

# AFRICA SOUTH

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Special Features:

**RIGHTS AND RIOTS IN NATAL**

by Professor Leo Kuper

**TORIES AND THE COMMONWEALTH**

by Lord Altrincham

**THE POETRY OF MADAGASCAR**

by Miriam Koshland



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EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL

JAN.—MARCH 1960

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## THE TWO FACES OF TERROR

EVER since the Nationalists seized power in 1948, South Africa has been in a state of suspended terror. The mechanism of tyranny has been developed with patience and care—in the self-perpetuation of Nationalist rule through electoral delimitation and disfranchisement, in the punishments with which the law is loaded against any effective forms of opposition, in the functions and powers with which an obsequious parliament has dressed officialdom and, particularly, the police. Political opponents are banned and banished without trial; the security police pry everywhere, listening and scribbling, pursuing and interrogating, with all the bland insolence of their inviolable dossiers; passports and permits are seized or refused without reason or appeal. Yet the engine has remained, for all that, securely locked in second gear.

On the crudest comparison with consummate terrors, like Nazi Germany or contemporary Portugal, the courts in South Africa have protected the law from persistent outrage. Political antagonists have not just disappeared, while their families endured exemplary victimization; trial in public court has remained the prerequisite of imprisonment and execution. The law may have been defaced beyond recognition, but it is still standing. Whatever one's judgment of the treason trial, its interminable proceedings and the vagrancy of the prosecution, the accused were not simply rounded up and shot, or shovelled secretly into concentration camps. Quite the reverse. Their trial has been conducted with a blare of publicity, and the Crown is attempting to prove its contentions before an increasingly restive bench at home and overseas.

Above all, the press has been left fundamentally free. Though vulnerable to persecution under a number of 'public safety' laws and consequently compelled to mince fine much of its comment, it remains in practice secure from seizure and censorship. It is a precarious freedom, of course, and one that may be enjoyed only at constant editorial risk. The Minister of Justice, pressed to give reasons for his five-year ban on the Editor of *'Africa South'*, cited for the most part various quotations from articles that have appeared in the magazine. Yet it has been, all the same, by the measure of the press under absolute terrors, freedom of a very precious sort, capable, for all its limitations, of having kept reason alive in a race-deranged society.

It is inevitable, of course, that press and judiciary together should be suffocated by the sack-cloth of white supremacy. The Nationalists have only needed time, to condition the country to its ultimate submission. Democracy is never destroyed in a day; it is undermined, gradually, carefully, till it is ready at last to cave in with one sure cut of the spade. For eleven years the Nationalists have been tuning up the engine. And now the time has come to push the pedal down flat to the floor.

Some of the recent appointments to both the provincial and appellate divisions of the judiciary are explicable only in terms of political packaging. Promotions have ridden roughshod over reputation and seniority; and lurking in the shadows of Government policy, legislation stirs to ease the retirement of recalcitrant judges. The South African judiciary has long enjoyed a reputation for administering the law uncorrupted by promises of power or fear of place. That it has deserved this reputation so well must be provocation enough to a government whose pursuit of power increasingly collides with the rule of law. No country can contain a free judiciary and the political and economic violence of apartheid peacefully together; the one must by its very nature consume the other in the course of its career. And so the Nationalists must serve notice on South Africa that independence of judgment is to be as tolerable on the bench as it is in parliament. Trial by political opinion stands ready to tie on the blind-fold.

How should the press escape? The Deputy-Minister of the Interior has already announced that a bill to provide for internal censorship is being framed in accordance with the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable Publications\* and is to be introduced by the Government at the coming parliamentary session. It is not yet certain whether newspapers will be covered; but that is not of much moment. If they escape, it will only be for separate execution straight afterwards. It is upon the whole world of free comment that the guns of the Government are now trained.

It is not easy to be serious about the recommendations in the 1957 Report. Where it is not almost pathological, as in its thick-lensed strictures on underwear advertisements, it is grotesque in its bigotry, defining the politically undesirable with so obvious and profound a contempt for the right of men to hold any conflicting opinions at all that editors will be serving five years

\*For a detailed analysis of the Report, see *'Africa South'*, Vol II No. 2—'The Final Stroke'.



in jail for publishing articles on the development of democracy in Ancient Greece.

For what are we to expect of a government that banned "Black Beauty" from entry into South Africa because the title apparently did not make it clear enough to the censors that the chief character is a horse? The recent banning of Bertrand Russell's "Why I am not a Christian" possesses at least the excuse that the book was read *first* and irritated the spiritual conjunctivitis of Afrikanerdom. With the same degree of discretion employed by the Board of Internal Censors as has been consistently exercised by the Board controlling what we read from abroad, we may expect bibles to be published with the Book of Exodus excised and government gazettes filling up the fiction shelves in all the bookshops.

How can the Nationalists hope to survive the very silence that they compel? While men may dispute, they may yet resolve in peace; with all argument forbidden, the future rides on the bullet and the knife. During the past six months, African despair has erupted into flaming sugar-plantations and wattle-groves, in outbursts of violence that have racked the rural areas of Natal. The Congress leadership appeals ceaselessly for calm; but how can it expect its calls to be obeyed? Black terror has accomplished what black protest and black petition have failed so formidably to achieve—the quick concessions of the afraid. Within days of the Cato Manor riots, the Durban City Council was considering a general increase in African wages; while arson scorches Natal, cries for black-white consultation scurry in the wake. How can it be otherwise? There are two faces to terror; and a country that shows the one must be prepared to bear the retribution of the other.

The Government would do well to consider the implications of all that it is doing and plans still to do. By shackling the judiciary and suffocating the press, it will accomplish the outward political conformity that its ever-growing greed for power coerces it to want. But the starch will only stick to the surface. And too deep for the eyes of censors to scrutinize or the courts to convict, the antagonism of men who have been deprived of any real reason for living will surge to the breach, drowning all that is worth saving in South Africa together with what is not. Surely, it is not only the sugar-plantations of Natal that South Africa is setting on fire with the frenzy of apartheid. It is itself.

*David Narain*



Law? Law? I AM the Law!

## NATIONALIST CONTEMPT OF COURT

SENATOR DR. THE HON. LESLIE RUBIN, LL.D.

*Senator representing the Africans of the Western Cape.*

THE impartiality of judges is the cornerstone of a democratic society. But it is not sufficient for judges to be impartial. It is equally important that they should be known by all the people to be so. This does not mean that they can never be criticized. Fair criticism is a salutary check on all persons holding public office, and there can be no objection when "reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good." But when something is said or written or done which is calculated to bring a court or a judge into disrepute, or to lower their standing or authority in the eyes of the public, contempt of court has been committed and the offender is liable to summary punishment by the court concerned. Behind the exercise of this power by the court is the firm belief that once the people lose faith in their judges, the administration of justice will suffer. The Nationalist Party has an ugly record of contempt of court since it came to power.

In 1951 the Government passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which removed the Cape Coloured voters from the common roll. In 1952 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared the Act invalid. Almost immediately there ensued a flood of bitter attack on the judges. It came from Government spokesmen including Cabinet Ministers, in Parliament and at political gatherings. Mr. Paul Sauer talked contemptuously of "the five old men of Bloemfontein". Mr. Eric Louw said that Parliament "cannot be subjected to the whims of the courts." Dr. Dönges said "the people must now decide whether to trust a Bench appointed and paid by a government but which was not responsible to anyone, or the Parliament elected by the people which had to get a mandate from the people at least every five years". The Minister of Posts and Telegraphs said: ". . . the Afrikaner people will never be satisfied to remain in this inferior position whereby the court—and that court consists of five paid officials, whether they be judges or not—whereby the five paid officials occupy a higher position than the House of Assembly." Mr. Strydom (later Prime Minister) said that it was "a terrible mistake . . . to take

the view that because a man is a judge he is therefore like a being from heaven who only sees matters in an unprejudiced light. The judges are ordinary people . . . It is very clear, according to reports which appeared in the newspapers and from the remarks of the judges, that from the beginning they had already made a study of the case and it was already decided what their judgment would be”.

Lesser lights of the Nationalist Party were even less restrained. Mr. Abraham, M.P., accused the Appellate Division of acting “irresponsibly”. Mr. van den Berg, M.P., asked: “Are judges different from other people? Are they not just as partisan as any other person?” Mr. J. H. Visser, M.P., said, “if I had a case in which thousands of pounds were involved I would not go to the Appeal Court. I would rather try to settle the case on a fifty-fifty basis with my opponent”. Senator le Roux said: “I want to put them this question. Which is the greater, the owner of the shop or his clerks, the owner of the farm or his foreman, the clerk or the Minister. You are concerned here with an employer and an employee. In this case the employee is the Appellate Division. They are in the service of the Government. The Government is the master”.

For lawyers, the implications of this onslaught upon the highest court in the land were disquieting. It was the first time in the history of South Africa that judges had been spoken of in this way. Everyone, it is true, expected the Government to be critical of a judicial decision that thwarted its policy. But these were not criticisms of a decision. They were attacks which impugned the impartiality and the good faith of the judges who had given it. Attacks of this kind, it seemed, could only serve to undermine public confidence in the courts. Was South Africa, the lawyers asked, now faced with a complete departure from the traditional concept of the judiciary as a group of highly trained men who could always be depended upon to dispense justice with complete impartiality? Did these attacks imply a new attitude on the part of the Government, in the future, to the traditional independence of the courts?

There were fears in many quarters that the Nationalists had displayed an attitude towards the function of the courts which threatened the whole delicately balanced basis of custom and convention supporting a completely independent judiciary. These fears were not allayed by subsequent events.

The Government replied to the 1952 decision of the Appellate



Division with the High Court of Parliament Act, in terms of which Parliament, sitting as a Court, but boycotted by the Opposition, held that the Separate Representation of Voters Act was valid. A few months later the Appellate Division declared that the High Court of Parliament Act was "invalid, null and void, and of no legal effect". The day before this decision Mr. Swart, the Minister of Justice, had deemed it necessary to administer another rebuke to the courts. "It seemed to be the fashion", he said, "for judges to criticize the laws of the land, and this was becoming a little tiresome".

The Government's next step was the Senate Act, which enlarged the Upper House sufficiently to ensure the requisite two-thirds majority required by the Act of Union. There followed the appointment of a number of additional Judges of Appeal, and the passing of the Appellate Division Quorum Act, which provided that appeals challenging the validity of an Act of Parliament should be heard by the new full Bench of eleven judges. The reaction of the legal profession to these measures is best conveyed in the words of the Hon. Percy Hugh Fischer, a former Judge-President of the Orange Free State Provincial Division, and son of the late Abraham Fischer, a former President of the Orange Free State. After referring to the "recent wholesale appointment of members of the Court of Appeal", and saying how important it was that "no government should appoint any member of the judiciary in such a manner or in such circumstances as to cast doubt in the mind of the public as to the integrity of the judiciary", he went on: "In the present case the public has been faced with the appointment of five additional judges to an existing court of six. As far as the public was aware there had been no suggestion that the existing number was not adequate for the work entrusted to it . . . With regard to constitutional matters, the public is of course aware that the present Government, through some of their members, have repeatedly expressed their disapproval of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. The public is also aware that the present Government, through these Ministers, have threatened to take steps to prevent a repetition of such decisions . . . Essential to the due administration of justice is the reliance of the public on the integrity of the Bench. To raise a doubt as to such integrity, even if it be in respect of one class of case, will in all probability raise doubts as to cases in general. It would seem that a greater injustice could not be done to the Bench of

the Appellate Division than the manner of appointment adopted by the Government in enlarging the Bench and altering the quorum”.

The Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, while he was Minister of Native Affairs, made this illuminating contribution to the catalogue of Nationalist comment on the judiciary: “I have had experience of judicial people and Heaven help me if they ever have anything important to decide”. Dr. Verwoerd may perhaps be forgiven for feeling bitter about South African judges. One of them was responsible for enshrining in the law reports a somewhat unflattering description of the Prime Minister’s activities during World War II. Dr. Verwoerd, while Editor of ‘Die Transvaler’, was accused by ‘The Star’ of falsifying news in order to support Nazi propaganda in South Africa. He sued for damages for defamation and was unsuccessful. After a lengthy hearing and an exhaustive examination of the evidence on either side, Mr. Justice Millin, in the course of a considered reserved judgment, said of Dr. Verwoerd: “There have been proved 2 very grave cases of the publication of false news in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false; 6 cases, on the whole less serious but still clear cases of falsification, where news, originally correctly reported, was falsely restated for the purpose of editorial comment; and 2 cases in which news was falsified by means of misleading headlines. He did support Nazi propaganda, he did make his paper a tool of the Nazis in South Africa, and he knew it”.

This judgment was referred to in the Senate in 1957. Extracts from the debate on that occasion provide further evidence of the contemptuous attitude of the Nationalist Party towards the courts.

‘Senator Friend: . . . but how did the Hon. Minister try to justify himself outside the court? He said that it was only a Jewish judge . . . I want to ask now . . . if the Minister was convinced that the judgment was wrong. . . . that this was done because the judge was a Jew . . . why did he not appeal?

Dr. Verwoerd: Because I knew that there was no justice to be found under your government.

Senator Friend: Some of our most competent judges are now being accused . . .

Senator Rossouw: Why did two of them become Liberalists later on?

Senator Strauss: I ask how many judges are not appointed to

the Bench from active politics? The People on the other side desire us to believe when it suits them that, as soon as a judge is decked in the robes of justice, all his political prejudices disappear; but what do we see, Mr. President? On the day when they leave the Bench how many of them do not immediately return to politics . . .

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.'

In his reply Dr. Verwoerd explained his refusal to appeal, by making several charges of the gravest character against Mr. Justice Millin, who had since died. These are examples: "a substantially important exhibit had to remain out of court because the judge was not prepared to accept it as evidence . . . it was very strange for the Bench to direct accusations against me as a person in the manner in which it did . . . in my opinion the judgment was not a fair or correct judgment . . . I had indeed to experience the unpleasant occurrence that it was apparently difficult for the Bench to give an unprejudiced judgment".

As to Dr. Verwoerd's reply to Senator Friend, this can only mean and have been intended to mean that if he had appealed against the judgment to the Appellate Division, he would not have got justice—clearly, a gross reflection on the integrity of the judges of the Appellate Division at that time.

Appointments to the Bench during the last few years have been puzzling and disquieting, for lawyer and layman alike. On the one hand members of the Bar, of impeccable character, ability and experience, in some cases outstanding members of the profession, have been overlooked; on the other hand, lawyers of junior status and with limited experience have been appointed. To an extent not known before in the history of South Africa's courts, many cases are argued today by Counsel before a judge who was several years his junior at the Bar.

The Act of Union empowers the Governor-General to appoint any "fit and proper person" as a judge of the Supreme Court. There is no other provision in our law which prescribes the qualifications, whether of ability or experience, necessary for such appointment. The guarantee to the public that a person elevated to the Bench will be a "fit and proper person" is to be found in well-established tradition. The distilled wisdom of centuries of experience in moulding an independent judiciary in Britain, has combined with the teachings of the Roman Dutch law to produce a set of principles which govern the

appointment and tenure of office of judges. These have always been an essential part of the system of justice in South Africa. Some have been embodied in the Act of Union; others, though not enforced by law, have become part of established practice.

Two of these principles are that the person appointed to the Bench must be a practising advocate of ability and experience (judged as a rule by seniority at the Bar), and that once on the Bench, his further advancement in judicial office, e.g. appointment as Provincial Judge-President or Chief Justice, is determined by his seniority as a judge. These two principles have served to maintain in the public mind the idea of the judiciary as an institution of the utmost stability, resting firmly on compliance with the highest standards of character and ability conceivable in public life.

Recent appointments show that the Minister of Justice has decided to ignore these two principles. Here are some cases taken from recent press reports. The Hon. Mr. Justice Botha was appointed Judge-President of the Orange Free State Provincial Division 22 months after he had been appointed to the Bench, and at a time when he was junior to most of his colleagues on the Bench and to 28 other puisne judges in the country. Among recent appointments to the Appellate Division, one is junior to 15, another to 16, and a third to 23 puisne judges in the country. The present Chief Justice, the Hon. Mr. Justice Steyn, who had been law adviser to various government departments, was appointed to the Bench in the Transvaal (in the face of vigorous protest by the Transvaal Bar) in 1951, and to the Appellate Division in 1955. He is junior to 2 Judges of Appeal, and in judicial experience to 17 of the 59 judges in South Africa. His appointment as Chief Justice overlooked Appeal Judges Schreiner (17 years at the Bar, appointed to the Bench in 1937 and to the Appellate Division in 1945, who acted as Chief Justice) and Hoexter (called to the Bar in 1918, appointed to the Bench in 1938, and to the Appellate Division in 1949). The Hon. Mr. Justice Beyers was appointed to the Bench of the Cape Provincial Division in 1955, and to the Appellate Division in 1958. In 1959 he returned to the Cape Provincial Division as Judge-President of a court which includes 3 judges senior to him in judicial experience.

These facts reflect in no way whatsoever on the character or ability of the persons appointed. Their qualification or fitness to sit as judges is not for a moment questioned. The criticism



is of the Minister of Justice for making appointments in defiance of a well-established tradition in South Africa. It is a serious criticism because such appointments must cause public uneasiness about the motives which actuate the Minister in abandoning a practice of such long standing; an uneasiness not likely to be dispelled by the frequent innuendoes about "liberalist judges" which have been made by Mr. Swart's political supporters.

A South African newspaper called upon Mr. Swart earlier this year to answer the following questions: (1) what was wrong with the previous system of appointing judges? (2) what are the benefits of applying criteria other than seniority in appointing judges? (3) what are these criteria? The questions remain unanswered.

Shortly before the end of the Parliamentary session in 1959, Mr. Swart produced another example of the new attitude displayed to the judiciary by the Nationalist Party. The Act of Union provides that "a judge shall not be removed from office except by the Governor-General on an address from both Houses of Parliament in the same session praying for such removal on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity". The same provision, recognized as the cornerstone of judicial immunity from arbitrary control by the executive, applies to the judges of Great Britain. It has never been invoked against a South African judge. In the Supreme Court Bill, the Government now added to the existing power of removal a new provision, empowering the Governor-General to suspend a judge from office "on the ground of misconduct", with the right of Parliament subsequently to approve or disapprove of the suspension. A South African Queen's Counsel condemned the new provision and, referring to the use of the term "misconduct" instead of "misbehaviour or incapacity", said: "Misconduct appears to have a wider meaning. I am thoroughly suspicious of it, especially in view of criticisms which have been voiced by Government politicians of judges. The Minister of Justice himself accused a judge of not doing his duty. Is this what 'misconduct' will mean?" There was widespread criticism, and the provision was dropped from the Bill. But South African lawyers were left wondering why it was ever considered necessary to publish and introduce a Bill containing such a provision.

## THE WHITE OPPOSITION SPLITS

STANLEY UYS

*Political Correspondent of the 'Sunday Times'*

THE annual congress of the official South African Parliamentary Opposition or United Party in August last year, on the eve of the Provincial Elections, resulted in the resignation of almost a quarter of its Members of Parliament and the formation of a new white political party—the Progressives. Amidst the exhumations and excuses, analyses and adjustments that followed, two highly significant conclusions emerged—the official Parliamentary Opposition has swung substantially to the right, narrowing the already narrow gap between Government and United Party on the doctrines of race rule; and, for the first time in South African history, a substantial white Parliamentary Party with wide, if not dominant, electoral support in many urban areas, had come into existence specifically in order to propagate a more liberal policy in race relations.

The origin of the Progressive break must be sought in the right-wing “rethinking” resulting from the total failure of the United Party to avoid a steady electoral decline during the 11 years in which it has been in Opposition. In 1948, the Nationalist Party came to power with a majority of fewer than half-a-dozen M.P.s. Today, it has two-thirds of the House of Assembly, partly due to the completely one-sided character of the electoral system (particularly delimitation methods) and partly to the growing numerical superiority of the Afrikaner. It did not take the United Party long to evolve the view that there was no profit in battering its head against a stone wall, and that the only chance of success lay in winning over “moderate” Nationalist voters.

After the General Election in 1953, when the U.P. suffered its second successive defeat, a right-wing breakaway movement, known as the Bekker or Conservative group, tried to swing the U.P. away from its anti-apartheid policies towards some entente with the then Nationalist Prime Minister, Dr. D. F. Malan. The movement failed, the group broke up, and the U.P. was able to consolidate its forces again. In 1958, the U.P. suffered its third big General Election defeat, and it is an indication of how far right-wing thinking had advanced in the Party by then that, instead of a small reactionary's group taking shape again, a powerful movement was launched to expel the small, so-

called "liberal" wing among the M.P.s.

It is not necessary to trace the tortuous path of the developing conflict within the U.P., except to mention that after the 1958 General Election defeat, Sir de Villiers Graaff, the leader, appointed a secret committee, consisting of U.P. Parliamentarians, to study the Party's racial policy; and that the points of conflict thereafter became more pronounced. During the 1959 Parliamentary session, rumours persisted of an impending move to expel the "liberals" from the U.P. caucus, on the grounds that their presence prevented "moderate" Nationalists from joining the Party. Sir de Villiers gave his considered reply to the Government's Bantustan policies, and one of his categorical statements was that the U.P. was flatly opposed to non-whites sitting in Parliament in any capacity. It was at this period that Mr. H. G. Lawrence, M.P., a former Cabinet Minister and the Party's front-bench debater, clashed with Sir de Villiers over the U.P.'s racial policies.

The fateful Bloemfontein congress was preceded by a congress of the United Party Youth, which is firmly under the control of the right-wing M.P.s. and which voiced its opposition to any liberal sentiments within the Party. Even before the Bloemfontein congress opened on August 11, there were rumours (some of which found their way into the newspapers) that the "liberals" were going to be "kicked out". Delegates from the rural areas dominated the conference, and it appeared that a definite campaign had been organised against the Progressives. On the first full day of the congress, Dr. Louis Steenkamp, M.P., a leading right-winger, introduced a resolution (which was not on the agenda) thanking Sir de Villiers Graaff for having stated that the U.P. believed that the African population should enjoy its political rights on a separate, not common, roll. The Progressives protested that the resolution closed the door to all future progress, and then the fur began to fly. Until late that night, the attack on the Progressives raged, with rural delegates overreaching themselves in their excitement and becoming positively abusive. One thing was made plain to the Progressives at that day's discussion: they were not welcome in the Party at all. Some observers believe that the plan was to goad two or three Progressives into resigning, but that the campaign got out of hand and led to a major split.

On the following day, when a number of delegates had left already, Mr. Mitchell, the right-wing Natal leader, introduced

the controversial resolution declaring that the U.P. would not purchase any more land in terms of the 1936 settlement—by which further land had been promised to the Africans in return for their disfranchisement from the common roll in the Cape—if that land was going to be used for Dr. Verwoerd's Bantustans. The Progressives protested vigorously. They knew that the reasoning was spurious: that it was a tactical, not a policy, resolution, and that it would be used to exploit the resentment of white farmers who objected to the expropriation of land for African use. In fact, two years ago, long before Dr. Verwoerd announced his Bantustan policies, Mr. Mitchell (to quote one of the Progressive M.P.s.) was "indulging in this type of propaganda, despite objections from some of his Parliamentary colleagues".

The protests of the Progressives left the congress unmoved, and the break then became inevitable. In the days that followed there was a series of meetings, or rather nostalgic farewells, between the Progressive M.P.s. and Sir de Villiers, which shows that far from being a hard-bitten bunch of politicians eager to launch out with a new Party, the Progressives were being positively sentimental about their departure.

Sir de Villiers later issued a lengthy statement and, on behalf of the Progressives, Dr. Jan Steytler, M.P., formerly leader of the Party in the Cape, replied with a statement that drew murmurs of applause from sympathisers all round South Africa. "We believe", said Dr. Steytler, "the time has come when white people should stop taking important decisions affecting non-white people without proper regard as to how the latter think and feel. Since the Bloemfontein congress we have, in fact, consulted a number of responsible Natives and we have found that they deplore in the strongest terms this decision taken at congress. They most certainly regard it as a breach of faith on the part of the white man. It is our view that South Africa cannot afford political stratagems of this kind, which destroy the trust and respect of the Native people in the guardianship of the white man . . . We have come to the conclusion that the temper of the Bloemfontein congress showed a complete unwillingness on the part of most delegates to face up to the challenge of contemporary events here and in Africa. The impression we have is of a Party congress reluctant to move with the times, unwilling even to interpret its own principles in a forward-looking manner. From the tone of congress we believe



that many delegates want to fight the Nationalists with the weapons of race fear and race hatred. The slogans of 'swart gevaar' (black danger) and 'kafferboeties' (kaffir-lovers) will be used against the Nationalists by people who should know better".

Even before this statement had been issued, Major A. Z. Berman, a U.P. member of the Cape Provincial Council and an ultra-rightwinger, had declared that the U.P. would fight the Provincial Elections in October on the old Nationalist slogan of the "swart gevaar". The departure of the Progressives was hailed by the more vocal right-wingers as positive proof to "our Nationalist friends" that the U.P. was now a purged, conservative Party. In a Press statement on August 25, the Progressives observed: "The delegates at congress showed an unmistakable tendency to go backwards rather than to go forward . . . they felt that by making a minimum of progress the Party would become an acceptable political home for the 'moderate' Nationalist, whose support congress was primarily concerned with getting". Captain Jack Basson, M.P., one of the least subtle members of the right-wing, predicted that for every "liberal" who left the U.P., four conservatives (presumably "moderate" Nationalists) would join it. Unfortunately for Mr. Basson, the results of the Provincial Elections have not borne out this prophecy.

The land resolution which was the cause of the trouble at the congress was passed by an overwhelming majority of the delegates, although Sir de Villiers himself was opposed to it, and in fact had made it known beforehand that he considered it to be of dubious propaganda value. That the Progressives had not gone to the congress with any intention of causing a split is proved by the fact that only a few were still in Bloemfontein when it was decided to issue a statement of protest. The others had already left the city, and they learnt only afterwards of the action of their colleagues, whereupon they promptly identified themselves with it. One of the Progressives subsequently declared: "I am certain that the delegates who favoured the motion did not realise that its acceptance would lead to a major split in the Party. Some of them may today be wondering if the possible gain of a few hundred votes in seats like Vryheid was a good exchange for 11 M.P.s. (now 12 with Mr. Lawrence), five M.P.C.s., several excellent candidates for the Provincial elections, and scores of the Party's best workers and supporters, and, not the least bad part of a bad bargain, the

further loss of confidence of the Natives in the white man's word".

It was at the stage when the Progressives were having difficulty in persuading the Opposition public that their breakaway had been unavoidable and, in fact, desirable, that Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, chairman (among other concerns) of the giant Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers, controller of much of South Africa's gold and all of its diamond industry, and himself a former United Party M.P., resigned from the Party, stating that he was "in general sympathy with the Progressive group". Although he has not formally joined the group, he has promised it financial support. Coming from South Africa's premier millionaire, with the reputation of being the most enlightened capitalist in the country, this was a lucky break for the Progressives. Even if the announcement did not have much effect on rank and file U.P. voters (their views have still not been determined), it certainly had an impact on influential business, newspaper, and other circles, where it was known that Mr. Oppenheimer was not the kind of man to throw his considerable weight behind ineffectual splinter groups. For the first time, probably, the business world, and many others, began to think of the Progressives as a group with a future.

The next lucky break for the Progressives was the announcement by Mr. Harry Lawrence, M.P., that he, too, was resigning from the United Party. Mr. Lawrence, unlike most of the Progressives, was well-known to the public. One of the most experienced Parliamentarians in the House, he had served as a Cabinet Minister under General Smuts, and then, in Opposition, had become virtual Parliamentary leader of the U.P. The significance of Mr. Lawrence's resignation was that he was no liberal; but in recent months he had displayed increasing concern over the state of race relations and over the U.P.'s obvious inability to frame a colour policy that faced the realities of the racial situation.

In his statement, Mr. Lawrence revealed that, before the debate in Parliament on the Government's Bantustan Bill, he had felt it prudent "to admit in principle the full implications of the acceptance of a multi-racial community . . . As a consequence, I had several full and earnest talks with the Leader of the Opposition and later made my views known to the Party caucus". After the debate on the Bill, Mr. Lawrence went so far as to write a letter to Sir de Villiers "making my own position quite

explicit". In that letter, Mr. Lawrence told Sir de Villiers that he was "unable to agree that your Native policy statement was an unequivocal acceptance of the implications which must flow from accepting the multi-racial state in preference to Verwoerd's policy of partition". At the time, Mr. Lawrence's Parliamentary colleagues were aware that the dispute between Mr. Lawrence and Sir de Villiers was a fundamental one. Indeed, it even seemed likely that Mr. Lawrence might break away from the U.P. These facts show that the conflict in the U.P., which led to the Progressive breakaway, had deep roots. As Mr. Lawrence explained in his statement, the resolution on the land issue at the Bloemfontein congress was only "the proximate and immediate cause" of the break.

I have dealt with Mr. Lawrence's position at length because it emphasizes two points: that the trouble in the U.P. was deep-seated and fundamental, and that the break, therefore, was inevitable; and that, essentially, what the Progressives represent is not a liberal flutter, but an alarmed reaction to a deteriorating situation by persons who, if they had lived in any country other than crazy South Africa, would be the respectable pillars of society.

The future of the Progressives, of course, depends on the United Party's breaking up further—that is, their future in Parliament. As Mr. Marais Steyn, M.P., expressed it, they cannot survive as a Party unless it is at the expense of the U.P. What, then, is the future of the U.P.? If the U.P. now intensifies its "*swart gevaar*" and "*kafferboetie*" propaganda, and concerns itself mainly with winning over "moderate" Nationalists, inevitably it is going to break up further. Up to the time of the Progressive break, Sir de Villiers had succeeded skilfully in holding the U.P. together, by balancing the right-wing against the left-wing, and vice versa. Now the left-wing has gone, and Sir de Villiers is left with a right-wing and the sprawling middle-wing, which contains several M.P.s who are not at all happy about the right-wing's manoeuvres. The Nationalists have been saying that Sir de Villiers is now Mr. Mitchell's prisoner.

The results of the Provincial Council elections in Natal were most heartening. The three Progressives (who stood as Independents) polled exceptionally well. In Pinetown, Mr. Lester Hall lost to the U.P. candidate by only 160 votes. In Durban (Gardens), Mr. Leo Boyd polled 1,954 votes against the U.P.'s 2,639. In Pietermaritzburg South, Dr. W. G. McConkey

polled 1,964 votes against the U.P.'s 2,692. These three candidates had less than two months in which to organise their election campaigns. The position in which the U.P. found itself in the Provincial elections was a disturbing one. It lost seats and votes to the Nationalist Party (apart from isolated successes here and there), and it also found that it was shedding voters to Progressives and Liberals on the other flank. The moral of the Provincial elections appeared to be that the political situation in South Africa is becoming more fluid, with an important section of the electorate showing a preference for Progressive and Liberal policies.

The next Parliamentary session will see the start of the clash between the Progressives and the U.P. Assuming that the Progressives establish themselves as a cohesive Party, what role will they fulfil in South African politics? Why should they succeed where the United Party has failed? The answer is that the U.P. need not have failed. It could have remained as a powerful Parliamentary Party if it had persisted in its opposition to Nationalist policies, which would have crumbled sooner or later.

What will the Progressives represent in South African politics? Even if the U.P. is reversing its direction, it will not be sufficient for the Progressives simply to take up where Mr. Mitchell is leaving off. The Progressives have stated that they intend to interpret U.P. policy in a "forward-looking manner"—this could mean anything or nothing. The situation facing the Progressives is this: if they adopt a policy that is only a few shades different from the U.P.'s policy, they will fail to make any impact on the racial situation and the U.P. electorate will see no reason why it should vote for Mr. Lawrence and Dr. Steytler rather than for Sir de Villiers and Mr. Mitchell. If, on the other hand, the Progressives adopt a bold racial policy, their survival as a Parliamentary group will depend on a qualitative change taking place in the white electorate. If this change does not take place, then they fail at the polls; if it does, then the future is theirs. In other words, they have nothing to lose by adopting a bold policy. With a bold policy, they *may* fail; without a bold policy, they will *certainly* fail.

Some observers have suggested that the Progressives will represent, in the main, the views of enlightened industrialists. In the present race-obsessed situation, a white Parliamentary Party, expressing the needs of progressive industrialism, and



speaking boldly on matters like the industrial colour bar, pass laws, living wages, influx control, the group areas act, job reservation, etc., could definitely serve a progressive purpose. To imagine that the Progressives will be liberal for the sake of being liberal is unrealistic.

But, and this is the point I should like to make in this article, it is not essential in South Africa today to advocate universal suffrage and equal rights in all spheres to be progressive. An enlightened policy on the issues I have mentioned should be heartily welcomed by every right-thinking South African. The situation is so grim in South Africa that a move such as that now being made by the Progressives must be given a fair trial—and every possible support. After that, it will be up to the Progressives to show their supporters and sympathisers that the faith in them has not been misplaced.

If South Africa ever reaches the stage where there is a clear dividing line between white supporters of apartheid and non-white victims, with nothing in between except a small and ineffectual group of white liberals, then there can be no peaceful solution to South Africa's racial problem. For helping to prevent this stage from being reached, the Progressives deserve thanks.

It is foolish to argue, as some people do, that between the Nationalist Government and the Congress Movement there is no room for a major political force; and it is just as unrealistic to insist that the Progressives must adopt radical policies which, while they would be welcomed by Congress supporters, would be rejected by 99 per cent. of white voters. The Progressives are not catering for Congress. They are catering primarily for urban white voters. If they can achieve something in this field, if they can keep a substantial number of white voters in the fight against the Nationalist Government, then they will have done considerable good.

The ultimate outcome of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa is foregone. Apartheid will be defeated. What is not certain is whether this victory will be achieved with the help of whites, and with the minimum of violence, or whether it will flow from a direct and bloody clash between the non-white masses and the white police state. If the Progressives succeed in their aim, and a section of the white electorate behaves sensibly, then South Africa will not be reduced to carnage and chaos. It will be a valuable victory.

## RIGHTS AND RIOTS IN NATAL

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AFRICAN leaders face the dilemma of choice between violence and non-violence in their struggle against oppression. These alternative means of political action were debated at the Accra Conference in December 1958, and the final compromise resolution reflects the conflict of views. The South African delegation strongly advocated non-violence, and this is the policy of the leaders of the South African liberation movement.

The case for non-violence may rest on moral grounds, or tactical considerations, or both. Where there are no constitutional means of change, as in South Africa, and where non-violent techniques appear relatively ineffective, we may expect a questioning of the whole philosophy of non-violence, especially by the younger men. And their doubts are heightened by the patent successes of violent action. Who could have foretold the constitutional and social changes in Kenya, following upon Mau Mau, or the quick pace of constitutional reform in the Belgian Congo after the riots at Leopoldville? And in Durban, where the low level of African income has been acknowledged for many years, an improvement in wages, though small, followed rapidly on the recent disturbances. In making an appeal for increased wages, the Director of the Bantu Administration Department in Durban declared that this was an opportunity to speak out "which I may not readily find again, an opportunity to be heard, because minds of men have become apprehensive and responsive by recent events at Cato Manor".

The disturbances began on the 18th June at Cato Manor, in the vast straggle of shacks which house fully half the African families living in Durban, when African women voiced their dissatisfaction with the Durban Corporation in a demonstration outside the Cato Manor Beer Hall. The previous afternoon some 75 women had stormed the Beer Hall and driven out African men at drink. The following morning they again demonstrated outside the Beer Hall, their numbers mounting to thousands, and demanded to see the Director of the Durban Bantu Administration Department. Police reinforcements moved into the Beer Hall, converting it into an armed fortress. African men wanting to take part in the demonstration were

driven away by the women.

The Director arrived at about 2 p.m. and invited five women to state their grievances. The speakers were all self-selected, showing the spontaneous nature of the demonstrations. The Director heard their grievances, and replied that the matter would be discussed further; they must now go home. The women were dissatisfied with this answer. The District Commandant of Police ordered them to disperse, and when they failed to do so, they were driven by baton charge across the stream into the shack area. Stones were thrown, and shots fired, conventional gambits which we have come to recognise in South Africa as the precursors to destruction of property and loss of life. The men became involved, lawless elements took advantage of the situation, and by nightfall buildings were fired in Cato Manor and the adjoining Chesterville location. The main target was the property of the Corporation, administrative centres, community halls, trading centres, vehicles; but other property was also destroyed, church, school and welfare buildings. Four people were killed.

Earlier in the day, the demonstrations had already spread to other beer halls, and in the period that followed most of the African areas of Durban were affected. Women were the prime movers in the picketing of beer halls and the occasional stoning of municipal buses. Many were arrested, and the daily papers began to headline their trials: "43 Native Women, 6 Men Accused in Beer Hall Rumpus", "Court Told: Atmosphere in Cato Manor is Explosive". Eight beer halls closed down for a period and African welfare services were threatened, since they are subsidized by beer profits. A bizarre commentary on the whole situation was provided by the manoeuvres to get the men back into the beer halls, so that the profits might again flow into welfare services.

Now tension started to develop in the rural areas of Natal, as women began to demonstrate by the destruction of dipping tanks and deputations to government officials. The most serious disturbance was at Harding, where tribesmen marched on the town to free their women, convicted for destruction of government property. Some farmlands were burnt, and the white population armed itself against the tribesmen. About 20 miles away, large numbers of African women, some armed with shields and spears, gathered to voice their grievances. Saracen armoured cars were sent to control them; and one of the news-

papers carried a picture of an African woman, armed with a stick, threatening one of the armoured cars. At Maritzburg, meanwhile, African boys had set fire to schools in a minor reverberation of the Cato Manor disturbances. By August 21, according to a newspaper report, more than 10,000 women had been involved in the disturbances, and 624 Africans, mainly women, had been sentenced to a total of 168 years' imprisonment and/or fines totalling £7,130. The demonstrations still continue, the most recent being a peaceful deputation to the Native Commissioner at Ixopo. 'Golden City Post' (October 11, 1959) reports that about 25 white policemen arrived, armed with pickhandles, sjamboks and sten-guns: the women were ordered to disperse. When they refused, three hundred and sixty-six were arrested, convicted and sentenced, each to a fine of £35 or four months imprisonment, a total of 122 years imprisonment or a fine of £12,810.

How are these events to be interpreted? The women of Cato Manor are specific about their grievances against the Durban Corporation. The Corporation, we are told, had promised in 1949 to build a place where Africans would be given licenses to brew and sell beer. Then, when the Beer Hall was built, the Corporation decided to sell the beer itself and made huge profits. Permits are given to the residents to brew a limited amount of beer, but these proved to be traps, because relatives, even a son, with whom a resident enjoyed his drink, were arrested and charged a fine ranging from £2 to 10s. And since it is not the Zulu custom for men to drink on their own, they go to the beer halls, which take part of their very small earnings. On the way home they are picked up by the police, and what little money they are bringing back for the children goes in fines. The Corporation boasts of the great profits it makes from beer, and at the same time refuses to pay higher wages on the ground that Africans must be earning enough in order to waste so much money at the beer halls. Because the municipality has not given a lead, other employers have not raised wages. Many of the women in Cato Manor are widows, who make a living by taking in washing and brewing beer. The Corporation—the grievances continue—destroys the homes of the people without giving them other accommodation in neighbouring locations. If a man loses his employment, he may be deported from Durban. There is no employment for the young people, they get into trouble, and are sent away to the

farms.

The Director of the Bantu Administration Department in Durban felt that the crucial issue was poverty. "I wish to make bold and say that whatever reasons have been advanced are of a purely superficial nature. Even the women who started off this tragic course did not express their grievances in terms of bare, basic and intrinsic facts. They have talked about Kafir beer and illicit liquor, transport and housing, shack removals and influx control, the keeping of livestock and the keeping of husbands, gambling dens and of shebeens. They have talked about those subjects as if they mattered for their own sakes. Only here and there did the real, naked reason break to the surface—money or rather lack of it . . . The basic and ultimate reason is an economic one. The poverty of the urban Bantu; the discrepancy between his earning capacity and his cost of living; his inability to meet the demands of modern times in a city modelled on the Western way of life; his inability even to meet the barest necessity of life, to feed, clothe, educate and house himself and his family".

This is certainly the core of the matter. The sufferings of poverty are aggravated by influx control. From the European point of view, influx control is a mechanism by which Africans are "canalised" to the areas in which there is a European demand for their labour. From the point of view of Zulus living in the rural areas of Natal, influx control often denies them the opportunity to alleviate their poverty by seeking employment in the areas traditionally open to them, more particularly Durban. For many urban Africans it creates insecurity in the threat of deportation if their labour becomes redundant or if they are declared illegal residents in the city.

Added to poverty are the many oppressive laws and administrative procedures. In Maritzburg and at Cato Manor, antagonism was directed against the Bantu Education Act in the burning of community schools. In the Harding area, there was resentment over a land resettlement scheme, which would have involved the destruction of homes. Dipping tanks were a general source of grievance, and women complained that they were obliged to give their labour for the maintenance of dipping tanks without reward. There were complaints against anti-squatter laws and against increased taxation.

Yet the African people have no effective means of lightening their burdens. Deputations are of little value, save to forge

unity, and to inform the world of the disabilities of the non-whites. As Chief Luthuli, President of the African National Congress, expressed it: "a child that does not cry may die unnoticed, carried by its mother on her back". When the Director of Bantu Administration in Durban reproached the women for not having come to him with their grievances, they asked of what use deputations could be. Had the Director consulted them before demolishing their homes? The Location Advisory Boards are purely advisory, and even then, Africans complain that little attention is given to their advice.

Mr. A. W. G. Champion, Chairman of the Locations Combined Advisory Boards of Durban, commented that "the African women of Natal have demonstrated that the sufferings endured by many families cannot be described in constitutional words. It is the voice of oppressed people who have no other means of voicing their grievances before the governments of the land . . . I do not blame them. I lay the blame at the door of the multiplicity of the laws and their regulations, which are harshly administered by men who do not show sympathy. Men and women in urban areas and rural areas suffer and feel the same". One of the demonstrators expressed the point more graphically. In destroying a dipping tank, the people had written a letter which the Government would read. (Report in 'Drum').

There is nothing new in the forms of action I have described—the police baton charge and the subsequent destruction of property, the beer hall picket, the stoning of buses, the destruction of equipment in the agricultural betterment schemes, the deputation to government officials; and in the past, women have played a part in this type of demonstration. The extent of their participation is however something new, the deliberate exclusion of the men, and the determination to act and to speak for themselves. This is all the more remarkable against the background of the traditional subordination of the Zulu woman, which is reinforced by the provisions of the Natal Code. An unconscious expression of subordination emerged in an interview with one of the Cato Manor women who complained that the police had beaten them. "No one has the right to beat a woman, only her husband". In this context of the almost perpetual minority status of the Zulu woman, under the guardianship of her father or her husband or husband's relative, the militant emancipation of women in these demonstrations suggests the beginnings of a suffragette movement.



This was the viewpoint of one African who laid responsibility for it on Government and Municipal authorities. They were treating the women like men. They issued them with separate registration books. "Why not both husband and wife on one card, seeing that they are married?" The photographers had removed the women's headgear, which only husbands are entitled to do. Officials had received deputations of women and listened to their grievances. Men resent the new emancipation of the women, according to this commentator, but they are behind them, because it is all part of the big fight against the whites. Since the Government treats women like men, let them behave as such.

I also believe that we are seeing the beginning of a suffragette movement, but arising from somewhat different causes. In the insecurity of the towns, and as a result of the migrant labour system and influx control, the stable core of the family is often the mother and her children. The low wages of their husbands oblige women to take on an economic role. In nursing and teaching they often earn more than their men. One can hear the phrase—"she is a woman, but she behaves like a man", or "she is like a brother to me"—indicating the new economic role of the women. And these new economic responsibilities are reflected in a growing emancipation.

Interwoven with the suffragette stirrings is the liberation movement. The laws bear heavily on the women. They are equally affected with the men by "canalisation" under influx control. And the impact of government control has been brought directly to them by the registration book (pass) system. Most politicians would have despaired of the conservative, subordinate Zulu women. Their level of political consciousness could hardly have been higher than that of many of the women who support the Opposition United Party. Yet in a short time, economic circumstances and Government policies have combined to awaken political consciousness.

The uniformity of laws bearing equally on the urban and rural population partly accounts for the rapid imitative spread of the demonstrations. To this must be added the fact that there are not two economies in Natal, a Zulustan economy and a white economy, but a single whole. The deportation of women from Durban, on the grounds that they were not legally entitled to live there, has helped to spread resentment and political consciousness into the more remote areas. The homogeneity of

the population, predominantly Zulu, is a further factor. And finally there is the suffragette aspect, the curious telepathic contagion women seem to have for each other.

The involvement of the women has meant the deeper involvement of the men. They are embittered by baton charges against the women, by their arrest and imprisonment. They are shamed by the militant role of the women, by the imputation that they are allowing them to fight their battles because police action will be less violent against women than against men. But above all, the woman represents the home. During the Cato Manor disturbances, the women sang "You touch women, you touch grinding stones". The militancy of the women threatens the family hearth.

In consequence political consciousness has been heightened among the Zulu people, a remarkable development given the general political backwardness of the population of Natal, both white and non-white. Some attempt was made to fasten responsibility on the African National Congress. This is a conventional allegation. Any disturbance must be due to Congress or Communists or both, and the allegation has the function of deflecting analysis away from the ideologies of the Government. Congress disclaimed responsibility—I have no doubt personally that the demonstrations were largely spontaneous—and immediately sought to restrain violence. It has now set itself the task of guiding the new political consciousness in constructive non-violent action along the lines of Congress policy. The task is made all the more difficult by the introduction of the raw inexperienced cadres of the women, and the deeper emotional involvements of the men. Peaceful development toward a democratic society in Natal may depend in large measure on the ability of Congress to canalise passion, under conditions of great hardship and provocation, into disciplined and effective non-violent political action.

*The conflicting ideologies and programmes of the Congress Movement and the breakaway recently-formed Pan-Africanist Congress will be dealt with in the next number, when we will publish an exchange between Mr. P. Nkutsou Raboroko, Africanist Secretary for Education, and Adv. Duma Nokwe, Secretary-General of the African National Congress.*

## TRAVELS IN TRIBALISM

ANTHONY DELIUS

*Political Correspondent of the 'Cape Times'*

"WE can modernise the tribal system", said Chief Frank Maserumule's son, a graduate of Witwatersrand University. He was a well-tailored, quick-witted young man, who had obviously made a deep impression on the Bantu Administration officials. Long before we had met him they had kept telling us about him, emphasizing his education. Now we began to see why.

'We' were a party of South African journalists, who sat listening attentively in the neat little dung-smearred courtyard of the Chief's house. Behind us the massive grey boulder, presiding over the mud-walled compounds, was turning pale gold in the late lowveld sun. Before us the massive grey head of the most impressive chief we had yet met nodded approvingly at his son's solution. He had, he confessed earlier, been extremely nervous of us, thinking we were some official party come to demand God-knows-what of him—but now he was simply a splendid old man, proud of his boy. The ragged band of his councillors, sitting respectfully to one side like poor relations, rustled with something like applause.

None of us quite realised at the time that we had been present at the birth of another one of those phrases that so hauntingly reveal South Africa's split personality. Everything on our journey through the embryo Bantustans had tended to this delivery. Later we were to hear it repeated by others, mainly officials. But here it came out clearly, explicitly, for the first time. In a land of "Bantu Education", "foreign natives", "third-generation temporary sojourners" and the rest, "modernised tribalism" had now arrived to join the growing family of etymological crazy mixed-up kids.

This was the moment of truth in our long trek trailing clouds of dust and Information Officers. If we had not been so affected by the placidity of the afternoon and the nearby sounds of women setting out the calabashes of beer, we would have jumped up. We would have cried out, "That's it! That's what keeps worrying us!"

All the way up from East London, as we zig-zagged through the areas scheduled by Dr. Verwoerd to become, one day, "independent Bantu homelands", these two conflicting concepts had kept troubling us, nagging at us—this "modernisation"

and this emphasis on "tribalism". They rode with us across the Transkei's 400 miles of hut-pimpled, wimpling grasslands, over the ant-bitten or cane-bristling hills of Zululand, past the lakes and spreading new forests of Northern Maputaland, through the alternating thorn-scrub and paw-paw groves of the lowveld Reserves, and among the trees and streams of Vendale's lovely mountains.

Everywhere we had seen the continuations or beginnings of dedicated though desperately understaffed attempts to turn the African tribesman into a modern farmer or forester. New crops, advanced methods, irrigation schemes, inland fisheries, proper use and control of such small plots as they have, better techniques of meat-raising and dairy farming, the organisation of sales and shows, all these things were being demonstrated to, urged upon the Xhosa, Zulu, Shangaan, and so on. It was not that this effort to stimulate change was massive or even adequate, but that it was stretched so far and into such unlikely places—a thin, sunburnt line of technical officers struggling to hold the front of a life-time's work for modernisation. Like so many Davids they faced the Goliath task of having to set up two million tribesmen on "economic units" of land, and shifting two million others off the land into non-existent Reserve industries and "rural villages". With a dogged, surprisingly hopeful persistence, they battled on to end the old fidgeting systems of tribal agriculture and the collector's passion for scrub cattle that characterizes tribal ranching.

All around them swarmed the new starry-eyed Information Officers and administrative men—babbling of chiefs, ancient and colourful ethnic ways, and battles long ago. For the task of these officials was to shore up a tribal society that had long been in decay, and revive the traditional authority of chiefs fading slowly but ineluctably into history.

From the start we encountered startling juxtapositions of modernity and tribalism. In the big Zwelisha rayon factory on the borders of the Ciskei, Xhosa workers handled looms as well as the average Lancashire worker; in the modern housing scheme on the opposite hill, a doctor and a bus-owner had built themselves £6,000 houses. But this hardly interested our white guide and Information Officer—he lectured us on Kwashi Ceremonies under Peddie's big milkwood tree, on the 17 different ways the Xhosa have of making porridge, and recited songs sung by youths at the Abakweta or initiation ceremonies. We had a

full-scale press interview with Chief Botha Sigcau, the new "Prime Minister of the Transkei", and then walked outside to watch his chief Mbongo, his head Councillor, and an enthusiastic commoner crawl in the dust to kiss his boots. We visited a mission hospital and found an initiation hut in the grounds—a woman doctor hygenically snipped off the foreskins and then the youths, attended by African male nurses, sat out their time on the hospital precincts.

Probably the most charming, yet curiously heart-rending, scene we saw in this conflict was during a visit to a very modernly equipped and designed T.B. hospital just outside Umtata. There we found the four-year-old son of a chief sitting up in bed among other solemn and bright-eyed black infants. At the coaxing of an official, he sang out all the traditional praises of his father as a rain-begetter and an intermediary with the ancestral spirits.

Thus against a background of gathering change we listened to this nagging, almost desperate insistence on tribal ways and traditions. It induced odd hallucinations in us. We began to suspect that the Government must consist of distant ethnologists with a vested academic interest in keeping the Reserves as cultural museums, in closing up the whole tribal system in glass cases as we have done with the Bushmen in Cape Town. There seemed something more in all this than simply a political stragem carried to extraordinary lengths and bizarre manifestations. The ethnological note, the nostalgia to preserve fully the elder ways and customs of the Bantu, rose to something like a dominant theme rather than a theme of domination. It reached heights even of artiness in the zig-zag screens of African design, the abstract tribal symbols, and the circular 'lapas' that were to become the junior common-rooms of the new, hastily built Bantu Universities. But strangest of all was to stand where old William Shaw, where so many fine Christian missionaries had first announced the revolutionary truths of their religion to the tribes of Southern Africa, and now hear a queer new evangelical fervour. For there was a curiously dedicated, missionary tone about many of our official informants.

Indeed, two of our Information Officers were *ex-missionaries*. One was nick-named 'Swazi' and the other 'Muruti' because of their special backgrounds. They represented the great seriousness and sincerity that the Government taps in its ethnic approach to African affairs. 'Swazi' was an intense fellow with a little

goatee, a dreamer, perhaps a poet, who sang us Xhosa roundelays and talked almost rhapsodically about the rustic joys of unspoiled tribal life. His spiel might have been even more charming if it had not been so obviously intended to demonstrate that the Africans were utterly different, remote from ourselves as human beings. 'Muruti' was a bustling, insensitively honest, muscular Christian type, always urging us onward to fresh ethnic discovery with rousing cries and imperious fanfares on motor-hooters. His most ardent statement to us was: "I have spoken to Bantu doctors and professors and A.N.C. leaders and headmasters—but I have spoken to the real élite of the Bantu in the kraals. They are the men of great wisdom and immersed in the ways of their people".

I do not give this quotation to draw the unspoken inference that advanced education necessarily makes for wisdom among the Africans, any more than it does among the Europeans. No doubt there are aged councillors among the illiterate tribesmen, who become sagacious beyond their generation. But the emphasis of both 'Swazi' and 'Muruti' was that modern education was dilution of the rich fund of traditional lore, a poor, reedy, artificial substitute for it. The source of all wisdom for the African, they seemed to indicate, was in tribal immersion. "They've got to go through a process of evolution, and that begins with the tribe", we were constantly told. To such thinkers it seemed that there had been an erroneous revolution, whose effects had to be undone. Way back, busybody liberals, over-civilised administrators and over-zealous missionaries had crashed in among and wrecked social subtleties they wotted not of. Africans had to be led back to the scene of the accident, to the point of the wrong turning taken under the sudden pressures of the great European intrusion.

'Muruti', for instance, gave us a lecture on the simple sense of justice in every African. The Europeans would put an African in gaol for stealing a cow. That was futile. Gaol, to the African, was like a rather rigorous holiday in a free hostel. A chief, in the old days, would fine the man's family or village—one cow for recompense, one cow to feed the court, and one cow for his own services. The next time the man stole a cow he would probably get a thrashing from the chief in addition to the fine. If the man committed the crime a third time, he might even disappear, pushed off a mountain-top, or something equally abrupt.



"Are you suggesting a return to these methods?" we asked.

"No, no," said 'Muruti', "I'm simply saying that they have a different outlook on dealing with crime".

But there was a slightly wistful note about this denial.

More daring than 'Muruti' was yet another Information Officer—an engaging young Pretoria University graduate with an R.A.F. moustache. He spent some time explaining to some of us in the back of a bus how tribalism should be taken to its logical modern conclusion. Each tribe should develop its own brand of Christianity. Thus each tribe would be able to make the Christian ethic part of its ethnic own. (We listened to this proposition in respectful silence. All forebore to point out that the African needed no encouragement to start his own particular brands of Christianity. There were already more than 2,000 of them in South Africa. Whether they were advancing respect for the Christian ethic as a result was debatable.)

The jealousy with which the authorities protect these tribal possessions from prying eyes was several times demonstrated for us. Once our Pretoria University guide took us off the road to show us some white-painted Abakweta youths recovering from their initiation in front of their hut. An American tourist, a member of the Byram caravan trek, joined the straggle of journalists down the hill-side and raised his camera with the rest.

"Are you one of these American tourists?" demanded our Information Officer sharply.

"Yeah . . . I . . ."

"Don't you know you are not allowed to leave the road in this territory without permission?"

The American disregarded this greeting and took his photographs.

If Abakweta initiates are officially difficult to encounter, the chiefs are even more so. None stay alongside the road, but reside on their farms mostly tucked many miles off the beaten track behind hills and red-tape. When we asked to see one particularly outspoken chief, great difficulties immediately arose. But there were other, bigger chiefs towards whom we were wafted on dust-clouds of official approval. For these men demonstrated the progress of the great tribal revival. They stood at the summit of the achievement, on the pinnacle of the Government's most recent statistical triumph.

The beginning of the new orientation is the acceptance of a 'Bantu Authority'. This system removes the white magistrate

to the outer orbit of the tribal system, although he is still the final authority. The chief or headman is promoted to a more active role at the centre of the group's affairs, and is advised by a mixture of hand-picked and government-nominated councillors. Where permitted by the commissioner or magistrate, he collects taxes and levies for administration revenue and specific projects—new schools, clinics, offices and so on. ("I'm letting my chiefs collect the dog-tax this year", said one Commissioner. "Next year maybe they can bring in the personal tax".) The system of authority is pyramidal and starts from just above the grass-roots level—the grass-roots themselves have a kind of power-vacuum interposed between them and the base of the pyramid. The authorities rise from district to regional to territorial. Aided by his council, the chief is supposed to give the sense of the popular feeling in his determinations. Thus "the chief's decision is final"—unless, of course, he happens to contradict a Government decision.

Recently the Government announced that already 80 per cent. of the Reserve tribes—nearly 4,000,000 people—have accepted Bantu Authorities. What is even more astonishing is that there is not one demurring tribe in the Transkei, long regarded as politically the most sophisticated of all the Reserves. Not one of the 123 districts of the area have held out against the new system. They have made the first grand-slam territorial acceptance of apartheid.

This reversion to Bantu Authorities in the Transkei is certainly notable. For more than 60 years, the Xhosa-speaking peoples have been toying with more representative forms of government than the tribal system. There the commissioners and the chiefs have had to deal with councils on which the majorities represented the taxpayers. The summit of the council system was the Bunga, a debating club in which at least half the members were taxpayer representatives. Many Bunga members could therefore speak directly for the people. In the new Transkei Territorial General Council, however, this elected element almost disappears.

The puzzling fact is that the old Bunga members in 1951 passed a resolution asking that nothing so primitive as the Bantu Authorities system be applied to the Transkei. Yet by 1955 the Bunga members had accepted the system. We asked a leading administrator, one who was believed to have invented Bantu Authorities, why there had been such a rapid change of mind. "Probably they got news of how well the Bantu Authorities were

working in the Transvaal," he said.

This must have been detected by remarkable powers of anticipation amounting practically to second-sight. When we arrived in the Transvaal, we found the most successful of the Bantu Authorities there only seemed to have got going tentatively by 1957, two years after the Bunga switch. Of course, teams of Bantu Affairs Department Information Officers might simply have brought forecasts of how well things were going to go in certain selected areas of the Transvaal. Mr. Chris Prinsloo, Chief B.A.D. Information Officer, is often mentioned in background reports as having been present at meetings where a Bantu Authority was accepted—after preliminary difficulties. The difficulties themselves were often great. Shootings, burnings and strong police retaliation took place in Zeerust and Sekhukhuneland, a Government-appointed chief was shot dead in the Ciskei, and so on. There was, and still may be, much unpleasantness in Tembuland. Even after the chiefs had accepted the Bantu Authority system for the Transkei, they had to make a request to the Government for arms to protect their persons.

We asked a senior official in the Transkei whether it would not have been possible, instead of reimposing the tribal system in its ethnic purity, simply to have made the councils more representative and given them greater local powers. He shook his head. "An old councillor once confessed to me that in the 30 years he had worked with it he had never once understood how the Bunga operated", he explained. Then he added, "the trouble with the old council system was that it was too Western, too foreign to Bantu tradition".

Chief Botha Sigcau, head of the Transkeian Teritorial Authority, is a very large man with an impassive face. I would almost call him poker-faced. He reminded me, as he sat before us in his natty executive's suit, of the head of a big car sales firm of my acquaintance. As his three chief councillors crept about him, bobbing obsequiously and uttering muted cries of 'Bayete!', the impression grew stronger.

We had entered his court-room by way of his office. On the mantelpiece of this ante-room stood two life-size, eye-catching portraits of Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. de Wet Nel, the Minister for Bantu Administration. Hanging shyly about in the far background was a much smaller signed photograph of the British Royal Family. Whether the Chief normally kept the pictures

of the Cabinet Ministers so well to the fore, or whether he simply placed them there for official visits, I do not know. Perhaps he follows some new version of Bantu tradition, and keeps them permanently there to ward off ill-luck and sudden visitations.

"The Government", said the Chief, "is our Father".

There was not a word he uttered about Bantu Authorities that would not have drawn enthusiastic applause from the next room had Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Nel been there in the flesh.

We asked if there were any African National Congress activities in his area. The chief passed the question over to his head councillor, rather as an ancient monarch would hand over a suspicious dish to his taster.

"We do not know the A.N.C. here", said the head councillor.

"What if A.N.C. members get sent back here when the chief's subjects from Johannesburg are returned to his country?"

"We shall ask the Government to deport them—as in the past", said the councillor promptly. It seemed that another good old tribal tradition was building up.

"You mean you cannot have two bulls in one kraal?" asked one of us, remembering a favourite analogy used by Mr. de Wet Nel.

"Yes, yes, that is it! We cannot have two bulls".

In the Transvaal we asked Chief Frank Maserumule's son whether he did not foresee African people wanting some more representative system.

"The tribal system *is* representative", he said. "All views and interests are taken into account".

"Would you allow the A.N.C. to organise here?"

"No, the A.N.C. is too one-sided".

"But why do so many of the better educated Africans join the A.N.C.?"

"They are misled".

"Before your representation in Parliament was abolished this year, why did you consistently return people to the Senate and House who agreed with much of what the A.N.C. said?"

"We were misled".

"Do you intend with all these new developments in Africa to maintain the tribal system as it is, then?"

"No, we can modernise the tribal system", said Chief Maserumule's son.

The technical officers believed that the restored tribalism

was going to be of some assistance to them. "Dealing with a crumbling society is like trying to pin down quick-silver", said one. "Now we have officially definite groups to work with, and at least one man, an effective chief, through whom to transmit plans". Whether or not it was lastingly good to restore a social system which had so long before begun to decay, the technical officers were too busy to consider. In any case it seemed to them a temporary expedient. One, looking ahead to that distant time when his plans had produced numbers of good peasant farmers on 'economic units' or even bigger ones, remarked, "Of course, they'll be the first to throw off the authority of the chiefs".

We heard many annoyed or despairing references to the people's indifference to instruction, precept, prescription. Many stories were told us of how all sorts of efforts to impart wisdom or stimulate change had drained away into a desert of popular listlessness. Administrators told us that this was due to the old system of "spoon-feeding", and now the Government was putting everything onto a do-it-yourself basis. The restoration of the tribal system was in itself an attempt to prime the pumps of popular initiative. It seemed to the authorities a healthier way of organising popular dynamism than through the A.N.C. which the Africans themselves had begun to develop. Yet we discovered in the course of our journey that ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, now exiled head of the A.N.C., was one of the best organisers of modernisation in his region and had built up a really viable cane-growers co-operative.

As we went along through the Reserves we began to form a strange impression. The people were somehow absent from the scene. Of course, there were thousands of Africans about us. We met chiefs, African agricultural demonstrators, clerks, teachers, even a radio announcer. But the people seemed remote from us, always at a distance. They never thrust themselves into our attention, possibly because the most thrusting part of the population, 70 per cent. of the men between 18 and 40, is always away earning a supplementary living among the 6,000,000 Africans working on the white farms and in the cities. Also, few of us could speak their language. They always appeared politely dissociated from us, busy in their languid way about other business. Chiefs, councillors, interpreters were eloquently articulate, but we were surrounded by the silence of the common man. The silence was eloquent too.

## THE BANTUSTAN FANTASIA

JOHN NIEUWENHUYSEN

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DR. VERWOERD is faced with two pressures which bear formidably on his policy formulation. Firstly, since his Party has been the governing one for eleven years, there is a need to justify the continued suppression of the non-White majority. Secondly, the pressure of events in Africa requires that he has a front on which to fight world opinion. Both pressures lead him to make a show of sincerity and achievement in the direction of apartheid.

The struggle for the control of Parliament now well and truly won, the new struggle is for a more difficult and explosive type of control, namely that over the sullenly suffering mass of the population. For this, many unprecedented powers and a great number of new legislative devices have been adopted; in addition, however, a more definite front is required on which world opinion can be fought, local opposition dealt with, and through which an image of integrity and Christian-like purpose can be presented to the *volk*.

This need for practical contributions to the "goal of separate development" is nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the Government's attempts to present itself as economically developing—and granting political independence to—the Reserves (certain scattered and often individually small areas, in total about seventeen million morgen, set aside under the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts for exclusive African occupation).

Various pieces of legislation were rushed through last year which are plainly intended to show that the Reserves are to be made into viable political and economic entities. There are now to be eight "Bantu national units" and four or five "Bantu colleges" in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and the University Education Extension Act. In addition, there is the Bantu Investment Corporation Act, which is supposedly designed to promote industrial and financial undertakings in the Reserves. It is as much an exercise in 'newspeak' to call this an investment institution however, as it is to call the new "units" self-governing, or the new "colleges" universities.

Describing the objects of this new Investment Corporation in Parliament, Mr. de Wet Nel stated that they had been worded "so widely that the Corporation can serve all the interests of



the Bantu in those (i.e. the Reserve) areas". The Government was starting the Corporation with an initial capital of £500,000. Although this was admitted to be a small beginning, the Government would be quite prepared to vote new funds if this was deemed necessary. However, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development added, he was "most confident that once funds and the potentialities of the Bantu himself have been mobilized, we may perhaps for a long time find it unnecessary for the Government to find further sums."

The channels into which this investment is to flow are deceptively termed "industrial, financial, and other undertakings". The enquiring mind will ask whether any industrial or financial undertakings exist now, or are likely to exist in these areas in the foreseeable future. It is very likely that the only "undertakings" worth speaking of are those which are in the distributive trade, and an expansion of African participation in this direction can probably only be experienced at the expense of existing European concerns. This change-over can hardly be said to be "economic development" as we understand it to-day.

The value attachable to the Act may be well judged by considering the extent of the capital sources which will be available to the Corporation. These are:- 1. the Government; 2. (foreign or local) extra-Reserve inhabitants; and 3. Reserve inhabitants.

The Government's meagre £500,000 (which is about one-eighth of the amount that the proposed change-over to a decimal system will cost), is in any event not a new or original allotment, for the money is simply to be transferred from that amount which has *already been voted* for the purchase of new Reserve land under the 1936 Land and Trust Act, now due to be scrapped.

As far as local or foreign extra-Reserve investors are concerned, we must take note of Clause 13, which *inter alia* provides that "no dividend shall be paid to the shareholder". With the profit motive absent, it is extravagantly absurd to expect that any monies will be forthcoming. Besides this, one must take into account the semi-dictatorial nature of the Corporation; since, although a so-called Board of Directors will run the institution, such is the extent of Ministerial control that these will be, in the words of an Opposition M.P., "a board of office boys".

Investors will not be lending money to a group of financial

experts with the chance of earning dividends; they will be lending it to the Minister for the purpose of pursuing his own misguided aims.

As for the third group of potential investors, the Reserve Africans, a quick glance at any of the large number of authoritative investigations into the conditions of these people and their areas will show plainly that the amount of saving which can be expected from them is negligible.

Mr. de Wet Nel should have known better, having himself been a member of the Tomlinson Commission which issued in 1955<sup>1</sup> the Government-sponsored and then Government-snubbed "blueprint" for the socio-economic development of the Reserves.

Amongst the estimates in this Report was one which held that the average income per family unit of a little more than 6 persons is £42 os. od. per annum, when calculated by "conventional" national income methods. This figure is later "adjusted" somewhat unsatisfactorily. In any event, compared with the *per capita* income of £99 4s. od. for the Union as a whole in 1950/51, the adjusted £12 9s. od. *per capita* income of the Reserves stands in sharp contrast; and Mr. de Wet Nel's expectations of investment from such a source are grotesque in the extreme.

The newly proposed "Bantustans" are designed to conjure up in the mind's eye multi-coloured pictures of the Bantu national homes, where the African will enjoy self-government in an idyllic setting of racial pride and progress. Seen against the grey reality of the true position in these areas, the picture becomes considerably less vivacious. Indeed, it gives the final lie to the possibility of such "separate development in separate areas".

The Reserves are imprisoned in a vicious circle. Low productivity is due to over-population, over-stocking, inefficient farming, and the prevalence of poverty and ignorance. Poverty and ignorance are themselves powerful hindrances to progress. Poverty, besides negating investment possibilities, gives rise to ill-health and inertia, which in turn lower productivity and so intensify want.

Over-population, coupled with the tribal tradition that every married man is entitled to land and grazing, has led to the situa-

<sup>1</sup>See "Africa South", Vol. 1. No. 2 — 'The Significance of the Tomlinson Report' by Professor D. Hobart Houghton.

tion where family holdings are so small that no improvement in agricultural practice is possible, and the custom of "lobola"<sup>2</sup> tends to bring about an excess of inferior and unproductive cattle. The small-holdings and overgrazed veld yield inadequate subsistence, so that each family seeks to augment its income by sending members of the family to work in urban areas. According to the Tomlinson Report, the remittances of migrants account for about half the family income. The result is that the average African male divides his working life between spells of work in the industrial centres and spells at home in the Reserves; and agricultural productivity declines still further because it is the most active adult workers who go away.

The Tomlinson Report estimated that practically every able-bodied African at some time in his working life leaves the Reserves, and that at any given time 40 per cent. of the male population between 15 and 64 years of age is absent in employment outside these areas. Labour migrants are probably economically active outside the Reserves for over 60 per cent. of their working lives. At a generous estimate, migrant workers may spend a third of their time in the Reserves working on the land or maintaining their homes.

An awareness of these facts places in its correct perspective the Government's talk of the potential of these areas as permanent "homes" for the greater part of the present and the future expected African population.

The areas are denuded, over-populated, and at the same time deprived of an able-bodied labour force. Moreover, it is very likely that the continuance of the system of migratory labour will emphasize this position. If it were Government policy that urban Africans could *settle* their families with them, and have permanent residence with the right to own land in urban areas, the Reserve position might be alleviated. A more stable and so productive labour force might then have a chance of establishing itself in the Reserves.

As it is, the Government's policy of not wanting Africans to possess tenure rights in the so-called "White" urban areas leads it to pursue the policy of migratory labour at all costs, so that a permanent, able-bodied working population in the "Bantustans" becomes impossible of establishment.

It may well be that current debate on the development of

<sup>2</sup>The buying of brides, usually with cattle.

"backward" areas has tended to exaggerate the importance of the capital factor. This may have been done for no better reason than that since the "developed" countries have large capital resources, the "under-developed" countries are presumed to require large capital resources if they are to enjoy progress on any significant scale. The argument ignores the point, however, as Professor Jack has put it, "that capital by itself, unsupported by the requisite technical knowledge and skill to use the capital, will be little effective".

For an evaluation, therefore, of the Government's attempts and proposals to develop the Reserve areas, one must not only look at the pitiful sums allotted to the Bantu Administration Department, or to the "butter-on-your-conscience" amount which goes to the establishment of the Bantu Investment Corporation from the Native Trust. One must look more closely at the people in these areas, their present position, and the Government's proposals for bringing them into a money economy of free enterprise and modern industrial organization.

The Government has burdened itself in its stated policy with the contradictory aims of maintaining on the one hand a "traditional" or "tribal" culture, and, on the other, with the encouragement of modernisation in the economic sphere. Nowhere in the Parliamentary debates, now so degraded by the arrogance of Government speakers, can one find a statement which comes to grips with the problem of what type of African culture is envisaged as consistent with Christianity and the techniques of industrial production and an exchange economy. The acceptance of individualistic methods of production is implicit in their assumptions concerning industrial development, yet nowhere is it stated whether these can be incorporated into anything which can be called "Bantu culture", or that preservation of the 'ethnic soul' which is the pulse of apartheid.

At the outset, therefore, the Government is confronted with an impossibility, namely the reconciliation of incompatibles, and this accounts for the lack of sociological sense in its policies, the numerous inconsistencies with which these policies are riddled, and the startling contradictions into which they are betrayed. When one sums up the factors mentioned as Government policy, such as industrialisation to save the soil, building townships, culling cattle, and technical education, it becomes impossible to see how Africans will be expected to develop "along their own lines".

It is impossible for change to a modern Western economy to occur in the context of the primitive African agricultural, social and political system. For industrial development, not only is participation in a world market required—the social and political framework which goes with the modern economy has also to be established. The development of a modern economy, the raising of income levels, requires a change in social structure, and in the individual outlook of the people concerned. And, indeed, despite Government mutilations, the African people have at all times shown that this is a change which they most earnestly desire.

One is led to the conclusion that all thoughts of separate development should have ceased abruptly with the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa. Before then, as Professor Hoernlé himself has said, territorial segregation might have been regarded as an equitable solution, for it would have been within the realms of possibility. Before 1860, our population was but a tiny fraction of what it is to-day, and we may note with Professor Frankel that the great population increase in the last 100 years has been made possible only because, with much imported capital, “labour could be applied to an ever-increasing extent to the exploitation of natural resources in those particular places where, on the whole, they yielded the greatest economic returns”. The main consequence of the transformation which has occurred since the discovery of gold and diamonds is that isolated African and European economies which supported small, scattered populations, have been replaced by the relatively large population of to-day, which is dependent for its standard of living on the highly integrated operations of a modern industrial community. Whereas 100 years ago, the European and African economy could exist alongside one another, to-day these peoples are indispensable to one another in the country which they irrevocably share.

The Government’s pronouncements may be providing it with a *Weltanschauung* for purposes of display, but the delusion which it is presenting is resulting in incalculable misery for the people whose present economic plight depends on Dr. Verwoerd’s pleasure. Whilst they are now suffering what is avoidable economic misery, the country’s future is being even further jeopardised by this policy, whose only real investment is in the development of rightful bitterness and resentment on the part of the African people.

## THE ABYSS OF BANTU EDUCATION

PHYLLIS NTANTALA

WHEN the African people in the Union of South Africa opposed Bantu Education and rightly called it "Education for Slavery", they little thought that so much havoc would be wrought by it within so short a time. Most people thought that at least those children who had reached the fourth standard would escape the holocaust. But it was not enough to attack the people from below; and the Government soon opened its second front, from the top, with its Bantu Junior Certificate syllabus, the introduction of the mother-tongue as a medium of instruction, and—when the Bantu Matriculation syllabus was rejected as an entrance qualification to the free universities—the debased education of the new tribal colleges.

The mutilation of Fort Hare and the establishment of the tribal colleges are, of course, a logical conclusion of Bantu Education—a fact that was ignored or played down, if foreseen at all, by those universities in South Africa that claim to be guardians of education but which are only now awakening to the dangers of Nationalist education policy for the country as a whole.

On the 1st of April, 1955, the Department of Bantu Administration (BAD) took over African education from the Provinces, without any programme and without any trained administrative staff. As was to be expected, the immediate result was chaos. Teachers worked for months without pay, the salaries of teachers in one district were sent to teachers in another, teachers and principals never received any replies to urgent correspondence sent to the Department, and—without any regulations governing the conditions of service having been drawn up and promulgated—teachers were made to enter into contracts with their new employers. This confusion lasted two years, during which a number of teachers were dismissed for opposing Bantu Education, and many schools disestablished to be re-established in more pliable forms. At the end of the period, eight types of school emerged, claiming to provide:

- (a) Lower and Higher Primary Education;
- (b) Secondary Education;
- (c) Teacher Training at Secondary and post-Matriculation level;
- (d) Vocational Training;



(e) Night School and Continuation Classes.

(1) **Government Bantu Schools** are schools under the direct control and administration of the Bantu Education Department and are mainly concerned with teacher and vocational training, though they also number a few other schools situated on government property. The Mission Board Schools fall under this category and that is why they had to be disestablished, suffering drastic changes in the process of their re-establishment. Long-established co-education centres like Lovedale and St. Matthew's in the Cape were made single sex schools; important educational centres like St. Cuthbert's in the Transkei have had to close down their primary and secondary schools.

Lovedale was re-established as a school for boys only, for teacher-training and secondary schooling, while St. Matthew's was limited to girls only, for post Std. VI teacher-training and secondary schooling. This has meant the closing down of the different branches of learning that had been provided at both places. The whole of the Industrial Department at Lovedale for both boys and girls has had to close down, while teacher-training for girls at the post Std. VI and post Junior Certificate levels has been discontinued.

At Lovedale the fine collection of books in the Cuthbert Library, one of the biggest and best school libraries in the country, was put up for sale; and today the former Cuthbert Library building is used as a storeroom for BAD books. The whole character of Lovedale has been changed, Lovedale the fount and shrine of education for non-whites throughout Southern Africa, where the dreams of so many Africans have sprouted and flourished. If Bantu Education was ever to achieve its aims, it was imperative that Lovedale should be destroyed and all these dreams uprooted. And so today, Lovedale is no more, and only its shell still stands.

At St. Matthew's, teacher-training for boys and post Junior Certificate teacher-training for girls have been discontinued, together with the music courses. Teacher-training standards have thus been deliberately lowered, and Std. VI plus a three-year course of training made the normal qualification for African teachers throughout the Union. In sane education it is *quality* rather than *quantity* that counts, and if the education of the African child is going to be worth anything at all, the standard of the teaching profession has inevitably to be raised. But Bantu

Education is not sane education; its object is the lowering—and not the raising—of standards. In some schools teacher-training and secondary education have been merged into a single composite department under one principal and with the same staff.

Now what has happened to all these displaced girls and boys from Lovedale and St. Matthew's? Their parents were advised sometime in August 1956, five months before these changes were due, to find their sons and daughters accommodation either at Lovedale or Healdtown if they were boys, or at St. Matthew's or Healdtown if they were girls. But Healdtown, which has always had a surge of students clamouring for admission, could take only a limited number, and neither Lovedale nor St. Matthew's, which have also always had long waiting lists, could accommodate the new refugees. For most of the displaced, the streets have become the classroom.

The boarding schools have deteriorated beyond recognition. The maintenance staff, except for the cooks, have been dismissed and their work given to students to do. Compulsory manual work intrudes everywhere—before and after classes everyday; corporal punishment provides the only discipline and a whole 'gestapo' system has been introduced, by which—profiting from the poverty of the African people and their desire for education—the authorities are offering scholarships to some students on condition that they spy on their fellows. A letter published in *'New Age'* of May 21st, 1959, is a confession from one of these victims of careful corruption. It is not a unique case; in any one institution there are usually three, four or more of such paid spies.

Inevitably these boarding schools seethe with student discontent and staff repression. In 1957, some 30 senior girls in Shawbury in the Transkei were sent home, allegedly for inciting trouble; and towards the end of the same year, on the eve of their examinations, about 200 men students at St. John's College, Umtata (Transkei), were sent packing. Early in 1957, at the Ndamase Secondary School, Buntingville (near Umtata), a student was shot during a disturbance; and while the resultant student trial was still in progress, the principal, who in court had admitted firing shots to "frighten" the students, was found shot in his house. No foul play was suspected. At Adam's College (Natal), during the second session of the school year, over 200 students were sent home in 1958; and in February of 1959, over 300 students at Lovedale (Cape) chose to go home. Such mass

expulsions are not, of course, reported by the State Information Office in its circulars abroad.

(2) **Community Schools** were formerly the day mission schools scattered throughout the rural and urban areas, built by the various communities and handed over to the churches for management. Even though they were under the management of the churches on whose glebes the schools stood, it was the communities, irrespective of faith or sect, that had constructed and maintained the buildings through various forms of fund-raising. Now, without consulting any of these people, not even the members of their congregations, some church leaders agreed to lease the schools to the Government. A number of such schools in a given area were now to fall under the administration and control of a School Board, with a School Board Secretary—some of its members to be elected by the community and others appointed by the local representative of the Government.

It is notable that, in most areas of the Cape Province, the people have been too hostile to Bantu Education to elect the School Boards, while many have refused to serve when appointed to them by the Government. Those who are to be found serving on these Boards are Government nominees and do not enjoy the confidence of the people—they know this, and the Government knows it too. In several places, however, ministers of the church broke the people's boycott of the BAD School Boards by agreeing to serve on them—forgetting no doubt that He whom they profess to follow and serve did not find it expedient to renounce the truth for which He stood when He was faced with death. Indignant at this betrayal, asserting their rights as communities and not as members of any religious denomination, the people turned quickly against them. In Peddie, in the Eastern Cape, they locked up the schools they had built with their own money and labour and told the minister-in-charge to build his own schools if he wished to hire them out to the Government. In Port Elizabeth, members of a certain church called upon their minister-in-charge, who had accepted the Chairmanship of the local Bantu School Board, to resign, reminding him that he depended on them for his livelihood. In Mt. Ayliff (East Griqualand, Cape) the people burned down the schools they had built rather than lease them to the Government, and then told the minister who had agreed to the lease to hire out his own schools. The hostility continues and grows.

(3) **Farm Schools** exist only on farms belonging to Europeans. Every farmer, with the permission of the BAD, may start a school on his farm for the children of his employees; he may not admit children from adjoining farms unless his neighbours have indicated in writing that they do not object to the attendance at his school of the children of their own employees. The managers of these schools are the farmers themselves or their deputies; and as a result of this comfortable and inexpensive arrangement, a large number of such schools has come into being. In the Free State, for example, there are today more farm schools than there are government and community schools put together—544 farm schools as against 312 government and community schools. The reason is obvious—such schools provide free child labour for the white farmers.

(4) **Mine and Factory Schools** are established by the owners of the mine or factory concerned, with the approval of the BAD. They must lie on the property of the mine- or factory-owner and are intended for the children of *bona fide* African employees of the mine or factory. The owners erect the buildings, and the BAD pays the teachers. As with farm schools, a mine or factory school may not admit children from adjoining mines or factories without the permission of their owners and the approval of the Government.

(5) **Unsubsidized Private Schools** are schools registered with the Department but receiving no subsidy. These include the remaining mission schools (mainly Roman Catholic) which follow the Bantu Education Syllabus and write the Bantu Education examinations, and the Seventh Day Adventist Schools, which have always been independent and conduct their own examinations.

A gloomy future faces the 600 odd Roman Catholic Church schools from which government subsidies have now been withdrawn and many of which have been refused registration. "Of the 662 schools, only about 150 have received definite registration—subject to restrictions and withdrawal", reports the *'Daily Dispatch'*, of 8th January, 1959. The newspaper then continues: "In the near future, only two of the Church's six teacher-training colleges will remain, and their degrees are not recognized by the State. The implementation of the Bantu Education Act has only just begun, but its stranglehold on teacher-

training institutions and secondary education will soon take its heavy toll. By the end of next year, there will scarcely be any of these institutions in the hands of the Church”.

(6) **Scheduled Schools** comprise a small number of schools which for some reason or other have not been classified—like hospital schools—and which, for purposes of administration, are managed by approved bodies or persons. This is not a new type of school; many big hospitals, for example, have for years been running schools to teach their young patients and those who wanted to improve their qualifications. These schools are run by groups of individuals or organizations who now and again appeal to the public for funds to continue their work.

(7) **Night Schools** (8) **Continuation Classes**—The BAD gives the figures for such schools as 6 in the Northern Transvaal, 75 in the Southern Transvaal, 5 in the Free State, 22 in Natal, 2 in the Transkei and 26 in the Ciskei, Cape. But these figures were compiled before the BAD banned private bodies from running Night Schools and Continuation Classes for Africans. In 1957, all those bodies running classes for Africans were required under the Bantu Education Act to obtain the permission of the Department in order to continue: many applied at once, but no reply was received until the middle of 1958. In the Western Province, the Cape Non-European Night Schools Association—which had been running night classes for Africans and other non-whites—lost four of its ten schools, all of which offered classes for Africans. When it at last resumed classes in 1958, only two managed to continue; the subsidy applied for through the “proper” channels was not granted, and no reasons were given.

The tendency throughout the country, of course, has been to ignore all those bodies and persons who have been at this work for a number of years and have learnt more or less all the problems involved: the School Boards which are now supposed to run the schools are not only unsympathetic, but generally ignorant; and the officers of the BAD are indifferent, where not actually hostile. Just how many of these schools still exist in the various Provinces—and how many have been unceremoniously banned—only the Government knows, and it has not published figures. It is improbable that the publications of the State Information Office will provide any enlightenment.

## UNEMPLOYMENT BY RACE

ALEX. HEPPLÉ

*Former Parliamentary Leader of the South African Labour Party*

UNEMPLOYMENT in South Africa rose in July to the highest level recorded for over twenty years. After a long period of full employment, workers are again being tormented by the fear of losing their jobs. The number of registered unemployed is double what it was two years ago: in October 1957 there were 14,445 White, Coloured and Indian workers registered as unemployed at all government labour exchanges; by July 1959, the number had risen to 28,722.

It must be noted that these figures do not cover African unemployment, although Africans comprise more than half the total labour force in manufacturing industry, 90% in mining, 80% in construction and 48% in transport. The official records of unemployment take no account of African workers, who are considered outside the scope of the unemployment problem for which the Department of Labour is responsible. The official records are thus grotesquely misleading—not only because they are incomplete, but because the very workers excluded are those most liable to become unemployed. Africans occupy the jobs where labour turnover is highest and where permanency is rare.

The government of Africans falls under the control of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development; African workers, both employed and unemployed, are under its jurisdiction. Its approach to labour matters, however, is quite different from that of the Department of Labour; it does not keep the same type of unemployment register, for its interest in unemployment is one of control and discipline, not of a welfare problem. It is consequently unable to give reliable, comparable figures for the number of Africans out of work, either generally or in respect of specific industries. It cannot supplement the Department of Labour's monthly figures for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, so as to provide a reliable record of the over-all unemployment position.

An estimate of the number of Africans out of work, based upon returns from regional labour bureaux throughout South Africa, was released by the Chief Information Officer of the Bantu Administration Department, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo, last May.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Rand Daily Mail—23rd May, 1959.



He said that reports from regional labour bureaux<sup>2</sup> showed that there were 95,000 Africans seeking work, "*which was a normal figure, representing about 4% unemployment*". In the absence of proper statistics, this is probably an optimistic estimate. It becomes interesting, however, in the light of the Government's constant claims that South Africa enjoys full employment.

### "Full Employment"

The Minister of Labour said in Parliament on the 21st May, 1959 that unemployment at the end of April had risen to 2.06% of the working population, which was still hardly more than the generally recognized measure of "full employment", viz. 2%. He made it clear, however, that he did not include Africans in this calculation, as they fell outside the scope of his Department.

The use of partial statistics to prove "full employment" has become commonplace in the field of political propaganda and is accepted without comment by the experts who report upon the state of the nation's economy. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Minister of Labour had not the slightest compunction in taking statistical apartheid a stage further in order to present the employment position in an even better light. Speaking to a Nationalist Party Congress at Bloemfontein in September, where White party stalwarts were preparing for the Provincial Election campaign amongst White voters, the Minister said, "*The unemployment figure for July was 28,722 of whom 14,534 were Europeans, representing 1.45% of the employable Europeans. According to international standards 2.5% was normal.*"

These figures not only excluded Africans, but Coloured and Indian unemployed as well. The Minister of Labour, in applying apartheid in this fashion, was merely following his leader, the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, who bluntly stated in Parliament,<sup>3</sup> "*. . . in my opinion the Indians are not our problem in the first place, but the problem of those who are so anxious to take the care of the Indians on their shoulders. If other people are worried about the Indians, let them take the Indians back there, where they would have better opportunities of employment.*"

Dr. Verwoerd did not identify "those", "them" and "there." Most of the Indian workers at present unemployed are descend-

<sup>2</sup>Many of these bureaux are controlled by municipalities who are not required by the central headquarters in Pretoria to submit monthly returns of unemployed Africans, such as are collected by the Department of Labour in respect of workers of other races.

<sup>3</sup>Hansard Col. 9420—29th June, 1959.

ants of the Indian labourers brought to Natal 100 years ago at the behest of the sugar planters, who suffered an acute shortage of labour.

### Unemployment Insurance

Statistical separation of the workless is the cold record of the practice of discriminating between workers of the different races. Africans thrown out of work not only lose their livelihood, but find their very survival in jeopardy. Social security in the form of unemployment insurance is denied to all but an infinitesimal number of them.

Under the 1946 Unemployment Insurance Act, African workers in commerce and industry were covered in the same way as all other workers. The scheme was a contributory one, but soon became unpopular amongst farmers and the mining companies. The farmers, who had been suffering a shortage of labour for some time, resented the fact that Africans in the towns could draw unemployment benefits, instead of being forced by hunger to work on the farms. The mining companies complained to the Government that: "*At a time when so many employers are in need of Native labour, it is illogical that large numbers of Natives should be able to draw unemployment benefits and live in idleness at the expense of the State.*"

At the time the mines were short of some 20,000 African underground workers. The pay offered was 2s. 8d. per day plus food and quarters, and it was a requirement that the workers should "live-in" in the special compounds provided.

One of the first things which the Nationalist Party did after coming to power in 1948 was to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act so as to exclude from the benefits of unemployment insurance all Africans earning less than a £3 10s. 0d. per week basic wage. As 90% of African workers fell within this category, the change amounted to a virtually total exclusion of Africans. Then, in 1957, the Act was re-phrased to make it clear that only those Africans earning a total wage of more than £5 3s. 3d. per week (£272 per annum), inclusive of cost-of-living allowances, qualified for membership of the Fund.

The removal of Africans from the protection of the Unemployment Insurance Act exposes them together with their families to utter destitution, and so produces pressures upon them to accept work on the farms and in the mines. These pressures are vigorously reinforced by laws and regulations

which limit the rights and opportunities of Africans to seek work. They are not free to go from factory to factory, from town to town, from one area to another in order to look for employment.

Once out of a job, an African becomes the pawn of the local labour bureau, to which he must report within 72 hours. There he is issued with a permit to seek work, for a limited period and only within the magisterial area where he is registered. The purpose of this control is to ensure a regular supply of cheap, disciplined labour. It was conceived a long time ago—long before the Nationalists ruled South Africa. It has been defined by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. de Wet Nel, with patriarchal simplicity in these words:<sup>4</sup>

*“There will always be thousands of Bantu on the Whites’ farms, in the mines, in industry and also as servants in the Whites’ homes . . . They will be there not as a right, but at the bidding and by the grace of the Whites. At best, they will be visitors in the White area.”*

In practice, this means that Africans cannot expect the protection of social security measures in the White (i.e. urban) areas. As long as there is work for them, they are welcome; but once they fall victims to unemployment, their presence becomes objectionable. Dr. Albert Hertzog, one of the Government’s specialists in labour affairs and now Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, emphasized this relationship between unemployment insurance and labour control when he said,<sup>5</sup> *“ . . . this must be seen from the point of view of the Government’s whole policy of apartheid . . . (which) means that Natives are no longer to be allowed free and unhampered entry into the cities . . . and means that there need not be a single unemployed Native in the city.”*

### **The Racial Remedy**

In tackling the problem of unemployment, racial considerations are of prime importance to the South African Government. While it would prefer to see the entire population gainfully employed, the Government believes that when there is not enough work for all, steps must be taken to ensure that Whites receive preference in the allocation of jobs.

A somewhat crude long-term plan has been devised to give effect to the racial priorities of the ruling political party; and this doctrinaire solution to the unemployment problem expresses

<sup>4</sup>Addressing the Nasionale Jeugbond—5th September, 1955.

<sup>5</sup>Hansard Col. 6798—1st June, 1949.

the real spirit and intent of the racial policy now being peddled at home and abroad as "separate development". It falls into three parts: (i) job reservation on racial lines; (ii) deportation of "foreign" Africans; and (iii) farm and mine work for Union Africans.

In terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, the Minister of Labour has power to reserve jobs for workers on racial grounds alone and make it a criminal offence for workers of one race to perform work which has been reserved for members of another. Several such decrees have already been issued, affecting employment in the clothing, building, engineering and transport industries, where a number of jobs have been reserved for White workers only.

As unemployment grows, so will job reservation. If the situation becomes serious, the Government is determined that the main burden should be carried by the non-Whites. If there are to be long unemployment queues, the Government hopes to keep as many Whites as possible out of them.

The State-owned railways, which at the moment are experiencing some slackness, have begun to get rid of non-White employees. During the recent session of Parliament, the Minister of Transport, Mr. B. J. Schoeman, stated,<sup>6</sup> "*Where it is found that there is a job being temporarily done by a Native that a White man can do, then the White man is placed into that job.*" The Nationalist Member of Parliament for Vasco, Mr. C. de Villiers, boasted at a Party meeting on the 3rd September, 1959<sup>7</sup> that "*during the past year, 13,000 non-Whites were ousted from the Railways, in keeping with the policy of the National Party to protect the White worker.*"

The second part of the Government plan to combat unemployment is also discriminatory, placing Union Africans in a different category from those who have come from Nyasaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland, and other parts of Africa. Many of these "foreign" Africans are already being deported; and only those working in the mines or on farms are being allowed to remain.

The Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, feels very strongly that workers from outside the country are an unnecessary burden, for he said in Parliament:<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Hansard Col. 2443—12th March, 1959.

<sup>7</sup>'Evening Post'—4th September, 1959.

<sup>8</sup>Hansard Col. 9420—29th June, 1959.

*"We are still saddled with approximately 400,000 foreign Natives, who are not our concern and responsibility. If those Natives were to be pushed out of South Africa—because preference must be given to Union Natives when there is unemployment—then there would be no suggestion of unemployment amongst Union Natives."*

A peculiar situation would develop in international affairs if the Prime Ministers of other countries adopted this extraordinary attitude towards workers who had immigrated into their territories. What would happen, for example, if the Prime Minister of Australia, faced with an unemployment problem, suddenly declared that the Hollanders, Germans and Englishmen who had flocked there and helped boost production in good times, were no longer Australia's concern and responsibility?

A month before Dr. Verwoerd's statement to Parliament, the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Bantu Administration declared that large-scale unemployment among Union Africans would not eventuate, *"because the 750,000 foreign Bantu now working in the Union could, and would be moved to make way for unemployed Union Africans."*<sup>9</sup> The Minister of Labour claimed on the 2nd October, 1959<sup>10</sup> that, since coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist Government had deported no less than 800,000 "foreign" Africans.

If this is correct and a further 750,000 are to be deported, the present government will have succeeded in expelling more than one-and-a-half million Africans from South Africa. Surely this must rank as one of the major feats of mass removal in history.

The policy of deporting "foreign" Africans is likely to bewilder thoughtful people who take note of the persistent complaints of shortages in mine and farm labour. The contradiction can be explained by the general belief amongst Whites that if every Union African could be compelled to work, there would be no shortage of labour anywhere in the country. The Unemployment Insurance Act was bitterly resented precisely because it ran contrary to the traditional policies for the control and direction of African labour; the very idea of Africans drawing unemployment pay was regarded as outrageous by most Whites.

Despite the stringent control exercised over the influx of rural Africans into the towns, in order to bind them fast to the rural areas, there is a chronic shortage of unskilled farm labour. And the mining industry, which enjoys special facilities in the

<sup>9</sup>Rand Daily Mail—23rd May, 1959.

<sup>10</sup>Die Transvaler—3rd October, 1959.

employment of Africans and draws vast supplies of migrant labour from the rural areas and the neighbouring African territories, experiences persistent difficulty in maintaining an ample supply of unskilled African labour.

In promising to give Union Africans the jobs now held by "foreign" Africans, the Government is in fact telling the Africans that their future lies in farm and mine work. "Surplus" Africans will be removed from the urban areas and made available to the farmers and mining companies. There are sufficient laws on the Statute Book to make this a simple task.

An African qualifies for permanent residence in an urban area only if he has been there continuously since birth, or has legally lived there for an unbroken period of fifteen years, or has worked for the same employer continuously for ten years. In addition, he must possess the further qualification of never having been sentenced to a fine exceeding £50 or to imprisonment exceeding six months.<sup>11</sup>

As unemployment spreads, those who fall out of work or are displaced by the application of job reservation will be deemed to be surplus to White needs in the urban areas and summarily ordered to leave. Steps will be taken to remove them from the towns to the rural areas or Reserves, where they can be induced to sign contracts of service with farmers or with the mining companies as migratory labourers.

In terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, any unemployed African is exposed to the danger of being declared "an idle or undesirable person", to be thereupon sent to a work colony unless he agrees to accept work with an employer (usually a farmer) approved by a Native Commissioner or Magistrate. As Dr. Albert Hertzog knowingly said, "*there need not be a single unemployed Native in the city*".

Will the Government solve its unemployment problem by applying its racial remedy?

The possible economic effects cannot be examined here, although they are obvious. The simple expedients of job reservation and mass removal are bound to shrink the internal market and invite boycotts in the export field.

Remedies of this kind can have nothing but harmful effects upon industry and trade. Nevertheless, they are already being applied; and thousands of workers are already suffering their effects.

<sup>11</sup>The maximum penalty for taking part in a strike is £300 and 3 years' imprisonment.



# THE ETHICS OF BOYCOTT

DAVID MILLER

ONE could not help remarking, during the last few months, that certain Nationalist spokesmen have shown an admirable concern for their non-white subjects. Referring to the action of the Jamaican government in refusing to buy S.A. goods, Mr. Eric Louw roundly condemned the boycott as an unethical means of coercion which all decent people must regard with distaste. He, and many another pious Minister, warned that such monstrous action, which constitutes in any case interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, would react upon the very people whose cause the Jamaican government is concerned to espouse.

All up and down the country admonishing fingers have wagged like twigs in the breeze, warning of economic hardship that must follow; and though one normally reacts only with suspicion when Nationalists champion human causes, the second part of the argument at least is so plausible as to require some examination.

To begin with, is the boycott unethical? Here one should correct a misconception. It is a fallacy to regard the technique of boycott as a rare or extreme form of economic sanction or political protest. It is, on the contrary, one of the most widespread and inescapable features of our economic life. Consider the following hypothetical case: I have been planning a tour of Europe and I am concerned to limit its cost. I elect, after due consideration, to include England, France and Italy in my itinerary. Shall I include Switzerland? I investigate the rate of exchange and find that it operates heavily in my disfavour. I decide that, despite its many attractions, I shall not visit the country until its rate of exchange becomes more favourable.

In every sense of the word, I have decided to boycott the tourist industry of Switzerland. My reason for doing so is no less precise for being implicit; it is to induce the Swiss government to reduce the high price of tourism in its country. If the external revenue from tourism is an appreciable proportion of total revenue and if the tendency to shun Switzerland is sufficiently widespread, the Swiss government will in due course be compelled to devalue the Swiss franc or take other steps to compensate the bad rate of exchange, and the object of the

boycott will have been achieved.

It does not make any difference to the principle involved that there has been no formal call to boycott. The agreement to do so may be tacit; the boycott remains a fact.

And this form of boycott occurs daily; it is an approved means of exerting economic pressure to a given end. No one would question the ethics of such action, nor ever has.

But let the matter not rest there. Suppose that I learn that YOU are planning a trip overseas and I say to you: "Whatever you do, avoid Switzerland like the plague. The exchange rate is prohibitive, and it will cost you the earth!"

Now I have not stopped at the mere act of boycott—I am now inciting you to boycott too. I have asked or induced you to join me in protest, and although the end at which I aim is still purely economic, the means I employ have become quasi-political. My opposition has become explicit; the means I employ have invoked elementary organisation; I have wittingly or unwittingly taken the first step towards a 'Boycott Switzerland' movement.

Once again this sort of action is a common everyday occurrence; people repeatedly embark upon such rudimentary campaigns, and no one would dream of questioning the ethic of even this extended action. Yet it has been the repeated thesis of government and business spokesmen alike that the boycott as such is bad in principle, is ethically reprehensible, and so on.

This point of view seems to rest then not upon the act of boycott, but upon the end towards which it is directed. There have in recent years been frequent and organised calls to boycott in South Africa—for example, the National Council of Women's call to women to boycott nylon stockings—which have not upset the delicately balanced ethical sense of the powers that be, presumably because the object of the boycott has been purely economic, i.e. a protest directed against unsatisfactory quality or price.

Perhaps then, a boycott is 'bad' only when the end as well as the means is political? But is it always possible to distinguish between these two ends? Returning to the example of Switzerland, suppose that the boycott, whether individual or organised, whether implicit or explicit, is designed not as a protest against the unfair rate of exchange, but as a protest against inadequate wages paid to workers in the Swiss cheese industry.

The object of the boycott is again clearly defined—to induce the Swiss manufacturers to pay their workers a higher wage. Suppose that here in South Africa the boycott is organised on two fronts:—

- (a) by the trade union movement, which is concerned with the plight of workers everywhere, and
- (b) by the Union government!

Yes, indeed, by the Union government, for the Union government does frequently indulge in boycott! Of course they do not call their action "boycott", what they say is something like this:

"In view of the fact that the Swiss manufacturers, by maintaining a level of wages lower than the norm, are able to compete unfairly with the local industry, an *ad valorem* tariff of 150% shall henceforth be levied against Swiss cheese". And Dr. Dönges, Minister of Finance, will smile nicely at the cameramen and preen himself on having done his patriotic duty.

Of course, apart from the difference in the technique employed, the objects of the two groups are not identical: the government is primarily concerned with the price of cheese; the trade union with the wages of workers. But in fact, the difference is not as great as would appear superficially, for both are really concerned with price, the one with the price of cheese, the other with the price of labour, and if the one motive is 'economic' then the other is 'economic' too.

At this stage, the Swiss authorities would hit upon a nice point. On the one hand, they say to the government of the Union, "How foolish is your action! By raising a high tariff, you are compelling me to reduce my price still further; and I will then not only be able to compete with you again on your domestic market, but in the export field I will be enabled to knock your cheese off the market entirely!" And to the trade union they might well say: "By refusing to buy our cheese, you are causing a recession in the industry which will force us to reduce wages still further and even to shut down our factories, thus creating unemployment."

This argument of course is not altogether groundless. The boycott of German goods in pre-war years may, if it had been at all effective, have inflicted hardship on good and bad Germans alike. Similarly, should the Congress boycott directed at certain firms cause their financial collapse, Africans employed by them will suffer hardship. The broader the terms of the

boycott, too, the broader the ranks of those who might suffer as a consequence. Suppose the hypothetical boycott to be directed not only against Swiss cheese, but against all Swiss products; then, if those groups conducting the boycott represent a large proportion of the export market, the Swiss people—those workers whose low wages touched off the campaign—might suffer real poverty.

This is so, but consider three points. Firstly, it is universally accepted that sacrifice towards the achievement of some good in the future is proper in a virtuous community. For example, Mr. de Klerk, in reserving the work of liftmen exclusively for Europeans, might calm the Africans who are about to lose their jobs, with the words, "Be patient now, it is for your own good. You will be doubly rewarded in the future by attending your own skyscrapers in Bantustan!"

Secondly, implicit in a decision to boycott, or to take any sort of political action, is the choosing of an acute hardship of comparatively short duration in preference to chronic hardship with little prospect of alleviation. Those boycotters who chose to walk between Alexandra Township and Johannesburg morning and evening during the bus boycott had clearly shown just such a preference and were suitably rewarded in their choice.

Thirdly, inseparable from an act of opposition is an element of risk; the more determined the opposition, the greater the risk involved. The crux of the matter is that the risks involved are calculated. If by the agency of the boycott, both domestic and foreign, the people of South Africa are made to suffer acutely, the blame lies with the Nationalists whose policies have been and will be, for as long as they continue, the cause of the chronic hardship which burdens the bulk of the population of the country. The people of South Africa know very well that only when the Nationalists are finally removed from office, will an end to hardship be in sight. In the meanwhile, once again faced with the choice of acute hardship of measurable duration or chronic hardship induced by the policies of those who profess to be so concerned with the effects of protest, the non-whites are unlikely to hesitate long in choosing the temporary rigours of the boycott.

## JACOBUS AND THE BARRICADES

ARNOLD BENJAMIN

*Staff of the Argus Africa News Service*

Early this year a reporter was sent to Johannesburg's Non-European General Hospital to check on Kangweni Singwo, a seven-year-old African boy who had caused a little to-do in the British press. In a photograph captioned "The Picture that Shocked South Africa", the child's inert form was shown lying on the road where he had been run over by a car—while an unruffled policeman, instead of getting him to hospital, proceeded with his official task of taking measurements.

In the rumpus that resulted, the authorities claimed at first that the boy was dead when the picture was taken. The reporter was sent to the hospital to produce the evidence that Kangweni Singwo was still very much alive. And while he was there he stumbled across a story that shocked South Africa much more.

Another young African boy, in the same ward for a tonsillectomy, had a regular visitor each day—an elderly white man who brought him sweets and presents and kissed him goodbye after each visit. It turned out that the boy was his "adopted son". The old man and his wife, a wealthy Afrikaner couple, were bringing him up as their own on their fruit farm outside Johannesburg. The boy, Jacobus, slept in their bedroom, ate at their table, even went visiting with them. Unable to adopt him legally, they had left him £2,000 in their will; planned to send him, after he had finished school, to train as a missionary in the Dutch Reformed Church.

It was an amazing story, and "Oom Thys" and "Tant Johanna" Heyneke were persuaded with not too much difficulty to reveal it. Both simple and devout church-people, there was nothing cranky about them. They said they had similarly godfathered the education of several other African youths for the church. But for nine-year-old Jacobus, "given" to them seven years ago by one of their farm servants, they had developed a special fondness. "The little fellow is shy with strangers," they said, "but we have taught him not to be embarrassed by his colour." What reaction did all this have on their fellow-whites? "We have lost some friends," the Heynekes said.

After this they nearly lost Jacobus as well. The unheard-of story, with pictures to prove it all, made a nine-days' talking

point in Johannesburg. Behaviour like that from a white man *and* an Afrikaner! Inevitably the Heynekes began to get abusive letters and 'phone-calls. It seemed that the Group Areas and a fistful of other Acts could be invoked to put paid to such non-conformity. Then gradually the furore settled down, and the curtain closed on this curiosity of South African life.

A freak, certainly—but also a convenient jumping-off point for some interesting questions. Is colour prejudice always going to remain the implacable force in South Africa we suppose it to be? Liberals have always assumed that it would take a revolution in white thinking, more than any other kind, to establish a harmonious multi-racial society here; some impossible brain-washing of an entire nation. "The Afrikaners would rather die than accept social integration," we have always told each other. How true is this? Is it not just conceivable that prejudice may be growing weaker and not stronger, as events in South Africa move to their 20th-century climax?

These are questions, not assertions. The continent is in such a state of flux today that it is hard to be certain about anything. What *is* certain is that the Union is not remaining immune to these changes. On the political surface, yes: we remain static in the face of the great African face-lift. But other forms of change have been affecting the Union as surely as anywhere else.

Today's South Africa can boast what is perhaps the most elaborate legal machinery ever devised for keeping two sections of a single community apart. It is not remarkably efficient, as machines go. Inexorable social, economic and human laws keep clogging up the works.

At one end of the scale, apartheid is made a monkey of every day by the Coloured who "plays white", by the African who takes a drink, by the man who beats the pass laws through remaining illegally in a white area. At the other end, the most sacred colour taboo of all is flouted persistently despite heavy criminal sanctions.

Sex relations are reputed to be the last sticking-point of colour prejudice. White liberals, otherwise sanguine about full integration, sometimes confess to a shamefaced doubt whether *they*, personally, would care to go to bed with an African. But the whites who regularly come before the courts on Immorality Act and "black rape" charges seem troubled by no such inhibitions. Mostly, from the names, they are Afrikaners.



Immorality prosecutions have become so frequent that the Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape has appointed special committees "to fight this evil." (The contraventions, not the Act).

There ought to be even more alarm and despondency over the ones that get away. In parts of white Johannesburg, elegantly groomed black prostitutes ply their trade more or less openly for whites. And just over the Mozambique border—where immorality is just immoral, not illegal—there are more examples. Once you have seen ordinary white South Africans in the dives of Lourenço Marques, fraternising with the mulatto hostesses and enjoying a holiday from the Union in every sense of the word, you are bound to change your ideas on Africa a little.

White and black may travel in their segregated trains from their segregated living areas, pass through their separate station entrances. But after that, they are walking the same streets, working in the same factories and offices, spending the same money in the same shops. All the time this means contact—a rubbing together which may lead to friction, but also to an inevitable exploration and discovery. No whites and few Africans can avoid it today.

All the time the African is becoming more like those he serves, acquiring Western tastes and interests, gaining new knowledge and confidence. Not even the blindest of whites can fail to notice these changes, and how spectacular they have been over the last decade in particular. Outwardly they make him irritable and uneasy. Deep down, he may be learning and changing as well.

Certainly once profits get directly involved, the white boss is suddenly stung out of his torpor. The last two or three years, years of boycott and strikes, have seen his first uneasy awakening. Chambers of Commerce and Industries have paid their first serious attention to the voice of the A.N.C.; they are spurring their members to pay better wages, to *talk* to their workers and find out their views. The white employer who, after ten years, calls his tea-boy in to ask him how he feels about the 'stay-at-home' is unlikely to get a straight answer; but at least it is an attempt, a start.

# # # #

So much for the long-term war of attrition on the frontiers of white exclusiveness. In one or two fields there has already

been something of a spectacular frontal assault. One is jazz music—the same point at which Negroes made their first big break into the white man's world in America.

Quite suddenly, the best jazz in South Africa today is played by Africans. "King Kong", the first African jazz opera, played for many months this year to some 80,000 Europeans in four principal cities of the Union. With music by an African, and starring the cream of local non-white entertainers, it created a sensation wherever it went. The critics raved, in both English and Afrikaans; the tunes headed the record hit parade for many weeks; the queues for seats were the longest in memory.

This impact is worth analysing a little. Part of it was the novelty of seeking black faces on a hitherto all-white stage; there were the heavily patronising ("Aren't they sweet?") and the sentimental ("Let's give them a jolly good hand.") But the real acclaim, it is clear, came from those who sat up suddenly with surprise to enjoy the show on its merits—notably the astonishing vigour and drive with which it was performed. A straight human contact was established across the footlights, a gap opened in the cultural colour bar.

All of which may sound pretty tenuous, but if you were in a "King Kong" audience you could not miss it—a deep warmth, an excitement and sense of discovery. It was a unique and historic thing to happen on such a mass scale in the Union.

Sport was another break-through point for the Negroes in America; and here, too, things are starting to move in South Africa. I remember the shock only seven or eight years ago when the news leaked out that Vic Toweel, South Africa's world bantam-weight champion, had been knocked out in training by an African, "Slumber David" Gogotya. Discovering that the idol boxed with blacks seemed to cause as much public alarm as the fact that he had been toppled. Today it is an open secret that every white boxer of note in Johannesburg uses non-white sparring partners; the sessions are still supposed to be held behind closed doors, but nobody troubles much to enforce this.

The peculiar absurdities of sports apartheid have long been manifest. Official white teams compete against all and sundry outside the Union, but a champion like Jake Tuli has to do all his fighting overseas. Now, with half-a-dozen international bodies threatening boycott of the Union, white sportsmen are becoming resigned fairly quickly to impending changes in the

old order. Rather multi-racial sport—to a nation that loves sport even more than it loves politics—than no international sport at all. If not for the special toughness of Government policy on this point, probably a start would already have been made in the Union by now.

# # # #

To return for a moment to jazz. It is interesting to note that African capabilities were first discovered, a good few years before "King Kong", by a rather unlikely bunch—Johannesburg's lower-class white teenagers and ducktails (the local brand of juvenile delinquent.) It was they who brought the word 'kwela' into English usage—together with other bits of African argot—long before it became a popular dance craze. It is they who are the most appreciative audience at any jazz concert that happens to be given for whites. Jazz-happy, hand-clapping, stomping, yelling encouragement, they appear troubled least of all by the colour of the performers. Much the same thing happens whenever black and white jazzmen get together in a "session". For the time being the common absorption overrides all barriers.

Crowds of long-haired, long-jacketed youths would turn up at the "King Kong" stage door, wanting autographs and a word with the performers. Others would sometimes have to be cleared from the orchestra pit, where they had infiltrated for a chat about jazz and perhaps a spot of quick improvisation with the players.

The remarkable thing, of course, is that these are teenagers of the lowest white classes, the group we have always supposed to be the most prejudiced and vicious of all. There is certainly none of the liberal's fuzzy sentiment involved here, probably little conscious thought at all; they come simply to hear the best jazz going, and it leads in the most natural way to social intercourse with those who make it.

The strolling penny-whistle bands that play in Johannesburg's white suburbs invariably collect a small crowd of Africans and often set an impromptu kwela session going in the street. White suburbanites watch from a tolerant distance. But the "duckies" are apt to be right in the middle, and occasionally—jazz being a sociable religion—carried away by the rhythm, and with no white "sheila" handy, they have been known to seize any African girl who happens to be around and dance with her.

There is a bunch of such youths that goes out on Sundays to the huge Government township of Meadowlands, complete with motor-bikes and molls and leather jackets, for a multi-racial kwela session and party. And the most liberated society I have ever heard of in South Africa is the crowd that used to meet regularly at a house in Bertha Street, Sophiatown (since demolished) for an all-week-end party. It consisted of white ducktails, black *tsotsis*—who had commandeered the place in the first instance—and some Indian and Coloured equivalents. The whites used to supply the liquor, the non-whites the dagga, and there was some loose mutual arrangement about girls.

This instance, of course, takes us well into the underworld, where there has always been a notable absence of race barriers. A common disregard for the law and a common way of life transcend them easily.

When it comes to the less disreputable white teenagers, one can find various explanations. They are attracted by the vitality and gaiety of African city culture, the casual way it merges with the underworld. They are in rebellion against the other restraints of society, so why not the racial one too? And of course there is the great unifying influence of hot jazz.

But it is still a most remarkable phenomenon, this instinctive belonging across the colour-bar. How did those jazz-happy teenage fans talk to the African players? I asked one of the white liberals who staged "King Kong." Did they seem to get on and feel at home with them? "More so than us," he answered.

# # # #

I think the truth we may discover at some not-too-distant day is that Afrikaner and African have a lot more in common than we might think; that the relationship between them even now is a curious two-faced one alternating between hate—I say this with all due circumspection—and a kind of love. Often there is a strange rough companionship between them—in the way they can talk and joke with each other, in a similar way of thought. Certainly the unsophisticated majority of Afrikaners share this understanding. There are the Afrikaners who go to witch-doctors for cures, and those who wait in the country surgery of Dr. J. S. Moroka for consultations. Even in the police force the bond persists. A recent newsreel showed a senior officer actually *shaking hands* with the non-white police to whom he was presenting medals.

The two races have roughly similar backgrounds, after all. Both are vigorous pastoral peoples still coming to grips with the rawness of city life, still not far removed from the soil. Each has been going through the throes of its own crude nationalism. They talk the same sort of language.

Writers like Sampson and Van der Post have remarked on this strange bond between oppressor and oppressed. It is a relationship which usually excludes the English South African; partly because he feels himself less native to the country, partly I would suggest because of his lingering Englishness. Though his political attitudes may tend to mild humanitarianism, his social ones are still overlaid with some ideas of class and breeding and cultural attainment. He may be harder than anyone to assimilate in the new South Africa.

You might find straight antagonism among the Afrikaners, but little snobbery. The leaders of Afrikanerdom remember that social segregation has not always been part of the local scenery; a million Coloureds are sufficient reminder of that. This after all is the driving fear behind apartheid, the fear of contact. Hence the severity of the laws to prevent it. Not even laws can make a good job of it; hence the final desperate goal of total separation and the Bantustan dream. The leaders can see no middle way, and they are probably right.

As one more pointer to the future, we ought not to forget the Nationalist "liberal revolt"—still for the most part a painfully guarded semantic rebellion, but slowly assuming significance. Afrikaner professors and some of their students are talking openly about the "human rights" of Africans. So is the Government, as part of the "new thinking" about Bantustans. How much *this* means is, of course, another matter; sufficient that it at least has the rank-and-file of the *volk* a little confused.

Meanwhile we must reckon as decided progress even such amount of multi-racial tea-drinking—whether of the drawing-room or round-table variety—as has been done lately by Afrikaner intellectuals in their "consultations" with non-white leaders. Ten years ago—or even two or three—it would have been unthinkable.

Let us remember too the increasing discomfort being caused by the pressure of events elsewhere in Africa. These are political and economic pressures principally, but also social ones. On one memorable occasion at least we have officially accom-

modated a visiting Ghanaian dignitary in the best hotels of Johannesburg and Cape Town. This V.I.P. treatment was on Government instructions—and complete with “white” liquor.

In any event I believe there still remains in the Union today, all things considered, a miraculous amount of goodwill between the races. You can see it in a hundred small ways in the Cape, where the old easy-going traditions still cling, and even in the rough-and-tumble of the Rand. For most of this tolerance—not all—we have to thank the almost indecently good spirits which the average African seems to preserve. If they can keep it up a while longer, further miracles may not be impossible.

The curious and touching case of Oom Thys Heyneke and his African “son” can be written off as an isolated eccentricity. It is still notable as a cross-current in the highly fluid sub-surface of life in South Africa in 1959. Dying on the barricades may sound all very fine in the abstract, as a rallying-call to threatened white mastery. When it comes to the push, living on is surely a better idea; how much more preferable to extinction, simply to let the barricades fall.





# DEVLIN IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

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A CASUAL observer might be forgiven for supposing that Southern Rhodesians had taken very little interest in the Devlin Report. Sir Edgar Whitehead has made no comment upon it; neither has Sir Roy Welensky; nor has the Opposition; nor, even, has that talkative elder statesman, Lord Malvern. The Southern Rhodesian Assembly has not debated it; nor has the Federal Assembly. The public has maintained an almost equally complete silence. There have been a few letters to the Press; but not nearly as many as were provoked, for instance, by the cost of living controversy or by the need for level crossings on the railways. Yet this impression of indifference is a false one. Rhodesians feel very strongly about the Devlin Report—perhaps too strongly to trust themselves to talk about it.

This emerges from the editorial comment of the various newspapers. The right-wing *Citizen* was the most outspoken in its condemnation. It described the Report as "worthless rubbish" produced by "nosey parkers steeped in the tradition of a law which would rather free nine guilty men than convict an innocent one". The more restrained comment of other papers struck a similar line of criticism of the "precise distinctions" drawn by the "legalistic" and "donnish" Commissioners. "It would have been cold comfort", wrote the *Rhodesia Herald*, "for the relatives to inscribe on the tombstone: 'Here lies John Citizen, died March 1959, not the victim of a massacre plot but a loose plan'." The *Central African Examiner*, while intending "no criticism of the Commissioners", summed up the general reaction of the Southern Rhodesian Press: "Most people with any long experience of Africa who take the trouble to study the facts in the Report will, we believe, draw the conclusions so far as the murder plot is concerned, that Sir Robert and his Government drew, rather than those drawn by the Commissioners".

The attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government to the Devlin Report has to be deduced less directly. The chief clue seems to be the publication of the Beadle Tribunal Report. The Beadle Tribunal was set up under the Preventive Detention Act to review the continued detention of some 100 Africans

after the end of the Southern Rhodesian emergency and to make recommendations on each case to the Government. They were not appointed to make a report; their proceedings were by law secret in order to protect Government informants; they were under no obligation to examine the general Southern Rhodesian situation. No report of any kind was anticipated—the most that was expected was a Government statement to a secret session of the Southern Rhodesian Assembly on any case where the Government had decided not to accept the recommendations of the Tribunal. Much to the general surprise, however, the Beadle Tribunal presented a report to the Government and that report was published. It was hard to escape the conclusion that the Beadle Report was intended to be a counter to the Devlin Report. And this impression strengthened when it was noted that the Beadle Report devoted some 6 of its 32 pages to an evaluation of Dr. Banda's reliability as a witness. Dr. Banda's evidence before the Tribunal was of very little significance to its work: this detailed appraisal seemed to have no meaning unless it was intended as a contrast with the Devlin Commission's attitude to Banda.

Although the Beadle Tribunal's findings differed from the findings of the Devlin Commission only on this point of Banda's reliability and although its report could not in any way be compared with the Devlin Report in length or depth or impartiality, it was generally hailed in Southern Rhodesia as in some sense an "answer" to the Devlin Commission. This came out very clearly in the debate on the Beadle Report in the Southern Rhodesian Assembly. Mr. Aitken-Cade, then Leader of the Opposition, congratulated the Tribunal for having "cut . . . (Dr. Banda) down to size", and continued: "Another point that emerges is the difference between an informed Tribunal, basing its opinion on local knowledge and on the local scene, and a Commission that does not have that advantage". Mr. Pichanick, the U.F.P. member for Highlands, made the contrast even more explicit: "When a previous report was published", he said, "the whole of the Press overseas and the local Press, and the broadcasting authorities and the television and everybody in fact, made tremendous fuss of this Report. Now what has happened as a result of the publication of this Report . . . (the Beadle Report) . . . simultaneously in this country and London? There has been no comment whatsoever that I have seen in the local Press coming from overseas papers. It is significant and

silence must mean something. It must mean that they are realizing that the findings of this Commission have brought out something that another commission could never find out. The reason is that the standing and reputation of this Commission is beyond question. It means this, that they understand the mentality of the African, but people who come from overseas, no matter how long they stay, can never really get to the back of their minds the mentality of the African". The clear suggestion is that one can accept either Devlin or Beadle, but not both, and that Beadle would have come to very different conclusions about Nyasaland than those reached by Devlin.

What is the explanation of this rejection by public and politician alike of the Devlin Report? Why has it become an article of Southern Rhodesian faith that there was a massacre plot in Nyasaland and that Banda was implicated in it? The general public, it would seem, believes in the massacre plot because it wants—because it needs—to believe in it. It has not, in most cases, read either the Devlin Report or the Nyasaland Government's White Papers. It believes not because of the overwhelming facts, but because a massacre plot seems more likely on the face of it than no massacre plot. The allegation that Congress was planning mass murder fits in with the stereotype of African behaviour that many Europeans have constructed for themselves. The attitude of these Europeans found an ugly expression in the *Sunday Mail's* leading article of August 23rd. The *Mail* asked why Africans in Natal had destroyed clinics, schools, dipping tanks and so on. "We believe", its editor wrote, "that the answer is to be found in the people themselves—the Bantu, not only in Natal, but throughout the sub-continent. For what has happened in Natal has had its parallel in Nyasaland, in Uganda, in the Congo. In all these places the mob, once excited, picks, almost as its number one objective for destruction, all those things which are for the benefit of the African. . . . Had drastic action not been taken in Nyasaland, missionaries would almost certainly have been slaughtered. . . . But looked at over a broad canvas it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that what the Bantu as a whole is seeking is not an opportunity to advance or to become civilized. Rather does he seem to have an atavistic longing to return to the days of Chaka and Lobengula; to the days of the knobkerrie and the shield, to the witch-doctor and the blood-letting".

"You are to be congratulated on your excellent leader last

Sunday", wrote one of the *Mail's* enthusiastic readers. "It expresses the thoughts of many people living in the Federation today". And it certainly does seem to reflect one of the fundamental beliefs of the Southern Rhodesian European. Rhodesia is not a fear-ridden country, but it is a country where the mere rumour of an African strike causes a panic rush to buy guns. It is a country where a Sunday paper divorce report can begin quite unselfconsciously: "A man left his young wife alone one night at their home in a remote part of Southern Rhodesia and as she sat in the bedroom reading, terrified of the dark and Natives . . ." To the Southern Rhodesian, African Nationalism means Mau-Mau. It is not for nothing that every new immigrant is at once advised to read Robert Ruark's *Something of Value* and then Nicholas Monserrat's *The Tribe that Lost Its Head*. This, the Southern Rhodesian European knows, is what the Africans are like. No matter how apparently civilized, they are always on the brink of a relapse into savagery. And so it is not in the least surprising that an elder of the Church of Scotland should have plotted massacre—it is, indeed, only to be expected.

Another reason for the public belief in the massacre plot is the feeling of solidarity with the Nyasaland settler population. To the average Rhodesian the Devlin Commission appeared as the very type of the "nosey parkers" from outside, the men who "don't understand our problems". The "men on the spot" believed in the massacre plot—therefore it must be true. And so, through fear and loyalty, the Southern Rhodesian European is committed to a belief in the massacre plot with all its implications—a belief which will distort his vision of events much as it distorted the vision of the District Commissioner at Nkata Bay, and very likely with similar tragic results. It is not, after all, a very hopeful sign that many Europeans are venturing into the multi-racial future "terrified of the dark and the Natives".

But what of the politicians? No doubt many of them share the fears and loyalties of their electorate; no doubt for them also, the belief in the savagery of the African serves at once as a justification of the past and a warning for the future. Yet this is not the main reason for the politicians' rejection of the Devlin Report. They reject it not so much because it dismisses the Nyasaland massacre plot allegations as because it threatens to undermine the case for the Southern Rhodesian emergency. Even to the right-wing politicians, the need to believe in the reality of the emergency is much more urgent than the need to

believe in the savagery of Africans in general. And for Sir Edgar Whitehead—whose chill clarity of view is not distorted by the fears and prejudices which dictate the reaction of many of his fellow Rhodesians—the need to believe in the emergency, or to have it believed in, is crucial.

Now, the Devlin Report does not at first sight appear to damage the Southern Rhodesian Government's case. Its findings for Nyasaland are much the same as Sir Edgar's assertions about Southern Rhodesia, assertions now upheld by the General Report of the Beadle Tribunal. But the instinct of the politicians is right—the Devlin Report and the Beadle Report are incompatible. They are so for two reasons—one of matter, the other of method.

In the first instance, the very identity of the findings of Devlin in Nyasaland and Beadle in Southern Rhodesia is suspicious. No one disputes, after all, that the crisis was very much more acute in Nyasaland; that the Nyasaland Congress was very much more efficiently organized and enjoyed very much wider public support; that its leadership was more desperate and its membership more militant. It is hard to believe that the danger in both countries was much the same. The Southern Rhodesian answer to this is that Mr. Justice Beadle would have found a much more serious situation in Nyasaland than Mr. Justice Devlin found. An equally good answer—and one that is likely to find more favour outside Rhodesia—is that Mr. Justice Devlin would have found a much less serious situation in Southern Rhodesia than Mr. Justice Beadle found.

Both answers depend, of course, upon a consciousness of the difference of approach in the two Reports. The Southern Rhodesian says that Mr. Justice Devlin and his colleagues were ignorant of local conditions and of the Bantu mind, while Mr. Justice Beadle and his colleagues understood both. Elsewhere people are likely to say that the Devlin Commission showed an astonishing degree of detachment while showing also an understanding of the peculiarities of the African situation, while the Beadle Tribunal, in all honesty, were prisoners of their assumptions. A few illustrations of these differences are needed to make this point clear.

The Devlin Commission notes as a fact that in Nyasaland "a District Commissioner cannot afford to be jeered at or insulted in public; if that is tolerated, it would lead to a loss of authority which would be fatal. Many unofficial Europeans consider that

the same thing applies to them." The Devlin Commission is saying that in a colonial situation it is natural for Europeans to take "disrespect" as seriously, almost, as actual breaches of the law or violence. But the Commission is perfectly clear in its own mind that there is a very important distinction between "disrespect" and criminal action. The Beadle Tribunal, with its solemn listing of Congress statements designed to "Ridicule and Undermine the Authority of (a) Native Commissioners, (b) Land Development Officers, (c) Chiefs, (d) Police, (e) African Members of Parliament", has allowed that distinction to become blurred. Similarly, the Devlin Commission realizes that it is likely that loose talk about beating and killing will be taken as the equivalent of a planned intention to beat and kill in a tense colonial situation, but it preserves its own keen sense of the distinction. This, again, the Beadle Tribunal failed to do.

There are many other such differences of approach. The Devlin Commission so distrusted the evidence of informers that it chose to base its findings on the other evidence available and to test the evidence of informers against it. The Beadle Tribunal, on the other hand, based its findings explicitly on the evidence of informers, and remarked that the other evidence available, though not in itself indicating planned violence or subversion, fell into this pattern in the light of the secret evidence of the informers. The Devlin Commission examined the reasons for the tension between Congress and Government and the general background to the emergency: the Beadle Tribunal, although its Report deals with the general issue of the guilt of Congress as a whole, deliberately refused to ask or to answer these general questions. In short, it is hard to imagine two investigations more differently conducted, or two Reports in which the conclusions drawn from a certain type of evidence were more disparate.

To proclaim belief in the Devlin Commission's findings, then, and to express admiration for its approach is tantamount in Southern Rhodesia to expressing grave reservations about the reality of the Southern Rhodesian emergency. Yet this emergency is the foundation of all Sir Edgar Whitehead's policy—both the frankly "undemocratic" emergency legislation and the "liberal" measures which balance it. It is also the foundation of the Opposition's very different deductions about the policy needed in the future. Finally it is the foundation of the ordinary Rhodesian's approach to African politics.

# PORTRAIT OF AN AGITATOR: PATRICK MATIMBA

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On Sunday, July 26th, 1959, Patrick Matimba was driven under guard from Salisbury Jail to the airport outside the city, where his wife and young daughter were waiting for him. At the airport he was released from an imprisonment which had lasted five months, on condition that he directly boarded a plane which would take him to Holland. The fares for himself and his family had been paid by the Government. He was told that he was not being deprived of his Southern Rhodesian citizenship; he was not required to undertake that he would stay away from his homeland. But he was told that as soon as he recrossed the frontier he would be rearrested.

We must suppose from this that the Government formally believes Matimba too dangerous a man to be allowed to live in Southern Rhodesia, and that his presence as a free man there would constitute some kind of threat to the safety and the order of the State.

Matimba came back to Rhodesia about three years ago, after some time spent in England. While there, he had earned his living by working in a café and had continued his education at evening classes. At an International Club he had met a young Dutchwoman, Adri van Hoorn. They had married, and there was now a baby girl. Matimba's earliest activities after returning to Rhodesia were in search of a home to which he could bring his wife and daughter. The Land Apportionment Act in Southern Rhodesia prohibits Africans and Europeans from living together in the same area, and he was not able to obtain a house in any African township. After a long unsuccessful search for some way in which he could set up home, it became clear that he could only live with his wife in some place where the provisions of the Land Apportionment Act did not apply. They do not apply to mission land. Matimba's father, an Anglican priest, was living in retirement at St. Faith's Mission, near Rusape. He approached the Mission authorities on behalf of his son—and they agreed that Matimba and his wife should come to live at the Mission.

So Matimba prepared to bring his wife to Rhodesia, and



Rhodesia prepared to receive her. Mr. Straw of the United Rhodesia Party, the Territorial M.P. for Rusape, was applauded by his audience when he declared that her arrival was not in the public interest. The Federal Government of the day, however, granted Mrs. Matimba permission to come and live in Rhodesia. Many thoughtless people considered that she should have been refused entry. They were properly rebuked by the Federal M.P. in whose constituency St. Faith's falls. "Any action of this kind", he said, "would have delayed the achievement of Dominion Status and upset the tobacco market. Let them think of that before deciding that the Federal Government was wrong in granting a permit to Mrs. Matimba." Both these comments were made at a meeting called by Federal and United Rhodesia Parties in Rusape Cinema Hall to discuss the situation. At the end of this meeting, 350 people passed an almost unanimous resolution calling for legislation against mixed marriages and demanding a general election on the issue, if such legislation were not passed.

So Mrs. Matimba joined her husband at St. Faith's. A woman at the meeting in the cinema hall had spoken of the reception she might expect. "When she walks down the street in Rusape, the whites and the blacks will, of course, look the other way". Yet Mrs. Matimba was not made unhappy. Africans do not find it easy to persist in that remorseless hostility towards mixed marriages which is attributed to them and expected of them by Europeans. It was decided not to hold a party to welcome Mrs. Matimba in the African township at Rusape—but only because it was felt this might exacerbate the Europeans. In the months that followed, no party or wedding in the local African community was complete without the Matimbas. On the Mission itself, the couple lived in an atmosphere easier for them than could have been found anywhere else in the Colony. They had no need or desire to walk hand in hand down the main street of Rusape. The Mission stands several miles away from the town, and when a wife goes shopping she does not take her husband; when a husband does his business or buying in town he does not take his wife. Only now and then did difficulties arise: when Mrs. Matimba took her husband's trousers to a dry-cleaner; when she had to go to hospital and her husband was not permitted to visit her.

At St. Faith's, Matimba kept the books for the co-operative store, and did the buying. But there was hardly enough work to

keep him busy, and nothing to stretch his powers. It is true that the co-operative experiments at St. Faith's were interesting, and there was intellectual stimulation in the courses which were held at the Mission—there was one held early in 1958 when politicians and university teachers gave talks on various aspects of democracy. There were also many visitors to St. Faith's, some of them eminent people; for St. Faith's has a world-wide reputation, as well as its reputation in Rusape. But Matimba had ambitions of his own, and the knowledge that he could not go and live elsewhere made him restless inside the Mission. While he was in England he had bought a small printing machine; and he was always talking of having this sent out to Rhodesia and starting a printing firm of his own.

In September 1957, the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress was founded. Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, the farm manager at St. Faith's, became one of the few European members. Matimba also joined. A branch was formed at Rusape. The man elected as secretary was soon found to be unable to do the job, and Matimba was persuaded to take it over. It is not easy for us to build up a very clear picture of Matimba's activities as an agitator, or to discover the exact steps by which he became one of the few hundred men whose activities by February 1959 were, according to the Prime Minister, threatening the whole security of the State. None of the inflammatory extracts from Congress speeches quoted in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, or later, in the report of the Review Tribunal, has been attributed to him. And the charges brought against him by the Government in the secret proceedings before the Review Tribunal, even if they threw light on the matter, could only be inserted here if the writer were willing to brave penalties of up to three years imprisonment under the Preventive Detention Act. Certainly Matimba had a passionate interest in politics. He read newspapers and Hansards, government papers and books on political subjects, incessantly. He loved to talk politics and, during discussions held at St. Faith's, would make long meditative contributions in his quiet voice, using the terms of political science carefully and illustrating attitudes and situations in a leisurely roundabout way with the proverbs and fables of his people. For Matimba, politics was an intellectual passion. He was interested—as who can help being?—in the strange wonderland of Rhodesian politics; he was interested too in the reactions there had been in Rhodesian society to his own anomalous

position. He was certainly less disturbed by the attention he was given than some other men might have been. He was also less embittered by it. The source of his political feelings was his own desire to lead a happy life, move where he wished, and do work that he felt worthwhile; rather than any larger passion for reform, personal political ambition, or all-absorbing dedication to a cause. He loved discussion, but he seems never to have addressed public meetings. He is said not to have been a very efficient branch secretary. He was often in talk critical of the Congress leaders. He felt Congress affairs were sometimes incompetently administered. He attacked the policy of making speeches deliberately in order to provoke the Government. And he was concerned to get his printing machine out from England and to set up his own business.

He tried once more to get a house in Highfields, one of the townships at Salisbury. The Southern Rhodesian Parliament discussed whether the wife of an African should be considered an African for the purposes of the Land Apportionment Act. One of the difficulties of such a solution, however, was that any legislation to effect it would clearly have been discriminatory, unless the African wife of a European could similarly be regarded as a European. The legal position remained as it had been. The printing machine arrived. A shop was rented in one of the humbler parts of Salisbury in Mrs. Matimba's name, and a business was established. Technically, Mrs. Matimba employed her husband. There were rooms above the shop; and there, surreptitiously and illegally in a European area, the Matimbas lived together. And it was there that Patrick Matimba was arrested, when the police burst into the bedroom at 2 o'clock in the morning of 25th February, 1959. He was taken first to Kentucky lock-up and then—with the more dangerous prisoners—to Khami Jail, near Bulawayo. Mrs. Matimba kept the printing business going, carrying out the few orders that came along, for cards and headed notepaper. She visited her husband at Bulawayo when she could, and helped in making transport arrangements from Salisbury to Bulawayo to enable the wives of detainees to see their husbands. The little printing shop in Market Square became the point where cars going to Bulawayo at the week-ends picked up their passengers. Her courage, in the strange situation where she found herself, was at this time very great. But as the months went by and her husband was not among the several hundreds of detainees released, as it became increasingly clear

that the Government intended to safeguard the safety and order of the State by keeping many men imprisoned without trial for five years, she found it more and more difficult to face the future. The printing business had to be sold. She was expecting another child. In her great difficulty, the Government's behaviour towards Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock suggested a course of action. He had been arrested at the same time as Matimba. A few weeks later he was offered his freedom by the Government on the condition that he immediately left the country. These terms he refused, and soon after, he was released unconditionally. Mrs. Matimba now approached the Government with the suggestion that her husband be released if he promised to go with her directly to Holland. The Government agreed to this. Matimba, after some hesitation, also agreed.

So the man who had done something or other which was not in the public interest, the man whose unconditional release would have imperilled the safety of the State, went upon his way. It would be unfair to the Government not to mention the risks it took in enabling Matimba to rejoin his family and enjoy his freedom elsewhere. It undoubtedly ran the risk of inviting similar appeals from the relations of other detainees, many of whom could probably find asylum in other parts of the world. There seems no doubt, of course, that these would be rejected. Yet clearly Matimba is not appreciably less dangerous than the rest—or why is he to be rearrested if he returns? Already the Government has suffered whispers that Matimba was released because he was an acute embarrassment to it. Further, the Government had appointed a Tribunal to inquire into—and report upon—the case against each detainee. The hearing before the Tribunal is, of course, in no sense a trial, nor is the Government necessarily bound by its findings. But still, in deciding to release Matimba and yet refusing to give him his freedom within the country before it had received the Tribunal's report on him, the Government showed scant courtesy to a body that is its own creation. The awkwardness of the Government's position was increased by the ungrateful behaviour of Matimba himself, and the perhaps over-officious zeal of a warder at Salisbury Jail, where Matimba spent the night before his release. The warder discovered two letters from Paul Mushonga and Robert Chikere-ma, detainees in Khami Jail, to "sympathizers" in London, which Matimba had smuggled out with him and which he intended to take to Europe. Smuggling letters out of prison is an

offence. The letters were taken from Matimba, but his release and departure were not delayed. Later Mushonga and Chikerema were sentenced to sixteen days solitary confinement and punishment diet as prescribed by the Prison Act.

For Matimba then, the story ends happily enough. To illustrate the suffering caused by the actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government, there are many other stories that can be told. Not that Matimba has been shown any mercy. There can be no mercy where there is no justice. But he has been, compared with others, rather lucky. His story is not told here because he is an outstanding political figure, a man of destiny. On the contrary; though as an African married to a European woman Matimba was a strange anomaly in the Southern Rhodesian scene, yet as a man looking for his happiness—not in dedication to any cause, but in the building up of a life for himself around work which gave him his independence—in this he is typical. When the political leaders of the great mass of the population have to be imprisoned by government in order to secure the State, there has been a fundamental political failure in the society. When men like Matimba cannot be left to live their lives, the failure, though it is less easy to name, goes much deeper. Matimba will probably make a happy life for himself in Europe. It is easier for us to feel more concern for the political martyrs, for the men totally devoted to their cause, than for him. It is also easier for us to feel more indignant about governments openly devoted to evil ends than about governments taking at every moment what seems the easiest way out, unconcerned with principle and appearance, or consistency, paying lip service to this and that, escaping from one embarrassment carelessly into the next, abrogating law in the name of order, and promoting the insecurity of the individual in the name of the security of the State. But the ease with which we feel concern and indignation is not always the best measure of the danger that threatens.

# THE BELGIAN TREASURY

VELLA PILLAY

*Economist*

It has for long remained something of a mystery how Belgium, alone of all the European countries, was able to emerge from the last war with a stable currency, with a volume of foreign exchange reserves as large as that held in 1938, and with little experience of any of the inflationary stresses that otherwise would have followed the reconstruction of the war-damaged Belgian economy. The official Belgian explanation has invariably been in terms of the determined domestic economic policies that were pursued from the moment of liberation.

The events of January last in the little-known Belgian Congo have, however, exposed much of the myth in this explanation. It took a week of riots and disturbances in Leopoldville to re-establish what has always been the basis for the post-war status and strength of the Belgian economy. For no sooner had these riots broken out than the European exchange markets became the scene of sustained attacks on the Belgian franc. Colonial stocks on the Brussels bourse fell heavily in value, and a climate of crisis swept over the whole Belgian economy. Within a fortnight Belgium's external monetary reserves fell by 100 million francs, or just under 10%, and the franc reeled under the possibility of devaluation. While the crisis was averted in time by the engagement of Belgian troops in the suppression of the Congo disturbances, what had for once become clear was the fundamental importance of the Congo to the metropolitan economy of Belgium.

For a small country like Belgium, with a population of less than 10 million, the size of its capital stake in the Congo is strikingly large. Between 1885 and 1956, the net inflow of new capital into the Congo has been estimated at about 50 billion francs. But this capital inflow has about trebled itself during that period as a result of the continuous reinvestment of unremitted profits, so that by 1956 the value of foreign investments in the Congo was in the region of £1,000 million (or some 20% greater than the 1956 value of direct foreign investment in the Union of South Africa). Of this capital value something like 80-90% is held by a small group of extremely large Belgian finance houses which, ever since the period of the 'Con-

cession regime' of Leopold II, have gradually enlarged their Congo interests—till today they occupy major monopoly positions over the whole realm of production, distribution and export in the Congo.

What is equally striking is the way in which the colonial administration has participated in the activities of these monopoly organizations. The *Charte Coloniale* of 1908 vested power over the Congo in the hands of the King of the Belgians; indeed, the Belgian Parliament possesses little control over Congo affairs except in financial matters and the grant of concessions. The King, working through the Minister of Colonies, is advised on all Congo affairs by a small but influential group of businessmen and officials—the celebrated *Conseil Colonial*. In practice this latter body not only formulates colonial policy for Belgium, but suggests laws to be decreed by the King. What is pertinent here is that this system has imparted to the colonial authorities the unusual function of guaranteeing the profitability of Belgian capital; or, as a recent official British report put it, "the Congo administration, which retains a large measure of financial participation in the important monopoly companies, ensures that Belgian capital receives a good return for its investment . . ."†

This system necessarily conditions the nature of the Congo's economy. It is a vast interlocking scheme of extremely large and influential private and para-statal interests operating in the exploitation of the rich raw material and labour resources of the colony. Something like 60% of the African wage-earning population are employed in little more than 3% of the commercial undertakings; and these undertakings possess some 86% of the total capital investment in the colony. These undertakings further operate over a variety of industries and activities, so that even the provision of transport facilities and public utilities remains the prerogative of the great Belgian financial houses. The *Société Generale*, probably the largest metropolitan enterprise to operate in colonial Africa, predominates everywhere in the Congo. It controls the only producer of Congo copper, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga; and the whole of the Katanga region is within the concession area of the *Société Generale*. The production of cobalt, zinc, uranium, manganese and tin is fully monopolized by the group, which is also overwhelmingly present in the manufacture of chemicals, textiles and construction, as well as in plantation farming, in commerce, banking,

† Board of Trade, *Overseas Economic Survey*, Nov., 1956.



insurance and transport. What little remains of economic activity in the Congo is shared by about four other financial groups (one of which possesses a strong British connection).

The fundamental aims of Belgian investment in the Congo have always been—and remain—the enlargement of the export sector through a systematic exploitation of those resources possessing markets abroad and in particular meeting the needs of the industrial economy of Belgium. Thus exports continue to absorb one-third of the national product. More than that, the persistent application of foreign investment funds into those primary industries which serve the needs of the overseas markets has tended to confine the range of export products to a relatively small number. This tendency towards primary product specialization has been a critical obstacle in the growth of African enterprise and of indigenous capital accumulation.

This does not, however, mean that there has been no development in secondary economic activities. According to indices of industrial production published in the Congo, the output of manufactured goods increased three-fold between 1947-56, while that of mineral production only doubled. But in absolute terms, the value of pure manufacturing production is small. Its development has been motivated largely by the immediate requirements of the mining industry and the ancillary fields of transport, communications and distribution. Hence the secondary industries that have developed in the Congo are concentrated in the Katanga mining region and export centre of Leopoldville.

There are perceptible signs that the involvement of an ever-growing number of Africans in the monetary framework, i.e. the African movement towards the towns and the mining areas in search of a money income, has resulted in growing local production of various consumer goods and some foreign investment of funds in what might be termed 'light industry'. Those industries nearest to mining and agriculture—construction and chemicals—predominate, however, in the manufacturing field. In 1956, mining and agriculture generated 30 billion francs, or about 55% of the ascertainable aggregate money income in the Congo. That of manufacturing industry amounted to no more than 7 billion francs, or about 10%.

The consequences of the Congo's dependence on exports and on Belgian capital are clearly demonstrated by the profound changes that have occurred in the occupational distribution of the Congo people and in the distribution of income and capital

ownership. Since the first entry of Belgian capital into the Congo in 1887, it is estimated that some 50% of the adult African male population have been drawn away from subsistence activity into the mines, the plantation farms, and various other wage-earning activities. The more one looks at the history of land concessions in the Congo, the more one must be impressed by the compulsions under which the African has had to find alternative employment in the concession areas and the towns. A Belgian Minister claimed in 1955 that about one-third of the Congo land area had been alienated for "non-African occupation". He did not state, however, the size of the non-alienated land area in which African produce had to be compulsorily sold to the monopolies at pre-determined prices. In any event, there is some evidence to suggest that even today the division between alienated and non-alienated remains vague and indecisive. It is this which in part explains the 5% annual growth in the numbers of wage-earning Africans.

What is crucial is the fact that the increased integration of the African population in the money economy has not resulted in any parallel African participation in what appears to have been a particularly rapid rate of capital formation and investment. Between 1950-56 the average share of the national income accruing to the African wage-earning population increased from about one-sixth to one-fifth. This increased share, however, does not appear to represent any absolute improvement in African income standards; it rather tends to suggest the rate at which the number of Africans drawn into wage-earning occupations has increased. Indeed, in so far as any substance can be given to the available statistics, the *per capita* income of the indigenous population remained about stationary during the period at around £40 per year, or about one-tenth of that in Belgium. The generally low level of African incomes (in relation to the substantial pace of capital formation) is also illustrated by the paucity of African savings in the total stream of savings in the Congo. In 1950, the mobilizable savings of the African sector amounted to £5 million. By 1956, in spite of the increased integration of the African in the money economy, these saving had fallen to only £4 million.

In contrast to all this, the share of the metropolitan element in the economic activity of the Congo is striking. Of the 100,000 resident whites, well over half appear to be in the service of the Belgian monopolies. No more than 9% are "colonists" in the

traditional sense, i.e. owning capital and engaged as resident planters and merchants. (The rest of the white population are almost equally made up of civil servants and missionaries). Thus the Belgian share of the Congo's national income can fairly be attributable to that going to the monopolies and their employees. Between 1950-56, this share was almost as much as one-half of all accountable incomes. The actual surplus accruing to Belgian capital (in the nature of profits) in recent years has averaged 12 billion francs (about £85 million) a year, or about the same as the African wage total.

These characteristics portray what is perhaps the essential content of contemporary colonialism in the Congo. There are what might be called two sectors of commodity exchange in the Congo: the export sector and the domestic market sector. And it is the export sector that is the measure of almost every investment decision and of all economic policy. Indeed, when one examines the current Ten-Year Development Plan—involving, as it does, a capital expenditure of 70 billion francs (about £500 million) between 1959-69—the emphasis continues to be placed on the provision of a broader infra-structure of transport and communications for the more effective exploitation of the raw material resources of this colony. But this is not all. The Congo's export trade is directly and wholly in the hands of the Belgian monopolies. Thus the surpluses from the export trade accumulate not directly to the Congo, but to the metropolitan economy of Belgium. In so far as a part of this surplus tends to be reinvested in the Congo, the reinvestment develops precisely those resources which enter into the needs of the metropolitan economy, rather than the needs of the Congo as such. This then goes a long way towards establishing the permanent dependence of the Congo on exports and hence on the decisions of Belgian capital.

It is, of course, true that Belgian capital has also entered the manufacturing field in the Congo; and this, to a certain extent, has been prompted by the growth of the domestic market provided by the wage-earning African population. But here, too, the surpluses continue to accrue to the metropolitan economy, if only because the Belgian monopolies control most of the field of manufacturing production and distribution. Further, the type of manufacturing undertaken tends to complement rather than compete with imports from abroad; since the fundamental consequence of Belgian capital has been the develop-

ment of the Congo as an adjunct to the metropolitan economy of Belgium.

It is against this background that the colonial element in the Belgian economy needs to be seen. During the last war, when the Belgian Government retired to London, the Congo's exports, particularly metals to the United States, earned a considerable volume of foreign exchange which inevitably became available for the reconstruction of Belgium after the war. Since the end of the war, the Congo's export of raw materials has continued to earn a surplus of dollar and sterling exchange which, through a complex arrangement between the Congo's central bank and the National Bank of Belgium, is added to Belgium's exchange reserves. In the period between 1948 and 1956, the Congo's surplus on trade amounted to 64.4 billion francs (£460 million) with all countries. The trade with Belgium also reaped a surplus of 1.7 billion francs. It was the Congo's wealth that enabled Belgium to become a major creditor nation in Western Europe and to hold a particularly 'hard' currency.

As the data in the following table suggest, Belgium's most direct interest in the Congo for its balance of payments position is the income received on 'invisible' account, i.e. of profits received and income derived from the Belgian provision of transport, insurance and other facilities to the Congo.

*Net Receipts of Belgium in its Invisible  
Transactions with the Congo  
000's million B. Francs*

	1949-56
Transport and Insurance .. .. .	17.2
Profits and Dividends .. .. .	15.4
Foreign Travel .. .. .	2.9
Other .. .. .	8.9
Private Remittances of migrants ..	4.6
	49.0

The income on these 'invisible' transactions has grown rapidly—from 3.3 billion francs in 1939 to as much as 12.3 billion in 1956. Something like 35% of this income is represented by the actual transfer of profits from the Congo—though this transfer is by no means a measure of the total profits earned by Belgian investments in the area. The central bank of the Congo recently

estimated that for the period 1950-56, the gross profits of Belgian enterprises operating in the Congo amounted to 61.6 billion francs (about £450 million); of this about 14.1 billion francs were remitted abroad. In the same period the net Belgian export of capital amounted to about 10.1 billion francs. Thus the Congo's remittance of investment income to Belgium is running at a rate higher than net new Belgian capital inflows. In spite of this, the fact that about five-sixths of the profits earned are retained in the Congo for reinvestment makes the volume of the Belgian capital ownership grow at an extremely high pace. The substantial income on "transport and insurance" arises from the fact that the Belgian shipping and insurance companies virtually run a monopoly in the provision of these services in the Congo.

What stands as possibly the most important and significant feature of Belgium-Congo economic relations is that concerning the financing of Belgian investments in the Congo. The whole of the foreign exchange surplus of the Congo (with the exception of a small nominal gold reserve which is held in the Congo for what appears to be a 'backing' to the local currency issue) is transferred to Belgium, by a technical device whereby these exchange surpluses are sold to the Belgian central bank for Belgian Government bonds. Next, commercial banking in the Congo is wholly in the hands of the large Belgian finance houses and banks; here a proportion of the deposits in the Congo are held in Brussels (again in the form of Belgian bonds and other assets). Further, the monopolies operating in the Congo tend to hold a substantial proportion of their more liquid assets at their Brussels head-offices. Finally, the Congo administration, which appears to have a habit of running budgetary surpluses year in and year out, employs these surpluses for holding assets in Belgium. In fact, what this day-to-day transfer of funds amounts to is a real disinvestment in the Congo with the added quality that it is in the nature of forced 'loans' to Belgium.

Thus, in effect, the system of financial relations presently practised is such as to enable the Congo to finance a large part of Belgium's capital exports back to the Congo. Congo surpluses placed in the "equalization fund" and held in Brussels amounted to as much as 8.1 billion francs at the end of 1957. Yet the Congo authorities borrowed 9.4 billion francs in medium and long-term loans on the Brussels capital market between 1950-56. Belgium takes in order to lend.

*Capital Movements: 000's million B. Francs*

	<i>Total</i>			
	1949-56			
<i>Private Capital</i>				
Outflow from Belgium	..	..	19.0	
Inflow from Congo	..	..	<u>11.1</u>	7.9
<i>Public Capital</i>				
Outflow from Belgium	..	..	13.2	
Inflow from Congo	..	..	<u>10.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Net Capital Outflow from Belgium	..			10.6
Belgium receipt:				<u>15.4</u>
Profit income on investments in the Congo				<u>15.4</u>

The Congo Basin Treaties of 1885 and 1919 had specifically imposed upon Belgium the condition of the "open door" to all investors and traders. And in so far as legislation is concerned, the Belgian authorities have scrupulously accorded equality of treatment to all nations wishing to operate in the Congo. And yet, after some seventy years of Belgian administration, the preponderant share of the trade of the Congo remains in Belgian hands. More than that, the investment share of Belgium in this colony is almost complete. The British investment stake in the Congo amounts to no more than 1.7% of the total, while that of the U.S. is less than 0.5%. Indeed, the British Board of Trade noted in a recent official report, ". . . the tendency has been to regard the Congo as an exclusively Belgian investment preserve, with the result that it has never been easy for foreign business to establish itself."

This investment preserve has in the course of time provided Belgium with a source of income sufficiently large to constitute an important item in the metropolitan economy. More than that, the character of the massive investment made in the past and the system of financial and currency relations that have been established, clearly have had the effect of converting the Congo into an appendage of the Belgian economy with little or no opportunity for independent development. In the Congo itself the one significant social consequence has been the rapid entry of the indigenous population into the money economy. There has, however, been no movement towards the Africans' acquiring the status of capital owners; the highest point in the scale of African advancement has been that of skilled artisans. Is it to be wondered at that African impatience with such a system is growing so fast?

## MINORITY RIGHTS IN KENYA

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WITHIN the last nine months there has been a remarkable transformation—or, perhaps I should say, clarification—in the attitude of the Asian communities towards minority rights and safeguards. Clear evidence of their present attitude is the memorandum submitted by the Central Council of the Indian Associations in Uganda on behalf of the Indian community to the Committee of Constitutional Enquiry set up by the Uganda Government. It declares plainly: “We consider ourselves an integral part of the Uganda community. We therefore cannot justifiably ask for minority rights”. A step in the same direction was taken immediately after the General Election in Tanganyika last year, when the Elected Members declared their opposition to a racial allocation of three ministerial seats to Elected African Members and one each to Asian and European Members. They demanded instead that the five Ministries for Elected Members should be filled on the recommendation of the Elected Members without reference to race.

In Kenya similar rapid strides have been made in the thinking of the Asian community. The Constituency Elected Members Organisation, which had made such a promising start—containing as it did all the Elected African, Asian and Arab Members, with the addition of Mr. S. V. Cooke, the most senior of the European Elected Members—has branched off into the Kenya National Party and the Kenya Independence Movement, the latter recently having ceased to exist as a body by the refusal of the Government to grant it registration under the Societies’ Ordinance. The KNP contains eight out of the fourteen African Elected Members and all the Asian Elected Members, while the KIM was supported clearly by four African Elected Members. The remaining two African Elected Members signed the policy statements of both the KNP and the KIM and successfully joined both bodies.

In its constitutional proposals, the KNP does not go as far as the Uganda Indian Associations in wholly abandoning communal representation. Instead it recommends the retention up to 1968 of a limited number of Reserved Seats for each of the communities, African, European, Indian, Muslim, and Arab, to be elected on a common roll with a restricted franchise but low



qualifications. Thus even on the new restricted roll, it is expected that African voters will greatly outnumber voters of other races. In addition, it is proposed that there should be a large number of Open Elected Seats, to be filled by voters on a common roll with universal adult franchise, so that if the voting went heavily on racial lines all or almost all these seats would go to African candidates. Under the proposals of the KNP (to which all the Asian Elected Members are party), the few seats reserved for the minorities will quite plainly not operate as a safeguard; indeed, as minority rights, their actual voting value will be slight. The function of the Reserved Seats is thus essentially to give expression to the democratic principle that minority sections must have a voice in the Legislature. But there is nothing in these proposals of the KNP seeking to give the minorities a privileged position or to give them anything in the nature of control or unfairly large influence in the Legislature.

With the same principle of representation in view, and to prevent candidates elected for minority communities from being persons wholly unrepresentative of opinion and wholly lacking support in their own community, from being, as it were, mere stooges of the majority community, the KNP recommends that candidates for Reserved Seats who do not secure a prescribed proportion of the votes cast by voters of their own community should be disqualified, even if they secured an overall majority of the total votes cast. The prescribed proportion is to be kept low; so that while minority sections retain a measure of influence in the elections for these seats, separate electorates are not brought in by the back door. The minority communities are thus given representation, without much power or influence in the Legislature or the Executive.

It is plain from an examination of the attitude and policies of the Asian communities in the three mainland East African territories that they have abandoned the idea of racial or communal rights or safeguards and that they are fully prepared to accept a representation based on democratic principles. But as political parties, which are essential for the realisation of parliamentary democracy, have yet to become established, the Asians have realistically, at least in Kenya, proposed measures to ensure, during the transitional period that must intervene before the racial parties which now operate are replaced by effective political parties, that the constitution should provide for representation of minority communities, though nothing like control

or power over the Legislature.

The history of the European and Indian communities in Kenya accounts for the differences in their present attitudes to issues such as the question of minority rights and safeguards. The Indian community has in the past been the victim of serious discrimination in matters of land rights, the Civil Service, immigration practice, political and local government representation, and so forth. The struggle of the Indian community for equality of rights has been based on an appeal to democratic principles. When, therefore, Africans appeal to the same principles, the Indian is already attuned to respond; and, if the African appeal is genuinely based on and genuinely follows democratic principles, it meets with no substantial resistance or opposition from Indians. With the Europeans the position has been different. They have always been a privileged minority in Kenya, politically, economically and socially, and they are far from prepared to accept democratic claims or democratic practices which would mean the loss or diminution of racial privileges.

The attitude of Asian communities is based not merely on their inability to justify ethically safeguards and rights for themselves as racial or communal groups. From a practical point of view, they are satisfied that safeguards and rights for numerically very small minorities based on or related to membership of a racial or communal group are illusory, and that such differences or seeming privileges will in effect relegate their communities to permanent membership of permanent minorities. They know that they have never in the past enjoyed control or substantial power or influence and that they are not losing privileges or power possessed in the past. On the other hand, if genuine and effective political parties, in place of exclusively racial parties, can be built up, the bulk of whose members would, of course, be Africans, but of which Asians and Europeans would be members, Asians could well find themselves members of groups or parties which could command a majority in the Legislature and so form the government of the day. From within the party or group they could thus influence—though not, of course, control—policy; and they would thus not merely be better off than if they had the right to elect or be represented by a small minority of members of the Legislature or Executive, but would be promoting a much healthier and more lasting political system, based on the principles of parliamentary democracy.

Asians have in the past taken the view, and they are becoming increasingly satisfied, that safeguards and rights based on race have no lasting value unless they are founded on the goodwill of and full acceptance by the majority community. They are fully aware how in the Union of South Africa minority rights, small and almost negligible though they were, have been washed away; and of the strenuous efforts and unscrupulousness that characterised the destruction of relatively unimportant safeguards.

The real danger to minorities is the danger of demagogues or power-seeking politicians in the majority group attempting to buttress themselves by diverting attention from their own weaknesses to members of minority communities. That could easily lead to persecution or victimization of minorities. How is that danger to be effectively dealt with?

The only protection of any value against that danger is to entrench as strongly as possible fundamental rights in the Constitution. The protection must, however, be accorded to persons as individuals, not as members of a race or communal group. A Second Chamber can be useful in that direction, since the delaying and revising powers given to such a Chamber may bring about a cooling of passions and give to temporary majorities time for second thoughts. If the bulk of the majority section entertain permanent or enduring feelings of ill-will towards the minorities, even a Second Chamber could not afford lasting protection to members of minority sections. Special provisions ought also to be incorporated in the Constitution to ensure that alteration of fundamental civil rights can be made only by a special legislative process requiring a special majority and by compliance with special conditions designed to prevent easy or hasty alteration of vital minority safeguards.

It will, of course, be of the utmost importance not merely to entrench fundamental individual rights in the Constitution, but to ensure that they cannot be washed away by the lack of an adequate judiciary. Special provisions will, therefore, need to be incorporated in the Constitution to secure the appointment and maintenance of a competent, impartial and independent judiciary.

Safeguards and protection for fundamental rights are as important to individual members of majority communities as to members of minority communities. For the majority community is bound sooner or later to split into political parties (indeed the first steps in that direction have already taken place);

and there is no assurance that some day many members of the majority community in the majority party may not find themselves in a minority party, potential victims of political persecution. The majority community will itself contain minority sections, tribal differences will not die overnight, there will be larger and smaller tribes with politicians ready to exploit tribal differences, and minorities, like the poor, will always be with us. Every individual thus has a strong interest in the safeguarding of the rights of minorities against the abuse of power by a majority.

While preparation of the ground cannot be too early begun, the latest time for the entrenching of these safeguards against the oppression of minorities or individuals by a governing majority will be before independence is accorded to the country. After independence is attained, it will be too late to expect an immature majority to act in the highest traditions of a mature parliamentary democracy. But before independence, the country will be sufficiently disposed to accept such safeguards, for even in the majority community there will be substantial numbers who would then be members of a minority party and who would welcome and might soon need such protection. Even the majority party may then be not strongly opposed to such safeguards and rights, since it must face the possibility that it may find itself some day in a minority, unless, like the Nationalists in South Africa, it is placed in the position of being able to take steps, having once secured rule, to entrench itself permanently in power. The British Government which will have to make the final surrender of power will be in a position at that time to impose such conditions, for which it will have complete moral and political justification. To fail in this regard, and to surrender power without precautions against the destruction of parliamentary democracy and its early conversion into a petty autocracy, whether by an individual or a group, would be the greatest breach of duty that the British people could commit against every inhabitant of this country.

In the ultimate analysis, the problem of minority rights and safeguards resolves itself into the problem of safeguarding the rights of the individual. That is the final problem of a constitution, and that essentially is the problem of minorities, whether racial, religious or political.

## WEST AFRICAN UNITY

PHILIPPE DECRAENE

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MONROVIA, capital of the Republic of Liberia, served as the setting during July of last year for the first meeting of Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and William Tubman, the governmental heads of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia. The meeting was a sign of the great acceleration in the steady change of Africa; for, since the accession of the Gold Coast to independence in May 1957 under the name of Ghana, the historic evolution of the Continent has altered its rhythm. On the morrow of the Second World War, the only independent States in Africa were Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa. Today there are six more: Libya, the formerly Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana and Guinea. In 1960, Togoland, Cameroun, Sierra-Leone, the formerly Italian Somaliland, and Nigeria—the largest and most populous of the territories still under British rule—will achieve their independence. The Constitution of the 5th French Republic makes—in Article 86—provision for the right to independence.

Pan-Africanism is clearly on the march. The formation of



the French Community, the two Accra Conferences, the Leopoldville riots, the creation of the Mali Federation and the Ghana-Guinea Union are each a step on the road towards the materialisation of the Pan-African ideal. Whether or not it is likely to be consummated in our time, Pan-Africanism is nevertheless one of the most powerful forces at work in the second half of our century. And the meeting of the three African statesmen, unthinkable less than three years ago, proves clearly that African unity has become a positive reality. Yet the difficulties encountered at the meeting show too that, in spite of the will to transcend national barriers, there remain significant obstacles in the way of the ideal.

It was on September 23, 1958, that M. Sékou Touré and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah decided to unite Guinea and Ghana and in this way form the nucleus of a United States of Africa. Reciprocal technical and administrative aid was promised; and Ghana made £10,000,000 available to Guinea for essential development. Coming as it did at the time of discussions on the European Common Market and the Free Exchange Zone, the union was seen in France as a manipulation of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices; it is believed that no such union would have taken place had the tension then existing between Guinea and France not forced M. Touré to turn eastwards.

Be that as it may, the Ghana-Guinea Union exists so far only in theory. No legal document has as yet given it concrete form; and there exist many factors which may yet prevent the realisation of a real and complete fusion of the two States. The journey of Dr. Nkrumah to Guinea in May, 1959, has achieved no positive results beyond a communiqué inviting the leaders of other African States to join their efforts to those of Accra and Conakry. The very fact that Ghana and Guinea remain in their respective monetary zones must compromise the efficacy and efficiency of the Union. Perhaps the real explanation of the Union's inadequacy lies in the lack of understanding between French- and English-speaking Africans. The considerable differences between the British and French colonial systems seem to have resulted in the creation of two West Africas which remain fundamentally foreign to one another; though how fundamentally, history must decide.

Four months after the proclamation of the Ghana-Guinea Union, 44 representatives of Senegal, Dahomey, Sudan and Haute-Volta met at Dakar and decided—on 17th January, 1959

—to regroup these four republics into a Mali Federation. The presidency of the Federal Assembly was entrusted to M. Mobido Keita. The 62 articles of the constitution—voted unanimously and by acclamation—stipulated Dakar as the capital, French as the official language, and Dahomey, Senegal, the Sudanese and Voltaic Republics as the four member States. The Federal institutions were to be three in number: the Executive was placed in the hands of the Federal President, who chooses his Ministers, two from each member State. The legislative power was vested in a Federal Legislative Assembly, elected for five years and made up of 12 delegates from each of the member States nominated by their respective legislative assemblies. Any West African State was made able to join the Federation at any time, provided it was a republic and respected the separation of powers.

The Mali Federation, as it was then conceived, was an important African entity. But, both economically and demographically, the dominance of the Senegal-Sudan axis was crushing. Moreover, Dahomey and Haute-Volta were not only "poor" partners, but reluctant ones. For Haute-Volta is greatly dependent economically on the Ivory Coast, while Dahomey is traditionally more closely linked with Lagos or Niamey. This explains why ratification of the new constitution met with great difficulties at Ouagadougou and Porto-Novo. The referendum organized in March, 1959, in the Haute-Volta Republic was a defeat for the federalists; and the Dahomey leaders, since the decision of the French government to build a harbour at Cotonou, have grown more antagonistic to the Mali Federation. Both republics have passed from the camp of M. Senghor to that of M. Houphouët-Boigny; they are no longer looking towards Dakar, but towards the Ivory Coast.

After the conference at Dakar on March 25, 1959, at which the *Parti de la Fédération Africaine* was born, a new Mali Union was formed, uniting Senegal and Sudan into a Federal State within the French Community. The Presidency of the Government has been entrusted to M. Mobido Keita, and the Presidency of the Assembly to M. Léopold Sédar Senghor. By limiting, for the moment, its territorial ambitions to Senegal and Sudan, this new Mali Federation has gained both in economic balance and in cohesion; though differences of opinion exist between the various leaders of the P.F.A., Dakar being less intransigent in its attitude to France than Bamako.



Since the proclamation of the Mali Federation, a further territorial regrouping—that of Senegambia—has become likely. The 270,000 inhabitants of Gambia belong to the same ethnic grouping as the Senegalese, and historically the countries have close links. In December, 1958, M. Mamadou Dia, head of the Senegalese government, went to Bathurst to propose the creation of a customs union, the use of the Gambia river for the transit of Senegalese goods, technical and financial co-operation within the framework of a common organization, the fixing of the groundnut price for both countries, and cultural exchanges. It cannot be long before the British possession and the formerly French one are linked together.

In April, 1959, Paris learnt that the governments of the Ivory Coast and the Voltaic Republic had signed an agreement in reply to the new Mali Federation. Dominated by M. Houphouët-Boigny's allegiance to the French Community, the agreement was politically more flexible and much less basic. The harbour of Abidjan in the Ivory Coast became a common establishment, administered by a board on which both republics are represented. The Abidjan-Niger railway was to be used communally by both countries, and road transportation was to be co-ordinated. The communal exploitation of postal services was to be studied, and a complete customs union was instituted, with provision for an equitable distribution of the duties and taxes received. A *Conseil de l'Entente* was to regulate all affairs concerning both governments, and an inter-State Convention would create the "Fonds de Solidarité" provided for in the constitution of the Ivory Coast. Finally, a common Court of Appeal would sit in Abidjan until the Haute-Volta could acquire its own.

Although the Niamey-Abidjan economic axis seems less solid than the Ouagadougou-Abidjan one—mainly because it is longer—a formal agreement was signed soon afterwards by Niger, the Ivory Coast and the Haute-Volta. Dahomey in its turn, after the fall of the Apithy government, gave its consent; and the Sahel-Bénin Union or the United States of the *Conseil de l'Entente* was born.

Finally one must mention the *Etats Associés Africains* launched last February by President Tubman, a "friendly Convention" regulating navigation and commerce among African States already—or soon to be—-independent. Sufficiently flexible to allow each of the signatories to retain its national sovereignty and identity, the Convention rejects any idea of political uni-

fication and is regarded with grave doubts by the orthodox Pan-Africanists, who see in it an American manoeuvre to substitute for a United States of Africa a flexible association more acceptable to the European powers.

Yet, despite the enormous advances in Pan-Africanism in so short a time, serious obstacles remain in the path of the ideal. The newly independent African States are jealous of their hard-won national sovereignty and reluctant to surrender any part of it. It is for this reason that the leaders of Mauritania keep their distance from other black African States; and that Nigeria, soon to be independent, shows no signs of wanting to delegate some of its powers to Ghana in any immediate West African Federation.

Within the States themselves, unity must first be accomplished. Togo and Dahomey are sharply divided into a North and a South; and in Guinea, the Christianised Soussous of the coastal zone keep strictly apart from the Islamised peoples of Fouta-Djallon. In Ghana, the better-developed coastal strip lives in uneasy partnership with the neighbouring Ashantis and Togoland, and more uneasily still with the underdeveloped and politically retarded "Northern Territories". In Nigeria, the Hausas of the North, with their Moslem Emirs, fear the hegemony of the "Men of the South"; while the Baileke of Southern Cameroun revealed their particularism in the elections of January, 1958.

Much of the disunity results, of course, from the collision of entrenched chiefly privileges with the establishment of universal suffrage. Dr. Nkrumah's principal difficulties have been with the Chief of the Ashanti; in Haute-Volta, those elements most hostile to the Mali Federation are found mainly in the entourage of Moro-Naba, who reigns over 1,700,000 subjects living around Ouagadougou; while the Ivory Coast authorities face a demand by the king of Assinia, H.M. Amon Ndofo III, to rule independently over his tiny kingdom of 8,000 kms. and 45,000 subjects. The king and his councillors are now in Abidjan prison awaiting judgment on the charge of having "threatened the security of the State". In Guinea too, the very first move of M. Sékou Touré has been to suppress the chieftainships and strip all political power from the chiefs of Fouta-Djallon. M. Ahidjo, however, promulgating on January 1, 1959, the new Statute of Cameroun, inserted a clause entrenching the rights of the chiefs; and the Nigerian authorities have created a Chamber of Traditional Chiefs.

The clash of political personalities also plays a part. The division of French Africa into two political clans is something more than a quarrel between "federalists" and "anti-federalists"; it is the result of the rivalry between Dakar and Abidjan, or more exactly between M. Senghor and M. Houphouët-Boigny, for the political leadership of French West Africa. In British Africa, this struggle for leadership is focussed in the conflict between Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Azikiwe, and, within Nigeria itself, in the rivalry for leadership of the State by Mr. Azikiwe, Mr. Awolowo and the Sadurna of Sokoto. Those who would over-emphasize the significance of such collisions, however, must have been amazed by the visit of Dr. Nkrumah to Nigeria in February last year. Pan-Africanism is a living force throughout West Africa; though personal rivalry must tend to weaken it, and nobody can predict how the principal actors in any West African Confederation—Dr. Nkrumah, M. Touré, Mr. Tubman, Mr. Awolowo, M. Senghor, M. Dia, M. Houphouët-Boigny and M. Mobido Keita—will submit to making one of their number the star.

Linguistic obstacles cannot be ignored. Knowledge of both French and English is extremely rare in West Africa; and, for the immediate future, the unity of French- and English-speaking communities, as in the proposed merger of the British and French Camerouns, is likely to encounter severe practical difficulties in administration.

Economic obstacles are most significant; and a United States of Africa will doubtless create a number of problems of economic competition, both in the fields of production and investment. The difference in economic prosperity between Ghana and Guinea, for example, is likely to put Guinea under the economic tutelage of Accra. For Ghana is today the world's first producer of cocoa, the third of industrial diamonds, and the fifth of manganese. It has, moreover, a population twice that of Guinea's, a reserve fund of £200,000,000, important bauxite deposits and an export trade ten times that of its partner. In the field of African investments, difficult but inevitable choices will have to be made; and it will not be easy to decide which project should be given priority over another. In the field of the electro-metallurgy of aluminium alone, four projects are in competition: the 'Volta River Authority' in Ghana, the 'Konkouré' in Guinea, the 'Kouilou' in the French Congo, and the 'Inga' in the Belgian Congo.

The young African States, weighted down by heavy underdevelopment, are reluctant to add to their burdens. Some of them request financial aid from France while rather shamelessly refusing to link their fate with that of their less prosperous neighbours. The Ivory Coast, thanks to its coffee and tobacco exports, has an annual foreign currency surplus of 16 milliard francs; yet the middle classes, mainly African small-holders, who govern at Abidjan refuse to share these profits with the members of a federation the very functioning of which may yet strike them as too onerous. Neither Lagos nor Ibadan wishes a compromise of its existing prosperity by the integration of its local economy into a larger unit; and this doubtless accounts for the lukewarm attitude of Nigerians towards West African unity.

Over and above the purely African obstacles to be overcome, there is the influence of the great powers and more particularly that of France and Britain, each of which countries attempts, in its own interests, to regroup the African units around itself. Great Britain, faithful to its fifteen year old policy of 'leaving in order to stay', tries to establish African federations; while France, which has always rejected indirect rule and still possesses a vague nostalgia for assimilation, dreams of a federal republic 'from the Rhine to the Congo'.

The British colonial system has often—not unreasonably—been compared with that of Carthage, the French with that of Rome. The British always placed their commercial interests above any humanitarian responsibilities, discouraging the economic and social development of their colonized peoples where such was not to their clear economic benefit. If they practised indirect rule, it was mainly to avoid the high cost of administration and concentrate on high investment returns. Yet not only was the British government the first to grant independence to a colonial territory; but, having once agreed to independence for the Gold Coast, it released Dr. Nkrumah from jail to offer him the premiership. And by subordinating Nigerian independence to the retention of those federal links which Britain herself had created, it successfully prevented the balkanisation of the huge territory. By playing off local rivalries the British government could have split the country up into three or four separate and competing units; but by having full confidence in its African élite, it worked for its own interests leaving intact one of the greatest economic and political units of Africa and assuring Britain's own economic future. Recog

nizing the intensity and potential of Pan-Africanism, the British have joined—and so strengthened—the current. The policy is already paying dividends. Since Ghana achieved independence, its white population has doubled; and the Governor-General at Accra has more effective authority than the High Commissioner of the French Republic at Lomé, while at the same time being less severely criticised by the people he administers.

The legalistic turn of the French mind, accentuated by the brains' trust of lawyers who govern the 5th Republic in ignorance of African realities, has formulated the concept of the *Communauté*. Faithful to the assimilationist idea, France wants Paris—and not Dakar or Abidjan or Tananarive—to be the centre of the Community. To the Pan-African ideal she replies with the ideal of Eurafrika, a project which has already been strongly condemned by the majority of responsible African leaders. The greater degree of autonomy that the French government has recently given to the territories under its control, the existence of an important French-speaking élite, the increasing economic investment by France and the encouragement she is giving to social development—all this will greatly help the maintenance of the *Présence Française* in Africa. But one factor has roused suspicion against her—that France refused to give *de facto* independence to her former colonial possessions, forcing them to choose between independence and continued membership of the Community. The authors of the 5th Republic have chosen a federal system around France and look askance at any inter-African regrouping; in the minds of many of France's present leaders, the desire for unity in Africa masks territorial or personal ambitions at variance with the interests of France. It is this defensive reflex which explains, at least in part, why the appeal by Mali for an effective regrouping of French West Africa awakened no response in Paris.

It is easy to conclude from this that France favours the balkanisation of Africa, and Britain the unity. But the present French constitution permits any number of political arrangements, from the most rigid federal system to a loose confederacy. The inevitable head-on collision between M. Senghor and M. Houphouët-Boigny has not yet taken place; and there is no reason why French common-sense should not come to terms with Pan-Africanism, and the partisans of a French Commonwealth prevail over the defenders of a strict federal orthodoxy.

## TORIES AND THE COMMONWEALTH

LORD ALTRINCHAM

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It is wrong to think that the British Conservative Party has a peculiarly bad record in Imperial, or Commonwealth, affairs. The myth has gained currency for various reasons which I will examine later; but first I must state quite categorically that, while no British Party has any cause to be proud of its record, the Conservative Party has done no worse than its rivals. In some respects it has done better.

The Liberal Party in the 19th century believed in economic mastery, without obligation to the weak. The industrial middle class on which it was based wanted only cheap raw materials and easy markets. Disraeli's imagination, and Joseph Chamberlain's prophetic business sense, enabled the Conservative Party towards the end of the century to acquire an interest in the Empire. There were grave flaws in both Disraeli's and Chamberlain's type of imperialism, but they were at least preferable to the short-sighted cupidity of the Manchester School. Gladstone, it is true, had some inkling of what was later to become the Commonwealth idea, and he saw the moral and practical necessity for coming to terms with Irish nationalism; but even he was capable of sending an expeditionary force to crush a nationalist rising in Egypt. Moreover, Liberal policy towards South Africa, which, like the Labour Party's towards India, is often paraded in shining contrast to that of the Tories, does not appear to have been very virtuous on closer inspection. The Boer War was simply a fight for supremacy between two white tribes: the Tories (supported at the time by many Liberals) won a costly victory for the British tribe, but the Liberals, when they came to power, made a settlement which ensured the ultimate domination of the Boer. Campbell-Bannerman, not Milner, was responsible for the present tragic situation in the Union of South Africa.

The Liberals cannot claim to have championed the rights of the Africans and Asians: they exploited the so-called "Chinese slavery" issue for electoral purposes, but in the long run their dispensation was more injurious to the oppressed majority in South Africa than that of a Tory Government would have been.

After the first World War the Liberal Party was ousted by the Labour Party, which also depended upon sectional support in the United Kingdom. The captains of industry gave way to the

non-commissioned officers—the trade union bosses. What did this mean, in terms of British Imperial policy? As spokesmen for the underdog at home the Socialists also proclaimed their concern for the colonial underdog, but their words were not matched by deeds. The 1945 Labour Government “gave” independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, but it is clear from all the evidence that Britain *could* not have held the Indian sub-continent, even had the Government been willing to try. Attlee and his colleagues were making a virtue of necessity, and Attlee himself was going back on the principles which he had helped to lay down as a member of the Simon Commission. I am quite sure that he was right to do so, and that his earlier views were absurdly cautious and conservative. But I am equally sure that his mind was changed by the logic of events, rather than by any belief in independence for its own sake.

This is corroborated by Labour’s record in Africa. They had six years in which to bestow democratic rights and grant self-government to the African colonies. By 1951 only the most modest progress had been made, the position of the European settlers in Kenya was virtually unchanged, Seretse Khama had been exiled after contracting a mixed marriage, and Dr. Nkrumah had been incarcerated. The radicalism of the Labour Party was confined to winning a place in the sun for British trade unionists. It has been well said that a Labour man is a Conservative without money. The Labour rank-and-file is insular and mildly jingoistic, and the Labour leadership looks above all to the underdogs who have votes in a British General Election.

Economically, no British Party has shown anything like generosity towards the overseas territories. Every penny spent by the Labour Government outside Britain was more than covered by American loans and grants, so it would be strictly fair to say that between 1945 and 1951 the United States was financing the Commonwealth. Even now the Americans are doing far more than the UK to help the independent Commonwealth nations; but what the UK is doing is at least being paid for out of its own earnings and savings. The Colonial Welfare and Development scheme, initiated during the War by a Tory Colonial Secretary, Mr. Oliver Stanley, as a means of helping the dependent territories to acquire basic amenities and services, has so far involved less money all told than is spent *each year* in providing subsidies for British agriculture! The Labour Party announced in its Election manifesto that it would spend one



per cent. of the national income on underdeveloped countries: more than this is, in fact, already being spent by the Tory Government, but it is pitifully inadequate. I should like to see the figure raised to five per cent. or more, and there is reason to hope that Mr. Macmillan, fortified by his victory at the polls, will take more drastic steps to narrow the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" in the Commonwealth as a whole. He has recently been talking about the problem—notably in his television discussion with President Eisenhower last September—and I shall be surprised if he does not act accordingly over the next five years.

The Tory Party has two handicaps in regard to the Commonwealth—the legacy of what I will call romantic-strategic imperialism (of which Disraeli and Winston Churchill have been the arch-protagonists), and a tendency to support European minorities against indigenous majorities. The former has been no more than intermittent, and it must never be forgotten that Baldwin pushed through Indian reforms in the 1930's in the teeth of opposition from Churchill and a strong faction of the Tory Party. The vindication of Churchill's views on foreign policy, and the enormous prestige which he gained as Prime Minister during the War, had the unfortunate effect of reviving the influence of his Imperial daydreams, which would otherwise have died a natural death. Much that has happened since—more especially the Suez catastrophe and the futile struggle against Cypriot nationalism—may be attributed to a Churchillian mood in the Tory Party, though it must be said that Churchill himself had the genius and magnanimity to avoid, while he was in office, such errors as lesser men have committed in an attempt to resemble him.

The other Tory handicap stems from Joseph Chamberlain, and is a preoccupation with the economic aspects of imperialism, to the exclusion of political, and at times of moral, considerations. The latest example has been the imposing of Federation in Central Africa, combined with blatant favouritism for European settlers in the Rhodesias and in Kenya. Despite the lesson of the West Indies—that European economic interests can best be preserved by the timely concession of political rights to non-Europeans—the Tories have until now been trying to maintain European political control in East and Central Africa. I believe, however, that the Nyasaland Emergency and the Devlin Report have caused a profound reappraisal in Whitehall, superficial

appearances notwithstanding. The immediate official reaction to the Devlin Report (as to the historic Durham Report in the last century) was hostile; but the Devlin Report has, like the Durham Report, a compelling quality, which no Government can permanently resist.

Already the signs are hopeful. Mr. Iain Macleod has succeeded Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. Mr. Macleod is liberal-minded, ruthless and intensely ambitious. He must know that a last-ditch fight for the old structure of European privilege in Africa would be his own political undoing: he will therefore strike the best bargain he can with African nationalists, and disappoint the extreme Right of his own Party—as President de Gaulle has disappointed the Algerian *ultras*. Lord Monckton has accepted the chairmanship of the Central African Commission, preparatory to the constitutional review. As Minister of Labour after 1951, Monckton had the job of convincing the trade unions that a Tory Government was their friend, and he succeeded admirably—because he was always prepared to give way and compromise. A sharply intelligent man, he will not allow nostalgia for the past to cloud his judgment of contemporary realities. Macmillan himself is a composite character: he has suffered, in his time, from both the Churchillian and the Chamberlainite attitudes towards the Empire. He actively encouraged the assault on Egypt in 1956—but he was quick to withdraw from the imbroglio when he saw how disastrous it was, and he will probably soon be shaking hands with President Nasser. As Foreign Secretary he refused to discuss self-determination for Cyprus—but he has since agreed to it. No doubt he will soon be greeting Dr. Banda as he lately greeted Archbishop Makarios. He is a pragmatist with a reforming instinct, and he is not weighed down by scruple. As Chairman of the Conservative Party he has appointed Mr. R. A. Butler, who as Under-Secretary for India helped to pilot the Government of India Bill through the House of Commons despite all that Churchill could do, and who is generally felt to epitomize the Tory Left. By giving him control of the Party organization, Macmillan has shown that he intends to resist any Rightward move which might follow the electoral triumph of October 8th.

The 1955 Tory Government made mistakes and even, in my opinion, committed one or two crimes of an imperialist nature. But paradoxically Mr. Lennox-Boyd has been an outstanding Colonial Secretary. He is completely innocent of racial prejudice

and has mixed very freely with people in every part of the Commonwealth. He has also been responsible for major constitutional advances—the independence of Ghana and Malaya, the birth of the Caribbean Federation, the successful negotiation of terms for Nigerian independence, and much else. His only weakness has been in dealing with European settlers: he has neither communicated to them his own enlightened view of race relations, nor has he had the temerity to overrule them. But the value of his work will be recognized long after his mistakes have been forgiven and almost forgotten.

The Tory Party has the advantage of refusing to take the "Little England" view that its opponents have, in their different ways, been inclined to adopt. That refusal has, as I have tried to suggest, a dangerous and undesirable side: it can go with an imperialism which is either predatory or vainglorious. But the good side must not be overlooked. When all the cant and hypocrisy have been discounted, there remains a residue of philanthropy which, together with a traditional shrewdness and adaptability, may lead through crisis to co-operation. But the Party must shed its belief in the entrenchment of European political power; must take the risk (which Disraeli took in this country) of mass enfranchisement in advance of mass education; and must lose its paternalistic tone, which is irritating to those who are up-and-coming, both at home and abroad. Macmillan was much improved by his Commonwealth tour at the beginning of 1958, and he seems to have been further improved by the chastening experience of Central Africa. His authority is unchallenged, his team is united, and the country is so absorbed with its own affairs that it will pay little attention to what is done outside. One may therefore hope that the present Tory Government will gradually calm the understandable fears of liberal observers who were shocked by events during the last Parliament and have noticed only the defects of Tory thinking on the Commonwealth.

## AFRICA AND THE BRITISH ELECTORATE

JAMES CAMERON

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THROUGHOUT that lowering night of the General Election I was in the radio studio on a long circuit to North America, "interpreting", as the fulsome phrase goes, whatever trends appeared. The task, however dispiriting, was at least simple. As the hours dragged by, one felt rather like one of Napoleon's junior officers giving a running commentary on Waterloo.

At one point in the debacle the remark came from our side that the dissolution of the Labour Party's hopes "would be taken as a blow by great numbers of people in Africa". There was a 3,000-mile-off pause at the other end, and then the interlocutor said: "I don't get you. How does Africa come into your election set-up over there?"

How indeed, one might have replied. The next few days did not provide much of an answer. One of the extra pangs of that post-election hang-over was the broad satisfaction, even exultation, with which the result was hailed overseas by such as Sir Roy Welensky and Winston Field, who lost no time in making clear their relief at a narrow escape. To be sure, this came as no surprise to those who pay some heed to the African scene; and to those who do not, it passed unnoticed. The fact was, and is, that Africa as an election issue had wholly failed. Failed is perhaps not the right word. In the broad picture of the campaign, it never got off the ground at all.

There were some commentators, chiefly myself, who came in for some pained and occasionally angry reproof from the Labour side for criticising the campaign as trivial at the best, and sometimes even evasive. I said myself before the polls that for the great Parties of Britain to present the case for the future in terms of City share-pushing or the purchase tax on washing machines was to treat the electorate as a crowd of solely avaricious and self-interested introverts, a fantastic state of affairs in the world of today. The Tories set this rather contemptible pace with their slogan of "Prosperity", but Labour fell only too readily into line. The high commands of both sides actually appeared to take pains to avoid emphasis on the great contemporary international theme, of which Africa was an essential part—not

by any means the only one, but in some ways the biggest.

There were regional exceptions; some of the candidates chose on their own responsibility to point out that every elector was simultaneously giving a vote in trust for the voteless Africans who, in their anxieties, could look for help to nobody else. There were constituencies where the word "Hola" was something more than just an easy heckling-word to interject. But on the whole Labour failed to challenge the Conservatives on the issues where they were palpably vulnerable—Suez, Kenya, Central Africa—insisting instead on competing in fields where the Tories were pretty well impregnable: fiscal matters, domestic stability, and so on. In other words, the broad strategy of the campaign ignored or avoided most things that could be considered moral issues or questions of fundamental human principle. To the evergreen argument that "no election is ever won on an international or colonial issue" one can only say: of course not, since these issues are never properly presented.

It surprised some of us, for example, that a really vigorous effort was not concentrated with all the top-level Socialist resources on Mid-Bedfordshire, where Alan Lennox-Boyd was balanced on a majority of less than 4,000. To have defeated the Colonial Secretary in his own constituency would not only have compensated greatly for having let him get away with Cyprus and Kenya and Nyasaland in the House but would, one cannot help feeling, have been quite possible. Instead, he was permitted to boost his majority by more than 1,000. The fact that he has finally shifted his activities from the Colonies to the Breweries does not diminish the unhappy effect of this.

So Labour lost, crushingly. That it probably deserved to can be small consolation to those in Africa who had so eagerly hoped otherwise. The question must arise now: does Africa mean anything at all to the broad mass of the British electorate?

Of course it is an impossible question to answer objectively: I myself have been told over and again that I am the last person to try to do so; preoccupied as I am with overseas affairs and indeed earning my bread and butter from their consideration, I get furiously impatient with those who think wholly in terms of washing-machines. Obviously Africa means something to the British electorate; and increasingly so, as the problems of the continent intrude themselves more and more dramatically into the British conscience. Equally obviously it does not mean

anything like enough. Africa means something to the City, to several religious groups, notably the Church of Scotland, and to the public that goes to big-game movies. It means something to readers of the 'Observer', the 'News Chronicle', and the political weeklies. It is probably fair to say that it means a great deal more to them this year than it did last, and last year than it did the year before. It is still, in all conscience, little enough.

No individual can presume to assess a national attitude except in terms of his own limited experience of it; my own has to derive largely from reactions I find to my own work. African controversies produce reactions more deeply felt and emotional, and at the same time less widespread, than for any of the more familiar cold-war issues. Until the state of emergency in the Federation, no African situation had produced any reaction comparable to that over Cyprus, for example, which is reasonable enough since no comparable body of British troops was involved. In any case, the real answer to any sort of public engagement in a political problem is in its treatment by the Press, and it is part of the character of the British Press that it is almost impossible for any colonial issue to interest a Fleet Street news editor until it has begun to express itself in violence. This is, of course, a truism. A drop or two of blood shed here and there (however irrelevant to the main argument) is worth more column-inches to a colonial question than a year of patient politics; the implications of this are serious. There are probably a million Englishmen who think of the late Kenya troubles (when they ever do) as something grotesque and incomprehensible and orgiastic for every one who knows even superficially what the devil it was all about. While the Press carries a big load of responsibility for this semi-frivolous public attitude, it is not easy to know what to do about it. Even serious journalists, painstakingly well-informed on the African subjects, even the Basil Davidsons and Oliver Woods, know the difficulties of introducing analytical articles that cannot be "pegged", as they say, to the news that someone has got himself slashed with a panga somewhere.

Naturally this explains the curiously erratic and spasmodic pattern of African coverage in the British Press. It also explains the problem with which we are faced every time an endemic situation momentarily solves its frustrations by exploding, in trying to explain, every time anew, the basic facts behind this

particular melodrama. The resulting over-simplifications satisfy nobody, and frequently do as much harm as good.

This is perhaps not invariably true. Last year's violent affray in Nyasaland was in itself so shocking to ordinary British opinion—and its repercussions through the Devlin Commission and the subsequent public argument so prolonged—that time and opportunity were provided for a fairly thorough explanation of the whole impasse of the Federation. Probably ten times more ordinary British citizens are at least *aware* of a Central African problem now than ever were twelve months ago, albeit in a vague and baffled way. (It is for this reason that the Labour Party's inability to capitalise on this during the Election seems the more unfortunate.)

Similarly nothing for a long time managed to project South Africa into the British consciousness until the Cato Manor affair in Durban during the summer. It was not, I feel, a particularly significant incident, nor more explicitly symbolic of the situation than many others; nevertheless, the news broke accompanied by one particularly dramatic photograph which was front-paged by almost every English daily paper, and for a while imaginations were seized. There was a photograph of what were unmistakably women being bludgeoned by what were unmistakably policemen. It served to rouse people more immediately than any of us had been able to do for years with our endless written polemics about the Union, and for a while South Africa was worthy of heated discussion. For a while—until the next time.

The British attitude towards South Africa is extremely typical. Even the most cynical cannot deny that the British electorate is aware of South Africa, that the name suggests an emotion of bitter dislike, and that apart from a handful of professional apologists you will find no one prepared to defend the Nationalists. Popular newspapers no longer feel it necessary to define the word "apartheid" with an explanatory footnote (and if you don't think that this is an advance, you should have tried to write about the Union a couple of years ago). In general terms, South Africa lurks somewhere in the British subconscious as an evil, as the symbol and apotheosis of intolerance, as the inexplicable paradox of the Commonwealth theme. Here and there it occurs to some people to do something about it—I was myself surprised on my last return from the Union to find the Boycott idea already germinating in many unexpected quarters. It would be absurd to say that the Boycott has yet even begun to



impinge on the buying habits of anything but the tiniest minority—yet last week, when my wife was buying grapes in our little neighbouring Chelsea greengrocer and stipulated “Not South African, please”, the old lady in the shop said: “That’s funny, you’re the fourth person this week who’s said that”.

There is a long way to go. Not every territorial problem is as comprehensible as that of South Africa. The question of the Federation, while gradually rising to the surface, is still deeply confused. Sir Roy Welensky, on his frequent appearances in the United Kingdom, is a different political animal from the laird of Salisbury. Sir Roy giving avuncular tongue to his Press Conferences, Sir Roy making deprecating gestures on the television, gives the impression of making “partnership” a real word. To connoisseurs of the cosy approach, Sir Roy in England is by way of being a success. He has had his work cut out counteracting the more articulate follies of Lord Malvern, but by and large he has done it, on personality. After the Election he can now argue, I suppose, that his reward is at hand.

This is not intended to be a defeatist, or depressing, picture. Compared with the picture of public opinion a year or two ago it is, indeed, encouraging. Where the British public is informed on African issues, it is almost invariably on the right side. That it is not yet well enough informed is to a great degree our fault, whose job it is to enlighten; and to that extent an improvement is certain, since every year there are more of us qualified to do so.

There is no use in those of us who feel committed to the African cause disguising our discouragement and regret at the turn events have taken at the polls. Our work will be that much harder, and longer. I do not think it will be shirked.



# TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE XI: THE HARP OF THE NATION

Dr. A. C. JORDAN

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IN the first few years of its life, from 1871 to 1878, 'ISIGIDIMI' was highly respected and trusted by the literate section of the Africans. Politicians, ministers of religion and lovers of general cultural progress paid tribute to it in prose and poetry. But with the sharpening of the struggle between black and white in the bloodiest period of the Wars of Dispossession, the people become disillusioned; and, by 1884, hardly any of the leading writers has a good word to say for the journal.

One of the most outstanding figures of this period was a contributor from St. John's Mission, Umtata, who styled himself "UHadi Waseluhlangeni" (The Harp of the Nation). The author of the poem whose first two stanzas (in translation) concluded our previous instalment, "Hadi" was a highly respected writer of great intellectual integrity, widely read for that period in the literacy of the Southern Africans. It seems that no controversy could be brought to a close in 'ISIGIDIMI' until "Hadi" had made his contribution. If he did not write, either the other participants or interested readers suggested that it was about time that he did so. As a rule his contribution to any discussion was in the form of a prose essay, but he often concluded with a poem inspired by the subject under discussion.

When 'ISIGIDIMI' was adversely criticized by its readers, "Hadi" implored the editor to exercise patience. He commended 'ISIGIDIMI' for not losing heart in the face of such severe criticism, and likened the journal to a warrior at whom the enemy have hurled so many spears that his body becomes like that of a porcupine. Nevertheless, the warrior walks boldly on like an elephant:

*Press on to the heights of Ararat,  
Thy people borne bravely on thy back,  
Rescued from the torrent of ignorance.  
Be patient as a toiling mother  
Famished, but hoeing and weeding the corn,  
Her baby crying on her back,  
Her corn plants withering in the sun.*

It must be remembered that the wars of this period include the War of Nchayechibi, against the Xhosa (1877-8), the Zulu War (1879), and the Gun War, mainly against the Basuto (1880-1). In 'ISIGIDIMI', the whole struggle was made to appear to the Xhosa reader as a struggle between Heathendom, represented by "utshaba" (the enemy), and Christendom, represented by "our troops", "the troops of Victoria, Child of the Beautiful". Those Africans who were defending their land against the white invaders were cast as villains, and opposition to annexation and white domination was made to appear as hostility to "the progress of the Word". Any reverse suffered by the white troops was greatly deplored, while every one of their conquests was hailed as "the triumph of the Word".

There is evidence in the letters to the editor that for a time the readers were infected by this propaganda—propaganda that successfully neutralized the African Christian intellectuals during the fighting. Indeed, one writer urged that as soon as any territory was conquered, the pagan chieftain should immediately be replaced by a Christian preacher. "Why should territory that has been won for Christ continue to be ruled by a heathen?" Even when the people in general wanted to revolt against the Act of Disarmament, one writer, Daniso Bulube, maintained that the blacks should be forbidden firearms until they had read the Bible! The first indications that the people had lost confidence in 'ISIGIDIMI' appear in 1881, when a Kimberley writer who styles himself "Ndingummbi" (I-am-a-digger) asks indignantly: "Whose messenger is 'ISIGIDIMI'?" He is followed by several others, including one Ndzeku who condemns 'ISIGIDIMI' as "ipepa elifileyo" (a dead paper).

It was not until April 2, 1883, after the editor had tried to defend himself against these attacks, that "Hadi" wrote as follows: "I am discussing the hostility that exists between 'ISIGIDIMI' and its readers across the Kei. The reason would seem to be this, that the younger intellectuals say they can never make out the true nationality of 'ISIGIDIMI'. 'ISIGIDIMI' never takes up a clear stand on political matters. It sides with the whites, for whenever a writer voices the feelings of the blacks, 'ISIGIDIMI' immediately makes him understand that he belongs to the side of the enemy. For instance, a writer who tried to put in a word for Langalibalele (a Hlubi chief) was quickly immersed under the waters of silence: while another writer, who expressed the idea that Langalibalele was a mere goat

trying to fight against an elephant, was given praise and his words were echoed far and wide.

“In these days, when the nation is sickening to death, in these days of long-lasting wars and short-lived peace, it is demanded of you by the youth of your fatherland that you give them the length and breadth and depth of national news. Moreover, it is demanded of you that you make a clearing in your paper, a clearing that you have to keep clean for men of conflicting views, so that in this clearing they may discuss all the matters that so affect their welfare and the welfare of all the blacks. Only then shall we know what we are doing. As a result of this practice, there will emerge in this clearing national orators and bards, some praising our side, and others praising the other side. Why cannot a bard emerge for once from the people of Mokhachane (Basuto) and sing as follows:—

*Arise, ye sons of the Mountain-at-Night!  
The hyena howls, the white hyena,  
All ravenous for the bones of Moshoeshoe,  
Of Moshoeshoe who sleeps high up on the mountain.*

*Its belly hangs heavy and drags on the ground,  
All gorged with the bones of warrior-kings;  
Its mouth is red with the blood of Sandile.<sup>1</sup>*

*Awake, rock-rabbits of the Mountain-at-Night!  
She darts out her tongue to the very skies,  
That rabbit-snake with female breasts<sup>2</sup>  
Who suckled and fostered the trusting Fingos,  
Thereafter to eat them alive.”*

In our last instalment we mentioned the attitude of the African intellectuals to the quarrels amongst representatives of the various churches. The Africans would seem to have thought that it did not matter very much which church you joined, so long as you became a Christian. “Hadi” has a fairly long essay on this and kindred subjects.

“The study of theology can never make one Christian body of us blacks. There are books and books on theology, and in their nature they are very polemical, and theology itself is a sea whose waves keep things asunder. Although they all sleep in the one womb of the Bible, these books kick one another

<sup>1</sup>Xhosa chief.

<sup>2</sup>Queen Victoria.

like Jacob and Esau in their mother's womb. Luther and Zwingli are the founders of Protestantism. They are one in their attitude to sin and in regarding the scriptures as the only true beacon of Faith. But in their theology they differed so much that Luther accused Zwingli of being a pagan. . . . If our forebears differed so much over theology, how can we hope to be united? The Protestantism that rescued us with a firm hand from the ignorant worship of the Roman Catholic Church has not the strength to bind us together into a unity like that of the Father and the Son.

"The spirit of enquiry, which is our pride and the pride of these days, has torn the body of the church apart. Even the early leaders of the church, who met at large conferences and tried to put the body together, did not succeed. Instead of coming to some agreement, their views scattered in all directions like crackers on Guy Fawkes Day. . . . And yet the true children of God in the Presbyterian, in the Wesleyan and in the Anglican Church cry to one another wanting to worship together; but the heads of the church do not know where to find the needle and the thread that can sow together the shreds that they have created . . ."

"Hadi's" disillusionment with the churches appears in a poem he wrote for 'ISIGIDIMI' of February 1st, 1884, which begins:

*Some thoughts till now ne'er spoken  
Make shreds of my innermost being;  
And the cares and fortunes of my kin  
Still journey with me to the grave.*

*I turn my back on the many shams  
That I see from day to day;  
It seems we march to our very grave  
Encircled by a smiling Gospel.*

*For what is this Gospel?  
And what salvation?  
The shade of a fabulous hili<sup>3</sup>  
That we try to embrace in vain.*

In the same year, an article by "Hadi Waseluhlangeni" was rejected by the editor of 'ISIGIDIMI', for being "too hostile to British rule". The great paper was dying indeed.

<sup>3</sup>Another name for a *thikoloshe* (a spirit).

# THE POETRY OF MADAGASCAR

MIRIAM KOSHLAND

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MADAGASCAR'S comparative smallness in size contrasts with the mosaic of her many races. Because of the island's particular geographical situation between three worlds—Asia, Africa and Australia—it has become a turning point of monsoons and a meeting place of peoples. Of these, the Indo-Malayans predominate.

In the west of the island live the *Sakalava* ("those holding the length and width"), an isolated tribe living on the shores opposite Mozambique. On the eastern plains live the *Antonosy* ("those of the island"), the *Tsimihety* ("those who do not cut their hair") and the *Besimisiraka* ("those who are numerous and united").

The *Antaimorona* ("those of the water's border") occupy the south and show a preponderance of Arabic influence. It is through them that we know of the first Madagascan scripts, dating back to the ninth and tenth centuries B.C. Still further south live other tribes: the *Tanala*, the *Vezo* ("those of the forest"), and the *Mahafaly* ("those who render happy"), with songs and funeral monuments similar to relics of ancient India. Next to them live the *Rara*, whose features indicate Australo-Melanesian blood.

And in the heart of Madagascar live the *Hova-Ambaniandro*, ("People from under the Sun"). They are of Indo-Malayan origin and have preserved their ancient philosophy, rituals and system of caste, as well as their language. Madagascar's most important ruler was Andrianampoinimerina, a contemporary of Napoleon I. He restored the unity of the *Hova*, which had become decentralized after a period of many wars one century before his reign. He made Tananariva the capital of Imerina, extending the frontiers of this province; and in the process of conquering other tribes, living scattered around Imerina, he established the superiority of the *Hova* amongst the other groups of the island. He also divided Imerina into six administrative territories; at the same time organizing the population of Imerina into six classes, after the pattern of the earlier caste-system of the aristocratic *Hova*. It is due to this monarch that, despite the multitude of tribes, so great a unity of language, manners and institutions exists today in Madagascar. For with

the consolidation of tribes under his reign, the mixture of Africa, India and the Far East became a unified country. Under Andrianampoinimerina too, much of the traditional Madagascan folklore and poetry was collected, with its three surviving principal forms:

<i>Hain-Teny</i>	—	Poetry.
<i>Kabary</i>	—	Discourses.
<i>Ohabolana</i>	—	Philosophy.

The African poet Léopold Sedar-Senghor once said that it is difficult for someone not living in Madagascar, or “thinking as a Madagascan thinks”, to understand the full meaning of Hain-Teny poetry, which is completely different from Western or even African poetry. Indeed, the only comparison possible is perhaps with Japanese Haiki poetry.

Verse in Madagascar originated as dialogue, the invention of which demanded a great ability in the use of language. The Kabary (literally “discourses”) have been, quite falsely, called “Negro-Palavers” by Europeans; the origin of these “poems” did not lie in a social gathering, but rather in a means of communicating ideas in a particular way. The most important Kabary were royal proclamations and demands for marriage.

The Hain-Teny, in a sense the more “popular” poems, are poems of love expressed by images and comparisons rather than by direct statement. Unfortunately Hain-Teny have been translated as riddles, obscure poetry, erotic poetry (see sample 1), word-games and especially proverbs. By the examples given later, this translation will be seen to be inadequate. Proverbs are indeed used in the Hain-Teny language and are part of its charm, but there are no poems consisting of proverbs alone. In many of these poems rhythm and form *resemble* proverbs and have therefore become more ‘popular’. In the poems quoted below, we see the difference between “pure” Hain-Teny (sample 2), and the use of authentic proverbs where only the contents reveal a poetic aspect (sample 3). In many of the contemporary Hain-Teny, false proverbs sometimes serve as a bait (sample 4); in others they serve as key or conclusion (sample 5). “To speak or to think in Hain-Teny” is best made understood in sample 6. Sometimes, as in other languages, the music of words alone forms images (sample 7). For onomatopoeic reasons it is impossible to translate this poem into any other language: its last lines express an arrogance symbolized by locusts; their wing’s noise is evoked in the poem’s first lines.



Another important characteristic of the Hain-Teny, especially in the older poetry, is the particular insistence on a parallelism in symbols and comparisons (sample 8). Unscribed passages belong, of course, to the rich body of Madagascar's traditional poetry.

1. May I enter, Rosao-the-precious?  
—Come in, Radriamatoa,  
I will spread for you a clean mat.  
—I do not care for a clean mat,  
I want a corner of your loincloth.
  
2. I am astonished,  
the great sterile rock  
dares the diluvial rain  
and in the hearth crackle  
the bad grains of maize.  
Like the renowned smoker  
who sniffs the tobacco  
when he has no hemp to burn.  
Foot of hemp?  
—Germ in the Andringitra,  
is nothing but ashes here.  
Perfidious flattery  
stimulates love a little  
but the plate is double-edged,  
why change nature?  
If you are tired of me  
mirror yourself in the water of remorse,  
you will decipher there a word I left.  
(F. Ranaivo)
  
3. A little word, Mister,  
a little advice, Madame.  
I am not the one-who-comes-often  
like a spoon of meagre capacity,  
nor the one-who-talks-all-day-long  
like the rivulet across the rocks . . .  
I am not the one-who-dances-without-invitation,  
nor the bachelor-who-gives-advice-to-the-married  
since I am not like the blind who sees for others.  
You are hardly so foolish that one must lecture you  
you are of noble ancestry  
you are the voara in the bushy foliage

the water-lilies finery in the pool. . . .

(F. Ranaivo)

4. Half-sigh imaginary flower,  
The girl had come to meet me  
when it occurred to her parents to stop her.  
I addressed her with beautiful words  
but she did not answer me . . .  
You will get old here, you and remorse;  
We and love  
We shall go home.
5. I represent the eyes  
you the ears:  
you listen to me  
I look at you.  
I am the bird-trap  
you the piastre-pieces:  
if you abandon me, the weight can only loose;  
should I abandon you,  
you will rust.
6. This tree here, on the edge of a dream:  
its blue leaves are intertwined  
its black branches united  
its twisted roots invisible  
and its fruited flower the memory:  
I think of you, Madame,  
since the time we separated.  
(Rabéarivelo)
7. Akory Rabehaitraitra  
No miriintona tsy nisy ady?  
Sa taitry ny akanga marevaka  
Ka nandao ny akoho miara-nihafy?  
Mihetaketaka foana ny aketa  
Mibitabitaka foana ny ambolo — — —
8. Indigoplant flowering for the second time,  
Ambrevade flowering for the third:  
Gather what you have poured out  
Take back what you abandoned:  
Three times you have changed  
And three times you have hardly found better . . .  
(Rabéarivelo)

## *Here She Stands*

Here she stands  
her eyes reflecting crystals of sleep  
her eyelids heavy with timeless dreams  
her feet are rooted in the ocean  
and when she lifts her dripping hands  
they hold corals and shimmering salt.

She will pile them into little heaps  
close to the bay of mist  
and give them to nude sailors  
whose tongues were cut out,  
until the rains begin to fall.

Then one can no longer see her  
but only her windswept hair  
like a clump of unwinding seaweed  
and perhaps some grains of salt.

JEAN JOSEPH RABÉARIVELO.

*translated by Miriam Koshland*

## *Love Song*

Do not love me, my friend,  
like your shadow—  
shadows fade in the evening  
and I will hold you  
until the cock crows—  
Do not love me like pepper,  
it makes my belly too hot;  
I cannot eat pepper  
when I am hungry.  
Do not love me like a pillow—  
one would meet in sleep  
and not see each other during the day.  
Love me like a dream—  
for dreams are your life in the night  
and my hope in the day.

FLAVIEN RANAIVO

*translated by Miriam Koshland.*

## CAR-BOY

IVAN HATTINGH

LAST call, Richard's Bay.

One foot on the gearbox and one on the throttle (puffs of dust from the car ahead linger, and we thread them like a darting needle), through a cutting—whaaaa-wha-whaaaa—and we surge between the gum trees.

Gum trees in the wind sound like steam escaping . . . hissss . . . ssss.

Stones clatter against the mudguards hard . . . Ta-Ta-Ta.

Sometimes I'm not sure I've got control of the car.

The dust in front lies deep and ridged and furrowed. The country's dry.

Behind it rolls in the thunder, up and out.

Sharp turn . . . she slides sideways, but nothing comes on the empty road and we continue.

Jesus, she's done 98,000 miles. That's what one buys a Rolls for. 98,000 miles in a Plymouth and still she sways and surges forward when I kick.

Ernest's eyes are shut. His head nods.

I'm lonely.

. . . . .

Ernest and I have travelled in this car for two years now. We've sat together in the heat and watched the dust ooze slowly through the floor and float in the hot still air. We've shared the same small space for two years. The car has thundered forward and the speedometer needle has swung rhythmically and uniformly from side to side . . . 65 . . . 60 . . . 65 . . . 60.

"What are you thinking about, Ernest?"

"Soccer."

"Do you feel lonely, Ernest? . . . Do you ever feel lonely and sad?"

"Yes . . . sometimes I feel sad."

. . . . .

We surge on.

"Do you want to drive, Ernest?"

"Do you want me to drive?"

"For Christ's sake I didn't say that! . . . I asked if you wanted to drive . . . Don't you ever feel like anything but having women?"

"Yes, I will drive."

We change seats. I step out of the car, stretch, and walk to the other side. All is quiet after the thunder. A far-away bird calls.

He slides across the seat. The car shakes on the corrugations as we pick up speed.

"I'm sorry, Ernest. Would you like to go to the sea after we've been to the Trading Store?"

"Yes please. It's a long time since I was at the sea."

Yes please. It's a long time since *I* was at the sea.

I was there too . . . and the time before . . . and the time before that. Two years and it's still 'I'. Two years . . . We got rid of the 'Sir' first, and then we talked of politics . . . remember . . . and justice . . . and religion and reality and sport and sex. Two years and still when the car door opens it's 'I'.

Has our friendship to be held together by four closed doors?

Must we be isolated by our movement across the still country before we can talk?

. . . . .

At Richard's Bay the wind is cold.

"Would you like tea?" says the Storekeeper.

"Yes please."

The place smells dry of the country . . . and cosy. Greasy blankets, Pennant paraffin in drums, meal bags rolled down to the level of promise (others sagged like old skin, barren), fill the room.

"We need rain . . . Would your car-boy like tea?"

Lean through the window.

"Ernest, you like tea?"

"Yes please."

Sit down on the wooden bench.

"How's the road to Ntambanana?"

"Corrugated . . . we need rain."

"Looks like you'll get some . . . Two spoons please."

"Never, it's far too cold . . . Your car-boy take sugar?"

"Ernest," through window, "how much sugar?"

Clap . . . the door swings back and forward in the wind . . . clap, clap, clap . . . a white kitten with its fur in points appears . . . clap.

"Two if it's a cup . . . six if it's a jam tin."

"Cheeky bastard, but he's got a sense of humour."

The tea cup has minute cracks and the tea is hot. Blow and tip. Suck gently . . . blow . . . suck gently. Lower the cup.

“New bridge completed?”

“Yes, they’re on the one over the Mpilwane now.”

. . . . .

Then down to the sea.

Through the camp sites . . . up, round, down, left, up . . . pass a hundred cosy nooks for Summer’s canvas, numbered in bitumen paint on boards nailed to trees.

Two monkeys sit by the roadside.

“Monkeys.”

One’s tired from young, one’s with young. It’s late for them . . . or is it early?

Christ I’m lonely.

A Citroen stands by the sand dunes. Over the dunes the cold wind blows, and the black man runs into the sea with his trousers rolled. A wave breaks and he runs to where the sand is dry and rubs it on his legs.







## BOOK REVIEWS

**A Book of South African Verse**—Selected and Introduced by **Guy Butler**. Published by Oxford University Press, 1959. Price 21s. 6d.

AN anthologist of South African English verse must decide from the start whether he wants to illustrate the national pattern of literary versifying or whether he intends an anthology of poems that can be enjoyed. The late Mr. Francis Carey-Slater's anthology provided for the first need—if it is a need. What would do most good, in a country overrun with historical self-consciousness, would be an anthology concocted quite irresponsibly by a lover of poetry who cared not a rap for literary history, but merely put in a number of South African poems he had specially enjoyed.

Professor Guy Butler is both a poet and an academic, and his anthology, *'A Book of South African Verse'*, is an attempt at a compromise between the two approaches. The poets are reasonably well represented. Campbell, Plomer, Prince, Madge, Fuller, Clouts, Wright, and Butler himself are not all of them indubitably South African, but they have all written poems that are worth reading as poems. Taken together, their work occupies a good share of the anthology. But Professor Butler has not forgotten the academic's duty. He is not content with a ha'porth of bread to such an intolerable deal of sack, but sandwiches in a good deal of dry biscuit, some of it worm-eaten. Pringle's verse, for example, is of interest to the historian, to the sociologist, and perhaps even to the literary historian. But as poetry it is dismal stuff, still-born when it was written, and long-dead today. Professor Butler of course knows this perfectly well, but he has thought it his duty to the academic profession to preserve the mummified relics as exhibits in the museum of literary history. Much the same objection

might be made against the inclusion of verse which illustrates not even literary history, but only the author's private difficulties, or his 'sensitive' observation of unusual places.

But although historical piety and some uncritical charity towards the living have been allowed too large an influence, this is the best anthology of South African verse that has yet appeared. The genuine poets—Campbell, Plomer, Prince, Madge, Wright, Clouts, Fuller and Butler himself—have been allowed a good proportion of the available space, and the examples from their work have been on the whole well chosen. These provide a sufficient body of serious poetry to give ballast to the vessel, and enable it to carry a certain amount of tophamper without capsizing.

To be self-consciously anything but a poet is usually bad for a poet. Shelley as a republican and atheist, Tennyson as a Briton, Hugo as a Buonapartist, and Walt Whitman 'inciting the eagle of Liberty to soar', are all embarrassing to readers today. The plague of English South African poetry is a recurrent self-consciousness, an awkward worrying about ancestors, environment, and social problems. Roy Campbell was not immune from this worry, but he brazened it out with an assumed assurance and insolence, and finally escaped from the worry by becoming a resident of Spain. Plomer worried too, identified his fear, and packed up and left. Madge, Prince, and Wright have also left. The imaginative English-speaking South African, it seems, can be at home anywhere but in South Africa; for home is a place where you can forget yourself and cease to be self-conscious, and here everything conspires to make the English poet guiltily aware of himself and his history.

The poems by Clouts included in this anthology illustrate this well enough. There are one or two of his best lyrics—clear and hard as crystals, yet most tender in feeling. But together with a poem like "The Sleeper" we find two poems about Roy Kloof, who suffers from a split personality. His Christian name is English but his surname is Afrikaans. "Rock" and "shire" are divorced within him:

"Division incarnate! An unhappy role!

My country has given me a flint for a soul".

I am a great admirer of Clouts' poetry, and I am sorry to see that this awkward stuff has been given such prominence. South Africa has not given Sidney Clouts a rock for a soul, and the pretence that it has is really rather foolish. South Africa has

permitted him to grow up with a singularly keen eye and lively imagination, and no doubt it asks him to pay the price that all awareness demands. Something of that price is indicated in the poem entitled "Within", where the division between self and reality is finely explored. But it is a far cry from perception of this kind to the self-dramatising of "Roy Kloof".

In Wright's work, this sense of not belonging to any one place is managed less awkwardly, because it is suffused with a deliberately childlike nostalgia. We are not to take it too seriously, for the poet has come to terms with himself and his history. In Delius' poem "The Pilgrims", there is a healthy movement of mind in which irony works tonically against the worry about where one really "belongs":

"The passing of land-birds overhead  
I heard near dawn on every sea,  
the dogged sky reforms, and home  
myself shouts welcome from the quay".

The theme is continually recurrent, almost an obsession. Surely there never was a body of poets so preoccupied with arrivals and departures, home, the Pole Star and the Southern Cross, voyages of discovery, ruins, relics, and geographical landmarks. This preoccupation with the self and its place in the world is very different from creative introspection. "Look in thy heart and write!" said Sidney's Muse. "Look at thyself and write" is too often the rule followed by South African poets. Of course in some of them this bothering about themselves struggles towards sanity, yet it must be admitted that a few of the contemporary poets are represented in this anthology by poems in which they seem to hug their "problems" to their breasts.

This is by no means to assert that poets should not deal with the complexities and the pain of personal experience. Nor would I suggest that they should be indifferent to the "social problems" around them, or to the facts of history as they persist in the life of today. What I complain of is an exaggerated concern for oneself as a member of a particular group—as a Christian amongst heathens, a White man among Blacks or Coloureds, an Englishman among Afrikaners, a European in Africa, or a South African in Europe. Some such concern is perhaps right, and in any case unavoidable. We might even believe that Wordsworth's Highland Lass was suspected of singing of "old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago" because Wordsworth as a travelling *rooinek* felt guilty about

Culloden, as well he might. But he at least allowed for the possibility of

“ . . . some more humble lay  
Familiar matter of today,  
Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain,  
That has been, and may be again.”

But when Campbell sees a Zulu girl suckling a baby he can see nothing but a member of a “sweating gang” from whose breast the baby is imbibing the memory of defeat and the hope of revenge. The White South African is at the mercy of history, which at the same time is politics. And this as it seems to me is a familiar disease in South African English poetry. The poet is forever worrying about his place in space and time, in South Africa and in her history. It becomes difficult for him to see other people as persons, and to forget himself in that contemplation. Butler’s poem about the Cape Coloured Batman is a good example. The Batman is as sympathetically seen as are the rustics in Gray’s *Elegy*. But he is seen historically, ethnically, and sociologically. Compare Uys Krige’s recent Afrikaans poems about coloured people. They are people who happen to be coloured, not people who illustrate what it is to be Coloured. And Krige feels no sense of guilt or of unauthorised intrusion. He enters into their lives with gusto.

Campbell’s satire was an attempt to escape from this tendency to lose the particular in the general. It is a pity that not more of the “Veld Eclogue” is given in this anthology, for the tone of contempt with which Campbell treats the enslaving categories of South African thought is essentially healthy:

“Think not that I on racial questions touch,  
For one was Durban-born, the other Dutch.  
I draw no line between them; for the two  
Despise each other, and with reason too!”

But this reasonable contempt for the fuss about “racial origins” hardly extends, in Campbell, beyond the colour line.

Nobody could accuse the poets represented in this anthology of being thoughtless or irresponsible. They are perhaps too much weighed down by the sense of history, by a feeling of responsibility for others, and by the determination not to indulge in rhetoric. Even Delius’ satire is in its way careful and scientific. The trouble perhaps is that they know too much to indulge in facile indignation or simple feelings of any kind. But the poet must transcend the individual person and his guilt

and hesitation!

“When such as I cast out remorse  
So great a sweetness flows into the breast  
We must laugh and we must sing,  
We are blest by everything,  
Everything we look upon is blest.”

South African poets are disarmingly frank about themselves, and this is one of their virtues. But their view of themselves and of the world is dimmed and blurred by failure to transcend their individual selves and speak as poets liberated by their task. They could learn much from Yeats, of whom Mr. Eliot has written that “unlike many writers, he cared more for poetry than for his own reputation as a poet or his picture of himself as a poet”. It is the picture of themselves as poets, and as *South African* poets, that gets in the way of their writing better. In this anthology there is a good deal of personal frankness, but there is too little poetry that is simply forgetful of self.

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