# AFRICA SOUTH
## IN EXILE

Vol. 4 No. 4 July—Sept. 1960



*Special Features:*

**THE NINETEEN DAYS**
An Anonymous Capetown Correspondent

**THE PRISONS OF APARTHEID**
by Sonia Bunting

**BELGIAN CONGO INDEPENDENCE**
by Colin Legum



GREAT BRITAIN AND AFRICA 4/-
EUROPE AND AUSTRALASIA 4/-
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 75c
INDIA AND CEYLON Rs. 2.50

# africa south

## in exile

VOL. 4 No. 4 EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL JULY-SEPT. 1960


CONTENTS




**AFRICA SOUTH** is published quarterly by Africa South Publications (Pty.) Ltd. Editorial and Advertising Offices are at 31a John Adam Street, London, W.C.2, England. Price per issue 4s.; 16/- per year, post free in Africa, Europe, Australia and the United Kingdom. In the United States, promotion offices are located at 336 Summit Ave., Mount Vernon, New York, N.Y., and subscriptions should be sent to Mrs. M. Singer at that address. Price per issue 75c; $3 per year, post free. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at New York, N.Y. Price per issue in West Africa 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mr. E. Mphahlele, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. Price per issue in South Asia Rs. 2.50; Rs. 10 per year, post free. Representatives, Messrs. K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 415 Galle Road, Colombo 4, Ceylon.

*The declaration of a State of Emergency in South Africa, with restrictions on the publication of news and comment shackling the press, has forced 'Africa South' into exile. The magazine will now be published from London, that it may continue to keep the outside world informed of developments in South Africa and attempt to keep the people of South Africa informed of developments in the outside world.*

*The South African Government has shown itself capable of governing only by committing violence against the still living mind. Yet it has not killed, and can never kill, ideas. However many men and women it holds in indefinite detention, however many organisations and newspapers it bans, South Africans of all races will persist in their struggle against the imprisonments of race rule.*

# SUNSHINE AND SHARPEVILLE

STILL splashing from the inexhaustible fountain of fantasy that is London's South Africa House are bright invitations to immigrate or travel to South Africa. Bewildered by beckonings to 'Sunshine Plus!' and 'Exhilarating South Africa', Britishers who have read their newspapers or watched television with any attention during the past few weeks must wonder whether Sharpeville could ever have happened or whether the news of it has somehow escaped the notice of South Africa's diplomatic representatives abroad. For what sort of people are able to find South Africa after Sharpeville exhilarating, or the persistent police assaults on Africans in the streets of South African cities an attraction second only to the sunshine? The invitations stand, lighting the corridors of consulates and competing against other playgrounds along the walls of travel agencies all around the world.

To believe that the South African Government is merely brazening it out is to catch just the glitter on the iceberg passing by. The South African Government is capable of brazening it out precisely because it sees no reason at all for doing otherwise. No administration that had so assaulted the conscience of the world by its acts would add such insult to such injury unless its own conscience remained quite clear of disquiet. The truth is, of course, that the South African Government still believes in what its own posters proclaim, and to remove them would be an admission of guilt that it is morally incapable of making.

The South African Government feels no guilt over Sharpeville because it recognizes no wrong in killing 68 people and wounding over 200 more in defence of white supremacy. If it condemns itself at all in the lobby of its heart, it does so only in whispered doubts of the prudence. Yet, conditioned by the stock responses of its own electorate, how could it have supposed that the outside world would have reacted with such a hurricane of horror to the death of a few dozen black men? Was white supremacy to be risked at the cost of a little shooting? And if a salutary lesson is to be given black resistance again, is prudence to dictate the suicide of rule?

There are many who still doubt that the South African Government planned the killings at Sharpeville. Yet much larger crowds of protesting Africans than the one which assembled outside Sharpeville police station have since been dispersed with

warnings, baton charges, shots in the air or the wounding of a few front-line demonstrators in the legs. And surgeons giving evidence at the Sharpeville Commission of Enquiry claim that three-quarters of the Sharpeville wounded whom they examined in hospital had all been shot in the back. Eye-witness affidavits that no warnings were given by the police emphasize the significance of this. The Government decided upon a massacre at the outset of the anti-pass campaign, as the show of intransigence that it had for so long been promising the country. It is unfortunate that the show should have excited so much censure abroad, but no loyal Nationalist considers the show any less right or necessary than had the outside world ignored Sharpeville altogether.

A government capable of Sharpeville is unlikely to be turned from the highway of defiance it has chosen by the pluckings of protest. The censure of the outside world may be inconvenient; but white South Africa has suffered censure before, without feeling it necessary to make any changes in its conduct. In time, as other countries flare into the headlines, attention will wander and the censure abate; Dr. Verwoerd himself has often spoken of apartheid as though all it needed to do was to last out its moral blockade before achieving ultimate acceptance as a sort of universal religion of race. The lunatic who believes himself to be the Archangel Michael is not open to dissuasion on the point; whatever scepticism he encounters, he ascribes to ignorance or wilful self-deceit. And in just the same way does white supremacy react to the rebellions of reason.

What the South African Government has never ignored is the possibility of restraint. Industrial action by world trade unionism, economic sanctions by the United Nations, the physical prevention of further control over the trust territory of South-West—any of these three forms of action would tumble the walls of apartheid merely by trumpeting. On two occasions in the past, the Government rapidly changed its mind about utilizing convict labour to break African stevedore strikes when it was threatened by International Transport Federation reprisals. Commerce and industry in South Africa are already rocking under the effects of the Emergency, and the whites are more than ever aware of the economics essential to supremacy. The average Afrikaner no longer communes with his bible among the clear flat horizons of the veld. He listens to commercial radio in his suburban flat and dodges the dreariness of work among paper-backs, the

films and hire-purchase furniture. Blood is not nearly as important to him as privilege; he fights to "keep the kaffir in his place" only in order that he should not run any risk of competitively losing his own. Such people, however shrilly they threaten it, do not die in the streets as their ultimate sacrifice to obsession. They submit when they see at last that they have no other choice; it is so much easier after all just to go on living.

The outside world has a choice between breaking the back of white supremacy and actively assisting it to survive. There can be no moral escape into mere acceptance. For the Saracens and sten-guns that alone can contain black resistance are bought from abroad with the profits of the violence they allow. Behind the policemen who fired into the fleeing throng at Sharpeville are those who trade with South Africa, from the dock-side to the shop, excharging or allowing the exchange of oil for diamonds, machinery for gold, bullets for fruit. They are accomplices in the force against which they protest; and as long as they remain so, their protests are not only hollow but insulting.

Sharpeville is yesterday now, with its 68 dead and over 200 wounded. Only in newspaper files can it still be seen, a suddenly arrested moment in the agony of Africa, twisted across the paper before being loosed into the past. The killed and the broken of Sharpeville are now a forgetting, the fading of faces under the glare of this morning's front page. And along the walls of airports and travel agencies round the world remain the coloured posters advertising 'Exhilarating South Africa'. If the revulsion against Sharpeville has any meaning at all, it must make another Sharpeville impossible, paying to those who died that Monday suddenly in the sunshine the respect of some purpose.

'Well, anyway, we were STRONG'

# THE NINETEEN DAYS

## AN ANONYMOUS CAPETOWN CORRESPONDENT

THE Pan-African Congress announced on Saturday 19th March, 1960, that it would embark on a campaign against the pass laws from Monday the 21st. The President, Mr. Robert Sobukwe, a lecturer in Bantu languages at the University of the Witwatersrand, called on people to leave their pass books at home and present themselves peacefully at police stations for arrest. There would be no bail requested, no defence offered and no fines paid. The campaign, he said, would be conducted in a spirit of absolute non-violence. It would be the first step in the African's bid for total independence and freedom by 1963 ('*Cape Times*', 19th and 21st March, 1960).

Responding to the appeal, small groups of Africans presented themselves at police stations in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Vereeniging, Capetown and Durban to surrender their pass books and to invite arrest. Among them were Sobukwe and his organization's secretary, Mr. K. Leballo. They were detained together with 130 other Africans in Johannesburg. The P.A.C. achieved its most notable successes in Vereeniging and Capetown, where thousands of men stayed away from work.

During the course of these events, the police fired on demonstrators at Sharpeville near Vereeniging and at Langa in Capetown. According to official reports 68 Africans were shot dead and 227 were wounded at Sharpeville. Estimates of casualties at Langa were 3 dead and 46 wounded. Various public buildings in Langa, including schools and administrative offices, were set on fire during the night after the shooting.

On the following day the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, gave the House of Assembly two explanations for the disturbances. They were symptomatic, he said, of what was happening on the African continent. He specified similar outbreaks that had taken place in other territories. It was a world-wide phenomenon, but especially evident in countries that were gaining independence. In fact, South Africa had experienced less trouble of this kind than all the other territories in Africa (Assembly Debates, 22nd March, 1960, Cols. 3877–8).

In the same address, he told the House that these events occurred in cycles and as a result of incitement. They could not be attributed to the policy of apartheid or any aspect of it,

such as the identity book system or influx control. He cited precedents in 1946–7 to show that such disturbances simply happened in South Africa. At this stage Dr. Verwoerd evidently leaned towards the second and simpler explanation. He rejected the Opposition's proposal of a judicial inquiry as premature and a political move.

When the Cabinet met on the morning of 23rd March, it had before it reports of widespread and unfavourable comments in the overseas press, and of a statement by the U.S. State Department that deplored the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa. The Cabinet then decided to appoint two single-judge commissions of enquiry to establish the facts. The Prime Minister said that it was also contemplating the appointment of another commission to investigate the underlying contributory causes (Assembly Debates, 23rd March, 1960, Cols. 3914–5).

Mr. Harry Lawrence of the Progressive Party drew the conclusion that the Prime Minister had changed his mind under pressure from the rest of the Cabinet and because of the criticisms in the world press (Assembly Debates, 23rd March, 1960, Cols. 4004–5). The inference is a reasonable one, and implies that the Government at this stage was anxious more about the nature of the reactions abroad than the African's state of mind. But internal and external developments interacted. To contain the flood of hostile criticism from abroad, the Government would wish to avoid a repetition of the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa, and therefore to prevent further demonstrations.

On March 23rd, Chief Luthuli, the banned President of the African National Congress, called on Africans to observe Monday the 28th as a Day of Mourning, instead of holding the anti-pass demonstrations originally planned for March 31st ('*Cape Times*', 24th March, 1960).

The Prime Minister, after describing the A.N.C.'s plans for passive resistance on this and subsequent dates, assured the House that the Government intended to take immediate steps to meet the threats (Assembly Debates, 23rd March, 1960, Col. 3994). On the following day, the police raided the homes of individuals and the offices of organizations in the main towns. On the same day Mr. Erasmus, the Minister of Justice, imposed a ban under the Riotous Assemblies Act on the holding of public meetings in 24 magisterial districts.

Apparently to meet this development, Luthuli issued a further statement. He appealed to members of all races to stay at home on the Day of Mourning. Striking the religious note that has characterized his approach to the African struggle, he asked ministers of religion to offer prayers for the dead and their families and to leave the churches open for people who wished to meditate ('*Cape Times*', 25th March, 1960).

Leaflets calling on people to stay at home on the Day of Mourning were distributed during the week-end from Friday the 25th, and some of the distributors were arrested. In a parallel action Africans under the leadership of the Pan-African Congress came to the police station at Caledon Square, Capetown, to hand in their pass books and court arrest. According to the regional secretary of the P.A.C., Mr. Philip Kgosana, a young student at the University of Capetown, 90 of the men were taken into custody on Thursday.

The biggest event of this kind took place on Friday morning, when some three thousand Africans marched to Caledon Square in order to surrender their pass books. After the police had interviewed Kgosana and Mr. Patrick Duncan, a prominent member of the Liberal Party and the editor of '*Contact*', Kgosana addressed the crowd and then led them back to Langa where they dispersed without further incident.

The march produced a widespread state of tension in Capetown and gave rise to many wild rumours which penetrated into the Houses of Parliament. The Minister of Justice announced that the Government would proceed at once with legislation to declare unlawful the A.N.C., the P.A.C. and other (unnamed) organizations. Whether taken in response to the demonstration in Capetown or to the A.N.C.'s stay-at-home campaign, the decision marked a turn in the Government's approach.

On Saturday the 26th March, police throughout the country were instructed that they should not arrest Africans for failing to carry passes. The official notice described this as a temporary concession which, the Minister of Justice claimed subsequently, probably saved many lives. The enforcement of the pass laws was evidently suspended to avert further conflicts between police and Africans, but Mr. Mitchell, the Opposition United Party's leader in Natal, condemned the instruction as "a shocking exhibition of complete weakness in dealing with the matter" (Assembly Debates, 28th March, 1960, Col. 4202). His criticism was at variance with his Party's declared policy of

relaxing the pass system, and must be assumed to have weakened any tendency in Government circles to come to terms with the African population.

A.N.C. leaders reacted sharply to the announcement of the proposed ban. Chief Luthuli ceremoniously burnt his pass book on the Saturday and called for an intensification of the campaign against the pass system. He declared that he would never carry a pass book, that the Government's decision to suspend the laws was merely an evasion, and that the banning of the A.N.C. would create even deeper chaos than at present. He warned that the A.N.C. would not see Africans deprived of their freedom of action (*'Cape Times'*, 29th March, 1960).

The stay-at-home campaign was successful in most of the big urban centres. An almost complete stoppage of work by Africans was reported in Capetown, Worcester and Port Elizabeth, while an overwhelming majority struck work in Durban, Johannesburg and many parts of the Reef. Indians in Natal and the Transvaal closed stores and offices for the day.

Two kinds of violent disturbance took place on the Sunday and Monday. One type was prominent on the Rand, where Africans attacked and attempted to derail trains as they returned to the townships with people who had gone to work in disregard of the appeal to stay at home. According to police reports, threats of reprisal were used in many centres against Africans who showed a desire to go to work on the Day of Mourning and succeeding days.

A different pattern appeared in some African townships in the Cape, notably at Cradock and Worcester, where residents set fire to schools and churches.

Parliament began on Monday, in an atmosphere of tension and mounting crisis, to debate the Unlawful Organizations Bill. The United Party promised its support on condition that the powers asked for were made subject to annual review by Parliament. Members of the Progressive Party opposed the Bill. They argued that if the Government thought that a state of emergency existed, it should use the powers conferred by the Public Safety Act, passed in 1953 as a result of the Defiance Campaign. Rather than take extreme measures, the Government should consult with the Africans' leaders (Assembly Debates, 28th March, 1960, Col. 4199).

Mrs. Ballinger, the Native Representative for Cape Eastern, expressed the same opinion. If there was no state of emergency

at the time, the sort of legislation now being proposed would quickly produce one. There could be no safety for South Africa until authority came to terms with the responsible elements of the non-European population and until the African leaders were persuaded that the Government was acting in the interests of the country as a whole. Some means had to be found for consulting with African leaders (ibid. 4210–11).

The Government side rejected this view. Mr. Vorster, the Deputy Minister of Education, Arts and Science, denied that an emergency had arisen. If action were taken under the Public Safety Act, it would be exploited by people who would then say that the Government had allowed an emergency to arise. Other members of the Government agreed that it was neither necessary nor advisable to declare a state of emergency.

Tuesday the 29th passed quietly, with Capetown's African population continuing its stay-at-home strike and groups of Africans in towns throughout the Western Cape handing in their pass books at police stations.

The Minister of Justice opened the debate on the second reading of the Unlawful Organizations Bill by warning that he would not hesitate to use the powers of the Public Safety Act if conditions grew any worse. What had to be stopped, he said, was the reign of terror conducted by the P.A.C., the A.N.C., and terrorists, white and non-white, who instigated from behind the scenes. He described the actions of the two Congresses as bordering on revolution. They wanted to bring to its knees any white government in South Africa which stood for white supremacy and white leadership. "What they want," he explained, "is our country" (Assembly Debates, 29th March, 1960, Cols. 4302–3).

Such a frank acknowledgement that his government was a government of, by and for the white minority could not have reassured either the darker-skinned South Africans or outside critics as to the State's ability to maintain a balance between competing groups. Sir de Villiers Graaff, the leader of the United Party, referred obliquely to this aspect of the Government's policy, when he described as intolerable a situation in which a large section of the population had no say at all in government and no contact with it except on a master and servant basis (ibid., Col. 4320).

His speech evoked an outburst of strong language from Mr. de Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Develop-

ment, who described Sir de Villiers Graaff's attitude as "one of the dirtiest things" and the biggest "stab in the back" ever made by the leader of the Opposition in South Africa's history. The Minister blamed a small group of whites who played a devilish game behind the scenes in order to obtain political power and fill their pockets. He also blamed the English press, English persons, and some members of the Opposition for the state of emergency that, he said, undoubtedly existed in South Africa (ibid., Cols. 4324–33).

Not all members of his Party were prepared to go as far. Mr. Froneman, the member for Heilbron, conceded that there was an emergency throughout the country but only to "a certain extent". To declare a state of emergency throughout the country would, he contended, involve making an admission to the outside world and thus would affect the nation's whole economic well-being (ibid., Col. 4359). His speech terminated the debate on Tuesday evening. By the time that the House met on Wednesday afternoon to resume the debate on the Unlawful Organizations Bill, the position had changed dramatically.

On Tuesday 29th it became evident that the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations would succeed in their efforts to induce the Security Council to take action on the South African crisis under Article 34 of the Charter. The article provides that the Council may investigate a dispute or situation in order to determine whether it is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Whether because of this pending action, or for other reasons not disclosed, the Government decided to invoke the powers of the Public Safety Act.

In the early hours of Wednesday morning the police invaded homes and arrested between 200 and 300 people in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Capetown, Paarl, Worcester and other towns. Those arrested were office-bearers and members of the Congress Alliance (the A.N.C., the S.A. Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the S.A. Congress of Trade Unions and the S.A. Coloured People's Congress), the P.A.C. and the Liberal Party. Among those arrested were the accused in the Treason Trial and Chief Luthuli himself, who was being examined as a defence witness in the trial.

The police, using the powers granted by the Public Safety Act, made the arrests without warrant. On applications to the Witwatersrand Supreme Court for the release of four detainees

under a writ of *habeas corpus,* the Crown was unable to show that a state of emergency had actually been proclaimed. The judge ordered the release of the detainees. A few left the Union or went into hiding; most were re-arrested later in the day. A further application for the release of 44 detainees was heard shortly before midnight, but failed when the police produced copies of the proclamation and emergency regulations which had been sent by military aircraft from Capetown.

On Wednesday morning police entered the Langa township and ejected people from their homes and barracks to get them to go to work. Africans reacted to the coercion by leaving the township and descending on Capetown. An estimated 30,000 assembled outside the police station in Caledon Square by noon. Their spokesman, Philip Kgosana of the P.A.C., asked for an interview with the Minister of Justice in order, it has been reported, to secure the release of their leaders and the satisfaction of the P.A.C.'s immediate demands: abolition of the pass laws, a minimum wage of £35 a month, and no victimization of leaders and strikers. On receiving an assurance from the police chief that he would arrange an interview, Kgosana led the people back to the townships.

The demonstration was far bigger but no less disciplined than that of the preceding week. Huge bodies of men performed the considerable feat of walking the six miles to Capetown and back again in orderly procession without dislocating traffic or causing a single unruly incident. Kgosana claimed justifiably that the leaders had shown their ability to control the people and conduct non-violent demonstrations peacefully as long as no one interfered with them (*'Cape Argus'*, 30th March, 1960).

Members of the Government had a different opinion. The Minister of Bantu Administration, in the speech already cited, claimed that "those people" accepted him as their leader. Ninety per cent of the Africans were law-abiding, while the terrorists constituted only one per cent of the African population (Debates, 29th March, 1960, Col. 4330). But Mr. F. S. Steyn, the Nationalist member for Kempton Park, thought in contrast that African nationalism had developed the unique quality, which had never been seen before, of fusing the rebellious spirits with the masses—taking advantage of a herd instinct that was compatible with that of buck and migratory birds. The Africans' instinctive spirit of massing together in a revolutionary tendency was wholly anarchical and destructive, as witnessed by the

organized marches. The spirit supplied the leaders, who shared the language, psychology and mood of the masses, with ideal revolutionary material (Debates, 30th March, 1960, Cols. 4404–5).

The Government showed some apprehension. It threw a cordon of police and troops armed with rifles, machine-guns and Saracens around the Houses of Parliament. When the House of Assembly resumed its sitting at 2.20 p.m., however, the Prime Minister was able to assure members that the position was completely under control in all areas, and that the Africans who had gathered in Capetown were moving back to the townships in two columns.

Dr. Verwoerd proceeded to tell the House that in the Government's opinion, unwarranted interference by the Security Council in South Africa's domestic affairs would encourage and incite agitators and rioters in the Union. The intervention could lead to a situation requiring vigorous action and further bloodshed (Assembly Debates, 30th March, 1960, Col. 4362).

He was followed by the Minister of Justice, who announced that the Governor-General had proclaimed a state of emergency as from March 29th in the areas in which public gatherings had been banned. Emergency regulations were being promulgated for some 80 districts out of the approximate total of 300. Mr. Harry Lawrence drew the obvious inference from the action. After 12 years of rule the Nationalist Government had decided that they could not govern and maintain order under the ordinary laws of the country (ibid., Col. 4436).

Standing Orders were suspended to allow the debate on the Unlawful Organizations Bill to proceed through the night. The second reading was passed at about 8 a.m. on Thursday by 128 votes to 16. The United Party voted with the Government. The minority consisted of the Progressive Party, the Native Representatives and two of the Coloured Representatives.

Those who opposed the Bill stressed the futility of relying only on force. They pointed out that the autocratic powers asked for by the Government could become a permanent feature of the Administration. They argued that a solution could be reached by removing legitimate grievances in consultation with responsible non-white leaders.

Government spokesmen naturally rejected both criticisms and proposals. They denied that responsible leaders existed among the urban Africans; there were only incitors and instigators

among the people, who imposed their will on the masses by intimidation and violence. Previous governments had faced similar troubles and employed similar methods, as during the last war. The basic cause of the unrest was the machinations of unscrupulous power-seeking politicians who drew support and encouragement from anti-government elements in the white population.

The Opposition came in for much of the blame. Mr. J. A. F. Nel, the Member for Port Elizabeth North, quoted from the House's Votes and Proceedings to show that members of the Opposition had introduced motions condemning racialism, the Groups Areas Act, pass laws, university segregation, and asked: "When motions such as these are moved in this House, is it surprising that we have riots in South Africa?" (ibid., Cols. 4415–7). Dr. Coertze, the Member for Standerton, gave examples of questions put in the House on the racial incidence of corporal punishment and of convictions for murder and rape, and of the number of men, women and children wounded at Sharpeville. Such questions, he argued, were put "with the scandalous object of creating the impression amongst the Natives that they have reason for grievances" (ibid., Cols. 4463–5).

Much of the contribution by members of the Nationalist Party was expressed in the following interchanges:

> Mr. M. C. van Niekerk: "I am of the opinion that the Native Representatives in this House are responsible for three-quarters of this critical situation."
>
> Mr. Speaker: "This argument has been used repeatedly."
>
> Mr. Van Niekerk: "I also charge the United Party with the tremendous part it has played in this incitement."
>
> Mr. Speaker: "That argument has already been used and the hon. member must now submit new arguments" (ibid., Col. 4548).

It is not to be wondered at that, in the atmosphere created by such hostilities, the Member for Zululand, when asking for information about the mass arrests of the early morning, should have drawn from the Member for Van der Byl Park the interjection: "You should be in gaol" (ibid., Col. 4454). Members of the Opposition Parties in the House when exposed to attacks of this kind had some reason to be apprehensive about their own prospects under the Emergency Regulations.

Any fears that they may have entertained on this score would hardly have been removed by a statement made by the Minister

of Justice in the committee stage. He had decided to abandon a proposed amendment to the Unlawful Organizations Bill which would have excluded from its provisions any political party whose object it was to promote the election of candidates to Parliament or a provincial council. For, he said, when once one political party was exempted, a difficult position might arise—though he did not elaborate on the nature of the difficulty (Debates, 31st March, Col. 4614).

Government members widened their definition of political criminals and traitors to include the Opposition Press and a host of organizations. Unless legislation aimed at the Press were introduced, said Mr. Abraham, the Member for Groblersdal, the Government would not be able to combat the situation. "Freedom of the Press" was idle fancy, if they permitted the Press to betray South Africa "in a manner in which the vilest defamer and traitor would sell his country to its enemies" (ibid., Col. 4498). Mr. Pelser, the Member for Klerksdorp, asked whether there would be peace and quiet if organizations like the Black Sash continued to assist Natives with food, or if "strangers" were allowed to send wild stories to newspapers overseas (ibid., Col. 4561). The Minister of Bantu Development could not imagine greater incitement of non-whites to revolt than what they were getting in the English Press and from certain leaders of the English Church (by name, the Revs. Reeves, Hopkins and Huddleston) who were committing treason and putting a blot on the English Church (ibid., Cols. 4331–2).

The debate revealed a deep cleavage, at least in the minds of Government members, between Afrikaner and English South Africans. Some Nationalists spoke as though the Afrikaner people were enlaagered—against the world, the blacks and the English in their midst. One might almost suppose that of the three evils, the English were the greatest. Mr. Ben Schoeman, the Minister of Transport, expressed his personal conviction that the British newspapers in South Africa would rather that the Natives governed than that the Afrikaner Nationalists remained in power. These newspapers, according to him, had never forgotten that the despicable Boers had taken over the reigns of government; they were still fighting the Anglo-Boer war (ibid., Col. 4428).

A notable feature of the debate and one that distinguished it from similar discussions in previous years, was the absence of reference to Communism. Only one member saw it as the real

culprit, and he belonged to the United Party and not to the Nationalists. It was Dr. Steenkamp, the Member for Hillbrow, in Johannesburg, who made this original contribution. It was clear to him that the basic cause of the whole situation was nothing but a Communistic move in South Africa. Here was clear proof that the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 had not been effective. The Government should again consider how to put a stop to these Communist tendencies. If it was not Communism, however, then the only alternative explanation was that ultra-nationalism had developed among the African population (ibid., Cols. 4424–5). But the Minister of Justice, when closing the debate, remarked that the Suppression of Communism Act could not justifiably be applied to an organization unless it was known to be Communistic. The Government could therefore not make use of the statute to suppress the A.N.C. and P.A.C. (ibid., Col. 4604). At this stage, therefore, the Government did not attribute the crisis to a Communist plot.

While the legislature was thus sleepily engaged, the executive arm of government proceeded apace with its measures to restore law and order. Troops were being called out, military and naval units were brought by air to Capetown from Pretoria, and at 2 a.m. on Thursday an armed cordon was drawn around Langa and Nyanga to seal them off from the rest of the city. Later in the morning police made another swoop on the Rand and arrested 34 members of the A.N.C. and P.A.C. More offices of African and Indian organizations were raided. In Capetown Kgosana was allowed an interview with the Secretary for Justice, but neither he nor his two companions returned to their homes. The police raided the offices of '*New Age*', a weekly newspaper that supported the Congress Alliance, seized documents and confiscated copies of the current issue. Police made baton charges on African demonstrators in two Reef townships. In Durban, thousands of African demonstrators marched from Cato Manor into the city. In New York, the Security Council met to discuss a motion on racial violence and segregation in South Africa. Demonstrations outside South African legations took place in a number of European cities and in New York.

The House resumed on the afternoon of Thursday the 31st to receive a report from Mr. Eric Louw, the Minister of External Affairs, on developments at the meeting of the Security Council in New York. The Union Government would take a serious view if the Security Council acted in regard to the Afro-Asian

complaint. Another matter that was receiving his serious attention was the attempt by two well-known agitators, Oliver Tambo, the Deputy-President of the A.N.C., and Ronald Segal, the Editor of '*Africa South*', to cross from Bechuanaland into Southern Rhodesia and proceed by air to New York (Debates, 31st March, Col. 4611). The House then went into committee and adopted the Unlawful Organizations Bill with little opposition.

On the following day the Security Council passed a resolution by nine votes to none, with Britain and France abstaining. It asked the Secretary-General to make arrangements with the Union Government to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter in South Africa. The resolution also deplored the Union's racial policies and called on the South African Government to abandon them.

Friday passed relatively quietly in South Africa. Brian Bunting, the Editor of '*New Age*', was arrested under the Public Safety Act, the Treason Trial in Pretoria was adjourned to April 19th because the Court agreed that the Emergency Regulations would tend to restrict the defence witnesses, and Africans staged another march through Durban. A gazetted proclamation called out and mobilized all commandos, the Permanent Force Reserve, the Citizen Force Reserve and the Reserve of Officers "for service in the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Union". The object of the call-out was that units should be in readiness for service at short notice. Emergency Regulations were extended to 31 more districts, bringing the total affected to 111.

Troops were flown on Saturday to Durban from the Rand. In Johannesburg an African first offender was sentenced to a fine of £100 or 12 months, for destroying his pass book. Several thousand Africans started out from Nyanga to march to Capetown, but were turned back by the police and military. Pass books, a school and a shop were burnt at Paarl, while reports came in from small country towns such as Grabouw, Somerset West and Hermanus, that Africans were handing over their reference books to the police. Prominent Coloured leaders drew much praise from the custodians of law and order by appealing to Coloured workers to maintain order and to ignore calls to stop work ('*Cape Argus*', 2nd April, 1960).

Newspapers were able to report on Monday, 4th April, that calm was returning to the Union's troubled centres. Early that day helicopters showered leaflets on Capetown's African town-

ships to warn residents that they would not be allowed to leave after 8 a.m. At least 40,000 of the Peninsula's African labour force of 60,000 were said to have returned to work. Docks, building and engineering trades, dairies and bakeries, where work had been virtually paralyzed or disrupted for the 10 days of the crisis, operated at something like normal. The Peninsula was under military occupation. Troops, armed with rifles and machine-guns and supported by armoured cars, moved in to guard all key points.

Acting under Emergency Regulations, groups of police scoured Capetown's streets, stopped Africans and, according to eye-witnesses, beat them in the streets or at police stations with truncheons, clubs and loaded rubber hoses. Heads of the Cape Chamber of Industries protested that numbers of law-abiding and responsible African workers had been assaulted. An African University lecturer was slapped in the face. An African clergyman was beaten with a sjambok. Fourteen clergymen of the Anglican Church appealed to the police to stop using indiscriminate violence on people in the streets. Police chiefs explained that Emergency Regulations gave police power to use force in order to remove or prevent any suspected danger. Force had to be used to get potential intimidators and trouble-makers off the streets. The aim of the police was not to make arrests but to deal with trouble-makers on the spot and send them on their way ('*Cape Argus*', 4th April; '*Cape Times*', 5th April, 1960).

The stay-at-home strike continued in full force only at Nyanga, the township where thousands of families had been resettled after being moved from other parts of the Peninsula. Members of the P.A.C. told a conference of foreign correspondents on Wednesday the 6th, that Nyanga residents, though sorely in need of food, would not go back to work until their national president, Sobukwe, gave the word. Although the police had moved from house to house chasing out and beating up the men, they remained obdurate. Sporadic clashes between police and residents occurred, an African constable was killed, a baby was shot dead, 45 Africans were injured.

On Thursday the 7th, troops were removed from Langa and sent to reinforce those at Nyanga, a few miles away. Police and troops swept into the township, went through every room of the shacks and cottages, removed over 1,500 men and women for screening, and held nearly 200 in custody. The operation achieved its aim of breaking resistance in Nyanga. Capetown

thereafter regained an atmosphere of apparent calm and normalcy.

Durban was the only other scene of major disturbances during the week. After three days of continuous unrest at the Lamontville township outside the city, police fired on a crowd of more than 1,000 Africans claimed to have been "intimidating those who wished to go out to work". One African was shot dead and four were wounded by gunfire. On the next day, Wednesday, heavily armed police, A.C.F. units, Saracens and armoured cars surrounded the Smith Hostel near Lamontville, and ordered the men outside. They were screened at the gate. Those who were allowed to proceed to work were marked with indelible ink stamped on their palms. More than 300 men were detained ('*Cape Argus*', 6th April, 1960).

South African reactions to the crisis were as varied as could be expected from the diversified and disunited character of the society. The establishment naturally supported the measures adopted to suppress African protests, strikes and demonstrations. But a considerable body of white opinion expressed dissatisfaction with the wholly negative content of Government actions. Of particular significance were the protests that came from Afrikaners and Nationalist circles. The influential Nationalist newspaper, '*Die Burger*', made several appeals for a more urgent and radical development of the constructive aspects of the Government's apartheid policy and for ameliorative action in the matter of passes, wages and the liquor laws. At the same time, the paper said in a leading article, the prospect of a common society was quite unacceptable. The enemy was black nationalism, which would not allow itself to be deflected from its aim of domination by numerical superiority. Concessions and a flexible policy were conceivable, but only within the framework of separation between white and black ('*Die Burger*', 6th April, 1960).

Nine leading ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church signed an urgent appeal to the authorities to restore harmony in human relationships and to reduce friction to a minimum. The Chairman of the Wool Board, Dr. Moolman, commented on the disastrous effects that the crisis might have on the farmers, and called on the Government to "amend their policies or else. . . ." Mr. Anton Rupert, the tobacco magnate, also called for a revision of policies.

The Government showed no sign of yielding to pressure. The Minister of Bantu Development insisted that the Union's

racial policy was the right one and would be continued. The Minister of Justice issued a statement declaring that the pass book system would remain, but that an attempt would be made to apply it in such a way as to bring to the fore the advantages which it held for the Africans without sacrificing the functions of control.

Parliament debated the third reading of the Unlawful Organizations Bill on Monday the 4th. Discussion was largely confined to the Progressive Party and its Nationalist critics, but the major contribution came from an Independent M.P., Professor I. S. Fourie, who had resigned from the United Party. He warned that legislation of the kind under discussion would sound the death knell of the whites. It confronted South Africa with only two alternatives: white baasskap (supremacy) supported by force and black baasskap. In the light of history he had no doubt which baasskap would triumph. Baasskap, like liberty, was indivisible. The price of baasskap over the blacks was baasskap over the whites. Turning to the U.P., he denounced its leader for his "cowardly attitude" in supporting the Banning Bill. He ended his speech by appealing to Afrikaners to remember their own history. Every time one of them had stood for a truth, he had been stamped an agitator. Organizations like the A.N.C. could not be banned, because their ideas could not be banned ('*Cape Times*', 5th April, 1960).

A long-expected measure, the Publications and Entertainments Bill, was read for the first time in the House on Tuesday the 5th. It provided for a Government-appointed Board to exercise internal censorship over books and periodicals, which would have to obtain the Board's permission before publication. Pamphlets, paintings, photographs and records would be rendered liable to the Board's ban. Newspapers would run the risk of prosecution if they published undesirable matter. Included in the definition of undesirable was anything which prejudiced the safety of the State, disturbed peace, good order, and the general welfare, or offended decency and religious convictions.

The Government, also on Tuesday, gave a foretaste of the censorship when the Minister of Justice banned '*New Age*' and '*Torch*', two weekly newspapers published in Capetown, under Emergency Regulations which enabled him to act against a publication that he considered to be subversive. The ban on '*New Age*' brought to an end a venture launched in 1937 that had become the mouthpiece of the Congress Alliance.

On Friday, April 8th, the Governor-General assented to the Unlawful Organizations Act and signed a proclamation in terms of the Act, banning the A.N.C. and P.A.C. The A.N.C., which had been in existence since 1912 as the Africans' most important political organization, anticipated the ban by closing its offices earlier in the week. It now became an offence for any person to join, support or carry on any of the activities of the banned Congresses.

Earlier on Friday, security police visited homes and arrested more than 100 Whites, Africans and Indians in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Capetown. Some of the wanted people were not at home and had apparently disappeared. The arrests were made under the Emergency Regulations in terms of which the names of detainees could not be divulged. It is known, however, that most of them had been included in the lists of Communists drawn up under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 and 1951.

The pattern of these arrests differed from that of the arrests made on March 30th. In the earlier operation, the majority of the persons arrested were office-bearers and members of the Congress Alliance. Those arrested on Friday the 8th did not fall into this category. Some had been inactive politically for many years, many had been banned from membership of or participation in the activities of a large number of specified organizations. They were arrested presumably not for participation in the events that produced the crisis, but because they were 'named' (listed) Communists.

The Minister of Justice has announced that charges will be brought against the detainees, after exhaustive investigations have been made. Under the Public Safety Act, however, they can be detained indefinitely and without charge. After the expiry of 30 days from the date of arrest, the names of detainees must be laid on the table of Parliament, if in session, within a further 14 days. If it is not in session, the names must be tabled within 14 days of the next session.

When he complies with these requirements, the Minister will be able to show that 'named' Communists form a substantial proportion of the detainees. A basis could thereby be laid for an allegation that the crisis originated in a Communist plot, even if no evidence were produced to establish a link between the 'named' Communists in detention and the crisis of 21st March and the succeeding days. *18th April, 1960.*

# THE LION AND THE COCKEREL

MICHAEL PICARDIE

*Arrested in Johannesburg during the first police raids in March as a member of the Congress Movement and the Liberal Party. He was released 12 hours later on a writ of habeas corpus—the state of emergency not having been properly proclaimed at the time of his appearance in Court. Before he could be re-arrested he slipped out of the Union to Swaziland, from where he made his escape to Britain.*

*Friday, the 25th March.* Five days after the shooting had taken place we were on our way to Sharpeville. There were two others in the car, S. and G., both of them second-rank African National Congress leaders. S. was ebullient. He chattered away in English, Afrikaans and Sotho, filling the car, the windows of which were closed against the autumn highveld air, with the sweet-sharp smell of illegal home-brewed beer. G., who sat in the back with the pamphlets, was silent. The Lion they call him, a man of over 70, the father of many children. Roaring at meetings, he would rouse his listeners to anger at their wrongs, an old man yet not quiet in his age, not preparing himself to slip quietly into his grave, but ready still to rage until the last of life.

"We're on the move, boy," said S. "The game is on!" His voice was exultant—the very sound of power. "Passes suspended! The cops afraid to come into the townships! No liquor raids! Man, do you know what I saw? A black bastard like me drinking gin out of a bottle in Commissioner Street. In the middle of Jo'burg! Verwoerd's retreating!" He took another of my cigarettes and puffed away decisively.

"Who says the Government won't attack again when the panic passes?" I said.

"*Ag*," said S. disgustedly, "so they attack! This is a fight, man. It's just the first round. Attack, retreat—it's all in the game." The Lion grunted and sighed and peered ahead of him through the window as if the animal he was stalking had just appeared through the reeds of a bushveld watering place where prey was to be found. But there was nothing much to be seen except a grim man-made landscape; mine-dumps yellow and worn by the wind into the symmetry of ancient monuments, plantations of blue gums for shaft timbering, dams of water for washing gold ore—these are our mountains, our forests, our lakes.

"You talk as if you, the A.N.C., were responsible for setting the ball rolling. The people came to Sharpeville last Monday to

listen to the Pan-Africanists, to Sobukwe's men, not to your's," I said.

"Sobukwe made a mistake," said S. "The time is not yet ripe for a defiance campaign against the pass laws. There was no organisation—nothing. But now we have to make the best of it. We cannot abandon the people now. Now that there is power, resistance in the air, we must grab the people and carry them forward!" He crowed like a cockerel. I felt a tremor in my bowels. I felt afraid and proud as if the dawn we hoped for might be tomorrow . . . but only the road lay ahead. And then we came to a bend.

"Dutchmen!" hissed the Lion. I slammed on the brakes and we skidded to a stop.

"What is it?"

"Police!" A hundred yards ahead there was a troop-carrier illuminated by the headlights of a squad car parked behind it at the side of the road: the gleam of rifle butts, brass buttons and polished leather on khaki.

"That's Sharpeville ahead," said the Lion, "the main entrance."

"Thanks for telling me," I said, and made a swift U-turn.

"We'll have to go round the back way," said the Cockerel cheerfully.

"You're mad," I said. "We'll never get through safely. The place is infested."

The Cockerel placed a warm brown hand on my shoulder. "Don't let us down, boy. Not now. Don't worry. The Lion knows a safe way in, round the back door. All right, *ntate*, father?" The Lion grunted his assent.

I sighed. This was a new kind of white man's burden—transporting the revolutionary blacks on an impossible safari into the urban wildernesses. I agreed, having first checked in the rear-view window that the Lion's Dutchmen were not following us.

"It would be better," said the old man, speaking slowly, "to leave Sharpeville till later. The Dutchmen will get tired and go to sleep. Now we must go to Evaton. The old man Msimangu is waiting for us."

So we went to Evaton—off the main road and onto an ill-lit dirt track. I parked the car in the shadows not twenty yards from the location superintendent's office. The Lion placed his own battered felt hat on my head so that I should be less recognizable as a white man. Passing for black is the order of the day

in the Transvaal maquis. The Cockerel hopped out of the car and strutted towards the entrance. A municipal African policeman challenged him. The Cockerel began to crow and flap his comb.

"What's happening?" I said.

"He tells the policeman that he is Pitje, the famous lawyer from Jo'burg who has an M.A. from the University, and he must be allowed in to see his client Msimangu on an urgent matter of business, and if he refuses then S. will tell his important white friends that he, the policeman, is a rogue who stops people going about their ordinary business and he will get the sack within a matter of days. The policeman now laughs a great deal and says that the African people are proud to have an educated man like Pitje amongst them, but that the Big Chief is coming to Evaton tomorrow and Pitje must be quick about his business because there is much trouble these days." The Lion sighed with relief.

The Big Chief was none other than Dr. Verwoerd who was due to address a great republican rally in Evaton the following day. Notwithstanding the imminence of great events, the Cockerel was allowed in; and presently he returned with the old man Msimangu, deficient in many teeth, but wise in the use of strategem, who was grateful to accept certain bundles of legal documents and place them in the carrier of his aged bicycle for distribution among the venerable Pitje's clients in the location the following day. And off we sped, to the joyful overtures of a Sotho hymn from the Cockerel, with the Lion providing the *basso profundo*. Compared with Evaton, Sharpeville was a piece of cake. The only depressing feature of this part of our mission was an encounter with a group of Africans trudging along the road to Jo'burg. They had been to the hospital to visit relatives wounded in the Sharpeville shooting, but had been refused admission by the policemen guarding the casualty ward. Also, they had burnt their passes—at the instigation of the Pan-Africanists, or rather the tough guys, the tsotsi crowd, who had jumped onto Sobukwe's bandwagon, and they were afraid to go home without their documents, and would we give them a lift to Jo'burg where they should not be known and not fall into the hands of the police so easily. There is no room in the car, said the Cockerel, and ordered me to drive off. "Pass burning—a mistake, a big mistake," said the Cockerel as we drove away leaving them still on the road to *Goli*—the Golden City.

*Saturday the 26th March.* A meeting of Congressmen in Johannesburg. We were waiting for a message from Pretoria where The Chief—Chief A. J. Luthuli—and other Congress leaders were in conference. Someone opened the door and stood framed there in his open shirt, blinking behind his spectacles, motionless for an instant, as if History was about to take a photograph for posterity. "The Chief has burned his pass!" he said. "The game is on."

Instructions were given. I was to take a car out with pamphlets propagating the new strong line—pass-burning. No one stopped to wonder at this change of policy or to question the wisdom of trying to outbid the Pan-Africanists at their own fiery and heroic game. It was as if individuals and even organizations were no longer responsible for decisions, but that the tide of events would carry us forward, and that if we were hasty or misguided, our faults were not so much in ourselves as in our stars—which is the terrible but necessary abdication from morals that revolutionary power demands.

*Sunday, the 27th March.* My first stroke of bad luck: Jimmy, a big black Othello of a man, and I, were stopped by an armed police block on our way to the West Rand, at the gates of the first location. We were detained, our literature confiscated and our names taken. After three hours of telephoning to the Special Branch the station commander was instructed to release us. We returned to Jo'burg to print more pamphlets. But the bonfires were burning already. The African townships do not need pamphlet-dishers to get to know the news. Events seem to take the form of spontaneous upheavals. I began to doubt my indispensability. The liberal's dilemma: with or without you, the people make their own history. Why, then, take risks which have little influence on the course of events? Conscience? When the nemesis comes you will regret that. Well, content yourself with the thought that in doing right, you legislate for mankind.

*Wednesday, the 30th March, 2 a.m.* Nemesis. Knock, knock, knock on the door. I jumped out of bed, switched on the light and tossed the remaining pamphlets out of the window. They fell into the jasmine bush that grows lushly, and fragrant at nighttime like an Eastern bride, against the backyard wall of the house: irrelevant and cruel of the senses to register its honey-heavy smell, the smell of love and promises and a gentle future, at that

particular moment, with the police knocking at the door. It is not the smell of Africa, not the strong grass smell after the rain, the smell of the sun-laden dust, and river slime, and electric thunderstorms, and a carcase rotting at drought-time, and the bushveld thorns dusted over with acacia pollen—enough thorns in the bushveld for ten million crowns for a contemporary Christ—and, oh Lord, we do need him now. A Johannesburg garden tries to escape all this. It smells of freshly cut lawn and roses and jasmine and water piped into a hose from a civilized reservoir—grafted skin upon the veld beneath.

I walked down the passage which echoed the voices of the policemen and Ben, my brother, who was at the door, and Yael, his baby daughter, who howled. I opened the door. There were two of them. They asked me my name and I told them.

"We are instructed to arrest you." They showed me their police-officers' cards. The older one, who smelt of brandy, was called Jacobus Christoffel du Plessis. The other one, Ignatius Hattingh, was young, deeply tanned, handsome, strong-jawed, close-cropped—the rugby player in the ads who drinks the man's drink—Lion Beer. Du Plessis was less impressive. His eyes were a bloodshot watery blue. Ginger moustaches drooped apologetically under a spreading flattish nose. His lips were thick, his forehead receding slightly and his greying hair had an indefinite curl.

"We are here to arrest you and search your room," repeated du Plessis.

"Under what powers and on what charge? Your warrant?"

"Never mind about that, man, we don't need a warrant," growled du Plessis.

"Under what law are you acting?" I insisted.

"*Godverdomme!*" grumbled du Plessis. He was sleepy. Breathing laboriously he searched his pockets and after a struggle emerged with a scrap of white envelope. "Public Safety Act, 1953," he announced. "There's a state of emergency proclaimed. We're detaining you."

"Why?" I said.

"*Ag,* man, don't ask me. I've got orders." And Hattingh added: "Now, where's your room?"

I led them down the passage. I knew that they would find nothing. The pamphlets were safely out of the way and I had destroyed my diary and certain Congress minutes the previous day. The Marxist literature of my student days gathers dust in

a grandfather's innocent cellar amidst a chaos of samovars, warming pans and Hebrew volumes of the Babylonian Talmud—Marx and Rabbi Hillel side by side in theological conference. But they did find something that interested them. It was a photograph of a girl called Gitanjali whom I'd met on a previous visit to England.

"Friend of yours?" said Hattingh.

"Yes," I said.

"Indian girl?" Oh, hell, I thought. I'm a threat to the morality as well as to the public safety of the race.

"Yes, she's Indian," I said. "What's it to you?" Ben made a cautionary gesture, as if to say, don't provoke them. Ben is a doctor, calm and gentle by temperament, rationalistic in outlook, his eyes large and dark, his skin olive, his cheeks haggard, nose long and delicate, hands long and fragile. He reminds me of Spinoza, and although our grandparents come from Baltic Russia, there must be a deep Spanish or Portuguese strain in the family—the Sephardic strain.

"An Indian girl, eh?" said du Plessis presently. He handled the photograph gingerly, as if the brown of her skin and the black of her hair might rub off on his fingers.

"Yes, I met her in England while I was studying. Interested? Want a pen-friend?"

"Think you're funny, man," said du Plessis grimly.

"No, man," I said. All white people are called "man" in South Africa. To be white is to be "a man", that is, adult. Africans are called "boy" and "girl", irrespective of age. To be black is to be infantile.

By this time Hattingh was in a rage. "Bloody communists!" he swore under his breath. He snatched the photograph out of du Plessis's hand and tore it up. It happened in an instant—a reflex action, as unpremeditated as the movement of a wild animal who is wounded. Du Plessis tried to stop him and when the pieces fell on the floor he rebuked the younger man angrily. All Hattingh could do was stare at me in incredulous fury—his head shaking and nodding, as an old man's might. "*Ag, kom. Daar is niks hier,*" he said and he stalked out of the room.

I packed a small bag with a change of clothes, toilet things and a number of books. "Yes, take a good deal," said du Plessis quietly. "You'll be away a long time."

We drove away leaving Ben on the front step. "Don't worry," I called out through the back window. He waved back in a dazed

fashion, his eyes larger than ever with their melancholy Jewish droop, in his striped pyjamas, looking at the police car—as an inmate of Belsen might gaze upon some nameless horror suddenly set upon him—with a puzzled child, legs akimbo, upon his hip.

We drove through the suburb of Saxonwold and past the Zoo. A lion was roaring. There was something hoarse and hollow in its quality—an old lag of a lion mourning the kudu, the wildebeest, the zebra, the long-lost watering place, the flat-topped bushveld camelthorns, the kloof where the baboon and leopard cry, the loss of the stars, now black-barred. The loss of Africa.

*Mayibuye Afrika!* Let Africa return! And she will come back. There are many lions roaring. The old Lion of the East was roaring at that very moment as they tried to track him down in Meyerton. One day they will break out.

"*Ag,* shame," said du Plessis. "Man, listen to that old lion roar! Why must they put them in a cage?"

"Yes, terrible," I said. "It's cruelty." And the Sharpeville dead, hardly buried, smiled and turned.

On our way to Marshall Square prison we passed through the Indian quarter of Ferreirastown. In someone's courtyard, where very often you may find a fig tree, I heard a young cock crow, and arching his neck for very joy at the morning star that hung over the eastern mine-dumps.

A new dawn. When will it come?

*Note to the Special Branch of the South African Police:*
*The events that form the background of this story are true. None of the characters described here, however, bears any resemblance to any person, living or dead.*


DIG!
WORK!
WORK HARDER!
NOW GET BACK TO THE JUNGLE!
GASK.

30

# AFRICAN AND INDIAN IN DURBAN

FATIMA MEER

*The following article was written just before the Emergency, having been commissioned by the Editor to commemorate one hundred years of Indian settlement in South Africa. The large number of Indians detained under the Emergency underlines many of the main conclusions in the study, reflecting the growth in joint Afro-Indian resistance to the doctrine and practice of white supremacy. Mrs. Meer is a sociologist attached to the University of Natal. Her husband, a prominent Indian lawyer and Congress official, is at present in indeterminate detention under the Emergency Regulations.*

DURBAN stands in a singular position of fascination for all those interested in the reactions of a multi-racial society. It is the only important city in South Africa which has offered two dominated groups of people—numerically alike, ethnically different, but sharing a generally common political, social and economic status—the experience and experiment of working out the problems of racial interaction. How have Indians and Africans responded to this test? Since the unfortunate riots of 1949, when Africans in Durban gave vent to an entire history of social frustration by a violent attack on Indians, the question of Indo-African relations has kindled a new emphasis on race relations in the Union. Eleven years after the incident, its impact still lurks grimly in corners of the mind, and the tendency prevails even in areas of progressive and enlightened thought to approach the matter with some trepidation.

Despite their tragic results, the riots left the Indian community with little rancour against the Africans. There was doubt of African dependability in the face of press and governmental provocation; but direct blame was apportioned to the Government, the white public, and the local authority in Durban, which had for years waged a vendetta of unrestrained malignancy against the Indian people. The joint patrolling of the riot-affected areas by the leaders of the Indian and African Congresses, which since 1946 had been moving closer together, and the issuing of a joint statement by the two bodies, bearing such names as Doctors Naicker, Dadoo and Xuma, Messrs. A. W. Champion, Msimang, Oliver Tambo and Moses Kotane, in which they pledged active support for Indo-African unity and initiated a joint council of the two Congresses, strengthened this attitude. The results of interviews with seventy Indians, chosen at random and representing a reasonably fair cross-section of the community,

substantiated this observation when they gave white instigation as the most common single cause of the riots.[1]

Durban of this period was plagued by hysterical anti-Indianism, brought to a head probably by the 1946 Indian Passive Resistance Campaign and the successful presentation of the South African Indian question before the United Nations in a manner which drew world attention to the more general problem of racial discrimination in the Union. Anti-Indianism kept Members of Parliament in their seats, newspapers on the streets and provided the most popular vote-catching bait in the 1948 elections.

A local United Party pamphlet described the Indians as "unassimilable and distasteful to all races in South Africa." Political speeches at all levels tended to violate the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act, and among those who indulged in such racialism were two future Governors-General, Dr. E. G. Jansen and Mr. C. R. Swart. The white press virulently supported this trend and took a leading part in creating and maintaining anti-Indian passions. They published high-pitched stories about Indian land-grabbing and the seduction of white girls in brothels run by Indians in white areas. Special scoops spread such headlines as: "HOW INDIANS ARE PENETRATING INTO WHITE AREAS"; "8 EUROPEANS RAID A DURBAN CLUB—MASKED MEN CAPTURE INDIAN WITH WHITE WOMAN—COUPLE GET ROUGH TREATMENT"; "EUROPEAN GIRLS—SENATE TO HEAR OF DURBAN'S LUXURIOUS INDIAN BROTHELS". These had the planned effect of raising a white public hue and cry, which significantly contributed to the promulgation of the Group Areas and Immorality Acts.

Neither the horror of the riots nor the destitute condition of the Indians, almost one-sixth of whom became temporary refugees, abated this anti-Indianism. Contrasting reports appeared in the press of the exemplary behaviour of Africans in refugee camps, who paid for all relief, and the dishonest, uncooperative attitude of the Indians, who, despite free rations, refused to assist officials and pilfered food when possible for

[1] 50% gave white instigation as cause of the riots.
15% gave Indian black market practices as the cause.
12½% gave African emotional weakness and jealousy of Indian success.
12% gave an Indian superiority complex.
6% gave African frustrations which used Indians as the scapegoat.
2½% gave racial hatred of Indians.
2% gave the initial skirmish between an Indian and an African.
13 of the Indians questioned were riot victims themselves, and all but one felt no rancour at all against the African people. They saw the causes of the riots in the following order—white instigation, poor social conditions, Indian black market practices, African ignorance. 10 reported loyal assistance from African friends and neighbours during the attacks.

illicit sales. Interviews were published in which anonymous Africans alleged seduction of African girls by Indians, Indian black market practices and rack renting. A feature article criticized Indians for lacking in civic sense[2], for failing to rise to the riot crisis and falling dependent on white welfare organizations. Another described them as "crafty fellows, innately dishonest in business and confirmed perjurers". Prominent white citizens tried to create the impression that stark discrepancies existed between the provision of Indian and African amenities, and made such poorly briefed statements as: Indians received free and compulsory education;[3] the Municipality provided seventy-five per cent of Indian housing![4]

A vicious press undercurrent tried to incite the African even further against the Indian. An unwarranted front page headline, the largest in the particular newspaper, carried a story of a police warning to Indian leaders to keep in check Indian instigation of reprisals against Africans. Local Members of Parliament requested legal assistance for Africans only before the Riot Commission Board, stating that Indians could afford their own defence.[5] There was a general tendency among the whites to identify themselves with the rioters. Some observed them sympathetically and were caught by the camera on newsreels and stills, silently enjoying the spectacle. Some assisted in the actual rioting; while some, many of whom were officially placed, tried to use the situation for the instigation of an African boycott of Indian trade and transport. Alternate municipal transport services were immediately provided and sustained for an unduly long period over routes normally operated by Indian buses, and government food depôts were set up for Africans to relieve them of the obligation to deal with Indian shops. While no generalized tendency towards a boycott move existed among the Africans, such statements as "Africans will never buy from Indian shops again", "Africans will never travel on Indian buses again" were

[2] (a) The Indians were among the first to organize their own relief. Of the first £13,472 donated to the Riot Relief Fund, local Indians contributed £8,114, the Government of India £3,750.
(b) Indians had built at the time one sixth of their own schools, and have an admirable record in the organization, building and supervision of their own social welfare institutions.

[3] Only a year before, 800 Indians had marched through the streets of Durban carrying such placards as "30,000 Indian children without schools" "Seventy five per cent Indians illiterate."

[4] Up to 1949, the Durban Municipality had built 662 houses for Indians and made available 90 building loans. Municipal estimates considered 3,210 houses necessary for the alleviation of Indian overcrowding in housing, and 1,380 for alleviation of African overcrowding —"Durban Housing Survey".

[5] A survey by the Department of Economics, University of Natal, estimated in 1949 that more Indians in Durban than Africans lived under the poverty datum line. The Institute of Race Relations reported that 70.7% of Indians in Durban lived under the poverty datum line. There were 7,000 unemployed Indians at the time.

freely made in the press, some of them emanating from responsible officials.

The police, though warned well in advance by strongly circulating rumours of the outbreak of more violence, and kept continually informed by the Natal Indian Congress, were caught unawares and ill-equipped on the worst night of the riots. An African journalist observed how a European woman jumped out of a two-seater car and urged on the rioters, saying: "Fix up the bloody Coolies. The Government is with you." "Is that so, missus?" he asked. "Yes, of course; don't you see what the police are doing? They are not shooting you!"[6]

Very soon after the riots, the relationship between Indians and Africans in trade and transport resumed their normal place. The incident constituted an abnormal eruption symbolic of a frustrated and abnormal society. Group demonstrations, organized or spontaneous, against the various aspects of a highly repressive racial government, form part of the tradition of the non-white people in South Africa. The outburst against the Indians was a freak occurrence, a deviation from the common rule, which—due to some rare chance causes—lost its target and became confounded in a mood of violent human imbalance. It was not a symbol of African antagonism against Indians.

Last year saw a new wave of demonstrations in Durban. There was some bloodshed as a result of shooting by the police. Generally, the demonstrations were orderly and took on the pattern of attacks on authority. Municipal buses were boycotted, and Indians who tried to set up alternate emergency transport were charged. A story appeared in the '*Daily News*' that Indians were inciting Africans against the use of municipal buses. Secret reports flowed into the A.N.C. office that African municipal drivers were being instigated by white officials to promote a boycott of Indian buses by Africans. There was speculation. Would Indians be attacked? The annual Congress 'Freedom Day' meeting of June 26th saw 60,000 Indians and Africans gather together at an Indian sports ground and resound their hopes for freedom in a mood of manifest political unity.

A few months later, the public awoke to press reports of a new trend in the established pattern of demonstrations by African women throughout Natal. Africans had rushed out of a central beer-hall, reminiscently situated at the focal point where the 1949 riots had begun, dashed down the street, assaulted some Indian

[6] '*Inkundla ya Bantu*'

peasant women squatting on the pavements hawking vegetables in their age-old tradition, and stoned Indian shop windows. An eye-witness reported later that police vans had stood by before the incident, but no action against the group of "rioters" had been taken until after damage had been done.

What was the meaning of this? Who were the assailants? They had been seen to enter the beer-hall just before this outburst. Had an attempt been made by some irresponsible section of authority deliberately to misdirect the course of the growing African demonstrations?

What is the state of Indo-African relationships today? A composite picture, perfectly objective, is a well-nigh impossible task in a problem of this magnitude. In any such relationship, the points of interaction are many and the actual relationship in operation can only be assessed in terms of a careful analysis of each of the significant points. Such a study of Indo-African relationship is not suggested here. The purpose of this article is to indicate the areas of Indo-African contact and evaluate the more general nature of the relationship operating in these.

General observations and discussions with people—seventy Indians and fifteen Africans were interviewed in a random selection reasonably representative of the community—prompt the belief that Indians and Africans have lived within reasonable bounds of amicability in Durban. Their relationship in the past has been no exception to the type of relationship which might be expected from two groups of people similarly placed, with cultural, linguistic and in some respects political and occupational differences. Their relationship today is better than could be hoped for from groups of people who have been used as pawns in the callous game of racial rivalries. This is a generalization that one deduces from their behaviour at public gatherings, their co-operation in sports and politics, and the close working together of the Indian and African Congresses.

Despite their differences, despite the small and significant areas of conflict which persist, there also exist strong emotional bonds between the two peoples—bonds forged in the shared misery of economic circumstances, joint experiences of malnourished babies, of living in overcrowded shacks, of sharing a communal tap, a communal privy. In a single yard there are many children, many frustrations. Among those who occupy it, there is much conflict; but, alongside the conflict, also a sympathy and an understanding.

Many Africans and some Indians tend to believe that the present state of general harmony obtaining between them has been forcibly brought about by the very dangers disclosed in the 1949 riots. Such a generalization, however, is superficial. Violence does not generally endear people to one another. The present relationship has emerged as the result of a voluntary movement from both sides towards each other. It is a result of a historical experience jointly tread. The early Indians stood aloof from the African as strangers do from each other. Indian leaders saw little logic in political identification with a group of people whose history in the country was so very different from their own. Theirs was a struggle against a British government for the redemption of broken promises, the reward of full citizenship rights offered them as a condition of their indenture to the colony of Natal. It was only after succeeding generations of Indians reorientated their relationship with government—saw it not as British or English, but white; saw themselves not as Indian, but black—that their political identification was born. It was not until Africans in skilled and semi-skilled trades set themselves up equally alongside the Indians, that the foundations of a labourer solidarity was laid. It was only when the urban Indian saw the African not purely as a migrant labourer, but as a member of a family unit, with personal ties as deep and manifest as his own, that the roots of primary social contact were sunk.

It is sociological belief that human integration is dependent on the proportion and variety of contact between people. Within the limits of a race restrictive society, Indians and Africans in Durban have experienced more contact in many more ways than any other two racial groups in the city, moving ever closer together in a community of interest.

While this growing together may be observed as the general process in the relationship between the two groups, stock must be taken of factors which impair the consummation of this trend. There are groups of people in both communities, small in number but intermittently vociferous, who—for reasons of personality, or traditions of a class, business or professional kind—remain aloof from each other. There are Indians, sometimes owners of cinemas and cafés, who enjoy the rewards of communal service on the boards of public institutions and who are reluctant to see any relaxation in communal consciousness. Invariably there are men of wealth who, due to their command over the material

benefits of an industrial society, draw large gaps between themselves and the Africans. Equally large gaps exist between them and other Indians. They stand aloof from the rest of the Indian people, but recognise that their roots are nowhere else. They stand aloof from the Africans and feel that there is an unbridgeable gulf between them. They appear either ignorant—or carefully avoid the knowledge—that the poorest of the Indians in Durban endure a form of material existence which in many respects may be described as more primitive than that of the African. Like whites they begin to believe that their good fortune has something to do with their inherent superiority as Indians, and so they encourage segregation between Indians and Africans in areas of contact over which they have control. It is in such situations, of course, that the seeds of bitter conflict between the two groups are scattered. And if the violence of the riots had an impact in changing Indian attitudes, then it was with reference to those of people falling into this group, a number of whom made new overtures to the African people and included them in their charities.

Generally Indians are not desirous of drawing social barriers between themselves and Africans. Seventy per cent of the Indians interviewed substantiated this observation. Indians and Africans have shared public amenities in common—in transport and educational institutions. They have lain together in adjoining hospital beds with no marked adverse reactions to each other. Only five per cent of the seventy Indians interviewed, on such points of contact as eating in common cafés, sharing common schools and transport services, and sitting alongside each other in cinemas, favoured a state of complete separation. While sixty-five per cent accepted unconditional integration, thirty per cent showed hesitation on some points of contact.[7] Rarely, however, was race superiority given as a reason for the reservations held. On the contrary, the recent trend has been for Indian opinion to express unequivocal condemnation of the segregatory practices obtaining in some Indian-owned cafés and cinemas; and youth, student, women and Congress organizations have been briefed to take active steps against them.

The fact that very little primary informal contact exists between Indians and Africans has often been misused to indicate

[7] Seven preferred segregated seating at cinemas.
Four objected to sharing common schools (Three out of fifteen Africans interviewed did likewise.)
Five objected to eating in same cafés.
Five objected to sharing same common transport.

a state of antagonism and racial prejudice between the two peoples. It is pointed out that Africans rarely appear at Indian social functions and that even at university level, where inter-communal contact between the two peoples is much increased, considerable strain exists. The Indians are often blamed for this, and it is alleged that any social distance flows from a general feeling of superiority they entertain over Africans. Indians themselves tend to agree with this accusation; and although sixty per cent of those interviewed believed in the inherent equality of the two peoples, the vast majority felt that other Indians did not do so. African opinion itself has shown painful awareness of what it has termed "Indian arrogance" and has drawn repeated attention to it.

It is not however racial arrogance which raises barriers to primary personal contact between Indians and Africans, but rather the limiting nature of the Indian social system. Outwardly homogeneous, South African Indians are a complex people broken up into smaller inter-related units in terms of their religious, language, and sensitively different ethnic practices, which confine and control all such contact as is implicit in the choice of friends, guests and marriage partners. The vast majority of them, the Hindus, have a heritage of the most rigid form of social division and stratification. Though generally emancipated from the impact of closed caste taboos, Indians still adhere strongly to the restrictive traditions of language and religion. Even the extension of some voluntary educational and social welfare facilities are limited by such barriers, and restrictions operate against their use by Indians of the "out group". The Indians thus erect barriers not only against Africans but equally against themselves, as they accumulate differences and consequently create associational units which are only outwardly integrated.

Indians *could* have maintained a state of isolation and perhaps enjoyed social conditions slightly better than those of the African people. There is no justification for believing that they are possessed of any greater concern for posterity, or have greater foresight than the average South African who lives in the present and ignores the future. The point requires some stressing that Indians have chosen to ally themselves politically with the African people, whatever social inhibitions persist.

The fact that the vast area of Indo-African relationship takes place on a parity level progresses this trend of co-operation and better understanding. Of the 85 Indians and Africans inter-

viewed, 77 indicated their knowledge of each other as neighbours, fellow workers and fellow students. Although primary contact is low, secondary contact between Indians and Africans on a more formal mass level is high, and every major move in the identification of non-white interest, in sports and politics, tends to flow from Durban and is often initiated by Indians. In keeping with the tone they have set for the observation of the Indian Centenary—'One hundred years in a multi-racial society. Forward to a non-racial democracy'—Durban Indians have recently created a £50,000 Trust Fund for the equal extension of Indian and African educational interests.

While non-white political aspirations are doomed for as long as power remains exclusively in white hands, non-white sport may attain international recognition within the present political framework to the exclusion of whites-only teams claiming to represent South Africa. The realization of this power and its effective demonstration in the international recognition accorded to the non-white sponsored, non-colour bar table tennis body, has combined with social and political pressures to rid non-white sport of any taint of racialism. Socially and politically, non-white leaders saw a real danger in the limiting of non-white relationships in sport to a contest between two racially opposed teams. In Durban the situation became periodically threatening when large soccer meetings, attracting upwards of 25,000 people and drawing equal Indian and African audiences, became roused to a display of opposed emotions, which soon enough became racially transcribed.

Significantly Durban made the first moves in organizing matches on an inter-race level, in instituting play between teams provincially rather than racially divided, and in opening the doors of local clubs to a mixed membership. Today federal bodies centralise non-white cricket, soccer and tennis, and constitutions are being changed to direct the selection of players along non-ethnic lines. It is an additional compliment to Durban that while in Natal non-white athletics, boxing and table tennis have never operated clubs on a sectional basis, in the Transvaal, due partly to the isolationist nature of the average Chamber of Mines employee, these tend to be organized on racial lines..

Political identification between Indians and Africans is periodically demonstrated in Durban on a mass level at rallies and meetings. While two distinct political organizations exist, the Indian and African public is developing a tendency to view them

indiscriminately. In the absence of banned Chief Luthuli, the custom today is for African enthusiasts to carry Dr. Naicker, President of the S.A. Indian Congress, shoulder-high to the dance and words of popular liberatory songs. Politically conscious Indians accept today, without any reservation, the A.N.C. salute, A.N.C. flag, A.N.C. slogans. All major meetings are held jointly, very often in traditionally Indian venues and addressed co-operatively by representatives of both groups. Appropriately, the African takes the lead, even in providing the major proportion of attendance at an Indian Congress Conference! Symbolic of this identification were the actions of African women, some in tribal dress, who during a closed session of the last Natal Indian Congress Conference walked sombrely up the aisle and placed their donations of sixpences and shillings on the Indian chairman's table. Today no major or important political decision is taken without the joint concurrence of the two bodies, apart from that of the other members of the Congress alliance; and except at conference level, machinery exists at all others for such deliberations to be continuously effected.

It is sometimes stated that Indo-African political unity exists only on a leadership level and that the poor attendances of Indians at meetings do not warrant the claim that politically the two peoples are equally identified. While overt Indian political expression tends to be comparatively subdued at the present moment, there is little doubt of where Indian political allegiance lies. Although only thirty-nine per cent of the Indians interviewed had attended either of the two very large political meetings held in the course of the year, seventy-two per cent had responded to the African National Congress call to boycott potatoes and only nine per cent had done so out of fear of African reprisals.

Despair of Indo-African solidarity caused by the fatal one-day political strike of 1950, when Africans in Durban did not come out equally with Indians and many Indians found themselves dismissed and replaced by African workers, no longer exists. Seventy-four per cent of the interviewed Indians stated their faith in African political support. A recent demonstration in a local factory, when Africans struck work in protest against the dismissal of thirteen Indian women fellow workers, tended to justify this faith. The two peoples today are learning to believe that the attainment of full democratic rights is a task which they jointly share in Durban. The sincerity with which Indian

speakers are applauded by Africans, the elation which characterizes the joint political participations of the two peoples,the transmission of emotional strength and security mutually absorbed by an Indo-African audience pledging common vows to symbols mutually recognized and revered—these are experiences which go deep and possess an impact only to be assessed when actually felt.

While the uneven growth of Indians and Africans as industrial workers and trade unionists has had a deterrent effect in the development of Indo-African labour solidarity, growing African realization of trade union benefits is clearing a hitherto difficult field of Indo-African co-operation. Until recently, the Indian worker faced with growing apprehension the prospect of unregisterable African labour which approached the common market on a lower wage notch and depleted his own trade union strength. Today, under Congress influence, Africans and Indians are organized in parallel unions and centralized in a committee which has an African chairman, an Indian secretary, and representative members from the two groups on the committee. In those industries where Indian labour is in the minority, Indians have been persuaded to join African unions and they have done so despite the disadvantages of non-registration.

From mass level secondary contact, opportunities flow for the forging of more meaningful primary relationships which knit a people into a single social unit. Informal socials, dances and receptions, emanating from sports and politics, continue throughout the year and create possibilities for drawing together Indians and Africans as friends. Moments of tension are also there: hot words exchanged between an Indian driver, an African passenger; an accident between an Indian motorist, an African pedestrian: but these are few and far between and become overshadowed by the repeated, routine incidences of cordiality which characterize the scene.

Although so different in the general presentation of their lives —the outward impressions so contrasting—there are many aspects of the two cultures which substantiate human belief in the innate universality of man. Indians and Africans share such social values as are inherent in their concept of the family, their attitudes to women and children, their customs in the choice of marriage partners, their extension of informal warm hospitality to unexpected visitors, their strong attachment to ritual ceremony and superstitious beliefs, their fervent regard for

educational attainment and joy in the aspirations of their youth. In both groups, intermarriage has rarely produced the problems of outcast persons, and women and children have become adjusted and absorbed into the patriarchal group.

In a hundred years, Indians and Africans have come a long way. One may seek, isolate, and abstract the differences which exist, and on generalizations thus drawn, condemn groups of people to a state of perpetual irreconcilability. On the other hand, one may emphasize the points of identification which persist between man and man and build a society on these. Conflict is an aspect of interaction. No relationship, no matter how close, is without its element of conflict. There is conflict between Indians and Africans, but it is the type of conflict which is commensurate with greater interaction, the movement towards greater identification. Indians and Africans have accepted the challenge of a multi-racial society, and are today, particularly in Durban, inspiring hope for a non-racial democracy.

# THE PRISONS OF APARTHEID

SONIA BUNTING

*One of the 91 still on trial for High Treason. Now—with her husband, Brian Bunting —in indeterminate detention under the Emergency Regulations.*

Last year's outbreak of typhoid at the Fort in Johannesburg suddenly flash-lit to the public gaze an aspect of apartheid till then carefully concealed—the scandalous over-crowding and primitive sanitary system typical of most of our older jails. Open latrine buckets stand next to drinking water buckets in cells crowded with as many as 100 men. And three hundred prisoners pass through the Fort every day.

One of the reasons why the typhoid epidemic became serious enough to explode into newspaper headlines was that the Fort does not seem to fall under any public health authority, but is a small empire of its own under the Department of Prisons. Johannesburg's municipal public health authorities have no access to the Fort unless by formal invitation. Even Union Health Department officials cannot enter the Fort as of right. The prison is the sole property of the Department of Prisons—and there is little doubt that the Department of Prisons treated the outbreak of typhoid with criminal neglect. The Fort was notified by hospital authorities as early as April 20th that there was typhoid in the jail, but the prisons continued to hide the fact for three full weeks and dismissed the cases as the usual gastro-enteritis—until the epidemic overwhelmed them, and the danger to the health of South Africa's largest city at last stripped the prison bureaucracy of its long-enjoyed immunity to public criticism.

Prisons have a procedure whereby a prisoner may complain about ill-treatment in jail. Theoretically he may complain to the prison authorities themselves, or to the visiting magistrate. In fact, however, he is nearly always too afraid. He fears victimization at the hands of the warders when the visiting magistrate is gone. He fears reprisals from his fellow-prisoners, for by no means all the prison assaults are perpetrated by warders. In fact, he fears the cell gangs even more than he fears the warders, for official supervision in grossly overcrowded jails is seldom adequate.

This was confirmed quite horribly in September 1958, when members of two rival gangs from Alexandra Township, just outside Johannesburg, the Spoilers and the Msomis, were arrested

and all incarcerated in the same cell. The next morning four Africans were found dead and two seriously injured. What, one wonders, were the warders doing while this vendetta was bathing itself in blood?

Only the man with a burning grievance, or with an unbreakable consciousness of his rights, will have the courage to speak up. And significantly it was during the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and in the years since then, when more and more political fighters were sent to jail, that we began to hear the truth about what happens "inside".

Miss Betty du Toit and Miss Freda Troup (now Secretary of the Treason Trials Defence Fund), both jailed in 1952 for participation in the Campaign, were shocked at the conditions in prison, especially for African women prisoners. "I saw a wardress whip a pregnant African woman," Miss Troup stated. Miss du Toit said similar incidents were frequent. She also saw a wardress hit a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy and with a baby of about sixteen months on her back.

Miss Troup said she would never forget the continual stream of filthy abuse used by the prison officials. "They habitually screamed," she said. "There was something hysterical in their attitude, especially to non-Europeans." When she and Miss du Toit left, one of the wardresses said she hoped they now realized that "Kaffirs are nothing better than animals".

Mr. Manilal Gandhi, son of the Mahatma, wrote an article at the time which appeared in '*Drum*' alleging harsh treatment of non-European resisters in the Germiston jail. A visiting magistrate said: "I have never seen signs of the prisoners being assaulted. In all the time I have been there, I have had only two complaints, but they were not directed against the warders."

Yet, Mr. Walter Sisulu, then Secretary-General of the African National Congress, had a different tale to tell. "The first day we were arrested, four members of my team were assaulted in the reception office. When I went to the Superintendent to lodge a complaint about these assaults, he said I had no right to complain about other people . . . I was punished by being 'isolated' for 15 days. The four who had been assaulted were also isolated, and statements were taken from them. They all identified the man who had assaulted them, but up to the time we left no action was taken. Other people were assaulted in our presence. But according to the prisoners, our presence led to a change in the prison; assaults were less frequent than usual.

"It is difficult for a prisoner to lay a complaint in jail, because victimization invariably follows. That is why the visiting magistrate heard no complaints. Any complaints would have to be made in front of the prison officers, and the prisoners are afraid. . . . The dishes were very dirty and the food, especially for Africans, was unfit for human consumption."

As a result of all these allegations and many more, there was a public outcry at the time. The National Council of Women passed a resolution viewing with "horror and alarm reports of brutal and savage treatment employed by some members of our police towards the least articulate section of our population".

"It is clear," said the '*Rand Daily Mail*' in a scathing editorial, "that when the authorities are about, such as a magistrate or a Director of Prisons, the warders do not go around beating up prisoners. On the contrary, that would be the last moment they would choose for such conduct."

Mr. C. R. Swart, the present Governor-General of South Africa and Minister of Justice at the time, hastened to deny the charges. "It is rarely that we get a complaint," he said. "It is strange that all these complaints come from Defiance Campaign volunteers"—as though that automatically implied they were all untrue. But surely it is not at all surprising that it should be the most advanced and courageous section of the community—those who participated in the campaign—who should refuse to be intimidated into silence about jail conditions.

More recently, when Capetown African National Congress men John Motloheloa and Jack Mosiane were sent to jail pending their deportation to Basutoland, more hair-raising stories were brought to light.

In Roeland Street jail, Capetown, a criminal court, with its own judges, prosecutors and lawyers, is conducted by prisoners in the remand cells. The bewildered new prisoner is asked for food or money. If he has neither, the 'judge's' sentence is, "Take him away and beat him." He is then set upon by the 'court orderlies' and beaten unmercifully, sometimes being subjected to the most gruesome tortures.

On one occasion a prisoner was ordered to drink four tins of water. Then, with distended stomach, he was attacked and beaten by the others so violently that he vomited all over the cell. (A more violent end to this water torture occurred on a previous occasion when, after being given the water to drink, the prisoner was given an 'injection' with a bicycle spoke and died from his

injuries after leaving jail.)

When it was Jack Mosiane's turn to come before the 'court', he refused to accept its jurisdiction. "I am a member of the African National Congress," he said. "You can't do these things with me." Jack Mosiane is not only brave, but also powerfully built. One of the 'defence counsel' said: "I propose that we leave this man alone. He is a Congressman and he fights for us."

One night, as Mosiane lay sleeping, he heard terrible screams coming from the next cell. After a while the screaming ceased. The next morning he heard that a few men had tried to make an indecent assault on a prisoner only 15 years old. All this took place during just one week-end in jail; for, on the Monday morning, he was released on bail.

Perhaps one of the most graphic and horrifying descriptions of what life can be like in jail (in this case also Roeland Street) is given by '*New Age*' reporter Alex La Guma in the issue of the paper dated 4th October, 1956. He deals with the colour bar in jail—how non-Europeans get different types of work under different conditions from Europeans, different food, and different sleeping facilities, all of them inferior of course. According to his informant, the cells are packed tight with 40 to 50 convicts—where the weak are condemned to an existence of terror and depravity.

"Shut off for years from normal life, men become slavering beasts preying upon their own sex. The young and defenceless men are forced to submit to abnormal relations and are threatened with death or torture if they refuse".

Mr. Swart, when Minister of Justice, maintained that prisons are meant to reform and rehabilitate those who have fallen foul of the law, but I doubt whether he had the African population in mind when making this assertion. The Leeukop Farm Colony is one of the proud establishments of the Department of Prisons, where the African prisoners learn farming methods and contour ploughing (not by oxen, but with themselves inspanned). Mr. Lot Motsoenyane was a prisoner who served his term at Leeukop —he was one of the Lichtenburg schoolboys who were sentenced for public violence in 1954.

"Prisoners here never get a hot breakfast. Their food (unsweetened black coffee and mieliepap) is put outside their cells at 3 a.m.; and the prisoners don't get let out until 6 a.m., by which time the food is ice-cold. But many do not get even

this wretched breakfast, for the warders, either for punishment or through sheer callous neglect, do not hand out meal tickets, without which no one can get food.

"While people are still eating their breakfast, warders hit them over the heads with batons to make them stop eating and line up in the work 'spans'. Some are sick and want to go to hospital. This is not allowed. I have seen men, unable to walk, carried to their work places and forced to work.

"I was in a special 'punishment span'. In the hot summer where we worked there was no shade, no water to drink. The men got so thirsty they drank the warm dirty stagnant water lying in puddles where people had actually been standing and working. The punishment span lunch-hour was cut down by half. After work we used to fall in, scarcely given time to snatch our food, and were thrashed naked into the cells. In their haste and confusion, constantly being beaten, some lose their spoons, some their tickets; both 'offences' for which they are punished by being deprived of food.

"Throughout the period I was in, we were never given soap. It is impossible to complain to prison visitors. I have seen warders chase people from the complaint line. Leeukop prisoners are always hungry, often famished. Yet food is left over and thrown by the warders to the pigs in front of the prisoners' eyes.

"There is incessant beating of prisoners by the white warders. There is incessant swearing; all African prisoners are called 'Kaffer se hond' and other ugly names. The prisoners are in a state of intimidation and seething resentment. I am sure that many young men who go in for petty offences come out as hardened criminals with a grudge against society."

As a result of many complaints, a commission inspected the place in 1955 and found that all was well. Henry Kolisang, who endured two and a half years there, was serving his sentence at the time of the investigation.

"We were ordered to clean up the cells," says Kolisang. "Normally 60 to 75 prisoners sleep in each cell, but they were told to remove most of the blankets and leave only 30 bundles. The prison itself was painted. When the 'spans' (work teams) went out, the armed guards who usually escorted them were withdrawn and janitors (who are also prisoners) were put in charge. *Prisoners were warned that those who gave unfavourable reports would get another five years*! The visiting party came and

went and saw nothing wrong—or so it seemed to the prisoners. As soon as they left, the old order was restored."

On one occasion during his term of imprisonment, an escaping prisoner was shot. All the prisoners were paraded to see his dead body. They were told by the warders: "Look what happens to a wise kaffir." For several days afterwards his blood-stained shirt was hung up to serve as a reminder to all.

Henry Kolisang told this story in 1957, after serving his two and a half years in Leeukop. When he came out, he said simply, "Leeukop is Hell." Even today its viciousness remains notorious, and prison warders everywhere use it as a threat to terrorize prisoners. "I'll have you sent to Leeukop!" they shout.

Kolisang himself was badly assaulted on the head with an iron bar by one of the warders, but he was not allowed to see the doctor. Some prisoners who were certified sick by the doctors or placed on light work, were sent out with the spans and made to work all the same.

Mr. S. P. Waterson, member of the Penal Reform Commission, wrote in a pamphlet entitled 'Crime and the Community' brought out by the Institute of Race Relations in 1945, that "our prison system is antiquated, obsolete, brutal, barbaric and unprogressive."

True, our prison system is antiquated, brutal, barbaric and all that Mr. Waterson alleges it to be. But it is not only our prison system which is responsible. It is the whole disease of white supremacy which fosters inhumanity and makes for the mistreatment of African prisoners by white warders. And this is reflected also in their bad treatment by African warders and at the hands of the prisoners themselves. The prevailing official attitude is that the African prisoner is "expendable", and this attitude is reflected from top to bottom of the prison hierarchy—in matters of diet, clothing, treatment. In the list of brutalities I have detailed above, it is almost invariably the African who is beaten and humiliated. I am not saying that life for whites in prison is free from its horrors—but I am quite sure that whites are not subject to the same savageries as are the Africans.

I myself witnessed the constant shouting and abuse heaped on the African women prisoners during the time we were in the Fort awaiting trial after the treason arrests in 1956. And this was at a time when the 156 treason accused, by their discipline and purposeful action, had already made an impression on the Fort. Other prisoners told us that beatings were not nearly so prevalent

during the time we were there. We were completely cut off from the African women prisoners most of the time, but whenever contact was made, the wardresses were occupied in screaming and using their short batons on them. I can't say that I ever saw any reason for this. It just seemed the habitual way of treating African women prisoners, who were regarded as people to be shouted at and pushed and beaten. Nothing of the sort ever happened to those of us who are white.

The Director of Prisons, Mr. Verster, spoke of the "shocking daily average" of 51,000 prisoners in South Africa during the earlier part of 1959—an increase of nearly 9,000 over the figure for 1957. In that year there were altogether 286,372 convicted prisoners serving sentences in our jails, of whom 147,212 or 51.4 per cent were petty offenders serving sentences of one month or less, many of them with the option of a fine which they couldn't afford to pay. In the words of the United Party's Dr. D. T. Smit during the debate on the Justice Vote in Parliament last year: "Many of these people should never have seen the inside of a jail. This is how many young Natives are linked with criminal gangs and become hardened criminals." These are the victims of the pass laws, men and women who, for lack of a piece of paper, are deprived of their liberty and subjected to torture and punishment quite out of proportion to the nature of their offence.

In the same Race Relations pamphlet on 'Crime and the Community', Julius Lewin, now Senior Lecturer in Native Law and Administration at the University of the Witwatersrand, wrote: "We are brought back to the inescapable fact that the major half of the problem of crime, namely petty offences, is essentially a problem of Native policy. The legislation that creates these innumerable petty offences is the legal reflection of a political attempt to reverse the operation of powerful economic and social forces. . . .

"Unless we take early steps to revise our Native policy, we will have brought into being a large army of lawless and embittered Africans on whose co-operation it will be impossible to count even under a revised system of law and administration."

Such an army, produced by force, cannot be defeated by force. It can only be disbanded when its members are enlisted as free men in the task of building a united, common and equal citizenship for all South Africans.

# PETITION FROM GAOL

*"We, the undersigned, being prisoners held in Capetown Gaol, Roeland Street, Capetown, under the emergency regulations, do hereby petition the Honourable the Minister of Justice, as follows:*

*1. We have been imprisoned now for periods of up to a month and more. Yet no person has to date told us of the reason for our arrest or confronted us with any charges or allegations or informed us of the period of our confinement.*

*2. All of us were arrested without warrant. We have been denied legal representation and the right to test the legality of our arrests in court. We have not appeared before any tribunal.*

*We have no knowledge of any legal machinery whereby we may exercise the elementary right of bringing our cases on review or appeal, or even of obtaining an interview with the competent authorities.*

*3. We have been refused access to the emergency regulations under which we are alleged to be held, and have thus deliberately been kept in ignorance of our rights as prisoners.*

*We are refused permission to discuss aspects of our cases even with members of our families who visit us.*

*We are thus deliberately prevented in all possible ways from taking effective steps to obtain our release.*

*4. We were torn away, at a moment's notice and in circumstances of the utmost harshness and injustice, from our homes, our wives and children, from our offices, professions and occupations.*

*Our families as well as ourselves, and in some cases our employees, are in a state of desperate uncertainty about the future. Not only are our livelihoods being ruined and our careers placed in jeopardy, but our entire lives have been disrupted.*

*Many of us have young children who now face insecurity and fear because their father or mother, and in some cases both parents, have been taken away from them without reason.*

*5. We submit that these circumstances—namely our arbitrary arrest, the complete denial of access to the courts and the law of the land, the failure to prefer charges or allow us to answer allegations, the veil of*

*mystery and secrecy shrouding our imprisonment, the fantastic restrictions by which we are cordoned off from the outside world and refused news of events that take place beyond the prison walls, the limitations placed on us in conversations with visitors—represent not only grievous discriminations in matters which are considered the ordinary rights of suspected and convicted criminals, but a reversion to medieval techniques and procedures that have long ago disappeared from all civilized communities.*

6. *For the above reasons we ask that we should be brought to trial without delay if it is alleged that we have committed any crime. Failing this, humanity and common justice demand that we should be immediately released.*''

The above petition, dated May 1st, bears the names of Jack Barnett, well-known Capetown architect, Harry Bloom, advocate and author, Brian Bunting, editor and journalist, and H. J. Simons, Associate Professor of Native Law and Administration at the University of Capetown, among the twelve signatories. Harry Bloom, Brian Bunting and Professor Simons have contributed frequently to the pages of '*Africa South*', while Jack Barnett has drawn many of the maps we have published. Three of the twelve names have not yet been publicly disclosed, as they do not feature in the list of detainees tabled in the South African Parliament by the Minister of Justice.


'No Deviation'—Eric Louw

# THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES

KEVIN HOLLAND

*Formerly at the University of Natal, now at Worcester College, Oxford.*

"*South Africa has so far achieved internal order with ordinary methods.*"
'The Times', 15th June, 1959

"*The Government in power has shown a devilish ingenuity in upsetting the balance of the nation. It has—there can be no doubt about it—wantonly used unnecessary force*".
'The Times', 6th April, 1960

On Wednesday, 4th May, 1960, Mr. Eric Louw held a press conference in London. It was attended by 137 journalists, all of whom were white, but nevertheless more hostile than they had been when confronted by Bulganin and Kruschev. The representative of the '*Daily Worker*' was excluded from South Africa House. There was nothing else unusual, except that Mr. Louw had declared his intention of telling the truth about South Africa, and that he succeeded in increasing the fund of anger against his Government when everyone had thought this impossible. This was unusual, because the Minister for External Affairs said all the things he usually says. His Government would not relax its policies, which were approved by the great majority of 'Bantu'. Those policies were disliked by foreigners because they were misunderstood, and they were misunderstood because of reports on South African affairs published in the overseas press.

It may be that attacking the press is Mr. Louw's favourite pastime because the press always reports attacks made against it, and Mr. Louw has a reputation for collecting cuttings in which his name appears. If Mr Louw were not theoretically the responsible representative of a Government, this state of affairs would be tolerated, perhaps even with the mild affection with which English people regard most oddities and anachronisms. But Mr. Louw *is* the representative of a Government, and it is therefore necessary to examine his accusations.

The charge, in its general form, was made by the South African Information Service, which falls under the Ministry for External Affairs. The Annual Report for 1957-1958 observed that

> "the foremost factor engendering ill-will and even hostility towards South Africa (is) the newspaper press, which for years has been waging a sustained campaign, giving rise among the broad masses to a blind feeling of blunt aversion and antagonism."

This attack was not made on the sensational press, but on "what are regarded as the most reliable newspapers of the country". Seventy-four per cent. of the items sampled by the Information Service appeared in '*The Times*' and the '*Daily Telegraph*'. The conclusions drawn from all this were interesting.

> "Some three-quarters of the items dealt with 'negative' subjects and subjects which, by their nature, create an unfavourable impression on a British reader: race policy and race relations (25 per cent.); party politics (11 per cent.); protest demonstrations (10 per cent.); the Treason Trial (8 per cent.); passports, censorship, police raids, etc. (8 per cent.)."

It seems, therefore, as if almost every important subject in South African life is either 'negative', or such as to excite indignation by its very nature. On its own admission, then, the State Information Office is faced with an impossible task in trying to present South Africa in a 'positive' light. An unconvincing attempt is made to show that malicious reporting has increased the unattractiveness of the subjects. The following sentence by George Clay in '*The Scotsman*', is cited as an example:

> "Mass arrests, followed by mild mass hysteria, have become a feature of South African life."

This was written at the time of the 1957 Reef bus boycott, when some 14,000 people had been arrested; but since this would make Clay's comment appear as the understatement that it is, it is not mentioned. The case could not be left to rest here, because it had not yet been made. The Report therefore goes on to make accusations in language colourful enough to suggest that it embodies the real reasons why the Information Service has been unable to impress people with its version of Sunny South Africa. Criticism of the Union grew as a result of

> "the so-called new humanism which has taken root far and wide as an aftermath of the first world war.
>
> Because it rests, in spite of its wholly human and ideological origin, on a basis of false and unrealistic values, this phenomenon is dangerous . . ." (p. 4).
>
> "In many countries on all sides of the iron and bamboo curtains South Africa . . . is abused by the prejudiced and denounced by the ignorant" (p. 3).
>
> "There is no panacea against suspicion, hostility and hatred which have their origin in the neurotic colour-consciousness (of) the Western World" (p. 7).

Statements as frank as these are, of course, usually reserved for

a political rally on the platteland. It is a pity that the publications of the Information Service are not widely read: they show conclusively that it is necessary only to give factual reports on events in South Africa in order to stir opinion up against them; and this, of course, makes nonsense of the charge Mr. Louw lays against the press.

A careful study of the British press during the past year bears this out. From June onwards, South Africa gained increasing attention. In June itself, the first of the Saracens arrived in time to witness the resentment of African women reach boiling point over police raids on their liquor supplies, the municipal beer-hall monopoly, the demolition of their homes, and, above all, the extension of the pass-book system to them. All papers carried pictures of the police conducting their celebrated baton charges against the women, many of whom had babies on their backs. Comment would have been superfluous; but in any case, there were few examples of 'sensational' reportage, and even in these, it was the technical layout, rather than the writing, that was adventurous. There was very close agreement between the news published in British papers and that which appeared in the South African press. (The Emergency had not yet been declared.) Sober accounts giving the background to the women's grievances were published in the serious Sunday papers.

An event which was widely publicised, and which earned the strongest comment, was the abortive attempt to banish Mrs. Mafekeng, though the banishment of Mr. Mnyanda from Durban at the same time passed unnoticed. The '*Daily Mail*' was alone in splashing across its front page the start of the Paarl demonstrations against the banishment. '*The Spectator*' published an article by the editor of '*Africa South*' on the farms to which people were banished. This provoked from South Africa House a letter in defence of the action against Mrs. Mafekeng—but this rare riposte was full of non-sequiturs and irrelevancies. It nevertheless stimulated a passionate denunciation of its writer by Bernard Levin (née 'Taper' of '*The Spectator*'), who compared the task of a South African apologist to that of the steward employed by a greyhound stadium to follow the dogs about collecting their droppings.[1] This, in turn, was pronounced by '*The Times*' to be abusing the privilege of criticism enjoyed by the press.[2]

The conduct of '*The Times*' during the past year deserves a

[1] November 13, 1959.
[2] November 26, 1959.

study on its own, as the quotations heading this article indicate. It alternated its editorial statements between forthright criticisms of the South African regime, and criticism of fellow critics. On August 5th it dealt with the Treason Trial, suggesting that Mr. Louw might try explaining in what way the Trial was compatible with the British sense of justice. Until he could do that, he should not make rash assumptions as to why British people were critical of South Africa. Later in the year, it condemned the boycott of South African goods, and declared that Labour M.P.s who supported it were guilty of "the height of irresponsibility". Supporting its argument against the boycott by an appeal to the authority of Walter Stanford, a then Liberal Native Representative in the South African Parliament, it omitted to mention that Stanford's attitude had been repudiated in a letter to '*The Times*' written by the Chairman of the South African Liberal Party. This year, however, it gave prominence in a news report to the Boycott Committee's pre-campaign national conference. When the news of Sharpeville came through, it published an editorial which was strongly critical of the South African Government; but the next day it turned to attack Labour politicians along with people who were involved in demonstrations outside South Africa House. Hardly had it done this when it took the unusual step of publishing a footnote to a letter in its correspondence columns, explaining that its criticism of demonstrators should not be taken to mean that it had any sympathy with the Nationalists. Presumably feeling that this was not enough, it followed almost immediately with another editorial, more sharply critical of the South African Government than any it had published in the past. No one can now doubt where it stands, for it has gone so far as to state that Verwoerd cannot continue to assert that his Government is not responsible for the turmoil in the Union without at the same time knowing that he is lying.

Comment as outspoken as this in the responsible press was inconceivable before Sharpeville was hurled onto the front pages of the world press in some of the grimmest pictures I have ever seen. The effect of the pictures themselves was to shock people into an awareness that the authorities in the Union really were as brutal as critics had maintained. Sharpeville changed more than the Union. Before it, the '*Sunday Times*' felt able to publish Montgomery's eccentric survey of the Union, which succeeded only in decreasing still further the number of the Field-Marshal's admirers. After it, however, came Dame Rebecca West's serial,

which showed considerable insight into the situation in South Africa, and which turned rather sour only in the final installment. Whereas beforehand the liberal movement in the Union had had sympathetic attention mainly from '*The Guardian*', the '*Daily Herald*', the '*News Chronicle*', '*The Observer*', '*The Spectator*', the '*New Statesman*', '*Reynolds News*' and, snippet-wise, from the '*Daily Worker*', only the '*Daily Express*' and Moseley's '*Action*' now have anything kind to say of the Nationalists; but as nobody with any intelligence treats the political views of these two with any seriousness, they may be tranquilly dismissed.

Why should Sharpeville have brought about this change? The principal reason is that public attention in Britain was already directed towards South Africa when the murders were committed. Two things in particular were responsible for this: the boycott movement and Macmillan's visit to the Union. The boycott movement had effectively publicised the fact that the liberation movement in South Africa was confronted with such formidable difficulties that it could not achieve its aims without tangible support from people in other countries. What happened at, and after, Sharpeville underlined this point. Macmillan's speech in Capetown, with its hint that Britain would no longer be able to support South Africa at the United Nations, gave people in this country a direct political interest in the Union.

The immediate outcome of the present tragedy is the unprecedented interest now being shown by British people in South African affairs. The extent of this interest was summed up by the '*News Chronicle*' when, on the day following the Chancellor of the Exchequer's last budget, it drew certain conclusions from a Gallup Poll, the results of which had just become public. This poll, it observed,

> ''proves the public is taking an unparalleled interested in the crimes in the Union. After Sharpeville, 99 per cent. of the public were aware of events in South Africa. For foreign news this figure is unique. On no important question have the 'don't knows' previously sunk to a fractional six per cent. Four people out of five can now state categorically that they find the South African Government's policy to be wrong.''

The press matched this interest by paying unprecedented attention to South Africa. Throughout the siege of Langa, all the London evening papers printed special bill-boards headed 'SOUTH AFRICA—LATEST', with a space underneath for the headlines to be scrawled in. Neither the Budget nor the talks

at Camp David could drive the news off the main news pages of the national press. Even the provincial papers gave prominence to the near-revolution. The result is that ordinary people, not only in Britain, now know a great deal about South Africa; and ordinary men's feelings of disgust against the Union's practices and policies increase in direct proportion to their knowledge of them.

Less than two years ago, the South African Information Service, after its round-up of the press, toasted itself with this prospect for the future:

> "There are, however, indications that more sophisticated opinion is reacting in our favour against the incessant noise being made by our 'liberal' detractors."

It spared itself the embarrassment of naming this opinion, which is not surprising in view of the fact that it would have to be more sophisticated than that of Sir Compton Mackenzie, Lord (Bertrand) Russell, Henry Moore, Pastor Niemöller, Dame Rose Macaulay, Sir Arnold Toynbee, and Laurens van der Post, who are among the many eminent people usually branded by the Service as "agencies of poison". The Service is now in the unenviable position of having emptied its armoury in order to commit suicide long before the full strength of its enemy was known. The simple truth is this: no analogous survey of the British press during the past year would reveal even a fraction of the 25 per cent. of items "favourable to South Africa" which were available less than three years ago to the research team in Trafalgar Square.

Increased knowledge of South African affairs was what made Mr. Louw's press conference seem so incredible. He answered questions blandly, as if the reign of terror conducted by his Government was in his opinion a quiet domestic affair. If South Africa's Minister for External Affairs thinks that the killing of more than seventy people and the arrest of a further 20,000 does not warrant every inch of space used in covering it, he has yet to do the homework he invariably accuses journalists of neglecting. Louw is more than a cliché; he has become a description.

# THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

DENNIS EISENBERG

*Staff of the London 'Daily Herald'*

MR. Eric Louw's now famous no-retreat press conference, held in the opening days of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' deliberations in London, seemed at first sight an incredibly stupid move. For did not this public whistling in the dark precipitate an instantly fierce response from Malaya's Tunku Abdul Rahman in which he threatened to fight apartheid to the verge of the Commonwealth itself?

Let us not at the outset, however, underrate Mr. Louw. True, he badly overplayed his hand, and by his unrestrained defence of apartheid seemed to insult the intelligence as well as the conscience of its critics.

Defending the indefensible and associating himself with the less pleasant aspects of human thought and endeavour is nothing new to this small-town lawyer-politician from the Karroo. Not for nothing is he Dr. Verwoerd's chief hatchet man, and it is usually left to Mr. Louw, as the Minister of External Affairs, to try and clear a path through the revulsion that the actions of his Government excite.

Mr. Louw has always enjoyed this. In his time he has obliged with anti-British, anti-semitic, anti-Indian, anti-cleric, anti-Adlai Stevenson, anti-Communist and, almost with every breath he takes, anti-press comments. Indeed it was left to the always faithful Mr. Louw to rebuke Mr. Macmillan for the liberalism of his now famous Capetown "wind of change" speech. And it was left to Mr. Louw, when Dr. Verwoerd was shot, to come to London and defend apartheid in the teeth of world-wide horror at the massacre of Sharpeville.

To understand why Mr. Louw spoke as he did, it is necessary to go back a little to that pre-Sharpeville day when Dr. Verwoerd agitated the South African Parliament by announcing that a referendum for a republic would be held. This was done precisely because Dr. Verwoerd was already at that stage running into rather heavy weather over his ruthless application of apartheid policies. There were rumblings of discontent among his own followers; and by switching all attention to the creation of a republic, Dr. Verwoerd not only distracted attention from

the increasing bitterness swelling between white and black, but immediately rallied Afrikaner unity to his side. For a republic has been a cherished ideal of the Afrikaners ever since the founding of Union in 1910; and, as an emotional aphrodisiac, talk of creating an independent republic cannot be rivalled in South Africa.

Dr. Verwoerd, of course, carefully avoided saying whether the republic would be inside or outside the Commonwealth. His strategy was clear. Mr. Macmillan was about to visit the Union and, by his very presence in the country, would appear to give his silent blessing to the idea. This alone would succeed in swinging votes among the English-speaking citizens to a change that they regarded with little enthusiasm.

Boldly Dr. Verwoerd announced that he would abide by the decision of the electorate in the referendum—a one-vote majority either way would be held decisive. There can be little doubt that the South African Prime Minister intended announcing at the last minute that the republic would remain inside the Commonwealth. English-speaking voters could then show their gratitude for this 'concession' by flocking to the ballot boxes and swelling the majority in favour of the republic.

Unfortunately, things just did not turn out that way. For one thing, Mr. Macmillan did not co-operate and, realising the way Dr. Verwoerd's Government was skilfully pressing his visit into the service of apartheid, he hit out strongly at racialism in his speech to the South African Parliament and warned South Africa of the dangerous course she was following. Then came Sharpeville and the world-wide shudder at the sharp reality of apartheid.

Dr. Verwoerd has always banked on two important facts—that Mr. Macmillan holds dear the concept of the Commonwealth, and that he realises the mutual economic benefits involved in retaining some British link with South Africa. Dr. Verwoerd himself had no intention whatsoever of quitting the Commonwealth—his own supporters were too aware of the advantages enjoyed by Imperial Preference tariffs not to make clear to him their disapproval of such a step. He guessed shrewdly that Mr. Macmillan would use all his considerable influence to keep the more outspoken of the Afro-Asian Commonwealth Prime Ministers from demanding drastic action against South Africa.

It was in this setting that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers started packing their bags for their annual meeting in London.

Dr. Verwoerd was not going to have South Africa reprimanded at the Conference and he made private contact with Mr. Macmillan demanding an assurance that apartheid would not be discussed at any formal meetings held in London.

This the British Prime Minister accepted, and it was decided well in advance that at the opening session of the Commonwealth Conference a statement would be issued reiterating the principle that the internal affairs of member states could not be a subject of discussion. As a sop to the more belligerent non-white Prime Ministers, Dr. Verwoerd agreed to discuss apartheid with them in twos and threes at informal private meetings. The South African Prime Minister would listen gravely to the strictures of his fellows and then simply ignore what they had said as politely as he could. The final communiqué would thus carry no mention of apartheid and how the other Commonwealth leaders felt about it, so that Dr. Verwoerd would be able to return to South Africa unbent and say: "You see, there was no fuss. People see our point of view—it is only the press that is behind the misunderstandings."

Dr. Verwoerd also intended to announce that South Africa might soon become a republic; and, in light of the "non-interference" clause, her associates could hardly object to her remaining in the Commonwealth. And just to make sure that this all went according to plan, Dr. Verwoerd intended coming in person to London—an unusual step as South African Prime Ministers have not of late made the journey themselves.

The assassination attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life changed all this somewhat, and the ever-faithful Mr. Louw was chosen to speak instead, being carefully briefed by Dr. Verwoerd before he set out. Everything was planned to perfection. The South African press conference which was originally supposed to take place on the Monday—on the eve of the opening of the Conference—was put off until Wednesday. This would allow the statement on "non-interference" to be issued and talk about expelling South Africa from the Commonwealth could then be dismissed as more of the usual "press lies."

On Wednesday, the carefully screened, all white representatives of the world press gathered in South Africa House, and while hundreds of students chanted "murder, murder" in Trafalgar Square outside, a decreasingly suave Mr. Louw carefully pointed out that he was unrepentant, that his Government intended sticking to its policies, and that there was a positive

side to apartheid which was much misunderstood. Somewhat aggressively he pointed out that South Africa would brook no interference in her internal affairs. The next morning's newspapers were uniformly hostile in their reports.

There had clearly been two grave errors of judgement at South Africa House. Mr. Louw had chosen to be strident, and his advisers had plainly misinformed him about the force and character of opinion against apartheid. And these two errors, coming when they did, are of tremendous importance; for it seems as though they may lead directly to the break-up of the Commonwealth or, more likely, the exclusion of South Africa from its ranks.

Despite his urbane façade and quick-witted lawyer's mind, Mr. Louw himself was obviously rattled by the extraordinary hostility of the 137 journalists who faced him. Used to many years of uttering threats and for long unrestrained in his hectoring outbursts, Mr. Louw went further than he doubtless intended. Instead of remaining calm and avoiding any impression of defiance, he lost his temper and made some astonishingly blunt and plainly provocative statements about his Government's plans.

In doing so, he should have known that his voice would carry far beyond Trafalgar Square, serving notice on the world and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in particular that there could be no point in discussing apartheid with him—informally, formally, or any other way. South Africa did not mean to budge an inch, however insistent and reasonable the persuasion.

The angry Prime Minister of Malaya reacted immediately, warning bluntly that he intended to do something about apartheid—"even if necessary to the bitter conclusion." Within his words lay the hint that there was no place in the Commonwealth for both a country like South Africa and a country like Malaya, even though the rules of the club might be very loose and accommodating. It is plain too that the Tunku is thinking in terms of international sanctions against South Africa, and in this Malaya will find from many other countries a sympathetic response.

Mr. Nehru, who opposed any drastic action against South Africa at the Conference, is known to be hardening his heart. Yet overshadowing all was a remarkable statement made by the Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria, in which he called for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth. That this was not just idle talk can be judged from the identical call issued

by the Western and Eastern Nigerian Prime Ministers in the same week.

Nigeria achieves independence in October, and its voice is bound to carry substantial weight in the councils of the Commonwealth. For with its rich mineral resources and population of 35,000,000, it cannot but play a pivotal part in the new Africa. It has already made clear that it will not trade with South Africa, and is likely to take the lead in encouraging a continental boycott.

Where Nigeria goes, can Ghana afford to lag behind? It has not escaped the notice of other African leaders that Ghana appears rather muted in its attacks upon apartheid. There has been increasing criticism, even within Ghana itself, at the discouragement given by Dr. Nkrumah to the boycott of South African goods. '*Drum*' may have been banned, but the import of South African foodstuffs and mining machinery continues.

If Nigeria is so vigorous and practical in its antagonism to apartheid, Nkrumah is unlikely to risk open African opposition by remaining so reluctant to take an active stand. A recent sign has been the withdrawal of the invitation to Mr. Louw to visit Ghana. The heart of Pan-Africanism has to do a little throbbing, after all, if it hopes to remain the heart.

So far Mr. Macmillan has with great skill restrained a strong call for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth. But the strain on the bonds holding together its members is growing hourly, and Mr. Louw himself has effectively destroyed the argument that by keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth restraint and sweet reasonableness can be induced into her affairs.

What of the future? If anything is certain it is that if South Africa continues her present policies, she cannot remain in the Commonwealth. The only alternative to this is the disintegration of the Commonwealth itself. For not only are the leaders of Afro-Asian countries personally indignant about the treatment of coloured people in South Africa, but they are experiencing increasing pressure by public opinion in their countries for action against apartheid.

It seems unlikely that a call for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth would receive anything but Afro-Asian support. Yet more than that will probably not be required, for South Africa will in due course declare herself a republic, and then must receive the unanimous approval of her associates in

order to continue as a fellow member. A polite but firm refusal is almost certain to follow. Dr. Verwoerd must surely recognise this. And Mr. Eric Louw will return to South Africa only to confirm the recognition.

The answer may well be that Dr. Verwoerd, if he still remains at the head of the Government, will not risk the indignity of being turned down and so take South Africa out of the Commonwealth himself. Despite the economic hazards of such a step and the resultant complete isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world, Dr. Verwoerd may not hesitate.

Yet there is still the possibility of rescuing South Africa from herself, and of increasing the stature of the Commonwealth simultaneously. If the Commonwealth countries who have spoken out against apartheid take firm joint action on a broad economic front, then Dr. Verwoerd, Mr. Eric Louw and the men who rule with them will be rapidly brought to their knees. Opponents of the present police-state regime in South Africa can do no better, if they wish to bring peace and liberty at last to the non-white peoples, than to wage an all-out economic war against it. This applies to all countries both in and out of the Commonwealth—but especially to the Commonwealth. Firmness of action can only cement its bonds and increase its moral influence in the world. Prevarication and platitudes will damage its prestige at the very least. Indeed, in South Africa today, the whole concept of the Commonwealth is being tried.

# THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES

THE RT. HON. HILARY MARQUAND, M.P.

*Labour Party spokesman on Commonwealth Relations.*

SINCE Sharpeville, certain leaders of the African National Congress have used Bechuanaland as an escape route from the Union to Britain. The Bishop of Johannesburg recently took temporary refuge in Swaziland. These events have, not surprisingly, focussed close attention upon the High Commission Territories.

Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland are all Protectorates under the British Crown. They became such at varying dates before and just after the Boer War, mainly because their inhabitants had appealed to Britain for protection from administration by the Boer Republics. However, in the optimistic atmosphere surrounding the creation of the Union, the Liberal Government's South Africa Act of 1909 referred in its preamble to "the eventual admission into the Union or transfer to the Union of such parts of South Africa as are not originally included therein ".

The rulers and peoples of the Protectorates have never asked for admission, but Union Governments have more than once called for their transfer. The matter was raised in 1919, in 1927, in 1935, in 1937 and in 1938. In 1938, the Neville Chamberlain Government seemed almost ready to agree, but the war intervened. From 1949 onwards the Nationalist Government pressed its claims with renewed vigour, till in April 1954, Sir Winston Churchill felt it necessary to state firmly that:

"There can be no question of Her Majesty's Government agreeing at the present time to the transfer of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to the Union of South Africa. We are pledged, since the South Africa Act of 1909, not to transfer territories until their inhabitants have been consulted, and until the United Kingdom Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing its views."

That statement was repeated later by Sir Anthony Eden, and repeated again in the House of Commons on 14th April, 1960, by Mr. Alport, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations. *There can be no question of transfer at the present time*—that is now clear. However speciously the proposal might be

put as part of a plan for a "self-governing Bantustan", the House of Commons—which has by its historic vote of the 8th April, 1960, publicly condemned the racial policies of the Verwoerd Government—would not accept it.

Yet there is one defect in Sir Winston's declaration. It is the word "consult", which was used in the Schedule of the Act of 1909. It is a word vulnerable to widely varied interpretations of meaning. The Africans of Nyasaland were said to have been 'consulted' before they were forced against their will into Federation. It should be recognised that 'consultation' through meetings with District Commissioners, or by obtaining the consent of tribal chiefs who depend for their livelihood and position upon the colonial power, will no longer do. It has been blown away by the "wind of change". The United Kingdom Government should now plainly tell Sir Edgar Whitehead that Britain's reserved power to protect Africans in Southern Rhodesia must remain until such time as Africans, by a majority, ask for its removal. It should tell the Union Government that the same applies to the three Protectorates now administered by the U.K. High Commissioner.

The High Commissioner is primarily an ambassador of the United Kingdom to the Union Government. As such, it is his duty to maintain the diplomatic courtesies and not to interfere with the policies of the government to which he is accredited. Yet that government pursues within its territories a policy towards non-whites which is radically different from that which he himself should pursue within the immediately adjoining Protectorates.

The British Government has considered whether it should separate these responsibilities of the High Commissioner—have one ambassador and one administrator—but has decided not to do so. As I have never had personal responsibility for this department, I hesitate to say outright that that decision was wrong. What I do say, however, and what I have said in the House of Commons, is that in the present dangerous situation, in which the Union is ruled by 'emergency powers', in which at least four Basuto were killed and 14 injured at Sharpeville, and in which one cannot be sure what further drastic acts may follow, it is essential to strengthen the administration within the territories. Clearly there should be a further considerable delegation of authority to each of the three Commissioners resident in the territories, and their staffs should be strengthened

by secondment of men with experience elsewhere in Africa and with sympathetic understanding of African aspirations.

Union industry derives great benefit from the labour of workers, mainly men, from the Protectorates. Mr. Fenner Brockway, M.P., recently estimated their number at 180,000. Remittances by these workers to their families, and the proceeds of the sale of many Protectorate products in the Union, are naturally of value to the territories; but the inevitable consequence is that they have become heavily dependent on the Union. It should be the aim of British policy so to accelerate economic development that that dependence is reduced. We must help these Africans, whom we have promised to protect, to withstand any pressure which may be brought upon them from the home of apartheid. We must help them to build up a healthy and self-reliant society by reducing the need for migration. If and when, at some future date, true democracy comes to prevail in the Union, and if the Protectorate Africans then freely decide to join it, they will be the more welcome if they bring to the new State a prosperous economy. In the meantime, we must seek to make the Protectorates, in Fenner Brockway's words, "models of racial equality and African advance".

The territories vary in their economic potential and their economic needs. Swaziland's natural resources of asbestos and other minerals, together with its fertile soil and good water supply, make it, despite its small size, the most prosperous of these. The Colonial Development Corporation's afforestation project, together with the other farming and sugar-milling projects which it has sponsored, will probably yield immensely valuable results before long. Such developments, with further expansion of industry, offer a very firm foundation for future prosperity. The territory's greatest need is for railway development.

Bechuanaland, containing much desert, is mainly a pastoral country and in recent years has received much help from the Colonial Development Corporation in developing its ranching and beef production. Recently, a prospecting agreement has been made between the Bamangwato tribe and Rhodesian Selection Trust. Some progress has been registered, but this is still a poor country.

Poorer still is Basutoland, from which many thousands of workers have to seek work in the Union. It is a mountainous

country on which sheep can successfully be raised, but the cultivable areas are overcrowded and suffer heavily from the greatest enemy of underdeveloped countries—soil erosion.

It would be unjust to say that no efforts at economic development have been made in recent years. Nevertheless, achievements so far do not match the needs of this so critical time. Fortunately, a comprehensive economic survey has just been completed under the chairmanship of Professor Chandler Morse, of Cornell University, who was nominated by the World Bank. Now that the Bank has new powers, giving it wider scope to help poor countries than it has had hitherto, there is hope that it will be ready to follow up with vigour whatever Professor Morse has proposed. His report is expected by the end of June. My colleagues and I have every intention of asking our own government at once what action they intend taking over it.

Economic development can never go forward effectively without the active co-operation of the people. The people must be informed about the broad objectives of the plan and its detailed application to their neighbourhoods. Their enthusiasm must be enlisted by giving them a feeling of active participation. If this is to be achieved in the Protectorates, two great advances must be made—one in education and one in democracy.

On the whole (thanks very largely to missionaries) the children of the Protectorates have—in comparison with other African countries—fairly good opportunities for primary education. The immediately pressing need is an extension of higher education, so that not only can administrators of development be trained, but also teachers to man the secondary schools. And these schools should be open to children of all races. Here again a valuable report by Professor Lewis, of the University of London, is at hand. Immediate action must be taken to implement it. Mr. Alport's response to his recent plea for a government grant to Pius XII College in Basutoland—the only University College in the territories—was encouraging. The next job must be to arouse public opinion in Britain—and for that matter in Canada, in Australia and even in Eire—to demand a vigorous expansion of this college.

There remains yet democracy. It has often been convenient in the past for empires to rule 'indirectly' through local kings, Rajahs, Emirs and Chiefs. So it has been in the Protectorates. But in India and Pakistan, in Nigeria and Malaya, such systems have had to give way or to adapt themselves to the imperative

needs of the twentieth century. I have no criticism to make of hereditary rulers in the Protectorates. Indeed, I hope and believe that, profiting by their own experience of life in Britain, and knowing what has happened elsewhere, they will be ready to help their people forward to more direct and active participation in development. A beginning has been made with the establishment of Legislative and Executive Councils in Basutoland. Bechuanaland may establish a similar pattern soon. In Swaziland, an Advisory Council to advise the Resident Commission on European affairs is elected by the very small European community, while African affairs are conducted on the traditional tribal pattern. The United Kingdom Government must not be deterred by Swaziland's substantial common border with the Union from the early establishment of some form of interracial collaboration, on a more democratic basis, in the process of government. The "wind of change" knows no frontiers in Africa. As our Prime Minister has recognised its existence and its force, he and his Government must press forward as rapidly as possible to secure in the High Commission Territories the full implementation of the ideal he proclaimed in Capetown:

". . . not only to raise the material standards of living, but to create a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature, and that must in our view include the opportunity to have an increasing share in political responsibility; a society in which individual merit alone is the criterion for man's advancement whether political or economic."

# A TORY LOOKS AT FEDERATION

JAMES LEMKIN

*Chairman of* 'Crossbow', *founder-member of the Conservative Party Bow Group, and member of the Africa 1960 Committee.*

If the Conservative British Government had not invented the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland it would not exist, and it should therefore be no wonder that the British Government do not reveal themselves as keen to destroy it. Conservatives dislike changing any institution too sharply, and many of them are still eager to couple this dislike with a firm urge now to create a strong multi-racial Commonwealth unit in Central Africa.

The Rhodes dream of British rule from the Cape ever northwards dies hard, but there are even further pressing philosophical reasons for establishing a multi-racial state in Central Africa. At a time when the Commonwealth in Africa is being ground between the nether and upper stones of opposing racist policies, Conservatives genuinely hope that in Rhodesia, even now, a real partnership between the races can be achieved. They are impressed with the strides taken by the Rhodesian economy since Federation. True, without Federation Southern Rhodesia would be worse off and Northern Rhodesia better off, but apart from this redistributive effect, African wages in all three territories have risen dramatically in real terms. To Conservatives, it is idle to argue that such wages might have increased by a similar amount without the Federal association; Conservatives believe in "a bird in the hand" and there is much to be said for that. Looking at race relations, many Conservatives are prepared to accept the word of the established Government of the Federation; and this, perhaps, leads them to take a Panglossian view of race relations and accept, as Sir Roy and Sir Edgar say quite frequently in London, though less often in Salisbury, that all is for the best in the best possible of Rhodesian worlds. But the Rhodesian universe is a very provincial one; perhaps with the exception of the '*Central African Examiner*'—now in reforming hands—and of two African periodicals in the northern territories, its press is owned by and attuned to only one wavelength. The pace of nationalism in Africa did not until recently get adequately reported in Rhodesia. The British Prime Minister's speech, to a virtually all white audience at a cinema in Salisbury in January,

came (albeit slowly, as the true meaning of Macmillan sank in) as a terrible shock. The speech clearly upset those in governmental circles, both in Rhodesia and perhaps in Britain, who thought that given a job of trimming, the Federal boat would be able to survive intact. The immediate reaction from the United Federal Party in Rhodesia was sounded in Sir Edgar Whitehead's speech, when he stated that he would have no truck with nationalists in the northern territories and that Southern Rhodesia would leave the Federation if African nationalist governments came to power in the north. The British Government, in spite of the distaste of some of its members for African nationalism, has released Kaunda and Banda and will give Nyasaland internal African government within twelve months. It appears that the point of departure for a realistic Conservative view about Federation is that H.M. Government is now insistent that no solution for the Federation can work without the European and African politicians of Rhodesia and Nyasaland coming to some terms, or at least a truce, with each other. The most important aspect of British policy during the next twelve months turns on the way in which the Conservative Government tries to bring such Africans and Europeans face to face, and the measures, influence and power which the British Government is prepared to adopt and exercise.

The sanctions available to the Conservative Government are, it is true, limited—not merely by constitutional power, but also by the philosophical framework in which Conservatives see the whole issue of Federation. Unwillingness to break up the Federation is, of course, an attitude which the existing government of the Federation can use as a weapon to persuade the British Government to preserve the 'status quo' for the time being. To counter this, there is the knowledge that the Conservative Government is also a realistic government and would not irrevocably commit itself to a federal structure which was wholly unworkable.

Turning to the sanctions themselves, these fall into several categories—the military, the economic and the constitutional. We can dismiss certain aspects of the military sanction at once. Her Majesty's Government would not use British troops against Europeans in the Federation in an effort to induce them to accept a political system alien to them. The United Federal Party know this; they also know that a 'Boston Tea Party' is a political manoeuvre that is unlikely to succeed. There is, of

course, a chance that such a coup could be better organised than the Jameson Raid; but the circumstances of the 'Tea Party' would constitute an illegal act, and Southern Rhodesians have a strict respect for the law, though there is less of such respect in the Copper Belt. But a coup in the Copper Belt would leave the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia very much at the mercy of the Africans. The government of Northern Rhodesia, which is still largely run by the Colonial Office, would take police steps to prevent such disorder, just as they are now taking steps to prevent African disorder. On the Copper Belt, many of the European employees depend on the mining companies for their livelihood, and these companies would unquestionably give their support to the territorial government against any unconstitutional moves based on violence. It is also likely that, were such a coup attempted, the Africans would walk out of the mines and the economy of Northern Rhodesia immediately come to a standstill. These are all factors which, when brought together, are likely to prevent a coup being seriously planned. This is not to say that in a moment of extreme emotion violence might not break out amongst the Europeans in Rhodesia, but it should be the object of British policy to contain the level of European emotion so that violent solutions do not come to the forefront.

The second sanction is economic. The protagonists of this argument always bring forward the example of the Development and Welfare Grant, a sum over £1,000,000, paid towards the establishment of the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the implicit condition that the University was to be truly multi-racial. It can be seen from the circumstances that this was a special case. The Copper Belt Technical Foundation set up by the two mining groups, in spite of all the goodwill exercised, has failed up till now to become at all multi-racial. The loans for Kariba were without any political conditions, save for a recommendation that the immigration intake into Rhodesia be geared more realistically. Rhodesia is an important market for United Kingdom goods, and it is doubtful whether, in general, it would be of any advantage for British consumers to boycott Rhodesian goods. The British companies are doing what they can to influence race relations, and every new investment by a British company in Rhodesia helps to enlarge the economic opportunity for Africans. Companies like Lever Bros., Barclays D.C. & O. and Dunlop have all, of late, by their work in the Federation, helped to provide opportunities for Africans to do

higher clerical and skilled work. If there is a sanction in the economic field it can only lie with the British Government, not so much in connection with the conditions for new capital investments, but arising out of the economic problems flowing from a possible break-up of the Federation. The British Government have helped to guarantee certain federal loans, including that for Kariba, and the British Government would, in theory, use the possibility of withdrawing guarantees from some of those loans, if threats were made by European or African alike to break up the Federation. One cannot, however, see the British Government withdrawing any such guarantees if the present 'status quo' continues. To sum up, therefore, it appears that the scope for economic sanctions is very limited; and, for that reason, the desirability of any such sanctions is not argued here.

This leaves two weapons in British hands—constitutional power and the state of African opinion in the Federation. There is a great deal of talk about the Federal Constitution and its Preamble, and the starting point for a Conservative, who readily recognises what is not practical, is that the Federal Constitution was the most that could be got in 1953. "Amalgamation" was, and is still, an untouchable matter. Expressed African opinion has, in general, since the Bledisloe Commission of 1959, been opposed to the political association of the three territories on the terms stated by the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia; and that opinion has both hardened as well as grown far more articulate since 1953. It seems clear that there will, at the very least, have to be changes in the Federal Constitution, and such changes can finally and lawfully be brought into force only by Westminster. The British Parliament and its majority party can revoke or amend the Federal Constitution without the agreement of, or any legislation by, the Government in Central Africa. There is a 1957 Convention under which the British Government agreed, amongst other things, not to extend domestic United Kingdom legislation to the Federation without the consent of the Federal Government, but clearly a unilateral review of the Constitution is not debarred by the Convention, as the Convention pre-supposes that the present federal structure will be sustained and only applies in such circumstances.

The principal object of the Federal Government in agitating for the Convention was to prevent any Labour Government from extending legislation on racial discrimination to Rhodesia; and one cannot help wondering whether this object, in itself,

was not self-condemnation by the United Federal Party.

Of course, the British Government is interested, at the many conferences of British African territories taking place in 1960 and 1961, to obtain the highest common factor of consent for constitutional revision. It is known that the Federal Government, having agreed not to press amalgamation, and knowing that dominion status is not available at present, is arguing strongly for the maintenance of the 'status quo' in terms of the exclusive Federal legislative list and franchise. They are proposing the dismantling of the African Affairs Board and its replacement, either by an Upper House or by executive machinery such as could be provided by an extension of the Government Office on Race Affairs. The Africans in the Northern Territories are arguing strongly for the dissolution of the Federation, and several of them will be included amongst the territorial delegations to the Review Conference. On the face of it, Monckton or no Monckton, the prospects at present are marginal of the Conference's agreeing or even acquiescing in a solution, as did a majority of the Kenya delegates at their Conference in January, 1960.

The Colonial Secretary is striving hard to get abreast of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. If he can retain the goodwill of Kaunda and Banda up to the Conference, he may be able to induce them to accept a temporary political solution which keeps *a*, not *the*, federal political structure in being. Clearly the price of this would be twofold. First, an undertaking that the 'status quo' would be changed and second, an assurance that there would be fairly rapid changes internally in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. MacLeod knows that once elected Africans concentrate on taking part in the government of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, they will be well occupied for a few years. Mr. Macmillan is taking on the Europeans. His task is the most difficult of all. Having told them the very opposite of a bedtime story about African nationalism, he must now assure them that the wind, though it will be fresh, will not blow with too violent a force of change. To achieve this he must get the support of some members of the Government Party (U.F.P.) in the Federation. He must cajole them by squarely putting before them the choice between their continuing their authority in Southern Rhodesia and associating with predominantly African governments in the north, or of challenging the authority of the British Government in an

attempt to break the constitution unilaterally. Such a choice may be a harsh one, but in certain circumstances it can be one which the Europeans need not fear. These circumstances are that Mr. Macmillan must assure the Europeans that the British Government are going to be responsible for internal security in the northern territories until independence, and, futhermore, that the British Government will see that a considerable contribution, both financial and otherwise, is made to the improvement of agriculture in the Federation, since in this way the momentum of the economy can best be secured. The British Government know full well, as happened in the Belgian Congo in 1957, that once the economy takes a down-turn political confidence is almost impossible to maintain.

No mention has been made so far of the response of the Conservative Party to the future of the Federation. There is considerable sympathy in the Conservative Party for African political advancement, and there is no sign that the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary have not got the support of almost the whole of the Party in Parliament. In addition, the Labour Party is largely supporting the Conservative Government at the present time on African affairs; and there is a real chance, though one must not mention the word 'bi-partisanship' at Westminster, that the House of Commons would be largely united and not divide on the future of the Federation or even that of Southern Rhodesia.

Knowledge of Africa, amongst Conservatives, has grown rapidly in the last twelve months, and members of the Conservative Party are eager to be assured that considerable political thinking is going on in Rhodesia about its future. The most important thing to be recognised, both in Britain and Rhodesia, is that there should be frank and open public discussion of the proposals to amend the constitution of the territories within the Federation itself, so that public support can be established for the moderate solutions which may well still be possible in Central Africa.

# PORTRAIT OF IAIN MACLEOD

JAMES CAMERON

*Columnist in the London 'News Chronicle'*

It seems no time since we used to say, watching, for example, the Mau Mau confusions dragging endlessly on, sapping away all human decencies in Kenya, that the next Colonial Secretary would at least be an improvement on Mr. Lyttelton. By and by we were back at it again, watching the vicious circle in Cyprus, and saying that in time things would have to get better, since we could scarcely do worse than Lennox Boyd. A little later, in Nyasaland, we kept it up a little more desperately: anything would be an improvement on what we had.

Someone, I expect Mr. Butler, once said of Sir Anthony Eden that he was the best Prime Minister we had, an observation of somewhat measured enthusiasm since we do not as a rule have more than one Prime Minister at a time. Such a definition would not wholly fit Mr. Iain MacLeod, who is the best thing in Colonial Secretaries since the job stopped being a sinecure. No Colonial Secretary can be better than his context allows him, but many can be, and have been, worse.

Perhaps a man may be deduced by his effect on those with whom he has to work and argue. Thus Dr. Hastings Banda, bounding out of Gwelo Jail full of a year's bottled-up enthusiasms, fell on the neck of Mr. MacLeod. "A great Christian gentleman," cried Dr. Banda, "Britain's greatest insurance-broker against trouble in Nyasaland!" When the doubting Thomases suggested that perhaps all of Mr. MacLeod's liberalisms were not shared by all of Mr. MacLeod's party, Dr. Banda would still not be denied: "Then it will not be Mr. MacLeod's fault."

Dr. Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana got on well with the Minister too. Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone was bowled over. Did not Mr. MacLeod begin their conference by saying: "At least let us not waste time arguing the principle of independence; *of course* we accept it." Sir Grantley Adams of the West Indies got on with him; so did Tom Mboya, with reservations. Dom Mintoff of Malta didn't, but then Dom Mintoff gets on with practically nobody these days. Sir Roy Welensky gets on with him in no way at all, which is perhaps the best recommendation of all.

The Right Hon. Iain Norman MacLeod, P.C., M.P. (Fettes and Caius College, Cambridge) is 46 years old, short and some-

what of a shrewd kewpie in demeanour; he has been defined as the complete political animal, the epitome of the clear-headed, far-sighted, broad-minded, multi-hyphenated Tory career member, who knows where he is going, and derives great satisfaction if he can go there on the right bandwagon. Some time ago the '*Guardian*', which should know, detected in him "officer-like qualities". One thinks of him, mused the editorialist, as "a district officer with irresistible claims to promotion". He is hard, efficient, intelligent. It is possibly not for nothing that he is one of the half-dozen best bridge-players in the world (he has played for England, and was once Bridge Editor of the '*Sunday Times*') and, furthermore, is one of the people who like to play chess against themselves. He is a first-class parliamentary debater; it was after a particularly biting joust with Aneurin Bevan over the Health Services that Mr. MacLeod leaped over the back benches in 1952 and reached the Ministry of Health in one bound. The Ministry of Labour came three years later. Before last year's elections it was he who ran the unofficial inner committee on Tory poll-policy, doing the job, they said, that Lord Hailsham should have been doing (just as now they say he is doing the job that Lord Home should be doing). Nowadays, when the Conservative constituency organizations cannot get Mr. Macmillan, they ask for Mr. Macleod. And rarely in vain.

If Iain MacLeod has got a very long way in a very short time, he has done so without the brandishing of many personal gimmicks. He is a tiresome proposition for the cartoonists. He lives a home-life of suburban rectitude in the heart of his own constituency, at The Ridgeway, Enfield.

In his eight months at Abbey House Mr. MacLeod has impressed himself, there is no doubt about it. His tour of Central and East Africa this year brought a heartening display of bile and hostility from the Rhodesian and Kenyan settlers, which Mr. MacLeod accepted with phlegm, recognizing perhaps that nothing could do him more good with the British electorate in its mood of the time. He brought the seven-year-old Emergency in Kenya to an end—though the method he used was questionable; while he ordained the gradual release of detainees, he simultaneously sanctioned the Public Security Bill which gave the Governor even more control over public meetings and parties and yielded him power to restrict all discussion without reference to the courts. This, it was generally held, was only making noises like a liberal. At the same time, his handling of the Kenya Conference was

a tactical triumph, as was admitted on all sides; the reconciliation of the African and the Blundell groups, however temporary, was an object-lesson in committee technique.

How far does he go now? No one who studies the subtle semi-tones of Government utterances can altogether miss the hint of disagreement in the higher reaches of the Conservative Party. Only in March it seemed that the Prime Minister went quite a step out of his way to temper the progressive mood of Mr. MacLeod. Rightly or wrongly, but at least unequivocally, Mr. MacLeod had made it clear that in Britain's view now the rights of Africans must come before the rights of immigrant Europeans, that H.M.G., however reluctantly, must henceforth recognise the superior claims of the majority.

Forthwith Mr. Macmillan made two important speeches of his own—once on television and once to the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association—in which he categorically loaded all his emphasis, as a statement of Government policy, on the side of Europeans' rights in Africa.

To everyone in British Africa, either black or white, all this spells confusion, and confusion spells doubt, and doubt spells uneasiness. It can, to be sure, be said of Mr. Iain MacLeod that he is the best Colonial Secretary we have—but how many have we?

# THE BELGIAN CONGO (II) TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

COLIN LEGUM

*Correspondent on African Affairs for the London 'Observer'*

THE Belgian Congo joins the rapidly expanding community of independent African States on June 30th. Its future is by no means assured. Predictions about the outcome of independence range from gloomy forebodings of large-scale inter-tribal massacres and fragmentation, to less sombre assessments of the difficulties that will confront the new government after independence. Nobody is optimistic.

The speed with which the Congo has moved from political servitude to emancipation makes it impossible to forecast with any certainty what the future holds. The political parties and their leaders are unknown quantities; they are in a nascent state at the moment when they are called upon to assume vast new responsibilities. Untested in politics, untried in government, unversed in administration—it will be a miracle if the Congolese leaders succeed in launching their experiment without any major tragedy. Their traducers are ready to revel in their misfortunes; but those who know the circumstances of the Congo will understand their difficulties.

The crux of Congo politics lies in the struggle between nationalism and tribalism; between those who wish for a strong, unitary State in the Congo, and those who desire a federal State of largely autonomous provincial governments based on tribal alliances.

These two viewpoints are crystallized by what has previously happened in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah triumphed in his demand for centralized government; but, to achieve it, he had to overcome the federalist demands of the Ashanti, the tribal chiefs in the Northern Territories, and the Ewe nationalists in Togoland.

In Nigeria, the nationalist demand of Dr. Nnamde Azikiwe was defeated by the insistence of Chief Awolowo and of the Northern Emirs that Nigeria should become a federation of the three major regions.

A similar struggle is being waged between the nationalists of Uganda and their traditional rulers. It was a feature, too, of the Sudan in the first year of independence.

Centralism versus federalism has bedevilled politics in the Old World for centuries; it may do the same in the larger countries of Africa. It is easier for the unitarians to win in small countries like Ghana than in the larger countries like Nigeria. The crucial question is whether they can win in the Congo.

The initiative in the Congo independence elections lies firmly with the unitarians. It seems almost certain that they will win the elections. But can they hold the country together against the sulky resistance of their opponents? It took Dr. Nkrumah three years to break the power of the defeated National Liberation Movement in Ashanti; he won in the end, but only after a very bitter struggle.

The difference between Ghana and the Congo is that in Ghana the Government was firmly entrenched. The C.P.P. party organization was broadly based and firmly united. None of these conditions applies at present to the Congo. If a newly independent government has to grapple with the tasks of setting up a new State while at the same time fighting off a determined secessionist movement, the outcome could be doubtful. To put the result beyond issue, the unitarians must achieve two results. Firstly, they must succeed in creating a powerful and united national movement capable of forming a strong and determined government. Secondly, they must succeed in routing the federalists in at least five of the six provinces. It may just be possible for them to deal with a challenge by *Abako* in the Lower Congo, provided that movement has no powerful allies in Katanga and Kasai, the two other provinces where federalism has a measure of popular appeal.

What does this all mean in terms of political parties and personalities? The complex and proliferate parties and their political rivalries only too vividly reflect the background of the Congo with all its immense diversities.

The country covers an area of 900,000 square miles with a population of 13,500,000 Africans and 113,000 whites, of whom 89 per cent are Belgian. The Congolese themselves are divided into 70 major ethnic groups, each of which is sub-divided into hundreds of tribes and clans. More than 400 dialects are actively used. Apart from French, known to the évolués, there is no *lingua franca*; although Kiswahili is widely spoken in the eastern parts, and Kikongo in the west. Nearly one-quarter of the Congolese are now urbanized; Leopoldville's population is 350,000, and Elizabethville's 200,000.

The Congo is divided into six provinces. The effects, if not the intention, of Belgian policy have been to develop separate, tribal governments based on district councils. Tribal loyalties have been fostered, and remain entrenched, even in the urban areas. All six provinces have developed characteristics of their own, partly historical in origin and partly due to more recent developments.

Katanga is the area of mining and industrial development, with a Congolese population of 1,650,000 and a white population of 33,500. As an industrial magnet, it attracted workers from many parts of the country. One effect of this immigration was that the indigenous Katanga people felt themselves numerically threatened by outsiders. Elizabethville is only a short distance from the towns of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and a degree of political affinity is felt between the whites of Elizabethville and those of Rhodesia.

Equatoria—a remote and undeveloped area lying well outside the mainstream of economic and political development—has a population of 1,800,000 Congolese, with only 6,600 Whites.

The Eastern Province, revolving around the expanding and politically lively capital of Stanleyville (the stamping-ground of Patrice Lumumba), has a Congolese population of 2,500,000, and a growing white population of 16,500.

Kivu, the scenically splendid and agriculturally temperate region, is in a minor sense the 'White Highlands' of the Congo: in this area official encouragement was given at one time to white settlement. Its Congolese population, organized into several powerful chiefdoms, totals 2,260,000; its white population numbers 14,000.

Kasai Province, plumb in the middle of the Congo, is the home of the Lulua, a self-conscious tribe who cling tenaciously to their traditional ways of life; this conservatism gave an opening to the ambitious Baluba. The advent of the political age has produced a sharp awakening among the Lulua. The Congolese population totals 2,345,000, and the whites 9,000.

Leopoldville includes the region of the Lower Congo, the home of the Bakongo, the most politically sophisticated of the Congolese tribes. The rapid growth of Leopoldville itself attracted large numbers of people from the Upper Congo; the évolué associations of these incomers came into conflict with the Bakongo tribal association, *Abako*. But the Bakongo comprise

a minority of the total 3,200,000 Congolese in the provinces. There are 33,600 whites.

This pattern of development naturally threw up tribal and provincial parties when the first flood of political consciousness overwhelmed the country in 1949. The effect of this was seen in the composition of the delegations that attended the Brussels Round Table Conference in January, 1960. Sixteen parties were represented by 50 leaders, many of whom had not met each other previously. The meeting at Brussels speeded up a process that had already started in the Congo for the formation of coalitions between like-minded parties.

Seen in retrospect, all the quarrels, suspicions and manœuvres at the Round Table Conference in Brussels were of purely transitory interest. Only two issues of lasting importance emerged: the division of the Congolese into two camps—Unitarians and Federalists; and a marked difference in attitude between a majority of the leaders who came to favour close and intimate relations with Belgium, and a strong, rather vociferous minority who remained deeply suspicious of the Belgians and who have sought immediate ways of diluting Belgium's influence in an independent Congo.

The two minority viewpoints—federalism and suspicion of the Belgians—are championed most strongly by Mr. Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the *Abako* party of the Lower Congo.

Kasavubu has a great deal in common with Chief Awolowo, although he has never read the latter's book or speeches and has no more than a nodding acquaintance with the name of the great Yoruba leader and first Prime Minister of Western Nigeria. It is not surprising, however, that two such similar viewpoints should arise independently in Africa.

Awolowo's path to Nigerian freedom had as its starting-point the culture and political organization of the Yoruba. He argued that the first essential to future Nigerian unity should be the entrenchment of the interests of the Yoruba and of their affiliated tribes in the Western Region. Only thereafter was he prepared to consider their unification into a wider Nigerian State.

Kasavubu's starting-point is the Bakongo, who once formed part of the powerful Kingdom of the Bakongo. It had declined before the European advent, and was subsequently divided up between the Belgians, the French and the Portuguese.

Kasavubu has been inconsistent over the *Abako's* aspiration to separate the Lower Congo from the rest of the Congo and to

establish a separate Kingdom of the Bakongo following its old historical lines. When I saw him in Brussels in January, he firmly denied any separatist tendencies. "It is all colonialist propaganda." His aim was national unity in the Congo which, he felt, could only be achieved through a loose federation. With the growth of the spirit of national unity, he thought it would be possible to strengthen the central government.

He developed his ideas at greater length when I saw him in March in Leopoldville. In answer to my question whether *Abako* is a tribal party, he said: "It is a national party. This is shown by its struggles for independence for the whole country, not just for the Lower Congo. Our aim is to build the country up from below."

But although Kasavubu claimed that the idea of federalism was winning support in the Congo, his major complaint was over what he felt to be a deliberate attempt to isolate *Abako*. What would happen if *Abako* were isolated as a result of the election results? This is the crucial question likely to face the Congo after independence.

"The Belgian authorities," Kasavubu said, "are supporting our political opponents in trying to isolate us. They do not appear to see the dangers of isolating the Bakongo, whose struggle was primarily responsible for producing independence. They imagine it is possible to rule the country against the bloc of the Bakongo. This is a dangerous miscalculation."

There was a clue to his mind in the following extracts from my interview with him.

The Bakongo could, if necessary, stand on their own feet in the Lower Congo; the other regions could not. If there were tribal divisions in the immediate future, the fault would lie with the Belgian Administration. "If the Belgians try and divide us, there may be a tribal clash. If not, things could go peacefully. If nothing happens before June 30th, things will settle down afterwards. If it doesn't settle down, we would find practical ways of dealing with the situation."

He did not say what practical ways he had in mind. But he did elaborate on what might happen if things went wrong. "If it came to a clash we would try to live on our own, and then start all over again trying to build up from the bottom."

This statement contains a serious threat. What does Kasavubu mean? I can only attempt a personal interpretation.

Kasavubu is determined that when the constitution is drawn

up after the independence elections, it should be of a federal character. If he does not get his way, and if the Bakongo are reduced to a minority within the Provincial Government of Leopoldville (which is possible), the *Abako* may consider setting up their own State. Whether this State will come within the framework of the Congo is not clear. But in view of Mr. Kasavubu's statement that "we would try to live on our own and then start all over trying to build from the bottom", the possibility of, at least, a temporary secession cannot be ruled out.

I put this point to him. Was there not, I asked, a danger that he would be putting back the clock and risking the destruction of Congo unity? To this he answered:

"People outside, and colonialists, should know that we will never again accept the colonial role, even if decolonialization should mean a period of tribal wars and bloodshed."

What kind of a man is Joseph Kasavubu, and who are his allies? He is short and squat, with mongoloid and Bantu features; he is suspicious and unforthcoming. He peers stolidly through large glasses; but this general impression of unfriendliness disappears if one succeeds in breaking down his natural reserve. He has a sly humour.

He was trained by the Roman Catholics, and remains close to the Church. But he is at the same time close to the Kibanguists, the separatist church movement of the Bakongo. His closest political adviser is Professor A. J. J. van Bilsen, a Belgian liberal and a staunch Catholic. As a student, he read classics and philosophy. He is a Thomist. After becoming a primary school principal, he studied agriculture by correspondence and later worked for 16 years in the Ministry of Finance. He has great political integrity. The Belgians accuse him of playing politics with Gaullist agents in Africa, and of making secret contacts with the West Germans. He has even been accused of being a Communist agent—a strange charge to level against a person who has maintained such close relations with the Catholics. Is he a foreign agent? His own explanation seems most reasonable. Such contacts as he has had with non-Belgians have been purely of an exploratory character to determine how much aid might be expected after independence to dilute the predominance of Belgian influence. It is easy to see why this objective should be distasteful to the Belgians; but this hardly constitutes a charge against his nationalist integrity.

Kasavubu is most powerful, but not the only leader of the

Bakongo. The party underwent a split (as did other parties) at the Brussels talks. But the oppositional Kanza faction, although a strong irritant, has not seriously weakened Kasavubu. It has, however, provided a lever for his opponents.

Theoretically, Kasavubu's closest ally should be the *Parti Solidarité Africain* (PSA), the other strong party in the Lower Congo. Its most effective leader is Cleophas Kamitatoe, a small, well-built, solemn-faced, fluent commune secretary.

PSA is a party of small rural workers and peasants spread over the 25 tribes who inhabit the Kwanga-Kwila region, one of the most heavily populated parts of the country. It stands for federalism, and began in alliance with *Abako*. But it has lately moved away from Kasavubu. If it goes into alliance with the non-Bakongo parties in the Lower Congo, it could become the most powerful party there. Such a manœuvre would complete the isolation of *Abako,* so feared by Kasavubu, and would reduce the Bakongo to a minority position in the province, although they could still dominate their own territory in the Lower Congo.

Among the many uncertainties of the Congo, the position of PSA is one of the most teasing. Will Kasavubu and Kamitatoe end up in a strong federal alliance, or will they bitterly dispute for power and authority?

Outside the Lower Congo, pockets of federalist support can be found in Katanga (where Conakat speaks for the interests of the 'sons of the soil') and in Kasai (where some Lulua are defending their political position against the Baluba). There are small pockets of support, too, in Kivu.

A common feature of the federalist movement is that it finds support in areas to which Congolese from other parts of the country have immigrated in large numbers. It is a defence of the local tribe against the strangers. In towns like Elizabethville and Luluabourg, where the 'sons of the soil' are outnumbered, feeling is inclined to run high; and although Leopoldville is not in Bakongo territory, *Abako* consider it their home ground.

But the federalists are disparate and weakly organized. Except for the Bakongo, they often represent the least sophisticated of the political movements in the country. Their role is essentially defensive, and often negative; their policy is largely parochial and inward-looking. For all these reasons they have so far made less of an impact on the national front than the unitarians.

The first name that springs to mind among the unitarians is Patrice Lumumba, a tall rake of a man, with a tiny, narrow head

and a chinful of beard, "specially grown for independence". His manner is lively and vital; his smile is light and quick and frequent; his movements are rather like those of a praying mantis. His tongue is silver; he talks rapidly and ceaselessly. But his easy, pleasant manner is deceptive; Lumumba is earnest and tough and capable, if the need should arise, of being ruthless. His hero is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; his model is Ghana.

"In a young State," he says, "you must have visible and strong powers."

He is a republican and a reformer. "Our need is to democratise all our institutions. We must separate the Church from the State. We must take away all power from the traditional chiefs, and remove all privileges. We must adapt socialism to African realities. Amelioration of the conditions of life is the only true meaning independence could have."

His outlook is firmly Western. "I am greatly impressed by Dr. Nkrumah's praise for the British. Mistakes have been made in Africa in the past, but we are now ready to work with the Powers who have been in Africa to create a powerful new bloc. If this fails, it will be the fault of the West. We are all ready to be friendly with a West which has helped us up to now. Provided our relations are based on real equality, we can work hand in hand to construct in Black Africa a grand well-organized society."

Ideas spill out, easily and well marshalled. He is a visionary and a realist. Also, he is a fly politician.

Patrice Lumumba heads the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC); which, like *Abako,* has split. Its 'moderate' and more Catholic wing is led by M. Kalonji. His own deputy-leader, Victor Nendaka, was expelled after a party rumpus over finance. The MNC appears to be getting a lot of money. Some say it comes from Belgian industrialists, others say it comes from the Belgian Administration; some say it comes from Accra; others say it comes from Moscow *via* Conakry. In the Congo today you believe nothing you cannot personally check.

Lumumba has been working his head off ever since he was released from prison—his manacle scars still lie white on his bony, brown wrists—to attend the Round Table Conference in Brussels. His main efforts are concentrated on party organization and in negotiating coalitions with other unitary parties.

His relations with the Belgians are now excellent. "I am delighted with the new spirit shown by Belgium." His chief

difficulties lie with the federalists, and with his fractious supporters in Kasai.

"The federalists want to divide the Congo, but our future lies in unity. The federalists seek to organize tribal feudalisms because they have no support on the national level."

Kasavubu he claims as a friend, but he is fiercely critical. "We fought together against colonialism. But because we fought against the colonialists that is no reason for wanting to establish a dictatorship, otherwise we are doing what the colonialists did."

He denounces *Abako* methods in the Lower Congo. "They have their private police, and run their own courts. They seek to frustrate the administration. The Lower Congo is full of complaints about the methods of *Abako*. They continue to behave as though they are still fighting the colonialists. They don't realize that things have changed. Because I seek to co-operate with the Belgian Administration under the changed conditions, Kasavubu accuses me of being bought by the Belgians. That is simply not true."

But Lumumba is optimistic about the future. "Our aim must be to have a truly national government. We simply have not got enough people to fill all the posts. With freedom and independence we can build a great nation." There is one qualification. "Every day we stretch out our hand to all the people, and to *Abako,* asking them to forget the past and to think of the future. If Kasavubu does not respond to this appeal, then we are going to have a very bad time."

Everything comes back, in the end, to Kasavubu. To the Belgians and the unitarians, he is the villain of the piece.

There are other fish nearly as big as Lumumba in the unitarian pool. Where they will end up in the election stakes depends on the stable colours they choose to run under when the final coalition lists become known.

Jean Bolikango stands out, at 51, as the prematurely elder statesman. Until recently he was head of *Inforcongo,* the Belgians' powerful and effective propaganda machine in the Congo. Bolikango leapt into the nationalist stream with a bitter denunciation of the role played by *Inforcongo*. He is a tall, broad, proud and handsome man; a strong Catholic, and the leader of the Bangala tribe. The main political influence in his life has been M. Leopold Senghor. But he also finds it possible to admire M. Houphouet-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, "for his

wisdom and calmness." To his own people Bolikango is sometimes known as The Sage, and sometimes as The Moses. Most of his life was spent as a teacher; many of today's politicians were his students. His aim is independence and unity. While he is willing to concede a measure of provincial autonomy, he is inflexibly opposed to federation.

Bolikango stands to the right of Lumumba, and M. Bolya stands to the right of Bolikango. Bolya leads the *Parti Nationalist Populaire* (PNP) which was supposedly set up originally with the help of the Belgian Administration. But whatever its origins, PNP is now viewed with some respect by other nationalists.

Bolya comes from Equatoria. He has a strikingly unusual face, rather like a Congo mask. It is a surprise when it becomes animated. He has a lot of influence, especially among the Mongo; and he has a reputation for honesty. He has managed to weld twenty tribal parties into the PNP. "There is a flickering of tribal feelings. If the other leaders do what the PNP did, we can create a national leadership that can damp down this feeling. There is no reason why each tribe should not remain what it is, yet agree to co-operate on a national level". His policy is to blend unitarianism with federalism.

M. Kashamura is a politician of an entirely different hue. He is a militant socialist. "How is Mr. Nye Bevan?" he asked me. "Tell him when you see him that his illness gave us great concern. All over Kivu our people ask how he is getting on."

Bevan's 'In Place of Fear', and the works of a different type of socialist, France's M. Jules Moch, set Kashamura's feet straying from his close early associations with the White Fathers. He is one of the leaders of the CEREA party in Bukavu, and his dream is to build socialism in the Congo. "The Africans are natural socialists." He took time off from the Round Table Conference in Brussels to venture behind the Iron Curtain. "I went as a tourist and I did not have enough time to form any definite impressions. There is good as well as bad; the same as in the West. We Africans will not throw away anything simply for the sake of doing so. We will be guided by our own African past, and take whatever is useful to us from both the West and the East."

His view of the future constitution is that it should be neither unitary nor federalist. It should provide for a strong central government, but with a broad autonomy for the provinces.

Kashamura is now 33, and knows prison life. He has been

a book-keeper and a journalist. His experience of working with Belgian socialists in the Congo suggests they are not 'sincere'. He believes that socialism can only come gradually to a country like the Congo. "We still need the industrial cadres, and we need to form effective labour organizations. Nationalization must come slowly so as not to frighten away capital."

For a country that for so long denied its people the right to politics, the Congo seems to have produced a reasonable variety of politicians. Their experience is limited, and their knowledge of the outside world is pathetically lacking. But perhaps their greatest shortage is of experts in economics.

The financial arrangements between Belgium and the Congo are still in the melting pot. If the Belgians strike too hard a bargain they could easily find themselves in the position of the Dutch in Indonesia. Despite its wealth, the Congo's financial position is most unsatisfactory. It has at the moment virtually no liquid assets.

The public debt is colossal; it stands at something like 49.438 billion Belgian francs. About 25 per cent of the annual budget is required to service these debts. To set off this debt, the new State will inherit the Congo Portfolio, which is valued at about 34 billion Belgian francs, most of it in the country's public utilities. But what is not generally known is that the Congo State will own almost one-half of the shareholding of the powerful *Union Miniere*.

The prodigious flight of capital that was allowed to run an unchecked course throughout 1959 and for the early part of this year drained the reserves of the Congo Central Bank. The credit of the Congo Central Bank has been underwritten by the Belgian Central Bank, but on terms that tie the Congo hand and foot.

There are other aspects of Belgian financial policy that should give cause for concern—to the Belgians as much as to the Congolese. Although the Belgians are proposing to provide generous technical and financial aid, their method is open to criticism. It will not be based on normal international standards of government-to-government aid. The Belgians intend to operate their own technical aid scheme in the Congo. This could easily lead to friction and misunderstanding.

But these skimpy observations of Belgian financial relations with the Congo are of necessity tentative as, at the time of writing, I do not know the final outcome of the Round Table Conference on economic relations. The Belgians would, how-

ever, be wise to be both generous and unpaternalistic in their financial dealings with the Congolese. Their interests in the Congo are estimated at something like 350 billion francs; they dare not risk their loss.

Readers who may recall my first article on the Congo in '*Africa South*' (Vol. 4, No. 1) will remember my promise to deal with the report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that went to the Congo after the riots in Leopoldville in January, 1959. The report forms a useful postscript for multi-racial territories which might seek to profit from the mistakes made by Belgium in the Congo.

The self-deception of Europeans in multi-racial societies is undoubtedly the major political problem still facing Africa. European supremacy is firmly maintained on an elaborate structure of propaganda both intentionally and unintentionally designed to reassure the white rulers of the justice of their cause, and to prevent the outside world from understanding what is really happening.

The Belgians excelled at this practice. They genuinely deceived themselves about the success of their own paternalist policies; they laid a massive smoke-screen that prevented a proper assessment of the wide gaps between the claims of their policies and their actual achievements. Nobody achieved greater success in providing a rationale for their paternalism; moral fervour and intellectual argument were harnessed to their cause. Inforcongo—the Belgian Department of Information in the Congo—was one of the finest propaganda machines in the world; the only pity of it is that it was not put to any better use.

But the efficiency of Belgian propaganda was a double-edged weapon. For the awakening came with such shattering swiftness and force that it left the Belgians bewildered and aghast at their own self-deception.

The moment of truth came with the angry race riots in Leopoldville on 4th January, 1959. Four days later the Belgian Parliament sent their mission to discover what had gone wrong. Before the Commission's report was ready for presentation in March, the Belgian Government had already produced its famous declaration of independence which, in the words of King Leopold, was designed "to lead, without fatal delays, but without inconsiderate haste, the Congolese people to independence in prosperity and peace."

But the riot had turned into a rout; the assurance about

"inconsiderate haste" was swept aside with considerable haste.

The Commission discarded the propaganda, the pretence and deception and the bogus claims about the advantages of paternalism over democratic political rights.

Its starting point was that the murderous riots would never have occurred if there had been no fruitful breeding-ground. Unemployment in Leopoldville was one of the causes. But it set greater store by the failures in human relations; especially between the '*kleine Blanken*'—the 'small whites'—and the Africans.

The Commission defined three stages in the evolution of a colony under white rule. The first phase follows on the period of occupation and pacification; the presence of the white man is accepted without discussion; he gives the orders and is obeyed. The rulers know their wishes. In the second phase the white man's sense of responsibility for the black man grows weaker. "Blacks are increasingly looked upon as workers with no personality of their own; they must be educated and instructed, though chiefly to increase the value of their labour; they are turned into skilled workers and clerks. At this time the whites in the larger centres have no other relations with the blacks than is necessary for their employment. The blacks make no complaints; they submit themselves without opposition to the privileges enjoyed by the whites. But, gradually, as they become more efficient in their work, their intellectual vision rises and they begin to see things in a different light."

The third phase comes with the declaration of human rights and the emancipation of colonies. Things become more difficult. "The whites are bound to a society in which the colour of one's skin plays an important role; on the other hand, the black évolués seek the immediate eradication of all colour bars."

The Commission moves on from this incisive analysis to consider the effects of deteriorating human relations. It shows how the whites become divided in their attitudes to the new situation; some are aware of the need for a new relationship; many remain indifferent; others poison relations by their words and actions. The 'small whites' feel threatened by the rise of évolués to fill their lower-paid posts; they assume a superiority complex, unsoftened by psychological insight.

Moreover, it is this group that is in closest daily contact with the blacks in their material relations.

On their part, the évolués—who become the political leaders

—are not always ready to bring about any improvement in human relations. They screw up their grievances. The absence of genuine social mixing leads to doubts about the sincerity of measures taken by the authorities. "In a country where the white man is both judge and jury, it is human that the black man should begin to feel that he can get no justice because he is black." Another cause of friction is the disparity in wages.

"The individual feelings of vengeance and of grievance are progressively increased; daily the dissatisfaction rises and is exploited by the black leaders in whose interests it is to spread hate against the Europeans. At the first opportunity the hatred explodes."

Apart from the doubtful judgment about the exploitation of racial hatred, this analysis applies as much to Kenya or South Africa or Central Africa as it does to the Congo.

The Commission showed the same honest spirit of inquiry in its careful dissection of Belgian policy in the Congo. Its findings are succinctly summed up in the heading of the chapter: "The tardiness of the Authorities; the lack of decision, and the weakness of the Administration."

The Commission's report put *finis* to the dangerous procrastination and illusions of the Belgians. It upheld the criticisms of those who for years had tried unsuccessfully to puncture the propaganda of Inforcongo. The much-vaunted paternalism was shown to be both ineffective and deceptive. Those who had praised it came to lament it. Even the Prime Minister of Belgium, M. Eyskens, was forced to say: "Indeed a political mistake was made in the past." But the mistake was discovered only after African nationalism had bolted from the stable.

# AT LAST SIERRA LEONE

EDWARD W. BLYDEN, III

*Formerly Head of the Department of Extra-Mural Studies, Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone. Founder of the Sierra Leone Independence Movement. Currently on visiting lectureships at various American Universities and Colleges.*

AMONG the commonplaces of our times one of the more persistent is the notion that all the dependent peoples everywhere in Africa are convulsed in a militant and irrepressible campaign against alien rule. In the more sensational journalese, this idea is expressed in "kicking the white man out of Africa". More sophisticated exponents portray the African nationalist phenomenon as the manoeuvres of a handful of Western educated 'extremists' to supersede 'White Imperialism' by 'Black Dictatorship'. African nationalism is accordingly seen purely in terms of race—black against white. In the Pan-African demands for 'independence', 'total liberation' and 'unity', only a rampant racialism is recognized as the essence of the African's agitation for freedom and self-determination.

A natural consequence of this sometimes uninformed, sometimes malicious interpretation of the ideas underlying Pan-Africanism is the snubbing of such colonial nationalist situations as are not punctuated by the now-familiar violent and counter-violent clashes between government and people. Events in countries such as Tanganyika or Gambia, for example, Nigeria or the Mali Federation, in which independence has been, or is being, achieved by negotiation, conciliation, and constitutional "bargaining" between the European colonial powers and the peoples concerned, make fewer headlines than events in areas where nationalist aspirations are being forced to find other, less desirable outlets. Tanganyika provides an illuminating example of a dependent territory where the nationalist approach to independence has taken the form of what might be described as "fencing-in", rather than "fencing-out", all inhabitants (regardless of race, skin colour, or national origin) who opt for a common Tanganyikan citizenship.

Yet, perhaps the most outstanding example of a colonial territory which has very recently negotiated its way to independence with hardly a show of any type of militant nationalism, is Sierra Leone, Britain's most "ancient and loyal colony" in West Africa. One of the last remnants of the Empire of George the Third, this 173-year-old 'Black Settler Colony' was literally *given*

its independence on April 20th last, even before the country's political leaders, assembled in conference with representatives of Her Majesty's Government in London, had submitted their formal application for it. Addressing the opening session of the conference, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Iain Macleod) is reported by '*The Times*' of London to have stated that "the conference need spend no time converting the British Government to the principle of independence. That is agreed to now without further ado". The formal announcement of May 3rd that the date of 27th April, 1961, had been agreed upon by both the U.K. and Sierra Leone Governments thus served as a mere formality to confirm what had already been decided even before formal consultations began on April 20th.

That the British Government's act was not altogether motivated by considerations of moral magnanimity was clearly borne out in the Colonial Secretary's candid admission that "it is impossible to ignore the swiftly changing African scene where political developments, almost breath-taking in their speed, are transforming the African picture" and that "these external events must have their repercussions in Sierra Leone". It was a diplomatically correct understatement for what '*The Economist*', in its issue of April 30th, claimed bluntly to be Britain's uneasiness over "Guinea . . . Sierra Leone's vocal, *left-wing* and active neighbour". Yet the significance in Britain's voluntary offer of independence is not only to be seen in the light of "external" circumstances. Action so "precipitate", to quote '*The Economist*' again, reveals also the high degree of mutual confidence existing between Britain and Sierra Leone—a relationship that sharply contradicts the stereotype portrayal of racialism in revolt.

To what then, is one to attribute this somewhat unusual relationship which a colonial power and a dependent territory enjoy, especially as evidence is scant of any special treatment to which Sierra Leone might be said to have been exposed in the course of her long history under the Crown? The colony is often and variously described as "dignified", civilized", "well-behaved", "loyal" and "restrained". The '*New York Times*' recently called it "a country of temperate and civilized thought". Yet, in its level of material advancement, it is still widely rated as amongst the most backward and undeveloped of Britain's overseas territories. How is one to explain the obvious stagnation of a colony, the modern beginnings of which antedate the Philadelphia Convention? Indeed, its initial association with

Britain was not that of a colony at all, but of a "Negro State", a "free Commonwealth", conceived and fostered in the finest spirit of eighteenth-century humanitarianism; its very origin was proclaimed to be the provision of a centrifugal force which would "bring Christianity and civilization" to the darkest continent. Ghana, Nigeria, and even Guinea, Sierra Leone's one-time 'wards' and 'protegés', have outstripped her by decades in political, social and economic development.

A trivial answer to this question is the half-facetious quip by Britishers and Sierra Leoneans alike that both Britain and Sierra Leone have been too busy trying to find an answer to the problem to do anything about it. "History has not dealt kindly with Sierra Leone", declared Canon Max Warren, Secretary of the Church Missionary Society of London, during the centenary anniversary of the Anglican Church in Nigeria—a church, the foundations of which were laid by Sierra Leonean missionaries and Christian workers at all levels. "Yet", continued Mr. Warren, "its (Sierra Leone's) astonishing influence on the rest of West Africa remains a fact of history. Ghana and Nigeria owe Sierra Leone a debt. You cannot understand what has happened in Nigeria in the past century unless you know how vast a part has been played in its development by Sierra Leone. . . ."

Others less given to philosophic or sentimental speculations view the situation in Sierra Leone as one of wildly ill-conceived beginnings. The peopling of a colony by freshly emancipated slaves and prostitutes, none of whom might be said to have had experience of organized civic life, can scarcely be regarded as the best material for founding and building a nation. The naive expectations of the promoters that, given a fresh start in life in a land remote from the scenes of their previous degrading existence and provided with the structural framework of free institutions, this tombola of misfits and undesirables would address themselves to the job of nation-building quite naturally proved fantastic. Above all, the material means for implementing the idealistic designs of those who championed the scheme were nowhere forthcoming, so that the picture of a 'commonwealth' doomed to failure before it had even begun is easy enough to draw. Yet this is hardly half the explanation, of course.

It is some measure of the interest and concern over Sierra Leone's affairs which the Colonial Office has exhibited that, even after the original "Settlement" was formally placed under the Crown in 1808, not all the 150-odd years of supposedly systematic

administration since then appear to have done much to alter the "face" of this "ancient and loyal colony".

In a recent narrative of what he calls the "extraordinary story" of Sierra Leone as a possession of the Crown, the author, Ian Fleming (an editor of the '*Sunday Times*' of London), projects this picture of Freetown, the ancient capital city, known to house "the finest and most important natural harbour" along the entire South Atlantic coast of the continent, and largely regarded as the logical substitute for the formerly British Simonstown naval base in Capetown.

> "I had a bad attack of fever in October '54 and then went up to Freetown to look into the shambles. It was called Freetown at the end of the eighteenth century, when we populated the Colony with 400 freed Negro slaves and sixty white prostitutes from the English ports. Extraordinary story. . . . There are practically no other European visitors except an occasional commercial traveller putting up in the one hotel—the City Hotel—which has twelve bedrooms. It's not much of a town. One's almost ashamed of it's being an English possession. . . . At any rate, there's no doubt that Sierra Leone comes near the bottom of the pile . . . (of our) bits and pieces of scattered territory all over the globe."
>
> "And Sierra Leone is littered with diamonds. . . ."[1]

One hundred and fifty years of British administration might be expected to produce somewhat better than that.

What is today the territory of Sierra Leone is far more than the mere 250 square miles of land acquired from the natural rulers of the aboriginal Sierra Leoneans in 1787. Further territorial acquisitions by Britain, almost exclusively on the basis of treaties of cession and friendship, led not only to an expected increase in the size of land thus brought under British jurisdiction and control, but also to a vastly increased population. Almost invariably compared in size with Ireland, Sierra Leone is two and a half times the size of Belgium, two and a quarter times the Netherlands, slightly less than twice the size of Denmark, and twenty-eight times the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Yet one of the principal reasons long held by the United Kingdom Government—be it Labour or Conservative—against Sierra Leone's capacity or fitness for independence was its alleged smallness in size and alleged poverty in natural wealth. A curious commentary on the territory's lack of wealth was recently

[1] Ian Fleming, *The Diamond Smugglers*, London: 1957, pp. 100ff.

provided by two important incidents, each within a fortnight of the other.

In the course of his opening speech to the constitutional conference on April 20th, the Secretary of State for the Colonies reiterated the view that "*Sierra Leone is not a large country, nor is it a wealthy one. It will have to husband its resources in wealth . . .* as carefully as possible if it is to play . . . a worthy role as a fully independent State". On this sore topic, the people of Sierra Leone had, as they have always had, a different idea. And this idea they effectively dramatized by presenting as a wedding gift to Princess Margaret an 18-carat diamond—the one item among the myriad gifts presented to her which made headline news in the press, on radio and on television in Britain, the United States and, possibly, beyond. The very same papers and radio news-agencies which had reported constitutional talks on small and poor Sierra Leone were now advertising the generous "diamond-rich" colony.

"Diamonds", as the Fleet Street weekly '*West Africa*' editorialised on February 20th last, might "still (be) trumps" in all calculations affecting the public welfare of Sierra Leone. But, diamonds are not the sole, heavy revenue-yielding natural resources in which the country is believed or already known to teem. Gold and iron ore apart, recent geological surveys have established the existence of huge deposits of, among other minerals, rutile, bauxite, molybdenite, sorundum, columbite, columbite tantalite, ilmenite and titano-magnetite, ilmeno-rutile, cassitirite, chromite, wulfenite, and platinum, as well as enormous quantities of salt.

Agricultural products also abound, constituting in their potential a quite new factor in the economic and commercial life of the country. Sierra Leone's economic foundations have, for the better part of the colony's history, been rooted in the palm kernel and its various by-products; while a rich variety of timber, rubber, copra, piassava and ginger has helped sustain the colony's economy. An even greater variety of agricultural products can be produced. Has the wealth of Sierra Leone ever been properly exploited? Would the colony come so near the "bottom of the pile" if it had been?

Sierra Leone, like many another African colony emerging into independence, can expect to experience the problems to which all new nations are exposed in the early years: the need of foreign capital for development, the necessity for the establishment of

alliances, political and economic, to provide security, skills, and loans (a trend in which young and small nations in Africa may well uncover suggestive implications for the Pan-African and smaller regional group movements to which the continent looks).

Economic development is clearly the country's first target. As '*The Economist*' article observed:

> "Sierra Leone (like every African state, but even more than most) needs development capital—and it needs £3 million *now*. . . . It needs more technical aid. . . . But as usual the prospect of the end of Colonial Office tutelage has found the Commonwealth Relations Office with no ideas to offer, except for a plummy establishment for a United Kingdom High Commissioner. . . ."

It will be Sierra Leone's misfortune if it is to find itself escaping from a Colonial Office (about whose indifference to, and neglect of the colony, students of West African constitutional history will find little room for disagreement) only to fall into the clutch of a Commonwealth Relations Office which, upon the confident assertion of '*The Economist*,' hardly ever has "ideas to offer" for a new Commonwealth member, is invariably unready to "face the new situations . . . presented by the accession of new States like Sierra Leone", and which, therefore, tends to undermine rather than to uplift the Commonwealth.

Sierra Leone achieves independence next April without violence or rancour. Its demand for self-determination does not spring from a passion of race. It asks to govern itself precisely in order to treat all its citizens alike and take from the earth for their good. Perhaps it will do no more for them than the British Government did over the years. Perhaps it will do much more. Whatever happens, it must be free to make its own mistakes. For nothing less is freedom, after all.

# THE ALGERIAN WAR

ANTHONY WEDGWOOD BENN, M.P.

THE war in Algeria is now half-way through its sixth year. According to official French sources the number of dead on both sides amounts to nearly 180,000. The Algerians say that they have lost 600,000 killed and 400,000 wounded. In addition, they point to a million and a quarter civilians taken from their homes by the French and concentrated in re-groupment camps, and half a million more who have fled to become refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. '*The Economist*' once calculated the cost of the war at £1 million a day. At its peak strength, the French maintained over 600,000 troops in the field against a rebel army less than one quarter that size.

Yet though the policy of military pacification has absolutely failed, no effective political solution has been seriously attempted. The consequences of this unresolved war have been felt as much outside Algeria as inside. It has cost the French people their Fourth Republic and many of their liberties. It has stirred African opinion more than any other single issue. It has occupied the attention of all the great powers and the United Nations. And for the NATO alliance it has presented a most disagreeable choice of difficult alternatives.

The Algerian war now threatens to become internationalized. There could easily be an extension of the fighting onto the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers. And foreign intervention of a graver kind cannot be ruled out. This is the prospect that faces the world and makes urgently necessary a solution. And to do that we must first understand the background.

The French occupation of Algeria dates back to 1830, when Algiers was captured after a three-year siege. It was not until 1857 that the conquest was completed with the subjection of Kabylia. But even after that, insurrection against the French continued spasmodically. The process of colonization encouraged a large number of French settlers to make their permanent home in Algeria. They received good land and protection, and they remain today the dominant factor—with the army—in the situation. Despite the claim that Algeria is an integral part of France, the pattern of colonization followed classic lines. French citizenship was only quite recently extended to the Arabs, who have had no real voice in their own government. Such constitu-

tional development as has been attempted has come about as a result of nationalist pressure in recent years.

The modern nationalist movement in Algeria dates back to the '20s when Messali Hadj founded—in France—the *Etoile Nord-Africaine,* which represented the aspirations of all the Arabs in the Maghreb. In 1936 he returned to Algeria and founded the P.P.A. It was—inevitably—banned by the French and its leaders arrested. Messali himself spent most of the next twenty years in jail.

During the Second World War the hopes of the nationalists were greatly raised by the belief that France would be compelled to give freedom to the Maghreb. But this was to reckon without her Allies. In 1942 came the North African landings—when British soldiers were dressed as G.I.s to reduce the resistance from the Vichy garrisons. Then the French were maintained in power. Hence the bitter comment: "The uniforms were American, the troops were British, and the victory was French."

In 1945 an uprising occurred and was put down with the greatest severity. According to American correspondents, 10,000 Algerians were killed before order was temporarily restored. The P.P.A. re-emerged in a new guise as the M.T.L.D., still under Messali's presidency. It contested the 1948 elections to the newly constituted Algerian Assembly. But this venture into constitutionalism offered little encouragement to those who had advocated the attempt. There is general agreement that these elections were faked by the French. The M.T.L.D. only got eight deputies in the new Assembly, and Ferhat Abbas's U.D.M.A. got only seven others. The rest were officials and pro-French Arabs who earned the title "Beni Oui-Oui's".

Experience of this constitution precipitated a fierce debate inside the M.T.L.D. and turned them towards other methods of achieving freedom. Different tendencies emerged on the Central Committee over the form the Algerian Revolution should take and how it should be launched. The Messalists became a minority as against those who were more militant and believed in a national front to cover all political groupings. When the first shots were fired in November 1954, the orders were in fact given by an inner and highly secret activist group who had formed themselves into a revolutionary committee of unity and action—the C.R.U.A.—and who resolved to act as a fuse to ignite the powder keg of Algerian nationalism.

By this time the split with Messali Hadj was complete. He refused to join forces with the newly formed F.L.N. national front and, after the revolution had begun, he himself formed the M.N.A. in opposition to it. For historic reasons the M.N.A. has been largely backed by Algerians working in France, and there is no evidence that it is an effective force in Algeria itself. The bitterness between the F.L.N. and the M.N.A. has been intense. The F.L.N. regard the M.N.A. as traitors to the cause of national unity, and the M.N.A. repudiate the claims of the F.L.N. to represent the Algerian people. There is ample evidence that a savage vendetta of violence has been conducted by each group against the other. And this unhappy split has undoubtedly helped the French enormously in their propaganda activities. The supreme irony is that Messali, whose place in the history of Algerian nationalism is beyond argument, has now been released by De Gaulle and lives under French police protection whilst still proclaiming his leadership of the Algerian people.

This split which is misunderstood and over-emphasized has been a definite factor in misleading the Socialist International and the British Labour Party in their attitude to the Algerian war. And it has been offered as an excuse by the French Socialists under Guy Mollet for their appalling record on Algeria.

Yet the simple and indisputable fact is that the F.L.N. is a highly organised national front and is the only combatant force in the cause of Algerian freedom. Since their famous conference in 1956 when they elected their leaders and adopted a very full constitution, they have constituted within themselves an embryonic state. This was consolidated two years later, in 1958, when the Algerian government in exile—the G.P.R.A.—was founded. It is now recognized by nineteen countries and fully supported by many others.

These are the credentials of the F.L.N., and they cannot be ignored.

Its published aims and policies show it to be a revolutionary social movement pledged to "the rebirth of the Algerian state in the form of a democratic republic". It is anti-Communist, anti-racialist, and pledged to a Maghreb federation. It is closely linked to the independent Algerian trade unions—U.G.T.A.—and stresses the social revolution which will be achieved by its victory.

Successive French governments have always been confident of military victory. Even Guy Mollet spoke and acted as if he had the power to impose his alternative policy of "internal

autonomy''. Self-determination was not even included as a possibility. ''Algeria is a part of France'' remained the official view. Indeed, under Mollet, even the informal contacts with the F.L.N. were broken off after the kidnapping of Ben Bella and the other Algerian leaders. More French troops were sent to intensify the fighting and the famous phrase ''the last quarter of an hour'' was coined in anticipation of victory.

The war became more bitter and more horrible with terrorism and torture—authenticated beyond any shadow of doubt—to symbolize the hopelessness of it all.

This was the background of De Gaulle's return to power. But what France needed was not a new constitution, but a new Algerian policy. And that was the one thing to be denied it. Two years after returning to power De Gaulle has brought France no nearer a solution to this problem.

In his famous speech of 16th September, 1959, De Gaulle appeared to be setting out on a new course. He granted the principle of self-determination and set forth various alternatives. Whilst rejecting any political discussions with the F.L.N. he offered cease-fire talks, and this offer was immediately accepted. They nominated Ben Bella and his four colleagues to act on their behalf. The French Government—and a lot of the world's press —took this as a calculated insult. But it was not so. Ben Bella has been able to keep in close touch with the F.L.N. since his imprisonment, he is still one of the very top leaders of the revolution, and enjoys the confidence of his colleagues to such an extent that he would certainly be authorized to negotiate on their behalf.

At this stage the F.L.N. were cautiously optimistic about De Gaulle's intentions. They did not mind a ban on negotiations about the future of Algeria, provided that the guarantees for self-determination were cast-iron. They were confident that a general election would lead to an overwhelming vote for an independent Algeria. But they suspected that De Gaulle was not in charge of the situation.

The 'colon' rising in Algiers in January provided the ideal opportunity to test the sincerity of De Gaulle's new policy. He succeeded in restoring order, and the leaders of the revolt were arrested. But it was only some weeks later that the price of his victory became apparent. In subsequent speeches De Gaulle banged the door on a negotiated peace settlement to be followed

by genuine self-determination. Since March all hopes of peace have faded and the war continues.

It would, however, be quite wrong to imply that things have gone back to what they were. In the last two years the Algerian war has been more and more a matter of international concern. It has always had the support of the Arab League and it was backed by the Bandoeng Conference in 1955. In 1957 it was successfully raised at the United Nations, although the resolution passed then was totally innocuous. The General Assembly resolutions of 1958 and 1959 were progressively better, and the French escaped severe censure only because of De Gaulle's self-determination offer. The world is now firmly committed to self-determination, and De Gaulle makes a great mistake if he thinks that he can retreat from it.

There have also been important developments outside the U.N. The Pan-African Conference in Tunis was absolutely dominated by the Algerian war. For the delegates there it was "an act of aggression committed by N.A.T.O. against the whole continent". And it seemed to indicate that the settlers would always choose to fight if they seemed in danger of having to surrender their privileged position. The plan for volunteers was more than a gesture. It was an indication that for many African nationalists this war would decide their future too.

The attitude of the Communist Powers to the Algerian war has been somewhat more complex. The Russians behave with complete diplomatic propriety and do not recognize the G.P.R.A. This policy may be reinforced by a fear that an independent Maghreb would come under American influence. The Chinese, however, are not thus inhibited. They have urged their assistance on the Algerians, who have been reluctant to take up all the offers made. The acceptance of massive Chinese help might damage their cause in the eyes of the world. Yet it remains a powerful threat. And the F.L.N. leaders would not hesitate to fall back upon it if total military defeat faced them.

For the N.A.T.O. Powers, Algeria presents an awkward choice. The leaders in Washington and London know that the policy of military pacification cannot succeed. But they dare not come out openly for fear of shattering the alliance. Indeed American military aid for France over the last ten years has run at an average of one million two hundred thousand dollars a day.

And yet, in the face of the facts of the situation, it is quite clear that America and Britain cannot continue with this policy.

What then is likely to happen if nothing is done? We must expect an intensification of the fighting this summer and probably a flare-up along the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers. If this produces incidents like the Sakiet raid, the Security Council would be bound to act; and so, undoubtedly, it would if foreign intervention were to reach serious proportions.

For France the prospect is even grimmer. De Gaulle cannot last indefinitely without producing results. And since he is clearly not in a position to impose a liberal solution, a civil war in France cannot be ruled out.

It is, therefore, perfectly clear that the Algerian war cannot be solved within the political or military context of Algeria itself or of Algeria and France. It is bound to be internationalized in some form before it can be settled. In hard terms this means either an extension of the fighting with all that that involves, or an international solution sought at, and underwritten by, the United Nations. With full United Nations backing for a cease-fire, negotiations for self-determination and a supervised referendum, peace could be restored. After that, enormous international aid would be necessary to put the new state on its feet. It is along these lines that Western policy should be reshaped. For the whole of Africa is watching to see whether freedom is held to be a matter of world concern and, if so, whether it can be peacefully achieved or not. Algeria is not an issue on which any of us can afford to remain uncommitted.

# TUNIS DIARY

An impression of the second All African Peoples' Conference held in Tunis between 25th and 31st January, 1960

CATHERINE HOSKYNS

*Our Special Correspondent at the Conference*

*Saturday*

FOR the last two days, by the spasmodic planes from Paris, Rome and Cairo, delegates from the political parties and trade unions of Africa have been arriving for the second All African Peoples' Conference. Coloured streamers in Arabic, French and English announce the conference in all the main streets; the solid bourgeois Tunisians, coming into the hotels for their mid-day drinks, are taken aback at the profusion of colour and language. The stark, white conference hall, shaped like the segment of a circle, buzzes with journalists, delegates and administrators. The boys of the Youth Brigade (known unofficially as Bourguiba's children) in red and white track suits carry messages at a brisk trot. The administration is efficient. Delegations are settled in their hotels, assigned cars and drivers and given meal tickets exchangeable in some of the best restaurants in the town.

On the surface all is excitement. For many delegates this is the first visit to an Arab or French-speaking country and tentative contact is made across linguistic and cultural barriers. The mayor of Dar-es-Salaam talks easily to the Tunisians in Arabic. A Kenyan and a trade unionist from Guinea find that they have a little Swahili in common.

Behind the scenes there is some strain. Not everything has gone smoothly since the Accra conference established the organisation and set up a secretariat in Ghana to work for freedom and unity throughout the continent. The appointment of Abdoullaye Diallo, Guinea's Minister in Ghana, as secretary-general was by no means unanimously approved; the death of George Padmore leaves a gap which will be hard to fill. The proposal to form an All African Trade Union Federation has divided African trade unionists in bitter dispute. Tom Mboya, the chairman of the first conference, has clashed so fiercely with the Ghana-Guinea element that, at a meeting of the steering committee in October, the position of chairman was demoted and he himself virtually suspended. It is unlikely that he will

attend as the Kenya constitutional conference is in progress in London, but the delegates from Kenya and from the strong Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) are already mutinous and on their guard.

Nor have the ambitious proposals for political union in Africa, set out in the Accra resolutions, quite materialised. The Conakry Declaration, signed in May by Ghana and Guinea, announced twelve basic conditions for a union of independent African states. When these seemed to find little favour in West Africa they were quietly replaced by the Saniequellie Agreement signed by Ghana, Guinea and Liberia, which recommended a *community* of independent states, each member maintaining its identity and constitutional structure. Clumsy pressure has made Nigeria in particular suspicious of the whole Pan-African idea.

Will the Tunis conference smooth over or accentuate these differences?

*Sunday*

It is inevitable, at this stage, that the keenest advocates of Pan-Africanism should be those who have most sharply fought the battle against colonialism, and those who are still fighting. So the strongest delegations are from Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Kenya and the Congo. Everyone wants to see Kojo Botsio, Ghana's Minister of Economic Planning, Ismael Touré, Sekou Touré's half-brother, and Fouad Galal, Nasser's shrewd and friendly expert on African affairs. Of the other independent states there are delegates from Ethiopia and Liberia; no one from Libya or the Sudan.

The exiles, Joshua Nkomo and Kanyama Chiume, are representing Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Mainza Chona, the excitable representative of the United National Independence Party, has flown in from Northern Rhodesia. Three Nyasas are said to have been refused passports. It is hard for anyone to come direct from South Africa, but Tennyson Makiwane and Patrick van Rensburg who have been in London organising the boycott of South African goods will speak for the African National Congress and the Liberal Party. There are two delegates from 'the African Revolutionary Front Against Portuguese Colonialism.' They keep themselves to themselves and work behind the scenes.

The biggest gaps are in the representation from the countries on the verge of independence. Only Chief Anthony Enahoro of the Action Group has so far arrived from Nigeria. No one

expects the Northern Peoples Congress, but where is Dr. Azikiwe's party, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons? There are no delegates at all from the governing parties of the French Community; Leopold Sedar Senghor's Parti de la Federation Africaine was expected, but the leaders are in Paris negotiating Mali's independence. Representatives of the Togoland opposition have come with the Ghanaians in a specially chartered aeropolane.

Lobbying is beginning—particularly over the crucial question of whether the member unions of the proposed African trade union federation shall be allowed to retain affiliations with international bodies such as the ICFTU and the WFTU. The difference on this cuts right across the natural linguistic and geographical divisions. Ghana, Guinea and Morocco assert that Africa's policy is neutralism and that these affiliations involve her in the ideological struggles of Europe. Tunisia and the East and Central African countries value the aid they get from the ICFTU and warn that Africa should not become isolationist.

*Monday*

The official opening. The flags of the independent states flutter a little in the breeze; the Tunisian guards in flowing robes line the approach to the conference hall. Everyone awaits President Habib Bourguiba; he arrives and stands, a small, erect figure, before the Tunisian flag while the national anthem is played.

Inside he speaks first in Arabic and then in French. There is direct translation and the English-speaking delegates plug in their earphones. His attitude is that of an elder brother. We have been through all this, he seems to say, take our advice. One wonders what he will say about the methods of revolution. With the Algerians at his elbow, can he do anything but endorse violence? He is unequivocal: personally, he says, I prefer to use pacific means, but all roads that lead to liberation are equally valid and equally respectable. It is the result that counts.

About African unity he is realistic—the road is long and scattered with pitfalls. Experience teaches that it is best to proceed by stages. When the effects of colonialism are eradicated, and difference, ignorance, superstition overcome, something real will have been contributed to the unity of the continent.

Bourguiba is an orator and the delegates love him. He leaves to a storm of cheering and to the music of the Neo-Destour song

of revolution. Everyone cranes to see the Algerian leaders, Ferhat Abbas and Krim Belcacem, who stalk out after him. The secretary-general makes his report. This is in general terms. There is no account of the activities of the secretariat; no analysis of how the Accra resolutions have been implemented.

This is Bourguiba's day. In the afternoon 100,000 people—a quarter of the population of Tunis—gather in the square to protest against the Sahara bomb. In the background the cream-coloured buildings stand out against a blue sky and placards in pale blue and red are interspersed among the crowd. Bourguiba speaks for nearly two hours in Arabic. The delegates are ranged behind him in tiers. Most of them do not understand a word but no one dreams of moving. Afterwards the crowd protests in orderly fashion outside the French Embassy and then quietly disperses. Bourguiba has issued an ultimatum to the French: they must evacuate their base at Bizerta by February 8.

Mallam Aminu Kano, of the Nigerian Northern Elements Progressive Union, and an NCNC delegate arrive. The latter claims that his invitation was deliberately sent late as an insult to Nigeria. He is trenchant and angry. News of the Algiers insurrection filters through. The Algerians use its propaganda value to the full.

*Tuesday*

The conference has appointed as chairman Ahmed Tlili, leader of the Tunisian delegation and, significantly, deputy president of the ICFTU. A praesidium of five is elected to assist Diallo and Tlili on the running of the conference. The members are Ismael Touré (Guinea), Ahmed Boumendhel (Algeria), Fouad Galal (UAR), Kojo Botsio (Ghana) and Anthony Enahoro (Nigeria). The PAFMECA group complain that it is weighted in favour of French-speaking and independent Africa. They are overruled. It is decided that heads of delegations shall address the conference for two days in open session, and that then the conference will break up into three committees and go into private session. The committees will prepare resolutions on independence, unity and economic questions.

The speeches begin; they are couched in inflammatory terms. Two things are noticeable; first the natural concentration on the situation in Algeria, and second the attack not so much on direct domination but on the economic control maintained by the ex-imperialist countries even after political independence is achieved.

The atmosphere changes when Boumendhel, the leader of the Algerian delegation, mounts the rostrum. He is well known from Accra—a big, unpretentious man with a deep and single minded passion. His speech is eloquent and specific. He makes four demands:

That all independent states should recognize the provisional Algerian government;

That they should contribute directly to the Algerian budget;

That a volunteer brigade should be formed to fight first in Algeria and then wherever it is required;

That action should be taken to prevent the West from supporting France.

He receives a standing ovation.

He is followed by the Nigerian, Anthony Enahoro, who makes a speech equally direct but on very different lines. I am assuming, he says, that we are all against colonialism. Then he gets down to business. He criticises the secretary-general for not preparing a proper report. He asks why certain of the Accra proposals have not been implemented. He suggests that the ruling that no money should be received from countries outside Africa has not been scrupulously followed. Finally he asks the conference to agree as a matter of principle not to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent country or support one African politician against another. He is clearly referring to the public support which Felix Moumie, the exiled leader of the outlawed Union of the Peoples of the Cameroons, has been given by the conference—support which has alienated not only the government of the Cameroons Republic, but also the British Cameroons and Nigeria. Enahoro receives surprisingly warm applause and walks out of the hall, massive, self-confident and impenetrable.

Alioune Diop, the editor of '*Presence Africaine*', arrives and begins to distribute English editions of the writings of Sekou Touré. English-speaking Africans are deeply impressed by the ideological framework in the political thinking of French Africans.

*Wednesday*

Mainza Chona of Northern Rhodesia speaks during the morning. His awkward vigour is delightful. "We're used to monkey tricks from the British," he says, "but now look what we are getting—Monkey Commissions." The South African

delegates speak, but neither makes much impression. The conference is orientated towards Algeria and finds it hard to look down to the South.

By the evening the East and Central African delegates are getting restive. This is the last day of speeches and, of all of them, only Chona has been called. They have complained to Enahoro and it is rumoured that he has threatened to resign from the praesidium. After some dispute Tlili rules that the work of the committees shall be postponed and the speeches continued on Thursday.

*Thursday*

Suddenly the air has cleared. Tlili's decision seems to have broken through the hostility and disbanded the cliques. The announcement that the Congo is to be independent on June 30 dissolves the conference in frenzy. Kanyama Chiume and Joshua Nkomo speak at length and receive applause. The Central African situation comes vividly to life. The theme of neo-colonialism is pursued. Suggestions that Africa should do without aid of any kind rather than prejudice her freedom are tempered by the knowledge of just how much Africa needs the investment and the teaching facilities of the European world. The general feeling is that Europe owes Africa aid, that it is not charity and should as far as possible be distributed through international agencies rather than through bi-lateral agreements.

*Friday*

The committees begin to sit. Will Boumendhel get his volunteer brigade? Will the conference split over the trade union resolution? In view of Bourguiba's remarks, what will be resolved on African unity?

Everyone waits for De Gaulle's speech and Bourguiba invites the Algerian leaders to dinner so that they may listen to it together. An immense amount of literature about Algeria is circulating among delegates and the enormity of the Algerian situation is the chief subject of conversation.

*Saturday*

The committees are still sitting and the closing session has been postponed until Sunday. There is deadlock on the trade union issue. The PAFMECA countries have threatened a walk-out if anything is passed to prevent an international affiliation. Ghana is ready to force the split. Only Diallo Seydou, the active

secretary-general of UGTAN,† seems interested in achieving a compromise.

At a press conference Bourguiba says that a brigade is a good talking-point, but that he would not welcome it on Tunisian soil. There are rumours that the FLN has agreed to send four guerilla leaders to Leopoldville after Congo independence to assist the Angolan nationalists.

*Sunday*

At the closing session the resolutions are read by Ahmed Boumendhel. Africans everywhere are asked to intensify the struggle and a committee is to be set up to co-ordinate aid from the independent countries to the nationalist movements. The word 'non-violent' has been quietly dropped. The economic resolutions reflect the concern of the conference with neo-colonialism and urge leaders to "wrest their respective states from economic dependence on the ex-imperialist countries". Independent states are asked not to enter into any undertaking which would prejudice the move towards liberty and unity in Africa.

Diallo Seydou has made his point and the trade union resolution is a compromise. The formation of an African trade union federation is recommended, but all details are left to the trade union conference which is to meet in Casablanca in May. The resolutions accept the Accra decisions, but go on to emphasise the need to break down the barriers between the various countries by the exchange of teachers, students, technicians and doctors. They ask for the abolition of visas and the formation of an African Transport Company.

There is a specific resolution about each country. Boumendhel gets his brigade but it is to be formed only to fight in Algeria—the suggestion that it should be a permanent unit has been rejected. Most of the resolutions follow usual lines: the French Community is condemned, Kenyatta should be released and the Central African Federation broken up. The surprises are the Cameroons resolution (which—after Enahoro's remarks—has been couched in wide, mild and extremely general terms) and the resolution on Somaliland, which definitely and categorically recommends a Greater Somalia union. There is some doubt as to whether, in the face of Ethiopian pressure, this resolution would have been accepted had there been more time for discussion.

† The Guinea Trade Union Federation

*Monday*

The new steering committee has been elected. It is big and fully representative. After some dispute Tom Mboya has been chosen in absence to represent Kenya. The tact of Fouad Galal has been rewarded. The conference in 1961 is to be held in Cairo.

Delegates are leaving. It remains only to try to sum up. In what directions is Africa moving? What has the conference achieved? Comparison with Accra is inevitable and there are some obvious changes. First, the whole attitude is more militant and more uncompromising. Africa is no longer prepared to wait. Independence is her right, and she will take it if necessary by force. The powerful oratory of the Algerians and the proximity of an African army have had a profound effect. At the same time Africans have moved from a simple demand for political independence to an awareness of the problems that face an independent country and the difficulties of finally extracting Africa from a dependent position. (The emphasis on this is indicative of the growing influence of French Africa.) Finally, African leaders seem sensibly to have come to the conclusion that political federation is the last and not the first step in unifying the continent. The urgent priority is to facilitate contact from one region to another.

Achievement is harder to assess. The conference did not split, as seemed possible at one time. It ended in a better humour than it began. In many ways the administration was more efficient but little time was left for discussion in the committees. The Accra procedure, which allowed the committees to sit all through the week, produced more considered decisions. The most important results, however, of a conference of this kind come not from the resolutions and their implementation but from the contacts made and the impression of vigour given both to the outside world and to the Africans themselves.

More thought is needed over the construction and organisation of the conference itself. At the moment it is too easily dominated by one country or one group of countries. The dangers of this were in the end avoided at Tunis, but another time it may not be so easy. If the conference is to be effective it must draw in those who now stand outside, not force out those who are already in. Much depends on the effectiveness of the steering committee.

# A MANNER OF SPEAKING

J. ARTHUR MAIMANE

THE boy entered the small cottage housing the post office through the door marked "Non-Europeans Only—Alleen Nie-Blankes." Five steps, and he was at the counter. He stood to the left of it, near the six-foot wooden partition that divided the counter and this side of the cottage from the "Europeans Only—Alleen Blankes" bigger half of the building. He looked through the brass grille running lengthwise down the middle of the varnished counter. The bespectacled telephone exchange operator sat before her switchboard in the nearest corner reading a novel and slowly passing the fingers of her left hand through her curly, steel-grey hair. A younger woman, the Post Mistress, was looking out of a barred window, humming a liedjie. There was nobody else in the one-room cottage.

After a minute, he coughed. The young woman turned her head slowly. Her eyes narrowed as she recognized him. She looked out of the window again. He coughed louder.

"Ja! What do you want?" She asked, without looking at him.

"Two tuppence stamps, please."

She took the four steps towards the counter slowly, hands on broad hips and head stuck out ahead of the body. She stood across the counter from him, her grey eyes boring into his.

"Say 'Missus'," she said quietly.

The middle-aged woman looked up from her novel and studied the two.

He remained silent.

"If you don't say 'Missus', you're not getting your stamps!"

"Look, mevrou, all I want is two tuppence stamps. I've said 'please', and that should be enough."

"Say 'Missus'—or get out!"

He stared back for a moment, shrugged his shoulders, and strolled out.

"That's the trouble with these Kaffers who go to school. They become cheeky," the middle-aged woman said in a resigned voice. She went back to her novel.

The younger woman prowled the length of the counter.

"I'm going to teach that short-nose manners, if that's the last thing I do here. I won't sell him stamps or anything till he calls me 'Missus'!"

An eight-year-old boy padded into the tiny room on dusty, too-large feet. He peered over the counter at the two women. He put his right hand on the counter, on a level with his eyes. The hand was clutching a sweaty sixpenny piece.

"Two two-penny stamps, asseblief Missus!" he piped.

After one more walk down the counter, the young woman served the boy. The boy walked out. And then she heard a sardonic laugh from outside the door. She quickly leaned over the counter, then ran to the "Alleen Blankes" half and looked out of the big, barred and dusty windows. She saw the "cheeky Kaffer", unusually clean for an African in a country dorp, in his blue gabardine trousers and checked shirt, walk slowly past the window, round the corner and onto the veranda; past the "Alleen Blankes" door. He was licking stamps onto two envelopes which he pushed into the letter box. Then he climbed onto a shiny bicycle and rode away, whistling.

"That Kaffer thinks he's clever! You know what he did, Tant? He sent that little piccanin in here to buy the stamps for him! If I could be sure which are his letters, I'd get them out and—and—and tear them up!"

"You'd only get into trouble, Katie!"

Fifteen minutes and two miles later, James climbed off the bicycle, leaned it against a shady tree, entered a mud-walled yard, across the courtyard from the big house. He leaned against the door.

His sister, busy at the stove, looked round and then went back to her work. "What are you so happy about?" she asked.

He laughed. "Looks like this is going to be another of those holidays! Had another staring match with that girl at the post office. Wants me to call her 'Missus'—*Sê 'Missus', jong!*" he mimicked.

"You better be careful, Jimmy. You seem to be losing touch. This isn't Jo'burg. This is still the same Olifantshoek you grew up in. And here you don't argue with white people. You can get into serious trouble."

"I don't care where it is; but I'm not going to call anybody 'Baas' or 'Missus'—I wouldn't even say it to my bo—the man I work for!"

"Don't be too sure of yourself, Jimmy. You're still a child—seventeen is not much."

"Oh, well! I suppose I might say it to a cop—when I'm in trouble. But that girl—why, she isn't even as old as you are, sissie. And I don't work for her, her father or her brother! In fact, she works for me—she's a public servant, isn't she?"

"All right, Jimmy; you keep on being a Jo'burg clever and you'll see." She turned round to look at him.

Two days later a tall, stout man, his woolly hair almost completely white, walked under the "Alleen Nie-Blankes" sign at the post office. He leaned against the varnished counter, his face close to the brass grille. He beamed at the middle-aged woman: "Good morning, Missus!" his voice boomed. And when the younger woman came into view: "Good morning, Nonnie!"

"Good morning, Johannes," the middle-aged woman said, a patronising smile on her wrinkled face. "How does it go on the lands?"

"Oh, not enough rain, Missus! This is going to be a bad year!"

"Ag, you're becoming a bloody Jew! You get fatter and richer every year—and you complain more about the crops every year."

"You know, Johannes," the young woman said brightly, "you're a good kaffer. Everybody speaks well of you. But your son! You better teach him some manners or there'll be trouble! Since you sent him away to school he's become very cheeky!"

The woolly head moved from side to side. "What has James done? He's a good boy."

"If he's a good boy, then he must call me 'Missus'. I'm not ever going to serve him in here until he learns some manners!"

"Ag, Nonnie!" the big man chuckled. "What can I teach him? I'm an ignorant old man who only knows how to plant mealies and castrate bulls. But he—he is getting educated! At school they teach him to call people 'Meneer', 'Mevrou', 'Mejevrou' and such things. I never went to college and don't know about such things—so you are 'Nonnie' to me, and the ou vrou is 'Missus'! That's how I was taught."

"Well, then that school is teaching him the wrong things!"

"Ah! But it is a white man, he tells me, who is teaching them your language! You are the people who brought us education!"

"Ag, you're getting weak in the head, Johannes. You're speaking like a communist! What do you want?"

On Saturday morning, all the white farmers in the district were gathered, big-boned, khaki-clad, red-faced, loud-spoken, in front of the corrugated-iron shop across the street from the post office. The most important corner in Olifantshoek. They leaned against their jeeps, Land Rovers, pick-up trucks and cars. They talked, waiting for their slow-moving, broad-beamed women, in their black silk dresses and tired straw hats. They were haggling with the two Indians inside the overcrowded shop that sold everything except a complete tractor or truck—they had these in pieces. The shop, the post office, the police station round the corner, the railway siding and the manual-operated petrol pump in front of the store made up Olifantshoek. Saturday morning was shopping day. Everybody would hang around, waiting for the morning train from Middelburg.

Thirty minutes after it left, they would crowd around the veranda of the post office opening their green post office boxes to collect their mail. During the week this task was relegated to their more intelligent labourers. But Saturday was a social occasion.

Katrina, the Post Mistress, was setting up her rubber stamps in preparation for the mail; while talking and giggling with the four broad-shouldered young men who were "jolling" her from behind the brass grille on the "Alleen Blankes" bigger half of the post office. The few Africans on the other side of the partition had to wait longer than usual to be served.

James made two slow circles on his bicycle between the post office and the store. Then, stepping hard on the right pedal, he spun the back wheel in the loose earth, raising a cloud of dust. He had to brake and pivot the bicycle on his left foot to stop it inches away from the big, dusty thorn bush near the "Alleen Nie-Blankes" post office entrance.

"What's that town kaffer doing here?" one of the farmers said to the man leaning next to him against a pick-up truck. Any tidily dressed black man or woman was a "town kaffer."

"No town kaffer, that. It's old Johannes' son. Goes to school in Johannesburg or somewhere. Dresses like a white boy—and seems to think he's a white boy."

"Next time he makes dust around here, I'll use my sjambok on him."

"His father is a good kaffer. Makes too much money, that's all."

James was in a jolly mood. He walked into the post office,

pushing his cloth cap back on his head. He nodded to the two bare-footed boys waiting at the counter and leaned on the counter with his arms crossed on it. Katrina came giggling into view from the other half, walked to the open wall safe near the telephone exchange, and lifted out a registered letter. As she turned back, she faced the three black faces peering at her from behind the brass grille. The smile came off her face.

"And what do you want?" she said sharply, looking at James.

"Good morning, mevrou!" he answered lightly. "I'd like to buy a money order."

She snorted and disappeared behind the partition. A minute later she was back. Without looking at him she served the two other boys. Then she turned to him.

"What did you say?"

"A money order for twelve and sixpence, please!"

"Say 'Missus'!" she hissed.

He laughed.

"Are you laughing at me?"

"But why should I call you 'Missus'? You aren't married, are you? I don't see a ring on your finger!"

Her face reddened and her eyes dilated.

"You bloody, cheeky kaffer! What do you think you are, hey? Insulting me—a white woman! What do you think you are!"

"Now, mevrou! Don't get angry——"

"Who's that kaffer insulting you, Katie?" a youthful bass growled from the other side of the partition. "He wants to get a hiding."

"Don't just stand there and talk, Gert! Come *donder* him! Come quick—he's running out!"

James had no time to get his bicycle. When he looked out of the door, three of the young men who had been "jolling" the Post Mistress erupted round the corner from the "Alleen Blankes" entrance. James dodged round the thorn bush, jumped a smaller one, and came out onto the dusty street. He didn't stop to think of directions, he ran straight ahead, crossing the street, passing the crowd of farmers and shop on his right, running up the street that went past the police station a hundred yards further on.

Katrina was at the door of the post office, shouting at the three young men: "Catch the swine! Catch the dog! *Donder* the bloody kaffer!"

The farmers, their wives and the Africans milling round the shop all looked round in surprise at the hysterical woman, and then at the four runners.

"What's going on here!" one of the farmers shouted.

The three farmers' sons spread out in the street as they ran after James. They were wearing heavy army surplus boots; but these did not seem to impede their running. James ran, pumping his arms and head. The dust-thick road ahead was clear —except for a white police constable slowly riding a bicycle towards him.

"Catch him, Jannie!" one of the pursuers shouted at the constable.

The young policeman jumped off his bicycle and threw it to the ground. He jumped into the middle of the street and stood there, legs apart and his arms stretched wide open. James ran straight at him. When he was almost on the policeman, he brought up his right fist as if to strike him. The policeman's hands jerked together to cover his face—and James veered sharply to the right and ran past him.

"Jou dom-kop!" one of the pursuers shouted at the constable.

The young policeman, turning red with anger and shame, swivelled round, his fingers fumbling at the flap of his holster. He jerked out the big, black pistol as the three men came abreast of him. He started running with them.

"Stand! Stand still, you kaffer! Stand or I'll shoot you!"

"Shoot him in the leg, you fool!"

James crouched down, veering to the bush-thick side of the road on his right.

The constable stopped and fired a shot above James's head.

"Don't play, man! Shoot the bloody bastard!"

James almost tripped when he heard the shot. He was near the bushes edging the road and, after a quick glance back, he dived into an opening, landing on his hands and knees.

As he scrambled to his feet, wiping his dusty, sweat-streaked face with the back of his hand, he heard one of his pursuers shouting: "There he is behind that bush, Jannie! Get him!"

James blundered into a bush ahead of him.

The young constable aimed quickly and carefully. He fired three quick shots, moving the gun an inch to the right with every shot. With the third shot, there was a scream from the bushes.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## SOUTH AFRICA IN A CHANGING COMMONWEALTH

**The Imperial Idea and its Enemies by A. P. Thornton.** Published by Macmillan, 1959.

**The Commonwealth and the World by J. D. B. Miller.** Published by Duckworth, 1958.

**The Afro-Asian States and their Problems by K. M. Pannikkar.** Published by George Allen & Unwin, 1959.

"IDEAS in politics, as elsewhere, are forced to fight a grinding battle with circumstances." With this terse remark, Professor Thornton introduces his book 'The Imperial Idea and its Enemies'. And this comment will serve as a convenient text on which to base discussion of two other works which have recently appeared. Professor Thornton and Professor Miller are each concerned with the basic factor of power in international society and, more particularly, in the Commonwealth. Dr. Panikkar shares their equal concern with the role of ideas in political struggle, but confines himself to a consideration of the internal problems facing the new States in Africa and Asia.

The first part of Professor Thornton's book is a masterly description of the origins and development of the 'Imperial idea' as expressed in the beliefs of such men as Rosebery, Curzon, Milner, Smuts and Amery. In recent years the reputations of these men have declined, as has the ideology they expressed, under the combined attacks of nationalism and democracy. What then was this ideology?

In the author's words it was "their faith, that it was the role of the British Empire to lead the world in the arts of civilization, to bring light to the dark places, to teach the true political method, to nourish and to protect the liberal tradition . . . to act as trustee for the weak . . . to command, and deserve, a status and prestige shared by no other." Like other ideologies, the Imperial brand was a happy mixture of morality

and power, as the last phrase in the quotation makes clear. And Disraeli, the greatest of all Imperialists, realized this and put into words what his party felt but could not articulate. Professor Thornton's book is one long detailed illustration of Disraeli's view (and that of his Imperialist successors) that "the extent and magnitude of the British Empire provided visible expression of the power of England in the affairs of the world." British relations with South Africa serve the author well as an example of the changing nature of the imperial idea.

In the years after the 'tribal peace' of Vereeniging, the imperial idea fell into disrepute and with it the influence of Cromer, Curzon and Milner. The Liberal victory of 1906 was an equally severe setback to the 'proconsuls' and their Conservative allies, as men began to think seriously about domestic matters and 'the condition of England.' The service class was left to harmonize the ideals of Empire and build a solid structure of imperial unity and strength, a task which by training and inclination it was singularly unfitted to do. The Milner Kindergarten remained a Kindergarten, and there was no third generation of Balliol men to carry on the proconsular tradition. And yet the problem of imperial administration could not be ignored, however unpalatable the Liberals found some aspects of the Imperialist faith. Liberals were committed to the notion of responsible self-government, and their opportunity finally came with the debate on the Union of South Africa Bill in 1909-1910. In the space of half a dozen pages Professor Thornton outlines succinctly the dilemma in which forty years of Imperial policy had placed both the British Government and the Conservative Opposition Front Bench. It was one thing to want to give the Boers self-government, quite another to cut off the indigenous non-white population from the protection of the Colonial Office that it had enjoyed against the local whites.

The twin principles of imperialism—responsible self-government (recognized in the constitutional progress made by Canada and Australia) and the tutelage, protection and uplift of the subject non-white peoples within the Empire—met in collision over the debates on South Africa. Both Liberals and Conservatives foresaw the need to maintain some kind of Imperial unity in South Africa, if British power was to have significance in a world where countries like Germany and the United States were rapidly becoming a threat to Britain's traditional economic and military dominance. This aim could best be served by coming

to terms with the Boers through the grant of responsible government to them. This had not always been Liberal Party policy, as Professor Thornton makes clear; Asquith, in opposition, had agreed with Milner, and indeed with Chamberlain[1], about the dangers of leaving the future of the non-white population in the hands of the Boers. In 1909 the Liberals were thus in the same position as their predecessors under Gladstone had been in 1881. At that time Hicks-Beach, speaking for the Conservative opposition, had criticized the Liberals for giving self-government to the Boers and ignoring the claims of the non-white population "whom," he said, "you are bound to care for in the future as in the past." Yet, in 1910, only a few voices, some from the Labour benches—Macdonald[2] and Keir Hardie among them—were raised against the proposal. Sir Charles Dilke's speech in the House on this occasion was an acute analysis of the Imperial dilemma; he stressed the dependence of the non-whites on the Imperial connection; to ignore their claims was to betray the Imperial ideal. Keir Hardie followed to argue "that this was the last chance the Imperial government would ever have to intervene for good in the affairs of South Africa." But such moral arguments for the maintenance of the Imperial connection failed to break the determination of the two front benches to consolidate British power in South Africa on the basis of co-operation with the Boers.

Certainly the Liberal decision of 1910 enabled Botha and Smuts to view South Africa's continuing association with Great Britain amicably. Whether any alternative policy for maintaining Imperial control over native affairs would have been possible, is a matter for considerable speculation. It is doubtful whether South African nationalists, British or Boer, would have been prepared to accept this limitation on their right to govern themselves. The persistent resentment felt by at least half the white population at the British connection, even in the attenuated form of the Balfour Declaration of 1926, leads one to be sceptical. Indeed, Smuts and Hertzog were prime movers in the negotiations to get the status of the dominions redefined after the First World War. The relations of Whitehall with settlers of predominantly English stock in areas like Kenya and the Rhodesias have been difficult enough; one is tempted to think that they could only have been worse in South Africa, with a national group which

[1] Chamberlain to Milner. 6th. March, 1901. (i.e. before the Peace was signed.)

[2] Macdonald, with prophetic insight, was sceptical about the "entrenched clause" protecting the coloured vote on the common roll.

owed little or no allegiance to Britain and which possessed all the characteristics of a colonial group in the modern sense of the term.

The Liberals in 1910 were in fact dealing not with one colonial group, but with two, the major of which, if only in numbers, was non-white. Peace and security could only be bought by appeasing one group at the clear expense of the others. In 1910 peace and security were as important to the Liberals, power and status to the Conservatives, as they are important to any colonial power at any time. Both parties realised, the Liberals perhaps unwillingly, that peace and security depend on power and on status. A friendly white-dominated South Africa was in the short run more important than a long-drawn-out struggle with a white élite over the rights and privileges of the non-whites, as yet to challenge white supremacy.

Given Britain's position in 1910, and the widespread realization that the dream of Imperial Federation had become obsolete, the new arrangements with South Africa appeared to give the Imperial idea a fresh start. It was to take two world wars to broaden the concept of Commonwealth (as the Imperial idea subsequently became) to include the non-white peoples. Sir Oliver Lyttelton's remark—"You cannot raise great eulogies and paeans on the granting of responsible government, without taking the full consequences of your actions"—is an ironic comment on the position of those self-same non-whites in South Africa who are the least privileged members of the new, so-called multi-racial Commonwealth.

Professor Miller's book is in many ways complementary to Professor Thornton's. Part I of "The Commonwealth in the World" offers a lucid and realistic account of the development of the Commonwealth. Professor Miller is specifically interested in the foreign policies of the individual Commonwealth States, and so he analyses each State in turn. The familiar precept, "foreign policy begins at home", has considerable significance in any attempt to analyse South African policy: Professor Miller very ably reveals the connection between our domestic conflicts and the image our diplomats attempt to project abroad of South Africa's role in international society. In a fascinating discussion on the relationship between national interests and foreign policy, he states: "Ultimately, ideas of national interest depend upon the ideas which men have of the place which they would like their

country to occupy in the world; and these ideas change in time, apart from never being unanimous within a country at a given time'' (p. 88).

The most compelling ''idea'' dominating South African domestic policy and, *ipso facto*, its foreign policy, is the doctrine of white supremacy; ''. . . every issue must sooner or later be submitted to the test of whether it will help or hinder the maintenance of white supremacy'' (p. 189). In his view there is very little division among the white ruling groups on the necessity for such a policy; and party approach to foreign policy may, in this respect at least, be properly labelled bi-partisan. He then lists the following factors as important in governing any definition of South African national interest: first, South Africa's isolated position at the tip of a predominantly non-white continent; secondly, the evident need to increase the pace of economic expansion; thirdly, the English-Afrikaans conflict over the status of South Africa, or the republican issue; and, finally, the rise of the new Afro-Asian States, with their bitter resentment of racial discrimination, and the corresponding polarization of the world into two hostile coalitions, both trying to persuade the uncommitted States of their good intentions.

Given these factors as conditioning South African foreign policy, what policies are in fact being pursued? Professor Miller cites the technical and economic co-operation with other countries in Africa South and East of the Sahara, as a policy specifically directed at gaining recognition of ''South Africa's domestic jurisdiction over her own territory and peoples.'' He cites the opposition of both major parties to Communism as a further example of bi-partisanship. For the Nationalists, this policy represents a retreat from the isolationist position held during World War II and earlier. He concludes: ''To this extent South Africa is probably more anxious for alliance with other anti-Communist countries than any other member of the Commonwealth'' (p. 196). This may well be true, but where are such allies to be found outside the Commonwealth, South African membership of which is a source of constant irritation to the extreme republican wing of the Nationalist Party? Under certain circumstances it is just possible that a military alliance might be signed with the Federation; it is hardly likely, however, that Ghana would be receptive to similar overtures. In any case, the majority of newly independent Afro-Asian States, whether inside or outside the Commonwealth, appear reluctant to enter

into precise military obligations, and South Africa's racial policy makes such an alliance even less likely.

It is true there are rumours that African States may be encouraged to establish diplomatic missions in South Africa. But can the Government assume that the diplomats appointed will refrain from discussing matters of common interest with Chief Luthuli? Their presence might easily lead to embarrassing 'incidents', of which there have been several in recent months. In any event, exchange of diplomats by South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria is hardly in the same category as an alliance in Professor Miller's sense of the word. The reader need hardly be reminded that South Africa, unlike Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Pakistan, has no share in any regional pact designed to prevent Communist aggression, despite its vital interest in the matter. Certainly, as Miller points out, the British and French in East and West Africa respectively are reluctant to forge precise military arrangements with the Union. Under these circumstances, the Department of External Affairs has apparently been forced to regard the British South Atlantic Fleet and the buffer State of the Federation as the best protection for the Union. It is also significant that the United States of America, the great underpinner of N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., has been, together with Britain, reluctant to underwrite South African foreign policy.

Professor Miller also makes it clear that South Africa has "the most widespread representation of the Dominions." The list of South African diplomatic missions is extensive, and one can only assume that the Union Government is conscious of the need to defend its policies vigorously in other parts of the world. It would hardly appear to be succeeding very well in this; and the overseas press, which is obviously a prime source of information on South African domestic affairs, has never been so hostile. One is left to conclude that South Africa is cast in a peculiarly defensive position in her internal relations and one which by its very nature makes foreign policy an extremely difficult and hazardous undertaking for the present government.

Finally, Professor Miller mentions some very compelling reasons for South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth. He lists the benefits that accrue to South African industries, wine and fruit in particular, from Imperial Preference and the British capital investment in the gold mines. He quotes

a passage from a leading article in '*Die Burger*' as the main theme of South Africa's present membership of the Commonwealth. "For example we believe that military and African affairs cannot with advantage be discussed in the presence of India. . . . The meaning of South Africa's Commonwealth membership lies in our relations with individual Commonwealth members, rather than with the whole wide heterogeneous circle" (pp. 203-4). In Miller's view it is a fact of political life that it is better to belong to one international association rather than none at all, as would assuredly be the case if South Africa were to contract out of the Commonwealth. In other words, the Commonwealth provides a 'listening post' for South African diplomacy; if she were to resign, the disadvantages of association—attacks by India on her non-white policy and an increase in the number of non-white members, to mention only two sources of dissatisfaction—would still remain. The Commonwealth principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member States is certainly to her advantage; outside the Commonwealth, this principle might no longer operate with respect to her former friends and neighbours within the association. Indian criticism of South Africa would possibly intensify; and Britain, if not Australia, might no longer feel constrained tacitly to defend South African policy at the United Nations.

Altogether this is a tough, realistic analysis of the Commonwealth today and, in particular, South Africa's position in it. Events since Sharpeville have only served to underscore the issues that Professor Miller has set down so lucidly; Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain herself have fought hard against any 'formal' discussion or vote within the Commonwealth on South Africa's racial policies. However, antagonism to the Union is growing, led especially by Malaya and the soon-to-be-admitted Nigeria; and the Commonwealth itself is straining on the question of South African membership. Should the Union decide to become a republic and apply for the automatic approval of Commonwealth members essential to her own continued membership, there is no certainty that the approval *will be* automatic.

Dr. Panikkar is well known as a scholar of considerable distinction and a diplomat with a wide range of experience. His new book consists of a series of six lectures delivered at the Sorbonne on the problems confronting the Afro-Asian States. It is a refreshing analysis of the aftermath of colonialism from one who is himself the product of a colonial environment.

To the South African his remarks on the nature of democracy in underdeveloped countries have considerable relevance.

"A third factor which affects the functioning of democracy in the new States is the lack of independent thinking connected with political problems. Democratic institutions provide only a machinery of political action; its leadership has of necessity to be concerned with the day to day problems of administration and with formulation of general policies. But it does not generate ideas" (p. 21).

Dr. Panikkar stresses repeatedly the importance in a democracy of "a process of co-operative thinking which is continuously going on, being debated, argued about and studied in detail", and he quotes the Fabian Society in Britain, the research organizations of the political parties, and the specialized groups studying national problems and "providing public men with ideas concerning every aspect of national life." He is thinking no doubt of the role played by Chatham House in Great Britain, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Institute of Strategic Studies, and of course the research faculties in the universities of Britain and the United States.

In this respect South Africa is still an "underdeveloped area". The unofficial opposition groups, the Congresses and the Liberal Party, for example, are so deeply involved in their day-to-day struggle against the ruling white oligarchy that there is little time and energy left for long-term planning on the basis of full-time research backed with the necessary financial resources. And certainly the society that South Africa has become since Sharpeville makes any real "process of co-operative thinking" impossible.

The Congress movement in India was led by educated Indians who had had at least the benefit of higher education under British rule. The Labour Party in Britain owes much to the early Fabians and the work of men and women like the Webbs, many of whom had the leisure and inclination to think about the kind of society they hoped to build in the future. The present South African government has made university education for non-whites a means of indoctrination within a totalitarian framework of control. It is clear that the new tribal colleges will offer an inferior education; it is extremely doubtful whether they will produce adequately trained doctors, engineers and lawyers, let alone become fertile breeding grounds for the ideas which any

democratic society must draw upon if it is to survive and develop.

Dr. Panikkar points out that "one of the remarkable features of the growth of democracy in England, France and America has been the re-emergence of universities as vital centres of political thought." Certainly our South African universities have done a surprising amount of work on political and social problems in the country, considering their staffing and financial problems; but few would deny that it has been done under difficult conditions and in an atmosphere where government has been on the whole extremely hostile to the growth of a free, independent and critical university spirit.

Dr. Panikkar's book deserves to be read by all who are interested in the political and economic development of the Afro-Asian states. Their problems are immense, and whether they succeed will depend, as the writer says, "on many factors, not the least of which are the vision of their leaders, the response of the general public . . . and the assistance and sympathy of more advanced nations" (p. 96). We too have men of vision in government, but their view of the future is one utterly repugnant to the majority of people in this country. The only response we apparently count on from the white public (i.e. the effective governing group) is a hardened conservative one, content to express itself in voting for parties whose programmes are based on fear and prejudice. It is at least a consolation to know that the non-white public can count on the sympathy, if not the assistance, of more advanced nations like India, whose rulers accept values of Western civilization, defined in terms quite foreign to the present South African defenders of that much maligned concept.

J. E. SPENCE,
*Department of Political Science, University of Natal.*

# SPONSORS

## SOUTH AFRICAN

MARGARET BALLINGER M.P. *Native Representative.*
SENATOR W. BALLINGER *Native Representative.*
GUY BUTLER *Poet and Professor, Rhodes University.*
H. DAVIDOFF *Former Labour Member of Parliament.*
PATRICK DUNCAN *Journalist.*
ERROL HARRIS *Professor, University of the Witwatersrand.*
ELLEN HELLMAN *Ex President, Institute of Race Relations.*
ALEX HEPPLE *Former Leader, Parliamentary Labour Party.*
LEO KUPER *Professor, University of Natal.*
L. LEE-WARDEN M.P. *Native Representative.*
LEO LOVELL *Former Labour Member of Parliament.*
CHIEF A. J. LUTHULI *President-General of the African National Congress.*
J. W. MACQUARRIE *Ex-Native Education Inspector.*
WINIFRED MAXWELL *Professor, Rhodes University.*
JESSIE MCPHERSON *Chairman S.A. Labour Party, Ex Mayor of Johannesburg.*
DR. G. M. NAICKER *President of the South African and Natal Indian Congresses.*
JORDAN K. NGUBANE *Journalist.*
ALAN PATON *Author of "Cry the Beloved Country."*
THE RT. REV. R. A. REEVES *Bishop of Johannesburg.*
ANNE WELSH *Writer, Economics Lecturer.*

## INTERNATIONAL

LORD ALTRINCHAM *Writer, and Editor "National & English Review"*
ROGER N. BALDWIN *Chairman, International League for the Rights of Man.*
SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, *Professor of Social and Political Theory, Oxford.*
JANE BOLIN *Judge, New York City.*
VAN WYCK BROOKS *Author and Critic.*
DOROTHY DUNBAR BROMLEY *Writer and Radio Moderator.*
DR. KENNETH B. CLARK *Race Relations Psychologist.*
BASIL DAVIDSON *Writer.*
THOMAS EDWARD DRIBERG *Journalist, Lecturer, Broadcaster.*
LOUIS FISHER *Author and Journalist.*
INDIRA GANDHI *President of the Congress Party of India.*
VICTOR GOLLANCZ *Publisher, Writer.*
JO GRIMOND M.P. *Leader of the British Liberal Party.*
JOHN GUNTHER *Author and Journalist.*
THE REV. DONALD HARRINGTON *Chairman, American Committee on Africa. Minister, Community Church of New York.*
JOHN HATCH *Writer.*
FATHER TREVOR HUDDLESTON *Community of the Resurrection.*
RT. HON. A. CREECH JONES P.C., M.P. *Ex-Secretary of State for the Colonies.*
THE REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING *President, Montgomery Improvement Association.*
KENNETH KIRKWOOD *Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, Oxford.*
COLIN LEGUM *Journalist.*
LOUIS MACNEICE C.B.E. *Poet.*
THURGOOD MARSHALL *Special Counsel to the N.A.A.C.P.*
KINGSLEY MARTIN *Editor, "New Statesman and Nation".*
DR. BENJAMIN E. MAYS *President, Morehouse College.*
ASHOK MEHTA M.P. *Indian Praja-Socialist Party.*
RABBI ISRAEL MOWSHOWITZ PH.D. *of the New York Rabbinate.*
NICOLAS NABOKOV *Secretary-General of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.*
DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR *Writer and Theologian.*
THE REV. WALTER P. OFFUTT *Assistant Secretary, Protestant Council.*
THE RIGHT REV. JAMES A. PIKE *Bishop of California.*
V. K. R. V. RAO *Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi.*
VICTOR G. REUTHER *International Affairs Director, United Automobile Workers.*
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT *U.S. Statesman.*
ALAN ROSS *Writer.*
BERTRAND RUSSELL *Philosopher.*
STEPHEN SPENDER *Poet and Co-Editor of "Encounter".*
THE REV. DONALD O. SOPER *British Methodist Leader.*
NORMAN M. THOMAS *American Socialist Leader.*
THE RT. REV. JOHN LEONARD WILSON *Bishop of Birmingham.*

*All correspondence to be addressed to the Editor, Ronald M. Segal, 31a John Adam Street, London, W.C.2.*

**Branch offices:**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Mrs. M. Singer, 336 Summit Ave., Mount Vernon, New York

WEST AFRICA: Mr. E. Mphahlele, Dept. of Extra-Mural Studies, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria.

PRINTED IN GT. BRITAIN BY PHILIP SANSOM, 11 OLD BOND ST., LONDON W.1