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# IN SIGHT OF THE END

IN White South Africa, faith in the indivisibility of Freedom is the cardinal heresy, a blaspheming of the Colour Bar in whose image the State has been raised. For South Africans there has always existed an 'apartheid' in Freedom, and the Whites have condoned and encouraged the division persistently, in a desperate faith of their own that the more freedom they took away from others, the more they would have to themselves.

But inevitably, quite the opposite of what they have believed and planned has happened. Because Freedom *is*, finally, indivisible, the freedoms they would have safeguarded and increased by their denial of them to others—freedom of belief and its public expression, freedom of movement and association, freedom of government election, and, above all, freedom from fear—they have denied to themselves.

In 1936, we plundered the Africans of the right to vote on a common electoral roll with Whites in the Cape. By allowing for three special white representatives to sit in the House of Assembly, elected directly by Africans in the Cape on a segregated roll, we pretended to ourselves that we were securing white democracy against the anarchy of an illiterate black electorate. There were few of us who cried aloud against the slick injustice of the Act. There were even fewer who realised that by making the votes of the Africans meaningless, we were making all votes meaningless at the same time, that by plundering the Africans of real Parliamentary representation, we were plundering South Africa of Parliamentary Government altogether.

And white South Africa, by and large, still does not realise it. Tyranny in South Africa needs only to be bleached to be democratic. There was something grimly comic in the way the United Party debated the Bill this year to remove the Coloured voters from the common roll in the Cape. It rested its whole case so selfrighteously on the correct majority required by the Constitution for an assassination of the Franchise. Would the correct majority have made the assassination any less immoral? Oppression is never proper, whatever clothes it wears. The Government, of course, was quick to claim that the principle of the Bill was sanctified by precedent. And how could the United

Party, loyal still to the policies of Smuts, declare unjust a precedent they themselves had been guilty of creating twenty years before?

Democracy in South Africa, always sickly, turned its face to the wall in 1936. Since then the end has never been in doubt. The Coloured will be taken off the common roll in the Cape very soon. Basically it cannot matter how. The Government has promised it. The Government will accomplish it—somehow or other.

How long will we have a Parliament, however unrepresentative, at all? The three Native Representatives in the House of Assembly will be shuffled out of the pack very soon—the Government casually promised us that this Session. The Labour Party will almost certainly lose the five seats it now holds in the 1958 Elections. The four new white members of Parliament, to be elected by the Coloureds in the Cape on a segregated roll, will remain in the game only as long as the Government keeps patience with them. And we have learnt how short is the Government's patience with any real opposition. The United Party will be the only Opposition left, and the United Party is at best only an apology. Perhaps for a while we will be allowed to keep the stacked deck, shuffling it scrupulously every five years to produce the same Declarer and the same Dummy. But eventually—and it will not take long—even the Dummy will be dealt out of the pack, and the whole game of Parliamentary rule in South Africa stacked away in the Office of the President.

We must take stock in South Africa. We have watched Democracy dying now for years, and some of us have not yet realised it is ill. Only white South Africans who could think they were bringing Christianity to Africa by jailing tens of thousands of Africans a year for not having the right papers in their pockets, could go every five years to the Polls in the stiff conviction that they were carrying on the business of a real democracy. For the Africans who never had the vote or who lost it in 1936, Democracy since Union has meant the squalid shanty-towns of Johannesburg, the compound system on the mines and private prison labour on the farms, the great tyrannies of countless little laws which they never had a share in deciding.

We must take stock in South Africa. To three-quarters of the population, Parliament represents the reason why nearly half of all African children die before they reach the age of sixteen, and why, in order that the other half should not die also, men leave their families for months and sometimes years on end to work on the

farms or in the mines of the whites under the most degrading conditions. It is the reason why Africans need a special Government indulgence to work in the cities and live on the outskirts in poisonous tin and cardboard-box confusion, why an African may be expelled from a town he was born in and in which he has lived and worked all his life at the order of a mere local official, without regard to his family or job and, at the discretion of the Governor-General, without the ordinary right of appeal to the Courts for a stay in the execution of his sentence. To all non-white South Africans, Indians, Coloureds and Africans, Parliament is the reason why they may find themselves robbed of home and business overnight because a Government Board has decided to paint white the ghettos in which they live, and why any expression of opposition to persecution of this sort is labelled agitation and regarded as criminal in the eyes of the law.

And Parliament, inevitably, is becoming the reason why White South Africans also are being stripped bare of their rights. The Suppression of Communism Act has made any real opposition to the Government's racial policies punishable by heavy prison sentences and wholesale confiscation of property. The "bannings" that have issued in a steady black rain from the Minister of Justice since the Act was passed have fallen on White and Non-White opponents of Government policy indiscriminately. The infamous "treason" raids of September last year showed finally how colour-blind is political persecution in South Africa.

And so it is with most of the repressive legislation the Government has shovelled through Parliament recently. The amended Industrial Conciliation Act is an attack on all Trade Unionism, White and Black; by forcibly segregating the Unions, the Government has divided labour only the more easily to rule it. Under the Group Areas Act, even White South Africans are to be ordered to leave their homes and uproot their communities and live where the Government instructs them to. The astonishment of the Whites in Paarl when they realised this is suggestive of the complacency with which they have watched, and the suicidal blindness with which they have encouraged, the persecution of the Non-Whites for years. "When Dr. Dönges (Minister of the Interior) explained the Group Areas Act to us," their spokesman is reported to have said, "he did not tell us that we would be the ones to have to move."

It will go on, it must, it cannot stop of itself. If Liberty is indivisible, Tyranny is indivisible also. Neither can have any regard

for the Colour Bar. And so every Parliamentary Session is inundated with Bills conferring extraordinary powers on individual Ministers, every Session disbands with a Cabinet momentarily dazed by the authority it has voted to itself. But the next Session is a return only to fiercer demands more fiercely demanded. The more power the Government seizes, the more it reaches for, till no more will be asked because there will be nothing left to give.

We are being driven along towards the disaster of a total Police State, and while most White South Africans do not even notice it because the whips are as yet being used upon other people's backs, the rest are too afraid of the whips to say anything in protest. It is not easy to cry out your horror aloud when you may lose what you consider the right, and what the Government prefers to call the privilege, of a passport, not easy when you may have your house searched in the middle of the night for evidence of "treason", your movements limited to a particular district by Government order, your associations restricted to only those gatherings the Government permits you to attend because you have been banned from meeting with more than two other people at any one time for any common purpose. It is not easy to run the risk of five years in jail for propagating what the Government ludicrously calls Communism, to lose your job, your property and your liberty because you believe in and practise your right to political opposition.

All this is not easy. But it represents a risk we must all find the courage to take. For sooner or later the risk will be forced upon us. And it is better, surely, that we should take it now, among the last hesitations of the twilight, than later, in the dumb lonely agonies of the dark. Above all, we must realise that we cannot fight tyranny in fragments. The dissipation of our resistance to it through civil wars over trivial differences of approach can only lead to the collapse of all resistance in South Africa before the undivided, indivisible onslaught. If it is treason in South Africa for White democratic opinion to ally itself with Black, it is a judgment we must necessarily suffer and be proud to call down upon ourselves.

The world outside South Africa must also join in the struggle, for it cannot afford to do otherwise. There have been too many Spains in its history for it to allow itself to break apart again over another. The world can never be safe for democracy and peace if a part of it is allowed to totter into tyranny. Liberty is not only indivisible within a particular country, it is indivisible all over the world. To preserve it at all anywhere, the world must preserve it everywhere. If South Africa is allowed to become a Totalitarian

State, the citizens of England and America will find pried loose from under them one of the stones upon which their own vital liberties stand. The end of the road we started down in 1936 is before our eyes. All people everywhere, for their own good, must resist its being reached.

## CHURCH AND STATE IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE RT. REV. R. A. REEVES

*Bishop of Johannesburg*

“THE State and the Churches do not form an antithesis in South Africa. On the contrary, the one is the team mate of the other.” This is the verdict of the authors of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa. If this were an accurate description of the relations between the churches and the state in this country, then something would have gone sadly wrong with the churches, for all through the Christian era the relation between church and state has been one of the most stubborn problems which has confronted the civil and ecclesiastical authorities alike. Moreover, since the Renaissance, the question of the relation between church and state has been an issue that any person who takes seriously his responsibilities in church and state cannot escape facing for long. This is inevitable, for since that time the various activities in which men engage have been regarded as autonomous. No longer have people viewed such activities as subordinated to the claims of religion. The result is that politics acknowledges no superior; business is regarded as an end in itself; and we hear a great deal of talk about “Art for Art’s sake”. Even in education, a field of activity in which the training of persons is recognised as being the primary function, there is frequently a strange reluctance among educationalists to accept the Christian view of the nature and destiny of the persons who are being educated. Indeed, the story of the church since the rise of the modern state has been very largely the record of the increasing loss of the moral and spiritual authority of the church over the everyday life of human beings.

At the same time the church has never ceased to claim that it

alone has the Gospel of salvation, and for this reason every department of human activity ought to be undertaken and carried through in conformity with the unique, final, and universal revelation which has been entrusted to the keeping of the church. Truly, in the Middle Ages the church had undertaken to try and control the state. But praiseworthy as that attempt was to bring men and nations to obey the law of God, it failed, as it was bound to fail, because, while the Christian must work and pray for the coming of God's Kingdom in this world, he has to remember that this Kingdom cannot come in its perfection within history. Later Luther tried to resolve the issue by making the church subservient to the state, on the naïve assumption that rulers would always be Christian, while in Geneva, Calvin attempted to subordinate the civil to the ecclesiastical authority. The student of history cannot fail to realise that the relation of church and state has been a perennial problem. And the churchman knows that it is a problem that is inherent in the nature of both church and state.

It is possible to visualise church and state working together as "team mates" if all the members of the community are convinced Christians, which they are not and never will be. Failing that, the only chance of this happening, is for the church to limit itself to the practice of a cultus, and for the state to take control of all the rest of human life. But the church can only do this at the terrible cost of betraying its destiny, for the church has a deep concern with many of those things over which the state has undoubted authority. And what is true of the church is also true of the state. While it is true that the primary purpose of the state is to maintain order, it has also to concern itself with the welfare of its citizens, including their moral welfare. Once it does this, then it enters that sphere which is the area in which the church is charged to operate. Thus it is that the relation of church and state is bound at all times to give rise to various problems, and indeed, sometimes to result in open conflict between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities.

No doubt ideally the state ought to be the team mate of the church, but to claim as is done in the Tomlinson Report that "the one is the team mate of the other" is a vivid example of what the psychologists have come to describe as wishful thinking. It may be maintained that the authors had the Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa particularly in mind when they penned these particular words. But I doubt very much if these words are entirely applicable even to the Dutch Reformed Churches, for it seems to

me to do a grave injustice to these churches to assume that they can be identified with present policies. Signs are not wanting that there are divergencies of views within these churches, as within all churches in South Africa, on the policies now being implemented by those in authority in the state. Also, one has reason to believe that on more than one occasion there has been tension between the Dutch Reformed Churches and the civil authorities on particular issues. That is what we ought to expect, for as I said earlier, given the kind of situation in which we find ourselves in South Africa, or in any other modern state for that matter, the church that is yoked to the state in the way visualised in the Tomlinson Report has already betrayed its calling and can scarcely claim the right any longer of being a Christian community. This must be so, because no church that is worthy of being a church can ever admit the pretension of any state to be an end in itself. It is not that the church objects to the state exercising the power that rightly belongs to it and which it must use in order to maintain community life. What concerns the church is the purpose for which the state uses its power, and the responsibility with which it is exercised.

This is all the more important in days like our own, when it is becoming increasingly clear in South Africa that we are not dealing with the liberal state of the nineteenth century rooted in religion, nor even with the rootless liberal state at the dawn of the twentieth century, but with the state that is set upon planning and ordering the life of its citizens. To say that, is not for one moment to suggest either that there has not been much cause for the interference of the state in the realm of education, health services, care of the aged and young, and unemployment, or that many definite benefits have not come from such interference. At the same time, we have to remember that while social planning has some meaning and justification, as Hans J. Morgenthau reminds us in "Scientific Man vs. Power Politics": "Very rarely, if ever, are the social planners justified in saying, 'we planned it this way'. The good that results from the execution of their plans is generally not the good they anticipated, and the evil that comes from their plans is either not the one anticipated or is not anticipated at all. The purer the intention and the more comprehensive the plan, the wider will be the gap between expected and actual results. This cannot be otherwise, since the more planned, i.e. the more abstract and logically coherent the plan is, the greater will be its incongruity with the contingencies of social life". Whatever may be our

views of the scope and limitation of planning, it is our lot to live in a society in which the state is ever increasingly concerned with ordering the life of the members of that society.

The assumption that lies behind some of the official utterances of the state, which suggests that the state has unlimited power is, I believe, an assumption that brings us to the very heart of the issue. It is an assumption which must always be challenged, because not only does it spell social tyranny, it is also an ethical absurdity. But, having asserted that limits must be placed on the power of the state, we must go further and try to discern the points at which that limitation is reached. That is a much more difficult question to decide, but I believe it is a task the church must not shirk if it is ever to regain the initiative in the life of society. I know of course that there will be those who will retort that such concern is not the proper business of the church. Yet, as Dr. Carnegie Simpson has pointed out in his book *The Church and the State* in speaking of the actions of Leo and Gregory I, "It is true that the business of the church is to proclaim Christ's Gospel, and is not to be a political rule. Yet what we see here is that in the course of history—or to say in a more religious and in a more deeply true phrase, in the providence of God—the Church in Rome was placed in a position where, if it could not protect civilization and save the world even politically, nothing else could".

Not for one moment do I wish to suggest that the church in South Africa to-day finds itself in as grave a position *vis-à-vis* the state as these Roman pontiffs of a former age did. But I believe that the trend of events in the political sphere in recent years lays a heavy responsibility upon the church in its relationships with the state. It may even be that the day is not far distant when the church may have as decisive a role to play in national affairs as it has had to do on more than one occasion in its long history. At any rate, for my part, I believe this is a day in which the church needs to be specially vigilant, without at any time allying itself with any one of the parties or factions now engaged in a struggle for power; or, for that matter, identifying itself with any particular system of government.

It would be a falsification of the situation in which the churches find themselves in South Africa at the present time to suggest that any church, as church, is suffering open persecution from the state. However, this does not mean that all is well between the churches and the state. Quite apart from the fact that the

attitude of the authorities towards certain individual churchmen has had some elements in it which have savoured almost of persecution in one form or another, there is bound to be increasing tension between the state and any church in which some of its members believe that the power of the state is being used oppressively and unjustly towards those who belong to particular racial groups in the community. The passing of the Suppression of Communism Act, and the mass of racial legislation which has been enacted since then, have all contributed to aggravate the relations between the state and some at any rate of the churches in South Africa.

Indeed, the Suppression of Communism Act is a good example of the effect that a great deal of recent legislation must of necessity have on church-state relationships. Truly, the Marxists are making a supreme effort to solve the problem of the relation of church and state by attempting to identify them. This they are doing by investing a form of the state with all the traits of religion: a strict dogmatic system; a division into orthodoxy and heresy; an unchanging philosophy; the holy scriptures of Marx, Engels and Lenin, which can only be interpreted and which must not be questioned; the division of the world into the faithful and the unbelievers; the Party which is hierarchically organised; fanaticism, excommunication and execution: the emphasis on original sin in the form of exploitation. Here is a state which has become a church with a vengeance. At first glance it appears that any Christian church must wholeheartedly support any legislation which is devised to suppress Communism in South Africa. But if we take the trouble to examine the Suppression of Communism Act, we find that the methods to be employed to achieve that end are such that the church is bound to oppose them. Quite apart from the fact that the probability is that such legislation will only succeed in driving Communism underground, there are grave objections to it.

The serious dangers which would result from taking the punishment of Communists outside the normal processes of law must be obvious to us all. For centuries now it has been demonstrated that the only guarantee of justice for any individual is the rule of law. Once the free access of any citizen to the courts is denied, then the freedom of all citizens is placed in jeopardy. Further, the fact that anyone who is named as a Communist may be deprived of his livelihood and have his movements restricted at the dictation of a cabinet minister, ought to cause us grave misgivings. The

judgment of the Appeal Court in the case of Emil Solomon Sachs made this very clear when the learned judges agreed with him that "The provisions of section *nine* of Act 44 of 1950 were, as pointed out by Sachs, of a very drastic nature. The person who was subjected to an order issued by the Minister under that section was so subjected without any charge being laid against him and without any trial". Perhaps the most serious objection that can be made to this Act, however, is the fact that under it the term "Communist" may be applied to any citizens who venture to criticise the *status quo* in South Africa. Indeed, the terms of this Act are so wide that anyone who is named by the Minister is only a "communist" in the technical sense laid down in this legislation, and may have little or no resemblance to a Communist in the accepted sense of the word. Here I believe is an example of tyrannical and unjust legislation which the churches ought to oppose by every means in their power, even if such opposition leads to a worsening of relations between church and state in this country.

While some churchmen have been deeply concerned by this or that piece of racial legislation, many of the churches were profoundly disturbed by the passing of the Bantu Education Act, because their endeavours in the field of education had for more than a century been an integral part of their missionary work. How great their enterprise had been can be gauged from the fact that at the time of the passing of this Act *six-sevenths* of all the schools in the Union for the education of African children were under the control of various churches and missionary societies. It is true that various churches reacted differently as to the practical action they decided to take as a result of the Bantu Education Act. Nevertheless, a great many people in many of the churches were agreed that the intention of the legislation was to assign the African to a place of permanent inferiority in South Africa. They concluded from much that had been said and written on this subject by those in authority, that this system of education violates the principles of true education because it is designed to train children for an assigned status in life, and is in direct conflict with the teaching of the church that all men, whatever their colour, are created by God in His image, and all stand in the same need of redemption as sinners. To such church people the Bantu Education Act was a clear example of the state overstepping the legitimate exercise of its power; the plainest illustration that has been given so far in South Africa of the state trying to exercise ever

increasing control over the lives of its citizens. Nothing that has happened since the passing of this Act has warranted a change in their original conclusion by those churches which condemn this legislation. On the contrary, a great deal that is happening in African education merely underlines and sharpens those original misgivings on the part of some at any rate of the churches in this country. It will be a long time before the churches forget either the cruel dilemma in which this legislation placed them, or the injustice that it is inflicting on the African people in order to preserve white domination.

Not that the churches are only concerned when the state acts in such a fashion that it restricts their own sphere of influence in the country. On the contrary, they are bound to be concerned with the welfare of all citizens; a duty which places heavy responsibilities on the church in a multi-racial society like our own. Here we do well to bear in mind Maritain's words when he declared that the aim of the state must be "to procure the common good of the multitude, in such a manner that each person, not only in a privileged class, but throughout the whole mass, may truly reach that measure of independence which is proper to civilised life and which is ensured alike by the economic guarantees of work and property, political rights, civil virtues, and the cultivation of the mind".

If we are willing to accept such a description of the aims that states ought to set before themselves, then we have to admit, surely, that so far they have not been realised for the great bulk of our population. The majority of people in South Africa have few, if any, guarantees for earning a reasonable livelihood; they cannot own land in the urban areas, except to a very limited and totally inadequate extent; and they have only the barest political rights, and those of an indirect nature. In such a situation the churches have a duty to urge upon the leaders of the state the necessity for them to take such action as will safeguard the fundamental rights of personal liberty for all citizens; to promote such conditions as will encourage the development of personality for all, whatever may be their racial group; and to encourage the free association of individuals in groups for any purpose which is neither vicious nor immoral.

If the leaders of the community take such a task seriously, then they will be compelled to try and secure as far as possible an equitable distribution of wealth and do all in their power to preserve justice between men in their dealings with one another, and in

general protect the weak and helpless against the powerful and the strong. Not that the church will suggest that all this can ever be done in one fell swoop. In practical affairs, that which is desirable has always to be correlated with that which is possible. There are times when some abuses and injustice have to be tolerated as, for example, when their removal would lead to even greater evils. But the fact that certain evils may have to be tolerated for a time is no justification for acquiescing dumbly in things as they are in our country. That it is impossible for political leaders to accomplish all that they desire in any given situation, is never any excuse either for them or for us to sit back and do nothing. Even less is there any justification for the church being an absentee in contemporary history.

But quite apart from the direct effect of any particular legislation upon any section of the community, numbers of which it must be remembered are members of this or that church, the churches are certainly hampered and frustrated in their work by the effects of a great deal of such legislation. For example, the large movements of Africans from one locality to another in the urban areas confront the churches with problems of a magnitude which very few citizens appreciate. Even if they receive compensation for their buildings they are faced with securing a great deal of additional money, and a great deal of time and energy has to be expended on a building programme which could be far more usefully employed in other ways. But there is far more at stake here than money and buildings. Any who are familiar with the life of the church know full well the patient work that is necessary over a long period of time to build up habits of worship and a sense of fellowship in any local church community. It is always a heartbreaking business to have to close a centre of religious activity, and while from time to time it may be necessary, this never lessens the problems that such action raises for the church. When this has to happen, not because of any real necessity, but only because masses of people are being moved from one area to another in order to implement a particular racial ideology, the churches cannot fail to be resentful. In this, as in other ways, action is being taken by the state which is bound to make the work of the churches much more difficult; action which some church people at least are not convinced is at all necessary.

Not that the churches are in any sense dismayed. Down the ages the church of God has weathered far worse storms than that which now overhangs the churches in this country. But it would be

foolish to pretend that much recent action has not added considerably to the difficulties confronting the churches in their work. The fact is that much that is now happening in the legislative and administrative spheres, of necessity, is bound to heighten the tension between the church and the state. This does not necessarily mean that such tension will develop into open conflict with the state. For one thing, the members of the churches, like the great majority of the citizens of South Africa, have been so conditioned by events that many of them are now prepared to accept policies which even a few years ago they would have opposed. Further, the fact that the churches are divided from one another tends always to weaken their position *vis-à-vis* the state. So much will depend upon the faithfulness of the churches to their calling. That calling remains unchanged in the changing conditions in which the churches have to live and work. It is to live by the demands of the Gospel, whatever may be the policies and actions of the state. And to accept the consequences of so living, whatever those consequences may be.

Yet the first duty of any church is to see that in very deed it is the church, for only thus can it make its proper contribution to the life of the community. First and foremost this means that churches have to look towards God in worship. At the same time they have to serve people. As they attempt to do this they are bound to come into relationship with the state. Even in the easiest of situations this relationship will create problems for which there are never any final solutions. Indeed, for the churchman there are never any final solutions, for here he has no abiding city. As Maritain once pointed out, "Worlds which have arisen in heroism lie down in fatigue, for new heroisms and new sufferings come in their turn and bring the dawn of another day". Still, because the churches in South Africa, as churches everywhere, are faced both with heaven and with history, they dare not turn their backs upon the happenings in contemporary society. Only by betraying their calling can they shirk the responsibility which lies so heavily upon them in the present complex historical situation in which God places them.

# THE CASE FOR APARTHEID

J. D. DU P. BASSON, M.P.

THE "Christian way of life", or "Democracy", or "Inter-racialism", or any other "way of life" that I can think of, mean different things to different people at different times, depending on who they are, where they are and what they are. And so it is, too, with "Apartheid". If some White men in South Africa see in it a ready instrument for the maintenance of their traditional world of supremacy over the Black man, some Black men in South Africa support it because it offers them an adequate and practical escape from the White man's historical position of superiority. And if some Black men, anywhere, look upon it as a device for the permanent subjection of their interests to that of the White man, most White men in South Africa support it because it is "the one way of freeing Whites and Blacks from an entanglement with each other which is bad for both but worse for the non-Whites". Whoever, therefore, sets out to write about Apartheid must write about it as he understands its fundamental aims and objects; and if he is a politician who supports the Party which propagates it, he will not escape the inclination to try and influence public opinion, and eventual Government action, along his own line of thought.

As I see it, there is nothing new in the concept of Apartheid: Wherever there lives a nation which prizes its national separateness and entrenches its future existence behind political boundaries, there the fundamental *principle* of Apartheid is accepted and applied. The struggles of nations, races, religions and cultures to retain their separate identities is common politics all the world over. That, in its essence, is the philosophy of Apartheid. So, the teaching of Apartheid is the simple doctrine of nationalism. And far from its having originated in the Union of South Africa, it is the very driving-force which has lately brought national separateness, or independence, to Hindu and Moslem in India, to Jew and Arab in Palestine, and to Tunisian and Moroccan in Northern Africa.

Looking at the wide hostility which South Africa alone has to contend with abroad, on account of this philosophy of nationalism, it is, therefore, more than astonishing to note that it was not inside South Africa, but outside, and not in the bad old days of rampant imperialism but in the current period of post-war liberalism, that the principle of Apartheid has scored its two most glaring

successes. The one was in India, as I have just pointed out. Here people, in a political set-up which had already become historical, found it so impossible, on account of religious, social and other differences, to live peacefully together in an integrated society that they had to be separated, or a-parted, into independent spheres of human activity called Bharat and Pakistan. The other was in Palestine where Jew and Arab, on account of historical, religious, racial and cultural diversities and ambitions, found a policy of integration so utterly dangerous to the peace and happiness of that part of the world, that they resorted to the only practical solution, namely Apartheid—and that under the very aegis of the United Nations Organisation itself!

Our tragedy in South Africa seems to be twofold. Firstly, that we have not yet achieved the successes which gained world approval for Apartheid in India and Palestine. Secondly, that the realities of history and the exigencies of party politics have combined here to cloud and confuse the fundamentals of Apartheid with the coincidence of Colour.

It began with the early beginnings of South Africa itself, when civilized immigrants from Europe settled in South Africa and (a century later) came up against uncivilized immigrants from central Africa, who also wanted to settle in South Africa. The civilized immigrants happened to be white; the uncivilized immigrants happened to be black. Had the natives from central Africa differed from the natives from Europe only in the matter of pigment, the latter would probably have welcomed them into their society—and the story of South Africa would have run a different course. But it immediately became clear that the immigrant from central Africa was not a “White man” with a black skin, as the immigrant from Europe was not a “Black man” with a white skin. The differences between them were far more radical than the colour of their skin. The European settlers noted their warlike nature, their different social institutions, their primitive subsistence economy, their different language, their witchcraft and ancestor worship, and, in general, their primitive way of life. And colour being the most noticeable difference, Colour came to be associated in the mind of the White South African with all these attributes. And so the coincidence of Colour became the dividing line—the bar to social contact and to equal political rights and responsibilities.

It is a very welcome fact that a small percentage of Bantu have since become “Westernized”. But then a new nation of White Africans (no longer Europeans) has arisen at the foot of Africa (not

by conquest but by colonization), and to-day the national differences between it and the vast majority of the eight-and-a-half million Black Africans are still so pronounced that the White people remain as strongly averse to the idea of integration as ever. They believe integration would bring about the dissipation of their national and cultural identity and their eventual domination, through sheer weight of numbers, by the Bantu.

In short, the new (White) African nation will resist with tenacity its domination by any other nation—were it to come from within (from the Bantu, by force or by infiltration) or from without (let us say from the Russians, by force or by a process of immigration). It is difficult to believe that any other nation, anywhere in the world, would act differently in the same circumstances. Gen. Smuts himself stated: "No Government in South Africa would have the power to get out of that position. . . . That is the fundamental position from which we start. That is the Colour Question". Yes, that is how we have simplified the issue, and what we call our "Colour Question" and our adversaries call our "Colour Prejudice".

But there need be nothing disparaging about Separate Development. Apartheid is not primarily a problem of Colour and an attitude of anti-Colour. When our statesmen proceed overseas they mix freely with the statesmen of a different colour. Because our way of life in South Africa is not at stake there. In 1954 I was one of twelve South African Members of Parliament, of all Parties, who attended the Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Nairobi, and we spent several weeks formally and informally eating, travelling and staying together in East Africa with non-White Parliamentarians from Pakistan, Ceylon and the British Dependencies. Again, because our national existence was not at stake there.

What the (White) South African nation want is not the wanton domination of the Bantu. They want to safeguard their security and preserve their identity, yes. They want to obviate the domination by the numerically stronger and culturally different Bantu nations of a homeland which they have so laboriously led to peace and prosperity. They realise that their present policy of Paternalism toward the Bantu cannot endure; that the boy becomes a man; and that the Bantu nations, too, have legitimate national aspirations and a right to the highest possible development of their talents. Naturally they would welcome the valuable assistance of the Bantu in the economic development of their living space. In return they are

more than willing to help the Bantu to a higher cultural basis and a better standard of living, and with a courageous and forward policy of development of its living space. But they believe that where one or more nations, each with its own aspirations and way of life, have to share and develop under the same political ceiling, a brute struggle for supremacy, with all its attendant pain and injury, is bound to ensue.

Politically the only dynamic solution which has so far offered itself to them—and which has proved successful on the Indian as well as the African Continent—is that of Apartheid; of Separate Development or National Separateness. It aims at the establishment of one or more permanent National Homes, with eventual Home Rule, for the Bantu, alongside a permanent National Home for the (White) South African nation. As the Prime Minister and leader of the National Party, Mr. Strijdom, so clearly put it in his first Christmas message to the Bantu in 1954: “The Government will, as in the past, continue to lead you along the path of self-development to maturity . . . to self-reliance and independence”. Which means there is nothing necessarily repressive in the principle of Apartheid—that intrinsically it is a policy of equal opportunities and equal privileges, only in distinct and independent spheres of activity.

The question is: Is it possible and can it succeed in South Africa? The practically-minded Tomlinson Commission certainly think so. The scientifically-minded South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Sabra) think so. The spiritually-minded Dutch Reformed Churches think so. And the politically-minded National Party think so. Fertile areas seven times the extent of England and Wales and nearly twice the size of France already stand reserved for the purpose. Will enough of the Bantu co-operate? Much will depend on the methods of the ruling nation and the attitude they adopt in proceeding to establish the New Deal. It should not be impossible for them to win the goodwill of the Bantu. The prospect of enjoying greater economic opportunities and reaching the higher privileges of citizenship in well developed national homes is bound to attract support. Will the (White) South African nation, as the ruler of it all, face up to the full implications of the task? It is difficult to foretell how the continually changing world will lead them to act to-morrow and the day thereafter; but it won't be unreasonable to believe that the majority of them, in the spirit of the Hindu philosopher's Wise Man, “when faced with total disaster, will give up half and save the rest”.



"DON'T YOU UNDERSTAND? WE'RE DOING THIS FOR YOUR OWN GOOD!"

# THE POISON OF PRACTICAL APARTHEID

DR. ELLEN HELLMANN

THE statement often made to-day that there is no real difference between the National and the United Parties reveals a complete indifference to—and lack of any understanding of—the effects of the measures the Government has introduced. I am not disputing the obvious: that the United Party has failed as an Opposition, that it has offered the country no clearly expressed alternative policy, that, in its despairing attempts to hold the votes of the conflicting elements of which it is composed, it has avoided frontal attacks on Government measures to the extent of seeming to agree with them.

Its leaders apparently still believe that the tactics of evasion and ambiguity will enable them to retain the votes of those who are United Party by habit and not by conviction, and to win the votes of those who do in fact support the Government's colour policy. Its leaders apparently still believe that they can discredit the Government by demonstrating that by "apartheid" the Government does not mean complete territorial separation and will do nothing to bring about what really amounts to partition. They steadfastly evade the simple truth that this is no threat but a promise. Apart from a few idealists in the Afrikaans churches and universities, the Nationalist voter is reassured by the knowledge that things will remain substantially as they are. Apartheid means "baasskap", overlordship, and it is a meaning which the Prime Minister, far from disguising, has been at pains to emphasise. And the United Party, with all its talk of "white leadership with justice", is clearly not prepared to challenge a view of the order of society which the overwhelming majority of Europeans in this country accept as the only possible one. The United Party, in other words, is continually fighting on the enemy's ground and not its own, and this is why important Parliamentary debates peter out and a no-confidence motion becomes the flat and lifeless thing it did last session.

But this does not mean that if there had been no National Party Government in power since 1948, but a United Party one instead, South Africa would be as it is today. If the National Party had been

defeated in 1948 and again in 1953, the Statute Book would present a significantly different appearance. I am convinced that there would, for example, have been no Group Areas Act, no Bantu Education Act, no Natives' Resettlement Act. The Natives Urban Areas Consolidation Act would undoubtedly have been amended—the habit of amending this Act is so ingrained that no Parliamentary Session would be complete without it—but I believe the direction of amending legislation would have been entirely different.

Two quotations from General Smuts demonstrate his changing approach to urban native policy. In 1937, addressing a conference of municipal representatives, he said: "There is no doubt the proper way to deal with this influx is to cut it off at its source and to say that our towns are full, the requirements met, we cannot accommodate more natives and we are not going to accept more except in limited numbers." Ten years later, in 1947 in Cape Town, he said, however: "The problem that arises is not to try to stem this tide. You won't stem it here in the Peninsula, and you won't stem it in Johannesburg. . . . The time is ripe when a new native policy has to provide . . . for this new development." In his 1948 election speeches, General Smuts made this changing attitude explicit when he stated that his Party would accept the broad outlines of the Fagan Commission Report: that it would, in other words, accept the view that urban Africans constitute a permanent and integral part of the urban population, that they are in the urban areas of right, and that his Party would jettison the old Stallard Commission dictum that "the native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister".

That was the difference between the two Parties. It was not a difference at that stage in accomplished deeds, but in intention and in the two widely differing possibilities that lay open to South Africa in 1948. Because the then Government had only in 1948, belatedly enough, come to realise the need for changed and forward-looking policies, and because its omission to put any proposed changes into effect enabled the National Party, in taking over, to do no more, apparently, than build upon South Africa's "traditional policy of segregation", the enormity of the present Government's interference in the lives of the non-European peoples has been heavily disguised.

For this has been the key-note of the Government's administra-

tion: interference. There is no aspect of our national life upon which the Government has not laid its disruptive fingers. In its passion to preserve white racial superiority, it has passed a spate of legislation empowering it to enforce tidier separation and more division in an already much divided and greatly separated land.

The fact that some good has resulted from certain of these legislative measures must not be allowed to obscure their main and over-riding effect—greater division, and its inevitable accompaniment, the disruption of human lives. Nor must the fact that certain by-products of Government legislation have been beneficial, be allowed to prevent the realisation that these benefits could have been obtained by other, wholly beneficial, means.

The obvious example is the Western Areas Removal Scheme, carried out in terms of the Natives' Resettlement Act. The beneficial result is Meadowlands, Dr. Verwoerd's showplace, a fine new housing scheme, rapidly a-building, complete with a school to every 400 families. It did not require the interminable descriptions given in issue after issue of *Bantu*, the propaganda journal of the Department of Native Affairs, to convince either white or black that Meadowlands is a much-needed and greatly welcome addition to Johannesburg's native housing schemes. We all knew that Sophiatown was overcrowded before the Government told us so. We knew that it contained slums. We asked, time and again, that the pressure on the Western Areas be relieved, that provision be made for the Africans who had nowhere else to go, that slum clearance be instituted. All this could have been achieved without the passing of a single law.

But in that case, the Western Areas would have remained what they were, areas proclaimed as "predominantly occupied by natives", and Africans would have retained freehold rights in them. And so Dr. Verwoerd's purpose would have been defeated. For Dr. Verwoerd's primary purpose was not slum clearance, but the removal of what he regarded as a "black spot", that is, "an area in which natives own land in a European area". And all towns are, on the Minister's interpretation, "European areas". The end result is that tenants are gladly removing to Meadowlands, as they would have done without an Act. Some are even paying substantial key-money to hire a room in what they believe is the block next due for removal. But for Africans as a whole, the Western Areas Removal Scheme remains a synonym for injustice, its deprivations outweighing its benefits. It is leaving a precipitate of resentment, no less real for all its suppression, and a widespread feeling of

insecurity and threatened displacement wherever Africans own property outside of the reserves.

Under the administration of the Bantu Education Act, too, there are certain benefits. Educationists seem to be agreed that the new syllabuses are an improvement. Africans here were pressing, as are Africans throughout the Continent, for greater secularisation of the educational system. They wanted a larger share in the administration of their schools. These facilities the Bantu Education Act is giving them. But in a country like the Gold Coast, these requirements are likewise being met—and more, for there is a greater urgency there to raise the educational standard, in order to provide the manpower for a self-governing state. In the Gold Coast, no new schools may be set up by the missions, but all existing mission educational institutions continue to receive the fullest measure of support and subsidy. No one disputes that there are many defects in native education in this country. But it did not require a Bantu Education Act to remedy them. If native education had been transferred to the Union Department of Education, if it had been laid down that all new schools should be Government schools, if provision had been made for a new system of inter-racial school boards and committees, which would have made it possible to use the experience and knowledge of Europeans, if . . . An Act of this nature would have been enthusiastically accepted by the whole country, white and black.

This, however, would not have provided for totally separate educational systems. And that is precisely what Dr. Verwoerd wants: an education, says Dr. Verwoerd, that “should stand with both feet in the reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society”. Hence the Bantu Education Act, with its insistence on separation, has come to stand, in African eyes, for inferior education. And there is a great hatred of the Act, although it has been “accepted” in the sense that there is no alternative and many Africans—some for personal advantage and others because they feel it is their duty to make what contribution they can under existing circumstances—co-operate in its administration. That the Government’s primary objective is to build the walls of racial separation even higher is shown, if further proof be needed, by its refusal to allow Europeans to serve on Bantu school boards and committees and to continue school-feeding in African schools, where school boards, faced with the cruel choice between extra teachers or school-feeding, decided against school meals.

Above all, this objective is shown up in the persistent and dogged

campaign to close the doors of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town Universities to non-European students. Other Government measures are causing more widespread disruption and suffering, but nothing, I believe, will do more harm to South Africa's future than the imposition of university apartheid. It will mean the cultural isolation of non-white students, cutting them off from the normal and fruitful contacts of university life in its fullness, denying them access to that environment in which Western tradition finds its richest expression. There is no necessity to do this evil thing. There are four different types of university in this country—enough to accommodate every kind of personal bias. Why then cannot the Government let things be? The *laissez-faire* of the past becomes a rose-coloured recollection by comparison with the obsessional interference of the present.

There was also no necessity for the Group Areas Act. What was needed, particularly in a city like Johannesburg, was that townships should be made available for the Indian community, which has been compressed within its present hopelessly inadequate areas for years, unable to find any release from conditions of intolerable congestion: and that areas should be opened up for the coloured community, which is literally being evicted onto pavements as factories take over the areas where it has customarily lived. In this way a system of voluntary zoning could have come into being. But this is not what the Government seeks. It has made the tidy division of its towns into group areas for each racial group and subgroup its goal. This will be tidying up on a grand scale. And in the process, the fingers of authority stretch out to convulse an area like the Cape Peninsula, where Coloured and White have lived for generations in peaceful juxtaposition.

How the Act will finally be applied is, as I now write, not yet clear. In towns like Lydenburg and Ermelo and Pretoria, in the towns of Natal, dispute has been fierce: the proposals municipal councils have made to the Land Tenure Advisory Board—proposals to make the whole Indian community live and trade in the veld miles from the town—have been shocking in their callousness. The Board has, to its credit, not been prepared to entertain proposals of this nature. But the principles which will guide the Minister in making his momentous decisions have not been made public. Are Indians to be permitted to retain their trading rights in towns? For it is clear, both from the proposals of local authorities and from the statements of National Party spokesmen, that Indians will be the victims-in-chief of the Group Areas Act.

I doubt if it is possible for any who are not directly affected—and the directly affected are at present the large majority of Indians and Coloureds, a handful of Europeans and some Africans—to visualise what it must mean to live for years under the shadow of the Group Areas Act, not to know if the home one lives in will be allowed to remain one's own, if one will be deprived of the trading rights and the livelihood on which one's whole family depends. This is what practical apartheid, the form of apartheid which the Government has been relentlessly promoting since it came into power, means. It means interference, actual or threatened: a Population Registration Act to check on forebears and friends and features and possibly to classify as "native" a whole family that has lived as coloured; an Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act with powers to force a man out of the trade union to which he belongs and to push him out of the work he has been accustomed to doing.

Separation is not an abstract thing. It is practical and immediate and expresses itself in a series of actions which affect the quality of men's lives and poison it. It is destroying such personal relationships, limited and tentative though these be, as exist between white and non-white, and is quite deliberately seeking to prevent further personal relationships from being established. The process of separating, of putting up racial barriers, which is basic to the concept of practical apartheid, is not dramatic. If only it were! For then it might break through unconcern and unknowingness and compel realisation of the resentment this slow, insidious process is building up, and of the incalculable, even if at present only partially visible, harm it is doing.

## LABOUR AND LABOUR LAWS IN SOUTH AFRICA

ALEX. HEPPLE, M.P.

Two labour codes operate in South Africa. They are part of the general policy of racial discrimination. The two codes were not specially conceived as a specific plan. They emerged over the years as the cumulative result of various labour laws and conventional practices which gave effect to colour bars. During the past eight

years, the Nationalist Party Government have sharpened the dividing line between the two codes by the enactment of new labour and other laws. It should not be thought, however, that the Nationalist party is the sole architect of discriminatory labour laws and practices. Other political parties, industrialists, mining companies and even many trade unions have supported this development. Many of them have done so with energy and enthusiasm.

The difference between the two codes is now considerable. On the one hand, White workers have perhaps as many rights as workers in most other countries. They have freedom to organise, form trade unions and have them legally recognised, engage in collective bargaining, and sell their labour where they will. While their trade union activities will be handicapped in the future because of restraints applied through recent legislation (of which more later), the code which applies to them includes the rights of industrial democracy. Coloured workers are included in this category, excepting that convention and custom limit their fields of employment, by denying them access to many occupations, especially in the Northern provinces. Broadly speaking, however, the one labour code may be said to apply to all workers except Africans.

Africans are in a completely different position. Not only are African trade unions denied legal recognition, but every possible obstacle is placed in their way to prevent their growth. The Government looks upon such organisations as a menace to White civilisation. As one Cabinet Minister expressed it:<sup>1</sup> “. . . the stronger the Native trade union movement becomes, the more dangerous it would be to the Europeans of South Africa . . . we would be committing race suicide if we give them that incentive.”

African workers are not permitted to engage in collective bargaining through the industrial council system. African trade unions cannot obtain legal status. Disputes with their employers cannot be argued and resolved by African workers themselves, but must be settled by Government officials. All strikes are prohibited under heavy penalties. Other laws and regulations, applicable only to Africans, are woven into the fabric of the labour code for African workers. One example is the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which restricts the free movement of African labour. Another is the Labour Bureaux system, established under the Native Labour

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<sup>1</sup> Mr. B. J. Schoeman. Minister of Transport. House of Assembly. 4/8/53. (When Minister of Labour.)

Regulation Act.<sup>1</sup>

It is usually claimed that discrimination in the economic field is merely one of colour, in accordance with the country's accepted policy of racial separation. However, the discrimination has far greater economic than social effects. It does not secure racial segregation in the workshops. Everywhere there are Africans assisting White artisans and operatives in the factories. The discrimination mainly imposes severe restrictions upon African workers, retarding their progress or limiting their earning power. The ultimate effect of the code applicable to Africans is to make them a reservoir of cheap, disciplined labour.

In order to understand fully the effect of these two codes upon labour organisation, one must first take note of the composition of South Africa's industrial labour force. African workers comprise 53% of all workers in private industry, Whites 30%, Coloureds 13% and Asians 4%. This shows that only a minority of South Africa's industrial workers are entitled to combine for the purpose of collective bargaining. The majority (i.e., the 53% Africans) are prevented from using their collective strength to this end in association with White and Coloured workers.

#### LABOUR ORGANISATION

Trade union progress in South Africa has suffered because of colour problems. Race prejudice has put workers' solidarity beyond the grasp of the trade unions. Lacking that basic essential, labour organisation has been uncertain and often weak. In the skilled trades of the engineering, building and printing industries, where White artisans inherited a long trade union tradition, powerful unions have always existed.

These unions made no effort, however, to organise the African labourers and operatives in these industries and enrol them as members of their unions. In the mining industry where approximately 300,000 Africans and 30,000 Whites are employed, only the Whites are organised, most of them in the Mineworkers' Union. With a membership of 17,000, the Mineworkers' Union comprises all eligible White mineworkers. As this total represents a mere 6% of all mining employees, it may be thought that the Union would be anxious to extend its influence among the rest of the employees, the 300,000 Africans. On the contrary, the Mineworkers' Union is positively opposed to the extension of trade

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<sup>1</sup> Native Labour Regulation Act. (Act No. 15 of 1911.)

union rights to African miners, and has stated that it would strongly resist such a development.

This policy is encouraged by the legal colour bar in the mines, whereby many mining occupations are reserved exclusively for White workers. It is strengthened by the attitude of the mining companies who are not only hostile to African trade unions, but take special steps to prevent African miners from organising.

In secondary industry, trade union growth has been hindered not only because of racial difficulties, but also because of the changing character of industry itself. During the last twenty years, a period of great industrial progress, large numbers of Whites and non-Whites have flocked into the urban areas, attracted by the jobs offered in the new and expanding industries. These new workers, lacking a trade union background and tradition, were ignorant of trade union purposes, suspicious of its intentions and susceptible to the propaganda of the politicians who shouted racial and communist-bogey slogans. The Nationalist Party, unsuccessfully busy with such propaganda since the early 1930's, suddenly met with success in the post-war years, mainly because of these new workers. The fruits of Nationalist success in disrupting the unions is revealed in the fact that workers are to-day divided into five federations, four of which bar African trade unions from membership.

This is a reversal of the former policy of the White unions, for, in 1929, the only trade union federation then in existence, the South African Trade Union Congress, was urging its affiliated unions to enrol all workers, irrespective of colour, as members of their organisations. In 1939 (now established as the Trades and Labour Council) this federation was pressing the Government to grant legal recognition to African trade unions. By 1949, however, it was fighting a losing battle on the question of colour. Its affiliated unions, enmeshed in the web of the country's apartheid policies, quarrelled, compromised, retreated, and finally fell apart. In a last effort to hold the few remaining unions together, the South African Trades and Labour Council radically modified its attitude, proposing the setting up of a separate Co-ordinating Council of African Trade Unions under its protection and guidance. This came to nothing. The crisis in the unions was then aggravated by the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act, as a result of which many prominent trade union leaders were declared to be statutory "communists" and ordered by the Government to resign from their unions. This law has also been used against militant trade

union organisers and officials whom the Government could not name as "communists". Such persons are prohibited from attending meetings of any kind, and are therefore unable to continue their normal trade union work.

As the old Trades and Labour Council struggled on, two new associations of trade unions came into being, the South African Federation of Trade Unions and the Co-ordinating Council of Trade Unions.

In 1954, when the Government announced several drastic changes to the Industrial Conciliation Act, the trade unions held a special Conference, called the "Unity Conference", to decide upon action to resist the Government's proposals. The outcome was a decision to form a new and stronger federation, called the South African Trade Union Council. This new body, in an attempt to embrace the maximum number of "registered" unions,<sup>1</sup> resolved to exclude from membership all African unions and unions having African members. Although most unions joined the new federation, others were not attracted, in spite of the imposition of a colour bar for their benefit. The Co-ordinating Council of Trade Unions, strongly pro-Government and pro-apartheid, decided to remain apart and to give the Industrial Conciliation Bill its full support. The unions remaining in the old South African Federation of Trade Unions also resolved not to oppose the Government's proposals.

Meanwhile, African trade unions, having been excluded from this "Unity" federation, were forced to make a home of their own. Thus was born the South African Congress of Trade Unions. Its constitution provides that workers of all races are eligible for membership, although its affiliated unions are largely African.

The five federations in existence at the present time are:

	<i>No. of Unions.</i>	<i>Affiliated Membership.</i>
The S.A. Trades Union Council . . . . .	48	150,000
The S.A. Federation of Trade Unions . . . . .	11	41,000
The Co-ordinating Council of S.A. Trade Unions . . . . .	13	19,000
The Federal Consultative Council of South African Railways and Harbours Staff Associations . . . . .	6	80,000
The S.A. Congress of Trade Unions . . . . .	21	30,000

<sup>1</sup> "Registered" trade unions are those recognised by law in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. African trade unions cannot be registered.

In addition to the above, there are a few trade unions which are unattached to any federation.

The division revealed by these figures is likely to widen as the compulsory apartheid provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956, force presently-combined White and Coloured workers into separate unions.

In these circumstances, labour organisation in South Africa rests upon extremely weak foundations, and South African workers are in no position to assert themselves in case of need. Considerable apathy exists in the unions. A long period of full employment has blunted interest in union activities. The rank and file show little concern at Government interference in their domestic affairs. Pathetically few workers are alive to the latent disasters in their present disunity. As this disunity stems mainly from policies of racial discrimination, White workers are consoled by the existence of statutory and conventional colour bars.

#### THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR

The colour bar in South African industry is part law and part custom. Legally, it applies in the mines through the Mines and Works Act,<sup>1</sup> which reserves certain occupations for Whites only, and in the building industry through the Native Building Workers Act,<sup>2</sup> which prohibits African building workers from competing with Whites in areas reserved for White occupation.

By custom, the colour bar covers a wider field. It does this in various ways. For example, in State employment the Government pursues a "civilised labour" policy. Since 1924 all State and Provincial departments have given preference to Whites in even the most menial occupations. In recent years, because other employment has been plentiful, insufficient Whites have been available and the Government has been compelled to employ Africans. There is no doubt that they will be replaced by Whites when jobs again become scarce.

In the skilled trades, where the Apprenticeship Act operates, few, if any, Africans are able to become apprentices. Although the law does not deny them the right, custom demands that only White youths sign indentures. Even when there was an acute shortage of apprentices in many trades this conventional colour bar was strictly observed.

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<sup>1</sup> The Mines & Works Act (No. 12 of 1911) as amended by Act No. 27 of 1956.

<sup>2</sup> The Native Building Workers Act (No. 27 of 1951)

Now the statutory colour bar is to be extended. In future, in terms of a new principle introduced into the Industrial Conciliation Act this year, the Government can declare any occupation, trade or industry to be the preserve of one racial group. The relative section of the law is entitled "Safeguard against inter-racial Competition". The debate in Parliament showed quite clearly that the real intention is to exclude Non-Whites from many spheres of employment.

As the reservation of jobs on a racial basis can succeed only through extensive State interference in industry and large-scale direction of labour, both employers and workers must expect to sacrifice many rights as this law is applied. Labour relations, already aggravated by many laws, will become more complicated. As it is, employers are compelled to treat their Non-White employees differently from their White employees.

#### EMPLOYER—EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

In disputes, one set of rules is laid down for White and Coloured workers through the Industrial Conciliation Act, and another set for Africans in the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act. In the case of White and Coloured workers, settlement can be arrived at through the procedures of negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, in the manner provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act. Throughout, the trade unions play the major role. The essence is self government in industry.

On the other hand, where disputes arise between African workers and their employers, quite a different procedure must be followed. Trade union intervention is avoided. The machinery of the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act is applied. This machinery is clumsy and complicated. The workers' interests are represented by Government officials who are usually out of sympathy with them. The workers cannot negotiate through trade unions, nor can they elect representatives to any of the Committees or Boards which are supposed to be looking after their interests.

They may, if they wish, set up Works Committees, but these are of little help to inexperienced workers, especially as they are denied the official support of recognised trade unions. Most African employees fear to organise such Committees lest they be victimised. Experienced trade unionists will have no illusions as to the worth of such Works' Committees, where employers are not obliged to recognise or deal with the protecting unions. Such Works' Committees could easily be puppet committees comprising

“boss boys”, usually the company police.

African workers are totally prohibited from taking strike action, under severe penalties. This places them at the mercy of their employers and makes it almost impossible for them to resist intolerable conditions or gross injustice. The dividing line between a dispute and a strike, as defined in the law, is so blurred that even a protest during working hours may lead to prosecution for stopping work. Whenever strikes do occur, the police are called in and the workers arrested.

In cases where African trade union leaders have endeavoured to intercede on behalf of their members, officials acting under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act have instructed employers to ignore them. But many employers are finding the law troublesome and expensive. Factories have suffered complete stoppages of work, not only during the disputes, but while the employees have been under arrest and appearing in court on charges of striking. In some cases employers have even gone to the extent of paying the fines imposed upon the workers, in order to free them and get them back to work.

There were 33 illegal strikes in 1954 and 73 in 1955. It is interesting to note that in 15 cases only did the workers gain higher wages or better working conditions, despite booming industrial conditions.

#### APARTHEID'S INSATIABLE APPETITE

Having two labour codes is one of South Africa's many burdens of apartheid. It is a burden which increases with economic progress. The racial theorists cast aside the fact that not only are all racial groups integrated into our economy, but that they are all indispensable to it. Even if racial discrimination in the economic field retards progress and threatens everyone's security, apartheid must be served. But apartheid's appetite is insatiable. It is not satisfied with two labour codes, separating workers two ways only, now it is claiming further divisions.

The drastic new principles added to the Industrial Conciliation Act this year impose apartheid upon the registered trade unions. No longer will White and Coloured members of these unions mix freely and enjoy the same rights. In future, no mixed unions will be registered. Existing unions must separate their members into White and Coloured branches, which must meet separately. Coloured members, even if in the majority, cannot be elected to the Executive committees of their unions, which must consist of

White persons only.

These will not be the last demands in the cause of apartheid. If the unions were unable to resist interference in their affairs in the past, they will be less able to do so in the future. Their solidarity has been shattered by racialism and their power reduced by law. Many old established unions may end up as nothing better than friendly or benefit societies.

There was a time when the unions could have asserted themselves through political action. That right has now been taken away. Henceforth, it will be illegal for any trade union to affiliate to a political party, or to give financial aid to political parties or candidates.

Apartheid will begin to crumble first in the economic sphere. Workers, whatever their colour, will have to bear the brunt of that event. It is essential that they should be seeking ways to unite their forces in order to withstand the upheavals of the future. That unity is possible only if enough White trade unionists adopt a more enlightened attitude towards Non-White workers. So far, there is little sign of it.

## THE NEW ORDER IN BANTU EDUCATION

J. W. MACQUARRIE

THE European and the Bantu inhabitants of South Africa first met, on any general scale, in the late eighteenth century. Trade and evangelization were the main reasons for contact and, to the missionaries, the education of the heathen was secondary only to his conversion. Thus, in 1799, the first Bantu school in South Africa was established in the Eastern Cape and other schools rapidly followed, the chief churches or missionary bodies being then, as now, the Methodists, the Scottish Presbyterians, and the Anglicans. In its aloofness towards Bantu education, the chief Afrikaner church, the Dutch Reformed Church may or may not have failed in its spiritual duty, but it has certainly committed a colossal strategic blunder. For a century and a half it has made almost no attempt to win the Bantu people, the mass of its fellow inhabitants of this land, to its ideals or even to its language.

The development of Bantu education differs greatly in detail in all four Provinces of the Union, but in each Province schools for Native people, usually made available to all comers by their colour-blind promoters, were established, maintained and financed for many years purely by the missionaries. Then followed, in the Cape and Natal, a period of Governmental support, limited at first to minute financial grants in aid of teachers' salaries and with or without the right of inspection. Between 1865 and 1921, the annual State expenditure at the Cape increased from £3,571 to £297,853 and in Natal from 1865 to 1920, from £2,009 to £36,195.

In the Transvaal and Orange Free State no State provision of any kind was made for Native education until "Milner's Kindergarten", the representatives of the conquering power, took control after the Anglo-Boer War. By 1920, Governmental expenditure in these two Provinces had risen to £39,054 and £4,000 respectively. The Cape has no special grounds for complacency in respect of its provision for Bantu education, but it will be observed that, in 1865, when its authority over the Bantu was limited to a chain of military posts on the outskirts of Kaffirland and a few mission stations inside and outside, its contribution to Bantu education was just a trifle lower than that of the settled twentieth century Free State almost sixty years later. In these present days too, when Transvaal Nationalism has triumphed over Cape Liberalism, the relative contributions in 1920-21 are not without significance.

In 1921 the Transvaal Provincial Council, faced with a financial commitment foisted upon it by an alien power, attempted to impose a direct tax upon the Native people for their education, in addition, it should be noted, to an existing Poll Tax of £2. The Union Government, under Smuts, intervened. Provincial Councils were prohibited from imposing direct taxation upon Natives and were required to provide "funds for Native education, not less proportionately to the whole sum spent on all education than was spent in the financial year 1921-1922". This amounted to a total of £340,000. The operative phrase was "not less" but it was also interpreted as "not more". In 1925, to meet the needs of the expanding system, the Union Government took over complete control of financing from the Provinces, gave them the block grant of £340,000 and two-fifths of the proceeds of the Native General Tax, commonly known as the Poll Tax, a tax of £1 per head on each adult Native male irrespective of income.

This general provision for Bantu education, meagre as it was, was significant in two respects. It marked the recognition, first by the

Provincial Administration and then by the Central Government that they had at least some responsibility for the education of the African and it provided a certain amount of relief and assistance, as regards teachers' salaries, etc., to the overburdened Missions.

Until the second World War, however, the history of Native education is that of a struggle between a growing demand by the people for education as evinced by an increasing enrolment, and a Development Account that could not develop. From 1935 onwards, larger and larger fractions of the General Tax were devoted to Native Education until, in 1943, four-fifths of this tax was allocated to education and the remaining one-fifth to other Native services.

In 1945, the liberally-minded Minister of Finance and Education, J. H. Hofmeyr, was able to break completely with the past. He placed the financing of Native Education upon the only truly satisfactory foundation by making it a charge on the general revenue of the country. The quickening of the country's economic life as a result of the war followed by Hofmeyr's financial provisions ensured that, from 1941 to 1954 when the Bantu Education Act came into operation, Bantu education surged forward, both quantitatively and qualitatively, at possibly the maximum rate consonant with healthy expansion.

Despite increasing Governmental assistance, the main responsibility for erecting and maintaining schools fell, until 1954, upon the churches. In 1953, for example, the Missions controlled 4,827 and the Government 992 schools, and the bulk of the latter had come under Governmental control only during the past decade.

By 1953, on a purely voluntary basis, Missionary effort and parental solicitude, aided by Government to the extent indicated above, had built up a school system of just under 900,000 children, accommodated in approximately 5,819 schools built almost wholly by voluntary effort, and staffed by over 21,000 teachers, almost all trained at Missionary Institutions.

The achievement in Secondary and Higher Education is particularly noteworthy. In 1924 there were two recognized Secondary Schools in the Union, at Lovedale and Adams College, each with not more than 70 pupils, and presenting less than a third of these yearly for the Junior Certificate Examination. There might be said to be one High School, for the main work of the University College at Fort Hare in these days was to prepare students for the Senior Certificate or Matriculation Examination. By 1949 there were approximately 19,000 pupils in at least 92 Secondary and

High Schools and to-day there are over 1,000 internal and another 1,000 external Bantu students enrolled in South African Universities.

When the Nationalist Government came into power in 1948, one of its first acts was to appoint a Commission, the Eiselen Commission, to inquire into Native education. Though it did not explore the historical background as fully as the Welsh Committee of 1935-36, this Commission produced an extremely full and comprehensive report, which became the blue print for the Government's subsequent Bantu educational legislation. The Government, indeed, has accepted the report in almost all important respects save the major one—the financial recommendations.

The Bantu Education Act of 1953 is short and restricts itself to a few fundamental principles, delegating to the responsible Minister very wide powers over the whole field of Bantu education. It is a signal example of the modern trend towards the delegation of power from the legislature to the executive.

Firstly, the Act transfers the control of Bantu Education from the Provinces to the Union Government. None of the Provincial Education Departments has welcomed this change as each has worked out a system more or less in harmony with its own attitudes and traditions. But, as three of them have had separate Departments of Native Education and as, since 1922, the Union Government has had increasing control of Bantu Educational policy, this transfer, in itself, need not mean for them a radical break with the past. The transfer, however, has meant the final uprooting of the old Cape liberal tradition in education whereby the education of all races came under the control of the same officials in the same Education Department. The value of this oneness of organization may easily be over-estimated, but it is only necessary to compare, for example, the conditions of service of teachers in the four Provinces, the relative enrolments, or the relative expansion of secondary education, to gauge to some small extent the very real value of this inter-racial educational organization with more or less common codes of education, and a common set of officials including inspectors.

Secondly, in order, it is stated, to secure greater integration of Governmental services for the Bantu people, education is transferred, not to the Union Department of Education, where it could be handled by officials experienced in, and dealing with, the educational policy of the country as a whole, but to the Department of Native Affairs. It may be, as the Secretary for Native Affairs has suggested, that, provided the necessary trained and experienced

educational officials are drafted to it, the Native Affairs Department is perfectly capable of handling this additional service, but, on the same argument, so is any other State department, including the Department of Prisons. It is surely strange that South Africa should require over a dozen Departments of State to handle the affairs of under three million Europeans but only one Department to control, and to control so minutely, the destinies of just under nine million Africans. Even on the grounds of mere administrative efficiency there is little to be said for the transfer. It is also unfortunate that Bantu education has passed from Departments honoured and trusted by the African people to one that is increasingly associated in their minds with irksome taxes, humiliating regulations, and repressive legislation.

Thirdly, three types of school are explicitly recognized: (a) Bantu Community Schools under the control of a Bantu Authority of some kind, (b) Government Bantu Schools either taken over from the Provinces or brought into existence by the Government, and (c) State-aided Bantu Schools. Further, after a date to be fixed by the Minister, no school may be established or conducted unless it is registered, and registration is at the discretion of the Minister acting on the recommendation of the Government's Native Affairs Commission.

The significance of these measures can only be realized in conjunction with the voluminous regulations which followed the passing of the Act and which served to implement it. Government Bantu Schools have been placed, naturally, under the complete control of the Government. Until the passing of the Act, thirty-three of the thirty-seven Teacher Training Institutions were State-aided Missionary establishments; all have now become entirely State Institutions. Practically all other Missionary controlled schools have been transferred to the ostensible control of the Bantu people as Community schools. For each community school there has been constituted a School Committee consisting purely of Bantu members, some nominated by Departmental officials and, except in urban areas, the rest by chiefs or headmen. Similarly, for each group of schools, the size of the group depending on a variety of factors, chiefly administrative convenience, a School Board is constituted partly from Departmental nominees and except in urban areas, by nominees of the chiefs or headmen concerned.

It should be borne in mind that chiefs and headmen hold office solely at the discretion of the Department, and that, as an additional safeguard, all nominations to Committees and Boards are

subject to the approval of the Department. Only in urban areas are a few direct representatives of the parents, chosen by popular vote, nominated for office, in place of tribal nominees.

Bantu School Committees, and, in some cases Boards, have been in existence for many years, and some have taken much interest in the schools, but most have been merely advisory. It is therefore praiseworthy, as the Minister himself has pointed out, to accord to the community official recognition and to delegate to it control of its own schools.

From the composition of the Committees and Boards, however, it will be seen that the Bantu people control their own schools only in so far as they conform to the wishes of the Department of Native Affairs. Even more open to question is the removal in one drastic sweep of a whole host of experienced and devoted European Missionaries from all official connection with the schools, especially in rural areas where, apart from teachers who, from their office, are excluded from such bodies, there are so few educated Bantu people.

The creation of a whole apparatus of offices and office equipment, salaries and allowances to the newly appointed School Board Secretaries, and attendance fees and travelling expenses to School Board members, have no doubt helped to "sell" the new deal to a section of the African people which might otherwise have actively opposed it. Probably, even with the expense of European organizers and other overheads incidental to the new system, the additional cost does not amount to a very large sum. But it does constitute an additional burden upon Bantu educational finance for which no extra funds are earmarked, and it is by no means certain that the increased cost will result in greater efficiency than was rendered by the unpaid missionary managers of the past.

Practically all the churches except the Catholic Church and certain Anglican organizations handed over their schools, mainly to the community. The alternatives were to retain the schools as private schools, as the Catholics did, in which case no Government subsidy was available, or to retain them as State-aided schools with a subsidy reduced from a 100% of the salaries and allowances of teachers to 75% in 1955 and by rapid stages to no subsidy in 1958. As most churches found it sufficiently hard to make ends meet on full subsidy, there was no real alternative to transfer, particularly as the charging of fees to the pupils was not permitted.

The attitude in regard to private schools is still obscure but it is clear that the Government does not favour such institutions and

it is possible that the registration of such schools may become progressively more difficult.

The section of this new Bantu legislation which inspires the greatest foreboding is the financial provision. The new deal is founded on the Eiselen Report and Dr. Eiselen is not only the architect but the builder, and a builder whose estimates have been drastically cut. The report envisages an initial ten years' plan with financial provision expanding at the average rate of about 7% per annum compound interest. Yet the Ministers of Finance and of Native Affairs have declared that the contribution from General Revenue towards Bantu education will be pegged at its 1954 level, viz. £6,500,000. In addition, of the Native General Tax, four-fifths, at present amounting to £2,000,000, will be devoted to Bantu education. As the receipts from Native taxation increase so will the educational system expand. In other words, to bring about Dr. Eiselen's 7% annual expansion, the yields of the Poll Tax must expand by 30% per annum compound interest. There is no sign that the Tax can possibly reach this goal, but there are signs that fresh Native taxation is contemplated.

The Minister of Native Affairs and his party, and also, regrettably, a large section of White South Africa clings stubbornly to two beliefs in regard to Native development. Firstly, they believe that the African paying, as he does, only £2,500,000 in Direct Taxation, makes an insignificant contribution to the expenses of Government. They forget the mass of indirect taxes, such as custom duties, etc., and the patent fact that the wheels of South African industry including farming, are turned by the great masses of underpaid African workers. Secondly, they assume that African social services must be directly self-supporting but can point to no other country in the world, nor to any other sphere in their own land, where the poor are expected to pay for their own social services.

Financial stringency has led to a number of economies, one of which is paraded as a positive improvement. The devastation of large European cities, the expansion of African education in the post-war decade, and the world-wide shortage of school buildings, have made everyone conscious of the double session experiment, i.e. the use of the same classrooms by two relays of pupils. The Native Affairs Department, aware of the strain of long school hours on the Bantu children in the sub-standards, has decreed that, in these classes, each pupil will attend for only two-and-a-half hours daily, and that the same classroom will be used by a second group

of pupils. The only significant variation from the established practice of double sessions is that there is no change of teacher. The same teacher caters for two successive waves, each of fifty children, and is exhorted to make her work more practical and give them more individual attention than in the past. It is by this subterfuge that enrolment is not only being maintained but actually increased. It remains now for the Minister to discover that, through quadruple sessions, every Bantu child could make a nodding acquaintance with education, without requiring the Government to find a single extra penny.

A second and most far-reaching economy concerns the qualifications and remuneration of teachers. In education, quality is more important than quantity. By an arduous evolutionary process, the professional quality of Bantu teachers has gradually improved. Since the 1890's, when little more than a Standard IV certificate was required, the level has gradually risen until in the post-war years the Cape was able to make the Junior Certificate plus two years professional training the minimum requirement for male teachers and was well on the way to demanding the same requirement for females. Following on the Eiselen Report, the Bantu Education Department has dismissed this as an expensive luxury, has lowered the minimum to a Standard VI education plus a three years course of training, and has taken energetic steps to make this the normal qualification, particularly for female teachers. European education demands, as a minimum qualification, the Senior Certificate plus two years of professional training; no one has the temerity to suggest a shortening and cheapening of the process.

The School Feeding Grant is being continued for the present but the Government does not like it, ostensibly because, unlike subsidies and social services to the European community, it is sapping the independence of the people and the sense of responsibility of the parent. The Government is, therefore, encouraging the Bantu School Boards to divert such funds to other school services, such as the extension and improvement of accommodation, on the plea that it is unfair that some children should receive not only education but food, while others go without either.

At least three features of the new syllabuses must be mentioned. The pattern of life in the world to-day, Western industrialism, postulates universal education. The late nineteenth century was content with Primary education for the masses, the twentieth century demands general Secondary education. The Native Affairs Department is satisfied with less than either of these wild ambitions.

Primary education, hitherto regarded as an indivisible, as an integrated course giving little more than general mastery of the three R's, has been split into two separate courses, each of four years duration, and each claimed to be self-contained. The Lower Course aims, as Nationalist politicians have stated, at satisfying the legitimate educational aspirations of the Bantu people. If it does, they are easily satisfied. The straitness or otherwise, of the gate leading from the Lower to the Higher Course is still veiled in the mist of the future. Meanwhile the anxious Bantu parent perceives that a barrier has been erected across the old Primary School Course, and realizes that barriers are erected for specific purposes.

The main accusation levelled against Bantu education in the past has been that it was too bookish and insufficiently practical. There is much truth in this criticism and for a century administrators, missionaries, and teachers—we need mention only Sir George Grey and Stewart of Lovedale—have laboured to meet it. But practical education demands smaller classes, a certain minimum of equipment, and greater accommodation. In short, it entails far more money per head than has ever been available for Bantu education. Nevertheless, with the increasing grants of post-war years, Bantu education to a slight but appreciable degree, has become more practical and less bookish.

The Minister, however, has pledged himself, within the financial limits set by his Government, to make education more practical and less literary. As a first step he has doubled the roll in the sub-standards and added to the curriculum a third compulsory language.

The introduction of a third language may well prove to be the most calamitous blow struck at Bantu education. The pre-1954 language policy, at least in the Cape, seemed reasonable and satisfactory and, indeed, is the policy advocated by the Eiselen Report. The child started off with instruction through the medium of his own Bantu language. He also learned one of the official languages (English and Afrikaans), gradually improving his mastery of this language until in the highest Primary classes he could use it as a medium of expression. By thorough mastery of this tongue pupils who passed on to higher education followed the same Secondary and University courses as their European fellow students. Over the past three decades they proved, in ever-increasing numbers and beyond any shadow of doubt, their powers to assimilate the same education as their White fellow citizens, and demonstrated, through their part in South Africa's industrial revolution, the benefits to the whole Union of their education on these lines.

It is unfortunate that, through the indifference of the Afrikaner church, and with great and notable exceptions, of the Afrikaans-speaking population, the official language chosen in the Cape and Natal was almost invariably English, but this was balanced to some extent by the frequent choice of Afrikaans in the Free State and Transvaal. In any case, the African people have wanted for many years to learn Afrikaans, and in all Provinces some provision has been made for teaching the other official language, whichever it might be, as a language in the later years of the Primary School Course.

The new Bantu education syllabuses, with an apparently meticulous sense of fair play, decree that both official languages shall be taught from the beginning of the second school year. The time hitherto devoted to one official language is, with a very small increment taken from practical work, neatly divided between the two official languages. Lack of mastery of one official language has been in the past the main stumbling block experienced by Bantu pupils in their progress to higher education. With only half the time in future devoted to this medium, the outlook for Bantu higher education looks black indeed.

It will be seen, in brief, that the language provisions minister to the twin gods of apartheid and tribalization. They aim at producing an African tolerably fluent in his own language, if he stays long enough at school, and able to communicate to a strictly limited degree in the two official languages with officials and other casual contacts. It will further be noted that the educated Bantu of the future will be ring-fenced in his own tribal group, because, without the lingua franca of the present, viz. English, contact between the six or seven major Bantu language groups will be narrowly circumscribed. Further to prevent tribal intermingling, training schools for teachers and Institutions in general are required to take pupils only from their own immediate area. It is even envisaged that, for university education, separate colleges will be set up in each of the half-dozen main regions and each will be attended only by students domiciled in that area. Doubtless, a Cabinet several of whose members have been exposed, fortunately without defilement, to the noxious influences of foreign universities, is, in this matter solicitous for the welfare of more impressionable mortals.

Many, perhaps most, of the missionaries who have perforce relinquished their control of Bantu education, and many Bantu parents and leaders, appear to derive comfort from the fact that

in the main the new Bantu Education is being administered by the same humane, experienced, and trusted officials who handled education under the Provinces. It is largely the purpose of this article to suggest that this is false comfort.

Under any State, officials are or ought to be without politics. Their duty is, honestly and faithfully, to put into practice the policy of the existing Government, or to resign. It is true that, in regard to details and procedures, the officials of the Bantu Education Department may and often will soften asperities, and apply Governmental policy with all possible tact and consideration. In matters of policy, however, they are the servants of the Government and have no authority in regard to almost any of the changes referred to in this article.

Nationalist South Africa which, in the Transvaal, ignored its obligations to Bantu education until forced to assume them by an alien power, which again tried in 1922, without success, to evade its obligations and throw the full financial onus on the people themselves, has returned to the attack. It can no longer evade all responsibility, nor can it make the Bantu assume total financial responsibility, but it appears to hope, with no great confidence and no very clearly defined goal, if not to sweep back, then at least to channel and to direct into more placid backwaters this great tidal wave which, for over a century has gradually but surely been gathering momentum.

It is a measure of the advance made by Bantu education that fifty years ago, the Nationalists and their forerunners regarded the educated African as an impossibility. Twenty years ago, with a ponderous apparatus of so-called intelligence tests which proved his general ineducability, they looked upon him as a freak. To-day they honour his ability by seeing in him a menace. Perhaps, in the next generation they will try to make him a partner and a friend—if it is not too late.

## BANTU EDUCATION AND THE AFRICAN TEACHER

LEO L. SIHLALI

IN dealing with a subject of this nature there is always present the temptation to enunciate a number of theories on education and,

in the light of these, to evaluate Bantu Education. It will serve our purpose better though, if mention is made of just one uncontroversial function of all education and then see how Bantu Education measures up to this generally accepted criterion. The educational system of any one country should aim at imbuing its products with a respect for, and a love of, the values and way of life held dear by its rulers. So far as the Union of South Africa is concerned, this way of life is the Western system of democracy or Christian capitalist civilisation. The type of education the State provides for all the children in the country should therefore be such that they are all equipped not only to appreciate this civilisation and thus play their part in stabilising it, but also to advance that social system. This shall be our point of departure for a discussion of Bantu Education.

Prior to the introduction of Bantu education there existed for the African section of the population what was then known as "Native" education. This "Native" education was characterised by the niggardliness with which the successive governments of the Union financed it, but it did not seek to inculcate in the African children a different set of values and outlook on life *vis-à-vis* children of European origin. It is true that African children were generally retarded by two grades or standards at the primary school stage, and that this inequality was continued up to the teacher training stage where there existed the "Native" Primary Lower and the "Native" Primary Higher Teachers' Certificates. In spite of this, however, education for Africans did not differ in content from that given the children of the other sections of the population, much less was it used as an undisguised instrument to instil in African children ideas of separateness or of their being an independent "race" with special qualities, abilities and aptitudes as distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of the country. Indeed in the field of general education, at the Secondary School and University levels, all education was the same. African students learnt much the same things as boys and girls in London or New York with, of course, minor local variations. But, according to Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, who piloted the Bantu Education Bill through Parliament, this type of education was unsuitable for the African because it misled him by opening his eyes to "the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze", and fostered in the educated African "unhealthy white-collar ideals". For these reasons therefore, "Native" education had to be transformed into "Bantu"

education. It was to create a pseudo-scientific basis for the differentiation between education for Whites and that provided for the Blacks that the Commission on Native Education (popularly known as the Eiselen Commission) was appointed in 1949.

The Commission had for chairman none other than Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, and one of the Nationalist Party's chief theoreticians on apartheid. At this stage we can do no better than reproduce the Commission's terms of reference together with part of the questionnaire it drew up and sent to individuals and organisations. The following were the terms of reference:

- (1) The formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitudes, and their needs under the ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration.
- (2) The extent to which the existing primary, secondary and vocational educational system for Natives and the training of Native teachers should be modified in respect of the contents and form of syllabuses, in order to conform to the proposed principles and aims and to prepare Natives more effectively for their future occupations.
- (3) The organisation and administration of the various branches of Native education.
- (4) The basis on which such education should be financed."

From the questionnaire we shall choose the following questions:

1. What do you consider should be the guiding principles of Native education?
3. What do you understand by the "racial characteristics" of the Native?
4. What are the special qualities and aptitudes of the Native?
5. In what way has the social heritage of the Native been determined by the characteristics referred to above?

We have quoted extensively from the Commission's terms of reference and questionnaire because these formed the basis of the system of Bantu education.

Among the bodies and organisations that gave both written and oral evidence before the Commission was the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.), the editor of whose publications the writer of this article is. In its memorandum C.A.T.A. completely rejected the idea of different educational systems for

the different ethnic groups as implied in the first question of the Commission's questionnaire. As against it, it posited what it considered should be the aims of all education. These it summed up as follows:

- (a) A sound education aims at the development of a whole and complete personality, i.e. it aims to develop the individual to his fullest capacity, mentally and physically.
- (b) It should enable him to take his place in the life of the community, i.e. fit him to earn his livelihood.
- (c) By basing his education on his interests and capacities, it should enable him to enjoy his leisure in the best possible way, i.e. it should develop his artistic capabilities.
- (d) It should make him capable of assuming the responsibilities of citizenship."

Continuing, the C.A.T.A. memorandum reached the very heart of the difference between itself and the apologists of the country's policy of apartheid or segregation when it said: "It is obvious from this that in any given State the aims of education must be the same for all its citizens, since there cannot be two or more kinds of citizenship within a State. Any such term, therefore, as 'Native Education' is untenable, because it immediately violates the very principles of education". This clear statement of C.A.T.A.'s stand on education later resulted not only in the dismissal of its members from teaching, but also led to their being victimised even after they had left government employ. Most of them have been virtually banned from entering industrial centres and seeking employment there. But we are anticipating events.

In 1951 the Commission completed its task. In 1952 the report was released. In the absence of all evidence that the African has qualities peculiar to himself as distinct from the rest of humanity, and despite the fact that he has been flung into the vortex of industrialism, the Commission recommended a different and inferior type of education for him, that the school should be an instrument for developing in him a tribal outlook. Further the commissioners felt that the control of African education should be transferred to a political department of State, so that it should be made to conform to the country's policy of apartheid. The local government of education was to be placed in the hands of illiterate chiefs and headmen who are, in fact, minor officers of the Native Affairs Department. A further principle recommended by the Commission was that the government vote on African education should progressively decrease in proportion to total expenditure, while

the parents of children at school, and in fact the whole community, were to be made to pay an ever increasing amount of money for the education of their children.

Meanwhile the government was going ahead with legislation to create machinery for carrying out the Commission's recommendations. So it was that in the same year the Bantu Authorities Act was passed. These "Authorities" are tribal organisations created by the government to act as its agencies in controlling and regimenting the social, political and intellectual lives of the Africans. As is to be expected, the central figure in each is the chief or headman who, as has already been said, is a petty officer of the Native Affairs Department. Whenever, then, Dr. Verwoerd claims that he has the support of the overwhelming majority of African leaders in the prosecution of his designs on African education, he refers to these illiterate chiefs who are in the pay of his Department.

At this stage readers are entitled to expect to be given a description of the working of the Bantu Education Act. Indeed, this article shall not have achieved its purpose if it does not show how vicious is this Act in its practical application. Nevertheless it is my opinion that a portrayal of the theoretical basis of the struggle between the protagonists of Bantu education, the head and officials of the N.A.D., on the one hand, and its chief opponents, the C.A.T.A. on the other, is necessary to a clearer understanding of the government's brutal actions. A further reason for this is that a number of church representatives who are opposed to the Bantu Education Act but not to Bantu education have confused the issue. They are concerned about their loss of control over the schools. To them the schools had been centres of proselytization. We are, however, not interested in the struggle of the Calvinists who have government backing versus the rest. To clear the mists therefore and place the incidents soon to be described in proper perspective, it will be necessary to quote some utterances by government spokesmen as well as give excerpts from resolutions passed by the C.A.T.A. at its conferences.

At its conference in Cape Town in 1952, C.A.T.A. passed a resolution on the Eiselen Commission Report that contained the following:

"Whereas it is the considered view of the C.A.T.A.:—

- (b) That the African has no 'special' qualities and aptitudes peculiar to himself and different from other human beings,
- (c) That the economic forces in S.A. have completely broken down the whole basis of the tribal system and that it is

not only fraudulent and reactionary, but also unrealistic and futile to attempt to revive tribalism through the agency of the schools or in any other manner,

Now, therefore this conference of C.A.T.A. :—

- (1) Rejects entirely the recommendations of the Eiselen Commission on 'Native' education.
- (2) Calls upon all Non-European teachers to organise the people and explain to them the recommendations of the report and the disastrous consequences of their application; particularly the proposed control of education by tribal authorities, the registration of schools along tribal lines, and the imposition of special 'Native' syllabuses and vernacular media of instruction, which are designed to limit the scope of African education in order to produce intellectually under-developed beings, with no hope of ever aspiring to, and claiming, opportunities and rights equal to those enjoyed by Europeans.
- (3) Warns the African people against the danger of accepting portions of the report which appear to be progressive, as all the recommendations are inseparably bound up with the fundamental aim of educating the African child for a subordinate position in Society."

Having accepted the report the Government, at the second session of the 1953 parliament, introduced the Bantu Education Bill. During the course of the debate the Minister of Native Affairs said: "When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them. . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. . . . When my Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge." This was a declaration of war on C.A.T.A. The Bill became an Act. One of its clauses provided for the imprisonment of any teacher who broke any one of the regulations that would be drawn up in terms of the Act. In December of that same year the Executive of the C.A.T.A. convened a Union-wide conference of teachers to protest against the passing of the Bill. Dr. Eiselen, chief official of the N.A.D. and chairman of the notorious commission, in a statement to the press which was broadcast over the air, warned teachers not to attend the conference; accused the C.A.T.A. of being "against all order" and made very thinly veiled threats

against those who disregarded his warning. Except for a handful of militants from the Transvaal and Natal, the conference was attended mainly by C.A.T.A. members who, together with the Teachers' League of South Africa, a body of Coloured teachers, have been among the few to adopt a firm and principled stand against Bantu education.

Now the Bantu Education Act has been in operation for over a year. Among its first fruits was a set of regulations that deprive the teacher not only of his professional status, but even of the rights enjoyed by an unskilled dock worker. For one thing he cannot claim his annual increments as of right. These shall depend on the "willingness" of the Minister to make funds available. For another he is subject to all officers of the N.A.D., be they road overseers, agricultural officers, civil magistrates or inspectors of schools. The definition of "Officer" is given as "any one on the fixed establishment of the Department", i.e. any one permanently employed by the N.A.D. Further it is stipulated that "the whole of a teacher's time shall be at the disposal of the (School) Board".

During this year unbelievable things have happened. Before going on to mention some of these, however, I wish to state that my information is not second hand. I presided over the conferences that denounced what later came to be called "Eiselen Schooling". Subsequent to that I have been a senior member of the Executive of the C.A.T.A. It has therefore been my duty to keep informed on all developments in education in all possible parts of the country, though in this particular article I shall confine myself to the Cape Province.

The Bantu Education Act has been used in different ways in different situations, but always against the African people. For instance, in December, 1953, the Native Affairs Department closed down a school near East London, presumably because the inhabitants of that village had resisted the government's agricultural measures. This was the beginning of the reign of terror with the Act used as the guillotine. Whenever terror has to be struck in people there is always the inevitable witch-hunting and inquisition. This part was played by the Special (Political) Branch of the C.I.D. (Criminal Investigation Department). Soon after the promulgation of the Act, members of the Special Branch made it a point to attend all meetings of the branches of the C.A.T.A. Not only that, but they made the rounds visiting teachers at their schools, interrogating them about their political beliefs and affiliations and the teachers' organisation to which they belonged.

In August, 1954, armed police entered a number of schools and produced warrants to search the classrooms and the homes of teachers. I was one of those subjected to this outrageous treatment in the presence of my pupils. In one instance a certain teacher had his person searched in front of his class. The correspondence of leading members of the Association bore marks of having been tampered with, while letters took an inordinately long time to reach their destination. A number of C.A.T.A. publications were seized in passage. Still, in spite of Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen's insinuation that we were a body of anarchists, no grounds for prosecuting us have been found, nor were any of our members charged in terms of the very stringent school regulations.

Then followed the dismissal of five of the six office-bearers of the C.A.T.A. together with four other prominent members. *There was not even the semblance of a trial, nor were there any reasons advanced for their expulsion from teaching.* This was in September, 1955, and since then a batch of teachers is dismissed each school term. Among those dismissed have been leading members of the profession. The N.A.D. just declares them "unsuitable" and they are immediately dismissed. Among them are men who had reached pensionable age and who, did the government not carry on a personal vendetta against them, would have been retired on full pension, seeing that no charges had been preferred against them.

It has been suggested earlier that Bantu education is regarded by the rulers as a means of retribalising the Africans, with the express purpose of solving, even if temporarily, the problems that flow from the conflicts of capital and labour. It is in the light of this understanding that the persecution of the dismissed teachers makes sense. Three months after the expulsion from teaching of the first batch of C.A.T.A. members, one of them, who had the requisite qualifications, was offered employment as an accountant by an Insurance Company. In spite of representations by the managing director of the Company as well as by its legal advisor, the Labour Bureau of the East London City Council would not allow this man to enter the Municipal area. This was the first hint that the dismissed teachers were to be denied all means of livelihood. Events were soon to prove that there was a conspiracy to crush these already victimised men. Not long after this, the president of the C.A.T.A. was, on the intervention of the Magistrate of Willowvale, compelled to sell his property and leave the area where he had been principal of a school for thirteen years.

(In their relations with Africans, Magistrates are known as Native Commissioners and are officials of the Native Affairs Department.) Not only was this man forced out of hearth and home, but he was refused by the Native Affairs Department of the East London Municipal Council the right to reside in that city where the Company of which he is Director has its headquarters.

Information which had reached us at about this time was fully confirmed when the Port Elizabeth Municipal authorities refused two of the dismissed teachers who had been accepted by different firms of attorneys to serve articles under them, the right to reside in the city. At the time of writing, the case of one of them which has been taken on appeal to the Chief Native Commissioner for the Ciskei has not received favourable consideration. These are not the only cases. The writer also received similar treatment. In his case, no sooner did he enter the area under the jurisdiction of the East London Municipality than were members of the Special Branch of the C.I.D. busily inquiring how he had got there. Though he was in employment, the head of the East London Labour Bureau, accompanied by a constable of the N.A.D., came to his place of work to effect his arrest, but could not as he was lawfully employed. However, only a few days after members of the Special Branch had intimated that he would be sacked by his employers, he was in fact summarily dismissed. These facts need no comment. The connection between the persecution of Messrs. Mda, Honono, Mkentane, Maja and Sihlali (the men referred to), and their opposition to the Bantu Education Act, is far too obvious.

It is painful to an educator to see how even Inspectors of Schools live in fear of the Special Branch. One is reminded of a certain inspector who with fear peeping through his eyes and a trembling in his voice related how he had been questioned by the Special Branch as to why he had recommended for permanent appointment a teacher who had just returned from a C.A.T.A. conference last year. It is heartbreaking to see these educational authorities tied down to routine clerical work and unable to visit the schools under their supervision. (One would like to believe that they are glad of this because what they would be required to enforce there should in the natural run of things go against their consciences as educationists.) But it is still more painful to see the work of a lifetime disrupted in one fell stroke as happened at the beginning of this year, when all the old teachers in one school and some in many others in the Willowvale district in the Transkei, were transferred from their schools simply because it was suspected that

they were sympathetically inclined to C.A.T.A. One of them had been principal of his school for thirty years, during which period he had raised his school from Standard II to Standard VIII. But then this is the Bantu Education Act in practice.

Considerations of space do not permit us to make even a passing comment on the debasement of education as illustrated by the new syllabuses. We do not have the time to show how standards are being deliberately lowered through the employment of people who on educational and moral grounds ought never to have been allowed to set their feet in our classrooms; nor can we allow ourselves a discussion of the tragedy which is now and again enacted when hundreds and even thousands of children are drawn out of the schools and thrown on to the streets. We would like to tell the world of how determined attempts are made to change the nature and quality of such world-famed places of learning as Lovedale and Healdtown and how it is intended to obliterate even the memory of these shrines of African education. And now the octopus stretches out its tentacles to strangle even university education. But enough has surely been said to show the drift of things and the rest may safely be left to the imagination of the reader.

## PASSES AND POLICE

DR. H. J. SIMONS

A POPULAR ragtime, sung with great gusto by concert troupes and received with never-failing enthusiasm by location audiences, is attributed to such well-known composers as Caluza and Sidiyo. It is more likely one of those folk songs that well out of a people's daily and bitter experience, and act as a catharsis. The song goes:

Nantso i-pick-up-van.

Manje sikwenze nto ni, Pick-up Van?

Ngapha nangapha yipick-up van.

Manje sikwenze nto ni, Pick-up Van?<sup>1</sup>

and usually ends in a refrain shouted by the audience: "Waar's jou pas, jong?"

One hundred and fifty years of experience have built up in the

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<sup>1</sup> There is the pick-up van.

Now, what have we done to you, Pick-up Van?

All around us are pick-up vans.

Now, what have we done to you, Pick-up Van?

African's mind an association as automatic as a reflex action between pass and police. It is kept alive daily in the thousands of men and women who queue up outside pass offices to have documents issued, stamped, or cancelled, who are raided or stopped for passes by policemen in streets, on railway stations, in homes and at work, or who appear before the courts, pay fines or go to gaol for breaches of pass laws. The toll is huge.

Africans convicted under Pass and Allied Laws, 1950—1955<sup>1</sup>

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Curfew Regulations . . . . .	48,910	52,469	60,749	66,849	73,226	74,048
Registration of Documents	47,799	57,958	66,501	63,160	78,623	89,885
Location Rules . . . . .	34,839	41,212	44,725	58,645	66,799	75,569
Pass Laws . . . . .	49,649	43,951	49,823	41,233	27,197	22,012
Other Offences . . . . .	36,190	36,830	42,526	58,552	68,363	76,089
Total	217,387	232,420	264,324	288,439	314,208	337,603

These are big delinquency figures, even in a country where one person in ten (not excepting children and women) is found guilty of a crime every year, but they must not be regarded as a complete record of convictions for 'pass offences'. For these are difficult to define and impossible to isolate from the criminal statistics as compiled and published.

The South African 'pass' conforms to the dictionary meaning of a written permit to go and come; but it also means permission to stay, live and work; and, thirdly, it corresponds to a passport, in that it means a method of identification. The African describes as 'pass' any document, including a tax receipt, which he is obliged by law to carry and produce on demand to authorised persons, such as policemen, municipal officials, magistrates and, in certain cases, landowners.

No one is quite certain as to the number of such documents, but the estimate of 27 or 28 made by Senator Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, may be taken as reliable. They include immigration permits, travelling passes, curfew or 'night' passes, permits to look for work, labour or service contracts, lodgers' permits and exemption certificates.

## HEAVY BURDEN

Fees paid by persons who take out passes and fines paid by those who do not, amount to a considerable revenue, but it is far out-

<sup>1</sup> Kindly supplied by Director of Census and Statistics.

weighed by administrative costs. Senator Verwoerd admitted in 1952 that his department alone spent £340,000 on the salaries of 950 clerks employed to issue—and £10,000 on printing—the 500,000 forms needed by pass laws.

To draw up an accurate balance sheet we should also include the wasted man-hours, salaries and allowances of thousands of other officials—municipal clerks, police, magistrates, turnkeys—who either issue, renew, cancel and check passes, or interrogate, arrest, prosecute, judge and guard the army of suspects and prisoners created by the laws.

The biggest debit item of all, however, is the injury suffered by millions of Africans under this extraordinary combination of medieval repression and modern bureaucracy.

South Africans are aware of the waste and friction. Africans have protested vocally and by means of petitions, demonstrations, and organised burning of passes. A Minister of Native Affairs—the late Denys Reitz—told the Senate in March, 1942 (when the enemy seemed likely to win the war) that 'nothing was so conducive to irritation, to bad feeling, to hatred, to disturbance of race relations between black and white, as the Pass Laws'.

Some of the severest criticism has come from government commissions and officials. I list the most important to illustrate the weight and length of authority behind the indictment: the important Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission of 1885, the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903—5, the Native Pass Laws Committee of 1920, the Native Economic Commission of 1930—2, the Committee of 1942 on Urban Africans, and the Native Laws Commission of 1946—8.

The things they condemned are, briefly stated, the irritation, inconvenience and loss of time suffered by Africans when applying for passes, or when detained needlessly and vexatiously, often for long periods, on their way to and from labour centres; the creation of criminals through the arrest and imprisonment of great numbers of people for wholly technical offences; the invasion of individual freedom, indiscriminate stopping, constant and harassing interference by policemen and others; the stigma of inferiority placed on the African by the blatant discrimination to which he alone is exposed; and the consequent racial antagonisms.

This is a damning indictment and, one might think, enough to arouse the whole country against the system. Actually, the demand for outright abolition has come only from Africans themselves and radical egalitarians in the rest of the population. A body of senior

civil servants, headed by Dr. Smit, then Secretary for Native Affairs, did protest in 1942 that 'the burden of the Native population had become heavier', and urge that 'rather than perpetuate the state of affairs described, it would be better to face the abolition of the pass laws'. Indeed, the laws were considerably relaxed during the rest of the war period. But the full load was restored as soon as the war had been won.

For there must be some means of pin-pointing the African, of controlling his movement and residence, as soon as he leaves the reserves to live under and among the White people. He must be able to 'account' for himself to any European charged with authority, or be treated as an actual or potential menace.

I am going to explain the reasons for this attitude and for the survival of the pass system during a century and a half of change from the period of frontier wars and a simple agrarian society to the industrialised urban communities of today. I shall show that the system owes its tenacity to function, that it is not merely at the fringe of the society, but is so intertwined with the colour-class structure that to abolish it would destroy the pattern of race discrimination.

## SECURITY AND LABOUR

Pass laws have undergone many changes of both form and purpose, but throughout their long history they have been used primarily to satisfy the European's opposing needs of labour and security. The White colonists, used to slave labour, would not do without black hands, and coerced, taxed or cajoled the tribesmen to work for them. At the same time they sought protection against these former warriors and descendants of the dreaded impis. The pass, like a modern passport, was used to limit the number of 'foreigners' coming into the settled territory, so that there would be enough for labour needs but not too many to endanger security.

Security was the aim of the first pass law applied to free persons. The British introduced it by proclamation in 1797, at the time of their first occupation of the Cape. All Xhosa were declared aliens, and refused admission into the Colony without an official permit. The next venture of this kind, which followed closely on the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, was however concerned mainly with labour needs.

The enactment took the form of a proclamation issued by the Governor, Lord Caledon, and applied to the semi-nomadic, cattle-herding Khoi-Khoi (misnamed Hottentots) whose grazing lands

had been seized by invading colonists and who were now to be pressed into service to replace the slaves. They were obliged to find a 'fixed place of abode'—meaning a White man's farm—or run the risk of being declared 'vagrants'. If they hired themselves out to an employer, the law required the drawing up and registration of a 'service contract'. No Khoi-Khoi was allowed to move about the country unless he had a pass issued by his employer or a magistrate. A person without a pass was a 'vagrant', and liable as such to be fined, imprisoned or contracted out to a farmer.

The sequel to this colonial variant of the medieval Statute of Labourers had lasting results. The law invoked the wrath of missionaries Van der Kemp and Read, first of a long line of protesting clerics, who attacked it as concealed slavery and violation of human rights. Wilberforce and other 'philanthropists' in England clamoured for Imperial intervention, and the proclamation was repealed in 1828 by the famous Ordinance No. 50 which established equality before the law between White and Coloured, the latter including Khoi-Khoi, freed slaves, and persons with combined European and non-European ancestry. The Coloured people have never since been subjected to a pass system.

The Cape Government retained it however to restrict the movements of Africans. All 'native foreigners' from Kaffraria had to obtain a pass to enter and remain in the Colony. Laws embodying similar restrictions are still found in the statute book, but their provisions have fallen into disuse in the Cape Province.

## FARTHER NORTH

The Voortrekkers who travelled northwards in ox wagons to appropriate tribal or unoccupied land and to escape from British rule took its pass system with them.

One of the first things they did was to fix a legal limit to the number of Africans allowed to live in the White settled area. The quota laid down in Natal in 1840, only two years after Dingaan's Zulu impis had been repulsed at Bloedrivier, was five families per farm—the same as the quota fixed by the Union parliament in the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936.

Another early security measure that survived in principle was the Transvaal Republic's Instruction to Field Cornets (justices of the peace) to allow no African to settle without permission near the 'towns'. It was issued in 1849, the year in which the South African Republic was born, but when there was hardly more than

bare veld, wild game, ox wagons and tribal villages.

The Republic in subsequent years taxed Africans to make them work for the colonists and introduced labour contracts for the employed, travelling passes for those who left tribal area or farm, and penalties for one who left the Republic without a pass. This last aspect received even more emphasis than influx control when the mining of diamonds drew African labour southwards during the 1870's.

## MINES AND TOWNS

In Kimberley, where Rhodes was anxious to stop the illicit trading in stolen diamonds that threatened to bring down prices on the legitimate market, Africans were imprisoned in closed compounds—as they still are—for the full term of their service contract. A pass system was introduced by Proclamation 14 of 1872, 'to provide greater checks than now exist to the theft and unlawful appropriation of diamonds in Griqualand West'.

Mine owners on the Witwatersrand, though less plagued by thefts, also housed African miners in compounds, for compound labour was considered cheaper and more docile than an urbanised proletariat. The owners' main concern was to stop the mass desertions from intolerable conditions in compounds and underground workings, where disease or accidents killed one man in ten from tropical and sub-tropical regions.

Mine managements demanded a rigorous pass system and the Republican Government complied and enacted a series of laws between 1885—89 that divided the Rand into labour districts and introduced a system of permits to seek work and registered labour contracts. The British retained and improved upon the system after the war of 1899—1902, and it was further elaborated and extended after Union by the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.

These laws marked a fateful turning point. For, together with the Native Land Act of 1913, which restricted the African's right of occupation to 7 per cent of the surface area, they laid the basis of the segregation policy that has been the pattern for every territory in southern, central and eastern Africa under the domination of White settlers.

The issues can be simply stated. In 1910, when the Union was born, it stood at the threshold of one of the world's fastest industrial revolutions, one that was to change Europeans, Coloured and Indians into a predominantly urban population and raise the

number of urban Africans from 508,000 in 1911 to 2,322,000 in 1951. If the example of other countries during industrial revolutions had been followed, the African peasants and agricultural labourers who were driven to the towns by hunger or ambition would have been allowed to strike root in the towns and form normal, balanced communities.

The governing class however chose another course, one more in keeping with the traditions of a frontier society and a mining camp. Urban legislation retains the old idea that every African who enters or lives in a town is a foreigner, regrettably indispensable, but dangerous and to be tolerated only under licence. His status was defined by the Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission of 1921, in a passage giving a pretext for denying Africans the municipal franchise:

'The Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister'.

## INSECURITIES

This policy was carried out by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. It has plunged African townfolk into a vast confusion and uncertainty. I shall describe the main features.

No African or company, including insurance and savings banks, in which Africans control more than a 20 per cent. interest, may acquire land, except with the Governor-General's approval, outside the locations and villages where African residents are segregated. Approval is rarely given, and it is State policy that Africans shall not buy land even in the locations. Not more than 6,000 African-owned plots have been recorded in urban areas, and the owners' lack of security was shown dramatically in the compulsory removals of people from the western suburbs of Johannesburg to Meadowlands, under the Native Resettlement Act of 1954.

Residential segregation in the towns is enforced by proclamations of the Governor-General, prohibiting Africans from living anywhere else than in a segregated location, village or hostel. Exemptions are granted to certain groups, such as domestic servants living on their employers' premises. Few towns actually do provide enough accommodation in the locations, so that many hundreds of thousands of families live in the peri-urban areas in atrocious slums of flimsy

shacks made out of packing cases, paraffin tins, sacking and corrugated iron. It is State policy to transfer the residents, by means of powers held under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, to legal squatters' camps controlled by a local authority.

Africans living in these camps or in municipal locations are tenants of the local authority. Even where Africans are allowed to build their own houses, they lease the plots on a monthly tenancy. Residents are subjected to restrictive location regulations, which prohibit visitors or lodgers, the latter including sons over 18 years, without the superintendent's permission and the payment of a lodger's fee.

In towns that enforce a 'curfew', no unexempted African may be on a street outside the location during specified hours, usually between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m., unless he has a 'special', the term commonly used for a night pass signed by an employer or official.

Employers and African male employees in proclaimed towns are obliged to register their service contract at a payment of 2s. a month. Employers must report the termination of contracts and desertions. Evidence of the contract must be produced on demand by an authorised person. Africans not registered under service contract or licensed as casual labourers must obtain a permit to look for work, which is usually issued for seven days and may be renewed at the discretion of the local authority. If the permit is refused, the unemployed African must leave the area.

An African may be removed from an urban area and sent to the reserve or a work colony under an order issued by a native commissioner declaring him, after an administrative inquiry, to be habitually unemployed, or without sufficient honest means of livelihood, or to be leading an idle, disorderly or dissolute life.

## INFLUX CONTROLS

With the object of reducing the number of Africans in the towns to the bare number needed by employers, use is made of restrictions and procedures described in administrative circles as 'influx' and 'efflux' controls. These operate, in conjunction with powers exercised under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, through a network of labour bureaux, administered by the Native Affairs Department under regulations framed in terms of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911. The bureaux are a means of directing the flow of African work-seekers away from the towns to farms and rural industries.

Influx control has undergone many changes, of which only the last two will be mentioned. By an amendment made in 1937 to section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the Governor-General had the power to issue a proclamation prohibiting an African from entering a specified urban area unless he had already secured employment there, or unless he obtained permission from the town authorities to look for work.

This gave the towns a measure of discretion which met with the disapproval of the Nationalist Government. It therefore obtained an amendment to section 10, so as to make controls operate automatically. In principle, Africans must get permission from the labour bureau, as well as from the municipality, to look for or accept work. Permission may not be given while there are unemployed Africans living in the area. Certain groups are exempt from these restrictions, as will be seen from the terms of section 10:

1. No native shall remain *for more than seventy-two hours* in an urban area, or in a proclaimed area in respect of which an urban local authority exercises any of the powers referred to in sub-section (1) of section twenty-three unless—

- (a) he was born and permanently resides in such area;
- (b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer for a period of not less than ten years or has lawfully remained continuously in such area for a period of not less than fifteen years and has not during either period been convicted of any offence in respect of which he has been sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine for a period of more than seven days or with the option of a fine for a period of more than one month; or
- (c) he or she is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 18 years of a person falling in (a) or (b) and ordinarily resides with him; or
- (d) permission to remain has been granted to him by the urban local authority.

An African who remains unlawfully in an area—the onus to show that he is there lawfully rests on him—is liable on a first conviction to a maximum penalty of £10 and two months' imprisonment, and banishment to his permanent or last place of residence.

These restrictions on the right to live and work operate in all urban areas, down to the tiniest hamlet, and apply even to those in the reserves, the African's 'tribal home'. Yet administrative officers complain that the controls are inadequate: firstly, because parliament has recognised a 'permanent' urban community and

given it security; secondly, because 'influx control' has been abolished by the provision allowing Africans to enter and remain for 72 hours in any urban area without permission.

The security granted by persons included in section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) has been diminished appreciably by an amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act that was rushed through at the end of the last parliamentary session. Local authorities—in effect location superintendents—are given the power to banish any African whose presence they regard as 'detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order'. Senator Verwoerd explained that his amendment was aimed, not at 'idle and undesirable' person, whose removal can be ordered under another section, but at the 'agitator type'. The discretion vested in officials is however wide and arbitrary and not limited to political leaders.

### ABOLITION OR CO-ORDINATION?

The size of the loophole opened by the free admission clause depends on the efficiency and ruthlessness of the administration. Thorough supervision has not yet been found possible in the big towns, in spite of frequent police raids, house to house inspections, and indiscriminate stopping of Africans in streets, buses and motor cars. Indeed, this activity rather resembles the labour of a man who tries to empty a barrel of water with a sieve.

Thoroughness and efficiency must be accounted as the chief aims of the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952. It enacts that all Africans, women as well as men, over 16 years must be issued with a reference book, to include all the information contained in the documents of the old pass system: photograph, registration number, address, tribal origin, tax receipts, service contract, exemptions, permit to look for work, refusal of permit.

As from a date yet to be fixed, many of the pass laws described in this article will be repealed. Then, Senator Verwoerd told the Assembly in June, 1952, 'Natives will have freedom of movement in the country, apart from the few restrictions which have to be imposed owing to the possibility of their being employed in certain urban areas'.

The Senator's 'few restrictions' resemble the proverbial tail that wagged the dog. Contrary to the recommendation of the Native Laws Commission of 1948 and the South African Institute of Race Relations, both of which recommended the issue of identity cards,

the Act of 1952 imposes a penalty for mere non-production of the reference book, as well as for forging, altering or using another's book. While the African will be able, after the fixed date, to travel on the highway without getting permission, he may be asked by any policeman to produce his book, and is liable to be arrested if he does not have a genuine, untampered book, or has not paid tax to date, or is under an unfulfilled obligation to perform labour dues for a farmer, or is declared a vagrant.

He is free to move subject to these conditions, but where can he go? If he enters a farm without the owner's permission, he commits trespass. If he enters a town, he must get permission within 72 hours to remain and work. If allowed to accept employment, he must, unless exempted, register a monthly contract of service. If curfew regulations apply, he must have a night pass to go outside the location after 9 p.m. The only restriction that will be abolished is the travelling pass, which long ago fell into disuse in the Cape and Natal.

The new document—a veritable Master Pass—may well prove to be a more efficient means of identification than any of its flimsy forerunners. Though not secure against forgery and fraud, it is certainly less vulnerable and, coupled with an elaborate finger-print bureau, may be expected to provide fewer opportunities for bribery, evasion and breach. Its issue has already produced a steep rise in tax revenue.

Greater efficiency is not necessarily a virtue in this instance. It will introduce more rigidity and greater repression in a society already overburdened with bureaucratic controls and limitations on progress. Africans will continue to evade and resist, as they are now doing with growing determination the issue of reference books to the women, who up to now have been able to defeat efforts to bring them under the pass laws.

It is to be doubted also whether the new system will rid the towns of 'redundant', or 'unlawful' or 'idle and undesirable' Africans. They, like the 'sturdy beggar' of medieval Europe, are products of an unstable society, of starvation and backwardness in the reserves, low wages and unhappiness on farms, and the ceaseless movement of the migrant worker. The Master Pass is there to perpetuate and not terminate these conditions.

## FUNCTIONS

To recapitulate, the pass system serves a variety of purposes, which may be indicated by reference to different groups in the

White population.

There are mine owners and other employers, who find the registered service contract a useful device to stabilize migrant workers and prevent a free flow of labour to more productive and remunerative fields of employment.

Farmers, in particular, refuse to attract workers by improvements in wages and working conditions. Instead, they look to Government to supply workers at low cost. This is done from farm jails, and under laws such as the Native Service Contract Act of 1932, which prohibits the employment of an African in the Transvaal or in Natal unless: (a) he produces a document of identification and (b) if he is domiciled on a farm, a labour contract or signed statement that he is not required to render labour service to the landowner.

There are the police, who want 'control' over 'unemployed, idle, and dissolute' Africans, and use the pass laws as dragnets in the hope of finding among those pulled in a suspected criminal. In this instance the pass laws serve as a substitute for more efficient methods of administration.

Like the English Poor Law statutes of the 16th century, the system is used to limit the liability of ratepayers for the maintenance of the poor. Since Africans cannot build or hire accommodation outside the locations, they must depend largely on municipal-owned houses, which are often subsidised from rates and central government funds. There is therefore pressure to limit commitments by excluding women and families, and allowing no more men than the number needed by employers.

Even this number is regarded as excessive by advocates of totalitarian apartheid, who prefer less industrialisation to more urban Africans. Their preference is based not on nostalgia for an agrarian society, but on the old-time fear of a Black proletariat, politically conscious, well organised and demanding its share of the national heritage. For, as Senator Verwoerd told the House of Assembly in April, 1950: 'Conditions on the farms are totally different from those in the cities. Natives who live or work on farms are employed by the farmers. On the farms there is no question of equality. The relationship of master and servant is maintained on the farms, and there is no danger that conditions will develop as in the cities, where they are working with Europeans on an equal footing—which gives rise to all kinds of undesirable conditions'.

Africans will, however, remain and multiply in the towns, for they constitute the only large reserves of labour available for

economic expansion. The Tomlinson Commission in fact predicts that even if its plans for developing the tribal areas are put into effect, four million Africans will be working in the White urban areas at the end of the century.

Government intends them to be migrant workers, without a permanent stake in the towns. It persists in rejecting the perspective, now accepted as inevitable in Rhodesia, Belgian Congo and Kenya, of a permanent, stable society of Africans in the towns, for it sees in this a threat to the traditional master-servant relationship between White and Black.

In the Union, therefore, integration and segregation are two sides of the same coin, and the pass laws serve to maintain caste-like differences within a common society. This too is recognised by Africans, whose children sing as they play in the locations:

Jongani e police station;  
Kukhona amapolisa.  
Sesona sifo sikhulu  
Kuyo le ndawo.

Vukani ebuthongweni  
Niyeke ukuthandaza!  
Sesona sifo sikhulu  
Kuyo le ndawo.<sup>1</sup>

## THE WHITE OPPOSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

STANLEY UYS

FOR the Nationalist Government, with its aim of permanent white supremacy, and the non-white "liberatory movement", with its slogan of "freedom in our lifetime", the political issues in South Africa are relatively straightforward. Squeezed between

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<sup>1</sup> Look at the police station;  
There are policemen there.  
That is the greatest disease  
In this place.

Arise from your sleep  
And leave off praying!  
That is the greatest disease  
In this place.

these two forces are no fewer than nine different Opposition groups, all seeking to overthrow the Nationalist Government, but hopelessly divided over how to achieve it. With only two exceptions—the once-powerful United Party of the late General Smuts and the old-established Labour Party—these groups all came into existence after the collapse of the United Democratic Front in the 1953 General Election. Each new group was launched in the belief that only *its* special method would defeat a Government which had scrapped the normal rules of political warfare and was legislating to stay in power for ever.

The seven new groups are:

1. The Liberal Party, concentrating on race relations.
2. The Federal Party, drawing its strength mainly from the English-speaking province of Natal.
3. The Anti-Republican League, appealing for a non-party front against a Nationalist republic, although catering specially for English-speaking South Africans.
4. The spectacular Black Sash women, with their silent public vigils, trying to stir the nation into defence of its Constitution.
5. The Covenanters, arguing the case for a new National Convention to reaffirm the Constitution.
6. Ex-members of the United Party who have quarrelled with their party over racial issues.
7. The South African Bond, a new right-wing party proposing a coalition of men of goodwill.

There is even a tenth group, the National Conservative Party, consisting of six M.P.s who broke away from the United Party but refused to resign their Parliamentary seats. They are more an adjunct of the Nationalist Party than part of the Opposition. One of their members has already crossed the floor to join the Government.

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To a lesser or greater degree, the nine Opposition groups listed above share the view that South Africa under Strydom is heading for a one-party State. They have heard Strydom's repeated claims that his Government has a special mission to fulfil in Africa, the maintenance of white civilisation, and they have detected with alarm the undertone of authoritarianism. This alarm was present right from the time of the Nationalist victory in May 1948. It manifested itself in the formation of the United Democratic Front, which mobilised anti-Nationalist whites of all shades of political opinion. For the first five years of Nationalist rule, from 1948 to

the General Election of 1953, the bulk of the white Opposition was united in a common front.

But, whereas the United Democratic Front brought 770,000 Opposition voters to the polls in 1953 and won 62 seats in the House of Assembly, the Nationalist Government, with only 660,000 votes, won 94 seats: the fruits of a "loaded" franchise and of an exceptionally favourable redelimitation of constituency boundaries.

That put an end to the United Democratic Front. The United Party, which had been swept along, with mounting reluctance, at the head of the Front, viewed the break-up with satisfaction. In one week-end, two new parties were formed, Liberal and Federal. Soon afterwards, the United Party served notice on its former wartime election ally, the Labour Party, that it intended contesting the five Labour Parliamentary seats at the 1958 General Election.

The splintering-off of the National Conservative Party occurred about that time, too, and before long the other new groups were making their appearance.

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The United Party's argument against continuing the anti-Nationalist alliance was that, however impressive the mobilisation of 770,000 Opposition voters by the United Democratic Front had been, it had won no victories. There was thus only one possible course: to get Nationalist supporters to switch their vote. This involved getting rid of the United Party's embarrassing left-wing allies. It also involved swallowing larger doses of Nationalism and apartheid.

This attitude of mind in United Party leadership circles had revealed itself even before the 1953 election. Opposition to apartheid had become increasingly erratic, and during the Parliamentary session which immediately preceded the 1953 election the United Party caucus was persuaded to vote for two notorious Nationalist laws, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

The 1953 election set the seal on this type of thinking. Formally and solemnly, the United Party resolved to "go it alone" for the 1958 election. Particularly vicious apartheid laws were to continue producing explosions in the House of Assembly, but on the whole the United Party managed to find more points of agreement on racial affairs. By deft manoeuvring, it began concentrating the struggle against Strijdom on "popular" issues, like the sanctity of the Courts, the inviolability of the Constitution (a loose term), economic issues and the worries of farmers.

Some United Party supporters, noticing that their vote was being taken for granted while the wooing was directed at Nationalists, objected to the new line. There were audible mutterings in several branches, and then two Johannesburg City Councillors, Mr. Richard Harvey and Mr. Jack Lewsen, resigned their United Party seats and stood again successfully as Independents. The revolt, however, went no further.

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The United Party Parliamentary caucus had still to give its decision. It contained half a dozen new backbenchers who, due to political unsophistication, were inclined to speak their minds freely, and were therefore promptly dubbed "liberals" by the Nationalist tacticians; it also contained a more experienced liberal, Dr. Bernard Friedman. Throughout the 1954 Parliamentary session, the caucus members snapped and snarled at each other, and the quarrel spilled over into the 1955 session. Then the testing time came.

It came on the Coloured vote, which the Nationalist Government had vowed to abolish and which the United Party was committed to defend. Observing a certain cooling in ardour in the upper ranks of the United Party over the coloured vote, one of the backbench "liberals" asked the party for a statement that, if it were returned to power, it would restore the coloured vote. The request threw the leadership into confusion. It had given a similar assurance a few years previously, but to repeat the assurance would simply defeat the whole strategy of winning over Nationalist voters, for whom the abolition of the coloured vote had become a matter of make-or-break. The leadership prepared a statement which, after many gyrations, failed to produce the requested promise. The six backbenchers and Dr. Friedman then tendered their resignations.

This crisis in the United Party occurred at a time of general discontent in the party's ranks. The resignation of seven M.P.s, who enjoyed the backing of influential urban members of the United Party, might easily have been a mortal blow to the ailing organisation. Emissaries sped between the leadership and the rebels, pleading, cajoling, promising. It was not a pretty scene. Dr. Friedman, his mind made up, stood firm throughout the whispered, urgent discussions, but his six comrades-in-arms showed signs of wilting. A second statement was prepared hurriedly for these six M.P.s, which they accepted glumly. The revolt was over. Dr. Friedman was out.

The period which ensued is an important one, because it set in train events which might yet lead to the consolidation of liberal forces. Dr. Friedman returned to his Hillbrow (Johannesburg) constituency to find that he had become a Cause. Other United Party supporters, some of them office-bearers, had resigned in sympathy with him. They formed a fervent reception committee, flanked by members of the Liberal and Labour parties. But a number of other United Party members, who had veered instinctively towards Dr. Friedman when the trouble began, waited for the backbench "liberals" to return from Cape Town before acting. The backbenchers then dealt their second blow at Dr. Friedman: to exonerate themselves, they argued against his stand—argued so eloquently that once again a revolt fizzled out.

The liberal-minded citizens who had clustered around Dr. Friedman viewed the events with dismay. They had been certain that, if all seven M.P.s had resigned together, the United Party probably would not have dared to challenge them in by-elections; or if this guess proved wrong, at the very least the liberal movement in South Africa would have been given an invaluable boost. But they had to look on helplessly while the decision whether to strike out on a new course or not fell on six undecided backbenchers, who could not see clearly the road ahead.

Dr. Friedman, for all these misfortunes, plus a muddled election campaign, polled a significant number of votes. But the rot had set in. In Port Elizabeth, where Mr. Alf Every had resigned his United Party seat in the Cape Provincial Council on the same issue, the United Party's ranks were closing in again, and Mr. Every was defeated by a big majority.

Many observers in South Africa to-day declare that the coloured vote crisis which occurred at the time of Strydom's introduction of the Senate Act—designed to pack the Senate and give him the two-thirds majority required to abolish the coloured vote—was the point of no return for the United Party, that since then Strydom has not looked back. The dividing line between the Nationalist Government and the United Party on apartheid has become ever more blurred, and at least one official United Party journal is now trouncing the Nationalist Government regularly for the undue amount of money it spends on the Africans, instead of looking after the whites.

To-day, white anti-Nationalists in South Africa remain largely confused and disunited. One complaint commonly heard is that

the United Party, far from opposing the Nationalist Government, is acting as a shock-absorber between the Nationalists and the anti-Nationalists and blocking the emergence of a new Opposition.

The charge is levelled against the United Party that, by seeking to eliminate the Labour Party from Parliament and trying to crush where possible other minority groups, it is establishing a two-party system; and that, in view of the United Party's diminishing opposition to Nationalism, coupled with the authoritarian nature of the Strijdom regime, this must lead inevitably to a one-party State.

Here, through concentrating too much on what is happening inside the United Party, some liberals have been guilty of directing too much of their fury against the United Party leadership and praying for its demise. They have calculated that the United Party's cunning plan to woo Nationalist support will collapse soon, causing the party to disintegrate and opening up the way for an expansion of the liberal movement. (By "liberal" is meant Liberal, Labour, "dissident" United Party, and possibly even Federal.)

Other liberals, rejecting this "waiting for the crash" line of thought, take the more realistic view that the liberal movement in South Africa must organise itself now, regardless of probematal developments within the United Party. They say that the liberal movement has not solved its own dilemma yet of the extent to which it should participate in the non-white "liberatory movement".

Increasingly, since the application of apartheid laws, the white and non-white political movements in South Africa have drifted apart. Non-whites were excluded from the United Democratic Front; they are also excluded, either expressly or in practice, from the general political activity of the nine different Opposition groups. The only regular contact between white and non-white political organisations is maintained through the "Congress movement", with progressive whites working through the South African Congress of Democrats.

However, a significant move is now being made to establish closer links between the non-white organisations and progressive whites. It is in the nature of a determined effort to prevent the Nationalist Government from sealing off whites and non-whites into separate compartments, with the inevitable fatal consequences.

Through banning notices and the rigid enforcement of apartheid laws, the Nationalist Government has tried to reduce contact between white and non-white politicians to the minimum. A

decision at this stage by white liberals to form a closer alliance with the non-white Congress movement would have far-reaching effects.

Yet another move is afoot within the liberal movement: to consolidate some of the groups into one political party.

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If one goes through the list of Opposition groups one finds that, with the possible exception of the South African Bond, which is an old-style party somewhat ill at ease in the modern revolutionary setting, they are all openly or covertly sceptical of the United Party's chances of recapturing power at the ballot box by the traditional methods of political struggle, however shrewd these methods might be.

Methodically, since 1948, the Nationalist Party has entrenched itself in power. The next move is to reduce the voting age from 21 to 18. For the majority of the Opposition parties, this is a special situation—requiring special handling. The Black Sash women stage their unique vigils; the liberal groups grope for a formula; the Covenanters want to enact 1910 and the foundation of Union all over again; the Anti-Republican League declares that “unless some unforeseen development occurs all that stands between the Nationalists and their dream of perpetual domination is the will of their opponents to resist—if needs be beyond the limits of constitutional convention”.

Common to all these groups is that extra note of urgency. They look on dubiously while the United Party continues loyally to fulfil the role of Her Majesty's Opposition, while Strijdom daily changes the rules of the Parliamentary game.

Will the United Party pull it off? Will the liberals succeed in getting together? Will the Black Sash stir Nationalist consciences? Will the special appeal to English-speaking South Africa evoke a response? Will a greater number of progressive whites ally themselves with the Congress movement?

These questions all hang in the air as the General Election of 1958 approaches. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Government and the non-white “liberatory movement” grind inexorably closer towards each other.

# AFRICAN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

JORDAN K. NGUBANE

Two facts need to be remembered in any discussion of African political movements. The first is that this is a subject which receives little or no attention in South African history books. As a result, European opinion is very largely unaware of the attitudes which have been shaping in the African mind within the last fifty years. This is unfortunate because it leads to unilateral solutions which only complicate the race problem on the one side, while on the other it denies very many White South Africans acquaintance with developments which wield a decisive influence on the relations between Black and White.

The second point is that the history of African political movements is, in fact, a record of specific ideas moving in the direction of finding a workable solution to what is, in African eyes, the White problem. This process dates from the time when the African came in contact with the White man.

For purposes of this article we shall confine ourselves to the most important movements which have arisen since Union.

The most important political organisation in this period was the South African Native National Congress, now the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912. An outline of the circumstances which produced it will shed light on its ideals, its history and its impact on both South Africa and the world.

Enlightened Africans at the turn of the century believed that Union was desirable because the African, the Boer and the Briton would survive and prosper only if they abandoned the path of racial isolation and pooled their resources in a bigger, united community. The African had the labour; the Boer controlled the gold-bearing reefs of the Transvaal while the Briton had the capital and the technology.

These Africans realised that if labour, natural resources and capital were harnessed together, the various races which had made this country their home could all look to the future with confidence. Such harnessing, however, was possible only where the racial groups concerned were united. The concept of united nationhood, then, came to be seen as the only effective and lasting guarantee of a

fuller life for every South African regardless of race, colour or creed. From this perspective the African saw implied in Union the rejection of the idea of separate destinies for each of the principal racial groups into which the peoples of South Africa were divided.

The prime movers behind the march to Union were, of course, White. But the unity they forged and expressed in *ex unitate vires*, our national motto, was an organic unity; something which would grow and expand and in the process embrace and benefit all who had made South Africa their home.

At the same time a sharp distinction was drawn between the *ideal of Union* as outlined above and what would be the possible *fact of Union*. There was widespread fear that Union attained on the terms of the Boer republics of the Free State and the Transvaal would, in fact, be a triumph for the temper of the slave-owner. The Boers were, of course, no longer slave-owners. But their long tradition of slave-owning and its impact on their history had left an indelible mark on their attitude to the man of colour. In African eyes, while they had abandoned slavery they had retained the temper of the slave-owner. This handicapped them gravely in their approach to the relations between Black and White.

Against this background the African naturally approached Union with mixed feelings.

The decisions of the National Convention (which brought about Union) confirmed the worst fears of the African people. The temper of the slave-owner scored a major victory against both Cape liberalism and British diplomacy. The Act of Union made it plain that the African was not to be accepted as a citizen in the new Union. Race and colour were to be absolute and permanent criteria by which to assess human worth.

This gave Union the character of a White united front set up to keep the African in permanent subjection. It created the need for an African united front to protect the Black man against the dangers inherent in a society where the temper of the slave-owner was the dominant influence.

Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, a barrister from Inanda, Natal, called together a conference of African chiefs and leaders from all the provinces. This unique gathering met at Bloemfontein in 1912 and bound all the African peoples of the Union in one racial, cultural and political front.

The delegates agreed to give up being narrowly Zulu or Xhosa or Suto or Shangane. They decided to emerge as a new people in history—the African people. To perpetuate these ideals they

brought into being the South African Native National Congress which later became the African National Congress.

From the statements of its leaders, press reports and its own declarations, the policy of the A.N.C. can be summarised as follows:

- (a) To unite the African people for purposes of using the strength of their numbers to ensure respect for their wishes;
- (b) To win over the White South African to the interpretation of the ideal of Union described above;
- (c) To awaken the world to the dangers inherent in a society where human values are assessed on the basis of race.

The S.A.N.N.C. was liberal-democratic in outlook and nationalistic in motivation. Its diplomacy was aimed, not at turning the African against the European, but at using the pressure of African numbers to convince an increasing number of Europeans that the values of life they (the Europeans) cherished were safest in a society where they were the common property of the largest number possible of all South Africans and not parts of an alien culture which could thrive only on the oppression of the man of colour.

The Congress faced its first real test in 1913 when the Land Act of that year was passed. This measure introduced rural residential segregation. This meant that large numbers of Africans who had lived off the land would be uprooted and ruined financially. That was bad enough. But the Congress saw in the Act an important step in the direction of barring every door to citizenship against the African.

A nationwide protest campaign was organised and when that proved of no avail, the Congress decided to place the matter before the bar of world opinion. A strong and representative deputation was sent to England in 1914. Needless to say it returned empty-handed.

After the war a second deputation was sent to England with instructions to proceed from there to Versailles if necessary. At Versailles they found themselves in the queue with General Hertzog who had come to plead for an Afrikaner republic. While it was hoped that the victorious powers might be interested in the Africans' case one motive in sending the deputation was to start working world opinion against evaluations of the human personality based on race.

Like most countries South Africa found herself in the throes of economic upheaval after the first world war. As happens when

that is the case, feelings between Black and White became strained. Need was felt for a more effective means of pressing for reforms than the conciliatory policy of the Congress.

A few African dockers started meeting in Cape Town. In 1919 they broadened the scope within which they were to work and formed themselves into the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.). The moving spirit here was the late Clements Kadalie who had originally come from the Nyasaland Protectorate.

Unlike the A.N.C., the I.C.U. was nationalistic in both outlook and motivation. It spoke a different language and employed different methods. It placed little or no reliance on petitions, protests and resolutions as the A.N.C. did. It was defiant and militant, often used the strike weapon and readily went to Court against any White employer who cheated his African servant of his rights under the law.

The I.C.U. was just the organisation to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the A.N.C.'s policy of conciliation and the progressively repressive nature of the laws passed by the Union Parliament. But before its leaders knew precisely what was happening, the I.C.U. found itself the spearhead of the emancipation movement. The process of transition from a trade union to a political party had been so swift the leaders of the I.C.U. had not had the time (and possibly the inclination) under the pressure of events to remember the importance of principle in a political organisation.

The I.C.U. can be said to have set out to test the efficacy of the weapon given the African by Dr. Seme. Its initial successes awakened the African people to a new consciousness of their powers.

This awakening produced two reactions from the White side which have an interest all their own. On the one hand General Hertzog and Dr. Malan, then leaders of Afrikaner Nationalism, were looking around for allies against the so-called British jingo. Both saw in the rising African giant a promising ally. General Hertzog sent a donation to the I.C.U. with this message: ". . . It is for us, by our common endeavours, to make this country, that we both love so much, great and good. In order to do that, we must not only ourselves be good and great, but we must also see that there is established between the white and black Afrikaner that faith in and sympathy with one another which is so essential for the prosperity of a nation. It is my sincere desire that that faith and sympathy shall exist and to that end I shall exert all my influence. . . ."

Dr. Malan telegraphed a message to an African gathering at

Queenstown which read: "No race has shown greater love for South Africa than the Natives. Therein he, the Native, assuredly is a pattern of true patriotism and is entitled to take his place side by side with the Nationalists in the common political arena."

From the extreme Left came another reaction. The response of the African people to militant leadership and the growing contradictions in the Union's economy convinced a few Left-wing thinkers that South Africa would be fertile ground for a revolutionary party. As a result a number of White socialist groups came together in 1921 and formed the Communist Party of South Africa.

The Communist Party was started as a White man's Party. From 1921 to 1924 it had its own colour bar and did not admit African members. This policy was changed in 1924.

In the meantime the government had got Parliament to pass the Native Affairs Act of 1920 which set up what were called Native Conferences. These were gatherings of chiefs and African leaders who met the heads of the Native Affairs Department from time to time to air the grievances of the African people. When they started showing signs of independent thinking, they were stopped by the Nationalist Government.

Then came the Rand disturbances of 1922. These sharpened racial tensions on both sides of the colour line to points of unparalleled bitterness. Afrikaner Nationalism got added impetus as a result. In the general elections which followed the strikes, the Communist Party brought out a manifesto in which it supported the Nationalist Labour Pact against the Smuts government. That gave Afrikaner Nationalism a push forward. The Smuts government fell and Hertzog took over.

The Nationalist Labour government was no friend of the African. Poor Whiteism had for a long time given the leaders of Afrikaner Nationalism very many sleepless nights. Following his civilized labour policy, Hertzog threw large numbers of Africans out of jobs to make way for the poor Whites. If this widened the gap between Black and White it also roused the interest of some of the leaders of the Congress in the Soviet Union as the friend of the oppressed. The late Mr. James T. Gumede, then President-General of the A.N.C., travelled to Europe and thence to the Soviet Union where, in his own words, he was fêted as though he was the Prime Minister of the Union.

He was a keen advocate of the Soviet system when he returned. Although he was thrown out of the presidency-general for his new sympathies his return marked another turning-point in the march

of ideas in the African community. The conciliatory policy of the Congress and the militancy of the I.C.U. had not succeeded in bringing the African nearer his goal. He was looking for allies elsewhere.

The Communist Party had by then long abandoned flirting with the Nationalists and the Labourites. Its new friends were the leaders of the Congress. Just about the time Gumede returned from Russia the Communist Party came out with a manifesto advocating a Black Republic. Hertzog produced his notorious Black Peril manifesto. That sent the Nationalists galloping to Parliament with a comfortable majority of their own.

Once in power General Hertzog struck to left and right against African political organisations, crushing the I.C.U. and crippling the Communist Party. The Congress was largely paralysed for action.

With his political opponents either immobilised or gaoled or exiled, General Hertzog thought the stage was clear for his Bills, one of which removed the Cape Africans from the common voters' roll and set up the ill-fated Natives Representative Council (N.R.C.).

Like the 1913 Land Act, the Hertzog Bills were not only one more rejection of the ideal of united nationhood; they were one more decisive step in the process of barring the doors to citizenship through peaceful evolution. This created a vacuum in which need was felt for a new organisation to co-ordinate African opposition to the Hertzog Bills. Thus was born the All-African Convention.

Where the Congress had spoken of a united African front and the I.C.U. of militancy and the Communist Party of a proletarian revolution, the Convention spoke a new language—the language of non-collaboration. The underlying theory here was that the African is oppressed by consent. That consent took the form of collaborating in making the machinery of race oppression work. If he refused to co-operate, the entire superstructure of segregation would collapse.

Differences developed quite early in the Convention over this issue and in the end led to the A.N.C. walking out of it.

Some members of the Congress decided to co-operate in making the Hertzog experiment work—as proof of the African's desire to collaborate in genuine endeavours to solve a manifestly tangled problem. They stood for election to the N.R.C.

The N.R.C. had not been long in existence when the second

world war broke out. The conservatives in the Council decided not to embarrass the Union government by pressing the claims of their people too far during the war. Unfortunately for them this provoked two reactions from the African community. On the one hand a section of the people came together and formed the African Democratic Party under Mr. Paul Mosaka of Johannesburg. The A.D.P. opened its doors to Black and White alike.

On the other, the younger men in the Congress established the Congress Youth League which was anti-communist, demanded positive action against race oppression and advocated an ambitious programme of constructive work in the African community.

These events happened against the background of developments in India where Gandhi had demanded a clear declaration of Britain's war aims and had been willing to be gaoled for this.

It was against the background of these events that what happened after 1948 must be seen. In this year Dr. Malan's Nationalist Party was returned to power by the White electorate. African opinion saw in this a final rejection by the majority of White South Africans of the ideal of united nationhood and the repudiation of the spirit of Union as expressed in South Africa's national motto. The African acted accordingly.

The annual conference of the Congress decided to take positive action in protest against what was regarded as a fatal triumph for the temper of the slave-owner. Apartheid's success at the polls was seen as the gravest menace that has ever threatened the existence of the African people.

The crisis into which the African was thrown as a result called for a new outlook and for new methods of struggle. New alliances were to be sought and friendships built with those willing to reciprocate inside and outside South Africa. In his choice of friends the African was no longer to confine himself to that White community which had returned to power a political party pledged to an ideology he regarded as threatening his very existence.

It was in these circumstances that the African launched the resistance movement. Its declared aim was to get six specified laws repealed. But in a country where the African does not enjoy freedom of speech beyond a certain point, the motivating urges which gave the resistance campaign its peculiar hue have an importance all their own.

The first of these urges was the desire to invite the White democrat to cross the colour line and join hands with the African democrat in the fight to defeat apartheid and return South Africa

to the ideal of united nationhood and the spirit of Union as expressed in *ex unitate vires*.

Secondly, the African sought to awaken the world to the dangers for internal and world peace inherent in the apartheid philosophy. The third motive was to demonstrate African solidarity with the ex-colonial peoples of Asia and to assure them that never again would the African side with the race supremacist in efforts to drive the Indian out of South Africa.

The campaign met with both failure and success. It did not get the six laws repealed. But it split the White community in two and created an atmosphere in which the White democrat discovered that the values of life he cherished were safest where the African majority regarded them as part of its own heritage and not portions of an alien and hostile culture. The healthy result was the formation of the Liberal Party of South Africa and the "liberalisation" of the Race policies of the Labour and Union Federal Parties.

Secondly, it swung world thinking overwhelmingly to the side of the African—as witness the voting in the United Nations and the general state of world opinion.

Thirdly, it awakened the peoples of Asia to the need for closer bonds between themselves and the people of Africa. This, in turn, set in motion a series of events which culminated in the Bandung conference at which the African National Congress was represented.

Lastly, the campaign gave the African the initiative to choose the direction of his political progress. The White supremacist was no longer to say what the status of the African would be in the future. This development made all talk of White baasskap meaningless. The bans on African leaders are a desperate effort to wrest this initiative from African hands.

With African States coming up on the continent the African progressively sees the race problem from wholly different perspectives. It would not be surprising if, under the impact of apartheid, he one day came to the conclusion that if Black and White can live together in this country only on the basis of master and servant and not as equals, then South Africa is the wrong place for the White supremacist to be in.

One conclusion emerges from all the foregoing: apartheid or any policy of race discrimination is no answer to the Union's race problem. The first great need of our times is a brand of statesmanship which will make our various peoples realise that salvation

for them lies in their standing together in the defence of a Union which shall symbolise their being heirs with an equal title to a tradition of freedom for which all have fought valiantly ever since Black and White met in this part of the world.

The second most important requirement is that we, Black and White, all need a powerful ideal which will bind together our peoples as against the influences which divide them. That ideal is the goal of a Greater South Africa where colour shall be no criterion by which to assess human worth; where Black and White shall be conscious, not of their skin colour but of the things they shall have in common; where no racial group shall feel threatened by any other and where each shall see in the security and prosperity of the others the only permanent guarantee of its own survival. This is the goal towards which the majority in the African community have been moving since Union.

## PASSIVE RESISTANCE

PATRICK DUNCAN

It is becoming clear that our country has only one future—a non-racial future. Once the social and economic forces begin to act strongly in any situation, then he who defies them does so at his peril. I was moved to read the summing up of Hitler by that simple man, his interpreter, Paul Schmidt. After watching human affairs at the top level for twenty-five years Schmidt's judgment is that there are at work in the world irresistible moral and economic forces, and that although dictators can construct false moralities and phoney economics which have dazzling short-term success, yet in the end such people are crushed and their systems with them. Now these social and economic forces are at work with great strength in South Africa, working for change in the direction of greater equality and of democracy. However great the will-power may be that attempts to dam them it will not succeed, and resistance will hurt mainly those who resist. The doctrine of White supremacy, as thinking men even on the Nationalist side know, is doomed. There are no social and economic forces strengthening it. We hear wild talk of the time coming for another "Blood River". There will be no second Blood River, and for this reason. In 1838 the Boers carried with them the

strength born of a superior economic and technological system. The spear could not resist the gun, nor the hoe the plough. To-day those who talk of Blood Rivers are obstructing, not helping, the flood of technological progress. White supremacy is ending abroad and in South Africa, and there is nothing that anyone can do to change this.

Given that amount of inevitability in our future, there remain great uncertainties. The two most important are (1) how do we reach our non-racial future: violently or non-violently? and (2) in the non-racial future will South Africa have any room for a White minority? The two are of course intimately connected. If quiet non-violence is used, and if White supremacy capitulates easily, then the answer to the second uncertainty is almost certainly "yes". I do not believe that there is at present any widespread desire that the White minority should leave. But if the Nationalists imitate Hitler, and plan a *götterdämmerung*; if they go down like Samson, then it is doubtful whether there will be any place in the future South Africa for the Whites.

Now, as to means, it will be objected that I have wrongly limited the choice to two possibilities—violence or non-violence. What about Parliament? Why should evolution to a non-racial future not come through Parliament as progress came in England and elsewhere? The answer lies in a century of stupidity. The Cape constitution of 1853 had everything necessary to guarantee the country a safe passage into the future. But each time the rights of the non-Whites have been changed since then, they have been cut down, never increased. This was true of the old Cape "Liberal" days, just as much as it is true of the illiberal days of Union. This process of taking away rights has never shown any tendency to reverse itself. On the contrary it has shown a tendency to speed itself up.

Now this destruction of non-White rights has weakened the position of the non-Whites in South Africa. This was intended. But it has also had the effect of weakening the position of Parliament, and therefore of the White minority. This was not intended, but time may show that racialism has harmed the Whites more than the non-Whites. The principal strength of any government derives from the belief which the ordinary man has in its legitimacy. People will do what legitimacy orders them to do without compulsion. They do it because we are all born with the feeling of loyalty to legitimacy within us. It is a quality which not every government possesses. It takes a long time to grow up, and, as

Mr. Strijdom has shown, can be destroyed quickly. Legitimacy is the most precious jewel in a sovereign's crown. Now, by removing non-Whites from the common roll the Whites have made Parliament unrepresentative of the non-Whites, that is to say of four-fifths of the South African people. A parliament which is not representative of a population is not a legitimate parliament, and has lost the best and easiest way of obtaining obedience to its laws.

Be that as it may, it is quite clear that it would be unrealistic to look to Parliament to increase the rights of the non-Whites sufficiently to allow us a smooth passage into our non-racial future.

There is another point that is sometimes raised, especially by members of the Liberal Party. Some Liberals believe that in a qualified franchise lies the key to a smooth crossing.

I regard this as quite unrealistic. The Nationalists or people like them are going to be in power so long as White supremacy lasts—the more dangerous a country this becomes, the more the Whites will tend to cluster round what they believe to be a strong government. No Nationalist is going to give a qualified vote to the non-Whites. And, what is much more important, the non-Whites will not accept it. Why should they? Any such qualifications have but one purpose in our country—to preserve effectual White control under a cloak of non-racialism. The non-Whites accepted a qualified vote in the Cape in 1853. For forty years every adult male in the Cape, African, White, and Coloured, had the vote, if he got a wage of £50 or more per year. He might be illiterate—it did not matter. What was important was that despite this generous qualification the Whites kept the power. And as soon as the non-Whites increased their voting numbers a little, the Whites cheated, and changed the rules to maintain their exclusive power. If this was possible in the Cape, the liberal Cape of the nineteenth century, how much more is it likely in the illiberal Union of the twentieth? And so the qualified franchise turns out to be just another pipe-dream, leaving us, as before, with our two alternatives. Between non-violence and violence, surely no sane person would prefer the latter.

It might be objected here that I am too optimistic—that there is in reality no such choice. The White minority has gone so far now, this argument would run, that it is not now possible for violence to be avoided. To this I would say two things: that I do not think there is any single human being in South Africa with a knowledge so profound of both White and non-White public opinion that he

could take it upon himself to make such a statement with any accuracy. Secondly, I believe it to be a great error to make a decision that violence is inevitable. Imagine the world-catastrophe that would follow such a decision at the present time by President Eisenhower or Mr. Khrushchev. Milner argued in 1897-9 that war had to come. It was an arguable view. I personally believe he was wrong. But the point is this: by making such a decision he in fact made war inevitable, and put himself and his country in the wrong. And of course there are degrees of violent political action, from the suffragette chained to the pole to the totalitarian annihilation-camp. We already have political violence in our country. We have violent collection of taxes in Reef beer-halls, and violent resistance to dagga-patrols, and tsotsi-violence. These are all partly political in that they would not be just as they are if we did not have a government based on colour-discrimination. Such violence is probably going to increase. But that does not mean that all our arts of statesmanship should not be directed at minimising violence in the difficult period of change that we are now entering.

If we accept that our path must be as non-violent as possible, then we are able to define fairly clearly the task of statesmanship in South Africa for the second half of this century: to accept the inevitability of the breakdown of the colour-bar; that the change-over will be exceedingly difficult and even dangerous; to work now and during the change-over to minimise violence and dislocation; to work during the change-over against racialism and sectionalism in all its forms; to work after the change-over for a South Africa which will have forgotten about race, and in which the descendants of all who are now South Africans will be able to live together normally in a democratic state. I use the word "normally" because it will not be the first or only time that there has been a state with minorities. South Africa is not the "unique" place that White South African self-pity would like to make out that it is.

Now in this task—the task of a non-violent change-over—the only star is the star of Gandhi. Many do not yet realise his greatness. John Gunther called him "one of the supreme political geniuses of all time", and Einstein said: "Generations to come, it may be, will scarce believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon the earth." In India Gandhi inherited one of the situations which men fondly call "insoluble" (meaning that someone wants the impossible, like the man with £100 a year wanting to run a Cadillac.) The British will to retain India was unbroken: the Indian will to rule India was unbreakable. Head-on collisions have usually

in human history meant war, but thanks to Gandhi's goodness and greatness there was a change-over, but no war, between the British and the Indians.

People object that Gandhi's methods were useful against the British who yield, but would not be any use against the Nazis or their admirers. I do not accept this. The British were utterly determined to hold India. Sir Winston Churchill said that he would not hand India over to the Indians—he did not propose to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. General Dyer in one day at Amritsar shot down some 500 Indians. The Government of India was quite prepared to use the fascist methods of internment and exile in order to damp down resistance to its will. And yet Gandhi's methods brought about a peaceful outcome—at least as between the British and the Indians. He called his methods *satyagraha*, or "firmness in truth". It implies that one has right on one's side, and that one is prepared to die, but not to kill, for one's beliefs. He invented it in South Africa during the years 1906-14. The story of those years is told in Gandhi's own book *Satyagraha in South Africa*. I cannot in a few lines paraphrase the book, but I would just like to say how moving I found his opinions—respect and liking for the Boers and for the British Empire—and how I admired his personal qualities—bravery worthy of the Victoria Cross, a piercing insight into truth and justice, and self-respect, personal and racial. I was particularly moved by his generous judgment on General Smuts's breach of faith. This book is the text-book of non-violence. Let us read it. It is a piece of South African history, even if it does not figure in the school matriculation syllabus. Let us see the true nature of this new political action, and see whether it is right for us.

Many people think that passive resistance has got to involve a breach of the law. This is not so. The Black Sash hauntings are a perfect example of *satyagraha*. Indeed the London *Economist* called its leading article on their movement "*Satyagraha in a Black Sash*". No one can have failed to have been moved by the dignity and the bravery which these women have shown, often in the face of the menaces and assaults of hooligans. Surely this sort of protest, based on the calm knowledge of moral rightness, has a great field of action in our future.

The greatest objection of course is that the Africans are not ready for passive resistance. This claim that the Africans are not ready for  $x$ , not ready for  $y$ , becomes somewhat tedious. Usually it conceals a desire on the part of the speaker not to see the Africans

doing *x*, or *y*. I can quite understand many White South Africans not wanting Africans to use one of the most powerful political weapons ever discovered. And does the Defiance Campaign not give the lie to the theory that they are not mature enough to practise passive resistance? Let us remember that no violence whatsoever was directly caused by that campaign, although the tension that was associated with the campaign might have helped, indirectly, to produce the police attitudes that have done much to bring death into politics. That this can be conscious policy cannot be doubted—witness the total failure of the police to use tear-gas to disperse crowds. Their weapons are guns, not tear-gas, the greatest harmless disperser of mobs.

Above all, let us realise that the choice is *not* between Parliament and passive resistance. It is between passive resistance and war. It is *not* between Tennyson's freedom, slowly broadening down "from precedent to precedent" and Gandhi's *satyagraha*. It is between Gandhi and Algeria or Belsen. It is between Gandhi and Haiti.

I mention Haiti for this reason: that eighteenth-century Haiti was in many ways similar to twentieth-century South Africa. There a small White minority grew rich on the backs of a large poor Black majority, and between them was a small group of men of mixed origin. In Haiti, too, there was a colour-bar, and segregation on the public coaches. When the French Revolution broke out, a revolution broke out in Haiti as well, and plunged the island into a long agony. Peace was restored by Toussaint L'Ouverture, the great Negro leader. He set up a state in which Black and White lived happily and productively side by side. Napoleon intervened, and tried to reintroduce White supremacy. The Whites helped Napoleon, who crushed Toussaint. But Toussaint was followed, not by slavery and White supremacy, but by a savage tyrant named Dessalines, who eliminated the entire White minority. Some left, and the rest were killed. Haiti has been ruled by men of colour ever since then. This is an example of what violence can do to a mixed society.

And now comes the reason why African nationalists, too, should study Gandhi. With the departure of the Whites went any hope of prosperity for Haiti. One hundred and fifty years have passed. Haiti has been free for a century and a half without the Whites. It would be difficult to pick a poorer part of the world than modern Haiti, though recently its government has done much for it. Up to the present poverty, disease, and witchcraft have ruled the

island. Who can doubt that if the White minority left the shores of South Africa we would suffer a similar economic eclipse? But if there is to be a violent race-war, and if the Africans won in the end, it is improbable that a White minority would remain. The Africans would be left with the damaged equipment of an industrial society, without the technical knowledge to work it. They would be poorer than they are to-day. Thus, even from a purely Africanist point of view, violence on this scale, even if successful, would be a catastrophe.

So let us all, White and Black, use our heads and hearts together for the future of our race, the human race, in our country. Let us use our heads to put behind us the childish nonsense of which the Tomlinson Report is so brilliant an example. Let us realise, as all the rest of the world realises, that White supremacy is doomed. Let us build realistically on the real, and aim at the possible. Let us open our hearts to the influences of true patriotism, and teach our children to love this land and the people among whom they have been born. But such ideals will remain idle talk unless we work to actualise them. And it is the purpose of this essay to show that there is only one way to do this—the way of Gandhi.

## THE UNITED STATES DISCOVERS AFRICA

DR. GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR.

THE single most important historical event of our century has been not world warfare, nor even the advent of Communism, but the emergence within the last decade of over 600 million people (one-third of the world's population) from the political domination of the West. Now we must place Africa, with another 200 million people, within the context of this historical thrust of dependent and exploited peoples towards freedom. Only a small percentage of Africa's people has gained that freedom, but the others will not be denied theirs for long and remain peaceful.

American policy is just beginning to recognize the fact of this "world revolution". It took the Japanese conquest in the Pacific and the victory of Communism in China to awaken any large section of American opinion to the true proportions of the situation

in Asia. But there have not been such devastating blows in Africa. American opinion and policy are almost unaware that Africa exists. Now thanks to John Gunther who, one critic thought, should be ranked with Stanley as one of the two greatest American explorers of the African continent, there are stirrings of reognition among our people that Africa, too, must be taken in deadly seriousness.

Since our relationship with Africa to date has been largely through the European colonial powers, American attitudes toward the African continent have been shaped mainly by the European viewpoint. Our scholars, diplomats, businessmen and missionaries have, with only minor moderations, picked up and reflected the European attitudes on this question. We have no American policy for Africa. Chester Bowles recently reminded us of this in his book *The New Dimensions of Peace*. We are simply the pale moon which reflects the light of the European sun on this subject.

However, this state of affairs is not likely to continue for very much longer. We are going to be forced out of our back-seat role by the "world revolution" that is now coming to Africa. The big question before Americans is: Are we going to burn our fingers badly by continuing to try to pull the European chestnuts out of the fire, or will we develop a reasonable policy in time to avoid the pending disasters in Africa? In Asia we did not. In Asia we came late to the banquet table where the European powers were engaged in carving up the prostrate body of China after the Opium War, and we decided that we, too, must have our share. We did nothing to attempt to convince our European friends that they should mend their ways in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and India. It was only the Japanese aggression and the Second World War that blasted the *status quo* of that part of the world and made it possible for these countries to gain their independence.

Now that America has discovered Africa, the colonial peoples are wondering if she will simply demand her share from the European powers or will throw her vast influence behind the freedom movements of the African peoples. The Communist assumption is, of course, that American capitalism will see in Africa a fertile field of investment, and will set out to extract the great mineral wealth of that continent by joining the colonial powers in the exploitation of cheap labour. According to them, capitalism cannot be reformed or even curbed. This, however, is a gross over-simplification of the factors shaping events and policies in Africa. The destiny of Africa is being shaped by factors far more important than the economic consideration of private capital.

Too often the Communists have been right about the revolution in colonial areas for the wrong reasons. After the outbreak of revolution it becomes very difficult for democratic countries to convince the ex-colonial peoples that the Communists were wrong.

The first factor shaping American policy is security considerations. Our alliance with the European colonial powers in the struggle against world Communism has resulted in acceptance of their policies in most cases. The most obvious example of this is in North Africa. Until the present at least, we have regarded the continued presence of France in North Africa as an indispensable part of the preservation of our string of military air bases. Our State Department has not liked many things which the French have done and considerable private pressure has been exerted on the French to give greater freedom to the people of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Yet we have always hesitated to criticize publicly the French and we have permitted equipment designated for French forces in N.A.T.O. to be transferred to North Africa for the suppression of rebellion there.

Many of our leaders, particularly the military, have been impressed by the argument that if the European powers are forced to withdraw from Africa we will no longer be able to rely upon much of Africa in an all-out struggle with the Soviet Union. This attitude the State Department has been careful not to express publicly because of the tremendous resentment it would create among the colonial and ex-colonial peoples. Yet there can be little doubt that it is the determining factor in our silence over the injustice of the French in Algeria and the crimes against humanity of the Nationalist Government of South Africa. Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has summed up this attitude in these words: "The United States believes that it cannot pursue policies in Africa which would jeopardize the position of, and its relations with, its allies in Western Europe".

However, in recent months there has been increasing realization of the suicidal nature of this attitude. Aggressive Communist expansion has become less of a threat and competitive Communist expansion has become much more dangerous. Some of our policy makers seem to be awakening to the realization that even a "neutral" Africa would be preferable to one caught in the grip of growing violence and increasing Communist penetration. For this reason, the strategic considerations shaping our acceptance of European policies have become weaker and it is possible that factors of a humanitarian and economic nature will become more

powerful in the final determination of U.S. policy.

In comparison to our economic stake in Asia or South America, the U.S. has little economic interest in Africa at present. However, this interest is growing. Strategic minerals such as uranium, copper, cobalt, and manganese have been our major imports. Unquestionably our desire to secure larger quantities of raw materials from Africa is growing as other sources of minerals, such as copper, are becoming depleted. Yet the United States economy is not wedded to the African colonies in the same sense as are the economies of Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal. If Belgium and Portugal were to lose their African possessions, there would be drastic cuts in the standard of living of the Belgians and Portuguese. Exports in the Belgian Congo in 1951 were in excess of imports by \$17,200,000. Huge profits are being made by the five controlling firms in the Belgian Congo in which the Belgian Government owns a large share. In 1950 the most important one declared a gross profit of \$50,000,000. The French and British economies are less directly dependent upon African colonies, although in both countries there are powerful trading and investment interests which have a considerable stake.

Related to the problem of European investment in Africa is that of European immigrant groups which have settled in North, Central, and South Africa. This presents a tie of cultural and filial interest which, to some extent, is related to European investment. These minority settler interests are much more selfish and short-sighted than even overseas investment interests.

Fortunately, United States policy in Africa is not greatly influenced by either large financial interests or an immigrant group settled in Africa. Our policies to date seem to have reflected the interests of these forces because of our overall policy of accepting the basic directions of the European powers.

There is little prospect that large blocks of American private capital will seek fields of investment in colonial Africa. There has been a recent increase in American investment in mineral production in South Africa, the Belgian Congo, Liberia, and Northern Rhodesia. However, the American businessman has traditionally recognized the fact that he operates under a disadvantage in a European colonial territory. As long as these areas remain dependent upon European powers, large amounts of American capital are unlikely to seek these outlets, despite the unusually high profit opportunities.

The actual effect of growing American interest in raw materials

from Africa is likely to exert a pressure in favour of the independence of colonial peoples. European suppression of the natural aspirations of the colonial peoples for freedom creates rebellion and a disruption of the sources of supply. Most of the nationalist leaders among the Africans have made it clear that they would welcome American capital and trade, provided they retain political control of their own destinies. Dr. Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Dr. Azikiwe of Nigeria have both stated that they realize the importance of foreign capital and trade in the development of their countries. However, they wish to direct this development in the interests of their own people and not simply for the benefit of foreign exploiters. This is being increasingly realized as a legitimate aspiration by United States businessmen and U.S. government policy makers. It is also becoming a point of friction with European powers who too often interpret their own interests in terms of retaining political power as a means of controlling for their own benefit the economic development of these areas.

A third important factor shaping American policy is the humanitarian and religious interest among several groups in this country. This factor has been very weak in terms of actual effect on policy to date and yet it is a growing influence as the intense preoccupation with purely strategic concerns relaxes.

American Christian churches have done a great deal of missionary work in Africa. They have built schools, hospitals, and churches in almost all the colonies and countries of Africa outside of the Moslem North. Most of their activities have been concentrated in West African territories and South Africa. Recently, these missions have come under sharp criticism from the growing nationalist forces who feel that, too often, the missionaries have either avoided political questions or supported the colonial administrations. However, the missionaries and churches who have given so much to Africa are unquestionably deeply sympathetic to the aspirations of the people they serve. They are becoming increasingly concerned that all that they have done is being undermined by the rising tide of bitterness directed against the West and all white men. American Protestantism and Catholicism are extremely fearful that what happened in Asia might be repeated in Africa. Therefore, the American government finds increasing pressure from the Christian Church to support policies in Africa which recognize the rights and dignity of the African people as against the selfish interests of a colonial system and a white supremacy which is contrary to the basic teachings of brotherhood

and equality in the Christian faith.

The religion of Islam represents a much greater competitor than Communism to Christianity in Africa. Reports of Moslem converts indicates that this faith is sweeping like a forest fire through sections of Africa. The fact that it is carried by coloured missionaries and is not tarred by the brush of white supremacy, but preaches and practises equality among men, gives it tremendous force in Africa. Christian leaders remember how all of North Africa was lost to Christendom from the 5th to the 7th century when Islam swept in on the tide of anti-Roman imperialism. While many American church leaders seem to be unaware as yet of the full dangers to their cause in Africa, it is unlikely that they will long remain in ignorance.

Another group which has a deep interest in Africa from the humanitarian and religious point of view is the American Negro. American Negroes are gaining a new sense of dignity and pride about their past. Many of them no longer regard the period of their ancestry in Africa as a time of ignorance and savagery which they would like to forget. Recent studies, such as Professor De Graft-Johnson's book *The African Glory*, have uncovered the rich heritage of African culture. The African people themselves, as on the Gold Coast, are recovering an understanding of their own past; so, too, the American Negro is realizing he has a tradition in which he can take as much pride as any Englishman or Scot. As this kinship with Africa grows, the American Negro is developing a great concern over the injustices in Kenya and South Africa and wants to forward the welfare of the people from whom he came. Too much cannot be expected from this quarter immediately as the American Negro has his hands full in completing his own struggle for social justice in this country. Yet a great many of his leaders see clearly the relationship of the struggle of the coloured races of the world for freedom with their own cause in America.

It is of course not only the American Negro who is awakening to the full moral dimensions of the battle for racial equality. American liberals have been greatly sensitized to this problem, and the beam that we see in the eye of our South African brethren is unquestionably a reflection of the mote in our own. We are at present beset by the difficulties of making racial equality a reality in this country and all the signs indicate that this will not be an easy road. However, great strides have been made. Our own experience is now tremendously useful in parts of Africa which

are going through a similar problem. Yet this problem is far more difficult in such areas as South Africa, Central Africa and Kenya, because small minorities of whites are surrounded by a great black sea and they are determined to hold their fortress against the in-rushing tide of the long-suppressed hatred of white oppression.

The liberal tradition is strong in America. It believes in the basic dignity and equality of all men. It rejects paternalism and racial discrimination. This is a faith that, given some education and economic progress, all men are capable of governing themselves, if not perfectly, at least reasonably. Liberal leaders in this country realize that our own country was born out of an anti-colonial struggle, and the reminders of our revolutionary past with which leaders in Asia and Africa have presented us have struck home. Chester Bowles and other leading liberal spokesmen are leading a movement for the re-establishment of these basic American beliefs as the keystone of a new foreign policy.

It is conceivable that, with the shift in Soviet strategy and the easing of world tension, the economic, humanitarian, religious, and liberal factors working behind the evolution of an American policy on Africa may begin to offset the dominant role of purely security considerations. Unquestionably we have entered a new phase in the struggle with world Communism in which the issue will be decided ultimately not in terms of armed might, but in terms of the relevance of each doctrine to the position of poverty and subjection in which two-thirds of the human race dwells. This is not fully apparent to those who hold the reins of power. It will take time; yet there are hopeful signs.

I believe the United States may develop an independent African policy of its own. These liberalizing factors will cause sharp breaks with the old policy of support for European powers who continue to hang on regardless of the desires and welfare of the dependent peoples. We will not see the United States, on the other hand, form an alliance with the ex-colonial peoples against the colonial powers, but in the years ahead we can look for an increasing movement in our policy toward a recognition of, and sympathy for, the less developed peoples who live in bondage. We will see develop an independent position which will stand for justice and oppose exploitation, racial discrimination, and the domination of the weak by the strong.

What the character of such a policy would be can only be briefly sketched here:

It would seek a speedy international settlement of the clash in

North Africa between France and Arab nationalism. It would condemn and boycott South African racialism. It would seek the fullest utilization and extension for Trusteeship Powers for the rapid achievement of self-government for Trust Peoples. It would support the U.N. and international action for the realization of independence and the development of all colonial area territories. It would support financially and technically the launching of large scale development programmes among all dependent peoples. In short, it would encourage the most rapid emergence of all colonial peoples to a position of equality and dignity in the family of nations.

## BRITISH COLONIAL PROBLEMS

FENNER BROCKWAY, M.P.

THERE are three distinct problems in the British Colonies. The first relates to those territories where there is no European population of any considerable strength and where no military strategic issues are involved. The Gold Coast and Nigeria are examples of such territories.

The second problem relates to places of strategic importance such as Cyprus, Singapore and Aden. The third to colonial territories or protectorates where there are strong European populations within the territory. Examples of these are Kenya, the Rhodesias and the Protectorates in South Africa.

The Gold Coast and Nigeria are now well on the way to self-government and independence. As I write, an election is taking place in the Gold Coast which will determine whether its independence will be immediately recognised. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, has said that if Dr. Nkrumah obtains a reasonable majority, its independence will be declared within the next few months. In the case of Nigeria there is already internal self-government within the three regions, East, West and North, and full independence is postponed only until the North is prepared to accept it.

It is a little humiliating to an Englishman that the colonial territories which are making the greatest advance towards self-government and independence are those in which British immigrant influence is least strong. If one asks a West African why it is that

his territories have progressed so rapidly, he will reply with a smile that the explanation lies in the mosquito. The mosquito? Yes, the mosquito which has spread malaria and frightened away European settlement.

This explanation is not quite fair. The West African territories had first contact with Europe, even though it was by the method of the slave trade. Subsequently, there were invasions from North Africa which also brought Europe nearer. Even so, it is disturbing that areas without European settlement should have advanced further than areas where there are European communities.

No one claims that all problems have been solved in such territories. Indeed, both Nigeria and the Gold Coast have had to face national disintegration by the re-emergence of tribal loyalties threatening their nationhood. In the Gold Coast the Ashanti have resented domination by the Coastal Government at Accra and have combined tribal consciousness with a renewed assertion of the traditional privileges of the chiefs. This is a warning that one may go forward to European conceptions of democracy too speedily. Dr. Nkrumah has wisely been ready to compromise by extending wide autonomy to tribal regions and by establishing advisory councils of the chiefs.

In Nigeria there has similarly been tension between the different tribes which live in the three regions. In the South, composed of the Eastern and Western regions, political awareness is highly developed and democracy largely accepted. In the North, however, there is a Muslim community under the influence of Emirs who are fearful of subordination to the more advanced South. Very wisely the two regions of the South have been ready to postpone independence for Nigeria as a whole until the North is ready to participate wholeheartedly. The South aims to give the North an example of the advantages of democracy by its use of the internal self-government which it now enjoys itself.

On the whole, one can say that Conservative Governments as well as Labour Governments in Britain recognise that the early achievement of independence in West Africa and similar territories is inevitable.

When, however, we come to areas of importance from the point of view of military strategy, the belief in self-government and self-determination is set on one side by British Conservatives. The conflict in Cyprus is due to the fact that the British Government regards the maintenance of military power on the island, to intervene if necessary in order to protect oil supplies in the Middle

East, as more important than the application of democratic principles. The same approach was responsible for the breakdown of the recent negotiations regarding a constitution for Singapore. Although the representatives of all parties in Singapore were prepared that Britain should maintain its control of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Mr. Lennox-Boyd insisted that Britain should also have a majority voice in the control of internal security. A similar problem is now arising at Aden, where the demand of the local population for self-government is being brushed aside on the grounds of its importance as a naval depot.

Three comments can be made on this Conservative attitude. The first is the inconsistency of denying democratic principles for strategic interests which are claimed to be essential for the success of Western democracy. It is not convincing when the military arm of the democratic cause rides rough-shod over the extended application of political liberty to newly awakened peoples. The inhabitants of Cyprus, Singapore and Aden are not encouraged to have much confidence in the peoples of the West.

The second point is that at the very moment when international tension and the danger of war are decreasing, Britain is challenging the principle of self-government on the ground that these areas are necessary for purposes of defence. History is against Britain. It is disastrous that our Government should be responsible for the repression of people for ends which are daily proving themselves less valid.

The third consideration is that British policy is futile. After the loss of life, the encouragement of racial bitterness, the deterioration of British prestige, and heavy expenditure which the British economy can ill afford, few doubt that in the long run the rights of these peoples must be conceded.

When we turn to the third group of territories, those in which there is considerable European settlement, the prospects are still more disturbing. The problem of military strategy may pass within a decade but the problems of multi-racial societies will persist. Unless there is a radical change in the attitude of the white minorities in Central and East Africa there is likely to be a prolonged period of tension if not of conflict.

In Central Africa, covering the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, there are six million Africans and 200,000 Europeans. The six million Africans are represented by six members in the Federal Parliament whilst the 200,000 Europeans have twenty-five members. In fairness I should add that there are three additional European

members with the duty of watching African interests, but my association with leaders of the African trade union movement in Northern Rhodesia and of the African Congress in Nyasaland indicates that Africans are well able to voice their own interests.

Opposition to this European domination is strong in the Rhodesias because much racial discrimination is practised there, and in Nyasaland because this is primarily an African state. There is deep resentment that they should be brought under the control of a European settler community.

This political domination reflects economic domination. In December 1953 the United Nations published a survey of social conditions in non-self-governing territories. The figures of living standards in Northern Rhodesia were startling. They showed that the *per capita* income of Africans was £10 16s. a year, including the value of subsistence crops. The *per capita* income of non-Africans was given as £483 6s. More startling was the fact that one-third of the value of the total wealth produced in Northern Rhodesia passed in dividends, interest and profits each year to financiers in Britain and America.

The most acute conflict in the multi-racial territories has occurred in Kenya. Lord Chandos, when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies, said that the emergence of Mau Mau had nothing to do with the social and economic grievances of the African population. I do not know how anyone can visit Kenya and believe this. Violence reflected three deep frustrations.

The first was social. In a sentence, we have destroyed the old tribal community life without substituting a society in which Africans have a conscious place and loyalties. The second frustration was economic. The Kikuyu reserve was so overcrowded that half a million Africans suffered from land hunger and became cheap labour on the spacious European farms or in the towns. When I was in Nairobi in 1952, the Attorney-General informed me that there were 10,000 homeless Africans in the city each night, and the conditions of overcrowding were so terrible that the death rate from tuberculosis had trebled in seven years.

The third frustration was psychological. When I first visited Kenya in 1950 my two companions were the East African representative of the United Nations, a Doctor of Philosophy at Columbia University in New York, who was a negro, and the First Secretary in the Office of the High Commissioner for India, who had an Honours Degree at Oxford University. We spent one hour trying to find a restaurant where we could have a meal together.

Everywhere no African was admitted. I was ashamed and my friends were humiliated. I ought to add that this ban is now being lifted, but undoubtedly the feeling among Africans that they were regarded as second- or third-class human beings did more to arouse bitterness than any other cause.

During the height of the Mau Mau crisis the Europeans were stunned into promises of concessions. One of the unhappy tendencies in Kenya now is to modify those promises. For example, the new proposals for their enfranchisement are contemptuously rejected by self-respecting Africans. They embody the new and dangerous principle of the multiple vote. Many Africans will have no vote at all, whilst others can attain two or three votes on qualifications which include not only education but income and property.

I am aware that these conditions and concessions will appear relatively progressive to many in South Africa, but British governments, whatever their political complexion, have since 1923 accepted the principle that the interests of the indigenous people are primary and that colonial territories should advance to self-government and self-determination on a democratic basis. When criticism is voiced of South African policies, I am always conscious that in many British territories we still deny the African peoples human rights, educational opportunity and the economic conditions which will permit a healthy life. It is our duty to right these wrongs if we are to have the moral authority to be critical of others.

Perhaps the best that can be said about Britain at the present time is the awakening of interest in colonial problems. Three years ago it used to be said that the House of Commons was indifferent. That cannot be said now. Questions are poured upon the Colonial Secretary and the debates are intense in feeling. The phenomenal growth of the movement for Colonial Freedom, which in twenty-six months has reached an affiliated membership of four million, is an indication of public concern. I think one can say that, despite the obstacles which I have described, Britain will move forward to an enlightened and just colonial policy.

# NIGERIA'S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

DESMOND BUCKLE

NIGERIA is the largest and most populous single colonial territory remaining in the British Empire. Situated on the west coast of Africa, on the shores of the Gulf of Guinea, it lies entirely within the Tropics.

The total area of the territory (including the area of that part of the Cameroons, former colony of Imperial Germany, now under United Kingdom trusteeship) is 373,250 sq. miles. Nigeria, therefore, is about four times the area of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is larger than all Germany, France, Belgium and Holland together.

Yet many people awoke to the size and importance of Nigeria only as a result of press publicity in connection with the Royal visit early this year. Nigeria will figure prominently in the news again in September when the fact will dawn on many people that yet another colonial territory—an entirely African country—is about to cross the threshold into independence.

Nigeria's history as a British colonial possession has been a short but strangely chequered one. It has been described as an "arbitrary block of Africa". That is an apt description. For the territory was carved by British imperialism from the body of the African continent during the imperialist "scramble for Africa" which took place at the end of the last century. And this operation was carried out with scant regard for ethnographic or economic realities. There were so many eager rivals for the possession of Nigeria and of Africa that there could be no room for finesse in the process of dismemberment.

The first Europeans to arrive in this part of West Africa were the Portuguese in 1472. The English arrived more than eighty years later, in 1553. Then followed what even British official reports now record as "a chapter in the world's history on which England, in common with other nations, now looks back with distaste. . . ."

An ever-increasing demand for Negro slaves for the plantations of America and the West Indian colonies resulted in ruthless competition among the maritime nations in their lucrative but nefarious traffic in human beings. Whole areas were depopulated; ancient cultures vanished with their peoples.

When at last the slave trade came to an end the activities of the imperialists changed from raiding the West African coastlands for slaves to the acquisition of territories and "spheres of influence". Rivalries among the Powers in this connection led to the Conference of Berlin in 1885. There the British representatives were able to claim successfully that British interests were supreme on the lower reaches of the River Niger and that territory—albeit ill-defined—on either bank of the river fell within the British sphere of influence.

From their base on the island of Lagos, where Britain had earlier established a Crown Colony, the British empire-builders, on one pretext or another, carried out a succession of armed expeditions into the interior. As a result of these, increasing areas were brought under British "protection". The great expanse of Northern Nigeria, comprising the remnants of the once great Fulani empire, was the last to be subdued. It was declared a "Protectorate" in the early years of the present century.

On January 1, 1914, Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated and the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria inaugurated. For the next thirty years the system of *Indirect Rule* was successfully applied in Nigeria. This technique of governing African peoples through traditional chiefs and tribal institutions has been a distinctive feature of British Colonial Administration. It preserved tribalism long after it would otherwise have disappeared and ensured that the political, economic and social development of many African peoples, for a long time, did not go beyond the limits imposed by a tribal form of society.

However, even if slowly at first, people do eventually succeed in bursting asunder the bonds which hold back their advancement. And the Nigerian people are no exception.

Apart from the great size of its territory, Nigeria has a great diversity of peoples, languages, religions and customs. The North, with its main nationalities, Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Tiv, is largely Moslem; while the South, with Yoruba, Edo and Urhobo (in the western part), and Ibo, Ibibio, and Anang (in the eastern) is mainly Christian and Animist.

It is hardly surprising that, in view of these diversities, national consciousness did not develop in Nigeria until a comparatively recent date. But the pace of development has been rapid and to-day the cry for self-government is being raised in one form or another throughout the country.

It was in 1938 that demands which envisaged Nigeria as a single

nation-state began to be raised. Mainly responsible for popularising these demands, through newspaper articles and speeches, was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, now Prime Minister of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Anti-imperialist sentiments began to take deep root among the Nigerians—especially those of the South—and movements for national liberation began to embrace ever wider sections of the population. Their demands have enforced the adoption of four constitutions since 1938.

The first mention of self-government was made in the "Youth Charter", a document adopted by the Nigerian Youth Movement, of which Dr. Azikiwe was a leading figure, in 1938. Outlining a concrete programme of national reconstruction as a "pre-requisite to self-government", the Charter stressed the need "to unify the different tribes of Nigeria by adopting and encouraging means which would foster better understanding and co-operation between the tribes so that they may come to have a common ideal. . . ."

Young Nigerians rallied to the Youth Movement in their thousands and soon the older organisations, whose horizons rarely extended beyond municipal boundaries, began to fade away. It was the Youth Movement representatives who were now winning seats on the Municipal and even on the Legislative Councils.

A period of difficulties resulting largely from personal ambitions and feuds among some of the leaders brought about the formation of breakaway groups. One of these took later on the first steps leading to the formation in 1944 of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.).

Inspired by Clause Three of the Atlantic Charter, which affirms "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live", Nnamdi Azikiwe prepared a memorandum entitled "The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa" in 1943. The memorandum requested the immediate abrogation of the Crown Colony system of government and the substitution of representative government in the British West African territories for a period of ten years. Upon the expiry of that period the introduction of responsible government was claimed for a further period of five years, at the termination of which it would be presumed that the ground would have been prepared for the promotion of the British West African territories to Dominion status.

The publication of this document and its demands relating in particular to reforms in education, health, social welfare, mining, agriculture, finance, trade, etc., were received with much enthusiasm, especially among the youth of the country. On the

initiative of the Nigerian Union of Students, a national convention was convened in Lagos on August 26, 1944. At this, the foundation meeting of the N.C.N.C., Dr. Azikiwe's memorandum was adopted as the basis of the party's programme.

From its inception the N.C.N.C. campaigned vigorously against Nigeria's colonial status. The party attacked the Richards Constitution, the constitution then in force, linking opposition to certain of its features with popular indignation at certain ordinances enacted at the instigation of the Governor, Sir Arthur Richards (now Lord Milverton). These laws related to government control of African lands and mineral resources, and also to the appointment and deposition of chiefs.

In 1945 the first general strike in Nigeria's history took place. The N.C.N.C. gave the striking workers full support and as a result, its prestige gained considerably while that of the older parties, which refused to support the strike, fell proportionately.

Not only was the strike successful, the N.C.N.C. political campaign had the effect of forcing the Colonial Office in London to agree to review the Richards Constitution in 1950, instead of 1955 as had originally been proposed by Governor Richards.

The N.C.N.C. began as a heterogeneous movement which brought under its wing various tribes, communities and groupings on the basis of an anti-imperialist programme. Within a year of its formation it had over 180 affiliated organisations. These included political, trade union, co-operative, peasant, tribal, cultural, sporting, women's and youth organisations. It was fairly obvious that such a movement was bound sooner or later to develop serious internal differences and difficulties. There were a number of minor eruptions before a major crisis supervened in 1948. A number of professional men of Yoruba origin who held important positions in the N.C.N.C. had been attacking it as an Ibo organisation and complaining that Dr. Azikiwe was favouring fellow Ibos with the most important posts in the party. The Yoruba leaders broke away from the N.C.N.C. to launch their own separatist organisation "to unite the various clans and tribes in Yorubaland, and generally create and actively foster the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yorubaland".

The inaugural conference of this All-Yoruba tribal organisation, officially called *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*,<sup>1</sup> took place on June 5, 1948,

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<sup>1</sup> *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, means the society of the descendants of Oduduwa—the legendary ancestor of the Yoruba people.

at Ile Ife. The chairman was the late Sir Adeyemo Alakija, wealthy barrister and member of the Governor's Executive Council.

In contrast to the N.C.N.C., which even if it is inconsistent in its practice, nevertheless proclaims the paramountcy of the interests of the workers, peasants and other under-privileged sections of the population, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa recognises "the system of chieftains and other tribal rulers, acknowledges their privileged position and leadership". (*The Times*, May 21, 1948.)

The formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa was by no means an unusual step. For the various tribes and nationalities such as the Ibos, Ibibios, Edos and Ijaws already had their social and cultural organisations. These organisations were in most cases rendering valuable service to their respective peoples and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa could do a similar job on behalf of the Yoruba people. However, it chose to enter politics, taking this course, moreover, under the reactionary banner of exclusivism and of championing the class interests of the Yoruba chieftains and wealthy landowners. In this way the Egbe Omo Oduduwa helped only those forces which stood in the way of the achievement of independent nationhood for Nigeria.

In the middle of 1951, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa formed a political party, the Action Group, to contest the first general election under the Macpherson Constitution which took place over the period August to December of that year. The party was intended to function only in the Western Region at first, but later on attempts were made to establish branches in the other Regions and to put up candidates there. This effort has shown poor results.

Nationalism in the North has taken a rather different course from that of the South. The North with its autocratic Emirs was the traditional stronghold of the system of "indirect rule". The Jami'ya (or Northern People's Congress), like the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in the Western Region, began as a social and cultural organisation. However, under the leadership of Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the Sardauna of Sokoto, two of the North's most prominent politicians, the Northern People's Congress declared itself a political party almost on the eve of the 1951 elections. Its programme enjoyed the almost unqualified support of the Northern House of Chiefs. It included retention of the Emirate system coupled with regional autonomy, but called for reform of local government and advocated eventual self-government for Nigeria. These Northerners have always said that self-

government would come in its own good time and they have refused to be stampeded into making demands linked with dates by Southern "hotheads" who were setting too fast a pace.

The truth of the matter is that the N.P.C. leaders fear that the more literate and politically conscious Southerners would swamp the administration in a self-governing Nigeria and the North would, in effect, be ruled from the South. There is, however, one other explanation of this distrust of the South. It is that it would be difficult in a democratic system of government for the Emirs of the North to retain their ancient rights and privileges. Indeed, these rights and privileges have already been under attack for some time. The Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.), which advocates the substitution of democratic forms of government for the autocratic rule of the Emirs, was in the field as a political organisation before the N.P.C. entered the fray. The workers, peasants and small traders of the North are rallying in increasing numbers to the support of N.E.P.U. The party, under the energetic leadership of its president, Mallam Aminu Kano, has been waging a relentless battle for universal adult suffrage, the secret ballot and freedom of speech and assembly. It was due largely to the denial of these elementary civil and democratic rights in the North that the N.E.P.U. did not fare better in the last general election. Supported by the N.C.N.C. with which it has an alliance, the N.E.P.U. will put forward a strong case at the London conference for electoral reform in the North.

The present Federal Constitution was introduced on October 1, 1954. It provides for a unicameral legislature which is only partly elected. Commercial interests (mainly those of British monopolies) have six special European representatives in the Federal legislature. There is also an Executive consisting of the Governor-General with three official and ten non-official members.

The 1954 Constitution preserved the division of Nigeria into three Regions—Northern, Eastern and Western—and with that the fixation of party political life along tribal lines. In the North, the Northern People's Congress is a party of the Hausa and Fulani aristocracy; in the Eastern Region, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons is mainly an Ibo party; and in the Western Region, the Action Group is a creation of middle class Yoruba intellectuals. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons alone can claim to be nation-wide in character. For it was successful in the Western as well as the Eastern Region in the last Federal Election, while in the North it maintains a firm alliance with the

Region's main opposition party, the Northern Elements Progressive Union.

In the Western Region general election held in May, the N.C.N.C. raised its strength in the Regional House of Assembly from 13 to 28—only 16 fewer than the ruling Action Group membership of the House. The N.C.N.C. poll was only 40,000 short of that for the Action Group.

In view of the fact that in the Federal election the N.C.N.C. won in the Western Region, the result in the Regional election, although registering a marked advance on that previously recorded, was a set-back for the N.C.N.C. Many potential votes were lost, undoubtedly because the N.C.N.C. election programme contained the argument that allocation of revenue between the regions should be based on need rather than on origin of the funds. To many Yorubas this was tantamount to the Western Region being required to subsidize the Eastern.

During recent months the main Nigerian political parties have been preparing their case which will be presented at the London Constitutional Conference in September. The N.C.N.C. started off with a declaration by Dr. Azikiwe at the party's convention last December. The declaration outlined a programme—the "Twelve Canons of Freedom"—which stated, among other things, that the status of Nigeria should no longer be that of a colony, but that of a completely self-governing member of the British Commonwealth; and that the Federal Government should be treated so as to preserve the political unity of the country while at the same time respecting diversities of language and culture, and the right of all the peoples to equal opportunity to develop.

Undoubtedly, at the Conference, the first and foremost issue will be self-government. On this the main parties are divided. Dr. Azikiwe has declared the N.C.N.C.'s opposition to the idea of separate constitutions for different Regions. Azikiwe has never abandoned the hope of achieving a united, self-governing Nigeria and he and his party want self-government for the whole Federation this year. While the N.C.N.C. is not opposed to a certain measure of regional autonomy, it considers this to be of far less importance than the issue of Federal self-government.

The Action Group, on the other hand, places Regional self-government first and wants to achieve this status for the Western Region this year. The party has formulated its proposals in this regard in some detail.

The Northern People's Congress desires no change in the

Federal House of Representatives. This can only be interpreted to mean that it opposes self-government for Nigeria this year—and, perhaps, for some time to come. The N.P.C., however, wants regional self-government for the North in 1959.

Another issue will be that affecting the vesting of "residual powers". The N.C.N.C., with the support of its opposition in the Eastern Region and N.E.P.U. in the North, wants "residual powers" to be restored to the Federation by the Regions. The 1953 Conference decided that these powers should remain with the Regions and this decision is still supported by the Western and Northern Regions. Moreover, the Action Group and the N.P.C., want the police, which is at present a Federal body, to be regionalised. This is a proposal which the N.C.N.C. strongly condemns. The Action Group, however, concedes that operational control of the Regional police should be vested in the Governor under self-government. This "concession" is hardly likely to appease the N.C.N.C. and its supporters. The Action Group and the N.P.C. both want a new Senate at the centre in which all the Regions will be equally represented.

A "Separate States" issue will very likely be raised by the N.C.N.C. with the N.E.P.U. giving doughty support. The N.E.P.U. urges the division of Nigeria into 15 Regions. It wants, above all, the creation of a Middle Belt region, a proposal which was advanced vigorously at the 1953 Conference without success. The Middle Belt is the name given to the southern area of the Northern Region. It is an area of considerable size populated by people who have little or nothing in common with the Hausas and Fulanis of the North and are not Moslems. The area which is partly forested includes the Bauchi plateau with its tin mines. The small opposition party, the Middle Belt Party, which came into being in 1953 is supported by emigrant Ibos living in the North, and by the N.C.N.C. and the N.E.P.U.

The N.C.N.C. advocacy of a further division of Nigeria is founded on a desire to reduce the possibility of one Region domination of the whole Federation. The party will most certainly want to keep Lagos separated from the Western Region. This separation, decided upon by Mr. Lyttelton in 1953, has always been regarded as unjust by the Action Group whose representatives will assuredly make a strong bid to have it reversed.

The Action Group also favours more states but only if "there is a majority wanting the separate state in the area concerned". Mr. Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group leader, seems to be

convinced that there is such a majority in the Benin-Delta area now included in the Western Region and he therefore favours the establishment of a Benin-Delta state. The fact that Benin, inhabited by the Edo people, is an N.C.N.C. stronghold in the Western Region is perhaps not unconnected with Mr. Awolowo's willingness to accommodate. Rid of Benin, he would be able to consolidate the Western into a Yoruba Region.

Whatever the Conference decides, it appears it will not be able to avoid creating at least one new Region. For the delegation from the Cameroons will propose that following the separation of the territory from the Eastern Region by decision of the 1953 Conference, this year's Conference should now consider favourably the demand of the Kamerun National Congress, the main party of the area, that the Southern Cameroons should now be constituted a Region.

The issue of electoral reform will figure prominently on the conference agenda. The N.C.N.C. has long urged the need for a uniform system for Federal elections if the North's preponderance of representatives in the Federal House of Representatives is not to be resented in the South. The N.C.N.C. strictures are aimed largely at the North where, as mentioned earlier, the undemocratic character of the elections denied to the N.E.P.U. the winning of even a single seat. In the last Federal election in the North the operation of the system of multiple electoral colleges meant that although the N.E.P.U. candidates did well in the primaries, they were all defeated in the later stages, when the lists of the electors were heavily weighted in favour of the representatives of the Native Administrations. Indeed, the *Daily Times* (December 30, 1954) commented that: "One significant feature of the elections is that the successful candidates were nearly all N.A. employees".

However, it is evident, judging from some of the results in the recent Western Region election, that the need for reform does not apply to the North alone. In the May election in the West certain constituencies appear to have been unduly favoured in the matter of allocation of seats. Egbado (Action Group support) with 47,033 electors was allocated 4 seats against 3 for Benin (N.C.N.C. support) which had 89,983 electors. And Urhobo (N.C.N.C.) with 143,346 electors was given only 3 seats—the same as Benin but one fewer than Egbado although it has nearly three times the number of voters.<sup>1</sup>

The question of British civil servants continuing to serve in the

<sup>1</sup> See Revised Voters' List, Western Nigeria. "Daily Times", May 5, 1956.

administration of a self-governing Nigeria will also be taken up by the Conference. In the early part of 1955, Dr. Azikiwe as Prime Minister of the Eastern Region abolished the expatriation pay of certain key British civil servants. The payment of special allowances to Government employees from overseas—expatriation pay—was deeply resented by many Eastern Nigerians who regarded it as a hangover from the old colonial practice of paying a higher salary to one of two equally qualified employees merely because he was recruited from overseas (Britain). The Regional Governor, Sir Clement Pleass, used his reserve powers of intervention to stop Dr. Azikiwe on that occasion. Since then the position of British overseas civil servants has been explained by Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, in a Statement of Policy Regarding Organisation in Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service (H.M. Stationery Office, London). According to this Statement, a list will be prepared of those people with the necessary qualifications, who wish to be seconded to overseas governments. These officers will be in the service of the British Government in the United Kingdom and will be seconded to the employing government. At the same time where constitutional changes take place affecting fundamentally the conditions of serving officers, compensation schemes will be negotiated by the British Government with the governments concerned. In special cases, as in Nigeria, where acute staffing difficulties exist, special arrangements will be made to help create conditions which will encourage officers to remain at their posts. All the Nigerian Regional Governments have received the Secretary of State's proposals for study and they will make their views known at the Conference.

A further subject of interest will be that of revenue allocation. At present the system is based on "derivation" but the Federal Government is given some freedom of action. A serious challenge to this system will be made by the N.C.N.C. which has decided that a new system based on need should be adopted.

There is one force which may or may not be represented at the London Conference but which nevertheless has played a vital role in Nigerian affairs and promises to do so again in the near future. That force is the Nigerian trade union movement.

Trade union organisation and militancy among the Nigerian workers reached a high level in 1945, the year of the first general strike in the territory's history. Several young leaders were thrown up by the movement. However, mistakes began to be made due largely to the fact that success turned the heads of some

of the leaders and caused them to think only in terms of personal power. From the crest of the victory of 1945 the movement fell into the trough of the defeat of 1950, following which the whole movement suffered a severe set-back from which it has not yet fully recovered.

The Nigerian Labour Congress was forced to dissolve itself, disputes arose among the former leaders and there was no agreement as to the steps to be taken to reconstitute the movement.

The decisions of the London Constitutional Conference of August, 1953, presented a challenge to the trade union movement of Nigeria, and stimulated a widespread demand for the establishment of a new trade union centre. The Federal Government itself was in favour of a new trade union centre, for it was unable to exercise control over the separate trade unions and it was difficult to apply a policy common to them all. The Government was anxious to organise a central leadership under the control of its Labour Department.

However, when the inaugural conference to establish a new trade union centre was held in the autumn of 1953, the militant elements, which had been to the fore in past trade union struggles, once again won considerable influence in the new leadership.

At first the Government refused to recognise the new body, the All-Nigerian Trade Union Federation (A.N.T.U.F.). More "moderate" elements were called for at a return conference but the result was that even more militant elements gained election to the leadership.

According to official reports there are 131 trade unions in Nigeria with a total membership of 143,282. The majority of these workers are in five trade unions, ranging from a membership of 10,000 in the Railway Workers' Union, to over 26,000 in the Nigerian Union of Teachers. It appears, however, that the Teachers' Union is not a genuine trade union but a staff association.

A.N.T.U.F. claims that there are only 51 important trade unions in Nigeria and that 46 of them (excluding the N.U.T.) with a membership of 130,000 are affiliated to it. In the report for its Third Annual Conference in November, 1955, it claims an affiliated total membership of 200,000.

A.N.T.U.F. is strongly opposed to the regional division of Nigeria as it believes that this facilitates division of the workers and the trade union movement by the Government and the employers. Separate wage awards as between the regions has already forced A.N.T.U.F. to set up a regional organisation in the East.

In August, 1955, an "Eastern Labour Congress" was set up at Port Harcourt after a two-day conference of trade union representatives.

A.N.T.U.F. has as yet no international affiliation. Neither is it aligned with any of the Nigerian political parties; indeed, within its leadership there is strong opposition to any Executive members associating themselves with the national parties which are regarded as thoroughly bourgeois in character.

The A.N.T.U.F. leadership have declared that they have lost confidence in the N.C.N.C. towards which many of them were once favourably disposed. Indeed, a number are former members of the N.C.N.C. They are said to be considering the formation of a Workers' Party sponsored by A.N.T.U.F.

It is apparent that many changes require to be made in the Nigerian Constitution at the London Conference. However, such are the divisions existing between the parties that a unitary constitution seems out of the question. Nevertheless, there will have to be some arrangement establishing a division of powers on a satisfactory basis between the centre and the Regions: one that must be clearly a vast improvement on that of 1953.

Above all, the vast majority of Nigerians want to see something more than the shadow of independence emerging from the Conference. The delegates will hardly dare return home without the substance.

## POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE GOLD COAST

JOHN HATCH

In 1956 the Gold Coast is the most important nation on the African continent. It is likely to retain that significant position for some years. Why is this? Where lies this tremendous significance? The answer is surely that what happens during the next few months in this small colony of five million people will be held to prove whether or not the African Negro is capable of emerging from colonial rule to control and administer an independent, democratic state. The test is certainly not conclusive. The success or failure of the Gold Coast Africans will prove nothing of the

capabilities of Africans in Nigeria, Kenya, the Congo, South Africa, or anywhere else. But in the great racial debate of Africa it will be taken as proof, until further incontestable evidence is forced upon the argument. The influence of the Gold Coast experiment, therefore, as distinct from its value as genuine evidence, will be profound throughout the continent.

Theoretically, British colonial policy has been based upon the principle of trusteeship for nearly a hundred years, but only since the second World War have British Governments been faced with the necessity of putting theory into practice. The ultimate duty of a trustee is to hand over authority to the ward, once the age of discretion is reached. Partly through pressure within the British political world; partly from the weakened international position of Britain; partly through an upsurge of nationalist emotion and increased power within the colonial territories; successive British Governments during the past ten years have faced the inevitability of transferring sovereignty from London to colonial capitals. This happened in the case of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon; it is now happening in Malaya, Singapore, the West Indies, and Cyprus; it will be faced this year in the Gold Coast, and, in a few more years, in Nigeria and Uganda.

The Gold Coast will not be the first colonial nation to become independent. Others have just been mentioned. It will not be the first non-European state in Africa. Already Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, have that status, and Morocco and Tunisia might claim it. But it is widely recognised that the Gold Coast is the stage for the first full attempt to create a modern state out of tribal Africa, and to transfer power over that state from an imperial government to the African peoples themselves, through the medium of westernised democratic processes. It is certainly the first such experiment south of the Sahara, and that is where the heart of the African problem lies. The experiment is therefore being watched minutely by all the peoples of the continent, and, indeed, hardly less closely by the peoples of the entire colonial world. This year of 1956 marks the watershed of the argument in the colonial world over the capabilities of the African Negro in modern life, and it is in the Gold Coast that the climax will be reached.

It has been speciously believed in some quarters that as soon as nationalist fervour had mounted to the pinnacle of success, Britain had agreed to transfer power, and an elected Gold Coast Government had taken control of the new state, tensions would disappear and a new era of development and social progress could be pro-

claimed. It would have been a unique historical phenomenon if this had proved to be the case. There was no Gold Coast before British colonisation; the last war there was fought as lately as 1911; the people of the country have no common history or tradition; they speak different languages, come from different tribes, belong to various religions. Indeed, one of the few things which they have had in common and which has alone perhaps held them together, has been British imperialist rule. It has been their united determination to get rid of this which has brought them closer together than ever in their previous history. What effect will the relaxation of British rule have upon their unity?

It is surely blind sentimentalism to anticipate that the transference of sovereignty from London to Accra would automatically solve the major problems which face the makers of this new state. The withdrawal of imperial rule does not effect the transformation of a set of tribal societies into a strong modern state; nor cure the poverty of a people brought up on a subsistence economy; nor produce the psychological revolution of transferring allegiance from traditional to secular rulers; nor establish the values of a democratic state, founded upon a monetary economy.

The major accusation against British rule may well be that it was dilatory in recognising the proximity of the transference of power and so did not help the Africans to prepare for responsibility by starting to cross these bridges long ago. Now they have had to face these awe-inspiring tasks within a period of only six years. In the circumstances they have accomplished an amazing feat. But we should be tragically blind if we believed that they have yet succeeded in building those foundations of national unity on which alone a modern democratic state can be built.

The first genuine development towards modern statehood came, not with the institution of elections in the 1940's, but rather with the organisation of the first mass political party. Once Nkrumah broke away from the older type of nationalist, who had remained dominated by the traditional authorities, the attack was fixed upon tribalism as well as imperialism. His Convention Peoples Party gave rein to those without privilege or status; for the first time the masses found hope, not only of liberation from the British, but of purpose and place for themselves as individuals.

At first, of course, the traditional authority of the chiefs was partially retained, through the means of indirect elections. Even so, the organisation of the C.P.P. and the martyrdom of its leaders in British gaols had created a new power. It was Nkrumah and his

“young men”, not the chiefs, who formed the first government.

The very character of this first mass party inevitably transformed that of the nationalist movement. The traditionalists had aimed at place and influence. The new nationalists sought power. Moreover, British rule had brought a new kind of economic life, with new needs and desires. These could not be satisfied by the traditionalists, with their rigid and static economic conceptions. The members of the mass party thus linked economic emancipation to their demand for “Freedom”.

The effect of bringing the masses into the political scene, therefore, was to transform what had been pressure by an elite into a mass revolt. But Nkrumah and his closest associates had been deeply influenced by their years in Britain and America. Although in their party organisation they tended to adopt the hierarchical structure of left-wing revolutionaries, they had recognised and accepted the virtues of political democracy. Their revolution was to be carried through by parliamentary means, provided that the British were not too obstructive. The personal magnetism of Nkrumah, his “charisma”, as it has been called, the unchallenged adulation in which he was held by almost everyone in the Gold Coast, ensured that if he was wedded to the parliamentary form, it would be accepted by the vast majority of the population.

The acceptance of parliamentary democracy fitted the new British colonial mood, in which power could be handed over to colonies provided that it was to responsible and representative government. It was quite unacceptable to the traditional rulers, who saw in it the final doom of their authority. Chiefs could not stand for elections. They would necessarily risk defeat, thus making their authority subject to the popular will. So they had to withdraw “above politics”, leaving the initiative, at least for the time being, to the “young upstarts” and their mass following.

This situation developed up to 1954. In that year a second election was held, the first on full adult suffrage for a completely elected Assembly. Two things are significant about this election. First, it was held just after the Braimah corruption case, in which leading Cabinet ministers were accused of using their offices for corruption and nepotism. This led to some unrest in the C.P.P., which was aggravated by the method of selecting candidates. Yet, in spite of all this unrest, the hold of Nkrumah over the peoples' minds was so great that his party secured a sweeping majority, almost entirely through the use of his name. But secondly, to the keen observer, signs of opposition could be discerned. In the

Northern Territories the Northern Peoples Party won a majority of seats. In Ashanti, although the C.P.P. won nearly all the seats, the majorities were frequently so small that a small swing would have widespread results. And it was in the North and in Ashanti that tradition was strongest. The Colony had known European contact for several centuries. This westernising influence was strongly suspect in the interior, at least by the chiefs and their supporters. No organised opposition had yet appeared, for the N.P.P. was no mass party. But the warning signs were there.

It seemed to the C.P.P. and to most outside observers, however, that Nkrumah had won a great victory, and that the way was now clear for the establishment of an independent Ghana state just as soon as the state apparatus was prepared. But the warning sounded in the election soon became a reality. In September 1954, only three months after the election, a new movement appeared in Ashanti. It has since taken the name of the National Liberation Movement, and is now associated with all the anti-C.P.P. elements throughout the country. It can claim, indeed, to be with its allies a genuine alternative government.

This Ashanti movement has taken the form of a counter-revolution. It marks the beginning of the disenchantment with Nkrumah. It combined the activities of a variety of sections who were disillusioned with Nkrumah and the C.P.P., yet it has never become a mass party on C.P.P. lines. Its leaders fight for the allegiance of the masses, rather than organise them along party lines. The effect of the movement, therefore, is to weaken the progress of a democratic system based on party organisation. It has appealed to the traditional tribal emotions, to the ancient loyalties towards the chiefs. It has inevitably attacked the new democracy, insisting that qualitative authority should replace the counting of heads.

Tribalism is the deepest root of this movement, but it is not the only one. The Ashanti war drums are beaten at election meetings; tribal dances and songs accompany them; the Asantehene and his Council have lent their support and strong traditional influence. Yet there are other symbols at these meetings; baskets and hoes and branches are carried, representing the dissatisfaction of the cocoa farmers with the C.P.P. Government. Some of the leading members of the N.L.M. too, formerly held office with the C.P.P. or were closely associated with Kwame Nkrumah. No doubt opportunism and political disappointment play a part in the movement.

These diverse elements had little in common in 1954, other than

dislike of the C.P.P. They had no political policy. Their opposition at first took the form of dynamite throwing and petrol assaults. There are, of course, always gangs of ruffians ready to be bought by either side to perform these tasks of violence.

The weakness of Nkrumah and his Government in face of this sudden threat was to underestimate its importance. Nkrumah himself has been consistently badly advised on the Ashanti situation and appears to have been acting under the influence of a cabal which has neither judgment nor integrity. The analysis and advice of honest party members and sympathisers have been ignored.

The result has been that the opposition movement has spread and deepened, more from the mistakes of the Government than from its own force of argument. It is true that the Government has met every one of the opposition's criticisms, but always too late and in the wrong way. Thus the cocoa price, which had been fixed at 72s. a load after the election, causing widespread anger amongst the farmers, was later raised to 80s. If this had been done originally, one section of the opposition would never have been associated with the N.L.M. Then, after strong accusations of corruption in the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the chairman was replaced—but again too late, after the damage had been done.

Perhaps the worst case of bad tactics was on the constitutional issue. Added to its charges of public corruption, the N.L.M. and its allies had by now devised a basis of policy. This consisted of a demand for a federal constitution in place of the unitary structure, and the calling of a Constituent Assembly to determine the constitution before independence. After months of propaganda Nkrumah finally agreed to invite Sir Frederick Bourne to make a constitutional inquiry and report to the Government. Yet immediately Bourne arrived in the Gold Coast, the opposition was given the opportunity of contracting out of giving evidence before him. The Government chose this time to pass the States Council Ordinance, limiting the powers of the chiefs. The N.L.M. thereupon declared that they would not appear before Bourne until this measure was withdrawn. It was the Government which had given them the chance of escaping from the embarrassment of defining their policy.

Finally, again after long, heavy pressure, the Government set up an inquiry into the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. The Cabinet must have known that there had been irregularities in the conduct of the Company's affairs, for several of them were in-

volved in it. Yet, instead of taking drastic action on their own initiative and really cleaning out the corruption, they put themselves in the position of appearing to have to bow reluctantly to the demands of the opposition—and set up the inquiry on the eve of the General Election. The evidence given to it, and the report which it makes, can hardly be other than damaging to the prospects of the C.P.P.

In the Spring of 1956, therefore, the opposition, by its own tactics and through the failure of the C.P.P. and their Government to act decisively and realistically, was able to show such a division in Gold Coast society as to convince the British Government that another election had to be held before independence. This was in spite of the fact that the Assembly had another two years to run and had been elected on a mandate for independence. The election is the first major test between the forces of the modern mass political party and the traditionalists.

In spite of all this stress, however, it should be realised that the C.P.P. Government has made immense strides in educational, social, and economic development. These could hardly fail to impress the electorate, if it were not for the struggle for power. Moreover, the machinery has been prepared for statehood. A currency has been arranged; African diplomats have been trained overseas; the military forces are now under the control of the Governor, ready to be handed over to the new Government; the plebiscite has been held in the Trusteeship territory of Togoland, and has shown a majority for integration with the Gold Coast.

Once Nkrumah and his Government recognised that they would have to face an election before independence, they acted with complete propriety. The Bourne Report had suggested that additional powers might be given to the regions, whilst maintaining the basic unitary structure, with final authority at the centre. This was obviously sensible, and gave the C.P.P. their main point, whilst still offering concessions to the opposition. The Government thereupon tabled their own White Paper, based on the Bourne proposals, had it debated and approved by the Assembly, and asked for a dissolution. This gave them the opportunity of appealing to the country for approval of this new constitution, with the assurance of the British Government that if they secured a reasonable majority the date of independence would be announced.

Superficially, therefore, the election was held on what form of constitution the new Ghana state should be founded. Actually, this is only a facade. The real decision is what forces in the country

should have power over the new state. The C.P.P. policy is based upon the power of the organised politicians, drawing strength from convincing the masses. The N.L.M. and its allies represent the last ditch defence of the traditionalists. The corruption allegation has been used as an election issue, but does not represent the heart of the matter. The party government of the C.P.P. has undoubtedly used its patronage, often unwisely, assisted by the fact that the government is the main source of capital and agency for social development. Chiefs do the same, as would an N.L.M. government; as do the vast majority of governments throughout the world. The real issue is the control of political power.

Writing before the election,<sup>1</sup> it seems probable that the opposition will win most of the seats in the North and in Ashanti, whilst the C.P.P. will hold the Colony. This will give the C.P.P. an overall majority, but leave the country divided. The opposition is most unlikely to accept such a result as decisive, and will continue to demand a Constituent Assembly before independence. This situation will demand tremendous patience, tolerance, and statesmanship. Beneath the political surface lurks the shadow of economic danger, for the catastrophic fall in cocoa prices—from over £400 a ton to just over £200 within the year—has not only rendered any idea of a federal system obsolete, but endangers all economic and social development.

It is the C.P.P. which is particularly challenged to measure up to the call for greatness. Mass disenchantment with Kwame Nkrumah as a deified figure has begun—in the country and in the party. This can be a strength, if genuine democratic participation and decision is the aim. The growth of real democratic practice depends largely on the reduction of Nkrumah's personal charisma. Yet this is the most difficult and dangerous of transformations. It requires the stature of a Nehru to achieve it—and he has not yet succeeded. Will Nkrumah measure up to the ordeal? Will he

<sup>1</sup>ELECTION RESULTS. Since the writing of the above article, the results of the 1956 Gold Coast Election have come to hand. They are here tabled next to the results of the 1954 general election.

	1954 seats	1956 seats
Convention Peoples' Party — — —	71	71
Northern Peoples' Party — — —	12	15
National Liberation Movement — — —	—	12
Independent Party — — —	16	—
Other opposition parties — — —	5	6
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discard those who bask in the aura of his sun and maintain the myth of his infallibility? We shall soon know. If he does so; if he sets himself to purge the party and the administration of corruption and nepotism; if the party members can adjust themselves to the new post-revolutionary situation and develop genuine democratic authority and accountability; then this historic transformation of a tribal colony to an independent, democratic, modern state can be achieved, and all Africa will salute the courage and wisdom of those who have won the battle.

## NICE TIME

HARRY BLOOM

“Whoa! Whoa! Whoa!”

He swung the bike around sharply in the road, dragging his foot in the sand to keep balance, and came to a skidding stop alongside the girl walking on the opposite pavement. As he did so, he made a series of rapid, short, chopped off whistling noises. Wasn't she the cherry who used to work for Wing Kee Cash Bazaar? The one he danced with all night at that victory party for Harry Dhlomo at the welfare centre?

But when he looked more closely, he saw that it was the wrong girl. She stared hard at him, thinking he was somebody *she* knew. He missed the moment to say something bright and shrewd, and the girl became embarrassed and suddenly turned round and walked off. He sat with both feet on the ground and his arms folded across the handle-bars—the bike was too small for him—and watched the red satin blouse, the green skirt, and the black patent leather shoes make a swinging, bouncing, angry retreat along the pavement.

“Hullo Sugarcake” he shouted after her; She paid no attention, so he whistled and said “Come here, I want to talk to you.”

“What is it?” she said, turning, and eyeing him suspiciously.

“What you doing today? tonight?”

“Go to hell.”

She walked on and he studied the show of trumped-up injury in her gait, without any hurt feelings at the rebuff. He watched until she disappeared around a corner; then he shrugged his shoulders, pulled the bike round and continued his ride to the location.

He rode slowly for a few moments, thinking what he ought

to do that night in Jabula—then he felt a sudden wave of exhilaration go through him, and he raised himself off the saddle and started to pedal very fast. He could not explain the sudden feeling. It was just a surge of excitement that ran through him. On that half-sized bicycle—it belonged to his young brother—he had to work hard to get up speed, churning furiously on the low-g geared pedals and banging his ankles on the pedal-sticks. It was all quite pointless, but he rode for several hundred yards with his buttocks hovering high above the saddle, his back almost horizontal, his elbows splayed out, his head down, just as he had seen the bike racers doing it on the newsreels. His white linen jacket flapped in the wind and his navy-blue sweat-shirt with broad white stripes across the chest crept out of his trousers and rucked up around his midriff.

Riding in that position he could feel the money and the magical cat's-eye pressing against him in the back pocket of his tight-fitting pants. He could feel them both distinctly, the rolled-up money and the heavy round marble. It gave him a good feeling and he arched his back to tauten the material of his trousers, just for the pleasure of having the wad of money and the lucky *goen* bulge in against him.

The money was his wages wrapped up with three pounds he had taken off the boys at New Amsterdam Laundry and Dry Cleaners the previous evening. The small change he had left in the game. The cat's-eye—that he had found in the street two weeks ago. He saw it lying there, in the gutter near the primary school, and something said to him "Don't overlook that, boy". He picked it up, and it seemed to wink at him, as if saying "You and I *know* something". The glass was furred but the colours were nice, and anyway it was *finding* something, and that's always lucky. So he spat on it and tossed it in the air and put it in his pocket and that afternoon he won thirty bob in a dice game at the dairy where he worked. Since then he had been right in the groove, topping everything with that game at New Amsterdam, when he seemed able to just whistle the right cards out of the pack. Yes, that glass was going to change his life.

The road started to climb and he settled back into the saddle and rode on now at a lazy pace. He had worked up a sweat and the shirt was sticking to him, moulding itself so smoothly over the firm round muscles of his chest that it showed up the tight points of his nipples. He was riding into the sunset. Ahead, on the horizon, was the power station, with a faint grey mist whispering off the tops

of the three huge concrete-cylinder cooling towers. The building was blazing with lights, although it was still day-time, but the lights looked brighter than ever against the peach coloured sky. There was a small lake, lined with baby trees and set among the grey slag-hills, and its surface caught the pink of the sunset, and at the same time the sharp, nervous twinkling lights of the power station. He had never seen it quite like this—so pretty—although he often came this way, and it gave him a kind of dreamy feeling, as if he were not really seeing it at all. It was like one of those places you see in the bioscope, before the big picture, Japan or some place.

He pedalled slowly along, thinking of Japan and countries he was really interested in, the musical countries like Rio and California, and the political countries like Moscow and Nigeria. Maybe, when he had enough money, he would see them all some day. They were little more than names to him, but it always gave him a sweet feeling thinking about visiting them, dressed in a sharp white silk suit and a panama hat and a walking cane . . . maybe . . . who knows?

. . . . .

He did not see the stranded taxi until he was almost on it. It was standing on a lonely part of the road, a big, dirty-black hulk of a car with cracked windows, and torn upholstery. The driver looked somehow like the car, large and shabby, with crooked glasses mended over the nose with a piece of string. He was standing beside the open bonnet, his jacket off, his huge misshapen trousers sagging on his threadbare braces, but he was not attending to the car. He seemed to be having an argument with the eight passengers who were sitting in a row, silent and stubborn, on a grass bank at the roadside.

‘What’s the matter?’

‘No petrol,’ the driver said through his teeth. Then he lost his temper. ‘But these bastards . . .’ He spat.

‘It’s not our job,’ one of the passengers said.

‘It’s not your job, it’s not your job,’ the driver said bitterly, and mimicking him.

‘It’s not our job to fetch petrol. We pay him to take us to Jabula location, not to walk all over the country fetching petrol.’

‘All over the country? You hear that? It’s not even one mile.’ He held up a quivering finger. ‘It’s just down the street.’ He turned to the boy and said helplessly, ‘I’d go, but I can’t walk’.

He pulled up one side of his trousers and showed his leg wrapped in an untidy swath of iodine-stained bandages.

The boy picked up the empty green can standing beside the car. "Give me the money," he said. They watched him ride away, gaily swinging the can. After a while he returned, balancing the full can between his arms on the cross-bar.

When the petrol was in the car, the passengers started to climb in again. "Oh, no you don't," the taxi driver said when some tried to take their old places in the front seat. He made all eight of them squeeze into the back, and when he had heaved the door closed on them he offered the boy a lift. "No need to pay. It's on the house," he said. They hoisted the bicycle on to the roof, secured it to the luggage brackets, and then, with the two of them sitting in majestic comfort in the front, and a heaving, stifling mass of bodies in the back, they started for the location.

"And what is your name?" the taxi driver asked, making it plain to the passengers in the back that they were going to be ignored for the rest of the trip.

"Tau. Koko Tau."

"Koko?"

"Well . . . Jake. That is Jacob. But the gang call me Koko."

"My name's Kelly MacKelly," the taxi driver said, fishing in his pocket and producing a grubby visiting card. "Coloured," he added, as if that explained the improbable name. "You have a gang?" he asked.

"Not exactly. Not like the Casbah boys, or Moola's mob. Just a bunch of us go places together. No crime or stuff like that."

"Ever been in gaol?"

"No. I keep clear of that place."

"I been," he said, jabbing his chest. "But not for crime either. Not supporting the wife and kids, that's all. A frame-up, that was. Tell me—you work?"

"Yes. Thorlund's Dairy."

"In what capacity?"

"Delivery." He paused for a moment. "But next month I'm being moved up to driver." As he said it, he clutched hard at the magical cat's-eye in his back pocket. It was not true—nobody told him he was going to be made a driver—but saying it with his hand around the lucky glass made it seem certain that the good news would be announced any day, and it did not feel like a lie saying it.

"That's damn good, boy. Your age?"

"Nineteen."

“Live with your family?”

“No. I lodge with my aunty in Pola location, me and my small brother.”

It was dark when they reached Jabula location. MacKelly stopped just inside the gate, and without turning his head, reached his arm back and opened the door. “Everybody *OUT*,” he yelled over the protests of passengers who wanted to go further into the location. When the passengers were all out he drove on again, slowly and meanderingly, as if not sure where to go.

“I think we go and have a little short mahog.<sup>1</sup> I know a nice little place,” he said at last.

. . . . .

Koko looked around him at the unfamiliar faces and furnishings of the shebeen. Somehow he felt like a stranger here. He wished they had gone to one of his own places, places where people smiled when he came in and said “Hey, Koko!” and where he was sure to catch up with some of the gang. This place was a little too fancy for him, and although they brought out the stuff all right, they looked sour at you, as if you’d come there casing up for the dicks. The thing was, you didn’t just *go* to a joint, you *belonged* to one and then everything was easy, and you could sit back and have a nice time, Saturday night. What’s more, there didn’t seem to be any *doppel* going on here—just drink and talk and dames. He was itching to get his hands on the dice.

This certainly was a fancy joint. It even had a fancy European name, Silver Slipper. In all his life he had never seen a joint like this. There were glass-topped tables, and a carpet, and coloured pictures—mountains with snow and ships sailing in the storm. You sat on chairs, blue plastic ones like those at the Sunrise Cafe, and there were four Beward benzine lamps that lit the place up bright as daylight. On one side of the room there were two brand-new all-white kitchen dressers, and whenever one of the girls opened the front to serve a drink, he saw the rows and rows of half-pint bottles of brandy and gin. This was no skokiaan joint—they served hard European liquor here. He wondered how much it cost the joint to keep the dicks quiet.

Kelly MacKelly was having a good time. He started off with four brandies in a row, knocking them back one on top of another, and then had another three, more steadily. Suddenly, from being

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<sup>1</sup> Mahog, abbreviated from Mahogany, meaning Brandy.

a rather sad and respectable old man, he became wild and talkative. He was sitting at the other end of the room from Koko—next to a well-known character called Kid Chocolate—and telling everyone ridiculous, flattering things about Koko, as if he had known him all his life.

“Some boy, that. He’s got a heart of gold. And hard-working too. You know what? Supports his *whole* family. You’d never think it, looking at him. Such a youngster.” Maybe his purpose was to put the proprietors and habitués of the shebeen at ease regarding Koko. Koko had taken three brandies, and so far Kelly hadn’t let him pay for a thing. He was beginning to feel the effects—the tight feel of the skin around his eyes, an extra edge forming hazily around people and objects, and a growing confidence in his wit and opinions. He heard Kelly start into a discussion about boxing with Kid Chocolate, and he sat back and began to allow himself to enjoy the evening.

A girl came and sat on the chair next to him. She wore lipstick and a kind of dusty brown powder on her cheeks. She asked him all kinds of questions—where did he work? did he have a girl friend? what did he do on week-ends? did he play sport?—and he answered dreamily and not caring much whether the answers were correct or not. All the time she kept ordering drinks for both of them, and as Kelly was now absorbed in the boxing talk, he paid for them himself, fumbling thick-fingered with his wad of money. The girl had a warm weaving voice, and she talked all the time, with her hand held lightly over his, not giving him a chance to think, and as she talked she grew more and more beautiful. She had a perfume which at first he did not notice, but which began to twine itself round him, making him groggy in a different way from the liquor.

Vaguely, he heard MacKelly saying “. . . yes twelve. All knock-outs. The *thirteenth* did for me—unlucky thirteen. But it was a foul, a dirty below-belt kick with the knee right in the private parts. It wasn’t even a punch.”

“Howcome the ref didn’t see?”

“It was a frame-up. The ref was bought.”

Koko turned his attention away from MacKelly and looked again at the girl. He said to her:

“How’d you like to come to Rio with me, baby?”

“That would be wonderful.”

“Yes, I’ll be pulling up and hitting out for there one of these days.” He slumped back and for a moment they said nothing.

Then he peered into her face and asked tenderly, "Didn't you work for Winkie the Chinaman one time?"

She patted his hand but did not answer.

MacKelly was standing up, his fists in a boxing stance. "I had what the press called a secret punch," he said, making a clumsy jab into the air. He was very drunk and could hardly keep his balance. "Like this—see. Left to the solar . . ." he plunged his arm down at an angle—"right feint to the chin—so. Then *wham*—left hook. You know, I never used to wait for the ref to count them out. Just take my towel and make for the dressing room." This mild display of shadow boxing had left him completely breathless.

"It can't be done," Kid Chocolate said. He was a stocky, tough-looking man with very wide shoulders. He had once been a famous boxing champ until drink and high life put the skids under him. Everybody knew him.

"What do you mean, it can't be done?" MacKelly said.

"I mean you can't knock a man out like that. It can't be done."

"Well, I done it—twelve times in a row."

"The man's never had a fight in his life. He's a big mouth," one of the other customers said.

"Is that so?" MacKelly snarled, glaring furiously all round the room. "Okay," he said to Kid Chocolate. "You want a demonstration?"

"Okay," Kid Chocolate said standing up and winking at one of his cronies. They squared up to each other, and MacKelly sent out a flabby left to the midriff which Kid Chocolate easily parried, a right cross which Kid Chocolate flipped out of the way, and the famous secret punch, a whirling circular hook which Kid Chocolate evaded by simply nodding his head to the side.

MacKelly stood with his hands at his side, looking as surprised as if the roof had fallen in. Everybody was laughing. "I didn't get it quite right, he said. "Let's try again." They went through the whole charade again, with exactly the same result.

"Oh well, you knew it was coming," MacKelly said. Everybody could see that he was distressed—"It's supposed to be a *secret* punch. I told you beforehand how it supposed to work. You were just waiting for it."

"Go-arn, you never had a fight in your life," Kid Chocolate said. He started to walk away and suddenly MacKelly struck out and caught him a slithery untidy blow on the ear. Kid Chocolate swung round with thunder in his face, but after a moment his

shoulders relaxed and he smiled and said in a friendly voice, "Let's try that punch of yours again". They faced each other and MacKelly sent out the now familiar left, the right, but suddenly a fist crashed through his hands, his arms, and squashed into his nose, sending him reeling over a chair, to lie flat on his back, unconscious.

A shriek went up from the women, and in a moment there was a free-for-all. Koko was in the thick of it, shoving and grunting and flailing his arms, not knowing why he was fighting, nor which side he was on. And then suddenly the noise died down and the fight was over. Another man was lying on the floor, but this one had blood spurting from his neck. Nobody seemed to know who had stabbed him.

"You dogs. You pigs!" one of the women, a partner in the Silver Slipper, was screaming. "Now we're going to have the police here. Oh, you dirty pigs."

There was a rush for the door and a panicky scramble down the steps. They all stood in a bunch on the pavement, very serious and sober and hardly talking, and then they realised the danger of standing there all together, and they began to disperse.

As he was walking away, Koko felt a hand slip into his arm. He looked down and saw that it was the girl from the shebeen. Although the fight and the cool night air had sobered him up, her pungent perfume brought back something of the mood he was in before the excitement started. They did not speak while she led him to her room.

He awoke sometime in the dead of night. After a moment he sat bolt up and began patting the bed around him. He found that he was alone in it. He fumbled at the end of the bed for his trousers, took out some matches and lit the candle that he remembered was standing beside the bed. He saw to his surprise that there was another bed in the room with a couple sleeping in it, and two men curled up in blankets on the floor. He tried to recall what had happened. He remembered coming into some sitting-room place, and having more drinks, and smoking, and the girl getting undressed. It was real powerful *dop* she gave him. He remembered going into a dark room, and the girl lighting the candle, but nothing more. He could not even remember if he made love to her.

He got dressed and went out into the street. He had a stinging headache, and was not yet quite sober. Suddenly he felt a desperate desire to know the time, but he walked for two blocks without meeting anyone. Then he heard a familiar rumbling sound, and a line of night-soil carts, with shadowy mules and bobbing red lights,

came round the corner. The driver of the front cart told him it was one-thirty.

He decided that there was still time for a little game and he started walking fast towards one of the dives that he frequented. The place was near, and he hurried down a narrow alley and pushed open the door. The room was wreathed in a thick fog of cheap cigarette smoke and there were more people in it than he could count in the dim candlelight. In one corner a crowd of fellows were sitting on the floor throwing dice. He recognised some of his pals, Charlie and Chips and one or two others, and he pushed his way into the ring.

When he put his hand in his back pocket, it remained glued there, and a sick look came into his face. The pocket was empty. He probed around with his fingers, unable to believe it was true. That dirty thieving cow had not only taken all his money, but the lucky cat's-eye as well.

"What's the matter, Koko boy?"

"Nothing," he said. But the temptation to play was too strong so he borrowed ten shillings from Charlie, and when his turn came he held the dice in his cupped hand, blew into it, rubbed it with the palm of his other hand, and said "Come on, you darlings, show them," just as he always did when he knew that the dice were listening, and that he could not lose. But when the dice trickled to a stop, they showed only a three and a two. He lost four shillings that round, three the next, and then the last three. He borrowed another pound, and although he won a few rounds he gave it all back. Nobody would lend him anymore. He spent the rest of the night moodily watching the play, hovering around outside the circle enviously studying the flow of the money, the pattern of the numbers that turned up. When dawn came the party broke up and he went outside and fell asleep under a tree.

He woke up feeling stiff and wretched. He thought about getting home, and remembered Kelly MacKelly, and that his bike was tied to the top of his taxi. He stood up, stretched his arms and started walking towards the Silver Slipper. The place was bolted up and there was an African constable on guard outside. When Koko asked him if he could tell him where to find Kelly MacKelly, the man who was knocked out last night, the constable asked: "What name!"

"Kelly MacKelly—you know, the taxi driver. Kid Chocolate knocked him out."

"Oh *him*. You mean Bob Theunissen. Oh, they took him back

to his house—he lives in Buxton Avenue, thirty-six.”

He found MacKelly—he could only think of him as that—propped up in bed with a thick wad of dressing taped over his nose. The old taxi-driver stared blearily at him with trembling, bloodshot eyes. “Your bike’s on the taxi—your bike’s on the taxi” he said weakly, but the words merely echoed Koko’s, and he did not seem to know what he was saying. Koko started to make conversation about the previous night, but he stopped short. He saw Kelly looking at him with a puzzled, hostile frown, and he realised suddenly that the man could not recognise him.

He untied his bike and began the journey back to Pola location. He had no wind and he found the going hard. After a few miles he stopped for a rest. The power station was behind him, up on the hill, and he turned round and looked at it. It didn’t look at all pretty now, just grey and dirty and sprawled out. It didn’t remind him of Japan or anything. He got on his bike again and his thoughts turned to to-morrow’s work. For a fleeting moment he saw himself at the steering wheel, driving one of the company’s vans. But there was something sour in the thought, and he put it from his mind.

“A—ah, the hell,” he said and pedalled slowly home.

## HOME THOUGHTS

### I

Strange rumours gripped Olympus. Apollo’s hand  
Paused at its work, set plummet and rule aside;  
Then glittering in clean-cut bronze he sped  
To rout the brash disturbers of that peace  
Which year by year had raised archaic Greece  
Nearer his vision of the poised and planned.  
O barbarous with drums, with dancing drums,  
Amid a snarl of leopards through whose hide  
Shimmer disastrous stars; the drunkard comes,  
Black Dionysus roaring in his pride!

Ten thousand times they fought, wrestling before  
Both gods and men; it seemed the very rocks  
Watched those wild bouts among the barley shocks,

The brown vineyards, the dusty threshing floor.  
If pressed Apollo side-slipped to the sun,  
Striking his rival blind, while he in turn  
Would slink instinctive into copses, run  
Underground like roots, and hoot weird scorn  
From his nocturnal world: but neither could  
Conquer the force in which the other stood.

The spectacle gave poets double sight;  
Their ears grew keen to catch at brightest noon  
Rumours of drums; and dark, ecstatic night  
Could wake with shafts not quivered in the moon.  
At last, at Delphi, half in love with him,  
Apollo gave the drunkard elbow room;  
But though his pride of leopards purred, near tamed,  
And he himself grew decorous, he might  
Still breathe a deep, vibrating gloom  
Round anything the Bright One named.

At length, when peasants through his autumn trance  
Stirred slow pavannes for summer on soft drums  
He cried aloud, (his leopards stretched their limbs):  
Kill me, Apollo, or join the tragic dance!  
Instead the Bright One watched: the flexing knees,  
The raving, rending; heard the ecstatic crying;  
But mirrored on his mind's white threshing floor  
Dark dancers sighed and swayed like cypress trees  
About a man on whose defiant dying  
Cracked clouds of knowing never moist before.

## II

Why do I hanker homewards, falter?  
Because in Arno's flood the stars  
Cavort with neon signs, headlights of cars?  
The Centaur, snapping its human halter,  
Demolishes baroque facades;  
The Great Bear runs amok  
Among our maps, tugging the Pole awry;  
O all things heave and buck  
Since Dionysus slipped Apollo's guards  
And let his leopards range the earth and sky!

Stupid of me to brood and cry  
These barbarous confusions where  
Triumphant marble effigies defy  
The moody turmoils of the air;  
But, as at home, I here discern  
The predatory shade;  
Asleep all day in ivy or that fern  
Which smothers the balustrade  
It sniffs the night and pads the cracked parterre  
Between dry laurels and the shattered urn.

Man's task is to get such dark things clear.  
Old Galileo, that empiricist  
Through gothic tombs, antiphonies of psalms  
Smuggled a serpent-sharp idea;  
Smoother linen cordage looped in his swinging fist  
Chilled the ascending stairs;  
The sceptre-grasping ikons round the dome  
Shook as his ape-like palms  
Paid out that system-smashing metronome  
Who jazztime spoilt the sweet waltz of the spheres.

Long years drifting through African dark  
Bred dreams that I might find, once here  
A burning beacon, a gyro-setting mark;—  
That cord would ruck and tangle where  
The rough stone of a leopard's bark  
Ripples the scrub with fear.  
What pendulum can trace the mind's unseen  
Sharp arcs, its blind man's reach  
Round knots of being that have never been  
Subdued to slip through flaming hoops of speech?

Never so clearly have I known  
That though the sharp mind's eye was made  
To sever struggling shape from strangling shade  
These shapes and shades can not be mine.  
O African creatures across this night  
I glimpse in our primitive storm  
Of thunder, whirl-wind, mirage-twisted light  
A lifted limb or glance  
Which I might free, give consciousness and form  
Dared I but stare into your furious dance!

### III

Old Galileo's heirs can cite  
How stubborn atoms may become  
Open to change in unimpeded light,  
Or round a rod of platinum  
May curtsey, open arms and start  
Dancing a different dance;  
But the catalyst remains itself, apart,  
Waits like a hermit there  
Through dull khamseens of accident and chance  
To set one crystal, get one colour clear.

These images at which I stare  
Beneath such slow, myth-burdened stars,  
Virgilian forests shedding mortal tears,  
Might blind me in my native air.  
Unless for some loved principle one strips,  
As the desert fathers did,  
The soul of gaudy accidents, and grips  
A Mosaic serpent or rod  
One's deepest cries come from Egyptian lips  
Blowing dead bubbles on a Red Sea flood.

### IV

I have not found myself on Europe's maps,  
A world of things, deep things I know endure  
But not the context for my one perhaps.  
I must go back with my five simple slaves  
To soil still savage, in a sense still pure:  
My loveless, shallow land of artless shapes  
Where no ghosts glamourise the recent graves  
And every thing in Space and Time just is:  
What similes can flash across those gaps  
Undramatised by sharp antitheses?

I boast no quiet catalytic wand  
Nor silently swinging, tell-tale pendulum  
To civilize my semi-barbarous land;  
A clearer love is all that I bring home:

Little, yet more than enough. Apollo, come!  
O cross the tangled scrub, the uncouth ways,  
Visit our vital if untamed abysm  
Where your old rival in the lustrous gloom  
Creates a different dance, a brand new rhythm  
To spell this dumb earth's agony and praise.

Perhaps among the shrubs and pebbles of this land  
Profiles not worn by centuries of use,  
Shapes, textures, new to your subtle hand  
Sounds, likely to startle the blasé muse,  
Perhaps the old dynamic shade will come,  
Nervous, breathless, avoiding your vision's range:  
But if, if only you will watch, will wait  
You'll kindle in that lightening interchange  
When thick clouds crack and to a thunder's drum  
Fall crystal words, dancing, articulate.

GUY BUTLER.

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