of imperialism for 104 years.. This period has not passed without resistance from the Namibian people. In 1903, the Herero people revolted against German colonialism. Three quarters of the Herero population was massacred by the Germans. After the First World War, Namibia was handed over by the British for South African custody. Instead of preparing the Namibians for national independence, the South African government, through imperialist interests, rooted themselves in Namibia and started to apply their apartheid policy in the region.

In response to the South African government's intransigence, the oppressed Namibians mobilized themselves into a popular resistance movement called the "South West African People's Organization" (SWAPO). In 1966, after years of peaceful protestation, SWAPO decided to wage an armed struggle against the South African forces for the national liberation of Namibia. The South African answer to this popular armed insurrection was to further strengthen its armed forces in the territory.

In 1978 the South African regime adapted its repressive tactics based on the insights of Professor Pascall's study. Pascall noted that it would be better for South Africa to "win the hearts and minds" of the Namibians than steamrolling them militarily. He drew attention to the fact that 95% of the Namibians were deeply religious and that state strategy should recognize this.

At a press briefing in Windhoek on the 5 February 1981, a senior South African commander to the South West Territory Forces (SWATF), General Charles Lloyd said:

"We cannot win this war through military means. We could actually destroy our military enemy. But, that does not mean that we will destroy our political enemy SWAPO, which is in the minds of the Namibian people. As you know, bullets kill bodies and not the mind. So we can destroy our military enemy, but that is not to say that we have destroyed the ideology of SWAPO. I would not say that we will solve the Namibian problem in a military way. That cannot be done, as I see it. What you really need for counter-insurgency is a good government". Cf. J. Fredericks, SA a different kind of war.

PREPARING THE SOIL FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.

In order to break any unified resistance of the Namibian Blacks, apartheid was reformed and camouflaged in 1978 by removing petty apartheid legislation. For example, the opening of hotels and restaurants to all races. At the same time, they considered it necessary to create divisions among the Blacks:-

- The South African Defense Force (SADF) created The South West African Territory Force (SWATF) in Namibia.

The South African Police (SAP) equivalent in Namibia is called The South West African Police (SWAPOL). Both of these repressive apparatus are controlled from Pretoria. South Africa's purpose was to "Namibianize" the war in order to confuse the population as to who the real enemy is.

- The Black Namibian population was divided into 10 ethnic groups and cultural differences were emphasized. We must note that the Whites were kept as one regardless of their nationality. This means that the small Namibian nation, with a population of two and a half million people, is governed by eleven different ethnic governments. Ethnic group rights are placed above individual rights. All social services, eg. health, education, welfare, are segregated on ethnic lines. Ultimately, it is the South African authority who prescribes to these various "governments". This over emphasized divisions is designed to create competition, mistrust and prejudice amongst the different groups.
- The natural and economic wealth of Namibia is controlled by the South African government and multi-nationals. They, therefore, are in a position to determine the nature of the social welfare and development services rendered to the local communities.
- Suspicion amongst the groups is strengthened by using Blacks as spies and informers against their own people. Small financial rewards are offered for information leading to the arrest of SWAPO "terrorists". In 1980, all SWAPO activities were banned in order to wipe out all resistance and create space for the State to implement its own plans. 80% of Namibia is now under martial law.
- After the pass laws were scrapped in 1974, the State introduced the SWA Identity card. This Card notes your name, date of birth, ethnic code and area code. It is used to recruit young males for the army. In 1981, military conscription became compulsory for all Black Namibian males. Excluded from this conscription were those males living along the Namibian borders to Angola and Zambia. The high 55% unemployment rate amongst Blacks, is an effective means towards conscription. SWATF and SWAPOL are the largest employers of unskilled Namibian Blacks. At the moment there are 120 000 SADF members in Namibia. This implies that there is one soldier for every ten Namibians. There is no real mobilization against military conscription. An Exemption board does not exist.
- In 1978, with South Africa heavily committed to operations in Southern Angola, the South African Police created the famous "Koevoet" (Crowbar) in order to strike fear into the local people and keep internal "order" in the country. Koevoet is known to have committed atrocities whilst dressed as SWAPO. This is done in order to discredit the SWAPO forces. This unit consists mostly of Ovambos and is regarded as the killing squad of South Africa. At a press conference on 4 February 1981, Major Errol Mann, the officer commanding the Black Caprivi Battalion stated:

"The best people to fight Blacks is with Blacks". (cf. J. Fredericks, South Africa: Another kind of war, pg. 75)

Political Strategies of South Africa in Namibia

There is a total onslaught on all sectors of the local Black communities. They work out popular programmes and act on burning needs of the community in order to create an image of being "do-gooders".

THE CHURCH - the Church and religion are being used to win over 'hearts and minds'

The Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) represent prophetic churches in Namibia and is the mouthpiece of the local progressive Christians. The Dutch Reformed Church has organized all other conservative churches (eg. some Zionist churches and the Pentecostal Evangelical expressions). This front, called the Namibian Churches Union, was formed as a counter body to CCN.

Numerous attempts have been made to use the Church and religion to win over the hearts and minds of the people:

- They created the Windhoek Theological Seminary to promote pro-apartheid religion and to combat liberation theology.
- All kinds of sects eg. Frontline Fellowship, Ichtus, American Pentecostals, are attempting to broaden their influence on the local population.
- The South African army also created cultural- religious groups along ethnic lines. Examples of these groups are; Etango (Ovambo), Ezuve (Kavango), Ejuva (in the east), Nambweza (Caprivi).
- Bible studies are organized by the above mentioned groups or White commando women, where they propagate anti-communist studies and attempt to turn the local people against the prophetic Church and political leaders. The army officials distribute Bibles freely among the local people.
- Applicable traditional rituals and symbols are incorporated into the "religious" services of these different religio-cultural sects.
- Social services -schools, kindergarten, hospitals- which were rendered by the prophetic Churches are now being duplicated by these right wing churches. The aim of such projects is to attract the population to the conservative services.
- In all the major centres in Namibia, we find "Media Centres for Christ" which supply conservative religious propaganda. Jimmy Swaggart missionaries have a media centre in Windhoek. Now that Swaggart has "fallen from grace", Billy Graham has risen in prominence.

The prophetic Churches in Namibia are either ignorant or do not take these right wing sects seriously. No counter strategies have been developed by the prophetic Church.

EDUCATION - a strong military presence in Namibian schools

Afrikaans was forced on the Namibians so as to keep them in isolation and bondage. Due to the efforts of parents and the Namibian National students Organization (NANSO), English is gradually being introduced as the medium of instruction.

In the North, SADF bases are built close to secondary schools. Black schools are used as recruitment centres for the SADF:

- Students are taken to army camps during week-ends for conscientization programmes;
- Soldiers are attired in SADF uniforms during class lessons in Black schools. The Cadets system encourages boys to enter into the SADF;
- "Veld and Vlei" courses, teaching children survival skills for times of war is common practice;
- Youth are undergoing special intelligence training programmes and are planted in schools to spy on and recruit other students;
- State bursaries are used as a destabilising tool;
- There is a high failure rate in Black schools. Failures do not easily get a second chance. Principals are asked to submit the names of these failures to the army for conscription.

All this creates a military atmosphere in the Namibian schools.

VIGILANTES - Koevoet!

In Koevoet, the army and security police created a legalised killing machine. Koevoet is feared by the local population.

3. Economy and living standards

- * Overview of economy (Namibia Support Committee)
- * Overview of economy (Financial Mail)
- * Pressclips

THE NAMIBIAN ECONOMY

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

Namibia Support Committee

15.3.89

Background Briefing on the Namibian Economy, March 1989

This briefing outlines the structure and the current state of the Namibian economy. It then looks in general at the constraints which the government of an independent Namibia will inherit from the colonial economy. Finally, it summarises SWAPO's economic plans for the transition period immediately following independence.

A HOSTAGE ECONOMY

The colonial economy in Namibia has been a hostage for over eighty years to that of South Africa: a consequence of the political domination and military occupation of Namibia by the apartheid regime. South Africa has historically exploited Namibia's natural resources, especially its fish, beef and minerals, to benefit the development of apartheid economic structures. It has imposed high tariffs on imports from other countries along with restrictive exchange controls. These have combined to make Namibia a captive market to which South African industry has had unrestricted access. The de facto inclusions of Namibia in the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area have abetted Namibia's development as a source of unprocessed raw materials for South African industry and financial revenue for the South African state. In addition, the economy has been dominated by the operation of a few large Western-based multinational companies, especially in mining. A system of migrant (or contract) labour, buttressed by racist laws, has been the foundation of the colonial economy - of a total workforce of about 600,000 in 1983 only 176,000 were in permanent waged/salaried employment. The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) was effectively outlawed in 1979 and its revival in 1986 was officially harassed.

THREE KEY INDUSTRIAL SECTORS

Mining, fishing and agriculture are the three key sectors of the Namibian economy. Each sector is geared to a foreign market and there is an absence of cross-sectoral links. As well as being highly fragmented the economy is extremely subject to fluctuating international commodity markets: 90% of physical goods produced are exported and 75-80% of goods consumed are imported. Manufacturing industry is undeveloped. Only the limited processing of meat, fish and minerals - mostly by South African companies - and a few Namibian-owned, light industries such as beverage manufacture and mechanical workshops can be found in the few main towns.

MINERALS

Nevertheless Namibia is the fourth largest mineral producer in Africa. Mining is currently the main pillar of the Namibian economy, contributing around 35% of GDP, 85% of exports and approximately 1/2 of annual government revenue through various taxes. This sector is dominated by three transnational corporations which employ 15,000 of the 18,000 strong mining workforce:

- Anglo-American (SA) which, through its De Beers subsidiary, controls Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM);
- RTZ (UK) which controls and operates the Rossing uranium mine;
- Consolidated Goldfields (UK) which effectively controls a number of gold and base metal mines through Goldfields Namibia, a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldfields South Africa.

A significant role is played in the industry by other, smaller, South African companies and parastatals, so that in total approximately two thirds of Namibia's mining industry is owned by

South African corporations, including some key Afrikaaner-owned firms.

FISH

Namibia has one of the world's richest fishing grounds and fishing is potentially the most important sector of the economy after mining. The in-shore fishing industry has been dominated by South African companies while the lucrative off-shore, or deep-sea, industry has been run by both West and East European fishing fleets. There has been no regulation by the occupation regime - partly because the apartheid regime cannot legally declare a 200 mile economic exclusion zone - and, as a result, over-fishing has severely depleted stocks. Pilchard and whale have been virtually destroyed and hake and mackerel, potentially worth R2 billion per annum, have been seriously depleted. The industry's contribution to GDP has fallen from an average of 20% in the '70s to an average of 5% in the '80s.

AGRICULTURE

The third key sector, agriculture, contributes approximately 12% of GDP while employing three fifths of the economically active population. The bulk of those employed are, however, absorbed by "informal" or peasant agriculture which contributes only 3% of GDP. In contrast to the informal sector, white settler farms employ only 12% of the workforce. Persistent drought in the early and mid '80s has contributed to a relative decline in settler agriculture's share of GDP over the last three decades. It has been estimated that one third (i.e. 1,700) of existing settler-owned farm units are uneconomic and they only manage to continue through state assistance. By contrast, peasant agriculture receives virtually no investment or marketing support, and land is severely overcrowded.

COST OF THE OCCUPATION

The cost to Namibia of South Africa's occupation has been growing, both in human and in economic terms. The economy as a whole has been depressed for the last 10 years as a result of low mineral prices, the over-exploitation of the fishing resources, prolonged drought, financial mismanagement and, not least, two decades of war. GDP growth between 1977 and 1988 has been estimated at -2%. Some 35% of GNP has been exported annually to foreign bank accounts. South Africa has recently imposed a R750m. foreign debt on the country. The average white wage is 20 times the average black wage - this is in a country with one of the highest GDPs per capita in Africa! The economy has not created enough jobs for the rising population, and the unemployment rate is estimated to be over 30% and growing. UNICEF has recently estimated that between 1980 and 1988 90,000 Namibians (or 5% of the population) died as a direct and indirect result of South Africa's colonial war.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE ECONOMY

The legacy of the war and the occupation will severely constrain the economic policies of the government of a newly independent Namibia. Factors such as the occupation regime's wasteful creation and mismanagement of parallel "bantustan" administrative structures, the lack of a central bank etc. will impose major difficulties in setting up new, workable fiscal and monitoring structures. In recent years the occupation regime has been running up a large external debt. Under international law on the succession of states, a SWAPO government would not be obliged to honour this. The administrative system in itself is obsolete, inefficient, racist and

South African corporations, including some key Afrikaaner-owned firms.

FISH

Namibia has one of the world's richest fishing grounds and fishing is potentially the most important sector of the economy after mining. The in-shore fishing industry has been dominated by South African companies while the lucrative off-shore, or deep-sea, industry has been run by both West and East European fishing fleets. There has been no regulation by the occupation regime - partly because the apartheid regime cannot legally declare a 200 mile economic exclusion zone - and, as a result, over-fishing has severely depleted stocks. Pilchard and whale have been virtually destroyed and hake and mackerel, potentially worth R2 billion per annum, have been seriously depleted. The industry's contribution to GDP has fallen from an average of 20% in the '70s to an average of 5% in the '80s.

AGRICULTURE

The third key sector, agriculture, contributes approximately 12% of GDP while employing three fifths of the economically active population. The bulk of those employed are, however, absorbed by "informal" or peasant agriculture which contributes only 3% of GDP. In contrast to the informal sector, white settler farms employ only 12% of the workforce. Persistent drought in the early and mid '80s has contributed to a relative decline in settler agriculture's share of GDP over the last three decades. It has been estimated that one third (i.e. 1,700) of existing settler-owned farm units are uneconomic and they only manage to continue through state assistance. By contrast, peasant agriculture receives virtually no investment or marketing support, and land is severely overcrowded.

COST OF THE OCCUPATION

The cost to Namibia of South Africa's occupation has been growing, both in human and in economic terms. The economy as a whole has been depressed for the last 10 years as a result of low mineral prices, the over-exploitation of the fishing resources, prolonged drought, financial mismanagement and, not least, two decades of war. GDP growth between 1977 and 1988 has been estimated at -2%. Some 35% of GNP has been exported annually to foreign bank accounts. South Africa has recently imposed a R750m. foreign debt on the country. The average white wage is 20 times the average black wage - this is in a country with one of the highest GDPs per capita in Africa! The economy has not created enough jobs for the rising population, and the unemployment rate is estimated to be over 30% and growing. UNICEF has recently estimated that between 1980 and 1988 90,000 Namibians (or 5% of the population) died as a direct and indirect result of South Africa's colonial war.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE ECONOMY

The legacy of the war and the occupation will severely constrain the economic policies of the government of a newly independent Namibia. Factors such as the occupation regime's wasteful creation and mismanagement of parallel "bantustan" administrative structures, the lack of a central bank etc. will impose major difficulties in setting up new, workable fiscal and monitoring structures. In recent years the occupation regime has been running up a large external debt. Under international law on the succession of states, a SWAPO government would not be obliged to honour this. The administrative system in itself is obsolete, inefficient, racist and

corrupt. The directly productive sectors of the economy are in poor shape, especially ranching and fishing - though, as outlined below, there has been some improvement in the last two years. The only trading port, Walvis Bay, will be at least temporarily controlled by South Africa, as may much of the road and rail haulage fleet - leaving the transport system in a bad state. Skilled professional, artisan and managerial losses will possibly be severe due to "white flight" in the aftermath of independence. Institutional and data bases for the management of the economy are inadequate and distorted. As mentioned above, the economy is very vulnerable to frequent international commodity price fluctuations. Finally, there will be a problem satisfying the aspirations of about 15,000 - 20,000 households in the new black middle class created by the South Africans and the mining companies, and those of the 30,000-strong local militia who have been recruited on inflated wages.

GROUNDS FOR SOME OPTIMISM

In spite of this appalling legacy SWAPO has some grounds for optimism. Mainly due to the effect of high dollar and sterling trading prices since 1986, GDP has increased in real terms at about 2% per year. The external balance improved and the external debt slightly fell. The exchange rate declined faster than inflation helping export sector profits to look healthy. Agriculture benefitted from better rainfall and higher karakul prices. The in-shore fish catch improved though it is not yet clear whether stocks have really recovered. Diamond output rose slightly, although there remain suspicions of the impending exhaustion of the better-grade deposits and their stockpiling in London and Switzerland. Base metal prices improved as did demand for most of the mineral products.

Quite apart from the possibility of starting to manage the economy from a better base than the decade '76-'86 offered, SWAPO now believes that prospects for the recovery of the economy look good if the independence process continues on track. It recognises that it will face an enormous task in the initial period merely to maintain levels of production and trade in the face of the constraints outlined above. SWAPO has said that it is confident, however, that an independent Namibia will offer good opportunities to investors and the commercial farmers provided they co-operate in the changes necessary to end colonial structures. Meetings with some of the mining companies and the July '88 Stockholm meeting with white Namibians have helped to re-assure all sides. It is fairly certain that independence will bring a property boom in its wake and boost the economy generally. SWAPO can also expect a certain amount of international rehabilitation and development aid on generous terms, although nothing equivalent to the damages that could be claimed against Western and South African firms which have broken the international ban on dealings with the colonial economy.

Economic reality in Namibia



Wolfgang Thomas, with the Small Business Development Corp, is author of *Economic Development in Namibia* (1978). The following analysis of the economic prospects for an

independent Namibia is taken from an article in the February edition of *Die Suid-Afrikaan*.

Three dimensions call for attention: the political and strategic; demographic and manpower shifts; and the direction of the economy.

As regards the internal political and strategic developments during the transitional phase, SA's dominant position as neighbour, its control of Walvis Bay and overwhelming regional power are of cardinal importance. Together with this is the fact that the Western powers, the Soviet Union, the OAU and even Swapo have no interest, with the onset of a power vacuum (as in Angola in 1975), in scrummaging for domination. Namibia's deeply heterogeneous population mix would have made the outcome of such a process particularly unpredictable.

Seen in this perspective, SA's continuing presence in Walvis Bay is thus probably stabilising, and it would seem improbable that Swapo or diplomatic leaders would address this potential point of conflict during the transitional phase.

The internal election process will probably be overshadowed by the general acceptance that independence will only be realised within the framework of a closer economic and strategic interdependence with SA. While party political rhetoric will probably not be dampened by this, the leadership of all the main parties will be thoroughly aware of this framework.

The influence of senior officials in the various State departments — and their continued presence during the transition — should not be underestimated in this regard.

Regarding demographic and manpower changes, the next two years could be relatively traumatic — especially for some groups — but in view of the total population of 1.5m (300 000 households) these problems do not appear to be insurmountable.

It is expected that a part of the almost 80 000 Namibians living in camps in neighbouring states will return. If their return directly coincides with the withdrawal of the security forces in the north, and without provision for financial assistance to households, a critical situation could easily arise. In that case the pressure of the southward migration could increase, creating problems in the Windhoek area.

Parallel to this stream, a number of smaller ones can be expected: the Untag

troops and assistant personnel, skilled Namibians who are spread around the world (but who will probably return after the election), and various foreign experts, businessmen, political observers, and others from countries bordering Namibia (including from SA) who would want to join the "Uhuru bandwagon."

Against that, a fair number of white (and coloured) residents of Namibia will join the present exodus, though probably not in great numbers. Though crunches as a result of the exodus of skilled labour could occur, and while new arrivals could not fill those vacancies in the short-term, one should not expect crises during the transitional period. The proximity of SA and the possibility of re-cruiting contract workers on a short-term basis should minimise these dangers.

At the same time, no dramatic weakening is expected on the economic side. Namibia's key sectors — mining, agriculture, fisheries and commerce — are well developed and have a couple of years of reasonable growth behing them. The construction sector is growing all the time, and the increasing urbanisation (already about 45%), will retain its momentum.

During the transition, budget financing will be primarily a problem of negotiation, since the deficits will be relatively small in relation to SA's declining defence commitments in Namibia and its total budget.

The general expectation is that foreign aid will be relatively smaller than hoped for. Yet it still seems possible to mobilise funds, other than private capital, for specific aid or bridging programmes (for example, the re-integration of refugees in the north). The single biggest problem is certainly compensation for reduced defence spending in the economy of the north.

The three years after independence will probably be the most crucial phase in the decade ahead. While speculation about specific trends at this stage is very risky, it is worth sketching the outlines of one scenario.

In the 10-year debate over possible developments in an independent Namibia, speculation about the composition of the first independence government often arose. Bearing in mind the limitations imposed by Namibia's dependence on SA, it seems that a "government of national unity" is virtually a *sine qua non* for a more stable new State. Any variant — say the exclusion of Swapo or some of the DTA groups — will probably not remain in power for very long.

Against this background, it seems likely that Namibia's economic system will be a relatively pragmatic mixture of socialist ideals and capitalist realities, more or less along the lines of the pattern in Zimbabwe.

If this route is followed from the outset — which looks possible in the light of Africa's recent past — the dreaded flight of capital

and skills from the country can be significantly contained, especially if the new government resists imposing drastic foreign exchange controls. With such a pragmatic policy it is quite possible that the return of skilled Namibians and other immigrants could fill most of the vacancies caused by emigration.

The same could happen with capital flow if there is a sympathetic attitude towards the mines, industry and financial institutions, to prevent a flight of capital, and if at the same time there is a combination of development aid and foreign private investment.

Taking into account Namibia's population of 1.5m, its work force of just more than 500 000, and an annual population growth of 45 000 as well as a work force increase of between 18 000 and 20 000, its resource base is not that unfavourable, especially compared to other African states.

If the new regime can consolidate its political position within three or four years, a more gradual economic growth process should certainly be possible thereafter. As far as exports are concerned, fish, minerals, meat, wool and tourism should strengthen the balance of payments (and foreign exchange), while a combination of urbanisation, agriculture and land reform, small business development and job creation, should stimulate economic growth in northern Namibia.

Against an urban complex of 250 000 to 300 000 people in Ovamboland, and about 100 000 to 120 000 along the coast (Walvis Bay-Swakopmund-Arandis), the Windhoek-Rehoboth complex could easily grow by 100 000 into a city of 350 000 over the next year.

The mining sector has a planning horizon of 10 to 15 years. With the development of the Koedoe gas field, certain new diamond fields and a series of mineral deposits in the central area of Namibia, mining should in the long-term probably retain a 30% share of the GDP. A partial government shareholding in the major mines should not hinder these developments. Similarly, it may be expected that a flexible land reform policy (aimed at under-utilised farms and the privatising of tribal land), will stimulate the agricultural sector. The further "Namibianisation" of the commercial and financial service sectors can, if sensitively tackled, stimulate domestic growth — without thereby cutting all ties with SA.

Of course, by changing these assumptions a fundamentally different future can be sketched. The basic ideas underlying the above scenario should however be clear: with independence drawing near, it also becomes clearer in Namibia that a changeover of power leaves limited scope for dramatic structural changes or reform — especially if one does not want to run high risks. ■

There is no food, water, houses or jobs, yet ...

THERE is a war in the south of Namibia. It is a war against poverty, drought and repression.

Dry and desolate, the towns of the south are surrounded by endless stretches of inhospitable scrublands.

Water is a luxury and the rock-hard riverbeds contain nothing but sand, stones and thorn trees.

Poverty is rife — especially in the black townships and ghettos which are inevitably situated outside the towns, away from the public eye.

One such ghetto is at the southern town of Rehoboth, where thousands of people live in one of the most run-down squatter camps in the country.

Residents refer to it as "Blikkiesdorp" (Tin Dorp).

The abject poverty of the inhabitants is vividly reflected in their housing.

Hundreds of shanties, barely capable of withstanding a strong wind, lie sprawled across several hectares of barren, sand-covered ground. They are made from rusted car doors, discarded sheets of corrugated iron and flattened tins. Shreds of plastic are wedged into the holes. Entire homes are held together by pieces of wire, nails and string. Half-naked children play between the shacks. Chickens and starving dogs wander through the camp in a constant search for something to eat.

The lack of employment is made obvious by the number of men who can be found sitting under trees or sleeping inside their shacks on any day of the week.

Many of the women, mothers and young girls, are employed as domestic servants at the homes of the wealthier Baster people who live in the town of Rehoboth — less than one kilometre

Thousands live in the Tin Dorp

from the camp.

The workers are badly paid, but for most it is their only source of income.

In an area where temperatures frequently reach 40 degrees Celsius, the residents of Blikkiesdorp are fortunate to be provided with some shade from the spreading trees which grow in the camp.

But the trees are a blessing in disguise. Known as cameeldoring, these trees have been declared a protected species by the Rehoboth government.

This means that residents do not have easy access to a supply of firewood.

There is no electricity in the squatter camp, and people have to cook over open fires and spend much of their time trekking long distances to find wood.

Those living in the camp are not required to pay rent for their shanties, but the Rehoboth government insists that squatters must erect their "houses" in neat orderly rows.

Several of the inhabitants are reticent and bitter when asked about their situation.

The mother of the Kharases family, which lives in the camp, says it is an every-day struggle to make ends meet.

Only one of her children attends school, while two stay at home because of lack of money. The other two work in Windhoek.

Her husband is unemployed, and the family lives off her income as a domestic servant.

"I work every day in a

Baster family's house, and for that I get R30 a month. I have a family to feed and there are clothes to buy. If that's what I get paid then that's what I must take. There is no choice," said Mrs Kharases.

Walking down a sandy road between the maze of shanties are two schoolgirls who pose for a photograph and answer some questions. Laurensia Cloete, 16 and doing Standard Five at a national education school in Rehoboth, lives with her aunt in a brick house built on the edge of a field which separates the poor from the very poor. They pay R40 a month for rent.

She says that they are a family of 10 children.

Her friend, Anna Marie Skrywer, is also 16 and says her mother maintains the family, but doesn't get much working for the Basters.

Anna believes that the war being fought in the north is between the "soldiers" who are protecting the people of Namibia and "foreigners" whom she labels "terrorists". She would not like to live in the north as she is "afraid of the war".

On the eastern side of the camp, in a tiny iron and wood construction which at first glance appears deserted, is 24-year-old Salmon Awaseb.

Living with both his parents in a shack hardly big enough for one person, Salmon tells of the hardships of life in Blikkiesdorp. His parents are unemployed and he too has stopped working on surrounding farms.

"I worked many hours every day and only got R35 a month. I have to find a job that pays more money. There are three of us that have to survive," he says.

He is thankful that he does not have children.

Parents and children in other "townships" and squatter camps throughout southern Namibia tell the same tragic story — widespread poverty, a lack of employment, terrible living conditions and poor wages.

A spokesman for the Rehoboth government says that there are around 400 families staying in the squatter camp. This figure could, however, be much higher. In almost every case, a family consists of between five and 10 people.

The only municipal service provided by the Rehoboth government is water. Taps are scattered throughout the camp, and there is one communal tap for roughly every five or six houses.

The squatters are not charged for the plots on which they build their shacks, but the spokesman said the government was considering charging people R300 to buy their own plots in the future.

The government is also considering setting up a squatters' committee, so that "matters can be addressed more easily".

In terms of the Rehoboth Self-Government Act, anybody living in Rehoboth is the responsibility of that government.

The Basters pay their taxes to the Rehoboth government.

4. Privatisation

* NUNW pamphlet

* Pressclips

WORKERS WILL STOP PRIVITISATION

Privatisation is the illegal sale of People's Property. Privatisation is an attempt to sabotage our independence. Privatisation will bring more hardship and suffering.

On the 20 and 21 March approximately 1500 people gathered at a seminar in Windhoek to discuss the threat of privatisation. The seminar was held by the trade unions affiliated to NUNW.

PRIVATISATION HURTS UNION MEMBERS

The unions have already felt the first attacks of privatisation. 492 workers of NATAU were dismissed by the NTC (NVK). NAPWU says that at least 40 workers were dismissed at SWABC. With this in mind the seminar was aimed at clarifying what privatisation is and how privatisation effects the lives of the Namibian people

WHAT IS PRIVATISATION?

Privatisation is the sale of government services such as transport, hospitals, electricity, water affairs, post and tele communications, and SWABC.

This means that Pienaar is selling people's property to the same companies that are paying us poor wages and asking for high prices.

SELLING PEOPLE'S PROPERTY IS SABOTAGING INDEPENDENCE

Privatisation is sabotage of Namibian independence. Government services are responsible for the living condition of our lives. Independence for the Namibian people means that the quality of our lives must become better.

It is the aim of the future People's Government to vastly improve these public services for the benefit of the people. If the hospitals, electricity, water, are controlled by private companies then the new government cannot bring the change that the people want.

Privatisation is an attempt to sabotage independence.

It strikes against the economic-political power of the future people's government.

HOW IS PRIVATISATION GOING TO AFFECT US?

TRANSPORT

Already a large part of the Namibia's transport services has been sold to NTC(NVK) for R150 million. NTC has already dismissed 492 railway workers so that the corporation can make more profits out of transport. The NTC also intends closing down the railway lines between Keetmanshoop and Luderitz if they cannot make more profits from these services.

The NTC also intends buying the Municipal bus services from the Katutura advisory board. A private owner of the bus services will not act out of responsibility towards the community. If profits cannot be made out of transport then it will be withdrawn without further thought about the people of Katutura.

PRIVATISATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SERVICE:

Already the Kitchens of the Hospital has been sold to FEDICS. NAPWU members at the Katutura hospital have stood together to resist this move.

Pienaar intends to sell the hospitals to American and Italian companies. He says this is necessary because South Africa is withdrawing all its financial assistance to hospital services. If this happens the doctors fees, fees for medicines and maternity fees will become a terrible burden for the people to bear. For people who can not afford these fees privatisation has become a matter of life and death. Cde Cecilia of NAPWU said that the prices of medical services will become extremely high. Workers of NAPWU are also

afraid that they may lose their jobs and their working conditions would become worse when the private companies take over.

PRIVATISATION OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER AFFAIRS:

The majority of workers can not afford the high cost of water and electricity. In many houses there is no electricity and proper running water at all. For the people who live on the land there is also not enough water for them and their cattle. For example look at the lack of water pumps in Hereroland.

Water and electricity is supposed to be provided by the government services. If private companies control water and electricity there will be high prices to pay and even less water.

Last year people in Usakos protested against the pot system. In Mariental many protested against the drip system. This protest shows the deep dissatisfaction about existing conditions. The sale of water and electricity services will only make things worse. Water and electricity are people's property.

PRIVATISATION OF POST AND TELE COMMUNICATIONS:

Unemployment is very high in Namibia and a large part of the work force is made up of migrant workers. The privatisation of Post and Tele-communications would mean a further rise in unemployment. It would also mean an increase in prices of tele-phones and other postal services. Migrant workers who work in Windhoek and Walvis Bay would not be able to afford the cost of maintaining contact with their families at home (that is, telephone costs).

PRIVATISATION OF SWABC

The SWABC Radio and TV does not want SWAPO to win the November elections. RADIO and TV will only tell and show bad things about SWAPO of Namibia and it will tell good things about SA and DTA. If this happens SWAPO could lose the November elections because the elections are not fair and free. The SWABC is also trying to tell the people that privatisation is good for the people, - so that we can accept privatisation.

WE WILL STOP PRIVATISATION

Privatisation is bad for the people of Namibia because it means :

- 1) More unemployment and dismissals.
- 2) Lowering of workers' standard of living ,eg. workers will not be able to afford transport, water and electricity, health services and education for their children.
- 3) Workers will not earn a living wage because increases in the cost of living will mean increased exploitation Workers will become poorer and poorer.
- 4) Companies are interested in profits not people.

Privatisation is a means to cause problems and destabilisation. If all these public services are privatised the future government will not be able to satisfy the needs and demands of the people. This will cause tension between the future government and the people.

It is for this reason that we call upon all Namibians to unite with SWAPO, and to stop privatisation. Privatisation is the enemy of the people of Namibia.

PRIVATISATION IS AN ATTACK ON OUR ORGANISATIONS

Unions are losing members through dismissals. Tremendous problems are being made for the future SWAPO government.

Workers, Students and the Community must unite to defend their organisations.

DEFEND SWAPO, NUNW, NANSOI STOP PRIVATISATION!

ALL WORKERS
THE COMMUNIST
CALLED UPON
ATTEND A MEETING
ON WEDNESDAY
EVENING 7 PM
THE NUNW
WORKERS OFFICE
IN KATUTURA
This meeting will
discuss the effects
of privatisation in
Namibia. All
country must
immediately call
for the
ending of
privatisation
IS TO SMASH
PRIVATISATION

VOTE AGAINST IMPERIALIST SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME

VOTE SWAPO. VOTE INDEPENDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA:



Stop selling Namibia, say unions

By Frank Melntjies

THERE is growing grassroots anger here over South Africa's efforts to privatise key state concerns before independence.

The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) has described privatisation as an attempt to 'sabotage' independence and has launched a mass campaign against it.

The anti-privatisation drive was building up to such an extent that the Administrator General Louis Pienaar was forced to release a statement denying wholesale privatisation and claiming that only certain services would be sold.

More than a week ago 15000 people turned up for a march to the offices of UN special representative Marti Ahtisaari and to Pienaar's residence. The march was stopped but officials nevertheless handed over letters to Ahtisaari and Pienaar, giving them until April 12 to respond to the demand that privatisation be stopped.

NUNW and the Namibian National Students Organisa-

tion (Nanso) have threatened with mass action which could lead to a national strike if they did not get a positive response.

According to NUNW, the railways were sold for a mere R150 million to Namibian Transport Company (NTC). Kitchens attached to hospitals have been sold to Fedics and the hospitals themselves will allegedly be sold to American and Italian companies.

'Necessary'

Pienaar is on record as saying the sale of hospitals is necessary because SA has withdrawn financial assistance. Other enterprises earmarked for selling off include electricity and water affairs, post and telecommunications as well as the SWABC.

The unions are in the front-line of the struggle because their members will be directly affected through dismissals and increased costs for basic services. NTC has already laid off 492 workers in its push for greater profitability.



The Resisting Church

Dr Abisai Shejavali, the General Secretary of the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) offers a message of hope to the people of Namibia: "Raise your heads because liberation is at hand".

The church in Namibia has taken a strong stand against South Africa's illegal occupation. Because of this the government has made the church one of its main targets of destabilisation. Clearly, the body of the church recognises the evils in the system and works to promote peace and justice.

As we have experienced in South Africa, the government does not only try to disrupt the work of the church, but adopts a strategy of Low Intensity Conflict. It has also tried to co-opt certain sectors of the church for its own use and propaganda. Whilst some churches seem to have been influenced by this strategy of the government, the people of Namibia have experienced too much hardship to be fooled. The CCN are in close contact with the experiences of the people and have actively worked to bring about liberation through Christ.

Namibians are keen churchgoers who have looked to the CCN for direction. Dan Tjongarero and Bob Kendeto, both active members of SWAPO, are also church leaders in Namibia. In this way, the struggle for independence and freedom come from within the church which has a strong relationship with SWAPO.

Reports from ministers in Namibia reflect the oppression

which has been directed towards themselves and their congregations.

Koevoet has attended services, dragged members of the congregation outside and beaten them. Several church workers have either been detained, banned or killed by the security forces.

Another account reveals how four Dutch Reformed dominees were refused salaries by their 'mother church' and one dominee was detained for two weeks for offering refuge to a group of parents and students who wanted the Army bases to be moved away from the schools. But the resistance is strong. One Lutheran minister said, "Whatever the case South Africa will not win this war".

In Walvis Bay, church work is very strong and the people are deeply aware of the issues facing them. Basis Christian Communities have been formed to constructively address problems which they may encounter in the community. Bible study groups have also started in hostels and these are working very well. The church in this area is essential because of South Africa's strong presence.

Dr Shejavali (CCN) was told that SWAPO is accused of being a "communist organisation" and he was asked whether it would repress the Church if it comes to power in an Independent Namibia. He answered that he had visited exiles under the protection of SWAPO and that he was also free to bring the gospel to the members.

Dr Shejavali continued, "And I could not have prayed with Sam Nujoma and others. Because when we are travelling and meet them, they do ask us to say a prayer for

them". Clearly, the church has a central role to play in the liberation of the Namibian people. The CCN aims to preach a gospel of "reconciliation, peace and freedom".

The demands of the progressive church in Namibia, join the demands of those who have lived



Prayer service of the CCN Senny Good

under South African domination for too long.

- The withdrawal of all South African troops
- The implementation of R435
- The securing of a SWAPO majority
- National independence and sovereignty.

The church has been actively involved in working with all Namibians to stand as a united and resistant force against the illegal government. One Lutheran minister said, "our people decided that they would rather die than succumb to such an evil government". □

5. The Church

- * Church history
- * The Resisting Church (Crisis News)
- * Statement to UN
- * Current Role (RRR)

Church history

The churches play a vital role in the political and cultural life of Namibian people. Over 80% of the population is Christian, with most of these being Lutherans. The main Lutheran churches are the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church (ELC), 10% of Christians are Catholic and 9% Anglican. The first missionaries in the country gave ideological support to colonial rule but gradually most of the churches have moved away from this although some still support the state, 1971 marked a turning point. The heads of ELC and ELCIN of the Lutheran churches wrote an open letter to the Prime Minister in support of the World Court Ruling declaring the South African presence in Namibia, illegal. Since 1971 the attitude of the churches has hardened and they have become more active in defending people against the state. During the contract workers' strike in 1971/2 the Anglicans were active in publicising the workers' side of the story and bringing South African Police (SAP) atrocities into the media. In 1977 the main churches issued a statement saying that torture was 'standard practise' during interrogation. In 1978 when two churchmen published a booklet on torture, they were kicked out of the country.

The church has become more aligned with the nationalist movement in recent years. In 1977 the Anglican supported SWAPO's call for a boycott of the bantustan elections in Owambo. The Lutherans, Catholics and Anglicans were by now supporting the position of the UN and also recognised SWAPO as having the support of the majority of Namibians. Many of the church people are members of SWAPO including church officers represented in the SWAPO leadership.

The more the churches have become involved in working with the oppressed majority and defending their rights, the more they have been persecuted by the state. Those strong opponents of apartheid in the church who were foreign citizens have been expelled from the country. Anglican Bishops Colin Winter and Richard Wood were deported in 1972 and 1975 respectively. Church hospitals have even been shut down despite the shortage of medical facilities for blacks. In 1973 the printing press for the Lutherans at Onijpa in Owambo was expertly blown up in an operation in which the South Africans were implicated. Another bomb destroyed the printing press in 1980. In January 1986 the building housing the Council of Churches was destroyed in an arson attack. Church members have been harassed and detained and church buildings desecrated.

In 1978 all the main denominations except the white Dutch Reformed church came together to form the Council of Churches in Namibia. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Church are all members of the Council of Churches.

The Council of Churches has tried to draw the attention of the world to the abuse of human rights in the country. They have called for the implementation of an unchanged Resolution 435, free elections and an end to South African rule. This position of the Council of Churches has been supported internationally, eg by the British Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches and the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference. In 1986 the major churches in Namibia and seven political parties including SWAPO signed an important document called the Ai-Gams Declaration. The signatories committed themselves to 'ely resist the status quo, to end the rule of the undemocratic transitional 'government' and for the implementation of Resolution 435.

The churches have been essential in maintaining services for blacks in the country because of the lack of concern by the South African - controlled government. Until the 1960s it was responsible for the education of black people. The churches now run schools, hospitals and clinics which are particularly important for the people in the north. In a recent development a few schools have established themselves with community support and help from the Council of Churches, as 'alternative schools'. The distinguishing feature of the schools is the amount of community participation and combol. The Council of Churches has a country wide programme of teaching English to adults and assists correspondence students. The Council is also organising a health programme which aims to form health committees in various poor communities. The committees meet and discuss their own health problems. Actions to improve health is taken by the local people. The CCN also runs a legal aid scheme to help the victims of army harassment.

In an independent Namibia the church's work in providing help with development projects and providing services will remain vital. Some services will probably in some way need to be integrated with services in order for a uniform policy to be implemented throughout the country. As the churches have been used to

working with SWAPO and have worked towards the creation of an independent government (which is likely to be a SWAPO one), and as so many SWAPO members are also Christians, the ground is laid for continued cooperation after independence.

Statement of the Council of Churches in Namibia to the United Nations Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council

Date: 16 January 1989

To: U.N. Secretary-General and Members of the Security Council

From: The Executive Committee of the Council of Churches in Namibia, representing over 900.000 Namibian Christians

■ 'Retain UNTAG group at 7,500'

We, the leaders of the Namibian churches, make a desperate and urgent plea to the members of the United Nations Security Council to retain the size of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group at 7.500 and not to reduce it in any way.

Our plea is made desperate by our conviction that the independence process in Namibia will be seriously jeopardised if the UNTAG force is reduced.

Our conviction is based on our awareness on what is now happening in Namibia. We have strong reasons to believe that:

1. Arms are being cached at strategic places in Namibia by forces unfriendly to Namibian independence.
2. Some people in Namibia are being supplied with arms in order to destabilise the independence forces.
3. Young Namibians are not only being recruited but are being integrated into the present military groupings in Namibia. They are being subjected to anti-Namibian propaganda and training.
4. UNITA members are being issued with Namibian citizenship documents to enable them to vote against SWAPO.
5. The South West African radio and television services and the core government press are continually producing biased propaganda aimed at influencing the course of elections in Namibia.
6. The South African military build-up is continuing in Northern Namibia. Long convoys of army trucks are seen moving North even in Kavango. New 'police stations' are being built in Ovamboland with the South African flag flying higher.
7. Members of Koevoet, the brutal South African counter-insurgency force, are to be integrated into the regular police force.
8. Police and Army forces are already campaigning for

elections. They call people to meetings, offer to plough their fields or to provide piped water. This must be urgently and adequately monitored by UNTAG members or the elections will be unfairly influenced.

9. If the UNTAG force is reduced, the Cuban withdrawal, already begun in good faith, will be seized by certain parties at any opportunity to bolster UNITA, hurt Angola and allow South Africa to retain its grip on Namibia.

10. The South West African Administrator-General's proclamation of White elections on 1st March 1989 will further confuse the independence process.

Thus we are convinced that to reduce the size of the UNTAG force will seriously jeopardise the Namibian independence process, the Namibian people will be left at the mercy of the South African forces and the whole of Southern Africa will remain unstable. In addition, the delay occasioned by the Security Council debate is frustrating the planning and fundraising of well-intentioned people here. The repatriation programme is especially at risk. This delay in itself may weaken the effectiveness of the independence process in Namibia.

We therefore plead with the United Nations Security Council most desperately and urgently that the UNTAG be held at 7.500 and this force be constituted and established in Namibia without delay.

Signed:

Rt. Rev. Hendrik Frederik (President, Council of Churches in Namibia and Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church)

Dr. Abisai Shejvali (General Secretary, Council of Churches in Namibia)

Rt. Rev. James Kauluma (Anglican Diocese of Namibia)

Rt. Rev. James Prinz (Methodist Church)

Rev. Peter Lamoela (United Congregational Church)

Rt. Rev. Kleopas Dumeni (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia)

Rt. Rev. Bonifatius Haushiku (Roman Catholic Church)

Rev. Bartolomeus Karuaera (African Methodist Episcopal Church)

Interview on RRR programme



Keith Vermulen of CCN asked Mr Immanuel Dumeni, co-ordinator of the RRR programme to explain it. DUMENI: churches in Namibia were already approached in 1978, after the adoption of Resolution 435, by the United Nations to assist in the process of repatriating exiled Namibians. Already then, the church readily agreed.

In October 1988, after an eleven year delay of the implementation of Resolution 435, the United Nations reiterated their request to the churches and they obliged and they established a "Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (later changed to Reconstruction) committee as a rather independent agency of the Council of Churches in Namibia.

VERMULEN: Can you outline the structures of the RRR committee.

DUMENI: The RRR Committee is made up of 7 delegates from the member churches of the CCN + has 5 full time officers - a Co-ordinator, Transport, Logistics, Administrative officers + a Treasurer.

VERMULEN: What is the function of the RRR Committee.

DUMENI: The RRR Committee is a creation of the member churches of the CCN. It was born as a service arm of the churches to help with receiving returning Namibians under the provision of Resolution 435. The RRR has the task of providing suitable reception + support centres. The later are to be used by people who cannot find immediate housing.

This responsibility will include the instalation of cooking and sanitary facilities, water + electricity supply. It will also involve the transortation of returnees from the entry points to the reception centres and from there to the respective homes of the returnees to the special centre of the member churches of the CCN.

The member churches of the CCN will also make provision for those without family, children, orphans, elderly people, disabled and handicapped people. The RRR is also to provide basic necessities such as food, blankets, medical services, educational and spiritual care.

VERMULEN: Who are the partners in the RRR venture ?

DUMENI: The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which will be responsible for bringing Namibians back is definitely a partner. Bot/so are many other friends who have supported Namibia over the years. This obviously includes the world council of churches (WCC), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and many more.

VERMULEN: You have now worked on the RRR for the past 5 monthes. Tell us of your experiences so far.

DUMENI: At the time of the creation of the committee, we had no idea what lay ahead of us with time the developments around 435 came along and shed some light, boosting our confidence.

The reaction of the churches and the people of Namibia to the work that lay ahead was very impressive. Churches offered places and centres to the RRR for use in serving our returnees. Some churches sacrificed their top personnel to serve in the ranks of the RRR. Individual people offered their services and some even started collecting money to assist the programme.

Their positive reaction boosted our morale and we were left with no doubt what so ever that we were involved in a national programme, that had an impressive backing from the Namibian people.

VERMULEN: Zimbabwe went through a similar process in 1980. Have you taken up any contacts with them?

DUMENI: The RRR committee enabled us to make contacts with brothers and sisters in the frontline states, especially with the Zimbabweans who went through repatriation and resettlement less than 10 years ago. They shared with us their experiences and gave us good advice. We shared ideas and got rich experiences from the neighbouring christian councils as well. Such consultations will continue + will be intensified.

VERMULEN: What was the response from the international community

DUMENI: For years the international community has supported the struggle of the Namibia people. Even now when Namibians prepare to return, that support remains and the international response to the work of the RRR was great. Our requests for assistance were answered with pledged and committments of moral and material support through the WCC and LWF, other committments we also made.

VERMULEN: Have you had any contact with those who are to return? What is their attitude?

DUMENI: It was great for the RRR staff to meet some of our people in exile, and to talk to them about their coming home.

The happiness on their faces is contagious. They have suffered and sacrificed for Namibia all these years. Now that they have successfully completed their mission, they are looking forward to a very victorious return.

VERMULEN: What would you regard as the most serious task of RRR?

DUMENI: The whole programme is a serious matter. The Repatriation is the 1st chapter in the process of implementing Resolution 435.

In this regard our tasks cannot be separated from the whole implementation process.

We have seen what South Africa did in the last few weeks. I therefore feel that our most important task is to make arrangements in such a way that the security of our returnees is guaranteed, and that the repatriation piece falls in its rightful place in relation to Resolution 435.

Furthermore, we have an important task of mobilizing our people to participate. The success of RRR lies in the Namibian people as a whole, not in the hands of a few RRR officers or committee members. All Namibians must work and pray for a smooth repatriation process, they need to open their homes for the returnees and must see to it that returnees are not harassed by the remaining illegal force in Namibia.

We need to encourage our people to report all violations and all maltreatments to UNTAG.

VERMULEN: Given the setbacks caused by the clash of S.A troops and SWAPO combatants in the North, will RRR continue to work to schedule and will these setbacks in anyway affect the churches preparations to welcome and resettle the returnees ?

DUMENI: As I hinted before, the S.A. forces are out to initiate events that could sabotage the implementation of Resolution 435.

They want to create an atmosphere of intimidation fear and chaos in order to use it as a weapon to prevent the return of our people, because such a return threatens them.

This leaves a huge challenge to the UN, namely to ensure that this South African move is halted.

We are moving forward with our preparations and we're determined to be on schedule.

We're however calling on UNTAG and the UNACR to make appropriate security arrangements in time for the arrival of our people.

What happened in the North served to remind us that the stabilizing forces are still not under control.

This is an important homework for Mr Arthisaari to be done in a very short time before the repatriation starts in mid-May.

We're working hard to be ready by that time because we don't want Repatriation to be delayed due to lack of preparedness on our side. It would give the enemies of 435 a good excuse.

VERMULEN: How do you personally see the future of RRR Programme? In relation to an independent Namibia?

DUMENI: RRR is really an emergency programme to provide assistance and guidance during this transition period.

The projects and programmes we plan will need to be reassessed by the new government.

The responsibilities will eventually be taken over by the government elect.

The churches must however be prepared to carry the responsibility they have carried until such a time when the new government can get its arrangements in place.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting, on 29 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 431 (1978) of 27 July 1978,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution 431 (1978) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West African People's Organization to the Secretary-General,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation and his explanatory statement;

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to twelve months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West African People's Organization to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, inclu-

ding its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President on 8 September 1978;

5. Calls upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters or transfer of power, in contravention of resolution 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present resolution, are null and void;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of the present resolution.

MARCH 1989**THE PEACE PLAN:
RESOLUTION 435 AND THE BRAZZAVILLE PROTOCOL**

UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 is the internationally accepted peace plan for the independence of Namibia. Although it was agreed to in principle by SWAPO and South Africa in 1978, Pretoria in subsequent years repeatedly raised obstacles to its implementation. Chief among these was the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. At the end of 1988, South Africa, Angola and Cuba concluded a tripartite agreement, known as the Brazzaville Protocol, which established a timetable for the implementation of Resolution 435 and for the Cuban withdrawal.

RESOLUTION 435

Resolution 435 is intended to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. UN supervision and control will be exercised through a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, and a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The Special Representative will work with the SWA Administrator-General (AG) to "ensure the orderly transition to independence".

Key provisions of Resolution 435 (and accompanying documents):

- a comprehensive cessation of hostilities will be observed by all parties, and South African and SWAPO armed forces will be restricted to base.
- thereafter all but 1 500 SA troops will be withdrawn within 12 weeks, prior to the official start of the election campaign. The remaining troops will be restricted to specified bases and will be withdrawn after the certification of the election. The "citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces" will be demobilised and disbanded.

SWAPO

personnel outside the territory will be allowed to return peacefully through designated entry points.

- the military section of UNTAG will monitor the above steps.
- the existing police forces are responsible for maintaining law and order during the period of transition. The AG, to the satisfaction of the Special Representative, will ensure their good conduct. Where appropriate they will be accompanied by UNTAG personnel. The police will be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.
- prior to the beginning of the election campaign, political prisoners and detainees will be released, refugees will be allowed to return, and the AG will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which might inhibit free and fair elections.
- unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in relation to the electoral process, and in violation of this and other UN resolutions, will be null and void.
- the election will be held country-wide on the basis of universal adult suffrage to elect representatives to a Constituent Assembly. The responsibility of the Assembly is to draw up and adopt a constitution for an independent Namibia. The Assembly will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit what ever additional steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent government.
- full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press will be guaranteed during the election.
- the Special Representative is to satisfy himself at all stages as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the electoral process, the elections themselves and the certification of the results. He will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference of the election process from whatever quarter.



Timetable of Namibian Independence

TIMING	EVENTS	UN INVOLVEMENT
Mid-February (D-42)		- Core UNTAG staff arrive in Namibia
1 April (D-Day)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal cessation of hostilities - Restriction to base of SWAPO and South African forces - Release of political prisoners and detainees begins - Repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation begins 	- The Special Representative of the SG and most UNTAG civilian, civilian police and military personnel arrive between 1 April and mid-May. They are deployed to 50+ locations throughout the Territory.
Mid-May (D + 42)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refugees and other returnees begin return to Namibia - General rules for elections issued - Reduction of SA forces to 12,000 - Repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws completed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNHCR assists in return of refugees and other returnees - UNTAG staff continues organisational and monitoring activities.
Early June (D + 63)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduction of SA forces to 8,000 - Release of political prisoners/detainees completed 	- All UNTAG activities continue.
1 July (D + 84)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Further force-level reductions to 1,500 SA troops - Military installations on northern border under UN supervision or deactivated 	- All UNTAG activities continue.
Approx. 1 July (D + 84)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Official start of electoral campaign - Voter registration begins 	- Second major contingent of civilian UNTAG staff arrives to support the monitoring of the electoral process.
Early October (approx.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Major part of electoral poll watchers arrive and are deployed to designated polling stations. 	- (Poll watchers are approx. 800 professional election personnel mostly coming from various Member States.)
1-8 November (approx.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elections to Constituent Assembly 	- UNTAG staff supervise elections and the timely tabulation and publication of voting results, to the satisfaction of the SRSG, who then certifies the results.
Mid-November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Completion of withdrawal of remaining 1,500 South African troops - Closure of all bases - Convening of Constituent Assembly 	- UNTAG activities continue. Many staff are expected to depart at this stage.
Date unspecified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conclusion of Constituent Assembly - Steps necessary prior to installation of new government 	- UNTAG activities continue, with more staff departing.

Courtesy of the Namibian Communication Centre, London

United Nations Security Council Resolution 435

A letter dated June 12, 1982 by representatives of the "Western Five" governments sets out the principles concerning the establishment of a Constituent Assembly and Constitution for independent Namibia (S/15287) as accepted by all the parties to the negotiations. The agreement is treated as a supplement to UNSCR 435, and is presented, in full, below.

A: The Constituent Assembly

In accordance with UNSCR 435 (1978), elections will be held to elect a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organisation and powers of all levels of government.

Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly.

Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write.

The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of the electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process.

Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.

The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation on the Constituent Assembly to different political parties which gain substantial support in the election.

The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the Principles of Part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two thirds majority of its total membership.

B: Principles for a Constitution for Namibia.

Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state.

The Constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be amended only by designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.

The Constitution will determine the organisation and powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a system of government with three branches: a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.

The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A above.

There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from the arbitrary deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.

It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect to provide for increased penalties with retropective effect.

Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service, and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.

Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and/or regional administration.

Signed by representatives of: United States, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, France.

**THE UNITED NATIONS
INDEPENDENCE PLAN FOR NAMIBIA**

THE HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND PROBLEMS

Namibia Support Committee

15.3.89

THE UNITED NATIONS INDEPENDENCE PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

On 22 December 1988, as part of a regional peace settlement, South Africa finally agreed to the implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence. This paper aims to describe the origins of the plan, its key elements, and the grounds for the very real fears that it will fail to achieve its stated aim of 'the transfer of power to the people of Namibia'.

1) THE HISTORY OF THE PLAN

a) UN Security Council Resolution 435

At the heart of the plan is UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978(1). It is important to realise that 435 is not itself the plan, rather it recalls previous Security Council resolutions, in particular UNSCR 385 of 1976, and adopts proposals contained in other documents, notably 'Proposals for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation(2)', presented to the Security Council on 10 April by the Western power 'Contact Group', and a report by the UN Secretary General(3). Other documents totalling thirty or more, many of them unpublished, have since defined modalities for implementing the original plan. Collectively all these documents containing qualifications and subsidiary agreements comprise the UN plan. One direct consequence of the confusion caused by the absence of a single statement of the plan has been to provide South African and its allies with room to manoeuvre.

b) The Appeasement of the Colonial Regime

So how did this confusion arise? In January 1976(4) the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 385 condemning the continued occupation of Namibia in forthright terms, demanding its immediate withdrawal, and specifying among other things that elections be held 'under the supervision and control of the United Nations.' The resolution concluded by resolving that in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, the Security Council would consider 'the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter or the United Nations.'

But this clear threat of sanctions was thwarted, as in previous years, by the major Western powers. Instead of forcing compliance, the governments of Britain, the US, France, West Germany and Canada formed the so-called 'Contact Group' and set about negotiating with South Africa. Out of these discussions emerged the 'Proposals' accepted through the adoption of UNSCR 435.

In fact in a number of crucial respects these proposals watered down the original plan. While UNSCR 385 envisaged immediate South African withdrawal from Namibia and the establishment of an interim UN administration, the new plan envisaged an ill-defined partnership between a UN Special representative and the South African colonial

1 See Appendix 1 for Text,

2 Document S/12636 10 April 1978.

3 Document S/12827 of 26 August.

4 This was shortly after the people of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau won their independence from Portugal leaving Rhodesia and Namibia as the last two colonies in Africa. A South African armoured column had just driven deep into Angola from the Namibian border

governor, the Administrator General. Key issues are left unresolved. For instance, while the proposals call for free elections to be held for 'the whole of Namibia as one political entity' they omit any particular reference to Walvis Bay which South Africa had announced the previous year had been incorporated into South Africa itself.

c) Attitudes of SWAPO and South Africa to 435

SWAPO has consistently declared that it will abide by all internationally agreed decisions on Namibia. Despite the clear watering down of UNSCR 385, it indicated its willingness to fight an election under the terms laid out in new UN plan.

South Africa by contrast, having initially appeared to accept the Contact Group proposals which were published on 10 April, displayed their true intentions a few weeks later when they perpetrated a massacre of 700 Namibian refugees at Kassinga in southern Angola on 4 May 1978, and went on to hold their own shotgun elections to an 'Interim Government' in December.

Undeterred, the 'Contact Group' engaged in yet more negotiations producing more qualifications of the UN plan. After the election of the Conservative government in May 1979, South Africa began to introduce a series of small objections to the detail of the plan. The British government was only too happy to allow the momentum of the independence process to slow down. The Reagan administration which took office in the US in 1981 was equally obliging. It was not until 12 July 1982, the Group informed the UN Secretary General that agreement had been reached 'by all parties to the negotiation' on 'Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia'. Among these principles are the stipulations that the Constituent Assembly should reach its decisions by a two-thirds majority, that the constitution when agreed should provide for protection of private property, and that there should be no retrospective criminal offenses - presumably designed to protect employers and members of the 'security forces' for being called to account for their actions during the colonial occupation.

Still South Africa was not satisfied, and despite the collapse of its 'Interim Government', pressed ahead with the formation of its so-called 'Transitional Government of National Unity' in June 1985. It was only the upsurge in political resistance within Namibia coupled with crushing military defeats in Angola that finally forced South Africa to agree to the implementation of any form of the UN independence plan.

2) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The ostensible aim of the plan is to ensure a smooth and equitable transition to independence for Namibia⁽⁵⁾. In theory it provides for an end to the war, for the return of refugees, the repeal of racist and repressive legislation, and for the holding of 'free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations' to a constituent assembly leading to independence in 1990. Unfortunately when the plan is looked at in detail it emerges that none of these aims are likely to be easily achieved in practice.

5 See Appendix 2 for the timetable for the implementation of the UN Plan.

a) Monitoring

i/ The UN Special representative

The UN's man on the ground during the election campaign will be the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. However, it appears that he will have little real power. He is vaguely charged with satisfying himself of 'the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process', given the right to 'make proposals', and required to report back to the Secretary General. In general his job is to work with the South African colonial governor who will be required to administer the elections. It is highly doubtful that the Security Council which has so much political capital invested in the current version of the independence plan would accept any refusal by the Special Representative to certify the results of the election or to suggest that the process be suspended because of irregularities.

ii/ UNTAG

UNSCR 435 provides for the establishment of a UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) comprising both a civilian and a 7,500-strong military component to work with the UN Special representative to monitor the ceasefire, the demobilisation and withdrawal of the South African forces from Namibia, and the disbandment of local militia forces, and to oversee the conduct of the elections.

During January and February of 1989 it became apparent that the Permanent Members of the Security Council (Britain, the US, France, USSR and China) were determined to slash the numbers of the military component of UNTAG. Ostensibly this was a cost-cutting exercise, but as was widely reported it actually represented a 'diplomatic triumph' for South Africa (and by implication an example of further appeasement of the colonial regime). Despite the overwhelming case for the need for a larger monitoring force than that envisaged in 1978 - the huge South African military build up over the past decade, the war in Angola etc - the UNTAG military component will now initially number only 4,650.

b) A Formal Cessation of Hostilities

i/ South African Defence Force

A central part of the plan is the phased withdrawal from Namibia of all SADF troops. By the time of the elections in November, only 1,500 will be allowed, confined to base at Grootfontein and Oshivelo in the North. They too must leave after the certification of the elections in November. The early indications are unpromising. During January and February, Church sources within Namibia reported on a continued military build up, while the Angolan government complained that South African forces have once again invaded their country on 8 February.

ii/ The South West Africa Territorial Force

The South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) is a locally recruited, 30,000 army, organised along racial

lines and operating alongside the SADF. Formed between 1976 and 1980 from various ethnic militia, it falls within the ambit of the UN Plan. The UN Secretary General's Report of 23 January 1989(6) is quite explicit. A key task of the military component of UNTAG will be 'To monitor the dismantling of the command structure of citizen forces including the South West Africa Territorial Force(7).' In fact recruitment into SWATF has continued until the last possible moment. The South African authorities have indicated that the SWATF is merely to be stood down on full pay until after the elections in November. It is difficult to imagine anything less likely to inspire confidence in a smooth transition to independence.

iii/ Other Forces

In addition to the SADF and the SWATF, there are a number of other military, paramilitary, and other forces linked to the colonial occupation. These include the Koevoet (see 'Policing the Elections' below); UNITA the South African and US sponsored rebel organisation fighting the Angolan government, many of whose members have been reported as entering northern Namibia; white settlers, all armed, and mostly supporters of the Nationalist Party; and far-right vigilante groups such as the so-called 'White Wolves' which claimed responsibility for the firebombing of 'The Namibian' in 1988.

c) The Electoral System

i/ Drawing up the electoral roll

The UN plan leaves unclear the process by which the electoral role is to be drawn up, although it will be in the hands of the AG and must be approved by the UN Special Representative. During two previous South African orchestrated 'elections' many legitimate voters were not registered. Conversely many ineligible people were given the right to vote. This time these might include UNITA members who have entered Namibia and been given Namibian identity documents. Given the basic disagreement about the size of the population - the South African authorities put it at around 1.1 million, while the UN estimates maybe 1.6 million - there are ample grounds for fears of manipulation of the roll by the AG. If South Africa's annexation of Walvis Bay(8) is not successfully challenged, Namibians born and permanently resident in Walvis Bay will be disenfranchised.

ii/ The Voting Age

It had been widely assumed that, as in most countries, all

6 Document S/20412. This report was produced at the request of the Security Council and forms part of the independence plan.

7 Para 43(d) S/20412.

8 See "Fragmenting the Future" for a wider discussion of the issue of Walvis Bay,

Namibians over the age of 18 would be entitled to vote. Recently the AG has argued that the age should be 21, a move specifically aimed at SWAPO's support among young people.

iii/ Voting System

The AG has opted for a system of proportional representation with a stipulation that in order to win seats in the constituent Assembly parties must achieve a certain proportion of the national vote. This has had the deliberate effect of prompting the formation of a number of coalitions united mainly by their opposition to SWAPO which is widely assumed to enjoy the support of the majority of the population.

d) Return of the Refugees

i/ Repatriation Programme

The UN Plan contains specific provisions for the return of Namibians from exile. A report of the Secretary General, accepted by the Security Council(9), states that in order to ensure that 'all Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory of Namibia (are) permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment, suitable entry points will be designated,' and that the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) should make provision for transit centres so that 'all returning Namibians will be free to locate where they wish.' 'Any other arrangements,' the Report continues, 'would be contrary to the guarantee of full freedom of movement.'

It has long been agreed that the UNHCR should have a single Namibian partner in the repatriation programme, namely the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), as the only Namibian NGO with a long record of administering humanitarian projects. After discussions between the UNHCR representative and the AG, counter-proposals have emerged. It is now suggested that Churches outside the CCN (either very small or explicitly racist) should also be partners, and also that the AG himself should provide some of the reception centres of returning refugees. This would be a clear violation of the UN Plan.

ii/ Number of refugees

SWAPO has reported to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that it has registered some 74,000 Namibian refugees entering Angola and Zambia. This is around 5% of the total Namibian population and will contain a large proportion of SWAPO activists. SWAPO has asked for between 41,000 and 42,000 of these to be repatriated under the terms of the UN PLAN. (The remainder are young people and combatants.) Smear stories emanating from South African and other western sources have claimed that the actual number is far lower, even that there are no refugees! Given that the South African AG is

responsible for drawing up electoral rolls, there is the real threat that attempts will be made to exclude many of the refugees from the electoral process.

e) The Election Campaign

i/Intimidation of Voters

Given the large numbers of military and paramilitary forces which will effectively still be stationed in Namibia (see 2b above) and the planned four month election campaign, there are both the means and the opportunity to intimidate the electorate. During previous 'elections' South African troops and police and private militiamen were much in evidence(10). Apart from obvious physical threats, attempts were made to influence voters by threatening to withhold health care, and by the offering of bribes.

ii/ Policing the elections

According to the UN Plan, 'Primary responsibility' for maintaining law and order during the transition period including the election campaign shall rest with 'existing' police, in other words with the colonial police force. These will number some 6,300 to be monitored by some 500 UNTAG police. This is a slight increase in the numbers envisaged in 1978 in response to doubling of South African force, although it clearly does not compensate for the cutting of the military component of UNTAG.

The most disturbing aspect of the policing question is the recent South African announcement that the notorious 'counter-insurgency' unit, the Koevoet, known to be responsible for a whole series of atrocities against the civilian population are to be reclassified as a police force, and therefore to be directly concerned with the policing of the elections(11). This directly contradicts the UN Secretary general's Report of 23 January 1989 in which it is stated that UNTAG will oversee the disbandment of Koevoet(12).

ii/ Control of the Media

Although most Namibian people will not need a radio broadcast or even a political rally to help them decide how to vote, the UN Plan creates a general obligation on the Special Representative to ensure that access to the media be free and fair, that parties in the election be permitted to import election equipment and materials, and that overseas monitors be allowed into the country. It should be noted that Namibian television and radio services are controlled directly by the South African authorities. Most of the press is also pro-South African.

10 For more information about intimidation in previous elections in Namibia see "Elections in Namibia" by Justin Ellis, BCC & CIIR 1979.

11 See Appendix 3.

12 See Document S/20412 Para 42.

f) The Constituent Assembly

i/ Voting

Decisions of the Constituent Assembly are to be by a 2/3 majority. This has crucial consequences for South Africa's strategy in the coming period. The aim will clearly be to deny SWAPO a two thirds majority in the assembly and thus force them to compromise with the unholy electoral alliances set up with South African support.

ii/ Entrenched Rights

As noted in ld) above, the power of the Constituent Assembly is already delimited by the 'Constitutional Principles' enshrined in the UN Plan. As yet it is unclear to what extent South Africa intends to insist upon the protection of so-called 'minority rights', a euphemism for white privilege. Over the past two years whites have been repeatedly assured by the South African government and AG that such protection would be guaranteed.

iii/ From the Constituent Assembly to Independence

Nowhere in the UN plan is it set out how the final transition to independence is to be achieved. UNTAG has a mandate to remain until the end of March 1990 when it is assumed that the Constituent Assembly will have finished its work. It is unclear, however, what is supposed to happen should the Constituent Assembly fail to agree a constitution. The fear is that should this occur, South Africa's allies within the assembly will resort to force. The existence of a SWATF maintained all the while on full pay, reports that various of South Africa's client politicians within the old puppet government have been recruiting private armies, and the recent announcement by the white National Party that they too might be forced to 'launch a liberation struggle' should they be dissatisfied with the outcome of the independence process all threaten to plunge Namibia into civil war.

g) The Regional Agreement

Although the UN plan for Namibian independence does not include agreements relating to regional issues, the South African government only agreed to its implementation on the basis of a tripartite agreement between itself and the governments of Angola and Cuba. According to this deal, timetable for the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia is linked to another timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

There are several ways in which the Cuban withdrawal might be slowed down leading to South African refusal to pull out of Namibia. South Africa itself, fearing the outcome of the elections in November, might attempt to sabotage the independence process by once again invading Angola (most recently on 8 February - after the signing of the regional peace settlement), and provoking a Cuban military response. Alternatively either South Africa or the United States could employ its surrogate, UNITA, to provoke such a development. Such developments would be the logical outcome of the infamous policy of "linkage" pursued by Washington and Pretoria which aimed both to justify the illegal colonial occupation of

Namibia by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and to secure for UNITA a place in the Angolan government.

3) CONCLUSIONS

There are two principal lessons to be learnt from the development of the UN plan over the last 13 years: first that despite the monstrous crimes of the colonial regime against the people of Namibia, there are almost no lengths to which Western governments will not go to appease South Africa. (Lately these Western powers have received support from within the Security Council from the USSR and China). Whatever the violations of the UN plan which South Africa may commit over the coming months, there is no guarantee that there will be any effective response from the UN. In other words, the outcome of the struggle for Namibian independence will depend as it has always done upon the efforts of the Namibian people themselves.

This being the case, the second lesson to be learnt is the need to understand the provisions of the plan as it now exists in their entirety. Unless the supporters of the rights of the people of Namibia to self determination are able to do this, it will become impossible to monitor deviations from the plan and therefore to mount effective campaigns against South Africa and their international allies. Until the UN, acting upon the recommendations of the UN Special Representative, actually endorses Namibian independence, Namibia is not free and South Africa remains in illegal occupation of the country.

APPENDICES

- A) UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)
- B) Timetable for the Implementation of the UN Plan
- C) The Koevoet

Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-western Africa

Initialed on 13 July 1988 at New York and agreed on 20 July 1988 by the United States of America, the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Cuba

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the south-western region of Africa. They recognize that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

A. The implementation of resolution 435 (1978) of the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

B. The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of resolution 435 (1978) of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said resolution.

C. Redeployment towards the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both States to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.

D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality and independence of States and for the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

F. Abstention from the threat and utilization of force against the territorial integrity and independence of States.

G. The acceptance of the responsibility of States not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other States.

H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the south-western region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.

I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.

J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

K. Recognition of the role of the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.

L. The right of each State to peace, development and social progress.

M. African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the south-western region of Africa.

N. Recognition of the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America.

Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa

Signed on 22 December 1988 at the United Nations, New York

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as 'the Parties',

Taking into account the 'Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa', approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement,

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as 'UNSCR 435 (1978)',

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435 (1978) and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality and independence of all states in southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress,

Urging African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,

Agree to the provisions set forth below:

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435 (1978) on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435 (1978).

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435 (1978), the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Angola shall co-operate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435 (1978). The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization or person in connection with acts of war, aggression or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of the borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435 (1978).

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat of or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression or violence against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in the agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

7. United Nations & Untag

- * Namibia: Untag (Idasa)
- * Untag (SA Barometer)
- * Pressclips

Untag

Central to the implementation of Resolution 435 and free and fair elections in the territory is the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag). Untag will have both a military and a civilian component.

Military component

The tasks of this component of the UN force includes:

- A) Monitoring the cessation of hostilities by all parties, the restriction of Swapo and South African armed forces to bases and the phased withdrawal of all except a specified number of South African forces.
- B) Surveillance and prevention of infiltration of the borders of the territory.
- C) Monitoring the demobilisation of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces and the dismantling of their command structures.
- D) Assisting the civilian component of Untag. The military component will be equipped with weapons of a defensive nature.

It is considered that the military component will consist of seven infantry battalions totalling approximately 5 000, plus 200 monitors, and command, communications, engineering, logistic and air support elements totalling approximately 2 300.

Civilian component

This will consist of two elements, one being the civil police

Civil police

This element will take measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process, accompany the existing police forces, when appropriate, in the discharge of their duties and assist in the realisation of the function to be discharged by the Administrator-General.

It is envisaged that approximately 360 experienced police officers will be required.

Non-police element

The non-police element will have the function of assisting the Special Representative in:

- A) supervising and controlling all aspects of the electoral procedures are strictly complied with, and receiving and investigating complaints of fraud or challenges relating to the electoral process.
- B) advising the special representative as to the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which may abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections.
- C) ensuring the absence of, or investigating complaints of, intimidation, coercion or restrictions on freedom of speech, movement and peaceful political assembly which may impede the objective of free and fair elections.
- D) assisting in the arrangements for the release of all Namibian political prisoners or detainees and for the peaceful, voluntary, return of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory;
- E) assisting in any arrangements which may be proposed by the Special Representative intended to inform and instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election and the procedures for voting.

It is envisaged that approximately 500 professional officers, as well as the necessary supporting staff will be required initially until the cessation of hostilities. Therefore 1 000 professional and 200 field service and general staff will be required during the electoral campaign and the period of balloting in order to cover all the polling stations. The staff will, among other duties, be required for 24 regional centres and over 400 polling stations.

Costs

In 1978 it was envisaged that the financial requirements for Untag would be as high as \$300-million. Of this approximately R33 million was allocated to finance the return of refugees and exiles. These costs will be considered expenses of the Organisation to be borne by Member States.

CCN Comment

(2 June 1989)

Where are the returnees?

There is speculation in many circles as to where the returnees are. Indeed the initial date of return date of return, May 15 is past. Still only 2 weeks ago the refusal of SWATF and SADF to be restricted to base determined the non-appearance of the former Namibian exiles. Clearly neither the UNHCR nor RRR would jeopardise the safety and protection of returnees under such circumstances.

Since then the Administrator-General intimated a "guarantee" of amnesty to the returnees. But the major question still arises: Are the returnees guaranteed freedom and protection under the law or are there laws which would override the so-called amnesty?

The issue of the removal of discriminatory legislation will therefore be a vital link to the appearance (or non-appearance) of the returnees.

Other sources have claimed that the ANHCR has facilitated the delay of the return in order to allow RRR to complete the "behind schedule" construction of reception centres (all critics please note that these are neither "refugee or transit camps".)


Ultimately, it will depend neither upon the utterances of the AG [be they about amnesty or his Namibian status] nor upon the extent to which the reception centres are ready. The returnees will come once there is concrete evidence that all discriminatory legislation is removed.

By the way, the Reception Centres are on average 80% complete - no mean achievement for any organisation working against time as well as under the AG's negative influence concerning CCM/RRR.

The SR (Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction) Committee was assigned the following duties

1. To arrange for the presence of Committee Members at entry points.
2. To arrange ways for a warm welcome to the returnees.
3. To provide moral, pastoral and material support for the returnees and to secure their safety.
4. To assist in running of reception and overflow centres.
5. To involve the whole community in support of the SR Programme.
6. To make recommendations to the 3R Committee Headquarters on how best to assist returnees.
7. To monitor the events related to Res. 435.

To achieve this the country has been divided into 10 UNTAG regions (see map) and entry points, reception centres and sub centres established.



Untag: Peacemakers Or troublemakers?

By Mark Verbosen

IF Marti Ahtisaari, UN special representative for Namibia, could not exercise authority over the South African 'colonial structures' in Namibia, Swapo would have to demand his resignation. Swapo's Windhoek branch said in a statement last week.

And the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) said in a joint statement they rejected the 'attempt by illegitimate South African representatives and their erstwhile backers in Britain and the United States to lay the blame for the carnage at the doors of Swapo'.

They also called on 'those forces which are monitoring this process to act effectively and impartially and not to collaborate further with those forces which have illegally occupied Namibia for decades'.

Swapo's Windhoek branch also strongly condemned the



Untag arrives - this time troops from Czechoslovakia. Pic: John Liebenberg (Afrapix)

showing false video films and pamphlets discrediting Swapo.

They accused South Africans of attacking Swapo combatants while they were trying to regroup and hand themselves over to Untag.

'As a result of the South African provocative military attack, Plan combatants were left with no alternative but to defend themselves.'

Swapo also condemned the decision to deploy the 'notorious' 101 and 202 battalions in order to fight Swapo.

Ahtisaari was accused of siding with the colonial authorities, and appealed to the UN Security Council to have the two battalions withdrawn and confined to base.

'We demand the immediate deployment of a great number of Untag soldiers in the north of the country and the original Untag number of 7500 should be put into operation or even doubled.' The Namibian

from Ahtisaari to ensure that Swapo members should not be forced to put on DTA T-shirts and even join that party because their employers want them to.'

Farmers

They also called on Ahtisaari to see to it that farmers and 'agents of the colonial administration' should cease

entation of Resolution 435,' the statement said.

Swapo called upon Ahtisaari to 'strictly ensure that the safety of Namibians is totally guaranteed by the Untag presence in Namibia.'

'The intimidation of Swapo members and supporters by farm employers in Namibia should not go ahead unchallenged. Therefore we demand

unprovoked shooting of Swapo members and supporters by two white vigilantes between Oshivelo and Tsumeb more than a week ago.

Rally

'This particular incident occurred after these peaceful Namibians attended a successful public rally of Swapo in Windhoek marking the implement-

8. Current situation

- * Why South Africa agreed to the settlement**
- * Obstacles to free and fair elections (NIG)**
- * Renewed fighting in April (NIG)**
- * The bumps along the road to freedom (WIP)**
- * Pressclips**

MARCH 1989

WHY SOUTH AFRICA AGREED TO A SETTLEMENT IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA

At the end of 1988 South Africa finally agreed to withdraw from Namibia and Angola. There has been intense speculation as to why this happened. Pretoria claims that the settlement was a victory for the diplomacy of Pik Botha and Chester Crocker. The real reasons, however, appear to relate to four sets of factors: the SADF's declining fortunes in southern Angola; the financial cost of South Africa's occupation of Namibia and war against Angola; the sustained resistance of the Namibian people; and the changing international balance of forces.

THE WAR IN ANGOLA

In July 1987 the SADF began an intense eight month campaign in Angola. After successfully saving Unita from a major FAPLA offensive, it attempted to seize the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale. The battle was a turning point for the SADF. For the first time in more than ten years it failed to meet its objective. In November the Guardian warned that it was only a matter of time before the MPLA "gave Pretoria a bloody nose" (22.11.87).

There were two reasons for this. First, FAPLA had successfully changed its strategy from counter-insurgency against Unita to conventional warfare against the SADF. According to Prof Peter Vale, it had become "one of the strongest and most impressive armies in Africa" (Weekly Mail, 22.04.88).

Second, South Africa had lost its previously decisive edge of air superiority over southern Angola. The SADF's aging Impala and Mirage fighters were no match for Angola's sophisticated new radar system and MIG jets, and were not replaceable because of the arms embargo. For the first time, Angolan and Cuban pilots began flying over Namibian airspace, and the SAAF was no longer able to provide adequate air support to ground troops (Weekly Mail, 20.11.87).

The shift in the balance of forces resulted in a significantly higher number of South African troop casualties and deaths than ever before (Weekly Mail, 29.04.88). This provoked several hundred conscripted Namibian troops to mutiny in protest against being used "as cannon fodder and Unita mercenaries" (Weekly Mail, 20.11.87). More worrying for Pretoria was the unprecedented wave of criticism from the mainstream Afrikaans community. Conservative parents of soldiers killed in action, pro-government newspapers and the NG Kerk began to question the morality of the SADF's presence in Angola, and call for its withdrawal (Fair Lady, 17.04.88; Die Kerkbode, 8.6.88).

Faced with the possibility of a military stalemate or serious defeat, as well as mounting pressure from within the white community, South Africa was forced to sign a ceasefire agreement with Angola in August 1988. In a disadvantaged position, it was also compelled to agree to the implementation of Resolution 435 in Namibia.

THE FINANCIAL COSTS

The war in Angola substantially added to the costs of South Africa's occupation of Namibia. At the same time as national income and therefore tax revenues in Namibia have fallen in recent years, South Africa's military and adminis-



trative costs have grown. These costs, in the region of R3 million a day, have become increasingly difficult for South Africa to bear in the climate of a severe economic crisis (Cape Times, 4.1.85).

By relinquishing political control of Namibia, Pretoria will remove this burden and thereby make additional sums available for upgrading programmes in black townships in South Africa. At the same time, it will continue to profit from a Namibian economy that remains dependent on it long after formal independence. South Africa will continue to provide 90 per cent of the territory's food and manufactured goods until Namibia can find alternative trade routes, and will continue to control its transport system and only deep-water port at Walvis Bay (Guardian, 8.1.89).

NAMIBIAN RESISTANCE

Despite the fact that the Namibian people have lived under a virtual state of emergency for more than ten years, they have sustained a high level of resistance to the occupation of their country. Resistance in 1988 was particularly intense, with nation-wide school boycotts; an increasing number of young people joining PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO; a rapidly growing labour movement that flexed its muscles with a two day stayaway; and an ongoing guerrilla war strengthened by the Cuban/Angolan presence on the border (Namibian, 16.12.88).

Pretoria has long conceded that it cannot win the war in Namibia, and its repeated attempts to impose an anti-SWAPO government on the country have been decisively rejected by its inhabitants and the international community.

THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES

In the 'Gorbachev era' there has been a far greater effort by the superpowers to resolve regional conflicts. For the first time, both superpowers were involved in attempting to achieve a settlement in Angola/Namibia. The Soviet Union was keen to reduce its financial commitment there, and the United States was desperate for a foreign policy success before Reagan left office.

Prior to the presidential elections in the United States, Pretoria was frightened that a Dukakis administration would end US support for Unita, leaving South Africa supporting it alone. A Bush administration, on the other hand, would increase military aid to the rebel movement, but would insist on it cutting its embarrassing ties to South Africa. Both possibilities therefore favoured a South African withdrawal. Pretoria also hoped that a settlement in the region would offer proof of the soundness of 'constructive engagement', and would forestall further sanctions efforts against it.

ISSUED BY THE NAMIBIA INFORMATION GROUP, CAPE DEMOCRATS, P.O BOX 21, SALT RIVER, 7925

MARCH 1989**OBSTACLES TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA**

UN Resolution 435, which provides for free and fair elections in Namibia, will be implemented on 1 April. A Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) are responsible for the supervision and control of this process. However, there appear to be a number of obstacles to genuinely fair elections.

PROBLEMS WITH RESOLUTION 435

Resolution 435 is very much a compromise position from the perspective of the Namibian people. It was preceded by Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, which called for SA's **immediate** withdrawal from the territory, and its **replacement** by an Interim UN administration through the transition period to independence. When SA rejected this plan, the Western members of the Security Council watered it down and proposed an alternative that became Resolution 435. This provides for the complete withdrawal of SA only **after** the elections. It allows the SWA Administrator General (AG), and his civilian officials and police, to govern Namibia during the transition period and to run the election.

The result is that the possibility of SA interference in the election is greater than would have been the case under Resolution 385, and that the independence process will now be administered by the SWA authorities responsible for the introduction and implementation of discriminatory and repressive legislation in Namibia. (The bias of the AG was indicated in November last year when he called for the formation of a political front in order to challenge the "SWAPO threat" at the polls (Namibian, 11.11.88)).

Resolution 435 also compromises on the status of Walvis Bay. Although the Security Council has demanded its reintegration into Namibia (Resolution 432 of 1978), Resolution 435 implicitly accepts SA's continued control of the town after independence. This will have serious implications as Walvis Bay is of great economic and strategic-military importance as the only deep-water port in the country. The SADF is likely to maintain its large military base there (City Press, 11.09.88). It has even been suggested that SA may 'withdraw' some of its troops in Namibia only as far as Walvis Bay (Star, 15.11.1988).

The Security Council recently decided to reduce the military component of UNTAG from the 7 500 troops envisaged by Resolution 435 to 4 650. UNTAG's responsibility is to monitor the disbanding and withdrawal of SA controlled troops, which have increased from 40 000 to over 100 000 since the Resolution was passed.

SOUTH AFRICAN INTERFERENCE IN THE PROCESS

For several months the SADF has been electioneering against SWAPO, particularly in rural areas (Namibian, 28.12.88, 4.11.88, 25.11.88). The AG and SWATF are encouraging anti-SWAPO black groups to form election alliances (Namibian, 11.11.88, 18.11.88). The Namibian regularly reports security force harassment of SWAPO, including detentions and banning of meetings.



In March 1989 SWAPO successfully applied to the Windhoek Supreme Court to prevent SWATF and SWAPOL from unlawfully interfering with its election campaign; it was alleged by former members of Koevoet that the counter-insurgency police unit had not been disbanded, as claimed, but was determined to prevent SWAPO from coming to power (Weekly Mail, 17.03.89).

SWAPO claims that SA is giving Namibian identity cards to Angolan rebels so that they can vote in the elections, and is attempting to set up an MNR-type counter-revolutionary force to destabilize the election process and an independent Namibia (Cape Times, 31.1.89).

SWATF was still calling-up conscripted Namibians for military service in early 1989. Since Resolution 435 envisages the dismantling of SWATF before 1 July, many Namibians see this move as an act of bad faith by SA.

In respect of the Resolution 435 provision that all political prisoners and detainees should be released prior to elections, the SWA authorities have stated that there are "absolutely no political prisoners" in Namibia. They regard SWAPO convicted prisoners, and even some detainees, as common law criminals (Weekly Mail, 3.3.89).

While General Malan has stated that Pretoria will abide by Resolution 435, he has stressed that it will maintain its opposition to SWAPO rule while he and the military "have any say in the matter". He added: "It was always our policy to keep Marxism and 'people's democracy' from our front door. We will not turn from this path" (City Press, 11.09.88).

CONSERVATIVE RESISTANCE TO RESOLUTION 435

The majority of white Namibians appear to be totally resistant to the implementation of Resolution 435. The National Party of SWA held an election on 1 March for the White Legislative Assembly (although this will be dissolved on 1 April). The AWB has organised well-attended meetings at which whites were called on to take up arms against those supporting Resolution 435 (Namibian, 4.11.88). There are also reports of vigilante groups in rural areas arming themselves for the elections (Namibian, 28.10.88).

PRETORIA'S CONCERNS

Pretoria's chief concerns relate to alleged SWAPO intimidation and to United Nations 'bias'. This latter point arises from the fact that the UN has long declared SWAPO the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people". However, it should be noted that the UN has stated its support for SWAPO will automatically fall away once Resolution 435 is implemented, that the Resolution calls for **free and fair elections**, and that SA has been consulted on the composition of UNTAG. The decision to acknowledge SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people was taken by the General Assembly and not the Security Council, which is responsible for the transition to independence. Furthermore, it is SA and not the UN that has a long history of attempting to prevent or undermine the democratic process in other countries.

ISSUED BY THE NAMIBIA INFORMATION GROUP, CAPE DEMOCRATS, P.O BOX 21, SALT RIVER, 7925

NAMIBIA FACTSHEET

NO.4

APRIL 1989

RENEWED FIGHTING IN APRIL

On April 1, the start of the implementation of Resolution 435, clashes between Swapo guerillas and South African security forces broke out in northern Namibia. For nine days the most intense fighting in the history of the border war raged along the 300 km frontier. According to official figures, 279 Swapo combatants and 23 security force members were killed. On April 10, South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the Mount Etjo Declaration to re-establish the ceasefire and facilitate the guerillas' withdrawal to Angola through Untag assembly points.

There has been considerable debate about who was to blame for the fighting. The debate hinges on the following questions:

WHEN DID SWAPO FIGHTERS ENTER THE COUNTRY?

This question is important because Resolution 435 provides for a "cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties and the restriction of South African and Swapo armed forces to base" (Security Council document S/12636). There was to be no cross border movement in the period immediately following the cease fire, which was to begin at 4am on April 1.

South Africa claims that an estimated 750- 1000 guerillas entered Namibia from Angola (Windhoek Observer, 8.4.89). According to the UN Secretary General, the SWA Administrator General informed the UN Special Representative in Namibia that guerillas had crossed the border "during the night of March 31" (Namibian, 5.4.89). Swapo's position is that all the guerillas were in the country before the ceasefire deadline, and that at any point in time it has always had a large number of soldiers in Namibia (Namibian, 6.4.89). Once the fighting began and the ceasefire was de facto suspended, more guerillas crossed the border.

WHAT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE SWAPO FIGHTERS?

South Africa claims that the fighters had hostile intent and planned to instigate violence (Windhoek Observer, 8.4.89). Swapo states that its soldiers were under strict orders to abide by the ceasefire and not to instigate any acts of military hostility; their intention was to hand themselves over to Untag and be confined to base under UN supervision (Namibian, 3.4.89). According to Swapo, the guerillas "fired only in self-defence after being hunted down and attacked" (Times of Namibia, 3.4.89).

The Special Representative reported to the UN Secretary General that the fighters had not come in an "aggressive capacity", but in order to "hand themselves over" for confinement to base by the UN (Namibian, 5.4.89). The Secretary General submitted a report to the Security Council in which he said that the combatants' instructions were to establish bases in Namibia but to refrain from attacking South African forces; he concluded that they had no malicious intent (Windhoek Observer, 8.4.89).

The position of the UN officials was based on the testimonies of captured guerillas, evidence at the scenes of the initial battles, and eyewitness accounts.

According to one such account, Mr Wedeinge Josiah, a school teacher in Okahenge, encountered a guerilla shortly before the first clash took place. "I asked him what he was doing here and he said to me: 'We came here with no problems about the war. We heard on the radio that the war is over. We have not come to fight. We have come home to live in peace. Our purpose is not to fight, we have come here to meet Untag'". A short while later the first shots were fired: "The fighters [Swapo] were relaxing under this tree when we heard the roar of vehicles in the distance. The fighters walked out to greet the vehicles. I think because they thought this was the United Nations coming to meet them. Then I saw the smoke from the bush, I heard the roar of guns, the Casspirs began to fire at them and many of the fighters died just there. The others ran into the bush and they were hunted down" (Cape Times 5.4.89).

Other eyewitness accounts of the first battles confirm this story (Windhoek Observer, 8.4.89; Sunday Times, 9.4.89; Namibian, 11.4.89 and 4.4.89; Times of Namibia, 4.4.89 and 7.4.89). Swapo therefore argues that it was the South African security forces that broke the ceasefire.

WERE THE SWAPO FIGHTERS ENTITLED TO BE IN NAMIBIA?

Resolution 435 provides for the "restriction of South African and Swapo armed forces to base". After the Resolution was passed, the UN Secretary General clarified what this meant in the case of Swapo soldiers: "any Swapo armed forces in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire will likewise be restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia to be specified by the Special Representative after necessary consultation" (S/13120, 26.2.1979)

In a subsequent letter to PW Botha, the Secretary General wrote that this statement was "designed exclusively to solve the problem that might be created by the presence of any [Swapo] forces [in Namibia]. I take it from the numerous reports I have received from your government of armed Swapo activity within Namibia, that you agree that there may be some such forces present in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire" (S/13173, 15.3.79).

The claim that Swapo forces were to be north of the 16th parallel in Angola consequently has to be based on the Geneva Protocol, signed in August 1988 by South Africa, Cuba and Angola. It provided, inter alia, for a ceasefire between the parties and for the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola. It also states: "Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, Swapo's armed forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel".

Swapo did not participate in the tripartite negotiations and was not a signatory to the agreement. According to Pik Botha, this was because Swapo was not a government but only one of 20 parties in Namibia, "and if you negotiate with [it] you have to negotiate with all the others" (Times of Namibia, 12.4.89)

The case against Swapo therefore hinges on a letter written to the UN Secretary General by the President of Swapo after the signing of the Geneva Protocol. This letter states: "Swapo has by its own sovereign and unilateral decision, as a national liberation movement in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva agreement..., committed

itself to take the necessary steps to help make the peace process in the South-West African Region irreversible and successful. In this context, Swapo has agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts which started as of August 10 1988 in Angola. By the same token, Swapo will be ready to continue to abide by this agreement until the formal ceasefire under Resolution 435 is signed between Swapo and South Africa" (S/20129).

In a subsequent report on Namibia, the Secretary General stated that the Swapo President had informed him that Swapo had "agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the Geneva Protocol, and would be ready to abide by that agreement until the formal ceasefire under Resolution 435" (S/20412; Guardian, 6.4.89).

Swapo argues that the above documents contain only an agreement to abide by the ceasefire. There is no explicit or implicit agreement to deploy its forces north of the 16th parallel.

Furthermore, in terms of the Geneva Protocol, such deployment would apply only "within the context of a cessation of hostilities in Namibia". Although Swapo agreed to abide by the cessation of hostilities established among South Africa, Angola and Cuba, Pretoria refused to reciprocate with respect to it. (South Africa's reason was that it was not at war with anyone in Namibia). There was thus no formal ceasefire in Namibia prior to April 1 (Swapo press statement, 8.4.89).

HOW DID THE SECURITY FORCES RESPOND TO THE GUERRILLAS?

During the first two weeks of the fighting, Namibian churches, lawyers and newspapers repeatedly accused the security forces of committing atrocities. These accusations have since been made by the overseas media as well (Argus, 19.4.89).

One of the most serious allegations is that the security forces appeared to have a policy of taking no prisoners. The allegation was first made by a human rights lawyer in a report to the Special Representative after a fact-finding mission to Ovambo land; it was based on the large number of guerrillas killed and the small number captured (Namibian, 6.4.89). The South African authorities immediately denied the claim.

A number of journalists have subsequently reported that some of the dead bodies had no injuries other than bullet holes in the centre of their foreheads (Weekly Mail, 21.4.89). Speculation that some guerrillas were executed after capture is fuelled by the fact that the security forces dumped hundreds of bodies in mass graves without complying with the Inquests Act, which would have provided an independent enquiry into cause of death. A TV journalist who interviewed a Koevoet officer was told that the only prisoners taken were "dead ones" (Channel 2, France).


People in Ovamboland believe that the security forces had long anticipated the presence of guerrillas in Namibia after April 1, and had decided they would eliminate as many as possible (Weekly Mail, 21.4.89). 'Security sources' have been reported as saying that the police began planning for an April 'incursion' in January, and had recruited volunteers and members of the SA Police to bolster their forces (Weekend Argus, 8.4.89).

The security forces are also accused of assaulting and killing civilians, burning crops and destroying kraals (Argus, 19.4.89). According the Council of Churches of Namibia, these events occurred not only in the heat of the fighting, but as "malicious" reprisals against villagers suspected of being Swapo supporters (Windhoek Observer, 8.4.89).

The Times of Namibia reported that members of 101 Battalion were "wildly firing shots at random and intimidating people, driving fear into the village [of Oluno]" (4.4.89). The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia sent a telex to the Special Representative expressing concern at the "wholesale slaughter" taking place in the north (Namibian, 5.4.89). People in Ovamboland believe that the security forces stripped the dead bodies of their clothing and refused to allow them to be identified in order to hide the fact that they included civilians.

The accusations are consistent with those made over the past years by numerous human rights and church reports on the actions of the security forces. The reports have generally singled out Koevoet, a special police counter-insurgency unit, as responsible for terrorising the civilian population in the north. Although Pik Botha said recently that Koevoet had been disbanded as "an act of good faith", people in Ovamboland report that the police involved in the recent fighting were Koevoet members: "it is the same faces, the same Casspirs, the same uniforms" (Namibian, 3.4.89).

As international condemnation of the security forces mounted, and the Special Representative prepared a report on their activities, the SWA Administrator General announced the formation of a permanent commission of enquiry into the allegations of harassment and intimidation (Cape Times, 20.4.89).



A Swapo Youth League rally in October 1988 - their message is very clear

The bumps along Namibia's road to freedom

As Namibia lurches towards independence, several issues have emerged which could impede a smooth transition in the months ahead. The following is a brief outline of some of the points of disagreement, accompanied by quotes from some of the key actors in the Namibian settlement plan:

1 South Africa is insisting that the voting age be 21 years, not 18. Swapo and the Namibian National Students' Organisation (Nanso) say this is a ploy to exclude the thousands of militant youth activists who support the liberation movement.

* SA Administrator General Louis Pienaar: 'In South Africa, the term adult means people over 21. As far as I am concerned, the voting age should be 21'.

* Nanso President Paul Kalenga: 'Probably 30 percent of the voting population is aged between 18 and 21, and the majority are politicised activists working in the Swapo Youth League and in Nanso - they are militant Swapo members. South Africa is trying to exclude these people from voting, lowering the number of votes for Swapo'.

* Swapo Deputy National Chairperson Dan Tjongarero: 'They know this age group is a militant pro-Swapo portion of the population: one has to ask whether the election will still be free and fair if this is accepted'.

2 South Africa is insisting that the qualifying period of residence for voting be as short as possible. There is evidence that Unita rebel troops and South African troops are being registered as 'citizens' to boost the anti-Swapo vote.

* Pienaar: 'My own choice is to make the residence period as short as possible, something like 12 months'.

* Executive of the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN): 'Unita members are being issued with Namibian citizenship to enable them to vote against Swapo'.

* Tjongarero (speaking at a Swapo rally in Windhoek): 'Attempts are being made to enlarge the numbers of those who are going to vote for the enemy in the elections, to make sure

Swapo does not get a two thirds majority (and be able to be the outright government). Many of the South African troops who have done military service here have been issued with Namibian identity documents'.

3 The notorious Koevoet counter insurgency unit - 'credited' with 70 percent of all guerilla deaths and allegedly responsible for some of the worst atrocities in the war - has supposedly been disbanded and its members integrated into the regular police force. But there is ample evidence (including some seen by this writer) that the members of the unit have simply donned new uniforms. The 3 000 Koevoet men will form almost half the Namibian police force of 6 300 assigned to 'maintain law and order' in the transition process.

* Pienaar: 'Koevoet no longer exists. The unit has dissolved completely, and the men have been sent for retraining (as regular policemen). Some could not be retrained, and they will not have the rank of policemen with powers of arrest'.


* Major General Dolf Gouws, commissioner of the SWA Police: 'Swapo were not the enemy, they were criminals. All criminals are the enemy of the police, and when they stop being criminals, they are no

longer the enemy ... Everybody in this unit was a policeman before, they are trained policemen, they will help maintain law and order'. Gouws said in a separate interview with the Times of Namibia that the policing role would keep them employed and 'prevent them taking up arms against Swapo'.

* Tjongarero: 'If Koevoet have been trained to be killers, if they have been trained to be extermination squads, if their only training was towards the extermination of Swapo, one wonders whether the stain on their brains can be diminished in just four months'.

* Legal Assistance Centre director David Smuts: 'I have serious doubts about Koevoet's ability to be impartial ... Untag (the United Nations monitoring force in Namibia) will have to be extremely vigilant as to what Koevoet is doing during the elections, and they don't seem to have sufficient people to do that'.

* Security police chief inspector Derek Brune: '(The challenge facing the Koevoet men) is basically to live in normal society again and to operate as normal members of society, and not as people whose primary aim is to hunt trained terrorists, but to be able to react in a



*Swapo's Dan Tjongarero on SA's proposal to change the voting age:
'... one has to ask whether the election will still be free and fair'.*

normal fashion in a normal situation ... No person was ever arrested or kept in detention on an illegal basis (by Koevoet) whatsoever'.

4 Swapo, in its economic policy document, says it will not expropriate white farms which are productive and useful to the economy. But those farms which are lying idle, used as tax loopholes or

owned by absentee landlords will be expropriated, and their owners paid out.

* Independent economic consultant Eric Lang, himself a farm owner: 'I think the agricultural sector has not been making its just contribution to the state revenue. Development must start taking place in the rural areas. I believe land that is just being used as weekend hunting lodges is not

BRIEFS



Left, Swapo's Publicity Secretary Hidipo Hamutenya, and right, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Nico Bessinger in Vienna in 1987

making a contribution to the economy and should be looked at very critically'.

* Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging leader Hendrik van As: 'We are definitely going to fight (this issue), and we will take up the weapons we need at the moment we need them'.

* Farmer Hendrik Kotze: 'If Swapo tries to take away our farms, the majority of white people will

become white terrorists in their own country'.

5 Swapo says it will want to buy significant shares in the mining houses (figures of 49 and 50 percent are being mentioned) and use their share of the profits to build a secondary manufacturing sector which will help reduce the country's dependence on mining. At present,

Namibia imports 80 percent of its needs and exports 80 percent of its products. The mines contribute one third of the gross domestic product, provide 85 percent of the exports, and pay just under half the country's total taxes.

* CDM diamond mine executive director Abel Bower: 'We have no problems with Swapo, we can live with them'.

* Rossing Uranium general manager Dr Michael Bates (whose company's share of the gross domestic product is between 17 and 20 percent): 'Rossing is looking forward to working in an independent Namibia. We sell uranium on the world market and as a result of the Namibian association with South Africa, sanctions have been having quite an impact on us. So we are looking forward to an end to that international pressure'.

6 The SADF is touring the country, telling people not to vote for Swapo and offering to rebuild homesteads.

* Democratic Turnhalle Alliance leader Dirk Mudge: 'Every time the military tells people to vote for the DTA, it's another vote for Swapo'.
Tony Weaver

Some unsolved riddles of the killing veld

"I'M not a military man," said a Swapo supporter in Windhoek's Katutura township last week, "but there's something that really worries me about how all those Plan fighters died on April 1."

Now that the war in the north has died down, Namibians are beginning to ask probing questions about the bloody two weeks of conflict.

If anything, the Katutura resident's concern is voiced more bluntly by civilians in Owamboland. There, it is firmly believed that when Swapo guerrillas came across the Angolan border just before and on the first day of the transition process, they were ambushed by the South West African Police.

The civilians reject the Swapol description of events, which essentially rests on the claim that "routine patrols" came across tracks, followed them, and were fired upon.

They point to the very large numbers killed in the initial clashes, compared with the two weeks that followed.

No reliable global figure is available. But according to official sources, 38 guerrillas — as compared with two policemen — were killed in one engagement, near Ruacana, on April 1. A police spokesman later said there had been 30 "contacts" on that day.

Residents of Northern Namibia believe that Swapol — and more specifically, the "renamed" elements of Koevoet — knew all about the imminent crossing, and simply let Swapo walk into an ambush.

Observers in Windhoek also point to long-standing South African claims that Swapo had been heavily infiltrated by Pretoria's intelligence agencies. If these were true, they ask, how was an infiltration on a scale dwarfing anything in the 23 year-old war carried out undetected until it was too late?

Against this, Pretoria has put it on record that complaints had been lodged with the United Nations for several weeks prior to April 1, detailing a Swapo build-up in southern Angola, below the 16th Parallel.

Nevertheless, the size of the infiltration was never hinted at, and the questions about the "ambush" persist, particularly among Swapo supporters.

There have also been angry Swapo accusations that even if, as South Africa says, regular police — not army — units attacked the guerrillas, they violated agreements by not limiting themselves to the carrying of small arms.

Many civilians allege that the Swapol Casspirs were armed with their customary rooftop cannons when the first "contacts" were made. Koevoet members say, however, that the big guns had been dismantled and were lying inside the vehicles when the firefights started — and were refitted during the battles.

As with all other elements of the complex peace package, there is ambiguity about the use of heavy weapons: the police were restricted to the use of side-arms, excepting in "extraordinary circumstances". Swapol argues an extraordinary situation, as envisaged by the relevant clause, did arise.

The underlying accusation — it has only this week been publicly aired — is that Koevoet, with or without the knowledge or approval of the army and the politicians, exploited an opportunity to wipe out as many of Plan's fighters as possible — and with effective international approval.

There were quick and emphatic denials from the security forces that a "no prisoners" policy had been adopted. However, for the previous two weeks there had been speculation among journalists in Owamboland that a number of guerrillas appeared to have been shot through the head at point-blank range, suggesting that not all had died in firefights.

This week, congressional aides and

The more we learn about Namibia's bloody border battle, the more the puzzle deepens.

If South African intelligence have indeed infiltrated Swapo as heavily as they like to claim, why did the biggest-ever border crossing come as a surprise? Why were Swapo's heaviest losses right at the beginning when they should have been geared up for an attack? Perhaps because they bumbled into a trap?

By **SHAUN JOHNSON**
in Namibia

reporters in Washington were bluntly told that many Plan fighters had been "effectively executed". A television documentary programme, compiled by a group called South Africa Now, showed pictures of dead guerrillas.

It also records the hasty mass-grave burials — since said by South African officials to have been unfortunate but "unavoidable" — and this has fuelled the grisly hypothesis.

Many of these aspects could be clarified if pathological and ballistical investigations are undertaken on bodies of exhumed guerrillas.

And there remain other unclear factors. Civilians wonder whether the uncompromising character of Swapol's offensive had the approval of the SWA Territory Force and the South African Defence Force.

There is also uncertainty over the full role played by politicians, such as Administrator-General Louis Pienaar and Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

But it is self-evident that if even some of the claims are proved to be substantively true, the international diplomatic gains made by South Africa since April 1, will be dramatically reduced.

And, for the first time, attention will be drawn away from the still-unresolved arguments about whether the guerrilla movement had legitimate grounds for believing that its fighters could surface in Namibia in peace.



SWA police lower the body of a Swapo guerrilla into a mass grave outside Oshakati

Picture: JOHN LEBENBERG, Reuters

DTA trains own police

THE South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) has been training its own paramilitary police unit in northern Namibia.

This has been claimed by Namibians in the north of the country.

The trainees and their instructors have been identified as former members of the South West African Territory Force's 102 battalion and the notorious police counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet.

Residents in Opuwa, near Kaokoland in northern Namibia, report that more than 200 "DTA police" perform military drills and physical exercises daily.

They are also said to be receiving training in the use of small arms at the nearby Opuwa Airbase.

Similar reports have also been received from the town of Rundu.

Sources in the area claimed that the men responsible for setting up the police force were a Major A Ngende, Staff Sergeant Fred Thighuru and other SWATF soldiers.

Ngende apparently told the prospective cops at a briefing that their task would be to detain anyone found intimidating DTA supporters.

They were also told that they would be required to attend all Swapo meetings, in plain clothes, and take down the names of every speaker, as well as what was said.

Ngende also promised that each cop would be armed with a pistol and paid R300 a month from the tribal offices.

A DTA official denied knowledge of the "DTA police" when approached for comment.

Huge dossier on Namibia 'dirty tricks'

By SHAUN JOHNSON

STARTLING details of widespread harassment of Swapo supporters by security forces were presented in the Windhoek Supreme Court this week.

The case has prompted South West African Territorial Force and Police chiefs to take the extraordinary step of agreeing to issue instructions to their members "to refrain from unlawfully interfering" with Swapo supporters' election campaigning.

In a landmark out-of-court agreement following an urgent court application on behalf of members of Swapo and the Namibian National Students' Organisation, the SWATF officer commanding and the commissioner of Swapo undertook to send the warning by communiqué to all their members as a matter of urgency.

Among the claims made in the court papers is that the notorious *Koewoel* counterinsurgency unit is still in effective operation, despite widely-publicised claims that it had been disbanded. The claim is made by men who were members of *Koewoel* until the middle of February this year.

US policy on Pretoria in the age of Bush
PAGE 12

It is also alleged, in an affidavit by a former police informer, that only last month Swapo members initiated an abortive attempt to blow up a car belonging to the acting vice-president of Swapo, Chief Hendrik Witbooi.

Swapo activists from northern Namibia also paint a detailed picture of extra-legal security force activity aimed at Swapo sympathisers.

The most astonishing evidence emerged from the affidavits of Paulus Davids and Petrus Joseph, former guerrillas in Swapo's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (Plan). After their capture by the security forces in the early 1980's, both were "turned" and became members of *Koewoel*. They

Security forces 'abused their powers'

● FROM PAGE 1

claim they were among some 25 ex-guerrillas in the Swapo unit. Davids and Joseph left *Koewoel* less than a month before this week's court action. Davids said "in *Koewoel* we were specifically instructed that Swapo was the enemy ..."

"We were instructed by our commanding officer, Captain Engelbrecht, to arrest anybody wearing clothing indicating that he was a member or supporter of Swapo."

Davids said he was the driver of a Casspir used to break up a students' meeting in Rundu in February, and alleged "it was clear from the actions of Swapo that the aim was not to keep the peace, but they were intent on harassing, intimidating and using physical force to attempt to prevent the meeting from taking place."

"It seemed to me that *Koewoel* was determined not to allow people the freedom to show their support for Swapo."

Davids recalled a meeting at *Koewoel*'s "Arendanses" base at the end of January, where Engelbrecht told the policemen that *Koewoel* had been disbanded: "He warned us that, simply because we were no longer *Koewoel* that did not mean that we were not still going to make war. He said should Swapo come to power then we would fight again."

"He instructed us to tell any people we met while we were on patrol ... that they must all vote for the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance)."

Davids said "nothing changed" after the "transfer" to Swapo. "We did not sign any forms, nor did we even change our uniform, except that we no longer wore the 'Swapo-TIN' (*Tentatusgeriste*) badge. There was no practical change in the way we operated as a unit."

Davids believed that "*Koewoel* and Swapo will do everything in their power to ensure that Swapo does not win the (forthcoming independence) election ... elements in Swapo are participating in unlawful, aggressive and intimidatory tactics so as to prevent ordinary citizens of Namibia from exercising their basic rights."

Joseph, the second ex-*Koewoel* operative, said he had previously been "afraid to leave *Koewoel* because I had been threatened with death should I do so. However, recently I decided that I had had enough." He was briefly arrested after his resignation last month.

Joseph said he heard of the "end" of *Koewoel* while in a Casspir with the unit on patrol in Owanboland on January 23.

"The only addition to our training was that we were given courses in crowd control ... During these practices our instructors encouraged us to shout '*Staan staakend die jong Swapos*'. (Smash the young Swapo members to pieces)"

Joseph confirmed that anti-Swapo propaganda was distributed. "... I fear that both SWATF and Swapo will continue with these unlawful activities, especially as the elections grow closer. I believe they want to keep out a Swapo government at all costs and, far from being a neutral police force and army ... they are intent on favouring the parties close to the Interim government."

In a separate statement Lukas Rooi, a police informer who had gone through a SWATF training course in the use of explosives, swore that he had been instructed by Swapo members to place a bomb under top Swapo official Hendrik Witbooi's car late last month.

He had been discovered before he could place the bomb, and confessed. In his affidavit, Witbooi called on the court to "come to my assistance to protect me and my family and other members of Swapo and its leadership ... especially during the run-up to the elections."

In his founding affidavit, first applicant Faustinus Wakudumo — head of Swapo's Youth League branch in Kavango — said he had been a victim of "an illegal and unlawful campaign of interference with (his) fundamental rights". He cited several specific instances of such interference.

"These actions are (being) carried out quite clearly beyond the statutory powers, duties and functions vested in SWATF and Swapo," he testified.

He said his evidence was not simply designed to discredit Swapo's opponents, pointing out that even prominent rival politicians, notably DTA leader Dirk Mudge, had said publicly the DTA was extremely upset at the military's tactics.

Wakudumo's evidence — corroborated by several other affidavits — paints a picture of systematic and continuing disruption of Swapo and Nanso meetings in Kavango and elsewhere by security forces.

The extra-legal interventions included the use of military vehicles, a helicopter, and violent attacks on Swapo supporters by SWATF soldiers.

Several deponents who described themselves as "known Swapo supporters" said they were in fear of their lives because of the open hostility of members of the security forces.

Nanso official Vincent Likoro described events at a regional conference of the student group held at Rundu, northern Namibia, on February 11.

Some 120 men who described themselves as "armies" arrived at the school hall in which the meeting was being held, said Likoro, and assaulted students after shouting "Kill the Swapos — We've come to fight, not talk". Likoro said he and his colleagues identified the intruders as members of SWATF's 202 Battalion.

"I fear for my own safety, let alone my ability to continue to function as a member of Nanso, in the weeks and months ahead."

The court papers contain many similarly allegations, including an automatic rifle attack on pupils at Rundu Hunter School on March 4. Teacher Edelberth Katamba said a "SWATF assailant" fired more than 80 rounds at students, injuring several.

The agreement between lawyers for the applicants and the security force chiefs came after the presiding judge, GJC Strydom, ruled on Tuesday that the matter could be considered as urgent. The respondents had opposed the application.

On Tuesday evening counsel for the respondents offered the undertaking, without admission of liability. Counsel for the applicants accepted.

9. SWAPO

- * Chronology of Swapo
- * Swapo's economic programme
- * Trade union movement in Namibia (NIG)
- * Cosatu support pamphlet
- * Swapo constitutional proposals (SA Barometer)
- * Swapo Women's Council
- * Interview with Swapo

NAMIBIA FACTSHEET

NO. 6

MAY 1989

HISTORY OF SWAPO

1957: Ovambo contract workers in Cape Town form Ovamboland People's Congress, later renamed Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO).

1958: Movement spreads to Walvis Bay and Windhoek. Emphasis on developing political awareness and building organisational structures. Sporadic strikes organised among fishermen and cannery workers.

1959: SAP open fire on mass demonstration against forced removals in Windhoek, killing 11 and wounding 59. Fourteen people acquitted on charges of public violence. As repression mounts, leaders like Sam Nujoma forced into exile.

1960: OPO changes name to South West African People's Organisation (Swapo) to mark break with tribal orientation. Twin strategy of national mobilisation and building international support.

1962: First Swapo members sent to Egypt for guerilla training.

1966: UN terminates mandate conferred on South Africa by League of Nations. International Court of Justice refuses, on technical grounds, to rule on South African control over Namibia. Swapo issues Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, committing itself to armed struggle. First clash between guerillas and SAP at Ongulumbashe on August 22 ("Namibia Day"). Swapo efforts also directed at political mobilisation among peasantry in northern regions.

1967: Swapo internal leadership, including Toiva ja Toiva, imprisoned under Terrorism Act. Repression forces Swapo to function increasingly underground.

1968: Exiles first propose that South West Africa be renamed Namibia.

1969: Swapo National Conference at Tanga, Tanzania. Resolves to intensify political and military operations in Namibia. UN Security Council declares South Africa's occupation illegal and calls for its immediate withdrawal.

1971: General strike of 20 000 workers against contract labour system, spreads to south where Swapo previously weak. International Court of Justice declares South African rule illegal.

1972: Mass peasant uprising in Ovambo region as dismissed workers return home and raise political consciousness. State of Emergency declared in region. Many detained. SADF deployed in north on large scale.

1973: Swapo-organised boycott of ethnic Ovambo elections leads to 3% poll. SADF takes over control of war from SAP. Swapo holds major conference in Zambia. Internal organisation divided into Youth League, Elders League and Women's Organisation. Guerilla wing renamed People's



Liberation Army of Namibia (Plan). UN General Assembly recognises Swapo as "sole and authentic representative" of Namibian people, and accords it permanent observer status.

1974: Political work leads to heavy repression. Thousands of people, including many Swapo leaders, leave country as refugees or to join Plan.

1975: Independence of Angola. Swapo able to establish bases in Angola, leads to rapid escalation of border war.

1976: A group of about 100 Plan soldiers mutiny against the leadership and are imprisoned. Ringleader Andreas Shipanga returns to Namibia and forms Swapo Democrats (which joins the 'interim government' in 1985). Swapo issues Programme of Action with health, agriculture, education and manpower policy for independent Namibia.

1978: SADF commandos launch major attack on Swapo guerilla and refugee camps in Angola. More than 600 refugees massacred at Kassinga. 200 guerillas captured and held without trial for six years at Mariental prison in southern Namibia. UN Security Council passes Resolution 435 for Namibian independence.

1979: Following SADF invasion of Zambia, Zambia ends support for Plan. Infiltration into Caprivi virtually stopped. Swapo given official member status of Non-Aligned Movement. Legislation prohibits public meetings in the north.

1980: SADF attacks Plan bases in Angola. Clampdown on Swapo- supporting trade unions. South African National Intelligence Service estimates Swapo will win 80% of vote in free elections. Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) sends petition to State President and 3000 Swapo supporters attend rally in Windhoek in protest against introduction of compulsory military conscription.

1981: SADF occupation of southern Angola weakens Plan's ability to infiltrate Namibia. Legislation effectively prohibits all Swapo meetings.

1983: Resurrection of Namibian National Mineworkers Union. Swapo begins urban guerilla attacks.

1984: Swapo arrests 100 alleged South African spies within its ranks. Many allegedly still imprisoned.

1985: South Africa forms 'interim government'. Effective ban on Swapo meetings lifted. Swapo supporting newspaper, the Namibian, launched.

1986: Swapo initiates revival of National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). Over next three years NUNW divided into five industrial unions with total membership of 50 000. CCN launches /Ai//gam alliance around Resolution 435.

1987: Mine workers strike for increased pay and improved working conditions. Mass demonstrations in Ovambo region against SADF occupation.

1988: Nation-wide resistance against SADF bases being situated close to schools in the north. 40 000 students boycott schools, and NUNW organises country's largest strike in solidarity.

MAY 1989

SWAPO'S ECONOMIC PROGRAMME

With the probability of a Swapo government in power in the near future, much attention is being focussed on the economic programme it will implement. The new government will inherit an economy shaped by a century of foreign domination and damaged by two decades of war. Economic problems have been worsened by poor prices for mineral exports, prolonged drought and a lack of investment.

Swapo's most recent perspective on a future economic programme is set out in an important Economic Policy Position Document, issued in December 1988.

KEY PRINCIPLES

The policy document states that Swapo's economic approach is based on the principle of social justice. A more equal distribution of wealth must be achieved, and the high levels of poverty and unemployment urgently addressed. Swapo envisages a gradual transition to socialism that will be shaped by the special circumstances of Namibia. It accepts that there are limitations on its ability to restructure the economy in the short term.

"Swapo leadership does not hide its belief in the moral superiority of social ownership and control of the economy. Egalitarianism forms the basis of its vision of a just social order. But the movement is realistic enough to know that for the immediate future, independent Namibia will not have sufficient finance or technical and managerial expertise to maintain reasonable rates of economic outputs".

While Swapo wishes to reduce foreign domination of the key mineral, fishing and agricultural export sectors, it "envisages no wholesale nationalisation of the mines, land and other productive sectors... for the foreseeable future". Instead, local public and private capital will play a greater role in a mixed economy with state, co-operative, joint venture and private participation. Since a substantial part of the capital stock (railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications, water supply, electricity etc) is already in the hands of the state, the priority will be effective management of these enterprises.

THE MINING SECTOR

Namibia is the fourth largest mineral producer in Africa, supplying diamonds, uranium and base metals. Swapo sees mining as the most important source of revenue for rebuilding the economy, and will implement the following measures:

- significant re-investment of mining profits within the national economy, especially to finance further mineral exploration and development.
- the integration of mining with the rest of the economy. This would include the development of mineral-based processing industries, the manufacture of construction materials and the establishment of metal refineries and diamond cutting facilities.



- higher effective taxation of foreign mining companies and a curb on the corrupt practice of 'transfer pricing'.

LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURE

Distribution and ownership of land will be a key issue confronting the new government, given the huge disparities caused by past policies of land allocation on a racial basis. Swapo rules out full-scale nationalisation of land, and will seek the establishment of a mixed sector comprising state farms, co-operatives, peasant family farming and private commercial farming.

Land redistribution will focus on foreign absentee landlords (who own 48% of white commercial farms) and resident whites with more than one farm. Swapo is committed to "just and fair compensation in those instances where state acquisition of assets from private hands is considered necessary for the rebuilding of Namibia's national economy".

Substantial state support in the form of credit, marketing, extension services, infrastructure and adequate produce prices will be channeled into the long neglected peasant sector in northern Namibia. A Swapo government will also promote the establishment of agro-industries such as grain milling and other forms of food processing to facilitate agricultural self-sufficiency and rural development.

An industry likely to benefit enormously from independence is the over-exploited fishing sector. This resource has been seriously depleted through over-fishing by South African and other foreign fishing fleets. By declaring and enforcing a 200 nautical mile exclusive zone off its coast, the new government would gain control over the world's richest hake resources (estimated to be worth R2 billion annually). The government could then allocate quotas and raise levies on concessions issued to other countries fishing in its territorial waters.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA

Swapo accepts that the Namibian economy is heavily integrated into South Africa's economy, with important sectors such as mining and fishing dominated by South African firms. However it does not believe that the economy is so dependent on South Africa that the new government will have to toe Pretoria's line if it is to survive economically.

The diversification of trading partners and transport links will be a priority but a substantial reduction of links with South Africa will clearly not be achieved overnight. A key factor here will be the future of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port. Under Resolution 435 it will remain part of South Africa, but most Namibians see it as an integral part of their country.

An independent Namibia may be able to obtain better prices for certain products than it currently obtains from South Africa by negotiating more favourable trade terms with European countries, under the Lome Convention for example. The new government will also seek to forge close economic ties with other countries in the region, and is certain to become a member of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC).

In spite of the danger of a flight of skills and capital, the outlook for the economy after independence is by no means gloomy. Swapo's programme is pragmatic and offers substantial potential economic benefits to the majority of people. An end to sanctions together with inflows of foreign aid should ease the difficult transition period.

MAY 1989

THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN NAMIBIA

Trade unions have not been a consistent form of organisation in the Namibian liberation struggle. Workers have always been at the core of Swapo's support, but have only been organised into industrial unions over the past three years. The growth of the unions has given workers a new confidence and strength to assert themselves politically and wage struggles against management.

THE GROWTH OF NUNW

In 1986 Swapo members initiated the re-emergence of the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). NUNW had existed as a general union between 1978- 1980, after which it was forced to function underground. Until 1986, however, it was essentially defunct.

The revival of NUNW took the following form: workers' committees set up in workplaces were organised into NUNW as a general union. As soon as a significant number of workers' committees in an industry had been organised, they came together to form an industrial union. Today the following industrial unions exist:

- * Namibian Food + Allied Workers Union (NAFAU) 12000 members
- * Mineworkers Union of Namibia (MUN) 12000 members
- * Metal + Allied Namibian Workers Union (MANWU) 7000 members
- * Namibian Public Workers Union (NAPWU) 10000 members
- * Namibian Transport + Allied Workers Union (NATAU) 1500 members

Over the past three years these unions have won substantial victories around wage negotiations and access agreements. However most companies refuse to recognise the unions. There are only recognition agreements at Consolidated Diamond Mining, Rossing and two smaller mines. The majority of companies will only negotiate with individual shopsteward or worker committees.

TOWARDS TRADE UNION FEDERATION

In June 1988 Namibia experienced the biggest stayaway in its history. The stayaway was organised in support of student demands for army bases to be removed from near their schools in the north. The stayaway demonstrated the need for greater co- ordination and communication between the industrial unions under the democratic control of workers at local, regional and national levels.

Furthermore, with the issue of Namibian independence on the agenda, the need for organised workers to have a united political voice has become more urgent. On May 12 this year workers will launch a new federation to help them meet these needs.

UNIONS SUPPORT SWAPO

With the implementation of Resolution 435, the role of the unions in the elections has received critical attention. The unions are united in supporting Swapo, which they see as the only party capable of bringing to workers a government committed to meeting their needs. The unions have therefore resolved to actively mobilise workers behind Swapo's flag in the elections.



PRIVATISATION

The unions are currently campaigning strongly against attempts by the SWA Administrator-General, Louis Pienaar, to sell public services to private companies. Services to be sold include hospitals, health services, post and telecommunications, medical schemes, SWA Broadcasting Corporation, water affairs and, in some cases, schools.

The unions have already felt the impact of privatisation with 500 workers dismissed from the National Transport Corporation and SWABC. Privatisation will also make it more difficult for workers to afford transport, water, electricity, health services and education for their children. The unions have accused Pienaar of attempting to sabotage Namibian independence by selling off key public services which would be the primary tools of a future government seeking to address the needs of its people.

UNIONS AND INDEPENDENCE

Both Swapo and the unions have committed themselves to building a socialist society. However, Swapo's recent economic policy document [Factsheet no.8] indicates that this will only be possible in the long term given the economy's structural dependence on South Africa and multi-national capital.

Historically it has been the united action of workers and their organisations which have most effectively challenged the unrestrained power of capital. For example, the 1971/2 contract workers' strike smashed one of the most vicious elements of control over the workforce- SWANLA, the national labour recruiting agency. Therefore the role and strength of the unions after independence will be critical in determining the extent to which an economically just society can be built.

VIEWS OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

The following quotes are extracts from an interview with Ben Ulenga, General Secretary of the MUN (Namibian, 20.1.1989):

"The last two years have seen a significant growth in trade unions in Namibia. There are now unions covering all major industries of the economy. But this doesn't mean we have achieved everything. There are still workers in the country who need to be organised. The strength of a union doesn't only depend on the number of members, but on how strongly and effectively that union is organised, particularly on a shop floor level. Union power can also be achieved through strengthening unity between the various unions".

"At the moment the aim of the union movement is to organise workers so that they can fight more effectively against the repressive conditions, found mainly in the economic field, but which overflow into the political field. I don't think the situation will immediately change when Resolution 435 is implemented. [For as long as] we are faced with a capitalist situation, our role will stay basically the same".

"In an independent Namibia with a Swapo government, we hope to have good relations with that government where we can make representations knowing that we are making them to a sympathetic ear. The struggle is against the multi-nationals, and under a Swapo government we hope that this is a struggle we could win. I don't believe that any other government besides a Swapo one would be sympathetic to our demands".

"New demands will come after independence and will be directed against the exploitation of workers by the transnationals. We will continue pushing for workers to have a direct say, by direct representation, in the law-making bodies of the country".

Namibian workers need **YOUR** solidarity



It took over 25 years of mass resistance by the Namibian people - supported by the armed struggle of PLAN and world-wide opposition to South Africa's occupation of Namibia - to force the Botha government to agree to Namibian independence in terms of United Nations Resolution 435. This was a step forward. But the struggle of the Namibian people is far from over. Botha and the bosses want the kind of "independence" for Namibia they gave to bantustans like Ciskei and Venda. The oppressed people of Namibia want real independence from South African oppression and exploitation. They want to take power into their own hands to build a Namibia that will put the interests of the oppressed people first. To do this they need the active support of the workers and youth of South Africa. The bosses and government we are fighting every day is the bosses and government the Namibians are fighting to get their freedom from. Workers and youth of South Africa and Namibia - UNITE !

Who is running the independence process ? Not the United Nations.

Many people believe the UN is now running the independence process in Namibia. This is not true. The SA appointed Administrator General Louis Pienaar is fully in charge. The UN is there to monitor the way he and the South West African Police (SWAPOL) handle the process to full independence.

The UN has sent its special representative Mr Martti Ahtisaari to Windhoek. His job is to monitor the actions of Pienaar and his administration. He will not be organising the elections.

Louis Pienaar will organise registration for elections. Pienaar and his administration, as well as the police he controls, cannot be separated from SA. The Chief Inspector - South African security policemen David Brune - and SWAPOL are made up of many South Africans.

It is Pienaar's job to organise the registration of political organisations, of voters and the voting itself. This is like appointing a wolf to guard the sheep.

What problems are there in the process ?

Already there are many stories of "cheating" in Namibia. People say that many SA soldiers and UNITA forces are going to be registered as voters. Pienaar wants the voting age fixed at 21 - instead of 18. This would mean that many youth, mostly SWAPO supporters, will not be able to vote.

The appointment of Mr Martti Ahtisaari is a bad blow for the Namibian people. Comrades in Namibia say he has spent 20 years talking about Namibian independence, but it took only 2 days before he authorised that the SADF's most feared battalions - 101 and 202 - could be released from barracks to hunt down SWAPO comrades.

It seems the UN is bending over backwards to try and prove they are not siding with SWAPO. They are too worried that in SA the UN is seen as an enemy which has demanded that SA end their illegal occupation of Namibia.

The NUNW and NANSO held a big protest in the streets of Windhoek last week to question the role of the UN. They carried placards demanding: "Ahtisaari, are you a puppet?" and "UN, whose side are you on?" They want to know if the UN is prepared to defend the right to organise democratically. They want to know if

the UN is prepared to act against intimidation. They want to know if the UN is going to stop the police from breaking up marches ? But all they see is the UN officials wining and dining with representatives of the South West minority and the South African government. All they hear from the UN is that "We are not involved in this or that issue".

What response from the Namibian people ?

It was like Uhuru had already come to Namibia on April 1. More than 15 000 Namibians were on the street ready to march to Ahtisaari and Pienaar. The people were demanding that privatisation be stopped.

The double highway from Katutura to Windhoek was blocked. Masses of people had gathered to march to the centre of Windhoek. They wore SWAPO colours and shouted slogans such as: "Viva SWAPO!" "Viva NUNW" and "One Namibia One Nation". In front of the crowd the NUNW officials argued with the police. They told them it was a peaceful legal march. But the police threatened to shoot if people did not go back. In front of the march militant youth and workers shouted "Where is UNTAG when the police are threatening to shoot us."

NUNW officials sent a delegation to UNTAG to ask them to come and monitor the protest. The leader of UNTAG armed forces, General Prem Chand, said: "What can we do? It's like our first day at school."

The marchers agreed to go back to Katutura. There thousands and thousands of people marched through the streets. Car, van and truck drivers hooted and showed their clenched fists. "One Namibia One Nation, Stop Privatisation" people shouted. More people came out of their houses. They also shouted slogans supporting SWAPO. People were celebrating that their struggle had eventually brought 435.

Later in the morning the rally started. There were about 16 000 people. Union leaders, NANSO and SWAPO leaders spoke about the people's struggle for independence. They attacked privatisation and called on the masses to "protect the property of the people." They warned that SA was putting many obstacles on the road to independence. They called on people to unite behind SWAPO.

In other parts of Namibia there was much more repression. There were armed attacks on the people of Rundu, Onankokwe, Qhalusu and other places. In many areas



crops and homesteads were destroyed, and people were killed and assaulted.

Political organisations in Namibia

There are at least 45 political parties in Namibia. SWAPO is the oldest party and has the support of the majority of people. The other parties, which have minority support, are SWANU, DTA and UDF. DTA has the support of some tribal chiefs. In the days of SA occupation DTA followed the line of participation. UDF is a coalition of ethnic parties. SWANU is a breakaway from SWAPO. It was really SWAPO which fought for independence.

Today all the parties are saying they were the ones who brought 435.

But these parties are not with the people. They are not making protests about the intimidation of SWAPO activists. They are not in the struggle against privatisation. Nor are these parties fighting against SA tactics to register South Africans and Unita soldiers to vote. These parties are not supporting NUNW and the unions in their demand for UNTAG to watch every step of SWAPOL and the S. Africans.

Many of these parties are spending all their time attacking SWAPO. They are more worried about campaigning for free enterprise. They are more worried about shouting for a "multi-party" state than about people being assaulted.

SWAPO lives in the masses

SWAPO support is everywhere. In the North, wherever you go, you see SWAPO's blue green and red colours flying. Although the police are present in many of the villages, the people show their support for SWAPO.

The North has always been a stronghold of SWAPO. But throughout these years SWAPO could not organise openly. Now the NUNW, SWAPO and NANSO are working to build joint structures throughout Namibia. But repression is very heavy. Many soldiers are handing out anti-SWAPO pamphlets. In one area, workers were shown films of the starvation and hunger in Eritrea, Ethiopia. The soldiers told the workers: "See what Namibia will be like under SWAPO." There are also reports that soldiers of the SWA army's 101 battalion are dressing in DTA colours. Some of them are handing out DTA badges and t-shirts.

But the people of the North are strong. They are the

backbone of SWAPO. The long brutal war could not break their determination.

What is happening now on the border ?

SWAPO guerrillas have always been in the North. Since the agreement to implement Resolution 435 many SWAPO guerrillas have crossed the border to be part of the people there. They had no intention of coming to fight. The SWAPOL must have seen this. When April 1st came SWAPOL struck against these comrades and forced them into battle. Other SWAPO comrades appear to have crossed the border wanting to hand themselves over to UNTAG. Instead they found no UNTAG - just SWAPOL and 101 Battalion. Over 120 SWAPO comrades have been killed since April 1st.

At the same time vigilante forces have been attacking SWAPO and NUNW activists inside the country. The general Secretary of the Mineworkers Union of Namibia - Ben Ulenga - narrowly escaped being killed when he was chased by a mob of DTA supporters who had just stoned the car he was in.

NUNW unites Namibian workers

"NUNW represents the organised workers of Namibia. As such we are part and parcel of the liberation movement led by SWAPO," says an NUNW organiser.

Workers in Namibia suffer worse repression than workers in South Africa. Workers are more exploited in Namibia. Wages are low and working conditions are bad. Average wages are around R150 a month. Workers in Namibia also don't have the same trade union rights that we have won.

At the moment NUNW, together with SWAPO and NANSO, is spearheading a campaign to stop privatisation. The South African authorities are trying to sell off all the public assets in Namibia before independence. Already the whole railway system has been sold for R150 million - which is nothing ! Hospitals are apparently being sold to American and Italian companies and even some schools have been sold to the capitalists.

NUNW says that if workers are to get a living wage; if jobs are to be created to end unemployment; if houses are to be built for the homeless - than the wealth of Namibia must be in the hands of the people of Namibia and not a handful of capitalists.

There have been several mass rallies - with thousands of workers attending - to protests against privatisation.



Build solidarity with the struggle in Namibia

Next month the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) will be officially launched as the major trade union federation in Namibia.

The NUNW has five affiliates in the mining, food, metal, transport and public sector. It is likely that a recently formed national union for teachers will affiliate to NUNW.

There are about 50,000 workers organised into NUNW affiliates. The total population of Namibia is just over a million - less than half the population of Soweto.

At COSATU's Second National Congress in 1987, we resolved too :

- fully support the campaign to implement UN resolution 435 - as a step towards the establishment of true namibian independence
- fully support the NUNW and its affiliates to gain full recognition in the factories, shops and mines where they are organised as far as possible
- promote all forms of material support, educational training and resources to consolidate NUNW and its affiliates
- to encourage our affiliates to build concrete links and offer concrete support to the affiliates of NUNW in each industrial sector
- to declare our preparedness to take solidarity action if the NUNW or any of its affiliates come under attack from either the employers, the interim puppet administration or its South African masters.

These are fine words. It is more important than ever that every union in COSATU struggles to make them a reality. Long Live the Namibian People.



Swapo's proposed constitution

Observers anticipate that Swapo will win the election in November, however, the election only ensures representation to the Constituent Assembly which is to draft a constitution for the country before independence. To have its own constitution adopted Swapo needs to get two-thirds of the Constituent Assembly to agree to its adoption. Below we reproduce extracts from the more significant clauses of the constitution proposed by Swapo.

The new Constitution makes no reference to socialism, many of its articles could be found in the constitutions of western states. The constitution appears to fall within the principles of the supplement to UN Security Council Resolution 435.

The State

The Republic of Namibia is an independent, sovereign, unitary, democratic and secular state, founded on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and social justice.

Windhoek will be the capital of Namibia and the official language will be English.

The details of the flag, the national anthem and the coat of arms are left open, but it can be inferred from the 1983 Constitution that Swapo will adopt the colours blue, red, and green in a horizontal position as the new flag and "Alert Namibia" sung to the melody of "Nkosi Sikelela i-Africa" as the new national anthem.

Walvis Bay

Walvis Bay is considered part of Namibian territory, thus rejecting South Africa's claim that Walvis Bay belongs to it.

Armed Forces

Namibia reserves the right to denounce treaties and concessions that the former administration entered upon that served the apartheid system, exploit the national wealth, or contradict the interests of Namibians.

Namibia shall respect and defend the principles of the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations and the general principles of international law.

Namibia shall not, in the context of power blocs, join or conclude military pacts or alliances or allow the establishment of foreign military bases on her territory.

The State shall ensure the exercise of human rights, and shall seek to increase productivity and improve distribution so as to increase the standard of living of the great mass of the Namibian population.

The State is to improve the quality of life and to safeguard and develop the natural environment.

The armed forces of Namibia shall serve the people and will always be subordinate to civilian authority. The President of Namibia, in addition to being Head of State and Government, is also the Commander in Chief.

Citizenship

Citizenship by birth will be granted to persons born within Namibia (except the child of a diplomat or career representative of another country). Citizenship will also be granted to persons born outside Namibian territory but whose father or mother held Namibian citizenship at the time the person was born. Citizenship by naturalization is possible under certain circumstances.

A person loses the right to citizenship if citizenship of another country is acquired or an oath of allegiance to another country is taken, or that person "voted in another country" or "established a domicile in another country"

Rights of the People

The constitution guarantees the right to work, social benefits, health care, education, housing, cultural rights, electoral rights, personal freedom, human dignity, freedom of association, life, property, trade unions and demonstrations. It assures freedom from forced labour and discrimination, together with freedom of travel,

expression, conscience and religious belief. It mentions also the right of "access to public position", and the "right against forcible entry into homes".

Workers have the right to form and belong to trade unions, and through their unions, to strike. The defence of Namibia constitutes the supreme duty and honour of a Namibian citizen.

Organs of State Power

The National Assembly is the supreme organ of state power. It will consist of 60 members elected "by direct, free, equal and secret ballot". The number of elected members "may be changed by majority vote". The Assembly is elected for five years.

The National Assembly "may elect 10 (non-voting) members from lists submitted by national mass organisations or other organisations, as the law may provide".

The National Assembly shall elect a Speaker and Deputy Speaker and a Clerk of the National Assembly. A quorum consists of 60 percent of the members. Permanent and ad hoc committees act as advisory bodies.

Promptly after sitting of the National Assembly, or at least once a year, a Member shall account for the Member's activities at a public meeting in the constituency.

No political party or individual may contest an election if the constitution or program of such party in any way advocates or accepts discrimination on grounds of race, colour, ethnic origin, language, sex or religion, or contains material likely to incite racial or ethnic hatreds.

The Ombudsman

He is systematically to review the laws and subsidiary legislation in force at Independence to determine whether they violate this Constitution, and to make recommendations to the Attorney-General for action. He is required "systematically to seek to discover instances of corruption among officials, and to take appropriate steps to remedy instances of corruption discovered". The Ombudsman will have "power to subpoena" and will "hold the highest security classification".

The President

The President of Namibia is vested with executive power, he presides over the Council of Ministers, the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Chairman and members of the Public Service Commission, the Governor-General of Planning, the Inspector-General of the Police, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, and the Ombudsman.

The President negotiates and concludes treaties and agreements with foreign states, and declares a state of emergency, of defence or peace.

The Constituent Assembly, sitting as an Electoral College, elects the first President. The National Assembly can impeach a President "only if by two-third vote it approves Articles of Impeachment".

Local Government

Provision is made for the establishment of local government in the form of regions, districts, subdistricts and municipalities.

A local organ of state power "shall consist of a Council elected by free, universal and secret suffrage, and an executive." A local government may "enact by-laws for the governance of that region".

Rule by Decree

The National Assembly may amend the Constitution by a two-thirds roll-call vote of all its members. For a period not exceeding five years after the coming into force of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers may issue decrees signed by the President, having the force of legislation.

The Constituent Assembly (formed as a result of the proposed independence elections in November) "shall constitute the National Assembly."

The Organisation of the Economy

Namibia's economic order rests on the principles of social justice, and has as its objective securing to all Namibians a life of human dignity. Its national economy shall enhance the well being of the people and ensure the satisfaction of their needs. Striving for the optimum utilization of human and natural resources for the benefit of the Namibian people, the state promotes economic development according to plan. The State guarantees a citizen a share of the produce of the country, according to the citizen's work.

By its plan for economic development, the State plans major capital investment in Namibia; and the principal institutional change required to transform Namibia's economy into an independent economy

serving the needs of Namibia's people, and other matters as prescribed by law or seems necessary and desirable to the Central Planning Commission.

Ownership of Natural Resources

The land, water, natural resources on earth, below the surface, in the continental shelf and territorial waters belong to the State. In the interest of national economic progress, the law determines the form and conditions of their exploitation.

Forms of Property Ownership

The Namibian economy rests on public, joint public private, cooperative, small-scale family and private ownership and initiative.

The private sector of the economy shall cooperate with the State to ensure the realization of the State social and economic goals for the benefit of the entire population.

The State shall support fully and encourage cooperative, small-scale family activities. In doing so, as provided by law, it shall provide marketing, extension and credit facilities, make land available, and provide farm inputs to these enterprises.

Land Reform

For the purpose of bringing about the abolition of racial restrictions on the control and use of land and to distribute the control of land more widely among the people, the State has the power to carry out land reform programmes.

Foreign Private Investment

Foreign nationals and foreign companies may invest in enterprises now located in the Republic under conditions and in ways determined by law.

As determined by law, with the agreement of the State, a foreign citizen may make an investment in Namibia. The State shall ensure that the investment will accomplish specific desired economic objectives for Namibia. So long as the agreement remains in force, the State may not compulsorily acquire investment made pursuant to that agreement.

The Central Bank

The State shall establish a Central Bank which will serve as the state's principal instrument to control the money supply, currency and the institutions of finance.

The Bank shall:

- * Serve as banker for the government.
- * Serve as banker for the private banks.
- * Regulate the banking system.
- * Issue currency and control money supply.
- * Control the use of foreign exchange.
- * Control the credit rates.
- * Promote the development of a healthy national economy.

And perform other functions as the law prescribes.

The Central Planning Commission

The State by law shall establish a Central Planning Commission which shall fall within the portfolio of the Prime Minister.

The Central Planning Commission shall prepare short-term, medium-term and long-term national development plans.

The Council of Ministers shall present the plans to the National Assembly. After enactment by the National Assembly, a plan shall have the effect assigned to it by law.

Public Enterprises

Enterprises in which the Government owns controlling interest form part of the public sector of the economy. A Public Enterprise shall fall within the portfolio of a relevant Minister as the President shall determine.

The managing and directorial personnel of a public enterprise shall manage the enterprise to ensure maximum feasible productivity and profitability within the limits of the plan.

Women, education and national liberation

Bience Gawanas, Martha Eliazer and Pauline Kaoses from SWAPO Women's Council discuss SWAPO's work in this area.

The Namibian war of liberation is being fought in various fronts and one of these is in education and literacy. It is one of SWAPO's aims to eradicate illiteracy and the women are playing a major role in this.

In SWAPO'S Department of Education and Culture most of the teachers are women. They carry out the daily educational duties in the SWAPO settlements and we have also got women educational officers who participate in decision-making as far as running the nation's education is concerned. The women also work as tutors and group-leaders in the Namibia Extension Unit (NEA), the distance education programme which SWAPO has established through its Department of Education and Culture.

The challenge to apartheid education

The existing system of education in Namibia is tailored to suit the needs of the colonizers - that is, to justify and maintain colonial domination (white supremacy) and exploitation (cheap labourers). It is therefore not surprising to find that there is not even a university in Namibia, that different schools exist for the "ethnic" groups and that Afrikaans, a white settler language spoken only in South Africa and Namibia, is used as a medium of instruction. In short, the ideology of apartheid is pursued through the education system, and it suffices here to state that, as long as Namibia remains under the illegal occupation of South Africa, education will continue to serve the interests of the white settlers.

National liberation means a liberation from all forms of discrimination, exploitation and oppression. The task of a national liberation movement is, among other things, to remove obstacles which serve as a hindrance to a people's advancement. Undoubtedly, the ideological aim of the racist education is to maintain illiteracy, ignorance, and superstitious belief amongst the Black population. The colonial educational heritage is one of the biggest difficulties facing SWAPO 's national liberation struggle. Therefore, one of SWAPO 's biggest tasks is the fight against illiteracy, with the provision of educational opportunities for exiles and the creation of schools in refugee settlements. SWAPO 's educational policies are clearly spelt out in the Political Programme adopted in 1976. It states that: "a deep-going socio-economic transformation of the Namibian society requires fundamental change in relation to production which will ensure the speedy development of the Namibian productive forces, particularly the development of the skills, knowledge and cultural creativity of the toiling masses".

Education within SWAPO can therefore not be the same as that which exists under colonialism. The aim is not merely to teach people how to read and write but most importantly to instil in them a consciousness which will guide them in their contribution to the development of their country. In other words, education is not merely the creation of graduates with no direct relationship to our objective of national reconstruction, but must be geared towards creating cadres who will put their newly acquired knowledge to the service of the people and the country. This is an education for liberation rather than as education for subservience.

Ten years of achievement

Looking back in particular over the last 10 years, the inroad made by SWAPO into the problem of education has been a remarkable achievement. During the 1970s, when the number of young people leaving Namibia increased considerably, SWAPO had the main task of providing educational opportunities to these young men, women and children. Hence, schools were opened in various SWAPO settlements, the main two being Nyango (Zambia) established in 1976, and Kwanza Sul (Angola) established after the South African attack on Kassinga in 1978. In both these educational centres creches were set up as well as a full six-year primary and three-year junior secondary courses.

After completion in the centres, students go on scholarships, either to other African countries or abroad for further education. In addition to the schools in the centres, hundreds of young Namibians are studying in Cuba as well as in the Congo. The United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka, Zambia, was set up in 1976, and provides training at middle levels for administration and management. At its 10th anniversary this year, UNIN proudly reported that it had trained more than 1 000 future administrators of Namibia. It has also expanded to include teacher, secretarial and legal practice training,

At the United Nations Vocational Training Centre (UNVTC), set up in Angola and officially opened

in 1983, students are trained in technical skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrics, plumbing, and so on. In view of the fact that most adults have passed the stage of formal education, adult education provision has been made to equip them with basic skills and knowledge. Activities include distance teaching, which involves correspondence courses for adults. Extension Unit. Opened in 1983, it has already enrolled over 1 000 students. Furthermore, projects for the development and advancement of skills have been started in the centers and include, among other things, weaving, driving, tailoring, and running poultry projects. The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), under the auspices of SWAPO's Department of Labour, established a trade union school for the education of workers.

The SWAPO Department of Education has also started an intensive teachers training programme, and many students have thus far qualified as teachers from institutions here in Britain.

Remedying the lack of qualified people has always been a prime objective. In the absence of qualified teachers, everyone who is capable of imparting knowledge is called upon to teach others.

Students are studying at colleges and universities all over the world, under scholarships provided by governments and progressive organizations. Thus far, SWAPO has produced graduates in various fields, such as medicine, law, engineering, development studies, and sciences.

The enormity of the task which faces SWAPO in its provision of educational services to the people lies in the fact that all the activities outlined above take place in very abnormal circumstances. The Secretary for Education, Nahas Angula, clearly outlined the difficulties:

"Our educational activities are taking place under conditions of national liberation struggle. Our activities have to be planned in such a way that they are flexible."

Teaching and learning under conditions of constant fear of South African attacks, and lack of educational materials and classrooms, necessitate a determination and dedication from students and teachers alike. What drives people on despite such difficulties is the search for education. Namibians can pride themselves in their achievements. With poor educational backgrounds many Namibians have to face educational systems which are challenging and demanding. Sharing classrooms with local students who have all the necessary educational background, and in most cases are much younger than ourselves, would have been very discouraging for many. But for Namibians it remains a challenge, for they all know that they are doing it for the benefit of their people. Students have resisted apartheid's "Bantu education", and want a better education. They therefore grasp any available opportunity to gain knowledge. All Namibian students under SWAPO see their education not as an end in itself but a means to an end.

The work of the SWAPO Women's Council

Women, who are the worst off in terms of educational opportunities under colonialism, have been the main beneficiaries of SWAPO's educational programme. In fact, SWAPO has made education accessible to all, but most importantly it has made great strides in redressing the imbalance in educational opportunities between men and women. SWAPO has recognized, as far back as 1969 with the setting up of the SWAPO Women's Council, that if women are to play a more productive role in national reconstruction, the various hindrances which retard their progress should be removed. Recognizing that women are the most oppressed of all people, SWAPO encourages women to take active part in activities that will create the possibility of overcoming their oppression and their subordinate status in society.

At the first congress of the SWAPO Women's Council (SWC), held in 1979, the Namibian women decided to set up programmes in order to eradicate illiteracy. As a result, they undertook a project in conjunction with the SWAPO Department of Education and Culture, where women started to teach all their sisters and brothers who did not know how to read and write. With the help of SWAPO Women's Solidarity Campaign (SWWC) and the World University Service (WUS(UK)), SWC has initiated a project producing literacy packs in English. These packs are based on themes such as pregnancy, nutrition and environmental health. It was felt that whilst these packs should help people to read and write in English, they can also serve an additional purpose - that of health education.

In SWAPO's settlements in Angola and Zambia, SWC has set up many self-help projects and has scored success in carrying out these programmes which are aimed at preparing Namibian women for the future active and creative participation in the reconstruction of our country. One of these projects is the Tailoring School. Women attend the tailoring school, and after graduation they become tailoring instructors in various settlements in order to enhance production, for example, of SWAPO school uniforms. Each and every woman in our settlements is involved in one project or another. They are very eager to learn everything that contributes to the well-being of the nation.

A typing school is also one of the projects that SWC has undertaken. After graduation these women go and work in various SWAPO offices or go on for further training.

Kindergarten and day care centres are some of the successful projects that Namibian women have established. All working mothers take their children to the day care centres. In the kindergarten project, women take care of orphans, children whose mothers are involved in various organizational missions, and

those whose mothers are sick or disabled. This project is wholly and completely run by the women themselves. As well as taking care of children, these women give them some kind of basic education before they reach the school age, when they go to the Education Centers and start school.

Apart from the projects, there are Namibian women who are being trained in various colleges and universities, in various fields. The rate at which women are progressing is very encouraging, although we haven't yet achieved everything we want to with education. SWC also hold meetings and workshops to exchange ideas. We hold workshops on nutrition so that the young ones are well-fed and grow strong with a sense of responsibility. There are also family-planning programmes.

Women and the liberation movement

Only by actively taking part in the national liberation struggle can Namibian women heighten their own political consciousness, sharpen their class perspectives, broaden their intellectual horizons, give full play to their talents, realize their own strength and increase their own sense of confidence. Women are cultural organizers so that our culture can be promoted. On the whole, the participation of women in the struggle is an important aspect of the liberation process.

Our vision for the future is quite bright. Women joined the liberation struggle, not through their experience as women, but as Black oppressed people. It is within the course of struggle that women become conscious of themselves as women. It is within the liberation movement that women see an alternative. Their participation in the liberation struggle is therefore a search for an alternative which will recognize their role and participation on an equal basis with men.

Women are the majority of those who are on scholarships abroad. Women are in the majority at UNIN, UNVTC and the schools in the settlements. It is an undisputed fact that SWAPO has done more for the Namibian people in the 25 years of its existence than South Africa has done during decades of colonialism. Our progress, however, depends to a large extent on international support. Material support for the various projects initiated by the various wings of SWAPO, notably the SWAPO Women's Council and the schools, is highly appreciated. The international community can rest assured that their support is put to the best use by the people.

Therefore, SWAPO appeals to the international community to continue and even strengthen their support.

Education has an important role to play - it is the transmission belt of our own culture and history. But, more importantly, it is an instrument, a means by which we will prepare ourselves as Namibian women and men for our part in a future independent Namibia.

An interview with senior Swapo member Peter Manning in London.

QUESTION:
How do people feel about the current state of events?

ANSWER: I was at an internal Swapo seminar in Lusaka [recently]. There were about 50 people from Namibia.

The sense of let-down on the part of Untag is just so enormous; people have no faith whatsoever in Untag doing a thing right. The fact that Marti Ahtisaari agreed to the deployment of those SWATF battalions and Koevoet on the 1st of April has finished his reputation forever among Namibians.

They feel very seriously let down by that. He knew perfectly well - it has been so well-documented and the UN had this information, and he as the Special Representative appointed 11 years ago had this information - he knows how well-documented the [past conduct] of these units is ... and yet he agreed to their deployment.

Q: That must affect the whole feeling about going back.

A: It has. There has been a fundamental problem over this.

The fact that Koevoet is deployed in the way it is in the north is cause for concern. There has been a big shift of people coming from the settlements saying, no, they've changed their minds, they don't want to go to the north, they want to go to Windhoek.

So that it's leaving the facilities that have been set up in the north under-utilised and those in Windhoek over-stretched (or they will be very soon).

Q: They feel safer in the urban setting?

A: Yes. Well away from where Koevoet is being deployed. The whole of northern Namibia is policed by Koevoet, not by anyone else.

Q: Is the anxiety about people's safety one of the biggest problems about repatriation? Are there other major problems?

A: It falls into an entirely different category. A lot of problems exist about not having homes to go to. A lot of people have been uprooted

NAMIBIA: THE

internally in the country where, over the years, watering places have been poisoned and they have had to move.

So there are going to be a lot of problems over people finding homes. We had a situation where some of these puppet chiefs in the north have said "these returnees are not coming into our land".

So the administration is trying to pose problems for our people returning, using these paid stooges. We are going to have problems where Swapo people come from the same family as people who may have someone in SWATF; the antagonisms that there might be. It is not going to be an easy time.

Q: You've mentioned something of South Africa's role: is there more you'd like to say, perhaps about their general intentions around resolution 435?

A: It is important to remember that they were forced into this agreement as a result of military [problems] and as a result of economic sanctions beginning to bite and out of fear of more sanctions coming [their] way.

The US Congress and Senate, during the course of last year when these negotiations were going on, were considering a much more comprehensive package of sanctions. This was against the background of the US Accounting Office making it known that as a result of the 1986 US Anti-Apartheid Act - limited sanctions by one country - South Africa's foreign earnings had dropped by 6.9 percent, so that the South African government was and remains terrified of the possibility of more comprehensive sanctions.

These two factors, the military and the economic, have been acknowledged in private discussion at any rate (they do something else in public) by both the US Administration and the British Foreign Office as being the factors that brought the South African government to the conference table. So they go into it unwillingly.

They don't really want to let go of Namibia. They don't want to see an effective transfer of power.

They don't really want to see a genuinely free and fair election if it means a Swapo government. So they are doing their best to prevent Swapo from gaining the type of electoral support that we should gain if the position of the Namibian population is fairly reflected in that election result.

This is not something we are sucking out of our thumbs either - the National Security Council in Namibia (Namibia's version of the State Security Council) met in September last year. It has on it Dirk Mudge and heads of different departments of the government; also a member, although he wasn't at that particular meeting, is the chief electoral officer they have appointed.

The discussion was on a plan to prevent Swapo gaining power through resolution 435. So that you have there a picture of [a] full state apparatus geared towards an anti-Swapo position specifically. Yet publicly they say that they are impartial.

The South African government position is clearly one that is antagonistic towards a genuinely free and fair election and it raises the necessity of a sizeable, efficient machine to monitor what they do every step of the way and to stand up to them.

Q: Is your view then that if the South Africans feel they cannot prevent Swapo's victory, they would want to attempt to scupper the whole process and have someone else blamed for it?

A: Yes. They have attempted that. There have been reports in the last couple of days that there have been armed infiltrators coming into the country. Exactly what they are up to I don't know.

We were suspicious some weeks ago when we had reports from inside Namibia that certain Koevoet

people had crossed into Angola. No-one knew what their mission was.

There was speculation that maybe it was to do with getting these people to cross into Namibia again ... so that they could take Untag along and show them the tracks and say: "There, see the footprints? That's Swapo."

The other problem is their delaying tactics. The plan required, for example, that all political prisoners be released by the ninth week I think, which [was] early this month. The SA government hasn't done that.

We've been ready to release those on our side, but Untag hasn't been there to take them off - but essentially this came as a result of South African delays on several counts.

What is more serious about the release of political prisoners is that we know that there were a lot of PLAN people held in the north of Namibia by the military. They have been held under very difficult conditions without any access by anybody to them.

Q: Are these delays in meeting deadlines of the plan effectively hampering the 435 implementation process?

A: By the end of the sixth week, in other words by the middle of May, a month ago, South Africa should have published all the electoral laws. So far they have published the draft of the registration law, but nothing of the actual electoral legislation.

Quite evidently the planning of the administration of campaign work, how you handle a registration drive, is seriously affected by this so that we have not been able to get on with the work that we need to do, so it certainly does detrimentally affect our position.

Also, the delay in the return of exiles has affected our organisation because a lot of our most capable people are still outside the country, including those who would be able to come to grips with running the election machine.

The delay has meant that we have not had the opportunity to set up and organise ourselves within the country in the way that we intended to.

This obviously affects the election campaign. South Africa's [supporters] have a large former hotel as their election headquarters in Windhoek, well-financed, highly organised. We have now secured an office but, by comparison, we are detrimentally affected by these delays.

Things like the whole confinement to base of forces: Koevoet hasn't been confined to base, hasn't been demolished. That's another delay. The capacity of Swapo people to organise in the north has continuously been disrupted by attacks on them.

The whole commitment to freedom of speech and expression, freedom of movement, has been seriously affected.

Q: And the repeal of the apartheid laws?

A: Again, this UN plan has been carefully worded. A lot of people have read it as being that all racist and restrictive legislation must be repealed. What the plan actually says is that all racist and restrictive legislation must be repealed insofar as it affects the electoral process. Much more limited.

We are taking a hard look at what has been repealed and what hasn't, but there are many things that don't fall within the realm of national legislation but rather of local government bye-laws and regulations that most certainly have a detrimental effect on the electoral process.

They issued a proclamation repealing aspects of AG8, which functions as a constitution setting up the tiers of government, all the bantustan arrangements. What they repealed, the effect of the repeal that they undertook, was simply to transfer the powers of these different legislative assemblies to the AG [Attorney-General] but leaving the structure intact so that you don't have any change away from the segregated educational facilities and that sort of thing - nothing like



CHALLENGE

that changes.

And I am going to make the point here that Resolution 385 required that South Africa must abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices. All; full stop. Particularly bantustans and homelands, said the resolution.

And Resolution 435 purports to implement 385, so what about this?

The second point there is that the continuing application of AG8 means that the racist and tribalist division remains in many important services in Namibia, thus retaining the type of national atmosphere consistent with what South Africa wishes to impose upon the country.

And thirdly, the South African [government] may seek to use these ethnic and administrative divisions to organise the elections, for example by publishing the voters' roll by districts, with the districts being the racist and tribalist divisions of the country, just as they did in 1978 when the voters' roll was by ethnic groupings.

Q: What about the different sectors during the transitional period and post-independence? How do you perceive the role of the church, students and youth? Women, workers, professions and whites?

A: What can you say about them? They all need to be really active. The students, I think, have given a very good example. That boycott in the north by the schoolkids of classes over the presence of Koevoet is a clear example.

They said that here you have a direct violation of 435; it is not possible to hold genuinely free elections while Koevoet is in the north, and that something has got to be done about it and we have no other means of drawing international attention to this issue, and we must use this means of boycott-

ing classes. It is to their credit that they have done that.

Q: Would you say that was the kind of work that all groups should engage in?

A: Certainly if we locked ourselves into complaining about South Africa's non-compliance on the elections and didn't get the right sort of effort to register the voters, we'd have missed the point.

We have to keep clearly in focus the necessity of first of all registering our supporters to vote and ensuring that they are properly registered, and secondly, of getting the message across to them as to how they vote, where they vote and that the voting will be secret.

The UN is not going to agree to anything less than that.

We must keep our objectives clear. Any irregularities or violations we must complain about, for sure. We must try and raise protest over them - it is not right, it is distorting the whole concept and preventing the fairness of the process. But, at the end of the day, we don't need fairness. The extent to which South Africa can distort this is limited and what we must do is ensure we get the basic things right - this process.

It is undoubtedly unfair, the whole bias of the media in Namibia, the vitriolic attacks against Swapo, the apparent dedication of the whole state structure to an anti-Swapo position, the way Koevoet is being deployed. All these are wrong. They are not conducive to a fair process. They should be stopped.

But if we drew back from this on that basis, we'd be the ones to lose and what we need to do is ensure that we get those basic things right. We need the resources to do it. That's another serious issue.

Q: Organisations inside South Africa - what are your expectations in terms of solidarity work?

A: I think progressive organisations in South Africa will know better than those in other parts of the world the nature of the struggle that is taking place, and while we regard the implementation of this election as a victory in itself, we don't believe that we've got there yet, and that we are going to have to fight every inch of the way during this momentous year for Namibia.

It is going to depend on us whether or not we achieve that goal of securing power or whether South Africa is going to get away with denying the majority genuine power.

So our expectations of progressive organisations in South Africa would be that they support us in this process in every way they can find possible. The needs are there and I feel sure that the goodwill is there; we've seen it in adverts in newspapers!

I think there is a great deal that could be done in very practical ways. We couldn't go into this here, but for example organisations like Cosatu have experience of a whole range of different activities. Skills like T-shirt printing might be quite a useful exercise on the ground.

There are tremendous needs - apart from anything else funding; money could be collected. There are now continuous fundraising efforts being made throughout Namibia.

Q: The coming elections you have already covered; do you want to highlight problems and prospects?

A: What has been very clear to us is that in recent months we have seen a growing recognition on the part of those who have wavered that their choice essentially is between Swapo and South Africa's [supporters], and that a vast majority of them are going to support Swapo. We have no doubt in our minds that this election roughly reflects the position of a two-thirds majority.

It is interesting to note that

whereas everyone has been forming coalitions to fight Swapo in the elections, some are starting to break up already, a number saying: "What is the sense in this and why try to oppose Swapo?"

The only thing that would stop us is if we were diddled - there is potential for that.

All we need is that it [the election] is an honest exercise; the more open and public the better.

Q: What about Swapo's attitude to the other parties?

A: We'll see who's left! The constitutional principle contained in the UN plan provides for there being a multi-party system. If Swapo gets a two-thirds majority we intend to accommodate other parties.

The process will be to go all out to win over all who oppose us ... At the end of the day, when things settle, it won't be a problem. Other parties are not antagonistic towards Swapo - we have met and discussed before.

We will have problems owing to destabilisation policies by the South Africans. If this occurs, we will have to adopt policies to meet the threat. There are a lot of signals that they intend to do this.

Q: If Swapo wins the election, what will its international relations policy be?

A: Namibia under Swapo will be a member of the OAU and UN. A nice fantasy would be if we fought for a position of permanent membership of the Security Council and ousted some other countries and took decisions about North European countries!

More seriously, we would join SADCC and probably the Lome Convention (with all its negative aspects), and would seek to be quite strongly non-aligned which is not a problem these days.

Q: And your attitude towards South African liberation movements?

A: It must be stated that we will take up our commitment to the liberation of South Africa. In terms

of the OAU position on member states, we would support the ANC materially and diplomatically, but it is quite clear that there won't be a military set-up.

The ANC itself has told us this would be impossible.

Q: What are your prospects for the elections?

A: There is a deep-felt sense within Swapo that Swapo was done a major injury in April in the way Swapo was depicted as having tried to sabotage the UN plan when Swapo has been the organisation that for years supported implementation of the plan and South Africa refused.

Swapo supported a ceasefire and offered a ceasefire and South Africa refused. It is clearly in Swapo's interests to go through with the UN plan because of our wide support; and the perception of the South African government is that it is not in their interests to lose Namibia.

There is a sense of injury in the way in which history was rewritten in that plan over what was agreed on; the return to bases, how Swapo found itself bounced into arrangements never envisaged in the UN plan.

Where there is a disagreement with two parties, kick the underdog into place. Swapo is not a sovereign government, doesn't have the resources available on the other side. There is a deep underlying resentment over the way Un-tag behaved. Never stood up to South Africa.

There is eyewitness evidence that South Africa broke the ceasefire. If there were not violations of the plan by the SA government, fighting wouldn't have taken place.

Apart from all this, though, there is a very strong sense of optimism in Namibia. At the end of the day we will win. We have the people behind us. We are going to secure through our efforts as large a percentage of the vote as possible to reflect the type of support we have in the country.

This is a challenge for us which we accept. We believe we have the capacity to see it through.

Namibia resources

Cape Town

* Community Education Resources

General resources on Namibia, with a more specific historical focus.

Oppenheimer Institute (next to Leslie Building), University of Cape Town.

Phone: 650-3588

* Education Resources and Information Project

A wide range of resources, including videos.

University Centre, UWC, Modderdam Road, Belville

or Room 25, 2nd Floor (Yellow Block), Community House, 41 Salt River Road, Salt River

Phone: 959-2137

* International Labour Research and Information Group

Focuses mainly on workers and trade unions in Namibia, although more general resources are also carried.

Room 14, 1st Floor (Green Block), Community House, 41 Salt River Road, Salt River

or Room 435, Sociology Department, UCT, Rondebosch.

Phone: 47-6375 or 650-3504

* CVET

A few videos which look at different aspects of Namibia.

School of Music, UCT, Rondebosch

Phone: 686-3882

* Namibia Information Group (Cape Democrats)

Collects and disseminates information and analysis.

PO Box 21, Salt River, 7925

Natal

* Ecumenical Resource Centre

A range of resources, including a slide tape show and videos.

20 St Andrews Street, Durban

Phone: 031-3018614

* PACSA

Phone: 0331-420052

Pretoria

* SACBC Documentation or J&P departments

Pretoria Cathedral Hall, Bosman Street

Phone: 211793

Johannesburg

* CRIC

PO Box 155, Judiths Paarl

Phone: 339-8240