

# AFRICA SOUTH IN EXILE

Vol. 5 No. 4

July—Sept. 1961

Special Features :

**SOUTH AFRICA : TOWARDS A CLIMAX**

by Brian Bunting

**THE TORMENT OF ANGOLA**

by the Rev. Clifford J. Parsons

**A PROFILE OF BUGANDA**

by Donald C. Savage

**THE PENANCE OF EUROPE**

by John Berger

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## in exile

VOL. 5 No. 4

EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL

JULY—SEPT. 1961

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**AFRICA SOUTH** is published quarterly by Africa South Publications (England) Ltd. Editorial and Advertising Offices are at Abford House, Wilton Rd, London, S.W.1, England. Price per issue 4s.; 16s. (sterling) per year, post free in Africa, Europe, Australia and the United Kingdom. In the United States, promotion offices are located at 336 Summit Ave., Mount Vernon, New York, N.Y., and subscriptions should be sent to Mrs. M. Singer at that address. Price per issue 75c; \$3 per year, post free. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at New York, N.Y. Price per issue in West Africa 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mr. E. Mphahlele, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. Price per issue in South Asia Rs. 2.50; Rs. 10 per year, post free. Representatives, Messrs. K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 415 Galle Road, Colombo 4, Ceylon.

## EXODUS

It is done. South Africa no longer belongs to the Commonwealth. Six months ago such a development seemed improbable enough. At the beginning of March, a few days before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference opened in London, it seemed impossible. The bulk of the British press busily assured its readership that the British Prime Minister had the whole issue snugly in hand. He was, one newspaper predicted, to conduct the conference like a meeting of the British Cabinet, cutting short controversy and moulding the concensus of opinion. The top people were even told by the Archbishop of Cape Town—in a letter to *'The Times'*—that the non-whites of South Africa wanted it so. Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the albino United Party Opposition, and Mr. Harry Oppenheimer of the Progressive Party, De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Anglo-American Corporation, emphasised the desire of all South Africans to remain in the Commonwealth.

The campaign had been so well mounted that it almost deserved to succeed. That it should instead so ignominiously have collapsed was due to a number of sudden interventions. Chief A. J. Lutuli, President-General of the banned African National Congress in South Africa, cabled *'The Times'* to contradict the Archbishop's appeal and request South Africa's expulsion. Two days before the conference began, Julius Nyerere, Chief Minister of Tanganyika, cabled the London *'Observer'* that to vote South Africa in would mean voting Tanganyika inevitably out of the Commonwealth. Public opinion in the Afro-Asian member states had persistently hardened against South Africa's association with the Commonwealth, till the Commonwealth itself was increasingly coming under assault. It is a mistake no doubt to confuse governments with peoples; but no government, however cynical, could continue to ignore what had become a popular passion. It would, of course, have been calamitous had a split over South Africa resulted in which white and black members of the Commonwealth would have faced each other across a canyon of recrimination. That this was avoided must be credited in the main to Mr. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada, who recognised that a Commonwealth which contained apartheid was a Commonwealth that carried cancer in its blood-stream. The determination of the British Government to

readmit a republican South Africa at all costs began indistinguishably to sag.

There remains little doubt, however, that Dr. Verwoerd could have emerged from the conference with readmission secured, had he shown the slightest willingness to unclench his fist. The other Prime Ministers would have gone far to avoid the precedent of rupture. Instead of compromise, however, Dr. Verwoerd had chosen the course of effrontery. He did not apologise for apartheid; that would have been too much to expect. He did not attempt to excuse it. He did not even observe a decent silence about it, in the knowledge that any display would inevitably draw attention to its character. He flaunted it, brandishing it with all the tawdry decorations of his own State Information Office, till the very shootings at Sharpeville became a malignant misrepresentation of white South Africa's benevolence. To commit a massacre is one thing; to claim it as an adventure in good neighbourliness is a little too much for even the well-lined stomach of the twentieth century to hold.

Had he left his disfigurements at the conference door, Dr. Verwoerd might yet have got his way. That he should have flashed his intransigence behind the curtains of Lancaster House was an indication not only of his arrogance but of his ineptitude. It seems, indeed, reasonably certain that all attempts at compromise finally floundered when Dr. Verwoerd refused to undertake that representatives of non-white Commonwealth states would be permitted diplomatic entry into the Republic. After two days of rancorous discussion, it became clear to him that South Africa was likely to be refused unconditional re-admission, and he formerly withdrew her application.

Dr. Verwoerd has entered the wilderness, and by his own choice. Though his supporters pulsed with pride at their latter day exodus, they are well enough aware—as how can they not be?—that their promised land is behind and not in front of them. Soon after his return to South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd registered a significant gain in a by-election at Bethal, the Transvaal rural constituency so celebrated for its forced labour and farm prisons. It would, of course, be fatuous to believe that white South Africa will reel from Dr. Verwoerd at the sound of the first shots fired over his head.

The Afrikaners are not escaping from enslavement; it is to avoid their enfranchisement that they are undertaking this vast



racial exodus from the outside world. They will follow Dr. Verwoerd into the wilderness as long as it is the wilderness of their own sterile dominion. They will desert him in the end, but only when their very survival is made contingent upon their enfranchisement to reason.

History recounts few instances of rulers who have by choice abdicated their dominion. To expect white South Africa to be coaxed or berated out of its privileges is to discount the very humanity that alone will liberate white South Africa from itself. Precisely because white South Africans are human, they will retain their privileges for just as long as they can; precisely because they are human, they will surrender them when surrender is the only route left them for survival.

There is more nonsense written and spoken about the ethics of intervention than almost anything else. Let us suppose that there exists a small republic somewhere in the Pacific, ruled by a religious fanatic and his followers. Let us suppose too that the ruler's peculiar fanaticism pivots upon the evils of this world and requires national Salvation in the purity of death. Suppose then that, supported by his well-armed converts, he sets out assiduously to transport his subjects to heaven, by slaughtering them all. Are we to accept that this is a 'domestic affair'? Is the world idly to watch the final murder, before intervening to the extent of repopling the cemetery? Let us suppose that the population of the republic does not share the fanaticism of its rulers, that it struggles with sticks against sten guns to survive and so only accelerates the approach of its end. Suppose too that it cries out for help in order to survive, that it appeals to the United Nations, over the heads of its own legal government. Are the great powers to quote the Charter at each other, or threaten counter measures to any unilateral intervention while the slaughter proceeds?

It is, of course, a grotesque hypothesis; but only perhaps because of the motivation and the degree. How far, in pursuit not of religious fanaticism but of greed, will Portugal be permitted to go in order to retain control over Angola? Let us suppose—not such an improbable hypothesis after all—that the already widespread nationalist rising in Angola persists, and that repression by bombing raid and massacre continues to mount. At what stage will pacification at last become genocide? At what stage will it be manifestly irrational for the world community to limit its intervention to pious demands for enquiry

and explanation? Should the Soviet Union find it profitable to intervene unilaterally against Portugal, will the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation be enlisted in support of Salazar?

Despite shootings and mass imprisonment, despite banishments and bans, the non-white peoples of South Africa will continue to resist race rule. Resistance will lead to repression, repression to resistance, till rebellion and massacre make of South Africa itself one long internal haemorrhage of humanity. It is difficult to see how non-white rebellion, isolated from outside assistance and assailed by modern weapons of war, can ever accomplish change; it is equally difficult to see how the non-whites can ever surrender to perpetual subjection. It is certainly foolish to believe that a government which showed itself capable of the unprovoked Sharpeville shootings would flinch at using aircraft to silence whole townships and districts. As long as the world regards what happens in South Africa and in Angola as a finally domestic affair, so long it gives to Verwoerd and Salazar the encouragement to crush resistance at any cost.


One may reasonably ask how the President of the United States can engage in attempts to overthrow the Cuban government, while viewing with a purely verbal distress the racial violence in Angola and the Republic of South Africa. It is a matter for considerable debate whether or not the Cuban régime is a popular one. No one can sanely suggest that the governments of Angola and South Africa enjoy the support of the populations whose resistance they contain only by an ever-growing exercise of force.

It is, of course, imprudent to encourage and even permit any state to intervene on its own against the government of another country. Once the principle is patently established that a state may do so—under the slogan of national security, justice or personal liberty—every society becomes vulnerable to assault by other governments, whose interpretation may differ widely from that entertained by the most of mankind. What does not endanger the free society, what can only increase the fundamental security of rational rule, is united intervention, undertaken at the judgement of the world community itself.

Indeed, it is only this form of intervention that can block effectively any risk of the other form; it becomes man's ultimate sanction against inhumanity. That the principle of such action was cemented into the very meaning of the United Nations is clear from the Charter. If the United Nations was at its founda-

tion an unreasonable reflection of the world community, it is clearly a far more adequate measure now. There are sufficient member states uncommitted to either of the power blocs to prevent any international intervention in the cause of one.

White South Africa and the Salazar régime that neighbours it have together undertaken an exodus from the contemporary world. It would be well if this were reflected in another exodus, a departure by the world community from the domestic obsession and power balances of the last century. By intervening openly in Southern Africa, the world community can do a service not only to the voiceless, voteless, anguished millions of the sub-continent, but an immeasurable service to itself. Should it refuse to intervene, it can only encourage intervention by an individual state with a far richer imagination. Southern Africa ought to be the battlefield of man against racial savagery and unreason. It must not be allowed to become the occasion for a war of men over strategic demarcations. There are some twenty three million non-whites in the Republic of South Africa, Angola and Moçambique. Their humanity should be of some concern to the rest of the world.



'Ah, just enough light for darkest Africa'

# THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

BOYCE RICHARDSON

*London Correspondent of the 'Montreal Star'*

ON the afternoon of Tuesday, 14 March 1961, the Prime Ministers or Presidents of ten Commonwealth countries, having decided after two days of argument that the Commonwealth stood for equality among men of different races and colours, then invited Dr. Verwoerd to choose whether South Africa wanted to remain a member of such an association.

"It is now up to Verwoerd," one of the delegates told me that evening. "He can accept or reject."

What Verwoerd had to accept or reject was a communiqué which would have, in the first place, expressed strong disapproval of South Africa's racial policies, criticising racial segregation as irreconcilable with the ideals on which the influence and unity of the Commonwealth rests; in the second, stated Dr. Verwoerd's justification for these policies; and in the third, announced that after hearing the South African Prime Minister, the other leaders were still of the same opinion and believed that it must be an objective of Commonwealth governments to create a society in which there is equality of opportunity, regardless of race and colour.

Several Prime Ministers made it known that this declaration was final, beyond any further negotiation. Only one move was left in the game, and that was Verwoerd's. Yet even this last door was in fact a false one.

As the next day's events were to prove, the Conference could have only one issue; even if Verwoerd had announced his acceptance of the communiqué, this would have been unacceptable to most of the other delegates.

After two days of highly charged discussion, it was no longer possible to retain in the Commonwealth the architects of apartheid. No matter how strong the condemnatory words that were published, the only issue was whether South Africa stayed or went. Julius Nyerere had said clearly that to keep South Africa in was to keep Tanganyika out. No form of conciliatory denunciation could skirt around that challenge.

The Macmillan attempt to "find a formula" had collapsed. But it came perilously close to success. Fortunately, just as



agreement with Verwoerd seemed possible, the Prime Ministers themselves—including Mr. Macmillan—realised that they were on the point of making fools of themselves. At the last minute they could not quite stomach the hypocrisy of the formula that they themselves had reluctantly prepared.

For several months Messrs. Macmillan and Sandys had been rummaging around at the bottom of their tactical bucket to find ways of keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth. And it can hardly be denied that they had done a very skilful job. First of all, in order to give themselves and Verwoerd the maximum room for manoeuvre, they had brought the Conference forward—against the wishes of several other Prime Ministers—so that it should be held before South Africa actually became a republic. This was done—of course—because of the pressing matters of world importance that the Prime Ministers had to discuss.

And even if these pressing matters should allow the leaders to get around at last to a discussion of South Africa, certainly no vote would be taken. No vote ever had been taken at these meetings. Therefore there could be no question of the so-called “rule of unanimity” which had governed these meetings in the past.

The other Prime Ministers would doubtless remember that it was a cardinal convention of these meetings that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of member states. If apartheid were to be fair game for denunciation, so too was the imprisoned opposition in Ghana, the oppression of the Tamil minority in Ceylon, the Naga revolt in India, the military dictatorship of ‘basic democracy’ in Pakistan, the White Australia policy or Canada’s immigration habits.

Two months before the meeting, Macmillan seemed to have won an almost bloodless victory. Duncan Sandys had been off trumpeting around the Commonwealth about disarmament—“it is now certain,” reported *The Sunday Times* loyally on January 22, just after Mr. Sandys returned, “that disarmament will be the principal subject at the Conference”—and one by one the Prime Ministers seemed to be retreating from their determination to bring the issue of apartheid to the boil. The Prime Minister of Malaya was not going to insist if he were the only one . . . Canada was beginning “to have second thoughts” . . . Nigeria felt that no outside pressure would move Verwoerd . . . Ghana was strangely silent. . . .

Dr. Verwoerd came to London first, and in the most outrageous press conference given here for some time, he lectured the reporters and the world about the wonders of air travel, the delights of apartheid, his neighbourly feeling for the blacks, and his hope that South Africa's outstretched hand of friendship would be tightly clasped by all his Commonwealth brothers of whatever colour.

This produced a strong reaction among the other Commonwealth leaders; but even at this late date, there is no doubt that the British were feeling fairly confident all would be well. The first days were spent meandering along amicably on disarmament ("that paramount topic") and other matters of world import. The fourth day, Monday, had been set aside for "constitutional questions", and the British delegation still believed that South Africa's membership would be quickly approved, leaving the denunciation of apartheid to be discussed separately towards the end of the Conference.

President Nkrumah arrived after the Conference had begun, and admitted reluctantly to reporters that he was not planning a "show-down". *The Times* announced the next morning that South Africa's retention in the Commonwealth was now assured.

Anyone who had searched for the occasional grain of wheat through the mountains of chaff collected at airport interviews should not, however, have been quite so positive as the man from *The Times*. The Tunku had said that the Prime Ministers should "not give a blank cheque" to South Africa over her membership of the Commonwealth. Diefenbaker had said he would propose a declaration by which all member states would accept the "dignity, worth and equality of every individual, regardless of race or colour."

Dr. Nkrumah could not understand how South Africa's membership and the issue of apartheid could be discussed separately and clearly planned to insist on their being discussed together.

From all this it should have been clear, even to *The Times*, that whatever else happened, there was going to be an unholy row on Monday, 13 March. This was made even more certain by the arrival in London towards the end of the week of a cabled article from Julius Nyerere, threatening that Tanganyika would stay out if South Africa stayed inside the Commonwealth.

Nyerere's article—which appeared in *The Observer* on

Sunday, 12 March—was so cogently argued, so thoroughly in harmony with Pan-African, radical and indeed liberal feeling throughout the Commonwealth, that Ghana had little option but to toughen its stand. One newspaper on Saturday morning announced that Ghana would threaten to leave the Commonwealth if South African remained. By Sunday this was the weekend sensation, even though it wasn't strictly true. The careful round of talks at Chequers, the secret diplomacy, the urbane search for an elegant compromise all speedily collapsed in face of 1,500 well-chosen words on the editorial page of *'The Observer'*. The plug was opened that Sunday, and already a bathful of British diplomatic soft soap was gurgling down the drain. The bath took three more days to empty.

Dr. Verwoerd opened the discussion by applying for South Africa's formal readmission to the Commonwealth as a republic. He was supported by Britain, New Zealand and Australia who took the view that this was merely a constitutional question. Canada first suggested that no decision should be made until South Africa actually became a republic, but that in the meantime a declaration of principles, to include equality of the races, should be discussed. This was unacceptable to the Afro-Asian leaders, so Diefenbaker fell in with them; he announced that South Africa's membership could not be treated as a purely constitutional matter but required positive approval. The time had come to make clear what the Commonwealth stood for; Canada not only deplored the principle and practice of apartheid, but believed it was contrary to the principles for which the Commonwealth ought to stand.

Later, in the House of Commons, Mr. Macmillan said his view had been that South Africa should be admitted "on constitutional grounds", but that at the same time the "strongest disapproval" should be expressed of her racial policies. It is fair to assume that, with the support of the Australasians, he espoused this view throughout the second day's discussion.

What, however, did Macmillan mean by all this? Simply that Verwoerd had allowed apartheid to be discussed, that this was rather remarkably generous of him, and that it was up to the others to meet him halfway by expressing their disapproval of his policies in acceptable language. This was the search for a formula that would leave South Africa to continue imperturbably with her membership of the Commonwealth and her policy of race rule alike.

Some of the other Commonwealth leaders did not see the discussion in precisely these terms. "The whole purpose of the discussion," said Mr. Nehru at his press conference afterwards, "was that they should abandon or modify or vary apartheid to some extent. Otherwise why argue?" It is interesting to speculate whether Macmillan really understood that, when the other Commonwealth leaders talked of a declaration of principles, they were not searching for an acceptable but empty formula by which to save Verwoerd's face (along with their own), but were groping for a weapon which would force Verwoerd to change apartheid.

Certainly Verwoerd never understood the discussion in this way; when he came at one point to draft a communiqué that was acceptable to him, it said very little more than that the matter had been discussed. "The only thing he agreed to," said Mr. Nehru, "was that I should be allowed to express my opinion. That didn't take us very far."

Yet the battle must have been fought tenaciously; by the end of the second day, Nkrumah, Nehru and Diefenbaker had got even Menzies to agree to the declaration of principles. But the acceptance or rejection of this declaration was left to Verwoerd.

What would have happened if, on Wednesday morning, he had said, "I accept your principles, and will subscribe to them"? Or, "I do not accept them, and yet wish to remain a member"?

There was no sensible answer to this. Macmillan, however, had still not given up hope. The search for an acceptable formula was taken up again on Wednesday, and after a good deal more talk, the communiqué was practically agreed.

But the two sides, while using the same words, had been speaking different languages. The white nations had been looking for a way to mollify criticism of South Africa's retention; the "Afro-Asian-Canadian bloc" (to use Verwoerd's phrase) had been trying to prove that the Commonwealth could have some modifying influence on the South African government. When Dr. Verwoerd would clearly not budge an inch, they could hardly agree to South Africa's membership. Then, on the last afternoon, Verwoerd made it clear that any agreed declaration was to be the end for all time of Prime Ministerial discussion of apartheid. This was surely the moment—and splendidly dramatic it must have been—when the realisation dawned on the other Prime Ministers that this Afrikaner who refused to exchange diplomats with them, whose pale eyes gleamed as he

wove his fantasies about a Commonwealth of friendly nations living side by side in South Africa, who dismissed all opposition as Communist agitation or malicious prejudice, who believed in his righteousness with a fervour that put him outside the reach of reason and discussion—this man was not one of them, and never could be.

Nehru then said that of course the battle against apartheid would be continued outside the conference room, and he would be happy to lend himself to that battle. Nkrumah announced that Ghana certainly did not consider the matter finished. Ghana, in fact, reserved its attitude both to its own continuing membership of the Commonwealth, and to South African membership.

Verwoerd then said that he had been perfectly reasonable, but that the others were being vindictive. Much to the relief, no doubt, of the others (except Menzies), he withdrew South Africa's application.

No one, said Mr. Nehru later, had been vindictive; but certain leaders had stated in the Conference that the Commonwealth might disintegrate, and, said Mr. Nehru, "the letter published from Mr. Nyerere showed how that might happen."

Within a week Mr. Macmillan discovered to the House of Commons his belief that "a tragically misguided and perverse philosophy" lay at the root of apartheid. And Mr. Sandys, who only two months before had toured the Commonwealth to plead for Dr. Verwoerd's retention, now admitted that it had been a waste of breath to ask the South African Government to change its racial policies.

In one of those marvellously bland switches of line which are the breathtaking and peculiar talent of the British Tory, Mr. Sandys said that what had happened would increase "the unity and moral standing of the Commonwealth throughout the world.

"I am determined to refute with all the power at my command the allegation that the Commonwealth is going to disintegrate," he said ringingly. What had happened was, he said, "sooner or later, inevitable."



## THE HEIGHT OF TREASON

FREDA TROUP

WHEN, on 23 March, in the last stage of the Treason Trial, Mr. Justice Rumpff interrupted defence argument—but one quarter delivered—to suggest that a week's adjournment, by enabling the judges to consider argument that had so far been heard, might shorten the duration of the trial, expectation came suddenly alive that the end was at last in sight.

Six days later, on 29 March, with white and non-white galleries filled to capacity, the court-room was tense, with hope held fearfully in check. The Crown doggedly made a last helpful offer to amend the indictment.

Mr. Justice Rumpff picked up his notes and began evenly to read his forty minute judgment.

*"We find you not guilty and you are discharged. You may go."*

The Crown argument began early in November last year and lasted nearly four months, with frequent interruptions from the judges, who found the method of presentation unsatisfactory and suggested other procedures.

The Crown's case, as summarised in the judgment (which dealt only with the African National Congress, "the senior and dominant partner" among the organisations) was:—

"The first overt act of treason laid against all the accused in the indictment is a conspiracy to overthrow the State by violence. Against each accused further overt acts are laid, and these acts are said to have been committed in pursuance of the conspiracy.

"The case for the prosecution is not that the accused came together and entered into a treasonable agreement . . . but that during the indictment period (from 1 October 1952 to 13 December 1956) a number of organisations in South Africa had a policy to overthrow the State by violence, that these organisations co-operated with each other to achieve their common object and for that purpose the Congress Alliance was established, with the A.N.C. as the senior and dominant partner.

"The accused are said to have conspired because they took an active and leading part in the activities of the organisations of which he or she was a member, with full knowledge of and support for the policy of such organisations.

"In order to prove the existence of the treasonable conspiracy, the prosecution had to prove the violent policy of the Congress

Alliance. It also had to prove the adherence of each of the accused to the conspiracy. It is conceded by the prosecution that if it fails to prove the treasonable conspiracy, there is no case against any of the accused. . . .”

The means by which the State would be overthrown, it was alleged, and a Communist or other form of State substituted, included the achievement of the aims of the Freedom Charter by violence; the preparation of the ‘freedom volunteers’ for acts of violence; the advocating and organising of illegal action, including the use of violence; propagating the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in which is inherent the use of violence.

The defence team analysed indictment and argument and showed that the Crown, following on questions asked by Mr. Justice Rumpff, had changed its case in the course of argument. For the original conspiracy to overthrow the State by violence had been substituted allegations (not to be found in the indictment) of a conspiracy to embark on extra-parliamentary methods, which the accused knew might or would provoke the government into using violence and against which the masses would actively retaliate. It was no longer, in the words of Mr. Maisels, Q.C., who led the defence, “direct violence”, but “contingent violence”.

The Court found that, although the membership of the A.N.C. was open to all who supported its policies, although some of its leaders had been Communists and although the type of State foreseen by the Transvaal Executive was a Communist State, known in Marxism-Leninism as a People’s Democracy, it had not been proved that the State envisaged in the Freedom Charter was Communist, nor that Communists had infiltrated into the ranks of the A.N.C., nor that the A.N.C. was a Communist organisation, nor that the accused had “personal knowledge of the Communist doctrine of violent revolution.”

The Court found, further, that the various speeches relied on by the Crown to prove violence were a minute and selected percentage of those made during the indictment period, that in general the reports of them were open to grave criticism, and that statements in A.N.C. official documents that its policy was non-violent were consonant with what many speakers at meetings had said. It was found that some A.N.C. leaders had been guilty in a few speeches of “sporadic violence”, but that these outbursts formed an insignificant part of the total number of speeches. In the various campaigns conducted by the A.N.C.

no violence had ensued, nor was it alleged that violence resulted from the activities of the organisations. The 'freedom volunteers' were required to carry out the policy of the A.N.C., to be disciplined and not to become violent even in the face of provocation.

*"On all the evidence presented to the Court and on our findings of fact, it is impossible for this Court to come to the conclusion that the A.N.C. had acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the State by violence, that is in the sense that the masses had to be prepared or conditioned to commit direct acts of violence against the State. . . . While the prosecution has succeeded in showing that the programme of action contemplated the use of illegal methods (e.g. strikes, boycotts, etc.), . . . for the achievement of a fundamentally different State from the present, it has failed to show that the A.N.C., as a matter of policy, intended to achieve this new State by violent means"*.

This judgment has established that the tactics of the Congress Alliance—the use of extra-parliamentary, and even illegal, means to achieve its ends—are not high treason. They remain, however, illegal activities and under various laws—the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, the 1953 Public Safety Act, the 1953 Criminal Laws Amendment Act, the 1960 Unlawful Organisations Act—subject to very heavy penalties. Furthermore, a Nationalist newspaper is already advocating a new legislative definition of treason. "New laws are essential to keep pace with the new methods and techniques which threaten the safety of white rule." A leading Member of Parliament has said that persons charged with treason should not be allowed to be acquitted, perhaps because of legal technicalities, and suggests that treason cases should be heard by military courts.

The judgment has, in addition, vindicated the banned A.N.C.'s policies and methods, acquitting it of treason and of Communism and also, in consequence, of charges long levelled against it by such varied accusers as the Pan Africanist Congress (P.A.C.), Liberals and the United Party—of being white dominated, or used by the Indians, or being the mere tool of white 'leftists'. Now no less an authority than the Special Court has found that the A.N.C. was "the senior and dominant partner" in the Congress Alliance.

On balance, the end of the trial is not in itself an end of any wider importance. The A.N.C. and P.A.C. remain banned organisations, and the 10,000,000 Africans enjoy no legitimate

representation. The confinement of the leaders, however, Chief Lutuli to the remote country and Mr. Sobukwe to prison, does not prevent the one from seeing his lieutenants and writing for the press, nor the other from issuing instructions from jail. Eleven organisers of the recent All-in African Conference at Pietermaritzburg in March (including two treason trialists) have been arrested and charged under the Unlawful Organisations Act; but that did not prevent a tremendous attendance at the Conference nor a call to the Government to initiate, before Republic Day on 31 May, a national multi-racial convention, failing which nation-wide all-race demonstrations would take place.

Twenty-eight people have emerged from the ordeal of a four and a half year trial on a capital charge apparently with intensified, rather than diminished, resolution. "We are overwhelmingly relieved that it is over. But even if we have to face the whole ordeal again, we will continue our struggle," is one typical comment.

The threat of internal strikes and demonstrations and external boycotts and sanctions has created great nervousness in commercial and industrial spheres; the stock market has declined spectacularly since Sharpeville. Dutch Reformed Church ministers, Stellenbosch professors, disaffected politicians, orthodox economists are now echoing, though still rather faintly, the call of "liberalists", "agitators" and such for modified race policies. Even the puppet chiefs of the Bantu Authorities, taking apartheid at its face value, are making embarrassing demands for independence now.

The withdrawal from the Commonwealth has been recognised by the non-whites as a tremendous triumph. With their leaders banned, banished, exiled, in prison or on trial, and their organisations disrupted, they have—against such powerful allies as big business, imperial preference, Commonwealth strategy, tough self-interest and nostalgic sentiment—got their way and inflicted a great defeat on white South Africa. This victory, followed almost immediately by the triumph of the treason trial, has engendered a profound sense of optimism and progress. The difficulties and sufferings to come are not under-rated. Yet there is a recognition, the exact opposite of that enjoyed by white leaders, that they are moving in the same inexorable direction as history.

# THE LIVING DEAD

HELEN JOSEPH

*National Secretary of the South African Federation of Women*

“It is not Mhlupeki that died but me, because what they have done to him they will do to me!” So wrote a lonely desperate man after years of hopeless banishment when he heard of the death of another exile. “You are like a person who has been buried alive”, wrote another.

In South Africa’s shameful history, one of the ugliest chapters is that of the stealthy, relentless persecution of the individual who opposes government policies. Only recently has the scandal of banishment been brought to light, the power that can and does pluck an African from the midst of his family and cast him into the most remote and abandoned parts of the country—there to live, perhaps to die, to suffer and starve or to stretch out his survival by poorly paid labour, if and when he can get it.

It is all quite legal, this banishment without trial, all neatly enshrined in an Act of Parliament passed many years ago. These powers are derived from Section 5(1)(b) of the Native Administration Act No. 39 of 1927 as amended:

5 (1) *The Governor-General may—*

- (b) *Whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest, without prior notice to any person concerned, order that, subject to such conditions as he may determine, any tribe, portion of a tribe or native shall withdraw from any place to any other place or to any district or province within the Union and shall not at any time thereafter or during a period specified in the order return to the place from which the withdrawal is to be made or proceed to any place, district or province other than the place, district or province indicated in the order, except with the written permission of the Secretary for Native Affairs.*

In 1956 this Act was amended further—

*Whenever any order issued under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) in respect of any native, cannot conveniently be brought to his notice, it shall be sufficient to leave a copy of the order with some inmate of his place of residence or to affix a copy thereof in a conspicuous place to his last known place of residence, and thereupon it shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed that the order has been brought to his notice.*



Over thirty years ago, General Hertzog, as Minister of Native Affairs, in introducing the Native Administration Bill, said that the power to move a "Native" from one place to another was an "excellent provision". The Bill provided that the Governor-General had power to remove a whole tribe from one place to another—presumably to enable whites to occupy the tribe's land; the Mamatola tribe was removed under this section. General Hertzog said that the powers to remove a "Native" could be used against stock thieves, but there is reason to believe that he had in mind political leaders rather than stock thieves. The Bill went to a Select Committee which agreed that not only tribes, but also individual Africans, should be deported if the Minister deemed it advisable.

According to the present Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, no record of removals of Africans under this section was kept prior to 1952. But individuals are known against whom it was used. Six Africans were removed from Mabieskraal, Rustenburg, in 1935 to Steenbokgat, where there was no water and no accommodation. They contested their removal orders in Court, and their defence counsel argued that a man could not be "simply dumped in the veld" but must get compensation and be removed to a habitable spot. They lost the case. A certain Mpanza was another. Under pressure from the Johannesburg City Council, the Government issued a removal order exiling Mpanza to Coldplace, Ixopo. He defied the order and won his case in the Supreme Court on the grounds that he was "exempted" from Native Law. Subsequently his certificate of exemption was withdrawn. It was Mpanza who led hundreds of Africans in 1944 out of the overcrowded, intolerable conditions of the Johannesburg locations to camp on land near Orlando, thus founding the 'squatters' Movement,' which had a great influence on subsequent housing policy.

It remained for the Nationalist Government, however, to realise and exploit the full powers of this Act of Parliament. The opponents of Bantu Authorities—the puppet régimes established by the Government—have been the real victims, perhaps because the limelight of publicity is not so easily focussed on the Reserves, and indeed for nearly six years these banishments went on almost unnoticed.

Since 1959 interest in the plight of these persecuted people has awoken, but questions asked in the House of Assembly during the 1959 and 1960 sessions elicited sparse information.

When asked for a list of persons on whom removal orders had been served during the period January 1948 to December 1958 and for information as to where they came from and to where they had been removed, the Minister supplied a list of 98 names, together with two further lists—the twenty seven places from where they had come and the twenty eight places to which they had been removed. As, however, no details were given of who had come from where, or to where any particular person had been sent, or when, this information was of little value. The reasons for banishment again constituted a blanket reply:

*“Their presence in the areas from which they were removed was inimical to the peace, order and good government of the Natives residing there.”*

Other questions and answers on the same day drew the information that the removal orders remain in force as long as *“it is deemed necessary in the public interest”* and that each order is reviewed at least once every year; the Governor-General decides when a removal may be terminated.

In 1961 further questioning drew a list of those who had been released and who had died, and a further thirteen names appeared which had not been included in the lists given in any previous year, though these were not new exiles. Are there then more people, flung into the wilderness, about whom the Minister himself neither knows nor cares?

Asked what such persons do at the places to which they have been removed, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development replied:

*“They are not prisoners and are not required to furnish details of what they do. I am therefore unable to answer this question.”*

Another question asked was on the opportunity such a person would have to present his case before a court of law, and the reply was:

*“They have free access to the courts, and the question of being given an opportunity does not arise.”*

This extraordinary reply merits comment. Under the 1956 Prohibition of Interdicts Act, the person to be removed is prevented from seeking an interdict and must leave immediately. He cannot appeal before he is removed; after his removal he may request reasons for his deportation, but the Minister is not obliged to disclose more than he deems may be disclosed *“without detriment to the public interest”*. Past experience

has shown that applications to court for the setting aside of deportation orders on various grounds, have led merely to the stopping of loopholes and the issuing of new orders or even amendments to the Act which close all escape routes. Only one deportee, J. Saliwa, has as yet been released as the result of any application to court. In 1956 he won his appeal on the ground that he was entitled to be heard before the order and warrant for removal could be issued. The Government reaction was a refusal to release other deportees on Saliwa's precedent, so that separate court actions had to be instituted. The Act was then amended, and no further releases followed.

In Driefontein in the Cape, Chief Mabe and his five counsellors also won their case in the Supreme Court in 1956, but fresh deportation orders were served on them the next day.

An application was made to court in 1960 by three deportees, Jackson Nkosiyané, Bangilizwe Joyi and Twalimfene Joyi, all from Tembuland, for an order compelling the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to furnish them with the reasons which he had given to the Governor-General to have them banished from the Transkei, or, failing compliance, for their deportation order to be set aside. The applications were dismissed with costs, and the prospects of setting aside any of the other deportation orders accordingly seem bleak. "Free access to the courts", whatever that may mean, now appears to be confined to the privilege of appearing there as a direct result of having defied a deportation order.

In 1960, the Natives' Representatives in the House of Assembly returned to the attack with further questions on subsequent deportations and the means of existence.

*Question:* "Whether any removed persons have been in receipt of a subsistence allowance; if so, (a) how many, and (b) from what source of revenue are such allowances made;

*Answer:* "Each Bantu is paid an amount of £2 prior to his departure. Suitable employment is found for him at his new place of residence. If employment is not available an allowance is paid, the amount being determined by the circumstances of each case."

This reply also merits comment. The reports from the deportees themselves do not support the Minister's bland statement, nor did the Minister explain that the allowance is a maximum of £2 per month, and only obtainable after months

of delay. A. Gwentshe was deported from East London to Bushbuck Ridge in the Northern Transvaal. There he had no allowance whatsoever and would have starved but for eating wild pawpaw roots. The pattern appears to be that in the camps where no employment is available—and the camps are deliberately sited in semi-desert areas—the allowances are eventually paid after long delays and then only every two months. In other areas, where the deportees are set down singly, they are sometimes offered employment of a sort—usually a labourer's work, irrespective of age or physical fitness. There are many, however, who have neither work nor money; they exist on the meagre help they have been able to obtain through the charity of the African people around them. One fact emerges clearly—the deportees are usually dumped without ceremony and left to fend for themselves. Only after months does the lavish allowance of 1/4d. a day become available—1/4d. a day to feed and clothe a man and provide for his far-off family, hundreds of miles away.

Another attack was made in Parliament in March 1960, when the Minister was asked again for the names of the deportees and to which place each was confined, who was in employment and their wages, who received government allowances and how much. The Minister refused to give further information.

The true background to this savage system of banishment emerges from the stories of the banished people themselves. The appalling history of the Matlala deportation speaks less blandly than the Minister.

In 1953 and 1954, following opposition to the imposition of Bantu Authorities, altogether 20 men and 3 women were deported from the Matlala Reserve in the Northern Transvaal. They were and still are scattered all over the country. Of these 23 men and women, 5 men have already died in exile and 16 are still living in their place of banishment. Only two have ever been released, and both died soon after they returned home. At least 2 of the men who died in exile were receiving no government allowance and had no employment. They were old and sickly, and it seems clear that they died of starvation. Only a few of these banished people are known to be in employment, and up to now not one has received any government assistance.

The condition of the families they left behind them in the Matlala Reserve is pitiable. Children grow up in rags, unable to go to school; some drift away to the local town or to the farms

in order to earn £1 or £1 10s. od. a month. The wives are not allowed by the Chief to plough; for mere existence they depend on the food they can beg from neighbours. In some cases the huts of the deportees were burnt down and demolished by the Bantu Authorities' Chief immediately after the deportation, and all livestock was confiscated.

Wives were called to the Chief's office and told they could be taken to join their husbands, but that they would not be brought back again; if they refused, they were threatened with deportation. In two cases where the husbands have died, the wives were merely informed by the Chief; they have not received any of their husbands' clothes or belongings as proof of death. Only in one instance was the husband's body returned for burial, but no belongings were returned with the body.

This is the story told by the widow of Frans Ramare, who died—according to the report of other deportees in the area—alone and starving, in Zululand.

“One morning he was called to the Chief's place. This was the last time we saw him. He never came back to say goodbye to his two wives and children. We later learned from the people that our husband was banished. Since then we never heard anything, until one day we got a message from the Chief saying that Mr. Frans Ramare passed away in exile. That was all. We never received anything from the Government about our husband's death and we did not see anything like his clothes, which could be used to prove to us that our husband is really dead. Since the banishment of our husband, we never received any letter from him. We never knew of his sickness until his death was reported, and we don't even know the date he passed away.”

Wherever there is opposition to Government plans, to Bantu Authorities, particularly in the tribal areas, the Government pounces on one or two individuals, summarily arrests and then removes them as far as possible. In 1956 Chief Jeremiah Mabe and his counsellors were taken from Rustenburg in the Transvaal to Driefontein camp in the Cape for opposition to Bantu Authorities and the extension of passes to African women. Chief Mopedi served a prison sentence for refusing to cull cattle and to repair fences; and *after* serving his sentence for this defiance of authority and non-co-operation, he was deported in 1954 from Witzieshoek to Groblersdaal; his wife was deported too. After two years he was taken from Groblersdaal to Frenchdale; he is still there.



In Sekhukhuniland it was the same story. Like Chief Mopedi, there is Stephen Nkadameng, who first served a gaol sentence of 18 months for incitement and three days after his release was deported to Gollel, on the Swaziland border. William Sekhukhuni shared the same fate. The pattern continues all over the country, wherever there is resistance to the imposition of Bantu Authorities, the system so hated and resented by the tribesmen, so destructive of their deep-seated sacred traditions and whole way of life. It was Matlala, Zeerust, and Sekhukhuniland; then Tembuland and Zululand; and today it is Pondoland. The dreaded camps are filling up again, and it is not only the rural Africans who are exposed to the threat. Ben Baartman and Elizabeth Mafeking were urban Africans who actively opposed the Government; so was Alcott Gwentshe, formerly of East London, who suffered six years of banishment and even now has been released from Frenchdale Camp only to be confined to the Transkei area where he was born. Could it be said that he has been promoted to second-class banishment?

The Government record is an ugly one. 116 Africans have been arbitrarily removed from their homes since 1948. 116 human beings have been arrested, thrown into police cells, handcuffed and taken under police custody to desolate areas, flung into an empty shed or hut, with nothing but the clothes on their bodies and, of course, the generous allowance—sometimes—of £2 a month to spend. Only there isn't anywhere to spend the money, if you go to Driefontein or Frenchdale or to any other of the isolated camps, chosen with such care by the Government.

What has happened to the 116 deportees during the years? 48 are still in exile; 10 are known to have escaped from South Africa; 41 have been released, some for only specific periods of probation; 11 have died in the camps, probably without medical attention of any sort, possibly for lack of it. 6 are missing and cannot be traced, unless the Minister will provide the information which until now he has refused to give. Perhaps they too have returned home; perhaps they too are rotting their lives away in some barren isolated corner of this country, hidden, forgotten.

The two main camps for the banished people are at Frenchdale and Driefontein. They are not large; provision is only made for 8 deportees in Frenchdale and 12 in Driefontein. But they are stark and bare, in semi-desert areas, many hot and isolated miles

from the nearest towns. The hyenas prowl around Frenchdale at night; the nearest store is 12 miles away and the nearest bus stop from Mafeking is 14 miles from the camp. True, the deportees may leave the camp freely and travel into Mafeking—if they walk the distance to the bus; but they must live in the camp. Gwentshe was charged for living in Mafeking Location; he protested that his hut at the camp was not fit for human habitation and he had been compelled to live with the other deportees who had no work and nothing to eat.

Driefontein is no better. Here there are 8 huts, and again there are no guards; but the deportees have been ordered to “stay there”, and since it is on the edge of the Kalahari desert, over 100 miles from Vryburg, the nearest town, there can be little incentive to roam. One exile, David Mabe, died here. Chief Jeremiah Mabe was re-deported to the camp.

During 1960 three men were banished from the Transkei to Driefontein. Their ages are 72, 63 and 60 years. There is no escaping the thought that they have been sent to this place of desolation to die. How should these old men survive? This is no less than premeditated murder.

In both these camps there exist no opportunities for employment, and the deportees in Driefontein depend upon government allowances of £2 a month. In Frenchdale the deportees from Witzieshoek refused to accept anything from the Government; they maintained that they would rather starve. There is no work, no occupation. The deportees say: “We are waiting to go home.” It is a long wait.

A third camp is at Southey in the Vryburg area, a ghost camp as yet uninhabited, but made ready for Elizabeth Mafeking, the mother of 12 children who fled with her baby at her breast, over the mountains to Basutoland, rather than endure the horror of unending desolation.

“*These are not prisons*”, says the spokesman of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo. “*It is erroneous to believe that these people are sent to detention camps, with barbed wire, warders and an atmosphere of a prison; they are not detained in closely guarded groups. In fact they are not guarded at all!*” True, the gates are neither locked nor guarded; but Twalimfeni Joyi was fined £3 or 4 days for leaving the farm Wesselsvlei without permission or escort. McGregor Mgolumbane faced a charge because he left the farm one Saturday morning to go to the Native Commissioner to order food, because his

supplies were exhausted, to order food because he cannot leave the farm freely to purchase his own supplies. On the way to the Native Commissioner he enquired the time and found he was too late to reach the office before 1 p.m. He turned back, but having been seen on the road, was arrested after he had returned to the area of the trust farm. Not "an atmosphere of a prison"? No warders? But he faced a charge of leaving the farm—even to seek food. And he is imprisoned in utter isolation, away from his family, his friends, his home. This punishment without trial is indeterminate; it depends upon the whim of the Government. The smooth talk from the Minister—that all removal orders are reviewed at least once a year—is meaningless when people remain in exile for eight, nine, ten years.

The camps are not the end of the story. Other deportees are scattered over the Northern Transvaal, over Natal and Zululand—one here, one there, many miles from each other. Right up to the Rhodesian border, to the edge of Swaziland, in the heart of Zululand, in the Transkei, in the Cape, they can be found—if you know where to look for them.

With cruel ingenuity, the man from the Transkei is banished to the Northern Transvaal, so that he may be isolated from those around him, until he learns to speak the new language; the Sesuto-speaking men from Zeerust and Sekhukhuniland are sent to the borders of Swaziland, to the heart of Zululand, so that they too must struggle with an unknown tongue. Employment? They may work as labourers for a few pounds a month—these men who were leaders among their own people, who were trade unionists, chiefs, university students—or they may be put to herding cattle.

One of the deportees, banished to the Zululand border, received £2 when he was deported in 1958; he has received nothing since, and there is still no employment for him. "I am living with friends I made after my arrival here. The only assistance I got is from my wife. There are no post office facilities, and the nearest phone is in Swaziland, over the mountains. The nearest hospital and doctor are 39 miles from where I am. . . . Life out here is not worth living."

Ben Baartman wrote: "My experience of banishment is that you are just taken to an empty town and nobody seems to care for you. You are given neither food nor any sort of job through which you can support yourself. In other words you are like a person who has been buried alive."

Chief Miya, now exiled already for six years in Pietersburg, was not allowed to return to Bergville to bury his daughter or his mother. Others write of death in their families, but of no permission to return for the funeral or to settle family affairs. Ben Baartman was granted permission to return from Zululand to Worcester for one week when his wife died, and this only after a storm of public protest over his orphaned children. Banishment is absolute, total and inflexible; there is no room in it for compassion, for any concession to human needs and anxieties.

In Parliament in 1959 the Minister gave this reply to questions about the family of one deportee.

*"His family is allowed to join him if they so desire. . . ."*

The family is therefore permitted to trek into the desert and establish itself in a camp on the edge of the Kalahari or in a hut in some isolated part of the Transvaal or Zululand, out of reach of any amenities, such as schools or hospitals, and with no means of subsistence other than £2 a month, which the deportees may or may not get, or employment at £4 or £5 a month, which the deportee may or may not be able to obtain. Some have done it. Mrs. Moilwa travelled with her children 500 miles and more to Eshowe and made her way to her husband, to find him herding cattle and living in an empty hut. She stayed some months and then returned to put their child into school again. And she battled on in poorly paid domestic service until at last she died. Her husband was brought from Zululand, only to arrive two hours after the death of his wife. He has now returned to his banishment, alone. Chief Miya's wife followed him into exile to Pietersburg, and is ready to join him again after coming to Johannesburg for the birth of their child. But the rest of the children are still far away in Bergville. Chief Mopeli's wife was exiled with him; she is still there in the desolation of Frenchdale.

The other families are large, however; they cannot find means either to visit their husbands or to stay with them. The separation is complete, and the families struggle on, abandoned to sickness and death. Friends and relatives save the forsaken families from starvation; but it is not, cannot be much more than that. Wives are left to till the fields and raise small crops to feed themselves and their children, or they may have to leave the children and go to the towns to seek work; children at school must leave because there is no longer money for school fees. From every

exile's family is a moving report of hardships and poverty.

One lonely wife writes: "My husband was taken away by the Magistrate on the orders of the Government. The Government does not provide—when I go to the office of the Magistrate, I do not see him. I do not work and I don't earn money. I was helped by my husband when he was here, because we sold our crop. There has been a famine. Rain is scarce, the ploughing has not been successful. We are starving and the people suffer many hardships."

Visits to some of these families in the Transkei have revealed their stark existence. Most of them have had to remain, because at least in their home area they would not starve altogether.

The future of the banished offers no hope. Their prospect of release and return to their families and their homes is remote, and in many cases the conditions attached make the release totally unacceptable. Former chiefs are offered release only on condition that they accept the new régime and undertake not to cause unrest. In the areas to which they are deported there is no prospect of earning an adequate living for themselves and their families, even when they *can* obtain employment. Chief Miya started at £2 a month, and after 6 years he earns £4. The highest wage of any deportee at present is £6 5s. od. Most are earning less than £6 a month.

These absolute powers of deportation are vested in the Governor-General—after 31st May, the President of the Republic—for the persecution and victimisation of people who have committed *no* crime, who have *not* broken the laws of the country, harsh as they are, who have *not* been brought before any court of law.

Yet Bangiliswe Joyi could write, after years of exile, after losing his application to have his deportation set aside: "We are not discouraged by losing our case, and what has pleased us most is that our being taken away has not frightened those from whom we have been taken, but made them bolder than they had been."

## ANGLICANS AND APARTHEID

THE REV. T. N. W. BUSH

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AFTER twenty centuries of Church history, it should not be necessary to define the mission of the Christian Church as stated by its founder. But in a nominally Christian land like South Africa, where most churchmen claim—by their actions if not by their spoken opinions—that apartheid and fellowship are reconcilable, a brief summary of accepted theology appears necessary.

According to the founder of Christianity, the Church exists to pursue one objective: the building, first of all, of close personal relationships between God and men; and then, as a natural consequence, between people themselves. It aims to establish a brotherhood between all men under the paternal care and guidance of God. It is to be a true family, with God as its head and all humanity of all times and places as its dependent children. Millions of sermons have pointed the analogy, justifying it by ample evidence from the New Testament and the patristic writings of the early undivided Church. It follows logically that differences of skin pigmentation, place of residence, race, spiritual condition or cultural and educational development cannot alter the fact that all men and women belong together and are responsible for each other as members of one universal family. Providentially planned differences in appearance, colour or culture must help rather than hinder the attainment of the Kingdom of God by providing that very diversity of gifts, interests and abilities which must make for the greatest possible attainment by the family as a whole. All people are complementary and necessary, like the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle, in the closest juxtaposition to each other. Apartheid . . . the separation of the pieces . . . must frustrate the perfecting of the Kingdom, the master-plan of God Himself for His creation.

In theory the Anglican Church, like other Christian bodies in South Africa, accepts these basic teachings and gives them a wider and more literal interpretation than other Churches, apart from the Roman Catholics. In Anglican social doctrine there is certainly none of the sophistry or rationalization of Dutch Reformed teaching, which claims that people of the various

racial groups are "equal but different"—whatever that may mean! How can there be, when it is freely agreed that the high-priestly prayer of the founder in Gethsemane, "that they all may be one", has been accepted by Christians of all ages as the fundamental justification for the continued existence of the Church.

But in practice a curious and saddening contradiction is at once apparent: what is accepted as theologically indisputable also appears to be dismissed as practically inexpedient, if not impossible. The teaching is not carried into the everyday world of actual relationships, and Christ's plea for family unity remains but a piously held and beautiful philosophy. In spite of the fact that Anglican churchmen hold controlling positions in commerce and industry, including the gold mining houses, and are therefore able to force changes upon the Government in a more Christian direction, hardly any use at all has been made of such opportunities as have arisen. Indeed, on the contrary, it was Anglican business interests in Natal which approached the Government with requests to apply the Group Areas Act in the Union for the first time, to protect them from the competition of Indian traders. Anglican lay opinion, expressed in the various synods through the years of crisis, has been notoriously and obstructively conservative towards any suggested opposition to the Government. Nothing, it seems, must be done which could in any way prejudice business interests. Rather, patience must be exercised in the hope that "something will happen" to unseat the present administration. At times there is evidence for a suspicion, however, that even this is more than a large proportion of Anglican businessmen desire, that they really want a 'strong man' like Verwoerd to remain in power so that unsettling changes will be avoided and business will be permitted to continue as usual. The lay members of the Church have, through their more influential representatives, actually prevented any determined stand or effective counter-measures to unjust legislation which their ecclesiastical leaders might have initiated. They have sold their principles for a mess of dividends. Mammon sits firmly enthroned on the altars of white Anglican churches while God has withdrawn to the locations and reserves. The Government is consequently free to tolerate without any fears the purely verbal opposition of the bishops and their liberal subordinates. It knows that nothing will follow except greater Nationalist solidarity, a louder outcry against the outrageous blasphemy of 'uitlander' parsons and missionaries, the traditional



enemies of 'volk' and 'kerk' since the earliest Dutch settlements at the Cape. So permission is readily given for the indignation meetings, the marches to City Hall steps, the publication of anti-apartheid literature (most South Africans will not bother to read it, anyway). Rude letters may be permitted in the English press; angry sermons and synodical charges may be delivered to congregations who have, after all, been listening to that sort of thing for years. Unconscious confirmation of this appears in the booklet *'Where We Stand'*, the collected statements of Archbishop Clayton on the subject of unjust South African race laws. The operative word is 'stand', as no revolt of a practical kind has followed when the verbal stand has proved ineffectual. The professing Christians will listen and be satisfied and then, both uplifted and edified, go home to their roast joint. It is most unlikely that many of them will even agree wholeheartedly with what they have heard. And that is where it will all end. And if it does not, the eccentric or over-zealous 'liberalist' will be dealt with promptly as an example to the others, like Father Nye and Miss Hannah Stanton—detained during the Emergency—whose fate was a salutary lesson to other priests and missionaries.

It is only fair, at this point, to remember that this failure of Anglicans in South Africa to apply principles or follow up solemn pronouncements is equalled outside the country by other professed and often more vociferous enemies of racialism, and with less excuse to offer. In South Africa there is the real danger of punishment, persecution and ruin. No such penalties hang over those in Britain, for example, who have been rightly loud in their denunciation of the Sharpeville murders and yet have betrayed a strange reluctance to translate this into positive action, whether it be boycotts or agitation for governmental diplomatic measures against the offenders. Or rather, it is mysterious until it is remembered that Great Britain has nine hundred million pounds invested in the Union and that the British people have never "had it so good", thanks at least in part to the soiled profits wrung from exploited South African non-white labourers. Verbal protests and wringings of the hands cost nothing, satisfy public opinion and are soon forgiven and forgotten by those against whom they are directed. No dividends will be lost, no markets imperilled and the overall economic structure of the country, so precariously balanced, will not be touched. So the only power on earth able to end racial discrimination in South Africa without bloodshed, through its

virtual control over the delinquent's purse strings, fails to lift a finger to implement the rulings of its own national conscience.

Within the Church itself, the bishops in South Africa find themselves opposed and frustrated over and over again by their adherents in the parishes. The year before last, for example, the Diocesan Synod of Kimberley and Kuruman accepted a motion sponsored by the Bishop over the admission of non-white members to churches in white residential areas. Delegates were briefed with episcopal authority to instruct the councils in the parishes to erect notices outside their churches inviting people of all races to attend services. This had been done at Cape Town Cathedral in the Mother Diocese for some two years, so it was hardly a novel idea and had been proved a useful one. The reaction on the 'platteland' was, however, exactly what the synod representatives had expected: the instruction was disregarded, and a threatening attitude towards the Bishop developed. In the parish of De Aar, the council unanimously agreed to "have none of it", while certain members of the congregation threatened to join the Dutch Reformed or Methodist Church if the notice was erected. The minister of the parish, a Cambridge graduate conditioned by many years of work in predominantly Afrikaner areas, found himself "in complete sympathy" with his white flock's attitude. Needless to say, therefore, the notice did not go up. Perhaps there is no connection between this matter and the subsequent resignation of the Bishop of Kimberley and Kuruman, but there is an inevitable and justifiable suspicion in many minds that he has realized the hopelessness of continuing the struggle on his own while most of his army is repeatedly going over to the side of the enemy. Those who call on the South African bishops to continue the struggle against injustice in the country should realize that the few diocesans who possess the courage and conviction to do so are rendered virtually powerless by the desertion of their own clergy and people at times when action rather than words is required. They experience, in fact, the abandonment and loneliness which was the lot of their Lord and Master on the first Good Friday, when the disciples "forsook him and fled".

But although there are those like ex-Bishop Reeves and the ex-Bishop of Kimberley and Kuruman, most bishops accept the fact of separate worship or else rationalize it in highly exaggerated terms of linguistic difficulties or the need to cater for the difficult working hours of African and Coloured members.

Another anomaly which has caused loss of confidence is the apparent ease with which most dioceses have accepted and perpetuated different rates of pay for their white and non-white clergy and lay workers. The fact that most non-whites cannot afford the high fees of the Church schools is accepted with relief by white Anglicans; while the prospect of educational integration in the European government primary School of Maseru, capital of the British Protectorate of Basutoland, has sent many Church members, some of them government employees, scurrying across the border to find places for their children in the Nationalist Government schools of South Africa. Some such Christians are even attempting to find employment outside the territory, in the Republic itself or in the two more backward Protectorates.

It is bewildering and saddening to the non-white and liberal white in South Africa to find the outside world looking to the Anglican Church for a positive and determined resistance to the Government's racial policies. Would that it could be so, but Trevor Huddleston published the sad and sobering truth about the matter in his *'Naught for your Comfort'* as far back as 1956. Since then the demands of the Sharpeville crisis in particular have highlighted the Church's inability or unwillingness to act. The supreme challenge which those March days constituted for all professing Christians was met by a pitifully small group of bishops and priests led by the Archbishop of Cape Town and Bishop Reeves, in the teeth of widespread disapproval by clergy and laymen alike. One of the Archdeacons of the Church even declared publicly that Joost de Blank had proved himself unfitted to occupy the Archbishop's chair, and that Bishop Reeves would be doing the Church in South Africa a signal service if he stayed in England permanently. Indeed, throughout the early days of the Emergency, the Johannesburg English newspapers published scores of letters from indignant Anglicans demanding the resignation of their bishop. A few months later, Canon Bryan Green, who was on a mission visit to two South African dioceses from his home parish of Birmingham, condemned the anti-Government slant, as he put it, given to South African news by most British newspapers, assuring his listeners that responsible people in the United Kingdom had nothing but sympathy for the misrepresented white people of South Africa. In all parts of the country the detention of Father Nye, Miss Stanton and hundreds of other Christians, without charge or trial, was accepted

and almost ignored by the great majority of their white co-religionists, while it is on record that the clergy of one city actually refused to visit detainees in jail when given the opportunity to do so. The whole sad story of Christian failure can, however, be exemplified and summed up by the Anglican Church councillor of one of the Pretoria parishes who went to his rector and said: "I am sorry, padre, but my wife and I have given the matter serious thought and have decided to transfer to the Methodist Church. Please do not take the matter as personal in any way, but you must admit that it is embarrassing to be Anglicans these days, not to mention the business consequences. It has not been an easy decision to make after our long association with the Church; you will remember that my wife's grandfather was a bishop in Scotland. But what would happen to our children, padre, if Scott, Reeves and Huddleston got their way?" Yes, indeed, what would happen if they got their way? And what would have happened if Jesus had got his way in opposing the shallow hypocrisy of his own co-religionists? And what would have happened to the Christian Church if he had abandoned the cause as our councillor was prepared to do? One might answer with the further question: what will happen if they do *not* get their way and African nationalism has to 'go it alone' or look to other agencies for support? And what will happen to the children, anyway, when they have to face their judge and answer, together with their parents and grandparents, for the crimes and the suffering of continued racial discrimination and selfishness? They have forgotten, or they do not care, who it was who once said: "I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat . . . in prison, and ye visited me not. Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of the least of these, ye did it not to me".

The failure of Anglicans to face firmly the demands of the racial situation has been principally the result of economic factors. Unlike his Dutch Reformed contemporary, the English-speaking Christian is not very interested in theological or philosophical argument. He is almost exclusively a materialist. The Archbishop and others who advocate positive anti-Government action are seen as the challengers of white privilege. If they get their way, a levelling of material conditions between black and white is seen as a consequence, with an enormous sacrifice in living standards by the whites. And as it is precisely the high wages, the cheap servants, the good dividends, the quiet untroubled sundowners in the evening and an early retire-

ment from toil and responsibility to the coast, which make life in South Africa seem so worth-while, such clerical liberalism simply cannot be tolerated. Besides, there is the uneasy suspicion that equal competition between men from different racial groups for the good things of life would reduce many whites to a position of naked inferiority. Many realize only too well the relative deficiency of themselves and their progeny in intellect and manual skills to welcome the abolition of privilege and protection. It is inevitable that such considerations should overflow from the secular into the religious thinking of the master race. The Church must, therefore, recognize itself as one of the supporting pillars of the social edifice in which it finds itself and must use religion to confirm or rationalize the so-necessary prejudices. If the Bible seems to teach contrary ideas, it must be re-interpreted or at least soft-pedalled. The parable of the Good Samaritan must be given a 'spiritual' rather than a 'literal' meaning. And above all, the eternal dichotomy between religion and politics must be perpetuated: the individual soul must be encouraged to occupy an ivory tower of personal morality and holiness, unscathed by the problems of the greater society to which it belongs. Social matters are the concern of the Government because God has willed it that way. Men like ex-Bishop Reeves are usurping the responsibilities of the politician and social worker, who have derived them by direct delegation from God Himself. Worse than that, they are threatening by their talk of equality the privileged stipends and working conditions of their brother-clergy and the security and prosperity of their wives and families. Even in the centre of the most enlightened Christian society, the only liberals deemed worthy of support are those who, like the leaders of the Progressive Party, offer material security through the backing of such agencies as the Anglo-American Corporation, and a guarantee that "our traditional way of life" will be perpetuated and hence our childrens' future assured. This is a natural enough wish, of course, except when it involves, in the honouring, the denial of all real promise to the vast majority of other South Africans simply because they possess a differently coloured skin.

On May 31st, 1960, the Union of South Africa celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. Speeches of Cabinet Ministers often refer to a much longer period of South African history, however: the three hundred years of European Christian influence and beneficence on the sub-continent. "Much has been done", it is

claimed, "in a very short time". Perhaps the period referred to, whether it be fifty or three hundred years, is a short enough time if you have enough to eat, comfort at home and golf on Wednesdays and at the week-ends to hasten it along. Otherwise it can assume the feel of eternity itself, an unending and unchanging hell which may be the same in another fifty or three hundred years time. The Church in South Africa has, in fact, had more than long enough to work out a Christian solution to the racial problem. But does the Church really want a Christian solution? Clergy and laymen find acquiescence both safe and comfortable. The Church schools demonstrate the position perfectly; they could not continue to function as they are, as a training ground for an economic aristocracy, outside the framework of apartheid. At one such school in the Orange Free State, most servants receive the princely wage of five pounds and ten shillings monthly, while old Timothy—who started his career in the institution as a shoe-black and fire-lighter forty years ago—now receives seven pounds and ten shillings each month and pedals his way to his work each morning and back in the evening to the African location four miles away. The Africans who live on the premises must eat their food squatting in a corner of the yard which surrounds their squalid tenement rooms, in order that the Church may turn out another generation of Christian gentlemen who have learned English and Arithmetic and the art of keeping their hands clean and leaving all manual work to the blacks. No change is deemed possible as it would involve higher fees for the already over-burdened parents, smaller salaries for the teachers who would certainly transfer their energies to government institutions immediately, or a general lowering of the living standards in the schools, putting them out of step with the real South African world outside. Just as the devout Roman Catholics of the once Belgian Congo must be blamed for failing to face up to avarice and selfishness in the eighty years of their colonial responsibility, so must the Christians of South Africa, in particular those who have known better, be blamed for tolerating the retarded growth and economic malnutrition of the non-white for three centuries—offering nothing more than sporadic verbal protests, while enjoying all the richness of living themselves.

The refusal of the Russian Church during the nineteenth century to identify itself with the struggle of the masses for their freedom, the refusal to recognize the sufferings and disabilities of the 'dark people' as a challenge, a contradiction of every New



Testament teaching, led inevitably to the atheism and persecutions of the post-revolutionary period. With frightening similarity the Church in South Africa has turned its back upon the stretching towards freedom of those imprisoned in the colour of their skins. Preoccupied with the pursuit of respectability and material security, its silence as much as its spoken criticism has ranged it against African liberation throughout the continent, and on the side of the racial reply.

Little if any time remains for a change to take place. Yet it is surely no exaggeration to predict that unless such a change does take place immediately, unless there is a general discovery and acceptance of the spirit of the Anglican prophets of this generation and a willingness to witness, suffer and even die for the truths enunciated by clergymen like Huddleston and Michael Scott, the future for the Church is bleak indeed. The full fury of African disillusionment may destroy it for ever as an effective force on the sub-continent.





## THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF RACE

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PRIOR to 1959 university education in South Africa was mainly, although not entirely, the privilege of the whites. The white fifth of the population, 3 million, enjoyed eight universities, some fairly small, but others reaching an enrolment of six or so thousand students. Half of these universities were Afrikaans medium, while half were English. There were barely enough students coming from the 12 million non-whites to fill one good-sized university college. Some hundreds went to the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg and to the University of Cape Town, where they were welcomed in the classrooms but were permitted only a limited place in extra-mural activities. In the University of Natal some non-whites, mainly Indians, were received, but only in separate classrooms, and there was the small medical school—with less than 100 non-white students—as part of Natal University at Wentworth, near Durban. Finally, there was Fort Hare University College, totally non-white, with nearly 500 students, to which I was appointed as Professor of Law at the beginning of 1958. No non-whites were admitted to any of the four Afrikaans universities.

To the Nationalist Government, ever widening instead of closing the ambit of apartheid, it was thought dangerous that any of the 'white' universities, drawing their revenues mainly from public funds, should allow non-whites to mix with whites in the classrooms, the laboratories, and, possibly, some few other forms of university life. A new policy, therefore, was embodied in legislation. In the future no further non-whites were to be allowed admission to any white university, though dispensation might conceivably be granted in rare and special cases. Non-white higher education was to be spread over five university colleges, of which only Fort Hare was then in existence. All of these were to be ethnic, and were to serve a separate section of the non-white population. There were to be three tribal colleges, one in the Northern Transvaal for the Sotho, one in Zululand for the Zulu, and Fort Hare itself, in the Eastern Province, for the Xhosa. In addition, there was to be a

college for the Coloured in the Western Cape, and one for Indians in Durban.

Fort Hare had been in existence for fifty years. It received non-whites from all over the Union and beyond, including Indians from Natal, and Coloured students from the Cape. At the time ethnic education was introduced, it had reached an enrolment of nearly 500 students, and was growing at the rate of 100 a year. The other two tribal colleges were opened at the beginning of 1960, as was the Coloured college at the Cape. The Indian college in Durban was opened this year. It was not enough for the Government to introduce Bantu Education. It had also to introduce three sorts of Bantu Education, and then add Indian Education and Coloured Education as well.

It is now over two years since the necessary legislation was passed, and some 18 months since three of the new colleges began to operate. What so far are the results? Fort Hare itself is undergoing a process of dismemberment. It has already lost a number of its potential students, and in a year or two will have lost all its Coloured and Indian ones, as well as all African students who do not happen to be Xhosa. Its numbers have already shrunk from 500 to 390, and it is inevitable that they will, in a year or two, fall to 200 or even lower. The other two tribal colleges are, of course, in their infancy; one has 86 students, the other 48. I entertain the gravest doubts as to whether, within the foreseeable future, the numbers at either of them will grow to even the 200 level. The Government may spend money, as it has been doing, with extravagance. It may make adequate, even generous, provision for new buildings. It may provide attractive conditions for the staff. It may even search the side-paths for new African students. But it will be many years—if ever—before any of these new colleges reach anything like the figure of enrolment which could be expected from a healthy and growing university. You cannot build up an institution for higher learning except on the basis of properly matriculated students, and under Nationalist rule, the present potential is barely enough for one university college, let alone five. And what possible justification can there be for splitting the non-white university population among five institutions? Why did not the Government foster Fort Hare instead, leading it to full university status, instead of dismembering it altogether? Now a young Zulu, who three years ago would have been received and encouraged at Cape Town, Johannesburg or Fort Hare is

being forced to conduct studies in a college of 48 students in a remote part of Northern Natal.

The Government, naturally, is committed to doing all in its power to make the new colleges succeed. Money has accordingly been spent, in an unusually lavish way, on buildings and staff. In capital and current expenditure, each non-white university student is costing the taxpayer five, in some instances even ten times as much as the ordinary white student. Yet little or nothing has been done to invite public competition for posts in the new colleges, and these have all been filled departmentally. The result has been that virtually all of the new appointments have been made from only one section of the community; if they do not all bear Afrikaans names, they are all Afrikaans-speaking. Of the five Principals, four are Afrikaans, while the fifth—who bears an English name and is, presumably, English-speaking—was the main exponent of the Government's policy of academic apartheid two years ago, when the Select Parliamentary Committee sat to take evidence on the University College of Fort Hare Bill.

Fort Hare was an English-speaking institution; it had been so from the beginning. All the students, and most of the staff, were English-speaking. Eight of the staff were dismissed when the Government took over, and eight others, mostly African professors and lecturers, have resigned. Their places have been filled, to a man, by Afrikaners. Fort Hare is not only being dismembered; it is in the process of being turned, so far as the language of its students will permit, into an Afrikaans institution. This has, of course, occasioned the most profound resentment and bitterness among Africans and Indians especially. Professor Z. K. Matthews, one-time Acting Principal of Fort Hare and the doyen of African university professors, was urged by the Government to remain. He was within two years of retiring age, and would have qualified for a reasonably generous pension. But he felt that he could not serve the new régime, and the course of events over the last 18 months has shown how wise and inevitable his decision was. For some years now the Government has maintained a force of special police in the tiny village of Alice, next door to Fort Hare, solely in order to watch the activities of the students. As a result of the reports from these police, a number of final year students, including the whole of the Students' Representative Council, were refused re-admission to Fort Hare at the beginning of the academic year.

The students have been simmering with unrest; but the activities of the police, combined with the threat of expulsion, have so far been sufficient to maintain a façade of peace. How the new college for Indians in Durban will fare remains to be seen. Leaders of Indian opinion have called for a boycott of the institution, and the new Principal, Professor Olivier of the University of Cape Town, will doubtless have a very difficult task ahead of him. The most peaceful of the five colleges would seem likely to be that of the Western Cape, but its intake of students will be limited by the small numbers of Coloured students equipped to pass the university entrance examination, and growing political opposition to Government policies among the Coloured has already made an issue of the special Coloured college.

The well-established universities of South Africa draw their revenues almost entirely from the taxpayer; their endowments, judged by English or American standards, are negligible. Why, then, has the South African Government taken upon itself to deny to students, solely because of their colour, the right to the best education which their abilities merit, more particularly when one half of our universities are not only eager to receive them, but bitterly resent their exclusion?

Whether ethnic education will provide the non-white peoples of South Africa with the higher training they so passionately want is profoundly to be doubted. That it will swell the torrent of racial rancour in South Africa seems certain.



# DEATH IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINES

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THIRTY-SIX thousand<sup>1</sup> men have been killed in accidents on the gold mines since the beginning of the century. Untold others have died from septicaemia and other diseases contracted as a result of accidental injury. Many more have lost limbs or eyes, or have been otherwise disabled.

The annual death toll from accidents on South African mines fluctuates around 800. The figure for 1960 was close to 1,400 because of the Coalbrook disaster of January 21. In Britain the number of deaths from mining accidents seldom exceeds 200 a year.

In 1956, the last year for which we have detailed figures, 816<sup>2</sup> miners were killed in accidents and the accident death rate was 1.56 per 1,000 workers. In 1910 the rate was 4.40 for black and 3.49 for white workers.<sup>3</sup> But the incidence of accidents increased from 30 per 1,000 workers in 1927<sup>4</sup>, when the existing definition of accidents was first adopted, to 58.7<sup>5</sup> in 1956.

The decrease in the accident death rate must therefore be attributed to improved first aid and medical treatment rather than to preventive measures. An accident is not a fortuitous, unavoidable event. It is, broadly, the result of defective adaptation to or control of environment, and could have been averted by the adoption of adequate care or technical and material safeguards. The high and increasing incidence of mining accidents points to deficiencies in management.

A contributory factor has been the penetration to greater depths, which now exceed 9,000 feet in the deepest gold mines. Temperature, humidity, and pressures are greatest, ventilation systems least effective, and rock bursts most frequent, at such depths. Deaths from heat strokes increase, miners tire more

<sup>1</sup>Chamber of Mines An. Reports.

<sup>2</sup>1958, U.G. 15 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1956 pp. 69-70.

<sup>3</sup>1911, Tvl. Mines Dept. An. Rep. Govt. Min. Eng. for 1910, p. 114.

<sup>4</sup>1928, U.G. 34 An. Rep. Govt. Min. Eng. for 1927, p. 47.

<sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, p. 76.

quickly, and accidents due to fatigue tend to multiply. But these consequences are not inevitable. The fault lies in the failure to ensure that the quality of safety work keeps pace with the degree of risk involved.

Relative neglect often occurs also in shaft sinking and development, usually the most hazardous stages in mining. Partly for this reason the Orange Free State gold mines have an annual accident death rate of 3 to 4 per 1,000 workers,<sup>6</sup> which is similar to the incidence on the Witwatersrand 50 years ago.

If the number of accidents varied strictly with the natural hazards of mining operations, one would expect the incidence on coal mines to be lower than on gold mines. Coal is mined to only about one-tenth the depth of gold mines, and access is by inclined shafts through which the men walk; the necessity of lowering by cages is obviated, and accidents from overwind do not occur. Yet the death rate from accidents on coal mines is not lower than that on gold mines. The respective rates in 1956 were 1.68 and 1.69 per 1,000 workers.<sup>7</sup> The chief cause of accidents in coal mines is from trucks and tramways; falls of rock and gas explosions cause most of the deaths.

*Accidents and Deaths on the Transvaal Gold Mines*

Nature of Accident	1907-8				1956			
	Accidents No.	%	Deaths No.	%	Accidents No.	%	Deaths No.	%
Falls of Ground ...	303	22.6	192	25.6	4,808	21.02	271	41.31
Falls of Material ...	186	11.2	58	7.7	3,860	16.87	44	6.71
Falls in Shafts, Excavations, etc. ...	113	6.4	67	9.0	202	0.88	42	6.40
Trucks and Trams ...	151	8.3	26	3.5	5,291	23.13	102	15.55
Other Machinery ...	108	6.0	24	3.2	350	1.53	12	1.83
Explosives ...	271	25.0	237	31.6	206	0.9	46	7.01
Movements of Cages Power, Fire, Water ...	202	12.2	123	16.4	249	1.09	76	11.59
Other ...	141	8.3	22	2.9	7,910	34.58	63	9.60
	1,475	100.0	749	100.0	22,876	100.00	656	100.0

The table does not disclose the nature of the human factors involved. The most important ones are: the employment of inexperienced and untrained men on dangerous operations; the colour bar; inadequate supervision; speed-up; and low compensation rates for deaths and injuries.

<sup>6</sup>An. Reports of Govt. Min. Eng.

<sup>7</sup>1958, U.G. 15 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1956, p. 69.

*Untrained Miners*

The employment of inexperienced miners was at one time a major cause of accidents. How, asked Mr. Fergusson, the Boksburg Inspector of Mines in 1911, could farmers, butchers, bakers, hairdressers and persons generally unsuccessful in their occupations, "be expected to understand the ordinary ground in the mine, much less where faulting and slips are met with"?<sup>8</sup> The Mining Regulations Commission reported in 1910 that mine managements made extensive use of unskilled whites, "often entirely ignorant of mining, and whose principal and often only recommendation is their physical fitness and their suitability for rough work".<sup>9</sup>

Untrained whites, after working a few months underground, were required to supervise gangs of Africans. Unstable, not doing the actual work performed by Africans, the white miner had often little knowledge of the mine on which he worked and still less of the African committed to his charge. Not surprisingly, the high accident rate was attributed largely to his "carelessness and lack of knowledge".

Harsher things were said about the black miners. Typical of the comments that appeared in the early reports of the Government Mining Engineers was the assertion that though they were "docile and quick to learn certain simple classes of work, their brain capacity does not enable them to understand the reason of things, or to realize the danger resulting from disobedience to orders, or from the many complex conditions of work underground".

The myth of an innate racial deficiency in the black man served to hide the real problem and the actual culprit. It was certainly not the illiterate peasant, inexperienced in industrial and mechanical arts, and unable to understand orders given in English or pidgin 'Fanakalo'. The responsibility lay with mine owners and managers who sent the Africans underground, perhaps on the same day as they arrived after a long exhausting journey, and without training or instruction.

The Republican Government wanted instruction to be given. In 1896, when the accident death rate was five per 1,000 workers, a regulation was enacted that read:

"Where any workers, especially persons of colour, are unable to read the regulations, the person in charge of them

<sup>8</sup>1912, U.G. 49 Rep. of Min. Eng. for 1911, p. 110.

<sup>9</sup>Final Rep. Mining Reg. Com. 1907/10, pp. 230-4.



shall see that such workers are made acquainted with the regulations concerning them or appertaining to their particular occupation and duty."<sup>10</sup>

The Chamber of Mines objected to the clause and in particular to the words "especially persons of colour" on the ground that "it would be simply impossible for the managers to carry them out".<sup>11</sup> Mine owners did not want to be under compulsion to provide instruction; but, if compulsion was to be applied, they wanted to limit the instruction to whites.

It was an uneconomic policy as well as an inhumane one. By keeping the African ignorant, mine owners not only sent up the accident rate but also strengthened the white miners' claim to a monopoly of the occupations conventionally assigned to them. Competency and colour came to be inextricably associated.

#### *Competency or Colour*

Formal instruction, when provided, was limited to whites, originally by way of apprenticeship and classes in drilling, and later at evening courses in mining techniques organised by the Transvaal University College. From these efforts emerged the Government Mining Training School which was opened in 1911 at Wolluter.

Coloured and Africans had to learn on the job. Some of them achieved an adequate standard of efficiency in skilled operations. When the Volksraad, at the request of white workers, amended the mining regulations in 1896 to prohibit "persons of colour from holding an engine-driver's certificate of competency",<sup>12</sup> the Chamber of Mines objected "on the ground that many persons of colour are competent engine-drivers".<sup>13</sup>

The unsuccessful strike of the white miners at New Kleinfontein in 1907 showed that Africans could work the mines under greatly reduced supervision, and drove home the realization that white artisans were losing their initial lead derived from wider cultural experience and technical superiority. The Mining Industry Commission in 1907-8, anxious to protect the white's monopoly of skilled work, issued a warning: "The theory that the Native is a 'mere muscular machine' must be discarded", it concluded. "Experience has shown that he can

<sup>10</sup>Law 12 of 1896, cl. 146.

<sup>11</sup>8th An. Rep. 1896, p. 64.

<sup>12</sup>Law 12 of 1896, cl. 106.

<sup>13</sup>8th An. Rep. 1896, p. 63.

no longer be looked upon as debarred by lack of brain and industrial training from interfering with the white man's opportunities of employment and as merely an aid to enable the white man to earn wages sufficient to keep him in contentment".<sup>14</sup>

As Africans gained experience in the mines, whites looked to a statutory colour bar for security. The British administration in the Transvaal extended the discriminations introduced by the Republican Government, and Smuts made a further addition in regulations issued under the Mines and Works Act of 1911.

Brown and black workers were excluded from skilled work by three sets of provisions. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State, they could not obtain or use the certificates of competency that are required for the performance of various specified operations. Secondly, only white persons were permitted to hold the positions of shiftmen, gangers, banks men and onsetters, or to blast, lock and unlock lamps underground, attend boilers, and operate electric machines in a fiery mine. Thirdly, certain kinds of work, such as removing props in a colliery, could be carried out only under white supervision.

The regulations were based on a draft prepared by the Mining Regulations Commission of 1907. The only explanation it gave of the colour bar was the bald assertion that "wherever the safety of life and limb is concerned, only competent white persons should be employed".<sup>15</sup> Fifteen years later the Mining Regulations Commission of 1925, appointed to re-establish the colour bar, argued that "not even the most exceptional" Africans were endowed with "a regard for safety, a sense of responsibility, and a capacity to exercise control over others".<sup>16</sup>

Such reasoning is of the *post hoc, propter hoc* variety. Comparison with the work done by Africans in the copper mines of Katanga or in South African collieries would show the falsity of the assertion.

The ratio of white to black miners is as one to 26 in Natal collieries, to 13 in Transvaal collieries, and to 8 in the gold mines. Since the work of the white coal miner is limited to supervision, blasting and examination, his hours are staggered so as to give him a shorter working week than the African's. When white gold miners wanted to follow suit, they were told that a redundancy in the amount of supervisors would either increase

<sup>14</sup>Mining Industry Commission 1907/8, p. 33 of Report.

<sup>15</sup>Final Rep. Min. Reg. Com. 1907/10, p. 249.

<sup>16</sup>1936 U.G. 25 Rep. of Min. Reg. Com. paras 28, 118.

the accident potential or throw doubt on the value of their work.

Africans in coal mines do the actual work of cutting, loading, hauling and raising the coal. In addition to lashing and tramping, they operate complicated pneumatic or electric cutters with a high level of precision and speed. "It would be an eye-opener to those persons who contend that driving a tram is skilled work", wrote the Government Mining Engineer in 1920, "to see comparatively raw Natives operating the heavy and rather complicated cutters". For this work they were paid £3 a month, and the 'boss boys' who trained them, £4 10s.<sup>17</sup>

### *Supervision*

In gold and coal mines, the white miner is essentially a supervisor and instructor. His role is made necessary and guaranteed by the enormous turnover of African workers under the migrant labour system. There are always 'raw' men from the tribal areas who have to be initiated into the simplest mining processes.

So far from the colour bar being a safety device, it tends to bring about a low standard of accident prevention. The rigid and unrealistic separation between supervisory and manual processes makes for carelessness and inefficiency.

Africans, who do the work, are not properly trained to understand the purpose of rules and procedures. Many with long service become highly skilled, and can teach the white miner much, but have little incentive to show a sense of responsibility.

In contrast to early attitudes, many mine managers are now alive to the value of training new African workers to understand orders, safety precautions, the requirements of personal hygiene, and how to work safely underground before they go underground. A three or four day course of practical instruction is usually given in a model mine built on the surface. Experienced men may receive advanced training, and those who pass aptitude tests are specially trained for the supervisory post of 'boss boy'. Training in work reserved for whites is not, however, given to Africans, though many are often called on to carry out these functions.

Whites receive training but do none of the actual manual work. The division of function blunts the incentive to become efficient and tends to cultivate an indifference in managements and white miners to the African's safety. Prejudice, differences

<sup>17</sup>1921 U.G. 40 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng., p. 114.

of culture and inequality of status discourage the growth of sympathy. White miners are not fellow workers of the blacks, but their superiors. The whites are inclined to ignore the African's individuality and to regard 'their boys' as an amorphous, changing and easily replaceable mass of labour power.

Mr. Fergusson, the exceptionally outspoken Inspector of Mines for Boksburg, made a revealing comparison between the division of labour on the gold mines and in English mines. Mining was something of a hereditary occupation in England, where a miner's son would help his father by doing work of a kind allocated to Africans on the Rand. The English miner took great care to secure and make safe the places where a lad was set to work, and at the same time to point out dangers to him. But in the gold mines, "the death of a Native is not looked upon by miners here as a very serious affair".

Fergusson also contrasted the serious view taken by mine managements of assaults on Africans with their indifference to accidents.

"It is well known to the directors that hundreds of men lose their lives annually through carelessness on the part of the miners and apathy on the part of the officials, and yet, speaking generally, they appear to make no personal effort in attempting to have matters improved in this direction.

It is difficult to understand this anomalous attitude: the explanation may lie in the fact, as the old adage has it, that 'dead men tell no tales'. Certainly a live Kaffir who has been assaulted is in a position to do a great deal of harm on his return home by persuading his friends not to allow themselves to be recruited."<sup>18</sup>

White miners, defying the regulations, often make Africans do dangerous work, such as charging and lighting up, for which they are not trained, paid, or held responsible. "There is a tendency on the part of miners", reported Brakpan's Inspector of Mines, "to give word to their Natives to light up and to remain sitting at their box or walk away to some convenient place on the way out and there await the arrival of the Natives. With low sloping widths and with perhaps 70 holes to light up, the lot of the Native is not enviable."

While miners are often prosecuted, and usually punished with a £10 fine if convicted, for failing to examine the working face

<sup>18</sup>1912, U.G. 49 Rep. of Min. Eng. for 1911, p. 111.

thoroughly after blasting, and for allowing Africans to kill or injure themselves by drilling in or next to misfired holes, the penalty is light in comparison with the sentence of £10 or two months' imprisonment commonly imposed on Africans for breaking safety rules.

Mine managers are ultimately responsible for preventing accidents. They are occasionally prosecuted, but the penalties usually imposed appear to be slight in relation to the injuries caused. One manager was fined £15 as the result of an explosion in a Natal colliery that killed 20 Africans.<sup>19</sup> In another case a £25 fine was imposed for neglect that led to the flooding of a mine in which 39 Africans and 2 whites died.<sup>20</sup> After a gas explosion resulting in the death of 78 Witwatersrand colliers, the manager was fined £50.<sup>21</sup> The commission that inquired into the causes of the Coalbrook disaster found negligence on the part of the management, but so far there has been no prosecution.

The original Mines and Works Act of 1911 fixed a maximum penalty of £250 or 12 months' hard labour for any act or omission which endangered the safety of any person. If the accused had caused serious bodily injury, a fine of £500 could be imposed; while in the event of a person having been killed, the maximum penalty was £1000 or two years' imprisonment or imprisonment without the option of a fine. In the Consolidated Act of 1956 the higher penalty for cases in which death results has been omitted, so that the maximum is now £500 or 12 months' imprisonment, whether a person is killed or injured.

### *Speed-up*

Mining is carried out at greater pressure on the Witwatersrand and Orange Free State goldfields than elsewhere in the Union. 'Forcing the output' or 'increasing the monthly production' have been given as reasons for high death rates in gold and coal mines. Managers are responsible for speed-up, but are rarely brought to book for accidents caused by inadequate supervision and hurry.

The complaint is an old one. The Inspector of Mines for Germiston complained in 1911<sup>22</sup>:

"The pressure is felt throughout the mine. The officials who work possibly on the bonus system must be biased in their

<sup>19</sup>1937 U.G. 23 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1922, pp. 38, 29.

<sup>20</sup>1936 U.G. 17 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1935, pp. 59, 64.

<sup>21</sup>1937 U.G. 19 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1936, p. 68.

<sup>22</sup>1912 U.G. 49 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng., p. 108.

judgments when the question arises of the advisability of cutting pillars, building stalls and packs, or allowing a doubtful stope to remain idle. They are probably aware that Natives start work before the arrival of the gangers, who are therefore unable to inspect their working places. Of course, the officials will not confess that working under high pressure is answerable for scamped or even neglected work, and consequently the death rate."

The pressure comes from the top. Directors and managers believe that the cost of sinking a shaft decreases as the speed increases. Moreover, they want the mine to be brought quickly to the producing stage, when dividends can be declared, interest on capital saved, and capital gains realized on the stock exchange.

Shift bosses and miners, in turn, being paid at bonus or contract rates based on output, stand to earn more by making the African work harder. Two-thirds of the Africans on mines on the Rand, however, are not paid by results, and gain nothing from the drive for greater output.

Hustle, inefficiency, and a false sense of confidence inspired by the unusual strength of the hanging wall encourage men to take chances to the point of neglecting ordinary precautions. A miner will instruct Africans to shovel away rock before he has examined and secured the working place after the blast at the end of the preceding shift. This practice of putting them to work under faulty hanging before the miner or timber men had inserted props and packing was "an absurd and dangerous custom", said the Government Mining Engineer in 1919. "Native and Coloured persons can, many of them, timber quite well, and more attention should be given to the matter of temporary props to save the Native gangs from death and injury."<sup>23</sup>

Falls of rock are consequently a common cause of injuries, and today account for more than half the number of deaths and more than one-fifth of all accidents in gold mines.

The activities of the Accidents Prevention Committee, which was set up in 1913, produced a more serious attitude to accidents than that shown in the earlier period. Other factors making for greater caution are the adverse effect of a high death rate on the recruiting of workers, the slowing down of production owing to shifts lost through injuries, and the rising cost of compensation.

<sup>23</sup>1914, U.G. 28 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng. for 1913, pp. 46, 47.

Speed-up comes from the management's excessive desire to make profits. As the Coalbrook disaster showed, the drive for profits can reduce the margin of safety in other ways. It was alleged in the inquiry that the management had caused the coal pillars supporting the roof to be thinned down—'robbed' is the expression used—to such an extent that the roof caved in. It was against regulations to make the pillars smaller than the size shown in the plan; but according to the evidence, the management had done just that in order to "prolong the life of the section". The Commission found that "the subsidence of the mine was due to the negligence and omission of the present consulting engineer, the general managers, the managers and assistant managers".

#### *Miners' Compensation*

When Sir Godfrey Lagden prevailed on the Chamber of Mines in 1903 to compensate injured Africans, the sum of £35<sup>24</sup> was provisionally fixed for death or total disablement. The mines finally decided to pay voluntarily and without statutory obligation the same amounts as those prescribed for Chinese by the Labour Importation Ordinance: £10 for the loss of both hands or both feet or one foot and one hand, or for the complete and permanent sight of both eyes, or death. £5 was payable for the loss of one foot, or one hand, or one eye. Lads under 16 years and men from Central Africa received only half these amounts. No benefits were payable to a worker who "exposed himself to unnecessary danger or died or was injured by disease, illness or disorder, or while under the influence of intoxicating liquor".

At the figure of £10 paid to dependants, the African miner was cheap in death as in life and hardly worth the cost of safety measures that would curb the drive to step up production. An incentive to prevent accidents was therefore provided when the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 imposed on mine owners, despite their protests, a statutory obligation to indemnify injured Africans. They were to receive from £1 to £20 for permanent loss of trade if still able to do other work, and from £30 to £50 for permanent loss of earning power, or, from 1914 onwards, for death.

The Director of Native Labour assessed the amount of compensation, collected it from the mining company, and paid it

<sup>24</sup>14th An. Rep. for 1903, p. 147.



as he thought fit to the worker or his dependant. In the case of death the award did not form part of the deceased's estate; if the Director decided that he had no dependant, the money was repaid to the employer.


African miners were very dissatisfied with the scale and administration of benefits. The maximum of £50 allowed for total permanent incapacitation was the equivalent of 13 months' average earnings. A man who lost a leg and who had virtually no hope of getting employment, was compensated for partial incapacitation and received a maximum of £20, the equivalent of only a few months' earnings. The Natives' Grievances Mining Commission found that an injured African received less than the amount of his probable loss, and markedly less than the benefit paid to a white miner in relation to earning power. Yet, in spite of its inadequacy, the improvement made by the Act of 1911 had a salutary effect on accident prevention. "Compensation now paid to Natives for accidents", reported a mining inspector in 1914, "has been a great incentive to more care being exercised by the mine officials to reduce accidents".<sup>25</sup>

African miners were not brought within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1914. Like other 'Native labourers' as defined by the Native Labour Regulation Act, they continued to receive a maximum of £50 for total incapacitation as compared with the £144 paid under the Act of 1914 to a man earning £4 a month. Mine workers suffered this discrimination until 1934, when a new Workmen's Compensation Act was passed that covered workers of all races.

The Act of 1914 did not, however, abolish discrimination. It excluded Africans from the pension rights provided for other permanently disabled persons. This inequality remained under the existing Workmen's Compensation Act, which was passed in 1941. Coloured, Indian and white workers receive a pension equivalent to 55% of normal earnings. Africans are allowed only lump sum benefits, based on earnings, but not less than £150.

The widow of a white miner killed in the Coalbrook accident will draw a pension of from £30 to £75 a month, depending on the number of children, under the compensation law. The African miner's widow will get a lump sum of at least £180, paid to her at the rate of £3 or £4 a month, but no pension. In her case the number of children does not affect the amount of

<sup>25</sup>1914 U.G. 30 Rep. of Govt. Min. Eng., p. 107.



*In the mine, after blasting*

compensation. The white widow, in addition to her statutory pension, received £150 from the white Miners' Union (from which Africans are debarred by law), £75 from the Chamber of Mines to cover immediate expenses, her husband's salary for seven months, and a rent-free house for the same period. The African widows received none of these benefits, not even on a reduced scale. The white widow will also draw a pension from the Governor-General's National Mines Disaster Fund, which was established with money donated to the victims of Coalbrook. Benefits to Africans from this fund will take the form of lump sum payments, but no indication has yet been given of the amounts. An official of the Social Welfare Department was reported as having said on the question of granting relief from the fund to Africans: "It seems to us that there is no need to throw money about in all directions till we have the whole business sorted out".

#### *Accident Prevention*

MINE managements have made a substantial effort to reduce the accident and fatality rate by adopting measures within the traditional framework of the mining organisation, i.e. without disturbing the relationship between white and African worker or raising the status of the African miner.

An Accident Prevention Committee, formed in 1913, organises safety first competitions, first aid classes on gold mines and collieries throughout the Transvaal and Free State. About 50,000 Africans are trained annually in first aid operations. Those who qualify receive a cash bonus. Africans are likely to be taught nowadays in a demonstration school the proper use of equipment, tools, mine boots and explosives. Many of them are subjected to aptitude tests which divide them into categories such as mechanical and non-mechanical. Persons who appear to possess the necessary qualities are put through a 'boss-boy' course to be trained as supervisors of African gangs.

Another great improvement was introduced when men from tropical regions were given an acclimatisation course on the surface before being exposed to the rigours of work at great depths.

Below 9,000 ft. temperatures can be as much as 108°F. Preventive measures are adopted to extract the maximum

amount of work short of risking death from heatstroke. The medical instructions are that:

'A native with a temperature of 101°F to 105°F is hosed down with water for three to five minutes, compressed air being used to accelerate the cooling if his temperature is 103°F or more. He is then rested for an hour, after which his temperature is taken again. If it is then down to 100°F or less, he is sent back to work at a normal rate if his temperature had not been 103°F or more before cooling. If it had, he is sent back to light duty under the close supervision of his boss boy for the remainder of that shift but works at the normal rate the following day.

If a native with a temperature of 101°F to 105°F does not cool to 100°F or less after an hour's rest, he is not permitted to work again for the remainder of the shift but is sent to hospital for a medical examination.'

Before these precautions were taken, an average of 13 African miners died every year from heatstroke (1927-53). Since 1954 the average number of deaths from this cause has been 11.

### COALBROOK POSTSCRIPT

COALBROOK was the biggest disaster in the history of South African mining. Never before have so many men been killed in one fall of rock.

We do not yet know the full significance of what happened at the Coalbrook mine on January 21, 1960. Not all the facts have been disclosed, and the case is still open.

At the time of writing, the law officers have not yet made known their decision whether or not to prosecute. What we do have are the combined findings of the statutory board of inquiry and inquest published on July 1960. The main conclusions in summary form are:

The whole of the north-eastern sector of the underground workings in the No. 2 seam of the Coalbrook North Collieries subsided on January 21, 1960. None of the bodies of the 437 persons killed has been recovered. The court finds that death occurred by violence.

The subsidence resulted in methane gas being liberated into the underground workings. The cause of death was multiple injuries due to crushing by the fall of ground and/or anoxia (deficiency of oxygen) due to the presence of a large percentage of methane gas or coal dust.

All the persons entombed underground died at about 7.30 p.m. on January 21, 1960.

The subsidence of sectors of the No. 2 seam workings occurred between 7.26 p.m. and 7.32 p.m. on January 21, 1960, and followed on the collapse of portions of the so-called old

section 10 of the mine that had taken place on December 28, 1959, and at 4.45 p.m. on January 21, 1960.

The subsidence of the mine was due to the negligence and wrongful act and omission of the present consulting engineer (Mr. G. Dixon), the general managers (Mr. R. E. Burnton and Mr. W. Lorimer), the managers (Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Taylor), and the assistant managers (Mr. H. Easingwood and Mr. Shankland) and other managers employed at this colliery from 1950 to January 21, 1960, personally and through their servants and agents.

One other fact of importance must be noted. On March 7, 1960, the Inspector of Mines decided to close the mine as a safety measure. When the company appealed, however, the Administration at a higher level reversed the decision. The mine is now functioning subject to many safeguards which had apparently not been adopted before the catastrophe.

We do not know if the timely adoption of these safeguards would have averted the subsidence. One can only ask questions. Were rumblings and cracks noticed months before the roof caved in? Were pillars 'robbed' of coal? Did men as well as rats begin to desert the workings many hours before the collapse? Is it true that men were ordered to go back to work under the threat of prosecution?

The questions have not been fully answered. Perhaps they never will be. Amidst the doubt and confusion we can only conclude that the defects which were commented on 50 years ago have not yet been eliminated from South Africa's mining system.

South Africans reacted typically to Coalbrook: a great amount of verbal sympathy at the time, a quick return to forgetfulness (expedited by the political emergency), and a poor response in hard cash. After all, only six white men were killed. Moreover, the 431 dead African miners belonged to Basutoland and Moçambique and were therefore not the responsibility of South Africans. We have, unfortunately, no reason to console ourselves with the thought that their deaths will bring about reforms in mining laws and practices, or in the position of the black miner in the industry.

## TOWARDS A CLIMAX

BRIAN BUNTING

*Former Member of Parliament representing the Africans of the Western Cape in the South African House of Assembly.*

LAST year's State of Emergency has done nothing to restore equilibrium to a South Africa now in a condition of permanent and ever-deepening crisis. Outwardly, the situation may appear depressingly familiar, and the cynics will see little sign of progress. The Government seems miraculously to survive every ordeal; in fact it gains steadily at the polls. Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister, continues to claim his faith in God, while strengthening the Defence Force and the police. There is still no crack visible in the "granite" front of Nationalist Afrikanerdom.

Yet there has been a profound transformation in the Union during the last year. The Government has never really recovered from the Emergency. Not only materially, but also emotionally, it has been irreparably damaged. Where in 1948 the Nationalists swept into office with the firm conviction that in apartheid they possessed the answer to all the country's problems, today their optimism has vanished. Oppressed by a multitude of doubts and anxieties, attacked by enemies both inside and outside the country, the Nationalists today admit that they are fighting with their backs to the wall.

Giving his reasons for withdrawing South Africa's application to remain in the Commonwealth after becoming a republic, Dr. Verwoerd told the House of Assembly on 23 March 1961 that the other members of the 'club' had not demanded full equality between black and white in South Africa.

"They did not ask at this stage for this complete surrender, but to begin with they asked for small concessions. They said that all we had to do was make small concessions and then we could find a bridge. . . . It was perfectly clear to me, however, that those small concessions were to be made not only to overcome an immediate problem, namely to keep us within the Commonwealth, but also with an ultimate object. It was to be the beginning of undermining our policy and therefore the thin end of the wedge to create the prospect of full equality in the sense which I have just mentioned".

So there are to be no concessions. The smallest concession will only encourage the clamour for more, and the white man will eventually be drowned in the rising black flood.

While Verwoerd lay near death, with two bullet wounds in his head during the momentous April days of 1960, Acting Prime Minister Sauer took the opportunity to proclaim that the old book was closed and to hint at the need for a new one. He was repudiated as soon as Verwoerd recovered the use of his tongue. Later in the year the Nationalist 'moderates' began toying with representation of the Coloured in parliament by Coloured—to make them firmer allies of the whites and prevent their forming any mass alliance with the blacks. Again they were firmly slapped down by Verwoerd, who made it quite clear that parliament was for whites alone and that no non-white would ever have the right to sit there.

This "granite wall" policy of the Prime Minister (the phrase is his own) has eliminated all real possibilities of change from within the white sector. In parliament itself, all representation to the left of the Progressive Party has been steadily removed. First to go were the Communists, under the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act; then the Labour Party, abandoned by its United Party allies; then the so-called Natives' Representatives—most of them Liberals—under the quaintly-named 'Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act'. Judging by recent performances at the polls, the parliamentary life of the Progressive Party may end with the next general election. The United Party has sold itself completely to a policy of appeasement as the only hope of winning over the marginal 5 per cent. floating vote which, like some will o' the wisp, lures it ever further into the political marshes. Dissident elements in the Nationalist ranks there undoubtedly are, but they see no future outside of Afrikaner nationalism, and can only be regarded, at best for the moment, as unwilling prisoners of Verwoerd's intransigence.

The white politicians mouth the same old phrases, without conviction, without enthusiasm. The parliamentary quarrels are conducted without either light or heat, in a sort of 'never-never' land where nothing that anybody says or does makes any difference anyway. The Nationalist die-hards scarcely deign to talk at all; they have put all their faith in force.

So most whites rush, like passengers in a driverless bus running downhill with the brakes off, towards disaster. They are



fascinated by the fate which stares them in the face, but seem overcome by a feeling of helplessness and futility. Even the Nationalists do what they do, not because they know it is right, but because they cannot bring themselves to do anything else.

Afrikaner nationalism has reached the peak of its possible strength, and is already declining. It has proved unable to win allies, apart from its paid servants, among any other section of the people. The English-speaking South Africans are more antagonistic than ever before. As in all times of crisis, there is talk of a coalition, but there can be no such coalition on the basis of Afrikaner nationalism, and if it does come about on any other basis, Afrikaner nationalism is broken anyway. The Nationalist Government claims to stand for the survival of the white man in Africa, but its greatest strength—its Afrikaner exclusiveness—is at the same time its greatest weakness, preventing a united white front because it automatically rejects an alliance with all non-Afrikaners.

On the other hand, African nationalism grows persistently in strength and, if one excludes the Pan-Africanist Congress, has shown its superiority to Afrikaner nationalism in its willingness to work together with other racial groups on a basis of full equality. The Congress Alliance already embraces Africans, Indians, Coloured and Europeans within the framework of a single united front. The influence of African nationalism can be measured in the birth and development of the Liberal and Progressive Parties, which represent attempts by a growing but still small number of whites to come to terms with it.

Since the Emergency last year, the African political movement has taken a great step forward in organising and holding the Pietermaritzburg Conference on March 25 and 26. The plans for this conference were laid at a meeting of 36 African leaders, of differing schools of thought, in Johannesburg last December. The general purpose of the meeting was to discuss the political situation that had arisen with the ban on the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (P.A.C.), and to create unity among the African leaders in the fight for adult suffrage and for the right of Africans to take part in moulding the future of their country.

Sponsors of the December meeting included the Rev. N. B. Tantsi, who presided; Adv. Duma Nokwe, former Secretary-General of the banned A.N.C.; Professor Z. K. Matthews, former Acting Principal of Fort Hare University College; and

Chief A. J. Lutuli, former President-General of the banned A.N.C. Former members of both the A.N.C. and P.A.C. took part in the meeting and, for the first time since the latter body broke away from the former, agreed to work together on the Continuation Committee, together with members of the Liberal Party and independents.

The December meeting unanimously proclaimed—"that this conference agrees on the urgent need for African unity and pledges itself to work for it on the basis of the following:

(a) The removal of the scourge of apartheid from every phase of national life;

(b) The immediate establishment of a non-racial democracy;

(c) The effective use of non-violent pressures against apartheid."

A second resolution observed events in Africa, to which South Africa's policies were diametrically opposed, and warned the Government that the banning of the A.N.C. and P.A.C. aggravated the cause of strife, racial tension and conflict in the country.

A new constitution for a Nationalist republic, in which the views of the African people were contemptuously disregarded, had been imposed. Because the Africans were denied participation in the referendum on the establishment of a republic, they refused to accept the result. The meeting therefore called on the African people to attend an all-in conference, representative of urban and rural areas, to:

"(a) demand the calling of a national convention, representing all the people of South Africa, wherein the fundamental rights of the people would be considered;

(b) consolidate the unity of the African people."

A Continuation Committee was appointed, consisting of the original sponsors together with the Rev. B. R. Raujili, Secretary of the Interdenominational African Ministers' Federation; Mr. Julius Mali, Transvaal Organiser of the Liberal Party; Mr. Marks Shope, Chairman of the African Laundry Workers' Union; Mr. Joe Molefi, former P.A.C. official; Mr. Jordan Ngubane and Mr. H. Bengu, of the Liberal Party; Mr. Congress Mbata, of the South African Institute of Race Relations; and Mr. Govan Mbeki, former A.N.C. Executive Member.

The date of the conference was fixed for March 25 and 26, and the stage seemed set for the most representative all-in African conference in the Union's history. It was not long,

however, before the united front created at the December meeting was cracked, once again by withdrawal of one-time members of the banned P.A.C.

A statement issued at the beginning of March, signed by sponsor Joe Molefi and other former P.A.C. leaders, proclaimed:

"We will not be party to any discussion relating to the calling of any multi-racial conference whatsoever. We genuinely seek a basis of unity among the African people into a compact whole, ready for an assault on white domination.

"Africans alone can solve the problems besetting South Africa. We alone can achieve freedom and independence. We therefore cannot be party to any conference based on preparation for a futile barren indaba".

The statement maintained that though the Pietermaritzburg Conference had started as an attempt to unify the African people, it had now shifted ground to preparations for a multi-racial convention that would prepare a new constitution for South Africa. The former P.A.C. leaders insisted that their formula was "unity in positive action on the basis of African nationalism".

Following the withdrawal of the P.A.C., Liberal Party members Jordan Ngubane and H. Bengu, and Congress Mbata of the South African Institute of Race Relations, also withdrew. The Liberals claimed that without the P.A.C. men, the conference would not encompass a sufficient range of African opinion.

A further heavy blow was struck at the preparations for the conference when shortly afterwards the entire Continuation Committee (ironically enough, including those who had withdrawn) were arrested on charges—under the 1960 Unlawful Organisations and 1950 Suppression of Communism Acts—of having taken part in the activities of an illegal organisation. No details of the charge have yet been made available in court, and the accused have all been remanded to 15 June.

It might have been thought that the defections of some of the leaders, together with the arrests, would have killed off the Pietermaritzburg Conference before it was born. In the event, however, the conference was held and attended by some 1400 delegates from all parts of the country, including the rural areas. Main speaker was former treason trialist and attorney Nelson Mandela, appearing on a public platform for the first time in five years since his 1956 banning order under the Suppression of Communism Act.

The time had come, he stressed, for the African people to fight back against Nationalist oppression. He was followed by delegate after delegate who came to the platform to endorse his call for action.

The conference unanimously demanded "that a national convention of elected representatives of all adult men and women on an equal basis—irrespective of race, colour, creed or other limitations—be called not later than May 31, 1961".

The conference also resolved—"should the minority Government ignore this demand of the representatives of the united will of the African people . . ."—

"(a) To call on the people to organise mass demonstrations throughout the country on the eve of the declaration of the Republic on May 31:

(b) To call on all Africans not to co-operate or collaborate with the proposed South African Republic or any other form of government which rests on force to perpetuate the tyranny of a minority; and to organise and unite in town and country to carry out constant actions to oppose oppression and win freedom:

(c) To call on the Indian and Coloured communities and all democratic Europeans to join forces with us in opposition to a régime which is bringing South Africa to disaster. . . ."

It is the challenge presented by this resolution which, by the end of April, had already led the Government to cancel all police leave, to step up Defence Force manoeuvres for dealing with "internal disorders", and to threaten the re-imposition of a general State of Emergency under the Public Safety Act, should it be found difficult to maintain order under the ordinary law.

Far from being cowed by last year's Emergency, however, or by threats of another one, the prevailing mood among non-whites seems to be one of defiance, typified by Chief Lutuli's Africa Day message, in which he said:

"When Dr. Verwoerd and those who accept his leadership stand 'granite-like' for our oppression, let us, and all freedom-lovers, be even more granite-like for our emancipation and with 'a courage that rises with danger' defy apartheid".

The attitude of a large section of the public, especially the non-whites, has been drastically changed by a succession of Government defeats—the forced departure from the Commonwealth, the series of anti-apartheid votes in the United Nations General Assembly, the collapse of the treason trial. It is obvious

to all that Nationalist Afrikanerdom cannot long survive a combination of its internal and external enemies. The pressures for change which are being exerted on the Government are enormous and grow all the time. Nationalist isolation has never been so complete as now.

The mood of confidence among the non-whites is matched by the temper of uncertainty, helplessness and, perhaps most important of all, sheer negation in Nationalist ranks. Pleas from Nationalist intellectuals, and even the Nationalist press, for "adaptability" are assiduously ignored or slapped down by the Verwoerd Government. Yet it remains a biological law that the organism which cannot adapt to a new environment must eventually perish.

Most disturbing phenomenon of all to the Nationalists has been the rapid and concrete growth of opposition amongst the Coloured people.

For years the Coloured have remained politically passive while the main attacks of the Government were directed against the African people. Not since 1939, when mass demonstrations were staged against General Hertzog's segregation plans, have the Coloured people as a whole taken united political action in defence of their rights.

Traditionally, they have been treated, to use the phrase of General Smuts, as 'an appendage of the whites'. They have been denied full equality; but at the same time they have been given a superior status, politically and socially, to any other section of the non-white peoples. The substantive inequality has rankled, producing such bitter manifestations as the tracts of the Non-European Unity Movement; but the substantial privileges, such as higher wages, better housing and fewer pinpricks from apartheid, have effectively prevented this irritation from spreading into action.

In fact, the more conservative Coloured have fully identified themselves with white supremacy in their attitude towards other non-whites. When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met the members of the Union Council for Coloured Affairs in February 1960, the Chairman of the Council, Mr. T. R. Swartz, welcomed him with these words:

"We are glad to have Mr. Macmillan here with us today, because the Coloured people of South Africa and especially those of the Cape have from the earliest days of the settlement fought side by side with the white man to break down the power

of heathenism in this land and to establish Christianity”.

It should not, however, be thought that Mr. Swartz was staking a claim for equality with the white man.

“The establishment of the Union Council for Coloured Affairs is accepted by a large and growing section of the Coloured population”, he told Mr. Macmillan, “as the beginning of a new era of racial co-operation between themselves and the Government, which will actively promote the positive aspects of the Government’s policy”.

It is doubtful whether Mr. Swartz would care to make the same claim today. In the meanwhile many things have happened to his people. Dr. Verwoerd has made it clear that the Coloured will never sit in Parliament; the most they can hope for is some sort of local self-government “in their own areas”.

The possibility of crossing the colour line is being steadily narrowed by the application of the Population Registration Act and the issuing of identity cards on a racial basis. The Coloured have been excluded from the “open” universities. Finally, Group Areas have been proclaimed in the Cape Peninsula, which will involve the uprooting of 79,248 Coloured and 3,658 Asians—a total of 82,906 non-whites—compared with the 7,271 whites who will have to move.

In March 1960, when Africans were marching in their thousands through the streets of Cape Town in protest against the pass laws, Edgar Deane, Secretary of the Furniture Workers’ Union, was one of a small group of people who issued a statement appealing to the Coloured people not to support the Africans by staying away from work. One year later, in March 1961, this statement was an important factor in the defeat of Deane for re-election to the Cape Town City Council. Elected in his place was George Peake, an executive member of the South African Coloured People’s Congress and a detainee during the State of Emergency last year.

Perhaps the most striking manifestation of Coloured militancy has been the proposal, initiated in Cape Town recently, to call a National Convention of the Coloured people. Among the sponsors of the proposed Convention, which is likely to be held in June, are men of a wide range of political opinion such as Bishop Francis Gow; Dr. R. E. van der Ross, the well-known educationalist; Mr. J. C. A. Daniels, of the Liberal Party; Mr. N. S. H. Kearns, of the Coloured Legion of the British Commonwealth Ex-Servicemen’s League, who earned some notoriety

when he defended South Africa's policies at the B.E.S.L. Convention in Australia not so long ago; and Mr. Barney Desai, of the Coloured People's Congress.

Discussions at the Convention will be based on the demand for the total abolition of the colour bar in every sphere and full citizenship for all the peoples of South Africa.

A statement issued by the Cape Town committee said that—after initial meetings of Coloured representatives, including leaders of Church, teacher, cultural, trade union and political bodies—it was agreed “that the only policy that can succeed in South Africa is one of complete equality for all people.” The statement continued:

“Having accepted that we stand for complete equality in a non-racial South Africa, we therefore reject all political and social agencies that have as their purpose the perpetuation of a system which implies the inferiority of, and imposes inequality upon, any South African of whatever race or colour.

“Bearing in mind that the stated policy of the Government as enunciated by Dr. Verwoerd, and the political and social institutions which are being used to implement that policy, are entirely repugnant to and inimical to the true interests of the people, it was agreed that there could be no compromise or collaboration with the present Government”.

More significant than the words have been the attitudes accompanying them. The Convention leaders have consciously tried to get the support of prominent African leaders, and one of the stated objectives of the Convention is to bring about more solid unity between Coloured and African in the struggle for democratic rights.

“Over a period of years, there has arisen a feeling that there must come about a united voice and force, embracing all democratic elements in South Africa, and drawn from all sections comprising the nation, i.e. whites, African and Coloured, to protest unitedly against the whole set-up of white domination and apartheid”.

Even more remarkable has been the statement issued in March of this year by four Muslim organisations and nine prominent Muslim leaders, and read in all Cape Peninsula mosques at Eid services. Headed ‘Call of Islam’, the statement reads:

“For too long a time now we have been, together with our fellow-sufferers, subjugated, suffered the humiliation of being regarded as inferior human beings, deprived of our rights to



earn and to worship freely according to the Divine Rule of Allah.

“We can no longer tolerate further encroachment on these our basic rights; we therefore stand firm with our brothers in fighting the evil monster that is oppression, tyranny and baasskap. . . . We call upon our Muslim brethren and all brothers in our sufferings to unite under the banner of Truth, Justice and Equality to rid our beloved land of the forces of evil and tyranny”.

Coming from the most conservative section of the Coloured people, a statement of this sort is unprecedented in our recent political history. It is believed to be the first of a series of moves which will eventually lead to a conference of all Muslims aimed at unanimous agreement strongly, militantly and uncompromisingly to oppose all forms of apartheid and discrimination.

The Coloured people are today more politically active than they have been for many years. The militant leadership of the Coloured People's Congress is receiving widespread, mass support at public meetings, attended by thousands of Coloured people who cheer to the echo all references to the planned demonstrations at the end of May.

“Stock up your food. Pull in your belts. The time has come”, said C.P.C. leader Mr. Barney Desai at a meeting attended by 8,000 Coloured people on the Grand Parade, Cape Town, on Van Riebeeck Day, April 6. And C.P.C. Secretary, Mr. Reg. September, told an Africa Day meeting attended by several thousands on the Parade on April 15: “We are no longer prepared to let the African people struggle alone. The days when the Coloured people stood aside will not be repeated”.

It must not, however, be thought that the Convention leadership is yet ready to take part in the end-of-May demonstrations planned by the Action Council, which was appointed in terms of the resolution of the All-in African Conference at Pietermaritzburg.

What we are witnessing today is the slow, and sometimes painful, withdrawal of the Coloured people as a national group from the white camp and the beginnings of their adherence to the black one. This in itself is a sign of the times. Black power is widely seen to be capable of challenging white supremacy. As the balance of power shifts, whole sections formerly attached to the one camp will begin to move towards the other. They may at first adopt a half-way position of neutrality; but that very

neutrality will still further weaken the position of the white supremacists and increase their isolation.

Most conscious of this danger are the Nationalists themselves. Pleading with the Government to do something to allay Coloured unrest, *'Die Burger'* said on April 20: "Let everything which the agitator can seize on and which can be removed, be removed with the utmost speed, for future race relations in the Cape are at stake as never before".

Only two days previously *'Die Burger'* had stated that "enemies" both inside and outside the country were precipitating "altogether the most serious crisis in South African history . . . not in the undefined future but in the next couple of months".

No one should be guilty of underestimating the power of the Nationalist Party, which remains the strongest and best organised political force in South Africa, with a multitude of weapons at its disposal. To think that Verwoerd will be easily defeated and apartheid wiped out overnight would only be to sow illusion among those fighting for democracy both inside and outside South Africa. The Government is still capable of, and will almost certainly take, ferocious reprisals against those in the country who engage in struggle against them.

Nevertheless, it remains true to say that never since the Nationalist Government came to power have conditions been more propitious for an all-out assault on the citadel of apartheid. The birth of the Nationalist republic on May 31 will take place against a background of growing hostility from the overwhelming majority of the population. Few babies could survive in such unpropitious circumstances. It is to be hoped the statisticians will shortly be able to record one more case of infant mortality resulting from pernicious anaemia.

## LEGENDARY LITERATURE

E. V. STONE

### Leading Article in the *Knightly Knews*—A.D. 691

The recent conference held by King MacArthur and his brave knights at the round table in Londinium has been fraught with much disagreement and has resulted in the unhappy withdrawal of Sir Stenalot from the brotherhood.

It is reliably reported that Sir Stenalot put forward the proposition that the concept of chivalry should be widened, and went on to explain how he applied this in his demesne. By denying all rights to the Common People and by making himself generally as hateful as he could, he let everybody benefit by comparison with himself. This, he maintained, was the true chivalry, for are not spiritual values to be valued more highly than temporal ones?

Despite his eloquence, he failed to convince the rest of the fraternity and has felt constrained to withdraw his allegiance. In withdrawing, he felt impelled to add that this was the beginning of the end of chivalry and of the break-up of the Round Table.

It is rumoured that on return to his castle, he was welcomed by all his serfs with tears in their eyes and lumps in their throats.



### Extract from the *Middle Ages Chronicle*—A.D. 1169

The Witanagamot must be congratulated in that it passed almost unanimously the long-awaited Extension of Rights Bill which has been before it almost six months. In spite of repeated attempts to introduce retro-

gressive amendments and to delay the passing of this historic measure, it has now become law.

Among the more enlightened provisions of the Bill are: the right of vassals and villeins to accept more abuse and ill-treatment without retaliation or recourse to the shire courts; the right of all serfs to send their children to inferior schools, where they will be given a good grounding in the ordering of society; the inalienable right of serfs to stay where they are, provided they aren't already where they shouldn't be; the right to hoe the squire's potatoes while residing at the squire's expense in the squire's pigsty, this as an alternative to imprisonment for heinous and devillishe crimes like failing to produce a passe; the right to be separated from wife and children when serving in the King's Mines; the right to aspire to the heights of serfdom and acquire a true patriotism. All these reforms are long overdue and should go far towards removing the causes of alleged discontent.

Readers will be grateful and proud to know that the two reactionary gamoters who voted against these reforms are to be tried for treason at the next session.



**Letter from the published correspondence of an anonymous leper—A.D. 1196**

'Dear Fellow-sufferer,

Here I am squatting outside the city wall, and with my back up against it. There is no charity in the world, as you must surely know, and those self-healthy prigs within have left me no alternative but to withdraw.

I have been criticised for withdrawing; but had I not done so, it is virtually certain that I should have been ignominiously expelled. As it was, I betook myself from their midst with dignity. This is a miracle, the wonder of which fills me with awe and gratitude. The only condition on which they were prepared to accept me was that I go to the miracle-worker and be cured of my leprosy; but as you know, we lepers have our pride. If I am not good enough for them as a leper, then I am not good enough and that is that. No self-respecting leper could tolerate such interference in his internal affairs.

Such is the depth of human infamy that many of the citizens are saying that they will refuse to buy the dough I kneed with my own hands.

Fare thee well, dear friend. It will be a hard struggle, but it is wonderful to feel free at last.

Yours without,

*(The signature is indecipherable—Editor)*

**Book Review from the Inquisitors Herald—A.D. 1490**

A New National Dictionary by A. L. Deurmekaar. Published by the Turnscrew Press, Toledo.

This scintillating and ingenious work is long overdue, and all those who hold religious purity dear to their hearts have felt the need of such a work for the last twelve or thirteen years.

Such praise as I could give this masterpiece would seem dull and shabby beside the lustre of the work itself, and thus to commend it, I cannot do better than provide a few quotations which must act as the hors d'oeuvre to the rich feast awaiting those wise enough to purchase it.

*Communism*—the doctrine that the Inquisition is wrong and cruel and un-Christian. (Hence *Communist*—any person who criticises adversely the Inquisition, the Grand Inquisitor, or any of the officials of the Inquisition).

*Agitator*—one who advocates the seven deadly sins (see *Liberty*).

*Good-Neighbourliness*—the art of keeping one's neighbours at a distance.

*Liberty*—one of the seven deadly sins, the others being *Equality*, *Fraternity*, *Justice*, *Love*, *Righteousness* and *Humility*.

*Miracle*—the art of calling an inevitable disaster a well-manoeuvred success.

*Patriotism*—the ability to ignore one's own vices.

*Priest*—A species of *Agitator*, which see.

*Professor*—See *Priest*.

*Treason*—An inexplicit offence punishable by four years' trial.



### Extract from a paper read by Professor Dichotomy to the Southern Association—A.D. 1916

In the last century there was a monk called Mengeling who, having nothing better to do, spent his time actually crossing different coloured flowers, white and red. Trust a priest to be doing mischievous and ungodly things like that behind the monastery walls! A priest, above all people, should know that if God had wanted a salmon-coloured race, He would have made it.

Not content with this, this meddlesome monk actually claimed to have discovered a law about it. This is obviously nonsense, since if there were a law about it, the law would have been repealed long ago.

Worse still, this wretched fellow was allowed to die peacefully in his bed.

Now this pernicious doctrine is creeping into the affairs of the animal world, and some farmers are even crossing dairy shorthorns with beef longhorns. Soon we shall have our pastures covered with a beery middlehorn race, and then where shall we be? I've said it before and I'll say it again, that if God had wanted there to be a Beery Middlehorn breed, He would have made it.

More than this, who knows where such ideas will finish? If the animal world has to endure this man-made affliction, why should not the idea be extended to humankind itself? If this final tragedy were to occur, how could our children and our children's children ever forgive us?





# THE TORMENT OF ANGOLA

THE REV. CLIFFORD J. PARSONS

*Associate Foreign Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society;  
formerly a missionary in Angola*

JUST as 5 January 1959, the date of the Leopoldville riots, and not 30 June 1960, the date of formal declaration, marks the beginning of their independence for the Congolese, so 15 March 1961 may well mark the beginning of independence for Angola. On that day the first popular African uprising against Portuguese hegemony in recent times took place. Its outcome is still in the balance; but whatever the immediate results, there can be no doubt that this is a turning point. Things will never be the same again.

In the history of peoples, the forlorn hope has often served as a fuse for the finally successful revolution. The way may be arduous, the odds seem insuperable, but conviction and determination bring their inevitable reward. At such times the innocent on both sides will inevitably suffer, and none can certainly regard with equanimity the horrors of the present struggle in Angola.

It is a major irony that a country which has prided itself on a non-racial policy of 'integration' should have witnessed the most bitter struggle between races in Africa south of the Sahara—so far. Looking across the South Atlantic, towards the Brazilian giant which grew out of the same matrix, one cannot but sorrow over the mediaeval spirit that the last 35 years have brought to Portugal. Had a strenuous endeavour been made to implement the traditional policy of non-racialism, Angola might well by now have presented to the world the most harmonious race relations in Africa, instead of the cruel conflict which has shocked even her closest friends.

In spite of government statements claiming the fullest awareness of what was brewing, the attacks when they came took the settler population of Angola by surprise. Years of propaganda, insisting that it could not happen there, had persuaded them that all was well, that Africans were not the resentful victims of injustice, and that in any event they had no weapons and no leaders. How wrong the propaganda was!

Clandestinely the Union of the Populations of Angola (UPA) had built up its organisation, based on necessity outside the

country. With some naïvety, they made it known that something was going to happen on 15 March; but the authorities refused to take the warning seriously, so that the initial onslaught was a terrifying success. Plantations, commercial centres and isolated government outposts were attacked and destroyed from the Congo frontier down to within a hundred miles of Luanda. At least 500 white and coloured people were killed, many of them with the long pruning knives or matchets used in plantation work. Women and children were not spared. There were mutilations. It was a chilling demonstration of what the release of long pent-up feelings can do.

The natural reaction of the white community was to defend itself. Military forces in the country were weak and widely scattered. The administrative authorities armed the civilian population, and throughout the country bands of vigilantes were formed. Their reprisals against Africans have not been as widely publicised as the atrocities committed by the insurgents, but the authorities have admitted their own difficulty in restraining counter-measures by the civilians. For at least a month the situation was practically anarchic, with the government holding the reins loosely in the hope that passions would work themselves out. In Luanda there was nightly terror in the locations where Africans, many of them educated and responsible citizens, were hauled from their homes and shot. In the interior wholesale arrests and summary shootings have resulted in the panic flight of most of the African population into the hills, ravines and forests, or across the border into the Congo. By the middle of May press reports widely quoted an estimate of 20,000 for the number of Africans killed in retaliation and repression.

With the approach of the dry season—which extends from May to October—the government has announced its plan for a ruthless campaign “to exterminate the terrorists,” first by burning the eight foot high bush grass, and then by bombing and strafing the forests in which the insurgents will be compelled to take refuge. This scorched earth policy is bound to be indiscriminate. With universal panic, women and children, the aged and the infirm, have uniformly fled from their villages, many of which have been burned or bombed out of existence. The answer that is commonly given to those who appeal against such a proposal is: “They started it. We must pay them back in their own coin.”

It is the purpose of this article to examine the truth of such

a statement.

Portugal's relations with Angola began in 1482 when Diego Cao discovered the mouth of the Congo river, landing on the south bank of the estuary, close by S. Antonio do Zaire. Nine years later Roman Catholic priests settled at Sao Salvador, the capital of the ancient Kongo kingdom, where in 1534 there were laid the foundations of the first Christian church in the southern hemisphere. Its ruined chancel still stands, a monument to the faith and courage of those early missionaries. Luanda, the modern capital, was not founded until 1575, and Benguela in 1617. In 1580 Portugal became a vassal of Spain and, in the next 60 years, lost much of her overseas empire. In 1640 she reasserted her independence; but in the following year the Dutch siezed Luanda, holding it until 1648, when Correia de Sa e Benevides recaptured the city with reinforcements brought from Brazil. By this time Portuguese influence at the Kongo court had declined and in 1660 the king revolted against his foreign overlord, only to be defeated in 1666 at the battle of Ambuila. From this time forward the Portuguese concentrated their interest further south, although missionary activity continued at the Kongo capital, Sao Salvador, well into the 18th century.

In 1763 Pombal expelled the Jesuits from Portugal and her dominions, thereby bringing missionary activity practically to an end. Since the spiritual arm was the most venturesome in seeking to penetrate the hinterland, the next hundred years saw little progress towards laying bare the secrets of the continent. Administrative and commercial interests, living mainly by the slave trade, as did other maritime peoples of the day, adhered to the coastal regions and suffered the corrupting influences that all such trading must involve. The journeys of Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto from 1877, courageous and resourceful as they were, were dictated partly at least by political considerations; but they came too late to ensure acceptance for the claim of effective occupation made at the Berlin Conferences.

In the scramble for Africa, Portugal felt herself unjustly treated. She was still left with the two extensive territories of Angola and Moçambique, which she desired to make into one by the acquisition of what is now Southern Rhodesia. A British "ultimatum" to Portugal in January 1890 stopped the Portuguese advance, but the patriotic reaction was such as nearly to bring down the monarchy in the first republican revolt of 1891.

In the 1890's Portugal's financial distress became acute, and it was commonly believed in the chancelleries of Europe that she would have to sell her colonies. In August 1898 Britain and Germany signed a convention, whereby spheres of influence were assigned to the two countries, should Portugal have to contract a loan with her colonies as security. The next decade witnessed increasing political tension between monarchists and republicans, resulting in the regicide of 1908 and the end of the monarchy in 1910. For 16 years Portugal tried democracy; but coming so ill prepared, and in face of steady opposition from the Roman Catholic Church, the country slipped increasingly into bankruptcy. So came the coup of 1926 and the beginning of the present régime. Two years later Salazar entered its government as Minister of Finance. By his financial competence and the most stringent control over public expenditure, he had within five years extinguished the public debt. The world economic crisis prevented any large-scale investment in the overseas territories during the 'thirties, while the Second World War and the Allied blockade of Germany delayed still further the internal development of Angola.

Portugal's neutrality, however, laid the foundations for her economic recovery. Trading agreements were made with both sides, and the leasing of the Azores to the Allies brought a considerable financial reward to Portugal. When the war ended and trade once more flowed freely among the nations, timber, vegetable oils and foodstuffs found a ready market and made the escudo one of the hardest currencies in the world. Principal amongst Angola's exports was coffee, which at one stage provided 60% of Portugal's foreign exchange. The money flowed into Angola, and the territory at last began to attract the investment that its potentialities deserved. The port of Luanda was enlarged and modernised. Hydro-electric schemes provided electric power for Luanda, Lobito and Mossamedes. The road system was improved by the construction of concrete bridges to replace the antiquated ferries and flimsy wooden culverts that had served for the pre-war volume of traffic. The flow of white immigrants increased as news of Angola's wealth was spread in Portugal. In 1940 there were 40,000 settlers; by 1950, 79,000; and by 1960, an estimated 200,000. Africans benefited indirectly from the increased wealth of the country, and directly through improved health services (the anti-sleeping sickness campaign with the new drug pertamidine was a notable

undertaking), and higher prices obtainable for the crops produced by peasant agriculturalists. Some few even acquired wealth through their ownership of coffee plantations.

Why then have the Africans revolted? The official view is provocation from without and Protestant complicity from within. The real reasons are economic, social, political and human.

### **Economic**

Amongst the trading community, there are to be found unscrupulous men whose exactions and dishonesties only serve to awaken resentment in their customers. It was such treatment that led to the Bailundo rising of 1902.

Resentment too had been caused by the expropriation of land, particularly in the coffee-bearing regions of the Dembos (Cuanza-Norte), Carmona and Sao Salvador, all three districts in which the initial onslaught of 15 March was particularly severe. Traditional African rights were not respected, save where regular and consistent cultivation could be proved. All land was, legally, vested in the State, which granted concessions to those who could prove capacity to develop their holdings.

Exceptionally, the government gave direct assistance to colonists, as in the striking and much publicised settlement at Cela between Lobito and Nova Lisboa; but in most instances outright grants of lands were made to immigrants from Portugal. Abuse also crept into the negotiations that preceded the granting of such concessions. Government officials (who by standards in other parts of Africa are very poorly paid) have often behaved with little regard for the 'mission' of Portuguese civilisation. Graft, corruption and deceit, in spite of the valiant efforts of some high-minded administrators, have angered and embittered Africans, whose feelings about the inalienability of land are as strong and ineradicable as Naboth's.

But even more fatal in its impact upon African opinion than commercial trickery or the expropriation of family lands has been the system of "contract" labour, a subtle euphemism for what in other places is called forced labour. Under this system all able-bodied males whose holdings fail to attain certain standards of size, efficiency or productiveness, or who do not hold an artisan's licence, are recruited forcibly for periods of six months at least in any one year, either for public works or for service with private employers. In November 1955, when

Portugal entered the United Nations, there was a momentary relaxation of the obligatory principle; but anxiety over the possible threat to the economy of the country was such that measures were soon enough taken to ensure that the flow of labour should not be impeded by any such aberrations as a free contract. All the same, Portugal's adhesion to the United Nations did mean more rigorous control over the employers of contract labourers. Payment began to be made at central administration offices rather than at district "posts", and a proportion of the men's wages had to be deposited with the administrator before men could be recruited. Medical care was guaranteed, and the issue of clothing, blankets and rations supervised. But the system was understandably hated and, although some habituated themselves to the routine and became "voluntary" workers, the vast majority bitterly resented their loss of personal freedom and the consequent inability to develop their own holdings. Many Africans in the frontier areas crossed into the Congo, and Ovimbundu labourers (Bailundos, as the Portuguese call them) from central Angola were sent to the coffee plantations of the north.

### Social

Portugal had prided herself on her non-racial tradition and the policy of assimilation. "This", said the Portuguese, "sets us apart from all other colonisers. We are colour-blind. Look at Brazil. Look at Angola." And until 1953 the Africans, or some of them, may even have believed this. In that year, the legislation governing the assimilation of indigenous populations was codified in a new statute. The status of "assimilado" was abolished, and instead, Africans qualifying for assimilation were, if successful in their application, accorded the status of full citizens. Unfortunately, the statute also provided in its provisions for the withdrawal of citizenship from Africans who might possess it, and in any assessment of recent events this factor clearly has great significance. A European can lose his citizenship *rights*, but he can never lose his citizenship. Such was not the case with Africans. Although Africans continued to make applications for citizenship, doubt had been sown in the back of their minds, and doubt that was nurtured by the obvious reluctance of government officials to assist Africans in gaining the newly offered status. Difficulties seemed constantly to be made over the provision of legal birth certificates and other



essential documents. The scale of remuneration, the standard of housing and the grade of education were persistently questioned. Africans often had recourse to shady lawyers in order to get over these difficulties, and many could have said, as Paul's centurion did: "With a great sum obtained I this citizenship." The requirements for assimilation were heavily loaded in favour of the urban dweller, although for peasant farmers the title of 'agricultor' brought certain privileges which several thousand Africans were glad to obtain in the regions about Carmona and the Dembos. But, by and large, Africans in the last five years have come to regard the policy of assimilation as a sham and a snare.

Without doubt too the extensive immigration of recent years largely contributed towards creating this impression. A growth of at least 100,000 within a decade, apart from natural increase, meant that the European population as a whole lacked much in experience of African life and conditions. The early settlers included many shrewd and hard-working peasants from Madeira and rural Portugal, who by their own efforts had carved out a livelihood for themselves without gratuitously prejudicing African interests. In many places, even as late as 1955, human relationships between the races were by no means unfriendly. After all, the economic and political disabilities endured under the Salazar régime were common to both black and white. But the new wave of immigrants introduced a new spirit into the country. Many came with the object of getting rich quickly, and most wished to stay in the security of the towns. (In Luanda recently I talked with a taxi driver who had only been outside Luanda once in 14 years!) Even the government has had its problems with square settlers who would not fit into the round hole of Cela. There were, of course, exceptions.

At the same time the economic recession of the past few years struck Angola. The price of coffee dropped. The demand for certain farm products diminished. The fishing industry in the South collapsed. And all this took place at a time when an increasing number of Africans were leaving mission and other private schools in search of advancement. Some of these came up against colour prejudice, and the rebuff was disillusioning. Unemployment quickened the spirit of competitiveness. Angola was ripe for development, but the resources were inadequate.

### **Political**

Political considerations were, of course, largely to blame for



this state of affairs. Portuguese are kindly and generous people, but political xenophobes. It is for this reason that they have placed so many restrictions on the entry of foreign capital. They fear the political miasma that hovers over loans and economic aid. Yet in a world hurtling along the road of material progress, Angola cannot expect its people to stand by and wait for the leeway of centuries to be reduced. Both black and white have been infuriated or constantly madly irritated at the slowness in the development of Angola's potential. Everyone's patience has its limit.

There is, too, the more direct political resentment at the continuing iron grip of the régime upon every aspect of daily life. The Portuguese are by nature independent and relaxed. They detest dictatorship and have been uneasy under Salazar's paternalism for many years. Ruthless measures with political opponents gradually crushed resistance to the New State, while Salazar's financial and diplomatic skill brought some of his opponents to a reluctant admiration. But in the past decade resistance has grown ever stronger, and the secret police (PIDE) ever more stringent in its counter-measures. In 1958 the anti-government candidate for the presidency, General Humberto Delgado, polled 20% of the votes in Angola: 40% abstained. The methods adopted by the government to secure the remaining 40% were, to say the least of it, unorthodox. Following this election, the secret police were introduced into Angola and security measures tightened up, so that many Portuguese, who had emigrated to Angola because of the freer air that was to be breathed there, glanced over their shoulders when talking in the cafés, while suspicion and fear mounted.

Coinciding with increased political repression came the beginnings of African liberation from colonial rule, beginning with Ghana in 1957 and reaching the northern border of Angola in June 1960. As early as October 1959 pamphlets were stuck on buildings in towns and villages throughout the northern border country, demanding independence for Angola in 1960. A forlorn hope? At that time Congo independence looked at least 5 years away. It came in 9 months. Small wonder, therefore, if Angola's Africans refused to admit that independence for them was on some far-off, invisible horizon.

### **Human**

There remains a final and compelling reason why Angola

has burst into flames: the decisive failure in humanity. The Portuguese are affectionate, home-loving and hospitable, but they can also be harsh and inhuman. And these flaws in character have left a bitter legacy behind. Nevinson's '*A Modern Slavery*' shocked an earlier generation by its story of callousness and cruelty. Although liberalism during the early days of the republic softened the harshness, the return of despotism has meant an exaltation of power that has stultified the law by turning every man into the absolute arbiter of his own actions. Beatings with the 'palmatorio', arbitrary imprisonment, the use of informers and *agents provocateurs*, the arrest of wives as hostages, collective punishments, and above all the contempt—here is the failure in humanity, so explicitly stated a few weeks ago by the new Minister of Defence, when bidding farewell to soldiers embarking for Angola: "You are not going to fight against human beings, but against savages and wild beasts."

Assimilation? Can Africans be blamed if they reject it?

The General Assembly of the United Nations has refused to accept Portugal's plea that Angola and other overseas possessions are *not* "non-self-governing territories" (December 1960). It has now agreed to the appointment of a five-man commission of enquiry into the situation in Angola (April 1961). National pride and fear of the economic consequences to follow any loss of her overseas possessions have inhibited Portugal so far from giving a rational audience to these resolutions. Her moderate men must realise, however, that they cannot insulate their country from the movements and ideologies that are sweeping the world. The Nigerian delegate spoke in statesmanlike terms at the April debate in New York when he said: "If Portugal were to take the necessary steps to rectify conditions and if they were to work towards progress and development, I am sure they would have the goodwill of the people of Angola. The African states are not bitter. They are quite prepared to be realistic about matters. They know there are problems to be solved. All we request of Portugal and the United Nations is that certain steps be taken now in order to enable the people of Angola to work towards their self-determination."

# A PROFILE OF BUGANDA

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Six years ago Uganda seemed likely to be the first East African territory to gain its independence. Now it is likely to be the last, for it has been caught in the turmoil of one of Africa's most explosive issues, the conflict of authority between the modern state and the traditional ruler. Ever since Dr. Nkrumah suppressed the power of the Ashanti Confederacy in the name of national unity, African kings and chiefs have feared for their thrones. These fears recently brought the Paramount Chief of Barotseland to London for discussions with the Colonial Secretary. In Nigeria a traditional ruler like the Sardauna of Sokoto felt that his only defence was to enter party politics. The Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II, and his Ministers have been obsessed by this issue, especially since that day in 1953 when the Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, unceremoniously deported him to England.

At the time the Kabaka was frequently charged with wanting to retreat to the position that his ancestors had held before the European conquest. This charge was wildly inaccurate. The traditionalists wished to hold fast to the benefits of the British alliance which, by the time of the Uganda Agreement of 1900, had secured for the Baganda the leadership among the kingdoms and races of Uganda.

British rule blocked Egyptian expansion up the Nile. The administrators and traders established themselves in Kampala and Entebbe, so that Buganda speedily became the commercial and administrative centre of the Protectorate. Buganda was also the centre of missionary activity. By supporting the conquest of the rival kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole, Buganda was able to annex portions of the latter two. The wholesale conversion of most of the Baganda officials and chiefs to Christianity and their thirst for Western education persuaded the missionaries and the British officials to use the Baganda as evangelists, administrators, and teachers in other territories, thus increasing their prestige and power in the Protectorate. Finally the Agreement of 1900, far from destroying the Kabaka's kingdom, eliminated feudalism and rebuilt Buganda on the basis of freehold ownership.

Both chiefs and peasants were, in varying degrees, satisfied by the land revolution. The successful introduction of cotton and coffee as cash crops ensured prosperity in the first decades of British rule. By the mid-'fifties Buganda produced 90 per cent of Uganda's coffee, which alone accounted for almost half of the Protectorate's revenue from foreign trade. Hence the dominating position of Buganda in the affairs of Uganda, even though the kingdom contains only 28 per cent of the Protectorate's African population.

It was absurd, however, to expect that parallel Baganda and British governments would always remain in harmony. The British officials sometimes promoted social or economic policies which were unacceptable to traditionalist Africans, such as the purchase of land for the expansion of the University College of East Africa at Makerere. For as long as British prestige remained high, the Protectorate could force the Kabaka and his chiefs to carry out unpopular measures. But as British power waned and as it became apparent that Britain would insist on giving independence to Uganda rather than a separate Buganda, the Kabaka and his chiefs felt the danger of alienation from their people and were alarmed by the possible elimination of Baganda institutions in favour of a unitary state.

A speech by the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, in June 1953, when he referred to the possibility of an East African federation, provoked the showdown. The Baganda had always shown a deep antagonism to such a federation, partly because they feared the domination of Kenya settlers and partly because they would inevitably enjoy much less influence within a wider grouping. The Lukiko, or Baganda Parliament, refused to countenance the kingdom's participation in the Legislative Council of the Uganda Protectorate and demanded a timetable for Baganda independence. The Governor refused and banished the Kabaka. Two years later Mutesa returned, firmly entrenched as a national hero, a great change from the early days of his reign when he was denounced as a playboy king and a British stooge.

In Ghana the Convention People's Party was the instrument employed by Dr. Nkrumah to destroy the rule of the chiefs. When political parties at last began to appear in Uganda during the early 'fifties, most observers felt that just such a clash would take place. The most significant party was the Uganda National Congress (U.N.C.), which looked to West Africa for inspiration. Two factors, however, checked its assault upon

traditional authority. First, the Governor persuaded the Kabaka to allow a portion of the Lukiko to be elected by direct suffrage, thus eliminating one of the major complaints against that body. Then Sir Andrew exiled the Kabaka. The Uganda National Congress, swayed by its Baganda leadership and its desire for quick popularity, threw itself into the struggle for the return of the Kabaka and so transformed itself from a national party into a Baganda pressure group.

After 1955 the Congress slowly declined in influence and popularity. For four years Uganda watched its death-throes, its repeated splits, and the endless disputes over the future of monarchical rule. The party's victory in the limited 1958 elections drew an utterly false picture of its unity. Later in the same year it divided on the question of Egyptian assistance. The U.N.C. reached such a degree of impotence by 1959 that Abu Mayanja, perhaps the ablest of its leaders, abandoned the party to join the Kabaka's government as Minister of Education. The Ministry is traditionally held by a Muslim, and Mayanja was the best qualified of his faith for the job. But he must also have felt Congress politics to be a dead-end before he would risk antagonising his old friends by such a dramatic switch. In this political vacuum, parties proliferated: the Uganda African Union, the Progressive Party, the United Congress Party, and the Uganda People's Union.

At this time Milton Obote brought together some of the elements in the U.N.C. and the Uganda People's Union to form the Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.), and Benedicto Kiwanuka reorganised the Democratic Party (D.P.), which had fought the 1958 election as a Roman Catholic party. Kiwanuka is 39, a Muganda, a former sergeant-major, a matriculant of Pius XII University College in Basutoland, and a graduate of London University. Before taking over the D.P. leadership, he had built up a flourishing law practice. He has tried to broaden the D.P. so as to include non-Catholics, but his major support outside Buganda still comes from the Catholic areas of West Nile and Acholi in the north and of Ankole and Kigezi in the south-west of the Protectorate.

Both parties are unsympathetic to the traditionalists in Buganda, but the D.P. managed to persuade a handful of Catholic Baganda to register for the 1961 election. The boycott by the remainder of the Baganda gave the D.P. a free gift of 20 of the 21 seats in the kingdom and therefore a clear majority in

the country of 44 seats to the U.P.C.'s 35, even though the U.P.C. polled 80,000 more votes. All the other parties were eliminated, while the U.N.C. itself secured only one seat and a mere 40,000 votes. The D.P.'s majority became 50 to 38 by the special elections in the Legislative Council. The party may even transform itself into a true majority party by the next election if it secures a timetable for independence at the constitutional conference which is to be held in London in September.

Neither the co-operatives nor the trade unions have produced effective resistance to the traditionalists in Buganda. Ignatius Musazi created a political party out of the co-operatives in the late 'forties; but this no longer exists, and nothing has taken its place. The trade unions are the weakest in East Africa and have recently split into two factions: the Trade Union Congress, whose moving spirit is H. M. Luande, the U.P.C. Member for Kampala East, and the recently formed Uganda Federation of Labour, based on Jinja and led by John Reich, the defeated D.P. candidate in Jinja North. The weakness of the trade unions has contributed to the indifference of the mass of non-Baganda migratory workers who staff the sugar plantations, farms, and many of the industries in the kingdom.

The Kabaka and his chief Ministers, Amos K. Sempa and Michael Kintu, are the guardians of much entrenched power. The Kabaka stands at the centre of a large circle of family relations who depend on him for their social prestige. The Ministers themselves command a considerable bureaucracy. In the last decade the British have transferred power over certain areas of education, hospital and health administration, and the agricultural and veterinary services to the Kabaka's government. These services not only give prestige but allow the exercise of a good deal of patronage.

Sempa and Kintu originally stated that they would oppose elections until the publication and satisfactory reception of the report now being prepared by Lord Munster on the relationships of the kingdoms and provinces of Uganda in an independent state. But the Ministers have gone from extreme to extreme. In 1958 they demanded a Greater Buganda in which the Kabaka would become Paramount Chief over such former tributary states as Busoga. Now they have grandiloquently declared complete independence, and they claim their new state to be economically viable.

This is difficult to assess, since it is not clear from official statements whether this independent Buganda is the present kingdom or the Greater Buganda demanded in 1958. If it is the present kingdom, it will lack the industrial complex at Jinja in Busoga, the cement of Tororo in Bukedi, the Frobisher copper mine at Kilembe in Toro, the tea estates in the same kingdom, the tobacco of Bunyoro, Kigezi, and the West Nile, and a portion of the cotton growing areas which exist in all the provinces. And the world market for Buganda's staple crop, robusta coffee, is in a particularly unsettled state. The Lukiko will also have to find the money to bridge the gap of £1,000,000 between the present government grants and the money raised in Buganda by existing poll taxes. No doubt Buganda could exist on a subsistence agriculture, as the density of population has not nearly reached the alarming figures in parts of Kikuyuland in Kenya. But the present standard of living could hardly be maintained without the aggression implicit in the scheme for Greater Buganda.

The D.P. has suggested that, rather than a single Head of State, the solution is a Council of State composed of the various rulers. It would be purely ceremonial but would allow the rulers to maintain their social precedence. The U.P.C. has shown preference for a single elected Head of State. Both parties also agree that the existing position of the rulers should be entrenched in the constitution, but that efforts should be made to prevent a full-scale federalism from developing which would cause an undue strain on the slender manpower resources of the state.

If the Kabaka's Ministers will not forego their dreams of glory and of domination, much will depend on whether Buganda's neighbours will deny her access to the sea by closing the railway now administered by the East African High Commission. Much will also depend on whether the British government is prepared to hand over to the Protectorate government the King's African Rifles and the central police and whether British officers will be allowed to remain if there is a showdown between a Uganda Prime Minister and the Kabaka.

Not only is the future of Uganda at stake but also that of the proposed East African Federation. Baganda separatism is the most difficult of the Colonial Secretary's East African problems. If he can solve it, he will have done more for East Africa than any of his predecessors.



## THE KENYA QUESTION MARK

A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

KENYA'S future is dominated by a massive question mark. No one can really forecast the role of the ageing Jomo Kenyatta, who waits patiently in restriction for the release which will bring him back into active national politics. It is impossible to say for certain how he will react to the context of contemporary Kenya, or what he is now like after his years of imprisonment and restriction.

The general elections of February this year implemented the Macleod constitution of 1960, when grudging agreement had been reached between the Africans, the moderate 'Blundellite' Europeans and the British Colonial Government. The Africans were to have their first elected majority in the Legislative Council, but they were not to have control over Kenya's 'Cabinet', the Executive Council.

In the Executive Council the Africans were to be outnumbered by 8 to 4; 3 Ministries were reserved for elected Europeans, 4 for European officials, 1 for an Asian and 4 for elected Africans. Furthermore, it was the Governor of Kenya and not the African Members who would select the Executive.

Thus Iain Macleod had allowed for African advance; but he had left sufficient power in the hands of the Kenya Governor to carry on the government without the co-operation of the African Members, should difficulties arise. The African parties had been able to organise on a nation-wide basis since the end of the Kenya Emergency. The electoral roll was wide enough to furnish most Africans with the vote, though the African constituencies were somewhat strangely composed. As *'The Economist'* commented afterwards: "It is certain that never again will 7,700 Masai be allowed to return two Members while 82,000 Kikuyu voters around Nyeri are represented by only one."

At the same time, the moderate Europeans—supporters of Michael Blundell's New Kenya Party—won some concessions at Lancaster House. A complex electoral system was devised to help them return to the Legislative Council. They had to win a minimum of 25% of the votes of their own European community in a primary election; but once they had accomplished this, they were almost certain of being swept to power on the

common roll, when the vast majority of voters in their constituencies would be Africans.

When the election campaign started, late in 1960, the contests for the African seats became the centre of interest in Kenya. The most stolid Kenya settler could see that the future of the country would soon lie firmly in the hands of the African majority. 1960 was virtually the first year that the settler newspapers had followed the intricacies of African politics with close attention, and the elections provided headline news.

There were already two well-established African parties. The Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) was the more militant nationalist movement. It had leaders of international standing in James Gichuru, Tom Mboya, Dr. Gikonyo Kiano and A. O. Oginga Odinga. These leaders had connections with the Pan-African political movement and had from time to time received wide publicity in the world's press.

K.A.N.U. was essentially an urban party. It was overwhelmingly strong in Nairobi and even in the port town of Mombasa, situated in the middle of its rival—the Kenya African Democratic Union—dominated coastline. The Kikuyu tribe (more than a million strong) saw K.A.N.U. as the logical successor to the Kenya African Union of pre-Mau Mau days. They also supported it because its leaders were conscious of the Kikuyu need for urban employment as an outlet for traditional Kikuyu land pressure. Finally, K.A.N.U. enjoyed the reputation of being Kenyatta's party. This was a tremendous advantage to the party in Kikuyuland and among literate Africans throughout the country.

The rival Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.) was formed largely as a reaction to K.A.N.U. Its followers came from most of the smaller tribes, which feared that the Kikuyu and Luo would gain absolute control of K.A.N.U.; the party itself was founded by the leaders of small tribal associations—Ronald Ngala, Masinde Muliro and John Keen—who formed K.A.D.U. at a time when K.A.N.U. looked as if it would unify the Africans of Kenya into one single nationalist movement.

K.A.D.U. leaders made much of their 'democracy' compared with the 'dictatorship' of K.A.N.U.; their party was certainly organised without internal rivalry or dissension. The K.A.D.U. leaders also claimed that their K.A.N.U. counterparts were difficult associates. Ronald Ngala described Tom Mboya as "quite impossible to work with".

Nearly all of the 33 African elected seats were contested. In some places party discipline broke down altogether, and two or three candidates of the same party stood against each other in the same constituencies. K.A.N.U. was particularly afflicted by internal strife, with the result that branch offices and national headquarters were frequently unable to agree on which candidate to support.

Members of both parties, and the majority of independent candidates, were in agreement on basic issues. They all wanted immediate independence, rapid Africanisation and the release of Jomo Kenyatta, and there was little to differentiate between them except their personal ability and past records.

Despite gloomy predictions in European quarters, each African candidate did not try to outbid the other in extremism. On the contrary, the election campaigns ran smoothly and without racial incidents. Nor were there any reports of intimidation or violence among Africans, while many African leaders, who were fighting stern election battles, actually found time to make 'responsible' statements about the need for foreign investment, the future of Europeans and other such delicate subjects. The lack of real issues to divide the candidates, however, led instead to intense personal rivalry between them. Internecine warfare in K.A.N.U. itself was as bitter as it was unexpected in a party trying to win an election campaign.

The long smouldering ill-feeling between the fiery Oginga Odinga and his associates on the one side, and Tom Mboya and James Gichuru on the other, blazed openly during the election campaign.

Oginga Odinga is of the same generation as James Gichuru; both men are nearing their fifties. He is a former schoolteacher, solid, bald, with fierce shining eyes. To the outsider his approach to politics seems to be flamboyantly emotional. His speeches in the Legislative Council, however, delivered in a high-pitched stream of words and punctuated by vigorous gesticulations, show a keen instinct for what is politically apt. Odinga has a charming manner, abundant hospitality and generosity; he is almost worshipped in his home country of Central Nyanza.

Odinga's chief rival, since in 1957 they first came together in the Legislative Council, has been Tom Mboya. Odinga is bitterly angry at the reputation Mboya has acquired internationally as leader of the African Elected Members, and he has an intense personal dislike for his fellow Luo tribesman.

Tom Mboya, a glamorous young leader of thirty, is someone who glitters with pragmatic, logical brilliance. His ability in the fields of negotiation, disputation, platform oratory, and interviewmanship is well enough known and unquestioned even by his enemies, but he suffers the misfortune of seeming to be self-assured to the point of open arrogance. Whatever reasons there are for it, he has acquired the reputation of being "quite impossible to work with."

In the past Odinga has persistently pursued a policy opposed to that followed by Mboya. When Mboya cultivated the friendship of the United States for assistance in the fields of higher education and trade unions, Odinga was reported to have sought the help of China. And when Mboya committed himself to the Western-orientated International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Odinga vigorously supported the independent All African Trade Union Federation. Whatever the personal rivalry, Odinga appears to follow a general political line to the left of Mboya, attacking such association with the West as appears to compromise his demands for an unaffiliated Africa.

Odinga indeed spoke on the election platforms of Dr. Waiyaki, a young Kikuyu doctor of medicine, who had decided to oppose Mboya in the Nairobi East constituency. Another who spoke with Waiyaki was Dr. Kiano, once a close friend of Mboya.

Mboya, in his turn, supported F. W. Odede, the veteran politician recently released from detention, in Odinga's constituency. He also made an attempt, a few weeks before the elections, to have Odinga expelled from K.A.N.U. In this he had the support of the stolid, weighty-worded party President, James Gichuru, who signed a statement giving reasons why he thought Odinga should leave the party. The K.A.N.U. Executive Council, however, tottering on the brink of elections, preserved some semblance of internal unity by producing a statement which skated over differences and called for a stop to dissension.

Many educated Africans took Odinga's part in his quarrel with Mboya. Prominent among them were the remnants of the 'Ginger Group'—a body of young men in K.A.N.U. who were trying to get the party to adopt more militant policies—and the Kikuyu élite, living in Nairobi and working in the professions and government service. But this unpopularity of Mboya with the Nairobi élite was more than balanced by his immense following among the mass of Nairobi workers.

When polling took place, the K.A.D.U. leadership was, to

all intents and purposes, united; but K.A.N.U. was still quarrelling, despite attempts by men of the centre, like Mwai Kibaki, to avoid a headlong clash.

The elections removed none of the principal conflicting personalities from the Legislative Council. On the contrary, all the main African leaders were returned in their own constituencies. Tom Mboya won by such a large majority that his four opponents, including Dr. Waiyaki, lost their deposits. This meant that he had persuaded the Kikuyu, who formed more than half his electorate, to ignore their fellow tribesman. It also showed that Odinga and the Kikuyu élite had supported Waiyaki in vain.

But Odinga was returned in Nyanza Central—a two member constituency—with an overwhelming majority, while Mboya's old rival, Clement Argwings Khodeck, was returned as the second candidate. Meanwhile Mboya's candidate, F. W. Odede, polled only a handful of votes.

James Gichuru had been returned unopposed at Kiambu in Kikuyuland, and Dr. Kiano won handsomely in another Kikuyu seat, while the leader of K.A.D.U., Ronald Ngala, had a sweeping victory on the coast. Thus all of the first-rank African leaders found themselves back in the Legislative Council.

As to the parties themselves, K.A.N.U. won a definite, but by no means devastating victory, over K.A.D.U. It won 18 seats while K.A.D.U. won 11, with the 4 remaining Members being Independents. One Independent then joined K.A.D.U., bringing its total to 12.

Later the Legislative Council, sitting as an electoral college, elected 4 Africans, 4 Asians and 4 Europeans as 'national members'. Here again K.A.N.U. exhibited disunity in its support of candidates, and three of the four Africans elected identified themselves with K.A.D.U. The final strength of the parties was accordingly 19 for K.A.N.U. and 15 for K.A.D.U. Whatever the composition of the two parties in the Legislative Council however, there could be no doubt that K.A.N.U. had emerged from the elections by far the stronger African movement in the country. It had polled some three times as many votes as K.A.D.U.—467,472 to 142,580—and been prevented from sweeping the African elected seats in the Legislative Council only by a combination of its own internal differences and the idiosyncrasy of the electoral delimitations.

With the completion of the elections, the Kenyatta issue again flared into dominance. K.A.N.U. refused to participate in the formation of any government until Kenyatta was released. K.A.D.U. at first refused as well; but after consultations with the Colonial Secretary, the party announced that it would agree to help in the formation of a government. The Governor of Kenya then announced that Kenyatta would be moved from Maralal to Kiambu district, only a few miles outside Nairobi, where a house would be built for him. K.A.D.U. was clearly counting on being able to present itself to the electorate as having been responsible for accomplishing concessions from the colonial administration and was clearly calculating on being in a position to present land and political reforms which would increase its standing as a nationalist movement with the Africans of the country. At the end of April it was announced that Ronald Ngala would become Leader of Government Business and Minister of Education; Masinde Muliro, Minister of Commerce and Industry; and a third member of K.A.D.U., T. Arap Towett, Minister of Labour and Housing. Ngala offered one Ministry—reportedly that of Commerce and Industry—to a K.A.N.U. Member, but this was rejected. There were reported differences among the K.A.N.U. Members over participation in any government, but by the end of April it appeared that the large bulk of the party would have nothing to do with the administration until Kenyatta was released.

Whatever the present constitutional standing of K.A.D.U., it remains unlikely at the moment that it will seriously be able to compete with K.A.N.U. as the major African nationalist party. It is on the release of Kenyatta himself and the part that he will play in Kenya politics that so much depends. There seems little question that Kenyatta himself would bring to K.A.N.U. the unity that it so calamitously lacks at the moment, forging its factions behind him into an effective political force. Precisely which of the factions—if any—he is likely to support remains uncertain. He doubtless recognises the urgency of a united K.A.N.U. and is likely to do all the leading himself, with all the elements in the party falling into step behind him. Certainly he must be released at once. The British Government cannot keep the acknowledged leader of the Kenya Africans much longer in restriction without shouldering all responsibility for a racial crisis that will once more rack the country.



## DAKAR AND BAMAKO

SIMON KIBA

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To this day the question of why the Mali Federation collapsed is being debated. What we do not recognise, however, is that passions are still too high for the parties involved to be able to judge with impartiality. We continue to abuse each other, and to publish white papers to justify ourselves. But fully to understand the causes of the collapse, we will have to wait on history.

The Mali Federation was born on 17 January 1959, with Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey as members. But the last two States finally decided not to commit themselves to the Federation, and it is now known that their withdrawal was encouraged by the French Government and by the Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast. The Federation was accordingly established by the two remaining partners: Senegal and Soudan. They agreed readily enough to seek independence within the French-African Community; but that independence once granted, differences over the structure of the new State arose that proved virtually insoluble. Soudan wanted a unitary structure, with a presidential régime similar to that of the United States. Senegal wanted a parliamentary régime and a loose federation, leaving a large measure of autonomy to the constituent States. The main reason advanced by Senegal in support of its case was that other States would find it easier to join such a federation in the future. Soudan, on the other hand, felt that only a strong federation would have the means to develop harmoniously a country stretching from Gao to Dakar.

A policy meeting between the leaders of the two States took place in April 1960. Discussions did not go smoothly; a friendship already strained could be mended only imperfectly. Argument centred on what principle should be adopted in redistributing the leading offices of the new independent Federation; and it was apparently agreed that offices should be divided on a fifty-fifty basis—Senegal to have the Presidency of the Republic, Soudan the Presidency of the Cabinet. Senegal decided on the candidature of M. Léopold Sédar Senghor, then President of the Federal Assembly of Mali. But the Soudanese refused to accept this. They wanted M. Modibo Keita to be Head of Government and Head of State, and offered Senegal the



Vice-Presidency and the Presidency of the Federal Assembly.

Meanwhile, the nomination of Colonel Soumare as Commander-in-Chief of the Army brought new conflicts, the Soudanese supporting Soumare while the Senegalese supported Colonel Fall. Both colonels were Senegalese; but Soumare had been born in the Soudan and enjoyed the friendship of Modibo Keita.

The final blow came when Modibo Keita deposed the Senegalese President of the Cabinet from his post as Mali Minister of Defence. The Senegalese were enraged. The Mali Federation collapsed on the night of 19 August 1960; and friendship between the two countries has been compromised ever since.

Soudan (now Mali) is a huge country, which was brutally colonised. Senegal barely suffered from colonisation. It actually helped the French to colonise other countries, which is why the expression "Senegalese sniper" has stuck. In the Soudan, then, the idea of African liberation is paramount. And this liberation must bring with it a complete separation between past and present: the Africanisation of cadres, expulsion of French armed forces, and the taking over of all public services by the Soudanese themselves. In Senegal, events take their course more quietly. This is partly because, since it was first colonised, the country has had Senegalese technicians; Africanisation started early.

Political parties too are organised differently in the two countries. Soudan has a single party, with a structure like that of the Communist Party, though it is not by any means Communist itself. The Union Soudanaise was founded as a section of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast; wherever it has established itself, the R.D.A. has tended to become a monopoly. It has always caused other parties to disappear, and disorder has often accompanied the process. But that was under colonialism, and the French were nearly always its accomplices. The Soudan party does not concede that there is any other path but its own. In practice, there is a single youth movement, the trade unions are united, and so are the women's movements. So effectively has this unity been brought about that the party is supported by the entire population. In every village, the secretary-general of the party branch is a key figure, for it is he who receives the orders from headquarters which the villagers are to carry out. Soudan, however, has one major difficulty—the Touaregs of the north. They do not propose to bend to the

'Negroes' who rule Bamako. They have kept all their own social customs, and the present government is forced to take their wishes into account. At present it is not the young men who have studied in Europe who hold the reins of power in Mali. It is the older generation, who founded the R.D.A. in 1946. That is why, in actual fact, Mali policy is really very cautious.

In Senegal, the main political party, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, has never been as strong or as centralised as the Union Soudanaise. Since a certain degree of unity was achieved between the followers of M. Senghor and those of M. Lamine Guèye, however, the internal struggle continues only sporadically. There is of course the Parti Africain de l'Indépendance, which was dissolved for wanting to 'communistise' the country, and the leaders are apparently still in gaol. Another party exists, the P.R.A.—Senegal, but it is limited in following to Casamance in the south.

The economic objective of Senegal is an African socialism. This socialism is far from a copy of scientific socialism; for it is a socialism which above all takes account of the particular character of the people and the country of Senegal.

Economics therefore played a part in the crisis of the Mali Federation. Senegal is at the beginning of a process of industrialisation, and Cap-Vert, the region near Dakar, is already well advanced. Industrial exploitation of the phosphates at Taïba is under way. In contrast, Soudan has no industry. The Office of the Niger, which cultivates a great deal of rice, has never balanced its budget. Capital investors in Senegal cast a suspicious eye upon the Marxist socialisation projected by Soudan.

So each of us proceeds on his own way. There is no immediate prospect of reopening the railway between Dakar and Bamako. The Mali Minister of Finance recently said so. It is clear that economic rupture hangs over the two partners. Who suffers most, would be difficult to say. Everyone suffers, that is certain.

Politically, Senegal has drawn nearer to the Conseil de l'Entente (the grouping of West African States led by the Ivory Coast under Houphouët-Boigny), which means in fact, to the Ivory Coast. Senegal was also among the original 'Twelve'—the French-speaking States who met at Brazzaville on 15 December 1960 and at Dakar on 30 January 1961. Mali has tried to preserve its neutrality, but it participated in the Casablanca Conference, which ranges her with Guinea and Ghana in West Africa.

## AT AND AFTER EVIAN

JEAN LACOUTURE

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THE end of the Algerian war is at last in sight. But the opening of negotiations at Evian on May 20 does not yet mean that the fighting is over—this will only come about after long and delicate discussions—or that Algeria can now resume a normal life, social peace and psychological disarmament, devoting itself to the task of reconstruction. One may now hope, however, that this state of underhand war, part civil and part international, which has been raging for almost seven years in this distracted country, may soon be replaced by primarily political debates in which violence, if present, will no longer be the only law.

Years will be necessary before the establishment of a real peace in Algeria; hatreds have been heaping for too long, the influence of the former régime is still too strong, and strong also are the illusions of those who think that it is possible to revive the past and wipe out the Algerian revolution as if it had never existed. First, it will take months before an agreement is reached between the French government and the leaders of the Algerian rebellion. Numerous divergences still keep them apart—deriving from the fundamental difference between the conceptions of the colonisers, even when determined on decolonisation, and the former colonised, even when equally determined not to drive their former masters to their ruin.

The background to Evian is a strange one. The French authorities are in apparent control of Algeria itself, except on extraordinary occasions when the crowd breaks through any barrier raised against it. The French army is everywhere, at least by day, and the F.L.N. forces have stopped all significant military operations, to limit themselves to underground work and terrorist activities at least as effective as their previous campaigns.

Whoever travels in Algeria today may seriously doubt the whole reality of the war, except for the enormous number of French soldiers quartered in the country. And yet, although the French seem to have won the battles, they must withdraw from the war, not only because of the influence exerted by the political and military cadres of the rebels on the mass of the

population, but also because of mounting international pressure; from the West, to prevent France from endangering the Western powers in a conflict with the Afro-Asian world, and from the East, with the threat of increasing intervention—if only through the arming and training of F.L.N. cadres—by the Communist countries.

In Algeria, therefore, there are three intertwined wars. First, there is the military struggle, between the French army and the rebels. This has been won by the French, as far at least as regular forces can do so against guerrilla fighters. The success of the British in Malaya was more thorough, but then the F.L.N. is far more developed than the Malayan rebels were and is furthermore assisted by neighbouring nations.

The second is a political war to win over the population to its very soul. There the rebels have registered the successes, in spite of the extraordinary efforts, sometimes generous, sometimes cruel, of officers who, after reading Mao Tse Tung, thought that with a few récépés and enough good will, they could “win over” a population. They forgot that the success of the Chinese revolution was due to revolutionary convictions, the desire to redress wrongs, to overcome poverty, to build a better society. They forgot that Mao’s first quality in the eyes of the Chinese peasants was to have been born in a Chinese village, like themselves. Colonel Argoud\* cannot say he was born in a Kabyle village. . . .

The third war is a diplomatic one. This too has been won by the F.L.N., but not completely; for France has managed to prevent a formal condemnation at the United Nations, to keep her allied support—which Portugal lost at the first alarm—to win even the confidence of Arab governments, such as that of Tunisia. But Paris cannot afford more cruel retreats. What has been lost is already too great, what could be gained through peace is too important. To prevent the diplomatic calamity of a rupture with its allies or direct intervention from the East, turning Algeria into a new Spain, Paris wants to put an end to this huge hunt, in which the cries of the hunted can be heard by the whole world.

But deciding to end the war is not the same as stopping it. Another strange aspect of this conflict is that it does not take place between two opponents but between several. The F.L.N.

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and the majority of the Algerian population face the French State with its army, faithful on the whole but with strong dissident elements. These elements can still produce a crisis similar to that of April 22, as they enjoy the favour of Algerian settlers—or roughly one million people, excluding the ten thousand or so 'liberals' who have already accepted Algeria's independence—as well as a small fraction of the Muslim population.

That a few Muslims, part of the army and most Europeans in Algeria, either by intrigue or inertia, should still oppose a radical change in the control of the country makes it very difficult indeed to bring the change about. The details of a cease-fire, of a provisional administration, of a State that would respect the rights of its minorities, can be agreed; but if all these forces join together against such a programme, they may sabotage it once more or in any case hamper it. All would reasonably agree that the two real contenders are General de Gaulle and M. Ferhat Abbas. But both are so placed that, to prevent bloodshed, they cannot go to the capital, Algiers, at the present moment and probably not for several months. It is a strange situation. Here is a house. It is to change owners, but neither the old owner nor the new one can enter it to hand over or receive the keys. . . .

What may be expected from peace in Algeria? What régime is likely to be established there? What sort of links may still exist with France? What are the chances of a Maghreb union, to encompass the new republic, Tunisia and Morocco? What consequences will the coming of this new State have on the fragile balance of power in Africa?

When asked, the Algerian leaders are quick to explain the nature of the power they want to establish. They all answer that they want their country to be unitarian (no federalism based on communities, as in Lebanon, or on territorial principles, as in Switzerland), really independent and free of diplomatic orientation (not bound, for example, by the Atlantic Pact), and 'socialist'.

Socialist? But how far? Are they thinking of a planned economy and rapid industrialisation? Or of some rural Marxism such as the sort Fidel Castro is trying to introduce in Cuba, an attempt which deeply interests all young Africans? But answers vary according to the people asked, as the Algerian revolution is far too complex not to shelter the widest range of tendencies, from

'Bourguibism' to 'Nasserism', from the admirers of the Chinese experiment to the admirers of the Guinean one. In fact, the most frequent answer is this: "As long as the fighting persists, we cannot put forward any specific programme. It might divide us at the very moment that unity is vital. We will see later. . . ."

If these answers reveal anything at all, they reveal a strong, although not too precise a tendency towards some form of socialism, mostly agrarian, based on land reform, reconversion of investments into industries, rigorous planning and mobilisation of the masses.

What is probably more important is the desire for that diplomatic independence, 'non-engagement' if not neutralism, which is so common among the newly emancipated peoples. This intention may, of course, clash with French wishes, and more manifestly and explosively so than plans for land reform or the redistribution of riches. For the association General de Gaulle will try to make the Algerians accept necessarily includes diplomatic independence; but it also includes certain common responsibilities towards security and foreign policy. Is it on this particular issue that the hardest battle is to be fought at Evian? Perhaps. 'Bases' have had a bad reputation in the Afro-Asian world, especially since Suez. . . .

The French, of course, have not yet surrendered the principle of 'association'. This is not only a response to clear realities in the social and economic situation of Algeria, but it also makes it impossible for General de Gaulle to conclude the war and recognise independence without having his action considered as an abandonment or a disaster. Whether it is a transitory formula, a diplomatic trick, or a régime corresponding to the reality of Franco-Algerian relations, the association of the two sovereign States will be the objective that the French negotiators will propose to the Algerians as the common principle both Paris and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.) could present to the voters in a referendum, following a formula which General de Gaulle made more or less official on May 8. In an article published on the same day by the '*Gazette de Lausanne*', the Swiss journalist, Charles H. Favrod, who at present appears the best informed observer of Algerian intentions, wrote that the F.L.N. leaders were considering this offer as one of the possible solutions, provided it really preserved their independence.

The Algerians will be able to experience such an association



to a certain extent during the "transitory period" which the Evian negotiations have to fix and which would make it possible to bring back some calm to Algeria under a joint government until the referendum. During these 12 or 18 months, it may be possible to see if, after a cruel seven years' war and in spite of hatreds accumulated between the two communities, co-operation can still be accomplished which may lead to a time-honoured association.

To many Frenchmen, at least to those who only consider peace in Algeria as a liquidation of all overseas engagements and an opportunity to concentrate upon the development of France, this formula of association could mean a regrouping of Paris, Tunis, Rabat, and Algiers. It would lead up to a 'great Maghreb', leaning in freedom on France. It is known that, during his recent trip to the United States, M. Bourguiba recalled that his aim was to get the three countries together and that he was ready to head them if he was asked to do so. The Tunisian leader added that the links of such a community with France could only be economic and cultural. Did he really reject any forms of permanent political co-operation? Certain previous declarations he has made enable us to doubt it. The rather hectic situation bound to emerge with the looming of this new State in the middle of the Maghreb may induce the Tunisian and Moroccan governments to look for assistance, stability and friends on a firmer ground.

The Maghreb, if at all formed, cannot help turning towards Paris. Not only because geography encourages it, but also because economics advise it and because French culture is deeply rooted in all three constituent countries, which share the same language and a recent history lived together under the French colonial system. Algeria alone could perhaps be more naturally independent from France than her two poor neighbours, whose need for assistance will doubtless be greater at first if they join their poverty than if they play their own cards separately. This may explain why a number of neo-colonialist elements, both French and European, so strongly wish for the creation of the Maghrebin union.

With Nigeria, of all the countries achieving emancipation, Algeria is the least poor in the middle cadres—graduates, foremen, local administrators—which are the most apt to accept the responsibilities inherent in freedom if its unity is to be preserved, once the problem of the presence and co-operation of Europeans



can be settled peacefully. A dynamic country, whose struggle towards self-government has held the whole world's attention and raised the regard of the younger nations, Algeria has already played an important diplomatic part at international conferences, especially inter-African ones. If the Chinese revolution had been able to "learn its way about" on an internal level in Yenan long before getting to power, the Algerian Republic will have served its diplomatic apprenticeship on the international stage. Yet this may be dangerous. Algeria's prestige, a little artificial, external, may create illusions and produce internal disappointments. It is less difficult to make a brilliant speech in Accra or Cairo or win a vote at the United Nations than smoothly to run a country or provide work for the peasants.

But those who have gone through the rough experience of the resistance movement will overcome such temptations and weakness more easily than others. After all, men who have gained their freedom by such dangerous means may well outshine those who achieved it after a few months imprisonment like Dr. Nkrumah, or on a bold vote like Sékou Touré, or after a successful conspiracy like Colonel Nasser. Men coming down from mountains, whether in Kenya or in Kabylia, always make a great impression on the people of the plane.

*(Translated from the French)*



## KEEPER OF THE UMBILICAL CORD

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THE rapidity with which political changes are taking place in Africa raises the fundamental question of native African political capabilities. In certain areas, particularly East, Central, and Southern Africa, strongly entrenched white elements still oppose the extension of additional political power to Africans on political and economic technical grounds. The political argument, which is the main concern here, asserts that Africans are simply too backward culturally and insufficiently experienced politically to shoulder the responsibilities of self-government, at least as conceived by Westerners. This assertion rests, in turn, on the assumption that the political institutions originally developed by Africans themselves failed to equip them adequately for the tasks of modern government.

Ample data are available on indigenous political systems. Nevertheless, these data have been largely ignored in judgments of native African political capabilities. One reason is that the evidence lies buried in technical monographs and reports painstakingly prepared by anthropologists and anthropologically-oriented colonial officials and missionaries.

A second obstacle arises from the methods specialists customarily use in describing native societies and their interlocking institutions. It is true, for example, that kinship relations and magico-religious practices play far more important roles in an African political system than in a Western society. These factors are not only significant in the ideology of the people, but they frequently provide the ultimate sanctions of authority. Their inclusion in a detailed, integrated description of the political life of a society, though scientifically proper and necessary, tends, however, to blot out the main outlines of the political system in force. The result is an over-emphasis on differences between African and Western political organisations, although the differences are actually just superficial.

Language factors, or terminologies, also present barriers to ready understanding of an indigenous political system by non-specialists. An individual in the Buganda kingdom, for example,

bears the quaint title, 'Keeper of the (King's) Umbilical Cord.' An analysis based on status and function shows that this person holds high rank and wields considerable power in the political organisation of the Baganda. It is often necessary to go beyond terminology to grasp fully the real facts of an African political system.

African political systems are comprehensible within the framework of recognized Western political concepts, since all governments, whether simply or elaborately organised, must perform certain essential functions—the maintenance of internal peace and order, the protection of persons and property, and the preservation of external security. In addition, African political systems are classifiable in the traditional manner—according to the degree of centralization or decentralization of authority. The criteria for classification involve, broadly, the distribution of power, more or less limited by some system of checks and balances and the right of veto and impeachment, as well as the structural aspects embodied in the administrative organisation and the principles and practices of law and justice.

While many African States consisted of only a few thousand people, in several instances millions of subjects were included under one government. In either case, however, the relatively complex political organisations were clearly defined. Moreover, a few of these States persisted for centuries, thus indicating the large degree of political stability that had been attained.

Space limitations forbid the description of more than a small sampling. The selection of the Baganda, the Ashanti, the Bantu-speaking tribes, and the Zulu under Chaka, has therefore been made with a view to showing varying political types that formerly existed in a large part of Africa.

**The Baganda:** The Baganda kingdom in Uganda, East Africa, attained its zenith in the second half of the nineteenth century under the rule of King Mutesa. Early in King Mutesa's reign the population was said to have been some three millions, but after his death a civil war and a severe famine reduced the inhabitants by half. Later, sleeping sickness further reduced the population, which in the first decade of the present century was estimated at something over a million.

The history of the Baganda, preserved in tradition and legends, describes over thirty generations of kings, beginning with the first king, Kuntu, who reigned about 1,000 years ago. Throughout this long history, Baganda rulers enjoyed despotic powers

and drew a sharp distinction between the royal family, whose blood was considered sacred, and the rest of the population—i.e., the commoners. Politically, the kingdom represents an outstanding African example of centralised power, in which ultimate authority over the lives and rights of its citizens (and slaves) rested in the monarch. Administration of the government, however, was the function of a large number of officials, ranked hierarchically, but with vertical mobility possible even to the lowest members.

A body of chiefs assisted the sovereign in governing the kingdom, which was divided for administrative purposes into ten large districts, each headed by a chief. Two additional chiefs, the prime minister and the king's favourite (called 'Keeper of the (King's) Umbilical Cord'), ranked higher than the district chiefs and, like the king, held tax-free estates in every district. Commoners addressed these two officials as 'kings' because they paid no tribute and sent their own agents along with the king's messengers when taxes and tribute were collected. They further enjoyed the exclusive right to visit the monarch at all times.

The prime minister stood foremost among the officials, serving also as chief justice. All State matters passed first through the prime minister's hands; even chiefs had to inform him in advance if they wished to visit the king. Since the Baganda would not tolerate a woman on the throne, the prime minister became regent if a prince was too young to govern the country. Although a king had the authority to depose his prime minister, it was only in extreme cases that he would exercise this power.

The ten district chiefs handled most routine administrative functions, rendering accounts periodically to the prime minister who, in turn, reported to the king and the full council. This council consisted of the prime minister, the favourite chief, and the incumbent district chiefs. Each chief controlled large tracts of land in his district, for which he was responsible to the king and council. The estates had to be kept in good order, or the chief would risk dismissal from office or a stiff fine.

District chiefs were required to maintain roads about four feet wide connecting their headquarters with the capital, where much of their time was spent. Whenever local affairs claimed their attention, these chiefs obtained the king's permission to return home; and, during their absences, authorised representatives

substituted for them in the council. In his district the chief was supreme; he was the principal magistrate and had a number of sub-chiefs as assistants.

Sub-chiefs were also obliged to maintain in good order roads leading from their residence to that of the district chief. Thus, it was possible to reach any part of the kingdom with relative ease. Sub-chiefs were independent of district chiefs in the management of their lands, and they exercised the right to conscript labour for work on roads, bridges, etc. In all matters that concerned the State, however, they had to consult their superiors.

The queen and the king's mother ranked above all chiefs, though below the king. They, too, wielded absolute power over their own subjects. Both controlled estates in each district which were administered by chiefs they appointed themselves, and they conducted courts in which cases involving their followers were adjudicated. The queen, who was absolutely prohibited from having children, was chosen for the position by the deceased king's official widow from among the new ruler's many wives. The king's mother was greatly respected and honoured throughout the land because of her close relationship to the king.

A full complement of courts operated in the Baganda kingdom. Cases were first tried in the courts of sub-chiefs, and if they ended in dispute they were referred to the higher district court. Appeals from the latter went to the court of the prime minister, where most cases ended, to be heard by him or delegated assistants. He personally judged important trials. Exceptionally, cases would go as far as the king's court, highest in the kingdom. Baganda custom prescribed that both plaintiffs and defendants should pay fixed fees to each court, thus making appeals a costly process. Established sentences obtained for all acts defined as crimes, such as theft, treason, adultery, homicide and murder. Prisons were lacking, but when offenders were ordered into confinement they were placed in the stocks, which consisted of heavy logs with holes large enough for the foot to enter.

Several tribes subjugated by King Mutesa held subsidiary places in the Baganda kingdom. The Busoga tribe to the north, which yielded large tribute in cattle, ivory, and slaves, was administered by one of the Baganda district chiefs, that of Kyagwe, while the Koki, formerly an independent kingdom,

and the people of the Kiziba country, were under the political jurisdiction of the Baganda district chief of Budu. The inhabitants of Ankole, a pastoral area on the west, though never subjugated by the Baganda, nevertheless sent large herds of cattle as tribute from time to time in order to ensure peace.

Tax-collection dates were set by the king, the prime minister, and the favourite chief, and then announced to the full council. The king appointed special revenue agents for each district, to which the prime minister, the favourite chief, the queen, the king's mother, and the district chiefs added their own representatives. Fifty per cent of the taxes collected went to the monarch, the others receiving fixed portions of the remainder. Each sub-chief was given a small part of the taxes gathered in his region.

Only the royal family was regarded as superior by birth. Hence, any subject could rise, or at least aspire, to the highest position in the kingdom through recognisably distinguished services. Knowledge of state affairs, bravery in warfare, and shrewdness in council discussions constituted the qualifications favourable for official advancement. In practice, however, sons of chiefs frequently achieved chieftainship in turn, since they had been trained from early childhood for such responsibilities.

The organisation of the Buganda government indicates its authoritarian character. The king had the right to appoint and remove all officials; as owner of the land he could dispose of it as he wished, thereby exerting powerful economic controls over the officials; he could advance or reduce any official's rank; he could ignore the advice of officials whenever he pleased, whether such advice came from council meetings or from individuals. Strong-willed Baganda kings have often exploited their powers to the limit.

In the ordinary course of government, however, certain accepted patterns acted as more or less limiting factors. A district chief, for example, seldom interfered in the relations between a sub-chief and his followers; the sub-chief was responsible for the actions of those under him, just as the king held district chiefs responsible for their entire districts. When public functions were necessary, such as tax levies, roadwork labour, construction of a royal house or a temple, it was customary to consult district chiefs on the labour supply available or the amount of taxes. A district chief would then summon his sub-chiefs for discussions on these matters.

Men who lived on a chief's land owed him allegiance. They were obliged to work and fight for him; but, since they were freemen, they had the right to leave a chief if they wished. In return for this allegiance and service, freemen received land to cultivate for themselves. It was therefore in the interest of a chief to treat his followers well, and this pattern served as a constant check on possible arbitrary rule at the lower levels of the society.

**The Ashanti:** Early in the eighteenth century several independent chiefdoms, located in Ghana, West Africa, united in a loose confederacy known since then as the kingdom of Ashanti. At the time, the kingdom contained a few hundred thousand people. The heads of the chiefdoms swore allegiance to the Ashanti king, at the same time relinquishing certain important rights and privileges which they had enjoyed as independent rulers; but they retained, as a group, considerable influence in the government of the realm, even to the extent of contravening royal decisions, if necessary. In fact, the king himself could be arraigned before this group, operating as a tribunal, if it was believed that he had overstepped the bounds of customary law and procedure. The Ashanti kingdom therefore represented a political type in which the spirit of decentralisation was fundamental.

Each chiefdom within the broad framework of the kingdom constituted a complete administrative unit, one almost a replica of the other. Further, the chiefdoms generally contained two or more sub-chiefdoms which also functioned as political and territorial entities—under administrative bodies patterned after the larger political divisions, but on a smaller scale. Some of these sub-chiefdoms were broken down into several political units, and in these again the same administrative principles prevailed.

In brief, the political organisation of the various parts of the Ashanti kingdom, from largest to smallest, was based on a single model, differing only in the number of officials and their degree of responsibility. The direct relationships between the heads of these political units formed the links which bound the kingdom together.

The political structure of one chiefdom may be used to represent the general Ashanti pattern. At its head stood the head-chief, who nominally ranked as chief executive and adminis-



trative officer, as well as supreme spiritual leader. Upon taking office, a precise statement of a head-chief's duties and limitations was publicly recited to the candidate, along with a warning to heed the advice of his councillors and never to act unless he had obtained their assent. Failure to observe this admonition was considered legitimate ground for the removal of a head-chief.

The office of chiefdom was hereditary, descending matrilineally in a particular Ashanti kindred. The senior female of the ruling kindred, called the queen mother, publicly nominated the successor to a head-chieftainship, but only after thorough discussion with, and the consent of, a group of officials known as elders or councillors. These officials generally sounded out the wishes of the majority of the people in selecting a head-chief. The queen mother and the elders also jointly held the power to remove a head-chief from office. When a head-chief entered on his duties he swore to observe customary Ashanti law, and in return the elders took an oath of allegiance to him. In addition, the head-chief had to swear allegiance to the king of Ashanti, a ceremony which fully confirmed him in office. He then joined the ranks of the king's elders, or councillors.

The group of elders consisted of two high ranking chiefs, a chief of kindreds, the leaders of the several army divisions, the head of the head-chief's personal bodyguard, and the head of the head-chief's household, to which a large number of official servants were attached. Many of the elders themselves ruled over sub-chiefdoms. They had their own council of elders, their own courts, and independent treasuries. Individuals who were tried in their courts, however, had the right of appeal to the head-chief's tribunal. Elders were obliged to attend sessions of the head-chief's court, over which the head-chief and the queen mother presided.

The villages in sub-chiefdoms were organised in the same pattern as the larger units, of which they formed integral parts.

Relations between the Ashanti king and the head-chiefs were clearly defined. They took an oath of allegiance to him; they surrendered the right to declare war; their power to impose capital punishment on their own subjects was curtailed, though permitted in special instances. The king, on the other hand, held the right to impose taxes on the head-chiefs, and he extended to every subject in the kingdom the right of appeal against judicial decisions rendered in lower courts to the king's court.

As a rule, the king and all chiefs leaned heavily on their councillors in the actual government of the territories under their jurisdiction. Lesser chiefs were for the most part permitted to manage their own affairs with a minimum of interference from the central authorities. Good government was generally attributed by the Ashanti to the system of decentralisation; and, since individuals were educated from early childhood, by precept and example, to know the tasks connected with government, political standards were high in the Ashanti kingdom and discords infrequent.

**The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa:** A large number of Bantu-speaking peoples in South Africa conformed more or less to a typical political organisation in which the basic political unit was the tribe. Each tribe generally had its own name, a recognized territorial area, and a chief at its head. The tribe was divided for administrative purposes into districts, sub-districts, villages, and wards, each under responsible officials. A system of councils operated throughout, assisting the head officials and the chief in governing the tribe and, at the same time, serving as a check on their powers. A characteristic feature of the Bantu political scheme was the hereditary nature of chieftainship; if the heir was too young to take office, a regent endowed with full power, rights and privileges performed the necessary functions.

The tribal chief enjoyed considerable privileges and authority, since he incorporated in himself the functions of ruler, supreme judge, sole convener of tribal meetings, war leader, etc. His responsibilities, however, reflected the rights and duties of the position. The chief was expected to guard the interests and welfare of his subjects, and to be available when petitions or grievances from tribal elements were submitted. The maintenance of law and order in the tribe, as well as the effective administration of political sub-divisions by sub-chiefs or headmen, devolved ultimately upon him.

A few individuals, usually close relatives of the chief and influential sub-chiefs or headmen, served as confidential advisers to the chief, assisting him in formulating tribal policy and other measures destined to go to the great tribal council for discussion. This tribal council comprised the chief's private advisers, all sub-chiefs and headmen, commoners chosen for their ability, and some of the chief's more distant relations. No new law or

action affecting the interests of the entire tribe could be put into execution without the prior approval of the tribal council. Decisions arrived at by the chief and his confidential advisers were submitted to the tribal council, where they were freely discussed or criticised, accepted, rejected, or modified. Since the council's co-operation was considered essential for the adequate government of the tribe, and its members did not hesitate to oppose the chief when necessary, this body operated as a powerful check on rulers with autocratic ambitions.

Every Bantu-speaking tribe had a system of local government that extended downward to include the village or even household. Large districts were administered by sub-chiefs who held their positions either through family relationship with the chief or because they were commoners of distinction. A council consisting of headmen of the sub-chief's district and the latter's private advisers aided in governing the political unit. The sub-district or ward, under the control of a local headman, constituted the smallest administrative unit. Like the sub-chief, headmen were also related to the tribal chief or were commoners of unusual ability. A small council composed of the headman's male relatives, important village leaders, and wise elders assisted in governing the sub-district.

The functions and responsibilities of officials throughout the tribal political system were fundamentally similar, except that those in charge of larger units exercised correspondingly larger functions and were subject to greater responsibility. Individual rights were protected by means of a well-established system of courts organised hierarchically, in which the privilege of appeal even to the highest judicial authority, the chief himself, was open to every tribesman. Political officials for the most part also administered the judiciary, aided by small groups of individuals recognised as experts in tribal law.

**The Zulu under Chaka:** Several times during the past two hundred years the political organisation of Bantu-speaking tribes in South Africa, as described above, underwent cardinal changes. These occurred when powerful chiefs arose who turned their energies toward amalgamating a number of independent tribes into a single political unit, either peacefully or through military conquest. Under such leadership, the Zulu, the Swazi, the Shangana, the Pedi, and the Ngwato, among others, developed into relatively great States in which one chief

ruled over several formerly autonomous tribes. The powers of the central authority in these States generally expanded far beyond that of the normal Bantu tribe, a pattern which affected the entire political structure. An outstanding example of highly-centralised, despotic rule is presented by the Zulu during its imperialistic stage in the first quarter of the nineteenth century under the famous Chief Chaka (or Shaka).

Within some ten years, till his assassination in 1828, Chaka managed to impose his rule over most of Zululand and Natal, bringing the many tribes he subjected by force into one nation. Interested chiefly in military matters, Chaka organised his warriors into regiments of men of the same age. These regiments were quartered for most of the year in barracks located in different parts of the country, where they engaged in military training, herded Chaka's extensive herds of cattle, and cultivated his fields.

During the Zulu period as a composite nation, its king exercised administrative, legislative, and judicial authority, and he had the power to enforce his decisions. He also acted as foreign minister in relations with Europeans and other tribes. Moreover, the primary religious and magical practices belonged exclusively to the Zulu monarch. He 'owned' the nation's regiments, which were mainly commanded by princes, chiefs or brothers of important chiefs, and, occasionally, valiant commoners. The king's family formed a powerful aristocracy which held the highest ranks in the land. Chaka placed his brothers in key areas as tribal chiefs and appointed other members of the royal blood to chieftainships. Marriages between the ruling family and families of tribal chiefs were encouraged so that strong kinship ties would bind the ruling class together.

Chiefs of tribes within the Zulu nation wielded only such power as the king delegated to them, principally in the administrative and judicial spheres. Although they could execute judgment, they had no power of life or death over their subjects, for this was the exclusive right of the king. Chiefs were also obliged to report serious crimes to the king. The chiefs of the various tribes served as a council with which the king was supposed to discuss matters affecting the entire nation. Within each tribe chiefs were assisted by councils.

Under a strong ruler like Chaka, the authority of councils was weakened considerably, in practically inverse ratio to the strength of the central authority. Chaka, for example, followed

a policy of keeping his chiefs at loggerheads with one another, thereby lessening their actual or potential power to act as a unit.

The few examples given above do not do justice to African experience in developing and carrying on adequate political systems. In actual fact, highly complex, orderly governments existed in every region of Africa before contacts with Europeans occurred. This was in part recognised by colonial powers. Under the British policy of 'indirect rule', well-established indigenous political institutions were utilised in the administration of the territories, with the reservation that the highest offices, and corresponding responsibility, were held by representatives of the mother country.

The brief descriptions herein given do suggest certain inescapable conclusions. First, that many African peoples have had considerable political experience over significant periods of time. Secondly, that Africans achieved stable governments which, in some instances, administered vast numbers of subjects. Thirdly, that those African governments fulfilled the essential tasks expected from governments in general. Finally, since large administrative corps were the rule, that a great many Africans had a thorough administrative and political training.

Translated into Western terminology, African political systems may be seen as quite comparable to all other systems, ancient and modern. The status, duties, and obligations of the ruler, whether king, chief, or family unit, were clearly defined in terms of the respective constitution, or better, customary law of the people. Similarly, specified roles were prescribed for the administrative officials who, in varying degrees, served as a check on the authority of the central power. The political and territorial sub-divisions into which States were divided for administrative purposes functioned as integral parts of the national government, according to regular systems of relationships which delimited the political authority of the parts from that of the whole. Well-organised methods for the collection of taxes and tribute operated. The rights of subjects were in most cases explicitly recognised and guarded from abuse by means of relatively elaborate court systems in which the privilege of appeal to the highest courts was a fundamental principle. Finally, popular will frequently found direct or indirect expression in the selection of rulers and high administrative officials, generally through the mechanism of representative councils.

## AFRICAN IVORIES

HERBERT F. RIESER

It is now over fifty years since African art emerged from its dusty obscurity in the ethnological corners of museums to become one of the dominant influences in the development of modern European art—truly dominant, in that its vitality inspired Picasso to his Negro Period and the creation of '*Les Femmes d'Alger*,' one of the most influential paintings of the 20th century. Although it is true that Cézanne was the precursor of Cubism, there is no doubt that the step from Cézanne to Cubism was made possible only because of the simplification and freedom which artists such as Picasso recognised in African art. Further, not only was the vitality of African art felt in Paris, but in Berlin and Munich too. It is not always appreciated to what extent the influence of African and other styles of 'primitive' art was formative in Expressionism.

Since 1910, African art has been fairly extensively written about—and has acquired a considerable following among wealthy collectors. Unfortunately, these writings consider African art only in its totality—ignoring, of course, the contributions of anthropological scholars, whose approach is essentially ethnological.

It is clearly time that African art should be considered and evaluated on the same basis as European. Further, it is time that Africans became more involved in the analysis and assessment of their own art forms. In a recent and comprehensive work on African art, there are only two references to African authorship in a bibliography of 122 items. It is undoubtedly true that social and economic needs must take first place in the newly created African States; but it should be appreciated that advances in these fields will yield only a sterile materialism if the indigenous cultures are allowed to die and be replaced by imitations of European prototypes. This is now all too apparent in some of the appalling creations which go under the name of 'tourist' carvings, as well as in the palpable imitations—unsuitably aged—which can now be found in some art galleries. It must not be said of the new Africa, with its deep-rooted tradition in art, as it is now being said of the West—as Professor Stuart Hampshire phrased it in a recent radio talk—"We are in a state of confusion



about the place of the arts in our lives and in the life of society as a whole."

To be specific, there is a crying need for a comprehensive work on the ivory carvings of Africa. It is all too frequently assumed that wood was—and is—the principal material of the African carver, and ivory the traditional medium of the Far East. To underline this general attitude, it is only necessary to refer to the section on 'Ivory Carving' in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. No mention whatsoever is made of African work. Yet, surprisingly, considerable space is given to Eskimo work, which, for all its appeal, is very limited when compared with African ivory carving.

What is fascinating about African ivories is their broad sculptural variety; and when one realises the difficult problems of technique which the material imposes on the carver, this achievement is all the more impressive.


I have recently compared a Benin ivory amulet with a Romanesque ivory diptych, and find that the Benin work well survives the comparison. The low relief design of the amulet is perfectly balanced within the cylindrical area, and the subjects of the design are beautifully and delicately carved; in fact, the figurations have a surprisingly large number of points in common. I also compared the amulet with a low relief Chinese ivory brush holder and found that it stood up to the challenge just as well as it did to the Romanesque diptych.

One of the most vital styles of African ivories is that of the small Warega figure carvings of the Congo. These are bold and direct, and have a sculptural force which, for me at least, has the same impact as a Henry Moore maquette. In fact, the Warega ivory figurines exemplify for me all that is truly 'primitive' in African art. So much so, that I always—and often unconsciously—call them to mind when viewing the excursions of contemporary sculptors into the primitive. I have in mind especially a little 'fetish' figure by Reg Butler which, for all its charm, remains a conscious striving after 'primitiveness' and inevitably a product of a sophisticated European mind.

To prove to myself that I am not overestimating the level and significance of African tribal ivories, I have carefully studied the Benin ivory amulet masks and the magnificent Balega ivory mask in the collection of the late Sir Jacob Epstein.

The Benin amulet masks I believe to be amongst the finest examples of ivory carving in the world. They are African





*Afro-Portuguese Ivory (16th Cent.)*  
Collection Herbert F. Rieser. Height 2 ins.

works, yet they have a powerful feeling of sculptural portraiture which I can only liken to heads done by such European sculptors as Donatello and Rodin. Though there is no doubt that Portuguese influences made themselves felt on the early carvers, the pieces remain emphatically African for all that.

The Balega mask is not just a fine piece of African carving. It illustrates very forcibly that quality of simplification and freedom which Picasso realized was necessary in order to step from Cézanne's ideas to Cubism; in fact, its feeling is strongly present in Picasso's *'Nude with a Towel'* (1907)—and the step to *'Bust of a Woman'* (1909), an early cubist painting, is very short. Another point about this mask, a purely personal one, is the influence it had on Epstein when he produced his head of William Blake. In many Epstein carvings, the African prototype is not hard to detect, but with the Blake, the influence is much more subtle and complete. It would be impossible to make a one-to-one correspondence of the Blake with the Balega mask, but the underlying common feeling and power are only too apparent.

The four examples above are drawn from what one might call the higher levels of African ivory carvings. The reason for this is simply that they are better known to the non-specialist, so that my comments are more likely to be meaningful. There is, however, a mass of ivory carving the quality of which is just as high as that of the works I have mentioned above, but which is little known and, except by a few collectors, is virtually ignored. I refer particularly to the functional objects—spoons, ladles, combs, bracelets and the like. Although such objects are essentially utilitarian, many made of ivory are adorned with figurative carving of the very highest quality. Such carvings are cogent examples of the inherent aesthetic sensibility of the African—a factor, I feel, which is common to all branches of the human family, but which tends to be suppressed in essentially materialistic civilizations. Compare a comb bought at a modern Western department store with, say, a Baluba ivory comb, and the true measure of what I mean will be quickly evident. This brings me back to what I said above regarding Africa and its indigenous arts.

One could go on endlessly, dealing with such pieces as the Baluba ivory amulets, Bapende ivory masks, or the exquisite Afro-Portuguese ivories which, until the recent publication of a book on these objects, were an almost unknown art form to the general reader.


If the new African States can appreciate their heritage, they may well be able to avoid making the mistakes which the West has made in creating hideous functional articles. The only excuse for the West is that it had no precedent. Africa has!



*Warega Ivory Mask*

Height 6 ins.

*With acknowledgements to the British Museum.*



*Bapende Ivory Masks*

Height 2 ins. each

*With acknowledgements to the British Museum.*

## SOUTH AFRICAN NEWSBOY

The veld grit thrusts  
 Spiked shrubs to sun;  
 Aloes brandish  
 Blood-soaked spears;  
 The puffy, stiff  
 Corpse-flesh of cactus  
 Jets a spray of needles;  
 Like a giant latrine-brush  
 The bare-trunked, tufted tree  
 Scours the sky.

You shudder at the hot prick and glitter of thorns,  
 Aware, everywhere, of the parched vegetable lust.

Cheap at threepence—a paper and a smile;  
 He'll sell you either: neither are his to give.  
 You have not studied the economics of smiling?  
 It may be safely included under Supply and Demand.

In this town you would not believe  
 How many churches. Dutch Reformed,  
 JESUS SAVES, in neon lighting,  
 Anglican, Presbyterian, Seventh Day Adventist:  
 Mass at eight; Knee-drill at ten;  
 See the last page, right-hand column.

Round his legs he wears,  
 Like bright red bangles,  
 Sores.

A non-drinking Calvinist (shares  
 Mainly in pineapples) warns:  
 Papists as Dangerous as Reds.  
 (Page three, the Catholics have just  
 Consecrated a Zulu bishop.)

Not that the little black newsboy knows,  
For he is one of the free,  
Who are not compelled to be literate.

Aloes brandish  
Blood-soaked spears.

DENNIS DAVISON



## PUSHY

P. VAN ROOYEN

I LIVED in Doornkloof for twenty years. It all seems pretty remote and improbable now, but at the time it was just what I needed to take my mind off things after my first wife died.

The people were a friendly lot—though there was a bit of a feeling even then, you know. It was a typical Highveld town with the usual gaggle of civil servants and shop-keepers, and a huge sheep-farming district to keep them in business. The black population far outnumbered the white and consisted mainly of Africans who lived outside the town in what was called a 'location'; but there was also a small community of Indians, some of the few who had been allowed to cross the Natal border to seek work. They made splendid waiters.

The hotel I bought occupied a strategic position in the middle of the shopping centre. There were two others, but neither was good enough to compete with the Protea. They existed largely on our overflow. "Hot and cold running water in every room" was one of our boasts, and it certainly helped to pull in commercial travellers from all over the country. During the summer months the place would be full of Portuguese women and children, refugees from the heat of Lourenço Marques. Goodness knows what they found to do all day. The lounge was large and comfortable; anyone in search of a sundowner and gossip was sure to find someone he knew there. The service was good, there was plenty of iced lager, and there was Pushy, of course.

Pushy ran the public bar and was an integral part of it all. If you'd ever run a pub, you'd know what a godsend it is to have someone you can trust in a job like that. He had complete charge of the bar: he did the stock-taking, kept the keys, and his books were always in perfect order. He was hardly an imposing figure—I had the floor raised six inches on his side of the counter to bring him up to a comfortable working height—but there indeed was a man of substance. His control of the rowdier elements was complete. He always reminded me of a little time bomb, ticking irascibly away, and every bit as liable to go off. Everyone, from the Mayor of Doornkloof down to the boy who washed the glasses, caught the rough edge of his tongue sooner or later. Now and again he'd get a newcomer on the raw; but mostly, people enjoyed his sarcasm and even took a special

pride in provoking it. However stinging and deadly his wit, it was generally agreed that he was only living up to his reputation and didn't mean a word of it. I wasn't nearly so sure myself, but I didn't say so, of course.

I saw a lot of him, but somehow there was no real contact between us. At night, after closing time, he would subside with a grunt at his usual table in the main lounge and drink two slow whiskies—he would never touch a drop while on duty. I would be at my desk, clearing up for the night—perhaps typing out the next day's menus with two fingers—and now and again, in his thick Polish accent, he would make some slow comment on the day's events.

"Bit off a trouble with Max again tonight. That man—he stay all night if I let him. 'Here, man', I say, 'aven't you got a home to go to?' 'Ag, Pushy, old boy', he say. 'I'll Pushy-old-boy you', I tell him. 'Vat Mrs. Bothma say to you when you come home so late?' I tell him to go and drink somereve else; I von't give him any more."

Cadgers didn't stand a chance in Pushy's bar. It was a brave man who'd try shirking his responsibilities more than once with exposure certain and imminent. "Come awn, come awn," Pushy would say, grey moustache bristling, "you don't get away vith it. Ve all play fair here." If you didn't like it, there was always the Grand, as Pushy was quick to point out. And if you took his advice in a fit of pique, somehow, sooner or later, you would be back again. He seldom lost a customer.

Looking back on it now, I often wish I had made an effort to find out more about Pushy. My own time was fully occupied and I suppose that must be my excuse. He seemed to be quite alone in the world; he had no close friends—apparently didn't feel the lack of any. Perhaps he was shy and needed a little encouragement to become more communicative. In all my dealings with him I could sense a barrier. It was like the counter which he kept between himself and the rest of humanity and without which he seemed lost and ill at ease.

Off duty, he was a different person. He would go for walks and window-shop in a desultory way, never straying very far because his feet worried him. I can see him still, plodding painfully from one dusty window to the other, examining its contents with a heavy frown on his face, the inevitable cigarette hanging from the side of his mouth and the ash from it dropping unheeded onto his taut waistcoat. He read nothing beside the



daily papers; he had no interest other than his job.

Sometimes I suspected him of helping out the waiters when they got into debt. This happened often enough, as they were born gamblers and frittered away their wages on all sorts of useless luxury. Mind you, there wasn't much in the way of excitement around there for them, because entertainment in Doornkloof is strictly for whites. Danka, the porter, was always borrowing money and forever in debt. It was his one failing. Of course, one knew that somewhere in the slums outside the town he kept a wife and a steadily-growing family. Every year, according to Pushy, who seemed to know, there would be another mouth to feed, and the house was cramped and squalid. Depressing, if one thought about it; but, living in Doornkloof, one probably didn't.

The hotel was always deserted on Saturday afternoons, and sometimes I took advantage of the peace and quiet to do a little overtime. On the afternoon I remember, only Danka was on duty; and as I went into my office, I noticed him leaning against one of the pillars, quite wrapped up in himself and looking miserable, I thought. Apparently Pushy, who came in soon afterwards, thought so too. I heard the slow step and the heavy smoker's cough as the old man lowered himself into his usual chair.

"Danka? And vot is the matter with you?"

"Notting, Sir."

"You look like your grandmother died or something?"

"No, Sir." Danka's voice sounded flat.

"You been gambling, I suppose."

"No, Sir. It's not that, Sir," came the injured reply. "I got trouble, Sir. Mr. Fisher, Sir, he say he going to take back my wardrobe I bought from him if I don't pay him straightaway, Sir, and he say I could starting pay him, Sir, after six months, he say, Sir. Now he want half straightaway, Sir, and it's fifteen pound, Sir. . . ."

Pushy promised to talk to Mr. Fisher about it. Danka thanked him profusely and that ended their conversation. I didn't let on that I had heard. But when I found out quite accidentally a little while afterwards that, old Fisher being his usual uncompromising self, Pushy had paid the bill and would recover the money from Danka "when he can afford to pay me", I taxed Pushy with it. It didn't do to encourage Danka to buy more than he could afford. I warned him that sooner or later,

Danka would let him down; but Pushy wouldn't even admit that he was helping him, let alone thank me for showing an interest. How can you hope to get anywhere with a man like that?

After almost twenty years of the Protea and its problems, I began to feel a hankering for home, so I sold out to a well-known syndicate in Johannesburg. It was rather a brusque young fellow—Johnson, his name was—whom they sent down to run the place. He obviously knew all the answers. The changeover went smoothly, for everything was well organised—if I say so myself—and Pushy's side of it was, as ever, in apple-pie order. So it was with some relief that I took myself off to the Bushveld, away from civilization, to take advantage of a long-standing invitation to relax on a farm bordering the Game Reserve. There, with no newspapers or post within twenty arduous miles, I just forgot about things for a while.

About a week before my plane to England was due in Johannesburg, I left the farm to spend a few days in Doornkloof. I wanted a last look at the Protea and the many good friends I was leaving behind. As I pushed open the familiar swing doors, I felt as though I'd never been away. A competent-looking young receptionist signed me in and directed a porter to take my bags. It wasn't Danka. He'd left, I was told. Yes—for good.

The public bar was rather quiet. Jurie van Rensburg was the only one I recognised, and he was sitting at a table having a drink by himself and looking rather glum, I thought. He wasn't a particular friend of mine, but I was thirsty. He brightened up considerably when he saw me.

"Ag, man, it's nice to see you again. Are you staying long? What will you drink?" I told him and he summoned a steward.

"Things isn't the same since you left," he went on. "It's that new broom we got here—you know, Johnson. He's busy sweeping all the customers away as well as the cobwebs, man." Jurie struck me heartily on the shoulder. "Everybody goes to the Grand now, but I still drop in sometimes for old times' sake."

"Bad as that, eh?" I said, flattered. "But surely Pushy hasn't left. Where is he, the old devil? Howcome he isn't serving? Is he ill?"

Jurie looked at me in some surprise.

"Ag—didn't you know, man? Old Pushy died three weeks ago—yes," he consulted his massive gold watch which showed the days of the week. "Three weeks ago yesterday. He had a stroke."

That shook me; I could hardly believe it. I don't think Pushy had had a day's illness in all the twenty years I had known him.

Jurie gave a short laugh.

"Heart failure, they *said*," he went on. "More like his blood pressure what finished him off. Man," he bent forward confidentially, "they say he and Johnson had a flaming row and I 'ear that he took Pushy's keys away and the old geezer nearly blew up, he was so cross."

I felt quite stunned. Pushy—dead!

"The stupid oaf," I said. "What did he want to do that for? I *told* him. . . ."

"Ag, you can unnerstand it, man. These *slim kèrels* come from Jo'burg and they don't trus' anyone and they think that everyone is going to do them down. He told old Pushy that he was going to run the hotel *his* way and that old Pushy was too big for his boots. . . ." Jurie chuckled and looked smug, drained his beer and ordered two more.

When I could speak again, I said, "You apparently thought so too."

"Ag, well, man, you know what it is. These Jews come here from Russia or somewhere and all they are after is money, and they hobnob with the kaffers . . . *sies!* You can't *like* people like that!"

A slow fury began to rise in my throat, but there was something behind this and I intended to find out what it was. Jurie had been one of Pushy's most fervent admirers. I swallowed hard.

"What do you mean?"

"They should be thrown out of the country—that's what I mean." His voice rose. "They're all the same, man, all Communists. There you got that Indian building his house next to the Bothmas up on the hill. He thinks he can do what he likes now, with all that money—building next to white people. We'll show him where he gets off. . . ." His words tumbled over each other and he shook with rage.

"What are you talking about?" I demanded.

"Danka, of course, Danka!" He looked at me as though I were mad. "Hell, man—you don't know nothing! Old Pushy left him all his money! What sort of a white man would do a thing like that? Damn traitor!" He spat. "Fancy leaving all your money to a *verdomde* Indian!"



## BOOK REVIEW

### THE PENANCE OF EUROPE

JOHN BERGER

*Art critic and author*

**Muntu: An Outline of Neo-African Culture by Janheinz Jahn.**

Published by Faber and Faber, London, 1961.

276 pp. with illustrations. 30s.

I REMEMBER that about five years ago I suggested to a distinguished London editor that he should publish some of the new African and West Indian poetry. "Are there any African poets?" he asked. But the question was almost rhetorical. He was convinced that there were none. And so naturally the matter was not pursued, and the poems were not published.

Today I don't think he would answer in the same way. Although very little African poetry gets translated or published in England, most people concerned with world politics and literature are dimly aware that Africa is up to something—and may even be up to poetry. Today I fancy he would ask: "Are these African poets really any good?"

I repeat this story to emphasise the relevance of 'Muntu'. Culturally England is the most parochial country in Europe, after Spain and Portugal. And so this book, which sets out to define the cultural traditions of Africa and Africans, is more than timely. There must be very few people who have nothing to learn from it: I myself have learnt a great deal. And, as always with learning, one becomes more modest and at the same time prouder. More modest about one's own limitations, prouder about the time through which one is living. But I also repeat the story for another reason. The distinguished editor

has had his prejudices about African poetry modified. In another five years they will have been modified even further. This is not because he has or will have read any of the actual poems. Nor is it because he has read about the poets as poets. It is because he too has been made aware of the great wind of change. It is because he suspects that Europe and the English-speaking world are now being challenged in every sphere. It is because Eisenhower had to cancel his visit to Tokyo, because France is being forced to negotiate with the F.L.N., because Lumumba won't stay dead, because people are asking questions about Brazil, because Cuba is through with its sugar-daddies, because Guinea speaks up and is listened to by the rest of the world, because it becomes increasingly clear that the uncommitted nations are in fact committed—committed to the progress they have been denied. In other words, this editor's reluctant recognition of African poetry is the result of political events. And in this he is in no way unique. My interest in African poetry is also the result of political events. And so also is Mr. Jahn's. Mr. Jahn is a German expert on African culture, but he would not have written this particular book if the political history of the last ten years had been different. And it is on this very point that I must criticise his book. Despite his profound knowledge of Africa, and despite his admiration for what Africa has and can produce, he seems unaware of the political nature of his own world. He understands Africa, but he does not understand progress. He condemns Europe, but he does not condemn superstitions. He loves vitality, but he does not love reason.

I want to assume that every one of my readers is going to read this book. It is well worth-while doing so. And therefore, because I assume this, I am not going to attempt to give a precis of Mr. Jahn's lessons. He is technically a good teacher. He himself has reduced a vast amount of material to a few simple expositions. And I doubt whether anyone, least of all I myself who haven't a hundredth of his knowledge, could do it better or simplify it much further. Read him and you will learn how Africans feel and think about man, death, procreation, rhythm, gods, rituals, medicine, symbols, words, dancing, poetry. And from all this you will also begin to understand the basic cultural attitudes that Africans in Africa and out of Africa share together. At this level—the level of information rather than interpretation—I would only add one warning. Mr. Jahn is clearly more at

home with philosophy and literature than with the visual arts. He has little to say directly about African sculpture or painting, and what he does say doesn't go very far.

On the assumption then that you are going to read this book for its information, I want now to discuss the attitude which is implicit in the way this information is presented. I think this is worth doing because I believe this attitude to be a dangerous one and because it can also easily become a common one, especially amongst those Europeans whose consciences have been stirred by the tragedies—no, the crimes—of Africa.

Mr. Jahn begins with a sensible generalisation. Every culture, he points out, is, according to its own standards, superior to every other. He proceeds to explain to us the standards of African culture. Theoretically he is aware of the dangers of exaggerations. He quotes Frantz Fanon, the doctor and writer from Martinique: "For us the man who worships the negroes is just as 'sick' as the man who despises them". But in practice Mr. Jahn uses so much special pleading and takes so many historical short-cuts that he ends up with the attitudes of a worshipper. He writes like a convert, a European convert to Africa. And the trouble with converts is that they refuse to allow themselves to think or argue outside a certain arbitrarily limited area.

He is extremely sensitive and sharp in reply to theories and statements which betray the innate sense of superiority of Europeans towards Africa. Fine. He is imaginative about the effects of racial prejudice on members of the so-called inferior race. He quotes Fanon on this problem too: "But I say that for a human being who has no weapons but his reason, there is nothing more neurotic than an encounter with the irrational". Excellent. He attacks the sensationalism with which Europeans have approached Voodoo and other African rites; he wants to show the all-embracing, consistent logic which governs and inter-relates every African ceremony and tradition. Again, admirable. He claims that African culture is free of the fragmentation and destructive alienations with which we in Europe are too familiar. He quotes, among many other well chosen examples, a poem by Aimé Césaire. It begins:

*' I who Kra-Katoa  
I who open breast  
I who maelstrom*

*I would wish to be ever humbler and lower  
Ever heavier without vertigo or vestige  
To lose myself falling  
Into the living grains of a well-opened earth.'*

Césaire, even in translations, is a marvellous poet.

But what are we to think when Mr. Jahn explains that Africans in Africa never developed any form of script for writing and then goes on to suggest that this was no great disadvantage because the invention of writing gave men the means to enslave and exploit one another? By this kind of historical logic every advance, every step in man's long progress, can be condemned, and you end up by believing only in the Garden of Eden. It is essential to take a dialectical view of history if we are to understand the opportunities that the historical process now offers us. It is true that the written word and mathematics made slave states possible. But these slave states developed architecture, astronomy, engineering and at the same time those conditions which inevitably led to the overthrowing of slavery; both the slavery imposed by men on men and the earlier slavery of all men in face of an unknown and uncontrollable nature.

Or again, what are we to think when Mr. Jahn explains the principles of African medicine and then suggests that there is really not so much to choose between African medicine and modern European medicine? The medicine man often had an extensive knowledge of herbs, and the latest findings of European medicine indicate that the patient's faith in his treatment is more important than the formula of the treatment. Both statements may be partially true, but they do not balance one another. Modern European medicine has doubled the expectation of life. It is absurd in cases of organic disease to equate a spell with a modern operating theatre.

Lastly, what are we to think when Mr. Jahn talks about art, and declares that "African philosophy stands consistently on the side of the artist"? What he means by this is that the finished work as an object in itself is considered relatively unimportant; what matters is the process of creating the work. I am sure this is true. But what Mr. Jahn forgets in his sweeping claim is that the interests and values of artists change according to the historical period. Today the modern European artists, in revolt against a social system that turns art into a commodity, may certainly sympathise with the African point of view and



agree with Mr. Jahn that African philosophy is more sympathetic to him. But to the Renaissance artist or the Classical artist, the African attitude would have been incomprehensible.

Well, what are we then to think? It seems to me we have to conclude that Mr. Jahn champions Africa in order to denigrate Europe. And this is not good enough, because it is too simple. Relative comparisons nearly always are. Time and time again Mr. Jahn contrasts Christian hypocrisy with the passion and vitality of African religion. The contrast is real enough. But the important next step is to show how both sets of superstitions have served various sectional interests and prevented man in general from understanding the truth. The choice is not between Africa and Europe. It is between understanding and ignorance. I agree that on the whole an African today is more likely to be able to grasp what is happening in the world than a Western European. But this is not because he is 'African'; it is because he has suffered and is still suffering the tortures of Imperialism. And Imperialism and the fight against Imperialism are the primary realities in the world today.

When you have read the whole of this book, you realise that Mr. Jahn gave himself away on the first page. Here he puts forward the argument he wants to destroy: the argument of European paternalism. "Europe is thought to know what is good for Africa, better than Africa herself. Admittedly, Europe offers different and rival doctrines—democracy or communism, Christianity or atheism . . . yet this alters nothing in the general pattern." Doesn't it? Are the Chinese 'European' because they are communists? Is Castro being Europeanised because he is an atheist? Is the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet a 'European' because he believes in democracy?

My own diagnosis is as follows. Mr. Jahn has become disillusioned with life as he knows it. He now calls his disillusion 'Europe' and his hope for an alternative 'Africa'. I have seen quite a number of people do this, or almost do it. At first it appears to be a rather sympathetic attitude—an attempt to make amends, to do penance. But finally it proves dangerous and is self-indulgent. We have loaded enough on to the back of Africa without now loading our discontent. If we are disillusioned with Europe, let us change it.

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